This thesis is my own work and all the sources used in its composition have been acknowledged.
STOICISM AND ROMAN EDUCATION

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
It is the purpose of this study to analyse in Roman education the considerable number of elements which are attributable to Stoic influences. The field of Roman education to be considered is that encompassed by the teaching of the *grammaticus* (or secondary schoolmaster), by the teaching of the *rhetor* and in the curriculum of the liberal arts or ἐγκυκλίωσις παίδευσι, which comprised grammar (literature), rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy. It is the range of education which might cover the ages eleven to eighteen; and it was the general education undertaken by students in Rome following possibly four years of elementary schooling. Because elementary education was concerned with the development of fundamental literacy and numerical skills, it includes no relevant aspects to consider from the point of view of Stoicism; so elementary schooling is not discussed. Also, as it is proposed to study Stoic influences in the standard programme of Roman education as experienced by secondary students, training for such fields as medicine, architecture and law is not discussed.

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1 It is difficult to indicate precisely when stages of pupils' education in antiquity began and ended. Possibly the age of seven was regarded as a suitable age to begin elementary schooling (Quint. i.1.15; H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, p.202; M.L. Clarke, *Higher Education in the Ancient World*, pp.1,2). When pupils were considered ready, they proceeded to the school of the *grammaticus*; eleven or twelve seemed to be an appropriate age to begin secondary schooling (Suet. *Ner. 7*; V. Pers.). It would appear that rhetorical education began about the age of fifteen and perhaps was completed at eighteen (Quint. i.1.12-14).

2 Quint. i.4.1.

3 Desirably, medical training was undertaken following the completion of a general secondary education (Galen xix.59).

4 As for medicine, the student architect was to have gained a knowledge of the subjects of the general curriculum, as well as of such subjects as drawing and law (Vitruvius i.1.12).

5 It is argued by a number of scholars that the framing of Roman law incorporated Stoic influences (cf. E.V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, pp.384,385,402; J.E. Renan, *Marc Aurèle et la fin du monde antique*, pp.22,23; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa I*, p.203, *Die Stoa II*, p.135). However, an analysis of Stoic elements in technical Roman law is considered not relevant to this thesis.
The period of Rome's social development considered as appropriate to this study begins in the mid-second century B.C., when Hellenistic influences began to appear and then to transform and consolidate the principles of Rome's educational patterns; it is appropriate to place Quintilian, or the end of the first century A.D., as the later limit of this period. Throughout this time there was in Rome considerable educational development and activity which took place within a set educational pattern that was Hellenistic in form. And there are a number of very fine studies which provide comprehensive information on Roman education of this period.\footnote{See Bibliography.}

With respect to Stoic philosophy, much has been written. Information on the Stoic systems is detailed, full and coherent, both because of extant literature of the late Stoics in particular and through the many studies of modern writers. So it is possible to gain quite a clear idea of Stoic philosophy, and also of Roman education. Yet, to my knowledge there has been no comprehensive treatment of Stoicism and its interaction with Roman education.\footnote{The work by G. Pire, \textit{Stoïcisme et Pédagogie}, sets out clearly and definitively the educational views of a series of leading Stoics, especially from the point of view of Stoic ethics. It is a useful text on Stoic thought and moral education rather than an analysis of Stoic elements in the education actually experienced by Roman pupils.} And this interaction is the proposed theme of this thesis.

Stoicism was the dominant philosophy in the Greco-Roman world from the third century B.C. until the third century A.D. and the appearance of Neo-Platonism. However, in keeping with the terms of this study the Stoic system will be considered only up to the end of the first century A.D. Stoicism, like Christianity and some other great community religions, had a theoretical rationale but was concerned in a pragmatic way with virtually all aspects of society. The Stoics had insight into and contributed in a practical way to the values of Hellenistic and Roman civilisation. H.-I. Marrou, commenting as an authority on education in antiquity rather than on philosophy, maintains that Stoicism was 'the interpreter of a whole civilisation' and that through a consideration of Stoic philosophy the historian can be accordingly aided in defining the atmosphere of thought or ethos of this period.
Such a rôle on the part of Stoicism is clearly exemplified in its contribution to Roman education. It appears in the teaching methods of the grammaticus who in his methods of literary exegesis was indebted to techniques furthered by the Stoics and in particular by the Stoic Crates of Mallos; in the teaching of grammar, that was regarded as so important in antiquity, there was a marked Stoic content; in Latin authors read in schools there were firm Stoic values and elements; many grammatici were either Stoic, or influenced by Stoicism; there was a Stoic rhetoric that was used by a number of orators and which can be identified with the 'plain' style, regarded as appropriate for certain occasions; the Stoics had views on the value of the curriculum of the liberal arts, or ἐγκύκλιος παράδειγμα, especially as propaedeumata for advanced and specialist education; and contributions were made by them to the development of each subject of the ἐγκύκλιος παράδειγμα, except music and arithmetic; the Stoics were the experts on dialectic; knowledge of astronomy was gained by pupils for the most part through the established school study of Aratus' Stoic poem, the Phaenomena; the Stoics Posidonius and Geminus made firm contributions to geometry. Throughout this study it is proposed to analyse and elaborate upon these and other Stoic aspects in Roman education as elements that are most important and substantial.

It may be now useful to comment briefly on the arrangement of chapters in this study. In tracing the development of Stoicism from its foundation to the end of the first century A.D., the initial chapter, in comparison to the following chapters, is very much introductory and straightforward. However, it is important to be aware of such development from the point of view of a coherent understanding of the Stoic system, of the way in which Stoicism adapted positively and effectively to changing social circumstances, and of its marked appropriateness and comprehensive acceptability to Rome's traditional ethos. Awareness of the Stoic framework, then, as set out in the first chapter is an essential background for considering the arguments presented throughout this study.

The chapters following the first chapter may be broadly categorised into three divisions. The grammatico-literary curriculum is covered in Chapters II to V; it is considered that a number of chapters
is essential to do justice to the many strong and diversified Stoic influences that were incorporated in what was taught as really the basic programme of secondary education.

Then rhetorical education with its Stoic elements is covered in Chapter VI. It is convenient to divide this chapter into two parts: the first part treats the Stoic style of rhetoric and the second part analyses particular Stoic elements in oratorical technique.

The final chapter is devoted to Stoicism and the teaching of the liberal arts, with particular reference to dialectic and the mathematical sciences. Grammar (literature) and rhetoric, the all-important subjects of the liberal arts programme for Roman education, have at this stage, of course, already been discussed in previous chapters. The final chapter covers, then, a number of particular subjects; it is felt that the varied content of this chapter is justified because the subjects discussed were really specialist disciplines that were studied much less substantially by secondary students than the grammatico-literary and rhetorical programmes of education.
CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF STOICISM
FROM ITS FOUNDATION
TO THE END OF THE FIRST CENTURY A.D.

Stoicism\(^1\) as a school of philosophy was founded in Athens in 294 B.C. by Zeno of Citium. As a dogmatic system of practical philosophy it was intended to give guidance to the individual in depressing political and social circumstances. Although the fourth century B.C. had been a very troubled period and the city-state, as a political and social organisation, had become obsolete, there had still prevailed a degree of freedom and therefore a degree of hope. Consequently there was an idealism in the speculative philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, who had developed systems of thought that were optimistically designed to strengthen the city-state. Their methods involved the investigation and careful questioning of ideas with a view to acceptance, or non-acceptance; in contrast to post-Aristotelian philosophy their systems were not dogmatic.

On the other hand, Hellenistic philosophies such as Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism concentrated on developing principles which might be wholeheartedly accepted by the individual as practical guides to life and which might lead to self-sufficiency. The establishment of such dogmatic systems followed political and social circumstances where the resources of Greece had been consumed in struggles between Achaeans,

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1 The principal sources that have provided general information on Stoic philosophy are: Diogenes Laertius; *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* (ed. H. von Arnim); Cicero's philosophical works; Seneca; E.V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*; P. Barth, *Die Stoa*; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*; C.J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, Vol. III: *The Hellenistic-Roman Period*; E. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*. Further reference texts are included in the Bibliography.
Aetolians and Spartans; where the independence of Greece had been crushed by the Macedonian ascendancy; where the city-state had been subsumed within world empire; where corruption and low morale meant that people were ready to accept firm principles and guidance to help them endure frustrating conditions.¹ In such a climate Zeno developed his system of doctrinal rationalism; in so doing he drew substantially on earlier Greek speculative philosophy and at the same time was sensitive to universal values in a world community, as appropriate to the situation in the Hellenistic empires.

Although it is possible to set out fairly coherently the teachings of the early Stoics and in particular of Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, there is virtually no contemporary evidence that can be referred to. We must wait until the first century A.D. for the first comprehensive accounts as given by Seneca and Epictetus; and of course the information supplied by Diogenes Laertius is of inestimable value. And the very great importance of Cicero must be acknowledged, for his eclectic approach to philosophy enables us to gain considerable information about many aspects of Stoicism. The fact that a wealth of Stoic information is increasingly available well after the time of Zeno testifies to its growing force and firm establishment in the ancient world. Apart from the literature that is directly and didactically Stoic there are Stoic elements in a vast range of authors: it was a philosophical system that was itself eclectically drawn upon. The ways in which Stoicism later modified its own principles and was used variously by different authors reflect its successful adaptation to changing conditions. The firm dogmatism of the early Stoics was later to be relaxed,² enabling the school to remain active for five centuries from the time of its foundation.

¹ Cf. Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, p.229. The Hellenistic age as the period of Macedonian domination is described as a period of subjection and disorder, while that of the city-states is described as a period of freedom and disorder.

² The Stoics' effective modification and adaptation of their principles will be discussed, where appropriate, throughout this study.
ZENO, AND THE ETHICS OF EARLY STOICISM

Zeno, on coming to Athens from Citium in Phoenicia, first joined the Cynic school and was taught by Crates. Reacting against the Cynic manner of life and somewhat insubstantial teaching he became a pupil of Stilpo who was concerned both with Cynic principles and Megarian logic. According to Cicero he was a student of Polemo and later was to adopt the teachings of the Academy on primary impulses. For ten years he was a student of Xenocrates, so clearly with him the influence of the Academy was strong. He was taught logic by Diodorus and Philo, showing a readiness both to study and to practise the principles of dialectic. It is clear that Zeno for a long time studied a range of philosophical teaching prior to framing his Stoic system. And in establishing the principles of the school Zeno's function was not so much to originate but to draw from and combine elements from previously formulated systems of thought. Zeno's procedure in so doing naturally meant that he was to be accused of plagiarism. Although Zeno may have been indebted to previous thinkers there was a certain originality and thoroughness in the way that the principles of the school were structured into a comprehensive and coherent system. Also, it is important to note that the Stoics made original contributions to and furthered the development of human study and activity; for instance dialectic, anomalist grammar, aspects of 'plain' rhetoric, ethical theory were developed substantially by the Stoics. In so doing their

1 Diogenes Laertius, vii.2.
2 Ibid.
3 de Fin. iv.16.45; cf. Acad. i.2.35.
4 D.L. vii.16.
5 Cic. de Fin. iii.2.5. ... Zenoque eorum princeps non tamen rerum inventor fuit quam verborum novorum. Cic. de Fin. v.8.22. Restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transstulissent, nominibus alis easdem res seuti sunt. Cf. D.L. vii.25; Cic. de Fin. v.25.74, iv.2.3; v.8.22; Acad. ii.v.15; de Leg. i.13.38.
6 Stoic contributions to such developments will be brought out in the appropriate chapters on respective aspects of Stoicism and Roman education, and in the discussion on the modifications made to Stoic ethics.
thoroughgoing methods of analysis, of proof, of division and subdivision gave firm strength to their arguments.

Zeno stressed the tripartite division of philosophy into ethics, physics and dialectic.\(^1\) His ethical scheme laid down that virtue was all-important and could be taught. Virtue comes by training and once acquired is sufficient for happiness.\(^2\) Virtue may take on a number of particular virtues, namely wisdom, justice, courage and moderation.\(^3\) Zeno therefore adopted Plato's category of four cardinal virtues, but in so doing considered wisdom the quality which embraced the other three virtues.

Also, virtue was achieved by living a life in accord with nature.\(^4\) To live in accord with nature (κατὰ φύσιν) meant that the individual, like creatures of the animal world, would have a primary impulse towards self-preservation.\(^5\) Life in conformity with nature meant life in accordance with reason, for the cosmos is controlled by rational law or λόγος. As man was a rational being, reason would control his impulses.

As φύσις also referred to the world at large, it was appropriate that the individual as well as being responsible and rational about his own welfare should be conscious of his duty to mankind and to the universe.\(^6\) The Stoics regarded φύσις as being synonymous with πνεῦμα; the soul was by its nature corporeal. Just as λόγος pervaded both the universe and the individual, so then the human soul was also directly related to the divine soul of the cosmos.\(^7\)

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2. D.L. vii.27; cf. Cic. de Fin. 27, 79.
6. Cic. de Fin. iii.63.
Just as virtue and happiness were identified, the good and the useful were linked with duty and reason. What was useful could not be distinguished from duty nor from virtue. The Stoics, therefore, in these attitudes were showing their absolutism and uncompromising dogmatism. Goodness could not be modified; there were no degrees of goodness, nor could it really vary in form. While emphasising the two clear-cut categories of 'goodness' and 'badness' the Stoics also provided for a category of 'indifferent' things or ἀδιάφορα. Included in ἀδιάφορα were honour, disgrace, wealth, richness, health, poverty and even death; ἀδιάφορα were apart from morality and were not of fundamental concern to the individual.

However, an 'indifferent' may be of varying degrees of value; some 'indifferent' things may be in accord with nature, others the reverse. Within ἀδιάφορα could be included things of moderate value and some things that are more preferred. Zeno was prepared to differentiate within the category of 'indifferent' things; he described as προηγμένα such matters as health, freedom from pain, wealth, unimpaired senses, fame, and ἀποπροηγμένα indicated pain, disease, poverty, disgrace, loss of senses, etc.

Zeno stipulated that there were appropriate actions or καθήκοντα (officia), where such duties might include friendship, family duty, public responsibilities. He was the first to apply the use of the term καθήκοντα to such concepts. καθήκοντα were at the same time κατορθώματα. It was appropriate then that in accordance with Stoic absolutism the only really perfect duty would be expressed as a virtuous life. Yet, later, Stoic theories of καθήκοντα could be adapted in a practical, effective manner to traditional Roman values through

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3 Cic. de Fin. iii.16.53.
4 Cic. de Fin. iii.15, 51 foll.
6 D.L. vii.115; Stob. ii.182; Cic. Tusq. iv.6,11.
Panaetius. Stoic duty in regard to honouring one's parents, family and country and Stoic responsibility as a member of a world society were strongly acceptable values for Romans of the second century B.C.

Strong emotions or passions were considered from a moral viewpoint rather than from the psychological. Emotions were regarded as contrary to reason. Zeno defined τίτις as disorder, which was an agitation of the soul alien to right reason and contrary to nature. An emotional condition represented an imbalance of the soul, which ideally should be rational and emotionless. Zeno thought that an impulse impinging upon judgment was a passion or an emotion; emotion was a strong impulse that was contrary to reason. 'Ακάθελτα was for the Stoics the ideal condition; the wise man or sage should be without emotion. Virtue was synonymous with ἀκάθελτα.

The early Stoic concept of the sage was an ideal to which it was essential to aspire, but impossible to attain. The sage was absolutely free of vices and faults. His judgment was unerring. He alone had real φρόνημα. He alone was rich and happy, for he enjoyed self-sufficiency and had no material desires. The sage was never defeated; he was resolute and invincible. He alone enjoyed freedom, because of his inner harmony and independence. For him such negative aspects as pain (λυπη), fear (φόβος), desire (ἐπιθυμία) and pleasure (ἡδονή) had no significance. However, such an unreal and unattainable ideal as originally set down by Zeno was later to be modified. The practical application of such an ideal for everyday life was impossible;

1 D.L. vii.110, ... ἀλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν φυχής κύνης ἡ ὑμὴ πλεονάζουσα.
2 Sen. de Ira, i.9,2; Ep. 88, 10.
3 D.L. vii.117.
4 Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 134.
5 See D.L. vii.117-120 for description of qualities of the wise man.
6 Cic. Parad. 6; Sen. de Ben. vii.3; 2; 6,3; 8,1.
7 D.L. vii.122.
8 D.L. vii.110.
accordingly provision was to be later made for the sage-in-progress (προφόρος), where the individual could be virtuous in proceeding steadfastly towards the ideal.

In his πολιτεία, which contained Platonic influence and elements, Zeno maintained that only the good were true citizens, and that the sage was the only one fit to rule or govern as a king, magistrate, judge or to be an orator. As a corollary the wise man should not live in solitude for he was in character equipped to contribute actively to society. Involvement in public life was completely consistent with Stoic principles; for there was a rational affinity between the individual and the universe. It was appropriate that, as the universe was equivalent to a world community, the individual should have some active responsibility in its social welfare. Such a view was clearly relevant to the ethics of the ruling Roman nobilitas of the second century B.C., when Stoicism was taken up so wholeheartedly.

Although the Stoics upheld the principle of self-preservation, which could be substantiated from the point of view of living in accord with nature, from the first they allowed the individual the right of suicide. Later, a significant number of Roman Stoics were to exercise this 'right', the first being Cato and then quite a few under the Empire. Suicide was justifiable if it was impossible to live satisfactorily κατὰ φύσιν; and if natural disadvantages completely outweighed natural advantages. For instance, intolerable pain, mutilation or incurable disease could provide a valid reason. Or, in keeping with the individual's concern for social welfare, suicide could be justified for patriotic reasons and for the sake of friends.

1 D.L. vii.33.
2 D.L. vii.122.
3 D.L. vii.123.
4 Cic. de Fin. iii.20,67; M. Aurel. iv.4; ii.16.
5 Cic. de Fin. iii.18,60.
6 D.L. vii.130.
7 Ibid.
The Stoics' system of ethics was based on their scheme of physics. Where the Epicureans based their theory of matter on the 'atom', the Stoics maintained that body was the element or component that moved and spread through the universe. Body moved through and combined with body. Associated with body was 'tone' (τόνος/intentio). Tone was virtually synonymous with dynamic force which might vary in intensity by exerting itself strongly or by quietly functioning in a relaxed way. The λόγος σπερματικός was the creative aspect of body, that could be regarded as the fiery force of body acting in association with tone or tension. A divine power or God activated the movement of matter. God was all-pervading and created the four elements — fire, water, air and earth. The four elements were incorporated or mixed within 'body', normally represented by heat, cold, dry and wet. These elements were derived from ethereal or primitive fire. Tension or τόνος pervaded the universe, just as it was present in the individual. The idea of a universal conflagration was upheld whereby at the close of the great year or cycle of years all was re-absorbed into primitive fire. However, the theory of world conflagration was not to hold throughout the history of Stoicism, although Zeno originally propounded the destructibility of the world in his treatise περὶ θανατού. The Stoics supported a geocentric concept of the universe, which was a perfect sphere; the direction of all things was to the

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1 Sen. Dial. vii.4,2.
2 Hipp. Phil. 21 (H. v. Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ii.469).
3 See discussion, E.V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism, p.160 foll.
4 D.L. vii.136.
5 E. Bréhier, The History of Philosophy: The Hellenistic and Roman Age, p.47.
6 D.L. vii.141; Cic. N.D. ii.46,118; Sen. Dial. vi.26,6. The concept of the great year was taken from the Pythagoreans.
7 For instance, it was a belief shared by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater and Posidonius, but not by Panaetius. Cf. D.L. vii.142.
8 D.L. vii.131.
middle of the sphere.\textsuperscript{1} The universe comprised two parts: in the middle
was the earth surrounded by water and air, and moving about it was the
aether.\textsuperscript{2}

Implicit in the Stoic view of the universe was the idea of
cause and effect, based on universal law and rational force. Fate or
destiny was determined by this universal law.\textsuperscript{3} Similar arguments
supported Stoic thinking on divination, which enabled man to predict
events in accordance with the rational order of the universe. Nothing
could occur without a basic cause and indeed particular, precise
circumstances would produce the same result.\textsuperscript{4}

The anomaly that was raised in regard to fate was to reconcile
free will (τὸ ἐν' ἀτυχεῖ) with destiny. And there was no clear answer to
this. The Stoics believed that the individual had some degree of
choice.\textsuperscript{5} It was argued that if the individual adopted appropriate
ethical values his will was being expressed in accordance with the will
of the universe. A particular choice, as an expression of will, was
related to a certain cause (τὸ ἀναγκῆς); for the wise man there was an
appropriate cause which closely associated destiny and will. Such
destiny and will, of course, should be in accord with nature and virtue.\textsuperscript{6}
Conversely, with the person lacking in virtue actions would be taken
that were not in accord with appropriate cause, will and destiny. So
cause, and desirably appropriate cause, was the basis of free will, for
no action by the individual was independent of cause.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{1} von Arnim, \textit{op. cit.}, ii.547.
\textsuperscript{2} Ar. Did. fr.31 quoting from Chrysippus.
\textsuperscript{3} D.L. vii.149; Stob. ii.178.
\textsuperscript{4} Plut. \textit{de Fato}, 11.
\textsuperscript{5} Cic. \textit{Acad.} ii.12,39; \textit{de Fato} 17,39.
\textsuperscript{6} Cf. Arnold, \textit{op. cit.}, p.214.
\textsuperscript{7} Plut. \textit{Sto. rep.} 23, 2 and 3.
Logic, or dialectic, was the system of study which suggested methods for determining what was true or false. It represented a theory of knowledge. Knowledge was based on representation or image (φαντασία) of an object, accurate perception of which led to apprehension (κατάληψις). The accuracy of the image could be equated with 'apprehensive representation' (φαντασία καταληψία). The 'apprehending representation' indicated certainty, or a degree of certainty. This certainty was not always in the perception by those less than a sage. For perception by the sage was sure and rational; perceptions by the sage fitted into a completely rational and coherent pattern. There were also primary conceptions that could be the basis of other truths. For the early Stoics it would appear that sensation and primary conceptions (προληψεις) were standards of truth.

To proceed beyond these basic considerations and to determine truths not directly and unequivocally apparent, there was a need to apply scientific processes of proof. Zeno in breaking away from the Cynics, who regarded certain truths as obvious, insisted on precise, scientific proofs in establishing similar truths. Stoic dialectic schematically set out these scientific methods. The fundamental statement or utterance for the process was the λέξις, which in itself was not material but expressed the substance of thought. 'Αξιώματα were the simplest statements that could be true or false. Statements comprised a noun or pronoun together with a verb. The κατηγορία was the predicate and an incomplete expression. A judgment was that which was true or false, but also a thing complete in itself (αυτοτελές), e.g. 'It is day', 'Dion is walking'. Although Zeno was very much concerned with dialectic and drew substantially on Megarian logic, it was the third leader of the school, Chrysippus, who as the great master of Stoic dialectic, built up the strong edifice of Stoic logic. Dialectic and its great importance for the development of grammar and Stoic anomalist

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1 D.L. vii.54. Cf. Cic. Acad. i.11,41.
3 See D.L. vii.63 foll.
theory will be especially discussed in Chapter III. Dialectic and its importance for Stoic rhetoric and as a subject of the liberal arts curriculum will be considered in Chapters VI and VII respectively.

CLEANTHES

Cleanthes of Assos succeeded to the leadership of the school in 260 B.C. on the death of Zeno. He was apparently lacking in originality, yet to him is attributed quite a number of works which cover a wide range of Stoic topics. Cleanthes continued very much in Zeno's tradition. With his concern for Stoic theology he emphasised the significance of destiny in the life of the individual. In his hymn to Zeus is expressed the Stoic religious feeling of the omnipresent divine power. The hymn became famous and was well known throughout the history of the school.

Cleanthes, and for that matter also later Stoics, tried to establish natural principles (λόγοι φυσικοί) for popular mythology; he was concerned with allegory, writing works περὶ θεοῦ and περὶ τοῦ κοινῆτο (that is, on Homer). Zeno had also similarly treated all the works of Homer and Hesiod. He wrote on the struggle of the gods (θεομαχία). Greek mythology was interpreted allegorically from the point of view of the Stoic concept of the universe. For instance, Cleanthes proposed that the name Dionysus was from διανύσαυ, based on the daily completion of the sun's course around the world. Cleanthes emphasised that the sun was the governing force in the world, and that

1 D.L. vii.168.
2 D.L. vii.174-175.
3 See von Arnim, op. cit., i.537 foll.
4 D.L. vii.175.
6 Ps. Plut. de Fluvi. v.3; D.L. vii.175 (i.e. περὶ γυγάντων).
7 Macrobr. Sat. i.18.
it would be the origin of the world's end by conflagration. The theological and allegorical views of Cleanthes influenced Chrysippus and Crates of Mallos in their allegorical exegesis.

CHRYSIPPUS

Chrysippus of Soli succeeded Cleanthes by becoming the leader of the school in 232 B.C. He systematised and elaborated upon what had been established by Zeno and Cleanthes. He is regarded as the 'second' founder of Stoicism. He brought an intellectualism to the system, while at the same time he maintained its original aims. To him has been attributed the lasting success of Stoicism throughout antiquity.

Where Cleanthes believed that virtue could be taught from moral premises, Chrysippus' view was that the individual could be educated to virtue through the intellect. Through his capacity for systematic analysis and because of his concern for precise definition Chrysippus carefully identified qualities of virtues in Stoic ethics. For instance, intelligence included the ability to distinguish between good and bad, and what was 'indifferent'. Bravery was the knowledge how to endure vicissitudes or was the necessary condition of the soul during suffering and hardship; the soul should be brave and without fear in acquiescing to the universal law. Correspondingly vices could be related to the individual's lack of knowledge.

Chrysippus upheld that events took place in accordance with fate; however, he determined that there were various antecedent causes. And the causes that were responsible for fate were so-called auxiliary

2 D.L. vii.183.
3 v. Arnim, op. cit., iii; Chrysippus, 229a; cf. G. Pire, Stoïcisme et Pédagogie, pp.37,38.
4 Stob. 102 ἐπιστήμη ἄγαθων καὶ καλῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.
5 Cic. Tusq. iv.53.
6 D.L. vii.93.
and approximate causes. But there were also antecedent causes that after occurring still provided the opportunity for the individual to influence the outcome. It was possible that assent or an expression of will might be given to antecedent causes.

He had an allegorical view of mythology, which was to be so strongly furthered by Crates of Mallos. He equated the Fates (μορφαλ) with just, inexorable destiny and the Graces (χροιες) with benevolence and gratitude. Chrysippus also supported divination; he wrote two books on this subject, one of which was on oracles and the other on dreams. Support of divination by the Stoics generally, except Panaetius, represented another factor in the acceptability of its scheme to the Roman ethos.

With Chrysippus there was some moderation of the dogmatic principles laid down by Zeno: good health, wealth, freedom from pain and honour were now not necessarily 'indifferent' things for an individual's happiness and welfare. The flexibility and eclecticism that began with Chrysippus and were characteristic of the Middle Stoics were the basis for the survival and developing success of the school, where adaptation was essential. It is not certain from whom originated the concept of the προχατιν or sage-in-progress, as a modification of the absolute principle that only the sage was virtuous and that no-one reached this ideal. According to Zeller, Chrysippus was probably responsible for categorising 'those in progress' into three classes, as

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1 Cic. de Fato. xvii.41. The terms suggested are adiuvantes and proximae.
2 Cic. de Fato. xix.45.
3 Cic. de Fato. xviii.42.
4 Stob. i.180.
5 Sen. de Ben. i.3,8; i.4,4.
6 Cic. de Div. i.3,6.
discussed by Seneca. The particular steps leading to virtue, as suggested by Zeno, were to become a realistic compromise as incorporated in the concept of the τιποτελή.

Chrysippus anticipated, also, the significance of human psychology for Stoicism, as emphasised by the Middle Stoics. Cleanthes had not considered the particular nature of the individual, but Chrysippus stressed that individual natures were parts of the nature of the whole universe. Therefore the τελειος of life was defined as life in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe. Human development is provided for in his argument that to live virtuously was to live in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature.

Chrysippus, more than any other Stoic, was a champion of dialectic. And he built up a system of logic that was to prevail throughout following centuries. Of the three divisions of philosophy he regarded dialectic as the most important. On the other hand, Zeno and Cleanthes regarded dialectic as a subordinate study, although they did write on the subject. Chrysippus wrote 311 volumes on logic, and his influence in this discipline went far beyond the Stoic school. He broke away from Aristotelian logic, but did not much contest its views; rather, he continued in the tradition established in Megarian logic, which had concentrated on problems of possibility and necessity.

Aristotle had been very much concerned with universals, where the basic syllogism may be 'If all A is B, and all B is C, then all A is C', or as an example 'If all human beings are animals, and all animals are mortal, then all human beings are mortal'. The Stoics, however, were concerned about statements on individual things. The Stoic syllogism would therefore be 'If A, B. But A, therefore B'. For instance, 'If the sun is

1 Ep. 75.8.
2 See M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, p.154.
3 D.L. vii.86.
4 D.L. vii.87.
5 Cf. P. Barth, Die Stoa, p.49.
shining, it is day. But the sun is shining, therefore it is day.\(^1\)
Accordingly, Chrysippus established five basic forms of the syllogism,
and his methods of dialectic were to make a substantial contribution to
proving and disproving arguments in rhetoric.\(^2\)

Some of the very important aspects of logic developed by
Chrysippus included the matter of simple and composite judgments,\(^3\)
inferences\(^4\) and Stoic theory on categories.\(^5\) His development of Stoic
grammar, that was basically a systematising of language for dialectic,
and his work on literary exegesis were to be of fundamental importance
when Hellenistic education was so enthusiastically taken up in Rome in
the second century B.C.

MIDDLE STOICISM

From the time of Chrysippus until that of the great figures of
Middle Stoicism, Panaetius and then Posidonius, there were a number of
Stoic thinkers, who although important have not been included in the
brief survey which constitutes this introductory chapter. Aratus and
Crates of Mallos will be discussed in later chapters, but there will be
no discussion on Aristo, Persaios, Herillos, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of
Babylon,\(^6\) Antigous, Archedemos, Antipater of Tarsus and Boethus of Sidon.
But with Panaetius we have a Stoic who was of the utmost importance for
Stoicism in Rome and who was the founder of Middle Stoicism.

\(^1\) See D.L. vii.55 foll. for discussion on Stoic dialectic.
\(^2\) See Chapter VI, especially.
\(^3\) See Zeller, \textit{op. cit.}, p.110.
\(^5\) See Zeller, \textit{op. cit.}, p.97 foll.
\(^6\) However, comment is made on Diogenes' attitude to music, ch. VII,
p.193.
PANAETIUS

Panaetius at one time a student of Crates of Mallos, was also taught by the Peripatetic and Academic schools. A Greek, he was born about 184 B.C. and in the middle of the second century B.C. became a very close acquaintance of Scipio and leading Romans of the time. Panaetius' Stoic principles provided a theoretical basis or rationale for the role of the nobilitas in Roman society. He provided a philosophical or intellectual basis for the Roman aristocratic ideal of rule. For Panaetius the Roman constitution represented a desirable form of government. Such a concept was based on the idea that the statesman particularly should embody certain Stoic qualities in his character. Personal inclinations should be subordinated to the welfare of all. The statesman should have the Stoic concept of justice which also incorporated a strong sense of social responsibility; and the Stoic idea of πρέπει (deorum) was especially important for a leader. During his long association with Scipio and contemporary leading Romans, Panaetius was instrumental in adapting the Hellenising spirit and Stoic dogma to Roman values. It is no exaggeration to maintain that but for Panaetius there would have been no such firm acceptance of Stoicism in Rome.

Panaetius' approach to philosophy and Stoicism was eclectic, in contrast to the dogmatic principles laid down by Zeno and Cleanthes. For instance, he drew upon the Platonic and Aristotelian idea that certain ones should lead and that others should serve; he substantiated such thinking from Stoic teaching of natural law. The modifications made to the system by Chrysippus were for the most part continued with

1 Strab. xiv.676.
2 Cic. de Div. i.6.
3 Cic. pro Mur. 66; de Off. i.90.
4 Cic. de Leg. iii.14; de Rep. i.34.
6 Lucilius, 1337.
7 Cic. de Rep. iii.33.
Panaetius, who discarded some basic Stoic principles while broadening and 'humanising' Stoic teaching into a wider pattern.

He placed primary importance on physics. He upheld the theory of universal law and life in accord with nature. However, he played down the theology of the school and the significance of fate. He rejected the concept of the universal conflagration, and virtually alone of Stoics did not support divination or astrology. Consequently he regarded the universe as indestructible. It is clear that his views on nature and physics provided for human development and individual psychology; and this emphasis is evident in a number of ways:

(i) He distinguished human nature from that of animals by asserting that man's sense organs gave him the capacity to appreciate beauty of form and tone, and led him to a capacity for artistic enjoyment. The arts then were the result of human effort; and for Panaetius human effort and expression were of great importance.

(ii) He broke with the Stoic tradition that all were equal. There were degrees of quality in mankind and in society. Such a view was no doubt acceptable to the nobiles of Scipio's time.

(iii) While Panaetius acknowledged the qualities of courage, justice and moderation, which were practical virtues, he also emphasised theoretical virtue (φιλανθρωπία) which enabled the individual through theoretical knowledge and intellect to decide what was morally appropriate.

1 D.L. vii.141.
2 Cic. N.D. ii.118.
3 Cic. de Div. i.6,12; D.L. vii.149.
4 Cic. N.D. ii.73 foll.
5 Cic. N.D. ii.140 foll; i.14.
6 Cic. Tusc. ii.65; de Div. ii.96.
7 D.L. vii.92.
8 Cic. de Off. i.6,19.
(iv) Panaetius considered that ἄνδρες were to be elevated to become significant, for virtue was not necessarily self-sufficing; health and material needs were important.¹

(v) He set down a human application of logos that enabled the individual to use 'reason' in regard to his own inclinations.

Panaetius, in the tradition of Crates of Mallos, was strongly interested in philological and literary exegesis. However, his sense of human psychology and his realistic outlook did not allow him to believe in the strongly allegorical and extreme idea that the poet should be a sage, with which Homer might accordingly be identified.² Yet he was strongly interested in literature, as indicated by his concern about establishing the authorship of certain works; and he wrote a favourable commentary on a poem by Appius Claudius.³

It is evident that Panaetius' standing both in Athens and Rome was extremely high. When he returned to Athens from Rome, the school flourished under his leadership. And at that time the Stoic school became the leading philosophical school there. In Rome his high standing with the Scipionic circle was unique in Roman history, for no other philosopher was to enjoy such a privileged position with the Roman establishment.

Cicero expresses great respect for Panaetius⁴ and of course was especially indebted to his περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος in writing his De Officiis. In keeping with Cicero's own attitude towards philosophy, he commends Panaetius for his less dogmatic approach to Stoicism and his readiness to draw from other philosophers.⁵

Panaetius' most important students were Posidonius of Apamea and Hecato of Rhodes. For the present survey, of these two Stoics it is

¹ D.L. vii.128; Cic. de Fin. iv.23.
² Pohlenz, op. cit., p.421.
³ Cic. Tusc. iv.2,4.
⁴ Cic. de Leg. iii.14.
⁵ Cic. de Fin. iv.79.
important to comment upon Posidonius, the great encyclopaedic intellect of Middle Stoicism. However, while Panaetius was very much concerned with a humanist approach to Stoicism and had a deep interest in social responsibility, Posidonius was the pure scientist, whose research and knowledge are of the utmost significance; but he was less concerned with the implications of Stoicism in the practical sense and for Roman society.

POSIDONIUS

Where Panaetius was able to find practical expression for his Stoicism within an ordered Roman society, Posidonius appeared to be a strongly interested but more detached observer. On the other hand, it might be noted that the unsettled circumstances of the republic that prevailed during Posidonius' lifetime made it impossible for him to associate with the governing class as Panaetius had done, and to a lesser extent Polybius, with the Scipionic circle; Rome's welfare was being determined too strongly by the changing power of individuals for such a situation to exist. Yet Posidonius' influence was strong with a number of leading Romans, as well as with scholars. Pompey was his friend, and at times visited him at Rhodes. Also, Cicero was his student and friend. But perhaps more importantly his influence was strong with such outstanding scholars as Galen, Asclepiodotus of Nicaea, Proclus and Cleomedes the mathematicians and Strabo the geographer. Although Posidonius was of impressive intellect, was a philosopher of far reaching influence, and wrote a great deal, nothing of his actual work has survived. Yet from other sources it is still possible to present a fairly coherent comment on his philosophic views.

In accordance with basic Stoic dogma Posidonius emphasised the articulated unity or monism, which meant that all things in the universe were connected throughout a divine order. Such a basic Stoic dogma

1 Cic. Tusc. ii.26,61; Pliny N.D. vii.30; Plutarch, Life of Pompey, 42.
2 Cic. N.D. i.123.
taught that all elements existed in all things;\(^1\) and a *vis vitalis* or δύναμις ζωτική pervaded all, a vital life-giving force that was universal.\(^2\) Posidonius gave special emphasis to this idea of a force that was strongly dynamic and active. He gave more attention to this aspect of Stoic physics than to the 'rational' aspect, to which according to the early Stoics everything was subordinate. For Posidonius warmth was the prime physical agent; there was a warm breath (πνεῦμα ἐνθρεμον) in the nature of all things;\(^3\) this πνεῦμα was the soul which moved and 'animated' plants, animals, human beings, etc. Posidonius believed that providence was related to warmth as the prime physical agent, while the early Stoics thought that providence was based on reason.\(^4\) Therefore throughout the whole universe there was πνεῦμα which could be identified with a divine intellectual spirit that extended through substance.\(^5\)

It was appropriate that in arguing that a divine, active *nous* permeated the world Posidonius upheld divination as a valid method of prediction; of all Stoics Posidonius was the strongest champion of divination. Therefore his thoughts on divination were important for Roman theology and religious practice. In Cicero's *De Divinatione* are comprehensively set out the arguments of Posidonius who considered divination in a tripartite manner;\(^6\) he maintained that Zeus could issue his prophecies through an inspired prophet, that fate could be predicted through astrology and that future events could be presaged through various natural phenomena.

Posidonius' views on ethics were in keeping with the more reasoned and modified thinking of the Middle Stoics, who as mentioned

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1 Cic. *N.D.* ii.84; Sen. *N.Q.* ii.4,6; vi.16.
4 Cic. *N.D.* ii.11-16.
6 Cic. *de Div.* i.125.
were prepared to give consideration to human psychology. Like early Stoics he believed that virtue could be taught, but stressed the concept of the sage-in-progress.\textsuperscript{1} Like Panaetius he believed that certain ἀδόκημα could contribute to man's happiness;\textsuperscript{2} he maintained that health and wealth could be considered 'good things'.\textsuperscript{3} However, he warned that such advantages as were included in ἀδόκημα could be also the causes of evil.\textsuperscript{4} Posidonius did not unequivocally uphold the idea of ἀδάνελα. He considered that there were gradations of emotions or passions, just as there were gradations leading to wisdom.\textsuperscript{5} Emotions should not necessarily be suppressed but should be subordinated to man's own reason or logos; in this way inner peace and harmony of soul could be acquired.\textsuperscript{6} Posidonius related these theories to the traditional Stoic principle of 'life in accord with nature'. His reasoned approach stressed that virtues be based on the right understanding of emotions.\textsuperscript{7} Arguing against traditional Stoic psychology he adopted Plato's view that in the psyche there were both rational and irrational elements.\textsuperscript{8} Posidonius provided for the process of human development where the child in its natural inclination to pleasure and power, and in its natural aversion to pain, matured in such a way that 'irrational' elements less dominated its behaviour.\textsuperscript{9} Such a theory, of course, was consistent with the idea that virtue could be acquired or taught.\textsuperscript{10}

While Posidonius had clear ideas on principles of Stoic philosophy that typified the moderate values of Middle Stoicism and were

\textsuperscript{1} D.L. vii.91.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{3} D.L. vii.103.
\textsuperscript{4} Sen. Ep. 87.13.
\textsuperscript{5} Cf. Bréhier, \textit{op. cit.}, p.138.
\textsuperscript{7} Galen, \textit{de Placitis}, 654,36; cf. Edelstein, \textit{op. cit.}, p.312.
\textsuperscript{8} F.H. Sandbach, \textit{The Stoics}, p.135.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., pp.135,136.
\textsuperscript{10} D.L. vii.91.
taken up by his followers, Posidonius' contribution is more marked in the various disciplines and subjects he researched and wrote about. His influence was very much through the great body of knowledge he built up by scientific and mathematical methods, whereas Panaetius' influence had been for the most part through his ideas on Stoic ethics and humanistic values.

Posidonius' research was based on a thoroughgoing scheme of causation, where the early Stoics had one simple concept of cause. He considered that cause was inherent in matter, in the principle of activity or reason governing the universe and in the soul itself which was a source of motion. His approach to philosophy was consistent with the importance he gave to causation, and consequently to mathematical processes. Galen believed that his philosophical principles and the ways in which his views differed from Stoic dogma were based fundamentally on his mathematics. And mathematics was dominant in his intellectual activity.

Posidonius was renowned as a geometer. He broke away from the traditional Stoic idea that mathematical figures existed only in thought, and convincingly based his mathematics on the principle that mathematical form was corporeal and that mathematical figures actually existed. As an astronomer Posidonius developed a coherent scheme based on his mathematical methods and on his firm views regarding world physics. He upheld a geocentric view of the universe, at the same time attributing to the sun a very strong force that was divine and possessed soul. He suggested precise calculations for the sizes of heavenly bodies and for distances between them. As a geographer he presented arguments based on travel and empirical observation, anthropological description and mathematical calculation. For instance, he had clear

1 Cf. Areios Didymos fr.18 Doxographi Graeci, p.457,4 foll.
2 de Placitis, 362,5; 653,14.
3 Comment on Posidonius' contribution to geometry is included in Chapter VII, 'Stoicism and the Teaching of the Liberal Arts'.
4 Cf. discussion by Edelstein, op. cit., p.303.
theories on tidal phenomena, and wrote on the ocean and regions in his ἐπὶ ὤψαυτὸν καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτῶν, providing precise measurements on these; and he presented views about environmental and geographic influences on mankind.¹

Posidonius' scholarship was imposing, covering many fields in great depth. He was receptive to the ideas of other philosophical schools, and was particularly influenced by Plato and Aristotle. It is agreed that his prose style was excellent,² and it has been suggested³ that his writings represented the high point of Hellenistic prose style. Although Posidonius gave original aspects to many principles of Stoicism, his principal contributions were to particular disciplines and to scientific research and development; his influence was not to be very strong in Stoic ethics or in other philosophical developments.

STOICISM AND THE ROMAN ETHOS

Of the complex and varied Hellenistic influences that appeared in Rome in the second century B.C., Stoicism in particular was acceptable to the Roman ethos; Stoic principles and traditional Roman values could be quite compatible. The concept of Stoic divine rationalism ruling the world could be readily equated with Roman pantheism and theology. The Stoic idea of the virtuous being active in politics and of the individual having a responsibility to his fellow man provided philosophic support to the political activity of Scipio and his fellow nobles.

Roman pietas which stipulated duty to family, gods and state could be regarded as consistent with Stoic duty or ἡσθηκὼν; also in other ways Stoic ἡσθηκὼν, as mentioned, could be equated with Roman officium, which required suitable, responsible conduct in accordance with a particular situation. The Roman state religion could also be related to and substantiated by Stoic theology. Q. Mucius Scaevola,

³ Ibid., Vol. I, p.211.
pontifex maximus, took over Panaetius' *tripertita theologia*,\(^1\) that set out three 'theologies': poetic theology which is futile, for gods are considered less than outstanding men; the theology of philosophers which may not really help the existence of the community; and the theology of statesmen which upholds the traditional religion of the community.

It is interesting that a number of jurists who were responsible for framing Roman law in the late second century B.C. and early first century B.C. were Stoic, or had Stoic sympathies. Stoic dialectic was applied to the development of Roman law by Servius Sulpicius, student of the Stoics, Lucilius Balbus and Gaius Aquilius Gallus.\(^2\) Q. Tubero had also applied dialectic to Roman law.\(^3\) It is generally contended\(^4\) that when the Romans framed from their own *ius civile* the *ius gentium* which was required for the legal administration of their growing empire, Stoic theories regarding the general community of mankind and the world logos provided a philosophical rationale for their legislation.

The Roman ethos from the middle second century B.C. was to be permanently changed and its elements enriched by Hellenistic influences. The synthesis so formed embodied substantial Stoic content. While it is appropriate to mention briefly these developments as appropriate to the brief survey which constitutes this introductory chapter, the analysis and explanation of such developments in regard to Roman education are really the theme of this thesis; they are to be discussed in detail throughout the following chapters. Roman education was taken over by the Hellenistic pattern which was grammatico-literary for the most part. Stoic anomalist grammar made a substantial contribution to the teaching of Latin grammar by the *grammaticus*. And the Stoic, Crates of Mallos, introduced to Rome methods of literary exegesis which were so strongly

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2 Cic. *Brut.* 152; 154.
influenced by Stoic philosophy. Rhetoric, too, had as one of its styles a plain form which could be associated with the Stoic style. Stoic dialectic made a contribution to methods of rhetorical proofs. The purpose will be to show that the Stoic elements in education and in intellectual activity were substantial and lasting. However, for the present it is first important to comment upon Late Stoicism and to complete this introductory outline.

LATE STOICISM

It is convenient to mark the end of Middle Stoicism with the death of Posidonius in 51 B.C. and the appearance of Late Stoicism with the work of Seneca and Musonius about the middle of the first century A.D. Yet, it should be noted that Cicero, who was a professed follower of the New Academy and had a strong but eclectic interest in philosophy, presented for Roman readers a great deal of Stoic thought in his prolific writings. In being the first Roman to treat philosophy in Latin, he exposed many Romans to Greek philosophy in general, and naturally to Stoicism in particular. Marcus Porcius Cato, who suicided in 46 B.C., represented the prototype of the Roman hero and practising Stoic. The repeated extolling of Cato throughout Latin literature indicates that he was regarded as the epitome of both Roman and Stoic ethics. Aelius Stilo, teacher of Cicero and Varro, was the outstanding Roman philologist of the first century B.C.; he championed Stoic anomalist grammar in Rome. And even though the analogist system was ultimately to prevail, especially through the efforts of Remmius Polaemon in the first century A.D., Aelius Stilo's influence was considerable and, later, he was often referred to by Quintilian.

Stoicism under the empire was of a very much different character from that of Panaetius and Posidonius. The late Stoics emphasised ethics with little concern for physics and dialectic. Their ethical and moral interest represented virtually a spiritual or

1 See pp.106 foll. for a comment on Stoicism in Cicero's works.
2 See Chapter IV, pp.94 foll.
3 See Chapters III and V.
religious support for the individual, while the Stoicism of Panaetius and Posidonius was a creative movement which provided vigorous and dynamic impetus to Rome's social and intellectual development. The positive and formative circumstances of the second century B.C. offered exciting opportunities for Rome's social progress. And there was felt a close Stoic identification with the state's institutions. Under the empire, however, autocratic and oppressive rule by the emperors meant that freedom of speech and action was curtailed. Career progress through the cursus honorum now depended on imperial recognition and favour rather than through the popular vote. There existed an inhibiting situation where people frustrated in their wish for freedom and in their opportunities for self-expression had recourse often to philosophy or to rhetoric, which for many became a hobby rather than a medium for political persuasion.

The independent stand taken by philosophers and Stoics was not acceptable to emperors, and especially to Nero and Domitian, who expected conformity and support. Such independence, as also shown by the early Christians, could not readily be tolerated by emperors who relied on emperor-worship to maintain a position of power. Stoic opposition, of course, was not organised; it was simply an assertion of free thinking. Although the Stoics were not condoned by the emperors, and the study of philosophy was questioned by many, there was a wide diffusion of Stoicism, of which there were many adherents.

The literature of late Stoicism is substantial, and is comprehensively available to us, in contrast to the fragmentary writings from early and middle Stoics. In keeping with its ethical emphasis this literature is very much hortatory and didactic. Seneca wrote his essays and letters in such a vein. Musonius set out rules for human conduct. Epictetus gave appropriate advice to youth, with whose moral

1 Cf. Dio Cassius, lxi.15.
2 Cf. Helvidius Priscus who as praetor was accused because he did not pay homage to the emperor. And under Domitian, Herennius Senecio was executed because he wrote a biography of Priscus. Dio Cass. 66.12-19, 67-73.
3 Cic. Tusc. iii.1; Tac. Agricola 4,3.
4 Cf. Bréhier, op. cit., p.152.
development he was concerned. Later, Marcus Aurelius in his τὰ εἰς ἑαυτὸν upheld an introspective approach which involved self-examination. Also, Stoics might serve as mentors or counsellors, such as Musonius and Coeranus did for Rubellius Plautus. As well as the specialist scholastic teaching by Stoics within the sect public lectures were given by outstanding Stoics or by itinerant preachers who were often satirised or scoffed at. The favourite form of teaching followed within the school was probably diatribes, where keen questioning and lively discussion followed a lecture.

As there were quite a few Stoic writers under the empire, it is appropriate for the present survey to comment upon the most influential Stoics of the period who were probably Seneca, Musonius and Epictetus; and the following comment will be concerned with these three late Stoics. This does not discount the importance of the Stoic poets Lucan and Persius, the latter being taught by the well regarded Cornutus, nor the importance of Hierocles who wrote his Ἡθικὴ στοιχείωσις and Περὶ καθηκόντων. Marcus Aurelius, the last great Stoic figure, is not discussed because he wrote at a time later than the period considered in this study.

SENECA

Seneca, as a Stoic, is somewhat enigmatic. He wrote earnestly and sincerely on Stoic values, but his own life reflected perhaps some conflict with such values. For he was ambitious, needing at times to comply with Nero's wishes, wealthy through service to the imperial cause, and an outstanding orator in his use of a style that was pointed and had impact. On the other hand, he was ascetic, religious in a strongly Stoic sense, and a champion of Stoic ethics both in his own attitude to life and in the manner in which he wrote. However, in comparing aspects of this apparent conflict in Seneca's life, authorities generally make an assessment in his favour; his Stoic qualities are generally regarded

1 Tac. Ann. xiv.57.
2 Cf. attitudes of Horace and Epictetus.
3 A. Gellius, i.26.
as strong and are to be appreciated, although at times he may have followed an expedient line of action.

Seneca himself did not profess to be a sage, and did not write for sages. Yet he believed that the idea of the sage-in-progress was a practical principle. Seneca in a letter to Lucilius urged daily self-improvement. He maintained that moral progress and personal education were related to living 'in accord with nature', as set down by traditional Stoicism; for Seneca this also meant living simply, which was in keeping with his basic asceticism. Like other Stoics of the period Seneca upheld a reflective attitude to one's life and the value of self-examination; in strongly recommending evaluation of each day, he maintained that it effected self-improvement and before sleep a tranquillity of mind. It was important for the individual to be self-aware, and recognition of one's own vices was the beginning of salvation.

He stressed the will as the fundamental factor in moral progress. And he regarded the will as more important than knowledge. He related wisdom closely to will when he offered a definition: *Quid est sapientia? Semper idem velle atque idem nolle.* Where the early Stoics had divided man into sage or non-sage, Seneca's division was of the will, that was either good or bad. The will was to be exerted so that *άριστεία* was won; yet he had a reasoned attitude to *άριστεία* for the

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2 Ep. xx.
3 Ep. v.1.
4 Ep. v.4,5.
5 *de Ira.* iii.2.
7 Ep. lxxx.4.
8 Ep. xx.5.
Stoic might feel sensation but with the proper direction of the will, sensation should be overcome.¹

For Seneca conscious effort was most important. His maxim was *vivere militare est:*² the individual had to work steadily and earnestly to acquire Stoic qualities of virtue and to withstand the strong pressures that might draw him away from moral progress. *Praemeditatio* was necessary to ensure self-preservation.³ And effort and struggle were embodied in his idea that the *προμονή* had to aspire to three significant stages of progress.⁴

Seneca emphasised the religious teaching of Stoicism, and he was concerned with Stoic theology more than any other Stoic since Cleanthes. He presents established Stoic thought, but with special emphasis on the all-pervading nature and universal influence of God. Seneca goes so far as to assert that God hardens those He loves.⁵ For Seneca, God is omnipotent and can be caring in the Christian sense.⁶ God has manifold functions. God and divine reason are nature.⁷ He is Fate.⁸ He is Jupiter. Seneca considered that Roman polytheism was subsumed in a Stoic monotheistic concept, where Hercules, Mercury etc. were identifiable as the one divine force.⁹ In short, everything was God.¹⁰

It is natural that, according to Seneca, the soul within the individual with its capacity for uprightness, goodness and greatness

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¹ Ep. ix.3.
² Ep. xcvi.5.
³ de Tranq. 11.
⁴ Ep. lxxv.8-14.
⁵ de Prov. ii.5.
⁶ de Ben. iv.passim.
⁷ de Ben. iv.17.
⁸ de Ben. iv.7,2.
⁹ de Ben. iv.8,1-2.
¹⁰ *Nat. Quaest.* i.Prel.13 *Quid est deus? Mens universi.* *Quid est deus? Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum.*
should possess a divine quality.\(^1\) The divine soul residing within us is
our guardian and takes note of our good and bad deeds. If we cooperate
with this spirit, we can become good and rise superior to fortune.\(^2\) Seneca allows for the possibility that the soul may be immortal, a
belief that he upholds more strongly than most Stoics.\(^3\)

Seneca wishes to remove the fear of death. He advocates self-
preservation but on many occasions he maintains that the individual
should be resigned to the possibility of dying at any time.\(^4\) He who has
removed the fear of death has cast off the bonds of slavery.\(^5\) Suicide
could be an acceptable way out, if a situation is intolerable and
insoluble. It seems that Seneca himself had mentally prepared himself
to commit such an act\(^6\) for he repeatedly discusses the prospect of death
and the education of oneself in this regard.

The influence of Seneca's writings was considerable, both from
his philosophical thought and from his eight tragedies. His plays,
which contain Stoic elements, strongly influenced writers as late as the
sixteenth century, and then French classical dramatists. And much of
his thought was in keeping with early Christian beliefs.

MUSONIUS

C. Musonius Rufus was a contemporary of Seneca and strongly
representative of the spirit of late Stoicism. He was concerned with
practical ethics, and like fellow Stoics of the period had limited
interest in physics and dialectic. However, he advocated the study of
dialectic so that his students learned to use logical processes.\(^7\)

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1 Ep. xxxi.11.
2 Ep. xlii.2.
3 Ep. lxv.24; Ep. xxxvi.8.
4 E.g. Ep. xxiv.15.
5 Ep. xxvi.10.
6 Ep. lxi.4.
7 Pohlenz, op. cit., Vol. I, pp.294,301; Barth, op. cit., p.188.
Musonius was a preacher of Stoicism, and not a writer. Yet his influence was considerable, for among his pupils were Epictetus, Aulus Gellius and C. Minucius Fundanus; the latter was to become consul. Musonius' method of teaching was Socratic discussion, and a student Pollio recorded his maxims in his collection ἀφορισμονεύματα Μουσωνίου, many of which are included in Stobaeus' Florilegium.

Musonius was uncompromising in a Stoic manner in his involvement in public causes. His participation was strongly individual; his activity was very much different from that of Seneca who fitted into the Roman institutional pattern. He prosecuted Egnatius Celer for giving false evidence against Barea Soranus, although in so doing he was pitting himself against the renowned cynic, Demetrios.  

Following the Piso conspiracy he was banished from Rome. He returned to Rome in 69 on Nero's death; during the trouble between Vespasian and Vitellius he preached to the soldiers involved on peace and censured them for bearing arms. For this he was given a violent reception and was manhandled.

Following Chrysippus he believed in the inherent goodness of man; virtue was based on knowledge and could be attained through daily habit. Vice was really the result of ignorance. The body could be conditioned to withstand enticement to vice. Musonius stressed the practical value of philosophy for showing us how to lead a virtuous life. Naturally such a practical view meant that, like other late Stoics, he did not urge the concept of the sage and associated absolute virtue. Musonius' sincerity was undoubted; his influence in his own lifetime was positive and healthy; and because of his integrity and character he has been described as the 'Cato of his generation'.

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2 Tac. Ann. xv.7.1.  
3 Tac. Hist. iii.81.  
5 Barth, op. cit., p.190.  
6 Barth, op. cit., p.187.  
7 Arnold, op. cit., p.117.
Epictetus (ca. 50-130) was originally a slave, a background which meant he was to stress that for the individual the study of philosophy could lead to independence of thought and to an egalitarian concept. When philosophers were expelled from the city by Domitian in 90, he went to live and teach in Nicopolis. Like Musonius, his teacher, Epictetus did not write on philosophy; his teachings have been recorded by his student and disciple, Arrian.

He thought that the student of philosophy and of practical ethics needed to recognise his own weaknesses and shortcomings. Man had a natural inclination to truth and goodness. But there was a contradiction in man that did not always enable him to follow this natural inclination. It was the function of philosophy to teach the individual to recognise and learn what was the truth, which would in turn lead him to happiness. Logic was important for establishing what was true or false, but Epictetus considered dialectic as completely subordinate to ethics and did not of course elevate it to the importance given it by Chrysippus. He did not have any significant interest in physics, although he maintained that one should have some educated awareness of physics and nature as appropriate to the Stoic principle of living 'in accord with nature'.

Self-education was fundamental; it was a process whereby the individual could learn and be conditioned to what was appropriate and what was basically alien. Training was important to distinguish between good and evil. Examination of conscience was important, a principle

1 *Discourses*, ii.11,1.
6 *Ench.* 49; *Discourses*, ii.14,27.
7 *Discourses*, i.26,2; iii.10.18; iv.5.4.
stressed especially by the late Stoics. Socrates' maxim 'know thyself' was particularly significant for Epictetus' teaching.¹

Epictetus emphasised the idea of the 'sage-in-progress',² where the will was so essential to progress successfully. And the will was the proper use of innate propensity.³ He upheld a theory of μνήμη ⁴ or 'representations'; the soul was to make the correct use of such impressions in relation to what was good or virtuous. Epictetus argued that the individual had and should have absolute freedom of will, and consequently he reduced the traditional Stoic significance of fate. To him is attributed a theory of προχαίρεσις⁵ (or moral purpose), which meant that the individual had the freedom to choose attitudes and his own values.

Epictetus championed Stoic theology. He associated the divine logos which controlled the world with the divine element in man which empowered him to govern the world.⁶ Also the divine logos, an element of which was also in man, should be observed⁷ and, in turn, there would be engendered in the individual a deep inner peace; such a principle is akin to Christian worship. God was omnipresent and omniscient; He was synonymous with soul, intelligence, knowledge and right reason.⁸ Just as Cleanthes had taught, we should thank and praise God.⁹

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¹ Discourses, i.26,18.
² Ibid., i.4,3; ii.19,25.
³ Ibid., ii.19,32.
⁴ Ibid., i.3,4; iii.3,4.
⁵ Ibid., i.30.4 Προαίρεσις οία δὲ καὶ χρήσεως μνήμησιν; cf. iii.22,103.
⁶ Ibid., i.4,3; ii.19.25.
⁷ Ibid., iii.13,112.
⁸ Ibid. ii.8,1 foll; iv.1,61.
⁹ Ibid., i.6,16 foll.; ii.14,10 foll.; iv.10,14 foll.
Epictetus taught much that was in accord with Stoic orthodoxy. For instance, he regarded external matters, ἀόρατα, very much in the same way as did the early Stoics; he upheld the Stoic view of social responsibility and the principle of family duty. And his firm sincerity is substantiated by his own way of life and humility. Epictetus' influence was strong. He was the friend of Hadrian; and his teachings have been long esteemed throughout the history of Christianity and Western civilisation.

From a review of Stoicism, that treats its development from its foundation until the end of the first century A.D., is gained a firm impression of a philosophical school that set out an extremely thoroughgoing and comprehensive system. Just as important as its completeness was the adaptability of Stoicism to various ages; and accordingly it made positive contributions to mankind in meeting social, spiritual and intellectual circumstances. In ethics there was an evolution from the time of Zeno to a less dogmatic, benevolent position. Its physics and natural science were of interest to researchers and philosophers, and at times were incorporated in literary works. Its dialectic was used by scientists and was taught in rhetoric, as providing sound methods of proof. Now, following this introductory chapter, the purpose is to look at this contribution as it is embodied in Roman education.
Secondary education as taught by the γραμματικός in Hellenistic schools was introduced and became established in Rome in the second century B.C. Authorities\(^1\) are generally unanimous in stating that the pattern of education to be taught by the grammaticus for succeeding centuries in Rome was the same as that taught by his Hellenistic counterpart. But in adopting the pattern followed in the Hellenistic grammar school Stoic trends that had begun to appear in the third and late second centuries B.C. became clearly established elements in the teaching of grammar schools in Rome. These were principally in the methodology taught by the Stoic Crates of Mallos, the Stoic system of Homeric exegesis, the Stoic slant on astronomy and geography (especially as evidenced in the popularity and standing of the Stoic Aratus' *Phaenomena*) and the teaching of the Stoics' anomalist theory of philology.\(^2\) But before elaborating upon these elements it is

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\(^1\) J. Bowen, *A History of Western Education*, p.152. (Reference is also made to the long lasting nature of Hellenistic education, cf. Pap. Oxy. i.124; iii.469; Antinoopolis Papyrus, ii.68.)


A.S. Wilkins, *Roman Education*, p.3.

Marrou identifies Roman and Hellenistic educational patterns so closely that he states that his chapters on Roman education are somewhat superfluous: "... l'adaptation au milieu linguistique latin n'entraîne pas de modifications profondes dans la pédagogie: le lecteur s'étonnera certainement du caractère littéral de cette transposition, un transfert pur et simple beaucoup plus qu'une imitation."

\(^2\) The anomalist's theory of philology and their conflict with the analogists will be discussed in Chapter III.
important first to understand clearly the method of teaching followed by
the Hellenistic and Roman grammaticus.

The function and aims of the grammaticus were to teach the art
of speaking correctly and to interpret authors. In the established
method of the grammaticus the first step was διδασκαλία or emendatio, a
correction of text where errors in reproduction by copyists had to be
eliminated; it was important that every pupil read the same version of
the text.

The second step was the διδασκαλία or praelectio, where the
text was read by the teacher with appropriate expression and some basic,
but not yet elaborated explanation indicating why it was read in a
certain way. The absence of punctuation in texts demanded some care and
preparation for interpretative reading. This was followed by recitatio
by the pupils who were required to learn the passage by heart.

The third step was έξηγησις or enarratio, and this was the
most important part of the grammaticus' teaching. The enarratio was
divided into two aspects: the methodice or verborum interpretatio and
the historie, or historiarum cognitio. The verborum interpretatio
involved the careful analysis of words in regard to grammatical form,
construction and etymology, and the explanation of difficult words or

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1 Ars grammatica praecipue consistit in intellectu poetarum et in recte
scribendi loquendive ratione: Sergius, 'Explanatio in artem Donati',
H. Keil, iv, p.486;
... recte loquendi et poetarum enarrationem, Quint. i.4,2.
in grammaticis, poetarum pertractatio, historiarum cognitio, verborum
interpretatio, pronuntiandi quidam sonus, Cic. de Or. i.187.

2 Dion Thrax. 1.

3 Quint. i.4,3.

4 Marrou, op. cit., p.230; Wilkins, op. cit., p.70.

5 Dion. Thrax. 2.

6 Quint. i.8,1.

7 Quint. i.1,36.

8 Cic. de Or. i.187; Quint. i.4,2.
glossemata. This part of the *grammaticus*’ work was subsumed in the vast amount of philological research and grammatical study that had been carried out throughout the third and second centuries B.C. by the schools at Alexandria, Pergamum and Rhodes.

The second aspect of the *enarratio* (or exegesis) was the ἐνεργείαν, which involved a comprehensive treatment of what the poet intended to say — his presentation of character, events, places. Such a treatment covered mythology and allegorical interpretation, geographical references and explanation, and aspects of astronomy — in short, everything in the text that the *grammaticus* thought should be explained, whatever the subject field.

The final step of the *grammaticus*’ treatment was the κρίσις or judgment, almost a comment on the ἔρευν, or the work's expression of a moral ideal. This 'judgment' has been firmly attributed to the Stoics, especially in regard to Homeric exegesis. The *grammaticus*’ treatment could be regarded as comprising the 'inferior hermeneutic' and 'superior hermeneutic'. The former consisted in the grammatical, stylistic and historical interpretation of texts, the latter being virtually the κρίσις and covering the moral, and possibly aesthetic judgment of the work.

It is not difficult to explain the general pattern of the *grammaticus*’ teaching in Hellenistic and Roman education. It was the education generally experienced by pupils at the secondary level, but this basically literary and grammatical education with its excursions into various subject fields such as astronomy and geography was actually

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1 Dion. Thrax. 10,9.
2 Dion. Thrax. 1.
4 Marrou, *op. cit.*, p.234. Les Stoïciens ont joué ici un rôle prépondérant: entre leurs mains, Homère est devenu "le plus sage des poètes", un sage de type romantique, dissimulant à dessein, sous le voile du mythe, toute une doctrine précise dont l'exégèse allégorique permettrait de retrouver les leçons. Ulysse, symbole du sage, nous enseigne par exemple ...
part of a broader ideal programme of education: the ἐγκύκλιος καλεία, which came to be termed the *liberales artes* in Roman education.¹ This general culture² comprised grammar (literature), rhetoric, dialectic as well as the four mathematical disciplines: geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music (theory).³ Generally, however, a pupil's acquaintance with the liberal arts depended upon the *grammaticus*¹ preparedness to move into these fields in the process of his textual explication.

INFLUENCE OF CRATES OF MALLOS

The key figure in the introduction of the γραμματικός' methodology to Rome was the Stoic Crates of Mallos.⁴ His standing in the Hellenistic world was high, being upheld vigorously by his followers, Ἐρασίθενου,⁵ but strongly contested by other scholars and especially by Aristarchus and his supporters at the Φασίλειον at Alexandria. But it was Crates' system that was introduced to Rome in the second century B.C. and successfully prevailed at that time. Although Suetonius was writing very much later, his acknowledgment of Crates' influence in the strongly Stoic spirit of the second century B.C. is justifiable when he claimed that *assidueque disseruit ac nostris exemplo fuit ad imitandum*.⁶ Crates introduced to Roman education the *grammaticus*¹ methodology as outlined above,⁷ literary exegesis from a Stoic viewpoint and Stoic anomalist philology.

¹ Cic. *de Or.* i.8-12; i.187; iii.127.
² Cf. Marrou, ... *culture générale*, op. cit., p.244.
³ Cf. the later division of the Trivium and Quadrivium.
⁴ Crates of Mallos (born circa 200 B.C.) was the Stoic head of the Library at Pergamum. He came to Rome in 169 as the ambassador of Attalus II (Suet. *de grmm.* 2). He had been a pupil of the Stoic Diogenes of Seleucia.
⁵ Cf. Ptolemy of Ascalon's περὶ τῆς Κρατιτελεο αἰρέσεως.
⁷ G. Pire, op. cit., p.50.
Crates wrote commentaries on Homer, Hesiod, Euripides and Aristophanes and of special importance was his Ἀδριανὸς Ἐν Ἐλέατοις. Homer had generally been looked to by the philosophical schools as literature to be interpreted and rationalised in support of their principles. The effective presentation of argument based on Homer helped substantiate the outlook of a certain philosophy. The cliché 'Bible of the Greeks' indicates the exalted standing and authority of Homeric literature. The Stoics had been very much interested in Homer from the time of Zeno, who wrote generally on poetry and produced five books on 'Homer's problems', giving allegorical interpretations; there were attempts to discover moral values based on natural principles (Δύοι φυσικοί, or physicalr rationes) in the poetic and popular representation of the gods. Cleanthes in his περί τοῦ ποιητῶν interpreted Homer from the point of view of both allegory and etymology; with him appeared the earliest known use of the word ἀλήθειας. And Chrysippus continued this tradition.

The introduction of Crates' Stoic interpretation, editing and exegesis of Homer fitted into a parallel bilingual system of education, where the Roman pupil received his education from both a Greek and Latin grammaticus. This tradition strongly prevailed until the first century A.D. There is clear evidence of educated Romans knowing and studying

2 P. Grimal, Le Siècle des Scipions: Rome et l'Helénisme au temps des guerres puniques, p.29 "L'Iliade', on le sait, avait été la Bible du peuple hellène."
3 G. Pire, op. cit., p.49, Les poèmes homériques jouaient chez les Grecs un rôle presque semblable à celui de la Bible chez les Hébreux.
4 Dio Chrysost., Or. 53,4; D.L. vii.4.
5 Cic. N.D. iii.24,63, Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica fluxit multitudo Deorum; qui induti specie humana fabulas poētis suppediavertum hominum autem superstitione omni refererant. Atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo puribus verbis explicatus est ... physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impias fabulas.

2 Marrou, op. cit., p.355, ...l'écolier suivait parallèlement les cours du grammaticus Graecus et ceux de son confrère latin.
Homer from the second century B.C. Scipio Aemilianus quoted verses from Homer when he expressed concern about the future welfare of Rome, as he contemplated the ruins of Carthage, and when he learned of the death of his brother-in-law, Tiberius Gracchus. Cicero also attributes Homeric knowledge to him. The philhellenism of the Scipionic circle was tinged with marked Stoic feeling, nurtured, as mentioned, through the strongly influential Panaetius and Polybius. Panaetius was interested in Homeric exegesis in Crates' tradition; his concern with literary criticism influenced both authors and grammatici. Panaetius was a faithful disciple of Crates and both exerted an influence in Roman pedagogy.

In introducing his method of Homeric exegesis to Roman pedagogy Crates used his editions of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, which incorporated extensive and detailed alterations in accordance with his method of διαδρασμός, or textual correction, to suit Stoic principles. His exegesis was based on interpretation of Homer's work, as well as textual modification, where the opportunity arose and when he thought it necessary. Crates' study and exposition of Homer was in opposition to the interpretation of his great rival Aristarchus, who had developed...
definite rules to correct and restore much of Homer, ostensibly to its original verse. The approach of the Alexandrians was strict, and did not tolerate solecism or barbarism in the text which was in keeping with their established system of grammatical analogy. But as well as following the anomalist approach, Crates directed his attention to cosmic and allegorical interpretation, with the appropriate Stoic judgment or κρισις ποιημάτων.¹

Crates and the Stoics regarded Homer himself as being in the tradition of the Stoic sage, who wrote with a didactic purpose.² Also Crates regarded Homeric heroes in the same light; this was especially so in regard to the Odyssey. Ulysses was the prototype of the Stoic sage. His supremacy over obstacles symbolically epitomised the Stoic aspiration to ride over and become detached from life's difficulties and frustrations, as well as becoming liberated from human passions.³ This was exemplified in his resistance to the temptations of the Lotophagi, Circe and the Sirens, and in not succumbing to the frenzied rage of the Cyclopes. Hercules could be similarly regarded,⁴ as independent in the Stoic tradition.

The Stoic interpretation of Homeric character can be compared to Virgil's portrayal of Aeneas who is often regarded as possessing Stoic qualities.⁵

Crates attributed to Homer the Stoic concept of the global earth,⁶ around which flow the oceans in a continuous expanse of sea;

¹ Pire, op. cit., p.49.
² Ibid., Cratès et les Stoïciens font d'Homère un aède n'ayant de goût que pour la vertu proscrivant le plaisir et ne s'écartant jamais de l'honnête. Ils le peignent donc à l'image du sage stoïcien.
³ Zeller, op. cit., p.369.
⁴ Zeller, op. cit., p.368.
⁵ See Chapter IV, where the Stoic content of authors taught by the grammaticus is discussed.
⁶ Heraclitus, Alleg. 36. The following discussion on Crates' Stoic interpretation and modification of Homer is generally based on the arguments of W. Kroll, pp.1634-1641, Pauly-Wissowa, xi.2.
the sun ends its course over the equatorial zone. The phenomenon of tide is caused by the confluence of ocean currents from east and west. The sun is the highest heavenly body, and is above the moon, planets and stars. Crates' forced Homeric interpretations meant that in *Odyssey*, xii.l, he identified ποταμότα ῥόδον 'Ὠκεανότα as a part of the great global ocean. He associated the two doves on Nestor's goblet, taking ambrosia to Zeus, with the Pleiades and identified the whole imagery as nourishment of the sun through ocean vapours. He altered *Od*. i.24, ἡμὲν δυσομένου 'Ὑπερῴονος ἢ ὑνίαντος, by having the Ethiopians live to the north and south of the equatorial ocean. In *Odyssey* iv.84 Crates included Ἱρευνοῦς instead of Ἱρεμβοῦς to fit the idea of Menelaus proceeding to the outer area of the ocean and to India. He also located the voyages of Ulysses in this outer ocean, which was a controversial issue between himself and Aristarchus. In *Odyssey* xi.14 he changed Κλυμερώων to Κερβερώων and located their country in the Arctic. He interpreted ἐλξώπαι as watchers of the Bear star, attributing to people of Homer's time a knowledge of astronomy consistent with Stoic thought. He substituted ἔννημαρ for ἔννημαρ in *Iliad* xii, considering that the traditionally accepted form absurdly signified that the gods required nine days to destroy a wall constructed by men in one day.

Crates' cosmic interpretation of the shields of Achilles and Agamemnon meant identifying μύκλου of one and πτώκες of the other as Stoic heavenly cycles; the ἀργύρεος τελαμών was considered the axis of

1 Cf. Cleanthes, Stoic frg. i.112; frg. 501.
2 Macrob. *Somm.* ii.9,3.
3 Heracl. 23.
4 Strab. i.5.
7 Gell. xiv.6,3.
the universe. He offered a similar interpretation of Aeneas' shield. Such allegorical and cosmic exposition was widely respected and was the accepted basis for concepts presented in later literature. Crates' cosmic interpretations were upheld by Posidonius, who in turn influenced Strabo, Plutarch and Geminus.

PANAETIUS' PUPILS

Whereas Crates introduced a pedagogical method to be used by the *grammaticus*, Panaetius is regarded as the consolidatory force in the founding of Roman Stoicism. As mentioned, his interest in moral and political philosophy together with a reasoned eclectic and conciliatory outlook in Stoicism especially found favour with and influenced *nobiles* active in Roman politics and society in the second half of the second century B.C. There is repeated evidence of this influence throughout Cicero who names as Panaetius' pupils Q. Tubero (*Lucullus* 44,135; *de Fin*. iv.9,23; *Tusc*. iv.2,4); C. Fannius, C. Laelius, Q. Scaevola (*Brut.* 26,101); Laelius (*de Fin*. iv.9,23); P. Rutilius Rufus (*Brut*. 30, *de Off*. iii.2,10); M. Vigellius (*de Or*. iii.21,78); L. Purius (*de Or*. ii.54, *de Rep*. iii.5). However, the only *grammatici* to be known as Panaetius' pupils were Apollodorus and Aelius Stilo. Posidonius, as his pupil, adopted Panaetius' teachings which were disseminated through Posidonius' influence. It is difficult to determine with any degree of

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1 Hom. *Il*. xx.269.


4 P. Boyancé, *Association Guillaume Bude, Actes du congrès, 1963*, p.222, *Ce que Panétius a donné au stoïcisme romain se situe dans la morale et dans la politique ... Peut-être aussi a-t-il influé sur la théologie.*

5 Suidas, *Lexicon* A3407. Apollodorus was a famous Athenian *γραμματικός* who was both a disciple of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and Aristarchus (see B. Tatakis, *Panétius de Rhodes*, p.36).

6 See Chapters III and IV.
precision Panaetius' contribution to the grammaticus' pedagogy; and it is unfortunate that Marrou has not given a further lead in describing Panaetius as one of the 'grands pédagogues classiques'.

**ARATUS' PHAENOMENA**

In discussing the introduction of the grammaticus' teaching in Rome due consideration must be given to the Stoic poem, the *Phaenomena* of Aratus. The popularity of this poem became firmly established; an Aratean tradition was established that lasted till the Renaissance. And there is firm evidence to suggest that the *Phaenomena* was read as a school text. Quintilian in discussing Greek literature to be taught in schools lists two categories. In the first category he refers to some half dozen Greek authors, headed naturally by Homer and including Aratus. He acknowledges Aratus' instructional value, but has reservations about his literary worth. An indication of the *Phaenomena's* standing is clearly given in Quintilian's introductory statement before he outlines his curriculum of Greek authors. He quotes


2 Aratus of Soli in Cilicia (c.315-263) had in his youth been a student of the Peripatetic Praxiphanes of Mytilene and then Zeno of Citium (see *Pauly-Wissowa* II, p.392). Although not a strong disciple of the school he was commissioned about 276 B.C. by the Stoic king Antigonos Gonatas of Macedonia to write the *Phaenomena*, which appeared in 274 B.C. The *Phaenomena* also includes the *Diosemeia*, which is concerned with meteorology. The *Phaenomena* proper of 730 lines was based on the prose work, the *Phaenomena*, by Eudoxus of Cnidus; the *Diosemeia* of 422 lines was largely derived from the *περὶ σημείων* of Theophrastus. Aratus also wrote an edition of the *Odyssey*, composed hymns and had a knowledge of medicine. He was regarded as versatile and talented by such a person as Callimachus who was also his friend (*καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συγγραφέα μου τοῦ Εὐδόκου καὶ ἐν τῇ καθημερίᾳ* — *Pauly-Wissowa* II, p.394).

3 G. Sarton, *Hellenistic Science and Culture in the Last Three Centuries B.C.*, pp.64 foll.

4 x.1,46.

5 *Arati materia motu caret, ut in qua nulla varietas, nullus adfectus, nulla persona, nulla cuiusquam sit oratio; sufficit tamen operi, cui se parem credidit.*

6 *Phaen. 1.*
Aratus in justification of his reason for beginning with Homer: *Igitur, ut Aratus ab Iove incipiendum putat, ita nos rite coepturi ab Homero videntur.* Even though Aratus' theme was ostensibly scientific, it was mostly grammatici who explained the poem. Because of its simple, direct style it was eminently suitable as an instructional work for young pupils. Crates had a good knowledge of the *Phaenomena.* He had particular opinions on the hymn to Zeus, which constitutes the praemium of the poem. It is significant that Crates in the process of his Homeric exegesis made references to the poem.

From the time of its appearance and throughout the period with which we are concerned, from the second century B.C. to the first century A.D., the *Phaenomena* was widely read. And the Aratean tradition was ultimately stronger in Latin literature than in Greek. The *Phaenomena* was a didactic poem that explained the constellations and meteorology from a Stoic viewpoint; in the Hellenistic world it was read as didactic poetry for popular education and was studied earnestly. It was commented on by the Stoics Boëthus of Sidon, Diodorus of Alexandria and Zenodotus of Mallos. Hipparchos, the great mathematician and astronomer of the second century B.C., in referring to certain errors made by Aratus, at the same time has commendation for the poem; his concluding statement testifies to the widespread acceptance of Aratus' explanations: ... and almost all who expound this particular

1 Marrou, op. cit., p.255, ... c'était en fait, le plus souvent, des grammairiens qui expliquaient ce poème.


2 The outstanding Aratean scholar, G. Kaibel, compared the expression to a father's explaining to a child, *Hermes*, Vol. 29, 1894, p.91, Es ist wie wenn der Vater dem Kinde den Sternenhimmel beschreibt, bald auf die Schönheit eines besonders hellen Sterns aufmerksam machend bald eine Geschichte erzählend, bald erklärend, bald betrachtend.


4 *Phaen.* 17,18, ... ἐμοὶ γε μὲν ἀστέρας εἰπεῖν Ἡ θέμς ἐνυμένης τεκμήριατε πᾶσαν δολὴν.

5 G. Sarton, op. cit., p.64.
poet associate themselves with his statements. It is significant that the only surviving fragment of Hipparchus' work is his comment (of a couple of hundred words) on Aratus, which could indicate the standing of the *Phaenomena* in antiquity. Attalos of Rhodes, a renowned mathematician and a contemporary of Hipparchus, also wrote a careful exposition of the poem, as well as several other writers. Later Posidonus wrote περὶ συγκρύσεως Ἄρατου καὶ Ὀμηροῦ.

In Latin literature Aratus' popularity is evidenced by the fact that Roman writers wrote translations of the *Phaenomena*. Cicero in his youth wrote a translation, 475 lines of which are still extant. Germanicus Caesar, nephew of Tiberius, also wrote a translation, 857 lines of which still survive. In the fourth century Rufus Festus Avienus wrote a paraphrase of the poem in 1878 lines, which we possess. Some part at least of Aratus was translated by P. Terentius Varro Atax in the first century B.C.

Also, Aratus' influence was strong among Roman writers. Lucretius drew on him. Ovid possibly under the influence of Callimachus points to the powerful position of Aratus. Manilius' *Astronomica* incorporated much of the *Phaenomena*. Virgil's *Georgics* comprises many elements of Aratus' *Diosemeia*. Much of the Stoic content of the *Phaenomena* would have been presented by the Roman grammaticus through his teaching of Virgilian literature. About 25 B.C. Virgil and other 'modern' poets were introduced in secondary education through Q. Caecilius Epirota, who was instrumental in raising the educational

2 Hipparchus, loc. cit.
4 admodum adulescentulus, N.D. ii.41.
5 G.R. Mair, introd. to translation of Aratus, Loeb, p.371.
6 Cum sole et luna semper Aratus erit, Amor. i.15.6.
7 G.R. Mair, op. cit., p.372.
8 Suet. de gramm. 2.
standing of Latin literature. In the first century A.D. Homer and Virgil were studied alongside each other.¹

Many Stoics produced commentaries on the Phaenomena; perhaps the most influential was Boethus of Sidon,² who about 150 B.C. wrote four books³ on Aratus, which were probably the basis of four later Vitae. Cicero had read Boethus and duly acknowledges him.⁴ It was probably through the Stoic Boethus and his commentaries that Roman authors produced their versions of the Phaenomena.⁵

It is clear that the Phaenomena was read and studied at all levels — by philosophers, authors of literature, scientists, grammatici. Such a diversity of people, many being of considerable standing, confirms its strong position in antiquity. Yet its theme, astronomy, although one of the studies of the ἐγνώκλος καὶ δεξία or liberales artes, was taught through literature. It was a clear instance of the literary technique of the grammaticus moving into the province of the scientific disciplines;⁶ and the position of astronomy in secondary education devolved mainly upon the literary explication⁷ of Aratus' Stoic and didactic Phaenomena. From their Hellenistic colleagues the Romans learned to relate the study of astronomy to the textual analysis of Aratus, and in mythological interpretation rather than from mathematical explanation.⁸

¹ Juv. vi.436; xi.180.
² He was the pupil of Diogenes of Babylon (Philodemus, περὶ τῶν Στιωκλίων).
³ Geminus, Isag. 14, ἔθεν καὶ Βοῆθος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ βιβλίῳ τῆς Ἀράτου ἔξηγησεις κτλ.
⁴ de Div. i.8.13.
⁶ Marrou, op. cit., p.254.
⁷ Marrou, op. cit., p.255, si l'astronomie figure en bonne place dans le programme des écoles secondaires, c'est à Aratos qu'elle le doit, et c'est sous la forme d'une explication de texte, d'une explication essentiellement littéraire, qu'elle était représentée.
⁸ Marrou, op. cit., p.378.
The importance of Aratus in antiquity has possibly been under-estimated, at least by British and American scholars. Authorities on Aratus are predominantly German. The leading scholars appear to be G. Kaibel, M. Erren (see Bibliography) and E. Maas. The French scholar, J. Martin, has written a highly authoritative text and G.R. Mair's Loeb translation, together with a very useful introduction is often referred to.

It is informative to consider briefly the Stoic content of the poem. The very first lines expound the omnipresent and divine power of Zeus, which is in accordance with Stoic theology. This homage to Zeus has often been compared to the famous hymn to Zeus by Cleanthes. Aratus praises Zeus who is ever present and cares for all mankind. This concern for man is embodied in the cosmic system where stars are placed in heaven as signs, by which seasons are indicated for farmers, weather changes are forecast and sailors are guided. The poem then is an exposition of Stoic astronomy and meteorological theory, rather than of Stoic morality.

A marked exception is the charming digression in the description of Justice, which is personified and at the same time given a strong Stoic quality. Aratus presents the version whereby παρθένος (or the Maiden) after mingling with mankind as Justice, was placed in the firmament as a star close to Boötes. She is portrayed as naturally

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1 It appears that a knowledge of Aratus was often assumed. Saint Paul quoted Aratus in his address from the Areopagus (see Pauly-Wissowa, II, p.395).

In Cicero, de Rep. i.56, Scipio, as would be appropriate for his strong Stoic interest, indicates a general familiarity with Aratus, *Imitemur ergo Aratum, qui magnis de rebus dicere exordiens a Love incipiendum putat.*

Also cf. Quintilian x.1.55.

2 *Phaen.* 1, "Ει μόι ἄρχωμενα τὸν οὐδέποτ' ἄνδρεσ έδώμεν ἄρητον· μεστά ἔξες λύχνος τάσας μὲν ēγγυαί, τάσας ο' ἄνθρωπων ἄγοραί, μεσθ' ἔξες δάλασσα.

3 2. 11.3-6. (*Zeö*) σταὶ γὰρ ἀντέσεϊς ἡμῖνς θυμοῦμεν προσευδήν ἐκ σοι γάρ γένος εἰς' ἄχου μυθόμα λαχάνεις μοῦσα, ὅσα ἔστε τε καὶ έρασε θυμή' ἐπε γαῖαν-τῇ σε καθυμνήσω καὶ σῶν κράτος αἰεν ἄειω.

4 1.105 ff.
beneficent, and ministering to mankind's every need. Her approach to mortal people was basically gentle and it was only man's intolerable evil that aroused Justice's severity. The Stoics' concept of justice was based on the cooperative ideal among men, where beneficence, charity and gentleness were the fundamental virtues to be upheld. Aratus' metaphorical description is consistent with Panaetius' concept of justice, as outlined by Cicero. This spirit of justice is also reflected in the teaching of the later Stoics: Seneca, Epictetus, Musonius and Marcus Aurelius; and it is especially exemplified in Seneca's treatises, namely De Beneficiis, De Clementia, De Ira. It is pointed out that the wise man from a sense of justice will allow for human weakness and particular circumstances when imposing punishment.

The Stoic cosmic system presented is based on the concept of a heavenly sphere that revolves each day about heaven's axis, that is fixed. The heavenly sphere is divided by the κύκλος ἐσμερρώδος (or celestial equator) and the two zones, between which extends the Zodiac with its twelve figures. The five planets (i.e. Saturn or Cronus, Jupiter or Zeus, Mars or Ares, Venus or Aphrodite, Mercury or Hermes — but unnamed in the poem), the sun and moon move within the Zodiac about the earth; the moon is closest to the earth, then the sun and at a further distance the five planets. Meteorological signs are given by

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1 Ibid., κας ε Δύκην καλέσκον, ἀγελρωμένη δε γέροντας, ης που ειν άγορη η ευρυχώρι εν άγυη. δημοτέρας ηελδεν επισερχουσα θεμλιτας.

2 1.112 κας αυτη, κότυνα λαών, μυρία πάντα παρετχε Δύκη, δότειρα δικαίων.

3 de Off. i.7,20, iustitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus ex qua viri boni nominantur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.

4 Sen. de Clem. ii.5-8.

5 Phaen. 21-23, cf. p.14 above. Crates attributed a similar cosmic knowledge to Homer, although there was a difference in the relative positions of the sun and planets. Such differences were not altogether uncommon among the Stoics.

6 Phaen. 512; 456.

7 Phaen. 455.
Zeus to aid mankind.\(^1\) The clouds, called *parhelia*\(^2\) (or *imagines solis*), indicate fair weather, a phenomenon also described in Seneca's *Naturales Quaestiones*\(^3\) and probably re-presented on the authority of Posidonius.\(^4\) Aratus' explanation that comets are passing phenomena, many of which herald a season of drought\(^5\) is consistent with the theories of Panaetius and Posidonius.\(^6\) Posidonius was probably the authority later followed by Roman writers who described Stoic meteorology;\(^7\) he is often mentioned by Seneca in his meteorological expositions. Posidonius,\(^8\) in turn, had drawn often from Aratus.

In schools throughout the Greek and Roman world the *Phaenomena*, although concerned with astronomy, was discussed with little scientific or mathematical precision; the *grammaticus* may have referred cursorily to a model of the earth's globe\(^9\) (such an aid also being used by Crates in his teaching\(^10\)), but the commentary was primarily literary and particularly explained the mythology, that was basically Stoic.\(^11\)

STOIC INFLUENCES IN HOME EDUCATION

The pattern of secondary education that was finally established was the teaching of a bilingual system whereby schools were

\(^{1}\) *Phaen.* 669.

\(^{2}\) *Phaen.* 880.

\(^{3}\) i.11-12.


\(^{5}\) *Phaen.* 1092.


\(^{7}\) Ibid.

\(^{8}\) Posidonius wrote on Aratus and Homer, comparing their interpretations of astronomy; and Posidonius' pupil, Diodorus of Alexandria, wrote a commentary of the *Phaenomena*. See J. Martin, *op. cit.*, p.30.

\(^{9}\) Marrou, *op. cit.*, p.255.

\(^{10}\) Kroll, *op. cit.*, p.1636.

\(^{11}\) Marrou, *op. cit.*, p.255.
conducted in Rome by the *grammaticus* and by his Greek counterpart. Yet this level of education was initially introduced to Rome for the most part in well-to-do households.\(^1\) It is relevant then, for this chapter, to look at the introduction of such education, which was mainly through slaves, together with its Stoic aspects. There had always been a tradition of household education in Rome, where a father was responsible for his son's training from about the age of seven; and it was natural that in the developing educational pattern of the second century B.C. arrangements were made for the young pupil to be taught within the home situation.\(^2\)

Cornelia the mother of the Gracchi, had a Stoic, Blossius of Cumae, teach her son Tiberius.\(^3\) Earlier, Aemilius Paulus procured Greek masters to teach his sons grammar, dialectic and rhetoric.\(^4\) Panaetius and Polybius enjoyed the hospitality of Scipio's home. This tradition continued beyond the second century B.C. and at levels of education other than that taught by the *grammaticus*. Cicero had a Stoic tutor Diodotus\(^5\) who stayed in Cicero's home until his death in 59 B.C. Diodotus gave Cicero lessons in a variety of subjects, but especially in dialectic, and geometry as a discipline for dialectic. Also, Augustus had in his home the Stoic Greek teacher Theon who wrote a textbook on *progymnasmata*, which were taught as transitional preparatory exercises from literary study with the *grammaticus* to oratorical study with the

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1 Marrou, *op. cit.*, p.334: *l'aristocratie romaine ... trouvait à domicile un personnel enseignant parmi les nombreux esclaves que la conquête lui procurait.*

2 Traditional Republican values meant that a boy should receive his training from his father. Even when schools became widely established, in the time of Quintilian education within the home was still being compared with school education, and the latter was not always favoured. Pliny, a strong supporter of this parental role, echoed a traditional Republican principle: *Suus cuique parens pro magistro* (Epp. viii.4,6).


5 *Brut.* 309, *ad Att.* ii.20,6; *Tusc.* v.113; *Acad.* ii.15.
rhetor. Tacitus also upheld the value of home education that used to be traditionally provided.

In discussing the role of the Stoic teacher in the Roman home, it might be pointed out that Roman families themselves became group adherents of Stoicism. It was a consolidatory situation for Roman Stoicism when Stoic teachers were domiciled with Stoic families. Such families, who evinced strong ethical and moral feeling, rather than showing an interest in scholastic subjects, were the family of Laelius (of the Scipionic circle), whose daughters married Stoics C. Fannius and Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos 117 B.C.), the family of Scaevola himself, and in the first century B.C. the family of Cato. Later, in the Empire, when there was a resurgence of Stoic feeling, the most famous Stoic family was that to which Paetus Caecina, Arria, Paetus and Helvidius Priscus belonged.

Although from early Republican times there was a tradition of home education that was still commended by writers during the Empire, education at all levels was clearly for the most part provided by teachers who conducted their own schools in an independent and non-institutional manner. Consequently, the arguments presented throughout these chapters are predominantly relevant to education provided in schools, rather than to private household arrangements.

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1 Gwynn, op. cit., p.200.
2 Dial. 28,2.
3 Cf. especially Tac. Dial. 28,4. Also Quint. i.2.
4 Marrou, op. cit., p.360 foll.
CHAPTER III

THE STOIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE METHODICÆ, OR TO THE TEACHING OF GRAMMAR

In Roman and Hellenistic education, as mentioned, a knowledge of grammar and of underlying principles for correct use of language was considered essential. For literary appreciation, as taught in the ᾿Αδελφίκα, it was necessary to have a clear understanding of words and forms for proper and intelligent reading. Grammar stood in relation to γραμματικῆ just as Euclidean postulates, definitions and axioms were fundamental to geometry.

A knowledge of grammar, as well as being important for an intelligent understanding of authors, was also regarded as necessary for correct speech and correct writing. Such a purpose was consistent with the ideal of ἙΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΣ or Latinitas, where a purity of language was to be developed. Seneca pointed out that the grammaticus was responsible for seeing to a cura sermonis. It is interesting to note that the

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1 Γραμματικῆ was a comprehensive term for the work of the grammaticus; cf. definition in Dion. Thrax. 1, where γραμματικῆ is defined as ἔμπειρος τῶν παρὰ πολλὰς τε καὶ συγγραφεῖσι ὡς ἔργα τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων, and its six μέρη are enumerated as ἀνάγνωσις; ἐξήγησις κατὰ τρόπους; ἀπόδοσις γλωσσῶν καὶ ἱστοριῶν; εὑρεσις ἐτυμολογιῶν; ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμῶν; κρόσους.

2 Philo, de Congressu, 26.

3 Quint. i.4.6. Quid enim tam necessarium quam recta locutio. i.9.1. recte loquendi scientiam.

4 Arnold, op. cit., p.149.

Also see C.N. Smiley, Latinitas and ἙΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΣ — the influence of the Stoic theory of style.

5 Ep. 88.3.
ideal of 'Ελληνικός, although stated by Aristotle, was strongly upheld by the Stoics, and is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius\(^1\) as the principal ἀρετή of speech. So in contrast to present-day emphases in the teaching of English in schools, grammar and precise word study were regarded as indispensable for literary understanding and correctness in using language.

GRAMMAR AND DIALECTIC

Grammar was first developed as a part of λογική or dialectic\(^2\) in the philosophical schools, and in due course found its way into the grammatico-literary curriculum taught in secondary schools. Although it was researched and systematised to substantiate logic, it was readily applied in the grammar schools to teach the rules of correct speech. A study that was of importance to the philosophers, and of very great importance to the early Stoics under the leadership of Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus ultimately became the province of the grammatici.

The Stoics, more than any other philosophical school, were concerned with dialectic and the relating of a grammatical system to their doctrine. Utterance, λέκτόν, was the manifestation of thought and the all-important process.\(^3\) Λέκτόν may be either perfect or imperfect. When it is perfect it expresses a proposition, and it is imperfect when the proposition is incomplete.\(^4\) This was the fundamental reason for the strong, far-reaching interest that the Stoics developed in grammar. In dividing λέκτόν into complete and incomplete expressions, grammar which determined the function of parts of speech was basic to defining such expressions. For instance, incomplete λέκτά were divided into two groups: one including proper names and adjectives, the other including verbs, or the predicate. So a proper name was δύναμις, and προσηγορία was

\(^1\) vii.140.


\(^3\) Zeller, op. cit., p.92.

\(^4\) Sext. Math. viii.70, τῶν δὲ λέκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐλληπὶ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ.
a common noun or adjective.\textsuperscript{1} A verb was κατηγόρημα or δήμα.\textsuperscript{2} Then there were further divisions and subdivisions which required identification of other grammatical functions and forms.

There was a conditional proposition (συνήμενον) formed from two single propositions by means of the connective 'if' (εἰ or εἰκερ); conjunction of propositions (συμπεπλεγμένον) was joined by καί; a disjunctive proposition (διεξενυμένον) was put together with 'or' (ή).\textsuperscript{3} Such detailed grammatical analysis, developed to substantiate Stoic logic or dialectic, led to a grammatical system and terminology, that became firmly established in antiquity. This terminology was later used by grammatici who were not Stoic. Dionysius Thrax, for instance, who had no affinity with Stoic philosophy, used this terminology in his famous τέχνη; and this handbook was probably instrumental in passing Stoic grammatical terminology on to the present day.\textsuperscript{4}

ANOMALIST THEORY OF STOIC GRAMMAR

Stoic grammar was based on the φύσει theory of language. Before the emergence of Stoicism opposing theories had developed as to whether language was basically φύσει or θεότε, as asserted by Hermogenes.\textsuperscript{5} The φύσει theory was taken up and developed by the Stoics who considered that language existed by nature; they accepted the natural form of the word, and the fact that language as a direct expression of thought was anomalous. The Stoics then were the champions of the anomalist theory. They accepted word forms as they were and did not attempt to categorise language carefully in accordance with καλίσεις and by analogy.

\textsuperscript{1} D.L. vii.58.
\textsuperscript{2} D.L. vii.58,64; Cic. Tusc. iv.9.21.
\textsuperscript{3} B. Mates, Stoic Logic, p.33.
\textsuperscript{4} Sandys, op. cit., p.147.
\textsuperscript{5} Cratylos, 383a.
\textsuperscript{6} 384d: οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἐκάστῃ περικεναι δύναι οὐδὲν οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἑθοσάντων τε καὶ καλοῦντων.
The Θεσεία theory, as maintained by Aristotle, set down that language was convention; and this was the basis of the analogist school that was established in the third century B.C. and whose leading protagonists were Aristarchus of the Μουσείου at Alexandria and Aristophanes of Byzantium. ‘Analogy’ became the name of this philological system, although properly speaking ‘analogy’ was the name of the principle used in the science of Κλήσις rather than for the science itself.  

With the Stoics consuetudo or συνήθεια was the governing rule; usage was the basis for their linguistic analysis; they accepted the fact that word forms and endings could be inconsistent, and that there could be ambiguity.  

Such ambiguity existed in a word like acies, but usage in associating this word with others in such phrases as acies militum, acies ferri and acies oculorum provided definite meanings. Chrysippus who wrote a number of books on Διάλογος (περὶ τῆς συνήθειας, περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰς λέξεις Διάλογος), pointed out that as language did not present a true image for dialectic relationships, anomaly prevailed in language; the form of speech and the content of what is expressed frequently do not correspond, and are often conflicting.  

On the other hand the analogists denied that such disorder existed; they claimed that declension indicated clear arrangement and consistency, and was in keeping with common usage. Order in inflexions, whether for noun (also adjective) or for verb was referred to under the comprehensive term declinatio. However, the argument mainly concerned

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2 Varro ll.ix.1: similes res dissimilibus verbis et dissimiles similibus esse vocabulis notatas.

A. Gell, N.A. xi.12 quoting Chrysippus omne verbum ambiguum natura esse, quoniam ex eodem duo vel plura accepti possint.

3 Augustine, Prinicipia dialecticae, 9.


5 Ibid.

6 Varro, ll.x.74: analogia est verborum similium declinatio similis non repugnante consuetudine communi.
the noun, rather than the verb, the basic issue being nouns of similar nominatives but different declension, such as in *lepus* and *lupus*.\(^1\)

It is probable that because of the controversy the analogists formed canons or rules of declension.\(^2\) To answer the criticisms of the anomalists, the analogists needed to have at their disposal a systematic arrangement of language, to which they could readily refer. Some analogists went so far as to suggest that where analogy had been lost, it should be restored,\(^3\) and Quintilian, an anomalist for the most part, satirises analogists for their forced, somewhat pedantic use of language.\(^4\) It appeared that by the end of the first century A.D., the main controversy had died down and a compromise prevailed, where it was allowed that analogy applied to inflexion and that where custom was firmly established, anomaly held sway.

The points to note in regard to the philological conflict are:

(i) the Stoic anomalist theory was largely responsible for a Stoic terminology of grammar that came to be generally used— even by their analogist opponents;

(ii) the anomalist theory was initially developed by a philosophical school, whereas the analogist system was developed mainly by Hellenistic grammarians of the third century B.C.;

(iii) in Rome the Stoic anomalists were in a strong position from the time of Crates until the middle of the first century B.C. and the time of Aelius Stilo and Nigidius Figulus;\(^5\)

(iv) following Varro,\(^6\) who presents both systems, the analogists began to gain the upper hand. Remmius Palaemon, teacher of

\(^1\) Quint. i.6,12.


\(^3\) *Ibid.*

\(^4\) i.6,27: *... aliuude Latine loqui, aliuude grammaticae.*

\(^5\) In Chapter V are discussed Roman *grammatici* who were Stoic.

Persius and Quintilian, and the author of an *ars grammatica* of lasting influence was an analogist; in this controversy grammarians tended ultimately towards analogism;\(^1\)

(v) to consider the whole question of grammar in perspective, it must be realised that philology in its various aspects was pursued in Roman and Hellenistic times as a scientific study of importance.\(^2\) Cicero, Varro, Quintilian and Pliny wrote at length on grammatical problems, and to Caesar is attributed a treatise *de analogia*. Linguistic study in this strong literary culture was earnestly undertaken by many, in contrast to the very much specialised linguistic interests of present-day scholars;

(vi) the above outline of the anomalist/analogist controversy can be elaborated in many particular aspects of philology — etymology, parts of speech, case forms, verb forms, glossemata, barbarisms, solecisms and even orthography.

But as the theme of this study is the teaching of grammar in secondary schools with an explanation of Stoic influences, it is now time to shift emphasis from this controversy, and to consider the Stoic elements in the *grammaticus' treatment of parts of speech, etymology, etc.*

For the period under consideration a very coherent and the best outline of the *methodicē*, or the *grammaticus' treatment of grammar*, is provided by Quintilian.\(^3\) The arrangement and content of the part of Quintilian's first book, from i.4.1 to i.5.54, could well be regarded as a compact *ars grammatica*.\(^4\) There is clearly set out throughout this part of his first book a series of requirements for the guidance of *grammatici*. And a discussion of such requirements will be a very useful basis for pointing out relevant Stoic elements.

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\(^1\) Colson, *op. cit.*, p.25.

\(^2\) Varro testifies to the large number of commentaries, *LL.viii.10.23, ... de eo Graeci Latinique libros fecere multos.*

\(^3\) Book I, *passim.*

IDENTIFICATION OF PARTS OF SPEECH

A very important early step in analysing the text is to identify the parts of speech: *Turn videbit, ad quem hoc, pertinet, quot et quae partes orationis* and also ... *grammaticus ... ut partes orationis reddi sibi désideret.* Quintilian regards this identification as important, and also firmly acknowledges the strong Stoic contribution in this systematisation.

Parts of speech were only broadly categorised by Plato into ὀνομα and ὅμω, which could be regarded as the subject and predicate, necessary elements for a sentence. Aristotle applied particular terms to the subject and predicate, the ὑποκειμένου and κατηγορούμενον, and added a third part of speech, the σύνδεσμος, to identify the conjunction and particle. The ᾱρθρον was added by the Stoics, as a term to refer to the pronoun and article, while they restricted the σύνδεσμος to an uninflected form. Chrysippus made an important division, that was to prevail till the present day, when he categorised the noun into the nomen proprium (ὄνομα) and the nomen appellativum (ὄνομα προσηγορικόν), e.g. 'Socrates' and 'horse', 'man' respectively.

The Stoic Antipater of Tarsus added the adverb (μεσότης/advertium), other Stoics preferred the term πανδέκτης to μεσότης.

1 i.4.17.
2 i.8.13.
3 i.4.19, Paulatim a philosophis ac maxime Stoicis auctus est numeros, ac primum convictionibus articuli adiecti post praepositiones, nominibus appellativo deinde pronomen, deinde mixtum verbo participium, ipsis verbis adverbia.
5 Sandys, op. cit., p.147.
7 Pupil and successor of Diogenes as leader of the school; was referred to as being among the magnos Stoicae sectae auctores — Sen. Ep. 92,5.
8 D.L. vii.57.
9 Char. gramm. i.190.24; 194.20. Later the term ἐξώρημα replaced μεσότης or πανδέκτης.
They related the adverb closely to the verb — *quasi adiectiva verborum nominabant*. ¹

The Stoics proceeded to sub-classify the ἄρθρα (pronoun) more precisely. The ἄρθρα ἔρωμεν referred to personal pronouns, reflexive, possessive, and demonstrative, while the ἄρθρα ἀροστάζη included the relative, interrogative and indefinite pronouns as well as the article.²

The participle was originally regarded as a noun form by the Stoics, under the term ἀντανάκλαστος προσηγορία. Later it was termed *nomen verbale* by the Stoics. The term μετοχή had been applied to it, because it was felt that a particular part of speech was required to describe these noun-verbal relationships. The Stoics, however, were loth to identify the participle as a particular part of speech, because the participle was considered a derived and not a basic form.³

The Stoics divided the verb into personal and impersonal forms, with further classification into transitive and intransitive kinds.⁴ The personal intransitive verb was called σύμβας, e.g. *Cicero ambulat*; the impersonal intransitive form was called παρασύμβας (i.e. where there is no functional object and the accusative form is a virtual subject), e.g. *Ciceronem oportet*; the personal transitive was ἔλαττον ἦ κατηγόρω, e.g. *Cicero rempublicam amat*; the impersonal transitive verb was ἔλαττον ἦ παρασύμβας (where the transitive quality could be expressed by a genitive object), e.g. *Ciceronem miseret reipublicae*.

The Stoics also arranged verb tenses about which there was no or little contention with the Alexandrians,⁵ except in the terms used. The division into four basic tenses⁶ meant that these were: the present (ἔνεστός παρατατεῖ), the imperfect (παρασκηνέως παρατατεῖ), the

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¹ Prisc. ii.54.11.
⁵ Steinhall I, *op. cit.*, p.310.
⁶ Priscian, vii.8 foll.
perfect (ἐνεστὸς συντελικός), the pluperfect (παρώχθηκενος συντελικός).\footnote{1} This was the system stated by Varro\footnote{2} and is the system referred to by Diogenes Laertius.\footnote{3}

Prepositions were named προθετικοῖ σύνθεσις\footnote{4} by the Stoics who like others concerned with grammar found it difficult to reconcile the function of a preposition in relation to accidence and the positioning of a preposition which could be adverbial, as in post longum tempus and longo post tempore.\footnote{5}

The adjective was generally regarded as a noun form, although Varro is one who identifies adiectivum as a distinct part of speech.\footnote{6} The adjective (ἐπωθετον) indicated, like any other noun, a σώμα ἢ πρᾶγμα, an σώσκα; λευκόν is the white(ness), the white object; so a word signifying color is not to be distinguished from any other δόγμα.\footnote{7} An adjective could be classified as a noun in the same way as the proprium and appellativum were kinds of nouns.\footnote{8}

DECLINING OF NOUNS AND CONJUGATING OF VERBS

The next clearly defined function of the gramicus, as indicated by Quintilian,\footnote{9} is the declining of nouns and conjugating of verbs – Nomina declinare et verba in primis pueri sciant. Although the systematic and elaborate organisation of nouns and verbs was undertaken

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2. ll. ix.32,96-101; x.33.47,48.
3. vii.57 foll.
5. Gudeman, op. cit. p.1806.
6. ll.viii.44. Has vocant quidam appellandi dicendi, adminiculandi, iungendi. These terms correspond respectively to 'nouns, 'verbs', 'adjectives' and 'adverbs'. Cf. Steinthal II, p.219.
8. Ibid., op. cit., p.254.
9. i.4.22.
by the Alexandrian analogists, the Stoics had been responsible for important preliminary developments. Originally Aristotle had simply differentiated the nominative case (called ὅνωμα) from the oblique cases (comprehensively termed πτώσεως). The Stoics later applied the term πτώσεως to the nominative as well. According to Diogenes Laertius the γενική, δοτική and αἰτιατική cases were called πλάγιαν πτώσεως.
Diogenes Laertius also refers to a treatise on five cases written by Chrysippus.

The terms γενική and αἰτιατική were somewhat erroneously translated into Latin. The original meaning of the accusative did not describe the case that denotes the object of an accusation, but rather the case denoting the effect of (τὸ αἰτιατὸν) an action; instead of accusativus a more appropriate term would have been causativus or effectivus. The Stoics regarded the γενική as the case denoting γένος or class; the term that came to be established in Latin, genetivus, is not as meaningful as the term later used by Priscian — generalis. The Stoics do not appear to have been interested in the κλητική or vocativus, no doubt because it would have little or no importance for their system of propositional dialectic. The distinctively Latin case, the ablativeus, does not appear to have a Stoic connection; it is interesting that the forming of the term has been attributed to Caesar, and its use was firmly established with later grammarians. Even though Latin grammatici may have mistranslated certain terms originally evolved by the Stoics, the basic Stoic division of cases as used by Greek γραμματικοί was adopted directly by the Romans together with its basic terminology.

1 Colson, op. cit., p.32.
2 vii.65.
3 vii.192.
4 Sandys, op. cit., p.147.
5 Ibid.
GENDER

Gender (γένος/genus) was to be indicated\(^1\) basically as masculinum, femininum or neutrale. The Roman grammaticus might also point out that some irregular nouns are ἐπίκεκολα, where one form may encompass both masculine and feminine gender (e.g. columba: dove/pigeon),\(^2\) or where a feminine form may indicate a male (e.g. Murena).\(^3\) Of the three basic genders the neuter form was regarded by the Stoics as having been οὐδέτερον, a virtual negation of the two 'positive' genders, ἄρσενικόν, ἡλυκόν.\(^4\)

Careful grammatical description of each word in the text was regarded as essentially important, and although grammatici may have given this grammatical explanation and required it from their pupils in varying degrees of depth and detail,\(^5\) it is clear from the reading of Quintilian, Dionysius Thrax, Priscian and the Grammatici Latini\(^6\) generally that there was a fundamentally standard procedure followed.

ETYMOLOGY

As well as such grammatical description, very often with just as much emphasis the grammaticus taught the etymological associations of many words: Scrutabitur ille praeceptor acer atque subtilis origines nominum ...\(^7\) Etymology,\(^8\) concerned with word origin and derivatives,

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\(^1\) Quintilian i.4.23, ... non erit contentus tradere in nominibus tria genera et quae sunt duobus omnibusve communia ...  
\(^2\) The form columbus only appeared about the time of Varro (II.ix.56).  
\(^3\) Quint. i.4.24.  
\(^4\) Cf. Steinthal II, op. cit., p.244.  
\(^5\) Quint. i.4.23.  
\(^6\) Cf. H. Keil, Grammatici Latini.  
\(^7\) Quint. i.4.25.  
\(^8\) Varro II.v.2-4, ... ubi cur et unde sint verba scrutantur, Graeci vocant ἐτυμολογία. Quint. i.6, Etymologia ... verborum originem requirit.
especially with regard to nouns, was a vast field of study and research extensively and earnestly pursued by Hellenistic and Latin philologists. And it constituted a very important part of the *grammaticus'* teaching of the *methodica*. But as well as being a field of word analysis taught by the *grammaticus* for its intrinsic value and interest, etymology also provided the basic principles for the treatment of solecisms, barbarisms, glossemata and very often orthography.¹

Etymology was predominantly a field of study undertaken and consolidated by the Stoics. It was important for their system of logic or dialectic, where the aim was to establish the truth. The close association of etymology and dialectic is indicated by the fact that Augustine's *De dialectica* or *Principia dialecticae* contains a clear exposition of the Stoic principles of etymology, which are regarded as important. The word itself, ἐπημολογία, suggests a theory of knowledge or truth based on philology; for the Stoics regarded ὀνόματα as originally ἤτοιμον.² The function of ἐπημολογία was to prove the truth or validity of words, by showing how the word corresponded to the object named, and also to show that ἤτοιμον revealed true religious, social and metaphysical values.³ Consequently, etymology could be relevant to the *grammaticus'* treatment of the ὑπορεύον where the implied meaning of a word and the poet's use of it could be explained.

The Stoic system of etymology was consistent with their theory of φύσεως, a doctrine that supported the natural truth in language, in contrast to the conventional, organised principles of language as upheld in the Ἀριστοτελεια theory. Etymology allowed that, although the roots of the word were true or valid, the derived word itself, as it came into being, might not have a form that reflected validity (ἤτοιμον).⁴ Such an argument fitted into the Stoic anomalist theory. The analogists did not concentrate on etymology, and furthermore vehemently criticised what

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¹ Each of these responsibilities of the *grammaticus'* teaching will be discussed a little later in this chapter as a development from the treatment of etymology.


³ Ibid.

⁴ Colson, *op. cit.*, p.25.
they regarded as forced, pseudo-scientific explanations. They could not accept such anomaly in word derivatives; and being philologists, and not philosophers, had no use for etymology and subtle word analysis in logic or dialectic. The resistance of the Alexandrians to etymology was unsuccessful, because as recommended by Quintilian and upheld by later grammatici, especially Priscian, the study of word origins—verba primigenia, primitiva and derivativa—was regarded as the teacher's function and responsibility. The extent of the Stoic comprehensive contribution to etymology is indicated from the time of Chrysippus who alone wrote ten books περὶ ἐτυμολογικῶν, and as late as Augustine who declared that Stoici autemant nullum esse verbum cuius non certa explicari origo possit.

Onomatopoeia, in keeping with the Stoic φόνσει theory of language, was a principle on which words could be first formed. Augustine, although writing considerably later than for the period under consideration in this study indicates the Stoic argument for onomatopoetic word formation: the word could directly represent the sound as in aeris tinnitum, equorum hinnitum, ovium balatum, tubarum clangorem, stridorem catenarum, but also the tone of a word could have an appropriate effect on the senses, as with voluptas which is somewhat

1 Cf. Varro ll.vii.109, ... in primo volumine est quae dicoantur, cur ἐτυμολογικὴ neque are sit neque ea utilis sit.

2 See pp.71-75.

3 de Dial. 6.

4 Aug. de Dial. 6, ... ut res cum sono verbi aliqua similitudine conoocat ... Perspicis enim haec verba ita sonare ut ipsae res quae his verbis significatur.

Also: Origen, contra Celsum i.18, λόγος βαθὺς καὶ ἀπόρρητος ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὄνυματων, πότερον, ὡς οἶδαί οἱ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἡσθεν εἰσὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἢ, ὡς νομίζω οὐλ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτοας, φύσει, μυθουμένων τῶν πρῶτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα καθ' ὅν τὰ, ὀνόματα, καθὸ καὶ στοιχεῖα τυνα, ἐτυμολογικὰς ἐστὶ φύσεως.

5 Aug. de Dial. 6, Sed quia sunt res, quae non sonant, in his similitudinem tactual valere, ut si leniter vel aspere sensum tangunt, lenitas vel asperitas litterarum ut tangit audition sic eis nomen peperit: ut ipsum lene cum dicimus, leniter sonant, quis item asperitateam non et ipso nomine asperam judicoet?
euphonious and with crux which is harsh sounding.¹

The Stoics postulated a number of different principles for word formation and meaning, but the suggested processes can hardly be invariably accepted as sound.

(i) The principle of vicinitas² meant that a word which had a precise meaning, could extend its application to allied objects. Such a word was piscina which had the precise meaning 'fish pond', but by extension came to mean 'pond' or large water container, although there was no association with fish.

(ii) The progressio ad contrarium suggested a very strange and erroneous reasoning, whereby a derived word implied an opposite idea to the meaning of the original word. For instance, bellum was supposed to have a contrary meaning to bellus.³

(iii) The formation of a word per id quo continetur meant that a word such as urbs was claimed to be derived from orbis.⁴

(iv) Correspondingly, a word could be formed per id quod continetur; for instance, horreum was to be derived from hordeum (just as 'granary' in English is formed from 'grain').⁵

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¹ Ibid. Lene est auribus, cum dicimus 'voluptas', asperum (est), cum dicimus 'crux'. Ita res ipsae adjiciunt, ut verba sentiuntur.

² Ibid. Ventum est, ut usurpetur nomen non tarnen rei similis, sed quasi vicinae ... Ita vocabulum non translatum similitudine, sed quadam vicinitate usurpatum est.

³ Ibid. ... bellum, quod res bella non sit, ... In actual fact, bellus is derived from benulus, a diminutive of benus, an early form of bonus; an early form of bellum was duellum (see Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary).

⁴ Ibid. ... ut urbut ab orbe appellatum voluit, quod auspicato locus aratro circundavi solet. The example given is false: urbs is from the Sanskrit vardh-, 'to make strong', while orbs is from the Sanskrit dhvar-, 'bend', 'twist' (see Lewis and Short, op. cit.).

⁵ Ibid. ... ut si quis horreum mutata d littera affirmet ab hordeo nominatum.
(v) The principle of metonymy meant that *mucro* (the point of a sword) could take over the full meaning of *gladius*.

(vi) Correspondingly, it was argued that the whole could give its meaning to a part, so that *capillus* was formed from *caput*.

(vii) **Efficientia** was a principle that enabled a word such as *vinculum* to be derived from *vis*. The argument was that chains use force, and that *vis* as a word implied force because the sound *u* has a forcible sound.

(viii) A principle that prevailed *per effecta* indicated that *puteus* was the origin of *potatio*.

Etymology was a field of study for which many principles were set down; the above-mentioned processes do not comprehensively describe the full range of possible etymological methods. However, although many of their basic principles could accurately explain the evolution of certain words, there was a tendency to rationalise and force explanations which were invalid. It is clear that from the time of Varro Roman grammatici maintained a lively interest in etymology and it is a justifiable claim that 'the world of words had a glamour and a wonder for them (i.e. educated people), which it cannot have for us.' The pupil of the grammaticus would hear explained the primitiva and

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1. Ibid. ... *vel a parte totum, ut mucronis nomine, quae summam pars gladii est, gladium vocamus*.

2. Ibid. ... *vela toto pars, ut capillus quasi capitis pilus*. *Capillus*, as a diminutive of *caput* is the probable etymology (see Lewis and Short, *op. cit.*). It is most doubtful that *pilus* should be associated.

3. Ibid. Again, the suggested etymology for the example given is unsure.

4. Ibid. *puteus quod eius effectum potatio est*. The example is not convincing. *Potatio* is from *poto*, which is derived from *ποτό*, while *puteus* is connected with *pu*—indicating 'cleanse' (cf. *purus*). (See Lewis and Short, *op. cit.*)

5. Cf. Quint. i.6; Varro *ll.*, Books v-vii.


derivativa of many words, and especially nouns.¹

GLOSSEMATA

As well as having an intrinsic interest in word origins and derivatives the grammaticus drew on etymology to explain 'glossemata'. 'Glossemata' were words that were no longer in common use and naturally were very often to be discussed in the explication of verse. Quintilian emphasises the grammaticus' responsibility in this regard: Circa glossemata etiam, id est voces minus usitatas, non ultima eius professionis diligentia est.² A pupil often was required to set out in a systematic list brief explanatory comments on the author being studied;³ this exercise was especially relevant to the explanation of γλῶσσας. The Stoic principles of etymology outlined above could assist the grammaticus' interpretation of such γλῶσσας; and this approach is especially applicable to Crates of Mallos who was so careful to interpret Homer from a Stoic viewpoint.⁴ Varro in discussing etymology (see Books v-vii) presents the Stoic viewpoint⁵ and relates glossemata to etymology: Camillam qui glossemata interpretati dixerunt

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¹ Cf. Priscian.

² i.8.15. Also note the emphasis placed on the treatment of γλῶσσας in Dion. Thrax 1.

³ Cf. Marrou, op. cit., p.232, who cites from a fragment such an explanation of words from Homer — the Homeric forms are on the left, the explanation on the right:

| Πηλιωδέως | καλῇ τοῦ Πηλέως |
| Ἀχυλίσος | τοῦ Ἀχυλλέως |
| οὐλομένην | ὄλεθριαν |
| ἡ | ἡτὶς |
| μυρία | πολλὰ |
| Ἀχαλωτές | τοῖς Ἑλληνὶς |
| ἀλγεα | κακὰ |
| ἐθήκεν | ἐπολίσαεν |

⁴ See Chapter II, pp.39 foll.

⁵ 1.1.vi.2, Huius rei auctor satis mihi Chrysippus et Antipater et illi in quibus et non tantum acuminis, at plus litterarum, in quo est Aristophanis et Apollodorus ... Varro, of course, presents the argument for analogy in his de Lingua latina, viii-x.
The treatement of 'glossemata' was regarded as important, and the Stoics through their system of etymology could contribute to this part of the grammaticus' teaching.

BARBARISMS AND SOLECISMS

'Barbarisms' and 'solecisms' were to be remedied by the teacher, if necessary; although it is allowed that at times these are acceptable, particularly in verse. A 'barbarism' is defined as a fault that occurs within a single word, while a 'solecism' usually applies to more than one word. Examples of barbarisms are:

(i) the 'Latinising' of a foreign word, e.g. *cantus* (iron tyre of a wheel), which was of Spanish or African origin; *mastruca*, which was Sardinian for 'a rough cloak';
(ii) the use of *gladia*, instead of *gladii*;
(iii) the tendency to change a deponent form, so that it conformed to the rules of a regular active verb, e.g. the use of the form *adsentio* instead of *adsentior*.

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1 *Il.vii.34*. Also see *vii.107*: *itaque sub hoc glossema 'collide' subscribunt.*
2 Quint. i.5.5, *Prima barbarismi ac solecismi foeditas absit ... et grammaticos officii sui commonemus.*
3 *Ibid.* Sed quia interim excusatur haec vitia aut consuetudine aut auctoritate aut vetustate aut denique vicinitate virtutum ...
4 Quint. i.5.6, *Interim vitium, quod fit in singulis verbis, sit barbarismus.*
   Quint. i.5.34, *Cetera vitia omnia ex pluribus vocibus sunt, quorum est solecismus ...*
5 Quint. i.5.8.
6 Quint. i.5.16.
7 Quint. i.5.13, *nam sive est 'adsentior', Sisenna dixit 'adsentio' multique et hunc et analogiam securi, sive illud verum est haec quoque pars consensu defenditur.*
It is evident that pupils would have perpetrated barbarisms by making errors in what was regarded as basically correct language in speaking and writing; however, in the latter two instances, relating to the forms *gladia* and *adsentio*, barbarisms were committed in the cause of analogy. According to Quintilian anomalous forms were acceptable and correct because of *consuetudo*. *Consuetudo* was fundamental to Stoic anomalism, which firmly supported such forms as *gladii* and *adsentior*. Quintilian, although not a Stoic, was an anomalist at heart and uses Stoic anomalist argument at times. Anomalist philology, which was of Stoic origin, could offer a defence and present arguments against barbarisms, which were urged in the name of analogy.

Solecisms usually occur where more than one word is involved, and very often when licence is taken with what is regarded as correct grammar, e.g. *Aegypto venio; ambulo viam*. Solecisms can occur with gender, number and more especially case. Naturally it was the *grammaticus'* function to note and remedy solecisms, when they were clearly grammatical errors. Even though the *grammaticus* would have treated solecisms independently of Stoic doctrine, there was to some extent a Stoic background to this part of the *grammaticus'* teaching. This contribution was in the use of grammatical terminology, as previously outlined, and in the treatment of solecisms by Chrysippus.

**ORTHOGRAPHY**

Orthography was to be given careful attention by the *grammaticus*; and it was equated with the *recte scribendi scientia*.

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1 Colson, *op. cit.*, p.31.
2 See Book v, *passim*.
3 Quint. i.5.39 — the correct forms are *ab Aegypto venio; ambulo per viam*.
4 Quint. i.5.45, *...fit soloecismus genere, numero proprie autem casibus ...*
5 D.L. vii.192.
6 Quint. 1.7.1, *... dicendum, quae scribentibus custodienda, quod Graeci ὁρθώς γράφοντα vocant; hoc nos recte scribendi scientiam nominamus.*
It involved not only mechanically correct spelling, but also a clear understanding of vowel quantities, and variation of meaning as influenced by pronunciation. Orthography was regarded as an important study by Roman grammatici and was researched and pursued independently of Greek theory.

It is difficult to associate Stoic philological principles with orthography. However, it was an aspect of the grammaticae teaching that was upheld by consuetudo, the Stoic keyword which emphasised usage. Anomaly prevailed in spelling, as emphasised by Quintilian: Verum orthographia quoque consuetudini servit, ideoque saepe mutata est. Orthographic problems had been looked at earlier in the second century B.C. by Lucilius, who was influenced by Stoic etymology; but such Stoic influence was short-lived because Lucilius' determinations on spelling were, in general, not consolidated in later literature. For instance, Lucilius argued strongly that the plural form in -i should be represented as -ei, but this inflection did not survive into the classical age.

PRISCIAN'S GRAMMATICAL EXPLANATION ANALYSED FROM THE STOIC VIEWPOINT

The teaching of the methodicæ, principally as outlined by Quintilian, has now been discussed from the viewpoint of Stoic elements in various aspects of this teaching. To substantiate and to exemplify

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1 Ibid. Cuius ars non in hoc posita est, ut noverimus, quibus quaeque syllaba litteris constet ... sed totam ut mea, fert opinio, subtilitatem in dubiis habet.

2 Gudeman, op. cit., p.1798.

3 i.7,11.

4 See F. Sommer, 'Lucilius als Grammatiker', Hermes xxix.1909, p.77 ... vielmehr darf man ihren Ursprung gestreut in den älteren Zeiten der Stoa suchen. Im Grunde genommen handelt es sich dabei um nichts anderes als um einen Ausläufer der Lehre von der µoxnov in der Wortbildung, nach Stoikerart hochgradig ins symbolistische verzerrt.

5 See 11.364-364 iam puerei venere e postremum facito atque i, ut puerei plures fiant, i si facis solum, pupilli, pueri, Lucili, hoa unius fiat.
these procedures it is informative to look at the detailed procedures described by Priscian. Although writing considerably later than Quintilian,\(^1\) Priscian is often referred to as clearly illustrating the established and traditional methods of the grammaticus.\(^2\) He uses the grammatical terms that were applied by his predecessors of the first century B.C. and first century A.D.\(^3\) Also, he chose to make his treatment of the first lines of each book of the Aeneid the basis of his analysing — Partitiones duodecim versuum Aeneidos principalium, Virgil being of great interest also to grammatici of the first century A.D. Consequently, for a number of reasons Priscian can be enlightening for the methods of the grammaticus generally.

The extent to which grammar was influenced by Stoicism is apparent when Priscian's explanations are analysed from the point of view of Stoic elements that were long established in Latin grammar. As a basis for such analysis, it is necessary first to realise the coherent and comprehensive approach outlined by Priscian. Details of his treatment of line 1, Aeneid iv (...) at regina gravi iam dudum saucia cura) were variously as follows:

*Scande versum.*

*Die caesurus.*

*Quot figuram est?* ... *Decem ... tres spondeos et duos dactylos.*

*Partes orationis quot habet?* ... *Septem.*

*Quot nomina?* ... *Quattuor: regina/gravi/saucia/cura.*

*Et quid aliud?* ... *Unam coniunctionem, at duo adverbia, iam dudum.*

*Tracta singulas partes.*

*At — quae pars orationis? Coniunctio.*

*Quid est coniunctio? Pars orationis adiectens ordinansque sententiam.*

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1 Priscian lived during the age of Justinian (483 - 565 A.D.).
2 Marrou, op. cit., p.376, refers to Priscian's methods as typical of the methods of the grammaticus throughout antiquity.
3 Cf. Varro and Quintilian, who use identical terms such as partes orationis, species, genus, nomen appellativum, etc. Such a tradition was long-lasting and appears almost invariable.
Regina — quae pars orationis est? ... Nomen.
Cuius est speciei? Derivativa.
Quale est? Appellativum, generis femini, numeri singularis, figurae simplicis, casus hic nominativi, declinationis primae.
Quae nomina ex eo derivantur, hoc est a rege? Regius et regalis.

gravi — quae pars orationis? ... Nomen.

iam — quae pars orationis est? ...
Adverbium. Quid est adverbium? pars orationis quae adiecta verbo significatulationem eius explanat atque implet.

dudum — quae pars orationis est? ...
Adverbium est temporis.

saucia — quid est? Nomen. Quale?
Appellativum. Cuius speciei?
Derivativa sive participialis. nam a participio sauciatus nascitur saucius.

cura — quid est? Nomen. Quale?
Appellativum ipsius rei; potest tamen et dea aliqua intellegi. ... videtur ergo esse derivativum verbale a verbo cura curas curat. Die nomina derivativa ex eo. Curiosus curagusus curator.

To illustrate how Stoic grammar became basic and integral to the established grammatical system, the above descriptions provided by Priscian may be considered in the light of their Stoic elements.

With regard to *at*, the conjunction had been identified as a part of speech before the Stoic systemisation of grammar.¹ Roman

¹ See p.59.
grammatici were not greatly concerned with classifying conjunctions, although Hellenistic Stoics with their deep interest in dialectic were very much concerned with identifying various conjunctions and their significance for clauses. It appears that the coordinate conjunction was classified as the coniunctio copulativa by Latin grammatici, but this term was used after the first century A.D.; it does not appear in Quintilian nor Pliny, and there is no indication of the use of the term by Remmius Palaemon.

Regina is one of four nouns (nomina) identified in this line, adjectives also being included in this classification. In the grammatical description of regina Stoic elements are incorporated in the terms derivatiae, primitivum, the etymological comment on the word, the reference to the genitive case and in the term appellativum. On the other hand, the classification relating to declinationis primae is a result of the analogist systematisation which for Latin grammar was probably carried out by Palaemon.

Gravi is treated as a noun; grammarians generally in antiquity did not distinguish the adjective as an independent part of speech; again the terms primitivum and derivativum stem from the established Stoic concern with etymology.

Iam and dudum are described in terms completely in the Stoic tradition. The adverb, as mentioned above, was added to the basic Aristotelian classification of parts of speech and related to the verb by the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus.

Saucia is to our grammatical understanding somewhat oddly regarded as a nomen. Participles were considered as noun forms,

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1 Steinthal II, op. cit., p.325, refers to Priscian's classification of conjunctions, but points out that hitherto Romans had been little concerned with conjunctions: ... während doch ein Vertreter derselben im Lateinischen nicht vorkommt.


3 Steinthal II, op. cit., p.325.

4 Steinthal II, op. cit., p.326.
although naturally there was a clear understanding of their verb origin. In this grammatical description of saucia there is an admixture of Stoic classification in the term appellativum and of Aristarchus' analogist terminology in the use of the words participialis and participio (μετοχή).1

Cura is explained as a nomen; and, as for regina, there is provided in the Stoic tradition a philological explanation in an etymological and allegorical manner.

It is possible to continue a 'Stoic' analysis of Priscian's treatment of each of the first lines of the Aeneid to emphasise further the Stoic elements that became established in Latin grammar. It is evident, however, from the discussion on grammatical forms contained in the body of this chapter and from the above analysis, that the methodicē incorporated a substantial Stoic contribution. The importance of this contribution is enhanced by the fact that the methodicē was given so much weight by the grammaticus, as evidenced by the number of handbooks on the are grammatica written as educational guides.

In researching a particular topic it is encouraging to read a statement that there is a need for such research. With regard to the teaching of grammar in antiquity the opinion has been expressed that 'the terminology of the studies, which formed the staple of general education, deserves more study than it generally receives.'2 Consequently it is hoped that this chapter in some measure has some meaning in relation to such a need.

1 Gudeman, op. cit., p.1792.

2 Colson, op. cit., p.36. The author continues: 'It is not sufficiently remembered that grammar in particular was a science which aroused a vast amount of interest and that it was ... a study with which the upper and middle classes at any rate were thoroughly familiar.'
CHAPTER IV

STOIC ELEMENTS IN LATIN AUTHORS READ IN SCHOOLS

To explain the importance of Stoic elements in the literature read in Roman schools, it is necessary first to determine the curriculum of authors that was taught by the grammaticus. Also, it is informative to compare the nature of this curriculum, with that taught by the Hellenistic γραμματικός; such a comparison gives greater significance to the Stoic content of Latin authors read in schools.

THE LITERARY CURRICULUM OF THE GRAMMATICOΣ

From the mid-second century B.C. to the end of the first century A.D. the literary curriculum taught by the Roman grammaticus, as discussed in the following pages, underwent considerable change. The rich and vigorous development of Roman literature meant that the curriculum of the grammaticus was to vary, expand and be more extensively taught, while the teaching of Greek literature in Rome by the γραμματικός became correspondingly less widely taught. Also, in contrast to the established literary curriculum taught by the Hellenistic γραμματικός, the Roman grammaticus came to give emphasis to the teaching of contemporary Latin literature.

The γραμματικός taught from a range of authors whose quality and worth had been established and were unquestioned. Consequently there was a tendency for the Hellenistic teacher not to teach contemporary authors, as indicated by Quintilian who points out that in the time of Aristarchus and Aristophanes (of Byzantium), Apollonius of Rhodes was not included in the list of authors to be taught, as this would have been contrary to a distinct policy only to teach established
authors of an earlier period. It would appear from excavations at Oxyrhynchus and Antinoopolis that a Hellenistic syllabus in Greek literature in the third century B.C. was made up largely of earlier major authors — Homer, Demosthenes, Didymus, Euripides, Menander, Plato, Thucydides, Hesiod, Isocrates, Aristophanes, Xenophon, Sophocles and Pindar. In the Hellenistic period the γραμμάτωκός probably chose to teach authors that were included in codified lists; and by the middle of the second century B.C. there was the 'canon' of ten Attic orators, ten historians, ten painters, ten sculptors, ten poets, ten philosophers, ten physicians. However, at times contemporary authors were included such as Callimachus, Aratus and the Epigrammatists — and also authors who were not of the first rank. But it was predominantly a pre-Hellenistic curriculum comprising established authors of stature. Such a curriculum, of course, meant that there was no actual Stoic content studied in school Greek authors, except in Aratus, who appears to have been the only Stoic author read by school pupils. Stoic elements would have been taught only by interpretation of Greek literature, as instanced by the methods followed by Crates and the Pergamum school, and especially in their study and teaching of Homer. In contrast, the very important argument to be emphasised and developed later in this chapter is that in Latin authors taught by the grammaticus a substantial Stoic content was consciously and systematically included. But this situation does not relate convincingly to the second century B.C.

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1 x.1.45. Apollonius in ordinem a grammaticis datum non venit, quia Aristarchus atque Aristophanes, poëtarum iudices, neminem sui temporis in numerum redegerunt.

As a matter of interest Quintilian (x.1.foll.) recommends the following lengthy list of authors, which he states is not intended to be completely comprehensive — Homer, Hesiod, Antimachus, Panyasis, Apollonius of Rhodes, Aratus, Theocritus, Callimachus, Philetas, Archilochus, Pindar, Stesichorus, Alcaeus, Simonides, Aristophanes, Eupolis, Cratinus, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Menander, Philemon, Thucydides, Herodotus, Theophrastus, Philistus, Ephorus, Clitarchus, Timagenes, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides, Lysias, Isocrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle.

2 J. Bowen, op. cit., p.149.
3 Marrou, op. cit., p.225.
4 Marrou, op. cit., p.227.
In the second century B.C. was established a bilingual educational pattern, where Roman teaching followed Hellenistic methods. Parallel teaching was undertaken in Latin and Greek. This parallel, bilingual system was exemplified in the teaching of Livius Andronicus and Ennius, both of whom taught in Latin and Greek. They were *poetae grammatici* who taught from their own Latin versions, and their works were both literature and school texts. Succeeding *grammatici* had at their disposal these school Latin 'texts'. About 50 B.C. Horace as a boy had been taught the poems of Livius Andronicus by his *grammaticus*, Orbilius. And in the latter part of the first century A.D. Quintilian was recommending Ennius as a school author. Other writers of the second century B.C. appear at some stage to have been used as school texts, although it is difficult to determine precisely their periods of popularity. One *grammaticus*, Curtius Nicias, a contemporary of Cn. Pompeius and C. Memmius, had a strong interest in Lucilius (180-103 B.C.); and his commentaries were very highly regarded. Nicias undoubtedly would have read Lucilius with his pupils. Lucilius is strongly recommended as a school author by Quintilian who also attests to his large number of supporters. In Horace's well known criticism of Lucilius is implied a wide spread popularity.

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1 Suet. *de gramm.* 1, ... *qui idem et poetae et semigraeci erant, Livium et Ennium dico*, quos utra lingua domi forisque doceisse adnotatum est.

2 *Ibid.* ... *nihil amplius quam Graecos interpretabantur, aut si quid ipsi Latine compositum praebegant. Praelegere* was a particular term referring to the *grammaticus'* preliminary treatment of a textual passage.

3 *Epistles ii. 1. 71.*

4 x.i.88.

5 Suet. *de gramm.* 14, *Huius (i.e. Nicias) de Lucilio libros etiam Santra comprobat.*

6 x.1.94, *Nam eruditio in eo (i.e. Lucilius) mira est libertas atque inde acerbitas et abunde salis.*

7 x.1.95, *Satura quidem tota nostra est, in quam primus insignem laudem aedepus Lucilius quosdam ita deditos sibi adhuc habet amatores ut eum non etiam modo operis autoribus sed omnibus poetis praefere non dubitent.*

8 *Sat. i. 10. 2,* ... *quis tam Lucili fator inepte est, ut non hoc fateatur?*
The tragedies of Accius (170 - 90 B.C.) and Pacuvius (220 - 132 B.C.), and the plays of Terence (194 - 159 B.C.) and Caecilius (219 - 160 B.C.) were studied, and were well known to Cicero and other orators, who frequently quoted these veteres Latini poets. Quintilian firmly supported the study of these old Latin poets but would prefer that they were read after the years of school. Tacitus indicated that Accius and Pacuvius had been read and studied over a long period of time, when he referred with satisfaction to the fact that they have yielded their position to Horace, Virgil and Lucan. Aelius Stilo, a very influential grammaticus of considerable standing, commended Plautus' diction so highly that Varro quoted him as saying that 'if the Muses wished to speak Latin, they would use the language of Plautus.' Such faith in an author strongly suggests that Stilo would have taught Plautus to his pupils. So, then, evidence supports the argument that leading Latin authors from the second century B.C. became established in school curricula. However, until the time of Cicero the teaching of Greek literature appears to have been given more weight. This was the situation from the period of the Scipionic circle, as evidenced by the fact that educated Romans had such a good knowledge of Greek literature. The strong standing of the study of Greek is indicated by the interesting situation that arose in 93 B.C. when L. Plotius, who was primarily a teacher of rhetoric, chose to teach boys in Latin; his

1 Quint. i.8.2. Nam praeципue quidem apud Ciceronem frequenter tamen apud Asinum etiam et cetero, qui sunt proximi videimus Enni, Acci, Pacuwii, Lucili, Terenti, Caecilli et aliorum inseriti versus summa non eruditionibus modo gratia sed etiam incuditatis, cum poetica voluptatibus aures a forensi asperitate respirent.

2 Quint. i.8.12.

3 Tac. Dial. 20. Exigitur enim iam ab oratore etiam poeticius decor non Acii aut Pacuwii vetero inquinatus, sed a Horatii et Virgili et Lucani sacrario prolatus.

4 Quint. x.1.99. Licet Varro Muses, Aelii Stilonis sententia Plautino dicat sermone locuturas fuisse, si Latine loquii vellent ...

5 See above, Chapter II, pp.39,40.

6 Cic. ad Titinimum, quoted in Suet. de rhet. 2. Equidem memoria teneo pueris nobis primum Latine docere coepisses Plotium quendam ... Continebatur autem doctissimorum hominum auctoritate qui existimabant Graecis exercitationibus ali melius ingenia posse.
school was closed in the following year ostensibly because it was considered that Greek was more effective for the purpose.

Throughout the first century B.C. there was a transitional period during which education in Latin grew in importance. Strong impetus to such a development was given by Cicero, whose stated aim in his writings was to enable his readers to study in Latin a content that had previously been available only in Greek. This growing importance is reflected in the increasing number of grammatici and in the studies written by them on Latin literature. By the time of the grammaticus Caecilius Epirota, (circa 25 B.C.) the situation was ready to introduce into schools the study of Virgil and other 'modern' poets. Suetonius attributes this development to Epirota, but educational change is rarely effected by individual persons and undoubtedly this trend had prevailed before Epirota may have been involved in this implementation.

It is well established that from the latter part of the first century B.C. many Roman authors were read in schools during their own life time, a situation that hardly applied to Hellenistic Greece. Virgil became the most important poet taught in Roman schools. In enjoying such a pre-eminent position he was placed on a level comparable to that of Homer, and well ahead of other Roman poets. Horace was firmly commended by Quintilian, who argued that he was the only lyric poet worth reading. Horace's own fear that he might become an author read in schools was actually realised. An interesting point is that

1 Cf. comments on the work of the grammatici in the following chapter.
2 Suet. de gramm. 16. Primus dicitur Latine ex tempore disputasse, primusque Vergilium et alios poetas novos praelegere coepisse ...
3 Quint. i.8.5. Ideoque optime institutum est, ut ab Homero atque Vergilio lector inciperet ... Itaque ut apud illos Homerus sic apud nos Virgilius auspiciatissimum dederit exordium, omnium eius generis poetarum.
4 Quint. x.1.87. Ceteri omnes sequentur.
5 x.1.96.
6 Sat. i.10.74. ... an tua demens vilibus in ludis dicitari carmina malis? non ego, nam satis est equitem mihi plaudere, ut audax.
Horace's comment indicates that the reading of Latin authors had become a wide-spread practice. On the other hand, the Stoic poet Persius, also commended by Quintilian,¹ is pleased to be read widely in schools.² Statius expresses a similar sentiment — that 'the youth of Italy eagerly learns and recites his verse.'³ Although many contemporary poets were taught throughout the first century A.D., some poets and lyric poets, in particular, were often regarded as not suitable for classroom teaching.⁴ Correspondingly, if Quintilian is a guide, an author was recommended and might be read because of his sound moral precepts.⁵

THE TEACHING OF PROSE

Traditionally the grammaticus taught only the poets, and the rhetor was concerned with prose writers. But this division of function was not always strictly observed; a possible 'confusion of roles' occurred often when:

(i) a teacher could be both a grammaticus and rhetor;⁶

(ii) grammatici were criticised by Quintilian for usurping the role of the rhetor by holding back pupils in their schools to teach them rhetoric, instead of permitting them to advance to the rhetor's school for instruction.⁷

¹ x.1.94. Multum et verae gloriae quamvis uno libro Persius meruit.
² Sat. i.28-29. At pulchrum est digito monstrari et dicier hic est! tam cîrratorum centum dictata fuisse pro nihilo pendes?
³ Thebaid, xii.815. Itala iam studio discit memoratque iuventus.
⁴ Mart. i.25.1-3. versus scribere me parum severos nec quos praelegebat in schola magister, Corneli, quaeris.
⁵ Cf. Quintilian on Hesiod, x.1.52. tamen utiles circa praecpta sententiae levitasque verborum et compositionis probabilis.
⁶ Suet. de gramm. 4. Veteres grammatici et rhetoricam docebant, ac multorum de utraque arte commentarii feruntur ...
⁷ ii.1.4. nam grammatico tenuis a forte assumptis historicorum criticorumque viribus pleno iam satis alveo fluit, cum praeter rationem recte loquendi non parum aliqui copieosam prope omnium maximarum artium scientiam amplexa sit.
(iii) the *rhetor* often taught poetry, for the inclusion of verse quotations could adorn the orator's speech.¹

These circumstances, firmly substantiated by the references given below, indicate that the *grammaticus* taught prose authors, as well as the poets. The fact that prose writers were introduced into the curriculum of the *grammaticus* meant that at this particular level of education they were read and studied by a larger number of pupils than if they were completely left to the school of the *rhetor*, for only a proportion of the *grammaticus' pupils became students of the *rhetor*.

The syllabus of prose authors was naturally headed by Cicero; his quality of diction and unrivalled rhetorical models ensured his pre-eminent position. His standing was so great that other writers were recommended only as they might approach or resemble him.² Then, according to Quintilian, Sallust and Livy followed Cicero.³ In a third category might be included Asinius Pollio, M. Valerius Corvinus, Julius Caesar, M. Rufus Caelius, C. Licinius Calvus, Servius Sulpicius, Cassius Severus, Domitianus Afer, Julius Africanus, Vibius Priscus, M. Galerius, Julius Secundus, Cornelius Celsus, Seneca. It is interesting to note that Latin poets from the early second century B.C. were studied into the first century A.D. On the other hand, the prose writers to be studied did not appear until at a much later period. In the first century A.D. the two prose authors mainly read were Cicero and Sallust. Although Quintilian placed Livy on the same level as Sallust, and in later centuries preference was given to Livy, Sallust in actual fact was generally and indisputably regarded as the historian of first rank.⁴

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¹ Quint. i.8.10. *Denique credamus summis oratoribus qui veterum poemata vel ad fidem causarum vel ad ornamentum eloquentiae adeuorem.* See also Tac. *Dial.* 20.

² Quint. ii.5.20. *... ut quiasque erit Ciceroni simillimus.*

³ Quint. ii.5.19.

BRIEF SURVEY OF CURRICULUM

What conclusions can be reached on the curriculum taught from the mid-second century B.C. to the end of the first century A.D.? Until the middle of the first century B.C. the Roman *grammaticus* probably taught from a number of verse writers such as Livius Andronicus, Ennius, Lucilius, Accius, Pacuvius, while throughout this period the teaching of Greek literature enjoyed a stronger position. However, there was a gradual yielding to the growing importance of the teaching of Latin literature by the *grammaticus*. From the latter part of the first century B.C. into the first century A.D. the *grammaticus'* position strengthened, while correspondingly the teaching of Greek literature, while still pursued, was not given priority.

From the first century A.D. the *grammaticus* had at his disposal a substantial body of Latin literature from which he might select his curriculum. Although this curriculum could vary in accordance with the preferences of individual *grammatici* and also could comprise a wide range of authors, the principal authors taught appear to be from the poets — Virgil, Horace and Terence; and from the prose writers — Cicero and Sallust.\(^1\) In due course, according to Arusianus Messius,\(^2\) there was established a *quadriga* of Latin authors: Virgil, Terence, Cicero and Sallust. Throughout the first century A.D., however, Horace's standing was high and he was undoubtedly read in schools at that time as a standard author in the curriculum. And Terence, although in the second century B.C. rated behind Caecilius and Plautus, was upheld from the first century A.D. as the outstanding verse dramatist.\(^3\) So, evidence suggests that by the first century A.D. the authors that were given prime place in the curriculum were Virgil, Horace, Terence, Cicero and Sallust; but also a considerable number of other verse and prose writers were taught.

\(^1\) Cf. Marrou, *op. cit.*, p.553. *Ars divina*: Exempla elocutorum as recommended to the consuls (395 A.D.) were *ex Virgilio, Sallustio, Terentio, Cicerone digesta per litteras.*

\(^2\) Quint. x.1.94. *Horatius et ... praecipuus.*

  Also, x.1.96. *At lyricorum idem Horatius fere solus legi dignus.*

The question now is to relate Stoicism to this literary curriculum. And the teaching of the *grammaticus* and the significance of Stoic elements in the literary aspect of it can be considered in a number of ways.

Many *grammaticoi* were themselves Stoic. They might choose to teach authors who were professed Stoics such as Seneca, Celsus etc. Or, they would exegetically interpret literature taught from a Stoic viewpoint, in the tradition of Crates of Mallos. Stoic *grammatici* will be identified and discussed in the following chapter.

By the first century A.D. there were a number of Latin authors who were themselves Stoics. Quintilian's syllabus included a number of such authors, namely Persius, Lucan, Seneca, Cornelius Celsus, Servius Sulpicius, Bibaculus. Of these Persius¹ and Seneca² appear to have been the most widely read and the most popular. It is very significant then that writers who strongly and unequivocally professed Stoicism were read as school texts. Their inclusion in the syllabus is in marked contrast to the curriculum of the Hellenistic *γραμματικός* whose policy was to teach Greek authors of an earlier period. The principles of Hellenistic philosophies were therefore taught more positively and given definite attention by the Roman *grammaticus*, in comparison to the teaching of his Hellenistic counterpart. Consequently there was a wider diffusion of Stoicism at the school level in Rome, than in Hellenistic schools. Such a situation also gives force to the argument that Stoicism became stronger in Roman society, than in Hellenistic communities. Without underestimating the very important significance for Stoic elements in the curriculum and for the influence of Stoicism in Rome, that actual Stoic authors were read in schools, I feel that an analysis of these authors would be somewhat superfluous. Their writing has been researched, and an interpretation of their Stoicism would be for the most part a repetition of previous, thorough evaluation and comprehensive commentaries.

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¹ Cf. *Sat.* i.28-29. See above p.81.
² Quint. x.1.126. *Turn autem solus hic (i.e. Seneca) fere in manibus adulescentium fuit.*
In acknowledging the very important fact that Stoic literature was taught in schools, it must be kept in mind that of authors comprising the literary curriculum generally taught, Stoic authors were secondary to the writers who were most favoured. To look at the situation in perspective, it is essential to identify the Stoic elements in the foremost authors taught and to determine what pupils would learn of Stoicism from the reading of Horace, Virgil, Terence, Cicero and Sallust. For we can assume that most of the grammaticus' pupils would have studied these writers. Such interpretation is much more complex than a discussion of purely Stoic authors, but is essential for this study.

The varied range of Stoic elements in these principal authors of the school curriculum is considerable. For instance, it is possible to analyse Stoic influences in the Aeneid with an interpretation of Stoic aspects in Aeneas' character; to identify the eminent position of the Stoic Cato who is upheld so highly by such a large number of writers; to consider Stoic influences in Horace and, in particular, his references to the Stoic paradoxes; and to survey the comprehensive treatment of Stoicism, principally in regard to ethics and theology, provided by Cicero throughout his philosophical works. The following discussion in this chapter will be concerned with these subjects.

STOIC ELEMENTS IN THE AENEID

It is clearly possible to determine Stoic elements in the Aeneid and to identify certain Stoic qualities in the character of Aeneas. But the influence of Stoicism on Virgil, although strong, is not absolute. Virgil's philosophy is very much eclectic, although the

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1 Cf. especially C.M. Bowra, 'Aeneas and the Stoic Ideal', Greece and Rome, 1933.

Also, Arnold, op. cit., pp.390-391.


Brooks Otis, Virgil, A Study in Civilised Poetry.

C. Bailey, Religion in Virgil.

P. Boyancé, La Religion de Virgile.
Stoic influences appear as strong as any other. It is important to note that Virgil's Stoicism is balanced by other elements and influences, such as Homeric allegory, Pythagoreanism, Platonic philosophy and Lucretian Epicureanism. However, a thorough interpretation of these aspects of Virgil's philosophy is very complex, and not fully relevant to the present study. On the other hand, there will be no attempt, nor is it justified, to establish the Aeneid as a Stoic poem, and Aeneas as a completely Stoic character. But markedly Stoic elements are clearly evident, and many grammatici would have identified and described them as such in their teaching.

Aeneas' character must be considered as one that fits into a world presented in accordance with the Stoic system. Aeneas' character and its Stoic qualities relate to a Virgilian Stoic cosmos. This concept of the universe is one where Zeus/Jupiter, transcending a polytheistic structure, represents the orderly arrangement and development of the world. Jupiter is the pater omnipotens Aether. Virgil's theology, like that of the Stoics, moves towards monotheism. God, as Jupiter, is the great and rational divine force in the universe, and is also synonymous with the universe and its order.

Such a concept of the universe means that divine will controls destiny. The Stoic προνοια is virtually the same as Virgil's fatum. Providence is fundamental both to Stoicism and to Virgil's theology. The aspect of Stoic philosophy relevant to Aeneas' role in the world is that his destiny is determined by the divine law and order in the universe. According to Chrysippus, basically the consequences of human actions and the actions themselves are fore-ordained. However, the Stoic view of fate was not absolute; there was some doubt expressed about the inexorable nature of a person's destiny. It was also

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1 See P. Boyancé, op. cit., passim.
2 Cf. Hymn of Cleanthes, p.48; Aratus, p.48 foll.
3 Cf. Georgics ii.325.
5 Cic. de Fato, 12,21.
acknowledged that the actions of man are determined by his relations to things: one individual can differ from another in the way he follows his impulses and feelings; while another individual under restraint and possible compulsion may with reluctance conform to the external law of the world.¹

These two markedly different roles for individuals to play in life are exemplified clearly in the Aeneid. Aeneas, although at times his feelings are swayed by the intensity of circumstances, especially throughout Books I - VI, proceeds in conformity with destiny. It is constantly reiterated that in accordance with fate or Providence he has very great responsibilities.² Aeneas' character is consistent with the Stoic concept that the individual should fit into the pattern of life ordained by the divine and ordered nature of the cosmos. Aeneas' attitude is emphasised when we consider the characters of Dido and Turnus; they are foils to Aeneas. Although at times Aeneas' feelings may conflict with his allotted destiny, rational thought together with divine law prevail. On the other hand, Dido and Turnus are the victims of their own passionate feelings. They are swept on by emotion, their intense feelings take control and their impassioned characters lead them to tragic deaths. They are, of course, the antithesis of Stoic types, yet they are intensely human and, especially in Dido's case, evocative of human sympathy. Their characters help throw into relief the Stoic qualities in Aeneas' character. As well as being a hero and individual, who plays out his part in a Virgilian Stoic world, Aeneas possesses certain Stoic qualities and values, which would have been identifiable as such by Roman readers.


Also cf. Sen. de Prov. 5.4. boni viri ... trahuntur fortuna, sequuntur illam.

² Cf. Aeneid i.2; i.22; i.339; i.546; i.608; ii.13; ii.350; iii.5; iii.395; iii.444; iv.13; iv.340; iv.440; v.22; v.56; vi.86; vii.272; viii.12; viii.398; viii.47; ix.133; ix.204; x.67; x.438.
AENEAS' STOIC COURAGE

There are three main requirements in Stoic courage, and each of these is filled by Aeneas.

(i) Bravery is fearless compliance with and obedience to the law of reason, as it applies to boldness and endurance. This form of courage, as set down by Chrysippus, clearly applies to Aeneas throughout the poem, although at times in the earlier books this resolution is firmly tested;¹

(ii) The brave man should be superior to bad fortune, however adverse. In Book VI² the prophetess passes such advice on to Aeneas, drawing on a reference to destiny, to support her words. Until Book VI Aeneas at times was somewhat confused and even defeatist, but throughout the latter part of the poem he is resolute and quite capable of overcoming ill-fortune. The very important aspect of such development is that Aeneas grows in strength. His development in character is consistent with the Stoic concept of the 'sage-in-progress'.³ The validity of this argument is substantiated by considering the various qualities in Aeneas' character, as discussed in this chapter;

(iii) Stoic courage requires a person to be prepared for any exigency and to maintain a confident balance.⁴ Aeneas acquires this kind of courage and in referring to it uses a term⁵ (praecipi) that is actually Stoic: omnia praecipi atque animo mecum ante peregi. The Stoic appropriateness of these words is indicated by Seneca who quotes this line when

¹ Cic. Tusc. iv.24.53. Fortitudo, inquit (i.e. Chrysippus), scientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo, summae legi parens sine timore.

² vi.95. tu ne cede malis, sed contra audientior ito quam tua te fortuna sinet.

³ Cf. conclusions of C.M. Bowra, op. cit.

⁴ Cf. Cic. de Off. i.80.

⁵ Praecipi is itself a Stoic word, cf. Cic. de Off. i.80.
describing a good man. Such preparedness was not always shown by Aeneas; for instance in Book I following the storm, and in Book V when some of his ships are burned, he is in despair and loses his resolve regarding his progress to Italy. But after his arrival in Italy he acts with confident preparedness.

THE STOIC ASSOCIATION OF PIETAS AND IUSTITIA IN AENEAS

The close association and virtual identification of pietas and iustitia is a strong Stoic concept. Such a connection emphasises the Stoic idea of the individual's responsibility to gods, family, country, society. Cicero often refers to the 'equation' between piety and justice, drawing on Stoic thought. Pietas and iustitia were closely associated Stoic qualities for the individual in a world community, ordered by a divine strength, so that respect for gods and man meant a strong concern for social justice. Aeneas is renowned for his pietas, and to him often at the same time is attributed iustitia:

\[ \text{rex erat Aeneas nobis, quo iustior alter} \]
\[ \text{neq pietate fuit, nec bello maior et armis.} \]

Justice is represented as synonymous with piety in the single line:

\[ \text{discite iustitiam moniti et non terrmere divos.} \]

And also concern by the gods and regard for justice, which are Stoic teaching, are emphatically mentioned. Force is given to these Stoic

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1 Ep. lxxvi.33.
2 Cf. de Fin. iii.30; ii.73; N.D. ii.119; de Rep. iii.20,24; de Rep. vi.23.13.
3 Cf. the epithet constantly applied to Aeneas — pius.
4 i.544.
5 vi.620.
6 i.603. *di tibi, si qua pios respectant numina, si quid usquam iustitia est, et mens sibi conscia recti, praemia digna ferant.*
qualities in Aeneas' character by comparing the line describing the
Stoic Cato on the shield of Aeneas forged by Vulcan,\(^1\) where again the
association of piety and justice is stated:

\[
\text{secretos pios, his dantem iura Catonem.}
\]

Throughout the poem Aeneas is consistently 'pious' and 'just'; these
qualities represent a Stoic aspect of his character that he possesses
from the outset, while his Stoic qualities generally are acquired as he
progresses through his experiences.

DETACHMENT FROM EMOTION

The Stoics had much to say on emotion and an emotionless
attitude.\(^2\) Aeneas has the capacity to be detached and emotionless, as
evouched in the lines:

\[
\text{mens immota manet, laeirmae volvuntur inanes.} \quad \text{3}
\]

and

\[
\text{Aeneas, magno iuvenum et maerentis Iuli}
\]

\[
\text{concursu, laeirimis immobilis.} \quad \text{4}
\]

But surely a completely emotionless hero was hardly acceptable to Roman
readers. Virgil does not depict Aeneas as a hero of absolute Stoic
\(\delta\nu\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\eupsilon\sigma\alpha)\. There are certain expressions of human emotion to counter-
balance a Stoic detachment; and to consider Aeneas' character in its
full perspective it is important to comment on certain aspects:

(i) the Stoics deplored anger, but as a warrior of dynamic force
he invariably shows rage in the heat of battle;\(^5\)

\(^1\) Aen. viii.670.
\(^2\) See Chapter I.
\(^3\) Aen. iv.449.
\(^4\) Aen. xii.399.
\(^5\) Cf. when he pursues Turnus, xii.527. \ldots fluctuat ira intus.

Also, xii.107. \text{Nec minus interea maternis seivus in armis Aeneas acuit Martem et se suscitat ira, ablato gaudens componi foedere bellum.}
(ii) the Stoics considered that there should be no overt display
of pity, let alone that one should feel anguish on behalf of
another. Aeneas, however, emotionally expresses pity
because of misfortunes that befall his companions; and
feels strong human pity when he meets Dido again in Book VI.¹

Aeneas' martial rage and at times, his anguished pity are non-
philosophical elements in a character that nevertheless can ultimately
be established as having many Stoic qualities.

AENEAS AS A 'SAGE-IN-PROGRESS'

There is a contrast in Aeneas' character as revealed in Books
I to VI, and in Books VII to XII. As mentioned, except for his constant
qualities of piety and justice, Aeneas' courage develops in accord with
a Stoic tradition. He also acquires in due course a stronger capacity
for rational thought, which implies a developing wisdom. Frailties of
which he is guilty in the earlier part of the poem do not apply to him
as a considerably more mature character following Book VI. As he
recounts his adventures during the sack of Troy he and others are
immemores caecique furore;² he refers to his irrational behaviour in
the words arma amens capio;³ and he describes his own frenzy as he
looks for revenge:

exarsere ignes animo; subit ira cadentem
ulcisci patriam et sceleratas sumere poenas.⁴

And, of course, with Dido he is to be enslaved turpique cupidine.⁵

¹ Aen. v.467. talibus Aeneas ardentem et torva tuentem
lenibat dictis animum lacrimasque ciebat.

² Aen. ii.244.
Also xii.888. sic pectore fatur.
xii.938. ... stetit acer in armis
Aeneas volvens oculos, dextram repressit.

³ Aen. ii.354.

⁴ Aen. ii.575-6.

⁵ Aen. iv.194.
Later, he may wage war furiously and feel sorrow at the tragic end of
others, but he is never at any time immemor, caecus furore or amens.
There is a clear development, and although not ultimately a sage in the
full Stoic sense, his growth in character is consistent with the Stoic
concept of the 'sage-in-progress'. A Stoic term is applied to Aeneas in
this regard in the use of exercere:

\[
\text{nate Iliacis exercite fatis ...} 1
\]

Exercere means 'test by ordeal'; to acquire or to approach the ideal
of being a wise man, it was essential to be tested. This idea occurs in
Seneca,2 and Cicero's use of the term exercitatio conveys the same
idea.3 Whereas in Stoic exegesis, as undertaken by Crates and Stoic
grammarians, Ulysses' and Hercules' characters4 were interpreted as
possessing Stoic elements, and were described as developing in accord
with the idea of 'the sage-in-progress', qualities portrayed in Aeneas'
character are the direct result of actual Stoic influences.

AENEAS AND THE STOIC IDEA
OF WORLD CITIZENSHIP

According to the Stoics the individual was not so much a
citizen of one particular country or nation, but was a member of a world
community;5 the individual's responsibility was to mankind, he was to
contribute to the welfare of all, and this was in keeping with his close
association with and his observance of the divine.6 The world then was

1 Aen. iii.182; v.725.
2 Dial. i.4. deus quos probat, quos amat, indurat, recognoscit.
3 Bowra, op. cit., p.15.
4 See Chapter II.
5 Sen. de Ot. 4; Ep. 68.2.
6 Vit. B 20, 3 and 25. Unum me donavit omnibus natura deorum et uni
mihi omnis ... patriam meam esse mundum sciam et praesides Deos.
de Tranq. 4.4. Ideo magno animo nos non unius urbis moenibus
celusimus, sed in totius orbis commercium emisimus patrianque nobis
mundum profesti sumus, ut illoeret lattorem virtuti camnum dare.

Epict. Dis. iii.22.83. ... man is not of a particular country but
κόσμος and υἱὸς θεοῦ.
one great community, where reason and one common law should prevail.\(^1\) When Anchises in Book VI\(^2\) describes Rome's future destiny to Aeneas he presents a picture of human progress moving towards a world community consistent with the Stoic scheme. The *pax Romana* of Augustus could be rationalised from the point of view of Stoic philosophy. The vision presented to Aeneas by Anchises refers to a world empire in close association with the divine,\(^3\) to a universal law and order,\(^4\) to the great force of ethereal fire in the world,\(^5\) and to a great ordered cosmos.\(^6\) Aeneas' role is to be instrumental in the preliminary measures for the establishment of a world community, similar to that idealised by the Stoics.

**Κρίσεις OF AENEAS**

It was the function of the *grammaticus* to present his *κρίσεις*, or moral judgment, on the text read with his pupils. This, of course, could involve a certain subjectivity. In respect to the *Aeneid* and the character of Aeneas, such *κρίσεις* would undoubtedly be influenced by prevailing values at the time. And the Stoic elements discussed above would surely have had considerable bearing on the *grammaticus'* judgment. Aeneas' character was certainly upheld by Virgil's contemporaries and by writers throughout the first and second centuries A.D. Aeneas was regarded as a model of piety and courage by Horace, and by a series of poets from Horace, Tibullus and Ovid to Statius, Juvenal and Sidonius.

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2. 1.756 foll.
Apollinaris. Seneca cites his filial loyalty, and the emperor Pertinax claimed descent from him. The clear implication is that Aeneas' character was understood by writers and readers of the time. Later, Aeneas' character was to be criticised by early church fathers and by a long succession of critics to the present day. An assessment of Aeneas' character must be based on prevailing moral values of the time. A consideration of the Stoic elements together with traditional Roman qualities, can aid an understanding of the moral values in Aeneas' character. Surely Virgil's purpose was to endow Aeneas with qualities that could be understood and appreciated by his readers; consequently the Stoic elements would have meaning both to sophisticated readers and, by explanation, to the pupils of the grammaticus. In being 'a stock part of the educational curriculum', the Aeneid would have been known to very many Romans, who would have understood and appreciated its Stoic elements.

STOIC CHARACTER OF CATO IN LATIN LITERATURE

A discussion of the character of the younger Cato is of course very different from a study of the character of Aeneas. An analysis of Aeneas' character, determining a variety of subtle and sophisticated elements that influenced Virgil is not altogether a straightforward process. A description of Cato's Stoic character is, on the other hand, a direct and unequivocal explanation. For the purpose of this chapter, it is important to note that Cato as a Roman hero, and as a Stoic prototype in the practical sense, was known to every Roman pupil. This is no exaggeration, for Roman literature is rich in references to Cato;

1 Bowra, op. cit., p.9.
2 de Ben. 3.37.1.
3 Herodian 2.3.3.
4 E.g. Augustine's condemnation of his inhuman attitude to Dido (Civ. Dei); also cf. Lactantius.
5 Bowra, op. cit., p.9. 'But it is also beyond question that the Aeneid was so vital a part of Roman education that its character was accepted beyond cavil or criticism by the orthodox ...'
and a clear portrayal of his character is available in authors principally read in schools, namely Cicero, Sallust, Virgil and Horace. It is appropriate then to outline Cato's character as represented by these writers and consequently as known to Roman pupils.

Virgil has a place for Cato in the historical episodes set out on Vulcan's shield;¹ Cato is passing on laws to those who can put them to good use — the *pii*, an instance of the Stoic association between *iustitia* and *pietas*.

Horace allots Cato a significant place in Roman history when he wonders whether he should tell of a number of historical occasions (including Cato's death),² before ultimately referring to Augustus' grandeur. He upholds Cato's courage and strength as superior to other leaders at the time of the civil war of 48 B.C.,³ in the ode that he addresses to Pollio who is in the process of writing his history. The virtue and morals of Cato's character and sincerity are contrasted with the assumed manners of a person whose actual character may lack strength.⁴

Sallust,⁵ the most widely read historian in Roman schools presents Cato's character through the words of his Catilinarian speech, and then even more convincingly in his comparison of Cato's and Caesar's characters; in this comparison Cato, whose proposals to the senate and not Caesar's are accepted, is really given preference for his qualities of character. The Stoic qualities portrayed by Sallust are his moral

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¹ *Aen.* viii.670. *secretosque pios his dantem iura Catonem.*

² *Od.* i.33. *Romulum post prius an quietum Pompili regnum memorem an superbos Tarquini fasces, dubito, an Catonis nobile letum.*

³ *Od.* ii.1.21. *audire magnos iam videor duces non indecoro pulvere sordidos et cuncta terrarum subacta praeter atrocem animum Catonis.*

⁴ *Epistles* i.19.12. *quid? si quis volutu torvo ferus et pede nudo exiguaeque togae simulat textore Catonem, virtutemne repraesentet moresque Catonis?*

restraint, an independent spirit free from passion, his austere integrity, his steadfastness, his self-control and strong sense of honour, his absolute and unquestioned virtue. The standing and popularity of Sallust as an historian undoubtedly gave esteem to the character of Cato.

Cicero is rich in references to Cato. His correspondence very often mentions Cato's participation in the day to day affairs of the senate, although it is questionable whether Cicero's letters were studied in schools. His speeches Pro Murena and Pro Sestio contain particular references to Cato, and firmly emphasise his qualities. And surely Cicero's speeches were studied in the vocational, rhetorical system of Roman education. The Pro Murena was probably well known to students, for it was cited and recommended by Quintilian. In the Pro Murena Cicero finds it convenient to satirise the Stoics, yet he portrays and acknowledges the positive qualities in Cato's character. He refers to his firm self-discipline, his earnestness and integrity, his high standing and his all-round exemplary qualities. And then he relates Cato's character directly to the Stoics, attributing to him

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1 Bell. Cat. liii.8. Qui mihi atque animo meo nullius umquam delioti gratiam fecissem, haud facile alterius lubidini male facta condonabam.

2 Bell. Cat. liii.21. animus in consulendo liber neque delicto neque lubidini obnoxius.

3 Bell. Cat. liv.2-3. ... integritate vitae ... severitas ...

4 Bell. Cat. liv.3. ... huius constantia laudabatur.

5 Bell. Cat. liv.5. ... Catoni studium modestiae, decoris ...

6 Bell. Cat. liv.6. esse quam videri bonus malebat.

7 Cf. viii.3.22; viii.3.79. Quintilian strongly recommends the passage of Pro Murena xiii.29 as being an excellent example of redditio (reciprocal representation).

8 ii.3. ... M. Catoni vitam ad certam rationis normam derigenti et diligentissimi perpendenti momenta officiorum omnium de officio meo.

9 Ibid. ... gravissimo atque integerrimo viro.

10 xxviii.58. ut ... auctoritatem ... pertimescam.

11 xxvi.54. M. Catoni, homini in omni virtute excellenti.
honesty, dignity, temperance, magnanimity, justice, and a generally outstanding character; although for the purposes of his argument in the Pro Murena he describes Cato's Stoicism as somewhat harsh and severe. In the Pro Sestio Cato's qualities are represented in his gravitas, integritas, magnitudo animi, unshakeable virtus, his strong sense of civic responsibility (an emphasised Stoic value) and his auctoritas.

In Cicero's De Finibus Cato is chosen to play a leading role, and at times appears in other philosophical treatises of Cicero. Throughout Books III and IV of the De Finibus is presented and contested the system of Stoic ethics. Cato is accordingly portrayed as a dedicated student of Stoic philosophy and as a person who epitomises its values.

As well as appearing prominently in the authors mainly read in schools, there are many references generally to Cato in Latin literature. Seneca comments upon his steadfastness, Pliny acknowledges his

1 xxix.60. honestatem ... gravitatem ... temperantiam ... magnitudinem animi ... iustitiam.
2 Ibid. ad omnes denique virtutes magnum hominem et excelsum.
3 Cf. pro Mur., 61-67,74.
4 pro Sest. xxvii.60-xxix.63.
5 pro Sest. xxviii.61.
6 pro Sest. xxix.62.
7 Cf. Tusc. i.30.74; v.1.4; v.11.32. de Leg. liii.40; Brut. 118.
8 iii.2.7. ... M. Catonem ... multis circumfusum Stoicorum libris. iv.22. studiosissimum philosophiae.
9 Ibid. iustissimum virum optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem.
10 Ep. civ.30. nemo mutatum Catonem totiens mutata re publica vidit, eundem se in omni statu praestitit.
11 N.H. praef. 9. te felicem, M. Porci, a quo rem improbam petere nemo audet.
integrity, Quintilian\(^1\) refers to Cato as an example in many contexts on the assumption that his life and principles are clearly known to his readers. And there are many other writers\(^2\) who mention Cato with unstinting praise. It is evident that for school pupils Cato was cast in the role of a national hero. His exalted position in history and literature at the same time encouraged a regard for Stoic character and values, which Cato himself so strongly exemplified.

STOICISM AND HORACE

Horace did not adhere to any particular philosophical system. To him has been attributed a degree of Epicureanism, which is largely due to his temperament, a moderately hedonistic way of life and his repeated recommendation to make the most of the present moment.\(^3\) However, Horace himself does not profess to be a follower of Epicureanism.\(^4\) But it is not the purpose of this discussion to consider Horace's Epicurean tendencies. Rather, it is essential to determine Horace's attitude to Stoic thought and to identify Stoic elements in his work, as these would have been explained in the grammaticus' teaching. And Horace's treatment of Stoicism is substantial. In a varied approach he satirises the Stoic absolute ideal of the sage, covers five of the six Stoic paradoxes, refers to Chrysippus.\(^5\) criticises the contemporary

\(^1\) iii.5.8 and 11; iii.8.37 and 49; vi.3.112; viii.2.9; ix.4.75; x.5.13; xi.1.69; xii.7.4.

\(^2\) Cf. Val. Max. ii.8.1; ii.10.8; viii.7.2.
Luc. i.128; ix.23.
Vell\(l\)\(l\)\(e\)\(u\)\(s\) Paterculus, ii.45.5; ii.47.5.
Tac. Ann. iii.28; iii.76.
Also there are the full references in Greek by Plutarch and Dio Cassius.

\(^3\) Cf. Epode xiii.3-4; Ode i.7.29; Ode i.11.8 (the famous \textit{carpe diem}); Ode i.11.11; Ode iii.8.37; Ode iii.29.42; Ode iv.19-20; Epistles i.4.12.

\(^4\) On only one occasion is Epicurus mentioned, and then flippantly. Cf. Epistles i.4.15-16.

\(^5\) Sat. i.3.127; ii.3.44,287; Epistles i.2.4.
Stoic Crispinus,\(^1\) mentions the Stoic Stertinius,\(^2\) upholds in separate instances a very considerable range of Stoic values, presents a Stoic concept of the cosmos in the *Odes* and cites Stoic logic.\(^3\)

By the way Horace refers to Stoic paradoxes it can be assumed that his Roman readers were, at least in a general way, aware of such maxims; in fact it is generally accepted that an awareness of these paradoxes was the way in which Romans mostly learned of Stoicism. Also, in Horace's time Stoic philosophers were giving lectures, which were so popular and well attended that Horace could humorously comment on the fact that the doorman at the lecture room was listened to when he passed on snippets of the lecture.\(^4\)

Later in his life Horace developed a clearly expressed respect for the study of philosophy. When writing in his middle years he was prepared to commend it as a pursuit in preference to poetry;\(^5\) at another time he earnestly urges his young friend Lollius not to neglect philosophical study.\(^6\) There is a transitional attitude to Stoicism on the part of Horace. In his earlier work, especially in the *Satires*, he is more critical of Stoicism than in his later writing. Such a development in attitude is indicated by d'Alton\(^7\) who maintained that it was 'possible to detect a nascent sympathy with its (i.e. Stoicism's) doctrines', even apparent in the *Satires*. The Stoic content in Horace and his attitude to Stoicism might be considered in an attempted categorical arrangement:

\(^1\) *Sat.* i.1.120; i.3.139; i.4.14; ii.7.145.
\(^2\) *Sat.* ii.3.33,296; *Epistles* i.12.20.
\(^3\) *Epistles* ii.1.45.
\(^4\) *Sat.* ii.7.45.
\(^5\) *Epistles* ii.2.141. *Nimirum sapere est abiectis utile nugis, et tempestivum puérís concedere ludum, ac non verba sequi fidibus modulanda Latinís, sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae.*
\(^6\) *Epistles* i.1.96. *Inter ouncta leges et percontabere doctos, qua ratione queas traducere leniter aevum.*
\(^7\) J.F. d'Alton, *Horace and his Age*, p.94.
To live in accord with nature

This maxim was a fundamental Stoic principle; it is quoted by Horace when he is upholding the pleasant simplicity of country life.\(^1\) The Stoic view of 'living in accord with nature' included a number of requirements, which are consistent with Horace's own philosophy of life: a disregard for external material goods and a non-acquisitive attitude were desirable,\(^2\) to aim for equanimity\(^3\) and to live frugally.\(^4\)

The possession of virtue is sufficient for happiness

*Epistle i.16* is Horace's commentary on the second Stoic paradox.\(^5\) The poet's discussion is direct and not satirical. Horace reiterates the Stoic principle that the person who lives *recte* is *beatus*. He deplores the hypocrisy of the man who only appears virtuous. This epistle has a strongly Stoic tone throughout. The culminating lines emphatically express the Stoic attitude that death by suicide\(^6\) is acceptable.

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1 *Epistles* i.10.12. *Vivere naturae si convenienter oportet.*

2 *Epistles* i.18.99. *num pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes.*

3 *Epistles* i.6.1. *Nil admirari prope res est una.*

4 *Epistles* i.10.

5 *Epistles* i.11.30. *... animus si te non deficit aequus.*

6 *Epistles* i.10.12. *Vivere naturae si convenienter oportet.*

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\(^{1}\) *Epistles* i.10.12. *Vivere naturae si convenienter oportet.*

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\(^{3}\) *Epistles* i.6.1. *Nil admirari prope res est una.*

\(^{4}\) *Epistles* i.10.

\(^{5}\) *Epistles* i.11.30. *... animus si te non deficit aequus.*

\(^{6}\) 11.79-80. *Ipse deus, simul atque volam, me solvet, opinor, hoo sentit 'moriar' more ultima linea rerum est.*

The divine reference, *deus*, is strongly in keeping with Stoic thought.
All sins are equal

The third Stoic paradox is satirised by Horace in Satire i.3. Although the tone of this satire is not vehement, for Horace this Stoic tenet is completely impractical. He states firmly that such an argument is completely unrealistic, and points out that philosophical reasoning can in no way justify the circumstance that the petty pilfering of cabbages from a neighbour's garden is as severe a crime as stealing objects that are sacred. The rational procedure, according to Horace, is to punish each offence suitably.

Only the wise man is sane

The fourth Stoic paradox is more than once upheld by Horace. It is the basis of his long carefully evolved dialogue between himself and Damasippus in Satire ii.3. Also, with no satirical intent he makes reference to this paradox twice in the Epistles. In the long dialogue satire with Damasippus Horace makes use of the Stoic paradox to criticise man's foolish irrational values. He cites at length the Stoic

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1 Cf. Cic. Par. Aequalia esse peccata et recte facta δὲ ζὸα τὰ ἀφαρῆματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα.

Also de Fin. recte facta omnia aequalia omnia peccata paria esse.

2 quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant cum ventum ad verum est: sensus moreque repugnant atque ipsa Utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi.

3 Sat. i.3.115-117.

4 Sat. i.3.76-79. Denique quatenus excidi penitus vitium irae cetera item nequeunt stultis haerentia, cur non ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur, ac res ut quaeque est, ita suppliciiis deliota coercet?

5 ὥσι πᾶς ἄφρων μανέναις.

ommem stultum insanire.

6 Epistles i.1.41. Virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima stultitia caruiisse.

i.6.15. insani sapiens nomen ferat aequus iniqui, ultra quam satis est Virtutem si petat ipsam.
Stertinius who has been lecturing on this paradox. Various kinds or phases of madness are discussed: avarice (11.82-157) is deplored; and even though Stertinius is presenting the case, the strong forceful tone of the argument clearly reflects Horace's personal condemnation of greed. Ambition is to be associated with insanity; ambition can lead to violent crime, and the criminal is also a maniac. Immoderation and self-indulgence (11.225-280) indicate insanity; the spendthrift is a madman, and useless whims to enjoy luxury are absolutely foolish. Irrational fear of the gods or superstition (11.281-295) is also an instance of insanity. In contrast to his treatment of the third paradox, where actual Stoic thinking is satirised, now Horace supports a Stoic maxim and uses it to point out the follies of mankind.

Only the wise man is free

Horace is in agreement with the thought of the fifth Stoic paradox. In answer to the question 'Who is free?' he answers emphatically that it is the wise man. Horace commends the wise man's self-sufficiency and his independence from external matters, ambition, passions. And the wise man's freedom from fear is in keeping with the teaching of Chrysippus. This paradox is the theme of Satire ii.8; it

1 11.48-40. Quem mala stultitia et quemque inscitia veri caeurn agit insanum Chrysippi portius est grex automat.

2 11.221-223. ... qui soeleratus et furiosus erit; quem cepit vitrea fama, gaudens Bellona aruentis.

3 Vincet enim stultos ratio insanire nepotes.

4 Cic. Par. Stoicorum 51 νέος ὁ σοφός ἐλεύθερος καὶ τὰς ἄφρων δοῦλος. Solum sapientem esse liberum, et omnem stultum servum.

5 Sat. ii.8.83-87. Quisnam igitur liber? sapiens, sibi qui imperiosus, quem neque pauperies neque mori neque vincula terrent, responsare cupidinibus, contemptem honores fortis, et in se ipso totus, teres atque rotundus, externi ne quid valeat per leve morari, in quem manca ruat semper Fortuna.

6 Stob. Floril. 21. ἀλγεῖς μὲν τὸν σόφον μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ με γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ
is similar in style to the third, where now the Stoic philosopher Crispinus has the role previously given to Stertinius. In both satires human frailty is criticised and Horace represents himself as the person who should apply the lessons; the Stoic message is conveyed in a light-hearted dialogue form, but with a certain basic seriousness.

The wise man alone is rich

Horace is inclined in *Satire* i.3 to satirise the sixth Stoic paradox,¹ that taught the wise man was rich and a king.² On the other hand, often he is in agreement with the attitude that worldly possessions matter little.³ Stoic thought is prominent in *Epistle* i.10, where Horace points out that the man is king who lives in 'accord with nature',⁴ and that the person who lives humbly and modestly may rise superior to kings.⁵ Stoic thinking is also reflected in his comment on wealth, when he facetiously and ironically refers to attitudes which place material possessions before everything else — even wisdom and kingship.⁶

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¹ Cic. *Par. Stoicorum* ὁ μόνος ὁ σοφὸς πλοῦσος
Solum sapientem esse dividem.

² *Sat. i.3.124.* Si dives, qui sapiens est, et sutor bonus et solus formosus et est rex, cur optas quod habes? 'non nosti quid pater,' inquit 'Chrysippus dicat: sapiens crepidad sibi numquam nec soleas fecit; sutor tamen est sapiens.' qui?

³ *Epistles* i.16.73-78; *Epistles* i.18.101-110; *Epistles* i.10.44-48; *Epistles* i.10.20.

⁴ *Epistles* i.10.8. ... vivo et regno ...
 i.10.12. Vivere naturae, si convenienter oportet.

⁵ *Epistles* i.10.32. ... fuga magna: licet sub paupere testo reges et regum vita praecurrere amicos.

⁶ *Sat. ii.3.97.* ... sapiensne? etiam, et rex et quidquid volet hoc, veluti virtute paratum speravit magnae laudi fore.
Stoic idea of participation in public life

To Horace, of course, active and responsible participation in public life had no appeal. He did not look for expression and fulfillment by holding public office. So his tone is jocular when he talks about himself becoming very active and involved in the hurly-burly of public life. But it is interesting to note that in this comment Horace is drawing from Stoic language and thought, for the Stoics invariably upheld the individual's responsibility to take part in public affairs. Horace directly translates Stoic terms, when he uses agilis for πραγματικός, and civilibus for πολιτικός, in stating that it was consistent with true virtue to direct one's energies in this way.

Reference to the sorites question in Stoic logic

Horace refers to the sorites or 'heap' puzzle of Stoic logic, when he is discussing the rational basis for assessing a poet's worth and is questioning the Roman tradition of honouring writers by their degree of antiquity. The significant point for the purpose of the present study is that Horace's reference to the sorites puzzle is so incidental, that the reader's knowledge of this aspect of Stoic logic is clearly assumed; it is apparent that the educated reading public were quite aware of this Stoic question.

As well as making elaborated comments on Stoic thought, Horace often makes passing references to Stoicism, such as his allusion to the

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1 Epistles i.1.16-19. nunc agilis fio et morsor civilibus undis virtutis verae iustos rigidusque satelles;
2 See comment on these lines by H.R. Fairclough, Loeb edition.
3 Epistles ii.1.45. utor permisco, caudaeque pilos ut equinae unum paulatim vello et demo unum, demo etiam, dum cadat elusus ratione ruentis acervi.

The question posed by the Stoics is how many grains make a heap. At what stage can it be logically determined by adding a series of single grains that a 'heap' is formed?
Stoic dialectic of Stertinius and to the work of Panaetius. His references to Jupiter as an all-pervading divine force is also consistent with the Stoic concept.

The conclusions to be drawn are that Horace had at least a broad and general awareness of Stoic philosophy; also from his ready references and assumptions it is evident that many of his readers had a comparable knowledge; although his attitude to Stoicism ranges from the satirical to the positive Roman pupils would have learned something of Stoicism from their reading and from the grammaticus teaching of Horace's work.

A STOIC ELEMENT IN TERENCE?

Of the principal authors included in the curriculum Terence is the only one in whom Stoicism is not really evident. But comedy is hardly a suitable vehicle for philosophical thought. Also, Terence whose plays appeared between 165 and 160 B.C. wrote at a time when Stoicism was only beginning to appear in Rome. Terence who enjoyed the patronage of the Scipionic circle was surely aware of Stoicism, but his works do not reveal its influence.

However, Stoic thought has been attributed to the famous words of Chremes in the *Heauton Timorumenos* — *homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto*. The line can be interpreted as expressing the Stoic concern for the general welfare of mankind and the Stoic concept of world citizenship.

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1 *Epistles* i.12.20. *... an Stertinium deliret acumen*

2 *Odes* i.29.13-14. *... nobilis libros Panaeti, ...*

3 *Odes* i.12.13. *quid prius dicam solitis parentis laudibus, qui res hominum ac deorum, qui mare et terras variisque mundum temperat horis?*

Also, *Odes* iii.4.44 foll.

4 i.77.

STOICISM AND CICERO

It is evident that from the latter part of the first century B.C. until the time of Quintilian Cicero's educational influence developed strongly together with his literary and historical stature. Quintilian, as the outstanding educationist of the first century A.D., is unstinting in his praise and in acknowledging his substantial debt to Cicero, who is cited on a very great number of occasions. Also, as well as being the leading educational thinkers of their respective periods they reveal a certain affinity in their theories, especially in relation to an educational, philosophical basis for rhetoric. Quintilian's regular references to Cicero justify the argument that Cicero was an important author in educational curricula.

Cicero himself, according to statements in his philosophical treatises, wrote with an educational mission in his treatment of Greek philosophy. His design was to present comprehensively in Latin for his fellow Romans all the philosophical systems, to interpret Greek philosophy critically, and to contribute to the education of the young. In his representations of Greek philosophy he introduced and developed a particular philosophical vocabulary in Latin, which became

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1 Cornelius Severus, friend of Ovid, dealt with Cicero's death in an historical epic (Sen. Suas. 6.26); Velleius Paterculus commends Cicero on three separate occasions (i.2.66; i.17.3; i.2.34). Seneca quotes praise from Cremutus Cordus (Sen. Suas. 6.23) and from Aufidius Bassus (Ibid.).

Although in the Augustan Age it was not likely that the reading of Cicero, the Republican, was encouraged, there is the story from Plutarch (Cic. 49.2) that Augustus' grandson tried to conceal from the emperor the fact that he was reading Cicero.

2 Cf. Index in the Loeb edition of Quintilian, where references to Cicero occupy seven columns.

3 de Div. ii.2.4. Adhuc haec erant; ad reliqua alacri tendebamus animo sic parati, ut, nisi quae causae gravior obstitisses, nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur, qui non Latinis litteris illustratus pateret.

4 de Fin. i.2.6. Sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, etaque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus?

5 de Div. ii.2.4. Quod enim manus rei publicae afferre maius meliusque possimus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem.
firmly established as language for ethics, science and logic. It is said that he was the principal person to provide 'Romans with words for *fantasia*, *synkatathesos*, *epoche*, *catalepsis* as well as *atonon*, *ameres* and *kenon*. And his substantial contribution to Latin vocabulary meant that the words he introduced were used beyond the areas of philosophy.

For the practical purposes of Roman education, however, it is probable that Cicero's philosophical treatises necessarily yielded a position in educational curricula to his speeches. Yet it is evident that the content and educational influence of his philosophical works prevailed strongly in a number of ways in Roman education, consequently giving considerable significance to his very substantial treatment of Stoicism.

Cicero, and later Quintilian, were the protagonists of a tradition in Roman education that the study of philosophy was essential for rhetorical training. The accomplished orator needed to be well grounded in philosophy. The use of preparatory exercises, *progymnasmata*, at an early stage in a pupil's education exemplifies this tradition; the pupil through these exercises was introduced to issues on a broader scale, that were really part of philosophical study. The considerable number of Stoic *grammatici* who are identified in the following chapter had at their disposal in Cicero's works a fairly full exposition in Latin of Stoic ethics and theology. In using this resource Stoic *grammatici* could read and pass on a Latin terminology for Stoic philosophy, if they were so inclined.

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2 Quintilian's very considerable references to Cicero for the most part mention his speeches.

3 Marrou, *op. cit.*, p.290. *Car le rhéteur ne dédaigne pas les idées générales, les problèmes moraux et humains; son enseignement en est tout impregné: la doctrine de l'invention fait le plus grand cas des précieux lieux communs, de ces grands développements passe-partout sur le juste et l'injuste, le bonheur, la vie, la mort ... si utiles à l'orateur parcequ'ils mettent en jeu des données fondamentales.*

It is difficult to determine which of Cicero's works a teacher might choose to study with his students. Quintilian's repeated references to Cicero's speeches would suggest that they were treated in schools, although rhetorical style of the first century A.D. differed from that of Cicero's time. Gwynn\textsuperscript{1} argues that \textit{De Inventione} was popular as a school text. And apart from Cicero's strictly philosophical works a teacher might use \textit{De Republica} and \textit{De Legibus} to impart something of political science. Of all Cicero's treatises on philosophy the \textit{Paradoxa Stoicorum}, although only a slight work, has a particular interest for the classroom. Cicero treats these philosophical paradoxes in an oratorical style. They are really model προγμνάσματα, and he is putting them into an acceptable popular form as 'commonplaces'.\textsuperscript{2} Cicero himself describes them as 'exercises', pointing out that he is transposing into oratorical discourse that which is argued in the philosophical schools.\textsuperscript{3} The significant point in regard to Roman education is that in these 'exercises' Cicero is incorporating an association between philosophy and rhetoric; from a practical viewpoint the \textit{Paradoxa Stoicorum} provides for the teacher model exercises that could be used with pupils at the secondary level.

Cicero's treatises, particularly important as they are written in Latin, were undoubtedly read by Stoics for their discussion of Stoicism; also they surely influenced the language and thought of later Stoic writers. It is probable, also, that Cicero had some influence on the Stoic content of Horace, discussed earlier in this chapter. Cicero's treatment of the Stoic paradoxes may have contributed something to Horace's substantial comment on these arguments.

As it is established that Cicero comprises part of the educational curriculum and, also, was read for his educational thought, it is important to look at the Stoic content in Cicero's works. This

\textsuperscript{1} op. cit., p.100.

\textsuperscript{2} Par. Stoic. 3. \textit{ego tibi illa ipsa quae vix in gymnasiis et in otio Stoici probant ludens conieci in communes locos.}

\textsuperscript{3} Par. Stoic. 3. \textit{et degustabis genus exercitationum earum quibus uti consuevi, cum ea quae dicuntur in scholis \textit{τειχως} ad nostrum hoc oratorium transfero dicendi genus.}
Stoic thought is expounded and elaborated at such length throughout a variety of his works that it would be a formidable task to give an exhaustive explanation of Cicero's presentation of Stoicism. Rather, the following discussion in this study is the survey of Cicero's treatment of Stoicism, so that some idea may be gained of the Stoic thought obtained by students from reading Cicero.

CICERO'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

Cicero's philosophical position was with the New Academy, as guided by Philo of Larissa and then by Antiochus of Ascalon. Cicero especially supported the policy of Antiochus, who tried to re-establish the spirit of Plato's 'original' Academy and who at the same time introduced eclectic elements from other philosophical schools. The eclectic, non-dogmatic nature of the New Academy was very much in keeping with Cicero's temperament. Because of Antiochus' eclecticism the school was prepared to adopt and uphold the Stoic belief of knowledge based on sense-perception; and to maintain the Peripatetic principle that virtue was the greatest good (but not the only good). Antiochus and Cicero, asserted that the Academic, Peripatetic and Stoic schools had much in common and that the differences between them were exaggerated. Such differences led to much pointless, pedantic quarrelling.

In Cicero's treatises there is frequently an overlapping of elements from various philosophical schools. And often he supports Stoic and Peripatetic principles, at the same time questioning the teaching of the Academy. For instance, in Book V of De Finibus he comes round to supporting the Stoic argument for self-sufficiency rather than the tenets of his former teacher Antiochus. Cicero is more often than not in sympathy with the principles of Stoicism, although at times he may be firmly critical. In fact, of the four principal schools of philosophy discussed by Cicero it is only the Epicurean system that he finds unacceptable. Although he frequently acknowledges the worth and character of Epicurus himself, the school's tenets are very much contrary to his own thinking and to traditional Roman values.
With Cicero Stoicism is discussed as much as any other philosophical school. However, it is important to note that, of the three divisions of Stoic philosophy — ethics, physics and logic — Cicero pays most attention to Stoic ethics and, with regard to physical science, concentrates on matters relating to Stoic cosmology. He is not really concerned with Stoic dialectic, although he undoubtedly had long discussions on this subject with Diodotus, the Stoic dialectician who for thirty years lived in his house; at times he makes only passing references to the 'sorites' issue in Stoic logic. In view of the particular emphases placed by Cicero on various aspects of Stoicism it is appropriate to set out Cicero's treatment of Stoic ethics:

Stoic virtue

Cato in *De Finibus* points out that moral worth is the only good;¹ this is a fundamental Stoic principle regarded as synonymous with living a life in accordance with nature. The man who lives virtuously has an awareness of the natural course of events, selects guiding principles that are in accord with nature and rejects the opposite.² In this way a wise man is free from frustration, restriction and want. His life is harmonious and fortunate.³ Nature also represents order or reason. Therefore to live in accord with nature is rational and morally right; virtue is synonymous with reason.⁴ Cicero through his works often refers to the basic Stoic principle — *naturae convenienter vivere*; and this becomes terminology used by Horace and later writers. It would appear that Cicero was instrumental in passing on this Stoic teaching, although he himself was not in full agreement

1  *de Fin.* iii.3.10.

2  *de Fin.* ii.11.34. *Stoicis consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste vivere, quod ita interpretantur, vivere cum intelligentia eorum rerum quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea quae essent secundum naturam reiciementque contraria. Also, cf. *de Fin.* iii.4.12.

3  *de Fin.* iii.7.26. ... necessario sequitur omnes sapientes semper feliciter, absolute, fortunate vivere nulla re impediri, nulla prohiberi, nulla egere.

4  *Acad.* i.10.58. *hie* (i.e. Zeno) *omnes in ratione ponebat.*
with its basic argument. Within the concept of Stoic virtue there are subsumed four cardinal virtues which Cicero sets out from the Stoic viewpoint. These are wisdom (prudentia/φρόνησις), temperance (temperantia/σωφροσύνη), courage (fortitudo/ἀνδρεία) and justice (iustitia/δικαιοσύνη):

Wisdom

Cicero states a Stoic principle when he points out that a man who aspires to wisdom is acting in accord with nature. Wisdom, according to the Stoics, is based on the fundamental principles of nature. Also, there is 'overlap' between wisdom and other qualities upheld by the Stoics. The possessor of wisdom is brave, calm, rational, not susceptible to distress; wisdom also embraces justice and magnanimity. Wisdom is irreconcilable with anger; the wise man in his self-control is invariably independent of angry feelings.

Temperance

In the De Officiis the Stoic concept of temperance is given as the control of reason over appetite or appetites, premeditated

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1 Cicero fairly presents Stoic reasoning on this matter although he is inclined to support the Peripatetics who, in contrast, could allow that some bodily and external things were 'good'.

2 de Fin. iii.7.23. Cum autem omnia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab iisdem necesse est proficiscit ipsam sapientiam.

3 Tusc. iii.7.15. At nemo sapiens nisi fortis: non cadet ergo in sapientiam aegritudo.

4 de Fin. iii.8.25. Sapientia enim et animi magnitudinem complectitur et iustitiam et ut omnia quae homini accidant infra se esse judicet, quod idem ceteris artibus non contingit.

5 Tusc. iii.9.19. Sin autem caderet in sapientiam aegritudo, caderet, etiam iracundia: qua quoniam vacat, aegritudine etiam vacabit.

6 Tusc. iii.7.15. At aegritudo perturbatio est animi semper igitur ea sapiens vacabit.

7 i.28-29.

8 i.28.10. Ita fit ut ratio praesit, adpetitus obtemperet.
conduct (rather than thoughtless precipitateness) and the ordering of one's life. In the Stoic pattern of virtues, temperance, like other qualities upheld by the Stoics, includes and is equated with a number of virtues. Temperance can mean frugality, which implies moderation and self-restraint. Frugality itself includes other Stoic cardinal virtues, fortitude, justice and prudence. Temperance gives 'beauty' to morality of conduct and speech. Also, temperance in a person means that he would refrain from hurting anyone either physically or verbally.

Bravery

The Stoic definition of bravery embodied a number of facets, which are referred to by Cicero. Such a wide-ranging, comprehensive set of concepts for bravery was especially distinctive in Stoicism. Bravery was regarded as self-sufficiency or self-reliance. The brave man is not susceptible to distress. A very distinctive Stoic

1 Ibid. Omnis autem actio vacare debet tementitate et neglegentia nec vero agere quicquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere. See above, p.88, where this aspect of Stoic thought is discussed.

2 Ibid. ... ut ne quid temere ac fortuito, inconsiderate neglegenterque.

3 Tusc. iii.8. omnes (virtutes) inter se nexae et iugatae sunt.

4 Tusc. iii.8.18. Qui sit frugi igitur vel si, mavis, moderatus et temperans, cum necesse est esse constantem.

5 Tusc. iii.8.17. ... frugi appellari solet, eo tres virtutes, fortitudinem, iustitiam, prudentiam frugalitas complexa est.

6 de Fin. ii.14.47. Cuius similitudine perspecta in formarum specie ad dignitatem, transitum est ad honestatem dictorum atque factorum.

7 de Fin. ii.14.47. ... et non audet cuiquam aut dicto protervo aut facto nocere, vereturque quidquam aut facere aut eloqui quod parum virile videntur.

8 Tusc. iii.7.14. Qui fortis est, idem est fidens ... qui autem est fidens, in proiecto non extimescit.

9 Tusc. iii.7.14. At nemo sapiens nisi fortis: non cadet ergo in sapientem aegritudo.
requirement meant that the brave man should be free from anger. Bravery is the application of rational judgment in encountering misfortune, or the maintenance of a steady judgment in meeting and repulsing vicissitudes which may seem disastrous. Courage stems from reason, which regards misfortune as unimportant and endurable. Chrysippus is quoted in defining bravery as a form of knowledge that is consistent with the supreme law of having no fear and enables us to tolerate adversity. Cato presents the brave man as a person who does not fear death, and draws on the Stoic concept of pain as not being an evil to substantiate this description. The brave man, according to Cato, is confident, has faith in his past and future, has self-esteem and believes that no ill can befall the wise man.

Justice

Cicero throughout his works drew substantially from Stoicism for his concepts and definitions of *ius*ititia*. The Stoics were very much concerned with social relations, and consequently justice was regarded as extremely important for the healthy functioning of society. The

1 Tusc. iv.23.52. *Non igitur desiderat fortitudo advocatam iracundiam*, cf. especially the arguments of the Stoic Sphaerus.

2 Tusc. iv.24.53. *vel conservatio stabilis iudicii in eis rebus quae formidolosae videntur*.

3 de Fin. ii.14.47. *Eadem ratio ... omnia humana non tolerabilia solum sed etiam levia ducens, altum quiddam et excelsum, nihil timens, nemini cadens, semper invictum*.

4 Tusc. iv.24.53. *Fortitudo est, inquit, scientia rerum perferendarum vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo summae legi parens sine timore*.

5 de Fin. iii.8.29. *... quem fortem virum dicimus effici posse, nisi constitutum sit non esse malum dolorem*.

6 Ibid. *is ... certe et confidere sibi debet ac suae vitae at actae et consequenti et bene de se se iudicare, statuens nihil posse mali incidere sapienti*.

7 de Off. i.7.20. *... qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur, cuitue partes duae sunt: iustitia in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri bona nominatur, et huic continuita beneficentia quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.*
Stoics believed that justice and its social systematisation in law had its basis in nature.\(^1\) Cato in *De Finibus* presents Chrysippus' argument that the person who upholds the code of law that exists between the individual and the human race is just; he who does not do so is unjust.\(^2\) Since man has a moral responsibility of justice to his fellow man, it is appropriate for him to take part in public life, remarks Cato who is voicing Cicero's own opinions on public life.\(^3\) The theory of Panaetius that man's most important and responsible activity should be for the welfare of society is supported by Cicero. The concept of justice, as held by Antiochus and by the Stoics, is pre-eminent. The claims of justice are so strong that they are given precedence over the pursuit of knowledge.\(^4\)

The Stoic association of *iustitia* and *pietas* is firmly supported by Cicero. It is a concept valued by other Roman writers,\(^5\) who appreciated this association as being consistent with traditional Roman principles. The connection between *iustitia* and *pietas* emphasises the Stoic thought that the individual has a responsibility to gods, family, country, society. The sense of Roman morality embodied in *pietas* is supported by and equated with Stoic *iustitia*. Also, the identification of *pietas* and *iustitia* is in accord with the force of nature.\(^6\) In *De Finibus* Cicero adopts the Stoic description of *iustitia* and upholds its connection with *pietas* in his discussion and support of

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1. *de Leg.* i.13.6. ... *natura esse ius.*

2. *de Fin.* iii.20.67. *quoniamque ea natura esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret eum iustum, qui migraret intuitum fore.*

3. *Ibid.* *Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem naturam esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adjungere et velle ex ea liberos.*

4. *de Off.* i.155.

5. See above pp.89,90.

6. *de Fin.* iii.22.73. *Atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas carititates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere; nec vero pietas adversus deos nec quanta ipsa gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest.*
the philosophy of the Academy. In the Somnium Scipionis the Stoic equation between justice and divine force is emphasised. In the Somnium Scipionis, which is strongly Stoic in a metaphysical sense, the identification of iustitia and pietas is substantiated by an argument that people who live by just, pious values are rewarded with a later life in the astral universe.

Justice contributes to other virtues. Correspondingly only a brave and wise man can preserve justice. In considering other virtues in relation to justice Cicero uses the arguments of Middle Stoicism, as propounded by Panaetius: the virtue of wisdom should be subordinate to justice. Pure speculation should be subordinate to the practical application of philosophy to aid mankind. Of the four cardinal virtues the principle of 'justice' with its implications for society has the greatest practical importance. Consequently Cicero's elaboration on law (ius) is consistent with both Antiochean and Panaetian views, where law and justice can also be traced back to nature. Cicero draws on the Stoic view in expounding the arguments of Antiochus regarding justice and its development from the original impulses of parental affection to

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1 de Fin. v.23.65. ... iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunatae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem.

2 de Rep. vi.13.13. nihil est enim illi principi deo, qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptius quam consilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitas appellantur; harum rectores et conservatores hinc profecti hue revertantur.

3 de Rep. vi.16. iustitiam colit et pietatem ... ea vita via est in caelum et in hunc coetum eorum, qui iam vixerunt et corpore laxati illum incolunt locum quem vides ... orbem lacteum ...

4 de Fin. v.13.66. iustitia ut ipsa fundet se usus in ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet.

5 Ibid. Servari enim iustitia nisi a forti viro, nisi a sapiente non potest.

6 de Off. i.157; de Rep. iii.15.24.

7 de Leg. ii.1.2. ... itaque, ut tu paulo ante de lege et de iure disserens ad naturam referebas omnia sic in his ipsis rebus, quae ad requietaem animi delectationemque quaeruntur, natura dominatur.
a solidarity of society.\textsuperscript{1} Also, in man's nature at birth there is an innate element of civic and rational feeling,\textsuperscript{2} which is consistent with justice.\textsuperscript{3}

CICERO'S DISCUSSION OF THE STOIC ANALYSIS OF 'DISORDERS OF THE SOUL'

Cicero acknowledges the thoroughness and discernment of the Stoics who took great pains to analyse and describe 'disorders of the soul'.\textsuperscript{4} He is happy to follow the line taken by the Stoics.\textsuperscript{5} He gives a clear Stoic definition for each of these disorders, explaining also that \textit{intemperantia}, the opposite of moderation as described above, is the source of these disorders.\textsuperscript{6}

The 'disorders of the soul' are listed in Diogenes Laertius,\textsuperscript{7} Cicero sets them out, using appropriate Latin terms:\textsuperscript{8}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{φθόνος} invidentia (envy)
  \item \textit{ζῆλος} aemulatio (rivalry)
  \item \textit{ζηλοτυχία} obtrectatio (jealousy)
  \item \textit{ἔλεος} misericordia (compassion)
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{1} H.A.K. Hunt, \textit{The Humanism of Cicero}, p.95.
\textsuperscript{2} Cf. Greek term πολιτικόν.
\textsuperscript{3} de Fin. v.23.66. \textit{Nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit ut habeat quiddam ingenium quasi civile atque populare, quod Graeci πολιτικόν vocant, quidquid agit quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea quam exposuicaritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa fundet se usu in ceteras virtutes, sic illas expedet.}
\textsuperscript{4} Tusc. iv.5.9. \textit{Quia Chrysippos et Stoici, omne de animi perturbationibus disputant, magnam partem in his partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt.}
\textsuperscript{5} Tusc. v.5.2. \textit{utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus qui mihi videntur in hac quaestionem versari acutissime.}
\textsuperscript{6} Tusc. iv.9.4. \textit{Omnium autem perturbationum fontem esse intemperantiam.}
\textsuperscript{7} vii.111 foll.
\textsuperscript{8} Tusc. iv.5.9.
Also, the 'disorders' can be classified in a number of subdivisions. Aegritudo (distress) includes invidentia, aemulatio, obtrectatio, misericordia, angor, luctus, maeror, aemumna, dolor, lamentatio, sollicitudo, molestia, adfictatio, desperatio. Metus (fear) includes pigritia, pudor, terror, timor, pavor, exanimatio, conturbatio, formido. Voluptas (pleasure) includes malevolentia, delectatio, iactatio. Libido (lust) encompasses ira, excandescentia, odium, inimicitia, discordia, indigentia, desiderium. Such systematic, comprehensive classification exemplifies the working method of the Stoics. Although Stoicism was largely based on thought developed before the establishment of the school, its thorough elaborate schemes in organising ethics, physics and dialectic became the basis for the school's success and wide spread acceptance.
CICERO'S USE OF STOIC ARGUMENTS
RELATING TO PAIN AND DEATH

Modification of Stoic thought is used by Antiochus throughout
the first four books of the Tusculan Disputations;¹ these books are
concerned with fear of death (Book I), pain (Book II), emotions as
disorders of the soul (Books III and IV). Cicero argues in support of
the Stoic view that the wise man should not fear death.² Also premature
death is not necessarily abhorrent.³ Cato in De Senectute supports a
rational, resigned attitude to death. Cato's attitude is fatalistic:
in accordance with nature's design each stage of a person's life is
planned, including also the final stage of death.⁴

Cicero in Book I of the Tusculans presents two alternative
views on death and the soul. One view is that the soul perishes on
death, which was the original, orthodox belief of the Stoics.⁵ The
alternative view is that the soul is immortal; this was the teaching of
the Academico-Peripatetics and some of the Middle Stoics of Cicero's
time. Indeed, it is possible that Cicero's views on immortality may
have come from Posidonius and Middle Stoicism, rather than from
Antiochus.⁶ Because of the eclecticism of Middle Stoicism Posidonius
was able to fit into his scheme the Academic doctrine of immortality,

² Tusc. i.38.91. Itaque non deterret sapientem mors ... quo minus in
omne tempus rei publicae suisque consulat.
³ Tusc. i.39.93. Pallantur ergo istae ineptiae paene aniles, ante
tempus mori miserum esse.
⁴ de Sen. ii.5. ... in hoc sumus sapientes, quod naturam optimam ducem
tanquam deum sequimur eique paremus.
de Sen. xix.71. quid est autem tam secundum naturam quam senibus
emori?
⁵ Cleanthes, in Nemes Nat. Rom., p.33, and Tert. de Ann.c.5: οὐδὲν
ἀσώματον συμμάχει σώματι οὐδὲ ἁσώματι σώμα ἀλλὰ σώμα σώματι.
συμμάχει δὲ ἡ ψυχή τῷ σώματι νοοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ καὶ τῷ σώμα τῇ
ψυχῇ. αἰσχωμένης γοῦν ἐρυθρών γινεται καὶ φοβουμένης ὧχον. σώμα
ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.
Also, cf. Chrysippus, in Nemes, p.34.
See E. Zeller, op. cit., notes, pp.210,211.
upon which he no doubt elaborated substantially.

In Book II of the *Tusculans* the Stoics are criticised for setting up syllogisms to prove that pain is not an evil. However, it is interesting to note that Cicero draws upon Stoic reasoning to support the view given by Antiochus that pain can be endured; although his main purpose is to demolish the Stoics' argument that pain is an evil.¹ Posidonius and the later Stoics² maintained that the soul comprises two parts³ — τὸ λογιστικὸν and τὸ διάλογον.⁴ The reasoning of the wise man enables him to govern the 'lower part' of his nature and to endure such a vicissitude as pain.⁵

SUICIDE

The case for suicide is argued by Cato in *De Finibus*. When a person lives in circumstances which are in accord with nature, it is appropriate for him to be alive. However, when most of his circumstances are not in accord with nature, suicide is justifiable.⁶ The Stoics firmly supported suicide as a solution to circumstances which

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¹ *Tusc*. ii.12.29. *Concludunt ratiunculas Stoici cur non sit malum, quasi de verbo, non de re laboretur.*

² *Tusc*. ii.18.42. Cf. Cicero's reaction: *Sitne igitur malum dolore nunc Stoici viderint, qui contortulis quibusdam et minutis conclusunculis nec ad sensus permanantibus effici volunt non esse malum dolorem.*


⁴ *Tusc*. ii.20.47. *Est enim animus in partes tributus duas, quarum altera rationis est particeps, altera expers.*

⁵ The διάλογον may be further divided into τὸ εἰσερχομενόν and τὸ θυμοειδὲς.

⁶ *De Fin.* iii.18.60. *In quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est e vita excedere.*
may be intolerable or beyond one's control. Although Cicero presents
the Stoic attitude to suicide, the school itself had set out much more
elaborate and detailed premises relating to this issue.

STOIC COSMOLOGY IN CICERO

In the *De Natura Deorum* where discussion is between Balbus for
the Stoics, Cotta for the Academy and Velleius for the Epicureans the
arguments of Balbus are those that are most positively supported. But
the issue is not that Stoic cosmic interpretation provides a single
coherent explanation. The theology of Stoicism is very much in agree­
ment with that of the Academy. The close association of the two schools
in regard to theology is emphasised by the fact that Epicurean arguments
are directed against Stoic-Platonic theology rather than against each
school singly. In the *De Natura Deorum* the Stoic theory considered by
Cicero is that of Posidonius and Middle Stoicism. The theology of
eclectic Middle Stoicism had much in common with the Academico-
Peripatetic theological system taught by Antiochus. In the *Academica*
appears a Stoic description of the universe and heavenly bodies. This
Stoic description provided by Cicero is consistent with and possibly
derived from the *Timaeus*. The only real difference between the Stoic
and Antiochean viewpoints is that Antiochus' theology denies that the
gods' control over man and the world is as extensive and as strong as
the Stoics maintain. At times Cicero in *De Natura Deorum*, *De
Divinatione* and *De Fato* criticises the emphasis given by the Stoics to
divine providence; such criticism is in keeping with the views of
Antiochus and the Academico-Peripatetic tradition. But the very
important point is that Cicero himself accepts the fundamentals of
Posidonius' Stoic cosmology, which is presented in Book II of *De Natura

1 D.L. vii.130. εὐλόγως τε φασὶν ἐξεῖσεν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφόν.
Also, cf. M. Aurel, v.29. ἦν δὲ μὴ ἐπεισέργωσθεν, τότε καὶ τοῦ ζήν
ἐξαλειφόμενον, δόθη λέγεται, ὥς μηδὲν κακόν πάσχων.
5 Hunt, *op. cit.*, p.137.
Deorum. In the Somnium Scipionis he presents the Stoic belief, also expressed by many Roman writers generally, that the supreme god rules the universe and that his presence is all-pervading.  

It is acknowledged that Cicero made a strong contribution to theological thought in antiquity. And clearly much of Cicero's theology is based on and incorporates Stoicism. Cicero was instrumental in organising for Romans theological thought in Latin, and in so doing he substantially used, and consequently passed on to Romans, the system of Stoic theology.

DIVINATION

It is in keeping with the Stoic concept of an ordered universe governed by divine force that the Stoics would be in a position to support divination. Cicero sets out comprehensively and at length the Stoics' reasoning for the validity of divination in De Divinatione I; although, of course he presents his refutation in Book II. The basic Stoic syllogism to substantiate divination states that 'If there are gods, there is divination; but there are gods, therefore there is divination.' Chrysippus was drawn on for support of divination; he had pointed out that every phenomenon occurred in accordance with the laws

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1 de Rep. vi.13. nihil est enim illi principi deo, qui omnum mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptius quam concilia coetueque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur.

de Rep. vi.15. ... deus is, cuius hoc templum est omne, quod conaplotis ...

de Rep. vi.24. movet ... hunc mundum ille princeps deus.

2 See Mayor's edition of De Natura Deorum, vol. iii, p.xviii. The comment is made regarding Book II, which is largely Stoic in content, that it is 'perhaps the most important contribution to theological thought which has come down to us from classical antiquity'.

3 However, it might be noted that other Roman writers who were concerned with theology were Varro (Antiquitates divinae); Appius Claudius Pulcher, P. Nigidius Figulus.

4 de Div. ii.17.41. Si di sunt, est divinatio; sunt autem di, est ergo divinatio.
of nature and never by chance. Also, the Stoics used the argument of a bond between mankind and gods, whose function it is to love mankind. Consequently the Stoic definition of divination, as given by Chrysippus, is the power to see, understand and explain premonitory signs given to men by gods. And even the choice of the sacrificial victim is directed by the sentiment and divine power which pervade the entire universe. Cicero's exposition in Book I gives the case for divination through the words of his brother Quintus. This explanation, completely based on arguments from early Stoicism and from Posidonius, is a coherent statement outlining the Stoic case on divination for Roman readers.

**CICERO'S TREATMENT OF THE STOIC CONCEPTS OF FATE AND FREE WILL**

The concepts of fate and free will in Cicero are to be considered against the background of Posidonius' Middle Stoicism, which strongly influenced the Stoic-Platonic system upheld by Cicero. As mentioned, Stoics themselves were caught up in an anomaly between fate and free will. Chrysippus' basic argument on fate is that every occurrence stems from a cause or causes; therefore everything occurs in accordance with fate. On the other hand, Chrysippus also points out that certain occurrences or actions are not connected with eternal

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1. *De Div.* ii.28.61. Quorum omnium causas si a Chrysippo quaeram, ione ille divinationis auctor numquam illa dioet facta fortuito naturallemque rationem omnium reddet: 'Nihil enim fieri sine causa possit ...'

2. *De Div.* ii.49.101. Si sunt di neque ante declarant hominibus quae futura sint, aut non diligunt, homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant ...

3. *De Div.* ii.63.130. Chrysippus quidem divinationem definit his verbis: 'vim cognoscentem et videntem et explicamentem signa, quae a dis nominibus portendentur ...'

4. *De Fato* ii.15.35. ... ad hostiam deligendum ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque divinam quae toto confusa mundo sit.

5. *De Fato* ix.21. Quod si ita est, omnia quae fiunt causis fiunt, antegressis; id si ita est, omnia fato fiunt; efficitur igitur fato fieri quaecumque fiunt.
causation, but are independent of fate. So Chrysippus somewhat enigmatically wishes to compromise and to allow for both situations, although he is more inclined to support the argument for fate. Chrysippus probably oversimplifies when he argues that fate prevails when it is not possible to change the outcome of antecedent causes, and that free will can function when preceding causes do not prevent us from altering a particular result. In accordance with these alternatives, circumstances can be respectively simple or complex. Although Cicero sets out the Stoic arguments for fate and free will, he himself in keeping with the teaching of the Academy does not attribute great importance to providential control; he gives support to the idea of free will. Cicero does not question the existence of the gods but rather the arguments relating to divine intervention as put forward by the Stoics. Cicero is not prepared to acknowledge the force of ἐρωτολογία, which is so fundamental and prominent in the Stoic system. He argues that there may be a certain interdependence and causality throughout nature, but regards the Stoic attitude as too absolute and exaggerated.

Cicero gives considerable attention throughout his works to the question of Stoic determinism; this theory is analysed in sequence in De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione and De Fato. The outline of the Stoic Platonic system in Book II of De Natura Deorum and the argument for divination in Book I of De Divinatione lead up to the treatment of providential fate.

Cicero's philosophical writing provided a field of study in Latin for later authors, philosophers, educationists, rhetores,

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1 de Fato xvi.38. ratio ipsa coget et ex aeternitate quaedam esse vera et ea non esse nesa causis aeternis et a fati necessitate esse libera.

2 de Fato xvii.39. Chrysippus tamen arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed applicat se ad eae potius qui necessitate motus animos liberatos volunt dum autem verbis utitum suis delabitur in eas difficultates ut necessitatem fata confirmet invitus.

3 de Fato xii.30. Quaedam enim sunt, inquit, in rebus complica, quaedam oopulata.

4 de Div. ii.29.
The principal authors taught in Roman schools have now been considered from the point of view of their Stoic content; yet it is not claimed that this Stoic content has been analysed in regard to every possible aspect or detail. Rather, the purpose of the discussion is to demonstrate that the Stoic content in the authors read is substantial, and would have necessarily been explained to students by their teachers.

The situation that can be established with respect to the first century A.D. is that pupils in schools learned much of Stoicism, for the most part from the standard curriculum of authors comprising in particular Virgil, Horace, Sallust, Cicero — as well as from such Stoic authors as Lucan, Persius, Seneca, Celsus. The educational situation during the first century A.D. is consistent with the strong position of Stoicism in Roman society, in philosophical thought and in Latin literature. And it is a justifiable claim that prior to the appearance of Christianity, the position and influence of Stoicism in first century Rome as a comprehensive philosophical and ideological force was unique in Greek and Roman civilisation.
CHAPTER V

STOICISM AND INDIVIDUAL GRAMMATICI

The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss particular grammatici, who were themselves Stoic, and also to determine the extent of Stoic influences on certain other grammatici. For such a treatment it is necessary to refer again to Crates of Mallos, who is firmly regarded as being responsible for establishing the grammaticus' tradition and methods in Rome, and whose influence was so extensive and prolonged. The method and content of Crates' teaching have already been discussed from the Stoic viewpoint in Chapters II and III; it is significant now to indicate that later writers and grammarians incorporated much of Crates' teaching in this work. Also, authors who were not Stoic chose to draw from Crates; included among these were Varro and Quintilian.

Varro in De Lingua Latina presents arguments on Stoic theories of anomaly that were previously expounded by Crates and his followers. He is cited in relation to the use of certain restricted case forms; and Crates' school is mentioned in a discussion on particular singular and plural forms. However, Varro does not hesitate to criticise Crates for his shortcomings. Crates' support of anomaly in grammar is later referred to by Aulus Gellius, when he is restating

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1 Suet. de gramm. 2. ... ac nostris exemplo fuit ad imitandum.
2 viii.66-71.
3 ix.63.
4 ix.1. ... Insignis eorum est error qui malunt quae nesciunt docere quam discere quae ignorant: in quo fuit Crates, nobilis grammaticus ... 
5 N.A. ii.25.1-11.
some of the arguments set out by Varro relating to usage in a comparison with rules of analogy. Crates is also cited by Martianus Capella in the De grammatica of his Disciplinae.

The Pergamene school of Κρατήτεως was strong and vigorous. Ptolemaeus of Ascalon wrote a treatise τῆς Κρατήτεως ἀιρέσεως; Zenodotus of Mallos earnestly championed Crates' system. Panaetius was his pupil, as were Tauriskos, Herodikos, Hermias (ὁ Κρατήτεως), Artemon of Pergamon, Asclepiades of Myrlea. His teachings on the Stoic interpretation of Homeric allegory were taken up by Heraclitus and Demo. His cosmological arguments were followed by Posidonius, and were consequently used by Strabo, Plutarch and Geminus.

Crates' methods, according to Suetonius, were directly adopted by Roman scholars, who in the tradition of his Stoic exegesis wrote detailed criticism of Latin poetry not very widely known to Romans of the time. They gave public readings together with commentaries and were responsible for giving early Roman literature a degree of recognition and standing. Octavius Lampadio appears to have been the first of these grammatici. He treated Naevius' Punicum Bellum in this way, dividing the single volume into seven books. Also, it would appear

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1 L.L. vii.68.
2 iii.289 foll.; 324 foll., as mentioned by H. Mette, Parateresis Untersuchungen zur Sprachtheorie des Krates von Pergamon, p.2.
4 Strab. xiv.676. See Chapter I.
5 W. Kroll, op. cit., pp.1640-1641.
6 Ibid.
7 de gramm. 2. Hactenus tamen imitati, ut carmina parum adhuc divulgata vel defunctorum amicorum vel si quorum aliorum probassent, diligentius retractarent ac legendo commentandoque etiam ceteris nota facerent.

The teaching steps indicated by the terms diligentius retractarent, legendo and commentando are in keeping with the pattern that was established for textual exegesis.

8 Ibid. ut C. Octavius Lampadio Naevii 'Punicum Bellum' quod uno volumine et continenti scriptura exposuitum divisit in septem libros.
that Lampadio prepared a commentary on the *Annales* of Ennius, as suggested by Fronto\(^1\) and Aulus Gellius.\(^2\)

Then Quintus Vargunteius following the procedure of *retractare, legere* and *commentare* also treated Ennius, giving his readings on particular days to large audiences.\(^3\) Laelius Archelaus and Vettius Philocomus are mentioned by Suetonius\(^4\) as *grammatici* who treated Lucilius in the Cratean tradition. Archelaus is probably the same *grammaticus* as mentioned by Charisius\(^5\) who describes him as a leading scholar who wrote a work on poetry: *De vitiiis virtutibusque poetarum*.

Vettius Philocomus, like Archelaus, lived in the second half of the second century B.C. They were friends and contemporaries of Lucilius. Vettius, as well as treating his satires in the conventional manner of the *grammaticus*, was himself censured by Lucilius\(^6\) for using alien words of Tuscan, Sabine and Praenestine origin. Vettius has been suggested as the identity derided, but perhaps not seriously, in a fragment of Lucilius.\(^7\) And, Archelaus and Vettius have been described as being helpful to Lucilius by listening to recitations of his works; also, they wrote commentaries on them after his death.\(^8\)

\(^1\) Fronto, 20.

\(^2\) N.A. xviii.5.11.


\(^5\) *G.L.* i.3.33. *Q. Laelius ex principibus grammaticis librum suum inscripsit, 'De vitiiis virtutibusque poetarum'.*

\(^6\) Quint. i.5.56. *'Taceo de Tuscis et Sabinis et Praenestinis quoque; nam ut eorum sermone utentem Vettium Lucilius insectatur ...'*


Lenaeus Pompeius, a *grammaticus* of the first half of the first century B.C., was a pupil of Archelaus\(^1\) and consequently was taught in accordance with Crates' methods. Lenaeus was a freedman of Pompey, and on the death of his patron and his sons conducted a school near the temple of Tellus.\(^2\) It is difficult to determine to what extent Lenaeus was actually influenced by Stoicism; on the other hand, his predecessors, Lampadio, Vargunteius, Vettius and Archelaus, in imitating Crates (as stated by Suetonius) undoubtedly learned Stoic arguments as well as a teaching methodology. Lenaeus moved outside his field of teaching and studying literature; he wrote a satire vehemently criticising Sallust for saying that Pompey had a shameless character.\(^3\) Also, he wrote on botany and medicine; and his work is at times used by Pliny.\(^4\)

Publius Valerius Cato was a contemporary of Lenaeus. He was taught by Vettius who, as mentioned, implemented the methods of Crates in his teaching.\(^5\) Valerius Cato was prominent as both a *grammaticus* and a poet. As a teacher and grammarian he had many distinguished pupils.\(^6\) As the leader of the *neoteroi*, or young Latin poets who were influenced by the personal and individual Alexandrian school, he had as his followers such renowned personalities as Catullus, Calvus, Furius, Bibaculus and Ticida. Cato's adherence to the emotionally expressive and at times erotic style of this school of poets hardly suggests the slightest interest in Stoic values. And it would appear that the three

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1 See note 4, p.127.

2 Suet. *de gramm.* 15. ... *defuncto eo filiisque eius schola se sustentavit; docuitque in Carinis ad Telluris, in qua regione Pompeiorum domus fuerat,...*

3 *Ibid.* ... *ut Sallustium historicon, quod eum oris probi, animo invereundio scripsisset, acerbissima satura lacraverit,...*

4 *Plin. N.H.* xv.5-7; xx-xxvii.

5 See note 4, p.127.

6 Suet. *de gramm.* 11. *Docuit multos et nobiles, visusque est peridoneus praeeptor, maxime ad poetiam tendentibus, ut quidem apparere vel his versiculis potest:*

> *Cato grammaticus, Latina Siren,*
> *Qui solus legit ac facit poetas.*
works for which he is known, *Indignatio*, *Diotymna* and *Lydia* (strongly erotic in content), are very much apart from Stoicism.¹

On the other hand, a very interesting reference from Furius Bibaculus associates Cato with two leading Stoic grammarians:²

*En cor Zenodoti, en iecur Cratetis.*

These words describe Cato as embodying in his heart and soul the spirit of Crates and Zenodotus of Mallos. Unfortunately the content of Cato's grammatical writings is unknown; Bibaculus' description then is most enigmatic, and a clear interpretation seems to defy analysis. Does the reference indicate that Cato upheld the grammatical teachings of Crates and Zenodotus? This is feasible for the anomalist Stoic school held sway in Rome in the first half of the first century B.C. Or, does it mean that he was a fine teacher in the pedagogic tradition of Crates and Zenodotus? A third explanation might be that the line is an expression of irony on the part of Bibaculus who is indulging in friendly satire. The surest conclusion is that such emphatic reference to Crates and Zenodotus firmly underlines the fact that their teachings were widely known and that their work and thought enjoyed a high standing in Rome at the time.

L. Aelius Stilo was the leading *grammaticus* of his time. He was a Stoic³ and consequently a champion of the anomalist system of grammar. His influence was strong and far-reaching, as emphatically stated by Suetonius.⁴ It is interesting that as well as being a teacher and an acknowledged scholar of grammar and literature, Aelius wrote speeches for Roman politicians, some of whose names Cicero⁵ mentions as

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² Suet. *de gramm.* 11.
³ Cic., *Brut.* 206. *Stoicus esse voluit.*
⁵ Cic., *Brut.* 169. *scriptitavit orationes multis.*
Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos, Quintus Caepio, Quintus Pompeius Rufus and C. Aurelius Cotta. ¹

Aelius numbered among his pupils Varro ² and Cicero ³ who highly commends his scholarship. His standing is substantiated by the fact that both his contemporaries and later writers refer favourably to his works. Varro mentions his *Interpretatio Carminum Saliorum* and at the same time describes Aelius as an outstanding scholar of Latin literature. ⁴ Aulus Gellius reiterates Varro's statement that Aelius is the most learned scholar of his time ⁵ and later refers to him as being an authority on Plautus; ⁶ his interest in Plautus is also indicated by Quintilian. ⁷ Aelius' Stoic interest was embodied in his work on dialectic entitled *Commentarium de proloquiis* or *περὶ ἀξομοιώτων* which is mentioned by Aulus Gellius. ⁸

Varro drew very much on the thought and work of his teacher Aelius, to whom he often refers. Varro's presentation of the arguments on the Stoic system of anomaly is particularly influenced by Aelius, who is often cited on word derivation. ⁹ And later, Quintilian chooses to quote Aelius' etymology. ¹₀ Aelius represents a peak in the development

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¹ Cic., *Brut.* 206.
³ *Brut.* 207. *... cum essem apud Aelium adolescens eumque audire perstudioso solerem.*
⁴ *L.L.* vii.2. *Aelii hominis in primo litteris Latinis exercitati interpretationem Carminem Saliorum videbis ...*
⁵ *N.A.* i.18.1. *... doctissimum tune civitatis hominem ... L. Aelium ...*
⁶ *N.A.* iii.3.1. *... Plauti comœdias curiose atque contente lectitarunt, non indicibus Aelii ...*
⁷ x.i.99.
⁸ *N.A.* xvi.8.2.
⁹ *L.L.* v.18,21,25,66,101; vii.2; viii.81.
¹₀ i.6.36.
of Stoic grammar in Rome. From the middle of the first century B.C. the strong position of the anomalist school gradually yields to the force of the Alexandrian analogists. Yet it is important to note that Aelius' influence still survives beyond his own time.

Servius Clodius was the son-in-law of Aelius Stilo\(^1\) of whom he was a close follower; it is recorded that he even stole one of Aelius' works before it was published and because of the ensuing disgrace he was forced to leave the city.\(^2\) Although Clodius' poor character meant that the possession of Stoic values on his part is unimaginable, being so much under the influence of Aelius he was undoubtedly a supporter of Stoic grammar. Like Aelius he was also interested in Plautus, as suggested by Cicero\(^3\) and Aulus Gellius.\(^4\) Cicero also refers to his scholarship.\(^5\) Just as Aelius had studied etymology and was cited on a number of occasions by Varro, Clodius was also acknowledged as an authority and was cited accordingly.\(^6\) And his *Commentario* on word derivation was later consulted and quoted by Aulus Gellius.\(^7\)

Gavius Bassus was a *grammaticus* who lived during the Ciceronian period and probably during the post-Republican years into the early part of the Augustan age.\(^8\) His interest in and method of analysing word formation indicates a pronounced Stoic influence.\(^9\) Also, the Stoic arguments of Posidonius are considered to have been incorporated in his work *De Dis*.\(^10\) Bassus' interest in word explanation

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2. Ibid.
3. Cic., *ad Fam.* ix.16. *Servius ... facile diceret 'hie versus Plauti non est hic est'*.  
4. iii.3.1.
5. Cic., *ad Fam.* ix.16. ... *quem litteratissimum fuisse iudico ...*
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
and etymology is embodied in his *De Origine Verborum et Vocabularum*. Quintilian refers to Bassus' etymology, and Aulus Gellius mentions his explanations on a number of occasions.

Lucius Crassicius was a successful *grammaticus* who taught a number of pupils from distinguished families, and also established a high reputation as a scholar through his commentary on Cinna's *Zmyrna*. Crassicius was strongly interested in philosophy, the study of which led him to give up his vocation as a *grammaticus*. He joined the philosophical school conducted in the Augustan period by Q. Sextius and his son.

The school of Q. Sextius drew mainly from Stoicism and Neopythagoreanism, and consequently was eclectic in its principles. Sextius' purpose was to set up an original Roman philosophical school. Much of Stoic ethics was incorporated in his teachings; for instance, the Stoic idea that only the wise man is free and sane is conveyed in his argument that the challenge in life is the acquisition of wisdom through victory over insanity. Also, he taught the Stoic principle that the power of the good man is comparable with the power of Jupiter. Surely Crassicius while still a *grammaticus* was for a period of time under the influence of Sextius, and without doubt imparted something of his teaching to his own pupils.

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1 A. Gell. *N. A.* iii.19.1. *velut eo die quo ego affui, legebatur Gavi Bassi, eruditi viri liber 'de Origine Verborum et Vocabularum'*.  
2 i.6.36.  
3 *N. A.* iii.9.1,8; 18.3; ii.4; iii.19; i.1.3; v.7.  
4 Suet. *de gramm.* 18. *Sed cum edoceret iam multos ac nobiles* ...  
5 Ibid. *deinde in pergula docuit, donec commentario 'Zymrmae' edito adeo inclaruit, ut haec de eo scriberentur:*  
   Uni Crassicio se credere 'Zymrnae' probavit.  
6 Ibid. *... dimissa repente schola, transiit ad Q. Sestii philosophi sectam.*  
Theon of Alexandria is an interesting personality to consider in this chapter. He is primarily known for his widely used work περὶ προγυμνασμῶν, and consequently is regarded as a writer very much concerned with rhetorical education. He is also important as a Stoic and educationist whose work in various ways is relevant to that of the grammaticus.

Theon lived during the first century A.D. The precise period of his life is uncertain, but it would appear that he was a contemporary of Quintilian who refers to him on occasions. In keeping with Stoic educational theory Theon's concept of education was broader than direct vocational preparation. He was a supporter of the ἐγκυκλιος καλεδεύα, and deplored the fact that this educational curriculum was losing force. He had a broad yet unified view of education, in keeping with the educational rationale argued by Hermagoras of Temnos in the second century B.C. and then by Cicero and Quintilian: the educated orator required a background of education that covered a range of subjects studied in some depth. A study of the liberal arts was the basis of such an education. Theon upheld the firmly Stoic argument that the orator should be well educated and be a vir bonus dicendi peritus.

Theon's own work embodies a range of subjects which exemplify his educational views. He was interested in grammar and philology, writing a treatise on syntax, Ζητήματα περὶ συντάξεως. His progymnasmata also reflected a strong grammatical interest; his treatment of the sections concerned with χρεία, μῦθος and διήγημα suggests a purely grammatical discussion. Although he himself preferred a direct oratorical style as consistent with his Stoicism, he wrote on and supported appropriate use of the three principal styles: the grande

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1 Stegemann, Pauly-Wissowa, VA2, p.2039.
3 Stegemann, op. cit., p.2038.
4 Cf. G. Reichel, Quaest. prog., passim; also mentioned by Stegemann.
(Demosthenes),\(^1\) the medium (Isocrates) and the tenue (Xenophon).\(^3\)

Other works on rhetoric written by Theon were 'Ρητορικαὶ ὑποθέσεις and κερὶ τεχνῶν ρητορικῶν βιβλία γ'.\(^4\) Theon's interest in dialectic is apparent in his κερὶ προγυμνασμάτων. His concern with δροι and διάφορα relates back to Stoic dialectic; his precise definition and treatment of close, subtle distinctions are a dialectic approach.

As it is the purpose of this chapter simply to discuss Stoic teachers or teachers influenced by Stoicism, it is appropriate to defer comment on progymnasmata and Theon's work in this regard to the following chapter; in that chapter will be treated Stoicism and the teaching of rhetoric. For the present it is important to point out that he was a Stoic educationalist of standing, whose work was used by and influenced both Greek and Roman teachers. Theon appears to have been one of the few Greek writers whose work was translated into Latin.\(^5\) And his standing became so high\(^6\) that later rhetoricians referred to him more frequently than to Quintilian or to Hermagoras.

L. Annaeus Cornutus was a Stoic grammaticus and a contemporary of Seneca; he had as his pupils Lucan and Persius, who came to his school at the age of sixteen.\(^7\) He wrote a text on grammar, De Enuntiatione vel Orthographia,\(^8\) as well as a book on rhetoric, De Figuris Sententiarum.\(^9\) Cornutus also wrote on Stoic philosophy,\(^10\) but

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\(^1\) ῆρδημινε μείζονα ἐς Δημοσθένην.
\(^2\) ῆρδημινε μείζονα ἐς Ἰσοκράτην.
\(^3\) ῆρδημινε μείζονα ἐς Ξενοφόντα.
\(^4\) Cf. Reichel, op. cit., 30; 23.
\(^5\) This translation was probably done after the first century A.D., and especially used by rhetores latini minores in their comparative studies. Cf. St. Glöckner, 'Quaest. rhet.', Bresl. philol., 1901 — mentioned by Stegemann.
\(^6\) Stegemann, op. cit., p.2053.
\(^7\) M. Pohlenz, op. cit., Vol. I, p.281.
\(^8\) Cassiodorus, G.L. vii.147.
\(^9\) Aul. Gell. N.A. ix.10.5.
he has been primarily regarded as a grammarian and educationist.\(^1\) Cornutus was particularly concerned with Stoic allegorical interpretation; for instance, he argued that the God Hercules was to be equated with Reason and was a ruling power in the world.\(^2\) As a grammarian Cornutus endeavoured to interpret Hercules' character completely in this light, although he could not accept Cleanthes' explanation of the twelve labours.\(^3\) It is interesting that three hundred years after the introduction of Crates' methods to Rome Cornutus was a grammaticus who strongly represented this Stoic exegetical tradition.

Following this review of personalities it may be useful to suggest some synthesis of this information. It is apparent that the tradition and teaching content introduced by Crates were maintained in the second century B.C. by Lampadio, Vargunteius, Archelaus and Philocemus; and Cratean methods are later apparent in the work of Cornutus during the first century A.D. Through their stated interests in literature and through their public readings there was during the second century B.C. a series of grammatici who were particularly concerned with literary appreciation and analysis in the Stoic exegetical manner of Crates. Their interest appears to be more literary than philological. The fact that a significant number of grammatici with Stoic leanings can be placed in the second century B.C. is consistent with the strongly Stoic spirit of that age.

In comparison with the strong literary emphasis of Stoic grammatici of the second century B.C. Aelius Stilo, Servius Clodius and Gavius Bassus during the first century B.C. were especially champions of Stoic philology. They vigorously researched and strongly upheld Stoic anomalist grammar. Perhaps this interest prevailed because of the developing linguistic richness of Latin literature and because of the

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2 Plut. *de Is.* 44. Hercules is τὸ πληθυσμὸν καὶ διαλρετικὸν πνεύμα.

conflict in Rome at that time between anomalist and analogist systems of grammar.

The grammaticoi referred to from the first century A.D., Cornutus, Crassicius and Theon cannot be readily categorised as pursuing common fields of interest as did groups of grammaticoi from previous centuries; this circumstance in itself reflects the expansive, varied interests of Stoics of the Empire and was anticipated by the varied studies of Posidonius. It might be concluded that the tradition of the Stoic grammaticus prevailed strongly in Rome from the time of Crates with certain shifts of emphasis; such variations reflect the attested adaptability and developmental changes of Stoicism.
CHAPTER VI

STOICISM AND THE TEACHING OF RHETORIC

The pupil proceeded from the school of the grammaticus to that of the rhetor possibly at the age of about fifteen, although the precise age is difficult to determine. Also, the functions of the grammaticus and rhetor were not clearly divided, the grammaticus especially teaching his pupils something of rhetoric. In general, higher education culminated in the training provided in the rhetorical schools; it was an education pursued by a large number of students, while comparatively a smaller proportion went on to studies in philosophy. Education for oratory had a very high standing evidenced by the fact that the income of the rhetor was four times as much as that earned by the grammaticus. It is clear that since the time of Isocrates rhetorical education, although at times subject to and contested by various strong forces, was upheld as the goal of the Greco-Roman educational programme.

A study of rhetorical education is a substantial field to research and set out comprehensively. It is not appropriate in this chapter to describe the reasons for the high standing of oratory and to discuss every aspect of rhetorical training in the ancient world, although such discussion is all-important to a full or general study of Greco-Roman education. For the requirements of this thesis it is

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1 See above Chapter IV. Cf. Quint. ii.1.3-6.
essential to divide the topic of Stoicism as it relates to rhetoric into two separate sections. In the first section the Stoic concept of their rhetoric is to be defined, the Stoic plain style described, and Stoic orators and *rhetores* are to be identified. The second section treats the Stoic elements and influences that became established in the general pattern of rhetorical teaching; such aspects, for example, may come from Stoic dialectic, from Stoic ethical questions as subjects for *théseis* and *chriae* exercises, in *προγυμνάσματα*, from principles of Stoic 'correctness' as exemplified in the avoidance of solecisms and barbarisms. The relatively straightforward comment on Stoic rhetoric will serve as a basis for and be followed by the analysis of Stoic elements in rhetorical teaching.

I. STOIC RHETORIC

Rhetoric was regarded by the Stoics as one of two parts of logic, the other part being dialectic. The simple distinguishing definitions were that rhetoric was the science of speaking well using plain narrative, and that dialectic was the science of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer. For the Stoics rhetoric and dialectic were so closely associated that the distinction between the two was arbitrary and could be reduced to continuous speech in comparison to dialogue.

The Stoics drew very much on the work of Aristotle who had given a philosophical basis to rhetoric, although the Stoics were not prepared to accept fully the fundamental methods in rhetoric which meant the manipulation of human emotion. The association of rhetoric with dialectic, where rhetoric was called *άντιστροφος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς*, was originally Aristotelian. The Stoics also agreed with Aristotle in attributing three divisions to rhetoric: deliberative, forensic and

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1 D.L. vii.42, τῇ τε ῥητορικῇ ἐπιστήμῃν οὖσαν τῷ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τῇ διαλεκτικήν τῷ ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων.


encomiastic. 1 And generally a very large number of elements in Stoic rhetoric had their origins in Aristotle’s scheme.

The early Stoics’ positive interest in rhetoric is indicated by the fact that Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus each wrote a techne on rhetoric. 2 Perhaps such handbooks could be useful to the person who participated in public life; such usefulness is in keeping with the Stoic principle that the individual should be conscious of his social responsibility and could be politically active. 3 Rhetoric could also be a useful tool to defend the school against the attacks of other philosophical systems and criticism in general. In any case, Stoic rhetoric was put to practical use by Romans in the second half of the second century B.C. 4

The capacity of the Stoics for practical implementation and to adapt to circumstances possibly casts doubt on the argument 5 that they were not concerned with actual use of their rhetoric and that they were simply conforming with the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, who wrote in terms of ideal citizens for an ideal world.

The Stoics very coherently incorporated rhetoric into their scheme, and they framed a definition and approach to rhetoric completely consistent with their teaching. In their comprehensive and thorough range of knowledge, rhetoric was the particular ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἐξ ἔγγευμ. 6 In accordance with Stoic dogmatism rhetoric was one of the

1 D.L. vii.42. καὶ τὴν μὲν ὑποτυπήν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι λέγοντα τρυμαρη τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς εἶναι σωμουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ δικαιολογοῦν, τὸ δὲ ἐγκυμωναστικόν.


Cic. de Fin. iv.7. ... scripsit artem rhetoricon Cleanthes, Chrysippus etiam ...

3 Zeller, op. cit., p.320 foll.

4 See pp.145-151.

5 von Arnim, op. cit., p.80.

6 Chrysippus, von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, i.292-294.
As Stoic values or virtues were absolute, only the wise man could be a true orator or rhetor. It is interesting that Quintilian, although in no way a Stoic himself, upholds Cato's definition that ideally orator est vir bonus dicendi peritus. The Stoic concept that true rhetoric is synonymous with wisdom, and that the true orator is virtuous, goes back to the sophist ideal that rhetorical ability is integral to σοφία. It was naturally appropriate that the Stoics considered speaking well meant speaking the truth, and the prime function of the orator was to inform or instruct, and not as Cicero and Quintilian maintained 'to instruct, give pleasure and to stir emotions.' For Zeno rhetoric was to be sensu tincta, and it was a Stoic principle that correctness of speech should be synonymous with correctness of thought.

The Stoics gave close attention to the dialectical aspects of rhetorical proof and in the atmosphere of scientific research and exactness of the third and second centuries B.C. strongly established an unembellished, pragmatic rhetoric that was widely used. Stoic rhetoric was in keeping with the doctrine of ἀδιάθετα which did not permit emotional appeal in oratory. Yet, in acknowledging the development and wide use of Stoic rhetoric it is important to keep in mind that emotional, persuasive rhetoric generally held sway. The Sophist

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1 Cic. de Or. i.83. atque ipsam eloquentiam, quod ex bene dicendi scientia constaret, unam quondam esse virtutem, et qui unam virtutem haberet, eum virtutes omnès habere, atque esse sapientem.

2 Cic. de Or. i.83. oratorem autem, nisi qui sapiens esset. Varro. Sat. Longe fug. ii(2), solus rex, solus rhetor.

3 Quint. xii.1.1.


6 Cf. Cic. de opt. gen. orat. 4; Brut. 185,198. Quint. iii.5.16. ... debet orator, ut doceat, moveat, delectet.

7 Quint. iv.2.117.

8 Quint. xii.10.5. ... recte sentire dicere.
tradition, then, which was concerned with enchanting the soul (ψυχαγωγία) was to prevail.

The Stoics substantiated a division in rhetoric that was initially introduced by Socrates, who emphasised that the teaching of thought and rhetorical expression were separate. Aristotle proposed to establish for rhetoric a dialectical foundation. Argument by proof is the essential process, and the effective orator is to be skilled in enthymemes and the use of examples. For Aristotle the proofs are indeed the only artistic aspects of rhetoric, while the rest of oratory is embellishment. There is a balance in his views on rhetoric; in the first book he outlines dialectical method (περί τοῦ πράγματος), and in the second (πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν) he gives due weight to a careful consideration of human character and emotions. Also, he acknowledges that language might be a means of conveying the orator's emotions and feelings to his audience (πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν).

This division of language is laid down by Theophrastus who refers to the λόγος πρὸς τὰ πράγματα as an uncoloured presentation of facts and the λόγος πρὸς τοὺς ἀκρωμένους which is artistic, affective language. The division suggested by Socrates and then upheld by Aristotle and Theophrastus was the basis for the Stoic doctrine that rhetoric was to be pragmatic and to be the precise representation of thought. The λόγος πρὸς τὰ πράγματα of Theophrastus is embodied in the definition of correct language given by Diogenes Laertius — συντομία δὲ ἐστι λέξεως αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα περιέχουσα πρὸς δηλωσιν τοῦ πράγματος. Language that was closely identified with matter was established as a

2 Aristotle, Rhetorica I, 1355a, 3-14.
3 1554a, 13.
5 vii.59.
Stoic principle; the tradition was maintained till Augustine who argued that communication should be *secundum id quod significat*, a requirement that can be equated with Theophrastus' λόγος πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.

The Stoics in stressing facts as the basis for argument developed a correspondingly appropriate style that was primarily concerned with utility. The Stoic style, according to Diogenes Laertius, embodied five principal qualities: ἐλληνικός, which requires the use of correct grammar and the avoidance of vulgar colloquialisms; lucidity which enables ready understanding; economy of language; appropriateness; and a certain distinctiveness. The early Stoics also made an issue of the avoidance of barbarisms and solecisms; their teaching on such faults of language was taken up generally by grammatici and rhetores, and particular emphasis was placed on avoiding them by Quintilian.

It is not easy to describe the historical development of Stoic rhetoric from the early Stoics to the time of Cicero. Yet, with Cicero there is a mass of information that testifies to the established use of a Stoic style in Rome from the time of the Scipionic circle; to the strong Stoic influences on Hermagoras, who was the most significant figure in rhetoric since Aristotle; and to the close relationship between Stoicism and the plain style of rhetoric. The Stoic style of rhetoric as described by Diogenes is incorporated in the plain style of rhetoric. There were three styles of rhetoric in Rome, first mentioned in the *Auctor ad de Dial.* 7.

1 *de Dial.* 7.

2 vii.59. ἐλληνικός ... σαφήνεια ... συντομία ... πρέπου ... κατασκευή.


4 Ibid. ὅ ἐξ ἑβαρβαρικός ἐκ τῶν κακῶν λέξεων ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ ἔξος τῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντων 'Ελλήνων, σολοκωμίκος ἐξ ἐστὶ λόγος ἀνακαλλήλως συντεταγμένος.

5 See above, Chapter III, pp.69-71.
Herennium as the gravis, the mediocris and the extenuata. The 'grand' style was an exuberant, embellished rhetoric; the 'middle' style might be described as a 'somewhat impassioned specimen of argumentation', while the 'simple' style used an everyday, conversational speech. The Stoic style can be closely related to and identified with the last-mentioned plain or simple style. The zealous efforts of the Stoics with regard to rhetoric were responsible for the way in which the plain style developed and was established in Rome as one of the three styles.

The plain style is often referred to by Cicero, who in describing generally the functions of the three styles points out that at times it is appropriate to use this pragmatic, objective approach. At various times the orator may effectively use any of the three styles; and although he himself is mainly an exponent of the full style, there is a place for all three styles in oratory. However, Cicero himself deplores oratory which is absolutely meagre and dialectical in the Stoic manner. In the Orator Cicero provides a description of the plain style, accurately setting out its Stoic qualities also not altogether inconsistent with the Attic style which was in evidence in the first century B.C. Such a style was restrained and used everyday language. It was to be pure Latin, simple and clear. It should also be fitting and appropriate. In short, the qualities upheld are similar to those principles laid down by Theophrastus and Diogenes Laertius.

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1 iv.8.11. foll.  
2 Quint. iii.1.14. atque hinc (i.e. after Isocrates) vel studiosius philosophi quam rhetores, praetipueque Stoicorum ac Peripateticorum principes.  
3 de Or. iii.177. Itaque tum graves sumus; tum subtiles, tum medium quiddam tenemus: sic institutam nostram sententiam sequitur orationis genus, ... Cf. also de Or. iii.212.  
4 Cic. Brut. 118. idem (i.e. the Stoics) ... ad dicendum inopes reperiantur.  
5 Or. 76.  
6 Or. 76. Summissus est et humilis, consuetudinem imitans.  
7 Or. 79. Sermo purus erit et Latinus, dilucide planeque dicetur ...  
8 Ibid. ... quid deceat circumspicietur.  
9 Ibid. Unum aberit quod quartum numerat Theophrastus in orationis laudibus.
The three rhetorical styles were associated with the three functions of the orator. These three functions were 'to instruct, give pleasure and sway emotions'. Both Cicero and Quintilian agree fully with these aims, although the terms used are not always identical, but rather synonymous. The plain style was appropriate for instructing, the grand style for moving, and the middle style for charming. As the plain style was the type of rhetoric supported and developed by the Stoics, it was appropriate that this style should make considerable use of Stoic dialectical methods of reasoning.

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE PLAIN
STYLE AND STOIC DIALECTIC

There is strong evidence from the use of certain terms that the plain style was closely associated with dialectic. The basic terms are subtilis and disputare; and there are many instances in Cicero, Quintilian and St. Augustine where these words are used to indicate a dialectic approach. On one occasion virtually the same words appear together — subtiliter disputandi ad docendum — to express the idea of dialectic argument.

Quintilian identifies subtilitas with dialectic when he maintains dialectica ... vires ipsa subtilitate consumet, and St. Augustine's definition is unequivocal: subtiliter disserere hoc est
dialectice. Subtilis also is a term which means the plain style in oratory; Cicero\(^1\) refers to the plain style as subtile in probando and Quintilian\(^2\) presents a definition of this style as the unum subtile, quod lovov vocant ... primum officium (ratio) docendi ... in docendo autem acumen.

Disputare is associated with the Stoics\(^3\) and has the meaning of 'to prove by dialectic'. Quintilian\(^4\) describes dialectic as disputatrix virtus and Cicero\(^5\) refers to the disputandi ratio et loquendi dialecticorum. There is a very close connection between disputare, subtilis, dialectice and the plain style;\(^6\) such a style clearly drew from Stoic principles and Stoic dialectic contributed to its effective use.

USE OF THE STOIC RHETORICAL STYLE BY PARTICULAR ROMAN ORATORS

There is firm evidence to indicate that in Rome the Stoic rhetorical style regularly had a significant number of adherents. Cicero often refers collectively to those orators who employed the plain, dry, unembellished style;\(^7\) more often than not he deplores close adherence to such a style and very often emphasises its shortcomings as he sees them. The fact that the users of the Stoic style are referred to as a particular body of people or orators, clearly proves that there

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1 Cic. Or. 69.
2 xii.58-59. Cf. also Itaque illo subtili praeципue ratio narrandi probandique consistet ...
3 Cic. Brut. 118. omnes fere Stoici prudentissimi in disserendo sunt, et id arte faciunt suntque architecti paene verborum; eidem traducti a disputando ad dicendum inopes reperiuntur.
4 ii.21.73.
5 Or. 113.
6 Cf. Quint. ii.21.13, where dialectic is defined as oratio concisa.
7 Or. v.20. — quod ipsum alii aspera, tristi, horrida oratione neque perfecta atque conclusa consecuti sunt.
were a considerable number active in Cicero's own lifetime, and no doubt many orators who were regarded as Atticists were also Stoics. At the time when Tacitus wrote his *Dialogus* in about 85 A.D., there was a class of orators who used the same style; Tacitus describes this style as concise and succinct, employing processes of argument and as dialectical. At the very end of the first century Quintilian indicates that at that time there was a considerable number of orators who regarded the function of rhetoric as to instruct, although the majority aimed at winning over their audience by emotional appeal. Such references from Cicero, Tacitus and Quintilian testify to the style used by an established class of orator.

The first instance of the use of the Stoic rhetorical style in Rome is the manner of speech of Diogenes of Babylon who with Critolaus, the Peripatetic, and Carneades, the Academic, was the Stoic member of the embassy of Greek philosophers that visited Rome in 155 B.C. The *modesta ... et sobria* manner of Diogenes' speech was suited to his use of dialectic; Diogenes according to Cicero was concerned with testing the truth of an argument, and distinguishing truth from error; his style then was the *genus subtile* as it came to be termed in Latin, although he himself of course spoke in Greek and used an interpreter. It is difficult to determine the influence exerted in Rome by the three

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1 Brut. 118. *QuaΣ hoc idem in nostris contingere intellego quod in Graecis, ut omnes fere Stoic prudentissimi in disserendo sint et id arte faciant sintque architecti paene verborum,...*


3 Quint. v. Proem. *Fuerunt et clari quidem auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere; ... plures uero (i.e. opponents of the 'instructional' style), qui nec ab illis sine dubio partibus rationem orandi summoverant, hoc tamen proprium atque praecipuum oredent opus, sua confirmare et quae ex adverso proponerentur refutare.*

4 A. Gell. vi.14.

5 *de Or.* ii.157. *... videene Diogenem eum fuisse, quidiceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam verbo Graeco dialecticam appellaret.*
philosophers, although their immediate impact was very forceful.  

Diogenes was an authority on Stoic rhetorical style and the definition of έλληνικός and concise speech set out in Diogenes Laertius' life of Zeno is taken from him. Although it is difficult to assess the direct influence of Diogenes of Babylon in Rome, his pupil Panaetius was the central figure of Roman middle Stoicism and was no doubt responsible for introducing to Rome much of Diogenes' teaching. From the time of the Scipionic circle until the period of the Atticists, who were opponents of Cicero, there was a series of orators who in varying degrees, but positively, used a style in keeping with principles set down by Diogenes of Babylon. Just as the teachings of Crates were furthered in Rome by Panaetius, it would appear that Diogenes' principles were indirectly taught in the same way.

C. Laelius was one Roman Stoic who was both a student of Diogenes and Panaetius, although his style was less strongly Stoic than some of the people who appeared after him. It is indicated that he used a plain style that could be described as quiet and elegant. On the other hand, Spurius Memmius, a fellow member of the Scipionic circle used a strongly Stoic, unembellished style. C. Fannius, son-in-law of Laelius, was a Stoic and had been a student of Panaetius. Cicero suggests that he was not really eloquent, but would have spoken in a finished, restrained way. Publius Scaevola possessed Stoic qualities in speaking with wisdom and in being strong in argument.

1 Cic. de Or. 155. itaque ... eos, dum Romae essent, ita se et ab aliis frequenter auditos. 
   Cf. A. Gell. iv.14. ... magno conventu hominum dissertaverunt.

2 Cic. de Fin. ii.8.24. ille (Laelius) qui Diogenem Stoicum adulescens, post autem Panaetium audiverat.

3 Cic. de Or. iii.7.28. lenitatem Laelius habuit.

4 Cic. Brut. 94. Sp. nihilo ornator, sed tamen astrictior; fuit enim doctus ex disciplina Stoicorum.

5 Brut. 101. is tamen instituto Laeli Panaetium audiverat.

6 Ibid. Eius omnis in dicendo facultas historia ipsius non inelegantem scripta perspici potest, quae neque nimis est infans neque perfecte diserta.

7 Brut. 108. P. Scaevola valde prudenter et acute.
Publius Rutilius was a Stoic orator, who lived until the early part of the first century B.C. He was a learned jurist and had been a student of Panaetius. His oratory was markedly Stoic in style; it was serious, bare and even sombre. It conformed to Stoic requirements in being systematic, incisive and plain. Although Cicero maintains that Rutilius' type of oratory is not really effective for winning over a popular audience, he acknowledges Rutilius' qualities as an orator and that the Stoic style of oratory had some significant standing in Roman public life.

Quintus Aelius Tubero was a Stoic and contemporary of Rutilius; his language was blunt to the point of being harsh and uncultivated, and virtually prevented him from advancing his career in public life. However, he ultimately attained the consulship in 118 B.C. He was devoted to the study of philosophy, and his own life was an embodiment of Stoic values. He was honoured by Panaetius, Posidonius and Hecato, all of whom addressed treatises to him.

Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the jurist and pontifex maximus, epitomised Stoic rhetorical principles in various ways. He was especially strong in exact, dialectical argument as was necessary for his function as a jurisconsult; accordingly his style had a brevity

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1 Cic. Brut. 114. ... multa praeclara de iure ... Panaeti auditor, prope perfectus in Stoicis.
2 Cic. Brut. 113,114. tristi et severo genere dicendi ... orationes ieiunae.
3 Ibid. quorum peracutum et artis plenum orationis genus sois tamen esse exile nec satis populari, assensioni accommodatum.
4 Cic. Brut. 116. ... ne haec quidem in civitate genera hac oratoria laude caruerunt.
5 Cic. Brut. 117. ... durus, incultus, horridus; itaque honoribus maiorum respondere non potuit.
6 Cic. de Or. iii.23.87; Brut. 117.
7 Cic. de Fin. iv.9.23; de Off. iii.15.63.
8 Cic. Brut. 145. ... peracutus ... ad excogitandum quid in iure aut in aequo verum aut esset aut non esset ...
and aptness for the matter under consideration. He had a particular talent for nullifying an opponent's strategies of embellishment and flamboyant representation. In the Brutus Cicero compares and contrasts Scaevola and Crassus, where Crassus of course is the type of orator taken by Cicero as a model for himself. Scaevola pleaded the case of his fellow Stoic P. Rutilius Rufus in 92 B.C., when the equites prosecuted Rutilius for the steps taken by him to restrict the activities of the publicani in declaring certain contracts invalid. Scaevola's defence of Rutilius was expressed in a style that was straightforward, plain and unembellished, yet elegant.

Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a contemporary of Cicero, and consul in 51 B.C., was an expert in the use of dialectic; he concentrated on civil law and is highly respected and commended by Cicero for a number of qualities. Sulpicius Rufus' style is not clearly described, but he is represented as differing from Cicero, just as Scaevola's style differed from Crassus'. He was a student of L. Lucilius Balbus, who was a firm Stoic and a teacher of dialectic. However, it is not certain whether Sulpicius himself was a Stoic.

The style of Cato, it would appear, had a certain duality. As a dedicated Stoic he might use a plain style embodying dialectical

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1 Ibid. ... tum verbis erat ad rem, cum summa brevitate mirabiliter aptus.
2 Cic. Brut. 146. in augendo, in ornando, in refellendo magis existimator metuendus quam admirandus orator.
3 Cic. de Or. i.53.229. dixit causam illum quodam ex parte Q. Mucius, more suo, nullo adparatu, pure et dilucide.
6 Cic. Brut. 153. As well as a knowledge of dialectic Sulpicius had loquendi elegantia and litterarum scientia.
8 See above, Chapter IV, pp.94-98, for the standing of Cato as a Stoic in Latin literature.
And in his speeches he often spoke on such Stoic qualities as self-control, virtue and courage. On the other hand, he was quite capable of using oratoria ornamenta if he considered the occasion appropriate. Consequently he did not always restrict his oratory to a plain style; and his oratory and eloquence are highly commended by Cicero.

Caius Sicinius and Titus Accius are described by Cicero as being trained in the principles developed by Hermagoras, the strongly influential rhetorician of the second century B.C. Sicinius and Accius used an oratory very much in keeping with the Stoic style; for Hermagoras himself although not a philosopher adapted much of Stoic rhetoric in his theories and teaching. The style of Sicinius and Accius was meagre, carefully developed in accordance with the inventio of the speech and painstaking.

Aelius Stilo, a professed Stoic, has a somewhat enigmatic role in regard to rhetoric. He himself was not an orator, but as mentioned he prepared speeches for others to deliver. Cicero has firm praise for Aelius, probably as a grammaticus, but refers to these speeches in a somewhat derogatory manner. It is very likely that they were written in the Stoic plain style, although there is no absolute evidence to confirm this.

1 Cic. Par. Pro. 2. Cato perfectus ... Stoicus, in ea est haeresi, quae nullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum; sed minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod proposuit efficit.

2 Cic. Par. Pro. 3. Cato dumtaxat de magnitudine animi, de morte, de omni laude virtutis, Stoice solet, oratoriis ornamentis adhibitis, dicere.

3 Ibid.

4 Brut. 263.

5 Brut. 271.

6 See Chapter V.

7 Ibid. Scribebat tarnen orationes, quas alii dicerent, ut Q. Metello ... f., ut Q. Pompeio Rufo, quamquam is etiam ipse scriptis eae, quibus pro se est usus sed non sine Aelio.

8 Brut. 205. ... vir egregius ... eruditissimus et Graecis litteris et Latinis.
We have now looked at the concept and content of Stoic rhetoric; and also its association with the 'plain' style of oratory. In addition, a number of people, who were either Stoics or who incorporated Stoic rhetorical elements in their own oratory, have been identified. It is now appropriate to comment on the various ways Stoic rhetoric was taught.

THE TEACHING OF STOIC RHETORIC

It is possible to relate Stoic rhetoric to teaching processes principally in three ways. For the rhetor Latinus may teach something of the plain style; a philosophical school may teach its own respective style of rhetoric; and an aspiring orator may wish to receive training in dialectic to develop effectiveness in argument.

Whereas the teaching of the grammaticus followed a relatively established pattern in his treatment of the methodico and historico, the methods of the rhetor involved wider variation. Suetonius\(^1\) even claims that each teacher trained his pupils differently; such variation might include composition of narratives, explanation of fine speeches, translation from Greek models, speeches praising or condemning individual people.\(^2\) Apart from such differences in methods it would be important for the rhetor to teach more than one oratorical style. Both Cicero and Quintilian emphasise the need for an orator to use, as required, either the grand, middle or plain style.\(^3\) This means that the competent rhetor should equip his students to use each style to some effect. Training in use of the plain style would, either consciously or unconsciously, draw from Stoic teaching, for as argued above the plain style is virtually equivalent to Stoic rhetoric. The rhetor who provided a comprehensive training programme would teach something of Stoic rhetorical plain style.

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1 Suet. de rhet. 1. *Sed ratio docendi nec una omnibus, nec singulis eadem semper fuit, quando vario modo quisque discipulos exercerunt.*

2 Ibid.

3 Quint. xi.1.4 quoting Cic. de Or. iii.55.20. *non omni causae neque audi tori neque personae neque temporis congruere orationis unum genus.*
Stoic rhetoric was naturally taught by the sect itself. Many Roman Stoics who used oratory would have been influenced and trained by Stoics within the philosophical school. It is evident that Stoic orators would have learned their particular rhetoric from Stoic philosophical teachers, rather than from rhetorical schools; and no doubt this was especially the case with those orators mentioned above who lived in the strongly Stoic spirit of the latter half of the second century B.C. Also, in the time of Quintilian the philosophical schools and Stoicism, in particular, were making a contribution to oratory beyond that provided by the *rhetores*. In Rome there was always a type of orator trained by the philosopher, although the significant majority had been taught in the rhetorical schools. However, the ideal championed by Cicero and Quintilian that the very proficient and best orator should be fully trained in rhetoric with the background of a philosophical education was pursued by very few.

Those orators who wished to develop their skill in precise and exact argument could benefit from training in dialectic, a study which became the domain of the Stoics. Although Cicero and Quintilian questioned the dialectical method when used as the predominant technique in rhetoric, they both acknowledged its value with certain audiences and when the occasion required close argumentation. The *rhetor* may have taught something of dialectic, but, if so, his teaching appears to have been very slight, for there is no evidence of such teaching in the rhetorical schools. However, there were teachers, termed *dialectici*, who concentrated on the teaching of dialectic. Cicero was taught dialectic by Diodotus, who lived in Cicero's home. Another teacher of

1 Quint. x.1.35. A philosophorum vero lectione ut essent multa nobis petenda, vitio factum est oratorum, qui quidem illis optima sui operis parte cesserunt.

Quint. xii.21.25. Stoici, sicut copiam nitoremque eloquentiae fere praeceptoribus suis defuisse concedant necesse est, ita nullos aut probare acrius aut concedere subtilius contendunt.

2 Cf. Quint. v.14.28. Namque in illis (i.e. dialectical type arguments) docti et inter doctos verum quaerentes minutius et scrupulosius scrutantur omnia.

3 Brut. 309. A quo (i.e. Diodotus) cum in aliis rebus tam studiosissime in dialectica exercerat.
dialectic was L. Lucilius Balbus,¹ who as mentioned was a teacher of S. Sulpicius Rufus. There was a tradition maintained in varying degrees by student orators to call in the assistance of logicians or dialecticians to teach them the theory of argument.² It was an aspect of education which may not have been pursued by students generally, but was useful to the conscientious orator who wished to strengthen his techniques in logic and argument. Dialectic as one of the liberal arts subjects and its significance in the educational programme is discussed in Chapter VII.

The preceding discussion in this chapter has been concerned with Stoic rhetoric and its comparatively direct use by certain Roman orators. The comment has been straightforward, although it is important to keep in mind that, notwithstanding the clearly evident use of Stoic rhetoric in Rome, most orators used the grand or middle style of rhetoric. However, there were Stoic elements in oratorical techniques outside the actual domain of Stoic rhetoric. Such Stoic influences, requiring somewhat more subtle analysis, can be identified in the various types of progymnasmata, or rhetorical exercises given to students, as well as in such aspects of oratory as the \textit{inventio} and \textit{status} techniques. The second section of this chapter is concerned with analysing these Stoic influences.

II. STOIC INFLUENCES IN ORATORICAL TECHNIQUES

The key figure in the development and teaching of rhetoric after Aristotle was Hermagoras of Temnos, who in the middle of the second century B.C. put forward his ideas on oratorical technique. Hermagoras' theories were very much based on Stoic principles,³ although he himself was not a philosopher. The \textit{Auctor ad Herennium} and Cicero, especially in \textit{De Inventione}, included much of Hermagoras' thought in


2 Quint. ii.4.41. \textit{His fere veteres facultatem dicendi exercuerunt assumpta tamen a dialecticis argumentandi ratione.}

their teaching. And *rhetores* and *grammatici* in their teaching of various progymnasmata followed procedures evolved from the methods of Hermagoras. Through Hermagoras Stoic rhetoric exerted an indirect influence on the teaching of Roman oratory. The strength of Hermagoras' position is clearly indicated by the fact that he was the leader of a particular school whose members were termed *Hermagorei,* and according to Quintilian it is evident that followers of Hermagoras were active after his life time.

Hermagoras' doctrine of invention was based on dialectical aspects of rhetorical proof, inaugurated originally by Aristotle and then minutely systematised, elaborated and formulated by the Stoic logicians. The attempts by Hermagoras to apply to aspects of rhetoric analytical arguments and proofs reflect the importance given to scientific method and the strong position of Stoicism in the latter part of the second century B.C. Hermagoras divided *πολιτικά ζητήματα* into *Θέους* and *ὑποθέους.* *Θέους* were general philosophical questions, which were discussed as a form of progymnasmata in the rhetorical schools; the treatment of a 'thesis' was basically an abstract argument, where a subject was considered without particular references to people or occasions. *Ὑποθέους* (or *causae*) related to particular people and circumstances; questions were to be resolved whether the action under consideration was just or not, honourable or harmful.

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1 Quint. vii.4.4. *Hanc partem Hermagorei κατ' ἀντιλήψιν.*
2 Quint. iii.1.16. *Fecit deinde velut propriam Hermagoras viam, quam plurimi sunt seuti.*
4 Cic. *de Inv.* i.6.8. *... qui oratoris materiam in causam (i.e. *ὑποθέους*) et in quaestionem (i.e. *Θέους*) dividet.*
5 Cic. *Or.* xiv.46. *haec igitur quaestio a propriis personis et temporibus ad univeri generis orationem traducta appellatur Θέους.* The phrase *πολιτικά ζητήματα* can be regarded as being of Stoic origin. Chrysippus was concerned with thirty-nine ζητήματα or subjects for investigation (D.L. vii.198). *Πολιτικά* could have a strongly Stoic significance; it may mean relating to the cosmos or universe, or may have a generally comprehensive meaning of 'popular'. *Πολιτικά ζητήματα* means, then, 'universal questions to be investigated'. Cf. G. Thiele, *Hermagoras,* p.25 foll.
There had been some treatment of philosophical 'theses' a considerable time before Hermagoras. Aristotle had defined the 'thesis',\(^1\) and had mentioned that nearly all dialectical problems were termed ἰδεοες.\(^2\) Yet Hermagoras was the person who established their use in rhetorical schools from the second century B.C. In so doing, in a practical way he was anticipating the educational ideal propounded by Cicero and later by Quintilian that the accomplished orator should have training in and an awareness of philosophy. There are a considerable number of specific examples of ἰδεοες in Cicero and Quintilian, and some of these are actually related to Hermagoras. The subjects of these 'theses' are drawn from various philosophical schools; yet Stoic 'theses' are suggested as often as examples from other systems. It is apparent that through this kind of exercise the student of rhetoric learned something of Stoic thought. Questions asked by the Stoics were implicit in such 'theses' as: 'Is the world governed by providence?'\(^3\) 'Should the wise man be active in politics?'\(^4\) 'Can a man be completely wise?'\(^5\) 'Is virtue itself the goal?'\(^6\) 'Does justice exist in nature or is it a convention?'\(^7\) 'Is virtue inherent or learned?'\(^8\) And 'theses' taken directly from Hermagoras, which were also issues taken up by the Stoics, included: \(^9\) 'Can the senses be trusted?' 'What is the shape of the world?' 'How large is the sun?'

\(^{1}\) *Topica* i.11. Θέσεις ἐστιν ὑπόλαβης παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίσμων τυγις κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν τυγις.

\(^{2}\) Bonner, *op. cit.*, p.2.

\(^{3}\) Quint. iii.5.6; v.7.35; vii.2.2; xii.2.21.

\(^{4}\) Cic. *Top.* 21.82; *de Or.* iii.29.112. Cf. Quint. iii.5.6.

\(^{5}\) Cic. *Part. Or.* 18.64.

\(^{6}\) Quint. iii.5.12.

\(^{7}\) Cic. *Part. Or.* xviii.62.

\(^{8}\) *Part Or.* xviii.64; *Top.* xxi.82.

\(^{9}\) Cic. *de Inv.* i.6.8.
It has been suggested\(^1\) that the rhetorical 'thesis' is based on the Stoic concept of \(\pi\varepsilon\rho\upsilon\sigma\alpha\tau\alpha\varsigma\). Hermagoras framed his \(\theta\varepsilon\sigma\varepsilon\varsigma\) or general questions on the \(\pi\varepsilon\rho\upsilon\sigma\alpha\tau\alpha\varsigma\) which indicates everyday, human situations. He used a \(\pi\varepsilon\rho\upsilon\sigma\alpha\tau\alpha\varsigma\) concept to translate the concrete, particular \(\upsilon\pi\theta\varepsilon\delta\varepsilon\varsigma\) into \(\theta\varepsilon\sigma\varepsilon\varsigma\). An example of the hypothesis-thesis issue is whether Orestes should be punished for killing Clytemnestra, argued as a general question regarding the killing of a mother by a son.\(^2\) Unfortunately Hermagoras has not provided rules or formulae for the practical treatment of \(\theta\varepsilon\sigma\varepsilon\varsigma\).\(^3\) It is likely that a teaching technique of Hermagoras was for pupils to formulate a 'thesis' from the 'hypothesis' and then to discuss the general issue.\(^4\)

From the 'thesis' developed the \textit{suasoria}, which could refer to a certain historical event or character.\(^5\) The \textit{suasoria} and \textit{controversia}, which was a declamatory exercise concerned with a particular legal issue, became established as progymnasmata; although the 'thesis' itself was still retained as a school exercise.\(^6\) It is interesting that Cato figures strongly in examples of \textit{suasoriae}. And, as late as Martianus Capella there was a \textit{suasoria} involving him: \textit{Deliberat Cato an se debeat ne victorem aspiat Caesarem trucidare.}\(^7\) Implicit in this \textit{suasoria} is the Stoic issue whether suicide can be an acceptable measure — as mentioned, a matter about which the Stoics had clearly developed arguments. \textit{Suasoriae} were usually based on subjects taken from Greek and Roman history; they were exercises which gave training in deliberative oratory, where an audience or individual may need to be convinced about alternative types of action. The \textit{suasoria} has a rhetorical background in the \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\sigma\pi\omicron\tau\rho\epsilon\tau\epsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma\) and \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\sigma\)

\(^1\) Kroll, \textit{op. cit.}, p.1095; \textit{cf. D.L. vii.109} for reference to \(\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{\eta}\mu\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\eta\ \pi\varepsilon\rho\upsilon\sigma\tau\theta\rho\eta\varsigma\).

\(^2\) See Quint. x.1.6 foll. for the general legal significance.

\(^3\) Cic. \textit{de Or.} ii.19.78; \textit{de Or.} iii.28.110.

\(^4\) Kroll, \textit{op. cit.}, p.1096.

\(^5\) See Quint. iii.10.5 foll.

\(^6\) See Bonner, \textit{op. cit.}, p.6 foll.

The controversia, being concerned with the legal point at issue, was an exercise for forensic oratory; it corresponded closely to the ὑπόθεσις of Hermagoras. Very often problems of moral philosophy were involved in controversiae, and naturally such problems could include questions taken up by the Stoics. Two such questions are, 'Is an oath given under duress inviolable?'\(^3\) and 'Is a person liable to be accused of ingratitude, if he does not return a favour?'\(^4\) A Stoic question is suggested in the Controversiae\(^5\) of Seneca when Cestius asks an dìi immortales rerum humanarum curam agant, which is elaborated upon by Albucius as a philosophical problem.

Chriae were moral essays where a pupil was required to write on some moral or philosophical problem. It might be noted that exercises in writing were regarded as essential exercises for oratory, and basically preliminary to rhetorical training.\(^6\) Such essays could relate to the teachings of the Stoics, as well as to the teachings of all philosophical schools. And a subject suggested by Quintilian refers to the Stoic Crates of Mallos.\(^7\) Chriae were taught in the usual manner of progymnasmata where the teacher provided the general scheme which was to be the basis for the pupil's effort.\(^8\)

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6 Quint. i.8.2.
7 i.8.5. Crates, cum indoctum puerum vidisset, paedagogum eius percessit.
8 Quint. i.8.3. Sententiae quoque et chriae et ethologiae subjectis dictorum rationibus apud grammaticos scribantur, quia initium e lectione ducunt.
Sententiae were maxims or aphorisms, that were often subjects for rhetorical treatment. Sententiae could be taken from various philosophical systems; and Stoic thought is often apparent in such sententiae. Some examples are: 'He is to be considered free who is not a slave to any vice';\(^1\) 'all rules for noble living should be based on virtue, because virtue alone is within its own control, while everything else is subject to fortune'.\(^2\) It would appear that sententiae were largely a Roman innovation in rhetoric, for they were not used at all by the Greeks according to Quintilian,\(^3\) who nevertheless recommends their occasional use in oratory and mentions the fact that Cicero also made use of them.

It is very important in considering Roman rhetoric and especially forensic oratory, to pay attention to theories of status or στάδιος. Hermagoras was responsible for elaborating upon basic types of case, which he carefully systematised and defined. The στάδιος was the position or frame of reference of a case, set up as a result of the respective statements of prosecutor and defendant. Archedemus, rhetorician of the generation following Aristotle, had done work on στάδιος, classifying two bases for a case, the status coniecturalis and status finitivus.\(^4\) But it was Hermagoras who, in using the methods and terminology of Stoic dialectic and the Stoic approach to classification and division,\(^5\) formulated the pattern of status to be upheld by Cicero and Quintilian and incorporated in Roman forensic oratory. Hermagoras maintained that there were four types of status.\(^6\) The constitutio coniecturalis (στάδιος) posed the question whether the defendant in pleading innocence committed the crime or not. The constitutio

\(^1\) *Auot. ad Her.* iv.17.24. *Sententia est oratio sumpta de vita quae aut quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita breviter ostendit hoc facto.*


\(^3\) *xii.10.48.* *Ceterum hoc quod vulgo sententias vocamus, quod veteribus praecipue Graecis in usu non fuit apud Ciceronem enim inventio.*

\(^4\) Cf. *Quint.* iii.6.31 foll.


\(^6\) See *Cic. de Inv.* i.10-19. *Constitutio* was a term used for στάδιος, which was later replaced by status.
definitiva (ὅρος) needed to be determined, if the defendant pleaded guilty, in regard to the precise nature of the crime. The constitutio iuridicialis or status generalis (πολύτης) determined whether the defendant in committing the crime was justified in doing so. The status translatius (μετάληψις) was a στάσις particularly attributed to Hermagoras; it concerned the question whether the court by which he was summoned was competent to deal with the crime which the defendant admitted to committing. In accordance with the Stoic pattern there were further subdivisions of στάσεως. The πολύτης was virtually classified into status or quaestiones legales (στάσεως νομικαί). These were cases concerning the letter of the law in contrast to the spirit of the law, i.e. ex scripto et sententia (κατὰ βεβάς καὶ διάνοιαν); cases involving ambiguitas or ἀμφιβολία about which the Stoics were very much concerned in their logic; cases concerning aspects of the same law which were termed contrariae leges or ἀντινομία. And then συλλογισμός would be used for cases where careful reasoning was required if there was not full provision made by the law; the Stoic contribution to legal syllogism was considerable where Stoic dialectic was applied to Roman forensic oratory.

Syllogism was actually part of the dialectician's teaching. Yet the rhetor might teach in his school those elements of dialectic that were particularly useful for proving or refuting arguments. Such elements were principally συλλογισμός, ἐνθυμήματα and ἐπιχείρήματα, although these terms are closely identifiable with each other. It is appropriate to comment upon these aspects of dialectic as integral to the general teaching of the rhetor, while a fuller statement on dialectic is to be made in the following chapter. The rhetorical significance of the following discussion is emphasised by the fact that the ἐνθυμήματα and ἐπιχείρήματα were actually rhetorical forms of the syllogism.

3 I.e. Chapter VII, 'Stoicism and the Teaching of the Liberal Arts".
It is possible to discuss at length syllogism and its function in dialectic, for much has been written on syllogistic proofs. But the basic procedure rests on the acceptance of a major premise, a minor premise and then the statement of the conclusion. A very simple example is:

If it is day, it is light. (major premise)
But it is day. (minor premise)
Therefore it is light. (conclusion)

And, of course, there were considerable variations involving negative forms and the juxtaposition of true and false premises. Quintilian points out that the orator might sometimes, although perhaps rarely, need to use a syllogistic proof. Cicero also pointed out the usefulness of the syllogism. Cicero writes in terms of five steps for syllogistic proof, where

(a) the major premise is given;
(b) elaboration and explanation of the major premise, with certain reasons, are provided;
(c) the minor premise is given;
(d) elaboration of and reasons for the minor premise are set out;
(e) a conclusion is reached.

It is very possible that the rhetorical adaptation of the syllogism was the work of Hermagoras. It is interesting that the syllogistic example given by Cicero is the proof of a Stoic argument that the universe is administered by design. Cicero goes on to give an actual example of

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2 See especially Benson Mates, *Stoic Logic.*

3 i.10.38. Nam et syllogismo, si res poscet, utetur et certe enthymemate, qui rhetoricus est syllogismus.

4 *de Inv.* i.34 foll.

5 See Note, H. Hubbell, p.104 Loeb edition *De Inventione.*

6 *de Inv.* i.34.59. Consilio igitur mundus administratur.
syllogistic reasoning for forensic oratory to prove that 'Epaminondas in contributing to the safety of the state could not have failed to obey the laws.'\textsuperscript{1} And it has been shown that Cicero used the form of syllogistic argument recommended in his De Inventione in Pro Archia, 18-19; Pro Caecina, 41-43; Pro Murena, 3-5; Pro Quinetio, 48-50; Pro Rabirio, 29-30; Pro Tullio, 41,42.\textsuperscript{2}

'Epicheireme' was the technical term given in rhetoric to this five-fold syllogistic argument. 'Enthyememe' referred to the rhetorical syllogism where only the major premise is probable; or perhaps where one term is omitted. An enthymeme was really an incomplete syllogism.\textsuperscript{3} An example of the enthymeme is in Pro Ligario,\textsuperscript{4} where a proposition is given together with a reason — 'At that point the justice of the cause was doubtful since there was something to be said on both sides;' then a proof is directly given without any other premise — 'But now we can only regard that cause as superior, which even the gods supported.' According to Quintilian\textsuperscript{5} the most effective type of enthymeme seems to be where a reason is subjoined to a dissimilar proposition, as in Demosthenes:\textsuperscript{6} 'Why should you go free in this particular instance, although the man who committed this crime previously was exonerated?

... For if you are condemned, no one else will propose anything of the kind.' (i.e. to be exonerated). Although the epicheireme was closely related to the enthymeme, the epicheireme appears to be a more precise development of argument. In fact the epicheireme has been defined as the syllogism,\textsuperscript{7} although the latter is based on facts while the epicheireme rests on statements. The form of the epicheireme and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} de Inv. i.38.69.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Preiswerk, De inventione orationum Ciceronianarum (Basel, 1905), p.101; cf. Hubbell, op. cit., p.114.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Quint. v.14.1. Ita est ille imperfectus syllogismus.
\item \textsuperscript{4} vi.19.
\item \textsuperscript{5} v.14. Optimum autem videtur enthymenatis genus, quon propositio dissimili vel contraria ratio subjungitur.
\item \textsuperscript{6} In Androt. 7; In Aristocr. 99.
\item \textsuperscript{7} Quint. v.14.14. Epicheirema autem nullo differt a syllogismis.
its close association with the syllogism strongly suggests that it developed under Stoic influence. More than one authority\(^1\) has indicated this, but it is difficult to substantiate, especially in view of our incomplete knowledge of Hermagoras' contribution to ratiocinative forensic oratory. For my part, the close reasoning of the epicheireme is consistent with Stoic dialectic and this method of argument was no doubt supported and possibly fostered by the Stoics. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine Stoic support for the enthymeme; they probably would have felt that such incomplete syllogisms were unacceptable for conclusive proof or refutation.

The form of rhetoric variously described as epideictic, encomiastic or demonstrative,\(^2\) included a pronounced philosophical content, which can be evaluated from the Stoic viewpoint. Such oratory was regarded as a form of display (ἐπίδεικτικόν, demonstrativum) and was concerned with firm praise of an individual person (ἐγκώμιατικόν), or conversely could be vituperative. The Stoics observed a division of oratory, which provided for the encomiastic;\(^5\) although they themselves were not originally responsible for the traditional classification of forensic, deliberative and epideictic oratory. Cicero often refers to epideictic oratory, although naturally such rhetoric was not as important as forensic oratory.\(^4\) Yet the ἐγκώμιον was clearly an exercise included in προγυμνάσματα.\(^5\) And at times it was an important form of oratory, where a person's character needed to be assessed in a legal hearing; also, it was the appropriate style for particular occasions, funeral orations, etc. Cicero himself wrote an encomium on Cato,\(^6\) no doubt including many of the principles which he postulates in

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\(^2\) See Quint. iii.4.12-16 for comment on various terms for this type of oratory.

\(^3\) D.L. vii.42. καὶ τὴν μὲν ῥητορικὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγουσι τρωμέρη, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς εἶναι συμβουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ ὅλκανθικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐγκωμίαστικόν.

\(^4\) Cic. de Or. ii.84.341.

\(^5\) Marrou, op. cit., p.273.

\(^6\) Top. xxiv.94.
De Inventione, De Oratore and in the Topica and which are completely consistent with Stoic values.

Honour (honestas or honestum) was an overriding consideration of epideictic oratory, although a person's life could be referred to in all its aspects. Honour, as set out by this kind of oratory, involved a range of qualities or ἀρεταῖς, which can be subsumed under the one embracing quality, virtue. Cicero in De Inventione defines virtue for the purpose of epideictic oratory in the Stoic manner—a habit of mind in harmony with reason and the order of nature. Cicero goes on to 'sub-categorise' virtue in accordance with definitions that are strongly Stoic, but not always exclusive to that school of philosophy; virtue has four parts—wisdom, justice, courage, temperance. Each of these qualities is described and subdivided further, and are very much consistent with principles of Stoic teaching. Theon, the Stoic progymnasmatic, lists a large number of possible attributes to be set out in encomiastic oratory. In a comprehensive description the qualities of virtue he postulates are quite similar to those set out by Cicero. Theon puts forward wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, piety, a noble spirit and magnanimity as the desirable traits of character on which to base an encomium. It is clear that philosophy through the rhetoricians had a strong influence on the content of epideictic oratory, as indicated both by writers in antiquity and, also, by more than one scholar.

It is evident, then, that Stoic ethical values are similar to those set down for epideictic oratory by rhetoricians; although it

1 Cic. de Inv. ii.51.156. in demonstrativō honestatem.
Top. xxiv.92. Laudationis (i.e. encomiastic speech) finis honestas.
2 de Inv. ii.52.59. Nam virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus.
3 Ibid. See above, Chapter IV, p.110 foll., for previous comment on Cicero's consideration of Stoic virtues.
4 de Inv. ii.53.160 foll.
would not be a justifiable claim that Stoic values were the only ones consciously included. The positive qualities of character upheld were not the preserve of only one philosophical school. But there is another important aspect to consider: in their suggestions for encomiastic oratory Roman rhetoricians were setting out qualities of character that were understood and appreciated by contemporary Romans. It is certain that their students would have been in sympathy with and to a significant extent aspired to them as worthwhile values upheld by responsible, conscientious members of their society. The requirements of character emphasised in encomiastic oratory conclusively show that Stoic values were identified with strong Roman moral principles.

STOICISM AND DECLAMATION

In regard to Stoicism and the topic of rhetoric there is one significant question that should be considered: Why during the first century A.D. was declamation with its rather flamboyant artifices so enthusiastically pursued, while at the same time Roman Stoicism also enjoyed a high point of popularity? For the principles of both were diametrically opposed. Declamation by the first century A.D. had become an exercise, in which professors of rhetoric might take part to gain publicity for their schools;¹ where pupils themselves might be required to perform before their parents;² where in social situations successful men of standing would vie with each other in rhetorical competition.³ The subjects for declamation in due course became extravagant and exaggerated, and quite sensational in regard to such issues as tyrannicide, rape and incest. The topics of declamation under the Empire are in marked contrast to the kind of declamation that interested Cicero who declaimed especially on philosophical questions in the company of friends.⁴ It is clear that Stoic rhetoric was very much apart from declamation as it came to be practised. For the purpose of

2 Cf. Persius iii.45; Quint. ii.7.1; x.10.21.
4 Cf. Tusc. iii.34.81; cf. Bonner, op. cit., p.30.
Stoic rhetoric was to reason strongly and present convincingly logical arguments while the intention of the declaimer was to please and win over his audience. However, it is to be kept in mind that the Stoic contributions to oratory generally, as outlined throughout the second section of this chapter, still apply to techniques used in declamation.

Declamation was the type of training in oratory experienced by pupils of the first century; and with all its faults in regard to extravagance and artificiality it was upheld as effective by Quintilian, who is ever aware of pragmatic usefulness in education. Yet it must be noted that Quintilian, in being sensitive to the extreme treatment of declamation, does put in a plea for realism.

It was really due to the circumstances of the time that there was no opportunity to use oratory in regard to momentous political issues; imperial rule had emasculated oratory. The political turmoil of the last century of the Republic inspired great oratory with Cicero as the outstanding protagonist. Peace and oppression under the Empire did not provide any such opportunities.

It is probable that, although declamation and Stoic philosophy are completely different pursuits, the reasons for the popularity of both exist in the social conditions of the time. Declamation for many Romans could be an intellectual game that also provided self-expression; as a pastime it could be a catharsis and compromise for those who might in a different age have gained fulfilment in political and public life. On the other hand, Stoicism under the Empire had a strongly religio-ethical emphasis that as much as at any other time in the history of the sect provided a guide to life in the social conditions of the age. While declamation provided an outlet or release, Stoicism gave the individual spiritual support. It is interesting that Stoicism with its

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1 Sen. Contr. ix.6.12, multa autem dico non quia mihi placent sed quia audientibus placitura sunt.

2 x.5.4. Aliter enim atque enitescit velut pabulo laetiore facundia et adsidua contentionum asperitate fatigata renovatur.

3 Ibid.

4 Tac. Dial. 38. ipsam quoque eloquentiam sicut omnia depacaverat.
large number of adherents was independent of the way in which declamation developed. Also, Stoics who took part in the quiet day-to-day activities of imperial civil courts undoubtedly found appropriate use for their particular Stoic oratory. Although the first century was especially the age of declamation, there were, as mentioned, adherents of Stoic rhetoric during this period. So it is a reasonable conclusion that Stoic rhetoric and declamation managed to coexist in the first century.
CHAPTER VII

STOICISM AND THE TEACHING
OF THE LIBERAL ARTS

The general school curriculum that was termed the ἐγκόρμιλος παιδεία or for Roman education the 'liberal arts' included a range of subjects that traditionally for the most part were grammar (literature and language), rhetoric, dialectic, astronomy, geometry, mathematics and music. Grammar and rhetoric have already been covered in previous chapters; so it is the aim in this chapter to treat Stoicism and the other subjects of the general educational programme. For such purposes it is important to comment upon the definition of the liberal arts (or ἐγκόρμιλος παιδεία); to indicate briefly its historical development; to determine its importance for philosophy and for Stoicism in particular; to determine the attitudes of Romans to this curriculum; to decide to what extent Romans studied the subjects of the curriculum apart from literature and rhetoric; to assess the significance of the large number of handbooks in these subjects; to discuss the Stoics' use of these subjects and the Stoic contribution especially to dialectic, astronomy and geometry — with due regard to those studies which depended strongly on τὰ ἐγκόρμιλα μαθήματα, namely geography, geodesy and meteorology.

THE ἘΓΚΟΡΜΙΛΟΣ ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ, OR LIBERAL ARTS,
AS THE IDEAL SECONDARY CURRICULUM

It is difficult to determine precisely when the ἐγκόρμιλος παιδεία was implemented in Greek education as the desirable general curriculum. The earliest reference to it is in the life of Aristippus, as described by Diogenes Laertius; and the import of such a reference must be considered with reservation, for the biographer was not a contemporary of Aristippus. Diogenes quotes Aristippus as maintaining
that those who went through the ordinary curriculum but did not continue on to philosophy could be compared to Penelope's suitors, and accordingly the efforts made were really futile. It was an educational programme supported by both Plato and Isocrates, who felt that the school curriculum should comprise mathematical as well as literary studies. By the third century B.C. the education of Archesilaus clearly embodied the ἐγκόκλιος παιδεία; the fact that the names of both the teachers and the respective subjects are given suggests a pattern of education experienced at the time by a number of students. Grammar was taught by Eugamus, mathematics by Autolycus, geometry by Hipponicus, dialectic probably by the Eretrian school, music by Xanthus, and Archesilaus chose to study philosophy in preference to rhetoric.

Marrou cites a palimpsest of the late first century B.C. or early first century A.D. written by a Stoic with Cynic leanings who comprehensively indicates the subjects of the ἐγκόκλιος παιδεία. Later, Seneca writes on liberalia studia in a letter to Lucilius, where he upholds the value of philosophy at the expense of liberal studies. Seneca comments upon grammar, music, mathematics, geometry, astronomy. Quintilian, like Cicero before him, strongly argues for the subjects of the

1 D.L. ii.79. τοὺς τῶν ἐγκόκλιων παιδευμάτων μετασχύντας, φιλοσοφώς δὲ ἀπολειφθέντας δύο οὕτως ἔλεγεν εἰὼν τοῖς τῆς Πηνελόπης μνηστήριοι.
2 Marrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité, p.523.
3 D.L. iv.30.
4 D.L. iv.29.
5 D.L. iv.32.
6 D.L. iv.33. ... καὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἰχετο καὶ τῶν Ἐρετρικῶν ἡπτετο λόγων, ...
7 D.L. iv.29.
8 Ibid.
9 St. Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, p.216.
10 Ep. lxxxviii.
11 i.x.6. nunc de ceteris artibus, quibus instituendos, prinequam rhetori tradantur, pueros existimò, strictèm suðiuòam, ut efficiatur orbis ille doctrinae, quem Graeci ἐγκόκλιον παιδείαν vocant.
The εγκύκλιος παιδεία was a broad ideal educational programme that was long-lasting and dated from about the fourth century B.C. Although the respective subjects were taught by specialists, pupils in undertaking these studies concurrently would be receiving a general, non-specialised education; this was a situation comparable to that in present-day secondary schools. However, the school curriculum of antiquity was in no way institutional. Pupils usually went to different schools conducted by particular teachers, although it was quite possible that a teacher would provide education in more than one subject. While the εγκύκλιος παιδεία theoretically represented a balanced curriculum, in actual fact pupils did not give equal attention to each subject. Pupils did not necessarily study every subject of the educational programme; in both Hellenistic and Roman society very firm priority was given to the grammatico-literary studies and to rhetoric.

Although the εγκύκλιος παιδεία was synonymous with the artes liberales Greek and Roman attitudes regarding mathematical studies or the subjects of the quadrivium varied considerably. The Romans in no way matched the Greeks' interest in and contribution to mathematical studies. Cicero indicates that Romans were little concerned with music and mathematics. Horace like Cicero reduced the significance of

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1 Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, p.211.
2 Quint. i.10.2. *Nam iisdem fere annis aliarum quoque disciplinarum studia ingredienda sunt.*
3 Cf. M.L. Clarke, *Higher Education in the Ancient World*; it is pointed out that *geometres* might teach geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music. Diodotus, tutor of Cicero, had a knowledge of music, as well as being a teacher of geometry and dialectic.
4 *Tusc.* i.3-5.
Whereas the Greeks maintained a long-lasting interest in pure science, it was an exception for a Roman to be interested in mathematical theory. The great importance placed on a literary and rhetorical education overshadowed the position of scientific subjects; and this was even more marked in Roman education than in Greek.

In acknowledging this situation there is to be kept in mind the widespread popularity of handbooks (τεχναί, artes). These manuals were written on a vast range of subjects; there were textbooks entitled ars grammatica, ars rhetorica, ars geometrica, ars musica. The wide prevalence of these handbooks which often had mathematical sciences as their subjects suggests that a significant number of Romans wished to learn something of these disciplines. Although they did not hold a strong position in the school curriculum, they were still studied by some who were interested. Such handbooks, of course, did not contain original thought and were often compiled by authors barely competent in the respective subjects. And Roman editors were happy to adopt directly Greek types of compendia. Just as the Greek τεχνη became ars in Latin, the Greek εἰσαγωγή or ψηφισμάτως became introductio (elementary treatise); to differentiate from the more technical nature of the τεχνη the Greek handbook was often termed εἰσερχόμενον, and the corresponding Latin term was manuale.

The existence of such textbooks, concerned both with the literary as well as the mathematical subjects of the ἀρχαίος παλαιότητα,
poses the question what their educational function was apart from their interest for the general reader. Answers are suggested in the following comments which mention the range of subjects studied for certain vocations; the significance of the liberal arts for Cicero’s and Quintilian’s training of the accomplished orator; and importantly for this study, the significance of the liberal arts as προσαλεύματα for philosophy.

THE LIBERAL ARTS AS VOCATIONAL προσαλεύματα

Vitruvius outlines the liberal arts together with other subjects as being essential for the training of an architect. The subjects given are literature, geometry, arithmetic, music, astronomy and also drawing, optics, history, medicine, law, philosophy. Vitruvius terms his ideal curriculum the encyclicos disciplina.¹ Galen writing in the second century A.D. outlines as important preparatory subjects for doctors those that he himself studied, grammar, dialectic, philosophy, geometry and arithmetic.² It would appear that broader education as embodied in the ἐγκυκλικός παιδεία was considered desirable for professional training. This principle is certainly reflected in the educational thought of Cicero and Quintilian, who upheld the importance of the liberal arts for the training of an orator.

Cicero is emphatic and unwavering in his view that an orator’s training should be based on a liberal education. And he very much regrets that the majority of orators lacked this.³ On the other hand, he does acknowledge that some had very considerably studied studia liberalissima, but only a few of these were to excel as orators.⁴

1 Cf. Vit. de Architectura, 1.3-10.
2 Lib. propr. 11-18.
3 de Or. 1.72. ... neminem esse in oratorum numero habendum, qui non sit omnibus eis artibus, quae sunt libero dignae perpolitus.
4 de Or. 1.73. tamen facile declaratur, utrum is, qui dico, ..., an ad diciendum omnibus ingenuis artibus instructus accesserit.

² de Or. 1.72. ... neminem esse in oratorum numero habendum, qui non sit omnibus eis artibus, quae sunt libero dignae perpolitus.
3 de Or. 1.73. tamen facile declaratur, utrum is, qui dico, ..., an ad diciendum omnibus ingenuis artibus instructus accesserit.
4 de Or. 1.11. ... ex omnibus eis, qui in harum artium studiis liberalissimis sint doctrinatinge versati, minimam copiam poetarum et oratorum egregiorum exstitesse.
Cicero goes beyond the range of the subjects of the liberal arts in recommending really a very wide and almost encyclopaedic field of study. On two occasions the particular subjects are mentioned, the lists being pretty well consistent with the conventional curriculum; Cicero suggests that poetry, mathematics, music and the sciences were established as school subjects to educate the young culturally and morally; and he includes in the *liberales doctrinae atque ingenuae* studied by Hippias of Elis geometry, music, literature and poetry, natural science together with ethics and political science. But Cicero supported a curriculum of subjects that were not rigidly specialist. He thought that a liberal education should be all-embracing and interdisciplinary. Also he argued strongly that law and history should be studied. Geography and human psychology were also desirable fields for study. In maintaining that the orator should take all knowledge as his province, Cicero also emphasised that he should have a deep understanding of philosophy. The *doctus orator* should embody a combination of rhetorical excellence and a command of philosophy, an ideal urged strongly by Crassus especially throughout the third book of *De Oratore*. And the very significant principle in this regard is that the *artes liberales* should be propaedeumata or basis for a command of philosophy. This was a premise laid down particularly by the Academy and the Stoics; and accordingly very shortly will be discussed the Stoics' attitude to the liberal arts. Cicero's ideal of *humanitas*, epitomised by Crassus,  

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1 *de Or.* iii.58. ... *artibus quae repertae sunt ut puerorum mentes ad humanitatem fingerentur atque virtutem.*

2 *de Or.* iii.127.

3 *de Or.* iii.132.

4 *de Or.* i.166 foll.

5 *de Or.* i.158 foll.

6 *de Or.* i.60.

7 *de Or.* i.67.

8 *de Or.* ii.5.

9 Cf. also the Stoic ideal expressed in the famous words of Terence, *Heaut. Tim.* i.77 — *homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto.*

10 *de Or.* i.27.
is also consistent with the educational spirit of the liberal arts, where the whole range of education was to be related to human values. It was in keeping with Cicero's own temperament and educational background to urge a synthesis of philosophy and rhetoric, also incorporating training in the liberal arts.¹

Quintilian's views on the education of an orator are very similar to those of Cicero whom he frequently mentions as his outstanding authority on educational thought. Like Cicero, Quintilian advocates the uniting of rhetoric and philosophy in the qualities of the 'ideal' orator.² His aim that the ideal orator should be *vir bonus dicendi peritus*³ implies the embodiment of strong philosophic values; and this principle is in keeping with Stoic thought.⁴ However, it is important to note that he has pronounced reservations about philosophers of his own time,⁵ although acknowledging the benefits of philosophical study.⁶ Quintilian places rhetoric on a higher level than philosophy,⁷ and regrets that philosophy, at least in his time, has gained so much ground at the expense of rhetorical education. Philosophy should subserve oratory;⁸ for it is the orator who makes the substantial contribution to society, while the philosopher in spite of his theories is not really active in practical government or in the law courts.⁹ It

¹ The historical background to Cicero's educational theory is somewhat complex, and related to the Sophist educational ideal. Such a discussion is not quite relevant to the present study. For a sound treatment see von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, p.97 foll.
² i.Pro. 13.
³ i.4-5.
⁴ As Quintilian was independent in his philosophical outlook, it is questionable that he would be so strongly influenced by Stoic teaching⁵ to adopt Stoic arguments in this regard. Cf. Gwynn, *op. cit.*, p.232.
⁵ i.Pro. 15.
⁶ i.Pro. 4 foll.
⁷ xii.3.12. *Philosophia enim simulari potest, eloquentia non potest.*
⁸ xii.2.5.
⁹ xii.2.6-8.
is natural that Quintilian himself did not profess adherence to any particular philosophical school; he preferred to give due importance to philosophy and its particular components as being necessary for rhetorical education. In fact, he expressly states that there is no need for an orator to give allegiance to any particular philosophical system. Quintilian's educational theory was strongly placed in the tradition of Isocrates. Consistent with this tradition he supported the Ciceronian principle of the *doctus orator*. However, there is an important shift of emphasis where Quintilian, although very much derivative from Cicero on educational theory, does not give to philosophy the elevated position set up by the latter, who expresses his own beliefs through the words of Crassus: philosophy is more important and is the source of oratorical fluency. It is interesting that the views of Quintilian and Cicero on their prototype of the 'ideal' orator are identical, but the premises for this development are different.

Quintilian regarded the liberal arts as directly essential for the education of an orator, and of course he was in no way concerned with their function as propaedeumata for philosophy. Quintilian's comment on the value of music, geometry and dialectic is very positive. Quintilian believed that the study of music offered many benefits; of Latin writers he is the most emphatic and outspoken in extolling music. It is clear that by his references to the position of music in antiquity and particularly in Greek culture, he is arguing for its stronger appreciation in Roman society. He would very much like to remedy the traditional situation where Romans regarded music of little educational value. He firmly points out that a knowledge of music enables the *grammaticus* to explain better the metre and rhythm of poetry, is related to aspects of philosophy and to ideas on the harmony of the

1 *de Or. iii.22.82. illa ... potiora duxisse quae ad sapientiam spectarent atque ex his hanc dicendi copiam fluuisse.*

2 *i.10.6. ... de ceteris artibus, quibus instituendos ut efficiatur orbis ille doctrinae, quem Graeci ἐγκύκλιον παῦσιν vocant.*

3 *i.10.9 foll.*

4 Corn. Nep. *Epam. i.2.*

5 *i.4.4.*
universe, 1 improves the tone and rhythm of the orator's eloquence, 2 gives an improved sense of gesture. 3

In regard to geometry Quintilian fully agrees with the educational ideas apparently held by a large number of people. 4 The principle of transfer of training is embodied in the study of geometry, for it exercises the mind and develops quick perception. 5 The orator needs to know linear geometry, so that he can confidently deal with cases concerning boundaries and measurements. 6 As geometria was also a comprehensive term, that included arithmetic, Quintilian thinks it appropriate to refer to the orator's need to be able to calculate. 7 He is in firm agreement with the educational association between geometry and dialectic. Such an association, of course, was strongly emphasised by the Stoics. 8

Quintilian points out that dialectic uses syllogistic methods, 9 and this is precisely the procedure used in geometry. The form of proof known as linear demonstration (γραμμικά ἀποδείξεις) is used in both geometry and dialectic. 10 And Quintilian proceeds to give examples showing how geometrical principles may disprove invalid arguments. The mathematical subjects of the έγκυκλίον παίδευα were clearly not regarded as independent of each other; geometry was basic to astronomy, for by its calculations the courses of the stars are determined. 11 Astronomy

1 i.10.8 foll.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 i.10.34. In geometria partem fatentur esse utilem teneris aetatis aetatibus ... ea vulgaris opinio est.
5 Ibid.
6 i.10.36.
7 i.10.35.
8 i.10.35.
9 i.10.37 foll.
10 i.10.30.
11 i.10.46.
was supported by Quintilian as a subject for study, for it is important for understanding the poets,¹ and it shows us that all things are ruled by order and destiny,² which he claims may at times be a consideration of value to an orator. The ordered nature of the universe is fundamental to the Stoics' physical system, although Quintilian's suggestion that this knowledge may be useful to an orator is not altogether convincing. It is appropriate that in his educational programme the subjects of the ἐγκύκλιος παθέξια should be subordinate to the teaching of rhetoric; and consistent with this principle he urges, like Cicero before him, that the orator's knowledge of subject-matter should cover in general terms everything on which he may be asked to speak.³

Of the liberal arts the subjects which dominated the school curriculum were grammar, literature and rhetoric. It is generally agreed⁴ that pupils were not really well educated in the other subjects; although, as mentioned, astronomy was studied as it related to literature and through Aratus' Phaenomena.⁵ It is difficult to establish to what extent Romans were educated in those subjects of the ἐγκύκλιος παθέξια, apart from grammar, literature and rhetoric. Cicero's Brutus, an informative text that comments on a long list of orators from the second century to the first half of the first century B.C., indicates very few who revealed a 'liberal education'. These are principally L. Crassus, Servius Sulpicius,⁶ L. Sisenna,⁷ L. Torquatus,⁸ possibly Sextus Pompeius who had a knowledge of geometry, law and Stoic

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¹ i.4.4.
² i.10.46.
³ vii.10.46; ii.21.20; ii.21.14; cf. de Or. i.6.20.
⁵ M.L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World, p.45 foll.
⁶ See above, Chapter II, p.44 foll.
⁷ Brut. 151.
⁸ Brut. 221.
⁹ Brut. 265.
philosophy\(^1\) and, of course, Cicero himself. Following Cicero Romans whose writings reveal a command of the liberal arts are Varro, Celsus, Pliny, Vitruvius. And although Quintilian and Seneca are strongly interested in educational thought and teaching, they themselves do not evince a significant knowledge of mathematical sciences. The teaching of these sciences was probably restricted to a limited number of students whose interests were scientific, technical or philosophical and to those pupils following the grammatico-literary curriculum\(^2\) who possibly might study these as supplementary subjects.\(^3\)

THE LIBERAL ARTS AS προπαλαθήματα
FOR STOIC PHILOSOPHY

From the time of Chrysippus\(^4\) the Stoics had emphasised the importance of the έγκυκλίος παιδεία as basic education for the aspiring philosopher. On the other hand, Zeno\(^5\) had earlier discounted the need for this educational background; and this attitude was also held by the Cynics, Sceptics and Epicureans.\(^6\) The confidence placed by the Stoics in the value of the liberal arts was shared by the Academy and Peripatetics.\(^7\) Yet with the Stoics as much as and probably more so than with other schools, the liberal arts became established as προπαλαθήματα for their philosophical teachings.\(^8\) In various ways Chrysippus set the direction for the later development of Stoicism. His influence is also reflected in the value placed on the liberal arts by later Stoics. The

\(^1\) Brut. 175.
\(^2\) Marrou, Histoire, p.378.

\(^3\) Quint. i.12.13. Ergo omn grammaticus totum occupare diem non posse debeat, ne discentis animum taedio avertat, quibus potius studiis haec temporum velut subsidiva donabimus.

\(^4\) D.L. vii.129. εὐχρηστέστερον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα φησιν ὅ Χρύσιππος.

\(^5\) D.L. vii.32.

\(^6\) Cf. Marrou, Histoire, p.244; Gwynn, op. cit., p.87.

\(^7\) Marrou, Saint Augustin, p.214.

\(^8\) Marrou, Histoire, p.145.
study of the liberal arts was in keeping with the eclectic and encyclopaedic tradition furthered by Crates of Mallos, Panaetius and Posidonius. Included in the wide range of works written by Chrysippus were books on poetry, dialectic, theorems, grammar and a book on definitions relating to various sciences. As shown above, Crates was interested in a wide field of learning; he proceeded from his studies in anomalistic grammar and literary exegesis to astronomy and geography. Panaetius, the Stoic humanist, who was interested in human progress, theology, ethics and cosmic interpretation, studied and wrote on certain subjects of the liberal arts. These were poetry, grammar and philology, dialectic and astronomy. Of all Stoics he was the one most influenced by Plato and Aristotle; Panaetius' field of philosophy was that which firmly believed in the propaedeutic value of the \textit{συνόλον παλαῖν}.

Posidonius had firm ideas on the value of the liberal arts. In contrast to the other arts, such as the manual, he stressed their 'free' aspect for they led to the inculcation of virtue. Posidonius divided the 'arts' into four categories and the liberal arts were by far the most educationally valuable, and particularly for the development of virtue and consequently for philosophy. In writing on a wide range of subjects he researched a number of the disciplines covered by the liberal arts. Also his interest was firmly directed to those fields

\begin{enumerate}
\item D.L. vii.200. \textit{πέρι τοῦ πός ὁ δὲ τῶν ποιημάτων ἀνοιξευ}.
\item D.L. vii.189-201, \textit{passim}.
\item D.L. vii.196. \textit{λόγοι ὑποθετικοί θεωρημάτων}.
\item D.L. vii.192-200, \textit{passim}.
\item D.L. vii.199.
\item Chapter II, p.38 foll.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.428.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.429; although he did not get too involved in pedantic argument; cf. Cic. \textit{de Fin.} iv.79.
\item Cic. \textit{de Rep.} i.15.
\item Sen. Ep. lxxxviii.21 foll.
\end{enumerate}
which were strongly located in the tradition of Plato, as much as that of the Stoics. He wrote on geometry, mathematics, astronomy, meteorology and geography as mathematical sciences, poetry;¹ these subjects are mentioned because they are relevant to the liberal arts. Posidonius was also considerably concerned with most important areas of philosophical study; he was strongly concerned with ethical issues, cosmic interpretations, history, divination, fate, anthropology, physics. Posidonius was not very much interested in rhetoric, although he did write on Hermagoras' ἔσος with the purpose of refuting his arguments.² However, his approach was probably based on philosophical rather than rhetorical premises. His interest in logic was directed to classification, to categories, to fundamental principles of science rather than to dialectical proofs as used in rhetoric. For instance, he maintained that the rules of logic were the rules of the world,³ that there were respectively the categories of words and things,⁴ that there should be a differentiation between efficient cause and antecedent cause.⁵

Posidonius, more than any other leading Stoic,⁶ stressed the mathematical sciences as the basis of philosophy;⁷ for him 'mathematics is as indispensable to philosophy as the carpenter is to the mathematician'.⁸ It is natural that with less emphasis placed on rhetoric, and with his upholding of science, Posidonius found the liberal arts an appropriate curriculum for the education of a philosopher. However, Posidonius' influence was for the most part on philosophers and

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¹ See M. Laffranque, Poseidonius d'Apamée.
² Plutarch, Pompey, lx.
⁴ Edelstein, op. cit., p.317.
⁶ The Stoic geometer Geminus being a strong specialist is excepted.
⁸ Sen. Ep. lxxxviii.25. sic philosophiae necessaria (i.e. mathematics) est, quomodo ipsi faber.
scientists; the educational implications of his scheme were not felt in society generally.

Seneca's long epistle on liberal studies is interesting. Seneca claims that the only worthwhile study is wisdom, or ethical philosophy as a basis for virtue. Accordingly Seneca attempts to place the liberal arts in perspective, and as they relate to his stated premise. The liberal arts may be worthy of study if they are able to set the direction of the soul towards virtue. And Seneca ventures to state a proposition that wisdom might even be learned without liberal studies; the tone of his words is such that he is obviously presenting a thought that is contrary to the established belief. He chooses to comment explicitly on a number of subjects of the έγκυκλίως παιδεία in his attempts to point out that their study does not lead necessarily to virtue. However, the clear implication is that these subjects comprise an established curriculum and are regarded traditionally as προϊσταμένα. It is the case of one person expressing his critical views on prevailing educational thought; such a prerogative, of course, is exercised vehemently by citizens of all generations. While Seneca acknowledges that the liberal studies may be rudimenta, they are not to be the culmination or opera of education. For they have certain shortcomings: the grammaticus, according to Seneca, in teaching language and literature does not necessarily teach virtue; the musician's teaching of harmony is well short of the ideal that it is important to reach the

1 Ep. lxxxviii.2. Hoc est sapientiae, sublime, forte, magnanimum.

2 Ep. lxxxviii.32. Potest quidem etiam illud dici: sine liberalibus studiis veniri ad sapientiam posse.

However, as mentioned (see p.27), Seneca's attitudes can be enigmatic. The question arises whether the argument presented actually reflects his own thinking or is simply stated expediently here to exalt the importance of virtue for wisdom by playing down the traditional school curriculum.

3 Ep. lxxxviii.2.

4 Ep. lxxxviii. Seneca does not in this instance agree with the views of Crates who thought that literature and especially Homer could be the basis of teaching Stoic values. Cf. also the ῥήματα or moral judgment made on the text by the grammaticus who through this had the opportunity to impart moral values.
situation that one's soul should be in harmony;\(^1\) the mathematician or geometer makes people more sensitive to quantity and to material calculation, and makes them too concerned about the measurement of such things as property;\(^2\) the astronomer simply imparts knowledge about a fixed order, for the firmament is unchanging and it is pointless for the individual to be concerned about the established celestial scheme.\(^3\)

As the \textit{ἐγκύκλιος παλέεα} was propaedeutic education for Stoicism and for philosophies of the Plato tradition, it is clear that serious students wishing to follow and become absorbed in certain philosophical teachings would have studied these subjects. Surely in Rome where there were so many Stoics there was some demand for studying the liberal arts as \textit{προκαλέσματα}. This situation probably did not apply to school age pupils, but to older students who wished to take up philosophy. For secondary pupils, as mentioned, the \textit{ἐγκύκλιος παλέεα} was regarded as the ideal secondary curriculum, which in actual fact was not comprehensively followed by pupils generally. Nevertheless, it is relevant and important to look at those subjects of the \textit{ἐγκύκλιος παλέεα} which not as yet have been covered and to which the Stoics contributed. Grammar, literature and rhetoric have already been discussed. It is now appropriate to consider dialectic and the mathematical sciences.

\textbf{STOIC DIALECTIC}

In discussing the teaching of dialectic it is important to indicate to what extent dialectic was studied, and then to comment briefly on the actual content of Stoic logic. Reference has already been made to Stoic dialectic, as it relates to rhetoric in general and to Stoic rhetoric in particular;\(^4\) the observations made are introductory to and relevant to this discussion. It is clear that Stoic

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ep. lxxxviii.9.
\item Ep. lxxxviii.13.
\item Ep. lxxxviii.14-17.
\item See Chapter VI, p.144 foll.
\end{enumerate}
propositional logic rather than Aristotelian logic of categories was preferred in Rome. References to logic made by Cicero and Quintilian mostly relate to Stoic dialectic, which was the basis of syllogistic proofs and the epicheireme used in rhetoric. Even in Cicero's *Topica*, which he claims is inspired by the *Topics* of Aristotle Stoic logic is prominently featured; yet the Stoics were not very much concerned with τοπική, which implies the region of an argument. Following Chrysippus there were a large number of handbooks written on Stoic dialectic, usually entitled έλεγχων διαλεκτική; and there are firm indications that such handbooks enjoyed a wide circulation. There are seven or probably eight authors who set out the basics of Stoic logic, which suggests a substantial long-lasting interest. Also, the number of references to *dialectic* by Cicero and Quintilian establishes the fact that there was a body of scholars who studied and taught Stoic dialectic. Those students who read Cicero and Quintilian were able to learn something of dialectic in a fragmented way, as it applied to the needs of rhetoric. And although the *De Inventione* was denigrated by Cicero himself as a youthful immature effort it was widely read and significantly contained a number of Stoic elements. These elements comprise Hermagoras' Stoic terminology and methods, syllogistic argument and Stoic ethical principles as relevant to character assessment in oratory. But it was necessary to study the works of the dialecticians for a coherent treatment of their discipline; Quintilian

1 See especially *Topica*, xii.53 foll.
2 Top. i.7. Itaque licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem.
4 Mates, op. cit., p.69.
5 Cf. Cic. Part. Or. 139; Or. 113,114.
   Quint. ii.4.41; vii.3.14.
6 de Or. i.5.
7 See Gwynn, op. cit., p.100.
8 de Inv. i, passim.
9 de Inv. i, passim; xxxiv.58 foll.
10 de Inv. ii.52.157 foll.
gives a clear indication how students learned something of dialectic, when he states that Cicero's contemporaries called in the assistance of the logicians to teach them the theory of argument. Although dialectic was a subject of the ἐγκύκλιος παλαιός, it may be argued that it was a specialist study pursued, naturally, by dialecticians and, as mentioned in the previous chapter, by those conscientious students of oratory who wished to develop their skill in dialectical argument.

Stoic logic was based on five basic types of syllogistic arguments. It was maintained that by the Stoic system of propositional logic every valid argument could be reduced to one of these basic types. Although Greek authors have more clearly set out these five basic syllogisms, it is significant for the present study to look at the treatment given them by Cicero and, to a lesser extent, by Quintilian. Cicero defines the logicians' first syllogistic proof from the point of view of the conclusion which is based on an assumed first statement (i.e. major premise) and then a following true state (i.e. minor premise).

The second syllogism indicates a negative conclusion when the major premise is positive, yet the following minor premise is negative.

The third form also indicates a negative conclusion when the major premise is expressed as a negative alternative. The minor premise indicates one of the alternatives; this means that the conclusion excludes the other alternative.

1 Cic. Topica, xiii.57. Ex eis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur, in quo est tota fere διαλαμβάνει.
3 See v.8.7. Quintilian, however, suggests only four forms of proof.
4 Cic. Top. xiii.54. Appellant autem dialectici eam conclusionem argumenti, in qua, cum primum assumpseris, consequitur id quod annexum est primum conclusionis modum.
5 Ibid. Cf. the conventional example: If it is day, there is light. There is no light, Therefore it is not day.
6 Ibid. Cf. It cannot be day and night at the same time. It is day, Therefore it is not night.
The fourth argument is based on a premise that presents mutually exclusive possibilities. Only one is true, according to the minor premise. So therefore the conclusion is that the other alternative is excluded. The fifth argument has the same major premise as the fourth. But the minor premise is expressed as a negative, which leads to a conclusion that is given as a positive statement. Cicero proceeds to mention sixth and seventh form that these are really excluded by the dialecticians for the scheme of syllogistic arguments. And in going beyond five syllogisms Cicero is mentioning syllogisms which are outside the standard, conventional schemata of the Stoic logicians.

Dialectic was fundamentally concerned with consequents, antecedents and contradictories. Diogenes Laertius elaborates on these aspects of dialectical proof more fully than Cicero: he refers to them as the appropriate terms for syllogistic arguments. Cicero suggests Latin equivalents for Stoic dialectical terms. Consequent is used for τὸ ἁγιόντος, antecedens for τὸ ἡγούμενον and repugnans for τὸ ἀντικείμενον. However, while Diogenes Laertius uses the appropriate terms as they naturally relate to syllogistic proofs and virtually assumes an understanding of them on the part of the reader, Cicero takes the trouble to define each of his terms. It appears that he needed to explain clearly terms that were not generally known. This is probably an instance of Cicero's policy of suggesting Latin equivalents for Greek philosophical terms.

1 Top. xiii.56. Cf. It is either day or night.
   It is not day,
   Therefore it is night.

2 Ibid. Cf. It is either day or night.
   It is not night,
   Therefore it is day.

3 Cic. Top. xiii.57. Deinde addunt coniunctionem negantiam sic: Non et hoc et illud; hoc autem; non igitur illud. Hic modus est sextus. Septimus autem: Non et hoc et illud; non autem hoc; illud igitur.

4 vii.80.

5 Top. xii.53. Deinceps est locus dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus.

6 Ibid.
With regard to propositional logic the Stoics distinguished between three implications in a statement, namely the actual significans, significate; and 'that which exists'. The most effective explanation is obtained from an example, as provided by Seneca, who cites an instance that Cato is seen to be walking. The actual movement seen is the 'sign'. 'That which is meant' is a statement (λεκτόν) that Cato is walking; 'That which is meant' then is a certain affirmation about a body. 'That which exists' is the externally existing object or the actual physical phenomenon. Seneca points out that there is a great difference between what is meant (λεκτόν, significate) and what is being talked about (body).

The Stoics had much to say on these three aspects. Signs were divided into two kinds, commemorative and indicative. In the commemorative sense the sign may reveal something which has previously been observed in relation to it. Also, it may indicate something which is not apparent. For example, smoke may reveal fire, which is a commemorative sign. With respect to an indicative sign, bodily movement signifies the internal power or even the soul of the body. The Stoics believed that the significans is a true antecedent proposition in a true conditional and therefore reveals the consequent.

The λεκτόν or significate was of very great importance. As well as being of fundamental importance to Stoic logic, the λεκτόν was the basis of Stoic grammar; the grammatical analysis and schemata of the λεκτόν were the foundation of the whole system of Stoic anomalist grammar that was taught by very many grammatici in antiquity.

1 Sextus, Math. viii.11 foll. οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοιχείων τριών φάμενος συζυγεῖν άλληλοις, τὸ τε σημαίνομενον καὶ τὸ σημαίνου καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον.
2 Ep. cxvii.13.
4 Ibid. 153.
7 See Chapter III.
The λεκτόν may be complete or defective. The complete form includes full interrogatives, full statements or judgments, and syllogisms. The defective λεκτόν is really a predicate. It was important then to distinguish between the subject (πτώσεις) and predicate (κατηγορία). The verb (δύομαι) indicates an isolated predicate. The functions of various parts of speech fit into the Stoic scheme of logic. A proper name (δύομαι) is a sign, or even a physical object, that indicates a quality belonging to one particular person. Class names (προσηγορία) indicate common qualities, e.g. man, horse. It is apparent that as the study of grammar was integral to both the work of the grammaticus and the dialectician, there could be some overlap of teaching; the student might learn grammar from the grammaticus' teaching of the methodicè and at a later age from the dialectician's teaching of Stoic logic.

This comment on Stoic dialectic is not intended to be a full, comprehensive explanation; such an explanation would be redundant for there have been already carried out thoroughgoing investigations of Stoic logic. Rather, the intention has been to mention dialectic as a subject of the ἐγκόψαλος παλαῖα and to discuss its significance in the general educational sense. In keeping with such an aim, it is appropriate to mention some of the 'popular' problems of Stoic logic; not because these problems were of really fundamental significance to this discipline, but rather because they were so widely known among people who were not Stoics themselves.

1 D.L. vii.63. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελὴ οἱ Ἐτῶικοὶ, τὰ δ' ἐλλιπῆ.
2 Ibid.
3 D.L. vii.64.
4 D.L. vii.58.
5 D.L. vii.57.
6 D.L. vii.58.
7 Cf. B. Mates, op. cit.
W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, pp.113-176.
The famous 'liar' problem (ὁ ψευδουενος) is mentioned by Cicero and Aulus Gellius. Cicero first obtains agreement that 'If you say it is now light and tell the truth, then it is now light.' He then proposes, without providing a solution: 'If you say you are lying and speak the truth, then you are lying.' Aulus Gellius states a proposition implying the identical problem: 'When I am lying and say that I am lying, am I not both lying and telling the truth?' The insoluble 'Nobody' argument was: 'If anyone is here, he is not in Rhodes; but there is some one here, therefore there is not anyone in Rhodes.' The 'Veiled Men' problem was: 'It cannot be that if two is few, three is not so likewise, nor that if two or three are few, four is not so; and so on up to ten.' Other arguments were the 'Concealed', 'Sorites' and 'Horned Folk'.

In keeping with their dogmatic principles the Stoics believed that the wise man was the true dialectician. The value of logic was upheld for other philosophical fields, that is physics and ethics. Yet, as with so many Stoic fields of study, dialectic was taken up by educationists as being important for general education. For both Stoics and educationists there was an association between dialectic and geometry; it is now the intention to consider geometry as a subject of the ἐγνώκαλος παλαια, and its relationship to Stoicism.

GEOMETRY

It was not until the time of Posidonius and Geminus that the Stoics made a contribution to the development of geometry. However, from the time of Chrysippus the value of geometry for dialectic had been

1 Acad. ii.96.
2 N.A. xviii.2.10.
3 D.L. vii.82.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. See Chapter IV, p.103, for comment on the 'sorites' fallacy.
stressed. Chrysippus himself did not further the development of mathematics, yet to him is credited a comment on the Platonic Ideas with which he compared locus theorems.\(^1\) It is clear, then, that Chrysippus had some interest in mathematics. Although the Romans limited their interest in mathematical studies to practical, everyday needs, Quintilian\(^2\) argues in keeping with Stoic thought when he points out that geometry closely resembles logic, for geometric problems are solved by syllogistic methods. Yet it is difficult to substantiate whether many Romans studied geometry, for the evidence is virtually non-existent. However, from Cicero we do learn that dialectic and geometry together were pursued by Sextus Pompeius\(^3\) and by Diodotus.\(^4\)

In Proclus' commentaries are included a considerable number of the geometrical arguments of the Stoics Posidonius and Geminus. Geminus was a student of Posidonius; he is often mentioned and his theories discussed on about twenty occasions in Proclus' authoritative work. In keeping with the Stoic schematic ideas of an ordered cosmos, Geminus' intention is to emphasise the whole logical structure of mathematics.\(^5\) It is from Geminus that Proclus takes various Stoic mathematical theories and also the mathematical arguments of Posidonius. The Stoic geometric-dialectic association is brought out in Proclus' reference to the Stoics' calling every simple statement an axiom, which even included hypotheses.\(^6\) In accordance with strict methods of Stoic subdivision Geminus carefully distinguished διόθεσις and ἀρχαί (which comprise

\(^1\) Proclus. ii.395. An example of the solid locus theorem is: 'The whole space between the parallel lines is the locus of parallelograms constructed on the same base.'

\(^2\) i.10.37. \textit{illa propositarum quaestionum conclusio non fere tota constat syllogismis? Propter quod plures inventias, quī dialecticae similēm quam quī rhetoricae fateantur hanc artem.}

\(^3\) \textit{Brut.} 175.

\(^4\) For previous references to Diodotus see p.51.

\(^5\) Hultsch, \textit{Pauly-Wissowa}, VII.I, p.1042. It is interesting that in antiquity the logicality of mathematics was questioned by the Epicureans and Sceptics. \textit{Ibid.}, p.1041.

\(^6\) Proclus, Prologue 2.77.
Geminus made also a careful distinction between the \( \alpha \iota \tau \iota \varphi \mu \alpha \) and \( \delta \xi \omega \mu \alpha \).\(^1\)

And he emphasised the \( \lambda \iota \mu \omega \alpha \) as being very significant for the development of a proof.\(^3\)

Such a brief comment on Geminus' concern with geometric principles of proof demonstrates at least the interest of the Middle Stoics in mathematics, as it may be related to dialectic. As well as their concern with geometric methods, there was some Stoic interest in certain principles and issues in geometry.

Posidonius and Geminus both commented on the concept of parallel lines. While Euclid defined parallel straight lines in the same plane and when produced indefinitely in both directions as not meeting one another,\(^4\) Posidonius' definition was: 'parallel lines are lines in a single plane which neither converge nor diverge but have all the perpendiculars equal that are drawn to one of them from points on the other.'\(^5\)

And Geminus' definition was: 'of the lines which are always equidistant from one another those straight lines which never make the interval between them less and which lie in the same plane are parallel.'\(^6\)

Posidonius clearly defined seven kinds of quadrilaterals;\(^7\) in so doing he was making a firm contribution to geometric description, for

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1. Proclus, 57.19; 59.11; 76.1; 178.2; 179.12; 199-218.
2. Proclus, 178.
4. Proclus, 175.
7. Proclus, 171. Cf. the Munich codex which has diagrams in margin (Morrow, op. cit., p.134).
Euclid had not unequivocally distinguished parallelograms from non-parallelograms. The seven quadrilaterals identified and explained by Posidonius are the square, rhombus, rhomboid, isosceles trapezium, oblong, scalene trapezium, trapezoid.

Whereas Euclid did not precisely distinguish problems from theorems, Posidonius and his followers emphasised the difference. He maintained that the theorem should be set out as an affirmative definition, e.g. 'In every triangle the sum of two of the sides is greater than the third.' A problem should be set out in the interrogative, e.g. 'Is it possible to construct a triangle on this straight line?'

Posidonius championed the cause of geometry against the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon who argued that propositions coming after the principles cannot be demonstrated unless something not contained in the principles is granted. Posidonius wrote a whole book to disprove Zeno's claims.

Geminus' work on the classification of lines was a significant contribution to geometry. He divided lines in the first instance into composite and incomposite categories. A composite line is one that is broken and forms an angle. Incomposite lines may either form figures, or extend indefinitely. Such figures are the circular, elliptical and cissoidal; those that do not are the straight line, the section of an obtuse-angled cone and the conchoid. Incomposite lines also may be 'simple' or 'mixed'. A 'simple' line may form a figure such as the circle, while others such as the straight line are unbounded. Geminus demonstrated that the two lines drawn from a point to a homoemeric line

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1 Proclus, 80.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Proclus, 214 foll.
5 Hultsch, op. cit., p.1044.
6 Proclus, 111 foll.
7 Proclus, 111.
and making equal angles with it are themselves equal;\(^1\) homoemeric lines are the straight line, the circle and the cylindrical helix.

These references to the work in geometry undertaken by Posidonius and Geminus are simply examples of their theories and contributions. They are mentioned to indicate this particular Stoic interest in geometry. However, this mathematical research belongs more to the tradition of pure scientific study as upheld by the Greeks rather than to the 'liberal arts' curriculum of the Romans.

ARITHMETIC

In regard to the study of mathematical sciences arithmetic was not necessarily separated from geometry. However, as it was traditionally a particular subject of the ἐγκύκλιος καλοεύα, it is appropriate to comment on arithmetic as such. Yet, for the Stoics arithmetic as a theoretical study had no interest at all. At the time of the early Stoics mathematics was only useful in regard to dialectic. During the third century B.C. there was no inclination to research arithmetic and algebra in the manner of Archimedes or Eratosthenes. And when the Stoics were interested in mathematical research they were to concentrate on geometry. Arithmetic had been a part of philosophical study principally before the Stoics. Its study had been furthered by the earliest Pythagoreans who were concerned with two aspects of arithmetic: the theory of numbers which was based on the relationship of numbers, and arithmology which representing a 'theology' of numbers was concerned with the mystical, magical properties of numbers. The Stoics' lack of interest in algebra and arithmetic was in keeping with trends in mathematical research after the third century B.C. The outstanding mathematicians from the second century B.C. were predominantly geometers, such as Hypsicles, Zenodorus, Nicomedes, Hipparchus, Theodosius of Bithynia. When we come to the Stoics, Geminus and Posidonius, they were also geometers, as was appropriate for prevailing mathematical interest at that time.

\(^{1}\) Proclus, 112.
Both with Romans and Stoics arithmetic was a tool for calculation. The Romans were not interested in arithmetical or algebraic study; their references to arithmetic indicate an application limited to everyday commonplace needs. Arithmetical facility was less the concern of the 'liberal arts' or secondary curriculum in Rome; it was given more attention by the elementary school teacher.

The Stoics restricted arithmetic and algebra to applied uses; they needed to use these branches of mathematics in making calculations in astronomy, geography and geodesy. To substantiate their concept of the universe the Stoics clearly needed to present firm mathematical bases for their physical sciences. Posidonius, for instance, had clear notions on geographical measurement, and was in fact an authority on 'mathematical geography'. He calculated the length of the earth's meridian as 240,000 stades; and he determined that the width of each of the torrid zones as he indicated them was 8,000 stades. Posidonius' investigation of the size of the earth was apparently less based on geometrical argument than the methods of Eratosthenes, which according to Cleomedes were more obscure. Posidonius' method of calculation in the latter instance is not given, but mathematical geography generally drew on arithmetic, trigonometry and geometry to make its measurements. But this Stoic interest in mathematics was well detached from Romans' day-to-day use of calculation. The only significant conclusion is that

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1 The arithmetical simplicity is marked, e.g. the number of times finger counting is mentioned, Plaut. *Mīl. glor.* 204; Quint. *xi.3.117*; Suet. *Claud.* 21; Juvenal *x.245.*

2 Also, for basic arithmetic, see Ovid, *Fastī*, iv.702; Horat. *de Arte Poet.* 325 foll.; *Cic. N.D.* ii.49; *Cic. in Verrem* iii.116; Pliny, *N.H.* xxxiii.133.


4 Cleomedes i.10.50-52.

5 Strabo ii.5.43; ii.3.7.

6 Cleomedes i.10.52.
arithmetic is not really to be considered in the general theme of Stoicism and Roman education.

**MUSIC**

The Stoics believed that the wise man could with profit devote some attention to the study of music; and Quintilian\(^1\) refers to the attitude of the Stoics to music in presenting his arguments for pupils to learn it as a subject of the ἐγκυώλως παιδεία. Yet the Stoics' thinking on music was related to ἀφθησις\(^2\) indicating apprehension by sense organs, a theoretical view which was hardly relevant to the subject of the school curriculum. Music was regarded as part of the physics of sound. The Stoics were interested in the physics of sound, which was naturally associated with one of the processes of the five senses. They were concerned that the mind picture (φαντασία) be based on accurate sense perception. Such clear perception was consistent with the Stoic view that λόγος, or reason, prevailed in the individual who normally could fully rely on accurate apprehension through the senses. In regard to sound they believed that vibrations spread spherically to form waves and strike upon the ears.\(^3\) Diogenes of Babylon\(^4\) wrote a work on music which considered ἀφθησις in a scientific way. Like Plato, he considered that music had educative value\(^5\) and might be taught before the pupil went on to what were considered as school studies. Diogenes, who was himself very sensitive to and appreciative of music, thought that the rational person had the capacity for aesthetic awareness; therefore musical effect on the senses was consistent with the rational system of the universe, or the logos.\(^6\) A very much less scientific

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1. i.10.15.
5. *Ibid*.
sentiment is attributed to Chrysippus who recommended music as lullabies for infants.\(^1\)

Although the Stoics may have provided for certain theories on music in their system, it was a study which did not really absorb them. Perhaps a strong interest in music was not compatible with their principle of ἀκός. Their views on music had little impact on educational thought or on the teaching of music. When it is also noted that the Romans, Quintilian excepted, questioned the value of music for education and did not uphold its teaching,\(^2\) it is a valid conclusion that for Roman education there is no really significant comment to make on Stoicism and the teaching of music.

ASTRONOMY

Astronomy was a field which very much interested Romans, although they themselves made no contribution to the development of a science which was so deeply researched and schematically organised by the Greeks. And Greek Stoics, although largely drawing on the thought of other philosophers and scientists, evolved a comprehensive and coherent system of astronomy. As an integral subject of the quadrivium of the ἑγκυκλιος πανεκλασα it is necessary at this stage to make some comment on astronomy and its teaching. However, as emphasised and discussed earlier,\(^3\) Roman pupils generally learned their astronomy from the grammatical explication of literature and especially through the study of Aratus' Phaenomena. Although it was fundamentally and scientifically a mathematical discipline, it was studied through the teaching of the historiogr, and it is clear that there was not always close attention given to mathematical, scientific precision in such teaching. As for the study of geometry, arithmetic and music, Roman pupils had little or no association with specialists who as mathematical scientists pursued the study of astronomy.

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1 Quint. i.10.33.
2 Corn. Nep. Epam. i.2; Cic. de Or. iii.87; Tusc. i.3-5.
3 See Chapter II.
It is important to note that in contrast to geometry, arithmetic and music, Roman authors drew substantially from Greek astronomy. Cicero, Seneca, Pliny and Vitruvius included in their writings much of Greek astronomy; and they also depend heavily on Stoic scientific thought in this regard. In due course there was a situation where through reading Latin literature Romans could gain quite an understanding of astronomy, and of Stoic astronomy in particular. As relevant to the significance of Stoic mathematical sciences and Roman interests it is informative to consider several instances (from a very much larger number) where in Latin literature prominence is given to elements of Stoic astronomy.

The Stoics upheld the geocentric theory of the universe; in the centre is the globe of the earth, around which is water and above which is air. The material of the world fully occupies the space within the world and leaves no vacant space; motion throughout the space occurs through avTCTevoLtoiTos. On the circumference of the universe is the fiery ether which moves in a circular motion. According to Cicero Cleanthes maintained that the stars are also made of fire. Pliny following Stoic teaching maintained that the moon comprised fire and air taking up particles of vapour from the earth because of its proximity. The stars took up vapours from the earth and from water as nourishment. Such a theory was in accord with geocentric ideas, for the stars it was thought moved over the earth as the source of nutriment. In the stars was embodied a vis vitalis, which was in keeping with the concept that they were rational and divine elements in the universe. The earth also embodies an animating soul, which provides nourishment.

1 This brief comment on Stoic astronomy might be compared with Aratus' concept, Chapter II, p.49 foll.

2 Sen. N.Q. ii.7.

3 Sen. N.Q. vi.6.

4 N.D. ii.15.40.

5 N.H. ii.9.46.


7 Cic. N.D. i.14.36 and 50; ii.15.39; 16.43. Acad. ii.37.110.

8 Sen. N.Q. vi.16; Cic. N.D. ii.9.
The Milky Way\(^1\) was made up of fiery vapours according to Posidonius who was agreeing with Aristotle. Zeno had originally believed that comets were formed when several stars united; however, the established view\(^2\) supported the theory that they were passing phenomena. Stoic theories on various natural phenomena were taken up by Roman writers. The rainbow was explained as the reflection of the sun's rays from watery clouds, or in Posidonius' opinions was an image of a segment of the sun or moon in a cloud suffused with dew.\(^3\) Hail was frozen cloud; rain was cloud transformed into water when moisture drawn up by the sun had only partly evaporated; snow was moisture from congealed cloud.\(^4\) Lightning was caused by the friction of clouds or by the wind breaking up clouds; thunder was the result of clouds bursting or coming together.\(^5\) Earthquakes occurred when air or wind moved into hollow parts of the earth, according to Posidonius.\(^6\)

The Stoics' scientific views on astronomy and meteorology were also related to precise mathematical calculation; the Stoic mathematical scientist could be interested in and relate geometry and astronomy, as evidenced by the research of Posidonius and Geminus\(^7\) especially. As a geometer-astronomer Posidonius pointed out that since the earth cast a conical shadow the sphere of the sun was greater than the earth's sphere; the sun could be seen from every part of the earth because of its great size.\(^8\) Posidonius calculated that the moon's orbit was ten thousand times as great as the earth's circumference and its diameter was four million stades.\(^9\) He estimated the distance of the

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7. Cf. his introduction to Aratus, *εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὰ φαινόμενα*.
moon from the earth as two million stades and the distance of the sun from the moon as 500 million stades.\textsuperscript{1} He calculated the diameter of the sun as three million stades.\textsuperscript{2}

Posidonius' Stoic order of the planets in relation to the earth was adopted by Cicero,\textsuperscript{3} who preferred this order to that of Plato. The sun was posited fourth from the earth; the moon was closest, then Venus and Mercury. Plato, on the other hand, placed Venus and Mercury above the sun, which was to be second from the earth. Cicero also took up the Stoic theory that Venus and Mercury, although not satellites, moved in close proximity to the sun.

The comments in this chapter on the mathematical sciences of the quadrivium have related to the traditional subjects, namely geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy. A discussion of associated and dependent fields such as optics, surveying and canons are considered as not relevant to the basic theme of this study. Also, the interesting and extensive field of astrology is not to be included in a study on Roman education, although almost all Stoics, except Panaetius, included astrology and divination within the Stoic system; while it is to be noted that for the Stoics astrology was virtually synonymous with astronomy and that Posidonius through his theories on divination was the outstanding proponent of Stoic astrology, the only treatment of such beliefs would be through incidental explanation on the part of the grammaticus.\textsuperscript{4}

The purpose of this chapter has been to look at the \textit{εὐκύκλως παλαιώς} or liberal arts programme of the secondary curriculum ideal, and especially to consider in educational perspective dialectic and the

\textsuperscript{1} Pliny, \textit{N.H.} ii.23.85.

\textsuperscript{2} Pliny, \textit{N.H.} ii.85; Cleomedes, \textit{κυκλῳδιες}, ii.146.2.

\textsuperscript{3} Cf. de Rep. vi.17; de Div. ii.91; \textit{N.D.} ii.51-53.

\textsuperscript{4} Marrou, \textit{Histoire}, p.252. Aucun indice toutefois ne nous permet d'affirmer que l'astrologie avait pénétré dans les écoles et qu'elle figurait au programme de l'enseignement libéral.
mathematical sciences together with their marked Stoic significance. It is evident that in actual fact the full ideal of the curriculum was not implemented and that these disciplines remained the province of specialists, who clearly did not teach classes of pupils as did the grammaticus and rhetor. We must come to the firm conclusion, then, that the general education pattern in antiquity was predominantly grammatico-literary and rhetorical. Yet whatever may have been the degree of importance of various subjects within the ἐγκώλλος παλέεα Stoic content and influence throughout this curriculum were most substantial.
CONCLUSION

Although the framework of Roman education throughout the period under consideration remained quite static, the introduction and establishment of a great number of Stoic elements, as analysed in previous chapters, represented within that framework important formative and developmental processes. Also, the establishment of these Stoic elements is markedly significant for later educational and scholastic aspects in the traditions of Western civilisation.

Previously most writers on a Stoic heritage have concentrated upon the influence of Stoic ethics, with special reference to Stoicism and Christianity. But it is also possible to consider Stoic elements and their retention in the educational history of Western education. For instance, the great contribution made by the Stoics to grammar and philology, as discussed, was basic to the grammatical system which has predominated until the twentieth century. And even if the champions of structuralist grammar and transformational grammar were to react against traditional grammar, they have still drawn upon an earlier, established system; they both use and change the original nomenclature. In any case, the contributions made to grammar by the Stoics are still alive and are still used in our own time.

While Latin authors are read, either in the original or in translation, something of Stoicism will inevitably be imparted. Virgil, Horace and Cicero, already mentioned as important school authors in the first century A.D., were authors of high standing throughout the history of the Western school curriculum. While Cicero especially is a source

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1 Cf. Arnold, op. cit., pp.408 foll. 'The Stoic Strain in Christianity'.
Barth, op. cit., pp.232 foll. 'Die Nachwirkung der Stoa'.
Pohlenz, op. cit., I, pp.400 foll.
of much Stoic thought, Virgil and Horace are also responsible for
preserving and conveying elements of Stoicism.

Rhetoric, of course, was to become a subject of the mediaeval
trivium, along with grammar (literature) and dialectic. Rhetoric, as
studied in antiquity, was not to survive into the twentieth century.
Throughout history the function of rhetoric was to pass through various
phases: political rhetoric prevailed in the first century B.C.; then
declamation became an exercise in the first century A.D.;
ecclesiastical oratory was later to hold sway; and then during the
Renaissance Cicero and Quintilian were studied again as guides to
oratory. It is hardly within the terms of the present study to trace
the teaching of rhetoric throughout history; yet it is clear that with
Saint Augustine\(^1\) and Martianus Capella\(^2\) there was an awareness of the
principles of rhetoric as had been laid down by Hermagoras, Cicero and
Quintilian. Therefore Stoic elements embodied in oratorical techniques
were clearly preserved as long as classical rhetoric was taught.

Stoic logic was especially perpetuated in the work of Boethius.
And when the study of logic became again popular after the Dark Ages, a
substantial part of Stoic logic was preserved. It is pointed out in
Kneale\(^3\) that Stoic elements, with some modification through a revival of
Aristotelian logic, were very much incorporated in traditional logic.

The Stoic contribution to Euclidean geometry was mainly
effected through Geminus, whose classification of lines into such forms
as conics and cissoids was included in Proclus' commentary and is of
particular significance. The predominance of Euclidean geometry
throughout mathematical history has ensured the preservation of some of
Geminus' work, and probably something of his teacher Posidonius.

Stoic theories on astronomy were for many centuries of
importance to scientific thought, although naturally of little relevance
since the time of Copernicus. Yet Aratus' Stoic poem, the *Phaenomena*,
was popular until the sixteenth century. He was well known in the Middle Ages; and his popularity at the end of the fifteenth century is attested by three *incunabula* edited in Latin and one in Greek (circa 1474-1499). Although Martianus Capella upheld the heliocentric view of the universe he at times drew directly from Aratus. There was a long-lasting support for Stoic astronomy until the era of modern astronomy.

As well as supporting in theory and practice as *propaedeumata* for philosophy the ideal curriculum of the liberal arts, the Stoics made firm contributions to subjects which were to become the *trivium* and *quadrivium* of the Middle Ages. And they were responsible for establishing an interaction between these subjects. With respect to the *trivium* grammar and dialectic were closely interdependent for the Stoics; also they closely associated dialectic with Stoic rhetoric. Of the subjects of the *quadrivium* geometry had firm meaning for dialectic; and Stoic astronomy was significant for grammatico-literary exegesis. This virtually interdisciplinary interaction helped to consolidate and perpetuate the ἐγκυκλίως παλέεια as the desirable educational curriculum.

The role of Stoicism in regard to Roman education has proved a most rich and fruitful field to research. And it is no exaggeration to describe as a unique phenomenon in Western civilisation the way in which one philosophical school, Stoicism, contributed so substantially to so many components of an educational system. For no other philosophical or religious movement has so integrally influenced so many disciplines within an educational programme. As these Stoic elements and influences were so strong and established, a firm Stoic contribution is embodied in the traditions and patterns of education which developed and was maintained throughout later centuries. A concluding comment might suggest that, just as Stoicism has been examined by many from the point of view of its connection with Christian ethics and social values, the

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1 Sarton, *op. cit.*, p.60.
3 Stahl, Johnson and Burge, *op. cit.*, pp.180,184. It is suggested that lines from Aratus, used by Martianus Capella, are 501-6, 511-524, 569-732.
present study has implications for an analysis of Stoic elements throughout the centuries of our educational traditions; such a theme could well constitute an important and substantial study.
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