Colonial Education Policy and Practice in Indonesia; 1900-1942

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Christiaan Lambert Maria PENDERS

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/ Chr. L. M. Penders
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Preface

So far, no detailed study has been made - either in Dutch, English, or Indonesian - of the history of education in Indonesia in the crucial period 1900-1942. In this study an attempt will be made to fill this gap. The only sizeable work in existence is Brugmans' 'Geschiedenis van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie', published in 1937. In this work, the period under discussion is treated in outline only. Brugmans, who was a high colonial official and had been closely involved in some of the major policy decisions concerning education in this period, was obviously unable to disclose information which at that time was still on the classified list. The other secondary material is very limited, and consists mainly of journal articles dealing with specific aspects or topics of colonial education policy.

This study, however, is based in part on extensive research in the Colonial Archives in the Hague and some hitherto unknown material has been brought to light. In order to give English speaking scholars some idea of the nature and the extent of the archival material available, the narrative has been kept fairly closely to the documents and a large number of excerpts translated by the author from the original Dutch - a little known language - have been included in the text.
Chapter I

The Prologue: Colonial Education

Policy in Indonesia until 1900

In Java, parts of Sumatra and the Malayan peninsula highly sophisticated civilisations had been in existence since long before the arrival of the first Europeans in the area. Not only was the art of reading and writing known but also a vast body of literature had been created.

Javanese culture was aristocratic in nature and it was especially in the kratons - the princely courts - that literary activity was flourishing. Upper class children were educated in the Javanese cultural traditions either by their parents or by private tutors. But also in the villages there apparently were always a few people who were able to recite from Javanese literary texts. (1) Another important cultural link between the kraton and the village was the wajang (the puppet theatre) in which the various themes of Javanese literature were portrayed. (2)

Formal education in schools seems to have been provided only with regard to religion. In the schools - asramas - that were often attached to Buddhist monasteries, monks or holy men - as is depicted in some

(1) Vastenhouw, M. 'Analphabetisme', 1949, 94–95.
of the scenes of the Borobudur (3) — taught both children and adults to read and to copy the sacred texts. With the penetration of Islam into Indonesia the asrama gradually evolved into the pesantren, a type of Muslim seminary cum boarding school providing more advanced instruction in Islamic theology and law. The Hindu/Buddhist origin of the pesantren could still be seen in its main characteristics:—

'...The entirely theological character of education, the great reverence for the teacher, who is not recompensed for his services, the students who roam around begging for their livelihood....' (4)

A more typical Islamic institution was the langgar, an elementary religious school, usually housed in a kind of small mosque or room provided for the purpose by a pious Muslim, where children were instructed in the rudimentaries of Islam.(5)

Owing to the absence of any statistical material it is impossible to make even a calculated guess at the indigenous literacy rate in Indonesia before the arrival of the Europeans. Perhaps in Java most of the nobility were able to read and write. In some areas such as West Irian, parts of Borneo and Sumatra, there were probably no literates at all, while in other regions a considerable number of

(3) Note: Borobudur is a famous Buddhist shrine dating back to about 800 AD situated in the vicinity of Jogjakarta (Central Java).

(4) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie' (Groningen/Batavia, 1938) 38.

(5) Note: Langgar can still be found to-day in almost every Indonesian village. Also a large number of pesantren do still exist, although now most of these schools in addition to religion also provide instruction in secular subjects.
people were able to read and write. For example, the census of 1930 found that in the Lampons (South Sumatra) 26.9% of people were literate. This comparatively high literacy rate in the Lampons resulted apparently from the practice of *mandjau*, a game played by young lovers who passed love letters to each other. (6)

It is also not possible to determine how much the Muslim religious schools contributed to the growth of literacy among the indigenous population. In the *langgar* reading and writing was definitely not taught and children learnt by heart the salient points of the Islamic religion. The standard of education provided in the *pesantren* varied widely with the qualifications of the teachers. Reports by Europeans in the nineteenth century — although vague in their description — are on the whole not very complimentary about the value of the *pesantren* either in terms of religious or secular education. (7) In these schools there was no fixed curriculum and students (*santri*) were not graded into classes. Moreover the method of teaching used was rather primitive. It consisted of the teacher (*kijaji*) reading aloud from the Arabic text and the students repeating after him sentence by sentence, attempting to memorise both the text and the *kijaji's* explanations. The main purpose in learning to read seems to have been to enable the student to recite the Qu’ran and apparently only very few *santri* managed to

(6) *Volkstelling 1930*, Deel IV. Hoofdstuk VII. Alphabetisme. 73-74.
learn to understand Arabic. At least this is the impression given in a report of 1831 prepared by the Regent of Patti, the head Djaksa (legal official) and the head Penghulu (religious official) of Japara. These Javanese officials describe the method of teaching in the pesantren as follows:

....In the pesantren or pengadjian first tuition is given in the alipan-alipan sic or the Arabic alphabet. This is followed by the book called toeroetan sic in which are shown the various signs needed to form the words, which are found in the Alcoran sic. Then one proceeds to reading the Alcoran followed by the book semoro-kandi sic which contains an explanation of dogma. After that the book kitab sitin sic is used from which the normal way of praying is taught. Instruction in these pesantren is directed more towards learning to read than to write Arabic. There are many who can read it well. The reasons for this are that to learn to write is considered unnecessary because the major objective has been reached when one can read the Alcoran....Seldom one finds that pupils, even the most advanced among them, can understand what they read, because it is in Arabic. The Alcoran is understood by means of the kitap tapsir sic which is a Javanese translation of the Alcoran.... (9)

These Muslim schools changed little until the beginning of the twentieth century, when a number of kijaji and religious organisations - influenced by reformist ideas from the Middle East - commenced to modernise the Islamic education system along Western lines. Furthermore, it should be realised that for most of the period of European rule these Islamic religious schools were all that was available in the way of formal education to the vast majority of Indonesian children.

(8) Note: pengadjian = school.
(9) Chijs, J.A. van der 'Bijdragen...' op. cit., 232.
The Period 1511-1830

In the Portuguese controlled areas such as Malacca and the Moluccas a promising beginning was made with the provision of Western style education to the indigenous population. Portuguese soldiers and administrators were accompanied by missionaries such as St. Francis Xavier, the founder of the Christian church in Indonesia. Realising that the school was an effective tool in the spreading of Christianity, missionaries placed a great deal of emphasis on indigenous education. In 1536 a school was founded at Ternate (Moluccas) for upper class native children. In addition to a religion, also tuition was provided in reading, writing and arithmetic. A similar school was established in the island of Solor (Timor archipelago) where it is reported that also Latin was taught.\(^{(10)}\) Also Portuguese missionaries introduced compulsory education at the village level.\(^{(11)}\)

Unlike Portuguese overseas expansion, which in addition to trade was motivated by a strong religious zeal, the Dutch East India Company (1602-1799) was solely concerned with commercial gain. The Dutch came to the Indiea to amass wealth and they remained traders rather than civilisers at least for the first two centuries of their presence in the area. The motto of the Dutch East India Company was to leave indigenous society as intact as possible. Interference was allowed only if reasons of commerce and trade demanded such action and the

\(^{(10)}\) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 17.
\(^{(11)}\) Ibid., 16-17.
Company therefore did not show a great deal of interest either in educating or Christianising the native population. In fact, in predominantly Muslim areas such as Java and Sumatra missionary work was actively discouraged in order to avoid any possible social and political repercussions, which were bound to upset the normal course of business. Only in the Moluccas, which had already been partly Christianised by the Portuguese, and in the other - still largely pagan - islands of Eastern Indonesia were Dutch Reformed ministers given a free hand.

In respect of education the Company restricted itself to the provision of schools for children of its employees and indigenous Christians. In these schools a great deal of emphasis, was placed on instruction in the Dutch Reformed religion, while also some reading, writing and arithmetic was taught. The number of pupils in Company schools in 1799 has been estimated at 6,680 of whom about 5,000 were Indonesian Christians.\(^{(12)}\)

In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, however, there was a distinct break with the principle of non-interference in indigenous affairs. The various colonial governments, which succeeded the Dutch East India Company after its dissolution in 1799, were prepared to admit - at least in principle - a far greater degree of responsibility for the economic and social advancement of the indigenous population as a whole. Largely responsible for this change in attitude were the ideas of the Enlightenment. The humanitarian ideals of such

\(^{(12)}\) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...'\ op. cit., p54.
'philosophes' as Voltaire, Raynal, and Rousseau; the concept of the 'noble savage'; the condemnation of slavery; and the strong belief in education as a socio-economic lever, all had an impact on Dutch colonial policy of the time. For example, in 1808 Governor-General Daendels instructed Javanese Regents to establish schools for indigenous children in their respective areas and to appoint properly qualified teachers. But Daendels, obviously influenced by the nativism of Raynal and Rousseau, made it clear that the purpose of these schools was not to Westernise but to educate the Javanese in their own: '...customs, laws and religious concepts...'. It has not been possible to determine how much the Regents took this instruction to heart in the few years that remained before the British occupation of Java (1811-1816).

Similar ideas about native education were held by the Dutch on their return to the Indies in 1816. The instructions of the King to his colonial representatives were written in the same Liberal spirit as the Netherlands constitution of 1815, in which the rights and the duties of both the state and its subjects were specified. Very promising in respect of native education was the Fundamental Law of the Netherlands Indies of 1818 which contained the first definite statement that it was the duty of the government to provide educational facilities for indigenous as well as European children. Furthermore, Indonesian

(13) H.I.O.C. no. 9 le stuk: 'Historisch overzicht van het regeerings-beleid ten aanzien van het onderwijs voor de Inlandsche bevolking', 1.
children were to be allowed entry into European primary schools. (14)

Whatever the motive was for this last clause - the available material is not conclusive on this point - so much is clear from the actual educational measures taken that it was definitely not the intention of the colonial government to Westernise large sections of the indigenous population. For example, in an instruction of 1819 to the residents the Governor-General Van der Capellen (1819-1824) stressed that in the public schools for natives:—

....It was the intention of the government to restrict education to the reading and writing of the vernacular and the knowledge of purely moral concepts, which should have no connection with any particular religion.... (15)

It was further emphasised that the purpose of education was to make the indigenous population more familiar with the spirit of '...existing laws and regulations...'; and in 1820 the Javanese Regents were instructed to take care not only of the supervision and the expansion of schools, but also they had to ensure, that:—

....As many children as possible will be instructed in reading and writing and that they should be instructed as early as possible in the duties of good and virtuous people.... (16)

This emphasis on the creation of virtuous citizens, the specific reference to non-sectarian moral principles, and the desire to keep indigenous culture as intact as possible, are again clear signs of the

(14) H.I.O.C. no.9 le stuk op. cit., 2.
(15) Ibid., 9.
(16) Ibid., 8 and 10.
influence of the Enlightenment on Dutch thinking at the time. This desire to strengthen and modernise indigenous civilisation — rather than replacing it by Western culture — is even more evident from the idea of Van der Capellen to introduce reading and writing into the existing Muslim schools, which as was seen above were entirely religious in nature. Most Residents were highly enthusiastic about this plan and they wanted to introduce it immediately and on a large scale. (17)

These promising plans to provide the indigenous population with modern education facilities were not allowed to materialise because the colonial government was unable to find the necessary finance. Van der Capellen’s mass education plan was deposited in the archives to be forgotten. The only meagre result was the establishment of three government schools for indigenous children at Pasuruan, Krawang and Tjiandjur.

On their return to the Indies in 1816 the Dutch attempted to replace the monopoly and forced delivery system of the Company by a more 'enlightened' system of colonial production and trade. Liberal tariffs were introduced mainly designed for revenue purposes rather than the protection of Dutch shipping and commerce. Colonial agriculture was to be developed by private enterprise. Large tracts of land were granted to European planters and it was hoped that the example set by these European plantations would induce the indigenous population to start producing for export on their own account and of their own free will.

(17) Ibid., 9 and 10.
This 'Liberal' experiment, however, failed. Dutch shipping and trade were unable to compete with the British and protective tariffs had to be introduced. To enhance the competitive position of the Dutch the Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij (N.H.M.) was founded in 1824 under the auspices of William I, the King of Holland. (18) The N.H.M. was given the monopoly of transporting government stores and the shipping and selling in Europe of colonial produce from West Java and the Moluccas, where the Company system of forced deliveries had remained in-tact. But these measures could not prevent a chronic deficit in the balance of payments. Furthermore, the colonial treasury was in dire circumstances. In 1824 the situation had become so desperate that the Governor-General, van der Capellen could see no other way out than to offer the colonies to the British firm of Palmer and Co as collateral for further loans. At this point the Dutch home government stepped in and granted a loan of 20 million guilders. Again in 1828 another loan of 15 million guilders had to be granted. (19)

The Cultuurstelsel: 1830-1848

By the end of the 1820's the Dutch government realised that more drastic measures were needed to make the Indies financially solvent and profitable to the mother country.

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(19) Knibbe, W.A. 'De vestiging der monarchie...' UB no.4 (Utrecht 1935) 100.
The Dutch King\(^{(20)}\) therefore approved the introduction of the
\textit{Cultuurstelsel}, which was a more sophisticated version of the Company's
system of forced deliveries. Under the \textit{Cultuurstelsel} Javanese
peasants were forced to grow export produce on part of their land in
return for low prices. The monopoly of buying, transporting and
selling these crops was given to the \textit{N.H.M.}, which in return provided
loans to the Netherlands treasury on the security of future crops in
Java. Thus, the fertile regions of Java and later also Northern
Celebes (Minahassa) and Minangkabau (West Sumatra) were turned into
large state enterprises.

So far native policy was concerned the \textit{Cultuurstelsel} also
meant a return to the policies of the Dutch East India Company.
In line with normal business procedure the overheads of colonial
administration were to be kept as low as possible. Furthermore, in
the view of van den Bosch\(^{(21)}\) — the architect of the \textit{Cultuurstelsel},
the main task of the colonial government was to ensure peace and order
and this could be achieved with the minimum of expenditure if native
society was left alone as much as possible. An active education
policy therefore was also considered politically unwise because it
would tend to disrupt indigenous society causing an adverse effect on
production and trade.\(^{(22)}\)

\(^{(20)}\) \textbf{Note:} Under the Netherlands Constitution of 1815 the King was given
almost unlimited power over the colonies.

\(^{(21)}\) \textbf{Note:} Johannes van den Bosch (1780–1844) entered the colonial service
in 1797 as an army lieutenant. He was promoted to major-general in
1816 and in 1818 he published a book on the Dutch colonies in which
he strongly criticised Raffles' policies and advocated a return to
the policies of the Dutch East-India Company. In 1827 van den Bosch
was appointed governor-general of the Netherlands West Indies and
in 1828 he became governor-general of the Netherlands East Indies.

\(^{(22)}\) Meinsma, R. '\textit{Het verval van het Cultuurstelsel}' (The Hague, 1955), 53
Hence very little happened in the way of indigenous education during the period of the Cultuurstelsel.

Similar to the Dutch East India Company the colonial government only provided some financial assistance to Christian mission schools in the traditionally Christian areas, mainly in Eastern Indonesia. In predominantly Muslim areas missionary activity was actively discouraged. For example, plans submitted by the Netherlands Missionary Society in the early 1830's for the establishment of schools for Javanese children were received by the government without enthusiasm and they were finally shelved. \(^{(23)}\) In the period 1846-1849 about 15,000 children of Indonesian Christians are reported to have attended mission schools. \(^{(24)}\)

Only very few non-Christian Indonesians were able to receive some kind of Western style education during the first half of the nineteenth century. The three government schools for Indonesians which had been established during the 1820's disappeared soon afterwards because of lack of government financial support. \(^{(25)}\) Also attempts by some more progressive colonial officials to establish schools for the indigenous population were unsuccessful because no financial support was forthcoming from the colonial government. \(^{(26)}\) Moreover, Indonesian children who since 1818 had been allowed to attend European primary schools do not seem to have made great use of this opportunity. For example, in 1847

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(23) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 89-92.
(24) Ibid., 121-122.
(25) cf. p. 9
only 47 non-Christian Indonesian children were reported as attending these schools. (27) Brugmans' argument that at this time Javanese were not interested in Western education does not seem to be completely correct. (28)

In fact a few upper-class Javanese are known to have provided their children with Western style education on their own account. The Regent of Tjiandjur maintained a school where twenty pupils, including two of his sons, were taught free of charge arithmetic and the reading and writing of Malay and Sundanese in both Latin and Arabic characters. (29)

Another instance is provided by the Regent of Banjumas who paid one hundred guilders per month for a private tutor to teach his children. (30)

The fact that so few indigenous children attended European primary schools was not only due to the apathy of parents. Perhaps a more important reason was that during the period of the Cultuurstelsel the colonial government actively discouraged this. In 1849 a regulation was issued forbidding the entry of Indonesians into European schools. (31)

The reason for this was that in line with the policy of non-interference in indigenous affairs the colonial government wanted to maintain the social status quo in the colony as much as possible. Hence Western education and the use of the Dutch language was to remain a monopoly of the upper crust in colonial society: the Dutch themselves.

Reasons of profit - the only acceptable norm at the time for government expenditure - eventually forced the colonial government to

(27) H.I.O.C. no. 9, le stuk op. cit., 16.
(28) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 100.
(29) Chijs, J.A. van der 'Bijdragen...' op. cit., 272.
(30) Ibid., 272.
(31) H.I.O.C. no. 9, le stuk op. cit., 15-19.
relax to some extent its policy of non-interference, at least regarding upper-class Indonesians. The government gradually came to realise that the Javanese nobility and the village heads on whose effective cooperation the success of the Cultuurstelsel depended so much did generally not have sufficient education behind them to carry out their tasks efficiently. After a great deal of deliberation between The Hague and Batavia a royal decree of 30 September 1848 empowered the Governor-General to budget annually a sum of 25,000 guilders to establish training schools for Javanese officials. The medium of instruction in these schools was to be the local vernacular. (32) By 1851 five of these training schools had been established. This was followed by the opening of the first teachers training schools for Indonesians in Surakarta (1852) and Fort de Kock (Minangkabau) in 1856. (33)

'Laissez-faire' Liberalism and Colonial Policy

The ascendancy of 'laissez-faire' Liberalism in Dutch politics in the period 1848-1870 also caused a gradual change in Dutch thinking on colonial affairs.

In 1848 a new constitution was adopted in the Netherlands which ensured a more important role in government to the Liberal bourgeoisie - 'the thinking part of the nation'. The power of the King was curtailed by the principle of ministerial responsibility; and the citizen was guaranteed the fundamental human rights of freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, and freedom of association.

(32) H.I.O.C. no.9, le stuk op. cit., 272.
(33) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 183.
So far as the colonies was concerned the new constitution stipulated that the minister was to submit to parliament a yearly report about the state of affairs in the colonies and that the principles of colonial policy were to be regulated by the legislature.

The Liberal colonial program was largely concerned with opening up the Indies for private enterprise. Humanitarian considerations, however, also played a part.

Criticism about abuses in colonial administration had reached Holland only sporadically during the heyday of the Cultuurstelsel. It was only from the mid-1840's onwards that there seems to have been 'an awakening of the national conscience.' Pamphlets appeared decrying the miserable lot of the Javanese and newspapers featured stories about the situation in the Indies. In particular reports about famines in Grobongan and Demak in 1847 seem to have caused much upheaval in the Netherlands. The struggle for the 'arme Javaan' (poor Javanese)

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(35) Note: In order to stimulate production the colonial government in 1832 awarded officials 50 cents for every picul (61.7 kilograms) of sugar produced. Similar arrangements came into existence for other export crops such as tobacco, tea and spices. Many Dutch and Indonesian officials in an excessive zeal for profits tried to drive up production in their particular areas to the utmost limit. In some areas the pressure put on the population was so great that neither time nor sufficient land was left for essential food production. In some areas of Java famine occurred in 1846 and 1847. For example, in Demak starvation and emigration caused a fall in population from 336,000 to 120,000 between 1848 and 1850. Source: Reinsma, R. 'Het verval...' op. cit., 27, and Colenbrander, H.T. 'Koloniale Geschiedenis' (The Hague, 1926) vol.III, 42.
was carried on in parliament by a small but vociferous group of humanitarians foremost of whom was van Hoevell (36) who stressed that instead of exploitation the first duty of the colonial government was to raise the economic and intellectual standards of the indigenous population. Criticism about the suppression and maltreatment of the Javanese increased during the 1850's and reached its culmination in 1860 with the publication of the 'Max Havelaar' by Multatuli (37) who in particular directed the attention of the Dutch public to the malpractices of Javanese officials.

The main point of contention, however, between the Liberals and the Conservatives was the question of how the colony could be exploited most efficiently. Most Liberals believed just as strongly as their opponents that the colonies existed for the benefit of the mother country.

The impact, however, of Liberal thinking on colonial policy was only gradual:

(36) Note: Wolter Robert baron van Hoevell departed for the Indies in 1836 as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church. He was an ardent Liberal with a genuine interest in improving the lot of the indigenous population. He propounded his ideas in his 'Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie'. He became involved in a movement in 1848 which petitioned the King for freedom of the press, secondary schools, and representation in the Dutch parliament. He resigned his post largely because of government pressure and returned to the Netherlands where he was elected to the Tweede Kamer (Lower House). He retained his seat until 1862. Source: Colenbrander, H.T. 'Koloniale...' op. cit., 43-44, and Vandenbosch Amry 'The Dutch East Indies, its government, problems, and politics' (Michigan, 1933) 48 note 14.

(37) Multatuli, pseudonym for Eduard Douwes Dekker, 1820-1887. Arrived in the Indies in 1838 where after having served in many parts of the archipelago he was appointed assistant-resident of Lebak (West Java) in 1856. He became soon involved in a dispute with the resident whom he accused of weakness in dealing with local Javanese officials who were pillaging and suppressing their own people. Dekker was transferred to another post but refused to mend his ways and was discharged from the colonial service. On his return to Europe he published the 'Max Havelaar' and numerous other writings in which he...
It is wrong to think that as a natural result of the direct elections in 1848 there immediately occurred a more realistic appreciation of colonial conditions. The exhortations of van Hoevell in the Lower House were exciting and new both in form and content. One did not know what to admire most: his considerable knowledge of the Indies...the boldness of the demands which he put or implied, or the glowing and eloquent manner in which his demands were formulated. But however much one liked to listen to Baron van Hoevell when it came to voting—at least about important questions—one turned away and listened to Baud (Conservative expert on colonial affairs tr. note) (38)

The Wet op de Staatsinrichting van Ned. Indie (Fundamental Law of the Netherlands Indies) of 1854 was therefore a compromise between the Liberal and Conservative position. On the one hand the Fundamental Law laid down that the Cultuurstelsel was to be maintained, but at the same time it made provisions for the gradual abolition of the system. Furthermore, the colonial government was ordered to protect the indigenous population against the excesses and abuses of the Cultuurstelsel. The influence of Liberalism is more directly visible in the provisions abolishing slavery, and granting the fundamental right of freedom of conscience. Freedom of the press and freedom of association were still severely restricted. Most important—particularly in the

(37) contd. from p.16 vividly described the inhumanity of Dutch colonial rule. Source: Multatuli 'Max Havelaar of de koffie-veilingen der Nederlandsche Handel - Maatschappij' verzorgd en toegelicht door Dr. G.W. Huygens (Rotterdam, Donker, 1962) 5-14.

(38) Idema, H.A. 'Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie, 1891-1918' (The Hague, 1924) 2-3.
context of this thesis - were clauses establishing the principle that it was the duty of the colonial government to provide education to the indigenous population.

Liberalism, however, continued to march forward and during the 1860's it became triumphant in Dutch politics. In the meantime knowledge about conditions in the Indies had spread more widely in the Netherlands and financial concerns in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were gradually showing more interest in investing in the Indies.\(^{(39)}\) The pressure of private planters in Java for a secure supply of land and labor was becoming stronger and when Fransen van de Putte\(^{(40)}\) - an ex-planter from Java - was appointed Minister of Colonies in 1863 the fate of the Cultuurstelsel was sealed. The first great success of van de Putte was the acceptance in 1864 of the Comptabiliteitswet (Auditing Act) which provided that the annual colonial budget was to be passed by parliament. Furthermore, a beginning was made with the abolition of forced cultivation: pepper, in 1862; cloves and nutmeg in 1863; indigo, tea, cinnamon and cochineal in 1865; and tobacco in 1866.\(^{(41)}\) Fransen van de Putte resigned in 1866.

\(^{(39)}\) Note: e.g. The Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij started to provide credit to private planters from about 1855 onwards. It was followed in 1857 by the Nederlandsch Indische Escompto Maatschappij. In 1863 another three credit institutions ('cultuur banken') were founded: the Rotterdamsche Bank, the Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, and the Internationale Crediet en Handelsvereniging 'Rotterdam'. Foreign capital also was attracted and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China opened a branch in the Indies. (Source: Mansvelt, W.M.F. 'Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij' (Haarlem, 1924) Vol.II, 356-362.

\(^{(40)}\) Note: Isaac Dignus Fransen van de Putte was born in 1822 at Goes (Zeeland). In 1838 he joined the merchant navy and reached the rank of first mate. In 1849 he was put in charge of the sugar factory Pandji in Java. Later he became a tobacco planter in East Java. Van de Putte returned to Holland in 1859. (Source: Colenbrander, H.T. 'Koloniale...' op. cit., 49-50.)

\(^{(41)}\) Furnivall, J.S. 'Netherlands India' op. cit., 165.
but the demolition of the Cultuurstelsel continued. The Suikerwet of 1870 abolished the forced cultivation of sugar over a period of twelve years. Coffee, however, remained an exception as it was considered a necessary mainstay of colonial finances. The Agrarische Wet (Agrarian Law) of 1870 not only tried to provide planters with secure land tenure, but also attempted to protect the interests and rights of the indigenous population. Virgin land could be rented for a period of seventy-five years. Land owned by indigenous village communities could be rented for shorter periods but no native owned land could be sold to Europeans or Chinese. Indonesians could also obtain — if they so desired — European legal rights on their land as distinct from the provisions of the adat law (indigenous customary law). The Koelie Ordonnantie of 1880 attempted to regulate the supply of plantation labor and prescribed the duties and rights of both planters and laborers. No indigenous workers could be recruited unless a written contract had been signed in front of the local colonial administrator. In this contract the employer had to agree to provide adequate housing and medical facilities. Also the duration of the contract, working hours, wages and their mode of payment were to be clearly specified. The employer was made punishable by law if he failed to carry out any of these conditions. On the other hand, the plantation worker, who had been recruited in this way, was forbidden by law to terminate his contract before the due date unless good cause could be shown. Labor disputes were to be settled by arbitration before the

(42) Colenbrander, H.T. 'Koloniale...' op. cit., 49-55.
local magistrate. (43)

It had taken the Liberals almost twenty years to win the battle for 'free' labour and private enterprise. Similarly it was not until the early 1870's that an attempt was made to provide education facilities to the indigenous population as a whole.

Liberal inspired colonial education policy in the period 1860-1880 forms a distinct and important break with the past. This is shown first of all in the attitude of Liberal colonial administrators to the dissemination of the Dutch language among the indigenous population. In complete contrast to the previous centuries of Dutch rule it now became official policy to encourage at least upper-class Indonesians to learn the Dutch language. Liberals argued that in view of the underdeveloped state of the various indigenous languages a knowledge of Dutch would speed up intellectual development and would be of great help in civilising the indigenous population. In a submission to the colonial government the Inspector of Native Education van der Chijs argued that in Indonesia the Dutch language should be allowed to act a role similar to the one played by Latin in medieval Europe. (44) The Governor-General agreed and on 24 June 1864 issued a regulation allowing Indonesians - irrespective of class or religion - to attend a European primary school if they so desired. (45) In addition to the Liberal desire to 'civilise'

(44) H.I.O.C. no.9 le stuk op. cit., 42.
(45) Ibid., 43.
the indigenous population another important motive behind the decision to re-open Dutch-language schools for Indonesians was the growing need of the colonial economy for Dutch speaking lower clerical and technical personnel. This demand resulted from the spread of Western private enterprise and the subsequent need of the colonial government to expand its administrative apparatus. It was mainly for financial reasons that the colonial government and European concerns wanted to fill these positions from local sources. In line with the Liberal principle of ensuring equal opportunities to all citizens the Minister of Colonies, Fransen van de Putte, in 1864 took the momentous decision - which again broke completely with past policy - to open civil service positions to all population groups in the colony. Candidates were to be accepted into the civil service on the basis of competitive examination. Two types of examinations were instituted: the Kleinambtenaarsexamen (Lower Clerical Entrance Examination) which demanded an educational standard equal to that of the European primary school, and the Grootambtenaarsexamen (Higher Clerical Entrance Examination) which required secondary school qualifications.\(^{(46)}\)

Closely connected with the introduction of these new civil service entrance regulations was the decision to open European primary schools to Indonesians\(^{(47)}\) and the introduction of secondary education in the colony. The first secondary school - the Gymnasium Willen III\(^{(48)}\) -

\(^{(46)}\) H.I.O.C. no.9 le stuk \textit{op. cit.}, 66-68.
\(^{(47)}\) cf. p.20
\(^{(48)}\) Note: The Gymnasium evolved from the old Humanist Latin schools and therefore placed a great deal of emphasis in its curriculum on the Latin and Greek classics. Until 1917 the Gymnasium was the only type of high school granting matriculation status.
had already been opened in Batavia in 1860. From 1867 onwards this
school - which soon after changed its name to Hogere Burgerschool (H.B.S.)\(^{(49)}\) - provided a special course training pupils for the Grootambtenaarsexamen. Other secondary schools of the H.B.S. type were established in Surabaja in 1875 and Semarang in 1877.\(^{(50)}\)

In addition to the European primary school and the H.B.S., which in principle were opened to all races in the colony, the colonial government also set up special schools of more advanced training for Indonesians. First in this category were the various teachers training schools in which Dutch was used as the medium of instruction. Then in 1878 four-year schools especially designed, for sons of prijaji - the Hoofdenscholen - were founded at Bandung (West Java), Magelang (Central Java), Probolinggo (East Java) and Tondano (Celebes). Also in these schools Dutch was the medium of instruction. Far more important - in terms of Indonesian social and political development - was the Dokter-Djawa school established in 1851 in Batavia for the purpose of training Indonesian vaccinators. In 1864 the original two years training course was expanded to three years and now in addition to vaccination students were also given instruction in minor surgery and the diagnosis and treatment of common diseases. In 1875 there was a further important reorganisation. The course was now extended to seven years and the first two years were

\(^{(49)}\) Note: Hogere Burgerschool means literally High school for Burghers. These schools were similar in curriculum to the Gymnasia with the exception that Latin and Greek was not taught.

\(^{(50)}\) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 149, 152.
devoted to bringing students to the required level of general education and training them in the Dutch language. Dutch was adopted as the language of instruction during the actual five year training course, which in addition to a large number of medical subjects also included physics, chemistry, botany and biology. Again in 1900-1902 another reorganisation took place. The course was lengthened and the name of the school was changed to School Tot Opleiding Van Indische Artsen - S.T.O.V.I.A. - (School for the training of Indies doctors). By now this institute had reached university level, and its graduates were eligible to qualify for a Dutch medical degree after about one further year of study at a university in the Netherlands. (51)

Liberal education policy also attempted to implement the stipulations of the Fundamental Law of 1854 regarding the provision of schools to the general indigenous population. As a first step in this direction an Inspector of Native Education was appointed in 1864. This was followed in 1867 by the establishment of a Department of Education. Finally in 1871-1872 the provision of elementary education to Indonesians was regulated by law. These regulations stressed that, first of all, care should be taken to train properly qualified Indonesian teachers. Subsequently between 1873 and 1879 six new teachers training schools were set up. The duration of the training course was to be four years and, as was seen above (52) Dutch was given an important place in the curriculum. In addition the following subjects were taught: one or more indigenous

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(52) cf. p. 12
language, history, geography, arithmetic, physics, agriculture, surveying, drawing, education, singing, and gymnastics. Furthermore, the regulations of 1871-1872 made provision for the establishment of three year elementary schools for Indonesians. These schools were to cater for the whole of the indigenous population irrespective of class. As such a flexible curriculum was prescribed. The minimum of education to be provided was the three R's, but in addition teachers were allowed — if the need arose — to give instruction in the whole range of subjects they had studied in the teachers training schools. (53)

It was soon found, however, that the primary school system which was established under the Education Regulations of 1871 was not only inefficient but also too expensive. Critics of the system pointed to the high rate of absenteeism and the practice of leaving school before completion of the course. For example, in the period 1878-1882 Indonesian children on the average stayed away from school one day out of every five, while in the same period 69.7% of pupils left school during the first year, 19.4% during the second year, and 7.5% in the third year, leaving only 3.4% of first year entrants to receive a school certificate (tamat beladjar). (54) Moreover the standard of education offered also left a great deal to be desired because of a lack of qualified teachers.

(54) H.I.O.C. no.9 le stuk op. cit., 1-2.
Teachers training schools showed a high failure rate, because trainees on the whole were not able to cope with the large range of subjects which were taught in Dutch - a foreign language - by European teachers who usually had no knowledge of the local vernacular. Hence many unqualified teachers were appointed. To make matters worse even many of the qualified teachers were often ineffective because they attempted to instruct their pupils in the whole range of subjects - including Dutch - which they had been taught at the teachers training school.\(^{(55)}\)

A controversy occurred in the colony on the fundamental causes of the inefficiency of the education system. The Liberal Director of Education, Stortenbeker was of the opinion that the idea of one basic school type with a flexible curriculum serving the whole of the indigenous population had apparently misfired, because neither the educational needs of upper-class children nor lower-class children were satisfied. In Stortenbeker's view educational needs were determined by the social status and function of the parents and hence he suggested that entry into the existing elementary schools should be restricted to upper-class children and that more simple schools - teaching the three R's - should be set up for the remainder of indigenous children.\(^{(56)}\)

An entirely different view was taken by Verkerk-Pistorius who argued that the core of the problem lay in the secular character of the government schools. According to this education expert Christian Mission schools were not only cheaper - always an important consideration in


\(^{(56)}\) *H.I.O.C.*, no.9, 2e stuk *op. cit.*, 3-4.
Dutch policy discussions - but also that they had proved to be far more attractive to the indigenous population:

'...Secular mass education...cannot lift a half-civilised people to a higher cultural level. In order to reach the objective religion has at all times and in all countries been an indispensable tool...!' (57)

Verkerk-Pistorius proposed that the running of the education system should be left to the Christian missions with the financial support of the government. (58)

The proposals of Verkerk-Pistorius caused strong opposition from Stortenbeker and other Liberal colonial officials and Dutch parliamentarians. In fact the criticism of Verkerk-Pistorius struck at the anti-clericalism of many Dutch Liberals who insisted on a complete separation of Church and State in Holland as well as in the colonies. In the Dutch parliament at this time the Christian parties (59) were attempting to stop Liberal moves to secularise education. This 'Schoolstrijd' - 'Schools struggle' - was now also transplanted to the Indies. The Colonial Fundamental Law of 1854 had laid down that the colonial government was to adhere strictly to a position of neutrality in religious affairs. Consequently, the Education Regulations of 1871 banned religious instruction in government schools and an ordinance of 1874 stipulated that private schools were only eligible for government subsidy after religion had been removed from the syllabus. (60) As a

(57) Ibid., 8.
(58) Ibid., 8.
(59) cf. p. 40 of Chapter II.
result of these new subsidy regulations a number of mission schools in Eastern Indonesia had to be closed down and some of the teachers training schools and primary schools run by the Netherlands Missionary Society were transferred to the colonial government. \(^{(61)}\)

Liberal legislation, however, held one advantage for the Christian Missions in that the principle of religious neutrality meant a reversal of the long accepted rule forbidding missionary activity in predominantly Muslim areas. Hence, during the last two decades of the nineteenth century Christian missionaries were allowed to work in larger numbers in areas such as Java and Sumatra. This benefitted the expansion of education facilities in these areas. The number of Indonesian pupils in Christian mission schools in Java increased from 1,001 in 1877 to 2,350 in 1892, while in the Outer Islands the figures for the same period were 11,158 and 15,755 respectively. \(^{(62)}\)

However, financial considerations forced the government to act before it had been able to reach a final verdict on these fundamental education issues. A drop in the world market prices of colonial produce, diseases in coffee and sugar, and a deterioration in the colonial financial position from the late 1870's onwards demanded the introduction of economy measures. The Minister of Colonies decided in 1885 that as a temporary measure the syllabus of both the teaching training schools and the primary schools were to be greatly simplified. Not only were Dutch and a number of other subjects taken from the curriculum, but

\(^{(61)}\) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...', op. cit., 168.
also some of the existing teachers training schools were to be closed and the expansion of primary schools was to be slowed down.\(^{(63)}\)

Apparently ideals such as the 'mission civilisatrice' or the 'white man's burden' were held at this time only by a few radical Liberals who strongly objected to this curtailment of education expenditure. The fervor of the majority of Dutch Liberals who since 1848 had been clamouring for the expansion of education facilities for the indigenous population slackened considerably as soon as the colonial government ran out of money and the Dutch treasury might be asked to contribute.

A final decision on the principles of education policy was not made until 1893 when the earlier proposals of Stortenbeker were adopted. Two types of elementary school were to be established: The Eerste Klasse School (First-Class School) destined for upper-class Indonesian children and providing a five-year course in the three R's, geography, history, nature study, drawing and surveying; and a Tweede Klasse School (Second-Class School) which was much simpler in its set-up and would provide a three-year course in reading, writing and arithmetic to lower-class children. It should be noted that in both school types the medium of instruction was to be the local vernacular or Malay and that the Dutch language was not taught.\(^{(64)}\)

The question of private versus public schools was finally settled in 1895 when a new subsidy ordinance was passed granting government

\(^{(63)}\) H.I.O.C., no. 9, 2e stuk op. cit., 5.
\(^{(64)}\) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 212-214.
assistance to any private school – including Muslim schools – providing these schools had a curriculum and standards equal to government schools. (65)

As is apparent from the statistics presented below, educational progress during the Liberal period was far less spectacular than radical Liberals such as van Hoevell had hoped for.

Production of teachers colleges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of pupils</th>
<th>Number of graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1873-1877</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878-1882</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883-1887</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888-1892</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893-1897</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898-1899</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hartgerink, H.J.H. 'De Staten-Generaal...' op. cit., 44.

Production of Dokter-Djawa school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of students</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1875-1884</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885-1894</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-1904</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 'Jaarlijks Verslag Der School Tot Opleiding van Inl. Artsen... over...1904-1905' (Batavia, 1906) 62.

Expansion of elementary schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Number of pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hartgerink, H.J.H. 'De Staten-Generaal...' op. cit., 39, 82.

(65) H.I.O.C. no.9, 2e stuk op. cit., 20.
Chapter II

The 'Ethical' Policy: 1900–1918

At the beginning of the twentieth century Holland embarked upon a new colonial policy, usually called the 'Ethical' policy, which can be seen as the Dutch version of the 'white man's burden' or the 'mission civilisatrice'. The outstanding features of the new policy were: the official abandonment of exploitation which had been such a marked feature of previous Dutch rule, and direct state intervention in order to strengthen the economic position of the indigenous population. Furthermore, indigenous education was boosted considerably and a beginning was made with administrative and political decentralisation culminating in 1918 with the opening of the Volksraad, a type of proto-parliament.

The 'Ethical' policy was motivated by economic as well as humanitarian considerations.

By the end of the nineteenth century the colonial government was confronted by two serious economic problems: a chronic budget deficit and an apparent deterioration in the economic situation of the indigenous population.

The Liberal colonial period (1860–1900) had in many ways seen a complete reversal of the principles underlying the system of van den Bosch. Not only had the Cultuurstelsel been gradually abandoned and had private enterprise been given security of land tenure and labor supply, but also the colonial government had been pressed into spending vast sums of money on projects which would have been anathema to van den
Bosch and Baud, such as the improvement and extension of the infrastructure, health services, native education, and the expansion of Dutch control in areas outside Java. Between 1875 and 1900 two hundred and fifty million guilders had been spent on the construction of railways, harbours and irrigation works.\(^1\) Moreover, the expansion of private enterprise in Java as well as the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra, had caused a considerable rise in expenditure on government administration, justice, the military and the police. Meanwhile the Netherlands had also become embroiled in the new upsurge of Western imperialism - the 'grab for colonies'. A notable case in point was the war with Achin which lasted for more than thirty years costing four hundred million guilders.\(^2\)

The colonial revenue system, however, was not sufficiently adjusted to cope with this vast increase in expenditure. The idea that colonies existed solely for the benefit of the mother country had not died with the change-over from the Cultuurstelsel to the Liberal system of private enterprise. Most Dutch Liberals were just as adamant as Conservatives in exacting the greatest possible benefits out of the Indies for the use of the home treasury. Accordingly, van den Bosch's policy of the 'batig slot', i.e. the system of levying tribute in the form of colonial budget surplusses, was continued until this lucrative source of revenue had finally dried up in 1877. Between 1867 and 1877

\(^1\) Furnivall, J.S. 'Netherlands India: a study of plural economy' (Cambridge, 1944) 211.

\(^2\) Ibid., 211.
an amount of 151 million guilders had been remitted in this way to the Netherlands where these funds were used to pay off the state debt, to mitigate the taxation burden on the Dutch citizen, and to build railways and fortifications. (3) If the 'batig slot' policy had been abandoned earlier then the colonial treasury would have been in a position to finance from its own resources the vast expenditure it was forced to make in the period 1870-1900.

To make matters worse the last quarter of the nineteenth century showed a downward trend in colonial revenue which the colonial government was unable to reverse. The Liberal theory of taxation that the replacement of the Cultuurstelsel and the subsequent loss of government revenue from colonial produce would be compensated for by an increase in customs duties and land tax resulting from the expansion of private enterprise did not bear out in the Indies. The gradual abolition of forced cultivation caused income from government produce to fall from 75.8 million guilders in 1867 to 27.8 million guilders in 1897. This loss was not balanced by a rise in other sources of government revenue with the result that in 1897 the colonial revenue was more than seven million guilders below that in 1867. (4)

One important reason for this was the failure of the colonial government to introduce an efficient and equitable system of taxation.

(3) Gonggrijp, G. 'Schets eener economische geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indie' (Haarlem, 1928) 178.

(4) Furnivall, J.S. 'Netherlands India...' op. cit., 341.
Europeans were only lightly taxed\(^{(5)}\) and European planters—after an economic depression in 1885—were successful in having the export duty on sugar lowered, while Dutch traders and industrialists had been able to gain sufficient influence in parliament to prevent the levying of import duties on manufactures goods.\(^{(6)}\) Most of the burden therefore came to rest on the indigenous population which by the end of the nineteenth century paid about 80% of the total amount of taxation levied.\(^{(7)}\)

The recurrent deficits in the colonial budget were balanced by loans from the Dutch treasury amounting in 1898 to 100 million guilders and settling the Indies with an extra burden of 36 million guilders per annum in repayments and interest.\(^{(8)}\)

By 1900 the colonial government was in a serious financial impasse. To increase taxation had not been possible because Europeans were unwilling to pay more and Indonesians had already been taxed so heavily that they could not pay more. The problem was even further aggravated because of a fall in the taxable capacity of the indigenous population resulting from diminishing native prosperity.

Liberal colonial policy had not only caused the colonial government to fall into serious debt, but there were also indications that

\(^{(5)}\) Gonggrijp, G. *Schets...* op. cit., 178.
\(^{(6)}\) Furnivall, J.S. *Netherlands India...* op. cit., 211.
\(^{(7)}\) Furnivall, J.S. *Netherlands India...* op. cit., 343.
the promised panacea of 'laissez-faire, laissez-aller' had by-passed large sections of the indigenous community, particularly in Java.

An important cause of diminishing native welfare in Java was the passive response of most of the peasantry to the changed economic conditions resulting from a steep rise in population and the penetration of a money economy.

The estimated population increase in Java was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>4,499,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>9,374,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>12,514,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>16,233,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>19,540,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>23,608,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>28,386,121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most historians have attributed this vast rise in population to the growing impact of colonial administration which by such means as vaccination against small-pox, provision against famines, and the establishment of peaceful conditions had removed at least in part the normal Malthusian checks. (10)

The Javanese responded to this increase in population not by diversifying their economy but by expanding the traditional system of subsistence agriculture. However, the population increased faster than the acreage under foodcrops causing a decrease in the per capita

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(9) Pelzer, K.J. 'Pioneer settlement in the Asiatic tropics' (American Geographical Society Special Publication no.29) (New York, 1945) Table XXII, 254.

(10) Note: Pelzer disagrees with this view. He points out that population estimates in the early nineteenth century are of dubious validity and should have been substantially higher (cf. Pelzer, K.J. in: McVey, R.T. ed. 'Indonesia', Chapter I: 'Physical and human resource pattern' (Yale, 1965) 16.
land available. According to van Deventer, the population of Java rose by 30% in the period 1885-1900 while agricultural land only increased by 16%. There was also no increase in the rate of productivity in the rice growing areas, although this was partly compensated for by the cultivation of other food crops on dry land. (11) Yet, most of the population increase was absorbed by the traditional agrarian economy. This resulted in what has been termed a system of 'shared poverty', where the same output was produced by an ever increasing input of labor causing each individual to work less in order to provide the whole of the community with economic support. As Geertz has written:

'...This peculiar Alice-in-Wonderland world, where people will work less hard, but not more; where they will allow other workers to reduce their own real income through a progressively disfunctional form of featherbedding; and where output stays the same but labor patterns grow steadily more complex, may seem a simple irrational fancy, but it is in fact a model of the type of situation towards which the Javanese economy has moved in its process of development...' (12)

But while in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the income of the Javanese farmer was on the average declining his need for cash money was increasing in order to cope with higher taxation and in order to buy imported cottons and utensils which had pushed traditional native industries out of existence. Hence the Javanese peasant was forced more and more to implement his sagging income by


growing export crops on some of his land, hiring himself out as plantation laborer, or renting out some of his land to European plantations. The vast majority of Javanese farmers, however, took these steps only as emergency measures to be discarded as soon as the immediate need for cash was satisfied so that they could return to the traditional pattern of subsistence agriculture. In the words of Boeke, rice growing meant to the Javanese peasant:

'...A form of cultivation for his own needs containing a wealth of experience...cultivation which he does not measure in economic terms but which he adheres to because it provides him with his most favoured food...a cultivation the product of which he has destined for himself and his family. He sells only because he is forced to by the need of money in the same way as earlier he was forced to yield some of his crop as taxation to his chiefs and the princes. Even to-day such a sale is still against his will forced upon him by the need for money. The farmer is driven to sell in response to the price obtainable but because of his urgent need for money...' (13)

In addition to this cultural barrier to economic diversification the Javanese peasant had developed a strong aversion to the cultivation of export crops because he had been forced to grow these during the Cultuurstelsel.

But even if the Javanese farmer had been willing to abandon rice growing for the cultivation of more lucrative crops such as sugar, he would have been confronted by a number of insurmountable obstacles. To establish and run a Western style plantation demanded large tracts of land, considerable capital, technical skill, and business acumen. The

average Javanese peasant was singularly lacking in these resources. Furthermore, estate agriculture—which was less capital intensive than industrial enterprise in Europe—depended for its profits largely on a secure supply of cheap land and labor. Hence, the rise of a prosperous Javanese peasantry would have militated against the vital interests of Western plantation concerns. And whenever Javanese farmers attempted to enter the export field the colonial government—pressed by the politically powerful plantations combines—forced these small-scale ventures out of existence.\textsuperscript{(14)}

Another reason for the decline in the Javanese standard of living was that the plantations were able—because of the uncompetitive position of the Javanese farmer and his generally passive response to economic change—to whittle down the price of plantation labor and land. This occurred particularly from the early 1880's onwards when sugar planters were severely hit by an outbreak of cane disease (sereh) and a serious fall in world market prices because of the increasing competition of beet sugar in Europe. In 1904 the average rent paid for one bouw (0.71 hectares) of land by sugar estates was about 20\% below that in 1870, while the daily wage of workers in sugar plantations fell from 30.5–37 cents in 1880 to 21.5–26 cents in 1904.\textsuperscript{(15)}

\begin{itemize}
\item[(14)] Geertz, C. 'The social context of economic change: an Indonesian case study' (Centre for International Studies, M.I.T., 1956) 47–49. See also: Boeke, J.H. 'Ontwikkelingsgang...' \textit{op. cit.}, 74–75.
\item[(15)] Colenbrander, ed. 'Leven en Arbeid...van Deventer...' \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. II, 262, 271.
\end{itemize}
All this was obviously not conducive to enhance Javanese economic development. According to van Deventer the situation had become so precarious that on the average a Javanese family had only 39 guilders in cash at its disposal per annum, which:

'...was needed to pay for clothing, the upkeep of house and furniture, lighting, entertainment; - and not least - to satisfy the demands of the fiscus....The slightest adversity, the least mistake is sufficient to disturb this rather tenuous balance and will deliver the head of the family permanently in to the hands of the usurer...'

(16)

Although van Deventer's findings cannot be considered as conclusive, because of lack of sufficient and reliable statistical date, (17) there are on the other hand indications such as a fall in the capacity of the indigenous population to pay taxes and to buy imported goods which point to a decline in indigenous economic welfare. For example, in 1875 the imports of rice and cotton accounted for 59.9 million guilders out of a total import value of 108 million guilders. In 1900 with a much larger population the same goods only amounted to 53 million guilders out of a total imports bill of 176 million guilders. (18) In terms of per capita of total population the import of goods amounted to 5.10 guilders in 1881-85; 4.76 guilders in 1891-1895; 4.20 guilders in 1897-1901; and 3.80 guilders in 1904. (19)

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(17) Huender, W. 'Overzicht van den economischen toestand der inheemsche bevolking van Java en Madoera' (The Hague, 1921) 3-4.
(18) Furnivall, J.S. 'Netherlands India...' op. cit., 215-216.
This reduction in native buying power caused concern to Dutch industrialists, in particular the cotton textile industry which was dependent to a large extent on the Indies as an outlet for its products. By the end of the nineteenth century manufacturing interests - owing to the steady progress in Dutch industrialisation since 1880 - had gained sufficient power in parliament to press the government for measures to improve the economic situation of the indigenous people in the colonies. In the words of the Socialist leader van Kol:

'....Industrial capital to-day...has an overwhelming interest in the prosperity and the growth of purchasing power of the indigenes. And in order to enhance industrial production in the mother country it must be opposed to low wages in the colony. Hence the interests of industrial capitalists do not coincide with and are in fact opposed to those of trading and financial capitalism...'</p>(20)

This economic motive underlying the 'Ethical' policy has been emphasized by a number of historians, including Furnivall who wrote that for industrialists in Holland: '...it had become a paying proposition to raise the standard of living* of the indigenous people.'(21) Hartgerink, however, takes this argument too far when he dismisses the 'Ethical' policy simply as a 'verkapte vorm van imperialisme' - i.e.: 'imperialism in disguise'.(22) In fact the 'Ethical' policy should also be seen in part as a reflection of the growing emphasis in Dutch home politics since about 1880 on socio-welfare legislation designed to strengthen

(20) Ibid., 1169-1170.
(21) Furnivall, J.S. 'Netherlands India...' op. cit., 227.
(22) Hartgerink, H.J.H. 'De Staten-Generaal en het Volksonderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie (1848-1918), (Groningen, 1942) 100-101.
the Dutch working classes against the unbridled capitalism of 'laissez-faire' Liberals.

During the last two decades of the nineteenth century doctrinaire Liberalism had gradually been losing ground to the newly emerging Christian parties and to a lesser extent Socialism.

The growing anti-clericalism of many Dutch Liberals since about 1870 had caused a strong reaction from both Protestants and Catholics. In particular Kuyper, the dynamic leader of the neo-Calvinist Anti-Revolutionaire Partij, fulminated in his writings and his parliamentary speeches against the 'ungodly' principles of the French Revolution and he wanted to return the Dutch people to the rule of God as laid down in the Bible. The struggle of religion against 'paganism' — as Kuyper termed it — culminated in the 1870's in the question of denominational versus public schools. Strong Liberal opposition to the granting of government subsidy to private schools was largely responsible for driving the Catholic faction and the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij together into a parliamentary coalition, which was called by Kuyper — rather euphemistically — a 'Unio Mystica'. Progressive Christian leaders, however, such as Kuyper, were not only concerned to strengthen religion against the forces of 'evil', but they were also convinced of the need for the social and economic emancipation of the Christian section of the nation. The Anti-Revolutionaire Partij gained most of its followers from the 'kleine luiden', that is the large and impoverished group of traditionally Calvinist small-scale farmers,
shopkeepers, and tradesmen. Similarly, Catholic strength was mainly based in the economically depressed Southern provinces of Brabant and Limburg. Christian social reformers blamed 'laissez-faire' Liberalism for the pauperisation and degradation of large sections of the Dutch people, and they demanded an extension of the franchise and the introduction of an active social and economic welfare policy. Furthermore, Christian tradesmen and workers were urged to organise themselves into trade unions. Another impetus, however for the rise of Christian workers' organisations was undoubtedly the appearance of 'atheistic' Socialism which was gradually making headway from about 1880 onwards when the Dutch industrial revolution was beginning to gain momentum. (23)

By the end of the nineteenth century no political party - including the Liberals - could afford to ignore the demands of the working classes any longer. For some time a number of Liberals had recognised the need to modify the principle of 'laissez-faire' and it was Liberal cabinets which introduced the first legislation dealing with the employment of children and women (1874 and 1899), industrial safety (1895), and compulsory primary education (1901). (24)

This change in the domestic political scene had also important repercussions for colonial policy. Ever since his first appearance in parliament Kuyper had strongly condemned the un-Christian spirit of Dutch colonial policy and practice. Accordingly the first programme of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij in 1879 included a colonial paragraph which denounced the exploitation of the indigenous population either by the state or private enterprise and it stressed that the Netherlands had to fulfill a moral vocation in the Indies. In Kuyper's opinion the only way to improve the lot of the natives was for Dutchmen to act as true Christians:

'...Our program should be the complete opposite of those who are Christians in name only...They boast of our past in the Indies. We should confess our guilt; the guilt of our fathers and of our own century....' (25)

According to Kuyper the only colonial system which was justified and complied with Christian principles was the system of trusteeship:

'...Not to keep these people underdeveloped...but to accept the three moral obligations which a guardian holds towards a foster child: a. to educate it morally, b. to manage its property wisely to obtain the greatest benefit for the child, c. to make it possible for the child to take - God willing - a more independent position in the future....' (26)

However, almost another two decades passed before Kuyper's ideas began to command a wider appeal. By this time also a number of Radical


(26) Kuyper, A. 'Ons Program! 1897 quot., ibid., 7.
Liberals and Socialists were clamouring for a new colonial policy which would put the interests of the indigenous people first. The final break-through came in 1901 when the Christian parties gained an overwhelming victory at the polls, and it was no mere coincidence that it was the first Kuyper cabinet which officially inaugurated the 'Ethical' policy. As Furnivall has written:

'...Colonial policy tends to follow, even at a distance, domestic policy. Liberty, Social Justice, Democracy, if approved as sauce for the domestic goose, are served up a little later with the colonial gander....' (27)

By 1900 then the majority of Dutchmen with an interest in colonial affairs was convinced that 'laissez-faire' colonial policy had run aground and that speedy and effective measures were needed to improve the economic condition of the indigenous people and to put colonial finances on a sound basis.

Opinions, however, differed as to the causes of the depressed state of the colony and the remedies needed.

A number of critics and colonial reformers blamed the 'batig slot' policy(28) for the economic distress of the Indies. Already in 1888 the Socialist Domela Nieuwenhuis had branded the Netherlands as a 'robber' state having despoiled the Indies of 850 million guilders,


(28) cf. p. 3/ of this chapter.
which in fairness and justice should be restituted to the colony.\(^{(29)}\)

The issue was raised again in 1898 by the Socialist van Kol who demanded that colonial finances should be separated from metropolitan finances with the proviso that at least the 151 million guilders remitted to the Dutch treasury since 1867 should be restituted and that the Netherlands should take over the responsibility for paying the interest charges of the debt incurred by the Indies.\(^{(30)}\) Again in the following year the question of restitution was brought up this time by the Radical-Liberal van Deventer in an article called '\textit{Een Eereschuld}' – 'A Debt of Honor'. Van Deventer went further than van Kol and demanded that at least an amount of 187 million guilders, i.e. 151 million guilders remitted as 'batige sloten' since 1867 and 36 million guilders paid in interest and repayment of the colony's debt since 1877, should be restituted. Furthermore, the Netherlands should take over the whole of the Indian debt amounting to 100 million guilders leaving a 'Debt of Honor' to the Indies of 67 million guilders to be used for economic development.\(^{(31)}\)

Most Dutch parliamentarians had no quarrel with the demand for financial independence for the Indies. This was finally granted in 1912 when the \textit{Indische Comptabiliteitswet} (Indies Audit Act) was changed to the extent that the Netherlands Indies was made a legal


\(^{(30)}\) Idema, H.A. 'Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie 1891-1918' (The Hague, 1924) 111.

\(^{(31)}\) Deventer, C. Th van 'Een Eereschuld' in Colenbrander ed 'Leven en Werken...' \textit{op. cit.}, Vol.11, 1-47.
person whose 'properties, assets, and liabilities' were separate from those of the mother country. This enabled the colony to contract loans on its own account from then on.\(^{(32)}\) As Colenbrander has remarked: 'Thus, separation as soon as it becomes apparent that nothing further is to be gained from the Indies'.\(^{(33)}\)

The question of restitution, however, caused a great deal of controversy and was opposed by the majority of parliamentarians. The Liberal Minister of Colonies, Pierson, pointed out to van Kol that although he agreed that:

',...Great injustice had been done to the Indies in previous years, severe injustice would be done to the present generation if it had to repay to the Indies the "batige sloten" enjoyed previously....' \(^{(34)}\)

On the other hand most Dutch politicians had become convinced that financial help to the Indies was necessary and urgent. In 1903 Idenburg, the Minister for Colonies, proposed an interest-free loan to the Indies of 30 million guilders to be divided over six years and as a first instalment 2.2 million guilders were earmarked in the 1904 budget for economic development and defence. This was only approved by parliament as an interim measure and the minister was urged to submit a properly worked out economic development plan as soon as possible.\(^{(35)}\) The opposition parties (Liberals and Socialists)

\(^{(32)}\) *Staatsblad*, 29 Juni 1912, no.207.


\(^{(34)}\) Idema, H.A. *Parlementaire Geschiedenis...* *op. cit.*., 112.

were very disappointed about Idenburg's plans, and demanded that large grants-in-aid should be provided to the Indies. Van Kol considered an interest-free loan of 2 million guilders as

'...A half-hearted attempt to do something...it ridicules the misery and poverty in the Indies, it is completely inadequate to stop a further deterioration, to stop a catastrophe....' (36)

The government parties and the Dutch press were also critical. The newspaper *De Telegraaf* commented that:

'...Minister Idenburg has a moral vocation but no money. At first we have...drained millions from the Indies and now when the Indies are famished and have collapsed we lift our eyes upwards, cry about moral vocation, sob and stroke our purses, and throw down alms compassionately mumbling a prayer.....' (37)

In 1904 Idenburg submitted the following plan to parliament. The Netherlands was to take over the responsibility for the repayment and the interest charges of the floating debt of the Indies which amounted to 40 million guilders. This would enable the colony to spend a similar amount over a number of years on semi-productive measures such as irrigation, emigration, and rural credit, without getting into further debt. This plan was adopted by parliament, although Radical-Liberal members such as Bos, who demanded a grant-in-aid of 100 million guilders, remained highly critical. The Socialist member van Kol showed his appreciation of Idenburg when he remarked:


(37) Welderen Rengers, W.J. *'Schets...* op. cit., 287.
'This Calvinist minister is much closer to me than the Liberal Cremer. If anybody can put the Indies on its feet then it is Idenburg'. (38)

A grant of 40 million guilders sounds a rather watered down version of the 'Debt of Honour', although it should be kept in mind, as Legge has written, that '....In proposing a policy of expenditure from the home treasury, the Netherlands was many years ahead of other colonial powers....' (39)

In any case the gods seemed to smile on this 'unselfish' gesture and almost immediately after its approval by parliament an upsurge occurred in the world market prices of colonial produce, in particular sugar, rubber, and tin. This enabled the new Minister of Colonies, Fock, to introduce a more equitable and efficient system of taxation. In 1906 special taxes were levied on tobacco and sugar and this was followed by the introduction of an income tax in 1907. Gross government revenue increased from 130.3 million guilders in 1897 to 311.3 million guilders in 1913. (40) As a result Governor-General van Heutz - partly also because of his efficiency and economy measures - was able to show a surplus on the 1906 budget. (41) Hence, expenditure on welfare projects was able to rise from 66.1 million guilders in 1904 to 177.3 million guilders in 1914. In the same period, however, the

(38) Idema, H.A. 'Parlementaire Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 176.
(39) Legge, J.D. 'Indonesia' (Prentice-Hall, 1964) 86.
(40) Colenbrander, H.T. 'Koloniale Geschiedenis...' op. cit., III, 72.
(41) Furnivall, J.S. 'Netherlands India...' op. cit., 340-341.
funds allotted to the department of War rose from 39.5 to 45.1 million guilders.\(^{(42)}\) A large proportion of this money was used for van Heutz' "pacificatie politiek", i.e. the policy of bringing the whole of the Archipelago under effective Dutch control. Achin was finally forced into submission in 1906 and by 1910 the whole of the Archipelago had been 'pacified'.\(^{(43)}\)

Some Dutch politicians — in particular the Socialists — condemned this imperialist expansion not only because they were opposed to aggression as such, but also it caused in their view an unnecessary and unwarranted drain on colonial finances diverting funds which were sorely needed for the economic rehabilitation of the Javanese population. From the beginning of his parliamentary career van Kol had strongly spoken against Dutch colonial expansion. In 1897 he had stated:

'...The problem of Achin governs everything... All other interests have to be put aside temporarily because of the Achin war. Such words must cause pain to everybody who is genuinely concerned with the lot of the Javanese. So it is intended to leave the thousands of hectares of arable land in the Solo valley to be ruined by drought, to let the plains of Tegal and Bagelen be destroyed by floods... to let the native in Banten struggle with disease and disaster, in one word to let the Javanese famish in order to satisfy the fanatical drive of the Netherlands for annexation....' \(^{(44)}\)

Van Kol dismissed the 'pacification' policy as capitalist expansion to obtain much needed raw material and to open up new markets for

\(^{(42)}\) Ibid., 344.
\(^{(43)}\) Colenbrander, H.T. 'Koloniale Geschiedenis...' op. cit., III, 90-91.
\(^{(44)}\) Idema, H.A. 'Parlementaire Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 98.
European industry, while 'the famishing Javanese pays for military campaigns'. (45) The Socialist leader Toelstra was even more cutting in his comments: '....Everything has remained as of old, only now capitalism is protected by the thurible and the Bible....' (46) Van Kol further argued that Holland did not have enough financial resources and manpower at its disposal to administer the whole of the archipelago properly. Hence, the only way out, according to van Kol, was to concentrate on Java and Sumatra and sell the other islands to interested bidders. (47)

Socialist criticism, however, was not able to gain any serious support in parliament. The various Ministers of Colonies defended the 'pacification' policy of van Heutz on the grounds that Dutch national pride had suffered enough during most of the nineteenth century when the policy of 'non-intervention' was adhered to and even the smallest indigenous potentate could get away with almost anything. Furthermore, Holland had a moral duty - and here 'Ethical' overtones can be heard - to bring the people of the whole of the archipelago to a higher level of civilisation, to encourage their economic development, and to rid them of the arbitrary rule of their own princes. Emphasis was also placed on the need to eradicate slavery and piracy. The Christian parties - and in particular Kuyper - went further than that and stressed that it was the first and foremost duty of the Netherlands:

(45) Idema, H.A. 'Parlementaire Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 176.
(46) Ibid., 176.
(47) Welderen Rengers, W.J. van 'Schets...' op. cit., 289.
To bring the same blessings of peace and order which the Netherlands has enjoyed by the grace of God since the light of the Gospels penetrated..." (48)

Moreover, Kuyper pointed at history which in his view had shown conclusively that nations which had remained outside the Christian fold had not been able to advance themselves on their own account. (49)

Others again - including most Liberals and also van Heutz himself - were more pragmatic in their defence of 'pacification' and inverting van Kol's argument they argued that the money for a welfare policy could not be found unless an end could be put to the unending military expeditions to various parts of the archipelago and these areas could be taxed properly so that the burden of empire which hitherto had rested mainly on Java could be more evenly distributed.

In fact income tax for natives was introduced in Achin in 1907, on the West coast of Sumatra in 1908, and by 1914 it had been extended to all the outer islands. This was partly responsible for a rise in indigenous income tax receipts from 3.5 million guilders in 1907 to 10 million guilders in 1914. (50)

And there is some truth in Colenbrander's assertion that because of van Heutz:

"...The Outer-Islands began to carry some of the burden of the upkeep of the state, which only then was able to obtain the means to implement its civilising task with a generous hand rather than in a miserly manner..." (51)

(48) Ibid., 281.
(49) Ibid., 281.
(50) Colenbrander, H.T. 'Koloniale Geschiedenis...' op. cit., III, 80-81.
(51) Colenbrander, H.T. 'Koloniale Geschiedenis...' op. cit., III, 92.
Concurrent with the Dutch drive to 'pacify' the whole of the archipelago attempts were made to modernise and also to some extent democratise colonial government and administration. The existing government apparatus – which was highly centralised – could no longer cope with the vastly changed conditions in the Indies in the first decade of the twentieth century. The central government was not only confronted with the gigantic task of administering a newly acquired and vast island-empire, but also colonial officers were required – under the terms of the 'Ethical' policy – to interfere far more frequently and drastically in native affairs than previously. The catch-cry became decentralisation for the sake of greater administrative efficiency as well as to satisfy the demands for self-government of private Europeans who had been growing in number from 1870 onwards when the colony was opened to private enterprise.

In order to relieve the Binnenlands Bestuur (Department of Interior Administration) from some of its burden new 'technical' departments such as Agriculture, Public Works, the People's Credit Service (Volks-crediet) were set up which were better equipped to execute the 'Ethical' native welfare program. The Department of Binnenlands Bestuur (B.B.) was to act as a coordinating agency at the local and regional level and it remained the: ‘....Most important point of contact between the central government and the people....’(52)

(52) Kat–Angelino, A.D.A. de 'Staatkundig beleid en bestuurszorg in Nederlandsch-Indie', II, (The Hague, 1931) 400.
To meet the growing pressure of Europeans for a greater say in the running of the colony's affairs the Decentralisation Law of 1903 expressly stated that some measure of self-government would be granted by means of instituting municipal councils and regional councils. This promise of self-government did not come true and only a slight measure of local autonomy was conceded. The jurisdiction of these councils was restricted to making regulations on the care and upkeep of roads, public works, and parks and gardens. More important matters such as police, public health, and education remained under the aegis of the central government. Finance was to be provided by the central government in the form of grants, although with the approval of the Governor-General councils were able to levy their own taxes. In 1913 the principle was adopted that the central government would match the amount of taxation levied by the local council. (53) The first municipal councils were established at Batavia, Meester Cornelis (Djatinegara), and Bandung in 1905. The first regional council was established in 1909 in the important tobacco growing area of East Sumatra. By 1918 there were 32 municipal councils and 25 regional councils. All population groups were to be represented in the local council although initially Europeans were given a majority. Members were either appointed by the Governor-General or elected by their own

population group. The top official of the central government was the president of the council ex-officio. In 1916, however, burgomasters were appointed by the Governor-General to the larger councils such as Batavia, Semarang and Surabaja.\(^{(54)}\)

An attempt was also made to decentralise the administrative task of the central government. In 1914 de Graaff, a former Director of Binnenlands Bestuur who had been appointed by parliament as special commissioner for decentralisation, submitted a voluminous report on administrative reform in the colony. De Graaff proposed that the Indies should be divided into twelve large administrative units (gouvernementen) to be headed by a governor and supported by its own finances. Furthermore, de Graaff planned to increase the efficiency of the European administrative corps by reducing its numbers, increasing salaries, better selection procedures, and improved training. It was also proposed that the native administrative corps - the Inlands Bestuur - should be given more responsibility, better training and higher salaries. De Graaff also suggested the establishment of regency councils to replace the regional councils which had been instituted under the Decentrálisation legislation of 1903 and which had been found to work unsatisfactorily.\(^{(55)}\)

De Graaff's scheme, however, failed to impress parliament where since 1913 a Liberal coalition had held a majority. Van Deventer

\(^{(54)}\) Colenbrander, H.T. 'Koloniale Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 96-97.
\(^{(55)}\) Encyclopedie van Nederlandsch-Indie (The Hague, 1917) Eerste Deel, cf. article on Bestuur, 287.
complained that de Graaff had taken no notice of the intention of parliament which had instructed him to devise a reorganisation of the Indies' government and administration on the basis of self-government. Van Deventer dismissed the 'gouvernementen' proposed by de Graaff as 'ambtenaarsstaten' i.e. autonomous units run by central government officials:

'...If decentralisation of the basis of self-government is wanted then the matter will have to be handled very differently. Then the whole of the directly governed area of the Netherlands-Indies must be organised in autonomous parts with their own governments to which part of the central government's task should be delegated....' (56)

The proposals of de Graaff were rejected by parliament and the question of regional decentralisation was not settled until the early 1920's.

The ruling Liberal coalition was far more concerned about the desires of many Indonesian nationalists who demanded greater participation in government. In 1916 Pleyte the Liberal Minister of Colonies submitted a proposal to parliament for the establishment of Koloniale Raad (Colonial Council with a multi-racial membership and advisory powers). This proposal was accepted by parliament with the addition that the council's name was to be changed to Volksraad (People's Council). The members of the Volksraad were to be partly appointed and partly elected.

(56) Colenbrander, H.T. 'Leven en Werken...van Deventer...' op. cit., II, 412.
The Governor-General in cooperation with the Volksraad was responsible for the construction of the annual budget, although final approval still rested with the Dutch parliament. The Colonial government could ask the advice of the Volksraad on all other matters. A Royal decree of March 1917 laid down that the Volksraad was to consist of 19 elected and 19 appointed members, each group comprising 5 natives and 14 Europeans and other Asians. The same decree also granted Volksraad members full parliamentary privileges and immunities. The first Volksraad was officially opened by the 'Ethical' Governor-General van Limburg-Stirum in May 1918. (57)

Another important attempt at administrative modernisation was made at the village level. A Village Act of 1906 made the village into a legal entity, i.e. in accordance with European law not adat law (Indonesian customary law). This was done not only to stop abuses which had crept into village government but also to make the village into a more effective instrument for government administration. Village government was to consist of the village head and a council to be elected by those villagers who were duty bound to render corves, retired village heads, officially recognised religious teachers, keepers of holy graves, and also members of the existing council. The function of the village head was to take care of day-to-day administration and in case of malpractice or negligence he was bound by law to make restitution to the village. In the case of important matters a meeting

of all villagers had to be called for consultation. However, any decision taken could be rescinded by the colonial authorities. The village government was made responsible for taking care of the upkeep of roads, public works, water supply, and reservoirs, and villagers could be called up — in accordance with the local custom — to render corvee for these purposes. Villagers, however, could not be called up for special projects unless the majority of voters agreed. Similarly agreement of the majority of villagers was necessary in the case of the leasing of village land and property. (58) De Graaff, who was the architect of the new legislation, had not only in mind to protect the rights of individual villagers which had been gradually whittled down as a result of the penetration of the Western plantation economy but he also hoped that: "...it should stimulate the process of social growth, and meanwhile enable local officials to cope with their prime function, the care of public welfare." (59)

The fact that the village was selected as an instrument to enhance native welfare reflects directly on the nature of the 'Ethical' policy of economic development which was almost solely concerned with raising agricultural productivity. This is well illustrated by van Deventer's

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(59) Furnivall, J.S. 'Netherlands India...' op. cit., 294. See also: Burger, D.H. 'de ontsluiting van Java's binnenland voor het wereldverkeer' (Wageningen, 1939) 232-235.
trias: 'irrigation, emigration, and education'.

In the period 1900-1940 as much as 270 million guilders were spent on irrigation works resulting in an increase of the total sawah area from 2.7 million hectares to 3.4 million hectares in the same period.\(^{60}\)

The attempts of the colonial government to induce Javanese farmers to emigrate to other areas of the archipelago were far less successful. The first organised emigration of Javanese farmers was in 1905 when as an experiment an agricultural colony was set up in the Lampongs (South Sumatra). The colony counted 30,000 people by 1930.\(^{61}\)

Attempts to settle Javanese in South East Borneo and Celebes (Sulawesi) met with failure. The situation improved somewhat during the 1930's when as a result of skilful propaganda, better selection methods and more extensive preparatory work in the areas selected for settlement more Javanese farmers could be induced to leave. Between 1936 and 1940 respectively 13,152; 19,719; 32,259; 45,339; and 50,622 Javanese emigrated, followed by another 47,095 in the first three months of 1941.\(^{62}\)

Another method used to improve the economic situation in Java was the introduction of agricultural extension services. In 1908 the first five agricultural advisors were appointed to the Department of

\(^{60}\) Jonkers, A. 'Welvaartszorg in Indonesie-een geschiedenis en perspectief' (The Hague, 1948) 94.

\(^{61}\) Kat-Angelino, A.D.A. de 'Staatkundig beleid...' op. cit., II, 339.

\(^{62}\) Jonkers, A. 'Welvaartszorg...' op. cit., 148.
Agriculture. They were joined in 1910 by Indonesian assistants
who had graduated from the Landbouwschool at Bogor. (63) Agricultural
extension officers set up demonstration fields and tried to induce
villagers to use fertilisers, better selected seeds, and more efficient
implements. Great efforts were also made to introduce new food crops
and commercial crops.

A great deal of attention was also given by the colonial govern­
ment to the problem of agricultural indebtedness. Pawnshops which were
the normal source of credit for Indonesians had been a government
monopoly since 1814. The practice of farming out pawnshops - mainly
to Chinese - had resulted in a great deal of usury and other mal­
practices detrimental to the Indonesian population. In order to stop
these abuses the colonial government in 1900 took over the running of
pawnshops itself. Similarly the opium monopoly was administered by
the government from 1904 onwards. In addition to the pawnshop service
(Pandhuisdienst) other sources of credit were created. In the villages
desa lumbung (rice banks) were set up, where people could borrow rice
until the next harvest. From the profits of the rice banks - who
charged from 20-25% - village banks were founded to take care of the
need for cash credit. By 1930 there were 6,000 desa lumbung and an
equal number of village banks in existence. (64) These credit
institutions - it should be stressed - were owned by and run for the
village in line with the Village Act of 1906. Elementary education
which - as will be seen in the next chapter - was to play an important
role in the 'Ethical' welfare program was also made the responsibility
of the village.

(63) cf. p. 118 Chapter III.
(64) Kat-Angelino, A.D.A. de Staatkundig beleid... op. cit., II, 346.
As Legge has written, the measures taken by 'Ethical' colonial governments to improve the living standards of the indigenous population were:

'
...In the nature of palliatives. They provided some alleviation of particular areas of hardship, but they did not achieve - and they did not attempt to achieve any thoroughgoing technological changes....' (65)

Admittedly, the importance of large scale industrialisation was stressed by a number of 'Ethical' reformers, but until the worldwide economic depression of the 1930's the various plans that were suggested were not implemented and van Oorschot (66) has termed the period 1900-1930 quite aptly as the 'papieren tijdperk' - the 'paper era' of Indonesian industrialisation.

Kuyper stressed in 1901 that the only way to develop the Indies was '...to lift the people of the Indies from the agricultural to the industrial state....' (67) The Minister of Colonies, Idenburg, strongly supported Kuyper and he envisaged the establishment of indigenous industries owned by indigenous capital. The Socialist van Kol dismissed van Deventer's views as:

'
...Militarist, imperialist and capitalist; I am deeply disappointed and any ties there have ever been between us are now broken. The expectations of van Deventer that emigration is the proper means to create a balance between production and consumption are delusive and will never come true. I believe that his plan for salvation which is indicated by the trilogy: 'education, irrigation and

(65) Legge, J.D. 'Indonesia' (Prentice Hall, 1964) 91.
(66) Oorschot, J.J. van 'De Ontwikkeling van de Nijverheid in Indonesie' (The Hague, 1956) 38.
emigration...is inadequate because the distress has taken on too vast proportions. He believes that in particular indigenous education will have an enormous impact on the well-being of the Javanese. I am of the opinion that this is an illusion which is completely out of touch with reality. The only solution is a more intensified production and this is only possible with industry, preferably large-scale indigenous industry....' (68)

In 1903 Idenburg instructed Abendanon, the Director of the Department of Education, Religion and Industry, to advise on the best ways and means to advance indigenous industrial development. Abendanon reported that large-scale European industries would not be advantageous because the Javanese would still not become independent. He suggested therefore a number of methods to improve and rehabilitate existing indigenous cottage industries and handicrafts. This report was never taken seriously by the government and was finally forgotten about. (69) Fock, who in 1904 had been instructed by Idenburg to write a report on the indigenous economic situation, stressed the importance of industrialisation. He suggested that the colonial government should try to create favourable conditions to attract European industrial capital. But like Abendanon also Fock emphasised the need for government action to improve existing indigenous cottage industries. (70)

(68) Idema, H.A. 'Parlementaire Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 191.
(69) Rapport betreffende de maatregelen in het belang van de inlandsche nijverheid op Java en Madoera te nemen...' (Batavia, 1904).
(70) Fock, D. ' Beschouwingen en voorstellen ter verbetering van de economische toestand der Inlandsche bevolking van Java en Madoera' (The Hague, 1904)
The growing prosperity of the Indies after 1905 seems to have caused a loss of interest in industrialisation in government circles. It was not until the First World War broke out and industrial produce from Europe became scarce that the matter was raised again. In 1915 Governor-General Idenburg instituted a special commission to look into the matter of industrialisation. Idenburg stressed that industrial development had become essential not only because the war had shown the disadvantages of an unbalanced economic structure, but also because the natural limitations to extending the agrarian sector of the economy had been reached as a result of the continuous increase in population. Idenburg's commission produced a number of reports which were scarcely taken notice of either in Holland or in the Indies and the commission was allowed to die a natural death in 1926 without having been allowed to accomplish anything concrete in the way of industrial development.

Van Oorschot mentions the following reasons for the disinterest of the Dutch in industrialisation: interior freight rates were too high; a wide-spread distribution apparatus was missing; import duties on industrial goods were too low to afford sufficient protection. He further stresses that:

'....The growth of plantation agriculture in the first quarter of the century afforded employment opportunities to many....'

and that

(72) Ibid., 37.
Certain Netherlands interests were opposed to industrialisation. Moreover, large scale capital investors saw no reason to interest themselves in new and risky ventures, while estate agriculture still offered adequate opportunities for profitable investment....' (73)

Van Oorschot, however, does not mention - or at least he does not spell out fully - the fundamental reasons for the failure of the attempts at industrialisation.

One most important cause of this failure was the strong opposition to industrialisation of the politically powerful plantation combines. Large-scale industrialisation would have tended to increase the demand for labor and therefore the price of labor. This would have been damaging to the plantation concerns which - as was pointed out above (74) - were largely dependent for their profits on low wages. But also Dutch industrialists as well as Dutch labor were unwilling to be priced out of the Indonesian market which was one of the most important outlets for Dutch industrial produce. In the final analysis then the industrialisation of Indonesia militated against the interests of the imperial economy as a whole.

Another criticism usually levelled against the 'Ethical' policy is that the colonial government allowed the vast profits made by Europeans firms to be 'drained' from the Indies. Van Kol complained at the beginning of the 'Ethical' period that the end of the 'batig slot' policy had not really meant the end of colonial exploitation. In van Kol's view the system of state exploitation (Cultuurstelsel) had been replaced by a system of exploitation by private entrepreneurs

(73) Ibid., 38.
(74) cf. p. 37 of this chapter.
who were 'draining' the colony of a great deal of badly needed capital.

Most 'Ethici', however, refuted the 'drainage' argument on the grounds that foreign capital was needed for Indonesian economic development and that it would be unreasonable to expect capitalists to invest funds for the sake of charity.  

Van Deventer argued:

'...Natives who are connected with the plantations are undoubtedly getting more income than they could earn if the plantations were not there....In general the assertion that the drainage of profits made by foreign capital in Java is one of the most important reasons for the economic decline of the indigenous population is not true. Without that capital the population would be in a very much worse position. (76)

A number of Dutch economists have tried to show that the 'drainage' of profits was not excessive. Haccou points out that average profits on an average total foreign investment of 3.5 milliard guilders in the period 1924-1936 amounted to 6.7%. Berkhuyzen puts the 'drainage' percentage at 6.2% in 1938. (78) Boeke also tried to play down the 'drainage' argument by stressing the advantages brought by the Western plantation economy to the indigenous population. (79) It is not possible to test the merits of the 'anti-drainage' arguments in the context of this thesis, although the writer feels that perhaps

(75) Welderen-Rengers, W.J. van 'Schets... op. cit., 22.
(76) Colenbrander, H.T. 'Leven en Werken...van Deventer... op. cit., II, 142-144.
(78) Berkhuyzen, A.P.H. 'De drainage theorie voor Indonesie' (The Hague, 1948) 96.
(79) Boeke, J.H. 'Economics and economic policy of dual societies, as exemplified by Indonesia' (New York, 1953) 202-203.
too much emphasis had been placed on the 'drainage' factor. As
Mackie has pointed out, a far more fundamental objection which can
be raised against Dutch economic policy in the Indies was the one-
sided development of the economy resulting from its pre-occupation
with production for export. The Dutch failed to stimulate:

'...Domestic industries and domestic income.
Besides this handicap, the "drain of resources"
was a minor obstacle....' (80)

As was seen above, industrialisation was against the interests of
the politically powerful plantation combines and Dutch secondary
industry as well. Many genuine 'Ethical' reformers often bitterly
complained about the machinations of European capitalists who tried to
sabotage official colonial policy. Governor-General Idenburg wrote
in 1913:

'I...I have always kept in mind that article 55 of the
Colonial Fundamental Law lays upon the duty: "to
protect the native population against oppression from
whatever quarter..."...Hence, I have come into conflict
with conservative opinions and inclinations; with capital
interests and personal idiosyncracies. One has been
crying for the economic development of the Native; one
wants to bring him to a higher intellectual and material
level. But as soon as these demands are beginning to be
met to some extent the objection is raised: not in this
way because he (i.e. the Native) will no longer be
submissive and I will have to pay more. This is not
openly said of course. But it is said in a whisper:
the people are running wild. The case, however, is that
the native is starting to think about himself and his
situation. It is the beginning of his "awakening". And
this does not necessarily mean that he is running wild....
We should be pleased about it all even though it causes
us some anxiety. After all we have wanted it that way -

'or at least we said so - and we have worked towards it through our education policy. I say this without boasting and with thanks to God: a great deal of strength and willpower is needed to refuse for months to succumb to the daily pressure to accommodate the demands and desires of "capital" and many colonial officers. (If I had not refused) I would have acted against my conscience....' (81)
Chapter III

'Ethical' Education Policy

The most important achievement perhaps of the 'Ethical' policy was the creation of a nation-wide education system for Indonesians ranging - at least in theory - from the elementary village (desa) school to university level.

The strong interest shown by 'Ethical' governments - in Holland as well as in the Indies - in expanding education facilities for the indigenous population was motivated by a number of considerations.

Most 'Ethical' reformers stressed that the provision of elementary education on a nation-wide basis was an important prerequisite to solving the problem of diminishing native welfare. For example, van Deventer was of the opinion that the Javanese people could never be brought to prosperity unless in addition to direct economic aid projects:

'...The education of the people is taken in hand. The task of our administration must be to teach the people to be independent so that they can think for themselves. Otherwise the Javanese will remain what they are now: poor and in need of help....' (1)

Another important stimulus to educational expansion was the growing demand for Western-trained indigenous personnel to staff lower and medium grade positions in the newly established 'technical' government departments such as Agriculture, Public Works, Health, and the People's Credit Service (Volkscrediet). Moreover, the vast extension of Dutch control over the archipelago as well as the

(1) Colenbrander, H.T. ed. 'Leven en Arbeid...van Deventer', op. cit., II, 159.
intensification of Dutch colonial administration demanded a better trained Native Local Government Corps (Inlands Bestuur). To staff the rapidly expanding government apparatus solely by Europeans was considered too costly and hence 'Indianisatie', i.e. the gradual replacement of Europeans by indigenous officials became official policy. Fock wrote that:

'...Nobody can deny the importance of a well regulated education system...for prospective native officials in order to prepare themselves properly for their task.... The improved training of native officials introduced a few years ago (2) should be extended so that eventually there will be available an adequate number of well-trained Natives who can - whenever possible - replace European officials....'(3)

Colijn, (4) Advisor on the Outer-Possessions, wanted to organise govern-

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(2) Note: This refers to the 'Hoofdenscholen' (cf. p. Chapter I), which in 1893 with the institution of the Eerste Klasse Scholen were changed into training schools for indigenous officials (Opleidingschool Voor Inlandsche Ambtnaren - O.S.V.I.A.).

(3) Fock, D. 'Beschouwingen en voorstellen ter verbetering van den economischen toestand der inlandsche bevolking van Java en Madura' (The Hague, 1904), 2. Note: Fock was a Progressive Liberal; president of the Tweede Kamer (Second Chamber of Parliament) from 1905-1908; governor-general from 1921-1926.

(4) Note: Hendrik Colijn (1869-1941); born from strictly Calvinist farmer stock; left for the Indies in 1893 as an Army lieutenant and was a military medal for valor during the Lombok campaign (1894). Promoted to captain in 1901 he was appointed adjutant to General van Heutz, the conqueror of Achin. In this capacity Colijn travelled widely throughout the archipelago to advise van Heutz, who in 1904 had been appointed governor-general, on the reorganisation of colonial government and administration. In 1909 Colijn left for the Netherlands to enter the Lower House of parliament as a member of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij. He served as minister for war from 1911 to 1913. In 1914 ostensibly abandoned his political career to take up a directorship of the Royal Dutch Shell group. On the death of Kuyper in 1920 he was elected leader of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij. He ended his formal business career in 1922 and entered parliament again in that year. Minister of Finance 1923-1926; prime minister in 1926; between 1927 and 1933 Netherlands representative at the Economic Conferences of the League of Nations; prime minister from 1933 to 1939; minister of colonies from 1933 to 1936; minister of finance from 1933 to 1936. The influence of Colijn on Dutch colonial
ment administration in the newly occupied areas on the principle that use should be made of:

'....Few European officials aided by Native or other personnel, but especially Natives because in addition to a shortage of Europeans it is desirable that our system of government and administration should develop that way....Therefore the first thing that should be done is to ensure a decent training of native officials....' (5)

More glorious - and also more wishful perhaps - was the role assigned to Western education by a number of 'Ethici' who envisaged that by 'associating' Indonesians with Western civilisation a cultural and political fusion would occur between the Netherlands and the Indies. Snouck-Hurgronje, (6) who was one of the most outspoken proponents of the 'association' ideal, envisaged in the future;

(4) contd. policy was considerable. Both as a private citizen and as a politician his interest in the Indies never waned. In Colijn's view economic as well as political development should start at the grass root level. He could see the independence of the Indies only in the long distant future after the God given task of the Netherlands in the Indies has been finally and successfully completed.

(5) Colijn, H. 'Nota over Politiek beleid en bestuurszorg in de Buitenbezittingen', part III (Batavia, 1907) 70-71.

(6) Note: Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje (1857-1936) was a noted scholar of Arabic and Islam. He spent some time in Mecca disguised as a pilgrim among the Indonesian colony. Appointed Advisor of Arab and Native Affairs to the Netherlands-Indies government (1899-1906); professor at Leyden University from 1907-1927 while at the same time acting as advisor to the Netherlands government on Arab and Native affairs. Snouck was one of the leaders of the 'Ethical' movement. He was in great sympathy with Indonesian nationalist aspirations and strongly pressed the Dutch government to speed up political reform in the colony. Snouck severely criticised the conservative view of Colijn cum suis and his influence on prospective colonial officers at Leiden university was considered so 'pernicious' by conservative politicians and Dutch business concerns that in 1926 they provided most of the funds to set up a new faculty of Indonesian studies (Indologie) at Utrecht university in competition to Leiden.
...The realisation of a beautiful political and national idea, i.e. the creation of a Netherland nation consisting of two geographically widely separated but spiritually closely united parts, one in North-West Europe and the other in South-East Asia....' (7)

As van Niel(8) has pointed out the terms 'unification', 'assimilation', and 'association' are often not clearly distinguished. In van Niel's view 'assimilation' and 'association' are sub-headings of 'assimilation' with the difference that the first means the replacement of indigenous civilisation by Western culture and the latter is a more gradual process which allows for diversification - at least temporarily - and which implies: '...a strong inclination to respect the indigenous culture and unwillingness to force change...'. This definition, however, does not fit those Dutch colonial reformers who took up the banner of 'association'. Perhaps the following quotations will illustrate this point. To van Deventer the ideal of 'association' conjured up a vision of:

'...A people of between 30 to 40 million which will fall thankfully and cheerfully under the spell of Dutch civilisation. Nothing do they want more than to penetrate into this civilisation; they send their children to schools where they can absorb this culture....' (9)

(7) Snouck-Hurgronje 'Nederland en de Islam' (1911) 83.
(9) Colenbrander, H.T. ed. 'Leven en Werken...van Deventer...' op. cit., III, 71.
Van Deventer's concept of education reveals him even more as a Westerniser. The purpose of the colonial education system was to:

'...Spread useful, civilising knowledge which also should enhance moral conscience and add to character formation. Thus, education in the widest sense of the word. Education which based on the proven methods of Dutch educational practice and using the Dutch language will lead to a fusion of the civilisation of the Indies....' (10)

Snouck-Hurgronje showed even less respect for indigenous civilisation when he argued that there could be no objection to cultural and intellectual imperialism (inlijving) because the indigenous population had for centuries been devoid of an independent national and political life. (11) This is even more clearly illustrated by Snouck's view of Islam which he considered as one of the most important stumbling blocks to Indonesian economic development. He advocated that the most effective means to counteract and eventually break the hold of Islam on the Indonesian people would be to 'associate' Indonesians with European civilisation:

'...Even in countries with a much older Islamic culture than in our Archipelago we see education successfully at work in liberating Islam from the medieval rubbish which it has carried in its train far too long....' (12)

In fact most of the prominent 'Ethical' reformers were convinced of the superiority of Western civilisation and they took little notice of indigenous civilisation which they usually dismissed as superstition and as an obstacle to their 'mission civilisatrice'.

(10) Colenbrander, H.T. ed. 'Leven en Werken...van Deventer...' op. cit., II, 424.
(12) Ibid., 78.
Hence, van Niel's definition of 'association' seems to be more applicable to conservatives such as Colijn and de Kat Angelino who stressed the importance of preserving and protecting indigenous civilisation in order to perpetuate Dutch rule, or to scholars such as Krom, Berg and van Vollenhoven, who had a genuine interest in and love for Indonesian culture for its own sake. Most 'Ethici', although subscribing to 'association' were in van Niel's terminology 'assimilators'. As Jonkman has written, in the 'Ethical' period: '....Association had degenerated into Western assimilation... the spirit of Macauley, of Western haughtiness...' reigned supreme.' Erugmans typifies the years 1900-1915 as the period: '....When association was the slogan and assimilation the practice....' (13)

While all colonial reformers agreed on the importance of education a controversy occurred on the strategy to be used in indigenous educational development. Snouck-Hurgronje strongly opposed the view that an immediate start should be made to 'associate' all levels of indigenous society with Western culture. According to Snouck the only proper and effective way to modernise Indonesian society was through the medium of the indigenous aristocracy. His argument seems important enough to be quoted at length:

(13) Jonkman, J.A. 'Indonesisch-nationale grondslag van het onderwijs ten dienste der Inlandsche bevolking' (Utrecht, 1918) 53, 54.
(14) Brugmans, I.J. 'Oostersche en Westersche elementen in het Nederlandsch-Indisch onderwijs', Indisch Genootschap-Verslagen 1940, 36.
...Native officials in Java show an unmistakable desire for higher development/emancipation. This should be taken as a welcome starting point for the European education of the Natives. These classes in Native society should be given the opportunity to receive a suitable and proper education. Care should be taken that the Native woman receives an adequate education in order to bring the whole family to a higher level of civilisation. And the well-trained Native official should be freed from the bonds of the present suppressive and obstructive guardianship.

On the other hand unfortunately there is as yet not the least sign of pressure among the general population of Java to avoid onerous debts and hence agricultural credit institutions, savings institutions and banks etc., which have been superimposed from above are bound to have no effect. They do not change the economic situation and to the insider these institutions seem caricatures of what they are supposed to be. In the same way an opinion at the present time on what is needed in the way of Native education can only be based on European theories. And if action is taken accordingly it is certain that only a costly disappointment will be the result....' (15)

Snouck therefore had little confidence in mass education programs and he stressed that the existing education system which was designed mainly to cater for the upper classes was satisfactory, although a more rapid expansion of these schools was needed.

Van Deventer seems to have been more in favour of a frontal attack on the education problem. He could see, however, the financial implications of a nation-wide provision of European-type primary schools and he suggested therefore that simple elementary schools should be set up for the masses and that the upper classes should be educated at the European level. (16)


(16) Colenbrander, H.T. ed. 'Leven en Werken...van Deventer...' op. cit., III, 420-421.
Policy makers such as the Minister of Colonies, Idenburg, and Governor-General van Heutz were more concerned with practical problems involved in expanding education, and they stressed the financial impossibility to provide the whole of the indigenous population with European type primary schools. This view was accepted by the majority of Dutch parliamentarians and as a result two separate education systems were created: an elementary vernacular school system to cater for the needs of the masses; and a Dutch-language school system destined mainly for children of upper class Indonesians.

The Evolution of the Vernacular School System:

Snouck's views on mass elementary education were only held by a minority of 'Ethici'. However, he found far more support - although for more selfish reasons - among a large number of conservative colonial officials and private Europeans who considered the education of the indigenous masses as a waste of money which would result in the creation of a discontented and politically dangerous intellectual proletariat. As the Inspector of Native Education, Habbema, wrote in 1904:

'Many still doubt the wisdom of providing the native masses with education. The desirability of education for children of the upper-classes is recognised, but not for children of the ordinary villager. It is often considered wrong that all children should receive education not only because they have no need for it but also because it makes them averse to manual labor. Boys who have attended school do not want to go back behind the plough but aspire to a 'position' and as the number of 'positions' is limited an intellectual proletariat will be the result. This can cause the government a great deal of trouble because disappointment followed by discontentment can lead to all sorts of bad practices. And in particular among dissatisfied
Habbema, who was a typical representative of the 'Ethical' school, argued that there was no reason to fear that the expansion of education would result in the growth of an intellectual proletariat. Only when education facilities were scarce would graduates tend to seek employment as clerks in the Western sector of the economy, but when the vast majority of the people had received education a person with an elementary school certificate would have lost his special status. Where Habbema pointed to the situation in Ambon and the Minahassa/a general provision of education had been in existence for a long time and where most school leavers returned to their villages to work as farmers, fishermen, or tradesmen. Moreover, Habbema argued that education was of political importance because it would teach people to think for themselves which would lessen the hold of fanatics and other politically dangerous individuals. An educated villager would also be less liable to be fooled and exploited by Chinese and Arab businessmen and money lenders. Most important, according to Habbema, was the role of education in eradicating superstition:

"...which still presses as a heavy yoke on the shoulders of the native population and seriously obstructs the people's freedom of movement. The people are allowed to work only at certain times...things have to be done in certain ways otherwise there will be conflict with

'Dewi Seri, Gendroewo's, Poentianak's (sic) and all kinds of other spirits and spooks. A great deal of time and money is lost because of superstition. One only needs to refer here to the time consuming harvesting of rice which is taken stalk by stalk and which is interspersed by the necessary slametans and numerous sedekahs in memory of deceased relatives. One only needs to think of money wasted on dukuns and the exorcising of devils...'. (18)

Education was necessary for all the indigenous peoples of the archipelago irrespective of the stage of cultural development they had reached. The greatest need for schools, however, existed in Java with its enormous economic problems. Habbema denied the generally held opinion of Dutch colons and officials that the native was lazy and that nothing could be done to improve his social and economic development. The Javanese was careless not lazy:

'...Also in our society carelessness is found particularly in uneducated people who live from day to day and who worry very little about their future and that of their families. When money is plentiful most of it is wasted, this is also true of the Native. When he has money he cannot wait until it has been spent on finery and sweets. He never thinks about saving and in case of the least adversity, sickness, or crop failure, there is no money to see him through the bad day. The result is poverty....' (19)

Education, according to Habbema, could cure this evil by inculcating in the pupil such civic virtues as order and cleanliness, diligence, devotion to duty and obedience. Education provided a further stimulus to economic development in that in addition to reading, writing, and arithmetic the children were taught to think and reason logically. (20)

(18) Habbema, J. 'Het politiek...' op.cit., 995.
(19) Ibid., 998.
(20) Ibid., 999.
Most 'Ethici' thought alone the lines of Habbema, but there was considerable difference of opinion with regard to the content and the standard of education which was to be provided by elementary schools. Van Kol objected to the intellectualistic curriculum in the existing government schools. He considered that two years instruction in the three R's was of:

'...Absolutely no value if after these two years there is no opportunity to practice reading and the art of writing....' (21)

Hence, according to van Kol the curriculum of the elementary schools should emphasise visual education. The children should be taught something about the sun, the stars, nature, plants, animals and fertilisers; they should be taught to work and superstition should be eradicated. (22)

Colijn felt that elementary schools should be simple in their set-up and he emphasised that practical education was just as important as instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic. (23)

Fock, who had become Minister of Colonies in 1905 and who—as was seen above (24)—was greatly interested in industrialisation outlined a mass education program which envisaged a rapid expansion of the Tweede-Klasse Scholen (Standaard Scholen) (25) and he was

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(22) Ibid., 1905-1906, 212-213.
(23) Colijn, H. 'Nota...' op. cit., III, 62.
(24) cf. p. 60 Chapter II.
(25) Note: The Tweede-Klasse School (Second Class School) had been set up in 1893 (cf. p. 28 Chapter I) as the standard primary schools for the indigenous masses.
further convinced that mass education (volksonderwijs) should be practical and technical in nature:

'...We must go in the direction of technical education... I do not want a slow and gradual development... I envisage a large scale organisation. I realise that this will cost money, but this expenditure is in fact an investment. Only practical education can advance the population economically. The cost should not be considered as unbearable; and most of the money can be found by borrowing. This is a matter which cannot and may not be postponed any longer. A slow and gradual expansion achieves nothing....' (26)

Governor-General van Heutz was very doubtful about the feasibility of Fock proposals for mass technical education and was strongly opposed on financial grounds to the minister's plan to expand the Tweede Klasse Scholen on a large scale. Van Heutz submitted Fock scheme to Snouck-Hurgronje - who as was pointed out above (27) was in principle opposed to any type of mass education. Snouck dismissed the idea of mass technical education on the following grounds:

'...Supposing that it was desirable to industrialise a large sector of the Javanese economy, it would still not be possible to realise this, because the Native population itself has not the slightest interest in the matter. I say it again. The European educator is only able to guide development. He cannot create something out of nothing.... Let us suppose, that the foreign doctor, in spite of this completely impassive attitude of the patient, is not only able to give a correct diagnosis but also a correct remedy - which are indeed risky suppositions to make. The result will be that these people, after having completed their training, will ask the government for suitable employment, because their own society can neither use nor pay for such highly trained workers. The state, which created these

(27) cf. p. 76 this chapter.
'superfluous tradesmen and industrial workers, will not be able to back out from its obligation to keep them alive.... Saving and credit institutions, emigration, and technical training, if superimposed from above... do not bring the Javanese one step closer to prosperity....' (28)

The Director of Education, Pott, was in full agreement with Snouck and at a departmental meeting all educational experts agreed that technical and vocational training - although highly desirable in itself - should be provided in separate schools. The elementary school should be solely concerned with intellectual development. (29)

As Habbema put it, in the elementary school:

'...All the available time - which is far too limited as it is - must be spent on the intellectual development of the pupils and such knowledge must be imparted which is useful to everybody, i.e. in the first place reading, writing and arithmetic. Thus, no training in technical subjects, home crafts, or agriculture in... the elementary school. For these subjects separate schools are necessary....' (30)

In the meantime the controleur Jasper had been appointed on the suggestion of the Director of Education to investigate the problem of elementary education and to advise on the need for an the feasibility of technical education for natives. Similarly to Fock this official stressed the importance of expanding the Tweede Klasse Scholen and he estimated that in Surabaja alone 33 new schools of this type were needed. In order to improve the efficiency of elementary education

(29) Hollandsch-Inlandsch Onderwijs-Commissie- Publicatie no.9: 'Historisch overzicht van het regeeringsbeleid ten aanzien van het onderwijs voor de Inlandsche bevolking' (Weltevreden, 1930) Pe. stuk, 41.
Jasper suggested better buildings, the establishment of school libraries and the improvement of teachers training. Technical and vocational training should be kept out of the elementary schools. Jasper was of the opinion, however, that there was a sufficient demand from European industry for technically trained indigenous personnel to warrant the establishment of three separate 'ambachtscholen' (Trades training schools). On the other hand he had found that as yet there was no demand in indigenous society for Western trained tradesmen. (31)

The controversy about the introduction of technical training in elementary schools was finally settled by the decision of the colonial government to adopt Jasper's proposals for the establishment of separate technical schools. In 1909-1910 three 'ambachtscholen' were established in the main centres of Java; Batavia; Semarang and Surabaja. These schools provided a three-year training course in the building trades, blacksmithing, turning and fitting, cabinet making, the electrical trade, boiler making. All students were instructed in technical drawing. Each school had a capacity of 200 students and the language of instruction was Malay. (32) The idea of the 'ambachtschool' was to bring '...a considerable number of Natives to a higher social and economic level...'. The government intended to give financial aid to graduates to enable them to set


(32) Kats, J. 'Overzicht van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie' (Batavia, 1915) 87-88.
themselves up in business either on a private or cooperative basis. It was further hoped that some graduates would eventually be put in charge of mobile technical training units (ambulante scholen) which would give practical instruction to villagers '...so that the instruction given at the ambachtschool could be used to encourage the industrial development of the people as a whole...'. These expectations, however, did not come true. For example, when the 'ambachtschool' in Surabaja first opened only 64 candidates applied for entrance. Of these 22 left after a few days. In June 1911 there were only 40 students in first year and 24 in the second year. (33) In fact the number of applicants continued to decrease and one of the major reasons for this was that:

'...Students held unrealistic expectations regarding their future. Many expected that immediately after graduation they would obtain a position as foreman, supervisor (or even better draughtsman) and they had no intention to earn a living as independent tradesmen. Hence it became apparent that this training did not reach the right persons, but only those who considered tradesmen as far below their social status....' (34)

In 1914 the responsibility for vernacular trades schools was transferred from the Department of Education to the Department of Agriculture, Industry and Trade and a new approach in technical education was adopted. It was argued that in order to reach the village technical education should be simple and compact. Hence,

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(33) Inspecteur van het Middelbaar Onderwijs aan den Directeur van Onderwijs, Eredienst en Nijverheid, 4 August 1911 in van der Wal op. cit., 186.
a more simple type of trades training school was set up in 1915. The duration of the course was two years, the language of instruction was Malay, and entrance was restricted to graduates from elementary schools. Initially European teachers were employed but they were to be replaced as soon as possible by Indonesian graduates from the 'ambachtscholen', who after graduation were to receive eighteen months practical training in European factories and another eighteen months of teachers training in the 'ambachtscholen'. (35) In 1920 there were nine two-year technical schools and three schools with a three-year course with 458 and 569 pupils respectively. (36)

Agricultural training was also kept outside the elementary school system and in 1912 the first 'landbouwschool' (agricultural school) was set up. In these schools practical training in agriculture was given in school gardens in addition to some instruction in theory. The duration of the course was two years and the language of instruction was the regional vernacular. Most of the students came from Tweede Klasse schools. In 1914 there were 14 'landbouwscholen' with 400 pupils. In 1914 a beginning was made with the introduction of 'landbouwkcursussen', i.e. courses in agriculture, to third year pupils of the village schools. The purpose of this training was to:

(35) Ibid., 95.
(36) Algemeen Verslag van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie over 1928, eerste deel: text. (Weltevreden, 1930) XXXVI.
"...Stimulate interest and love for agriculture by teaching pupils some of the elementary concepts of botany and by giving them a little practical instruction...." (37)

Similarly to the vernacular technical schools these agricultural training schools missed their mark, i.e. to improve indigenous agricultural productivity:

"...It soon appeared that one had aimed too high. Many of these schools were set up without any preliminary investigation whether local conditions favoured the success of these agricultural schools. Again the mistake was made to keep instruction too theoretical and therefore education was too far removed from the simple agricultural methods of the Native population. Moreover, the great shortage of trained Native personnel had the result that the majority of graduates did not return to agriculture. Only 10% became farmers...." (38)

It is obvious that very little was done in the way of vernacular technical and agricultural training during the 'Ethical' period. Far more attention was given to elementary intellectual education. The major objective of the colonial government in expanding elementary school facilities for Indonesians was apparently the eradication of illiteracy. Colonial officials were instructed in 1907 to keep in mind that:

"...The objective of the village school is in general no other than to instruct the children in reading, writing and simple arithmetic...." (39)

(37) Creutzberg and Hardeman 'Het onderwijs...', op. cit., 92.
(38) Algemeen Verslag van het Onderwijs...1928...' op. cit., LXIV.
(39) Hemert, K.J. 'Verzameling voorschriften betreffende het Inlandsch Onderwijs' (Batavia, 1915) 439.
Creutzberg, Director of Education, pointed out in 1918 that the actual purpose of 'volksonderwijs' was to eradicate illiteracy as soon as possible. As was pointed out previously, most 'Ethical' education experts argued that 'intellectual' education was necessary to rid the Native of his superstitious practices which were considered as one of the most important obstacles to his social and economic development. Education was also considered necessary to protect the Native against himself, i.e. education would develop the intellectual and logical powers of the Native which would make him see the folly of his 'irrational' economic behaviour patterns. Thus, education was only indirectly connected with the 'Ethical' indigenous welfare program in that literacy was considered as a necessary prerequisite for economic development.

However, the standard of elementary education which the colonial government eventually was prepared to provide to the indigenous population did not reach the expectation of many 'Ethical'.

Fock's plan of 1905 to expand the Tweede Klasse Scholen at a rapid rate met with a great deal of opposition from Governor-General van Heutz who claimed that the minister's scheme would bring the colony to the brink of financial ruin. Van Heutz calculated that the implementation of Fock's directive would cost one hundred million

(40) Volksraad Handelingen, 1918, 237.
(41) cf. p.77-78 this chapter.
(42) cf. p.76-77 this chapter.
guilders per annum, taking into account that in 1908 total government expenditure only amounted to 128 million guilders the Governor-General's concern becomes more understandable. Furthermore, van Heutz was opposed to the expansion of Tweede-Klasse Scholen on a large scale because he feared that instead of reinforcing the native economy this would result in the creation of: '....A discontented proletariat, which is able to read and write but which does not want to work with its hands any longer...'. As was pointed out above, the fear of creating an 'intellectual proletariat' was widespread at the time, while also the denigrating view of Snouck-Hurgronje regarding mass elementary education undoubtedly influenced the shaping of van Heutz's opinion.

Van Heutz attempted to solve the problem of elementary indigenous education by the introduction in 1907 of a new school type: the village (desa) school, which was much simpler than the Tweede-Klasse school and which was to be paid for by the villagers themselves. In some ways the educational ideas of van Heutz were far more influenced by 'association' - in the definition of van Niel - than the thinking of many prominent 'Ethici'. The Governor-General was opposed to superimposing the new elementary school from above and instead he wanted

(44) Ibid., 123.
(45) cf. p.73-74 this chapter.
a school which was adapted to existing village conditions and which therefore could be more easily integrated into village life. Van Heutz attempted to achieve this objective in the following ways. He reasoned that the educational demands of the rural population were as yet very simple and therefore only a minimum of elementary education was needed such as instruction in the three R's. In order to keep education within the village orbit the Leidraad (Regulations) for village schools laid down that:

'...Education must also serve to inculcate in the children a more accurate understanding of the more important things they meet in daily life. In arithmetic one should concentrate on the weights and measures used by the population. If possible and if it is considered useful more advanced students should be taught the more important aspects of the metric system....' (46)

School periods should be arranged in accordance with local conditions:

'...In particular account should be taken of those times when older children are usually required to help at home and in the fields....' (47)

Religious and cultural usages should be respected. As such separate classes should be held for girls and school times should not clash with the hours when normally children receives religious instruction. Moreover:

'...In the busy harvest periods the number of school hours can - if necessary - be decreased...the requirements of agriculture...should as a rule determine whether longer holidays will be necessary....' (48)

(46) Aanwijzingen voor eene proefneming met de oprichting van Inlandsche gemeentescholen op Java en Madoera, 1906. in: van der Wal op cit., 74.
(47) Ibid., 75.
(48) Ibid., 75.
Furthermore, van Heutz emphasised that the problem of elementary education could only be solved in the context of the policy of decentralisation and the reinforcing of village autonomy (Village Act of 1906). Hence he wanted to model the elementary school on other village institutions such as the desa lumbung\(^{(49)}\) and the village banks. However, according to van Heutz, the school would never be fully accepted as a true village institution unless the situation could be reached where villagers did not only want a school, but were also prepared to pay for it, because: '...It can be proved from experience that free education - like any other gift - is not appreciated for very long...'.\(^{(50)}\) Thus, the principle was laid down that the village should carry the full financial responsibility for the building, the upkeep, and the running expenditure of the school, including teachers' salaries. The village school teacher was not to be considered as an official of the central government, but as a village official:

'...Admittedly teachers because of their training may be somewhat above the mass of the population but in social status they should be no more than first among equals and they should remain that way. They ought to feel at home in the village and should gain the confidence of the other villagers so that they can impart their knowledge in particular to the older ones. Hence the teacher should be completely free to engage in farming in the same way as other villagers....' \(^{(51)}\)

\(^{(49)}\) cf. p. 69 Chapter II.

\(^{(50)}\) Aanwijzingen... op. cit., 76.

\(^{(51)}\) Aanwijzingen... op. cit., 72.
A moderate salary ranging between 15 and 25 guilders per month was to be paid to teachers out of school fees, while teachers—like other village officials—were also to be given the use of a parcel of village land.

In order to avoid that villagers would consider the school as an additional form of taxation it was stressed in the regulations that colonial officers should not make use of compulsion in spreading village schools. Instead they should try to persuade villagers to build schools and also pay for them by stressing the great benefit of education. (52)

Van Heutz substantiated his rejection of Fock's plan by stressing the 'intellectual proletariat' argument, but also finance was of course a major underlying reason for the adoption of the village school scheme, and as he wrote to Idenburg:

'....Two possibilities were open to me; either to carry out blindly what the ill-informed minister wanted, which would have cost the Treasury approximately 100 million guilders per year; or I could have interfered discreetly still leaving him (i.e. Fock) the honour of being considered progressive in education, I have chosen the second possibility and I have restricted the expansion of tweede klasse scholen as much as possible....And more realistically I have quickly introduced village schools which only receive temporary government support and which—at an annual cost of 1 million—will achieve just as much in the way of reading, writing and arithmetic as the unpayable Tweede Klasse scholen of the minister. The latter are only useful for the comparatively small number of people who are entirely removed from the village sphere....' (53)

(52) Ibid., 77.
(53) Gouverneur-Generaal aan den Minister van Kolonien (Idenburg), 26 January 1907 in: van der Wal op. cit., 123.
It seems hard to accept, that van Heutz and his advisers were really so naive as to believe that this self-financing system would result in an adequate expansion of village schools. It seems more likely that the colonial authorities attempted to dispose in this way of a responsibility, which had been imposed upon them by the 'spirit of the times', but which nevertheless was considered as a wasteful and useless expenditure of public funds. In any case, the argument that the government was incapable of financing a nationwide provision of village schools is not very convincing. There can hardly be any doubt that the colonial government was able to contribute a considerably larger sum to elementary education than the one million guilders per annum - less than 1% of the 1908 budget - which van Heutz was willing to spare. Rather than financial incapacity, it seems to have been the conviction that the majority of indigenous people were not in need of education, because they did not show any desire for it, which was responsible for the adoption of van Heutz's village school system. Illustrative of this attitude is the argument advanced at the time by the colonial government that:

'....For the people in general, for the children of the ordinary villager whose aim in life should be to continue to live in the same social stratum as their parents, the education provided in the village schools...is the proper one. The present level of development of the Javanese people at least for some time does not demand very high requirements....' (54)

(54) H.I.O.C. no.9 2e stuk, op. cit., 49.
Even as late as 1923 the Director of Education complained that the need of Indonesians for education was still too often belittled:

'...It is almost unbelievable to insiders that this need is still denied or treated as unimportant in some European circles....Persons, who are recognised as experts on the Indies, or who put themselves forward as such, are often heard to say, that the need for education only exists in the minds of a few maniacs. It has then supposedly been observed that only a small number of national leaders demand education and that in contrast the masses are disinterested....' (55)

Under this new system the Tweede Klasse school (standard primary school) which in the 1893 reorganisation (56) had been envisaged as the standard elementary school for the whole of the indigenous population, was retained. But now entry into these schools was restricted to those Indonesians who had lost contact with the land and who were dependent for their livelihood on employment in urban areas. The standard primary school was also given the responsibility for training prospective village school teachers. Pupils who had completed the three years standard primary school (Tweede Klasse School) were put in charge of a village school after one further year of training - which was mainly of a practical nature - by the headmaster of a Tweede Klasse school. Van Deventer, the 'Ethical' reformer, who from the beginning had been very dubious about the educational value of the village schools complained in 1912:

(56) cf. Chapter II
The teachers of the standard primary schools have received teachers' training, and they have reached a much higher level of development than their pupils. Village school teachers are on the whole boys, who have hardly mastered the material which they have to teach and they have to consult their booklets repeatedly. I have visited many village schools in all parts of Java and I am not exaggerating when I say that at the most in one out of ten village schools the teachers are up to their tasks. If it has been the intention to provide proper elementary education by these village schools then this experiment must be termed a miserable failure....' (57)

In 1916 the training of village school teachers was somewhat improved when special two year training courses were introduced (Leergangen). In addition to teaching practice students were now also given instruction in educational theory. Although by 1928 the number of these training courses had increased to 277, they still could not cope with the ever increasing demand for village school teachers and in some districts recourse had to be taken to the old method of training. (58)

Van Heutz' desa school system which placed most of the financial responsibility for elementary education on the villagers themselves was applied mainly in Java. In some of the Outer-Islands however, the responsibility for elementary education was delegated in large part to the Christian Missions.

As was seen above (59) the attempts of the Christian Missions in the latter part of the nineteenth century to take control of

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(58) Algemeen Verslag van het onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie, 1928, xliv.
(59) cf. p.28 Chapter I.
indigenous elementary education had been followed by Liberal opposition. Mission organisations, however, strongly supported by the Christian parties continued to press for an education monopoly. The Minister of Colonies, van Asch van Wijk - a member of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij - wrote to Governor-General Rooseboom in 1901 that:

'...It is not intended that the government should take the responsibility for mass elementary education in the Netherlands-Indies. This need must be filled by private initiative. The state which should support this initiative as much as possible, only should act on its own account when there is a real and urgent need for the type of education provided in government schools....' (60)

Private initiative meant to the Minister the Christian Missions. The leaders of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij had always stressed that to bring Western civilisation to the Indies without Christianity would be disastrous. Kuyper condemned Westernising without Christianising as applying a new varnish to a rotten piece of timber. (61) Idenburg emphasised in parliament that the moral vocation of the Netherlands was not only concerned with bringing material but also spiritual progress:

'...Material progress is germinated by spiritual progress. Matter does not control the spirit, but the spirit controls matter and only when the right spiritual training is given is it to be expected that measures taken to improve the lot of the indigenous population will be effective and fruitful. For example, if a way was found to lighten the burden on the Native and to increase his income so that he would have at his disposal double of what he has now then he would be even more prosperous if his spiritual fibre would stop him from wasting his money on e.g. gambling and opium.

(61) Brouwer, B.J. 'De Houding van Idenburg...' op. cit., 8.
'Hence spiritual development is not a side-issue and is not something which evolves from greater prosperity. Indeed it must be concurrent with material development....'(62)

In the Dutch parliament there were three schools of opinion on the question. The Christian parties pressed for the delegation of all elementary education to the Christian Missions. Another group of parliamentarians - mainly moderate Liberals - could see the financial advantage of farming out education, but they stressed that in predominantly Muslim areas government schools should be established. A third group - consisting mainly of Radical Liberals and Socialists - strongly objected to what they called Christian imperialism and they advocated a nation wide system of public schools.(63)

In 1909 Colijn, Advisor on the Outer-Islands and also a member of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij, brought the matter up again and submitted a concrete plan for delegating the responsibility for elementary education in some of the Outer-Possessions to the Christian Missions. Colijn proposed that the cost of education should only be partly reimbursed to the respective Missionary organisations. The government should make up its mind on what it was willing to spend on elementary education in a certain area and then should try to come to an agreement with the Mission society in that area. Colijn pointed out that his scheme would be advantageous to the treasury

because until then the cost of elementary education in the Outer-Islands was born entirely by the government, while in Java financial responsibility had been delegated to the villages.\(^{64}\)

A number of Liberal 'Ethici' were strongly opposed to Colijn's plan on the grounds that it controverted the principle of religious neutrality laid down in the Colonial Fundamental Law of 1854. Moreover, it was argued that while in Holland government subsidy to private schools was justified on the grounds that parents had the right to choose for their children the education of their liking, this did not apply to the Indies where the rights of Muslim parents were not respected as they would be forced to send their children to a Christian school.\(^{65}\) Snouck Hurgronje was doubtful about the results of the scheme, and in his view 'cultural association' would be far more fruitful than 'religious association', because:

'...The strong tendency of the Native society in the last 25 years to adopt our culture has nothing to do with religion. We must be glad that the Natives are not willing to be held back by Islam - which is opposed to such an association - to pursue the so desirable object of seeking closer ties with us....' \(^{66}\)

Governor-General Idenburg and the Minister of Colonies, de Waal Malefijt who were both prominent members of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij strongly supported Colijn's plan and they were able to have it accepted by parliament.

\(^{64}\) Gouverneur-Generaal aan den Minister van Kolonien, 5 April 19 in: van der Wal op. cit., 161-174.

\(^{65}\) cf. e.g. the statements of Bos and Ter Laan - a Radical Liberal and a Socialist respectively in: Staten-Generaal. Tweede Kamer 1912-1913, 720-734.

\(^{66}\) Snouck Hurgronje, C. 'Nederland en de Islam' op. cit., 89.
As a result the care of indigenous elementary education was delegated by the government to the Christian missions in such non-Muslim areas as North Celebes (Sulawessi), West New Guinea (West Irian), the Batak lands (Sumatra), Flores and Sumba. In return the respective missionary societies were reimbursed part of the cost incurred. For example in the case of Sumba the government paid for 75% of the running expenditure and the total capital cost of standard primary schools. But with regard to village schools at the most 300 guilders for building and furnishing costs and 100 guilders per annum for current expenditure was reimbursed. (67) Thus, the missions still had to find a considerable amount of money to run their schools.

In addition to easing the financial burden on the government, a major motive for this farming out of vernacular education to the Christian missions had been the need to counteract the proselytising activities of Islam in these still largely pagan areas. Although even on purely religious grounds it would have been difficult to expect a Christian government to have acquiesced in the attempts of another religion to convert its subjects, a most important consideration in this apparently all out drive to christianise as much as possible of Eastern Indonesia was the age old political fear of Islam. It was argued that if the government would send its own teachers, who were largely Muslims, Islam was bound to make progress in these areas. As one colonial official put it:

(67) Lulofs, C. 'De Soemba onderwijs regeling' TBB, XIV no.3, 1913, 189-190.
Dr. Snouck Hurgronje has repeatedly argued that the Mohammedan religion has no priestly caste. Each adult, convinced Muslim has the right to preside at the religious services of the community; each Mohammedan has the duty to proselytise...From a political point of view it may not be a matter of indifference to the government whether the still animist peoples of the archipelago are converted to Islam or Christianity. To delegate the care of the education to the missions...furthers the creation of the same ties between the population and the Netherlands ruler as the ones which have made the inhabitants of the Minahassa and many of the Moluccan islands such faithful subjects....' (68)

The Christian missions, however, kept also pressing for similar subsidy arrangements for their schools in such predominantly Muslim areas as Java and Sumatra. When in 1917 a constitutional amendment was carried in the Dutch parliament granting equal financial treatment by the government to both public and private schools in Holland, the Christian missions immediately began to agitate for similar legislation in the Indies. They were strongly supported in this by Idenburg, Minister of Colonies and a leader of the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party), who wrote:

'...In my opinion the spreading of Western culture - in this case Western education - is part of the task, which the Netherlands has to fulfill in the Indies. This is not the task of only a part, but of the whole of the Netherlands people. It is reasonable and necessary, that all forces, which want to participate in the fulfilment of this task should be given the opportunity to do so. It is irresponsible to exclude those who object to 'secular' education although they are very willing to cooperate in the fulfilment of the

(68) Lulofs, C. 'De Soemba onderwijs regeling' op. cit., 183.
Netherlands' task in a manner which is in accordance with their philosophy of life - which itself is one of the bases of western culture - . . . .

Equal financial treatment of both private and public schools will be a powerful means to come closer to the final objective of a general provision of education, because private initiative - no longer fettered by financial restrictions - will be able to develop much stronger . . . .

Gunning, a spokesman for the Protestant missions went even further than that and at the 1919 Kolonial Onderwijs Congres (Colonial Education Congress) he claimed that mission schools had proved to be far more acceptable to the indigenous population than public schools. According to Gunning a genuine acceptance and appreciation of education would not occur as a result of enforcing villagers to build schools. Instead the village school should be propagandised and this could be done far more successfully by private organisations such as the Christian missions, which unlike the government officials:

'...Work without prenta aloes sic (i.e. compulsion) and which have achieved that e.g. in the Minahassa one kampong (village) will not be surpassed by another in the matter of education . . . . Complaints are made about the superfluous number of schools in the Minahassa and the Batak lands. This is not completely untrue. I have seen myself that in the Minahassa two villages had each a school, although they were only separated by a small passable river. One school would have been sufficient, but they wanted each their own. They wanted to show off the school. Of course I do not agree with this, but all the same I wish to point out that in contrast to the fiasco of the government . . . .

Gunning further emphasised that in order to ensure the acceptance of the school the financial burden on the village should be made as light as possible. The new village school subsidy regulations of 1922 did not go far enough:

'...The government is not able to abandon the principle of self financing....Surely the government has already departed to such an extent from this principle that in my opinion it could go a little further. Initially the central treasury was prepared to contribute at the most 100 guilders per annum for each village school. Now...this amount has already increased to 591 guilders per annum. But why then is this system - which apparently cannot be fully maintained - completely done away with?...Is this the proper method of popularising a school...which is still far from being sufficiently appreciated? A special tax is a type of forced contribution which creates a great deal of resentment. I certainly would not vouch for the fate of the village schools in our more civilised mother country if it had to be maintained by a special tax....' (71)

In the government's view, however, equal subsidy treatment of public and private schools was not only financially impossible but it was also considered as politically dangerous. The Director of Education, Creutzberg, wrote in 1919:

'...Financial equalisation of course will lead immediately to an enormous development of activity by the Missions in the field of both vernacular and Dutch-Native education. If it remained at that then this could be viewed - by some with the hope, by others with the expectation - that people and country...would only fare better....But I have no


doubt that all kinds of undesirable elements will - when it no longer costs anything - take over Native education, be this in order to compete with the missions or merely to further their own political interests. It is certain, that immediately a number of Europeans, especially socialist teachers, will be willing to found in conjunction with extremist Natives school organisations which will enjoy a tremendous popularity. Thus my greatest fear is that the education of Natives will irrevocably become entangled in politics. This may be viewed more or less magnanimously in countries, which govern themselves, but with regard to the Indies with its foreign government where all native political activity is directed against that government, the consequences can only be disastrous....' (72)

The question of equal subsidy treatment of private and public schools was finally settled in 1924 when a number of amendments were made to the subsidy ordinance of 1895. The principle that every private school was eligible to receive government subsidy whatever its religious affiliation, was maintained. But now more generous subsidies were granted to private Dutch-language and Tweede Klasse scholen (standard primary schools). On the other hand with regard to village schools the new regulations laid down that the principle of self financing was to be adhered to and that at the most teachers' salaries could be reimbursed. (73)

Many 'Ethici' had been very critical about the standard of education provided in the village schools. Already in 1912 van Deventer called the village schools experiment a 'miserable failure'.

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(73) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 359-360.
and he blamed the low standard of education in these schools on inadequately trained teachers. (74)

Also during the debates on the Netherlands Indies budget for 1914 Liberal Democrat members regretted that Fock's plans for indigenous educational development had not been accepted, and they insisted on a much greater expansion of standard primary schools. (75) The Liberal Minister of Colonies at that time, Pleyte, agreed that village school education was sub-standard and he instructed the colonial government to increase the rate of expansion of Tweede Klasse Scholen (standard primary schools). Pleyte felt that this change in policy was especially necessary because of the tremendous popularity of the Sarekat Islam movement, (76) which made the provision of solid elementary education of the greatest importance. (77)

As a general provision of standard primary schools was considered financially impossible the colonial government reached a compromise solution. It laid down that standard primary schools were to be established in each sub-district of Java, and further it introduced a new and cheaper school type: the vervolgschool (continuation school). The vervolgschool, which provided a two

(74) Colenbrander, H.T. 'Leven en Werken...van Deventer...' op. cit., II, 377.
(75) Staten Generaal, Bijlagen. 1913–1914, Indische Begroting 1914, 47.
(76) cf. p. 179 Chapter IV.
year course of instruction after the three year village school was to be established in those areas where the population because of its level of economic and social development, was in need of more than three years of elementary education. (78)

The expansion of village schools— as can be seen from the table below— also was far too slow for many 'Ethical' reformers.

**Village school— Java and Madura**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Number of Pupils</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>66,125</td>
<td>5,114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>99,757</td>
<td>7,295</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>2,551</td>
<td>157,048</td>
<td>9,917</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2,948</td>
<td>187,046</td>
<td>12,670</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>3,521</td>
<td>223,450</td>
<td>15,965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>3,696</td>
<td>242,436</td>
<td>18,619</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>4,006</td>
<td>269,458</td>
<td>24,413</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>4,185</td>
<td>274,113</td>
<td>25,403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>4,473</td>
<td>270,551</td>
<td>26,331</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Village schools— Outer-Islands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Number of Pupils</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>30,972</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>37,841</td>
<td>3,420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>44,387</td>
<td>5,425</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>46,836</td>
<td>6,984</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>55,542</td>
<td>9,017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>55,080</td>
<td>8,593</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Liberal Minister of Colonies, Pleyte, calculated in 1918 that at this rate of progress another 38 years were needed to catch up with the existing backlog. Two major and partly interconnected reasons for this slow progress in village school education were: the unwillingness of the colonial government to pay for elementary education and the general disinterest of the indigenous population in the village schools.

The pious hope, that the apathy of rural Indonesians to education could be successfully overcome by inducing - not compelling - villagers to accept the idea of a school, which they themselves should pay for, soon proved to be unrealistic in practice. Only on very few occasions were Indonesians willing to comply with government propaganda, and even then the school came generally to be considered as:

'...One of those many tribulations, which it pleased Allah to inflict through Government officials....' (80)

But even if it had been possible to overcome indigenous non-response by means of persuasion, there was still the important question whether the village would be able to pay both for the construction of the school and its running expenses. Already in 1908 the director of Binnenlands Bestuur - B.B. - (Department of Local Government), De Graaf, had warned, that:

(79) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 2 March 1918 in: van der Wal op. cit., 344.
(80) Plas, C.O. van der Kolonial Onderwijs Congres, Stenografisch Verslag 1919, 213.
'Not only are the villagers totally ill equipped financially, but also the population is in general so poor, that any new institution, which raises the financial burden, will be received with suspicion.'

Therefore, De Graaff suggested that initially the government should be prepared to grant more financial assistance than had been planned. Furthermore, he pointed out that if the village school was to be reasonably effective in its aim then funds for inspection and teachers training should be provided. The government needed to have no fear of surpassing:

'...The sum of one million guilders per year - an amount, which is certainly not disproportionate to the importance of the matter - if only education is introduced gradually and if continuous care is taken not to advance the village school to such a level, where it no longer fits in with the social needs of the Javanese and surpasses the village's capacity to pay....' (81)

These suggestions, however, were not very well received by the colonial government. How strong the idea was in high government circles that elementary education for the indigenous population - although fashionable - was not a matter of great urgency, is indicated by the following comment of the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies). Criticising De Graaff's proposal that European inspectors should be appointed, the Raad was of the opinion that:

As long as the organisation of village education is still in its formative stage, one must be careful to avoid increasing the organisational structure, unless the aim one has in mind in providing elementary, for the ordinary villager sufficient education, is lost....' (82)

But, as De Graaff had warned, the subsequent tardy growth of village schools was not always due to disinterest on the part of villagers. Also the inability to pay proved on occasions to be an obstruction. For example, the resident of Banjumas wrote in January, 1909:

'...Occasionally there is evidence of a desire to found village schools. But in my opinion this desire is not strong enough to overrule the financial objection....' (83)

The resistance to the introduction of village schools - either because of complete disinterest, financial incapacity, or both - was so strong in some areas (84) that in 1910 the Inspector of Native education suggested a departure from the principle of non-compulsion:

'...In areas where the population cannot yet be brought to accept a general introduction of village schools, it is advisable to form small groups of schools - even though some perintah halus (lit. gentle pressure) will have to be used....' (85)

(82) quot. van der Wal, 130 note 1.


(84) Note: For example the controleur of the Kediri district wrote in 1909: '...Initially I had planned to introduce during 1911 village schools in a number of places, but this plan had to be abandoned in the face of an absolute unwillingness on the part of the population....' in: van der Wal op. cit., 181.

In practice, however, this 'gentle pressure' often resulted in the use of direct force. This caused a great deal of popular resentment against the village school, which came to be considered solely as an additional form of taxation. As one observer remarked at the Koloniaal Onderwijs Congres (Colonial Education Congress) in 1919:

'...In some parts of the Priangan (West Java), on the west coast of Sumatra and in Korintji there seems to exist a great deal of interest in village schools. Everywhere else...the founding and upkeep of village schools depends on the pressure of the Native heads, which varies from 'gentle persuasion' to direct force....Perhaps initially one has fallen for the illusion, that also villagers were already influenced by the new spirit, which animates the 'awakening East'. After all one easily believes what one hopes for....But when it became clear that in the village the situation had remained almost unchanged, it was obvious, that the activity of government officers would be construed into a command from above...the Native knows indeed that it pays him to obey the government....' (86)

Another observer at the congress drew the following pathetic picture of what he had seen of compulsory methods in village education:

'...In Madura I once saw a small group of crying children who as a form of punishment sat in front of the Assistant Wedono's(87) house. They were stamped all over in ink with 'Je Maintiendrai'(88) because they had been guilty of not attending school....' (89)

(87) Official in the Native Local Government Service.
(88) Je Maintiendrai (I shall maintain), is the motto on the coat of arms of the Dutch royal house.
(89) Plas, C.O. van der Koloniaal Onderwijs Congres 1919, 212.
The slow progress of vernacular education caused a great deal of criticism in the Dutch parliament and in 1918 the Minister of Colonies stressed that the rate of expansion should be accelerated. He suggested that a plan was to be constructed:

'...which is designed to achieve within a reasonable period of time a general provision of education. A period of 35 years would not be too long for the Indies in general but with regard to the more developed areas such as Java and Madoera, the West-Coast of Sumatra, and Menado a shorter period of time would in my opinion be desirable....' (90)

Pleyte agreed that the principle of self-financing of village schools needed modification. On the other hand he insisted that a general provision of education would be impossible unless most of the financial responsibility could be delegated to the lower autonomous administrative units. Pleyte pointed to the example of Japan where a general provision of education within half a century would have been impossible, if not most of the cost had been borne by the local councils. The Minister further suggested that perhaps the system which had been adopted in the Netherlands would also be applicable to the Indies. Under this system the state only paid for the teachers' salaries, while the cost of construction and furnishing of the building and other running expenses were to be borne by the local authorities. (91)

(90) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 2 March 1918 in: van der Wal op. cit., 340-347.

(91) Ibid.
The colonial authorities, however, went somewhat further than the Minister had suggested; and the budget for 1919 and the following years, provided an extra one million guilders per annum for the construction of an additional 1000 village schools. Moreover, some financial assistance was provided to help needy villages pay for teachers' salaries and other running expenditure. Finally in 1922 the matter of government subsidies to village schools was definitely regulated. Under the new system the village, as before, would in principle be responsible for the construction, furnishing, and upkeep of the school, but building loans would be provided by the government when needed and in special circumstances these loans could be granted without charge or at a low rate of interest. The government on its part would take care of teachers' salaries while other running expenses were to be paid for out of school fees. (92) These new village school subsidy regulations of 1922 were in fact a belated admission by the colonial government of the failure of van Heutz' scheme and they removed to some extent one of the most important obstacles: lack of finance, which hitherto had stood in the way of a more rapid expansion of the vernacular school apparatus.

The evolution of the Dutch-language education system:

Three major factors which were responsible for the expansion of Dutch-language education for Indonesians during the 'Ethical' period

can be singled out: the growing demand of the colonial economy for Western-trained and Dutch speaking Indonesians; the pressure of 'Ethical' colonial reformers to 'associate' at least upper-class Indonesians with Western civilisation; and the increasing interest of upper- and middle-class Indonesians themselves in Western education.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the opportunities for Indonesians to learn the Dutch language were very restricted. As was seen in Chapter I, (93) in 1886 the Dutch language had been removed from the curriculum of indigenous primary schools and teachers training schools. The only schools where Dutch was taught were the European primary schools. In fact the decision of 1863 (94) to re-admit Indonesians into European primary schools had caused a great deal of opposition from European residents – in particular Eurasians. The 'Hoofdcommissie van Onderwijs' (Central Education Commission) pointed out to the Governor-General in August 1864 that a large influx of Indonesian children into European schools could be expected and it cited the case of a native fruit vendor in Batavia who had applied for the admission of his children free of charge in the best school in town. The commission argued that the entry of large numbers of Indonesian children into European schools would not only present the colonial government with serious financial difficulties but also that it would cause:

(93) cf. Chapter I p. 27-28.
(94) cf. Chapter I p. 20.
"...Strong discontentment among lower class Eurasians and also among Regents who would object to seeing their children seated in school alongside lower class Native children...." (95)

In order to limit entry into the European primary school to upper-class Indonesian children the colonial government decided in 1864 that Indonesian children - unlike Eurasian children - could no longer be admitted free of charge. Furthermore, from 1872 onwards Indonesian parents were to be assessed in the top bracket of the school fees scale and Indonesian children were required to wear European dress and shoes. (96) European parents, however, were still not satisfied and kept pressing the colonial government for stricter admittance regulations. Finally in 1893 the Minister of Colonies decided that upper-class Indonesian children should be accommodated as much as possible in the Eerste Klass Scholen (First Class Elementary Schools) which, as was pointed out above, (97) did not teach Dutch. This was followed in 1894 by another regulation which restricted entry into European primary schools to children from Dutch speaking Indonesian families. (98)

These new regulations, however, were not applied with a great deal of vigour as is apparent from the following table:

(95) H.I.O.C. no.9, 2e stuk, op. cit., 14.
(96) Ibid., 50-52.
(97) cf. Chapter I, p. 28.
(98) H.I.O.C. no.9, 2e stuk, op. cit., 44.
### Pupils in European primary schools

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Christian</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
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**Source:** Bijlage, A van: Directeur van Onderwijs aan Gouverneur-Generaal, 18 October, 1907 in: van der Wal op. cit., 108.

For some time the colonial government had been concerned about the loss of prestige suffered by the Native aristocracy during the course of the nineteenth century. The Regents – the former viceroys of the Javanese kings – had been left a great deal of their traditional authority during the period of the Dutch-East India Company. This situation changed during the nineteenth century when the various colonial governments attempted to introduce a more European type of government administration. In the process the Regents and other traditional local leaders of lower rank were gradually 'defeudalised' and were created into a corps of relatively unimportant colonial officials – the Inlands Bestuur (Native Local Government Service) which was a branch of the Department van Binnenlands Bestuur – B.B. – (Department of Interior Administration). The Native ruling class
was also gradually shorn of the outward signs of its traditional power. The system of *apanages* i.e. the right of the Regent to levy taxes for his own use in the form of produce, money, or labor, was abolished in 1867. The performance of *corvee* by villagers to Native officials was abolished in 1882, while also the paying of homage, and the pomp and splendour of traditional ceremonial was reduced. Furthermore, the *Inlands Bestuur* remained largely uneducated in the Western sense and became intellectually and technically stagnant being by-passed more and more in decision-making by European colonial officials. In 1899 the Regent of Demak, R.M.A.A. Hadiningrat, wrote:

'...Since, in general, the native heads remained at their former level of education, this too, provided a reason why native officials were not longer consulted, a fact which could naturally do no other than undermine their standing and prestige....' (99)

This situation had worried the colonial government for some time and as was seen in Chapter I (100) in 1845 special elementary schools had been set up for Native officials, followed by the establishment of *Hoofdenscholen* (101) in 1878. These schools, however, did little to improve the situation.

By the end of the nineteenth century the colonial government had become convinced that both for political as well as financial reasons it was of the greatest importance for the Dutch cause to

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(100) cf. Chapter I p. 14.

...Politically it is of great importance for the continuation of our rule to bind the people to use partly by letting (the people) participate as much as possible in government administration and partly by letting (the people) feel our rule as little as possible. Both these objectives can be reached most effectively by restricting ourselves as much as possible to supervision and to leave the actual task of governing as much as possible to the Natives themselves. In this way also the mistakes that are made will not be blamed so much on us but rather on their own compatriots...The appointment of Native instead of European officials in all positions where this is possible will greatly decrease the burden on the budget...Any type of European administration is too expensive for a country like the Indies...because it is obvious that a rich country like the Netherlands with a population which is six times smaller can easily afford a much greater budget than the Indies which is a poor country. Thus a serious inconsistency has crept into the Indies budget which has to provide for a European administration which is twice as expensive as in the Netherlands. The first thing to be done is to change this situation if we want to be in a position to provide properly for the needs of the Indies which as yet have not been taken care of. And this can only be done by gradually replacing European officials wherever possible by Native officials which will be paid at a lower salary based on the low standard of living of the people....'

The 'ontvoogding' - lit. 'detutelage' - of the Native heads, i.e. the granting of greater responsibility to the Inlands Bestuur (Native Local Government Service) became an accepted principle of policy during the 'Ethical' period, although as will be seen later the actual measures taken were not of great consequence. It was realised of course by the colonial government that before any attempt at 'ontvoogding' could be made the status and the efficiency of the

Inlands Bestuur would have to be raised considerably. Liberal minded politicians and colonial officials argued that this could be best achieved by providing indigenous leaders and administrators with a Dutch education, by 'associating' them with Western civilisation. These colonial reformers condemned the moves made in the last two decades of the nineteenth century to restrict the entry of Indonesians into European primary schools. In 1889 the Minister of Colonies, Keuchenius, who in 1863 when a member of the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) had strongly supported the re-opening of European primary schools for Indonesians, wanted to see the Dutch language re-introduced in teachers training schools, because he believed that teachers by reading Dutch books would be able to advance themselves to a higher intellectual and cultural level. Keuchenius also stressed the importance of Dutch for Native officials and leaders. (103) Keuchenius' idea to spread the Dutch language more widely among the indigenous population was not very well received in the Indies. On the other hand the colonial government agreed with the minister that the training and education of Native officials should be improved and suggested that as a first step the Dutch language should be introduced in the Hoofdenscholen. Again in 1893 the colonial government emphasised to the Hague that the best way to enhance the sagging prestige of Native officials was to provide them with a Dutch-language education. (104)

(103) Brugmans, I. J. 'Geschiedenis... op. cit., 222.
(104) Nota van de afdeeling Al van het ministerie van Kolonien, 16 December, 1901 in: van der Wal op. cit., 15.
A number of conservative European colonial officials who undoubtedly were concerned to maintain their superior position in the colonial status system were strongly opposed to using the Dutch language in their dealings with Indonesian officials. This attitude elicited a strong reprimand from the Council of the Indies in 1890. The Council bitterly complained that the European officials concerned appeared not only:

'...Unwilling to appreciate that Natives have been able to master that language (i.e. Dutch) but they also appear to consider this as a disadvantage. In any case they do nothing to encourage the use of the Netherlands language. There are even some, who on the grounds of peculiar notions about Native etiquette, refuse to converse with Natives in that language. In this way then the training which the Government – after considerable effort and expense – tries to provide to Native officials is deliberately made useless by her European servants....' (105)

The Council further advised the Governor-General to instruct the various heads of regional government to encourage the use of Dutch in conversations between European and Native officials. A circular to that effect was issued in September 1890. (106)

It was pointed out, however, by conservative European colonial officers that the government circular failed to take sufficient notice of indigenous social values. And they argued that the use of Dutch would put indigenous officials – in particular Javanese – in an embarrassing position, because:

(106) Ibid., 28.
The Javanese...use High-Javanese, Middle-Javanese, or Low-Javanese in accordance with the rank of the person they are addressing. This is not a question of etiquette at all—as is believed in the circular—but is a matter of respect which is deeply rooted in the people and its culture. Our language is not as discriminative as the Javanese language so that a native who speaks Dutch to us raises himself to our status. He knows that this is disrespectful not to say uncouth...." (107)

Less selfish perhaps but certainly more fundamental was the criticism levelled against a Dutch education for Indonesian officials on the grounds that this would remove the indigenous ruling class too far from the common people:

"...It is said that the Westernisation of the Native heads will tie the people closer to the Dutch government. But this argument does not work out in practice. The more Native leaders become Western in dress, behaviour, thinking and actions the further they will be removed from the Javanese peasant....Thus they (i.e. Native leaders) should not be encouraged to study in European High Schools and the knowledge of Western techniques which is required of them should be kept to a minimum. Their education should be adapted to Eastern situations and concepts and it should above all be an education which prepares them for their future position. No European High School is needed with geometry, algebra, French, German and English grammar and all the other subjects which the Westerner considers absolutely essential for his children, but which are not needed at all by the Native heads in order to become good administrators. All this Western school knowledge and the years of residence in large cities among European youth will estrange Native young men from their people and thus make them less suitable to act as a leader later on...." (108)

These criticisms, however, failed to have any significant impact on colonial policy which became influenced more and more by

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(107) Deli Courant no. 58, 4 November 1890, quot. Nota van de Afdeeling Al...16 December, 1901, op. cit.

the 'Ethical' ideal of 'association'.

Financial and political expedience which were the major reasons for the adoption of the policy of 'ontvoogding', were also the main motives underlying the 'Ethical' policy of staffing the 'technical' departments of the colonial civil service as much as possible with Indonesians. This process is more generally known as 'Indiansatie', lit., 'Indianisation'. The 'Indiansatie' of the colonial public service was seen by 'Ethical' reformers as an essential step towards the achievement of the ideal of 'association'. Snouck Hurgronje stressed that the colonial authorities should ensure that:

'...All the work that can be carried out by these children of the land who have received modern training is also in fact entrusted to them. It is unrealistic to continue the present situation, where these young Natives, who came forward as the best products of the new direction in colonial policy are looked upon by senior government officials in the Indies as phantasmas, who after a great deal of hesitation are pushed in some corner....' (109)

Pointing to the rising tide of Indonesian nationalist feeling Snouck emphasised that this process had begun without the help and even in spite of the opposition of the government:

'...There is no longer the question if these sections of the people of the archipelago who are most receptive to higher intellectual development will put us aside in the intellectual field. The only question that remains to be asked is if the further development of this movement, which has started with such an impetus, will happen with out cooperation and under our direction, or in spite of our resistance and under the leadership of others who will not be long in forthcoming. In

'my view the answer to this question cannot be a subject of a prolonged discussion....' (110)

In order to make 'ontvoogding' and 'Indianisatie' a reality a change in policy concerning the Dutch-language education of Indonesians was obviously necessary. As one official report put it:

'...To encourage the Native to use Dutch in official dealings while on the other hand not to give him but even restrict the opportunity to learn that language, was a policy which could no longer be maintained and which can only be explained in terms of the frequent change of leadership in the Department of Colonies....' (111)

As a first step in the direction of 'ontvoogding' Dutch was introduced in the 'Hoofdenschool' at Magelang in 1899. This was followed in 1900 by the reorganisation of the 'Hoofdenscholen'. These schools which hitherto had meant to provide a sound general education to prospective Native officials were now transformed into training schools for indigenous officials ('Onleidingschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren - OSVIA'). A certificate of a European primary school was a pre-requisite for entry into the OSVIA which was to provide a five year course of study. The training program was divided into a preliminary part of two years and a more advanced course. In the preliminary two years pupils were trained at a secondary level in such subjects as Dutch, Malay, the local vernacular, mathematics, geography, history and natural science. In the advanced training course students continued to study the same subjects

(110) Ibid., 96.
(111) H.I.O.C. no. 9, 2e stuk, op. cit., 29.
as in the preliminary years but in addition they received instruction in legal subjects such as the principles of jurisprudence, the constitutional and administrative law of the Netherlands-Indies, economics, agricultural science and surveying. (112)

In 1914 a Bestuurschool (School of Public Administration) was founded in Djakarta to train lower officials (hulp-gezaghebbers) in the European branch of the Department of Binnenlands Bestuur and to provide more advanced training to Indonesian administrators in particular the Regents. The course was of two years duration and was mainly practically orientated. The subjects covered were Dutch, English, law, elementary agricultural science, and an introduction to civil engineering. (113)

The principle of 'ontvoogding' was also applied in the judiciary. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Regent of Serang (Banten) had asked the colonial government what the employment prospects would be for his younger brother who wanted to study law at Leiden university. The colonial government considered that the time had come to abolish the principle that functions in the judiciary which demanded Western legal qualifications could not be filled by Natives. A Royal decree of 1905 declared that: 'No Native who satisfied the legal qualifications needed for a position in the judiciary should be excluded from such a position for the reason that he is a Native...'. Furthermore, in 1908 a


(113) Ibid., 56-58.
Rechtsschool (School of Legal Studies) was founded in Batavia for the training of Indonesian legal officers. The Rechtsschool provided a six years training course. In the first three years students who were recruited from the European primary school were given a sound secondary school training, while the last three years were spent on legal studies.\(^{(114)}\)

Other institutes of tertiary training open to Indonesians were the NIAS (School for Netherlands-Indies Doctors), another medical school similar to the STOVIA\(^{(115)}\) which was established in Surabaja in 1914, and the Nederlandsch-Indische Veeartsenschool\(^{(116)}\) (Netherlands-Indies Veterinary Science School) which also was opened in 1914. In a similar category was the Middelbare Landbouwschool (Agricultural College) founded at Bogor in 1913.\(^{(117)}\)

The question, however, as to how prospective Indonesian students should be enabled to obtain the necessary Dutch-language qualifications to enter these professional training schools caused a considerable controversy and took a long time to be settled.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century European teachers in a number of areas in Java\(^{(118)}\) had set up private Dutch language

\(^{(114)}\) Creutzberg, K.F. and Hardeman, J. 'Het Onderwijs...' op. cit., 52-5

\(^{(115)}\) cf. Chapter I p. 22-23.

\(^{(116)}\) Note: This training school provided a four year course in the following subjects: Mathematics, physics, chemistry, German, biology a large number of veterinary subjects, and practical instruction in diagnosis, anatomy and surgery.

\(^{(117)}\) Note: The purpose of this institution was to train agricultural and forestry officers. The three year course consisted of mathematics, physics, chemistry, botany, biology, geology, agricultural science, agricultural economics, forestry, forestry exploitation and administration, surveying, accountancy, hygiene and German.
courses for Indonesians. These courses were apparently well attended and received financial support from the colonial government. (119) Abendanon, the 'Ethical' Director of Education (1900–1905), was not in favor of these private courses and proposed that special Dutch-language courses should be added to the Eerste Klasse Scholen. Abendanon, however, was not only interested in 'associating' the upper layers of indigenous society but he also stressed the importance of disseminating the Dutch language as widely as possible among the native population as a whole. The Director pointed out that an investigation in 1902 had shown that the private Dutch-language courses were not only attended by people who tried to improve their position within the civil service but also by a considerable number of people who apparently wanted to learn Dutch for its own sake. The investigation had covered 45 courses totalling 1,634 pupils of whom only 392 were public servants. (120)

The Director's representation caused the colonial government to order another investigation the results of which appeared to confirm Abendanon's opinion that a considerable interest existed.

(118) Note: Courses are known to have existed in: Semarang, Tegal, Pati, Probolinggo, Bangkalan, Kudus, Modjokerto, Ngandjuk, Purworedjo, Kutuardjo, Bojolali, Magelang, Wanosobo, Malang and Pasuruan.


(120) H.I.O.C. no. 9, 2e stuk op. cit., 30.
among Indonesians to learn Dutch. Hence the Governor-General, Noosenboom, decided that as an experiment a Dutch-language course should be attached to one European primary school in each region of Java and Madura. \(^{(121)}\) This decision, however, was revoked by the Minister of Colonies, Idenburg, who although not opposed in principle to the spreading of the Dutch language argued that Abendanon's plan had one serious disadvantage:

''...This disadvantage is in my opinion that the Government will fritter away its financial resources and will not be able to fulfill its foremost duty which is to provide elementary education to the indigenous population as a whole and in accordance with its needs...'' \(^{(122)}\)

Idenburg was not convinced at all that the investigations had shown conclusively that a real need for Dutch-language education existed and he did not only reject Abendanon's plan but also ordered the colonial government to discontinue its practice of granting financial support to privately run Dutch-language courses. \(^{(123)}\)

In order to provide Indonesians with an opportunity to obtain the Dutch-language qualifications necessary for entry into professional training schools the colonial government followed the pattern set by the Dokter-Djawa School (STOVLA) where since 1875 Dutch had been used as the language of instruction. Prospective 'dokters-djawa' were initially required to attend a two year course in Dutch before

\(^{(121)}\) H.I.O.C. no.9, 2e stuk op. cit., 30.
\(^{(122)}\) Ibid.
\(^{(123)}\) Ibid., 31.
starting their medical studies. In 1890 it was decided to draw students only from the European primary schools and 40 Indonesian applicants were allowed to enter the European primary school free of charge each year. In 1900 this number was increased to 80. With the reorganisation of the Hoofdenscholen into OSVIA's it was decided in 1903 that 60 prospective students per year were to be allowed into European primary schools free of charge. (124)

Undeterred by this setback Abandanon continued his Dutch language crusade, and he proposed that Dutch should again be made the medium of instruction in teachers training schools and that the entrance regulations for European primary schools should be eased. These proposals were also not very well received in the Hague. Loudon, the head of Section A1 of the Department of Colonies, argued that there were two serious objections to instructing Native teachers in the Dutch language. Firstly, teachers training would have to be lengthened which was inadvisable in view of the shortage of teachers; and secondly, the cost of training in terms of salaries and personnel would be prohibitive. Furthermore, Loudon could not see any advantages in Abendanon's scheme:

'....Does one really believe that a native teacher who teaches in a native language will retain his knowledge of Dutch by daily conversation in the village?...And taking account of the native character will not the fruits of his education soon disappear?... Does one really believe that teachers after they have obtained a position will continue their studies? After all it is one of the contentions of the Director of Education that just because of this further study

(124) H.I.O.C. no.9, 2e stuk op. cit., 33.
'a higher level of intellectual development will be achieved which will be of benefit to education....Section Al is not very confident about this....' (125)

According to Loudon a teacher could be just as well trained and could be even more effective without a knowledge of Dutch because there was no guarantee that an Indonesian villager would profit from a teacher with Dutch-Language qualifications:

'....In the first place the native man in the street does for the time being not need to know Dutch and even if he did then he should be taught by Dutch teachers and not Natives. Surely nobody can seriously suggest such a scheme in view of the cost involved, nor can the government for political reasons intend to deform the simple native to a quasi-European with his greater needs, discontentment, complaints etc. Native education must remain native and this is possible because the Native can be given the necessary knowledge also by means of the vernacular....Thus for the ordinary native who visits the public school there is no need to know Dutch....' (126)

Loudon dismissed Abendanon's claims that there was a widespread demand in indigenous society for Dutch-language education as follows:

'....Are these not merely phrases? Is this not actually the argument of a utopian who has beautiful dreams but does not take account of the realities of life?....' (127)

The Minister of Colonies, van Asch van Wijck, was in general agreement with his departmental officers that Dutch-language education should be restricted to upper-class Indonesians. The Minister was not so strongly opposed to the use of Dutch in the teachers
training schools and he informed Batavia he would not object to an experiment with the introduction of Dutch in one of these schools. (128) For this experiment the colonial government selected the teachers training school at Fort de Kock (Bukittinggi) in Minangkabau (West Sumatra). (129)

More successful were the attempts of Abendanon to have the European primary schools opened more widely to Indonesians. The Director complained that the regulation of 1893 restricting entry to Dutch-speaking Indonesian children was unjust, because many of the Eurasian children in the European primary schools could hardly speak Dutch at all. Abendanon referred here to an enquiry held in 1900 by the 'Nederlandsch-Indisch Onderwijs Genootschap' (Netherlands-Indies Teachers Association) which had found that of the 1,476 'European' children admitted into European primary schools only 433 or 29.3% could only speak a little Dutch and 621 or 41.5% could not speak the language at all. (130)

Abendanon, however, was strongly opposed by the Governor-General, Roosenboom, who argued that a large influx of Indonesian children into European primary schools was not only undesirable on financial grounds but also because this would result in a lowering of standards. (131) But Abendanon received considerable support from progressives in the

(128) H.I.O.C. no.9, 2e stuk op. cit., 32.
(129) Ibid.
(130) Ibid., 34.
(131) Ibid., 34-35.
Dutch parliament who during 1901-1903 kept pressing the Minister of Colonies for more flexible admission regulations for European primary schools. (132) This political pressure from Holland caused the colonial government in October 1903 to issue a decree lowering the school fees for Indonesian children and permitting Indonesian parents with a monthly income of less than 50 guilders to send their children to a European primary school free of charge. (133) As a result of this measure the number of Indonesian children in European primary schools was able to increase from 2,427 in 1903 to 3,764 in 1906. (134)

The opportunity for Indonesians to receive a Dutch-language education were widened when in 1907 Abendanon's original plan was adopted and Dutch was introduced into the Eerste Klasse Scholen and the teachers training schools. However, the Eerste Klasse Scholen remained elementary schools in the sense that they did not prepare pupils for the Klein-Ambtenaarsexamen (Lower Civil Service Entrance Examination) nor were pupils eligible to enter the professional training schools with the exception of the OSVIA. (135)

One important reason for the decision to introduce Dutch into the Eerste Klasse Scholen was to divert Indonesian children away

(132) H.I.O.C. no.9, 2e stuk op. cit., 35.
(133) Ibid., 35-36.
(134) van der Wal op. cit., 108.
(135) H.I.O.C. no.9, 2e stuk op. cit., 43-44.
from the European primary schools. The large influx of Indomesian children into these schools had - according to the education authorities - caused a lowering of standards. Jasper who - as was seen above (136) - had been ordered to carry out an investigation of indigenous educational requirements reported in 1906:

'...For some years it has been impossible to deny that a large category of Natives show a strong desire to have their children learn our language. This demand has been satisfied to some extent by the liberalisation of the admission of Native pupils to European primary schools... but unfortunately - as is clear from my investigations... this has been detrimental to these schools. The educational level in particular that of Dutch has fallen ....Furthermore, a considerable number of children have entered who originate from the lower classes of Native society and who do not really need a knowledge of our language....' (137)

European parents also repeatedly complained about a decline in educational standards and morality in European primary schools. An official enquiry held in 1907 regarding the impact of Native pupils on standards of education and the morals of European pupils showed according to the Director of Education, Pott, unmistakingly that:

'...The standard of education in particular in regard to Dutch...had suffered....The majority of persons interviewed deny that a moral degeneration has taken place. Others, however, complain about the lack of bodily hygiene in Native pupils...and about certain manipulations which are difficult to describe here more fully but which pupils are prone to indulge in when romping about. Older pupils in particular are considered as detrimental to morality in the schools....' (138)

(136) cf. p.78-79 this chapter.
The Director of Education proposed that admission of Indonesian children into European primary schools should be restricted again to the upper-classes. The colonial government agreed and in January 1908 reversed the decision of 1903 by increasing school fees for Indonesian children and by abolishing free places.

The Dutch government approved, although the Minister of Colonies, Heemskerk, commented:

'...This school question is like all other school questions extremely difficult. It is only for practical reasons that I can agree to the revocation of free admission. I consider the dissemination of the Dutch language among the whole of the native population as of the greatest importance. The prejudices of Eurasians that natives and Chinese should not be allowed to speak Dutch seem very stupid to me. Hence the spreading of the Dutch language should be stressed and the revocation of free admission is only acceptable for the reason that not everything can be done at once and that one has to start gradually from the top....' (141)

However, the problem of providing adequate Dutch-language school facilities was still far from being settled. In 1909 the question of admitting Indonesians into European primary schools was brought up again, this time by Hazeu the Advisor for Native Affairs. Hazeu directed the attention of the Director of Education to the newly founded Javanese national organisation 'Budi Utomo' which was highly critical of colonial education policy:

'...No matter how inexperienced, unpractical, hesitant, yes even divided the leaders of this movement — which

(139) 'Directeur van Onderwijs...' in van der Wal op. cit., 117.
(140) Ibid., note 1.
(141) Ibid.
(142) cf. p. (139-140) Chapter IV.
'is the first outward sign of Native self-expression — may appear, on one point the whole of Young-Java is in full agreement and holds very strong convictions, i.e.: the need for education which is seen as a necessary means for economic improvement as well as intellectual advancement. This widely felt and impetuous desire for more and better education is not — as some people try to argue — a passing whim or fashion. On the contrary it is a natural consequence of the rapidly changing social conditions in Java as well as in almost the whole of the East. As a result latent energies have been activated and people are looking for the most effective weapons to equip themselves for the struggle for existence....' (143)

Hazeu argued that a sound knowledge of Dutch was a condition sine qua non for any Indonesian who wanted to advance himself economically, socially and intellectually, because all schools above the elementary level used Dutch as the medium of instruction, while also for most positions in the civil service a knowledge of Dutch was required:

'....In short, whoever does not command the language of the rulers has very little chance to advance himself in any way. If this is kept in mind then it becomes entirely understandable that the whole of the Javanese prijaji class tries with all available means to have their children learn Dutch as early as possible. The earnestness of their resolve is perhaps best illustrated by the financial sacrifices which the Javanese are willing to make. All this, however, will mean little if the Government does not provide the necessary education facilities....At this junction it is not my intention to point out again the great importance — also for the Government — which is attached to the instruction and education of Natives. Nor do I want to recall again the great political importance of the intellectual development of the Native upper-classes under Dutch guidance and by means of our language....' (144)


(144) Ibid.
In Hazeu's opinion the existing opportunities for Indonesians to receive Dutch-language training were too restricted and he suggested that as a first step the European primary schools should be opened to all upper-class Indonesian children and not only to those from Dutch-speaking families. Moreover, Hazeu wanted to upgrade the Eerste Klasse scholen. He argued that the reorganisation of the Eerste Klasse scholen had been half-hearted because these schools did still not prepare pupils for the Klein-Ambtenaarsexamen (Lower Civil Service Entrance Examination) nor did they give access to professional training schools other than the OSVIA.\(^{(145)}\)

The question of admission of Indonesians into European primary schools was finally settled in 1911 when a government decree was issued stipulating that entry was to be restricted to those children:

\[\ldots\text{Who in connection with their future position in society which largely depends on the position and the degree of education of their parents and their own intellectual aptitude are in need of the education provided in these schools...}\]\(^{(146)}\)

Furthermore, lower-class Indonesian children who had the capacity and the inclination to follow a higher technical or vocational training, such as in medicine, law or administration, were also to be allowed entry.\(^{(147)}\)

In 1911 also the Eerste Klasse School (First class school) was reorganised. In order to prepare students for the Klein-Ambtenaarsexamen the course was extended to seven years and Dutch

\[\begin{align*}
(145) & \text{Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken... 27 January, 1909 op. cit.} \\
(146) & \text{U.I.O.C. no.9, 2e stuk op. cit., 61.} \\
(147) & \text{Ibid., 61-62.}
\end{align*}\]
was to be taught from the second year onwards. Governor-General Idenburg commented that it was:

'...Highly desirable to...establish intermediate indigenous schools which would supply a sufficient number of properly trained (people) for the numerous positions in the lower brackets of the administration....'(148)

This was followed in 1914 by a transformation of the **Eerste Klasse School** into the **Hollandsch-Inlandsche School – H.I.S. –** (Dutch Native School). This school was equal in standard and curriculum to the European primary school with the only exception that in addition to Dutch – which was the language of instruction – the regional vernacular and Malay were also taught. Unlike the **Eerste Klasse School** the **H.I.S.** gave admittance to secondary schools. The **Dutch Native School**, however, was intended as an exclusive school catering only for those Indonesian children, who in line with their social status and the demands of the economy needed Dutch-language education. A circular issued by the Department of Education in 1913 stipulated that social prestige and the financial status of parents were to be the two factors determining eligibility for admission into the **H.I.S.** In order to retain this exclusive character of the **H.I.S.,** high school fees were levied. (149) Three possibilities were open to a student who had obtained a Dutch primary school diploma. First, he was eligible to enter the lower brackets of the colonial civil service. Second, he could continue his studies at the secondary and later at the tertiary level. And third, he could obtain professional

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(148) **H.I.O.C.** no.9, 2e stuk **op. cit.,** 65.
(149) **Ibid.,** 71-72.
qualifications in any of the secondary training institutes such as teachers colleges, technical colleges, commercial high schools, home science schools, training courses for police officers, naval officers, chemists and health inspectors. As will be seen in the next chapter, the majority of Indonesians with a Dutch primary school certificate made only use of the first possibility.

Simultaneously with the establishment of the H.I.S., in 1914 a new type of secondary school the MULO (School for More Advanced Primary Education) was created. This school, although classified by the Dutch as primary, would because of its standard and curriculum be equivalent at least to a three year course of secondary education in English speaking countries.\(^{(150)}\) Initially the MULO did not link up with the secondary school system (H.B.S.).\(^{(151)}\) But in 1916 the MULO became the sub-structure of a new type of high school, the Algemene Middelbare School - A.M.S. - (General High School). The A.M.S. was especially set up for Indonesians and like the H.B.S. it gave admission to the university.

Another important function of the MULO was to prepare students for entry into one of the various tertiary training institutes such as the STOVIA, which hitherto had provided their own preparatory courses.\(^{(152)}\)

\(^{(150)}\) Note: The curriculum of the MULO comprised the following subjects Dutch, French (optional), German, English, Arithmetic, Mathematics, Biology, Physics, History, Geography, and Drawing.

\(^{(151)}\) cf. Chapter II p. 21-22

\(^{(152)}\) cf. p. 20-21 this chapter.
In 1919 the Dutch language school structure was nearing completion with the opening of the first university faculty (Engineering) in Bandung. Demands for the establishment of a university in the colony had already been made from the beginning of the century. In 1908 the Indische Universiteitsvereniging (Indies University Association) had been founded on the initiative of a number of Eurasians, (153) who suffered because of the absence of this type of education in the colony; soon after also a number of Indonesians joined this association.

The colonial government, however, agreed with the opinion of van Deventer who wrote in 1910 that the time for the establishment of a university in the Indies had not yet come, because the colony lacked the proper intellectual atmosphere in which academic studies could flourish. For the time being the Netherlands should act as the academic centre of the Indies. Van Deventer urged that this situation should be changed as quickly as possible and this could only be done by increasing and speeding up the flow of Indonesian students to universities in Holland. Only when a sufficiently large body of indigenous academics would begin to exert an influence on Indonesian society would the time be ripe to transform the existing professional schools in medicine, law, veterinary science, and agriculture into a full university. (154)

(153) Douwes Dekker, E.F.E. (Setiabudi), who was to play an important part in the Indonesian national movement was among the initiators. cf. Koloniaal Onderwijs Congress 1919, Stenografisch Verslag, 168.

(154) Colenbrander, H.T. ed. 'Leven en Werken...' op. cit., II, 279.
The number of university students in Holland, however, remained rather small. One important reason for this was the high cost involved which prohibited the vast majority of Indonesian parents from sending their children to a Dutch university. Furthermore, the number of prospective Indonesian university students was not very high, because only very/Indonesian graduates were being produced by the Dutch High Schools in the Indies.

A proposal put forward in 1913 by the Indische Universiteitsvereeniging for the establishment of a technical university was dismissed by the government on the grounds that the social and the economic development of the Indies had not yet reached a stage where the founding of such an institution would be warranted. The Director of Public Works to whom the question had been submitted argued that:

'...The standard of teaching in a technical university must be equal to that in technical universities in the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Japan, so that the graduates of the Indies technical university will be considered internationally as fully qualified ingenieurs, and not as engineers in the Anglo-American sense of the

(155) In the period 1900–1920 only 52 Indonesian students and 58 Chinese students entered the first year of a Dutch university, while in the same period 25 Indonesians and 13 Chinese graduated. (Source: A. van Marle of Amsterdam, who has calculated these figures largely from University calendars. These figures have not been published so far.)

(156) Between 1900 and 1928 only 279 Indonesians and 222 Chinese graduated from Dutch high schools (H.B.S. and A.H.S.) in Indonesia (Source: H.I.O.C. no.1, 2e stuk table XXV).
It seems to me that no greater disservice can be rendered to a developing Eastern country than to provide it with mock universities...as the British have done in India...The disadvantage of universities in name only...affect in the first place its graduates, who...will experience the unpleasant results of their deficient education.... Such a situation will lead - in particular in a colony - to the breeding of antagonism between the colonial graduates who are considered inferior...and graduates from the mother country. Such antagonism can become dangerous, especially if it develops among the leading classes....

The Director was also of the opinion that no university should be established in the Indies until the secondary system was producing at least fifty prospective students per year. (157)

Changing circumstances, largely resulting from the First World War, soon forced the colonial government to reverse its earlier position. Lack of regular communications with the mother country during the war years had caused a serious lack of engineering graduates in the colony. The pinch was felt especially by private enterprise and it is therefore not surprising that in 1917 a number of Dutch firms banded together to set up a Royal institute for university education in the Indies. After more than three and a half million guilders had been donated a technical university was established at Bandung in 1919. In order to regain the initiative in the politically important field of university education the colonial government was compelled to change course. The Director

of Education in a speech to the Volksraad in 1918 declared that the government no longer believed that the Indies was not yet ripe for university education. Instead the government hoped that universities would contribute considerably to the intellectual life of the colony. It was further laid down that the only norm for future university expansion would be the supply of prospective students produced by the secondary school system. (158) The technical faculty at Bandung was taken over by the government in 1921 and this was followed by the transformation of the Rechtschool into a faculty of Law in 1924, and the transformation of the STOVIA into a faculty of Medicine in 1927.

It should be noted that the Dutch-language education was completely separate and that it was impossible to transfer from a vernacular school to a Dutch-language school. In 1918 the Director of Education, Creutzberg, pointed the inequity of this system and he argued that:

'There was no guarantee that the Dutch-Native schools were benefitting children who were the most eligible from the point of view of intellectual capacity....'(159)

To remedy this situation Creutzberg proposed in 1920 the establishment of Schakelscholen (Linking-schools). This proposal was accepted by the colonial government and the first Schakelscholen were established in 1921. The Schakelschool which was open to the

(158) Volksraad. Handelingen, 1918, 262.
(159) Ibid., 328.
brighter graduates of the vernacular Tweede Klasse Scholen provided a five year course to bring students to the same level of education as graduates of the seven-year Dutch-Native school. (160)

Initially the Dutch-language primary schools were staffed mainly by Europeans, most of whom had been imported from Holland. In 1912, however, the so-called 'Akte Nederlands' (Dutch-language teaching diploma) was introduced. This enabled Indonesian graduates from the teachers training schools to obtain Dutch-language teaching qualifications equal in standard to those required in European primary schools. Following this a Hogere Kweekschool (Higher teachers training school) was established at Purworedjo for the purpose of training Indonesians as Dutch-Native school teachers. Other training schools of this kind were founded at Magelang and Bandung. (161) As a result the number of Indonesian teachers in Dutch-language primary schools gradually increased and in 1927 they numbered 1,323 as compared with 2,601 Europeans and 78 Chinese. (162)

The production of the Dutch-language primary and secondary schools in the period 1900-1904 is illustrated in the following tables:

(160) U.I.O.C. no. 9, 2e stuk op. cit., p. 82.
(161) Algemene Verslag van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie, 1928 XLVIII.
(162) Ibid., 1927, Table XXV.
### Dutch-language primary schools (all types) graduates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Indonesians</th>
<th>Other Asians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-1904</td>
<td>5,287</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>2,392</td>
<td>3,851</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total production in the period:
- 1900-1927: 46,646
- 1900-1927: 36,207
- 1900-1927: 7,322

Source: H.I.O.C. no.1: De uitbreiding van het Westersch onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie sedert 1900, 2e stuk, Table Xa.

### Dutch-language secondary schools (three-years course) graduates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Indonesians</th>
<th>Other Asians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-1904</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total production in the period:
- 1900-1927: 5,192
- 1900-1927: 2,279
- 1900-1927: 824

Source: H.I.O.C. no.1, op. cit., 2e stuk, Table XXIIIa.

### Dutch-language secondary schools (five-year course) graduates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Indonesians</th>
<th>Other Asians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-1904</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total production in the period:
- 1900-1929: 2,092
- 1900-1929: 279
- 1900-1929: 222

Source: H.I.O.C. no.1, 2e stuk, op.cit., Table XXVIIa.
Dutch-language primary schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Algemene Verslag van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie, 1928 Tweede Deel, Tabel 1, 2.

The Nature of the 'Ethical' education system:

One of the outstanding features of the 'Ethical' education system was its dualist - or to use Furnivall's terminology - its pluralist character. Two distinct systems of education: a vernacular and a Dutch-language one, were developed alongside each other. Again each of these systems were dualistic consisting of different school types providing for various socio-economic needs. Admittedly in 1921 the Schakelscholen were established for the purpose of linking the two systems together. However, this link as can be seen from the following table - was a rather tenuous one and only very few Indonesians were able to make use of it:

Schakelscholen - number of graduates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925/26</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926/27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927/28</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928/29</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929/30</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930/31</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931/32</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932/33</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933/34</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934/35</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Schakelscholen — number of graduates (contd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935/36</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936/37</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937/38</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938/39</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939/40</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Departement van Economische Zaken. Onderwijsstatistiek over het schooljaar 1939-1940 (Batavia, 1941), Table 74.

What were the reasons for this dualism? One important reason why not all Indonesians could be provided with Dutch-language schools was undoubtedly finance. It was realised from the beginning by colonial policy-makers such as van Heutz and Idenburg that to provide the whole of the indigenous population with schools of the quality of the European primary school was financially impossible. A government commission calculated in 1931 that a nation-wide provision of Dutch-Native schools — which were cheaper than European schools — would have involved the following outlay:

**Immediate outlay:**

- running expenditure: 1,009 million guilders
- capital costs: 1,435 million guilders

**Additional annual outlay to keep up with population increase:**

- running costs: 15 million guilders
- capital costs: 25 million guilders

Taking into account that total government expenditure in 1929 amounted to 498 million guilders the above figures — which do

(163) *H.I.O.C. no.7* 'De nog wachtende taak op onderwijsgebied' 10,14.
(164) *H.I.O.C. no.3* 'De Overheidsuitgaven voor Onderwijsdoeleinden in Nederlandsch-Indie' Table LV.
not include the cost of teachers training — should make it abundantly clear that to create the Dutch-Native school into a general standard primary school was a financial impossibility.

This financial argument, however, does not really give the answer to the question posed at the beginning: why dualism? Given the financial limitations, the further question should be asked: why did the Dutch not develop a uniform education system which was within the range of the government’s capacity to pay?

The answer to this question is to be sought partly in the fact that the policy-makers concerned were Dutchmen who naturally tended to superimpose a system of education on the Indies which was familiar to them. Educational differentiation according to social and economic class needs was — and still is to a certain extent today — an outstanding feature of the education system in Holland. Education in Holland is not free and school fees at the primary level are levied in accordance with the capacity of parents to pay. At the secondary and university level fees are high which fits in with the old established principle of Dutch public finance that: ‘people only value something when they have to pay for it’. Policy-makers in the Indies — as in the Netherlands — were concerned to devise an education system which would disturb the socio-economic status quo as little as possible. Even as late as 1948 the writer knows from his own experience that lower-class Dutch parents were forced to make considerable financial sacrifices if they wanted to send their children to a top secondary school such as the Gymnasium, not to speak of university. Similarly in Indonesia lower- and
middle-class Indonesian parents were forced to pay exorbitant fees to have their children attend the highly-coveted Dutch-language schools. In the Indies, however, discrimination was worse than in Holland because poor European — read Eurasian — parents with an annual salary below 1800 guilders were exempted from paying school fees. Interesting in this respect is the following comment made in 1913 about the European schools by W.J. Oudendijk, Advisor on Chinese Affairs:

'...Initially these schools were certainly meant only for children of European parents, but now they are attended mainly by children of mixed blood. It is not clear to me what right the government has to spend tremendous sums of money out of general taxation revenue on public schools while at the same time it excludes from these schools a large section of conscientious taxpayers....It seems to me that this discrimination cannot be kept up for long. It seems to me that the attempts to make the Netherlands-Indies an independent part of the Netherlands realm with its own welfare policies, with its own development patterns along the lines of Dutch civilisation, with its own sense of unity within the Netherlands state, must of necessity lead to a situation where all schools which are established and run with public funds should not only benefit a privileged class but should become instruments — paid for by the community — to bring civilisation and knowledge to everybody who desires it and has the money to pay for it....The concept of rulers and ruled must eventually disappear and must be replaced by the idea of a realm of the Indies under Dutch guidance, an area in East-Asia where the Netherlands carries the 'white man's burden' placed upon her by world history, an area where Netherlands civilisation will take root and flourish....' (165)

Hence, according to Oudendijk the first thing to be abolished was discrimination in education and he suggested that the European schools should be opened as widely as possible for Indonesians and

Chinese. Even better and more effective would be to devise a system where Indonesian and Chinese pupils would take their first three years of primary education in a Dutch-Native and Dutch-Chinese school and would take the last three years in a General primary school where all population groups would study together. (166)

Closely tied to the policy of providing education in accordance with social and economic class needs was another important feature of colonial education policy: the principle of 'concordantie', i.e. the policy of basing educational standards and curricula in the Indies on those existing in Holland. Various reasons and appreciations of the 'concordantie' principle have been presented. The 'Ethical' Director of Education, Hazeu, explained the adoption of the principle as follows:

'...What at present is usually meant by European education was initially destined solely for the European population in this country. When these schools were founded one had only in mind children of Europeans living here and children of Eurasians.... It is therefore understandable that one scrupulously tried to make the education system here an exact copy of that existing in the Netherlands. And as the top layer of European society here alternated between the Indies and the Netherlands...it was considered of the greatest importance to ensure that the schools at all times and in all respects were corresponding exactly with those in Holland....' (167)

Hazeu pointed out that 'concordantie' had posed no problems when the European schools were only attended by European children and a few Indonesians. But when the influx of Indonesians increased

tremendously they were refused admittance and special Dutch-language schools for non-Europeans were set up, such as the Dutch-Native schools and the Dutch-Chinese schools. Hazeu objected to this increasing dualism within the Dutch-language system and he argued that as the increase in European pupils was only small compared with Indonesian and Chinese pupils:

'It is self-evident that in future planning...the dualist system must be abolished as much as possible and an attempt must be made to develop Dutch-language schools which are not destined exclusively of Europeans, or Indonesians or Chinese, but which are suited for all population groups in the Indies: thus there must be unification in the field of education....' (168)

Hazeu also attacked the 'concordantie' principle and he wrote that in the Indies curricula should be kept as close as possible in tune with the specific needs of the Indies:

'It is my firm opinion that in this country one should strive for an energetic development of all branches of education in an Indies direction. Thus the education system should gradually grow more independent from the Dutch model and should in the first place take more notice of the special needs of all layers of Indies society - in particular the indigenous population....' (169)

It should be kept in mind, however, that Hazeu did not advocate a lowering of standards. He wanted an education which was 'gelijkwaardig' - of equal value - to that in the Netherlands but which was better suited to conditions in the Indies.

In 1924 the Onderwijsraad (Education Council), a body established in 1919 to advise the government on educational matters, supported

(169) Ibid.
the retention of 'concordantie' on the grounds that European cultural life in the colony had the right to keep a direct connection with the mother country. Furthermore, the Council stressed the political importance of ensuring that locally trained people should have qualifications which were equal in value to those of imported personnel from Holland. And the Council also argued that:

'...As long as Western education has to be given and is desired by all population groups the principle of 'concordantie' must remain the pivot on which the education system rests. If we abolish this principle then we will get bogged down. We see examples of this in British-India, French Indo-China, in the Philippines where the standard of education has deteriorated because there was no 'concordantie' with the mother country....' (170)

The Council also stressed the importance of adapting schools as much as possible to Indonesian conditions, but it pointed out that this requirement was very difficult to comply with in view of the need for 'concordantie':

'...If it is desired to maintain 'concordantie' and at the same time not to estrange education too much from it Indies surroundings then the only solution seems to be an overloaded curriculum....' (171)

Another argument advanced for maintaining 'concordantie' was simply that the West set the tone in colonial society and that the indigenous people should follow suit. For example, in 1928 the Director of Education, Hardeman, argued that:

'...The Netherlands character of the schools must be accepted as unavoidable as long as Netherlanders are in charge here. In any case it is not sure by any

(170) Advies van den Onderwijsraad inzake de reorganisatie van de opleiding van het personeel bij het Westersch Lager Onderwijs (Wleevreden, 1927) 6.

(171) Ibid., 7.
'means that a nation which strives to reach the same intellectual level as leading nations of the world, can ever ignore completely the well proven Western methods which can be found in all school systems of the major powers. Is it not significant that the Japanese education system - at least its major features - had been copied almost exactly from the West...?' (172)

Undoubtedly, there were a number of 'Ethici' such as Abendanon, Snouck-Hurgronje and van Deventer, who were moved by reasons of fairness as well as a feeling of cultural superiority and wanted to present Indonesians with the best Holland could provide. On the other hand, most Dutchmen - to judge from events in the 1920's (173) appear to have been mainly concerned about creating an adequate supply of Dutch-speaking Indonesian personnel for the civil service. But as soon as this supply target had been reached and Dutch speaking Indonesians began to compete more seriously with Eurasians and Europeans - which endangered the social and economic status quo - measures were taken to slow down the production of Indonesian Dutch-language school graduates.

The writer feels that a number of important objections can be raised against the principle of 'concordantie' and the 'dualist' education policy of the Dutch. The 'Ethical' education policy resulted in an unbalanced educational development. A class of Dutch speaking and Western-orientated Indonesians was created who very often were far removed from the common Indonesian people. In addition to


(173) cf. Chapter V
causing an unnecessary 'dualism' within indigenous society colonial education policy discriminated against the common Indonesian people. A disproportionate segment of the education budget was allotted to the Dutch-language education system to the detriment of the vernacular system, while only European and very few Indonesian children benefitted from the Dutch-language schools. The following table shows the percentages of the total indigenous school population in 1930 attending Dutch-language primary schools and vernacular schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Dutch-language primary schools</th>
<th>Vernacular schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>94.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>96.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese Principalities</td>
<td>12.48</td>
<td>87.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>96.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javan and Madura</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>95.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer-Islands</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>95.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Indies</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>95.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Dutch-language primary schools</th>
<th>Vernacular schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>92.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>91.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese Principalities</td>
<td>25.62</td>
<td>74.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>90.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javan and Madura</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>90.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer-Islands</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>94.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Indies</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>92.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: H.I.O.C. no. 7 'De geografische verspreiding van het onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie en de nog wachtende taak op onderwijs gebied, Table XXVI.
Furthermore, the over-emphasis on Dutch-language education was partly responsible for a very slow rate of increase in the indigenous literacy rate, which in 1920 stood at 3.9%\(^{(174)}\). The following table shows the expenditure on vernacular education and Dutch-language education (both primary and secondary) between 1911 and 1929.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vernacular schools</th>
<th>Dutch-language schools</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: H.I.O.C. no.3 'De overheidsuitgaven voor ondervisdoeleinden in Nederlandsch-Indie, Table III

A government commission\(^{(175)}\) calculated in 1930 that a nationwide provision of village schools would have involved the following outlay:

- Running expenditure per annum: 25.5 million guilders
- Cost of teachers training to be met at once: 4.7 million guilders

Thus if 80% of the total amount budgeted for primary education had been spent on vernacular education then from the early 1920's onwards there would have been sufficient village school space available to absorb the school population.

\(^{(174)}\) Volkstelling (Census) 1930, Deel V, Hoofdstuk IX, 31.
\(^{(175)}\) H.I.O.C. no.7a op. cit., 9.
Chapter IV

Colonial Education Policy and its Ramifications within Netherlands-Indies Society

The greatest beneficiary of the various educational measures taken during the nineteenth century was the Eurasian group, i.e. the people of mixed Indonesian and European descent. In the absence of reliable statistics it is difficult to obtain a numerical picture of the Eurasians in the nineteenth century. A survey made in 1815 put the number of Europeans and their descendants in Java at 1,750 which in all probability was too low an estimate. In 1854 the number of Eurasians was estimated at 14,000. Between 1860 and 1930 the number of Europeans in the colony increased from 44,000 to 240,000 and according to van der Veur 56% or 133,659 were Eurasians, most of whom were concentrated in Java.\(^{(1)}\)

For a long time Eurasians, who in the words of one Minister of Colonies were deficient in patriotism and the stability of character needed in responsible positions had only been able to obtain minor posts in the civil service. During the period of Company rule and also during the first half of the nineteenth century positions of any importance had almost invariably been filled by Dutchmen.\(^{(2)}\) However, since the return of the Dutch in

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(2) H.I.O.C. no.9 le stuk op. cit., 63.
1816 attempts were made to improve the social and economic condition of the Eurasian population. The European primary schools which had been set up since 1818 were almost entirely monopolised by Eurasian children because most Dutchmen sent their children either to Holland or to private educational institutions in the colony. Eurasian parents without means were exempted from paying school fees and in 1833 more than a third of the children in European primary schools received a free education. In order to curb irregular attendance - which was common among Eurasian children - the colonial government decreed in 1830 that nobody could be employed as a clerk in the civil service unless he had completed the primary school.\(^{(3)}\) The colonial government also tried to set up technical and commercial training courses in order to create a 'middle class' of independent Eurasian entrepreneurs. These ventures met with very little success because the vast majority of Eurasians were solely interested in obtaining employment in the civil service and considered trade and manual labor below their social status. Demands by Eurasians for the establishment of secondary schools in the colony which would have enabled them to compete more successfully with overseas personnel for the higher and medium positions in the government service were not met by the colonial authorities. In fact the position of Eurasians in this respect became even worse, when in 1843 an academy was established at Delft in the Netherlands which was given the monopoly of training for higher positions in the colonial service.\(^{(4)}\)

\(^{(3)}\) Brugaans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' *op. cit.*, 96–98, 84–87. 
\(^{(4)}\) Ibid.
This caused a growing resentment among the Eurasian group which burst out into the open in May 1848 when after a rather stormy public meeting of prominent Eurasians and some Europeans in Batavia the colonial government was presented with a petition of grievances. This outburst seems to have taken the colonial government by surprise and it quickly changed its long-held conviction that Eurasians were too degenerated and too unenergetic to constitute a political danger. Governor-General Rochussen (1845—1851) considered the political position of the Dutch in Java as very precarious. In his view the Javanese disliked the Dutch and they only tolerated them; the Chinese were solely interested in money and the good things of life; and the Arabs hated the Dutch. Moreover, recent arrivals from Holland were often very Liberal in their opinions and many Dutchmen of longer standing in the colony showed very little patriotism. Most dangerous, however, according to Rochussen were the Eurasians, the pariahs of Indies society, who hated the Dutch and who would take advantage of any political change because they had nothing to lose and everything to gain. Thus, the Governor-General strongly advocated that the grievances of the Eurasian group should be met as quickly as possible. (5)

This political motive was further reinforced by humanitarian considerations during the Liberal period of colonial rule. The demands of Eurasians were met in the sense that secondary schools

were founded in the colony and positions in the civil service were opened to all Dutch subjects irrespective of race. Initially Eurasians were able to almost completely monopolise the new secondary schools in the colony. The first Indonesian student — a grandson of the Sultan of Surakarta — was admitted in 1874, but it was not until 1930 that in some high schools Indonesian students outnumbered Europeans. In regard to their legal status the position of the Eurasians also improved considerably during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Colonial Fundamental Law of 1854, which divided the population of the Indies into Europeans and Natives, classified Christians of mixed origin as Europeans. (7) Finally, to disperse any remaining doubts about the special status of Eurasians the Netherlands nationality law of 1892 classified Eurasians as Dutch citizens. (8)

Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century the Eurasian group had been created into a privileged class within colonial society. Intent on expanding or at least maintaining this recently acquired special status most Eurasians strongly resented any attempts by Indonesians to step in their place.

Another important result of the changes in colonial education and employment policy since the mid-nineteenth century was the gradual breakdown of the traditional, rigidly stratified Javanese

(6) Veur, P.W. van der 'De Indo-Europese... ' op. cit., 86.
(7) Ibid., 90.
(8) Ibid., 84.
status system. Signs of this are already noticeable in the last decades of the nineteenth century, when a slight — but nevertheless significant — increase in social mobility within Javanese society is visible. Facilities for more advanced Western training such as the STOVIA and the teachers training schools had made it possible for sons of lower prijaji(9) and even some commoners to advance themselves socially and economically because now they were able to find employment in the highly coveted government service which carried the highest prestige in Javanese eyes.

Previously participation in government and public administration had been the monopoly of the higher nobility. And although since the beginning of the nineteenth century the power of the locally independent Javanese aristocracy had been severely curtailed and they had been gradually transformed into a corps of colonial civil servants, the Native Local Government Service (Inlands Bestuur) this had not meant an increase in social mobility within the prijaji class or Javanese society as a whole. In fact positions in the Native Local Government Service remained the privilege of the nobility and the principle of hereditary succession — which had been used de facto — was in 1854 laid down by law. Sons of prijaji could only hope to succeed their fathers. To rise on the hierarchical scale was practically impossible. Actually the situation in this

(9) Note: The Regents and their descendants or people with a higher status than the Regents e.g. Pangeran (princes) are known by the Javanese as prijaji. The term is sometimes used in a wider sense including all government officials.
respect was deteriorating when because of the large rise in the population since the beginning of the nineteenth century also the size of the prijaji class increased but the number of available government positions remained relatively stable. As a result many sons of prijaji had to be content with positions below the rank held by their fathers, while the number of those who could not be placed at all was increasing. (10)

The situation in this respect improved somewhat during the Liberal period of Dutch colonial policy (1860–1900). Now government employment no longer came to depend entirely on the accident of high birth because Western education and training made it possible for Indonesians to enter the government service outside the aristocratic Native Local Government Service. But the new positions of doctor and teacher were for quite some time not rated very highly on the traditional Javanese social scale. In order to make these positions more attractive and more acceptable in the Javanese world the government granted dokters-Djawa and teachers a rank which was about equal to the middle positions in the Native Local Government Service. (11) In 1878 also allowances for teachers trainees and teachers' salaries were increased. (12)

Higher prijaji continued for some time to consider medicine and teaching as occupations below their social status. As a result most of the students in the teachers training schools and the Dokter-Djawa school originated from the lower prijaji or commoners.

(10) Niel, R. van 'The emergence of the modern Indonesian elite' op. cit., 28.
(12) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' op. cit., 171.
This situation did not change until the early 1890's when - as can be seen from the table below - more upper-class Indonesians were entering the Dokter-Djawa school.

Dokter-Djawa School - students and graduates according to social status of parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1875-1884 students</th>
<th>1875-1884 graduates</th>
<th>1885-1894 students</th>
<th>1885-1894 graduates</th>
<th>1894-1904 students</th>
<th>1894-1904 graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a. Sons of high Native officials</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radja</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangeran</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patih</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head-Djaksa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-Collector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedono</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head-Panghulu</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Army Officer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **b. Sons of middle-ranking Native officials** | | | | | | |
| Djaksa              | 1                  | -                   | 3                  | 3                   | 8                  | 1                   |
| Assistant-Wedana    | 4                  | 1                   | 16                 | 6                   | 21                 | 5                   |
| Dokter-Djawa        | 3                  | -                   | 19                 | 4                   | 15                 | 1                   |
| Teacher             | 3                  | 1                   | 27                 | 11                  | 63                 | 10                  |
| Mantri              | 10                 | 4                   | 29                 | 10                  | 44                 | 5                   |
| Vaccinator          | 1                  | 1                   | 3                  | -                   | 7                  | 1                   |
| Native veterinary surgeon | -                  | -                   | -                  | -                   | 1                  | -                   |
| **Total**           | 22                 | 7                   | 97                 | 34                  | 159                | 23                  |

| **c. Sons of lower Native officials and private persons** | | | | | | |
| Clerk               | 6                  | 4                   | 9                  | 2                   | 10                 | 2                   |
| Prison warder       | -                  | -                   | 1                  | 9                   | 2                  | -                   |
| Telegraph operator  | 3                  | 1                   | 1                  | -                   | 1                  | -                   |
| Type-setter         | 2                  | -                   | -                  | -                   | -                  | -                   |
| Draughtsman         | -                  | -                   | -                  | -                   | -                  | -                   |
| Supervisor          | -                  | -                   | 1                  | -                   | 2                  | 1                   |
| Soldier             | 4                  | 1                   | 2                  | -                   | 1                  | -                   |
| Village head        | 7                  | 6                   | 17                 | 5                   | 6                  | -                   |
| Trader              | 3                  | -                   | 2                  | -                   | 2                  | -                   |

continued over/
Social mobility increased far more significantly in the first two decades of the twentieth century, when as a result of the 'Ethical' policy, larger numbers of Indonesians were able to receive Dutch-language education and consequently could obtain employment in government agencies or in private Western firms.

In fact the drive of Indonesians for Dutch-language education was so strong that the Dutch-Native school lost its intended socially exclusive character almost from the beginning. This is illustrated in the following table which shows a comparison of the social backgrounds of students in the Eerste-Klass scholen in 1912 and students in the Dutch-Native schools in 1927:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1927</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesman</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tram conductor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cart driver</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village police</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coolie</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants (House)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official on half pay</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private and without profession</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession unknown</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General total: 147 41

Source: School tot Opleiding van Inlandse Artsen...Jaarlijks Verslag, 1904-1905 (Batavia, 1906) Bijlage no.10.
### Social status of parents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1912 %</th>
<th>1927 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regents</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-rank officials</td>
<td>10.31</td>
<td>15.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-rank officials</td>
<td>37.01</td>
<td>36.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-to-do private persons</td>
<td>26.56</td>
<td>15.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-class parents</td>
<td>24.56</td>
<td>29.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: H.I.O.C. no.5 'De sociale en geographische herkomst van de Westersch opgeleide Inlanders' 6-7.

Combining the categories of children of lower officials and lower-class parents it can be seen that already in 1912 lower-class children formed 61.57% of the total school population in the Eerste Klasse scholen.

The vast majority of Indonesians with a Dutch-language primary school certificate strongly preferred to find clerical employment in the colonial civil service or private Western firms rather than establishing themselves as independent entrepreneurs in commerce, industry or agriculture. An investigation held in 1928 showed that in the larger urban centres of Java, such as Batavia, Bandung, Surabaja, Solo and Jogjakarta, 83.39% of Indonesians with Dutch-language school qualifications were in wage employment, while 14.79% had no profession and 1.82% were self-employed. (13)

One of the major reasons for this was that Indonesian parents saw the Dutch-language school primarily as a means to advance their children on the traditional hierarchical scale. Manual work and any other type of 'non-intellectual' employment was held in

(13) H.I.O.C. no.11 Eindrapport, 1c stuk, 41.
low esteem and the average Indonesian parent could not see why education was needed to become a farmer or tradesman. A Dutch-language school certificate came to mean prijalti status and the ability to speak Dutch became a new status symbol.

Another reason which attracted Indonesians to the Dutch-language schools was the markedly higher wage rate in the Western sector of the economy. This desire for greater social prestige and the monetary incentive were gradually reinforced by a growing nationalist sentiment which expressed itself in a demand for equality with Europeans. Nationally conscious Indonesians felt more and more that it was largely education which was responsible for European superiority. It might also be argued that this craving towards equality with the upper stratum in colonial society and the fact that Europeans very seldom - if ever - engaged in 'non intellectual' employment strengthened even more Indonesian opinion that education if not followed by employment in the Western sphere of the economy was wasted.

The intensity of the demand of lower class Indonesians for Dutch-language education is further exemplified by the heavy financial burdens that parents were willing to carry. Out of a sample of 11,909 Indonesian pupils in Dutch-Native schools it was found that 50.13% of parents had an income below 1000 guilders per annum.\(^{(14)}\) It must further be realised that many Indonesian parents

\(^{(14)}\) H.I.O.C. no.4 De kosten van het Westermsch Onderwijs in Verhouding tot de draagkracht der bevolking, 28.
in addition to school fees had to meet the cost of European clothing, footwear, travel and sometimes board. The costs were often too prohibitive for one family to bear and as a result it became common practice among lower class Indonesian parents and relatives to pool their resources to enable at least one of their children to attend the coveted Dutch-language school.

The number of Indonesian graduates from the Dutch-language education system is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Number of Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools (a)</td>
<td>36,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary schools:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-year (b)</td>
<td>2,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6 years (c)</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Training (d)</td>
<td>6,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Training (e)</td>
<td>1,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) European primary schools, Dutch-Native schools, and Linking schools, both public and private.

(b) MULO and the three year H.B.S., both public and private.

(c) Five years H.B.S. and six years A.H.S.

(d) Teachers training schools, commercial schools and technical schools.

(e) Tertiary training institutions in Law, Medicine, Agriculture, Veterinary Science and Public Administration.

(15) H.I.O.C. no.1 2e stuk, op. cit., Tables: XXIIIa, XXVIIa, XXXVIIIa and b, XLIII. Note: Only the total number of students irrespective of race in Secondary and Tertiary training institutes are given. The proportion of Indonesian graduates has been put at 40%, an estimate based on Table XXXVII. The number of Indonesian graduates from Dutch universities have been calculated by Mr. A. van Marle of Amsterdam mainly from university calendars.
The appearance, however, of this new Indonesian elite of Western trained intellectuals and semi-intellectuals caused a great deal of friction both in indigenous society and colonial society as a whole. This was already apparent at the end of the nineteenth century when graduates of the Dokter-Djava school and the teachers training schools appeared on the scene. Indonesian doctors and teachers felt that the social and economic status accorded to them was not in keeping with their educational standing, which especially in the case of Dokters-Djava was often superior to that of higher prijaji and many lower class Europeans (Eurasians). In 1904 the Director of the STOVIA observed, that:

'....The position of Native Doctor is after all not highly regarded in Javanese society, from which most of the students originate; a Native Doctor does not belong to the prijaji....' (16)

Often the Dokter-Djava's sense of dignity and his desire for social equality received a rude shock when confronted with the realities of colonial life. For example, in his memoirs, one Dokter-Djava complains about the inferior status accorded to his profession on official occasions:

'....How painful the position was may be illustrated by the fact that on official occasions European clerks (17) of the Assistant-Resident, people who have usually great airs, Chinese officials, urban district officers(18) in fact all of those people with whom the Native doctors had daily dealings in the course of their work...sat on chairs looking down on the Native doctor, who was not

(16) School Tot Opleiding Van Inlandsche Artsen. Ontwikkeling van... op. cit., 43.

(17) Note: European should be read to mean Eurasian.

(18) Translation of the Dutch term 'wijkmeester'.
'considered worthy of a chair....' (19)

Another interesting incident is related in the memoirs of Achmad Djajadiningrat, a high Javanese official, who was rebuked by a Dokter-Diawa, because he:

'...Treated him somewhat haughtily. In any case I did not treat him with any more consideration than I would have accorded to a mantri(20) or assistant-Wedana(21)....' (22)

In the twentieth century, however, the Javanese nobility gradually came to give more recognition to Indonesians with professional qualifications. An example of this is the appointment of Dr. Radjiman, a STOVIA graduate, as personal physician to the Sultan of Surakarta. In particular university titles came to be highly regarded in upper class Javanese circles. The story is told about the young son of a high Javanese aristocrat who when asked what he would like to become answered without any hesitation: "Meester, Doctor, Ingenieur". (23)

Another early example of this new trend in Javanese aristocratic thinking was the Djajadiningrat family. Achmad Djajadiningrat was one of the first Javanese graduates of the H.B.S. and his brother Husein graduated in 1913 with Honours as a Doctor of Philosophy (Eastern Letters) at the University of

(20) Lower grade positions in Native Local Government Service.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Achmad Djajadiningrat 'Herinneringen van...' 1936, 237.
(23) 'Master of Law, Doctor of Medicine, and Master of Engineering' quot Burger, D.H. 'Structuurveranderingen...' op. cit., 105.
Leiden.\(^{(24)}\) Also to be mentioned in this context is the deep interest shown in Western education by the Regent of Djapara, the father of Raden Adjeng Kartini, one of the earliest pioneers of the emancipation of Indonesian women.\(^{(25)}\)

But although the upper stratum of the new elite of Western educated Indonesians might have become more acceptable in aristocratic indigenous circles, this was not so in the case of the majority of Europeans.

The new Indonesian intelligentsia constituted a threat especially to the Eurasian group, which was still in the process of consolidating its privileged position in colonial society. This position, as was seen above, had been gradually improving since the mid-nineteenth century. Most Eurasians therefore only paid lip service to the demands of 'Ethical' colonial reformers for 'association' with Indonesians not only in cultural but also in social and economic terms. Thus, the gradual replacement of Europeans by Western trained Indonesians also in the higher positions - which was one of the most important conditions for the success of the method of 'association' - could only proceed very slowly, because it was quietly sabotaged by many European officials. Snouck-Hurgronje bitterly complained that Indonesians were expected to have attained '...A degree of perfection which in Europeans is

\(^{(24)}\) Achmad Djajadiningrat 'Herinneringen...', \textit{op. cit.}, 290.

only found in exceptional circumstances...''

Governor-General Idenburg was also very perturbed about the attitude of many European officials whom he found:

'...Very conservative; I would almost add racially egoistic. They want to keep almost all kinds of intellectual and consequently material advantages for Europeans and for those who are classed as such. These advantages should not be withheld from the native population....' (27)

The practices employed to stop Indonesians from reaching leading positions in the civil service are described in the memoirs of Achmad Djajadiningrat. He complains that the occasional Indonesian who after a great deal of effort and difficulty had managed to obtain the necessary educational qualifications, would usually be placed in a low position in the Government Rural Credit Service (Volkscredietwezen). If the person concerned managed to reach a point on the scale where leadership would be required then he would be transferred to another department where although not suffering financially he would not be entrusted with any managerial responsibility. (28)

Socially also the cleavage between Europeans and Indonesians tended to widen in the twentieth century. The large influx of privately employed Dutchmen since 1870 and the arrival of greater numbers of European women since the turn of the century had resulted


(27) Ibid., 29.

(28) Achmad Djajadiningrat 'Herinneringen...,' *op. cit.*, 261.
in the formation of typically European enclaves in the urban centres of Java, where in addition to class social acceptance depended to a large extent on colour.

Curbed in their ambitions and influenced by Western ideologies of social justice and political development in other Asian countries many Indonesian intellectuals turned to nationalism as a solution to their problems.

Indonesian nationalism, however, manifested itself in many shapes and forms. Soon the movement was split into various mutually opposed groups and factions. Three major ideological streams: Islam, Communism, and Radical Nationalism, tried in turn to combine under their banner Indonesian nationalist feeling in all its variety, but these attempts met with very little success.

A detailed description and analysis of the various political parties and factions cannot be given within the context of this thesis. As this study deals with colonial education policy and its impact on indigenous society it seems more appropriate to present a somewhat more detailed description of the nationalist reaction to colonial education policy.

It has already been pointed out that Dutch-language education was greatly sought after by many Indonesians for reasons of personal advancement. Colonial education policy also was an important catalyst in the rise of Indonesian nationalism and in this respect the creation of a dissatisfied Western educated elite has already been mentioned. The reaction of this elite, however, to colonial education policy showed considerable variations.
Western-orientated Indonesian leaders did not only demand schooling with standards and curricula equal to those in the European schools, but they also were convinced that Westernisation was the quickest and most effective way to modernise Indonesia and to gain national independence. This Western-orientated group was highly critical of the 'dualist' nature of the colonial education system and demanded a Dutch-language education for the population as a whole.

Orthodox Muslims objected to the secular character of the government schools as well as the colonial government's obvious preferential treatment of Christian Mission schools. Both the secularising effect of colonial education as well as the increased activity of the Christian Missions were considered by Muslims as a serious danger to the hold of their religion on indigenous society. From the beginning of the twentieth century an Islamic revival occurred in Indonesia which had strong nationalistic overtones. Not only were Islamic political parties established but also a great deal of effort was put into the modernisation of the Islamic education system.

Strongly opposed to Westernisation as well as Islam were a number of radical-revolutionary nationalists who were concerned to strengthen and revitalise traditional indigenous culture in order to ensure that the modern Indonesia of the future would have retained its own national identity. The political party with the strongest cultural-nationalist bias was the Partai Nasional Indonesia (P.N.I.) - Sukarno's party - and later the Partindo.
The first modern national organisation set up was Javanese in origin. A retired dokter-Djawa, Mas Wahidin Soediro Hoesodo, was one of the first to advocate the advancement of the Javanese people by means of Western education as well as the study of traditional Javanese culture. He travelled widely throughout Java to disseminate his ideas and to collect money for a Javanese study fund. Wahidin's efforts met with very little response from the prijaji, but his ideas were enthusiastically received by the students of the STOVIA. These students were highly critical of racial discrimination and the privileged status of the nobility. And spurred on by the examples of the Chinese and Eurasians who were organising themselves at this time to further their interests, the students came to the conclusion that also a modern association was needed to work for the advancement of the indigenous population of Java. As a result the first Javanese national organisation called Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour) was founded in the STOVIA building on 20 May, 1908.

Budi Utomo gradually became more political in character and in 1917 political programme was adopted which included demands for parliamentary government, universal suffrage, a uniform legal system, religious neutrality, and the creation of equal opportunities for Indonesians in the social and economic field. In 1918 Budi Utomo joined the 'radicale Concentratie' in the Volksraad, i.e. a

(29) Kahin, G. McT. 'Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia' (Cornell Univ., 1952) 64-65.
group of radical European and Indonesian members who demanded the immediate introduction of self-government. During the 1920's the impact of Budi Utomo on the Indonesian political scene gradually declined and finally in 1935 the organisation amalgamated with the P.B.I. (Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia) to form the Partai Indonesia Baja (Parindra) a more moderate political party which was particularly interested in Indonesian educational and economic development.

In 1912 another political organisation was founded: the Indische Partij (the Indies Party) which was far more radical than Budi Utomo and which was mainly sponsored by Eurasians. Its founder Eduard F.E. Douwes Dekker was a distant relative of the famous E. Douwes Dekker (Multatuli) the author of the 'Max Havelaar'.

As van der Veur had written:

Alf E. Dekker exemplified characteristics which would pattern his later life. As an employee on a coffee-estate and subsequently at a sugar-factory in East-Java he was dismissed because he put the interests of the company behind the interests of the laborers and 'went along too well' with the indigenous population.

He volunteered to fight against the British in the Boer war and he was captured and was held in a prison in Ceylon until 1903. The Indische Partij admitted as members anyone who was resident of the Indies irrespective of class, sex or race. The objective of the

(33) cf. Chapter I, p. 16.
(34) Veur, P.W. van der 'Introduction...Eurasians of Indonesia...' op. cit., 156.
party was rather carefully phrased as the social and economic advancement of the population of the Indies with all available legal means. The actions and the writings of Douwes Dekker made it abundantly clear that full independence and that as soon as possible was the real objective. In an open letter to the Governor-General Douwes Dekker had threatened:

'...Excellency, I tell you if ever our fist will clinch itself around a weapon - which fate may forbid - then it will be not out fault. Then you, Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, you and your associates will have to assume the responsibility....'(35)

Douwes Dekker's plan to combine all population groups in the colony into one mass political party was not very successful. Neither the Chinese nor the Dutch residents in the colony showed any interest in joining. In March 1913 the party claimed 7,000 members of whom 1,500 were Indonesians. The majority of Indonesians stayed aloof out of distrust and resented the feeling of superiority of Eurasians towards the indigenous population.

The Indische Partij was put out of action in 1913 when the colonial government refused to grant legal recognition and its three most important leaders: Douwes Dekker, Suwardi Suryaningrat, and Tjipto Mangunkusumo, were exiled to the Netherlands. Most of the Eurasian followers of the Indische Partij joined the strictly Eurasian organisation Insulande which was unable to exert very much influence in Indonesian politics because of constant internal division. The return of Douwes Dekker to the Indies in 1919 gave

(35) Veur, P.W. van der 'Introduction...Eurasians of Indonesia...' op. cit., 162.
Insulinde, a new lease of life and in June 1919 the organisation changed its name to Nationale Indische Partij – N.I.P. (National Indies Party). In May 1921 the party claimed to have a membership of 72,000 but as van der Veur(36) points out most of these were probably lower-class Indonesians whose membership was only nominal. The N.I.P. was growing continuously more radical and many of its leaders were jailed. In 1923 after four years of 'consideration' the colonial government refused to approve the statutes of the N.I.P. and the party ceased to exist.

Douwes Dekker – at least ostensibly – retired from politics and entered the field of national education. In August, 1922 he opened the 'Preanger Onderwijs Instituut' at Bandung. From this evolved in 1925 the Nationale Schoolvereeniging 'Het Ksatryan Instituut', which set up a school the Vrije Nationale Lagere School (Free National Primary School). In its teaching programme this school was similar to the European Primary school. By 1937 the Ksatryan Instituut had established five of these primary schools with about 750 pupils. In addition the organisation had established in 1932 the Nationaal Handelscollegium (National Commercial College), a secondary school, which started off with 70 pupils. The three year course was designed to train pupils to establish their own business, or to find employment in journalism or teaching. Following this three year course students could continue their studies in the Nationale Opleidingschool voor Zelfstandig Onderwijzer (National

Training School for Independent teachers), which was set up for the purpose of providing qualified personnel for the 'wilde scholen'.

From 1935 onwards students could also receive further training in journalism in the Middelbare Journalisten School (College of Journalism). This was followed in 1937 by the opening of the Moderne Vakschool voor Jonge Dames, a school providing two and three year courses in home science, foreign languages and commercial subjects. The main purpose of the Ksatryian Instituut, as its name implies, was to train people in the qualities of the Ksatryia (the knight), such as self-reliance, courage and independence of spirit. The reason for the emphasis on economic and commercial subjects was to help to create an Indonesian middle class of independent entrepreneurs, future leaders and not servants. Thus, great stress was placed in the curriculum on the development of character and personal initiative:

'...Training which solely directed at obtaining employment only creates half developed people. Our School diploma does not open the gate to government employment. But rather we desire to help to develop the knowledge, the understanding and especially the courage to be independent....' (38)

Neither the aristocratic Budi Utomo nor the Eurasian dominated Indische Partij had been able to attract mass support. Far more

(37) Lit. means 'wild schools', term used by the Dutch designating private Indonesian schools, which were not subsidised by the government.

successful in arousing widespread interest in the national cause was Islam.

Although Islam as a religion was very often no more than a veneer the majority of Indonesians considered themselves nevertheless as Muslims. According to Deliar Noer the term bumiputera (lit. son of the land) was only applied to Indonesian Muslims not Indonesian Christians. (39) Or as one prominent Christian Missionary described it:

'...Islam means to those who adhere to it in this archipelago a great deal more than what we call religion. For them in addition to being the way to salvation, it also carries the national consciousness of the brown man against the white man. Foreign rule is born comparatively easily if one can say to oneself and to others: 'But we have Islam; at the Day of Judgement and in the after life the future is ours and here on earth we form a great fraternity, spread over the whole world of which Mecca is the centre; this is ours and is untouchable, it is our strength, which even European might cannot break.'...'(40)

During the nineteenth century when the West was beginning to penetrate more deeply into indigenous life both in the political, economic, and cultural (education) sense, also orthodox Islam began to exert a more profound influence on some sections of the Indonesian community. The Dutch mistrusted Islamic 'fanaticism' and tried to curb it by restricting the pilgrimage. Muslim teachers on the other hand hated the kafir (unbeliever) colonial government


(40) Gouverneur-Generaal aan den Minister van Kolonien, 7 October 1912 in: van der Wal op. cit., 216. In this despatch the Governor-General quotes from an interview with Dr. Adriani, a prominent Christian missionary.
and condemned Western concepts, methods, and education as heretical. Muslim resistance was on the whole passive. And the kijaji and his santri continued to live along traditional lines, closed off from the outer world in their pesantren often oblivious of the social and economic changes that were taking place in Indonesian society. Only on occasions - usually in times of widespread economic distress - would the kijaji put himself at the head of the villagers around him and declare a holy war against the infidel colonial government. These uprisings - although occurring with increasing frequency during the course of the nineteenth century - were of a local character and badly organised and could be easily suppressed by the superior colonial forces.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, however, a number of ulamas (teachers) in Minangkabau and some orthodox communities in Java took up the challenge of the West in a far more positive and effective manner. Influenced by modernist ideas from the Middle East these Indonesian Muslims set about with great energy and zeal to stave off the threat posed by the West to Islam by taking the offensive often using Western methods of organisation.

Islamic modernism or reformism was an attempt to revitalise Islam in its struggle for survival against the ever increasing impact of Western political and intellectual superiority. This Islamic renewal had been gaining strength during the second half of the nineteenth century in the Middle East, particularly in
Egypt, where prominent Islamic scholars such as Djamal-al-Din-al-Afghani\(^\text{(41)}\) and his pupil Muhammad Abduh\(^\text{(42)}\) through their writings and activities had exerted a far-reaching influence throughout the whole of the Muslim world. According to these reformers the decline of Islam as a political power and as a civilisation was due to the fact that Islam had not been able to keep up with intellectual and social developments in the rest of the world. During the ages the originally simple and rational core of the Islamic faith – the Qu'ran and Hadits – had been overgrown by such a burden of irrational beliefs and superstitions, that any intellectual progress had become impossible. Since the decline of the great Islamic civilisations of the past, Muslims had obviously erred in their ways. They had succumbed to heresy; and this was the major reason why Islam had no longer been able to fulfill

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\(^\text{(41)}\) Djamal-al-Din-al-Afghani, born in 1839 near Kabul, where he studied all the higher branches of Muslim learning both religious and secular. Wandered throughout the Middle East, Europe (Paris, London) and also visited the U.S.A. preaching against European interference in Muslim countries. He also entered into a polemic with Ernest Renan attempting to refute the latter's statement that Islam was incompatible with modern science. Al-Afghani had an important influence on the Egyptian nationalist movement and the Persian reformist movement. Mirza Muhammad Riza who murdered the Sjah in 1892 was one of his pupils. Al-Afghani died in 1897 at Constantinople.

\(^\text{(42)}\) Muhammad Abduh was born in 1849 to a peasant family in lower Egypt. He studied at various Muslim schools and later at the Al-Azhar. Initially he was very interested in mysticism and for a while he closed himself off from the world. In 1872 he came into contact with Al-Afghani and became one of his most brilliant pupils. Abduh was eventually banned from Egypt because of his liberal tendencies. He went to Beirut, Paris and later to Tunis from where he was allowed to return to his homeland in 1889. In 1894 he was made a member of the Legislative Council of the Al-Azhar and in 1899 he was appointed to the office of mufti, the highest religious post in Egypt. Abduh died in 1905.
its God ordained purpose of being the most powerful community on earth. To enable Islam to rise again Djamal-al-Din-al-Afghani laid down that as a first step religion should be cleansed from impurities and heresy. Furthermore, he dreamed about the re-establishment of a powerful empire uniting all the Muslim peoples under the one great caliph. To implement his ideals he advocated direct political action. Al-Afghani became feared for his fierce speeches and actions throughout the Muslim world by indigenous and colonial governments alike. His pupil Muhammad Abduh suggested a more gradual approach and his objectives were:

'...1) the purification of Islam from corrupting influences and practices; 2) the reformation of Muslim higher education; 3) the re-formation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought and 4) the defence of Islam against European influence and Christian attacks....' (43)

As the scope of this thesis does not permit a treatment of Islamic reformism in the whole of Indonesia, the discussion will be restricted to Minangkabau (West Sumatra) and parts of Java where this movement was most prominent.

At the beginning of the twentieth century a number of hadjjis who had been strongly influenced by Islamic modernism returned to Minangkabau where they attempted to disseminate their ideas by holding public debates and by editing newspapers and journals. Most of the efforts, however, of these Islamic reformers

went into remodelling and reconstructing the existing Muslim education system. The reason for this was that Muslims considered the colonial education system as one of the greatest dangers to their religion. As Snouck-Hurgronje\(^{(44)}\) had foreseen the lack of religious instruction in government schools and the closer contact of students with Western thinking and ideologies tended to 'emancipate' them from Islam. In particular students who originated from a prijaji or adat conscious milieu - where Islam had never been able to penetrate fully - succumbed more easily to the lure of Western rationalism and secularism. But also among students with a more strongly orthodox Islamic background a weakening of faith or even a complete abandonment of it was not uncommon. An early case in point was Dr. Abdul Rivaï, a Minangkabau and graduate of the STOVIA who was the first Indonesian to obtain a medical degree in Europe. He also edited one of the first Malay language periodicals in Indonesia, the *Bintang Hindia* (Star of the Indies), but because of its critical views on government policies this journal was soon suppressed. These achievements made him a celebrated man among his own people. On the other hand his Western ways, his marriage to a European woman, and his rejection of both the adat and Islam caused a great deal of apprehension in Minangkabau.\(^{(45)}\) Other examples of prominent Minangkabaus who were

\(^{(44)}\) Cf. Chapter III, 70.

\(^{(45)}\) Deliar Noer *'The rise and development...'* op. cit., 65.
In addition to secularisation Islam was confronted by yet another danger: Christianity. Since the relaxation during the Liberal period (1860–1900) of the earlier rule forbidding missionary activity in predominantly Muslim areas, the Christian missions had been able to expand their field of action considerably in Java and Sumatra. Lutheran missionaries converted a large section of the Batak people in Central North Sumatra; and other Protestant missionaries established themselves in East Sumatra and Nias. The Catholic Church even penetrated into the Islamic stronghold of Padang in Minangkabau. In Java also Protestants as well as Catholics became very active and exclusively Christian villages were established in Modjokerto (East Java) and in the Priangan area (West Java). Furthermore, as was seen in Chapter III in the first decade of the twentieth century when the Christian parties were in power in the Dutch parliament the Christian missions were given a monopoly of education in large parts of Eastern Indonesia. Other signs of a definite Christian bias at this time in the colonial administration was the subsidising of Christian hospitals and orphanages and the issuing of the so-called 'Sunday Circular' and the 'Market Circular' which laid down that state

(46) cf. Sutan Sjahrir 'Sjahrazad, Indonesische Overpeinzingen' (Amsterdam, 1945).

(48) cf. Chapter I, 28.

(49) cf. Chapter III, 94.
festivities and markets could not be held on Sundays. (50)

In order to counteract this double threat of secularisation and Christianisation Muslim reformers in Indonesia tried to establish a modern Islamic education system which was similar in scope to the government one. This was done by establishing Islamic versions of government schools such as the H.I.S. and the MULO and also by introducing Western educational techniques and curricula in the traditional Muslim schools.

The first modern Islamic school in Minangkabau was the so-called Adabyah school, which was established in 1909 at Padang by Hadji Abdullah Ahmad. The Adabyah school was a primary school and its curriculum was similar to that of the Dutch-Native school (H.I.S.) with the addition that Islam was made a compulsory subject. (51)

The progress of the Islamic educational renaissance in Minangkabau can be gauged from the following statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modernised Muslim religious schools in Minangkabau - 1934 (52)</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernist:</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>25,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional:</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>9,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>34,577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(50) Niël, R. van 'The emergence...' op. cit., 84.
(52) C.A. Memorie van Overgave van den Resident van Sumatra's Westkust, B.H.F. van Heuven, 31 December 1934, Mailrapport 254/35.
Some of the Indonesian children after completing their training at one of these modernised Islamic primary schools, were able to pass the entrance examinations for the government secondary schools. Many, however, after leaving the Dinijah or Sumatra Thalawib schools returned to their villages setting themselves up as businessmen, Islamic teachers or journalists. Others again went to the Middle East, in particular Egypt to continue their studies at a higher level. In the table below the number of students in the Middle East and their geographical origin in Indonesia is shown:

**Indonesian students in the Middle East**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin in Indonesia</th>
<th>Cairo</th>
<th>Mecca</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palembang</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Coast of Sumatra</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Coast of Sumatra</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bencoolen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampungs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atjeh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapanuli</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banka</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West-Java</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jogjakarta</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and East Borneo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 69 Indonesian students in Cairo 56 studied at the Islamic university - Al Azhar - one studied at the Cairo university, 8 attended secondary schools, 3 studied at the Darululum (54) and one received private tuition.


(54) Note: Darululum, four years secondary school giving entry into Cairo university and some faculties of the Sorbonne.
On their return from Egypt many of these students set up Islamic secondary and teachers training schools, such as the Al-Djamijah Islamiyah, which was established at Sungajang in 1931, the Normal Islam (Kullija Mu'allimin Islamiyah) and the Islamic College at Padang. These schools provided both religious and secular education from primary to secondary level. Furthermore, in 1936 a conference of Madrasah teachers (Muktamar madrasah) was held at Padang Pandjang for the purpose of standardising the curricula in all modern Islamic schools in Minangkabau. The conference decided to grade Islamic education into the following five stages:

1. **Madrasah Awalijah**, a three year course equal to the standard of education provided in the village school.

2. **Madrasah Ibtidaijah**, a four year course equal to the government schakel school (linking school).

3. **Madrasah Tsanawijah**, a three year secondary school similar to the government MULO.

4. **Madrasah Mu'allimin (Guru Islam)**, a three year course similar to the government teachers training school.

5. **Madrasah Islam tinggi**, a four year course at tertiary level.

Most religious schools in Minangkabau agreed to adhere to this system of grading; and by the end of Dutch rule already thirteen Islamic teachers training colleges had been established, a remarkable feat for an area such as Minangkabau with only one and a half million inhabitants. (55)

(55) Mahmud Junus 'Sedjarah Pendidikan...' op. cit., 96-103.
The last stage in this process of providing an Islamic education system which was equal in scope to that set up by the colonial government, was completed with the establishment in December 1940 of an Islamic university, Sekolah Islam Tinggi, at Padang. This Islamic university comprised the faculties of Religion (Law) - Fakultas Sjari'at; and the faculty of Education and Arabic - Fakultas Pendidikan dan Bahasa Arab. This institution, however, was closed again in March, 1942, on Japanese orders. (56)

In Java Islamic reformism was largely an urban phenomenon. Its rejection of mysticism, its emphasis on rationalism and individualism was particularly attractive to the indigenous traders and fitted in with the already more dynamic life of the kauman. The first modern Muslim school organisation in Java was the Al-Djami'at al-Chairijah - The Good Organization - founded in 1905 by a group of wealthy Arabs in Djakarta. In addition to sending youths to Turkey for study the organisation also established an elementary school in which religion, arithmetic, geography, history (Islamic) and other secular subjects were taught. The language of instruction was Malay. Dutch was not taught, but instead English was made a compulsory subject. The teachers for this school were recruited from throughout the Muslim world, including Morocco, Tunis, Sudan and Arabia. (57)

(56) Mahnud Junus 'Sedjarah Pendidikan...' op. cit., 103-107.
(57) Deliar Noer 'The rise and development...' op. cit., 91-92.
The first completely Indonesian efforts in this Islamic revival were the Sarakat Dagang Islamiyah and the Sarakat Dagang Islam, modern Islamic trading cooperatives founded respectively in 1909 in Djakarta and 1911 in Bogor by a certain R.M. Tirtoadisoejo. In 1911 Tirtoadisoejo came to Solo to organise indigenous textile traders against Chinese competition. It was out of this Sarakat Dagang Islam at Solo that in 1912 the Sarekat Islam was born which within a few years was to grow into the first Indonesian mass political movement. (58)

The initial platform of Sarekat Islam was to further the cause of Islam in Indonesia and to work for the socio-economic advancement of the Indonesian people in cooperation with the colonial government along the lines of the 'Ethical' welfare program. It is claimed that in 1919 the organisation had 2.5 million members. (59) By this time, however, Communists had infiltrated the party and subsequently the movement became more radical and revolutionary. A struggle for the party's leadership ended in 1921 with the ousting of the Communists who founded their own political organisation: the Partai Kommunis Indonesia. After this split, the Sarekat Islam was gradually falling into political insignificance and the leadership of the Islamic revival movement passed to another organisation called Mohammadijah which had been

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(58) Petrus Blumberger, J.Th. 'De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie' (Haarlem, 1931), 56.

founded in 1912 and which concentrated on the educational and social field. Its founder kijaji Ahmad Dahlan was born in Jogjakarta in 1869 as the son of the official preacher (chatib) at the Sultan's mosque. He twice undertook the pilgrimage and in Mecca came into contact with the teachings of Muhammad Abduh.

The objectives of Mohammadijah as laid down in the constitution of 1912, were to spread Islam among the people of the residency Jogjakarta and to improve the religious life of its members. These objectives were to be reached:

1) by the holding of public meetings where religious subjects would be discussed;
2) by the founding and maintaining of modern Islamic schools;
3) by the founding and maintaining of mosques for public religious services;
4) the publishing of religious books, newspapers and tracts.

Originally only people in the Jogjakarta district could become members, but in 1920 it was decided to extend the organisation's activities over the whole of Indonesia. (60)

Copying the proselytising methods of the Christian missions, Mohammadijah in addition to founding schools also established hospitals, orphanages, and organisations for poor relief. The organisation met with a great deal of success. In 1925 there were already 29 branches with 4000 members; and so far there had been founded 8 Dutch-Native schools, a teachers training school,

(60) Petrus Blumberger, J.Th. 'De nationalistisch beweging...'
op. cit., 93.
32 standard schools, and 14 religious schools (madrasah), with 119 teachers and 4000 pupils. Two clinics had been established, one at Jogjakarta and one at Surabaja, and an orphanage and house for the poor at Jogjakarta. By 1929 membership had grown to 16,000; and the Taman Pustaka (publishing section) had during the fifteen years of its existence published and distributed 700,000 books and brochures. The Mohammadijah women's organisation, Aisijjhah, also had made great progress; in 1929 there were 47 branches and 50 groups with a membership of 5000. Aisijjah also had established 32 schools for girls with 75 teachers. In 1938 Mohammadijah counted 852 branches and 898 groups with 250,000 members. It maintained 834 mosques and prayer houses (langgar), 31 public libraries and 1774 schools. There were also at that time 5,516 male and 2,114 female missionaries (muballigh). 

The progress made by Islamic reformism caused conservative scholars to organise themselves. In 1926 a number of prominent kiaji in East Java founded the Nahdatul Ulama (Association of Legal Scholars) at Surabaja.

The major objective of Nahdatul Ulama was to further the cause of traditionalist Islam and to encourage believers to adhere strictly to one of the four madzhab. To achieve this objective the organisation would attempt: 1) to create unity among the ulama, who adhered to any of these four madzhab; 2) to scrutinize books (kitab), based on these madzhab, for their orthodoxy; 3) to

(61) Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch Indie. Supplement VI, 267-270.
spread Islam as much as possible by every means allowed within the Law; 4) to further Islamic education; 5) to take care of the running of mosques, prayer houses (langgar), religious schools, and pious works such as giving support to widows and the poor; 6) to further agricultural, trading and industrial enterprises in as far as this was not in conflict with the Law. (62)

The Nahdatul Ulama spread rapidly throughout Java and also branches were established in Borneo (Kalimantan). In 1930 there were six branches in West Java, twenty-one in Central Java and eighteen in East Java. By 1937 the number of branches had grown to seventy-one and by 1942 to one hundred and twenty. (63)

The importance of the role played by Islam in the Indonesian national 'awakening' in particular by the Muslim schools where a always/strong anti-colonial spirit had existed cannot be easily over-estimated. Islamic nationalism, however, was different in spirit and purpose to secular nationalism. In Islam politics and religion are inextricably intertwined and for new Orthodox and old Orthodox Muslims alike the only conceivable ideological foundation for the new Indonesia of the future was Islam.

This demand for an Islamic state caused strong opposition from both Western-orientated nationalists and cultural nationalists who insisted on a complete separation of church and state. The result was a serious split in the national movement which could

(62) Petrus Blumberger, J.Th. 'De nationalistische beweging...' op. cit., 89.
not be healed, and as Mohammad Natsir wrote in reply to attacks on Islam by secular nationalists:

'...Let us from now on be frank and blunt to each other. For our aim and purpose are not similar. You seek independence for Indonesia on account of the Indonesian nation, on account of Mother Indonesia. We struggle for independence because of Almighty God, for the well being of all the inhabitants of the Indonesian archipelago. You seek independence from a foreign government, because of the foreignness of its government. We struggle for independence from the government of foreigners, or even from our own people because of the difference in ideals and the way of life; because of the absence of Islam in government....' (64)

By the early 1920's Sarekat Islam, the major Islamic political organisation, had lost the initiative to the Communist Party.

Communism had been brought to the Indies by Dutchmen who in 1914 had founded the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging - I.S.D.V. - (Social Democratic Association of the Indies). This organisation was able to penetrate with some success into existing political parties such as the Sarekat Islam and the Indische Partij. By 1918 a bitter struggle for control had ensured within the Sarekat Islam which finally ruined this organisation and caused it to fall into political oblivion. During the early 1920's the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) was able to increase its membership considerably and to take control of the labor union movement.

According to McVey:

'...In the P.K.I expansion much depended on commanding the loyalty of influential leaders, and with literacy and organisational experience very scarce, this was a chronic party problem. In the urban centres, leadership

(64) Deliar Noer, 'The rise and development...' op. cit., quot. 431-432.
'was usually associated with the labor unions.... In the smaller towns and rural areas it came principally from those who, as a result of superior education, ambition, or contact with urban life, felt deep frustration with the status quo. Such persons might be traders and cash-crop farmers distressed by the depression, better-situated villagers – often hadjis – angered over burdensome and complicated taxes, religious teachers opposed to kafir rule and regulation of religious activity, or local notables and officials alienated by injustices they felt had been done them by higher authorities....' (65)

This rather motley composition of local leadership created problems in particular of party discipline and in 1923 the party leadership decided to introduce indoctrination courses. This decision was made mainly on the instigation of Tan Malaka, P.K.I. leader and trained school teacher. As a result Sarekat Rakjat schools were set up. According to Dutch intelligence reports of 1924/1925 there were 38 of these schools in Java with 2,100 pupils. (66) Communists were also able to penetrate the A.B.C. cursussen. (67)

(65) McVey, R.T. 'The Rise of Indonesian Communism' (Cornell Univ., 1965) 185.


(67) Note: A.B.C., acronym for Analphabetisme Bestrijdings Comite (Committee to Combat Illiteracy) founded in 1921. A number of prominent Indonesians including Hadji Agus Salim, Soetadi, R.L. Djajadiningrat, took an active part. Strong support was also forthcoming from the Netherlands Indies Teachers Association, the Theosophical Society, Indonesian teachers associations, Indonesian youth organisations such as Jong-Java and Jong Sumatra, the STOVIA, students of the Rechtshoogeschool (Law faculty), and various missionary organisations. In the Priangan area (West Java) 1,361 courses with an average of 40 pupils each were flourishing. In East Java a course was established in each village. An estimated 2000 courses with 80,000-90,000 pupils were set up in the whole of Indonesia.
adult education classes set up in 1921 by the well-known educationalist Post for the purpose of eradicating illiteracy. But when the colonial government stopped a number of communist teachers from participating any further, the A.B.C. movement gradually disintegrated. The P.K.I. not to be beaten decided to start its own literacy campaign and established 'snel scholen' (lit. quick ready schools) in which free tuition in the reading and writing of Javanese, Malay, and also on occasions of Dutch and English was provided to adult members of the party. In March 1925 there were 16 of these schools in Java with 450 pupils.\(^{(68)}\)

In the years 1924/1925 the P.K.I. was growing increasingly more revolutionary in its activities. Many strikes occurred and in 1926/1927 Communist inspired rebellions broke out in West Java and West Sumatra (Minangkabau). These uprisings were easily suppressed by the colonial army and the police. More than 18,000 persons were arrested and of these 4,500 were finally sent to prison. The colonial government which hitherto had been fairly lenient in its treatment of radical nationalist offenders and had allowed a number of revolutionary leaders to go into exile in Holland or other overseas countries now took on a much harsher line and 1,308 Communists were sent to Tanah Merah prison camp at the Upper Digul river in West Irian.\(^{(69)}\) This suppressive policy and the greatly


\(^{(69)}\) McVey, R.T. 'The rise of Indonesian Communism' op. cit., 353.
increased vigilance of the Poltieke Inlichtingen Dienst - P.I.D. (Political Intelligence Service) effectively crushed the P.K.I. until the end of Dutch rule.

As McVey has written:

'...The P.K.I. had been the last of the older generation of Indonesian political movements to play an active role; the others... had either given up entirely or retired from the struggle against Dutch rule. The removal of the Communists from the political scene caused the new generation, which had hitherto been gathering in the background, suddenly to occupy the center of the stage. These were the secular nationalists, who saw their anti-Dutch efforts directly in terms of striving for an Indonesian nation-state rather than in the internationalist framework of Islam or Communism or in the political and cultural particularism of the regional movements....' (70)

This new generation of Indonesian nationalist leaders was completely distrustful of the colonial government and non-cooperation, self-help, and racial exclusiveness were the paramount features of this new phase in Indonesian nationalism.

The non-cooperative attitude was largely the result of disappointment about the outcome of Dutch promises for a greater degree of self-government. Also some nationalists had become strongly influenced by the Marxist anti-colonialist ideas and the non-cooperation movement in British-India. Furthermore, increased racial exclusiveness on the part of Indonesians was mainly a reaction to the racial discrimination practised by the European community and the wealth and power enjoyed by Europeans which was out of proportion to their number.

(70) McVey, R.T. 'The rise of Indonesian Communism' op. cit., 354.
A very important role in this new development was played by Indonesian students in the Netherlands. In 1908 Indonesians living in the Netherlands had founded mainly for social purposes, an association called the Indies Society (Indische Vereniging).

After the arrival of the exiles Suwardi Surianingrat and Tjipto Mangunkusumo in 1913 this society became more politically orientated, although it did not show a great deal of political vigour until the twenties. In 1917 another society the Indonesian Union of Students (Indische Verbond van Studerenden) was founded on the principle of the association of all races living in the Netherlands Indies. At the various congresses held by this society, both Indonesians and Dutchmen showed themselves very critical of the Dutch colonial system. After a few years however, the Indonesian Union of Students lost most of its Indonesian members to the Perhimpunan Indonesia which was established in 1922 as a revigorated and reorientated form of the old Indies Society. The first Council of Perhimpunan Indonesia consisted of R. Iwa Kusumo Sumantri, T.B. Sitanala, Moh. Hatta, R. Sastromuljono, D. Mangunkusumo. But also Dr. Sutomo and Sutan Sjarir were prominent in the founding years of the Perhimpunan Indonesia.

The political importance of the Perhimpunan Indonesia should be stressed because many of its members on their return to


(72) Koch, D.M.G. *op. cit.*, 100.
Indonesia exerted a profound influence on the Nationalist movement. In 1923 the society issued a well-defined program of action of which the main point was a free and democratic government for Indonesia should be striven for by every Indonesian without relying on the support of foreigners. The various regional national movements which had sprung up in imitation of Budi Utomo were to be condemned and a strong emphasis was to be placed on Indonesia as a national unity. In 1925 another important clause was added which stressed that only a conscious, self-reliant mass action could achieve freedom. The Perhimpunan Indonesia also took up contact with other anti-colonial movements including the communist inspired League against Colonial Repression. (73)

On his return to Indonesia Dr. Sutomo set about putting the new program into action. In 1924 he founded the Indonesian Study Club (Indonesische Studie Club) in Surabaja for the purpose of training leaders and disseminating information among the masses. Dr. Sutomo concentrated his efforts especially on social and economic problems, and various institutions such as hostels, banks, advisory services and cooperatives were founded.

In imitation of Dr. Sutomo, the General Study Club (Algemene Studie Club) was founded in Bandung by Sukarno, who had recently graduated from the Faculty of Technology in Bandung. The General Study Club was more politically orientated and kept close relations

(73) Koch, D.M.G. op. cit., 100.
with the *Perhimpunan Indonesia* in the Hague. Under no circumstances did it want to have anything to do with the colonial government. The *Perhimpunan Indonesia* planned to establish a mass political movement in Indonesia and considered Sukarno as the most suitable person to establish such an organisation. Subsequently on 4th July, 1927 Dr. Sukarno, Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo and Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Mr. Budiarto and Mr. Sunarjo established at Bandung the *Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia* (*P.N.I.*).\(^{(74)}\) The *P.N.I.* was emphatically non-cooperative and it was the first unitary nationalist organisation emphasising that the whole of the Netherlands-Indies — 'from Sabang to Merauke' was a nationally united entity: Indonesia.

Both the *Perhimpunan Indonesia* and the *P.N.I.* were suspected of complicity in the revolts of 1926/1927, because of their cooperation with the Communists. As a result Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo was exiled and in the Hague and Leiden the quarters of *Perhimpunan Indonesia* members were searched. Mohammad Hatta, Ali Sastroadmodjo, Abdul Madjid Djojoadiningrat and Mohammad Nazir Datuk Pamuntjak were arrested, but they were later freed again on the strength of a technicality in Dutch law and after a publicity making trial.\(^{(75)}\)

The activities of the *P.N.I.* were kept under strict surveillance by the *Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst* (*Political Intelligence Service*) and in 1929 Sukarno and other *P.N.I.* leaders were arrested on suspicion of plotting a revolution in 1930. Although the evidence

\(^{(74)}\) *Koch, D.M.G.* *'Om de vrijheid'* (1950) 101.

for this was very flimsy Sukarno was condemned to four years imprisonment.

The P.N.I. was dissolved and a controversy developed about tactics to be followed in the national struggle. The Partai Nasional Indonesia (Partindo), which was founded in 1931 by Sartono, remained non-cooperative in spirit and emphasised mass activity. Other nationalist leaders such as Hatta and Sjahrir were convinced that a different approach was necessary. They favoured a smaller party, the membership of which would be drawn from the intelligentsia. The main program of the party would be to train cadres who were to diffuse revolutionary nationalist ideas among the masses. Such a party, the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, was founded in 1931 by Sjahrir. On his return from the Netherlands in 1932 Hatta became its chairman. The Partindo in line with Marhaenism emphasised the struggle for political freedom. In order to achieve this quickly a united front was necessary consisting of the whole of indigenous society irrespective of religion and class. The Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, however, considered the unification of all classes in indigenous society into one political unit as impossible. Hatta declared on one occasion that the policy of Partindo could not bring about persatuan (unity), but only persatean (Sate is an Indonesian food consisting of small pieces of barbecued meat on skewers). According to Hatta a stick of sate could consist of all sorts of meat, but concepts such as people, bourgeoisie and nobility could not be chained together into one compatible unit. If there was to be unity between these groups
then each would have to abandon its principles. The nationalist struggle should be directed towards organizing the proletarian masses. And a class struggle both against foreign capitalism as well as the indigenous bourgeoisie was necessary. (76)

Sukarno's sentence was shortened and he was released from jail in December 1931. At first he tried to mend the split within the radical nationalist movement. But he was unsuccessful and finally he joined the Partindo. As van't Veer puts it:

'...Sukarno became the leader of the mass party, which sought its strength in rousing speeches at mass meetings - where the great leader could show off his speaking talents and where he could be number one without any opposition....' (77)

This split in the nationalist leadership, however, went much deeper. Men like Hatta and Sjahrir had spent a considerable time in Holland where they had experienced European civilisation at its source. Their methodology and their goals were Western in spirit. They were convinced that Westernisation - and that as quickly as possible - was the only firm basis on which the new Indonesia could be built. Sjahrir's view of the future Indonesia was quite clear. As a convinced socialist he believed in a democratic welfare state. Also Hatta tended this way although he remained a believing Muslim.

Sukarno's political ideology, however, is far more complicated. And part of the answer might be provided by a closer look at his social background.

(76) Pluvier, J.M. 'Overzicht...' _op. cit._, 50.
(77) Veer, P. van't 'Sukarno' (The Hague, 1964) 30.
Palmier has written about Sukarno: '...Pious Muslim though he is, he has always put his nationalism before his religion....' (78) The latter part of this statement is true enough. Also I have no doubt that Sukarno is a religious man. To call him a pious Muslim, however, is another matter. It is highly doubtful if he was brought up as an orthodox Muslim during his childhood. His father was a prijaji, that is he belonged to the class of Javanese which had always resisted complete Islamisation. Prijaji culture remained very heavily impregnated with Hindu/Buddhist elements. It was among the Javanese nobility that the ideal of the ksatrija, the fearless and blameless knight of the Raymayana and the Baratajuda epics, was kept alive. Furthermore, most prijaji adhered to what had been called agama djawa, a mystical, syncretic and tolerant type of religion, which has been characterised by one prominent Javanese as follows:

'...What is the Javanese Philosophy of Life? Does it originate in Buddhism, Brahmanism, Hinduism or Islam? All four of these do not completely reflect our philosophy of life, but they are part of it. The animism of the earlier period and the theosophy of the present are also intermingled with it, even the Christian religion in the form of Catholicism and 'Protestantism' have been absorbed in our philosophy of life....' (79)

Another Javanese, the cultural nationalist Suwardi Surianingrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantoro) put it in a different way:

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(78) Palmier, L.H. 'Sukarno, the Nationalist' in: Pacific Affairs Vol.XXX no.1, March 1957, 110.

(79) Saarasoevondo 'Op welke wijze kan bij de opvoeding van de Landskinderen de Inheemsche cultuur meer tot haar recht komen?' in: Djawa 1924.
We had a religion in ancient times. This was followed by another religion and so on, and perhaps it is just because of this changing of religions, that the Javanese is not very zealous religiously. He prefers to take over various doctrines from other religions. The most important thing of course is to lead a really moral life in as far as that is possible, and that in our opinion is true religion. And even if this is not recognized as one of the official religions it is unjust to deny its existence.

Viewed in the perspective of his prijaji cultural background, Sukarno's political philosophy — which after all is highly syncretic — becomes perhaps more understandable.

Furthermore, unlike Hatta and Sjahrir, Sukarno had never been to Europe. The West was only known to him through books and in the highly watered-down version which he encountered in the colony. He never saw democracy at work. And the West to him meant only imperialism, capitalism, national degradation and exploitation. In spite of all his quotations Sukarno never really understood European civilisation. In spirit he remained a Javanese, mystical and syncretic, and in his approach to politics he could be called a cultural nationalist.

It is no mere coincidence that in the mid-1920's Sukarno headed the Bandung branch of Taman Siswa, the foremost cultural nationalist organisation in Indonesia. Unlike Sjahrir and his followers there was one group of Indonesian nationalists, which believed that modernisation did not necessarily have to occur at the cost of losing one's national culture and identity. And in

(80) Suwardi Suryaningrat taken from a speech held at the Eerste Koloniaal Onderwijscongres. Stenografisch Verslag, 1916, 278.
line with the development of a unitary and Indonesia-wide nationalism, attempts were made to create a new Indonesian culture, and an Indonesian national identity, which was rooted in the cultural heritage of all the Indonesian islands. The most important leader in this cultural nationalist movement was undoubtedly Suwardi Suryaningrat, better known as Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, a name adopted in 1928 meaning 'teacher and intermediary of the gods'. In 1922 Dewantoro founded the Taman Siswa, a national school organisation, which should be seen first of all as a reaction against the 'denationalisation' effect of the colonial education system. Dewantoro strongly condemned the common practice of Western-educated Indonesians of imitating Europeans in all aspects of life; and as he wrote in 1938:

'...We felt a faint semblance of happiness or satisfaction in our hearts, when we had the opportunity to have contact with Europeans, to speak Dutch also with our countrymen, to appear in Western dress, to furnish our houses in Western style. We went even further in our desire to imitate; a party would be considered common or boorish without a Western menu; without a jazzband, without a glass of Dutch gin...Thus, we would be at a level with the Dutch. Nevertheless in all this we found but little, which in accordance with generally accepted cultural standards could be considered to be of true intellectual value....'(81)

According to Dewantoro too much emphasis was placed in government schools on the training of the intellect, while character training

was largely neglected. Intellectualism bred materialism and individualism, which were the three underlying causes of the unrest and division in indigenous society. To ensure a harmonious and peaceful development of the child – and therefore of the nation as a whole – it was absolutely necessary to reorientate education on a national cultural basis. The motto adopted at the founding of the Taman Siswa was '...Kembali kepada alam-alam...' (Let us return to our inner selves). The reasons for this return to national culture were further explained in the Declaration of Principles of the Taman Siswa:

'...With regard to the future we find ourselves as a people in a state of confusion. Misled through imaginary needs, which as excretions from a foreign civilisation are difficult to meet from our own resources, we ourselves have actively contributed to this disturbed state of mind. We were always in a state of discontentment. Also as a result of this deception we strove for a one-sided development of the intellect, which made us economically dependent and which at the same time estranged us from the people we belong to. In this confusion our own culture must be the starting point from which we must progress. Only on the basis of our own civilization can a peaceful reconstruction occur. In this national form, without imitation, should our people appear on the international stage....' (82)

In terms of the school curriculum the return to national culture meant the replacement of Western songs, games and cultural activities by indigenous ones. Javanese music (gamelan), the puppet play (wajang), and classical dancing were taught. Also the teaching of history differed significantly from that in

(82) Ibid.
government schools. An Indonesia-centric approach was taken and emphasis was placed on the period of former Javanese grandeur such as the Hodjopahit Empire. The history of the Netherlands Indies was only taught in the wider context of national history as a whole. Furthermore, the mother tongue was the language of instruction in the first few years of the primary school. Malay, Dutch and English were taught as subjects. Another important innovation was the introduction of civics as a subject. For the remainder the Taman Siswa schools followed the same program as government schools.

It should be emphasised, however, that the Taman Siswa was far more than just a school organisation. It was a fully fledged cultural nationalist movement with its roots deeply embedded in the national Javanese ethos. The Taman Siswa actually evolved from a Javanese philosophic-religious group, the Selasa Kliwon, which had been founded in 1921 by a number of Javanese intellectuals including the philosopher Pangeran Ario Surio Mataram and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. Dissatisfied with the Western character of the nationalist movement the Selasa Kliwon refused to be 'a spirit of the West' and instead it emphasised a spiritual regeneration of the national self. Only then could a harmonious development of the individual and the nation be ensured. Pangeran Ario Surio Mataram likened the life of the individual (salişra), the nation (bangsa) and the world (manungsa) to concentric circles. It was the objective of the Selasa Kliwon to ensure '....Prosperity and happiness of the individual, of the nation as a whole and of all
Two important conditions, however, were to be fulfilled before this ideal could be achieved. Firstly, the individual should be free to determine his way of life as long as this did not endanger the harmony of the world. And secondly, human behaviour should be based on personal love. The Selasa Kliwon group disbanded again in 1922 when it saw its ideals realised in the Taman Siswa. (83)

The ideas of Pangeran Ario Surio Mataram were further developed by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro in his so-called Tri-con theory (tri meaning three and con standing for continuity, concentricity and convergence).

Continuity referred to traditional national culture, which if left unhampered and respected by outsiders would be able to continue its natural growth. Chauvinism, however, went against the Taman Siswa spirit and Dewantoro stressed that contact with other cultures was necessary in order to enrich and strengthen national life. On the other hand this cultural borrowing should be carried out concentrically, that is there was to be no wholesale imitation of foreign cultures, but rather foreign elements were to be carefully selected and should subsequently be nationalised. This did not mean that Dewantoro considered the various cultures in the world mutually hostile. On the contrary the final goal of

Taman Siswa was to work together with other countries towards a convergence of all the various cultures into a universal one. This universal culture was to be fed from below by all the differing national cultures, which would still be able to retain their national identity.

This Tri-con principle was also to be the basis for the creation of an Indonesian national culture out of the various existing regional cultures. An Indonesian culture meant:

'*...A unitary culture in which the regional and local cultures will be harmoniously interwoven. In this way the development of a unitary culture will not mean the obliteration of the regional and local cultures. One the contrary the more these thrive the more the unitary culture will thrive....'* (84)

Another important principle of Taman Siswa philosophy was the rule forbidding both religious and political instruction in its schools. Religions and politics tended to take up the whole of the personality, and they were also often the cause of splitting the family, the nation and the world into hostile camps. Before a person should be allowed to choose a particular political or religious direction he should be an adolescent. Furthermore - and this was the whole raison d'etre of the Taman Siswa movement - before making a choice an individual should have become impregnated with a philosophy of life, which although allowing for freedom of action and expression should have endowed him with a love and respect for the ways of life and the convictions of others. The

(84) Mohammad Said 'Taman Siswa - Garden of Pupils' stencilled paper n.d.
banning of active participation in religion and politics on the part of teachers and pupils alike did not mean that the movement was non-religious or non-political in spirit. Its origin in the Selasa Kliwon strongly suggests otherwise. But rather than adhering to a particular institutionalised religion the Taman Siswa spirit was based on a religious code of ethics which was a synthesis of the syncretic agama jawa and humanism. In the Taman Siswa schools an attempt was made to inculcate pupils with a spirit of tolerance, a willingness to set aside one's particular religious differences in order not to damage the chances of a harmonious development of society. Thus, all religious faiths could be assimilated into the Taman Siswa way of life:

'...After all every religion can be considered as a revelation of God's will. The perfection of man is the purpose of every religion. Thus he, who dedicates his life to this lives in accordance with the will of God, and he who does this will feel one with Him....' (85)

It was also in the political sphere that Taman Siswa strove for this unification. The evolution of the various peoples and ideological groupings of the Netherlands Indies into a harmonious whole; a free and united Indonesia, could only be achieved if Indonesians learned to act in a spirit of give and take. It was the task of the Taman Siswa to develop this disposition in their pupils.

In conclusion then the Taman Siswa movement presented a new Indonesian philosophy of life based on a synthesis between the old

and the new. It was primarily designed to develop a spirit of cultural, religious and political unity among Indonesians. But it also aimed at restoring national self-respect and self-confidence, which has suffered greatly from the colonial situation and the confrontation with a foreign civilisation which economically, politically and technologically was far superior. This also explains its insistence on self-help and its refusal to accept government subsidy for its schools.

The influence of Taman Siswa philosophy on Sukarno's political ideology is unmistakable. When a few years ago the writer asked Mohammad Said, the Taman Siswa leader in Djakarta about the relationship between his movement and Sukarno the following answer was given:

'...Do you see this sirih leaf? You will notice that one side is smooth and the other rough. But when you bite the leaf then both sides will taste the same....'

By the end of 1941 the Taman Siswa movement had spread almost over the whole of Indonesia, and at that time it comprised 199 branches with 207 schools, 650 teachers, and about 20,000 pupils. Among these schools there were 24 Taman Dewasa (MULO), 4 Taman Guru (Teachers training schools), and two high schools. (86)

In addition to the Taman Siswa a number of other educational institutions were founded which could be classed as cultural-nationalist. The most important of these were the Perguruan Rakjat in Djakarta, the Ksatryian Instituut at Bandung which has

(86) Buku peringatan Taman Siswa 30 Tahun op. cit., 244.
already been mentioned, and the Indonesisch-Nederlandsche School (Indonesian-Netherlands School) of Mohammad Sjafei at Kajutanam (Minangkabau).

The Perguruan Rakjat, founded in 1929 in Djakarta, was actually a fusion of two existing organisations: a library club called Pustaka Kita, and a study club, named Persatuan Untuk Beladjar (PUB). The objectives of the Pustaka Kita were to establish a library and to organise lectures on important subjects. Its leaders were S. Soenarjo and A. Monomuto Wilson. The PUB on the other hand was founded to train its members in foreign languages and journalism. The first governing body of the Perguruan Rakjat included Dr. Mohammad Natsief and Mr. Mohammad Yamin. As a first step the Perguruan Rakjat organised in January 1929 a Volksuniversiteit, (People's University) a type of adult education course in European languages, history, constitutional law, ethnology, sociology, accountancy and stenography. Almost all these courses were given by students of the Rechtshoogeschool (Law faculty) in Djakarta. The organisation also organised weekly lectures by prominent personalities, such as Ki Hadjar Dewantoro on national education and Dr. Purbatjaraka on Indonesian languages. The success of these ventures caused the Perguruan Rakjat to spread its activities and at the end of 1929 it opened in Djakarta a Dutch-language primary school (perguron rendah umum); a Linking School (perguron rendah umum penambah), and a MULO (perguron rendah umum luas). This was followed by the opening of a teachers training school (perguron umum pendidikan) in July 1932,
and a high school (persedian untuk perguruan tinggi) in July 1933. (87)

In 1933 there were 66 pupils in the primary school, 67 pupils in the MULO, 14 pupils in the teachers training school and 35 pupils in the high school. At that time the director of the Perguruan Rakjat schools in Djakarta was Amir Sjarifoedin, (88) who then was studying law.

The government Inspector of Western Education in a report of 1933 was very critical about the standard of education in the Perguruan Rakjat schools and he wrote that no evidence could be found for the organisation's claim of being a cultural-nationalist institution. (89) Whatever the value of this observation by a sceptical colonial official, so much is clear that by 1936 at the Perguruan Rakjat congres its leaders had a definite cultural-nationalist purpose in mind. At this congres Amir Sjarifoedin outlined the following fundamental principles on which the education

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(88) Note: Amir Sjarifoedin, graduate from the Rechtshoogeschool in Djakarta, became one of the leaders of the Gerindo - Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia - (Indonesia's People's Movement), a leftist party founded in 1937. During the second world war he led an anti-Japanese underground movement. Sjarifoedin became Minister of Information and Defence in the first Republican cabinet (31 August 1945 - 14 November 1945). He was Prime Minister during 1947-1948, and was one of the leaders of the communist rebellion (Madium affair) in 1948. Soon afterwards he was captured and executed.

(89) C.A. Inspecteur van het Westersch Lager onderwijs in het 2e ressort aan den Directeur van Onderwijs en Ereredienst no.36 Geheim, 9 September 1933. Mailrapport 1179/33.
in the Perguruan Rakjat schools was based:

1. The education of the PR is based on a national Indonesian foundation. The children are educated in a national Indonesian spirit.
2. The PR not only takes care of intellectual but also of physical education and strengthens such points of character as honesty and magnanimity.
3. The PR furthers the character training of Indonesian youth by inculcating a sense of duty self-confidence and spiritual freedom.
4. The PR strives for a philosophy of life and knowledge which is practically orientated.
5. The PR strives towards an education, which will create a progressive philosophy of life, and which takes account of the past and present social virtues of our people.
6. The PR furthers an education which stimulates love for Indonesian civilisation.

There are obvious points of similarity in this program with that of the Taman Siswa. Other Perguruan Rakjat organisations were founded in Djatinegara, Semarang, Surabaja, Bandung, Maccasar, Jogjakarta, Madiun and Palembang. Originally independent, in 1934 all these organisations were united in the Stichting (Foundation) Perguruan Rakjat. In 1936 there were 1500 pupils in all Perguruan Rakjat schools.

The Indonesisch-Nederlandsche School (Indonesian-Netherlands School) - later called Ruangan Pendidik, was established by Mohammad Sjafei at Kajutanam (Minangkabau) in 1926. Sjafei had been in Holland for a few years studying at various colleges and visiting educational specialists in his search for an educational philosophy which would fit the particular demands of Indonesians.

(90) C.A. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken..." 5 Mei 1936 op. cit.
(91) Ibid.
He came to the conclusion that the colonial education system was far too passive, because the child was supposed to listen to the teacher and then to retain what it had heard. Thus, the child was hardly given any opportunity to act on its own initiative, to express itself:

'...If a child has studied in this way for years then later it cannot but have developed a passive nature...Life shows that the passive is always conquered by the active. A passive Indonesian people will lose against an active people. If we desire to remain intact as a people then we must become active....' (92)

In regard to its intellectual training program the school of Sjafei was similar to the Dutch-Native school. But in line with Sjafei's motto: 'Hoofd, Hart en Hand' (Head, Heart and Hand) and as a reaction against the over-emphasis on intellectual training in government schools, also great emphasis was put on the 'expression' subjects such as singing, painting and handicrafts. Furthermore, pupils were given technical training to aid them in their struggle for life and they left the school as confident and well-trained tradesmen, businessmen, farmers or graziers.

In 1926 the N.I.S. had started off with 26 pupils in a room of a private house with no desks, books or teaching equipment. In 1935 a secondary school course had been added and in 1939 the number of pupils had grown to 900. In the meantime - largely as a result of the efforts of the students themselves, who put their training into practice - well equipped and spacious school buildings,

houses for teachers, a boarding school housing 300 students, sports fields and well equipped workshops had been built.

Modernised Muslim as well as cultural nationalist schools managed to draw a considerable number of Indonesian children away from the government education system. Not all Indonesians, were by any means influenced to such an extent by either religious-nationalist or cultural-nationalist ideals that they were prepared to desist from sending their children to a government Dutch-language school. Until the end of Dutch rule many Indonesian parents mainly for socio-economic reasons persisted in demanding a Dutch-language education for their children. In addition - as was seen above - there was also a group of Indonesian nationalists who rejecting both Islamisation and Indonesiaisation firmly believed that only through Westernisation would Indonesia be able to take its proper place among the nations of the world. The nationalist leader Tjipto Mangunkusumo for example was of the opinion that the dissatisfaction and dislocation caused by Western education was indispensable for creating a revolutionary atmosphere. He also rejected the use of traditional culture and language in the formation of the new Indonesia. As he put it in a 1916 debate:

'...The psyche of the Javanese people has been changed to such an extent that a change of the language, or more cynically a killing of the language has become urgent. Only in this way will it be possible to build another language on its ruins and also another civilisation.' (93)

Also in the Volksraad debates numerous instances can be found of Indonesian members clamoring for more Western education in order to bring the Indonesian people into line with the rest of the world.

Another prominent Indonesian advocating Westernisation was Takdir Alishjabana, writer, linguist, and co-founder in 1933 of the literary periodical Pudjangga Baru (The New Writer). It was an article published in 1935 by Takdir in the Pudjangga Baru which triggered off a fierce polemic among Indonesian intellectuals. According to Alishjabana the concept of Indonesia was a twentieth century one. He condemned as unhistorical the practice of cultural nationalists to see the Modjopahit Srawijaya empires as forerunners of the new Indonesia and to baptise Diponegoro, Imam Bondjol, and other earlier prominent anti-Dutch indigenous leaders as Indonesian heroes. Alishjabana dismissed the history of the Indies before the twentieth century - the pre-Indonesia period - as the dark ages, which were of no use in the building of a new and vigorous Indonesian culture:

'...The spirit which created the imposing Borobudur is not compatible with the spirit which burns in the hearts of the leaders of the Indonesian ideal in this twentieth century....' (94)

In Takdir's view it was impossible for the new Indonesian culture to be a continuation of Javanese, Sundanese, Malay or other traditional cultures in the archipelago. Young Indonesians

should not concentrate on the restoration of the Borobudur and the Prambanan, they should leave this to the government archaeological service. Indonesian culture should be allowed to develop freely and without any preconceived ideas from the pre-Indonesian period. This was necessary:

'...Because somebody who has not yet been able to free himself from Javanese culture will do his utmost to introduce a Javanese spirit into Indonesian culture, somebody, who has not been able to liberate himself from Malay culture will do his utmost to introduce a Malay spirit into Indonesian culture and so on. To those people Indonesian culture means Javanese culture or Malay culture which has been slightly modernised. This means the introduction of dissension within Young Indonesia circles. The Javanese faction will not be happy when the culture which is called Indonesian consists of Malay culture which has been changed a little. And reversely other factions will not be happy, when Indonesian culture consists of Javanese culture which has changed a little....' (95)

Not the traditional culture of the Indies, which was static in nature, but the dynamic approach to life of Western countries should be taken as a model in the building of Indonesia. Only these countries which were dynamic, such as America, Europe, and Japan held a powerful place among the nations of the world. To those who dismissed the West as egoistic, materialistic, and intellectualistic, Alishjabana retorted that they should remember that it was because of the close contact with the West that a dynamic nationalist movement had been able to rise: '...Even the word 'Indonesia' of which we are so proud today is a word which we obtained from the West....' (96) Furthermore, Alishjabana

(95) Ibid., 16.
(96) Ibid., 18.
argued, the criticism levied by cultural nationalists against Western education was completely misplaced. Intellectualism, egoism, materialism which had become social problems in many developed Western countries, were highly desirable qualities in the Indonesian context, where they were necessary to lift up the people from a state of medieval stagnation.

Another example of an Indonesian who rejected traditional culture was the nationalist leader Sutan Sjahrir. In his memoirs he points to the cultural difficulties of the small group of Indonesian intellectuals, who unlike European intellectuals could not continue to build on their cultural heritage because:

'...Here for centuries there has been no intellectual, no cultural life, no progress anymore. There are the much praised eastern art forms - but what else are these than rudiments of a feudal culture, which for us, people of the twentieth century are impossible to fall back on. The wajang, all this simple symbolism and mysticism - which reminds us of the alegory and medieval wisdom in Europe - what can it still offer us intellectually and culturally? Practically nothing. Our intellectual needs are twentieth century, our problems, out outlook are twentieth century....To me the West means effervescent, surging life, the dynamic. It is Faust whom I love and I am convinced that only the West, in this dynamic sense, can liberate the East from its slavery....' (97)

These Western-orientated nationalist leaders then severely criticised the colonial government for not providing enough Western schools for the indigenous population; and in this they received strong support from many Indonesian parents although often perhaps for more prosaic motives. How strong the demand for Dutch-language education really was in indigenous society can be

(97) Sutan Sjahrir 'Sjahrazad, Indonesische Overpeinzingen' 1945, 60-61 and 127.
gauged from the large number of private Dutch-language schools which were set up by Indonesians, when from the mid-1920's onwards the colonial government largely for political reasons decided to slow down the growth of the Dutch–Native school and during the depression the expansion of these schools was completely halted. Most of these 'wilde scholen' could be classified as 'bread and butter' schools. They were usually one man affairs founded by retired school masters or unemployed Dutch speaking Indonesians who tried to earn a living this way, although often a precarious one.

The 'wilde scholen' were of great historical significance because of the role they played in the nationalist movement. During the 1920's and 1930's when the effectiveness of the nationalist movement was severely hampered by the repressive measures of the colonial government many radical nationalists or would be agitators — who managed to stay out of prison — channelled their energies into the independent national schools. It was in the 'wilde scholen' that the nationalist spirit was kept alive and that 'cadres' were trained for the time when independence would arrive. It should also be stressed that at the same time the 'wilde scholen' because of their great ideological variety tended to intensify and perpetuate the socio-political segmentation in Indonesian society. Certainly the Dutch recognised the importance of the 'wilde scholen' to the nationalist movement and as will be seen in following chapters the colonial government attempted to control the national independent schools by repressive legislation.
Chapter V
The Emergence of a New Colonial Policy: 1918–1930

The years immediately following the end of the first World War saw the final break between the Dutch and radical Indonesian nationalists. Any hopes the Dutch ever may have had about pacifying radical nationalists by instituting the Volksraad were dispelled almost immediately after the opening of the first session in May 1918 when the Sarekat Islam leaders Abdul Moeis and Tjokroaminoto severely criticised the colonial system. (1) Again at the beginning of the second session of the Volksraad on 14 November 1918 radical Indonesian members (Tjokroaminoto, Abdul Moeis, Radjiman, and Tjipto Mangunkusumo) strongly condemned the colonial government for distinctly favouring the interests of European capital to the detriment of the indigenous population and they rebuked Europeans in general for their attitude of racial superiority towards Indonesians. (2) While these speeches obviously did nothing to abate the existing feeling of uneasiness in the colony, European fears about an impending revolution were raised to a high pitch when rumors reached the Indies about a Socialist

(1) Volksraad, Handelingen 1918. 124.

(2) Ibid., 429.
coup d'état in the Netherlands. (3) Communist European soldiers and sailors held demonstrations and the Indonesian Communist leader Darsono incited Indonesians to follow the example of the Russian people. (4) In the Volksraad on 16 November the Dutch Socialist member Cramer pledged his full support for the Indonesian nationalists and on his instigation the Radicale Concentratie (Radical Concentration) was formed consisting of the S.D.A.P., Insulinde, Budi Utomo, and Sarekat Islam. (5)

The first reaction of the Governor-General van Limburg Stirum was that the Volksraad would have to be transformed into a full parliament in case the Socialists had come to power in Holland. As he wrote to Idenburg, the Minister of Colonies:

'...Although I kept out of circulation the most disquieting telegrams from Reuter and the Melbourne agency Orient about the situation in Holland a red wind was nevertheless blowing in the Indies... Its influence was so strong that even one of the most highly respected High Court judges demanded that a parliament should be established immediately in the Indies. Your Excellency will realise then what far-reaching desiderata others were putting up. In

(3) Note: In November 1918 the Socialist leader Toelstra who was strongly impressed by the Russian revolution as well as the revolutionary activity of the German Social Democrats attempted a coup d'état. Toelstra announced to the Dutch parliament that a revolution was unavoidable and he advised the Dutch government to give in without a struggle. If not then the Dutch government would be responsible for the disastrous consequences. The Socialists, however, were not united and the Government took preventive measures such as the sending of Catholic troops from the Southern provinces to Western Holland. The 'revolution' fizzled out after a few days and Toelstra was forced to admit in parliament that he had made a 'mistake'.

(4) McVey, R.T., 'The rise of Indonesian Communism' op. cit., 32.

(5) Volksraad, Handelingen 1918/1919, 206.
general people were highly agitated and very
nervous... wild rumors circulated about the Queen
having abdicated and about me being replaced...
It was because of all this that I decided on 16.11.
to interfere... and to make a declaration in the
Volksraad which would make it clear that the govern­
ment was not blind to the signs of the times...'(6)

A telegram of 18 November from the Hague(7) stating that the
Dutch government after promising speedy political and economic
reforms was regaining the initiative and that Socialist leaders
had decided against revolution does not seem to have set the
Governor-General completely at ease. Furthermore, convinced that
the Indies should move with developments in the rest of the world
van Limburg Stirum declared in the Volksraad on 18 November that
he envisaged important political changes in the colony and a
transfer of responsibility from the colonial government to the
Volksraad. The extent of this transfer of power, however, could
not yet be fully determined. (8)

These rather vague promises did not satisfy the Radicale
Concentratie which moved on 25 November that a democratically
elected parliament to which the government should be responsible
for its actions should be introduced before 1921 when the term
of the existing Volksraad was to end. (9)

(6) Gouverneur-Generaal aan den Minister van Kolonien, 1 December 1918.
in: van der Wal 'De Volksraad en de Staatkundige ontwikkeling
van Nederlandsch-Indie, een bronnenpublicatie, eerste stuk 1891-1926
(Uitgaven van de Commissie voor Bronnenpublicatie betreffende de
geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie 1900-1942 van het Historisch
Genootschap no.2., 256-257.

(7) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 18 November 1918
In: van der Wal 'De Volksraad...' op. cit., 255.

(8) Volksraad, Handelingen 1918/1919, 251.

(9) Ibid., Onderwerp 27 stuk no.2.
On 2 December the Governor-General informed the Volksraad that a commission would be established to advise on constitutional reforms. He further added that:

'...A reform of any importance is unthinkable without a considerable extension of the powers of the Volksraad and without a principal change in the character of that institution which will have to be transformed from a strictly advisory body into an integral part of government with a real participation in and control of the administration. Although this is not the time yet to determine in what way this new structure will have to be erected, it is unavoidable that the reorganisation will result not only in a transfer of authority and influence to local councils and the Volksraad but also in a change of position between the motherland and the colony with a possible shifting of the centre of gravity....'(10)

Van Limburg Stirum strongly condemned the opposition of rightist European members in the Volksraad to his policy and he threatened to dismiss any official who was unwilling to follow the policy directives of the government. (11)

The Radicale Concentratie was disappointed about van Limburg Stirum's statements and considered the promised commission as a case of giving with the one hand and taking it back with the other. (12)

On the other hand many Europeans in the colony - concerned about the growing radicalism of the nationalist movement and in particular the increasing influence of Marxist thought - condemned the policies of van Limburg Stirum as weak and ineffective and demanded a policy of repression.

(10) Volksraad, Handelingen 1918/1919, 429.
(11) Gouverneur-Generaal aan den Minister van Kolonien 28 December 1918 in: van der Wal 'De Volksraad...' op. cit., 270.
(12) Volksraad, Handelingen 1918/1919 520.
Also in the Netherlands the political support of parliament on which Van Limburg Stirum had been forced to lean more and more against mounting opposition in the colony had largely disappeared when in May 1918 the parties of the Right had gained an election victory over the Radical-Liberal coalition which had been in power since 1913. The Dutch government as well as the majority of Dutch newspapers were highly critical of van Limburg Stirum's handling of the situation and of what they termed as rash and irresponsible promises of Indonesian self-government. Idenburg, the new Minister of Colonies, wrote to the Governor-General on 11 December 1918:

'...I have noticed that current affairs in Europe have also exerted great influence in the Indies. On the surface I would say far too much. And I feel that in fact there has been a great deal of impetuosity and much misunderstanding. Certainly the whole world is moving in what one likes to call a 'democratic' direction. But surely there are differences in the degree of urgency...I am convinced that in the Indies we must avoid giving in to fashionable delusions. Not only because this can never be right theoretically, but also on practical grounds it must lead in the Indies to chaos. What is happening in Western countries lives more or less in the people and is a product of centuries of historical development. Neither the history nor the development of the Indies took place along these lines, and even if it did then it has been very weak and incomplete. An uncritical adoption of Western ideals - or do I have to say slogans - does not achieve what is aimed at in the West...but the result will be an oligarchy of the worst kind, that is of incapable people. We must be firmly opposed to this....'(13)

With the exception of the Radical-Liberals and the Socialists all parties in the Dutch parliament were strongly critical of van Limburg Stirum. Most outspoken was the Liberal member Fock who

(13) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal 11 December 1918 in: van der Wal 'De Volksraad...' op. cit., 261-263.
in particular opposed a shifting of political power from Holland to the Indies. (14) Also the Roman Catholic Party member van Vuuren left no doubt as to his party's views on Indonesian political development:

"...The time to release the Indies is in my view so far away in the distant future that in general the best thing to do is to prepare them as energetically as possible, but to speak about it as little as possible...." (15)

The increasingly more revolutionary tone and activities of the Indonesian nationalist movement during 1919 and 1920 made the position of van Limburg Stirum even more tenuous.

In May 1919 Abdul Moeis, one of the Sarekat Islam leaders, made a propaganda tour of Celebes. This visit caused a great deal of enthusiasm and in some areas people began to refuse to render corvee (heerendiensten). When the centreur de Kat-Angeline attempted to enforce the heerendiensten at Toli-Toli he and a number of indigenous officials were killed in a riot. (16)

In July 1919 another incident occurred in West Java where a number of Indonesians peasants were killed by colonial troops. The requisitioning of rice - a measure introduced by the colonial government to overcome a serious rice shortage in the colony - caused a great deal of resentment and was vigorously opposed by the Sarekat Islam. A certain Hadji Hassan, a fairly wealthy landowner in the village of Leles near Garut took it apparently upon himself to resist by force the government on this issue. When

(15) Ibid., 2036.
civil officials and colonial troops arrived to settle the matter. Hadji Hassan and his family barricaded themselves in their house and refusing orders to surrender the hadji and some of his relatives were killed when the troops opened fire. The handling of the situation in Leles was severely criticised by 'Ethical' minded Europeans. Conservative Europeans, however, were equally horrified when an investigation into the Garut affair brought to light the existence of a secret society which appeared to aim at overthrowing the colonial government. This society known as Sarekat Islam-Afdeeling B (Section B) was concentrated in the Priangan area in West Java and had been started in 1917 by a Hadji Ismael who preached revolution and sold djimat (charms) which were supposed to make the bearer invulnerable to Dutch bullets. (17)

Trouble was also increasing at the labor front. The number of Indonesian labor unions grew markedly during 1919. Many of these were Communist controlled and the number of strikes rose tremendously. In 1919 66,000 workers went on strike as compared with 7,000 in 1918. (18) As a result the powerful European plantation interests - in particular the Sugar Syndicate - put increasing pressure on the colonial government to shed its 'sickly Ethicism' and to institute a policy of repression.

The time of 'Ethical' colonial reformers was clearly running out fast, moreover, many of these Europeans who previously had been 'Ethically' inclined began now to get second thoughts when confronted with the rapid and turbulent tide of radical nationalism. The reaction of the majority of Dutchmen to the aspirations of revolutionary nationalists is probably best expressed in a letter of Idenburg to van Limburg Stirum in May 1919:

"...What caused me to describe the situation in the Indies as unpropitious is not the fact that a few uncouth speeches were held in the Volksraad, but much more the fact that almost the whole of the Volksraad and in fact the whole of the interested public accepts the leadership of the extreme Left... I would not like to describe the situation any darker than it really is - but deep down I am convinced that we must prepare ourselves for much disappointment. An accommodating attitude...will not satisfy the nationalists ed. note but will only result in a demand for more. This is unavoidable because the creation of discontentment by pressing demands which cannot be fulfilled is one of the official tactics of that particular party. If one gives 50$ then 70$ will be demanded; if one goes to 70$ then 90$ will be asked for.... Considering that only very few are well informed in this respect and that on the other hand the vast majority is only concentrating on economic needs, one achieves a great deal with these tactics and the government is always in the wrong. But what will happen when the gentlemen i.e. radicals ed. note have taken over themselves. Then surely the situation will be very different! But so far we have not gone yet. We cannot leave the Natives in the lurch like that...."(19)

Although in his private letters Idenburg obviously disagreed with the more progressive ideas of van Limburg Stirum he always remained sympathetic to the Governor-General and defended his policies in the Dutch parliament. The replacement, however, in mid-1919 of Idenburg as Minister of Colonies by the arch-conservative S. de Graaff, who had no time for the Indonesian nationalists at all even further minimised the chances of van Limburg Stirum to influence policy in a more liberal direction and made in fact his position untenable. Also the small band of 'Ethical' colonial officials on whose shoulders the blame for the increasing 'communist' agitation was heaped with great invective by the European press found the situation becoming unbearable. In 1919 the Adviser for Native Affairs, Hazen, trusted councillor to van Limburg Stirum, was no longer willing to be laughed at as: "... a good natured fool, a mad ethicus or a doting enthusiast...", and left the colony to take up the chair of Javanese in the University of Leiden. (20) In March 1921 he was followed by van Limburg Stirum who in the words of the new Minister of Colonies de Graaff was not a suitable person for reappointment because he had

"...Staked his soul and salvation on the Volksraad and has promised too much in order to be able to make a proper retreat. It is high time that a moderate statesman is to take over the reins in the Indies, who although not opposed as a matter of principle to every reform...should still be reserved with regard to premature ideas...." (21)

(20) quot. Brouwer, B.J. 'De houding van Idenburg...' op. cit., 81.
(21) Ibid., 81-82.
After Colijn had declined the offer\(^{(22)}\) the right wing Liberal Fock who had been one of the most severe and poignant critics of the regime of van Limburg Stirum was appointed Governor-General. The stage was now set for the implementation of the harsher line of action against Indonesian nationalist for which most Dutch colonists, conservative politicians, and businessmen had been clamoring for so long. The door which had always been kept open by Idenburg and van Limburg Stirum for Indonesian nationalists to plead their case was now closed. Similarly in the Netherlands the government showed not the slightest interest in the concerns and desires of Indonesian intellectuals; Creutzberg, who had recently been appointed Vice-President to the Haad van Indie (Council of the Indies) wrote to van Limburg Stirum in 1924:

> "...I would gain a great deal of satisfaction from my new position if I would be able to persuade my colleagues to accept a somewhat different idea about the best way to govern the Indies. I am sceptical, however, in this respect, and I fear that we are confronted here by a Zeitgeist which is much stronger than we are. Most of the prominent leaders are in this regard no different from the masses and they are incapable of differentiating. They are completely caught by the very understandable spirit of reaction which pervades various European countries and this prevents them from realising that the situation in the Indies must be viewed in a different perspective from that in the mother country. There are a considerable number of leading figures in the administration here who perhaps in Holland would be excellent administrators but who have not the slightest understanding of the situation in which a colonial government finds itself! The most irksome impressions of this I gained in and around the Ministry of Colonies. It seems to me that this is largely a question of fashion. One is

\(^{(22)}\) Brouwer, B.J. \textit{op. cit.}, 82–83.
considered to sin against the 'bon ton' if one does not express oneself as coldly and cynically as possible about everything that appears in the Indies as a new and impetuous life. I am absolutely convinced that it is far more the 'tone' of our present regime than specific legislative and administrative matters, which are carried out or not carried out, that sets Young India — and I fear irrevocably — against the Netherlands. The embitterment in more or less intellectual Native circles, and especially among the students in the Netherlands, is taking on alarming proportions...."(23)

Many colonial Dutchmen and conservative politicians in Holland were apparently convinced that only a small segment of the top layer of indigenous society had been infected by the disease of 'communism' and that in any case nationalist leadership did not truly represent the voice of the Indonesian masses. As Colijn put it:

"...On the one hand I consider this movement futile, not at all a real popular movement, but rather an action in which actually one a small part of the indigenous upper class, as thin as the silvery membrane of the rice grain, is directly involved. Nevertheless this movement can under certain circumstances become dangerous....Therefore this destructive nationalism must be squarely opposed...."(24)

Undoubtedly the policy of stifling the voice of revolutionary agitators and protecting the masses from their 'pernicious' influence which was adopted from the early 1920's, had the full support of Colijn and his followers. During Governor-General

(23) Archief van Mr. J.P. Graaf van Limburg Stirum (2e Afdeeling Algemeen Rijksarchief, collectie no.114, no.60.: Mr. K.P. Creutzberg aan van Limburg Stirum, early January 1924.

(24) Colijn 'Koloniale vraagstukken van heden en morgen' (Amsterdam, 1928) 45.
Feck's regime a far more extensive use was made of the so-called *exorbitante rechten*, i.e. special powers granted under the colonial constitution enabling the Governor-General to exile or intern politically dangerous individuals after a minimum of legal procedure. Moreover, other security laws were tightened and new ones introduced designed to bridle the press, to restrict public gatherings and the freedom of movement of political propagandists.\(^{(25)}\)

Conservative politicians and colonial administrators, however, realised that to repress revolutionary nationalism merely by force would only be a stop-gap measure. The problem had to be tackled at the core. Most conservatives diagnosed that the 'Ethical' policy was responsible for the widespread discontent and upheaval in indigenous society. In addition to dismissing — as was seen above — the accommodating attitude of previous governments to Indonesian nationalism as weak, ineffective and 'sickly ethical', also the methods and the ultimate objectives of 'Ethical' colonial reformers were strongly criticised. Ever since its adoption at the beginning of the century the 'Ethical' policy had been attacked by a number of scholars, politicians, and colonial officials on the grounds that the impatient attempts of 'Ethici' to replace indigenous institutions and techniques by Western ones were bound to cause a great deal of resentment and turmoil in indigenous society. The only way, according to these

critics, to achieve a peaceful modernisation of Indonesia was by a gradual process of synthesising the still vital elements in indigenous culture with Western ones, by patterning Western concepts and techniques into the mould of indigenous institutions and procedures. Many 'Ethici' were accused of trying to introduce Western political, social, and economic concepts and institutions - the products of centuries of historical evolution in Europe - in a completely different cultural context. These critics argued that Western political ideals, Western economic theory, and cultural concepts were not universally valid and could not be superimposed at will on a people with a completely different cultural and historical background without causing serious social and political discontent.

The foremost critic of the 'Ethical' policy of Indonesian political emancipation was Colijn. In the 1916 debates in the Dutch parliament Colijn had been very critical of the Volksraad which he considered an anomaly, because in his view participation by Indonesians in government should start at the local level. (26)

It was, however, only since 1918 when the Radical-Liberal coalition lost its majority in the Dutch parliament and the rapidly rising tide of revolutionary nationalism turned away many erstwhile 'Ethical' Europeans from 'association' with Indonesians that

Colijn was able to have an important impact on colonial policy.

In September 1918 Colijn restated and reformulated his views on political reforms in the Indies in a pamphlet called: *Staatkundige Hervormingen in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Political Reforms in the Netherlands-Indies). In this pamphlet Colijn severely criticised the *Volksraad* in its present form of proto-parliament and also was strongly opposed to a bill introduced a few months earlier by the Liberal Minister of Colonies Pleyte investing regional councils rather than the local *bestuursambtenaren* with autonomous power.

Colijn pointed out that the majority of Dutch politicians were agreed that the final objective of Dutch policy was to educate the Indies towards independence. There was, however, a serious difference of opinion between those who Colijn termed the revolutionary-democratic group and the historical-democratic group about the methods to be used to reach this objective. According to Colijn, the revolutionary-democratic group, led in parliament by Pleyte, seemed to have a one-sided view of the term 'democracy' which was identified with such concepts as parliamentary government and universal suffrage. To grant parliamentary democracy to the Indies in its present state of development was unwise and dangerous. Far more realistic was the historical-democratic school of thought which envisaged the creation of a system of government and administration which fitted in with existing conditions in the Indies. The question whether this structure was democratic or not in accordance with ruling ideas
in Holland was not important to Colijn, because he was convinced that:

"...The same institutions which can be democratic for a people at a certain stage of development, can become an instrument of repression and can cause a loss of freedom for a people with a different background...."(27)

Colijn further stressed that it was the vocation of the Netherlands to bring the Indies to nationhood. This was the result of history. Before the arrival of the Dutch in the archipelago an Indies state did not exist. Whatever political unity there was in the Indies in the twentieth century was the result of Dutch efforts; and similarly the formation of a people of Insulinde (Indonesia) out of the many nations and tribes of the archipelago would be a Dutch creation:

"...This historical fact that we Netherlanders were the rulers and the people of the Indies the subjects, is the realistic basis on which all political reforms must be built so that serious mistakes can be avoided...."(28)

This point, according to Colijn, needed to be emphasised, because:

"...In the last few years a number of people who are interested in the Indies show a strong tendency to deny this ....Actually they are ashamed about the fact that we are rulers. So far as the past is concerned they certainly have a point, but they also feel that our present and future policy must be based on completely different premises. For the present this policy must be based on association which in the future will result in a complete fusion.... It should be easy for the politically educated reader to recognise the philosophical origin of these ideas. He will easily recognise that the basic premise underlying this ideal is the denial or the under-

(27) Colijn, H. *Staatkundige Hervormingen in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Kampen, 1918) 6.
(28) Ibid., 8.
estimation of the primeval fact that there are differences between individuals and races.... It is the revolutionary idea of equality applied to the ethnological field. The significance of this can perhaps be best exemplified by saying that in essence it is identical to the idea of neutrality in the field of religion....' (29)

Colijn agreed that in the past the indigenous people had often been wronged and the Anti-Revolutionnaire Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party) was in full sympathy with the Liberals in condemning this. On the other hand, Colijn did not agree with the opinion current in most of Europe that:

'...Only an autonomous state is in accordance with human dignity; and the rule of one people by another is shameful for both the ruler and the ruled....' (30)

Colijn argued that colonialism was historically inevitable and that history showed that nations were the result of interacting cultures. This cultural cross-fertilisation could occur in two ways. In some cases a lesser developed nation could be influenced by a strong and powerful neighbouring country. Mostly, however, a strong and more advanced country would occupy a weaker and under-developed nation. This last method, however,

'...Always appears to be the most effective one. From this antithesis between ruler and ruled there evolves - historically speaking - the antithesis between prince and people, and government and subjects. This is characteristic of political development everywhere. Thus, the course of historical development is such that the original sharp antithesis between ruler and ruled is an impetus for the latter to work towards gradually replacing the ruler. When this process is fully

(29) Ibid., 8.
(30) Ibid., 9.
completed and the differences between the government and the governed have completely disappeared in a full democracy, then also the motive underlying political development has disappeared and the danger of disintegration will be imminent resulting eventually in another colonial situation. The above is necessary to make it clear that in political life the antithesis between ruler and ruled is in no way unnatural and that therefore our acceptance of the historically grown relationship between the Netherlands and the Indies is in itself no reason for shame and that the accusation of being reactionary is not at all justified providing the ruler is fully aware of his vocation.\(^*\) (31)

Colijn further compared the relationship between the Netherlands and the Indies as one of father to son:

\(^*\)....When the son is growing up inevitably the moment will arrive when the child feels it should assert its own individuality....The moment will arrive - to use a popular phrase - when he will ask for the house key. This will happen - and is in fact happening - in the Indies....Even at this stage all kinds of unripe elements demand rights which they are not yet capable to exercise. They demand in a loud voice that the Netherlands should relinquish its rule. But, does a good father immediately give in to such demands by a child? It would be the easiest way out and he would save himself a great deal of trouble and abuse, also from outsiders, but it is just the father who is conscious of his vocation who does not give in so easily. He realises that his resistance will be of very great importance in the character building of the child. He realises that the child just because his ideas conflict with those of his father must learn to test his personality and character so that he will be able to distinguish between what is capricious and undisciplined and what is part of his true personality. In so far as education towards political independence is concerned a similar relationship exists between the Netherlands and the Indies. However, also with us the tendency is too strong to give in out of weakness to the often unjustified demands of small groups which often completely

(31) Ibid., 9-10.
unjustly assert themselves as the voice of the Young Indies. In this way one certainly avoids being branded as a reactionary, and one might even get a short vote of thanks from the democratic side. Abdication, however, would not in any way whatsoever be in the real interest of developing an Indies democracy, which can only develop normally and strongly as a result of the balancing power provided by Netherlands rule. Nothing therefore would be more pernicious if the belief in our vocation - under the influence of ideas of association - would weaken prematurely..." (32)

In Colijn's view 'Ethical' politicians such as Pleyte and his followers had concentrated too much on creating autonomous units of government while neglecting the need for decentralising executive power. Colijn pointed out that the need to decentralise existed irrespective of the need for autonomy. In any case, the bestuursambtenaar (colonial administrator) should at least initially have the power to control the decisions and activities of the various local and regional autonomous units. Pleyte had lost sight of the fact that administrative decentralisation and the granting of autonomy were interconnected in the sense that administrative decentralisation was:

"...a means to educate towards autonomy, because just in the same way as somebody who has learned to obey is at the same time taught to give orders, also somebody who had learned to execute faithfully the rules made by others is trained at the same time to make rules himself. As a result administrative decentralisation is always followed by autonomy...."(33)

Colijn also criticised Pleyte's proposed reforms because they were based on:

(32) Ibid., 10.
(33) Ibid., 18-19.
The type of modern, unitarian, parliamentary state which exists in the Netherlands, with its simple division into realm, province and municipality. This is apparently accepted by the designers as the optimum for all times and all nations, including the Netherlands-Indies.

A perfect example of this was the Volksraad which was set up in the image of the Dutch parliament while in fact conditions in the Indies were such that a full parliamentary democracy based on ministerial responsibility and universal suffrage could not yet be introduced. In its present form as a proto-parliament - without having any real legislative power - the Volksraad was in fact an official agency which could do nothing else than to subject the colonial government constantly to severe criticism. The colonial government on its part could do nothing to change this unsatisfactory situation:

*...After all in democratic countries the minister is free - when the opposition is becoming unreasonable - to resign and to force the opposition to take over the government itself. He can say as it were: If you can do it so much better, then do it yourself and we will have a turn at controlling you....The Indies government has been denied this normal means of defence against the Volksraad. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, even the sharpest criticism does not guarantee that the opposition when it has finally succeeded in toppling the government has the will and the capacity to govern....This is of course even more true of men who have never had the opportunity to gain practical experience in government. In the second place in the Indies the opposition between the government and popular representation will coincide more and more with racial division. Therefore, if at some time Dutch bureaucratic rule will have to cede power to a nationalist opposition, the return of the old government will be out of the question and

'it will mean the end of Dutch rule not only in Java but in all our other possessions. The Volksraad in its present form is in a position to indulge in unrestricted and irresponsible criticism, the consequences of which it will never have to bear. As such one has created in the form of a merely advisory body an institution which possesses more power than a modern parliament....' 

The major fault, according to Colijn, of the existing political set-up in the Indies was the strong tendency to create a unitary state. One had neglected to start at the beginning that is at the local and regional level. The reason why the Volksraad would inevitably fail should be sought in:

'...The political dogmatism which instead of trying to build Indies self-government on what has historically grown, has tried to create an Indian state out of nothing....It is immediately obvious that in instituting the Volksraad the all-important condition that autonomy must be built up from below has been completely neglected. The roof has been constructed before the walls which have to support it, were built....'(35)

Colijn further asserted that geography was the most important factor in determining the political structure of a country. A glance at the map would make it obviously clear that instead of a unitary state the Indies should be a federal state consisting of a number of autonomous island provinces. Each province should again be a federation of local and regional autonomous units. Local autonomous councils should be elected directly, because it was at the local level where: '....The young democracy can have its fling' and will gain experience in

(35) Ibid., 30.
government by active participation.

The provincial governments, however, should be elected by and only from the members of local councils. Direct elections at the provincial level should only be introduced gradually. Only when the stage had been reached where local and provincial autonomous governments were working properly and efficiently would there be a place for a central Volksraad, which because of the federal system would become a Rijksraad (Council of the Realm) in which each province was represented by delegates chosen by and from the members of provincial governments.

The most important advantage of the federal system was, according to Colijn, that a:

"...Direct confrontation between the central Netherlands government and the Indies democracy about imperial matters, is excluded...."

Furthermore, direct elections for the provincial government could be introduced more quickly then in the case of the existing central Volksraad, because the:

"...Complete - or at least relative greater ethnological homogeneity of the province...would exclude or certainly very much diminish the danger of one nation dominating the other through the Volksraad....A federal organisation opens up the possibility for each territory to develop at its own pace. It will be possible e.g. that a completely autonomous Java will be represented solely by Natives in the Federal Council, while at the same time the deputation from Sumatra - because it is still in the transformation stage - will consist for elected Native and appointed members, and while the deputation from New Guinea - which is still completely underdeveloped - will consist entirely of officials of the autocratic Netherlands government. Finally, while in a unitarian state
it is certain that the various nationalities—
in the absence of a positive community of interests—
will unite themselves to put up a common front
against the foreign ruler, this will be avoided
in a Netherlands controlled federation. In a
federal political structure this Dutch government
will be able to retain for a long time to come its
moral role of a disinterested arbitrator in the
ever sharpening struggle for national and economic
dominance between the various territories. Dutch
power will only remain as long as it is considered
indispensable..." (36)

Colijn's views were strongly supported by many officials of
the Department of Binnenlandsch Bestuur — the 'demi-gods' in
Benda's terminology (37) — who since 1900 had lost some of their
previously almost dictatorial power because of the 'Ethical'
policy of 'ontvoogding' and 'Indianisatie' and who also were
loath to see the growing influence of the more specialised
'technical' departments. (38)

However, the Herzieningscommissie (Commission for Constitutional
Reform) which had been instituted by van Limburg Stirum in 1918,
rejected in its final recommendations Colijn's proposals for a
Federal structure. The commission advocated a unitary govern-
ment with wide powers in internal affairs but it did not press
for full self-government. It was also recommended that suffrage
should be extended to all Netherlands subjects irrespective of
race providing they complied with certain standards of education
and economic prosperity. (39)

(36) Ibid., 35-36.
(37) Benda, H.J., 'The pattern of administrative reforms in the closing
years of Dutch rule in Indonesia' in: Journal of Asian Studies
(38) Ibid.
The Minister of Colonies, de Graaff, dismissed these proposals as 'studeerkamerwerk' (an academic exercise) and in his view the commission had not taken into account sufficiently the urgent demand for administrative decentralisation. Moreover, de Graaff who had little time for Indonesian nationalist aspirations argued that it was impossible to draw a clear distinction between internal and external affairs as both were closely interrelated and the Netherlands could not take care properly of the external relations of the colony without having a say in internal policy matters. (40)

De Graaff's views caused very strong opposition in progressive quarters in the Indies as well as in Holland and in order to soothe progressive opinion the Netherlands Grondwetsherziening (constitutional reform) of 1922 laid down that in principle the Indies should be allowed to take care of its internal affairs as much as possible. Also the name 'colony' was eliminated. But very little notice was taken of this principle in the actual reform measures introduced in 1925. This earned de Graaff the nickname of Simon the Liar. The Indies remained an integral part of the Netherlands Kingdom, the Governor-General was still the ultimate source of power in the colony who could dismiss and appoint heads of departments at will. Admittedly the Volksraad was given co-legislative power but without the introduction of the principle of ministerial responsibility this power was almost farcical. In case of conflict the Volksraad could not force a change of government and the

(40) Graaff, S. de 'Parlementaire geschiedenis van de wet op de staats-inrichting van Nederlandsch-Indie 1925' (The Hague, 1938) 14-21.
dispute has to be submitted to the Dutch parliament for a final
decision. Furthermore, the Volksraad remained a partly elected
and partly appointed body. Its president and 22 members were to
be appointed and 38 members were to be elected (20 Indonesians,
15 Dutchmen and 3 other Asians). After considerable controversy
it was decided in 1929 to grant Indonesians a majority of seats.
Elections were staggered and separate for each population group in
order to ensure adequate representation of all important population
groups in the colony. (41)

The Minister of Colonies, de Graaff, quickly took advantage
of the swing towards conservatism in Dutch politics and managed to
have his earlier proposals (42) for administrative reforms accepted
by parliament. The new system envisaged a division into provinces,
province regency councils and municipal councils. The first was established
in West Java in 1926 followed by East Java in 1929 and Central Java
in 1930. Each province was headed by a Governor who was responsible
for his actions to the Governor-General. The Governor was assisted
by a Provincial Council which was elected on the same principle as
Volksraad members. The province although ostensibly intended
as an instrument of self-government in practice turned out to be
an autonomous administrative unit which took care of functions
which previously had been dealt with by the central government such
as health, water supply, public works, and agricultural extension
services. In 1936 also education was delegated to the provinces.

(41) Kat-Angelino, A.D.A., de 'Staatkundig beleid...', op. cit., II,
460–469.
(42) cf. Chapter II, 53.
But any measures taken by the provincial government could be rescinded by Batavia and as Vandenbosch very aptly puts it:

'*The Governors are glorified Residents.*' (43)

The Regency councils were to replace the regional councils established under the Decentralisation Law of 1903. (44) Their membership was to be predominantly Indonesian and elections were staggered. The Council was headed by the Regent who was responsible for his actions to the other members. The Regency council was empowered to make regulations binding on the area under its jurisdiction and it was also to supervise the village councils. Similarly to the Provincial Councils any decisions made by the Regency Council could be vetoed by the central government.

The Outer-Islands were also to be divided into provinces, but administrative and political decentralisation at the lower level was - unlike Java - to be based on ethnic group communities (adatgemeenschappen). This system was much closer into line with Colijn's ideas than the administrative decentralisation of Java which was plainly based on the Dutch model. At the beginning of 1938 the provinces of Sumatra, Borneo and Eastern Indonesia were instituted as well as the adatgemeenschap of Minangkabau and Bankar followed by the establishment of the group community of Palembang in 1941. (45)

As Benda has written:

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(43) Vandenbosch, A., 'The Dutch East Indies, its government, problems and politics' (Michigan, 1933) 112.
(44) cf. Chapter II, 52.
(45) Verslag van de Commissie tot bestudeering van staatsrechterlijke hervormingen ingesteld bij gouvernementsbesluit van 14 September 1940, deel I, 137.
There can, then, be little doubt that on the eve of the Second World War the foundations of a revigorated Beambtenstaat, a colonial polity proper, had been firmly reestablished. If in 1918 autonomy had appeared around the corner, two decades later it had receded into a barely perceivable future. Doubtless the early reforms had been hastily if not over-optimistically conceived, and the hopes for the rapid Westernisation of as yet slowly and quite unevenly evolving Indonesian society were perhaps bound to run aground. Nor can we deny the fact that the nascent Indonesian political leadership ignored the proffered hand... Granting all this, and granting even that the new direction, with its emphasis on carefully guided evolution of the diverse ethnic adat communities — especially in the islands beyond Java, where many of them still remained more or less intact — was by no means devoid of intrinsic merit, it is hard to escape the conclusion that not only the immediate but very likely also the long-range beneficiaries of the post-1931 'settlement' would have been the Dutch, and more especially Dutch officialdom, rather than the Indonesians...

This policy of moulding Indonesian modernisation into existing indigenous patterns which de Kat—Angelino has termed 'intensieve synthese politiek' (policy of intensive synthesis), was also applied more and more during the 1920's in the legal field. And also in this case the intrinsic value of this approach — which is close to 'association' in van Niel's terminology — seems hard to deny. From the beginning of the twentieth century the legal scholar van Vollenhoven had been strongly opposed to the 'Ethical' tendency to introduce a uniform Western legal system into Indonesia. Van Vollenhoven revolted against the lack of appreciation of Indonesian adat law (customary law). He stressed that adat law was a living thing and was understood by the people. A direct imposition of Roman—Dutch law would be useless because it would be completely

out of touch with the realities of Indonesian life and decisions made under Dutch law would fail to satisfy the sense of justice of the indigenous population. Van Vollenhoven was an ardent Liberal who strongly objected to the colonial policies of men such as Colijn and de Graaff. However, the 'adat' approach in the legal field fitted in - although van Vollenhoven's motives were very different - with the thinking of the Colijn school of thought and as Benda points out:

'...It seems likely that this emphasis on the adat community provided a welcome underpinning for the administrative reforms in the Outer-Islands of the 1930's....' (47)

So much is clear that from the mid-1920's onwards a more adat conscious approach was adopted in the legal field. The thirty years struggle between legal experts advocating 'unification' and those insisting on the adat law was settled in 1927 in favour of the latter. In 1928 an Agrarian advisory commission was set up to advise the government on the need to bring land legislation more closely into line with the adat law. In 1932 it was laid down in principle that cases involving the indigenous community should be settled in terms of the adat law. In 1935 village courts in the adat tradition were established and in 1938 a special Islamic court of appeal (Hof voor Islamitiesche Zaken) was set up and a special section was added to the High Court, (Raad van Justitie), to deal with appeal cases from adat law decisions. (48)

(47) Benda, H.J. 'The pattern of... op. cit., 604. This point is also made by Amry Vandenbosch op. cit., 125. The connection, however, is contested by Wertheim cf. Benda, H.J. 'The crescent and the rising sun' (The Hague, 1956) ix.

(48) Keuning, J. 'Het adatrecht en de rechtsbedeling over de inheemse bevolking' in: Balans van Beleid op. cit., 227-228.
During the 1920's also the principles underlying the 'Ethical' policy of indigenous economic development came under attack. A number of politicians and economists strongly criticised the 'Ethical' policy for failing to raise the indigenous standard of living. In 1924 the Socialist leader Albarda declared in parliament that millions of Javanese were starving and in support of his statement Albarda pointed to a considerable fall in revenue from the government salt and opium monopolies and a sharp rise in the revenue from the government pawnshops. (49)

From the various investigations that were held to determine the economic situation of the indigenous population the general picture emerges that the population of Java was certainly no better off and perhaps even worse off than in 1900. A survey published in 1921 by Huender concludes:

'...The Indonesians of Java and Madura earn more than previously and in relation to their income they pay less taxation. On the other hand this is of little benefit to them because of an increase in the cost of living, which leaves them only a little for their upkeep. Government aid to improve their economic situation is necessary and from now on economic initiative and the desire for economic development must be stimulated....' (50)

The fact that taxation revenue had ceased to rise was worrying according to Huender because:

'...Cessation in this case means - considering the formidable population increase - retrogression....' (51)

On the other hand the taxable capacity of the Javanese had reached the utmost limit and in fact most Javanese were close to the bread-

(49) Staten-Generaal Tweede Kamer, Handelingen 1924/1925, 1103.
(50) Huender, W. 'Overzicht van den economischen toestand der inheemsche bevolking van Java en Madoera' (The Hague, 1921), 247.
(51) Ibid., 246.
line. It seemed according to Huender that many of the measures taken since the adoption of the 'Ethical' policy to improve the indigenous economic situation had only had little effect. Huender admitted that his judgement might be somewhat too hasty as the 'Ethical' policy was only in its beginning stage. On the other hand, it had to be stressed that most Indonesians who responded to the government welfare program tended to find employment in the Western sector of the economy and had failed to show any economic initiative of their own:

"...The lack of a middle class and of an economically differentiated indigenous society remains an alarming phenomenon..." (52)

An investigation held in 1926 into the impact of taxation on indigenous society came to the same conclusions as Huender. In this report it was pointed out that from 1913 onwards a gradual decline in the economic situation had occurred:

"...Taking everything into consideration...the situation as it was in 1913 has now - although only barely - been restored....In previous years there was everywhere an unmistakable depression. Nevertheless a small group of people has benefitted and is still doing so. And as such society had grown a little more differentiated. In the depression the urban group generally suffered more than the farmers. If one enquires in the villages about the situation then...the impression is given that things were better before the war. This feeling should not be explained only in terms of the general human tendency to idealise the past..."(53)

(52) Huender, W. 'Overzicht... op. cit., 247.
An investigation held by van Ginkel into the indigenous economic situation - which was also published in 1926 - was in some ways more optimistic and in other ways again far more pessimistic. This report concluded that:

"...The economic situation of the Native population... should not cause any alarm. The depression of the war and post-war years has been absorbed for a number of years by the agrarian economy. The fact that the general situation has been improving had not failed to exert a beneficial influence. An indication of this economic discovery was found i.a. in the considerable rise during 1925 of imports of goods mostly used by the indigenous population and the subsequent increase in import duties. Also indirect taxation revenue pointed to an increase in consumption..." (54)

The van Ginkel report, however, contained a rather interesting statement about the measurement of indigenous welfare which seems important enough to quote at length:

"...When considering statistics and information (on native welfare ed. note)...one should take care not to attach the same meaning to the concepts such as welfare and standard of living as is done in Western countries. In this respect Eastern and Western standards are entirely different. The foreigner who travels through these lands and who sees how in general the people are housed, dressed, and how they live from day to day, will - if he uses his own standard of measurement - be inclined to conclude that there is no welfare at all. But the person who knows that the Native tends to give very little attention to his house and household goods as well as his clothing which is a natural consequence of the climatic conditions he is living in - will not immediately make the conclusion that there is no welfare. Furthermore as the Native is used to spend very quickly the cash he has in hand particularly because he knows that he can obtain credit, then also this living from day to day does not have to be a symptom of diminishing welfare, This should be considered as the normal situation which fits in with the nature and character of the

people. To take care of the future which is the great stimulus for the Westerner to save is not found among the great masses of the people. And as long as the Native remains fatalistic and expects that when the time comes that he no longer can look after himself his children will take care of him — in the same way as he did in the case of his parents — it is futile to look in the East for welfare in the Western sense. Labor is only considered as a necessary evil not as a means to greater welfare. Anyone who is free to determine the duration of his labor will work no longer than is necessary to provide for his daily needs. If he is able to provide for these needs temporarily without working then he will not make use of the employment opportunities offered. For example, if the rice harvest in a certain area has provided the population temporarily with cash then an employer can only count on an adequate supply of labor as soon as this money has been spent and there is a need again to work. Thus, where factors are at work as the ones mentioned above and where one is dealing with people whose economy is based on living on credit and to whom the drive for capital formation in the Western sense is in general lacking and who prefer to beget large numbers of children to the improvement of the lot of the individual and who cannot yet be induced to get the utmost from their fertile fields, in such a case the standard of living can only rise a little above the minimum existence level. It may be that to the Westerner this standard of living does not deserve the name of economic welfare, the point is that the Native considers it as such. (55)

This line of argument was strongly attacked by the Dutch economist van Gelderen who pointed out that in this way the whole problem of welfare could be reasoned out of existence and that it would make any welfare policy illusory. (56)

The 'dualist' nature of the Netherlands-Indies economy which was brought out in the van Ginkel report was also strongly emphasised by Boeke, a prominent economist. Boeke stressed that the behaviour

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of the Indonesian masses, which were still living in a pre-capitalist stage, was ruled by different motives from those in the more developed capitalist economies and that therefore the principles of Western economics were not applicable to an Eastern situation. Most Indonesian peasants were not interested in producing for export and the main task of the government was to educate these people in the sense of arousing the same economic needs which were in existence in fully developed countries.

Education in Boeke's sense meant to inculcate a greater degree of self-activity and self-responsibility. Initially Boeke like Snouck-Hurgronje envisaged that this education process should begin with the indigenous upper classes. But later he changed his mind and emphasised the importance of concentrating on the nationalist leadership, because:

*... Those who have the strongest feeling of independence will try to oppose official compulsion, and when authority is strong this reaction will turn unavoidably against this authority. The Native movement of recent years... is conclusive proof of this argument. When some colonial administrator typifies this small but energetic section as 'hadjis, usurers, and returned and more world wise convicts' then he shows that he is clearly unable to give an accurate appreciation of the real and potential value of this class in terms of social development...* (57)

In Boeke's view the government should try to encourage this energetic element as much as possible to advance itself.

Boeke, however, was very pessimistic about the possibility of uplifting the Indonesian masses as a whole by modern methods.

because of the non-response of the vast majority of peasants.

He believed therefore that the only realistic way to improve the lot of the masses was to protect and to vitalise the village, the traditional indigenous social and economic unit. If this course was taken it would be necessary:

*To recognise that indigenous society has its own pattern of development, its own needs, and that this society must be protected against any further disintegration. The need must be recognised to develop this society from within and in an organic way. This recognition is the basis of scientific dualism. It is a recognition, a realisation that the first requirement should be a study of indigenous society, or perhaps better of indigenous societies, of their needs, their nature, their capacities, their desires. It is also a realisation that a policy of social, economic, and political development should be built on this basis. It is a realisation that indigenous civilisation should be treated with reverence and that one should try to reinforce the feeling of freedom and self-responsibility.*

(58) Boeke, J.H. 'De begrippen dualisme, unificatie en associatie in de koloniale politiek' K.S. 1923, 168.

According to Boeke existing government policy towards the village - although in theory adhering to the principle of non-interference - was in fact nothing else than an attempt to make the village into a more useful and amenable tool of a Western government. Very little account was taken of the need to respect and to strengthen what was still alive of traditional village civilisation. The real spirit of village life was misunderstood and too much emphasis was placed on economic development. But:
'...What really typifies the village is just a lack of economic orientation. Not economic motives and objectives, but all kinds of social traditions and convictions direct its behaviour, its interests and community life. If the village is to be activated then economic plans should not be emphasised....'(59)

Boeke also condemned the paternalistic attitudes of many Dutch colonial officials and their attempts to force the pace in indigenous development. In his view the government should try to stay in the background keeping ready to lend a helping hand whenever this was asked for.

Furthermore, Boeke's theme of self-activity and self-reliance as well as the example of Gandhi caused him to be strongly opposed to industrialisation as a solution to the problems of Java:

'...Over-population, as I pointed out at the beginning of my lecture, is an Oriental problem par excellence, and industrialization is the recommended Western solution. It is an urban and mechanical solution which, in as far as it is a solution, will work primarily to the advantage of persons who can be withdrawn from agriculture entirely, either on a permanent or a temporary basis. It does not effect a solution that is at all large enough in scope for the periodic, organic unemployment of the rural, agrarian masses. Yet it is this type of unemployment which is of most importance, because of its dimensions, its influence on the morale of the peasantry, its diffusion, and its inevitability. What is needed is an opportunity for employment that is periodic, localized, and general, one not involving capital investment and not requiring too much special skill or exertion—a form of simple cottage industry meeting general, primary needs.

For this reason I consider it a social service of the first order that Gandhi, in his apostolic propaganda for the spinning wheel, the charka, has

(59) Ibid., 'Derpsherstel', Indisch Genoetschap, 20 February 1931
'pointed the way in which the solution must be found. Hand spinning, in fact, manifests all the traits of an ideal cottage industry, at least for India, where cotton is grown practically everywhere..."(60)

More important for an understanding of the official position are the views of de Kat-Angelino who in 1929 was seconded by the Dutch government to write a study of the objectives and the philosophy underlying Dutch colonial policy. He completed his task in 1931 with the publication of his monumental 'Staatkundig beleid en bestuurszorg in Nederlandsch-Indie', which was published in English under the title 'Colonial Policy'. Although meant primarily as propaganda the work has a great deal of scholarly merit and shows a penetrating insight into the problems confronting the colonial ruler as well as the subject people.

Similarly to Boeke great stress was placed by de Kat-Angelino on the development of self-activity and a sense of civil responsibility. But while Boeke considered the development of these qualities as a necessary precondition for economic development de Kat-Angelino saw them as the final objectives of Dutch colonial policy. He pointed out that when these attitudes had become common place in indigenous society the task of the Dutch had been completed and the time for Indonesian independence had arrived. Moreover, in contrast to the pessimistic view of Boeke that it would be impossible to modernise the vast majority of Indonesians,

the central point of de Kat-Angelino's argument was that the difference between East and West was one of degree and not of kind. He pointed out that also in Eastern societies such qualities as loyalty, a spirit of give and take, self-activity, and a sense of social responsibility, were to be found in abundance, but - and here was the essential difference with the West - these qualities were only limited to the clan, the family and the village. It was the main task of the colonial government to overcome this particularism by widening the horizon of these myriads of self-centred communities.

'...The spirit of sacrifice which now is restricted to parents, to relatives and other personal relationships, should be widened into the spirit of sacrifice of the citizen for the public cause, of man for every good cause of humanity. In this way the result will not be a mosaic of Western and Eastern elements, but the Eastern soul will be a vitalised by the Western spirit in its universal form. The entire content of the idea of synthesis is to widen the sphere of Eastern soul with the precious treasure of the moral and intellectual capacities of the West....'(61)

Education was according to de Kat-Angelino one of the most important tools in bringing this situation about.

On the other hand Boeke's emphasis on self-activity and his person centred approach in the application of welfare measures were in line with government thinking in the 1920's and 1930's. However, Boeke's rejection of the universal validity of Western

economics does not seem to have influenced government policy to any extent. This is clear from the policy of industrialisation — in the Western sense — adopted during the depression years. Boeke's influence seems to have been at its strongest in the Volkscreditwezen (People's Credit Service) and the cooperative movement the two fields in which he had been officially involved during his tour of duty in Indonesia (1911-1929).

The People's Credit Service had originally been set up to help along indigenous economic development by means of village cooperation. The cooperative aspect was given a legal framework in 1915 based on Roman-Dutch law. The desa lumbung (paddy banks) had some success but the village banks and district banks had little effect in terms of economic development. In June 1920 a Cooperation commission was instituted with Boeke as president. According to Boeke the slow progress of the cooperative movement was due to its Western character as well as to the fact that government officials had been forcing these novelties on the indigenous population. The recommendations of the commission were incorporated in a new Cooperation Law of 1927 which emphasised the establishment of cooperatives on an Indonesian (adat) basis in order to: "...encourage and reinforce the traditional economic organisation of the indigenous population." (63)


(63) Ibid., 210.
Furthermore, the cooperative movement should concentrate on providing for those needs which were felt deepest in indigenous society. And as the greatest need was for cash credit the cooperative movement was to become an integral part of the People’s Credit Service. This new approach in cooperation had some measure of success as is shown in the following table:

Cooperatives – Netherlands Indies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Credit</th>
<th>Consumer</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,848</td>
<td>101,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,725</td>
<td>194,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14,064</td>
<td>264,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18,337</td>
<td>353,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18,707</td>
<td>402,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19,044</td>
<td>449,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20,022</td>
<td>355,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32,749</td>
<td>590,595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indisch Verslag 1938, I, 212.

The Dutch scholar Krafft, however, strongly advocated that a special cooperative service should be set up and the principle of cooperation be extended to the fields of agricultural production and trade. Krafft – similar to Beeke – stressed the importance of reinforcing village life and institutions:

*...The Eastern world is inundated with modern Western concepts and with the products of Western technology. This causes confusion. And cooperation does not have this effect, because it fits in entirely with the feeling of solidarity and cooperation which still exists in Indonesian society. Cooperation instead of bringing something new reinforces traditional village life and revitalises it to a certain extent. Compared with the artificial means which often with the best intentions have been superimposed cooperation is far more organic and completely adapted to existing indigenous life...* (64)

(64) Krafft, A.J.C. ‘Cooperatie...’ *op. cit.*, 320-321.
Krafft - like Boeke - stressed the educational value of the cooperative movement and he pointed to the educationalist Montessori who had emphasised that the task of the educator was in the first place to protect and guide innate capabilities without stifling their development:

"...Dr. Montessori was referring here to the individual child, we would like to transpose this concept to a people. A child is educated towards independence by self-activity, a people achieves independence by thinking and deciding for itself...." (65)

As will be seen in the following chapter, the ideas of Montessori and other modern educationalists who advocated self-expression and self-activity in education also exerted a considerable influence on educational thinking and to some extent educational practice in the Netherlands-Indies during the 1920's and the 1930's.

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(65) Krafft, A.J.C. 'Cooperatie...' *op. cit.*, 318-319.
Chapter VI

The 'Ethical' Education Policy under Attack: 1920–1930

During the 1920's the 'Ethical' education policy came under attack from various quarters and for various reasons. A number of educationalists, politicians, and colonial officers severely criticised the existing education system for its inefficiency and wastefulness in terms of indigenous socio-economic advancement while some were also concerned about the political implications of existing education policy. The general view was that the core of the problem should be sought in the emphasis on intellectualist education in the schools and demands were made for the introduction of 'work schools' of the Montessori and Frobel type which would act as far more efficient socio-economic levers. Others went further and blaming the Western character of the education system as a whole for the inefficiency of schools advocated - in line with Boeke and Colijn - a more Indonesia-centric approach in indigenous education.

The school as a socio-economic lever:

As was discussed in Chapter III at the beginning of the 'Ethical' period there had been a controversy about the function of the elementary schools. Some reformers such as the Minister of Colonies Fock wanted to introduce technical and practical
training into schools so that elementary education would fit in
directly with the 'Ethical' native welfare program. The proposals
of Fock were not accepted and the role of elementary schools
was confined to the spreading of literacy among the indigenous
population.

During the 1920's, however, the need to relate vernacular
education more directly to indigenous economic and social
advancement was strongly brought to the fore again by a number
of Dutch educationalists in the colony. Foremost among these
were Nieuwenhuis\(^2\) and Post,\(^3\) who advocated a reformation
of the colonial education system along the lines suggested by

\[^2\] Dr. G.J. Nieuwenhuis was in Holland connected with the new
educational movement (Gooische Schoolvereeniging). In the
Indies he was appointed a member of the Onderwijsraad (Education
Council) set up in 1918 to advise the Director of Education
on educational problems. In 1921 Nieuwenhuis was appointed
to a commission set up by the Netherlands Indies government to
study the education system in the Philippines. Among his
many publications the most important one is probably 'Opvreiding
tot autonomie' (Education towards autonomy) published in 1923
comparing the Netherlands Indies and Philippines education
systems.

\[^3\] P. Post had been connected in Holland with the new educational
movement (Baarnsche Schoolvereeniging). In the Indies he
taught at the Gunung Sari Kwekschool of the Theosophical Society.
He was the initiator of an adult literacy campaign the
Analphabetisme Bestrijdings Comite (1921-1924). The best known
of his writings is probably his 'Volksonderwijs in Nederlandsch-
Indie' (1932) in which he blamed fault methodology as the
major underlying cause for the failure of the government
literacy campaign.
such prominent educational reformers as Frobel, Montessori and Ligthart. According to these reformers the true function of all education was to prepare the child for adult life. This was not done in the existing school systems where children's minds were usually crammed with a great deal of intellectual knowledge most of which was of no value in actual life. In the 'new' schools an attempt was made to educate children in greater harmony with themselves and the world around them. In addition to the normal intellectual disciplines of reading, arithmetic, etc., also time was allotted to arts and crafts, sport, gymnastics, nature study, drama, school excursions, singing and music. In particular Frobel had emphasised the idea of 'self-activity' and the 'do' school rather than the existing method whereby children

(4) Friedrich Frobel, German educationalist. In 1826 he published his 'Menschenerziehung' (The education of Man). In his view the function of education of education was to reconcile the contrast between individual interests and the demands of society. A great deal of emphasis was put on practical training and activities which would bring pupils more closely into contact with nature and their own environment.

(5) Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Italian educationalist, Catholic, democrat and scientist. She stressed individual liberty and attempted to develop the innate capabilities of children to the full. Like Frobel in the view of Montessori the main problem of the child was to adjust itself to its immediate surroundings. The syllabus therefore was to be largely practical and was designed to develop the imagination of the child. But unlike the Frobel schools where great stress was put on the fairy tale and the fable in the Montessori schools more concrete teaching materials were used which would bring children more directly in contact with real life.

(6) Jan Ligthart, Dutch educational reformer, who set up a 'modern' school in the Hague (1885–1916). The syllabus was based on his 'Volle Leven' (Full Life) plan stressing the self-development of the child and an education which was in harmony with the realities of life.
were forced to sit passively listening to the teacher and repeating parrot fashion what was being taught. In the words of the Dutch educationalist Toet the objective of the new educational philosophy was to:

"...Make education into a creative force. Every creation presupposes understanding and knowledge and leads in turn to a better understanding and knowledge. Productive activity is the magic means whereby the modern educationalist opens the door to the children's land of happiness. Energy develops warmth, creative activity develops love of life. It is the joy of the conquerer which fills the child when it is struggling to create..." (7)

In order to make self-activity possible education should respect the individuality of the child and it was always to be kept in mind that individuality could only develop when discipline was allowed to evolve outwards from the inner self of the child. This would lead to a liberation of all the intellectual and spiritual forces that were living within the child:

"...The unfolding of creative forces in the child is possible only where the need for activity follows immediately from its own spiritual and intellectual life. And as each child has its own rhythm and timing the principle of self-activity can best be striven for when the inclination of the individual is left to develop itself freely..." (8)

The Koloniaal Onderwijs Congres of 1919 (Colonial Education Congress) was one of the first occasions where the need was expressed to bring the colonial education system more closely into line with modern educational developments in the rest of the

(7) Toet, J. 'De nieuwe schoolbeweging en de congressen van 'The New Education Fellowship' Publicaties van het Bureau van den Onderwijsraad VI, 1929, 21.

Gunning, one of the delegates at this congress, was of the opinion that to combat illiteracy — although necessary — was not the most important function of the vernacular school. The major objective of the elementary school was to teach children how to be active. How much knowledge pupils actually ended up with when they left school was not of primary importance. Also not of great importance was the question raised by some educationalists whether in addition to the three R's children should also be given some practical training in agriculture:

"...In general it seems to me that it matters less what is learned. It is of far greater importance if one has learned to exert oneself sufficiently. Surely one cannot instruct children between the ages of 6 and 12 in agriculture! What in my opinion really matters is that the children are taught to observe exactly the things that surround them and that the how and why of things are explained; above all that they are shown in practice that there is mobility in hard work..."(9)

The case for education rather than the training of the intellect and the memory was put even more strongly by another delegate, Bomebakker, who — unlike Gunning — strongly advocated the establishment of 'work' schools on the Montessori and Frobel principle:

"...I read that teachers in the Indies in the beginning are amazed that native pupils are enabled by an inherent dexterity of hand to obtain very rapidly a certain proficiency in writing and drawing. But what does our school actually do to develop that capacity?...Montessori tells us how with geometrical figures she gives children the opportunity — she does not "teach" them — to discover that they can learn geometry when they are 7 and 8, 9 and 10 years old..."(10)

(9) _Kolonial Onderwijs Congres 1919_, Praeadvicezen, 117.
(10) _Kolonial Onderwijs Congres 1919_, Stenografisch Verslag, 237-238.
Another plea for closer integration of education with real
difficult was made in 1921 by Sanders in an article dealing with
agricultural training in indigenous elementary schools. Sanders
argued that in most advanced countries of the world the principle
of modern educationalists such as Ligthart that education should
prepare people for real life had been adopted. The same principle
was also valid in underdeveloped countries such as Indonesia not
only for educational reasons, but even more for reasons of economic
development:

"... In my opinion the duty of the government... is in
the first place to improve the economic situation of
society. It is certain that mass education is the
most suitable means... Without sound elementary
education this is impossible..."

Education, however, was to be largely practical in nature. This
was necessary in particular in Indonesia where the indigenous
population was on the whole not interested in economic progress:

"... Thus one shall have to adapt education far more
directly to the improvement of the economic situation.
I would prefer for the masses at least initially:
simple education which solely concentrates on the
practice of agriculture, because 85% of the population
can be considered as being engaged in agriculture or
connected with it for their livelihood. Thus, farmers
must be trained to run their businesses more intensively
and more lucratively... Many sound measures taken by
the government not only become ineffective because of
the complete lack of knowledge of the masses, but also
because of a lack of interest of the people, which
needs all its energy to obtain what is absolutely
necessary to keep alive... Training in agriculture can
in my view bring a great deal of improvement; I even
go further and will argue that there is no other type
of training which is better suited to change the farmer
and his old, inefficient methods into a stronger
individual, who will act with more self-confidence... It
is therefore my opinion that the introduction of
simple instruction in agriculture in all Native schools
will have salutary effects..." (11)

(11) Sanders, F.B. "Landbouwonderwijs op de Inlandsche lagere scholen"
K. a 1921, 425.
It should be noted, however, that some of the demands of these educationalists had already been put into practice by the colonial authorities before the 1920's.

Most important in this respect was the establishment as early as 1908 of a commission to provide suitable literature to the indigenous population. From 1911 onwards libraries were added to the standard primary schools and Dutch-language schools not only for pupils but also for the people as a whole. In 1917 the Kanteer voor Volkslectuur (Bureau for disseminating literature to the people) was set up which not only published and distributed fiction but also books dealing with practical subjects such as agriculture, hygiene, medical care, education etc. In addition to collecting indigenous stories and fables the Kanteer also translated and published Western children's stories and classical authors such as Kipling, Dumas, Defoe and Mark Twain. Initially the response of the indigenous population was not very encouraging and in 1912 on the average only 60 books were borrowed from each library during the year. In 1928, however, 3000 volksbibliotheken had been set up and the average yearly borrowing rate had risen to 1000 books per year.(12)

With regard to practical training, in 1911 agriculture was introduced as a subject in both Dutch-language and vernacular teachers training schools. But it was not until 1926 that the first teachers were produced who during the whole of their course had been trained by qualified personnel. Also two year courses in

agriculture for village school teachers (geerecursussen) were established. After completion of this course teachers would conduct courses in agriculture in the village. Furthermore, in some vernacular schools practical training in agriculture was given in school gardens. (13) All this, however, occurred on a very small scale and in 1922 there were only 6 geerecursussen with 58 pupils and only in 38 villages were courses in agriculture given counting a total of 464 pupils. (14)

Moreover, in 1917 also a beginning was made with the introduction of gymnastics and by 1928 this subject was taught in 1,987 standard primary schools. (15)

The impact of modern education theory on colonial education policy, however, became much stronger during the 1920's. In 1921 a special official was appointed to prepare for the introduction of manual training. This subject was made compulsory and in 1924 it had been introduced in 170 standard primary schools, 7 continuation schools, and 14 village schools. By 1927 manual training was taught in 1,356 standard primary schools and continuation schools. (16)

Furthermore, in 1922 the existing vernacular landbouwscholen (agricultural schools) which were considered too theoretical in their approach were transformed into landbouwbedrijfscholen. In

(16) Ibid., 178.
This new school type more emphasis was placed on the practical application of modern methods in agriculture and the school was run as a model farm, each pupils taking care of his own plot of land.\(^{(17)}\) Also from 1928 onwards some continuation schools provided an extra year to train pupils either in agriculture or retail trade.\(^{(18)}\)

In 1926 the Minister of Colonies Welter insisted that this process of adapting indigenous schools more closely to modern educational developments in the rest of the world should be speeded up and that similar reforms should also be introduced in the village schools. The Minister wrote:

'...In all civilised countries today there is a school of thought which stressed that not only everything should be avoided which could cause children to dislike education, but also that education should be adapted to the formation of character so that children will be trained as civic minded people who have learned to take pride in their work. Practically everywhere it is realised that the old teaching methods put too much stress on intellectual development and that too little is done in the way of moral training and the cultivation of an independent spirit and the will to work. Also little account is taken of the practical needs of pupils... It is therefore not surprising that also with regard to education in the Indies in the last few years one has advocated in speeches and writings a system which is more purposeful and which fits in better with the spirit of the times...'

Welter therefore suggested that the vernacular schools should pay more attention to indigenous social and economic advancement and that the curriculum in these schools should concentrate more on practical training, the formation of character and the development of a sense of civic responsibility in pupils. This could be done:

\(^{(17)}\) Brugmans, I.J., 'Geschiedenis...', op. cit., 350.

\(^{(18)}\) Ibid.
...By fostering an appreciation of labor in school gardens; by cultivating thrift...by opening the eyes to the benefit of order, neatness, hygiene, love for their own country and civilisation, appreciation of other human beings, by inculcating frankness, honesty, fidelity, gentleness with animals etc. Furthermore, more attention should be paid to physical education...`

The Minister was also greatly concerned about the insignificant impact which the vernacular school had so far on the social development of the village. In Welter's view also the milieu to which pupils returned after leaving school was extremely important and education should take greater account of this:

`...It cannot be denied that the influence of education will be strongest there where the school is supported by the family. And it is the mother rather than the father who familiarises the young child with practising these virtues which are valuable in the small unit of the family....`

Girls, who in 1923 only composed 13% of the total number of pupils in village schools, should therefore be encouraged to attend school in larger numbers. And Welter suggested that in areas where strong religious resentment against co-education existed, special village schools for girls should be established. (19)

This last directive of Welter was acted upon immediately by the colonial authorities and special village schools for girls were established in various areas. By 1932 there were 566 of these schools in existence. (20) In fact the need to encourage the education of indigenous girls had already been recognised in

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the colony for some time. Initially, however, the care of girls' education was left to private initiative such as the Vereeniging was Kartini School Fonds, which established its first school at Buitenzorg (Boger) in 1916. In 1928 there were eight of these schools, which were modelled on the Dutch-Native school catering for daughters of upper-class Indonesians. (21) In 1918 also the colonial government started to take a more active interest and as a first step special teachers training schools for girls were set up in Jogjakarta, Padang Pandjang (Minangkabau), and Salatiga. This was followed in 1922 by the establishment of the first so-called meisjesvervolgscholen (continuation school for girls). By 1930 there were 151 of these schools with 11,000 pupils. In the syllabus of these schools emphasis was placed on practical subjects such as home science, the production of native textiles (batik) and hygiene. From 1924 onwards also Dutch was added to the curriculum of some schools. (22)

The other directive of Welter, however, dealing with the introduction of practical subjects in village schools caused a great deal of controversy in the Indies. At a conference of Inspectors of Vernacular Education held in July 1926 the proposals of the Minister were strongly objected to on the grounds that practical experience had shown that three years of village school


(22) Croes, H.Ch. 'Onderwijs aan inheemsche meisjes in Ned. Indie met een Inlandsche taal als voertaal' Publicaties van het Bureau van den Onderwijsraad IX, Mededelingen IV, (1930), 47-58.
education was not even sufficient to teach pupils the bare rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic. The Inspectors suggested that instead of practical education and gymnastics the training of village school teachers should be improved and ways and means should be found to establish closer contact between the school and the family. The Onderwijsraad (Education Council) was also highly critical and in its opinion the village school should be left alone as much as possible and no major changes should be introduced in the syllabus unless they were demanded by the indigenous population itself. Furthermore, in the council's opinion it was ludicrous to accuse the village schools of over-emphasising intellectual training, because these schools provided only the simplest possible instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic. Similarly to the Inspector's conference the Onderwijsraad pointed out that three years were hardly sufficient to carry out even this very simple program. Therefore, no time was available for practical education or gymnastics, nor did the other suggestions of the Minister make sense: "What is the use of talking about hygiene if there is no water for bathing or sanitation? Sanitation should be introduced and clean bathing water provided before the use of the toothbrush is...

(23) Advies van den Onderwijsraad aan den Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst over de verhoging van de maatschappelijke en karaktervormende waarden van het Inlandsch Lager Onderwijs (Volksschool en Inlandsche scholen der 2e klasse en in het bijzonder het meisjesonderwijs) aangeboden bij schrijven van 17 October 1927, No.345, Publicaties van het Bureau van den Onderwijsraad VII, (Weltevreden, 1929) 1-3.
'taught at school...gymnastics will only be beneficial to the people when hygenic rules are followed....'(24)

Furthermore, the educationalist Nieuwenhuis in a special report considered the Minister's proposals to increase the appreciation of Javanese children for manual labor and love of nature as completely unrealistic. He wrote:

'It has been said that love of nature, plants and animals, will increase an interest in farming. Anyone who has some knowledge of a farmer's mentality - which is practically the same the world over - knows that such love in the case of the farmer is very unplatonic and have very little to do with little flowers. Botany, talk about fertilisers...will not make a farmer out of a prospective clerk. And now the second mistake. Is the Javanese farmer really so afraid of work that he has to be taught its value in school? Anyone who knows a little more about native society than baboes (sic), kebons (house servants) or koelis (sic), will hold a very different opinion. And thirdly, is the desire for a white collar job really so stupid as long as the average clerk still earns more than the farmer?...' Therefore the educational value of a school garden is very small, there is no reason - as in the case of other manual labor - to spend even one hour in school for that purpose....'(25)

The Onderwijsraad concluded that it was far more important to improve the training of village school teachers by lengthening their courses and by establishing boarding facilities. Also the salaries of village school teachers should be increased. With regard to the standard primary school the Onderwijsraad was not opposed to manual training, but this subject should not be made compulsory. Furthermore, to some of these schools a sixth year should be added. Also the training of teachers in the standard

(25) Ibid., 49.
primary schools should be improved and in the *Normaalschool* (vernacular teachers training school) Dutch should be added to the curriculum and the course of training should be lengthened.

These recommendations of the *Onderwijsraad*, however, were ignored by the colonial government which insisted that practical training and gymnastics were proper methods for popularising education. Moreover, the various methods that had been suggested to improve the standard of education in vernacular schools were dismissed on the grounds that they were too expensive. (26)

The importance of adapting the vernacular schools more closely to the practical needs of indigenous society was again highlighted in the final report of the *H.I.O.C.* (27) The commission stressed that the standard primary school should become the school:

"...Where all layers of the indigenous population which desire more knowledge and intellectual development than is provided in the village school can satisfy their cultural and economic needs." (28)

In order to make the standard primary school more attractive to Indonesians the *H.I.O.C.* suggested that the educational standards in this school should be raised to that of the Dutch-Native school. This could be done by introducing Dutch in the curriculum and by lengthening the course to seven years. Moreover, the commission

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(27) *H.I.O.C.*, acronym for *Hollands-Inlands Onderwijs Commissie* (Dutch-Native schools commission) which was instituted in 1927 to look into the economic efficiency of the Dutch-Native schools cf. pp. of this chapter.

(28) *H.I.O.C.*, No.11, *Eindrapport* *op. cit.*, 74.
envisaged that the future function of the standard school would be to "nurture an indigenous middle class...". (29) This school therefore should provide the kind of training needed in the struggle for life within the indigenous sphere and the curriculum should be designed in such a way that it would be helpful in the development of the indigenous economic sector. Thus, in future more attention was to be given to instruction in practical subjects which were related directly to local economic needs. This could easily be done because the standard primary school in addition to the already existing:

"...Trades schools and professional schools, and also the vernacular MULO schools (30) which perhaps will be established in the future, do not train for further study....The standard primary school only be able to perform its function properly when it directs itself to practical needs and when it does not strive too much for intellectual development...." (31)

It should be noted, however, that the educational reformers who have been discussed so far were not demanding a closer adaptation of education to indigenous cultural patterns, but rather they stressed the need to change Western educational methodology along modern Western lines so that education would fit in better with the demands of indigenous society as seen through Western eyes. Also after the various reforms that were introduced by the colonial government, the education system -

(29) H.I.O.C. No.11, Eindrapport op. cit., 76.
(30) cf. Chapter IX, 419.
(31) H.I.O.C. No.11, Eindrapport op. cit., 74-75.
from village school to university — remained Western in spirit and orientation. In fact a number of educationalists stressed the political importance of spreading the Dutch language and culture as widely as possible among Indonesians. For example, Nieuwenhuis saw:

'...The spreading of the Netherlands language as a primary factor in consolidating Netherlands culture and Netherlands interests....'

In Nieuwenhuis' view, however, the existing method of dispersing the Dutch language in the Indies should be changed. The top layers of indigenous society should have both a passive and active knowledge of the language; the intermediate group of teachers and lower technical and clerical personnel only needed to be able to read and write Dutch; while the lower classes after completing the vernacular elementary school should be given the opportunity to learn this language in teachers training schools, commercial and technical schools, and evening classes. (32)

Also the Minister of Colonies, Weltev, stressed in 1926 that:

'...The dispersion of our language and thereby our culture — providing an enlightened government takes care to eliminate and to neutralise destructive factors — must help the appreciation of Netherlands rule and thus must in the long run bring the Native population closer to us. Only in this way is it possible to achieve a strengthening of the influence of the Netherlands and a penetration of the Netherlands imperial idea, which will remain in existence even if in the future the actual power position of the Netherlands might drastically change....' (33)

(32) Nieuwenhuis, G.J. 'Opweking tot autonomie...' (Groningen 1923) 314.

(33) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 12 February 1926, op. cit.
Another example was Hardeman, Director of Education, in December 1927, who stressed that the H.I.O.C. in its investigation should not restrict itself to the economic and social aspects of the question but also should keep in mind the important cultural value of this type of education for Indonesians. (34)

Although the H.I.O.C. felt not required to carry out a specific investigation into the cultural aspect of the Dutch-Native schools, it nevertheless stressed in its final report that the cultural value of this education was very high and should not be lost sight of in future policy. The commission further emphasised that the modernisation of Indonesian society could only occur along Western lines and that the Dutch language was an indispensable tool in this process.

To some critics, however, the approach of reformers such as Nieuwenhuis did not go far enough. In their view the core of the problem of indigenous non-response was that the existing education system was too Western in character and that it failed to take account of what was really alive in the minds of the people. Education therefore should be based on indigenous civilisation. A synthesis should be attempted between East and West by vitalising and modernising those indigenous concepts, institutions and practices which were still alive and which were therefore understood and accepted in the indigenous world.

Both the Dutch language schools and the vernacular schools system were completely Western orientated. The following is an example of how ill adapted school curricula were to the Indonesian environment:

'...In a private teachers training school in a desolate little island in Eastern Indonesia... students were asked during the final examination if they knew: what cities were conquered by Frederick Henry, how many times the name William occurred in Dutch history...what type of soil was prevalent in Friesland, what canals converged in Groningen....'(35)

This Westernisation of indigenous education had been strongly condemned since the beginning of the 'Ethical' period by a number of Dutch politicians - mainly Socialists - educationalists and missionaries. The Socialist Westerveld, for example, demanded a system of Indonesia-centric education to ensure that the Indies would produce within the shortest possible time the leadership that was necessary to lead the colony to independence. Similarly, the modern tendency in missionary activity was to establish nationally independent churches and communities by attempting to adapt Christianity to regional cultural patterns. (36)

Post, a well-known educationalist, (37) argued in 1927 that the diagnosis of the reasons for indigenous indifference to vernacular schools had not gone deep enough. According to Post villagers on the whole were not interested because the government school was

(35) Jonkman, J.A. 'Indonesisch-nationale gronddag... op. cit., 56.
(36) Ibid., 57-64.
(37) cf. this chapter p. 250.
superimposed as an institution which was unfamiliar and out of
touch with the realities of village life. The school was entirely
foreign to the average villager, who could see nothing else in it
than a great deal of extra trouble brought into his life by the
government. In Post's view the school could only become more
acceptable if it was adapted more closely to indigenous life:

"...In the beginning the school is determined by
society...When the school has been completely
accepted it will be possible with the greatest
care to introduce new elements. Only then and
not earlier will the school begin to influence
its surroundings...At present the village school
has not been adapted and because of this it has
not been accepted..."(38)

Post suggested therefore that school times should be changed to
suit village life. Children should be able to take care of their
parents' cattle or to help in the fields. Holidays should be
granted at harvest times and there also should be no school on
Fridays and market days. The architecture of the village school
should also be better adapted to existing indigenous ideas about
school buildings:

"...The village school, however primitive it is, is
something new. It is different from the pesantren,
which is a haven for everybody in the district. In
harvest times, when many migrate elsewhere to work,
the pesantren opens its doors widely for everybody.
(the pesantren) is a known type of school...the
village school...is not a centre, except in those
very few places where the teacher is a strong personality.

(38) Advies van den Onderwijs raad...17 October 1927...Bijlage F,
After one o'clock it is dead until the next morning at half past seven. If only this school could have been built in a way that it could become an extension, an enrichment of village life. In Javanese districts for example this could be done by building the school in the form of a pendopo.(39) Why should there be such a somber, windowless space for the children of a people, which lives with its whole soul in nature. In this climate a roof alone is sufficient. Class rooms could be separated by bamboo partitions, which would be as efficient as the thin walls in the present village school. Behind the pendopo there should be the dalem, the house of the teacher. In the East there have never been schools, as we know them. The asramas the pesantrens are the homes of the pupils or at least houses the teacher....The pendopo is suitable for evening gatherings. The contact with the family, or rather the desa (village) can be better established in the school than in the house of the parents....(40)

Post further stressed the importance of religion in the curriculum.

A school where no religious instruction was given was a product of the West. In the East, however, everything still centred around religion, and:

'....If it was possible to have elementary religious instruction, then the school would undoubtedly rise very much in stature. This religious education would have to be in accordance with the wishes of the respective parents in the villages, which — and here there is a large difference with Europeans — hardly differ in rural areas....An enquiry among 600 families in Batavia...showed that all of them, without exception, wanted religious instruction....Why should this unhealthy and very miserly idea of a school without religious instruction be maintained any longer....'(41)

(39) Pendopo, Javanese pavilion like building.
(40) Advies van den Onderwijs raad...17 October 1927...Bijlage E. op. cit.
(41) Ibid.
This agitation for Indonesia-centric education in vernacular schools met with some success. In 1927 the government issued a regulation allowing religious instruction in village schools. It was stressed, however, that government teachers were forbidden to give such instruction and that the demand for religious education should come from the parents and should not be the result of pressure by teachers, village officials or other authorities. Moreover, pupils could not be forced to attend religion classes. Furthermore, in 1933 a Sundanese school teacher, Kusumadinata was given time off from his teaching duties to devote to research on Sundanese songs for use in schools. The Governor of East Java, van der Plas, compiled a little handbook of Madurese songs for use in vernacular schools. In Jogjakarta and Surakarta village school teachers were taught Javanese classical dancing by teachers from the palace. In Bali an anthology of stories illustrated by local artists was compiled, and it was decided to erect school buildings in traditional style. Also the home government saw the need for Indonesia-centric education in village schools. In 1934 the Minister of Colonies, 


(44) Minister van Koloniën aan den Gouverneur-General 12 April 1939 in: van der Wal op, cit., 617-628.
Colijn wrote that the lack of cultural synthesis in the curriculum was one of the major reasons for the non-acceptance of the village school by large sections of the population. The village school was too Western in its set up and:

"...It is possible to imagine a school which is more closely related to the milieu, the mentality and the way of life of the people for whom it is destined.... As an example...I would like to point to the best of the schools established by the Taman Siswa movement...."(45)

In Colijn's view the only concession made so far in the village school to specific indigenous needs was the use of the local vernacular as the medium of instruction. For the rest the village school was almost an exact copy of its counterpart in European countries. Colijn urged the colonial government to change the syllabus of village schools and to bring them more closely into line with indigenous civilisation. (46)

Interesting in this context are also the educational efforts of van der Plas, Governor of East Java, who was convinced that the Taman Siswa movement was following the right educational principles. Under the direction of van der Plas a school was set up in Cheribon to teach the old Javanese art of carving. He also induced Javanese and Madurese teachers to revive local songs, games and dances in the village schools. This, according to van

(46) Ibid.
der Plas resulted in a much greater popularity of these schools. Van der Plas also tried to re-train teachers and set up camps where teachers would work together with Indonesian specialists in art and culture. Most of these specialists were drawn from the Taman Siswa schools. (47)

The use of a more Indonesia-centric approach was also advocated as the most effective method in agricultural training. Keens, an agricultural extension officer wrote in 1920 that for agricultural training to be effective:

'It must be real education, that is it must be understood by the people. It must guide the people, it must give them knowledge. Education must give something to the people which is considered and understood as wisdom by that people... Thus, formal education cannot be superimposed on people just like that. One must learn to know the people, to learn to understand its psychology, its soul... Only then will it be possible to offer it something. If one wants to achieve anything with a Mohammedan people it is necessary to know and to understand their religion and philosophy of life. The Muslim cannot conceive anything without reference to Islam. This is also true of education....'

The average villager, according to Keens, was only interested in religious education. The schools provided by the government were only acceptable if they led to a better economic and social position. The village school was unpopular because it attempted to educate indigenous children not train them for a specific function. So far as educating their children was concerned the villager preferred to send them to the traditional langgar or pesantren. According to

(47) Plas, Ch.0. van der 'Nationalism in the Netherlands-Indies' (Institute of Pacific Relations, N.Y., 1942) 14-16.
Koens the same was true of agricultural training in the village. As long as pupils were able to obtain a position of foreman on a plantation or were given a piece of virgin land, the school would be well attended. But as soon as the school attempted to teach pupils Western principles in order to improve agricultural productivity pupils would become disinterested and would no longer attend. In Koens's view:

"...The Native peasant distrusts our knowledge or that of his compatriots who are trained and guided by us. Our native teachers of agriculture are only accepted to the extent that they are able to provide better seeds and seedlings, to help children obtain a position, or to secure credit. But as soon as this teacher wants to impart his knowledge he is met with little or no trust. The education provided by the government to the Native is completely impregnated by a Western leaven. Even village school teachers are trained according to Western methods...."

Native teachers were too far removed from their own people to have any effect and they should therefore be encouraged to study the psychology and the religion of the people they were dealing with. Furthermore, Koens argued that the existing agricultural training schools should be transformed and that the pesantren should be taken as a model. (48)

The discussion so far has been restricted mainly to the vernacular education system and a number of problems in educational techniques have been described which were not peculiar to the Indies alone but which worried educationalists the world over.

Intellectualism was in the nature of most Western education systems and during the twentieth century modern educationalists were able to convince educational authorities in most of Europe and also in the United States of the need to adapt school curricula more closely to the social and economic needs of pupils. Socio-economic adaptation in education also became the watchword in other colonial areas such as the Philippines where the Monroe commission of 1925 condemned the existing education system as too intellectualistic and too American orientated. In Africa too British policy during the 1920s was concerned not to estrange pupils from their surroundings and in education notice was taken of the various tribal cultures, and the school interior was kept simple and specifically African. Furthermore, manual labor was given a prominent place in the curriculum as well as indigenous literature and art.

During the 1920s also the Dutch-language education system was severely criticised. This criticism, however, did not only involve questions of educational techniques but also had an important financial and political basis.

The Dutch-language schools problem:

The educationalist Nieuwenhuis strongly advocated a reformation

(49) Monroe, J., *A Survey of the Educational system of the Philippine Islands* (Manila, 1925) 59.

of the whole colonial education system along modern lines for educational as well as political reasons. Nieuwenhuis wrote in 1923 that the political development of the Indies was influenced more and more by external factors such as United States' policy in the Philippines, the happenings in British India, the possibility of a Pacific war, and the growing impact of Islam and Communism. Another important factor which in Nieuwenhuis' view made a change in education policy absolutely necessary was the fact that within the Indies political development was ruled by sentiment rather than rational thinking:

'...On the grounds of both these statements we must realistically keep in mind that the independence of the Indies will come about much earlier than most people think; it will also come before political conditions are ripe for it. Therefore, in the time which is still available we must do everything possible to minimise the detrimental effect of this break for the Indies as well as the Netherlands. We must oppose a policy of excessive exploitation by both those Netherlanders and Indonesians who are only concerned with their immediate self interests. We must follow both a practical and idealistic policy which also takes account of the following generations. For us Netherlanders this means that rather than immediate profits we should strive for cultural and economic consolidation. For the Indonesians this means that they should think more about the building up of an Indies state and less about good jobs and immediate success.....'

The most important task that lay ahead for the colonial government was to train indigenous leaders. This was in particular important in order to avoid that political power in the Indies would remain in the hands of the feudal aristocracy. This power should be held by a new elite of Western trained and democratically educated
leaders. Therefore the training of leaders should concentrate on developing such qualities as a strong will, perseverance, a healthy body, sharp judgement, and a willingness to serve the community. In order to foster these qualities both the elementary and the higher education system had to be fundamentally changed:

'...This reformation must occur on the lines of the 'work' school, which emphasises independence, responsibility and a harmonious development....Moral education must be furthered by other teaching materials, other methods....In particular the training of will power must be reinforced by methods of self-activity and self responsibility....Intellectual education should concentrate less on memory and more on the development of other mental functions. This is found to be necessary in the whole of Europe (complaints by Einstein, Bernstein and the whole of modern education theory); but this is even more necessary in the Indies, which still lives entirely in the stage of thoughtless and parrot fashion repeating (ngadjji)....'

With regard to the need for a rapid economic - and therefore political - development of the indigenous masses, Nieuwenhuis was of the opinion that elementary education was less important than such measures as hygiene, credit facilities, and irrigation. Similarly to Snouck-Hurgronje, and initially also Beeke, he believed that any attempts

'...To activate the people of the Indies to work (sense of continuity in work, respect for manual labor) can only succeed when its leaders are trained to set the example. In all Dutch language primary schools and in all schools of more advanced education training in practical subjects must be introduced....'

He also stressed that education could only be successful if school life and home life were integrated as much as possible. Furthermore, Nieuwenhuis demanded a break with the long accepted principle of basing curricula and educational standards in the Indies on those existing in Holland (concordantie). The syllabus, methods, and examination requirements in indigenous schools should be determined by the needs and the circumstances of the Indies. The comparatively small group of children of 'trekkers'—i.e. those Dutchmen who returned to Holland after having completed their tour of duty in the colony—could be raised to Dutch educational standards and requirements by private tuition. (52)

This last proposal to break with the principle of 'concordantie' was completely opposed to the aspirations of the politically powerful group of 'blijvers', which as was seen in Chapter IV was just at this time greatly concerned to protect its vital class interests. Furthermore, very few Dutchmen at this time had the insight and the foresight displayed by Nieuwenhuis about the future of colonialism in Asia; and his demands for a rapid development of the Indies towards self-government was completely out of touch with the realities of colonial policy during the 1920's. The demands of educationalists, however, for a more practical orientation in school curricula and for a more direct

use of education in indigenous economic development were acceptable to many European officials not so much for reasons of educational efficiency but rather they could see the use of these new methods in counteracting revolutionary nationalism and communism. For example, the Resident of Besuki wrote in 1924 that although the repressive measures taken by the government against radical nationalism had met with some success:

'*....It must still be realised that a permanent improvement can only be achieved when concurrently measures are taken in the economic field, which will improve the living standards of the people and which will aid the formation of indigenous capital. In a prosperous land, in a country with a financially healthy peasantry it will be difficult for communism to take root and political excesses will be an exception....There can be little doubt that the productive capacity of Native agriculture is capable of improvement, even great improvement....'*

The Resident further argued that education policy which so far had almost entirely concentrated on the intellectual development of a comparatively small section of the population had clearly run aground. The time had arrived to redress this situation and this could best be done by reallocating to agricultural development funds which had been destined for education. Although the Resident had no intention of doing away with education, he pointed out that:

'*....After all the final goal of education is not only to advance the intellectual level of the population but also certainly no less to increase material welfare....'*

Another instance is provided by the Resident of Kediri who in a report of 1927 about Communist riots in Blitar wrote to the Governor-General:

'...A fact is that many leaders...are young persons who were misfits in their previous occupations or who have not been able to obtain a profitable position after leaving school....It would deserve serious consideration...to modify the syllabus to such an extent that it no longer solely provides school knowledge. Education does not cater for the desire of the population for practical knowledge. On the contrary it tends to uproot pupils from their cultural surroundings without giving them the capacity to bring themselves to a higher standard of living....'(54)

Also Colijn (55) in his 'Vraagstukken van heden en morgen' (Problems of to-day and to-morrow), published in 1928 after a visit to the Indies, pointed out that 'Ethical' education policy had been an important catalyst in the rise of radical nationalism; and he stressed the political importance of adapting the indigenous education system:

'...Almost exclusively to the needs of the still so very simple indigenous civilisation and to concentrate in particular on economic development....'(56)

Furthermore, a growing concern is noticeable during the 1920's in both public discussions and official reports about the 'overproduction' of Indonesians with Dutch-language school diplomas. Fearing the political dangers of an 'intellectual proletariat',

(55) cf. biographical note, Chapter III, 67.
(56) Colijn, H. 'Vraagstukken...' op. cit., 17.
these critics demanded a slowing down or even a temporary halt in the expansion of Dutch primary schools.

A rather striking example of this change in attitude is provided by Creutzberg, Director of Education and the architect of the Netherlands Indies education system. In 1918 Creutzberg told the Volksraad that: "The only point that worries the government is the far too small number of Dutch–Native schools." But only five years later in a lecture to the Indische Genootschap (Society of the Indies) he maintained a very different point of view, stressing the importance of restricting the entry of Indonesians into Dutch-language schools. Developments in India and especially the report of the Calcutta University Commission in which the dangers of creating an 'intellectual proletariat' were emphasised, appear to have made a deep impression upon Creutzberg and other Dutch officials.

The existence of an 'intellectual proletariat' in the Indies was shown in a report, published in 1926, about the economic situation of the indigenous population in 1924 – a year of

(57) Rede door den Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst uitgesproken in de vergadering van de Volksraad van 21 en 22 July 1928... aangeboden door het Bataviaasch Nieuwblad. (Batavia, n.d.) 41.
(59) Report of the Commission appointed by the government of India to inquire into the condition and prospects of the University of Calcutta. 1919.
(60) Opinion expressed by Dr. P.J.A. Idenburg, Director of Education (1936–1940) during an interview at Hilversum (Netherlands) on 31 October, 1963.
economic depression. In this report it was noted that, as a result of economy measures in government and Western private firms, a slump had occurred in the demand for office workers. Consequently, many Dutch-speaking Indinesians had been forced to accept positions which did not require their educational qualifications. Moreover, there was also a large number of Dutch speaking Indonesians, who, being unable to find clerical work of any description, refused to accept manual work and preferred to stay unemployed. It was estimated that in Batavia 16.5% of the 10,000 Indonesians with Western style educational qualifications were unemployed. The report concluded that although economic conditions had been improving since 1924, the only group of Indonesians whose economic position continued to deteriorate was the Western educated section of the city populations. A speedy recovery of the demand for clerical workers was not to be expected. (61)

These findings caused a controversy in the Volksraad in 1926, where some members of the standing committee on education demanded that the funds for Dutch-Native schools provided for the 1927 budget, should be cut down. (62) The government, however, replied that this unemployment problem would solve itself, as eventually the people concerned would be forced for economic reasons, to take on work other than clerical employment. (63) This reply failed to satisfy conservative European members. Most outspoken was Talma, a representative of the Western plantation concerns, who strongly

(61) H. Pieven de Malines van Ginkel. Verslag van den economische toestand der Inlandsche bevolking 1926 Eerste deel. 242 and 266.


(63) Ibid., Memorie van Antwoord.
criticised the government for pursuing an education policy which apparently was designed to increase the production of people who were only fit for office work. Instead more agricultural and technical schools were needed:

'...We must educate producers, not people who can do nothing else than push a pen or a pencil or at the most operate a typewriter. There are already too many of these....'

A radical change was needed and education policy should be designed to satisfy the demands of the economy. (64)

Indonesian members, however, denied that an over-production problem existed and they pointed to the very high illiteracy rate among the indigenous population. They also accused European critics of misinterpreting the purpose of primary education, which was not — or in any case should not be — to train pupils for specific functions. (65)

Although the government tried to allay the fears of Indonesian members and stated that so far there seemed to be no necessity for a change in education policy, it pointed out rather significantly that the problem of unemployment among Western educated Indonesians would be closely watched. (66)

A similar concern about the political dangers of an 'intellectual proletariat' is noticeable in the reports of Dutch government officials of this period. The Resident of Besuki for example, in a report to the Governor-General in 1924 feared that schools soon

(64) Ibid, Handelingen, Talma, 1926/1927, 14 June 1926, 177-179.
(65) Ibid., Soejono, 22 June 1926, 435-437; Djajadiningrat, 22 June 1926, 438-439.
(66) Ibid., Hardeman, Director of Education, 28 June 1926, 587-588.
would begin to produce ever larger number of Indonesians who
could no longer be placed in government agencies or Western
private enterprise. The result would be:—

'...The appearance of an intellectual proletariat...
which will become an easy prey to agitation, because
it will be embittered towards a government, which
provided the opportunity for self betterment but finds
it impossible to provide a living....'

To avoid this dangerous side effect the Resident suggested that
during the next few years funds earmarked for education should be
diverted to improving indigenous agricultural productivity. The
Resident concluded that only when sufficient native capital had
been formed could a diversification of the indigenous economy be
expected. Only then would Western educated Indonesians no longer
be dependent entirely on employment in the Western sector. (67)

Another approach to the problem of this intellectual proletariat
was suggested in a report of February 1927 by the Resident of
Banjumas to the Governor-General about the tactics to be followed
in combating communism. Repressive measures — although necessary —
were not sufficient to create a state of affairs in which a peace­
ful evolution of Indonesian society would be possible. A more
positive policy was needed. He argued that as the colonial problem
was in the first place one of educating subject peoples towards
self government and finally independence, then also the systematic
training of Indonesians in political thinking and behaviour was
necessary:—

(67) C.A. Resident van Besoekei aan Gouverneur-General. 7 November 1924
No. 60 Geheim. Mailrapport 70/25. Geheim Kabinet Verbaal
Native youth, which has finished primary school dreams about freedom. At the bottom of each (indigenous) movement is an awakening nationalism. What is done by us to teach the upper strata of the population a proper understanding of the word freedom?

Furthermore, the Resident criticised the existing education system for concentrating too much on intellectual training and for not taking account of the demand of the economy for Dutch-speaking personnel. The political danger of an 'intellectual proletariat' could only be partly overcome by restricting the entry of Indonesians into Dutch-language schools. In the Resident's view a far more effective method would be for the government to take the offensive and to propagandise its course as widely as possible. This propaganda should be based on the explicit recognition of the justice of Indonesian national aspirations and all efforts should be directed towards infusing the upper layer of Indonesian society with sound ideas about politics, economics and the rationale behind the government's policies of colonial development. (68)

This suggestion, however, seems to have gone astray in the general turmoil created by the communist uprisings of 1926-27. Instead many conservative European members of the Volksraad came to see a direct connection between the expansion of Dutch-Native schools and the incidence of communism, and they demanded a drastic cut in the expenditure on those schools.

The colonial government also showed signs of having changed its earlier attitude and in his opening speech to the Volksraad, the Governor-General stated that in considering whether the expansion of Dutch-Native schools should continue at the present rate not only finance but more in particular the need of the economy for Dutch speaking Indonesians should be taken into account. But it was above all a speech made by Meyer Ranneft, a spokesman for the group of Europeans who considered the Indies as their homeland - the so-called 'blijvers' (lit. 'those who remain') - which triggered off a fierce debate in the Volksraad. Meyer Ranneft argued that it should have become abundantly clear that the various government measures, which had been designed to bring about progress, had accentuated the existing unrest and antithesis in Netherlands Indies society. The ideas of Snouck-Hurgronje to use a Westernised nobility as a medium for the infiltration of Western civilisation among the masses sounded unrealistic when compared with the realities of Indian society in 1927:

"...Also how unrealistic sounds the notion of association, the ideal to breed intellectuals who before everything else would consider themselves as citizens of the Netherlands empire...." (71)

In Meyer Ranneft's view education was a most important contributory factor to the rise of communism and extreme nationalism. He based this opinion on his experience as a colonial administrator.


(70) J.W. Meyer Ranneft, born 1887, president of the Volksraad 1929-1933; vice president of the Raad van Indie, 1933-1936.

in the residency of Japara, where he had observed that the incidence of communism was higher in the richer districts. And he explained this phenomenon by pointing out that it was just in these richer districts where education had spread most. Although agreeing that education could have an important positive influence on the development of Indonesian society, it could also cause dangerous excesses:

"...I can appreciate struggle...but not murder. I can appreciate nationalism. But I cannot appreciate the extreme form which is called communism and which is dangerous..."

In Meyer Ranneft's view an investigation was warranted to establish to what extent Dutch-language education had contributed to the rise of radical nationalism. An easy sample for an inquiry of that kind was provided by the communist leaders who had been exiled to the Upper Digul in New Guinea. Moreover, in order to avoid the creation of an 'intellectual proletariat' Meyer Ranneft strongly emphasised the necessity of relating education policy more closely to the demands of the economy. He argued, that the output of education in terms of national income had been very low. All that had resulted so far was an ever increasing competition between Eurasians and Indonesians for jobs in the government service and Western private enterprise. Although admitting that the actual results of education were difficult to assess, Meyer Ranneft maintained as a matter of principle that more should be got out of education - in economic terms - than was put into it. This was

(72) Information supplied by Dr. Meyer Ranneft during interview in the Hague on 10 October 1963.
particularly important in an under-developed country where the
cost of education was high and the population poor. The proper
source of finance for education should be the additional national
income created by education and not the continuous grants from
the government. Meyer Ranneft concluded that the existing policy
of providing as much education as possible was wrong and dangerous.
Instead both the quantity and the standard of education to be
provided to the indigenous population should be determined by the
demands of the economy. But before any such change in education
policy was decided upon a thorough investigation into the working
of the existing system, especially its economic efficiency, should
be carried out. (73)

This speech elicited strong criticism from both the Indonesian
and the more progressive Europeans in the Volksraad. The following
comment of the Indonesian member Suroso provides a representative
sample of how his compatriots felt:

'...The great interest shown recently by Europeans
in the Native education system leaves me with a feeling
of suspicion rather than gratitude....I can only see
in this interest the danger that the education system
for the Native population will be disorganised and
that its expansion will be halted....Furthermore it
has been suggested to introduce an education policy
which is based on the needs of the economy. The
advocates of such a policy are right in so far that
as for them the only purpose of education is to train
employees, they judge the results of education by the
number of unemployed. It is therefore not surprising
that those voices were heard for the first time only
after the communist danger had begun to threaten this
country. For is it not true that as many consider the
existence of unemployment as the cause of this danger?....(74)

(73) Volksraad, Handelingen, 1927-1928, Meyer Ranneft 22 June 1927
305-308.
(74) Ibid., Suroso 22 June 1927, 310-311.
Educated Indonesians had come to consider entry into the Dutch-Native school as a right, which should be extended to as many Indonesian children as possible. As Suroso put it in the Volksraad:

'...The Netherlands Indies are now being drawn into the world economy. Its population not only consists of indigenous people, but also of an ever increasing number of foreigners, who consider Indonesia as their Fatherland. If these population groups should be able to receive a better education, then it is no more than just that the government brings the indigenous people to the same level of development as the other population groups, in order that it may take a worthy place in the world economy and can cope better with the struggle for life. Therefore if every European or Chinese child is given the opportunity to receive elementary education in the European Primary school or Dutch-Chinese school, then every indigenous child must also be given this opportunity, be this in a Dutch-Native school or Linking school....The fact, that European society is in a better economic position than the other groups is due in the first place to the education which the European receives....The level of development in a society is thus to a certain extent dependent on the level of education, which the people receive. That this could well result in an intellectual revolution, because society is living through a period of intellectual overproduction, is unavoidable. But are then the inventions in all kinds of scientific fields in Europe not the result of this overproduction? Overproduction and unemployment actually stimulate every individual in finding a way out and to carve out a new means of existence. Therefore this phenomenon...if it exists at all, causes me no anxiety, but it rather encourages me....'(75)

In reply to this criticism the Director of Education tried to allay the fears and suspicions of Indonesian members of the Volksraad, stating on 5 July 1927 that the government had no intention of retarding — not to speak of halting — the expansion of Dutch-Native schools. (76)

(75) Volksraad, Handelingen, Suroso, 22 June 1927, 310-311.
But in fact the colonial government was far more seriously concerned about the Dutch-Native schools problem than was conveyed in this statement. Proof of this is that even before Meyer Ranneft had brought up the matter in the Volksraad in June 1927, the Department of Education had carried out an investigation to determine any possible relationship between 'overproduction' of Dutch primary school graduates and the incidence of communism.

On March 8, 1927 the Director of Education had written to the Governor-General that:

'*... Already for some considerable time it has seemed desirable to me to collect data about the educational background of the more prominent extremists in this country in order to obtain a better insight in the influence of education on extremist activity....'*

Subsequently a survey was made of the educational qualifications of 150 communist leaders, who had been imprisoned after the recent uprisings in West Java. It was found that 11.3% were illiterate, 5.1% were literate without having received any formal schooling, 42.3% had attended vernacular schools and 41.3% Dutch-language schools. Furthermore, it could be said that 55% of communist leaders who had received formal education had not been able to find employment which was in keeping with their qualifications. (77)

This investigation was continued throughout 1927 by Mansvelt, a senior official in the Department of Education. The sample was now increased to 331. But Mansvelt pointed out from the beginning

that this number was too small a basis for reliable conclusions to be drawn. Furthermore the information that had been obtained was not entirely trustworthy because prisoners were not always willing to reveal their whole life history. Nevertheless, according to Mansvelt, the data showed certain trends which were worthwhile noting. Of the 331 persons examined 88.8% came from Java. The widely varying ages of the prisoners which averaged 29.7 years, suggested that the popular belief - that communists were mainly young people - was wrong. With regard to education 277, or 83.7%, had received some formal schooling. None had gone to university, 4.5% had attended secondary schools, 15.5% had received some professional training and 35% had attended Dutch primary schools. But only 9.3% had been able to obtain a Dutch primary school certificate. According to the investigator a valid correlation between Dutch-language education and the incidence of communism could not be established on the basis of these figures. This conclusion would be reinforced if it was taken into account that the sample studied consisted of communist leaders and not of the rank and file. If, in addition, account was taken of the age distribution then it appeared that the period when prisoners attended primary school would have fallen on the average between the years 1904 and 1911, i.e. before the Dutch-Native school was introduced. Mansvelt concluded that all that could be said was that there was a connection between literacy and the incidence of communism. On the basis of the sample, however, no valid correlation could be
established between a particular school type and communism. (78)

But, as will be shown in the following pages, these negative conclusions of Mansvelt's study do not seem to have persuaded the colonial government and the majority of Europeans in the colony to abandon their suspicions.

Another indication that the colonial authorities were far more seriously concerned about the Dutch-Native school problem than they wanted to admit publicly, is provided by a study made by the Department of Education at the beginning of 1927 — thus again before the matter had been brought up in the Volksraad — about the social and economic background of pupils in Dutch-Native schools. Such an inquiry had been suggested by the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) in the course of its investigation into the problem of finding properly qualified teachers to staff Dutch-Native schools. A proposal of the Director of Education to replace the more expensive European teachers by Indonesians and Chinese was dismissed by the Raad on the grounds that this would mean a lowering of standards, in particular with regard to the teaching of Dutch. The retention of high educational standards was far more important than an unrestricted expansion of Dutch language schools for Indonesians. In any case it was impossible to keep up with the desire of Indonesians for this type of education, and:

"...After the need for Dutch-language education of the higher and upper middle classes has been satisfied — and this point is probably nearly reached — any further expansion in fact means the filling of a bottomless barrel...."
Therefore, before the teachers' problem could be settled, it would be necessary first to estimate the number of Indonesian children who were eligible to receive Dutch-language education, and to find out to what extent their educational needs had already been satisfied. (79)

The Governor-General accepted this proposal and the Director of Education was instructed accordingly. (80) A departmental inquiry found that out of a sample of 52,600 children in Dutch-Native schools 66% did not comply with the norms of social and economic standing required for entry in these schools. (81)

The Volksraad was informed about the results of this investigation on 5 July 1927, the government emphasising the serious nature of this large influx of lower class Indonesians into the Dutch-Native schools. It planned therefore to follow up the earlier proposition of Meyer Ranneft to appoint a commission of experts to carry out a statistical investigation into the social and economic status of Dutch-Native school graduates. (82) On 26 November 1927 the Director of Education in a letter to the Governor-General commented that:

'...The outcome of this investigation...reinforced the impression that a thorough study of the question to what extent Dutch-language schools can and ought to be expanded must be considered as urgent. Furthermore, this impression is reinforced even more by the

(79) Advies van de Raas van Nederlandsch Indie, 3 September 1926, no.XIX in: van der Wal 'Het onderwijsbeleid...' op. cit., 409-411.
(81) Volksraad, Handelingen 1927/1928, 671.
(82) Volksraad, Handelingen, 5 July 1927, 671.
Two days later, on 28 November 1927, the government instituted the Hollandsch-Inlandsch Onderwijs Commissie — H,I,O,C. — (Dutch-Native Schools Commission). The Commission was composed of six European members, including the chairman, and five Indonesians. The H,I,O,C. was instructed first of all to determine the extent of the 'overproduction' of the Dutch primary schools. Second, it was to advise the government on the need for a revision of the norms that hitherto had been used in expanding Dutch-language primary schools. And third, the commission was to submit a concrete plan for the expansion of these schools during the next five years. (84)

After having conducted a large number of scholarly investigations the H,I,O,C. concluded in its final report — published in 1930 — that the Dutch-language school system suffered from two basic defects. First, it had failed to satisfy the actual educational needs of society, because more graduates were being produced than could be absorbed by the economy. Second, it was inefficient, because a large number of pupils left school before the completion of their course. (85)

(84) H,I,O,C. No.11. Eindrapport, le stuk, i–ii.
(85) H,I,O,C. No.11, op. cit., 55.
What were the norms used by the H, I, O, C, to determine 'overproduction'? The commission stressed from the outset that there was a fundamental difference in function between the primary school in Holland and its equivalent in the Indies. In the Netherlands the primary school provided the minimum of education required by the whole of the population. This function was performed in the colony by the vernacular village school. The Dutch-language primary schools in the Indies, however, were destined only for upper class indigenous children. Moreover, these schools had a specific economic function in the sense that they trained pupils for clerical positions in the civil service and Western private enterprise. It was in this capacity as a training establishment that the Dutch primary school could become 'overproductive'. The extent of any 'overproduction' could be measured by determining the proportion of Dutch speaking Indonesian graduates who had not been able to find employment which required a Dutch primary school certificate.\(^{(86)}\) The H, I, O, C, found that in 1928 about a quarter of Dutch speaking Indonesians, employed by the civil service and by European firms, held positions in which Dutch primary school qualifications were not necessary.\(^{(87)}\) Although agreeing that this result was less startling than expected, the commission pointed out that this figure was not a true indication of the actual situation because it still reflected the effect of the earlier backlog in the supply of Dutch speaking indigenous

\(^{(86)}\) H, I, O, C, No.6a: *De Werkgelegenheid in Nederlandsch-Indie voor Nederlandsch sprekkenden* 58.

\(^{(87)}\) H, I, O, C, No.6 and 6a op. cit., 14 and 73 respectively.
personnel. This backlog, however, had been caught up with and during the last few years the situation had altered radically. In the school year 1928/1929 as many as 9,120 Dutch speaking Indonesians were produced, while only 3,900 new openings were available. The problem of ‘overproduction’ would become worse with the years, because the output of Dutch primary schools was increasing at the rate of 6.8% per annum as compared with an increase of 2% in the demand for this type of labor.

What — in the opinion of the H.I.O.C. — were the effects of ‘overproduction’? The first result was a devaluation of Dutch primary school diplomas. Or, in other words the money invested in this type of education by parents and the community as a whole no longer brought a reasonable economic return. In the commission’s view there was no difference between a special school, such as the Dutch-Native school, and a factory in the sense that both were subject to the law of supply and demand. But, as the commission pointed out, overproduction of a commodity such as shoes:

‘...Does not mean that there are no consumers left who can use these goods; it means that relatively speaking...too many shoes have been produced and that the consumer has a greater need for other commodities. Thus, overproduction of shoes is also possible when a part of the population is still walking around in bare feet....’

Under normal circumstances there would occur an automatic readjustment in production until demand and supply had regained equilibrium. This, however, was not happening in respect of the supply of Dutch

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(88) Ibid., 6a, 70.
(89) Ibid., 75.
(90) Ibid., No.11, 1e stuk, op. cit., 10.
speaking Indonesians, Indonesians remained intent on obtaining a clerical position in the Western sector of the economy, although the possibility of finding such employment was becoming more remote every year. In order to improve their chances more Indonesians tried to gain secondary school diplomas. This not only increased the financial burden on the parent, but it also caused a further devaluation of the Dutch primary school certificate. The reasons why Indonesians refused to seek any other type of employment were to be found in the attractions of the higher wage rates offered in the Western sector of the economy and the fact that the opportunities for socio-economic advancement in the indigenous sphere were very limited. Furthermore, there was also a psychological factor:

"...The Native suffers from an inferiority complex with regard to Westerners. Therefore he strives to become as much as possible the equal of the European. The possession of a Dutch primary school certificate does not only mean a salary based on a western standard of living, but also greater prestige and authority in the indigenous world..."(91)

The H.I.O.C. admitted that diploma devaluation as such was not necessarily undesirable. It could mean that society had reached a higher level of civilisation. On the other hand, the purpose of education should be a harmonious development of the whole population. What had occurred in the Indies was an uneven development of education. Too much had been invested in Dutch primary schools with the result that there was a surplus of Dutch speaking Indonesians on the labor market. In this situation the

(91) H.I.O.C. No.11 le stuk, op. cit., 12.
government had the fullest right to consider whether or not in future years public funds could not be better used on other projects such as vernacular elementary, and technical education.

In the commission's view 'overproduction' was also politically dangerous:

'Too much of a certain type of education causes disappointment and resentment, and it has undesirable social effects.' (92)

The H.I.O.C. pointed out, however, that it did not subscribe to the current opinion that there was a special relationship between Dutch-language education and the rise of communism. This had been disproved by Mansvelt's study. (93) The whole of the colonial education system undermined traditional life because it exposed students to outside influences. There was no remedy against this 'deracination' unless one wanted to resort to the unacceptable solution of abandoning the education of the indigenous population altogether. Although the Dutch-language education system as such was not the original cause of the discontent in indigenous society, the consequences of 'overproduction', such as diploma devaluation and unemployment, were certainly important contributory factors. Indigenous parents often made heavy financial sacrifices in order to enable their children to receive a Dutch language education. But when:

'It appears that all these sacrifices have been in vain then an element of disappointment and even resentment is created. The government cannot ignore this if it does not want to be accused of trying to sell stones for bread.' (94)

(93) cf. this chapter, 288-290.
(94) H.I.O.C. No.11, le stuk op. cit., 17.
That these political dangers were not imaginary could be seen, according to the commission, from the examples of British India and French Indo-China, where the failure to adapt education to the actual needs of society had resulted in a great deal of political upheaval.

In addition to 'overproduction' the commission also found — rather paradoxically — that the Dutch-language school system also suffered from a severe lack in productive efficiency. Many pupils left school before the completion of their course. Investigations showed that only 40.9% of students entering the first year of the Dutch-Native school managed to obtain the final diploma, as compared with 55.9% and 33.3% in European primary schools and Dutch-Chinese schools respectively. A major reason for this high rate of 'wastage' was, according to the H.I.O.C., the difficulty of the curriculum. In particular the intricacies of the Dutch language proved a stumbling block to many Indonesian children. Another important factor was the high cost of Dutch-language education. In addition to high fees parents were often required to pay for board and lodging because Dutch-Native schools were only situated in the larger population centres. In general the situation was such that only the slightest upset in the family budget would result in the withdrawal of a child from school.

Also the unsuitability of accommodation and unhygienic living

(95) Ibid., No.2 Het Leerlingenverloop en de bestemming der abiturienten bij de instellingen van Westersch onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie, 2e stuk (tabellen en staten), Tables XXXIII, XXV, XXXV.
conditions often adversely affected the performance of pupils. (96)

One immediate result of this productive inefficiency was that the number of Indonesian students in the five-year high schools and university was too small. By 1927 on the average only 41.5% of Indonesian Mulo students had obtained the final diploma, (97) while in the A.M.S. (98) and H.B.S. (99) the portion of graduates was 61.2% and 29.6% respectively. Finally only 1% of pupils entering the first year of a Dutch primary school was able to matriculate. (100)

In its final recommendations on future policy the H.I.O.C. suggested that the following improvements should be introduced to increase the productive capacity of the Dutch-Native schools. First the medium of instruction in grades I-III should be the vernacular and not Dutch, because the use of a foreign language from the beginning of primary school adversely affected both the linguistic ability and the intellectual development of the child. Second, the curriculum of the Dutch-Native school should be differentiated after grade V in order to enable backward pupils to receive a completed education at lower level rather than

(96) Ibid., Eindrapport, le stuk, op. cit., 35-37.
(97) Ibid., No.2, 2e stuk, op. cit., Table XLVIII.
(98) Ibid., Table LII.
(99) Ibid., Table LX.
(100) Ibid., No.11, le stuk, op. cit., 49.
allowing them to leave school without any educational qualifications whatsoever. Third, an eight grade was to be added so that pupils who were not intending to continue their education at a secondary level could be prepared for practical life by training them in typing, stenography, and commercial subjects. Fourth, school fees for poorer students should be reduced. And lastly, to improve living conditions boarding facilities were to be established at Dutch-Native schools and also at some Linking schools.

With regard to avoiding any further 'overproduction' the commission recommended that the entry of Indonesians into Dutch-language primary schools should be severely restricted. The present practice of admitting every child whose parents were able to pay should be discontinued and the original norm for entry: the high social status of parents, should be strictly adhered to in future. As such only those Indonesian children from upper-class families where Dutch was used as the vernacular were allowed to enter the European primary school, while the Dutch-Native school was to cater only for those children from upper-class families where Dutch was not yet in common usage.

As the number of prospective students falling under these categories was comparatively small the commission further suggested that most of the existing Dutch-Native schools should be transformed into Linking schools. These schools should be open to a limited number of lower-class Indonesian children, who were to be selected on the basis of intellectual capacity only.
The vast majority of Indonesian children, however, would have to be accommodated in the vernacular school system. In order to make vernacular education more attractive to the indigenous population, the H.I.O.C. recommended that the curriculum of the Tweede Klasse school (standard primary school) should be made more comparable to that of the Dutch-Native school. For example, Dutch could be taught as a subject.

Until all these suggested improvements had been effected there was in the opinion of the commission no case for any further expansion of the Dutch-Native schools.

In addition to this short term solution, the H.I.O.C. also attempted to tackle the problem of 'overproduction' at the core. The commission suggested that a Dutch primary school certificate should no longer give automatic entry into the civil service, but that in future a Mulo diploma should be demanded. Also the Klein Ambtenaars Examen (Lower Civil Service Entrance Examination), which had been devised in 1863 to enable people without formal schooling to qualify for admission into lower clerical positions in the civil service, should be discarded.\(^{(101)}\)

These final recommendations, however, were not supported by all members of the H.I.O.C., and a number of minority reports were presented to the government. Indonesian members argued that to halt the expansion of Dutch-Native schools would be

\(^{(101)}\) H.I.O.C. No.11 Eindrapport, 1e stuk, op. cit., 90-91.
irresponsible. For example, Sutedjo maintained — in direct opposition to the majority viewpoint in the commission — that the sole purpose of primary education was to lay the basis for the further intellectual and moral development of the child. The question of what type of employment the child would be able to obtain was irrelevant:

'...Dutch-Native education has come to mean...that we, Indonesians, by means of the Dutch language can ...come into contact with world civilisation. This is necessary for the renovation of our society.... When graduates of the Dutch-Native schools accept a lower salary, then the salary scale must be adjusted accordingly. But this should not be a reason for restricting the expansion of education. So far as I am concerned I have no objection to Dutch primary school graduates earning a little less. In fact the government should be pleased about this increase in national development. Furthermore, the unemployment, which has been observed is not of such alarming proportions that the expansion of Dutch-Native schools must be stopped. This unemployment can be reduced to a minimum by increasing employment opportunities.... If the government is really concerned to advance and develop Indonesia...then it may not deprive the oncoming generation of that type of schooling, which provides the basis for further development. The further expansion of Dutch-Native schools is necessary....'(102)

On the other extreme there was a minority group, led by Meyer Ranneft, which not only demanded that any further expansion should be halted, but also that a number of existing Dutch-Native schools should be transformed into vernacular Tweede Klasse schools (standard primary schools). Meyer Ranneft, although agreeing that the Dutch-Native school could have a cultural value for Indonesians, warned that this argument should not be overstressed:

(102) H.I.O.C. No.11 Eindrapport 2e stuk, 26.
Because the formation of an intellectual proletariat, is no cultural gain. Although economic prosperity and culture are not the same thing and can even be antagonistic to each other, a certain minimum of economic prosperity is nevertheless a condition for every culture. Economic prosperity is the first and not the last requirement for cultural advancement. Culture does not flourish in slums...." (103)

What, however, really worried Meyer Ranneft and many other Europeans – especially Eurasians – was the depreciation of diplomas in money terms, which would occur as a result of continued overproduction:

'*...A number of indigenous nationalists are fiercely opposed to the differentiation in education for the various population groups. They consider it as a grievance, that the education which is meant to be exclusive for the Native group, is available to the whole of the European group. What they want first of all, what they want more urgently than culture or economic prosperity is equality with Europeans, even if this means a lowering of wages. Here is a source of conflict, because even if this European group is generous enough to accept equality, it will never accept a lowering of its own standard of living....' (104)

A continued devaluation of diplomas, however, would mean that eventually civil service salaries would decrease to such an extent that Europeans would no longer be able to keep up their standard of living. The result would be that Europeans would try to seek more lucrative positions elsewhere, leaving the civil service entirely in the hands of Indonesians. Granting that this at first sight might be the only final solution to the

(103) H.I.O.C. No. 11 2e stuk, op. cit., 11.
(104) Ibid., 14-15.
problem, Meyer Ranneft pointed out that in fact the situation would continue to deteriorate, because the number of positions requiring Dutch-language school qualifications would remain small compared with the ever increasing supply of applicants. Even more dangerous would be the elimination of Europeans from the government service. This would undoubtedly result in social, political and economic chaos, because for a long time to come the colony could not yet do without Western leadership. If the present policy of an unrestricted admission of Indonesians was continued then a fierce class struggle would result. In the end this would mean the destruction of the colonial status system:

"...It can never be expected that in practice the upper classes will passively acquiesce in seeing their children fall back to a lower level. It is just because classes here in the Indies are far more widely separated from each other than elsewhere, that the disappointment and pain of being unable to reach a higher standard of living, of being forced to retrograde to a lower social plane, is infinitely stronger....The stronger classes therefore will defend themselves and this will cause struggle and pain....Nobody should have any illusions either about the feelings of many of those, who originate from the masses, when they find that the diplomas, which they have obtained after so much sacrifice, have little value...or about (the feelings) of many upper class parents, who in spite of their bitter opposition, see their children socially degraded...." (105)

Most commission members, however, were more moderate in their views than either Sutedjo or Meyer Ranneft.

(105) H.I.O.C., No.11 2e stuk, op. cit., 16.
In respect of Sutedjo's argument the majority opinion in the H.I.O.C. was that the cultural value of the Dutch-Native schools should not be underestimated. On the other hand this did not mean that an unrestricted expansion of these schools was warranted. For those Indonesians, who were unable to enter the Western sector of the economy, the Tweede Klasse school (standard primary school) would be of equal, of not of greater cultural value:

'...Because the cultural value of education only comes fully into its own, when this education is directed towards the future employment of the pupils....'(106)

The commission also rejected the proposals submitted by Meyer Banneft, because it was felt that to close existing schools would create even more resentment and turmoil than this measure tried to prevent.

Although Meyer Banneft represented a minority viewpoint in the H.I.O.C., this is not to say that his ideas did not reflect what was felt by the majority of Europeans in the colony. Actually, the political views of a number of Europeans (107) in the commission were too moderate to be called representative of the European group as a whole.

(106) Ibid., No.11 le stuk, 83.
(107) Reference is made here to the Chairman, Professor E.J.O. Schrieke, and the Socialist van Gelderen, the Catholic missionary Father van Kalken, and Slotemaker de Bruyne, Protestant missionary.
The fears expressed by Meyer Ranneft about diploma devaluation were deeply felt especially by Eurasians, who constituted the largest section of the European group. The 'class struggle' referred to by Meyer Ranneft had in fact already been in existence for some time. As was seen above, the opportunities of Eurasians for socio-economic advancement had improved considerably since the middle of the nineteenth century. The Eurasians had become a privileged class enjoying European status and monopolising most of the schools and the civil service positions in the colony. The 'Ethical' policy of colonial development, more in particular the establishment of a Dutch-language school system for Indonesians and the official policy of gradually replacing Europeans by Indonesians in the government service (Indianisatie), was considered by Eurasians as a threat to their privileged position in the colonial status system. They refused to accept Western educated Indonesians as their equals, both socially and economically. By sabotaging the policy of Indianisatie as much as possible, by exerting political pressure, and because of the fact that as the largest group of Dutch loyalists in the colony they were an indispensable asset to the colonial government in its struggle against radical nationalism, the Eurasians managed to maintain their special status until the end of colonial rule. Under these circumstances it was natural for the Eurasian group to oppose strongly any

(108) cf. Chapter IV, 147-150.
policy which would reduce them to the Indonesian standard of living. Therefore the colonial government was continuously pressed to institute special salary scales for Eurasian public servants. The Indonesian Volksraad member Suroso, who objected to this, was asked by the prominent Eurasian leader de Hoog:

"...To concentrate a little more on his shoes rather than on his principles, because shoes were a necessity for the average Eurasian, but they were still a luxury for the average Indonesian...."(109)

In 1923 a new salary system was adopted for the colonial civil service. There were to be three categories of salaries: the A-scale, based on the Indonesian standard of living; the B-scale, based on the Eurasian standard of living; and the C-scale, which was designed to attract personnel from Holland. Although these regulations provided some protection to Eurasians, the number of Indonesian civil servants kept increasing. They were even becoming more numerous in some of the B-scale positions. For example, in 1932 42% of the officials holding B9 positions were Europeans as compared with 57.4% in 1928.(110) Eurasians, however, were hardest hit in the private Western firms, where no artificial barrier existed against the entry of Indonesians into lower and medium rank positions.


(110) Ibid., 90.
Viewed in this perspective it should be clear that the 'overproduction' of Dutch speaking Indonesians and its concomitant of diploma devaluation was a question of vital importance to Eurasians and the 'blijvers' group as a whole. It struck at the root of the existence of this group as a privileged class. This was, in the writer's view, why the H.I.O.C. - although the commission did not state this openly - refused to abandon the principle of 'concordantie' which was the basic cause underlying the Dutch-Native schools problem. As de la Court has written:

'...The fact that the education system was too expensive and too top heavy was caused primarily by the insistence on 'concordantie' i.e. the requirement that education in the Indies should be equal to that in the Netherlands not only in standards but in everything else....Thus this Amsterdam standard has pushed more advanced education up to such a level that a far too large proportion of the education budget was devoured, while the social effect of this education remained far below expectations. This happened in the first place because the capacity of the Indies society to absorb graduates was inadequate...causing discontent and disappointment, and in the second place because only a few Indonesian parents could afford to pay for this long extended schooling....Dutch-language education dislocated society and was not adapted to the needs of the country. It stimulated far more the desire to reach a higher salary scale than the desire to serve the country and the people. It sometimes offered material advantages but it did not create idealism....' (111)

Nieuwenhuis, as was pointed out above, was also strongly opposed to 'concordantie' and to the question how much Holland should influence educational standards in the Indies he replied:

(111) Court, J.F.H.A. de la 'Paedagogische richtlijnen voor Indonesia' (Deventer, 1945) 69-70.
"...We have nothing to do with Dutch standards. The Indies primary school should be allowed to exist for its own sake just as the Dutch primary school.... We in the Indies are much more broadminded than our compatriots in Holland. We have crossed the oceans and have come into contact with a different culture from our own. And therefore we object to Dutch standards because we do not like them. We have thrown the ballast overboard and we do not want to be encumbered with it again....And after all why should we take in this ballast again? It slows down development for all; and only very few need concordantie in order to do well in Holland and these few can be looked after without having to change the whole curriculum....At the highest 5% of pupils of the European primary schools go to Holland and to ruin the other 36,000 pupils for the sake of 5% would be highly unjust even more so because these children are usually in a much better financial and social position than the majority....There is only one solution: the standard in the Indies must not be the same as in Europe. Each society should have a level of education in accordance with its stage of evolution....If we are honest and officially recognise standards which can be reached more quickly then we will enable much broader sections of the community to advance. We will cause less dislocation in indigenous society, less discontentment and we will be able to spend more efficiently the money saved in this way on older and better selected individuals who as future leaders must have a look at the West...."(112)

The H.I.O.C., however, considered the retention of 'concordantie' as a political and economic necessity, because:

"...The Netherlands-Indies is more and more becoming a part of the world economy and the standards in this economy are set by Europe and America. It is this fact and not in the first place the colonial relationship with the Netherlands which forces the Indies to maintain Western educational standards for the sake of its leaders in the economic and government field....Furthermore, the abandonment of 'concordantie' would mean that persons trained in the Indies would be at a serious

disadvantage when competing with imported personnel. In this way Dutch-language education in the Indies would really become a failure and the millions spent on it would have been largely wasted..." (113)

In particular the last sentence of the above quotation gives the impression that in stressing the need for 'concordantie' the H.I.O.C. was also concerned to condone the existing socio-economic status quo in the colony, which certainly was in line with the wishes of the 'blijvers' group and many European B.B. officials. On the other hand the commission pointed out that 'concordantie' did not have to mean a slavish copying of the Dutch system. The most important thing to ensure in the view of the H.I.O.C. was that educational standards in the Indies were equal to those in Holland. (114)

In fact the demands of some educationalists for a more Indonesia-centric education also in Dutch-language schools had gradually been gaining a greater degree of acceptance in official circles. De Kat-Angelino whose views can be taken as representing the official position wrote in 1931 that many Western educated Indonesians had become deracinated and completely materialistic in outlook. To overcome these problems de Kat stressed the need to adapt school curricula more closely to the Indonesian situation. The task of the vernacular school was to widen the views of pupils and to develop the personality. At the same time, however, great care was to be taken not to remove them too far from the

(113) H.I.O.C. Eindrapport, 1e stuk 56.
(114) Ibid.
village where they lived. The function of the Dutch-language school was to bring students into closer contact with the West. The program in these schools, however, should be designed in such a way that the love and understanding of the pupil's own people and culture should be retained and reinforced. Only then would modern Indonesians be able to see their own society and civilisation in a world context; and only

"...In this way can a sense of unity come about which is rooted in the local ethos. Only in this way will Western knowledge be in harmony with indigenous society and culture...and people will try their hardest to vitalise all that is good in their own heritage and to make it serviceable to socio-economic and political needs of the present and the future. This is the real meaning of the idea of synthesis. What is envisaged is not a mosaic of Western and Eastern cultural elements, a sort of patchwork quilt, but rather people should be taught to apply sound criticism and proved methods of development and organisation to their own culture, to enrich and intensify the heritage of their fathers...."(115)

De Kat-Angelino emphasised that the adaptation of education to local culture alone was not sufficient to achieve the ideal of 'cultural synthesis'. It was equally important to present Western civilisation in all its aspects. Too much emphasis was placed in colonial education on the material achievements of the West and the spiritual, the intellectual contributions of European civilisation were grossly neglected:

"...We have all sinned by continuously emphasising to the East our technical wonders, giving the impression that therein our secret was hidden; we

(115) Kat-Angelino, A.D.A. de 'Staatkundig beleid...' sp. cit., 921.
'have sinned by hiding our holiest goods with the same feeling of shame which causes us to be silent about feelings of love, friendship, piety, fidelity, patriotism. It is a rule among Western men to show these qualities by their behaviour and their deeds.... An entirely wrong emphasis had been placed just on this fundamental point. This is harmful to the West as well as to the East and in particular to the synthesis idea. One can never show the East the way it is seeking when it is not made clear that the only important difference between East and West is the wider social horizon....Thus, the East does not need to import anything 'Western'; it must, however, give a wider application to its moral principles....'(116)

If this was achieved then according to de Kat-Angelino revolutionary nationalism would lose its hold on the people, and all Indonesians would be willing to cooperate with the colonial government to work for a peaceful and harmonious evolution of the Indies into a new and modern Indonesia.

The first official report demanding a more Indonesia-centric approach in Dutch-language schools was published in 1916. The Advisory Commission of Secondary Education which published its report in 1916 was the first official body to recommend the adoption of a more Indonesia-centric approach in Dutch-language schools. The Commission advocated the establishment of an Algemene Middelbare School - A.M.S. - (General High School) which would offer students a choice of three distinct curricula: Western humanities; mathematics and the physical sciences; or Indonesian studies. The commission was convinced that in addition

(116) Ibid., 1121, 1123, 1125.
to a grounding in the Dutch language and literature, a study of the 'Indonesian humanities' could serve as a proper basis for further study in university Arts subjects. Furthermore, it was felt that as Indonesian students could be expected to feel better at home in their own cultural heritage, this would be the most appropriate method:

'...To create among them that interest and desire for study, which after all is the sole and proper basis for all fertile academic activity....' (117)

Although the government accepted these recommendations, it was not until 1926 that the first A.M.S. with an Indonesia-centric orientation was established at Solo. (118) By this time political considerations had strongly boosted the earlier demands for a greater degree of cultural synthesis in indigenous education. And, by the mid-1920's it was far more widely believed among Europeans, that:

'...Our education has brought knowledge, and sometimes advantage, but it failed to change the heart of the Asian, because it ignored his family as well as his religion. For that reason all we did was to cause confusion. It is for that reason that the contact between West and East is so difficult for the weaker party and in many ways so bitter. For that reason development is irregular and explosive....' (119)

(117) Verslag van de commissie van advies inzake aanpassend middelbaar (voorbereidend hoger) onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie... 1916, 33.

(118) Nota van het departement van onderwijs en Eeredienst inzake de oprichting en de organisatie van een Faculteit der Letteren in Nederlandsch-Indie, Djawa 1930, No.3, 5.

(119) Nota van der Plas, 7 December 1927, in: van der Wal op. cit., no.94.
To stop this socio-political ferment in indigenous society — or at least to guide it into calmer waters — a number of politicians and colonial officials stressed the need to adapt the curricula of indigenous schools more closely to the Indonesian scene.

The idea of using Indonesia-centric education as a counter­vailing principle to revolutionary tendencies in indigenous society was clearly behind a proposal submitted in 1927 to the colonial government by van der Plas, an official of the Native Affairs Bureau. Van der Plas had been requested to advise the government on the most effective ways and means to counteract revolutionary propaganda among the indigenous population. In a report presented to the Governor-General on 7 December 1927 van der Plas pointed out that his research had substantiated the current belief that in particular those indigenous intellectuals, who had been uprooted from their own cultural heritage, had been most susceptible to revolutionary propaganda:

'*...This is in accordance with the general theory, that the best guarantee against revolutionary tendencies is an Indonesian society...which is as homogeneous as possible....This immediately poses the question whether a more nationally orientated education...could be an antidote....'*(120)

Van der Plas emphasised that the ideas of the indigenous population about the role of the school and the teacher differed widely from the European conception, and hence a real need existed for more cultural synthesis in education. Moreover, this would fit in

(120) Ibid.
with a current trend in the nationalist movement, because

"...in ever widening circles of intellectuals it has been realised that the Westernised Dutch-Native schools are unsatisfactory. This is realised by most Regents, by Princes with such completely different personalities as the Mangkoe Negoro and the Pakoe Alam; by an old fashioned man such as Dr. Radjiman just as much as by Mr. Singgih, Ratulangie and many extremists such as Ir. Soekarno and Mr. Iskak...." (121)

Van der Plas further asserted that many non-cooperators among the Indonesian nationalists would be willing to participate in the building of Indonesian society, if they only were given a chance. Many nationalists, however, had pointed out to him that the authorities were not genuinely interested in letting Indonesians run their own affairs. And they complained that even if the Governor-General happened to be quite sincere in this matter colonial administrators would make sure that everything would be subjected to their paternalistic scrutiny. In van der Plas' opinion there was no better remedy against extremism than to provide radical nationalists with the opportunity for creative work in the social and cultural field, preferably in conjunction with more moderate nationalists. The accepted practice of having social and economic investigations conducted by Dutch officials should be abandoned; instead, this work should be left to commissions comprised entirely of Indonesians representing a cross section of indigenous political and religious opinion. A case in point was the current controversy about the future role of the Dutch-

(121) Ibid.
Native school. The terms of reference of the H.I.O.C. were primarily economic and political; but it was equally important to determine whether the curriculum of this school was in need of reform, what direction this change should take, and what measures were to be taken. A second Dutch-Native school commission comprising Indonesian members only was therefore necessary; and among the list of members suggested by van der Plas were: Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Batulangi, Soekarno, and Soetomo. (122)

These proposals were strongly opposed by the Department of Education. First of all it was objected that a second Dutch-Native School Commission to investigate the fundamentals of this education would obviate the necessity of the first H.I.O.C. Cooperation between two such commissions would be impossible as the conclusions of the one would tend to be negated by the other. It was, moreover, impossible to introduce an Indonesia-centric curriculum in the Dutch-Native school because this would prevent pupils from furthering their education at the secondary or tertiary level, where the curriculum was of necessity Western orientated. Also Dutch-Native school graduates would be unable to find employment in government and European private enterprise where Western style educational qualifications were demanded. The Department also rejected the conclusion that the Dutch-Native

(122) Nota van der Plas..., op. cit.
schools had been an important contributory factor in the rise of radical nationalism. It noted that recent investigations had shown that no valid correlation could be established between that type of education and the increasing incidence of communism:

"...The argumentation of van der Plas seems to me incorrect because it is based on an equalisation of Western education and Western influence. To stop the first is...feasible. To curb Western influence...is humanly impossible..." (124)

Van der Plas' observation that an increasing number of Indonesian intellectuals was objecting to Westernisation was denied on the grounds that this was only prevalent in some 'Javanese circles'. The Department maintained that the vast majority of the indigenous population desired Western education and it pointed out that ample evidence for this could be found in the agitation of recent years in the Volksraad and the Indonesian press against any interference by the government with the existing education system. Any attempt to introduce an Indonesia-centric curriculum in Dutch-Native schools would cause widespread resentment and was bound to create suspicion: "...Exactly in those circles which may still be considered as pro government or at least as inclined towards cooperation with the government..." (125) In any case the

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(123) This Chapter, 288-290.

(124) Acting director of education to Governor-General, 17 January, 1928, quot. van der Wal, op. cit., 448. See also Director of education to Governor General, 23 February 1928, ibid., 452-456.

(125) Waarnemend Directeur...17 January 1928 op. cit., 455.
Director apparently had little trust in indigenous civilisation as a useful tool in the modernisation of Indonesia. This is clear from his statement that:

"...It is highly questionable whether a people desiring to reach the same intellectual level as the leading nations of the world, will ever be able to go without proved Western methods in training and education." (126)

Governor-General de Graaff who had succeeded the conservative and hard hitting Fock in September 1926 was far more impressed by the proposals of van der Plas. The policy of de Graaff was concerned to re-open a dialogue between the government and radical nationalists, and to convince the population of the justice of the Dutch cause. As such he tried to be as accommodating as possible to nationalist demands and he also attempted to gain the cooperation of radical political groups by appointing in 1927 a number of left-wing Europeans and the nationalist leaders Tjokroaminoto and Sutomo to the Volksraad. The latter, however, declined. (127) With regard to the plan of van der Plas the Governor-General disagreed with many of the criticisms levelled by the Department of Education. In his opinion the question of 'cultural synthesis' was of extreme importance and he pointed to British India and the Philippines where too much educational emphasis on the West had led to highly undesirable political results. The problem of finding employment for holders of an

(126) Waarnemend Directeur...17 January 1928 op. cit., 452-453.
(127) Brouwer, B.J. 'De houding van...' op. cit., 117.
Indonesia-centric school diploma could be overcome and the Governor-General ordered the Department of Education to look into this matter. De Graaff further argued that in any case the government would eventually be forced in the interest of the population itself to seek a solution to the education problem by means of 'cultural synthesis', even if this was against the wishes of the majority of Indonesian intellectuals. The time, however, for such a decision was not yet appropriate because:

"....The conviction that the deracination of the Native which is accentuated by the present set up of Dutch-Native schools, and presents a great danger to a harmonious development of the people has not yet penetrated deeply enough...." (128)

The Governor-General argued that if the plans of van der Plas were implemented at once, the situation would arise where the desires of a relatively small group of extremist leaders would be accommodated at the cost of arousing strong opposition by the vast majority of the Indonesian intelligentsia. De Graaff decided therefore that the proposals of van der Plas should be shelved until the time that the demand of Indonesians for Western orientated education would have abated somewhat. (129)

The establishment in 1919 of the faculty of Technology in Bandung caused a great deal of discussion among educationalists about the question when and how a full university should be

(129) Ibid.
founded in the Indies. One important theme which runs through nearly all deliberations is that regarding its curriculum such a university should not be an exact copy of its counterparts in the mother country. On the contrary strong pleas were made for Indonesia-centric university education in particular in Arts.

The idea for an Indonesia-centric faculty of Arts was first expressed at the 1919 Koloniaal Onderwijs Congres by Krom, an expert in the history of Hindu-Javanese culture, who stressed that:

'The University in the Indies should be for the Indies. It is destined for those whose later work will benefit the Indies themselves, and under no circumstances may it be allowed to degenerate into an imitation of a European university, organised on the basis of European education and serving to enable Netherlanders, who live in the Indies, to obtain a training locally, for which they otherwise would have been forced to go to Europe....'

The primary purpose of an Indies university was:

'....The training of leaders (Native as well as European),...and a deepening of the culture and civilization of the Indies population in all its variety...something else shall have to be put in the place of Dutch Roman culture, which is the foundation of university education in Holland. To omit this would be criminal; and it would make university education into no more than training in some superficial technical ability without any intellectual cohesion or any deep inspiration. In this way the university would sell stones for bread. Thus the foundation should be a culture equal to the Hellenistic Roman, but in accordance with the spiritual disposition of the population. What culture this has to be is not in doubt. Java under the influence of Indian Hindu civilisation was able to maintain itself on a high cultural plane for seven centuries. A people which can create the old Javanese literature and architecture has no cause to take second place to any other nation....'(130)

Many prominent scholars agreed with Krom's position and a commission was appointed to advise the congress on the organisation of a university. In its report of 1921 this commission suggested that an Indonesia-centric faculty of Arts around which other faculties should be concentrated should be founded immediately. (131) This view was supported by most speakers at the 1924 Koloniaal Onderwijs Congres. For example the well known Dutch historian Huizinga made a strong plea for the creation of a faculty of literary and philosophical studies which not only would provide service courses to other faculties, but which also would function as the central organ of the whole of academic life in the Netherlands Indies:

'....There is something completely new to be created in the field of literary studies in the Indies. That is study of the humanities based not on the knowledge of Greek and Roman, but on Hindu and Muslim culture. It is obvious, that the university of the Netherlands Indies, when completed, must also provide for the study of Latin and Greek. But if it is to be true to its vocation of acting as a centre where the peoples of the Indies will be able to develop themselves...in line with their own culture, then it must be accepted, that their spiritual past is not Hellas and Rome....The task of orientalists at the university must be in the first place to teach Indonesians how much richer than they themselves thought the two great civilisations have been on which theirs has been built....If it is considered that the Indies are ripe for university education, then one must also dare to face the consequences....'(132)

The almost unanimous opinion of scholars and educationalists in

(131) Schrieke, B. 'Indisch universitair onderwijs in de bezuinigingstijd' K.S. 1924, 51-52.

favour of establishing first an Indonesia-centric faculty of Arts failed to sway the colonial government which decided that as an initial step some of the existing professional schools should be elevated to university status. Thus, in 1924 the old Law School was transformed into a faculty of Law and in 1927 the STOVIA became a faculty of medicine. The only concession made at this stage to the demand for Indonesia-centric university education was the inclusion of a number of Indonesian subjects (languages, ethology, sociology and Islamic studies) in the curriculum of the new Law faculty. The government pointed out that the establishment of a separate Faculty of Arts would be postponed until such time that the secondary school system was producing a sufficient number of prospective students.

In 1927 the question of an Indonesia-centric faculty of Arts was raised again, this time by the Director of Education. The Director argued that after the eloquent pleas made at the 1924 Koloniaal Onderwijs Congres, it would be difficult to deny the desirability of a faculty of Indonesian studies. An academic centre of study and research in the Indonesian humanities would be an important factor in providing the intellectual leaders of the new Indonesia with a balanced training. This would/of great political importance because graduates in Indonesian studies would be:

(133) Schrieke, B. 'Indisch universitair onderwijs...' op. cit., 55-56

Less liable to join the ranks of those Indonesian intellectuals who have been uprooted from their own culture and who are unwilling to engage quietly in constructive work. It is hoped that these Arts graduates will exert a moderating influence and that they will be more inclined towards cooperation with the government. (135)

Furthermore, in the Director's view the argument that Arts graduates would have difficulty in finding suitable posts was overdone. And he pointed to possibilities for employment in teaching, the Archaeological service, libraries, museums, journalism, and also Indonesian private schools such as the Taman Siswa. (136) The Director stressed the urgent need for decisive action, because in 1929 the first group of students trained in the Indonesian humanities at the A.M.S. in Solo would graduate. Students who wished to continue their studies in the same field at university level would be forced to go overseas and the political dangers of this were too well known to need further comment. The Director concluded his plea by suggesting that a commission of experts should be appointed to advise the government on the possibility of opening a faculty of Arts in 1930. (137)

The Raad van Indie, although not directly opposed to a faculty of Arts, was not impressed by the Director's case for urgent action. Obviously influenced by the current fear about creating

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(136) cf. Chapter IV, 193+.

(137) Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst 28 October 1927 op. cit.
an 'intellectual proletariat' the council's recommendation was negative because it felt that the Director had failed to present a convincing case on the all important question whether Indonesian Arts graduates would:

'...Be able to find employment in accordance with their training....The answer to this question in the Council's opinion determined the actual value of a faculty of Arts....It is clear that higher training which cannot be put to proper use in society is a social evil rather than a social good....' (138)

The more liberal minded Governor-General de Graaff, (139) however, supported the Director of Education, and playing down the 'intellectual proletariat' argument he stressed the importance of an Indonesia-centric faculty of Arts as a countervailing power to revolutionary nationalism. De Graaff argued:

'...For some time extreme nationalists have been attempting to break with Dutch and to elevate Malay to a 'bahasa Indonesia'....It would be wise for us to counteract this reaction which is threatening to go to the other extreme of completely rejecting the good elements in Western civilisation and excessively idealising the value of the indigenous cultural heritage. This process i.e. cultural nationalism should be controlled to prevent it from degenerating into irrational self-aggrandisement. Indigenous and foreign elements should be moulded into one harmonious whole. This can only be done by intellectual leaders who because of their strictly scientific training are able to see the true value of their own cultural heritage and who can see the possibility of adapting it to the demands of modern times....An Indonesia-centric faculty of Arts is the place where such intellectual leaders must be trained....' (140)


(139) cf. p. 3/7 this chapter.

(140) Gouverneur-Generaal aan den Minister van Kolonien, 13 August 1928 in: van der Wal op. cit., 434.
The Minister of Colonies agreed to the establishment of a commission along the lines suggested by the Director of Education, providing that all aspects — including the question of employment — would be thoroughly studied and that no a priori decision was to be made on the opening of the new faculty in 1930.\(^{(141)}\)

The Governor-General, however, wanted to press the matter further and replied that as the Minister apparently agreed in principle to the establishment of a faculty of Arts, all that remained to be done was a matter of organisation. This could be carried out far more efficiently by a small committee of experts rather than the larger commission the Minister had in mind.\(^{(142)}\)

In spite of the Hague's disapproval the colonial government went ahead and appointed a committee to prepare a blue print. In this plan which was submitted early in 1930 the earlier arguments of the Director of Education and the Governor-General were repeated. Furthermore, in order to counter the 'intellectual proletariat' argument the committee suggested that the output of the new faculty should be limited by insisting on the highest possible standards and by setting difficult examinations.\(^{(143)}\)

After consultation with the Raad van Indie\(^{(144)}\) the Governor-General on 6 March 1930 telegraphed the Hague for permission to

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\(^{(142)}\) C.A. Gouverneur-Generaal aan den Minister van Kolonien, 22 March 1929. Verbaal 16-4-1929.

\(^{(143)}\) Nota van het Departement van Onderwijs en Eeredienst inzake de oprichting en de organisatie van een Faculteit der Letteren in Nederlandsch-Indie met kostenraming. Reprint from Djawa 1930 no.3, 9.

\(^{(144)}\) C.A. Advies van de Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie no.1, 28 February 1930. Verbaal 12 March 1938 No.12/229.
publish this plan. (145) Officials in the Ministry of Colonies, however, were highly perturbed about the way the question had been handled in the Indies and the colonial government was accused of trying to take the matter out of the hands of the Minister. Furthermore, it seemed that the colonial authorities were attempting to bypass at any cost the important question of how Arts graduates could be properly employed. The recommendation to restrict the number of graduates by imposing difficult examinations was unrealistic:

'It is desired to establish a faculty, but fearing that graduates cannot find employment their number is to be restricted by raising standards so high that only few students will succeed. In this way it is indeed possible to set up this so greatly coveted faculty, but the professors will teach before empty rooms....' (146)

The Secretary General of the Ministry of Colonies added in postscript that in the Indies officials had apparently gradually come to imagine that they ought to have a faculty of Arts irrespective of any considerations which might be brought against it. Although fully agreeing with the criticism of his departmental officers the Secretary General pointed out that as the matter had already gone so far all he could advise the Minister was:

(145) C.A. Gouverneur-Generaal aan den Minister van Kolonien, telegram no. 66, 6 March 1930. Verbaal 27 March 1930 no. 24.
(146) C.A. Ministerie van Kolonien, 4e Afdeling, Nota over oprichting van een letterkundige faculteit te Batavia. Verbaal 27 March 1930 no. 24.
To give your blessing to the establishment of a faculty of Arts...providing this is financially feasible and also if this will not prevent the implementation of other measures which are important from the political point of view....'(147)

This story of official deliberations concerning an Indonesia-centric faculty of Arts makes clear that the colonial rulers were confronted by a dilemma. On the one hand the Governor-General and the Director of Education supported the demand for an Indonesia-centric faculty of Arts because they considered 'cultural synthesis' as a remedy for radical nationalism, while on the other hand the fear of this same nationalism – which is implied in the 'intellectual proletariat' argument – caused the Hague to softpedal the issue as long as possible. The solution to this dilemma was shelved by the advent of the economic depression. Although the colonial government went ahead and provided 55,000 guilders for the opening of a faculty of Arts in the 1931 budget, this in effect was only a token gesture. As will be seen in the next chapter, the postponement of this project was one of the first economy measures taken during the depression.

The actual opening of the faculty of Arts only took place in 1940.

The Problem of Indigenous Literacy

One important by-product of the investigations of the H.I.O.C. was the highlighting of the sorry state of the vernacular education system and its failure to raise the indigenous literacy rate to any appreciable extent.

(147) Ibid.
As was seen in Chapter III, in the early 1920's the colonial government decided to modify van Heutz's system of village school financing.

As a result of this partial removal of the financial obstacle 2,980 new village schools were opened in the period 1920-1922. An economic slump in the following three years, however, forced the colonial government to reduce its expenditure on indigenous education to even below the pre-1919 level and between 1923 and 1926 only 300 new village schools were opened. (148)

The need for a more rapid expansion of vernacular schools was stressed again in 1926 by Welter, Minister of Colonies, who insisted that as the financial situation had improved, the 1927 budget should provide for the establishment of at least 600 new village schools. (149) This ministerial directive was received with little enthusiasm by the colonial authorities. The Director of Education pointed out that in Java and Madura 26% of children in the age group 6-9 years could be accommodated in village schools, but that only 22.6% made use of this opportunity. In the Director's view this meant that the retarded growth of village schools during the previous few years was not due to a lack of government financial support but that the main reason was the apparent disinterest of the indigenous population itself in

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(149) Ibid.
education. Therefore the minister's instruction to establish
600 new schools per annum was unrealistic and the Director
suggested that instead the 1927 budget should provide for only
450 new village schools. The colonial government agreed and
during 1927, 1928 and 1929 finance was made available for the
establishment of 450 new village schools. (150)

The greater financial involvement of the government in village
school education during the 1920's can be gauged from the table
below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rise in government expenditure, however, was still very
inadequate as was shown by the H.I.O.C., (152) which calculated
in 1931 that the costs of an immediate provision of village
schools to the whole of the indigenous population would be as follows:

(150) C.A. Nota van de 4e afdeeling over uitbreiding van het Inlandsch
volksonderwijs en bevordering van het meisjesonderwijs, 3 April
1929. Verbaal 5 April 1929, no.24.

(151) H.I.O.C. No.3 'De overheidsuitgaven voor onderwijsdoeleinden
in Nederlandsch-Indie' Table LXXXIV.

(152) Ibid., No.7a 'De nog wachtende taak op onderwijsgebied'
9, 14.
Million guilders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediate Outlay:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Running expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional Annual Outlay:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Replacement of teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in running expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to compensate for the growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, government expenditure in 1929 was still only one fifth of what was actually needed. The H.I.O.C. further showed that during the 1920's the expansion of village schools had only barely managed to keep ahead of the growth in population. In the period 1920–1928 the total number of indigenous children in the age group 6–9 years had increased on the average by 67,461 per annum as compared with an average annual increase of 74,254 children in the three year village schools. The commission noted that at this rate of progress it would have taken another 167 years before all indigenous children in the age group 6–9 years would have been able to attend a village school. (153)

In addition to the problem of finance there were a number of other factors which adversely affected the growth of literacy among the indigenous population.

One important factor which considerably retarded the spread of literacy was the large drop-out of pupils before the completion

of their course. In the period 1913 to 1925 on the average only 50% of the boys and 40% of the girls in village schools were able to reach the end of the second year. Again there was a considerable drop-out during the third year with the result that only 34% of the boys and 31% of the girls who had entered school three years previously, were able to obtain a final certificate (tamat beladjar). The results of the standard primary schools were no better. Between 1916 and 1921 on the average only 42% of the boys and 16% of the girls managed to reach the final goal.

In 1925 and 1926 an investigation into this problem was carried out by the Socialist orientated Nederlandsch Indisch Onderwijs Genootschap - N.I.O.G. - (Netherlands Indies Education Association). Questionnaires were sent to Indonesian headmasters of 483 standard primary schools and continuation schools in Java and Madura - that is one third of the total number of these schools - asking their comments on the possible causes for the unsatisfactory rate of production of vernacular schools. The various causes are tabulated below in the order of importance indicated by the headmasters:

(154) H.I.O.C. No.10 "Nadere gegevens omtrent het leerlingenverloop" Tables VI, VIII.

(155) Ibid., Tables I and II.
1. Disinterest in education on the part of parents;
2. Inability of parents to clothe and feed their children properly;
3. Child labour;
4. Pupils forced to work at home;
5. Unwillingness or inability of parents to pay school fees.

The vast majority of teachers in this sample were of the opinion that the only effective way to overcome the problem of drop-out was to introduce a system of compulsory elementary education. A panel of Dutch school inspectors to whom the N.I.O.G. had submitted the question of compulsory education, unanimously rejected such a move. Some of the more important objections made were the lack of teachers, school buildings and the financial inability of the government to provide for these needs in the immediate future. Moreover, the underdeveloped state of the rural economy not only prevented any further increases in the financial burden on the village, but also parents could be expected to resist strongly any attempt to deprive them of the much needed help of their children. It was feared that compulsory education instead of furthering educational development would retard it because of increased parental resentment. As one inspector argued:

'...The demand for education in my opinion still exists to a large degree only in the imagination of some members of the Volksraad and prominent
In my opinion compulsory education is feasible when only a small part of the population needs compelling... I am convinced that... the introduction of compulsory education... would result in a tremendous number of infringements, which would have to be punished....

These objections, however, were rejected by the N.I.O.G. which stuck to its original program of a general provision of free, compulsory education irrespective of colour or class. It argued that the large funds needed to achieve these objectives could be found by raising taxes on the profits of European enterprises in the colony. At least 25% of the annual overseas remittances of European firms should be appropriated by the government to be spent on indigenous education and other welfare measures, while at the same time the tax burden on the indigenous population should be reduced. It was hoped that as a result of these measures Indonesians would eventually be in a position to set up their own industries. When this stage had been reached the government should protect these Indonesian owned enterprises by means of further increasing taxes on European firms or by even nationalising them. The N.I.O.G., however, was realistic enough to see that such a scheme for indigenous educational expansion could never be realised '.... Under the existing colonial situation....' (156)

Although during the 1930's the need for compulsory education was repeatedly stressed by Indonesian nationalists and more

progressive Europeans the colonial government stuck to its arguments that such a measure would not be feasible either for financial or political reasons. For example, Schrieke, Director of Education, argued in 1933 that compulsory education was out of the question because "...at present even a three year compulsory education system cannot be paid for...." (157) More fundamental was the controversy about compulsory education which occurred in the Volksraad in 1936 and 1937. In reply to a speech by Iskander di Nata the Director of Education, Idenburg, pointed out that:

"...In principle the government accepts compulsory education in every situation where already the vast majority of the population is convinced that its children need education. Then parents, who because of indifference or a lack of responsibility fail to send their children to school, will be serious offenders and they will undoubtedly be condemned by public opinion. In such a case compulsory education backed by legal sanctions is justified. But as long as the general public does not yet think this way a very large number of people would have to be compelled and punished for something which would not be condemned by public opinion and their own consciences as a serious offence...." (158)

Some Indonesian members, however, retorted that in many other fields such as health and taxation Indonesians were compelled by law to comply, although this also was opposed to their sense of justice. (159)

(157) Schrieke, B. 'Critische beschouwing van Dr. Kraemer's artikel: Het volksonderwijs en de crisis' K.S. April 1933, 155-156.
(158) Volksraad. Handelingen 17 August 1936, 979.
(159) Ibid., 1937, Soetardjo 299-300; Iskander di Nata 321.
Against this Idenburg argued that the introduction of a system of compulsory education would mean a fundamental change in colonial education policy. The village school had been envisaged from the beginning as an essential part of village life. The intention of the government has always been to reach this objective by gradually accustoming the population to the idea of a school. In the government's opinion compulsion and legal sanctions were not the proper way to popularise education. The fact that compulsion was used in health matters was different because in this case the safety of the whole community was involved. The taxation argument was also unrealistic because only with the possible exceptions of the most primitive communities taxation had already been known for a long time in Indonesia. In respect of education force could only be used when:

'...The community in general fully realises the value of a school so that the withholding of children from school will be an offence which must be punished by the authorities for the sake of the child. The government is also opposed in principle to the idea of using legal force as a threat without actually intending to use it on a large scale. This would decrease the respect for the law....'(160)

Another means suggested to ensure a greater retention of literacy was to increase the duration of village school education. This proposal also caused a considerable controversy. In 1930 Mansvelt, a senior official in the Department of Education, published an article on the educational situation in British

(160) Volksraad, Handelingen 6 August 1937.
India, where similar difficulties were being experienced with vernacular elementary education. He pointed to a recent report by the government of British India which concluded that in that colony:

'...Throughout the whole educational system there is waste and ineffectiveness. In the primary system, which from our point of view should be designed to produce literacy and the capacity to exercise an intelligent vote, the waste is appalling. So far as we can judge, the vast increase in numbers in primary schools produces no commensurate increase in literacy, for only a small proportion of those at the primary stage reach Class IV, in which the attainment literacy may be expected....'(161)

A number of educational experts in the Indies agreed that at least four years of education were necessary to produce durable literacy. Post argued:

'...With its three year course...the village school does not go very far. There is no guarantee whatsoever that it actually combats illiteracy....This applies even more in a school where most of the teachers have received...inadequate training and where irregular school attendance reaches unbelievable proportions....'(162)

Kraemer, a Christian missionary, wrote that the village school had been criticised from the beginning on the grounds that:


(162) Post, P. 'Het volksonderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie' (Mededeelingen van het Nutseminarium voor Paedagogiek aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam, no.21) 1932, 20.
A three year education is of little use; it does not leave a permanent mark. In particular this is so because the children leave school at too early an age. The expressed opinion of the department is that a three year education is quite sufficient. Opposed to this is the unanimous view of everyone who is involved in education....

In reply to this criticism Schrieke, the Director of Education, pointed out that the three year village school had been selected not only for financial reasons but also because the indigenous population in general was apparently not in need of any more education. Although it was fashionable to quote the opinion of education authorities in British India that only a four year elementary education could produce literates:

'The truth, however, is, that even a six year elementary education does not produce permanent literates. This has been shown by investigations in Europe. The retention of school knowledge is dependent on the use to which it is put by those concerned. It is clear, that in a primitive agrarian society, which consists mostly of illiterates and in which the practical need to read and write is still small, much of what has been learned at school, will be irretrievably lost....Yet the results of the three year system are not as sombre as some have pictured them: the recent census has at once disproved these pessimistic expectations....'

Schrieke apparently alluded here to a study by Brugmans, a high official in the Department of Education, who on the basis of the 1930 census had attempted to prove that the efficiency of the three year village school in producing durable literates was much higher than was generally expected.

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(163) Kraemer, H. *Het volksonderwijs en de crisis* K.S. 1933 No.2, 135
(164) Schrieke, B. *Critische beshouwing*... op. cit., 155-156.
his investigation to West Java, where census figures had shown that between 1920 and 1930 the number of Indonesian literates had increased from 356,338 to 783,734, or in proportional terms an increase from 4% to 7% of the population. From the 783,734 persons however, who had been counted as literate, no less than 152,463 had informed the enumerators that they had never attended school. As no similar figures were available for 1920 Brugmans assumed that in 1920 the percentage of literates without formal schooling was the same as in 1930. He then reached the conclusion that between 1920 and 1930 about 350,000 literates had been produced by schools. Furthermore, assuming, as the Census Bureau had done, that pupils in third class should be counted as literate, Brugmans — using a calculated guess — put the number of pupils entering third year of an elementary school between 1920 and 1930 at 404,000. Thus, there was still a discrepancy of 55,000 literates to be accounted for. Not satisfied with the gains he had already taken for granted Brugmans attempted to reason this difference away by declaring most of these 55,000 literates as deceased in the meantime. He concluded:

'...However tentative the calculations...are, it proves, that practically all pupils, who reached third class, were notified as literate in the census....'

In order to reinforce this conclusion, Brugmans further argued, that if entry into fourth class had been assumed as a basis for permanent literacy, then the increase in literates between 1920
and 1930 would have only been 150,000. But as the census had shown that actually 350,000 literates with formal schooling had been produced at this period, this indicated that a three year schooling must have had a far more positive effect on the literacy rate than critics had tried to make out.

Apart from the many calculated guesses there are - in the author's view - two basic flaws in Brugman's argument. First of all he had set out to disprove the criticism that a three year school education provided no guarantee for permanent literacy and it was obviously implied that most of the literates, who according to his calculations had received no more than three years education, would have been produced by the village school. But Brugmans fails to supply any proof for this deduction. On the contrary it could be argued, that these literates had attended three classes of a Dutch-language primary school or standard primary school. Actually this is even more likely to have happened, if account is taken of the fact that in these schools the standard of education and the quality of teaching was much higher than in village schools, which would have ensured a greater chance of permanent retention of what had been taught.

The second weakness in Brugmans' argument is the fact that his investigation was restricted to West Java. Even if his conclusions were taken to be correct then they still would not be applicable to many other areas of Indonesia, because in West Java - especially the Priangan area - schools had been established
since 1860. It could therefore be expected that pupils leaving school after three years would have less difficulty in remaining literate, because they returned into a more receptive milieu.

Brugmans, however, attempted to turn this last objection to his own advantage; and in a rather tautologic fashion he stated that this was:

'...A new argument against the opinion, that the knowledge gained at school disappears sooner or later. The older and the more widely spread vernacular education is in a certain area, the more rooted it has become in indigenous society....'

But Brugmans failed to elaborate as to how long it had taken for these schools in the Priangan to become effective. It was in fact just this ineffectiveness of the village school in raising the social and economic standards of the rural population within a reasonable period of time, which had caused many educationalists to demand among other improvements at least a four year elementary education. In the last analysis then the argumentation of Brugmans remains - to say the least - very unconvincing. Just as unconvincing was his final conclusion that:

'...The census contains an affirmation of the correctness of the education policy that has been pursued during the last decades....'

Looking at the actual census figures any objective observer - even in 1930 - must have been at a loss to find any reasonable justification for the self congratulating attitudes of Schrieke and Brugmans. The census was conducted in September and October 1930. Everybody who was able to write a short letter - not
necessarily without mistakes - in any type of alphabet about a simple subject was considered as literate. Also children who had entered third class of a school were counted as literate. (166) Using these norms an indigenous literacy rate of 6.4% was arrived at. As is shown in the following table there was a great deal of variation in the literacy rate in and between the various islands:

Geographical Distribution of literacy - 1930 (167)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Literacy Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Menado (Northern Sulawesi)</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moluccas</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Eastern districts of Borneo</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor and dependencies</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western districts of Borneo</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebes (Sulawesi) and dependencies</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali and Lombok</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java and Madura</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the Outer Islands</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Indies</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The comparatively high figures in Northern Sulawesi and the Moluccas were attributable largely to the efforts of the Christian missions, which had been working in these areas for centuries.

Also in the larger urban centres, as is shown below, the literacy rate was on the whole higher than the average, because of the greater density of schools in these cities and the greater response to education by Indonesians.

(166) Volkstelling 1930 Hoofdstuk VII, Deel I, 65.
(167) Ibid., Deel V, 83.
Literacy in urban areas – 1930

Makassar 12.7
Bandjermasin 10.0
Medan 23.5
Padang 28.9
Palembang 13.2
Batavia 11.9
Semarang 12.1
Surabaja 12.2
Bandung 23.6

The following table shows the growth of the indigenous literacy rate between 1920 and 1930:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Java and Madura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Indies</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(168) *Volkstelling 1930* Deel V, Hoofdstuk VII, 83.
From these figures it is not only obvious that a great deal remained to be done with regard to the education of girls, but also that an increase of 2.5% in the indigenous literacy rate over a period of ten years was — to say the least — highly unsatisfactory. At this rate of progress it would have taken another 374 years before the whole of the indigenous population would have been literate. (170)

The H.I.O.C. in its final report pointed out that if the government wanted to make any significant headway in the battle against illiteracy then education facilities should be expanded at a much faster rate. As Dutch-language schools and the standard primary schools were far too expensive, there was no other way open than to spread village schools as rapidly and as widely as possible. The commission believed that a rapid expansion of schools would be the best possible remedy for the problem of drop-out and the general disinterest in education at the rural level. In the view of the H.I.O.C., a retention of literacy was only possible when the child returned to a situation:

\[
\frac{A - B}{C} \times D = \frac{100 - 6.4}{2.5} \times 10 \text{ years} = \frac{93.6}{2.5} \times 10 \text{ years} = 374 \text{ yrs}
\]
Where it can retain and apply what it has been taught. Moreover, the more literacy is prevalent in the surroundings of the child the more the knowledge taught at school will be valued and thus the desire to take away the child from school will weaken. It can thus be expected that the drop-out in village schools will decrease in proportion to the expansion of this education. (171)

The commission also advocated that the quality of education in the village schools should be improved and that it should be brought as close as possible to the level of standard primary schools. (172)

These recommendations of the H.I.O.C. became official policy during the remainder of the period of Dutch rule. The Minister of Colonies, de Graaff, wrote in 1931 that the investigations of the H.I.O.C. had clearly shown that colonial education policy had run aground. On the one hand there was the Dutch-language school system, which was 'overproductive', inefficient and too costly, while on the other hand the growth of village schools was only just able to keep up with the population growth. Thus, in the Minister's view:

'...A steady expansion of the number of village schools and continuous care to improve the standard of education in these schools - although keeping in mind their elementary character - must in my opinion become a very important point in education policy during the coming years....As long as still two thirds of children of school age cannot even avail themselves of this most elementary education, as long as the increase of the number of children in village schools only barely surpasses the growth in population, and thus the battle against illiteracy is making only very little progress, I cannot find any justification -

(171) H.I.O.C. No.11 Eindrapport 1e stuk, 77-78.
(172) Ibid., 78.
'either from a social and economic point of view or from the point of view of indigenous educational advancement as a whole – for continuing to spend the largest share of the available means on a type of education which only benefits a minimal proportion of the population. Thus most of the effort shall have to be concentrated on expanding the number of village schools....'(173)

However, as will be seen in the next chapter, this policy statement of de Graaff was taken very little notice of during the years of the economic depression (1930–1936) when the need to economise apparently overruled all other considerations.

Similarly, the recommendations of the H.I.O.C. concerning the Dutch-language education system were not able to have a great deal of impact on education policy during the depression.

Chapter VII

The Impact of the Economic Depression

(1930–1936) on Colonial Education Policy

and Practice

As was shown in the previous chapter, the growing concern of educationalists and policy makers about the inefficiency of the education system in raising indigenous economic and social standards as well as the political implications of this in terms of the rising tide of revolutionary nationalism had caused the colonial government to reconsider its education policy during the 1920's. A blueprint for the necessary reforms had been presented in the final report of the H.I.O.C.

But as Brugmans(1) has written: the advent of the economic depression absolved the colonial government from making the politically difficult decision to act on the H.I.O.C. recommendations.

As a primary producer the Netherlands-Indies was hit particularly severely by the world-wide depression of the 1930's. The impact of the depression on the trading position of the Indies can be seen from the following statistics:

(1) I.J. Brugmans 'Onderwijspolitiek' in: 'Balans van Beleid' op. cit., 165.
### Netherlands Indies — Value of Foreign Trade

**1928-1936**

(millions of guilders)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export Value</th>
<th>Index 1928=100</th>
<th>Import Value</th>
<th>Index 1928=100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1590</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1488</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An immediate result of this decrease in economic prosperity was a drastic fall in government revenue from 835 million guilders in 1928 to 455 million guilders in 1934,\(^{(3)}\) while in the same period the public debt increased from 1,004 million guilders to 1,508 million guilders.\(^{(4)}\)

The financial difficulties of the colony were further aggravated by the fact that the Netherlands and its overseas territories remained on the gold standard until September 1936. Although as can be seen from the table above, exports remained in excess of imports during the depression years, this surplus was not sufficient to pay for 'invisibles'. In particular the remission in gold of charges and repayments on the heavy debt

\(\text{(2) } \text{Broek, J.O.M. 'Economic development of the Netherlands Indies', } 1942. \text{ Figures are adapted from table 13.}\)

\(\text{(3) } \text{Indisch Verslag 1939, 437.}\)

\(\text{(4) } \text{Ibid., 440.}\)
burden, seriously hampered an early recovery of the Netherlands Indies economy. (5)

In order to avoid bankruptcy the colonial government was forced to take remedial action. In addition to the introduction of trading regulations and a policy of protection to foster local industrial development, public expenditure - including that on education - was drastically reduced.

Already on 6 December 1929 the Minister of Colonies had warned Batavia about the danger of a general economic collapse and he had strongly suggested that the colonial budget should take account of this. Following this, the Minister wrote on 10 October 1930 that his earlier apprehensions had been proved right:

'...It should be clear by now even to the greatest optimist that we are not dealing with a short term economic disruption...This is a general collapse which will severely affect the world economy for years to come....'

The Minister stressed that budget deficits should be avoided at any cost because the credit worthiness of the Indies was at stake. Therefore no new development programs were to be started and existing projects were to be slowed down, or, if possible completely halted. Concerning education the Minister wrote:

'...I do not have to emphasise to Your Excellency that I have an open eye for the very great importance which in many ways is attached to a steady expansion of all types of education facilities. Nevertheless,'

"I may not and cannot close my eyes to the precarious financial state of the country, which decidedly does not permit an expansion of education at the present rate...."

The colonial government therefore was requested to cut down the education estimates provided for in the 1931 budget, and it was to avoid as much as possible any educational expansion during 1932. (6) Again on 8 December 1930 the Hague repeated its demands for strict economy measures, including a 'reduction in education expenditure in all its forms'. (7) The resulting reduction in government expenditure on education during the depression years is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Government Expenditure (a)</th>
<th>Education Expenditure (b)</th>
<th>Index 1930=100</th>
<th>Education as % of total expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>523,876</td>
<td>55,296</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>481,596</td>
<td>55,285</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>424,877</td>
<td>46,501</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>378,160</td>
<td>38,986</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>349,956</td>
<td>33,071</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>316,107</td>
<td>28,037</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>338,166</td>
<td>26,176</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Net expenditure, i.e. income from fees etc. deducted.
(b) Net expenditure, i.e. income from fees, examination charges etc. deducted. It should be noted that only expenditure by the Department of Education is shown. Expenditure by other Departments on specific training courses is excluded.

(6) C.A. Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10 October Verbaal 10 October 1930 no. 23/754.
(7) C.A. Ibid., 8 December 1930, Verbaal 8 December 1930 no. 18/945.
(8) These statistics are based on tables 385 and 399 in: Indisch Verslag, Part II, 1935, 1937, 1939.
Thus, by 1936 education expenditure as compared with 1930 had been more than halved, while in the same period total government expenditure had only decreased by 36%. Initially a reduction in education expenditure was obtained by decreasing overheads without modifying the education system itself. In accordance with the Minister's request the original estimates for 1930-1931 were reduced by two million guilders. This involved - only to mention a few of the more important measures - the postponement of the opening/a faculty of Arts, the reduction of teachers' salaries and scholarship allowances. Savings were also made on teaching materials and a more economic use was made of existing school space by combining schools and increasing the number of pupils in each class. (9)

Increasingly more drastic economy measures were taken in subsequent years; and perhaps in some of these the influence of the H.I.O.C. recommendations can also be detected. The 1931-1932 budget, for example, made no provision for any further expansion of Dutch-Native schools. Furthermore, in the school year 1932-1933 thirteen Dutch-Native schools in smaller towns were transformed into standard primary schools in which Dutch was taught as a subject. (10) Also in the same year the curriculum of Dutch-

(9) Nota 4e afdeeling, Ministerie van Kolonien, Verbaal 13 December 1937-8/1170. Overzicht van de maatregelen die in de jaren 1929-1937 zijn getroffen tot bezuiniging op de onderwijsuitgaven....

(10) Algemeen Verslag van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie 1932-1933 XI-XII.
Native schools and Dutch-Chinese schools was changed to the extent that now instead of Dutch the vernacular or Malay was to be used as the medium of instruction in the first three grades.\(^{(11)}\)

Another important measure taken in the school year 1932-1933 was the transformation of 186 standard primary schools into village schools plus continuation schools.\(^{(12)}\) On the other hand a number of measures were taken such as the decision in 1931 to slow down also the expansion of vernacular schools which went much further than the H.I.O.C. had envisaged and which must therefore be solely attributed to the impact of the economic depression.

The colonial government, however, in its public statements emphasised that it attempted to achieve the necessary reduction in education expenditure by rationalising and not by drastically changing the existing education system.\(^{(13)}\)

In January 1931 Meyer Ranneft pointed out to the Begrootings-commissie (Budget Commission) that there was something seriously wrong with colonial education. Policy makers in the preceding years had aimed far too high and had erected an education system which was too expansive. Every time there was even a slight economic disruption education expenditure had to be curtailed. This was also dangerous from a political point of view, because:

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\(^{(12)}\) *Ibid.*, 1932-1933, XXXI.

'...It places the government continuously and unnecessarily in a state of accusation...' Meyer Ranneft argued that the economic depression should be taken as an opportunity to re-shape the education system and bring it more in line with the capacity to pay of the economy.\(^{(14)}\) The Budget Commission was in full agreement and in its final report it stated that it was:

'...Necessary now more than ever to effect drastic economies in the whole of the education system by means of an effective reorganisation, which without lowering standards will make possible a realistic expansion. The system which is followed now leads to such an increase in expenditure on education that it seriously obstructs the achievement of a reasonable provision of education to the indigenous population within the foreseeable future...\(^{(15)}\)

Actually plans for such a reorganisation had already been submitted by Schrieke, Director of Education, and were at the time - 1931 - under consideration. The Director proposed that there should be two types of primary schools, the Nederlandsche Lagere School (Netherlands primary school) to which only Europeans and upper class Indonesian children were to be admitted, and an Algemeene Lagere School (General primary school) incorporating the various existing types of elementary schools. The latter school was to be divided into section A and section B, each of

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\(^{(14)}\) C.A. Kort Verslag van de dertiende vergadering...24 Januarie, 1931 van de bij het Gouvernementsbesluit van 20 December no 2...1930...ingestelde Begrootingscommissie. Mailrapport 125/31 Geheim p.23.

which consisted of a sub-structure and superstructure (see diagram).

**Algemeene Lagere School**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section A</th>
<th>Section B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-years; medium of instruction: vernacular or Malay; Dutch taught as a subject.</td>
<td>3-years; medium of instruction: vernacular or Malay; standard to be equal to A I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Linking-class; one year to teach Dutch.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II</th>
<th>II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-years; Dutch as medium of instruction; standard to be equal to Dutch-Native School.</td>
<td>4-years; medium of instruction vernacular or Malay; Dutch could be taught as a subject; curriculum to be adapted to specific demands of region; e.g. agriculture, trade, industry.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Schrieke claimed that the main benefits of his plan were a better and cheaper selection of pupils for the Dutch-language school system, and a more economic use of available resources.

The Director pointed out that under the existing system it often happened that the top classes in Dutch-Native Schools were not filled and that neither the available teachers nor room space were utilised to full capacity. Under the proposed integrated system this could be overcome by channelling pupils from two or more sub-structures to the one upper-structure. Also teachers and class rooms could be shared by both super-structures A and B. Wastage
in student numbers could be brought to a minimum by transferring unsatisfactory pupils from sub-structure A to B, where they would be able to receive a rounded off education instead of entering society without any educational qualifications, as so often happened under the existing system. Furthermore, the exclusion of Dutch as a medium of instruction in the first three years of the A-division would take away one of the most important causes of the high failure rate and 'wastage' in existing Dutch-Native schools. \(^{(16)}\)

So far Schrieke's proposals can be seen as an attempt to realise the recommendations of the H.I.O.C. In one important aspect, however, Schrieke was completely opposed to the majority view of the H.I.O.C. Although agreeing that because of financial reasons the Dutch-Native School could never become a standard primary school for Indonesians, the Director considered an adequate supply of prospective Indonesian university students more important than the undesirability of 'overproduction' and the devaluation of Dutch-language school diplomas. Moreover, Schrieke argued that it would be impossible to reintroduce the originally restrictive norms for admission into Dutch-language schools because if the government decided to put the clock back then:

'...Sixty-six percent of pupils in these schools would have to be sent away. It is obvious that such a radical interference in well established rights is impossible....'

\(^{(16)}\) C.A. Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst aan den Gouverneur-Generaal 28 February 1930 no.79x/A. Verbaal 19 July 1930 no.27.
The existing situation therefore had to be taken as a fait accompli and the great variety of school types should be integrated into one, because social milieu and class - the main reason for this diversification - were in practice no longer used as norms for school admission. Ideally entry into Dutch-language schools should depend solely on intellectual capacity. However, if this norm was adopted a tremendous rush on the Dutch-language section could be expected. To prevent this Schrieke suggested the levying of high school fees. (17)

The Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) was in general agreement. It did suggest, however, that more effective measures were needed to curb the influx of pupils into the Dutch-language section, although it realised that a too drastic restriction would be dangerous politically. No final decision, however, should be taken on the plan until after the recommendations of the H.I.O.C. had been published. The council concluded that previous consultation with the metropolitan government was not necessary because under the constitution educational affairs came under colonial jurisdiction. (18)

This procedure elicited a severe reprimand from the Hague, and the colonial government was ordered to take no further action on educational reorganisation until consultation had taken place with the Minister. Not only was the Minister irritated about the

(17) Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst...28 February 1930 op. cit.
(18) C.A. Advies van de Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie no.1, 30 May 1930. Verbaal 19 July 1930 no.27.
colonial government's attempt to keep matters within its own hands, but he was also very critical of the Schrieke plan as such. (19)

The reasons for the rejection of Schrieke's plan were set out in a lengthy ministerial despatch of 8th August 1931. The Minister pointed out that in his view the necessity of a reorientation in the educational field had been brought to the fore by the Dutch-Native school problem. There was no reason to reorganise the European primary school or the vernacular schools, because such revision would be damaging to normal educational development. Schrieke had apparently lost sight of this essential point, as his plan was unnecessarily comprehensive.

In the Minister's opinion the investigations of the H.I.O.C. had shown clearly that the existing policy of expanding the Dutch-language school system was running into insurmountable difficulties of finance and of finding adequate staff and that this system had proved to be highly inefficient both in terms of productivity and indigenous socio-economic advancement. The costly Dutch-language schools were only benefiting a very small segment of the indigenous population, while at the same time the vernacular school system was only making very little headway in combatting illiteracy.

(9) C.A. Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal 19 July 1930. Telegram no. 150. Verbaal 19 July no. 27. The draft of this telegram was annotated by the Ministry as follows: '.....The Raad van N.I.....dares to assert boldly that matters could well be settled without consultation with the supreme government.....A serious warning in this matter is necessary....'
According to the Minister colonial education policy had obviously run aground, and the problem should be tackled at its roots in the sense that the size of the Dutch-language school apparatus should be cut back so that its cost should not exceed either financial or staffing possibilities. Moreover, the productive efficiency of the system would have to be greatly improved. The Minister's major criticism of Schrieke's plan was that it failed to comply with these conditions. This was especially so in regard to the demand that the cost of the education system should be brought into line with the capacity to pay of the colonial economy.

Although agreeing that a better selection procedure and a more economic use of existing resources — the two outstanding features of Schrieke's plan — would undoubtedly reduce expenditure, the Minister saw these economies only as temporary. As soon as the latent capacity of the existing system would have been fully utilised — which would happen within a short time — a steep rise in costs was bound to reoccur again if no severe restrictions were applied on the admission of Indonesians into Dutch-language schools. Instead of reducing this influx Schrieke's plan tended to work the other way. (20)

The Minister therefore proposed another plan which envisaged a considerable modification of the existing Dutch-language primary

(20) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 8 August 1931 in: van der Wal op. cit., 492-507.
The only school to remain intact was the European Primary School which would continue to cater for European and upper-class Indonesian children. The education system proposed for middle and lower-class Indonesian children is outlined in the following diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village school; 3 years; vernacular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government school 2nd. class;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 years; vernacular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking class; one year;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to teach rudimentaries of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Dutch language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government school 1st class;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4 years; vernacular; Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taught as a subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-year school with Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as language of instruction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mulo**

**A.M.S.**

**University**

In principle the three-year village school would have to suffice for the vast majority of Indonesian children. Stressing the importance of a more rapid increase in indigenous literacy the Minister laid down that in future education policy should concentrate on expanding the size and the quality of the village school system.

To restrict the entry of Indonesian children in Dutch-language schools and to improve the productive efficiency of these schools the Minister proposed a strict selection procedure. It was
unnecessary for most Indonesian children who desired to continue their education beyond the village school to know the Dutch language. They should be able to satisfy their educational needs in vernacular continuation schools of two to three years duration (2nd class government school). Only the better pupils should be selected to enter the Schakelklasse (Linking class), a one year course of instruction in the Dutch language. After the completion of this Linking class a further selection was to take place. Outstanding students should be allowed to continue in the four year Dutch-language school, while the remainder could continue their education in the 1st class government school, a vernacular school teaching Dutch as a subject. (21)

The Minister's plan, however, does not seem to have made a great impact on actual education policy during the depression when — as already has been pointed out — all efforts seem to have been geared to cut down expenditure even at the cost of slowing down the vernacular education program the importance of which figures so prominently in the Minister's scheme.

On the other hand, in official statements in the Volksraad as well as in official correspondence of the time the impression is given that the colonial government was not only intent on reducing expenditure to the utmost limit but also that it was concerned to effect a fundamental reorganisation of the existing education system.

(21) Minister van Kolonien aan Gouverneur-Generaal, 8 August 1931 in: van der Wal op. cit., 500-507.
For example the Governor-General wrote to Colijn, the Minister of Colonies, in 1932:

'...Already before the economic depression commenced and there was no possibility to economise on the present scale, it was clear — also because of the investigations of the Dutch-Native schools Commission — that during the years unintentioned or unforeseen outgrowths had appeared in the education system...which necessitated a drastic reorganisation in the provision of education. This especially applied to Dutch-language education, which because of the unsystematic expansion of Dutch-Native schools and also because of a too liberal and difficult to control subsidy legislation, soon came to be disproportionate to the capacity of the Indies' treasury and the socio-economic need for Dutch speaking personnel. It was thus obvious, that the government, when it was forced by the depression to severely curtail education, it had to grasp this opportunity to introduce reforms at the same time. To a certain extent it is fortunate that compelling external causes instigated this action; without this stimulus this purging process would have taken much longer and the opposition would have been even stronger and tougher. But it had to come....' (22)

Further evidence for this is found in various submissions of the Department of Colonies. In July 1931 section 4 (4e afdeeling) of the Department stressed that so far as education policy was concerned:

'...The circumstances at present are the most favourable to effect a decisive change of course. The present depression will allow to get away with things which would be impossible as soon as the financial crisis starts to diminish even slightly. If one...lets this psychological moment pass by then the same opportunity will not return for years to come....' (23)

(22) Gouverneur-Generaal aan den Minister van Kolonien 29 September 1932 in: van der Wal op. cit., 562-563.

(23) C.A. Ministerie van Kolonien, 4e afdeeling, Nota hervorming lager onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie, Verbaal 20 July 1931 no.20.
Again in 1937 Section 4 in a survey of education policy during the depression years pointed out that:

'The following fact that must be drawn attention to and that is that in the period under discussion education in the Netherlands-Indies was not only affected by a financial crisis but also by a policy crisis. A change of climate so far as education was concerned had already taken place before the end of 1929 when the depression hit with its devastating consequences for Indian finances. Thus the depression was not the cause for this crisis in policy but it considerably sharpened it and hastened it along. When looked at in this perspective the whole complex of economy measures can be divided into two major parts which of course overlap and are interrelated at many points. Nevertheless this division is necessary to understand the policy which was followed. Some of the measures taken were concerned to cut down luxuries and unnecessary fringes... another part of the economy measures shows in addition to a considerable lowering of costs that it was intended to place more emphasis in education policy on the indigenous sphere....'(24)

In support of this last assertion the document goes on to point out that the expansion of Dutch-Native schools was stopped, that the vernacular was introduced as the medium of instruction in the first three years of the Dutch-Native schools, and that standard schools were replaced by village schools plus continuation schools.

The Department of Colonies, however, seems to have overstressed the positive character of education policy during the depression. In fact the statement that greater emphasis was placed on the indigenous sphere is highly debatable. What in fact happened was that the opportunity of Indonesians to receive an education was severely restricted not only by stopping the expansion of Dutch-

language schools but also by slowing down the growth of vernacular schools. If the Department of Colonies meant that greater emphasis was placed on Indonesia-centric education then very little evidence for this can be found. On the contrary, the need to increase the effectiveness of the vernacular school as a socio-economic lever and the need to introduce more Indonesia-centric education, policies which had been so strongly advocated during the 1920's appear to have been entirely set aside during the depression period. In a speech of 1933 Schrieke, Director of Education, tried to explain this as follows. He pointed out that the government had so far been unwilling to adapt this education system more closely to the indigenous sphere, because it was uncertain what form the future social and economic development of the colony would take:

'....The education system must take account of the structure of society....The direction in which society in this country has moved during the last decennia is determined by the dominant position of the Western top layer of the social pyramid, which is dependent on export trade. This Western element has created around itself a sphere in which it sets the norms and which forms an irresistible attraction to those who live in the indigenous sphere. This power of attraction is probably caused by the difference in wage levels.... The needs of the Western sphere determine the demands of government administration in the widest sense of the word....the technical and hygienic apparatus, the standard of the legal system, transport, etc. They also determine the norms to which the various employees and therefore the education system will have to comply....'(25)

This then was the reason for maintaining a standard of education in the Dutch-Native schools which was equal to that in schools for Europeans (concordanie beginsel). Schrieke stressed that this principle was not must an invention of the Department of Education, but it reflected the realities of colonial society. Indonesian graduates from Dutch-language schools were not able to find suitable employment in the indigenous sphere, and they were completely dependent on the Western sector of the economy. From this situation there had arisen the problem of 'overproduction' of Dutch-language schools:

...But this was not the problem that came about as a result of the depression. That was another problem; will this depression cause a change in the structure of society?... Will Western enterprise - which has collapsed for the moment - disappear completely, or will it be able to restore itself on a smaller and simpler footing? If the socio-economic structure remains the same then this means that Western norms will continue and thus nothing essential will change.... If on the contrary it appears that as a result of the depression Western enterprise can no longer exist even on a more limited basis, then this will have far reaching consequences for banking, shipping, transport, etc. The Western economic sector will lose its dominant position in society; it will no longer set the standard. In that case this country will no longer be in need of radio or air communications and the need for highly trained technical personnel will become small. Then society can determine its own norms, which, because of financial necessity, immediately can and must be very much lower. The socio-economic need to know Dutch will then be reduced to a minimum. This would mean a social revolution, which would result in a radical change in the education system....

(26) Ibid.
One thing, however, was clear according to Schrieke, and that was that the period of pseudo-prosperity of 1925 to 1929 would never return again. So, government expenditure would have to be reduced in line with the financial capacity of the economy. In respect of education the government had tried to achieve this by simplifying the existing education system. A principal reformation of the system should only be attempted when the economic situation had become more stable again. On the other hand as the Indies in the near future would undoubtedly be far more dependent on the home market, the government intended – as soon as the financial situation would allow – to concentrate before everything else on the expansion of the vernacular education system.

More to the point perhaps was the following comment of Idenburg, Director of Education, who wrote in 1938:

'....In many aspects the depression had a purifying and clarifying effect. It has led to the position that anything that is asked for is no longer given the same urgent attention automatically, as previously was sometimes the case. A great deal of weeding out has been carried out on the basis of utility and necessity. The pressure, however, of the financial distress was too great to allow education policy – in addition to this negative selection process – to express itself in bold positive measures....'(27)

Certainly most Indonesians and also a number of more progressive Europeans were highly suspicious of the government's claim that

in addition to economy measures also a reorganisation of the Education system was intended and they accused the colonial government of 'afbraak' of demolishing the existing education system.

When the government ignored this criticism a political crisis occurred in the colony culminating in the rejection by the Volksraad of the education estimates for 1933.

Many Volksraad members, although agreeing that economy measures were necessary, felt that the government was going too far with regard to the vitally important field of education, and they were strongly opposed to the severe curtailment of education expenditure in the 1930-1931 and the 1931-1932 budgets. When, however, the government in the middle of the 1931-1932 financial year introduced a supplementary budget reducing education expenditure by another 4.5 million guilders most Indonesian members and also a number of Europeans made it clear that they were no longer willing to cooperate in what they considered as the gradual demolition of the existing education system. The most important of these additional economy measures were: a further reduction in university salaries, an increase in teaching loads and the size of classes in all types of schools, and an increase in the proportion of Indonesian and Chinese teachers in Dutch-Native and Dutch-Chinese schools. Another measure which in particular caused a great deal of resentment was the introduction of a quota system for Muló schools and stricter regulations concerning the removal of incapable or unsatisfactory students from these schools.
Immediately after the opening of the Volksraad on 1 August 1932, Soetardjo severely criticised the MULO quota system. (29) This led to the adoption by the Volksraad of three motions (Soeroso, de Hoog and Dwidjosewojo) requesting the government to abolish these regulations. (30) Also, the decision to slow down the growth of the vernacular education system and to stop the further expansion of Dutch-language schools caused a great deal of opposition. Commenting on the government's argument that the provision of education should be reduced in line with the decrease in employment opportunities, the Indonesian member Soangkoepen retorted:

'...How is it possible to speak about a decrease of educational needs in this country when there are still millions of people who are illiterate? Can then the entire education system of the Netherlands people do nothing else than make indigenous children into educated paupers?...I do not believe that this is actually all that the government has in mind for these regions and their people, but that it is also of vast importance to develop the population to such an extent that it will be able to cooperate in the further development of this country, which undoubtedly can and finally must lead to its independence....' (31)

The explanation of the government that the various economy measures were intended at the same time to reorganise the education system on a more systematic and efficient basis was received with a great deal of misgiving in the Volksraad.

(30) Ibid., Handelingen 1932-1933, 21, 46, 58.
(31) Ibid., Handelingen 1932-1933, 791-792.
Many members were of the opinion that the various ad hoc measures that had been taken had resulted in nothing else than a decrease in the provision and the quality of education. (32) When the government persisted Wiranata Koesoema on behalf of the faction of Indonesian local government officials in the Volksraad demanded a continued expansion of vernacular education and Dutch-language schools and an amelioration of the MULO quota system. If these wishes were not complied with then his faction would be forced to vote against the education estimates for 1933. This stand was strongly supported by the nationalist group ('Nationale fractie') (33) and the N.I.V.B. faction. (34)

Following the rejection of this ultimatum by the government Wiranata Koesoema submitted the following proposals. The government should establish as soon as possible a commission to study and report on the educational problem. Such a commission should submit proposals for a reorganisation ensuring a satisfactory expansion of educational facilities in the near future and a closer adaptation of the education system to the needs of society. The commission should also be allowed to review the various economy measures that had already been taken in respect of education and the government should refrain from curtailing education expenditure.

(33) The members: Joebhaar, Koesoemooetojo, Moechtar, Soangkoepon, and Soetomo.
(34) Nederlandsch-Indische Vrijzinnige Bond (Netherlands Indies Liberal Union). Its members were: Fournier, Ratu Langie, Arifin, and Soejono.
any further until the commission's work had been completed. And, finally, the recommendations of the commission, which was to be fully representative of the various interested parties in the colony, should be accepted by the government as the basis for the reorganisation of the education system. (35)

These proposals, which commanded a much wider support in the Volksraad than the earlier demands by Wiranata Koesoema, were put to the government on behalf of the Indonesian local government officials group, the N.I.V.E., the Catholic group (Monod de Froideville, Kasimo and Pastor), and the members De Dreu (I.S.D.V.), Dwidjosewojo, Notosoetarso (C.S.P.) (36) and van Mook (Stuw).

Wiranata Koesoema warned at the end of his speech:

'...Finally, I must declare on behalf of the abovementioned factions and members, that although our point of departure is the present status quo this does not mean in any way an approval of the economy measures that have already been taken. It will depend on the complete implementation of these demands by the government what position will be adopted in the voting on the education estimates....' (38)

The government, although agreeing to establish a study commission, insisted that such a commission should work within

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(36) Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging (Indian Social Democrat Union).
(37) Christelijke Ethische (Staatkundige) Partij (Christian Ethical (Political) party).
(38) Volksraad. Handelingen 1932-1933, 1382.
the financial limitations set by the government. Nor was it prepared to bind itself a priori to the recommendations of such a commission. Commenting on the demands of Wiranata Koesoema the Director of Education, Schrieke, wrote to the Governor-General on 1 September 1932:

'*...The intention of this declaration is clear; a Commission is wanted, which would be given the task to devise a reorganisation of the education system and whose eventual recommendations would be automatically accepted by the government. In the meantime the government would have to halt any further curtailment of education and would have to nullify by means of a supplementary budget any economy measures that had not yet been put into effect. The emphasis of course was on the latter, because indigenous members – and this is sufficiently supported by past experience – are a priori opposed to any reformation of the education system....'*(39)

The government offer of an education commission without discretionary power failed to satisfy the opposition in the Volksraad, and on 26th August, 1932 this body rejected the education estimates for 1933 by a margin of five votes. Of the thirty-one votes against five were by European members: Pastor, Monod de Froideville (Catholic); De Dreu (Socialist); van Mook (Progressive Liberal); van Helsdingen (Protestant). Only three Indonesian members (Mandagie, Apituley and Sosroh dikoesoemo) out of a total of twenty-eight supported the government. (40)

(39) C.A. Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst aan den Gouverneur-General, 1 September 1932 no.282x/A Geheim. Mailrapport 909/32 Geheim.

In accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Indies constitution (Indische Staatsregeling) the matter had now to be referred to the Netherlands Estates-General.

Socialist spokesmen in the Dutch parliament had repeatedly criticised the colonial government's policy of economising on education expenditure. In the words of the socialist member Ter Laam:

'...The curtailment which is at present being effected in the Indies and which can be better described as the demolition of education' does not only damage the present but also completely spoils the future. The way affairs are being conducted in the Indies is far removed from a wise education policy. It is not at all surprising, that opposition has arisen in the Volksraad against this demolition....'(41)

The Socialist party (S.D.A.P.) at this time, however, had little influence on the running of affairs as it was in opposition to a coalition government of religious, liberal and conservative groups, led by the arch conservative Colijn.(42)

The only support outside parliament for the action of the Volksraad came from the Netherlands branch of the socialist orientated Nederlandsch Indies Onderwijs Genootschap, (Netherlands Indies Teachers Association). In its journal 'Het Indisch Onderwijs' it chastised the apathy of most Dutch political parties in respect of its colonial task:


In the Indies the axe was applied in an irresponsible manner to the highest interests of the country. The completion of the still so primitive and small education structure has been halted in the land situated around the equator, which already for more than 300 years is called 'Netherlands' Indies, but where only about 10% of the population has been in a position to obtain some education. What already has been constructed is in danger of becoming neglected. Educational expansion has been halted. The Mulo school was subjected to a quota system in the land 'of quotas and forced deliveries'. The standard and the value of the Dutch-Native school will decrease. The 'unchecked' provision of education was stopped. (The result is) a discontented department of Education, a discontented teachers corps, a discontented population. These are the first results of the bungling reactionary regime of the present....The grievances and abuses which in the Netherlands Indies have created a highly explosive situation can only be taken away when the House following the example of the Volksraad, will reject the education estimates. Such action would teach future governments a lesson, to take into account more carefully what is alive in the minds of the 60 million subjects in the Indies....'(44)

The article ended with the observation that in view of the political situation in Holland and the general apathy towards colonial problems the appeal of the Volksraad would be in vain.

In the beginning of March 1933 the education estimates for 1933 were passed unaltered by the Dutch Lower House after a minimum of discussion. A motion by Ter Laan to nullify the Mulo quota system was rejected. Instead the parliament sanctioned the establishment of a study commission in the form suggested by the colonial government.(45)

(43) Note: 'Quotas and force deliveries' refers to the period of the Forced production and Consignment system (1830-1870). cf. Chapter I.

(44) Het Indies Onderwijs, no.12, 27 February, 1933.

(45) van der Wal, op. cit., 570 note 1.
Het Indisch Onderwijs commented:

"...The appeal of the Volksraad to the Netherlands parliament has been in vain. Small minded politicians together with an almost complete ignorance of the situation in the Indies have made any radical modification impossible. This means that for the time being the development of education in the Indies is out of the question...In order to rid itself of all this unpleasantness the House has delegated the matter to a new commission in a form not desired by the Volksraad..."(46)

In the meantime the colonial government - apparently considering the decision of the Dutch parliament as a foregone conclusion - had already established on 22 April 1933 the Adviescommissie voor Onderwijs - hervorming (Advisory Commission on Educational Reform). In its final report, which was submitted to the government in February 1935, the commission noted that because of its composition from various political parties and other opposing groups and factions it had been unable to find any satisfactory solutions to the problems it had to deal with.(47)

During the remainder of the depression the colonial government continued to curtail education expenditure. The result was, as is shown in the following table, that the expansion of Dutch-language school facilities for Indonesians was almost completely halted:

(46) Het Indisch Onderwijs, 13 March 1933.
(47) van der Wal op. cit., 570 note 1.
Dutch-language education system: 1931-1937

Number of schools and Indonesian students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary schools students</th>
<th>Secondary schools students</th>
<th>University students (first year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931/1932</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932/1933</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933/1934</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934/1935</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>7,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935/1936</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>7,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936/1937</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>8,464</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The effect of the depression on vernacular education can be gauged from the table below:

Vernacular Education: 1931-1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Village schools</th>
<th>Continuation Schools</th>
<th>Standard Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pupils</td>
<td>Pupils</td>
<td>Pupils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931/1932</td>
<td>16,921</td>
<td>1,320,131</td>
<td>1,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932/1933</td>
<td>16,075</td>
<td>1,368,692</td>
<td>1,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933/1934</td>
<td>16,598</td>
<td>1,423,387</td>
<td>1,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934/1935</td>
<td>16,728</td>
<td>1,507,931</td>
<td>2,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935/1936</td>
<td>16,962</td>
<td>1,585,236</td>
<td>2,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>263,105</td>
<td>1,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the period 1931-1936 only 41 new village schools were opened. The increase in the number of continuation schools was due to the transformation of standard primary schools into

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(48) Tabulated from: Algemeen Verslag van het Onderwijs in Nederlands Indie, 1936/1937. Tables 6, 9, and 42.

continuation schools. The final result, however, was that in 1936 there were 498 vernacular schools fewer than in 1931. In the same period the number of pupils in village schools and continuation schools combined increased by 364,131. Subtracting the decrease of 330,317 pupils in standard primary schools a figure of 33,824 is obtained representing the total gain in vernacular school pupils between 1931 and 1936. Comparing this result with the H.I.O.C. estimate of a yearly increase of 67,468 children in the age group from 6 to 9 years and 112,490 in the age group from 6 to 12 years, it is obvious that whatever had been gained by the literacy campaign of the previous decades was rapidly lost again during the depression years.

Another aspect of depression policy which had serious repercussions on future educational expansion, was the curtailment of the teachers training program. The situation in this respect between 1931 and 1936 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production of teachers (all races)</th>
<th>1931-1936 (51)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vernacular teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-language teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931/1932</td>
<td>2,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932/1933</td>
<td>2,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933/1934</td>
<td>1,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934/1935</td>
<td>1,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935/1936</td>
<td>1,251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(50) cf. Chapter VI, 329.

Thus, the average yearly production of vernacular school teachers in the depression years was about 1570. This was nearly sufficient, if Idenburg's estimate in 1938 of 1600 teachers per annum is taken for granted\(^{(52)}\) - to cope with the yearly increase in the village school population. On the other hand, no provision was made to train the extra teachers needed to reduce the backlog of illiterates, which - as was seen above - had been increasing during the depression years.

One positive aspect of the depression was that it caused a speeding up of the process of 'Indonesiaisation' of the government service. While it had been government policy since the beginning of the twentieth century to replace Europeans by Indonesians in the civil service, this process - for reasons explained previously\(^{(53)}\) - had been very slow. During the depression, however, the colonial government was forced by the pressure of finance to fill as many medium and upper rank positions as possible with lower paid Indonesians\(^{(54)}\).

This increase in the socio-economic mobility of some Western educated Indonesians could not offset by far the tremendous damage done to Indonesian educational development by the depression. For example in 1930–1931 43.72\% of six year old Indonesian children

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\(^{(52)}\) Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst aan den Gouverneur-Generaal 28 November 1938 \textit{in}: van der Wal \textit{op. cit.}, 593.


\(^{(54)}\) Wertheim, W.F. 'Indonesian society in transition', 129.
attended all types of government and subsidised private schools as compared with 39.62% in 1934–1935. (55)
Chapter VIII

The Reaction of the Colonial Government to

the National Schools Movement

As early as the nineteenth century the colonial government had been acutely aware of the political dangers involved in privately run schools for Indonesians, and it had enacted legislation accordingly. Considering the extremely small number of Indonesians who had been able to receive Western education at that time, the possibility of Indonesians setting up private secular schools was negligible. Legislation therefore was solely concerned with Europeans who were involved in indigenous education and Indonesian Muslim teachers.

Article 126 of the Fundamental Law of the Netherlands Indies of 1854 granted Europeans the right to teach European, but not Indonesian or Eurasian children. To avoid the spread of ideas dangerous to 'peace and order' in indigenous society, an ordinance was passed in 1880 requiring certain political and moral qualifications for Europeans who applied for permission to open schools for Indonesians or Eurasians. This was followed in 1912 by other regulations specifying teaching qualifications in particular with regard to the Dutch language. The supervision of Muslim leaders was laid down in article 124 of the Fundamental Law of 1854 which placed non-Christian

(1a) Staatsblad, 1880 no.201.

(1b) Ibid., 1912 no.286.
religious teachers under the supervision of the local native rulers. Furthermore, an ordinance in 1905—the so-called 'Guru ordinantie'—required Islamic teachers to obtain written permission from the Regent or the head of local government to teach.

When the question of placing all Indonesian and Chinese private schools under government supervision was raised for the first time in 1914, it could still be dismissed as a matter of no great urgency. But when by the early 1920's radical Indonesian nationalists were extending their activities also to indigenous education, the government was forced to take action. In a report of October 1921 the Resident of Semarang urged the government to repress the communist controlled Sarekat Rakjat schools in his district. Again in February 1922 the same Resident directed the attention of Batavia to a newspaper report concerning the educational activities of Suwardi Surianingrat in Jogjakarta and he insisted that the existing legislation should be extended also to cover private schools run by Indonesians for Indonesians.

The Procureur Generaal (Attorney General) in a report about the educational activities of Communists in Bandung was also of the opinion that legislative action was necessary. Following this the Director of Education in a submission of 27 July 1922 to the

(1c) *Indisch Staatsblad*, 1905, no.550.


Governor General stressed that the time was now ripe for action because:

'...The S.I. school in Semarang and the teachers training school of Suwardi Surianingrat (sic) in Djockja (sic) are part of a destructive policy....'

The Director enclosed a draft ordinance which became law with only minor modifications in 1923.\(^{(lg)}\) The ordinance required individuals and organisations to notify the authorities of their intention to open a private school. This would enable the government to remain informed about the nature and the number of 'wilde scholen'. Furthermore, the heads of regional government were empowered under this ordinance to suspend for a period of up to two years any private school teachers whom they considered as political agitators.\(^{(lh)}\) In 1925 this last regulation was changed to the extent that even at the time of notification a prospective teacher could be refused permission to teach when in the view of the local authorities there were good grounds to believe that his only purpose was to engage in political activity.\(^{(li)}\)

In addition to the fear of political indoctrination in the 'wilde scholen', the colonial authorities felt that the inadequate standard of education provided in these schools could produce politically dangerous results. The Director of Education, van der Meulen, at a regional government conference in 1925 stressed

\(^{(lg)}\) Ibid., 367.
\(^{(lh)}\) Staatsblad, 1923 No.136.
\(^{(li)}\) Ibid., 1925, No.260
that:

'...The danger that can be expected from sub-standard education in a colonial situation is, in the first place, the discontent in which the disappointment of graduates unavoidably results....On the basis alone of what is known from the inspection reports of some of these schools...it is certain that this education must result in a great deal of disappointment for pupils and their parents. This disappointment leads to discontent which under the present circumstances will almost invariably be directed against 'capital' or against the 'oppressor', but almost never against the countryman by whom one has been fooled....'(lj)

One of the major causes of the rapid growth of the 'wilde scholen' was, according to the Director, the inability of the colonial government to provide the indigenous population with adequate education facilities. Under these circumstances the Director felt that the government had no right to interfere with those private Indonesian schools which provided a reasonable standard of education. In fact, civil servants — although unofficially should help these schools as much as possible. Only in the case of sub-standard 'wilde scholen' could the government take action; and the Director suggested that for the time being officials should restrict themselves to warning the indigenous population about those schools which were operating under false pretences. The majority of the heads of regional government agreed with the Director of Education and some suggested that licenses should be issued to private school teachers on the condition of certain minimum qualifications.\(^{(lk)}\) Also the Minister of Colonies in a letter of 5 January 1925 to the Governor-General advocated the use

\(^{(lj)}\) Nota van den Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst 6 January 1925 in: van der Wal op. cit., 380-381.

\(^{(lk)}\) Ibid.
of a licensing system. The Director of Education, however, was opposed on the grounds that the government in granting licenses to teachers, who were not fully qualified, could give the impression of condoning this sub-standard education. This would greatly strengthen the advertising power of the 'wilde scholen' concerned. The colonial government agreed with the Director of Education and the question of licensing teachers in the 'wilde scholen' was dropped. (1m)

During the depression years, when public expenditure on education was severely curtailed, the number of 'wilde scholen' increased tremendously. According to a government survey in 1927 there were 573 independent private schools in the whole of the Netherlands Indies. (1) By 1937, however, the number of 'wilde scholen' had increased to 1,961. Divided according to type, there were 101 kindergartens, 58 European primary schools, 210 Dutch-Chinese schools, 854 Dutch-Native schools, and 266 vernacular schools together with 129,565 pupils and 4,982 teachers. Of these 129,565 pupils 4,337 were Europeans, 91,255 were Indonesians, 32,991 were Chinese and 982 other Asians. These statistics, however, are not complete because schools with a different program to that of government schools such as the Taman Siswa were not included. Adding another 20,000 pupils in Taman Siswa schools (2) we obtain a total of 111,255 Indonesian children in the 'wilde scholen'. (3) If this is compared with 81,492 Indonesian children in public and subsidised Dutch-language schools in 1937/38 (4) the extent of the Indonesian effort in 'self-help' is clearly shown.

(1m) Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst aan den Gouverneur-Generaal 13 June, 1932 in: van der Wal op. cit., 513-514.
(1) van der Wal op. cit., 466 note 1. (2) cf.
(3) Algemeen verslag...Onderwijs...1937/38, 150-157. Tables I-V.
Although the 'wilde scholen' undoubtedly made a significant contribution to the educational development of the Indonesian population, their effect on the general indigenous literacy rate was severely limited by the lack of trained teachers, teaching materials and inadequate accommodation. Government reports almost invariably complain about the low standard of education in the 'wilde scholen'. The Resident of Batavia, for example, wrote in 1934:

'....Non-subsidised schools - more commonly known as 'wilde scholen' - are abundant in this residency. Agreeing that indeed there are some schools...which approach the norms laid down by the government, it must nevertheless be concluded that the majority of these schools have a low or even a very low standard and that they are considered by their founders or administrators as commercial ventures....' (5)

These unfavourable reports by Europeans - who might be accused of a tendency to dismiss any sign of Indonesian self activity as inferior - were corroborated also by some Indonesians. The union of Indonesian government school teachers (PGKB) in a report of 1937 of a survey conducted in Surabaja was greatly concerned about the sub-standard education provided in many 'wilde scholen'. The PGKB stressed that although its investigators had used norms which were by far not as strict as those applied by government inspectors, it was still found that in 184 schools out of a total of 244 'wilde scholen' education was definitely sub-standard. Furthermore, of the 997 teachers only 517 were found to be fully qualified and in 38 schools accommodation was completely unsatisfactory. The report

(5) C.A. Memorie van Overgave van den Resident van Batavia L.G.C.A. van der Hoek, 20 August 1934. Mailrapport 1320/34.
concluded that on the whole parents did not receive value for their money and that improvements were urgently needed. (6)

Another instance of Indonesian criticism of educational standards in 'wilde scholen' is provided by Sutopo Adiseputro who emphasised this problem at the second National Education Congress held in Surabaja in 1937. (7) Further examples can be found in abundance in the Volksraad debates where Indonesian members repeatedly urged the colonial government to take steps to bring the 'wilde scholen' up to standard. (8) However, when the colonial government in 1932 introduced the so-called 'Wilde Scholen Ordonnantie' which—at least ostensibly was designed to deal with sub-standard private schools, such a tremendous uproar was caused in Indonesian society that the government was forced to withdraw this legislation.

As was seen above on p. 380 the question of licensing teachers in the 'wilde scholen' had been raised in 1925 but the government decided to drop the matter because it was felt that the licensing system might result in free publicity for the 'wilde scholen'.

The matter of inferior private Indonesian schools was taken up again in April 1929 by Hardeman, the Director of Education at the time. He pointed out that although no doubt proper educational qualifications should be demanded of teachers in 'wilde scholen'.

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(6) De School (PGKB journal) 27 August 1937 no. 45.


(8) cf. e.g. Volksraad. Handelingen 26 July 1938, Thamrin, 439-440.
there were a number of practical reasons which caused him to advise against such legislation. Firstly, government insistence on teaching qualifications - if they were worth the name - would put a serious obstacle in the way of private initiative in education. This was politically inadvisable, in particular with regard to such bona fide nationalist educational institutions as the Taman Siswa which were principally opposed to government subsidy because they wanted to remain free to pursue their own ideals:

'...Looked at in this light there is reason to ask if it will be morally justified to prescribe government standards...also for those schools which have been set up by Indonesians themselves because of a desire...to create an education system which it is hoped and expected will be able to satisfy national needs more fully....' (10)

Secondly, in obstructing Western-orientated 'wilde scholen' political dangers were involved. In their strong desire to give their children a Dutch-language education many Indonesian parents were willing to make great sacrifices to pay for an inferior substitute for the education which the colonial government was not able to provide. Any interference, therefore, was bound to cause much discontent which could easily be fanned into hate against the colonial government by political agitators:

'....Similarly to my predecessor in office...I must give a serious warning against the restrictive measures which - although motivated by the best intentions - will not be valued as such by the people. Just in these times of transition, which

'are marked by a seeking and groping for the best ways and means through which the awakened groups in indigenous society try to realise their ideal future, such interference seems to me...highly inopportune....' (11)

These warnings, which were to prove realistic were not heeded by the colonial government. The Raad van Nederlands Indie (Council of the Indies) although willing to take exception to the Taman Siswa and similar organisations, insisted that the 'bread and butter' 'wilde scholen' were politically too dangerous not to be dealt with. The council in its submission to the Governor-General quoted the following passage from a report by the Onderwijsraad (Education Council):

'...These schools are breeding a proletariat. They create a class of people, who consider themselves too good for manual work (which they were never taught and do not want to be taught) and who because of their defective education are no good for anything at all. The danger of these schools to the healthy development of the people may not be underestimated....'

Thus, for the council, sub-standard education as such was not the most important issue at stake. But rather the 'wilde scholen' had to be eliminated because they tended to nullify the measures taken by the colonial government to stop the growth of a politically dangerous 'intellectual proletariat'. Furthermore, as a considerable increase could be expected in the number of 'wilde scholen', preventive action should be taken as quickly as possible before '...the matter got completely out of hand'. (12)

(11) Ibid., 466.
(12) Advies van de Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie no.XXII, 4 October 1929 in: van der Wal op. cit., 467-472.
Subsequently, on 17 October 1929 the Governor-General ordered the Director of Education, Schrieke, to take further action in the matter. It was, however, not until June 1932, that Schrieke was able to submit a draft bill. The Director pointed out that if the same standards demanded in government schools were to be applied to the 'wilde scholen' then almost all these schools would disappear. Apart from the moral obligation to accommodate the displaced pupils from 'wilde scholen' in government schools, the whole purpose of legislation designed to improve the standard of education in private Indonesian schools, would be lost because:

"...The closing of inferior schools would mean that pupils instead of better education would receive no education at all...".

On the other hand, many 'wilde scholen' were guilty of misrepresentation, because the results of the education provided were often not in proportion to the fees paid by parents. In particular inferior Dutch-language education which was bound to cause disappointment and discontent, could not be condoned by the government. The purpose of the proposed legislation then was to curb excesses. It was clear that the 'wilde scholen' could not be expected to employ fully qualified teachers and to provide accommodation which complied exactly with government specifications. In this respect Schrieke agreed with the Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie that:

"...The main purpose of legislation should be to restrict inferior education. Much will have been accomplished already, when no longer practically everybody, qualified or not, can act as a teacher...." (13)

The new ordinance replaced the one of 1923 and introduced a licensing system. Anyone desiring to teach in 'wilde scholen' was required to apply to the head of regional government who, after consultation with the Inspector of Education, could refuse a licence either on the grounds that the applicant was politically unsuitable or that he had failed to satisfy certain minimum qualifications. Anyone desiring to teach in a private unsubsidised Dutch-language school should at least be in the possession of a government Dutch-language primary school diploma. Those wanting to teach in vernacular schools should have at least completed a government standard primary school. Schrieke stressed that licenses were not diplomas. They could be withdrawn at any time, and they were only an indication that the government had no objections to the license holder teaching in a 'wilde scholen'.

The new ordinance also dealt with the problem of misrepresentation. Many 'wilde scholen' were designated as Dutch-Native School (H.I.S.), although the standard of education they provided was usually far below that in the government H.I.S. To stop this abuse, the ordinance stipulated that no private school could be founded or continue its existence unless it had received official recognition by the head of regional government. This certificate of recognition was to specify the educational status of the school concerned. Under no circumstance would a private school be allowed to carry a designation such as H.I.S. or MULO unless the standard of education offered was equal to that of the respective government counterpart. Any breach of the regulation in this respect would
be punished by the closing of the school concerned.  

The ordinance was submitted to the Volksraad on 13 August 1932 where it met with a great deal of opposition from the majority of Indonesian members. Although agreeing that some government control was necessary, the view was taken that the ordinance went too far and it was feared that it would curtail private Indonesian initiative in education too drastically. Soangkoepo was of the opinion that the proposed legislation would have been reasonable if the government had been able to provide the whole of the indigenous population with proper education facilities. As this, however, was not the case, any obstruction to the 'wilde scholen' was irresponsible. Any education, however insignificant, would be of value to the Indonesian people. Admitting that the government should have the right to interfere in the case of politically dangerous schools, Soangkoepo pointed out that for that purpose adequate provisions had already been made in the ordinance of 1923. But if the government went further than that, then it:

'... Denies the importance of parental rights. ... No matter how good the government's intentions are regarding the welfare of indigenous children, it will never be able to take the place of the parents of these children. The government surely does not believe that indigenous parents are so backward that they cannot see that some schools are dangerous and harmful to their children?... Even an animal knows what is best for its offspring. Thus the reason why parents cannot give the best education to their children is their inability to do so, but not because they are stupid and unwilling. Further-

(14) Directeur van Onderwijs... 13 June 1932 op. cit.
'more, the government can always advise the parents on what is important for their children, but in my opinion it has no right to subject parents or private teachers to demands, which they cannot or find it difficult to comply with, while the government cannot give any financial assistance. One cannot forbid a patient to go to a quack, when a doctor prescribes medicines which he cannot possibly pay for...'

Iskander di Nata proposed that if the government claimed the right to close schools, it should also assume the duty to take over these schools, providing the school organisations concerned had no objections and the government was given a free hand to decide what school type – Dutch-language or vernacular – was needed in the particular area. (16)

Wiranata Koesoema feared that the ordinance as it stood would result in the closing of ninety percent of the 'wilde scholen':

'...In my opinion it is the moral duty of the government to provide these pupils who are dislodged with the necessary education. This would not be possible because of the depression. There is thus a vicious circle. The 'wilde scholen' are a result of the present financial distress. The present discontent about the inadequate provision of education by the government will undoubtedly become far more intensive when a large number of 'wilde scholen' will be closed....' (17)

An amendment, however, by Wiranata Koesoema, Iskander di Nata and the socialist member de Dreu, which was designed to replace the licensing system by a system where prospective teachers were

(17) Ibid., Wiranata Koesoema, 1577.
merely required to give official notification of their intention, was rejected in the Volksraad. On the other hand, three other amendments were passed. These were that only schools carrying the name of a government school would be required to ask for a certificate of recognition, and that schools could not be closed on the grounds that they were not needed in the particular area. Also interested parties had the right of appeal to the central government. The local authorities could neither close an existing school nor prevent the establishment of a new one while an appeal was pending.\(^{(18)}\)

The government accepted these changes and the amended ordinance was passed by the Volksraad on 9 September 1932, the majority of Indonesian members voting against it.\(^{(19)}\)

But also outside the Volksraad the 'wilde scholen Ordonnantie' (wild schools ordinance) caused a great deal of concern and many Indonesian newspapers took a strong stand against it. For example, the paper Sedio Tomo of 20 and 22 August 1932 featured a sharp attack upbraiding the government for its policy of 'demolition' and the new proposed ordinance which was designed to obstruct the advancement of the indigenous population.\(^{(20)}\) Furthermore, the paper Sinar Deli in its issue of 25 August 1932 protested against the licensing system for teachers, which it feared would especially affect the Taman Siswa schools.\(^{(21)}\)

\(^{(18)}\) Volksraad, Onderwerp 59, stuk 10, sub IV, and stuk 9, sub. VIII.
\(^{(19)}\) Ibid., Handelingen, 1691.
\(^{(21)}\) Ibid., 203-204.
After the ordinance had been passed by the Volksraad this opposition became far more intense. In the Sedio-Tomo of 28 to 30 September, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, the Taman Siswa leader, although agreeing with the need for some government control of 'wilde scholen' objected to the dictatorial way in which the government had attempted to foist this new legislation on the people. Furthermore, he feared that in spite of the assurance given by the government, the ordinance could and would be used to curtail the 'wilde scholen' as much as possible. Ki Hadjar Dewantoro ended this protest by counselling the Indonesian people to be patient and to remain strong of heart.\(^{(22)}\)

This was followed on the next day, 1st October, by a telegram from Dewantoro to the Governor-General condemning the government's action as a serious interference with the basic rights and the vital interests of the Indonesian people. He threatened that a large scale passive resistance action might become necessary.\(^{(23)}\) Ki Hadjar Dewantoro explained his position more fully in an article in the Pusara Taman Siswa. He wrote that it had become gradually clear that motions of protest would not influence the colonial government. If the danger posed by the 'wilde scholen Ordonnantie' was to be successfully counteracted then resistance was necessary which under the circumstances could only be passive in the sense of refusing legal validity to the ordinance. Dewantoro wrote:

\(^{(22)}\) Ibid., 235-237.
\(^{(23)}\) van der Wal, op. cit., 526 note 4.
I consider the ordinance principally as an infraction of the people's right to determine the way in which the children should be educated. Incidentally it is an affront to private non-subsidised education, because with this ordinance not only inspection is involved, but also the control of something which belongs to the people itself, which it has founded and paid for itself....'(24)

Dewantoro's appeal for passive resistance caused a tremendous reaction from the whole of the Indonesian population. It triggered off protest meetings all over Indonesia by nationalist and Muslim organisations. (25)

In order to stave off a general upheaval the colonial government decided to send Kiewiet de Jonghe, its official representative in the Volksraad, to Jogjakarta in order to discuss the matter with Dewantoro. During these discussions Dewantoro pointed out that the licensing system was a restriction of freedom of conscience. He had no objections to the previous system or against qualification requirements. In reply to the assurances by Kiewiet de Jonghe that the ordinance was directed against sub-standard schools and not against the Taman Siswa, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro replied that it was not the government but its officials whom he distrusted;

'...We cannot take for granted that these officials will be objective in the granting of licenses. Experience teaches us that by not granting licenses they will try to obstruct us in our work, and...

(24) Pusara Taman Siswa, official organ of the movement, 4th October 1932.

'education is to the Taman Siswa a religious task. To obstruct this would thus be a definite restriction if not an annihilation of freedom of conscience....' (26)

That Ki Hadjar Dewantoro was not overstating his case can be seen from government inspection reports of Taman Siswa schools. For example, a report by the Inspector of Education, Schuit, who visited a number of Taman Siswa schools around Bandung in December 1932, contains the following rather depreciating remarks:

'....Of the principles outlined by K. Hadjar Dewantoro in many publications nothing has been found in these schools....'

Obviously still highly indignant about his reception by one of the Taman Siswa schools which slammed the door in his face, the Inspector wrote:

'....To our question...what were the reasons for this uncivilised treatment, there followed an excited peroration about 'sama manusia' and 'Indonesia', the meaning of which escaped us....According to general opinion this little school must be considered as 'a political breeding place'....In most schools, exercise books contained songs such as Indonesia Raja and other hymns to Indonesia, which although literally speaking do not exceed the bounds of neutrality...have no other purpose than to educate children against existing authority....One of the pupils...had written an essay about 'The bird held captive in a cage' in which in bad Dutch and in a very bombastic manner he expressed the desire to break out of this cage....It seems very desirable to do away with this whole business which passes for education....' (27)

(26) Begeeringsgemachtigde voor algemene zaken bij de Volksraad aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 26 October 1932 in: van der Wal op. cit., 553.

In order to impress Dewantoro that the colonial government had no intention of hampering genuine Indonesian efforts in education Kiewiet de Jonghe showed him a draft circular which was to be sent out to the heads of regional government setting out the way in which the new regulations were to be applied. Dewantoro had to admit that the government had no apparent intention of destroying the 'wilde scholen' movement, but he still persisted in his opinion that the ordinance of 1923 could easily have been amended to include qualification requirements:

'...The licensing system to me remains a cage. The circular makes this cage more beautiful than I thought, it is even a gilded cage. Also the mangey birds have been removed, and care will be taken that the cage will be hygienic. All this in itself is of course very good, but it remains a cage. As a matter of principle we cannot agree with it. We keep hoping for a change in the ordinance which will meet our objections of conscience. The system of licensing is to us unacceptable in principle....'(28)

The most that the Taman Siswa could accept was a system of notification, as laid down in the previous ordinance, which would be followed by an official recognition of the teacher:

'...We do not want to deny at all the government's right to repress, but to ask for a license to carry out a religious task is repulsive to us....'

Dewantoro, however, agreed to explain the government circular to a Taman Siswa leaders' conference. This gesture on the part of Dewantoro was to no avail, and in a letter to Kiewiet de Jonghe

(28) "Regeeringsgemachtigde voor algemene zaken... op. cit., 538."
the Taman Siswa leader wrote that the conference was convinced of the need to:

'...Insist on a complete withdrawal of the ordinance, because neither the government circular nor eventual clarifications of the text would take away — as long as the principle of asking permission was maintained — our objection which is based on Right and Conscience.... Also your generous assurances, which certainly testify to your honesty and good will, were contrasted by our many striking experiences....' (29)

By the end of 1932 the nation-wide agitation against the 'wilde Scholen Ordonnantie' had reached a dangerously high pitch, especially because of the direct involvement of the radical political organisations. For example at the Bandung protest meeting of the Partai Indonesia (Partindo) held on 25 December 1932, it was stressed by Supono that the Ordinance obstructed the progress of the people:

'...We shall take the mask away from imperialism.... Slowly we have become used to a great deal...but this ordinance is the limit....Behind the curtains a real colonial play is enacted. It is our task to tear these curtains apart....The Government sets up schools ostensibly to advance the people. In reality the capitalists are in need of lowly paid wage earners. Then the depression comes. And nothing is more natural than to decrease the number of schools....Two different measuring sticks are used. In 1929 the expenditure on education for every European child was 47 guilders and for every Indonesian child this was only 55 cents. Is that just?....'

The speaker then went on to show the unfavourable situation in regard to literacy as compared with other Asian countries. He also pointed out the lion's share taken in the budget by the armed forces and police.

(29) Regeeringsgemachtigde voor algemene zaken... op. cit., 538.
The chairman (30) of the meeting stated that it was clear that:

The government was far removed from the people. If there was a popular government here, then the situation would be different. The government would have the duty to change these regulations, but they are not changed. We ask: is the Volksraad a truly representative body? The public answers 'Tida' (No). The police interrupts: 'Mr. Chairman stop provoking the public, otherwise the meeting will be dissolved'.

Also Sukarno had his say at this meeting:

Why should there be control over teachers who at the highest have 5 hours daily contact with Indonesian youth? Why is there no control over the babus (children's nurses) and house boys, who have far more contact with children? And why does the government not control the Kampung (native quarter) houses which are in a much worse condition than any school building? On the average the Indonesian pays 22.50 guilders annually in taxes as compared with 13.50, 9.60 and 19 guilders respectively in Hindustan, the Philippines, and China. Such is your fate, but few are your rights....' (31)

This tremendous popular outburst against the 'wilde scholen' Ordonnantie made the government realise that if it wanted to avoid a prolonged political conflict it would have to reconsider its position. Yet to give in publicly to this popular agitation was out of the question.

In the meantime, however, the question had been brought up again in the Volksraad. On 8 December 1932 Wiranata Koesoema asked if the government would be prepared - in view of the wide-

(30) The name of the chairman is not mentioned in this report.

spread popular demands - to return to the 1923 ordinance and
instead of licenses would request teachers to register officially.\(^{(32)}\)

As this proposal came from the Volksraad - a government organ-
and was not a direct result from popular agitation the Governor-
General considered this an appropriate moment for the government
to take the initiative again. He therefore instructed the Director
of Education to prepare a reply indicating that the government
would be willing to consider a Volksraad motion on the matter.
Schrieke submitted a draft reply to the Governor-General on 16
December which declared unequivocally that the government was not
prepared to give in to the radical opposition that had arisen and
replace the recent ordinance by that of 1923. If, the Volksraad,
however was of the opinion that such a revision was necessary and
could devise another system which would guarantee the same preventive
effect as the existing ordinance then the government would be
willing to consider a motion. The Director of Education commented
that considering the adamant attitude of Dewantoro he could see
no political gain in the Governor-General's move:

'...To give in any further to this agitation than in
the draft reply seems inadvisable not only for reasons
of law and order but also because the right wing groups
in the Volksraad on which the government is dependent
for its support would not understand. Even less so
would the European press....' \(^{(33)}\)

\(^{(33)}\) C.A. Directeur van Onderwijs... 16th December 1932 op. cit.
Also the *Advocaat-Generaal* (Solicitor-General) to whom the question had been submitted showed very little enthusiasm. In his view to elicit a proposal from the *Volksraad* to accommodate the objections that had been raised against the *wilde scholen Ordonnantie* would mean a serious loss of prestige for the government. A change of attitude by the government would undoubtedly be considered by the vast majority of Indonesians as a victory for Dewantoro and the national cause:

> '...The political leaders will also profit by this eventual quasi victory of Dewantoro....The danger to government prestige which is thus created is serious and causes one in the first instance to incline towards the view that any concession to the desiderata of Dewantoro should be rejected. Such a concession could furthermore stimulate the revolutionary movement to increase its courage and thereby achieve unity....'

On the other hand it was clear that the execution of the ordinance — in view of threats of passive resistance — would result in hundreds of convictions against school teachers, school organisations, the closure of hundreds of schools, and the frequent use of the press gag and other repressive measures. In the view of the Solicitor-General nationalist leaders would immediately seize this opportunity to prolong this state of tension as much as possible and they would undoubtedly join Dewantoro in his fight for freedom of education. The Solicitor-General pointed out that in view of the weakness of the police — which had been seriously curtailed as a result of the depression — the government should avoid a show-down. He suggested therefore that the new ordinance should be suspended for the time being and be replaced by the
previous one. In the meantime a carefully selected commission - which Dewantoro should be invited to join - should be appointed to study the question. (34)

During a special meeting of the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) on 23 December 1932 the Governor-General agreed with the advice of Schrieke that there was no need for the government to give in to popular agitation. But:

'...If this opposition came through legal channels, i.e. in the form of a Volksraad motion then the Governor-General would not be opposed in principle....'

Also, if the Volksraad suggested it, a commission along the lines proposed by the Solicitor-General was not unacceptable:

'...There is however yet another reason why His Excellency has changed his views in this matter. The ordinance has been presented as merely a matter of educational reform, but gradually the Governor-General has come to realise that it also can be used as a political weapon. If this was the intention of the designers then 'the Governor-General considers this neither necessary nor desirable....'

The majority of the Raad van Indie agreed with the Governor-General that the viewpoint of Schrieke, the Director of Education, to oppose as a matter of principle any alteration to the ordinance was incorrect and politically dangerous. (35)

Consequently on 24 December 1932 an answer was sent to Wiranata Koesoea: Popular agitation was no valid reason for the government

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(35) Notulen van de buitengewone vergadering van de Raad van Nederlandsch Indie... 23 December 1932 in: van der Wal op. cit., 549-555.
to change its stand. Yet the government desired to avoid any misunderstanding and wished to make it emphatically clear that no political intentions were underlying the new ordinance. The sole reason for this legislation was to counteract existing abuses in the 'wilde scholen' and in this respect the government was unwilling to deviate from its purpose. Leaving open, however, the possibility for the Volksraad to submit proposals for revision the reply ended:

'...On the other hand there is the question whether the way in which the ordinance tried to achieve the objective will be usable in practice. This is not a question of principle as far as the government is concerned....' (36)

Subsequently on 11 January 1933 a motion was put by Wiranata Koesoema in the Volksraad to the effect that the Wilde Scholen Ordonnantie should be temporarily replaced by the ordinance of 1923. This would enable the Volksraad to reconsider the matter and to find in cooperation with the government a way of stopping abuses in the 'wilde scholen'. It was further hoped that the government would be prepared to carry out an investigation into the grievances against the ordinance:

'...In order to consider the possibilities of submitting a revised ordinance to the Volksraad which would accommodate the desires of the various organisations....' (37)


(37) Volksraad. 1932/1933 Onderwerp 125, stuk 1-7.
This motion was passed by the Volksraad on 16 January and accepted by the government, which then temporarily substituted the legislation of 1923 for the wilde scholen Ordonnante.

The Minister of Colonies in a despatch of 16 January 1933 approved of the conciliatory attitude taken by the colonial government to the agitation caused by the new ordinance. He was very critical, however, about the inopportune timing of the legislation:

'...It is not really surprising that this legislation has caused unrest and resistance at a time when the government is forced to suspend or curtail the expansion of education...'' (38)

In the meantime the colonial government had decided not to wait for the submission of a new ordinance by the Volksraad. Although it was convinced that a solution to the problems had to be found, and in cooperation with the Volksraad, it was not the government's intention at all:

'...to make this body responsible for a revision of the ordinance or to hide behind its decisions. After all the government must take itself the responsibility for any further proposals. It only wished first to ascertain the opinion of the Volksraad. What is illegal activity outside the Volksraad can be submitted within it in a legal manner....'' (39)

Subsequently on 4 February 1933 a new draft ordinance revising the wilde scholen Ordonnante was submitted by the government to

(38) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 16 January 1933 in: van der Wal op. cit., 556.

(39) C.A. Algemeene Gouvernement's secretaris aan de president van de Volksraad 28 January 1933. Mailrapport 162/33.
the Volksraad. The licensing system was abandoned and the previous system of repression was reintroduced. The new ordinance was accepted by the Volksraad and came into force on 1 January 1934. (40)

In spite of all this manoeuvring by the government to avoid losing prestige, the united action of the Indonesian people had clearly won the day. Apparently the debacle with the Wilde scholen Ordonnantie convinced the colonial government that it was no longer possible to put an effective stop to the growth of these schools and that the only realistic policy would be to try to improve the standard of education in the 'wilde scholen' as much as possible. (41) The first step in this direction was the inclusion of a provision in the new Public Service Salary Regulations (H.B.B.L.) of 1933 granting a special allowance to Indonesian public servants whose children were educated in 'wilde scholen' which under the ordinance of 1933 were permitted to carry the name of a government school. Thus, sub-standard schools or schools which did not conform to the education program in government schools, such as the Taman Siswa, were not eligible for assistance under this scheme. The Director of Education wrote in 1935 that this new regulation had stimulated many 'wilde scholen' to improve their standards as much as possible. (42)

(40) van der Wal op. cit., 558 note 2.

(41) Opinion expressed by Dr. P.J.A. Idenburg during an interview with the author at Hilversum (Netherlands) in October 1963.

Indonesians, however, considered the granting of child allowance only as a token gesture. Especially in the Volksraad pressure was maintained to grant more substantial aid to Indonesian national education. The various proposals however, that were put forward could find no favour with the colonial government. In August 1933 for example an amendment to the education estimates requesting that government teachers training schools should be used to provide qualified teachers to the 'wilde scholen' as well, was rejected by the Volksraad. The Director of Education commented that the financial situation would not allow the government to expand its teacher-training facilities. Moreover, the fact that more than 800 trained vernacular schoolteachers and 250 Dutch-language school teachers had been unable to find work showed that the capacity of the 'wilde scholen' to absorb trained teachers was not as great as Indonesian members supposed. The Indonesian member Soangkoepon made the reply that 'wilde scholen' were widely advertising for qualified personnel in the press. But apparently teachers who had just completed their training were still hopeful of being placed in the government school system and were unwilling to teach in the 'wilde scholen' which in recent years had been given such a great deal of unwarranted bad publicity in the press.

Again in July 1935 Soangkoepon took up the issue of government aid to 'wilde scholen'. In addition to granting child allowances the government, he argued, should also pay a premium for every pupil of

(44) Ibid., Handelingen, 1934-1935. 791-792.
(45) Ibid., 878.
a 'wilde school' who passed the entrance examination for a government secondary school. Sutardjo added that as the government was not able to satisfy the educational demands of the indigenous population, it should do everything possible to help the Indonesian private schools. This could be done by providing cheap building materials and teaching aids, free medical services and advice on educational problems. The conditions for child allowance should be extended to include as many 'wilde scholen' as possible. Government aid, however, should be given without strings attached.\(^{(46)}\) In its reply the government indicated that it was unable to adopt these suggestions for financial reasons.\(^{(47)}\)

The colonial government had, however, been studying the possibilities for increasing its aid to the 'wilde scholen'. The Director of Education, de Kat-Angelino, had been requested by the Governor-General in January 1935 to investigate the possibility of reducing the amount of subsidy paid to recognised private schools and using the amount saved to subsidise the 'wilde scholen'.\(^{(48)}\) De Kat-Angelino was strongly opposed to this idea. He argued that this would mean a complete revision of the existing subsidy system and that as long as there were no pressing budgetary reasons it would be politically unwise to introduce changes which were bound to cause an upheaval. Teachers in recognised private schools would

\(^{(46)}\) Volksraad. Handelingen, 1935-1936, 381.

\(^{(47)}\) Ibid., 757-758.

strongly resent being paid at a salary level below that of their colleagues in government schools. A strong reaction could also be expected from Christian political parties and organisations both in the colony and the mother country. There was another problem, the fact that teachers in subsidised private schools received a government pension. The Director was also opposed to the granting of direct subsidies to 'wilde scholen' as such. He felt that there was no certainty that government subsidy would be used to appoint better qualified staff. Probably all that would happen would be that many unqualified teachers would gain a slightly higher salary. According to de Kat-Angelino the most important objection, however, against subsidising 'wilde scholen' was that this would be directly in conflict with one of the fundamental principles of colonial education policy which was to keep Dutch-language schools socially exclusive:

'...Dutch language education is not for the large masses, it is not popular education, but education which is only necessary and appropriate for those who live in the comparatively thin Westernised upper layer of Indies society....If Dutch language education is expanded beyond the need of this Westernised upper stratum then overproduction of intellectuals with its undesirable concomitant of spiritual deracination and social discontent etc. will occur....' (49)

As a result of these observations by de Kat-Angelino the colonial government decided to shelve the matter. (50)

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(49) C.A. Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst aan Gouverneur-Generaal 14 April 1935, no.9650/A.O.s Verbaal 5-7-35-8.

Indonesian agitation for greater financial aid for independent national schools continued. In 1936 the Taman Siswa started to agitate on the issue of child allowance. According to the regulations Taman Siswa schools were not eligible for this type of subsidy, because they did not follow the government curriculum. Nevertheless, some Taman Siswa schools had been given aid in this way, while others had not. On the insistence of the parents concerned the Department of Education had been willing — after inspection of the schools — to bend the regulations to the extent that Taman Siswa schools could apply for licenses to carry names of government schools. In 1936, however, the governing body of Taman Siswa decided to refuse to apply for licenses unless all its schools were allowed to do so. The question was finally settled after Ki Hadjar Dewantoro had been received in audience by the Governor-General in December, 1937. From the beginning of 1938 government officials with children in public, subsidised private and all unsubsidised private schools were eligible to apply for child allowance. (51)

The colonial government remained unwilling, however, to subsidise 'wilde scholen' directly until the end of its rule.

Summarising this chapter, it is clear that the 1923 ordinance was directed at suppressing any possible political activity in the 'wilde scholen'. On the basis of the available evidence, however, such a clear-cut answer cannot be given concerning the motives of

(51) Buku peringatan Taman Siswa 30 tahun... op. cit., 228-229.
the colonial government in introducing the Wilde scholen ordinance of 1932. One group of officials, notably the majority of members of the Raad van Indië, emphasised the political dangers of an 'intellectual proletariat' and they insisted that in line with the policy of restricting the influx of Indonesians into government Dutch-language schools also the growth of private Dutch-language schools should be controlled. Others, including the Governor-General and the Director of Education were apparently solely interested in protecting the population from sub-standard schools and thus avoiding possible political discontentment. Although the wilde scholen Ordonnantie was ostensibly only directed at sub-standard schools and misrepresentation, its actual effect would have depended a great deal on the judgement and inclinations of the particular head of local government. While the historian may have his doubts about the actual intentions of the colonial government, Indonesians at the time had no such qualms and immediately accused the government of attempting to crush the national independent schools. The story of the Wilde scholen Ordonnantie is important in the history of the Indonesian national movement, because it was the first time that ideological differences were set aside and a united front was created to deal with what was considered as a national emergency. It was also the first time in the history of Dutch rule that the colonial government was forced to back down because of popular agitation, undoubtedly a heartening feat to nationalist leaders in the 1930's when the freedom movement was at such a low ebb.
By 1937 the Netherlands-Indies' economy was slowly beginning to recover from the depression. As a result the strict economy measures of the previous six years were gradually relaxed and public expenditure – including that on education – was allowed to rise again to more normal levels. Furthermore, the colonial government was now able to adopt a more positive attitude again towards indigenous education, and attempts were made to repair the severe damage caused to educational development during the depression. The main point of this chapter, however, is to show how the colonial government – with the economic depression gone – tried to deal with such fundamental issues as the Dutch-Native schools problem and the indigenous literacy rate, which came to the fore again and were urgently in need of a final solution.

**The Dutch-language schools problem**

In a submission of November 1938 the Director of Education, Idenburg, pointed out to the Governor-General that a final solution to the Dutch-language schools problem was urgent. Idenburg argued that although the growth of these schools had been severely curtailed during the depression, this had not prevented Indonesians from satisfying their demand for this type of education. The rapid growth of the 'wilde scholen' with about 120,000 pupils showed definitely otherwise. Idenburg emphasised that he mentioned this phenomenon:
In order to demonstrate that whatever the government may think about the desirability of a Dutch-language education for indigenes, the people itself seek to satisfy this demand with such energy that the views of the government are no longer of great importance. We are in fact confronted with a problem for which a solution has not yet been found....

The Director was further of the opinion that the 'intellectual proletariat' argument, which had been stressed so strongly in the 1920's, was now no longer valid, because most Dutch speaking Indonesians were willing to work in lower positions and for less money than twenty years before. Discussions with Indonesian leaders had also convinced him that the motive behind the demand for Dutch-language education was no longer so much a desire for socio-economic advancement, but the conviction that this education was necessary for the intellectual strengthening of the Indonesian people. Thus, according to Idenburg, an over-production of Dutch-language school graduates did not necessarily mean any more:

'The creation of a group of half-intellectual proletarians. These people will be absorbed again by the economy, although not in the way the interested parties had initially imagined....'

This still did not mean, however, that the H.I.S. should become the standard primary school for Indonesians. The restricted financial capacity of the government - which had been the original reason for keeping this school socially exclusive - was still as important a factor as ever.

The only way, according to Idenburg, to put at least some restriction on entry into Dutch-language schools would be to
reintroduce Dutch as the language of instruction in the first three years of the H.I.S. Thus, a sound knowledge of Dutch could be used as the main criterion for entry. The vast majority of Indonesian children, however, would have to satisfy their desire to learn Dutch in the vernacular school system. Idenburg suggested, that in the future the much cheaper continuation schools, some of which had already been established during the depression, should become the standard school providing Dutch language instruction to the Indonesian population.\(^{(1)}\)

The Minister of Colonies, Welter, was impressed by Idenburg's suggestion to concentrate the teaching of Dutch in the continuation schools. For the rest he dismissed the Director's arguments. The essential point, according to Welter, to be realised was that for a long time to come Dutch-language education could only be made available to a very small proportion of the indigenous population: '....This fact determines the exclusive character of this education'. The question whether the major reason for restricting entry was financial or socio-economic was debatable and not of major importance.\(^{(2)}\)

To insist, as Welter did, on restricting the entry of Indonesians into Dutch-language schools without giving any further instructions as to how this was to be realised in practice, did of course little to solve the problem.

\(^{(1)}\) Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 28 November 1938, in: van der Wal \textit{op. cit.}, 580-616.

\(^{(2)}\) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal 12 April 1939 in: van der Wal \textit{op. cit.}, 617-628.
In the meantime, the influx of Indonesians into Dutch-language schools - as can be seen from the following table - continued to increase:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary schools</th>
<th>Mulos and other secondary schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935/36 74,803</td>
<td>1935/36 6,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936/37 78,184</td>
<td>1936/37 6,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937/38 81,492</td>
<td>1937/38 7,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938/39 84,509</td>
<td>1938/39 8,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939/40 88,223</td>
<td>1939/40 10,021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a long report of February 1940 Idenburg pointed out to the Governor-General that the situation was getting out of hand. Up to then it had been possible to absorb the ever increasing influx of students into existing schools, either by filling up classrooms or by adding new ones. The point, however, had been reached where many Indonesian children who were eligible to enter a Dutch-language school had to be turned away because of lack of space. A policy decision therefore on the future expansion of these schools was urgent. This, according to Idenburg, posed a real dilemma. It seemed irresponsible, in particular in view of the vast amount of work which still had to be carried out in eradicating illiteracy, to spend ever increasing sums of money on a type of training for which there was only a limited demand in the colonial economy. On the other hand there was the fact that the demand for Dutch-language education was very strong. It was politically dangerous for the

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(3) Departement van Economische Zaken...Onderwijsstatistiek...1939-1940 op. cit., Table 15 and Table 16.
colonial government to ignore this:

'...It is certainly not necessary for me to point out here that there is hardly anything about which the indigenous population is so sensitive as education. Colonial policy is almost solely judged on what it does concerning education. In the eyes of the indigenes education is the barometer of our colonial rule....'

The real problem, according to Idenburg, was no longer one of how to restrict the entry of Indonesians into Dutch-language schools, but how to find the necessary finance for the politically unavoidable expansion of these schools. Idenburg offered a three point solution. First, costs could be considerably reduced if the Dutch-language schools were completely 'Indonesianised', in particular when expensive teachers, imported from Holland, would be replaced by Indonesians who would be paid on a local salary basis. Such a policy would also help to meet the persistent demands of Indonesians for a greater say in the running of their country's affairs. So far the government had rejected these requests on the grounds that the Indonesian population was not yet ripe for self-government while promising at the same time that it would do everything possible to create the conditions necessary for speeding up this emancipation process. What the government failed to do, however, was:

'...To confess that it lacks the means to carry out energetically and speedily the measures needed to achieve these objectives. We are doing our best in the fields of rural economics, education, health, and transport, but all the time we are obstructed by our financial incapacity....Our debts, pensions, defence,
'and the securing of internal order cost already so much that it is impossible for us to conduct an intensive development policy. We simply do not have the people or the capital available. Even as it is we are sinking ever more deeply into debt....'

Idenburg was of the opinion that the time for action on the delicate point of an Indonesia-based salary system was opportune, because the government could still maintain with good cause that Indonesia was not yet in a position to rule itself. Moreover, Indonesian nationalists could be made to realise that such a policy would show the best promise for:

'...A quick ripening process. The idea that the price which the population of the Indies must pay for a speedy development towards independence would depend on the acceptance of a lower salary structure, is so logical in itself - and is also verified by experience elsewhere - that I consider it quite possible, that, when attention is drawn to this in a tactful but persistent manner, it will be acceptable to the interested groups in Indies society....'

The second part of Idenburg's solution was an appeal for a drastic change in budgetary policy. If a reasonable expansion of educational facilities was to be ensured in the future then a considerably higher proportion of government funds would have to be allocated to education. The Netherlands-Indies, which spent 9.3% of the budget on education in 1936 had fallen far behind its close neighbours such as the Philippines and Thailand which were spending 23% and 17% respectively. Idenburg further argued that in any case in a colony where education was sorely needed to activate a great deal of latent economic potential, expenditure on education should not be allowed to vary with the
cyclical movements of the economy, as had been the practice so far. If the existing system of financing was maintained only very little money could be made available for educational purposes:

'...This means that we will keep out of our reach the only real solution for our restricted financial capacity, i.e. larger revenues through increased prosperity and trade. This brings up the question whether as a matter of principle we are on the right track when expenditure which serves to strengthen general productivity and internal trade is put on a par with expenditure which is only concerned with present needs and interests....'

The third part of Idenburg's solution to the problem of financing the necessary expansion of Dutch-language schools was to give more effective aid to the 'wilde scholen' in such matters as teaching materials and the lending of qualified teachers. (4)

What is really striking about Idenburg's proposals is that they were so very much different in tone and purpose from the usual policy deliberations concerning indigenous education. While from the 1920's onwards - as was seen in previous chapters - an attempt had been made to use education to counteract radical nationalism, now the Director of Education argues that more money should be spent on education in order to speed up the achievement of Indonesian self-government. Furthermore, it should be stressed that Idenburg was the first senior official ever in the long history of Dutch colonial rule to argue that the socio-economic advancement

of the indigenous population should overrule all other policy
c onsiderations and that education expenditure should not be
 allowed to vary with the fluctuations in the economy.

The question to be asked, however, is how widely Idenburg's
 ideas were accepted in government circles. A search in the
 Colonial Archives for documentary evidence of the Minister's
 reaction to this very critical analysis of colonial education
 policy was unsuccessful. Considering, however, the reaction of
 both the colonial and the home governments to the Petition Soetardjo (5)
 and other demands by Indonesians for a greater degree of self-
government, the proposals of Idenburg seem to have been out of
 touch with the general trend in Dutch thinking at the time.
 Moreover, a government decision to completely 'Indonesianise' the
 civil service would have undoubtedly causes an uproar among the
 sizeable group of 'blijvers'. (6) It is highly unlikely that the
government would have risked a break with this group on whose
 political support the Dutch cause depended so much. On the other
 hand, Idenburg's proposals were in line with what had been happening

(5) Petition presented to the colonial government in July 1936 by the
Indonesian Volksraad members Soetardjo, Kartohadikoesoemo, Kasimo,
Batulangie, Datoe Toemenggoeng, Kwo Kwat Tiong, and Alatas. The
petition asked for a conference between representatives of the
Netherlands and the Indies to construct a plan for the granting
of self-government within a ten years period. The petition was
accepted by the Volksraad with 26 votes for and 20 against. The
Dutch government, however, was unwilling to grant permission for
such a conference and in 1938 when the question was brought up in
the Dutch parliament only two members: the socialist van Gelderen
and the Indonesian Communist Rustam Effendi voted in favour of the
petition.

(6) cf. CHAPTER IV, 160-161.
quietly during the previous decade, when as a result of the depression the rate of 'Indonesianisation' of the civil service had been speeded up. This trend continued after the depression and it is rather interesting that it was just Idenburg's own post of Director of Education which was the first top position to be occupied by an Indonesian, Loekman Djajadiningrat in 1941. No evidence, however, has been found that any attempt was made to put into practice any of the educational reforms suggested by Idenburg in the short time available before the Japanese occupation. The only exception was the Director's proposal concerning the 'wilde scholen' which fitted in with the thinking of the Minister. In 1939 Welte had written to the Governor-General about the 'wilde scholen':

'...It must be realised that at the present stage of educational development even this education...can have a certain value in regard to the intellectual development of the population. In any case a movement which has grown so strongly and extensively as this one cannot be any longer ignored by our government....'

The Minister added that ways and means were to be found to improve the standard of education in these schools to the extent that - without forcing them to conform to the curricula in public schools - they would become a valuable asset to indigenous educational development. (7) Thus, in 1939 and 1940 Idenburg was able to pay personal visits to a number of Taman Siswa schools, the Ksatryian

(7) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 12 April 1939 in: van der Wal op. cit., 627-628.
Instituut, and the school of Mohammad Sjafei at Kajutanam, offering without any strings to lend teachers and a free supply of teaching materials. (8)

The Battle against Illiteracy

One of the most serious results of the depression was, according to Idenburg, the complete stagnation of vernacular education. Idenburg estimated that to eradicate illiteracy within a reasonable period of time, 80,000 new pupils would have to be absorbed by the vernacular system each year. This meant an annual increase of 800 village schools and 1600 teachers per annum. (9)

These revelations came as a surprise to Welter, the Minister of Colonies, who had been under the impression that the vernacular schools had been able to make normal progress also during the depression years. Welter stressed therefore that in future all efforts were to be directed at eradicating indigenous illiteracy. This was not only important for the success of the government's indigenous economic development program, but also in view of:

"...The increasing international criticism of our colonial policy, in particular by countries which consider themselves as 'have-not's', the reduction of the percentage of illiterates in the Netherlands-Indies must be considered as a problem of the first order...." (10)

(8) Information supplied by Dr. P.J.A. Idenburg during an interview with the author in October, 1965 at Hilversum, Netherlands.


(10) Minister van Kolonien aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, 12 April 1939 in: van der Wal op. cit., 617-618.
This ministerial directive enabled Idenburg to take the matter firmly in hand and in March 1940 he submitted a five-year plan for the expansion of vernacular schools. As a first step this plan envisaged the opening of five new teachers training schools (five year course) and fifty training courses for village school teachers (two years' duration). From 1942 onwards, when the first group of village school teachers would have completed their training course, 1000 new village schools were to be opened every year. And from 1945 onwards, when the first group of qualified teachers would be available, 150 new continuation schools were to be opened each year. To enable local authorities to expand educational facilities at this rate, Idenburg suggested that the central government should reimburse all teachers' salaries in full and 5/8 of the building costs of village schools. (11)

The Director of Finance agreed in principle with Idenburg's plan; for financial reasons, however, he suggested that the annual expansion of village schools should be reduced from 1000 to 800. (12)

The colonial government agreed, and provision was made in the 1941 budget for the opening of 3 teachers training schools and 40 village school teachers courses. This would enable the establishment of two hundred continuation schools and eight hundred village schools per annum. (13) The only tangible result of this rather

(13) van der Wal op. cit., 689 note 4.
promising 'doorbrekingsplan' ('break through' plan) was the opening in 1941/1942 of 32 new continuation schools. (14) The implementation of the remainder of the program was prevented by the Japanese invasion.

The Vernacular School as a Socio-Economic Lever

Idenburg also attempted to take up again the policy of adapting education more closely to the needs of indigenous economic development. As was seen above, (15) in 1928 one year courses in agriculture and retail trade had been added to some continuation schools. In 1938 there were 140 of these courses in agriculture in existence. The courses in retail trade, however, had not been very successful and in 1938 it was decided to set up special two-year schools in retail trading. A course to train teachers for these new schools was established in Batavia and in 1938 the first retail trading schools were opened in Java. (16)

The continuation school also gave access to the so-called ambachtsleergangen, trades training courses of two years' duration, which were established in 1936. The skilled tradesmen produced by these courses, however, usually were absorbed by the Western sector of the economy. In order to stimulate indigenous industry the Department of Education decided in 1939 to send a number of technical

(14) van der Wal op. cit., 689 note 4.
(15) cf. HAPRER VII, 256-257.
(16) van der Wal op. cit., 600 note 3.
teachers into the field in order to act as technical extension officers. These teachers travelled around the country helping to set up industrial cooperatives and giving technical advice to existing indigenous industrial enterprises. According to Idenburg this experiment proved to be very successful.

Pupils who had completed a continuation school course also were able to continue their education at the Indigenous Mulo. The first one of these was established in 1937 in Jogjakarta by the Muhammadiyah organisation with the financial assistance of the colonial government. Other Indigenous Mulo schools were founded in Surakarta (1937), Bandung (1939), Bandjermassin (1938), Palembang (1938) and Surabaja (1939). In these schools Dutch and English were taught as subjects. In Java the local vernacular was the language of instruction and Malay was taught as a subject, while in the schools in the Outer Islands Malay was the language of instruction. The Indigenous Mulo was essentially meant to cater for the needs of the indigenous sector of the economy. Its program was designed to train pupils for leading positions in indigenous commercial enterprise. It was also envisaged that in future years the Indigenous Mulo would give access to more advanced vernacular technical and professional schools.

(17) Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst... 28 November 1938 op. cit.
(18) Information supplied by Dr. P.J.A. Idenburg during an interview with the author in October 1963 at Hilversum (Netherlands).
Another development during the last years of Dutch rule was the expansion of university education. The establishment of a faculty of Arts had been accepted by the colonial government in principle in 1931, but had been postponed because of the depression. A 1934 report on the future development of university education in Indonesia again emphasised the great need for the founding of a faculty of Arts as soon as the financial situation would allow. The question was taken up in the 1937/38 session of the Volksraad during the deliberations on the education estimates for 1938. In reply to Volksraad demands Idenburg stated that a faculty of Arts could not be done without; and in a letter to the Governor-General in early January 1938 he pointed out that the establishment of a full university could no longer be postponed. He further suggested that Dr. I.J. Brugmans, secretary of the Department of Education should be appointed to organise and prepare the establishment of a faculty of Arts.

Idenburg's views, however, again conflicted with those of the Minister of Colonies who was far less convinced about the

(19) cf. Chapter VII.
(20) Rapport van de commissie tot bestudeering van de toekomstige ontwikkeling van het hooger onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie 1932, 30-33.
(21) van der Wal op. cit., 629 note 2.
(22) Ibid., 644 note 1.
(23) Ibid., 629 note 2.
urgency of the matter. In Welter's view the restricted funds that were available could be far more profitably spent on the expansion and improvement of the vernacular education system. (24)

On 17 August 1938 the Indonesian Volksraad members, Thamrin, Soeroso, and Wirjopranoto submitted a motion to the effect that a faculty of Arts should be established by 1940 at the latest. This motion was passed by the Volksraad with 29 votes for and 17 against. (25) The government replied that it would take the matter in hand immediately without binding itself, however, to a definite opening date. (26)

In a report of 24 September 1938 Idenburg again stressed that immediate action should be taken and he reiterated his earlier proposal that Dr. I.J. Brugmans should be appointed to take charge of the necessary preparatory activities. Idenburg agreed with the Minister that the emphasis in education policy should be on the vernacular system. But he pointed out that the needs and desires of the comparatively small intellectual elite - the product of education policy in the previous thirty years - could not be ignored and should be catered for. Although these desires from within Indonesian society could not be taken as the sole norm for university expansion and employment opportunities for graduates

(25) Ibid., 631 note 3.
should also be taken into consideration. Idenburg added that:

'....The demand for certain types of education in itself is a factor which cannot be completely ignored without having to suffer consequences which from a social and political point of view could perhaps be even more obnoxious than an over-production of western trained young people. In this respect I wish to point to a phenomenon, which as such has nothing to do with the extension of our university education, but which is demonstrative in respect of the phenomenon which I have just indicated in general. I am thinking here of the development of the so-called 'wild' schools, which in my opinion are one of the most serious problems confronting education policy in this country....' (27)

Idenburg further argued that a great deal of propaganda was being directed at Indonesian parents urging them to send their children to universities in other Eastern countries such as Japan, Egypt and Turkey, because in Indonesia university facilities were inadequate. The political dangers involved were obvious. Furthermore, as a beginning had already been made with university education in Indonesia, Idenburg was convinced that:

'....This development may not be slowed down too severely and too artificially, because otherwise there will be the continuous danger that our very good system will be weakened by an inferior initiative from indigenous society itself. Thus the government in addition to an intensive education policy for the masses must continue to concentrate on the upper structure of our education system....' (28)

(27) Directeur van Onderwijs... 24 September 1928 in: van der Wal op. cit., 634.
(28) Ibid., 635.
Not wishing to under-estimate the danger of creating an intellectual proletariat, Idenburg stressed that in advocating the establishment of a faculty of Arts he was not so much interested in creating a new category of highly trained personnel, but rather in widening the scope of university education in Indonesia. The reason for this was that so far university education in Indonesia had been unbalanced in the sense that only doctors, lawyers and engineers were being produced. The last two categories of graduates - because of their training - were particularly prone to become completely estranged from indigenous life and culture. This not only causes an unharmonious development of indigenous society, but also made these graduates more easily susceptible to 'ideologies of a negative nature'. As Indonesian university graduates and students were very prominent in the political movement the necessity to ensure a more balanced and harmonious composition of this top group in indigenous society was obvious. A more Indonesia-centric curriculum in secondary schools and the establishment of a faculty of Arts with an emphasis on Indonesian studies would, according to Idenburg, go a long way in achieving this objective. It would not only complete the university structure, but would also enable various cultural and religious groupings within the colony to work within the university framework. In addition to chairs in philosophy and the humanities Idenburg also envisaged special chairs in Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam:
'...Here is a chance for the government to give a positive sign of interest in Islam. It is always extremely difficult for the government to do anything else on this point than to adopt a position of passive interest. Any positive interference, even a well willing one, is considered with suspicion in the Islamic world. Yet I am convinced that e.g. the fact that annually more than one million guilders is made available to the Christian religion while nothing is done for the Mohammedan religion will be seen ever more strongly in indigenous society as a favouring of certain ideologies which is no longer to be allowed in this country....' (29)

The faculty of Arts also was to become the centre of linguistic studies. This was particularly important in view of the future expansion of the vernacular education system.

Idenburg further suggested that instead of providing a complete training in Eastern literature and philology the faculty of Arts should combine with the faculty of Law to produce top administrative officers with a sound juridical and cultural and linguistic background.

Idenburg further argued that also from the point of view of international appreciation of Dutch colonial rule, it was important not to wait any longer with the foundation of a full university in the Indies. The Dutch term Hoogeschool, meaning a university institution specialising in one or a number of related disciplines, was often translated abroad as high school. This gave a completely false impression of the status of tertiary educational

(29) Directeur van Onderwijs... 24 September 1938 in: van der Wal op. cit., 640.
institutions in the Indies. Finally the fact that in indigenous society the absence of a full university was felt as a serious lack in colonial education policy was of great importance. Idenburg felt that: '....A gesture donating a full university to the Indies would be of great political importance....'(30)

The Raad van Indie in its recommendations to the Governor-General admitted the need for a faculty in the humanities. But it insisted that this university institution should be called a Faculteit der letteren en Wijsbegeerte (Faculty of Letters and Philosophy) rather than an Oostersche Literaire faculteit (Eastern Literary Faculty). Historically and politically the Indies were oriented towards and based on European, in particular, Dutch culture. An over-emphasis on Indonesian studies in the faculty of Arts would deny this fact:

'....A faculty of Arts...cannot and may not become an Eastern cultural centre because it would pose a danger of becoming a focus point of a one-sided nationalism within the walls of a government institution. Instead of reinforcing the Netherlands empire it would lead to its weakening. Especially this last consideration caused the Council emphatically to prefer a 'Faculty of Arts'....' (31)

The Council was also concerned about the employment opportunities for Arts graduates and it suggested that the proposed investigation should consider this point. Another matter raised by the Council

(30) Directeur van Onderwijs... 24 September, 1938 in: van der Wal op. cit., 644.
(31) Ibid., 646 note 1.
was that graduates in Indonesian studies from the universities of Leiden and Utrecht should be allowed to compete with local graduates for positions in the colonial service.\(^{(32)}\)

On 4 March 1939 the government appointed Dr. I.J. Brugmans to carry out an investigation about the organisation of a faculty of Arts and the employment opportunities of its graduates. Brugman's report was published in 1940. The occupation of the Netherlands by the Nazis in May 1940 emphasised the need for extending university facilities in the colony and the faculty of Arts was established on 1 October 1940. It was to provide training in the following disciplines: social sciences, Indonesian languages and literature, history, ethnology and anthropology.\(^{(33)}\)

Another important development in university education had been the opening in October 1938 of the Bestuursacademie (Public Administration Academy). The purpose of this institution was to train indigenous public servants at university level. A three year course in legal and administrative subjects was provided. Its graduates could sit for the Doctoraal (Master's) examination at the Law Faculty after having pursued one further year of study.\(^{(34)}\)

The government also planned to introduce in the spring of 1941 an ordinance to the Volksraad for the purpose of setting up a complete university. This university would comprise in addition to

\(^{(32)}\) van der Wal \textit{op. cit.}, 649 note 1.

\(^{(33)}\) Ibid., 649 note 2.

\(^{(34)}\) Ibid., 643 note 1.
the existing faculties of Law, Medicine, Engineering, Arts and the Bestuursacademie also a Faculty of Agriculture which would provide training in agricultural science, forestry, veterinary science and biology. But the German occupation of the Netherlands left no time for the necessary preparation to establish an integrated university. The Faculty of Agriculture was, therefore, established as a separate institute on 1 September 1941. A draft ordinance to combine the various independent faculties into a University of the Indies was submitted, however, to the Volksraad in December 1941. The Japanese invasion prevented the passage of this bill and it was not until 1947 - during the brief period of Dutch post-war rule - that the University of Indonesia was founded.\(^{(35)}\)

Summarising this chapter, the period of the economic depression had been too negative in character to allow a final decision on the important educational problems that had arisen during the 1920's. In the period 1937-1942, however, when the overruling need to economise was gradually subsiding, these issues came to the fore again urgently demanding a solution.

Idenburg's solution to the crucial Dutch-language schools problem was apparently out of touch with the realities of Dutch colonial policy at the time and was too drastic to be acceptable. With the notable exception of university education, the attitude of the colonial government towards Dutch-language education for

\(^{(35)}\) van der Wal \textit{op. cit.}, 649-650 note 2.
Indonesians remained as ambivalent as it ever had been during the history of Dutch rule.

The government's attitude towards vernacular education was far more positive. And the trend towards 'Indonesianisation' or 'dualism', which had emerged during the 1920's, was continued. This can be seen from the greater emphasis placed on widening the scope of the vernacular system and the establishment of vernacular Mulo schools. Furthermore, very promising for indigenous educational development was Idenburg's 'break-through' plan.

The colonial era in Indonesian history, however, came to an end before these policies could be implemented.
Conclusion

The history of Dutch policy towards the indigenous population in the Indies is characterised by long periods of strict non-interference in native affairs interspersed with short bursts of civilising activity. In general this meant that periods in which Dutch self-interest reigned supreme were followed by usually shorter intervals of repentance and a genuine willingness to improve the social and economic situation of the Indonesian people. The number of unselfish Dutch colonial reformers, however, always remained small and their policies, if acceptable at all, were usually quickly put aside again as soon as it became apparent that they would be damaging to the economic and political interests of the colonial ruling classes. It is therefore impossible to discern in the native policies of the Dutch a straight line of development towards a definite objective. In particular in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when more interest was taken in the advancement of the indigenous population, there was a continuous shifting in purpose and method. This vacillating nature of colonial policy remained a marked feature of Dutch rule until the end.

The 'Ethical era in Dutch colonial policy can be described as a period of 'repentance', although certain important economic motives underlying this policy cannot be denied. The 'Ethical' policy, however, did not really change fundamentally - and in
fact did not want to do so – the economic structure of the Indies. Similarly, 'Ethical' education policy was concerned to maintain the socio-economic status quo in the colony as much as possible, and the indigenous population was only allowed a very restricted degree of social mobility. This is evident from the 'pluralist' nature of the education system which was designed to provide for specific class needs, and also from the principle of concordantie which distinctly favoured the upper-crust in colonial society: the Dutch, the Eurasians, and the upper-class Indonesians.

On the other hand, 'Ethical' education policy created a small but nevertheless vociferous and politically influential new elite of Western educated Indonesians who did not feel at home in the existing colonial status system. The attempts of this new elite to gain proper social and economic recognition within the existing colonial status system caused a great deal of friction. The indigenous nobility, adat chiefs, and the European 'blijvers' group – especially the recently emancipated Eurasians – felt threatened in their privileged position, and tried to obstruct as much as possible the official policy of 'Indianisatie' of the colonial civil service. Thus, frustrated in their ambitions a number of Western educated Indonesians turned to nationalism as a solution to their problems. From 1918 onwards Indonesian nationalism was becoming increasingly more radical, largely because of the growing impact of Marxism. This craving of
Western educated Indonesians for equality with Europeans also manifested itself in a strong preference on the part of Indonesians to enter a Dutch-language school. Most Indonesians, however, seem to have been solely concerned to advance themselves in this way on the existing socio-economic scale, because a Dutch-language school certificate meant employment in the Western sector of the economy and a higher social and economic prestige for the holder in indigenous society. Another motive — which became stronger when time moved on — was the strong desire of Indonesians for equality with Europeans. This strong demand of Indonesians for Dutch-language education persisted until the end of Dutch rule.

The response of Indonesian national leaders to Western education was far less unanimous. Muslims fearing both the secularisation effect of government schools and the increasing activity in the educational field of the Christian missions were the first to rally and set up a modern education system of their own. From the early 1920's onwards also cultural nationalists, concerned about the ever growing impact of the West on indigenous culture and civilisation, reacted by establishing their own schools in which a 'cultural synthesis' between East and West was attempted. Another group of nationalist leaders, however, considered Westernisation as the sole answer to Indonesia's problems and they severely criticised the colonial government for failing to provide adequate education facilities for the indigenous
population. Furthermore, some Western orientated political parties and organisations, such as the P.K.I., set up their own schools in which they tried to imbue Indonesian children — similarly to the Muslim and cultural nationalist schools — in their particular ideologies. Less idealistic perhaps and more interested in socio-economic advancement were the Indonesian parents who sent their children to the many 'bread and butter' private Dutch-language schools which were set up in large numbers in the late 1920's and the 1930's when the government decided to halt the expansion of its own schools.

It has been argued that although the 'wilde scholen' undoubtedly made a contribution to indigenous educational development, the political importance of these schools was of much greater historical significance. The 'wilde scholen' were an essential part of the nationalist movement and it was shown that many of these schools were affiliated with political parties. Particularly in the late 1920's and the 1930's when the political movement was at a low ebb because of severe repression by the Dutch, the 'wilde scholen' played an important part in keeping the nationalist spirit alive. The Dutch realising the political danger of the national schools tried to curb their influence by repressive legislation, although as was shown in Chapter VIII these attempts were not very successful. In order to silence the radical movement the Dutch, in addition to the use of repressive measures, also adopted a new approach in indigenous
social and economic development. The 'Ethical' method of direct Westernisation was condemned as ineffective causing a widespread discontent and turmoil in indigenous society, a situation in which revolutionary nationalism was bound to flourish. Critics argued that a mere Indonesia-centric approach would be far more effective in ensuring a harmonious and peaceful modernisation of the Indies. Both van Niel\(^{(1)}\) and Benda\(^{(2)}\) have shown that during the 1930's a policy change in this direction is noticeable in such fields as justice, agricultural extension, hygiene and agricultural credit.

One of the aims of this study has been to show that similar criticisms were directed at 'Ethical' education policy and that the colonial government during the late 1920's was in the process of preparing a fundamental change of direction in colonial education policy. There were various reasons for this. Many Europeans complained about the failure of the 'Ethical' education policy to create a greater degree of indigenous economic prosperity. A number of educationalists blamed this failure on the intellectualist character of the education system and on faulty educational techniques, and they demanded that curricula should be adapted more closely to indigenous social and economic needs. Other educationalists went further than that and singled out the Western

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(1) Niel, R. van 'The emergence...' *op. cit.*

(2) Benda, H. 'The Crescent and the Rising Sun' *op. cit.*
character of the education system and wanted a more Indonesia-centric approach in education. This widespread dissatisfaction about the 'Ethical' education system must, however, be seen in the wider context of the 'Zeitgeist' of the 1920's when many Europeans in the colony and the colonial authorities were growing increasingly more anxious about the radicalisation of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

The basic educational problem confronting the colonial government during the 1920's was Dutch-language education for Indonesians. Neys's thesis is particularly concerned with the problem of acculturation and he only touches on the Dutch-language school problem in passing. Brugmans and van der Wal, the only scholars who have published sizeable general studies of Dutch colonial education policy quickly skip over the political aspects of the problem and give the impression that the colonial government was forced to change course because of financial reasons and difficulties in finding adequate numbers of trained staff. These were undoubtedly important reasons, but from the sources examined it is evident that another important motive behind the agitation to restrict the entry of Indonesians into

(4) Brugmans, I.J. 'Geschiedenis...' op. cit.
(5) Wal, S.L. van der 'Het onderwijsbeleid...' op. cit.
Dutch-language schools was political. First of all the documents clearly show that many Europeans and also the colonial government saw a direct connection between 'overproduction' and the rise of communism. Meyer Banneft's 'economisch rendement' argument hardly features in secret government correspondence, while on the other hand the fear of an 'intellectual proletariat' is repeatedly stressed. Furthermore, the 'blijvers' group considered diploma devaluation as a serious threat to their existence as a privileged class. Thus, the agitation against the H.I.S. can also partly be seen as an intensification of the struggle of the 'blijvers' to avoid being swamped by Indonesian competition. The solution proposed by the H.I.O.C. was to halt the expansion of Dutch-language schools for the time being, to increase entry qualifications, and to channel the vast majority of prospective Dutch-language school students into vernacular schools. It was also pointed out that the majority report of the H.I.O.C. was too moderate in tone to be called representative of European opinion in the colony. It was argued that the minority report of Meyer Banneft was a far more accurate gauge of what the majority of Europeans felt. In summary, the solution of the Dutch to the H.I.S. problem was repression. The proposed restrictions on entry should also be seen as an attempt to dry up the supply of potential revolutionary leadership as well as an attempt to protect the vested interests of the 'blijvers' group. The unwillingness of the colonial government to abandon the principle of 'concordantie' certainly points to this conclusion.
The implementation of the new education policy, however, was interrupted by the economic depression of the 1930's and the pre-occupation of the colonial government, with financial problems was apparently so great that no positive education policy was possible. In fact, the urge to economise was so strong that even the vernacular system was made to suffer greatly, causing serious harm to indigenous educational development.

As was seen in Chapter IX, in the last five years of Dutch rule, when the financial situation had improved, the colonial government was able to adopt a more positive policy again towards indigenous education. The general direction of colonial education policy in the period 1937-1942 was towards 'dualism'. This is evident from the attempt to widen the scope of the vernacular system. It was also at this time that the first realistic solution to the Dutch-language schools problem was proposed by a government official. Idenburg suggested to 'Indonesianise' the education system, the civil service, and the government salary structure. Furthermore, he demanded a planned educational expansion - irrespective of the fluctuations of the economy. Idenburg's views, however, were undoubtedly out of touch with the realities of Dutch political objectives of the time. And no principal decision on the Dutch-language school was taken in the short time that remained before the Japanese invasion. The only promising features of colonial education policy in these last years of Dutch rule were the acceptance of Idenburg's 'break through' plan and the extension of university facilities.
The period 1937–1942 was too short to repay the damage and to work out a definite program of educational expansion. As Wertheim puts it:

'...A 'break through' certainly occurred, but we Netherlanders were no longer allowed to have anything to do with it. We used the sado(6) as a means of transport at a time when an aeroplane was hardly fast enough for Asiatics....'(7)

Dutch ex-colonial officials, such as Brugmans, de Kat-Angelino and van der Wal(8) point proudly to the fact that in 1940 about 40% of children in the age group 6–9 years were receiving an education in government or subsidised schools. They further try to gild the pill by arguing that the indigenous literacy rate of 6.44% found by the 1930 Census was unrealistic. If the part of the population below 10 years of age would have been subtracted the literacy rate would have been as high as 30.83%. Wertheim has clearly shown the fallacy of this calculation and has pointed out that at the highest there could have been an indigenous literacy rate of 10%.(9)

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(6) Sado = Horsecart
(8) cf. 'Balans van Beleid' op. cit., 154 and 44 and van der Wal op. cit., 654 note 2.
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