

The 1992 PNG

Election

**Change and Continuity
in Electoral Politics**

Edited by Yaw Saffu

Political and Social Change Monograph 23

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**The 1992 Papua New Guinea Election:
Change and Continuity in Electoral
Politics**

Edited by Yaw Saffu

Department of Political and Social Change
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
Australian National University
Canberra 1996

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Preface and acknowledgements

This book continues a tradition that goes back to the first national election in Papua New Guinea in 1964. It is essentially a record of aspects of the 1992 Papua New Guinea national election. But there are backward glances to earlier elections in order to show trends in Papua New Guinea's electoral politics. A very brief summary of the political background to the 1992 election will be in order.

At the end of the 1987 national elections, the outgoing Prime Minister, Pias Wingti, re-emerged as Prime Minister, having obtained the support of 54 MPs, against 51 for Michael Somare, the leader of Pangu Pati. Wingti led a coalition of his People's Democratic Movement, Sir Julius Chan's People's Progress Party, Ted Diro's People's Action Party, two smaller parties and Independents, five of whom were given ministries, in a cabinet of 27. Ted Diro, who coveted the Deputy Prime Ministership, was the king-maker on this occasion. His party had managed to attract to its fold virtually all the Independent MPs from the Papuan region.

But two days after Diro had helped to put Wingti in power, news of a major corruption scandal involving him hit the headlines. As Forests Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister in the outgoing government, Diro allegedly misused his position for private accumulation. He was forced to resign from cabinet in November on account of damaging revelations and five counts of perjury at a Commission enquiring into the allegations. From then on, Diro's thwarted ambition became a source of great instability. Wingti's coalition fell in a parliamentary vote of no confidence in July 1988 when Diro switched his support to a Pangu-led coalition, and Rabbie Namaliu, Pangu Pati leader only since May, became Prime Minister by a vote of 58 to Wingti's 50.

Although he was still to clear his name, Diro became a minister, and then Deputy Prime Minister, in Namaliu's government until April 1991, when a Leadership Tribunal found him guilty on 81 counts of misconduct as a Leader. The other major parties in the Namaliu government, besides Namaliu's Pangu and Diro's People's Action Party, were the Melanesian Alliance, led by John Momis, the Regional Member for Bougainville, and the League for National Advancement, a group which broke away from Pangu in 1986 and was led in Parliament by Karl Stack. Namaliu's prime ministership

coincided with a very difficult period for PNG, economically, politically and socially.

Within six months of Namaliu's accession to the Prime Ministership, a violent agitation by a landowner group began on Bougainville. It developed into an armed secessionist rebellion which resulted not only in the closure of the Panguna copper mine, on which Papua New Guinea depended for 40 per cent of its annual foreign exchange earnings and 17 per cent of its internal revenue, and the loss of cocoa and copra exports from the province, but also in the prosecution of a costly counter-insurgency warfare. From 1990, under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank, the government began to impose austerity measures in order to balance its books.

On top of the extraordinary jolts to the economy and the authority of the state represented by the Bougainville rebellion, a veritable compensation mania broke out all over the country. Demands for very large sums, with threats and use of violence, were made by landowners on resource developers and the government, clearly a demonstration effect of the Panguna landowner rebellion. In 1992, the Bougainville crisis showed no sign of being resolved soon.

An endemic law and order problem also got much worse. Politically motivated criminal activities, such as breaking into the Ombudsman's Offices and razing the offices of the National Fraud Squad and the Police Anti Corruption Unit to the ground, featured strongly alongside the usual armed robbery, rape, break and enter and tribal fighting. In the Highlands, premiers publicly lamented the take-over of their provinces by criminals, and sought a declaration of a state of emergency.

Despite mounting evidence that the country faced serious difficulties on practically every front, members of parliament showed no inclination to curb their constant resort to the vote of no confidence which destabilised government but enabled MPs to advance themselves through the cabinet reshuffles which such motions and votes of no confidence usually induced. Rabbie Namaliu's government survived until the 1992 election, but at the cost of open payments to disgruntled MPs, truncated parliamentary sessions and long periods of non-convening of parliament.

Although the economy had managed to recover by the time of the 1992 elections, through fiscal discipline, the opening of new gold mines and the support of donor countries, the so-called 'Pacific paradox' (whereby a contraction of real economic activity

apparently coexists with healthy macroeconomic indicators) was evidently at work. There was no improvement in the unemployment problem, Papua New Guinea's number one social problem, along with its related law and order problem.


As with two earlier studies in which I participated, those on the 1982 and 1987 elections, the number of interested observers of Papua New Guinea affairs who stayed the course for this study is smaller than the number that started. It is to this group, those who delivered on their promise, the contributors, that my special thanks go. Without them, there would be no book.

Reuben Kaiulo, the Electoral Commissioner, and his staff were as friendly and as helpful as ever. My indebtedness to them goes back a long way. Several contributors make their own acknowledgment of the help they received from the Electoral Commissioner and his staff.

The following must be thanked individually for their much appreciated contributions towards the production of the book: at UPNG, Marlene Karu, Bonnie Tauvala, Francis Sakala, Vagi Raula, David Kleinsasser and Roselyn Bauwai; at ANU, Claire Smith, Bev Fraser, Ron May, Sinclair Dinnen, Bill Standish and Alison Ley.

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Yaw Saffu
Canberra
March 1996



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1

Continuity and Change in PNG Electoral Politics

Yaw Saffu

The importance of elections in the evolution of PNG's statehood needs little discussion. The first three national elections, in 1964, 1968 and 1972, were key elements in the decolonisation process. They were a significant part of the political learning process and of the largely unplanned transfer of decision-making power from Canberra to Port Moresby. These twin processes included political education programmes organised by the colonial administration (Reay 1964; Baker 1970; May 1976), the establishment of local government councils (Fenbury 1980), the evolution of the legislature and the cabinet system (Parker and Wolfers 1971; Wolfers 1976), the emergence of political parties towards the end of the 1960s (Wolfers 1970), and the making of the Independence Constitution (Constitutional Planning Committee 1974).

The post-independence elections of 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992 have performed the primary functions assigned to elections in liberal democracies, namely, recruiting political leaders and legitimizing their rule. The transition from traditional 'big-man' leadership to that of the youthful, Western-educated, politician has been effected through these elections. Free, over-subscribed, keenly-contested elections have underpinned PNG's brand of exuberant, vibrant and populist democracy. By one test of democracy, what might be termed 'the extent of uncertainty of electoral outcomes test' (Przeworski 1986; Seligson 1989), and by another test, Robert Dahl's test of 'public contestation and participation' (Dahl

* My thanks to Ron May, Sinclair Dinnen and Bill Standish for their helpful comments on the draft of this chapter.

1971, 1989), PNG must be counted as one of the most democratic states in the world.

Over the thirty-year period of these elections, PNG has undergone very rapid and enormous changes in practically every aspect of society (Strathern 1984, 1993). These changes have been reflected, to some degree, in electoral politics (Bettison *et al.* 1965; Epstein *et al.* 1971; Stone 1976; Hegarty 1983; King 1989; Oliver 1989). The dominant concerns of both politicians and the public (and of the colonial administration also in the earlier period) and, therefore, the themes that emerged most forcefully, varied over time. The study of the 1972 election, for instance, was subtitled *Prelude to Self-Government*. Self-government was the dominant theme, among the elite and the small attentive public at least. Lack of understanding and fear of what self-government would entail were widespread, with deliberate disinformation on the issue by a self-interested expatriate planter class.

In those early years, threats of disruption to elections did not emanate from the Highlands, which is where election-related violence is most commonly expected nowadays (Dinnen; Ketan this volume). Then, it was areas such as East Sepik, the Gazelle peninsula in East New Britain and the coastal areas of Papua, such as Rigo and Abau, which presented threats of boycott, on account of cargo cultist activities or militant micro-nationalist agitations. These caused such official anguish that they prompted the Electoral Commissioner, supported by the leading national politician, Michael Somare, to advocate compulsory voting (Stone 1976:62-67).

The large amount of space devoted to cargo cultism in the earlier studies reflected the considerable lack of sophistication on the part of very large sections of the population, as they struggled to make sense of colonialism and all its manifestations, particularly the enormous gap in affluence and technology between themselves and the white colonisers (Harding and Lawrence 1971; Stone 1976:67-167). The enormous influence of individual expatriates in electoral affairs, as indeed in district and regional affairs in general, another reflection of the times, progressively declined with every election. The basis of electoral choice (whose discovery is, ultimately, the objective of all electoral studies) was also affected by the factors in social change, even if to a lesser extent than it might have been expected.

After reviewing the first four elections, David Hegarty (1983) concluded that the 1977 election had been characterised as much by continuity as by change. On the side of continuity, he referred to the continuing weakness of parties in electoral politics, 'clan' mobilisation by candidates as primary strategy, and voters' pragmatic and essentially materialistic expectations. On the side of change, he pointed to the disappearance of secessionist agitations and platforms, the Papua Besena and the Napidakoe Navitu movements having become spent forces by then. However, if a distinction is made between the context of elections and the behaviour of actors and participants, as this chapter seeks to do, it can be argued that, despite an undoubted rapid social change over the period, continuity in electoral behaviour, rather than change, has been the more striking feature.

Continuity and change in context and behaviour

Continuity and change are two sides of the same historical coin (Barker 1949). The ability to speak intelligibly of trends is the clearest acknowledgement of this. Trends connote change, but within a recognisable framework of continuity. Thus, continuity and change are not mutually exclusive. They co-exist and are relative. Indeed, students of Revolution are constantly aware of the persistence of tradition in the face of revolutionary change (Dunn 1989; Calvert 1970).

Observable changes in PNG electoral politics in the period have stemmed mainly from changes in the contexts in which the successive elections have been held, rather than from changes in the basis of electoral choice. For instance, the arrival of political parties on the scene (effectively, only after the second election), and the transfer of sovereign state power to Papua New Guineans, with the coming of independence, were both very significant changes in the context. The electoral system has been changed once (after the third election) and there have been electoral boundary changes (although not since 1977, in spite of two national censuses in 1980 and 1990 which show a need for such changes). There have been amendments to the Organic Law on National Elections (as Reilly's chapter, this volume, discusses).

In the sense of context, electoral politics have come a long way, along with expanding participation in, and increasing control of, the economy by Papua New Guineans, and with increasing education and the spread of worldly sophistication. Thus, some expatriate

campaign gimmicks during the earlier elections, seeking to win votes simply on the basis of the technological wonders of the polaroid camera, for instance, would now be laughed out of court. However, while the socio-economic, legal and institutional environments and the political atmosphere surrounding elections have changed enormously, the determinants of electoral choice (or electoral behaviour), by comparison, have hardly changed over the period.

The 'parochial handout mentality model' (Filer this volume), or the 'parochial good works' model (Parker 1971), still reigns supreme, in 1992 as in 1964 and 1968. Filer observes: 'Communities vote for the candidate who offers the greatest material reward and candidates normally offer the greatest reward to their own community'. Studies in this volume confirm that questions of local conflict and local development, the personality, status and wealth of the individual candidate, and his or her ascribed relationship with the relevant ethnic/language groups in the electorate, which the earlier published studies identified, continue to be primary considerations in electoral choice.

However, 'primary' is not the same as 'exclusive'. To attempt to substitute 'exclusive' for 'primary', and ignore completely the influence of secondary association factors (such as church affiliation and political party affiliation) and other specific situational factors (such as current local conflicts and issues and the skill and energy which candidates put into their campaigning) in *all* electorates, would be to allow the imperatives of parsimony and elegance of 'theory' to get in the way of comprehensiveness and validity of explanation. If the unvarnished, unadorned ethnic/clan vote explanation of electoral outcomes works well at all on its own, without the need to consider other factors, this would be so only in some Highlands electorates where clans can be relatively large (say 1500 members) and candidates are many (over thirty is normal). An appropriate weight also has to be given, these days, to the serious inroads which the ever-expanding and evidently all-embracing commoditisation process has made into electoral politics (Ketan 1995; Yasi this volume).

From a political development perspective (Huntington and Dominguez 1975; Weiner and Huntington 1987), electoral politics in PNG have either remained essentially unchanged, stuck in the moulds in which they emerged in the first national election in 1964, or they have 'decayed', as exemplified by an increasing election violence and an open sale of blocs of votes by 'vote contractors',

particularly in the Highlands (according to students in my second year PNG Politics class in 1992; Ketan 1995; *The National* 31/1/95:15 'Lessons from the WHP polls'). PNG's commendable persistence with free, competitive elections as the primary mode of addressing the political succession problem is, of course, in itself, a major contribution to the process of political development, to the extent that a tradition of governance which incorporates regular renewals of mandate of rulers in this manner is regarded as a key element in political development.

However, political development also involves processes of increasing governmental capabilities, of penetrating and regulating society, of extracting necessary resources and compliance, and using these to meet aspirations of citizens for peace, security, health, education, material improvements, and so on (Almond and Powell 1966; Migdal 1988). The nature of PNG electoral politics, as analysed in the studies assembled here, and in those of the earlier volumes, and the fragile coalition governments and free-wheeling parliamentary politics they give rise to, have tended to undermine political development, understood as increasing the effectiveness of state institutions (Saffu 1988a, 1988b).

Similarly, an increasing shift of attachment of citizens away from sub-national or sub-territorial, kinship-related, primordial and ascriptive symbols to more national or territorial, more secular, secondary organisation-based, achievement-oriented symbols and criteria is widely accepted as an important variable in political development. But, after thirty years, PNG elections continue to be essentially separate electorate-based contests. The politics of choosing representatives and political leaders continue to be very much grounded in local issues and in intricate relationships among local groups. Thus the 'national' in national elections remains something of a misnomer, despite the obvious national attributes of the exercise: the role of the national Electoral Commission and members of the national public service who officiate; the national police and defence force who provide much needed security; the role of the media; political parties which sponsor candidates across the country and national leaders who criss-cross the country to campaign for their party's nominees.

Despite the existence of these political parties, no linkages can as yet be found between parties, voting and governance, particularly with respect to policy outcomes. Fluidity, formlessness and an apparent lack of an effective, integrative centre thus characterise

PNG's parliamentary system. Holding governments accountable in these circumstances becomes virtually impossible. The electors' insistence on, and exercise of, their powers and rights of accountability miss the target, namely, the government. Instead, the result is a massive sixty per cent re-election failure rate of MPs in 1992, ten per cent more than the preceding average, with all that such high failure rates entail for non-accumulation and non-consolidation of experience in governing, and for the likelihood of extreme self-regarding behaviour on the part of insecure, essentially one-term MPs.

So far, since independence, more PNG governments have been changed through parliamentary votes of no confidence than through elections. Governments have changed through elections twice, in 1982 and 1992, and through votes of no confidence four times, in 1980, 1985, 1988 and 1994. This reflects the failure of elections to induce the growth of cohesive parties that significantly influence (not to say dominate) electoral politics. (But it is also a reflection, admittedly, of the absence in PNG of the usual Westminster, prime ministerial constitutional weapon of dissolution of a recalcitrant parliament). Party organisation continues to be weak. Party identification is not an important basis of electoral choice. A 1987 survey of electors established that the party principle does not feature prominently in the decision calculus of electors (Saffu 1989). The low premium which electors place on parties explains the large number of candidates who stand as Independents, and win (see Tables 1.9 and 1.10 below).

In the absence of the party factor, there is an overwhelming concentration on candidate evaluation, which is based primarily on candidates' personal attributes, particularly their kinship and ethnic affiliations. These affiliations are assumed to define automatically the candidates' positions on local conflicts. It is on the basis of local issues and considerations, generally, not on national issues (these are not usually canvassed by candidates) that representatives are chosen during elections. Summing up the 1968 election, R.S. Parker (1971) observed that there was widespread rejection of those candidates who raised issues broader than the material needs of their localities. On the whole, candidates still do not raise broad issues. But parties do issue manifestos which purport to raise issues and offer party policies. Party leaders also usually raise broad, national issues, and the national media do publicise them. However, the consensus among observers, as reported in the

published studies, is that local issues overwhelmingly predominate at the electorate level where the electoral choice is made. Thus the electoral process in PNG does not do very much, directly, for national integration, even if it does not, unlike in many African countries, actually help to undermine national integration (Zolberg 1968; Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988).

An increasing participation by citizens in the election of their rulers (which should enhance accountability and responsiveness on the part of the rulers), and in the determination of the basic agenda and outcomes of public policy, would be accepted generally as a significant element in the concept of political development. In that regard, voter turnout rates in PNG have been consistently high: 72.3 per cent in 1964; 63 per cent in 1968; 60 per cent in 1972; 68.9 per cent in 1977; 66.3 per cent in 1982; 72.9 per cent in 1987 (PNG Electoral Commission 1987:5) and 81.2 per cent in 1992. Although the pre-1992 turnout figures need to be discounted somewhat, because of the operation of section 141 of the Organic Law on National Elections (explained below), turnout rates have remained high since the first elections, when some commentators sought to explain them in terms of slavish obedience of simple villagers to *kiaps'* orders (Hughes and van der Veer 1965:400-402). The predominantly parochial basis of electoral politics in PNG, however, undermines the effect, particularly the developmental import, of popular participation, as the papers by Ben Reilly and Joe Ketan (this volume), in very different ways, argue.

The large numbers of candidates in PNG elections account for a great deal of the healthy looking turnout rates, because kinsmen have an incentive and an obligation to go out and vote. But if the large numbers of candidates boost popular participation, they are also responsible for the diminishing proportion of the votes obtained by winning candidates, as Table 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 below would show.

Table 1.1: Average Number of Candidates Per Electorate

Year	No. of	%	Av. No. of	Av. Increase	%
		Increase	Candidates	in Candidates	Increase
			Per Electorate	Per Electorate	
1964	298	--	5.5	--	--
1968	484	62.4	5.8	0.3	5.4
1972	611	26.2	6.1	0.3	5.2
1977	879	43.9	8.1	2.0	32.8
1982	1125	28.0	10.3	2.2	27.2
1987	1513	34.5	13.9	3.6	34.9
1992	1655	9.4	15.2	1.3	9.4

Note:

- (i) The number of electorates was 54 in 1964, 84 in 1968 and 100 in 1972. It has remained 109 since 1977.
- (ii) The optional preferential electoral system operated until the 1972 election. The current first past the post system began in 1977. Some commentators have posited a relationship between the explosion in the number of candidates and the introduction of that system (e.g. Reilly this volume). But it must also be remembered that the election of 1977 was the first after Independence.

Table 1.2: Per cent Votes Obtained By Winning Candidates

Year	Under 10%	10-19%	20-29%	30-39%	40-49%	50% +
1977	--	11	37	26	16	19
1982	4	20	33	20	14	18
1987	2	39	41	13	4	7
1992	9	45	33	14	3	5

Table 1.3: Per cent Votes Obtained By Winners in 1992 By Region

Region	Under 10%	10-19%	20-29%	30-39%	40-49%	50% +
Islands	—	2	5	4	2	4
Papua	1	10	8	—	1	—
Mamose	1	13	9	5	—	1
NCD	1	3	—	—	—	—
Highlands	6	17	11	5	—	—
Total	9(8.2%)	45(41.3%)	33(30.3%)	14(12.8%)	3(2.8%)	5(4.6%)
Cum.Tot.	9(8.2)	54(49.5)	87(79.8)	101(92.6)	104(95.4)	109

Note: Papua in these tables excludes Southern Highlands Province which is included in the Highlands

Aspects of the results of the election will be examined later. Here, I want to use the distribution of votes obtained by winning candidates in 1992 to point out a persistent and pervasive feature of PNG electoral politics, namely, the contrast between the Islands region and the Highlands region. For instance, whereas the only two-person contest in the whole election occurred in Namatanai, in the Islands region, the record for the highest number of candidates standing in an electorate was, once again, set in the Highlands region, 48 in Sinasina Yonggomugl (up from 29 in Kundiawa in 1982, and 45 in Kerowagi in 1987, all in Chimbu province).

From the point of view of political development, Table 1.3 presents a discouraging picture. In terms of the number of candidates and the percentage of votes obtained by winning candidates, the situation in the National Capital District (NCD), the most modernised area of the country, is more akin to the Highlands situation than it is to that of the more politically advanced Islands. The percentages of winning votes in the four NCD seats were 9.6, 12.9, 14.5 and 16.1. The cause of the low winning percentages was the same as in the Highlands, the large number of candidates: 41, 26, 27 and 18 respectively. Further aspects of the 1992 results will be examined later. Meanwhile, we shall seek further perspectives on change and continuity in PNG electoral politics through a brief summary of findings of a survey of candidates in the 1992 election.

A profile of PNG's emergent political elite

Among the many engrossing sets of data which the PNG Electoral Commission (PNGEC) routinely, and helpfully, makes available to academics and other commentators after each quinquennial national election are the bio-data of candidates. Information is provided on gender, age, education, current occupation and, where available or applicable, a brief history of previous employment. Successive studies of PNG elections have used these data to chart the changing profile of PNG's emergent political elite since the first election: the progressive reduction (until recently) in the average age of its members; their increasing educational levels and corresponding improvements in their occupation and experience in the environment of modern organisations; the extent of the turnover of its parliamentary wing; and (since 1987) their party affiliation at the time of the election.

The profiles drawn from such data have generally been incorporated into constituency and general overview studies on the elections. But Turner (1989) used the PNGEC data to compare the subset of successful candidates in the 1987 election with the larger set of all the candidates to see if there were significant differences between the two groups of successful and unsuccessful candidates on gender, age and educational levels. He found that regional differences appeared more marked on the age and education dimensions than differences between winning and losing candidates.¹

While the bio-data of candidates compiled by the PNGEC yields a great deal of information about the emergent PNG political elite, to draw a more rounded portrait of this elite, much more information than is obtained and offered by the PNGEC is required. For instance, what factors primarily motivate the PNG political elite? What are its opinions, attitudes and knowledge regarding political, social and economic issues? Indeed, what is its perception of politics in general, and of the PNG political culture in particular? How does it perceive the electors and what beliefs does it hold on how to campaign and win elections in PNG? What conception of representation does it hold? Partly to provide data on these additional dimensions of the PNG political elite, and partly to

¹ Incidentally, in a survey of electors in that election, region of residence turned out to be the most significant explanation of electoral behaviour in PNG (Saffu 1989).

obtain data to check the findings of a survey of electors undertaken during the 1987 election on the determinants of electoral choice in PNG (Saffu 1989), and thus to provide another perspective on electoral behaviour in PNG, a survey of candidates in the 1992 national election was undertaken.

The survey

In May, just over seven hundred questionnaires were sent to candidates who had provided postal addresses to the PNGEC, and senior undergraduate students taking a Methods course with the author tracked down about a half of the candidates in the National Capital District (NCD). In June, Dr Bill Standish distributed one hundred questionnaires in Chimbu province. 252 completed questionnaires, representing about a third of the total sent out, but a mere fifteen per cent of the entire population of candidates, were returned. The sample was, essentially, self-selected. However, because of the PNGEC data, it was possible to compare some sample statistics with their corresponding population parameters, and to determine the extent to which this essentially self-selected sample was representative. For instance, Table 1.4 compares the sample and population on gender, while Table 1.5 compares the age distribution of the sample with that of the population.

Table 1.4: Comparison Between Sample and Population on Gender

	Total	Male	Female
Sample	252	249(98.8%)	3(1.2%)
All Candidates	1655	1639(99%)	16(1%)

Table 1.5: Age Distribution of Candidates

	Under 30	30-39	40-49	Over 50	Unknown
Sample	13(5.2%)	133(52.8)	74(29.5)	24(9.6)	8(3.5)
All Candidates	89(5.4%)	905(54.7)	495(29.9)	128(7.7)	36(2.5)

Table 1.6 compares the educational levels of the sample members and those of all candidates.

Table 1.6: Distribution of Educational Levels of Candidates

	Below Gr.6	Gr.6+Tr/ Gr.7-10	Gr.10+Tr/ Gr.11-12	Gr.12+Tr/ Tertiary	Post- Tertiary	Unknown
Sample	23(9)	38(15)	84(33)	53(21)	42(17)	17(5)
All Cs.	189(11)	735(44)	368(22)	285(17)	20(1)	58(4)

Finally, Table 1.7 compares the regional distribution of the candidates in the sample and in the population of candidates.

Table 1.7: Candidates by Region

	Islands	Papua	Mamose	NCD	Highlands
Sample	19(7%)	33(13%)	48(19%)	72(28%)	80(32%)
All Cands.	100(6%)	296(17%)	404(24%)	112(7%)	743(45%)

While the sample statistics and the population parameters can hardly be distinguished on gender and age, the better educated candidates are over-represented in the sample, as is to be expected

in a survey which relies predominantly on a mailed questionnaire. Whereas only a quarter of the sample had not gone beyond Grade 10 or its equivalent (i.e. Grade six plus some job training), among all the candidates the proportion was 55 per cent. At the top end of the education variable, whereas 16.7 per cent of the sample had obtained post-tertiary education, in the wider set of all the candidates only 1.2 per cent had had such education. In this respect then, characteristics drawn from the sample, as we shall seek to do here, can be regarded as perhaps tending to emphasise features at the advanced end of the spectrum of the emergent elite, a point which the relative over-representation of NCD candidates and the relative under-representation of Highlands candidates probably reinforce. However, on the showing of these comparisons, it can be claimed that the sample is representative enough to base generalisations about the emergent PNG political elite on it.

Without entering into any debate about what the term 'political elite' means (Lasswell *et al.* 1954; Meisel 1958; Macrae 1984), the term is used here very loosely to refer to all those who are, have been, or clearly aspire to be, through elections, in positions to make political decisions through the structures of the modern state for, and on behalf of, their fellow compatriots. It certainly is not meant to connote, much less to denote, the existence of a self-conscious minority which is characterised by what Meisel has formulated as 'consciousness, coherence and conspiracy', in relation to the wider society (Meisel 1958: 4). A less fertile ground than traditional PNG for that kind of elite is difficult to imagine. PNG societies generally lacked the sort of hierarchical structures and their supporting ideologies and legitimating principles which are synonymous with domination by enduring, self-perpetuating minorities (May 1984). Modern, introduced hierarchies and inequalities are still too recent to have produced consolidated elites characterised by Meisel's three 'Cs'.

Some demographic characteristics

The gender composition of the emergent political elite reflects the unequivocally patriarchal, male-dominated society that PNG is (see Sepoe this volume). The proportion of women candidates has remained minuscule, at around one per cent in each of the four elections since independence. Female MPs have become more than a rarity and an endangered species; they have actually disappeared

altogether. From three in the 109-member chamber in 1977 to one in 1982, there has been no successful female candidate since 1982.

As Table 1.5 indicates, the PNG political elite is predominantly young. Sixty one per cent of all candidates who declared their age were below 40, with the 30-39 age cohort accounting for 56 per cent. Only eight per cent were aged 50 or more. This has been the pattern of age distribution of candidates in the three national elections preceding 1992 (Turner 1989:60). However, since independence, there has been a perceptible shift in the age distribution at the younger end. The proportion of candidates aged 30 or less declined from 32.4 per cent in 1977 to 17.6 per cent in 1982, and to only 5.5 per cent in 1992. The juvenescence of the PNG political elite, during the transition to independence and in the immediate aftermath, with all that it has entailed, for the relative dearth of deep, relevant experience, has almost certainly bottomed out. The modal age of the political elite, ten years from the 1992 election, will most likely be the 40-49 bracket. By international standards, it will still be a young elite. But compared with the situation up to the 1990's, its members are likely to exhibit indices of higher levels of training and experience that correlate with their advancing age.

Similar observations can be made about the educational levels of members of the political elite. The distribution in Table 1.6 suggests that the political elite is probably somewhat poorly educated, even by Third World standards. However, compared with the educational attainments of the indigenous members of the first two Houses of Assembly, progress on this front has been impressive. Wolfers (1968: 273) commented as follows on the educational background of members of the Second House of Assembly after the 1968 election: 'The new indigenous members ... are, on average, probably better educated... than their predecessors; only 26 of them have no formal education at all [*out of 61 indigenous members: my parenthesis*] while 19 have some post-primary (i.e. post-standard VI) education to their credit, including two who have completed a year's university, and one Highlander...with 4 years' post-primary missionary training.' The educational levels of members of the political elite have gone up with every election, and there is no reason why that should not continue.

The Electoral Commission's data on the occupation of candidates are often (though not deliberately) misleading. Candidates who have resigned their jobs a year or two earlier to return to the electorate tend to describe themselves on the nomination forms as

'subsistence farmer' or as 'unemployed'. Our survey took respondents back five years before the election and worked our way through whatever jobs they had had over that period. On the basis of responses to four related questions, the categories drawn up, with the distributions of respondents, were as listed in the following table.

Table 1.8: Broad Occupational Backgrounds of Sample Candidates

Category	Number	Percentage
1. Never Employed	3	1.2
2. Unemployed Now	11	4.4
3. Self-employed Now	25	10.0
4. Self-employed(small)	15	6.0
5. Self-employed(big)	33	13.1
6. Employee(low)	66	26.3
7. Employee(high)	69	27.5
8. Politician	20	8.0
9. No Response	9	3.6

Notes:

1. Now (in 2 and 3) means in the last year or two.
2. Small means an annual income of less than K10,000
3. Low means non-supervisory, clerk/artisan/equivalent
4. Those in categories 2 and 3 came from 6 and 7 in the ratio of virtually 1: 1

Ninety four per cent of the respondents were married while 3 per cent had never been married. Unlike the traditional 'big-men', members of the emergent political elite are predominantly monogamous (81.7%), as against 10 per cent who have more than one wife. If the family size of the members of the elite group is any indication of the population policy they will support, advocates of a slower population growth in PNG evidently have a battle on their hands. More than one half of the respondents (52.2%) have four or more children. In fact, 15 per cent of the respondents have seven children or more.

It is not known how much the considerable influence of the Catholic Church contributes to the large family size. What is

known though, from observation, and confirmed by the survey, is that, if the degree of religiousness can be indicated by the number of times a person goes to church, religion is taken seriously by members of the political elite. Almost two thirds of the respondents (64.9%) said they went to church at least once a week, almost certainly a higher rate of church attendance among the elite than in most other places. Twenty two per cent attended once or twice a week; 11 per cent said they never went to church.

The claim which is often made by PNG leaders, that PNG is a Christian country, evidently, has some empirical basis, if the extent of church membership among the political elite is the yardstick. Only 3 per cent of the respondents said they belong to no church. The longest established churches accounted for over 60 per cent of the respondents: Lutherans (22.7%); Catholics (20.7%); United (15.1%); Anglicans (2.8%). The Baptist, SDA and Assembly of God altogether accounted for another 20 per cent.

Political characteristics

Moving now towards characteristics with more obvious political significance, it has to be said that a substantial proportion of the members did not appear to fit the conception of politicians finding their metier in their youth or by joining voluntary associations. For instance, two-thirds of the respondents (66.1%) said they had never taken part in any public protest or demonstration of any sort. Exactly one half of the 25 per cent who said they had, had done so as students; 6 per cent had taken part in a protest as a member of a trade union; the rest had participated as members of a traditional community.

A significant proportion were not 'joiners'. Thirty six per cent of the respondents said they were not involved in any voluntary organisation of any sort, while another 16 per cent said they were inactive members of the associations they were involved in. That makes more than one half of the respondents. Even among those who said they were active in voluntary organisations, only a few (5 per cent of the respondents) were involved in associations which had political aims, and only 1.5 per cent were involved in trade unions. Religious organisations (9.6%) and social/sporting clubs (8%) both had more respondents working for them. But, in the spirit of Melanesian reciprocity, the few who were actively involved in voluntary associations expected to receive help of one kind or

another in their campaign, although not monetary help, which only 4 per cent expected

Why would individuals who had previously shown such weak indications of interest in politics become candidates? Who was prodding them? Nineteen per cent said 'nobody'; it was their own decision. The largest response category was: 'the community' (33.5%). This was followed by 'relations' (12.0%), 'friends' (10.0%), 'party/other candidates' (4.4%), 'church' (4.4%) and 'the youth' (3.6%). To a direct question, 'Why did you choose to stand as a candidate?', 'ambition or career', which is probably the truest response, was mentioned or implied by 14 per cent, the fourth largest response category. Three larger response categories were more like what one would expect to hear: 'failure of M.P./government' (19.5%); 'I can deliver' (15.5%); 'poor services' (14.7%). Another 11 per cent said they stood because 'people urged them', while 'corruption' was the reason given by 8 per cent. It is interesting that corruption was not mentioned by a larger number. Corruption was constantly in the public view at the time. Ombudsman-initiated leadership tribunals were investigating four government back-bench MPs for corruption at the time and opposition leaders were flogging corruption allegations for all they were worth.

Some candidates (22.7%) said they had decided only within the preceding twelve months to stand, while 8 per cent said they had harboured the ambition since independence. In between these two were those who said 'since the last election' (28.3%) and 'more than five years ago' (20.6%). For 38 per cent, this was not their first time as candidates. Eighteen per cent had stood for national parliament elections, 14 per cent had stood for provincial assembly elections and 6 per cent had tried for both.

Perspectives on campaigning

One of the most consistent findings from the 1987 survey concerned the unimportance of political parties in the decision calculus of electors. Nevertheless, it has been argued that because of the organisational support which parties can give to candidates their role in elections should not be dismissed out of hand (Oliver 1989; King 1989). I expected that candidates would be in a privileged position to throw some light on the significance of the party factor in campaigning.

First of all, 61 per cent of the respondents said they had no party affiliation. Pangu had the largest number of adherents (5.6%), with

only three other parties People's Progress Party (PPP), People's Action Party (PAP) and League for National Advancement (LNA) each claiming more than 3 per cent of the respondents. Of those who were affiliated, only 24 (or 9.6% of the total number of respondents) had been party members for five years or more. Of the respondents who were members of political parties, only a small minority (15.5%) could be classified as serious members, using criteria such as paying dues or attending meetings.

Secondly, it is clear that parties are not fussy about whom they sponsor as candidates; they do not insist on party membership. Thus, sixty per cent of the respondents (far more than those who claimed party affiliation) said they were sponsored by parties. It was thus confirmed, as some contributors in this volume point out, that not all 'independent candidates' are genuinely independent. The three parties sponsoring the largest number of candidates in the sample were PPP (22.7%), Pangu (16.3%) and Melanesian Alliance (MA) (12.7%).

Thirdly, despite the large number of respondents who said they were party-sponsored, when they were asked what organisations were helping them in their campaign, only a tiny number (2.4%) mentioned the party. The distribution of responses to that question was: 'informal committee of friends and relations' (31.5%); 'none; no group' (16.3%); 'group I am associated with', namely, 'sports club' (14.3%), 'work-mates' (14.3%), 'church group' (10.4%) and 'village group' (8.8%).

What, then, does party support mean, in practice? For some of the respondents who claimed to be party-sponsored, evidently party support meant nothing. One half of the respondents (49.4%) said they received no 'material support' from the party; but nineteen per cent did, with Pangu (5.2%) accounting for the greatest number. When a question was asked about who was funding their campaign, only a small proportion of those who answered (7.6%) mentioned either the party or the party leader. The sources of funding, for the 96 per cent who responded, were: 'self and wantoks' (77.6%); 'traditional community' (4.4%); and 'business associates' (1.2%); 'other' (2.0%).

Given the high cost of everything in Papua New Guinea, anecdotal evidence, and observation of what is involved in campaigning in Papua New Guinea (feasts, beer, handouts, including money), the amounts of monies candidates claimed to have spent were usually easily credible, although, of course, there was no way

of checking on the claims. At the low end, a quarter of the respondents (23.1%) said they had spent, or would have spent by the end of the campaign, up to K5,000. At the top end, 8 per cent claimed campaign expenditure in excess of K50,000. The modal range was K10-20,000 (27.1%). The rest was: K5,000-10,000 (19.9%); K21,000-49,000 (18.7%); 'no response' (3.2%).

Lack of funds (45.8%) and transportation (20.7%) were the two main problems of campaigning according to the respondents. Other problems were 'demands by electors' (5.6%) and 'threats' (2.4%). A tenth of the respondents said they faced 'no problems'. Identical proportions of candidates (44% each) moved around their electorate mostly on foot or by car (their own or their friends' or relations'). Only two respondents, less than one per cent, mentioned 'party vehicle' as the major means of getting around in their electorate.

House-to-house campaigning was the preferred mode of campaigning for about a third of the respondents (33.1%), with public address systems (or rallies) and posters (17.1%) and *mumus* and traditional entertainment (6%) a long way behind. Other methods of campaigning mentioned by respondents were 'church meetings' (3.6%), 'payment for electors' services' (2.8%) and 'tv/radio/newspaper promotion' (2.4%).

The phenomenon of localised support is one of the most clearly established features of electoral politics in PNG. How do candidates explain the phenomenon? Their own campaign plans and activities could be expected to give clues about what they believed to be major determinants of electoral choice in PNG. One of the questions intended to probe this area was the question: 'Which of the other candidates standing against you do you consider to be your major opponents?' The follow up question, as usual, was 'Why?'

'Incumbency' was clearly, in the view of most respondents (35.5%), the reason for the electoral strength of the feared opponent. Name recognition and the provision of services were the two elements that were most often associated with the advantages of incumbency. Although money was mentioned separately (by 16.7%), it must also be regarded as a related explanation in some of the cases of incumbency. It is interesting that the 'size of his/her traditional group' was cited by only 2 per cent of the respondents in this connection. However, 'splitting my base', which is also an acknowledgement of the primordial factor, was the reason given by 6.4 per cent. 'The party behind him/her' was put forward by only 3.6

per cent. Some respondents (14.3%) were so confident about their own chances that they did not believe that any opponent was 'major'.

To a more direct question about which areas candidates were concentrating attention on, and why, 'one's own home area or wife's home area' (33.9%), 'where one has lived/worked' (17.1%) and 'where one is not known' (7.6%) were the three answers given most frequently. Other answers were 'because the area has no strong candidate or has no candidate of its own' (3.6%) and 'co-religionists' (1.6%). Candidates stood predominantly where they were working (63.3%) or they resigned to go back and live for a year (9.6%) or two (3.2%) in the electorate before the election. Only seventeen per cent stood in a different place from where they worked and yet did not resign at least one year before the election. But as May's reference to the poor performance by the 'Foreign Sepiks' suggests, 'showing the face' only for electoral benefit evidently does not pay these days.

The final question on this issue was: 'The people who will vote for you, why do you think they will vote for you?' The most numerous response category was 'community and traditional reasons' (37.5%), and it was followed by 'personal attributes, honesty, ability, education, experience', (all 16.8%), and then by 'past service or help given' (15.9%). 'Associates or party' was the reason given by only 4.5 per cent of the respondents.

The political elite and issues

The existing studies on Papua New Guinea elections have established that issues do not play a significant role in the choice calculus of electors. Compared with most other liberal democracies, to the extent that issues count with electors in Papua New Guinea, they are local issues. Party leaders issue glossy manifestos, and the national press give the national issues put forward by the leaders some prominence. But the issues raised at the national level usually do not go much beyond very general promises of action, and do not generally provoke sustained or searching debates. There are many reasons for that. First, there are no known ideological differences among the parties. Secondly, no party devotes time or resources to research in order to develop policies. Thirdly, even party-sponsored candidates are not keen to dwell on national issues when it is local issues that make the runs. Finally, with so many independents, issues cannot really crystallize. Nevertheless, some issues raised at the national level in the 1992 election, corruption in particular, and promises made, for instance, PDM's free education and subsidy to

tree crop farmers, and the LNA's Village Services Scheme, seeped through to the local, grassroots level, as Foster and May, for instance, show in their chapters.

But even if issues do not win elections in PNG, and rational candidates, therefore, do not spend a great deal of time and energy raising them in their campaign, presumably, as people who are asking for a mandate to make decisions, candidates have views on what might be wrong in the society and how these might be fixed? What problems do they consider need most attention? What solutions, if any, do they propose?

An item in the questionnaire asked candidates: 'What do you consider to be the three main problems in the country today?' The following table ranks the four problems which were mentioned most often on each of the three responses, with the percentage of respondents endorsing them in brackets:

First Response		Second Response		Third Response	
Law and order	(28.8)	Unemployment	(27.5)	Unemployment	(14.3)
Corruption	(20.8)	Law and Order	(16.7)	Law and Order	(13.1)
Unemployment	(15.6)	Corruption	(14.3)	Corruption	(10.0)
Attitudes	(5.2)	Poor Infrastructure	(4.0)	Attitudes	(5.6)

Clearly, there was a high degree of consensus among the candidates about the core problems that needed tackling. More important, the problems identified were all major problems in the country. However, to the follow-up question ('How can you help to solve them if you are elected?'), disappointingly, 8 per cent did not answer that question, and another 8.4 per cent were coded as having 'no clue'. Two of the largest categories of respondents, 25.9 per cent who said (or implied) that they would 'initiate laws', and 9.6 per cent who said (or implied) that they would 'implement tough laws', were obviously addressing the law and order problem, and they showed touching faith in the coercive capacities of the state. A smaller group, 4.4 per cent, who indicated that they would do something about 'party system/state institution building' were the only other respondents whose views could be described in any way as state-centric. The rest, who said (or implied) that they would encourage private enterprise (25.9%), or who implied a preference for the market by saying they would push for privatisation (3.2%) or who said (or implied) that they would involve the church (4.0%)

were obviously not putting their faith in the state, whether it was the law and order problem or the unemployment problem which they were addressing. Not only were such respondents evidently on the right track, according to the current, dominant views on economic development and how to achieve it (Toye 1987), their responses were consistent with what has been observed about a generalised distrust of the state in PNG (Filer 1995). An interesting category of respondents were the 10.8 per cent who saw their own advancement, their appointment as ministers, as a solution.

Such a category is totally consistent with what is known about the behaviour of MPs in PNG: the perpetual motion in parliament, crossing and recrossing the carpet, and flitting from party to party, in search of ministerial positions. Did candidates think that a period of apprenticeship was necessary for new MPs before they could be appointed to a ministerial position? Surprisingly, in view of what goes on in the period of mustering the numbers to form a government after an election (see below), almost one half of the respondents (46.6%) said a period of apprenticeship was necessary, while 31.1 per cent said 'it depends' and only 16.7 per cent said it was not necessary, with 5.6 per cent not responding.

Two previous questions, seeking to probe the same areas as the follow-up question, were: 'What are some of the things you think the present MP should have done that he has not done?' and 'What do you plan to do as a Member of Parliament?' 'Failure to deliver development to the electorate (45.8%) and 'lack of responsiveness' (8.8%) were the two major failures of incumbent MPs, according to their rivals. Both were failures at the local level. Failure in terms of the national economy (6.8%), indigenisation or localisation (6%), law and order (3.2%), and corruption (2.4%) were the specific categories of failure on national issues. As to what they themselves would do as MPs, the priorities implied by their responses were national (36.3%), local (30.3%) and both (23.5%), with neither national nor local (e.g. those who would pursue some international agenda) (8.8%) and 'no response' (1.2%) bringing up the rear.

To assess the value to be placed on responses to the questions touching on issues and what MPs could do about them, and also because of the paucity of specific knowledge of what MPs do, which was revealed by the 1987 survey of electors (Saffu 1989:24), a question was asked about MP's work. Unlike the electors, the majority of candidates (85.2%) knew the sort of activities MPs are

involved in. But 12.7 per cent of the candidates clearly did not know the work of MPs, while 2.1 per cent did not answer.

Two questions were asked to elicit candidates' conceptions of representation and to provide some clue about how they view other PNG politicians. These were: 'If you are defeated, do you expect the winner to represent equally all the people and interests in your electorate?' The follow-up question was: 'Why do you say that?' Almost one half (41.8%) said they did not expect the winning opponent to represent all fairly and equally; a third (35.5%) said they did, and almost one quarter (21.5%) said they did not know what to expect of the winner regarding how fair-minded and non-clannish he would be as a representative. While a quarter of the respondents (25.1%) suggested that MPs act on the basis of 'duty', for another quarter (22.3%) 'electoral realities' are what move MPs; for a tenth of the respondents notions of 'reciprocity' are at the basis of their judgement about whom the winner will represent.

Policies are what decision-makers intend to do about problems or issues. Interests, knowledge and ideals all have a role to play in shaping policies. We know something of the dominant interest of MPs, especially when the success rate of re-election is so dismal. It is called 're-election concerns'. However, not nearly as much is known about the ideals PNG politicians subscribe to, or how they view the future of PNG, whether they are essentially optimists or pessimists. To the question, 'How do you see the future of this country?', more than one half of the respondents (52.2%) were pessimistic; 30.3 per cent were optimistic; 11.2 per cent gave conditional, qualified or mixed answers; 2.8 per cent gave inappropriate responses and 3.6 per cent did not respond.

The questions seeking to elicit information about the political ideals the political elite subscribes to were: (a) 'Which world leaders do you admire most?'; (b) 'What about PNG leaders? Which PNG leaders do you admire most?'; and (c) 'Why?', as a follow-up question to each of the above questions. The world leaders who were most admired, by 57.4 per cent of the respondents, were leaders of liberal democratic countries, whereas only 17.5 per cent of the heroes named were authoritarian political leaders. The heroes named by 6.4 per cent of respondents were non-political figures while there was a large 'no response' category (14.3%). The bases of the admiration were effectiveness/achievement (26.3%); the help they had given to PNG (these generally tended to be Australian Prime

Ministers) (22.7%); the ideas they stood for (21.1%); and their nationalism (9.6%).

As for the most admired PNG leaders, apart from a large (15.1%) category of 'nobody/no response', the following was the ranking: Chan (22.7%); Somare (20.7%); Okuk (17.5%); Wingti (9.6%); Momis (2%); and Diro (1.2%). Iambakey Okuk, the flamboyant Highlands leader, who died in November 1986, had a reputation for being 'strong/decisive', which was the reason given by the largest category of respondents (23.5%) for the choice of their PNG heroes. Most PNG-watchers will no doubt be able to match the other bases of admiration with particular leaders in the list: 'efficient manager' (15.5%) (would mostly mean Chan, who appears to have this reputation); 'consensus seeker' (9.6%) and 'nationalism' (6.8%) would be mostly Somare, while 'welfarist/grassroots policies' (8.8%) would fit practically every PNG political leader of the first generation (all of them populist politicians) with the possible exception of Chan. But the most astonishing, and revealing, comment that the political elite makes about itself is the omission of Rabbie Namaliu's name from the list. Arguably the best Prime Minister PNG has had to date (his handling of the Bougainville crisis, particularly the economic policies his government embraced following the closure of the Panguna mine and the consequent loss over night of 40% of PNG's foreign exchange earnings and 17% of internal revenue makes him a very strong candidate for that accolade), certainly the best educated and most articulate, and with a personal integrity that is absolutely untainted by rumour, Namaliu was not named by even one half of one per cent of the respondents as the most admired PNG leader.

The conduct of the election

The law governing the conduct of elections is an important aspect of the context for electoral politics. In November 1991, parliament belatedly passed into law several recommendations for changes in the Organic Law on Elections which the independent Electoral Commissioner had made in 1987, in his Report to Parliament on that year's national election. The timing of these amendments, coming as late as they did (the changes were gazetted only on 11 February 1992 while the writs for the election were issued on 26 March) undoubtedly affected the quality of the conduct of the election. In many places all over the country, with respect to the conduct of the election, the bureaucracy simply broke down. Even without the

added pressure from these late amendments, the Commission's inability in the past to administer all the varied aspects of the electoral process without a hitch had been noticed (Stone 1976: 86; Wijeweera 1989:41).

Thirteen changes were passed into law but one of them, the issue of identification cards as a requirement for voting, was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, which thus made it possible for the election to proceed as planned. The Electoral Commission would have found it impossible to issue identification cards to all prospective voters in such a short time. A major aim of several of the changes was a reduction in the number of candidates. The nomination fee was raised from K100 to K1000, the proportion of votes required to be won by candidates to obtain refund of their deposits also went up, as did the fee required to lodge an election petition. Although the number of candidates went up despite these increased fees, the rate of increase fell for the first time since 1972.

Other changes in the election law and administration were intended to reduce election-related violence and corruption and to enhance the legitimating effect of elections. The nomination period was reduced from six to four weeks. The voting period was also reduced, from three weeks to a maximum of two weeks, with one-day voting planned for the Highlands provinces (except the Eastern Highlands), Manus and Port Moresby. The period of mustering numbers to form a government, between the return of writs and the first day of parliament, was also reduced, from three weeks to one, while the period of lodging petitions in the Court of Disputed Returns was also reduced, from 60 to 40 days.

The 'whisper vote' (by which illiterate voters were allowed to whisper their choice to the electoral officer who then makes the appropriate mark on the ballot paper for the voter) was eliminated. In its place, a practice that had gone on for years in many parts of the country, namely, illiterate voters taking a kinsman to the polling booth to assist, was legalised. The much-abused section 141 of the Organic Law on National Elections, the so-called 'sectional vote' provision, was abolished.

This provision had allowed people whose names were not on the electoral roll to vote, after signing or thumb-printing a statutory declaration to the effect that they were otherwise eligible to vote. An Electoral Commission Report indicated that 21.6 per cent of all those who voted in the 1982 election did so under that provision (Electoral Commission 1987). The provision had been used by

candidates to import 'guest voters'. It was known to encourage underage and multiple voting. Its abolition was long overdue. However, its abolition so close to the election meant that there was not enough time to get the message through to voters about the consequences this time of not enrolling. Consequently, the chronic inability to compile a satisfactory electoral roll, which section 141 had helped the Electoral Commission to hide, was now fully exposed. All over the country, thousands of voters were turned away on polling day because their names were not on the roll.

The electoral process in PNG has remained a very long-drawn out affair. Writs for the election were issued on 26 March 1992. The nomination period stretched from that day to 24 April. Polling began on 13 June and went on in many parts of the country for two weeks, to 27 June. The counting and the declaration of winners were not completed nationally until ten days after the end of polling. Then there was one week of intensive lobbying by party leaders for the support of the successful candidates in their bid to form a government on the floor of parliament when it convened on 15 July. Further, unlike other Westminster parliamentary systems, dates for the holding of elections are absolutely fixed. They are not subject to manipulation by the prime minister. But, on the other hand, on the negative side, as the date for the issue of writs is known to all politicians and intending politicians, a period of eighteen months or so before the issue of writs should realistically be included in the election campaign period. Intending candidates, including incumbents, begin campaigning around that time, that is about eighteen months earlier.

The conduct of national elections has always been a most gruelling examination of the state of PNG's organisational capacity. In 1992, 15,225 polling officials, divided into 3,065 polling teams, operated 8415 polling stations, with most teams moving around to operate several polling stations over the two week period. In the PNG environment of pervasive casualness towards official responsibility, of underdeveloped communications and transport infrastructure, vast expanses, isolated villages and difficult terrain, and often poorly educated and inadequately trained electoral officials, the likelihood and the frequency of administrative slip-up are high. The conduct of elections occurs under the intense scrutiny of anxious and ambitious politicians (and their followers), a great many of whom have invested a lot of money, energy, and time in their quest. The consequences of administrative failures for the

incidence of election-related violence and for the legitimating effect of elections are increasingly worrisome.

However, so far, no matter how poorly the Electoral Commission has performed (admittedly in the face of these daunting obstacles), and no matter how vociferously condemnatory powerful politicians have been of such performance during the election (as in 1992, in the face of thousands being turned away because their names were not on the electoral rolls), as soon as results are declared, the more powerful fraction of the political elite, the winning candidates, immediately cease all criticism. Evidently, a level of performance that obviously has not disadvantaged them must be acceptable, and there is no need to give the ever increasing number of candidates who dispute the results in the courts (63 in 1992 compared with 47 in 1982) any ammunition. To some extent, the increase in the number of disputed returns reflects the problems of electoral administration, which do not appear to have diminished with successive elections. However, an evident increase in the willingness by candidates to bribe and intimidate voters is also a factor (Nongorr 1994).

Since the 1987 election at least, the Electoral Commission had recognised the twin problems of 'multiple entries' and 'no entries' in the compilation of electoral rolls and had based requests for funds to computerise its operations on those shortcomings.² In February 1991, anticipating the abolition of the 'sectional vote' provision, and the necessity, therefore, for the common roll to be as complete as possible, the Commission organised a meeting in Wewak of *kiaps* (district managers, as they are now called) from all over the country to discuss what could be done to ensure maximum registration of voters. Two further meetings followed in Port Moresby. With a staff ceiling of fifty-six, divided between headquarters and the provinces, the Commission itself could not undertake the task of compiling the common roll in each of the 89 open electorates. It had to rely on the *kiaps*, as it had done since 1964. But the 'kiap system' of district administration has collapsed (Gordon 1983; Strathern 1984). The new, indigenous *kiaps* no longer go on patrols to the villages. Consequently, the Provincial Data System on which the Commission had depended in the past to compile the common roll had not been updated since 1980. The Commission considered using

² This section is based on notes taken at a debriefing session for Provincial Electoral Officers and Returning Officers at the Travelodge Hotel in Port Moresby in September 1992.

local councillors who live in the villages to compile the rolls but felt it might compromise its integrity by doing so. Being politicians, their impartiality in compiling the rolls could not be guaranteed. Teachers were the other obvious group. But it appears that the question of funds had ruled out their use.

While a crisis in district administration was identified as a major source of the Electoral Commission's problems, electoral officials in the Eastern Highlands and Madang provided another perspective: rural, grassroot alienation from the state. It was claimed that in a number of places, enumerators were not welcome. People refused to give their names and officials were chased away. While such a lack of grassroot cooperation impeded registration, a claim that a similar lack of cooperation occurred at the very top of the provincial public administration (the secretaries of two provincial departments were identified as 'totally uncooperative') was even more depressing.

In defence of their inadequate input and inability to update the Rural Population Register and the Provincial Data System, the provincial departments could also probably plead lack of funds and adequate personnel. Presumably, they could also blame sections of the people for their uncooperative attitude, the same rural, grassroots alienation referred to above. Commentators on PNG affairs have observed the lack of cooperation between the state and the people (Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Morauta 1987). However, while PNG certainly has no monopoly over inter-agency and inter-bureaucratic rivalry and jealousy, it has been observed: 'The achievements or initiatives of one agency are sometimes viewed with suspicion and received less than warmly by others' (Morauta 1987:14). Traditional village jealousy and rivalry for prestige appear to have been carried over into the modern bureaucratic environment.

Although that was not the objective of the Electoral Commission's debriefing meeting, a crisis in PNG public administration was identified. How to get appropriate data from the villages on a continuous basis so as to continuously update the electoral rolls has been a persistent problem. The Electoral Commission itself, not unlike other agencies within the PNG public administration, has not been without its own problems of inefficiency. It accepted responsibility for the late arrival of election materials in the provinces. But it was claimed that security considerations, safeguarding of ballot papers, for instance, had to be

balanced against early printing. The consensus of opinion among the electoral officials was that the timing of the distribution had been wrong; materials should have been sent at least a week earlier.

The results

Appendix A provides a complete list of the 1992 results in all 109 electorates, while Appendix B shows where the parties put up candidates, indicating where party leaders believed they had support, and how they actually performed, in the provinces and regions. Together with the map of the electorates and the index to the map, these appendices are meant for those who might wish to pursue further analyses of aspects of PNG elections and politics.

Tables 1.9 and 1.10 below summarise several aspects of the results. In addition, Table 1.9 compares aspects of the 1987 and 1992 elections and, thereby, provides indications of trends. Table 1.9 highlights a deterioration in the base of the parliamentary superstructure. The large number of candidates has already been noted above, an average of 15 per electorate in 1992. The second feature highlighted by the table is the large role assumed by independent candidates. In 1992, for every party-sponsored candidate, there were three independent candidates. They obtained almost two thirds of the votes cast and 39 of the 109 seats, compared with 41 per cent of the votes and 22 seats in 1987. Independents have been a great source of instability in both the governing and opposing coalitions that are put together in parliament, as they flit from coalition to coalition in search of the opportunities that can help their re-election chances.

Their movements largely account for the difference in the state of the parties at the beginning and at the end of the 1987-1992 Parliament. As the strength of the Independents has increased at elections, so the strength of the parties which constitute the core of the coalitions has decreased.

Since 1986, seven parties (Pangu, Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM), Peoples Progress Party (PPP), Melanesian Alliance (MA), Peoples Action Party (PAP), League for National Advancement (LNA) and National) have provided the core of the two opposing coalitions in Parliament. In 1987 they won 51 per cent of the votes and 76 of the 106 seats contested. In 1992, their share of the vote was down to only 32 per cent while managing to secure 68 out of the 109 seats.

Table 1.9: Parties and Independents in the 1987 and 1992 Elections

1 Party	2 1987 Vote	3 (%)	4 Seats Won	5 Seats at Diss- olution	6 1992 Cand.	7 1992 Vote	8 (%)	9 Seats Won
Pangu	408802	(14.9)	26	35	94	294738	(9.3)	20
PDM	298715	(10.9)	17	20	52	247379	(7.8)	15
PAP	87836	(3.2)	6	3	43	147538	(4.7)	12
MA	153611	(5.6)	7	4	45	134903	(4.3)	7
PPP	168280	(6.4)	5	13	47	90465	(2.9)	8
LNA	132001	(4.8)	3	5	40	68188	(2.2)	4
Natnal	135761	(5.0)	12	11	13	26303	(0.8)	2
Country	10743	(0.4)	0	0	24	18646	(0.6)	0
United	87243	(3.2)	1	6	1	2539	(0.1)	0
MIG	60922	(2.2)	4	0	--	--	--	--
Papua	34636	(1.3)	3	3	--	--	--	--
PBesena	17122	(0.6)	0	0	--	--	--	--
Wantok	17028	(0.6)	0	0	--	--	--	--
Leiba	2611	(0.1)	0	0	--	--	--	--
NSettlement	164	(0.0)	0	0	--	--	--	--
PSP	--	(-)	--	--	28	94902	(3.0)	0
Liberal	--	(-)	--	--	37	29979	(0.9)	1
BAP	--	(-)	--	--	9	9817	(0.3)	1
PLabour	--	(-)	--	--	1	274	(0.0)	0
Indeps	1117635	(40.9)	22	8	1226	1994132	(63.1)	39
TOTAL	2732390		106	108	1655	3159803		109

Source: Report to the Fourth National Parliament, 2 August 1987 (Port Moresby: The Electoral Commission, July 1987); PNG National Election 1992: Total Votes Polled by Candidates (Port Moresby: The Electoral Commission); Bio-Data on Candidates for the Fifth National Parliament General Election 1992 (Port Moresby: The Electoral Commission).

Note:

1. Elections in three electorates were postponed in 1987 on account of the deaths of candidates during the campaign period, hence the total of only 106 seats.
2. Six parties which had participated in the 1987 election had disappeared by 1992, while four new parties emerged to participate in the 1992 election.

The ephemerality of political organisations in PNG can also be captured in the table. Six parties which competed in the 1987

elections had disappeared by 1992. The Morobe Independent Group (MIG), the political vehicle by which the one time premier of Morobe Province, Utula Samana, had taken himself to the national arena, transformed itself into the Melanesian United Front in 1988. It waxed and waned in the frenetic parliamentary numbers games. By 1992, however, MIG/MUF had evaporated; as had Papua Besena and Papua Party and three paper parties. Meanwhile, as with every election since 1968, new parties emerged to contest the 1992 election: People's Solidarity Party (PSP), the Liberal Party, the Black Action Party (BAP), People's Labour Party (PLP) and Country Party, which had no known connection with the Country Party of the seventies. There were also several very loose groupings of independent candidates. The People's Rights Independents Group, spearheaded by the National Capital District MP and businessman, Hugo Berghuser, himself a PAP-endorsed candidate, was the best known of these.

The most substantial of the new parties, PSP, essentially a breakaway party of ex-PAP members, which polled more votes than PPP and more than the LNA and the National Party together, won no seat while PPP won eight and LNA and National together won six. Several of the parties listed in the table are a reminder of a strong tendency to political fragmentation in PNG, as if in imitation of the marked segmentation of PNG social structures. PSP's breakaway from PAP severely checked the growth of the latter's electoral strength in 1992, in the same way that PDM and LNA's breakaway from Pangu had done, from the mid-1980s. We will never know how differently, and how much more effectively, PNG's parliamentary system could be performing in the 1990's and beyond, but for this marked, apparently traditional, fissiparous tendencies in PNG political culture (May 1982; May and Nelson 1982).

Table 1.10 summarises aspects of the party system. First, the table shows clearly the fragmented nature of the party system. Secondly, it illustrates the strong regionalist element in PNG politics. Each of the three largest parties, in terms of the number of seats won, has a strong regional base. At least 50 per cent of the seats won by each of them are in their 'home region': Pangu in Mamose, PDM in the Highlands and PPP in the Islands. Thirdly, the table underlines the result of Pangu's continuous decline. (Pangu's performance in 1992 should be compared with its best performance ever, in 1982, when it won 34 per cent of the vote and 51 of the 109 seats). As the party that had the best nationalist credentials, urban

support and trade union links in its formative years, Pangu could now collect only 5.6 per cent of the NCD vote, and it failed to win a seat in the capital. Pangu is still the largest party in PNG and the most institutionalised, having survived three changes of the party leader. But it is no longer dominant in any region. Even in its 'home region', the north coast Mamose region, where it performed best, its share of the vote was only twenty per cent, although it took forty per cent of the seats.

Table 1.10: Percent Votes/No. of Seats Won By Parties By Region

Party	Islands	NCD	Papua	Mamose	Highlands
Pangu	10.6/3	5.6/0	7.1/4	20.1/12	3.4/2
PDM	8.3/2	5.5/2	2.6/1	3.7/2	11.8/9
PPP	12.2/4	4.5/0	2.4/1	2.5/2	1.3/1
MA	22.5/2	0.2/0	2.0/0	5.7/2	1.9/3
PAP	0/0	11.0/1	10.9/6	2.0/1	4.6/4
LNA	4.7/1	0.1/0	2.0/0	3.3/2	2.3/2
PSP	0.2/0	2.2/0	4.5/0	2.9/0	3.1/0
National	0.1/0	8.4/1	0.8/0	0.7/0	1.6/1
BAP	0.4/0	0.7/0	0/0	0.1/0	0.5/1
Liberal	0/0	1.9/0	1.4/1	0.5/0	1.4/0
Country	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	1.6/0
United	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
PLP	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Independents	36.1/5	60.1/0	66.5/7	57.4/9	66.1/17

As Table 1.10 shows, no party won even twenty per cent of the seats. Even if the parties in the Namaliu/Pangu-led government coalition (Pangu, MA, PAP, LNA and the Paul Pora faction of the National Party had stuck together after the elections, they would still have been short of a winning coalition. Therefore, the familiar, frenetic and unedifying post-election trade in MPs, which has characterised PNG elections since 1972, had to be undertaken, but with ever more imaginative strategems.

As convention dictates, the core parties and members of each of the two opposing groups vying to put together a winning coalition set

up camp in some resort hotel, and trusted emissaries are then sent out to bring in any uncommitted MPs they can find. At the beginning of the exercise, this usually means at least fifty per cent of all MPs. The MPs, even party-sponsored ones, are keen to find out what package deal each coalition leader is prepared to negotiate with them, in exchange for their support in the election of the prime minister on the first day of parliament.

A ministerial position is the hardest currency, and everybody's opening gambit bears a name with 'minister' in it. But the constitution-makers, with uncanny prescience, put a constitutional limit on the number of ministerial positions available. However, in recent years, Parliament, in its wisdom, has created deputy ministerial positions. So those are also available. And inflated election expenses might be looked at, with a view to reimbursement, and so on.

The Pangu-led group, consisting of the coalition partners in the outgoing Namaliu government, namely, PAP, MA and, initially, LNA, gathered at the Madang Resort Hotel, whose owner, a naturalised citizen, happened to have just been elected to the Madang Regional seat in the new parliament, as an independent.

The Wingti-Chan group, with PDM and PPP as the core, had a master strategist, also a naturalised citizen, an independent and a new Regional Member, for Milne Bay. His strategy was brilliant. Three camps, not one, were established on remote islands in Milne Bay. The only way a curious MP could get there to find out what was happening, and return after having checked things out, was by courtesy of Sir Julius Chan's helicopter. MPs on one island had news of what was going on the other two islands and, indeed, in Madang, via the leaders. Issues of the *Post-Courier* for the week preceding the July 15 1992 meeting of parliament have several reports of alleged kidnappings and detentions of MPs.

Only one case of an alleged detention will be cited here. This involved a new Southern Highlands MP. He stood as an MA candidate. The Electoral Commission's official publications, including the ballot paper, leave no doubt at all on that score. He went to the Wingti-Chan camp evidently to compare 'packages', in the usual manner of new MPs. The MA MPs were at Madang with the Pangu-led coalition. The deputy leader of MA, the party that sponsored him, was sent to Alotau, the provincial capital of Milne Bay, to talk to this MP. He returned from Alotau, not having been able to see him.

As Wingti won the prime ministership by a single vote, the casting vote of the Speaker, his coalition's nominee for the position who had just been elected, it would be no exaggeration at all to say that the inspired choice of venue, and the controlled means of getting back from it, rather than the defection of the LNA from the Namaliu-led coalition, is what delivered the prime ministership to Wingti., who led a coalition made up of his PDM, Chan's PPP, LNA and a host of Independents.

The studies in this book

Ben Reilly's paper discusses the impacts of two electoral systems on PNG politics, the optional preferential system used for the first three national elections and the first past the post or simple majority system in use since 1977. He contrasts the camaraderie among candidates and the high proportions of the vote obtained by the winning candidates under the former system with the vote splitting tactics, the concentration of candidates' campaigns on, and votes from, a small section of the electorate, and the increasingly low proportions of the votes obtained by winning candidates under the first past the post system. He argues that these cannot be good for democracy.

Observers of the earlier elections remarked on how extremely polite and civil the candidates were towards one another (Parker 1971; Strathern 1976). Although candidates could afford to be sporting in the pre-independence days when the stakes were not so high, the contribution of the optional preferential system to the avoidance of mudslinging could have been substantial.

Legal provisions and institutional arrangements obviously affect (political) behaviour. But, equally, if the law and the institutions fail to take sufficient account of social realities, such as the very high degree of social fragmentation in the case of PNG, then the law and the institutions themselves may forfeit their legitimacy. Reilly makes this point cogently and, consequently, argues the superiority of the optional preferential system in the PNG context. However, the ingenuity of aspirants to political power in PNG and the administrative capacity required for the more complicated optional preferential system are probably somewhat underestimated.

If the optional preferential system were reintroduced, it would be as likely to be adaptively domesticated as the simple plurality system has been. Instead of the 'splitting strategies' engendered by

the current simple plurality system, it is 'sponsoring strategies', as practised currently by regional/provincial candidates (for instance, by Paias Wingti in the Western Highlands in 1987, where he indulged in multiple endorsement of PDM candidates in the Open seats in the province, and by Peter Kuman in Chimbu in 1992, where through his Country Party he sponsored as many as 26 candidates in the six Open seats) that will flourish. In terms of the impact on the number of candidates who stand, the 'sponsoring strategy' is not likely to differ from the 'splitting strategy'. Yet, the fundamental problem that has to be addressed by any electoral reform in PNG is the large number of candidates in PNG elections.

Sinclair Dinnen provides a detailed account of the elaborate security measures that were taken, in view of rumours of threatened widespread election-related violence. These measures included liquor bans, declaration of fighting zones in several Highlands areas and a massive show of police and defence force presence through staged parades in the provincial capitals. The actual election-related violence that occurred before, during and immediately after the polling and the counting of votes, is also meticulously assembled. Whether one deplores electoral violence, because it can threaten the legitimacy of the democratic process, as most observers and commentators would argue, or whether one views it as signalling the vigour of the democratic process itself, as a *Post-Courier* editorial cited by Dinnen suggests, Dinnen argues that election-related violence is more often than not the latest episode in an ongoing, even if temporarily dormant, inter-group conflict which would have been settled, traditionally, by violence (Joe Ketan's paper (this volume) is also an extended elaboration of this point).

Thus, until the balance of authority between the PNG state and the predominantly autonomous entities constituting the PNG society shifts decisively in favour of the state, so that its laws and regulations hold sway over the latter, it would appear that elections will always have to be approached with the kind of extensive and intensive security preparations that Dinnen describes. A collective sigh of relief can then be breathed when, as in 1992, the level of violence turns out to be lower than expected.

The subtitle of Orovu Sepoe's paper on women candidates in the election, 'Casualties of PNG Political Culture' is an apt summary of its main arguments. In this area of improving women's access to political decision making positions, PNG has gone backwards. Several features of the PNG political system which go to explain the absence of a female MP since 1987 are highlighted: the relative unimportance of ideology and principles in PNG politics; the relative irrelevance of parties in the decision-making calculus of electors; the continuing strength of traditional ideas and practices in modern PNG, in this case the transfer to the modern arena of the political minority status of women in most parts of traditional PNG; the increasing role of money in PNG elections; a marked tendency towards social and organisational fragmentation, which affects women's organisations also.

Support for an increased number of females in elective political positions might conceivably, in special circumstances, be based on pragmatic grounds. But it is more easily presented as a matter of principle. Where principles are at a discount, as in PNG politics, then an issue like the desirability of an increased number of females in political decision-making positions, on grounds of principle, is not likely to obtain widespread endorsement. Similarly, if political parties were more influential in determining the choice which electors make, then party sponsorship of female candidates in safe seats could help to overcome entrenched prejudices in a male-dominated society such as PNG.

The chapters dealing with individual electorates provide a range of explanations for the election results. The retrospective look which several authors take, in response to the editor's request, provides perspectives on the theme of continuity and change.

In explaining the victory of the PPP leader, Sir Julius Chan, over his Pangu-sponsored challenger and civil servant, Esekia Tomon, in the only two-person race in the whole election, Robert Foster takes a retrospective look at the 1987 election in Namatanai to discuss the findings of MacQueen (1989) regarding an apparent erosion of PPP's position and Chan's popularity. Foster takes issue with MacQueen's claim of the existence of age/education cleavage and generational politics where the young and educated overwhelmingly support Tomon and Pangu while the older and less educated folk throw in their lot with Chan and the PPP.

Foster argues that a more effective local organisation of Chan's campaign, which was not unrelated to the vastly superior financial

resources at his disposal (a multi-millionaire businessman, in parliament continuously since 1968, a rare feat in PNG accomplished in 1992 by only two other persons, Sir Michael Somare and Sir Pita Lus, and with an aggregate of twelve years as minister or prime minister) was the primary explanation of his victory. Chan's local organisation also mobilised a diffuse sentiment of anti-incumbency, a perception of a need for change at the national level, which benefitted the opposition leaders, including Chan. What Foster reports as *ontap* (national) issues, corruption and the Bougainville crisis, for instance, permeated the electorate and favoured Chan. The prolongation of the Bougainville crisis and its inevitable impact on a relatively nearby electorate like Namatanai (locals forced to return because of the conflict, the consequent cessation of remittances and greater pressure on local resources) all worked against the Pangu candidate. The impression had been created by the opposition parties that a quick military solution was available but was being passed up by Namaliu, the prime minister and Pangu Pati leader.

Besides explaining Chan's victory, Foster also probes the meaning and the significance to the electors of the state and its various institutions, including elections and the voting act. Foster suggests that the election should be viewed as a state ritual. Voting is a secular ritual through which citizens, as voters, acquire transient social identities as members of the national community of voters, and through which the state makes itself visible and real to ordinary, rural Papua New Guineans.

Pokawin and Rooney's paper on electoral politics in Manus provides a detailed exposition of the factors that determine electoral outcomes on that politically sophisticated island. The first factor is the 'home base'. The support of the cluster of villages making up the ethnic group to which the candidate belongs, and the support of its traditional allies, if any, must be secured if one is to have a realistic chance of being elected. Thus the size of the group and of its allies matters, as does the number of candidates from the group seeking to represent it and the electorate. However, no ethnic group is large enough to ensure victory on its own, even when it assumes, for the purpose of the election, a temporary regional identity and leadership in apparent competition with perceived other 'regional rivals'. Therefore, support is needed from beyond the 'home base', however variably this is defined.

The candidate's reputation, especially that which is gained through incumbency, and church support (and the Makasol or Win Neisin, originally a sort of cultist group, must be seen as virtually a church) are vital. Imaginative and active campaigning, for newcomers especially, is also important. The authors also allude, subtly, to the role of money. There is no party vote to speak of, as the telling differences in the votes obtained by open and provincial candidates of the same party make abundantly clear. The party factor is weighed by electors alongside other factors, and it is not usually at the top of the list. Pragmatism and tolerance (which can deceive the unwary candidate, especially when it is combined with Manusian hospitality) are the two principal values underlying electoral politics in Manus.

Colin Filer sets out primarily to explain the electoral success of Christopher Sambre in the Nuku electorate in the West Sepik province, and of Karl Stack in the West Sepik provincial, from 1977 (until Stack evidently lost interest in winning in 1992, perhaps having already decided to renounce his PNG citizenship and resume his Australian citizenship, which he did in 1993). A subsidiary question Filer sets out to answer is the extent to which the alliance forged between those two contrasting personalities (one an ex-Fransiscan monk, the other an ex-kiap) contributed towards their respective electoral successes. Such alliances between provincial candidates and those in the open seats are common, even without the added party dimension which obtained in this case. One of the many achievements of Filer's paper is that it succeeds in demonstrating the wide range and the complexity of factors that explain electoral outcomes in Nuku, and the inadequacy, therefore, of what he puts forward as the dominant academic explanatory model of PNG electoral politics: 'the parochial handout mentality, which combines the value of primary group loyalty (parochialism) and the distribution of material benefits (handouts) in a circle of instrumental rationality'.

Filer's own data would not allow him to deny, and he does not deny, the operation of the 'parochial handout mentality' as a major factor in electoral politics in Nuku. However, Sambre's own ethnic group is less than five per cent of the electorate and, in 1992, deeply divided, fielding four candidates. Sambre had not succeeded in getting amenities for the electorate. He had never held a ministerial position and, thus, had had only limited influence to

peddle in Moresby, and only modest personal means to 'buy' support. The dominant academic model is not helpful in this case.

What explains Sambre's continued success, according to Filer, is largely the turning of ethnic competition into a moral contest: the group that wins is the group that exhibits best what leadership should be. Thus the Namblo, Sambre's group, showed its moral pre-eminence because its candidates drew votes from the more numerous groups, even from those with their own candidates. But Filer ultimately seeks to explain Sambre's victory in terms of his own personal authority and the influence of the Pangu Pati. Sambre's personal authority had been propagated throughout the electorate through a network of personal devotees, Catholic Church catechists and Pangu Pati local organisers.

In sum, Filer's analysis shows, in many places, the importance of ethnicity and locality, church and party, Sambre's personal authority, a generational factor, political economy questions and a 'complex of material transactions' in Nuku's electoral politics.

Ron May brings to bear on his analysis of electoral politics in the East Sepik province perspectives gained over twenty years of close observation of PNG affairs. 'Mit na Bun' (Meat and Bone), like Filer's 'Steak and Grease', is a powerful evocation of the central focus and concerns of the type of politics which is encountered in Third World societies of severe poverty and deprivation, and which has been summarised, for Africa, as 'The Politics of the Belly' (Bayart 1993). The prominence of cargo cultism in the East Sepik in the sixties and seventies (the cult leader, Yaliwan, was elected in 1972 with 87 per-cent of the vote, the highest margin of electoral victory in PNG to date) indicated the centrality of popular aspirations for material goods. May hints at whiffs of cargoism in the 1992 campaign. But it was the mainstream churches, especially the Catholic Church, that had to be taken seriously into account in explaining electoral outcomes in the province.

Ron May confronts head on a question which editors of at least three of the election studies on PNG have put at the core of their overviews, namely, the role and significance of political parties in PNG elections (Hegarty 1983; King 1989; Oliver 1989). In explaining the election results, May explores the extent to which political parties can be said to have penetrated the PNG political system. The East Sepik province is the home base of the Pangu Pati, courtesy of Sir Michael Somare, a founding father and the leader of the Pangu Pati for twenty years, and the representative of the East

Sepik province in parliament for even longer. Thus, it was as good a place as any to test the claim which was made after the 1982 election (Jackson and Hegarty 1983) that parties were becoming more salient in PNG elections.

Already, in 1987, May had observed that party organisation and party competition seemed weaker, compared with 1982 (May 1989). This was not surprising. Pangu had suffered two severe haemorrhages in 1985 and 1986. First, Paias Wingti, then Pangu Pati deputy leader and deputy prime minister, defected with 14 Pangu backbenchers to form the People's Democratic Movement. A year later, there was another defection, by some of Pangu's most senior, energetic and brightest leaders, including Tony Siaguru, Barry Holloway, John Nilkare and Karl Stack, to form the League for National Advancement. Thus, within two years, Pangu had split into three. May's conclusion, after looking again at the role of the parties in the East Sepik province in 1992, is that 'there has been little progress towards an integrative, ideologically-based party system' and that even in the East Sepik 'where party loyalty has been maintained over several elections, the value of Pangu Pati endorsement lies in the fact that the party is identified with the Sepik itself'.

Joe Ketan's paper has been referred to several times already. Of all the studies collected here, Ketan's is the most relentless exposition of the traditional community vote thesis. Politics at all levels in Hagen are 'organised along traditional structural lines'. His paper shows, once again, why national elections are really separate electorate competitions. The central role assigned to complex historical and cultural relationships in electoral behaviour and outcomes suggests that knowledge of electoral politics in one electorate does not necessarily equip one to discourse confidently on what might be happening in the next electorate.

Yasi's paper is the only one from my 1992 second year PNG Politics class to be included here. I had hoped to be able to include more than one paper from the group, to provide the kind of reports that I believed would reflect more closely how the ordinary participants in the drama themselves viewed and interpreted what was happening. According to him, the popular definition of a serious candidate in *imbonggu* these days includes, interestingly, the capacity to pay electors for their votes, in addition, of course, to the ability to bring development. (Joe Ketan also mentions 'big money' alongside strong traditional support and 'resources' in his

characterisation of 'serious contenders'.) It appears that in Imbonggu, not unlike many electorates in PNG, church support is of far more significance than party support. Yasi gives interesting thumb-nail descriptions of the Imbonggu section of the new political elite.

The last chapter, Bill Standish's wide-ranging paper on the national significance of trends of decay in Chimbu electoral politics, was written after all the other chapters, including this one, had been finalised, almost ready to go to the printers. Amidst continuity in clan rather than political party voting there are also dramatic changes. The tale Standish tells of recent electioneering by threat in Chimbu is chilling, and his conclusion that elections in Chimbu can no longer be described as free and fair appears warranted. But it provokes questions. Exactly who is denying freedom and fairness to whom in this instance is a pertinent question. There is no hint of government manipulation, or of a systematically co-ordinated undermining of the central tenets of Free Elections. Ironically, it is untrammelled competition rather than any effective curb on it that seems to be a major part of the problem. But, as he says, correctly, if the pattern of electoral behaviour he describes for Chimbu, and the extent of bumbling electoral administration there, were to occur more widely in Papua New Guinea, the legitimacy national governments derive from elections would be seriously eroded. However, there is enough evidence in the rest of the book to show that the Chimbu pattern of violent, intimidatory, corrupt and thuggish behaviour he describes is *not* the dominant pattern in Papua New Guinea.

Conclusion

The studies collected here provide confirmation that elections in Papua New Guinea continue to be free and fair, at least as far as government control and manipulation are concerned. But they also confirm the continuity of the two fundamental features of Papua New Guinea elections: the relative unimportance of political parties in the electoral process and the essentially local character of electoral politics. These two features are related to the phenomenon of pronounced localised support for candidates, the large numbers of candidates, the success of independent candidates, the virtual impossibility of predicting national electoral outcomes in Papua New Guinea and, indeed, the turning of national elections into primaries where the elected representatives, not the people, really determine who heads government. The generally weak

coalition governments that result from these elections, and the excessively pragmatic behaviour of MPs, in their support of party leaders and policies, are also related to the two basic features. Until political parties become better established and acquire a more central role in the choice calculus of more electors, the negative developmental impacts of Papua New Guinea electoral politics, which emerge clearly in this book, will continue and, probably, escalate.

The Effects of the Electoral System in Papua New Guinea

Ben Reilly

Papua New Guinea (PNG) approached the 1992 elections in a reformist mood. The greatest number of amendments to the electoral system since independence—including a vastly reduced polling period, a tenfold increase in the nomination fee, and the abolition of 'sectional voting'¹—were passed by Parliament in November 1991, three months prior to the issue of election writs in March 1992. A further change, providing for the introduction of a Voter Identification Card (with a photograph of the voter) was also adopted. However, after representations from the Electoral Commission, the Supreme Court ruled the Identification Card unconstitutional—much to the relief of the PNG Electoral Commission, which otherwise would have faced an impossible administrative task in implementing the ID card provision so close to a national election (Kaiulo 1993). Most of these changes were designed either to simplify the administration of PNG elections or to combat two perennial problems: extremely high candidacy rates, and abuse of the system through fraudulent 'sectional voting' and the increasing incidence of election-related violence.

The success of these measures was, in retrospect, limited. The tradition of 'zestful participatory democracy'² continued with a

¹ Under the old section 141 of the *Organic Law on National Elections*, people whose names were not recorded on the electoral roll were allowed to cast a "sectional vote" by swearing to the electoral official that they were over 18 and had lived in the electorate for more than six months. The provision was widely thought to be abused, especially by under-age electors, although its removal, so close to the 1992 election, meant that many voters throughout the country were not able to cast a vote.

² The phrase is Jim Griffin's.

record 1655 candidates standing for election to 109 seats—an increase of 142 on the 1987 figure, but a slower rate of growth than for the previous six elections, each of which saw a marked increase from the preceding election in the total number of candidates. The polling period was relatively peaceful, and suspicious occurrences were, if anything, less prevalent than in the past. Yet the Electoral Commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo, still felt compelled to avoid ‘a chorus of complaints from angry candidates during the counting period, by going into hiding, shaving his moustache and moving to a hotel’ (Callick 1992:33), a move that would be seen as drastic in most democracies but raised little more than a passing mention in PNG.

One factor that has come increasingly under the spotlight in PNG is the first-past-the-post (plurality) electoral system. PNG has used this system since it abandoned the Australian-based system of optional preferential voting (OPV) in 1975. This paper examines the history of the debate concerning the merits of these two electoral systems in PNG, and examines the claims made for and against both systems. It also looks at the effects of the two most basic components of PNG’s current electoral system: single member electorates and the plurality method of vote counting. It concludes by arguing that the electoral system has had a distinct and largely unrecognised influence upon PNG’s unique example of representative democracy. Specifically, it contends that the plurality system is particularly poorly suited to PNG’s highly fractionalised polity and its social and territorial conditions, and has served to undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process in PNG, and that a reversion to the OPV system for future elections may well be justified.

The Optional Preferential Vote in PNG

PNG’s first three elections in 1964, 1968 and 1972 were held under the OPV, a watered-down version of the ‘full preferential’ method used in Australia at the federal level. Electors were required to express a first preference (defined as the number 1) for a candidate, and then an option of further preferences (2,3,4 etc) for other candidates listed on the ballot paper. In a departure from the Australian practice, it was reasoned that it would not be necessary to compel voters to express preferences for all candidates. Considering PNG’s low literacy and numeracy rates, this was a sound move, as an imitation of the full preferential system would have seen any numbering mistakes render a ballot paper informal—

which would have had dramatic ramifications.³ In a similarly sensible move, the Australian system of compulsory voting was not introduced 'because of the novelty of the elections and the problems of terrain and climate' (Hughes & van der Veur 1965:406). With those important exceptions, the remainder of the PNG Electoral Ordinance 1963 was a direct copy of the Australian Commonwealth Electoral Act of 1918.

The introduction of preferential voting was an example of a colonial 'institutional transfer' in which both the metropole and colony were happy to persist with familiar institutions rather than experiment with something new. Hughes noted that the First Interim Report of the Select Committee on Political Development (October 1962), which had been charged with the task of making recommendations on the Territory's future representative institutions, had favoured the preferential system as 'giving the fairest result' (Hughes 1965:36), declaring that four-fifths of witnesses to the Committee had supported this option. The recommendation was readily accepted by both the colonial administration and the Australian government.

PNG's first nationwide elections were held in 1964. While preferences were distributed in the great majority of electorates the final result differed from that provided by a first-past-the-post system in only five of the 44 electorates: Henganofi, Tari, Kaindi, Markham and South Markham Special. Henganofi provided a classic example of the way disciplined preference swapping amongst a group of aligned candidates can overcome a single dominant plurality winner (see Table 2.1). Candidate Bono, with massive support from his own region but negligible support elsewhere, lost to candidate Ugi, situated in the centre of the electorate and attracting a considerably broader range of support. Ugi was well behind on first preferences, but gained the majority of all other candidates' preferences to win the seat.

³ However, it was the optional nature of the preference marking that led the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC) to abandon the OPV system in 1975, arguing that the optional nature of preference marking under the OPV system meant that "voting results tend to swing towards that" of first-past-the-post (PNGEC 1983:78).

Table 2.1: Allocation of Preferences in Henganofi Open Electorate, 1964

Candidate	First count	Second count	Third count	Fourth count	Final count
Forapi	787	-	-	-	(787)
Posi	1758	12	-	-	(1770)
Punupa	3708	73	41	-	(3822)
Bono	8028	12	35	224	8299
Ugi	3925	667	1362	3274	9228
Exhausted*	-	23	334	324	681

* An 'exhausted' vote comprises a ballot where preferences have not or cannot be assigned to a continuing candidate, hence 'exhausting' before the full distribution of preferences.

In 1968, due to the distribution of preferences, eleven electorates (out of a total of 84) returned different results than would have been the case under a straight plurality system. Neither the 1967 Final Report from the Select Committee on Constitutional Development, nor the 1968 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on the House of Assembly Election 1968 made any recommendations for changing the system. But the Chief Electoral Officer's report stated: 'The strongest argument against the preferential system is its complexity for the average voter and its complexity for the count ... Much has been said in this election of the merits of the "first past the post system" and how simple it is to operate'. But in a prescient remark, he also noted that first-past-the-post in the British Solomon Islands had resulted in one particular candidate being elected with 388 votes out of an electorate of 10,000 voters! (Chief Electoral Officer 1968:32-3). Even the United Nations Visiting Mission conceded that 'while there were drawbacks in the preferential system it felt bound to acknowledge that it is probably the best system to use in the circumstances prevailing in the Territory' (Visiting Mission 1968:68). But the Mission went on to make the quite impractical recommendation that a minimum of four

preferences should be expressed on all ballots where there were four or more candidates in future elections, a provision which would, if adopted, have resulted in a large number of votes being rendered informal. The recommendation was not adopted.

In the meantime, opposition to preferential voting was growing amongst a small but influential band of commentators. Writing in January 1968, E.P. Wolfers claimed that the preferential system had 'deceived' voters in the past—and that voters in two by-elections in 1965 and 1967 had accordingly 'indicated far fewer preferences than in 1964'. He went on: 'One thing is sure, however, a preferential system in which it is not compulsory to number all squares (as it is in Australia) may produce an almost random result: if it fails to produce a result identical with that which would result from a plurality vote, it can produce any of a variety of results, depending simply on how soon the supporters of the candidates first eliminated tire of indicating their preferences. Is it any wonder that some candidates are urging their supporters to indicate only a first preference?' (Wolfers 1968:70). Despite this line of argument, increasing numbers of candidates in PNG were elected in both 1968 and 1972 as a result of preference swapping (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Cases where leading candidate on first preferences was defeated after distribution of preferences, 1964-1972

Year	No of cases	Electorates involved	Percentage of all elected seats
1964	5	Kaindi, Henganofi, Tari, Markham, South Markham Special	9
1968	11	Finschhafen, Goilala, Goroka, Gumine, Ialibu, Kandep-Tambul, Kerowagi, Nawae, Sinasina, Sohe, Tari	13
1972	16	Bulolo, Hagen, Henganofi, Ialibu-Pangia, Kandrian-Gloucester, Koroba-Kopiago, Kundiawa, Lagaip, Lufa, Nawae, Nipa, North Fly, Okapa, Poroma-Kutubu, Sinasina, Tambul-Nebilyer	16

The Report of the Electoral Commission of Inquiry into Electoral Procedures (1970) came down firmly in favour of preferential voting. It argued cogently the benefits of the preferential vote, suggesting that if voters 'are unable to gather enough votes to have their 'local' man elected then their next preference is a man who can adequately represent them in the House because he is literate, articulate and able to move freely throughout the electorate. In addition they feel that such a man would represent all groups without prejudice, something they fear will not happen at this stage if a man is elected from another language group' (Chief Electoral Officer 1970:2).

Preferential voting and accommodation

This argument maintains that the use of preferential voting would result in superior and more representative candidates being elected. The negative of vote-splitting can be transformed into the positive of preference-swapping. Does preference swapping have any other useful properties? At least one possible benefit has been raised by political scientists looking at schemes for post-apartheid South Africa elections: the need for parties and candidates to swap preferences in pursuit of victory creates incentives for accommodation between competing interests, and is thus particularly appropriate for elections in deeply divided or fractionalised societies. Arend Lijphart (1985) and Donald Horowitz (1991) have both produced detailed studies concerning electoral engineering for divided societies, with South Africa as their main focus of study. Lijphart argues for a list system of proportional representation as a catalyst to coalition government and thus, he hopes, a consociational version of accommodation and power sharing at the parliamentary level. Horowitz, by contrast, begins from the point of view of the voter and campaigning parties, arguing that the most feasible path to inter-group accommodation is via a preferential voting system.

Horowitz's study of electoral systems is particularly interesting for PNG, because he makes clear that preferential voting, alone amongst the major voting systems, produces considerable incentives for candidates to broaden support bases in search of a majority. This has very significant benefits at both the constituency and parliamentary level:

The price of successful negotiation is intergroup accommodation and compromise. The exchange of second and third preferences, based on reciprocal concessions on ethnic issues, is likely to lead to an accommodative interethnic coalition if no party can form a government alone (Horowitz 1991:189).

Preference swapping also directly affects the behaviour of political actors:

[Preferential voting] will make moderation rewarding by making politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of groups other than their own. The dependence is only marginal, of course, but it will sometimes be the margin of victory. Since parties must pool votes before they pool merely seats, they must find ways before the election to communicate their ethnically and racially conciliatory intentions to the voters. After the election, they must deliver on those commitments or risk electoral retribution (ibid:196).

Horowitz's conclusion could have been written with PNG's severely fractionalised and divided society in mind. Looking particularly at the way preferential voting works in such societies, he sees many benefits. Under a preferential voting system, he notes, 'many elections will turn on second and third preferences. Parties that succeed in negotiating for second and third preferences will be rewarded ... Under conditions of party proliferation, therefore, [preferential voting] is likely to produce governments committed to accommodative policies' (ibid:190).

These benefits of preferential voting appear to have been largely overlooked by commentators in Papua New Guinea prior to independence (and the change to plurality) in 1975. Of the numerous studies, mostly by Australian authors, detailing the period leading up to independence, it appears that only Ballard had noted the fact that OPV 'encouraged collaboration among candidates within an electorate' (Ballard 1978:11).

The former PNG Minister (and now Deputy Secretary-General of the Commonwealth), Sir Anthony Siaguru, has been one of the most perceptive critics of PNG's current electoral system. He first campaigned publicly for electoral reform in 1982, proposing three fundamental changes aimed at stabilising parliamentary politics: constitutional amendment to allow a Prime Minister to call an

election if he lost the confidence of parliament; 'anti-hopping' provisions to force members who switch parties to face an immediate by-election; and a return to optional preferential voting. Siaguru argued, like the 1970 Report of the Electoral Commission of Inquiry into Electoral Procedures, that a return to optional preferential voting would result in the election of superior candidates with broader support:

(Electors) consider themselves bound by social and family obligations to cast their first vote for their relative or a person from their own clan, house line or language group. It might not be that that person is the best candidate in the judgement of the voter! But he or she is obliged because of social traditions to vote for him. I know of elections in the past, when the optional preferential system was in use, where candidates went around the electorate saying 'Don't vote for me as your first choice. I know you will have to give your first choice to your line candidate. But give me second.' And they did get in on second preferences or third preferences. They did it with far greater representative support than, say, the member who has got in with less than ten per cent of the vote. That is ridiculous! (quoted in Dorney 1990:78-9).

Despite being supported by Prime Minister Somare's Cabinet in 1982, none of these three changes was ever put to Parliament. It appears that many backbenchers were (understandably) reluctant to introduce changes which, in the process of disciplining the parliamentary political process, would have severely affected some of their career prospects (through the early election and 'anti-hopping' proposals) and indeed their re-election prospects. Their actions emphasised the truth of Richard Rose's dictum that 'once chosen, electoral rules tend to persist by their own inertia' (Rose 1983:42-3). Electoral reform will always be difficult to achieve, because the legislature will always be a product of the existing laws, and consequently will tend to resist the uncertain ramifications of change.

Nonetheless, Siaguru continued his campaign for electoral and constitutional reform following the elections. In 1985, in an article published in both the *Times of Papua New Guinea* and the *Australian*, he put forward a penetrating case for widespread

constitutional reform, arguing that the Westminster system in PNG was reminiscent of 18th-century England in its unstable faction- and personality-driven politics. He suggested a number of measures to enhance effective government and strengthen the position of the Prime Minister, including the re-introduction of preferential voting; official registration of all political parties; halving (to 14) the size of the Ministry; compulsory by-elections for MPs changing parties after their election; and a constitutional amendment to allow a Prime Minister to request the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament and call fresh elections.

Siaguru argued that preferential voting is 'complementary to the emergence of disciplined parties, since it encourages the presentation of disciplined philosophies of government as the basis for the elector to cast his preferences' and would thus 'be a major step in realising a national consciousness among Highlanders, Papuans, Islanders and New Guineans' (*Times of Papua New Guinea*, 21 July 1985). He refined this argument in a similar article after the 1987 elections, writing that

The recent election has borne out all my worst fears. The extreme multiplicity of candidates, combined with first-past-the-post, has produced results not only absurd but dangerous. As more and more candidates stand, so the appeal to the electorate becomes more and more localised. The candidate with the largest localised support base wins. Elected members emerge with a ridiculously low percentage of the vote . . . The system no longer provides for the best representation, not does it provide for the most able leaders. The consequences of frustration and disillusionment among the electorate lead to violence and community upheaval.

An optional preferential system will not only enable fairer representation, but by encouraging the presentation of genuine philosophies (rather than parochial appeal) as a basis for the elector to cast his preferences, it will make for more disciplined political parties (*Post Courier*, 5 August 1987).

In 1986, Siaguru introduced a private members bill to reintroduce OPV for PNG's national elections. The proposals failed to attract the two-thirds support level needed for amendment to an organic law, and the Bill did not advance beyond the second reading stage.

Unlike previous occasions, however, the Bill was debated in Parliament and thus provides a valuable opportunity to consider the arguments for and against preferential voting in the eyes of PNG parliamentarians.

There was considerable support for the Bill amongst senior MPs, particularly those who had served in several parliaments. The then Minister for Justice, Warren Dutton, who had been elected under both voting systems, strongly supported the change, arguing that preferential voting resulted in greater identification between the electorate and the elected member, saying 'when I was first elected to this Parliament in 1968, even the people who had given me their sixth and last preference vote considered that they had in fact voted for me and therefore, I was their member and I would look after all of them rather than just the small group of people who gave me their first preferences' (*Hansard*, 27 November 1986). Dutton argued that preferential voting would encourage greater identification on the part of elected MPs with their constituency. The failure to do this was, he felt, one of the major weaknesses of the first-past-the-post voting system:

I would state categorically that the reason why we had so many Courts of Disputed Returns, why we have had instances of violence and other disruptions during elections, can be placed squarely on the first-past-the-post system . . . if we were able to pass these amendments I am prepared to guarantee that the elections that we will hold in 1987 would be more peaceful, more respected, and would return to Parliament members who were supported by the majority of the people in their electorates (*Hansard*, *ibid*).

While numerous members from both sides of the Parliament stated their support for the amendment in principle, many went on to say that, with a national election due within six months, there was not enough time to make such a major change before the 1987 election. Most speakers pledged to support the bill if it was re-submitted after the 1987 election. Unfortunately for Siaguru, he lost his seat of Moresby North-East after an acrimonious election campaign, and the momentum behind the proposed amendments disappeared with his political career.

In 1987 the Electoral Commissioner also addressed the question of the benefits of a return to the OPV system. Stating that previous election results had posed the question 'as to whether the nation has an efficient democratic process', the Commissioner's election report argued that OPV would reduce conflict, and that losers would more readily accept the result:

The question that has to be addressed is whether OPV reduces conflict and generates greater acceptance of the final result because 'trading off' of preferences between candidates will occur. This spreads the sense of the winner having relied on more electors than gave him/her their first option. In the final count of a preferential system the winner is seen as having an absolute majority over his nearest opponent. He can, therefore, be seen as having been invested with majority approval. First-past-the-post is simpler and should yield quicker results, but . . . a small solid block of votes from a *lain* or linguistic group can determine who wins. This does not engender responsibility to the whole electorate, nor, ultimately, national attitudes (Electoral Commission 1987:4).

The fact that the Electoral Commissioner joined the debate on the electoral system was itself a significant step. With the wisdom of historical hindsight, it is possible to make some points regarding the abandonment of OPV for plurality.

First, it is clear that, despite the claims of the Chief Electoral Officer in 1973 and the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) in 1974, preferences were being exercised by increasing numbers of voters in each election prior to 1977. As Table 2.2 details, the use of preferences changed the result in five cases for the 1964 election, 11 cases in 1968 and 16 cases in 1972. The CPC mistakenly claimed that in 1972 'in only 13 electorates was the candidate who led on the first count defeated after preferences had been distributed' (CPC 1974:15-16). The use of the word 'only' appeared to imply that this was a relatively small amount. In fact, this is a far higher rate of preferences changing results than has ever been achieved in Australia. The increasing use of preference victories can be interpreted as a sign of the increasing confidence of voters using preferences as a means of defeating candidates with strong (but localised) support in favour of more widely acceptable candidates.

Secondly, the arguments for 'simplicity' put forward by the advocates of plurality suggest the question: simplicity for who? The structure and layout of the ballot paper and the accepted voting method is identical under plurality and OPV—the only difference being that electors can, if they wish, mark further preferences after their first preference. Admittedly marking of further preferences requires literacy and the ability to write numerals. In addition, OPV is definitely more complicated than plurality in the scrutiny of ballot papers. But that is a task performed by electoral officials, not voters. While questions remain as to the capacity of the election administration to successfully manage a preferential count, the possible benefits of a change to OPV, particularly on the 'zero sum' attitudes that currently prevail towards electioneering in many areas (and the associated factors of campaign violence and intimidation) may well have significant benefits for electoral administrators as well as voters and candidates.

First-past-the-post in PNG

The first-past-the-post or plurality electoral system is the most widely disseminated single system in the democratic world, with almost a third of all countries using this system (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1993). The method of vote counting under this system has been seen as simple for both voters and electoral officials, easy to understand, and transparent. Its structuring of electoral competition into 'winning' and 'losing' candidates is as easy to grasp as a horse race: the horse that passes the post first is the winner. Whether other horses lose by a nose or ten lengths is irrelevant. Plurality elections require no complicated arithmetic, no vote transfers or quotas. They do not even require literacy or numeracy: choices are marked with a tick or a cross, and photographs or party symbols on the ballot paper can be used to identify candidates.⁴ There are no preferences, and there is almost always a quick count and a clear winner.

In PNG, following the influential criticism of OPV noted earlier, support for a change from OPV to plurality gained momentum following the release of the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on

⁴ Photographs of both candidates and, for the first time, party leaders were used on the ballot papers at the 1987 and 1992 elections, in an attempt by the Electoral Commission to encourage party identification and possibly minimise the informal vote.

the 1972 House of Assembly Election in February 1973. Without openly supporting a new electoral system, the new Chief Electoral Officer, Simon Kaumi, writing under the heading 'Preferential System versus First-Past-the-Post', made it clear that the complexity of the OPV system was causing difficulties:

The preferential system is no doubt a fairer system than the first-past-the-post system but, while appreciating its fairness, it is becoming more and more complicated as well as time consuming. Papua New Guinea's electoral system must be completely revised with a view to making it simple and less complicated so that it is easily understood by both polling officials and the voters. As the country approaches self-government, Papua New Guinea's electoral system must be simplified ... In the 1968 general election 84% of the Members were elected first-past-the-post while in the 1972 general election 85% of the members were also elected first-past-the-post. These figures indicate a clear swing away from a proper preferential voting system and I feel it is time Papua New Guinea looked realistically and critically at its voting system and made its own decisions as to what is suitable for its future democratic needs. The question is not one of democracy, rather one of finding a voting system that is simple and suitable to the people of this country (Chief Electoral Officer 1973:18).

These words were quoted approvingly by the CPC in its Final Report. Stating that 'we fully agree with this view', the CPC endorsed both the suggestion that OPV was unnecessarily complicated, and that plurality would be 'easier to understand, easier to run, and the results become known much more quickly. For these reasons, we recommend a change to the 'first-past-the-post' system' (CPC 1974:15-16). The post-independence government accepted this recommendation, and the resulting *Organic Law on National Elections*, which has laid down the framework for all elections since 1977, provides for a plurality electoral system.

The consequences of the new system were immediately apparent at the 1977 general election. Setting the pattern for all future elections, a disturbingly high number of seats (42—almost half the Parliament) were won by candidates with less than 30% of the vote,

and the related factor of 'vote splitting'—friendly candidates with little hope of winning the seat standing in order to 'split' an opposition block vote—first became a factor. Hegarty noted that vote-splitting tactics in 1977 'heightened tension between clans and groups and in some cases polarized electorates to the point of violent conflict ... this situation contrasted markedly with campaigning styles in previous elections where opposing candidates often toured their electorates together urging voters to cast preferences.' (Hegarty 1983:15). Hegarty went on to suggest that 'a continuation of such aggressive campaigning in future elections could well weaken the credibility of the electoral system'. It is clear that the incidence of such tactics has indeed increased, and that the combination of high rates of candidature, vote-splitting tactics and the continuance of clan-based voting blocks have progressively undermined the representativeness of the elected legislature.

Even the Electoral Commission, which had championed the change, appeared to have doubts about the new system. In his report on the 1977 national election, the Electoral Commissioner, J.S. Mileng, expressed support for a change to a full preferential system as 'a fairer system of voting' and suggested that the problem with the old OPV system was that 'the voter is not required to mark his/her full support for the running candidates, therefore the voting system tends to swing towards that of the 'First Past the Post' Voting System'. First-past-the-post was considered to be simpler and easier to administer than OPV, but 'the system itself deprives the right of an elector to consider placing a second choice for the next best candidate. Secondly where there is a strong voting block, it always has the chance of electing its candidate outright, whilst candidates coming from a minority group would have no chance of getting elected' (Electoral Commission 1983:78-9). The report also detailed the relatively new phenomenon of campaign violence in some electorates, and the fact that areas where 'block voting' was not a factor were strongly disadvantaged by the new system.

In fact, changes in the nature of campaigning have been one of the most debilitating effects of the plurality system. Previous election studies have noted that even under the OPV system, voting patterns were largely parochial and clan-based. But they have also shown that the winning candidates in many electorates were those who cultivated the preferences of those outside their own local area. Kuabaal's description of candidates' campaigns in 1972 in the Sinasina Open electorate, a Simbu electorate with seven major

tribal groups each speaking a different Sinasina dialect, noted that the eventual winning candidate concentrated his campaigning in areas where he had no traditional alliance or denominational ties, and in fact gained 41% of his primary votes from such areas (Kuabaal 1976). Such a scenario would be virtually inconceivable today, where the risks of campaigning in a 'hostile' area tend to overshadow the marginal possibilities of picking up significant numbers of votes from rival areas. In fact, in both 1987 and 1992, candidates in Simbu were virtually restricted to campaigning only in their home base areas. The 1987 elections saw one candidate in Kerowagi win with 7.9% of the vote; and this was surpassed in 1992 where the winning candidate in the Sinasina Yonggamugl Open electorate (also a Simbu seat) attracted a bare 6.3% of the vote (a new record). As well as undermining the overall legitimacy of both the electoral process and the elected legislature (see below), such results point to a change in the meaning and nature of a 'constituency'. For many MPs, their actual constituency is not their electorate but the much smaller sub-group within their electorate to which they owe their allegiance, and their parliamentary positions.

The trends of increasing candidature and minority support for winning candidates have been well covered elsewhere (Griffin 1988; Electoral Commissioner 1987) and will be only briefly covered here. Table 2.3 shows the continuing increase in the number of candidates per electorate since 1964:

Table 2.3: Candidates per Electorate 1964-1992

Year	No of Electorates	No. of Candidates	Average per Electorate
1964	54	298	5.5
1968	84	484	5.8
1972	100	611	6.1
1977	109	879	8.1
1982	109	1125	10.3
1987	109	1513	13.9
1992	109	1655	15.2

The factor of increasing candidacy levels is, of course, strongly related to the decreasing degree of support for successful members. The higher the number of candidates, the smaller the total vote needed to gain a plurality and hence win the seat. As Table 2.4 indicates, the 1992 election continued the trend, apparent since Independence, of increasing numbers of successful candidates being elected with minority support.

Table 2.4: Percentage of votes gained by successful candidates 1977-1992

Year	No of seats	Percentage of formal votes gained					
		<10%	10-19%	20-29%	30-39%	40-49%	50%
1977	109	-	11	37	26	16	19
1982	109	4	20	33	20	14	18
1987	106	2	39	41	13	4	7
1992	109	9	45	33	14	3	5

In a similar distribution to 1987, only five MPs in 1992 gained an absolute majority of votes, while those with less than 20% of the vote rose from 41 in 1987 to 54, or 50 per cent of the seats in Parliament. However, the figure of most immediate concern was the nine MPs elected with less than 10% of the vote. As in previous elections, most of these candidates were Independents from the Highlands area where inter-clan fractionalisation is most prevalent and where inclusive or accommodative candidacy is nowadays virtually unknown. To have almost one-tenth of a Parliament made up of candidates unwanted by over 90 per cent of their electorate gives a new twist to the term 'representative democracy'. Their election is invariably based on very high candidacy levels (over 40 per electorate in some cases) and clan-based voting blocks which together make it possible, and often inevitable, that successful candidates will be supported by very few voters. By way of contrast, the record lowest level of support for a successful candidate in the home of first-past-the-post, the United Kingdom, at their 1992 elections was 26 per cent of the vote.

As noted earlier, the Electoral Commission sponsored amendments to the Constitution and the *Organic Law on National Elections* just prior to the 1992 elections aimed at reducing the number of candidates contesting seats. The nomination fee for prospective candidates, which had remained at K100 since 1975, was increased to K1000, making it one of the highest financial hurdles to contesting elections in place anywhere in the world.⁵ (In fact, there was considerable pressure to make it higher. The Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Laws and Acts, to which the proposed law was referred following its introduction in the National Parliament, recommended that the fee be raised to K1500 and, in a further attempt to restrict candidature, that the minimum age for candidature be raised to 30 years. The Government did not support either recommendation.) A number of other restrictive measures were also introduced: only the successful candidate would receive a refund of the nomination fee (previously, any candidate who polled more than 10 per cent of the votes of the winning candidate—which in most seats meant almost everyone—received their money back); nominating candidates needed to have the support of 100 enrolled voters from their electorate; and the nomination period was reduced. The Electoral Commission did not try to hide the fact that the new provisions were aimed squarely at reducing candidate numbers:

Both national and provincial elections have been characterised by a very large number of candidates, and the numbers are increasing with each election.

Many of these candidates have no chance of winning whatsoever, as can be seen by the very low amount of votes which they poll (in the 1987 general election several candidates polled no votes whatsoever). The presence of so many candidates presents a bewildering and confusing choice to the voters, as well as adding to the expense of the election and complicating its administration at all stages.

⁵ The Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional a similar attempt made in 1981 to restrict candidate numbers by increasing the nomination fee to K1000, which it held infringed the underlying Constitutional principle of free and equal participation by all citizens.

While the right to stand for elective office is accepted in principle it is contended that the restrictions proposed are reasonable and are overall in the public interest, in that they will only deter the 'no-hope' candidates and will reduce the confusion of voters (Electoral Commission 1991:8).

As Table 2.3 makes clear, the best that can be said for these measures is that they reduced the rate of increase of the number of candidates from the previous election. The 1992 elections still registered a record number of candidates overall (1655), and a record for one seat (48 candidates for Sinasina-Yonggamugl). The 1992 results also graphically demonstrate the relationship between the number of candidates and the vote share necessary to win the seat—Sinasina-Yonggamugl Open, with the highest number of candidates, required the lowest winning vote share of only 6.3%; while in Namatanai Open, with only two candidates, Sir Julius Chan scored 58.5%. There is no strict causal relationship between candidacy levels and a winning candidate's vote share: both tend to encourage the other. The understanding that so few votes are needed to gain a place in the national parliament itself encourages candidature from those who would otherwise not consider standing; the higher candidature levels mean that fewer votes than ever are needed to gain a plurality, and on it goes. Although high candidacy is one indicator of democratic participation, in PNG it is clearly, in the words of the Electoral Commissioner, 'excessive and undesirable both from the point of view of effective representation and the electoral process itself' (Electoral Commission 1987:5).

Candidacy levels are also strongly linked to electoral violence. It is precisely those (usually Highlands) areas where block voting and high candidacy are a problem that electoral violence is also a factor. Like many aspects of PNG electoral politics, this factor is another example of rational (if anti-social) behaviour in the face of an inappropriate system: as 10 or 20 votes sometimes separate the winner from the second place getter, any action taken to influence only a small number of votes can have significant effects. Just as the small number of potential second preferences gained under an OPV system can be the threshold between victory and defeat, so small numbers of votes forcibly gained (or, more often, forcibly withheld) can prove crucial. Electoral violence is clearly an 'anti-system' behaviour, which affects the legitimacy of the democratic system itself. Although in PNG violence is a part of everyday life which

cannot be examined in isolation, specific electoral violence is more often a response to the internal logic of the electoral system than an attack upon it.

Summary: preferential versus plurality voting

The disadvantages of first-past-the-post in PNG have now been outlined. What, in summary, are the advantages of a change to preferential voting for future PNG elections? The arguments put forward for preferential voting are that it:

increases the chance of election of candidates with wider appeal, resulting in superior and more representative candidates standing;

encourages accommodation between competing interests, making it particularly appropriate in divided or fractionalised societies such as PNG's;

produces incentives for candidates to broaden support bases in search of a majority vote, and to collaborate during campaigning, thus reducing conflict and changing the nature of election campaigns;

rewards reciprocal concessions between competing groups, thus encouraging conciliatory positions and moderate policies;

if it manufactures an absolute majority (which admittedly the OPV system does not necessarily achieve) it encourages unsuccessful candidates to better accept the result.

Two related 'negative' advantages of OPV compared to the present plurality system—that is, defects in the present system that OPV does not suffer from—have also been presented. These are that preferential voting:

negates the advantages of dummy candidates standing to 'split' an opposition block vote, thus (presumably) resulting in lower levels of overall candidature;

results in candidates being elected with a considerably higher proportion of the vote than plurality, thus increasing the legitimacy of the elected legislature.

One further argument in favour of OPV can be made. By encouraging candidates to pool votes and rely on areas outside their immediate clan base for preferences, it assists the development of responsible government and nation building by encouraging a less localised focus in favour of broader regional or even national considerations.

The disadvantages of the preferential vote are that it is more complicated than plurality, both for voters and electoral officials, that it creates difficulties for illiterate or innumerate voters, and that the scrutiny takes longer. While these are legitimate concerns—particularly considering the overstretched resources and administrative difficulties the Electoral Commission faces in administering the current system—it would appear that the widespread potential benefits of preferential voting are such as to warrant serious consideration of a change in electoral system. If nothing else, OPV should stymie the benefits of ‘vote splitting’ and serve to reduce the attractions of candidature for those persons unlikely to be able to muster support outside their own clan base. Yet it is the potential wider benefits—the impact upon election campaigning, party behaviour, candidate quality and the overall legitimacy of the legislature—that offer the most compelling case for change.

Territorial representation in PNG

One factor common to all Westminster-style systems is that members of parliament represent spatially-defined areas, or ‘electorates’. In PNG, these electorates can be divided into two distinct groups: the 89 ‘open’ electorates, defined on the basis of population, and 20 ‘regional’ electorates, which follow the boundaries of PNG’s 19 provinces and the National Capital District.

The spatially-defined areas which members represent, both open and regional electorates, are rarely homogeneous, most being made up of numerous overlapping clan and tribal groups, often with their own distinct language and territorial base. Voting patterns in many areas, particularly the Highlands, tend to be in ‘blocks’ along clan lines, with minimal vote leakage to candidates of rival clans. Political loyalties are focussed primarily at the level of personal, clan and regional allegiances, rather than along party or

ideological lines. Demographically, PNG is fractionalised along several levels—at the clan, village and immediate region level, but also along the over-arching geographical axes of south coast (Papua), north coast (New Guinea), Highlands and Islands. PNG can thus be classified as one of the most divided nations in the Pacific region, albeit without the bi-polar racial, linguistic or colonial divisions of other South Pacific polities. As noted above, these divisions can be mitigated or accentuated to some degree, depending on the choice of voting system.

But no matter which voting system is used in PNG, there still remains an enduring conflict (both in PNG and in other similar systems, such as the United Kingdom's) between the principle that people are being represented and the principle that places are being represented. The most obvious manifestation of this tension in tribal-based societies such as PNG is the long-term conflict between traditional tribal and linguistic regions and the much larger and often arbitrarily-drawn divisions of the state, such as electoral boundaries.

For PNG's first mass-suffrage elections in 1964, the nascent Electoral Boundaries Committee introduced the concept of 'electoral zones', made up of autonomous 'Open' and 'Special' electorates, 'determined on the basis of geographic isolation (as in the cases of the island districts), ethnography and communications' (Chief Electoral Officer 1964:1). The zones agreed upon were the five major island groups of Manus, New Ireland, Bougainville and New Britain, and a corresponding division of the mainland (into Milne Bay, Sepik, South, North-East and Highlands). Each zone was divided into electorates 'on a strictly mathematical basis', following the (then) Australian practice of a maximum 20% deviation from the mean size of electorates. 'Tribal and linguistic affiliations' were to be taken into account where possible, as were issues of accessibility in 'sparsely populated areas' (*ibid*).

This initial demarcation and distribution exercise laid the basis for the new system of representative government based on territorial representation and universal suffrage. Each electorate was based on territorial areas to be represented in the national legislature; the new Members would have to simultaneously work together (as part of the new state) and in competition (for resources, development and the like for their electorate). Although these new electorates were primarily legislated to represent equal numbers of people, they also served to represent territory. Furthermore, the ten 'Special'

Electorates represented far larger geographic areas and, although initially devised as a means of ensuring expatriate representation and expertise in the legislature (and later that of educated Papua New Guineans), were also the forerunner of today's 20 provincial electorates.

The first (and last, at the time of writing) redistribution of boundaries under the plurality system took place in 1977 under the *Organic Law on National Elections*. The introduction of national electoral boundaries overlaid a potentially more potent division upon the tribal and *wantok*-based landscape of PNG. But they rarely corresponded to tribal divisions (and deliberately so) and only recognised the most evident of physical features.⁶ What then explains the almost complete acceptance of the territorial system of single-member electorates in PNG, at a time when many of the other fundamental characteristics of the electoral system are being questioned?

Regulation of geographical conflict

For a start, there is the assumed 'naturalness' of the system itself. There was virtually no consideration of other systems either for the first mass elections, or in the extended consultations in the lead up to the Independence Constitution. The CPC's Report does include a passing reference to proportional representation (which would require multi-member electorates of some sort) only to explicitly reject it as

very complicated and ... usually found in countries where there are well-developed political parties. On both these grounds, proportional representation would be unsuitable for Papua New Guinea (CPC 1974:15).

In most colonial situations, the hegemony of the colonial empire's own institutions and assumptions is generally sufficient to foreclose speculation on alternative forms of government structure, especially considering the new rules are normally drafted and put in place by

⁶ This factor is an almost universal aspect of uninominal district electoral boundaries drawn to maintain population parity, however; it is a rare community whose natural borders coincide with electoral ones. As Michael Steed has noted, "most single-member constituencies are thoroughly artificial, ephemeral pieces of territory which have no meaning outside the electoral context" (Steed, 1985:282).

members of the metropolitan power rather than indigenously. The CPC was unquestionably an indigenous body. But the range of options available to it when recommending complex institutional devices such as electoral systems was obviously heavily circumscribed by the colonial experience. Nevertheless, it is curious that some form of proportional representation was not at least considered by the CPC, because most scholars have agreed since the 1960s that single-member 'winner take all' electoral systems are unsuited to plural societies. Sir Arthur Lewis's experience of the failure of post-colonial democracy in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone prompted him to write that 'A system which suits homogeneous class societies need not be expected to function well in non-Marxist plural societies. Where cleavage is a problem, one needs a system which will give minorities adequate representation, discourage parochialism, and force moderation on the political parties'. He added: 'The surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral system of first-past-the-post' (Lewis 1965:73). Thus Lewis favoured PR with multi-member constituencies:

In a plural society, proportional representation with a few large several-member constituencies is better than electoral systems with many single-member constituencies not only because it gives more satisfaction to the minorities, but also because it reduces the *geographical conflict*, and the racial, religious or other differences which go with geography (ibid:72, emphasis added).

Vernon Bogdanor reflects the prevailing viewpoint amongst scholars when he writes that 'plurality and majority methods will work less successfully in deeply divided or plural societies than in homogeneous ones' (Bogdanor 1987:195).

There can be little doubt that single-member electorates do focus geographical conflict in a number of ways in PNG, just as they did in the West African states which concerned Lewis. The very action of dividing territory into smaller political units has implications for future geographical conflicts. Where boundaries run along ethnic lines, they serve to regulate a pre-existing state of affairs, focussing conflict between constituencies and representatives. Under a Westminster-style system, this conflict can be expressed at the parliamentary level through the elected representatives, and via

party groupings based on regional and/or ethnic lines. Although dangerous, particularly for minority groups, this form of division does have the advantage of offering a constitutional arena for conflicts to be expressed. It also means that major groupings need to be included in positions of power to allay potential conflict. In PNG, ministries and other government positions are allocated at least partly on the basis of region, and the need to strike the right balance of Papuans, New Guineans, Highlanders and Islanders.

Geographical conflict is focussed quite differently where electoral boundaries either (i) cross major ethnic groupings, thus dividing common interests or (ii) circumscribe numerous small ethnic groups within one electorate. In these cases, both of which occur in PNG, conflict at the regional level is not faithfully mirrored at the parliamentary level. Under the first scenario, similar groups are politically divided from their common interests, leading to intra-group division and dilution of voting power. Under the second scenario, which is particularly common in the Highlands, the large numbers of small competing groups and 'block' voting along ethnic lines lead to MPs being dependent on votes from, and in practice often representing, only a small minority of the total electorate. Under these circumstances, a representative's 'constituency' is often far less than the sum of its voters, and can entail only one small group and/or area within an electorate. As noted earlier, this factor is exacerbated by the dynamics of the plurality electoral system.

PNG's well-documented traditional system of groups conflicting along territorial grounds can thus be either reflected or refracted by that supposed 'mirror of the nation's mind', the electoral system. It remains open to argument whether a system that faithfully reflects territorial divisions in the parliamentary sphere (thus providing the safety valve of a constitutional arena of verbal and other non-physical conflict) is superior to a system that refracts or suppresses this conflict, or depicts only one small part of it. While long experience in Africa and elsewhere has graphically demonstrated the dangers of parliamentary majorities and minorities forming along ethnic lines (particularly for minorities), PNG's case suggests that a failure to reflect conflict at the parliamentary level does not suppress the actual conflict on the ground, and can actually exacerbate it.

Constituency contact

The standard argument in favour of single-member electorates is that they enable the representative to have close contact with the constituency he or she represents, which thus makes them far more responsive to their electors' wishes than would otherwise be the case. Although the 'constituency contact' argument has been largely rejected by scholars in relation to larger nation states due to the sheer size of most electorates—even the most conscientious local member could retain personal contact with only a relatively small proportion of the total number of people he or she represents—it has retained a strong element of truth in terms of PNG elections, where the relentless parish-pump nature of most campaigns encourages a high degree of personal contact (and exchange) between campaigning politicians and voters. Moreover, a succession of past studies (Saffu 1989:19-20) emphasised the need for visibility and personal contact when campaigning: the importance of 'seeing the face' of a candidate. This factor is probably less strong today, however, as increasing conflict in many areas means a lack of contact between electors and candidates, many of whom now only campaign in safe 'home' areas.

While 'character' is a predictable determinant of voter choice in a polity where all candidates stand on basically the same platform, it is also a function of the single-member constituency system of electoral organisation. In this way it can be argued that the single-member system works more authentically in PNG than in party-based polities such as Australia or the UK, where the party affiliation of a local candidate is far more important than knowledge of his or her personal characteristics (Crewe 1985).

Traditional forms

The single-member system is also analogous to PNG's traditional method of leadership vested in what has become known as the 'big man'. In fact, many of the functions of the traditional 'big man' have been replicated by elected representatives, as this description of the role of the 'big man' from the Introduction to the 1964 election study suggests:

Political leadership was closely linked to the active day-to-day control, acquisition and ceremonial disposal of community wealth. Authority to control others was

legitimized in the first instance by its acceptance within the kinship system, but this recognition was sharply limited by the office holder's practical ability to perform successfully those functions his group considered necessary (Bettison et al 1965:3).

It is enlightening to read academic accounts of some of the more recent provincial and district level campaigns to note just how similar the current expectation of leadership duties is to this traditional role. Standish's account of the 1982 Chimbu provincial campaign, for example, cites the key resources for the use of the prospective member as 'parties, beer and brotherhood' and notes that 'it was virtually obligatory for candidates to give very large beer parties, to show that the candidate was a good and generous man, and to reinforce his position in his own group and beyond. Otherwise, open candidates use much the same campaign style as previously, but with very frequent mention of their political party and the name of its leader. They walked and talked their way around the men's houses at night, and the markets by day, with a fairly standard spiel that they would speak out firmly (*tok strong*) for their people, and try to get more and better roads for their electorates' (Standish 1989:191).

Thus, it can be argued that the single-member electorate system fitted naturally onto the pre-existing forms of traditional leadership, both in terms of the requirements for successful leadership and the solitary (as opposed to group) nature at the apex of community representation. As past electoral studies have pointed out, the 'counterpoint between traditional and modern bases for status-competition' (Strathern 1973:283) defines elections in many parts of PNG, with the result that there is a strong two-way incentive for a tribal leader seeking election to build up his ceremonial exchange links and for others to invest in him. Elections provide an arena in which traditional rivalries can be fought out, which has severe implications for overall representation when campaigning (and hence the elements of personal contact and exchange) only take place within the narrow regions of a candidates' 'home' area.

Many of the 'exchange' obligations of contemporary politicians are delivered via the well-known 300,000 kina per annum Electoral Development Funds, allocated to each MP for spending at his discretion within his electorate. These 'slush funds' can be seen as a unique PNG adaptation of the usual budget expenditure of

governments which reinforces both exchange links and a strong focus on the needs of the constituency. But as an efficient mechanism of government fiscal policy they are a questionable instrument. Numerous MPs have openly favoured their own clan base (which, as noted earlier, can be a small fraction of the total electorate) in the distribution of funds; some have openly used the scheme to acquire personal wealth (Sherlock 1992). The funds were originally envisaged as a useful initiative for utilising a sitting member's intimate knowledge of local needs to by-pass bureaucratic bottlenecks and fund roads, bridges and other basic infrastructure where they are most needed in an electorate, thus (presumably) increasing overall living standards and cohesion. Instead the provision of such direct funding has more often served to reinforce fractionalisation at the electorate level, as funding is widely expected to be a 'payola' from the winning candidate to reward and reinforce clan support.

Provincial electorates and regional weighting

Finally, PNG is a geographically, culturally, linguistically and ethnically diverse nation. Prior to independence, the Australian colonial administration had not produced a coherent sense of national identity, and the majority of political activity was regional and parochial. The devolution of power to provincial governments following independence was a tacit acceptance of heterogeneity. The expansive nature of this decentralisation was also an acceptance of the special needs and interests of PNG's provinces, and their representation in Parliament via provincial electorates was effectively weighted in favour of the smaller provinces, and particularly the islands. In 1971, the Second Select Committee on Constitutional Development noted that there had been some call for the removal of regional electorates, although the Committee itself made it clear it did not support this view. But by 1975 there had been 'a considerable shift in opinion on this matter', and the CPC unanimously recommended that regional electorates be abolished. Their report argued that 'the original reasons for regional electorates has been largely invalidated by the increasing numbers of well educated people returned from open electorates' (CPC, Chapter 6:1). Moreover, the constitutional provisions on citizenship, and increasing standards of literacy, meant that the formal educational qualifications which were the basis of regional electorates were no longer necessary. The Government, however,

successfully argued for a retention of such electorates 'in order to retain greater representation in the Parliament for the less populous districts' (Goldring 1978:41-42).

The debate on the utility of regional electorates goes on. In 1983, the General Constitutional Commission added its voice to those calling for the abolition of provincial electorates (General Constitutional Commission 1983:112). This was echoed in 1987 by the Electoral Commissioner, who claimed that the need for two separate lists of candidates causes 'confusion in an electorate where voters are still nearly 80 per cent pre literate and provincial candidates are necessarily more remote as a rule from the ordinary voter' (Electoral Commission 1987:7). Other commentators have argued that provincial electorates actually serve a useful purpose, forcing candidates 'to transcend narrow, localized tribal and clan loyalties in reaching out for support in a larger territorial unit', and pointing out that a number of PNG's most prominent politicians have been elected from provincial electorates (Wijeweera 1989:40).

One consequence of regional electorates was that they effectively introduced a regional weighting into PNG politics which remains today. While such arrangements are not uncommon in other diverse federal societies (Australia and the USA are two examples of countries which use their Senate to weight representation in favour of smaller, less populous States), the incorporation of this weighting in a unicameral legislature is quite unusual. It is clear from the electoral law that PNG's open electorates are designed to represent people. In the cases of the provincial electorates, however, it is explicitly the provinces themselves that are being represented, which is why a vote in the provincial electorate for Manus (11304 electors in 1987) has ten times the value of a vote in the Western Highlands (123119 electors in 1987).

Some territorially homogeneous but culturally, religiously or linguistically divided societies have their Parliament elected from a single, nationwide constituency (eg the Netherlands, Israel) which gives no acknowledgment to territorial difference. PNG stands with a group of other nations—typically large, geographically diverse nations such as Australia, Canada and the USA—in which territories and regions demanded, and received, disproportionate legislative representation and powers as their price for joining the new nation.

The effects of the single-member system

Some possible reasons for the almost unquestioned adoption of a plurality system of single member (uninominal) territorial representation in PNG have been put forward above. But what have been the effects, if any, of this system? Many observers would argue that institutions like electoral systems have little real effect on political behaviour in Western societies, and even less in traditional societies, where the decision-making process is not focussed at the parliamentary level. The diffusion and formlessness of party activity in PNG is widely acknowledged and generally attributed to the lack of ideological cleavages in PNG society, as well as its very short political history. There has been little examination of the institutional factors which may have affected or influenced PNG's fluid party system. Some writers emphasise the irrelevance of Western institutions such as party, parliament and the judicial system in the face of PNG's regional and clan-based decision-making processes. Moreover, institutions such as the first-past-the-post electoral system have not produced the type of party system they were intended to. The *Economist* has referred to PNG's 'Italian' political system, while Ghai has noted that results so far have been those usually associated with proportional representation: 'multiple parties, large candidature, coalitions, and weak governments' (Ghai 1988:77).

While it is easy to over-emphasise the importance or influence of political institutions (and particularly of electoral systems) in any polity, they should not be consigned to irrelevance. This is particularly the case for a polity such as PNG which has been engaged in rapid social and cultural change for the past 30 years, because it is in periods of rapid change that electoral systems are at their most influential. Plurality systems generally work to stifle new trends or movements, unless they are regionally based, in which case a plurality system will generally serve to over-represent their importance (Bogdanor 1983).

Constituency focus

PNG politics at a national (ie parliamentary) level actually reflects, to a large extent, the inherent and predictable effects of a constituency-based system of representation grafted on to a weak-party system. Most single-member constituency systems are strong

party systems, and the internal logic of party, party identification amongst the electorate and parliamentary party discipline all serve to marginalise a constituency's importance. However, the combination of weak parties and uninomial districts, particularly in a country with poor communications and a localised, heterogeneous population, leads to an almost slavish responsiveness to the constituency (which, as noted earlier, is not necessarily the electorate, but often the smaller sub-group which voted for the member). This relationship holds true whether we are talking about USA Congressmen, Irish deputies or PNG parliamentarians. While this may be a good thing in terms of some democratic theory, it can have very considerable deficiencies from the point of view of broader democratic accountability.

In a rebuttal of Richard Rose's much-quoted contention that the difference in electoral systems is more a matter of degree than principle (Rose 1984), William Irvine has argued that the form of electoral system can have a vast influence in regionally-divided polities, and that the plurality system in particular serves to encourage regionally-based politics. Irvine contends that politicians seeking to maximise their chances of electoral success will 'frame their appeals and expend campaign resources of time and money (including whatever pre-election patronage they can muster) in those regions where they have the best chance of success and to ignore regions that are less favourable to their party ... as a result of these incentives, strongest in a country with a plurality electoral system, party support becomes increasingly concentrated in particular regions of the country' (Irvine 1988:15-16). Likewise, in severely divided electorates such as those in the PNG Highlands, and particularly open electorates, candidates can (and do) ignore large sections of unfriendly territory, concentrating instead on maximising their vote in their 'home' region(s). Because uninomial systems seek to find the 'best' single representative for a territorially defined community, it is not in candidates' interests to seek to reflect a range of ideologies and policy preferences. Rather, as Irvine has shown, they seek to avoid such representation and concentrate their efforts away from specific ideological or policy platforms. This feature of uninomial representation is amplified by the lack of an ideologically coherent party system. The result is that rational candidates, responding to career incentives, will emphasise both the importance of region and the irrelevance of ideology or policy in their platforms. They will also attempt to

campaign as efficiently and inexpensively as possible—which, in PNG, often means localising their appeal and effort as much as possible to secure the (minimum) plurality vote needed for election.

Regionalism

Under the uninomial plurality system there is an enormous electoral advantage in having an efficiently distributed vote. This does not, however, mean an evenly distributed vote. In fact, an even distribution of votes across all electorates would almost certainly see a party win no seats at all. Most efficient is to concentrate (but not over-concentrate) votes according to region. The total size of a party's vote is largely irrelevant for this purpose: the spatial distribution of the votes between constituencies is all important.

A party that is regionally-based and assiduously cultivates its regional support can achieve a much higher seats-votes ratio than a party which spreads its support level too thinly over a wider area. Of course, a determined regional focus from a party presumes a significant level of party organisation and party identification amongst voters—two prerequisites in short supply in PNG. Nevertheless, a regional display of electoral results by party, such as Richard Natkiel's mapping of the 1982 election, shows a significant level of regionalism at the party level in PNG overall (Leonard and Natkiel 1987).

Similarly, a single candidate within a highly fractionalised constituency like those in PNG needs to strike a judicious balance between appealing to home areas alone and to campaigning in hostile areas which offer few votes. May's analysis of ballot box results from Angoram Open in 1987 suggests that campaigning patterns appeared to have a more productive effect upon votes gained than more superficially attractive explanations such as party identification. His conclusion was that 'the most that can be said with any certainty is that energetic campaigning and 'being known' (both of which parties facilitate) gain votes, but that local support factors are still of great importance, especially for minor candidates' (May 1989:120).

Regionalism has received limited attention in past PNG electoral studies (Anere 1989), but it is inevitable that the overriding importance of region of residence identified by Saffu (1989) in his study of voting behaviour at the 1987 election will lead to more detailed examination of regional importance. The existing electoral structure means that any party—particularly a new

party—wishing to gain significant parliamentary representation will have to focus, at least initially, at the regional—rather than national—level. Even parties hailed as ‘ideological’, such as the Melanesian Alliance, have a strong regional base and in fact rely on their regional appeal for their limited electoral success (King 1989).

Spatial fractionalisation

The regional focus of PNG’s electoral system is thus an agent of both the regional preoccupation of the electorate and their elected member, and of PNG’s party (and social) structure. Any party which aims to maximise its parliamentary representation must reckon primarily with two territorial factors: the level of regional support for their party and the level of regional support for their anointed candidate (often these are not the same ‘region’—candidates in particular tend to come from a particular village or ethnic power-base within an electorate). This leads to the observation that PNG elections are ‘territorially fractured’ on at least two dimensions: between constituencies and within constituencies. The former is, as much of this paper has attempted to demonstrate, partly a result of uninomial territorial representation. Intra-constituency fractionalisation, however, manifests itself in electoral competition between different groups within an already-delimited constituency, with consequent electoral behaviour such as vote-splitting and dummy candidates. As noted earlier, this is primarily an effect of the plurality electoral formula, which contains no disincentives to candidate multiplication.

Temporal fractionalisation

As well as the territorial fractionalisation noted above, PNG elections are fractured on another level: that of time. The 1992 election was spread over a two-week polling period; previous elections have lasted four weeks or longer. The spreading-out of elections temporally as well as spatially is a feature of elections in many developing countries: limited resources and harsh terrain mean that a lengthy polling period is often the only way of reaching all the electorate. This is especially the case in PNG, where the well-established procedure of mobile polling requires a long time-frame in some of the more inaccessible electorates. As results are not announced progressively, it is not clear what the specific effects of this added dimension are upon voters, beyond campaign speculation

as to the pattern of early results and activity. It does, however, serve to lengthen the time between the opening of polling and the declaration of the result, which is a cause for instability in itself. As any general would know, a lengthy campaign is a risky campaign, because resources cannot be maximised in short, efficient bursts. Increased stress and tension on candidates and particularly the electoral administration are a result, and indeed the Electoral Commission itself has claimed that the length of the polling period creates 'tensions and upheavals' (Electoral Commission 1991:9).

Conclusion

Most of the countries cited above (USA, Australia, Ireland) require their budding local member to have established some prior contact with the district he or she wants to represent (Australia, for example, requires a candidate to be enrolled or entitled to enrol for the electorate they are contesting). PNG goes further by requiring the intending member to have a prior residence-based relationship with the constituency: nominating candidates must be at least 25 years old, a qualified voter for the electorate and be born in that electorate or have been continuously resident there for the two years prior to nomination or for five years at any time (Constitution, section 103). This takes the legislative requirement for localism further than any Western democracy and, when combined with the powerful institutional and social forces outlined above, is a further pressure towards constituency-focussed politics.⁷

This responsiveness at the level of the individual constituency leads to collective irresponsibility at the level of the national political system. There is simply not enough incentive for PNG parliamentarians to focus on national, as opposed to local and regional, interests (even those of the electorate as a whole rather than the candidate's 'home' area). The parliamentarian has two mutually incompatible responsibilities: a focus on the national good, and a focus on expressing the interests of his constituency, and extracting benefits for them from the nation's government. While this conflict is fed by PNG's tribal history and non-ideological,

⁷ Such residential qualifications can lead to surreal administrative difficulties. Wolfers has noted the celebrated occasion in the late 1960s when a star-fix had to be obtained to clarify in which electorate a particular candidate, whose home-base straddled two electorates, was qualified to stand (Wolfers 1968).

development-based politics, it is pushed along by the clientelist nature of localised politics focussed on territorial representation. As Bogdanor (1985:300) has noted:

There is, in fact, a deep-seated conflict between the notions of geographical representation and responsible party government, between the representation of territory and the representation of opinion. In a political system dominated by the clash of parties, the parliamentarian's constituency is likely to be of subordinate importance for him; while a system in which the dominant focus is the constituency will probably not articulate opposing interests and opinions very successfully.

This is particularly true of a country which uses the plurality method of electoral formula. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the combination of the plurality formula and single-member districts in PNG's severely divided society has had deleterious consequences for PNG's political system, emphasising territorial cleavages at the expense of national goals and rewarding a focus on constituency-based concerns rather than national policy interests.

Violence, Security and the 1992 Election*

Sinclair Dinnen

Introduction

In anticipation of the June 1992 national elections, the Papua New Guinean (PNG) Police Commissioner announced that police and defence forces would mount a massive joint security operation for the duration of the election period. This would be the largest such exercise since independence, surpassing that provided for the 1991 South Pacific Games in Port Moresby and Lae, as well as earlier police/defence force operations on Bougainville (*Post-Courier* 19 and 21/5/92). Security was to be concentrated in the Highlands Provinces which, according to police intelligence reports, were likely to be the main trouble spots (*The Times* 21/5/92).

The phenomenon of election-related violence is by no means confined to PNG. Nor is there any evidence that its incidence in this country matches, as yet, the intensity of that experienced in many other developing nations (Chandidas 1971). The comparatively short history of elections in PNG nevertheless suggests a relationship between violence and political change, whereby 'a certain level of violence is expected in conjunction with elections (especially after them), whether at national or provincial level' (Strathern 1993:51). In this respect, the elaborate security operation proposed for 1992 caused little surprise.

Violence occurring in the context of PNG elections must be set against the broader context of pervasive concern with what is euphemistically referred to as the 'law and order problem'. A crucial dimension of this more diffuse set of concerns (Dinnen 1993)

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relates to the capacity of the state to respond to escalating levels of lawlessness and other perceived challenges to its authority. The ongoing Bougainville rebellion, growing violence on the part of organised criminal gangs (Harris 1988), militant compensation claims against the state by customary landowners, (Strathern 1993), and the waging of tribal warfare in many parts of the Highlands provide ample evidence of the extremely tenuous writ of centralised authority in PNG and the limited ability of the state to control illegal violence. The increasing availability of firearms (home-made and factory produced) and rumours of their intended use in the elections accentuated these concerns. In 1992, for example, Foreign Affairs Minister Sir Michael Somare claimed that police in the Highlands had uncovered high powered rifles imported from Australia and were concerned that these might be used to intimidate voters during the elections (*Post-Courier* 10/2/92).¹ Experience from previous elections also confirmed the intense passions aroused on such occasions and their potential for generating conflict and violence (Iamo et al 1992).

In this paper I shall look very generally at the issue of collective violence in the PNG context with particular reference to its incidence in the 1992 general elections. The review is nation-wide in scope and largely based on newspaper reports, documentation from relevant government agencies, and interviews conducted during fieldwork in Port Moresby, Southern Highlands and Enga. In the first section, I shall look critically at the concept of violence and its current usage in PNG. In the second, essentially descriptive section, I shall outline the security measures adopted by state authorities during the election period and the pattern of violence as reported in the media. Drawing on this earlier material, the concluding section will provide a broad outline of the principal features and dynamics of collective violence in contemporary PNG, within and beyond the electoral context.

¹ Bill Standish confirmed that in Simbu Province many such rumours accompanied the elections. One example concerned an MP who allegedly had high-powered automatic Chinese rifles. Those who voted against the MP, according to the rumour, were likely to be attacked by the weapons, which, it was claimed, had been used in a 1990 tribal warfare. The police searched but failed to uncover the guns. Such rumours and threats play an important role in the mobilisation of votes in the electoral context (Personal Communication).

Violence and elections in Papua New Guinea

Without becoming entangled in the hermeneutic issues, we can tentatively define 'violence' as acts involving the intentional use of physical force. Use or threats of physical force, like most other forms of social behaviour, usually occur in the furtherance of particular objectives. It is the task of the researcher to identify these reasons whilst, simultaneously, analysing the perceptions of those who challenge the legitimacy of such acts. The labelling of behaviour as violent and, hence, illegitimate, will usually be done by reference to some preordained code of values or norms. In the modern nation state it is usually those definitions contained in state law that determine the official legitimacy or otherwise of violent behaviour. Legitimacy, in this case, is seen as flowing vertically downwards from a central authority. In the case of small-scale societies, on the other hand, it has long been recognised that legitimacy tends to be widely distributed along horizontal lines. As Southall points out:

Fundamental responsibility for the maintenance of society itself is much more widely dispersed throughout its varied institutions and its whole population, at least, usually, all its adult males, (Southall 1968:167).

Whilst the formal status of nation-state was attained in 1975, the PNG state remains weak and fragmented. Its lack of internal coherence and limited external purchase over the plethora of collective entities comprising civil society is widely acknowledged (Ashton 1991) and manifests itself in numerous ways. Many of the features of the misleadingly termed 'breakdown in law and order' are indicative of profound underlying conflicts within and between different sources of power dispersed throughout the national boundaries. The extent of this dispersal, particularly of coercive power, accentuates the problems of authority for both state and non-state actors in PNG. Such a situation may be contrasted to the ideal of modern statehood, under which the state claims a monopoly over coercive powers.

The phenomenon of tribal fighting in PNG provides a useful illustration of behaviour that clearly challenges the state's proclaimed monopoly over violence. In the process, it illustrates the continuing existence of numerous parochial non-state entities that also proclaim a prerogative over coercion. From the viewpoint of the state, it is the illegal violence entailed in tribal fighting that

constitutes the 'law and order' problem. For the participants, however, the fight is perceived as a legitimate mechanism, albeit of last resort, for resolving an underlying dispute over land, pigs, an earlier killing or whatever (Strathern 1977). Discussing the results of a survey of popular attitudes towards tribal fighting, Mapusia found that 'tribal fighting itself was not perceived as an example of lawlessness' but, rather 'was seen as an attempt at solving a problem' (Mapusia, 1986:60). In a similar vein the Clifford Report commented:

Tribal fighting is a response to disorder, to a dispute or a breach of a norm not a problem in itself. For participants the law and order problem is the offence or dispute, not the fighting, (Clifford et al 1984/1:92).

Tribal fighting or, more accurately, tribal warfare (Meggitt 1977; Reay 1982; Burton 1990) also draws attention to an important defining feature of violence in Papua New Guinea—namely, its group or collective character. The social organisation of much violent crime in western industrialised contexts has led criminologists to focus pragmatically on its manifestation in individual crimes and criminals and has, consequently, favoured behavioural analysis of individual criminal careers (Weiner 1989). This orientation has, to some extent, been reinforced by the continuing influence of biological and genetic approaches in the study of human behaviour, including violent behaviour (Goldstein 1986). In PNG, however, the student of crime is confronted with social phenomena that are overwhelmingly collective in character, such as those involving tribal warriors or 'rascal' gangs. Whilst the line between individual and collective violence remains conceptually and operationally ambiguous, these two forms of violence generally suggest quite different lines of causal inquiry and interactional dynamics.

There is general agreement that escalating levels of collective violence and, in particular, the revival of tribal fighting (Gordon 1983; Paney 1973), accompanied the gradual dismantling of the former colonial system of decentralised administration and its replacement with a highly centralised system of government. In social control terms, several observers identify the demise of the colonial system of district-level administration as responsible for generating a social control vacuum at local level which has, in turn, facilitated increasing levels of violence and lawlessness. It is in this

context that popular demands are often heard for the return of the kiap (district officer) (*Post-Courier* 13/8/91).

The claim that decentralised state controls were exclusively responsible for the temporary colonial peace, however, tends to over-emphasise the purchase of the former at the expense of informal customary controls. Pax Australiana—which lasted less than thirty years in most parts of the Highlands—was not achieved through the displacement of informal authority. Given the severely limited resources of the colonial administration and the short time periods involved, pacification could only have been achieved through the active cooperation of customary authorities (Gordon and Meggitt 1985). How long this peace might have endured had independence not arrived in 1975 remains an open question. As the Clifford Report said of the colonial period:

Customary law held sway and only when it failed was the kiap involved.. Papua New Guineans accepted this odd system with its ritual and irrelevant sanctions only as long as they had to (Clifford et al 1984:112).

By the late 1960's and early 1970's an increasing propensity to challenge state authority was becoming apparent. The immediate context of the contemporary law and order situation is relatively well known. The removal of discriminatory legislation (in particular, that concerning freedom of movement and alcohol consumption), urbanisation, rapid population growth, and a growing constituency of marginalised youth provided important preconditions for crime and delinquency. Added to this, slow and uneven economic development, increasing social disparities, limited employment opportunities, and a deteriorating system of infrastructural support and delivery of government services have all contributed to growing levels of social unrest manifested in, amongst other things, escalating lawlessness.

At another level, tensions between central and local sites of power have contributed to the emergence of what some writers (Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Strathern 1993) identify as a deepening crisis of internal legitimacy in post-colonial Papua New Guinea. The weakness of state authority in Papua New Guinea simultaneously facilitates violence by and between both non-state and state actors (Amnesty International 1990; Robie 1993). In the former case, the tenuous purchase of centralised authority enhances the already considerable autonomy of more parochial sites. In the

latter, violence may result from frustrations experienced by state actors charged with controlling challenges to state authority but who, in practice, lack the necessary operational capacity to do so. Similar frustrations may arise from the tensions and contradictions inherent in the workings of the different components of the criminal justice system. Thus, many PNG police believe their work is constantly undermined by the perceived leniency of court sentences, as well as by the manifest failure of the Correctional Institutions Service (CIS) to provide secure custody. The ineffectiveness of the internal police disciplinary procedures, in turn, ensures that officers who succumb to the temptation to dispense 'summary justice' to suspects have little fear of official reprisals.

The problematic character of 'violence' in general, and its application within the Melanesian context, is particularly evident in the case of election-related violence. Under state law there is no criminal offence of 'election violence' per se. Insofar as violent behaviour occurring during an election attracts legal sanctions these will be for standard criminal offences such as assault, inter-group fighting, carrying a weapon and so on. Particular electoral offences provided for under the Criminal Code (Chapter 262, Revised Laws) and the *Organic Law on National Elections* tend to deal with non-violent attempts to subvert the electoral process, although some of these might also involve the use or threat of violence, such as Undue Influence (S.102 of the Criminal Code); Interference at Elections (S.108 of the Criminal Code); Disorderly Behaviour at Meeting (S.198 of the Organic Law on National Elections). As with other forms of violent behaviour, an understanding of that occurring in the course of elections needs to be situated within its encompassing social and cultural contexts (Riches, 1986:vii).

First introduced in 1964, the electoral process in Papua New Guinea and its host political system have had a relatively short period of gestation. The flurry of recent electoral debate and reform demonstrates growing official recognition of the need to modify and adapt the system as more unforeseen difficulties become apparent. As with other contemporary state institutions and processes in PNG (Larmour, 1992), the social embeddedness of the electoral system remains tenuous and its operation susceptible to contention and dispute. Far from being displaced or neutralised by the downward thrust of central authority, local political traditions have proved remarkably resilient and, in many respects, have successfully penetrated the state in a reverse process of 'upward colonization'

(Gordon and Meggitt 1985:181). Standish has recently documented the same process in Chimbu Province (Standish 1992).

Complex processes of socio-cultural integration can be seen in a number of features of contemporary Melanesian political culture. Local expectations of the role of political leadership, to take an obvious example, diverge in significant respects from those embodied in the introduced system. Standish has commented that in the Highlands '[a] Member is expected to be a delegate, rather than a representative with freedom of political judgement' and, further, that 'local kinship loyalties preclude the transfer of much trust to the member of a potentially (or actually) hostile lain' (Standish 1983:117). Whereas a strong party system is a defining feature of the Westminster model, it is well established that party affiliation plays little part in the decisions of the vast majority of voters in Papua New Guinea (Oliver 1989). The persistence of tribal and clan allegiances as factors influencing voter behaviour has also been noted by many commentators. In the study cited above, Standish remarked that 'elections are contests between the clans and tribes, a poorly sublimated manifestation of traditional rivalries' (Standish 1983:117). Strathern (1993) has argued further that the local power bases of Highlands politicians have, in fact, become progressively more tribalised in recent years. According to May, a major consequence of this form of electoral loyalties is that:

It ensures the interplay of traditional and modern politics, with the implications this has for the accumulation and distribution of wealth and influence for political purposes, the manipulation of *kastom* to political ends, and occasionally the use of violence. (May 1982:645)

The intensely competitive character of PNG elections is evidence of the high levels of expectation on the part of both candidates and supporters and the vital stakes at issue in the electoral contest. This, in turn, is evidence of the more general processes of interaction referred to above. Membership of the National Parliament provides access to the funds and resources essential for securing and promoting a member's local power base, as well as advancing his own material position. Even more spectacular powers of patronage and opportunities for self-enrichment are associated with ministerial office. Thus, the post-election competition for ministries has become as intense as, if not more than,

the initial election contest itself. As well as structuring the relationship between national parliamentarians and their electoral constituents, patronage has increasingly come to shape relations between politicians at national and provincial levels. Where conflicts and disputes arise in this context, they are likely to be reproduced at different levels of the political system, thereby adding to their overall intensity and propensity to violence.

In practice, a member's local power base bears little relation to constituency boundaries and is more likely to be built around extensive kinship and patronage networks. As some early observers of PNG's elections put it:

In many electorates nearly all the people linked by village residence, clan or language voted for one candidate...The election was then basically a test of the size of inter-electorate groups and not concerned with comparing the policies or qualities of the different candidates. (Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979:133)

The enduring practice of granting national parliamentarians access to a variety of discretionary funds (the so-called 'slush funds'), for sponsoring local development projects, reinforces the politics of patronage. The observations of Gordon and Meggitt in Enga appear to have resonance throughout the Highlands:

Government is seen not as a mechanism for development but as an instrument to be used to establish and extend patronage ties (Gordon and Meggitt 1985:158).

The highly localised orientation of national politicians inevitably departs from official perceptions of the government process and is also likely to generate considerable tension at the local level. As Strathern points out, this *modus operandi* undermines official processes of government, whilst simultaneously encouraging 'the factionalization of relationships between groups within local electorates' (Strathern 1993:46) which may, in turn, facilitate conflict and violence. Where the constituency units are smallest, as in the case of provincial assembly elections, competition between candidates and their supporters tends to be in the form of head-on clan and tribal confrontations. In larger constituency units, as in national elections, deliberate (or believed to be deliberate) 'vote splitting' within tribes and clans inevitably results. This process of intra-group fragmentation has been identified by several observers

as a major precipitating factor underlying contemporary patterns of collective violence in the electoral context.²

These processes shaping competition for political office are illustrated in a number of familiar features of post-independence elections and parliamentary politics in Papua New Guinea. They include: the high number of candidates contesting seats, the small margin of votes polled by successful candidates,³ the frequency of disputed returns, the absence of election issues, the growing number of Independents, and the willingness of elected members to switch party allegiances in order to secure access to power (Oliver 1989). In his review of the 1987 elections, Saffu quotes approvingly from the work of another political scientist who said that in many contemporary post-colonial situations 'elections have become the alchemy that turns base metal into gold' (Saffu 1988:255). Such an analogy is particularly apt in PNG at a time of intensive and lucrative mineral exploitation which, in turn, amplifies opportunities for political patronage. Given the spiralling levels of expectation raised in the electoral context, it is hardly surprising that the disappointment of losing candidates and their supporters can quickly turn to conflict and violence.

How we perceive the dynamics and direction of the evolving political process in Papua New Guinea will clearly influence the way we view and respond to the phenomenon of election-related violence. For some, the disorderly struggle for political power is indicative of the lack of local understanding of the introduced political system and the inadequacy of administrative and logistical support (Smith 1960). For others it illustrates the absence of alternative means of material advancement. Some even see it as signalling the vigour of the democratic process itself. Thus, the claim in a local newspaper that:

The potential threat of election violence, according to authorities, is an indication that the people of PNG have made great progress since independence and are

² Standish claims that this process of 'splitting' has been the cause of most post-election violence in Simbu Province in recent years. In this situation, people are blaming members of their own tribe/clan for the loss of their own preferred candidate (Personal Communication).

³ 52 members with less than 20 percent of the vote and only seven gaining over 50 percent.

conscious of their political rights, (*Post-Courier* 19/5/92).

The weight of evidence reviewed in this paper suggests a more complex diagnosis. At one level, many cases of contemporary election-related violence in PNG stem from the continuation of long-standing forms of inter-group (sometimes intra-group) competition whose genesis lies beyond the electoral context. From this viewpoint, it is not the election process per se that generates conflict and violence and our focus turns, instead, to the political and socio-cultural configurations of Melanesian social organisations. The election, in such a situation, serves essentially to accentuate underlying competition and tensions existing within and between such entities. At a more general level, such conflicts are symptomatic of the deeply contested character of ongoing processes of integration between local-level political organisation and more encompassing national, regional and provincial polities. Ultimately, our study of contemporary conflicts in Papua New Guinea, whether election-related or otherwise, must be able to accommodate 'fine-grained analysis of local cultural and sociological processes, on the one hand, and critical analysis of regional and state-level sociopolitical and economic processes, on the other (Knauff, 1990:291).

The 1992 elections

Before looking at the data from the 1992 elections, it is useful to distinguish between incidents occurring at different stages of the electoral process. Conflict may occur prior or subsequent to voting, as well as during the voting process itself. For the purpose of the following review, we shall distinguish between three broad stages:

- Violence occurring in the lead up to the election, ie. in the nomination period and during pre-polling electioneering;
- Violence occurring during the election period, ie. during polling and counting;
- Violence occurring after polling, ie. in the context of disputed returns, failure to pay electoral officials and so on.

In this context, it is also useful to distinguish between two broad categories of factors that may precipitate election-related violence. First, there are those which relate to ongoing local power struggles that may manifest themselves in election-related violence but whose causes lie beyond the immediate electoral context. Examples

would include tribal and ethnic disputes that pre-date, and may well post-date, the immediate election period. Second, there are those precipitating factors relating directly to the administrative conduct of the election. Examples here include violence related to failure to supply sufficient numbers of ballot papers, deficiencies in the common and supplementary rolls, allegations of malpractice against electoral officials⁴ inadequate security etc. In practice there will inevitably be overlap between categories—as in the case of conflict generated by allegations of malpractice against officials on the grounds of their tribal or clan allegiances. The distinction may nevertheless be of use in contemplating reforms. Thus, problems in the administration of elections that contribute to violent responses may be relatively straightforward to resolve through more rigorous preparation, planning, resourcing or procedural reform. Precipitating factors related to more profound issues of local social and political organisation will clearly require quite different courses of remedial action.

(i) *Security arrangements*

Security arrangements for the 1992 elections were elaborate, involving large numbers of police and defence force personnel, and planning began many months prior to the actual conduct of the election between 13 and 27 June. In order to reduce the prospect of disruptions it was decided to hold one-day polling in all Highlands provinces, except Eastern Highlands, as well as in the Lae Metropolitan area and the National Capital District. Such an operation required a high degree of planning, mobility and coordination between electoral officials and security personnel. An initial planning meeting in 1991 between the police and Electoral Commission was followed by regular meetings between the principal institutional actors in different parts of the country. Thus, in February 1992 a team of senior defence force officers visited Western Highlands, Enga and Southern Highlands and were briefed by the respective provincial secretaries on their preparations and about potential trouble spots (*Post-Courier* 24/2/92). In the same month regional police commanders, senior defence force officers and

⁴ Standish advances the view that there is often a convenient scapegoating mechanism at work in this respect. It is easier to blame and harass a small group of electoral officials than to fight a tribal/clan enemy or precipitate a fight within the tribe/clan. In a sense blaming officials constitutes a face-saving safety value (Personal Communication).

officials from the Electoral Commission met in Goroka to discuss preparations for the June elections (*ibid*). In March the Police Minister announced the establishment of a police intelligence unit to gather and collate information on individuals, including candidates, expected to cause problems during the election (*Post-Courier* 11/3/92). Provincial police commanders, senior defence force officers and provincial returning officers from the Highlands region met with the Acting Police Commissioner in Mount Hagen in May to finalise operational plans for the elections (*Post-Courier* 5/5/92). Similar meetings were held in the other three regions.

Preparatory actions included pre-emptive police operations designed to detect and confiscate illegally held weapons and close down black market liquor outlets, as well as the announcement of liquor bans for the duration of the elections in different provinces. In the National Capital District, for example, police raided a number of settlements in May confiscating a wide range of weapons, including home-made and factory-made guns, as well as suspected stolen property (*Post-Courier* 8/5/92). Some Highlands Provincial Police Commanders authorised pre-emptive raids against suspect villages (as in Enga) whereas others did not (as in the Southern Highlands), preferring roadblocks as a means for detecting and confiscating weapons and alcohol. In June, for example, it was reported that police manning roadblocks in the Southern Highlands had confiscated 10 factory-made guns, as well as home-made guns and ammunition (*Post-Courier* 17/6/92). The same report said that police in the Western Highlands had confiscated three pistols from two intending candidates at a roadblock, whilst in Enga police raids had netted seven factory-made guns, many home-made guns and a large quantity of ammunition.

In April, Electoral Commissioner Mr. Reuben Kaiulo told all provincial secretaries that a liquor ban was essential in order to minimise disruptions at the forthcoming elections. In his view:

The increase in the number of home-made and factory-made firearms, some of which are high powered automatics, as well as the fact that the Constabulary's police strength will be taxed to the limit, should be seriously considered. (*Post-Courier* 22/4/92)

Whilst some Highlands provinces such as Enga and Chimbu already had liquor bans in force, other provinces subsequently introduced controls, either bans or restrictions on trading, for the

duration of the election period (*Post-Courier* 3/6/ and 5/6/92). The association between alcohol and violence also led to restrictions being imposed by provincial authorities in other regions, including Morobe (*Post-Courier* 10/6/92), Central, Gulf (*Post-Courier* 16/6/92) and the National Capital District (*Post-Courier* 17/6/92).

Concern with tribal fighting led to the declaration of the entire Simbu Province as a fighting zone under the Inter-Group Fighting Act (Chapter No. 344 of the Revised Laws). Explaining this action, the Provincial Secretary said the decision was made 'in anticipation of any election-related violence'. (*Post-Courier* 10/6/92). The Simbu Provincial Government presented the police with 24 pump action shotguns and four 22 calibre pistols worth a total of K7,000 to assist in policing the election (*ibid*). Bans were placed on the holding of political rallies and other forms of campaigning within the boundaries of Kundiawa town. Similar restrictions—with or without legal authority—were introduced elsewhere in the Highlands Region. The Provincial Police Commander in the Southern Highlands, for example, spoke of a successful 'voluntary' curfew applied in Mendi during polling between 28-30 June whereby people were told to stay off the streets between 6pm and 6am (Interview - 6/7/92).⁵ Public displays of strength by police and defence force personnel were carefully staged to ensure maximum public awareness of the state's intention to deal promptly with electoral disruptions, using force where necessary. Thus, on Saturday June 13 more than 1,300 policeman paraded at the Pope John Paul Oval in Mount Hagen and were joined by 50 soldiers who had marched from Kimininga police barracks (*Post-Courier* 16/6/1992).

Resort to public displays of strength by the security forces and the subsequent scale and character of the joint security operation should be understood against the background of severely depleted police resources throughout the country. For many years the police have been calling for an expanded force to meet the demands of a growing population and other factors seen as contributing to rising crime rates. In July 1991, for example, Police Commissioner Ila Geno revealed that whereas at Independence in 1975 the ratio of police to public was 1:520, it had since fallen to 1:800 (*Post-Courier* 11/7/1991). Current police data suggests a particular manpower

⁵ According to Standish, a similar 'unofficial curfew' was imposed by police in Kundiawa, simbu Province (Personal Communication).

shortage in the Highlands region, where concern with violence has been especially high.

On May 20 the Police Commissioner publicly announced details of the massive nation-wide security operation, code-named Natel 92, planned for the elections (Times 21/5/1992; *Post-Courier* 21/5/92). Over 2,500 personnel from both police and defence force were to be involved. Of these 2,000 would be police of whom 1,500 would be deployed in the Highlands Region where most trouble was anticipated. Subsequent reports indicated that the number of police actually deployed in the Highlands was between 1,300 (*Post-Courier* 17/6/92) and 1,400 (Police Debrief Document dated August 19, 1992). In addition, 75 members of a Police Rapid Response Unit were already on the ground guarding strategic resource developments including those at Yagifu, South East Gobe, Porgera, Mount Kare, and the Hides gas fields (*Post-Courier* 17/6/92). The objectives of the police operation were to ensure 'a smooth and trouble free election' and involved:

- (a) the guarding of polling stations;
- (b) the security of ballot boxes;
- (c) the security of polling officials;
- (d) the controlling of traffic;
- (e) assisting polling teams;
- (f) the prevention and detection of election offences; and
- (g) the general maintenance of law and order.

Mr. Geno put the estimated cost of the police involvement at K2 million. The highly centralised character of the security operation was evident in the operational arrangements. Overall Commander for Operation Natel 92 was Deputy Commissioner and Chief of Operations Bob Nenta, assisted by Chief Superintendent Albert Mula in his capacity as Police/Electoral Commission Co-ordinator for the election. The five Divisional Commanders (Border, Central, Highlands, Coastal, and Islands) were in charge of all police operations in their divisions and were to report daily to the overall commander. The operation was to be conducted in two phases. Phase one covered the polling period from Saturday 13 June to Saturday 27 June 1992. Phase two covered the counting period from Saturday 27 June to Saturday 4 July 1992.

The role of the Defence Force was authorised under Section 23 of the Defence Act (Chapter 74 of the Revised Laws) which provides for the force to assist in 'Service to the Public' under the following circumstances:

(1) If the Minister thinks that it is in the public interest to do so, he may authorize any part of the Defence Force to perform any public service within or outside the country that is capable of being performed by the Defence Force on such conditions (including conditions as to payment) as he determines.

It was envisaged that the Defence Force would perform a supporting role to the police in maintaining law and order during the election. The latter would provide the frontline security whereas the former would:

- (a) assist police in enforcing curfews;
- (b) provide backup for police in maintaining control points such as road blocks;
- (c) show a PNGDF presence by conducting highway patrols and moving around different districts;
- (e) provide radio communication for polling teams in remote areas.

The auxiliary and deterrent character of the defence force involvement was stressed in discussions with both the Provincial Police Commander for the Southern Highlands (Interview - 6/7/92) and the Wabag Station Commander in Enga (Interview - 7/7/92). High mobility was an essential component of the display of strength given the relatively small number of defence force personnel involved. The defence force Commander announced in June that only 40 soldiers would be deployed in each of the four Highlands provinces (*Post-Courier* 10/6/92). A further 200 would be on standby at Taurama barracks in Port Moresby to be deployed if required. Throughout the operation control of the soldiers remained with the defence command (*Post-Courier* 22/4/92). Traditional rivalries between the two principal security agencies—the police and defence force—emerged in the former's post-election debriefing document. Speaking about the involvement of the defence force, the Deputy Police Commissioner claimed that 'their role was not clearly defined' and 'at times they operated in isolation' (Police Debrief 1992:12). He recommended against any future joint operations (*ibid*).

(ii) *Pre-polling violence*

In general, there were few reported incidents of violence occurring prior to polling. An election rally in Mendi, Southern Highlands Province, where three candidates simultaneously nominated for the Imbonggu seat, degenerated into fighting as rival supporters clashed

(Times 23/4/92; *Post-Courier* 23/4/92). The *Post-Courier* reported a 'riot' involving 15,000 supporters. *The Times* estimated the crowd at a more conservative, but still substantial, 9,000. The former also reported hospital authorities in Mendi confirming that nine people were treated for injuries sustained in the disturbance. The latter reported one casualty and said that damage to property was limited to a shop owned by one of the nominating candidates. The situation appears to have been inflamed by some abusive verbal exchanges between the candidates—a not uncommon feature of political rallies in the Highlands (Standish, 1983)—and the proximity of large numbers of excited rival supporters. In addition, the number of police responding from the adjoining Mendi police station was extremely small—estimated by *The Times* as 12. The riot squad, which would normally have dealt with such a situation, was in Mount Hagen undergoing training. The *Post-Courier* reported Highlands Division Commander Bunu Katusele as saying that similar fighting had occurred in Kundiawa, Chimbu Province, on April 21.⁶

In May, just over a month prior to polling, supporters of former M.P. Gerard Sigulogo threatened disruptions in Kavieng, New Ireland Province, if their candidate was not allowed to contest the June elections (*Post-Courier* 5/5/92). Mr. Sigulogo had previously been found guilty of misconduct in office by a Leadership Tribunal in 1990 and was subsequently dismissed from his Kavieng seat and barred from holding office for a three-year period expiring in March 1993. Despite this, he nominated for the 1992 elections in April. The Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea, Sir Buri Kidu, made clear that a person barred from public office after a Leadership Tribunal hearing was ineligible to seek public office during the period of the ban (*Post-Courier* 1/5/92). Subsequently the Electoral Commission removed Mr. Sigulogo's name from the list of candidates. The circumstances in which this decision was belatedly taken immediately aroused the wrath of the latter's supporters. In a letter to the Electoral Commissioner, the New Ireland Administrative Secretary wrote that:

Our (electoral) officials are being targeted as well as being implicated as having conspired with the sitting

⁶ According to Standish there was violence in Kundiawa on 3/6/92 arising from street campaigning and a candidate's vehicle was stoned in a village on 5/6/92. These incidents were cited as the reason for the subsequent ban on campaigning within Kundiawa (Personal Communication).

Member and other intending candidates resulting in Mr. Sigulogo's termination from contesting. Both the provincial returning officer and the returning officer for Kavieng Open are in fear for their safety as they have been told in no uncertain terms that if Sigulogo is not allowed to contest the supporters will attack the officials. (*Post-Courier* 5/5/92)

The threats of violence do not appear to have been fulfilled in this instance but once again attest to the intensity of local rivalries aroused by the electoral process.

A few days prior to polling the media reported clashes between rival supporters in New Ireland. Nineteen people were reportedly arrested for an earlier fight between supporters of the People's Progress Party (PPP) and Pangu Party on June 6. Of the 14 people arrested, ten were charged with fighting and creating disturbances and four with assault. A later incident involved rival supporters attending a rally at Sohun village in the Namatanai district and the *Post-Courier* reported 12 serious injuries and claimed that police reinforcements had to be brought in from Kavieng (*Post-Courier* 10/6/92). The same report mentioned a fight between two opposing groups of supporters on the Duke of York Islands in the Kokopo electorate in East New Britain province. Again, high emotions, the proximity of opposing supporters and, initially at any rate, the absence of security personnel appear to have contributed to these incidents.

(iii) *Polling violence*

The first formally reported incident of polling-related violence occurred in the Western Highlands, when a candidate for the Tambul-Nebilyer seat and some of his scrutineers allegedly smashed open four ballot boxes scattering the enclosed ballot papers (*Post-Courier* 19/6/92). The police had not established any grounds for the suspicions of the candidate and his scrutineers in respect of the particular boxes. The candidate and two others were subsequently charged with unlawfully opening and destroying ballot boxes (*Post-Courier* 22/6/92). The Chimbu police commander reported that three candidates had been charged in connection with alleged threatening behaviour and assault. At the same time the Enga police were investigating an incident in which an armed gang held up security guards at Kandep and made off with more than 8000 unmarked ballot papers.

On June 22, eighteen ballot boxes containing votes from the Lumusa area in Western Highlands were burnt by villagers allegedly protesting over official failure to meet their demands for an electoral boundary change (*Post-Courier* 23/6/92). In Wapenamanda, Enga province, disgruntled supporters of one candidate smashed open three ballot boxes and emptied their contents in front of the Wapenamanda government station (*ibid*). According to the Enga Provincial Police Commander the boxes had just arrived after polling was completed when a truck full of supporters arrived and broke three open. The same report mentioned the arrest of the sitting member for Kompiam-Ambum in Enga for allegedly breaking open four ballot boxes from his own electorate. An assault on a policeman accompanying polling officials was also reported at Buna village in the West Sepik province, while fighting between supporters at a polling booth was reported in the Kubalia area of the East Sepik. According to police, who claimed fourteen arrests, the Buna villagers were apparently angry over the arrest of a fellow villager for another election-related incident. In Kubalia a further eleven people were arrested and charged with fighting (*ibid*).

The first reported fatality occurred on June 29 after a man was shot in a confrontation between supporters and police at the Walium government station in Madang province (*Post-Courier* 1/7/92). According to a subsequent report by the Police Commissioner, the incident began when scrutineers questioned the presiding officer as to why the seal on one of the uncounted ballot boxes appeared to have been tampered with (*Post-Courier* 3/7/92). Initial discontent spread when the Electoral Commission refused to suspend counting and led to the fatal confrontation between police reinforcements and angry supporters armed with sticks and iron bars. Commissioner Geno said that 'police were forced to use tear gas and gunfire to control the situation and to protect themselves, officials and property' (*ibid*). In addition to the deceased, two other supporters reportedly required medical treatment.

Perhaps the most spectacular reported incident of poll related violence was the hijacking of ballot boxes containing votes cast from the Komo-Margarima seat in the Southern Highlands (*Post-Courier* 1/7/92). According to newspaper reports, 28 boxes being transported under escort from Tari to Mendi on June 26 were intercepted by an armed gang near Nipa. Twenty one of the boxes were totally destroyed, while seven were returned after having been tampered

with. In their report to the Electoral Commission the Komo-Margarima returning officer and his assistant claimed that the incident was 'politically motivated' and made allegations of improper conduct against the security forces. On the latter charge, the electoral officials said that it had been previously arranged to airlift the boxes from Tari to Mendi. Instead they were transported by road 'in absolute defiance of explicit instructions from both the District Co-ordinator... and acting police station commander (Tari) at the relevant time' (ibid). They further claimed that the police escort from Mount Hagen broke into the Plant and Transport Board yard in Tari and removed the truck with the boxes to drive it to Mendi. Further criticism was directed at the police role in this incident by the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Local Government and District Administration Branch of the Department of the Southern Highlands Province who commented that: '(i)t is unbelievable when you see people removing 28 ballot boxes in front of 16 policemen' (Report to the Electoral Commissioner, 8/7/92).

(iv) Post-polling violence

Shortly after polling was completed fighting was reported between supporters of different candidates at the Koban plantation on the border of the Dei and North Waghi Open Electorates in the Western Highlands (*Post-Courier* 1/7/92). At about the same time, it was reported that part of a village outside Kundiawa in Chimbu province had been set on fire in an election related incident.⁷ A senior government official in Kundiawa was quoted as claiming that the arson was the work of supporters of a number of candidates for the Sinasina/Yonggamugl electorate who were angry that villagers had supported another candidate (*Post-Courier* 2/7/92). A newspaper report claimed that two tea factories and several bridges along the Hagen-Baiyer road in the Western Highlands had been destroyed by supporters of losing candidates (*Post-Courier* 3/7/92) but this was subsequently denied in a later report (*Post-Courier* 6/7/92) which confined the damage to an office complex and two vehicles belonging to one of the tea estates.

Threats of violence by losing candidates and their supporters consumed much police time in the immediate post-polling period. The Coastal Divisional commander reported that rumours of

⁷ Standish reported a number of instances in Simbu where police/defence force deliberately burnt houses to punish, or 'teach a lesson' ('mekim save') to, angry supporters of losing candidates (Personal Communication).

possible trouble were rife in Lae and that police were stepping up security measures in anticipation (*Post-Courier* 6/7/92). At the same time, police in Wewak, East Sepik, were guarding key installations and increasing patrols after threats by losing candidates to telephone services, water and power supplies (*ibid*). In Madang, police responded to threats by guarding commercial property belonging to the newly elected members for the provincial and open seats respectively. Three further fatalities were reported in the Western Highlands (*Post-Courier* 7/7/92). In the Western Highlands, two men were apparently killed in election related group fights—one in the Nebilyer area and the other in the Dei Council area—while a third was reportedly killed in a drunken brawl at Kudjip in what police believed was a celebration of an election win.

Discontent with the conduct of the election in the National Capital District (NCD) (*Post-Courier* 26/6/92) led to initial calls by some candidates for a recount (*Post-Courier* 1/7/92) followed by more strident demands for fresh elections (*Post-Courier* 3/7/92). Police issued a general warning against public demonstrations following information that losing candidates and their supporters in the NCD were planning to stage mass demonstrations against alleged electoral malpractice (*Post-Courier* 8/7/92; *Times* 9/7/92). As this warning was issued, police reinforcements moved into the Dei area of the Western Highlands amidst fears of a major fight between opposing clans following earlier election related violence in the area (*ibid*). In Mount Hagen in the Western Highlands threats of violence by losing candidates and supporters resulted in restricted trading hours over a two week period and the business community complained of significant loss of revenue (*ibid*). According to the Western Highlands Chamber of Commerce over K200,000 in lost sales was attributable to closures resulting from threats of violence. The senior judiciary reiterated earlier statements by the police and others that disgruntled candidates should resort to the courts for redress. The Chief Justice told the press that:

Those who are aggrieved by the conduct or the outcome of the 1992 national elections in any way may petition the National Court for remedy. (*ibid*)

The Enga Provincial Police Commander's vehicle was damaged when he drove into a fight between supporters of two rival candidates at Wapenamanda (*Post-Courier* 9/7/92). Meanwhile

another senior Enga police officer described the post-polling atmosphere in Wabag as 'explosive' owing to the Electoral Commission's failure to pay election officials, adding that 'each day we are almost having a riot here in Wabag town (sic)' (ibid). At the same time reports reaching the Western Highlands Provincial Office in Mount Hagen revealed that many teachers who had assisted with polling had been threatened and prevented from going to work (*Post-Courier* 10/7/92). As a result several community schools had yet to resume their third term classes. Group fighting was reported in the Southern Highlands after the announcement of the election results (Times 16/7/92).

During the frenetic 'numbers game' in the immediate post-election process of government formation, the Police Commissioner warned of threats against newly elected independent members to 'persuade' them to join particular factions or parties (*Post-Courier* 13/7/92). Former Attorney-General Bernard Narokobi subsequently called for a commission of inquiry into such threats (*Post-Courier* 4/8/92). When it was eventually announced on July 15 that Paias Wingti would be the new prime minister, boisterous crowd behaviour occurred in both Mount Hagen and Mendi. Although business premises were closed all day in both towns, little actual violence appears to have taken place (*Post-Courier* 17/7/92).

On 27 July a peace agreement was signed by four warring clans in the Dei Council area in Western Highlands (*Post-Courier* 28/7/92). The agreement followed an election-related incident in which three men were killed during fighting between the four clans (ibid). A spokesperson for the Department of Western Highlands said that if the agreement was breached, the Department would recommend that Dei be declared a fighting zone for an indefinite period and that all government services be withdrawn. In August it was reported that no government services had actually been delivered in the Kol district of the Jimi area of Western Highlands since the end of vote counting in June (*Post-Courier* 28/8/92). Most government workers had apparently fled because of continuing threats by disgruntled supporters of losing candidates (ibid). A revival of the previously mentioned group fight that originated in a drunken celebration of the election results in the Kudjip area of the Western Highlands was reported in September (*Post-Courier* 1/9/92). According to the report, two further fatalities occurred in late August in the fight between the two clans (ibid). The same report

referred to tension persisting between Baiyer river clans in the Western Highlands over an earlier election related shooting.

Election-related violence was still being reported as late as October, almost four months after polling was completed. The Highlands Divisional Police Commander claimed that the Kagua district of the Southern Highlands had turned into 'wild west' country since trouble flared in the aftermath of the June elections (*Post-Courier* 7/10/92). He said that the problem began with violence between supporters of both the winning and losing candidates but that criminals had since taken advantage of the general breakdown in law and order. The new member for the Kagua Erave seat contended, in turn, that the police were themselves partly to blame (*Post-Courier* 8/10/92). He claimed that destruction of property during special police operations in several villages and the very small number of police currently stationed in the area contributed to lawlessness (*ibid*). The police had the final word in the newspapers when the Southern Highlands Provincial Police Commander blamed the new member for not having done anything to resolve the conflicts he and his opponents created during the election (*Post-Courier* 20/10/92).

Problems associated with the non-payment of electoral officials and other administrative matters continued to surface many months after the election had been declared. In December, for example, the Provincial Electoral Officer in Wewak, East Sepik Province, was reported as saying that disgruntled candidates and electoral officials had threatened him and his officers over the issue of payment and reimbursement of nomination fees (*Post-Courier* 21/12/92). These difficulties, in fact, continued into 1993 with many angry scenes outside the Electoral Commission HQ in Boroko, Port Moresby.

Discussion

Official post-election evaluations emphasised the peaceful manner in which the 1992 national elections were conducted. Whilst it is not possible to quantify the actual extent of violence with any degree of accuracy, secondary evidence suggests an altogether less tranquil picture. Associated acts of interpersonal violence (ranging from verbal threats to actual killings) and extensive damage to property were reported at various times in different locations before, during and after the 1992 elections. As anticipated, most reported incidents occurred in the five Highlands Provinces. The majority of these took

place after polling had been completed, although some serious incidents—such as the alleged hijacking of ballot boxes in the Komo-Margarima seat—also occurred during the polling phase. Reports of election-related violence continued to be heard for many months after the formal electoral process had been completed.

The seemingly complacent tone of official evaluations appears to be a result of genuine surprise (and relief) that the scale of disorder was not worse, rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead. National elections inevitably attract considerable international interest and their peaceful conduct provides important 'signs of good conduct to the outside world' (Hermet et al, 1978:15). Government sensitivity over PNG's overseas image and, in particular, its impact on potential investors has become a recurring theme in official law and order discourse. The conduct of peaceful elections has become an important test of government control, as well as providing broader confirmation of the legitimacy of the government process.

The deterrent impact of the massive security operation is difficult to evaluate. Its highly transient character and the circumstances of some reported incidents (ie. the Mendi 'riots' and Komo-Margarima case) suggest that it may have been less decisive in practice than its architects would concede. The carefully orchestrated displays of (essentially militaristic) strength by security forces and warnings of swift retribution for disruptive elements belie the actual capacity of the PNG state to deal with lawlessness on any significant scale. In the absence of actual capacity, the appearance of such capacity would, hopefully, achieve the same result. As Griffin has remarked in the Bougainville context, '(t)he Papua New Guinea state is too weak for successful coercion' (Griffin, 1990:14). In this respect, the weakness of state authority has contributed to the notable gap between rhetoric and reality characterising official law and order discourse in the post-Independence period.

The continuing jostling for position between (and within) state authorities and the array of more parochial sites of power provides the broader context of such representations. The derogatory remarks of the Highlands Divisional Commander comparing the Kagua district of the Southern Highlands with the American 'wild west' may provide a more appropriate analogy than their initial delivery suggests. The frontier experience in both the United States and Australia was similarly marked by the fragmentation of

authority, relative autonomy of actors (state and non-state) and high levels of inter-personal violence (Reynolds, 1987).

Resort to collective violence as a means of resolving grievances remains deeply embedded within the socio-cultural traditions of many Melanesian societies. This is particularly so in the Highlands, although it should also be noted that other forms of violence played a significant role in many lowland communities (Knauff, 1985). In their 1985 report on 'law and order' in Enga, Wormsley and Toke remarked that 'Violence is often a conscious political strategy for achieving traditional political goals' (Wormsley and Toke, 1985:Appendix I:18). Reconstructions of pre-colonial history attest to the prevalence of violence as a political tactic in these societies (Berndt, 1962; Hallpike, 1977; Meggitt, 1977). Likewise, whilst popular acceptance of the rule of the *kiap* appears to have contributed to the suppression of much violence during the short colonial history, the resurgence of tribal fighting and 'payback' since the early 1970s indicates the persistence of such traditions (Gordon, 1983; Gordon and Meggitt, 1985). That is not, of course, to suggest that the explanation of group violence in the Highlands—whether in the context of elections or otherwise—can be reduced to one of cultural predisposition.

Twenty years ago Standish analysed the resurgence of tribal fighting during self-government in terms of the convergence of traditions of collective violence, freed from the suppressive effects of colonial rule, and the social and political insecurity generated by a rapid and traumatic process of decolonisation (Standish, 1973). In the nineteen years since independence the social and economic stresses that have contributed to the emergence of serious 'law and order' problems' in the late 1960's and early 1970's—ranging from urban 'rascalism' to tribal fighting—have multiplied and intensified. The precipitating factors identified earlier have added to the already considerable pressures upon both formal and informal processes of social control.

For purposes of this paper, the significance of contemporary elections is their potential for magnifying conflicts associated with ongoing processes of political change. These processes, in turn, involve the, at times volatile, interaction between introduced and indigenous political traditions. As Standish and others have argued, introduced institutions and processes have become increasingly appropriated and transformed by existing local political cultures. The inherently competitive social organisation of

Highlands societies, for instance, as embodied in patterns of socio-political leadership, competitive exchange practices, and intense status rivalries (Feil, 1987), provides the cultural milieu into which the introduced processes have been absorbed and transformed. The continuing role of violence illustrates the highly aggressive nature of much of this competition. It is, thus, hardly surprising that the ritualised competition of the formal electoral process takes on an additional, often explosive, intensity. Moreover, it is simply not possible in this context of integral plurality to separate out 'traditional' and 'modern' spheres of activity. As Strathern remarks:

Highlanders have both avidly sought wealth through cash cropping and business activity, and at the same time quite tenaciously held on to certain indigenous ways of behaviour, particularly in the sphere of prestige-seeking and exchange but also in terms of exercising violence to resist, or per contra to effect, political changes. (Strathern 1993:45)

Strathern, noting the rising trend in militant compensation claims by customary landowners against the state, suggests that clans treat the state as another clan as, indeed, they do most external entities (Strathern, 1993:54). Given the patent success of such belligerent strategies (against both state and other collective actors) and, conversely, the deficiencies of more formal bureaucratic processes, violence appears to be a rational strategy. By demonstrating the rewards of violence, such actions further undermine state legitimacy.

Just as the prospect of election victory induces growing levels of monetary investment on the part of candidates (Saffu, 1988:255) and inflated expectations on the part of supporters, the prospect (or realisation) of defeat is likely to arouse passions of similar intensity. Mangi has recently argued that many incidents of post-election violence in the Highlands are carried out by supporters of defeated sitting members. He contends that such supporters target properties erected by the former member on the grounds that these should disappear with the demise of their original political patron:

The supporters usually argue that their candidate was responsible for the construction or improvements made to the station or school. However, now that he has lost the

election they have every right to destroy all the things that he did and that the newly elected member can 'start fresh' and build up his own from scratch. (Mangi, 1993:42)

The number of incidents that occurred in the post-polling phase of the 1992 elections attests to the levels of disappointment, frustration and anger among defeated candidates and their supporters, and, more particularly, their reluctance to accept defeat. They also attest to a more general reluctance to accept as 'final' the results of the electoral process, or any other formal process of adjudication for that matter. In the electoral context, violence is viewed by many defeated supporters as the only mechanism they have to blame and attack others. They simply cannot accept that their own tribal/clan group was divided, that they did not deserve the vote, or that their group is relatively small in numerical terms. Figures released by the Electoral Commission revealed that by December 1992 a total of 61 election petitions disputing the returns had been received. Of these, 33 had either been withdrawn or dismissed, leaving an outstanding total of 28. The 61 petitions covered 52 of the 109 electorates or, in other words, 48 per cent of all electorates. Even where the formal legal process is exhausted, a wide range of informal channels of contention remain open. When the stakes are perceived as being so high, election defeat can easily lead to prolonged process of violent protest and reprisal.

To the more profound issues concerning the capacity and legitimacy of state authority and the ongoing struggle for economic and political ascendancy in contemporary Melanesia can be added the aggravating factor of organisational shortcomings on the part of the Electoral Commission and other 'bits of state' involved in the administration of the election. Allegations of shortage of ballot papers, deficiencies in the common and supplementary rolls, multiple voting, procedural irregularities during polling and counting, inadequate security provision and so on, were frequently made and issued from most parts of the country. Polling periods that had been deliberately shortened in order to reduce the possibility of trouble had to be extended because of administrative problems (*Post-Courier* 26/6/92). Major communication problems between provincial electoral officials and the Electoral Commission in Port Moresby added to the impression of chaos in some areas (*Times* 25/6/92). Moreover, lack of familiarity with electoral procedures on the part of voters, candidates and officials added to the confusion in many

places. Where difficult decisions had to be made in such circumstances, as in the case of Mr. Sigulogo, electoral officials would inevitably be accused of bias and manipulation. Such is the lot of most umpires. Without wishing to underestimate the magnitude of the logistical problems involved in mounting a national election in such difficult terrain, the administrative failings evident in the conduct of the 1992 elections undoubtedly contributed to overall tension. Whether understood as a 'face-saving safety valve', as suggested by Standish (fn. 4 above) or as an expression of genuine grievance, dissatisfaction with the administration of elections in PNG remains a recurring source of dispute.

It should be clear by this stage that the factors contributing to many of the actions labelled 'election-related violence' extend well beyond the immediate electoral context. Consequently, the explanatory value of a narrow election focus is extremely limited. Insofar as rewards and tolerance of violence remain high, we can expect its incidence and gravity to continue and increase. This is particularly the case in the highly charged context of elections. As we have seen, resort to violence as an acceptable strategy for the pursuit of collective interests has a respectable pedigree in Highlands societies and one that significantly pre-dates contemporary notions of the rule of law. Moreover, whether in the context of sophisticated bank heists, land disputes, or elections, the rewards of violence are abundantly clear. The intensive flow of rhetoric from official sources and symbolic deployment of security forces do little to disguise the underlying problems of legitimacy and capacity confronting centralised authority in Papua New Guinea.

In the electoral and formal political arena, we are witnessing the appropriation and transformation of introduced political processes by local level interests. This is what is meant by the process of 'upward colonization'. Rather than a unidirectional process of top-down government, we see a more dynamic and volatile process of interpenetration. Violence plays a significant role in this process as the elections, amongst other things, illustrate. Rather than a monolithic process of disintegration, as the weak state collapses from within, we see the active colonisation of state processes and their selective deployment for local, essentially tribalised, power struggles. The outcome is not the wholesale degeneration into anarchy predicted by the more extreme proponents of disintegration. Instead, we are witnessing the emergence of a new

hybrid form of Melanesian politics conducted through a mix of cultural traditions. In this sense, it is more appropriate to describe these developments as part of a broader process of 'disintegrative integration' (Strathern, 1993:54).

Women in the Election: Casualties of PNG Political Culture

Orovu Sepoe

Introduction

Lack of participation, or limited participation, by women is a crucial development issue. This is particularly true in developing countries (Jahan, 1984). Papua New Guinea (PNG) illustrates the difficulties that women have in achieving leadership positions in what is otherwise an open political system. There is an increasing acknowledgement of the fact that in a comparatively short space of time a very tiny proportion of PNG women have 'made it' in various formal spheres of contemporary life, such as education and the social services, both in the state bureaucracy and in the private business sector. However, in politics, in PNG the number of women who have entered leadership positions is virtually zero. Indeed, as of the 1992 election, there is no woman in any elective political position in the country. It appears that in politics, particularly at the national level, women have to struggle even harder than in other spheres to break the barrier of male dominance. Unlike bureaucratic positions where jobs are offered largely through formal qualifications and merit, access to the seats of political power is through competition in the open political field and it is evidently a much more difficult task for women.

The gross underrepresentation of women in top political positions is clearly a global phenomenon. Women all around the world have discovered that politics is a no woman's land. Even among the exceptional cases of women who have made it to the political top, it is amazing what proportion have made it as a stand-in for their slain or departed husbands and fathers. Why have women not been as successful in entering the highest political decision-making arena? No doubt the answers to this simple yet difficult question

would be numerous. However, a helpful hypothesis is that women, compared to men, possess fewer strategic political resources, those which determine or at least support success in politics such as wealth or money spinning enterprises, property, or access to bank loans, and, above all, helpful beliefs embedded in the political culture. With the dice heavily loaded against them, only a tiny minority of women have braved these obstacles and entered electoral politics.

This chapter discusses women candidates in the 1992 election. These women were singularly unsuccessful in their attempt to become national legislators. Who were this tiny band of women who entered electoral political fray and are there any characteristics that distinguish them from other women? A brief account of the role of women in the traditional context and a similar brief historical background of women in modern PNG politics will probably help in an understanding of the issues involved.

Women in traditional Papua New Guinean society

In the context of traditional PNG societies, it is difficult to generalize about the political role of women. Given its diversity, one can only speak of a number of models. From scholarly studies done by anthropologists to observations by ordinary Papua New Guineans, there appears to be a range of views about the political role of women. The predominantly patrilineal societies in PNG were male dominated in decision-making. Most Melanesian societies '...associate political power with exchange of prestige goods and control over garden land' which are typically the domain of men (Macintyre, 1985:209). Therefore, to speak of the traditional political role of women in PNG, generally, men dominated decision-making. Nagari (1982) observed that in public meetings in traditional PNG women were not allowed to speak. Strathern (1972) argued that because clans are male dominated institutions in PNG, women are not dominant in terms of decision-making and religious ceremonies.

However, it appears that in the few matrilineal society in pre-colonial PNG, women had a more elevated role in politics. Weiner had this to say about a matrilineal society, the Trobriand Islands. 'The fact of matrilineality gives women a domain of control that men can neither emulate successfully nor infiltrate without any degree of lasting power' (Weiner 1976:234). Macintyre gave the following account of another matrilineal society:

When women enter the political arena it is exclusively as representatives of their own lineages, that is as mothers or sisters, not as wives. Women who take part in political activities are skilled orators and their manner of self-presentation is substantially similar to that of articulate men. Here...political leadership is not simply a matter of prestige or wealth, but has to be demonstrated in forceful talk and the capacity to convince or persuade others with words (1985:210).

Although the above differences in the political role of women in traditional societies have been observed by anthropologists it is not at all clear that any such differences can be observed now, since the beginning of modern representative institutions in PNG.

A brief history of women in national politics

In the pre-national elections period of Legislative Councils, the colonial government appointed Alice Wedega to the legislature in 1961. Miss Wedega, from Milne Bay Province, was born in 1905 and was educated up to the elementary school leaving level by the London Missionary Society (LMS). Influenced heavily by her educators, she became a teacher and an evangelist among the head hunters of inland areas bordering the Central and Milne Bay provinces. As an educator she also initiated grass-roots schemes to help women and girls in villages in her province with home economics. As a result of her work amongst women, she was a first in many things. In January 1952, she was appointed the first Papuan woman delegate to the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in New Zealand. At this conference, she spoke of the situation of Papua New Guinean women in education. She also became the first Papuan Girl Guide Commissioner, the first indigenous woman to be appointed a member of the Legislative Council, and the first national woman to receive the honour of MBE. Her experiences from travelling abroad on many occasions for missionary work widened her horizon.

The 1964 House of Assembly election drew three women candidates. One, Ana Frank, was a national while two, Shirley Ann Mckellar and Kay Aschcroft-Smith, were expatriates. Mrs Frank, 47 at the time, a Motuan from Pari Village, Central Province, was a mother of seven children. She had been educated up to Standard 5 by the LMS. Her father and grandfather served as LMS pastors

while she became an LMS teacher and worked for five years. In 1954, she was appointed to the District Advisory Council, but resigned a year later due to family obligations. Mrs Frank was encouraged to stand by a group of European women whom she had contact with through her involvement with the Girl Guides and Women's Club Movement. With only 240 votes, she came eleventh out of a total of 12 candidates in the Moresby open electorate (Hughes, 1965:248). Hughes (1965:366) reported that Mrs Frank received only 5 votes from her own village, Pari. She competed against three other Motuans, all males, from her village. Mrs McKellar, wife of an Assistant District Officer in Madang, contested the Madang Open Electorate. Active in the Girl Guides Movement, she was placed third with 3,226 votes, after two indigenous male candidates. Mrs Aschcroft-Smith, wife of a public servant in Port Moresby, stood for the Central Special Electorate. Throughout the fourteen years she had lived in the territory, she had actively engaged in various activities including the RSL, Women's Auxiliary, YWCA, Country Women's Association and the Girl Guides. Mrs Aschcroft-Smith came last with 405 votes out of a total of six candidates who contested.

All three women candidates lost. Pondering the failure, Hughes and van der Veur (1965:129) concluded: 'The failure of women candidates is not surprising, considering that even in the Native Local Government field, only three of 4,473 councillors were women—two in Mekeo and one in Rigo. It may well be a very long time before the House of Assembly seats its first elected woman member.' In 1968 there was only one woman candidate. Mrs J. Wilkinson, a 43 year old wife of an Australian planter trader, stood for the Esa'ala Open Seat in Milne Bay and lost. A commentator on the 1968 election observed:

'Very few people indeed, including women, were very sympathetic to the idea of a female representative in the House of Assembly...It not only went against the grain of traditional culture for a woman to stand and talk as an equal in the councils of men, but it was almost unthinkable that she would be able to achieve anything that a man could not' (Epstein et.al. 1971:103).

It seems clear that at that point in PNG's political history women were unacceptable as candidates for elective public offices. Even the existence of traditional matrilineal societies evidently

could not help women rise to the highest echelons of decision-making structures in the modern context.

In 1972, four women contested: Josephine Abaijah (Central Regional); Therese Daera (Moresby Coastal); Patricia Wilson (Gulf Regional); and Debra Waya (Hagen Open). Only one of the four, (now Dame) Josephine Abaijah, was elected for the Central Regional seat. Although her election could be seen as a very significant break-through for women participants in electoral politics in PNG, Abaijah's presence was insignificant in terms of influencing decision-making for women's advancement. Secessionist politics interested her more than women's advancement (Griffin, et.al 1979). Her Papua Besena Movement, which originally demanded a separate independence for Papua, was the vehicle for her electoral success.

There have been four national elections since 1972, all in the post-independence era. Only three women have won seats in those national elections. In the first post-independence election of 1977, ten out of the 879 candidates were women. They included Dame Josephine Abaijah who won again. Only two others, Waliyato Clowes (for Middle Fly Open) and Nahau Rooney, (for Manus Open) won seats. In the 1982 election, all three, Abaijah, Clowes and Rooney, stood with fourteen other women. Nahau Rooney was the sole female winner, but only after a successful appeal to the Court of Disputed Returns. In 1987, Rooney and seventeen other women, including once again Abaijah, contested. All the women candidates were defeated.

Table 4.1: Female Candidates and MPS 1972-92

Year	Total Candidates	Female Candidates (Number)	Female Candidates (%)	Female MPs
1972	608	4	0.66	1
1977	879	10	1.14	3
1982	1124	17	1.51	1
1987	1515	18	1.25	0
1992	1655	16	0.97	0

Female candidates in the 1992 election

Of a total of 1655 candidates who contested the 1992 election, sixteen were women.¹ Thirteen of them stood for open seats, the geographically smaller and less populous seats, and two stood in the National Capital District (NCD) provincial/regional electorate. With its better developed communication/transport network, and relatively compact, geographically, the National Capital District provincial/regional seat has had at least one woman candidate in previous elections since 1977. The two female candidates there in 1992 made it an exceptional provincial/regional seat. In other parts of the country, only veteran Abaijah considered vying for one of the larger and more populous provincial seats, the Milne Bay provincial/regional seat. As Table 4.2 shows, by far the largest number of women stood for seats in the National Capital District, continuing the trend from previous elections.

Table 4.2: Women Candidates in 1992

Electorate	Name of Candidate	Party
Abau Open	Zelma Ani Gagari	IND
Kairuku Hiri Open	Louise A. Aitsi	IND
Sinasina Yonggomugl Open	Tamo Printa Engui	IND
Wewak Open	Laura Martin	IND
Henganofi Open	Yamis Sanap Gigimat	IND
Lufa Open	Ellen Hama Hamena	IND
Milne Bay Provincial	Josephine M Abaijah	IND
Huon Gulf	Enny Mapu Moaitz	IND
National Capital District	Margaret Loko	IND
National Capital District	Mabel Gavera	IND
Moresby North East Open	Elizabeth Diya Yama	IND
Moresby North West Open	Maria Ibai Hayes	IND
Moresby North West Open	Diana Debessa	IND
Moresby South Open	Winnis Tua	IND
Nipa Kutubu Open	Hosta Tai	IND
Baiyer Mul Open	Rose Naginel Uaiang	IND

¹ A by-election for Sumkar Open, in December 1992 after the death of Galen Lang, drew one more woman candidate.

All the female candidates stood as independents. What does this mean for the women candidates or the overall disappointing election outcome? Studies of previous elections indicated that party affiliation is not a primary determinant of success or failure of candidates. However, parties still do matter in PNG politics: '...parties endorse candidates who are going to win... parties provide money, posters, balloons, T-shirts, transportation, the material base for an active campaign' (Oliver, 1989:7). Formation of coalition government in PNG is a game played largely by parties. Hence, access to political power is enhanced by political parties. In this context, as all the women candidates stood as independents, they lost whatever little advantage party sponsorship might have given them.

The outcome of the election was disappointing for those who had hoped to see women succeed at the polls. All the women candidates were unsuccessful. Just one candidate, the veteran and former member of the House of Assembly (1972-77) and member of Parliament (1977-82) Josephine Abaijah, came second to the winning candidate, but her tally was 14,700 votes behind the winner. The second best performance among the women candidates, that of Enny Moaitz, was fourth out of a total of nineteen candidates in the Huon Gulf Open. Enny Moaitz was a well-known provincial politician in her own right, having been the first and only female Premier in the history of Provincial Governments in PNG, when she was elected Premier of Morobe, 1988-1989. In the NCD, the female candidate who did best, Margaret Loko, came fifth out of a total of eighteen candidates. Loko's total votes, however, were approximately only half of those of the winning candidate's. In general, the women candidates polled well below half the total votes of their respective winning candidates. Most scored below five percent of the total votes in their respective electorates. If, in the context of very large numbers of candidates in PNG elections, we define a serious candidate as one who polls more than five per cent of the votes, then only four of the sixteen female candidates in 1992 (or 25 per cent) can be so classified.

Table 4.3: Women Candidates' Votes, Position and Percentage

Name of Candidate	Total	Percentage	Position/Total No of Candidates
Zelma Ani Gagari	418	3.03	12th/21
Louise A Aitsi	275	1.21	18th/20
Tamo Printa Engui	17	0.07	48th/48
Laura Martin	1185	7.74	4th/6
Yamis S Gigimat	427	1.98	18th/21
Ellen H Hamena	979	4.57	9th/24
Josephine M Abaijah	9044	15.76	2nd/9
Enny M Moaitz	1130	8.06	4th/19
Margaret Loko	3785	7.86	5th/18
Mabel Gavera	1906	3.96	8th/18
Elizabeth D Yama	409	3.11	12th/27
Maria I Hayes	665	3.42	10th/41
Diana Debessa	101	0.52	34th/41
Winnis Tua	164	1.05	22nd/26
Hosta Tai	405	1.17	10th/12
Rose N. Uaiang	5	0.02	15th/16

Analysis of outcomes: past and present

As in 1987, the 1992 election turned out to be an election without a successful bid for a seat in the national parliament by a woman. A second consecutive electoral defeat for all women candidates raises a certain amount of anxiety among women activists and advocates. What do women have to do to be accepted by the voters as capable of representing them in the national legislature? What factors account for the poor performance by female candidates?

I offer two hypotheses. First, the nature of PNG politics seriously diminishes the chances of women occupying elective positions in the land. More specifically, the political culture of PNG overtly leaves women aside as casualties in electoral politics. The political culture systematically and thus, in a sense, unconstitutionally, denies women equal participation in positions of power. There are certain notable features of PNG politics which, irrespective of the formal constitutional guarantees, adversely affect the chances of women being elected. Second, women are not a homogeneous category. Differences abound amongst women. There

are obvious socio-economic or class differences such as level of educational attainment, occupation and income, and there are cultural, ethnic, religious, and other social cleavages which make women just as heterogeneous as men. But whereas men, irrespective of where they stand in the divisions, regard other men as capable of presenting an electorate, this is not so with women. It is only a very small minority of women who belong to the elite in society—those with relatively high levels of income, who are educated, and who have often held relatively high positions of power in the modern, formal sector and who are likely to want to stand for election—who believe that women are also capable of representing an electorate. The overwhelmingly large proportion of women, the rural, less-educated, low income earners, evidently do not share the elite women's belief in, or desire for, female participation at the highest political levels.

Regarding the consequences of the dominant PNG political culture, it is clear that the National Goals and Directive Principles have remained largely 'pen on paper' and politicians' 'word of mouth' because of the style of politics which has developed and persists in PNG today. A bargaining process characterizes the political style in PNG. The bargaining process is essentially pragmatic and opportunistic (Saffu, 1982). Actors or participants in the process do not set much store by principles if these do not gain them access to the centre of political power. Among participants, political parties are particularly interesting because of the significant impact they could have on other actors, be these women candidates or male candidates, and on the political process in general. In PNG, political parties are immensely fragile and range from no-ideology to a nearly non-ideological grouping. This is one reason why PNG has always had coalition governments, usually formed by loosely allied political parties, since 1972. The parties here also lack firm policy commitments. If political parties were a more formidable force in electoral politics, and showed some commitment to advancing women in politics, women MPs would not be as rare as they have been.

Issues are not important in PNG electoral politics (Oliver, 1989). But in the event that women's issues are raised, this in itself does not pose an unsurmountable challenge to any groups competing for votes. In the context of PNG politics, women's issues usually play a marginal role in catching votes and are often trivialized. The generally disadvantaged position of women in society, despite

formal constitutional guarantees, is a clear indication of this situation. In the absence of firm policy stands by political parties, if there were votes to be won on specifically women's issues, any actor in the electoral process could voice appealing policy stands on these issues and make use of the opportunity to win votes. Women candidates cannot, however, promote women's issues in order to win votes because the support is unlikely to be forthcoming from voters. Inferiority complex amongst women themselves and unhelpful societal attitudes towards women make it most unlikely for women to gain politically from raising women's issues. In fact, male candidates who raise women's issues would stand a better chance of obtaining votes from those who are sympathetic to women's causes. Thus, opportunism, falsely claiming concern for women's interests and needs, if that should appear promising for votes, is another aspect of the pragmatic political style in PNG. The development of such a political culture has significantly contributed towards making women candidates casualties in the electoral politics of PNG. Numbers matter more than policy issues in PNG politics. Whether or not women candidates voice women's issues, those who contest elections are themselves manifestations of women's issues. Their participation in the electoral process is a women's challenge in what is already a firmly established male domain. Unless the population at large is sensitive to policy issues, women's issues are unlikely to have much impact in electoral politics.

Political parties have over the years voiced concern and included women in their party platforms but concrete support has been very shallow indeed. The 1992 election was a stark revelation of this point. As it was pointed out earlier, none of the women candidates were party affiliates. All the women candidates stood as Independents in fourteen electorates. In the electorates they contested, only four of the winners were Independents. The rest were won by candidates who were supported by the major parties operating in PNG, namely, Pangu, Papua Action Party, Melanesian Alliance, National Party, and People's Democratic Party.

It seems clear that calculations for a possible coalition begin prior to the election. A pragmatic process considers potential women candidates as liabilities because of prevalent attitudes in PNG's male dominated society. Political survival matters most so that national ideals or goals, such as 'equal participation by women', can easily be sacrificed. Political parties do all they can to avoid the risk of losing political power, or not gaining access to it. Thus women

are left out of party sponsorship because general beliefs in the male dominated society are not helpful to their chances of winning. As long as PNG politics is a numbers game, another resultant feature of a bargaining political style, women are likely to be left out from the very beginning of the lengthy and intricate path towards the formation of a coalition.

With regards to the second hypothesis, the irony of the historical record of women as national politicians is that the highest number of women in parliament, three, was witnessed in the first national parliament whereas none have been elected after the second post-independence poll. One would expect there to be more female MPs now. Why are there no women MPs in the current parliament, seventeen years after independence? The context of the political environment in 1977 is significant here. PNG had just gained independence two years earlier. The system was fresh and fluid. It was relatively free of entrenched interests, whether economic, social, intellectual or political. The economic factor had not yet entered. Politics as an avenue to rapid wealth had not become so obvious then. But neither was the need for a strong economic backing, the need for money and investment to even enter politics. Women then were able to enter politics on an even economic base of competition with men. The notable absence of women in the nation's highest decision-making forum today is an indication that previously subdued and undeveloped economic interests have become predominant in the politics of PNG. Economic interests have become more clearly defined as the motor of PNG politics.

Elites, whether they be political, economic, social or intellectual, have a critical role to play in developing countries. These people—only a tiny fraction of the population—take on the leadership role. Although their nature and actual size may differ from one political system to another, the fact remains that elites are crucial and a factor to be reckoned with. PNG is no exception. Politics, particularly at the national level, is elite business. The parliamentary institutions along with the electoral system are all colonial transplantations. It is thus not surprising that only those with some formal education and the knowledge of the formal system can be expected to assume leadership roles in them.

Why should this favour men more than women? The majority of participants in electoral politics have been men because 'development' and 'modernization' have initially been male biased. In terms of participation in formal education, employment, business,

and so on, the male population in the world has advanced further than the female population. Compared with men, women are newcomers to the modern formal sector so that, to-date, only a very small minority of women have received the same level of modern and formal qualifications and experiences as men. Turner aptly makes the point from a historical perspective.

It was men who acquired the steel axes to lighten their workload, who travelled, who acquired knowledge and skills, and who negotiated with the white men of the colonial administration. Even when 'development' came along, this was taken to be the exclusive business of men. (Turner, 1990:86).

Elitism, as far as women in politics is concerned, is also promoted by socio-cultural factors. Papua New Guinean society still considers domestic duties such as household maintenance and rearing of children as exclusively women's work and responsibility. These activities are both time and energy consuming. Consequently they deprive women of the time and energy for activities outside the home. Political activity then becomes, at best, only a spare time activity even for the highly educated women. For the majority of women, who reside in largely rural, lower social and economic levels of society, there is often no spare time available. Also, public support is usually very low, or completely lacking.

An observation of the Costa Rican situation should be equally applicable to the PNG's scene:

Culturally speaking, a misbelief persists that women are unable to take decisions, particularly of a political nature, and as a result a woman's role should be limited to her reproductive function and to the private sphere. Both men and women perceive as natural phenomena that women are not equipped for participating; it does not interest them to do so and they fear taking decisions. Such beliefs are linked to problems of self-respect, self-esteem and the marginalization of women, which limit their power to act and prevent them from regarding themselves as qualified for, and deserving of, managerial posts and decision-making functions. The effect of this is felt acutely when women have to oppose men in an attempt to implement arrangements because the woman has to struggle not only against the mistaken

beliefs of men but also against her own beliefs (United Nations, 1991:41).

What this means for women in PNG politics is that because only a minority of elite women are conscious of the gap in the political life of the country, only they make special efforts to be involved in electoral politics. These are the women who are able to verse themselves with the processes and structures of the formal sector. These are the women who decide to contest elections with the hope that their presence would reflect a broader image of women as active participants in politics. Rural women are, hence, effectively left out of the decision to participate as candidates themselves or to lend support to these elite women who contest. The potentially greatest support base—the rural and non-elite women—is sawn off, so to speak.

Table 4.4: Background of Women Candidates

Name of Candidate	Brief Background
Zelma Ani Gagari	Accounts Clerk and Auditor; Director of own business
Louise A Aitsi	School teacher; Executive officer - National Council of women; Tutor - UPNG; Women's Programme Officer - South Pacific Commission; Private Consultant - Women in Development
Tamo P Engui	Youth worker; Leader of Women's group in the electorate
Laura Martin	Businesswoman (Naturalized citizen)
Yamis Gigimat	Welfare and Liaison Officer
Ellen H Hamena	Accountant
Enny M Moaitz	Provincial Politician, Premier of Morobe - 1987/88
Margaret Loko	Former Hospital Secretary; Organiser of Women's Council, National Capital District.
Mabel Gavera	Former employee of Reserve Bank of Australia; Organiser, Papua Regional Women's Council

Elizabeth Yama	General Secretary - Girl Guides Association; company secretary with Yama Security
Maria I Hayes	Teacher; Manageress of Private firm; Executive Officer, Sir Michael Somare's Opposition Office and Ministerial Staff to other Ministers; Secretary to PNG Family Planning Association; President of Women in Politics
Diana Debessa	Office Secretary, Electricity Commissioner; Agriculture Bank and Shell Company
Winnis Tua	Teacher
Hosta Tai	Teacher
Rose Uaiang	High School teacher

In the 1992 election, the elite bias of women's advancement in PNG became more pronounced. What is evident from the background of the female candidates is that all had been through the formal educational system. All had been educated at high school level or beyond. At least three, Gagari, Aitsi and Gavera, had received university level education.

Education is universally perceived as a major vehicle for women's advancement, and in Papua New Guinea it has been educated women who have been its staunchest advocates...Education allows women to participate in the modern world... When women acquire education they begin to understand and gain access to modern institutions. Jobs, cash income, status, power, new technology and material possessions all come into reach with education. (Turner, 1989:87-88).

In the political arena, education has certainly become an unofficial criterion for candidacy (Turner & Hegarty, 1990:17).

The recent election and women's advancement in general have been elite biased because, in PNG as elsewhere, improvements to the situation of women have initially started from the top. Increasingly, in PNG as elsewhere, women have become polarized as a group. For instance, Jahan notes that in Asia any generalisation about women must take into account the immense diversity and vast contrasts both between countries and within each country. The continent has women holding very powerful political positions such as (the late) Indira Gandhi and (desposed) Imelda Marcos and

thousands of well-educated and professional women, but at the same time one finds millions of the world's most oppressed women there (Jahan 1994:59). The top layer of women are atypical in that they can be easily differentiated from the rest by their educational attainment, labour force participation in previously 'male' fields, income, etc, while the majority have remained where they have always been, left behind. They live a subsistence lifestyle and still await their share of the benefits of modernization.

In a Third World context such as PNG, the decision to become involved in electoral politics is largely made by the elite women because they can claim to play the leadership role in a modern context. Involvement in electoral politics is seen by the elite women as a means for improving the condition of women as a group in a modern society. But access to power is also an end in itself. In essence, for these women along with their male counterparts, '... winning a national parliamentary seat is ... the most coveted political prize' (Turner & Hegarty, 1987:2) because with it comes status, extra resources and a host of personal benefits and privileges. Along with professional women, the lives of the few women who have made it as politicians stand in great contrast to the rural majority and the less-privileged. Aspiring politicians, male or female, are mostly motivated by the ends of political power, the benefits and privileges that flow from being in the corridors of power.

The failure of women to win any seats in the National Parliament in 1992 resulted from the fact that the women candidates were mostly operating in a vacuum. Non-elite women are not interested in electoral politics even as voters. As voters, it is unlikely that they would vote for women candidates because they also share the dominant political culture with its anti-female leadership bias and they might also act on the specific instructions of the male head of household or clan. In other words, female candidates are not products of a consultative process amongst the women folk. The need to endorse candidates by women's groups is now beginning to be recognised. The efforts now made by the Women in Politics group to assist aspiring female politicians is one such attempt. Furthermore, it is understood that women voters often do not vote independently of their spouses or escape male intimidation. This concern has been raised since 1982. 'In May 1982, the Police Minister, Warren Dutton, had proposed separate women's election

booths to stop women being pressured by their husbands or harassed by unknown men...' (Wormald 1989:91).

Political education of women to act collectively has not even started in PNG. Even elite participation in politics is not a collective choice. The decision to participate and the choice of electoral strategy are personal or individual. Significantly, the elite women are a divided group in itself. Divisions in the ranks of the elite women have contributed to apparent dissipation of effort.² In the NCD, for example, two women—Loko and Gavera, contested the NCD regional seat, while another two, Hayes and Debessa, stood for the Moresby North West Open.

Conclusion

The fact that all the women contesting were defeated does not necessarily mean a failure on the part of the women candidates. It is once again the politics of PNG which has failed them. It is necessary to recognise the fact that not all women in PNG share the view that women must gain political power at the national level, or at the lower levels of government, for that matter. As for the men, perhaps an even smaller proportion do. Perceptions, attitudes and behaviours differ between and within sections of our society due to differences in custom, religion, economic and educational status, and so on. We must acknowledge this diversity. Societal differences are difficult to overcome. Thus the struggle for equality must be understood as a long term and a continuous one.

More women with high formal education and more women in business are likely to ensure increased level of participation by women. This is not meant to applaud elite politics. Realistically it is the only way a greater number of Papua New Guinean women will become engaged in the political process. The more women who are educated and the more they participate in spheres of modern life, the more the leap to political decision making offices will appear normal and perhaps the less the difference will become between the elite and non-elite women in PNG. What is important is the need for an awareness and education programme which should penetrate all sectors of the society, aimed at both the male and female population. This may help to re-shape the more conservative conscience and perceptions of the population at large. This is

² Occasional 'collisions' amongst the elite women illustrate the point: *Post Courier* - 18/9/91 and *Post Courier* 10/12/92.

essential, but by no means sufficient, to enhance equality in the political sphere. Organisation and forward planning are also essential. Women themselves must take on these tasks, but with the support of the state and of the men.

Manus: Reign of Subtlety over Deception of Hospitality


Stephen P Pokawin and Nahau Rooney

Elections in Manus have developed a character. The title of this chapter is meant to capture an aspect of this character. Candidates and their supporters would be welcomed and receive enthusiastic reception everywhere they go. People would turn out to listen to them. They would be given food to eat and beds to sleep on. A candidate who is unfamiliar with this nature of the Manus electorate will end his or her campaign convinced that (s)he had overwhelming support wherever (s)he went. But, frequently, the results would turn out to be different and surprising to him or her.

In Manus as elsewhere in PNG, people nominate as election candidates for a variety of reasons. These include a trial run, a wish to signal one's intention to begin a political career; a desire merely to frustrate the efforts of a candidate one dislikes; in the case of a minority of candidates, a well-founded belief that they can win and are to be taken as serious contestants for leadership. Not all candidates are confident that they can win. Yet they nominate and invest money, time and energy campaigning. Why do they contest in the first place when they know they cannot win the election? The answer perhaps lies in the principle of 'chance' and in the characteristics of PNG electoral politics which tend to turn election outcomes into something of a Russian roulette.

In this chapter, we shall analyse the 1992 national election in Manus, highlight the factors that influenced the outcome of the election and, in the process of offering our interpretation of the results, introduce the reader to an aspect of Manus political culture. The provincial and open electorates in Manus are coterminous. Although in the minds of some voters and some candidates the provincial seat carries a higher status, there is in fact no difference

The Islands Provinces, showing Manus Electorate



in the quality or qualification of candidates. The study looks at the two electorates together.

Background

Since 1964 the people of Manus have been going to the polls to elect leaders to represent them in the national parliament. From 1964 to 1972, elections to the then House of Assembly were held every four years. During the third House of Assembly, the term was extended to five years, 1972-1977, and five years it has remained since. There have been four elections since independence, beginning with the fourth nationwide election in 1977. Thus, if regularity of elections to a country's legislature testifies to the health of its parliamentary democracy, then it is in good health in PNG.

In Manus as elsewhere in the country, the electoral process was introduced with the local government council. The Baluan Council was established in 1951 and the North Coast Council in 1963. The two councils combined to form the Manus Local Government Council in 1964. It was abolished in 1981 and replaced with sixteen community governments. From 1993, the term of the community government coincides with that of the provincial government. Since 1979, Manus people have elected leaders to the provincial government. Initially, the term of a provincial government was three years but it was extended to four years in 1983. With this history, then, election and electioneering were already part of Manus political life by the 1992 elections.

Since the 1982 national election, Manus has experienced twists in its parliamentary representation. James Pokasui was declared winner for Manus Open by one vote ahead of the incumbent, Nahau Rooney. Nahau Rooney's challenge in the Court of Disputed Returns resulted in the Court over-turning the results and declaring her the winner with a 11 vote margin. The Regional Member, Michael Pondros, was dismissed in 1983 for a breach of the leadership code. A by-election was conducted and Arnold Marsipal was elected to complete the term. Brian Campbell, who ran second to Marsipal in the by-election, also challenged the results in the Court of Disputed Returns. The Court ruled against him and upheld Marsipal's election. In the 1987 election, Pokasui won Manus Open. The result was challenged by a candidate, Martin Thompson. Pokasui was found to have breached the electoral laws and a by-election was ordered in 1989. Memel Pohei was elected. The result was again

challenged by Martin Thompson. Towards the end of 1991, the Court declared the petitioner, Martin Thompson, as winner by one vote.

The frequent court challenges meant that instead of a normal five year term of office, Manus was represented intermittently, from 1987 to 1992, by three different members—James Pokasui: July 1987 to July 1989; Memel Pohei: August 1989 to November 1991; and Martin Thompson: November 1991 to July 1992. These electoral challenges were part of the background to the 1992 national election in Manus.

Table 5.1: Manus representatives to the national parliament

Term	Open	Origin	Regional	Origin
1964-68	P. Maloat	Balopa	J. Cross	New Ireland
1968-72	P. Maloat	Balopa	W. Lussick	New Ireland
1972-77	M. Pondros	Sopomu-MB	P. Kasau	Ere-Kele
1977-82	N. Rooney	Nali	M. Pondros	Sopomu Malai Bay
1982-87	J. Pokasui	Lelemasih	M. Pondras	Sopomu Malai Bay
1987-92	N. Rooney	Nali	A. Marsipal	Rapatona
	J. Pokasui	Lelemasih	A. Marsipal	Rapatona
	M. Pohei	Ere-Kele		
1992-97	M. Thompson	Balopa		
	M. Thompson	Balopa	A. Marsipal	Rapatona

By the 1992 election, Manusians had begun to identify very strongly with the sixteen electorates which returned members to the provincial assembly. To a very large extent, these electorates brought together people of the same linguistic and cultural heritage. Since 1979 these electorates have been moulded into political units. The establishment of community governments in 1982/83 to coincide with the boundaries of the provincial government electorates further consolidated the political, cultural and administrative significance of the electorates. The 1993 provincial election further strengthened this when members of the provincial assembly also became presidents of their respective community governments.

The electorates

The 1990 national population census placed the population of Manus at 32,830. Of this 16,806 were male and 16,024 were female. Under the laws determining representation in the national parliament, Manus has two representatives, one for Manus Open, and the other for Manus Provincial. Manus is the only province in the country where the open electorate and the provincial electorate coincide. This situation has existed since the 1972 election. Prior to that Manus was an Open electorate only. Manus and New Ireland constituted one Regional electorate.

Manus as a single political constituency at the national level is further subdivided into sixteen constituencies at the provincial government level.¹ From 1979 to 1989, Manus had fifteen constituencies, the minimum allowed for under the Organic Law on Provincial Government (OLPG). The number of constituencies was increased for the 1989 election by one constituency when the Western Islands electorate was split, due to vast geographical distances between the islands, to form the North Western and South Western electorates. These provincial government constituencies are important political and administrative units. They are used by the

¹ The Provincial Government constituencies are as follows:

1. North Western Electorate
2. Kali-Bipi
3. Soparibeu
4. Tulu-Ponam
5. Kurti
6. Bupi-Chupeu
7. Lelemasih
8. Lorengau
9. Los Negros
10. Nali
11. Pere-MBunai
12. Ere-Kele
13. Sopomu-Malai Bay
14. Balopa
15. Rapatona
16. South Western

From 1979 to 1989, constituencies 1 and 16 made up the Western Islands Constituency. They were split into two in 1989 by the Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission because of distance.

Electoral Commission to administer national elections and politicians use them as the basic political units to plan their vote winning strategies.

Administration of the election

The conduct of the 1992 national election in Manus was efficient. A total of 250 polling officials, organized into 56 polling teams, covered the entire province. Sixteen Assistant Returning Officers were appointed, one for each community government/provincial government electorate. Fifty-six teams were allocated under the immediate administrative responsibility of the respective Assistant Returning Officers. The overall responsibility for the election fell to Joe Hilarai, the Provincial Returning Officer, and Simon Sinai, the Returning Officer for the Manus Open Electorate.

Three training sessions were conducted for the Returning Officers in Rabaul and Kimbe. Within the province, the two Returning Officers conducted three separate training sessions for the Assistant Returning Officers on the conduct and administration of the election. The Assistant Returning Officers in turn conducted two separate training sessions for the polling teams under them [Hilarai and Sinai 1992]. Since the 1989 Provincial Government election, elections in Manus have been conducted in a single day. The 1992 National Election was also conducted in a single day, on 17 June. Polling stations opened at 8 am and closed at 6 pm. The ballot boxes were taken to Lorengau within 24 hours and held in police custody until counting started at 2 pm on 26 June. The results were declared soon after 10:30 am on 27 June. Radio Manus covered the counting live from 5 pm 26 June to 8 am 27 June. The smooth conduct of the election was not surprising because voters had been well educated through Radio Manus, election pamphlets and extensive campaign by the candidates.

The only concern arose when voters were surprised to find that their names were not on the Electoral Roll. Some voters who had voted in the past could not vote because the Electoral Roll excluded them. Since this was the first time that the amendment to Section 152(a) of the *Organic Law on National Election* was being implemented, disallowing voters whose names do not appear on the Electoral Roll from voting, many people could not vote. The Electoral Roll was not properly compiled. It had names of those long deceased; names were recorded more than once; and some names were recorded in different villages or electorates than those from

which they came. Thus the Electoral Roll and Supplementary Roll registered a total of 20,833 eligible voters, about two thirds of the entire Manus population of which children under 18 would be clearly more than a third. 12,960 voters cast their votes, which is consistent with the total votes cast in previous elections in Manus.

Candidates

A total of 14 candidates contested the two Manus seats, eight for the provincial seat and six for the open seat. This represents a smaller number of candidates compared to the past elections since independence. Table 5.2 shows the number of candidates contesting the two seats since the two electorates were created. For the first time, fewer candidates contested the Open electorate than the Provincial electorate.

Table 5.2: Number of Candidates 1972 - 1992

Year	Provincial	Open	Total
1972	4	6	10
1977	6	10	16
1982	9	10	20
1987	9	14	23
1992	8	6	14

Table 5.3 below shows where the 1992 candidates originated from and whether they were endorsed by a political party or contested as independents.

Of the fourteen candidates, four had no previous experience in politics, either at the national or provincial government level. Four had been, or were, members of the Provincial Government Assembly. Three, plus the two incumbents, had been members of the National Parliament. Six had previously contested national elections. Eight were contesting the national election for the first time. Of those who were contesting the national election for the first time, only four candidates—Vincent Tonam, Paliau Bernard, Charles Kanamon and Nali James—were contesting any election for the first time. T. Kasou and M. Kuweh were members of the provincial assembly;

Bernard Kaspou and Mark Hosea had contested provincial government election in the past.

Table 5.3: The Origins and Affiliations of Candidates

Candidate	Electorate	Endorsement
MANUS PROVINCIAL		
1. James Pokasui	Lelemasih	PDM
2. Roy P Pogat	Nali	Independent
3. Andyson B Kaspou	Lelemasih	Independent
4. Vincent Tonam	North Western	Independent
5. Paliau Bernard	Sopomu-Malai Bay	Independent
6. Arnold Marsipal	Rapatona	Pangu
7. Tarcisius Kasou	Kali-Bipi	MA
8. Michael Pondros	Sopomu-Malai Bay	Independent
MANUS OPEN		
1. Martin P Thompson	Balopa	LNA
2. Mark Hosea	Sopomu-Malai Bay	PDM
3. Michael Kuweh	Kurti	Pangu
4. Charles S Kanamon	Sopomu-Malai Bay	PSP
5. James Nali	Sopomu-Malai Bay	Independent
6. Memel Pohei	Lorengau/Ere-Kele	MA

Table 5.4: Electoral Experiences of Candidates

Incumbent	Contestants of Past National Elections	Past Members of Parliament	Past and Present Provincial Assembly Members	First time Contestants
PROVINCIAL				
A. Marsipal	A.Marsipal J. Pokasui R. P. Pogat M. Pondros	J. Pokasui M. Pondros	R.P.Pogat T. Kasou	B. Kaspou* V. Tonam P. Bernard T. Kasou*
OPEN				
M. Thompson	M. Thompson M. Pohei	J. Pokasui M. Pohei	M. Pohei M. Kuweh	M. Hosea* M. Kuweh* C. Kanamon N. James

*First time contestants at the national level only

Political parties

Political parties play a somewhat ambiguous role in Manus politics and its electoral process. Apart from a handful of party supporters, everyone else who expresses an interest in standing for elections is a potential member of any political party. People’s choices of which party to join depend on numerous factors including what they hope to get out of membership; the views of relatives; which party is prepared to support their candidacy; their rejection by another political party; the party of their keenest rival; appeal of the leadership of the political party. In the 1992 elections, the Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM), Pangu and the Melanesian Alliance (MA) endorsed candidates for both seats. The People’s Solidarity Party (PSP) and The League for National Advancement (LNA) endorsed one candidate each for the open electorate. Five candidates contested as independents in the provincial seat and one contested as an independent in the open seat. An independent candidate for the provincial seat, Paliau Bernard, was said to be

supported by the Peoples Progress Party (PPP), having been associated with Sir Julius Chan and PPP for a long time.

The political parties supported the candidates with nomination fees, posters, funds and campaign speeches by party leaders. The level of support varied from party to party. The then Opposition Leader, Paias Wingti, visited Manus on a chartered plane and campaigned for PDM candidates. The then Prime Minister, Rabbie Namaliu and Pangu Pati team flew into Manus and to several parts of Manus by helicopter to campaign for Pangu candidates. On the other hand, the PSP and the LNA were only labels on the candidates; the candidates virtually stood on their own.

The provincial government campaigned against political parties. The voters were urged to carefully consider the candidates and vote for the one they believed would be the best Manus leader. A candidate's membership in a political party should be immaterial according to the provincial government. This sentiment arose from the fact that party policies do not seem to matter very much once a person is elected. After the election, political party organisations tend to withdraw from the scene to await the next election when they re-emerge to woo support. Also, by the time of the next election, membership of the core group spearheading the political party would have changed. A candidate who previously contested under a political party could be now either endorsed by another political party or contest as an independent candidate, depending on his or her calculation of what was best in the situation.

The strength of political parties in Manus depends to a large extent on the leadership. Thus, in 1992, Pangu Pati had the influence of the then Minister, Arnold Marsipal; Pika Kasau, the President of the Manus branch; and Provincial Minister, Michael Kuweh. MA organisation centered around the former Open Member, Memel Pohei. The PDM had no organizational base in Manus. Its presence was by sponsorship of James Pokasui and Mark Hosea. A similar description applied to the LNA and Martin Thompson and to the PSP and Charles Kanamon.

Out of the eight candidates for the provincial seat, five contested as independent candidates. Some had sought party sponsorship but were not successful. Either the party they sought endorsement from opted for another candidate or the party saw the candidate's chances of winning as negligible and thus decided not to commit itself. One candidate, Paliau Bernard, who stood as an

independent candidate, would almost certainly have teamed up with PPP if he had won.

For the Open seat, only one out of the six candidates contested as an independent candidate. Nali James, a graduate of the University of Technology, had been in the village over the past few years and had been actively involved in a small scale forestry project. Of the candidates who received political party endorsements, only Arnold Marsipal (Pangu), Martin Thompson (LNA) and Memel Pohei (MA) had long associations with their respective political parties. All three had been MPs. Others associated themselves with political parties clearly only for the purpose of the election.

Party policies did not have much effect in influencing the manner in which people voted. Policies, like other promises during campaigns, have taken on a negative character. Experience has shown that promises made during elections are often not carried out after the election. Rather than by their intrinsic merit, policies appear to be assessed in terms of the influence of the candidates espousing them and their standing in the communities in which they campaign. When the candidate has the support, the policies he propounds are given significance by his supporters and taken seriously by the voters. Otherwise policies are dismissed as '*em kempein tasol!*'.

Pangu Pati has an active branch in Manus. A senior member, Pikhah Kasau, is also one of the Vice Presidents of the Pati in the country. The branch's strength has been due to the election of Arnold Marsipal to the National Parliament. Marsipal's electoral office has also been Pangu Pati's office. Pangu was prepared for the election. It worked closely with the Provincial Government, organised meetings, issued press releases, and sent out teams to campaign for its candidates.

The Pati Leader and Prime Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, and the veteran Pangu Campaigner, Sir Pita Lus, visited Manus and campaigned for their candidates. They used a helicopter to visit and campaign in Lopahan (where the President of the Manus branch comes from), Kari (the home of the party's candidate for the Open seat), Baluan, and Pam (from whence the Chief of Staff in Namaliu's office comes). In Lorengau, the Prime Minister launched the Manus Small Business Association and spoke at the Lorengau market. Interestingly, he was accompanied not only by Arnold Marsipal and Michael Kuweh, but also by Martin Thompson. The

LNA, to which Martin Thompson belonged, was at that time a member of Namaliu's coalition.

The PDM has no presence in Manus. Officially, the party endorsed James Pokasui and Mark Hosea for the provincial and open seats, respectively. The leader of the party and then Opposition Leader, Paias Wingti, visited Manus and addressed the people at Lorengau market. He also visited Loniu Village, the home of one of his staff, Jacob Jumogot. The two candidates campaigned separately, not as PDM candidates, but as individuals. They even dissociated themselves from certain party policies, particularly on free education. The Manus provincial government publicly campaigned against the hand-out mentality including free education. It is interesting to note that Paias Wingti avoided the issue of free education when he visited Manus. In his speech at Lorengau Market, he made no reference to free education. Instead, he emphasized education as a right of every citizen. Everywhere else, free education had been a central plank in Wingti's platform.

The MA branch was led by the former Open Member and candidate for Manus Open, Memel Pohei. During his time as Open Member, he had set up committees in every electorate. The committees were responsible for receiving, screening and deciding who received his Electoral Development Fund. The same committees were also seen and used as branches of MA. When the Court of Disputed Returns declared his election void in November 1991, the system also crumbled. The 1992 election revived the committees, turning them and the MA organisation into the Memel Pohei election machine. The two MA candidates, Memel Pohei for the open seat and Tarcisius Kasou for the provincial seat, campaigned separately.

The PSP existed only on the nomination form of the candidate for the open seat, Charles Saleu Kanamon. Similarly, the LNA existed only on Martin Thompson's nomination form and his poster. No LNA organisation existed in the province. Martin Thompson's association with the Win Neisen, formerly Makasol Movement, formed his organisational base in the province.

Campaigning

Campaigning in Manus involved visits to the villages by the candidates and their supporters, (by cars and speed boats, helicopter and chartered planes) use of recorded songs and jingles, especially on Radio Manus, feasts and ceremonies, posters, use of traditional

symbols of 'Katim buai', showing of video films and campaign rallies addressed by party leaders.

For the most part, candidates identified who their serious opponents were and concentrated their campaigns against them in an attempt to attract votes away from those candidates. For the provincial seat, the incumbent, Arnold Marsipal, was clearly the target of most of the candidates, particularly James Pokasui and Michael Pondros. All three had represented Manus in Parliament. Some candidates conducted clean campaigns right through. Vincent Tonam and Paliu Bernard conducted the cleanest campaigns.

Campaigning for the open seat was different. The incumbent, Martin Thompson, had only been a Member of Parliament since November 1991, and so was not a target of a 'sheer campaign'. Each candidate quietly moved about the province to make himself known and attract support. The only heated exchanges were between Michael Kuweh and Memel Pohei. They used Radio Manus extensively to attack and counter-attack each other. They had both been MA supporters, and both had sought MA sponsorship. When the MA leadership in the province, dominated by Memel Pohei's supporters, endorsed him to contest the open seat, Michael Kuweh defected to Pangu Pati and immediately received its endorsement. This further intensified animosities between the two candidates and their supporters.

The candidates and their supporters were free to campaign anywhere in the province. No disruptions or election related violence occurred during the campaign period. Peaceful campaigning has been a feature of the Manus electoral experience. The *Report of the Chief Electoral Officer* on the 1972 House of Assembly General Election reported that Manus was "one of the quietest districts free from threats of any sort" (p.23).² Manus being a small place, information about the activities and campaign strategies of the candidates easily passed on to their rivals. Changes in campaign strategies by candidates who thought they had become disadvantaged by such knowledge were continuous.

The Provincial Government permitted school grounds to be used for campaigning by candidates so long as normal operations of the schools were not disrupted. This was allowed because the election process would result in a leader who would be required to support

² See, in addition, Rooney, W. 'Island Politics: The Elections in Manus' in Hegarty, D. (ed), 1983.

and assist the community, including the schools. Church buildings and areas were also used by candidates to campaign.

Most candidates campaigned as individuals, including those sponsored by political parties. This is evident in the results, in the localised support for candidates. The only political party which was truly organised was Pangu Pati. It had two teams which campaigned for its candidates. At one stage, supporters of other candidates expressed their opposition to such strategy on Radio Manus. They argued that the candidates themselves should campaign instead of the committees. Supporters of candidates would campaign for them wherever they found themselves, in *kamls* (the men's houses), at village gatherings among family members, and in other villages when the opportunity arose. This level of campaigning either consolidated the support generated by the candidates or lessened the impact of other candidates.

Throughout the province, members of the family or village were often divided in their support for candidates. In the extreme case, the father might support one candidate, the mother a different candidate, and the children support someone else. There was also the situation where, because a candidate gave a member of the family something, it was agreed that he would vote for that candidate whilst the rest of the family vote for someone else.

Results

The two sitting members were returned. Arnold Marsipal won with 2,547 votes (out of 12,960) against James Pokasui with 2,434, while Martin Thompson received 4,759 votes to secure the Open seat against Memel Pohei with 4,408 votes. Arnold Marsipal was the sitting member for Manus Provincial and Minister for Labour and Employment. He had also been Minister for Defence and actively involved in Parliamentary Committees. Personally, he did not campaign extensively during this election. The Pangu campaign committees did the campaigning in selected areas. He spent a few days in the province and visited selected areas. He used Radio Manus effectively. He spoke directly to the people on issues. His views and statements were highlighted on the news programme, and he used the 'Toksave' programme well. He stood on his record. According to him, his two terms in office as Provincial Member for Manus had exposed him to the Manus people. The people knew him and could decide whether to return him or go for a new leader. He

believed he had served Manus well as an MP. It was now up to the people to either vote him back or withdraw their support from him.

During his terms in office, he had worked closely with the Provincial Government, allocated funds from the Electoral Development Fund to many groups and individuals, and supported and stood by families who suffered misfortunes. He took part in traditional ceremonies, maintained communication with Manus people through his Electoral Office in Lorengau and used Radio Manus to maintain his presence in the minds of the Manus people. His very colourful and impressive posters maintained his presence in the villages during the campaign period. When the results came out, a few candidates and their supporters were surprised that he won because he had not personally done much campaigning.

Table 5.5: Distribution of Votes in Manus Open

Names of Candidates	Distribution of Votes							Total
	Thompson	Sinai	Kuweh	Kanamon	Nali	Pohei	Infor	
Area								
North Western	138	19	25	06	168	40	03	399
Kali-Bipi	291	87	83	04	2245	69	09	767
Soparibeu	89	99	93	87	166	227	04	757
Tulu-Ponam	54	193	138	01	50	139	05	580
Kurti	114	13	448	01	14	357	08	955
Bupi-Chepeu	116	16	89	11	09	291	01	533
Lelemasih	434	109	68	07	29	813	09	1469
Lorengau	414	49	122	45	41	516	02	1203
Los Negros	271	44	75	07	08	374	11	790
Nali	161	38	39	01	11	175	02	430
Pere-MBunai	343	16	16	03	05	183	0	566
Ere-Kele	213	03	08	01	08	511	02	746
Sopomu-Malai	558	257	18	15	376	256	08	1488
Balopa	785	04	07	04	27	79	03	909
Rapatona	528	14	101	41	21	271	04	980
South Western	250	13	06	01	10	107	01	388
TOTAL	4 759	974	1 337	227	1 167	4 408	88	12 960

Table 5.6: Distribution of Votes in Manus Provincial

Names of Candidates										
	P'sui	Pogat	K'pou	Tonam	Benard	M'pal	Kasou	P'dros	Info	Total
Area										
NW	73	88	01	147	13	46	20	05	06	399
K-B	64	09	03	27	17	36	522	53	06	737
S'beu	117	10	13	164	29	21	177	222	04	757
T-P	199	04	56	100	38	58	34	86	05	580
Kurti	174	76	29	48	63	376	142	32	15	955
B-C	174	76	29	48	63	376	142	32	15	955
L'sih	547	85	247	64	35	140	24	313	14	1469
L'gau	166	126	82	29	77	244	218	226	34	1203
L-N	226	21	35	16	44	103	187	134	24	790
Nali	78	176	37	08	07	67	08	06	03	390
P-M	127	67	53	41	37	163	39	35	04	566
E-K	112	54	53	21	18	143	23	317	05	746
S-M	96	72	30	37	326	235	164	514	14	1488
B'pa	165	158	4	35	137	390	12	91	07	999
R'tona	165	158	4	35	137	390	32	50	09	980
SW	34	9	1	6	09	51	272	04	02	388
TOTAL	2 517	1 190	668	782	1 021	2 623	1 905	2 120	154	12 980

Martin Thompson, the Member for Manus Open since November 1991, conducted a very effective but quiet campaign. He was very selective about where he campaigned. His reputation as a successful lawyer, having won two cases at the Court of Disputed Returns, and his leadership of the Win Neisen Movement, helped his campaign. He made good use of the Electoral Development Fund. Just before the writs were issued and Parliament was dissolved he publicly announced that he would cease the distribution of his Electoral Development Fund, even though decisions had already been made. The Funds would be distributed after the election. Thompson introduced the use of recorded songs into the campaign. With the help of Kenny Lucas, a campaign song was written and sung on cassette tapes in the Titan language and in *tok pisin*. The Titan version appealed to the Titans to stand together to elect Thompson whilst the *tok pisin* version placed emphasis on good leadership. Copies were produced and distributed.

The tables above, extracted from Hilarai and Sinai [1992], summarise the votes each candidate received from each electorate in Manus.

Interpretation of the results

While the 1992 election results confirmed the traditional voting behaviour of the Manus voters, they also appeared to present a few new trends.

Firstly, as always, reputable and serious candidates received majority votes from their home area. This is known in Manus as the 'base vote' or '*has blong basket*'. A serious candidate is expected to secure the votes in his own area before he can expect support from other areas. Votes from other areas depend on whether they have their own home candidates and, if so, whether they are serious candidates. If they are, they would be expected to secure the 'base votes' there while other candidates compete for the rest of the votes. Serious candidates in this election secured a majority or a good percentage of votes from their respective home areas or from areas with which they were associated. Thus both Michael Pondros and Memel Pohei secured a very high percentage of votes in Lelemasih, with which they have been associated by circumstances and choice, even though they are from the Sopomu-Malai Bay and Ere-Kele electorates respectively. Memel Pohei secured 813 votes out of 1,469 from Lelemasih, which was the highest number of votes secured by any candidate in any one electorate.

A corollary of the first point is that where an area has no home candidate, all candidates compete energetically for votes. In such situations, candidates with traditional relations, previous political support, or a reputation that mobilizes the voters have an advantage over others. It is in such situations that achievements and proven performance of candidates count for most.

Depending on the number and calibre of candidates, those who secure three digit votes in at least two thirds of the electorates are the likely winners. The contest in the provincial seat was between Marsipal and Pokasui. In the open seat, it was between Thompson and Pohei. All four candidates received a substantial number of votes in over two thirds of the electorates. A clear win by a candidate in his home base is only effective if he can comfortably secure a similar expression of support in seven to ten other electorates. This factor naturally makes election in Manus democratic. The smallness of the communities requires candidates to widen their appeal throughout the province if they want to be elected as leaders representing Manus in the National Parliament. A candidate who is regionalistic or throws around extremely

partisan or sectionally narrow-minded vote-winning slogans would win in his territory but not overall in the election. Marsipal and Thompson and their runners-up, Pokasui and Pohei respectively, demonstrated this point.

Thirdly, voting is not on party lines. The role of political parties in mobilizing votes for their respective candidates is very negligible. Pangu endorsed Arnold Marsipal and Michael Kuweh for the provincial and open seats, respectively. Marsipal won with 2,547. Michael Kuweh received only 1,337 votes. PDM endorsed James Pokasui and Mark Hosea Sinai for the provincial and open seats, respectively. Pokasui received 2,434 votes whilst Sinai received only 974. Tarcisius Kasou, MA's provincial candidate, received only 44 per cent of the votes received by his running mate, Memel Pohei, who came second in the open seat. The results suggest that other factors were more influential than association with political parties.

Fourthly, in the 1992 national election no woman contested either of the two Manus electorates. In the 1987 Election, Nahau Rooney, the then incumbent Open Member unsuccessfully re-contested the seat. Since 1964, when elections for the National Parliament were first held, only two women have contested the leadership of Manus. Nahau Rooney successfully contested the Open Seat in 1977 and 1982 and Elizabeth Buara unsuccessfully contested the Open Seat in 1982.

Of the 12,960 voters in the 1992 election, about 50 per cent were women. Of the eight polling areas which recorded the number of male and female voters, 3,085 were male and 3,039 were female voters. Women in Manus have not voted as a group. There was no indication in the 1992 election that women voted as a group. Candidates did not raise issues peculiar to women to appeal specifically to women voters. The role of the family, church membership and successful campaigning by the candidates were the influential factors. As awareness among women increases and male-dominated leadership exposes its own weaknesses, women as a group of voters in Manus should emerge as a group to be reckoned with in the making and unmaking of Manus leaders in future elections.

Many factors combine to influence the way people vote. Origination or association with a particular area is one important factor. For example, Tarcisius Kasou, a candidate for the provincial seat, secured 522 votes in Kali-Bipi from where he originates. His MA running mate for the open seat only secured 69 from Kali-Bipi.

Similarly, Memel Pohei received 813 from Lelemasih with which he has associated himself whilst Tarcisius Kasou received only 24 votes. Other examples include Arnold Marsipal, who received 390 votes from Rapatona, his home base, while his Pangu running mate for the open seat, Michael Kuweh, received only 101 from Rapatona. On the other hand, Michael Kuweh received 448 votes from Kurti, his home base, whilst Arnold Marsipal received 376 votes from there. (See Table 5.7). The votes Marsipal received were not necessarily because of Michael Kuweh; he has traditionally received good support from Kurti since he began contesting national elections.

The weaknesses of political parties in Manus make candidate evaluation the key factor in the election. A person with greater appeal stands a greater chance of succeeding whether he contests as an independent, is endorsed by a very obscure political party or is endorsed by a major political party.

Table 5.7: Role of Political Parties

ELECTORATES	Pangu Pati		Melanesian Alliance		People's Democratic Movement	
	Marsipal	Kuweh	Kasou	Pohei	Pokasui	Sinai
N/Western	46	25	20	40	73	19
Kali-Bipi	36	83	522	69	64	87
Soparibeu	21	94	177	227	117	99
Tulu-Ponam	58	138	34	139	199	193
Kurti	376	448	142	357	74	13
Bupi-Chupeu	160	89	31	291	174	16
Lelemasih	140	68	24	813	547	109
Lorengau	244	122	218	516	166	49
Los Negros	103	75	187	374	226	44
Nali	67	39	8	175	78	38
Pere-MBunai	163	16	39	183	127	16
Ere-Kele	143	8	23	511	112	3
Sopomu-Mala	235	18	164	256	96	257
Balopa	314	7	12	79	82	4
Rapatona	390	101	32	271	165	14
S/Western	51	6	272	107	34	13
TOTAL	2 547	1 337	1 935	4 408	2 434	974

Some observations about the performance of candidates might throw further light on the elections. Generally, first time candidates did better than expected. Vincent Tonam secured the second lowest number of votes, but he received majority votes in North Western where he comes from and came third in Soparibeu. Paliau Bernard came second to Michael Pondros in Sopomu-Malai Bay where they both come from, but he did well in Balopa and Rapatona, where he has traditional ties. Nali James secured a substantial number of votes in North Western, Kali-Bipi, Soparibeu and Sopomu-Malai Bay.

Michael Pondros, who came in a strong third with 2,160 votes behind Arnold Marsipal and James Pokasui, reversed his dismal 1987 performance. 1987 was clearly too close in time to his dismissal from parliament in 1983 for leadership code offences. Out of the sixteen electorates, he secured a good proportion of the votes in six. He received majority votes in three: Soparibeu, Ere-Kele, and Sopomu-Malai Bay. He came in second in Lelemasih, Lorengau, and Los Negros.

Andyson Bernard Kaspou, a candidate for the provincial seat, came home last with 684 votes. This is worth mentioning in light of his having spent a lot of time moving around the province under the guise of doing research for the Office of the Prime Minister. He was also the most educated of the candidates. In 1989, he contested for the Premiership but was not successful. His efforts between 1989 and 1992 to systematically understand the voting behaviour of the Manus voter and establish himself failed to support his bid for a seat in the National Parliament.

Tarcisius Kasou's candidacy for the provincial seat is also worth mentioning. He had been the Member for Kali-Bipi in the Provincial Assembly since 1985. From 1985 to 1989, he was the Deputy Premier and Minister for Community Government. He secured 68 per cent of the votes in his electorate and secured three digit votes in six other electorates. His performance in the South Western electorate was outstanding. He received 70 per cent of the votes from South Western even though he did not go there to campaign. He out-performed Arnold Marsipal, the sitting member, who received only 13 per cent of the votes. His success could be attributed to the support he received from the Provincial Assembly Member for South Western and the efforts by the Provincial Government, within which he was Deputy Premier, in effectively

incorporating Aua and Wuvulu into the administration of Manus Province.

For the first time since the 1964 election to the House of Assembly, the voters elected simultaneously two persons from the southern islands of the province to represent Manus in the National Parliament. Arnold Marsipal hails from Nauna Island in the Rapatona electorate and Martin Thompson is a Mouk from Baluan Island in the Balopa electorate. This fact raised apprehensions among the inhabitants of the main island, while the inhabitants of the south islands and Titan communities on the south coast celebrated the success. But both groups were restrained and sensitive to each other's situation.

The political undercurrent of Manus society introduces distinctions based on seafarers versus landowners, north versus south, Christians versus Paliau followers and, recently, east versus west, as significant political divisions. In this election Tarcisius Kasou, Mark Hosea and Vincent Tonam used the last distinction to gain support. They all originated from the western end of the province and no person from that region of Manus has ever represented the province in Parliament. At the Provincial Government level, they have assumed the post of Deputy Premier but not Premier. This led to the three candidates and their supporters calling for a change to allow a west coast person to be elected to Parliament in this election. They were successful in appealing to west coast but not to the province as a whole. Since the western end of Manus does not have the population, support from the wider Manus community is needed for a candidate from there to succeed.

Similarly, Martin Thompson subtly used the seafarers/Titan and Paliau followers well in consolidating his votes. Such dichotomies will continue to impact upon future elections. This confirms Rooney's observations on the 1977 national election where he noted the dichotomy between the seafarers and the landbased people:

The state of tension between the seafarers and gardeners is a major political force in the province even today, and had its effect on the election even though the more modern dichotomy between north coast and south coast appeared to be more significant [Rooney 1983:273].

In the 1992 national election, we observed the introduction of the east-west dichotomy. This has emerged because of increasing political consciousness of the west coast people and the effect of the logging operations in the area, resulting in increased contribution of the region to the country's economy.

Martin Thompson's victory was seen as victory for Makasol or Win Neisen, the politico-religious group which emanated from the Paliau Movement. Thompson was an active member, leader and advisor to the group. However, the results clearly showed that Thompson received a substantial number of votes from non-Win Neisen areas throughout the province. His reputation as a Lawyer and his earlier unsuccessful bids for the National Parliament seat had elevated his stature in the province.

The aftermath and conclusion

Except for a minor post-election dissatisfaction in the camp of candidate Memel Pohei, the election results were accepted by the candidates and the Manus people with their usual equanimity. Memel Pohei ran second to Martin Thompson, only 351 votes behind. Michael Kuweh received 1,337 votes which Pohei's supporters thought would have gone to Pohei if Kuweh had not contested the election. Pohei and his supporters saw his failure to win as the result of Kuweh's candidacy. As we have noted above, Memel Pohei and Michael Kuweh have had political differences for some time. They have exchanged letters and commentaries over Radio Manus. Differences are rooted in their style of politics, genuine disagreements about adherence to MA principles and competition for MA sponsorship. Had Kuweh not contested, Pohei would probably have won the election. The tension manifested itself in the stopping of vehicles travelling through Buyang (Pohei's village) from Kari in the Kurti electorate where Kuweh comes from and which he represents in the Provincial Assembly. The situation spread into Lorengau, but the momentum dissipated as quickly as it had risen.

The general situation after the election was to wait and see what the newly elected leaders would do. The two elected leaders immediately left the province to take part in the process of electing the new government of Papua New Guinea. And, this time, the conduct of the election left no room for court challenges.

The 1992 national election highlighted tolerance and unintended deception as characteristics of Manus political behaviour. Wherever the candidates went to campaign, they were

received and looked after by the leaders, and villagers turned out to listen to them, even though they might well have decided who their candidates were. Speeches were made to support their bids to win the election. So, while the candidates usually left the villages satisfied that they had support there and moved on confident that they would win the election, they discovered that when the votes were counted, their expectations were far from reality. The outcome of the 1992 national election in Manus for both the Provincial and Open seats affirms the reign of subtlety over the deception of hospitality. Candidates who do not fully appreciate the dynamics of Manus electoral politics would easily be misled by the easygoing tolerance and hospitality that characterise Manus political culture.

State Ritual: Ethnographic Notes on Voting in the Namatanai Electorate

Robert J. Foster


... one of the important aspects of the existence of a modern state, precisely as a complex of social interaction of individual persons, consists in the fact that the action of various individuals is oriented to the belief that it exists or should exist, thus that its acts and laws are valid in the legal sense.

Max Weber

The state is not the reality that stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask that prevents our seeing political practice as it is. . . My suggestion is that we should recognize that cogency of the idea of the state as an ideological power and treat that as a compelling object of analysis. But the very reasons that require us to do that also require us not to believe in the idea of the state, not to concede, even as an abstract formal object, the existence of the state.

Philip Abrams

In a footnote toward the end of *The Savage Mind*, Claude Lévi-Strauss elucidates his famous claim that 'there is no such thing as the real totem' by citing the observation of an old Indian chief (1966:239). According to the story, recounted by Diamond Jenness in a 1929 lecture on the Indians of Eastern Canada, the chief used a simile to describe the 'bosses' of animal and plant species. Now and then the Indians see and kill these 'bosses,' but for the most part the 'bosses' remain out of view of the Indians:



Tanga Islands, Namatanai Electorate

They ['the bosses'] are like the government in Ottawa. . . An ordinary Indian can never see the 'government.' He is sent from one office to another, is introduced to this man and to that, each of whom sometimes claims to be the 'boss', but he never sees the real government, who keeps himself hidden.

I remembered this story while thinking about the comments that Anton Neof, a middle aged Tangan man, made during a conversation with me and another Tangan friend, Somanil Funil. It was the evening of June 23, just before the close of the polling period of the 1992 national election. The topic of our conversation was government corruption. Neof informed me that local supporters of the People's Progress Party (PPP), of which he was one, had challenged local Pangu Pati supporters with the charge that the current government was corrupt. The Pangu supporters, he continued, replied that it was not the government that was corrupt, but rather certain individual people. Neof countered, he said, with a pair of rhetorical questions: 'What is the government if not these people? If I went to see the government what would I see but them?'

I take Neof's remarks as one small piece of evidence that Tangans, perhaps like most citizens of Papua New Guinea, do not imagine the state as a reified entity or transcendent abstraction—something that exists independently of the flesh and blood public servants who operate (or not) in its name. Neof's identification of Pangu Pati with 'the government' suggests an alternative and unfetishized conception of the state as the particular people who actually comprise it. It is a corollary of this conception that state officials relate to 'the people' much as patrons to clients, that is, as dispensers of largesse and guardians of well being (see Clark n.d.). In other words, the idea of a state as an autonomous institution, let alone belief in The State, commands no more self-evident recognition by ordinary Papua New Guineans than it does by political commentators (see, e.g., Filer 1992 on 'bits of state'). It is very much to the point of political analysis, then, to ask: what are the means by which the *idea of the state* is communicated? What are the means by which this idea is made experientially real, naturalized

as a taken for granted feature of everyday affairs? Or, what are the means by which 'the state' becomes visible in the course of events?¹

In this chapter I propose to address these questions through a brief ethnographic description of voting in the Tanga Islands, Namatanai Electorate, New Ireland Province. My aim is to suggest how the concrete act of casting a vote in the national election assumes the form of a secular ritual that, in the structure and symbolism of its performance, enjoins upon participants a particular definition of community, on the one hand, and of personhood, on the other. That is, the act of voting performatively demonstrates membership in a community of voters (the nation) whose relationship to each other is mediated, expressed, and guaranteed by the state. In so doing, the act of voting presumes and promotes definitions of community and person that are different from those that conventionally organize local social life. At the same time, the act of voting constitutes 'the state' as an experiential reality—however temporary—for people who otherwise rarely encounter state agents or agencies (military, legal, or administrative) as a salient aspect of their everyday lives.

Before turning to the ethnographic details of voting in the Tanga Islands, I first report the overall results of voting in the Namatanai Open. I discuss these results with reference to Norman MacQueen's analysis of the 1987 election in his article, 'Faltering Progress: Namatanai Open, New Ireland' (1989). As will become evident, the results of the 1992 election dramatically reversed the trend that MacQueen saw of an 'erosion in the PPP position'. On the basis of my observations of the election in the Tanga Islands, I want to suggest two reasons that might account for this reversal: the local level organization of Sir Julius Chan's campaign, and the diffuse perception of a need for change in national level government.

PPP returns to power

The story of the 1992 elections in New Ireland Province was the complete and convincing victory of the candidates of the People's Progress Party. PPP won all three seats in New Ireland, reclaiming both the Provincial seat and the Kavieng Open seat it had lost in the 1987 election (table 6.1). Former Police Commissioner Paul

¹ For related discussions of belief in the idea of the state see Abrams 1988; Cohn and Dirks 1988; Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Geertz 1980; Taussig 1992; Weber 1978.

Tohian defeated Pangu Environment and Conservation Minister Michael Singan, and Ben Micah Allan ousted sitting member Lapaseng Meli of the Melanesian Alliance. PPP's impressive showing in New Ireland Province thus magnified its more modest resurgence on the national scene after a dismal performance in the 1987 elections. At the end of polling, PPP had won six new members in addition to the two new members from New Ireland.

Table 6.1: New Ireland Province election results, 1992

Candidate	Party	Vote	Percent
<i>Namatanai Open</i>			
Sir Julius Chan	PPP	11,567	60.07
Ezekiel Tomon	Pangu	7,686	39.92
<i>New Ireland Provincial</i>			
Paul Tohian	PPP	16,563	50.37
Michael Singan	Pangu	11,886	36.14
Miskus Maraleu	Ind	3,351	10.19
Ilias Kasikit	Ind	1,081	3.28
<i>Kavieng Open</i>			
Ben Micah Allan	PPP	5,391	38.24
Lapaseng Meli	MA	3,332	23.63
Sition Gion	Ind	1,976	14.01
Tokau Kamalu	Pangu	1,598	11.33
Mesulam Aisoli	Ind	1,052	7.46
Kevin Patio	Ind	747	5.29

But it was Sir Julius Chan himself, founder and long time leader of the PPP, whose victory in the Namatanai Open most dramatically reversed the apparent decline in the fortunes of his party. Chan won 60.07 per cent of the votes in Namatanai, the highest per cent since the first post-independence national election when he took 64.5 per cent of the votes cast. In other words, his share of the total vote increased by about 12 per cent over the previous election when he won 8,246 of 17,081 votes (48.25%). Perhaps even more significant than the scale of the victory was its nature: Chan won in a head to head race with Ezekiel Tomon, the Pangu candidate, thus distinguishing Namatanai as the only seat in the country contested

by just two candidates (plate 1). There could be no accusations of 'vote splitting' made against PPP; that is, there was no evidence to excite speculation about PPP supporting so-called independent candidates in order to siphon off anti-PPP votes. Suspicions of this sort of strategy had surfaced in the previous two elections and had prompted MacQueen (1989:223) to wonder if the 1992 election would see 'a much more elaborate and ruthless set of tactics including perhaps the sponsorship of 'splitters' and 'syphons' by each side...' Chan's support was well distributed throughout the electorate. He won a majority in nine of the eleven divisions (see map), losing narrowly only in Lihir and in the traditionally anti-PPP East Coast Central (see table 6.2).

Table 6.2: Breakdown by division of voting in the Namatanai Open

	Chan	Tomon
Tabar Island	957	394
East Coast Central	813	922
East Coast Central	543	547
West Coast Central	787	646
East Coast Namatanai	1854	801
West Coast Namatanai	1036	452
Susurunga/Tanglamet	1249	1093
Kandas	723	334
Lak	500	423
Lihir	1322	1362
Tanga	1214	651
Anir	559	161

His victory thus reversed losses in the previous election in both the southern mainland divisions of Lak and Kandas. Chan also maintained strong support from the offshore islands of Tabar, Anir and Tanga, as well as from east and west coast Namatanai. He won his home division of Susurunga/Tanglamet by a small majority. As far as can be roughly determined by correlating ballot boxes and polling places, Chan appears to have won the 'home area' of both himself and Tomon, the villages of Huris and Hialon. Chan's strongest support within the Susurunga/Tanglamet division,

however, appears to have come from the Tanglamet villages of Muliama, Warangansau, and Sena.

Chan won 22 of the 29 ballot boxes counted in the total vote for Namatanai. Nonetheless, close inspection of the ballot counts indicates that even in divisions where Chan won large majorities, some villages or village clusters supported Tomon. For example, in Sir Julius's own birthplace, the Tanga Islands, significant support for Tomon could be found in certain locales (see map). While the majority of voters on the main island of Boang, home to 75% of the Tanga population, supported Chan, residents of western Boang (Fonli and Taonsip) gave Tomon 106 more of the 718 votes cast (57.38%) than they gave to Chan (table 6.3). By contrast, residents of eastern Boang and the less populous islands of Lif, Tefa and Malendok gave Chan 908 of 1147 total votes (79.16%).

Table 6.3: Estimated correlation of ballot box counts and polling villages in the Tanga constituency

Ballot Box No.	Votes	Polling Villages
84	Chan: 438 Tomon: 78	Tefa, Kitkita, Balamfal, C/School, Malesak C/School, Put, Put Plantation, Put Health Ctr., Fangwel, Sinaudo, Balanwaransau, Gargaris, Minmale C/School, Nonu
85	Chan: 306 Tomon: 412	Ansawe, Taubie, Fonli, Fonli C/School, Taonsip, Taonsip C/School, Luanke, Tiriwan
86	Chan: 470 Tomon: 161	Sasa, Amfar, Amfar Catholic Mission, Bil, Kamunaseo, Ambaba, Tanga Station, Sunkin, Ambisune

Similar examples of the opposite kind can also be adduced. For instance, strong support for Chan could be found in some locales within the two divisions that Chan lost, East Coast Central and

Lihir. This pattern suggests that highly local factors inflected the trend of province-wide support for Chan in this election. In the Tanga case, which is most familiar to me, support for the Pangu slate in western Boang derived in part from strong support for Michael Singan. I was told that Singan had rendered material assistance to the operations of Tanga Trading, a locally owned network of small trade stores headquartered in western Boang and run by men with relatives in the Taonsip and Fonli areas. In other parts of New Ireland, different local factors might have modified the tendency of the overall vote. For example, significant numbers of non-native New Irelanders in the East Coast Central division, especially plantation workers and settlers originally from the Sepik, might have voted their traditional allegiance to Pangu Pati (see MacQueen 1989). Similarly, in the Lihir Islands, the only one of the three ballot boxes that gave Tomon a majority of the votes (633 to 453 for Chan) was probably used in polling places located in the vicinity of the Ladolam Mining Camp on the western side of Lihir Island (Niolam or Big Lihir). It is possible that Chan's clear defeat in these villages registered the dissatisfaction of voters with his role in negotiations surrounding the development of the Lihir gold mine.

Local factors aside, how can the manifest decisiveness of Chan's victory be explained? My answers to this question are based solely on observations made and information gathered by myself during a brief visit to the Tanga Islands for the second week of the June polling period. The applicability of these answers to other parts of the electorate must be treated more as a hypothesis than as a claim. I offer them in response to the hypotheses formulated by MacQueen in accounting for what seemed to be in 1987 a trend of 'faltering progress' for the PPP.

First of all, as table 6.3 illustrates, support for Chan's candidacy throughout Tanga was not 'a given,' that is, neither Tanga nor the other island divisions ought to be regarded as 'official' PPP reserves. (Recall in this regard that Chan had won Lihir in the previous two elections, even when running against a Lihir candidate in 1987.) MacQueen (1989:223) reported that the anti-Chan camp drew this same conclusion from the results of the 1987 election and vowed 'that the next campaign must pay much more attention to the island districts.' In retrospect, however, it seems that Chan and his party also shared this conviction and altered their campaign methods accordingly. The *Post Courier*, for instance, reported that:

In his victory statement, Sir Julius said he and the other two PPP candidates had won because they had conducted 'grass roots' campaigning. They had educated voters and not swayed them with political promises and 'gimmicks' (Yadi 1992).

Similarly, PPP Chairman Zebang Zurenouoc said of his party's campaign that 'We did this at the grass roots level and we did it at a comparatively low cost. PPP owes no favours to anyone' (Hriehwazi and Bengi 1992).

What did this 'grass roots' campaigning look like in Tanga, and how did it differ from the Pangu campaign there? Someone like myself arriving on Boang Island the day before polling began there would notice immediately the numerous bright yellow and red Pangu campaign posters (plate 2). These posters covered the exterior walls of many of the houses along the vehicular road from Amfar to Taonsip, even though some of these houses were in areas that in the event voted overwhelmingly for Chan. By contrast, no posters for Chan or the other PPP candidate, Paul Tohian, could be seen. The executive in charge of the PPP campaign in Tanga, Sipiien Severin, told me that no funds were available for posters which, in any case, he considered a poor investment. Indeed, I heard reports of how Pangu posters on the islands of Lif, Tefa, and Malendok (where 85% of the residents voted for Chan) had been defaced.

On the other hand, the PPP campaign put in the hands of several key supporters photocopies of 'Namatanai Electorate Nius,' a booklet produced by 'the Office of the Member for Namatanai.' The booklet contained anti-Pangu and pro-PPP/Chan articles taken from the *Post Courier*, a copy of Chan's curriculum vitae, pictures of specimen ballots, and photographs of PPP rallies held throughout New Ireland Province. Men who visited the house and lineage men's house of my host and PPP supporter, Partui Bonaventura, would leisurely peruse the booklet, paying greatest attention to the photographs of the rallies. These photographs included several snapshots of Sir Julius's visit in March to Tanga, one of two trips made by Chan to Tanga in the closing phase of the campaign. In the context of the other similar photographs, these pictures struck me as pleasing the Tangan men who examined them by conveying a sense of the place of Tanga in New Ireland Province as a whole. That is, these pictures, unlike the Pangu campaign posters, did not make a direct appeal for support to individual voters, but rather evoked for Tangans a sense of their belonging to a larger community of PPP

supporters, a community that extended beyond the boundaries of their own island home.

I was told that neither Ezekiel Tomon nor Michael Singan personally visited Tanga during the election campaign, although Sir Pita Lus was said to have visited in order to speak on behalf of Pangu Pati and to criticize Chan's political career. The absence of the Pangu candidates was perhaps due to a lack of financial resources, a problem that hampered Tomon's campaign in 1987 (MacQueen 1989: 218). Sir Julius, by contrast, enjoyed access to the resources of his family's airline company, Islands Aviation, which since 1991 has serviced all of the offshore islands on a regular basis (e.g., scheduled flights from Boang to Rabaul five days a week). His visits to Tanga, as to other locales in the electorate, 'tended towards the regal' (MacQueen 1989:217), brief but spectacular appearances at the major community centres on Boang: Fonli, Taonsip, and Amfar. Chan was not seated on a throne or borne aloft on a litter, newly invented traditions of Papua New Guinea political campaigns, but he was presented with numerous cooked pigs and honoured as the big man whose coming occasions an elaborate feast. Sir Julius, I was told by one man, apparently performed his part of this drama, using the opportunity of his March visit to dispense small monetary gifts to several senior men in poor health (one of whom ardently supported the Pangu slate), thus 'shaking hands' with them one last time in recognition of past assistance they had given.

I was not present to observe the festivities associated with Sir Julius's visits, but I was present at one PPP rally/feast held during the polling period. On the eve of voting at each of the three polling places on Boang, PPP supporters staged rallies at which speeches were made by Tangan PPP campaign executives—most of whom were relatively educated men in their thirties and forties—and other prominent local residents. The crowd was encouraged to get out and vote, informed of voting procedures, and shown the location of Chan's and Tohian's pictures on specimen ballots. Copious amounts of food, drinking coconuts, and betel nut were contributed, redistributed, and consumed on each of these occasions by the largely pro-PPP crowds that attended.

The scale of the feast I observed at the Taonsip polling place was much smaller than that of the feasts held in honour of Chan's visit—pigs were not eaten, for example—but its organization was broadly similar. On the day prior to the feast, local women




Plate 1. Specimen ballot for the Namatanai Open Electorate posted on the outside wall of the men's house (*bia*) at Mokatilistunglo.



Plate 2. Pangu Pati posters displayed on the outside wall of the Tanga Trading tradestore in Taunsiip.




Plate 3. Setting up the polling area at Mokatilistunglo. Men's house in the background



Plate 4. Voting at Mokatilistunglo

prepared *mangat*, scraped yams mixed with shredded coconut meat and wrapped for baking in a leaf packet. Local men meanwhile constructed a bamboo platform on which to pile and display food brought to the feast. These activities were loosely coordinated by Partui Bonaventura, a senior man recognized as the leader of his matrilineage (*matambia*), that is, as the principal organizer of the mortuary rites undertaken to commemorate deceased matrilineage members (see Foster 1995). In doing so, Partui followed procedures commonly used in organizing and performing mortuary feasts. For example, he distributed rice to various individual households which assumed responsibility for cooking it and bringing it to the feast for redistribution. The rice was purchased with funds supplied by PPP campaign executives, but the labour for preparing it was supplied by households mobilized for the purpose by Partui. Similarly, these households provided the mostly female labour involved in sweeping the site clean, serving the food, and washing up afterwards.

The rally/feast at Taonsip was attended by scores of local men, women and children as well as PPP supporters from other parts of Boang. A truck load of guests arrived from Amfar, featuring a chorus of young men singing a PPP theme song that, I was told, had been composed by a Tangan stringband, recorded on cassettes, and circulated throughout the province. The dignitaries included not only the lieutenants in charge of the PPP campaign in Tanga, but also several senior lineage leaders, counterparts of Partui who likewise used their customary authority and skills in organizing PPP-related events. In short, the rally/feast made it appear as if the PPP campaign had successfully linked an organization of younger, educated executives to the networks of support focussed on more senior PPP 'committee men,' customary lineage leaders or 'big men' (*kaltu dok*). In this way, the campaign generated public support for Chan among both senior and junior generations of men, and among voters with very different degrees of exposure to schooling and to issues of provincial and national significance.

It would be misleading to imply that this inter-generational linkage of organizations was without problems. On several occasions, for instance, I heard older committee men complain that the younger executives were not equitably sharing PPP resources, namely, cash and store bought food. But the linkage is notable in light of MacQueen's claim that the dominant cleavage between supporters of Chan and Tomon in 1987 could be described in terms of

an 'age/education' nexus (1989:214). According to MacQueen, Chan's support derived mainly from an older, less educated age group familiar with Sir Julius's career since before independence. Areas in which this age group retained its customary authority over younger voters could therefore be expected to support Chan. However, given the declining influence of the senior generation, on the one hand, and the growing population of younger, more educated voters, on the other, the prospects of continued support for Chan would seem dim.

The split between PPP and Pangu supporters in Taonsip could not easily be characterized in terms of an opposition between senior and junior generations. Indeed, one PPP supporter, a man in his thirties, claimed that older, uneducated Taonsip men preferred to support Pangu in the mistaken belief that Michael Singan, if elected, would financially reward loyal followers on a lineage by lineage basis. In any case, it is clear from the magnitude of Chan's victory in most Tangan locales that a sizeable percentage of the younger, more educated voters supported PPP.² I surmise that this outcome resulted at least partially from a campaign that used young male executives to appeal to young male voters *as well as* older lineage heads to deploy their customary authority and organizational skills. I should also add that many of the younger and more educated Tangan women voted for Chan explicitly on the grounds of his support for Tangan women's groups (or mama groups). One Taonsip woman active in these groups, closely associated with the Catholic Mission, affirmed this sentiment to me at the pre-voting PPP rally. Chan's support apparently took the form of passing on a request for funds from Sister Gerhildis to Niugini Mining Ltd (NGM). According to Colin Filer (personal communication, 10/13/93), a monetary gift was made by NGM in 1990 or early 1991 as part of a nationwide public relations strategy, although many of the Tangans with whom I spoke associated the gift specifically with NGM's participation in the Lihir Joint Venture.³ Sir Julius, along with NGM's exploration manager, Gavin Thomas, made a

² I note in this regard that Karen Sykes, an anthropologist conducting educational research in the Lelet plateau during the election, told me about one senior man and Pangu supporter who expressed anger over his young nephew's open support for Chan and the PPP (personal communication, June 30th, 1992).

³ I am uncertain as to the exact size of the gift, but several Tangans reported it to me as K20,000.

public presentation of the gift to the Tangan mama groups at Amfar on Boang Island. Filer (personal communication, 10/13/93) reports that according to Thomas, 'Chan was present in his capacity as part-owner of the helicopter' that brought Thomas to Tanga for the presentation.

The speeches made at the Taonsip rally were self-consciously non-confrontational. Speakers urged their audience to make considered and independent choices, that is, to vote for a candidate on the basis of his merits and not on the basis of who else appeared to support the candidate. Speakers neither criticized Pangu policies or Tomon (in fact, Tomon's and Singan's names were never mentioned) nor praised PPP policies and Chan. But two speakers unambiguously called for a change in national government and reiterated Sir Julius's desire to lead such a change. One speaker thus carefully pointed out that although Sir Julius had been involved in national politics for a long time, most of his career was spent as a member of the opposition. These remarks made it clear that at least for some voters, national level issues ('*antap*' versus 'grass roots' issues) were relevant to the campaign in Namatanai. Of these issues, by far the most important was Bougainville.

Although only one speaker at the Taonsip rally alluded to Bougainville (along with the shutdown of UPNG) as circumstances indicative of the need for wise leadership, the effects of the Bougainville crisis were beginning to make themselves felt in Tanga. These effects went beyond those of outrage caused by the serious gunshot wounds inflicted upon one Taonsip police officer wounded in an ambush by BRA soldiers. Tangan men who had held well paying jobs on Bougainville, either at Panguna or elsewhere, had been forced to return home to Boang, some with families. Their presence put a double strain on local resources. First, returnees required land for making gardens and building materials for houses, extremely scarce resources on the overcrowded coral island of Boang (see Foster 1995 for more detail). Second, the returnees were no longer able to remit wage income to their relatives in Tanga. This loss of remittance income came at a time of severe depression in the price paid for smoked copra, the only other major source of cash income for Tangans. Accordingly, many Tangans expressed frustration over the prolonged nature of the Bougainville crisis. Generally unsympathetic to the BRA cause, the Tangans with whom I spoke were critical of the Namaliu government's handling of the crisis; some openly advocated a quick, military solution.

Another national level debate that surfaced in the local campaign was official corruption, but this issue was present more as an idiom than as a specific issue. In his address (delivered in *tok pisin*) at the Taonsip rally, Sipien Severin specifically asked about the meaning of the English word 'corrupt.' He himself confessed to not having a clear explanation to offer, but nonetheless claimed that PPP would have nothing to do with 'corrupt' groups. By the same token, however, 'corruption' functioned for Pangu supporters as an idiom for criticizing Chan's campaign tactics. For example, Karen Sykes (personal communication 6/20/92) reported hearing comments of one D.P.I. officer on the Lelet Plateau to the effect that Chan's 'loose use' of money in the campaign amounted to bribery. The officer claimed that 'Chan is 'Asian' in his business and his political style' and that Australians would not tolerate his gift giving.⁴ Nonetheless, the election result suggests that this criticism did not hurt Chan. On the contrary, it appears that Chan was able to mobilize the well known sentiment of anti-incumbency in Papua New Guinea by presenting himself as an anti-corruption candidate in opposition to the Pangu led government, despite the fact that he was one of the longest sitting members of parliament in all of the country.

In addition to 'corruption', a second idiom that shaped the campaign in Tanga was that of party politics. As MacQueen (1989:223) observed about the 1987 election, the head to head nature of the contest focussed attention on party identity unusual in PNG politics. This focus was even more intense in 1992, and, I suspect, it was the resulting polarization that precipitated the violent clash between PPP and Pangu supporters at Sohun village, Namatanai, during a PPP rally (Yadi 1992). In Tanga, both Pangu and PPP

⁴ Even in Tanga, where Chan was born on his father Chin Pak's plantation in 1939, Chan's Asian ancestry was sometimes held against him by his detractors. I heard Pangu supporters allege, for example, that 'Chan's party' is a white man's party while Pangu is for black skinned people. One Taonsip man told me that Chan was from Tanga, true enough, but that his ideas were those of white skinned people. This same man also likened the PPP strategy of rallying on the evening before voting as a procedure for buying votes--for treating voters as if they were chickens. Karen Sykes (personal communication, June 30th 1992) reports similar comments from a senior Lelet man who compared Chan's gifts to the laplaps once distributed as charity by condescending Australians: 'You see,' the man explained, 'Chan is a masta just the same.'

supporters made it clear that there was no middle or neutral ground on which to stand: one was either for or against PPP or Pangu. Party affiliation very much counted in voters' minds (cf. Oliver 1989: 7-8); saying so, however, leaves open the question of what is to be understood by 'party affiliation.' I conclude this report on the election in Namatanai by briefly considering this question.

In Tanga, party affiliation did not mean the endorsement of individual voters for the programmes and policies of either Pangu or PPP. That is, people did not vote for Sir Julius Chan *because* he represented PPP (if anything, it would be the other way around) or for Michael Singan *because* he represented Pangu. This is not to say that there was no awareness of the parties as nationwide organizations of prime significance in the formation of government, the distribution of ministries, and so forth. It is, however, to say that party affiliation took shape locally as the assertion—temporary and tentative—of a novel social identity. PPP supporters would often playfully address members in the opposite camp by calling out 'Hey, Pangu!' Pangu supporters would likewise refer in a heavily ironic way to an opponent as '*kwila bilong PPP*' ('ironwood of PPP'). Pickup trucks would rush through the dark Boang night carrying young men shouting in mock seriousness, 'PPP, PPP, PPP! Pangu, Pangu, Pangu!', a jocular deflation of the rivalry between the two political parties. Indeed, playfulness and irony very much characterized the ethos of trying on party identities in Tanga.⁵ As Anton Neof once put it, politics is a game; it has its own time, but when it's over, it's over.

In retrospect, the election campaign arguably allowed Tangans to experiment with their social relations along lines other than the familiar ones of kinship, affinity, ceremonial exchange, locality, and generation (none of which wholly defines the PPP/Pangu split). For a time, two brothers or a father and son might go their separate ways; they might spend their days with different cliques in different men's houses. But when the election was over, they would reunite and cooperate on the basis of a shared matrilineal or familial identity. Political identities would recede into the background once more, and other social identities—such as those appropriate to mortuary rites or property relations—would come to the fore. The transience of the campaign, and hence of the social

⁵ Another droll piece of campaign humour was the acronymic reading of PPP as 'papa paulim pikinini' ('father abuses child').

identities it brought into being, thus enabled Tangans to stand at some critical distance from what they were doing as they were doing it—as if they were self-consciously performing roles in a play. For no matter how vigorous the public show of support for Pangu or PPP, the campaign context in which such demonstrations acquired significance was ultimately ephemeral. As soon as the election results were announced, as soon as ‘the game’ ended, the relevance of party affiliation to everyday Tangan social life would become less obvious and less compelling.

Voting as ritual

To think of politics as an activity that unfolds in its own time, an activity that temporarily posits unconventional social identities and enables people to assume these identities as if they were performing a role, is to think of politics in terms of ritual. In the remainder of this chapter, I will treat voting in Tanga as a rite that promotes a non-conventional definition of personhood, that is, as a set of procedures that defines persons as separate individuals and reconnects them directly to a community of similar individuals, the guardian of which is the state. I want to focus on the details of actually casting a vote, the particular way in which people assemble, observe, and participate in polling during a national election. Again, I base my argument on the events I observed in Tanga during the 1992 national election; their applicability to situations elsewhere in PNG requires further investigation. My main aim is to highlight the process of individuation enacted in casting a vote: the process of ‘singling out’ or disconnecting a person from the nexus of social relations that defines his or her identity and positing for that person a new identity as a discrete and autonomous individual, in short, a citizen.

Polling in the Namatanai Open began on the morning of Saturday, June 13th and continued in some divisions until the afternoon of Friday, June 26th. One polling team was assigned to each of ten divisions; two teams were assigned to the East Coast Central division. Each team moved from polling station to polling station throughout the division, holding elections in morning, afternoon, or all day sessions. In Tanga, the movements of the polling teams were widely known in advance; schedules and updates on the progress of the teams were broadcast by Radio New Ireland to listeners eager for election news. Voters who were unable to vote when the team visited their area of residence could vote at other

polling stations; similarly, voters from other parts of the electorate who were visiting Tanga (e.g., visitors from Anir) could vote at any polling station, provided their names appeared on the common roll.

I arrived on Boang Island on Friday, June 19th. Voting was scheduled to begin there the following day in the Fonli area. I observed the voting in Fonli as well as in the Taonsip area, where I had lived previously, on Monday, June 22. It is on the basis of these observations that I offer the following description.

In the Taonsip area of Boang, the polling station was set up in the hamlet of Mokatilistunglo in the shade of a large grapefruit tree. This hamlet, and the men's house located there, is the site where many Taonsip residents gather for purposes associated with community government: Monday 'line' meetings, elections of Local Government Council representatives, censuses, visits from health workers, and so forth. Partui Bonaventura, the current leader (*kaltu dok* or 'big man') of Solsol matrilineage (*matambia*) of clan (*funmat*) Korofi resided in this hamlet. Previous leaders of this clan, some of this particular lineage, had occupied the office of *luluai* since its institution by the German colonial state, and consequently their residential hamlets ('camps') had been used for assembling people on the occasion of a patrol officer's visit. This habit has persisted into the post-independence era.

Partui, as I have already mentioned, was a well known supporter of PPP. When Sir Julius visited Boang in March, he was received at a feast made on exactly the same spot as the polling station. Similarly, the evening before the voting, local PPP organizers held their rally and feast at this same location. Accordingly, the site of the polling station was hardly neutral space. (By contrast, polling two days earlier was held at the Fonli Community School since rain prevented its being held at the old 'camp' at Taubie. People who had congregated at the school in order to vote were thus able to shelter in the classrooms that were not being used on the weekend.) Pangu supporters who shunned the previous evening's rally would have no choice but to come to Mokatilistunglo to cast their votes.

Given the close association of the Taonsip voting site with a particular lineage and its leader, and through him, with a particular party and candidate, the first actions undertaken by the polling team had the effect of demarcating a public space that rendered these associations irrelevant. Upon arrival at Mokatilistunglo on the appointed morning, the team of four polling

officials and two policemen immediately began to rope off an area within which to conduct the voting. Team members traced a large, waist high rectangle with a ball of twine, wrapping the twine at each corner around a makeshift post or a convenient palm tree. They thus separated the voting area from the rest of the hamlet, including the Solsol men's house where many men expecting to vote had begun to gather, and created a stage on which to display the nation-state of Papua New Guinea. For inside the rectangle, people acted ideally as representatives of the state or as citizens of the nation in whose name the state legitimates itself. No other identities, personal or collective, were in principle relevant (plates 3 and 4).

Inside the demarcated space sat two kinds of state representatives: the polling officials, all outfitted in identical white tee shirts with red lettering, and the policemen, likewise outfitted in identical blue uniforms. Admission to the 'inside' was carefully regulated and granted to only three categories of people: scrutineers, local *komiti* ('village aldermen'), and individual voters. The scrutineers—all men, mostly young—were delegates of the two rival factions in Taunsip who were responsible for observing the voting and making sure that no irregularities occurred. Each scrutineer wore a small identification tag displaying the word 'scrutineer'; some scrutineers sat inside the rectangle but away from the polling boxes. *Komiti*, one from each of the three polling villages in Taunsip, entered the polling area in order to assist the polling officer in identifying the names of recently deceased residents and calling names of voters from the *komiti's* village (see below). Individual voters also entered the polling area, but one by one, and only after their being publicly 'singled out.'

Outside the demarcated polling space stood clusters of men, women and children, observing the proceedings or otherwise occupying themselves in conversation or child care until their names were called. Many of the men milled around the men's house, the exterior walls of which were posted with notices of the laws concerning electioneering; many of the women sat in and around the nearby cookhouse (*felungkur*) of Partui's wife. The names of voters were read aloud by a polling official from the electoral roll; the names were grouped by census domicile (or village) and ordered alphabetically within each domicile. When a name was read, the person would separate himself or herself from the crowd and move toward the entrance to the polling area. People would walk

forward, sometimes swaggering, sometimes demurring. Women in particular would often raise their hands to their mouths in a characteristic gesture of discomfort, but men too were highly self-conscious of the concentrated gaze of the assembled onlookers.

As prospective voters approached the polling area, they would be reinstructed if necessary not to bring their purses or baskets inside. People would accordingly deposit their purses at the entrance way. Similarly, prospective voters were instructed not to come inside with any clothing (tee shirts, caps, *laplaps*) or paraphernalia (buttons, pamphlets, signs) that bore the name, picture or logo of any candidate or party. I understood this regulation to apply only to electoral officers and scrutineers, but the polling officials in Tanga applied the regulation to the voters as well. Voters would then report to one of the polling officials who checked the voter's name against the common roll. Another official would then mark the nail of one of the voter's pinky fingers with a stripe of indelible ink—a preventive measure against multiple voting. Yet another official would distribute the ballot papers to the voter and direct the voter to one of two cardboard polling booths, where the voter would mark the ballot papers.

At Fonli, the polling booths were set up so that a voter's back was turned toward the crowd (plate 3). That is, the actual act of voting took place with the crowd—scrutineers, miscellaneous spectators, electoral officials, and policemen—looking from a distance over the shoulder of the voter. At Taonsip, the polling booths were arranged so that the crowd could not see directly into the booth; the voters' backs were turned toward the bush. After completing the ballot papers, the voter folded his or her papers several times, and then stepped out of the booth to deposit the papers in the locked metal ballot box near the exit of the polling area. One of the policemen, who kept casual watch over the box, would assist the voter whenever more space in the box was needed to accommodate the ballot papers. The voter would then exit the roped off area, retrieve his or her purse, and melt back into the crowd.

How can we understand the actions involved in voting as elements of a ritual? I suggest we begin by considering the symbolic transformation in personal identity that the process of 'singling out' ideally effects. To be singled out is to be constituted as a discrete, autonomous individual—a person with an intrinsic rather than

relational identity.⁶ This constitutive process begins in earnest with the public calling of a voter's name. Although people were called to vote village by village, anyone whose name was on the common roll could vote anywhere in the electorate at anytime during the polling period; the identity of voters was thus disconnected from their identity as residents of particular villages. Furthermore, within each village voters were called in alphabetical order. That is, voters' names were not ordered by family units, as they were in census counts I have previously observed, but rather by a logic that did not evince any relations or connections among the names called. This procedure produced one especially odd effect. Given that many female names in Tanga are prefixed with Tin-, it appeared that women voted in a single bloc after a long parade of men whose names began with the letters A through S.⁷

The voter must enter the polling area stripped of his or her relational identity, that is, his or her identity as a nephew, mother, affine or consanguine. This effect was achieved and epitomized, perhaps unintentionally, by requiring voters to leave their baskets outside the polling area. In Tanga, one's personal basket is the material locus of one's relational identity, the site of the small tokens that people give and take in the continuous enactment of everyday sociality—betel nut, lime, tobacco, rolling paper, matches, combs, spoons, coins. On the one hand, certain categories of people, such as a man's sister or his brother in law, ought never to touch or inspect each other's baskets; on the other hand, other categories of people, such as a man's female cross-cousins, are enjoined to invade and play with each other's baskets. A quick fix on someone's relational identity can be secured by determining who does or does not have access to his or her basket. Accordingly, the requirement to divest oneself of one's basket effectively made voters shed the material sign of their relational identity before entering the polling area. This requirement, moreover, tacitly recalled the

⁶ For more discussion of the contrast between intrinsic individuals and relational persons (or 'dividuals') see Strathern 1988.

⁷ It is important to note that simply calling names in alphabetical order was not enough to eclipse completely the relational identities of the people so called. Many Tanga names, for example, combine personal names with the name of one's father or husband. It was the names of older men and women that were the most individuated—combinations of a personal 'place name' and a personal Christian name (e.g., Partui Bonaventura).

customary procedure followed in constructing a new men's house, when the sponsors of the men's house and its associated feasts require male guests to leave their baskets outside the structure until it has been properly dedicated. Tangans explain such a requirement as a sign of deference or respect (*ninatke*) that must be shown by the guests for their hosts and the deceased big men commemorated by the hosts. I have elsewhere (Foster 1995) interpreted this practice as part of the procedures by which feast organizers assert their own autonomy by temporarily eclipsing the relational identities of both their guests and themselves.

Similarly, the requirement that voters not enter the polling area displaying any signs of support for a candidate or party divested voters of their collective identity as members of a political group. Voters thus entered the arena as individuals whose actions must be made to appear as autonomous, that is, as individuals acting uncoerced, of their own free will rather than out of loyalty to a group.⁸ The public appearance of the vote thus conformed to an ideal that was articulated in Severin's speech the evening before, namely, that one's vote must be one's free personal choice; one must not support a particular candidate merely because some other friend or relative is doing so.

If the voter must be freed and individuated, detached from a nexus of relational identities, before entering the polling area, then the voter's presence inside the area makes visible membership in a new community, and hence a new identity. The public verification of one's name on the electoral rolls announces one's membership in the community of eligible voters. More tangibly, the indelible ink stripe drawn on one's finger signifies membership in the community of active voters. By the end of the day, the adult population of Taonsip would be classified into two categories: voters and non-voters, the former recognizable by their marked fingers.⁹ By the end of the polling period, between one and two million people in Papua

⁸ It is worth noting in this regard that individual voters are made to appear in the indigenous image of 'big men,' people whose autonomous action is at once the cause and consequence of their power (see Clay 1992).

⁹ I note in this regard that several people responded to the news that they would not be able to vote because their names were not on the common roll with shame as well as anger. The problem of unrecorded names on the common roll was relatively minor in Tanga compared with situations elsewhere in PNG.

New Guinea would be walking around with striped fingers. This population forms the large, translocal community into which one is recruited by the act of voting: the community of voters who have made their marks for the nation. In this community, one's identity is not relational, defined in terms of age, gender or kinship differences; for one's identity in this community is precisely the same as every other member's—that of a free and equal citizen.

It would be wrong, however, to imply that the ritual process of singling out voters unfolds automatically or that the ideal of autonomous individualism is realized unproblematically. For if the script of the ritual pushes in one direction, the actual performance of the ritual often pulls in another, namely, toward the local convention of relational identity. Take, for example, the gaze of the people outside the polling area, including that of people who had already voted themselves. These spectators peered intently into the ballot boxes, trying to determine by the angle at which the voter marked the ballot the candidates that the voter supported. At Taonsip, a group of PPP committee men sat just outside the bounded area, watching the proceedings closely. At times they would begin to edge along the backside of the polling area in order to get a better view into the boxes. Polling officers would instruct them to move back. The group would obey, but soon start creeping back again. These men were not only trying to produce an estimate of the votes for their party, they were also trying to determine if people voted according to their publicly stated intentions. (Recall that because of the two party nature of the race, such intentions were unavoidably indicated by one's presence or absence at a party rally.)

In other words, the ideal of a *private* vote, an important corollary of the voter's identity as a discrete individual, was hardly accepted without question in Tanga. In one of the speeches made at the PPP rally, a party executive made it plain that people would be watched during the election. Yes, he said, people were free to choose whomever they wished; but, he cautioned, if people voted for Pangu (*kalap long Pangu*), then they would not be given access to PPP resources. Scrutineers, he claimed, would report whomever lies. And, in fact, scrutineers did seem to keep as close an eye as possible on who might be voting for whom. In addition, many men remarked to me of their happiness about the 'new' regulation that allowed non-literate voters to enter the polling area with an

assistant of their own choice.¹⁰ Formerly, I was told, polling officials themselves rendered assistance to voters in need, thereby preserving the confidentiality of the vote. In 1992, many senior men and women voted with the assistance of their sons, daughters, nephews or nieces, thereby subverting the twin ideals of the individuated voter and the private ballot.

In short, the twine demarcating the polling area not only separated two different physical spaces, but also defined a contested interface between competing ideals of community and personhood. Movement from outside the polling area to inside the area enacted a transition from a world defined in terms of relational identities to one defined in terms of essential individuals. Inside the polling area, voters joined an imagined community of Papua New Guinea citizens, a 'deep horizontal comradeship' of equal and alike individuals (Anderson 1983). Outside the polling area, one assumed one's place in a community of persons defined in terms of their particular and dissimilar relations to each other, relations organized (sometimes hierarchically) in terms of age, gender, residence and kinship. While polling officials and policemen inspected the proceedings from within the polling area in order to enforce one definition of personhood, spectators and scrutineers along and outside the polling boundaries witnessed the proceedings in order to enforce a competing definition of personhood. Thus although I find it useful to think of voting in Tanga in terms of ritual, I do so only by emphasizing at the same time the uneasy and contradictory nature of the ritual process.

Concluding remarks: imagining the state

I began this chapter by asking how the idea of the state makes itself visible and real in the lives of rural Papua New Guineans. I have chosen to focus not on practices of coercive violence or routine administration, though certainly such practices make this idea visible and real. Instead, I have directed attention to the concrete act of voting, the way in which its structure and symbolism promote a particular definition of personhood and community. That definition of personhood is one of citizenship; that definition of

¹⁰ Yaw Saffu (personal communication, October 18, 1993) points out that, in practice, in many parts of the country where he had observed elections since 1982, this provision for an independently chosen assistant had been available whatever the Organic Law on Elections actually provided.

community is one of nationhood. I want now to conclude simply by pointing out how the promotion of these definitions of citizenship and nationhood entails the constitution of the state.

In voting, one engages in a double act of inscription. A voter indeed makes his or her mark for the nation, as the slogan of the PNG Electoral Commission, printed boldly on the election booths, exhorted (plate 4). But at the same time, the voter himself or herself—and not only his or her pinky—is marked upon, his or her identity constituted and validated by the state. This marking takes shape as the ritual transformation I have tentatively described above. Put differently, the condition on which one registers one's choice as a citizen of the national community is that one acquiesces in the authority *and the reality* of the state to safeguard this choice. In the ritual of voting, there is an undeniable saliency to the idea of the state. The state appears very concretely in the guise of polling officials and policemen, computer generated electoral rolls and metal ballot boxes. The state appears as that which makes it possible to be a citizen of the nation, that which safeguards and facilitates the capacity of the nation to express its political will. To the extent that one acquiesces in the ritual procedures of voting, one acquiesces in the reality of the state and in the force of the definitions of personhood and community upon which the state is predicated.

In Tanga, state ritual was contested in rather small acts of resistance such as intrusive spectating, the smallness of the contest perhaps indicating the degree to which the idea of The State has become taken for granted. In other parts of Papua New Guinea, the contest was large, overt, and violent—a manifest demonstration of an incapacity or unwillingness to imagine the state as the guardian of the nation and its citizens (see Clark n.d.). One might equally read this rejection of state ritual as a rejection of the ideals of personhood and community the ritual promotes. There is perhaps no more potent symbol of resistance to the ideal of autonomous individuals united in a solidary community, and thus to the foreign ideal of a nation-state, than a ballot box hacked to bits or dumped unceremoniously in the Waigani swamp.

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'Steak and Grease': A Short History of Political Competition in Nuku


Colin Filer

Steak and grease

I was out campaigning in Wilwil village, and the people there wanted to know why Chris and Stack were standing together. I said that if you want to fry a piece of steak, you have to put some grease in the pan as well, and the result will be delicious.'

The man who told me this little story had been actively campaigning for the political alliance between Karl Stack ('Steak'), sitting member and candidate for the West Sepik Provincial electorate, and Christopher Sambre ('Grease'), sitting member and candidate for the Nuku Open electorate. It was June 17, 1987, about half-way through the voting period in the national election of that year, and we were sitting outside Sambre's house in Nuku station. I was about to return to Port Moresby, having decided that it was quite obvious who was going to win the election in this particular corner of the nation, and already looking for an explanation of this predictable result. To me, the story was memorable because the piece of *tok bokis* which it contained, the image of 'steak and grease', offered a clue to one such explanation—one which certainly contained an element of truth, but which I found particularly interesting for the questions of political morality which it involved.

Images of meat and its consumption generally carry a powerful resonance in Melanesian village discourse. The image of 'steak and grease' was not simply an image of difference and complementarity; it also bore the connotation of particular political values. To put the



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matter very simply, the speaker seemed to imply that Karl Stack's 'value' was contained in the material benefits which he placed at the disposal of his constituents, while Christopher Sambre's 'value' was to be found on the opposite side of this political coin, in the moral quality of his leadership.

Stack's political support was drawn from local admiration for his toughness and his wealth. He was perceived to be an 'action man', the former kiap who once drove bulldozers, and now flew helicopters, from one end of the province to the other, an abrasive and impulsive character, but one who could afford to 'rubbish' his political opponents because his lavish generosity could always be relied upon to compensate for rumours of irregularity attached to his financial dealings. Stack's supporters were persuaded by his bluster to believe that he was like a lucky hunter in the capitalist wilderness which lay beyond the understanding of the village people, purchasing their loyalty with shares of his accumulated wealth, no questions asked.

Sambre's reputation was entirely different. Here was the humble Christian man of modest means, who did not gamble, smoke, chew betelnut, drink alcohol, had still not learnt to drive a car and (unlike many politicians) was apparently untainted by rumours of sexual misconduct or financial malpractice. His life-style still testified to the vow of poverty which he had once taken when he joined the local order of Franciscan missionary monks. His style of generosity was not remarkable for the amount of goods or money which he gave away, which could not beat the minimum available to any national MP, but for the fact that he kept nothing for himself. Ostentation played no part in what he offered his constituents, but he secured the loyalty of an extensive network of supporters in the villages of his electorate by flattering them with his trust in their capacity to follow his example.

If we ask how and why these two men managed to dominate the politics of the Nuku area, in a sequence of election triumphs which stretched from 1977, the first answer is already contained in the image of 'steak and grease': the contrast in their styles of leadership was such that they had all the angles covered in the business of appealing to the floating voter. In which case the problem, which has sometimes puzzled their supporters and their critics simultaneously, is to understand how two such individuals, so different in every way, could manage to sustain their double act for such a length of time. The most plausible solution to this problem is

to recognise that each man had such a different conception of the basis of his own power that each could see the other as the instrument of his own designs, perhaps even as a nuisance or a necessary evil, without beginning to suspect how he was represented in the other's scheme.

Stack would certainly have taken the remark about 'steak and grease' to mean that Sambre's moral postures have merely been the icing on a cake baked by himself or Michael Somare. When the chips were down, Sambre was nothing more nor less than the Pangu Party's Nuku bagman. In this sense, Stack's understanding of the local political situation was perfectly consistent with the orthodox academic analysis of electoral politics in any part of Papua New Guinea. From this point of view, electoral success is based on the reproduction of a 'parochial handout mentality' which combines the value of primary group loyalty (parochialism) and the distribution of material benefits (handouts) in a circle of instrumental rationality where each is seen as a means to the other. Where this mentality predominates, communities cast their votes for the candidate who offers the greatest material reward and candidates normally offer the greatest material reward to their own communities. In that case, the only form of genuine political choice is that which arises when people cannot vote for one of their own, and are therefore open to persuasion by the promise of rewards from relative strangers. Stack's strategy was therefore twofold:

- to present himself as the most plausible source of material benefits to those groups whose members or leaders were unwilling or unable to identify themselves with any of the other candidates for the provincial seat; and
- to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with running mates in the open electorates from whom he could acquire the maximum amount of local support without damaging his own reputation as the provincial candidate whose handouts reached the parts which his opponents would not touch.

And so long as Stack could also maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with the leadership of the Pangu Party, Sambre's personal loyalty to Michael Somare had the additional advantage of reducing his own 'price' as a political client in the national arena, even at the same time that it may have added to his value as a small-time political patron in his own backyard. Sambre was

apparently willing and able to deliver the electorate of Nuku without demanding ministries or other major prizes as his just desert.

If Stack ever paused to compare different parts of his own provincial constituency with each other or with other parts of rural PNG, he might have wondered how Sambre managed to consolidate his own position through three successive national elections in an electorate which contains something in the order of sixty tribal communities whose members speak approximately thirty local languages. Linguistic evidence alone does seem to indicate a degree of ethnic or cultural fragmentation in the Nuku area which is fairly remarkable, even by Melanesian standards. From Stack's point of view, an excessive degree of cultural fragmentation might be taken to reduce the relative value of primordial group loyalties in the organisation of electoral support, and thus to increase the relative value of any material benefits promised or delivered by candidates to relative strangers. In that case, the mix of ethnic fragmentation and economic backwardness throughout his own provincial electorate could be said to have reduced the price which Stack was obliged to pay for his own political support because the opposition would invariably be divided and impoverished to an unusual degree. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that circumstances such as these have made it very difficult indeed for sitting members to retain their open seats when they are men like Sambre—men of modest means and small ambitions whose communities account for less than five per cent of an electorate which is inclined to think the 'wantok system' is the major obstacle to its 'development'.

Sambre has always seen his own political success, with or without Stack's material support, as one aspect of his own position within his own tribal community, the Namblo community, and also as one aspect of that group's historic mission to establish its hegemony amidst the sixty-odd communities which make up the electorate. From his and their point of view, the multicentricity and cultural diversity of local groups has turned the ethnic contest into a form of moral competition, a 'level playing field' where victory is not awarded to the group which has the largest population or the most conspicuous success in business, but the one whose style of leadership presents the most convincing image of what leadership should be. From this point of view, white outsiders like Karl Stack, the Franciscan priests, or even an ethnographer like me, are seen as assets or instruments attracted to the Namblo cause by this same

style of leadership. The partnership of 'steak and grease' is thus configured in a way which no longer seems to fit the orthodox analysis of rural politics in PNG, because the 'parochial handout mentality' would now have to be seen as an obstacle, and not the key, to any valid explanation of Sambre's political success.

Political space

It would, of course, be pointless to deny the continuing significance of local communities and localised relationships in determining the way that Sambre's constituents cast their votes. In order to grasp the quality of local political relations, it is first necessary to describe the complex internal structure, and the variety of external linkages, which define this slice of political space. The Nuku Open electorate stretches south from the peaks of the Torricelli mountain range to the margins of the Sepik River floodplain, covering an area of about 3,543 square kilometres. To the south and east it borders the Ambunti-Dreikikir electorate, which is part of East Sepik Province, while to the north and west it borders the Aitape-Lumi electorate. The Sepik Highway traverses the northern part of the electorate, having first penetrated Nuku District in 1972, reaching Yangkok station by 1980, and now (in theory at least) providing permanent access from Lumi station to the coastal town of Wewak (see Map 1). Nuku station and many of the villages in the southern part of the electorate are connected to the highway by a network of feeder roads whose condition varies with the weather and the work which is (or is not) done to maintain them. A great deal of time and money has been spent on the construction of another road which would link Nuku (and Lumi) to the coastal town of Aitape, but the last and most difficult section across the peaks of the Torricelli range has never quite been completed.

The Nuku Open electorate contains eight census divisions, with a combined resident population of 35,219 including 35 non-citizens—mostly missionaries. Six of these census divisions constitute Nuku District, which is administered from Nuku station and represented in the Nuku Local Government Council, itself formed in 1965. The two Lumi census divisions (East and West Au) constitute the Yangkok Sub-District of Lumi District, which is administered from Yangkok station and represented in the Yangkok Local Government Council, which broke away from the Wapei (Lumi) Local Government Council in 1977, when the electorate was first created.

Table 7.1: Area and population of census divisions within Nuku Open electorate.

Census division	Area (km ²)	Resident population		Intercensal growth	1990 density
		1980	1990		
Maimmai-Namblo	411	3365	3883	+15.4%	9.4
Wanwan	1172	2805	3272	+16.6%	2.8
Makru-KlapleiA	211	5194	6345	+22.2%	30.1
Seim	126	3703	4320	+16.7%	34.3
East Palei	451	3208	3655	+13.9%	8.1
West Palai	421	3298	4135	+25.4%	9.8
East Au	361	4920	5481	+11.4%	15.2
West Au	390	3727	4128	+10.8%	10.6
Total	3543	30220	35219	+16.5%	9.9

Insofar as voters subscribe to the idea that residents of a single district or council area share certain political interests, then one would have to infer that the boundary separating Nuku District from the Yangkok area has placed Yangkok candidates at a considerable disadvantage in elections for the Nuku Open seat, simply because of the gross imbalance in their respective populations. On the other hand, Nuku District itself contains a number of spatial sub-divisions, deriving partly from the realm of 'custom', and partly from recent historical experience, which have at least as much political significance as the Nuku-Yangkok boundary. And insofar as villagers within the electorate have become increasingly disillusioned with the capacity of the state apparatus to deliver 'development', they may have modified or lost their inclination to accept the official division of space as a useful or genuine guide to the spatial distribution of electoral support.

Within Nuku District, there is a long history of mutual antagonism between the people of the 'Maimai' region, which comprises the four southern census divisions, and the 'Palai' people who inhabit the East and West Palei census divisions in the north. The origin of this antagonism can be traced back to the manner in which the District was initially colonised. The Palai¹ people were

¹ Nowadays people normally pronounce the name as 'Palai', possibly because of the fact that this is also a word in Tok Pisin, and the meaning of

the first to be contacted by alien bird-of-paradise traders (in the German period) and labour recruiters (in the 1930s), and also the first to be brought under Australian administration, because they were more accessible to the old Sepik District headquarters at Aitape (Marshall 1938). The 'Maimai' people,² whose name is taken from that of the small tribal community which had the honour of hosting a police post established in 1939, had barely begun to experience the impact of colonial administration before the process was interrupted by the Japanese invasion. When Maimai was re-established as a patrol post in 1948, and the small number of Maimai labourers recruited in the pre-war years returned to join their families, their Palai counterparts could still regard them as 'bushkanakas'. But this disparity was soon removed once the first Catholic mission stations were constructed at Wati, overlooking what is now Nuku station, and Andapa, in the midst of the Seim villages. Nuku patrol post was constructed in 1957, replacing the old Maimai station, and administration of the Palai region was simultaneously transferred from Aitape to Nuku, thus inaugurating the boundaries of what eventually became Nuku District. By then the steady flow of migrants to and from plantations had closed the gap between Palai experience and Maimai innocence, but it had also reinforced the sense of separate identity.

If the Palai-Maimai contest has been an important factor in the electoral arena, it would seem to have been a rather one-sided affair, because Maimai people outnumber Palai people by more than two to one (see Table 7.1). But if the Yangkok (Au) people are brought in on the side of their Palai neighbours, the result is a fairly equal split between North and South. The Yangkok people were previously part of the wider category of 'Wapi' people, whose regional identity was created at the same time as that of the Palai people (by the use of a different route across the Torricelli

this word ('lizard') is one which seems to be associated with the name itself—at least in the minds of the Maimai people. The official spelling 'Palei' may either represent the original indigenous pronunciation of a particular community or an erroneous stroke of some kiap's pen.

² The Maimai community is actually an offshoot or 'colony' of Sambre's larger Namblo community to the east (See Map 1), and the census division to which they belong has thus been named after this pair of related communities.

Mountains from Aitape), and who now make up the great majority of the population of Lumi District. On the whole, I think it would be true to say that the local candidates in national elections have normally been seen as 'Maimai', 'Palai', 'Wapi' or (since 1977) 'Yangkok' candidates, even if a few of them have made considerable efforts to overcome the regional limitation of their political support. In this sense, the North appears to suffer an indelible weakness which results from its internal division at the same level at which it is opposed to the South, but I think that it would also be true to say that local voters have now grown more accustomed to the idea that their electorate is split between two 'moieties' of roughly equal size, and the most appropriate names for these would now be the 'Nuku-Maimai' and 'Palai-Yangkok' regions.

Each half of the electorate is structurally identical, not only in the sense that it contains four census divisions, but also because it contains three provincial government electorates as well. In each case, the two most populous census divisions have their own elected representative in the Sandaun Provincial Assembly, while the other two have been combined to form a single constituency. If we then apply the standard measures of social and economic development to the different parts of the electorate, we can also say that each of the two halves is split between a 'central' and a 'peripheral' zone, where the density of population is closely associated with levels of economic prosperity and access to government services. From this point of view, the Seim and Makru-Klaplei census divisions, each with its own MPA, together make up the central zone of the Nuku-Maimai region, while the two Au census divisions make up the central zone of the Palai-Yangkok region—and it is no coincidence that a government station is located in each of these two regional centres.

I have used this division of the electorate into four parts, each containing a pair of census divisions, to summarise the spatial distribution of votes cast in the various elections which are the subject of my subsequent analysis. The convenience of this procedure is obviously related to the fact that polling teams and census patrols alike have normally operated within the boundaries of particular census divisions, and this unit of analysis therefore presents itself as the most obvious way to analyse and compare the data produced by both forms of bureaucratic activity. However, the spatial configuration of the electorate has other characteristics which are certainly obscured by this fourfold partition.

There is a much greater contrast between central and peripheral zones in the southern half of the electorate than in the northern half, and there are other measures of development—most notably the volume of cash crop production, the nutritional standards of young children, and the level of school attendance amongst the economically active population—which tend to show that the Yangkok zone is even more ‘backward’ than the Palai and Maimai-Wanwan zones.³ Yangkok government station and the neighbouring headquarters of the Christian Mission of Many Lands constitute a small enclave or island of ‘development’ in a sea of backwardness which embraces most of the villages in the two Au census divisions, as well as neighbouring parts of Nuku and Lumi districts. The construction of the Sepik Highway through the northern half of the electorate has created an alternative criterion for distinguishing between central and peripheral zones within it, since villages in all four census divisions may now be said to be divided by their proximity to the main road. But the road itself does not seem to have stimulated a level of commercial agricultural activity which is in any way comparable to that which has developed in parts of the Nuku-Maimai region.

Karl Stack’s bulldozing efforts back in 1972, and the subsequent construction of the present access road linking Nuku station to the Sepik Highway, were both partly motivated by the large volumes of cash crops—especially rice and robusta coffee—which local villagers had begun to cultivate in the 1960s in response to the efforts of colonial agricultural extension officers who had no similar success in other parts of what was then Lumi Sub-District. The epicentre of this development was not the government station itself, but the densely populated Seim Census Division, whose inhabitants have traditionally cultivated yams and other root crops with an intensity which sets them apart from most other communities in the electorate (Bourke et al 1993). It is also possible to distinguish a

³ In 1980 it was estimated that the value of cash crops exported from the Yangkok zone was only K2,900, barely 5 per cent of the total for the electorate, suggesting that people in this area earned an average of only 30 toea per capita from this source—less than the average for Lumi District as a whole (WSIDS 1982:102-3). Statistics on nutritional standards are taken from Kelly et al 1982, and those on school attendance from the 1980 national census. Tracer (1991) has recently produced a detailed study of the relationship between nutritional standards and subsistence agriculture in this area.

larger geographical area, which embraces the greater part of the Makru-Klaplei Census Division and some other areas within the Nuku-Maimai region, perhaps even extending into the southern parts of the Palai region, as well as the Seim villages, where a combination of favourable environmental factors—relatively low rainfall, moderately hilly terrain, with only limited patches of barren grassland—are clearly associated with a higher level of agricultural intensity, greater population density, and higher standards of health and nutrition. The contrast between this central agricultural zone and the remaining parts of the electorate is one which has traditionally been conceived as a contrast between ‘yam people’ and ‘sago people’.

Unlike most other parts of the Maimai-Wanwan zone, there is no doubt that Sambre’s Namblo community belongs to the central agricultural zone which is defined in this way. If any doubt surrounded their traditional status as ‘yam people’, they have consistently acted to remove it by their pursuit of all available opportunities for ‘development’. The five Namblo villages are the only villages in the Maimai-Wanwan zone which have had reasonable road access to Nuku station and the outside world for any length of time, and which have therefore been in a position to participate in successive waves of cash cropping on any significant scale. Having used their own labour to build and maintain the road in the 1960s, they then pooled part of the proceeds from their first sales of cash crops to build their own community school, thus ‘forcing’ the Catholic mission to supply them with teachers to run it. In this and other ways they raised their own level of social and economic development to the point where their removal from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘centre’ of the Nuku-Maimai can only serve to accentuate the contrast between these two zones.⁴

The central agricultural zone includes within its borders the largest traditional political communities in the electorate—that is to say, the largest groups which were named as such by their own members, and whose members shared a single set of institutions for resolving their internal disputes, while recognising the need or duty

⁴ For example, the 100 per cent of Namblo children who lived within one hour’s walk of a community school in 1982 were part of the larger population of Maimai-Wanwan children of whom only 41 per cent had this level of access. In the Wanwan Census Division alone, the proportion was 24 per cent (WSIDS 1982:352).

to support each other in times of war with neighbouring communities. By these criteria, it can be argued that there were—and still are—five communities of ‘yam people’ who occupy the agricultural centre of the electorate. In order of their current size, these are: the Seim community (with 4,290 resident members in 1990), the Makru community (2,776 members), the Kafle community (1,663 members), the Arkosame community (1,351 members), and finally the Namblo community (1,123 members). These five communities together account for almost one third of the traditional population of the electorate, while the rest of this population is distributed between a much larger number of political communities—perhaps fifty in all, with an average membership of less than 500 people. The only other traditional political community with a population of more than 1,000 is the Wanim group, whose 2,001 members form a majority of the population in the Wanwan Census Division, who have close linguistic and cultural affinities with the Namblo community, and even seem to regard themselves as ‘yam people’, but whose internal solidarity has always been questionable precisely because of their exceptionally scattered (‘one-by-one’) pattern of settlement.

Of course, there is no reason to assume that the ‘tribal solidarity’ of traditional political communities, whatever their relative size, has now been translated into the modern electoral arena. Like other Melanesian communities, those in the Nuku electorate have exhibited a familiar tendency to segment and divide as their populations have expanded and their members have experienced the many novelties of colonialism and its aftermath. Nevertheless, the critical thresholds of political unity are still obviously linked to the size and density of tribal populations, and while it is true that all local communities normally manifest some internal factional conflict over the distribution of their political loyalties, the locally uneven process of economic and infrastructural development has also facilitated a greater density or complexity of social and political relationships between those groups which occupy the central agricultural zone. This is the contest within which some Namblo leaders have been able to formulate the argument that their own community, despite its relatively small size and peripheral position within the central agricultural zone, evinces the optimal combination of internal political solidarity and external political alliances.

The value placed on the means of communication between local communities may also be said to reflect the unusual extent of linguistic diversity within this electorate—one of the few cultural phenomena which very obviously serves to distinguish it from other areas with a comparable size and density of population. According to Laycock (1975), there are no less than twenty-eight vernacular languages spoken in this electorate, and some of these contain significant variations of dialect. This means that the average 'language group' contains only two traditional political communities, and even now has barely more than a thousand native speakers. And yet the political significance of such diversity is not so clear. It could certainly be held to portend the excessive political fragmentation of the electorate, but it could also be said to reduce the potential significance of primordial group loyalties in electoral contests, precisely because the only ethnic groups in evidence are much too small to make an impact on their own account—even if they were internally united.

The twenty-eight languages of the electorate can themselves be classified in ways which partly correlate with those regional distinctions already made by reference to various measures of social and economic development, and which may have some further bearing on current political behaviour because they point to prehistoric population movements through the area. Four of the twenty-eight languages belong to what linguists now call the 'Sepik-Ramu phylum', while the other twenty-four belong to the so-called 'Torricelli phylum', and there is no discernible relationship between these two groups of languages beyond the existence of an occasional loan-word. The geographical boundary between these two groups of languages appears to follow the boundary between the 'yam people' and the 'sago people' except that the Namblo and Wanim communities speak Torricelli phylum languages, while a few scattered groups of 'sago people' around the margins of Wanwan Census Division speak Sepik-Ramu phylum languages. So this linguistic boundary approximates, without exactly matching, the administrative separation of the Makru-Seim and Maimai-Wanwan zones within the southern half of the electorate.

In order to understand the way that people in this area have traditionally conceived the unequal distribution of power between different points in political space, it is first necessary to abandon the idea that 'cultures' are the properties of local groups, and then to reconstruct the cultural identity of each traditional community as

the intersection of several ancient pathways, each passing through the space now occupied by several neighbouring groups, along which sundry 'culture heroes' are understood to have created a wide variety of unrelated cultural distinctions during the course of their mythical travels. From this point of view, the unusual extent of linguistic and cultural diversity in this electorate is no longer to be seen as the effect of a corresponding degree of mutual isolation between traditional political communities, most of which appear to be diverse collections of smaller groups with different migration histories, often speaking unrelated languages, but as the outcome of a 'culture of diversity' which occupies the space between communities (Filer 1990).

Local variations in the perception of cultural difference reflect the practical or material relationships which used to exist between the members of neighbouring communities. There really were (and still are) paths leading from each community to the borders which it shares with maybe five or six neighbouring groups, and each of these paths was likely to have a special practical quality of its own. Thus, for example, Namblo people distinguish between the type of distant enmity, bordering on mutual avoidance, which they encountered on the path leading towards the villages clustered around the present site of Mukili mission station and the much closer, almost intensely reciprocal type of hostility which they found amongst their Wanim neighbours to the south, with whom they knew they had a wide range of close cultural affinities. They make comparable distinctions between the different forms of alliance, exchange or cooperation which used to be found in their relationships with other neighbours—ranging from the idiom of kinship with their 'country cousins' in the Maimai community to the more distant and formal manner in which men traded secrets with their partners in the Makru villages.

Although this constellation of relationships created chains of alliance and enmity which cut right across the zonal boundaries discussed above, and this traditional pattern of political relationships still has some resonance today, it is no longer possible to say whether the position of the Namblo community within this constellation of mythical and practical 'roads' is one which actually facilitated the acquisition of some additional power during the period following European contact. What can be said is that the generation of young Namblo men who eagerly signed up as foot-soldiers of the Catholic church during the 1950s and early 1960s, and

who were then dispatched to all corners of what is now Nuku District, practised their own style of ethnology in their various postings, and were subsequently able to convince themselves—and possibly their ‘converts’—that Namblo was somehow destined for a hegemonic role by virtue of its customary charter.

When I first came to know this cohort of former catechists in the early 1970s, I found that they were well able to articulate a vision of their collective political destiny in which their ‘traditional’ role and reputation as mediators or peace-makers had created a lasting condition of mutual attraction between themselves and the colonial authorities which now gave them the privilege of representing or imposing ‘the law’ throughout the network of political alliances which they had reconstructed with their bibles and their talent for ethnology. Within a year or so, the acknowledged leader of these ‘middle men’, Ferdinand Guam of Wambiu village, had been elected Chairman of the Nuku Local Government Council—a position which he held until his resignation in 1987—and ‘Brother Cosmas’, the young Namblo boy who had been ‘given’ to the Church when the first priests arrived in the area, returned (or was redeemed) to function in the thoroughly appropriate position of Council Rules Inspector. In this capacity, and with the former catechists as his campaign team, Sambre was ideally positioned to contest the Nuku Open seat.

The 1977 and 1982 elections

In 1977 ‘Steak and Grease’ confronted and defeated a pair of sitting members who had represented that fear of Independence which was organised around the banner of the United Party. Paul Langro had held the West Sepik Regional seat, while Jacob Talis had held the Wapei-Nuku Open seat, since 1968. Both men claimed to have been born about 1940, though they were probably somewhat older, and both had been schooled by the Franciscan missionaries who based themselves at Aitape in the years following the Second World War. Paul Langro was born in a village near Vanimo, had spent some time in a Catholic seminary in Rabaul, then matriculated at the Administrative College in Port Moresby before being appointed as a Local Court Magistrate in 1967—an appointment which subsequently justified his membership of the Constitutional Planning Committee in the second House of Assembly. Jacob (‘Jack’) Talis came from Ningil village, near the boundary between Lumi and Nuku Districts, had received six years of primary schooling, taught in a mission

school and became a founder member of the Wapei Local Government Council before making his entrance on the national political stage.

In 1977 Karl Kitchens (as he then still was) polled 23,260 (almost 55 per cent) of the 42,419 votes cast for the West Sepik Provincial seat, defeating Paul Langro by 6,403 votes.⁵ The only other candidate for the seat was one Gordon Campbell, a naturalised citizen of New Zealand parentage who had once worked as an odd job man for the Franciscan fathers, then built and operated a hotel in Vanimo, and finally acquired an interest in earthmoving equipment which strangely matched Stack's erstwhile feats as an amateur bulldozer driver. But Campbell was no match for Stack when it came to piling up votes, for he collected only 2,012, less than 5 per cent of the total.

In the same election Chris Sambre polled 5,489 votes (almost 42 per cent) of the 13,150 votes cast for the Nuku Open seat, defeating Jack Talis by 718 votes. Three other candidates contested the Nuku Open seat in 1977.

Unlike the other four candidates, Yirwei was not a Catholic but a follower of the Christian Mission of Many Lands, which had established its local headquarters on the territory of his own village, and it is likely that most of his votes were collected from other followers of the same sect. Yirwei and Talis shared most of the votes cast in the northern (Palai-Yangkok) part of the constituency, while Sambre and the other two candidates shared most of the votes cast in the southern (Nuku-Maimai) part.

In 1982 'Steak and Grease' were both returned to parliament with convincing victories which reflected the widespread success of Pangu Party candidates in challenging the legitimacy of the Chan-Okuk government which had displaced Michael Somare's regime in 1980. Karl Kitchens Stack (as he had now become) polled 19,686 (almost 45 per cent) of the 43,863 votes cast for the West Sepik Provincial seat, defeating his old rival Paul Langro by 6,199 votes. In the wake of his earlier defeat, Langro had spent some time in pursuit of a law degree at the University of Papua New Guinea and had then been appointed Secretary to the Sandaun Provincial Government, but neither of these achievements enabled him to make any significant reduction in his margin of defeat. Stack and Langro both suffered a similar decline in their share of the total vote

⁵ Throughout this chapter, it is assumed that votes 'cast' are those allowed as 'formal votes' by the electoral authorities.

because they were competing with five other candidates who jointly secured almost one quarter of the total votes cast for the seat, though none of the five got more than 10 per cent of the total.⁶

Chris Sambre also faced an increase, from four to six, in the number of rival candidates contesting his seat, but still managed to secure 5,466 (more than 46 per cent) of the 11,794 votes cast for the Nuku Open seat, which meant that his personal share of the total had increased by more than ten per cent. This improvement is partly explained by the lower level of turnout in the 1982 election, but this in turn reflects the fact that no one candidate was able to replace Jack Talis (who did not stand) as the champion of the Palai-Yangkok region. James Yirwei, who had abandoned his teaching career for some unspecified form of 'business', was able to quadruple his own level of support, securing 2,302 (almost 20 per cent) of the votes cast, but this only brought him third place in the result. The runner-up was John Wotong, who secured 3,038 (almost 26 per cent) of the votes cast, while another 988 votes (less than 9 per cent of the total) were shared between the remaining four candidates, all of whom were based in the northern part of the constituency.⁷

John Wotong was born in Yemereba village, which lies to the west of Nuku Station, in the same census division and the same provincial constituency as Sambre's home village of Imbiyip. He had graduated from the Administrative College in 1973, spent some years as a District Officer in West New Britain, and somehow found his way on to Sir Julius Chan's personal staff during the latter's reign as Prime Minister from 1980 to 1982. Unlike the other candidates opposing Sambre in 1982, Wotong was clearly a party man, albeit in an area where his party (PPP) had no previous record of serious political activity. Wotong's electoral strategy was partly

⁶ The five were: James Kanaik (4,172 votes), Stephen Sio (2,444 votes), Peter Gall (2,321 votes), Melchior Peaka (1,008 votes), and Jonah Warwein (745 votes). None had any specific connection with Nuku except for Stephen Sio, who had once been the headmaster at the Namblo community school, had gone on to win the Aitape-Lumi Open seat in the 1977 national election, and then decided to abandon this seat in his fruitless quest for the provincial prize.

⁷ The four were: Luke Tom from Asier village (410 votes), Pian Kawa from Ningil village (283 votes), Joe Worongat from Yadagaro village (220 votes), and Herman Kaukau from Mai village (75 votes). Asier, Yadagaro and Mai are all Palai villages. Luke Tom and Pian (Joe) Kawa both stood again in subsequent elections (see below).

based on the larger political wisdom of the People's Progress Party and its leader, but also reflected the geographical position of his home village, which lay close to the border between the northern and southern halves of the constituency. The result suggests that he alone of Sambre's rivals was able to collect a reasonable number of votes in the Maimai region, though most of these probably came from members of his own language group in the villages around Mukili Catholic Mission. The rest of his votes, 2,000 or more, were almost certainly obtained in the two Palai census divisions, whose own candidates scored only 705 votes between them, but he was unable to muster any serious support in the Yangkok area, so could not hope to match the massive block of votes which Sambre garnered from the Nuku-Maimai region. Perhaps his most signal achievement in this election was to win the support of two prominent leaders within Sambre's own Namblo community—the provincial MPA for the Maimai-Wanwan constituency and the local government councillor in Sambre's own village of Imbiyip—both of whom were soon to lose their offices as a result.

The 1987 election

The 1987 election is the first national election for which I have been able to analyse the geographical distribution of electoral support by the voters of Nuku Open electorate for candidates contesting the Nuku Open and West Sepik Provincial seats. It has not been possible to analyse the distribution of votes between specific local communities within the electorate, but the zonal pattern is accurately represented in Tables 7.2 and 7.3.

In 1987 Chris Sambre seems to have lost about 1,000 of the votes which he had won in 1982, and thus lost almost 20 per cent of his previous share of the total votes cast for the Nuku Open seat. On the other hand, there was only a slight reduction, from 2,428 to 2,365 votes, in the margin of Sambre's victory over his nearest rival, the persistent James Yirwei, who had also lost an equivalent proportion of the votes which he won five years previously. Although the number of candidates contesting the seat had increased from seven to nine, this had rather less to do with Sambre's own loss of support than the fact that three of his opponents in 1987, as against one in

1982, were able to secure a reasonable proportion of the votes cast in the southern half of the constituency.⁸

Table 7.2: Distribution of votes for the Nuku Open seat in the 1987 election.

Name of candidate for open seat	Maimai-Wanwan	Makru-Seim	E&W Palai	Yangkok (Au)	Total votes (%)
Christoper Sambre	1354	1968	713	420	4555 (37.1)
James Yirwei	199	22	140	1729	2090 (17.4)
Peter Wauwau	62	714	862	32	1670 (13.9)
Andrew Komboni	102	986	48	36	1175 (9.8)
Luke Tom	6	67	836	69	978 (8.1)
Carolus Kalang	23	32	43	733	831 (6.9)
Paul Wanur	493	142	89	13	659 (5.5)
Joe Aflatawa	6	89	7	3	105 (0.9)
Peter Masinbai	2	28	1	16	47 (0.4)
Total votes	2247	4051	2661	3051	12010(100.0)

⁸ The Namblo Pangu supporters predicted that Sambre would obtain 70-80% of the vote in the Maimai-Wanwan area, 45-55% of the vote in the Makru-Seim area, less than 10% of the vote in the Palai area and the East Au census division, but a much higher percentage in the West Au census division. These predictions proved to be a great deal more accurate than those made by his opponents.

Table 7.3: Distribution of Nuku Open Votes for the West Sepik Provincial seat in 1987.

Name of candidate for open seat	Maimai-Wanwan	Makru-Seim	E&W Palai	Yangkok (Au)	Total votes (%)
Karl Stack	1258	2415	934	1193	5800 (48.4)
Ignas Wunum	908	1345	1550	229	4032 (33.7)
Robert Hayaku	11	28	22	962	1023 (8.5)
James Makain	13	121	79	296	509 (4.2)
Anthony Mawei	19	11	17	151	198 (1.6)
Dorothy Tekwie	9	35	14	117	175 (1.5)
Mamis Ninesiang	4	88	28	39	159 (1.3)
John Sanawe	6	32	22	21	81 (0.7)
Total votes	2228	4075	2666	3008	11977 (100.0)

In 1987 Karl Stack secured 20,813 of the votes cast for the West Sepik Provincial seat, over 1,000 more than he had won in 1982, though his share of the total provincial vote, which had itself increased from 43,863 to 50,286, fell by almost eight per cent. This might seem to be a fairly predictable result when one considers that the number of candidates contesting the seat had only risen by one, but seems rather more remarkable when one realises that Stack was no longer the official candidate of the Pangu Party and this was the first time in three elections that he had been opposed by candidates who might reasonably be expected to make significant inroads into his earlier monopoly of the votes cast in Sambre's constituency. There were two such candidates:

- Ignas Wunum from Nuku village, having failed in his attempt to win the Nuku Open seat in 1977, had continued in his career as a provincial public servant, most recently as Provincial Non-Formal Education Officer.
- Robert Hayaku, though not a local man, was a long-serving employee of the Christian Mission of Many Lands, most recently acting as its Education Secretary, and, being stationed at Anguganak, should have been able to secure part of the sectarian vote which formed the core of James Yirwei's support in his successive efforts to win the Nuku Open seat.

Oddly enough, both men were endorsed by Father John Momis, and thus purported to be members of the Melanesian Alliance Party, thinking perhaps to garner some of the grassroots Christian sympathies on which Chris Sambre seemed to thrive. In the event, Wunum ran second to Stack, though he only won 7,263 votes, less than 15 per cent of the provincial total, while Hayaku ran fifth with 3,922 votes, less than 8 per cent of the total votes cast.⁹ Table 7.3 shows that Wunum won more than half his votes in Nuku District, while Hayaku got nearly 25 per cent of his in the Yangkok area alone, and the two men between them were able to collect more than 42 per cent of the votes cast in Sambre's constituency, even though Stack himself got more than 48 per cent of these votes. And although Stack got 30 per cent more votes than Sambre in Sambre's own backyard, these were still less than 28 per cent of Stack's provincial total, suggesting that the Nuku vote was rather less important to his success than it had been in previous elections. In the absence of his old rival Paul Langro, the most obvious explanation of Stack's resounding triumph in 1987 is that none of his opponents—not even the Provincial Non-Formal Education Officer—had the fame or notoriety required to collect a significant number of votes in several different parts of the province.

Within the Nuku Open constituency the strategic alliance between 'Steak and Grease' lost nothing of its previous significance to either of its principals, despite the novel threats deployed by their opponents. From my own observation of the polling period, it was clear that the Pangu 'party machine'—if such it can be called—had been geared to support both candidates as if they occupied a common platform, and thus to play down the many questions which had arisen concerning Stack's involvement in the formation of the break-away League for National Advancement in 1986. Indeed, a cynical observer might even be forgiven for thinking that the utility of this connection had encouraged Sir Michael Somare to endorse an official Pangu candidate for the provincial seat who had precious little chance of purloining any votes from the sitting member, let

⁹ The other five candidates were: James Makain from Lumi District (5,989 votes), Mamis Ninesiang from Telefomin District (4,468 votes), Anthony Mawei from Amanab District (3,253 votes), Dorothy Tekwie from Vanimo District (2,803 votes), and John Sanawe from Aitape District (1,775 votes). Makain's father, Makain Mo, held the Lumi-Nuku Open seat in the first House of Assembly, from 1964 to 1968.

alone winning. Dorothy Tekwie, a 29-year old social work graduate who had been absent from the province since completing Grade 10 at Vanimo High School, came seventh in the field of eight, polling 2,803 votes, less than 6 per cent of the total cast. Ms Tekwie's gender may have done her an additional disservice, but Pangu stalwarts in the Nuku area were not obliged to adopt a sexist position since they had the better argument that people will not vote for someone they have never seen.

Table 7.4 compares the number of votes obtained by 'Steak and Grease' in each of the twenty-three rounds of counting in Sambre's constituency. This table seems to confirm the belief of Sambre's own campaign team that people who voted for Sambre should normally also vote for Stack. There were at least 155 voters in the Makru-Seim area (MS5-MS7) who failed to live up to this expectation, mostly members of Ignas Wunum's own Makru community who might be forgiven for supporting their own 'wantok', and at least 108 voters scattered around Sambre's own Maimai-Wanwan area, whose failure to follow Sambre's instruction on this score might be taken to confirm my own impression that some of his most active supporters were not entirely happy with his political marriage of convenience. Elsewhere, most notably in the Palai area and amongst members of the Seim language group, Stack was able to attract the votes of people who simultaneously voted for one of Sambre's opponents.¹⁰ But in the Yangkok area, Stack's total in each of the five counts was similar in magnitude to Sambre's vote plus that collected by another Open candidate described by Sambre's men as 'one of us'.

The 'pro-Pangu independent' was Carolus Kalang, a former soldier from Wublakil village, northwest of Yangkok Station, whose special function was to take votes away from Sambre's persistent rival, James Yirwei, in the latter's own stronghold. Table 7.2 shows that Kalang performed his part quite well, though it also reveals that Sambre himself was able to collect almost 14 per cent of the votes cast in the Yangkok area, largely because a group of

¹⁰ Stack's popularity in the Seim villages dated back to his days as the kiap in charge of Nuku Patrol Post, when he used his earthmoving skills to create the road link between Seim and Dreikikir. Since the Seim people have always been the most prolific cash croppers in Nuku District, they had good reason to be grateful to the man who first gave them road access to the export market, and Stack's technique for collecting the Seim vote in national election was simply to drive back there on a rented bulldozer in order to remind people of his former exploits.

village leaders in West Au Census Division decided to join his network of personal supporters in the final phase of the campaign period.

Table 7.4: Relative popularity of Karl Stack and Chris Sambre amongst Nuku Open voters in 1987.

Count number	Karl Stack			Chris Sambre		
	votes	percent	rank	votes	percent	rank
MW 1	24	7.9	2	36	11.5	3
MW 2	231	35.6	2	237	36.0	2
MW 3	202	58.2	1	228	64.0	1
MW 4	229	48.2	2	243	51.2	1
MW 5	460	90.7	1	501	98.6	1
MW 6	136	54.4	1	145	58.2	1
MS 1	416	60.0	1	262	37.5	2
MS 2	163	26.5	2	100	16.1	2
MS 3	454	88.2	1	347	68.2	1
MS 4	528	69.7	1	250	32.8	2
MS 5	411	66.2	1	450	73.1	1
MS 6	305	54.3	1	409	75.7	1
MS 7	138	44.4	2	150	49.3	1
PL 1	192	40.7	2	80	17.0	2
PL 1	192	40.7	2	80	17.0	2
PL 2	12	3.2	3	12	3.2	3
PL 3	176	30.8	2	170	29.1	2
PL 4	369	66.5	1	263	50.8	1
PL 5	161	41.2	2	152	37.8	2
YA 1	228	58.8	1	5	0.9	5
YA 2	351	8.4	1	7	1.2	3
YA 3	68	63.5	3	35	4.3	3
YA 4	226	45.9	1	124	33.8	2
YA 5	320	45.9	1	249	34.5	2
Total	5800	48.4	1	4455	37.1	1

And thus it came about that Sambre's votes in Yirwei's own base area exceeded Yirwei's votes outside it. But the runner-up's defeat was more predictable and less significant than some other aspects of

the final outcome, precisely because the bulk of his support was still locked in the Yangkok area, just as it had been in two previous elections, and his own relative success proved the failure of an oppositional strategy in which he played a relatively minor role.

Given the local triumphs of 'Steak and Grease' in 1977 and 1982, it was by now quite obvious that their defeat would need an opposition with a strategy which could unite or combine the personal loyalties of village leaders in all four zones of the electorate. And the man who set himself up as the architect of this strategy in 1987 was the man whom Sambre had beaten into second place five years previously—John Wotong. Wotong had gained some compensation for his loss by winning the Maimai-Wanwan seat in the Sandaun Provincial Assembly at the provincial elections of 1984.

From his vantage point in Vanimo, Wotong seems to have decided that the best (and perhaps the only) way to undermine Sambre's political machinery was to construct a set of countervailing alliances:

- between himself and the other five MPs who represented Sambre's electorate in Vanimo;
- between the Sandaun Provincial Government and the Nuku Local Government Council; and
- between his own People's Progress Party and the Melanesian Alliance.

For reasons which I have not been able to discover, Wotong decided against a repetition of his own candidacy for the open seat, and opted instead to act as Campaign Manager for the PPP's new candidate, Andrew Komboni.

At fifty years of age, Komboni was the oldest candidate, at least by his own reckoning, to have contested the Nuku Open seat since its creation. His age explains his lack of formal education, but he had spent many years as a Catholic mission teacher and catechist, and was the local councillor in his own village of Kafle #1 when he was appointed as Interim Member and Speaker of the new Sandaun Provincial Assembly in 1978. He had since been elected and re-elected as MPA for the Makru-Kafle constituency, and had even scaled the heights of the premiership for a year or so, until he and his fellow members were left to ponder their political futures by the suspension of the Sandaun Provincial Government in 1986.

One of these fellow members inserted a large hole in the first plank of Wotong's electoral strategy by throwing his own hat into the Nuku Open ring as an independent candidate. Peter Wauwau from Yambil village had been a community school teacher for fifteen years before his election as MPA for the Palai constituency, a fact which helps to explain his subsequent appointment as Minister for Education in the Provincial Government. Wauwau's candidacy made it hard for Wotong to bequeath Komboni many of the votes which he had won in Wauwau's area in 1982, and harder still because another Palai candidate, Luke Tom, had managed to consolidate his own electoral support in part of Palai area where Wauwau's influence was weak. Tom was the most highly educated candidate to contest the Nuku Open seat, having completed twelve years of formal schooling, and he now carried the endorsement of Pias Wingti, whom he apparently mistook for the leader of the National Party.¹¹ After a varied career as a social worker and sales representative, he had settled down to become a 'subsistence farmer' in his mother's village of Asier, just north of the CMML station at Sibilanga, where he had reason to hope that his good works as a Presbyterian might win him more votes than the 410 he had scored in the previous national election.

It was perhaps the prospect of losing the Palai area which encouraged Wotong and Komboni to sponsor two additional candidates, Paul Wanur and Joe Aflatawa, in order to break Sambre's usual monopoly of votes cast in the Wanwan and Makru areas. Wanur had spent the previous six years teaching the children of his own political community at Wulbowe Community School, while Aflatawa, from the Makru village of Ifkindu, had been employed for eight years as Executive Officer for the Nuku Local Government Council. Sambre's acolytes insisted that these two had walked the campaign trail in tandem, openly acknowledging their role as spoilers for the PPP. In the event, the votes they won between them almost matched the number gained by Sambre's own spoiler, Carolus Kalang, but were barely more than one fifth the number

¹¹ Tom filled in a questionnaire distributed by the UPNG Department of Political and Administrative Studies in which he described himself as a 'sympathizer of the National Party'. In the same document, he made the revealing statement that 'Nuku has been the slave for Pangu for the last 10-15 years [and] somebody have to loose their chains and make them free'.

which Sambre himself scored in the southern half of his constituency (see Table 7.2).

At the same time, Komboni was unable to obtain any significant number of votes outside his own provincial constituency, and even there his share of the vote was at least 10 per cent lower than the 46 per cent which he had won in the 1984 provincial election. Wotong's sponsorship of Joe Aflatawa was itself evidence of Komboni's inability to 'unlock' the support which Sambre had persistently gained from the Makru villages, despite their close linguistic and cultural affinities with his own Kafle community. There were no such affinities with the Seim people, whose MPA Peter Ukwando made a rather weak demonstration of support for the PPP campaign but was unable to deliver more than 10 per cent of his own constituents. Most of the voters in the Seim villages ignored both Komboni and their own ethnic candidate, the deluded Peter Masinbai, and either voted for Chris Sambre because he was the ally of their patron Karl Stack, or else voted for Peter Wauwau because he had recently taken a Seim woman as his second wife.¹² At the same time, Wotong was only able to persuade 102 of his own provincial constituents to vote for Komboni, barely half the number that voted for James Yirwei, and barely a quarter the number that voted for Chris Sambre in the Mukili area alone. Indeed, Sambre's majority amongst his 'traditional tribal enemies' in Wotong's own backyard was much the same as his majority throughout the Maimai-Wanwan zone.

It is difficult to say whether or how the results of this election might have been affected by the 'unholy alliance' which Wotong thought he had forged between the PPP and MA candidates. On the final day of the campaign period, Komboni's team packed themselves into a couple of trucks and motored off to Yangkok Station in order to engage in some confabulation with James Yirwei, but I was unable to record Yirwei's own opinion of this visitation or his understanding of the role which he had been assigned in Wotong's larger strategy. Nor can I say what value Ignas Wunum placed on the support of Wotong, Komboni, and other members of the

¹² Masinbai was a former plantation labourer, with no formal education, who became a CMML pastor in his home village of Usitamo before resigning to contest the election on God's personal instructions. He had no scrutineers or other visible supporters, and none of the other candidates took him seriously.

suspended Provincial Assembly, though it seems quite likely that his experience as a provincial public servant would have left him with some fairly strong views on their individual merits. Wunum certainly knew that he was the only feasible alternative to Karl Stack in the minds of most Nuku District voters, and he shared Wotong's belief that disgruntled local councillors would play a major role in mobilising anti-Pangu sentiment, but he might have paused to wonder if he had anything to gain from an explicit association with a provincial government whose own misdeeds were all too clearly signalled by the fact of its suspension.

The 1992 election

In 1992 there was a further increase in the number of candidates in both the Nuku Open and West Sepik Provincial seats, reflecting a nationwide proliferation of political ambitions and a corresponding fragmentation of political loyalties in each local arena. At the provincial level, this trend was magnified by Karl Stack's own stated reluctance to nominate for a fourth term in the national parliament, which must surely have raised the hopes of many would-be contenders, and his subsequent refusal to devote any serious time or money to his own campaign. Without Stack's rhetorical and material assistance, Chris Sambre's grip on the Nuku Open seat was also seen to be vulnerable, despite his own determination to retain it, so this election became, in effect, a test of his own ability to survive the loss of this longstanding strategic alliance.

In the event, Stack polled only 4,825 (less than 8 per cent) of the 60,916 votes cast for the West Sepik Provincial seat, but this was still more than half the 9,310 votes polled by the winner, John Tekwie, in a field which now boasted a total of thirteen candidates. The winner, an economics graduate and erstwhile public servant, was the younger brother of the luckless Dorothy who had received Michael Somare's lukewarm support in 1987, but had swapped his sister's political allegiance for a notional alignment with Ted Diro's People's Action Party. The Pangu ticket was picked up by the egregious Paul Langro, who came back for a third and final tilt at his old foe, while Sambre's arch-rival John Wotong was also lured into the fray by the prospect of Stack's demise, though now without the patronage of Julius Chan.¹³ Six of the thirteen candidates

¹³ Sambre's supporters maintained that Wotong had been ousted from the PPP because of his previous misuse of party funds.

(including Stack) were based in the Aitape-Lumi Open electorate, and these six candidates between them won almost 37 per cent of the total votes cast for the provincial seat. Another four candidates (including Tekwie and Langro) were based in the Vanimo-Green River electorate, and they won almost 42 per cent of the total votes. The one candidate based in the Telefomin Open electorate scored just over 10 per cent of the total, while the two based in Sambre's Nuku Open electorate scored just over 11 per cent between them. Apart from the winner, who got just over 15 per cent of the total, only two other candidates scored more than 10 per cent on their own account—Rex Namah from Vanimo, another denizen of the Sandaun Provincial Government, who ran second with 6,761 votes, and the Telefomin candidate Jeffrey Atiksep, formerly a training officer with Ok Tedi Mining Ltd, who ran third with 6,161. Karl Stack still beat Paul Langro, the latter collecting only 4,291 votes, but John Wotong beat both of them with his own total of 5,032.

Meanwhile, Chris Sambre lost more than half his previous share of the votes cast for the Nuku Open seat, but his 2,930 votes (barely 18 per cent of the total) were still enough to get him past the winning post, since only one of the fourteen candidates opposing him was able to secure more than 10 per cent of the total, and this one candidate, Andrew Kumbakor, could only muster 2,359 votes (less than 15 per cent of the total). And yet Sambre's fourth victory was not simply the result of continuing political fragmentation throughout his electorate. If anything, it was achieved despite the fact that Sambre's own community was more divided than the rest. In the three elections from 1977 to 1987, Sambre had always been the only Namblo man standing in a field which grew from five to seven to nine candidates in all. What happened in 1992 was that three Namblo candidates stood in a field of fifteen, and although the Namblo community itself only delivered 564 (3.5 per cent) of the 16,002 votes which counted for the Nuku Open seat, these three candidates between them still scored over 28 per cent of the total vote, and Sambre himself was still re-elected. So the problem is not so much to explain Sambre's own personal loss of popularity as to explain the continuing preeminence of the Namblo community despite the glaring evidence of internal divisions in its leadership.

Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show how the votes of Sambre's constituents were distributed among the candidates for both the open and provincial seats in 1992. These tables show that John Wotong could at last claim some sort of victory over his arch-rival, for he

managed to collect 213 more votes amongst Sambre's constituents than Sambre himself. Sambre's own supporters had little doubt that Wotong was the man behind the challenge now posed to their candidate by Andrew Kumbakor, a 32-year old 'plantation manager' from the Seim village of Yiriwandi. Kumbakor certainly posed more of a threat than Andrew Komboni had posed in 1987, or might pose again in 1992, because the Seim people accounted for more than 12 per cent of the electorate's population in 1990, and delivered more than 15 per cent of the votes cast in 1992, whereas Komboni's Kafle community, though somewhat larger than the Namblo group, accounted for less than 5 per cent of the population and delivered only 4.6 per cent of the votes. Even in 1987 Komboni had struggled to collect more than 600 votes outside his own community, but now, having already lost his Makru-Kafle seat in the provincial assembly, he not only fell short of collecting 100 votes outside the three Kafle villages but barely managed to command a majority within them.

The contraction of Komboni's support was partly achieved, and certainly underlined, by the relative success of Melchior Mokul, the leader of a break-away sect of the South Seas Evangelical Mission whose followers were largely confined to the community of Arkosame and some of the Wanwan settlements immediately west of it. Mokul was widely described as the 'brother-in-law' of Jimmy Akuli, the man who had beaten Komboni in the 1988 provincial elections and thus became the Makru-Kafle MPA, but it seems that the Arkosame block vote which was cornered by both men was little more than the political reflection of a strictly localised millenarian movement. If the Arkosame and Kafle candidates were both unable to garner any significant number of votes amongst the more numerous Makru group, which accounted for almost 8 per cent of the electorate's population in 1990, then Makru voters, who had no candidate of their own, were bound to play a major role in deciding the outcome of a contest between the remaining candidates from the south of the electorate—all of whom were either Seim or Namblo men.

Now if it is true that Wotong had abandoned his former promotion of Komboni, which he never seems to have taken too seriously, it is not so clear that he had switched his patronage to Kumbakor, and even less likely that Kumbakor had come to see himself as Wotong's client, since Wotong collected only 110 (less than 5 per cent) of the Seim votes cast for the provincial seat in 1992,

while Kumbakor collected almost fifteen times as many in the open contest. Most of the Seim people who voted for Kumbakor, along with a substantial number of people in the Makru-Kafle area who did not vote for Kumbakor, cast their second votes for Rex Namah, either because he was Paias Wingti's candidate for the provincial seat or else (more likely) because he had established some personal connections with a number of leading individuals in the Makru-Seim zone, including Kumbakor himself.

The reason why Sambre's supporters perceived a deeper or more devious connection between Kumbakor and Wotong was that a second Namblo candidate for the open seat, Simon Wama, was seen to be the willing instrument of both these men's designs. Wama was a former soldier from Wambiu village, whose rivalry with Sambre's home village of Imbiyip has continually threatened the political solidarity of the Namblo community as a whole. There is little doubt that most of Wama's voters cast their second votes for Wotong, while Wotong's support of Wama's campaign in the Mukili and Wanwan areas was clearly critical to Wama's momentous defeat of Sambre in the Maimai-Wanwan zone as a whole. In this respect, Wama was obviously far more useful to Kumbakor's campaign than Komboni's two 'spoilers' (Wanur and Aflatawa) had been in 1987. Anticipating the substance of this threat, Sambre and his own supporters seem to have colluded in a counter-spoiling operation which saw Gregory Ambasi stand as a second Seim candidate, and Primus Hari stand as a third Namblo candidate, in the contest for Sambre's seat.¹⁴

Gregory Ambasi, a humble catechist from Hambasamba village, had been the most prominent Pangu 'supporter' in the Seim area during the 1987 election, and in this capacity had probably helped to deliver some 400 of the votes which Sambre finally accumulated. With Sambre's reciprocal support, Ambasi was then able to enter the provincial assembly as Member for Seim, having defeated the incumbent, Peter Ukwando, in the provincial elections of 1988. In 1992 he won 480 Seim votes, slightly more than the 471 which had secured his place in the provincial assembly, but nowhere near the 1,618 won by Kumbakor. On the other hand, he won more than 500

¹⁴ I have not been able to establish the chronological order in which the relevant nominations were submitted, but this would make little difference to the popular perception of the process which had come to prevail by the end of the campaign period.

votes in the Makru villages, considerably more than Kumbakor, and even managed to pick up 135 votes in the Mukili area from people who must have been dismayed or disinterested by the political disintegration of their Namblo neighbours.

Table 7.6: Distribution of the Nuku Open votes for the West Sepik Provincial seat in 1992.

Name of candidate for open seat	Maimai-Wanwan	Makru -Seim	E & W Palai	Yangkok (Au)	Total votes (%)
John Wotong	1305	524	961	353	3143 (19.7)
Rex Namah	287	1916	245	96	2544 (16.0)
Clement Tumana	108	502	681	961	2252 (14.1)
Harry Wunum	242	936	110	207	1495 (9.4)
Paul Langro	97	327	479	583	1486 (9.3)
Martin Enda	87	210	380	241	918 (5.8)
John Moipu	13	297	146	417	873 (5.5)
Alex Nonwo	17	240	39	575	871 (5.5)
John Tekwei	144	207	103	401	855 (5.4)
Karl Stack	263	239	140	34	676 (4.2)
Peter Saroya	195	187	44	132	560 (3.5)
Hank Yakai	12	20	18	168	218 (1.4)
Jeffrey Atiksep	6	7	12	26	51 (0.3)
Total vote	2776	5614	3358	4194	15942 (100.0)

Primus Hari, like Peter Wauwau, was a former schoolteacher and sometime Minister for Education in the Sandaun Provincial Government. In 1982, when he was still the Maimai-Wanwan MPA, he had made the unfortunate mistake of supporting Wotong's campaign against Sambre in the national election, partly because of the same village rivalries which now brought Simon Wama to conduct a similar campaign with Wotong's backing. When Wotong successfully challenged Hari's occupation of the Maimai-Wanwan seat in 1984, Sambre took the opportunity to treat Hari as a sort of prodigal Pangu son in the hope that Hari's influence in his own village of Wambiu would help to limit the escalation of conflicts between the 'youth' of Wambiu and Imbiyip. If Hari's intervention in this latest election had any significant effect, it was to show that Sambre could still split the Wambiu vote, if any Wambiu candidate

chose to oppose him, without losing any of his own support in Imbiyip. Even if Wama had obtained the 300-odd votes which Hari managed to collect throughout the electorate, this would only have shown that two Namblo candidates could place first and third in the same contest, without making any other difference to the overall result.

There is no reason to doubt Sambre's own belief that the outcome of this contest for the open seat was bound to turn on the bitter and twisted construction of political relationships between the Seim and Namblo candidates—not only in the southern half of the electorate, where all of them were based, but in the northern half as well, where all the local candidates invariably neutralise each other. As in 1987, Peter Wauwau and Luke Tom were the only candidates based in the Palai zone, but Wauwau, like Komboni, had already lost his seat in the provincial assembly and could no longer mobilise his affinal connections in Seim, while Tom's share of the vote fell back below the level he had gained in 1982, thus confirming the old adage that two-time losers should never stand again.

The Yangkok zone boasted a total of six candidates, all of whom were based in the central part of East Au Census Division. These were:

- Carolus Kalang, whose function as a Pangu spoiler was now somewhat redundant, was probably encouraged to stand by his acquisition of the East Au seat in the provincial assembly, but he still failed to retain the 7 per cent share of the vote which he had won in 1987;
- Nimbaken Situk of Wulukum village, the man whom Kalang had defeated in the last round of provincial elections, who was still unable to match Kalang's share of the vote on this occasion;
- Mauri Nemantu, a nursing officer from Anguganak village, who replaced Andrew Komboni as the official candidate of the People's Progress Party, but could not improve on Komboni's fourth place in the 1987 poll, despite his acquisition of 370 votes in the Palai zone; and
- Joe Kawa, yet another former schoolteacher, who was even more successful in gathering votes outside of the Yangkok zone, and thus able to gain third place in the poll, possibly because his base in Ningil village enabled him to trade on

the network of political alliances previously set up by Jack Talis.

- The last two Yangkok candidates were Tom Yuankou, a former medical orderly from Anguganak village, and Nick Kauni, a former local councillor and youth group leader from Yangkok village.

Although these six candidates between them won more than 95 per cent of the votes cast in the Yangkok zone, the simple fact that there were six of them was enough to ensure that none could win even 10 per cent of the votes cast by the whole electorate, despite the moderate success which two enjoyed in the Palai political vacuum.

Of course, if six candidates based within a five-mile radius of Yangkok station were able to win nearly 33 per cent of the votes cast for the Nuku Open seat in 1992, it might plausibly be argued that they were doing rather better than the three Namblo candidates who won less than 29 per cent of these votes, and a Yangkok-based candidate might yet hope to break the Namblo grip on political power in some future contest. On the other hand, it must be remembered that these six Yangkok candidates do not speak a single vernacular language and do not, by any stretch of the imagination, belong to a single traditional political community, whereas the Namblo group, regardless of the ancient rivalry between its two largest villages, has been a single linguistic and political unit for as long as anyone can remember. Bearing this point in mind, it is still instructive to compare the combined performances of candidates from different parts of the electorate in each of the local areas where votes were combined for the count in 1992.

If it is true that the Namblo community exercises a form of political domination in its own right, then Table 7.7 shows that this influence is remarkably widespread within the confines of Nuku District, however tenuous it might be in the Yangkok area. It may not seem surprising that the Namblo candidates secured more than 50 per cent of the votes cast in all four parts of the Maimai-Wanwan zone, since there were no candidates from other local communities to compete with them, and John Wotong, the sitting MPA, was himself sponsoring one of the three. But the Namblo candidates achieved the same result in the area around Nuku station, which contains the speakers of at least three local languages, none closely related to the Namblo language, as well as a motley collection of government workers. The three Namblo candidates scored more votes in the

Makru-Kafle area than the two Seim candidates, they almost certainly won more than half the total votes cast in the Makru villages themselves, and obtained 15-30 per cent of the votes cast in each of three Palai areas. Even in the Seim villages, the three Namblo candidates almost scored 10 per cent of the votes cast, whereas the two Seim candidates could not even achieve 1 per cent of the votes cast in the Namblo villages and adjacent Wanim villages which make up the 'Namblo' area shown in Table 7.7.

Table 7.7: Relative popularity (% vote share) of Nuku Open candidates from different parts of the electorate in each of fourteen counting units in 1992.

Counting Unit	Candidates' Place of Origin				
	3 Namblo	2 Seim	2 M-K	2 Palai	6 Yangkok
Mukili	55.6	23.5	2.2	2.7	16.1
Namblo	93.9	0.9	4.7	0.0	0.4
W Wanwan	87.5	2.3	0.3	0.8	9.2
E Wanwan	59.1	11.0	25.2	0.2	4.5
Mak-Kaf	30.7	28.9	34.1	1.7	4.7
Seim	9.7	87.2	1.8	1.0	0.3
Nuku	51.5	20.4	0.7	23.9	3.4
S Palai	27.9	15.5	1.1	40.5	15.0
NE Palai	15.0	8.9	0.2	40.7	35.1
NW Palai	28.1	12.3	0.7	19.0	40.0
NE Au	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.2	99.0
SE Au	1.8	0.2	0.5	1.2	96.2
SW Au	2.2	1.5	1.1	0.4	94.8
SW Au	14.0	0.6	0.4	0.6	84.5
Total	28.3	23.4	7.3	8.3	32.7

If we compare the proportions of votes won by the three Namblo candidates in each of the four main zones in 1992 with those won by Sambre alone in 1987 (see Tables 7.2 and 7.5), we find that:

- the proportion fell only slightly in the Palai zone, from 27 per cent to just over 25 per cent;

- it fell substantially in the Yangkok zone, from almost 14 per cent to only 3 per cent, and also in the Makru-Seim zone, from almost 49 per cent to less than 27 per cent; but
- it actually increased in the Maimai-Wanwan zone, from just over 60 per cent to nearly 74 per cent.

These changes can largely be explained by the number of serious contenders from each zone who were contesting the two elections. The number (and even the identity) of the Palai candidates remained constant, while the number of Yangkok candidates rose from two to six. Andrew Komboni was the only serious contender from the Makru-Seim zone in 1987, because the other two (Joe Aflatawa and Peter Masinbai) could barely muster 150 votes between them. On the other hand, Paul Wanur, a Wanwan candidate, took almost 500 votes in 1987, whereas the Namblo candidates faced no equivalent challenge in 1992.

If it is true that the three Namblo candidates in 1992 were competing for a sort of 'Namblo block vote', one might go on to infer that the total size of that vote had been diminished by local perceptions that the Namblo community could no longer present a united political front. On the other hand, the recognition of this fact should also alert us to the possibility that Sambre's victory in 1992 owed rather less to his membership of the Namblo community than it owed to his retention of a significant rump of personal 'Pangu' supporters throughout the length and breadth of the electorate. For if we consider the spatial distribution of votes among the three Namblo candidates, we find that Sambre scored more than 83 per cent of the 2,468 votes which the Namblo candidates obtained outside his own Maimai-Wanwan zone, but less than 43 per cent of the 2,059 votes which they obtained within it. And even if we consider Primus Hari to be one of Sambre's own supporters, thus raising the 'Pangu' share of the Maimai-Wanwan vote, we must still recall that many of Simon Wama's votes, both inside and outside the Maimai-Wanwan zone, were delivered by the influence of Sambre's old enemy John Wotong, the only man who has matched Sambre's own capacity to create and maintain an enduring network of political alliances throughout the electorate. And in two successive provincial elections (1984 and 1988) John Wotong had secured more votes in the Maimai-Wanwan constituency than the combination of Namblo candidates who opposed him, which also

seems to imply that it is Sambre's personal authority which has created the impression of a field of Namblo domination, and not the enduring fact of Namblo hegemony which has promoted Sambre's own political career.

If we then focus our attention on the spatial distribution of support for Sambre and his individual opponents, we find that, in 1987, Sambre got more than 30 per cent of the vote in fifteen of the twenty-three counting areas distinguished in that election, and scored a simple majority over all other candidates (more than 50 per cent of the total vote) in eight of them. Amongst his rivals, James Yirwei had only six counts over 30 per cent, Peter Wauwau had only five, and none of the other candidates achieved this percentage in more than three of the counting areas. In 1992, when the number of counting areas was reduced, and their size correspondingly increased, Sambre scored more than 20 per cent of the votes cast in seven of the fourteen, Simon Wama and Mauri Nemantu each managed the same feat in three, while five other candidates (Ambasi, Wauwau, Kalang, Kawa and Yuankou) could only manage it in two of them. Interestingly enough, Sambre's nearest rival, Andrew Kumbakor, only managed to achieve this percentage in the single counting area which was equivalent to Seim Census Division, where he got slightly more than two-thirds of the 2,405 votes cast by members of his own political community. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that Sambre's superior capacity to garner votes outside the immediate vicinity of his own home area was as much the explanation of his victory in 1992 as it had been in 1987, and perhaps even more so, now that his own political community had been so thoroughly divided.

If we can also finally say that Sambre's earlier triumphs owed more to his own personal authority than they did to the patronage of Karl Stack, it is much harder to say what, if anything, has replaced the force of their former alliance. In 1992, Nuku Open voters gave Stack only 14 per cent of the votes which brought him seventh place in the election for the West Sepik Provincial seat, and this dismal performance testifies to a serious lack of enthusiasm from Sambre's Pangu network. On the other hand, it is not clear whether the mere fact of Stack's candidacy was enough to dissuade Sambre from promoting any of the alternative candidates, perhaps because he feared some accusation of disloyalty, or whether his evident failure to form an alternative alliance was based on the pragmatic observation that none (apart from an unthinkable

relationship with John Wotong) could serve to expand his existing network of political support within the electorate. Although it is true that Wotong was able to accumulate a certain amount of political capital out of Stack's removal from the local arena, Table 7.6 shows that the only other local candidate for Stack's seat, Harry Wunum from Mansuku village, was unable to make any significant impression outside his own Makru community, and so challengers based in other parts of the province were able to collect more than two thirds of the votes cast by Sambre's constituents.

This pattern of voting for the provincial seat marks a dramatic departure from that which had been evident in earlier elections. In 1987, the 'outside challengers' for Stack's seat could not even muster 10 per cent of the Nuku Open votes, and Harry Wunum's namesake Ignas (to whom he is not directly related) was able to collect more than a third of them when Stack himself collected almost half. This semblance of parochialism evaporated in 1992.

- Wotong did manage to score more than 20 per cent of the votes cast in eight of the fourteen counting areas (one more than Sambre), but only achieved an overall majority in two of them—his own area of Mukili and the lightly populated West Wanwan area to the south of it;
- Despite his university degree in education, Harry Wunum still scored slightly less than 30 per cent of the votes cast in his own Makru-Kafle area, and could not obtain even 20 per cent in any of the other counts.
- Rex Namah scored slightly more than 30 per cent of the votes cast in the Makru-Kafle area, and more than 45 per cent of the votes cast in the populous Seim area, but could only pass the 20 per cent mark in two other counts.
- Clement Tumana, an agriculture graduate based in Aitape, matched Namah's performance by scoring more than 20 per cent of the votes cast in four of the counts, and even Paul Langro managed this achievement in two of them, despite the apparent lack of support from his Pangu 'running mate' Sambre.
- Apart from Wunum, there were three other challengers—Martin Enda (a law graduate from Amanab District), Alex Nonwo (an arts graduate from Lumi District) and John Tekwie (the economics graduate from Vanimo who actually

won the seat)—who scored more than 20 per cent of the votes cast in one of the Nuku Open counts.

- In this respect the five university graduates all matched or surpassed the sitting member's performance, because Stack only passed the 20 per cent mark (though he could not reach 25 per cent) in Sambre's Namblo area, despite the lukewarm backing of his former ally.
- The two remaining candidates based in Aitape District—Peter Saroya and John Moipu—both scored more than 10 per cent of the votes cast in two of the Nuku Open counting areas, and in Saroya's case, this achievement included 17 per cent of the votes cast in the Namblo area, where more than 50 per cent of the voters refused to cast their votes for either the sitting member, Karl Stack, or their local MPA, John Wotong.

The uneven spatial distribution of support for candidates in this particular contest is also revealed by the fact that three or more of them each scored more than 10 per cent of the votes cast in all but two of the fourteen counting areas—the two exceptions being the Mukili area, where Wotong alone took 69 per cent of the votes, and the Seim area, where Namah took nearly 47 per cent, Tumana took nearly 18 per cent, and six other candidates (Nonwo, Saroya, Moipu, Wunum, Wotong and Tekwie, in that order) shared more than 32 per cent of the total.

Furthermore, a comparison of the votes cast for the open and provincial seats in each of the fourteen counting areas reveals a singular absence of correlations in the distribution of support for pairs of open and provincial candidates—apart from the match between votes cast for John Wotong and Simon Wama in the Maimai-Wanwan zone, where both men shared a common interest in the erosion of Sambre's own power base. Otherwise the evidence suggests that candidates for the open seat were normally unwilling or unable to make a consistent delivery of their own political support to one of the candidates standing in the provincial contest—even within the boundaries of their own political communities—while most of the candidates standing for the provincial seat were able to win several small blocks of votes in various parts of Sambre's constituency through a variety of deals or appeals mediated by a large number of village and clan leaders—including the candidates for the open seat and their own key supporters—without thereby

creating anything which might be compared with Sambre's Pangu network.

In 1982 and 1987, the central fact of political life in Nuku Open electorate was a coin with two sides—the alliance of 'Steak and Grease' on the one side, and the bitter feud between John Wotong and Chris Sambre on the other. In 1992 the feud remained without the alliance, and was still central to the outcome of both local contests, but its principals both lost ground in a political field where local and personal loyalties are both more specific and less durable than they have been in the past.

Political morality

Let me now return to the problem posed at the beginning of this paper—the problem of how to account for the specific form of Sambre's political success over the period since independence, including the nature and extent of his own dependence upon the alliance of 'Steak and Grease'. Psephological analysis appears to confirm the persistence of locality and local ethnicity as essential factors in the determination of electoral outcomes in Sambre's electorate, even if these factors operate within a complex and sometimes mysterious construction of political space. On the other hand, it is hardly possible to maintain that the process of economic development or the condition of economic backwardness is simply irrelevant to the local political process, since questions of political economy do constitute the basic substance of political talk. And while it might be true to say that Sambre's local version of the Pangu Party does not correspond to Western or Weberian conceptions of the role which parties play in 'modern' politics, it is neither the figment of his own political imagination nor the organisational form of some local or ethnic entity. It might be construed as the organisational expression of a 'handout mentality' whose operation is not strictly parochial, but it also exhibits some moral qualities which are difficult to reconcile with standard models of political patronage, and which seem to form an essential part of Sambre's own political authority.

Most of Sambre's opponents in four successive elections have obtained the great majority of their votes from members of their own traditional political community and one or more of the communities with which it shares a common border. And that is why they have lost. Even the largest of these traditional political communities (Seim) does not have the numbers to guarantee the election of a

single candidate—unless perhaps that candidate could corner its unanimous support. But that is never likely to happen, firstly because the probability of communal unanimity has always been inversely related to the size of the political community, secondly because the number of candidates (and therefore the range of electoral options) has been steadily increasing, and finally because the partial or complete abandonment of ‘custom’ has eroded the political cohesion of communities both large and small. It is true that candidates have normally won a higher proportion of the votes cast in their own community than they have won in any other, provided that they have not been in competition with other members of their own group (as Sambre was in 1992), but it would not be true to say that members of communities which do not have a candidate of their own have normally cast their votes for one who is a member of the nearest neighbouring community. Sambre himself did gain the unanimous support of the Namblo community in 1977, lost it in 1982, regained it in 1987, and lost it again in 1992, when he faced two other Namblo candidates. I cannot say which other communities have given all or nearly all their votes to one candidate, but I think it could be argued that a candidate is no more likely to monopolise the votes of his own community than some other community with which he has established a special relationship. It might even be argued that those communities which produce candidates are rather less likely to show a united front than those which do not. In other words, we need to treat the relative political solidarity of local communities as an independent variable, and one which is almost certainly beyond the control of any individual candidate, even when he is at home. And if the last election destroyed the original (perhaps now mythical) association between the solidarity of the Namblo community and Sambre’s own personal authority, Stack’s withdrawal seems to have revealed, in the high proportion of votes cast for candidates based in other electorates, that ‘Nuku-ness’ has also lost the force of its appeal as a focus of parochial loyalty within West Sepik Province—possibly because it designates an area whose artificiality is now associated with the failure of the state to keep its promise of ‘development’.

If perceptions of physical distance between voters and candidates are insufficient to explain the overall distribution of votes in this electorate, and even less able to explain the dimensions of Sambre’s successive victories, can the balance of the explanation lie with the identity and interests of social strata which transect

the local barriers between political communities? Three types of sectional division have some plausible capacity to fill this gap:

- the class distinction between peasants and workers, which in this case largely matches the popular contrast between 'grassroots' and 'elites';
- the sectarian divisions between Christian denominations, whose potential significance has grown with the declining influence of the Catholic church; and
- the social construction of generation gaps between sections of the adult population which have been educated or initiated under different political and economic circumstances.

But it is hard to weigh the relative significance of these three factors in the local distribution of political power because of the linkages between them. Although the 'class structure' of the electorate can best be understood in terms of the triangular relationship between a state apparatus, a 'political' or 'leadership' apparatus, and a mass of villagers (or 'peasants'), most full-time government employees were born in the electorate, and are therefore members of local political communities, and most of the local candidates in national and provincial elections are themselves former government employees, even if they have hitherto been working outside the electorate. Furthermore, since the great majority of candidates have been trained or employed in the delivery of social services of one kind or another, and the greater part of this work has been organised by church agencies functioning in association with particular government departments, members of the political apparatus have normally been closely identified with specific denominations before they begin their political careers. And the local 'elites' who thus tend to oscillate between the state apparatus and the political apparatus are themselves likely to be the sons or nephews of men who have occupied the sundry offices of community leadership—as local councillors, village court officials, aid post orderlies, school board members, catechists or pastors—which have been, and are still, engaged to mobilise electoral support.¹⁵ The irony of this is that the quality of government is

¹⁵ The masculine gender is used deliberately here because there is still no sign that this electorate is likely to produce a female candidate, or even female

perceived to have declined in proportion as the state apparatus has come to be seen as the only viable route to political power, and the value of 'politics' has likewise declined with the growing intensity of competition for political office amongst the occupants of this same state apparatus. Hence the appearance of a vicious circle which can only be squared by the intervention of some force which is external both to politics and to the state, which people are now far more likely to identify with some species of Christianity than with the production, distribution or redistribution of material wealth.

Since the whole state apparatus tends to appear, in the eyes of the local population, as nothing more nor less than a pool of potential candidates, its remaining members seem to feel that they cannot afford to be seen as the supporters of any one candidate, and do in fact go to some lengths to keep their support to themselves, even while they harbour their own private political ambitions. 'Connections to the state' do not appear to be especially important even as a source of authority within each local community, especially because those members of the community who also have positions in the state apparatus are generally not living at or near their natal homes. If these same individuals do go out of their way (or make their way home) in order to engage more directly with the masses, they would quickly be accused of losing their professed impartiality, and the nature of the services which most of them distribute has always made it difficult to disprove such accusations. The result of this situation is that public servants have no obvious impact on electoral outcomes, either as voters or as subjects of political talk. There may now be 300 households in this electorate which contain a school-teacher, health worker, or some other species of public servant. Taken together, these households would not account for more than 700 of the votes cast in the last national election, which is less than 2 per cent of the total. The method of polling does not permit any precise analysis of the votes cast by

'supporters' who play an active role in electoral campaigns. The political situation of women is rather neatly portrayed in one Namblo anecdote which tells how a man told his wife to vote for a candidate other than the one he would vote for himself, and then beat her when he discovered that she had disobeyed him and done what wives are normally expected to do.

these individuals, but the distribution of votes cast at Nuku station, which must include a substantial proportion of votes cast by 'educated elites', appears to confirm my general impression that their loyalties have been no less divided than those of the masses. Insofar as candidates are themselves normally drawn from the ranks of this class, we may suppose that kinship, friendship and occupational alignments all play some part in the division of their votes, but these are not matters on which candidates or their supporters care to speculate, presumably because they make so little difference to the result.

But if local public servants lack the wealth, status, or social distance which might cause them to be represented as the class enemies of ordinary villagers, the same cannot be said of Karl Stack, whose very conspicuous wealth, commonly framed by accusations of 'corruption', has not only attracted the outspoken antagonism of many candidates over the years, but has also prompted many local public servants to reveal their sympathy for this antagonism. In which case, it may be argued that class is relevant to politics in this area, not because of any conflict between the two classes which are actually represented here, but rather because of their differential perception and evaluation of the 'missing' class of capitalists. When Stack was in his prime, the mass of village voters all agreed that 'business' was the key to 'development', and if the more educated members of the electorate were inclined to dispute Karl Stack's manner of wielding this key, they found it much harder to convince the ordinary villagers that they knew how to wield it in a more effective way. In class terms, then, the combination of 'Steak and Grease' won votes because it was seen to represent the alliance of 'big business' and the 'middle peasantry', and the very low level of 'peasant differentiation' in this area may serve to explain the relative popularity of naked capitalist values, since local villagers (unlike the local public servants) had not come to think of 'business' as a game that they could never win.

In retrospect, Stack's failure to deliver the promise of 'development' before he left the local political arena has either encouraged or confirmed the recent transformation of these attitudes. From my brief observations of the 1992 election, I would say that there is now much wider acceptance of the idea that 'business' and 'corruption' are not only two sides of the same coin, but are equally incompatible with 'true Christian values'. If 'Steak and Grease' once represented the belief that Capital and Christianity were

partners in 'development', Sambre's position on one side of this equation may not only be threatened by the loss of his former ally, but also by the spread of radical or evangelical varieties of Christianity which tend to feed on the perceived 'corruption' of the Catholic variety with which he is identified. Given Sambre's own background as a member of the Franciscan order, and the role of former Namblo catechists in founding his political 'machine', it would seem quite natural to suppose that the spatial and temporal distribution of his electoral support have both reflected the local popularity of the Catholic church. I do not have the statistical evidence required to test this hypothesis, but my conversations with candidates and supporters suggest that Christian leadership, as a generic concept, carries far more weight with voters than the conflict of sectarian theologies. What this means, in practice, is that candidates naturally use their membership of a particular church to mobilise their own electoral support, but neither they nor their supporters castigate opposing candidates for being members of another one. There are some exceptional cases in which a candidate's religious standing is widely seen to be the sole basis for his political endeavours, as with Melchior Mokul's challenge for the Open seat in 1992, but candidates like these are not taken too seriously by anyone outside their own denomination, and it is more common to find that a candidate's sectarian affiliations are not even known to his opponents. The allocation of political support depends more crucially on a distinction between 'real' Christians and 'superficial' (skin) Christians, which cuts across sectarian lines to evoke a common image of virtuous leadership which is at odds with the 'hand-out mentality', the '(wantok) system', and other images of corruption, and if the alliance with Stack has sometimes been taken to detract from Sambre's reputation on this score, his membership of the Catholic church has not.

On the other hand, it could more plausibly be argued that the style and substance of Sambre's political authority, along with other aspects of his own community's political hegemony, have been so intimately linked with the colonial social order that their appeal cannot transcend that generation of village leaders whose own political initiation took place under the rule of the kiap. The most tangible evidence in support of this argument was the T-shirt designed and supplied by Karl Stack for distribution by Sambre's supporters during the 1987 election campaign, which bore the telling slogan *lapun i-gat save* ('old folks know what's what').

There is a good deal of evidence from various parts of Melanesia to suggest that different forms of authority are associated with different generations of men, each of which has grown up with a different experience and expectation of the political system. Within the Namblo community, men formerly acquired positions of ceremonial leadership or ritual authority through the conduct of an initiation cycle which generally divided them into 'half-generations', in which the distinction between the grade of 'older brothers' and the grade of 'younger brothers' was no less important than the distinction between fathers and sons. Local communities were distinguished from each other by their possession of independent initiation cycles, which were themselves a major ingredient in the formation of communal or 'tribal' identities. These initiation cycles have withered away with the advent and development of state and church institutions. But the period of colonial and post-colonial development, which now stretches back about sixty years, has been divided by a series of events and experiences which can be interpreted as new forms of initiation, and which do seem to divide the male population of the electorate into generations which are separated by intervals of approximately fifteen years. My own observations of the Namblo community have led me to conclude that this succession of new generations can be defined by the overlapping periods from 1930 to 1950, 1945 to 1965, 1960 to 1980, and the period of Independence from 1975 to the present. Within the five-year phases of transition, it is possible to identify events which can be seen, with the benefit of hindsight, to have 'initiated' a new phase in the development of the community itself and much of the surrounding area. This periodisation of local history may seem unnaturally neat, but it corresponds with the manner in which Namblo men talk about the transfer of political authority from one generation to the next.

Sambre's position of leadership within his own community is one which partly hinges on his ability to mobilise the support of two generations—the generation of 'middle-men' (born between 1930 and 1950), in which he is one of the youngest members, and a succeeding generation of younger men (born between 1945 and 1965), in which he is one of the oldest members. It was the 'middle-men' who gained their political ascendancy during the 1960s, first in the Namblo community itself, then in other parts of the electorate, and we have seen that Sambre's 'Pangu network' was constructed from foundations laid by Namblo catechists who were the representatives and

instruments of this ascendancy, whose slogan was the rule of 'law', as represented by colonial authority. But these men have now largely retired from active political life, and once 'the law had broken down' (to quote one Namblo middle-man), the way was clear for younger men to say that Sambre's backing of the former kiap was the action of an Uncle Tom.

From my own observations of the 1992 election, I should say that this kind of accusation had indeed become the common refrain of many young men born in the period since 1960, who had never bought into the colonial political system, and who now evince a volatile mixture of disillusionment and frustration. But the fact that Sambre still won that election, even without Stack's support, and lacking the active involvement of supporters older than himself, shows that he has retained a crucial following in several communities amongst the generation born from 1945 to 1965. Sambre and his many challengers agree that this is something called the Pangu Party. The point of which they differ is the question whether it survives entirely the instrument by which the sitting member buys political support with 'slush funds' helpfully supplied by Parliament (if not by Stack or by Somare), or whether it embodies other values which, if not exactly policies or ideologies, are not reducible to crude material incentives.

In some national electorates, there is no sign of any party organisation except in the period immediately preceding an election. But this is not the case in Nuku. Ever since his days as a Council Rules Inspector (1974-77), Sambre has worked hard to establish and sustain a scattered network of 'committee-men' (komiti) and other (active) 'supporters' (sapota) throughout the electorate, and there is little doubt that his success in this respect has played a major part in the perpetuation of his personal supremacy. The Pangu network is a distinctive and enduring element in the local political apparatus, and one which has expanded in significance as Nuku Local Government Council and the Sandaun Provincial Government have fallen into disrepute—as if it were, in practice, an alternative to both. The Nuku Pangu Party is not an organised political machine but a nebulous social organism. Sambre may be the head or the heart of this organism, but even he is not entirely certain of its membership or constitution. I call it a 'network' because it is a series of optional, personal and horizontal relationships between a fluctuating number of village leaders, including Sambre himself in his role as the undisputed leader of

Imbiyip village (if not the whole Namblo community). The shape of this network is determined by the location and reliability of the various Pangu komiti. Like the Council ward komiti, the community school board komiti, and the Catholic parish komiti, each of these individuals is primarily responsible for the people (and in this case the votes) of a single village. But villages are not uniformly attached to the Pangu network, and the role of the komiti varies accordingly. In some villages there is no Pangu komiti, either because there is no leader willing to assume this position, or else because its former occupant has crossed the floor. At the other end of the scale, there are villages where Sambre has such solid support that there is no real need for a komiti, and several leaders may alternate or combine their occupation of this role with no particular deliberation. The choice of a komiti becomes a critical issue in those villages where the leadership is divided in its political allegiance. The most valuable of the komiti are those who lead minority factions within their own villages, but can still deliver the support they promise, and make accurate assessments of the choices being made by other leaders in their neighbourhood. The Pangu network could thus be described as an organic component of a locally uneven and chronically unstable pattern of village leadership, which features a fluctuating mixture of consensus and competition within each generation of authority.

It is only in his own home village of Imbiyip that Sambre has succeeded in creating or promoting an effective specialisation of political functions between individual members of different political generations. During the 1980s, one of his classificatory sons specialised in driving, damaging and mending motor vehicles, after Sambre had personally arranged for him to be trained in these arts by the Franciscan fraternity at Aitape. This young man spent most of his time ferrying passengers and messages from one end of the electorate to another, consuming an average of one second-hand Toyota Landcruiser per annum, but boosting the name of Pangu by providing free lifts to actual and potential supporters. Having helped to establish a cash-crop purchasing agency in the mid-eighties, Sambre likewise made arrangements for two of his 'nephews' to gain some training in business management, thinking that either or both would then be able to accomplish the unlikely task of running this organisation at a profit. Meanwhile, a third 'nephew' acquired a university degree in agriculture—a subject which Chris certainly encouraged him to study, thinking that this

would provide his village and his party with the knowledge necessary to expand the production of agricultural commodities. And this nephew had another vital role to play, as leader of the Imbiyip Electric Band, the best equipped and most accomplished band in the electorate, regularly hired to perform at nocturnal village 'parties' during the dry season, and thus, in one sense, Sambre's own ambassador to youth.

The band, the cars, the business arm—this patchwork of activities should not be seen as a concerted instrument for gathering political support, but as the 'modern' strands in thicker ropes of reciprocity which bind the leaders of successive generations and distinct communities. Bands and cars and business groups are the material with which the younger generation weaves alliances. Older generations, including Sambre and the majority of his komiti, construct their mutual relationships with more 'traditional' commodities. Pigs, cows, chickens, dogs, tobacco, betelnut—the Pangu network also functions as a means of redistributing the surplus of such items from one village to another. And the way that Sambre apportions his share of the so-called 'slush fund'—and much if not most of his personal income—is only another strand in this complex web of material transactions.

No-one sees this simply as a way of buying votes. The purpose of the exercise is to maintain a sense of justice in the ranks of the komiti, so each perceives that different degrees of loyalty and treachery are adequately measured in the total balance of transactions governed by the norm of reciprocity. Treachery is born of jealousy, so the judicious use of 'handouts' to control the incidence of jealousy is vital for the reproduction of 'support' throughout the network as a whole. But here there is a real dilemma. Every handout to an individual komiti risks as much support as it obtains, because there will be someone else who asks 'Why him, not me?', but Sambre cannot afford to hold the money back in case the jealousy is then directed at himself. Each election is a time for individuals affiliated to the Pangu network to reassess each other's credit ratings. Sambre makes these assessments through the agency of his 'campaign teams'. Despite their title, these small groups of tried and trusted men are not primarily engaged in making speeches or persuading people how to vote. Their main role is to go around collecting promises from less reliable supporters, and then lay their own judgement on the line by telling Sambre how much they think these promises are worth.

In this electorate, as elsewhere, political rhetoric, in the conventional sense associated with the use of loudspeakers, has much less significance than rumour and gossip as the oral expression of political values, but these 'hidden' forms of conversation are such as to militate against the listing or classification of 'campaign issues', because the issues tend to be embedded in specific, and even idiosyncratic, approaches to the question of why someone might or might not be inclined to vote for a particular candidate, and general statements of value can only be derived by adding up the reasons offered by several people, in a variety of situations, or in respect of several candidates. From my own first-hand observations of fireside political talk in the dying days of the 1987 campaign period, mostly amongst individuals who were at least pretending to be Pangu supporters or agents, I can supply the following examples:

- One komiti recounted his receipt of K300 from Sambre and the same amount from Stack (to help his 'business'), but then went on to complain that some individuals got K500 when they provided a lower level of 'support' in return. It is notable that this man regarded his receipts as proof that the donors were not playing the 'system', because the 'system' entails broken promises to people who are not 'wantoks'.
- In another context, local support for Stack was explained by the proposition that white men like him could have no interest in playing the 'system' precisely because they had no 'wantoks'. 'White men have no wantok system—when they want to distribute something, everyone gets a share.' This point was made on top of the argument that the 'system' is especially prevalent amongst the indigenous leadership of West Sepik Province because it is amongst the most backward provinces in the country.
- It was said that all members of the Seim community would vote for Stack because he had given them material assistance when their gardens were damaged by flood waters, and it was implied that members of other communities could not resent such assistance because it could not have been motivated by a desire to harm them at the same time. And if it should be thought that Stack's generosity was still motivated by nothing more than a desire to collect the maximum number of votes in the area,

the point was also made that Stack had promised to pay local children's school fees out of the income generated by the Stack West Sepik Trust even if he were to lose his seat.

- I was told that the 'Christians' in a community (Arkosame) which contained no Catholics would vote for Sambre because they had previously 'promised' to do so—the implication being that Christians (including Sambre but perhaps not Stack) were people who kept their promises and whose relationships ultimately rested on trust, and not on the distribution of material goods.
- Likewise the fuss made about the last-minute inspection of Sambre's lifestyle by a small deputation from the Yangkok area, where it was well-known that his overall level of support would not be very high, because it was held up as proof that Sambre was the only candidate capable of capturing the 'moral minority' of voters in the Electorate whose values had given them the capacity to overcome the primordial loyalties of kinship and residence.
- By contrast, it was said that the people of one Seim village (Awes) had 'betrayed' the Pangu cause by deciding to vote for their new tambu Peter Wauwau after Sambre had done all that was necessary to ensure their loyalty by making a timely donation to their newly established business group. But this last statement is not simply a statement about the 'fundamental material realities' of political patronage. For it hinges around the suggestion that the would-be 'clients' had not only breached the norm of reciprocity by soliciting and then renouncing a gift from their Member, but had done so in pursuit of an affinal relationship which was itself morally flawed—in ways which it would not be fair for me to detail here, but which provided Sambre's men with many homilies related to the proposition that their candidate was 'not a man who messes around with women'.
- If opposing candidates could not be criticised for their sexual misdemeanours, nailed down with this particular type of faithlessness, it was not too hard to discover other forms of irresponsibility which could be represented as evidence of broken moral contracts. Thus the PPP 'spoiler' Paul Wanur may not have betrayed his wife, but was said

to have betrayed his own (Wanim) community by resigning his job as headmaster of a local community school (at Wulbowe) in order to contest the election. The argument in this case was that his own people had a special need for him to remain in his position at the school because he was the first of their number to be trained as a teacher, and what made matters worse was that his own role as a spoiler for another, less educated candidate (Andrew Komboni) implied a recognition on his part that he could never hope to win the contest for himself, and his actions therefore had no more merit than the dubious content of his deal with the PPP.

- Komboni himself was said to stand little chance of collecting any votes from the Seim community because he had taken sides with his own (Kafle) community in a major land dispute between the two groups. But Pangu supporters normally preferred to portray the PPP candidate as a man who did not have the brains to realise that he was the puppet of a campaign manager (John Wotong) whose own moral failings were bound to undermine his chances. One Pangu supporter conveyed this idea by comparing Komboni to a small tree which is knocked over when a storm blows down the much larger (and presumably rotten) tree which stands next to it.

From these examples I think it can be seen that the general tenor of 'political talk' is the moral quality, and frequent moral ambiguity, of political relationships which inevitably have some material content, but which cannot be evaluated simply by the size of what is promised or delivered. Although I would not wish to deny that images of corruption or misappropriation on the part of 'political elites' have a well-established place in the discussion of politics, and may well contain substantial grains of truth, it is important to remember that 'grassroots opinion' in places like Nuku may be much less concerned with misappropriation than with maldistribution, and the foundation of complaints about 'the system' is therefore not to be found in a distinction between public and private property which has barely entered the popular consciousness, but rather in a version of the proverb that 'familiarity breeds contempt'. On the one hand, a candidate must come close enough to be seen, and even scrutinised, before he can hope

to win votes. On the other hand, the purpose of that scrutiny is the production of malicious gossip, and the assumption behind it is that all candidates (or perhaps all of 'us' Papua New Guineans) have a natural tendency to abuse positions of power by using them to frustrate the promise of 'development'.

In 1987 Karl Stack told the voters of Nuku Open electorate that he had quit the Pangu Party because its leader insisted on giving the meat of 'development' to people in other parts of the country, leaving only the bare bones for the two Sepik provinces. This was indeed one of the very few things which anyone could remember any candidate saying in a public speech. In that year, there is little doubt that Sambre's vote was fattened by the bits of meat which Stack himself was able to supply, despite the rumours put about by some of his detractors that he had been bribed by Stack to leave Somare once his victory had been secured, or, if he failed to do so, then he must be foolish to maintain a loyalty which Stack himself had said was fruitless. Sambre survived in 1992, despite the fact that it was very hard, if not impossible, for him to show that his electorate was more 'developed' than it had been five years earlier, and also in the absence of the lavish promises and bombast of his former ally. Life after Stack was possible because the local Pangu Party's bones were still in place—or else, if Sambre's challengers were right, because he had resorted to a form of sorcery (called 'alpha-power') to twist the outcome in his favour. Next time the feast will still have been postponed, the bones will be a little older, and the challengers will have concocted new designs on Sambre's moral reputation. And if he loses or retires, the question then is whether his community can come up with another candidate—perhaps the leader of the Imbiyip Electric Band—to prove that there was always something more to Sambre's leadership than either Stack or Pangu could bestow.



Sir Michael Somare on the campaign trail (Photos: R.J. May)




Police at a polling booth (Photo courtesy *Times of PNG*)



Raising money for nomination fees (Photo courtesy *Times of PNG*)



Members of the security forces looking after the polling in the Eastern Highlands province (Photo courtesy *Times of PNG*)



Voting in Manus (Photo courtesy *Times of PNG*)

Election in the East Sepik: *Mit na Bun*

R.J. May

The election of 1992 was the fifth national election I have observed in the East Sepik Province, over a span of twenty years. Like previous national elections in the province it lacked much of the drama which characterised contests in many other parts of the country, and turnover in the province's seven constituencies was relatively low. Nevertheless, in greater or lesser degree, it mirrored tendencies in electoral politics elsewhere and highlighted some of the changes, and continuities, in politics in East Sepik. In particular it raised questions about the extent to which political parties have penetrated the political system in Papua New Guinea and about the future of Pangu Pati in East Sepik. Under successive Pangu administrations, Pangu's opponents argued, other provinces had prospered ('*ol i bin kisim mit*'), but the Sepik had been left with the scraps ('*mipela i gat bun tasol*'); it was, they said, time for change.


Parties

East Sepik has been a traditional stronghold of the Pangu Pati. Sir Michael Somare, for a long time the party's leader, has held the regional seat since 1968, guiding the country through self-government and independence as chief minister and then prime minister before his coalition government split and he lost a vote of no confidence in 1980. The parliament's longest serving member, Sir Pita Lus, a Pangu stalwart, has been returned from Maprik since 1964. Ambunti-Dreikikir, Angoram, Wewak and Wosera-Gau'i have also mostly been in Pangu hands. Yangoru-Saussia has been the maverick, but following the victory of Pangu's John Wauwia in a by-election in Yangoru-Saussia in 1983 (after the sitting member, John Jaminan, had been convicted on a rape charge following his election in 1982), Pangu held all seven seats in East Sepik. In the elections of 1977 and 1982 most candidates in East Sepik, indeed, described

themselves as 'pro-Pangu', though the party discouraged this in 1987 and 1992.

Since the early 1980s the Melanesian Alliance (MA) has been a significant presence in the province, largely through the efforts of the party's parliamentary deputy leader, Bernard Narokobi, and the party's perceived association with the Roman Catholic Church, whose influence in the province is strong. Having stood unsuccessfully against Somare in 1982, Narokobi became the member for Wewak in 1987, defeating Pangu's Tony Bais and breaking the Pangu monopoly of East Sepik seats. In the lead-up to the 1987 elections there was talk of a national electoral pact between Pangu and the MA to avoid contests between candidates from the coalition partners, but this did not eventuate. The MA stood against Pangu in all but one (Angoram) of the East Sepik seats—without conspicuous success, apart from Narokobi. There was again talk of an electoral pact prior to the 1992 elections. But in early April, Narokobi announced to a meeting in Wewak that the MA would contest all seven seats and he endorsed the opposition slogan then circulating in the province: *'Kilim Pangu. Senisim lida now'*.

Other parties have contested the national elections in East Sepik. But their presence in the province has been generally tenuous, with little in the way of machinery or finance, little involvement by national party leaders, and for the most part seemingly only weak commitment on the part of candidates. In 1982 Jaminan, standing as a United Party (UP) candidate, was elected in Yangoru-Saussia. He subsequently split with the UP and joined Iambakey Okuk's Peoples United Front, later drifting back to the struggling UP. In 1987 Jaminan was again associated with Okuk, standing unsuccessfully as a National Party candidate. In early April 1992 opposition leader Wingti visited East Sepik and announced that his Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM) party planned to contest all seven seats in the province. Wingti endorsed PDM candidates for Ambunti-Dreikikir (Yapi), Maprik (Dopi) and Yangoru-Saussia (Jaminan). Subsequently, Teddy Sane emerged as PDM candidate for the provincial seat (though he was said to have had 'discussions' with other parties and was listed officially as 'independent'), along with Ben Gene (Wewak). (Sane had previously contested the Angoram seat unsuccessfully, in 1977 as a PPP candidate, in 1982 as a National Party candidate, and in 1987 as an independent, before being elected to the provincial assembly).



East Sepik Electorates

In 1982 there was some suggestion that parties were becoming more salient in Papua New Guinea politics (see, for example, Jackson and Hegarty 1983). There was some evidence of this in East Sepik in 1982 (see the qualified assessment in May 1989a: 221-27) but in 1987 party organisation and party competition seemed to be, if anything, weaker (May 1989b: 114). This was even more so in 1992. Pangu, as usual, had a fairly strong presence. Operating, as in previous years, from an office at the back of the Provincial Assembly building, the party had an efficient campaign director (James Winare, a former Papua New Guinea High Commissioner to Australia) and a budget of K200,000, most of which went on transportation (each endorsed Pangu candidate had a Toyota Landcruiser, the candidates in Angoram and Wosera-Gaui were provided with outboard motors, and Somare made frequent use of a helicopter) and the production of multi-coloured posters. All sitting members were endorsed: Baran Sori, a former school teacher, was chosen to stand against Bernard Narokobi in Wewak Open. Some 'pro-Pangu' candidates received assistance in at least two electorates, though, as noted above, the party discouraged people from standing as 'pro-Pangu'.

The Melanesian Alliance also ran a well organized campaign, from a derelict building, owned by the Catholic Church, down by the ocean front at Boram, but it appeared to have meagre funding. It ran candidates in all seven electorates. Although it had a 'campaign coordinator' (Jim Simatab, a local businessman who had directed the National Party campaign in 1982) the MA's campaign once again centred on, and derived much of its energy from, Bernard Narokobi. Despite Wingti's early enthusiasm, the PDM seemed to have little in the way of party organisation in the province, its campaign apparently being directed by Sane from a house in the Wirui settlement in Wewak. The official list of candidates showed three as PPP. Massimbor (Ambunti-Dreikikir), Manwau (Wewak) and Marasembi (Yangoru-Saussia). Endorsement had been offered to former premier, Jonathan Sengi, who, however, stood as an Independent. It was also generally believed that Schultze had PPP backing in Angoram (although Schultze was listed as Independent. Ali (Angoram) and Hombomia (Yangoru-Saussia) were listed as LNA. But during the campaign PPP and LNA organization was conspicuous by its absence.

In casual discussions with people in Wewak, along the Sepik Highway, and in villages in the Angoram, Wewak and Maprik districts in 1992, there seemed to be a growing cynicism about politics

generally and about political parties in particular. There was still some loyalty to Pangu, which people tended to identify with East Sepik and with the 'father of independent Papua New Guinea', Sir Michael Somare, and some attachment to the MA, which many saw as occupying the moral high ground in politics. But my impression was that in 1992 there was little interest in parties among both candidates and voters, especially since parties other than Pangu and MA were not well known and had little to offer materially. Attitudes towards politics were also coloured by the province's recent experience of provincial government.

The experience of provincial politics

East Sepik had been one of the first provinces to press for decentralization and in its early years the provincial government had been generally regarded as one of the more successful (see May 1995). In these early years the provincial government had, overtly, eschewed party politics, which its leaders saw as potentially divisive, though the first two governments (1979-83, 1983-87) were widely seen as 'Pangu governments'. Relations with national politicians, though certainly not well developed, were generally cordial. Over the years there has been some interchange between national and provincial politics. Cultic figure, Matias Yaliwan, represented Yangoru, briefly, in both the national and provincial parliaments (May 1982; Winnett and May 1983; Gesch 1985). Bill Eichorn (Angoram) and Matias Yambumpe (Wosera-Gau) both became provincial members after failing to gain re-election to the National Parliament in 1982. Eichorn was succeeded in Angoram by former provincial assembly member Philip Laki Yua, and in 1987 Laki survived a challenge from Leo Unumba, who resigned as deputy premier of the province to contest the national election. Several candidates have unsuccessfully contested both provincial and national elections and at least three (Sane, Anisi and Malenki) have become provincial members after failing to gain election nationally.

In 1986 tensions developed in relations between the provincial government and the seven Pangu national MPs for East Sepik, which culminated in the latter's calling for the suspension of the provincial government. Relations further deteriorated in 1987 when a 'non-partisan', but predominantly MA, government was elected to the provincial government, and after a falling out between the premier, Bruce Samban, and the MA, which withdrew its support

from the premier. From around 1987 provincial politics became particularly fractious and, after further demands from the East Sepik's national MPs, in March 1991 the provincial government was suspended. Subsequently part of the provincial government headquarters was burned down and Samban and several others, including another provincial minister, were arrested and later convicted on charges of arson and misappropriation.

During the 1992 national election campaign the electorate's memories of these events were very fresh; indeed Samban and others were convicted and gaoled in April 1992 while the campaign was in progress. This contributed both to a general distrust of 'politics' and politicians and to a widely-held specific view that those associated with the suspended provincial government had brought shame on the province and should not contest the national elections. (In the event, three members of the suspended provincial government stood—Sane (provincial), Alois Anmokm (Angoram) and Greg Mais (Yangoru-Saussia). Sane and Anmokm polled poorly; Mais finished fourth out of twenty-two candidates.)

The candidates

With the candidate's deposit having been raised to K1000 in 1992, it was generally anticipated that there would be fewer candidates than in the previous election. This was not so nationally. More surprisingly, perhaps, given East Sepik's relatively low cash income levels and the devastating effect of floods in the Sepik River basin in 1992, more candidates nominated in 1992 than in any previous election, the number increasing between 1987 and 1992 by over 40 per cent (see table 8.1). Oddly, the number of candidates increased in the provincial and Maprik electorates, where the chances of unseating either Somare or Lus seemed very slim. The main increase, however, came in Yangoru-Saussia, where judgements about Wauwia's vulnerability attracted twenty-two candidates.

Apart from the seven sitting candidates, 10 candidates who had contested in 1987 stood again in 1992, though two shifted from open seats to the provincial, and Bais stood not in Wewak but in Yangoru-Saussia, the electorate of his birthplace.

The average age of candidates was fractionally higher—40.2 years compared with 39.4 in 1987—and education levels, predictably, rose. In 1992, 12 of the 74 candidates had university degrees (4 out of 52 in 1987) and 13 had other tertiary qualifications (11 in 1987); the number educated to grade 10 rose from 19 to 31 and

the number educated to below grade 8 fell from 13 to 4. Only one woman contested in 1992, Australian-born Laura Martin, who stood (as she had in 1982) as an independent in Wewak. Martin was supported by the influential East Sepik Council of Women. (In the event she came fourth but subsequently secured a seat in the reinstated East Sepik provincial government.)

Table 8.1: Number of candidates standing

Year	1977	1982	1987	1992
East Sepik Province	3	3	4	6
Ambunti-Dreikikir	6	10	9	8
Angoram	8	9	12	13
Maprik	7	8	5	10
Wewak	11	10	5	6
Wosera-Gauai	12	11	5	9
Yangoru-Saussia	9	6	12	22
Total	56	57	52	74

An interesting feature of the 1992 elections was the number of Sepiks in government service or business elsewhere in Papua New Guinea who returned to the province to stand for election. Widely referred to as 'foreign Sepiks', they polled poorly.

Organising the election

When I arrived in Wewak towards the end of May, an electoral education campaign had been completed (with assistance from an East Sepik Political Awareness Task Force, apparently linked to the MA), supplementary rolls had been finalised, and ballot papers were being delivered—a task made difficult in parts of Angoram and Wosera-Gauai by floods along the Sepik River. A total of 79 teams had been put together to carry out the polling, each accompanied by two policemen (another twenty police had been seconded from East Sepik to the highlands).

The provincial electoral officer chaired several meetings of a provincial committee which included the Provincial Police Commander, a liaison officer from the Papua New Guinea Defence Force barracks in Wewak, and representatives from the provincial

administration and the Electoral Commission. At a meeting I attended there were reports of alleged threats of violence if certain candidates lost, and some expressions of concern over possible disturbances as a result of 'Yumi Yet' activities (see below) and over the abolition of the Section 141 provisions. It was also anticipated that there would be 'numerous disputes' after the votes were counted. But, generally, electoral arrangements were well in hand and officials expected a fairly quiet election.

The campaign

Formal campaigning commenced in early April. Pangu's campaign was launched by Somare and Prime Minister Namaliu who visited the province for two days at the beginning of April. The prime minister, travelling by helicopter, addressed well-attended rallies in Wewak and in several villages in the populous Maprik district. He returned for a further visit three weeks later.

The MA campaign was launched a few days later with a church service, a parade, and a low-key visit by MA leader John Momis. In a nomination speech, Narokobi (who was at the time Attorney General in the Pangu-led coalition government) spoke of a groundswell of opposition to Pangu in the Sepik, expressed in the slogan 'Kilim Pangu' ('defeat Pangu'). He promised 'humble and honest leadership'; 'Somare can spend a million kina to campaign', Narokobi said,

..I will spend a billion betelnut, a billion coconuts and a billion sugarcane to beat them We are appealing to the people. If they want good honest government, they vote us; if they want this country to be run by multinational corporations they vote the other parties We are not promising big things, just the basics of life (*Post-Courier* 6/4/92).

Somare responded by calling on Narokobi 'not to fool voters':

Elections are expensive and we have to raise money to pay for posters, T-shirts and all sorts of election gimmicks. You don't pay for those with unsold betelnut, coconuts and sugarcane (*Post-Courier* 8/4/92).

And from the highlands National Party leader Michael Mel called on Narokobi to clarify his statement (*Post-Courier* 9/4/92). Opposition leader Wingti also embarked on a two-day tour of the

province in early April, reportedly addressing 'large and enthusiastic crowds, numbering in the thousands' in Wewak, Maprik, Dreikikir, Ambunti, Yangoru and Kubalia. Wingti described his tour as 'very successful'. 'I have been to the East Sepik many times before but never seen reactions like this before', Wingti told reporter Wally Hiambohn. The people have a strong desire for change (*Post-Courier* 6/4/92). Wingti told those attending the rallies that a PDM government would pursue vigorous agricultural development, including subsidizing the tree-crop industry; provide free and compulsory education to grade 10; reduce income tax by 50 per cent, and encourage downstream and secondary processing industry. He also referred to the growing threat of corruption ('This country is going to the dogs, it is going down in the hands of corrupt people', *ibid.*), and promised that a PDM government would address this. (The previous week a former Pangu minister had resigned from the National Parliament to avoid sentencing after a Leadership Tribunal had found him guilty of forty-three counts of misconduct in office. The same tribunal recommended that Prime Minister Namaliu and Finance and Planning Minister Pora be investigated [both were subsequently cleared], while the Ombudsman Commission had shortly before this referred four former Pangu ministers to the public prosecutor on charges of alleged misconduct in office.)

Following this comparatively high-profile launching, however, the campaign in East Sepik in 1992 was generally fairly quiet. Although there were more candidates in 1992, the aspiring politicians seemed to be less conspicuous than in any election I have witnessed in East Sepik. Many candidates, short of funds, seem to have concentrated their efforts in the villages where they expected to gain votes, sometimes relying on contacts to distribute their posters more widely. Electoral posters were well in evidence—village trade stores and meeting places often displayed almost as many posters as there were candidates—but village people seemed to have more difficulty identifying the candidates in their electorate than in previous national elections and, as noted, were generally dismissive of the several 'foreign Sepik' candidates. T-shirts and other trappings of election campaigning were not much in evidence.

There were of course variations. The Pangu machine, with its numerous komiti, worked fairly smoothly, and the endorsed Pangu candidates (most of them sitting members) covered most of their electorates. Somare, campaigning for the first time without the

responsibility of being prime minister or opposition leader, spent more time in the province, campaigning on his own behalf and in support of the open candidates. I accompanied him on several occasions when he attended pre-arranged village meetings, flying in by helicopter. At Moiem, on the Sepik River, the helicopter landed on the far side of the river and Somare and his party were escorted across on a raft by a group of traditional dancers and led to a raised dais from whence several village leaders (including representatives from women's and youth groups) made formal speeches, listing their grievances and demands. Somare then made his presentation to an audience of about eighty people, criticizing the record of the former Wingti government and reminding voters of Pangu's past record, and fielded questions.

Questions tended to be demanding, though not aggressive. They covered such topics as the need for development, funding of the village school and aidpost, the status of provincial government (it was then planned to elect a new provincial government after the national election, though people were aware that the future of the provincial government system was under review), and policies concerning women. People had also heard stories of the Somare Foundation (a foundation, which had attracted overseas funding, intended, in Somare's words, to carry on the work of Pangu) and of the multistorey office building, Somare Haus, which the foundation was building in Waigani. Somare was quizzed about the purpose of the foundation and about the sources of funding for Somare Haus (which some believed was to be a hotel). He answered that the foundation was to be his legacy to the people of Papua New Guinea and East Sepik, that it would help assure the future of Pangu Pati, and that his ability to draw in overseas funding for such a project reflected his status as a leader. This answer was generally accepted approvingly. Following the speeches food was presented and after about three hours Somare flew on to his next meeting.

Another day, Somare visited several villages including Kaboibus (where the helicopter pilot had some difficulty finding a place to land—to the annoyance of villagers who had cleared a small patch of kunai and could not understand why the helicopter would not land there). There, villagers in traditional dress chaired Somare to a prepared enclosure where he was joined by the local Pangu member, John Wauwia, the local Pangu komiti, and the local headmaster. The group was then issued with the traditional challenge by a group of ageing spearmen, who, in the customary

fashion, railed against the visitors, who were accused of being late arriving (villagers had gathered several hours before the helicopter landed) and generally having neglected the village and ignored the demands of the 'bus kanaka'. This was followed by a series of traditional dances and a re-enactment of the election of the area's first national member, Beibi Yambanda. Somare was then presented with a bird of paradise skin and welcomed by an official spokesman before he and Wauwia were invited to speak.

Kaboibus is the home place of John Jaminan and feelings towards Pangu were mixed, but Somare was well received as 'the father of the nation'. Again, Somare and Wauwia were subjected to some quite penetrating questions, covering such topics as local development needs, funding for the local school and aid post, the sealing of the Sepik Highway (stalled because of demands for compensation where the new road cut a few corners across village land), and the future of the provincial government. There were also questions about Somare Haus, and about corruption in government. Again, the meeting, which took around two hours and was attended by about one hundred people, was followed by a small feast before Somare flew off to his next engagement at Wingei.

In contrast I also spent several days travelling in a small utility with Jonathan Sengi, former provincial premier and an independent (pro-Pangu) candidate for Yangoru-Saussia. Sengi, accompanied by two young supporters, travelled from village to village, meeting with his komiti and distributing posters, and talking with (mostly small) groups of village people. I accompanied Sengi to one formal village rally but since people are mostly out in their gardens during the days, most of the talking was done at night, around the evening fire, and in the early morning. The questions asked during meetings covered much the same ground as those raised during the more formal rallies attended by Somare, though they tended to be more specific and focused on what Sengi could offer if elected. Given the nature of the meetings, there was more genuine discussion, which often ranged quite widely. Again, provincial government was a topic of particular concern (most people showing little support for provincial government, which they suggested had declined after Sengi's premiership), as were local development issues. Sengi was asked about other candidates, and handled such questions with modest discretion. He advised people, when asked, to support Somare for the provincial seat.

From his headquarters in Wewak, Teddy Sane attempted to coordinate the opposition to Pangu, under the banner '*Mit na Bun.*' (The slogan harked back to an incident in the 1987 election campaign when, while campaigning in his Lower Sepik home base, Somare had been shown some bones by a hostile village spokesman and told that that was all the Sepik had received from the Pangu members; where, the villager asked, was the meat?) But Sane was never given much chance of personally unsettling Pangu, especially since, as the former provincial Forests minister, he had been tainted by the demise of the provincial government (indeed he was one of several provincial members facing misappropriation charges).

Elsewhere in the province the long-serving Pita Lus cut his familiar dashing figure at pre-arranged village meetings and roadside stops; Bernard Narokobi undertook his usual well-organized 'grassroots' campaign, and other candidates came and went. People with whom I spoke were less willing than in previous years to predict the outcomes of the election and seemingly less interested in and more cynical about the whole process.

There were, inevitably, a few incidents. In April it was reported to the provincial electoral officer that a quasi-religious, 'cultic' movement, the '*Yumi Yet Asosiesin*', was active in the Ambunti-Dreikikir, Maprik and Yangoru-Saussia electorates, and was campaigning with its own ballot papers. After a rally near Dreikikir one man was said to have been killed and village houses burned. '*Yumi Yet*' (which is the slogan of the Melanesian Alliance) had links to the former Peli Association and the New Apostolic Church (see May 1982; Gesch 1985) and was said to be supporting MA candidates. (There had been similar MA support from former Peli supporters in the 1982 and 1987 elections—see May 1989a; 1989b). But despite fears that this might disrupt the election in some polling places the association had very limited impact. Similarly an 'Operation Jesus-Election '92', organized by Evangelical Church elements in Wewak in early June, had little visible impact.

In May Narokobi accused Somare of vote-buying after Somare's office had paid out money and presented two boats to Wewak islands communities using Electoral Development Fund finance. Narokobi said he had asked police to conduct investigations with a view to pursuing corruption charges. Narokobi also threatened legal action against Wewak candidate, Dr Moses Manwau, whom he accused of spreading a false rumour that Somare and Narokobi had

stolen money to build a 'hotel' in Port Moresby (a reference, presumably, to Somare Haus).

In other incidents, local campaigning was interrupted when the campaign vehicle of provincial candidate Tobias Kuelik Sakra collided with another, killing one person, and when Sari Wimban's vehicle overturned in Angoram, injuring several occupants. In Wewak Sir Michael Somare attracted publicity when he punched an off-duty policeman whom he accused of campaigning for a rival candidate. Several candidates were reported to have received hostile receptions when they attempted to campaign in unsympathetic villages, and there were several minor altercations between rival candidates and their supporters.

The results

As noted above, there was comparatively little turnover of members in East Sepik in 1992. In the provincial seat Somare was again returned, with a decisive 54.3 per cent of the vote (54,714 votes to his nearest rival's 17,774). There was some criticism of Somare during the campaign but most voters were prepared to show him the respect which, as the nation's founding father, they felt was due to him. In Wewak, Narokobi was reelected to the seat he had won in 1987, with a healthy 40.8 per cent of the vote, defeating the endorsed Pangu candidate, Sori, by 6107 votes to 3786. And in Ambunti-Dreikikir, Angoram, Maprik and Wosera-Gauai the sitting Pangu members were returned, Akesim with 33.5 per cent of the vote, Laki with 24.9 per cent of the vote, Lus with 34.1 per cent and Wanjik with 32.7 per cent. For Lus this was a seventh term in office; for Laki and Wanjik a third term.

Yangoru-Saussia was again the odd case. In 1972 cult leader Matias Yaliwan was elected from Yangoru-Saussia, with 87 per cent of the vote (see Winnett and May 1983). In 1973 he was forced to resign from the National Parliament for non-attendance at sittings. In the ensuing by-election Yaliwan's offsider Lainus Hepau was elected. In 1977 rivalry between two Pangu candidates allowed John Jaminan, the sole Pukia ('Mountain Arapesh') speaking candidate to slip through. Poor electoral strategy on Pangu's part allowed Jaminan to win again in 1982 but he was subsequently convicted on a rape charge and in 1983 his vacant seat was filled in a by-election by John Wauwia (who had stood in 1977 and 1982). In 1987 Jaminan was again a candidate, having received a pardon after the alleged rape victim had retrospectively withdrawn her complaint; but he

was defeated by Wauwia. Between 1987 and 1992 Jaminan had faced several more charges arising from traffic offences and failure to appear in court, and eventually murder. However, on the latter charge the state's case appears to have been inadequate and in 1992 Jaminan was again a candidate, albeit a fairly low-key one.

Twenty-two candidates stood in Yangoru-Saussia in 1992. In addition to Wauwia and Jaminan they included: Tony Bais, the member for Wewak from 1977 to 1987 and a former East Sepik District Commissioner who, prior to the election, had been appointed Administrator of the suspended provincial government; a former Premier (Jonathan Sengi), a former Deputy Premier (Greg Mais) and former Speaker of the Provincial Assembly (Petrus Wafi). Surprisingly, to many people, Jaminan emerged the winner, with 13.7 per cent of the vote, ahead of Wauwia (10.9 per cent). Mais was placed fourth, Bais fifth, Wafi tenth and Sengi last. Wauwia was not seen generally as a very dynamic member, but Jaminan's victory again seems to have reflected his ability to pull in the 'ethnic' vote. Unfortunately, at the time of writing the result in Yangoru-Saussia was still under appeal, an intended study of the vote was not possible.

In terms of party performance, Pangu's endorsed candidates came second, in the two seats Pangu did not win and this was probably in part a reflection of the value of Pangu endorsement. MA candidates came second in Wosera-Gauai, third in the provincial seat and in Ambunti-Dreikikir, fourth in Angoram (the same position which the MA candidate, Terenfof, had achieved in 1987 when standing as an independent), and well down in Maprik and Yangoru-Saussia. Apart from Jaminan (a former UP, NP and PUF member) the PDM did poorly as did the candidates associated with the PPP (except for Massimbor who was runner up in Ambunti-Dreikikir). Especially considering that political parties normally do not support candidates who seem likely to be losers, the conclusion has to be that, apart from Pangu, party endorsement was worth little in terms of votes received.

Following the count there were challenges to the results in Angoram, Ambunti-Dreikikir, Wosera-Gauai and Yangoru-Saussia, but none was pursued successfully.

Angoram revisited

In 1987 I carried out an analysis of the vote, by ballot box, in the Angoram open electorate (May 1989b). Since ballot box data was

available for Angoram in 1992 I have repeated the exercise to see what, if anything, changed. In 1982 Philip Laki Yua, a member of the provincial government from 1979 until his resignation to contest the national election, stood as a pro-Pangu candidate, against the sitting member and endorsed Pangu candidate, Bill Eichorn, and won. Eichorn came in third behind another pro-Pangu candidate John Maiben, whom many had seen as Eichorn's likely successor as Pangu candidate. The three Pangu candidates together won 73 per cent of the vote. The endorsed National Party candidate, Teddy Sane, came fourth, with 12 per cent of the vote. Eichorn was subsequently elected to the provincial assembly and did not contest another national election.

In 1987 Laki stood as the endorsed Pangu candidate in a field of twelve. Maiben did not stand in 1987 and Laki's main contenders were Sane (who stood in 1987 as an independent, though he had links to the PDM) and Leo Unumba, who had resigned as provincial deputy premier to contest the national seat. Of the twelve standing Laki was the only party-endorsed candidate though one claimed affiliation with the PPP and one with the Melanesian Alliance, two were believed to have links with the PDM and two were regarded as pro-Pangu (though Pangu Pati had officially refused to recognize 'pro-Pangu' labels). In 1987 I commented that in over a decade of election-watching in Papua New Guinea I had never witnessed a campaign as quiet as that in Angoram; few candidates appeared to have moved much beyond their group of villages (*ibid.*:117-118). In the event Laki was returned with 32 per cent of the vote, defeating Sane (21 per cent) and Unumba (13 per cent).

In the 1987 study I undertook an analysis of ballot box figures (there were 38 ballot boxes) to see how votes were spread. Laki predictably achieved the best spread of votes (though he derived quite a high 31 per cent of his vote from only four ballot boxes), Sane, surprisingly, achieved a comparable spread. For Unumba and the other candidates the vote was more highly concentrated: Unumba received 42 per cent of his vote from four boxes; the fourth placed candidate more than half his vote from two boxes, and the sixth placed (Tamoane) a high 74 per cent from two boxes and no votes at all in nineteen boxes. Summarizing the analysis I concluded:

It is tempting to infer from the size and spread of his vote that Laki, as the endorsed Pangu candidate, received a party vote. The uncomfortable facts are, however, that Laki received the same percentage of the

vote in 1987, as Pangu-endorsed candidate and sitting member, as he did in 1982, as an unendorsed challenger, and that Sane, the endorsed NP candidate in 1982 supported by Okuk and the MA, as an Independent in 1987 improved his share of the vote (from 12 to 21 per cent), and achieved a geographical spread comparable to that of Laki (as, to a lesser extent, did Unumba). Moreover, the concentrated vote for Tamoane in what has to have been lower Sepik, suggests that in the Pangu heartland itself local loyalties prevailed over party. On the basis of these observations, the most that can be said with any certainty is that energetic campaigning and 'being known' (both of which parties facilitate) gain votes, but that local support factors are still of great importance, especially for minor candidates (May 1989b:119-20).

In 1992 Laki was again the endorsed Pangu candidate. Against him were ranged twelve candidates:

Alois Anmokm, aged 38 in 1992, from Arango village, a former bank officer and a member of the suspended provincial government;

Januanus Sami, 39, from Marienberg, a former employee with Wantok Publications and provincial public servant;

Martin Anskar, 30 from Yip government station, a former patrol officer and the son of a former MP from Upper Sepik, Anskar Karmel;

Ludwig Schulze (Schulz), 42, from Angoram town (and originally from New Ireland Province), a local businessman (dealing primarily in crocodile skins);

Lumek Johnson, 31, from Kambaramba, a 'self-employed' former PTC technician; *Victor Terenfop*, 43, from Akuram village (Yuat), a former

Francis Ali, 36, from Angoram, a former policeman; schoolteacher;

Paul Japhlom, 43, from Angoram, a UPNG graduate who had served as a patrol officer and as national commissioner for housing;

Andrew Kaur, 31, from Chimunco, another UPNG graduate, who described himself, cryptically, in 1992 as 'under-study';

Sarry (Sari) Wimban, 50, from Mindimbit (Middle Sepik) but living in Wewak, a former health extension officer;

John Maiben, 42, a Middle Sepik man resident in Wewak and employed as a mechanic with the National Works Department; and

Joe Kenny (Keni), 48, originally from Yangoru but long-time resident in Angoram, where he is a prominent businessman. In 1972 Kenny had stood as the endorsed Pangu candidate, but was defeated by Eichorn (see Wandau 1976).

Of the twelve, Sami, Terenfop and Wimban had all stood in 1987 (placing tenth, fourth and fifth respectively), and Schulze and Maiben had stood in 1982 (though neither contested in 1987). In 1992 Terenfop stood as a Melanesian Alliance candidate, and Ali for the LNA. Sami, Anskar and Wimban were all said to have covert or 'undercover' PDM support, while Maiben and Kenny had earlier Pangu association, and Schultze was believed to have PPP support.

I witnessed very little of the campaign in Angoram (spending most of the time in Yangoru-Saussia), but local gossip suggested that Laki and Ali, at least, had done some fairly serious patrolling, while Schulze, Japhlom, Wimban and Kenny campaigned less extensively but were able to exploit komiti networks from a strong base in Angoram. Angoram is one of the largest electorates in the country, and in 1992 had suffered severe flooding. Funds were short and travel often difficult. Not surprisingly, most candidates, as in 1987, focussed their efforts on areas of anticipated support. The general feeling prior to polling seemed to be that the real contest was between Laki, Schulze and Kenny, and so it proved to be. These three took 61 per cent of the total vote, ahead of Terenfop (10 per cent) and Wimban (8 per cent) (see table 2).

Table 8.2: Candidate Performance

	Anmokm	Januaris	Laki	Anskar	Schultz	Pandima	Ali	Terenfop	Japhlom	Kany	Wimban	Maiben	Kenny
Best 3 ballot box results as percentage of candidate's total vote	64.9	57.0	18.4	63.7	18.3	72.7	52.2	46.1	44.0	63.2	26.0	38.5	15.5
Best 6 ballot box results as percentage of candidate's total vote	88.6	67.5	32.0	82.7	31.4	89.3	69.9	65.7	65.1	76.4	42.2	50.4	57.7
Total vote	687	249	4541	364	3156	440	655	1822	771	174	1506	385	3488
Percentage of total vote	3.7	1.4	24.7	1.9	17.2	2.4	3.6	9.9	4.2	0.9	8.2	2.5	19.0
Placing	7	12	1	11	3	9	8	4	6	13	5	10	2

Table 8.3: Analysis of Ballot Box Results

Ballot box	Total votes	First and second ranked candidates in box	Candidate with most votes as percentage of total votes cast	Two candidates with most votes as percentage of total votes cast
1	306	Laki, Schulz	94.1	98.7
2	271	Laki, Wimban	94.5	97.0
3	295	Wimban, Laki	54.2	94.9
4	324	Laki, Wimban	50.0	84.9
5	286	Laki, Schulz	66.4	84.3
6	418	Laki, Schulz	32.5	58.9
7	85	Keni, Laki	47.1	70.6
8	299	Laki, Schulz	70.6	84.6
9	376	Laki, Keni	50.3	71.8
10	282	Schulz, Keni	51.1	80.1
11	52	Laki, Schulz	98.1	100.0
12	355	Schulz, Johnson	38.3	53.5
13	428	Keni, Schulz	35.3	61.0
14	277	Keni, Wimban	32.9	53.4
15	493	Ali, Wimban	20.7	35.1
16	562	Ali, Anskar	24.9	45.7
17	354	Japhlom, Kaur	42.7	62.7
18	378	Terenfop, Laki	38.4	66.4
19	338	Keni, Laki	39.1	60.4
20	348	Keni, Januarius	41.7	60.1
21	391	Ali, Japhlom	25.6	43.0
22	324	Johnson, Keni	58.0	77.8
23	398	Terenfop, Laki	33.2	63.3
24	399	Terenfop, Wimban	70.2	80.7
25	360	Terenfop, Maiben	83.1	93.1
26	368	Terenfop, Laki	70.9	81.8
27	500	Schulz, Keni	48.2	74.4
28	462	Keni, Schulz	47.4	87.4
29	515	Keni, Laki	32.8	64.3
30	312	Laki, Terenfop	44.9	70.5
31	133	Japhlom, Schulz	64.7	78.2
32	275	Anmokm, Keni	30.2	53.1
33	240	Schulz, Maiben	25.8	42.9
34	359	Schulz, Keni	37.3	48.5
35	307	Schulz, Keni	29.3	56.7
36	346	Keni, Laki	22.3	41.9
37	277	Keni, Schulz	22.0	39.0
38	332	Laki, Schulz	63.9	78.9

Table 8.3: Analysis of Ballot Box Results (continued)

Ballot box	Total votes	First and second ranked candidates in box	Candidate with most votes as percentage of total votes cast	Two candidates with most votes as percentage of total votes cast
39	395	Laki, Wimban	73.4	95.9
40	245	Laki, Keni	65.7	82.0
41	111	Keni, Schulz	94.6	97.3
42	216	Wimban, Laki	54.6	77.3
43	283	Laki, Schulz	53.4	79.5
44	90	Schulz, Laki	61.1	93.3
45	322	Laki, Keni	61.2	89.4
46	333	Laki, Keni	33.6	61.9
47	246	Keni, Anmokm	40.7	74.0
48	330	Anmokm, Keni	85.2	93.6
49	294	Keni, Anmokm	40.8	64.6
50	280	Keni, Schulz	48.9	87.1
51	342	Keni, Laki	32.7	57.3
52	183	Schulz, Wimban	35.0	62.8
53	184	Keni, Schulz	29.9	54.9
54	295	Keni, Schulz	30.8	54.6
55	236	Schulz, Wimban/Laki	52.1	61.4
56	233	Anmok, Schulz	33.9	62.2
57	381	Keni, Laki	38.3	70.9
58	370	Terenfop, Laki	53.8	73.0
59	174	Keni, Schulz	57.5	74.7

Tables 8.2 and 8.3 look at the spread of votes, on roughly the same basis as calculated in 1987 (May 1989b:tables 1 and 2). Interestingly, the results are much the same. In 1992 Laki's votes were again fairly well spread, being placed first in 14 of the 59 ballot boxes and second in another 14 (13/37 and 9/37 in 1987), but nevertheless receiving 32.0 per cent of his vote from six ballot boxes (31 per cent from four in 1987) and scoring less than 30 votes in seventeen of the boxes. In 1987 the second placed, independent candidate, Sane, surprisingly received a similar spread; in 1992 the third placed candidate Schulze (independent) also recorded a comparable spread (see table 8.2), while the second placed candidate, Kenny had a more concentrated vote (57.7 per cent of

votes coming from six boxes) but actually outscored Laki in the number of first placings (18).

Voting for the minor candidates was again, predictably, more highly concentrated. Terenfop, who stood as an independent in 1987 and received 50.2 per cent and 65.5 per cent of his votes from two and four boxes respectively, was the endorsed MA candidate in 1992 but nevertheless recorded a very similar spread—46.1 per cent and 65.7 per cent from three and six boxes—again casting doubt on the value, per se, of party endorsement. Four candidates (Sami, Anskar, Kaur and Maiben) failed to win a single ballot box, though three of them came second in at least one. Overall, considering that campaigning seems to have been more restricted in 1992 and that parties were at least nominally more in evidence in Angoram, the pattern of voting seems remarkably similar.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding their apparent disenchantment with 'politics', parties and politicians, the people of East Sepik turned out to vote in 1992, and voted to return six of the seven sitting members (five Pangu, one MA); only in Yangoru-Saussia was the sitting member defeated, and he was defeated by the previous (1977-1983) member. Despite the pronouncements of Pangu's opponents in the East Sepik, and of opposition leader Wingti, the forecast groundswell against Pangu did not translate into votes, except perhaps in Yangoru-Saussia, which has something of a record for producing contrary results.

Whether Pangu's success reflects support for the party as such, support for the candidates personally, or simply an advantage of being in office, remains unclear. With the well-established national pattern of turnover of MPs at elections of around 50 per cent, there does not seem to be much to support the last of these, though it is possible that voters in the Sepik pay more respect to sitting MPs—especially MPs with the acquired status of Somare or Lus—than is the case, say, in the highlands. The success of the five Pangu candidates lends some weight to the view that Pangu Pati endorsements counts, though later results in Angoram, a Pangu heartland, as well as the outcome in Yangoru-Saussia, suggest that the Pati's endorsement has only limited value and a good campaign and strong local support are critical. Whether Pangu will be able to maintain its dominance of East Sepik when Somare and Lus

eventually leave the scene remains to be seen. Pangu's loss in the ('non-partisan') provincial elections in 1987 might be taken as an indication that allegiance to Pangu Pati in East Sepik cannot be taken for granted (though in fact the subsequent demise of the provincial government probably did Pangu no harm).

Apart from Pangu, the MA seems to have attracted some generalized allegiance (including the support of Yumi Yet members), but, with the possible exception of Nyani in Wosera-Gai, only Narokobi was able to translate this allegiance into an effective vote. Endorsement by other parties seems to have counted for little.

Thus, twenty years after the last election under colonial administration it would seem, from the East Sepik, that there has been little progress towards an integrative, ideologically-based party system. Even within East Sepik, where party loyalty has been maintained over several elections, the value of Pangu Pati endorsement lies in the fact that the party is identified with the Sepik itself.

Apart from this, it will be interesting to see if the increased number of candidates in 1992 marks the beginning of a trend which has been seen elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, and which has tended to produce a pattern of restricted campaigning, increasing parochialism (during the course of the campaign in 1992 Somare frequently referred to 'ethnic' voting), and occasional violence. The victory of the controversial Jaminan in Yangoru-Saussia, where the largest increase in candidates occurred, however, suggests no simple conclusion.

Postscript

In March 1994 a tribunal found Angoram MP Philip Laki guilty of twenty-five counts of misconduct in office and misappropriation of public monies, and dismissed him from office. In the ensuing by-election seventeen candidates stood, including Kenny, Schultze, Unumba and Sami. Victory went to Schultze, who stood as endorsed PPP candidate, breaking Pangu's twenty-two year hold on the Angoram seat and reducing its representation in the East Sepik to four seats.

Electoral Politics in Mount Hagen: The Dei Open Election

Joseph Ketan

Introduction

The 1992 Dei Open election was won by the Pangu Pati candidate, Melchior Pep, with 5,435 votes or 27 per cent of the popular vote and 1,998 more than his nearest rival, an Independent candidate, Koi Ranpi, who polled 3,437. Another Independent, Reuben Namba Parua, came close behind in third place with 3,036. Melchior Pep beat seven other candidates to retain his seat, which he had won in 1987 by beating Reuben's father, Parua Kuri, a long-time MP since the colonial House of Assembly days.

This paper presents an analysis of structural group-based electioneering in one Open electorate in a Highlands province and the law and order problems that are held to stem from such electoral behaviour. Purported 'electoral violence' is analysed in the context of the underlying relationship among groups and individuals. The concept of electoral violence can be rather misleading when analysed on its own. In the Highlands, violence during elections should generally be explained in terms of the structural organisation and in historical relationships among local groups. My analysis of violence during the election is restricted to the Dei Open electorate because of my knowledge of tribal structures and group alliances in the area.¹

¹ This study is based on two months fieldwork conducted in Mount Hagen during the 1992 National Elections, with funds from the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission and the PNG National Research Institute. I am grateful to both institutions for their support, without which this study would not have been possible. I am most grateful to the following: the people of Mount Hagen for sharing their experiences with me; Mr Henry

Background to the Dei Open Electorate

The Dei Open electorate is part of the Hagen North District of the Western Highlands Province. With a population of 41,849 persons (1990 Census), Dei is the largest Local Government Council in the area. It comprises almost half of the Hagen North population (see Table 9.1), which makes it the only local government council area considered big enough to be an open electorate on its own.

Table 9.1: Local Government Councils in Hagen North District

Local Government Council	Population (1990)	%
Mul	18,813	21.84
Dei	41,849	48.58
Baiyer	18,692	21.70
Lumusa	6,796	7.90
Total	86,150	100.00

Source: PNG National Statistical Office: Final Population Figures: 1990 National Population Census (Port Moresby: 1994).

The Dei electorate is strategically placed in a very diversified geographical area. Contrasting features within its boundaries are: (1) the North Wahgi swamplands which are currently the centre of intense commercial activities, including one of the largest coffee plantations in the southern hemisphere; (2) the rolling plains of Hagen North, covered by thick layers of volcanic ash and debris and home to some of the world's oldest agricultural systems (Loffler 1977; Steensberg 1980; Golson 1981; 1982; Gorecki 1982); and (3) the

Tiki, Murpup village, for transport assistance on polling day; Dr John Muke, Anthropology Department, University of Papua New Guinea, for helpful comments; and above all, Dr Bill Standish, Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper. As a Hagener, an individual and part of a local group going through the motions of 'development', I have also drawn on personal experiences.

rugged terrain of the southern slopes of the Sepik-Wahgi Divide which is densely covered with rainforest.

The electorate shares administrative boundaries with five other open electorates: Hagen; Mul-Baiyer; Jimi; North Wahgi; and Anglimp-South Wahgi. In the east it shares a common border with North Wahgi at Kimil. Westwards it runs parallel with the Wahgi River and the Jimi-Wahgi Divide till it reaches the Gugla creek, a tributary of the Gumanch River which empties into the Wahgi at Rukmump. In the northwest, it drops over the Jimi-Wahgi-Baiyer Divide at Mbukl, then crosses the plains of Baiyer and onto the slopes of the Miti Range where it separates Dei from Mul. In the southwest Dei shares a common border with Hagen Central at Kuk (Burton 1987a; 1987b; 1988). In the south the Wahgi River separates Dei from Anglimp-South Wahgi.

The bulk of the population occupy the fertile valleys, where the population density is about 200 persons per square kilometre. In parts of the valley where portions of land have been allocated for resettlement, the figure is even higher. Swamplands which were once considered the domain of bad spirits (*kor rakra* in Melpa language) are now filled with human settlements. This is a by-product of the Health Department's malaria eradication programme which began soon after European contact, and the improved methods of swamp drainage introduced by the Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL), both of which have helped to cause a shift in perception in the socio-religious system. The peopling of the Wahgi Valley floor began after the eradication of malaria and the 'malevolent spirits' which were held responsible for the high fever that used to be endemic there.

A.J. Strathern (1984:87-88) provides a discussion on such relocation of settlements. Examples of such movements are: (1) the Kawelka's return to their lower-altitude Kuk territory from Mbukl; (2) Tepuka kinsfolk who have joined the Kawelka there and also at the ancient Raemb settlement not far from Kuk; (3) the movement of various groups, including many Minembi clansmen, who have migrated down to the Baiyer valley around Tiki plantation, where coffee grows fast at an altitude of less than 2,000 metres; and (4) Minembi and Kombukla tribesmen who have moved down to the Kugmi and North Wahgi swamplands. This considerable relocation of settlement, both towards roads when they are newly built and, more strikingly, from high to low-altitude terrain, is a widespread phenomenon. Muke (1994) presents an excellent discussion on both

historical and prehistorical population movement in South Wahgi. As inward migration continues to accelerate towards the twenty-first century, these fertile valleys will face major population pressure. In fact, it has already resulted in conflicts among the occupants, with several clans brutally evicted from the Tiki area following the Kawelka-Minembi war (1986-1990) and another war fought over the Kugmi swampland between the Kombukla and Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair during the early 1980s. Furthermore, the Remdi-Minembi war (1984-1989), although triggered by an incident at a local tavern, had its roots in conflicts over land. That the Tenga valley was used as a battlefield was not fortuitous; antagonists on both sides had their eyes on the prime land.

The people of Dei speak Melpa, a Non-Austronesian language classified as part of the Central Language Family, East New Guinea Highlands Stock, Trans-New Guinea Phylum (Wurm and Hattori 1981). They ideally live in territory-claiming named groups. These groups, called tribes, are made up of clans which often claim remote common ancestry. These groups can be very competitive and often try to outdo each other with gifts of money and pigs in the never ending politics of reciprocity (A.J. Strathern 1971; A.J. and A.M. Strathern 1971:3; Rubel and Rosman 1978:195-196). The Mount Hagen *moka*² ceremonial exchange system is one such arena of competition but electoral politics is arguably fast becoming an attractive arena for such competition in the modern era.

Structural organisation of Hagen society

In Hagen, as in other parts of the Highlands, we find a highly elaborate hierarchy of structures. Individuals belong to an elaborate set of progressively more inclusive named groups, such as tribes which have a segmentary structure (A.J. Strathern 1971: Chap.2; 1972:18; Burton 1989:256). These group levels, from the largest to the smallest, are: phratry, tribe-pair, tribe, tribe section, clan, clan section, subclan, subsubclan, and lineage (A.J. Strathern 1971; 1972). Although Hagen social organisation is really based on tribes (Burton 1989), I have included phratry and tribe-pair as levels above the

² Moka is the term in Hagen for reciprocal exchanges of wealth between partners, in which the rule is that a main gift should exceed an initial or initiatory one (cf. A.J. Strathern 1981:10; 1971). The main items of exchange used in moka are pigs, pork, previously pearlshells and nowadays cash.

tribal level because of their relevance to the discussion on political organisation. Hageners have no direct translations for these terms although there is definite organisation along these lines. However, they do have words for the other levels: the tribe is referred to as *reklaep tenta*³ ('one line'); clan as *tepam tenta* ('one father'); subclan as *manga rapa tenta* ('one men's house'); and the lineage as *tepamkangemal* ('father and his sons').

Hagen tribes

Difficulties in the use and definition of group structures have received much attention. A prolonged debate in the anthropological literature is whether the PNG Highlands social structure is exclusively based on (1) a patrilineal descent system or (2) a descent dogma based on a cognatic system. Under the latter an individual can claim dual membership (through both the father and the mother), whilst under the former one can ideally claim group membership only through the father's line (Barnes 1962; 1967; Langness 1964; Sahlins 1965; Meggitt 1965; Scheffler 1966; 1973; Lepervanch 1967; 1968; A.J. Strathern 1969; 1972). Many of the problems encountered by early Highlands ethnographers were of their own making. The application of Western anthropological concepts to Highlands group structures, or trying to explain Highlands societies using African models, was a common mistake made by many early ethnographers. What appears to outsiders as bewildering makes perfect sense to Highlanders and one only needs to ask the people themselves. Hageners, for example, agree that some of the members of their lineages are *wua-nt-mei* ('born of the man') while others are *amb-nt-mei* ('born of the woman', i.e., the sister), without implying that the latter are 'second-class members' (A.J. Strathern 1966:357). This clearly indicates that group membership in Hagen is not restricted to agnatic descent (father-to-son), even though the lineage (*tepam kangemal*, 'father and his sons') is described that way. In practice, a sister's sons as well as others, including war refugees, can gain membership of a group

³ *Reklaep tenta* is a term that can also be used when referring to other group levels. Other idioms applicable to the whole range of group levels are: *mbo tenta* ('one stock' or 'one kind'); *mbi tenta* ('one name'). A.J. Strathern (1972:chap.1) provides a more comprehensive discussion of Melpa structural idioms.

without necessarily tracing descent to an apical ancestor. However, most members of a group can trace descent to a putative ancestor.

Table 9.2: Phratry organisation in Dei Open Electorate


Raembka	Pipilka	Welyi-Kuta	Non-Phratry
Tepuka	Remdi	Minembi	Mapkli
Kawelka	Kimka	Kombukla	Palke
Nelka	Roklaka	Welvi	Purke
Kentpi	Kiklpukla	Romalke	Punti
Kumungaka	Kopi		Kimbo
Klamakae			Roipke
Dakapkae			Mungapka
Epikae			Mentem-Mema
Waklupka			Gulke
Prandke			

Note: Based on information supplied by Kawelka informants (Yap Goimba, Pati Manga and Komonsi Ongky). It is possible that there are smaller groups which have not been included in this table. Also, note that Gulke, Kimbo, and Mungapka, amongst others, have recently been included in Raembka mainly for political reasons.

In spite of all the difficulties, the language of descent used in ethnography today when describing social units is still littered with words such as lineage, clan, tribe, and phratry (Feil 1987:34; Barnes 1962; A.J. Strathern 1969; 1971; Scheffler 1985). While accepting that there is considerable difficulty in putting these terms to use, some working definitions will suffice here. A tribe can be defined as a politically or socially coherent and autonomous group occupying land or claiming a particular territory (RAI 1951; Burton 1988; Muke 1994). In fact, it is true in some areas that the tribe is the most cohesive and autonomous political group. Tribes, as indicated in Figure 1, have a segmentary structure and may, depending on size, be subdivided into several levels of sections, clans and subclans (A.J. Strathern 1972; Burton 1988; 1989). In Hagen, the biggest tribes, in order of numerical strength, are: the Jika and Mokei of Hagen

Central, with an estimated population of 20,000 and 15,000 respectively; the Kumdi (c.10,700 of Mul Council; the Minembi (c.7,000) of Dei; and the Kuli (c.5,000) of Anglimp-South Wahgi district.

Figure 1: A typical Hagen segmentary structure: that of the Kawelka



Source: Based on A.J. Strathern (1972:35), Kawelka informants and personal observation

The tribe is probably the most important political and military unit in Hagen society. It is an alliance of clans which may or may not claim common descent and membership is ideally by agnatic descent (through the father's line). Hageners speak of 'tribe' as something to be reckoned with in terms of warfare, ceremonial exchange and commercial enterprise. In the event of war, tribesmen may have to defend their territory together or face decimation. Apart from this military function, a tribe may stage a *moka* or a *singsing* as a single unit. It can also sponsor candidates to contest elections as well as promoting business enterprise. While it is true that these functions are currently being performed at this level in smaller tribes, they have been transferred down to the section or clan level in bigger tribes. Jika as a tribe, for example, is so large and fragmented that in 1986 warfare broke out within its Maipngel section. The Jika Komb-Akelemb clanpair, as a result, was routed by the Melakambo-Komapei-Opromb triad of clans.

Opinion on the function of the clan is divided but most anthropologists agree that the clan is strictly the largest exogamous unit in any given structural hierarchy (Lowman/Vayda 1971:322; Brown 1971:212; Meggitt 1971:196; A.J. Strathern 1972:18; Rubel and Rosman 1978:187; Burton 1988:15). Exogamy is the rule which requires that individuals must seek a marriage partner outside the group. Major characteristics of the clan, according to Vivelo (1978) are: (1) based on unilineal descent ('one-line' descent; tracing of descent through one parent and that parent's same-sexed progenitors, i.e., all males or all females); (2) from this can be formed local or residence groups (of people living together); (3) may be a corporate group, i.e., they may control some valued commodity (such as land); (4) may be exogamous (cannot marry from within the group); (5) often have group taboos (a proscription, a 'don't', which usually carries with it supernatural sanctions); and 6) contain members of both sexes originally but, following the rule of exogamy, one sex must leave the group upon marriage (Vivelo 1978: 162- 163).

Using these general characteristics as a check-list, an examination of Hagen social structure shows that none of these fit perfectly but, with some modifications, the first four points and the last one may be applicable. In this way, one may conclude that in Hagen the clan is a landholding local group of which the core members are related by patrilineal descent, tracing bloodlines to a common male ancestor, which means that one cannot marry from within the group. Descent, however, is not the only criterion of

membership because marriage into the group also provides members, while marriage out of the group results in loss of active membership (Vivelo 1978:163).

A major problem with this definition is its disregard for exceptions to rules governing this type of organisation. Hageners, for instance, describe the clan (and levels below the subclan) as of *tepam tenta; mema tenta* ('one father; one blood') but that does not mean patrilineal descent is a charter for recruitment, nor can all its members claim common descent. Females born into the clan, upon marriage, gain membership to a husband's group, but never entirely relinquish their own, and are addressed by using the name of their descent group as a prefix to their personal names. Clansmen rely on their sisters for assistance in staging large events, such as ceremonial exchange, and often encourage them to shift residence, together with their husbands and children, back to their place of birth. A sister's sons, in particular, are usually encouraged to return to their maternal kin and sponsored by their uncles to do so. This and other factors show how flexible Highlands groups are when it comes to defining their social structures.

This flexibility and continuous evolution can be seen all around. Some groups are clearly named and historically autonomous. The Tungei of South Wahgi are a good example (Burton 1988). But others have developed into large exogamous tribal sections, such as Jika Maipngel. A tribal section in the making is the Kawelka example shown in Figure 1. The three Kawelka clans—Kundmbo, Mandembo and Membo—can be more accurately described as tribal sections rather than clans because the Kawelka themselves do not have a name for this level today. Currently the most commonly used names are Membo Keiyambo, Membo Oyambo, Krupmbo, Klamambo and Kundmbo. This clearly indicates that Krupmbo and Klamambo, previously subclans, have now almost assumed clan status while Keiyambo and Oyambo, former sub-subclans, have evolved into subclans and possibly clans. This leaves Kundmbo which still remains as a clan.

Above the tribal level is a loosely organised level called phratry (see Table 9.2). A typical Hagen phratry is an alliance of tribes which do not necessarily claim common descent but may have corporate property and functions. Pipilka Business Group, which owns Hagen Park Motel and several coffee plantations, is a good example. Others are the Welyi-Kuta business group and the Raembka, an alliance of Tepuka, Kawelka and Nelka interests. It is

evident (Strathern 1984:87) that these business groups, whose membership was founded on neo-traditional coalition-style ties between existing large groups, facilitated the plantation acquisition scheme which began in the mid-seventies. These groups have also facilitated the political ambitions of individuals. Former Dei MP Parua Kuri, for example, had successfully utilised both Raembka and the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance as his political foundation for three successive parliamentary terms, from 1972 to 1987, until the Kawelka pulled out of the alliance. Likewise, Kuri's successor, Melchior Pep, appeared to have consolidated his position within his Welyi-Kuta group since taking office in 1987. He was returned to Parliament during the June 1992 elections (but was forced to resign under the provisions of the PNG Leadership Code).

Between the tribe and phratry levels can be found another level of organisation called the tribe-pair. These are mainly political units whose membership is drawn from traditional ties based originally on military alliances between tribal groups. Although Hageners have no definite term for this, it is, however, a widespread phenomenon, in which *moka* exchange is usually intense and many wives are taken from each other. Within the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, for example, members of each partner refer to those of the other as *ang wua* ('brother-man'). The intriguing phenomena of tribe pairing and neo-traditional coalition-style alliance are discussed below.

What needs to be emphasised is that in Hagen politics at both local and national levels are generally organised along these broad lines. There is evidence suggesting that candidates have been sponsored by all levels of group. Former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, for example, had largely been a (Raembka) phratry-based candidate during his early days in the House of Assembly and later a (Tepuka-Kawelka) tribal pair-based candidate when tribes from within Raembka began sponsoring their own candidates. In contrast, his son, Reuben Parua, was a (Tepuka Kiteipi) clan-based candidate during the 1992 elections. Paias Wingti was another clan-based candidate when he first contested the Hagen Open seat in 1977. Melchior Pep is a good example of a tribal-based candidate. While he may have consolidated his position amongst the Welyi-Kuta phratry during the 1992 election, his Kombukla tribe provided the necessary foundation for his win during the 1987 election.

Candidates and group affiliates

Eight candidates contested the Dei Open Electorate seat held by Melchior Pep, a Pangu party member. As indicated in Table 9.3, the major phratries of Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta were all represented by candidates. Both Raembka and Welyi-Kuta had three each while Pipilka had two candidates. Out of the eight candidates, only four were serious contenders with 'big money', resources and strong support. They were Koi Ranpi, Wikai Membi, Namba Parua and the incumbent Melchior Pep. The others, in spite of genuine interest they held in contesting, provided little competition for Pep and mostly ended up being used as political stooges by others for the purpose of splitting votes in opposition strong-holds. It was widely believed that Melchior Pep, with Pati Wamp's assistance, encouraged Matrus Mel amongst the Tepuka and, possibly, Puri Ruing⁴ amongst the Roklaka to split Raembka and Pipilka votes, respectively. This facilitated the prevalence and dominance of Welyi-Kuta in Dei. Accidentally or by design, the choice of available candidates somewhat favoured the sitting member. While the results suggest the employment of the principle of divide-and-rule, this, however, cannot be proven conclusively.

As against the widespread belief, it has to be noted that Tepuka Kelmbo clansman, Matrus (Dokta) Mel, appears to be emerging as a 'power broker' type of politician in Dei generally and, particularly, in Raembka politics. He is, by virtue of tribal membership and a special relationship maintained with his maternal Kentpi uncles, in a unique position to influence stability in Raembka politics. Conversely, he could easily cause instability because of his vulnerability to external forces. By accepting a campaign vehicle from Pangu Party president and Kombukla tribesman Pati Wamp, Matrus may have compromised his own position, in addition to jeopardizing the chances of his fellow Raembka candidates by splitting their vote. But Matrus alone cannot be blamed for risking the position of the Raembka group in Dei politics. All the Raembka

⁴ In spite of what other people may have said and believed at the time, after having spoken to the candidate, I am not convinced that he was a political stooge. The significant increase in Puri Ruing's vote during the 1993 Dei Open By-Election reinforces this view that he was a serious contender in 1992.

candidates were equally responsible for narrowing Raembka chances; for three to stand was always going to be risky.

Table 9.3: Candidates, tribes, tribe-pairs and phratries of Dei

Candidate	Tribe	Tribe-pair	Phratry
Koi Ranpi	Remdi	Kumdi-Remdi ¹	Pipilka
Puri Ruing	Roklaka	Roklaka-Waklupka ²	Pipilka
Wikai Membi	Minembi	Kombukla-Minembi	Welyi-Kuta
Michael Yona	Minembi	Kombukla-Minembi	Welyi-Kuta
Melchior Mack Pep	Kombukla	Kombukla-Minembi	Welyi-Kuta
Philip Bobby	Kentpi	Kumungaka-Kentpi	Raembka
Reuben Namba Parua	Tepuka	Tepuka-Kawelka	Raembka
Matrus Dokta Mel	Tepuka	Tepuka-Kawelka	Raembka

Notes:

1. Although the Kumdi-Remdi is a more traditional alliance, and the relationship is continued in Mul Council area ('where 'Upper Remdi' is paired with Kumdi), the Remdi in Dei (a.k.a. 'Lower Remdi') are now closely associated with the Kimka-Roklaka pair.

2. Like Remdi, Roklaka is also geographically divided. The Roklaka *nu-porpei* ('those who live downstream') are commonly paired with the Waklupka while those residing at Gumanch are paired with Kimka.

As it turned out, Tepuka-Kawelka votes were mainly divided between Matrus Mel and his fellow tribesman Namba Parua, while a large proportion of Raembka votes were spread among the three candidates. Although Matrus was expected to pick up a good fraction of the Kumungaka-Kentpi votes, it is difficult to determine a more accurate figure due to lack of relevant data. Progressive tally sheets, with records of individual ballot-box counts, are essential for this type of analysis. These, however, were not available at the time of writing.⁵

⁵ Pending results of challenges in the Court of Disputed Returns, the Electoral Commissioner is understood to have instructed his officers not to provide access to data.

Table 9.4: The 1992 Dei Open Election Results

Candidate	Votes Polled	%
Melchior Mack Pep	5,435	27.19
Koi Ranpi	3,437	17.19
Reuben Namba Parua	3,036	15.19
Wikai Membi	2,345	11.73
Philip Bobby	2,079	10.40
Puri Ruing	1,989	9.95
Matrus Dokta Mel	1,539	7.70
Michael Yona	85	0.43
Informal	45	
Total	19,990	100.00

Source: Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea (1992b).

Meanwhile, at Gumanch, fellow Pipilka candidates Puri Ruing and Koi Ranpi were pitted against each other in a contest which would ultimately determine the fate of Pipilka as a unit in Dei politics. The Pipilka, now also a registered business name, historically comprised the mainly Dei resident Kimka, Roklaka, Remdi, Waklupka tribes and the Hagen, Anglimp and Nebilyer resident Kopi-Nokpa tribe-pair (Burton 1988). Pipilka's relatively small size in Dei suggests that as a political unit it cannot for many years win the Dei Open seat if more than one Pipilka candidate runs. It can be argued that Puri Ruing was able to collect votes which otherwise may have gone to Koi Ranpi. Furthermore, he picked up Waklupka votes which otherwise may have gone to Philip Bobby and Namba Parua. Yet, it can also be argued that had Puri Ruing not contested, his votes would not necessarily go to Koi, because the Waklupka votes would have gone to Philip Bobby and his fellow Raembka candidates.

Even at this crude level of analysis, it is clear that a Raembka candidate was never going to win. It was boxed in from all corners right from the beginning. Pipilka was never going to make it either. With the Kimka-Roklaka alliance thrown behind Puri Ruing, Koi Ranpi depended entirely on his own Remdi tribe with a bit of help from some Kawelka. Although the Kopi tribe belongs to the Pipilka

alliance, its members live closer to the Tepuka and are in fact Namba's matrikin. Namba, therefore, picked up most of the Kopi votes and Koi only a few.

The Welyi-Kuta group, on the other hand, were well in control. The votes of their principal candidate, Melchior Pep, came mainly from his own group, the Kombukla, the Minembi Papike clan who reside on Kombukla territory, as well as 'bloc votes' from the Welyi tribe. That was enough to give him a good foundation. He made up the extras from the Kawelka Kundmbo clan, through his relationship with an aspiring politician, Pik Ruin,⁶ and he may have picked up the usual marginal or swing votes from all over. Considering that he was a minister in the Namaliu government, his chances of picking up swing votes were pretty good.

That Namba Parua was able to come third had to be a strong warning to the others because no one expected him to do that well. Although his father, Parua Kuri, was a former MP, Namba was believed to have been rejected by some Raembka leaders in favour of his younger brother, Ilam (Robert) Parua, during the planning stages. But he insisted on standing as an independent. Even his own father, who was silently entertaining the idea of re-entering national politics himself, did not endorse Namba's nomination. This became apparent during Namba's abduction by Nengka tribesmen when Parua was said to have 'celebrated' with two cartons of beer at his Urunga home: 'What did I say? Go tell his mother, Kopi amb (woman)... to go and get him' (Kawelka informants: pers. comm.). Part in anger, part in remorse at his helplessness, he appeared to have blamed those who had endorsed his son as a Raembka candidate and Namba for not consulting and listening to advice offered by his father. Whatever the case, Namba attracted enough support to come third, after winning candidate Melchior Pep and runner-up Koi Ranpi.⁷ Having briefly discussed the individual candidates, I now turn to their primary political support bases.

⁶ While Pik Ruin does enjoy a special relationship with Melchior Pep, the Kombukla-Kawelka-Kundmbo relationship is an historical one. For example, Strathern's analysis of marriage patterns showed that 'Kundmbo have intermarried mainly with groups among the Minembi and Kombukla with which they do have either traditional military alliances or recently developed exchange partnerships' (1972:134).

⁷ Following Melchior Pep's resignation, Rueben Namba Parua won the 1993 Dei Open Byelection with 4,494 votes, improving on his 1992 position by 1,458 votes. Koi Ranpi came second with 3,522 votes, only 85 more than

Friend or foe: a relationship of sorts

The phenomenon of tribe-pairing is widespread throughout Hagen society. It is a relationship that is formed and nurtured by close proximity, mutual trust and reciprocity of goods and services. Ideally, women are given and taken as wives from within such groups and ceremonial exchange is usually intense between the partners. Disputes at this level are easily resolved and tribal partners will assist each other in the event of external adversity. In his discussion on alliances, Strathern (1972) extends pairing to the major levels:

Pairing indicates either a former or a current special linkage between two groups; and groups can be paired together in this way at any level from the sub-sub-clan up to the tribe. Paired clan-groups intermarry fairly closely and are more likely to share territory with each other than with other groups. From their close association disputes also arise, in which their separateness is temporarily emphasised (1972:223).

Table 9.5: Special Alliances (tribe-pair and others): population data

Tribes-pair/Alliance	1979 ^a	1990 ^b	Adjusted 1995 ^c
Tepuka-Kawelka	4,358	7,519	5,865
Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka	4,596	2,680	6,185
Kombukla-Minembi	7,066	6,795	9,509
Kumungaka-Kentpi	3,988	4,363	5,367

a. From Western Highlands Provincial Data System (NSO 1982);

b. 1990 National Population Census (NSO 1993);

c. Based on 1979 figures (a) and at two per cent compounded population growth rate.

his 1992 score of 3,437. Puri Ruing made a significant improvement, from 1,989 to 3,138 (a positive difference of 1,149 votes).

Three examples of this form of alliance are discussed here, with special emphasis on political organisation. They are: (1) the Tepuka-Kawelka pair of Raembka; (2) the Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka coalition-style alliance; and (3) the Kombukla-Minembi pair. While the discussion is mainly centred around this election, relevant historical references are included.

The Tepuka-Kawelka: an uneasy alliance

The Tepuka-Kawelka alliance had been a particularly strong one. There are as many sons of Tepuka women among the Kawelka as there are Kawelka nephews among the Tepuka. Elaborate exchange ceremonies have been staged between the two groups, the most famous being Kawelka's *moka* to the Tepuka in 1974, which was portrayed in a Granada Television Disappearing World Series documentary as Ongka's Big Moka. This *moka* comprised a large herd of pigs—including one called 'Rut Pepa' owned by the Kawelka big-man Ongka—as well as a Toyota Land Cruiser⁸ and a motor bike. The major recipients were the then MP Parua Kuri, and Dei businessman, Goimba Kot, both the sons of Kawelka women. What follows is Ongka's own account:

At our big moka we gave away as many as 20 cattle as extra gifts. We purchased 20 commercially raised pigs and added these to our own home-reared ones. We gave 40 cassowaries. As for our own pigs, how could you possibly count them? At the head of the row of pigs I put my own pigs: Rut Pepa, named after our place Rut or Mbukl. It is the one I wagered against the cargo cultists, and I had Andrew [Strathern] take a picture of it which I still keep. Next in line was my Rut Wane, then Pklok Wane, then my Rut Pokl. These were the four pigs with personal names which I gave. As extra gifts I myself bought two cows and gave them away. The car too was purchased as a result of my persuasion: we all contributed to its price (Ongka 1979: 123).

⁸ A grey Toyota Landcruiser vehicle, which Parua began to use long before the final moka ceremony, was bought at a cost of AU\$3,600 (A.J. Strathern explanatory note in Ongka 1979:123). The use of the car as a moka gift was the first of its kind anywhere in Mount Hagen.

It took ten years before the return *moka* was made. Parua Kuri, still an MP in 1984, orchestrated the presentation during that year. Old exchange partners from the Kawelka felt that they were treated unfairly. Parua conveniently forgot to include the Land Cruiser and the motor bike. Ongka, a long-time exchange partner and Parua strong-man, felt betrayed. He laid out a photograph of 'Rut Pepa' in front of him and said, 'Parua has the young boys in the centre of the *moka pena* (ceremonial ground) and me at the periphery' (pers. comm.). Parua lost the bulk of the Kawelka support that year and the elections three years later.

In 1986, two years after Parua's *moka*, war broke out between the Kawelka and Minembi following the death of a Kawelka Kundmbo clansman who died outside clan territory under dubious circumstances (Iamo and Ketan 1992:103). The Minembi, with the exception of the Kimbo clan, are traditional enemies of the Kawelka. The Tepuka, like the other pair-partner, the Kopi and Kimbo, are traditional allies of the Kawelka. However, in this war, circumstances did not permit the involvement of the Tepuka. As a result, Kawelka, Kopi and Kimbo, went to war without Tepuka. Tepuka's case was quite understandable: with Parua Kuri vying for another term in Parliament, his Tepuka tribe could not afford a war against the Minembi.

The allied forces of Kawelka-Kopi-Kimbo eventually routed a section of the Minembi in 1986, but not without loss. The war (1986-1990) cost them many young men before the Minembi were brutally evicted from their Tiki territories. While the combined forces were taking stock of their losses, Parua Kuri announced his decision to contest the Dei Open for another term of office. In June 1987 he was voted out of office. Parua thus tasted his first defeat at the polls. Until then, he was one of the few surviving MPs from the days of the House of Assembly. He was bitter and vowed not to forgive his Kawelka uncles. The Kawelka had broken away and thrown their weight behind rival candidates, Koi Ranpi and Melchior Pep. It was Pep who unseated Parua in 1987 and successfully retained his seat in 1992. This was Ranpi's second time to come second in an election: he was narrowly beaten by Pep in 1987. Parua, like his son Namba in 1992, came third during the 1987 elections. The support behind these candidates was determined by that of the tribal groups behind them. The split in Parua's tribal base in 1986 led to his loss in 1987 which was replicated by his son's loss in 1992.

The Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka: a triad of business convenience

The Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka triad came about as a result of the plantation acquisition scheme. Its first main objective was to acquire the Gumanch coffee plantation, one of the largest in the southern hemisphere. The Remdi, with the help of current company secretary Kofi Puklma and Hagen businessman and politician Michael Mel, registered a business group called Pipilka Development Corporation. The neighbouring Kimka and Roklaka were invited to purchase group shares in the company. It is interesting to note here that Pipilka as a phratry prevailed over the tribe-pair level: Roklaka was separated from Waklupka and Remdi from Kumdi, in order to form this neo-traditional coalition-style alliance with Kimka. They bought a few more businesses, including the Hagen Park Motel, and fought a war against the Minembi over the Kugmi land. Although the principal combatants were the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair versus the Kombukla clans, it was widely believed that both Minembi and Remdi assisted in various capacities. This was made clear when full-scale warfare erupted between the Remdi and Minembi in 1986. This war lasted nearly five years, costing many lives and millions of kina in massive destruction of property and cash crops (Ketan 1995).

But soon the relationship turned sour when the Kimka-Roklaka faction of the group complained about non-payment of dividends from the businesses owned by Pipilka Development Corporation. The dispute was still not resolved by election time in 1992. Inevitably, the Kimka-Roklaka faction withdrew their support for the Remdi candidate, Kofi Ranpi, and endorsed their own man, Puri Ruing, a move that suited Melchior Pep and Pate Wamp. Puri, a Port Moresby-based policeman and a somewhat reluctant politician, went into the race well behind the others. He did not have the time to do any planning, nor did he have many resources with which to compete effectively. His was a case of too little, too late.

Despite his Pipilka base, Kofi Ranpi was still able to pick up Raembka votes. But whether Kofi might have mustered the numbers to win, had he had the support of the Kimka-Roklaka voters, is anyone's guess. Pipilka may well be too small a group and perhaps too timid a cat to make it on its own in the jungle of Dei politics.⁹

⁹ It could well be the case that Pipilka's primary focus still is business, not politics and war (which can destroy business).

Kombukla-Minembi: an unlikely pair

The Kombukla-Minembi pair is a very unlikely combination. If anything, it is the Miti Ku chain of mountains they share territorially that makes them a group. Historically, the Kombukla have been paired with an Anglimp-South Wahgi tribe called Warike. And the Minembi have always been a loosely organised cluster of clan sections. Owing to their large size the Minembi are so fragmented that they have never accomplished any major event in a cohesive manner. They have lost wars to relatively smaller tribes whom they would otherwise have defeated easily. They have never endorsed a Minembi candidate as a group. Rather it has always been a situation of smaller clans and sections fighting their own wars or endorsing their own candidates. Consequently, the Kombukla took advantage of this situation. On their own, Kombukla elders know they are not big enough for a political base. Hence, their pact with the Minembi, beginning with the acquisition and development of the Kugmi coffee project in the early eighties. But the Minembi fought several wars without the Kombukla. Kombukla, however, was more than willing to make up for this in other ways. And what better way than to deliver goods and services. In Pati Wamp and Melchior Pep, the Kombukla have tacticians who can plot and manipulate supporters to win elections. With access to government resources, they have built roads and have brought business into the area. They have poured in thousands of kina into the area. Thus, they have successfully won two elections in this manner.

'Electoral violence': cases and explanations

'Electoral violence', as a term denoting various types of violence during elections, is being deliberately avoided here mainly for analytical reasons. This is because of the argument that there is no such thing as 'electoral violence' *per se.*, and that purported 'electoral violence' cannot be fully understood without knowledge of the underlying historical and structural organisation of the groups involved. The term, election-related violence, is used instead. Election-related violence can be divided into three broad categories: (1) violence that occurs before polling; (2) violence during polling; and (3) violence that occurs after the polling period.

Pre-polling violence'

'Pre-polling violence' is a term that can be used when referring to election-related violence which occurs before the polling period. It includes any form of violent act: ranging from fist-fights to the total destruction of property and lives. During the 1992 Dei Open election a number of cases fitting these criteria were observed. The first involved the alleged 'kidnapping' of Raembka candidate, Reuben Namba Parua, in which he was said to have been forcefully taken by members of the Nengka tribe.¹⁰ Allegedly, Reuben angered the Nengka by jumping onto the bonnet of a car they were driving and tried to rip the mesh on the windscreen. Afraid that he would damage the vehicle, the driver shifted into gear and took off abruptly, whereupon the force sent Reuben sprawling onto the roof. He was pulled over into the back of the utility as the vehicle accelerated towards Kotna and away from his home. His Tepuka tribesmen gave chase rather gallantly but in vain. According to Remdi informants, he was taken into Nengka territory and held captive until his release was negotiated by a fellow candidate (Koi Ranpi) and his supporters on the following day.¹¹

The second case involved a fight between supporters of Melchior Pep and those of two other candidates, which resulted in damaged vehicles and minor bruises. Pep's supporters were alleged to have set up a road-block between Kotna and Kondopina in an effort to stop other candidates from 'poaching' votes. Vehicles belonging to Puri Ruing and Wikai Membi were stopped at this road-block and during the ensuing struggle, Ruing's vehicle was extensively damaged while Membi's escaped with minor dents.¹² The next day, a PMV

¹⁰ Nengka are traditional enemies of the Tepuka and a number of Raembka allies. In 1970 former Dei MP and Tepuka tribesman, Parua Kuri (father to Rueben) sustained serious axe wounds to his cheek after an attempt was made on his life at Muglamp by members of the Nengka tribe. This violent attack, according to Strathern (1984:25), was an attempted revenge for an earlier event in which a Mul driver was killed inside Dei. Consequently, a member of this Mul Council tribe was sentenced to jail for a lengthy period because of the attack on Parua.

¹¹ When questioned about the incident two weeks later, Rueben Parua, however, shrugged his shoulders and brushed aside the issue as anything but important.

¹² Wikai Membi's Land-Cruiser station wagon was said to have escaped with minor dents because of the extensive wire mesh and iron

bus owned by a Kombukla big-man, Krai, was confiscated by Ruing's Roklaka tribesmen in a road-block at Gumanch and was damaged in revenge.

Case three also involved the impounding of a vehicle. But this time the vehicle did not belong to either a candidate or his supporters. It was the Returning Officer's official vehicle which was taken. Melchior Pep's supporters were alleged to have seized the vehicle from the Assistant Returning Officer while he was returning to Muglamp station from an official run. The Assistant Returning Officer, Steven Korowa, happens to be a fellow Remdi tribesman of Pipilka candidate Koi Ranpi.

These examples show that violence, arising from issues to do with the structural and historical relationship among Hagen groups, is becoming increasingly important in elections. Reuben's apparent act of aggression towards the Nengka can easily be explained in this context. Naturally he was suspicious of the presence of Nengka tribesmen inside Tepuka territory during an election period. Certain historical events were carved into his young mind at an early stage and probably will remain important in his life. At a tender age he witnessed the brutal attack on his father. Then as a young man he watched his father being toppled from power. Now he saw his clan's traditionally loyal Raembka supporters turn their back on him. It is widely known that a large number of Raembka voters were successfully courted by Pipilka candidate Koi Ranpi. The Nengka, owing to their traditional ties with the Remdi, were perceived by Reuben Parua as supporters of Koi Ranpi. In this context, their unceremonious flight from Tepuka territory, with Reuben as captive, is quite understandable.

Likewise, the second pre-polling incident can also be understood from a structural and historical perspective. Wikai Membi's vehicle may have escaped with minor dents because of its precautionary reinforcements but one must consider the fact that Wikai Membi is a Minembi tribesman and Pep needs Minembi numbers in order to win elections. Any attempt by Pep's supporters to hurt Wikai's supporters or damage his property would be seen by the Minembi as

reinforcement on the windscreen and side glass. Wikai's Minembi tribe is a traditional pair partner of Melchior Pep's Kombukla tribe; Puri Ruing's Roklaka tribe had fought a war against the Kombukla over land (Strathern 1984:24-25).

an offence against them as a group. Pep, therefore, would do his utmost not to offend Minembi voters. Conversely, to offend Puri Ruing and his Roklaka tribesmen would not be of major electoral consequence to Melchior Pep. It is generally believed that Pep does not rely on Roklaka votes because they are not only traditional enemies but also a relatively small tribe.

The third incident involving Pep supporters and the Assistant Returning Officer can also be explained in terms of structural and historical relationship of Hagen grouping. The Remdi are traditional enemies of the Minembi-Kombukla pair and modern business enterprises are organised along similar lines. It is obvious that Pep supporters were suspicious of a Remdi tribesman, albeit an electoral official, found inside their territory with a government vehicle. In this instance, it is also reasonable from a Hagen world view to suspect rival candidates and their supporters of 'voter-poaching' inside one's own territorial boundaries, also known as a base-vote area. Elsewhere, I have discussed the composition of a base-vote group, how it is nurtured and protected from rival candidates, and other similar strategies designed by local groups in an attempt to win elections (Ketan 1995).

This pre-polling violence fitted the patterns of conflict which already existed, but flared up in the context of intergroup rivalry during the elections. In many instances, personal confrontations between powerful individuals often made situations very volatile, invariably resulting in assault on persons and destruction of property such as vehicles.

'Polling violence'

The term, polling violence, is used here when referring to instances of violence which occur during the polling period. While some cases of violence during this period can be explained in terms of traditional relationship between groups, it is disturbing to see that state-generated violence¹³ is on the increase. Dissatisfaction over the logistical organisation of the elections resulted in heated arguments between electoral officials and candidates, which

¹³ This refers to violence in response to action, or inaction, by polling officials, such as nondelivery of ballot-papers, coupled with an apparent lack of police presence at polling stations.

culminated in the punching of a Returning Officer.¹⁴ Generally, polling in the Western Highlands was peaceful, with minimal disruptions. In Dei it was no different; it was particularly pleasing to see that polling in the home-base of candidates was exceptionally peaceful and very orderly.

There were only two reported cases of violence during polling in Dei. According to electoral officials, a bus-load of Pep supporters were attacked by Wikai Membi supporters at Kumbunga village.¹⁵ Compensation of K90 was later paid to the Pep supporters and the conflict resolved. The other incident involved an attack on Reuben Parua's supporters by those of Melchior Pep. Informants claimed that a vehicle hired by Reuben Parua for his supporters was smashed, a man was injured and a substantial amount of cash was stolen from the truck.¹⁶

It is significant to note that the incident involving Pep and Membi supporters was resolved quickly while the case of the missing money and the attack on Reuben Parua's supporters was not treated with similar urgency. It is a reflection of the kind of relationship that exists between the various groups.

'Post-polling violence'

Any form of election-related violence which occurs after the polling period is referred to as post-polling violence here. This also includes violence that continues even after the election results have been announced. Whilst data on post-polling violence are limited my own assessment, based on election monitoring studies, suggests that post-polling violence usually culminates in tribal fights. These conflicts

¹⁴ Western Highlands Provincial Returning Officer, Kapping Isong, was attacked on the 16 June 1992 at Kagamuga, allegedly by supporters of Paias Wingti, over the non-delivery of ballotpapers. Mr Isong, when questioned in Port Moresby over the incident, blamed the Electoral Commission for the delay which resulted in his attack, but said he was reluctant to lay charges against the assailant.

¹⁵ This information was supplied by Assistant Returning Officer Steven Korowa and Presiding Officer Henry Rumints. Stationed at Kumbunga polling place, Mr Rumints, who was on site, agreed that Wikai supporters possibly resented the Kombukla intruders.

¹⁶ As revealed by Robert Parua, a victim of an incident at Mitamp on the eve of elections, two of Rueben Parua's campaign vehicles were allegedly attacked by Kombukla tribesmen, with damages valued at almost K3,000.

are organised along tribal and phratry lines. Whether they escalate into full-scale alliance-based warfare, or are resolved peacefully, often depends on kinship networks which cut across clan and tribal boundaries, and thus become a prime factor in conflict resolution.

After the election only one serious case of post-polling violence was reported for the Dei Open electorate. While it had been widely believed that several cases of tribal warfare would eventuate, and people had predicted considerable violence during and after the 1992 elections, only this one election-related conflict resulted in fatalities: three brutal deaths, several hospitalised with serious injuries and massive destruction of property. The conflict, the Welyi-Kentpi War, started over the fatal shooting of a Simbu security man while employed by a business group representing Welyi-Kuta interests. The deceased was one of many Simbu workers employed by the company to work on its coffee estates. He lived at Yan, a small Simbu settlement inside Kentpi territory, with his family and friends. Owing to their residential status, the Simbu migrants were expected to 'bloc-vote' for the Kentpi candidate, Philip Bobby. But, as it turned out, they were already committed to their employer. It is commonly held that most of them voted for Welyi-Kuta strongman Melchior Pep.¹⁷

Raembka informants insist that the deceased was attacked by a gang whose motive is believed to have been robbery; they were after the labourers' wages and coffee money which was kept at the factory office. The Kentpi and their Raembka allies maintain that the deceased was merely an unfortunate victim of circumstances and that there was no foul play. But, for the Welyi, the Kentpi were responsible, they were upset over the election results and this was their way of exacting revenge. Kentpi denied this and put the blame back on the Welyi. Warfare erupted. In the battle, two Kentpi warriors were killed. A Welyi sustained injuries and had to be hospitalized.

Thus two hypotheses vie for acceptance: (1) a murder was committed as part of an attempt to restore tribal authority; (2) robbery was the motive leading to an unplanned death, which triggered conflict in an already strained relationship. The first

¹⁷ In the absence of progressive tally sheets containing results of specific ballot-box counts, voting patterns were largely based on assessment of information supplied by scrutineers.

hypothesis suggest some people were desperate to restore tribal authority. The Simbu settlers owed their jobs to the Welyi but lived on Kentpi land. By supporting the Welyi in their election bid, they could be said to have been in defiance of Kentpi authority. Retribution comes in various forms—some more hideous than others—and death might have been the form of retribution that was chosen. On the other hand, the Simbu man—a security guard—might have been shot on the spur of the moment in a robbery that went horribly wrong. If so the shooting of the Simbu was exploited by both sides to wage war on each other. That the outbreak of war was so sudden, with little attempt at exploring avenues for a peaceful settlement, was indicative of an unfriendly relationship in which any little incident is capable of providing a pretext for a fight.

The magnitude of this hostility was potentially very large, considering that the Kombukla and Minembi tribes could have thrown their support behind their fellow Welyi-Kuta phratry colleagues. And if that had happened, fellow Raembka tribes of Kumungaka, Nelka and Gulka might have joined forces with Kentpi. Even Tepuka, in spite of their differences, might have joined in, with the rest of Raembka members following suit. That would surely have resulted in a large-scale phratry warfare—something which has been unheard of in recent times.¹⁸

Conclusion

My analysis leads to two major conclusions: (1) Dei politics is still centred around neo-traditional coalition-type groups; (2) election-related violence is largely determined by these underlying social and historical factors.

Dei politics largely revolve around the major phratries of Pipilka, Raembka and WelyiKuta. Tribal groups may compete against each other in endorsing candidates. But it is necessary for each candidate to court prominent leaders in order to gain phratry-wide support. This is absolutely vital for winning elections. Both

¹⁸ According to accounts given by a Kawelka big-man, Goimba Onombe, the last major phratry war was fought between the Raembka and Welyi-Kuta some time in the 1930s, when the Welyi were almost decimated by the combined forces of the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and their Klamakae, Kopi and Kimbo allies.

Parua Kuri and Melchior Pep used Raembka and Welyi-Kuta, respectively, to win elections. Raembka did not win the 1992 election because it had three candidates and so its vote was split three ways. In addition, none of the candidates was able to muster the support of 'neutral' groups, either from within or outside the phratry. This raises an important point. In spite of the availability of a primary kin-group, it requires skill to mobilise support. In other words, all candidates may claim a solid vote-base, comprising kinsfolk and clansmen, but it is the more skilful candidates who can convert that support into votes, and go a step further to compete effectively for votes in marginal areas.

Similarly, election-related violence is rooted in the kind of relationship maintained by individuals and groups in the area. The type of relationship is often determined by historical and structural factors. The likelihood and severity of election-related violence depend on such factors. Warfare, such as the one between the Welyi and Kentpi indicated an already deteriorating relationship before the issue which triggers hostilities, especially as avenues for resolving the conflict were not sought. That hostilities did not escalate into a full-scale alliancebased warfare was largely because of cross-cutting kinship ties. Groups may be politically aligned one way, but individuals, including some very powerful and influential ones, may have interests on all sides. Large-scale warfare is thus usually averted, as in this case. But perhaps another reason why large-scale warfare did not eventuate was because of the impending by-election. The need for each group to obtain the maximum possible vote for its own candidate dictated the need for conciliatory gestures towards other groups. Thus, in fact, in the structural groups set-up in the Dei electorate, election violence or violence during elections is understood to be counter-productive. But existing tensions and disagreements may erupt into violent conflicts during elections because of all the added pressures from competing for direct access to the state's mega resources.

The Election in the Imbbongu Open Electorate

Joseph Yasi

The Imbbongu Open electorate is one of the eight open electorates in the Southern Highlands Province. I will discuss the following aspects of the general election in relation to the Imbbongu Open seat: the general background of candidates and their motivation to run, their campaign strategies and techniques and the results. The ideas presented and discussed have been obtained in three main ways: firstly, by interviewing the candidates where possible; secondly by interviewing relatives and close friends of the candidates; finally by being there and following the progress of the election campaign in the electorate. Because of the way the information has been collected, its reliability may be questionable. However, I have tried to present here what I believe to be useful and reliable information.

The candidates

Eight candidates contested the Imbbongu Open electorate. They are, in the order they appeared on the ballot paper: (1) Robert Posu Mindi, (2) Julius Piel Kera, (3) Albert Napinu Mambu, (4) Anthony Temo, (5) Glaime Warena, (6) Dominic Melawe Kanea, (7) Korowa Pokeya, and (8) Robert Tawa.

I wish to mention at the outset that those who contest elections in Imbbongu these days and wish to be taken seriously are expected to have either the material resources or proven leadership ability or both. The voters in 1992 were looking for people who have had previous leadership roles and/or have the necessary material resources to compete. The ordinary grassroots or rural people do not look at a degree from a university. They are first and foremost interested in what a person will do for them in terms of development in their area and, secondly, whether he or she is capable of paying

them for their votes. Otherwise, in the absence of these two considerations, the candidate will have to be a 'wantok' or a relative in order to secure their votes.

The eight candidates were all males. All of them were married. Marital status represented an important element in the calculation of support. Most of the candidates believed that they would receive votes from their wives' clan and village. Slightly under a half of the candidates were between thirty and forty years of age, with two in their late twenties and three over forty. All eight candidates were Southern Highlanders and from areas within the electorate.

Table 10.1 presents the educational background of the candidates. All eight candidates had had some form of formal education, with three having attained tertiary level.

Table 10.1: Education profile of candidate

Candidate	Community	High School	College	University
Robert M. Posu	Grade 6			
Julius P. Kera				LLB
Albert N. Mambu				UPNG student
Anthony Y. Temo		Grade 8		
Glaime Warena	Grade 6			
Dominic M. Kane		Grade 10		
Korowa Pokeya			C.T.C.*	B.Ed (UPNG)
Robert Tawa			Adcol.	

*Community Teaching Certificate

Church affiliation ranked high among the calculation of support by candidates. Three were affiliated with the Pentecostal church, two were members of the Catholic church, while the remainder dispersed over a number of religious denominations. Candidates had early contact with their church and church members and they expected their votes in their favour. Some had been fully involved in church-organized activities. The church thus provided an additional opportunity for leadership of the group. During the campaign, candidates emphasized their church membership and past work and appealed to church groups for support. Church activity is seen to be politically significant.

Unlike church affiliation, party affiliation counted only with some candidates, and definitely not with the voters. Some candidates were overtly, officially, endorsed by a political party and others ran as associated with, and covertly in receipt of funds from, a political party. The rest of the candidates are classified as Independents. The following table gives a breakdown of party affiliation.

Table 10.2: Party affiliation of candidates

Candidate	Party	Comments
Robert Posu Mindi	Independent	Pro-PDM candidate
Julius Piel Kera	PDM	Officially endorsed candidate
Albert N. Mombu	PIR*	" " "
Anthony Temo	PAP	" " "
Glaime Warena	PPP	" " "
Dominic M. Kane	Independent	Genuinely independent candidate
Korowa Pokeya	LNA	Officially endorsed candidate
Robert Tawa	Pangu	" " "

Of the eight candidates, six were officially endorsed by political parties and two ran as independent candidates. Robert Posu and Dominic Melawe Kanea were the independent candidates, although Robert Mindi Posu was a PDM sympathizer and was in receipt of funds from that party.

The final background consideration relates to occupational experience. Table 10.3 shows the proportion of candidates who were public servants immediately prior to the election.

* (Ed.: Peoples Independent Right was a loose collection of independent candidates around Hugo Berghuser, a PAP minister in the Namaliu coalition who was standing in the National Capital District (NCD) electorate; it was not a registered party.)

Table 10.3: Occupation of candidates

Candidate	Public servant	Other
Robert M. Posu	Clerk - Dept of S. H'lands	
Julius P. Kera	Lawyer - Public Prosecutor's Office	
Albert N. Mombu		Arts II-UPNG
Anthony Y. Temo		Sitting MP
Glaime Warena		Businessman
Dominic M. Kane	Purchasing Officer, DW&S-Mendi	
Korowa Pokeya	Principal, Dauli Teachers Coll.	
Robert Tawa	District Manager, Pangia Dist.	

Three of the candidates had had previous political experience, while five had not. The three with political experience were Anthony Temo, the Sitting Member for Imbbongu Open, Glaime Warena, former MP from 1977 to 1987, and Robert Mindi, who contested the 1991 Southern Highlands Provincial Elections, coming second to his uncle who defeated him by 72 votes.

Robert Posu—Robert Posu, an Independent candidate with some assistance from PDM, was born in 1962 in Wakwak village in the SHP. He is the son of a village headman who was the first Mendi man to greet and welcome the first white Patrol Officer (Ivan Champion) into the Mendi Valley with a *singsing*. He is a former Defence Force soldier who has in the past unsuccessfully contested the Mendi Constituency in the SHP Provincial Assembly. He came second overall in this election.

Robert Posu's decision to contest can be explained by his background in social organizations (political involvement and association) and by his evaluation of his character (self-conception of leadership). He is a politically-minded person. This is probably influenced by the fact that he is the son of a well respected village leader.

He was also critical of the way the Imbbongu MP and Minister for Transport, Honourable Anthony Temo, was using the Electoral Development Fund (EDF). The minister was building new roads and maintaining old ones using his own company. He was standing against Temo to expose the conflict of interest and end the corruption by defeating him.

Julius Piel Kera—At thirty-seven, Julius Piel Kera entered the campaign with considerable experience in law. He was born in Maral village in the Ialibu District in 1957. After secondary school at Mendi High School, he had a stint with the Ialibu Local Government Council as a Council Executive Officer (CEO). He entered UPNG in 1979 and graduated in 1983 with an LLB Degree. He has worked with the public prosecutors office ever since. He has assisted people with free legal services.

Julius appears to be very self-confident of his leadership potential. He ran for election for three central reasons: (i) to see a change of government; (ii) to fight for better services for the rural population; and (iii) to help curb the law and order problems in the country, particularly tribal warfare.

Albert Napinu Mombu—Born in Yore village in Lower Mendi in 1963, Albert Mombu was a Second Year Arts Student at the UPNG. He was the president of the Southern Highlands Students Association at the UPNG Waigani campus. The student crisis in 1991, which saw the closure of the University in the second semester, gave him the opportunity to campaign and contest the elections.

He had two reasons for contesting the elections. First, he wanted to assess his chances in future elections; in a sense, this was a trial run to register his name with the electors. Second, he wanted to contribute to the defeat of the sitting MP—Anthony Temo—because he believed the minister was involved in several corrupt dealings and cheating the people.

Anthony Yarnaik Temo—At the time of the election Anthony Temo was forty-five years of age and the sitting member for the Imbbongu Electorate. He was running for his second term in parliament. He was firmly established in Mendi as a businessman and politician. He had been the member for the Upper Mendi constituency in the SHP Provincial Assembly for two terms. He resigned to contest the 1987 national elections. He is married to seven wives who have been very influential in the lead-up to his campaign and in contributing to the success of his community standing.

Anthony Temo decided to run for the second term for three main reasons: firstly to defend his seat and form the next government; secondly to promote the policies and platform of the Peoples Action Party and thirdly to bring more essential services to the people of the Imbbongu Electorate.

Glaime Warena—Glaime was the officially endorsed candidate of the Peoples Progress Party and had served for two terms in parliament as a minister and government backbencher, from 1977 to 1987. Of the eight candidates, he was the oldest at forty-eight and ranked as one of the 'hot favourites'. He was confident that his record of service and past political involvement would identify him as a man of achievement. However, his chances of winning were made slimmer by the fact that there were four other candidates from the same area in the race including the other highly fancied candidate Julius Kera. To improve his chances, Glaime had attempted to do a deal with Julius. In vain, he asked Julius to step down and support him with the promise of wealth and a senior position in the government bureaucracy should he win. Glaime Warena was serving as a Director on the Board of Directors for the Beechwood Logging Company operating in his area of Kaupena.

Dominic Melawe Kanea—Dominic Melawe Kanea had deep roots in the Imbbongu Electorate. He was born in 1958 in Kendal village where he presently lives. He received his education at Mendi High School to Grade 10 level. He served as a stores supervisor and purchasing officer for the Division of Works and Supply (DW&S) in Mendi. He resigned in 1990 because he had planned to contest the elections as an independent candidate in 1992.

He had one main reason for contesting: to show the general public that election was not only for the rich and powerful. He was overall the most upright of the candidates. He said he intended to show the parents of young people that by accepting bribes from the candidates, they were undermining their own children's chances of becoming leaders through elections. If bribes became an integral part of elections, then their children could have leadership qualities and the prospects of a future leader, but their opportunities would be made slim because they would not have the resources to bribe voters in order to get their votes. By his campaign method he hoped people will vote honestly and freely for the candidate of their choice. However, his campaign strategy of educating the voters was in vain, as shown by the number of votes he received and the amount of money that was received by groups of people who sold their votes. Sums of up to K200 were offered to individual voters.

Korowa Pokeya—Like Dominic Kanea, Korowa Pokeya has deep roots in the Imbbongu Electorate. He was born in 1951 in Kaupena village (which is also the village of the Governor General, Wiwa Korowi). Korowa Pokeya received his High School

education at Awaba High School in the Western Province and then attended Awaba Teachers College (which has since been transferred to Dauli in the Southern Highlands Province). Prior to standing for election, he was the principal of his college, which is run by the Evangelical Alliance Mission of Papua (EAMP). He had been associated actively over the years with EAMP, having held various positions within the church as a committee member, youth organizer, etc. He was an executive member of the EAMP for the Eastern Papua region.

Korowa explained his decision to run as a candidate by two factors. First his past and present work in the church, the help he extended to people in his community and his initiatives in various associations contributed to a favourable assessment of his leadership ability. Second, he wanted to see more government assistance towards church activities. He felt the churches can do more in producing good citizens of the country.

Robert G. Tawa—Robert Tawa was born in 1956 in Orei village in Ialibu. He is married with four children. He considers himself to be a Lutheran although not a regular church goer. He completed six years of primary school and four years of secondary school. He was a banker for several years and then turned to a completely different career as a patrol officer (kiap or a District Manager/Co-ordinator, the new name for the kiap). His decision to contest was influenced by his position and also by his people's pressure on him to contest. He was working as a District Manager for the Pangia District in the SHP when he resigned to contest the elections. Being a District Manager, he saw that the basic services were not reaching the people. Also, as a kiap, he believed he had the experience to work closely with the people.

He believed that people were better served when there were no provincial governments. From his experience, he was critical of the provincial government system and wanted it to be overhauled. He would like to see the resurrection and improvement of the local government system .

The candidates' motivation to stand

To borrow from Premdas and Stevens (1978:16-95), several reasons can be identified to account for the decision to stand. Usually more than one variable is significant.

The first is the individual candidate's perspective on leadership. All the candidates believed they were leadership

material: they had (1) a high self-esteem, that is, a feeling they were more capable of representing the interests and needs of the constituents than other individuals, or (2) a strong desire to serve in the capacity of leader in the political arena, or (3) a sense of duty to stand in order to advance and defend the interests of the electorate.

A second reason for standing stresses the relationship between the individual and his/her associates. The decision to enter politics is often planted and nurtured by 'wantoks' who feel that the group should have one of their own to represent them. There was an element of this in most of the cases above.

The third variable underlying the desire to stand relates to the existence of compelling local issues. Corruption and lack of development were central issues for several of the candidates. All these reasons are not incompatible with a wish to advance oneself materially and socially by becoming an MP.

Some of the reasons given by Premdas and Stevens as bases for the decision to run for election do not seem to apply to the Imbbongu situation. For instance, the motivation relating to party loyalty and identification does not apply in Imbbongu. When party sponsorship was sought, it was purely for whatever material or organisational support that could bring, not for any belief in what the party stood for.

Campaign strategies and techniques

The techniques and methods of campaigning available to each candidate contesting the Imbbongu Open seat can be divided into four categories: (1) radio (media); (2) public rally (meeting); (3) organization and (4) community leaders.

Radio Southern Highlands was used for three main purposes before and during the election. The first one was to campaign for a good and peaceful election. A candidate would ask everyone to play politics in a clean and honest way to avoid conflicts. Secondly, the station was used to inform the constituents of planned meetings and visits by candidates. A candidate would tell the people he was to meet of the date, time, place and the purpose of his visit. He would also tell them how he would be arriving, using helicopter etc., and who would be accompanying him. Thirdly, it was used by candidates to warn people about voting for candidates who would mislead them.

A candidate could use 'meetings' or 'public rallies' to convey his message. These included mass meetings, community-based meetings

and other forms of small group gatherings. A large rally that was held in Mendi left one person dead and several others injured when it ended in chaos. The rally was organized so that all candidates could speak, debate issues and ask questions of one another.

Each candidate resorted to a system of organization to conduct the campaign. This ranged from the highly sophisticated and specialized apparatus established by the major candidates, but particularly exemplified by the sitting MP, Anthony Temo, to small groups of friends and relatives who organized the campaign of the lesser candidates.

Between the candidate and the large number of constituents is a significant tier of community leaders. These include the leaders of local churches, sports clubs, local government council and other associational groups which play an important role in shaping the political opinion of voters. Practically all candidates sought to recruit as many of these leaders as possible, especially in traditional villages where they literally hold the key to the collective preference of the community. Some candidates used these leaders to buy from people who had votes on the 'market' for cash or kind. The most successful ones were often 'tipped' with large amounts of cash or taken to Port Moresby on the government kumul aircraft.

The factors that most likely influence or determine the choice of campaign strategy and techniques can be grouped into four main headings: (1) resources; (2) structure of the electorate; (3) expected sources of support, and (4) experience and personality of the candidate. All four are important for winning election, but I personally view resources as the most important one, particularly in relation to politics in the Highlands in general.

Result of the election and analysis of candidates' performance

Robert Posu Mindi received 2339 votes. His votes came from his traditional village surrounding Mendi town and a good number of votes from the workers in town. There were two factors which prevented him from scoring more than this. The first one is to do with boys from his village harassing workers in town. He lost some votes through this. Secondly, during the election period, he was living separately from his wife because of a domestic argument. His wife's relatives did not vote for him. These votes were given to either Anthony Temo or Albert Mombu who are related to Posu's wife. I believe that if Posu had had the resources and if the

problems I have just mentioned had been ironed out, he would have fared much better.

Julius Piel Kera scored 2767 votes. During the campaign he was considered as one of the candidates likely to win the election. But when the votes were counted, he received votes from his area only and a few votes from elsewhere. His failure to secure more votes can be explained in two main ways: (i) he was not well known outside his own area, and (ii) there were four other candidates from his home area. Had he campaigned a year earlier, he would have fared better than this. He supported other candidates on the Mendi side to split Anthony Temu's votes, but Temu still managed to win the election by a big margin.

Albert Nypini Mambu contested the seat mainly to assess his future chances and to oust the sitting M.P. by splitting his vote. He collected 1430 votes which are votes which would normally go to Anthony Temo. For a student he did very well. He did split Temo's votes, but not enough to see his downfall. He would have got more votes had he been serious about contesting and had he obtained the support of a major political party like Pangu or PDM. He did not go out and campaign in all parts of the electorate but concentrated mainly on Anthony Temu's strongholds.

Anthony Temu had the resources, manpower and the support to easily win the election. His 6438 votes were much better than his previous winning margin. He won by 1000 votes in the previous election in which he ousted Glaime Warena. In this election, he won by 3060 votes from his old rival, Glaime Warena. He won because of these factors: (i) the dishing out of cash and kind through his campaign managers; (ii) development projects he has brought into the electorate and (iii) his campaign message that he was to hold the position of Deputy Prime Minister of the country. This third was probably the strongest factor, swinging support in his favour. Nevertheless, the other factors were also important.

Glaime Warena came second overall with 3378 votes. His performance was greatly affected by the other candidates from his home base who contested against him. If these four candidates had allowed him to contest unchallenged, he would have obtained enough votes to emerge as the winner. However, political differences among themselves made it impossible to give him that opportunity. The great bulk of his votes came from his own clansmen and other faithful supporters. From reliable sources he used K60,000 to campaign in this election.

Dominic Melawe Kanea emerged as the weakest candidate, scoring only 75 votes. Due to lack of resources (money, vehicle, party support etc.) he did not stage an effective campaign. His 75 votes came from his own clan and his wife's clan.

Korowa Pokeya's 1903 votes came from the Ialibu side of the electorate where he concentrated a great deal of his campaign. His failure to travel extensively within the electorate cost him votes. But he received votes from members of his church denomination. Even though a big figure in the electorate, he did not impress the voters sufficiently to get their votes.

Robert Towa received 2850 votes. The great bulk of his votes came from his own area. He got some votes from workers of the Local Government Services in Mendi. He was not that familiar with voters on the Mendi side of the electorate. However, on his first time out, his votes represented nearly 14 per cent of the votes which is quite good.

A total of 20,380 votes were cast for the Imbbongu seat in the 1992 election. Forty eight per cent of the votes were received by the three candidates contesting from the Mendi side of the electorate. This includes the winning candidates' votes. Fifty two per cent went to the five candidates from the Ialibu side of the electorate.

The implications

Three broad overall implications can be derived from the results of the elections in the Imbbongu Electorate in 1992. First, clearly the candidate who won and those who came close to winning had the backing of large communities and also of organizations such as a party or a church group. Second, people did not vote on party basis. They continue to vote primarily for the candidate with whom they are associated traditionally. This implies that 'wantokism' and kinship are still strong in the minds of the constituents. But the support of secondary associations is required to gain support beyond the primordial group. Third, the ability to buy votes also made a difference.

Elections in Simbu: Towards Gunpoint Democracy?

Bill Standish

Introduction

In 1992, just as in 1972, unsuccessful Simbu candidates told me they had talked all night about the best 'road to power' and were still seeking ways of mobilizing sufficient electoral support. The intense competitiveness of Simbu politics demands innovation whenever opportunity allows. The 1992 election saw all seven MPs defeated, so the winners, at least, were successful pathfinders and some were innovative. Recent elections in Chimbu (commonly named Simbu) Province reflect the intensification of political competition within Highlands society into conflict, and the decreasing administrative capacity of the state. After a five year gap since I observed the 1987 national election, I spent six weeks in Simbu in May-July 1992, and subsequently four weeks in June-July 1993 and two weeks in March-April 1995.¹

In contrast to my chapters on the 1972, 1977 and 1982 elections (Standish 1976, 1983, 1989), which focussed on political recruitment and voting patterns as part of a study of local-level politics, this

¹ I wish to express my thanks to those in Papua New Guinea who made this study possible: the Electoral Commissioner, Mr Reuben Kaiulo, MBE and his staff including Messrs Alwyn Jimmy and Henry Gull; Mr Pokware Kale, Director, Advisory Services, National Parliament; the Simbu Provincial Secretary, Mr Joe Bal and his Deputy, the Provincial Returning Officer, Mr Robert Matbob and their assistants; my host Mr Rudi de Jong; my fellow Bamugl villagers and the many candidates, officials and other Simbu friends who responded to my curiosity. In Canberra I thank my colleagues Professor Yaw Saffu, Mr Sinclair Dinnen, Dr Ron May, Ms Allison Ley, Mrs Bev Fraser and Ms Sue Andrews.


paper will identify issues of national significance in the changing politics of contemporary Simbu, and refer to similar observations of violence and predictions of increasing turbulence in the Western Highlands (Ketan 1995 and this volume; Strathern 1993; Reay 1987). If replicated elsewhere these trends would threaten national democratic structures and indicate the political weakness of the state. The main findings of this paper—reduced administrative capability, the use of public funds for individual benefit, the low moral authority of the state and limited state control of the society, the intensification of local political competition into conflict, the large scale of electoral cheating and the use of force and intimidation by state and non-state actors in politics—will be seen to be inter-related, and reinforce each other.

Campaigning in the 1990s continues a pattern of highly intense and localised campaigning, (by now) ritualised campaign feasts—once again the main form of ‘parties’ in these elections—the free-wheeling distribution of cash to buy support (or at least a hearing) from voters, and the large-scale use of state funds by political incumbents which first emerged in 1987.² The crossover effects between provincial and national political arenas first seen in the 1980 provincial and 1982 national elections (Standish 1989) increased, this time with state resources from the provincial sphere used in the national-level electoral contest.

The progressive decline in overall administrative capability and the loss of state control over Simbu society has been exploited by both candidates and their supporters, so that elections are now very turbulent events which disrupt other government activities in the province for months. In each election the problems of electoral administration under ever more unstable and tense conditions have increasingly tested the capacity of the available officers and the willingness of candidates and their supporters to exercise restraint and play by the rules. The state does not deeply penetrate and control clan society, and has been unable to prevent increasing intimidation of voters to make them follow the wishes of local candidates and their close supporters and scrutineers. It has not been able to prevent post-election retribution which contributes to the ongoing inter-group disputes expressed in clan warfare. Nor has it

² As explored by Hastings (1987), after I alerted him to the issue, and Brown (1989).

CHIMBU PROVINCIAL ELECTORATE



been able to prevent escalation in the scale of electoral malpractice each successive election.

In both 1982 and 1987 the number of votes under Section 141 (whereby people formally declare their eligibility to vote even if not on the roll; hence, a mechanism often thought to involve election fraud) had increased dramatically. In both 1987 and 1992 it was believed in Simbu political circles that multiple voting by many voters helped certain candidates win. In the one day poll initiated in 1992 there was no security presence at most polling booths. In the belief that this had made it possible for officials to be coerced into allowing double voting on a large scale, in the 1993 Simbu Provincial Assembly elections many candidates and their supporters intimidated officials into facilitating cheating on a truly massive scale. Both officials and winning candidates and their supporters admitted that armed intimidation of both voters and polling officials occurred across the entire province, and that the election results were corrupted. Post-election violence increased, and a number of the Simbu political elite in 1993 expressed concern at the increasingly violent expressions of these new forms of political conflict, and predicted they would lead to [civil] war.

Cumulatively, this means it is no longer possible to describe elections in Simbu as free and fair. Electoral politics in Simbu are seen by Simbu observers and participants alike as likely to become even more violent. I have drawn attention to the security dimension of these trends elsewhere (Standish 1994). This chapter concludes by re-endorsing³ the argument of Simbu political players that not only does the lack of security and degree of electoral fraud affect the viability of the electoral process but, ultimately, they reduce the legitimacy of state structures in the country as a whole, with serious implications for development and political stability.

The political context

Provincial and national politics have been interwoven in Simbu since Iambakey (later Sir Iambakey) Okuk was 'regional' (from 1975 officially 'Provincial') member. Okuk used his expertise and capacity as Deputy Prime Minister in 1980 to marshal the resources to bring together the first elected Simbu Provincial Government, headed by his fellow Kamanegu tribesman, Matthew Siune. In

³ Department of Political and Administrative Studies (University of PNG) seminars, 22 July 1987 and 22 July 1992.

early 1981 the political instability surrounding Siune's government contributed to ethnic mobilisation and a series of killings in Kundiawa. This in turn provided impetus for a southern or 'bomai' bloc alliance to form behind John Nilkare, who defeated Okuk in the 1982 election. Okuk, a culture hero throughout the PNG Highlands, subsequently won the Eastern Highlands seat of Unggai-Bena and was Minister for Agriculture when he died of cancer in late 1986. In 1984 Siune won another provincial election, again with Okuk's help, but in his role of Provincial Affairs Minister Nilkare initiated investigations which led to the Simbu government's suspension for maladministration and Siune's imprisonment for misappropriation. The replacement premier, Peter Gull, was seen as being a protege of regional member John Nilkare.

Okuk's former campaign manager, Peter Kuman, was from 1982 MP for Kundiawa Open, and became Minister for Transport in 1985 and thereby gained access to sectoral funds which he used during his successful 1987 campaign against Nilkare for the regional seat and to help the other five Open MPs, who—unusually—were all re-elected in 1987. It is widely believed that they succeeded because in the run-up to the elections they collectively distributed over K0.5m of Minor Roads funds obtained from Kuman, which had gone immediately into the hands of voters. In the 1988 provincial elections Gull was replaced as premier by a former provincial planner, David Mai, who had links to the Peoples Progress Party leader, Sir Julius Chan, the deputy leader of Pias Wingti's coalition. When a coalition headed by Pangu Pati's Rabbie Namaliu replaced Wingti in July 1988, Kuman in the Opposition lost access to all funding except the discretionary votes (Electoral Development Funds, EDF, known as 'slush funds') shared by all MPs.

Mid-1992 was a period of acute cash shortage in Simbu. The national government had lost almost 20 per cent of revenues with the forced closure of the giant Panguna Copper Mine in 1989 following sabotage and terrorist attacks by landowners. Then from 1990 with the attempted secession of Bougainville the country not only underwent a World Bank inspired minor structural adjustment program, with nominal 10 per cent cuts across the board in government outlays, but experienced a heavy fiscal drain in funding the military attempt to defeat the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. Provincial budgets were squeezed most by the cash flow crisis, while national government expenditure actually grew. Yet Premier Mai's government spent about K2m per annum, starting in 1990, on a 'free education policy' which meant that for parents of

community and high school students in Simbu there would be no fees, usually K20 or K250 per student. The revenue foregone was the equivalent of one third of the province's non-salary budget, and hence absorbed much of the government's annual operating and maintenance funds, and contributed to the almost total lack of activity in road maintenance and agriculture and the rapid decline in education and health services.

Coffee is the principal cash earner in Simbu but roadside marketing had almost ceased in 1992. Prices were very low and production reduced slightly because of coffee rust disease. Incomes were very low and production down despite a substantial government subsidy to exporters, because two of the province's three factories in the 1980s had closed after political interference and landowner discontent, while the trafficability of the feeder road network and even the Okuk Highway had declined because lack of maintenance and *raskol* banditry made carrying valuable cargoes a dangerous activity. In 1992, Simbu was definitely not awash with the coffee earnings which had funded large beer parties as a standard feature of the 1977 and 1982 campaigns (Standish 1983 and 1989). But neither was this a return to the almost cashless campaign of 1972 (Standish 1976), because in the two decades since then the country had become self-governing and many state resources and business opportunities had become available to politicians and public servants.

The official electoral structures had also been changed for the 1992 poll. The main change was the newly legislated requirement removing 'Section 141' votes and requiring people to get themselves on the electoral roll in order to vote. The second was the administrative decision made in March 1992 under the amended legislation to conduct a poll in one day, rather than the usual two to three weeks which in 1987 was thought to have contributed to large scale double-voting and other forms of cheating. Publicity material about the need to be on the roll arrived very late in 1991, just before the roll closed. Provincial administration staff were annoyed at the shortage of funds to update and then correct the roll, especially after the Electoral Commission (EC) charged the Chimbu electoral funds fifteen thousand Kina for EC pullovers which they did not order or want. The province had not held a detailed village census for over a decade. The update exercise was conducted in part by school leavers and other casual staff in their home areas, some of whom told me they had deliberately inflated the lists by including dead, underage

and absentee clan members, in order to expand their clan's vote. (I verified their claims in one subclan.)

When the draft printouts were received back for checking in February 1992 many errors were found, and the provincial officials unsuccessfully sought the computer disks to correct the roll themselves. However, it was alleged that further fictional names were placed on the roll during this checking period. When the printed rolls appeared only a few days before the voting, more major errors were found, with whole clans in the wrong electorate and some groups duplicated. On some occasions duplicated sections were ripped out, and in others lists of certified voters were inserted into the rolls. Problems with the roll became grounds for a later (unsuccessful) petition against the Sinasina Open result, discussed below.

Simbu had 186,000 residents in the 1990 census, but the initial total on the roll was 227,845. After checking and removing obvious duplication this was cut back to a final total of about 120,000 names.⁴ In PNG the median age is 18, the same as the voting age, so in 1992 there should have been only approximately 93,000 eligible voters resident in Simbu. Clearly the roll was unreliable, and all interested parties knew it, well before what had long promised to be a period of frenzied electoral competition.

Candidates and alliances

Once again Simbu had many candidates, 224 in all, with an average of thirty-four per Open seat in 1992, compared to 184 candidates in 1987, an average of twenty-eight. The smallest Open field was Karimui-Nomane with twenty-one contestants and the largest (in the country) Sinasina-Yonggamugl, with forty-seven men and the province's sole woman candidate, Tamo Printa Engnui. The first to stand since 1982, she was brave, and received only seventeen votes. There were twenty-two candidates in the regional contest, a rise from sixteen in 1987. Clearly the new K1000 nomination fee was no deterrent—rather, the payment of this fee became a matter for assertion by candidates' clan members and other supporters. Some rumoured candidates dropped out of the field once they realised who

⁴ 120 000 figure, personal communication, Chimbu Provincial Returning Officer; 137 000 figure calculated by adding Open electorate totals from Open Electoral Officers' mimeoed working documents.

their opponents were, and one withdrew after a severe assault, in order to prevent clan warfare erupting and probably causing deaths.

The history and motives of each candidacy vary, with Simbu's best and brightest attracted to politics. As in previous elections, some were perennials, such as Yauwe Riyong who finally won the Chuave contest after first trying in 1972. Some clearly stood in order to gain the status of candidate and improve their renown, as noted for earlier elections (Standish 1976, 1983, 1989; Brown 1989). University graduates, including engineers and accountants, stood in most electorates, and senior *kiaps* and two provincial police commanders also stood. Some candidates with prominence in business and the bureaucracy appeared unenthused about campaigning, stating that they had been persuaded to stand partly as a matter of pride for their clan and tribe, and, they hinted, to provide an initiatory feast of pigs and the basic beer party they said were expected of all candidates since Okuk's big campaigns of 1977 and 1982. Where they had connections with a local Open contestant, similar parties were frequently paid for in advance by regional candidates. Elections are times of redistributive consumption, rare times when the meek can consume at others' expense.

As usual, rumours abounded that many candidates were dummies or splitters, set up by some candidates or their supporters to divide the vote of potentially strong candidates. Clearly there was little sense—except a spoiling role—for three candidates from Dirima village in Gumine standing. Two of these lived and campaigned yards apart from each other, although the third—a former university student who belonged to a different clan—had done his sums with census figures and was sure he had the numbers to win. He got his clan's base vote, but no more, and they all lost. Although most candidates appeared genuinely to believe they stood a good chance, clearly in some cases their candidacy was part of a local popularity contest, sometimes testing the water for provincial assembly elections due within a year.

Inter-group collaboration also occurs. Fragile election deals are made in the years before each election between older leaders of neighbouring clans and tribes, depending on the strength of their known possible candidates. One aim is to alternate parliamentary representation between groups. These alliances, some of which date back 15 years, are based on common opposition to third parties or the rest of the electorate and their hopes of sharing the spoils of development funds if successful. However they are often broken

when a new young candidate emerges late in the day and refuses to defer his plans simply because of an agreement made without his participation. The ambitions of younger individuals and unpredictable inter-group rivalries, as well as any deliberate vote-splitting by dummies set up by outsiders, thus all undermine such schemes, which unintentionally serve to increase the likelihood of bitter recriminations when—inevitably—all candidates lose bar one.

The most noteworthy candidates in the regional contest were known by the parts of their name emphasized here:

- **Peter Kuman** Kakep, aged 38, from Papanigl area near the Kundiawa/Kerowagi border, was sitting member; his self-adopted last name means the 'spokesman'. In early 1992 he was married to the daughter of a provincial politician from the Kamanegu tribe, Matthew Siune, then standing for Kundiawa Open. As a police riot squad officer before the 1982 election, Kuman was feared for his reputed toughness. He was campaign manager for Okuk in 1982 and had been a minister from 1985 until the 1988 change of government. Previously a member of Paias Wingti's People's Democratic Movement (PDM), in 1992 Kuman campaigned as leader of the Country Party, saying he had the blessing of Sinake Giregire, well-known former Daulo MP and Country Party founder, and claimed he would form a government and become prime minister;
- **David Goro Mai**, aged about 40, from East Elimbari in Chuave, the Premier of the Simbu Provincial Government and previously provincial planner with training in Canberra. While Premier, he—along with other cabinet ministers and politicians—obtained many tens of thousand Kina through the provincial Agricultural Guarantee Scheme to establish a large coffee plantation near his village. As well as 'free education' he also made sure a new high school was started in his home area;
- **John Bola** Endemongo Kua, in his late twenties, Deputy Premier and son of Endemongo, a former luluai of Endugwa (No 3) tribe of Kup subdistrict. As the main critic of the provincial government, John Bola was the effective leader of the opposition in the province, and made explicit allegations of corruption against the Premier and a senior official, while he was himself on bail for corruption charges during the campaign. He was thought likely to appeal to younger voters because of his fearless opposition to

police rough-house tactics. His blunt personal style was reminiscent of Okuk, and his single campaign slogan was "For Leadership". While supporting the free education policy he acknowledged that he only stood at the last moment because David Mai refused to step aside from the Premiership during the campaign, which would have made John Bola acting premier. (A number of senior public servants had raised the idea with the Provincial Secretary that the Premier should stand down for the duration of the campaign, and the Premier reportedly rejected this suggestion.) Bola agreed with me that by standing he would take votes from Kuman, whose clan's fighters in 1990 had killed between a dozen and twenty of Bola's Endugwa No 3 tribes' warriors and allies with a high-powered rifle during clan warfare;

- **Sir Joseph Nombri**, aged 51, a Kamanegu tribesman who was married to Siune's paternal uncle's daughter. (Siune supported his son-in-law, Kuman, at the poll, but his clanspeople mostly voted for their fellow Kamanegu.) Nombri had recently returned after 11 years as PNG Ambassador to Japan, a position he had used to obtain a fire truck for Kundiawa and also funding for a new K8m provincial hospital, which government officials had wanted for 20 years. Unfortunately for Nombri, construction of this new complex did not start during the campaign period. Nombri said the hospital was "My campaign in a nutshell", and myths abounded, with one old luluai, Kuatinenem, saying patients in the new *haus sik* would be diagnosed and treated by computers, with no need for doctors. (Sadly, when it was finished, doctors were indeed in short supply.) 'Sir Nombri' was the first highlander *kia*p (patrol officer) and district commissioner, and had been a Public Service Commissioner. He was a member of the mid 1960s Bully Beef (political) Club and a founding chairman in 1967 of the Pangu Pati (Kiki 1968: 149, 158), unusually for a highlander in the 1960s, advocating rapid progress to Home Rule. He remained close to Sir Michael Somare, who in early 1992 clearly wished to recycle himself as Pangu leader. Officially, in 1992 Nombri was an independent candidate; his supporters proclaimed him to be a possible prime minister;
- **Peter Kamis** Miugle Koglkia, aged 34, an economist from Upper Chimbu, had also been provincial planner. Until recently Kamis

was director of the South Simbu Rural Development Project, a K5m AIDAB-International Bank for Agricultural Development funded four-year attempt to improve development in southern areas, with agricultural research and advice, vegetable marketing, new schools, roads, literacy training and women's programs. Although the project was regarded as only a mixed success, with its successful marketing side dependent largely on American Peace Corps workers, people were grateful to Kamis and he hoped to convert this into a huge block of votes in the southern area;

- **Yalwai Boniwan**, aged 45, had been a welfare worker in Simbu for over two decades and most recently Provincial Youth Officer. Born on Manus Island, but with a Simbu wife from near Peter Kuman's village, Boniwan was the first non-Simbu to stand for the regional seat after Independence;
- **Palma Embia**, aged 33, a coffee buyer from Kerowagi District, was expected to poll well with support from his fellow Seventh Day Adventist church people;
- **Fr Louis Ambane**, aged 49 from Goglime in the Upper Simbu Valley, was the second Simbu priest to stand, following the 1972 and 1987 candidacies of Sir Ignatius Kilage (later Governor-General). Fr Louis had served in several Simbu parishes, was a Chaplain to the police and was concerned about issues of political morality and corruption;
- **Aribill Gonapa**, aged 32, a senior *kiap* from Iabakogl area in Sinasina, had stood in 1987 and this time was endorsed by the People's Solidarity Party, and had very strong support from Nimai tribe and the large Koge Village;
- **Dr Errol Sipa**, from Gumine in south Simbu, was Provincial Medical Officer and reportedly was provoked into standing by a rash comment from Peter Kuman to the effect that Kundiawa was filled with Gumine people who had no right to live and work there;
- **John Numi** (Nime), aged 39, was a Port Moresby-based businessman from Yonggamugl who had held the Sinasina-Yonggamugl seat since 1982, but apparently chose to stand for the regional seat to maximise his chances of re-election;

- **Kerenga Andambo Rabisman**, a villager from Yonggamugl aged 40, was the most widely publicised candidate because his name means, literally, 'rubbish man', a Tokpisin expression for person with low status and low energy, with few possessions and usually no wife. His name made the newspapers and Rabisman was seen as a joker in Simbu with rumours that he dreamt the dwarves would vote for him, but for a time he campaigned publicly in Kundiawa, and it was widely alleged his nomination and fee were organised by a Kamanegu political family in order to block Nombri.

Some of the most important Open electorate contests and candidates were those in:

- Chuave with sitting member **Brown Sinamoi** (Minister for Telecommunications, businessman and former Speaker) challenged by Yauwe Riyong, about 43, a high school teacher from Lofaifo in Nambaiyufa, and twenty-two others including the first naturalised citizen to stand in Simbu, a former agriculturalist, Robin Benson, who walked the entire electorate but ultimately received only 274 votes;
- Kundiawa, with an unusual candidate in **Joseph Bare Onguglo**, 33, radical nationalist, Australian and UPNG educated. This Port Moresby-based businessman and founding leader of the Black Action Party (BAP, sometimes Blacks Action Party), comes from Bongugl in the Upper Chimbu, the only candidate in the densely populated Womatne area, and was challenging Open MP, Wagi Merimba, from even further up the Chimbu;
- Gumine where **John Mua Nilkare**, about 44, campaigned from his Omkolai birthplace, although he is now a Goroka-based successful businessman-cum-pig farmer-cum-political consultant. A former Chimbu regional MP and Minister for Provincial Affairs (1982-85), he challenged sitting member **Bill Ginbol Ninkama**, son of a former MP, Ninkama Bomai. A businessman-coffee planter, former agriculture teacher and minister (1985-88), Ninkama had a base vote from his mother's Kaukau village just next to Nilkare's Omkolai;
- Kerowagi, where the sitting member, **Jim Yer Waim**, a former school teacher, nationalist youth activist and Pangu Pati Minister for the Environment, was unable to move openly out of his Gena tribe's heartland because of a resurgence of decades-

long fighting with the Siku clan (Standish 1973) and was visibly quite demoralised by public hostility which followed his rough electioneering in 1987;

- Sinasina-Yonggamugl, always a fragmented electorate (Kuabaal 1976), where forty-eight candidates were standing, perhaps one reason the sitting member since 1982, John Numi, transferred to the regional contest. Among the strongest candidates would be a former provincial police commander, Ben Okoro, 42, from the large Dumun village, and Ludger Mond, 35, from Mai in Yonggamugl, a Catholic church worker who had been supported by Fr John Momis of Melanesian Alliance; and
- Karimu-Nomane, where two members of the Provincial Government, **Philip Biriwae Yomo** and **Seberai Domu** were standing against sitting MP Paul **Powa Sisioka**. All three came from the thinly populated southern sector of this divided electorate, which usually succeeded in providing the MP because their vote was concentrated, rather than split excessively.

Parties

The Simbu elections were not primarily contests between political parties. Five sitting Open members were listed as independents on the ballot papers, although some, like Ninkama, received help from one or two and were grateful not to have their opponents endorsed. In all, thirty eight candidates (or seventeen per cent) had party endorsement on the ballot, one per cent fewer than in 1987. By the time the results were printed the Electoral Commission reported 53 party candidacies, including many new names but with some earlier party nominees now independent or linked to different parties. Apart from possible latecomers and confusion among officials at either end, the cause may have been changed loyalties once the nomination period was over with the richer and better organised parties gaining new followers.

The three parties with local leaders were the most visible in Simbu. The Country Party appeared most active with twenty candidates in Open seats, thereby enabling Peter Kuman to have many local campaign meetings and show his photo as party leader on all ballot papers, with five extra endorsees by the time of the count. The League for National Advancement (LNA), nominally led by Karl Stack from West Sepik but with John Nilkare as Chairman, had seven nominees, some announced as late as early June. One,

Yauwe Riyong, had stood with LNA in 1987. Nilkare sought an alliance with Yalwai Boniwan, who was thought to be popular in the Gumine area, but there was never a close relationship with Boniwan, whose main campaign was against rich politicians, and he criticised those who campaigned by helicopter (which Nilkare had done in 1987). The Black Action Party, led by Onguglo, endorsed two others and campaigned strongly with rallies where it had effective local campaign organizers.

The major parties of the late 1970s had almost disappeared in Simbu, the National Party after Okuk's 1982 regional defeat and 1986 death, and Pangu after the splits in 1985 and 1986, when PDM then LNA separated. In 1992 Pangu suffered from the disadvantage of incumbency, which made it the target of all political aspirants. There was a perception, widespread among Simbu elite members, that Namaliu, with his consultative and consensual style, was indecisive as national leader. Pangu only claimed four adherents on the ballot papers, including Jimmy Yer, and was damaged by the rivalry between Namaliu and Somare, neither of whom was remembered as having visited during 1992. Simbu's most prominent Pangu supporter, Nombri, was not even officially endorsed on the ballot paper, yet was criticised for failing to campaign with or assist other Pangu candidates. PDM leader Wingti apparently did not campaign in Simbu—he had been asked to stay away in 1987—and only endorsed three candidates, although PDM claimed four including Premier Mai. Sir Julius Chan briefly visited the province before the campaign, without endorsing Mai and, with his Peoples Progress Party (PPP) never having had a strong team in Simbu, endorsed only one candidate. The National Party, Okuk's campaign vehicle which once dominated Simbu but split since 1987, only endorsed two. The Papuan-based People's Action Party had four endorsements, the Liberals eight, and the People's Solidarity Party and the Melanesian Alliance two each. Most parties appeared even more unfinancial and disorganised than in 1987, after a high point in 1982. With the minor exceptions of the LNA under Nilkare, the Country Party and the BAP, party campaigning was insignificant in Simbu and had ceased by June. Gone were the head-to-head National-Pangu party contests of 1977 and 1982.

Issues and Ideologies

The Simbu campaigns, in as much as they are about policy issues rather than prestige for the candidates and their groups, centred on

development issues, with the common claim that there had been stagnation with no development in the 17 years since Independence. In broad terms this is true, with several major businesses and mission stations closed, but trunk roads have been improved and three new high schools built. Locating the causes and a way out of this developmental paralysis was less obvious. The decline of government services was obvious, and the provincial government's 'free education policy' was blamed by both electors and candidates with whom I talked. Other causes such as the national fiscal crisis caused by the Bougainville revolt were not mentioned.

Campaigning was not meant to be easy, not even for an old hand like John Nilkare, coming back into politics after five years in business. On the policy level he was unable either at a large rally or in private conversation to clarify his party's Village Services scheme, although he emphasised it would bring older leaders back into prominence. He ran an expensive campaign, which climaxed with a huge party rally at Omkolai's former airstrip, at which he danced in traditional dress and distributed many cooked pigs, made speeches and organized a leaflet drop by aircraft. On Australian ABC Television he said this was a traditional event, and the recipients of his hospitality swore they would vote for him (ABC TV 1992). Nilkare told me he found campaigning for an Open seat, with the need to initiate and activate alliances and mobilize votes at the local clan level, with many feasts and exchanges, to be much harder than campaigning for the regional seat, which he had done three times previously. Nilkare was fortunate his funding came from his own sources, rather than public funding, and although he was criticised for alleged big spending he was not accused of misappropriating state funds, charges faced by all incumbent politicians.

Five ministers of the Namaliu government had faced Leadership Tribunal charges for misappropriation, which enabled Wingti and Opposition candidates generally to focus on 'bribery and corruption' (*Post-Courier*, 2 April 1992:33). Eight other MPs were charged. Namaliu proposed an Anti-Corruption Authority to weed out the problem (*The Times of Papua New Guinea*, 21 May 1992:32). 'Corruption' was the most commonly heard and most nationally relevant campaign issue in the Simbu campaigns, and 'Honesty' the common pledge. The usual explicit focus was on the wastage involved in the uncontrolled use of slush funds by MPs and provincial assemblymen, a perceived waste of resources which particularly

annoyed public servants and police—some of whom were provoked into standing by the EDF. These funds were not insignificant in Simbu, totalling millions of kina over a few years.

As an example, the Opposition frontbencher, Bill Ninkama of Gumine, agreed that in early 1992 he had K200,000 available, comprising EDF (K100,000), Local Government Commissioner's Tied Grants (paid via the province), Education and Health subsidies. His liberal use of funds was brought to the attention of officials during the campaign. His comment was: 'The sitting members have the resources for the election. That's the system. It's not my wrong. It's the system. They may change it. Politics is very different now from in the 1970s'. He told me by the end of the election he had K12,000 unspent. His support had been targeted to local leaders, if after watching them he judged them suitable. He said Nilkare, an absentee 'without a permanent materials house at Omkolai', had thrown K100,000 around and killed many pigs, whereas he had killed none. 'You have to be smart, the thing to do is to know the electorate and target where you'll get support' (Interview, 24 June 1992).

On ABC TV Ninkama smiled while saying he had many friends from 'dubious dealings'. He denied he gave money for votes, but said he helped people with 'buying people's wives, having friends, having a few drinks, typical of Melanesians anyway.' He was running on an anti-corruption platform, but when asked about his own activities, said: 'But that is to the smaller side. I'm talking about white collar corruption that is more destructive, more unpleasant' (ABC TV 1992). This public acceptance of money as part of the political game in PNG annoyed other Simbu political figures who saw the interview and were concerned that Australia would cut aid to PNG as a result of such frankness. At the same time, most MPs argued that—given the implementation capacity in government—the EDF was the only way to get development to the people, and clearly many candidates were intending to gain control of such funds themselves. It was not until 1995 that Sir Mekere Morauta, a former Finance Secretary, pointed out that MPs are not project managers.

Yet while the corruption issue damaged sitting MPs it did not differentiate non-MPs candidates from each other. Something similar had occurred with the 'Grassroots' slogan of the 1987 election, the appeal to the little people against the prosperous and powerful. These are useful slogans for candidates without the funds for a splashy campaign, but they do not help political aspirants to

prove they can deliver the goods in the form of the desired projects, cash or jobs, if or when they achieve office.

The most controversial interpretation of Papua New Guinea's underdevelopment was voiced by Onguglo, BAP leader, who demanded 'economic independence' (*Post-Courier*, 6 September 1991:44-45) and in Simbu reportedly blamed foreigners for the lack of employment. I did not meet Onguglo during the campaign. His election poster was written in Kuman, the electorate's sole language, using symbolism. It said he was a true leader for the men's house, and would divide the resources (scale the pig) for every men's house. It was translated to me as saying that foreign business is taking the wealth ('gris') from the country. The poster spoke about changing from strong sweet potato as food, but argued against addiction to expensive and highly taxed imported rice and tinned fish. It pledged a modern lifestyle (We will not have wooden houses and sleep with the fleas) and tin roofs [which would collect clean water], and roads so women never had to carry bilums. Under Onguglo the government would provide cash for people's pockets to help them with businesses to be run by local people. Onguglo reportedly argued also for education for all to Year 12, and for a good hospital. His policies implied a dramatic transformation of society and rewriting of the constitution, which was taken by educated Simbu as implying revolutionary change.

Some Onguglo rallies were turbulent events and Peoples Action Party leader Akoka Doi was chased away from one near Minggende Catholic mission complex. Aspects of the BAP campaign and this reaction were reminiscent of the Okuk campaign in 1972. Like Jimmy Yer in 1987, Onguglo argued as a central plank that expatriates—without distinguishing between their role or expertise—should be expelled, and like Yer at that time some of his supporters advocated 'revolution', without explaining this term, which is now used often by some radical Simbu activists.⁵ Although there was considerable resentment in Simbu at the influx of Taiwanese and Korean businessmen into Kundiawa, some of whom allegedly had paid kickbacks to provincial leaders over contracts and were funding some electioneering, there was still a perceived need for expatriate

⁵ James Yer Waim in the 1987 Kerowagi campaign advocated the deportation of some expatriates and for the first time brought the word 'revolution' into Simbu political debate. (In his *Post-Courier* advertisement, Onguglo was more cautious, saying 'check and revoke naturalised citizens'.)

expertise in government and mission services. Onguglo was virtually the only candidate in Kundiawa Open to campaign outside his home area. Villagers said that Onguglo's policies and promises appealed to disaffected youth. His perceived anti-expatriate attitudes caused anger among some middle-aged people in the Mindima area, which led to verbal brawling, and ultimately very few votes.

Interestingly, a strong supporter of the BAP near Minggende gave what was essentially a dependency analysis of PNG's political economy, saying that foreign business dominated all PNG governments. He argued that all mines and all land should be state-owned, and factories should be established to create employment. A revolution was needed, and if the security forces resisted, he said, they would be defeated by popular uprising, as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army had demonstrated. Onguglo himself was popular for helping highlanders in Morata settlement, Port Moresby, where he had run a store, and—apart from his focus on expatriates—his overall analysis was endorsed by the Melanesian Solidarity Movement (Melsol) spokesman Powes Parkop (Personal communication, September 1992).

Campaigning

After the nomination frenzy in 1992, there were no major campaign rallies in Kundiawa, although most district centres had market places where there was some public campaigning by locals who felt on safe territory. The regional candidates lodged their nominations in Kundiawa township, which has always had a neutral status as a government town. As in Mendi in the Southern Highlands, boasting crowds accompanied candidates on these occasions, leading to minor disturbances. In the 1970s, candidates could campaign fairly freely in the town, despite some near riots in 1977 (Standish 1983). In the 1980s campaigning in town was less frequent, and loudhailers were frowned upon by public servants and magistrates. It also annoyed members of the Kamanegu tribe after they asserted traditional claims to ownership of the town land in 1986 by burying Sir Iambakey Okuk in the town centre.

At the end of May 1992 Aribill Gonapa from Sinasina campaigned in Kundiawa, pledging social security payments, whereupon Sir Joseph Nombri, a Kamanegu, mocked this as unrealistic and unfundable. Premier Mai then used the loudspeaker on Aribill's car to support him, and on some reports was winning the argument when angry Kamanegu youth stoned Aribill's windscreen.

Over the next hour a riot broke out which led to the stoning of the South Pacific Bank, among other buildings. One observer claimed the police deliberately let the situation get out of control for an hour, in order to have a case to increase police powers. The following week the entire province was declared a Tribal Fighting Zone till late August, a step long under consideration (*Post-Courier*, 10 June 1992:12). The first measure taken was to forbid any campaigning within the town boundaries. Apart from one candidate, a *kiap* who persisted with campaigning near the town's western boundary, Kundiawa became almost a campaign-free zone and the election moved out into the villages and districts, where it remained.

In Simbu society the clans of around a thousand people and tribes up to five thousand are large enough in themselves to influence the outcome of elections. These groups have been competitive rivals and enemies for centuries. Although elections are contests between individuals in wide new arenas set up by the state, all Simbu candidates are members of clans and tribes which as corporate groups themselves bring their existing identities and oppositions into the new electoral arenas set up by the state. In the first instance candidates must try to ensure as a base vote the support of their clan, and preferably tribe, but because the other candidates have similar clan bases they must then try to gain additional votes outside this traditional base. Having made this investment, candidates and their supporters resent outsider candidates entering 'their' territory.

Nowadays outsiders are often chased away, with force, if necessary. Usually a quick stone through a car windscreen is an effective deterrent, and this happened to Okuk in 1977 and to Bill Ninkama early in the 1992 campaign. Nombri was pelted with mud when attempting to campaign at Kerowagi market on 11 May, and when his convoy of vehicles left stones were thrown at Nombri's car, injuring him. A fortnight later, soon after the Kundiawa riot, Nombri's vehicle was stoned again when parked at Koge village in Sinasina, an Aribill stronghold. The following week some police and soldiers came to extract payment of compensation for Nombri, and burnt seven houses at Koge and killed and took a number of pigs and cassowaries. The police commander justified his men's action, saying that to ensure a free election candidates had a right to speak anywhere, whereas Koge villagers standing in the ashes of their houses complained about the violation of their basic human rights. Thereafter most campaigning was very quiet, concentrating almost

solely on villages and men's houses at night, or safe, set-piece rallies organised by local supporters within their home territories. It became doubtful whether effective democratic competition for votes was any longer possible.

Yet voters have some discretion, too, and are able to bargain. Candidates reliably reported demands for payments of around K1000 in order to get a hearing. Some wealthier candidates, including MPs, gave out many 'Michael Somares' (K50 notes) in the campaign. There appears to be a distinction made between brazen campaign generosity, which can be acceptable, and covert payments made to gain influence, which are seen as shady. Often these latter payments were made at night, as candidates sought to win support outside their base area. An LNA organiser, the late Leo Kuabaal, was angry that preparations for a funeral at Emai were interrupted at night by outsiders seeking to dish out K800 to get votes, and said he chased them away. Some potential candidates sought money from sitting MPs as a payment not to stand and split the vote, and allegations had been made as early as 1982 that rich candidates offered large sums to divide their rivals home bases. Once again in 1992, brokers sought to trade blocks of votes for sums of money or valued food items. In 1987 I had seen handwritten notes offering blocks of votes in exchange for rice and tinned fish, and in 1992 Bill Ninkama claimed he had a folder of such notes 'as thick as a Concise Oxford Dictionary'. The validity of such deals must always be suspect, especially if a group has its own candidates. Just as in 1982 with Okuk's famous 96,000 bottle beer party at Kundiawa airstrip, candidates like the *kiaf* Otto Olmi in Gumine said his Dirima village supporters would accept their share of rival candidate John Nilkare's 250 pigs at Omkolai airstrip, but he was confident that he would still get their votes.

In March 1992 as in 1987, candidates gave parties (with 100 cartons of beer worth K2,600 the normal campaign starter) for their own clans to ensure their support. From April there was a ban on liquor sales in Simbu, which quietened the campaign and no doubt saved money for most candidates, while it helped those individuals running black markets and those richer candidates prepared to pay double (K50) a carton for beer. Even the smallest campaign these days costs about K20,000, with candidates paying for pigs, and supplying store food. Wholesale stores thrived during the run-up to the poll with sales of rice and tinned fish and freezer meat. Bill Ninkama, for instance, bought 29 cartons of frozen beef brisket worth

K1,400 just days before the election. He told me he did not give out money, but rather food.

A businessman and Open campaign manager told me that giving out cash was not a binding means of campaigning, whereas food was most effective but had to be given out the day before polling so people were still satisfied. Yet I am not fully convinced that in Simbu votes are actually bought, or in Andrew Strathern's word 'commoditized', although there are strong reports of candidates attempting that for Mount Hagen society (*Post-Courier*, 30 December 1994:2; Ketan 1995). The time when money is most effective, I would argue, is in bribing an individual not to stand (which was done quite cheaply, with beer, as early as 1972 in Chuave) or in funding splitters and spoilers. But to obtain a mass vote, money is never enough, and there is never enough money. In 1987 a Simbu MP allegedly cashed an EDF cheque for K35,000 into K5 notes, which he gave out just before the poll—and lost, with each vote costing K20 plus foodstuffs and beer. Okuk spent about K250,000 plus on his Simbu campaign in 1982, and discovered a gift to one group always antagonizes others.

It is my understanding that outside the clan, 'vote buying' in Simbu is still regarded as somewhat improper and is attempted secretly, or else through agents—who may not actually disperse the funds but keep them. While money is needed even to consolidate the base vote for a member of his clan or tribe, without insuring total support, there is no guarantee money will work outside a candidate's home area. Candidates clearly need to spend money, even to gain an audience, but that does not guarantee them votes. Campaigning is, as they say, a gamble. The best funded people are likely to be recent returnees who have made their fortunes elsewhere in the country, yet they may not have the local knowledge or contacts to link up with the most effective campaign assistants. In campaigning beyond the home base, policies and personality and a well-known personal record of service can count, as was demonstrated by Onguglo in Kundiawa and some regional candidates. In the regional contest, a demonstrated ability with government funded pork-barrel can be very effective, if not essential, but (except in Kuman's crude use of roads funds in the 1987 campaign) this is not just a matter of spreading cash around.

Four provincial members stood, two against each other for the regional seat and Karimui-Nomane, and two were ultimately successful. They had evidently retained the support used to win

their Provincial Assembly seats, and were not at all disadvantaged by the patronage and discretionary funds available in their provincial posts. Other provincial linkages were shown in the way campaign assistants to MPs are frequently men who have aspirations for future provincial candidacy, and use the campaigns (and their chance to distribute other people's largesse) as a means to develop political credit which hopefully could be called upon in later elections such as the planned 1993 provincial assembly poll.

Pork-barrel and patronage were the main forms of actually demonstrating political capacity. The leading regional candidate, David Mai, freely agreed with me that his campaign was based on the 'free education' policy, later adopted by Wingti's PDM, but already implemented by Mai's government. At Karawiri in his home area, Mai had built a new high school from provincial resources, for which national government funding was now being sought. Although he visited most areas of the province Mai is not an orator; apart from possible links with provincial assemblymen he had no obvious political machine and his campaign was clearly based on his skills in pork-barrelling. Some instructions to issue funds—including a K1000 *ex-gratia* payment to the relatives of the late Asuwe Kawage, a former MPA and Siambugla clan leader—clearly annoyed public servants, as had occurred in 1987. In 1992 some district officials refused to distribute government funds, so this was done by the Premier's own staff.

Mai's principal rival seemed to be the former welfare and youth worker, Yalwai Boniwan, who had walked about the province for months, sometimes barefooted, with a friendly low-key approach particularly appealing to women, I was told. He criticised established politicians for their helicopters, wealth and waste, and spoke of the need for development for youth, a reminder that he had distributed funds—reputedly hundreds of thousands of kina over the years—to help local youth groups, and that he would be their *kago boi* (servant) and, unlike other politicians, would return once elected. It was not surprising, then, that when Premier Mai heard of Yalwai's campaign he reportedly diverted K50,000 of provincial funds late in the campaign and sent out K50,000 of cheques to youth groups—some to people who had not even lodged a proposal.

Another strong rival was Kuman, who campaigned as an archetypal, macho Highlands man. At ridgetop rally at Onguma in Yonggamugl he claimed to dominate another Simbu MP, 'a little

baby'. After July 4, when in power, other leaders would see his tomahawk, he said.

While I was national Minister for Works I created a record, I broke the law and brought K3.2 million⁶ into Simbu, and the Simbu people consumed it. Yes! The people of Simbu and I were very happy. And I will do it again, this time!⁷

The crowd whooped with delight. Having blamed Pangu for uniting the country with a culture of thievery (*stil pasin*), Kuman pledged to send the thieves and corruptors in all levels of government to court. Much of his abuse of Namaliu, Wingti and his rivals Mai and Bola was unprintable. As might be expected of a Country Party leader, he promised when in government to improve rural roads and bridges and bring services back under the national government, to sack the Simbu Provincial Government, remove duties on agricultural imports, and to lower prices for electricity to help local business create jobs and to help public servants. He blamed the '*fakin Pangu Pati*' for only subsidizing coastal crops like copra and cocoa and promised a K2 per kilo subsidy for coffee, across the board, regardless of price, to be funded by gold and oil revenues, including the Lihir project [still years away] and Bougainville [still closed]. A woman in the crowd of 200 gently commented 'Ohooo! What a *good* government!' Despite the verbal aggression, it was a fun occasion for the audience (field notes and tape, 8 June 1992).

In 1992 the main form of discretionary funds available to MPs were the EDF. These funds became something of a liability for MPs. It is impossible to satisfy an electorate with this kind of funding, although Nilkare as regional MP for 1982-87 did well by organising the purchase of ambulances which carried his name as donor. Wagi Merimba, Kundiawa MP, had passed all his EDF funds on to the provincial authorities to spend, which gained him little credit, and he was blamed in southern parts of his electorate for having done

⁶ The amount spent in Simbu was estimated by officials at the time as about K0.65m., with about half of that amount transferred to Open MPs. Hastings (1987) said \$A0.423m (K0.3m) went to Kuman himself.

⁷ In Tokpisin: '*Taim ni stap olosem Minista bilong Woks insaid long Papua New Guinea mi karim, mi brukim recod, mi brukim lo, karim 3.2 million kina ikam insaid long Simbu. Pipol bilong Simbu ol i kaikai. Yes! Pipol bilong Simbu na mi i hamamas. Nau bai mi wokim gen!*' (Tape).

nothing. The province, in fact, lacked the planning and administrative capacity to use such funds on complex new projects, but needed the funds for maintenance. Other MPs were accused of only helping their own group or family with these funds, and I heard no MP take credit for any specific project. Chuave MP Brown Sinamoi was Minister for Telecommunications, and as such had a discretionary role to play in the allocation of multi million kina upgrade contracts to Asian bidders, but he had no funds to attempt the kind of discretionary role initiated by Kuman in the lead-up to the 1987 poll. Sinamoi ran a solitary campaign as an independent (with a campaign vehicle proclaiming that he, too, would be PM). After an unfortunate campaign vehicle accident which killed one man and seriously injured another he was under acute pressure for K40,000 compensation in the days before the poll. (He told me he settled for K10,000 and numerous pigs.)

Two campaign techniques were new to me in 1992. The first was the use of a small printed business card with the candidate's photograph, handed over quite ceremonially, which in some remoter areas was held by voters as a kind of talisman, a pledge of commitment which seemed to oblige the holder by some magic power to vote for the person pictured. The second was a more directly physical form of campaigning. A week before the poll, while driving southeast from Kerowagi township, I was forced to the side of the road by well over a thousand running youths and adults, brandishing sticks, booming out the deep Simbu chant 'Uwooooo!' as they surged a kilometre to the edge of their Siku clan territory at Kerowagi road junction. They had come from a rally in support of Open candidate John Kamb at Siure village, opposite Goglme Catholic church, yet showed no sign of his Peoples Action Party endorsement. It was merely a blunt display of numbers which scared my passengers—one fled—and Kamb's people announced by sheer mass of flesh that he would receive a large vote.

Intimidation from all sides

Simbu political players themselves emphasize the hyperactivity and tension of their frenetic campaigns. After several elections, candidates have told me with hindsight that they were surprised at what they had done in the heat of the moment, craziness brought on by power hunger: '*Mipela hangri na longlong long paua*' Having invested a fortune to ensure (or try to buy) the loyalty of their own people, at least some 1992 candidates were prepared to seek to

enforce the solidarity of their vote—keeping the voters honest, as it were. This is what leads to threats to voters before the poll and intimidation of voters at polling places. Candidates and their close supporters are literally saying ‘If you don’t vote for me—especially after accepting my hospitality—I’ll take revenge.’ Scrutineers watch to make sure voters vote ‘the right way’. Their reports can and do lead to recriminations after polling if individuals or groups are believed to have broken the obligation to deliver their votes which they acquired in accepting the candidate’s hospitality. Electoral *kiaps* officially reported details to the police of threats in the case of one candidate in Sinasina who was believed to be armed, and such statements were reported in some detail in Brown Sinamoi’s Court of Disputed Returns statement appealing Yauwe Riyong’s victory in Chuave Open.⁸ I know of several such threats in two parts of Kundiawa Open, and heard of others. Claims of such intimidation have been made but not tested for Simbu, for example by Okuk in 1982. Election results have been nullified by Courts of Disputed Returns in the past, because such intimidation clearly involves undue influence. In the case brought by Sinamoi only one case of intimidation was tested in the court, found valid, and Riyong’s election was eventually declared void. Justice Tracy Doherty concluded that a court

should not lightly overturn the decision and wishes of an electorate but our Laws are intended to maintain a free and unfettered right to cast a vote as the individual wants without having to look over his shoulder for fear of offending anyone and that is the right the Court protects.⁹

The intensity of political conflict is one of several dimensions of the growing violence in the unstable Highlands region. As well as explicitly mobilizing in the electoral arena alliances originally made in clan warfare, the parochial nature of political conflict in 1992 was increased as candidates were often deterred or prevented

⁸ Shepherds Lawyers, Port Moresby, petition to National Court of Justice, MP 174/92 Brown Sinamoi v. Yauwe Riyong and Electoral Commission (Chuave Open Electorate)

⁹ National Court of Justice, MP 174 of 1992, Brown Sinamoi v. Yauwe Riyong and Electoral Commission, dated 31 March 1994, p21. (Riyong defeated Sinamoi in the consequent by-election.)

from campaigning outside their home base area. In 1990 the first high-powered automatic weapons had been used in clan warfare to complement the home-made and factory-made shotguns by then commonly used in clan warfare. In May 1992 there were reports of battles under way in Gumine district and at the government station at Gembogl, almost the only flat land in the Upper Chimbu valley. That month rifle shots were heard near Pari village in Kamanegu, the base of two candidates. A storekeeper was shot at Kerowagi during an armed robbery. What most alarmed officials was the potential combination of campaign passions and traditional conflicts and the availability of deadly weapons, in particular in the post-election period when recriminations were most likely to erupt, and competition become conflict. Partly to discourage others, before the poll three Simbu candidates were charged with election related violence, in cases of alleged threatening behaviour and assault, and one sitting MP was questioned about the movement of two military rifles and another charged with having two unlicensed pistols (*Post-Courier*, 22 June 1992:1). Other incidents did not reach the courts, or press.

It has been noted in Mount Hagen society that the boundaries distinguishing election and clan conflict feed into each other (Strathern 1993). In Simbu, clans and tribes will give support to some of their neighbours in their battles, knowing they will be compensated for any losses, in the explicit expectation of reciprocal backup in their own disputes with third parties. I heard a prominent candidate state to a small crowd in his neighbouring tribe the evening before polling 'Remember our alliance. We have fought alongside each other. We have the guns and in the fighting we killed many'. There was real tension in the air, relieved by a loud shout, because as well as being a superficially joking reminder of the support given in warfare this was taken as a real threat, later allegedly spelt out but not carried out, to use deadly weapons against recent allies in war who he saw as now being disloyal in voting against him.

Fears of violence during the 1992 election were not baseless. Several voters had been assaulted by 'witnesses' in 1982, and in the worst case in 1987 the fracturing of one woman's skull in the polling booth requiring her hospitalisation. Furthermore there had been cases in 1987 of houses burnt at Kup because the owners voted against

the local candidate.¹⁰ Clan warfare has arisen in the supercharged atmosphere of campaigns since 1977, and have become a regular aftermath of elections in Simbu. As alliances based in warfare are mobilised in hyperactive campaigning, it is a relatively small step for campaigning to slide into fighting. I have mentioned reliable reports in 1992 of candidates intimidating voters with firearms. Some of these were brought to police attention by officials and villagers. Well before the poll Foreign Minister Somare had mentioned police reports of high-powered weapons imports and police fears that such weapons might be used to intimidate voters (*Post-Courier*, 10 February 1992:5).¹¹

Even without an election, Simbu people are often regarded as volatile. People from all over the province visit Kundiawa regularly, especially on fortnightly pay days when the population of 5000 usually trebles with about 10,000 rural visitors seeking cash, food and excitement. In 1992 any minor incident such as the arrest of a shoplifter could escalate into a disturbance beyond the crowd control capacity of the small and poorly equipped police detachment, and minor urban riots on several pay Fridays increased tension in Simbu before the poll. The Kundiawa police were said to have only two shotguns; the Provincial Police Commander (PPC), Robert Kalasim, was aware of police guns being 'given to wantoks' and stolen. As a practical sign of co-operation and goodwill the provincial government purchased for K7000 twenty-four pump-action shotguns, ammunition and four pistols (*Post-Courier*, 10 June 1992:2) which the Premier presented to Kalasim at a public ceremony. 'We are', said the grateful PPC, 'in a desperate situation with regard to security'.

In January, months before the National Election (NATEL) 92 exercise plans were announced, Simbu officials and police requested military help because police resources would be stretched too thin even for a security presence confined to mobile teams. They realised

¹⁰ At nearby Minj in the Western Highlands, houses were burnt and women raped in 1982 for voting against their husband's group (Reay 1987; personal communication, July 1994) and there are similar reports (Strathern 1993:51) from Mount Hagen after the 1990 provincial assembly election.

¹¹ Police concerns about a guns-for-drugs trading commenced around 1987; whether marijuana was being traded on a large scale I do not know, but certainly its usage was widespread in Simbu by 1992.

that for the nation's international image it would be better if there was no military callout at all. They sought troops not because they expected a revolution, they said, or because they wanted to suggest Simbu was a wild and dangerous place, but because of their desire for an efficient one day poll. They noted the need for caution in a province where the respect for law enforcement authority had eroded over the last few years and police parties had come under armed attack in the past twelve months. (An example of this was the incident in early June when a *kiap* who was an election official was assaulted and wounded on the Gumine road. He was removing a roadblock which had been set up to extract payment for road works, a not uncommon ploy in Simbu.)

The regular Simbu police force of 144 was reinforced a fortnight before the 22 June vote by about the same number of extra police and a platoon of Defence Force (PNGDF) infantry in the combined NATEL exercise, discussed in Sinclair Dinnen's chapter in this book. The national plan and agreement with the provincial government was that the soldiers would be kept in reserve, separate from the regular police. In practice, men from both forces soon formed combined units, and after a few days in the bush started wearing bits of each other's uniforms, with police wearing green army face paint and—according to provincial officials, who were scandalized—procuring women for the soldiers. The police seemed keen to show the soldiers how tough they were, and an off duty policeman commonly swaggered through the town in motley uniform holding a shotgun on his hip, a woman on his other arm.

In Simbu the combined security force appeared at a loss to know how to prevent violence or its escalation. As mentioned above, the whole province was declared a Tribal Fighting Zone and a liquor ban declared. The Highlands provinces were unable to reach unanimity on this ban, which in Simbu was broken by some of the rich and powerful—including some candidates, a few police and a hard boiled *kiap*. The PPC gave a number of election 'awareness' talks at gatherings and election rallies around the province. At Nilkare's Omkolai rally the PPC's loudspeaker barked out that people who created disturbances would have their pigs shot and taken and houses burnt, without compensation, and the stirrers would be caught, 'dead or alive. DEAD OR ALIVE!' He subsequently told me that the police needed the 'respect' of the Simbu, and the way to get it was to be tough, and he described as necessary deterrents the extra-judicial punishments he called 'destructions'. Following what

had become the standard procedure for an 'operation', in the run-up to the poli the security forces shot, killed and took many valuable pigs, goats and cassowaries, intimidation intended to deter troublemakers. To my knowledge they burnt around 100 houses both before and after the poll in a temporarily successful effort to deter inter- and intra-group fighting. Villagers regarded the police tactics as excessive: *'ol i overim'*.

The security operation was seen as necessary, but created constant headaches for electoral officials. It was to be funded by the Electoral Commission, through the provincial accounting system. An initially high budget estimate for a five day polling operation was cut back on the suggestion of officials, but twice before and after the poll the PPC threatened to withdraw all staff from election security work immediately unless he was paid additional sums of some hundreds of thousand Kina, pressure the Provincial Secretary described to me as 'blackmail' and grounds for official complaint. Nonetheless, creative accounting was used and after negotiations with a commercial bank provincial officials pulled money from district accounts to fund the police, in the hope of receiving a refund from the Electoral Commission at a later date. Providing security on the scale needed for the campaign period, the poll and the count, and the period of adjustment after results are known, is expensive. Police sources say their budgeting arrangements and logistics capabilities are very weak. Policemen are virtually expected to eat off the land, without proper catering and accommodation not only when in the field but in provincial bases. Once again, electoral administration was hampered by systemic problems of state administration.

The one day poll

Simbu was one of four Highlands provinces which opted for a one day poll in 1992. The plan was for polling teams (originally 311 were planned) to collect votes on Tuesday 22 June at 250 polling places, replacing the usual 50 mobile teams each moving around several locations over a two week period. This plan necessitated the training of about a thousand casual electoral officials, many non-public servants, who camped out in unfamiliar places with new people for four days before returning to Kundiawa for the count. It also meant it would not be possible to have the usual four policemen per polling place, and indeed no police at most booths, but rather about twenty mobile security teams. The security operation required

very tight co-ordination, with any delay likely to cause problems in a domino effect. The thousands of extra police announced as part of NATEL in the Highlands in reality were about 500. The additional police were intended to move from province to province, with a three day relocation period between securing the polls in each province. The extra police already located in Simbu went west to Enga Province where the poll was delayed by the late printing and distribution of ballot papers.

On Thursday 17 June the Simbu polling teams were preparing to move out to their polling stations and the Simbu public was at a pitch of excitement, when Simbu officials heard that late receipt of ballot papers in Enga had delayed voting, but with one third of the population Seventh Day Adventist a Saturday poll was impossible. Enga deferred its voting till the Monday, and kept almost all the extra police. After considering their options, Simbu officials made an explicit gamble, to hold their poll without the planned extra mobile security teams—and indeed with no police at most polling booths—but also without announcing the changed security arrangements. Although most teams lacked vehicles or radios to call for help, it was hoped that in case of major disturbances they could signal for help to officials overhead in a helicopter, who could call in one of the five mobile truckloads of police and soldiers.

The gamble worked. Voting was mostly very orderly, with people keeping their own places calm. Witnesses were kept cordoned off, away from voters, a sensible innovation. The one disturbance, which I witnessed, took place at Ywagle, near Mindima village. A poll clerk assisting an elderly woman allegedly marked a ballot paper outside the little box in her chosen candidate's square. Tables were turned, papers sent flying and clerks roughed up as underlying tension erupted. Extra police who happened to be passing on the highway were soon called to the scene, along with a squad of soldiers; they showed their weapons but exercised restraint as the complainants refused to be mollified. The incident occurred partly because of a misleading briefing by an election official, and, although carelessly marked, the paper was still a valid vote for the intended candidate. After an hour the Returning Officer arrived, broke the tension with his explanation and a joke, the woman voted again and polling resumed. Overall, Simbu was quieter than Western Highlands and Enga, for which senior police and an army officer took credit ('We hit them hard, early')—yet clearly the

credit lay with the Simbu public, determined to record their vote for their preferred candidate in their own place.

Double-voting was allegedly very common, with the finger nail dye easily removed with bleach or a lime. It was widely believed that at Siure, near Kerowagi, John Kamb's supporters had coerced officials into signing hundreds of ballot papers, thus allowing multiple voting on such a scale that his relatively small group of people gave him a winning margin of over 900. (I provide statistics below which tend to disprove this allegation.)

The last stage of polling day was to truck the ballot boxes through the night to shipping containers in the Kundiawa police compound. In January it was initially anticipated by Simbu officials that this would be a time of acute danger requiring numerous military patrols to secure the roads. Ultimately only two trucks were hired for the soldiers. The fears were not groundless. A few boxes had been stolen in previous Simbu provincial elections. (In 1992 ballot boxes *were* stolen in the Western Highlands, and a NATEL commander was reported as saying this was a matter of electoral administration, not a security issue.) In Simbu some tired and rather limp police arrived in town draped over the boxes, rather like coffee buyers guarding bags of coffee, but mostly it was *kiaps* who rode shotgun as if on a stagecoach carrying the gold. Escort vehicles were provided free by candidates themselves, determined to ensure that their expensive base vote reached the vote bank unscathed.

The major difficulties of the one day poll arose from problems with ballot papers arriving late from Port Moresby. The logistics were nightmarish. Papers for one seat had to be reprinted in the last few days to correct names and photographs, and most of the papers arrived only a day before the poll. The bundles varied enormously and had to be checked and recounted overnight into standard lots of 500 before dispatch, often by helicopter, mostly on the day of voting. The last papers arrived so late that one polling booth only received theirs at 3pm on polling day, but people waited patiently till midnight to complete the poll. Such delays have occurred with all elections in Simbu, but a one day poll does not allow for administrative glitches. At 6 pm at the two booths at the large village of Dumun in Sinasina there were hundreds of people waiting to vote (some allegedly for the second or later time!) and a decision was taken to extend the poll by a day. Dumun was the base of two candidates, including the tough police officer, Ben Okoro, and in my observation the crowd was volatile on both days. The decision to

extend polling was later challenged in a Disputed Returns petition by the second candidate (see below), along with the use of part of an old roll by the Returning Officer because a large section of names had been omitted inadvertently in Port Moresby. Such problems could perhaps have been reduced if Simbu officials had more time and resources in the preceding months, but they sheeted the blame onto the Electoral Commission.

The ten day count

Four days later, after an unreal hiatus, the count started on the Saturday evening at three locations in Kundiawa town. It continued all night. Each candidate was entitled to one scrutineer in each tally room, so as well as dozens of poll clerks there were up to 70 scrutineers plus police in the tally rooms. On several occasions the crowds had to be thinned out to enable a smooth count, and I saw a policeman ram a shotgun into the buttocks of one man hurrying from the room. A hundred people watched in shocked silence. Tensions were high and the process slow because it took a long time for routines to become established, and for some Open seats they were never established. Scrutineers obviously wanted to hasten the process and rarely had a chance to play a constructive role and challenge dubious votes. Some appeared not to understand the processes under way, but the most attentive were able to watch the flow of votes by box, before the totals were tallied and double checked and then posted on large blackboards for the crowd outside. Usually the process was transparent, and knowing where the boxes came from explained each candidate's changing tally. Yet at times, when several boxes were posted at once, apparently sudden large jumps in candidates' totals lacked explanation and aroused suspicion. So too did delays caused when some returning officers decided to freeze counts and backtrack to try to identify errors as they crept into their counts. Apparently frustrated after five nights of waiting with his supporters, the policeman, Okoro, slipped past two sets of security, found one of the boxes from his own area, tipped the contents out, saying 'Count that!' and stormed off, unhindered. When it was clear that he had won, at four in the morning, some of his friends in the police force left the counting room, which had been locked up with all personnel inside in an attempt to prevent rumours and trouble, and shot flares into the sky, thereby signalling news of his success to Okoro, ten kilometres away.

Despite an early decision after the first night to keep the count to daytime, after pressure from the Electoral Commission for quick results most returning officers decided to keep up night time counting in the belief that this would assist crowd control and security. Most staff were camped with *wantoks* around the town and tried to sleep during the days. After two days and nights work they moved slowly, the work slowed down, and mistakes proliferated. Some teams tried to count night and day, and with one exception most ROs felt unable to delegate and set up different shifts headed by their assistants. The ROs personally checked each box tally, a slow process, and some double-checked figures during the day while keeping an eye on routine government administration.

With 110 to 176 boxes per electorate, the whole process became too much for some of the electorate teams, and indeed for the *ad hoc* group in the provincial tally room. Volunteers tried hard, but paper and data management skills were in short supply. Computers and adding machines were scarce, as were skilled people with easy familiarity with mind-numbing numbers. The Sinasina and Kerowagi teams, for instance, each had to make over 10700 separate additions in the vertical columns on the tally sheets, and then repeat them on the horizontal lines as a cross check. Not surprisingly, mistakes crept in; the problem was that without constant cross-checking they remained unnoticed—despite the scrutineers—for hours and sometimes days, and then on occasion the count was halted for hours or days trying to pinpoint mistakes. I pointed out errors in Sinasina additions, one involving 2000 votes, and it took the Kerowagi RO almost another week after the result was announced to double check his figures and make adjustments of hundreds and even thousands to the already announced figures. In the regional there were sixteen changes (eight in excess of 100 votes, three over 1000) to the announced totals before these were rushed to Lae by armed *kiaps* to be flown to Moresby, where one apparent typographical error of 1000 appears to have occurred at the Electoral Commission itself.

Fortunately, none of these latter mistakes would have affected the results. Errors are an inevitable by product of human nature; we are not machines. Mistakes in addition are not a recent phenomenon in Simbu; they occurred in the 1982 election, and took a long time to rectify in 1987 as well. The simple mistake in addition which I pointed out in Sinasina before the figures were released may well have been picked up by an official, but probably would not have been

noticed by any scrutineers in the room because they were not being given box-by-box progressive totals. If it had not been noticed it would have affected the outcome. I dwell on the difficulties because they show that willing officers were stretched beyond the limit of human efficiency.

These people worked heroically under great pressure, but the Provincial Returning Officer later said that night-time counting had been a mistake. Centralising the count had lowered security stresses in 1992 compared to 1987, when a planned attempt to burn Kerowagi tally room was aborted, and there were near-riots from intimidatory crowds at Gumine and Chuave. And in 1992, fortunately, pressure from Port Moresby was less than in 1987 when the previous Electoral Commissioner angrily demanded results within hours at a time when days and nights of work remained, and threatened to sack volunteer officers who had volunteered primarily out of a sense of civic duty. But Simbu generated real tensions, nonetheless, and they can only become greater as heightened electoral competition increases the complexity and volume of work in future elections.

Staff and casual election workers in Simbu have since 1977 expressed unwillingness to work on elections when their lives can be threatened (Standish 1983). In July 1992 over K0.5m was owed to Simbu, causing resentment of the Electoral Commission, which was clearly experiencing a shortage of funds from the national government. It took the better part of a year for all the electoral staff allowances to be paid by Port Moresby, despite one of the returning officers staying there to extract funds from the Electoral Commission. Meanwhile ROs were harassed and threatened by their erstwhile workers, and Kerowagi District Office was paralyzed for months by a blockade of angry young people demanding their entitlements.

Results

The Open campaigns had mostly been based on particularism and localism so it was no surprise that the solidarity of clan votes was even tighter than in previous elections. Despite the potential for fragmentation with so many candidates, box totals were small, and the valid votes in most boxes went almost entirely to one candidate, especially for Open seats. Indeed it was possible where there were several boxes at one polling place for the first box to go to one candidate, the rest to others, as different clans started voting. This is a continuation of corporate decision-making and clan solidarity

noted since 1972. Time and space preclude me giving a more detailed analysis in this report, although the contrast with Angoram described by May (this volume) is stark.

What was unusual in 1992 was the failure of any sitting member to gain re-election. Despite their funds and patronage, they all received votes much lower than in 1987. In Open seats, the winners and their percentage of votes were as follows Riyong (Chuave, 12.09), Nilkare (Gumine 7.71), Yomo (Karimui-Nomane, 9.90), Kamb (Kerowagi, 10.76), Onguglo (Kundiawa, 15.95) and Okoro (Sinasi-Yonggamugl, 6.31). Two were LNA, one Peoples Action Party and one Black Action Party. Of these, only Nilkare was reputed to have had an expensive campaign. The winners either had such a large base vote from several polling booths that they won on that alone, or else—like Nilkare and Onguglo—had not only a large base vote over several booths (982 and 2,961 respectively) but significant blocks of votes away from their base areas (639 and 700). Although most candidates worked mostly on their clan and tribe and relatives by marriage to form a base vote, few succeeded in dividing other people's base votes; this tends to undermine the argument about commoditization. Rather than buying votes, it seems that money may merely have ensured base votes.

I have already mentioned Kerowagi controversies. As noted above, there were delays of days in the Open count as exhausted officers tried to locate and correct mistakes, and Kerowagi was not completed for days after other electorates. During one such delay, James Kimin Pikip, who with 1915 votes was running second at box Count 127, was brought in a Western Highlands government car to a meeting with Sinasi winner Okoro at Kundiawa to discuss forming a Simbu bloc in the process of post-election coalition making. Pikip was angrily abused by the crowd at Kundiawa airstrip for associating with Hageners and described as a 'political prostitute'.¹² Visibly shaken at this onslaught, Pikip may have been secretly relieved when John Kamb gained 2576 between Counts 128 and 147, and by the final Count 176 Pikip had only received another 15 votes (totalling 1944) to come in third behind Kamb (3120) and Camilus Bongro (2124). Kamb's golden streak started at Barawagi polling place, and continued through Gagul, Siure, Goglime and Tauglpene. The first four of these places had 3923 voters

¹² A woman who complained at this language was whacked and told to shut up because this was men's business.

registered on the draft of the roll. At Siure, Kamb's own place, there were 1043 registered voters and only 945 voted. Of these Kamb received 907. These figures would seem to disprove the rumour put around by unsuccessful candidates that Kamb's sudden surge was based on massive double voting at Siure. Kamb's political baptism was just starting. For a week helicopters on charter to political parties buzzed the Highlands provinces, carrying political agents seeking to induce the winners into their party and coalition. John Kamb avoided the crowds at Kundiawa airport and was collected from a nearby ridge top, only to discover later that he was with the wrong party.

Premier Mai won the regional contest with 23,273 votes (16.82 per cent), a clear 10,811 votes ahead of Palma Embia on 12,462 and Fr Louis Ambane on 10,894. All these men had widespread appeal, Mai adding to his high poll in Chuave Open of 10,902 (47 per cent of his total) with a strong vote in all areas except the central Kundiawa Open. Probably he succeeded because of his 'free education' policy and some resentment of the periphery against the centre. The runners-up, Embia and Ambane, were well known churchmen with strong connections into widespread congregations. The two former *kiaps* Aribill Gonapa and Sir Joseph Nombri followed close behind. The vote for most candidates was concentrated, with over half their votes in their home Open electorates, as shown in Table 11.1. The exceptions were for the most part strong candidates who could expect high votes outside their home areas because of their career performance and reputation. They included Nombri (with 41 per cent and the rest evenly spread); Peter Kamis (with 50 per cent of votes at home but 26 per cent in Karimui-Nomane); Peter Kuman (39 per cent but only 8 and 15 per cent respectively in his previous extended bases of Kerowagi and Gumine).

The volatility of the Gumine vote is interesting. As expected, the outsider Boniwan polled well there with 3058 votes. However Dr Erol Sipa polled 7244 votes and defused any local resentment by having a celebratory parade to mark his victory among the local Gumine candidates. He later returned to head up the Kundiawa Hospital. Peter Kuman had been elected on a southern vote in 1987, which collapsed in 1992. His opponents in the campaign had occasionally mentioned in a 1990 battle the deadly effectiveness of a high-powered automatic rifle reputedly owned by Kuman. Indeed, this issue was alluded to in public even by Kuman himself, and was widely believed to have cost him his huge southern vote in 1992.

Table 11.1: Chimbu Provincial electorate, 1992: interim count by Open electorate (candidate's home electorate vote underlined)

CANDIDATE	CHUAVE	GUMINE	KARIMUI- NOMANE	KEROWAGI	KUNDLAWA	SINASINA- YONGGAMUGL	CHIMBU PROVINCIAL TOTAL	(%) of valid votes
Peter Kamis Miugle Kogkia	26	196	2192	1407	<u>4263</u>	397	8481	6.2
Tom Bomai	12	<u>625</u>	19	156	12	16	840	0.6
Dr Errol Siba	92	<u>7244</u>	1057	137	187	161	8878	6.5
Aribil Gonada	968	387	468	473	175	<u>7966</u>	10437	7.6
Marome Kapu Yalbir	<u>2303</u>	45	944	31	41	199	3563	2.6
Peter Kumari Kakep	442	1031	579	1846	<u>2766</u>	421	7085	5.2
Clement Kalap	8	<u>1652</u>	9	170	23	39	1901	1.4
John Numi (Nime)	563	222	50	394	295	<u>1315</u>	2839	2.1
James Balua Mu	62	<u>1362</u>	345	53	13	179	2014	1.5
Dokta Kiage Kombulyagl	5	29	963	148	<u>931</u>	451	2527	1.8
Ambane Louis (Fr)	40	1207	724	2711	<u>5377</u>	835	10894	7.9
Yalwai Boniwan	813	3058	1563	544	<u>693</u>	1099	7770	5.7
Arnold G Wau Aglai	45	135	15	<u>3650</u>	303	167	4315	3.1
David Goro Mai*	<u>10902</u>	2557	4316	1390	688	3420	23273	17.0
Simon Kauba	20	<u>1131</u>	328	18	8	69	1574	1.1
Patrick W. Aulakua	255	314	50	<u>1395</u>	223	1211	3448	2.5
Guambo Peter Tinake	84	15	16	34	<u>2042</u>	1567	3758	2.7
Martin Lulu	<u>3694</u>	50	34	48	210	446	4482	3.3
Kerenga A. Rabisman	112	190	123	381	360	<u>2745</u>	3911	2.8
Sir Joseph Nombri	393	306	1013	2642	<u>3853</u>	1179	9386	6.8
John (Bola) Endemongo Kua	272	143	8	<u>2671</u>	50	34	3178	2.3
Palma Embia	708	631	1689	<u>8673</u>	360	401	12462	9.1
INFORMAL	53	92	40	70	58	67	(380)	
INFORMAL (%)	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	
TOTAL	21892	22622	16545	29042	22931	24384	137396 valid votes	-

Source: Compiled from Assistant Returning Officers Tally Sheets, July 1992.

Note: On electoral Commission (EC)'s total vote tabulation John Numi is recorded with 3839 votes, not 2839

Three weeks later he was proud of his 10 years in parliament ('a Simbu record') and said he would start doing something for himself.

The aftermath

Tensions were high as the results trickled out, and villagers stayed awake all night writing down results broadcast on Radio Chimbu. Inevitably as results were known there was squabbling among losing electoral battle lines, and from disappointed candidates and their supporters the individual snide comments and verbal 'back stabbing' known in Tokpisin as *suitim tok*. Tensions are highest when closely related candidates divide their communities and the fear of internal conflict is greatest. Houses were burnt at Mogl in Yonggamugl, in one payback between in-laws. Cooler heads prevailed in most instances, yet one big loser twice threatened in his own village to attack a neighbouring clan which had not voted for him. Families moved with their pigs away from the clan border, and the police were informed. When visited in his place, the losing candidate reportedly told police his weapons were in Lae; he was warned against making threats. Gradually the tension eased—until the provincial assembly election in 1993, that is.

As in Simbu elections since 1977, however, it was usually easier for losers to find an outside scapegoat and blame officials with bias or accuse rivals and their supporters of massive electoral fraud. So conspiracy theories flourish and officials are accused of bias, if not of actually rigging the election. In general the centralized count meant there was much less trouble than on previous occasions when crowd control was impossible in remote locations. Once again enormous energy was devoted by groups of losing candidates to collect evidence for appeals to Courts of Disputed Returns, in some cases alleging that polling teams camped on site before the poll had been plied with women and drink to make sure they allowed multiple voting the next day. Pre-poll briefing always warns against officials compromising themselves in any way.

Most complaints related to inadequacies in the electoral rolls, especially in Kundiawa where hundreds of people were not listed and hence were denied votes; to the delays in voting; and to the few occasions when voting was carried over till the next day. More allegations of intimidation by winning candidates and their supporters surfaced at this time, and were reported in detail in Brown Sinamoi's petition for the Chuave electorate noted above. The greatest accusation of electoral malpractice and

maladministration allowing fraud was made in Sinasina, where Ludger Mond's supporters argued that Okoro's loud intervention in the count and additional name lists added to the roll (from earlier certified rolls) contributed to many improper votes being allowed. In this case, as in many others, the candidate who had led for most of the count was overtaken when the last few boxes covered a strong candidate's base area. On several occasions the loss of face when the leading candidate was overtaken in the last hours of the count precluded rational discussion—the prize had seemed so close for so long. Ludger appealed to the Court of Disputed Returns, alleging errors of electoral administration, but his petition was dismissed.¹³ The appeal mechanism to a Court of Disputed Returns was a useful safety valve, but eventually the expense and legal advice deterred most would-be appellants.

Nonetheless, there was a backlash and some fighting between different clans in a few areas, such as among the Dage tribe near the Kerowagi-Western Highlands border. There many houses were burnt in different locations by police in a swift attempt to deter large scale conflict. It worked in the short term, but people waited till the police left and fighting broke out again, and continued in 1995. At Mogl, mentioned above, police and soldiers used firearms and burnt houses with the logic of deterring further arson. On hearing rumours of agitation, the police (allegedly accompanied by soldiers) burnt twenty-five houses in total around Mindima and also near the Marigl River in Gumine. There was a strong belief among district officials and local villagers that the police had been manipulated by individuals in such cases, had asked no questions of local officials and had gathered no local intelligence before they lashed out. The principal problem of violence after the 1992 poll, then, may well have been the security forces, but there was probably less fighting—in the short term—than after previous national and provincial elections. Neither critics nor supporters of police can prove that their presence prevented disturbances or caused it.¹⁴ However in the

¹³ David Lambu and Associates Lawyers, Hohola, petition to National Court of Justice MP 160/92, Ludger Luker Mond v. Kerenga Ben Okoro and Leo Tualir and the Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea - Sinasina-Yonggmugl Open Electorate: National Court of Justice, MP 160 of 1992, Sakora AJ, Waigani 30 October and 30 November 1992; Woods, J., Kundiawa, 10 February 1993.

¹⁴ The Provincial Secretary sought to extend the liquor ban after the soldiers left, as a controlled study to see if there was any change later when the

following year there were several major fights under way, especially in the Gumine (Marigle and Dom) and Kerowagi areas, with up to 22 killed in each of two fights that lasted months. The extra security had gone, the PPC was changed, and Simbu people clearly saw no permanent improvement arising from their stressful 1992 experience.

However the Simbu way of electioneering had changed, and the following year's provincial assembly election became the most violent to date. It was widely believed in Simbu political circles that John Kamb had won his seat by organizing large scale double voting, effected by coercing polling officials. Once again in 1993, competition was fierce, with huge expenditures in money and ego at stake. It was a two-week poll, but this time there were also two policemen, unarmed, at each booth. The poll was extraordinary. Even the Premier, Edward Bare, was prevented from voting for himself in his own Gena tribe area, despite the presence of the Provincial Secretary and the Police Commander. Declaration (section) voting remained in Simbu's provincial election law, and the Provincial Secretary wrote to the Electoral Commissioner that

'candidates ... bring in people by truck loads to cast [section] votes ... even if they are not from a particular constituency'; '... the policemen were over-powered by the people'; ' ... because of threats being issued to our polling officials ... polling officers were forced to sign and hand out ballot papers', and 'double voting has become the order of the day ... throughout the whole province. In all instances the ballot papers issued had exceeded the names on the common roll'.¹⁵

I have reliable reports from voters, officials, journalists and candidates themselves that in many areas candidates and their core supporters encouraged and even forced their own people to vote repeatedly for them, openly showing rifles, axes, knives and pistols, with menace. Similarly, they coerced polling officials to allow multiple voting by individuals, up to twenty times or more, and in

liquor ban was lifted. (I do not know the outcome of this experiment, but certainly warfare had escalated by 1993.)

¹⁵ Simbu Provincial Secretary to Electoral Commissioner, 'Widespread malpractices in the Simbu provincial elections', file 29-3-6, 21 June 1993.

some instances stole papers and forced presiding officers to sign them. A very experienced officer wrote

A polling team cannot impose any control when surrounded by 600 to 1000 voters with soot blackened faces with orders or the desire to intimidate voters as they please. Weapons are being waved under polling officials noses to keep them quiet while people vote time and again.

Some groups checked voters' papers before putting them into ballot boxes. 'Unfavourable votes are destroyed on the spot and the hapless voter dragged out and dealt with. Polling officials have become mere spectators at a sick anti-democratic live show.'

Eventually the death which officials had feared occurred. An intending voter approaching the booth at Wandi booth was stoned and later died; he came from another clan, and it was thought he would vote against the local man. The police had decided not to carry arms because they could be overwhelmed, and their arms seized. When three mobile squad members visited Emai (No 2 Dingga) in Sinasina, carrying arms, they were attacked with an axe and their weapons were seized. Thereupon the police burnt thirty-five houses at Emai in the presence of the Provincial Secretary, himself an Emai man. Soon the weapons were returned and the culprits were handed over.¹⁶ They were publicly whipped in the police compound, and a policeman injured in the original attack subsequently used his service gun to shoot up some houses in Emai, a central place for a tribal enemy of his own people (Standish 1994). Politicians are not the only people who confuse their state roles and clan obligations. This whole sequence did not deter fighters in several areas after the election, and five more people were reported killed in retribution or in election-related clan warfare.

Halfway through the poll the Provincial authorities faxed a series of ever more anxious letters to the Electoral Commissioner which documented fourteen separate types of violation of the Electoral Act. The Provincial Secretary called for the election to be aborted, and for the use of stronger security—including PNGDF troops—in a fresh election.

¹⁶ In 1992 weapons were taken from soldiers at Minggende and used in a Highway robbery. On that occasion the villagers handed over the weapons and youths before the police had a chance to rampage.

There is no democracy in the current conduct of the elections in Simbu province. In the interests of the province and the country I call on you to declare the current elections in Simbu province null and void.¹⁷

These calls were publicly supported by John Nilkare, the Minister for Village Services and Provincial Affairs (*Post-Courier*, 23 June 1993 and *The Times of PNG*, 24 June and 7 July 1993). Because members of all political camps in Simbu were participating in the malpractice Nilkare probably had no partisan stake in the outcome, although subsequently a new Simbu Provincial Government was formed with the assistance of Prime Minister Wingti. Nilkare discussed the election with real anger, and had no interest in Simbu political outcomes being determined by force. The Electoral Commissioner's legal advice was that he could only suspend the elections briefly in the event of a riot or such disturbance. He asked for full reports, including police reports, which were needed so that in the event of an appeal the matters could be documented. Only a Court of Disputed Returns could overturn the election, he said. There is no sign that the cabinet and the parliament sought legal opinion on whether they could Declare a State of Emergency and/or whether it was possible to suspend the entire provincial administration in order to abort the election process. An implication of the Electoral Commissioner's advice appears to be that some legislative amendment must be considered with some urgency to enable a response within the constitution in case in future a similar situation arises.

Both anecdotes and figures demonstrate the sheer scale of malpractice in 1993. In the Kup area, some booths did not vote because all available ballot papers had been used at Bi village booth, and something similar occurred in Lower Koronigl (Kerowagi). In the entire poll, some 254,346 votes were collected, from a population thought to number 185,346, including children and non citizens, so provincial officials calculated that at least 68,470 'extra persons voted', although on my calculation the figure was probably more like 150,000 extras.¹⁸

¹⁷ Op.cit. (note 15 above)

¹⁸ Figures from Provincial Returning Officer, July 1993, using National Statistical Office census figures.

Members of the Simbu political elite were stunned by what they had done and witnessed. In his broadcast speech opening the new Provincial Government, the new Premier, Edward Aba, said 'We got here by foul means not fair, but we are in power now, and here we shall stay.' In the April 1995 meeting of the Assembly, the last before the whole system was aborted in the 1995 constitutional changes, Aba repeated this refrain. Asked about the use of weapons, one assembly member told me 'We all did it. We went crazy'. Some maintained their lust for power. A week later, an assemblyman who had been excluded from the cabinet was widely believed, including by his own clanspeople, to have masterminded a major attack on the Kundiawa commercial sector by about a thousand people protected by high-powered weapons. The police on duty were outgunned, a vehicle would not start and they were powerless to stop K100,000 of food and other stock being taken over a four hour period. This event was a deliberate assertion that this tribe could make the provincial capital ungovernable, and hence had to be included in any provincial ministry. (The provincial member's village house was reportedly one of eight burnt by police, but he later received a ministry.) Displaying fear and a feeling of inevitability, maybe a dozen members of the Simbu elite in 1993 predicted—without any prompting from me—that the next elections in Simbu would be a form of war, with candidates fielding armies, and that belief had spread by early 1995.

Conclusion

At face value, and taken in isolation, the 1992 Simbu national elections were reasonably democratic, but the campaigns and elections followed trends which have developed consistently since 1977 towards increasing bribery, intimidation and malpractice. The Simbu political public know this, and often argue that the MP represents only that sector of the electorate which voted for him. Open winners in Simbu in 1992 received only between 6.31 and 15.95 per cent of the valid votes, and the highly successful regional winner received only 16.82 per cent. In each electorate, those who lose can unite against the winner. As has occurred after previous elections, several winners apparently felt endangered, and every one left the province by helicopter in the post-election coalition-making period. In early 1995 one MP was rumoured never to have returned to his electorate (and later in the year when he did return his car was hijacked as a sign of hostility). Another only visited his corner of

the province by helicopter, it was alleged, fearing to drive on the (admittedly very bad) roads through his opponents' territories. Clearly, some of the electorate's anger arises from what MPs do, and do not do, after the election. It is often impossible for elected members to move freely and perform as a representative of their entire electorate. The implications of the low votes of winners and continuing post-election hostility are that the elections are currently not a mechanism which give popular legitimacy to the parliament and authority to the government, and nor do they provide a chance for continuing democratic participation in decision-making.

These points were used in 1987 to advocate a coup, an extreme response by defeated candidates, yet one which reflects profound disillusionment with the political system and its foundation in elections. The 1993 provincial election, with its dangerously widespread use of threats and actual violence, further reinforces such concerns. Subsequent violence in the Western Highlands provincial poll (Ketan 1995) indicates not that Highlanders are wild men, although they can be, but that there are systemic problems in Papua New Guinea society and politics.

Despite the heroic efforts of officials on the ground, the two elections described here were not free and fair. While Simbu-based observers and participants will have heard much of the information in this paper, it has not been pulled together before. Open Returning Officers have apparently written few formal reports to the Electoral Commission in the last four elections, out of a combination of exhaustion and frustration with what they see as lack of understanding of the difficulties of their dedicated work. The new PPC told me in July 1993 he had no written reports of the intimidation of polling teams, although he knew of many such incidents. Simbu journalists with personal and professional connections with the provincial government, and perhaps inhibited from reporting bad news about their province, do not report much of the detail of local politics to the local media. Thus the Port Moresby elite and international observers hear little of the kind of sad and bad news in this paper, and the detailed studies of Reay (1987) and the recent writing of Strathern (1993) and Ketan (1995).

I have argued elsewhere, using Migdal's terminology, that Papua New Guinea has 'strong' societies, autonomous but divided. The state, by contrast, is 'weak' (Migdal 1988, Standish 1994). It lacks administrative and service capacity, without the political strength to make difficult policy decisions and implement

programmes; it does not politically penetrate and dominate the society. Sometimes state resources can be used for local benefit, but politicians lack authority outside their own communities, and the state as a whole lacks popular legitimacy, worsened by its own excesses in the attempt to gain control. The societies are increasingly isolated from the state, which is irrelevant to their needs, and withdraw from engagement with the state.

In many ways this paper illustrates state weakness and lack of administrative capacity and co-ordination, both at the centre and at the periphery. Changes can be made to electoral administration, but the difficulties described are symptomatic of weaknesses in the whole governing structure. I will not make a series of recommendations in this paper, although one immediate conclusion is that an optional preferential system would be too complex for both the electoral staff in this province and the scrutineers and candidates. Before the 1992 poll I had recommended a return to the kind of system which in 1972 I saw creating the environment for co-operative campaigning between candidates who sought each other's preferences. That system operated in the last years of a relatively strong colonial state, and the political culture of Simbu since then has become a tougher game, zero-sum, winner-takes-all.

Provincial officials in Simbu are clearly concerned at the shift in political practice in their province. Official structures can influence political behaviour, but they are also themselves influenced by the political activities of national actors, who in turn are operating in an international economy which is primarily interested in the country's minerals and which craves political stability. Politicians put their energies into the immediate issues, and for the parliamentarians elected in 1992 their main concerns have been controlling and expanding the minerals sector and removing the provincial tier of politics. The present parliamentarians succeeded under the present electoral system, and at present may lack a motive to change it, having in 1995 removed their provincial government rivals. As in 1991, when changes were made to the constitution and electoral system, this may change in the run-up to the 1997 poll.

Issues of security and the authority of state agencies are likely to remain contentious. Police officers admit their men are hated by villagers; they seek public respect but know the public have little cause to trust police when police cannot protect themselves, let alone the public. The 1992 poll in Simbu may have been relatively peaceful on a 'once only' basis, a bluff which succeeded then but

which was blown away forever in the 1993 provincial election. Although the state is in part maintained by sometimes indiscriminate use of force, the excesses of the security personnel had quite antagonized senior provincial officials by the end of the 1992 election. The state itself is fragmented, and although provincial officials in 1993 called for a strong army presence in a new provincial poll, the capacity is not there for an intense presence right across the Highlands, let alone other parts of the mainland or Islands regions.

When elections are conducted by improper means, the whole parliament and whole state is discredited. Yet paradoxically, the Simbu want their political prizes to have some legitimacy, and even while conducting a poll at gunpoint in 1993 they went through a distorted ritual of democratic voting. Just as Simbu political practice has evolved, the national rules have changed under the new provincial government system introduced in 1995, which gives great powers to provincial governors (usually regional members). The new system greatly privileges sitting members. They become the targets for the next cohort of political aspirants. Simbu politics promises to intensify still further.

In one of his strongest statements as Governor-General, the late Sir Ignatius Kilage made a public plea for wisdom and judgement by the people of Papua New Guinea, and discussed the challenges faced by the government at that time and the stresses on the country's democracy:

It is certainly not the easiest of systems because it demands a permanent state of compromise among all sections and all opinions in the community. The system works only if we the people believe in it and act positively to make it work. (*Post-Courier*, 31 March 1989:p31.)

It remains to be seen whether the political will can be found in the new system to confront the problems of an increasingly turbulent society, for politics to be seen as an activity of national scope rather than local self-interest of the crudest kind. Even if there is a reversal of recent trends in Simbu towards money politics, intimidation and violence, it remains to be seen whether sufficient government resources can be provided to give provinces the capacity to conduct efficient, free and fair elections. Unless the kind of issues raised in this paper are faced, elections in Simbu, in the Highlands

generally, and possibly in some other parts of the country, will only be a dangerous sham—a form of democracy at gunpoint.

APPENDIX A

RESULTS OF THE 1992 PAPUA NEW GUINEA
NATIONAL ELECTION

A: ISLAND PROVINCES

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
BOUGAINVILLE PROVINCIAL				
Fr. John Momis	12,556	68.27	MA	SMP ¹
Samuel Karol	2,401	13.05	IND	PPP*
John Banono	2,062	11.21	IND	
Informal	1,374	7.47		
Total	18,393			
CENTRAL BOUGAINVILLE				
Joseph Egilio	769	50.39	IND	SMP
Samuel Akoita	582	38.14	IND	
Raphael Bele	50	3.28	MA	
Patrick Itta	7	0.46	IND	
Informal	118	7.73		
Total	1,526			
NORTH BOUGAINVILLE				
Michael Ogio	4,801	29.10	PDM	SMP
James Togel	4,519	27.39	MA	
Donatus Mola	2,287	13.86	IND	PPP*
Sylvester Niu	1,931	11.70	IND	
Uzziah Toukes	1,658	10.05	IND	
Martin Golu	880	5.33	IND	
Informal	424	2.57		
Total	16,500			

¹ Sitting Member

* This indicates that the party affiliation on the ballot paper (shown by the portrait of the party leader next to the candidate's photo) is different from the party affiliation reported in the Electoral Commissions's official results as shown under Party.

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE				
Michael Laimo	135	36.39	IND	NMP ²
Peter Kungka	63	16.98	MA	
Martin Bonai	41	11.05	IND	
Paul Nerau	1	0.27	IND	
Informal	1,374	7.47		
Total	371			
E.N. BRITAIN PROVINCIAL				
F. Koimanrea	14,446	25.81	IND	NMP
E. Tobaining	8,171	14.60	PANGU	SMP IND*
Sir R. Tovue	6,928	12.38	IND	
Martin Tovadek	6,357	11.36	MA	IND*
Damien Kereku	5,351	9.56	IND	
Michael Konjib	3,377	6.03	IND	
Henry Tokubak	3,260	5.82	IND	
Ereman Tomete	2,561	4.58	IND	
Francis Vagene	2,027	3.62	IND	
Informal	3,494	6.24		
Total	55,972			
GAZELLE OPEN				
Nakikus Konga	8,267	39.87	PANGU	NMP IND*
Tonny Wong	5,584	26.93	IND	
S.S. Manikot	5,456	26.31	MA	SMP IND*
J. Marshall	780	3.76	IND	
Informal	650			
Total	20,737			
KOKOPO OPEN				
Rabbie Namaliu	5,559	41.41	PANGU	SMP
Oscar Tammur	5,201	38.75	IND	
S.T. Tokutang	1,276	9.51	IND	
Jack Diuvia	1,042	7.76	MA	
Informal	345			
Total	13,423			

² New Member

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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POMIO OPEN

Alois Koki	6,355	55.47	PDM	SMP
Patrick Pangun	3,195	27.89	IND	PANGU*
Edward Melo	3,195	11.66	IND	
Leo Longi	429	3.74	MA	
Informal	142			
Total	11,457			

RABAU OPEN

John R. Kaputin	2,857	27.59	IND	SMP
T. Tobunbun	2,679	25.87	IND	
Martin Kelly	1,533	14.81	IND	
Ronnie Kalulu	1,349	13.03	IND	
S. Topuipui	1,103	10.65	MA	
Abakuk Tomaing	493	4.76	NAT	
Informal	340			
Total	55,971			

MANUS PROVINCIAL

A. Marsipal	2,547	19.65	PANGU	SMP
James Pokasui	2,434	18.78	IND	
M. Pondros	2,160	16.67	IND	
T. Kasou	1,935	14.93	MA	
R. Pious Pogat	1,254	9.68	IND	
Paliau Benard	1,017	7.85	IND	
Vincent Tonam	775	5.98	IND	
Andyson Kaspou	684	5.28	IND	
Informal	154			
Total	12,960			

MANUS OPEN

M. Thompson	4,759	36.72	LNA	SMP
Memel Pohei	4,408	34.01	MA	
M. Kuweh	1,337	10.32	PANGU	
James Nali	1,167	9.00	IND	
Mark H. Sinai	974	7.52	PDM	
C.S. Kanamon	227	1.75	PSP	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(MANUS OPEN continued)				
Informal	88			
Total	12,960			
NEW IRELAND PROVINCIAL				
Paul Tohian	16,563	48.44	IND	NMP PPP*
Michael Singan	11,886	34.76	IND	PANGU*
M. Maraleu	3,351	9.80	PPP	IND*
Ilias Kasikit	1,081	3.16	IND	
Informal	1,314			
Total	34,195			
KAVIENG OPEN				
Micah Ben	5,391	37.54	PPP	SMP
Lapaseng Meli	3,332	23.20	MA	
Sition Gion	1,976	13.76	IND	
Tokau Kamalu	1,598	11.13	PANGU	
Mesulam Aisoli	1,052	7.33	IND	
Kevin Patai	747	5.20	IND	
Informal	265			
Total	14,361			
NAMATANAI OPEN				
Sir Julius Chan	11,567	58.45	PPP	SMP
Esekia Tomon	7,686	38.84	PANGU	
Informal	537			
Total	19,790			
WEST NEW BRITAIN PROVINCIAL				
Lucas J. Waka	7,612	21.23	PANGU	SMP
Gregory Mongi	6,826	19.04	MA	
Vincent Ulelio	6,316	17.62		
Joseph Gori	5,069	14.14	IND	
John Dako	3,762	10.49	IND	
Paul Nakmai	2,812	7.84	PPP	
Theodore Baisi	1,620	4.52	IND	
Jacobus Guldin	931	2.60	IND	PDM*

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(WEST NEW BRITAIN PROVINCIAL continued)

Informal	902			
Total	34,850			

KANDRIAN GLOUCESTER OPEN

Andrew Posai	2,583	19.83	PPP	NMP
R. Lawrence	2,294	17.61	IND	
Bernard Vogae	2,263	17.37	PANGU	SMP
Francis Auram	1,999	15.34	IND	
Issac W. Dau	1,512	11.60	BAP	IND*
David Nasar	1,401	10.74	MA	
Lucas Wanskin	795	6.10	IND	
Informal	182			
Total	13,029			

TALASEA OPEN

Patterson Lowa	5,794	25.43	MA	SMP
Moses Nahia	3,296	14.46	LNA	
Philip Ragi	2,383	10.46	PPP	
Caspar Nuli	2,353	10.33	IND	
Dennis Galia	1,575	6.91	PANGU	
Dr B. Tonar	1,436	6.30	PDM	
Siaken Komboli	1,364	5.99	IND	
John Raka	1,118	4.91	PDM	
Baundo Tangika	696	3.05	IND	
Benny Mataio	644	2.83	INS	
Jerry Walala	511	2.24	IND	
Tumu Tumex	433	2.90	IND	
Thomas Namui	354	1.55	IND	
Peter Puana	220	0.97	IND	
M. Tobob	167	0.73	IND	
Informal	444			
Total	22,788			

B: MAMOSE / NORTHERN LOWLAND

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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EAST SEPIK PROVINCIAL

Sir M. Somare	54,714	53.65	PANGU	SMP
Tobias K. Sakra	17,774	17.43	IND	
H.L. Kabai	10,194	10.00	MA	IND*
Jacob Wama	8,628	8.46	IND	
Teddy Sane	7,631	7.48	IND	
John Ulai	1,798	1.76	IND	
Informal	1,235	1.21		
Total	101,974			

AMBUNTI DREIKIKIR OPEN

Judah Akesim	5,521	32.26	PANGU	SMP
H. Massimbor	2,362	13.80	PPP	
Klapat Nick	2,259	13.20	MA	
Jezrel Hambak	2,049	11.97	IND	
Jack Wangu	1,510	8.82	IND	
CainYapi	1,314	7.68	PDM	
Silas K. Keble	1,158	6.77	IND	
Joe Cornelius	834	4.87	IND	
Informal	109	0.64		
Total	17,116			

ANGORAM OPEN

Philip Laki	4,541	24.72	PANGU	
Joe Kenny	3,488	18.99	IND	
Ludwig Schulze	3,156	17.18	IND	
V. Terenfop	1,822	9.92	MA	
Sarry Wimban	1,506	8.20	IND	
Paul Jajphlom	771	4.20	IND	
Alois Anmokm	687	3.74	IND	
Francis Ali	655	3.57	LNA	
Luimek Johnson	440	2.40	IND	
John Maiben	385	2.10	IND	
Martin Anskar	364	1.98	IND	
Januarius Sami	249	1.36	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(ANGORAM OPEN continued)				
Andrew K. Kaur	174	0.95	IND	
Informal	130	0.71		
Total	18,368			
MAPRIK OPEN				
Sir Pita Lus	6,692	33.72	PANGU SMP	
F. Wandahwan	3,039	15.31	IND	
Bill Yalikwien	2,587	13.04	IND	
Daniel Dopri	2,049	10.33	PDM	
C. Yalikiti	1,595	8.04	IND	
Paul Azaluen	1,480	7.46	IND	
David Sipani	905	4.56	IND	
S. Yalongi	549	2.77	MA	IND*
Benny Gabi	416	2.10	IND	
M. Taminja	316	1.59	IND	
Informal	217	1.09		
Total	19,845			
WEWAK OPEN				
B. Narakobi	6,107	39.91	MA	SMP
Baran Sori	3,786	24.74	PANGU	
Dr M. Manwau	2,336	15.27	PPP	
Laura Martin	1,185	7.74	IND	
Luke Gukain	823	5.38	IND	
Ben Gene	722	5.38	PDM	
Informal	342	2.24		
Total	15,301			
WOSERA-GAUI OPEN				
Paul Wanjik	4,948	32.52	PANGU	SMP
Albert Nyani	2,301	15.13	MA	
Cletus Cox	2,196	14.44	IND	
James Walange	1,790	11.77	IND	
Edward Suaiman	1,643	10.80	IND	
Brian C. Tapi	687	4.52	IND	
Luke Don Misha	580	3.81	IND	
Markus Bande	577	3.79	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(WOSERA-GAUI OPEN continued)				
J. Yangomban	402	2.64	IND	
Informal	89	0.59		
Total	15,213			
YANGORU-SAUSSIA OPEN				
John Jaminan	2,214	13.61	PDM	NMP
John Wawia	1,770	10.88	PANGU	SMP
B. Hagoria	1,247	7.66	IND	
Greg M. Mais	1,206	7.41	IND	
Tony Bais	1,151	7.07	IND	
Paul Kafafi	1,406	6.43	IND	
J. Yuamiamba	856	5.26	IND	
Tom Nidof	745	4.58	IND	
J.P. Hombomia	674	4.58	LNA	
Petrus Wafi	617	3.79	IND	
A.K. Hoandie	600	3.69	IND	
A. Wagambio	594	3.65	IND	
Henry Konduo	537	3.30	IND	
Mark Mauludu	494	3.04	IND	
Tom Hekao	468	2.88	IND	
H. Marasembi	425	2.61	PPP	
H. Hasimani	372	2.29	IND	
T. Benguma	284	1.75	IND	
P.J. Waranak	273	1.68	IND	
John Waranduo	238	1.46	IND	
Billy Kuari	220	1.35	IND	
Jonathan Sengi	183	1.12	IND	
Informal	58			
Total	16,272			
MADANG PROVINCIAL				
Peter Barter	35,157	39.05	IND	
Peter Yama	16,018	17.79	IND	
Jackson J. Kas	10,444	11.60	IND	
Melchior Kasap	9,055	10.06	MA	
Tom Pais	5,095	5.66	PANGU	
S. Yasina Bulu	4,073	4.52	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(MADANG PROVINCIAL continued)				
N. Bunag Derr	3,521	3.91	IND	
Jerry Warun	2,934	3.26	PPP	
Mathew Kabig	2,093	2.32	IND	
Indimu P. Korah	640	0.71	IND	
Informal	1,002			
Total	90,032			
BOGIA OPEN				
Tim Ward	2,110	13.78	PDM	SMP
B. Mollok	1,606	10.49	MA	
C. Silari	1,512	9.88	IND	
N.P. Kirriwon	1,500	9.80	IND	
Tom Kumana	1,443	9.42	PANGU	
Thomas Igam	1,405	9.18	IND	
PR. B. Sulum	1,016	6.64	IND	
T. Soalilibia	815	5.32	IND	
Peter Kombe	799	5.22	IND	
Joseph Bomkai	772	5.04	IND	
Robert Magun	498	3.25	IND	
Gabriel Magun	456	2.98	IND	
Joe N. Tola	437	2.85	PPP	
Rudolf Mongali	417	2.72	IND	
M. Kahumbu	400	2.61	IND	
Informal	125			
Total	15,311			
MADANG OPEN				
Stanley Pil	2,480	15.68	IND	NMP
Paul Kamod	2,140	13.53	PANGU	
F. Sawan Bahin	1,713	10.83	NAT	
W. Jongamup	1,282	8.11	IND	
Sanol Malaga	1,111	7.02	PPP	
William Banjoy	1,060	6.70	IND	
C. Kramer	997	6.30	LNA	
John G. Gig	832	5.26	IND	
Max Moeder	799	5.05	IND	
Stanley Naifa	749	4.74	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(MADANG OPEN continued)				
J. Bukikun	657	4.15	IND	
Tom M. Namora	480	3.03	IND	
Meliakey Oss	411	2.60	IND	
J. Sau Kasom	286	1.81	IND	
M. William Puio	283	1.79	IND	
Joe Bon	210	1.33	IND	
Informal	327			
Total	15,817			
MIDDLE RAMU OPEN				
G.A. Oringawai	2,741	17.17	MA	NMP
Henry S. Yei	1,769	11.07	IND	
Michael Mimpì	1,674	10.49	NAT	
John W. Soisek	1,523	9.54	IND	
James Yakip	1,488	9.32	IND	SMP PDM*
Paul Jorimbi	1,064	6.67	PANGU	
Fr D.G. Mump	915	5.73	IND	
Steven Kaskas	906	5.68	IND	
Lalau Karmonga	672	4.21	IND	
Ermot B. Bai	661	4.14	IND	
John Opan	588	3.68	IND	
Solomon Ambro	530	3.32	IND	
Sambal J. Imus	485	3.04	IND	
Nick Yarrington	466	2.92	IND	
A. Iriaman	370	2.32	IND	
A. Jevi Kaiyul	84	0.53	IND	
Informal	27			
Total	15,963			
RAI COAST OPEN				
Samuel Pariwa	3,038	21.99	LNA	SMP
Marcus Kawo	2,278	16.49	PPP	
Baafae Sia	1,887	13.66	IND	
James Yali	1,658	12.00	IND	NAT*
Peter Nombo	860	6.23	IND	
Sosenu D. Jerry	815	5.90	IND	
Mendai Kimbei	747	5.41	IND	PDM*

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(RAI COAST OPEN continued)				
John Poe	623	4.51	IND	
Galga A. Kaitip	533	3.86	IND	
Mafuk Gainda	444	3.21	PANGU	
Sapia Gemungo	397	2.87	IND	
Malagu Lalu	209	1.51	IND	
Steven P. Saud	134	1.39	IND	
Informal	134			
Total	13,815			
SUMKAR OPEN				
Galeng Lang	3,179	18.45	PANGU	SMP
Mathew Gubag	2,643	15.34	MA	
Mugiari Bass	1,823	10.58	IND	
Peter K. Bais	1,709	9.92	IND	
Mark M. Arek	1,436	8.33	NAT	
Kare Bawe Maor	1,411	8.19	IND	
John Y. Babau	1,365	7.92	PPP	
Kume S. Warren	1,202	6.98	PANGU	
Anton H. Koss	1,142	6.63	IND	
Kulubob Matei	785	4.56	IND	
Kalala Aelong	381	2.21	IND	
Informal	156			
Total	17,232			
USINO BUNDI OPEN				
George Wan	1,646	13.87	PPP	NMP
Amath Siaki	1,576	13.28	IND	
Iogurua Dorea	998	8.41	IND	
Tedor Tuya	938	7.90	PANGU	SMP
Bob Wati	785	6.61	IND	
Jack Tulia	705	5.94	IND	
Joseph Koroma	622	5.24	IND	
John Kimbuna	608	5.12	MA	
A. Alles Kopai	510	4.30	IND	
Anton Gakana	502	4.23	IND	
Hari Mutan	490	4.13	IND	
Garima P. Tai	414	3.49	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(USINO BUNDI OPEN continued)				
John Sarett	380	3.20	IND	
J. Kormino	366	3.08	IND	
Kiap G. Tomas	318	2.68	IND	
Stanis Gilo	283	2.38	IND	
John Kaupa	192	1.62	IND	
O. Mangoroa	139	1.17	IND	
Norbert Buak	123	1.04	IND	
John T. Kunjon	121	1.02	IND	
Eddy T. Toure	78	0.66	IND	
Utu Y. Mathew	50	0.21	IND	
Informal	156			
Total	17,232			
MOROBE PROVINCIAL				
Jerry K. Nalau	30,546	24.47	PANGU	NMP
Utula U Samana	21,081	16.89	IND	SMP
Jonathan Soten	13,472	10.79	IND	
Hama Anga	12,047	9.65	IND	
Daan R. Marc	11,507	9.22	IND	
Kim bun Keindip	10,587	8.48	PSP	
John Maran	10,150	8.13	IND	
Martin Tapei	5,119	4.10	IND	
Boyamo SaLI	4,595	3.68	IND	
W. Siawong	2,712	2.17	IND	
Informal	156			
Total	17,232			
BULOLO OPEN				
Samson C. Napo	5,403	25.66	IND	NMP
John Muingnepe	4,419	20.98	PPP	
Mathew Bendumb	3,045	14.46	PANGU	
Peter N. Mon	1,578	7.49	IND	
Sauaro Borea	1,340	6.36	IND	
Joseph Ben	1,177	5.59	IND	
Ronald Asaiya	720	3.42	IND	
B.G. Peter	582	2.76	IND	
Roy L. Yasiling	487	2.31	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(BULOLO OPEN continued)				
Mathias Philip	429	2.04	IND	
David Philip	277	1.32	IND	
David I. Hukulu	269	1.28	IND	
Robert Ottio	261	1.24	IND	
Manase G. Niaru	212	1.02	IND	
Y. Bingiding	212	1.02	IND	
Y. Kaimato	165	0.78	IND	
Moses Mumengau	111	0.53	IND	
Michael Wanamo	70	0.33	IND	
Informal	301			
Total	21,058			
FINSCHHAFEN OPEN				
Yaip Avini	2,652	19.02	PANGU	NMP
T. Mionzing	2,437	17.48	IND	
Manzau Lengko	1,966	14.10	IND	PPP*
A.T. Mandan	1,746	12.52	IND	
Musalu Geamec	1,530	10.97	IND	
R. Williong	1,183	8.49	IND	
Umbi Taunam	1,055	7.57	IND	
Q. Bazinu	473	3.39	IND	
John Titigiong	278	1.99	IND	
S. Mugarenang	240	1.72	LNA	
Baficnus Fuseo	212	1.52	IND	
Bakung B. Idac	153	1.10	IND	
Informal	17			
Total	13,942			
HUON GULF OPEN				
Tukape Masani	1,651	11.70	IND	NMP
Peter Namus	1,294	9.17	LNA	
Ben Garry	1,216	8.62	PANGU	SMP
Enny M. Moaitz	1,130	8.01	IND	
Paul C. Mantila	1,082	7.67	IND	
Morgan Langim	1,081	7.66	IND	
Eddie T. Maino	954	6.76	IND	
Hagai Joshua	896	6.35	PPP	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(HUON GULF OPEN continued)				
Bill Itamar	894	6.34	IND	
Wally Mondo	542	3.84	IND	
Emma Mankuo	524	3.71	IND	
Adam Munana	496	3.52	IND	
Joseph Kawage	460	3.26	PSP	
Elisha Ahipum	430	3.05	IND	
John K. Siroi	336	2.38	IND	
Dr Musi Sau	264	1.87	IND	
Kotoemo Tauye	259	1.84	PAP	
David Jacob	255	1.59	IND	
Tek Jana	200	1.42	PDM	
Informal	174			
Total	14,108			
KABWUN OPEN				
Ginson G. Saunu	3,610	28.39	IND	NMP
Tom Horick	2,476	19.47	PDM	SMP
Atong Dimoing	1,144	9.00	PANDU	
Giana Gawo	1,095	8.61	IND	
Imbong James	930	7.31	IND	
Gam Niala	805	6.33	IND	
Henzi Yakam	796	6.26	IND	
Joe Wahasoka	549	4.32	LNA	
Wagao Openg	431	3.39	IND	
Muteng Basa	278	2.19	IND	
Gigo Zallion	249	1.96	IND	
Teteng G. Wike	232	1.82	IND	
Linzon Banban	101	0.79	IND	
Informal	19			
Total	12,715			
LAE OPEN				
Bart Philemon	1,266	9.27	IND	NMP
Michael Badui	1,121	8.21	IND	
Sam Moses	915	6.70	IND	
Timbing Kahata	809	5.92	IND	
James Baibary	588	4.31	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(LAE OPEN continued)

Titus Wambun	566	4.14	IND	PAP*
Jack Wahem	564	4.13	IND	
Tony Ila	543	3.98	PANGU	SMP
Bala Poyia	530	3.88	IND	
Davis Koringo	450	3.29	IND	
Leo Kende	435	3.18	IND	
Mike Konia	431	3.16	IND	
Jonathan Saing	412	3.02	IND	
Andrew Vinara	386	2.83	IND	
David Kepak	373	2.73	IND	
Kenny Imbong	366	2.68	IND	
Levi Zairo	331	2.42	IND	
Daniel Nato	305	2.23	IND	
Uncle Thom	305	2.23	IND	
Billy T. Noi	294	2.15	IND	
Bob Maronga	281	2.06	IND	
John Omar	263	1.93	IND	
John H. Auafuru	228	1.67	IND	
Gerry M. Bewa	214	1.57	IND	
Kabi Mande	200	1.46	IND	
John Garap	191	1.40	IND	
Peter Tiba	190	1.39	IND	
Tofa Boto	176	1.29	PSP	
Andrew Palawa	172	1.26	LIB	
Peter Seske	164	1.20	IND	
Sikop Imbong	147	1.08	LNA	
George Mack	131	0.96	IND	
Tony Gabuogi	83	0.61	IND	
Informal	228			
Total	13,658			

MARKHAM OPEN

Andrew Baing	3,035	22.55	PPP	NMP
S.B. Mambon	2,326	17.28	IND	SMP
Parim Chiru	1,193	8.61	IND	
Buva Y. Yakutu	1,184	8.80	PDM	
P. Tongon	905	6.73	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(MARKHAM OPEN continued)				
Thomas Kammi	766	5.69	IND	
I. Ben Jerry	691	5.13	LNA	
Geoffrey Magas	617	4.58	PANGU	
Kerry S. Wapip	431	3.20	IND	
Jesse Bunum	357	2.65	IND	
Paia Rifi	304	2.26	IND	
A. Waiyum	274	2.04	PLP	
Informal	55			
Total	13,457			
MENYAMYA OPEN				
Thomas Pelika	2,005	15.59	LNA	NMP
B. Philip	1,188	9.24	IND	
Ainde Wainzo	921	7.16	IND	SMP
N. Yakayamz	905	7.04	IND	
Seth Jaru	836	6.50	IND	
Giatulu Eva	813	6.32	PANGU	
Jenato Awamu	715	5.56	PDM	
Aaron M. Akui	661	5.14	IND	
Job Talau	625	4.86	IND	
N. Bourne	531	4.13	IND	
Ngkiye Paje	524	4.07	IND	
B. Natiapango	515	4.00	IND	
S. Kaiamoto	491	3.82	IND	
Michael Koni	480	3.73	IND	
A. Ivango Menos	464	3.61	IND	
Sam Thomas	446	3.47	IND	
H. Anapeinato	396	3.07	IND	
Informal	345			
Total	12,861			
NAWAE OPEN				
Yamandi Amos	2,521	21.31	IND	NMP
Philippe Gaman	1,549	13.09	IND	
Tim Bonga	1,547	13.08	PANGU	SMP
Baia Sindi	1,195	10.60	IND	
Nangaring Bapi	1,061	10.10	PAP	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(NAWAE OPEN continued)

Bangim Jim	650	8.97	IND	
Michael M. Angi	485	4.10	IND	
J. Silingi	423	3.58	LNA	
Paul T. Timaro	368	3.11	IND	
Jack Keakop	271	2.29	IND	
Tim Bafenu	267	2.26	PSP	
Tuyom Lucas	109	0.92	IND	
Informal	129			
Total	11,829			

TEWAI SIASSI OPEN

Peter L. Garong	3,460	26.93	PANGU	SMP
Soling Zeming	1,939	15.09	IND	
Pitta Lotung	1,557	12.12	INDGU	
Joshua Ongom	942	7.33	INDS	
Asitore N. Tim	908	7.07	IND	
Michael D. Livi	660	5.14	PSP	
Tom Jalambi	648	5.04	PDM	
Willard Wemalo	569	4.43	IND	
Amos W. Berg	427	3.32	PPP	
Bayang S. Mare	427	3.32	IND	
Fadibang Matu	358	2.79	IND	
Micah Rex Lapu	316	2.46	IND	
Richard Maribu	264	2.06	IND	
NBiding Simau	162	1.26	IND	
Amos Tali	141	1.10	IND	
Japhet Kodong	31	0.24	LIB	IND*
Informal	37			
Total	12,846			

WEST SEPIK PROVINCIAL

John T. Talu	9,310	15.04	PAP	
Rex Namah	6,761	10.92	PDM	
Jeffrey Tiksep	6,161	9.95	PSP	
Clement Tumana	5,367	8.67	PANGU	
Alex Nonwo	5,230	8.45	IND	
Uwen Wotong	5,032	8.13	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(WEST SEPIK PROVINCIAL (continued))				
Martin Enda	5,014	8.10	IND	
Karl W. Stack	4,825	7.80	LNA	SMP
Paul Langro	4,291	6.93	IND	
John Moipu	3,060	4.94	IND	
Peter Saroya	2,188	3.53	IND	
Harry Wunum	1,954	3.16	IND	
Hank Yakai	1,453	2.35	IND	
Aloitich Peien	0	0.00	PPP	
Informal	1,250			
Total	61,896			
AITAPE LUMI OPEN				
Paul H. Mambei	4,519	26.17	PANGU	SMP
B. Akuire	3,754	21.74	IND	
Wakopu Thomas	2,963	17.16	IND	
S. Rainbubu	1,722	9.97	LNA	
Jack Auto	1,483	8.59	IND	
Peter Mumbru	971	5.62	IND	
Robert A. Sai	844	4.89	LIB	PDM*
Peter Meros	544	3.15	IND	
Andrew Morien	221	3.15	IND	
Informal	244			
Total	17,265			
NUKU OPEN				
C. Sambre	2,930	18.17	PANGU	SMP
A. Kumbakor	2,359	14.63	IND	
Joe Kawa	1,492	9.25	IND	
Mauri Nemantu	1,396	8.66	PPP	
G. Apkusha	1,384	8.58	PDM	
Simon Wama	1,291	8.01	PSP	
Peter S. Wauwau	904	5.61	IND	
Carlos Yuni	888	5.51	IND	
N. Sitook	659	4.09	IND	
Melchior Mokul	651	4.04	IND	
Tom Yuankou	638	3.96	IND	
Andrew Komboni	511	3.17	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(NUKU OPEN continued)				
Luke Tom	432	2.68	IND	
Primus Hari	306	1.90	IND	
Nick K. Moyik	161	1.00	IND	
Informal	120			
Total	16,122			
TELEFOMIN OPEN				
Bob Netin	2,152	15.10	IND	NMP PPP*
Clarkson Dikinsep	2,130	14.95	PANGU	
Felix Tapineng	2,055	14.42	LNA	SMP
John Makau	1,592	11.17	IND	
Danny Bangal Lane	1,335	9.37	MA	
Mathew A. Futengim	1,257	8.82	IND	
Wesani Iwoksim	1,020	7.16	PSP	
Mathew Nawan Dupkut	839	5.89	IND	
Percy Winau	719	5.05	PDM	
Yayef Yahe	573	4.02	IND	
Wagera Buia	321	2.25	IND	
John Dua	124	0.87	IND	
Informal	131			
Total	14,248			
VANIMO GREEN RIVER OPEN				
Nappotti Buru	2,077	14.57	IND	NMP
Tom Inohha	1,947	13.66	IND	
Micah Wes	1,438	10.09	PDM	
Joe K. Nali	1,405	9.86	LIB	
Wap Yawo	1,359	9.53	PPP	SMP
Gerald Gubon	1,189	8.34	LNA	
Enda Zachary	1,106	7.76	MA	
Wini Marcus	984	6.90	IND	
Peter Apoi	961	6.74	IND	
Daniel Maskim	787	5.52	PANGU	
Nanau Susuma	680	4.77	IND	
John Kawa	207	1.45	BAP	
Informal	116			
Total	14,256			

C: HIGHLANDS

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
CHIMBU PROVINCIAL				
David Goro Mai	23, 273	16.82	IND	NMP PDM*
Palma Embia	12,462	9.00	IND	
Ambane Louis	10,894	7.87	IND	
Aribill Bonapa	10,437	7.54	IND	PSP*
Joseph Nombri	9,336	6.78	IND	
Errol Siba	8,878	6.41	IND	
Peter Koglkia	8,481	6.13	IND	
Yalwai Boniwan	7,770	5.61	LNA	
Peter Kakep	7,085	5.12	CP	SMP
Martin Lulu	4,482	3.24	IND	
Arnold Aglai	4,315	3.12	IND	
A Rabisman	3,911	2.83	IND	
John Numi	3,839	2.77	IND	
Guambo Tinake	3,758	2.71	IND	
Marome Yalbir	3,563	2.57	LIB	
P Aulakua	3,448	2.49	IND	
John E Kua	3,177	2.30	IND	
Dokta Kiage K	2,527	1.83	IND	
James Balua Mu	2,014	1.46	IND	
Clement Kalap	1,901	1.37	IND	
Simon Kauba	1,574	1.14	IND	
Tom Bomai	840	0.61	IND	
Informal	380			
Total	138,395			
CHUA VE OPEN				
Yauve Riyong	2,636	12.09	LNA	NMP
Sinamoi Brown	2,481	11.38	IND	SMP
David F. Anggo	2,321	10.64	IND	
George S. Muroa	2,111	9.68	IND	
Kumon Launa	1,814	8.32	IND	
Elias Kurubu	1,538	7.05	IND	
Jim Nomane	1,517	6.96	IND	
Martin Dama	848	3.89	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(CHUAVE OPEN continued)				
Moree Nimbe	837	3.84	IND	
Steven K Otan	809	3.71	IND	
Kem Giano	617	2.83	IND	
Pasta Koma	567	2.60	IND	
Stanley Koi	559	2.56	IND	
Danley M Gue	490	2.25	LIB	
Kiman K Mori	460	2.11	IND	
Robert Fonggu	434	1.99	IND	
Kopon tonari	360	1.65	IND	
Nime F Tapie	331	1.52	IND	
Michael Kiagi	300	1.38	CP	
Robin Benson	274	1.26	IND	
Malcolm Kopon	249	1.14	IND	
Martin Mundawa	184	0.84	IND	
Gerry Ninbe	51	0.23	IND	CP*
Informal	20			
Total	21,808			
GUMINE OPEN				
John M Nilkare	1,621	7.17	LNA	NMP
Kale Clement	1,379	6.10	IND	PAP*
Fred T Arre	1,358	6.00	IND	
Aulkupa Wamil	1,349	5.96	IND	
John M Dulume	1,201	5.31	IND	
Dom Alphonse	1,195	5.28	IND	
Noah Kool	1,114	4.92	IND	
Kuble Kaiule	1,002	4.43	LIB	
David K Maima	939	4.15	IND	
Otto Olmi	939	4.15	IND	
John More Aula	922	4.08	IND	
Tolpari Sipa	900	3.98	CP	
Bil Ninkama	805	3.56	IND	SMP PDM*
Nul M Taima	720	3.18	IND	
James M Yopa	653	2.89	IND	
Sipa Simon Bon	632	2.79	IND	
Mathew Yobale	570	2.52	IND	
Kopan Barth	549	2.43	IND	
James Aiwa	525	2.32	MA	
Clement Kirin	422	1.87	CP	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(GUMINE OPEN continued)

Oltai Baago	421	1.86	IND	
Tala K Arol	418	1.85	IND	
Bob Wai Kona	397	1.75	IND	
Paul Ninkam	374	1.65	PDM	
Moses M Aina	368	1.63	IND	
Kaupua Wemin	337	1.49	IND	
Peter Kumo	117	0.52	IND	
Gaull K Gaul	115	0.39	IND	
Yaldrua J Olmi	88	0.39	IND	
Joseph Kumo	84	0.37	IND	
Andrew S Aula	32	0.14	IND	
Joseph Kolkia	14	0.096	IND	
Informal	37			
Total	22,623			

KARIMUI-NOMANE OPEN

Philip Yomo	1,638	9.90	IND	NMP
Peter Balbe	1,314	7.94	IND	
Jacob Wai	1,155	6.98	IND	
Teebee A Aure	1,005	6.07	IND	
Amos B Kawale	999	6.04	BAP	
Peter O Wemin	994	6.01	IND	
Habai R Hobel	909	5.49	IND	PSP*
Paul P Sisioka	857	5.181	IND	
Seberai Domu	818	4.94	IND	
Mu Peter Nimbe	710	4.29	CP	
Koin Siape	699	4.22	IND	CP*
Nick Tom Kore	670	4.05	IND	
Steven S Magi	528	3.19	CP	
Tinne Kaube	508	3.07	IND	
Geoffrey Kama	448	2.71	IND	
Kubulo Y David	389	2.35	CP	
Wange Ku	388	2.34	LNA	
Thomas Kawale	378	2.28	LNA	
Mondo N Moro	371	2.24	IND	
Peter Gelua	303	1.83	IND	
Daniel Ninkama	282	1.70	IND	
Bare T Vitus	267	1.61	IND	
Esau O Seao	264	1.60	IND	
Tony Olabe	236	1.43	LIB	
Sena Korarome	137	0.83	LIB	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(KARIMUI-NOMANE OPEN continued)

John Yoba	106	0.64	IND	
Jonatha Aise	97	0.59	IND	
John Duma	41	0.25	PANGU	
Neil Kaupa	7	0.04	IND	
Hasanuga Parai	7	0.04	IND	
John Kamun	2	0.01	IND	
Sam Kundi	0	0.00	IND	
Informal	22			
Total	16,549			

KEROWAGI OPEN

John Kamb	3,120	10.76	PAP	NMP
Camilus Bongro	2,214	7.64	IND	
James K Pikip	1,944	6.70	IND	
Zerike Duambo	1,933	6.67	IND	
Nil Yongumulg	1,658	5.72	NAT	
Jim Yer Waim	1,410	4.86	PANGU	SMP
Joe K Tumun	1,396	4.81	IND	
A Edward	1,183	4.08	CP	
Paul Nuglai	1,167	4.02	IND	NAT*
Steven A Gene	1,143	3.94	IND	
Alois Siune	907	3.13	CP	
Joe Nerebare	884	3.05	LNA	
Dewe Embia	801	2.76	IND	
John Kauga	784	2.70	IND	
Mandi Teine	750	2.59	IND	
Dawe James Kai	665	2.29	CP	
David D Gagma	633	2.18	IND	
Geregl Walter	633	2.18	IND	
Andrew M Waguo	625	2.16	IND	
David Tul	609	2.10	PDM	
Joseph Numambo	551	1.90	IND	
Kagl Mundua	533	1.84	BAP	
Thomas G Kaman	469	1.62	LIB	
Kurumba Taia	440	1.52	IND	
Bolkun P Bame	399	1.38	IND	CP*
Mark Danga	391	1.35	IND	
Robert Mondia	360	1.24	IND	
Joseph W Apa	344	1.19	IND	
Yagl K Yogl	288	0.99	IND	
Joseph Mondo	277	0.96	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(KEROWAGI OPEN continued)				
Kigl B Duru	140	0.48	IND	
Joe I Ulka	110	0.38	IND	
Korangie D Wam	81	0.28	IND	
John Ulkanve	57	0.20	IND	
R Kuanande	34	0.12	IND	
Informal	61			
Total	28,995			
KUNDIAWA OPEN				
Joseph Onguglo	3,661	15.95	BAP	NMP
Wagi Merimba	2,566	11.18	IND	
Francis Dama	1,299	6.67	IND	
Mathew Siune	1,188	5.18	PAP	
Kire William	1,122	4.89	IND	
Peter Baka	1,029	4.48	PANGU	
Kemai Wire	931	4.06	CP	
Fred Nua	818	3.56	IND	
K Goromauglo	736	3.2	IND	
Andy Siure	711	3.10	IND	
F Kombukun	702	3.06	IND	
James W Ulka	648	2.82	CP	
Wally Yegiora	617	2.69	IND	
Misim Goiye	571	2.49	IND	
James Dindongo	549	2.39	IND	
Kogl Peter	536	2.34	IND	
Joe Toa	490	2.14	CP	
Siwi Muruk	466	2.03	LNA	
Arnold Kunda	435	1.90	IND	
Thomas Waim	434	1.89	LIB	
Kuman K Kawage	375	1.63	IND	
Andrew Deglba	315	1.37	IND	
Dominic Kama	252	1.10	IND	
Joe Wau Kuman	236	1.03	IND	
Fabian Kawao	191	0.83	IND	
Jack Biange	156	0.68	CP	
Lukas K Kiak	116	0.51	IND	
Joe Komba	103	0.45	IND	
Michael Aigal	82	0.36	IND	
Umba Guane	22	0.10	IND	
Informal	60			
Total	22,948			

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
SINASINA YONGGOMUGL OPEN				
Kerenga Okoro	1,532	6.31	IND	NMP
Ludger Mond	1,450	5.97	MA	
Kale K Garap	1,105	4.55	IND	
Nibson Nibabe	989	4.07	CP	
Samuel W Kama	988	4.07	IND	
Mogia Wemin	981	4.04	IND	
M Waisime	912	3.75	IND	
John Tangila	897	3.69	IND	
Thomas G Apa	881	3.63	IND	
Koningi Mui	814	3.35	IND	NAT*
Paul Mane Papa	730	3.01	IND	
Nime Dabire	698	2.87	PPP	
Ware Mukale	671	2.76	IND	
Mogmane Wamil	646	2.66	IND	
Tom K kune	632	2.60	IND	
David Aukamane	619	2.55	IND	
Waiang Michael	603	2.48	IND	
Boi Degemba	570	2.35	IND	
John Ninkama	567	2.33	LNA	PDM*
Moipa Nilkapp	550	2.26	IND	
Taul Peter	537	2.21	IND	
Gola Dom Ray	494	2.03	IND	
John G Aina	474	1.95	IND	
Kjune Paul	474	1.95	CP	
John Tai	451	1.86	IND	
Bart Bokun	439	1.81	IND	
John Dege	416	1.71	IND	
Kiage Wel	373	1.54	PDM	
Philip Talmba	335	1.38	IND	
Joe Maul	327	1.35	IND	
Anthony Konia	322	1.33	IND	
James Baundi	301	1.24	LIB	
Sue K Drua	296	1.22	IND	
Gipmai Kiak	286	1.18	IND	
Jonathan Kale	280	1.15	PAP	
Sam Y Mogia	229	0.94	PANGU	IND*
Peter Tugo	214	0.88	CP	
Peter Gull	198	0.82	LNA	
Lister Baule	174	0.72	IND	
Bonney Aravil	165	0.68	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(SINASINA YONGGOMUGL OPEN continued)

Dama Rino Poka	134	0.55	IND	
James Kowia	107	0.44	IND	
John Korul	90	0.37	IND	
John Kultu	81	0.33	IND	
Bulake Maule	65	0.27	IND	
Hubert M Kui	56	0.23	IND	
Yuke Komba	43	0.18	IND	
Tamo P Engnui	17	0.07	IND	
Informal	5			
Total	24,288			

EASTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL

Aiva Ivarato	20,377	29.10	PDM	SMP
Barry Holloway	6,880	9.81	LNA	
Vegu Javono	3,877	5.54	IND	
Tisa K Mixio	3,684	5.26	IND	
Ifisoe Segeyar	3,274	4.68	IND	
Silas Atopare	2,924	4.18	PANGU	
Philip Avuti	2,605	3.72	IND	PSP*
Simon Guri	2,322	3.32	IND	
Ferao Ori	2,079	2.97	IND	
Dekot Koki	2,040	2.91	CP	
Tepi Ya'Ato	1,878	2.68	IND	PPP*
Hona S Javati	1,868	2.67	IND	
Paddy K Fagon	1,537	2.19	IND	
Abundi Ende	1,374	1.96	IND	
Umuna Biaote	1,340	1.91	IND	
Musa P Auve	1,304	1.86	IND	
Bune Sogomari	1,248	1.78	IND	
Talf K Siove	1,239	1.77	IND	
James Yanepa	1,211	1.73	NAT	
Saio A Godfrey	1,128	1.61	IND	
James Korarome	1,026	1.47	IND	
Kassa Mohamet	968	1.38	IND	
Kone P Koko	954	1.36	PAP	
Lobuna Umanda	913	1.30	IND	
Kafe Kopi	795	1.14	IND	
Soti Sihuvo	702	1.00	LIB	
Kiri Miori	481	0.69	IND	
Informal				
Total	70,028			

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
DAULO OPEN				
Gunia Sowa	1,326	6.77	MA	NMP
Keruai Gorofu	1,270	6.48	LIB	
Ganarafo F Ron	1,221	6.23	LNA	
Koyangko Tony	1,170	5.97	IND	
Gerus Y Moses	1,118	5.71	IND	
Paul Bayango	1,073	5.48	IND	
L S Robebe	990	5.05	IND	PSP*
Gorosahu Ekime	844	4.31	PANGU	
Nathan Aputi	729	3.72	IND	
Bire K Peter	722	3.69	IND	
Gimiseve John	692	3.53	IND	
Kare K Jacob	679	3.47	IND	
Tenige Ohuno	674	3.44	IND	
Kamawe K Bilak	673	3.26	IND	
Fege Joe	638	3.22	IND	
Dawa J Arapi	630	3.01	LIB	
Ron Unurufo	590	2.48	CP	
Gafie Benefa	485	2.47	NAT	
Duwabene Gai	484	2.46	IND	SMP
Wogaro Kevin	482	2.31	IND	
Sirifav Samuel	453	2.12	IND	
Sou Ifu James	416	1.82	IND	
Garahe Robert	356	1.78	IND	
Foxy Forukave	348	1.72	IND	
Ghabilih Wally	337	1.70	IND	
Baru M Kiripo	334	1.61	IND	
Gotuno Colvis	315	1.12	IND	
George Kimiho	219	0.82	IND	
Kipoi Jim	161	0.28	IND	
Rambi Robert	54	0.22	IND	
Guri N Mai	43	0.19	IND	
Kanimbo Thomas	37	0.08	IND	
Hongoro Goya	15	0.07	IND	
John Bimai	14	0.07	IND	
Informal				
Total	19,592			
GOROKA OPEN				
Mathias Ijape	4,614	22.73	IND	SMP
Enoch Asineha	2,128	10.48	NAT	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(GOROKA OPEN continued)				
Argo Ohue	1,465	7.22	PDM	
Bebes Korowaro	1,087	5.35	PANGU	
Michael Gotaha	1,038	5.11	IND	
Ubum Makarai	929	4.58	PPP	
Vaiha Gosoware	776	4.58	IND	
Wilson Pegipo	768	3.78	IND	
Samson Akunaii	722	4.58	IND	
Jim Joavari	674	3.32	IND	
Alfred Kerenga	662	3.26	PAP	
Moses Divilake	631	3.11	IND	
Huhuna Inapero	623	3.07	IND	
Ronald Janis	588	2.90	IND	
douglas Warii	520	2.56	IND	PSP*
Gipene Pirehu	390	1.92	IND	
Cecil Toluana	383	1.89	CP	
Murray Paiyesi	360	1.77	IND	
Henry Nenizo	346	1.70	IND	
Gou Sine	286	1.41	IND	
Robert Hiemute	284	1.40	IND	
Joe Andrias	284	1.40	IND	
Ken Yasihe	1.12	1.12	IND	
Jeffrey Tehe	1.00	1.00	IND	
Koni Aize	0.70	0.70	IND	
Bryan Kahayhor	0.54	0.54	IND	
Informal	60			
Total	20,301			
HENGANOFI OPEN				
Viviso Seravo	3,487	16.14	IND	NMP NAT*
John Giheno	3,031	14.03	PANGU	SMP
Peter Hinome	2,050	9.49	IND	
Pelly Beglana	1,706	7.89	IND	
Vincent Hatefa	1,547	6.82	PDM	
Kijon Korarome	1,473	5.22	IND	
Obi K Eseni	1,127	4.04	IND	
Kisopa Sagao	873	3.38	IND	
Monkofa Bafina	731	3.09	IND	
Vini Arihafa	668	3.02	IND	
Philip Akif	652	2.95	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(HENGANOFI OPEN continued)				
Jota K Sifu	637	2.95	IND	
Simon Naka	522	2.42	IND	
Sepo A Joseph	454	2.10	IND	
Aaron Kasse	442	2.05	IND	
David Lupa	438	2.03	IND	
Seah Pupuk	431	1.99	IND	
Yamis Gigimat	427	1.98	IND	
Megani Kahentoi	358	1.6	IND	
Wesley Tankore	312	1.44	IND	
Jack J Kagamo	244	1.13	IND	
Informal	60			
Total	21,610			
KAINANTU OPEN				
Avusi E Tanao	2,126	9.72	PDM	SMP
Yuntuvi	1,907	8.72	IND	
Jerry Mantavi	1,828	8.36	IND	
Zoregos Aejofo	1,213	5.55	IND	
David Tuvisuvi	1,209	5.53	IND	
Kapi Honerinke	1,208	5.52	LIB	
John C Inape	1,201	5.49	IND	
S Kamunda	927	4.24	NAT	
Yamu Esseo	894	4.09	IND	
K Tokave	840	3.84	IND	
Terry M Onawa	750	3.43	IND	
Tonny W Kafane	750	3.43	IND	
Mankly Nonao	712	3.25	PANGU	
Nimo Masio	639	2.92	IND	PSP*
Matie Pe'E	588	2.69	IND	
Bob Wa'O	586	2.68	IND	
B Pinunke	526	2.40	IND	
George Sio Moa	525	2.40	IND	
Samo Tofuya	442	2.02	IND	
Tony Agonami	440	2.01	IND	
Koi Nakime	404	1.85	IND	
Patrick Sukao	361	1.65	IND	
Tota Kauve	328	1.50	IND	
Steward Apaika	303	1.39	IND	
Tuse Risonave	253	1.16	IND	
Tisa J Yubiko	161	0.74	IND	
Jebi Andy	160	0.73	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(KAINANTU OPEN continued)				
Wewiak Erinuwe	101	0.46	IND	
Sai Temita	56	0.26	IND	
Tolobai Turua	49	0.22	IND	
Chris N Togino	47	0.21	IND	
Freemon Hugao	8	0.04	IND	
Paul O Foro	3	0.01	IND	
Informal	0			
Total	21,875			
LUFA OPEN				
Mathias Karani	2,864	13.37	NAT	NMP
Komane Wasege	1,791	12.50	IND	
Iya K Nopa	1,774	8.36	PDM	SMP IND*
Jeffrey Kauve	1,488	8.28	IND	PSP*
Jacob Isapi	1,442	6.95	IND	
Neskege Aigava	1,438	6.73	IND	
Tovoi D Kima	1,011	6.71	PPP	
Eleen Hamena	979	4.72	IND	
David Biritu`	707	4.57	IND	
Yaya Denewari	635	3.30	LNA	
Yaviri Famundi	634	2.96	IND	
Famundi Atara	631	2.96	IND	
David Kemigota	597	2.95	IND	
Stephen Avian	540	2.79	PAP	
Kulifano Heyo	466	2.52	IND	
Bonu Aunu	461	2.18	IND	
Uve Sabumei	436	2.15	IND	
Tiki L Kaphipa	282	2.04	CP	
Philip Sokom	217	1.32	LIB	
Tom Umave	199	1.01	IND	
Deyaba Iyodeke	70	0.93	IND	
John D Kisivi	22	0.33	IND	PDM*
Johnson Eklipe	3	0.01	IND	
Informal	55			
Total	21,420			
OBURA WONENARA OPEN				
Peter Gaige	4,838	20.64	IND	SMP
Muki Taranupi	3,133	13.37	IND	
Lenni Aparaima	2,931	8.36	IND	
Hea Hahamani	1,788	7.63	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(OBURA WONENARA OPEN continued)

Joe Eha	1,633	6.97	IND	
Mota Bun	1,406	6.00	IND	
Jones Sa'Asia	1,079	4.60	IND	
Duobe Kiambu	931	3.97	IND	
S Sarireka	925	3.95	IND	
Mine Kipefa	829	3.54	IND	
Mono Ata	822	3.51	IND	
Paru Tukundo	803	3.43	IND	
John Orame	649	2.77	IND	
Sambeni Kawena	615	2.62	IND	
Bikul H Noni	490	2.09	IND	
Aruna Kingsley	432	1.84	IND	
Peter Andau'O	63	0.27	IND	
Jessy Sanima	42	0.18	IND	
Tuai David	31	0.13	IND	
Informal	55			
Total	23,440			

OKAPA OPEN

Castan Maibawa	4,069	16.79	IND	SMP
Oriva Iki	1,625	6.70	IND	
Tekura Regani	1,470	6.06	MA	
Frank Fikena	1,402	5.78	LIB	
William Wanlek	1,399	5.77	IND	
Sam Fakii	1,365	5.63	IND	
Wato K Avinaga	1,272	5.25	IND	PSP*
Epaga Taigi	1,270	5.24	NAT	
Terry Umolo	1,209	4.99	LNA	
P Kosinto	1,168	4.82	IND	
G Eigavara	1,060	4.37	IND	
Tanoi Meuro	901	3.72	IND	
I Sami Ayolepi	901	3.72	IND	
B Sagata	737	3.04	IND	
Paul Oyaboso	669	2.76	IND	
David Tagindo	648	2.67	IND	
Smith W Iko	632	2.61	CP	
Andrew Wande	577	2.38	IND	
Robby Ananas	546	2.25	IND	
Jacob B Wanu	502	2.07	IND	
Legos W Aiyata	315	1.30	IND	
Iso Morabo	253	1.04	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(OKAPA OPEN continued)				
Rivai Hafime	168	0.69	IND	
Asa Kabo	48	0.20	IND	
Informal	35			
Total	24,241			
UNGGAI BENA OPEN				
Kevin Masive	3,416	18.55	PPP	NMP PAP*
B Sabumei	2,861	15.53	IND	SMP
Kapi Sarohafa	2,502	13.58	IND	
Nana P Stagg	2,330	12.65	IND	
David Oino	1,124	11.53	IND	
K Abisinito	1,262	6.86	IND	
Lomutop Philip	1,260	6.84	IND	
Jason Sinopane	1,136	6.17	IND	
T Laganaso	880	4.78	IND	
G Solomohafa	358	1.94	IND	
Ricky Aiyowiye	8	0.04	IND	
Informal	282			
Total	18,419			
ENGA PROVINCIAL				
J. Balakau	26,822	17.48	IND	SMP
Dokosa Amean	17,465	11.38	PDM	
Sanis Kaka	15,874	10.35	IND	
Kandep Pyanji	15,295	9.97	IND	
Peter Ipatas	15,044	9.81	IND	
K Joseph	11,643	7.59	IND	
Paul Torato	10,905	6.63	IND	
Anton Parao	8,396	5.47	MA	
E Kombeakali	4,957	3.23	PSP	
Poteyalin Nepo	3,787	3.02	PAP	
Makole A Kapo	3,262	2.47	IND	
Poketa J Minas	3,787	2.13	IND	
Kare S Makape	3,262	1.66	IND	
Sauan Amaiu	2,551	0.99	IND	
Aino Yangala	1,521	0.36	IND	
Perema K Mek	550	0.33	IND	
James Tengen	499	0.33	IND	
Informal	48			
Total	153,425			

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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KANDEP OPEN

Jimson Papaki	8,557	35.89	PDM	SMP
Job Takesane	3,234	13.56	IND	PAP*
Tum Erasi	2,837	11.90	IND	
Sakias Tamao	2,126	8.92	LIB	
Peter Y Pasul	1,621	6.80	IND	
Mup Mapitu	1,598	6.66	IND	
John S Lau	1,364	5.72	LIB	
Jack Lombaiya	1,268	5.32	IND	
Peter A Pyaso	1,237	5.19	IND	
Rawers Was Per	3	0.01	IND	
John Yaka	0	0.00	MA	
Informal	9			
Total	23,845			

KOMPIAM-AMBUM OPEN

John T Pundari	2,630	11.35	IND	NMP
Cornlius Kakal	2,609	11.26	MA	
Leo N Igitman	2,364	10.21	IND	
Michael Mangal	2,184	9.43	IND	
Jack Tiakai	1,649	7.12	IND	
T Pyalanda	1,549	6.69	IND	
Tom Amaiu	1,543	6.66	IND	SMP
Charles S Nar	1,519	6.56	IND	
Robert Yalui	1,142	4.93	IND	
Peter Tambuak	1,002	4.33	PANGU	
Pakea Mana	780	3.37	IND	
Tinalapin Siki	767	3.31	IND	
Laima Koraka	735	3.17	IND	
N Kemben	591	2.55	IND	PPP*
Otto Napi	553	2.39	LIB	
Candy Lombange	502	2.17	IND	
Michael Lugu	330	1.42	IND	
Mark Kukuni	223	0.96	IND	
Jeffrey S Kaki	149	0.64	PAP	
Tenny Pakawa	77	0.33	IND	
Sauen B Yakyo	53	0.23	IND	
Informal	211			
Total	23,162			

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
LAGAIP POGERA OPEN				
Anton Pakena	6,020	9.34	IND	NMP
Philip Kuala	4,318	6.70	IND	
Yadas Kutato	3,894	6.04	IND	
Jonatan Paraia	3,841	5.96	IND	
Tenda Lau	3,094	4.80	PANGU	SMP
Jack K Amu	2,800	4.34	IND	
Waite Yapipa	2,775	4.31	PDM	
Napi Kandaso	2,538	3.94	IND	
Mark Ipuia	2,514	3.90	IND	
Opis Yandapake	2,327	3.61	IND	
Wambea Makapa	2,321	3.60	IND	
Kaen Poko	2,293	3.56	IND	
Laipen Wallen	2,209	3.43	IND	
Yasowa Kome	2,189	3.40	IND	
Jack L Kutal	2,178	3.38	IND	
Yesu Kulina	2,106	3.27	IND	
D Waiakali	2,078	3.22	IND	
Solo Pita	2,053	3.19	IND	
Godfrey Waip	1,972	3.06	IND	
Ned J Lakari	1,921	2.98	IND	
Sambe Kolaip	1,76	2.74	PAP	
Philip M Sa'A	1,697	2.63	IND	
J Wailingi	1,418	2.20	IND	
Luke Ero	816	1.27	IND	
Rolan Paina	684	1.06	LIB	
Waro Pol Waro	665	1.03	IND	
Jack Kuro Lome	585	0.91	IND	
Yange T Kappin	513	0.80	IND	
Chris K Paiya	435	0.67	IND	
Kapilo Maso	280	0.43	IND	
Yaka L Uma	64	0.10	IND	
Kunali tindipa	3	0.00	LIB	
Informal	85			
Total	64,451			
WABAG OPEN				
Albert Kipalan	3,567	12.37	IND	SMP PPP*
K Joe Tengea	3,368	11.68	IND	
Daneli Kapi	2,792	9.68	IND	
Jim T Kongo	2,551	8.85	IND	
Kandes Philip	2,264	7.85	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(WABAG OPEN continued)				
Roy K Maramuni	1,958	6.79	IND	
Martin Tokopae	1,915	6.64	IND	
Maiting Laima	1,710	5.93	IND	
Maso Samai	1,514	5.25	IND	
Yakan Yoke	1,494	5.18	IND	
Kandan G Kia	1,430	4.96	IND	
Aaron P Heron	1,364	4.73	PANGU	
Paul Nili	1,124	3.90	IND	
Michael Puio	993	3.44	IND	
Yali Kandakin	397	1.38	IND	
Otto L Yallon	389	1.35	IND	
David I Pake	6	0.02	PSP	
Tasan Talian	5	0.02	IND	
Informal				
Total	28,841			
WAPENAMANDA OPEN				
M Iangalio	7,800	30.16	PDM	SMP
Ronald Rimbao	5,378	20.79	PANGU	
I Keowaip	3,204	12.39	IND	PAP
Yambatani Taso	3,099	11.98	IND	
Frank Iki	1,610	6.22	IND	
S Ambulini	1,565	6.05	IND	
Pato Kakarya	1,55	6.02	IND	
Gerry M Paya	911	3.52	IND	
Mek Kaki	317	1.23	IND	
Nisia Lawrence	295	1.14	IND	
Palyaka Ipi	96	0.37	IND	
Sake Ben Wia	13	0.05	IND	
Informal	20			
Total	25,864			
SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL				
Nipa Dic Mone	43,345	26.22	PAP	SMP
Paul Poto	41,504	24.00	PSP	
Anderson Sia	23,341	13.50	PDM	
Dabura Kamuna	19,548	11.30	IND	
Dabura Kamuna	15,985	9.24	IND	
S Mendepo	11,765	6.80	IND	
Hotwan Awaru	8,739	5.05	IND	
Nambi Rapula	5,855	3.39	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL continued)

Informal	858			
Total	172,940			

IALIBU PANGIA OPEN

Roy Yaki	5,948	32.54	PDM	SMP
Pundia Kange	3,227	17.66	PANGU	
Uma Moore	2,388	13.06	PAP	
Paul Turi Wari	2,230	12.20	IND	
Emo Wapiri	1,457	9.57	IND	
Simon Yopai	698	3.82	IND	
Kenneth Turi	286	1.56	LNA	
Tindua Benong	19	0.10	IND	
Informal	275			
Total	18,278			

IMBONGGU OPEN

Anthony Temo	5,465	29.30	PAP	SMP
Glaimi Warena	3,354	17.98	PAP	
Robert G Tawa	2,839	15.22	IND	
Julius Kera	2,761	14.80	PDM	
Posu Mindi	2,211	11.85	MA	
Korowa Pokey	1,079	5.78	IND	
Albert Mombu	863	4.63	IND	
Dominic Kanea	59	0.32	IND	
Informal	22			
Total	18,653			

KAGUA ERAVE OPEN

Daniel Tulapi	4,301	18.60	PAP	NMP
Mata Topa	3,277	14.17	IND	
Yano Belo	2,601	11.25	IND	
Ken Nakisi	2,320	10.03	IND	
John Mandali	2,148	9.29	IND	
Benny Malu	2,109	9.12	IND	
Soso Tomu	1,994	8.62	PANGU	SMP
Adc Kiap Toi	1,606	6.94	IND	
Dokta R Kanea	1,093	4.73	IND	
Joseph M Limu	599	2.59	IND	
W Baisakesi	486	2.10	IND	
Kare Metepa	449	1.94	IND	
S Paglipari	75	0.32	LIB	IND*

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(KAGUA ERAVE OPEN continued)

Kevin Poloepa	45	0.19	IND	
David L Dolo	5	0.02	LIB	IND*
Informal	17			
Total	23,125			

KOMO MARGARIMA OPEN

Balus Libe	4,538	35.13	MA	NMP
Alfred Kaiabe	2,857	22.12	PSP	SMP
Marabe Makiba	2,690	20.82	PANGU	
S Kabilali	2,629	20.35	IND	
David D Pole	181	1.40	PPP	
John L Kuabu	12	0.08	IND	
Informal	11			
Total	12,918			

KOROBA LAKE KOPIAGO OPEN

Herowa Agiwa				
Urape	2,683	18.94	PANGU	NMP
D Arababali	2,465	17.40	IND	
P Herason	2,334	16.48	PPP	
Matiabile Aruru	1,720	12.14	IND	SMP
Mathew Magaye	1,303	9.20	IND	
Yawale Kulu	1,202	8.49	IND	PAP*
Julius T Kiapa	1,187	8.38	IND	
Epe Peri Loya	616	4.35	IND	
Topo S waswa	382	2.70	IND	
Elo W Gill	172	1.21	IND	
Payale Elo	46	0.32	IND	
Kenny W Kewi	7	0.05	IND	
Informal	47			
Total	14,264			

MENDI OPEN

Michael B Nali	4,627	16.37	IND	NMP
Huli Joseph	4,029	14.26	PPP	IND*
Harry Komba	3,913	13.85	IND	
William M Ank	3,447	12.20	IND	
Francis Pusal	2,855	10.10	PANGU	SMP
Sili Koriama	2,854	10.10	IND	
Epeya Benson	2,722	9.63	IND	
Paul K Sorom	2,223	7.87	IND	PPP*

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(MENDI OPEN continued)

Philipus Hapon	1,498	5.30	IND	
Joseph Wanne	62	0.22	IND	
Mendep J Ungia	0	0.00	PAP	
Informal	29			
Total	28,259			

NIPA KUTUBU OPEN

Philemon Embel	9,919	28.67	PDM	SMP
Joshua Polis	5,153	14.89	IND	
Yut Uhae Iabo	4,370	12.63	IND	
Sosoro Hewago	3,950	11.42	IND	
John K Korpis	3,812	11.02	IND	
Dunstan Ami	2,138	6.18	IND	
Porop Stanley	1,987	5.74	PSP	IND*
Robert K Solo	1,874	5.42	IND	
Bai-abi Irahigu	727	2.10	IND	
Meri Hosta Tai	405	1.17	IND	
Informal	96			
Total	34,600			

TARI OPEN

Mathew M Yago	3,688	21.13	MA	NMP
Habia Babe	2,933	16.80	IND	
Haralu Mai	2,592	14.85	PANGU	SMP
Joseph Hungi	1,619	9.28	IND	
Thomas Talu	1,478	8.47	IND	
Bara Kamiali	1,423	8.10	IND	
David Takirako	993	5.69	IND	
Ebabe Jame Aba	834	4.78	IND	
Joseph Palive	778	4.46	IND	
Dokta J Tebela	503	2.88	PSP	
Peter A Irai	489	2.80	IND	
Steven Agilo	65	0.37	IND	
Mathew Honapi	53	0.30	PAP	
Informal	16			
Total	17,454			

WESTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL

Pais Wingti	69,067	39.30	PDM	SMP
Andrew Tai	33,924	19.31	IND	
C Kulangie	20,270	11.54	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(WESTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL continued)

Thomas Nolonga	11,383	6.48	IND	
Michael M Yaki	10,416	5.93	IND	
Kundi Pok	8,572	4.88	IND	
Apa John Aris	6,371	3.63	IND	
Brian K Lawi	5,425	3.09	IND	
Robert Enga	4,440	2.53	IND	
Poto T Akis	3,445	1.96	IND	
Paul Marida	1,369	0.78	BAP	IND*
Informal	1,040			
Total	175,722			

ANGLIMP SOUTH WAHGI OPEN

William E Wii	5,155	15.59	IND	NMP
Kuk Kuli	4,369	13.21	MA	
G Kuma Waipek	4,369	13.10	LNA	
Michael Mel	4,272	12.92	NAT	SMP
Roger T Palme	3,358	10.15	PPP	
Opai Kunangel	2,539	7.68	UNT	
Pius N Kuri	2,430	7.35	IND	
John Kundi	2,280	6.89	IND	
Michael T Onum	1,650	4.99	PANGU	
Benny B Yembe	1,303	3.94	IND	
Daniel D goma	1,034	3.13	IND	
Ronald M Banga	231	0.70	IND	
Ul Pena	50	0.15	IND	
Informal	69			
Total	33,071			

BAIYER MUL OPEN

Robert Nagle	3,274	15.09	IND	NMP
Joel P Pepa	2,838	13.08	IND	SMP
Awap Rumint	2,825	13.02	IND	
Mokwa Mamando	2,499	11.52	PPP	
Moses Mamando	1,967	9.07	IND	
Fikus Noki Kau	1,882	8.68	IND	
Tom Rangip	1,835	8.46	PDM	
John Nii	1,761	8.12	IND	
Jeffrey Puri	1,500	6.91	PANGU	
Trapura Yaluma	802	3.70	PAP	
Kundi Maku	100	0.46	IND	
Robert L Tapi	40	0.18	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(BAIYER MUL OPEN continued)				
Paul Dokta	7	0.03	IND	
S Kinjikali	5	0.02	IND	
Rose Uaiang	5	0.02	IND	
Kundi Miki	5	0.02	IND	
Informal	348			
Total	21,693			
DEI OPEN				
Melchior M Pep	5,435	27.19	PANGU	SMP
Koi Ranpi	3,437	17.19	IND	
Reuben Parua	3,036	15.19	IND	
Wikai Membi	2,345	11.73	IND	
Philip Bobby	2,079	10.40	IND	
Puri Ruing	1,989	9.95	IND	
Matrus D Mel	1,539	7.70	IND	
Michael Yona	85	0.43	IND	
Informal	45			
Total	19,990			
HAGEN OPEN				
Paul Pora	9,213	34.60	IND	SMP
John Rapura	3,636	13.66	NAT	
Nixon Anis Koi	3,527	13.25	IND	
Patrick Kolta	3,271	12.29	IND	
Bob Tepra	2,415	9.07	IND	
Allan Kulunga	2,140	8.04	NAT	
John Elepa	1,142	4.29	IND	
Glen Komonga	1,203	4.52	PPP	
Informal	78			
Total	26,625			
JIMI OPEN				
Kimb Tai	3,536	23.63	IND	NMP
James Kupul	2,275	15.20	IND	SMP PDM*
Paul Tondul	1,624	10.85	IND	
Sir T Kavali	1,262	8.43	IND	
Koromb Tulpa	1,176	7.86	IND	
Felix Bangi	1,258	8.41	PDM	
William Pok	897	5.99	BAP	
Didimas Gai	878	5.87	IND	
Ingwai Dire	811	5.42	PANGU	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(JIMI OPEN continued)				
Peter N Sekan	724	4.84	IND	
John Taime	499	3.33	IND	
Informal	27			
Total	14,967			
NORTH WAGHI OPEN				
Yimbal Aipe	3,301	15.38	IND	NMP
William Wii	2,578	12.01	IND	SMP
thomas Kommon	2,265	10.55	IND	
David Bal Mol	1,543	7.19	IND	
Robert Maima	1,228	5.72	LIB	
Vincent Anamb	1,222	5.69	IND	
Wilson N Wile	1,158	5.40	IND	
Peter M Ka	1,045	4.87	PSP	
Paias Banga	1,033	4.81	PAP	
Tony K Kapil	998	4.65	LNA	
James G Koimo	931	4.34	IND	
Raphael Tolgna	886	4.13	IND	PDM*
Caspar Guan	885	4.12	IND	
Tony Walep	736	3.43	IND	
Alfred W Kolio	590	2.75	IND	
William B. Pel	509	2.37	IND	
Palnge Burum	505	2.35	IND	
Informal	49			
Total	21,462			
TAMBUL NEBILYER OPEN				
Vincent Sipaka	7,269	25.36	PDM	NMP
Thomas Negints	4,870	16.99	IND	SMP
Yano Poponawa	3,825	13.34	IND	
Kome Topela	3,000	10.47	IND	
Fred Kiman Wur	2,802	9.77		
Simon Numa	2,356	8.22		
Kole Ninjipa	1,639	5.72	IND	PPP*
Paliwa Mapikon	1,505	5.25		
Ayaka Kepo	817	2.85	IND	PANGU*
Joseph Waguba	347	1.21		
Informal	235			
Total	28,665			

D: PAPUA AND NCD

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
CENTRAL PROVINCIAL				
John Orea	13,851	23.14	PAP	SMP
Paul Bodi	7,279	12.16	IND	
Peter Pako	6,864	11.47	IND	
Willie A Valie	5,200	8.69	IND	
Kone Vanuawaru	4,821	8.06	IND	
Rima Kikulu	4,798	8.02	IND	
Tony Huai	3,900	6.52	IND	
Isaiah Oda	3,837	6.41	PANGU	
Moses Anai	3,674	6.14	IND	
Aisi Loko	1,328	2.21	IND	
Kwalimu Lofena	1,321	2.21	IND	
Gima Kepo	1,111	1.86	IND	
Andrew Dani	964	1.16	IND	
Informal	901			
Total	59,849			
ABAU OPEN				
Jack Genia	2,436	17.64	PANGU	SMP
Desmon Baira	1,998	14.47	PAP	
Aaron Bebao	1,640	11.87	IND	
David Rakilea	908	6.57	IND	
Opa Taureka	716	5.18	IND	
Gavu Maria Lama	611	4.42	IND	
Ila Pagave	607	4.40	IND	
Gavi Mae	586	4.24	IND	
S Roakeina	579	4.19	IND	
Daniel Mera	459	3.32	IND	
Bonou Dedele	438	3.17	IND	
Zelma Gagari	418	3.03	IND	PSP*
Augerega	415	3.00	IND	
Rai Ova	374	2.71	LIB	IND*
Edi Kapigeno	293	2.12	IND	
Gerega Pepena	252	1.82	IND	
Oruba Oruba	249	1.80	IND	
Pat Ila'ava	239	1.73	IND	
Kei V Kapa	215	1.56	IND	
Donald Value	201	1.46	IND	
Michael Hilake	102	0.74	PPP	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(ABAU OPEN continued)				
Informal	75			
Total	13,811			
GOILALA OPEN				
Camillo Esef	2,309	25.24	PANGU	NMP
Andrew Ruddaka	1,565	17.11	PAP	SMP
Perai Manai	941	10.29	PPP	
Sylvester Moge	914	9.99	IND	
Joe Manau	691	7.55	IND	
Elijah Onne	546	5.97	LIB	IND*
Allan Woila	519	5.67	PDM	
Louis Mona	472	5.16	IND	
Allan Koma	449	4.91	IND	
Ajax E Bia	378	4.13	IND	
L Kilemu	336	3.67	IND	
Informal	27			
Total	9,147			
KAIRUKU-HIRI OPEN				
Moi Avei	3,495	15.41	PAP	NMP
Joseph Aoae	3,028	13.35	IND	SMP
James Mopio	2,426	10.70	IND	
Seri Hęgame	2,405	10.61	PANGU	
Tamarua Trudi	1,718	7.58	IND	
Ammanuel Ume	1,602	7.07	IND	
Kere Moi	1,198	5.28	IND	
Ammanuel Ume	938	4.14	IND	
Aihi Ovia	812	3.58	IND	
Louis V Ido	790	3.48	IND	
John Koaba	777	3.43	IND	
John Apini	619	2.73	IND	
Kuea Kaeka	457	2.02	IND	
James K Moaba	438	1.93	IND	
John H tali	412	1.82	PPP	
Joe Aitsi	340	1.50	IND	
Kose A Aisi	325	1.43	IND	
Louisie A Aitsi	275	1.21	IND	
Ernesto C Awo	270	1.19	IND	
Jack Aila	94	0.41	IND	
Informal	255			
Total	22,674			

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
RIGO OPEN				
Dibara Yagabo	3,997	28.11	IND	NMP
Galeva Kwarara	2,534	17.82	IND	SMP
Steven Vaira	1,413	9.94	PANGU	
Tufi Sega	1,031	7.25	PSP	
Teio Ila	990	6.96	PDM	
Mou Barea	875	6.15	IND	
Philip Bouraga	872	6.13	IND	
Launce Vetari	834	5.86	PDM	
Vavine Tauni	761	5.35	PAP	
Roby Gave Duri	666	4.68	IND	
Mairi Mehutu	185	1.30	IND	
Informal	62			
Total	14,220			
GULF PROVINCIAL				
Chris Haiveta	5,385	19.45	IND	PANGU* NMP
Jacob Kairi	4,106	14.83	IND	
Akia Kairi	2,339	8.45	IND	
Posa M Posa	2,042	7.37	IND	
Dominic Evere	1,912	6.90	MA	
Lemek Kum	1,552	5.60	IND	
M Maravila	1,551	5.60	IND	
Chris Hova	1,532	5.53	IND	
Dominic Paulus	1,393	5.03	IND	
John T Poha	1,355	4.89	IND	
John Kavvo	1,147	2.35	IND	
Ope Oeaka	652	2.33	IND	
Kelly Tauraki	645	2.25	IND	
F Malaisa	624	1.96	IND	
Tony Malaisa	544	1.20	PAP	SMP
Aaron Noaio	332	1.10	SMP	
Leo Kavava	272			
Informal	275			
Total	27,691			

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
KEREMA OPEN				
Tom Koraea	1,765	11.17	IND	NMP
Robert Maera	1,715	10.85	IND	PANGU*
Haro Sarufa	1,174	7.43	LNA	IND*
Samuel Kamiato	1,048	6.63	IND	
Daniel Itu	977	6.18	PAP	SMP
H Erekofo	963	6.09	IND	
Susuve Laumaea	888	5.62	IND	
Adamson Yavako	886	5.61	IND	
Pou Toivita	714	4.52	PPP	
E Karukuru	701	4.44	IND	
Mathew Donaipa	659	4.17	IND	
Augustine Hako	623	3.94	IND	
Reuben Aka	528	3.34	IND	
Peter Ginau	522	3.30	PSP	
Joseph Mangabi	506	3.20	IND	
Joiu Koaru	499	3.16	IND	
Makeu M Auhova	388	2.46	IND	
Harry Aitam	349	2.21	IND	
Joseph Meata	329	2.08	IND	
Ika Oavera	299	1.89	LIB	IND*
Wesley Oakari	268	1.70	IND	
Informal	104			
Total	15,801			
KIKORI OPEN				
Roy Evara	2,128	17.91	IND	NMP
R D Kimave	1,845	15.53	PANGU	
Allan Ebu Marai	1,798	15.13	IND	SMP
Horepa Evara	1,292	10.88	IND	
Ivei Kurei	1,085	9.13	IND	PAP*
Francis Heardo	725	6.10	IND	
Avae Kaia	521	4.39	PPP	
rola Miere	514	4.33	IND	
Rev Oria Gemo	484	4.07	IND	
R Haroavila	421	3.54	IND	
Ron Hoka	301	2.53	LIB	
Kuberi Epi	294	2.47	IND	
Esau Mailau	200	1.68	IND	
Philip Omohae	102	0.86	IND	
Nao Kouoru	87	0.73	MA	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
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(KIKORI OPEN continued)

Informal	83			
Total	11,880			

MILNE BAY PROVINCIAL

Tim Neville	23,743	41.39	IND	NMP
J. Abajah	9,044	15.76	IND	
Dennis Young	5,640	9.83	IND	SMP
Aiden Moliola	4,149	7.23	LNA	
Jacob T. Lemeki	3,616	6.30	PAP	
Billy Inafala	3,434	5.99	PANGU	
Dan Hesaboda	2,970	5.18	IND	
John Tubira	2,144	3.74	IND	
Kaidama Elliot	1,840	3.21	LIB	
Informal	790			
Total	57,370			

ALOTAU OPEN

Iairo Lasaro	3,648	19.67	PDM	SMP
John Penrose	1,929	10.40	IND	
Simon Mumuri	1,605	8.65	IND	
Peter Sandery	1,318	7.11	IND	
Moses David	1,125	6.06	IND	
Lyle O'Connor	1,015	5.47	IND	
Gerald Senapil	969	5.22	PAP	
Joe Area	905	4.88	IND	
Jerome Uliyelo	1877	4.73	IND	
Jules Deboi	854	4.60	PANGU	
L. Jellico	767	4.13	PPP	
Joseph Isako	743	4.01	IND	
Simeon Kibikib	660	3.56	IND	
Kevin Yabaga	651	3.51	IND	
BlasiusBiu	475	2.56	IND	
Kaliton Sali	354	1.91	IND	
Alfred Kaniniba	318	1.71	LNA	
Informal	337			
Total	18,550			

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
ESA'ALA OPEN				
John Kanadi	2,365	21.40	LIB	NMP
J. Maladina	1,582	14.32	PDM	SMP
Lassam Kelebi	1,403	12.70	IND	
Wens Kenodega	1,216	11.00	IND	
Wilson Ephraim	1,143	10.34	IND	PPP*
David Petelo	1,108	10.03	PANGU	
Justine Weimate	930	18.42	PAP	
Rex Leleibuna	625	5.66	IND	
Donald Kisianid	410	3.71	IND	
Henry Andrew	171	1.55	IND	
Informal	98			
Total	11,051			
KIRIWINA GOODENOUGH OPEN				
Beona Motawiyi	2,430	16.54	PAP	SMP
Kevin Daidaday	1,699	11.56	IND	
Patrick Tomausi	1,582	10.77	LNA	
J. Sikwaileta	1,438	9.79	PANGU	
Robert Ulitaia	1,428	9.72	PPP	
William Rudd	1,418	9.65	IND	
Kevin Kaidoga	1,375	9.36	IND	
Tom Cameron	1,198	8.15	IND	
Topsi Tubasi	903	6.14	IND	
R. Mugwagata	586	3.99	IND	
G. Mwasaluwa	522	3.55	LIB	
Informal	116			
Total	14,695			
SAMARAI-MURUA OPEN				
Titus Philemon	2,997	22.95	PPP	NMP
Gordon Wesley	1,749	13.40	PDM	
Ebe Kasaiwabu	1,258	9.63	IND	
David Bagita	1,177	9.01	IND	
Israel Edoni	1,171	8.97	PSP	
Noino Losane	1,054	8.07	IND	
Perry Dotaona	738	5.65	IND	
B. Taukuro	609	4.66	IND	
David Morona	593	4.54	PANGU	
N. Kapowota	375	2.87	IND	
James Muraga	372	2.85	IND	
Israel Sabbath	354	2.71	PAP	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(SAMARAI-MURUA OPEN (continued))				
Sheldon Frank	322	2.47	IND	
Manako Gaunede	199	1.52	IND	
Informal	89			
Total	13,057			
NATIONAL CAPITAL DISTRICT				
Bill Skate	7,763	16.11	NAT	NMP
Hugo Berghuser	6,956	14.44	PAP	SMP
L. Titimur	6,192	12.85	IND	
Jack Pidik	3,972	8.24	PANGU	
Margaret Loko	3,785	7.86	IND	
Solepe Tunofi	3,656	7.59	PPP	
Vani Vaieke	2,216	4.60	IND	
Mabel Gavera	1,906	3.96	IND	
Jimmy M. Varika	1,858	3.86	IND	
Thomas Guare	1,629	3.38	IND	
John Agui Sele	1,371	2.85	IND	
Tau Po'o	1,065	2.21	IND	
Joe Mesa	923	1.92	PSP	
Michael Teke	889	1.85	IND	
Stanley Amua	811	1.68	IND	
Aria Yopo	629	1.31	IND	
Paul Sare Bray	566	1.17	IND	
Andrew Kawage	477	0.99	BAP	
Informal	1,516			
Total	48,180			
MORESBY NORTH-EAST OPEN				
David Unagi	1,905	14.48	IND	SMP
John Makabe	1,879	14.29	IND	
Amos Yali	1,027	7.81	IND	
Peter Mondo	848	6.45	IND	
Fred M. Bokoi	796	6.05	IND	
Girty Simon	736	5.60	PANGU	
R. Yangomina	617	4.69	IND	
Pisson Wiye	571	4.34	IND	
Airi Frank Ray	554	4.21	IND	
Thomas Domu	526	4.00	IND	
Albert Pou	429	3.26	IND	
Elizabeth Yama	409	3.11	IND	
Anjo Minao	4.05	3.08	PSP	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(MORESBY NORTH-EAST OPEN continued)				
Harry Hoerler	397	3.02	PAP	
Konze Kara	302	2.30	IND	
Sina Saraga S	299	2.27	IND	
Alois Wemin	275	2.09	IND	
William Rumbia	250	1.90	IND	
Mark Tine	172	1.31	IND	
Kaiapa Tebela	133	1.01	LNA	
James Gondo	96	0.73	IND	
Rubert Hatau	88	0.67	IND	
Joe Waine	71	0.67	IND	
Luke Suba Wai	62	0.54	IND	
Peter Touabo	52	0.40	IND	
Umasi David	48	0.36	IND	
Daley Maima	5	0.04	IND	
Informal	200			
Total	13,153			
MORESBY NORTH-WEST OPEN				
R. Suckling	1,861	9.58	PAP	SMP
Vincent S. Eri	1,800	9.27	IND	
Laren R. Samai	1,583	8.15	LIB	
Tom Aumkele	1,300	6.70	IND	
John H. Hariki	1,184	6.10	PDM	
Thomas Willie	1,041	5.36	IND	
Thomas D. Jones	727	3.74	IND	
Ila Tiana Ila	673	3.47	IND	
Jack J. Suao	669	3.45	IND	
Maria I. Hayes	665	3.42	IND	
Arua A. Miria	538	2.77	PPP	
Dadi Toka	518	2.67	IND	
Michael Konjil	506	2.61	IND	
Mahuru R. Rarua	498	2.56	IND	
Nou K. Kari	453	2.33	PANGU	
M. Ketombing	430	2.21	IND	
Luke Tai	371	1.91	IND	
John Pokani	344	1.77	IND	
Gima Gini	320	1.65	IND	
Timothy Raula	273	1.41	IND	
Yak Lusup	253	1.30	IND	
David Oaseoka	241	1.24	IND	
Mathew Wii	235	1.21	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(MORESBY NORTH-WEST OPEN continued)				
John Kosi	203	1.05	MA	
S. Giregire	182	0.94	IND	
Nelson Makeu	162	0.83	IND	
Robin Kumaina	162	0.83	IND	
Alphonse Umba	162	0.83	BAP	
Jack Laad	159	0.82	IND	
Sani Gras Root	159	0.82	IND	
Jimmy Yani	131	0.67	IND	
Andrew Panap	123	0.63	IND	
Ken H. Awaseo	111	0.57	IND	
Diana Devessa	101	0.52	IND	
Collin Yomba	97	0.50	IND	
Conny Pipalan	96	0.49	IND	
Simon Singut	93	0.48	IND	
Paul W. Aisir	88	0.45	IND	
George Kumai	55	0.28	IND	
Ivan Wandowe	49	0.25	IND	
Gerard Exton	23	0.12	IND	
Informal	778			
Total	19,417			
MORESBY SOUTH OPEN				
Albert Karo	2,013	12.91	PDM	SMP IND*
Raymond Agonia	1,315	8.43	IND	
Legu Vagi	1,244	7.98	IND	
George Lavari	1,078	6.91	IND	
Simon Bomai	1,184	6.10	PDM	
Wesley Sabiyam	987	6.33	IND	
Bill Dihm	956	6.13	IND	
Manu Geno	823	5.28	IND	
Mai Makao	672	4.31	PSP	
Otto Akarapa	643	4.12	PPP	
Arua Au	504	3.23	IND	
Jatu Esawo	497	3.19	IND	
Joseph Karolo	486	3.12	IND	
OpexPaimuru	362	2.32	IND	
David Doriga	342	2.19	IND	
George Lori	335	2.15	IND	
Peter Bal	335	2.15	IND	
Isaac Teo	303	1.94	IND	
Biliso Osake	267	1.71	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(MORESBY SOUTH OPEN continued)				
Joe Povoria	218	1.40	IND	
Ben Yokon	176	1.13	LIB	
Winis Tua	164	1.05	IND	
Steven Palisa	130	0.83	IND	
Jackson Eka	129	0.83	IND	
Kala Kosuwo	99	0.63	IND	
Informal	449			
Total	15,596			
NORTHERN PROVINCIAL				
S. Siembo	2,874	8.16	IND	NMP PAP*
Benson Garui	2,767	7.85	PAP	SMP
Steven Tago	2,682	7.61	NAT	
Undariba Waimi	2,055	5.83	PSP	
Kevin Surute	1,922	15.65	PANGU	
John Arekai	1,759	4.99	IND	
Allan Saruwa	1,728	4.91	IND	
M. Jiregari	1,670	4.74	IND	
Mark Taua	1,625	4.61	IND	
Hudson Daworo	1,408	4.00	IND	
Kipling Gombo	1,243	3.53	PDM	
Titus Gegera	1,243	3.53	MA	
Dennis Koviro	1,162	3.30	IND	
John Lucas	1,076	3.05	IND	
Albert Oraka	1,042	2.96	IND	
Dennis Kageni	995	2.82	IND	
Cutbert Taiane	949	2.69	PPP	
R. Kubuni	918	2.61	LIB	
Cecil Kibikibi	900	2.55	IND	
Joshual Sovi	872	2.48	IND	
Wallace Orere	797	2.26	IND	
P. Sasingako	670	1.90	IND	
Basil Koe	649	1.84	IND	
L. Sumani	605	1.72	IND	
Dickson Maioni	569	1.62	IND	
Hangiri Ute	567	1.61	IND	
Informal	409			
Total	35,226			

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
IJIVITARI OPEN				
Simon B. Kaumi	3,231	18.53	IND	NMP
Akoka Doi	2,738	15.71	PAP	SMP
Keli Hau'ofa	1,408	8.08	IND	
Douglas Garawa	1,232	7.07	PDM	
Rex Arek	1,022	5.86	IND	
Hudson Arek	883	5.07	PPP	
Gideon Pinoko	826	4.74	IND	
J. Marauri	798	4.58	IND	
W. Jojoga	782	4.49	IND	
K. Gegeyo	719	4.12	IND	
Pol. G. Toki	584	3.35	IND	
D. Furifuri	530	3.04	IND	
Anton Porusa	494	2.83	PSP	
William Suremo	480	2.75	IND	
A. Muadi	463	2.66	IND	
Evan Sasa	390	2.24	IND	
Jim Kourah	273	1.57	IND	
A. Kofafa	177	1.02	IND	
Fr M. Asor	137	0.79	IND	
Godwin Bonga	127	0.73	IND	
Informal	139			
Total	17,433			
SOHE OPEN				
John Waiko	2,906	16.33	PAP	NMP
Clement Kerahu	2,795	15.71	IND	
Edmund Uhe	2,335	13.12	PSP	
George Soka	1,473	8.28	PANGU	
Rex Embahe	1,206	6.78	LNA	
Wilson Suja	1,029	5.78	IND	
D. Egimbari	1,022	5.74	PDM	
Ijumi Karol	932	5.24	IND	
John Kerari	874	4.91	IND	
John Toivita	746	4.19	IND	
Rodney Kove	629	3.53	IND	
David Beu	578	3.25	IND	SMP
Henry Wariwang	556	3.12	IND	
John Porei	332	1.87	IND	
Kris Karogol	252	1.42	IND	
Informal	129			
Total	17,794			

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
WESTERN PROVINCIAL				
Dere Wamaro	8,143	20.48	PAP	NMP
Kala Swokin	5,245	13.19	PSP	SMP
Norbert Makmop	4,254	10.70	IND	
Kayama Sinba	4,150	10.44	IND	
Peter Gelau	3,514	8.84	IND	
Bulida Gawga	3,330	8.38	PANGU	
Gen Gom	2,677	6.73	IND	
Tatie Olewale	2,300	5.79	IND	
Katie Yangtem	1,408	3.54	IND	
SiwareLewis	1,311	3.30	IND	
John Bagari	1,152	2.90	IND	
Andrew Diak	1,113	2.80	MA	
Amula Bibaesi	1,037	2.61	IND	
Informal	118			
Total	39,752			
MIDDLE FLY OPEN				
Bitan Kouk	3,181	25.69	IND	NMP
Aino Keiba	2,002	16.17	IND	
Suma Kamaya	1,698	13.71	PANGU	
Daeki Kolesa	1,288	10.40	PSP	
Babadi Sawasi	1,211	9.78	IND	SMP
Edward Egobia	1,198	9.68	IND	
Iti Didiga	1,078	8.71	IND	
Sowati Bagiya	405	3.27	PPP	
Kadalo Abaiya	263	2.12	IND	
Informal	57			
Total	12,381			
NORTH FLY OPEN				
Bob Bubac	2,499	18.22	PANGU	
Philip D. Dipai	1,898	13.84	PSP	
Vincent Kadibu	1,551	11.31	IND	
Pius Fred	1,272	9.28	PAP	
Pious Kuri	1,239	9.04	IND	
Sam Wingen	945	6.89	IND	
Warrent Dutton	911	6.64	PPP	
Keop Kowa	866	6.32	IND	
Simon Aimsep	754	5.50	IND	
Steven Kume	559	4.08	IND	
Simon Kewa	442	3.22	IND	

Name of Candidate	Votes Polled	%	Party	Remarks
(NORTH FLY OPEN continued)				
Peter Danga	411	3.00	IND	
John Tae	132	0.96	IND	
Aim S. Apinai	111	0.81	IND	
Informal	122			
Total	13,712			
SOUTH FLY OPEN				
Perry Zeipi	3,352	24.11	PAP	SMP
G. Gagarimabu	2,999	21.57	MA	
Iakoe Gariga	2,214	15.93	IND	
Ronnie Pakini	1,365	9.82	IND	
Sirini Gauga	1,339	9.63	PANGU	
Brian Wyborn	1,125	8.09	IND	
Lawrence Manu	701	5.04	IND	
John B. Aiede	400	2.88	IND	
Riley Samson	310	2.23	IND	
Informal	96			
Total	13,901			

APPENDIX B

PERFORMANCE OF PARTIES AND INDEPENDENTS BY
REGION AND PROVINCE

A. ISLANDS

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PROVINCE	PARTY	No. of Candidates	% Vote	Seats	SMP	New MP
B'VILLE	MA	4	49.5	1	1	
	PDM	1	13.8	1	1	
	INDEPENDENT	12	36.7	2	1	1
ENBRITAIN	PANGU	3	20.6	2	1	1
	MA	5	13.4	-	-	
	PDM	1	5.9	1	1	
	NATIONAL	1	0.4	-	-	
	INDEPENDENT	17	59.6	2	1	1
MANUS	MA	2	24.7	-		
	LNA	1	18.5	1	1	
	PANGU	2	15.1	1	1	
	PDM	1	3.8	-		
	PSP	1	0.9	-		
	INDEPENDENT	7	37.0	-		
N/IRELAND	PPP	3	50.0	3	1	2
	PANGU	3	31.0	-	-	
	MA	1	5.0	-	-	
	INDEPENDENT	5	12.4	-	-	
WNBRITAIN	MA	3	20.0	1	1	
	PANGU	3	16.3	1	1	
	PPP	3	11.1	1	-	1
	PDM	3	10.9	-		
	LNA	1	4.7	-		
	BAP	1	2.2	-		
	INDEPENDENT	16	34.9	-		

B. PAPUA

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PROVINCE	PARTY	No. of Candidates	% Vote	Seats	SMP	New MP
CENTRAL	PAP	5	18.3	2	1	1
	PANGU	5	10.5	2	1	1
	PDM	3	2.0	-	-	-
	PPP	3	1.2	-	-	-
	PSP	1	0.9	-	-	-
	LIBERAL	2	0.7	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	57	67.9	1	-	1
GULF	PSP	2	4.2	-	-	-
	MA	2	3.6	-	-	-
	PANGU	1	3.4	-	-	-
	LNA	2	3.0	-	-	-
	PAP	2	2.4	-	-	-
	PPP	2	2.2	-	-	-
	LIBERAL	2	1.1	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	40	80.0	3	-	3
MILNE BAY	PAP	5	7.3	1	1	-
	PANGU	5	6.5	-	-	-
	PDM	3	6.2	1	1	-
	LNA	3	5.3	-	-	-
	PPP	3	4.6	1	1	1
	LIBERAL	3	4.1	1	-	1
	PSP	1	1.0	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	38	64.8	1	-	1
NORTHERN	PAP	3	12.1	1	-	1
	PSP	3	7.0	-	-	-
	PANGU	2	5.0	-	-	-
	PDM	3	5.0	-	-	-
	NATIONAL	1	3.8	-	-	-
	PPP	2	2.6	-	-	-
	MA	1	1.8	-	-	-
	LNA	1	1.7	-	-	-
	LIBERAL	1	1.3	-	-	-
INDEPENDENT	44	59.7	2	-	2	

B. PAPUA (continued)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PROVINCE	PARTY	No. of Candidates	% Vote	Seats	SMP	New MP
WESTERN	PAP	3	14.5	2	1	1
	PANGU	4	10.0	1	1	-
	PSP	3	9.5	-	-	-
	MA	2	4.6	-	-	-
	PPP	2	1.5	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	31	60.1	1	-	1

C. NATIONAL CAPITAL DISTRICT

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PROVINCE	PARTY	No. of Candidates	% Vote	Seats	SMP	New MP
N.C.D.	PAP	4	11.0	1	1	-
	NATIONAL	1	8.4	1	-	1
	PANGU	3	5.6	-	-	-
	PDM	3	5.5	2	2	-
	PPP	2	4.5	-	-	-
	PSP	3	2.2	-	-	-
	LIBERAL	2	1.9	-	-	-
	BAP	2	0.7	-	-	-
	MA	1	0.2	-	-	-
	LNA	1	0.1	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	90	60.1	-	-	-

D. MAMOSE

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PROVINCE	PARTY	No. of Candidates	% Vote	Seats	SMP	New MP
EAST SEPIK	PANGU	7	40.6	5	5	
	MA	6	11.5	1	1	
	PDM	4	3.1	1	-	1
	PPP	3	2.5	-	-	-
	LNA	2	0.6	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	52	41.6	-	-	-
MADANG	MA	5	9.3	1	-	1
	PANGU	8	8.7	1	1	
	PPP	6	5.5	1	-	1
	NATIONAL	3	2.7	-	-	
	LNA	2	2.3	1	1	
	PDM	1	1.2	1	1	
	INDEPENDENT	78	70.3	3	-	2
MOROBE	PANGU	10	18.4	3	1	2
	PSP	5	4.9	-	-	
	PPP	4	3.5	1	-	1
	LNA	7	2.2	1	-	1
	PDM	5	2.1	-	-	
	PAP	2	0.5	-	-	
	PLP	1	0.1	-	-	
	LIBERAL	2	0.1	-	-	
	INDEPENDENT	129	68.0	5	-	5
WEST SEPIK	PANGU	5	12.9	2	2	
	PDM	4	8.4	-	-	
	LNA	4	8.0	-	-	
	PAP	1	7.6	1	-	
	PSP	3	6.9	-	-	
	PPP	3	2.3	-	-	
	MA	2	2.0	-	-	
	LIBERAL	2	1.8	-	-	
	BAP	1	0.2	-	-	
	INDEPENDENT	37	49.8	2	-	2

E. HIGHLANDS

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PROVINCE	PARTY	No. of Candidates	% Vote	Seats	SMP	New MP
CHIMBU	COUNTRY	19	6.4	-	-	-
	LNA	8	5.3	2	-	2
	LIBERAL	8	2.6	-	-	-
	BAP	3	1.9	1	-	1
	PAP	3	1.7	1	-	1
	PANGU	4	0.9	-	-	-
	MA	2	0.7	-	-	-
	NATIONAL	1	0.6	-	-	-
	PDM	3	0.5	-	-	-
	PPP	1	0.2	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	172	79.4	3	-	3
E/H'LANDS	PDM	5	11.2	2	2	-
	LNA	5	4.3	-	-	-
	NATIONAL	6	3.7	1	-	-
	PANGU	5	3.6	-	-	-
	LIBERAL	7	2.5	-	-	-
	PPP	3	2.4	1	-	1
	COUNTRY P	5	1.7	-	-	-
	MA	2	1.2	1	-	1
	PAP	3	0.9	-	-	-
INDEPENDENT	179	68.4	4	3	1	
ENGA	PDM	4	11.6	2	2	-
	PANGU	4	3.4	-	-	-
	MA	3	3.4	-	-	-
	PAP	3	2.0	-	-	-
	LIBERAL	5	1.5	-	-	-
	PSP	2	1.5	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	90	76.6	4	2	2

E. HIGHLANDS (continued)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PROVINCE	PARTY	No. of Candidates	% Vote	Seats	SMP	New MP
S/HIGHLANDS	PAP	7	18.0	3	2	1
	PSP	4	13.8	-	-	-
	PDM	4	12.4	2	2	-
	PANGU	6	4.7	1	-	1
	MA	3	3.1	2	-	2
	PPP	3	1.9	-	-	-
	LNA	1	0.1	-	-	-
	LIBERAL	2	0.0	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	64	45.0	1	-	1
W/HIGHLANDS						
	PDM	4	23.3	2	1	1
	PANGU	5	4.4	1	1	-
	NATIONAL	4	3.6	-	-	-
	PPP	3	2.0	-	-	-
	MA	1	1.3	-	-	-
	LNA	2	1.6	-	-	-
	UNITED	1	0.7	-	-	-
	BAP	2	0.7	-	-	-
	PAP	2	0.5	-	-	-
	LIBERAL	1	0.4	-	-	-
	PSP	1	0.3	-	-	-
	INDEPENDENT	68	61.1	5	1	4

Source: Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea 1992b.

Note: There are discrepancies between the above and Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea 1992a regarding party affiliation of candidates.

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The studies collected in this book confirm that elections in Papua New Guinea continue to be over-subscribed, extremely keenly contested and free from government control and manipulation. They also confirm the continuity of the two fundamental features: the essentially local character of Papua New Guinea electoral politics and the relative unimportance of political parties in the electoral process. Other pronounced features of Papua New Guinea elections stem from these two: the very large number of candidates (an average of 15; 48 in one case); the very large number of independent candidates who win; the extremely localised support for candidates; the relative absence and irrelevance of national issues; the virtual impossibility of predicting electoral outcomes in Papua New Guinea; and the turning of elections into primaries, where the elected representatives with the most imaginative strategems and deepest pockets determine, *after* the elections, who will head the government.

The legitimisation function of Papua New Guinea elections is queried by these studies: on account of the above features; on account of an escalating electoral violence, allegations of corruption and administrative lapses; and on the grounds that the MPs often cannot perform their representative functions while their excessively self-regarding and pragmatic behaviour, as far as their support of coalition leaders and policies is concerned, render the coalition governments that result from these elections weak.

The basic conclusion that may be drawn from these studies is that, until political parties become better established and undertake a massive and continuous public education programme and assume a more central role in the choice calculus of many more electors, the negative developmental impacts of Papua New Guinea electoral politics will continue and, probably, escalate.

Yaw Saffu has been at the University of Papua New Guinea since 1981, and Professor of Political and Administrative Studies there since 1989.

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