WRITING A PREFACE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY
AND THE SEARCH FOR "THINKING SPACE" IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

In recent times many of the "givens" of post-World War Two International Relations have undergone remarkable and dramatic change. The Cold War it seems is over, once mortal enemies are recipients of food aid and questions of the ozone layer, AIDS, satellite surveillance and global drug cartels are the stuff of everyday International Relations analysis. In this situation patterns of thought and behaviour regarded, traditionally, as corresponding with a universal, essential "reality" in International Relations have come under increasing scrutiny and challenge.

This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the widespread reassessment of contemporary International Relations now taking place. It does so in bringing to the debate the perspectives of a broad critical literature which has urged a more tolerant, self-reflective and sophisticated approach to theory and practice in a period resonant with old dangers and unique opportunities. It does so, more specifically, from a Critical Social Theory perspective which over that past decade has introduced to the International Relations agenda a range of approaches to knowledge and human society previously alien to it.

In particular, Critical Social Theory scholarship has located the ostensibly detached tradition and discipline of International Relations as an intrinsic element of a much larger cultural and philosophical enterprise, which, in the post-Enlightenment era, has become the dominant way of "knowing" the world and which has successfully transformed a particular "meaning" of reality into "reality" per se. This, singular, homogeneous and narrowly focused image of the world has become International Relations in the post-World War Two period, establishing the boundaries of legitimate and relevant theory and research and underpinning the "art of the possible" in policy terms.

From a variety of Critical Social Theory perspectives scholars have sought to alert the International Relations community to the problems and dangers of this approach in an increasingly complex world. This is a central concern of this thesis which, via post-
modernist influences in particular, critically addresses issues crucial to future global power relations, in order that they be accorded a more serious and sophisticated treatment and that possibilities and potentials for thinking, speaking and acting in different ways be no longer silenced and excluded in the traditional manner.
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In 1988 Roger Tooze spoke of his concerns about the "unwritten preface" in the study of contemporary International Political Economy. These concerns, Tooze explained, were provoked by a major silence within mainstream scholarship on questions of philosophy or, more precisely, on questions of epistemology, questions of how we come to "know" and give "meaning" to the world. This was the site of the "unwritten preface" to the extent that epistemological questions were either excluded entirely from the analytical agenda, or were marginalised as issues peripheral to the "real-worldism" of researchers who "define knowledge and knowing as non-problematic in the philosophical sense".

There were, claimed Tooze, a number of negative implications associated with this situation which, nevertheless, continued to shape and direct study and research on an important aspect of international life. The first implication was that a state of "mutual incomprehension, if not antagonism" existed within the scholarly community, between those who maintained that any understanding of International Political Economy must be located in the broader philosophical context, and the great majority of scholars who considered philosophical debate insignificant to their research and analysis.

Accordingly, in the mainstream agenda of International Political Economy scholarship, in the late 1980s:

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1 Roger Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface: 'International Political Economy' and Epistemology", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17(2) (1988), pp.285-293. The term International Political Economy, as Tooze acknowledges, is a contentious one primarily because of its limited conceptual scope - as a reference to the political relations between states and/or national economies. This conceptual and linguistic connotation is not a neutral one, nor one incidental to the issues at hand. Rather it represents a way of "knowing" the world and a method of giving it "meaning" that is fundamental to the epistemological issues that Tooze raises and to the silences he describes. This and related issues of language will receive further attention as the thesis develops. The capitalised presentation of the term is to distinguish the scholarly community that Tooze's comments address from the broader notion of a functioning global economy, although this too, it will be argued, is not as obvious a distinction as it might appear.


3 Ibid.
matters of philosophical interest and concern are either defined as not relevant to the individual or group producing knowledge or are left to the provenance of the theorists who inhabit a shadowy underworld of meta-everything. These theorists are [considered] inconsequential to the 'real world', except to provide instrumental frameworks for the selection and ordering of 'the facts'.

Explaining, more precisely, the nature of this mainstream approach Tooze gave it a name - positivism - and located four of the characteristics which accorded its adherents the confidence of their convictions. Firstly, he suggested, it was predicated upon the notion that "science provides the best way [of] understanding the physical world and that, secondly, "social and political phenomena are in principle amenable to the methodology of science". Its third characteristic: the proposition that "logical positivism represents the practice of science", is complemented by its fourth, that "positivism [is] the only appropriate basis for social science".

On the basis of this "unity of science" thesis, articulated in positivist terms, alternative explanations of the world are dismissed as irrelevant and/or prescribed as insignificant, abstract and effectively "meaningless". This process of exclusion and/or marginalisation is rarely invoked (explicitly) in terms of "theory" versus "reality" in the 1980s, but, more commonly, as an ongoing interchange between the advocates of a "scientific" theoretical approach to knowledge and society and those engaged in "non-scientific" theorising. In this regard, as Tooze confirmed, nothing much has changed since the behaviouralist-dominated days of the 1960s, when such a contrast characterised the dispute between mainstream social science scholars and theoretical dissenters within

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5Ibid, p.289, emphasis added.

6Here Tooze uses Richard Ashley as an example of an alternative voice excluded from serious consideration by a rigid disciplinary perspective on knowledge and reality. When Ashley, in The Political Economy of War and Peace (1980) sought to confront some of the philosophical "preface", he was, noted Tooze, "regarded as a theorist by the mainstream". Consequently, "much of what he (Ashley) had to say about IPE was marginalised before there was any consideration of the substance of his analysis", ibid, p.287.
the social science community in the United States in particular. Consequently, three decades later, at the (North American) centre of international studies, mainstream scholars retain a commitment to a "unity of science" thesis and to its self-affirming logic as articulated in positivist based analysis. The presumption remains, therefore, that "real" knowledge (as opposed to abstract theorising) "is testable against a non-problematic reality", that "the language of theory...is independent of the language of observation (facts exist in their own right and are epistemologically prior to theorising)"; and that "a value-free account of IPE is both possible and necessary to produce objective knowledge".

This positivist metatheoretical framework is, for Tooze, the keystone of the "unwritten preface" in that its self-affirming, self-enclosed logic renders further theoretical questioning of it unwarranted and effectively irrelevant. Acknowledging the power of this particular knowledge form, Tooze sought, nevertheless, to problematise it and, in a rudimentary way, open some space for alternatives to it. He proposed, consequently, that the dominant perspective on International Political Economy was inadequate on at least three counts. It was, he charged, limited in its intellectual and analytical scope, particularly regarding the issue of change which could only be accommodated in terms of prior changes in the world "out there"; moreover, it was intrinsically rigid and unable to reflect, seriously, upon either itself or alternatives to it, and it was "potentially harmful" in its refusal to think beyond its own arbitrarily

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8Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface" pp.289-290, emphasis added. The term IPE represents International Political economy.

9The point here, of course, is that if "real" knowledge is derived from activities "out there" in the real world (via testing procedures designed to separate out "facts" from interpreted, theorised values) then further reflection upon the theoretical process is hardly relevant to the business of "meaningful" research and analysis. This is particularly the case in regard to issues of epistemology and to the concerns, in general, of those "who inhabit a shadowy underworld of meta-everything".

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constructed boundaries of "knowing" and "meaning". Accordingly, argued Tooze, mainstream scholarship in the late 1980s must confront its "unwritten (philosophical) preface" in order that its (positivist) closure be opened, its silences be spoken, its limitations be reflected upon and its socio-intellectual processes of construction be more thoroughly understood in an age which increasingly defied simplistic and dogmatic representations of the "reality" of the global political economy.

This is where this thesis enters the debate. More precisely, it is in relation to some of the themes raised by Tooze in his critical commentary on scholarship in the International Political Economy field that this work seeks to broaden the debate and confront the issue of an "unwritten preface" in International Relations more generally. It aims, in this regard, to go beyond the rudimentary critical perspectives of Tooze's short article and locate the issues at stake there as part of that larger and more profound conversation about the way we come to "know" and give "meaning" to the world that has energised social theory scholarship across the Anglo-American disciplinary spectrum in recent years. Integral to this new interdisciplinary conversation has been the proposition that the kind of "mutual incomprehensibility" described by Tooze, needs to be understood as an element of a more substantial "dialogue of the deaf", characteristic of Western thought generally in the post-Enlightenment period, as the pursuit of a rational-scientific

10Even within the most illustrious of its contemporary texts, therefore, analysis is restricted to a narrow regime of "meaningful" knowledge and to a singular, rigidly inscribed method of attaining such knowledge. Tooze uses the example of Robert Gilpin, in this regard, particularly in The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). A more detailed account of Gilpin's restricted approach appears in Chapter Seven of the thesis as part of a broader discussion of the issues raised by Tooze.

11The term International Relations in its capitalised form will refer here to the conventional way that global life has been studied in Western (primarily) Anglo-American Universities and understood in intellectual and policy making circles. In this regard it is an extremely contentious term imbued with "traditional" and "disciplinary" connotations that will be critically addressed in this thesis. It is not meant, therefore, as a neutral or "descriptive" term but as a means of locating the major institutionalised forums in which the dominant notions of "reality" have been articulated and the dominant practices of Realism advocated and invoked.
philosophy of society has become institutionally and culturally embedded in modern societies.12

In seeking to resuscitate this silenced conversation, critically inclined scholars have confronted mainstream positivist perspectives with a range of counter arguments centred on at least three major themes designed to open an effectively closed modern discourse. The first theme has seen positivist based explanations of reality - gleaned from the knowledge of a world "out there" - countered with approaches which repudiate all "external" foundations for knowledge, which reject all notions of independent, universalised and essentialised foundations of understanding. The second has addressed, in more precise terms, the process of knowledge construction and has emphasised the socio-historical and cultural basis of understanding - the process of "meaning-making". The third has seen a renewed focus on the issue of language, not as a neutral agency merely "describing" reality, but as inexorably bound up in the constitution of reality.

In these terms the challenge to disciplinary orthodoxy, across Anglo-American social theory, has projected to the forefront of contemporary debate the largely taken-for-granted reference points for our understanding of the contemporary world, derived primarily from variations on Liberal and Marxist themes and represented as discrete, self-contained categories of, for example, the "real", the "rational", the "scientific", and the "foundational". In so doing it has sought to render problematic and open for further critical appraisal the dominant story of modern social life as it has been told by its major philosophical traditions. It has sought, more precisely, to re-address some of the most important themes in modern philosophy - the quest for a science of human society - questions of rationality, sovereignty, objectivity and truth - relations of subject and object, fact and value, knowledge and power, theory and reality, in order that we might understand more profoundly the way we think and act in human society in the late Twentieth century.

This is of significance for this thesis because, in recent years, critical challenges of this kind have begun to gain influence within the International Relations community as Tooze's concern with the "unwritten preface" indicates. Here, however, as in the larger interdisciplinary context, the issues at stake are more significant than those encompassed in any immediate conflict between "scientific" researchers and "theorists" engaged in the analysis of International Political Economy. Rather, the issues raised by Tooze represent a contemporary and microscopic dimension of a larger conversation about "knowing" and "meaning" that has been intrinsic to modern social life since images of cogito rationalism became fundamental to self-identity, and the (rational) pursuit of foundational certainty became the raison d'être of modern theory and practice. More explicitly, the issue of an "unwritten preface" in International Relations resonates with the tensions and complexities of that period which has seen notions of cogito rationality and rational-scientific foundationalism transferred, via the European Enlightenment, to the contemporary age of nuclear weapons and an interdependent world economy. This has been a period, when, in unique technological circumstances, a narrowly based interpretation of social reality has been transformed into a universal agenda for all theory and practice; when, in the search for a secure (secular) foundation for understanding the modern world, the discourse of meaning associated with human history and politics has been appropriated by the scientific project; when an image of reality, centred on a model of the natural sciences has been embedded at the core of the study of human society by figures such as Hume, Kant, Comte, Dilthey, Marx, Russell and Popper.

In the early chapters of the thesis, consequently, attention will be focused on this broad historical and philosophical process of making the modern world "meaningful". As part of this early discussion attention will be paid also to the often "forgotten" influences of modern rationalism and foundationalism at the core of approaches ostensibly resistant to such influences. This is a crucial issue in an International Relations context, because it brings to the forefront of the discussion the question of the self-proclaimed Realist approach which has been dominant in the International Relations
community since the Second World War. The point, more precisely, is that for much of this time Realism has proclaimed its distance from the mainstream flow of modern theory and practice and from the influences of positivism, in particular. That it has done so in exemplary modernist terms and via positivist principles of dichotomised logic (e.g. domestic/international) only adds to the complexity of the themes dealt with in this thesis.

At one level the paradox of the dominant Realist perspective illustrates the quite alarming theoretical unselfconsciousness characteristic of International Relations scholarship generally down the years, which in the contemporary period is reflected in the "post-positivist", "post-behaviouralist" and neo-Realist approaches to International Political Economy recorded by Tooze. At another level, the paradox and exclusionary tendencies associated with Realist thinking in the 1980s and 1990s represents the continuing and potent presence within International Relations of a modernist perspective which (via positivism in particular) "disallows reflection" upon the process by which it "knows" and gives "meaning" to the world.

The question of paradox and the non-reflective tendencies within modern thought will, consequently, be another important theme in the thesis. Indeed it will be a theme integral to it as the work seeks to provide a positive, constructive dimension to the discussion of the "unwritten preface" by highlighting the efforts of critically inclined scholars in the Third Debate in International Relations of recent years to expose orthodox paradox and encourage self-reflection. The major critical arguments of the thesis are

13From this point on, the term Realism will appear in capitalised form when it refers directly to that dominant form of theory and practice in International Relations. This, again, is not an unproblematic representation of the term, but an attempt to demarcate a central term in the thesis from other uses of it (e.g. in more traditional philosophical realism) and, again, to overcome, as much as possible, the "quotation" issue. I am sensitive also to the fact than its conventional usage the notion of Realism in International Relations is integrally bound up with positivist philosophical perspectives. In a more nuanced climate this, in itself, would be an issue for debate. It never has been in International Relations, for reasons to do with the silences of the "unwritten preface". I will say something more comprehensively about the issue in Chapters Five and Six. And in Chapter One the question of the "differences" within Realism will be addressed (e.g. between Traditionalist and "scientific" Realism). On the issue of the differences between positivism and realism in Scientific circles see, for example, the debate in Russell Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

14This is a Habermasian theme from Knowledge and Human Interests trans J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1971), p.vii, which, I think, is particularly apposite in regard to positivist influences in International Relations.
bound up with the attempts of (some) scholars in the Third Debate to confront Realism, and its major disciplinary "alternatives", with the silences and omissions of its "unwritten preface" and to indicate how a more open, tolerant and sophisticated understanding might be gained of a contemporary global situation of great danger and great opportunities.15

Here, the insights of post-modernist scholarship are considered of particular interrogative value and themes derived from the post-modernist intervention in the Third Debate will be significant, both explicitly and implicitly, throughout the work.16

Before saying something more precisely about the way these themes are to be integrated in the thesis, one more general introductory point is worth making, which might help summarise the discussion to this point and sharpen an appreciation of the


16 In this thesis the term post-modernism will be used to designate that approach derived from a variety of contemporary Continental scholars including Foucault, Derrida, Barthes, Baudrilliard and Lyotard, and from Nietzsche. The term post-modernism is a contentious one for a number of reasons, some of which will be touched on in Chapter Four. At this point the issue of contention I refer to, primarily, is the relationship between post-modemist scholarship and that described as post-structuralism. There are subtle differences between post-structuralist and post-modernist perspectives, as James Der Derian has noted in, "Philosophical Traditions in International Relations", Millennium 17 (1988), pp.189-193. Their shared insights and analytical commitments are more profound than their differences, however. As Der Derian has emphasised, both perspectives acknowledge the "constitutive nature of language" and they share an antipathy toward "closed" systems of knowledge "in which analysis and identity are reducible to binary oppositions", ibid, p.192. My decision to use the term post-modernism rather than post-structuralism in this thesis, therefore, has less to do with any substantive differences between them, and more with a sense I have that the former term has a slightly broader connotative range than the latter (e.g. relating to art, architecture, "culture"). This is important in the present context, because, increasingly, the post-modern scholars being attracted to write and think on (Traditional) International Relations issues, are coming from previously alien realms of scholarship, from angles and perspectives which, it seems to me, signifies a post-modern spirit and scope. More specifically, the post in post-modernism denotes the attempt to go beyond the dominant ideas, concepts and practices of modernity, including the theory and practice of structuralism. For a broad overview of the modernity/post-modernity theme see Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987).
nature and purpose of the extended discussion to follow. The point, simply put, is that
the need for a work of this kind has never been more acute. This is apparent enough if
one ponders even briefly the kind of responses proffered by prominent figures in the
International Relations community to the criticisms aimed at its dominant positivist-Realist
sector. Tooze's comments indicated the general tone of such responses, and as the thesis
unfolds many similar examples of orthodox crudity will be illustrated to supplement
Tooze's argument. But it is not the more obvious examples of Realist intolerance and
unselfconsciousness that are of most importance at the moment. Rather, it is the subtler,
less obvious moments of Realist rigidity and limitation that are more significant because,
in such moments, the power of modernist knowledge is never more evident, its capacity
to render intelligent minds critically impotent never more stark.

Characteristically it is that which is left unsaid that is the crucial factor in these
moments. This was the case in a recent work by Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach
which, in the moderated theoretically sensitive tones of "post-positivist" scholarship in
the 1990s, indicated a measure of empathy for those who "celebrated" the more critical
atmosphere of International Relations in the current period, while supporting a
reformulated "scientific" approach in which "we can adapt empiricism to the task of
making sense of the world around us".17 The "dissident" scholarship of the critics was
accorded credit for illustrating the "crude, often ahistorical empiricism that has dominated
scholarship in our field for over three decades" and for introducing sophisticated insights
drawn from interpretivist philosophies and literary theory.18 But, ultimately, concluded
Ferguson and Mansbach, the critical challenges of the Third Debate must be resisted if
their aim was to fundamentally undermine the traditional practices of the discipline.
Instead, what was needed was a more nuanced empiricist approach which, in "setting
forth values and assumptions, defining terms, clarifying variables, and collecting
evidence for generalizations", could overcome in the future the silences, omissions and

17Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for
18Ibid.
crudities of the past.\textsuperscript{19} This was the correct response, they argued, when the alternative was to "get hopelessly bogged down in epistemological debate".\textsuperscript{20} And after all, they insisted, it is one thing to appreciate post-modernist claims about textually based reality, but it is quite another if it means "that we are unable to penetrate the "external reality" behind the "texts" that describe that reality".\textsuperscript{21}

A number of critical points might usefully be made about a position such as this, given the nature of the discussion on paradox and unselfconsciousness that preceded it. In particular Ferguson's and Mansbach's support for an adapted empiricism that is tolerant to other approaches and fully aware of its normative dimension requires comment, primarily because it represents the tip of a much larger modernist-positivist "iceberg" with all its attendant intolerance and unselfconsciousness. The problem here is that this notion of a tolerant empiricism is effectively a contradiction in terms. This is not a question of intentionality on the part of individual empiricist scholars, however empathetic they might be to "otherness". It is a question of the way that empiricist knowledge of self and the world is constituted. It is a question, in this regard, of a reductionist process which can recognise as "real" knowledge only that knowledge derived from an independent (foundational) source, either via inductivist "intuition", as in the case of much Traditionalist Realism, or more commonly by deductivist testing procedures which sift the residual "reality" from the normative impact of the human "tester". It cannot by its own metatheoretical logic allow for non-empiricist alternatives because, whatever else such alternatives represent, they cannot by (empiricist) definition represent "real" knowledge of the world "out there". Ferguson's and Mansbach's notion of an "external reality" behind the (post-modernist) "text" is an obvious enough example of the level at which alternative positions are understood and their own is not.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid, p.383.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid, p.366.
A second brief comment on their work might enhance the sense that Ferguson and Mansbach, and others of their ilk, are engaged in an enterprise which is not well enough understood. This relates to the unproblematic connection they draw between empiricism and the further development of a (social) "scientific" approach to International Relations. The point here, and it one that will receive extended discussion in the thesis, is that such a connection is, even its in own terms, illusory and contradictory. It is ironic, also, in the context of a purportedly self-conscious empiricism, that the most devastating indictment of empiricist based approaches to social science analysis came from perhaps the greatest of all empiricist scholars, David Hume, who, in the Eighteenth century rejected empiricist claims for scientific ("real") knowledge of the world as ultimately, and inevitably, metaphysical.22

One of the tasks of the thesis, as it develops, will be to illustrate that Hume's conclusion about the inadequacy of empiricism remains relevant to influential approaches which in the post-Kantian period have sought to overcome the implications of the Humean critique (e.g. Popper's and Weber's). This notion of having overcome or superseded the problems of Enlightenment thought is central to my third and final comment on the Ferguson and Mansbach position at this stage. This concerns the unspoken but very powerful assumption in the work of scholars such as Ferguson and Mansbach, and others, that the questions raised by critical voices in the 1980s and 1990s have been exhaustively debated in the past, when the major problems of the discipline and of the broader Western tradition were either resolved or deemed inherently unresolvable, and thus not worthy of further attention.

Such a position, it will be argued, is assumed at the core of mainstream (e.g. neo-Realist) scholarship, generally, in the 1990s and in the recent contributions of scholars

22The irony is increased for an argument that seeks to distance itself from positivism, but claim some sort of empiricist position, when one considers Leszek Kolakowski's proposition that Hume was also the "father" of positivism. See Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), p.43.
such as Thomas Beirsteker and Robert Keohane.\textsuperscript{23} In these cases, as in the case of Ferguson's and Mansbach's argument, the unstated proposition is that there is either nothing of fundamental value left to say about, for example, questions of ontology and epistemology, and/or that which has been said leads to the conclusion that there is no alternative to positivist/empiricist based analysis. Articulated in broader terms, the assumption is that whatever could have been usefully said on these complex philosophical issues has been said - over nearly three millenia of Western philosophy - and that the fruits of this debate have been fully integrated into the International Relations agenda. Consequently, the unspoken message from the orthodoxy to the critics of the Third Debate, is this: your "theoretical/philosophical" efforts are of some value and are appreciated for the intellectual contribution they make to scholarship generally. However, we do not need another "preface" for International Relations - it has already been written, in the "great texts" of Western history and philosophy - and it has been absorbed, understood and integrated within the discipline, particularly within the theory and practice of the dominant Realist approach.

This thesis will seek to illustrate that this is indeed a major unspoken assumption at the base of orthodox scholarship, and that it represents another and very potent example of the limited and narrow regime of understanding associated with the study of International Relations in the contemporary period. The suggestion here is not that the philosophical critiques of recent times are unique. Nor is it suggested that the questions and issues raised by these critiques are totally alien to the International Relations community. Rather, the suggestion is that if they have been absorbed, understood or integrated in International Relations at all, it has been in the most shallow and superficial of terms. The suggestion, more precisely, is that the questions and issues of the "unwritten preface" - of ontology and epistemology, of the way we think and act in the world and understand "reality" - have either been ignored in International Relations, or

rendered marginal and barely relevant by an orthodoxy which has interpreted the Western historical and philosophical story in a narrow, exclusionary and inadequate manner. This orthodoxy, most influentially manifested in the "scientific" (neo)Realism of (mainly) United States scholarship, but also in its (mainly) British Traditionalist counterpart, continues, thus, to represent as the "reality" of International Relations a narrow, self-affirming and self-enclosed image of the world "out there". This Realist image, invoked via disciplinary ritual and training practices, represents a complex, ambiguous and heterogeneous matrix of existence as a simple, linear story of (socio-intellectual) unity, coherence and identity. The end result is an approach to the contemporary world fundamentally detached from the everyday experience of so much of that world.

Speaking of the Realist image of reality Robert Cox has portrayed it as a narrow, conservative perspective which privileges "old [positivist] intellectual conventions"\textsuperscript{24} and a limited "problem solving" orientation, that:

\begin{quote}
\text{takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. [Its aim] is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.\textsuperscript{25}}
\end{quote}

The critical challenges of the Third Debate in International Relations have generally supported Cox's insights on this issue and have supported also his appeal for a more sensitive, sophisticated and critically attuned perspective, concerned "not just with a static past but with a continuing process of historical change".\textsuperscript{26} This is a position supported in this thesis, which argues for the kind of tolerant, open-ended and genuinely pluralist approach to theory and practice to be found in much of the critical literature of the Third Debate.

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\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid, p.208.
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\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid, pp.208-209.
\end{flushright}
It does so, in the first instance, as part of a broad ranging discussion which seeks to locate the contemporary issues on the International Relations agenda as part of a much larger "critical" conversation on human society within Western history and philosophy, which recently has resounded again throughout Anglo-American social theory. The first four chapters of the thesis are, in their different ways, concerned to illustrate the significance of this broader location and conversation for contemporary International Relations.

Chapter One is concerned primarily to introduce, in a more substantial way, many of the themes touched on above. It seeks to make some early connections between orthodox theory and practice, articulated in post-1945 positivist-Realism in particular, and the critical literature of the Third Debate which has confronted Realism with interrogative themes drawn from the wider interdisciplinary debates in social theory. It introduces the notion of a Critical Social Theory, in this context, and explains why Critical Social Theory approaches are considered most conducive to opening International Relations to its "unwritten preface", and to a more tolerant and inclusive understanding of itself and the world. Towards the completion of the chapter the discussion turns toward two rather controversial dimensions of the contemporary critical debate and indicates their significance for the thesis as a whole. The first, concerns the "celebratory" attitude within the Third Debate, the second, the post-modernist expression of this attitude.

Put simply, the "celebratory" attitude maintains that the critical offensive aimed at orthodox positions in International Relations has created a sense of uncertainty, insecurity and incoherence within the discipline, which is a healthy, positive and entirely necessary situation if its orientation towards closure and exclusion is to be fundamentally challenged and a genuine "thinking space" is to ensue. Prominent within the "celebratory" literature have been the wide-ranging contributions of scholars transferring post-modernist perspectives from Continental philosophical sources to the primarily Anglo-American arena of International Relations debate. Some of these post-modernist themes are discussed with particular attention being paid to the discursive analytical approach and to
concepts of genealogy and logocentrism. Also raised briefly is the question of modern knowledge and power and the possibility of resistance to it in an International Relations context.

Chapter Two has a more precise analytical purpose in that it seeks to explain, in more detail, some of the connections between the broad social theory debates and the Third Debate in International Relations. It does this by focusing on two questions intrinsic to both - the question of modernity and the question of positivism. The initial discussion, in both cases, is oriented towards providing a definition for two of the most complex and contentious themes in social theory. The definition of modernity does not replicate the conventional perspective with its strict chronological orientation. It emphasises, instead, the "modern" as a particular way of framing the questions we ask of the world. This, it is argued, is a process of metatheoretical framing derived from Cartesian rationalism in particular, which remains paradoxically committed to (pre-modern) foundationalist and essentialist premises. This notion of the modern, it is suggested, adds a dimension to the conventional story of rational progress in that allows for the modernist commitments of ostensibly anti-modernist, anti-progressive forces and perspectives (e.g. Realism in International Relations).

The first half of the chapter is concerned to illustrate how modern subjects and objects have been produced and have reproduced themselves in terms of a modernist discourse. The discussion here is of a more conventional tenor to the extent that it tells the conventional modern story via some of its "great texts" and "great men" (e.g. Locke, Hobbes, Descartes and Kant). The purpose of the discussion is, nevertheless, always critically honed in that it draws attention to that which is left unsaid, and seeks to illustrate how the silences and omissions of the conventional modernist narrative were just as significant in shaping modern subjects and objects as were the rituals of seeing and "knowing" at the surface of human experience.

The chapter turns to the question of positivism in these terms. It defines positivism as the foremost philosophical expression of an empiricist epistemology, as
crystalised in the Enlightenment. It then argues, via a discussion that ranges from Hume, through Comte and Logical Positivism to behaviouralism and the so called "post-behaviouralist" age of the present, that positivism is the site of some of the most powerful of modernism’s influences (e.g. of paradox, foundationalism and unreflective conservative silence) to the extent that its adherents in the 1990s no longer recognise its impact upon their lives. This, as intimated above, is an issue directly relevant to an International Relations community which has either never acknowledged its positivist commitments (e.g. Wight, Bull and the Traditionalists generally) or which, in recent times, has represented its position in "post-positivist" terms (e.g. Ferguson and Mansbach and neo-Realism generally).

Chapter Three, accordingly, is concerned to confront this issue in a manner that International Relations scholars have been reluctant to confront it, by critically evaluating the often very sophisticated "post-positivist" perspectives in social theory which form the basis of similar claims in International Relations. The purpose of this discussion is to problematise one of the most powerful assumptions of Realist and neo-Realist thinking, an assumption which underpins the contemporary orthodoxy in International Relations. The chapter concentrates on five major "post-positivist" themes, all of which are of significance in the International Relations agenda in the 1990s. The first of these, Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism is accorded extended treatment as testament to its influence over the years. The others: Kuhn’s paradigm approach; the Analytical Philosophy perspective (of Wittgenstein in particular); Scientific Realism (e.g. Structuration theory); and elements of the broad hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Verstehen, as articulated by Morgenthau via Weber) are discussed from a number of angles, and in a manner that seeks to them justice while illustrating their continuing commitment to positivist themes and modernism in general. Some of the implications of this situation are then considered, both for social theory and more particularly for International Relations.

27In this regard it follows Leszek Kolakowski’s understanding of the issue, in Positivist Philosophy, pp.11-17.
Chapter Four addresses the continuing narrowness and limitation of Anglo-American thought from another angle, that of Critical Social Theory approaches which have confronted positivism and modernism at the most profound philosophical level. Attention here is focused on themes intrinsic to International Relations - questions of rationality, empiricism, of "reading" history, of the subject in the philosophical text, of the object "out there" in the world, of relations between language and power, and of sovereignty. Two Critical Social Theory perspectives are accorded special attention - the Critical Theory approaches of two generations of Frankfurt School scholarship and of Jurgen Habermas, in particular, and the post-modernist perspective introduced in Chapter One. These have been the most influential Critical Social Theory perspectives in the Third Debate and both, it is argued, have something important to offer in opening the fundamentally closed discourse of International Relations. Both approaches are, initially, discussed in general terms and their critical capacities are evaluated. The discussion then turns to the relationship between them and the tensions associated with that relationship. Reservations are expressed about both approaches, in this regard, and while preference is accorded the post-modernist position it is argued that, if post-modernism is to have the impact its insights warrant, it must continue its dialogue with critical modernist approaches such as Critical Theory.

Having thus established a broad discursive framework within which a debate on the "unwritten preface" of International Relations might be usefully understood, the idiom if not the critical purpose of the thesis changes, from Chapter Five on, as the discussion concentrates more directly on the literature commonly associated with International Relations. Chapter Five, accordingly, is concerned to illustrate how modernist and positivist influences have always been dominant in International Relations. It illustrates, firstly, how International Relations scholars have framed the questions they ask of the world in terms derived from a positivist reading of the modern Western narrative. It emphasises the way International Relations has come to "know" the world (i.e. in dichotomised terms of subject/object, fact/value, theory/practice, realism/idealism,
domestic/international, sovereignty/anarchy) and how it has accorded "meaning" to the world it acknowledges "out there" (i.e. via inductivist and/or deductivist judgements on independent "facts"). Three more specific examples of the modernist legacy are then presented. The first stresses the continuity between the neo-Kantian idealism of the inter-war years and the Realism which superseded it at the centre of the discipline. The second concentrates on the first "great text" of International Relations, E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis and indicates how its positivist themes became the basis of the quest for a "science" of International Relations that continues, unabated to this day. The third provides a "concrete" example of the implications and dangers of this narrow discursive orientation - the orthodox reading of the Cold War - which saw the interpretive ambiguity of the immediate post-World War Two period reduced to a simplistic narrative of unified self-affirming certainty and a generation of "reality" set in terms of "us" and "them".28

Chapter Six investigates the "golden age" of Realist scholarship - between the early years of the Cold War and the end of the Vietnam War - when some of its inadequacies became too difficult to ignore, even for its adherents. Early in the chapter the most important of all Realist texts, Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, is the focus of attention. The discussion, however, speaks of Politics Among Nations in a way that Morgenthau refused to speak of it, in terms of Max Weber's influence upon it and the broader impact upon Traditionalist Realism of Verstehen hermeneutics, the "other side of the positivist coin".29 The discussion then traces the (often unacknowledged) connection between Politics Among Nations and the "quest for certainty" that characterised the
"behaviouralist revolution" in International Relations in the 1960s. In this period an amalgam of ethnocentric arrogance, progressivism, innovation, pragmatism and rigid conservatism marked the positivist-Realist ascendancy. This is illustrated in a brief discussion of the Modernisation literature and its "certainty" concerning the peoples of the Third World, and a larger inquiry into the mainstream scholarship on Cold War security and Nuclear strategy. The chapter ends with a critical retrospective on the era and its legacy and an illustration that in 1990s (e.g. in the work of Stephen Walt) that nothing much has changed after the debacle in Vietnam and in the "post-behaviouralist" era.

Chapter Seven develops this theme further in returning the discussion to its original context and the question of an International Political Economy in the 1980s and 1990s. The purpose of this chapter is to confront the claim of the new orthodoxy - neo-Realism - that (i) represents something other than the discredited Realism of the Vietnam years; that (ii) its new interest in "economics" indicates a more sensitive and profound attitude to the world, beyond U.S. foreign policy interests and Traditionalist images of a world of security dilemmas and anarchical power balancing; and (iii) that its structuralist orientation represents a more sophisticated "post-positivist" comprehension of global affairs. These are themes countered in a discussion which looks critically at the contribution of figures such Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, Arthur Stein and Robert Keohane.

Chapters Eight and Nine are concerned, primarily, with Critical Social Theory alternatives to the modernist/positivist orthodoxy. Their purpose, accordingly, is to illuminate some of the "thinking space" that scholars utilising Critical Theory and post-modernist themes have opened up in International Relations in recent years. Chapter Eight concentrates on the Critical Theory contribution in this regard. It reviews Richard Ashley's pathbreaking "Poverty of Neorealism" and evaluates both its obvious


contribution to later Critical Social Theory perspectives, and the silences in its argument which allowed its targets to sidestep some of its more devastating indictments of their "poverty". Robert Cox's contribution is also highlighted and Cox's recent work on political economy and hegemonic order is presented as an important counterpoint to the dominant perspectives of neo-Realism. The chapter ends with a discussion of Critical Theory scholarship that has much to contribute but which retains, to its detriment, the universalised and essentialised tendencies of post-Enlightenment emancipatory schemas.

The final chapter, Nine, engages with some of the post-modernist scholarship which, in recent years has added a "different" and critically potent dimension to the International Relations agenda. It seeks to illuminate this "difference" and via a series of post-modernist attempts to open up closed aspects of orthodox theory and practice, illustrate this potency. Four broad areas of the post-modernist contribution are addressed. The first concerns post-modernist attempts to undermine the textual basis of Realist understanding of the world by problematising the singular, essentialist reading of its "great texts" (e.g. of Thucydides and Machiavelli and of "diplomatic culture"). The second concentrates on the efforts of post-modernists to re-conceptualise some of the "givens" of the modernist-cum-Realist world view - notions of sovereignty and anarchy in particular - and the process by which Otherness is constituted. The third looks more precisely at post-modernist perspectives on questions of security and strategy in the post-Cold War era. The fourth, via R.B.J. Walker's One World, Many World's considers the nature of, and prospects for, a post-modernist politics of resistance in International Relations in the future. Throughout the discussion emphasis is placed on the inherent and purposeful "concreteness" of this post-modernist scholarship, and the connections it stresses between its discursive interrogations and the everyday "practice" of power politics.

Throughout the thesis, also, another issue is paid serious attention. It concerns the (perceived) inaccessibility of the new Critical Social Theory literature for many, trained in and committed to, the traditional ways of reading and writing International Relations. Tooze, as indicated, was concerned about the problem of "incomprehension" in this regard and Steve Smith has recently made a similar point.\(^3^3\) My response to these concerns is to share them while acknowledging that not only those influenced by Continental scholarship are guilty of obscurification and jargonised presentation, as any perusal of mainstream International Relations journals will attest. It is a truism also that, having coaxed the International Relations thoroughbred to the wellspring of Critical Social Theory, there remains, very often, a reluctance even to wet the lips. As Donna Gregory has said, in relation to offers of post-modernist sustenance, the tendency has been to "attack" rather than to read.\(^3^4\)

This thesis, nevertheless, represents an attempt to communicate sophisticated and often very complex themes in a manner which does them some interpretive justice, while accounting for the interested reader who might otherwise be inhibited and/or intimidated by the "foreignness" of the literary fare on offer. For this reason and to underline the point that it is International Relations' own (unwritten) preface that is at stake here, the discussion to follow is, for all its "foreign" influence, couched in a conventional language and, wherever possible, the references used are from traditional sources. The point, to reiterate it, is that it is not necessary to invoke a Foucault, a Derrida or a Habermas to comprehend that which has been left unsaid, unthought and unwritten in International Relations. On the critical margins of modern Western thought there have always been those working to open "thinking space", and even in the scholarship which has been integral to the framing of modern ways of thinking (e.g. Descartes, Hume, Kant, Weber,

\(^3^3\)Smith, "The Development of International Relations as a Social Science", *Millennium* 16(2) (1987), pp.189-206.

there were opportunities for critical reflection that have been effectively ignored, by Anglo-American social theory in general, and by International Relations in particular.

A Critical Social Theory perspective is necessary in this situation, however, because it explains how and why this continues to be the case, and because it illustrates the power and (largely unrecognised) dangers of the unsaid, the unreflected, and the "unwritten" in a world which everyday, and in so many ways, defies simplistic grand theorised invocations of its "reality".
CHAPTER ONE

CONFRONTING THE UNWRITTEN PREFACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Reality, it seems, is not what it used to be in International Relations. In recent times patterns of thought and behaviour identified as corresponding with an enduring, essential reality of international life have been subject to remarkable and often dramatic change. Indeed, in the 1990s, it is suggested, we are living through a watershed period of revolutionary change, in which "ideologies are reordered, boundaries are redrawn, alliances are reshuffled, new symbols of identification arise and old identities are resurrected".\(^1\) The catalyst for much of the new revolutionary spirit has undoubtedly been the policies of Perestroika and Glasnost in the Soviet Union which, in one form or another, and with varying results, have sparked off political tinder boxes from Beijing to Berlin.

In the West the resultant sequence of events has been cause for much celebration. There has been widespread rejoicing at the new opportunities for personal and political liberty within the societies of Eastern Europe, in particular. There has been smugness also. For those, in particular, who represent capitalism and utilitarian social relations as the natural order in the modern world, it was the Socialist system and not its market based counterpart that was always destined to "wither away".

Notwithstanding the now confident re-articulations of well rehearsed polemic and the optimism concerning post Cold War opportunity, and "new world" orders, there is also a not insubstantial sense that the current era is one of major crisis. At one level this is not at all surprising. The opportunities for future liberty in Eastern Europe are, after all, laced with the great dangers that have attended previous resurrections of national

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identity in that complex region. Similarly, the social revolution unleashed by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union has, to understate the case, the potential for something other than a future characterised by openness and prosperity. And while celebration might be the appropriate response at scenes of erstwhile central balance foes actually transforming their swords into plowshares, there is well founded apprehension about the increasingly lethal arsenals of the Third World, where, for all the change and talk of historical watersheds there has been little, if any, change in the lives of those decades ago identified as the "wretched of the earth". Grinding poverty remains the most prominent characteristic of much Third World existence, where spiralling infant mortality rates, chronic unemployment and inadequate shelter and health care are the stuff of everyday life. And then there is the pall of smoke, the size of India, that hangs over the Amazon jungle.

It is, however, another dimension to the issue of crisis that will receive most direct attention in this thesis. Simply put, it concerns the process by which we have traditionally understood and given meaning to reality in International Relations. Or, more specifically, it concerns the increasingly acknowledged inadequacies of the process by which we continue to reproduce that meaning, in the face of the dangers and opportunities of the contemporary period.

As R. N. Berki has recently reminded us, in a slightly broader context, the question of reality is not exhausted by reference to the "facts" of the world, or any simple aggregation of them. Rather, as Berki emphasised, reality can never be grasped in its factual completeness, because reality is never complete, never entirely coherent, never accessible to universalised, essentialist or totalised understanding of it. On the contrary,

2Like many of the terms and meanings associated with this thesis, the notion of a Third World spoken of in these terms, is a problematic concept. This is not just because of the differences and complexities of life within the geographical regions usually referred to as the Third World, but because of the increasing evidence that many of the characteristics commonly associated with life in those regions (Africa, Asia, Central and South America) are discernible within the First and Second (Socialist, ex-Socialist) worlds. I seek, nevertheless, to assist the flow of the work by keeping the use of "quotations" around terms such as this to a minimum. This is an issue of particular importance in a thesis such as this because of the question of representationalism that in its later stages will become more explicitly a matter for discussion.

reality is always characterised by ambiguity, disunity, discrepancy, contradiction and difference. An adequate political realism, consequently, is one that above all recognises its limitations in this regard and acknowledges its partial, problematic and always contestable nature. Inadequacy, in this sense, is the representation of a partial, particularistic image of reality as (irreducible, totalised and uncontestable) reality itself. The problem, suggested Berki, is that it has been precisely this inadequate representation of reality that has dominated within the Anglo-American intellectual community, particularly that sector of it concerned with International Relations.

As a consequence two rather "primitive" themes have become increasingly associated with the question of political reality in International Relations. The first is articulated through the language and logic of "immediacy". The "real" world, in this regard, is that which is immediately "there", around us "disclosed to us by sensory information". Reality, on this basis, "is a world of tangible, palpable, perceptible things or objects. It is material and concrete". Accordingly, the correct (realistic) response to the real world out there is "accommodation". Realism, in International Relations, thus becomes the common-sensical accommodation to the tangible, observable realities of this (external) world. At this point the second "primitive" Realist theme acts to reaffirm the first and by its own logic, at least, grant it greater legitimacy. This, suggested Berki, is the "necessity" theme which confirms the need for accommodation to the facts of reality but which accords them greater historical and philosophical facticity. Reality now becomes:

the realm of the unchangeable, inevitable and in the last resort inexorable occurrences, a world of eternity, objectivity, gravity, substantiality and positive resistance to human purposes.

In this manner Realism is now imbued with moral, philosophical and even religious connotations, in its confrontation with the real world "out there". It becomes

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4The "primitive" theme is Berki's in, On Political Realism, p.7.
moral in that it observes certain rules of conduct integral to the reality of human
behaviour. It can take on a religious dimension in that reality is understood as an
accommodation to an inexorable destiny emanating from the realm of ultimate
"necessity". Its philosophical status is established as Realists, acknowledging the
necessity for accommodation, represent their understanding of reality in the serious,
resigned manner of (for example) the scholar/statesman contemplating the often
unpalatable "is" of the world. The knowledge form integral to this Realist philosophy is
that concerned, above all, with control. Because the reality in question is "the authentic,
the significant, the important, the relevant, the ultimate, the veritable and attestable" real
knowledge of the world must be revealed in unified and systemic terms, as an "operative
principle".6

Ultimately, Berki argued, the knowledge form associated with a Realism of this
kind is positivism; its philosophical identity, as a consequence, is marked by dualism and
dichotomy. Thus, "realism in modern philosophy means the assertion of a reality
'independent' of the observer, to be distinguished from idealism which derives external
reality from the thinking mind".7 A positivist Realism in this way signifies its
acknowledgement of a:

positively existing political reality 'out there' manifested in ever-recurrent
institutional forms and relationships, those mainly of power and struggle, to
be recognised and acquiesced in.8

The theory and practice of positivist Realism is at its most powerful, suggested Berki, in
a form familiar to the International Relations community, the Realpolitik perspective of
post-Bismarckian foreign policy. Here, the "immediacy" and "necessity" themes are
synthesised in fundamental assertions about the anarchical reality of human life which,

7Berki, On Political Realism, p.15.
8Ibid. This is the "is" of the world "as it positively is and persists over time", as opposed to "idealism
which believes that politics, as the creature of human will and design can be re-made according to
intention".
bereft of a Leviathan, is in "permanent need of restraint." A genuine Realist in this circumstance is the observer of the world "out there" aware, above all, of the need for the law and order proffered by the sovereign state in a post-Renaissance world of states. The Realist, accordingly, remains "grimly and heroically pessimistic", perceiving:

law and order, and their maintenance by force, as a permanent and ever precarious holding operation [understanding] peace, tranquillity, prosperity, freedom [as] a special bonus, accruing to people as a result of living in a well ordered society...[where] the price to be paid is constant vigilance, constant readiness to use force.10

This scenario the Realist represents in appropriately stark "moral" terms, in which the recurring rituals of power politics are played out against "eternal moral laws which govern an eternally corrupt human nature". And, while in the broad sense there is acknowledgement of the philosophical legacy associated with this Hobbesian/Machiavellian scenario, there is also the increasingly powerful positivist tendency to "disavow reflection". As a result, positivist Realism, in this form, is "highly suspicious" of other forms of knowledge which place more emphasis on theoretical understanding of "abstract principles".12 Such approaches are regarded as, at best, "irrelevant to government" (and the maintenance of order) and at worst "inimical" to the real concerns of political life at the international level.13

For Berki this represents a logical circularity which, in detaching itself from theory and interpretation, effectively detaches itself from the interpretivist (historical, cultural and linguistic) context of everyday human existence - from the social and intellectual life blood of reality. Even in its most sophisticated form (e.g. Popperian/Lakatosian) a positivist-Realist approach is, from this perspective, an anachronistic

9Ibid.
10Ibid, p.16.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
residue of the European Enlightenment, and mainstream Western philosophy in general, which continues the futile quest for a grand (non)theory of existence beyond specific time, space and political purpose.

Berki's commentary on the Realism issue is by no means original, of course. Arguments concerning the "theory impregnated nature of fact" and the notion of "interpreted" reality have long been part of Western philosophical discourse. Indeed they have been central to it since the Enlightenment, when the much longer Western tendency towards bifurcation was crystalised into claims for Realism set upon positivist principles of knowledge. Moreover, since Hegel sought to say something more profound about the "real" nature of the world by closing the Kantian dualism, approaches such as Berki's have represented one of the major "alternatives" to positivist-Realism.

For all this, and taking into account the simplicity with which the issue has been addressed to this stage, Berki's argument is useful here as a point of entry into a more complex set of debates about understanding reality that are now resonating throughout the literature of the International Relations discipline. At the most immediate level, as intimated above, these debates reflect a sense of crisis among those seeking to explain the implications for International Relations of the extraordinary events associated with the end of the Cold War, in the face of widespread recognition that the positivist-Realist orthodoxy is incapable of providing such explanations in other than "primitive" terms.14

14The question is broader than this, of course. As the discussion to follow will emphasise it is not just a matter of Realism's inadequacy but the inadequacy of that whole discourse represented as International Relations, which includes the major alternatives to a Realist perspective (e.g. conventional Marxism, variants of systems theory, the so called pluralist and structuralist paradigms etc). For a general discussion of Realism and its "alternatives" see John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983). On the Marxist alternative, which in International Relations has never had the kind of influences it has enjoyed, at times, in social theory generally, see John Maclean, "Marxist Epistemology, Explanations of 'Change' and the Study of International Relations", in Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimensions edited by Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones (London: Frances Pinter, 1981); Maclean, "Marxism and International Relations: A Strange Case of Mutual Neglect", Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17 (1988), pp.295-319; Vendulka Kubalkova and A.A. Cruikshank, Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990); and Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985).
This raises the question, more directly, of why this is so. In broader thematic terms it brings us directly to a central issue of this thesis, concerning the diversity of attempts to confront questions such as this as part of the extended intellectual agenda in International Relations of the 1980s and 1990s. For all the diversity of this literature one of its points of connection is the proposition that while, elsewhere, the problems of mainstream Anglo-American theory and practice have undergone sustained, critical challenge, International Relations remains the "backward discipline", still largely isolated from the main currents of contemporary intellectual life.15 The result: the continuing dominance of a "primitive" Realist approach set upon the kind of metatheoretical premises identified by Berki as the most inadequate in understanding reality in the world.

In this sense, at least, the critical scholarship of recent years is replicating themes addressed by commentators such as Robert Rothstein, who, in the early 1970s, acknowledged that Realism in International Relations, represented a rather dubious set of propositions about the "true nature" of the world that were "extrapolations from the diplomatic history of nineteenth century Europe".16 So extrapolated, the real world was one in which:

states were involved in an unending struggle with each other (because that was the nature of states in an anarchic world); power was necessary to survive in it or continue to to fight; all states were potential enemies...but the worst might be avoided by clever diplomacy and by virtue of the fact that all alike shared a similar conception of [utilitarian] rational behaviour.17

This, explained Rothstein, became the "catechism" of Western intellectual and policy making circles in the post World War Two period as International Relations became effectively part of a North American social science perspective, integrating its scientific quest with "the wisdom of certain 'eternal verities' conveniently collected in a few

17Ibid, p.351.
texts". The result was a particular "state of mind with which to approach problems" which permeated University and Government sectors and which "conditioned the political climate so that some actions seem 'to stand to reason' and others seem naive - by definition". Realism, on this basis, was the:

doctrine which provided the intellectual frame of reference for the [academic and] foreign policy establishments...[which] determine[d] the categories by which they assessed the external world and the state of mind with which they approached prevailing problems.

However, for all the similarities between Rothstein's position and the contemporary critical literature, there is one significant distinction between them. It is that Rothstein, like many other commentators of the period, was speaking of this Realist "catechism" in retrospective tones. More explicitly, Rothstein, in 1972, spoke of this Realist approach as "no longer in style in academic circles", while acknowledging its continuing dominance among (policy) practitioners who were less troubled by the "inconsistencies and anomalies that trouble the theorist". This, as intimated, is by no means an isolated view. Since the early 1970s a plethora of works have claimed that the crude state centric images of the Realist "catechism" have been superseded. In the wake of the Vietnam War, in particular, International Relations literature has been characterised by a succession of claims to have gone beyond (crude) Realism and (unreflective) positivism. Indeed, it has been in this period that the discipline has understood itself as

19Ibid, p.353.
21Ibid, p.347.
engaged in the third major stage of its (rational) development, centred around its Third "great" Debate.

The first of these debates, according to disciplinary folk lore, saw International Relations scholars responding realistically to the world "out there" in overturning the utopianism of Wilsonian Liberalism in favour of the power politics format outlined in E.H. Carr's, *The Twenty Years Crisis* (1939). The basic principles of this power politics Realism were then confirmed and rendered more systematic in the greatest of all the discipline's "great texts" - Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (1948). The search for the "objective" and enduring "laws" of international life, spoken of by Morgenthau, was then taken up in earnest as (mainly) North American scholars sought to give modern intellectual sustenance to Carr's appeal for a "science" of International Relations set upon Realist first principles.

The second developmental stage and associated "great debate" arose from this quest, and a conflict concerning it within Realist ranks in the mid-1960s. Here the (mainly) North American Behaviouralists, armed with (Popperian) falsificationist techniques, sought to further distance Realist scholarship from the lingering metaphysics of the (mainly) British Traditionalists and their commitment to ambiguous "philosophical" concepts and themes. The second "great debate" petered out in the late 1960s with both

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24 The term Traditionalists will be capitalised here to designate it from the more common usage of the term throughout the thesis. This again is by no means an unproblematic term. It relates to that sector within Realism, primarily in Britain, which have represented their power politics "catechism" in a fashion
distinct from the mainstream of positivist-Realism in the United States. Characteristically, the Traditionalists (or Classical school of Realism) have emphasised historical and philosophical scholarship, rather than the explicit "scientific" approach dominant in the discipline since the early 1960s. I will outline my position on this issue in a number of ways throughout the thesis, but simply put, for now, I do not accept that the Traditionalist approach is fundamentally different from the "scientific" one, but maintain that it is a variation on it. The Traditionalism of Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau or Stanley Hoffmann, for example, is a variation on the positivist theme which reflects the differences of style, emphasis and tone within a philosophical perspective which resonates with the influences of early British empiricism, the Humean scepticism of the Enlightenment, Comtean and Durkheimian data-gathering fetishes of the Nineteenth century and the contemporary concerns for falsificationism and "research programs". But the positivist story is more complex than this, to the extent that its principles of understanding and explanation remain powerful at its discursive intersections with a number of "alternative" perspectives, including the neo-Kantian and hermeneutic perspectives of a Weber or a Mannheim which have seeped into Anglo-American social theory offering a measure of interpretive sensitivity amid the explicit search for "value freedom". Traditionalist-Realism in this regard represents the "other side" of the explicit positivist coin, repudiating the "methodological" orientations of the post-Logical Positivist era, but continuing nevertheless to frame the questions it asks of the world in terms of the phenomenalist and nominalist perspectives on "knowing", which are a defining characteristic of positivist theory and practice. The result is a less harsh but no less committed rendition of a modernist ontology set in terms of a series of dualisms and dichotomies (subject/object, fact/value, theory/practice, is/ought) which afford "meaning" to a Realist world of order/anarchy, Realism/idealism, domestic/international, and a Realist "history" defined in terms of "recurrence and repetition". One of the implications of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations is that the Traditionalists have never seriously reflected upon the discursive connections with their "scientific" counterparts. Hedley Bull's rather superficial attack on the behaviouralists in the second "great debate" of the 1960s was enough to convince both sides that nothing more could be said of value on the dispute between them. See Bull, "International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach", World Politics XVIII (1966), pp.361-377, reprinted in, Contending Approaches to International Relations edited by Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). Herein lies one of the silences and limitations of International Relations. R.B.J. Walker has summed up the situation well enough with his insight that in the second "great debate" a:

version of a more or less decrepit [British] empiricism...primarily inductive and idiosyncratic in orientation [was pitted against] a predominantly American version of the same [positivist] empiricist tradition...which favoured a more deductive approach and which drew upon pragmatism and logical positivism.


In the period since the 1970s the developmental story has been renewed, albeit in slightly different form. Now, it is suggested, the era of positivist Realist dominance is effectively over and the International Relations field is, almost literally, the site of a hundred (theoretical) flowers blooming. The third disciplinary stage, consequently, is the stage of competing paradigms, of conflicting clusters of theory, of Globalism, Pluralism, Structuralism and of a resurgent International Political Economy. This is the age of Complex Interdependence and Transnationalism, of post-behaviouralism and/or post-positivism, and, more latterly, of Regime Theory, Hegemonic Stability Theory and in more general terms of neo-Realism.

In this third and current developmental stage, however, the International Relations community has become engaged in a "great debate" unlike anything that has preceded it. As a consequence, it has been confronted with the kind of challenges to its self understanding and identity which, previously, it has either ignored or proclaimed marginal to the reality of an international environment, distinguished from its domestic counterpart by the anarchy "out there". It has, for example, been confronted with the proposition that its disciplinary self understanding, its image of a linear rational development - from the crudity of power politics Realism to the nuanced theoretical sensitivities of neo-Realism - is largely illusory. Or, to return to Rothstein's characterisation of events in the early 1970s, the proposition, from many quarters in the

Third Debate, is that power politics Realism is still very much in style in academic circles and that it is not only practitioners who are unconcerned by the "inconsistencies and anomalies" that permeate their understanding of the world they seek to explain in Realist terms.

This does not suggest that there have been no worthwhile attempts to confront the complex matrix of problems faced by International Relations scholars in the contemporary period. Nor does it simply dismiss the efforts of those who have sought to open up Realist theory and practice in one way or another in recent years. What it suggests is that while some of these attempts have shown themselves capable of producing interesting and important insight, they have, ultimately, closed off our capacity to ask "different" and more profound questions; to construct genuinely alternative interpretations about global life in the last part of the Twentieth Century. This, as a number of critical commentators have argued, in their different ways, is because such approaches do not question profoundly enough the issue of how, as Rothstein put it, a positivist-Realist approach "determines the categories" by which the world is understood or how it comes to dominate "the state of mind" of intellectuals and policy makers and "condition the political climate" generally.27 As a consequence, mainstream International Relations scholarship in the 1990s, for all its developmental claims to the contrary, remains fundamentally incarcerated in the positivist-Realist framework that characterised its understanding of the world "out there" in the 1940s and 1950s.

This is obviously a theme of some importance for this thesis and between Chapters Five and Nine, in particular, it will receive more comprehensive and more direct treatment. At this point, however, John Vasquez's contribution to the debate might illustrate the complexity and significance of this issue, and why it requires serious attention in terms of the broader issue of the "unwritten preface".

In the most comprehensive survey of the discipline yet undertaken, Vasquez in *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (1983) indicated clearly enough the major problems associated with understanding and explaining the real nature of contemporary international life, from a Realist perspective. More significantly, he did so in the falsificationist terms which, since 1945, have been dominant at the (North) American disciplinary centre. His findings, as one commentator put it, hit at Realism "like an Exocet missile." Constructing a data set of nearly 8,000 Realist hypotheses, Vasquez proceeded to then "test" them for their accuracy, their capacity for prediction and their "scientific" significance. Vasquez found, for example, that in terms of accuracy, no less than 93.1% of Realist hypotheses were falsified. On their capacity to predict behaviour at the international level the findings were just as devastating, to the extent that Vasquez concluded that, in the area that ought to have shown most impressive results - the power politics premises of Morgenthau - the actual situation was that "the central power politics framework [is] among the the poorest performers in actually predicting behaviour". And on the question of "scientific importance", only 157 of the nearly 8,000 hypotheses failed to be falsified, and of these exceptions, nearly 70 percent were considered "trivial".

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29 Banks, "Where Are We Now?", p.222.


31 Ibid, p.194.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid, p.199. And as P.M. Morgan in, *Theories and Approaches to International Politics* (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1987), p.26, pointed out, the Traditionalists can take no heart whatsoever from Vasquez's findings even if they attempt to detach themselves from his American approach. The point is that, as Vasquez made clear, the premises that were being "tested" were Traditionalist premises "to a large extent quantitative international relations has been using the new behavioural techniques to reformulate and test propositions present in the Traditionalist literature".

35
Setting aside the quantitative idiom at the end of his study Vasquez made clearer the dangers associated with the dominant mode of understanding in International Relations. He concluded, for example, that "as an image of the world employed by policy makers, power politics promotes certain kind of behaviour and often leads to self fulfilling prophecies". Drawing out some of the implications of this situation on the central question of the discipline - the question of war and peace - Vasquez had a chilling statement to make on the orthodox answer - the alliance system and balance of power. Here, he maintained, the most likely (statistical) outcome of a state centric, anarchical theory in power politics practice is war, not peace. His findings were that:

power politics is an image of the world that that encourages behaviour that helps bring about war...[thus] the attempt to balance power is itself part of the very behaviour that that leads to war...[Consequently] It is now clear that alliances do not produce peace but lead to war.

The value of Vasquez's study, apart from its comprehensiveness, is that it comes from inside the dominant (positivist) political science mainstream that since World War Two has largely determined the boundaries of International Relations. As such it represents a relatively reflective brand of positivism which fits the description above of much so called post-positivist/post-Realist work since the 1970s. That is, it is capable of important insight and of opening up debate to the point where many of the orthodox "anomalies" are exposed, but then, suspicious of the implications of moving off from its scientific foundation, it acts to close off debate, to effectively marginalise any fundamental challenge to that foundation. Vasquez, accordingly, having devastated the positivist-Realist orthodoxy in terms derived from Kuhn, in particular, proposed that, "the primary problem lies not in the research methodology of the field but in the

36See for example Ferguson and Mansbach, "Beyond Celebration and Despair"; Beirsteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations"; and Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International Organization: The State of the Art on an Art of the State".
incorrectness of the [Realist] hypotheses that are being tested". Moreover, in offering advice on the future direction for the discipline, he suggested, promisingly, that "international relations inquiry should become more interdisciplinary than it has been", only to orient his interdisciplinary perspective, finally, toward the "political science theory and research" approach of David Easton.

The foregoing, I think, is a useful example of the kind of restricted approach that has led to much frustration among those within International Relations hoping for a more genuinely open regime of thought in the wake of Vietnam, and the other "anomalies" in the Western world view in the 1970s. In this case it is not just the reference to Easton that is significant cause for frustration as much as Vasquez's unwillingness to confront the questions he raised, in more penetratingly critical terms. The question raised by the alliance issue is a case in point. Here, having undermined the Realist approach at its core and shown it to be both inadequate and highly dangerous, Vasquez is drawn to the proposition that "since it is now known that alliances...do not bring about peace, the theoretically interesting question is what causes actors to seek alliances". Having raised the question, however, Vasquez effectively retreated to the positivist theoretical "hard core" to begin to answer it, postulating (predictably) the need for more precise (scientific) methodological procedures. What he did not do is what much Third Debate literature has urged upon the discipline in general - to seriously re-address the way the questions are posed before assuming a foundational framework for any answers.

In Vasquez' case, however, there is never the attempt to confront the possibility that "what causes actors to seek alliances" has to do with the way they identify themselves


38 Ibid, p.223. The significance of this will be developed further in the chapter to follow and in Chapter Six when the influence of behaviouralism is discussed. Easton, of course, was a major figure in the "behaviouralist revolution" in (mainly) North American social theory during the 1960s in particular. His major work is, probably, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971).

as (sovereign state) actors and understand their relationship to the world "out there". In other words what Vasquez failed to do, in his otherwise remarkable study, is question the connection between his own approach, set upon the scientific premises of observation and testing, and the positivism underpinning the frame of explanatory reference for International Relations in general, in which the world appears as an (objectified) realm of anarchy characterised by the utilitarian behaviour of individuals states, either systemically or contingently presented. This is a connection that has been urged by those in the Third Debate emphasising the need for more sophisticated inquiry into metatheoretical issues.40

It is argued, consequently, that for all their surface erudition, the Traditionalist heirs of Morgenthau and Carr continue to present their "historical and philosophical" accounts of reality in terms which substitute universalised and essentialist propositions of (anarchical) "recurrence and repetition" for serious historical and philosophical inquiry.41 Moreover, it is charged, in the face of major "anomalies", the pursuit of scientific legitimacy for International Relations goes on, as Tooze suggested, articulated within neo-Realism as part of a rather dubious amalgam of state centric politics and neo-classical economics.42 Commentators such as Mervyn Frost have, in this circumstance, appealed to both "classical" and "scientific" Realists to go beyond the " positivist bias" at the core of their analysis which so limits its insights. The problem, argued Frost, is that both Realist articulations:

40Vasquez's study ended at the end of the 1970s. His findings on the continuing dominance of positivist-Realism were affirmed by Alker and Beirsteker in, "The Dialectics of World Order".


seek to verify their conclusions by reference to the "facts" which are in some sense "hard" and there for all to see (i.e. ascertaining the facts does not require an interpretative effort on the part of the investigator and the facts are ascertainable by the investigator without his having previously adopted any particular theory), and the links between conclusions and evidence (or hypothesis and verifying data) are intersubjectively verifiable. Both stress that the results of their studies do not derive from subjective, relative or conventional judgements...[and] common to both approaches is a radical distinction between the status accorded to factual judgements, to which the discipline of international relations should aspire and that accorded to value judgements.43

This issue has been raised from a slightly different angle by Stephen George in his commentary on the Traditional/"scientific" debate within Realism.44 Focusing on the Traditionalists of the "English School", in particular, George argued that Traditionalism is committed to the view that "the only legitimate way to study international relations is the examination of concrete historical situations"; these studies to be carried out "according to essentially subjective and intuitive procedures". The problem with this position, he noted, was that it represented, for its advocates, an "anti-theoretical" perspective which merely described the world the way it "is". This, suggested George, has led to an "unselfconscious" body of scholarship:

committed to the empiricist belief that the task of the historian is to tell the story of what really happened without imposing anything of himself on the narrative.45

The exemplar position in this regard was Martin Wight's, whose unselfconsciousness led to promulgations about the "recalcitrance" of International Relations to be theorised about, from a historiographical perspective rooted in positivist presuppositions about the distinction between "theorist (subject) and the world (object) "out there". In this context Wight came to a series of conclusions about the "real" nature of International Relations. He concluded, for example, that International Relations was ultimately the realm of

43Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations, p.10.


"recurrence and repetition" rather than progressive change.\textsuperscript{46} He concluded, furthermore, that this historical pattern - the enduring reality of recurrence and repetition - might be understood by Realists in the contemporary period via the textual utterances of three groupings or categories of thinkers: the Machiavellians (i.e. Realists) the Grotians (i.e. Rationalists) and the Kantians (i.e. Revolutionaries).\textsuperscript{47} It was in relation to this "essentialist monologue"\textsuperscript{48} that Wight organised his history and its "great texts". And it was from this (objectified) perspective that contemporary Traditionalists were directed to the (essentialised) textual source of the enduring wisdom about International Relations contained in the permanent debate between Realists, Rationalists and (Kantian) Revolutionaries. Evaluating the results of this approach to "history and philosophy" John Fitzpatrick has argued that for all its (rather embroidered) erudition it was a "partisan" story that sought to "universalise" the Traditional (Realist) image of the European state system and to identify the perspectives of International Relations per se, "with the perspectives of a great power elite".\textsuperscript{49} Indeed, as Wight's protege, Hedley Bull, admitted, Wight's exemplary Traditionalism was predicated on the assumption that


\textsuperscript{47}Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?". Whatever Wight meant to illustrate by this trichotomy it has become another theme in Traditionalist literature which has been represented as somehow different from the dichotomised format of orthodox (American) Realism per se. It is difficult to understand how "difference" can be seriously claimed on this issue when what Wight did was to merely replicate the simplistic realist/idealist structure and to place another universalised category in its centre. The "Grotian" category might have afforded a mellower tone to power politics Realism and to Traditionalist analysis of the anarchical world "out there", but it did nothing to confront the problem of "primitive" dichotomised thinking which the Traditionalists were critical of in relation to their "scientific" counterparts. See also footnote 53.

\textsuperscript{48}This is R.B.J. Walker's theme in, "The Prince and the Pauper".

\textsuperscript{49}Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations", p.47. This is a theme taken up also by David Boucher who has maintained that Wight's general understanding of the "order" issue in Western philosophy represents a highly problematic and rather simplistic reading of a complex literature, see Boucher, "The Character of the History of the Philosophy of International Relations and the Case of Edmund Burke", \textit{Review of International Studies} 17 (1991), pp.127-148.
there was a "rhythm or pattern in the history of ideas which is there, waiting to be uncovered".50

This did not lead Bull, or Traditionalists in general, to a critical reappraisal of a scholar who personified the "alternative" to (North) American Realism. It resulted instead in the impotent posturing of the second "great debate", and the continuation of the "positivist bias" across the Realist spectrum. In Bull's case it led to an influential and often incisive contribution to the International Relations debate that was, nevertheless, limited by Traditionalist unselfconsciousness on the "theory" question. Accordingly, while seeking more sensitive answers to central Realist problems - i.e. of order and anarchy - Bull's (meta)theoretical commitments saw his questions framed in such a way that his analytical efforts were severely undermined. While seeking, therefore, to provide an alternative to the explicit positivist-Realism of his counterparts in the United States, Bull was drawn to the conclusion that anarchy was "the central fact of international life" and, most importantly, that it was the "starting point of theorising" about International Relations.51 This notion of an anarchical realm, beyond theorising, the point at which theorising "starts", is a typical example of the "positivist bias" noted by Frost. It was noted too by Jones, who perceived in Bull's work an objectified and essentialised notion of history and philosophy in which "time and change [were] a troublesome irrelevance".52 And it was noted from another angle by Fitzpatrick who has maintained that Bull "remained imprisoned in the restricted categories" of Wight's Eurocentric and elitist model to the extent "that the only analytical categories available" to Bull were those centred on an enduring dichotomy between the "great powers and the rest".53


52 See Jones, "The English School", p.10.

53 Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations", p.46. On some of the other the silences and omissions in Bull's thinking see H. Suganami, "Reflections on the Domestic Analogy: The Case of Bull, Beitz and Linklater", Review of International Studies 12(2) (1986), pp.145-158. This is
It has been against this kind of background that the new critical approaches of the Third Debate have appealed for a broader, more sophisticated approach to questions of how the dominant framework of the Realist "catechism" remains so pervasive in an era which has ostensibly cast off its influences. Associated with these appeals has been the related concern to confront the International Relations discipline with issues, themes and approaches which, elsewhere have enabled Anglo-American scholarship to deal in a more sensitive and tolerant way with the problems of knowledge and human society in the last quarter of the Twentieth Century, in the age of "post-Realism" and "post-positivism".

another dimension of the issue raised earlier in relation to Traditional (Classical) scholarship (see footnotes 24 and 47) and it requires a further comment here. The major focus of attention in this work will be on the centre of the International Relations discipline, in the United States. But as indicated here this does not mean that the peripheral outposts of International Relations theory and practice, in Britain and Australia, for example, are not part of the discussion to follow. On the contrary, as Frost's quotation suggested and Berki's early commentary and Walker's note on the second "great debate" (footnote 24) indicated, they are integral to it. This is not to ignore or remain insensitive to the claim, by the British, in particular, that theirs is a fundamentally different perspective that cannot be included in this way. It is to acknowledge that there are differences, of style, tone and emphasis (e.g. international "society") and that British scholarship has, on occasions, offered more sensitive insights on questions generally dismissed as "philosophical" by those at the hard edge of the "behaviouralist revolution". My position, nevertheless, is consistent with that of Vasquez, Frost, Walker, Fitzpatrick and R.N. Berki in suggesting that at the fundamental level, there is no great difference between the British (and Anglophone) positions and the "scientific" approach of American Realism. My suggestion, rather, is that this notion of difference is another site at which the lack of serious attention to the "unwritten preface" is evident, that the British, for all their "philosophical and historical" tendencies have never seriously contemplated the impact upon their thinking of questions of essentialism, and universalism and the logocentric structure of their "philosophy" in general. Accordingly, for all the professed "difference" of a Wight or a Bull, there is still the rather crude resort to the world "out there", to what Ashley has called the Anarchy Problematique and to an essentialised, ahistorical notion of "recurrence and repetition". Stephen George's perspective offers a clue as to the unacknowledged positivism at the core of the "historical" and "philosophical" approach of the Traditionalists. My own work, in recent times has sought to add a dimension to this argument. See "Some Thoughts on the Givenness of Everyday Life in Australian International Relations Theory and Practice". I will try to explain this position more precisely as the work develops. Chapter Two on the modernism/positivism issue might help in this regard, so too the discussions of Verstehen scholarship in Chapter Three, and the more direct commentaries in Chapters Five and Six. It is acknowledged, nevertheless, that this is an issue that warrants a more comprehensive argument than it is to receive in this thesis with its orientation towards the "unwritten preface" at the centre of the discipline.

In particular, it is suggested, more serious analytical attention must be paid to the historical and philosophical circumstances which saw positivism emerge as the foremost articulation of the Enlightenment pursuit of a rational scientific "foundation" for modern human life, for an "indubitable element of human existence that can 'ground' human knowledge". Hence, in recent times, a range of critical works aimed at the way in which the Realist mainstream of the International Relations discipline has framed the questions it asks of the international arena and has legitimated its answers. Hence, the increasingly critical responses to the dichotomised crudity of Realist scholarship which, in the face of generations of counter argument and vibrant debate in other areas of the Humanities, continues to represent its theory and practice in universalist and essentialist terms - as "corresponding" to an (anarchical) and unchanging reality - detached from and largely irrelevant to the complexities of domestic theory and practice. Hence, also, the growing frustration at the tendency within the discipline to fail to seriously confront the simplicity of its approach to fundamental analytical issues concerning, for example, the relationship of "knower" and "known", the nature of individuality, of (rational) choice, of reading "history", of power and of change. Hence, the attempts in the 1980s and 1990s to speak in a more sophisticated and insightful manner about disciplinary "givens" such as the sovereign state, the utilitarian nature of the state system, and the overall closure of an approach to theory and practice rendered static by an uncritical adherence to Western, post-Renaissance, historical and intellectual experience.

Simply put, then, the Third Debate in International Relations has seen a dissent against a discipline seemingly unwilling to confront the most basic questions of its approach to theory and practice, in a period in which the dangers of narrow and intolerant thought and behaviour are ever more evident. This dissent I have described elsewhere as

Allen and Unwin, 1986); and Ian Craib, Modern Social Theory: From Parsons to Habermas (Sussex: Harvester, 1984).


56See in particular Richard Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", in International/Intertextual Relations eds. Der Derian and Shapiro.
the search by Critical Social Theorists of International Relations for some "thinking space" within those dominant post-Enlightenment frameworks of theory and practice by which we have increasingly come to understand and identify ourselves and the "real" nature of the modern world.57 This Critical Social Theory term will be used throughout this thesis to refer to that form of dissent within the Third Debate which has most profoundly sought to challenge the closure of the Realist orthodoxy. At this point I want to explain more fully what this dissent represents by further introducing Critical Social Theory themes as they relate to the Third Debate in International Relations and to the issue of the "unwritten preface". I want also to begin to make explicit some of the, as yet, rather vague references to my own position in this debate, and in the thesis in general.

Critical Social Theory

The term social theory, as it is to be utilised in this thesis, is perhaps best defined by Anthony Giddens, who has described a "body of theory":

shared in common by all the the disciplines concerned with the behaviour of human beings. It concerns not only sociology...but anthropology, economics, politics, human geography, psychology - the whole range of the social sciences...[I]t connects through to literary criticism on the one hand and to the philosophy of natural science on the other.58

More precisely, the notion of social theory, in this context, refers to that formal structuring of knowledge about "the behaviour of human beings" that has become the disciplinary core of the Western Humanities in the last century or so. The notion of Critical Social Theory, in this regard, relates to the widespread and diverse literature which, for the past three decades, in particular, has posed fundamental challenges to the "givens" of social theory orthodoxy, across the disciplinary spectrum. Speaking of


58Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory, pp.5-6.
Critical Social Theory, in these terms, Richard Bernstein has nominated scholars as diverse as Feyerabend, Gadamer, Rorty, Habermas and Foucault, as having contributed significantly to a "new sensibility and universe of discourse" and an "open and extended dialogue" in Anglo-American scholarship.\(^5^9\)

Acknowledging the tensions and differences between such contributions, Bernstein has emphasised, also, the "similarities and shared resonances" of their critical enterprise. All, in their different ways, he suggested, were engaged in dissent against the dominant images of reality in the modern world projected by the major post-Cartesian theoretical traditions (e.g. Liberalism/Marxism) centred on the figure of "rational man" and the pursuit of a rational science of human society.\(^6^0\) All, in this context, sought to challenge what they perceived as the intellectual imperialism of the "spectator theory of knowledge" derived from the (Cartesian) foundations of modern thought and crystallised in the European Enlightenment.\(^6^1\) All were concerned to critically re-address the dualised and dichotomised "givens" of a post-Enlightenment frame of metatheoretical understanding, expressed, most potently, in the dominant positivist discourse of contemporary social science.

This has resulted, generally, in a Critical Social Theory approach which combines a genuine humility in front of knowledge, with a critical perspective which accepts no unquestioned givens, which takes nothing for granted, which acknowledges nothing axiomatically, which questions all presuppositions, which challenges all arbitrarily imposed boundaries, which always asks how and why. In the face of orthodoxy and traditional acquiescence, it represents, as intimated earlier, the face and voice of dissent.

\(^5^9\) Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.2.

\(^6^0\) The term "man" will be used here as it has been by International Relations and Western traditions of thought in general- i.e. in privileged terms. I use the term in this way not as an insensitive acquiescence to the dominant discourse but to highlight the gendered nature of the theory and practice dealt with here, and a major silence on the International Relations agenda in particular. On this question, more generally see A. Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and J. Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

\(^6^1\) Ibid, p.1.
This dissent, for all the negativity associated with it in some quarters\textsuperscript{62} is infused with a eminently positive direction and critical purpose which, simply put, is to prise open some space within orthodox social theory, in order that voices otherwise marginalised, be heard; that questions otherwise suppressed, be asked; that points of analytical closure be opened for debate; that themes, issues and arguments effectively dismissed from the mainstream be seriously reconsidered and re-evaluated. It has been with this purpose in mind that Critical Social Theory scholars have sought to break through the limits of our understanding of the present, and go beyond the boundaries of a dominant knowledge form set upon the notion of a single unified reality and its associated methodologies. It is in relation to this critical purpose that Critical Social Theorists have sought to open up some space so that we might begin to think in "different" ways, to explore the possibilities effectively closed off by orthodox notions of the "art of the possible". It has, to paraphrase Foucault, been the search for thinking space that has given the new conversation across the social sciences its critical energy, purpose and direction.\textsuperscript{63} It has been a search of many paths, many directions, but, at the intersections, Critical Social Theory scholarship has been engaged in a shared enthusiasm for the insights of alternative explanations of how we got to the present and why we think the way we do about the contemporary world. At these intersections, consequently, there has been renewed interest in the dissenting voices of thinkers and themes which might enhance the search for "thinking space".

There has, accordingly, been a renewed interest in the later works of Wittgenstein and others who have emphasised the significance of language in "making" social reality. Interest too has increased concerning the critical interpretivism of scholars such as Ricoeur and Gadamer, and their dissent against the one sided psychologism associated with much hermeneutics scholarship. Enhanced interest has been shown in philosophy


of science debates, particularly on the question of science as a (paradigmatic) sociological enterprise taking place between competing speech communities. In recent times too, themes derived from Marxist discourse have received renewed attention, particularly the anti-vanguardist Marxism of Gramsci, and the Critical Theory of Habermas and two generations of Frankfurt School thinking which, while retaining elements of its Marxist legacy has sought a different kind of synthesis between philosophy and empirical research. Most significantly for this present work, there has emerged, also, a postmodernist dimension within Critical Social Theory literature, which has confronted the disciplinary orthodoxy of Anglo-American social theory and modern thought, in general, with the dissenting voice of Nietzsche and, more directly, the deconstructivist strategies and "politics of representation" theme associated with scholars such as Foucault and Derrida.

In its (belated) transference to International Relations, the Critical Social Theory challenge to the reigning (Realist) orthodoxy, has resonated with the complexity, diversity and tensions associated with the larger interdisciplinary debates. Accordingly, when referring to the Critical Social Theory scholarship in International Relations, I have in mind the contributions of a whole range of scholars, including Richard Ashley, Rob Walker, Robert Cox, Mervyn Frost, James Der Derian, Michael Dillon, Michael Shapiro, David Campbell and Bradley Klein, all, in their different ways, seeking to open "thinking space" in a previously alien and closed discursive territory. For all their differences, however, they and their critical enterprises are connected by their "celebratory" attitude within the Third Debate in International Relations. This is an attitude which will be endorsed in a variety of ways throughout this thesis.

Celebrating the Third Debate: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations

Emphasising the parallels between the new Critical Social Theory challenges in International Relations, and the "intellectual ferment that the other social sciences are
presently undergoing", Josef Lapid noted that, for the first time in any serious manner, the issues at stake included:

some of the most highly prized premises of Western academic discourse concerning the nature of our social knowledge, its acquisition, and its utility - including shibboleths such as "truth", "rationality", "objectivity", "reality" and "consensus".64

In particular, Lapid highlighted the significance of critical debates in International Relations, aimed at:

the empiricist-positivist promise for a cumulative behavioural science [which] recently has forced scholars from nearly all the social disciplines to reexamine the ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations of their scientific endeavours.65

In these circumstances, he argued, a new agenda was emerging in International Relations which replicated that of the interdisciplinary debate to the extent that the literature of the Third Debate now resonated with the four major analytical responses noted by Anthony Giddens in the broader social theory context.66 The first of these responses comprised the pall of "despair" which Giddens perceived descending over much mainstream scholarship in recent years. Among the "despairing", he suggested, were those increasingly anxious about the interest in metatheoretical inquiry among Anglo-American scholars. Accordingly, the "despairing" response has been characterised by appeals for the retention of orthodox attitudes and social scientific research methods. The second response, deemed "dogmatic" by Giddens, has seen attempts to counter the increased uncertainty of the times with a more strident reassertion of the enduring wisdom of disciplinary "great texts" and/or the great traditions of Western thought. If the first two responses have been largely negative in tone and implication, the third, invariably the most controversial, has been positive, indeed enthusiastically so, in "celebrating" the lack of intellectual security and foundational certainty across the

64 Lapid, "The Third Debate", p.236.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
disciplines, as an opportunity to open up space for greater diversity, understanding, tolerance and "difference". The final response, which represents Giddens' own position (and that of Lapid) offers qualified support for this "celebratory" position, but mistrusting its (perceived) nihilistic tendency, has sought a more systematic "reconstruction" of disciplinary thinking and attitudes in the future.

All four responses are evident in the literature of the Third Debate, as Lapid suggested. Those, for example, who have "despaired" have done so, largely, in terms which echo the concerns of their counterparts in the interdisciplinary debates. There have, consequently, been widespread lamentations at the loss of cohesion and theoretical direction in International Relations, as "established patterns" become hazy or disappear beneath "trenchant criticism". There has been obvious frustration at the demise of "guiding principles" and, even in the most elastic of analytical spaces, there has been exasperation at the lack of clear direction in formulating new "paradigmatic" questions and answers. Some, meanwhile, have pronounced a state of absolute theoretical "chaos". Typically, the "despairing" responses has concentrated on the problems of the overly "theoretical" and/or "philosophical" nature of the new critical literature. Calling, therefore, for "concrete" research practices rather than abstract "theorising" have been prominent figures in the North American International Relations community, such as

67 See Lapid, "Quo Vadis International Relations?", p.84.


71 For a despairing perspective see P. M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics; and on the "chaos" of the contemporary period see Banks, "Where Are We Now?"
Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane, Thomas Beiesteker and James Rosenau, all, to one degree or another, and with different degrees of empathy, urging the retention of social science traditions in the face of philosophical abstractionism.\textsuperscript{72}

The "dogmatic" (second) response has been articulated in International Relations somewhat differently than in the broader context, where the retreat to the great texts of a Mill, a Weber or a Marx is something of a disciplinary tradition in itself. In International Relations, however, the "dogmatism" has taken the form of a renewed search for security and certainty in, for example, Kenneth Waltz's retreat to the universalist axioms of structuralist Realism,\textsuperscript{73} Robert Gilpin's attempts to relocate the central questions of war and peace in rational choice terms,\textsuperscript{74} and the decade long concern of neo-Realist scholars, in general, to re-establish the intellectual and institutional superiority of the (American) "hegemon".\textsuperscript{75} Here, nevertheless, the resort to the "great texts" of a Thucydides and a Machiavelli has increasingly marked the "dogmatic" attempt to accord contemporary credibility to a Realism in crisis.\textsuperscript{76} The "restructuring" response has been evident enough too, in, for example, the "synthetic" Critical Theory approach of Andrew Linklater and Mark Hoffman, and in the sophisticated positivism of Lapid, Vasquez and Ferguson and Mansbach.\textsuperscript{77} In Chapters Eight and Nine, in particular, more attention will be paid to responses such as these. For the moment, however, I want to concentrate on the


\textsuperscript{73}Kenneth Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics}.

\textsuperscript{74}See Robert Gilpin, \textit{War and Change in World Politics}, and \textit{The Political Economy of International Relations}.

\textsuperscript{75}See for example, the discussions in Keohane, \textit{After Hegemony}.

\textsuperscript{76}See Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, p.66; and Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", in \textit{Neorealism and Its Critics} ed. Keohane, pp.507-508.

\textsuperscript{77}Lapid, "\textit{Quo Vadis} International Relations?"; Linklater, "Realism, Marxism and Critical International Relations Theory"; Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate"; Hoffman, "Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory", \textit{Millennium} 17 (1988), pp.91-95; Ferguson and Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair"; and Vasquez, \textit{The Power of Power Politics}. 

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"celebratory" scholarship of Critical Social Theory scholars in the Third Debate and the particular significance it has for the arguments to follow in this thesis.

Its most immediate significance is that Critical Social Theorists, invoking "celebratory" attitudes and approaches, have provided some of the most stimulating contributions to the "new universe of discourse" in International Relations that Bernstein proclaimed integral to Western social theory, in general, in the past three decades. Even more significantly, perhaps, Critical Social Theory scholarship has taken International Relations into new intellectual territory, not in order to score cheap philosophical points over a Realism hardly able to defend itself, but so that dominant and dangerous discourse - intrinsic to international practice - be increasingly and more effectively challenged. The "celebratory" response is, in this sense, concerned to expose a regime of "theoretical" closure intrinsic to the everyday "practice" of power politics, as articulated from the Gulf, to the flattened Barrios of Panama City, from Tiananmen to Timor.

In the 1980s and 1990s, therefore, at a time of both great dangers and great opportunities in global politics, there has emerged in the "celebratory" works of the Third Debate a more profound concern than ever before in International Relations, to question the procedures by which the Realist orthodoxy (in particular) frames, not only its (power politics) answers, but its questions. It has, in this regard, taken seriously the challenge thrown out to the broader social theory community by Jane Flax in 1981, when she exhorted them to:

*elucidate and examine the most prominent paradigm of reality, its characteristic institutions, the social and political forces which stimulate and support its modes of rationality, and to explore alternatives to the givenness of everyday life.*

The challenge posed by the "celebratory" literature has been summed up best (and ironically) perhaps by a Traditional-Realist, such as Kal Holsti, who, lamenting the

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78 Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*, p.2.

increasing "disarray" within a once coherent International Relations community, acknowledged that Realism and the (modern, Western) tradition from which it is derived, is now facing the kind of interrogative pressure previously unknown in the discipline. As Holsti has put it:

In the past decade, the three-centuries-long intellectual consensus which organised philosophical speculation, guided empirical research, and provided at least hypothetical answers to the critical questions about international politics has broken down.80

At the epicentre of the "broken down" discipline, maintained Holsti, was a multifaceted challenge to the "assumptions and world views upon which [Realism] is based". Consequently, in the turbulent times of the 1980s and 1990s, the critical voices raised against the Realist orthodoxy have:

raised new kinds of questions about international politics, questions which were not relevant to the kinds of problems contemplated by our intellectual ancestors and most of those working within the realist, or classical tradition.81

Whilst accepting the general thrust of Holsti's observation here - that the challenge to the "assumptions and world views" of Realism is causing tremors of uncertainty in International Relations - this thesis will take issue with the attendant proposition, that the questions raised by critical voices now, were "not relevant" in the period of unequivocal Realist dominance, from the end of World War Two until around the early 1970s. To suggest, moreover, as Holsti does, that the "behavioural revolution has had little to do with the present debates", is merely to underline the urgency of the need for a "preface" in International Relations, if only to put an end to the "sense of well being [and] satisfaction" which Holsti noted as characteristic of the Realist golden age.82

This thesis argues that it was this very sense of "well being and satisfaction" on the part of International Relations scholars, during periods of heightened intellectual

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid, p.2
activity such as that brought on by the behavioural revolution, that has increased the sense of disarray among Realists, in particular, in the 1990s. It further argues, in this regard, that when faced with the opportunity, in the 1960s, to think seriously about the questions raised by the behaviouralists in their dispute with the Traditionalists, the discipline settled instead for the shallow, the superficial, the easy polemic. Moreover, and most importantly, if Holsti is correct about the scope of the Third Debate - that it represents a challenge to a "three centuries long intellectual consensus which organised philosophical speculation [and] guided empirical research" in Western thought - then what is required is a broader engagement with modern Western thought than has yet been attempted by International Relations scholarship.83

In seeking to write a "preface" for International Relations, this thesis seeks to make a contribution of this kind, by opening up for debate a whole range of themes, issues and questions that might assist the contemporary attempt to come to grips with a challenge of the magnitude described by Holsti. It does so in following the lead of much Critical Social Theory literature of the "celebratory" mode, which has been concerned to confront the dominant images of contemporary human society by locating them as part of much broader framework of understanding derived, in particular, from the rational scientific postulates of European modernity.

For all its diversity, consequently, the Critical Social Theory literature evokes a shared sense of dissatisfaction and frustration with a Realist led discipline which, in the

83One point is worth explicit comment here on the "new genre" of scholarship in International Relations. It is that at one level at least it is not "new" at all. It represents instead the attempt to confront the International Relations discipline with issues, themes and questions that elsewhere have been part of the analytical agenda for a considerable time. Nor is its critical concern with modernity and the problems of the dominant Western traditions "new" in the broader context. It has been a theme at the heart of both critical (e.g., Frankfurt School) and Conservative (e.g. Leo Strauss, Arendt and Oakeshott) scholarship for many years. Its significance now, to reiterate, is that for the first time in any serious way these broader concerns are being directed to the International Relations discipline which for so long, to its detriment, has remained effectively isolated from the "great debates" of social theory; see my "Some Thoughts on the Givenness of Everyday Life". It should be noted also, that rarely, in these critical works, is it suggested that we simply jettison images that, since the Enlightenment, have provided the dominant (meta) theoretical framework by which we have understood ourselves and the modern world. The purpose, more specifically, is to confront the disciplinary mainstream with the limitations of its perspectives in order that International Relations scholars and practitioners, be more capable of dealing with a world in which, more than ever, reductionist grand theories, centred on crude dichotomies, are both inappropriate and dangerous.
wake of the defeat of the Western superpower in Vietnam, a fundamental restructuring of the world economy, the continuing misery and volatility of Third World societies and the dangers and opportunities of the post-Gorbachev era, continues, generally, to approach the global arena in terms of a caricatured and limited agenda of understanding.

At one level, of course, the source of this caricature is simply enough located, in the crude dichotomies of the power politics Realism, dominant since the end of World War Two. At this level it is worth concentrating, for a moment, on what, in retrospect, is one of the most potent utterances in Realist textual history which has since become a site of philosophical ritual for a generation of International Relations scholars and policy analysts. Represented by E.H.Carr as a criterion by which a Realist attitude and approach could be distinguished from "unreal" perspectives, it suggested that, in regard to International Relations "the function of thinking is to study a sequence of events which it is powerless to influence or alter".\(^{4}\) The point here is not that the commitment to a whole series of dichotomies (subject/object, fact/value, theory/practice) inherent in this statement is, by itself, or in isolation, the crux of Realist inadequacy or even the crudest articulation of its caricatured nature. The point, rather, as will be argued in more detail later, is that in the half century since The Twenty Years Crisis the positivist logic that, in that work, allowed for the separation of an (external) "sequence of events" from "thinking", has remained effectively unchallenged in the discipline Carr's words did so much to define. Indeed, in the ensuing years positivist approaches have received enhanced intellectual and institutional sustenance in some of the most influential of Realist texts, both explicitly and in implicit and unacknowledged form.

This is not just a matter of Morgenthau orienting a whole generation of scholars towards the "objective laws" of politics at the international level.\(^{5}\) Nor is it simply about that moment of major irony in the first "great debate", when Carr attacked the inadequacy

\(^{4}\)Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, p.10, emphasis added.

\(^{5}\)Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp.4-5.
of inter-war idealism on the basis that it was a narrow, ethnocentric approach, drawn uncritically from Western Enlightenment sources. It concerns too the nominally unrelated proposition of Knorr and Rosenau in 1969 that, in the dispute between Realists of the second "great debate", one point "command[ed] universal agreement, namely that it is useful and appropriate to dichotomize the various approaches to international phenomena". It is integral also to Michael Sullivan's conclusion that one of the problems with the critiques of Realism, in the 1970s, was that perhaps "their picture of the world...[was] at variance with the real world", and to James Rosenau's continuing insistence, in the mid 1980s, on "the basic tenets of empirical science which require that variables be specified and the analyst be ever mindful of the eventual need to observe and measure". And it concerns Kal Holsti's Traditionalist commentary, on the same period, which suggested that a new paradigm would not be unwelcome in the discipline if it passed the test which both scientific and Traditionalist-Realist scholarship had instigated. The test of acceptance, Holsti explained, required that any new approach was characterised by "logical consistency, the capacity to generate research, and reasonable correspondence with the observed facts of international politics".

The issue of caricature then, at this level, has to do with the question of positivism's multi-layered and continuing impact upon the International Relations discipline. More pertinently, perhaps, it concerns the question of how and why International Relations scholarship has remained committed to caricatured approaches to theory and practice that, across the Anglo-American disciplinary spectrum, have been subject to intense critique in the past three decades or more. The answer, from the Realist

86 Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, Chapters 3 and 4 in particular.
87 Knorr and Rosenau, Contending Approaches To International Relations, pp.13-14.
89 This is Rosenau's view in, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit Driven Actors in World Politics", p.553.
mainstream, is a predictable and well rehearsed one, of course, emanating as it does from the wisdom of previous "great debates". It is, simply put, that the discipline retains its distance from the broader debates because the theory and practice of International Relations is, by definition, fundamentally different from that in the "domestic" realm; the difference being the anarchical nature of international reality, which imposes the restricted premises of a power politics "art of the possible" upon the analyst and the policy maker. International Relations is in this way defined by the international/domestic dichotomy and, in a self affirming (logical) feedback loop, the theoretical boundaries of the debate are set in precisely the terms established by Carr, in which thinking subjects are faced by an (objectified) world of endemic anarchy "out there" which "they are "powerless to influence or alter".

In the Third Debate of the 1980s and 1990s, however, this is a no longer an irresistible logic even in a discipline so attuned to "disavow reflection" on the way it (metatheoretically) frames its questions and constructs its answers. Consequently, the concern to go beyond caricature, has seen critical scholars extend the International Relations agenda into some previously alien intellectual territory. This has seen an acknowledgement of the Third Debate as an intrinsic part of a "major reorientation in philosophy [that] has been occurring this century",91 centred on the attempt to:

make a decisive break from the comfortable, deeply ingrained and indeed addictive Western habit of making a rigid separation between subject and object, between the knower and the known.92

This, it is argued, is an issue of particular significance in International Relations, where the "addiction" has provided the "founding myth" of the discipline (e.g. the dichotomy of Realism and Idealism)93 and one of its points of greatest closure which, in the two earlier "great debates" effectively demarcated the boundaries of inquiry:

91 Walker, Political Theory and the Transformation of World Politics, p.4.

92 Ibid.

the point beyond which metatheoretical dispute need be pursued no further...
[at which] metatheoretical dispute have been, if not resolved, at least codified
and left in peace.94

It is, therefore, in seeking to pursue this particular metatheoretical dispute a good deal
further, that Critical Social Theorists have "celebrated" the extension and relocation of the
International Relations agenda in the Third Debate to the larger frame of critical reference
associated with the pursuit of a modern (rational-scientific) philosophy of human society,
in the post-Enlightenment period. And this too is the general thematic context in which
this thesis seeks to write a "preface" for International Relations, and explain, in as
comprehensive terms as possible, what the Critical Social Theory challenge to
International Relations is all about.

However, while I am in (some sense) privileging the "celebratory" perspective
here, I will not do so uncritically. This would violate both the spirit and the integrity of
the works in question and of my own ambition for the thesis. Consequently, while this
work seeks to open up questions effectively closed off by more mainstream approaches,
and while, in Chapters Eight and Nine, in particular, it will illustrate that there are
alternative perspectives worthy of serious consideration, it ultimately has no easy
answers to offer, no instant panaceas for an ailing discipline, no ready-made all-purpose
"alternative" Realism to supersede the outdated model. Instead, my position on the
question of alternatives is, perhaps, best explained by reference to the perspective
introduced in Berki's work at the commencement of this chapter, and then to the
influences of post-modernism upon this work.

The significance of Berki's scholarship, in this regard, is that while it was
designed to expose the inadequacies of a positivist-Realist approach to knowledge and
society, the alternative was not a simple Hegelian variant with similar totalising
characteristics. Rather, for Berki, the important issue was not the advocacy of some
simple dialectical counterpart to Realism, but the space opened by the careful application

94Ibid, pp.69-70.
of (non-teleological) dialectical themes to a major site of positivist closure. In this regard any adequate approach to political reality was one which remained "conscious of its own limitations" and which did not "strive after a deceptive kind of coherence by obliterating differences and forgetting limitations".95

This is a theme integral to post-modernist approaches within Critical Social Theory, otherwise opposed to any semblance of dialectical logic. In bringing to contemporary debates critical perspective honed in discourse analysis, genealogy, deconstructionism, and textuality, post-modernism has added a potent and profound dimension to the exposure of "primitive" theory and practice in International Relations, which eschews the traditional search for ultimate coherence, irreducible answers, and ready made alternatives. It seeks rather to problematise and open to critical inquiry the processes - historical, cultural and linguistic - which accord notions of coherence and irreducibility their "meaning", and which situates the search for "alternatives" as the raison d'etre of critical inquiry. More explanation is obviously required on a complex perspective such as this, and it will be forthcoming, in Chapter Four, where my reservations about some aspects of post-modernism will be aired, and in Chapter Nine, where different dimensions of the post-modernist contribution to Critical Social Theory in International Relations will receive attention. For now a brief introductory commentary is necessary concerning what is still for the International Relations community a rather alien approach to theory and practice.96

The Post-Modernist Celebration of "Thinking Space" in International Relations

As indicated above the question of reality and realism, in post-modernist literature, is confronted in terms similar to the (broadly) Hegelian approach of Berki, and other Critical

95Berki, On Political Realism, p.10.

96See Joseph Lapid's comments in "Quo Vadis International Relations?"
Social Theory approaches, including Habermas' Critical Theory. But, more unequivocally than all of these perspectives, post-modernists stress that reality is in a perpetual state of flux, of movement, change and instability. This is not the common understanding of the nature of reality of course. Social theory, in general, and International Relations in particular, have, as noted earlier, understood reality in essentialist, unitary and universalist terms. From a post-modernist perspective this is not surprising, because, it is maintained, the notion of a singular, stable, knowable reality has been an integral part of a dominant post-Enlightenment story, in which the ascent of Western "rational man" is located as integral to the gradual historico-philosophic unfolding of the world's "real" nature.97

Like all other claims to "know" the world and its (singular, essential) reality this is regarded as a narrative fiction, a story of certainty and identity derived from a dominant discursive practice which reduces the flux of existence to a strategic framework of unity and coherence. A discourse, in this context, is not synonymous with "language" as such, it refers, rather, to a broader matrix of social practices which gives "meaning" to the way that people understand themselves and their behaviour. A discourse, in this sense, generates the categories of "meaning" by which reality can be understood and explained. Or, more precisely, a discourse makes "real" that which it prescribes as "meaningful". In so doing a discourse of Realism, for example, establishes the socio-linguistic conditions under which "realistic" theory and practice can take place, and establishes simultaneously that "theory" and that "practice" which, by discursive definition, does not correspond with "reality". Understood this way:

To be engaged in a discourse is to be engaged in the making and remaking of meaningful conditions of existence. A discourse, then, is not a way of learning "about" something out there in the "real world"; it is rather, a way of

producing that something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful. Discourse creates the conditions of knowing.98

This discursive representation of reality in the world (and the "real" nature of subjects and objects in it) is for post-modernism an integral part of the relations of power which constitute all human societies. Accordingly, the process of discursive representation is never a neutral, detached one, but always imbued with the power and authority of the "namers" and "makers" of "reality" - it is always knowledge as power. A major concern for post-modernist scholars, consequently, is to interrogate the conditions of knowledge as power, to explain, how discursive power is constituted, how its premises and "givens" are replicated at all levels of society, and to reveal its limited, exclusionary practices, in order to open space for critical thought and action.

This, simply put, is what Derrida sought to do in locating the dominant modernist discourse in the post-Enlightenment search for an essential, universal "rationality"; for a "centred structure...a fundamental immobility and reassuring certitude".99 Derrida focused his critical attention on the process by which this "certitude" was achieved. This he described as the logocentric process, a process of textual/social representation, derived, initially, from Classical Greek scholarship, which creates identity, unity and universalised "real" meaning by excluding from the "meaningful" that which does not correspond to the logo (original, singular, authentic) conception of the "real".100 In this way, at the core of Western history and philosophy, is a textual "past" framed in terms of a whole series of dichotomies which demarcate that which is "real" and that which, by its


99See Derrida, Writing and Difference, p.279.

100See, in particular, Derrida, Of Grammatology. More explicitly, the proposition here is that to understand modernity and dominant ways of representing the real nature of the modern world is to understand history as a text analogue. This is to say history needs to be understood as having been made via the dominant "readings" of it. The same understanding applies to the human agents of history who, in "making" history, do so in re-presenting its dominant textual utterances on the self and the world of selves. To understand the modern Western text therefore is to appreciate the dominance of a particular way of re-presenting the self (e.g. the rational individual) and the world (the progressively rationalised object of scientific knowledge). More explicitly it concerns a particular set of interpretive attitudes and practical dispositions (i.e. discursive practices) which enable this particular reading of the modern text to be represented as modernity itself - as corresponding to everyday reality "out there".
definitional relationship with prescribed "reality", cannot be. This story, aggregated and institutionalised via its articulations across the contemporary social theory disciplines is the modernist, "meta-narrative" - the discourse of self/other, identity/difference, of realism/idealism, of illusory certitude, of (for example) Realist knowledge as power, of an essentialised, universalised image of Reality as International Relations.101

It was in relation to this notion of a textually constructed "meta-narrative" of the present, that Foucault sought to de-construct the "past" in genealogical terms. The genealogical approach, derived primarily from Nietzsche,102 was Foucault's archaeological tool in his attempts to expose the discursive processes by which contemporary subjects and objects have been constituted in terms of a dominant "knowledge" and a singular, unified, "meaning". As Foucault put it in Power/Knowledge, genealogies, are the stories of:

local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise, and order...in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects.103

Nothing in this genealogical approach to history is "given", natural, inevitable or unchangeable. Rather, the objects and subjects of history are discursively constructed via logocentric processes of framing real "meaning". This is, by definition, an approach to history suspicious of any kind of determinism, of universalised patterns of thought and behaviour, of developmental formats (e.g. stages of growth) or any grand theorised

101 This, it should be noted, does not suggest that a logocentric discursive regime disallows critical challenges to its dominance. These challenges are an ever present part of the struggle within which it exists. Its power, however, is that having established the existing historical and philosophical boundaries within which challenges take place, it continues to impose the boundaries - the framework - of those challenges. In so doing its power is articulated through its capacity to exclude, to trivialise, to marginalise - to oppose that which is real with that (for example) which is merely "utopian", "idealist" and "irrational. But this language of exclusion is no more linguistic, in the narrow sense, than is the notion of discourse; integral to both is the power that is dominant modern knowledge.


103 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p.83.
pronouncements of "essential" behaviour. It rejects, in this regard, conservative (e.g. Realist) postulations about "recurrence and repetition" as firmly as it rejects invocations of an (already existing) emancipatory spirit or revolutionary consciousness. It acknowledges no single, essential history, but the struggle of "histories", the struggle between discursive practices.

In terms of Western modernity, "history" is thus understood as the logocentrised privileging of a particular discursive constitution of subjects and objects (i.e. rational "man" confronted by a single "knowable" reality) and the marginalisation and/or exclusion of those "histories" (and their subjects/objects) which do not fit within the identifiable boundaries of the modernist "meta-narrative". The primary suggestion is that at the heart of modernism is a philosophical illusion, derived from the Greeks, which is centred on the notion that there is an ultimate foundation for our knowledge, beyond the social construction of that knowledge. The illusion, in other words, is that beyond mere social "appearance" there is a foundational "reality", a realm of purer understanding that, once discovered, can help us unlock the essential nature of the relationship between the subjects and the objects of the world.

Consequently, post-modernists have argued, since the European Enlightenment, in particular, modernist history and philosophy has become a "hermeneutics of suspicion", a search for the hidden, underlying, essential meaning of life. 104 More specifically, the overwhelming purpose of modernist thinking has become the "search for an Archimedean point upon which we can ground our knowledge".105 And while belief in Archimedean points or external Gods, or the pursuit of ultimate foundations for reality might not, of itself, be a particularly dangerous phenomenon, post-modern scholars (following Nietzsche's lead) have pointed to some of the dangerous dimensions emanating from such beliefs and purpose. The problems associated with foundationalism

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104 This is a term associated initially with the critical hermeneutics scholarship of figures such as Paul Ricoeur. See "Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture", in P. Rabinow and W. Sullivan eds., Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

105 See Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.16.
have been powerfully articulated by Foucault who has warned of the associated tendency towards a totalising view of history:

whose function is to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself; a history that always encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of the past; a history whose perspective an all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development.106

The point here, of course, and it is one that is at the heart of much of the Critical Social Theory of the contemporary period, is that the modernist search for foundation, indeed the very assumption of a single foundation for reality in the world, implies closure, intolerance and the attempted suppression of "difference". The argument, in general, is that in the post-Enlightenment era, in particular, as the search for "real" meaning has accelerated, modernist theory and practice has become more and more intolerant of "difference", of Otherness, of that which cannot be "rationally" controlled. Moreover, as modernist discursive influences have shaped the Western social theory disciplines, historico-philosophical "traditions" have become systematically identified and defended in terms of their foundationalist knowledge. This has given rise to a modern "ideological" spectrum, of sorts, as "knowing" and "meaning" have been carved into discrete, hermetically sealed, fiercely boundarised "Weltanshauung"s and disciplined rituals of re-presentation. Acknowledging the insights and differences of these traditions post-modernists have, nevertheless, placed critical emphasis also on the discursive connections between them, stressing that via their foundationalism, their associated epistemologies of real meaning and their totalising histories, they are integral elements of a larger modernist "meta-narrative.107

In its disciplinary articulation, therefore, the dominant Western historico-philosophical discourse has continued to "make" reality in terms of a hierarchised process


107For example the intersecting nature of the Liberal "Whig" story of the march of progress, set upon universalised images of utilitarian rationality, the complex dialectical unfolding of Hegelian consciousness and the Marxian "stages" of growth, as the class "in itself" becomes the class "for itself".
of "knowing" and "meaning" and a rigid process of closure and exclusion. Accordingly, one modern tradition after another has legitimated its own foundationalist position by reducing nearly three millenia of discursive struggle to a series of simple oppositions in which (our) "facts" are distinguished from (their) mere "values", (our) "rationality" from (their) "irrationality", (our) identity from (their) "difference", (our) "reality" from (their) "idealism/utopianism".

In its transference to International Relations this post-modernist perspective is evident in a subtle but important analytical refocusing - away from traditional concerns with individualised subjects and objects and the (epistemological) question of how we come to (rationally) "know" the world, and toward explanation based in social and historical processes and the on-going struggles between discursive strategies. Once focused in this manner debates over central issues in contemporary global life become inexorably bound up with questions of language and interpretation; the knowledge/power nexus; the construction of modern "man"; and the question of how to effectively resist the impositions of power articulated via the privileged logocentric discourses of modern scientific-rationality.

Critical attention has been particularly focused on the way that the post-1945 discipline of International Relations has framed its traditional understanding of reality - centred on the great Realist dichotomies of order/anarchy, domestic/international and realism/idealism, those discursive meanings that accord it its power politics legitimacy. But post-modernist attention has, in an International Relations context, been focused beyond the relatively ordered arenas of "theoretical" conflict, per se. Stressing the knowledge/power nexus it has emphasised the implications of a modernist strategy of exclusion and foundationalist certainty for those who do not fit within its boundaries of identity, order and reality.108

108 Not only post-modernists have oriented their thinking in this manner, Critical Theorists too have warned in their different ways that "the dream of knowing man scientifically... [reinforces] the techniques of surveillance and manipulation developed by power to 'normalize' and discipline men", see Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.526.
Put simply, the concern here is that the discursive language and logic which defines and excludes the "subversive" and the "terrorist" is also the power that legitimates their destruction on behalf of the sovereign state, the central government, the vanguard of the party. In more general terms this is a concern with a modernist knowledge form which, in its quest to "master" the natural and social worlds, has transformed the lives of peoples and cultures in every corner of the planet. The modernist authority vested in "rational man", for example, has been used to liberate, to empower, to revolutionise. But at a cost. For in spreading the word of the (post-Cartesian) "death of God" (and mythical thinking) and in proclaiming its new secular rational-scientific substitute, Western theory and practice has, often brutally, invoked its strategies of control, its discipline, its unified frame of reference about the good life, its singular "reality", its insistence on sovereignty, its bulwarks against nihilism. It is in this quest - to impose a singular, foundational "reality" upon miscreants and unbelievers - that the post-Enlightenment "will to knowledge" has quite literally become the "will to power".

It is in confronting this quest that Critical Social Theorists in general, and post-modernists in particular have confronted the knowledge that is power in International Relations. It is in relation to this quest that post-modernists such as R.B.J. Walker have, in recent years, sought sensitive alternatives to it. A brief comment on Walker's efforts in this regard might help summarise the discussion to this point and help ventilate some of the themes that are to follow. Walker's One World, Many Worlds (1988) was concerned with the plight and the potentials of critical social movements around the world seeking, often in circumstances of great danger, to reclaim the power to make decisions about their lives. Their struggles, Walker suggested, have become significant for a number of reasons, not the least being that peoples engaged in them have recognised that:

it has become necessary to refuse received conceptual boundaries, to search for new forms of understanding, and to develop a clearer sense of the complex relationships between theory and practice, knowing and being.\(^\text{109}\)

Walker acknowledged as positive the localised and heterogeneous nature of these attempts to find "thinking space", perceiving in them the possibility of an alternative political future in which people might find ways of reclaiming their lives from the grand theorised "traditions" that have shaped both the conservative and radical "art of the possible" in modernity. It was in this context that Walker responded to the promptings of those whose perspectives also prompted this attempt to write a "preface" for International Relations; those who demand that problems be "solved", rather than merely "philosophised" about. Walker responded by suggesting that:

[any solution] must grow out of the ongoing practices of people everywhere, not be molded by those who claim to have a god's-eye view of what's going on. It is sometimes important to resist the inevitable demand for hard-nosed, concrete solutions to particular problems.\textsuperscript{110}

Developing the point further, he had this to say:

Under the present circumstances the question "What is to be done?" invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. It is an arrogance inconsistent with the kind of empirical evidence we have before us. This evidence requires a willingness to face up to the uncertainties of the age, not with the demand for instant solutions, but with a more modest openness to the potentials inherent in what is already going on. The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions but also, and more crucially, for \textit{a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together}.\textsuperscript{111}

It is in this spirit and with these broad principles in mind that this thesis seeks to write a "preface" for International Relations, by explaining the nature and significance of the search for "thinking space" in Critical Social Theory and by paying particular attention to post-modernist themes and premises along the way.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{111}Ibid, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{112}In doing so it is worth reiterating that to "celebrate" the space for more sophisticated theory does not in any way denigrate empirical research and/or "problem solving" analysis. The proposition, rather, is that such work, for all its objectivist insistence, can never be detached from theory.
It seeks in this way to reconnect International Relations to the broader flow of contemporary "theoretical" inquiry, for all the "practical" reasons outlined above. In so doing it will bring to the forefront of contemporary debate on International Relations a number of critical and often unconventional themes, not as if in some realm of unified reality an essential/foundational Archimedean point of reality exists, in which ultimate answers can be found to the great questions of the 1990s, but in order to raise some questions that can no longer be ignored by scholars engaged, perhaps more directly than any others, with everyday questions of life and death. This questioning process will begin in the chapter to follow which goes to the core of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations, in modernist discourse and the powerful and enduring positivist re-presentation of it.
The debate over modernity is multifaceted and complex. There is, for example, a large and sophisticated literature dealing with modernity which focuses on what might be described in the narrow sense as "cultural" studies or as the realm of "aesthetics" - of art, literature and architecture. These, however, are elements of the debate that simply cannot be addressed here except in the most superficial of terms. Consequently, in this thesis the primary focus of attention will fall on what Calinescu has called modernism's "fifth face" - that which is "broadly philosophical, including problems of epistemology, the history and philosophy of science, and hermeneutics". Most explicitly it is concerned with the way in which the category of the modern has been understood and articulated in the major traditions of Western philosophy and social theory.

This is still an inherently complex enterprise, of course, but there is a clear and useful starting point for the discussion. It relates to the tensions between two broad positions on the modernity question which, in one form or another, have been evident within social theory literature over the past century. The first, which presents a positive and generally optimistic account of the modern world and its achievements, conceives of modernity in terms of a contrast - to earlier epoches characterised by myth and superstition in which the lives of individual subjects were suffocated beneath the

1For an interesting overview of the issue see Matei Calinescu's, Five Faces of Modernity (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987).

2Ibid, p.268. My concentration on the "fifth face" is not to suggest of course a fundamental distinction between philosophy, social theory and aesthetics. From the European Romanticism of the nineteenth century, through both generations of Frankfurt School scholarship, to contemporary post-modernism, the politico-philosophical critique of modernity has always been very closely associated with aesthetic critique. But except for brief and fleeting references this is just one of the dimensions of the present debate that I cannot deal with here.
uniformity and rigidity associated with the traditional "objects" of their world (e.g. gods, static social formations). Modernity, in this sense, represents a contrast to times and places that were "less free, less rational, less productive, less civilised, less comfortable, less democratic, less tolerant, less respectful of the individual, less scientific and less developed".

A less sanguine interpretation of the modern world is also evident. It is one which, while it acknowledges the more obvious successes of modernity, emphasises also its costs, perceived as an alienation from a rich cultural and historical tradition, the loss of a sense of morality, and spirituality, and of an awareness of the need for social hierarchy and order. Modernity, from this perspective is often presented in terms of something lost, of a world in decay and decline, of flimsy, unanchored peoples reeling under the impact of "bureaucracy, nationalism, rampant subjectivism, an all consuming state, a consumer society" and rampant commercialism.

This latter position has been quite clearly articulated in the populist promulgations of neo-conservatism in recent times. But it has a longer and more substantial intellectual lineage in the works of those who, inverting the notion of contrast and locating the "foundation" of the present in the "essence" of the past, have interpreted modernity against the perceived standards of some "golden age" of, for example, Greek rationalism.


4 See Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p.1

5 Ibid.

6 It is a theme clearly evident in the works of someone like Daniel Bell, for example, who when he is not proclaiming the "end of ideology" is pointing to the cultural demise of modern society, the spread of avant garde hedonism and the imminence of "revolution". Thus:

What we have today is a radical disjunction of culture and social structure, and it is such disjunctures which historically have paved the way for more direct social revolution. There is no distinction [anymore] between art and life. Anything permitted in art is permitted in life as well...[and] the life-style once practiced by a small cenacle is now copied by the "many"...and dominates the cultural scene.

or theological certainty. Here, the historical approach of influential scholars such as Leo Strauss have been important. So too the sophisticated Aristotelian conservatism of Hannah Arendt and the updated Humean insight of Michael Oakeshott.7

This is a very important theme in an International Relations context where the modernist legacy has often been articulated in (ostensibly) anti-modern, anti-scientific ways by influential power politics Realists proffering Classical or Traditionalist perspectives.8 As later discussions will illustrate, however, the modernist influence upon Traditionalist, and all other variants of Realism in International Relations, is fundamental to the way it reads its "history", interprets its "great texts" and frames its understandings of the real world "out there". Indeed it is this "forgotten" modernist influence, that is, in many ways, the crux of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations, its hidden, ignored and/or marginalised (metatheoretical) dimension, that which speaks it, but which it cannot speak. It is, accordingly, to the broader "positive" interpretation of modernity that this chapter turns, to begin to write and speak the "preface".

At the core of the "positive" interpretation of modernity is that image of linear rational progress that has become integral to the Western world view, per se. Here, modernity is understood in developmental terms - as a progression - from the mythical to the scientific, from the barbaric to the rational/democratic, from the constrained, ordered subject to the utilitarian individual "free to choose".9 It is in relation to this image of modernity that Western philosophy and contemporary social theory has framed its responses to the "perennial questions" - the questions of the relationships between subjects and objects, between humankind and the natural world, of the dilemmas of past and present, and of the possibilities for the future.


8See the comments in Chapter One, footnotes 24 and 53.

9On this theme in particular see Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, Chapter 1.
Modern subjects, as a result, have been defined in terms of their distance from traditional pre-modern objects. Knowledge, history and society, similarly, have been interpreted as a sequential movement in which an increasingly distanced rational subject is confronted by problems of the natural and social worlds and, via the correct "problem solving" techniques, overcomes them. Applied to the question of the "good" modern society this perspective has led to some unequivocal statements of modernity in which being modern is:

being "advanced" and being advanced means being rich, free of the encumbrances of familial authority, religious authority, and deferentiality. It means being rational and being "rationalised."\(^{10}\)

This perspective has had a number of significant articulations within International Relations, some more explicit than others. Of the latter variety the crude developmentalism of W.W. Rostow (1962) and the equally crude authoritarianism of Samuel Huntington (1968) will receive more attention in Chapter Seven as part of a discussion of the Modernisation Theory of the 1960s.\(^{11}\)

For now, however, two broader themes are of more immediate significance. The first relates to what Richard Rorty has called the "Cartesian, Lockean, Kantian" tradition of philosophy, which has framed contemporary Western theory and practice within one variant or another of "cogito" rationalism.\(^{12}\) The second theme, distinct, yet inexorably interwoven with the first, centres on the "mechanical paradigm" of the new physics of the Seventeenth century which had such an impact on the search for a science of philosophy since.\(^{13}\) More specifically, it concerns the development of a modern philosophy of

\(^{10}\)This is the view of Edward Shils, in Tradition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981), p.288.

\(^{11}\)In Rostow’s case, see The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); and for Huntington see Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).


\(^{13}\)This theme is introduced in interesting fashion in Jeremy Rifkin, Entropy: A New World View (New York: The Viking Press, 1980).
science, in the post-Enlightenment period, dualistically framed in terms of "man", the rational knowing subject, responding to the vicissitudes of an "external" (objectified) realm of reality.

It is in this general context that a definition of the terms modernity, modernism and modernist thinking will be proffered in this thesis. It is a definition that rejects the notion of the modern as a precise historical/philosophical age or epoch and which understands it, instead, as a complex set of interpretative practices, simultaneously historical and linguistic, which had its (written) origins in the ancient Western classics.\(^\text{14}\) The first definitional theme, therefore, - modernity as a way of "framing" reality - highlights the interpretative continuity within Western philosophy of the attempt, via dualised and dichotomised premises, to objectify human knowledge in the search for an indubitable foundation for it.

It suggests that the idea of progress integral to contemporary Western theory and practice is set upon a particular process of interpretation in which the (historical and philosophical) "ascent of man" is framed as part of an attempt of subjects to increasingly distance themselves from the (metaphysical) objects of primitive, traditional, societies. In this sense, the dominant interpretative tradition of Western philosophy is the story of the unfolding of the human capacity to "rationalise". It is a story which, in its many re-interpretations in different time and space, within vocabularies with modified, reformulated or even radically changed "meanings", has become for many contemporary writers and speakers unrecognisable as part of the original tradition.\(^\text{15}\) This has for so

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\(^{14}\)This definition is influenced primarily by Connolly's similar arguments in Political Theory and Modernity, which I want to develop a little differently here.

\(^{15}\)By the seventeenth century for example the nature and role of the Classical (e.g. Aristotelian) subject was being transformed as the "objective" reality of the world was reinterpreted in accord with the universal laws of Newtonian particle mechanics and Cartesian certainty concerning the autonomous, individual ego - the rational modern subject that "thinks". By the early twentieth century, however, homage was being paid to a fully blown "science" - the new paragon of rationality - the contemporary vehicle of our detachment from relativism, myth and irrationality. And while a debt was acknowledged to earlier, more primitive understandings of (scientific) reality, "new" traditions now sought to elevate their techniques and methods above the "metaphysics" that had gone before to the extent that they sought to explain the reality of human society in terms of a modern theory of knowledge - without a subject.
long been the case within Anglo-American social theory scholarship (and International Relations) which has acknowledged, to some extent, its simple linear notions of progress, its crude inductivism and the "theory impregnated" nature of "fact", but which has hardly touched upon the broader social and political implications of its logocentrism, and/or its relentless pursuit of a reality set upon indubitable foundations.

A second element of the modernity definition offered here seeks to add a dimension to this issue. This identifies modernist thought as the site of major paradox. The paradox in question is that which sees the celebration of an ever increasing distance from the primitive pre-modern world (and its idealism and metaphysics) continually predicated upon the most basic of assumptions in "pre-modern" thinking, the assumption that there is a foundation for human knowledge, prior to and beyond, history, culture and language. In the age which has ostensibly and triumphantly detached itself from the legacy of such "pre-modern" traits, the paradox of modernity is that a faith in foundationalism still reigns at its ontological core.

The paradox issue in this context is extremely complex. It is raised here not as a thematic precursor to an argument in favour of some arbitrary, synthesised notion of rationality or logical consistency against which all writing and thinking on modern political society must conform. It has a more significant role in the present discussion as the touchstone theme of the more sinister side to modernist theory and practice. It is a paradox, in this sense, which serves it power function by seeking to deny the very existence of paradox. Or, less obtusely, the paradoxical faith in foundationalism within modernity is, as scholars from Nietzsche to Adorno have noted, at the heart of the attempt to deny the differences, the discontinuities, the contradictions and the paradoxes that are an integral part of human life and reality. The continuing search for an ultimate, external, foundation for knowledge and increasingly the application of its certainties has, in this regard, seen the the "will to know" inexorably intertwined with "the will to power".

This is more than some vague reference to once liberating ideas having become ideological straightjackets, it goes to the heart of the attempts by Critical Social Theorists
to illustrate the other side of the dominant story of Western progress to modernity. For some, such as Habermas, the problem is manifested most clearly, and most dangerously, as positivist based approaches to knowledge associated with scientific control of the natural environment increasingly become ideological mechanisms of social domination. For others, particularly post-modernists, the foundationalist paradox of modernity is articulated as a homogenising, totalising approach to theory and practice which, in logocentric fashion, celebrates identity, unity and sovereignty, while defining as Other, as threatening, that which is "different". Its critical emphasis accordingly is upon that which has been excluded from the grand design, upon the voices that are not heard within the cacophony of conformity, upon those disciplined and/or punished for their "difference".16

The major genealogical question of modernity, in this regard, is the question of how its subjects and objects are "made" in discursive terms. From this perspective too the question of modernity and modernist thought is most usefully discussed - not as a well defined age or epoch in the traditional sense - but as a socio-linguistic process, by which (metatheoretical) rules of knowledge are set, particular theoretical and methodological categories are accorded universal meaning, and discursive boundaries are established and maintained.

To appreciate more fully the significance of this argument, and the "framing" and "paradox" themes underlying it, I want to broaden the scope of the debate a little at this point, in order to more directly indicate how the major traditions of contemporary social theory, and ultimately the dominant tradition of International Relations were derived from a particular way of "framing" Western history and philosophy. Integral to this

16Most recently these concerns have been directed towards the most fundamental category of International Relations theory and practice - the sovereign state - understood not as some "given" realm of unity and identity, the progressive outcome of the modern detachment from its primitive feudal predecessor - but as a site of interpretive and political struggle "made" in and by particular discursive practices, and represented as International Relations. See Richard Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique", Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17 (1988), pp.227-262; and "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", in International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics edited by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989).
discussion, as it develops, will be the issue of positivism - the most important conduit of modernist history and philosophy across the social theory disciplines and within International Relations.

These are themes which warrant thesis length discussion in themselves, of course, but I offer here, initially, a brief sketch, a skeletal image of the way in which the story of the Western past and present have been commonly connected by philosophers, historians and social theorists. In the discussions to follow some of the missing nuance will be added as more emphasis is placed on particular thematic elements of this, admittedly, rather crude representation.

From Myth to "Cogito Man", and Beyond

Jonathan Ree has established, in succinct fashion, some of the most important themes on the "framing" issue, with his description of the dominant approach to Western philosophy, as one which:

canonises the great thinkers and the basic texts...[and] indicates that being a philosopher means being a successor to Plato, Aristotle and the rest, and perpetuating the practices which according to the [mainstream] history of philosophy - these great men have bequeathed.17

In later chapters it will become clear that the impact of this "great man/great text" tradition upon International Relations has been considerable. But, even in more sophisticated intellectual climes, being a successor to Plato and Aristotle, it seems, has had its problems, particularly concerning the attempt to "succeed" the Greeks in their quest to find a secure foundation for human knowledge and social life. Indeed for some, as intimated above, an engagement with the great scholars and the great texts is an experience of such profundity that it leads to an overwhelming pessimism concerning the prospects for civilisation in the modern era.


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Generally, however, the dominant story of Western history and philosophy has been read, and celebrated, as an integral feature in the human trek towards enlightenment. On this account Western modernity is conceived of as emerging out of the darkness of primitive myth - towards the brilliant light of the Greek classical age - and/or out of the "dark ages" of Aristotelian and Christian speculation toward the dawning of modern consciousness in the European Renaissance and the age of science. This broad framework of human progress, the Western story of the (philosophical) ascent of "man" has been filled out with the enduring wisdom of its heroic figures. Here, consequently, is celebrated the great poetic contribution of a Homer, the social vision of a Sophocles, the integrity and sacrifice of a Socrates, the historico-political insight of a Thucydides, the rationality of a Plato, the nascent empiricism of an Aristotle. All are presented as crucially significant voices in a larger social and rhetorical process by which understanding of the world and of the conscious subject in it is, slowly but surely, detached from the realm of myth and the unquestioned "givens" of a primitive life.

Within this process are perceived some specific patterns of detachment, more identifiably modern in character. The modern individual thus comes into view, albeit faintly, as the "subject" became increasingly detached from the previously dominant "objects" of mythical knowledge and reality. And with the emerging dualism between subject and object in Greek thought is glimpsed the first stirrings of modern rationality. Accordingly, as one commentator has affirmed, it was "the new image of the Cosmos moulded by the Greeks that pave[d] the way for the new view of the ego". But the modern view of the "ego", and of modern rationality was held in abeyance for a while,

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19 Much less emphasis has been placed on linking these intellectual positions to social, historical and linguistic structures. For a discussion of the implications of this detachment of the great men from their time, place and class see Richard Ashcraft, "Rethinking the Nature of Political Theory".

for about a millennium in fact, while the power of theocracy reigned over the power of scientific inquiry. Yet even here the sense of a forward movement was not completely assuaged, as:

the mediaevals inherited a cosmology which both justified the belief in a supersensible reality and [which] at the same time presented an elevated picture of man's ability to gain access to it.

Most importantly from the neo-Platonists there was passed on:

a theory of creation, according to which the entire world emanates from the intellectual light of God's self contemplation. Reason, being the part of man which participates in the intellectual light, knows things not as they seem but as they are.\(^\text{21}\)

The great dualism remained then (between the worldly sphere and the God sphere of immutability - between appearance and reality) and increasingly "reason" became the "aspiration towards that ultimate sphere".\(^\text{22}\) In its most influential Christian reformulation, by St. Augustine, the emphasis was adjusted somewhat as more stress was placed on the need for those in the "inner" sphere (of human society and politics) to turn away from the ephemeral and the sensual and toward the eternal truth of the "outer" realm of the single God, of ultimate knowledge and purity.\(^\text{23}\) And, with the Augustinian synthesis of Greek rationalism and Hebraic legend, another powerful emphasis was introduced to Western philosophy that has remained, in one form or another, at its core to the present day. This saw the species relativism of the Greeks relegated in favour of a focus on "man" and created "man" alone, as the focus of philosophical attention. More specifically it saw the classical dualisms reformulated somewhat into a matrix more recognisably modern, consisting of three oppositional couplings - those between man and


\(^{22}\) Ibid, p.15.

God, man and nature, and man and man - the reconciliation of which depended upon the "right use" of reason.  

For the exemplary figure of Christian pessimism, of course, there was a fundamental impediment (human created evil) to any reconciliation with God, at least in earthly terms. But this impediment theme has also been perceived as an important element of modernist progression, because derived from it, first in the Nominalist perspective in the middle ages, and then via the works of scholars such as Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Freud and Hegel, philosophical focus has fallen upon the location of the created evil - the human mind - and the Classical/Christian dualisms have again been reformulated, as the struggle between egoistic man and natural man, between love of self and love of God, between self interest and social interest. In medieval Christianity therefore, for all its closure, there was space for the Greek notion of a cosmos to which a rational order applied, and for scholastic training in "science". The Humanists of the Renaissance were, consequently, able to advance the view that the Christian world view could be gleaned not only from the holy texts but from the scientific texts of the age. In the same vein, the Protestantism of the Reformation, with its attack on institutionalised Christianity, and its debunking of the miraculous, helped provide an intellectual bridge on which physics and astronomy could flourish at the expense of theological orthodoxy.


25 In a short hand presentation such as this many nuances are sacrificed for the broader goal of providing a thematic backdrop for the central focus of the discussion. For a work that tries (in very rudimentary fashion) to bring together some of these themes and relate them ultimately to contemporary (International Relations) thinking see my unpublished Honours thesis, "The Physis Factor: An Analysis of the Effects of a Classical Philosophical Theme on Aspects of Contemporary Political Theory" (University of Western Australia, 1981).

This Renaissance period is sometimes presented as a watershed in Western history and philosophy (and particularly, via Machiavelli, in International Relations). Here, the story goes, the great classical dualisms were confronted with an emerging scientific scepticism which radically transformed the nature of Western thought. "Lost" in the attack were the political, religious and spiritual unity of European Christendom; the certainty of theology; the faith and authority of the traditional bible; the prestige of the Catholic church; and the "divinity" of the Feudal state. In their stead there emerged "Renaissance man" set upon replacing metaphysics with truth, myth with fact. And here again the Western dualisms of life were reformulated to take into account an emerging and important distinction - that between modern science and philosophy. More specifically, the philosophical purpose of the Renaissance and the age of (scientific) revolution that followed it centred on another attempt to reconcile the great classical dualisms, this time via a synthesis of the "scientific" side of the polarity - set upon the notion of a universal fact of motion - with its other side - increasingly embedded in the logic and rationality of mathematics.27

Two kinds of synthetic activity are afforded particular attention in this regard. The first emphasises the axiomatic geometric principles and logico-mathematical deductive systems of figures such as Copernicus, Galileo and Newton, which were to have such a direct impact upon early empiricism. The second concentrates on the (related) attempt by Descartes, in particular, to re-unify the outer "infinite" world (of the Christian God) with the inner, "finite" world of "ego", of modern rational man.28 This Cartesian synthesis is


28An enormous amount has been written on the Cartesian contribution to modern theory and practice. For a broad overview of Descartes thinking see, Margaret Jacob, The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution; and G. E. Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Descartes, Philosophical Writings (London: Nelsons University Paperbacks, 1970); see also the interesting work by E. Gilson, "Concerning Christian Philosophy", in Philosophy and History ed. Klibansky and Paton, which emphasises the enduring connections between Descartes' new scientific philosophy and Christianity.
of special significance here, not just because it marks a crucial juncture in the progress story - as Western "rational man" shifts inexorably away from the Classical age of myth - but as the point where the continuity of Western thought is (paradoxically) systematised into a recognisably modernist form.

The issue of significance here concerns the question of how (Classical) foundationalist themes remained integral to the framing regime that Cartesian thinking introduced in the Seventeenth century, at the very point when modern thinkers were beginning to celebrate their identity as the new sovereign figures of history, the makers and shapers of their own destiny. It is a question, more precisely, of how this paradox at the heart of post-Cartesian modernism impacted upon the theory and practice of the European Enlightenment, and ultimately the development of contemporary social theory and International Relations. Two themes drawn briefly from the complex Cartesian legacy might illuminate the "how" issue a little; the first, which accorded later rationalism its (illusory) coherence, the second, which provided empiricists and positivists with their particular variation on the coherence theme.

Descartes and the Paradox of Modernity

Located at that margin where Classical and Christian images of reality intersected with the scientific age of the Seventeenth century, Descartes was confronted with a series of questions that would not be unfamiliar to a contemporary social theorist or (neo-Realist) seeking coherence and stability in a time of ambiguity and disorder. In the immediate Cartesian context they related to a perceived gap in the new rational/scientific logic, a "space" that had to be filled if metaphysical (mythical) uncertainty were not to inhibit progress toward a new kind of reconciliation between man and God. The questions, roughly, were these:(i) given that we are rational, what is the exact nature of reason?: (ii) does reason have "laws" that are amenable to scientific resolution?: (iii) if reason is "scientific" what does this imply for the relationship between man and God?
The answers Descartes proffered are extremely complex, of course, and cannot be discussed in any depth here, but one theme is of particularly importance for the discussions to follow, and requires, at least, brief comment. It is that in seeking to answer the great philosophical question of the age of rational science, Descartes sought a "mind" centred solution based on the most immutable of "external" foundations - that derived from God. This Cartesian logic is evident enough in Meditations of First Philosophy (1641) a work which represents the textual mainspring of a framing regime, and which continues to provide (paradoxical) certitude for those seeking ultimate answers in the present.29

Descartes sought in this work to throw off metaphysics once and for all and replace it with certainty. The basis for this certainty was, simply, that which could not be doubted. For Descartes, on this basis, the only foundation for certainty was that "I think": this he argued was a statement that was quite obviously "true", and self verifying, because even to doubt it, proves it. The keystone of a new philosophy of certainty then was human rationality - the mind that thinks - "cogito". This particular dimension of the Cartesian legacy has, rightly, received attention from critical thinkers in the contemporary period seeking to locate the discursive sources of modern sovereign identity. Richard Rorty, for example, has located in the Cartesian "cogito" theme a fundamental modernist trait in the process of framing centred on the notion of "mind", as a "special subject of study, located in inner space, containing elements or processes which make knowledge possible".30 This focus on the "mind" as the ultimate source of rational knowledge was of major significance, suggested Rorty, because it marked the beginning of a systematic philosophical search for an objective self conscious knowledge of reality, centred on the rational capacities of the modern sovereign individual.

29For a discussion of the significance of this text, see Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy, Chapter 2; Bruce Aune, Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism (New York: Random House, 1970); Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Rationalism, pp. 16-20; and Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

But there is another element, it seems to me, that needs to be added to the Cartesian "cogito" theme if its enduring power and (paradoxical) nature is to be better appreciated. This concerns Descartes' efforts to ground the certainty of the "mind" in more traditionally appropriate terms, to go beyond mere subjectivity and connect rational "knowing" to an independent universe of things which, as the Classical/Christian scholars had maintained, could only be understood by the most rigorous application of "right reason"—a "right reason" for the modern thinker Descartes that lay in physics and mathematics.

To make this connection Descartes turned in the same direction as the Classical scholars before him—to the "outer" sphere, to that external source of reality that for so long had provided foundational knowledge and socio-ethical direction. The logic was simple enough: because I have doubts and seek to overcome them I obviously do not have perfect knowledge. But I do have an idea of perfection, in God. However, because I do not have perfect knowledge I could not have devised this idea. It could only have come from the realm of perfection, from God. There must, therefore, be a God (and more pertinently) there must be a realm of perfection, an independent reality, an immutable foundation for understanding the world, which via God given rationality (and the most rational methods of science) humankind has the capacity to grasp as "laws".31

This final theme is significant in regard to the Cartesian influence on empiricism, as well as his more obvious legacy for later "mind" centred rationalist thought. His contribution to empiricism, and thus, ultimately, to positivism, owed much to his status as a mathematician and a "founder of modern physics", and the impact of his work on Newton.32 Thus, while at one level Descartes' rationalist approach undermined the increasing faith in inductivist reasoning and a science based on quantification, the

31 See Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy for a broad overview discussion of this theme.

32 For a discussion of the Cartesian influence on Newton in this regard particularly as it relates to the "law of inertia" see ibid, pp.40-41.
"cogito" process of a priori reflection was always connected (through God) to universal, axiomatic, physical laws and the notion of a rigorous system of mathematised understanding associated with them. Mathematics, proclaimed Descartes, included the "primary rudiments of human reason" and was in terms of rational (God given) knowledge "the source of all things". Subsequently, and as his influence grew throughout Europe, Descartes' science of "universal mathematics" as an integral part of the "mechanisation" of the (Western) world view:

succeeded in turning all of nature into simple matter in motion. [Descartes] reduced all quality to quantity and then confidently proclaimed that only space and location mattered...[This] mathematical world was tasteless, colourless and odourless. Mathematics represented total order, [it] successfully eliminated everything in the world which might in any way be thought of as messy, chaotic and alive...[it was a] world of precision, not confusion.33

It was left to Newton to devise the natural laws of time and space from this universal mathematical premise and, armed with the Newtonian laws of motion, the new modernists were able to celebrate a major detachment from the mythical world "by separating and then eliminating all the qualities of life from the quantities of which they are a part".34 With Newtonian particle mechanics, in other words, and with the interpretive space provided by Cartesian logic, seventeenth century Europeans proclaimed what contemporary positivists (and mainstream International Relations specialists) assume as "given" - a fundamental distinction between "objects" and "subjects", between "mind" and "matter", between "thought" and "fact.35

33Ibid, p.35.

34See Rifkin, Entropy, p.37. Newton's three laws (1) A body at rest remains at rest and a body in motion remains in uniform motion in a straight line unless acted upon by an external force. (2) The acceleration of a body is directly proportional to the applied force and in the direction of the straight line in which the force acts. (3) For every force there is an equal and opposite force in reaction. For a discussion see ibid, p.36

35As Alfred North Whitehead was to point out (in terms which have relevance for Realist state centric analysis) one of the characteristics of the Newtonian framework was its inherent staticity. This was because, following Newton, it became possible to:

state the relation of a particular material body to space-time by saying that it is just there, in that place; and, so far as simple location is concerned, there is nothing more to be said on the subject.

This "mechanical paradigm" proved irresistible to the philosophers of the day, particularly in England, where the natural laws of the universe were enthusiastically embraced by bourgeois thinkers seeking to explain the progressive nature of modern society as it successfully (and rationally) detached itself from the ancien régime. It was, consequently, from within the "mechanical paradigm" that British empiricism developed, and it was as part of an attempt to resolve tensions within early empiricist thought that Hume synthesised it into positivism proper.36 This Humean contribution to the dominant Western narrative will be the focus of attention, shortly, as will the major Kantian contribution, in this context.37

However, this very abridged and superficial treatment of Cartesian thought requires one final comment at this point: it is that in the wake of the Meditations, for example, it becomes possible to speak of a uniquely modernist thought, not necessarily in terms of the questions it asked, nor in strict historical terms, nor as a "break" with the past (e.g. between Ancient and Moderns), nor even in its focus on "cogito man" per se, but in the way that Western philosophy was, from then on, increasingly captured by a particular way of framing its major debates. The Meditations in this sense represent the textual mainspring of a (metatheoretical) process by which the central questions, problems and patterns of Western philosophy have been systematically framed to the present day.

36Without, hopefully, caricaturing the issue overly it might be suggested that there was a geographical distinction associated with the spread of Cartesian influence in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries in Europe. On the Continent rationalism flourished as scholars such as Spinoza and Leibniz sought to more rigorously apply the axioms of geometry and the new science of calculus to the great philosophical questions concerning the relations between God, and modern "man". In Britain, particularly England, where the theory and practice of bourgeois liberalism was at its most advanced, an atomistic, individualist, brand of empiricism became dominant that was fiercely (and paradoxically) anti-metaphysical and generally inclined towards epistemological reductionism.

37On the rationalist side it was the Cartesian notion of "essence" that was emphasised, the proposition that the "mind" has innate capacities of perception that allow us to know the essence of things aside from empirical observation. The empiricists and positivists utilised another interpretation of "cogito" to establish their alternative version of philosophical foundationalism and immutable certainty. For an accessible discussion of some of the complexities of this issue see Bruce Aune, Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism.
Richard Bernstein has had some interesting things to say on the Cartesian legacy, in this regard, emphasising that it remains integral to social theory in the late Twentieth century, expressed as the continuing pursuit of an Archimedean point - an irreducible foundation - upon which to ground our knowledge. Thus, while at one level it has been a legacy with radical modernist implications, the catalyst for a variety of emancipatory movements seeking to overcome the dominance of theology, metaphysics and "traditional" prejudice on behalf of rational human creativity, it has been a major philosophical conduit for (pre-modern) foundationalist logic.

The Cartesian legacy, in this regard, has made a major contribution to modern philosophical orthodoxy centred (ostensibly) on the theory and practice of "rational man", while connected by a metatheoretical umbilical cord to the "external" foundational authority of the new theology of rational science, the new metaphysics of empiricist/positivism. It is in this sense that the Cartesian search for an irreducible foundation for human knowledge has retained its (paradoxical) significance for the critical debates in contemporary social theory. And in the broader context of this chapter, it is in this sense that the Cartesian legacy represents an exemplary modern perspective, in terms of its metatheoretical framework, which continues to dominate the way we ask our questions about knowledge and human society in the contemporary period. Consequently, as Bernstein has suggested, while modern thought has repudiated many of Descartes' substantive philosophical claims, it still resonates with the:

Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.16.

See for example the discussion of the "empiricist metaphysic" in E. Gellner, Legitimation of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Thomas McCarthy, in The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), has spoken of the impact of the new theology of scientism integral to Western social theory in these terms: "the theory of knowledge (had become) the philosophy of science; reason became scientific reason; and the interests of reason was either denied or equated with the technical interest in in prediction and control of objectified processes", p.84.

This, to reiterate is not to suggest that Descartes was the first or only Western philosopher to engage in such a search. As the earlier discussion emphasised, foundationalism, in one form or another, has been a central feature of Western thought since Plato sought to "found" real knowledge of the world in an outer sphere of truth and perfection rather than in the inner sphere of politics and human imperfection. Accordingly the emphasis on Cartesianism does not imply the strict ancient/modern dualism of much mainstream political theory.
problems, metaphors and questions that [Descartes] bequeathed to us... problems concerning the foundations of knowledge and the sciences, [the] mind-body dualism, our knowledge of the "external" world, how the mind "represents" this world, the nature of consciousness, thinking and will, whether physical reality is to be understood as a grand mechanism, and how this is compatible with human freedom.41

Significantly too, the legacy of Cartesianism has been manifested in a fundamental anxiety at the core of modernist approaches to theory and practice. This Cartesian anxiety, expressed, by Bernstein, as the "grand and seductive Either/or" dualism, states that:

_Either_ there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, _or_ we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.42

This is a foundationalist anxiety at the metatheoretical heart of modernity which continues to be articulated across the social theory disciplines (and at the core of International Relations theory and practice) as an objectivism characterised by:

the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness or rightness.43

The dominant form of this objectivism, suggested Bernstein, is the one most commonly encountered in positivism. It states that:

there is a world of objective reality that exists independently of us and that has a determinate nature or essence that we can know.44

Which brings us directly to the question of positivism and its significant influence upon Western philosophy and contemporary social theory.

This too is a complex and multifaceted issue that can only be sketchily dealt with at this point, but even in this form its possible, I think, to understand enough of the nature of the positivist perspective to understand its attraction and potency in a

41Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.17.
42Ibid, p.18.
contemporary social theory context. The discussion to follow will also seek to explain how positivism, at least in its sceptical Humean form, provided a rudimentary "thinking space" for modernist scholarship which, even for Hume, was ultimately closed off by the power of its foundationalist legacy.

The Emergence of Modern Positivist Thought.

With the development of a "new physics" in the Seventeenth century based on the overthrow of Ptolemaic and Aristotelian cosmology, by scholars such as Copernicus and Galileo, the rudiments of an empiricist theory of knowledge were emerging in (particularly) Western Europe and Britain. Galileo, in particular, was important in this regard, as "the first to formulate...the phenomenalist programme for knowledge", and a conception of science, centred on the need for experimentation and the formulation of quantitative "laws".45

In England, moreover, Francis Bacon was pronouncing the "old" tradition of Greek philosophy as of no more value than "prattle... characteristic of boys", because, for all its philosophical contemplation it had not "adduced a single experiment which tends to relieve and benefit the condition of man".46 Accordingly, insisted Bacon, the real purpose of modern knowledge was "the building in the human understanding [of] a true model of the world, such as it is in fact, not such as man's own reason would have it be".47 In the same vein, and in terms which bring the knowledge/power nexus more starkly into focus (particularly Foucault's focus) Bacon's search for an objective

45See Leszek Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), p.28. Others too were contributing to a broader "scientific" understanding of the world in ways that were to remain embedded in positivism. In France, Mersenne outlined a new phenomenalist physics that was quantitative, mechanistic and anti-metaphysical and which aimed at "an exact quantitative knowledge of the phenomenal world, a knowledge sufficient for man's practical exploitation of that world", ibid, p.30.

46This is taken from Bacon's "Novum Organum", as cited in Rifkin, Entropy, p.33.

47Ibid, p.34.
knowledge of the world was one stimulated by the desire to gain, "command over things natural - over bodies, medicine, mechanical power and infinite others of this kind".48

It was in this discursive atmosphere that the tensions between the early inductivist logic of Bacon, Hobbes and (to a lesser extent) Locke on the one hand, and the rationalist subjectivism of Berkeley on the other, prompted the Humean attempt at synthetic resolution.49 These tensions can only be touched on here for their immediate significance to the later Humean argument. One theme of significance, in this context, concerns Hobbes' transference of the new physics of Galileo and Newton to a social context.50 In the early pages of Leviathan, for example, Hobbes framed all human life in (Newtonian) terms of matter in motion. However, and here the Cartesian influence was evident, for Hobbes the modern capacity to control both the natural and the social world was understood (via rational science) as part of God's revelatory power. The capacity to create order and a unity out of an otherwise atomised, contingently related sphere of existence was, in this sense, proof of God's sovereignty and the (inexorably related) explanatory power of modern science.51

48Bacon, cited in ibid, p.34.


50There are of course many dimensions to the work of Hobbes and those whose work is discussed from now on. At this point, however, I am interested in Hobbes' contribution to the "mechanisation of the world picture" theme and the conceptual space this provided for later empiricist thinking centred on an atomised, contingent premises. More specifically I am concentrating on the dominant interpretation of Hobbes (in Locke and Hume for example) which, for all its limitations has been basically unquestioned in International Relations. For a more sophisticated recent discussion of Hobbes see Michael Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), Chapter 1; and William Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, Chapters 2 and 3.

51See Leviathan edited by M. Oakeshott (Blackwell, Oxford, 1960), Chapter 1. For an overview discussion of Hobbes on this matter see D. Grace "Augustine and Hobbes", in, Comparing Political Thinkers edited by R. Fitzgerald (Sydney: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp.54-75. On p.56 Grace has this to say about some of the themes touched on here and more generally in relation to Hobbes' foundationalism:

For Hobbes (as opposed to Augustine) God is in the...background. He has set up the universe on certain principles...and left it running. Hobbes then is able to leave God out of his explanation of human behaviour and his theory of ethics. He is a materialist who reduces all that is and happens in the world to matter in motion.
Hobbes' approach to knowledge and (analysed) society resonated with these themes. Accordingly, the human world, no less than the natural one, was made up of individual, atomised entities, contingently related. The "natural order" between individuals was, consequently, a utilitarian struggle of individual (self interested) entities, and, just as in the universe, unity and order in the human system was dependent upon a sovereign power, a Leviathan. Significant too, was Hobbes' early attempt to undermine rationalism via an empiricist theory of language. Here (foreshadowing the work of Locke, Hume and the Vienna Circle) Hobbes sought to do away with metaphysics by denying the a priori faculty and projecting a genetic account of the origin of "meaning" which rendered supersensible things "meaningless". "Real" knowledge, in this sense, was derived from individual sense impressions (of "real" things) and not from some innate "essence". In this way, as Michael Ryan has noted, Hobbes laid claim to an "absolute knowledge", which identified empiricist method with the axiomatic authority of the sovereign voice, in the sense that "the authority of the sovereign's law depends on the establishing of unambiguous proper meanings for words".

John Locke's theory of knowledge generally reinforced and enhanced these Hobbesian premises in maintaining that real knowledge of the world was derived from experienced sense data and not from some extra experiential or innate rationalist source. Hence the "tabula rasa" proposition. Moreover, with Locke, the Classical questions of

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52At a more nuanced level, as Connolly in, Political Theory and Modernity has illustrated, Hobbes understood the rhetorical power associated with a common faith in the idea of sovereignty in the age where God and Feudal power relations were no longer obviously sovereign, see pp.30-40. Ryan develops a similar argument in his Introduction to Marxism and Deconstruction.

53See Hobbes, Leviathan. Chapters 1, 7 and 8.

54See M. Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction, p.3.

55See Essay Concerning Human Understanding edited by A. Campbell-Fraser (New York: Dover, 1959), II.i.2 vol. 1, pp.121-122. And, developing some Hobbesian themes further, Locke sought to distance modern natural law thinking from the metaphysics of the ancients by reducing the great questions of philosophy to "experience" and an individual utilitarian model of rational choice. Consequently, and famously, "things... are good and evil, only in reference to [individual] pleasure and pain", ibid, II. xx p.303. For a broader debate on the close connections between the work of Hobbes and Locke often overlooked by those who would divorce the "liberal" from the "authoritarian", see Roger Masters, "Hobbes and Locke", in Comparing Political Thinkers ed. Fitzgerald, pp.116-141.
"meaning" and "knowing" became increasingly reduced to "internal" processes of cognitive reflection. Modern epistemology became psychologically oriented and "reflection" upon the real meaning of political society was increasingly oriented toward utilitarian rational choice formulas of "means" and "ends". Moreover, in seeking to analogise Newtonian particle mechanics with the workings of the human mind, Locke developed a fundamental philosophical purpose for modern philosophy, in which the search for objective self consciousness in scientific rationality, becomes in Richard Rorty's terms, the search for a "final commensurating vocabulary for all possible rational discourse".

This search saw the solipsistic tendencies in Locke's epistemology taken to the subjectivist extreme in the work of Berkeley, who, in accepting its foundationalist premises, effectively reduced the empiricist approach to an exclusive mind dependent process located in individual cognition. Ultimately, therefore, Berkeley attacked the illogicality of those who would, "distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive of them existing unperceived". These, then, were some of the tensions confronted by David Hume in his attempt to solve the problem of the rationalist - empiricist debate, bequeathed to modernity by Descartes.

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56 Locke's individualist epistemology, based on "choice", was articulated, of course, in terms of a voluntarist social contract which converted Hobbes' "natural law" of sovereignty into a defence of bourgeois constitutional government. See Masters, "Hobbes and Locke"; Cornforth, Science Versus Idealism pp.21-49; Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy, pp.21-50; Cowley, A Critique of British Empiricism, pp.1-48; and Schact, Classical Modern Philosophers: Descartes to Kant, pp.100-120.


58 See Cornforth, Science Versus Idealism, p.43. With Berkeley and Locke in particular modern empiricist thought gained another important dimension or orientation, which retained its inductivist base but more directly connected the search for scientific reality with an extreme subjectivism. In modified form this was an orientation that was to reappear later in post-Kantian fashion as variants of phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches to theory and practice.
Hume's epistemological position is well enough known, set as it is upon a cognitively based dualism which went beyond the original Lockean formula. The result: the Humean distinction between "impressions" and "ideas". For Hume, thus, knowledge about the world as it really 'is' could only be gained from the initial realm of immediate sense experience or "impressions". All other cognitive activity, however complex or imaginative (including that associated with geometry, algebra and arithmetic), was perceived as belonging to the (retrospective/theoretical) realm of "ideas". It could not be considered as corresponding with reality simply because it relied upon abstract categories which did not correspond with "what is anywhere existent in the universe".

This primary distinction drawn by Hume cannot be underestimated in any discussion on the nature and development of positivism. This is because, in more systematically logical terms than ever before, Hume made it possible to conceive of a realm of "fact" distinct from that of "theory", an "is" from an "ought", and a process of knowledge construction in which an objectively existing sphere of reality imposed its sense impressions upon a "passive" subject. It became possible in this context also to


60 The former, Hume maintained, corresponded to the immediate sense experience of the world; the latter, to the retrospective meaning or imagination associated with such experience (i.e. the distinction between the experience of pain, sound, colour, smell and later images or memory of it). Thus, "All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, relations of ideas and matters of fact", cited in Aune, Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism, p.43. On the issue generally see also Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, pp.42-60; Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy, pp.121-124; Cowley, A Critique of British Empiricism, pp.1-17; and Schact, Classical Modern Philosophers, pp.185-203.

distinguish "facts" from "values", and to designate as "metaphysical" all non factual, (normative) elements of cognition.62

Leszek Kolakowski's interpretation of Hume, on this issue, locates four major (metatheoretical) "rules and evaluative criteria" integral to positivism. The first, which privileges phenomenalist epistemological principles states, in short, that only phenomena which can be directly experienced by the observing subject are capable of generating knowledge of the "real" nature of the world.63 In so doing, it acts to repudiate the notion, associated with classical metaphysics and theology, that observed phenomena are merely manifestations or "appearances" of some hidden essential reality that cannot be "known" in the scientific sense. It thus (ostensibly) acknowledges no underlying deep structures, no "essences" or "ideal states" beyond the worldly phenomena that can be experienced and empirically recorded.64

This phenomenalist rule has a second element which, in complementing it, informs the positivist scholar of what can be regarded as legitimate knowledge of reality and what cannot. This is the principle of nominalism. It proposes that general statements about the world that do not have their reference in independent, observable, atomised objects, should not be afforded real knowledge status. Objects, therefore, that are not referable to the senses cannot, by nominalist logic, be assumed to exist outside of the senses. Rather, from the perspective of a phenomenalist/nominalist based theory of knowledge, the real world, the world we can "know" must be centred on "individual, observable facts".65 Most significantly, from this perspective, theorising, however complex in nature, can only be a cognitive retrospective enterprise. It must take place,

62 On this point see Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, pp.43-50; Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy, pp.121-124; and Cowley, A Critique of British Empiricism, pp.56-78.

63 See Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, pp.11-17.


65 Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, p.15; see also Bronowski and Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition, pp.203-205.
literally, after the (experienced) fact. Theory or the process of "theorising" is in this sense detached from (experiential) "practice". Theoretical knowledge can, thus, be acknowledged only as part of a cognitive (subjective) attempt to organise, categorise and give meaning to (already existing) reality. This leads to a third principle of positivism, that which "refuses to call value judgements and normative statements [real] knowledge". This principle asserts that it is not possible to speak meaningfully of (for example) "truth", "goodness", "harmony", "morality", and/or "justice" in the world, because such categories, if they are said to exist at all, must be empirically observable and verifiable. It maintains that while we "are entitled to express value judgements on the human world...we are not entitled to assume that our grounds for making them are scientific". The fourth principle of positivism, invokes a commitment to the unity of the scientific method, and something more will be said on this issue in the next chapter when Popper's positivist status is considered.

The more immediate point, however, is that on the basis of these positivist principles, Hume stands as the quintessential Enlightenment philosopher, intent on constructing a secular, scientifically based philosophical foundation for modern society. However, it is Hume's scepticism concerning the inherent limitations of any positivist/empiricist approach which is also of significance here. This scepticism led him to a series of conclusions about empiricist based thinking which have continuing relevance for this discussion of the "unwritten preface", as points of critical entry into a largely closed discourse. This, primarily, is because Hume's major conclusion was that empiricist based claims for real knowledge could not be defended, except in metaphysical terms.

Hume's scepticism on this issue owed something to Locke's treatment of the question of how immediately sensed knowledge of external objects are transformed into

66Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, p.17.
67Ibid.
meaningful "fact" by the individual subject.68 Developed further by Hume the proposition was that while human knowledge is originally derived from immediate sense experience - the objects of cognition by which we come to "know", understand, give meaning to and make judgements about reality, are not external to the mind at all. We can, according to this logic, never actually "know" the nature of any externally existing reality, as early inductivists suggested, all we can finally know are the objects subjectively constructed within our own minds.69

The crucial question then becomes, of course, how do we "know" that these sense impressions, these mediated copies of real things, are in fact derived from the physical world of reality, external to us. The empiricist answer, of course, pointed to "experience". But this, Hume suggested, was not logically possible because:

the mind has never anything present to it but perceptions and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of such a connection is therefore without any foundation in reasoning.70

The point is that if we only know the world via (mediated) perception, we cannot possibly know a reality, external to the mind, by perception alone. Nor can memory provide the answer, for our memory is of that which we have perceived, and a priori inference is ruled out by Hume because, as with all rationalist formulas, it refers only to relations between "internal" ideas. What then of the basic argument of modern science, i.e. that we understand the real nature of the world via experiment and the knowledge derived from the conjunction between cause and effect? Well, here too Hume undermined the "givens" of his age, and of those to follow. Hume's position, on this issue, is explained by Bruce Aune, in this way:

68On Locke's contribution in this regard see the discussion by Masters, "Hobbes and Locke"; and those by Cornforth, Science Versus Idealism, pp.27-30; Cowley, A Critique of British Empiricism, pp.1-11; Schact, Classical Modern Philosophers, pp.179-184; Gupte, Origins and Theories of Linguistic Philosophy, pp.31-48; Fitzgerald, Comparing Political Thinkers, pp.117-140.

69See the discussion in Aune, Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism, p.64.

70Hume cited in ibid, pp. 65-66, emphasis added.
To infer that A is the cause of B we must have experienced a constant conjunction between cases of A and cases of B. Hence to infer that external bodies cause our sense impressions we must have experienced a constant conjunction between such bodies and our impressions. But to experience a conjunction of two things we must experience both things. Since we never directly experience external bodies, we cannot experience a correlation between those bodies and the impressions they are believed to cause.\textsuperscript{71}

The implication of this argument is clear enough. It is that there is no logical basis, in empiricist terms, for the proposition that knowledge of reality is directly derived from of an independent, world "out there".

Hume's critical attention was, of course, turned with devastating results on the other great pillar of modernist thought - the rationalist notion of a "mind" centred foundation for knowledge, in modern cogito man. For Descartes of course this was the indubitable basis of certainty - that which could not be doubted. In Hume's work doubt abounded, primarily because of his insistence that it was not possible to actually perceive the "thing" (man) that thinks, or to "know" its real (objectified) nature. All that is ever known, he argued, are mediated perceptions of thinking man, even of the "self" as cogitator. Consequently:

when I enter most intimately into what I call \textit{myself}, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch \textit{myself} at any time without perception and never can observe anything but the perception [consequently] I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle of or collection of different perceptions.\textsuperscript{72}

And in a passage that has all kinds of implications for the confident articulations of sovereignty in Realist logic and the associated invocation of identity in a world of difference, Hume proposed that:

The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid, p.66.

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid, p.67, emphasis added.
nor identity in [its] differences-whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity.73

This uncompromising approach to questions of knowledge led Hume to his condemnation also of the "supersensible" elements of Liberal social contract theory, which he argued, could not be "justified by history or experience, in any age or country of the world".74 Rather, he charged, any proclaimed correspondence between an external law of human nature, and the Whig notion of social progress, was nonsensical in both epistemological and political terms. The "naturally" endowed social contract was, he maintained, an entirely secular phenomenon centred on political elitism, which saw a change only in "the regal part of government...[a]nd it was only the majority of seven hundred, who determined the change for ten millions".75

There is then in Hume's sceptical position a glimmer of modernist "thinking space". It is, however, a glimmer that has been virtually ignored by orthodox social theory, and by International Relations scholars committed to the simpler, unifying features of the Humean contribution to modernism. This is perhaps not so surprising, in Hume's case, when one recalls that the potential for openness in Hume's critique of empiricism and rationalism was ultimately undermined by a process of self-closure based on the very positivist foundationalism his own logic condemned as inadequate.

There is no work that I am aware of that explains Hume's final decision to remain committed to a positivist approach other than his own in which he suggested that finally, logic and reason must always remain secondary to "belief", to "passion". More pertinently, Hume, it seemed, for all his scepticism, remained incarcerated within the

73Ibid.

74This is taken from Hume, Essays Moral, Political and Literary as cited in Paul Corcoran, "Rousseau and Hume", in Comparing Political Thinkers ed. Fitzgerald, p.168. Its significance for International Relations is explained, for example by Robert Cox in his, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in Neorealism and Its Critics edited by Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) in terms of the Realist propensity to analogise the Liberal distinction between civil society and the state to the domestic/international distinction.

75Corcoran, "Rousseau and Hume", p.169.
modernist (Cartesian) dualism of either/or, which in his case was represented either as the pursuit of "assurance and conviction", on the one hand or a situation in which:

all discourse, all action, would immediately cease, and men would remain in a total lethargy until the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, would put an end to their miserable existence.76

In this acquiescence before the foundational power of the "Cartesian anxiety" Hume was, perhaps, after all, the quintessential modernist, searching even at the critical margins for "assurance and conviction" in the face of the "necessities of nature". Whatever the case, if there is one theme that can be said to characterise the Western story of modernity in the period since Hume, it has been the search for "assurance and conviction" centred on a series of ingenious attempts to construct a scientific philosophy which avoided the paradoxical consequences exposed by Hume.

This is not all there is to the story, of course, for between Hume and the reign of Logical Positivist certainty and behaviouralism, there was the "Kantian turn" in the Western narrative. The significance of Kant for International Relations will be discussed in relation to inter-war "idealism" in Chapter Five, in regard to Weberian thought in Chapter Six, in relation to the critical Theory of Andrew Linklater in Chapter Eight, and from another angle, in Chapter Nine, via Richard Ashley's Foucauldian reading of Kantian influence on the question of sovereignty.77 At this point, however, my concern is to establish, in more conventional terms, the discursive connections between Kant and the dominant strain of modernist theory and practice located, by the Eighteenth century, in the space between early Humean positivism and rationalism.

76Hume as cited in Aune, Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism, pp.66-7.

77Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War".
Kant sought to redeem philosophical thought from the scepticism of Hume in proposing a new variation on the Classical-cum-modern dualisms. Hume, as indicated above, ultimately advocated a positivist/empiricist approach to knowledge and society, even while the scepticism remained in his work about claims to have found the missing link in Western philosophy (i.e. between the laws of thought and reality). Kant perceived a way out of the dilemma by acknowledging the futility of all empiricist based claims to "know" the world in a direct, unmediated form, via "experience". Rather, he argued, the universal axioms of science are already presupposed in empirical analysis and thus cannot be logically derived from a process of experience as empiricists argued. More precisely, argued Kant, the basis of knowledge was derived from a set of synthetic a priori categories of the mind. All knowledge consequently involves the application of these categories (e.g. time, space, cause) to "experience". All objects, in this sense, require (apriori) concepts derived from the basic mind categories. This includes the objects of science, thus all scientific explanation presupposes the (apriori categories of) the thinking subject.

A new sense of (modern) scientific philosophy was possible on this basis because it was now acknowledged that factual scientific knowledge, derived from "experience", must ultimately conform to the philosophical categories of mind, without which it is impossible to "experience". This gave added impetus to the search for a modern scientific philosophy centred on Cartesian "cogito man", because, as Richard Rorty has pointed out:

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78 On the Kantian argument in this regard, see Scruton, A Short History of Western Philosophy; ch. 10; Aune, Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism; Aronowitz, Science as Power; Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), part 1; and from a different angle, Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature; and Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?", in The Foucault Reader edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).

79 Aronowitz, Science as Power, pp. 240-244.
Kant put philosophy "on the secure path to science" by putting outer space inside inner space (the space of the constituting activity of the transcendental ego) and then claiming Cartesian certainty about the inner for the laws of what had previously been thought to be outer.80

In this way, with the notion of modern man as both part of the (natural) world, yet "autonomous" of it (as the site of knowledge) Kant added a profound dimension to the modernist notion of the autonomous (sovereign) rational actor, able to "transcend" objective structures and finally "know" itself and the world. Importantly, thus, while Kant severely undermined the proposition that knowledge was grounded in "experience", the "Kantian turn" (toward transcendence and emancipation) remained objectivist, in its dualised acknowledgment of a world of rational subjects and "things in themselves". Accordingly, as Bernstein has explained, Kant did not "question the need for an ahistorical permanent matrix or categorical scheme for grounding knowledge", but, instead, and to a far greater extent than some of those he criticised, Kant insisted on "an a priori universal and necessary structure of human knowledge". Moreover, in seeking to establish an objective "moral" knowledge, autonomous of the is/ought framework, Kant, sought "to demonstrate once and for all that there is a basic universal, objective moral law for all rational beings".81 One more theme requires brief comment here in order that the significance of the Kantian reformulation of the modern story be more fully appreciated.

The important issue here is that, following Kant, Western philosophy was effectively transformed into the paradigm of the "knowing" subject, as questions of "meaning" and "knowing" were increasingly centred on the study of epistemology. This was of major significance to post-Enlightenment historians and philosophers now able, with confidence, to "fit" the great thinkers of the past into a particular kind of discursive framework in which each asked - how is our knowledge possible? The attempts to find

80 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.137.
81 Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.10.
answers to this question now began to dominate the modern Western story. The answers (or attempted answers) of the great thinkers now become the intellectual building blocks to the present. Consequently, a particular discursive process drawn from Greek/Christian sources, energised by the Cartesian introduction of the rational subject, the Humean positivist intervention, and the a priori premise drawn from Kant, became, in the age of Western expansion and power politics, the universal mode of progressive thought, the process of framing all human history and thought. This regime of framing, based upon the paradoxes and ambiguities surrounding the new man/god of modernity, now became modernity, it gave new and more certain "meaning" to its reality. It became the "meta-narrative".

Following the framing of the modern "meta-narrative" in this way, at least three distinct though (metatheoretically) connected approaches to knowledge and society have been discernible in the post-Kantian period, all of which have been integral to the modernist framing of social theory. One, influenced by interpretivist themes drawn from Kant's apriori premise, has treated with some sensitivity the inherent problems of an empiricist approach to knowledge and society as outlined by Hume. It has, accordingly, centred its search for a modern scientific foundation for real knowledge in the realm of historically constituted social behaviour and accumulated cultural experience (in the "retrospective" realm of memory, habit and conventional wisdom). As such it has contributed to Anglo-American thinking a more critically inclined modernism with a more limited, less progressivist notion of science than that commonly associated with Enlightenment based thinking. This tradition is described by Susan Hekman as "positivist humanism" (Verstehen theory, phenomenalism, ordinary language analysis, etc) and more will be said about it in Chapter Three.82 A second post-Kantian tendency, privileging the Kantian "emancipatory" dimension, has, of course, been a major influence

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82 See Susan Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); and Weber, the Ideal Type and Contemporary Social Theory (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). The approach has tended to privilege rationalist themes in Kant, focusing attention on the apriori categories of the mind, seeking the source of real foundational knowledge in intersubjective understanding. Its connection with hermeneutic thought (e.g. through Weber) will be considered in Chapter Three.
upon modern radical thought, via its reformulations by Hegel and Marx, and this will be
the focus of attention in Chapter Four and in direct International Relations terms, in
Chapter Eight. For now, it is the third and dominant post-Kantian tendency that I am
most concerned with, that characterised in the Nineteenth century by its privileging of the
lingering objectivism in Kant, and the search for an objective foundation for knowledge
in a world of "things in themselves".

Comte and Logical Positivism: Framing Contemporary Social Theory

It was upon this highly suspect theoretical edifice (a positivism stripped of its sceptical
aspect) that in the mid-Nineteenth century August Comte's approach influenced Anglo-
American social theory with the proposition that real scientific knowledge of social and
political reality could indeed be attained by observation of an existing world of "facts",
independent of any particular social theory or interpretation. The result, by the end of
the Nineteenth century was, as Fred Suppe has confirmed, an increasingly unproblematic
pursuit of scientific reality:

Firmly based on empirical inquiry rather than upon philosophical speculation.
[In which] there was no doubt that a real objective world existed independent
of individual perceivers.

83 Though even in the crudest realms of positivist scientism there has usually been a passing reference to
the issues raised by Hume. In Comte's work, for example, there is a rather shaky juxtaposition of both
pragmatic and inductivist themes. See Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, pp.70-2; Giddens, Studies in
Social and Political Theory (London: Hutchinson, 1977), pp.31-44; Keat and Urry, Social Theory as
Science, pp.71-87. In its Comtean variation, as Giddens has noted, positivism represented a story of
"human knowledge in general" and the development of scientific thought in particular which is perceived
as having progressed through "the successive phases of "theological", "metaphysical" and "positive"
thought. This developmental process was governed by a simple principle, in which:

those disciplines relating to phenomena furthest from man's own involvement and control,
develop first, and the history of science as a whole is one of a progressive movement
inwards towards the study of man himself.


Following Comte thus, the positivist/empiricist approach to knowledge and society in Anglo-American circles was effectively reduced to a one-dimensional enterprise (from the gathering of "facts" to the construction of "laws"). Indeed, pronouncing traditional philosophy dead, a contemporary positivism emerged which sought finally to fulfill the modern obligation to detach science from metaphysics and any lingering subjectivism. It did so, paradoxically, by recourse to a crude empiricist theory of knowledge which, as Hume a century earlier had shown, was ultimately metaphysical and subjectivist in the extreme.

By the turn of the century, however, some of positivism's cruder elements were coming under critical scrutiny in German and British philosophical circles. The impetus for the change came less, perhaps, from philosophical problems in the Hume-Kant debate, but more from problems raised by theoretical physicists finding anomalies in positivist logic as they developed the areas of quantum mechanics and relativity theory.\(^85\) At stake were the axioms of Newtonian theory integral to modern thought since the Seventeenth century. More specifically following the works of scholars such as Einstein, Bohr and Heisenberg, renewed and critical attention was placed on fundamental questions concerning the nature of observation, of evidence and of the validity of experimental and quantitative methods for attaining and verifying "facts".\(^86\)

The response of mainstream positivist scholarship however, was, (in Lakatosian terms) to protect the "hard core" of its theory, its empiricist epistemology, and address the

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\(^85\) Explaining this in *Science as Power*, p.241, Stanley Aronowitz has noted that the reason this challenge to positivist/empiricist thinking was taken so seriously at this time was precisely because it emanated from what had been the source of legitimate modern knowledge since Newton - theoretical physics. Thus, "physics had provided the opening for speculation; permission had been given".

\(^86\) The atmosphere of the times is captured nicely by Aronowitz when he recalls the frustration of the German physicist von Weizsacker on encountering the positivist insistence "that anything that can be theorized is based on corresponding sense data". In response and in exasperation, von Weizsacker countered with the proposition that "theoretical physics may posit phenomena for which the data not only are unavailable but cannot be observed or measured." Even more directly destabilising for the dominant Anglo-American philosophical perspective was a recognition that at the core of the natural sciences "Bohr and other modern physicists [now] refuse[d] to describe events in terms of properties of objects independent of the situation of the observer", ibid, pp.239-250, emphasis added.
new challenge not as a matter of fundamental philosophical inadequacy but as primarily a
methodological issue concerning the issue of verification. Faced by a challenge to
modern objectivism the reaction was an attempt to distance scientific rationality further
from the non-sense associated with the ("pre-modern") metaphysical element in Western
philosophy. More specifically it centred on the application of a stricter regime of
mathematics and formal logic to the philosophical problems of the day, as articulated via
the logical atomism of Russell, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the extreme
phenomenalism of Mach.

The general perspectives and goals of this new "Logical" Positivism were perhaps
best articulated by Herbert Feigl, who stressed that the Vienna Circle scholars, in
particular, sought a scientific philosophy of human society "in the spirit of Hume and
Comte, but equipped with more fully developed tools". More pertinently, the Logical
Positivists used their new tool kit to further distance rational scientific thinking from the
metaphysics of post-Kantian philosophy. As A.J. Ayer suggested, it was this:

explicit rejection of metaphysics, as distinct from a mere abstention from
metaphysical utterances [that was] characteristic of of the type of [logical]
empiricism known as positivism.

Or, as Giddens' has put it, Logical Positivism sought to redefine philosophy as rational
and scientific, by classifying:

Most of the traditional ontological and epistemological dilemmas of
philosophy as belonging to metaphysics and hence outside the scope of
rational discussion.

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87 Or more directly to distance itself from the metaphysical "sophistry and twaddle" that Hume believed
"we should commit to the flames", see Norman Stockman, Antipopositivist Theories of the Sciences, p.23.

88 On Logical Positivism, generally, see Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy; Giddens, Positivism and
Sociology; Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory; Aronowitz, Science as Power; Fred Suppe,
The Structure of Scientific Theories; and Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science. For a critique of
phenomenalism which exposes its solipsism and paradox see Aune, Rationalism, Empiricism and
Pragmatism, pp.75-100.

89 Cited in Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory, p.44.


91 See Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory, p.44.
The end result was an approach to knowledge and society which asserted that the real task of modern philosophy was to analyse the "logical structure of scientific theories, of the principles of induction used by scientists [and] the logic of explanation".92 Any analytical enterprise outside this framework was deemed to be dealing in (philosophically) meaningless metaphysics. This position was exemplified in (the early) Wittgenstein's proposition that "[t]he right method of philosophy would be this: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy".93

With Logical Positivism, therefore, modernist philosophy altered its focal point. Whereas, in the post-Kantian period philosophical discourse had centred (often explicitly) on a priori cognitive themes; with the ascendancy of Logical Positivism, "real" knowledge became exclusively identified with an objectified notion of science and the scientific method. In this sense modernism and modernist philosophy, became, effectively, the philosophy of (objectivist) science. This new philosophical discourse of science now reformulated a central modernist question. Instead of directly asking how is our knowledge possible?, it now concentrated on the issue of how knowledge claims could be methodologically justified and validated. This was a subtle but important shift in that it shifted from the forefront of debate the question of the rational subject and the notion of a cognitive (a priori) constitution of objects. This "decentering" of the subject was not, it must be said, a precursor of things to come in post-modernism. It represented, rather, an attempt to distinguish once and for all between the scientific enterprise - concerned with the construction of objective knowledge (via a process of observation and testing) - and that residue of Western metaphysics concerned with discovering philosophical origins and with general questions of subjectivity. It sought above all, in this regard, to distance itself from the ambiguity, paradox and cognitive

92See Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences, p.22.

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reflectivity which it associated with the "old" philosophy of Descartes and Kant. That it did so in terms framed by Descartes and Kant, and in a manner Hume showed to be paradoxical in the extreme, makes Logical Positivism perhaps the exemplary modernist perspective.

This is of some significance, of course, because it was with the dispersal of its leading exponents, in the wake of Fascism, that the Logical Positivist approach, in both its conservative and more liberal form (e.g. in Neurath) became a direct and very influential feature of Anglo-American social theory, and of behaviouralism in particular.

The Behaviouralist Revolution and Contemporary Social Theory

The continuing potency of the principles, (if not the explicit tone) of Logical Positivism have been the focus of attention among a whole range of Critical Social Theorists concerned at the closure it invokes upon thinking, speaking and acting in the world. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, critical scholars such as C. W. Mills and Alvin Gouldner were warning of the dangers of positivist reductionism at the heart of a Sociology discipline in the United States, ostensibly committed to pluralist intellectual pursuits and social values.94

The particular concern of Mills and Gouldner, and of many Critical Social Theorists since, was the impact upon North American scholarship (in particular) of the "behavioural revolution" which, had "captured and pervaded" thinking on politics and society, by the early 1960s. Indeed as David Ricci has put it, by this time

the behaviourists [were] so persuasive within the discipline that there no longer existed any large and intellectually cohesive group of political

scientists who believed in anything but behavioural work as the raison d'être for the discipline.95

Behaviouralism, in this period, then, was integral to the way that social theory orthodoxies understood and explained the world. And in the early years of the Cold War it was integral to the particular way of framing the place and role of the "West" in its struggles with its enemies "out there".96 It did so in a manner which illustrated just how powerful the modernist framing regime had become at the North American centre of social theory, particularly in its Logical Positivist articulation. At the core of behaviouralism, accordingly, was the dichotomy between "science and nonscience".97 More specifically, behaviouralism defined itself, primarily, in relation to the positivist dichotomy of is/ought. Thus, scientific (behaviouralist) research dealt with the "is" of the world, its tangible, verifiable "facts", while Others (political theorists, traditional philosophers, theologians, Marxists, etc) dealt with the "oughts", those aspects of existence that had no factual referents and thus could not generate "real" knowledge.98

Behaviouralism, therefore, was not concerned with "elaborations of political doctrine, or what the state ought to be", it focused only on "hypotheses which could be tested against empirical data".99 Following the dictates of Logical Positivism, the


96This is an important issue for International Relations as the discussion in Chapter Six, in particular, will testify. On this see Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", Daedalus 106(3) (1977), pp.41-60.


98Ibid, pp.39-42.

99Ibid, p.137, emphasis added.
emphasis was on empirical verification rather than philosophical speculation. In this way post-World War Two social theorists sought to construct the "social physics" that Comte, in earlier time has posited as within the rational capacity of modern "cogito man". And there was no doubt about the nature of the enterprise, at least in its most basic form. It was, as one behaviouralist put it in the early 1970s, all about "a body of systematic and orderly thinking about a determinate subject matter".100

This is not to suggest that the behaviouralism of the 1960s and 1970s was no more incisive than the Comtean format of the Nineteenth century. One major addition, of course, aside from the mathematised influence of the Logical Positivists, was the impact upon it of Karl Popper's work and the post-Kantian sensitivities of Critical Rationalism. In the chapter to follow Popper's status in the modernist/positivist story will be the focus of extended discussion. The point, for now, is that the Popperian influence helped sharpen at least three features of the behavioural revolution: (i) its cumulative, linear sense of progress and truth, articulated via a scientific process of discovering and testing the "facts": (ii) the (related) sense of the problem of inductive empiricism (direct perception) and the need, therefore, for the "tentative" representation of deductive science (particularly after, and in response to, Kuhn's critique in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970): and (iii) a "non ideological" method for illustrating how the Western (i.e. United States) "open" system of politics, society and (rational-scientific) thought, was superior to Other "closed" ideological regimes.101

At one level, as David Ricci has noted, this led to an overwhelming concern with research methodology and scientific technique, rather than analysis, and with a "piecemeal" and "building block" approach to social issues which increased the

100This is from Evron Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioural Approach on Traditional Political Science", in Changing Perspectives in Contemporary Political Analysis edited by Howard Ball and Thomas Lauth (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971), p.79, as cited in Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, p.140.

conviction within behaviouralist circles that any alternative approach could only be engaged in the realm of "traditional" thought, of speculative philosophy, of "meaningless" normativism.\textsuperscript{102} It led, more pertinently, to a situation entirely familiar to any critically inclined observer of the International Relations community:

whereby a certain kind of political analysis was read out of the realm of respectable inquiry and then largely ignored as useless to the affairs of realistic people.\textsuperscript{103}

At another level, and also of immediate significance for its impact upon International Relations, this Popperian influenced behaviouralism concerned itself with the question of the modern "good life" only in terms of its falsification credo. Accordingly, its statements about issues of "good", "moral", and "ought", in this context, were couched in the language and logic of the value-free analyst responding to the data, as "tested". Thus, the Anglo-American structure of social relations and political economy was accorded superior status, not because of any ("traditional") commitments on behalf of the scientific testers, but precisely because they were societies open to systemic "testing". This perspective was articulated by Gabriel Almond, in terms which represented Anglo-American societies as having:

some of the characteristics of a laboratory; that is, policies offered by candidates are viewed as hypotheses, and the consequences of legislation are rapidly communicated within the system and constitute a crude form of testing hypotheses.\textsuperscript{104}

The point, made more succinctly, was that while Western (i.e. North American) society might not accord with all images of the Democratic "good society", it was superior because it provided "the necessary [pluralist] mechanism for [its] own correction".\textsuperscript{105}

This was, undoubtedly an irresistible logic for many during the Cold War and it was

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid, pp.137-143.

\textsuperscript{103}Ibid, p.150.

\textsuperscript{104}This is from Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", \textit{Journal of Politics} (August 1956), p.398, as cited in Ricci, \textit{The Tragedy of Political Science}, p.159.

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid.
integral to the rise in status of social theory scholarship in that post-World War Two period when United States society, in particular, celebrated the "end of ideology" and the triumph of pluralist democracy, albeit of the narrow institutionalist variety invoked by Schumpeter.\textsuperscript{106}

In the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate, however, and increasing doubts about the theory and practice of United States pluralism, the "givens" of behaviouralist positivism underwent enhanced critical scrutiny. An important dimension of this reassessment saw the legitimacy of the larger (social) "scientific" project itself challenged. Much of this challenge centred on the relationship between (social) scientific theory and the (policy) practice of the post-war "new society".\textsuperscript{107} But for all its instrumentalist tone the debate in the United States did at some points overlap with the longer and more "abstract" tradition of theoretical reflection on the European Continent. As Bernstein and others have attested, it was a debate that soon became locked into the larger questions of Western philosophy that under the positivist influence of the political science mainstream had been effectively removed from research agenda's as "irrelevant". Consequently, in the age that had so triumphantly celebrated its modernism by proclaiming the "end of ideology", and the capacity of problem solving techniques to solve the great questions of contemporary society, the challenges of the early 1970s focused again on philosophical themes that, from Descartes on, had framed the way that Anglo-American societies had understood themselves and their world. Questions once asked only at the margins of

\textsuperscript{106}My comments here relate, generally, to that period in the 1950s and 1960s, in particular, when "political science" was reduced to a concern for institutional systems, the "workings" of Government, etc, those aspects of society that were "concrete", that could be empirically observed, measured and tested for their correspondence to the "tentative" facts. See, for example, David Trueman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951). The reference to Joseph Schumpeter relates to his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950) in which he produced a theory of democracy that basically reduced it to a process in which largely disinfomed citizens vote for a change in elite rule. The practical, testable (i.e. survey, voting studies) nature of this new theory was appealing, for obvious reasons to behaviouralist political scientists, bored by the "meaningless" debates over philosophical issues such as political participation. The implications of the above remain "tangible" to this day in Political Science Departments and in their products.

\textsuperscript{107}On this see Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, introduction.
Anglo-American social theory, were now re-addressed more widely and with more critical intent. At its most profound this challenge:

posed questions about fundamental categorical distinctions between 'theory' and 'practice' where 'practice' is understood as the technical application of theoretical knowledge; the distinction between empirical and normative theory, where the former is directed towards description and explication of what is, while the latter deals with the clarification and justification of what ought to be; the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive discourse; and the distinction between fact and value.108

This was in many ways the catalyst of the Critical Social Theory challenges that in the 1990s are now beginning to make critical incisions into International Relations. As indicated in Chapter One, if there is one theme that has bound Critical Social Theory perspectives together over the years it is the affirmation that positivism remains alive, if not so well, at the core of orthodox social theory. Hence, to complete this discussion of the way that a modernist way of framing, continues, via contemporary positivism, to shape contemporary social theory (and International Relations) two synthesised statements on the nature of contemporary positivism and modernism are of value here.

The first comes from Norman Stockman who, concluding his comprehensive inquiry into the state of (social) scientific thought, in the 1980s, affirmed the discursive connections outlined in this chapter with the proposition that positivism continues to dominate in the:

tradition of empiricist attempts to provide a new foundation for knowledge on the basis of that which cannot be doubted. This attempt follows the Cartesian programme, and what qualifies it as empiricist is the idea that the indubitable basis must be presented in the realm of sensory experience. [This is]...the idea that there must be something that is absolutely certain, otherwise nothing is certain.109

The second statement, from Roy Bhaskar, develops these themes a little with his insights on how and why positivism continues to be such a powerful influence in the


109Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences, p.30.
contemporary period. In Bhaskar’s view it is the updated “correspondence rule” that continues to appeal: the rule which states that:

only by comparing our theories about the world with the world itself via our experience of it in an ultimately unbiased, impartial fashion, can we hope to improve our scientific knowledge about the world.110

And more precisely in relation to the discussion thus far:

The importance of positivism lies partly in the fact that almost all post Humean, post Kantian philosophies stand in certain critical, logical and historical relations to it; partly in the fact that it is the philosophy of common sense...par excellence; partly in the fact that it is intimately associated, on the one hand with the most successful scientific system hitherto seen, viz Newtonian mechanics, and on the other, with the most powerful socio-economic order hitherto known, namely capitalism [and] partly in the fact that it continues to structure contemporary philosophy of science and social science, even when these are formally opposed to it.111

**Summary**

This chapter has sought to go to the core of the “unwritten preface” in International Relations by going, initially, to the metatheoretical core of Western social theory and illustrating, in admittedly rather sketchy terms, the connections between a dominant way of framing modernity, in Western philosophy, and the contemporary power of the knowledge that is positivism. Any attempt to boil down the complexity of the issues traversed in the discussion, thus far, risks doing further injustice to them. Yet its possible, I think, to make a summarised statement about where we have been in this chapter, by focusing on a theme that, in one form or another, was central to it.

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111This is in Bhaskar’s, *Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation* (London: Verso Publishing, 1986), p.305, emphasis added. It is interesting for obvious reasons but for some not so obvious ones too in that it represents a critique of positivism from a position which still retains a commitment to the foundationalism of “the most successful scientific system hitherto seen”. A broader discussion of the “Scientific Realist” alternative to positivism of Bhaskar, and others, such as Mary Hesse, will appear in Chapter Three. In the International Relations field the counterpart to Bhaskar’s position might be that of Alexander Wendt, for example, in “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, *International Organization* 41 (1987), pp.335-370.
This theme was evident in the attempt by the Greeks to distance themselves from their past by detaching themselves, via reason, from the traditional "objects" of their world. It was articulated in the wake of the "death of God" in the Seventeenth century age of science and Cartesian rationalism, as the search for some other eternal, ultimate foundation for certainty in an increasingly uncertain world. In the European Enlightenment it became more intrinsically associated with the pursuit of an indubitable reality independent of the distortions of specific time place and culture - the search for a common human nature with laws of thought and behaviour synonymous with the axioms of natural science. From the Nineteenth century on it has energised the quest for a social theory purged of metaphysics, from which genuinely analytic statements might be made and/or scientific laws proclaimed, about modern human society.

This theme - the attempt to separate and distinguish that which is real, foundational, and eternal - from that prejudiced by history, culture and language - remains at the heart of contemporary Western social theory in its most powerful modernist representation - positivism. And, as Chapter One sought to illustrate, this theme remains at the core of the "primitive" Realism dominant in International Relations. It is, therefore, integral to any discussion of an "unwritten preface" in International Relations.

As both Chapter One and Two have indicated, however, there is great contention surrounding this theme, both in social theory and in International Relations. Particularly contentious is the proposition that a modernist framing regime, complete with foundationalist paradox, continues to dominate in an age which has proclaimed its post-behaviouralism, post-positivism and post-Realism. The next chapter seeks to confront some of this contention in evaluating some of the major claims, in social theory, to have breached the "meta-narrative", to have gone beyond objectivism, foundationalism and the modern framing practices of positivism. It seeks, therefore, to engage with another crucial aspect of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations.
The preceding chapter sought to construct a broad framework of discussion in which an "unwritten preface" for International Relations might be understood. It did so in identifying the modernist framing regime within Western philosophy and contemporary social theory. Closing down the analytical focus a little, it then addressed the most influential articulation of modernist thinking - positivism - and its continuing impact across the social theory disciplines. The discussion emphasised the enduring and paradoxical foundationalism at the core of the positivist based orthodoxies in social theory and, implicitly at least, sought to indicate the connections between this situation and the "primitive" state of the intellectual art in International Relations, described in Chapter One.

This chapter now re-connects, more directly, themes introduced in Chapter One and Two in that it seeks to evaluate the claim, made by many in International Relations in recent years, that while orthodox (Realist) analysis, in particular, might have articulated some of the cruder aspects of the "positivist bias", in the past, it has now sloughed off its "primitivism" and is engaged in a post-positivist, post (Traditional) Realist phase of its development. This is a claim that tends to be asserted and/or implied rather than substantively argued, in International Relations, as the recent Ferguson and Mansbach article illustrates. Some of the broader implications of this assertive tendency will be addressed between Chapters Five to Nine. The present chapter, however, seeks to illustrate that across the interdisciplinary social theory debate claims for post-positivism and/or post-foundationalism are often highly problematic. It seeks, in this way, to

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undermine related claims in International Relations, and the logic that flows from them particularly in contemporary neo-Realism.

It is in this context that this chapter focuses, initially, on some of the most significant "post-positivist" claimants in social theory, in order that: (i) their influences be more clearly understood in a general social theory context; (ii) that a substantive dimension be added to the "unwritten preface" in International Relations; and (iii) to explain, from another angle, why Critical Social Theory scholarship in the Third Debate has, ultimately, been oriented toward two "post-positivist" approaches in particular - Critical Theory and post-modernism. These two approaches will receive extended treatment in the chapter to follow which will also address some of the most sensitive Critical Social Theory responses to the post-positivism issue and to the question of foundationalism.2

A brief exploration of some of the themes at the heart of the "post-positivist" debate might help focus attention on the discussion to follow. Here, the work of Mary Hesse is of value. In recent years, Hesse has sought to explain developments in the history and philosophy of science, placing particular emphasis on the impact of positivism upon the contemporary social sciences.3 She has concluded that dominant within Western social theory is an approach to knowledge gleaned from three empiricist based themes, crystallised during the Enlightenment. The first: a naive realism which postulated an external factual world (object) independent of the observer (subject): the second: the postulation of an intersubjectively available "scientific language", which afforded the capacity to simply "describe" the real world in terms unsullied by interpretive bias and/or theory; and the third: a correspondence theory of truth; the proposition, simply put, that statements about reality are true if they correspond with the "facts" and

2 The notion of post-positivism will be addressed here, explicitly, but the question of modernism is always fundamental to the debate.

3 In, for example, Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Brighton: Harvester, 1980).
false if they do not. The resultant "model" of social science analysis was one which indicated a capacity both to (objectively) "experience" the world, independent of theory, and/or in hypothetico-deductive terms "test" ones theories against the available (factual) evidence. It was under this modernist framing regime, as the previous chapter indicated, that the foundation of Enlightenment knowledge (i.e. the modern "meta-narrative") became the foundation for contemporary social theory.

The added value of Hesse's work is that it provides sophisticated discussion of the way this modernist way of framing reality has come under challenge in recent times. There have been two major dimensions to this challenge. The first has seen the previously "given" relationship between post-Enlightenment positivism and the natural sciences seriously re-assessed; while the second has undermined the unity of science proposition connecting the natural to the social sciences. Three associated arguments have been central to these challenges. One has stated that the "data" gained by analysts of human society cannot be independent of theory - that it is theoretical interpretation that gives meaning to data as "fact". Another has maintained that the relationship between (thinking, creating) subjects and the objects of the world, and between theory and fact, cannot be explained adequately in dualised or dichotomised terms. And, finally, there has been widespread repudiation of the notion of a detached, objective language which merely "describes" the factual reality of the world.

Challenges of this kind have come from all angles since the heyday of the Logical Positivists, and at different times and in different places the claims of (among others) ethnomethodology, phenomenology, conventionalism, pragmatism, structuralism, Critical Rationalism, Analytical Philosophy, Scientific Realism, Critical Theory, post-modernism and variants of hermeneutic thought have found support in this regard. In the present work some of these approaches cannot be addressed at all in any direct way while


5 Ibid, pp.170-171.
others will receive only brief comment. Five: Popper’s Critical Rationalism, The Kuhnian challenge, Analytical Philosophy, Scientific Realism, and the broad hermeneutic tradition, will receive more extended analytical treatment in the discussion to follow.

The criterion of priority in this case is simple enough. The falsificationist theme and the general attitudes and principles of Popper’s Critical Rationalism have been at the heart of the International Relations discipline, particularly in the United States, since the early Cold War period. They remain dominant, I will argue (in Chapters Six and Seven in particular) in, for example, the structuralist Realism of Kenneth Waltz, in the so called "renaissance" of contemporary security and strategic studies, and in the confident "post-positivism" of scholars such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane in the neo-Realism of the 1990s. The hermeneutic tradition (or elements of it) has also had a significant, albeit less obvious, influence on International Relations, primarily via the Verstehen perspectives of Max Weber as relayed through the exemplar Realist texts of Hans Morgenthau. The influences of Analytical Philosophy have become more explicit in recent times in the works of scholars such as Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie; and the Scientific Realist perspective is evident in the Third Debate, in the work of Lapid and Tooze, for example, and more specifically via the structuration approach of Alexander Wendt. The question of where to begin the discussion poses no real problem either. For

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forty years, or more, indeed, for the life of the International Relations discipline centred in the United States, the deductivist perspectives of Popper have been integral to it.

Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (i): Popper and Critical Rationalism

It is not hard to understand why Popper's Critical Rationalism has been the most influential of the "post-positivist" approaches over the past three decades. Here, after all, was an approach to knowledge and modern society which acknowledged the crudities of the Logical Positivist legacy, and which accounted for elements of Continental (primarily Kantian) rationalism, while paying respect to Humean scepticism. Here, nevertheless, was an account of the Western philosophic tradition that was inexorably and triumphantly bound up with the "good" modern society, and which associated itself with a positive Enlightenment project centred on analytical openness, pluralism, objectivity (via testing procedures) and a process of cautious, progressive (rational) reform.

However, from the time that Popper delivered his "twenty seven theses" at the Tubingen conference in 1961, the debate has raged as to whether Critical Rationalism did represent a fundamental break with positivism and its associated problems, or whether it remained incarcerated within the foundationalist paradox of post-Cartesian thought.9 Popper, insisted that it did.10 His opponents across the years, and the disciplines, have insisted that his Critical Rationalism, for all its sensitivity, remained part of a positivist tradition, limited by its modernist metatheoretical commitments.11 This is not a debate

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9 This refers to the controversy that has been central to social theory debate in Germany since 1961. It arose in the wake of a conference held in Tubingen on the nature of the social sciences, at which Karl Popper presented his twenty-seven theses on the issue and Theodor Adorno and others replied to him. Since then scholars on both sides of the divide have continued the dispute. For a discussion of these debates see Adorno ed., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976).


11 See, Fred Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories (Chicago: University of Illinios Press, 1977), chapters 1 and 2; Adorno ed., The Positivist Dispute; Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
which can be confronted in other than the briefest of terms here, but one theme, drawn from the debate between Popper and his critics, might illustrate both the (continuing) appeal and the problems of Popper's position.

It relates, initially, to the way that Popper defined positivism - i.e. in a narrow and restricted way - as Logical Positivism - and the way that he sought to detach himself from this definition. In short Popper rejected positivism (i.e. Logical Positivism) on the basis that it misinterpreted the essence of the Enlightenment and the modern quest for scientific philosophy. Popper, accordingly, sought (to some extent) to reconnect the "perennial questions" of Western philosophy with the essential scientific project. He argued, in the process, that the (Logical) positivist insistence on a dichotomy between science and metaphysics lacked logical credibility. Moreover, in confronting seriously the Humean self critique of positivism, Popper (ostensibly) repudiated logical atomism, the extreme nominalism which underpinned it, the "correspondence rule" associated with it, and the inductivist technique of knowledge construction built upon it which, since Bacon, at least, had been an integral part of Western scientific thought. Just as significantly, Popper rejected the phenomenalism (or sensationalism) that, via direct sensory experience, provided (logical) positivists their "protocol sentences" of real meaning.

The problem with (Logical) positivism, according to Popper, was, in this sense, simple enough. Its philosophy of science rested upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the real and critical method of the natural sciences. Thus its misguided "naturalism"


12 See the discussion in Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp.34-54 on the "modern positivists" as Popper termed them. For an overview see Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences pp.19-27.

13 The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp.34-47. Here he focused on the verifiability issue, arguing that if metaphysical statements were "meaningless" as (logical) positivism asserted, then verification could not be the criterion of "meaning". This was because in the process of verifying a statement it had to be understood and if it could be understood then it must have "meaning", ibid, p.47.

14 Ibid, pp.27-47.
suggested to social scientists that they "begin with observation and measurement...[and]
proceed, next, by induction to generalisations and to the formation of theories".15 This
notion was inadequate, Popper charged, because discovery and progress in the natural
sciences do not proceed in terms of generalisations derived from observation, but as part
of a procedure which, methodologically, is centred on deductive causal explanations, and
a regime of rigorous testing. It was in relation to this notion that Popper accepted the
value ladenness of the scientific process, at least as it concerned the rules or behavioural
conventions by which the scientific community "is guided when...engaged in research or
in discovery".16

To understand and continue (in a more restrained way) the Enlightenment tradition
of progress was, for Popper, bound up in these conventions. Indeed, given the
(ostensible) rejection of external foundations for knowledge, these methodological
conventions now defined science and its theory of knowledge in sociological terms. The
most famous and most important convention of course was the principle of falsifiability,
and it was the application of the falsifiability principle that demarcated scientific (real)
knowledge from other knowledge forms (e.g. speculative, normative, ideological,
religious). The pursuit of scientific knowledge in this sense was not certainty of the
Cartesian kind, but "freedom from dogmatism" and careful, progressive understanding of
the world provided by "the adventure of science and by discoveries which again and
again confront us with new and unexpected questions".17 And in another famous passage
Popper outlined his new Critical Rationalist notion of progress - one set upon a rational
procedure of:

trial and error, of conjecture and refutation: of boldly proposing theories; of
trying our best to show that these are erroneous; and of accepting them
tentatively if our critical efforts are unsuccessful.18

15Adorno, ed., The Positivist Dispute, p.90.

16The Logic of Scientific Discovery p.50; see the discussion between pp.49-56.

17Ibid, p.38.

This was all wholesome stuff, of course, the stuff that the modern heroic figures of the age of the "end of ideology" were made of, even if the caution, moderation and the concern for "erroneous" theorising were conspicuous by their absence during the great bulk of *The Poverty of Historicism* and *The Open Society and its Enemies* (Volume Two) and its polemics on Kant, Hegel and Marx. This nevertheless has been the context in which Popper has sought to distance himself from positivism, proclaiming in unequivocal terms, that:

Throughout my life I have combated positivist epistemology...I have fought against the apeing of the natural sciences by the social sciences, and I have fought for the doctrine that positivist epistemology is inadequate; even in its analysis of the natural sciences.19

Even from this brief outline of Popper's position, it is clear that this is not a claim easily undermined. Popper's Critical Rationalism echoed the scepticism of Hume concerning the problems of inductivism and solipsism and, in rejecting the axioms of nominalism and phenomenalism, he acknowledged (seemingly) anti-foundationalist sociological principles. In the "behaviouralist revolution" of the 1960s and since, in a broad social theory context and in International Relations, this Popperian position has been maintained, albeit sometimes in reformulated (e.g. Lakatosian) terms.20

Popper's critics however have never accepted that his Critical Rationalism overcame the paradoxical limitations associated with positivist thought. The attack on

19This is in Adorno, ed., *The Positivist Dispute*, p.299. An interesting angle on the heroic figures issue is to be found in Charles Taylor "Overcoming Epistemology", in *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?* edited by Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1987), pp.464-488. Taylor here made the point that the status of someone like Popper was due primarily to the status of epistemology in Anglo-American intellectual circles. Only on this basis, argued Taylor, could Popper "obtain a hearing for his intemperate views about famous philosophers...which bore only a rather distant relation to the truth", ibid. p.464. Barbara Goodwin has developed the point in a somewhat different direction in, "Utopia Defended Against the Liberals", *Political Studies* XXVIII(3) (1980), pp.384-400. Goodwin argued here that to understand the status of Popper was to appreciate the significance of his "tolerant" scientism for a Cold War establishment, seeking to compare "open" societies with "closed" ones. This is a theme that from a slightly different angle post-modernists such as David Campbell have brought to International Relations; see, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States", *Alternatives* XV (1990), pp.263-286.

Popper by both generations of the Frankfurt School is well enough known in this regard,\textsuperscript{21} and more will be added on this issue later. But criticism of Popper's position continues to flow from sources who, in other respects, would have little in common with Habermas \textit{et al} or, indeed, with each other. Critics such as Norman Stockman, Leszek Kolakowski and Ernst Gellner, for example, have emphasised the significance within Critical Rationalism of a central tenet of positivist thought - the notion of the unity of scientific method.\textsuperscript{22} Their argument, consequently, is that while Popper detached his Critical Rationalism from the nominalism and phenomenalism of Positivism, and while he explicitly acknowledged the "theory impregnated" nature of observation, he (paradoxically) continued to represent social theory and practice in terms of a \textit{single foundation} of understanding based on the (pure) method of the natural sciences. In the \textit{Poverty of Historicism}, this was clearly the position taken by Popper in his support for:

a doctrine of the unity of method; that is to say, the view that all theoretical or generalising sciences make use of the same method, whether they are natural sciences or social sciences...The methods always consist in offering deductive causal explanations, and in testing them (by way of predictions).\textsuperscript{23}

For Stockman this represents positivism by any other name at the core of the most influential "post-positivist" perspective in social theory. He indicated how this was so, both in regard to falsificationism and in regard to Popper's treatment of the issue of scientific "laws". On the former issue it was Popper's support for the falsificationist methods of Hayek in \textit{The Poverty of Historicism} that alerted Stockman's critical attention.\textsuperscript{24} In this work Popper argued that "historicist" critiques misunderstood the real


\textsuperscript{24}Popper, as cited in ibid.
nature of the scientific enterprise (e.g. as inductivist/nominalist) and he then provided an example of a corrective to this misunderstanding in the form of Hayek's economic theory (based on the convention of falsificationism). In so doing, suggested Stockman, Popper's approach was revealed:

as precisely that which was earlier criticised as positivistic; for the doctrine of the unity of method, rather than being proposed as a convention, is [now] advanced as a correct description, either of the methods in fact in use, or perhaps of the 'essence' of both the natural and the social sciences?25

These suspicion were enhanced for Stockman when taking into account Popper's "rejection" of (Logical) positivism on the question of universal laws. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, for example, Popper rejected the idea of "the principle of the uniformity of nature" on the basis that it was a proposition not falsifiable by empirical evidence.26 Elsewhere, however, this logic was itself unequivocally undermined. Consequently, and in relation to the social sciences, Popper proclaimed that:

it is an important postulate of scientific method that we should search for laws with an unlimited realm of validity [because] if we were to admit to laws that are themselves subject to change, change could never be explained by laws.27

And Popper had some rather strange things to say also about the "sociological" process of understanding integral to Critical Rationalism. He maintained, for example, that:

of course this does not mean that all 'social laws', i.e. all regularities of our social life, are normative and man imposed. On the contrary, there are important natural laws of social life also. For these the term sociological laws seems appropriate.28

The problem here, of course, is not just the implied existence of "laws" beyond, and independent of the "normative", but the related and more explicit assertion concerning

25Popper, Poverty of Historicism, p.126.

26Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p.253; as cited in Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences, p.127.

27Popper, Poverty of Historicism, p.103, emphasis added.

independent "natural laws of social life" which, by Popper's own logic (of falsificationism) and the rules of conventionalism, must be regarded as metaphysical, i.e. not empirically verifiable.29

Kolakowski, in his *Positivist Philosophy*, has added weight to the suspicion that Popper's sociological conventionalism remains grounded in positivist and foundationalist presuppositions. In Kolakowski's view the major difference between a genuine position set in terms of sociological convention, and positivism, is the notion held by the former approach that:

the data of experience always leaves scope for more than one explanatory explanation, and which one is chosen cannot be determined by experience.30

Because, however, Popper's approach to conventionalism and his definition of "real" science continued to accept as "given", an empiricist account of the *origin* of knowledge (the world of independent objects to be tested for their facticity) it ultimately "represents an extension of positivist philosophy".31

This is Gellner's conclusion also.32 Indeed, Gellner, like Kolakowski, has concluded that Popper smuggled back into his Critical Rationalism the very empiricist epistemology that (like Hume) he explicitly acknowledged as inadequate.33 Going further, Gellner has argued that the basic assumptions underlying Popper's falsificationist principle are ultimately phenomenalist in nature. His proposition, accordingly, was that Popper's whole deductivist, hypotheses testing procedure, was (paradoxically) predicated

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29 On this issue Stockman is sensitive to the proposition that written at different times these statements might simply indicate intellectual looseness on Popper's part. He countered this by exposing the same themes in the work of another major Critical Rationalist, Hans Albert, and concluded that "the justification for the doctrine of the unity of method of the natural and the social sciences advanced by critical rationalism does not...seem to be satisfactory even by the standards of Popper's original theory of scientific method [falsificationism]", ibid, pp.127-128.

30 Kolakowski, *Positivist Philosophy*, p.158.


32 Gellner, *Legitimation of Belief*.

upon a fundamental *inductivist* premise - the "empiricist metaphysic - the picture of the world as constructed by sense data". This, Gellner acknowledged, remained a powerful and compelling (if illusory) perspective in the contemporary period:

> Not because the world is so constructed or because there is any such 'pure' data; [but] because this picture conveys so well the crucial [scientific] requirement - that of insoluble data which are independent of the theory that is being judged.34

For all his sophisticated attempts to detach himself from the legacy of Logical Positivism and the problems of empiricist inductivism, therefore, Popper and his Critical Rationalism, argued Gellner, retained an image of the knowledge process as a dualised "conflict between hard fact and logical contradiction". Popper, therefore, was "wrong in repudiating or disassociating himself from positivism".35

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34 Ibid, p.175.

35 Ibid, pp.174-5. In *What is this Thing Called Science?* Alan Chalmers has taken another angle on the Critical Rationalist issue, stressing the fundamental problems associated with Popper's notion of an objective "third world" of theory. As Chalmers has shown, while Popper's "third world" proposition (and his whole falsification argument) depended entirely upon a theoretical process involving atomised, contingently related actors, he simultaneously had to acknowledge that "human minds [second world] become crucial in forming the link between the first world of physical objects and the third world of theories". The problem for Popper, resultingly, was the deep contradiction involved in accepting on the one hand the "theory impregnated" nature of all fact, and on the other, retaining a commitment to a "correspondence theory" of truth, see ibid, pp.139-140. There is also the question of Lakatos, of course, and whether he takes the Popperian perspective any further. This is not a major theme in the present discussion primarily because Lakatos has really only been invoked in passing by Realist scholars in International Relations, seeking to deflect criticism of their continuing "positivist bias". In this regard Keohane's use of Lakatos' name in "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", is typical of the strategy. Lakatos, of course, sought to defend as much as was defensible of Popper's Critical Rationalism in the face of its critics, particularly Kuhn's, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970). The compromise perhaps was Lakatos' repudiation of the strict falsificationist principles in Popper and his focus on a plurality of "research programmes" some of which (progressive research programmes) discover new "facts", while others (the degenerating variety) do not. See "Falsificationism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970). This provided for Keohane an organising framework for debate which concluded, not surprisingly, that we need a number of "research programmes" all working away at "theory" in the International Relations discipline. See *"Theory of World Politics*, pp.189-200. The "theory" involved, of course, corresponded with the positivist presuppositions of both Lakatos and Keohane on what "theory" is. Omitted from the "theory" spectrum, therefore, were approaches that question the positivist notion of "theory". Keohane, utilising Lakatos again, has made his statement on these works elsewhere. In *International Institutions*, p.392, for example, Keohane launched an attack on those "reflectivists" without a research programme...[that] can illuminate important issues in world politics", making it clear that their efforts were not as significant as those engaged in the process of empirical research and "theory" testing. Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker have responded by casting doubt on Keohane's understanding of his Lakatosian position in regard to "research programmes", emphasising the critical "reflective" aspects of Lakatos' work ignored by Keohane; see Ashley and Walker, "Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies", *International Studies Quarterly* 34(3) 1990, pp.259-269. The suspicion that Keohane might not have read/understood Lakatos on this issue is enhanced when one ponders the tolerance of Lakatos on "research programmes" compared to Keohane's intolerance regarding the value and significance of the

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In one form or another, of course, these are all themes to be found in the works of Thomas Kuhn, particularly The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) which, with its repudiation of the "discovery" based "building block" notion of scientific progress has become an influential counterpoint to the Popperian perspective in social theory. Kuhn's general paradigm arguments are well enough known not to warrant another comprehensive rehearsal of them here.\textsuperscript{36} But two Kuhnian themes, in particular, are just worth noting in relation to the Critical Rationalist approach, the first concerning his critical attitude toward the philosophy of science, the second, his interest in the "language" question.

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn challenged the very authority of (post-Baconian) science and the "unity" of the scientific method with an explanation of the process of knowledge construction that did not emphasise atheoretical experimental techniques, or methodological directives. His focus, instead, was on the shared "rules of (paradigmatic) interpretation" which provided scientific communities, in different times and places, with an a priori framework of meaning and understanding about the "real" nature of the world, which their observations, hypotheses and testing procedures ostensibly "discovered". This went well beyond the sociological conventionalism of Popper with its continuing commitment to a cumulative progressivist notion of scientific discovery. Instead, rejecting the notion of a cumulative and incremental model of

"reflectivists". The point is that Lakatos maintained that even for the most established and "progressive" of "research programmes", it "may take decades of theoretical work to arrive at the first novel fact and still more time to arrive at interestingly testable versions" of that fact. Keohane, it seems has missed the point in his admonishment of the very new critical literature of the Third Debate even if it did fit within his "research programme" perspective. On Lakatos' position, see Jerry Ravetz, "Ideological Commitments in the Philosophy of Science", Radical Philosophy 37 (Summer, 1984), pp.5-11, at p.9.


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progress, towards truth or ultimate reality, Kuhn's argument complemented those of hermeneutic scholarship (and Wittgenstein and Winch) in emphasising the importance of language or, more precisely, the conflicts between "different language-culture communities".37

Progress in this language-culture context was dependent, not on the efforts of independent scientists engaged in (an individualised) process of observation and testing, as Popper proposed, but on the scientific community, as a whole, acknowledged as members of different "language groups" faced with "communication breakdown".38 When this situation was recognized, Kuhn proposed, a wider, more meaningful dialogue might become possible across paradigmatic boundaries. Eventually, he argued, scholars would learn to "translate" rival theories, and in so doing "describe...the world to which [that] theory applies".39 Kuhn's central proposition then - that knowledge is constructed by social communities following agreed upon norms, traditions and rules of reading and interpretation, and not by an atheoretical process of "testing" (theory impregnated) observations - has obvious implications for Critical Social Theory approaches seeking to break down the objectivism and foundationalism of positivist based modernism. Of significance too was Kuhn's proposition that paradigms are not connected by some external realm of scientific fact, but have a fundamental incommensurability.40

For the less discerning of Kuhn's critics this incommensurability notion represents nothing less than meaningless relativism.41 But, as in the case made against post-modernists refusing to privilege one discourse against another, it is the charge rather than its intended target that lacks validity. The point is that the distinction between

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37Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.205.
38Ibid, pp.201-203.
40Ibid, pp.92-111.
41See G. Gutting ed., Paradigms and Revolutions.
paradigms, as presented by Kuhn, does not exclude comparison and critical evaluation. What is excluded is the possibility of comparison and evaluation in terms of some neutral, atheoretical "foundation" of (scientific) knowledge, capable of arbitrating between paradigms. Kuhn, as I understand him, sought to explain that different paradigms comprehend and explain the world in ways that correspond, not to some illusory external realm of "fact", but to the knowledge rules and linguistic conventions at their (metatheoretical) heart. The notion of incommensurability, in this sense, sought to establish the parameters for inter-paradigmatic comparison, rather than declare such comparison impossible.

For all this, and for all its (controversial) impact upon social theory, the "post-positivist" voice of Kuhn has rarely been echoed, directly, in International Relations. When it has been so utilised the results have been rather disappointing, and rarely has the Kuhnian interest in "language communities" been afforded serious attention. There are, of course, good reasons for Critical Social Theorists to be cautious about accepting the Kuhnian arguments, given the feeling in some quarters that his arguments are not necessarily "transferable" to social theory generally, and the lingering suspicion that a commitment to scientism persists. And there is also the broader, and understandable, concern about the whole paradigmatic structure, which perceives of thought and social behaviour in terms of discrete, hermetically sealed, frameworks. Whatever else this represents, it resonates with the same modernist tendencies which demarcated "philosophy" from "science", "theory" from "practice", "subjects" from "objects", "Realism" from "idealism" etc.

42 I refer here to the "paradigm" approach of some British International Relations scholarship in particular, which in Chapter Eight will receive more extended attention. On this issue see for example Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate", in International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory edited by M. Light and A.J.R. Groom (London: Frances Pinter, 1985); Ernie Keenes, "Paradigms of International Relations: Bringing Politics Back In", International Journal 44 (1989), pp.42-67; and Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate", Millennium 16 (1987), pp.231-249. I exclude Vasquez from this general critique, his Power of Power Politics, for all its silences did seek to take the Kuhnian position seriously.
This is acknowledged to some extent at least in another interesting "post-positivist" perspective which has utilised Kuhnian, and general post-Kantian influences, to go beyond the Popperian dominated positivist agenda. This is the (mainly British) Scientific Realism of scholars such as Mary Hesse, Roy Bhaskar, Russell Keat and John Urry and Rom Harre, which is beginning to have an influence on the Third Debate in International Relations.43

Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (iii): Scientific Realism

Scientific Realism has sought to fundamentally restructure thinking on philosophy of science issues, in particular, and social theory issues in general, in recent times. As part of this restructuring attempt it has attacked the whole positivist agenda, including its Popperian dimension, while developing an alternative approach to knowledge and society based on a form of critical hermeneutics. The Popper question is treated seriously in this literature, but very much as a lingering residue of a discredited Enlightenment epistemology.44 Critical Rationalism, consequently, is conceived of as another (if high profile) contemporary variant of the Cartesian system of understanding. In this sense, and for all its protestations to the contrary, the falsificationist principle and the hypothetico-deductive approach in general, are perceived as derivatives of an atomistic ontology, a rationality based in "meaningful" propositions (connected to atomistic sense


44 See, in particular, Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science.
impressions) and "the belief that the ideal form for knowledge, and especially for scientific knowledge, is the deductive system".45

This is a view evident in the work of Mary Hesse who, more clearly than her Scientific Realist colleagues, has outlined an alternative "post-positivist" direction for the future, which seeks once and for all to move beyond even the most sophisticated of modern "scienticisms" as represented by Popperian positivism. The basis of this new direction lies in an inversion of the notion that there is a unity of method between the natural and social sciences. There is such a unity, Hesse has argued, but it is based in hermeneutic logic.46 More explicitly, Hesse's Scientific Realism has rejected the modernist axiom that posits a dichotomy between the (pure) knowledge of science and the (impure) historically conditioned knowledge of social life. She has maintained, accordingly, that Western social theory can now release itself from the relentless search for a scientific knowledge of human society akin to that of the natural sciences, and begin to redirect its inquiries to the far more complex, but far more relevant, complexities of social interpretation. Indeed, in Hesse's view this process is already under way, in the extended social theory "conversation" of the 1980s. The crux of the conversation for Hesse, however, is the debate between those who, in a non-positivist manner, seek to carry forward some elements of the more sensitive Enlightenment approach to science (e.g. herself) and those (the "relativists") who eschew any notion of a universal scientific rationality in any terms.47

This has been a central theme also in other Scientific Realist literature. An interesting variation on it is to be found in Roy Bhaskar's work. For the past decade or so Bhaskar has developed an argument in favour of a "restructured" science of social reality which goes beyond positivist dichotomy but which continues to acknowledge "real

45 Harre, The Principles of Scientific Thinking, p.8; see also Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science pp.120-138.

46 Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions, pp.170-174.

47 See Hekman's discussion of this point in, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge, pp.44-45.
world" structural conditions which predate social interpretation and which exist "independently" of them. In Bhaskar's terms, accordingly, to understand reality in human society is to understand something about the underlying structures which allow for the social conditions of understanding. In this context Bhaskar has insisted that all knowledge is socially constructed, via distinct interpretative vocabularies, but that the existence of societal structures (i.e. of learned, pre-existing social knowledge) impose limits and constraints upon knowing and speaking. These structural constraints can be as understood as equivalent to (social) scientific "laws". Treated as such they can become a new, non positivistic, "scientific" basis for social inquiry. Bhaskar, has, in this sense, proclaimed an independent realm of structural being - a social foundationalism that is similar, in effect, if not in intent, to Popper's notion of independent "sociological laws". This has led to an attempt to construct an emancipatory "critical naturalism" from the premises of Scientific Realism based on "knowable emergent laws" of social life.

The lingering structuralism evident within much Scientific Realist literature has led its critics to conclude that while it has added a valuable and ingenious dimension to the attempt to escape the problems of modernist thought, and of positivism in particular, it has not actually escaped either. This is a conclusion reached by Susan Hekman in her assessment of this particular "post-positivist" claimant. While acknowledging Scientific Realism's general sophistication Hekman has maintained that it has "little affinity to the anti-foundationalist position". Instead, she proposed, Scientific Realists do not reject the "sacredness" of modern science and its methods, as they claim, but seek to redefine science in order to claim more territory for its domain. Accordingly, there are at least

49 Ibid, pp.45-83.
50 See Bhaskar, "Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation", p.27.
51 See Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge.
53 Ibid, pp.46-47.
three major continuities between Scientific Realism and the mainstream modernist approaches (including positivism) it purports to have superseded.

Firstly, though there is much made of the hermeneutic nature of the natural sciences by Scientific Realists, what is advocated "is not the extension of the hermeneutic thinking of the social sciences into the natural sciences, but rather, the extension of the scientific method into the social sciences".54 Instead, therefore, of acknowledging the hermeneutic character of all knowledge, as does someone like Gadamer, there is, in Critical Realism, still a commitment to the scientific character of all real knowledge. Secondly, throughout the Critical Realist literature there is a notion of a single, independent "real world" that limits and constrains the interpretative efforts of human social actors. This, maintained Hekman:

reveals the [Scientific] realists' failure to transcend the Enlightenment conception of knowledge [and is evidence] that the realists continue to seek a foundation for their conception of knowledge provided by the 'real world'.55

Thirdly, and most paradoxically perhaps, while ostensibly accepting the interpretive nature of scientific thinking, Scientific Realists fail to pay heed to the issue of the "hermeneutic circle". Or, in Hekman's terms, "they overlook the fact that the investigator's position as well the position of the investigated is [also] socially determined".56 Consequently, they take for themselves the very Archimedean position they are so dismissive of in relation to positivism. For all its sophistication, therefore, Scientific Realism remains bound within the confines of the positivist articulation of modernity, and its paradoxical foundationalism.

This as we shall see is a trait very evident also within the new "scientific" Realism (neo-Realism) of the 1980s and 1990s in International Relations. And it is a trait also within that multifaceted approach known as Analytical Philosophy, one of the most

54 Ibid, p.46.
55 Ibid, p.47, emphasis added.
56 Ibid.
important modern attempt in Anglo-American social theory to deal with the issues of knowledge and human society and the question of language. Analytical Philosophy themes are discernible now in some of the most sophisticated "post-positivist" arguments in International Relations and as such require comment here.57

**Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (iv): Analytical Philosophy and the "Linguistic Turn"**

The Analytical Philosophy approach emerged from critiques of the logical atomism and crude inductivism associated with Logical Positivism. In this sense, as John Thompson has said, it represented the "second stage" of a modern attempt to distance Western philosophy from the impurities of metaphysics, and ground thinking unequivocally in a science of human society and most particularly, linguistic practice.58 The works of two figures, in particular, epitomise the Analytical position in this regard, those of W.V. Quine and his critique of the empiricist "dogmas" underlying Logical Positivism59 and of the "later" Wittgenstein whose recantation of the logical atomism of his *Tractatus* sparked off a "linguistic turn" in Western philosophy.60


58See Thompson's comments in *Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.9-35. In recent times the works of Davidson, Dummett, Putnam and Searle have been associated with the Analytical position, while others such as Frege, Strawson, Ryle and Wisdom have, over the years, and in their different ways, been prominent contributors to its development and its twin concerns with logical rigour and "language". For a contemporary summary of the literature and its debates, see Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy eds., *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?*; and Rajchman and West eds., *Post Analytic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).


60On the linguistic turn in all its complexity see Jay, *Marxism and Totality*, p.88.
Quine repudiated the twin pillars of post-Kantian empiricist based thought - the notion of a fundamental distinction between analytic and synthetic statements (between logically true knowledge received via experience and that which is produced via verificationist procedures) - and the nominalist principle which reduced the conditions for real knowledge of the world to a universe of atomised contingent "things". Instead, Quine pronounced all knowledge "synthetic", in the sense that all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, was derived from "man made fabric". Accordingly:

The totality of our so called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges...But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. 

No particular experiences are linked to any particular statements.61

Wittgenstein, in his later works, made a major contribution to the Analytic position in instigating a broader, more tolerant tendency in Anglo-American thought and a fundamentally revised understanding of the nature and role of language in constructing social reality.62 In explaining his shift in thinking Wittgenstein confronted what postmodernists might now refer to as the "hermeneutics of suspicion" perspective. In reflecting upon his earlier search for foundational certainty, Wittgenstein acknowledged that:

my notion in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was wrong...because I too thought that the logical analysis had to bring to light what was hidden (as chemical and physical analysis does).63

The significance of this statement was that it went beyond the question of whether, via protocol sentences, one could "discover" the real knowledge of modernity and society. It

61See W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", pp.59-60, emphasis added.


questioned the whole notion of a reality, "out there" waiting to be discovered. This led, in *Philosophical Investigations*, to a broad critique of the reductionism and essentialism associated with the positivist approach to language, particularly the proposition, dominant since Hobbes, of an atomised, contingent, linguistic universe in which words were accorded singular, essential meanings that "corresponded" to real things. This view was repudiated by Wittgenstein in terms which emphasised not the homogeneity and singularity of language but its heterogeneity and social diversity. In short he rejected the essentialism of language in favour of a notion of socially constructed and applied "language games", which emphasised the way that language was actually used, in different times and places, and how it constructed reality as part of a "speech act".64 It was in this sense that, following *Philosophical Investigations*, for many within Anglo-American philosophical circles the search for reality became the attempt to understand the way that grammatical rules were used in various societies to give meaning to their (linguistically constructed) real worlds. Moreover, on the centuries old notion of a correspondence between reality and language, Wittgenstein had this to say:

Grammar is not accountable to any [external] reality. It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary.65

In this way Wittgenstein undermined the Logical Positivist understanding of language and reality at its metatheoretical core; its (given) empiricist epistemology. More specifically, he undermined the phenomenalist logic of an approach to knowledge which took as given the atomistic nature of the relationship between the "objects" of the world, and their meaning, as expressed in elementary linguistic propositions. Concerned to explain the way that such sentences are actually used in social activity, Wittgenstein concluded that to understand reality through language was to engage in complex social practices which defied the atomised logic and positivist/empiricist explanations of the empirical moment in "understanding". It was, he argued, necessary to concentrate not on


the logical independence of things, but on the systemic relationship between them which invests them with social meaning.66

This critique of atomism was complemented by Wittgenstein's attack on essentialism in Logical Positivism. He argued that a general theory of language which sought to reduce everyday understandings of terms to a singular essentialist meaning missed the point, about the multiplicity of meanings to be found in social activity. Accordingly, the meaning of a term/word/symbol could not be assumed to correspond to some essential (and externally derived) foundation or object, but was dependent upon the particular constitutive role it had in particular socio-linguistic systems or "language games."67 Wittgenstein's later position, pregnant with implications for Critical Social Theory perspectives across the disciplines, was centred thus on a set of interlocking propositions which maintained that:

There are no independent or objective sources of support outside of human thought and human action...There is no standard or objective reality (always fixed, never changing) against which to compare or measure a universe of discourse...nothing exists outside of our language and actions which can be used to justify, for example, a statement's truth or falsity. The only possible justification lies in the linguistic practices which embody them: how people think and speak, and how they live.68

To conceive of language in this way - not as an exclusively descriptive medium but as a "form of life", a process intrinsic to human social activity - is, in effect, to convert nouns into verbs. To "speak" in this sense is to "do": to engage in a speech act is to give meaning to the activities which make up social reality. Language thus no longer describes some essential hidden reality, it is inseparable from the (necessarily social) construction of that reality. In this context, the starting point for any investigation of reality is the


relationship between the rules and conventions of specific "language games" or "forms of life" and their socio-historical and cultural meaning.\(^{69}\)

The Wittgensteinian dissent against Logical Positivism opened up for critical inquiry much that had been effectively closed off under the intellectual imperialism of the modern (post-Cartesian) approach to knowledge and society. His sociology of language perspective represented (like post-modernist discourses) more than a discourse of "words", somehow detached from the non-discursive realm. It maintained, instead, that the rules which govern the way that speech acts take place represented a specific understanding and organisation of social life. Consequently, the study of language and its rules of grammar become, simultaneously, an investigation of reality in the world. Importantly too, in casting doubt upon the "correspondence theory" of truth, and the relationship between the thinking subject and the (external) object, analytical attention was focused away from individual cognition and "psychological" processes and toward a theory of action set upon the way that, in social circumstances, people describe and enact their reality.

The insights of Quine and Wittgenstein, therefore, have acted as a catalyst for much of the critical reassessment of Anglo-American thinking on knowledge and society in the contemporary period.\(^{70}\) More obviously perhaps than any other post-positivist approach touched upon here it has prefigured the Critical Social Theory perspectives of

\(^{69}\)This is a theme very evident in post-modernist literature, of course, although often more directly via Sassure than Wittgenstein. It is a theme also that in Chapter Four will be accorded more attention in the works of Critical Social Theorists seeking to re-formulate some of the "givens" of linguistic philosophy. On this see Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy eds., *After Philosophy.*

\(^{70}\)Stressing the undeterminancy of (empirical) data in social life and the insights of the "linguistic turn", Analytical Philosophy has confronted mainstream modernism with at least three major challenges. The first has concentrated on the Enlightenment view of reason, articulated in terms which privilege either objects or subjects as the foundation of knowledge. Against the universality of this approach there have been various expressions of the notion of "language games" and/or "forms of life" emphasising the irreducible plurality of truth, argument and validity. The second challenge, has concentrated attention on the modernist agent of "reason", the atomised, sovereign subject. The counter argument here has been couched in terms of social structures of consciousness, and the proposition that the subject of knowledge is always intrinsically and practically engaged with the world, and that our thoughts and language are representations of that intrinsic engagement. The third Analytical challenge has problematised the "correspondence rule" intrinsic to modernist thought. In its place has come the notion of "objects" as always interpreted elements of social, historical and linguistic "meaning".
the present. Which begs the question of why it been the voices of Habermas and Foucault that had most impact upon Anglo-American critique in this regard and not the more direct heirs of Quine and Wittgenstein (i.e. why not Davidson or Dummett or Putnam or Searle?). There are a number of reasons that might be advanced for this, one of which suggests that for all its critical potential and insight, Analytical Philosophy has not broken free of the repressive impact of modernism. At one level, of course, this might be explained in relation to the "conservative" tendencies within the seminal works of figures such as Quine and Wittgenstein.

Quine, for example, did a "Hume" in the sense that having effectively illustrated the inadequacy of positivist approaches, and indeed any notion of realism based on empiricist principles, he then continued to advocate an empiricist basis for logical analysis. As Aronowitz has noted (in terms which re-emphasise the Cartesian anxiety) Quine, and many of those who followed him in the Analytical Philosophy school decided, ultimately, to hold on to the "boundary's edge" of science, and the traditional logic of language, rather than confront the possibilities beyond that boundary.\textsuperscript{71} Wittgenstein's "conservatism" was articulated in another way. In \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, for example, in discussing the \textit{purposes} of his new philosophy of language, Wittgenstein proposed that:

\begin{quote}
philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

Commentators such as John Thompson have focused on this statement as important in understanding why Analytical Philosophy, as a whole, has not carried through the critical enterprise it seemed set to perform for Western social theory. The point, Thompson argued, is that while post-Wittgensteinian scholarship, in general, has stressed the "meaningful and social character of human action" it has often effectively


\textsuperscript{72}Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, p.49.
"disregarded considerations such as power and repression, history and social change" and has failed to emphasise strongly enough the connection between the "problem of understanding" and "considerations of explanation and critique". The problem, in short, is that "language" based analysis of the Analytical Philosophy variety does not always ground its inquiry strongly or unequivocally enough in the everyday practices of political society.73 As another commentator has suggested, in much Analytical Philosophy, "theory and criticism, explanation and enlightenment disappear together, and give way to a conservative descriptivism".74 On the question, therefore, of why Habermas and Foucault are at the forefront of Critical Social Theory in the 1980s and 1990s, and not Analytical Philosophers, the answer perhaps lies the (modernist) conservatism of a "post-positivist" claimant which does not emphatically enough connect knowledge to power.

But there is another, more precise, reason for the suspicion about Analytical Philosophy in Critical Social Theory circles. It has to do with its continuing and paradoxical commitments to modernist foundationalism. These commitments were evident in a recent article written by Michael Dummett, which complained about the continuing "scandal" of a modern philosophy "that through most of its history [has] failed to be systematic".75 This "scandal", opined Dummett, emanated from a basic misunderstanding of the "real" nature of philosophy, and the "repeated illusions" associated with the post-Kantian attempt to find a foundation for human knowledge. Thus:

Husserl believed passionately that he at last held the key that would unlock every philosophical door; the disciples of Kant ascribed to him the achievement of devising a correct philosophical methodology; Spinoza believed that he was doing for philosophy what Euclid had done for

73 Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics, pp.4-8.

74 Hans Albert, cited in Stockman, Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences, p.137.

75 Dummett, "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?", in After Philosophy eds. Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy, p.212. The significance of the article is enhanced by Richard Bernstein's view that Dummett is regarded by some as the leading British philosopher of the contemporary period, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.5, and by Dummett's own view of the closeness of British and (North) American thinking on the issues he raised, "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic?", pp.193-194.
geometry; and before him, Descartes supposed that he had uncovered the one and only proper philosophical method.\textsuperscript{76}

So far so good, but in response to these "illusory" enterprises Dummett then spelt out what philosophy really \textit{is}, and what its systematic method ought to be. This he did in relation to one unequivocal proposition and "three tenets...\textit{common to the entire analytical school}".\textsuperscript{77} The proposition was that "Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established"; the first of the tenets was that "the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought"; the second, that the study of thought must be "sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of thinking"; and the third, that "the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of language".\textsuperscript{78}

This was the kind of reasoning that led to Richard Rorty's criticism of Analytical Philosophy in \textit{Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature}. In this work Rorty repudiated the proposition that philosophy can only be "real" when it is "logical", or more precisely, when it is reduced to the rigours of the formal mathematised logic associated with Frege. This, for Rorty, was a perfect example of the continuing commitment within Analytical Philosophy to the modernist tradition of Descartes, Locke and Kant, that it ostensibly sought to supersede.\textsuperscript{79} It was, in Rorty's view, consistent with the:

kind of philosophy which stems from Russell and Frege...[and] classical Husserlian phenomenology [which is] simply one more attempt to put philosophy in the position which Kant wished it to have - that of judging other areas of culture on the basis of its special knowledge of the "foundations" of these areas.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid, p.215.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{80}Ibid, p.8.
Consequently, he concluded, Analytical Philosophy, for all its insights, had betrayed any critical potential that scholars such as Quine and Wittgenstein had given it and had become just:

one more variant of Kantian philosophy, a variant marked principally by thinking of representation as linguistic rather than mental, and of philosophy of language rather than "transcendental critique" or psychology, as the discipline which exhibits the "foundation of knowledge."\(^81\)

From this perspective, Analytical Philosophy, whose claim to "post-positivism" and "post-foundationalism" is centred on its notion of reality as socio-linguistically produced, is perceived instead as paradoxically committed to the modernist search for a "permanent, neutral framework for inquiry."\(^82\) It stands, in this regard, not as a genuine alternative to ahistorical foundationalism, but as an "attempt to escape from history - an attempt to find nonhistorical conditions of any possible historical [and philosophical] development."\(^83\)

Rorty's perspective will receive further attention in Chapter Four. It is, however, the final theme he raises here that is of more immediate significance for the present discussion, because the question of history as the locus of philosophical discourse is a theme integral to hermeneutic scholarship and hermeneutic insight has, to one degree or another, informed all of the "post-positivist" perspectives discussed thus far. Something, consequently, needs to be said at this point about hermeneutics, as a "post-positivist" perspective. In the chapter to follow some of the more critical manifestations of hermeneutic thought will be discussed (e.g. of Gadamer) and its influences on Critical Theory and post-modernism emphasised. For now my major aim is to connect the broad hermeneutic tradition to its more specific influence on orthodox Anglo-American social theory, evaluate its "post-positivist/post-foundationalist" status and then, via an

\(^{81}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{82}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{83}\text{Ibid, p.9.}\)
introductory discussion of Max Weber's hermeneutic perspective, connect it to the "great texts/great men" Tradition of International Relations.

**Beyond Modernism and Positivism? (v):**

**Hermeneutics - From Von Humboldt to Dilthey and Weber**

The hermeneutic approach has a long and distinguished pedigree in Western philosophy. It was integral to both Greek and Roman attempts to "interpret" reality in the ancient world. In the post-Reformation period, in Europe, it was articulated most commonly in philological texts, in jurisprudence, and increasingly, as part of a German based Protestant reformism, which maintained that the new world of scientific rationality could be understood most profoundly by reference to historical and cultural tradition (e.g. as interpreted through the Christian scriptures). In the full flush of the Enlightenment, however, the gap between the increasingly influential scientific approach and the hermeneutic philosophy of textual interpretation began to widen as logical calculation and empirical analysis gained ascendancy over cultural tradition and scriptural exegesis.

The Enlightenment, nevertheless, was the catalyst for a new form of "philosophical hermeneutics" which understood itself as a humanist alternative to "mechanical" modernism. In this period hermeneutic scholars, such as Wolff and Chladenius, began to shift their attention away from a primary concern with philology and jurisprudence and toward the construction of a philosophy which rested, not on the certainties of natural science, but on "certain generally applicable rules and

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84 See the discussion of the development of hermeneutic theory and practice in Karl Mueller-Vollmer, The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition From The Enlightenment to the Present (New York: Continuum, 1985). Other useful overview works include William Outhwaite, Understanding Social Life (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975); Fred Dallymar and Thomas McCarthy eds., Understanding Social Inquiry (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge; Hekman, Weber, the Ideal Type and Contemporary Social Theory (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory; and David Boucher, Texts in Context (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985).
principles...valid for all those those fields of knowledge which rely on interpretation".85 By the Nineteenth century this hermeneutic perspective was articulated increasingly as part of that broad Romanticist movement which held significant sectors of the central European intellectual community in its grasp. Consequently, in the atmosphere of the (anti-modernist) new aesthetics of Fichte, Schelling and the Schlegels, German thinkers such as Schleiermacher, and later, Von Humboldt, began to reformulate elements of Kantian thought into an approach to knowledge and society which focused on human rationality in the socio/cultural process of understanding - Verstehen. Following the lead of the historian/theologian, Schleiermacher, this hermeneutic approach sought to oppose what it saw as positivism's one sided ahistorical perspective with an explanation of reality emanating from a historical and cultural dialectic, as expressed in textual language. This, it was argued, was not a process in which a passive subject received and ordered sense data, but in which a language tradition represented an individual's "life process". As Von Humboldt put it "language is never a mere tool of communication, but an imprint of the mind and the world-view of the speaker".86

Conceived of (by Droysen) as the "Bacon of the historical sciences",87 Von Humboldt became a significant figure in the hermeneutic story, both for his direct intellectual contribution and for his influence upon the work of scholars such as Troeltsch, Droysen, Cassirer, Meinecke, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer.88 Von Humboldt insisted that we come to "know" and give meaning to the world not through some passive encounter with external sense data, but through a creative social process in which the human mind is shaped by, and shapes, cultural reality in language. He explicitly rejected a trait that was to characterise later hermeneutic thinking (e.g. from Dilthey to Collingwood) which maintained that language was a neutral means of

85See Mueller-Vollmer, The Hermeneutic Reader, p.4.
86Ibid, p.12.
87Ibid.
"transferring" meanings from one mind to another. Rather, argued Von Humboldt, there is nothing "in" the mind, as such, to transfer. Instead, and here his influence upon Gadamer and Habermas is evident, "meaning", he argued, is a matter of active linguistic competence (Sprachkraft) which arises from the human social process - from the dialectical interaction of mind and the social use of grammar. Language in this sense (as it was for the later Wittgenstein) is produced from and by the relationship between "things" (e.g. individual minds/language structures) rather than an essence or property of "things", as it was for positivism.

This for Von Humboldt was the basis of an alternative "objective" science of social life, which did not reduce human existence to the mechanistic scientism of positivism. Consequently, while he stressed the differences between languages (as social/cultural "life processes") he stressed also that in the process of understanding these differences, one goes beyond the limits of one's own (social, historical, cultural) being, and connects (via speech, writing, texts) with a broader, shared process of human understanding per se. In short, one engages in "elementary forms of linguistic understanding and communication which [occur] in all human societies". Von Humboldt believed it possible to derive from this hermeneutic format a mediated science of human history and culture, centred on an interpretation of temporally and geographically diverse language forms, which, in an important sense, existed "independently" of time and space (in socio-cultural meaning, art and literature) and were susceptible, accordingly, to social scientific inquiry. In Von Humboldt's terms this

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89 Ibid, p.14. This is a notion that in recent times has been re-convened in the work of Gadamer (and Ricoeur), I will say something of this in the next chapter.

90 Here too are obvious connection points with later Wittgensteinian themes and those of Winch. At the same time there is a "transcendental" neo-Kantian theme here that has been utilised in various ways over the years, most notably by Popper in his notion of an objective "third world" of theories and in another sense by Weber, in distinguishing the "objective" residue of the means/ends process. I will return to this latter theme at the end of the chapter.
was a scientific approach without the kind of foundationalism he perceived in positivism and in the teleology of Hegel and Marx.  

It was against this background, and with Comtean influence sweeping through European and North American intellectual communities that, by the mid-nineteenth century, the hermeneutic approach sought to repudiate what the historian, Droysen, described the "crass positivism which unfortunately if finding great support in the development of the German sciences". Droysen's response was to reject the notion of writing "objective" history or recreating the past, as it "really" happened. Rather, he argued, the historian deals with the "things" of the past (ideas, institutions, texts, practices) in the present, and the interpretative practices of the present can never be detached from the "objective" happenings of the past.

Having made these important incursions into modernism and positivism, however, Droysen, it seemed, sought the same kind of foundationalist certainty that has characterised modernist thought since Descartes. The "Cartesian anxiety", in this case, was to have a decisive impact upon later hermeneutic approaches. This is because - in reformulating the work of Von Humboldt - Droysen shifted hermeneutic thought, increasingly, toward a (rationalist) concern with "psychological, emotional and spiritual themes". Seeking to go beyond the ambiguities and differences of a reality based on

91Indeed he explicitly distanced his historical analysis from that of Marxism (and the historical objectivism of Von Ranke) on the basis that such approaches search for "final causes" and the "ideal whole" where none existed, ibid, pp.15-16. As Mueller-Vollmer points out Von Humboldt was sensitive here to the issue of the "hermeneutic circle" or "double hermeneutic" issue. He stressed in this regard that the events of the past do not exist as real independent objects in the positivist sense but that it is the historian that "must supply the inner coherence and unite the individual events without which [such] events would be meaningless". The point of course is that in interpreting individual events as part of cohesive explanatory whole by which they are to be understood (including the notion that there is no 'whole') there can be no meaningful distinction drawn between individual, contingent parts and the interpreted whole which positivism in all its variants, insists upon.


93Ibid, p.19. In terms of the "hermeneutic circle" thus: "the part is understood within the whole from which it originated, and the whole is understood from the part in which it finds expression".
culturally expressed language, he sought a more profound "internal" locus of understanding, centred in "the attitude, intention or state of mind of its originator".94

At the height of (explicit) positivist influence, in the late nineteenth century, this "internal" focus in hermeneutics was central also to the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, who, in developing further the "psychic" theme, sought to counter mechanistic explanations of knowledge and society by emphasising some fundamental differences between the natural and human sciences. Ultimately, argued Dilthey, the knowledge of the human sciences was independent of that of the natural sciences and for this reason alone the positivist quest was an illusory and inappropriate one. The "post-positivist" result, however, was a hermeneutic approach resonant with modernist influences and implications which stressed an extreme form of individualism (albeit of the psychic rather than the utilitarian kind) with major solipsistic tendencies. In Dilthey's terms this approach was inherently superior to any form of positivism because (in neo-Kantian fashion) it went beyond the passive reordering of externally given "fact" and instead:

[examined manifestations of human creativity and intentionality...[by] recapturing in past documents and past records the original spirit that animated their authors.95

In his later works the extreme psychologism of Dilthey's approach was mediated somewhat by the impact upon it of Hegel and the phenomenology of Husserl.96 Consequently, the attempt to secure a foundation for human science in a psychologically based theory of knowledge was presented more in terms of a socio-cognitive dialectic in which outer "externalisations" of language always correspond to an "inner" (and basic) understanding of everyday life. In other words, and in a way similar to the (later) Wittgenstein, there was in Dilthey's hermeneutics (albeit faintly) the notion that reality is not independent of language, but that language and the social practices it gives meaning to

94 Ibid.
95 Ibid, p.23.
96 Ibid, p.25.
is reality. Interpreting "meaning" in texts, therefore, was to engage in a process by which reality is constructed and reconstructed across time and culture.

It was via this later perspective of Dilthey that the hermeneutic approach began to influence Anglo-American, particularly British scholarship, in the first quarter of this century. Its impact upon Collingwood, Oakeshott, Greenleaf and the British history of ideas school has been documented by David Boucher, who has identified the hermeneutic approach in this way:

Its central concern [was] with the search for the author, for the understanding that historical actors had of the situation in which they found themselves. It concerned itself with the integrity and autonomy of cultures and the authors who wrote within these confines. It assumed that the meanings which individuals hoped to convey were somehow fixed in the artifacts they produced, or in the languages they used. Sensitive intelligent research exegesis, it was believed, guided by hermeneutic principles, would enable the student to recover, re-enact, or even re-experience the original meaning, or at least come very close to this ideal.97

This Anglo-American hermeneutic approach has had a chequered history in relation to social theory, in general, and International Relations in particular. At one level - as expressed in Collingwood's work - it has had little influence on either. At another level - via Weber (and to a lesser extent Mannheim) - it becomes a significant issue for the discussions to follow, particularly in Chapters Five to Nine. The impact of Weber's thinking upon the exemplar Realist, Hans Morgenthau, is an issue for specific debate in Chapter Six. But the broader significance of Weberian thought can be signified at this point by touching briefly on an adaption to hermeneutic thinking contained within his work, as it was transferred to Anglo-American social theory.

The primary distinction here centred on the mediating influences of neo-Kantian scholars, such as Rickert and Simmel, who sought to shift Verstehen scholarship away from its psychological emphasis (Geisteswissenschaften) to a more specific study of cultural issues (Kulturwissenschaften). This shift in emphasis was characterised by a more thorough attempt to integrate social and psychological factors than had been the case.

97Boucher, Texts in Context, p.5.
even in Dilthey's later work. Its aim was to overcome the narrow egocentrism associated with Dilthey's approach while retaining his basic distinction between the "cultural" and "natural" sciences.98

Weber sought to employ this adapted Verstehen approach in the quest for the great synthesis of the age - the bringing together in a coherent theoretical matrix of a Germanic interpretivist approach and British and French positivist/empiricism. In so doing, he confronted, in a highly sophisticated manner, the problems of inductivism and solipsism, and in particular the notion of a logical separation between fact and value. What Weber proposed (like Popper later), was that though fact was always culturally derived and value laden, it was nevertheless possible to perceive of it in independently verifiable (scientific) terms. The contradiction seemingly inherent in this conclusion was explained away by Weber in terms which saw him reformulate the knowledge process and radically limit the capacity of the "social" sciences.

His ultimate perspective was a classically modernist one in which the old philosophical questions of epistemology and methodology were reduced to an instrumental relationship between a scientifically deduced "is" and a culturally derived "ought". In this way Weber sought to answer the question haunting modernist thought since Descartes and Hume: how is it possible to speak scientifically of reality in human society when, in that context, understanding of reality is dependent upon intersubjective meaning bestowed upon it by subjectivised objects?. The solution was provided by Weber's notion of a limited scientific objectivism, and a means/ends logic of technical rationality.99 More specifically, Weber limited his critical scientific attention to the "object" of inquiry, assumed to be an individual actor acting in a "rational" manner (i.e.


that which was purposeful in relation to the attempt to attain particular interests or ends). Given this important assumption, the scientific problem associated with overcoming intersubjective meanings was effectively dissipated by a perspective that conceived of "meaning" as an irreducible quality generated through the pursuit of individual (pre-given) ends or interests. From this theoretical position it became possible to calculate and predict (in a limited scientific fashion) the behaviour of actors following culturally constructed interests or ends.100

By assuming a means/ends rationality for all actors (either observing subjects or observed objects in the social sciences) a (positivist) distinction is thus drawn between the process by which the value laden, socially constructed premises of the observer are derived (the process by which an observer selects and prescribes as valuable a particular fact/event/object) and that process by which the actions of those observed are ultimately described and evaluated.101 Consistent with Weber's means/ends logic, values, ethics or normative theories of all kinds, in either the observed or the observer, are taken as given and deleted from useful scientific discourse. The social scientific enterprise accordingly is one which can only make judgement upon the behaviour associated with pre-given ends.

In this way Weber solved the modernist epistemological conundrum for contemporary social theory and Anglo-American political science in particular. And, as we shall see, this is precisely the way the Weberian Verstehen perspective has been utilised by Realist theorists in International Relations.102 Here, the behaviour of the observed actors (individual states) is taken as "given": i.e. perceived as motivated by the rational pursuit of pre-given (and culturally determined) ends or interests. As a


101This is the basis of Popper's and Lakatos' claims to have gone beyond the Humean paradox.

consequence, the observing scholar is relieved of the tiresome task of scholarly reflection upon the theoretical nature of either object or subject.\textsuperscript{103}

Some of the direct implications of this Weberian connection will be addressed in Chapters Five to Nine. Emphasised at that time will be the continuing faith in the "unity of science" thesis, in Weber's work, and its methodological individualism and rational choice themes. It will be argued, ultimately, that the transplanted and very sensitive Weberian image of "reality" has, if anything, increased the tendency towards positivist closure in International Relations. This might seem a rather strange judgement given the undoubted sophistication and insight of Weber's hermeneutic approach. Susan Hekman, however, has illuminated the issue in a useful way with her discussion of Verstehen themes in social theory generally.\textsuperscript{104} The problem with Verstehen approaches, argued Hekman, lies not so much in what they say but in their silences and omissions. More explicitly, in seeking to distinguish the human from the natural sciences many of the most influential "post-positivist" approaches under the Verstehen rubric fail to confront the foundationalism which affords positivism its objectivist logic and which, in turn provides its social science legitimacy. Verstehen approaches, accordingly, for all their critical insight on the problems of objective knowledge in the social sciences, remain effectively uncritical on the objectivity question in the natural sciences (e.g. Weber's faith in empiricism).

Indeed in continuing to accept the validity of the (natural) scientific model many of the most prominent "post-positivist" approaches continue to privilege the epistemological and methodological tenets of empiricism and positivism as the foundation for all knowledge, even while repudiating positivism's applicability for the knowledge of human

\textsuperscript{103}See the discussion of Waltz in the chapter to follow.

\textsuperscript{104}Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge. Hekman uses the term Verstehen in a broader sense than my usage in this chapter. The term Verstehen (process of understanding) in Hekman's work refers to a range of approaches, associated (broadly) with a Sociology of Knowledge perspective, which have in their diverse ways, challenged the notion that there can be objective scientific knowledge of human society akin to that in the natural sciences. The Weberian approach, derived from the hermeneutic tradition outlined here is part of this Verstehen tradition.
society. As such in continuing to acknowledge a fundamental epistemological assumption "the opposition of subject and object" (and fact/value etc) Verstehen approaches, like Weber's, "represent the other side of the positivist coin".\textsuperscript{105}

This is a point well made by Roy Bhaskar with his insight that:

hermeneuticist and neo-Kantian philosophies of social science tacitly presuppose positivism - first in their acceptance of it as the essentially unquestioned truth about the world known by natural science; second in their reproduction (in transposed forms) of characteristically positivist philosophical positions in their accounts of the knowledge of the social world.\textsuperscript{106}

The point, to reiterate it, is that the dominant hermeneutic tradition in Anglo-American social theory remains, like so many of its counterparts in the "post-positivist" debate, discursively committed to the modernist regime of framing so effectively represented by positivism across the disciplines. This, of course, is what Mervyn Frost was getting at with his proposition that Realist scholarship in International Relations remains, for all its professed "difference", captured by the "positivist bias" at its metatheoretical core. Frost noted that in both its Traditionalist and more explicit "scientific" variant, the Verstehen connection was crucial to the Realist image of the world. As the "other side of the positivist coin" it allowed for occasional hermeneutic insight (and claims for "post-positivism") whilst retaining for Realism the basic positivist dichotomies of subject/object and fact/value, so important for disciplinary identity, the means/ends rationality of power politics and an image of the world "out there".\textsuperscript{107} The

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid, p.99.

\textsuperscript{106}Bhaskar, \textit{Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation}, p.306. The broader significance of this theme, for International Relations, has been noted, by Regis Factor and Stephen Turner in Max Weber and the Dispute Over Reason and Value, who have concentrated on the relationship between Weber's work and that of Morgenthau. This, they argued, is a connection that goes well beyond any generalised intersection of Anglo-American and Germanic influences in Morgenthau's approach, to the extent that every major idea in Morgenthau's power politics is derived from Weber's hermeneutic perspective. This, of course, to some extent explains the tensions in Morgenthau's work which sees him crudely propound the existence of "objective laws" at one moment and at another engage in more subtle hermeneutic tones on the issue of textual interpretation. In Chapter Six there will be a more comprehensive discussion on the implications of this for International Relations.

\textsuperscript{107}Frost, \textit{Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations}, Chapter 1. See the discussion of this issue in Chapter One of the thesis, footnotes 24 and 53.
hermeneutic (Verstehen) perspective, therefore, like all the other "post-positivist" approaches addressed in this chapter, is an integral issue in any discussion of International Relations, in the 1990s, that seeks to confront the "unwritten preface" in the search for "thinking space".

Summary

This chapter has sought, from a number of angles, to develop further some themes introduced in Chapters One and Two. These chapters established the framework within which a discussion on the "unwritten preface" in International Relations might usefully take place. They did so in locating the modernist discourse and its framing regime based on a paradoxical foundationalism, as central themes in the "unwritten preface". They focused also on the development of positivism as the primary conduit of modernist theory and practice in contemporary social theory. Both chapters emphasised the limitations and closure associated with this discursive situation. In this chapter the aim was to illustrate that it is a situation that remains at the core of Anglo-American social theory scholarship, even in the era of "post-positivist" and "post-foundationalist" disavowal of the disciplinary past. More specifically, this chapter focused on five "post-positivist" approaches which are influential both in the broader social theory context and in the extended International Relations agenda of the Third Debate.

The chapter dealt, initially, with the most influential of "post-positivist" claims, in this regard, that promoted by Karl Popper and articulated across the Anglo-American intellectual community for the past generation. The argument here was that while Popper's contribution has undoubtedly added a degree of sophistication to the (social) scientific quest over the years, his Critical Rationalism with its hypothetico-deductive method, does not represent a post-positivist position because it remains metatheoretically committed to the "empiricist metaphysic" and to the (foundationalist) "unity of science" thesis. The rigidity and closure of Popper's approach was illustrated by Thomas Kuhn in
the early 1970s and Kuhn's paradigm approach gained adherents as a genuinely "post-positivist" perspective. The chapter turned briefly to this issue. It acknowledged the "thinking space" opened up by Kuhn's critique but maintained that its "post" status was somewhat problematic given the basic structure of a paradigm logic which understands discursive relations in terms of autonomous, hermetically sealed sociological entities - or "language communities". This, it was indicated, smacked of the atomised logic of modernist thought and of a neo-Kantian positivist universe of "things in themselves".

The mainly British Scientific Realist perspective was also addressed. Here it was recognised that in the work of scholars such as Mary Hesse much interpretivist progress has been made within philosophy of science scholarship. It was argued, nevertheless, that there are tendencies within Scientific Realist literature that cast serious doubt on its claim to have cast off the modernist influences of positivism. In particular, it was argued, the lingering influences of a "unity of science" position, and notions of independent "structural" element in social reality undermine the "post-positivist" perspectives of Scientific Realism.

The contribution of Analytical Philosophy to the breaking down of modernist and positivist dominance in social theory is undoubted. In this context Wittgenstein's significance was noted and the "linguistic turn" theme acknowledged as an important aspect of Critical Social Theory literature of recent years. It was noted too, however, that some of the most influential of Analytic arguments over the years - pronouncing the social nature of language, the linguistic construction of reality and the end of dichotomised thinking in general - have also invoked basic empiricist premises and a "detached" notion of philosophical purpose. This, plus the evidence of a continuing zeal for "correct" method on the part of major Analytical Philosophers of the present day has led to the conclusion that a modernist frame of reference still prevails. This was the conclusion on the last of the perspectives addressed in this chapter, that which represents its "post-positivist" approach as part of the hermeneutic tradition, transferred from (mainly) German scholarship in the early years of this century. The discussion here concentrated on one of the main avenues of that transference, that via the Verstehen perspective of
scholars such as Von Humboldt, Dilthey and Weber. The argument here was that Verstehen insight has contributed significantly to alleviating some of the cruder aspects of positivist based social theory, but that its lingering psychologism and more importantly its Weberian based representation of social science objectivism has, if anything, strengthened the power of modernism and positivism in Anglo-American social theory, as the (hidden) "other side of the positivist coin".

Like much before it in this thesis, this has been a rather truncated discussion of some very complex themes. It has not meant to condemn or dismiss, but to problematise, in as many ways as possible, one of the major "givens" of recent years in social theory and International Relations - the "given" that assumes that positivism is an anachronism and that contemporary theory and practice has sloughed off its "primitive" discursive characteristics and with it the power of post-Cartesian modernism. The chapter to follow seeks to illustrate, more directly, some of the implications of the illusion associated with this "given" and then indicate how some of the most interesting of Critical Social Theory approaches have sought to overcome its enduring influence, thus opening some "thinking space" for critical scholars in International Relations.
CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY AND THE SEARCH FOR THINKING SPACE

Some of the implications of the situation discussed in the previous chapter were highlighted by Anthony Giddens and Johnathon Turner, in 1987, in a work which reflected upon the contemporary nature of Anglo-American social theory, and which, in so doing, affirmed an important thematic connection between the larger interdisciplinary debates and International Relations. This connection concerned the conventional wisdom, in both contexts, on questions of disciplinary development. Or, as Giddens and Turner emphasised, it concerned the self understanding of scholars, across the Anglo-American social theory spectrum that theirs was an enterprise marked by pluralism, intellectual diversity and theoretical tolerance, in the "postpositivist" era. Not so, suggested Giddens and Turner, because Anglo-American social theory remains dominated by "a particular set of views influenced by logical empiricism [positivism] in philosophy" that is concerned, above all, with:

[T]he status of the social sciences, especially in relation to the logic of the natural sciences; the nature of the laws of generalisations which can be established; the interpretation of human agency and its differentiation from objects and events in nature; and the character and form of social institutions.2

In more specific terms, Giddens and Turner described an dominant interdisciplinary perspective characterised by:

a suspicion of metaphysics, a desire to define in a clear cut way what is to count as 'scientific', [and] an emphasis on the testability of concepts and propositions and a sympathy for hypothetico-deductive systems.3

2Ibid. p.1.
3Ibid.
For Giddens, this was confirmation of an earlier judgement. In 1982 he concluded that Anglo-American social theory had not progressed in any fundamental way from the Logical Positivism of the early Twentieth century, but was now encompassed within a disciplinary "orthodox consensus". This "orthodox consensus" he characterised as a static impasse between an often unacknowledged but still potent positivism (e.g. expressed in Liberal and/or Marxist terms) and an illusory "alternative" derived from the hermeneutic scholarship of a figure such as Weber, in particular. Subsequently, in 1987, Giddens and Turner were able to record that an "orthodox consensus" remained dominant (if no longer entirely secure) within Anglo-American social theory, while its mainstream remained committed to a "spectator" theory of knowledge and an epistemological regime which limited inquiry to questions of:

What is 'out there' in the social universe? What are the fundamental properties of the world? What kind of analysis of these properties is possible and/or appropriate?

The discussions in Chapters Two and Three, in particular, sought to explain in more detailed fashion, how this has come to be the case in Anglo-American social theory, and why, in turn, it is so important that the Realist "orthodox consensus" in International Relations be challenged. This chapter is concerned, more directly, with the question of what such a challenge should encompass. It seeks, in this regard, to highlight the "celebratory" perspectives of much Critical Social Theory literature in the broad social theory debate, in order to furnish the discussion of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations with a sense of what an alternative critical agenda might look like. It focuses, initially, on a range of critical literature which locates the continuing closure of social theory as part of the modernity question, and it then takes a more specific look at

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5Ibid, p.3.


7See the discussion on "celebratory" scholarship in Chapter One of the thesis, pp.46-66.
the two most influential Critical Social Theory perspectives - Critical Theory and post-modernism. Both approaches will be discussed, initially, in general terms, and then something will be said about the tensions between them, on the modernity question. Finally, having outlined my concerns about Critical Theory in this context, I will indicate my reservations about some aspects of post-modernist scholarship, and conclude the chapter by returning to the broader issue of a Critical Social Theory agenda in International Relations, and the significance to that agenda of the Critical Theory/post-modernism relationship.

Prising Open The "Orthodox Consensus": Some General Perspectives

In the face of the enduring power that is modernist knowledge, the Critical Social Theory challenge has emanated, largely, from what Bernstein has described as a "growing sense" that "something is wrong with the ways in which the relevant [social theory] issues and options are posed" and, increasingly, with a desire to change the "the categorical structure and patterns within which we think and act". Bernstein, of course, is not the only commentator to have represented the critical challenge in these terms. Others too have emphasised its connection with a broader sense of crisis in modern life, while, simultaneously, recognising the potential for change (and conservative resistance to it). Examples of this critical insight have come from a whole range of intellectual locations in recent times. The two to follow have particular thematic significance for the discussion in later chapters, given their concern with the crisis of modernity and the post-Enlightenment pursuit of certainty.

The first comes from Robert Bellah, who in 1985, spoke of some of the paradoxes of modern life, in these terms:

There is a widespread feeling that the promise of the modern era is slipping away from us. A movement of enlightenment and liberation that was to have freed us from superstition and tyranny has led in the twentieth century to a

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Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.2.

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world in which ideological fanaticism and political oppression have reached extremes unknown in previous history. Science, which was to have unlocked the bounties of nature, has given us the power to destroy all life on earth. Progress, modernity's master idea, seems less compelling today when it appears that it may be progress into the abyss. And the globe today is divided between a liberal world so incoherent that it seems to be losing the significance of its own ideals, an oppressive and archaic communist statism, and a poor, often tyrannical third world reaching for the first rungs of modernity.9

These are themes that have been taken up, even more profoundly, by Jane Flax, who has captured the sense of the Critical Social Theory challenge to modernity, with her proposition that:

Something has happened, is happening to Western societies. The beginning of this transition can be dated somewhat arbitrarily from after the First World War in Europe and after the Second world War in the United States. Western culture is in the middle of a fundamental transformation: a "shape of life" is growing old. The demise of the old is being hastened by the end of colonialism, the uprising of women, the revolt of other cultures against white Western hegemony, shifts in the balance of economic and political power within the world economy, and a growing awareness of the costs as well as the benefits of scientific "progress". Western intellectuals cannot be immune from the profound shifts now taking place in contemporary social life.10

For Flax this is a crisis of contemporary society that goes beyond the "sense" that something is wrong with the way we ask our questions. It is, more specifically, a growing recognition that the Enlightenment dream is over, that, for all its promises, the "Enlightenment has failed". Most importantly, argued Flax, in language appropriate for the discussion thus far in the thesis:

The political and philosophical aspirations and claims typical of Enlightenment thinking appear to have been falsified by that which it was supposed to predict yet cannot account for: the subsequent course of Western history.11

Particularly vulnerable in this regard, she suggested, was the scientific philosophy of the Enlightenment and its historical narrative of reason, knowledge, progress and freedom.

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10These are Jane Flax's insights in, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p.5.

Accordingly, and from all angles, there are fundamental challenges to the "self-certainty of reason and its science", and, for many in the current period:

It is no longer self evident that there is any necessary connection between reason, knowledge, science, freedom and human happiness. Indeed the relation between these now appears to be at least partially and irresolvably antagonistic. The escape from tutelage through reason and knowledge that Kant believed was also the path to freedom may, it seems now, lead instead into an even more terrifying enslavement to the products of that knowledge.\textsuperscript{12}

This is an important theme in a Critical Social Theory context concerned to open up closed theory and practice. At one level, as Flax noted, it has allowed for (effectively) silenced voices to be heard again, as those associated with anti-Enlightenment sentiments (e.g. Nietzsche) now seem, to many, more like prophets than "cranks".\textsuperscript{13} It is important too because it connects the broader social theory debate starkly and directly to an International Relations context.

It does so when the developmentalism of the post-Enlightenment period, projected via the concepts of progress and rational science, is confronted with some of its sinister implications, concerning, for example, the connection between the ascent of the rational modern subject and the questions of Hiroshima and Auschwitz. The point here, of course, is that a celebration of the age of rational science and modern technological society cannot simply be disconnected from the weapons of mass slaughter, of the techniques of genocide. Nor can the language and logic of liberty and emancipation be easily detached from the terror waged in their names, by, for example, the major Cold War foes, each proclaiming itself the natural systemic heir to the Enlightenment dream. And while many in the 1990s celebrate the "end" of the Cold War, as the victory of one Enlightenment based economic doctrine over another, the other side of this particular coin must also be confronted, in the poverty of so much of the world, and in the growing underclasses in "developed" societies where neo-classical and neo-Marxian "scientific" approaches have dominated the economic debates.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid, p.8.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
One more point, made towards the end of Chapter One is also now of direct significance in this context. It is that the Critical Social Theory approach under discussion here, and which informs this thesis, is characterised, above all, by a sense of its limitations and by the integrity with which its carries out its critique. There can be, accordingly, no retreat to simple formulae, and/or respectable polemic. Hence, the reluctance of a scholar like Flax to simply condemn the Enlightenment (or more precisely its dominant scientific project) in favour of some ready made alternative "realism", unfettered by its distorting influences. The alternative she offers, consequently, is predicated not on the regurgitated certainties of intellectual/institutional conventional wisdom, but on a willingness to confront the "intellectual vertigo" of an approach which acknowledges the ambiguities, paradoxes and uncertainties of everyday life.14 More precisely, any Critical Social Theory approach of this kind must represent itself in ambivalent terms for, just as we cannot separate the terror that is modernity from the liberty that is modernity, neither can we, the products of modernity, simply detach from it our alternative suggestions for the future.15

This perception, of course, is no source of comfort for contemporary thinkers, critically inclined, or otherwise. Indeed, as Flax has put it, "the more the fault lines in previously unproblematic ground become apparent, the more frightening it appears to be without ground".16 Hence the "intellectual vertigo" she speaks of. There are, however, many who have taken up the challenge of modernity in a positive, constructive manner: still suffering from "vertigo" to be sure, still shaken by both the extraordinary achievement and colossal brutality that is their heritage, but now no longer willing to celebrate the former while remaining blind to the latter. This has meant more than a surface level consciousness of the need to think and act in more sensitive and tolerant


15Making Marx's (Hegelian) point again in a different circumstance, Flax thus acknowledged that "even revolutionary philosophies bear the mark of the tradition out of which they arose and against which they rebel", ibid, p.10.

16Ibid, p.6
ways. It has meant a more profound willingness to critically confront the way we think and act, to strip bare the very basis of thinking and acting, to reinterrogate its meaning and the ways we legitimate the social and intellectual "givens" that for so long have been reality - the way the world is, "out there". It has provoked the widespread Critical Social Theory challenges to modernity and positivist social theory in recent years, as scholars from a range of disciplinary backgrounds have sought different ways to understand the world and speak of change within it. This has been an attitude evident, for example, in debates over contemporary philosophy, where Critical Social Theory perspectives have prompted a significant reassessment of some intellectual and institutional sacred cows.

Questioning the "Perennial Questions": Reassessing Contemporary Philosophy

The nature of the Critical Social Theory challenge to philosophy is exemplified in a number of recent works. Prominent among them is Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and two edited collections concerned with developments in Post Analytic Philosophy and the nature of Western thought After Philosophy.17 The overall thrust of these works is that the dominant (foundational) reference points for mainstream philosophical inquiry are now under more severe and fundamental challenge than at any time since Descartes introduced the "deep assumptions, commitments and metaphors" of modern philosophical rationality.18 The general tone of the works is perhaps best summed up in the proposition that, for many in the contemporary period "philosophy is at a turning point, that things philosophical cannot simply go on as they have".19


18 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p.2.

19 This is in the Introduction to Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy, After Philosophy, p.2.
There are many variations on this theme among contributors to these works, but the arguments tend to focus on three aspects of "things philosophical". The first concerns the rationality premise as it has been most influentially projected in post-Cartesian philosophy. The more specific critical target, in this regard, is the formalism associated with rational inquiry, which, following Hume and Kant, allowed modern conservatives and radicals alike to represent their philosophical discourses in terms of certain invariant principles of meaning. The second critical focus, interwoven with the first, concerns the sovereign, rational subject of modern philosophy. Represented principally in atomised, disengaged terms (e.g. the autonomous "individual" in market Liberalism and/or intuitivist Conservatism) or as partially "completed" (e.g. the Marxian class actor coming to consciousness) the modern subject is projected as the transparent human agency of a universalised rationality, which can be (epistemologically) "known". The third focus of critique makes more explicit the philosophical idiom within which this notion of reason and its transparent subject have been most commonly "known" in modern philosophy - the language idiom. Here, it is argued, even following the "linguistic turn" in Analytical Philosophy, the modern subject has remained effectively detached from an independent world of (corresponding) objects, which in rational terms are represented through language. In this context, the task of the philosopher seeking to "know" this objective reality is to determine the truth content, or otherwise, of "speech acts".

This modernist regime of framing, with its universalised notion of rationality, has now been confronted by the notion of the "irremediably local character of all truth, argument and validity". The totality, unity and certainty associated with post-Kantian philosophy has been countered with arguments exposing its fallibility, its historical and cultural variability and its heterogeneity. Consequently, foundationalism has been

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20 Or, of course, as the sovereign individual state of International Relations.

21 Ibid, p.4.

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rejected, in any form. The central figure of modern philosophy - the rational subject - has been confronted with its "other" side - as articulated in the works of scholars like Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Emphasised, also, has been the proposition that "mind" will be "misconceived if it is opposed to "body", as will "theory" if it is opposed to "practice". Accordingly:

the subject of knowledge is essentially embodied and practically engaged with the world: and the products of our thought bear the ineradicable traces of our purposes and projects, passions and interests...[Consequently] it is no longer possible to ignore the intrinsically social character of the "structures of consciousness," the historical and cultural variability of categories of thought and principles of action [and] their interdependence with the changing forms of social and material production.

This perspective, of course, has implications for any understanding of the nature and place of language in the world. Consequently, there is repudiation of "linguistically naked" objects in the world, and notions of disengaged subjects observing and (retrospectively) representing such objects in linguistic terms. Rather, it is suggested:

the condition of our forming disinterested representation of the world is that we be already engaged with it. And the kinds of representation we form will depend on the kind of dealings we have with it.

Or, this more emphatic statement of language as an inexorably social phenomenon:

Man makes the world, and the world means nothing which man has not made it mean, and that only to some other man.

At one level, then, and in reiterating forgotten and/or ignored themes from the later Wittgenstein in particular, the critical debates in philosophy have charged that the objects

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22Ibid. My commentary here is generalised, and I am aware that some of the contributors to these works are not always consistent in their application of these principles. This of course is strikingly evident in relation to Rorty who in so many ways is the epitome of the anti-foundationalist scholar, while as David Campbell has shown a crude foundationalist when it come to Cold War issues. See Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States", Alternatives XV (1990), pp.263-286 at p.265. The general themes are nevertheless, I think, an accurate representation of the new philosophical position, at least in intent.

23Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy, After Philosophy, p.4.

24Ibid, p.5.

25These are the words of the Pragmatist philosopher Charles Pierce as cited in Rorty's, "Pragmatism and Philosophy" in ibid, p.34.
of real knowledge in the world are always pre-interpreted, always, "textually" located and formed. Similarly, the subjects of real knowledge - the interpreters and namers of objects - are always in and of the text, themselves interpreted and named by it. Language, in this sense, can never be a neutral tool by which the thinking subject describes (the subjects and objects of) reality, nor can such descriptions be simply or objectively evaluated for their linguistic truth content. Rather, language is the medium by which reality is "made" - by which, over time, the real nature of subjects and objects are textually framed and reframed in the particular social, cultural and linguistic discourses within which notions of evaluation and truth are constructed.

An important and related theme in this reassessment of philosophy is the notion of philosophical knowledge as social practice. In Rorty's terms, thus:

if we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature, we will not be likely to envisage a metapractice which will be the critique of all possible forms of social practice.26

Rorty's point here is significant in any attempt to "reframe" the modern, in that once the "meaning" of "real" knowledge is released from its dominant representation in the modern philosophical story, there is space for a "conception of philosophy [and social theory] which has nothing to do with the quest for certainty".27 This is an exiting prospect for Rorty because in breaking down the "urge to see social practices of justification as more than just such practices" the possibility arises for a more profound understand of humankind which recognises that "knowledge" and "language" have no ultimate referents but are socio/cultural tools for coping with constructed (and therefore changeable) reality.28 This might allow different questions to be asked of a closed regime of understanding. Thus, instead of constraining theory and practice to the structured relationship between universalised categories - a given subject and a given object - the

27Ibid, p.171.
task of understanding becomes a historical inquiry into the multifarious vocabularies of meaning across different cultures, epoches and social practices, in the search for a practical knowledge concerning the:

relations between alternative standards of justification [for social practice] and...actual changes in those standards which make up intellectual [and social] history.29

It is in this context that Rorty has appealed for a reassessment of the work of Wittgenstein - as a bridge into a non-determined space where the closures of modernism give way to a genuine pluralism and a different set of attitudes to intellectual and social conflict. Rorty has called too for a new philosophy, acknowledging pragmatist themes, which re-establishes a broad hermeneutic approach to knowledge and society. Recognising the problems of his position Rorty has explained that the term, hermeneutics, used in this way is:

not the name for a discipline, nor for a method of achieving the sort of results which epistemology failed to achieve...[but] an expression of hope that the cultural space left by epistemology will not be filled - that our culture should become one in which the demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer felt.30

More concisely, the call for a critical hermeneutic philosophy by Rorty is an appeal for a contemporary perspective which escapes from the modernist urge toward homogeneity, unity, and sovereignty and the foundationalism that acts as the (ultimate) justification for power politics. It is an appeal for a new more profound conversation among contemporary peoples, a conversation which recognises the problems of different, competing discourses but presupposes no independent constraints and considers that the "hope of agreement is never lost so long as the conversation lasts".31 It is in regard to this kind of "conversation" that something needs to be said also about the contribution of

29 Ibid.
Hans Georg Gadamer to a Critical Social Theory approach concerned to overcome the modernist way of framing.

Gadamer and a Critical Hermeneutics of Praxis.

Gadamer's hermeneutic approach differs from those that preceded it in a number of important ways. It shares a legacy with Schleiermacher and Von Humboldt, but it draws its influence also from figures such as Heidegger, and from classical Greek scholarship (e.g. via the Aristotelian notion of phronesis).\(^{32}\) Gadamer, in Truth and Method, for example, defined his critical hermeneutics as a universal approach to understanding which comes to know the world through the interpretation of texts in history, as they express their "Dasein" - their "basic being in motion...[a] being that can be understood is language".\(^{33}\) This marked Gadamer's attempt to redefine the Western philosophical story in terms which saw it as an ongoing conversation, and which recognised no distinction in understanding between the scientific and the social world.\(^{34}\)

\(^{32}\)See Gadamer, Truth and Method trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). Importantly also Gadamer's hermeneutics takes an unequivocal stand on the question of the subjective objectivism of scientific hermeneutics. It rejects the very notion that all social thinking is "subjective" on the basis that such a position merely continues the modernist dichotomy of subject/object and the quest that sees a search for the latter in the pure methods and principles of science. In Truth and Method, first published (in German) in 1960, Gadamer indicated his alternative position by proposing that:

\[\text{I \[do\] not remotely intend to deny the necessity of methodological work within the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). Nor \[do I\] propose to revive the ancient dispute on method between the natural and the human sciences...[instead] the question I have asked seeks to discover and bring into consciousness something that methodological dispute serves only to conceal and neglect, something that does not so much confine or limit modern science as precede it and make it possible.}\]

Ibid, p.xvii. Gadamer in this passage points to a notion of hermeneutics with ambitions far beyond those of its earlier advocates which seeks to understand the "truth" of the human sciences beyond questions of method. Indeed in prescribing this task for his study Gadamer proposed that hermeneutics was concerned with questions beyond those of (conventionally understood) epistemology - it was he suggested concerned with questions of (ontological) "being" that are intrinsic to human life per se.

\(^{33}\)Ibid, pp.xxii-xxiii.

\(^{34}\)This made his hermeneutics distinctly different of course. In acknowledging no special status to scientific knowledge Gadamer intersects with scholars such as Hesse and Bhaskar, but unlike those who also perceive of a unity of hermeneutic knowledge Gadamer's position contains no privileged place either for a "structural" foundation.
From this perspective, Gadamer pronounced the modernist story a particular image of the world derived from the "unbroken tradition of [Western] rhetorical and humanist culture" which had been metamorphosed into a universalised and "objectivist" framework of understanding via positivist scientism, in particular. In this way, he suggested, a latent Cartesianism had transfixed earlier hermeneutic thought, trapping it within a dichotomised metatheory. Similarly the notion of reason and rationality in "scientific" (e.g. Dilthey's) hermeneutics, for all its commitment to historico-cultural inquiry, was still set in terms which posited a distinction between (universal) reason and (cultural) tradition, between (foundational) rationality and (socio-historical) prejudice. Importantly, however, Gadamer considered it possible to reclaim this story for those written out of it, by serious interpretative regard for the humanist anti-modernism in, for example, art and literature.

Consequently, and in terms which link him to Habermas, post-Wittgensteinian thought and (with qualifications) to post-modernism, Gadamer insisted on a historically and culturally situated "reason" which, in its various language traditions, exhibited its essentially human quality. It was in this context too that Gadamer sought to overcome the legacy of foundationalism. This, strange as it might seem, is where Gadamer returned to the Greek Classical texts in order to reconvene a practical philosophical perspective set in terms of "praxis" rather than "techne". This "praxis" for Gadamer was closely identified with the Aristotelian notion of phronesis. For Aristotle and for Gadamer (and in modified form for Habermas) the importance of phronesis is that it represents an alternative knowledge form and way of understanding from both episteme (scientific knowledge) and techne (technical knowledge). In contrast phronesis is concerned with practical-ethical knowledge, with understanding the human world and learning how to live in it.

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36See the discussion in Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp.283-290.
Phronesis too is about difference rather than unity, about diversity rather than homogeneity. Whereas scientific and technical knowledge forms deal with foundations, with independent "things" and formulas of given means and ends, phronesis knowledge is about concrete, particular, knowledge of social situations. By pursuing phronesis knowledge, therefore, the "scientific mystification" of modernity might be broken down and the "false idolatry of the expert" reassessed in favour of a critical hermeneutics of praxis concerned with a knowledge of human society, which is:

not of a general kind of knowledge, but of its specification at a particular moment. This knowledge also is not in any sense technical knowledge...The person with understanding does not know and judge as one who stands apart and unaffected; but rather, as one united by a specific bond with the other, he thinks with the other and undergoes the situation with him.37

This, for Gadamer, is a more profound process of understanding than any derived from an "objective" knowledge, or even that which seeks "empathy" between individual minds in history. It is the basis of all genuine understanding which sees a "fusing" of horizons between the interpreter and that which is interpreted. And it is not a foundationalist position, for while the text and its language contain "universal" human themes, texts are not given - to be understood "as such and only afterwards used...for particular purposes". Rather the interpreter seeks to understand "what this piece of tradition says, what constitutes the meaning and importance of the text". In so doing the interpreter must not seek detachment from the concrete hermeneutical situation, for it is in the "fusion" of time and mind that we become conscious of the "I" as the "thou".38

There is in Gadamer's concept of "Dasein", obvious influences of Hegelianism and the historical movement of "consciousness". There is also a sense of holism, reminiscent of Hegel and suggestive of a universal process of understanding in Gadamer's "fusion" notion. But Gadamer has stressed the distinction between the dialectic of the "Geist" and the dialectic of historical "fusion". In the former, he

acknowledged, the Hegelian movement of consciousness heads towards a "scientific" totality, towards "the certainty of itself in knowledge." This notion of "being", coming to know itself in history must end for Hegel in "absolute knowledge, i.e. in the complete identity of consciousness and object". Gadamer's critical hermeneutics, however, is oriented towards ever opened conversation, not ultimate closure. This notion of hermeneutics, accordingly, "always contains an orientation towards new experience". It represents a:

dialectic of experience [which] has its own fulfilment not in definitive knowledge, but in the that openness to experience that is encouraged by experience itself.

For obvious reasons Gadamer's critical hermeneutic perspective has been taken seriously in Critical Social Theory circles. Much of its influence, however, has been indirect, in modified form, for example, via Habermas. And it is towards Habermas, or more precisely, Critical Theory in general, and then post-modernism, that the chapter now turns, in order that something be said about the two most influential Critical Social Theory approaches that have sought to confront modernism, positivism and the foundationalist paradox.

40Ibid.
41Ibid, p.319. The term "experience" used here is not of course that used by empiricists. Rather it relates to the Hegelian use of the term denoting the movement of consciousness. A more appropriate term in German is "Erfahrung".
Confronting Modernity: (i) The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School

It is perhaps a tautology to suggest that an understanding of Critical Theory is dependent upon an understanding of "Western" Marxism in the years since Marx's death. But in the present context, to help locate the Critical Theory approach, it is necessary to touch, briefly, on one theme in Marxist literature relating to this issue. It concerns the complex and enduring question of whether there was an early "philosophical" Marx and a later "scientific" one. Both interpretations have held sway within Marxist literature in the years since Marx's death. For the majority of that time, however, as Western social theory has grappled with issues of scientific philosophy, of positivism and of hermeneutics, Marxist orthodoxy was gripped by a fiercely held "scientific materialism" set in dialectical terms.


44 On "Western Marxism" see the discussion in Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept From Lukacs to Habermas, pp.1-20; and for a more critical angle, see Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1976).

45 The French experience is a microcosm of this interpretative struggle with direct relevance to the emergence of post-modernism. Here the discursive pendulum has swung between the "philosophical" interpretation (e.g. Sartre and existentialism) and the "scientific" (Althusser and structuralism). For a useful discussion of some of the implications of this for the present discussion see Mark Poster, Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

46 It might be argued of course that in the hands of "eastern" polemicists such as Plekhanov and Lenin, and given the actual revolutionary circumstances which Marxist theory and practice confronted, it was not surprising that highly complex and ambiguously presented positions were simplified and sloganised. But as other Marxist scholars have noted there is plenty of scope for the view that in the "great texts" of Marx and Engels it is possible to find crude positivist understandings of knowledge and society. In Engels' work this is less ambiguously the case. His Dialectics of Nature (Moscow, 1972) published posthumously contains the most definitive statement of the notion that there were universal (dialectical) laws which applied both to nature and society. More significant however is his Anti-Dhurbing (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975) published during Marx's life and containing a chapter from Marx. Whatever the case it was Anti-Dhurbing which according to Plekhanov gave "final shape" to a Marxist philosophy of science that directed orthodox Marxist thinking until perhaps the 1960s. This is Plekhanov's view in
But in the years since Marx's death there has also been another prominent approach to this issue which has insisted that Marxism is an anti-empiricist, anti-positivist philosophy of knowledge and society which understands "objective" reality and the post-Kantian emancipatory project in social and "interpretivist" terms.\(^{47}\) The relations between objects and subjects in this sense are intrinsic to the dominant relations of power at a given historical period. In a modern "class" context, therefore, that which appears "external" to social consciousness, (scientific fact) is regarded, rather, as a reified expression of the ruling ideas of the class that rules - an ideology of bourgeois scientism - designed to alienate modern peoples from an understanding of their (class) reality, by detaching the story of class power from its human source.

This was a theme integral to the attempts of Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, from the 1920s on, to shift emancipatory thinking away from the reductionism of its scientific orthodoxy (particularly its tendency toward a determining "economic" sphere) and recapture the philosophical kernel of Marxism in human society and culture.\(^{48}\) The argument, broadly put, was that social progress was not dependent upon the scientific discovery and application of universal laws - of the consciousness of a mechanised dialectical materialism - but of concrete social practice associated with critical reflection on the dominant power relations and the "reality" of its knowledge form. Positivism from

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\(^{47}\)For a thinker such as Lukacs for example the holism and theory of historical development in Marxist thought precludes any notion of a radical separation of object and subject. In, *History and Class Consciousness* he argued instead that any dialectical laws that might exist were socially and historically grounded in the relationship between the self-conscious activity of subjects and the (objective) social conditions produced by prior human activity. In this sense the "object" world is always an alienated or reified form of social relations of production. He draws particularly upon Marx's "early" works for this view, particularly *Poverty of Philosophy* (1847). See Lukacs comments in *History and Class Consciousness*, pp.5-10.

\(^{48}\)Critical Theorists sought in this way to re-emphasise the socio-cultural (superstructural) elements of Marxist theory and practice as something other than as mere epiphenomena of the (natural laws) of the economy. See the discussion in Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, pp.205-250; see also Adorno's introductory remarks in, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp.1-10. This became increasingly the case as "Western" Marxists became aware of the Soviet state and Stalinism and some of the unexpected implications of the universal "law of contradictions".
this perspective had transformed a particular "technique" (scientific empiricism) into a social and intellectual "universal" force which now "circumscribes an entire culture...and projects a historic totality - a "world".49 This mechanistic thinking - the reduction of reason to Instrumentalist ends - was the basis of the social logic that reified "techne" over "praxis", and which ceded power to the "objective" knowledge of the expert.50

In other words if modernity had demythologised the natural world, as both Marxism and Liberal theory stressed, then the bourgeois capitalist world had mythologised it again by detaching the thinking subject from the process by which meaning was given to the objects of reality. Knowledge, in this sense, is very definitely power, and the language of bourgeois power was the language of "instrumental rationality" - the language of natural science (e.g. positivism) applied uncritically to social life. Accordingly, the logic and language of the post-Enlightenment philosophy of science - of modernity - were deeply implicated in the subjugation and distortion of the critical potential within modernity upon which "progress" (self-reflective, social emancipation) depended. This applied to so called "revolutionary" societies (e.g. the USSR) as well as to the Liberal states of Western Europe and North America, indeed to any society which understood its "reality" in rational-scientific terms. The most immediate problem for Critical Theorists such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, was that the ideology of instrumental-rationalist knowledge had become so pervasive in the heartland of industrial capitalism that it had become the (illusory) reality for the industrial working classes - the supposed proletarian agents of radical change.51

Consequently, in the works of Adorno and Horkheimer, in particular, there was little left of the optimism that characterised earlier Marxist analysis. Indeed the whole

49See Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p.154.

50Alienated from itself, then, the human capacity to think critically was now reified in the (external) power of scientific rationality which now, in turn, subordinated human self understanding to its (class) will. The result: "the domination of human by human through the mediation of the of the domination of (alienated) nature", see Stanley Aronowitz, Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p.130.

51See Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment; and Adorno, Negative Dialectics.
modernist tradition, set upon linear notions of progress and emancipatory consciousness, was now perceived in a different, more sombre, light. It was in this circumstance that early Frankfurt School scholarship focused on the "totalitarian" dimensions of a particular form of reason - instrumental reason - which, it was argued, dominated modern thinking with its technological fetish, and its reduction of social complexity and nuance, to simple "problem solving" techniques. Exposing the positivist project at the heart of the (ostensibly) neutral knowledge process was, in this sense, an emancipatory enterprise with direct political implications. But, in the period between the two World Wars, the emancipatory project seemed utopian in the extreme for many Marxist oriented scholars. Gone was any faith in the revolutionary potential of the industrial proletariat, as the welfare state and mass consumerism gave material sustenance to the claims that "ideological" struggle was indeed at an end. If there was space for difference, for questioning, for self critique, for emancipation, it was at the margins of modern society among the artists, writers and creative avant-garde. Hence, the shift in Critical Theory literature towards "cultural" themes and away from traditional Marxist concerns with proletarian class struggle.

But for all the pessimism associated with the works of the first generation of Frankfurt School scholars, the "thinking space" bequeathed to those who followed was

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52 Horkheimer articulated this mood in "The Authoritarian State", in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader eds. Arato and Gebhardt; also cited in Jay, Marxism and Totality, p.217, in this way:

According to Hegel, the stages of the Weltgeist follow one another with logical necessity and none can be omitted. In this respect Marx remained true to him. History is represented as an indivisible development. The new cannot begin before its time. However the fatalism of both philosophers refers to the past only. Their metaphysical error, namely, that history obeys a defined law, is cancelled by their historical error, namely, that such a law was fulfilled at its appointed time. [However] the present and past are not subject to the same law.

Not all Frankfurt School scholars were as resigned to the hopelessness of the present as Horkheimer's perspective implies. Marcuse, for example, remained committed to the search for an emancipatory politics in modern societies which he acknowledged as "totalitarian" in its suffocation of critical self reflectivity beneath the vested interests of instrumental (or technical) rationality. Marcuse nevertheless continued to search for spaces within "one dimensional" modern bourgeois society within which its "other" dimensions might be understood and radically utilised. Ibid, pp.221-2.

53 And hence the attack on "Western" Marxists by more orthodox scholars like Perry Anderson in Considerations on Western Marxism.
one which framed the possibility of rational emancipation in a social praxis which went beyond the dichotomised logic of a positivist dominated modernity. This, as Horkheimer explained in a passage that remains integral to the contemporary debate, was because:

The intervention of reason in the processes whereby knowledge and its object are constituted, or the subordination of these processes to conscious control, does not take place...in a purely intellectual world, but coincides with the struggle for certain real ways of life.54

This principal, which asserted the historical and political nature of all knowledge as power, and which understood "theory" as inexorably connected to "practice", has remained at the core of the contributions of the second generation of Frankfurt School scholars in the years since the death of Adorno, Horkheimer and Adorno. The most prominent figure in Critical Theory in this period has been Jurgen Habermas, and Habermas' influence has been integral to the Critical Social Theory challenge of recent years and to its transference to International Relations.55

Jurgen Habermas and the Emancipatory Project Revisited

A central feature of Habermas' wide-ranging analysis of contemporary society has been the attempt to find emancipatory and transformational elements in the theory and practice

54Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.245.

of modernity. But the Habermasian project, emerging in the Cold War years, developing in the brief and heady days of new left radicalism, and maturing during an age which has seen something of a flight from Hegelian/Marxism among European scholars, has, by necessity, differed in important respects from earlier Frankfurt School approaches.

On the question of emancipation, for example, Habermas has sought to expose the idealist and utopian elements of earlier Hegelian/Marxist thinking, which produced both grand universalised theories of revolutionary change and, in the wake of revolutionary failure, a philosophical cul-de-sac of pessimism and despair. Habermas rejected this latter tendency, (epitomised for him by Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*) as a one-sided and negative interpretation of the dialectical legacy of Hegelian and Marxist thought, which has resulted in an understanding of modernity that was a "left counterpart to the...theory of totalitarian domination". In order, thus, to rekindle the positive emancipatory element in Critical Theory, while rejecting its universalist totalising tendencies, Habermas has engaged in a long-term restructuring of Hegelian/Marxist thought in terms of a radical communicatory rationalism, influenced by post-Wittgensteinian notions of "ordinary language" and the symbolically-mediated interaction between "speech communities".

In particular, and here his response has been aimed at both (early) Critical Theorists and post-modernists, Habermas has argued that there is nothing conceptually or historically *inevitable* about the suppressed nature of the "will to question" in modern societies. Rather, for Habermas, "thinking space" still remains in post-Enlightenment modernism, beyond the restrictions placed upon it by a particular (positivist) knowledge form in its association with capitalist social relations. Habermas' Critical Theory project,

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57 This shift towards linguistic based analysis was recognition on Habermas' part that a defence of Enlightenment reason could no longer be predicated upon a notion of underlying and unfolding "consciousness". On this recognition and its implications see, in particular, Mark Poster, *Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context*, p.76.
accordingly, is aimed at resuscitating the (modernist) critical faculty in the face of those who no longer acknowledge such a possibility.

The problem with earlier forms of Critical Theory, he insists, is that it failed to distinguish between the spheres of instrumental reason, and communicative reason, and the "rational" activity associated with both. Consequently, early Critical Theory misunderstood the emancipatory task in seeking to overcome the power of instrumental reason in all spheres. Its pessimism and sense of resignation (and/or its resort to Hegelian totalism) was inevitable thus because it sought not only the transformation of social relations, but also of relationships with nature and its productive forces. The point, suggested Habermas, in Toward a Rational Society was that scientific rationality per se was not an ideological force, nor the instrumental action it produced. What was repressing emancipatory thinking and action was the power of social theories such as positivism which transferred the logic of instrumental rationality, from its appropriate sphere, to the sphere of everyday communicatory activity, where it distorts the categories of practical social life and reduces questions that ought to be open to political and ethical discussion into closed issues of technical formula. The result was the:

depoliticization of the mass of the population, which is legitimated through technocratic consciousness...[as] the reified models of the sciences migrate into the socio-cultural life world and gain objective power over the latter's self understanding. The ideological nucleus of this consciousness is the elimination of the distinction between the practical and the technical.58

It is in these terms that Habermas has sought to go beyond the Critical Theory of the original Frankfurt School and acknowledge, more broadly, some of the omissions and silences in Marxism. His argument, in this regard is, that a contemporary Critical Theory requires something more than a blanket and indiscriminate rejection of modern scientific knowledge as ideological, or of appeals to some form of Hegelian totalised consciousness as an emancipatory alternative. It requires, for example, an appreciation that it is no longer just the (traditionally) oppressed parts of society which are ideologically pacified. Instead the focus of Critical Theory attention must be on those spheres of humaneness

58Habermas, Towards a Rational Society, p.112.
that are excluded from, and repressed by, the transference of scientific principles into social life. It must, in this regard:

penetrate beyond the level of particular historical class interests to disclose the fundamental interests of mankind as such, engaged in the process of self constitution. ⁵⁹

Leaving aside, for the moment, the notion of the fundamental interests of mankind "as such", this perspective of Habermas' has prefigured an important theme in a Critical Social Theory context, in that it led him to a concern with "language" and the emancipatory possibilities therein. This was a theme evident in his work well before the "linguistic turn" of the 1980s. As he explained in Towards a Rational Society the problem with modern scientific ideology, as articulated in positivism, in particular, is that it:

violates an interest grounded in one of the two fundamental conditions of our cultural existence: in language, or more precisely, in the form of socialisation and individuation determined by communication in ordinary language. This interest extends to the maintenance of intersubjectivity of mutual understanding as well as to the creation of communication without domination. Technocratic consciousness makes this practice disappear behind the interest in the expansion of our power of technical control. ⁶⁰

This passage draws together many of the concerns, themes and issues of the large and complex Habermasian project. Here, for example, is a concern about the legacy of Logical Positivist linguistic analysis and its association with the modern urge for social control. Here is a hermeneutic concern for a "humanness" derived from a discourse of intersubjective communication, and here too, albeit in different form, is a concern of the Frankfurt School to overcome technocratic consciousness in favour of the creation of a rational mode of communication free from (ideological) domination.

These were themes evident also in the 1970s, in Knowledge and Human Interests, a work more than any other that has assisted in the transference of Habermasian themes to International Relations, and a work that exemplifies the ambition (and the

⁵⁹Ibid, p.113.
⁶⁰Ibid.

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problems) of Habermas' contribution to Critical Social Theory. This work sought to establish an open ended dialectic of communicative rationality (a contemporary praxis) upon a series of socially grounded "cognitive interests".

The first of these "interests" - the "technical-cognitive interest" - reflected the fundamental human interest in survival and material existence. It promoted a knowledge form aimed at more effectively manipulating and controlling an objectified environment. In the modern period this "interest" found its foremost philosophical expression in positivism, via which it had become reified into an "object" in itself, constituting a "reality" beyond socially based communicative knowledge. But, argued Habermas, while this knowledge form was important, it represented only one aspect of human social life. Just as important, though effectively marginalised in modernity, was a "practical cognitive interest" in social understanding, interpretation and "rational" communication. This was associated with the (broad) hermeneutic knowledge form, which emphasised the need for inquiry into the way that social and cultural "meaning" became transposed into (scientific) "fact". The third "interest", in many ways the most important in the Habermasian schema, constituted the generative capacity for change. This, the "emancipatory cognitive interest", was associated with the most repressed knowledge form in modern society, the "critical" knowledge form inherent in the post-Enlightenment urge to - to question - to reflect - to reason. This, for Habermas, is as natural an aspect of human social being as is the interest in survival and communication. It is the keystone of the "rationalism" that he has sought to resuscitate in a modernity which has distorted the "meaning" of rational action. Indeed it is this notion of a "will to reason" which, in

61 The primary transference of Habermasian themes has been by Richard Ashley, in "Political Realism and Human Interests", International Studies Quarterly 25 (1981), pp.204-236; and "The Poverty of Neorealism", International Organization 38(2) (1984), pp.225-286, and I will say more about the implications of this in Chapter Eight.

62 For Habermas' discussion of these "cognitive interests" see the Appendix to Knowledge and Human Interests. The point of Habermas' argument here, of course, was to re-ground (Critical) theory in practice (human interests). This, however, for Habermas' critics, was the weakness of the argument, with many of them unhappy about the actual status of the "interests" in question. In the Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas confronted his critics. For an interesting discussion of this issue see Jay, Marxism and Totality, chapter 15.
the face of his critics, Habermas had maintained is the kernel of the emancipatory radicalism of Critical Theory in the contemporary period. Thus, he has argued:

while again and again [the will to reason] is silenced...in fantasies and deeds it develops a stubbornly transcendental power...it is renewed with each act of unconstrained understanding, with each moment of living together in solidarity, of successful individuation, and of saving emancipation.63

To gain emancipation from the ideological structure of modernity, therefore, is for Habermas to re-connect "rational" knowledge to human interests, to regenerate the critical potential of modernity in terms of an ideologically unhindered communicatory process. In this quest Habermas has drawn upon a variety of intellectual sources in the 1980s in his quest for a "theory of communicative action".64 Two of the principal influences upon this theory have been the hermeneutics of figures such as Gadamer, and elements of the broad Analytical Philosophy approach inspired by Wittgenstein.65 And for all the conflict of the Habermas-Gadamer dispute Habermas has integrated into his reformulated Critical Theory the Aristotelian distinction between techne and praxis which underpinned the refusal of Gadamer to reduce politics to administrative technique, or power to force.66 Moreover, in accepting (albeit with reservations) the Aristotelian concept of phronesis as the basis for social communication, Habermas has sought to uncover what he regards as the "universal conditions that are presupposed in all communicative action".67 In short, in the 1980s, Habermas has continued to insist that there are dimensions, possibilities, and potentials inherent within the Enlightenment tradition of modernity, that offer opportunities for critical reflection and political dissent, and which must not be dismissed

63See Held and Thompson, Habermas: Critical Debates, p.221.
64Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1; and Theory of Communicative Action Volume 2.
65For a discussion of this See Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality; Thomas McCarthy The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas; Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics, pp.83-100; and Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, pp.40-49.
66See McCarthy The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, pp.187-193; and Jay, "Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn?: Reflections on the Habermas-Gadamer Debate"; see also the discussion in Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, parts 1 and 4.
in an age which has lost its faith in the human capacity for creative, radical, thought and action.

For a whole range of reasons, however, there are many within the Critical Social Theory community who feel decidedly uneasy about Habermas' attempts to resuscitate this "rational" critical theme of post-Enlightenment philosophy. Notions of "universal conditions" of communication, and "human" interests, associated with "rational" theory and practice, have obvious and negative connotations for contemporary scholars seeking to break free of the power of the modernist framing regime, of foundationalism, and of the "Cartesian anxiety". Consequently, Habermas and contemporary Critical Theory, in general, have come under concerted attack, from post-modernists, in particular, perceiving in the new rationalism of the 1980s, the old rationalist illusion (and dangers) of the modernist "meta-narrative". This tension, between Critical Theory and post-modernism, is an issue I regard as crucial for the nature of Critical Social Theory scholarship in the future, particularly in International Relations, and I will return to it shortly, after making some general remarks about post-modernism which develop further the introductory comments in Chapter One.

68 A good example of this critique, which claims that ultimately, like Lukacs, Habermas is engaged in prioritising the "subject", is provided by Joel Whitebook in, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas," Telos 40 (Summer, 1979), pp 50-62. Whitebook says:

By introducing a dualistic framework to overcome the shortcomings of his predecessors, Habermas is following Lukacs earlier in this century. Whereas Habermas introduces his dualistic framework to correct the monism of Horkheimer and Adorno, Lukacs introduced his to correct the monism of Engels...In both cases the goal is to "save the subject".

Ibid, pp.53-54.
Confronting Modernity (ii) The Post-Modernist Perspective

As indicated in Chapter One, it is difficult to speak of post-modernism, in general terms, without violating what is perhaps its primary characteristic - its concern for heterogeneity and difference. For all its diversity, however, it is possible to discern a corpus of attitudes, themes, concerns, (values even) shared by scholars as different as Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, Lacan, Lyotard and Rorty, etc. Framed as a series of questions asked by scholars such as these, a post-modern critical agenda includes: (i) the question of modern Western society and culture. Or, more precisely, the question of the legacy of Western modernity for contemporary understandings of the real world and the real self; (ii) the question of knowledge and power, in particular the *how question* concerning the socio-linguistic conditions of the construction of dominant knowledge forms, and their disciplining and re-presentation in contemporary life; (iii) the (more precise) question of history and philosophy - of the Western "meta-narrative" - of the impact of the Enlightenment and the subsequent pursuit of a modern scientific philosophy; (iv) the question of the modern subject - of the sovereign rational actor of modernity; (v) the question of closure, exclusion, power politics, and life on the margins, the question of dissent and resistance.

Derived from these major headings are a number of analytical sub-themes which give "meaning" to the post-modernist critique of modernity. Important in this regard, as the discussion in Chapter One illustrated, is the notion that reality is not a unified, systemic whole, understandable in objectivist terms. Rather, from a post-modern perspective, the objects and subjects of reality are socio-linguistically constructed - their meanings are not "given", but are made and remade by people in different times and places, representing themselves and their world as part of discursive practices. As indicated in Chapter One, also, a discursive practice is not reducible to a single "great text", or even (necessarily) to a dominant tradition or discipline. It represents, rather, the embodiment of a particular way of framing questions and answers, of distinguishing truth and reality in social and political institutions, in the dominant technical processes, and in the general behaviour of people in their societies. This connects together language and society in a way that defies dichotomised representations of their relationship, in the sense that it is the discursive practices which construct the subjects and objects about which language speaks. Any discursive inquiry, therefore, is simultaneously an investigation of the socio-historical conditions under which language, meaning and social power intersect. As the preceding chapters have sought to show this has obvious implication for some of the most revered themes in post-Enlightenment philosophical folk lore: the notion of the modern subject, of history, of scientific knowledge, power and the notion of a reality "out there".

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the post-modern critical agenda, in this regard, is its proclamation of the (metaphoric) "death of man". The post-modernist target here, of course, is not humankind per se - it is not an anti-human perspective - but the particular idea of "man" and/or "human nature" that has been privileged in modern Western philosophical discourse. The proposition here is that because human "being", and nature, is a social, historical and linguistic construction - not a "given", the mirrored reflection of some external realm of pure essence - there can be no essential "man" whose fundamentally transparent character can be "known" via the correct knowledge/language
form. Hence, the proclamation of the "death" of, or more commonly, the decentering of the modern heroic figure of Western philosophy (e.g. the author, the sovereign individual, the class conscious citizen). Hence, the (Nietzschean inspired) suspicion of a modern story of "man" set upon the unfolding capacity for rational thought and action, and increasingly enlightened structures of power. Hence, the genealogical approach to history, derived from Nietzsche, which aims to expose the power/knowledge connection in modern theory and practice, by critically analysing the ways in which we have constructed the knowledge of ourselves, as modern subjects and objects.

Post-modern scholarship, not surprisingly, has also been at the forefront of the critiques of modernist philosophy (at least in big "P" institutionalised terms). The argument here is that because knowledge is not a homogeneous entity, but discursively produced and legitimated, there can be no foundational (philosophical) "knowledge" that underpins all other knowledge forms and which can act as a criterion of truth and meaning for them (e.g. as in Analytical Philosophy). Accordingly, the notion of a philosophy of language which can arbitrate on truth claims is repudiated by post-modernists. Knowledge (including philosophical knowledge) is socially and historically constituted; there can, therefore, be no neutral, transparent (realm of) philosophical knowledge or language against which philosophy can make "rational" judgements concerning the "reality" of its meanings.

This critical insight is applied also to the rational-scientific knowledge of social theory in general. Thus, while acknowledging the moderated tones of contemporary knowledge claims - e.g. the notion of "law-like" descriptions of "laws" - rather than "laws" per se, this, from a post-modernist perspective, disguises an important dimension of the modernist power/knowledge nexus. The point is that the "descriptive" knowledge of mainstream social theory is always inherently and powerfully "prescriptive". This is

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71 On the problems of big P philosophy see Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. 

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because it is the knowledge form that gives (rational-scientific) "meaning" to the decision-making procedures, policy formulations and general rules of thought and behaviour in the modern world. Consequently, those who deviate from that "meaning" or question and disregard official decisions and policies, do so in the face of a knowledge form and its procedural techniques that are, by definition, rational, ordered and corresponding to the reality of human nature and society.

From a post-modernist perspective this is just one example of the relations of power that emanate from the struggle of discursive practices. Power, in this context, cannot be reduced to its traditional sites (class, gender, the state system). Rather, power operates in every site. It cannot, as such, be overcome; not by revolutionary means, nor, by the freeing up of modern emancipatory potentials (e.g. as in Habermasian Critical Theory). Power, instead, is integral to all discursive practices, to the way we think and act, to the way that we are defined as thinkers and actors. The discursive politics of power, consequently, is at its most reprehensible for post-modernists in societies which understand reality in the most homogeneous, unified and orderly of ways, for here the subjugation of difference, of heterogeneity, of alternative discourses of reality, have been most successful - and thus most brutalising of both "mind" and "body".

A post-modernist politics of dissent, accordingly, seeks to disrupt and erode the theory and practice of these "realities", which, in celebrating the ascent of some in the post-Enlightenment period have, for the sake of identity, unity, coherence and order in their world, suppressed the (human) difference, ambiguity and "otherness", integral to it. Post-modernism, in this regard, seeks to illuminate the "enabling" as well as repressing elements of power politics, by exposing the process by which it is constituted and represented and opening space for resistance to it. This it does in relation to the "woman" who, from Aristotle to Freud, has been represented as the negative side of "man", to the people of the Third World, defined and named as the negative side of the (developmental story) of the First (and Socialist) world. This it does, not in absolute terms, but in
support of approaches to knowledge and society which disrupt the closure associated with all forms of absolutism.

In Chapter Nine I will return again to this post-modern politics of dissent as it has been articulated in the Critical Social Theory literature in International Relations. At this point, however, I want to say something about another dimension of the post-modern agenda, that concerning its relationship with Critical Theory on the question of modernity. Here, the conflict with Habermas, in particular, has provided some stimulating and occasionally vitriolic exchanges.

**The Modernity Question Revisited: Habermas and Post-Modernism**

There are perhaps two phases in the Habermasian contribution to the modernity debate with post-modernism. The first, which takes in the period up to and including *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1980) is that characterised by a rather uncompromising approach to post-modernism as "neo-conservatism".72 In the second period, since the early 1980s, and including his *Discourse of Philosophical Modernity* (1985) there has been a more measured response to post-modernist thought, though some major differences clearly remain. Indeed in a recent debate with his critics Habermas reflected on this early antipathy toward post-modernism in a way that continued to represent his distaste for "theories of totalitarian domination", derived from Nietzsche in particular.73


73 See Habermas, "Questions and Counterquestions", in *Habermas and Modernity* ed. Bernstein, pp.192-216. There are clear biographical and historical reasons for the shift in tone and subtlety over this period. Until "Modernity Versus Postmodernity" there is little evidence that Habermas had seriously grappled with the post 1968 shift in French social theory. This had to do with the (perhaps understandable) aversion of a German leftist to the German forerunners of post-modernism (e.g. Nietzsche and Heidegger) and his primary interest in emancipatory post-Enlightenment theory.
Habermas here had two important statements to make to his contemporary critics on the modernism issue. The first, saw him acknowledging that, to a substantial degree, they are engaged in a shared project, that of exposing logocentrism and opposing:

the ontological privileging of the world of beings, the epistemological privileging of contact with objects or existing states of affairs, and the semantic privileging of esoteric sentences and propositional truth.\(^{74}\)

The second, marked out Habermas' rejection of the broad conclusions reached by French scholars such as Derrida and Foucault, and their Anglo-American counterparts, such as Rorty. Just like the early Critical Theorists, suggested Habermas, and even more ironically, these thinkers have become victims of the totalising tendencies within modernity, which has seen a "single thread of propositional truth and theoretical reason...stylized into the monopoly of humanity".\(^{75}\) His point was that post-modernists have seized on "a single thread" of post-Enlightenment experience - its pessimistic dimension - and have transformed it into an inevitable and all encompassing "counter narrative" which inevitably dissolves into violence and terror and systematically excludes any space for creative, radical change. In contrast, in the 1980s, Habermas continued to maintain that the Enlightenment tradition offers "thinking space" - space in particular to reflect upon and resist the dualised and dichotomised strategies of metatheoretical meaning that gave such "rational" credence to the philosophy of the subject and (social) scientific inquiry. He suggested, therefore, that in the face of a logocentric "meta-narrative":

Instead of following Nietzsche's path of a totalising and self-referential critique of reason, whether it be via Heidegger to Derrida, or via Bataille to Foucault, and throwing the [modernist] baby out with the bathwater, it is more promising to seek this end through the analysis of the already operative potential for rationality contained in the everyday practices of communication.\(^{76}\)

\(^{74}\)Ibid, p.197.

\(^{75}\)Ibid.

\(^{76}\)Ibid, p.196, emphasis added.
Post-modernists confront Habermas, and the modernity question, on somewhat different premises, in rejecting either the possibility or desirability of retaining the emancipatory spirit of the Enlightenment dream. Or, more precisely perhaps, post-modernists emphasise that the emancipatory spirit of the Enlightenment was always \textit{nothing more} than a dream, that notions of a universal emancipatory theory and practice capable of freeing people from the ideas and structures which oppressed them, was always and inevitably the "will to power" of certain actors, in a power matrix designed to privilege certain discursive practices. The "rationality" of the Enlightenment, from this perspective, was always, simultaneously, the power and domination of (for example) the Western imperialist, the Stalinist apparatchik, the Cold War technician and nuclear strategist, the (humanist) agent of power politics.

This theme has been addressed, in incisive fashion, by Mark Poster, as part of his general discussion of the dispute between Habermas and post-modernism, in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{77} Habermas, suggested Poster, disturbs post-modernists most with his insistence that the modern critical project should seek to resuscitate those elements of (genuine emancipatory) reason in contemporary bourgeois society.\textsuperscript{78} The problem with this proposition, from a post-modernist perspective is that it \textit{misses the point} about the relationship between knowledge and power, theory and practice. The point being that post-modernists:

\begin{quote}
do not dispute that there are "elements of reason" in liberal culture. What they dispute is the lens that discerns "reason" in law and democracy but not in gas chambers and atom bombs.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

The point, to reiterate it in terms of Jane Flax's concerns in \textit{Thinking Fragments}, is that Habermas seeks to privilege the positive aspects of a modernist discourse while silencing its negative, oppressive dimensions. In seeking, therefore, to resuscitate the

\textsuperscript{77}Poster, \textit{Critical Theory and Poststructuralism}.

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid, p.22.

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid.
emancipatory potential in modern human life he effectively promotes its potential for mass destruction, for social control, for domination at all levels. Summarising the post-modernist concern on this issue, Poster proposed that:

When Habermas defends with the label of reason what he admires in Western culture, he universalises the particular, grounds the conditional, absolutizes the finite. He provides a centre and an origin for a set of discursive practices. He undermines critique in the name of critique by privileging a locus of theory (reason) that far too closely resembles society's official discourse.\(^80\)

But there is another dimension to the post-modernist critique of Habermas and modernity that need to be emphasised here if the profundity and "difference" of its challenge to modern theory and practice is to be appreciated. This concerns the earlier Critical Theory perspectives of Horkheimer and Adorno, in particular. Their Dialectic of Enlightenment, for example, was marked by a deep sense of pessimism about the nature of modernity, and disenchantment in particular with the emancipatory promise of Enlightenment rationality, in either its Liberal or Marxist guise. In this regard, accordingly, there are obvious and significant thematic similarities between some of the first generation of Frankfurt School scholarship and contemporary post-modernism. The differences, however, are more important in the present contest. They relate to the reasons for the disillusionment felt by Adorno and Horkheimer which, for them, centred on the demise of and/or "distorted" nature of the post-Enlightenment emancipatory project.

Post-modernists do not share this disillusionment. Instead, and following Nietzsche's view of modernity, rather than that of Kant, Hegel and Marx, the emancipatory project is perceived as "distorted" in the first instance. There is from a post-modernist perspective, therefore, no sense of once great liberating ideas and practices becoming agencies of repression and domination. The proposition, rather, is that all discourses centred on unified notions of humankind and society, privileging "given" subjects and objects (the autonomous individual, the class, the tradition, the religion, the developmental process) are already and inexorably implicated in relations of

\(^{80}\)Ibid, p.23.
domination, control and power. Thus, while it might be suggested that the (scientific-rationalist) foundations of modernity have been undermined and/or "distorted", a post-modernist approach maintains that it is this very foundationalism that is at the core of the problems of modern theory and practice, in the first place.

This is why the question of "rationality" becomes for post-modernism an integral feature of modern theory as practice, because since Descartes the "rational" voice has been the universal voice, the voice of the autonomous subject of modern life that "knows" itself, that speaks of, and for, universal reality. The voice of "reason", however, was/is never innocent. The voice of "reason", of modern truth, is also the voice of modern biology, chemistry and physics, of technocracy, of multinational capital, of warfare, of the power politics state. It is, as such, the institutional voice of both freedom and oppression, of liberation and domination, of openness and closure. To theoretically privilege one "side" of modernity, in this situation, is to engage in the practice of exclusion (and sometimes terror) that is the experience of the "other" side, that which has no (rational) voice.

Accordingly, and to return to Poster's point, above, this is why post-modernists were so disturbed, when in the late 1980s, Habermas in his Theory of Communicative Action propounded the view that (at its best) modern scientific rationality "is governed by ideals of objectivity and impartiality secured through unrestricted discussion". Habermas, of course, is not suggesting here that this is how science "happens" as such. He is more interested in providing examples of the spaces in which the potential for "unrestricted discussion" are most evident. But, as Poster makes clear, post-modernists have a right to be concerned about a (relative) privileging of such space because:

modern science largely operates with an exclusion of women and minorities form its discourse, and exclusion that is legitimated precisely by the apparent procedural neutrality of "unrestricted discussion".

81 Habermas, cited in ibid, p.24.
82 Ibid.
Having said all this and, accepting the significance of it, I want now to go against the grain of the discussion a little and argue that, nevertheless, post-modernism must remain engaged with the Critical Theory perspective of Habermas, and indeed with the Critical Social Theory "conversation" in general if it is to have the critical impact upon International Relations that its insights warrant. I take this position for two reasons. The first is that for all the emphasis placed on the problems of a Habermasian position, outlined above, there are dimensions of the Critical Theory project (and other modernist approaches) that do allow substantial "thinking space", and that might not, necessarily, add up to foundationalist closure in the traditional sense. There are, in other words, critical opportunities and tensions in modernity, and particularly Critical Theory, that should not be dismissed in any Critical Social Theory enterprise. The second reason for raising this issue, in this way, concerns my reservations about some elements of postmodernist scholarship and a tendency within it for simplistic dismissal, and for the kind of "detachment" that renders it no more connected to political practice than the positivist objectivism of so much modernist literature.

In this latter context I have in mind the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard and The Postmodern Condition (1984). More precisely, it is the tendency within this work to "escape" modernity that is of concern. David Kolb has made the point well in his commentary on Lyotard's proposition that, like the great modernist artists (e.g. Joyce, Schonberg and Cezanne) we must seek to counter modernity's repressive features by going "outside the great self-enforcing cultural systems" and "starting new language games...new forms of life". The problem with this position, Kolb argued, is that it "pictures the modern world as more unified than it is, with the consequence that the postmodern gesture becomes too stereotyped". Kolb might have reflected on the more

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84Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p.258.

profound problem associated with a post-modern perspective that creates a dichotomy
between one hermetically sealed unity - modernity - and another - post-modernity, but his
point is, nevertheless an important one. It suggests that Lyotard's post-modernism is
effectively detached from the modernity it seeks to counter, in seeking "new language
games" (in Analytical Philosophy style) rather that "taking advantage of the multiplicity of
tensions already constituting the domains we find ourselves within". The point,
developed further is that which I also want to make in relation to post-modernism, Critical
Theory and the Critical Social Theory enterprise in general. As Kolb has put it:

There is internal tension and multiplicity even within what threatens us. Lyotard
resists what needs resisting but perhaps he expresses too much concern to stay
ahead of the language of the tribe and belong to the true avant-garde. [However] If
the elements of our multiple inhibitions are themselves internally multiple and
tense, there is room for freedom and creativity without the need always to be out
ahead.\footnote{\textsuperscript{86}}

It is this tendency towards avant-gardism, this sense of "detachment" within some
post-modernist scholarship that Habermas, quite rightly, has pointed too as a
conservative and stultifying aspect of its character.\footnote{\textsuperscript{87}} It is this tendency, I suggest, that it
must confront and overcome if it is to remain the most potent voice within a Critical
Social Theory conversation searching for "thinking space". It must, in this regard, heed
Kolb's advice and acknowledge that modernity, for all its closure, is also a complex
matrix of tensions and critical potentials with the capacity for something other than
unreflexive complicity.

This does not require compliance with a (unified) "meta-narrative" as a Lyotard
would have it, nor is it a simple "hermeneutics of suspicion" position, assuming deep
within the Western philosophical tradition, some essential, transhistorical, transcultural
theme (individualism, rationality, logic, emancipation, Spirit, alienation) just waiting to
be recovered, and applied to the problems of the age, in grand theorised form. It does
require, however, that in recognising the problems of modernist thinking, one recognises

\footnote{\textsuperscript{86}}\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{86}}See Rorty on this in "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity", in Habermas and Modernity ed.
Bernstein.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{87}}See Rorty on this in "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity", in Habermas and Modernity ed.
Bernstein.
also, that the complex "interpenetration" of ideas, themes, and concepts acknowledged by Hegel, or the "intersection of narratives" recognised by Derrida, or the multiplicity of "language games" described by Wittgenstein, or the "Dasein" perspective outlined by Gadamer, represent space for something more than a unified conformist set of modernist practices. It represents space also for critical dissent, the potential for resistance. It is in this space, and upon this potential, that post-modernism must expose closure and confront the exclusionary repressive aspects of modernity.

This, it seems to me, is a position congruent not only with Habermasian attempts to refocus a disillusioned radicalism on the continuing presence of the potential for "rational" thought and communicative practice, but of a Foucauldian concern to locate a Nietzschean resistance in a "rational" world. Nietzsche, of course, is often represented as the great cynical voice of Western thought, the relentless exposé of the "will to power" at the core of all modern theory and practice. At another level, seen perhaps as sceptic rather than cynical, Nietzsche does indicate the potential for another scenario - not beyond relations of power - but arising from a space for resistance within the relations of power. This, of course, is where a genealogical approach to knowledge and society, and its "power as enabling" theme is such an important element of a post-modernist perspective. As William Connolly has explained:

Genealogy aims at a kind of self examination: a rethinking of how one has been formed historically which encourages one to experience the dissonance in the form one has become; a rethinking which encourages the self to endorse, modify or oppose each contingent formation...[i]t clarifies cloudy formations on familiar horizons by placing them under a different sky.88

It is in this sense that a (broad) Nietzschean approach to modernity allows for chinks of critical light, for the potential for seeing through the foundationalist "cloudy formation".

It is in this sense that in Nietzschean (and Foucauldian) terms, the most repressive of modernist power relations and socio-intellectual closures can produce a whole range of resistances which allow for the possibility of non-foundationalist critical perspectives and actions. The enhanced tension between the "will to knowledge" and "the will to mastery"

88See W. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p.150.
is, consequently, an important theme in the potential for resistance. Thus, on the one hand:

the more completely the quest for transparency governs the self - in its prayers, confessions, disciplines, therapies and self intellectualizations - the more precisely the conscious interior of the self mirrors the norms, standards and aspirations of modern society [in this sense] the drive to self knowledge is the drive to render the self more 'predictable' and 'calculable'.

On the other hand, however:

even as the self is drawn into its own entrapment...[it] continues to resist, oppose and subvert this drive to unity, transparency and calculability.89

This perspective is articulated powerfully by the Foucault of "What is Enlightenment" (1984) who, in moderating much of the earlier vitriol against all aspects of modernism, emphasised that while he retained a deep suspicion of Enlightenment rhetoric and ambition, it was important to understand that:

the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude - that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.90

My suggestion, in this regard, is that it is worth taking seriously Foucault's insight concerning the potential for something other than "faithfulness to [the] doctrinal elements", in the modernist tradition, and that a genuinely "critical" social theory must continue to explore this possibility, albeit on the excluded and often silenced margins of modernity.

This is not just to acknowledge the historically and culturally obvious - that we cannot simply detach ourselves from the Enlightenment and its influences. It is to acknowledge that we cannot simply disengage our alternative critical perspectives from it. It is to acknowledge that a scholar such as Berki might have something more to offer than Hegelian totalism, it is to suggest that an Adorno, a Gramsci and a Robert Cox represent something other than conventional Marxist closure, it is to think seriously about the

89Ibid, pp.151-152, emphasis added.

proposition that dialectical logic need not be teleological, it is to critically, rather than dismissively, confront the complex Habermasian claim, that there still might be space within modernity for a more open critical theory and practice, that the modern meta-narrative is not bereft of the potential for non foundationalist theory and practice. It is, in short, to reject the paradox associated with some post-modernism which, projecting the spirit of tolerant critical theory and practice, engages in the clichéd, polemical closure that characterises so much of the modernism it eschews. It is to define a post-modern politics of dissent as the attempt to go beyond the dominant "meanings" and practices of modernity, not as "detachment" from modernity per se.

This is not to ignore the problems (and dangers) of a Habermasian perspective, it is to take seriously those elements of his thinking which defy simplistic categorisation. There is, for example, the question of the "subject" in Habermas (and in Hegelian Marxism in general) which might easily be dismissed in "hermeneutics of suspicion" terms - thus closing off any useful conversation. And yet there is clearly something more than this going on in Habermas' thinking, as is evidenced in his reflections on Hegelianism in Theory and Practice (1974). Here, concentrating on the notion of Spirit, in Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, Habermas stressed that this particular "being in motion" (Dasein) is unequivocally the product of human social interaction, as mediated through language (symbolic representation) Labour (control of nature) and the struggle for "recognition". Consequently, in stressing the interpenetration of these elements in the social construction of the subject, Hegel explained, that:

> Spirit is not the fundament underlying the subjectivity of the self in self consciousness but rather the medium within which one T communicates with another T, and from which, as an absolute mediation, the two mutually form each other into subjects.

The point of course is that this interpretation of Hegel (or more precisely of Hegel's reading of Kant) problematises the notion of a unified (transparent) ego 'I' which

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91 See the debates in Theory and Practice, and Knowledge and Human Interests in particular.

92 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p.145, emphasis added.
comes to know its "objective" self through self reflection, in favour of a heterogeneous, historico-social notion of the subject in which knowledge, of self and other selves, is grounded in the (constructed) reality of social interaction. Accordingly, Habermas goes on to conclude that:

Kant proceeds from the identity of the "I" as an original unity of transcendental consciousness. In contrast to this, Hegel's fundamental experience of the "I" as an identity of self consciousness is not an original one, but can only be conceived as one that has developed...The (Hegelian/Marxist) critique of knowledge...consists precisely in relinquishing the viewpoints of a "ready made" or "completed" subject of knowledge.93

And there is the question too of Habermas' universalism, again a seemingly obvious aspect of a modernist "meta-narrative" of the Kantian "emancipatory" variety. But is it? It certainly did not appear so in Communications and the Evolution of Society (1979) where Habermas stressed his opposition to the teleological tendencies in Kant, Hegel and Marx, and argued for a progressivist approach which privileged "neither unilinearity nor necessity, neither continuity nor irreversibility".94

The point here is not that it is possible to find passages in the work of a sophisticated scholar like a Habermas (or a Foucault) that problematises the general categorisation of them, it is, rather, that a post-modernism engaged with a world of complexity, paradox and ambiguity, should never be engaged in simplistic categorisation and closure, but always open to critical "conversation", particularly with those it opposes. This, to reiterate, is not an argument for Habermas, as it were, nor is it in any way an argument in favour of some sort of synthetic fusion between Critical Theory and post-modernism. It is, an argument for openness and positive, constructive theory and practice over polemic, detachment and closure.95

93Ibid, p.156.

94Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p.140.

95It is in this context, and for all that has gone before in this chapter, that I regard Foucault's work and that of a scholar like Habermas (the two most important influences on a "celebratory" response in the Third Debate) as aspects of a broader shared project, as indicated in the discussion of Critical Social Theory in Chapter One. For all their differences, I suggest, theirs is a positive attempt to open up the closure in modern Western theory and practice in order that its reflective, critical potentials for resistance be explored and utilised. This is not, of course, the common reading of the relationship between the most
This is an issue far too complex for any comprehensive treatment in this thesis. It is introduced at this point both because it is integral to the contemporary debate in Critical Social Theory, and because as the thesis is now about to turn more directly to the literature of International Relations, it is integral to any "postpreface" future in that context. The point, in short, is that as in the larger interdisciplinary debate, Critical Social Theory scholars in International Relations must, if they are to take advantage of available "thinking space", take seriously the questions raised in the conversation between Critical Theory and post-modernism. My concern is that, to this point, this has not been a trait evident in the Third Debate, where, to this stage at least, there has been no equivalent to the works of scholars such as Mark Poster, Michael Ryan or Jane Flax.96

Generally, however, the post-modern scholarship in International Relations has not been guilty of the Lyotardian over statement and avant-gardism. For the most part the tendency has been toward a kind of intellectual apartheid, with Critical Theorists and post-modernists invoking strategies of exclusion, and/or marginalisation similar to those which have had such a detrimental effect upon debate in International Relations, generally, in the era of Realist dominance. The tendency toward simple dismissal and closure is evident, nevertheless, often, ironically, in otherwise very powerful and sophisticated post-modernist works. In his "Living on Border Lines" argument, for example, there are times when Richard Ashley's rather cavalier attitude to modernist philosophy sometimes sees him come very close to the Lyotardian perspective. In this work, consequently, as part of a Foucauldian inspired reading of the "Kantian turn" and influential Critical Theorist of the age and his most illustrious of post-modernist counterpart. More often than not the two are presented as two ends of a modernist spectrum: Habermas, the German heir of Kant, Hegel and Marx, desperately seeking to retain an Enlightenment faith in rationality, progress and emancipation; Foucault the heir of Nietzsche, and a post-1968 pessimism in French intellectual circles, propounding an extreme antipathy to modernity in all its dimensions, particularly its rationalist/emancipatory one. This is a position easily enough defended. Within the works of both scholars over the years there are many passages which suggest that the popular reading is the most accurate. My point, simply, is that simple conclusions of any kind are singularly inappropriate in relation to projects as complex and contentious as these.

96This is not to suggest that post-modernist are unaware of the issue. Der Derian, for example, makes this clear in his, "Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations", International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics edited by Der Derian and M. Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp.3-11.
the emergence of modern "sovereign man", the contribution of Habermas is simply lumped together with that of "Christian humanists", Liberal notions of the "rights of man" and a Marx, who it is claimed appealed to something called "dialectical materialism".97

I have indicated, above, my reservations about treating Habermas in this simplistic way, and nothing of value can be achieved by developing the point further here, except perhaps to suggest that to dismiss Habermas on the basis of Knowledge and Human Interests (and I know of no post-modern work in International Relations that seriously confronts any other of his works) is, surely, contradictory to the spirit and critical integrity of the post-modernist enterprise set down by a Foucault? Similarly, there is more at stake than mere pedantry on the issue of Marx as a "dialectical materialist". For anyone even sketchily aware of the complexities and controversies associated with Marx's work on this point (i.e. its relationship to Engels' later works) this is an issue that goes to the heart not only of the "scientific" debate in Marxism but to the question of whether Marx's Historical Materialism was ultimately foundationalist, in a modernist sense, or whether it was emphatically grounded in human history and society. A more sensitive approach would, surely, have left space open for this question. Likewise, an approach concerned with openness over closure would, surely, take more care with the issue of "totalised" history in Marx. For Ashley in "Living on Border Lines", however, Marx's sketchy image of a future Communist society is effectively reduced to a simplistic "end of history" scenario. Thus, approaches such as Marxism, it is contended:

can imagine the end of the state only when the sovereign subject it invokes finally achieves total knowledge and total freedom - only that is when history is totally subordinated to man's sovereign will. It can imagine the end of the state, yes, but only at the end of time.98

The point here is that while it might well "fit" a (rather overstated) Foucauldian argument to read Marxism in this way, a very serious doubt remains as to whether Marx

97 Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", in International/Intertextual Relations, eds. Der Derian and Shapiro, p.266.

98 Ibid, p.269.
really did see a Communist society as the "end of time", as the moment of "total knowledge and total freedom". It would be just as simple, and just as inappropriate, to reduce Neitzsche's insights on modernity to a "grand theory" of the human psyche - a "hermeneutics of suspicion" concerning the "given" inadequacies and blindness of the "herd". It could mean this, but it could (and does) mean a great deal more, and it is in that space, beyond the simplistic, beyond the polemical, that Critical Social Theorists and post-modernists, in particular, must be engaged.99 A post-modernist politics of dissent, in this regard, is post-modern in the sense that it seeks to confront, at every level, those aspects of modernity that undermine any potential people might have to produce in their everyday lives critical understandings and resistances to power relations which silence, demean and oppress them. To achieve this a post-modernist approach cannot become a negative philosophy of "disintegration" as some critics perceive it,100 nor dare it close off the possibility that within post-modernism there are the very modernist tendencies that its own critical insights expose so starkly.101

I will return to this issue again in Chapter Nine, primarily in regard to R.B.J. Walker's One World, Many Worlds which represents a rudimentary statement of a post-modern politics of dissent of the engaged, constructive kind alluded to above. For now a

99 This has been the space where Ashley has worked, almost exclusively, over the years, and no one has contributed more to a Critical Social Theory perspective of the kind advocated here. His "Living on Border Lines" argument, for example, will be featured in Chapter Nine as a major example of post-modernist scholarship which opens up previously closed space on the sovereignty issue. My point here, critically made in relation to aspects of that work, is that post-modernism cannot afford closure in its own works while exposing it in others. On a related point there is more than a little arrogance associated with the notion that the Kantian imperative is so powerful that only post-modernists can resist it - that only post-modernists can understand the power of metatheoretical framing, and resist it - that only post-modernists can understand the significance of the Kantian turn in Western philosophy, and resist the spell of the "meta-narrative".


101 In this context, the appeal here to acknowledge the complexity in Marxism, for example, is not made on behalf of some "anything goes" relativism, but, on the contrary, because not everything goes (e.g. "closure" of thinking space and creative life opportunity doesn't "go"). Accordingly, a post-modernist politics of dissent must, in its intellectual dimension in particular, be always capable of withstanding criticism of its own positions as a counter narrative based on a simple reification of modernism's "other side". To do this it must remain engaged in a serious and sensitive conversation with modernism and be willing to accept, for example, that "hermeneutics of suspicion", like beauty, can be in the eye of the beholder.
final, more generalised comment is necessary to bind together the discussion above and introduce its relevance to the discussion to follow in Chapters Five to Nine. It is this: contrary to the view of a Lyotard, attempts within modernist theory and practice to order and control the past, present and future, have never been totally successful. Modernism's hegemony has never been complete, it has never been totally able to suppress the tensions within it - the space for doubt, for asking how and why, for self critique. Modernist thought, for all its desire to foundationalise, to squeeze diversity into unity, heterogeneity into homogeneity, has never been fully able to cope with the autonomous "individual" who cannot be defined except in social terms; the independent object that is simultaneously subject; the word that goes beyond its singular meaning; the absolute truths that are interpretations; the pluralism that is reductionist; the science that is sociology; the rationality that is metaphysics; the relentless "differences" intrinsic to patterned social life. Accordingly, whenever modernist thought has proclaimed a "grand theory" of the secular good life, based on singular, foundationalist themes, there has always been the voice of modernist critique to proclaim its limitations.102

The point, to reiterate it, is that within modernist thinking, for all its domination by rational scientific modes of knowledge, its cogito subjectivism, its "will to power" and "will to mastery" there has, as Habermas points out, also been the tensions, the nagging voice of the "will to question". This is a theme undervalued by those who search the blurred horizons for signs of "golden age" certainty, or those convinced of the critical inadequacies of the "herd". It is a theme, conversely, which is over-valued by those who would celebrate modernity in terms of the linear progress of the "conscious" subject, of unfolding rationality, or of scientific discovery.

102 As Connolly, for example, has suggested as modernity has striven to perfect its strategies of "change and progress", the very core of its strategies have come under question. The debate continues to rage for example as to the "right" agent of change - the individual, the community or the class? And how is that which is to be changed - the past and present - to be understood? Are the techniques used in the "natural" sciences adequate, or must human history be approached in a different, more tolerant, less restricted way? Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p.3.
This thesis seeks neither to undervalue or overvalue this theme, but to acknowledge it as a space within which questions, debates, and issues, integral to modernity can be returned to the forefront of the debate, particularly in regard to the study of International Relations. It is a space in which the insights of a diversity of scholars can be utilised as points of entry into effectively closed arenas of theory and practice. In the present context the chinks of modernist light associated with the insights of figures such as Carr, Morgenthau, Vasquez and Stanley Hoffmann, will be of significance at different times during the discussions to follow, as this thesis now seeks to enter the "thinking space" of critical modernism, and more latterly, post-modernism, and apply the major themes of the discussion thus far directly to the tradition and discipline of International Relations.

Summary

This chapter has sought to bring up to date, as it were, the broad debate over the question of modernity and its continuing influence upon Anglo-American social theory, which in the context of this thesis has represented the outer discursive framework of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations. It added a dimension to the "philosophical" section of the thesis by introducing some Critical Social Theory themes and approaches that have genuine claims to have confronted modernity, positivism and the foundationalist paradox. It argued that the approaches at the forefront of the search for "thinking space" have sought a "concrete", and particular knowledge of the social world, rather than a

103 To refresh the memory: Chapter Two defined the modernity issue in terms of the metatheoretical regime of framing bequeathed (primarily) by Cartesian rationalism and a paradoxical foundationalism which, in its positivist formulations (via Hume and neo-Kantianism) in particular, has continued to constitute "real meaning" in Anglo-American social theory and International Relations. Chapter Three confronted a counter-proposition on this issue - the proposition that questions of modernism and positivism are no longer of major relevance in an era which has solved the Humean problem, closed the Kantian dualism and absorbed the essence of the modernist preface. The discussion in Chapter Three sought to render this proposition problematic in broad social theory terms, but with one critical eye on the "post-positivism" of contemporary International Relations scholarship (e.g. neo-Realism).
universalised and idealised image of reality predicated on one variant or another of the "empiricist metaphysic".

It emphasised the attitude and insight of a scholar such as Jane Flax, in this regard, with her sense of "intellectual vertigo", and her understanding of the need for "ambivalence" in a contemporary situation of danger and opportunity, as a dominant way of life "grows old" and resists its decline. It looked, also, at the contribution of contemporary philosophers seeking to overcome the legacy of "correspondence rule" logic and foundationalism in general, and at Gadamer, wrestling with the residues of foundationalism in hermeneutics and Analytical Philosophy and, in the process, offering important glimmers of post-positivist meaning in a notion of a historical "fusion" between thinking subjects and a textualised past.

Special attention was paid to the contribution of Critical Theory scholarship, described, rightly, by Mark Poster, as representing "the best of what remains in the shambles of the Marxist and neo-Marxist theoretical positions". Here, emphasis was placed on the Frankfurt School critique of positivism and modernity and a post-Enlightenment Weltanschauung which has transformed creative potential for social change into the self-centred rituals of "one-dimensionality". The contribution of Habermas was noted and, in particular, his argument against his critics that to turn away from the potential for rational communication is to become complicit in the destruction of a crucial human capacity - the capacity for critical reflection upon the world and for informed practical decisions in it.

Major emphasis was placed on post-modernist approaches to the question of knowledge and power and modernist foundationalism. Themes introduced in Chapter One were discussed again, from another angle, and post-modernist discursive perspectives on questions of reality, power and the modern sovereign subject were given further ventilation. The purpose here was to indicate, more explicitly, the thematic nature

104 Poster, Critical Theory and Poststructuralism, p.3.
of an approach increasingly influential in Critical Social Theory debate, while prefiguring a major source of critique in International Relations that is to inform the discussion from now on, most directly in Chapter Nine. The chapter ended with a brief discussion of an issue that requires a great deal more thought and time than it was accorded here. It concerns the relationship between Critical Theory and post-modernism, or, more profoundly, perhaps, the whole notion of post-modern politics of dissent in the future.

Something more will be added on this issue in Chapters Eight and Nine and at the completion of the thesis. The more immediate task, at this point, is to illustrate how the discussions of the first half of the thesis (Chapters One to Four) are intrinsically connected to the second half (Chapters Five to Nine) and how some of the major themes in the broader Critical Social Theory debates have become integrated into the International Relations agenda. This process now begins, in the chapter to follow, as part of a discussion which connects the issue of the modernist regime of metatheoretical framing to the more conventional literature and idioms of International Relations, and illustrates some of the implications and dangers of this connection in the period since the Cold War.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FROM MODERNIST TRADITION TO COLD WAR DISCIPLINE

This chapter is concerned, primarily, to illustrate the direct discursive connections between the broad social theory debates over modernity and positivism, and the literature most commonly associated with the study of International Relations. More precisely, the aim of this chapter and, indeed, of the thesis from now on, is to utilise Critical Social Theory perspectives in order to open up for questioning some of the pivotal concepts, themes and premises of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations, effectively closed off under the narrow regime of interpretation and analysis discussed in a variety of ways in the preceding chapters. Particular attention will now be paid to the dominant intellectual Tradition of International Relations as outlined by a diversity of scholars down the years. Attention too will fall on the more recent disciplinary manifestations of this Tradition which emerged in the wake of two World Wars.

It will be argued that, for all the (professed) detachment from the broader theoretical flow of "domestic" life, the Tradition and discipline of International Relations has understood itself and its subject/object matter in a manner consistent with the development of contemporary Western social theory as presented in the first section of this thesis. Accordingly, the dominant Tradition of International Relations will be

understood as part of the larger modernist discursive practice discussed in earlier chapters, as resonant with the problems, tensions, paradoxes and potentials intrinsic to such discourse. These include: a dualised frame of reference at all levels (e.g. subject/object, fact/value, is/ought, self/other, domestic/international, Realist/idealist); an objectivist, linear sense of (Western) history; essentialist reading practices and logocentric strategies of categorisation, definition and exclusion; and in the age of "post-positivism", the continuing commitment to a (largely) unquestioned positivist foundationalism.

To speak of a Tradition of International Relations, at all, is to speak, primarily, of a particular disciplinary representation of it, in embryo after World War One, but at its most influential in intellectual and policy making circles after World War Two, in the United States. It is in this sense that the International Relations Tradition is representative, by and large, of an American social science (positivist) reading of some of the "great texts" of Western history and philosophy. While, therefore, as Stanley Hoffmann noted, E.H. Carr's British text, Twenty Years Crisis is considered the "first scientific treatment of world politics" it was in the United States that "International Relations became a discipline". More significantly for the present discussion it was under United States social science tutelage that International Relations became focused on

286. The mainstream of the Tradition and discipline have rarely reflected upon it in the way that more critically inclined scholars have. As R.B.J. Walker has said, International Relations scholars have "absorbed the unfortunate habit, characteristic of political science in general, of treating "the tradition" as both somehow naturally given in the "great texts" and largely irrelevant to the analysis of modern human affairs", Walker, *The Prince* and *The Pauper*, p. 26. Nevertheless, the general sense of a singular, developmental narrative can be gleaned from a perusal of, for example, F.H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); Ian Clarke, *Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969", in *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1962* edited by B. Porter (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972); and Kal Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985). When speaking of the Tradition in this context I will distinguish the term from the broader use of the term with a capital T.

2Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", *Daedalus* 106(3) (1977), pp.41-60, p.43.
a disciplinary "quest for [scientific] certainty" based on modernist principles of knowledge and (behaviouralist) methodological premises.3

Consequently, the questions asked and (historico-philosophical) issues raised by International Relations scholarship have been severely limited, to the extent that complex epistemological/ontological debates over knowledge, meaning, language and reality - the issues of how we think and act in the world - have been largely confined to one dimension or another of the "crass positivism", that the German historian Droysen was so perturbed about in a broader context.4 The dominant post-World War Two Realist approach, accordingly, has resonated with one variant or another of a "spectator" theory of knowledge, in which knowledge of the real world is gleaned via a realm of external facts (e.g. of inter-state anarchy) which impose themselves upon the individual scholar/statesman, who is then constrained by the policy/analytical "art of the possible".

In its (mainly) North American variant, infused with (primarily) Popperian insight and behaviouralist training rituals since the 1960s, this has resulted in a Realism set upon the enthusiastic invocation of falsificationist scientific principles.5 The (mainly) British alternative, meanwhile, has invoked a species of "intuitionist" inductivism often more sensitive in tone to the various critiques of positivism, but, ultimately, no less committed to its perpetuation. These particular variants of modernism, which scholars from Hume to Vasquez have shown to be incapable of providing the kind of (scientific) knowledge advocated for them, and which scholars such as Berki, Hekman, Hesse and Gadamer have proclaimed philosophically and historically "primitive", represent, nevertheless, the socio-intellectual backdrop for this chapter.

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3Ibid, p.57. This, of course, and not uncoincidentally, replicates the broader "quest for certainty" that Rorty pointed to as the major quest of Western modernist philosophy in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p.61.


5For a discussion of some of the broader implications and problems of this commitment see the discussion in Chapter Three of this thesis and the commentaries, among others, of Vasquez in, The Power of Power Politics; and Stanley Hoffmann in "An American Social Science: International Relations".
Consequently, the task of the thesis from now on is to explain, more precisely, how and why International Relations must acknowledge this situation and confront its "unwritten preface" via the Critical Social Theory challenges that, elsewhere, have begun to change the "primitive" nature of contemporary Western thought. The analytical structure of the earlier chapters will be re-convened to assist in this task. Initially, therefore, the discussion in this chapter will seek to locate International Relations as part of a modernist way of framing - as indeed a microcosm of the dominant Western tradition of interpretation and understanding. The focus will then fall more generally on the process by which International Relations has been constructed and defined in the period since its institutional inception following World War One. It will do so in a way that integrates Critical Social Theory themes with a reformulated approach to the discipline's folk lore regarding its "stages" of intellectual growth and "great debates".

This well rehearsed format will be altered somewhat in the attempt to provide a broad genealogical approach to contemporary International Relations set upon four interrelated phases, which, while broadly chronological, represent not the successively greater understanding of a complex reality, but more accurately, and paradoxically, the consistent repression of such understanding. Stanley Hoffmann's insights are useful here, particularly his commentary on the literary development of the Realist "quest for certainty" in the Cold War years. This "quest", argued Hoffmann, has been articulated in "three waves" of Realist literature. The first "wave" emanated from the publication of Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* in 1948 and Realist responses to it until the late 1950s; there was a "second wave", distinguished by a shift in Realist research orientation, from the late 1950s to around the end of the Vietnam War, which saw the discipline dominated by behaviouralist problem solving approaches to Cold War strategic issues; and a "third wave", noted by Hoffmann, in embryo form, in 1977, which saw the

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"quest for certainty" oriented towards a post-Vietnam International Political Economy approach concerned with Realism's increasingly evident anomalies.\textsuperscript{7}

Keeping these broad themes in mind this chapter, and those to follow, will seek to add detail and a more contemporary critical edge to Hoffmann's Traditionalist-Realist perspective on this issue. In reformulating the "three waves" proposition it will deal with the "quest for certainty" in International Relations as various phases of a modernist regime of metatheoretical framing. These phases are: (i) the neo-Kantian phase: most influential in the inter war years; (ii) the Realist-positivist phase: centred on the E.H. Carr's "great text"\textsuperscript{8} which, in the Cold War years evolved into (iii) the positivist-Realist phase, with its own (North American) "great text":\textsuperscript{9} a more precise positivist epistemology (rational-scientific), language mode (representational), methodology (falsificationist) and analytical orientation (problem solving). The discussion then moves to (iv) the (equivalent) "post-positivist" phase of the 1980s and 1990s in social theory, the phase of neo-Realism, Regime Theory and Hegemonic Stability Theory, the phase of the Third Debate. The present chapter will concentrate in particular on the first two of these phases, taking the somewhat reformulated story of the Tradition and its contemporary discipline to the early years of the Cold War. My initial concern, however, is to thematically connect this discussion of the International Relations Tradition and discipline to earlier chapters by briefly establishing its modernist character.

\textbf{International Relations and Modernism: Some Broad Discursive Connections}

At its most obvious the modernist legacy in International Relations is represented in the way the discipline has read and interpreted its "history" and framed its "philosophical"

\textsuperscript{7}The "wave" that prompted Tooze's concern in "The Unwritten Preface".


stances. As in the broader context great texts and great men punctuate a meaning script set (largely) unproblematically in dualised and dichotomised terms. Logocentrism is the dominant structural theme as "history" is reduced to the incantations across time, culture and language of those whose enduring wisdom corresponds with that which is universally and foundationally real. A major characteristic of the International Relations historical narrative, consequently, has been its particularly modernist reading of a:

\[ \text{single body of thought}, \text{ incorporating both the pre-modern work of classical Greece and the middle ages, and also writings from the 1648-1914 period.} \]

Not surprisingly, what philosophical debate there has been concerning the historical development of International Relations has also has been framed within classically modernist terms. Accordingly, as R.B.J. Walker has noted, the dominant International Relations Tradition has resonated with themes evident in modernist "intellectual traditions in general" complete with their textual "myth of origin". The problem, here, both generally and in relation to International Relations, is that in reifying the teleologies of the Greeks, the march to Christian salvation, the Liberal path to sovereignty and rationality, the Hegelian trek to universal consciousness, the timeless, universal pattern of "recurrence and repetition" and/or the Marxian route to classlessness, there is, inevitably, so much which is excluded - that "embarrassment of subtexts" encompassing, for example, "ethnocentrism, racism, the arrogance of empires, the butchery of wars and extermination camps". More pertinently, as Walker noted, the problem is that this

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10 On the "great men" tendency see R.B.J. Walker, "The Prince and The Pauper"; Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations; and Stephen George, "The Reconciliation of the 'Classical' and the 'Scientific' Approaches to International Relations", Millennium 3-5 (1975), pp. 28-40. On this issue it is worth noting George's perception about the "great man" reading of "history" by Traditionalist scholars trained in Britain in particular. George says: "The values which were dominant in the cloistered atmosphere of Oxford, Cambridge and the London colleges and their provincial fascimilies were translated into a history which saw individuals as the motive forces in world affairs, concentrated on Great Men and focused on the foreign policies of particular states". Not surprisingly, as George noted, the general result was a scholarship characterised by "dry narrative accounts with little depth of analysis...[which was] indistinguishable from high-class journalism", ibid, pp.35-36.


universalised "meta-narrative" of Western modernity continues, in the 1990s, to inform "the most basic categories through which we understand and act in the world".13

International Relations, for example, continues to be characterised by a crude "essentialist monologue" complete with its cast of "theatrical figures" which has dominated the reading and writing of International Relations down the years. The leading voices in this particular monologue are Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, Morgenthau and Carr.14 Their "script", as interpreted by the International Relations mainstream over the years, has been marked by a coherence and self affirming logic concerning the "perennial questions" of power, state sovereignty and national interest, underpinned by an enduring wisdom on issues of "human nature or political necessity, structural determinism or the tragic condition of human existence in general".15

As in the broader modernity context, the Tradition of International Relations has been represented as a homogenised, cumulative narrative, in which, via a further process of interpretative selectivity, certain "great texts" of Western philosophy are accorded a "meaning" that corresponds with the real world while others are marginalised or dismissed altogether using logocentric strategies of exclusion.

In the Realist narrative, for example, the Platonic contribution is considered highly problematic, not because, as critical social theorists have argued, it began the (textual) separation of subject and object in Western thought, but because it did not

13Ibid, p.27. I understand Walker here to be saying that for all these reasons we should be problematising the very notion of a Tradition which is unproblematically used as the foundation for analysis. I have no problems with this position. For the sake of the debate here, however, my position is that this is precisely how the Tradition continues to be understood. I speak of the Tradition therefore in the way that the discipline until very recently has spoken of it - but always for a critical purpose - that is for the purpose of opening up what has Traditionally remained closed.


separate them enough. Thus, as E.H. Carr maintained, while Platonic insight might well
be significant for "domestic" theorising, when confronted with the problems of
knowledge and human society at the international level, Plato's contribution was merely
to, "advocate highly imaginative solutions whose relations to existing facts was one of
flat negation". Thucydides, on the other, hand is commonly deemed to have understood
the "existing facts" very well. His "Melian dialogue" is, in particular, accorded a
universal, ahistorical quality with its enduring wisdom that "among neighbours
antagonism is ever a condition of independence". Later, within the millennia of
theological dominance in the West, Augustine is generally perceived as having got it right
with his pessimistic incantations on "fallen man". And, in the Renaissance, modern
Realism finds its exemplar scholar and text in Machiavelli and The Prince as the modern
world begins, in systematic form, to distance itself from the religious and social myths of
its past.

16 Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, p.6.

17 Thucydides as cited in Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International
Relations", p.44. In Chapter Nine the place of Thucydides in this narrative will be problematised
somewhat via a range of alternative readings of his "essential" Realist position.

18 The Augustinian influence upon Realism has been very significant, albeit implicitly so in many cases.
Of the more explicit representations of a Christian pessimism in Realism, see Reinhold Niebuhr,
Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Scribner's, 1953); and there are explicit
Augustinian themes in Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, particularly in its opening pages with its
perspectives on the unchanging egoistic power lust of "human nature". Kenneth Waltz had some
interesting things to say about the Christian "reductionism" of Niebuhr and Morgenthau, in Man, the
State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) and this will be an
issue returned to in Chapter Seven. The Augustinian influences were evident also within the British
Realist community, primarily via scholars such as Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. On Butterfield
see Christianity, Diplomacy and War (London: Epworth Press, 1953) and on Wight, Power Politics edited
by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978); and together,
more generally, see Bull's comments in "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations", British
Journal of International Studies 2(2) (1976), pp.101-116. This is an interesting issue in relation to the
continuity of the great classical dualisms in contemporary thought. On the more specific connection
between Christianity and rational-scientific based approaches such as positivism see Margaret Jacobs, The
Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), ch. 4; and
Leszek Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972) has some interesting comments
on the way that Christianity made its peace with positivism.

19 The problematic nature of this particular piece of essentialism will be illustrated in Chapter Nine via
the work of R.B.J. Walker in, "The Prince and The Pauper".
Leaping across cultural, historical and linguistic voids Hobbes' insights into the anarchical world are then usually introduced to the narrative, often via the proposition that:

in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority because of their authority, because of their independence, are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators...which is the posture of war.20

Rousseau too is presented as a major Realist contributor to the International Relations tradition, particularly to its understanding of the security dilemma faced by all states in an anarchical world, in which a state's:

safety and preservation demand that that it makes itself stronger than its neighbours. [Because] it cannot increase, foster, or exercise its strength except at their expense.21

Closer to the present, any number of commentators are represented as carrying on the Tradition - as understanding in the contemporary world what their forebears had so incisively understood in the past - about "human nature" (Morgenthau, Neibuhr) the structural reality of interstate competition under anarchy (Waltz), the "art of the possible" concerning an international society (Wight, Bull) and the enduring character of the system in an interdependent world economy (Keohane, Krasner).

The contemporary punch line to the Realist story - the post World War Two power politics approach - the most obvious and influential manifestation of this modernist way of framing the classical Western tradition - has been variously articulated over the years. But there are a number of "fundamental assumptions" which continue to form this, the "hard core" of Realist theory and practice and which, for the great majority of contemporary scholars, continue to define it in the 1990s. They are: firstly, that individual, sovereign, states (and/or their official diplomatic representatives) are the most

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20Cited in Lijphart, "The Structure of Theoretical Revolutions", p.44.

21Cited in ibid. The notion of Rousseau as a Realist is perhaps most famously represented in Waltz, Man, the State and War; see also Clarke, Reform and Resistance in the International Order, where Rousseau is represented as the "pessimistic" side of a Realist/idealist dualism (with Kant on the other side).
important actors on the world stage and must therefore be the primary units of International Relations analysis. Secondly, that the International arena is the site of endemic anarchy and is therefore fundamentally different from the domestic one (accordingly, its theory and practice must be understood in fundamentally different terms). Thirdly, in both historical and contemporary terms the "essence" of inter state behaviour is the struggle for power. Fourthly, that this struggle for all its anarchical consequences follows a "rational" pattern - the (utilitarian) pursuit of self interested "ends" on the part of all actors. Fifthly, that while there are "societal" cooperative tendencies evident within the state system (e.g. regime behaviour) this should not be understood as a fundamental systemic characteristic. This is an approach, consequently, that for all its posturing towards an International Political Economy in recent times, has continued to represent the world in terms of:

mankind as divided into separate, sovereign states, each keeping law and order within its borders by the application of force from the centre, and also using force to keep secure against other states. Relations between states [are] conducted by diplomacy, against a background of military preparedness and alliances, and within a limited code of international law of which states, not people, [are] the subjects. The whole system of states [is] sustained against overthrow by the balance of power.

The most important concepts of the Tradition, therefore, remain those of "state sovereignty and its logical corollary, international anarchy". The concepts "sovereignty" and "anarchy" are in this context of relatively recent vintage. The former, was formulated in the late Renaissance and articulated broadly in the "individualist" age of the Eighteenth century, the latter derived, primarily, from debates about a "state of nature" and a (domestic) "social contract" in Britain in the Seventeenth century. Their

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22 I am sensitive here to the problems of providing "check lists" such as this, but these themes are taken from a spectrum of sources and discursive positions, including Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", in Neorealism and its Critics ed. Keohane; Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, ch. 2; Justin Rosenberg "What's the Matter With Realism?", Review of International Studies 16(4)(1990), pp.285-303; and Michael Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory".


24 Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations", p.43. As Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine will seek to show, in a variety of ways, nothing has changed since Lijphart wrote this in 1974.
dichotomised presence in modern thought is, at one level, as Robert Cox noted, to do with the projection of the bourgeois state/civil society antinomy to International Relations, and as Ashley has more recently illustrated, with the continuing logocentrism of a neo-Kantian philosophy in neo-Realism.25

The most potent metaphor in the vocabulary of the International Relations Tradition is the concept of "balance" of power. Here, again, however, a historically, culturally and linguistically specific theme has been accorded a timeless, universalist status in International Relations. Thus, the most celebrated modern figure in the tradition, Hans Morgenthau, has asserted in deterministic fashion that "balance" in the international system is a "natural and inevitable outgrowth of the struggle for power"; that, therefore, the "balance of power" is a "self regulatory mechanism".26 This (positivist) determinism is continued in the work of one of Morgenthau's most influential heirs (and critics) Kenneth Waltz, whose influence on neo-Realism will receive more attention in Chapter Seven. On the "balance" issue, specifically, Waltz's amalgam of Traditionalist Realism and utilitarian positivism has seen balance of power rearticulated as a "system" of external constraints - as a matter of (structural) cause and (systemic) effect. Theorising about the "system", consequently, is regarded (in classically positivist fashion) as a "retrospective" enterprise. The metaphor of balance of power thus becomes a fully blown:

theory about the results produced by the uncoordinated action of individual states. It is [therefore] not a theory of state policy, but rather a theory about environmental constraints. The environment is produced by the actions and


26Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.22. This is not the only way that the concept has been used, indeed it has had a variety of "meanings" over the years but Morgenthau's "mechanical" one has been evident throughout Realist literature, particularly in the United States. See Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics on this and for a general discussion of the balance of power theme in Realism see Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962); Martin Wight "The Balance of Power", in Diplomatic Investigations eds. Butterfield and Wight; and the special issue on the Balance of Power, Review of International Studies 15(2) (1989).
the interactions of states, but that environment then appears like a market in a competitive economy, as a force that no state acting alone can control.27

This "systemic" dimension has been one of the most influential reconceptualisations of the basic premises of the Tradition in the post World War Two period.28 But as a whole range of contributions to the Third Debate have maintained, in their different ways, the modernist metaphor of "balance", presented either in Traditional power politics form or in structural terms, remains central to "the common image of the world" that has continued to direct the way that the great majority of International Relations scholars have understood and explained the world throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.29

As intimated in Chapter One, for Critical Social Theory scholars of the Third Debate, it is this International Relations Tradition that has been the conduit for the simple, albeit powerful, caricature of history, politics and society that remains dominant in the Realist dominated discipline to the present. The modernist character of this caricatured approach is never more evident, of course, than in its "myth of origin" - the supposed dichotomy between Realism and idealism. The crudity of this approach has been noted by Richard Cox, who has critically responded to the Traditional International Relations tendency to "separate all political thought into what are alleged to be its two fundamental antithetical types". Such a strategy, for Cox, resulted in a rather bizarre understanding of knowledge and history which grouped together:

Plato, Grotius, Locke, Kant and Woodrow Wilson as "idealists", and Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Churchill and Lenin as "realists". [In this context] the idealists tend to be "rationalists" who deny or greatly underestimate the "power" factor in politics, and elevate absolutist moral principles into ultimate realities. Conversely, the "realists" tend to be pragmatists who place their emphasis on the power factor as the real basis of political action.30


28And as such will receive extended attention in Chapter Six.

29Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations", p.49.

The sheer arbitrariness of this logocentric strategy was both puzzling and troubling, for Cox. He was puzzled, for example, by the oppositional regime which "opposes Locke to Machiavelli, but places Thucydides in the same category as Machiavelli" without (seemingly) considering the possibility that "Locke ultimately had more in common with Machiavelli than with Plato". He was troubled by the analytical consequences of lumping together figures of vastly different times, places and capacities, such as Plato and Woodrow Wilson. Here, for example, he pointed out the problem of assuming that their "utopianism" was basically the same:

in spite of the fact that Plato specifically makes his Socrates speak of the impossibility of making the best regime actual, whereas Wilson conceived of the actualisation of a world of democratic states as both possible and necessary.

An earlier theme requires reiteration here: it is that the crudity of a dichotomised format such as this has not to any great extent inhibited its influence within the International Relations discipline. Indeed, for broadly the same reasons that the Humean (self) critique was ignored by his successors (the overwhelming desire to find an irreducible foundation for knowledge of reality) the Realists of the post World War Two period, in particular, have constructed their own identity and the parameters of the International Relations tradition in dichotomised, logocentric terms at all levels. And while the problems of dichotomised thinking have been occasionally acknowledged, the general response to the broad underlying philosophical issues associated with reading history and philosophy in this way has, to say the least, been disappointing. One influential response has been to suggest that the problem lies not so much in privileging a power politics reading of history and philosophy but in not privileging it enough. Thus, as Traditionalist historians have told the story, the lessons of the "great texts" (e.g. The Prince) and the wisdom of the "great men", have not always been heeded well enough. Consequently, the development of a genuine Realism in modern International Relations

31 Ibid, p.268.
32 Ibid.
was somewhat diverted as other (e.g. rationalist/Kantian) influences proliferated and as early Realist thinking veered off toward reformism (e.g. in the works of the Abbe de Saint Pierre), moralism, plans for "perpetual peace" (Kant) and legalism (e.g. Grotius). These utopian irritations (remnants of a metaphysical past) are, in Realist narratives, traced right up to the present century, in the (futile) post World War One efforts of Western liberal scholars and statesmen to subvert the theory and practice of power politics.

This is a position articulated powerfully in Hedley Bull's condemnation of those "idealists", who sought to challenge the wisdom of the early Realists and their insights into the universal and enduring reality of International Relations down the ages. In Bull's view, thus:

The "idealists" were not remarkable for their intellectual depth or powers of explanation, only for their intense commitment to a particular vision of what should happen. [However] in their disparagement of the past they lost sight of a great deal that was already known; in some respects their work represented not an advance but a decline in understanding in international relations, an unlearning of old lessons which a later generation of writers found it necessary to restate. In their assessment of the present and the future they were guided more by their hopes than by the evidence in hand.34

What Bull refers to here, of course, is an important element of the modernist connection in International Relations - that which connects the present broad discussion of Tradition to a more precise theme - the historical and intellectual circumstances surrounding the institutional establishment of International Relations as a discipline after World War One. Or, as it is to be presented here - the neo-Kantian phase in the modernist "making" of International Relations.

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33See F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace.

Neo-Kantianism and the Discipline of International Relations

The discipline of International Relations was institutionally formulated in the wake of the carnage that was World War One. It developed, accordingly, in an atmosphere charged with a fervent desire to more adequately understand and more effectively control the seemingly endemic hostility within the international arena in order, above all, to prevent war on such a scale occurring again. It was in this context that International Relations scholarship was seized with a Liberal reformist zeal which owed much in tone and intellectual commitment to the European Enlightenment and its rebuttal of the theory and practice of the Ancien Regime.

More explicitly, the early years of the discipline's development saw a concerted attempt to overcome the mistakes of the past - of the old world of European great power dominance, imperialism, balance of power strategies and the closed, elite diplomacy associated with the Concert of Europe. In its place the scholars and statesmen of the inter-war years introduced to International Relations "new world" ideas and structures set upon modern scientific-rationalist premises. The solutions proffered were often of an (Anglicised) neo-Kantian ilk, predicated as they were upon the institutionalised application of the values of democratic Republicanism, and a reformulated "unity of nations" structure centred on the cooperative efforts of individual, sovereign states, most obviously expressed in the League of Nations and associated institutions such as the International Court of Justice.

In short, this neo-Kantian phase of the discipline's development, brief though it turned out to be, "constituted the first effort by intellectuals and statesmen alike to apply

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35 See Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, ch.2; Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations"; Olson and Onuf, "The Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed"; and Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory".

36 The reference here is to the Kant of Perpetual Peace, edited by L.W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merril, 1957): the Kant generally known to International Relations specialists. See also Clarke, Reform and Resistance in the International Order.
ideas of enlightened [rational] self-interest to international politics". This is not to suggest that prominent scholars of the period, and political figures such as Woodrow Wilson, entirely rejected the strategies of power politics. Their aim, rather, consistent with the progressivism of their approaches, was to intellectually and structurally reformulate the nature of modern relations between states in line with actual (rationally derived) "reality" as opposed to the "irrationality" of the past.

These orientations were articulated in a variety of ways by the scholars and statesmen of the era. In the inaugural address of the first Chair of International Politics, for example, in the early 1920s, the recipient bemoaned the lack of rational scientific principles in the study of the state system, reflecting that if an "ordered and scientific body of knowledge did exist in 1914...perhaps...the catastrophe might have been averted". Another influential dimension to the debate was added by the most prominent advocate of the new Liberal internationalism on the political stage, Woodrow Wilson, "the [political] prophet of the new era" who "symbolized the idea that the anarchy of power politics should be ended by the injection into international relations of the highest values evolved by [Western] political man". Wilson was perhaps the most explicit advocate of a neo-Kantian approach to the questions of war and peace in the inter-war period, advocating collective security principles and a commitment to progressivism centred on the superiority of modern democratic forms of government and rights of individual sovereignty. Understanding world history through the dominant modernist prism the Wilsonian approach assumed that, for all its tragedy, the events of World War One, in sweeping away the last vestiges of the Ancien Regime had brought forth the age of democratic thought and politics to the international arena. Accordingly, International Relations was now set to enter the next "stage" of its rational development, in which the


38This was the view of C. K. Webster, cited in Olsen and Onuf, "The Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed", p.6.

language and structural principles of the domestic (democratic) realm became directly appropriate.

Emphasis was thus placed on the importance of "objectifying" the spirit of the age via the institutionalisation of democratic structural principles. The League of Nations was, in this sense, the institutional vanguard of the post-war liberal age in international affairs, the forum in which a new modern rational elite of sovereign states might progressively distance themselves from the inadequate theory and practice of the past. It was against this background that Wilson appealed to the unfolding (universal) consciousness - the "general judgement" - of the world's peoples, maintaining that in the new objective circumstances (democracy rather than autocracy) the "conscience of the world" would decide what was "right" in post-war political life. Giving grist to the mill of those who, later, were to ridicule the ethnocentric arrogance of his position, Wilson propounded, further, that in the new age of Western rationality "a bad cause will fare ill, but a good cause is bound to be triumphant...You dare not lay a bad cause before mankind".40

The most accomplished scholarship of the period, it has been argued, emanated from the works of Alfred Zimmern, particularly his The League of Nations and the Rule of Law (1936) and a brief comment on this and other of his works indicates perhaps most clearly its modernist legacy and its consequent limitations.41 In his discussion of the League, for example, Zimmern promoted its establishment as "in harmony with the [historical] nature of things"; and as a cause which, "whether in the long or the short run ...would prevail".42 In the same vein the years following the first World War were

40Cited in ibid, p.52.
41Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935 (London: Macmillan, 1936). This is the view for example of Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson eds. in Principles and Problems of International Politics: Selected Readings (New York: Knopf, 1950), p.18, where they describe Zimmern as the "most polished" of the writers of time and "the most influential representative" of the newly formed International Relations discipline.
understood as "a period of transition" in which the old traditional resort to power politics was to be transcended in favour of the politics of cooperation and "responsibility". 43 In the mode that later was to prove so irresistible to critics such as E.H. Carr, Zimmern exhibited the kind of faith in modern legal-rational forms of order that he equated with the British model of society, in particular, and towards the end of his life, with the "moral" leadership of the USA in its struggle with the Soviet Union. 44

Like many scholars of the period Zimmern resisted the "old" power politics image of the international arena set in stark Hobbesian terms and a fundamental conflict of interests between individuals in the state system. In rejecting such an image, as that "wicked theory of the mutual incompatibility of nations", Zimmern's arguments paralleled those of Liberal economists gaining influence at the time. 45 Zimmern, however, paid little attention to economic issues per se: his was a Traditionalist perspective for all its reformist inclinations. Rather, the solution for Zimmern lay in the establishment, at the international level, of the rationality inherent in (British) law, which, at the domestic level, had overcome the worst excesses of "market" conflict and created a "community interest in preventing and punishing breaches of the peace". 46 If such a structure were in place at the international level, antagonisms might be brought to the surface for rational debate. In the new atmosphere of diplomatic/legal cooperation, states could "negotiate freely about their rights, in a spirit of mutual confidence and respect". 47

On the question of Fascism and the frailties of legal rational solutions in this context, Zimmern explained the problem in rather predictable (dichotomised, logocentric)


45Ibid, p.289. There was in this context no fundamental conflicts between the world's peoples, but cooperation depended upon finding ways of ameliorating the struggle for scarce political and economic resources that characterised a modern state system, and which had resulted in the collision of the major competing actors in 1914.


terms. The world, he suggested, in its "transition" period, must be understood in dichotomised terms - as divided between "good" and "bad" states, between "old" and "new" systems, between "traditional" and "modern" societies, between "them" and "us". On the one hand, more explicitly, there were modern "welfare states" such as Britain, the USA and France, where individuals ruled through democratic structures and the rule of law prevailed. On the other hand, there were "power states", such as Germany, Italy and Japan, where individual freedom and a healthy community consciousness was still subsumed beneath the legacy of the old absolutist state system.48 The synthesised answer to this problem, for Zimmern, lay in the transference of the value system of the "welfare states" to the rest of the world, in order that individuals in all states could control and direct foreign policy as they did in "good" societies. Zimmern's individualist perspective, and the universalism associated with it, was thus expressed in the view that:

it is the common man who counts in international relations...and who decides the issues of peace and war...It is to the common man that we must address ourselves if we would make progress towards the establishment of the Rule of Law in world affairs.49

It was this kind of statement, of course, which provoked Realist (state centric) critiques of positions such as Zimmern's as rather ridiculous liberal "idealism". On the broader "welfare states - power states" dualism, moreover, Zimmern's approach was wide open to E.H. Carr's charge that it amounted to an unselfconscious avowal of Enlightenment grand theory. The most obvious analytical implication of this, argued Carr, was that it blinded "idealist" thinkers to the fact that the "welfare states" were themselves part of the "power state" matrix. The appeal for a (universalised) consciousness of the "common [liberal] man" and for an international community based on the rule of law was, in this context, no more than the polemic of the "satisfied" allied

49Cited in ibid, p.287.
powers of 1919 concerned to further strengthen a set of power relationships which advantaged them.50

Carr's critique of the neo-Kantians, of course, was designed to establish the credentials of his own analysis of the actual "reality" of the inter state period, and I will turn to this issue directly in a moment. The more immediate point of the discussion above was to illustrate how, from its very institutional beginnings, the theory and practice of International Relations has been framed in modernist terms. But there has been another theme also associated with the discussion to this point, one which has sought to emphasise the continuity between the (modernist) Tradition of International Relations, its disciplinary beginnings in the "idealism" of the neo-Kantian phase, and the fully blown positivist-Realist phase which superseded it.

One final note on Zimmern might indicate the nature and complexity associated with this modernist continuity in an International Relations context. It concerns, at one level, Zimmern's explicit commitment to the "scientific" study of politics and to the scientific tradition which, at Oxford, "has been the home of such studies since the days of Occam in the thirteenth century".51 At another level it relates to Hedley Bull's proposition that Zimmern was the first "classical" (Traditionalist) scholar of the International Relations discipline.52 The point here, of course, is that for Bull the work of scholars such as Zimmern was perceived as an earlier stage of the rational development towards "real" knowledge of International Relations.

This modernist progressivism concerning the neo-Kantians and their later Realist counterparts, might become more evident in the discussion to follow, which introduces

50It failed in other words to understand a different interpretation of post-war reality held by those states whose (rational) interests (and to a large extent those of its "common" people) were served by destroying the Liberal/rational status quo so unproblematically supported by scholars like Zimmern. See Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, part Two.


52Ibid.
the contribution of another major "classical" scholar, E.H.Carr, and the first (scientific) Realist "great text", *The Twenty Years Crisis*.53

The Making of a Discipline: Towards a Realist Science of International Relations

Perhaps more than any other Realist scholar, before or since, Carr, in *The Twenty Years Crisis*, sought to confront head on some of the broad philosophical issues that connect International Relations to the broader tradition of Western modernity. In so doing the first "great text" of the Realist-positivist discipline in International Relations resonated with a major modernist tension - between Anglo-American positivism (i.e. as in British historiography) and themes drawn from the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Mannheim's Verstehen approach) - the "other side of the positivist coin".54 This tension was obvious enough from the beginning of *Twenty Years Crisis* when Carr made it clear that he sought to build upon the "science of international politics" which is in its "infancy".55 Carr's (positivist) building block approach was represented, however, in terms of a theory of the state set in dialectical terms. Consequently, in promoting the idea that the nature of the state, and political reality in general, are constructed upon the "contradictory" nature of the human actor (as both egoist/individual and sociable/communicator), Carr contended that:

The [political] State is built up of these two conflicting aspects...[therefore] utopia and reality, the individual and the institution, morality and power, are from the outset inexorably linked.56


56 Ibid, pp.95-96.
An adequate Realism, on this basis, must be understood as the sum of a complex dialectical interaction involving the *inexorably* linked behaviour of "creative" individuals within a broad socio/cultural context (i.e. as in a sociology of knowledge approach). Ultimately however, this valuable, if rather rudimentary, insight was effectively neglected and the original dialectical format progressively transformed into a one-sided positivist approach to knowledge and society. In *The Twenty Years Crisis*, resultingly, the potential for genuinely open-ended theoretical dialogue at the heart of Realist scholarship is quickly stifled, with the introduction to the debate of a series of hard and fast categorical distinctions set in logocentric terms. Thus, the nature of political reality (as opposed to the "idealism" of the inter-war years) was not now centred on any "inexorable links" between subjects and objects, theory and practice, but rather on the absolute *distinction* between:

An inclination to deduce what should be from what was and what is [and] an inclination to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what should be.\(^{57}\)

Having introduced this classical Humean dichotomy - between "is" and "ought" - Carr then claimed that it "determines opposite attitudes towards every political problem".\(^{58}\) Consequently, if inevitably, in *The Twenty Years Crisis* there appeared a dazzling variety of dichotomies and dualised categories of analysis that have since continued to afford Realist scholars a theoretical shorthand with which to identify the "is" from the "ought", etc., in every facet of their inquiry. In the logocentric fashion that was later to take on epidemic proportions within Realist scholarship, Carr thus shifted from an original position emphasising the complex dialectic of "subject" and "object", to a power politics Realism which insisted on the factual *independence* of some "inexorably linked" aspects of existence over others. Indeed, for Carr (as it was for Weber, Popper and Morgenthau in similar circumstances) Realist analysis was ultimately dependent for its

\(^{57}\)Ibid, p.11.

\(^{58}\)Ibid.
explanation of the world upon the positivist detachment and privileging of "fact" over "value", "is" over "ought" and "object" over "subject".

This became more evidently the case in The Twenty Years Crisis when Carr turned to the issue of Realist methodology. Here, he insisted on an approach to study which rejected idealist/utopian attempts to transform "wish" and "need" into reality, in favour of a rigorous concentration on "the observation and collection of facts". Carr developed this theme further in explaining the theoretical bankruptcy of "idealism", which, he asserted, was identified by:

Its inability to provide any absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international affairs.

Carr's lurch into positivism can to be gleaned also from his discussion of one of the central theoretical issues in modernity - the question of the relationship between the natural and social sciences. On this point, Carr's analysis (like that of Realists/neo-Realists later) drifts inexorably toward the very "empiricist metaphysic" it sought to reject. In dichotomised fashion, consequently, Carr sought to distinguish the "natural" from the "political" sciences on the basis that the latter was dominated by the theoretical purpose and interests of the analyst (i.e. the "ought" factor) while the former "because of the nature of the object of study", defied the corrupting influences of such analysis. Thus, in the study of the physical sciences:

Purpose is in the strict sense irrelevant to the investigation and separable from it...[the physical scientist's] conclusions can be nothing more than a true report on facts. It cannot help to make the facts other than they are: for the facts exist independently of what anyone thinks about them.

The major implication of this rather crude inductivist approach to the factual world "out there" was, that as part of the positivist "scientific model", it now became the basis upon which a Realist identity and analytical purpose was framed.

60 Ibid, p.88.
61 Ibid, p.3, emphasis added.
For E.H. Carr, accordingly, the superiority of a Realist approach was centred on its capacity to overcome (historical, cultural, theoretical/interpretivist) purpose, in favour of (objective) factual analysis of the kind associated with the "natural" sciences. Carr proposed, consequently, that while in its early stages the science of International Relations suffered from "idealist" theorising:

Realism in its mature stage places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences. It tends to depreciate the role of purpose [value based theory] and to maintain, explicitly or implicitly that the *function of thinking is to study a sequence of events which it is powerless to influence or alter*. [Moreover] realism tends to emphasise the irresistible character of existing tendencies and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies.62

The first part of this statement I have referred to previously as one of the most important and classically unselfconscious statements in the history of International Relations scholarship.63 The point, at this juncture, is that one does not need to reject Carr's critique of the neo-Kantians to recognise the paradoxical and inadequate nature of his own related modernist position, with its equally one-sided positivist determinism acknowledging a sphere of reality "out there", independent of the function of thinking, which the observing subject is "powerless to influence or alter". In detaching the subject, as a creative force, from the Realist analytical equation in this way, Carr introduced to Realist scholarship a positivist logic which David Hume in the Eighteenth century had shown to be an entirely inadequate basis on which to understand or explain the reality of human existence. And yet, fifty years after Carr's contribution to the discipline, Realist scholars of both the British and American schools continue to objectify the "irresistible" character of existing (anarchical) tendencies, while "wisdom" continues to be most associated with those who detach themselves from the theoretical process and merely accept and adapt themselves to the external "givens" of an independently existing reality.


63See Chapter One p.53.
Lest my position on Carr's contribution be misunderstood, on this point, one further comment is necessary on it. It is that for all the "crassness" of its subsequently privileged element, there is much that is incisive and valuable in *The Twenty Years Crisis*. This is not just a matter of the more sober and cautious passages to be found there on the nature of Realism, but of the more immediate analysis of the inter-war period contained within its pages. Carr was, in this sense, correct to attack the one sidedness of the neo-Kantians and their blindness to the (non-progressivist) forces at work right at the heart of their progressivist "history". He was correct, also, to emphasise the dangers of, and potential for, "irrationality" in the neo-Kantian "rational" universe, and to warn of the dangers of power politics behaviour among European states still, in one way or another, living in the shadows of the most destructive war ever recorded. I cannot imagine any Critical Social Theory scholar in the 1990s who would not acknowledge Carr's insight on these issues.

The problem, however, is that because those who followed Carr in the Realist pursuit have never seriously confronted his or their own one-sidedness, their own blindness, intolerance and analytical silences, a potentially critical analysis in the 1930s, has been increasingly transmuted into a universalist, ahistorical, uncritical and dangerous "catechism" since. This is one of the reasons why a "preface" needs to be written and taken seriously in International Relations and it is a theme that will receive more attention in the chapters to follow, particularly in Chapter Eight where something will be said about Critical Theory attempts, in the early 1980s, to highlight the "repressed" potential for critical analysis in the works of Realists such as Carr. 64

Before this, however, more needs to be added on the issue of the developing International Relations discipline, which by the late 1950s, was increasingly captured by power politics Realism, and a harder edged modernism expressed in a more explicitly "scientific" approach to theory and research.

64 In the work of Cox in "States, Social Forces and World Orders"; and Ashley, in "The Poverty of Neorealism".
The Discipline Consolidated: The Cold War and the Construction of a Positivist-Realist International Relations

If the disciplinary seeds of positivist Realism were sown in the responses to the "anarchy" of the inter-war years, it was in the shadows of World War Two, and more directly in the glare of the Cold War between the nuclear superpowers, that positivist Realism became the dominant institutional and intellectual mainstream of International Relations. The literature on the Cold War is, of course, the stuff that mainstream disciplinary training in International Relations is made of. And rightly so given its significance for contemporary theory and practice.

However, the question I want to raise here, albeit briefly, concerns the way in which the Cold War has been represented in the International Relations context. It is, I argue, a perfect example of a modernist based "orthodox consensus" at work, in that both orthodox and alternatives approaches are framed in fundamentally the same way, thus disallowing the need for either side in the dispute, or those looking on in the broader community, to seriously question the foundations of their "great debate". The end result was a post-war discursive practice in U.S. intellectual and policy making circles that helped significantly to "make" International Relations what it is today. More specifically, in relation to the Cold War issue, the "making" of International Relations was articulated in an enhanced and sometimes hysterical affirmation of Western modernity, expressed, for example, as opposition to a Soviet "other": in an analytical environment projecting (primarily) North American social scientific attitudes and rituals (i.e. positivist problem solving): and in the largely uncritical acceptance (bordering on reification) of a particular kind of power politics wisdom, most influentially expressed in Hans Morgenthau's, Politics Among Nations, first published in 1948.
The Cold War debate in International Relations is commonly represented as a clash between Realist and "revisionist" interpretations of the "facts". The Realist case, it is acknowledged, is not a homogeneous one as such. Instead two major variants of Realist argument are considered significant. The first (the official U.S./Western approach) suggested that the Cold War was an inevitable outcome of the post Second World War power structure, in which the victorious democratic powers were confronted by the Soviet Union - an erstwhile ally - now ideologically committed to the destruction of Liberal-Capitalist principles and ultimately to world domination. The second Realist variant also blamed the Soviet Union for the Cold War and also understood its emergence and development in deterministic terms. This perspective, however, brought a more Traditional power politics wisdom to bear on the story, maintaining that it was not so much the ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism that was driving the Soviets towards conflict with the "Western" powers, but the expansionist desires inherent to great powers in the state system. This desire, according to influential realists such as Morgenthau and Kennan, was particularly strong within Russian history and national character. And, ideologies aside, faced with the unparalleled strategic opportunities in 1945, Stalin was concerned above all to fulfil the historical/strategic ambitions of the Czars.

The "revisionist" perspective is also generally regarded as having two main variations. One, associated with "radical" scholars such as William Appleman Williams, suggested that it was, if anything, US desire and opportunism that was at the core of Cold War tension rather than Soviet expansionism. From this perspective it was the desire of U.S. foreign policy and a Corporate elite for world wide market penetration that was the keystone to Cold War conflict. The problem for U.S. ambition, of course, was the post-war existence of another superpower disinclined to allow capitalist penetration,


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particularly in its newly acquired sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{67} The second "revisionist" perspective had similar characteristics, but a harder, Marxian based critical edge. Articulated via the works of scholars such as the Kolko's, the Cold War was understood as part of broader developments in a worldwide class struggle, with the U.S. seeking, above all, to eradicate any challenge to its power from Socialist states.\textsuperscript{68}

There is, undoubtedly, valuable insight associated with all of these perspectives. The problem, for the discipline of International Relations, and for a generation forced to live within the confines of Cold War theory and practice, is that this insight was projected in terms that reduced it to its most basic (ontological/epistemological) common denominator. Excluded from the Cold War debate, consequently, in both academic and more "popular" spheres were other insights that, while they might not have prevented conflict per se, might have alleviated its effects long before Gorbachev and his followers woke up from their particular experience of the Enlightenment dream-cum-nightmare.

On this theme, Charles Nathanson has noted that for all their obvious differences the Realists and their opponents in the Cold War debate all assumed into their analysis a single, external world of fact, "out there", against which the reality of post war International Relations could be understood. Thus, for the Realists, "Soviet actions were there to be read transparently as unambiguous signs of a threat to the national security of the United States".\textsuperscript{69} For the "revisionists", on the other hand, "the interests and prejudices of US policy-makers were equally transparent, flowing directly and unproblematically into anti-Soviet policies and actions".\textsuperscript{70} Both sides, in other words, were locked into positivist metatheories which limited the kinds of questions they could


\textsuperscript{70}Ibid, p.444.
ask and allowed them to exclude from their analysis important self-reflective themes. Within Realist accounts the orthodox "historical narratives"71 of the "official" US Government perspective most clearly expressed this positivist approach. On the other side, as it were, the work of the Marxist scholars, was also clearly centred in positivist grand theory (i.e. the unfolding class struggle).

The "revisionism" of scholars such as Williams (portrayed as "idealistic" by Marxists)72 is a little more complex in terms of its positivist archaeology. As Deborah Welch Larson has attested, this is because Williams followed basic Verstehen principles of knowledge and explanation, articulated most directly through a Mannheimian Sociology of Knowledge prism.73 This of course allows for interpretative analysis at one level but not at another, particularly concerning the notion of an independent world "out there" and the scientific model in relation to it. Accordingly, the most influential Cold War alternative to positivist Realism was framed in terms of contemporary social science methodology and the postulation of "covering laws".74 I will return to this issue shortly as it relates to the general position of Morgenthau, the most influential Realist scholar of the Cold War age and beyond.

Firstly, however, something briefly needs to be said about the broader analytical implications of this example of the modernist framing of the Cold War, concerning the question of what was excluded in order that the "givens" of a modernist discourse might dominate. Here, Nathanson's contribution is useful, even if his appreciation of some of


74Ibid, p.12. The Verstehen connection was discussed in broad terms in relation to the hermeneutic tradition in Chapter Three, and its influences have been noted at different times in the more explicit International Relations context of Chapters Four and Five. Its most influential site in realist terms was in Morgenthau's work and this connection will be the focus of attention in the chapter to follow. On the problems of Verstehen as the "other side of the positivist coin", see Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge.

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the nuances of the Cold War debate is a little sparse at times. Nathanson's argument, set primarily within post-modernist premises, sought to illustrate how the orthodox Cold War debate excluded questions about the discursive construction of the Cold War, in the United States, in particular.

Accordingly, he argued, after 1946, the Soviet "threat" became the central plank in U.S. foreign policy and the central obsession in US society, not because of any radical change in Soviet behaviour (i.e. the external facts) but, because "policy makers had found a new language, or script, for interpreting the meaning of Soviet behaviour". Until 1946, Nathanson suggested, there was a great deal of ambivalence within the United States about the nature of the Soviet Union and an ambiguity about its future direction and strategic ambitions. And, he noted, "as long as [this] ambiguity was recognised, negotiations were also seen as reasonable and necessary".

After 1946, however, this ambiguity dissipated, to be replaced by the kind of foundational certainty that underlined the rise of positivist Realism in intellectual and policy circles, and the often hysterical anti-Communism throughout the United States. At this point, with ambiguity gone (and any potential for "thinking space" closed off) genuine attempts at understanding and negotiation were no longer considered "reasonable [or] necessary", particularly for a nation possessing the ultimate in modern technological achievement - the Atomic bomb. At the forefront of the resultant "threat" scenario that followed was George Kennan's (initial) reading of Soviet character and intent, articulated in secret correspondence with the Truman Administration. The significance of this

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75 I refer here to his judgement that all sides of the debate assumed that "actions, interests or prejudices speak for themselves, requiring neither interpretation nor translation", in "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat", p.444. The more nuanced point I think is that many in the debate acknowledged interpretivist themes but that it was a particular kind of interpretation that allowed facts to "speak for themselves". Nathanson's work draws extensively on Daniel Yergin in, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977).


77 Ibid, p.454.

78 This was the (in)famous "Long Telegram", that remained classified information until 1971.
particular process of closing down "thinking space", emphasised Nathanson, was that it had little to do with any "observation" of Soviet behaviour in the post-war period, because U.S. intelligence, in general, had acknowledged that there was little evidence of expansionary capacity or ambition at this time.\textsuperscript{79} Rather, the foundation of Kennan's analysis was his Traditional power politics understanding of "history", especially the "given" nature of Russian and Soviet history. Accordingly, sweeping interpretative ambiguity aside, the Soviet future was analysed as determined both by the Soviet "past", and implicitly, by relations between traditional and modern societies in general.

The Russians/Soviets were, on this basis, a "neurotic" people, with an "instinctive sense of insecurity" that, in the post war era, had become heightened by their interaction with "the more competent, more powerful...economically advanced West".\textsuperscript{80} Such a power could not be rationally dealt with because it was "[i]mpervious to the logic of reason [and] seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality".\textsuperscript{81} On this basis, all the Russians/Soviets understood was force, because, it was argued, throughout their "history" their leaders had learnt that security only comes via "patient and deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power[s], never in compacts and compromises with it".\textsuperscript{82}

With this "historical" analysis established, the Cold War scenario had its (external) "factual" foundation. From this foundation all other logic flowed. The Soviet desire to expand was, in this discursive context, both predictable and a source of great danger to the West, in general, and the US in particular. This was because the modern attempt to alleviate Russian "neurosis" were now combined with a Marxist ideology which preached world domination and the destruction of capitalist democracy. Indeed, for Kennan, empirical evidence of Soviet expansionism was already "fact". The Soviets, he recorded, were already engaged in securing "certain neighbouring points" conceived of

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid, p.459
\textsuperscript{80}Ibid, p.455.
\textsuperscript{81}From Kennan's "Long Telegram", cited in ibid, p.456, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{82}Ibid, p.455.
as being of "immediate strategic necessity" (e.g. Iran, Turkey). However, warned Kennan, "other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas" (e.g. Persia, Spain, Gibraltar).

Following Kennan's report, noted Nathanson, a major change in attitude occurred in policy making circles in particular. Now, U.S. foreign policy analysts had a way of "reading" the Soviet Union which accorded them the certainty they craved. Now, backed by the wisdom of the expert, they had a language and a logic which allowed them to synthesise (totalise) the ambiguity, give identity to the fragmentation, transform mere interpretations into fact. Consequently, even while intelligence reports continued to indicate that the Soviets were not engaged in any threatening activities (or at the least that these activities could be understood in a different ways) U.S. officials began the process of constructing the "self-generating, self-confirming reality" that became the Cold War for Western societies and for International Relations.

In this context Truman's top ranking civilian and military advisers lost their sense of uncertainty and a "remarkable agreement" emerged about the Soviets and the world "out there". The subsequent reality, complete with historical and empirical evidence, was that the Soviets:

believe that war with the United States...is inevitable. [The Soviets]...are increasing their military power...and are seeking to weaken and subvert their potential opponents...The language of power politics is the only language which [the Soviets] understand...The main deterrence to Soviet attack is the United States ...The United States...should entertain no proposal for disarmament...as long as the possibility of Soviet aggression exists...The United States should support and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the Soviet Union.

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83 From Kennan's "Long Telegram", cited in ibid, p.455.
84 Ibid, p.462.
86 This is taken from a memo to the President in September 1946 as cited in ibid, p.460.
Two points drawn from Nathanson's work require reiteration before moving on. The first is that Nathanson's approach, following post-modernist perspectives, did not seek to dismiss as irrelevant or invalid (and certainly not "unreal") those conventional accounts of the Cold War debate outlined earlier. What it sought to do was to illustrate that there were other ways of understanding the reality of the Cold War that were not encompassed within the orthodox discourse. It sought, moreover, to illustrate that there were other options available in practice to the policy makers at the time which were excluded from serious consideration or marginalised by the particular discourse that "made" Cold War reality for them. The point here is that it was the discursively produced reality that the policy makers and intellectual sectors responded to, not some external world "out there" that imposed its real knowledge upon them. As Nathanson put it, "[w]hat had changed was not Soviet behaviour but the US method of interpreting it".87 And while anyone aware of the literature of the period will know of Kennan's more nuanced and empathetic observations in later times, Nathanson's overall point on his early contribution remains valid. It is that the "Long Telegram" of February 1946 created an "interpretive straightjacket" from which neither Western nor Soviet analysts could escape for forty years.

Another question flows from all this, of course, which asks: why was it that Kennan's discourse, in particular, was privileged over the others? On this question Nathanson's argument has more in common with some of the "revisionists" than with the Realists. He suggested, for example, that Kennan's discourse complemented a desire on the part of U.S. capitalists and Corporate planners, to tame a workforce which had become more militant as it understood the opportunities inherent in a burgeoning US economy after World War Two. In an intensely anti-communist atmosphere, this "taming" process became decidedly easier, even more so when allied with a direct Soviet

87 As Nathanson noted, "at the very time that the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were being framed, the Military Intelligence Division was observing that the Soviets had limited their involvement in the Middle East, diminished their ideological rhetoric, and given only moderate support to Chinese communists", ibid, p.462.
"threat." At the same time, among the Government and intellectual elites, the end of the war bought a measure of uncertainty and directional confusion to U.S. thinking and research. Kennan's Soviet "threat" thesis, and the identity it now helped construct for U.S. (domestic) leadership - and U.S. foreign policy - helped overcome that uncertainty and provided strategic political and moral direction for the new leaders of the "free world".

This issue of U.S. identity construction will receive more direct commentary in Chapter Nine, but the more immediate issue, and a second important point derived from Nathanson's work on the Cold War, is that it focused attention not so much on the conventional *why* question, but more on the (post-modernist) *how* question. Acknowledging that each major approach to the Cold War has an answer as to *why* it happened (complete with objective, verifying evidence) the orientation in Nathanson's work was toward the question of *how* the Cold War was constructed from the struggle between competing discourses on its "real" nature.

As this thesis has sought to emphasise, to begin to come to grips with this question (and an important element of the "unwritten preface") it is necessary to break through those powerful cultural and conceptual boundaries that have been dominant in International Relations for so long. Hence the need for a Critical Social Theory perspective concerned to provide "thinking space" for a Tradition and discipline in order than it can confront questions it no longer asks of itself, in order that, in re-asking them, it might become aware of both its process of exclusion and closure, and its potential for re-inclusion, openness and change.

It was with this issue (broadly) in mind that Nathanson suggested that the power of the Cold War Realist "script" (apart from its association with vested interests in U.S. society) was derived from a way of understanding the world dominant in the West since "the Bible taught the peoples of Christendom how to interpret what was going on 'out
This, however, as earlier chapters of the thesis have indicated, is only part of the (modernist) story. A more explicit rendition of it, in the Cold War context, would emphasise, not just the Judeo-Christian dualism, but those that followed it in the era of the "death of God", particularly since the Enlightenment, when the reality of knowledge gleaned from the world "out there" was sanctified by the new theology of scientific-rationalism - the religion by the 1950s of the American social sciences.

As a modern theology, of course, there was much more emphasis placed on questioning, on confronting the Traditional "givens". But as the earlier discussion has explained, there were, in the dominant positivist sect, certain questions on which "reflection" was effectively "disallowed". Within the ecumenical councils of the International Relations hierarchy this was particularly the case regarding the detachment of the observing subject from the object of reflection - the world "out there". Consequently, there has been little critical questioning of the capacity of an expert such as Kennan to understand the "facts" of Russian/Soviet "history", or the "real" meanings of Russian/Soviet cultural life, from a power politics perspective steeped in the assumptions and biases of Western modernity and positivist theory. The implications of not asking such questions were evident enough in the 1950s and 1960s as positivist assumptions and interpretive biases became an increasing source of closure on the Cold War and in International Relations generally. In this period the conservatism inherent in state centric analysis was now increasingly complemented by the "problem solving" theory of Western "scientific" scholars engaged in a struggle with the ideology of the Soviet Other. At the centre of the International Relations discipline, in the United States, the result was a static, uncritical, modernist framing regime, increasingly articulated in behaviouralist terms, which began to speak in more confident tones of its knowledge of the world "out there".

I want now to begin to address this issue and that period between the onset of the Cold War and (roughly) the war in Vietnam, when the modernist legacy - via a fully

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blown positivist Realism - increasingly "made" International Relations in terms of the opposition between a unified Cold War "Western" identity and the "difference" and danger of an anarchical world "out there" - the realm of the Soviet Other. Initially, at least, I will address this issue in the way that the discipline usually does when it speaks of its "development", that is via the scholarship of its first disciplinary "heroic figure", Hans Morgenthau, particularly in Politics Among Nations. My treatment of Morgenthau's work, however, is concerned to open up the debate rather than close it off. Accordingly at the beginning of the next chapter Politics Among Nations will be spoken of in terms that Morgenthau refused to speak of it, in terms, that is, of Max Weber's major Verstehen influence upon its basic concepts and conclusions.

Summary

This chapter was concerned, above all, to illustrate a discursive connection between the broad historical and philosophical discussions of the thesis in Chapters One to Four and the more explicit inquiries into the theory and practice of International Relations which are the primary focus of attention from now on . It sought, initially, to illustrate how the Tradition of International Relations was derived from that broader discursive tradition of Western history and philosophy which, since the Enlightenment has provided a story of unity, identity and (positivist) certainty, for modern social theory. In this regard it emphasised the story of the development of International Relations - its Traditional story - as the site of a rather crude logocentric narrative, in which a selective cast of "heroic figures" (unproblematically) speak the eternal wisdom of power politics across the complexity of time, histories, cultures and linguistic practices, culminating in the disciplinary rhetoric that is contemporary Realism, in all its variants. Concentrating on the early disciplinary articulation of the Tradition, in the inter-war years, the chapter emphasised the explicit modernism associated with its neo-Kantian phase in which a rationalist progressivism reigned when a broader, more sensitive approach to theory and
practice was crucial. A less obvious modernist connection was then addressed - that between the neo-Kantianism of the "idealists" and the Realism which superseded it.

Here, it was argued, the modernist framing regime was not fundamentally changed. Whereas the "idealists" had understood reality in terms of the rational unfolding of democratic consciousness in dialectical confrontation with a power politics world "out there", the Realists now retained the dichotomised structure of understanding in "observing" a world "out there" characterised not by post-Kantian emancipatory opportunity, but by the stark realities of (all) human history which as Carr made clear represented a "sequence of events which [creative thought/re-interpretation] is powerless to influence or alter".89

The discussion then sought to more directly confront the theory/practice, knowledge/power issues, integral to Critical Social Theory analysis, by shifting the focus of attention to the most "concrete" of International Relations themes, the Cold War between the "West" and the Soviet Other. The arguments here were significant both for the immediate issue of the development of power politics Realism and also for the notion of an "unwritten preface" in International Relations. The major proposition was that our understanding of the Soviets and of the Cold War more generally - which for forty years dominated the lives and minds of contemporary peoples - was severely limited by the questions excluded from Realist (i.e. Western) theory and practice, and from the perspectives of its major "alternatives" in the disciplinary spectrum. It was argued more precisely - and here the modernist connections were re-emphasised - that just like the "idealists" and the Realists in their variation on the positivist/foundationalist theme, International Relations scholarship in the early years of the Cold War could not question itself - it could not reflect upon the way it "knows" the world or the process by which (real) "meaning" is given to it, incarcerated as it was/is within a positivist metatheory. In relation to the early Cold War Realist discourse that helped considerably to "make" the subjects and objects of International Relations for a generation to follow, it could not, for

89Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, p.10.
example, reflect upon the process by which a figure such as Kennan could extrapolate from an essentialised "history" the "reality" of Soviet ideological intent in the post war years. It could not more specifically breach the "positivist bias" at the core of Anglo-American thinking which left unquestioned the process by which the subject (e.g. Kennan) engaged with the object of inquiry (e.g. the Soviet Union).

Accordingly, ignoring at least a century of "preface" on alternative approaches to interpretive complexity, the "mature" Realism of the Cold War International Relations discipline followed the modernist mainstream narrative in obliging the observing subject to merely "describe" the values, ends, cultural norms, interests and moral and ideological perspectives of a particular social practice, which it then treated as if they were objective, non-normative "facts", beyond the interpretive/theoretical realm. As the earlier chapters indicated this severely limits the capacity of modernist thinkers to seriously reflect upon important questions of modern life. Most significantly in relation to the Cold War it limited any "Western" potential for critical (self) reflection upon the meaning of Soviet action in that crucial period before the prophecies of the Cold Warriors on both sides, were (self) fulfilled.

It might be argued of course that this is simply too esoteric a point to make in this context, that foreign policy "practitioners", particularly in times of crisis, are less interested in the complexities of "theory" and more concerned with quick, problem solving, "practice". For a range of reasons, hopefully now apparent in this thesis, this is not an acceptable proposition - its practical implications are simply too dangerous to accept. But even if, for argument's sake, this was an acceptable proposition, it still does not explain how or why the theoretical crudity of the Cold War became, and (largely) remains, the "catechism" of International Relations in those sites of intellectual/academic analysis where "reflection" and critical inquiry is purportedly the raison d'etre.

This was the kind of question which underlay the final connection the chapter sought to make, very briefly, at its conclusion - between the early post-war discipline set upon a modernist Tradition and energised by Carr's call for a "scientific" International
Relations - and the influence of Hans Mogenthau's *Politics Among Nations*, which, from 1948 on gave the Cold War "quest for certainty" a Weberian hermeneutic imprimatur. The discussion now to follow seeks to explain the implications of this connection for the way we continue to think, speak and act in International Relations.
The direct connection between Weber's thought and that of Morgenthau has been rarely acknowledged by International Relations specialists. Its influence, nevertheless, has been important and powerful. In the early years of the Cold War this was particularly the case in regard to Morgenthau's fundamentally Weberian defence of Realism constructed upon the textual wisdom of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Richelieu, Hamilton and Disraeli: those who understood "the [real] nature of international politics as an unending struggle for survival and power". More specifically, as Regis Factor and Stephen Turner have illustrated, Morgenthau's famous propositions concerning the difference between "utopian" and Realist thinkers were derived directly from Weber's theory. Accordingly, "utopianism corresponded to Weber's category of persons who have chosen ends that cannot be achieved in the world by any known means". Realists meanwhile, were those who, according to Weber, recognised that "to act in international politics entailed the doing of evil". Realists, in other words were those who

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1This is not purely due to any lack of theoretical introspection on the part of the discipline. It has as much to do with the reluctance of Morgenthau to acknowledge Weber's influence upon him until late in his life. While, therefore, as Regis Factor and Stephen Turner have illustrated, Weber's ideas were to form the backbone of Morgenthau's work, and while the structure of Morgenthau's argument in his major International Relations texts were taken directly from Weber's writings, Morgenthau consciously avoided any direct association with him. Turner and Factor have explained this situation in sympathetic terms, stressing that in the 1940s and immediate post-war years, Morgenthau was reluctant to emphasise his indebtedness to a "German theory of Politics". Consequently, Morgenthau adopted a long-term strategy, "which permitted him to present Weber's views with their full polemical force, without the disability of their origins", Max Weber and the Dispute Over Reason and Value (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p.169; see also pp.167-173.


3See ibid, p.172. The "utopian" basis of liberalism, therefore, was for Morgenthau, as it was for Weber, (and for Carr) the non-recognition that, in following (value based) "interests" in the world, inter-state political action was always potentially at risk of doing evil. Weber's scepticism about "utopianism" here was prompted not only by the influences of Dilthey and Rickert, et al, but by a much older image of reality prompted by influences in Machiavelli. See Footnote 7.
acknowledged the necessity of accommodation to the real (anarchical) nature of International life. The notion of "interest" derived from Weber, and reformulated slightly by Morgenthau, has also become a crucial theme in Realist thinking. For Weber (if rather vaguely) the notions of "values" and "interests" were grafted together in order that the Verstehen social scientist could objectively evaluate the social and political facts of life seen as competing "interests" (ends). For Morgenthau, likewise, it was possible for the analyst of International Relations to speak in "objective" terms about the reality of the international arena (the struggle for power defined as interests) while accounting for value laden subjectivity. In this way, Weber gave to Morgenthau (and to a whole generation of Traditionalist-Realists) a Verstehen based synthesis which appeared to overcome the "moralism" of the liberals, the progressivism of the "idealists" and the crude inductivism associated with conventional scientific approaches.

This chapter is concerned with some of the implications of the modernist connection here - between Morgenthau's Verstehen based approach to the world "out there" - and the fully blown positivist Realist phase in International Relations which developed from it - in the era of the "behaviouralist revolution" and the scientific "quest for certainty". The discursive power of the Weber-Morgenthau perspective was evident at two levels of Cold War theory and practice. Intellectually, the Verstehen influence assisted, significantly, in the transference of behaviouralist attitudes and methodological principles to International Relations, in that it allowed (North) American Realists (in particular) to maintain the Realist disciplinary quest for scientific analysis while (ostensibly) overcoming the problems of the first (Traditionalist) attempts to provide coherent explanation of reality via inductivist empiricism.


5See Factor and Turner, Max Weber and the Dispute Over Reason, p.173. See also the broader discussion on this point in relation to Weber in Chapter Three, pp.146-149.

6Marxism of course remained an "ideology" - its image of reality therefore distorted by extreme value based analysis and thus not worth taking seriously.
In this regard, Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism, with its moderated scientific ambitions and precise methodological conventions, intersected nicely with the power politics images of Weber and Morgenthau - images invoking age old European wisdom about a world of "warring gods" - of irreconcilable value systems - of endemic conflicts of "interests". In its "new world" reformulation, Morgenthau's modified Weberianism was of significance also because of the direction and enhanced legitimacy it afforded to post-war Realism in U. S. foreign policy circles. In particular, with its stress on the "means/ends" logic of international life and its Traditional focus on diplomatic statecraft, it signified for the policy planner and "practitioner", a (deceptively) simple and flattering account of who and what was fundamental to contemporary power politics existence.

These are themes that will now be explored further in using the Weber-Morgenthau connection as a point of discursive entry into a broader discussion of International Relations in its most explicitly modernist phase. Following an initial inquiry into Morgenthau's textual legacy to the post-war discipline, its implications will be explored in a brief discussion of the Modernisation Theory attempt to impose the certainties of the Western "meta-narrative" upon the Third World, and then attention will focus on the major mainstream articulation of Realism in the 1960s, that associated with security and strategic discourse.

7The influence of Machiavelli upon Weber is an interesting connection here - particularly concerning the "warring gods" principle (irreconcilable value systems) and Weber's reformulated notion of a power politics based on cultural antagonisms. For a discussion see Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writing of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp.135-137; and *Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber* (London: Macmillan, 1972); see also Richard Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (London: Methuen, 1976), pp.45-51. For a broader debate on Machiavelli and the "warring gods" theme see Isaiah Berlin, "The Originality of Machiavelli", in *Studies on Machiavelli* edited by J.M. Gilmore (Florence: G.C. Sansoni, 1972), pp.147-206. The connection here with Morgenthau's deep Augustinian perspectives is also obviously significant in his understanding of the contemporary "art of the possible" in International Relations. The importance of the Weber/Popper intersection here, of course, was that the insights of the former allowed for the possibility of "scientifically" evaluating the clash of "interests" (ends) while the latter indicated how, precisely, it was to be done.
Politics Among Nations: the Verstehen Dimension

The Verstehen tensions in Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations are, if anything, even more apparent than in Carr's earlier scientific "great text" The Twenty Years Crisis. Accordingly, within its opening pages, Morgenthau, in Politics Among Nations, is both classical hermeneuticist and hard-nosed positivist. In the former mode he provided for Realist scholarship perhaps the most famous hermeneutic statement in the history of the discipline. Echoing the injunction of hermeneutic scholars down the years to get "inside" the text Morgenthau pronounced thus that Realists must, above all:

Retrace and anticipate as it were the steps the statesman - past, present and future - has taken or will take on the political scene. We [must] look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches: we must listen in on his conversations with other statesmen; we [must] read and anticipate his very thoughts.8

In this mode at least, Morgenthau's Realism implied that the text analogue - the world of statesmen - is the primary social and linguistic practice to which Realist theory must relate itself. An adequate Realism must, on this basis, seek to understand and explain the norms, rules, ideologies and competing interests of diplomatic statecraft. Realist analyst must attempt to get "inside" the world of the diplomat, the foreign policy-maker, the strategist and the power broker. Realism must, in this sense, correspond with the actual practice - the reality - of statesmanship. It is validated when it has meaning for the practical man of affairs, the diplomat statesman, the human agent of power defined as "interest".

Taking a slightly wider angle, Realist scholarship, following (broad) hermeneutic principles of study, must seek to interpret the "inner" nature of the world of States. It must do more, for example, than simply reaffirm the anarchy of the system, or make more rigorous and systematic the evidence of an endemic struggle for power and influence. It is interested, rather, in a more profound kind of historical and cultural

understanding of the relationship between states, emphasising modes of communication between them through the use of "intersubjectively understood symbols within the context of rule governed institutions".9 Realist scholarship of this kind is not (ostensibly) restricted to a "problem solving" ambition, but is concerned with "the attainment of a possible consensus among actors in the framework of the self understanding derived from tradition".10

Such a task, it might be argued, could only be carried out with the total involvement of the creative (and self-critical) analyst. But for Morgenthau, seeking the authority of the scientific method for the study (and political practice) of International Relations, the value laden scholar is magically detached from the analytical equation via a Weberian derived (means/ends) conjuring trick, which, forty years later, remains part of the of the Realist repertoire as expressed in neo-Realist perspectives. This Verstehen influence was evident as Morgenthau, in underwriting the "catechism" of the Cold War "Prince", gave focus and purpose to his power politics Realism. In a statement which encompassed so much of Morgenthau's perspective, and underlined his contribution to the "quest for certainty" within International Relation, he explained that to understand the world realistically, and solve its problems, we must:

put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose...and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts of international politics and makes a theory of politics possible.11

This orientation became more explicit in Politics Among Nations as Morgenthau insisted that Realists understand that "[international] politics is governed by objective laws", the operation of which are "impervious to our preferences". Moreover, he proclaimed, the

11Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.5, emphasis added.
task of the Realist was to distinguish what was:

true objectively and rationally...and what is only a subjective judgement divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.\(^\text{12}\)

Now, even in a discipline not noted for its critical theoretical tendencies, it might be supposed that anomalies of this magnitude within its exemplar text would provoke serious intellectual debate. This has rarely been the case.\(^\text{13}\) Instead, in largely uncritical terms, the foundationalist tendency in Morgenthau's thought became integral to the Realist perspective in the post-war years. This was particularly evident with regard to the debate over the nature and purpose of theory and the manner in which Realist theoretical statements must be judged or "tested". On this issue Morgenthau insisted that Realism must meet both an empirical and logical test. It must, he stressed, be "consistent with the facts and within itself". Consequently, the central question asked of any Realist analysis must be: "do the facts as they actually are lend themselves to the interpretation the theory has put on them?" Moreover, and with the "empiricist metaphysic" looming large, he warned that Realist theory:

Must be judged not by some preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.\(^\text{14}\)

Theory, in this sense, as it was in Weber's "alternative" to positivist logic, is simply a means to a pre-given end. Its purpose quite clearly is to (retrospectively) bring "order and meaning" to a (factual) "mass of phenomena" which, in contingent and unique form, exist independent of the theorist. Morgenthau's Realism was, resultingly, for all its interpretivist posturing, finally constructed upon a "spectator" theory of knowledge

\(^\text{12}\)Ibid, pp.4-5.

\(^\text{13}\)When it has been as in Waltz's, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) it has been on the basis that Morgenthau's Realism missed the essence of "reality", (e.g. the structuralist essence) not in terms of any fundamental questioning of the notion of "essence" or of Realist "reality". A larger discussion on Waltz and the implications of this for the discipline in the 1990s is to follow in the next chapter.

\(^\text{14}\)Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp.4-5.
which rendered the subject a passive receiver of independently existing reality "out there". As such, it represented the "primitive" understanding of reality spoken of in Chapter One and, which throughout the discussions since has been shown to be an entirely inadequate basis for coping with a complex and multi-dimensional international environment in the 1990s.

As much of the critical literature of the Third Debate has emphasised, however, the inadequacy of this approach has once again been no hindrance to its influence or popularity. Consequently, as the International Relations discipline increasingly closed down the focus of its analysis during the 1950s and 1960s, the "memory" of positivist-Realist inadequacy became increasingly dulled. In this period the discipline of International Relations was dominated by the power politics Realism introduced, most famously, by Carr, and given a more formalised legitimation by Morgenthau in the Cold War period. As Robert Keohane has put it, in terms which link together some of the themes touched on above:

During the postwar years, political realism swept the field in the United States. Its opponents may have been overwhelmed as much by the exigencies of the Cold War as by the rhetorical brilliance of the leading realists or the power of their argument. Yet for the most part, discussions of foreign policy have been carried on, since 1945, in the language of political realism - that is, the language of power and interests rather than of ideals or norms.15

Speaking of this period, in retrospect, one of the most illustrious of post-war Realists, John Herz, confirmed this theme, indicating that:

We proposed...to start from the givens of international reality and to build theory on the foundations of the nation state as prime actor, the recognition of the role of power in pursuit of the national interest, the concept of security, the security dilemma, and so forth.16

In tones more consistent with the critical aims of this chapter it might be more accurate to say that, with Morgenthau, and confirmation in intellectual circles of the way


one must respond to the (Cold War) world "out there", the heterogeneity, ambiguity and
potential openness within the modernist narrative of the International Relations Tradition,
was more and more closed off in favour of determinist rhetoric, reductionist method and
the narrowed focus of the "problem solver". In this vein, as Vasquez has noted, the
power of Morgenthau's, Politics Among Nations, was that it "provided a synthesis of
what a generation had been trying to express"17 and while some were to re-assess the
more assertive elements of his approach18 Realist scholars since have continued to accord
seminal status to Morgenthau and the positivist elements of his Cold War perspectives.19

This is an issue discussed at length in Stanley Hoffmann's famous article in
1977, which connected the development of a post-war International Relations discipline
with the broader movement towards social scientific analysis in the United States, in the
age of the "behaviouralist revolution".20 Morgenthau here is, unequivocally, the
"founding father"21 of the International Relations discipline, in its scientific (positivist)
Realist stage, primarily because in "boldly positing the existence of a field of scientific
endeavour, separate from [Traditional concerns with] history and law", Morgenthau
prompted an already existing "national ideology" in the United States, to "magnify[y]
and expand eighteenth century postulates" drawn from the Enlightenment.22

Committed, therefore, at the policy level to a world view centred on the crudest
form of logocentric logic (e.g. free world/closed ideology) the United States policy elite
turned increasingly to those willing to speak to the "Prince" in terms supportive of a

18For example Stanley Hoffmann, in "An American Social Science: International Relations", Daedalus
106(3) (1977), pp.41-60; and from another angle, Waltz in Man, The State and War.
20See Hoffmann "An American Social Science: International Relations". See also Robert Cox, "Social
Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in Neorealism and its Critics
ed. Keohane, which, from a (broad) Critical Theory perspective, makes the same general point.
21Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", p.44.
22Ibid, p.45.
Realist Cold War perspective and the "American (scientific) way". More explicitly it was the voices of (North) American scientific-rationalism that were heard proclaiming, what Stephen George has called the "three analogies", which, their advocates claimed, "formed the pillars of American power".23 The first analogy, not surprisingly, was with the natural sciences. From the post-war perspectives of the scientific Realists thus:

it was through the application of of the knowledge derived from the natural sciences that the United States was able to control nature [accordingly] ...what was needed was a science which would allow it to control international relations in the same way that it controlled nature.24

Secondly, and echoing the new technological age of (North) American consumer society, there was the analogy with cybernetics. Here, suggested George, a "materialistic concern with machinery" produced mechanistic outlooks, which saw humankind as machines, in psychology, society as a mechanism, and International Relations as a system of communication flows, "controllable, as are all machines, in principle".25 The third post-war analogy was with (neo-classical) economics and business management techniques. The objective here was to construct a set of policy principles for International Relations which would:

give American policy-makers the same ability to control the international environment as American businessmen had to control their labour force, production process and markets.26

It was against this immediate discursive background that the growing discipline of International Relations began to speak more confidently of its (rational-scientific) "knowledge" and of the correct means/ends method by which the enduring Realist wisdom of Western history must be transposed to the reality of the world of nuclear weapons, deterrence and the Third World "problem". Now, as part of the "can do"


24Ibid.


26Ibid.
generation, International Relations scholarship became more explicitly part of the "orthodox consensus" of Western social theory as it increasingly represented itself at that intersection of neo-Kantianism and Anglo-American positivism, articulated in the broader forum by (Popperian based) behaviouralism. Now, the "master concepts"  of (North) American social thought - progress and science - were applied to International Relations with the kind of confidence that in the broader social theory context, saw positivist/behaviouralists attacking the (non-scientific) "metaphysics" of more traditional approaches to the "perennial questions". Accordingly, those who urged a more scientific approach to International Relations did so in terms which echoed the positivist ambitions of the Enlightenment and its post war re-articulation in behaviouralism.

It was in this context that the Morgenthau inspired "first wave" of scientific Realism, gave "both the new intellectual enterprise and the new diplomacy the general [theoretical] foundations they needed". More specifically, as Hoffmann put it, after World War Two and Politics Among Nations, International Relations became committed to the "applied Enlightenment" view that:

all problems can be resolved, [and] that the way to resolve them is to apply the scientific method...and to combine empirical investigation, hypothesis formation and testing - and that resort to science will yield practical applications that will bring progress.

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27 Now of course any Marxist influence was even more excluded from serious debate. As Vasquez has put it Marxism became the "whipping boy" in International Relations scholarship rejected as "ideology", "idealism" and dangerous, see Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p.50.


29 See the discussion on behaviouralism in Chapter Two, pp.104-110. In the context of the times, as David Easton put it, the behaviouralist goal was the exemplary modernist one concerned to construct "a science of politics modeled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences"; cited in John Gunnell, "Political Theory: The Evolution of a Sub-Field", in Political Science: The State of the Discipline edited by A. Finifter (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983), p.19. In this atmosphere, as now in International Relations, those not engaged in "concrete" empirical research were attacked for their "abstraction" and irrelevance.

30 Hoffmann, An American Social Science: International Relations", p.57.

Following this dictate, International Relations specialists as (social) scientists:

were depicted as problem solvers, moving diligently and systematically to uncover the mysteries of the natural world. An important aspect of problem solving [in this regard] was the ability to predict behaviour, and closely associated with prediction was the capacity to manipulate and control.\(^{32}\)

Never was this amalgam of modernist characteristics more evident than in the literature which, on this basis, now sought to solve the problems of the Third World by recourse to models of Western developmentalism and Modernisation Theory.\(^{33}\)

**Modernisation Theory: The Modernist Knowledge/Power Nexus Epitomised**

Modern Western industrial societies, it was asserted, had, by the 1960s, effectively overcome most of the problems (poverty, unemployment, ideological struggle) that beset "traditional" societies. In Western industrialised modernity, the argument went, those problems that remained were essentially matters of a technological incrementalism. Buoyed further by the successes of the "Free World" over Fascism and in its confrontation with Stalin's "closed society", Western, primarily North American problem solvers turned their attention and their rational scientific techniques to the task of "developing" the post-colonial societies of the Third World. To this issue they brought

\(^{32}\)See Little, "The Systems Approach", p.76, emphasis added.

an "ideology of developmentalism" centred on:

an essentially dichotomous approach...based on the work of nineteenth-century evolutionary theorists, and the comparison of the ideal-typical variables, tradition and modernity.34

More explicitly in the age which celebrated the "end of ideology" they brought a grand theory of development set upon a model of modernity which represented it as a:

process of change toward those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and then have spread to other European countries.35

Integral to this Modernisation Theory, in the decades after World War Two, was the "rediscovery" of (neo-classical) economics and of rational choice theory, in particular, which became the new orthodoxy not only in the universities but in the policy making sectors also.36 This is an issue of continuing significance for this discussion and for the broader issue of International Relations as a modernist discourse. Hoffmann indicated why, in connecting post-war Realism to the broader social theory context, where, at the end of World War Two:

a new dogma appeared. [in that] One of the social sciences, economics, was deemed to have met the expectations of the national ideology, and to have become a science on the model of the exact ones; it was celebrated for its contribution to the solution of the age-old problem of scarcity and inequality.37

The attempt to emulate the scientific achievements of economics was irresistible among Realists who proposed that, as in economics and political science, the focus in International Relations was:

not on on the origins and effects of culture, nor on the structures of community or of voluntary associations but on the creative and coercive role of a certain kind of power, and its interplay with social conflict.

34Higgott, Political Development Theory, p.17.

35Eisenstadt, Modernisation, Protest and Change, as cited in Higgott, Political Development Theory, p.16.

36Ibid, p.22.

37Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", p.47, emphasis added.
Accordingly, the analogy was drawn between the new science of International Relations and "that other science of scarcity, competition and power, economics".38

The connection made here between the new "dogmatism" of scientific economics and Cold War Realism is, ultimately, consistent in a modernist sense. The textual connection point rests again with Morgenthau and Politics Among Nations. More precisely, as Keohane has recognised, Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations established his central premise of rational state interaction, upon a notion of rationality "that is standard in neoclassical economics". Consequently, at the textual core of power politics Realism was an image of (analogised) human behaviour set within the conceptual boundaries of utilitarian rational-action. In this sense:

to say that governments act rationally...means that they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximise their utility.39

Keohane emphasised that Morgenthau was more subtle in his appreciation of this formula than it might appear, acknowledging that it was "not descriptively accurate". The rationality notion was, in this sense, for Morgenthau a "baseline", which could be "tested against the actual facts".40 Either way the legacy of Morgenthau is important here. The point is that for a generation of less "subtle" Realists the utilitarian formula has been understood as "descriptively accurate", while, on Keohane's own account, the mark of a more "subtle" Realist scholarship was the attempt to "test" Morgenthau's rationality postulate "against the actual facts". Some of the implications of this limited frame of reference will be discussed later in this chapter and in the one to follow. For now its impact upon 1960s Modernisation Theory requires some further comment.


39 Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", p.12.

40 Ibid. Indeed, according to Keohane, Morgenthau's "sophisticated" notion of rationality represented one of the Realist enduring wisdoms. Consequently, in waving the universalist wand, he pronounced it "consistent both with the [rationality assumption] of Thucydides and...later realists and neorealists, including Waltz", ibid.
In this context, the "dogmatic" status of neo-classical economic theory, and its rational choice theme, in particular, underlay the "quest for certainty" of prominent behaviouralists-cum-Modernisation Theorists, such as David Apter, for whom the key to progress and modern development in the Third World was an "improvement in the conditions of choice and the selection of the most satisfactory mechanisms of choice".

Similarly, for Gabriel Almond, the aim for scholars of development centred on the pursuit of "rational choice models of political growth".

Some of the crudest, albeit most influential work of this genre, emanated from the new economics of growth, as prescribed by figures such as W.W. Rostow, "the architect of modernization theory". Rostow's major text, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, resonated with modernist doctrines projected in terms of a "theory about economic growth, and a more general...theory of modern history as a whole".

The title of the work indicated its linear, progressivist tenor and, as an explicit "alternative to Karl Marx's theory of history", its status in the modernist "orthodox consensus" of Anglo-American social theory. So too its emphasis on the "transition" between traditional societies and modern ones. On this issue Rostow asserted:

It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories [i.e the five stages of growth] the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption.

Rostow's modernist credentials were never more explicit than when developing this

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46 Ibid, p.4.
"stages" theme. Here, a crude logocentrism informed the "father of modernisation theory" of the differences between traditional (backward) societies and their modern (rational-progressive) counterparts, and of the historical process by which the former were superseded by the latter. Thus, proposed Rostow:

In terms of history...with the phrase 'traditional society' we are grouping together the whole pre-Newtonian world: the dynasties in China; the civilisation of the Middle East and the Mediterranean; the world of medieval Europe. And to them we add the post-Newtonian societies which, for a time, remained untouched or unmoved by man's new capability for regularly manipulating his environment to his economic advantage.47

It is hard to imagine a more explicit celebration of Western modernity and its central sovereign figure - rational man (the user and controller of all things - natural and social) than this. Here, is confirmation of Bacon's ubiquitous postulate about knowledge and power, here starkly put is the doctrine of utilitarian "usefulness" and the theory and practice of control that continues to inform neo-Realist scholarship until the present day.48 Here too, of course, the other side of the modernist coin, "the dark underside of the development process" becomes increasingly evident.49 Here, the "knowledge" of Western Modernisation Theory becomes the power politics of Cold War political practice - the "theoretical" justification, for example, of US strategy in the Third World, legitimating the support of indigenous elites and their military regimes (i.e. the order priority) in the attempt to defeat "revolutionary labor movements in the name of creating favourable climates for international investment and wage assembly work".50 Developing this theme, Bradley Klein has emphasised the narrow ethnocentric and ideological framework of Modernisation approaches centred upon a:

process of enforced changes, implemented from above by a secular state system, that strategically alter the social landscape and prepare the way for a

48In Waltz's, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979) in particular.
49Klein, "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO", p.316.
50Ibid, p.316.
capitalist, market oriented political system.\textsuperscript{51}

Another insight into the "ideology of development" of the 1960s explained the logic of its "quest for certainty" in more explicit ideological terms, wherein:

an underdeveloped country must first create a stable (read non-Communist) government. This will then lead it to develop an economic base through the intelligent application of foreign aid and domestic investment. As the economy develops, a middle class will emerge which automatically shares the political values of the Western middle class. With this process of embourgeoisification will come democracy and property.\textsuperscript{52}

Integral, therefore, to Modernisation Theory was an image of reality in which any "freedom to choose" was dependent upon and determined by, a particular kind of social order, an order that in a Cold War context (Western order vs the anarchy of Soviet inspired disorder) could only be instigated and guaranteed by adherence to the politico-economic values and interests of the "West", represented by United States foreign policy, and the intellectual certitude of the "American way". This was a theme then already evident well before its 1980s variation in the works of North American Hegemonic Stability Theory and/or neo-Realism explaining how and why the U.S.A. is Bound To Lead.\textsuperscript{53} For Apter in 1971, for example, the aim was to "identify systems of order that do not penalise development and patterns of development that do not jeopardise order...our point of departure is choice".\textsuperscript{54} A much more explicit avowal of the order theme is to be found in the works of a figure such as Samuel Huntington, who in reformulating some of the Modernisation perspectives of the early 1960s, in less sanguine times, placed less emphasis on development as a linear, progressivist unfolding

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid, p.315.


\textsuperscript{54}Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation, p.6.
of freedom to choose, and more on a minimalist Realist "art of the possible", in which social progress was dependent upon strong institutionalised order and the power of political and military elites.55

It might be argued, of course, that Modernisation Theory, with its 1960s ethnocentricty, was itself a "stage" in the development of the Western cultural awareness of "otherness" and "difference" - a theoretical anachronism in an age of post colonial innocence. And, after all, Rostow's proposed "theory of economic history" was fairly swiftly exposed as both inadequate economics and crude ahistoricism.56 But to dismiss the Modernisation debate in this way would be to miss an important point about it, and its enduring significance for the more mainstream of International Relations literature in the 1980s and 1990s. The point, in short, is that many of the themes integral to the Modernisation literature of the 1960s and 1970s - its ethnocentrism - its crude essentialist reading of "history" - its techno-rationalist bias - its positivism, and more directly - its twin conceptual pillars of (Western capitalist) order and (individualist) choice - continue to be central to the way that the discipline, and its North American centre, in particular, has understood explained and legitimated its representation of global politics until the present. The order priority, for example, remains as part of the great (either/or) dichotomy throughout Realist literature (e.g. the order/anarchy theme from Bull to Waltz) while the order/choice theme remains at the heart of neo-Realist perspectives in the 1990s, which also continue to legitimate their Huntington like advocacy of strong (hegemonic) power, via an essentialist reading of Western history and Philosophy.57

Consequently, I want now to develop further this discussion of the positivist

55See Huntington, Political Order and Changing Societies. This is a theme at the forefront of de Sola Pool's concerns in 1967: "[i]t is clear that order depends on somehow compelling newly mobilised strata to return to a measure of passivity and defeatism from which they have been aroused by the process of modernisation. At least temporarily, the maintenance of order requires a lowering of newly acquired expectations and levels of passivity." In I. de Sola Pool ed., Contemporary Political Science: Towards Empirical Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p.26.

56Higgott, Political Development Theory, ch. 2.

57See the discussion, for example, in Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Realist phase of the discipline by concentrating more specifically on that period which gave enhanced credibility to Modernisation Theory and the more general projection of modernist thought in the Cold War projection of U.S. foreign policy. This is the period (approximately) between the early 1960s, and the enthusiasm of the "behaviouralist revolution", and the early 1970s, when faith in the "American way" began to dissipate somewhat in the face of the debacle in Vietnam. In the more immediate context this is the period, when in Hoffmann's terms, the "first wave" of the "quest for certainty" in International Relations, gave way to a "second wave" which saw Strategic Studies become the dominant sub field in the Realist led discipline.58

The "Second Wave" of Positivist Realism: Behaviouralism and Strategic Discourse

It was during this "second wave" period that the discursive character of the International Relations discipline increasingly replicated the broader social theory context. Consequently, as Vasquez has noted, behaviouralist scholarship in International Relations (connecting Morgenthau via Weber and Machiavelli to Popper) did not challenge the fundamental assumptions of power politics Realism, but sought instead, (like neo-Realists two decades later) to make it more "scientific".59 Rhetorically, nevertheless, there was a new critical edge within the discipline as the "scientific" Realist community articulated its increasing antipathy towards Traditionalist preoccupation with "history, exegesis and methodological conservatism".60 What the Traditionalists did not understand, argued those advocating behaviouralist solutions to contemporary problems, was that the old inductivist approaches of the Realist past were out of step with movements in the natural and the social sciences, now drawing upon themes from "theoretical physics and economic theory [which] are clearly distinguished from the


59Vasquez, Power of Power Politics, Chapter 2.

60This was the view in the broader behaviouralist context of Deutsch and Reiselbach, cited in John Gunnell, "Political Theory: The Evolution of a Subfield ", p.20.
history of past theories".61

In particular, it was argued, the "non theoretical-empiricism"62 of the Traditionalist past must give way to a more formal, systemic approach to theorising based not on the (naturalist) misunderstanding of the scientific method but on Popper's deductivist reformulation of it in which real science progresses via the falsificationist process.63 Hence, the exclusion and/or marginalisation of some aspects of the International Relations Tradition and its disciplinary "great texts" by those who now sought to establish their own more mature Realist credentials. Hence, the attempts to "test" major Traditionalist themes (e.g. balance of power) against hypothetico-deductive models.64

The sense of a linear, progressivist continuity of (real) knowledge in International Relations was clear enough in J.D. Singer's discussion of the dichotomy between "prescientific and scientific approaches" to International Relations. The parallels with Popper's work were obvious here in Singer's proclamation of the Traditional Realist

61 Ibid.

62 This is a term used by David Truman in his discussion of the linear development of (North) American political science, cited in Gunnell, ibid, p.20.

63 See the discussion on Popper and this issue in Chapter Three, pp.117-124. Some of course like J.D. Singer wanted to distinguish his optimistic scientism from the negativity of the Popperian approach, while at the same time stating rather strangely that he agreed with Popper's logical argument on the problems of verification. See "The Incompleat Theorist: Insight Without Evidence", in Contending Approaches to International Relations edited by Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p.65.

approach (e.g. Carr, Bull, Wight) as inductivist and therefore "prescientific". Singer's proposition, accordingly, was that Traditionalist Realism and its inductivist past, represented an earlier stage of scientific Realist analysis. Thus:

we cannot confirm or disconfirm a proposition [hypothesis] until it has been formulated, and the first draft of any such formulation almost invariably finds its expression in the classical mode.

Singer's proposal, more explicitly, was that while scholars, from "Thucydides through Carr, Wolfers, Claude and Morgenthau", had provided a great deal of "careful empiricism", this was not enough, because "these scholars have actually pinned down very little in the way of verified generalisations". Building upon this "careful empiricism" the scientific Realists of the behaviouralist era attempted to "pin down" the facts of International Relations indicated in prescientific (first draft) fashion by the Traditionalists. Gaining their theoretical sustenance from mainstream social theory debates the new scientific Realists scholars sought, in particular, to construct hypothesised models of interstate behaviour which could be "tested" and/or falsified against historical and contemporary "fact". Important here were Morton Kaplan's System and Process in International Politics which drew on a cognitive systems approach, and works by Karl Deutsch which introduced communication theory and cybernetic approaches to the discipline. Taken together, it is suggested, the contributions of Kaplan and Deutsch set the pattern for the behaviouralist reformulation of power politics Realism during the 1960s. Within this context many sought to more rigorously "verify" central power politics themes derived from Carr and Morgenthau. This broadened the research scope of the discipline considerably, adding significant sub-

65 The reference here is to Popper's strategy in detaching himself from (Logical) positivism, by emphasising its inductivism in contrast to his deductivist falsificationism. See the discussion in Chapter Three, pp.117-124.

66 Singer, "The Incomplete Theorist; Insight Without Evidence", p.68, emphasis added.

67 Ibid.

fields to the dominant power politics disciplinary heartland.69

Some, for example, concentrated on issues of national interest and national power, important, if rather vaguely presented concepts in the Realist "great texts". The question of power, in particular, was confronted in a manner that has continued to characterise disciplinary scholarship in general to the present day. As Vasquez has pointed out the this was a question framed with an "operational" principle and strategy in mind. Accordingly the debate over the real meaning of power was reduced effectively to competing aspects of its Weberian reading. Was it, in this sense, "the same as capability, influence, coercion, force, or just another word for cause?"70 Ultimately, power was represented as a national capability and/or resource, a representation designated as most applicable to precise explanation and predictive analysis.71 The works by the Sprouts in the 1950s and the Organski's in the 1960s exemplified the attempts to give operational verifiability to the "power as capability" notion.72 Scholars such as Guetzkow and Rummel, meanwhile, brought social psychology themes to bear on the issue, while Rosenau's "pre-theory" continued to find adherents.73

Another major research orientation among behaviouralist scholars was that concerned to elaborate the central Realist notion of the state and to understand in more

70 Ibid, p.55.
specific terms the location and nature of decision making at the international level. Works by the Hermann's, for example, employed simulation techniques to test hypotheses on the capacity for rational decision making in times of extreme crisis and the (potential) outbreak of nuclear war.74 Charles McClelland studied patterns of "interaction" in pre and post crisis situations and others developed theories of war based on perception and misperception of the "facts" under crisis conditions.75 This is a line of inquiry that has retained its influence in the works of Robert Jervis from the 1970s on.76 In the 1960s too Neustadt's theory of "bureaucratic politics" emerged to stimulate later influential images of state decision making based on struggles between Governmental elites (e.g. Allison).77

The "mechanistic" and systemic orientation of the period was perhaps most obviously expressed in relation to the major concept of the International Relations Tradition - the balance of power. Morgenthau, as earlier indicated, talked of this concept as a natural mechanism of power politics relations between states. Many, following him, sought to add more precision to the concept and, via a verifiable general theory,
operationalise it. Arthur Burns, for example, sought a "pure theory" of power politics centred on the balance of power principle that illuminated its transhistorical and universal applicability. Kaplan, meanwhile, created complex systemic models in order to test competing explanations of the balance concept and how to explain change in relation to it. Closely related to the attempt to scientifically theorise the balance of power concept was the attention paid to alliances. Here, coalition theory and the theory of collective goods were utilised to explain the behaviour of allied partners. Influenced by game theory assumptions and techniques it sought also to account for systemic state behaviour over time. Indeed, "Game Theory was [to become] the major conceptual innovation provided by the [strategic] subfield in articulating the realist paradigm".

Consequently, some Realist scholarship was oriented toward the search for a

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78 See Vasquez, Power of Power Politics, p.81.

79 Ibid, p.81.


81 See, for example, Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics.


scientific theory of International Relations in terms of a macro-systemic focus on the (anarchical) environmental circumstances in which the sovereign state actor operated. This was not yet the fully blown positivist-structuralism that was to become so influential within neo-Realist circles in the decades to follow, but in the early systems theory of Singer and McClelland the seeds of an Anglo-American positivist based structuralism were evident in International Relations.85 Kenneth Waltz, integral to the structuralist-Realism of the present, made an important contribution in the 1960s also, on the question of which systemic structure provided most order and stability.86 The ensuing debate saw works employing ever more complex quantitative tools designed to correlate and test hypotheses about balance of power systems down the ages.87

The question of war, and its causes, was another given a more systemic treatment in this period. Whereas Morgenthau and earlier power politics scholars had been generally pessimistic (often fatalistic) on this issue, the behaviouralists were buoyed by the progressiveness inherent in their approaches. This led, from the mid 1960s to a:

systematic effort to search for the causes of war, with the hope that in the distant future a truly empirical and scientific understanding of war (not like the normative, uncorroborated theory of the idealists) would make a world at peace possible.88

The most significant research project to flow from this disciplinary orientation, of course,


88See Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p.89. And just to reiterate the notion of an "orthodox consensus" once again, as Vasquez point out the peace research movement in International Relations also largely sprung from this progressivist, positivist based approach to the evidence, as for example in the mathematical modelling of the physicist Lewis Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960). See also the earlier pioneering work of data collection by Quincey Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).
has been the Correlates of War project which has provided a data source for scholars ever since seeking more precise models of what causes war and how it might be prevented.89

Throughout the behaviouralist period the issue of nuclear war loomed large. So too did the question of nuclear deterrence.90 Influential works by Herman Kahn introduced new levels of complexity to deterrence logic while prompting International Relations scholars to think the "unthinkable" - i.e. the use of nuclear weapons as an ultimate deterrent.91 Among nuclear strategists, however, it was the "rationality" premise associated with game theory that proved most appealing as the basis for scientific theorising about human behaviour and decision making processes in the nuclear age. Via game theory techniques, it was argued, strategic problems could be reduced to "a manageable form in which the dilemmas and paradoxes of the age could be bared and solutions explored". At the broader level (echoing Logical Positivism) the aims of nuclear strategic analysis were to construct a:

Nuclear strategy as a science [in which, firstly] the logic, dynamics and management of nuclear war and its deterrence can be explained and controlled by precise, quantifiable methods and policies. In this science of nuclear strategy only "hard" quantifiable variables of military capabilities, technological parameters, and economic resources are relevant... [while]..."soft" variables as historical patterns, cultural traditions, political practices, and personality traits are not particularly relevant because they cannot be accounted for in meaningful terms.92

Throughout the 1960s, accordingly, the literature of International Relations specialists


91 Kahn, On Thermonuclear War; Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable.

resonated with rational deductive approaches and game-theorised models derived largely from neo-classical economic theory and utilitarian assumptions about human nature and behaviour. As far as deterrence theory was concerned, the works of Thomas Schelling were, perhaps, the most sophisticated in their attempt to build into the equations theoretical dimensions not allowed by the more formalised approach to "gaming".  

There were, nevertheless, a number of scholars unimpressed with the outcomes (if not the methodological inputs) of the dominant articulation of the strategic/security discourse. Bruce Russett, for example, instigated major statistical studies concerned to illustrate that, the question of its theoretical sophistication aside, deterrence did not deter. Others, such as the mathematician Anatole Rapaport, also cast doubt upon deterrence logic and its assumptions, particularly its one dimensional commitment to coercive behaviour and its rigid zero-sum utilisation of the rationality premise. From more conventional perspectives also a range of analysts began to critically "test" deterrence hypotheses against historical evidence, finding the deductive logic of orthodox strategic thinking often unsound in its own (empiricist) terms.

In more recent times this and other dimensions of the discipline's "quest for certainty" has attracted broader and more profound criticism, and I just want to touch on some of these critical themes before moving on to the "third wave" of the disciplines development. Vasquez, as indicated earlier, has been particularly devastating in this


95A. Rapaport, Fights, Games and Debates: Rapaport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Schocken Books, 1964); see also in this vein Phillip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence.

regard and at this point it is worth reiterating some of the conclusions he reached on the positivist Realist approach of the 1960s and 1970s.

In relation to behaviour in foreign policy making, deterrence and bargaining procedures, for example, Vasquez's found that Realist literature provided, at best, ambiguous evidence in support of its claims, while, at worst, it stood as a dogmatic and narrow representation of reality, replete with danger and paradox. He had some critical things to say, for example, on the rationalist presumption that: (i) decision makers will act in similar ways, responding as they do to a single "external" reality; and (ii) that these decisions can be deduced in terms of utilitarian model of rational self interest. This universalised and essentialist perspective was found wanting, he argued, immediately one confronted it with a range of studies not encompassed within its narrow analytical boundaries (e.g. social psychology). In particular, argued Vasquez, Realists have effectively ignored alternative approaches which maintain, for example, that, "decision makers process information in terms of images they have developed of other actors and of the environment" and which illustrate that, under conditions of crisis:

new information that conforms to existing images tends to be emphasized, and information that is dissonant with the images is often not seen, ignored or explained away.

Moreover, in stressing that, "overreliance on images and analogies to what worked in the past" tended to dominate in situations where Realism has projected a (singular, utilitarian) rationalised logic at work, Vasquez concluded that hypothetico-deductive models of foreign policy action:

based on the assumption of selfish interest and/or calculation of costs and benefits, are too simplistic either as description or prediction of behaviour, and certainly as explanation.

Ultimately, he proposed, "foreign policy is not based on a rational calculation of the

98 Ibid.
national interest" and, more generally:

rational actor models cannot account for behaviour in the two circumstances in which realist explanations would be expected to be most applicable - crisis interaction and the onset of war.100

This final point has particular significance for the seminal neo-Realism of Kenneth Waltz to be discussed in the next chapter. In the more immediate context it has significance for that enormous literature which has explained issues of political crisis and war in terms of the game-theorised logic of deterrence for more than three decades. On this issue Vasquez found that, even in relation to the behaviour of the United States since the onset of the Cold War, this approach was inadequate in its own terms and, accordingly, "one cannot help but doubt its relevance for decision makers who have a different culture, history, language and ideology".101 Similarly, he proposed, "War is not the rational or Machiavellian calculation and test of strength" that Realist analysis proclaimed it to be, but a much more complex phenomenon that required a more sophisticated analytical regime to understand its nature and implications.102 Finally, on the Realist assertion that International Relations is, at its core, the endemic struggle for power, Vasquez countered that while evidence exists that this is, at times, an accurate representation of "one type of behaviour found in the global political system" the broader Realpolitik explanation "does not provide a [universal] theory of world politics, but merely an image that decision makers can have of the world".103

Some of the implications of this limited perspective Vasquez also illustrated in relation to alliance formation as the application of Realist "theory" to the "practice" of war and peace. Here, as indicated earlier, his conclusions are chilling, given the confidence with which alliance strategies (e.g. balances of power) have been prescribed as the only

100Ibid, pp.210-211.
102Ibid, p.213.
103Ibid, 216.
realistic response to an anarchical world "out there", in the period of Realist disciplinary
dominance. In short, the findings were that, "balance of power and alliance aggregation
generally do not prevent war, but are preparations for war". When the emphasis was
shifted slightly to account for the more precise debate over the best systemic formation by
which war might be avoided, Vasquez's findings had a similar ring to them. On the
question, for example, of whether power parity or preponderance is the safest balance
system, Vasquez found an interesting irony concerning Realist analysis. It was that, on
occasions, both systemic structures have been associated with peaceful relations between
the major states while, at other times, both have been associated with periods of warfare.
The irony of course is that while Realist scholars might point to "factual" correlation of
their hypotheses on this issue, they cannot do so in the terms that their (universalised)
correspondence rule theory demands - that is in terms of a general theory of war and
peace across historical time, cultural space and interpretive practice.104

On the systemic question, in general, Vasquez had this to say about positivist
Realist scholarship between the late 1960s and 1970s:

many scholars [in this period] debated whether a bipolar or multipolar system
would produce peace. If the realist paradigm were an accurate guide to
inquiry, at least one side would have been expected to be correct. Instead,
both were wrong. The only major difference is whether one will pay the
Grim Reaper all at once with a few severe wars, or on the instalment plan
with many wars.105

Now, at least three qualificatory points can be made about the revisiting of
Vasquez's mammoth study, just undertaken. The first is that his study ends at 1980.
Consequently, something needs to be said about the continuance or otherwise of the
themes he raised in the last decade or so, if the significance of his findings are to be
connected directly to the debate on neo-Realism to follow. It will be shortly. The second
qualification, as indicated in Chapter One, is that for all Vasquez's insights, his is
ultimately a modernist critique which, in its pursuit of a more genuinely scientific

104Ibid, p.221.
paradigm for International Relations, paradoxically replicates the modernist discursive agenda at the core of positivist Realism. There is a need, consequently, to open up that which Vasquez leaves closed even in his devastating critique of the discipline, and this too will be increasingly attempted as the thesis progresses from here.

In so doing the third qualificatory point becomes important. It relates more specifically to the modernist limitations of the literature from which Vasquez derived his findings. The point, less obtusely, is that for the most part Vasquez drew his critical findings from scholarship which falls within a Realist framework of understanding. For some, of course, this indicates (correctly) that Realism is a complex intersection of approaches and perspectives that cannot be easily reduced to a single literary articulation of it. But there is another more profound issue that needs to be raised in this context. It is that the existence of "alternative" approaches within Realist literature does not undermine the proposition that it represents a dominant and effectively closed modernist discourse at work. Indeed, as indicated in Chapters Two and Three, one of the primary characteristics of a post-Kantian Western discourse is the range of "alternative" voices that might be heard within it. The point that needs to be reiterated here is that made in Chapters Four and Five (on the Cold War) which is that, to a very great extent, the "alternatives" are themselves part of a discursive "orthodox consensus". Hence, it is the foundationalism at the core of positivist/behaviouralism (the "empiricist metaphysic") which remains the primary reason for the basic inadequacies of strategic discourse, as exposed by Vasquez, and which continues also to limit Vasquez's critical "alternative".106

The implications of this have been recorded in a slightly broader context in Philip Lawrence's recent updating of issues central to strategic discourse during and after the period of Vasquez's inquiry.107 Connecting together some of the broader themes of the

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106I will develop this point again later (in Chapter Nine) and bring the issue up to date by saying something about an "alternative" voice in the 1990s, Barry Buzan.

thesis with the more immediate concerns of this chapter, Lawrence sought, in 1987, to illustrate the inadequacy of contemporary mainstream strategic analysis by confronting it with some of the philosophical questions that it has studiously and systematically ignored since the 1960s. Lawrence was particularly interested in the Weberian legacy at the core of strategic analysis and the impact (albeit unacknowledged) of Weber's mediated positivism upon the question of how strategists come to "know" and understand the real world. The most significant theme here was "the radical bifurcation between theory and practice", allowed for by Weber, which in turn has allowed an (ostensible) "value neutrality [which has] been virtually canonised as common sense" by a generation of strategic analysts.\textsuperscript{108} Rejecting this "common sense" proposition, Lawrence located the major problems of strategic discourse at its modernist core, in the "rationalism, empiricism and pragmatism" that have informed and directed it.\textsuperscript{109} He noted the influence of rationalism, in projecting the "logical coherence of deductive arguments" and modelling techniques for empirical analysis (with game theory as its most obvious manifestation): of empiricism, in legitimating the process of "observation and experiment and the idea of truth...concretized in verification against data"; and of pragmatism, in invoking the "usefulness" criteria for analysis, the notion that "if a particular theory is useful then it can be regarded as true".\textsuperscript{110}

All of these themes, as the following chapter will illustrate, are very evident in contemporary neo-Realism, but Lawrence sought to make two, more precise, points about them regarding strategic discourse since the 1960s. The first was that "strategic studies is woefully lacking in hard facts and verifiable theories",\textsuperscript{111} the second (echoing Michael McCGwire's misgivings) that, nevertheless, it has been the (non existent) "facts" and their "verifiability", that has "defined the agenda and provided the vocabulary of

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid, pp.296-297.
\textsuperscript{109}Ibid, p.297.
\textsuperscript{110}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111}Ibid.
strategic discourse throughout NATO", and indeed, throughout the international community for the past generation. The result, suggested Lawrence, was a primitive and ultimately dangerous perspective on the world "out there" which, for example, has represented an "article of faith" (deterrence theory and practice) as a scientific postulate. Moreover, in drawing on its modernist epistemological legacy, strategic discourse had constructed its disciplinary image of the world on an illusory distinction - between policy analysis and political and "normative" commitment (fact/value). Consequently, in typical modernist form, those trained in strategic discourse since the 1960s have (ostensibly) detached themselves from the "political" process on the basis that "scientific reason cannot dictate ends of policy". From this perspective, it became possible (indeed necessary) for strategic analysts to proclaim that,

the reality under scrutiny - in our case force and conflict - is an external reality which is independent of of the academic strategist who merely describes and explains what exists.113

The implications of this, aside from its closure and paradox, range from a systematic desensitising of the dangers of nuclear megadeath to encouragement of ever more lethal arms race, all in the name of value free policy analysis. At one level, resultingly, the "quest for certainty", in the discipline since the 1960s, has allowed for some at least "to live in psychological comfort in a world where there are 50,000 nuclear warheads with an explosive power of 20 billion tons of TNT".114

The logic of such a position is best summed up, perhaps, by Robert Tucker's proposition that a Western strategic posture based on deterrence theory has been empirically validated, because the nuclear superpowers have "behaved quite prudently for three decades".115 Whatever else such a statement represented, suggested Lawrence, it

112Cited in ibid, p. 295. In Chapter Nine something more will be said on the NATO issue, particularly in regard to its position in the security/strategy discourse at the end of the Cold War.

113Ibid, p.300.

114Ibid, p.298

stood (paradoxically) as a "value" judgement on deterrence, which assumes that firstly, peace has been determined by deterrence strategy, and secondly that "the development of thermo-nuclear weapons, MIRV's, MARV's and the strategic defense initiative are examples of practical wisdom".116 At another level, regarding the role of scientific strategic analysis in accelerating the arms race during the Cold War, the modernist power/knowledge nexus is once again clearly and dangerously discernible. Accordingly, in the late 1970s, at the time of the "second" Cold War it was the logic of scientific policy analysis that gave legitimacy to the "window of vulnerability" thesis peddled, during the Carter and Reagan Administrations. This scenario, which depicted the Soviets as having both the intent and the capacity to destroy U.S. land based missiles in their silos, was "hardly credible" given the existence of a TRIAD defence structure. And yet this very scenario "represented a major input from strategy into the political arena".117 Explaining how this was possible, Lawrence reiterated Nathanson's theme concerning the "interpretive straightjacket" of U.S. Cold War thinking and its understanding of the Soviets. Accordingly, Lawrence proposed:

what [was] really fantastic here [was] the political assessment of the Soviet Union which presumed the Soviet leaders could gamble on a lack of response from the B52's and submarines when 60 of the former or 15 of the latter could destroy the USSR's industrial base.118

When Lawrence turned to the question of why this "fantastic" scenario continued to gain credence in the 1980s the issue of modernist closure was returned to the forefront of the debate. Primarily, he maintained, the problems of International Relations scholarship, since the 1960s, has been its epistemological commitments and the resultant "quest for certainty", which has blinded it to its interpretive, value laden and ideological character. Consequently, "pragmatism which applies literally to the practical efficacy of strategy, is irrelevant to the practice of nuclear strategy [and] ...Empiricism, which demands verification against "facts", is also inapplicable because of the interpretive

116Ibid.
118Ibid.
character of strategy”. Moreover, the rationality principle at the heart of game theory, and the behavioural logic of the Realist international system, per se, had provoked an "abstraction" creating the "illusion of truth where none exists".¹¹⁹

As so often in the post-Enlightenment period, however, the inadequacies and dangers of the "quest for certainty" have been either ignored or effectively marginalised by an orthodoxy, concerned to create "an illusion of truth where none exists". In this case, consequently, the mainstream discourse on security and strategy remains, to the present, committed to the very assumptions, premises, themes and policy prescriptions, which since Morgenthau and the early years of the Cold War, have incarcerated Realist scholarship in an "interpretive straightjacket".

One final example of this incarceration will suffice here before moving on. This is a particularly important articulation of the modernist "interpretive straightjacket", because it was presented in 1991 with nuclear tensions dissipated, and because it was meant to illustrate the new, more insightful nature, of strategic thinking as the "West" looks beyond the "necessities" of the Cold War. It came from Stephen Walt and it proclaimed a "more rigorous, methodologically sophisticated and theoretically inclined" age of security discourse.¹²⁰ Walt's primary aim was to establish that after the "golden age" of strategic discourse in the 1960s, when there was often "little reliable information" nor "systematic evidence supporting the authors hypotheses"¹²¹ the 1980s and 1990s has seen a "renaissance" in security and strategic studies based on "systematic social science research rather than on unverified assertion or argument".¹²²

Acknowledging that these new perspectives still fitted "comfortably within the

¹²²Ibid, pp.211-212.
familiar realist paradigm"123 Walt sought, nevertheless, to emphasise the qualitative
difference between the earlier (behaviouralist) Realist perspectives and the more
sophisticated contemporary variant. In this regard he pointed to the (perceived)
fundamental changes which took place after the Vietnam War when "scholars in security
studies beg[an] to abandon the relatively simple assumptions that had guided the first
wave".124

Developing this notion further, Walt emphasised a new sensitivity on historical
issues as "among the most important developments in security studies" in the 1980s and
1990s.125 Chiding earlier scholarship for its "ahistorical" tendencies, he then proceeded
to represent the "sophisticated" alternative in typically unsophisticated terms, in
celebrating the use of "historical cases as a means of generating, testing and refining
theories".126 The paradox associated with this position - which, in the era of "post-
behavioural"/"postpositivist" scholarship saw "history" represented in typical
behaviouralist/positivist form - (i.e. as an ahistorical "object" in the past "generating"
facts which can then be tested to create "theory") - was seemingly lost on Walt who
meandered on, in familiar terms, propounding the value of "focusing on concrete
historical events" as part of a "more nuanced, policy relevant theory".127

The modernist continuity at the core of Walt's "new" thinking was most exposed
when he sought to locate the new strategic debate as part of the broader "scholarly agenda
among theorists of international politics" in the 1980s and 1990s.128 The omission here
was not so much what Walt had to say about the Third Debate, but the limitations and

123Ibid, p.212.
124Ibid, p.216.
126Ibid.
127Ibid.
silences of his representation of it. The problem for Walt, more precisely, was that his understanding of the current theoretical agenda stretched only as far as his (positivist) understanding of "theory" did. Accordingly, Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* was praised, as a "powerful reformulation" of Realism, while nowhere was there any attention given to the more critically informed literature of the contemporary "scholarly agenda" which has fundamentally undermined Waltz's work.\(^{129}\)

The reason for an omission such as this is made clear enough when Walt, in seeking to sum up his argument, exposed his own commitment to the crude positivism which characterises Waltz's neo-Realism. Thus, remarkably, in 1991, the "newness" of the security/strategic discourse was represented, by Walt, in terms of a three dimensional positivist project concerned, initially with the process of "theory creation". This process, explained Walt, was all about "the development of logically related causal propositions explaining a particular phenomenon of interest". The focus then fell upon the process of "theory testing", which, he explained, concerned "attempts to verify, falsify, and refine competing theories by testing their predictions against a scientifically selected body of evidence". And, finally, there was the question of "theory application" which, encompassed "the use of existing knowledge to illuminate a specific policy problem.\(^{130}\) Summarising this new, more sophisticated, approach to security/strategic issues at the end of the Cold War, Walt proclaimed its new purpose as the search for "cumulative knowledge about the role of military force". This, he suggested, was an ambition well within the reach of the new breed of security/strategic analysts of the 1990s, because:

> the field [now understands that it] must follow the standard canons of scientific research; careful and consistent use of terms, unbiased measurement of critical concepts, and public documentation of theoretical and empirical claims.\(^{131}\)

\(^{129}\)Ibid, 219. Waltz's work will be the subject of discussion in the next chapter. At this point it is worth noting Alker's and Biersteker's proposition that *Theory of International Politics* does not even represent sophisticated positivism in its "search for 'value free' timeless laws...proposed with Olympian detachment". See "The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist of International Savoir Faire", *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (1984), pp 121-142, at p.133.


\(^{131}\)Ibid, p.222.
At the completion of Chapter Six in a thesis such as this, there is, hopefully, no need for further comment on Walt’s perspective, except, perhaps, to suggest that, in itself, it is a testament to the need for International Relations scholars to take seriously their "unwritten preface". One more theme from Walt’s work, is, nevertheless, of significance here. It concerns his commentary on the Critical Social Theory contribution to the Third Debate and, not surprisingly, it was representative of the "despairing" response in this context.\(^{132}\)

Consequently, Walt felt compelled (presumably on the basis of his close reading of such literature) to warn that:

security studies should remain wary of the counterproductive tangents that have seduced other areas of international studies of international studies, most notably the "post-modern" approach to international affairs.

This, he explained, was because:

Contrary to their proponents' claims, post-modern approaches have yet to demonstrate much value for comprehending world politics; to date these works are mostly criticism and not much theory...[moreover] issues of peace and war are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world.\(^{133}\)

On this note, with post-modernist scholarship being dismissed on the basis of the "real" world knowledge of a crude positivist of the Realist mainstream, the most constructive response might be to utilise Walt's perspective as a prime example of the continuing positivist domination of security/strategic discourse, and as evidence of the broader continuity between modernism and International Relations which this chapter has sought, again, to illustrate.

\(^{132}\)Ibid, p.223. The issue of the "despairing" response to Critical Social Theory in International Relations is discussed in Chapter One, pp.47-50.

\(^{133}\)Ibid, p.223, emphasis added.
Summary

This chapter has sought to develop further, and from a number of angles, the notion introduced in Chapter Five of the fundamental *continuity* between the modernist discourse of Western theory and practice discussed in Chapter Two and the Tradition and discipline of International Relations. The previous chapter concentrated on the emergence and early development of a modernist framing regime in the discipline of International Relations as textually derived from the Realism of E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years Crisis* and from the "interpretivist straightjacket" of the early Cold War years. This chapter had slightly different concerns and ambitions. It sought at one level to connect the positivist Realism of the 1950s and 1960s in International Relations to the broader discursive circumstances associated with Anglo-American social theory, in the same period. Its point of entry, in this regard, was the Weber-Morgenthau intersection and the Verstehen perspective which, for a century or more, has invoked in Anglo-American thought images drawn from that border area of hermeneutics and positivism.

Attention was paid to the "great text" which more than any other afforded post-war Realism its confidence and policy status - Morgenthau's, *Politics Among Nations*. Consistent with the broader aim of the chapter, attention was also focused on a silence in Morgenthau's work, and that, subsequently, of the discipline, concerning the impact upon it of Weber's Verstehen perspective - "the other side of the positivist coin". This, it was argued, was the discursive space within which International Relations engaged its scientific "quest for certainty" in the 1960s - a "quest" carried out, primarily, in Popperian falsificationist terms. The discussion concentrated on the *implications* of this for the questions and answers of those purportedly observing the "facts" of the Third World and of the nuclear stand off "out there" in the Cold War world. In both contexts, it was argued, the image of reality generated was derived primarily from the limiting modernism which constituted the discursive boundaries of Realist "reality".  

134 As in the discussion in the previous chapter, pp.230-238, which utilised Nathanson's work on the "interpretivist straightjacket" of the immediate post-war years, to make the same point.
illustrated most starkly in the crude ethnocentric progressivism of Modernisation Theory and, from a different angle in the mathematised and formularised commitments of a generation of security/strategic analysis oriented towards a "scientific" articulation of Traditionalist, power politics "givens". And while, within the security/strategic community there were "alternative" voices occasionally heard (e.g. Russett, Jervis) they spoke in modernist discursive terms. Vasquez's valuable (critical modernist) insights were revisited, to indicate some of the "practical" implications and great dangers of this continuing discursive dominance in security/strategic thinking. The chapter came to an end with an attempt to illustrate how, right up to the present (beyond Vasquez's study) the modernist legacy spearheaded by positivist principles of understanding remains at the forefront of Realist theory and practice. Philip Lawrence's critique was utilised to indicate that the rationalist and empiricist perspectives of Seventeenth century European philosophy continue to direct International Relations research and policy prescription in the nuclear age, albeit in pragmatist terms. Stephen Walt's recent contribution to the debate indicated, even more profoundly, the desperate state of the intellectual art in the 1990s.

In short, this chapter has been concerned to further, and more profoundly illustrate why it is important to locate the Tradition and discipline of International Relations as part of a modernist framing regime, and how, through the years of the 1960s in particular Realist scholarship was limited by its modernist commitments. In relation to the "quest for certainty" of this period and since, the chapter sought to provide a different angle on a literature which resounded with claims to have discovered the foundational basis of: (i) the reality (i.e. anarchical) of relations between states; (ii) the nature of the modern world of states and/or state "system" (with its independent, utilitarian structure and its inevitable security dilemmas); (iii) of the "art of the possible" (i.e. order under anarchy) associated with the "control" of modern International Relations; and (iv) of the correct method (positivist/empiricist) by which the world "out there" is to be understood.

The chapter now to follow has similar concerns in that its focus of attention is the
replication of modernist and positivist commitments in the new orthodoxy of International relations in the 1990s - neo-Realism. It argues that there has been nothing original or even surprising in the response of Realists to the "anomalies" of orthodox theory and practice in the post Vietnam era, which appeared to undermine the "certainty" of their state centric, power politics, analysis. Like orthodox responses before them, across the social theory spectrum, the neo-Realist response has had all the hallmarks of a modernist discursive practice, albeit in updated and reformulated mode. There has, thus, been the resort to even more precise level of certitude, and a narrowing down of the "meaningful" principle (i.e. rational order under anarchy) which would have done the Logical Positivists proud. And, in replicating earlier paradoxes associated with the post war "quest for certainty", the neo-Realism of the (fully blown) "post-positivist"/"post-behaviouralist" era has been articulated in exemplary positivist terms, consistent with the behaviouralist attempt to make the Tradition of International Relations Realism more "scientific".

This is not to suggest that the neo-Realists of the 1990s have reverted entirely to the "high politics" scenarios of the past, or that their Traditionalism is represented, explicitly, in the "metaphysical" terms repudiated by behaviouralism. Rather, in seeking to accommodate some of the criticisms of the 1960s and 1970s, the more nuanced of the mainstream in the 1980s and 1990s have made selective forays into the behaviouralist and Traditionalist genres in reconstructing their approach to the "is" of the world in the contemporary era. The result is a fusion of Traditional Realist epithets and systemic "models" of behaviour derived primarily from the "scientific" insights of neo-classical economics, now re-presented as contemporary reality in the age of an International Political Economy. It is to this modernist hybrid and its continuing closure that the discussion now turns.
CHAPTER SEVEN

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE REGIME DEBATE:
FROM (RELATIVE) OPENNESS TO NEO-REALIST CLOSURE

Much of the impetus for the International Political Economy approaches of the contemporary period, and for the emergence of neo-Realism, emanate from that period in the early 1970s when Realist theory and practice was confronted with crisis on a number of fronts - e.g. the Vietnam war, the failure of Modernisation Theory in the Third World, and a series of challenges to United States global hegemony.\(^1\) These crises provoked, among more sensitive commentators at least, attempts to go beyond the rigidity of the post-1945 "catechism" (either Traditionalist or behaviouralist) and confront Realism with some of the anomalies of its theory and practice. Consequently, after the impotent jousting of the second "great debate", and while the mainstream on both sides of the positivist Realist coin, "breath[ed] a sigh of relief and [got] back with clear consciences to what they had been doing"\(^2\) some within Realist ranks began a rudimentary but long

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\(^1\)For a broad overview of this period and the impact it had on International Relations see Maghoori and Ramberg eds., Globalism versus Realism: International Relations Third Debate (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982).

\(^2\)This was a theme raised by Martin Indyk, "The Australian Study of International Relations", in Surveys of Australian Political Science edited by D. Aitken (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p.276. Interestingly Indyk was reflecting here upon the attitudes of Anglophile Traditionalists who, cheering from the Antipodean bleachers, hailed Hedley Bull's "victory" over the North American "scientific Realists", a "victory" that meant a great deal to those whose identity largely rested on their Traditionalism with its air of (British) superiority. See Bull, "International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach", World Politics XVIII (April 1966), pp.361-377; reprinted in Contending Approaches to International Relations edited by K. Knorr and J. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

It is interesting too, in this regard, to ponder Indyk's proposition that if, instead of celebrating Bull's "victory", his supporters had critically evaluated his arguments, they might have noted that he didn't argue a case "for" the Classical school at all, but merely reiterated some already existing antipathies toward the "scientific" approach. Going beyond Indyk, of course, its worth recalling Bull's own commitments to the positivism which in its deductivist articulation he condemned with such relish. On this issue see Chapter One, footnotes 24 and 53. In a recent work I have tried to explain the complex nature of Bull's theoretical position by relating it to his major philosophical influence via John Anderson. See "Some Thoughts on the Givenness of Everyday Life in Australian International Relations: Theory and Practice", Australian Journal of Political Science (forthcoming). Whatever the case this episode marks another site at which International Relations scholars needed to think much more seriously about their perspectives, and didn't.

The implications of this were evident enough in the analysis of Australia's mainstream Realists on the
overdue re-assessment of some fundamental premises and positions. At this point, and to varying degrees, the crisis in Realism began to overlap with that larger sense of crisis in Anglo-American social theory, discussed in earlier chapters.3

This is a theme of obvious significance for this thesis, and in this chapter it will be explored as part of a discussion which concentrates on the theory and practice of International Relations in the period between the 1970s and the present. In the broader social theory context this has been the period of Critical Social Theory and a "new conversation" within Anglo-American scholarship.4 It has also been the period when, for all the claims to the contrary, a positivist based "orthodox consensus" has continued to dominate.5 The tensions between critical thought and disciplinary orthodoxy have been replicated in International Relations, as the comments on the Third Debate, in Chapter One, indicated.6 Accordingly, as conservative forces elsewhere regrouped and responded to "revisionist" accounts of reality so, in International Relations, the "revisionism" of the Interdependence scholars of the early 1970s, and a liberalised or "Grotian" International Political Economy perspective, has been confronted by the neo-Realism of some of the most prominent figures in the discipline.7 The result is that International Relations in the major foreign policy issue of the post-war period - the Vietnam War. See Indyk, "The Australian Study of International Relations".

3See the discussion in Chapter One on the Critical Social Theory challenges to orthodoxies across the disciplines, pp.43-66 and in Chapters Three and Four.


5See Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (London: Macan, 1982), p.2; see also the discussion in Chapter Four, pp. 154-156.

6See Chapter One, pp.32-43.

7The Interdependence position at this time is associated primarily with the work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. See Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) which they edited and Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); and Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 2nd edition (Boston: Scott, Foreman and Company, 1989). The latter works reflect the shifting attitudes of the authors, away from the (relative) liberal openness of the period after Vietnam and the crises of the 1970s, and towards the resurgent (neo)Realism of more recent times. There were others too working in this Interdependence area. See, for example, Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); and Cooper, A Reordered World: Emerging International Economic Problems (Washington D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1973). The "Grotian" designation is that of neo-Realists such as Stephen Krasner toward the works of figures such as Donald Puchala, Raymond
1980s and 1990s has again begun to resonate with the (illusory) certitude of a reasserted positivist-Realist "catechism".

The discussion in this chapter will be organised, primarily, around this theme of relative openness and subsequent closure. It seeks, in this context, to again illustrate the modernist continuity in International Relations in a period which, more explicitly than ever, has seen its Realist mainstream attempting to detach itself from the limitations of its (positivist, behaviouralist, Traditionalist Realist) "past". It argues that, for all the proclamations of post-positivism and post-Realism the most influential "alternatives" to Realism (and modernism) in the current period, are, like their counterparts in the broader social theory context, still very much located within modernist/positivist "orthodox consensus". And it indicates, in the most contemporary of terms, why it is so necessary that Critical Social Theory attitudes and perspectives become a significant part of the agenda, in a Tradition and a discipline which continues to ignore its "preface", and which continues consequently, to understand and "respond" to the world in "primitive" terms.

**Vietnam, Interdependence and the Regime Debate**

The debacle in Vietnam forced a re-assessment of United States security/strategic discourse, its understanding of some aspects of the world "out there" (e.g. South-East Asia) and its foreign policy perspectives in general. As part of this post-Vietnam crisis, Realists of all varieties were confronted with a range of "revisionist" critiques aimed at the inadequacies of their approach to knowledge and society.8 Boiled down to its basics, the

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8See, for example, Robert Blum, **Drawing the Line: The Origin of the American Containment Policy in East Asia** (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982); Daniel Yergin, **Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977); David Halberstam, **The Best and the Brightest** (New York: Random House, 1972); Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, **The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked** (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1979); Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel, **Roots of
charge, in the early 1970s, was that Realism represented a simplistic, ethnocentric and ideological articulation of Western (primarily North American) interests, which was unwilling and/or incapable of dealing with a complex international arena.

In terms of fundamental Realist assumptions, and its "quest for certainty", at least three precise criticisms can be gleaned from the critical literature on the Vietnam War. The first, pointing to the inadequacies of behaviouralist policy analysis, noted that for all the intricate modelling, mathematical posturing, systems theories and assertions about the patterned "recurrence and repetition" of inter-state life, Realists had no adequate theory of the state, no accurate insight into the history, culture and socio-political structure of Vietnam, its peoples or its struggle. Secondly, for all its proclamations of universality, and for all its game theorised accounts of means/ends behaviour and strategic predictability, derived from the "rationality" principle of neo-classical economic theory, Realism had no comprehension of the North Vietnamese capacity for "irrational" behaviour in regard to levels of "acceptable damage". Thirdly, committed to crude assumptions about the nature of "power" (e.g. as modern military/technological capacity) all the Realist "historical" and philosophical insight, and all its techno-rational predictive capacity, could not account for the defeat of a modern Western state at the hands of a traditional society, utilising "backward" technological and intellectual resources.

In a rudimentary way, then, the crisis of the post-Vietnam period prefigured the Third Debate critiques of the 1980s and 1990s with their attacks on the theory and practice of positivist-Realism. The ensuing debate saw a degree of self reflective scholarship emerge which (to some degree) reflected a new awareness of theoretical/interpretive issues now becoming influential across the Anglo-American social theory spectrum. It evoked, as one commentator saw it, "a more profound and difficult shift in intellectual orientation rooted in increasing discontent with the scientific inadequacy as well as the unacknowledged ideological preconceptions of liberal
development theory” and strategic analysis in general. Another view of the period stressed that across the social theory disciplines the impression was growing that:

what was supposed to be objective scientific knowledge was in fact a disguised form of ideology that lent support to the status quo; that the most striking characteristic of the social sciences was not their ability to illuminate existing social and political reality, but their inability to provide any critical perspective on what was happening.

It was in this general atmosphere that, in the early 1970s, scholars such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye began to prise open some critical space within International Relations, on themes previously closed off under the rigid framing regime of conservative Realist scholarship since World War Two. Their basic Interdependence argument was that, contrary to the commonly held Realist image of the state centric world "out there", actors other than sovereign states must be accorded significance in any contemporary power politics equation. To understand international order in the 1970s, consequently, was to understand a more complex matrix of power relations, not reducible solely to the crude power machinations of sovereign states, but influenced also by the activities of other (multinational, transnational) non-state actors and the politico economic connections between them, at both micro and macro levels.

This is not to suggest that the Interdependence challenge of Keohane and Nye represented a serious effort to critically re-evaluate Realism in terms of its modernist legacy, or even its positivist inspired "disavowal of reflection". Rather, the purpose, as Keohane, in retrospect, recalled, was to supplement a "basic theory of state action" and


11See Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics.


construct "structural models of international Regime change" in order to "improve the ability of Realist or Neo-Realist analysis to account for [such change]".\textsuperscript{14} For all this, and for all the ambiguity with which the Interdependence themes were presented in the 1970s, in questioning Realism's Traditional state centric premise, and in emphasising the significance of non-state (transnational) actors and issue based analysis, the work of Keohane and Nye opened some space for (moderately) critical and more pluralistic analysis at the American centre of the discipline which, since the Cold War, had largely recited the Realist "catechism".

It was in this space that the debate over the nature and role of politico-economic regimes became a significant theme in International Relations. The issue of regimes had been raised in the "integrationist" or "functionalist" scholarship of the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{15} In the 1970s, however, when (among other things) the demise of Bretton Woods, the challenge to United States economic dominance by Japan, the OPEC crisis and the catastrophe in Vietnam, were increasingly represented as weakening U.S. power in the world and (in North America in particular) as nails in the coffin of the post-war order, the regime issue re-emerged as part of a reformulated disciplinary perspective on contemporary reality at the international level. And, it was on this basis that questions of order, sovereignty, and systemic power relations - central themes in the Realist lexicon - became inexorably interwoven with the regime issue and the question of United States

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid, p.160.

\textsuperscript{15}See, for example, Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organisation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968); and from a European perspective, David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). In this period also others, such as John Burton, were developing alternative perspectives which did not centre on Traditional state centric analysis. Burton's alternative stressed integrative behaviour among a variety of actors and it was presented in terms of social psychology premises and with "systemic" ambitions. It has remained an influential approach in Britain, in particular. See Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Vasquez's insight needs to be noted on this issue regarding the discursive continuity of this early regime (or integrationist) theory. Vasquez's point is that the work of Deutsch and Haas, for example, was always conducted "within the context of the [R]ealist paradigm" with neither Deutsch's communications and cybernetic theory, nor Haas' functionalism, violating the "fundamental assumptions" of power politics Realism. See Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p.115. I will add a dimension to this issue shortly in the discussion on "Grotian" regime theory - the updated version of "integrationism".
hegemony in an interdependent world. The regime debate has, subsequently, become the site of various attempts to "open" International Relations to approaches and understandings traditionally excluded from serious disciplinary concern. The discussion to follow looks briefly at a few of these attempts and neo-Realist responses to them.

**Regimes and the "Grotian" Search for Thinking Space.**

The definition of a regime is itself an issue of much debate. One influential definition regards regimes as that set of implicit or explicit "principles, norms rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area".16 Another definition represents regimes as "the set of rules, norms and procedures that regulate behaviour and control its effects in international affairs".17 Explaining these definitional components in more detail, Stephen Krasner indicated that:

- **Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude.**
- **Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.**
- **Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.**
- **Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.**18

Read positively, an approach such as this would appear to represent an important thematic shift in emphasis for International Relations scholarship indicating, perhaps, that "primitive" Realist notions of an anarchical world "out there" imposing its power politics essence upon passive receivers have been superseded. To some degree this has been the case. Working in the "thinking space" prised open in the early 1970s, scholars such as Oran Young, Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala and Ernst Haas, for example, have added interesting and useful dimensions to the regime debate. Their general perspective, designated "Grotian" by Realists such as Krasner, has maintained that the theory and

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practice of regimes largely supersedes Realist understandings of the world, which are now perceived as "too limited for explaining an increasingly complex, interdependent and dangerous world".19

More specifically "Grotian" regime theory has sought to undermine the power politics explanatory matrix by suggesting that the "essence" of a Realist explanation of reality - the struggle for survival in an anarchical world via balance of power strategies - does not adequately address contemporary inter-state relations, even those involving "major-power rivalry, that are traditionally looked upon as clear cut examples of anarchy".20 Going to the belly of the explanatory beast Puchala and Young have developed this theme by asking different sorts of questions about a seminal example of Realist power politics - the frantic grab for imperial possession in the lead up to World War One. Even here, they have suggested, something other than anarchical balancing was going on, when "the international relations of the imperial powers were regulated by a regime that prescribed certain modes of behaviour for metropolitan countries vis-a-vis each other and toward their respective colonial subjects".21

This "Grotian" approach does not dismiss Realism's focus on power politics behaviour per se. Its aim, rather, is to illustrate that the reductionist homogeneity of mainstream Realism blinds it to the complex and heterogeneous nature of international behaviour and to a more nuanced understanding of it. Accordingly, while it is acknowledged that the most common reason for regime compliance is, at one level or another, "calculated self interest", Puchala and Hopkins have argued that there is more analytical value in going beyond the obvious and investigating, "how regime participants calculate their benefits and costs".22 Of importance here, for example, are questions of


20Puchala and Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons for Inductive Analysis", in International Regimes ed. Krasner, p.86.

21Ibid, p.67.

22Ibid, p.90.
how regime participants "assign weights to perceived "moral" benefits of acting in accord with norms, or perceived "moral" costs of acting against them".23 The significance of this reassessment of orthodox Realism, of course, is that it questions the utilitarian basis of Realism's understanding of power politics state behaviour. It suggests, rather, that notions of individual self interest as a basis of understanding are limited and inadequate, that notions of rational action set upon market analogies must be placed in social and historical context and given normative dimensions.

Another critical suggestion to come from this quarter concerns the issue of change in International Relations and the rigidity of Realist understanding of it. Here, it is recognised that regime change "most often comes after changes in the structure of [inter-state] power".24 But, seeking again to go beyond the obvious, Puchala and Hopkins have maintained that there are other sources and motivations for change, for example, "via cognitive learning [e.g. knowledge of environmental exigencies] and the recasting of goals among dominant elites". Contrary, therefore, to the essentials of Realism, there are explanation of change which occur without "significant changes in [the] power structure" between the major states.25

Ernst Haas is another for whom the study of regimes adds to a contemporary understanding of the world, because it represents:

the interactions of homo politicus with nature and with culture ...[Moreover] it rests on the supposition that our collective understanding of our political choices increasingly depend on how we think about nature and about culture.26

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
The sense of a more sophisticated "thinking space" opened up in Haas' work is enhanced with his proposition about the metatheoretical limitations of Realism, which, he maintained, must give way to perspectives concerned with the:

ontogeny and phylogeny of consensual thought about interactions between man, culture and nature...[about] conceptualising a shared notion of what really exists - a reality that includes more than the familiar political conflict among states.27

Such a perspective, he argued:

implies that we cannot know the reality "out there" because our notion of what it contains changes with every twist of the scientific enterprise. Man-the-knower is the victim of his methods of acquiring knowledge and is therefore condemned to settle for successive approximations to reality.28

Others, less "Grotian" in attitude and perspective, have, nevertheless, centred on the regime issue in broadening the intellectual scope of their analysis. Most famously, perhaps, John Ruggie has insisted that to understand the "embedded liberalism" of the post-World War Two regimes is to extend the issue beyond (orthodox) Realist boundaries and understand regimes as "akin to language".29 Ruggie's point was that we "know" about international regimes:

not simply by some descriptive grammar of their concrete elements, but by their generative grammar, the underlying principles of order and meaning that shape the manner of their formation and transformation.30

Friedrich Kratochwil has taken this theme further. In a sophisticated discussion of the "fact'/interpretation" issue and regime behaviour, he has emphasised the need to go beyond:

the conception of 'science' which is derived from the development of physics and conceived of as consisting of a "third world" of objective knowledge

27Ibid, p.25.
28Ibid.
...science' as a practice in which validity claims are scrutinised among practitioners.31

Even from this brief perusal of it, then, it is clear that, to some degree, and at one level or another, regime literature since the 1970s has engaged with themes and questions earlier prescribed as central to the Critical Social Theory challenge to the discipline in recent times. Indeed, on the basis of contributions such as those touched on above - indicating an intersubjective realm of rules and norms as constitutive of contemporary international reality - an observer encountering the disciplinary literature in the 1980s, might be forgiven for thinking that it is has been Wittgenstein, Winch and Kuhn, rather than Popper and Weber, that have been most influential philosophically over the years - that International Relations is not the "backward discipline" some critics claim it to be. Forgiveness might also be forthcoming if it was also suggested that any crisis in Realism that might have existed in the past, has been largely overcome as International Relations scholars grapple seriously with the major philosophical issues across the contemporary Social Theory spectrum. It might also be concluded, in this context, that the Critical Social Theory challenge, with its charge of continuing "primitiveness" and calls for increased "thinking space", is inappropriate, exaggerated and even churlish.

This, I suggest is not the case. Rather, as in the broader social theory context, an "orthodox consensus" continues to reign in International Relations and seemingly genuine "alternatives" to its modernist discursive power continue to be framed in modernist terms. This can be illustrated, initially, by looking more critically at the nature of the "thinking space" opened up by "Grotian" regime theorists, and the focus on language introduced to the debate by Kratochwil and Ruggie.32 The discussion will then focus, more directly, on the most influential "alternative" of the post-Vietnam period - neo-Realism.


32 A good general critique of liberal/"Grotian" regime theory is to be found in Richard O'Meara's, "Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory", Millennium 13(3) (1984), pp. 245-264. O'Meara's article includes commentary on contributions not covered here (e.g. by Oran Young).
My contention on "Grotian" regime theory is that, for all the genuine insight it brings to the contemporary debate it does not represent a fundamental break with the dominant discourse, but rather an adaption of it (hence the unintended appropriateness of the "Grotian" label bestowed upon it by Realists). Ernst Haas' contribution, for example, is clearly of contemporary significance with its concern to "illustrate the range of past and future choices about international collaboration in a context of changing self understanding". Such an approach seems clearly distinguishable from the positivist objectivism that has characterised Realist analysis over the years. Yet, some rather obvious similarities remain, between a Realism that bases its scepticism about cooperative regime behaviour on an objectified world "out there", and an argument which invokes the significance of regimes on the basis of an "evolutionary epistemology".

The problem, in short, is that the insight which allows Haas to expose the externalised and thus limited "reality" of Realism is, itself, derived from the same (modernist) framework which understands the regime based alternative as "the politics of collaboration...seen as evolving alongside the evolution of consciousness itself". Suspicions that this useful rejoinder to positivist-Realism is predicated on a rather rudimentary progressivism are only enhanced when Haas sets out his intellectual position, which, he revealed, "implies the permanent evolution of regimes and of knowledge about regimes".

The contribution of Puchala and Hopkins is, like that of Haas', a valuable addition to the literature dominated by a "primitive" Realism over the years, but it too, under even mild scrutiny, is shown to be intrinsically linked to the Realism it seeks to repudiate. The problems here are, if anything, more immediately evident than in the case

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34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid, p.25, emphasis added.
of Haas' "evolutionary epistemology". The major problem lies in the attempt to go
beyond the state-as-actor focus of orthodox Realism by focusing, instead, on the role of
elites in regime maintenance. This, in effect is an expanded version of the "bureaucratic
politics" model, which suffers from all the problems that have beset similar approaches
over the years.37 Moreover, while it might, as the authors intend, go beyond the "rarefied
abstraction" of the state38 it really only goes as far as Wight's and Bull's international
society approach did, that is, to the "rarefied" world of the state elite - the world of the
diplomat and statesmen, working on behalf of the state and its "national" interest.39
Consequently, while claims are made for a broader, more heterogeneous and
fundamentally different approach to International Relations from "Grotian" scholars such
as Puchala and Hopkins, the basic analytical attention remains focused upon hierarchical
power structures, decisions made from above by state-based actors. Summarising the
"Grotian" perspective, Richard O'Meara has come to a similar conclusion, finding that:

the Grotian and traditional [Realist] approaches are not incommensurable: both rely on the analytical concepts of power and self-interest and both are ultimately concerned with describing and explaining the behaviour of states.40

Consequently, maintained O'Meara, "Grotian" approaches "echo the explanation of
regime formation offered by the Realist scholars in their attempts to accommodate
regimes". Thus:

while there is certainly much to be gained from an analysis which focuses on the interactions of governments, bureaucracies and non governmental actors, the Grotians seem too timid to launch the necessary investigations [into their continued Realism] and to acknowledge the inevitable theoretical and paradigmatic consequences.41

37 On these problems see the discussion in Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p. 76.

38 Puchala and Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons From Inductive Analysis", p.63.


40 O'Meara, "Regimes and their Implications for International Theory", p.257.

41 Ibid.
This is a theme that also applies to the contributions of those, like Kratochwil and Ruggie who, while they might blanche at the term "Grotian" as applied to their work, have introduced to recent debates some sophisticated analysis of philosophical issues largely eschewed by the discipline in general. Here, however, the limits on critical inquiry are most clearly evident because they are self imposed. Accordingly, having emphasised the need for insights drawn from the "interpretive sciences" they then firmly close off the discussion by stressing that their position should not be taken as "advocating a coup whereby the reign of positivist explanation is replaced by exploratory anarchy". This example of the "Cartesian anxiety" on the part of Kratochwil and Ruggie is, when added to the limitations of "Grotian" regime theory, indicative of the situation which provoked the Critical Social Theory responses in the Third Debate. It indicates, primarily, that the "thinking space" of the 1970s did not stay open for long. Instead, since the late 1970s, the potential for a fundamental reassessment of the theory and practice of International Relations has been overhauled by a resurgent Realism (represented as neo-Realism) concerned, at the level of "practice", with the retention of the hierarchical status quo of the post-World War Two period (e.g. United States hegemony) and "theoretically" with an enhanced "pursuit of certainty".

By 1977 the Realist backlash was already evident in the work of Robert Tucker, who, reflecting upon the challenges posed by Interdependence scholars, regime theorists and "liberals" and "radicals" generally, sought to reaffirm the Traditional need for structural continuity and systemic order, albeit in terms of a basic inequality between states. Tucker's logic was simple, familiar and self-affirming. The international system, it was argued, has always been anarchical and relations between states have "always been in essence oligarchical (unequal) largely because it [the system] has been

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43Ibid, p.768.

Consequently, it has been the "self help" principle that has been the key to order in an anarchical world. This principle, Tucker explained, is:

the right of the state to determine when its legitimate interests are threatened, or violated, and to employ such coercive measures as it may deem necessary to vindicate those interests.

This, Tucker insisted, is a principle that must not be violated, because while it has its drawbacks (i.e. it might create greater inequalities) it is integral to the structural reality of the international system and, as the basis of systemic order, it is the only hope for any "progressive" change and/or any inter-state equalisation in the future.

In Tucker's refurbished representation of Realist "reality", therefore, the challenge of interdependence and regime cooperation was confronted with the Realist "given" that change (in an anarchical system) is only possible when it comes from the top, when it is in the interests of the major powers and when it does not unbalance the systemic order based on the "self help" principle. In Tucker's terms, consequently, the dilemma of the contemporary age is that it is the "institution of self help that must be changed if international society is to become more egalitarian". The problem, in the 1970s, he argued, was that those advocating change simply did not understand the fundamental structural difference between the international state system and domestic society. In particular they failed to appreciate the "fundamental dilemma" of an international structure "marked by the absence of the elementary conditions that have attended, and made possible, the progression of equality within civil society". Tucker's response, accordingly, was to re-invoke another Realist "given" - the domestic/international dichotomy - emphasising that "in the absence of those conditions that give cohesiveness to [egalitarian] domestic society, and that permit order without tyranny, the decline of self

46 Ibid.
help may bring increased disorder” in the international realm. Tucker's particular target here was Interdependence scholarship, primarily because the "meaning that some read into interdependence may encourage expectations of substantial equalisations of material conditions". This, however, was an unreal expectation, because the structural reality of an interdependent world can only be understood in terms of:

resentments and conflicting interests that result from present inequalities of wealth and power [that] will simply go largely unresolved in a system marked by the progressive erosion of the principal traditional institutions of order.

Tucker's Inequality of Nations is, ultimately, no better nor worse than any other contemporary incantation of the Realist "catechism". Its significance here is that, published in 1977, it stands as an early testament to the post-Vietnam resurgence of the Realist dogma. It indicated that, tiresome and ephemeral anomalies aside, the International Relations mainstream had, by the late 1970s, recovered their sense of certainty after a short period when a sense of ambiguity, ambivalence and difference threatened. Waltz's Theory of International Politics published in 1979, confirmed this to be the case, and generally within a few years, the potential "openness" of the early 1970s was effectively closed off as Realists (e.g. via Kindleberger) further integrated neo-classical economics themes with their power politics, and articulated their "catechism" in

49Ibid, p.175.
50Ibid, p.177.
51The influences of the economist Charles Kindleberger have become evident in the neo-Realism of scholars such as Keohane, Gilpin, Krasner and Stein etc. Kindleberger, via the rational actor model associated with collective goods theory and a game theorised "history" of the last century or so, has provided much of the discursive raw material for the enhanced interest in "economic" themes in recent years, (and for Hegemonic Stability Theory). His basic argument is that economic stability at the international level is, by definition, a collective or public good, in that all actors benefit from the ordered and stable nature of international trade in such circumstances. The problem with the international "market", however, is that many actors will "free ride" in the pursuit of national interest rather than the public interest of the system as a whole. Accordingly, the goal of order and stability at the international level is dependent upon the power and public spirited motivation of the strongest power - a hegemon - who can underwrite and maintain the conditions under which order and stability can characterise the "market". Integral to this theory of order, for Kindleberger, is the need for a hegemonic power regime based on Western Liberal premises of market openness and (capitalist) freedom to choose. See Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy", International Studies Quarterly 25(3) (1981), pp.242-254.
the moderated terms appropriate to the new age of "post-positivism", "post-Realism" and an International Political Economy.52

The result, I will argue, has been a moderated "primitivism" which has seen the rational sovereign figure of Western modernity unproblematically projected back to centre stage, and the complexity of human life, history and cultural difference, again reduced to the selfish, utilitarian image of human nature integral to a particular reading of Western Philosophy, as transposed to International Relations after the European Renaissance in the form of the sovereign state - the rational actor in the (analogised) market. It has seen, moreover, the resurgence of the pursuit of scientific certainty - centred on structuralist deductive modelling and game theory - as part of an institutionalised "politics of forgetting" designed to insulate Realism from its interpretivist critics. To further enhance the sense of discursive continuity associated with the neo-Realist replication of Realist "primitivism", the discussion to follow will continue to focus attention on the regime issue, but from now on in order to illustrate the closed disciplinary responses to it, by the new "dominant school of international relations theory" - neo-Realism.53

**Neo-Realism: The New Orthodoxy in International Relations**

Speaking of neo-Realist approaches in the regime context, Stephen Krasner explained that as the "modal position" within the discipline since the 1980s, it has insisted that, for all the proclaimed significance of regime behaviour, there are, in reality, structural factors, which determine the activities (cooperative or otherwise) of actors in the international

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52 Born again Realists like Keohane, of course, have turned "moderation" into an art form in the 1980s, but already in 1977 Tucker was promoting his reformulated power politics perspective as that of a "moderate", confronted by the radical "visionaries" of the post-Vietnam era, for whom, "the imminent and radical transformation of the international system hold out the promise of utopia". Similarly, in the late 1980s when Michael Sullivan reflected on the fact that the Globalist approach "may be at variance with the real world" it was all done with a linguistic (if not philosophical) caution born of the post-Vietnam experience. See "Competing Frameworks and the Study of Contemporary International Politics", **Millennium** 7 (1978), pp.93-110.

This "modal" position, furthermore, "elaborates a conventional structuralist critique that rejects any significant role for principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures". Krasner was quick to point out that there were differences between "conventional" structuralist approaches of this kind, associated with scholars such Waltz and Susan Strange, and the "modified" (moderate) structuralism of his own work and that of figures such Keohane, Robert Gilpin and Arthur Stein. In outlining these differences Krasner indicated (unwittingly) just how powerful the concepts, premises, metaphors and language of a modernist way of framing remain at the metatheoretical core of neo-Realism. Thus, he suggested, a "modified structural" approach:

accept[s] the basic analytical assumptions of structural realist approaches, which posit an international system of functionally symmetrical, power-maximising states acting in an anarchic environment. But they maintain that under certain restrictive conditions involving the failure of individual action to secure Pareto-optimal outcomes, international regimes may have a significant impact even in an anarchical world.

My aim, from this point on, is to illustrate how both "conventional" and "modified" dimensions of neo-Realist scholarship remain locked within the limited confines of the Realist Tradition/discipline and how, in broader terms, its commitment to the dominant modernist discourse continues to restrict its capacity to understand the complexity of contemporary world politics. I will do so, again, in terms set by Krasner, by taking seriously his proposition that the issue of regimes, and world order in general, must, in the future, be confronted at a more sophisticated level than has been the norm in the Realist dominated past. The point, as Krasner put it, is that:

The issue is not so much whether one accepts the possibility of principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures affecting outcomes and behaviour, as what one's basic assumption is about the normal state of international affairs.

57 Ibid, p.10, emphasis added.
It is, therefore, in relation to the basic assumptions brought to images of the "normal state of international affairs" by neo-Realists that I now turn to some of the major literary contributions of the genre. In the first instance the seminal contribution of Kenneth Waltz will receive extended attention, albeit in a rather unconventional manner. Attention will then be directed to the works of figures such as Krasner, Gilpin, Stein and Keohane.

From Reductionism to Banality: Kenneth Waltz and Neo-Realist Structuralism

Kenneth Waltz's contribution to International Relations spans four decades. In that time he has added influential dimensions to Realist scholarship. Since its publication in 1959, for example, his Man, the State and War, has been accorded the status of a classical text in the discipline. Moreover, Waltz's, Theory of International Politics (1979) has been promoted, by Joseph Nye, as the work which manages to reveal the logic of power politics Realism more profoundly than any other. It is difficult to argue with such a view, which unwittingly and ironically, vindicates the critical attitude taken toward Realist and neo-Realist theory and practice throughout this Thesis.

My own position on Theory of International Politics and (to a lesser degree) Man the State and War is that they stand as major indictments of an International Relations community which, closed to critical reflective capacity for so long, has accorded such high status to works of so little substance. They stand, in this regard, as a testament to the continuing legacy of a closed modernist discourse in the period of Realist dominance in International Relations. In comparing these works here I want to to add a dimension to


this proposition and open to Critical Social Theory inquiry two more of the “great texts” of the Realist discipline.\(^{61}\)

The differences between the two works, I suggest, is, ultimately, more a matter of tone and attitude than analytical quality. *Man, the State and War*, for example, had a certain charm and intellectual width, manifestly lacking from the later work, and in 1959, at the height of Realist confidence and influence, Waltz was willing to ventilate at least some of the philosophical and analytical givens of the Realist "catechism". Two decades later, however, in less favourable circumstances for U.S. Foreign Policy and Realist theory, his mood and ambition was narrower, more constrained and less philosophically tolerant.

In 1959, for example, Waltz sought to confront the theologically based dogmatism associated with Morgenthau’s notion of human nature and its implications for Realism as the basis of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War years. Waltz, more specifically, sought answers to the "perennial questions" of International Relations - regarding the causes of war - that for Morgenthau and other major Traditional Realists (e.g. Niebuhr) were ultimately reduced to "original sin" notions concerning the inherent evil of "man". In *Man, the State and War*, the reductionist position was attributed (among others) to Augustine, Luther, Malthus, Niebuhr and Morgenthau, the keystone of this philosophy being that, "the root of all evil is man, and thus he is himself the root of the specific evil, war". In an international context, maintained Waltz, this logic flowed into another which "explain[ed] the great ills of war by the evil qualities of some or of all states".\(^{62}\) It proposed, further, that political strategies concentrated on the "balancing of power with power" is necessitated by the "the sinful character of man".\(^{63}\) This was the

\(^{61}\)Richard Ashley of course has done the same thing in "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", in *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* edited by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); and his specific commentary on Waltz will be discussed in Chapter Nine. My discussion here takes a different angle on the two texts and seeks to make some broader points more appropriate to the present work.

\(^{62}\)Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, p.3.

\(^{63}\)Ibid, p.28.
logic which, in a famous passage from Politics Among Nations, led Morgenthau to explain the essence of international politics as the power lust of egoistic human nature which, he pronounced "has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India and Greece endeavoured to discover" the "laws" of political reality.64 From this perspective, accordingly, the inner nature of individual states represented the "inner nature" of humankind thus explaining the "external" world of inter-state conflict and the fundamental anarchy of the state system.65

This Realist image of the world Waltz found unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, not the least being its connection to an "idealist" counterpart that based its essentialised, reductionist understanding of international life on the rational, progressive "goodness" inherent to humankind and the influence of "good" states over evil ones in the international system.66 Both approaches, he maintained, were simplistic and one sided and both were bound up in a metaphysics of human nature which resulted in largely meaningless assertion and inadequate analysis of what really is essential about international politics. Moreover, for Waltz, neither the "pessimistic" nor "optimistic" images assisted greatly in the search for the scientific Realism which Carr had urged and which (North) American behaviouralists had pursued after World War Two. But here too, argued Waltz, there was reductionism, with much behaviouralist scholarship reduced to a fact grubbing empiricism devoid of political analysis.67 For Waltz, in 1959, therefore, there was a need for a Realist approach which went beyond metaphysical assumption dressed up as analysis and which offered more than a detached empiricism.

64Ibid, p.27.
65Ibid, p.5.
66See ibid, pp.1-40. Most obviously of course that such a position might in some self affirming way explain actions prescribed as "evil" but it can say nothing of so many other characteristics of either individuals or sovereign states, ibid, pp.27-28.
which "simply ignore[d] the role of politics and propose[d] apolitical solutions as though they were to operate in a vacuum".68

Waltz's alternative was centred on another image of the world drawn from Rousseauan thought in particular. Rousseau's insight was crucial, argued Waltz, because it illustrated that the major cause of war emanated "neither in men nor in states but in the state system itself".69 More precisely, Rousseau understood why, in the international context, politics was synonymous with relations of systemic anarchy. This was not because of the inherent goodness or badness of individuals or sovereign states, but was a necessity of the system itself, a structural reality of inter-state relations which all states responded to. Just, therefore, as "man, in a state of nature...cannot begin to behave decently unless he has some assurance that others will not be able to ruin him" so an individual state:

might want to remain at peace [but] may have to consider undertaking a preventative war [because] if it does not strike when the moment is favourable it may be struck later when advantage has shifted to the other side.70

This Rousseauan insight, claimed Waltz, made possible a general theory of international relations "that explains the behaviour of all states, whether good or bad".71 It represented, more specifically, and in more modern terms, the eternal wisdom of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes in understanding that, in inter-state behaviour, at any time and in any place, "reason is bound, in every case of doubt, to obey the promptings of self interest - which in itself would make war inevitable, even if all parties desired to be just".72

69Ibid.
70Ibid.
72Ibid.
In summary, Waltz, sought, in *Man, the State and War* to establish the principles of a general theory of International Relations which echoed the general behaviouralist "quest for certainty", but which emphasised, more explicitly, the political dimension of the anarchical "system". His utilisation of Rousseauan philosophy was, in this regard, useful in (re)establishing two Traditional Realist "givens" about International Relations. The first: that conflict is inscribed in any social system which lacks an "orderer"; the second: that the balance of power is an integral and necessary function of the resultant anarchy of the international system. This was an approach superior to Morgenthau's, Waltz claimed, because while it acknowledged the behaviour of individual states as the immediate cause of war, it established that, in reality, such behaviour was ultimately dependent upon "the general structure that permits them [states] to exist and wreak their disasters".73

In *Man, the State and War*, this thesis on structural anarchy was presented in terms that allowed for a modicum of interpretive space within which the dogma of the Realist "catechism" might be critically reviewed. In qualitative terms, however, the Waltzian "great text" was just as limited and theoretically unselfconscious as its mainstream Realist counterparts. Taking up this theme, Justin Rosenberg has noted the self affirming and circular logic of *Man, the State and War* and its continuing commitment to Realist logocentric logic, concerning, for example, the domestic/international antimony.74 In Waltz's case this resulted in: (i) the establishment of the principle that autonomy and sovereignty were dependent upon an overarching authority, (a condition absent in the international system) and: (ii) the exclusion from "meaningful" analysis of the experience of *domestic* states that are "internally conflict ridden" and anarchical, even while fulfilling the conditions for "ordered" sovereignty.75 Like so many Realists before

73 Ibid, p.185, emphasis added.
75 Ibid, p.293; see also O'Meara, "Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory".
him (and since) Waltz's was silent on the issue of "domestic" anarchy, orienting his attention instead, to "external" factors concerning the systemic constraints imposed upon states. This is an important site of silence and exclusion for Realists generally, because in this analytical space is located the "given" of the balance of power scheme - represented as the only realistic response to an "anarchical" world.

As Rosenberg has illustrated, however, while this logic might have impressed an uncritical discipline since 1959, it is less than impressive when critically examined, even in its own terms. This is particularly the case, he suggested, if one ponders Waltz's attempts to project his structuralist logic in game-theoretical terms. In this context Waltz acknowledged two major caveats to his theoretical enterprise that exemplified its weaknesses. The first caveat recognised that the anarchical "systems game" was not necessarily a zero-sum one. The second caveat allowed for the fact that states were engaged in other "games" simultaneously with the security game. The problem with these caveats, argued Rosenberg, are that they basically undermine the whole Waltzian schema (and structuralist neo-Realism per se). This primarily is because they:

concede that within certain limits (which in practice turn out to be very wide indeed) the impact of anarchy on the behaviour of states varies according to determinations quite outside the purview of a Realist theory. [For example] a state may choose or be forced to behave quite otherwise than predicted by the logic of balance of power: it may be prepared to countenance large scale retreat internationally in order to release resources for urgent domestic goals; it may undertake the military defence of a transnational socio-economic system which leads it routinely to exceed the requirements of the visible 'national interest'; in extreme cases, where it contends with serious internal challenges, it may even fail properly to resist an external aggressor [while] certain security interests may simply be overridden because their pursuit is judged too costly in either domestic or international terms.76

On this basis, and in Waltz's own terms, even if all the "games" played by all the states were governed by the rules of structuralist anarchy, "we could still not predict the

76Rosenberg, "What's The Matter With Realism?", pp.293-294, emphasis added.
outcomes a priori since the relative importance to each state of each game at any one time is contingent”.77

This, of course, begs the question of what precisely Waltz's early structuralist "great text" did contribute in 1959, if the anarchy notion at its base, and the balance of power theme at its theoretical centre cannot account for international behaviour except occasionally and under certain circumstances and then only in retrospect. The charitable answer, is that it was an attempt "to account for why war persists in the international system without any claim to explain why any particular war occurs".78 It was, in this sense, an alternative Realist grand theory to that centred on Morgenthau's "original sin" proposition. This, it must be said, is hardly a major contribution, for, aside from flogging dead horses, all Waltz's "great text" ultimately established, as Rosenberg stressed, was that there is "a dimension of international politics, given by the absence of government, which conforms to Rousseau's parable".79 Or, put in the language of the (analogised) neo-classical market, which later was to be its location, Waltz's grand theory suggested, that:

where knowledge of others intentions is imperfect and the use of force is not ruled out...rational calculation cannot afford to assume...an assured harmony of interest.80

This then is the theoretical "molehill" brought forth by the Morgenthauan "mountain" in 1959 which provoked Rosenberg's response that:

77Ibid, p.294; and Waltz, Man, the State and War, p.206, when he says "no sets of rules can specify how important the [security] game should be considered".


79Ibid, p.294. The parable in question here is the "stag hunt" parable used by Rousseau to emphasise the problems of a single notion of rationality in human affairs. It goes like this: five hunters agree to join together to hunt a stag and share the proceeds in order that their general hunger problem be overcome. They fan out and surround the stag. However, as they wait for the moment of cooperative action, a hare runs by, and one of the hunters grabs it, thus startling the stag who runs off. Rousseau's point was that it was just as logical and rational for the hunter to take the hare as to leave it - because he could not be sure that someone else would not do the same. For Waltz the parable was used to represent the dilemma of states seeking cooperative relations in an anarchical system. It leads, of course, to a conclusion based on the "self help" principle, and the notion that individual state intentionality is not the basis of interstate behaviour.

80Ibid, p.294.
having rightly dispensed with the reductionism of Morgenthau, Waltz's theoretical Realism is little more than a "banality" which merely reaffirms that inter-state behaviour can be understood as a recurring Prisoners Dilemma, particularly in regard to security issues.\textsuperscript{81}

Put in the broader terms of this chapter Waltz, in \textit{Man, the State and War} provided an "alternative" to mainstream Realism, which, like its Wightian Traditionalist counterpart, was little more than an embroidered re-presentation of Realist "primitivism". And like all of the Realisms which his structuralism sought to supersede, Waltz's arguments in \textit{Man, the State and War} resonated with the metaphysics and abstractionism of modernist discourse. This is never clearer than in regard to the lingering (and paradoxical) \textit{individualism} at the foundation of Waltz's structuralism.

The Traditional (modernist) articulation of individualism in International Relations is related to the behaviour of the atomised sovereign state in the anarchical system. For all Waltz's debunking of this scenario, this is precisely his own in \textit{Man, the State and War}, where the detached, autonomous "individual" of modernity remains the (metatheoretical) foundation of logic and analysis. This is obvious enough in relation to the "stag hunt" parable, utilised by Waltz, where the actions of the selfish hunter are those of a (Hobbesian-like) actor in some \textit{presocial} state of nature. Just as obviously (and again in Hobbesian rather than Rousseauan fashion) Waltz constructed his whole notion of an anarchical world "out there", upon this image of the presocial "individual". The result, a structuralist Realism based on "a set of external constraints which derive from the \textit{aggregate} of individual, reciprocally calculated rational choices".\textsuperscript{82} The problems of this position are even more apparent when its silences are taken into account on central Realist notions of power and change. For example, in perceiving of the international system as a situation in which each state is forced to respond to "a set of external restraints given by the number and relative strength of the individual units comprising it", the state is (implicitly at least) defined as "ontologically anterior to the international

\textsuperscript{81}Ibid, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid, p.295, emphasis added.
Realist understanding of power and change are, on this basis, reduced to a circular simplicity in which "change" becomes the variations in the numbers (of states) involved in the system. In similar fashion, "power" simply becomes the relative distribution of weight (e.g. military strength) between the individual states.

These are themes that have received critical attention from a variety of sources in recent times, and some of these critiques will be considered shortly. For now I want to illustrate the discursive continuity between Man, the State and War and the first "great text" of neo-Realism, Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979).

The similarities with Waltz's earlier "great text" are clear enough from the outset of Theory of International Politics, indeed from the moment that Waltz reiterated his intentions to "construct a theory of international politics that remedies the defects of present theories". The basic theoretical defect, he (re)asserted, was the continuing influence of reductionism in International Relations when what was needed was a structuralist grand theory. Turning to the question of how his approach was capable of

83 Ibid.
84 For an example of this see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Chapter 3.
86 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.1.
87 In the 1979 version of Waltz's thesis, consequently, various "reductionists" are again put to the polemical sword. It goes without saying that this includes all "radical" perspectives. The theory of imperialism associated with Hobson and Lenin, for example, is inadequate because "what claimed to be a general theory turned out to be a partial one". And, as was the case twenty years earlier, Waltz's targets included those Realists who remain committed to Traditional state centric analysis. Those, for example, like Stanley Hoffmann whose theory was "crude and confused" and "did[n't] develop a theory" but merely displayed a "strong commitment to a particular intellectual approach". Then there were those like Richard Rosecrance whose approach was "not at all productive", and those like Morton Kaplan whose "language is loose and imprecise to the point of misleading the reader", who makes "extraordinary claims" for his work but whose "[theoretical] performance does not measure up to them". See Waltz Theory of International Politics, p.36 (on Lenin); p.49 (on Hoffmann); and p.50 (on Kaplan).
remedying the reductionist defects he perceived, Waltz illustrated that mountains can indeed bring forth molehills, albeit twenty years apart.

If the implications of Waltz's efforts were not so serious his attempts to remedy Realist theory, and overcome its reductionism, would be an enterprise filled with (unintended) mirth. This is primarily because from the beginning of Theory of International Politics, Waltz's anti-reductionist position was presented in the most reductionist of terms - those associated with the singularity of the "unity of science" thesis.88 In Waltz's case, however, the defence of the scientific approach, in 1979, was less subtle than Popper's similar defence in earlier times. Accordingly, the "scientific" case in Theory of International Politics adds up to the kind of mainstream discussion that one saw in the aftermath of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, when Anglo-American "post-positivist" social scientists began to speak a little more sensitively (albeit just as narrowly) about debates that for years had been the staple diet of philosophy of science texts. In Theory of International Relations, for example, Waltz simply followed the Popper line in contrasting positivist Realism (reductionist, fact grubbing empiricism) with his deductivist structuralism which, he claimed, acknowledged the "theory" dimension in its search for systemic generalised explanations of reality.

In this context, Waltz's argument had three basic assumptions: (i) that it was necessary and desirable for International Relations to have a general theory characterised by the logic and rigour of theorising in the natural sciences; (ii) that this general theory could not be achieved while International Relations specialists remained committed to the "inductivist illusion" and its associated reductionism; (iii) that this general theory was achievable because there was a systemic order in International Relations that could be discovered if scholars began to think systematically about "the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millenia".89 Waltz characterised the "inductivist

88Waltz thus replicated Popper's defence of a mediated scientific perspective in the same way that Popper did and with the same paradoxical consequences. On this issue see the discussion on Popper in Chapter Three of this thesis, pp.116-124.

89Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.66.
illusion" (at the core of Traditionalist Realism and behaviouralism) in exemplary Popperian terms - as the examination:

of numerous cases with the hope that connections and patterns will emerge and that those connections and patterns will represent the frequently mentioned "reality out there".

It was an "illusion", he continued, which:

apparently rests on the conviction that knowledge begins with certainties and that induction can uncover them. But we can never say with assurance that a state of affairs inductively arrived at corresponds to something objectively real.90

As with much of the moderated neo-Realist perspective of the 1980s and 1990s, (and much "post-positivism" generally) this is fine as far as it goes. The problem is that this is as far as it goes. Thus, while (ostensibly) acknowledging the problems of inductivism and the notion of an external real world of "fact", Waltz followed this logic anyway in repudiating "interpretative" approaches to theory in favour of his scientific structuralism. On the issue of "theory" and (scientific) "laws", consequently, Waltz followed the (modernist) route laid down by Carr and Morgenthau, and in broader terms, by Western scholars, in general, in the post-Cartesian era. Thus, asserted Waltz: "theories are qualitatively different from laws". Why? Because:

Each descriptive term in laws is directly tied to observational or laboratory procedures, and laws are established only if they pass observational or experimental tests.

Laws, on this basis, are derived from observation and testing, as per the natural scientific model. However:

theories, [unlike laws] contain theoretical notions [and] theories cannot be constructed through induction alone, for theoretical notions can only be invented not discovered.91

Anyone doubting the continuing power of positivism at the core of neo-Realism need only ponder Waltz's position here, as, like generations of positivists before him, he

90 Ibid, pp.4-5.
91 Ibid, p.5, emphasis added.
invoked the great dichotomy between "theory" and the "real" world - the former, the realm of "internally" generated "invention" - the latter, the "external" repository of laws which theories (retrospectively) explain, order and systematise. Ultimately, therefore, as Waltz explained, "theory, though related to the world about which explanations are wanted, always remains distinct from that world". This, it must be remembered, is a position seeking to remedy the defects in approaches to International Relations centred on the "illusory" relationship between inductivist observation and a "real" world "out there". It represents, instead, another confirmation of the "primitive" nature of Realist/neo-Realist thinking in the contemporary period, and a striking example of the continuing discursive power of a modernist regime of framing at the core of a discipline which has ignored its "preface".

The limitations, silences and omissions integral to this approach were as evident when Waltz presented his structuralist Realist alternative in Theory of International Politics as they were in its first articulation in Man, the State and War. The main propositions were, nevertheless, just as confidently asserted. In 1979, thus, Waltz argued that reductionist approaches, based on the empirical behaviour of individual "unit level" (state) interaction, were inferior to structuralist approaches centred on deductively engendered knowledge of the deeper organisational principles of international life. The primary theoretical task, therefore, was to separate that which was essential to understanding the international system - its unchanging foundational quality - from that which was ephemeral, and susceptible to historical/cultural/ideological change. In more classically modernist terms this was deemed vital, because the:

failure to mark and preserve the distinction between structure on the one hand and units and [historical] processes on the other, makes it impossible...to distinguish between causes and effects.

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92 ibid, p.6.
93 ibid, ch. 4.
94 ibid, p.78.
A major requirement, Waltz stressed, was that certain "vague and varying" concepts and approaches must be omitted from Realist analysis before "useful" structuralist theory could be applied to the real world. These "vague and varying" concepts included, "environment, situation, context and milieu". Moreover, a whole range of questions must also be "left aside" in search of "useful" theory. Included here were "questions about the kinds of political leaders, social and economic institutions, and ideological commitments states may have". Also deleted from a structuralist Realist perspective, Waltz made clear, were other (presumably) non-useful "questions about the cultural, economic, political and military interaction of states". The point of all these exclusions, explained Waltz, was to "establish structure by abstraction from 'concrete reality'". This was to be achieved:

by leaving aside the personality of actors, their behaviour, and their interactions...[and by] ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how they are arranged or positioned).

This was deemed crucial to structuralist Realism, because:

how units stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of the units is a property of the system.

The sense of ahistorical staticity engendered by a statement such as this was increased when Waltz spoke of precisely what a structuralist approach was set to achieve. At this point, in 1979, the echoes of Man, the State and War, and a generation of Realist conservatism rang out in Waltz's "great text" of neo-Realism, with the proposal that it is:

the structure of the system [that] acts as a constraining and disposing force, and because it does so, systems theories explain and predict continuity within the system.

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95Ibid, p.80.

96Ibid.
Above all, therefore, Waltz's structuralism was system oriented because, it is "within a system, [that] a theory explains recurrences and repetitions, not change".97

Twenty years on then Waltz's structuralism begins to sound rather like an updated rendition of the "mountain" and "molehill" refrain noted by Rosenberg. Waltz confirmed that this was indeed the case with his discussion in Theory of International Politics of the essential organising principles by which the international system was to be understood in structuralist neo-Realist terms. Here, almost incomprehensibly, he returned to the domestic/international dichotomy for his theoretical inspiration. Thus:

[d]omestic systems are centralised and hierarchic...[while] international systems are decentralised and anarchic...Domestic political structures have governamental institutions...International politics, in contrast, has been called 'politics in the absence of government'.98

It was at this point that the "banality" theme attributed to Man, the State and War, became even more relevant to the neo-Realism of Theory of International Politics, written twenty years later. Unlike 1959, however, there was no attempt now to embroider the structuralist argument in interesting philosophical fabric. In the place of the Rousseauan parable, consequently, there was another - the parable of the capitalist market - presented as a microeconomic analogy for the endemic anarchy of the international system. In this context, Waltz insisted, two questions could be asked concerning the anarchical structure of both forums, with the answers allowing superior insight into the theory and practice of International Relations. The first question: how are markets formed?; the second: how do they work? Waltz's answer to the first question was that "[t]he market of a decentralized economy is individualist in origin, spontaneously generated and unintended". Such a market, he insisted, "arises out of the activities of separate units...whose aims and efforts are directed not towards creating an order but rather toward fulfilling their own internally defined interest". This begs an answer to the second

97Ibid, p.69, emphasis added.
question - i.e. how does the system actually work?, how is order created in the system? Waltz's answer here was as simple and as unconvincing as that offered to the first. The answer? - the "hidden hand". Thus: "the individual acts for itself", and consequently, "[f]rom the coaction of like units emerges a structure that affects and constrains all of them".99

Turning specifically to the other side of the analogy - the international market - the answers were as predictable. Accordingly, the basic insight of neo-Realism - the structuralist essence which set it aside from the "defects" of its Realist predecessor was that:

International political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self regarding units. International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be they city states, empires, or nations. Structures emerge from the coexistence of states. No state intends to to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be constrained.100

Rousseau thus meets Adam Smith. The result, rather incongruously represented in this context, is an ahistorical, depoliticised scenario replete with vague references to "spontaneously" generated markets and political structures that mysteriously "emerge".101 This is the keystone of Waltz's structuralist insight - the intellectual font of his frustration with the Hoffmanns and the Kaplans. This is what they didn't and don't know. This is what he "knows" about the international system that is so significant as to warrant his forceful critique of the disciplinary mainstream and its "radical" alternatives in Theory of International Politics.

99Ibid. p.90

100Ibid.

101The point here is that like many neo-conservatives seeking to fuse a minimalist reading of Smith with a rigid Conservative traditionalism Waltz does no justice to either discourse by depoliticising and dehistoricising them.
In order that it not be thought that Waltz's more recent promulgations on the issue have been ignored here, it is worth just contemplating further his position in 1990 on the "theory" question. Very little has changed, it seems, because as Waltz explained:

A theory is an intellectual construction by which we select facts and interpret them. The challenge is to bring theory to bear on facts in ways that permit explanation and prediction. This can only be accomplished by distinguishing between theory and fact. Only if this distinction is made can theory be used to examine and interpret facts.102

And as a contemporary postscript to his structuralist position in 1979 he left little doubt in 1990 that the mountain has indeed brought forth another molehill with his explanation of the fundamental difference between (state centric) Realism and neo-Realism, which was, that, "anarchy sets the problems that states have to cope with".103 Waltz's position has not escaped criticism even from within the International Relations mainstream and I will briefly touch on two of these critiques at this point to indicate both their saliency and their limitations.

The rather dramatic lapses in logic in Theory of International Politics have been seized on, for example, by John Ruggie, alarmed at the crudity of Waltz's structuralism. Ruggie has argued that Waltz's structuralist theory is so inadequate that not only is it unable to explain where individual states came from, it cannot explain where the contemporary state structure came from.104 The point, maintained Ruggie, was that Waltz's general theory, for all his protestations to the contrary, is static and ahistorical. Accordingly, it:

provides no means by which to account for, or even describe, the most important contextual change in international politics in this millennium: the shift from the medieval to the modern international system.105


103Ibid, p.36.


105Ibid, p.141.
Ruggie, significantly, did not question the anarchy theme at the core of Waltz's structuralism, but argued that Waltz's approach did not allow for the different forms of anarchical relations characteristic of different historical epochs during the development of the state system. Ruggie's claim, in other words, was that Waltz's assertion of a structuralist "recurrence and repetition", across space, time, culture and linguistic practice, misunderstood the heterogeneous and historically dynamic nature of "agents"/"structures" and political systems. This, to understate the case, is a rather damning criticism of a work that sought to "remedy" all that has gone before in the discipline, in systemic terms.

A similar sort of argument has come from Alexander Wendt who, taking up Scientific Realist themes developed by Hesse and Bhaskar, and popularised (as "structuration") by Giddens, has focused on the confusion and paradox of Waltz's approach to the "agent/structure" conundrum. Waltz's argument, suggested Wendt, failed to deal adequately with this crucial issue because it was ultimately about a one sided structuralist determinism. Wendt's major concern was Waltz's failure to deal adequately with the nature of the "agent" - the individual state - in his structuralist matrix. Wendt's argument was that Waltz simply ascribed ontological priority to states without explaining their precise relationship to the structure as a whole. This, as the discussion above has sought to illustrate is precisely the way Waltz dealt with the state-as-"agent" issue, in proposing that "markets arise out of the activities of separate units", and that "from the co-action of like units [states] emerges a structure". For Wendt, also, this


107See the discussion of this approach in Chapter Three of the thesis pp.127-131. On Wendt's articulation of it see, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory".

108Waltz, of course, was aware of the problem and sought to deflect it with vague references to a lack of correspondence between intentions and outcomes, see Theory of International Relations, p.90.


110Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.90.
added up to a pretty ordinary attempt to theorise structurally about International Relations, primarily because it could not offer a structuralist explanation for the existence of states! Or, in Wendt's own terms, "systems structures cannot generate agents if they are defined exclusively in terms of those agents in the first place".111

This said, it is worth recalling that for all the saliency of their criticisms of Waltz, there is in Wendt's "structuration" perspective, and Ruggie's structuralism, a continuing commitment to a "unity of science" thesis, and the attainment of a genuinely scientific theory of international reality based on positivist basic assumptions. Their critical "alternatives", in other words, reinforce arguments made throughout this thesis about the continuing (hidden, unwritten) power of the dominant modernist discourse in International Relations.112

And even when attempts are made to re-historicise the neo-Realist "catechism" the modernist discursive legacy continues to dominate proceedings. In Robert Gilpin's, The Political Economy of International Relations (1987), for example, this legacy is evident within a work presented in the tolerant, moderated tones of the "post-positivist" age in International Relations. As Roger Tooze as noted, however, the underlying positivism of Gilpin's approach limits, and ultimately renders paradoxical his attempts to add historical and philosophical sensitivity to neo-Realism.113 Gilpin's discussion of competing ideologies (e.g. Liberalism/Marxism) in The Political Economy of International Relations provides a good example of the problem in this regard.

111 Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem", p.342
112 See the discussion of these issues in Chapter Three of the thesis, in relation to Wendt, between pp.127-131 and Ruggie, concerning Analytical Philosophy perspectives, in pp.131-140.
At the surface level this does not appear to be the case. Indeed, at this level Gilpin bought a measure of Kuhnian inspired sensitivity to the ideology issue.\(^{114}\) At another, more fundamental level, however, Gilpin’s positivist Realist commitment required a dichotomised frame of analytical reference to legitimate its superior logic. Consequently, as Tooze indicated, Gilpin defined ideology in a particular way which effectively reduced it to a "subjective act of faith or intellectual commitment".\(^{115}\) Having constituted ideology in this (positivist) manner, Gilpin is then able to subtly detach himself, and his own understanding of the reality of the International Political Economy, from the interpretivist constraint imposed by his initial Kuhnian allusion. This allows, ultimately, for a neo-Realist perspective which assumes "that the [competing] ideologies can be tested against a separate and external reality, unconnected to belief and ideology".\(^{116}\) This, as the following discussion will illustrate is a strategy characteristic of neo-Realism in the "post-positivist" era. In Gilpins' case it resulted, on the one hand, in a sensitive "post-positivist" acknowledgment of the problems of "proving" the superiority of one ideology over another, while on the other, as Ernie Keenes has indicated, it saw Gilpin seeking, via a positivist sleight of hand, to illustrate how a "theoretical" approach such as his was superior to mere "ideologies".\(^{117}\)

Stephen Gill has provided another dimension on Gilpins' "theoretical" approach, in this regard, in concluding that it represented a synthesis of:

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\(^{114}\)This is very much the spirit in which Gilpin establishes his position in the work, drawing on Kuhn in acknowledging the problems of theoretical reductionism. Here, accordingly, it is acknowledged that:

Although particular ideas or theories associated with one another may be shown to be false or questionable, these perspectives can be neither proved nor disproved through logical argument or the presentation of contrary empirical evidence.


\(^{115}\)Tooze, "The Unwritten Preface", p.291, emphasis added.

\(^{116}\)Ibid.

institutionalism, utilitarian rational choice analysis and a Realist framework of international relations, which is built upon the insights of Thucydides, E.H.Carr and Hans Morgenthau...[Accordingly] he is a methodological individualist who separates 'politics' and 'economics' and his ontology emphasizes states and markets.118

On this basis, suggested Gill, it was not surprising that the major substantive concern of Gilpin's neo-Realist critique of (threatening) "ideologies" in the 1980s, was "the stability of the international economy in a period of American hegemonic decline".119 Gilpins "theoretical" knowledge was, consequently, intrinsic to the power politics image of the neo-Realist mainstream. It was a knowledge/power nexus from which Gilpin observed the world "from the 'top downward' through the lens of the dominant interest of the largest capitalist nations" and upon which he, and neo-Realists generally, seek a structural stability and order that serves such interests.120

The analytical implications of Gilpin's reformulated Realism were dealt with in interesting fashion by Gill, and in a way that further exposed the modernist continuity and attendant limitations of neo-Realism generally. On Gilpin's "theoretical" perspectives, for example, Gill noted that "Gilpin uses a rational actor model of the state which is seen (at least potentially) to defend the nation's welfare and security: the national interest".121 On the basis of this assumption (the paradoxical reductionist assumption of Waltz also) Gilpin's "theory" moved in entirely predictable directions. Thus, as Gill indicated, the state system was understood in terms of a "utilitarian calculus of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of international action (or inaction)".122 In this (anarchic) systemic scenario, the focus for Gilpin, as it was for Waltz and for the Realist community in general, was order. But again, predictably, it was an order understood only in

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119Ibid.
120Ibid, p.370.
121Ibid, p.372.
122Ibid.
Traditional terms, or in the reformulated Traditionalism of the neo-Realists. Thus, in Gilpin's understanding of the world "out there", "conflict is avoided by institutional mechanisms: e.g. a balance of power (as in the nineteenth century Concert system) or hegemony".123

Gilpin's insights on the Political Economy of International Relations were, consequently, of the same universalised and essentialised variety that has informed Realist scholarship from Wight to Waltz. In Gilpin's case, accordingly, "world history is depicted ...as a continuing cycle of hegemonies and balance of power systems".124 The contemporary period is very easily fitted into such a narrative, of course, as (initially) the story of post-World War Two U.S. hegemony and the resultant stability in the "balance", and (subsequently) the decline of U.S. hegemony since the 1970s and the resultant instability and disorder in the world system. For Gilpin, therefore, and for other neo-Realists of the "declinist" variety, the crucial issue of International Relations was the resuscitation of U.S. hegemonic power, and by definition, the resuscitation of international order and stability.125 The problem, for Gill, however, was not just the (continuing) U.S. centric propensity of Realist analysis but the increasing silences and omissions associated with it. In Gilpin's explanation of contemporary "reality", therefore, the EEC was not analysed at all, and "little attention [was] given to the USSR or Eastern Europe, or indeed China". The reason for this is an old one, it has to do with the restricted and inadequate representation of the world at the discursive core of Realism, in whatever guise. As Gill has explained it, the problem is that:

124 Ibid.
Gilpin's view of the 'East' is restricted by his ontology: the international political economy is understood in terms of power blocs, factor flows and the calculation of the relative power positions of states.\textsuperscript{126}

The limitations and silences of Gilpin's neo-Realist approach to International Political Economy are, as Gill suggested, to do with questions of hidden and unspoken ontological commitments, as this thesis has sought to illustrate, in a variety of ways, throughout its chapters. The question of how and why these commitments continue to direct and restrict neo-Realism will be confronted from interesting angles in the chapters to follow, which concentrate specifically on Critical Theory and post-modernist perspectives on this issue. For now I want to conclude this more generalised discussion of these themes by illustrating, in more precise terms, how the modernist characteristics that continue to hinder the work of "modal" structuralists like Waltz (and "historians" like Gilpin) are just as evident in the literary contributions of the self proclaimed "modified" neo-Realist structuralists. I will do so in taking up Krasner's invitation to investigate the "basic assumptions" of some of the most prominent neo-Realists of the current period.

"Modified" Neo-Realism: Probing some "Basic Assumptions"

Stephen Krasner's proposition that the keystone of neo-Realism lies at the level of its "basic assumptions" was presumably made in line with his understanding of the new theoretical sensitivity of the "post-positivist" age. Whatever his motivation it is a proposition that invites a critical investigation of his own "basic assumptions", and which, once accepted, finds them wanting, particularly on the central regime issue.

The first problem, in Krasner's case, arises when one ponders again the "modified" structuralist position he associates himself with. This position, as Krasner makes clear, does not accept that regime behaviour is the fundamental organising principle of the international system, even in an interdependent world of international

\textsuperscript{126}Gill, "Two Concepts of International Political Economy", p.372.
political economy. Rather, for Krasner, as it has been for Realists down the ages, "power-maximizing states acting in an anarchical environment" remain the foundational element of international reality.\(^{127}\) This being the case, and if regimes, defined by Krasner as "principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures", are not fundamental to international life, the question of what is fundamental becomes significant in Krasner's scenario.

More precisely, Krasner's position begs two questions. The first, simply put, is this: if contemporary state interaction is not about principles, norms and decision making procedures, what, precisely, does affect "outcomes and behaviour" in the international system? On Krasner's own account, "principles" are "beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude". Norms of behaviour, meanwhile, relate to a set of social "rules and obligations". "Rules" relate to "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action", while "decision making practices" are defined as the "prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice".\(^{128}\) In the light of this, the proposition that this is not the fundamental issue in international life becomes more problematic. Indeed it is hard to imagine, theological images aside, how one does come to an understanding of regimes or, of anything else, if not through a process such as this. Putting the question a little differently would be to ask of Krasner this: if understanding is not derived via "beliefs of fact and causation", if it is not formulated in human societies with "rules and obligations" that mediate, define and police understanding in terms of socio-intellectual "prevailing practices", what on earth is it derived from? If, in other words, understanding is not derived from human social interaction and knowledge construction, where from? The answer, in Krasner's terms, is already given - i.e. from one's "basic assumptions" about the normal state of international affairs. Which, of course, only serves to beg the second, and obvious question concerning the derivative source of these "basic assumptions" if

\(^{127}\) Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", p.2.

\(^{128}\) Ibid.
they do not emanate from the historical, societal and philosophical experiences encompassed in regimes.

For Krasner, and for those neo-Realists so confidently asserting the "concreteness" of their approach to the world, it is at this point that their paradoxical commitment to the "empiricist metaphysic" is exposed. Exposed also is the "basic assumptions" notion in neo-Realist structuralism - as part of a modernist epistemology which (like Waltz's) is paradoxically reductionist - and reliant upon positivist premises concerning the anarchic structure "out there". This became more evidently Krasner's position when he reflected that the "prevailing explanation" among "modified" structuralists, for regime behaviour, and indeed all other behaviour at the international level, was:

egoistic self-interest...[which is] the desire to maximise one's utility function where the function does not include the utility of another party.\(^{129}\)

Another prominent "modified" structuralist, Arthur Stein, has developed this notion further, asserting that, "the same forces of autonomously calculated self interest that lie at the root of the anarchic international system also lay the foundations for international regimes".\(^{130}\) However, Stein insisted, at times "rational self-interested calculation leads actors [states] to abandon independent decision making in favour of joint decision making [i.e. in regimes]". In the resurrected jargon of order and choice in the neo-Realist age this cooperativist urge is explained in terms of "Pareto-suboptimal outcomes".\(^{131}\) But even leaving aside the jargon and (for now) the notion of "independent" decision making in this scenario, the question remains as to how different this perspective is from the Traditional Realist postulate that suggests that in the

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\(^{129}\)Ibid, p.11.

\(^{130}\)Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World", in International Regimes ed. Krasner, p.132.

\(^{131}\)Ibid, p.111.
"objective" circumstances - interstate anarchy - sovereign states sometimes join together for specific interests, albeit always ultimately in the "national interest".

The answer is that there is no more difference between Traditionalist and neo-Realists on this issue than there was between Traditionalists and behaviouralists in the 1960s. Indeed for Stein, the fundamental "objective" circumstance applied in contemporary International Relations as significantly as it ever did for Realists of earlier times. Accordingly, the basic problem to be solved in the 1980s involved "grappling with the problem of trying to describe and explain patterns of order in the anarchic world of international politics". In short the "basic assumptions" of neo-Realism (of Krasner, Keohane, Gilpin, Stein, Waltz etc) is the anarchy assumption - the same fundamental assumption that has informed Carr and Morgenthau, Wight, Bull, Kaplan and Tucker, and a generation of Realists about the real nature of the world "out there". In the era of neo-Realism, "post-positivism" and International Political Economy, however, this Realist fundamental assumption has been re-packaged to take account of the enhanced "theoretical" sensitivities in some sections of the International Relations community. Consequently, when Stein applied his neo-Realist insight to the regime issue he did so, in his own terms at least, in theoretically explicit fashion. His discussion of the "theoretical" status of neo-Realism in comparison to "Grotian" approaches was particularly interesting in this regard, if only because it confirmed again the rather parlous state of mainstream thinking in International Relations in the 1990s.

Stein's argument was predictable enough. It was that approaches based on a structuralist understanding of the international system were superior because they were:

132 Ibid, p.115, emphasis added.
133 In Chapter Nine via Ashley's discussion of the Anarchy Problematique, something more substantial will be said on this issue. See Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique", Millennium 17 (1988), pp.227-262.
rooted in the classic characterization of international politics as relations between sovereign entities dedicated to their own self-preservation, ultimately able to depend only on themselves, and prepared to resort to force.134

The great value of this approach, he argued, was that it provided an image of inter-state behaviour which corresponded to "reality" per se. Thus:

The [systemic] outcomes that emerge from the interaction of states making independent decisions are a function of their interests and preferences. [Consequently] Such independent behaviour and the outcomes that result from it constitutes the working of normal international politics - not of regimes. 135

The implication of this argument is that "normal" International Relations takes place where actors make independent decisions in a "free market" of anarchical power politics. This was precisely Stein's point. He explained, accordingly, that regimes exist where "the interaction between the parties is not unconstrained or is not based on independent decision making".136 Again then, and just as incongruously as in other neo-Realist scenarios, Rousseau (and/or Thucydides/Machiavelli) is joined in unholy union with Adam Smith (and/or Charles Kindleberger) and just as in Waltz's case, the old dichotomies are trotted out to add Traditionalist credibility to the new International Political Economy of neo-Realism. For Stein thus the "most common regime" is "domestic society", because:

even the freest and most open [domestic] societies do not allow individualism and market forces full play [therefore]...Domestic society, characterised by the agreement of individuals to eschew the use of force in settling disputes, constitutes a regime precisely because it constrains the behaviour of its citizens.137

The definition of regime, utilised here by Stein, owes something to another modernist theme that over the years has intersected with positivist utilitarianism - i.e. social contract theory - a perspective which David Hume found unconvincing when it was


135Ibid. emphasis added.

136Ibid, p.117.

137Ibid. emphasis added.
first used to project a set of bourgeois interests as a grand theory of human behaviour in
the Eighteenth century. The more immediate problem of the definition, and of the neo-
Realist perspective from which it comes, is that it represents the crudest kind of Laissez-
faire atomism that even liberal political economists have repudiated. Indeed, Stein's
image of an unconstrained rational universe of competing (state) actors - "free to choose"
represents not just a return to Traditionalist Realist reductionism, but to the crudest
"billiard ball" articulation of it.

Not all "modified" structuralists represent their position in quite the way that Stein
does, even if the "basic assumptions" and their implications for analysis remain
fundamentally the same. Robert Keohane, for example, takes a more measured approach
to the regime issue as befits an erstwhile liberal Interdependence scholar of the 1970s.
Speaking in the mid-1980s about the neo-Realist approach in general, and his own
assumptions in particular, Keohane was the model of the new breed of theoretically
sensitive Realist, gently chiding the policy analyst and/or the "practitioner" for perhaps
thinking that "theory" was irrelevant to the real world of International Relations.

Not so, soothed Keohane, because theory can be "useful" in understanding the
real world. Indeed, he suggested, "theory does have implications for practice". Outlining some of these implications Keohane explained the distinction between the
"theories of world politics on which policymakers and commentators rely" and scientific
theories such as Newtonian physics. The essential difference here, he explained, was

138 See the discussion on this issue in Chapter Two, p.95.

139 The point is that while it is an entirely legitimate enterprise to question the nature, role and even
perhaps the functional existence of regimes, an approach such as this is so devastatingly blinkered that it
cannot possibly be a referent to an international arena which resonates with "constraint" for all its actors,
particularly those dependent upon the institutional whims of an "open" liberal system (e.g. via the World
Bank and the I.M.F.).

140 Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Neorealism and its Critics ed.
Keohane, pp.1-3.

141 Ibid, p.3.

142 Ibid, p.2.
that while the latter provided a "powerful, value-free explanations of outcomes" the former was invested with the "scholar's values, and their own personal experiences and temperaments".\(^{143}\) In the 1980s it might be expected that the odd "policy analyst" who had read Thomas Kuhn or pondered Heisenberg's conclusions about the interpretive nature of quantum physics, might want to question this particular rendition of the modernist story. But this aside, the positivist "primitiveness" of Keohane's theoretical understanding became increasingly evident when he turned to the question of the relationship between theory and reality.

Again the tone was moderate and impeccably 1980s, even if the substance reeked of Eighteenth century empiricism. Thus, intoned Keohane, on the question of understanding reality "[e]ven if one could eradicate theory from one's mind it would be self defeating to try". Why?, because "Reality has to be ordered into categories, and relationships drawn between events".\(^{144}\) For Keohane, then, as for so many in the line through Descartes, Locke, Hume, Comte and Popper, "theory" is represented as a cognitive reaction to reality rather than as integral to its construction. "Theorising", consequently, is understood as the the retrospective process by which reality is ordered into (interpretive) categories. "Theory" in this context takes place after the fact. "Theory", more explicitly, helps us understand the "relationship between events" which are prior to theory.

From this position, of course, the really meaningful question becomes that framed by Logical Positivism: e.g. how do we test/verify whether our "theories" are in fact congruent with reality as it is "out there".\(^{145}\) It is not necessary to call upon the work of critical "reflectivists" for confirmation that this is indeed Keohane's position. Stephen Krasner has confirmed it, in proposing that, for Keohane, international reality is framed

\(^{143}\)Ibid, pp.4-5.

\(^{144}\)Ibid, p.4.

\(^{145}\)This raises the spectre of positivist paradox once again, of course, given that Keohane is seeking to distinguish his theory from the scientific model derived from Newtonian physics. This, however, is an issue that presumably does not warrant the attention of a "real world" researcher.
in terms of two basic assumptions about the nature of the real world - two a priori "facts" against which the scholarly (theoretical) enterprise starts. The first, "fact", echoing power politics Realists from Morgenthau to Waltz, is that International Relations is all about "a world of sovereign states seeking to maximise their interest and power". The second, echoing "market" analyses from Smith to Kindleberger, is that the fundamental determinant of behaviour (including regime behaviour) is "egoistic self interest".146

Consequently, for Keohane, taking his cue from the Logical Positivists, the issue (in this case the nature of regimes and the contemporary international arena) becomes essentially a matter of methodology - a process of "theorising" and falsifying the "facts" - of explaining their "implications for practice". Given that the major "facts" are already framed as the site of egoistic individualism and market anarchy, there is not much question of which methodology is the appropriate one. Keohane, accordingly, takes a position on regimes "that relies heavily on rational choice analysis in the utilitarian social contract tradition".147

The analytical results, of course, are predictable enough. Because the world "out there"is made up of sovereign states following selfish interest - two conclusions must "logically" flow from this: (i) the cooperative/communitarian impulse within the state system recorded by regime theorists is, in reality, an illusion; and (ii) all "meaningful" international behaviour is, in essence, the pursuit of individual self-interest on the part of sovereign states following Traditional "self-help" principles. Regime behaviour can only be understood, therefore, as the pragmatic (rational-actor) response of self seeking actors to conditions in which utility maximising is sometimes best served by some sort of collective decision making scenario. Change, in other words, as the Realist tradition has always asserted, can only come from above - from the rational action of the major powers following rational self interest. The change to regime institutionalism in the post-World

146This is Krasner's view of Keohane in, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", p.11.
147Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", in International Regimes ed. Krasner, p.141.
War Two period, celebrated by some as fundamental change, was no more than a pragmatic readjustment of power politics behaviour. Realism is thus saved from critical challenge by neo-Realism. The discipline can get on with doing what it has been doing - solving the problems of the world as it really is - not how some casts of reformulated (reflectivist) "idealism" would have it.

For many, however, this self-enclosed logic remains less than convincing. Richard O'Meara is one commentator unconvinced by Keohane's soft sell neo-Realism. Keohane's position, he argued, is ultimately "shallow" and "sterile" in its attempt to accommodate the certainty of market logic to Traditional Realism. Consequently, O'Meara complained, Keohane's work is riven with silences and omissions on the very issues he purports to address, for example "regimes are ignored, rather than explained, and none of the traditional paradigm's shortcomings are addressed at all". O'Meara's views complement those expressed above, in that he perceives the major problems of Keohane's analysis as emanating in the basic assumptions he brings to it. In O'Meara terms, thus:

in order to apply his microeconomic analogy, Keohane must embrace states as coherent units which alone compromise the world political system. Although elsewhere Keohane has described states as 'multifaceted, even schizophrenic' he now assumes that states are not only 'billiard balls', but rational utility maximisers as well.

Furthermore, argued O'Meara, by defining a regime as a structure designed merely to facilitate international agreement, Keohane simply disregarded "all of the basic questions concerning why regimes actually arise in the international system". Consequently, while lip service is paid to the need to investigate the interpretive, social interaction within regimes, the liturgy of the Realist catechism remains all powerful to the extent that the demand for agreement between states - "the key motivating factor in the process of regime

148O'Meara, "Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory", p.255.
149Ibid, p.255.
150Ibid, p. 256.
formation" - is treated as an "exogenous" variable in the anarchical struggle between them.

The point, suggested O'Meara, is that for all the moderation of Keohane's argument he, and for that matter all other neo-Realists, simply ignore and/or marginalise the important critical issues concerning the problems of accommodating the issues of regimes with the basic assumptions of their Traditional (positivist) Realism. The question of "anarchy" for example is never seriously confronted. Rather, it continues to be asserted that the international system is anarchical because there is no central authority - no orderer - as there is to control the anarchical forces at the domestic level. O'Meara pointed to a simple flaw in this Realist "given" - the fact that:

one could identify many states which do have centralised authorities and yet appear to be even more "anarchic" than our decentralised international society.151

Emphasising the heterogeneity in the system, in contrast to neo-Realist homogeneity, O'Meara added also that "deviance, compliance and order are all found to varying degrees in both types of social organisation".152 And, making some simple points about the historical and social nature of decision making in the "market", he reminded neo-Realists that:

even in the supposedly anarchical world of international relations, national decision makers are always bound to some extent by past decisions that they and others have taken and by past commitments that they have made.153

This, stressed O'Meara, was an issue the "calculus of decision making cannot ignore", and it raised a broader problem for neo-Realists which suggested that "anarchy is not a proper description of contemporary world politics" because the agents of anarchy - the (supposedly) independent choice making states - are always constrained by historical and

151Ibid, p.251. This was the silence noted by Rosenberg on Waltz, which maintains the domestic/international dichotomy and the anarchy "out there" so important to Realist identity "in here".

152Ibid, p.251.

153Ibid.
Moreover, he argued, to continue to reduce the issue of regimes to the Tradition of sovereign state analysis is to limit understanding of a more nuanced phenomenon. Here, O'Meara emphasised, "although regimes are implicit or explicit interstate agreements, the group of actors whose behaviour and relations are regulated by a regime is seldom limited to states alone".155

The value of O'Meara's critique, leaving aside its commitment to a paradigmatic solution, is that it confirms, from yet another angle, the proposition put at the beginning of this chapter which spoke of a fundamental continuity at the (meta)theoretical core of Realism and neo-Realism, and which suggested that both were limited, positivist based rearticulations of the "search for (scientific) certainty" in Western modernity. One final confirmation of this is worth recording here. It comes from Susan Strange, whose own "alternative" to neo-Realism is entirely consistent, in qualitative terms, with the other "alternatives" discussed in this chapter.156 Strange, nevertheless, is incisive in her commentary on the nature and problems of a neo-Realist perspective on the regime issue and on its image of the world in general. A neo-Realist led discipline, in this regard:

leads to a study of world politics that deals predominantly with the status quo, and tends to exclude hidden agendas and to leave unheard or unheeded complaints, whether they come from the underprivileged, the disenfranchised or the unborn, about the way the system works. In short in ignores the vast areas of non regimes that lie beyond the ken of international bureaucracies and diplomatic bargaining.157

154Ibid.

155Ibid, p.252, emphasis added. Examples proliferate in contemporary literature even if ignored by neo-Realism. Integral to the deep sea mining regime of the the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, for example, are the "interests" of a "very vocal group of mining corporations" as well the state signatories. regimes constructed to deal with environmental issues - concerning the polluting of the Oceans - deal, likewise, with "both public and private ships and tankers", while the major monetary regimes around the world, created by states, are, nevertheless, intrinsic to the everyday reality of "banks, corporations and other financial institutions, not to mention individuals", ibid, p.252.

156See "Cave! Hie Dragons: A Critique of Regime Analysis", in International Regimes ed. Krasner. Here, Strange presents an "alternative" to neo-Realism set upon a Traditionalist Realist variant that claims to be both Marxist and to the "right of most liberal internationalists", see p. 338. It is very strange.

Strange's explanation for why this is so raises themes that, in the chapters now to follow, can be discussed in more profound terms. The point, she argued, is that neo-Realism persists in looking for an all pervasive pattern of political behaviour in world politics, a "general theory" that will provide a nice, neat and above all simple explanation of the past and an easy means to predict the future. Despite all the accumulated evidence of decades of work in international relations and international history (economic as well as political) that no such pattern exists.158

Summary

This chapter returned the thesis discussion to its original locus of concern on the issue of the "unwritten preface" - the International Political Economy debate and the neo-Realist attempt to re-establish a Traditional Realist image of "recurrence and repetition" in a post-Vietnam period of politico-strategic crisis, interdependence and widespread challenges to the "American way". It focused, in particular, on neo-Realist responses to "Grotian" regime theory and the proposition that "something" was happening in the world that was not reducible to Traditional premises of power politics, global anarchy and the determinants of the security dilemma. The aim was not to argue for "Grotian" insight per se, but to illustrate the closure and inadequacy associated with neo-Realist responses to it.

At the forefront of these responses has been the theory of structuralist anarchy invoked by Kenneth Waltz, and the "modified " structuralism of figures such as Keohane, Krasner and Gilpin. The discussion sought to critically evaluate their positions, in their own terms, and from a variety of perspectives, some generally supportive of neo-Realism. The result was not very comforting, to say the least, given that neo-Realism is now the dominant approach to theory and practice in the 1990s. Any sense of a new, more sophisticated understanding in Realist ranks was found to be illusory the moment one critically examined the textual contributions of leading neo-

158 Ibid.
Realist scholars. On behalf of anti-reductionist structuralism, for example, the crudest reductionism was seen to flourish (e.g. in Waltz and Stein). At the centre of a discipline which dismisses its critics as "abstract" theorists, the "empiricist metaphysic" was seen to reign, the hidden font of intolerance and rigidity (e.g. in Keohane, Krasner, Gilpin). The picture got bleaker. Leaving aside the problems of structuralists who can't explain structure (e.g. Waltz according to Ruggie and Wendt); and analysts of an interdependent world who leave the E.E.C, China and the Soviet Union (as it was then) out of their analysis (e.g. Gilpin); the neo-Realist world view was shown to be as narrow, silent and caricatured as it ever was on questions of power, change and human "difference".

Thus, in the 1990s, the anarchical world "out there" remains contrasted to the rational, ordered model of domestic life, even while the experience of so many at the domestic level is incontrovertibly and terrifyingly "anarchical". Thus, the enormous complexity and indeterminancy of human behaviour, across all its cultural, religious, historical and linguistic variations, continues to be reduced to the simplicities of utilitarian rational choice models and reformulated images of "billiard ball" logic. Thus, in an era which has seen Western images of development and weapons of war increasingly resisted and in which other voices, perspectives and realities are beginning to be heard in the global arena, International Relations via its dominant neo-Realist mainstream, continues as Susan Strange has put it, to "deal predominantly with the status quo" and leave unheard or unheeded" the appeals and complaints of "the underprivileged, the disenfranchised or the unborn, about the way the system works".159 As this thesis has sought to illustrate, in a number ways, these are the "practical" implications of the "unwritten preface", and it has been in relation to implications such as these that Critical Theorists and post-modernists have sought, in recent years, to expose the dangers of the "theoretical" silences and omissions associated with them. The final chapters now turn to the efforts of some of the Critical Theory and post-modernist literature which has

159Ibid, p.338.
attempted to go beyond neo-Realism and the Tradition it represents and open up some "thinking space" in International Relations.
CHAPTER EIGHT

OPENING UP SOME "THINKING SPACE" IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

(i) THE CRITICAL THEORY CHALLENGE

This chapter, and the one to follow, are concerned with the way in which questions of theory and practice, dealt with throughout this thesis, have been directly confronted in the 1980s and 1990s in the new critical literature of the Third Debate in International Relations. They seek, more explicitly, to say something of the various ways in which the Tradition and discipline of International Relations, framed in modernist terms and articulated, primarily, within positivist-Realist principles of understanding, has been re-written, re-spoken and re-conceptualised in recent years, in Critical Social Theory literature. Attention will be focused, in particular, upon five interrelated, but distinct, themes within this diverse body of work.

The first, and most general of these themes, involves the more profound philosophical conversation now going on within the International Relations community provoked, in large part, by the "celebratory" scholarship of the Third Debate. The second, more specifically, concerns the re-conceptualisation of the major "givens" of International Relations, particularly its notions of anarchy, sovereignty, order, hegemony and rationality, themes integral to neo-Realism. The third relates to those challenges aimed at the literary foundation of Realism's discursive power, centred, primarily, on a re-readings of the great Realist texts and a reassessment of the contribution of Realism's "heroic figures". The fourth emphasises the need to re-formulate our understanding of strategic and security issues in an era when the identity of "self" and "other" can no longer be unproblematically be represented in Cold War terms, and the fifth deals with some of the implications for International Relations of a re-constructed interpretivist attitude to global political life in the future.
The major intellectual conduits of increased "thinking space" in the extended conversation of the 1980s and 1990s have been those that have been most influential in transferring the larger Critical Social Theory concerns to the Third Debate - Critical Theory approaches and variants of the emancipatory project and, in more recent times, various approaches invoking post-modernist principles of critique. The discussion to follow will be organised, primarily, around these two perspectives. In this chapter it will concentrate on that literature invoking (broadly) emancipatory themes, derived from Critical Theory sources, which characterised much of the challenge to the neo-Realist orthodoxy in the early 1980s.

The Emancipatory Impulse in the Third Debate. Habermas and the "Poverty" of Neo-Realism

Some of the most influential of the Critical Social Theory challenges of the 1980s highlighted that matrix of theoretical tensions connecting power politics Realism to the post-Enlightenment pursuit of a science of human society, in order that the emancipatory potential of such tensions be ventilated and positively invoked within the International Relations community. Primary among these tensions, it was charged, was that between the reductionism and closure derived from Traditional and neo-Realist positivism, and the historical sensitivity and critical openness discernible at the hermeneutic intersections of Traditional Realism, in particular.

The Habermasian influence on this literature was most explicit in Richard Ashley's "Political Realism and Human Interests" which, in 1981, employed concepts from Knowledge and Human Interests to illustrate how, increasingly, since the Cold War, Realism had systematically reduced understanding and explanation in International Relations to a single knowledge form (scientific-rationalism) a single methodology (deductive-empiricism) and a single research orientation (problem solving) in short, to a
single "cognitive interest" - in a "technical" knowledge and a theory of control. Rejecting this image of knowledge and the world, Ashley proposed the need to explore the "deeper relations between realist concepts, knowledge claims, and modes of inquiry and grounding, on the one hand, and the world of social action, on the other". His aim was not simply to condemn or dismiss Realism per se, but, in Habermasian terms, to expose some of the "critical tensions that make realism, at least potentially a vital, open ended tradition".

This could only begin to happen, argued Ashley, if International Relations scholars turned away from the analytical cul-de-sac of structuralist neo-Realism, and rediscovered the interpretivist route traversed, however rudimentarily and sporadically, by "practical" Realists such as Bull, Herz and Morgenthau. This "practical" strain of Realist thought had critical potential because it sought a knowledge of International Relations, not in order to more effectively control an objectified environment, but in order to understand how, in the contemporary world of states, it is possible:

to be and behave as a worthy member of one's traditional community with its intersubjective and consensually endorsed norms, rights, meanings, purposes and limitations on what the individual participant can be and might become.

With this conceptual space opened up, notions of power and national interest could be perceived as derivative of historical, political and cultural interpretation, rather than as the pre-theoretical "givens" of a "technical" Realism. Centred on the historical and political interests of human actors rather than the mechanical operation of systems or structures, a more progressive understanding of reality might then become conceptually possible. A Critical Theory approach, in this sense, (and in Habermasian terms) represented the potential for thinking and acting:

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2 Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests", pp.206-7.

3 Ibid, p.212.
freed from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and [the] conditions of distorted communication that deny humans the capacity to make the future through free will and consciousness.4

These were themes at the forefront of Ashley's most powerful contribution to the emancipatory genre: "The Poverty of Neorealism" (1984).5 This work quickened the pulse of the Third Debate perceptibly and became something of a catalyst for the extended critical agenda of the past few years. As such it requires extended treatment at this point.

In "The Poverty of Neorealism", Ashley set his critical sights on the elite of the neo-Realist mainstream in reiterating the proposition that, in the name of scientific scholarship, they had "betrayed" the "rich dialectical content" of Traditionalist Realism6, in the same way that positivist structuralists (e.g. Althusser) had purged the emancipatory legacy of Marxism, reducing it to an ahistorical and depoliticised understanding of politics "in which women and men are the objects, but not the makers of their circumstances".7

In this way, neo-Realists such as Waltz, Gilpin, Tucker, Keohane and Krasner, had reduced Realist thought to:

positivist structuralism that treats the given order as the natural order, limits rather than expands political discourse, negates or trivializes the significance of variety across time and place [and] subordinates all practice to an interest in control.8

Borrowing some vitriol from E.P.Thompson, Ashley branded this neo-Realist approach "an orrery of errors" set upon a "self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments".9 This, claimed Ashley, was the


6Ibid, p.228.

7Ibid, p.226.

8Ibid, p.228.

9Ibid. At the heart of this orrery was a positivist/empiricist epistemology. As Ashley put it, "neorealist theory is theory of, by, and for positivists", ibid, p.248.
(metatheoretical) foundation of neo-Realism's closure. Here, the "machine like" self enclosing unity of neo-Realism's framing regime "excludes all standpoints that would expose the limits of the given order of things".10 This it did, at one level, by refusing to problematise its state-as-actor model. Rather, it treated as "given" the "existence, boundaries, identifying structures, constituencies, legitimations, interests, and capacities to make decisions" of modern states.11 And, for all its "scientific" posturing, neo-Realism effectively immunised its state-as-actor premise from any process of falsification. The state-as-actor approach, consequently, represented for neo-Realism precisely what neo-Realists claimed it did for Traditionalism: a "metaphysical commitment prior to science and exempted from scientific criticism".12 This limited neo-Realist understanding to the extent that alternative behaviour (e.g. transnational regime behaviour, class relations) could only be comprehended when reduced to the logic of methodological individualism.13

Neo-Realism, accordingly, represented a normative, biased and ideological perspective which "implicitly opposes and denies recognition to those class and human interests which cannot be reduced to concatenations of state interests or transnational coalitions of domestic interests".14 It also represented a significant problem of analysis for the Realist hierarchy in the more critically attuned atmosphere of the post-Vietnam period. Thus, seeking to deal with criticism of its state centrism in well worn modernist fashion - by relocating it to the realm of scientific objectivity - neo-Realists had embraced with enthusiasm a structuralist approach, which, elsewhere across the Social Theory spectrum, the positivist mainstream had largely repudiated.

11Ibid, p.238.
12Ibid, p.239.
13Just, therefore, as collectivist behaviour in general is understood (i.e. by Liberal Pluralism) as the aggregated expression of individual needs, interests etc, so, in the analogised fashion of the International Relations Tradition, all international behaviour is comprehended through the prism of the individual state, following its (given) self interest.
14Ibid.
Ashley focused on the "poverty" of Waltz's structuralism, in particular, stressing its tendency, on the one hand, to grant the anarchical structure of International Relations "a life of its own independent of the parts, the states-as-actors" while, on the other, seeking to establish "the independence of the structured whole from the idealized point of view of the lone, isolated state-as-actor".15 Ultimately, concluded Ashley, neo-Realism got the worst of both theoretical worlds, encompassing "atomism's superficiality combined with structuralism's closure".16 As earlier discussions sought to illustrate, this projection of neo-Realism's limitations is relevant not only to Waltz but also to many of those who have sought to detach themselves from his "conventional" structuralist approach. This was a conclusion also reached by Ashley in the period before his thinking became totally oriented toward post-modernist discourse analysis. Accordingly, in 1984, the work of Waltz, Keohane, Krasner, Gilpin, Tucker, Kindleberger et al was represented as a "collective movement or project", characterised by "shared principles of practice, and observing certain background understandings and norms that participants mutually accept as unproblematic". This was the case, even though "the participants may not be conscious of (may merely take for granted the universal truth of) the norms and understandings integrating them as one movement".17

The basis of this unselfconsciousness was, for Ashley, underwritten by the impact upon it of positivist principles of knowledge.18 More precisely, and in more direct Habermasian terms, the problem was perceived as neo-Realism's commitment to a technical rationalist mode of knowledge that "aims to reduce all aspects of human action to matters of purposive-rational action".19 This was the crux of the "distorted

15Ibid, p.255.
16Ibid, p.256.
17Ibid, p.228.
18And of the projection "on to the plane of explicit theory [of] certain metatheoretical commitments that have long been implicit in the habits of positivism", ibid, p.249.
communication" of neo-Realism which professed itself to be a theoretical force that "demystifies all forms of romanticism, dispenses with atavistic myth, and establishes the 'end of ideology'" while, ultimately, endorsing "a metahistorical faith in scientific-technical progress that positivist science itself cannot question".20 This was the basis of neo-Realism's "betrayal" of the Realist revolt against idealism and the scientific critique of Traditionalism's metaphysics. It was a "betrayal", in this (Frankfurt School) sense, not just in terms of the Thompson -Althusser dispute but in the wider sense of the "betrayal" of an entire Weltanschauung (emancipatory democracy) by the "totalitarian" forces of positivist scientism.

In an International Relations context this "betrayal" had seen the post 1914 quest for a sensitive, enabling, knowledge of International Relations increasingly reduced to the ritualised dogmas of a particular economic logic and power politics ideology. Neo-Realism, in this sense, was a microcosmic expression of the "totalitarianism" of Anglo-American modernity, an ideological hybrid which from Traditional Realism had "learn[t] only an interest in power" and from post-Enlightenment science "only an interest in expanding the reach of control".21 The implications of this Ashley represented in terms which echoed the lamentations of Adorno and Horkheimer surveying a modern scenario dominated by the blindness and paradox inducing powers of technical-rationalism. The major implication was the effective exclusion from International Relations discourse of any reflective self inquiry into questions of knowledge construction and the complexities of understanding the world in "realist" terms.22

21Ibid, p.228.
22Some of the more immediate implications were: (i) a denial of history as an indeterminate social process in favour of a singular, universalised "history"; (ii) the denial of social practice in favour of an essentialised socio-political reality, set upon the behaviour of an "idealized homo economicus"; (iii) a narrow and self serving comprehension of power, reduced to the calculation of "means" (interests); and (iv) an inadequate understanding of politics, reduced to utilitarian struggle and represented as the structural "is" of the world; ibid, pp.258-260.
In 1984, as indicated, Ashley's critical perspectives were still framed in emancipatory terms drawn, primarily, from Habermasian Critical Theory. However, other influences were becoming apparent in his thinking, most particularly those of Bourdieu and Foucault. It was from this (rather problematic) intellectual trinity that Ashley constructed his "dialectical competence model" alternative to neo-Realism. This approach, he maintained, represented the genuine fusion of theory and practice necessary to begin to understand the complex world of the 1980s. Rather than privileging one side of some positivist dualism, it was "at once subjective and objective, necessary and contingent". It recognised, moreover, that all claims for universality, "reflect and conceal particular points of view and particular interests". Simultaneously, it acknowledged that all claims made on behalf of "immediate, contingent and specific experience, [or]...on a unique heritage or unreflected understandings of individual interests" are intrinsically problematic, because they conceal "implicit universalising projects" about the real nature of the world.

Such a model, argued Ashley, could open up significantly different understandings of International Relations. Offering interpretive, hermeneutic based insight it would, for example, allow reflection upon neo-Realism's status not just as a "theory" concerned to explain, interpret and organise the facts, but as a deeply embedded regime of theory and practice, which "together with the worldwide power bloc whose dominance it signifies and secures" helps create and reinforce "modern global hegemony". Understood this way, different questions might be asked of the process by which this hegemony is constructed, in terms of the "social, economic, and environmental conditions upon which its practical efficacy depends". It might,

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23 Ibid, p.266.
26 Ibid.
consequently, be understood not as some sort of structuralist inevitability, nor as the irreducible essence of contemporary international life, but as the dominant world order: among a multiplicity of mutually interpenetrating and opposed world orders some of which might escape the logic of the modern global hegemony and assert alternative structuring possibilities.\(^2^7\)

Once this "thinking space" was acknowledged alternative idea forms could begin to exploit the silences and omissions of the dominant theory and practice, in order to "transform [their] conditions of dominance, [and] produce the conditions of their own self-realization".\(^2^8\) At the broader level, a more sophisticated and critically honed appreciation of the complexities and crises of contemporary International Relations could emerge, not just in terms of "one more cyclical economic crisis" but (perhaps) as:

an epochal crisis of world authority...involving a denigration in the learning capacity of the [dominant politico-intellectual] regime and, consequently, a loss of political control.\(^2^9\)

The emancipatory connections, between Ashley's 1981 article and the "Poverty" arguments of 1984, were most explicit when he outlined the rudiments of his alternative approach to theory and practice. This was due, primarily, to Ashley's reassertion, in 1984, of his earlier proposition that such an alternative was already present in the Traditionalist (classical) Realist approach which neo-Realism sought to make scientific. A major critical purpose of the "Poverty of Neorealism" accordingly, was the attempt to "recover" from Traditional/classical Realism "those insights into political practice which neorealism threatens to purge".\(^3^0\) Ashley was not unaware of the complicity of Traditionalism in the global hegemony of theory and practice associated with neo-Realism.\(^3^1\) He insisted, however, that as the "ethnomethodology of the modern tradition

\(^{2^7}\)Ibid, p.279.

\(^{2^8}\)Ibid.

\(^{2^9}\)Ibid, pp.278-279.

\(^{3^0}\)Ibid, p.229.

\(^{3^1}\)Ibid, p.274. For all Ashley's enthusiasm regarding the critical theory potential of the Traditionalist approach to knowledge, he was aware of its limitations. Its appeal to the "wisdom" of the diplomatic
of statesmanship"32 Traditionalist Realism invoked a broad hermeneutic approach to understanding that was animated by a "practical interest in knowledge", which was resistant to the frozen categories of neo-Realism and irreducible to its rational choice premises.33 In 1981 Ashley had sought to utilise the sensitive Traditionalism of Herz as an example of this hermeneutic difference. In 1984 it was Morgenthau who was projected as the personification of Traditionalism's "practical" cognitive interest.34 In 1984, thus, a series of quotations from Morgenthau were presented, all indicating his distaste for the post-Enlightenment "scientific" approach, all invoking a historical and interpretivist alternative.35 Indeed, maintained Ashley, Morgenthau, on "many occasions" stressed the "unhistoric and apolitical" nature of the utilitarian, positivistic and rationalist commitments characteristic of neo-Realism, proposing that such commitments:

threaten to produce a form of pseudo-political understanding that falsely reduces the inherently dialectical character of politics to the monothetic orientation of economic reason, an orientation in which all perspectives, even the measure of power and its changes, are thought to be ultimately collapsible into a singular internally consistent scale of universally inter-convertible values.36

For Ashley this was evidence enough that Traditionalist Realists such as Morgenthau, "given a chance to speak, would be among neorealism's sternest critics".37 Ashley's important critique of neo-Realism was, consequently, and in this regard, an attempt to reinvoke Morgenthau's voice on behalf of a silenced interpretivist insight at the

purveyors of the diplomatic true tradition was, he noted, as often as not presented in terms of history defined solely by the actions of "great men", ibid, p.230. There was, moreover, he proposed, little effective difference between the Waltzian proposition concerning "bold conjectures" as the source of theory and the vague "intuitionism" of Traditionalist perspectives on metatheoretical issues. And for all its awareness of the problems of the pseudo-scientific method of much post-World War Two Realist thought, the Traditionalist alternative remained conceptually incarcerated in the dualised and dichotomised understanding of International Relations.

32Ibid, p.265.
34The ultimate "error" of neo-Realism, in this sense, was that its dominant (technical-rationalist) logic was repudiated by its own intellectual tradition, and by Morgenthau, the most influential Realist of all.
35Ibid, pp.280-281
36Ibid.
core of neo-Realism. It was an attempt thus to "emancipate" International Relations by emancipating Realism's repressed critical dimension. This particular element of the work, however, stands as its most obvious point of weakness. Not, necessarily, because of its attempt to illuminate a critical potential within Realism, "repressed" by its dominant reading. As stated earlier this thesis has empathy with such an ambition. Rather, the problems for Ashley, as his critics were quick to discern, concerned the implications for his general argument of the "recovery" theme.38

Kratochwil, for example, in a spirited defence of "scientific" interpretivism landed some telling, and valid, critical blows on Ashley's characterisation of Morgenthau as the exemplar Traditionalist, repelled by the positivism of neo-Realism.39 Kratochwil countered by simply selecting from Morgenthau's writings famous passages which emphasised Morgenthau's, at times, crude positivism. Kratochwil, moreover, accused Ashley of blindness in relation to Morgenthau's influence in transferring rational actor premises to contemporary Realism.40 He stressed too the intellectual insensitivity associated with Ashley's lumping together of critical influences drawn from diverse sources such as Habermas, Foucault and Bourdieu in his "dialectical competence model". These were the kind of issues raised by others also. Gilpin, for example, though struggling with the intellectual issues at hand, was able to highlight the problems of Ashley's tendency towards dichotomy in his representation of the relationship between Traditionalism and neo-Realism, on behalf of an otherwise dialectically informed approach to knowledge and society.41

38 Generally also invoking a variant of the "Robinson Crusoe" individualist argument to counter Ashley's claim of shared metatheoretical premises binding together neo-Realism's various strains.


40 On the question of Morgenthau's part in this transference, see Chapter Six of the thesis, pp.242-247.

41 Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", International Organization 38(2) (1984), pp.287-304. Gilpin's response, though pertinent on this point, was the one that perhaps illustrated best how correct Ashley was in his projection of neo-Realists as limited and unselfconscious in their understanding of the world they speak so confidently of. Gilpin's response was generally dismissive of Ashley's argument, pleading a Robinson Crusoe type defence on the charge that neo-Realists are bound
Such criticisms, to some extent at least, were justified. Ashley, in 1984, seemingly did not comprehend (or at least did not acknowledge) that the "repression" of critical potential in Realism was not due to the impact of neo-Realism's positivist scientism per se, but to the modernist framing regime at the core of Traditionalism which established, at the metatheoretical level, the discursive conditions for theory and practice of both Traditionalism and neo-Realism. Nor did he acknowledge what Stanley Hoffmann understood in 1977, that Morgenthau was the "father" of scientific Realism and integral to the transference of economic rationalism at the core of the discipline of International Relations. Moreover, in 1984, Ashley did not acknowledge what this thesis has sought to illustrate in its early chapters: (i) that positivists can repudiate scientific rationality on positivist grounds (e.g. Popper, Lakatos); (ii) that an anti-

together by discursive commitments and chiding Ashley for the "needless jargon" of his argument, ibid, p.289. It was on this issue of Ashley's jargon however that Gilpin revealed the narrowness and superficiality of his response to serious criticism. Gilpin, for example, complained that he couldn't respond to some of Ashley's arguments because "International Organization failed to send an English translation with the original text", ibid, p.289. This was presumably a humorous comment meant to further convince the mainstream readers of International Organization of the tortuous and ultimately insignificant nature of Ashley's thinking and writing. The joke though was on Gilpin and indeed on the discipline, because the passage which most offended Gilpin was one which indicated only that his reading regimen remained incarcerated in the caricatured debates of the past. The offending passage came as Ashley was seeking to distinguish other approaches than the positivist one for understanding the world. In this vein his point was that "For eschatological discourse (evident in phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and some hermeneutical sciences) the objective truth of the discourse lies within and is produced by the discourse itself", "The Poverty of Neorealism", p.249. Gilpin's response was simply to pronounce that while he was sure this statement "and many like it throughout the article are meaningful to Ashley, I [Gilpin] have no idea what it means", "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", p.289. There was no hint of effort here to try and understand Ashley's point which, after all, in 1984, and after years of post-behaviouralist debate on the question of hermeneutics and the "theory impregnated" nature of the "facts" was not that difficult to understand. But it is not just the arrogance of Gilpin's response that was its most disturbing feature - such arrogance is almost to be expected in a discipline which has been so uncritical of its "heroic figures". The more disturbing point is the indication the response gave that Gilpin's understanding of the issues he deals with is remarkably shallow. It has to be remembered that Gilpin engages explicitly in "theoretical" debate and speaks with authority on "theoretical" issues. It was Gilpin, after all, who bemoaned the fact that Traditionalist scholars (unlike neo-Realists) were "not well grounded in social theory"; see Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism" p.231; and it was Gilpin in The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) who invoked Thomas Kuhn as an influence and who was confident enough to take on the complex issue of ideology, including Marxist ideology. Yet, in relation to Ashley's criticism of his theoretical position he suddenly doesn't know what all this "means". The narrowness of Gilpin's scholarship is clear enough perhaps in relation to his analysis of the world political economy which barely includes Eastern or Western Europe or China. In his response to Ashley a similar attitude and capacity was evident.

Enlightenment approach proclaiming "historical/philosophical" knowledge can be advocated in terms of the essentialist, universalist principles of positivist rationalism (e.g. Wight, Bull and the British School); and (iii) that Verstehen based interpretivist perspectives (e.g. Morgenthau via Weber) are "the other side of the positivist coin".

My own view is that Ashley's "Poverty" article represents the contribution of an outstanding and creative thinker who, in the early 1980s, personified the restlessness and frustration of a liberal sector within the United States International Relations community, which perceived the promised "openness" of the post-Vietnam period rapidly being closed off by the neo-Realist hierarchy and Hegemonic Stability Theory. The restlessness, creativity and frustration are very evident in the "Poverty" article. The result, for the most part, is a stimulating and sophisticated critique of orthodox theory and practice pitched at the kind of intellectual level generally alien to an International Relations audience, a critique which prefigured much of the Critical Social Theory literature that was to follow. At the same time there was in Ashley's wide ranging attack on neo-Realism an occasionally cavalier approach to complex issues, (e.g. the connections between Habermas, Bourdieu and Foucault) which left his arguments vulnerable to a critical audience only to pleased to pick up on some obvious flaws. Thus, in concentrating on its obvious problems of logic, his critics were able to ignore and/or marginalise those elements of Ashley's argument which exposed the limitations of neo-Realism in general.

Moreover, in missing the point on the Morgenthau issue, in particular, Ashley allowed the neo-Realist hierarchy to sidestep the broader questions of Realism and modernism and the broader inadequacies of their Tradition and discipline. In summary: Ashley's emancipatory work in 1984 opened up important "thinking space" for many within the International Relations community, but, ironically, those who were its major targets were able to effectively close it off. Indeed, as this thesis has sought to illustrate, there is still little evidence that neo-Realists have begun to address the substantive issues raised in Ashley's exposition of their "poverty".

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Since the mid 1980s Ashley has shifted considerably from an explicit emancipatory approach to a post-modernist perspective, and to a position which does acknowledge the larger modernist location of the issues at hand in 1984. More will be added later on his important contribution to the Critical Social Theory literature in this genre. At this point however another important contribution to emancipatory scholarship requires attention, one that raises these issues again, albeit in a slightly different form. This is the contribution of Robert Cox who, throughout the 1980s, confronted neo-Realism with an emancipatory perspective influenced by Habermas but also by Gramsci and anti-structuralist Marxism in general.

Cox, Gramsci and a Critical Theory Alternative to the Neo-Realist International Political Economy

Cox's essay "Social Forces, States, and World Orders" (1981) is an early example of his contribution to the Critical Social Theory literature, in recent times. This work, like Ashley's, also sought to "recover" from Traditionalist Realism an open ended interpretive nuance, which, for Cox, was located in the historical scholarship of figures such as E.H.Carr and Ludwig Dehio. And, like Ashley, Cox developed his arguments in terms of a major tension - between a latent Critical Theory perspective at the core of Traditionalism - and a "problem solving" approach, dominant since the Cold War and the Americanisation of the discipline. This "problem-solving" category generally

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43 Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory". This has been reprinted with an important postscript where Cox discusses the distinction between positivist and historicist forms of knowledge in Neorealism and its Critics ed. Keohane. Cox's ideas have been developed in his recent work (the first of a four volume collaborative project with Jeffrey Harrod, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). On his Gramscian connection, see Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", Millennium 12(2) (1983), pp.265-291.

44 Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.131.

45 The "problem solving" approach is ahistorical, static, positivistic and conservative. Accordingly "It takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and political relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action". Thus, "Since the general pattern of

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complemented Ashley's (Habermasian) concept of "technical" Realism, but Cox's argument diverged significantly from Ashley's when it came to the question of Morgenthau's role in the discipline's development. On this issue Cox stressed Morgenthau's seminal contribution to the "problem solving" perspective and to neo-Realism in general.46

Scholars such as Morgenthau and Waltz, argued Cox, were integral to the objectification of Realist theory and practice, and, since the Cold War, to a concern, above all, with "the defence of American power as a bulwark of the maintenance of order".47 It was this ideological form of Realism, he charged, that continued to underpin and direct neo-Realism, limiting its potential for understanding to the "prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized".48 Into the 1980s then the overriding purpose of neo-Realism was a conservative problem solving one, concerned to "make [existing] relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble".49 Its dominant knowledge form, accordingly, was a crude positivism which rendered neo-Realism inadequate as a source of "real" knowledge about human political society because it misunderstood the relationship between theory and the reality it sought to explain. In his 1981 article, consequently, a major emancipatory task, for Cox, was to recover for contemporary institutions and relationships is not called into question, particular problems can be considered in relation to the specialised areas in which they arise", ibid, p.129.

46Indeed, he argued, it was influential scholars such Morgenthau and Waltz, though "individuals of considerable historical learning" who had adopted a "fixed ahistorical view...[which] transformed realism into a form of problem solving theory". It was scholars such as these that had been integral to the increased orientation of International Relations, away from those elements of its Tradition which approached political reality as a contingent phenomenon "susceptible to change", towards a Realism constructed in terms of an enduring anarchy, resistant to meaningful change, ibid, p.131.


48Ibid, p.128.

49Ibid, p.129.
International Relations scholarship some basic philosophical principles of critical interpretation that the neo-Realist orthodoxy had "forgotten".50

Cox's point, of course, was that all theories (including Realist hegemonic theories) are historically and politically grounded and, that dominated by the history and politics of the Cold War, Realist theory was grounded in the "problem" of how to control and manage an apparently enduring superpower conflict. This problem-solving approach was inadequate, however, because in focusing its attention upon a frozen objectified image of the world "out there", and not reflecting upon the larger process by which that image is theoretically constructed, Realism effectively blinded itself to the prospect of a changing reality, generated by the dialectical interaction of theory and practice. A Critical Theory approach was necessary, in this context, maintained Cox, precisely because it did reflect upon the process of theorising, in order to "become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorising, and its relation to other perspectives".51

Critical Theory, thus, reconnected (theoretical) knowledge, human interests and the everyday practice of power, and opened up a previously foreclosed debate about the relationship between theory and practice. It was an approach that did not posit an ahistorical "continuing present", but oriented attention toward a "continuing process of historical change". It did not accord existing institutions and power relations the status of "facts" or "givens" but "call[ed] them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of change".52 It was in these terms that, in 1981 and in subsequent works, Cox introduced a definably Gramscian tone to his

50 The first and most important of these principles was that which rendered problematic any assertion about an independent reality "out there" accessible via objective empirical observation. Rather, Cox stressed, it is "academic convention [which] divides up the seamless web of the real social world into separate spheres, each with its own theorizing". Instead, he insisted, knowledge of reality is always intrinsically connected to social practice and "to the ways in which human affairs are organized in particular times and places", ibid, p.126. Consequently, "theory is always for someone and for some purpose": theories all have a perspective set in social and political time and space and all perspectives represent an image of the world as seen from the standpoint "of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power...or of present crisis...", ibid, p.128.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid, p.129.
Critical Theory arguments. Cox's argument here, (complementing Ashley's) was that like everything else in the Realist lexicon, the question of hegemony was situated as part of a power matrix which reflected the dominance of an "orderer" - the most powerful state (i.e. the United States) - over the "ordered" Others. When change was the issue the response was framed, predictably, in power politics terms (the demise of "order" in the state system) and in the terms of the dominant perspective (United States foreign policy). To open up some "thinking space" and reconceptualise contemporary International Political Economy, Cox argued, an alternative (Gramscian) approach to hegemonic power was required, which insisted on a dialectic between knowledge and power, between the power structure (the state system) and its "superstructural" elements (e.g. ideological) that helped constitute and legitimate that power.

The point, maintained Cox, was that neither the structure of state interaction, nor the question of hegemony in the International Political Economy could be understood exclusively in power politics terms. Rather, to understand systemic and hegemonic

53 See, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method".

54 I refer here, in particular to his "Production and Hegemony: Toward a Political Economy of World Order", in The Emerging International Economic Order edited by H. Jacobsen and D. Subyanski (California: Sage, 1982); and to his major work in the genre, Power, Production and World Order. The issue of social forces in Cox's work is an interesting one and it represents an attempt to go beyond the conventional Marxist notion of the "social relations of production", although this clearly is its conceptual source. As Cox explains, a social forces approach is concerned with the interconnection of three dimensions of power: (i) over the productive process; (ii) social power - the relations between classes and (iii) control over the state - political power. It is from this power matrix, he argues, that particular constellations of social forces emerge. In an interdependent world economy and with the impact within and upon the power matrix of monopoly capital and an internationalised production process, there are, suggests Cox, possibilities for change as new constellations of social forces become evident around the world. See, "Production and Hegemony: Toward a Political Economy of World Order"; and Power, Production and World Order, Chapters 1 and 10 in particular.

55 While acknowledging that, at one level, neo-Realists were correct to emphasise the military and economic aspects of power when dealing with the questions of contemporary International Political Economy and hegemony, noting that the hegemony of Britain in the nineteenth century and the United
power was to understand the power of hegemony in the Gramscian sense, as the "temporary universalisation in thought of a particular power structure, conceived not as domination but as the necessary order of nature". Since the Nineteenth century, in Anglo-American societies, the "necessary order of nature" had centred on the "universalisation in thought" of the correctness of capitalist market relations and its associated social formations. The role of the state in this hegemonic theory and practice was to ensure the necessary conditions in the international economy for the universalisation process to take place.

At the pinnacle of the hegemonic formation, thus, (e.g. the USA after 1945) the resultant tendency has been to herald international economic success as consistent with the "natural order" of modern social existence. Any challenge to this success has been interpreted as "unnatural" interference in the process of universalisation - at the political level - at the level of inter-state conflict. It was in this hegemonic context that Realism, from its disciplinary centre in the United States, has managed to reduce the complex matrix of issues of International Relations to a concern with hegemonic order; an order represented as in the interests of the state system as a whole, as in the interests of the "natural" (modern) order. In this schema, (Capitalist, market) economics has been accorded a "given", taken-for-granted, status - an (often) unspoken but powerful commitment within Anglo-American Realism and throughout its hegemonic territory. The emergence of a neo-Realist structuralism (based on microeconomic theory) and Hegemonic Stability Theory was, in this sense, the explicit representation of a deep ideological commitment in Realism, drawn out by challenges to its hegemonic power.

These challenges, Cox acknowledged, did not represent a threat to international capitalism per se, nor, in the short term, to the state system built upon it. Rather, he argued, the hegemonic crisis for the United States was, to a large extent, a crisis of

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56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

States since World War Two has been underwritten in this way; see Cox, "Production and Hegemony", p.38.
hegemonic legitimation, the crisis of a dominant power no longer able to effectively articulate its hegemonic logic.\textsuperscript{58} In Gramscian terms this represented a significant historical moment when the hegemon could no longer project its domination as in line with the "necessary order of [politico-economic] nature". This, Cox suggested, was not solely or primarily because of the demise of institutions (e.g. Bretton Woods) that acted as major agencies of U.S. hegemonic power, or the end of the Cold War, as such, but it has to do with broader structural changes in the International Political Economy. These were changes which, for all their concern with structural analysis, neo-Realists could not adequately deal with because they were not reducible to simple models of individual state interaction. Rather, they concerned changes in social forces brought on by an internationalised production process and the international division of labour associated with it.

This, maintained Cox, has provoked significant responses in societies both favourably incorporated in the world economy, and those increasingly marginalised by it - with both sets of responses placing pressures upon the post-World War Two hegemon. In the case of the "core" societies, for example, the costs have largely been bourne by labour forces engaged in traditional industries (e.g. manufacturing, agricultural). Hence, increased tensions on issues of protectionism and "restructuring", and between small indigenous capitalist sectors and multinational capital. Hence, too, an antipathy to calls for "free" trade by the dominant politico-economic power (the United States) and the advocation of protected blocs in competition with the hegemon. In the marginalised societies of the Third World the impact has been somewhat different and the political and social conflict more direct. Generally, however, there has been increased conflict between elites seeking to control (in one way or another) the consequences of the internationalisation of production upon their societies and the (often) disenfranchised masses seeking (in one way or another) to confront the everyday misery of their existence. In this context too, the United States has found it increasingly difficult to

\textsuperscript{58}Here the influence of Habermas is evident also in terms of his arguments in Legitimation Crisis trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).
project its image of the benign hegemon ordering International Relations in favour of the market and "natural" (Western, modern) political structures.59

This was likely to continue, suggested Cox, because there was little evidence that the intellectual/policy community in the United States understood that its politico-economic power was dependent upon something other than its power politics capacity to "deter" and/or keep the world in its "natural" (free trade) state. In fact, Cox's argued, there was always something more than than Realist image of state power at stake in its reign as hegemon. It always was:

a world order...founded not only upon the regulation of interstate conflict, but also upon a globally conceived civil society ie a mode of production of a global extent which brings about links among the social classes of different countries. [It is] the global structuring of [these] social forces [that] shapes the different forms of state, while states in turn influence the evolution of the regulatory pattern of the global hegemony.60

This is an important affirmation of Cox's Critical Theory position. This was what he was getting at with his distinction, in 1981, between an ahistorical "problem solving" Realism and a Critical Theory approach which refused to take existing power relations as "given", but which was concerned with the origins of such relations and "whether they might be in the process of change".61 It is an important dimension of the "thinking space" that Cox has sought to open in his examination of the emancipatory potentials of new social forces and new state formations that might emerge with contemporary changes in global production processes.

From Cox's perspective change is not explained from the top down (i.e. at the behest of the major states) as in Realism, but it occurs as part of a more complex matrix, as changes in social forces help restructure world order and the pattern of global hegemony. It becomes possible, thus, to think of stability, order and hegemony not,

59More often than not, consequently, its one dimensional perspective on the issue has seen it drawn towards cruder articulations of order maintenance in the Third World.

60Cox, "Production and Hegemony", p.45.

61Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.128.
necessarily, in terms of the dominant state, or as a recurring factor in some determined "historical" structure. Rather, history and the international hierarchy of states is understood, always, as part of a dialectic between social and material forces mediated through the political/institutional agencies of the state. And while, like neo-Realists, Cox is concerned with the question of what comes after U.S. hegemony, his response has not been to proclaim the ungovernability of the system, but to examine the possibilities for alternative state formations in the future - and the emancipatory potentials of social forces emerging in the present.

In *Production, Power and World Order* (1987) he approached this issue by developing a complex socio-historical schema set within patterns of production relations and their attendant social forces. This discussion was complemented by another, outlining various historical forms of the state characterised by their politico/institutional structures. Of most immediate significance, in this regard, was Cox's perspective on the period between 1945-1980 (the end of his study). In this period, he argued, there has been an ongoing tension between variants of the "redistributive" state formation based on a command economy and single party control (e.g. U.S.S.R and China) and "neo-Liberal" states derived from the "welfare-nationalist" states of the post-World War One era. In the 1970s, with the "redistributive" state formation in the process of decline and reformulation, some of the most powerful "neo-Liberal" states have evolved into the "hyper-Liberal" formations associated with the United States, under the Reagan Administration, and Britain under Thatcherism. In these states emphasis has been placed on possessive individualism, patriotism and a strong military profile, while, in both international and domestic policy, there has been increased antipathy to issues of (for example) welfare statism and human rights. It is in this context, Cox argued, that the marginalisation of the Third World and conflict between the marginalised and the major productive states is set to increase.

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63 Ibid, Chapters 8 and 9.
It is, therefore, this matrix of conflicts, between material and ideological forces, that is the basis of the hegemonic crisis for Cox. Unlike his neo-Realist counterparts, however, Cox has perceived this crisis as pregnant with potential for progressive social change, a historical moment with the potential for counter-hegemonic response. His point, in short, is that if one understands the crisis in his Critical Theory terms there is nothing so determined about the International Political Economy that can structurally prevent the changes in worldwide productive processes provoking changes in social forces worldwide, changes not necessarily controlled by, or on behalf of, the hegemon or the major powers. His broader intellectual point, consistent with his philosophical discussion in 1981, is that there is nothing determinate about the real world "out there". Accordingly, it can be examined and understood from a perspective other than the dominant hegemonic perspective; its "answers" being effectively shaped by the (metatheoretical) questions asked of it. For Cox, thus, asking questions framed in the critical modernist tradition of the Frankfurt School and anti-structuralist Marxism, the answers, at least, allow for the possibility of something other than "recurrence and repetition" and/or the necessity of US hegemony. Above all they allow for a serious analytical inquiry of International Political Economy along Critical Theory lines.

Cox's Critical Theory approach is not without problems, of course. Like every other mode of inquiry discussed in this thesis it is replete with them. His major work, *Production, Power and World Order*, for example, really only covers the period until the end of the 1970s. Since that time some of its empirical analysis has been rather overtaken by the extraordinary events of the past decade, particularly in Eastern Europe. In this regard, as Stephen Gill suggested in 1990, the new state formations that seem to be emerging might not be characterised by greater capacity for dissent at the international system, but by a consolidation of "hyper-Liberalism" which will see:

a new identity of interests between established workers and transnational productive capital, between certain financial and trading interests, consumers,
service workers, and even the leaders and some workers of the previously communist states (perhaps eventually in the USSR).64

In the context of this work, of course, there is another level at which Cox's Critical Theory requires critical attention. This concerns its location in modernist discourse. Or, more precisely, it concerns the question of whether his approach genuinely opens "thinking space" or whether, in post-modernist terms, its critical value is undermined by its modernist emancipatory commitments. My position on Cox's contribution, specifically, is that it represents something other than vulgar Marxism and that analytically it has a great deal more to offer that the narrowly framed image of International Political Economy projected by a figure such as Gilpin.65 I do, however, take seriously the post-modernist position on this issue, and there are themes in Cox's work which could be interpreted as consistent with a "meta-narrative" reading of Historical Materialism, and the historical development of a "repressed" critical rationality. On close reading, however, Cox's, Production, Power and World Order, for example, is a more sophisticated argument than this, with the detailed discussion of the relationship between production, social class and political power, in that work, warranting serious and sustained study, before any conclusion is reached regarding Cox's modernist status.

The modernist commitments and limitations of some other emancipatory contributors to the Third Debate are less difficult to evaluate. The work of the Anglo-Australian scholar, Andrew Linklater, for example, has been characterised by an explicit Kantian progressivism and, in more recent years, by arguments oriented toward a synthesis of Traditionalist Realism and Critical Theory. In two editions of Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (1982 and 1990) Linklater's commitment to Kantian philosophy has been expressed in attempts to establish, for contemporary International Relations, notions of "a moral progress, universality, human subjectivity


65 In, for example, The Political Economy of International Relations.
and autonomy". In between times this has led to a rather problematic reading of the new debates in International Relations. In 1986, for example, Linklater, concluded that the liberal Interdependence literature of the 1970s "inevitably paved the way" for a more systematic appreciation of Marxist based perspectives on International Political Economy. This notion he developed, in claiming that:

liberal analyses of interdependence combined their critique of realism as an empirical account of world politics with a challenge to its adequacy as a guide to political practice. This challenge began to recover the concept of progress for the theory of international relations, and encouraged the belief that the purpose of international theory was not to understand 'recurrence and repetition' in the international system but to identify and strengthen alternative historical possibilities immanent within it.

The most charitable response to a proposition such as this is that it might have relevance to some Interdependence scholarship, but is clear that, for Linklater, major Interdependence works, such as those of Keohane and Nye, are understood as contributing to the (perceived) post-Realist search for "progress" and "alternative historical possibilities" in International Political Economy. This, as the previous chapter indicated (and as Keohane has affirmed) is assuredly not what such works were about. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how they could be so interpreted, unless one is committed to an overwhelming modernist image of "history" as the unfolding of a progressive human rationality, most powerfully "immanent" at the core of the dominant ideology (i.e. as liberalism gives way to its "higher form").

This is, I think, the discursive keystone of Linklater's progressivist optimism and the philosophical catalyst for his broader project, outlined in Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical International Theory (1990). Here, his primary concern was to construct "a philosophical defence of the notion of universal emancipation and a practical


Ibid, p.302, emphasis added.

inquiry into the measures which may be capable of advancing this ideal". This ambition, as the title of his work suggested was, for Linklater, bound up with an attempt to "incorporate" and "supersede" Realism and Marxism. It was, in other words, an argument in favour of dialectical synthesis that went far beyond the emancipatory themes to be found in either Ashley's or Cox's work. While Ashley and Cox sought to expose a tension within Realism that represented a potential (hermeneutic) "thinking space" for any Critical Theory perspective, Linklater's approach was built upon more orthodox modernist foundations. Consequently, Linklater's dialectical approach had a "totalising" dimension to the extent that its "thesis" (Realism) and "antithesis" (Marxism) were represented in antinomised form, a form capable of generating a "real" meaning from both which could then be utilised as the basis of a synthetic "transcendence".

This is a perspective articulated in Beyond Realism and Marxism, from a position rooted in Enlightenment rationalism and a reading of Realism and Marxism, in International Relations, which acknowledged their limitations but which seemed oblivious to, and/or uninterested in, those critiques of both which stress the dangers of modernist universality and the imposition of essentialist meaning in theory and practice. Thus, in Beyond Realism and Marxism Linklater couched his emphasis on the "significance of moral development" and his evaluation of "the evolution of universal moral norms" in terms of Habermasian Critical Theory and sought his synthesis with Realism on this basis. He was aware, of course, of Realist antipathy to a position such as this and the added difficulties, therefore, of any dialectical synthesis. This, however, was no insurmountable problem for a scholar of the British/Australian school, who turned, in time honoured fashion, to Martin Wight for additional "thinking space".

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71Ibid, p.5.

72Ibid, p.7.

73Ibid, Chapter 1, especially pp.9-15 and conclusion.
The value of Wight here, of course, relates to his (in)famous trichotomy in 1966 which categorised International Relations thought in terms of Realist (Machiavellian) Rationalist (Grotian) and Revolutionist (Kantian) perspectives. For scholars such as Bull this second category allowed space for Realist analysis of international "society", rather than merely a system of anarchic states. For Linklater, the final two categories allowed space for an analysis that "shifts the emphasis from systemic forces to systemic principles". The systemic principles at issue, in this case, were those of universal morality and universal community - the principles of a universalised emancipatory project - principles that, via Wight, could now be encompassed within a single synthetic schema involving elements of (Traditionalist) Realism.

As my previous comments have indicated I have some empathy with a project that confronts neo-Realism with insights drawn from a sophisticated Historical Materialism, a la Robert Cox. However, while Linklater's contribution over the years have been characterised by high quality analysis and a thoughtful, critical disposition, his perspective is more obviously problematic in terms of its modernist limitations. It is one thing, for example, to develop a counter-hegemonic argument on Gramscian and Habermasian grounds, it is quite another to seek to combine "elements of Realism and Marxism within one conceptual framework" particularly if that conceptual framework is dependent upon the "recovery" of universal moral norms and notions of universal moral communities. It is in this sense that Linklater's work is highly susceptible to the "meta-narrative" critiques of post-modernists concerned about the dangers of continuing to think and act in terms of (Western, modernist) universalist schemas for emancipation of the species. In a Postscript to the second edition of Men and Citizens, Linklater began to address the issues at stake here, and he did so with some sensitivity to the differences and

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74 See Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?", in Diplomatic Investigations edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966). See also the comments on this strategy in Chapter One footnotes 24 and 53.

75 Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism, p.17.

76 Ibid, p.165.
potential points of contact between Critical Theory and post-modernism. It remains to be seen, however, whether this represents a serious concern to confront the problems of modernism or whether the synthetic commitments persist. This is a question confronted in a slightly different way in the final example of emancipatory scholarship for discussion here, that centred on the mini-debate of the late 1980s between two British scholars, Mark Hoffman and Nick Rengger.

Hoffman sparked off the debate in 1987 with an article highlighting the significance of Critical Theory approaches for the "inter paradigm debate", which for British scholars centred at the LSE, in particular, represents the current state of the disciplinary art in International Relations. Hoffman's proposal, complementing the Traditional view of the discipline's development, was that following the two "great debates" and the "post behavioural revolution" of the 1970s and the new International Political Economy surge of the 1980s, Realism had lost its status as the "agreed core of the subject" and the discipline was now characterised by paradigmatic diversity. This situation, he characterised as leading to both "confusion and a degree of intellectual insecurity" and a discipline increasingly "exciting and alive because of the diversity of approaches, issues and questions within it". Emitting one cheer for this diversity Hoffman's response was (like that of Giddens in the broader context and Linklater in the

77Certainly in Beyond Realism and Marxism, also published in 1990, the sensitivity towards post-modernism is entirely absent to the extent that when alluding to the new critical debates it is virtually ignored. There are obtuse references however that say much. For example, when discussing theorising in the 1980s Linklater reduces the debates to the tension between positivism and hermeneutics. However, he claims, "what they have overlooked is the possibility of a critical theory of international relations which analyses the prospects for universal emancipation", ibid, p.4. This is an extraordinary statement given the focus upon this very question in almost all post-modernist scholarship but it does indicate Linklater's attitudes and perspectives.


79For an influential articulation of this theme see Michael Banks, "The Inter Paradigm Debate", in *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory* edited by Margot Light and A.J. R. Groom (London: Frances Pinter, 1985).


81Ibid.
more immediate one) to seek to overcome any sense of intellectual insecurity by "restructuring" the discipline in favour of a Critical Theory paradigm, which:

through the process of self-understanding and self-reflection, is able to provide a critique of existing social order and to point to its immanent capacity for change and for the realisation of human potential.82

Indeed, in Hoffman's view, Critical Theory represented "the next stage in the development of International Relations theory," a stage with:

the potential for creating a new focus within the discipline of International Relations that is post-realist and post-Marxist...[which] provides the basis for the reintegration of International Relations into the broader traditions and concerns of social and political theory.83

At its most specific, in emancipatory terms, this new Critical Theory "stage" was set to return International Relations thinking to its essence, its fundamental purpose. Or in Hoffman's (Marxian derived) terms "the point of international relations theory is not to alter the way we look at the world, but to alter the world".84

Responding to Hoffman's article, Nick Rengger affirmed his general agreement with its concerns but questioned some of Hoffman's assumptions about his Critical Theory paradigm and its role in the contemporary debate.85 In short, what Rengger proposed, gently and in a rudimentary way, was that Hoffman's notion of a radically inclined Critical Theory set to lead International Relations into the next stage of its development, missed two important points intrinsic to the issue. The first: that much of the critical literature of the 1980s seeking a "reintegration" of international theory and Social Theory, and concerned with radically transforming the discipline, did so from positions that were, in other respects, incompatible with Hoffman's Critical Theory.

82Ibid, p.231.
84Ibid, p.244.
85Rengger, "Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman".
There was, suggested Rengger, a growing body of critical scholarship of this kind, which "stood close to, or within post-modernism".86

The second point, a more substantive one in relation to Hoffman's argument, questioned the nature of Hoffman's Critical Theory and its relationship to the paradigms it sought to supersede. Rengger's point was that the Critical Theory propounded by Hoffman sounded very like the "establishment international theory" it opposed.87 The connection point here was the rationalism inherent to both. In Hoffman's approach it was represented in terms of the search for elements "universal to world order,". In International Relations, more generally, it was represented as an unambiguous "reductionist rationalism" integral to "problem solving" theory.88 This created the suspicion for Rengger that Hoffman's Critical Theory was, perhaps, philosophically committed to the very foundationalism and positivism that it was constructed to overcome. It was in this sense, part of a dominant modernist discourse, articulated in terms of a conventional Marxist dialectic, that is a dialectic "with a fixed terminus: a telos to aim for and to bring about".89

Hoffman's reply to Rengger was pitched at a significantly higher level than his original article, and it introduced to the debate some themes touched on in Chapter Four of the thesis, which are, I think, crucial to the debate between (broadly) emancipatory approaches and post-modernism in International Relations.90 On the question of rationality, for example, Hoffman took a Habermasian position in rejecting the notion of a single, already existing rationality, deep within modernism awaiting "re-discovery" in Critical Theory. Acknowledging the Enlightenment legacy within Critical Theory, it was,

86 Which Rengger termed "radical interpretivism", see ibid, p.84.
87 Ibid, p.82.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid, p.83.
90 Hoffman, "Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory".

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nevertheless, argued Hoffman "the most self-reflective outpost of the radical tradition of
the Enlightenment" and it was in this context that its rationalist commitments needed to be
understood.91 In particular, he stressed, Critical Theory understood the problem as not
human rationality per se, but "the universalisation of a single form of rationality, namely
instrumental, economic and administrative reason". Consequently, Critical Theory:

retains a concept of reason which asserts itself simultaneously against both
instrumentalism and existentialism, which is exercised in conjunction with
normative concerns and which is critically applicable to itself. The essence of
rationality, in the context of critical theory, entails a limitless invitation to
criticism. In consequence a complacent faith in rationalism is ruled out.92

The issues of foundationalism and universalism received similar defences. On the former
Hoffman reiterated Critical Theory's antipathy to all kinds of certain knowledge, derived
from "external" sources. Rather, he countered, Critical Theory "points to open ended
knowledge which is continually subject to critical assessment".93 It was in this sense, he
argued, that its notion of dialectics resisted the teleology of a "fixed terminus" approach,
such approaches entailing "a determinism of outcomes which critical theory specifically
seeks to counter".94 This principle, Hoffman suggested, flowed over to the question of
universality in Critical Theory, which it always confronted in a "cautious and contingent"
manner. The point, he maintained, was that unless a critical social theory could offer
"universalistic standpoints" we are reduced to arguments that can only "convince a given
audience at a given time".95 What Critical Theory provided in this circumstance, was an
approach which, both "recognises the problem [of universality] and acknowledges its
own limitations".96 Hoffman did not directly address the issue of post-modernism in his
reply to Rengger but implicit throughout it was an attitude rather similar to Linklater's

91 Ibid, p.92.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid, p.93.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
which reduced post-modernist analysis to the realm of "dispassionate observers rather than concerned critics".97

Overall, the Hoffman-Rengger conversation has added a useful dimension to a discipline unused to the art of philosophical reflection on the way we come to "know" and give "meaning" to the world and, in its British context, it brought some interesting contemporary social theory themes to bear upon a disciplinary sector bereft, generally, of such discourse.98 In the context of this thesis it represents a useful point of thematic continuity on questions of theory and practice that have been confronted in a number of different ways throughout this thesis. In this regard it helps re-focus attention upon post-modernist contributions to the Third Debate, which are now to be the focus of the final chapter.

Summary

This chapter has focused on one of the most potent articulations of Critical Social Theory scholarship in International Relations - the Critical Theory perspectives derived from the post-Kantian emancipatory impulse in Western philosophy and the more specific influences of Hegel, the Frankfurt School and anti-structuralist Marxism (e.g. in Gramsci). The chapter dealt with four dimensions of the Critical Theory contribution to the Third Debate, those of Richard Ashley, Robert Cox, Andrew Linklater and the Hoffman-Rengger debate. It sought in this way to give a sense of the diversity and analytical quality associated with the Critical Theory perspective and to indicate again some of the problems of a post-Kantian emancipatory perspective in its efforts to overcome the closure of neo-Realism in the 1980s and 1990s. Ashley's contribution was an important one in this regard not only for the intellectual breadth and insight it brought

97 Ibid.

98 Its value remains limited, for example, because of its inability to question the status of Realism in its "paradigm" format, and because of the rather unsophisticated and uncritical approach to the paradigm question in general. Vasquez's understanding of the Kuhnian perspective is of a far higher standard.
to the debate but because of the tensions it exposed in the Critical Theory quest to "recover" from modernity its emancipatory dimensions. Ashley's critique of neo-Realism stands as perhaps the most devastating indictment of orthodox unselfconsciousness yet recorded in the Third Debate. And it came as little surprise that leading neo-Realist figures, such as Gilpin, were embarrassingly limited in their responses to him: Ashley after all had confronted them with their "unwritten preface". And yet, as indicated in the discussion, there was enough slippage in Ashley's argument to allow for counter responses that had a measure of validity.99

Cox's contribution was interesting in this regard because it too illustrated the "poverty" of neo-Realism but in a slightly different manner. In 1981, applying some relatively orthodox Critical Theory principles, Cox was able to locate neo-Realism's "problem solving" approach as an updated variant of a conservative (Cold War oriented) Realism, committed above all to a retention of the status quo in theory and (foreign policy) practice. From his Gramscian oriented perspective, in 1987, he was able to illustrate the static and limited nature of neo-Realist analysis again, this time by providing an analysis of the world political economy that was inclusive, wide ranging and theoretically sophisticated. The contributions of both Ashley and Cox were substantially different from their neo-Realist counterparts in another way also, in that they raised questions about issues rendered effectively silenced by the orthodoxy (e.g.power, hegemony, change, ideology).

The problems of a Critical Theory approach were also highlighted in the chapter, with the tendency toward universalism and essentialism (and ultimately foundationalism) noted in works which, nevertheless, represent important sites of critical modernist

99The reason for Ashley's vulnerability, in this regard, is an issue that goes to the heart of a debate touched on in Chapter Four of the thesis and the tensions between Critical Theory and post-modernism, which I argued were important for the future of a Critical Social Theory perspective in International Relations. Put simply, it is a question of whether the framing regime which distinguishes Critical Theory and upon which it attempts to "recover" the critical elements of modernity is such that it must always result in the kind of paradoxical dichotomy that Ashley's critics pounced on with such relish. I am not sure that it does. Whatever the case, this might be a useful area of debate for Critical Social Theorists in the future.
resistance to the Realist mainstream. The chapter to follow concentrates on the primary site of this resistance in the Third Debate - post-modernism.
CHAPTER NINE

OPENING UP "THINKING" SPACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (ii)

POST-MODERNISM: RECONCEPTUALISING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The nature of the post-modernist challenge to the Tradition and discipline of International Relations is quite literally spelt out in the title of James Der Derian's and Michael Shapiro's, *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics.*

The explicit influences on this work, those of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva, Barthes and Baudrillard are, in more than the obvious sense, "foreign" to a discipline dominated from its Anglo-American centre. The influences, more generally, are those of discourse analysis, genealogy, deconstructionism and textuality, and it is in this context that post-modernists have sought to question, critique and add dimensions to the "reality" of International Relations.

The "foreignness" of the post-modern approach is epitomised in the inclination to "read" the social world as a text; an inclination integral to Derrida's deconstructive philosophy, aimed at logocentric framing practices, and Foucault's concern with discursive practices generally. The central questions asked by scholars such as these concern notions of "meaning" and "knowing", fundamental concepts in Western philosophical discourse. Or, more precisely, they concern the implication for our dominant forms of "meaning" and "knowing", if the processes integral to the construction of a text are indeed analogous to the process by which social and political reality is constructed. From a post-modernist perspective, the critical task is to illustrate how the textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to illustrate, in specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the

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It is in this way that post-modernism re-focuses contemporary analysis on the power/knowledge nexus and, to a greater extent even than Critical Theory, on theory as practice.

In the post-modernist contribution to International Relations, consequently, there has emerged an alternative way of understanding and articulating reality, one focused on intertextuality and socio-linguistic practice, rather than monological literary convention and positivist objectivism and foundationalism. Whatever else this alternative approach achieves, it problematises the dominant modernist commitment to a world of given subjects and objects, and all other dichotomised givens. In so doing it reformulates basic questions of modernist understanding in emphasising not the sovereign subject (e.g. author/independent state) and/or the object (e.g. independent world/text) but, instead, the historical, cultural and linguistic practices in which subjects and objects, (and theory and practice, facts and values) are constructed. Post-modern approaches in International Relations are thus concerned:

- to interrogate present knowledge of international relations through past practices,
- to search out the margins of political theory,
- to listen for the critical

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2 Derrida, for example, sought to do this by illustrating how the logocentric process of construction in modernist philosophy is intrinsic to the way that contemporary social reality is constructed in terms of a hierarchy of socio-political "meaning"; centred on a sovereign voice (e.g. of reason, reality, systemic interest) and a marginalised, excluded regime of "otherness". Foucault sought to further historicise these dual processes by illustrating how, via dominant discursive practices, we have come to "know" ourselves as modern peoples, and how, in this discursive context, we give (subjective) "meaning" to the (objectified)world. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); and Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972).

3 In other words where real meaning is derived from the interrelationship of texts rather than from some objectified external source. This is what Barthes was getting at with his notion of "intertext" as "a multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash", cited in Der Derian, "The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations", in International/Intertextual eds. Der Derian and Shapiro, p.6. In the same volume see Michael Shapiro, "Textualising Global Politics"; and William Connolly's discussion of the "discovery" of America in intertextualist terms in "Identity and Difference in Global Politics". The language issue in post-modernism is influenced (as well as by Wittgenstein) by the critical reaction to the structuralism of Saussurian linguistics by scholars like Derrida and the understanding of language and discourse that flows from this debate. Thus, instead of language being an asset employed by a pre-existing subject, or a constraint imposed on that subject, language comes to be seen as the medium through which the social identity and existence of that subject is made possible.

4 Language, thus, is emphasised, not as a capacity of, or constraint upon a "given" subject but as a medium through which subjects (and objects) are made.
voices drowned out by official discourses, and to conduct a theoretic investigation of the textual interplay behind power politics.\textsuperscript{5}

It is in this deconstructionist "thinking space" that post-modern scholars, in their different ways, have begun to challenge the dominant orthodoxy in International Relations. In this final phase of the thesis, consequently, I want to address some of the most significant of these post-modernist works and indicate more generally the contributions of post-modern scholarship to a Critical Social Theory of International Relations.\textsuperscript{6} The discussion will be organised around four broad concerns of post-modern scholarship in particular: the first emphasises the concern to open up to critical interrogation the "great texts" of the International Relations Tradition and discipline; the second focuses on post-modernist challenges to fundamental Realist concepts such as sovereignty, anarchy and the construction of Otherness; the third looks at some of the ways in which post-modernists have dealt with the questions facing International Relations at the end of the Cold War; and the fourth touches on the nature of, and prospects for, a post-modern politics of resistance in International Relations.

\textbf{Textualising International Relations: Re-reading the Tradition and its Discipline}

One of the major post-modernist incursions into alien International Relations territory, has, not surprisingly, sought to disrupt the discursive certainty derived from the Traditional "great texts". The aim here has not been to dismiss the dominant readings but to illustrate that they are, indeed, "readings"; that they can be "read" in different ways; that their status is derived, not from any correspondence with an essential (real) meaning,

\textsuperscript{5}Der Derian, "The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations", p.6.

\textsuperscript{6}Post-modern scholars have been extraordinarily prolific in recent years. This, added to the complexity of their arguments means that I can't claim the following discussion to be comprehensive, as such. My aim, rather is to select what I consider to be some of the major contributions of recent times, works which establish some of the larger philosophical principles of post-modern scholarship in dealing with quite precise topics and issues. My aim on the complexity issue is the same as that throughout the work, to do justice to sophisticated themes while representing them in the most accessible and concise way I can.
but from a discursive strategy intrinsically connected to the dominant form of (socio-historical) knowledge and power.\textsuperscript{7}

The necessity for an alternative reading of the major Realist texts has been enhanced in recent times as neo-Realists have confronted the uncertainty of the age by calling again on "heroic figures", such as Thucydides and Machiavelli, to grant their updated scientism a measure of Traditional credibility.\textsuperscript{8} Scholars from more general Critical Social Theory perspectives have assisted post-modernists in undermining neo-Realism in this regard. Michael Doyle, for example, has noted that while a particular reading of Thucydides might well be consistent with a "minimalist" Realism which reduces International Relations to the crudest form of anarchy it is incompatible with the scientific structuralism of neo-Realism.\textsuperscript{9} Following a careful (re)reading of Thucydides' works, Doyle stressed the incompatibility between an approach which centres its Realism upon notions of "ends defined in terms of power" and rational choice theory, and a Thucydides, who held that:

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\textsuperscript{7} At the core of this challenge has been a repudiation of the positivist reading rules characteristic of International Relations scholarship. The critical proposition here is that "reading" for International Relations has been understood as a largely unproblematical enterprise, a natural, neutral activity, whereby an interested individual enters into some sort of imaginative encounter with a [literary] text, reading it respectfully on its own terms and drawing real meaning from it. The contrary position is that this approach to reading is far from neutral but congruent with a particular modernist discursive practice, which objectifies the text and detaches the reader from it.

\textsuperscript{8} Kenneth Waltz, for example, has maintained that \textit{The Peloponnesian War} represents a fundamental account of the "anarchic character of international politics". As an early Realist, claimed Waltz, Thucydides understood the timeless axioms of international life and consequently remained a thinker relevant to the contemporary age of nuclear arms with his insights into the "striking sameness of the quality of international life thought the millennia", see \textit{Theory of International Politics}. (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p.66. Robert Keohane, meanwhile, in discussing the latest (structuralist) reformulation of Realist thought acknowledged a linear connection between Thucydides, Morgenthau and Waltz. Indeed suggested Keohane, in Thucydides there is to be found the three fundamental assumptions of Realism that in \textit{Politics Among Nations} formed the basis of Morgenthau's contribution to the theory and practice of United States foreign policy in the Cold War years and which in \textit{Theory of International Politics} underpinned the structuralism or neo-Realism that is "at the center of contemporary international relations theory in the United States" in the 1980s and 1990s. Keohane's comments can be found in "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in \textit{Neorealism and its Critics} edited by Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.2-11.

\textsuperscript{9} Doyle, "Thucydidean Realism", \textit{Review of International Studies} 16(3) (1990), pp.223-237, p.231.
neither a state’s ends nor its means nor (therefore) its choices could be adequately determined solely through an analysis of international structure.¹⁰

Daniel Garst has taken this theme a little further in illustrating how shaky is the textual foundation of neo-Realism’s world view.¹¹ Garst was particularly interested in the way that neo-Realists such as Gilpin, Waltz and Keohane sought to appropriate Thucydides as the first "scientific" Realist. There are a number of quite fundamental problems with such a reading, argued Garst. One major problem is that it misunderstands completely the emphasis placed by Thucydides on the significance of human actors as the "conscious initiators of events".¹² Consequently, "Thucydides does not begin" with structuralist principles which posit the foundation of an anarchical world in the "external" power distribution of actors. Nor does his argument in The History of the Peloponnesian War follow this logic unless one reads it an extremely limited manner, one which excludes from serious attention a series of verbal exchanges or "paired speeches" which Thucydides interweaves with the main narrative in order to "lay bare what stood behind the narrative".¹³ This, however, is precisely what happens when neo-Realists such as Gilpin, Waltz and (to a lesser extent) Keohane read Thucydides. The result is a very unconvincing reading of Thucydides which, according to Garst, completely misrepresents his position on power politics, anarchy and the timeless realities of International Relations.¹⁴ Thus, concluded Garst, contrary to neo-Realist claims "Thucydides' history does not point to general laws explaining international conflict, nor did its author intend it to do so". Moreover:


¹³Ibid, p.7. Garst makes the point that Hobbes' translation of The Peloponnesian Wars noted the crucial significance of this strategy.

¹⁴Particularly unconvincing in regard to the correlation drawn by Keohane between Thucydides and Morgenthau, both of whom its asserted, sought to understand reality via the documented perspectives of leaders and statesmen in historical context. The problem for Keohane, noted Garst, is that it is in the marginalised verbal exchanges rather than in the narrative per se that Thucydides presented the "accurate accounts of actual speeches given on particular occasions", ibid, p.5.
Thucydides reminds us that power and hegemony are above all bound to the existence of political and social structures and the intersubjective conventions associated with them. Nothing could be more foreign to Thucydides' way of thinking than neorealism's ahistorical treatment of these concepts. And nothing could be more pernicious to Thucydides than neorealism's insistence that the quest for power is an underlying and enduring systemic imperative that exists independently of social structures created and maintained by human agency.15

The significance of these critiques cannot be overstated, nor can Garst's conclusion that, once critically read, Thucydides is better understood not as the "father of realism" but as a "contested terrain for realist and critical approaches to international relations".16 The critical significance of this "thinking space" is that it renders highly problematic the whole textual foundation of the Realist dominated discipline of International Relations. It brings into question the literary font of Realist eternal wisdom, upon which Realists from Wight to Waltz have legitimated their transhistorical images of "recurrence and repetition". It creates ambiguity at the core of Keohane's philosophical certainty concerning the "fundamental" connection between the ancient and contemporary worlds, now flowing through structural Realism. It signifies real doubt as to the validity of Krasner's neo-Realist image of "normal [anarchical] state of international affairs".17 It renders ironical Gilpin's proposition that "[e]verything that the new realists find intriguing in the interaction of international economics and international politics can be found in The History of the Peloponnesian War".18

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15Ibid, p.25. This final theme has also been probed by Hayward Alker, who has emphasised the significance of dialectical logic in Thucydides work. Utilising a formal dialogical approach to textual inquiry, Alker has illustrated how the Melian Dialogue, in particular, has been appropriated by neo-Realism in ways that have severely limited the consideration of political options in the contemporary period. See Alker, "The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue", American Political Science Review 82 (1988), pp.805-20; see also Alker and David Sylvan, "Foreign Policy as Tragedy: Sending 100,000 Troops to Vietnam" Paper prepared for the XIV World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Washington, D.C. August, 28-September 1 1988).

16See Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism", p.3.

17See the discussion on Krasner's position in Chapter Seven, pp.297-299.

The point, in reiteration, is not that these alternative readings are "right" and Realist readings "wrong", but that what we are dealing with at the foundation of the Tradition of International Relations is a contested terrain of textuality and representation, not an arena of politico-economic certainty, nor historical "fact". In an era in which hermeneutic insight and "contextualism" have become increasingly respectable in Anglo-American social theory, this might appear a rather insubstantial point to be making (or re-making) at this stage of the thesis. However, as was stressed in Chapter One in regard to the positivism at the core of International Relations, this remains an issue of real significance because it goes to the heart of the "primitive" Realism which continues to dominate in this context. Thus, to acknowledge alternative readings as corresponding to what Thucydides thought and said, is to undermine the foundationalism that has underpinned Realism, and modernist thought in general since the Seventeenth century. It is to undermine the notion of a single, irreducible reality, against which conflicting interpretations/theories can be evaluated for their truth content. Moreover, to acknowledge the "reality" of alternative readings of Thucydides is to bring into question that which by its phenomenalist and nominalist premises cannot be questioned, the empiricist/positivism that allows Realism its (rational scientific) legitimacy, its (modern) intellectual and social power. It is to bring into question the very Tradition which is International Relations, to cast doubt upon the discipline which sets its boundaries and establishes its rules of thinking and research, its criterion of "meaningfulness".

Major post-modernist scholars of the Third Debate, such as R.B.J. Walker, James Der Derian and (post-1984) Richard Ashley are well aware of the implications for orthodox theory and practice of the "thinking space", opened via intertextualist strategies. In their contributions of recent years, accordingly, they have sought to further disrupt Realist textual certainty, while seeking always to illustrate the broader discursive connections between the dominant Tradition of International Relations and of modernist theory and practice.
Walker, for example, has critically reassessed the significance of Machiavelli in this regard finding that, as with Thucydides, and the other literary icons of Realism, Machiavelli has been reduced to a "heroic figure" of parody and caricature by those seeking philosophical certainty for their image of the contemporary world of states.\textsuperscript{19} To re-read Machiavelli, in this context, is thus to "problematize the most basic assumptions on which claims about the tradition are based". Moreover, and more directly regarding the post-modernist concern with the knowledge/power nexus, it is to:

indicate one way of identifying some of the discursive practices that have turned a historical problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of the present.\textsuperscript{20}

As a Realist icon, of course, Machiavelli appears in the Traditional folk lore on one side of the great logocentric divide between Realists and Others (Idealists, "domestic" political theorists, ideologues etc). This has provided for the discipline an "eternal dialogue" that, in its most common reading, is reduced to an "essentialist monologue" in which, via a great man reading of the (textual) script:

terms such as power, state and national interest appear with great regularity, interspersed with claims about human nature or political necessity, structural determinism or the tragic condition of human existence in general.\textsuperscript{21}

Sometimes, as Walker noted, the dichotomised format is reformulated somewhat to include a via-media notion, as in Wight's work, or to take account of Weberian sensibilities, as in the contributions of a Morgenthau or a Stanley Hoffmann. But this does not in any fundamental way question either the boundaries, or the (power politics) premises of a Tradition framed in Realist terms.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19}Walker, "The Prince and 'The Pauper': Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of International Relations" in International/Intertextual eds. Der Derian and Shapiro, pp.25-49.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid, p.29.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid, p.31.

\textsuperscript{22}In Wight's case, the middle road acts above all to reinforce the foundational legitimacy of its two opposite poles, while adding a mellower tone to the starkness of one of them. The utilisation of Weberian themes has a similar motivation and purpose in allowing those "uncomfortable" with their power politics commitments to seek refuge in a Weberian "ethics of responsibility". But as Walker puts
Accordingly, crucial to all Realists, be they Humean Tories such as Wight and Bull or North American structuralists such as Waltz, Keohane and Krasner, is the figure of Machiavelli, or at least the Machiavelli of the dominant Realist disciplinary reading. This "Machiavelli" gives to Realism its Renaissance complement to Thucydides' Classical statement of the "priority of power over ethics, about the necessity of violence and intrigue in the affairs of state, about ends justifying means and raison d'etat".23 However, argued Walker, this is to simply endorse a "particularly suspicious interpretive history" about Machiavelli which has been long acknowledged elsewhere but not in the "backward discipline" of International Relations.24 At least two significant silences are evident in the dominant Realist reading, he suggested. The first concerns The Prince, the exemplar text of Machiavellian Realism. Here, Realists have accorded essentialist status to those passages in which Machiavelli appears to distinguish between power and ethics, privileging the former over the latter. But, charged Walker, to represent this as Machiavelli's "essential" position and, more significantly, as an element of some eternal Realist wisdom, is to engage in the kind of exclusionary textual strategy that is replicated in the dominant knowledge forms and power relations of modern social life.

In the case of The Prince, for example, the dominant reading is rendered entirely problematic the moment one includes that which is excluded and/or marginalised in Traditional discourse, the issue of virtu, and Machiavelli's attempt to deal with the problem of violence in the pursuit of a life of virtu, which is the major focus of The Prince. Moreover, when the question of virtu is read into The Prince, it becomes apparent, Walker maintained, that the text revered by Realists as integral to a historico-philosophical Tradition of state centric Realism is, more accurately, a work concerned with the specific problems of the new Renaissance states. A re-reading of The Prince, it "the ethic of absolute ends" remains the silent possibility against which necessities and responsibilities are articulated". See Ibid, p.30.

23Ibid, p.32.

24Ibid. It is worth recording here C.C. O'Brien's comment that according to Isiah Berlin there were at least twenty-eight "main interpretations" of Machiavelli. See The Suspecting Glance (London: Fairbain and Fairbain, 1972), p.21.
concluded Walker, renders Machiavelli not the Renaissance heir of Thucydides, but "someone trying to make sense of historically specific circumstances and attempting to do so in the discursive categories then available to him".25

This, reading, he argued, is given added salience when the second silence of the Realist "Machiavelli" is opened up for inquiry. This is the silence on works other than The Prince, effectively ignored by Realists, which, if consulted, contain "another" Machiavelli and a series of questions that Realism and the International Relations Tradition cannot answer. The point is that the Machiavelli that emerges from the Discourses on Livy, or The History of Florence, or the Art of War, is not the arch Realist of International Relations at all, but a complex Renaissance scholar concerned above all "with the possibility of establishing a life of virtu within autonomous political communities".26 More obviously than in the The Prince, the central concern here is not the anarchic state system, as the Tradition and discipline must insist, but the Classical (Greek) conception of the polis, part of the "domestic" realm that is (dichotomously) separated off from the "international" by the Tradition that proclaims Machiavelli as its own.27 And, for those who for nearly half a century now have sought to unproblematically connect Machiavelli, via some linear textual chain, to the contemporary world of International Relations, there is, claimed Walker, another substantial problem of "reading". This concerns Machiavelli's philosophical antipathy to all universalist schemas and/or notions of transhistorical structural laws. Here, noted Walker, Machiavelli's acknowledgement of fortuna as intrinsic to social life and his Classical notion of time, undermine any appropriation of him as an early voice of a universalised "recurrence and repetition" and/or structural necessity.28 Rather, Machiavelli can be read


26Ibid, p.34.

27Thus, as Walker emphasises, though Machiavelli's concerns with skill, virility and courage allow for extra-territorial situations, these are qualities considered "first and foremost" as necessary for "effective participation and citizenship within the community", ibid, p.36.

28Fortuna, argued Machiavelli, was "the arbiter of one half of our actions", ibid, p.37. Thus the qualities of virtu in the Prince were partly the capacity to deal with those things that could not be controlled.
as drawing on Classical philosophical notions of time and being, which, for example, rebut any (Christian derived) notions of determinate "externalities", and/or modern notions of time which fit some "knowable" pattern or structure. Instead, Machiavelli's sense of time, and of political life, in time, was dominated by the notion of temporal flux and contingency in which the vicissitudes of fortuna rendered inappropriate and dangerous any philosophy of certainty, order and control.

As in the case of Thucydides, then, the Tradition of International Relations, legitimated to the present by the textual certainty of power politics and structural anarchy in Machiavelli, is found to be highly problematic and uncertain under alternative critical inquiry. Thus, as Walker concluded:

Structural accounts of the international system draw upon ontological (and thus political) commitments that are significantly different from those to be found in Machiavelli's writings. [Moreover] Contrary to some translations, there is no clear statement to the effect that the end justifies the means. There is no clear notion of national interest defined as power.

For all this, argued Walker, there should be no surprise that Realists of all hues should continue to privilege a caricatured reading of Machiavelli, because it is integral to the:

last ditch attempts by the defenders of modernity to hang on to the promised certainties of scientific method and the philosophy of identity.

The significance of the Traditional "Machiavelli", in this regard, is underscored, of course, when one remembers that in Realism's pursuit of certainty, identity and control:

[i]t was only after Machiavelli that the principle of state sovereignty came to be framed within the context of the Euclidean-Galilean principle of absolute space rather than the complex overlapping jurisdictions of the medieval era. [And]...it was only after Machiavelli that it became possible to pretend that the state is a fixed form, a pretence expressed initially in the legal codes of

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29In which time and social and political life is subordinated to and determined by some external realm of eternity.

30At one level there is "recurrence and repetition" in the sense that there is a cyclical dimension to Machiavelli's thought. The point here is that given the surety about fortuna and the need to guard against it, this is hardly the rationalist and/or positivist certainty of Realist readings of it.


32Ibid, p.44.
territorial sovereignty, and found more recently in the reifying categories of so much of the socioscientific analysis of "balances of power" and "foreign policy decision making".33

Walker's conclusions on the Realist readings of Machiavelli are most important in a post-modernist context in that they return the discussion squarely to the issue of modernism and the discursive practices associated with the "making" of International Relations. This is a theme underlying Walker's proposition that, following a deconstructivist reading of Machiavelli it would be more appropriate, perhaps, to include him as part of an idealist tradition, rather than a Realist one. Machiavelli, read this way, is the Renaissance humanist struggling to find at least a minimal political ethics in a world in violent flux brought on by the emergence of the new state system. Walker's point, of course, is not that Machiavelli necessarily should be read this way, but that the possibility of this, or any other alternative reading, is excluded from serious consideration in the International Relations Tradition. This not only blocks off potential "thinking space" in an already closed discipline, it limits the insight that might be gained from a significant thinker; it reduces our understanding of the state system to a modernist textual caricature, and it continues to blind the dominant contemporary approach to theory and practice to the processes by which it reads its "reality", and lives it.

In particular it blinds Realism to its process of constructing its philosophical and social "meaning", because:

[w]hat is systematically obscured by the reifying claims about realism as a tradition is that realism has been constituted historically through the negation and displacement of a prior understanding of political life understood in the context of universalist aspirations. [Thus] if one is to speak meaningfully of a tradition of international relations theory at all, it must be an account that places the discursive practices of negation and displacement at the centre.34

This final theme has been central also to James Der Derian's attempts to prise open some "thinking space" in other regions of the Realist discursive empire. Concentrating, initially on opening up genealogical questions left begging by Traditionalist Realists, Der Derian

33 Ibid, p.42.
34 Ibid, p.39.
has, more recently, probed Realist strategies of "negation and displacement" from a sophisticated semiotic perspective.35

In the former mode Der Derian engaged in a re-reading, in 1987, of the "true tradition" of diplomatic statecraft.36 Acknowledging that Traditionalist Realism had provided a "richer vein" of historical scholarship on diplomacy than its "problem solving" counterpart, Der Derian emphasised, nevertheless, the closure of a Traditionalist "history" marked by conservatism and essentialist reading strategies.37 Thus, the Traditionalist image of diplomacy is often:

implicitly and uncritically supportive of a teleological view of diplomacy, the idea that we have reached - or even are approaching - after a long odyssey the best, the final form of diplomacy.38

Like all modernist schemas of this kind, argued Der Derian, the "meaning" given to diplomacy is one gained from a process of discursive conflict which excludes and/or marginalises elements of its "history" that are not consistent with the dominant narrative.39 This "meaning" then becomes reified in disciplinary texts and everyday attitudes and behaviour, its status as a "given" of the Tradition ensuring that little, if any, critical questioning will take place on it in "theory" or "practice".

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36 See Der Derian, On Diplomacy.

37 Ibid, p.2.

38 Ibid, p.3. This view of diplomacy is not surprising, he argued - works on diplomacy having been almost exclusively written by former diplomats or by those captured by its world view. Thus, the literature on diplomacy, conveys "a view of diplomacy as a specialised skill of negotiation, and seeks to 'maxim-ize' that skill for the benefit of novices entering the profession. Understandably, [the] histories of the origins of of diplomacy tend to be sketchy and rather anecdotal. Moreover, since the authors were [often] serving governments at the apogee of imperial power, they probably were not interested in looking too widely and too deeply into a past which undermined the twin pillars of skillful negotiation - order and continuity", ibid, p.2.

39 As Der Derian puts it: "the given origins of diplomacy have been defined more by diplomacy's present status and needs than by its past principles and practices", ibid, p.3.
Consequently, to open up "thinking space" in On Diplomacy, Der Derian sought to explore some of the "dynamic and dispersed forces behind the formation of [Realist] diplomacy". More precisely, and in line with post-modernist deconstructivist procedures, Der Derian was concerned to add a dimension to the power politics idiom associated with diplomatic history and its origins and explain the power of diplomacy in discursive terms. His genealogy of diplomacy, accordingly, was "an interpretation of how the power of diplomacy, in the absence of a sovereign power, was constituted and sustained by a discursive practice, the diplomatic culture". It was, in this sense, an attempt to go beyond the insights of Traditionalists, such as Wight and Bull, and open up critical space left closed by them. In particular Der Derian was concerned to explore questions "the classical school have not explored in any depth" including the question of how the diplomatic culture was formed and transformed, and how its power of normalisation in a Leviathan-less world has been reproduced.

The task of this archaeological quest, as Der Derian emphasised, was not to provide a "new" theory of diplomacy so superior to the reigning model that it would immediately solve the problems of the day. The task, rather, was to illustrate how it was possible to reconceptualise the theory and practice of diplomacy by exposing the discursive process by which "diplomacy" was constructed, conceptualised and legitimated as a fact of International Relations in the first instance. The task, in other words, was to open effectively closed space in order that a crucial phenomenon of international life be, again, imaginatively and seriously reassessed, critically reflected upon, and empirically

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid, p.4.

42 It was Bull for example who, in the Anarchical Society, defined this diplomatic culture as the "common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives", cited in ibid, p.4.

43 Ibid.
evaluated in complex and dangerous times.\textsuperscript{44} Given the embedded nature of the diplomatic culture in modern (Western) theory and practice, the difficulties of such a task did not escape Der Derian.

Consequently, the work is characterised by careful, sustained and impressive scholarship, sensitive to etymological and archival "meaning", but always critically attuned to that which is not said, that which is strategically excluded in the processes of state making and diplomatic exchange. It is characterised also by a the sophisticated utilisation of two critical themes, in particular. The first, a general Nietzschean approach to textual interrogation (i.e. genealogical); the second, the concept of alienation which provided for Der Derian a working definition of diplomacy - as a process of mediation between estranged (alienated) individuals and groups.\textsuperscript{45} The alienation concept, in this regard, provided the major thematic point of entry for understanding diplomacy in discursive terms. The history and "meaning" of diplomacy was, from this perspective, bound up in the attempt to mediate an estranged and alienated international realm. As relations of estrangement changed, therefore, so too did the theory and practice of the mediation process - of diplomacy. Thus, to problematise and disrupt the dominant, (Western, modern) notion of what diplomacy "is", required that the complex nature of these historical changes be illustrated, in order to expose the process by which they have come to "make" (and re-make) diplomacy. A further task, in this regard, was to shift analytical attention away from the closed ("given") discourse of the dominant diplomatic culture, and focus it more on the broader cultural and historical practices of an estranged political landscape, from which diplomacy emerged and against which its universalised image of reality must always be open to question.\textsuperscript{46} 

\textsuperscript{44}In Der Derian's terms the task was to "demarcate by interrogation (rather than pre-empt by predictions) new terrains for empirical studies of diplomacy", ibid, p.3.  

\textsuperscript{45}See ibid, p.6. The discussion of alienation in On Diplomacy goes far beyond its common articulation in Hegelian-Marxian terms. But it does deal with a modernist concept in a sensitive and interesting way, one that does not see central modernist concepts as entirely incongruous in a post-modernist idiom.  

\textsuperscript{46}The focus here is not on the development of diplomacy as the unfolding of power politics negotiation, but of "the symbols, rules, norms and conventions of a diplomatic culture and the political configurations of power", ibid, p.69.
The resulting discussion is one that sees the former student of Bull going beyond his teacher (and Bull’s mentor, Wight) in providing a genealogy of diplomacy that includes, rather than excludes, historical themes and ideas that challenge the uniform identity of the Realist narrative. Der Derian introduced six interpenetrating but distinct ways of understanding how diplomacy was “made” and became “normalised”. The first concentrated on the mythical origins of diplomacy, particularly those associated with the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The second focused on the implications for diplomacy of the estrangement of Christianity, inside the Holy Roman Empire and outside it, as European Christendom confronted its Other (e.g. Islam). The third and fourth themes emphasised that increasingly complex period when (relatively) simple horizontal estrangement began to give way to the vertical estrangements associated with the breakdown of Christendom and the emergence of a modern state system. The fifth concentrated on the major problems for the diplomatic culture of both the French and Russian Revolutions, and the Sixth, which encompassed the present period, looked at the transformation of diplomatic processes in the age of “Techno-diplomacy”, in which “diplomacy has become a subsidiary of [the] technological processes of alienation”. The implications of this techno-diplomatic age, particularly its capacity for surveillance and its speed factor (the instantaneous nature of communications, weapons delivery and response times) are themes that have been increasingly the focus of Der Derian’s attentions in more recent

47 In this way paying the kind of genuine compliment to his teacher that Bull’s students in Australia have never done. The discussion of Hegelian and Marxian themes in the work, plus the Nietzschean influence opens up some interesting dimensions for “thinking space”.

48 Ibid, p.5.

49 Ibid, pp.44-68. The alienation theme is salient at all kinds of levels here of course, including that alienation between “man” and God which underpinned the great dualism of Augustine and was the dominant influence on Western thought and diplomatic culture for at least a thousand years.

50 Ibid, pp.68-105. This was a period of (relatively) simple power relations and (relatively) simple approaches to mediation. The process of mediation here was to do with making sure that the interests of the West were protected, though by the late Middle Ages the simplicity was gone as a more vertical estrangement characterised relations within the Holy Roman Empire.

51 Ibid, p.203.
times as he has brought the insights of Virilio to bear upon International Relations. But to conclude this discussion of On Diplomacy it is worth reiterating again some of the post-modern themes underlying its very intricate and sophisticated arguments.

Of most significance here is the fact that while the genealogy presented in On Diplomacy followed a basically Traditionalist chronology, it did not add up to the Realist "history" of an "essential" diplomatic statecraft unfolding to the present via an increasingly rationalised process of power politics logic. The history and philosophy of diplomacy, as Der Derian illustrated, is much too complex for such a narrative. The argument, put another way, is that there is nothing in the theory and practice of contemporary diplomacy that can be understood by recourse to some essentialised past, or some universalised common sense, or simple "historical" precedent. Diplomacy, rather, at every moment of its development, was shaped by the matrix of tensions, ideas and conflicts which underlay the estrangement of international actors and made the mediation process "meaningful" to those engaged in it. In the contemporary period its identity and "meaning" remains locked within this discursive matrix, always intrinsically engaged with it, never detached from it. It is in this context that Der Derian's postmodernist re-reading of the diplomatic text seeks to speak to the "practice" of a contemporary diplomatic community, which, in the 1990s, faces an interdependent world economy, massive social inequality, unique ecological dangers and exploding historico-cultural tensions, with a diplomatic culture set in the illusory certainty of modernist universalism and essentialism.

The final word on his work is, perhaps, best left to Der Derian who sums up the post-modernist perspective well, in suggesting that the value of On Diplomacy:

should be weighed by its ability to devalue the accepted truth or theory that diplomacy has an essence of common sense, and an origin that can be chronologically and geographically fixed. The method of devaluation has been, so to speak, to flood the market-place of the diplomatic discourse with

52Ibid, pp.199-210. See also Der Derian, "Spy versus Spy: The Intertextual Power of International Intrigue"; and "The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulations, Surveillance and Speed".
multifarious interpretations which have at one time or another been implied or imposed by power-relations.\textsuperscript{53}

Whatever else the post-modern interrogations of the Realist "great texts" achieve, they have introduced to the "post preface" agenda a question entirely begged by mainstream literature: it asks how/why is it that such significant aspects of Western theory and practice, contained in the "great texts", are systematically excluded and/or marginalised by contemporary Realists? One answer, of course, is offered by Critical Theorists such as Cox utilising Gramscian hegemonic logic. Another, more consistent with post-modernist scholarship, is that much like Martin Wight's "history", which simply leaves out whole historical epochs that do not fit his power politics pattern, neo-Realism "forgets" that which doesn't fit within its positivist -structuralist boundaries of "meaning".\textsuperscript{54} More precisely neo-Realism engages in a systematic "politics of forgetting" when it is confronted with the kind of interpretative ambiguity which undermines the sovereignty so integral to its image of reality at all levels. Accordingly, this question of sovereignty has been a major focus of critical attention for post-modernists in the Third Debate.

\textbf{Deconstructing Sovereignty: Towards a New Genealogy of International Relations}

The theory and practice of sovereignty is bound up with the narrative of diplomatic history central to Der Derian's concerns in \textit{On Diplomacy} and it is an integral factor in International Relations discourse. The "meaning" of sovereignty in Traditionalist literature, for example, is commonly perceived as synonymous with state power, the legitimate use of state violence and legal/territorial legitimacy and, in Hobbesian terms, with a supreme and necessary authority in a Leviathan-less world. For those articulating their Realism in more explicitly systematic terms it is the sovereign rational actor - the

\textsuperscript{53}Der Derian, \textit{On Diplomacy}, p.200, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{54}On this issue see John Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations: The Tyranny of Ahistorical Culturalism", \textit{Australian Outlook} 41(1) (1987), pp.45-52.
individual sovereign state engaged in an analogised politics of market choice - that is the primary focus of attention.55

Post-modernist concerns on the sovereignty issue are generally focused on the connections between these articulations of sovereignty, across the Realist spectrum. Of major concern is the "given" status of the sovereignty theme within Realism, a status, it is argued, which renders it an effectively ahistorical, universalised component of an "art of the possible" bounded by Realist power politics logic. It is in this sense that the issue of sovereignty represents another point of closure in International Relations in an era in which the need for openness and flexibility of thought and action are so necessary. Post-modernist critique, in this context, is oriented not toward the instantaneous production of some "alternative" to the politics of state sovereignty, but toward the opening up of our understanding of sovereignty in order that we be more capable of taking the opportunities and/or facing the dangers of a global future in which the Traditional resort to permanent principles and static premises is increasingly inappropriate and inadequate.

To re-read the sovereignty literature is, once again, to encounter the Western "meta-narrative", projecting for the Tradition of International Relations its cast of essentialised voices, the "heroic figures" of a homogenised "history", thinking, acting and speaking in terms congruent with the rise of a diplomatic culture and the logic of power politics.56 But, if like Richard Ashley, for example, one is asking different questions of this "history", it is possible to find in the post-Renaissance period, not just


56See for example Wight, System of States; Hinsley, Sovereignty; and Donelan ed., The Reason of States.
an emerging state system destined for (largely) uncritical reification in a future disciplinary "pursuit of certainty", but a discursive strategy that gives that system "meaning" and ensures its (largely) untheorised acceptance.\(^\text{57}\) Simply put, this strategy acts to bind together, in a language and logic of modern reason, the sovereign man of post-Cartesian philosophy and the sovereign state of Thucydidean/Machiavellian origin.

This is a discursive strategy of some significance for modernism. For Liberals it represents a space for the emergence of a civil society and the logic of the "social contract"; for Marxists it marks a crucial "moment" of modern ideological and institutional class oppression. From a Hobbesian perspective it is the rationale for the Leviathan. For the dominant Tradition in International Relations, more generally, it is the site of one of the major "problems" to be "solved" in a modern world of states - the problem of how to reconcile the principle and practices of individual sovereignty, at the state level, with peaceful relations at the inter-state level.\(^\text{58}\) For post-modernists such as Ashley, however, it represents in all these articulations, a limited appreciation of the discursive process by which the question of sovereignty has been framed in modernist thought, which, in turn, limits the potential "answers" that might be derived from a re-reading of it. In particular it fails to appreciate the implications for the theory and practice of sovereignty of the logocentric framing regime which constitutes its "meaning" in modernity.\(^\text{59}\) The key issue here, argued Ashley, was the nature of logocentric discourse which privileged:

a central interpretive orientation - a coherent sovereign voice...that supplies a unified rational meaning and direction to the interpretation of the spatial and temporal diversity of history.\(^\text{60}\)

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\(^{57}\)I refer to two works, in particular, here "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17(2) (1988), pp.227-263; and "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", in *International/Intertextual Relations* ed. Der Derian and Shapiro. The discussion will be oriented primarily toward the "Living on Border Lines" article which is, I believe, a particularly important example of post-modernist scholarship given its scope, its philosophical content and the (Foucauldian) theory of the state it invokes.

\(^{58}\)For Western thought generally it is the site of one of the "perennial questions": that which explores the question of the individual and the state.

\(^{59}\)Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War", pp.259-323.

\(^{60}\)Ibid, p.261.
The problem for modernist discourse, and for International Relations, in particular, is that in this discursive context, the question of sovereignty had been effectively reduced to "ahistorical closure". This, Ashley insisted, was not to deny the differences between conflicting modern approaches on the sovereignty issue, or the difficulty of the issue, it was to acknowledge, that:

a logocentric discourse is inclined to impose closure by resorting to one or another fixed standard of interpretation that is itself accorded the status of a pure and identical presence.61

Thus, the resort to "history", "Philosophy", the "individual", the "class" or the "state" as the sovereign voice of interpretation by which all other interpretations are judged, excludes from the interpretive process the question of:

how, by way of what practices ongoing here and now, is just this sovereign voice of interpretation differentiated, set apart, and empowered so that it may be recognized, despite its historicity, as a pure and extrahistorical presence, a self evident and identical voice of of truth in itself?62

This was the question that Ashley sought to include in his post-modernist discussion of sovereignty. Accordingly, like Walker and Der Derian in their re-reading of other Traditional "givens", Ashley brought to this debate a range of additional themes and conceptual insights from the post-modern lexicon. In particular, in his discussion of the connections between sovereign man and the sovereign state, in 1989, Ashley introduced a Foucauldian reading of Kant to the debate that accorded it an interesting "new" angle, one which returns the focus of the thesis to themes developed in Chapters One and Two.63

The argument, very briefly, is this: since Kant and the fundamental break with Classical epistemology, "meaning" and "knowing" in the world has been founded in the

61Ibid. p.262.
62Ibid.
sovereign man of modernity. Since that time mainstream history and philosophy has been focused on:

the heroic figure of reasoning man who is himself the origin of language, the maker of history, and the source of meaning in the world.64

However, since Kant, also, there has been an awareness that the "death of God" has not seen modern man bequeathed with God's omnipotence. Thus, sovereign man, invested with the will and the capacity to emancipate humankind from those objective forces that were thought to determine "meaning", and restrict "knowing", is cognisant of the fact that he is limited by the very knowledge that is the font of such power. Modern sovereign man, therefore:

upon exercising his powers of reason, sees plainly that he is emeshed in language and in history, indeed that he is an object of language and history. [Further] if man is the transcendental condition of the possibility of all knowledge, he also knows himself to be an empirical fact among facts to be examined and conceptualized. If he is a potentially lucid cogito, he knows himself to be surrounded by domains of darkness and ambiguity that resist the penetration of his thought.65

This is the dilemma of the modern man/god, the creator of "knowing" and "meaning" who, knowledgeable of his limitations, must seek to overcome them and fulfil his potential as the maker of history, the shaper and controller of human and material destiny. This, then, is the driving force of the "will to knowledge" in modernity and, in the attempt to impose/apply that knowledge, the will to certainty, to control, to mastery, to power.

For all its post-Kantian differences, the argument goes, modern theory and practice has been founded upon this figure of sovereign man, the "heroic figure" of modernity seeking to deal with the constraints upon his capacity to re-make the world in his image. For "market" Liberalism, thus, the modern historical narrative is that of the possessive individual of civil society, struggling (in the general/national interest) to break

64 Ashley, "Living on Border Lines", p.264; see also the discussion in Chapter Two of the thesis, pp.97-100.

65 Ibid, p.265.
down constraints upon free choice and natural competition. For Marxism, it is the narrative of the class conscious oppressed, struggling to break down the constraints upon their potential as fully conscious human beings. In each case the narrative is framed in terms of a "given" sovereign subject, privileged, via logocentric reasoning, over a world of objectified limitations/constraints, which "deny the promise of transcendence already present in the sovereign subject". It is with the modern fusion of sovereign man and the sovereign state, suggested Ashley, that the "will to knowledge" and the "will to power" has found its most powerful form and institutionalised modern forum. The state, in this sense, has become the site of reasoning man's knowledge and meaning, while, simultaneously, representing the major resource by which the constraints upon the fulfilment of reasoning man must be controlled, disciplined and punished. The state, then, imbued with and shaped by man's knowledge and "meaning":

will not be disposed to turn its coercive means against reasoning man; it will deploy its means to tame those "anarchic dangers" of history that threaten to escape the will of reasoning man.

This is a crucial theme in a Foucauldian based re-reading of the sovereignty issue, and in International Relations generally, because it prefigures the modern logic of power politics and the state centric view of an anarchical world of Otherness. In Ashley's terms, it gives identity to the state, as a:

time and place set in opposition to a region of anarchy-a region of historical contingency and chance that refuses to submit to the sovereign truth of reason.

It is in this sense that, for all the differences of the International Relations literature, the basic questions (war, peace, security, power, hegemony, justice) remain framed in a modernist (e.g. Realist) discourse, which opposes a realm of sovereignty, identity and

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66Ibid, p.267. This is the significance of the "Kantian turn" that was touched on in Chapter Two, pp.97-100, for after Kant, modern theory and practice was founded upon this framing regime to the extent that whatever the differences between modern ideologies, these differences were framed in terms of the privileged figure of reasoning sovereign man.


68Ibid.
reasoned understanding, against a realm of anarchical Otherness - that realm which refuses to accept the reality of "history", of power, of structural necessity. Herein, lies the foundation of some of the great logocentric tensions of Realist modernism, e.g. between identity/difference, self/Other, and domestic/international. And herein lies its fundamental problem of understanding, because, until it acknowledges its discursive character it cannot acknowledge that its answers merely replicate the limitations of its questions. Until it does this it cannot begin to think and act outside the caricatured and ritualised boundaries of, "recurrence and repetition", the "security dilemma", "hegemonic stability" and "The Anarchical Society".

This question of anarchy was central to another of Ashley's contributions on the sovereignty issue that I will touch on shortly. At this point, however, a comment is necessary on the way that he connected his broad post-modernist re-reading of sovereignty directly to the conservative Realism of International Relations, which, in one form or another, has represented itself as distinct from, and antipathetic to, post-Kantian theory and practice. Ashley did this in turning to the "great texts" of Kenneth Waltz, which were the focus of extended discussion in Chapter Seven. Ashley brought to his discussion a more explicit Foucauldian language and logic which he focused on Man, the State and War in particular. This was not just because of the hierarchy this text invokes - between sovereign man - and war - the most dangerous, most irrational, constraint upon man. Nor was it the positioning of the state in the title of the text - as the demarcation between sovereign space and anarchical space - that most excited Ashley's interest. Rather, it was because of the closure that this framing regime invoked, for Waltz's later work, and for structuralist Realism in general, that Man, the State and War was so important.

In Man, the State and War, Waltz searched his "three images" for the space in which man's modern quest could be fulfilled; for the logic by which the restraining forces of anarchy might be overcome. He found the crude individualist image inadequate in this regard, so too its conventional statist equivalent. Ultimately, of course, Waltz concluded
that only his third, structuralist image, had valid "meaning" in International Relations, and it invoked a meaning of betrayal in that it found the Kantian promise illusory; it found that "there are no guarantees that man will obey his promise to man". For Waltz, accordingly, the Realist focus shifted from the sovereignty of reasoning man to the sovereignty of the anarchical system. And, by *Theory of International Politics* (1979) any lingering ambiguity had gone, the anarchical structure was now the sovereign voice of International Relations, the shaper and maker of history, of political power, of human potential. Anarchy, thus, (made by man but beyond his transcendental powers) was now the foundation of "meaning" in relations between states, and Realist "knowing" was now centred on this pessimistic, fatalistic, deterministic "meaning", that, in its (historical) certitude required no further critical questioning. The Realist task now was to accommodate to the necessities of an anarchical structure and seek via scientific knowledge, its systemic intricacies. Unquestioned, of course, in all of this, was the figure of modern sovereign man, the (metatheoretical) catalyst of Waltz's anti-modernist Realism.

This has been the broad discursive context in which Ashley has confronted the sovereignty issue in terms of the Realist "Anarchy Problematique" (1988). And it is in this context that he has located the enduring power of the anarchy notion for neo-Realists in a contemporary replication of "interpretive dispositions and practical orientations" integral to modernity.

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69Ibid, p.287.

70Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique".

71Ibid, p.228.
Sovereignty. The State And The Anarchy Problematique

Seeking to understand and explain global life in the 1980s and 1990s in a period of increasing uncertainty for the Traditional way of thinking and acting in the world, neo-Realists, argued Ashley, "are disposed to invoke one or another sovereign presence as an originary voice, a foundational source of truth and meaning...that makes it possible to discipline the understanding of ambiguous events".\textsuperscript{72} Integral to neo-Realist analysis, consequently, is the logocentrised opposition between a privileged interpretative centre - the sovereign state - signifying rational identity, a homogeneous, coherent, knowable "self" - and a dangerous, uncontrollable realm of Otherness - the domain of anarchy, always threatening the identity, unity and control, deemed necessary at the international level.

This is the Anarchy Problematique, in which a sovereign presence (the contemporary state) has become \textit{the} principle of interpretation which allows for a transformation of ambiguity and difference into a coherent framework of unified understanding. This is the Anarchy Problematique, which (in Logical Positivist fashion) has established for the discipline a hierarchical distinction between that which is rational and meaningful (i.e. can be known scientifically and whose behaviour can be mediated) and that which is "outside" the realm of rational, meaningful discourse, and indeed is a danger to it. This is the Anarchy Problematique, which has ensured that when neo-Realists ask the central questions of the contemporary agenda (e.g. how can there be governance without an (international) government?; how can there be order without an orderer?; how can there be lasting regime co-operation in a situation of endemic anarchy?); the answers are already "given" at the (hidden, unspoken) core of the logocentric discourse. This, therefore, is the Anarchy Problematique that sees neo-Realist problem solvers already assume as axiomatic the "problem" of anarchy they purportedly seek to "solve".

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid, pp.230-231.
It is in the context of the Anarchy Problematique, accordingly, that the early "primitivism" of the discipline is replicated by neo-Realists, as the post Renaissance state, an "intrinsically contested, always ambiguous, never completed construct" is represented once again as an "unproblematic rational presence already there, a sovereign identity that is the self sufficient source of international history's meaning". Here too the modernist paradox continues to be writ large, as neo-Realists commit themselves to "demystify and explode arbitrary ideological limits imposed in history" while, simultaneously, imposing upon their updated scientific scholarship, an (empiricist/positivist) metaphysic in the form of an interpretive principle for which "critical questioning is disallowed". The state, in this equation, is not privileged as it once was when it was represented as the only sovereign figure in Realist analysis. Rather, the state is now projected as one sovereign actor among a multiplicity of sovereign actors (including non-state actors), and the new "realism" in International Relations is calculated as the sum of the rational decisions made by all (recognised) sovereign actors. But, as Ashley stressed, this has merely allowed contemporary Realists to acknowledge some earlier silences while simultaneously replicating them, primarily because appreciation of non-state actors does not repudiate the modernist discursive practice that sees all man/state interaction reduced to "sovereign" status (e.g. in individualist, rational choice premises).

73Ibid, p.231.

74Ibid. This then is the self reasoning state "immunised from reasoned criticism because it must be taken to be the principle of reasoning discourse in itself".

75Hence, the significance of a global economy is recognised and within it the impact of non-state actors upon the human and material resources available to states, and the choices made by them. It is recognised more precisely that should there be too many restrictions on non-state economic actors "world markets would collapse, economic contraction would set in, and in all locales, environmental deterioration, social dislocations, and political instability would result". On the other hand the state retains its major significance because with its "organisational resources and privileged claim to the means of violence", it is considered:

necessary to the protection of property rights, the maintenance of order, and the provision of the social conditions in which freedom can be sustained and production can flourish.


76Thus the state is no longer necessarily conceived of in strict atomised terms in a world of interdependence and transnationalism; the state, nevertheless, remains imbued conceptually with kind of
Consequently, the contemporary neo-Realist representation of the world of sovereign competition is beset with contradictions and anomalies so stark that they can no longer be easily ignored or marginalised. Thus, having incorporated into and acknowledged the importance of non-state actors upon the choices and interests of sovereign states, old questions are begged about precisely what this state now is, what its boundaries now are, what its "meaning" can possibly be. In a neo-Realist (market) context this "meaning" is represented in terms of homogeneous, choice making sovereign identities engaged in competitive interaction, which at the bare minimum, suggested Ashley, renders all actors in an interdependent world, entities with a "coherent set of interests and possessing some set of means that it is able to deploy in the service of these interests". However, simultaneously engaged in a Traditionalist enterprise of logocentric privileging, neo-Realists must also represent the state "as an entity having absolute boundaries unambiguously demarcating a domestic 'inside' and setting it off from a international [anarchic] 'outside'".

This strategy is, thus, no longer logical even in neo-Realist terms, because:

the turn to nonstate actors renders radically unstable any attempt to represent a historical figure - the state or any other - as a pure presence, a sovereign identity that might be a coherent source of meaning and an agency of the power of reason in international history.

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77Ibid, p.248.

78Ibid, emphasis added. What characterises the "inside" is what characterises the dominant representation of the modern Western state per se: "an identity that not only reconciles the contesting interpretations in a unique and universally recognised interpretation of a 'national interest' but also effectively mobilises social resources, as means, by appeal to this 'interest'". The "outside" of the boundary is the realm of "contesting interpretations and practice [which are] recalcitrant in the face of the sovereign voice of interpretation that reigns within".

79Ibid, p.234.
Ashley's point, simply put, is that in recognising the significance of non-state actors in a Traditional world of states, neo-Realists:

must allow that the boundaries of the state and domestic society are themselves open to interpretation and, with different interpretations might be taken to include or exclude different understandings of what universal interests of the state might be and different understandings of the resources that might be legitimately summoned in the name of those interests.80

For Ashley the paradox associated with this situation is significant not so much for any theoretical inadequacy it exposes but for the space it opens for other ways of understanding global politics. The aim of his deconstructive enterprise, consequently, is to open up to interpretive inquiry previously closed questions on state sovereignty and the Anarchy Problematique. In particular, and consistent with the broader aims of the Critical Social Theory literature across the disciplines, his concern is to open up the dominant discourse on the state, to illustrate:

that the foundations that gave it its supposed identity...its evident fixity of purpose, and that defined its seemingly necessary limits were never so secure as they might have seemed.

More positively, the aim is to illustrate that the foundations of Realist theory and practice:

were never more than effects of practices of representation that could be made to work only so long as competing voices of an always equivocal culture could be excluded or silenced.81

This, for Ashley, and post-modernists in general, is a crisis of Realism to be sure but, more pertinently, it is the crisis of modern representationalism starkly evoked. The strategy of exclusion that creates and reinforces the power of modern sovereignty in contemporary life is here writ large in the representation of "domestic society", as a sovereign, rational, identity, opposed to anarchy - a region of difference, ambiguity and

80Ibid, p.250. There is no suggestion here that the state is no longer important; like the Critical Theorist, Cox, scholars invoking post-modernist principles of inquiry have acknowledged the continuing importance of the state. The point, rather is that from a post-modern perspective the critiques of state centrism, since the 1970s, have opened some important (if rudimentary) thinking space with implications for neo-Realism and modernist discourse generally.

81Ibid, p.252.
indeterminacy. The Anarchy Problematique then, is a modernist discursive strategy in which:

differences, discontinuities, and conflicts that might be found within all places and times must be converted into an absolute difference between a domain of domestic society, understood as an identity, and a domain of anarchy, understood as at once ambiguous, indeterminate and dangerous.  

It is in this sense that International Relations is exposed as the site of discursive struggle - the struggle to impose a dominant discourse of "meaning" and "knowing", the struggle to define and produce International Relations in terms of a particular constellation of (sovereign) subjects and objects, which replicate that larger discursive constellation represented in modernist textuality. It is in this context that post-modernism pronounces theory as practice, the process of textuality as political power, language and representation as International Relations. And with the struggle now out in the open, as it were, scholars like Ashley with his concept of Anarchy Problematique, are beginning to open up a different set of questions integral to it.

Some of these questions are now central to post-modernist works on U.S. Foreign Policy. Michael Shapiro, for example, has asked questions of the politics of representation in relation to the way that the United States has represented "Central America", and specifically, "Guatemala", as part of that threatening realm of Otherness intrinsic to U.S. security discourse. There are at least two themes in Shapiro's work that require comment, both of which are important in understanding post-modernism's interpretivist approach and its analytical potency. The first reflects the capacity of intertextualist premises to open closed dimensions of international "theory"; the second

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82 Ibid.
concerns the "practical" implications for a state such as Guatemala of the dominant representational practices in International Relations.

The first theme was raised by Shapiro in the context of Todorov's *The Conquest of America* (1984) which problematised the conventional notion of "discovery", and shifted attention to a representational practice of Spanish imperialism. Shapiro's concern, in this regard, was to illustrate "that the kind of mentality which Todorov ascribed to the Spanish conquerors persists in the way Guatemala is constituted within the American foreign policy discourse". Seeking to show "how" foreign policy discourse constitutes Guatemala as an Other, rather than rake over old analytical coals on the "why" question, Shapiro emphasised the role played by "academicians, policy thinkers and journalists" in an Otherness discourse which "constitutes an unreflective apology for American neoimperialistic practices". This, he charged, is a subtle process in which Guatemalan society is reduced to geo-political fact, "out there", to be read only in terms of its "regime ideology" and/or the behaviour of its political leaders. This ignored "meanings" integral to the social and political history of Guatemala (e.g. of colonial and class relations) and, more generally, it depoliticises and dehistoricises the whole practice of state making, and meaning making, by which our understandings of International Relations are framed. In the case of Guatemala it has allowed U.S. foreign policy to

84 T. Todorov, *The Conquest of America* trans. R. Howard (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). The genre if not the specifics is that of Edward Said's *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). The term "discovery" here refers to the notion of finding something that was not previously there, either via isolated scientific experiment or in anthropological terms as in this case. The post-modern counter of course is bound up with Barthes' intertextualist notion and the general argument concerning representation as opposed to "experience". For a discussion of the difference between experience and representation in this context see Shapiro's "The Politics of Fear: Don DeLillo's Postmodern Burrow", *Strategies* 1 (1988), pp.120-141, in which he takes the fiction of Franz Kafka and Don DeLillo, and their questioning of the meaning of "fear" and "danger", to demonstrate how danger is bureaucratised in the contemporary era to such an extent that there is no longer any correlation between our immediate experience and the representations we consume as citizens of a state. For a broader discussion which deals with the semiotic approach to "discovery" in an accessible way see also W. Connolly, "Identity and Difference in Global Politics".

85 Shapiro, "The Constitution of the the Central American Other", p.89.

86 Ibid, pp.90-91. The "why" question is not ignored, but as Shapiro puts it, it is "controversial only for both naive and cynical apologists of American capital" that the "why" question is bound up with attempts to exploit Central America for the benefit of United States capital; ibid, p.90.
make and name Guatemala as part of an unproblematic spatial domain already imbued with a dominant discourse of "meaning".

To understand, more precisely, how this has been achieved and how the "meaning" of the object Guatemala has been constituted and represented, it was necessary, argued Shapiro, to investigate the constitution and representation of the American self in International Relations. Here attention was focused, not surprisingly, on the Realist security/strategic discourse that has been the primary idiom of the sovereign voice of the United States. To understand Guatemala, in this sense, was to understand its "difference" in the discursive practice of identity making. In this regard the "meaning" of Guatemala (and Central America in general) is bound up with the "intensity of interests congregated in modern superpowers...[which has] resulted in a comprehensive level of surveillance and intervention all over the globe". More explicitly, Guatemala is given "meaning" as part of an objectification of an externalised world of Otherness (an Anarchy Problematique) in which:

there are ever more categories and predictive scenarios, for the modern security-oriented discourse can tolerate no surprises or uncertainties, not only because of relation to defence of a state but also to the perceived connections with ongoing domestic ways of life.87

This begs the question of what precise danger a small state like Guatemala could pose to the United States and its "domestic" way of life. The answer, as Shapiro explained, is intrinsic to the modernist constitution of the identity/difference dichotomy, in particular. Accordingly, if the self is construed in terms of contemporary security discourse, then all other actors in the discursive system will be located on the "axis of threats" to that security. If, as in the case of the United States, the self is identified most profoundly with a crisis management perspective, then states such as Guatemala are identified as "indirect threats" whose potential for disorder must be disciplined and controlled.88 Moreover, if identity, is understood, in this sense, as a moral/grammatical code of

87Ibid, p.106.
88Ibid, p.102.
"meaning" in the world, then there is an added (Western, ethnocentric) dimension to the "mentality" concerning Central American states such as Guatemala, because:

to the extent that the Other is regarded as something not occupying the same natural/moral space as the self, conduct towards the Other becomes more exploitative.89

To illustrate how this discourse is represented in ways other than direct politico-economic intervention, Shapiro turned to what became known as The Kissinger Report (1984).90 In this document, he suggested, contemporary security policy as U.S identity was unproblematically articulated in relation to Guatemala as Other. Consequently, The Kissinger Report, characterised by a "remarkable consensus" among contributors to it, presented its observations on the "realities of Central America" in predictable terms.91 Prominent, therefore, among the Report's findings was one which echoed the responses of (at least some of) the Conquistadors in their "discovery" of the Indian peoples, centuries ago: i.e. for Guatemala to become a stable, less threatening Other, it must become like us, it must seek to replicate our identity.92

Unproblematically represented, the we here are the champions of foreign private investment, of multinational penetration of a potential market, albeit it in a context of an awareness that, in 1984, any resistance to this scenario might require something other than Conquistadorian strategies. Nevertheless, in 1984, the "venerable colonialist code" was rearticulated in, for example, the debate over what should be done should a Latin American country choose to "seize a U.S. company". In such circumstances, it was asserted, the U.S. would be forced to defend an irreducible principle of identity, which

89 Ibid.
91 Both of these quotes are from The Kissinger Report as cited in Shapiro, "The Constitution of the Central American Other", p.116.
92 Ibid, pp.113-114. As Shapiro stresses the expectation is not so much to create a carbon copy of Western bourgeois society but to improve on the "rough draft" that Central American societies are regarded as. The progressivism of modernist history and philosophy and of Modernisation Theory it seems is not dead after all.
states that "the property rights of its citizens must be protected in a foreign country".93 And just to make sure the message was clear enough, in recognising that the State Department might have a "propensity toward accommodation" in these matters, the Report warned that:

Congress usually exerts pressure to proceed firmly against the small brother who has disregarded his big brother's rights.94

Even when a more sensitive tone was evident in the Report's findings, and even when a Central American voice was heard within it, the identifying security/strategy discourse remained fundamental to the "meaning" of Guatemala and to the way the U.S. must "know" it, if it is to remain secure in its post-Monroe Doctrine sphere of influence. This was never more evident, maintained Shapiro, than in the Report's attitude to the question of human rights in Central America generally. On this issue there was acknowledgement of the need for land reform, but "no question raised about incompatibilities between the construction of American strategic interests and the ability of the Other to acquire...land reform". In particular, there was no mention of U.S. involvement in the overthrow of Guatemalans engaged in land reform.95 Instead, the question of human rights was subsumed within the debate on the possibility of U.S. intervention to protect its security interests. Thus, summing up U.S. involvement in Guatemala and the region in general, the Report recognised that:

On the one hand, we seek to promote justice and find it repugnant to support forces that violate - or tolerate violation of - fundamental U.S. values. On the other hand we are engaged in El Salvador and Central America because we are serving fundamental U.S. interests that transcend any particular government.96

From Shapiro's post-modernist perspective, there are at least two conclusions to be drawn from this interrogation of one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in U.S.

93Ibid, p.113.

94Ibid.

95For example in the intervention of 1954 which overthrew the Arbenz government.

96Cited in ibid, p.120.
foreign policy. The first is that the intertextuality premise was shown to be a valuable critical counterpoint to the conventional notion of "discovery", when it came to the process by which the political figures, academics, journalists and others associated with The Kissinger Report, framed their "reality" of Guatemala and Central America. The second is that, more explicitly than ever, foreign policy "theory" is better understood as "practice". Consequently, in refuting the proposition that the findings of The Kissinger Report were based on a reality "discovered" during its inquiries, Shapiro argued that, on the contrary, they were framed in accordance with a discursive representation of Guatemala and Central America that was already there in the "colonial mentality" of European culture and literature, and in the unquestioned premises of modernity corresponding to U.S. identity in the world. Consequently, The Kissinger Report, and the larger U.S. security discourse that its findings replicated:

failed to understand both its own discursive practice and to attain a grasp of what Central America could be if it were approached in a less-appropriating form of knowledge/practice. The commission reproduced the kind of Central American isthmus that has been produced in the European imagination for centuries.97

The conclusion, then, is that at the core of its thinking on Central America, U.S. foreign policy remains constricted within the static confines of a security discourse bounded by the Anarchy Problematique and modernist notions of sovereign self and threatening Other. And, emphasised Shapiro, this theory as practice has some frightening implications for the region in the future, if U.S. policy makers, failing to reflect upon the way they construct the "reality" of Central America, continue to respond to that "reality" in Traditional fashion. Indeed, he concluded, the representation of Guatemala and Central America in U.S. security discourse, in the late 1980s:

provides the general rationale for the already-in-place policy of active economic and civilian/military intervention to help the not-yet-perfected Central American Others.98

97Ibid, p.122.

98Ibid.
David Campbell has developed these themes from a different angle in looking at some of the implications of U.S. foreign policy continuing, in the 1990s, to conceptualise the world in terms of modernist sovereignty and the Anarchy Problematique. Campbell has focused, in particular, on issues surrounding the demise of the major Cold War Other and the tendency towards triumphalism on the part of the "victors". His view is that euphoria and self congratulation is entirely misplaced; that to speak of victory and proclaim a new more democratic world order, is not only to trivialise the great dangers attending the breakdown of the Soviet empire, but to ignore the plight of the "majority of humanity" for whom there is little hope in any foreseeable future. But for Campbell there is a more immediate danger associated with the demise of the great Cold War Other. It is that the demise of the Soviet Union, and the complexities surrounding that event, are likely to be marginalised by the United States foreign policy community in favour of a reading set upon Realist power politics premises and an uncritical modernist progressivism. The danger is, therefore, that United States foreign policy theory and practice will remain incarcerated within the Cold War discursive confines of sovereignty and anarchy, thus remaining insensitive to many problems of its own identity and that of a world upon which it has such an impact.

As the discussion in Chapter Seven emphasised, the primary theme in the orthodox reading of the Cold War was centred on a positivist construction of reality in which the "Western" subject observed an objectified realm of anarchy "out there", the realm, after 1945, of the Soviet Other. As the organising principle of U.S. foreign policy this became the Cold War for Realist scholarship, understood as the "realm of necessity

100 Ibid, p.263.
101 The work by Francis Fukuyama being an example of the genre. See, "The End of History", National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), pp.3-18.
for U.S. policymakers. The critical task, for Campbell, was to "show that US foreign policy was constituted by dimensions other than external necessity" in order both to expose its limits and problematise any future reading of new world orders in Traditional terms. He sought, thus, to reconceptualise U.S. foreign policy in terms of the Anarchy Problematique which, he argued, limited conventional foreign policy discourse to certain questions and privileged geopolitical practice and security in terms of (sovereign) territorial integrity, while ignoring, or treating as epiphenomenal, issues of culture, ideology, representation and interpretive ambiguity at the core of the sovereign state. In this sense U.S. foreign policy was constituted by the:

disciplining of the ambiguity and contingency of global politics by dividing it into inside and outside, self and other, via the inscription of the boundaries of the state.104

The sovereign state (the U.S.A.) has, in this way, been framed and given identity in terms of the discourse of anarchy and danger "outside" it. Its foreign policy, consequently, has been accorded an irreducible logic which privileges the theory and practice of power politics in its efforts to respond to the anarchical "realm of necessity". Similarly, a hierarchy of "meaning" has been established which has expunged from the (legitimate) pursuit of "knowing" questions concerning the status of the sovereign self and all matters of interpretive ambiguity. But, Campbell insisted, these issues must be explored if we are not to further close off the possibilities for sensitive and more appropriate foreign policy in the future. Most importantly, he charged, the United States must begin to critically reflect upon itself, to reflect that its identity, framed in relation to danger between states in an anarchical world, is part of a much larger regime of framing concerned with the disciplining of dangers within the state. It must, in this regard,


103 Campbell, "Global Inscription", p.264.

104 Ibid, p.270.
understand that the demarcation between inside and outside, self and other, identity and difference in International Relations, is another dimension of the way in which the "United States" has been framed as part of a process of privileging a certain discursive image of historical and philosophical reality. In this sense:

the practices of foreign policy serve to enframe, limit, and domesticate a particular meaning of humanity...it incorporates the form of domestic order, the social relations of production, and the varying subjectivities to which they give rise.105

The "particular meaning of humanity" privileged in the United States is that centred on Liberal democratic political structures, capitalist economics and the modern "individual". These have been the "givens" that have circumscribed the rational unity, certainty and identity of the "United States", the sovereign presence engaged in a struggle to domesticate and discipline a threatening realm of contradiction, ambiguity and Otherness. As Campbell emphasised, however, when the U.S. narrative of self identity is re-read, re-historicised and politicised, a number of excluded narratives are necessarily reinvoked - narratives of genocide, expansionism, dispossession, of extraordinary state surveillance, of the struggles of gender, of sexuality, of "difference", contingency, ambiguity, and Otherness.106 When one included these readings, argued Campbell, and when one then pondered the representation of the "United States" in its International Relations context, the conclusion was that:

[the boundaries of the state... have] long been the result of domesticating the self through the transfer of differences within society to the inscription of differences between societies.107

Understood in these terms, of course, the Cold War can be understood not as the only "realistic" response to anarchical necessity, but as a "disciplinary strategy that was global

106The scale of "the Cold War at home" is sometimes staggering. As Campbell records the FBI alone had some 430,000 files on "subversives" during the 1950s; ibid, p.276.
in scope but national in design". More precisely the Cold War and orthodox readings of it can be understood as another site at which the Anarchy Problematique was invoked to provide a sovereign, foundational presence, from which the threat of "difference" and Otherness could be rendered unified and controllable. In the Cold War context, more precisely, it was invoked:

through the invocation of anarchy and disorder as problems that threaten the United States and via a concern with the 'individual' as a defining moment of being "American".

This is not to suggest some simple cause and effect scenario, nor any coherent class/elite based design at the core of U.S. theory and practice. But what Campbell's argument does suggest, as did Shapiro's, is that questions of representation, systematically excluded from foreign policy discourse, must be included if the United States, and the International Relations discipline centred therein, is to be more capable in the future of understanding itself and the world in which it lives. What it suggests, more generally in relation to the present discussion, is that modernist theory is intrinsic to the practice of International Relations and that post-modernist critical perspectives have something important to contribute to the opening of that theory as practice, in the post-Cold War era.

From different angles, the works of Shapiro and Campbell have focused post-modernist attention on a core element in International Relations, the discourse of strategy and security which has been central to Realist representations of the "is" of the world since 1945. The final discussion in this thesis will look, briefly, at some of the post-modern literature that has sought, more directly, to reconceptualise the "meaning" of security and strategy in the era which has seen the demise of its Cold War raison d'etre.
Reconceptualising Strategy and Security in the Post Cold War Era

The discussion on strategy and security studies in Chapter Seven illustrated, I think, that while there were always reflective and sophisticated tendencies within that field, it was, and remains, an exemplary arena of positivist-Realism, technical-rationality and modernist discursive practices in general.110 This being the case, post-modernists have been concerned to reconceptualise the "meaning" of strategic and security discourse by opening it to questions its Traditional agenda continues to ignore or marginalise.

Attention, for example, has been focused on the growing sense of insecurity concerning state involvement in military-industrial affairs and the parlous state of the global ecology. Questioned, too, has been the fate of those around the world rendered insecure by lives lived at the margins of existence, yet unaccounted for in the statistics on military spending and strategic calculation. And, for those concerned to open to greater democratic participation a closed intellectual/policy realm, a critical target has been the (technical-rational) language of exclusion integral to a strategy/security discourse to the extent that complex questions of politics, ethics and social life, have been reduced to the illusory certainties of "rational" action, game-theory and systems analysis.111

110 Even in the most thoughtful contemporary outposts of the genre, in, for example, the work of Barry Buzan, the focus of analytical attention remains firmly focused on the Traditional geo-political framework of reference and a privileged state, the sovereign voice of national security, albeit now as part of an updated "levels of analysis" approach. This is not to trivialise Buzan's contribution. There is much to applaud in his thoughtful approach, but it remains an example of "repressed" modernist critique. See Buzan, Peoples, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983); and more recently, "The Case for a Comprehensive Definition of Security and the Institutional Consequences of Accepting It", Arbeidsapirer Working Papers 4 (1990), pp.1-17. In these works his "level of analysis" approach is indicative also of the legacy of Traditional thinking. Thus while acknowledging the importance of other actors and "levels" than the state, the argument on national security remains rooted in the notion of a distinction between the state and civil society on the one hand and between individual states and the state system on the other. This is a theme raised by Walker in, "The Territorial State and the Theme of Gulliver", International Journal 39(3) (1984), pp.529-552; and by Cox in "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", Millennium 10(2) (1981), pp.126-155. The point they both make, in their different ways is that such a position tends to reify the Liberal notion of a special relationship between individuals and civil society in the "domestic" realm while understanding as fundamentally different those relations "outside" this realm. As the discussions above have sought to show, this stance, however sensitively presented, excludes from serious critical questioning relations integral to both "inside" and "outside".

111 On these themes see R. B. J. Walker, The Concept of Security and International Relations Theory Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (Working Paper, No.3, San Diego: University of California, 1988); Walker, "The Territorial State and the Theme of Gulliver"; see also Walker's Chapter Six in One World, Many World's: Struggles For A Just World Order (Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner,
This, then, has been the context in which post-modernists have insisted that questions of culture, language, and discourse be added to the strategy/security agenda, and that the dominant (Realist) "meaning" of "strategy" and "security", be reconceptualised to include debates on the discursive process by which it has produced:

a field of strategic studies [which] conceptualizes global political space in ways that privilege the freedom of major powers to manipulate violence and threaten war as legitimate instruments of policy.112

In this regard, the post-modernist critique of Realist strategic/security discourse is aimed at exposing one of the most dangerous aspects of the knowledge/power nexus in International Relations, thus "divest[ing] power of its legitimacy and thereby disable[ing] the discourse".113 The point of such a critique, succinctly articulated by Bradley Klein in terms which have a more generalised appropriateness in post-modernist scholarship, is, "to give power no place to hide".114 This, it is acknowledged, is no easy task given the embeddedness of a discourse which, since the Cold War, has successfully projected the Traditional (modernist) narrative of International Relations at the forefront of its theory and practice, in "attribut[ing] to the international system a timeless ontological quality of anarchy" which it must "manage" on behalf of the system (or society) of states.115 Moreover, the sovereignty attributed to state actors in this narrative allowed strategists and security analysts to construct a Cold War scenario in which "the problems are out

1988). An interesting angle on the issue is provided also in Michael Shapiro "Strategic Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of "Security Policy" in the Video Age", in International Studies Quarterly 34(3) (1990), pp.327-341; and Bradley Klein, "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics", Review of International Studies 14(2) (1988), pp.133-148; Klein, "Beyond the Western Alliance: The Politics of Post-Atlanticism", in Atlantic Relations: Beyond the Reagan Era edited by S. Gill (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989); and Klein, "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO", International Studies Quarterly 34(3) (1990), pp.311-326. This is not to forget the contributions of those who have in different ways sought already to overcome some of the positivist-Realist problems in this regard, for example, Jervis and his work on "perception/misperception". The sovereignty issue still pertains however, in Jervis's case, in terms of his psychologism.


113Ibid.

114Ibid, p.5.

there, in the real world, in an international system over which statesmen have no choice, no control, except to react responsibly". Accordingly, with this a "given" of the nuclear age, strategic/security analysis became a major focal point of the Anarchy Problematique, "devis[ing] and subsequently act[ing] upon global geopolitical space according to the rules of strategy as a human science". And, on this basis, strategic/security discourse has been able to "naturalise" its language and purpose to the extent that any challenges to its hegemony has been relatively easily dismissed as destabilising to the "natural" order of the (anarchical) international system.

However, as Klein suggested in 1987, when "strategy" and "security" are read in representational terms and located in their discursive context, the detached, technorationalist "naturalness" of such analysis dissolves into a modernist framework of pseudo-scientific privileging which, in power politics terms, was/is:

- designed to preserve both American leadership over the [Western] Alliance and the hegemony of Western multilateral trading arrangements throughout the Atlantic core and the Third World periphery.

It has been in this "thinking space" that a whole range of post-modernist scholars have confronted the strategic/security discourse in a period which has seen the irreducible "reality" of the Cold War overturned, in rapid and dramatic circumstances, and the hegemony of the Western superpower challenged on a number of fronts. They have argued that to more adequately understand the potentials and dangers of the age the dominant Western approach to strategy and security must be reconceptualised in order that the nature and implications of its identity be understood in representational terms. It must, in this regard, be understood as part of a larger process of constructing identity in

117Ibid.
118In Klein's terms, "[t]he language of the whole strategic debate cloaks itself in the aseptic, ahistorical and anodyne terminology of a manipulative violence that sustains the practices of postwar hegemony without expressly addressing them. [It thus] severs its architectonic from the structure of the political economy it legitimates", ibid, p.16.
119Ibid, p.17.
Western modernity, one that privileges a particular way of life and a particular "meaning of humanity", which is then represented as International Relations. If this process is not acknowledged, it is argued, understanding of human society will remain restricted to the Realist rituals of the Traditional sovereign state-as-actor in an anarchical world, thus foreclosing serious consideration on differences within and between states, and of human ideas and activity beyond the "necessities" of the security dilemma.\textsuperscript{120}

At the forefront of this new debate on security and strategic issues have been postmodernists eager to indicate how it might be possible to go beyond the static confines of theory and practice exemplified in the dominant representations of "strategy" and "security". Scholars such as Klein and Michael Dillon, for example, have located the crisis of identity in NATO as a significant microcosm of the post-Cold War period in this regard.\textsuperscript{121} In one sense, as Klein has argued, NATO has become the victim of its own "success". This "success" was not so much in deterring the Soviet "threat", but in having constructed a Cold War identity for itself and its allies "which all members of the West either embody or aspire toward", and which was worth dying for.\textsuperscript{122} The challenge spearheaded by Gorbachev has significantly undermined NATO's "success", in this context, by undermining the primary reason for its existence. But the Gorbachev phenomenon and the social revolutions in Eastern Europe have, it is argued, opened up an even more profound space for change - a discursive space effectively closed down during the reign of the Cold War identity.

This, clearly, is a space of great opportunities and obvious dangers, a space where the construction of Cold War cultural unity and identity is sure to be confronted by

\textsuperscript{120}This is the problem of the "levels of analysis" approach put another way. It does not of course add up to traditional notions of ideology, given the antipathy to all logocentric discourse including that concerning crude class analysis and/or notions of "false" as opposed to "real" consciousness.


\textsuperscript{122}Klein, "How the West Was One", p.320.
those whose "difference" was expunged within it. The more direct and obvious implications of this opened space are already to be seen and heard on the streets of those states once unified by the threat narrative of the Warsaw Pact security discourse. But it is in the West, Dillon has suggested, that the implications of the challenge to NATO's identity are perhaps even more profound, given that organisation's connection with, and articulation of, modernist representational practice. Bringing a post-modernist concern with performativity to his analysis, Dillon has thus entered the "thinking space" of the era of revolution in strategic/security discourse in an attempt to ventilate closed off obscured and denigrated aspects of NATO rhetoric and identity formation. From this perspective the crisis of identity in the West brought on by the Gorbachev challenge is understood as a prime example of the "extent to which [the] contest over meaning is an intrinsic part of the politics of order". More explicitly, it exposes relations of knowledge and power to a different logic, one that repudiates the (positivist) sense of detachment integral to the success of the Cold War orthodoxy. Thus:

knowledge in doubt radically problematises the exercise of power, because the one is the principal medium of the other [and] Power problematised, of course, threatens the character and constitution of political order, for without the inscriptions of power there is no order, because all order is an effect of power.

What is at stake here, then, is not just the future of NATO as the strategic mainspring of Western power and order since World War Two, but the very framework of "real" knowledge about International Relations that has given "meaning" to the identity of

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123 The identity theme here goes back before the Cold War, in many cases back to the state making processes of Versailles. In general terms though, as Dillon has put it, with the fall of the "meta-boundary" there has been a "re-articulation - the re-entering of history - of many of the subordinated and aspirational identities which the post-war order has covered over"; "The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity", p.119.

124 The term "performativity" is part of the broader Textuality theme integral to post-modernism. It owes a good deal to the work of the semiotician, Roland Barthes, and emphasises those rhetorical aspects of language performance that under modernist (particularly positivist) reading rules are ignored or demarcated off from the "real" (logical, rational) meaning of the text. It seeks, in this sense to explore the hidden and often very powerful meaning of that which is not "said", directly, and is thus concerned with historical, cultural and linguistic practices rather than an exclusive focus on the "author" (sovereign figure).


126 Ibid, p.117.
NATO and Western power and order, in that period. And this of course is why the issue is exciting so much attention among post-modernists, because the space opened now is that which leaves exposed and vulnerable the process that for so long has represented a particular "meaning of humanity" as the unproblematic is" of the world, the unifying, sovereign presence that "we" must defend, to the point of genocide if necessary, against "them". The process of meaning-making, in other words, is exposed as process. Exposed, in particular, is the process by which meaning has been made in the period of Realist dominance of International Relations.

This, for post-modernists such as Dillon, Klein, Walker, Ashley, Campbell, Shapiro and Der Derian (and for a Critical Theorist such as Cox) does not evoke concern over hegemonic decline and the restoration of Traditional order, but stimulates "celebratory" invocations of alternative political formations, of more tolerant, more inclusive forms of human society. Dillon articulates the "celebratory" perspective well in suggesting that while the "astonishing devaluation of our post-war discourse" has obvious dangers, it provides us with a unique opportunity to comprehend the process by which "questions of international (in)security are integrally related to questions of political subjectivity". The broader implication of the post-Cold War era, then, is that we are witnessing not only the dissolution of "a regime of truth", but in the increasingly problematic geo-political space that is "Europe", the dissolution of "the politics of political discourse itself".127 This, it must be stressed is no statement of Traditional progressivism on Dillon's part, the intellectual legacy of Nietzsche and Foucault eschews such a position. What it represents, rather, is the acknowledgement of the space for resistance to power politics and imposed subjectivity in a Europe now engaging everyday in the actual process of re-making its meaning. In this regard, it acknowledges and celebrates the enhanced potential for "thinking space" as the unified strategic reality of a generation dissolves into a site of unique re-constitution (e.g. Germany) and reconceptualisation of self and others.

127Ibid.
Other post-modernists have developed these themes in their diverse inquiries into the post-Cold War era, some finding reason for cautious optimism that a theory and practice of "difference" might be emerging. This potential has been noted by Pertti Joenniemi, who has probed the broad discursive issues facing the West in its confrontation with a democratising Soviet Union in the context of the strict Otherness of orthodox strategic/security discourse. More recently he has looked into NATO's Cold War mirror image in a study of the impact upon the Warsaw Pact of the demise of its primary "orderer". Simon Dalby, meanwhile, has continued his investigations into the implications of the breakdown of strategic/security discourse set upon "given" geopolitical premises in a discussion on the politics of de-alignment in the former "Western" and "Eastern" blocs. In the latter, in particular, he has acknowledged as positive the emerging critical responses among dissident groups within and outside the policy arena, seeking a reconceptualised form of political community in the future in which:

security is not something that can be limited to the military preparations of states, rather political communities have to transcend the boundaries of individual states, and the boundaries of alliances.

All this, of course, needs to be kept in perspective. The war in the Persian Gulf (1990-1991) was evidence enough of the continuing capacity of the erstwhile Western superpower to invoke the Traditional "meaning" of the strategy/security discourse for its own interests. Nevertheless, the emerging tendencies within (often) marginalised communities around the world, to question the "meanings" and boundaries of their lives, is a theme of obvious significance for post-modernists. To conclude this discussion of post-modernism in International Relations, consequently, I want to touch on its

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significance in relation to R. B.J. Walker’s, *One World, Many Worlds*, a work that explores some of the major themes of the genre: sovereignty, textuality, representationalism, the Anarchy Problematique, and the limitations of strategic/security discourse, from the point of view of the marginalised, the silenced, the omitted, those whose lives, cultures and histories have, for so long, been read out of the power politics narrative.

**One World, Many Worlds: Toward a Post-Modernist Politics of Resistance?**

The immediate locus of Walker’s attention are those critical social movements around the world working to more fully understand, resist and change dominant power structures in their specific sites, and under a diversity of cultural circumstances. Movements of this kind range from the conventional social movements in Western industrialised societies, organising to resist nuclear weapons, militarism, environmental degradation and gendered politics, to the movements in Eastern Europe and throughout the Third World, engaged in similar struggles, and those over specific issues of ecology (e.g. pollution, deforestation) and broader struggles for a more secure, peaceful and dignified life. The significance of these movements, for Walker, is that while they, inevitably, are part of a global struggle in "One (interdependent) World", they represent also a politics of difference, the articulation of the "Many Worlds" of people’s experiences and aspirations, which cannot, and should not, be constrained by the dictates of a particular "meaning of humanity" as projected in the Traditional discourse of International Relations.

Their significance is enhanced in this latter regard by many of their practices, which defy traditional grand theorised strategies of revolutionary thought and behaviour in favour of creative, innovative resistance, established and carried out in specific sites of struggle. They are, in this sense, examples of a practical political dimension of the search for "thinking space" in the contemporary period, activating in their everyday lives and struggles the concerns of Critical Social Theorists seeking to challenge dominant
discourses of hierarchical power and repressed aspiration. These activities, consequently, are acknowledged as part of "a transformative assault on our inherited notions of authority, legitimacy and power" which:

> carries the possibility of reconstructing the conditions for a decent life from the bottom up, without waiting for elites to become enlightened or replaced by still more elites.\(^{130}\)

Critical social movements, in their different locations and circumstances, are engaged in this reconstructive enterprise in repossessing their history, language and culture, in rediscovering the enabling dimension of power and in confronting the "givens" of International Relations.\(^{131}\) Their struggles represent an important new dimension of dissent for post-modernists, suspicious of all traditional claims for emancipation, on behalf of the people, the class, the common interest, and sceptical of all singular, homogenised images of "reality", "liberty", "freedom", of all "isms" proclaiming post-Enlightenment visions of the good life.

This is not a perspective that denies the desirability of "planetary integrity, of people's security, of empowering development for all, of deepening democracy everywhere".\(^{132}\) Rather, it is a perspective which cares enough about the possibility of such conditions, not to endanger them by abrogating responsibility for them again to another vanguard, another Realism, another Tradition, another religion, another Philosophy, another rational-scientific panacea for a self-satisfied, disempowering, bourgeois ideology. Accordingly, while there is no sense of reification or idealisation of critical social movements in Walker's work, there is an appreciation of their struggles and

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130 Walker, One World, Many Worlds, p.8. The claim here is not that critical social movements explicitly articulate post-modernist principles of critique, nor does Walker make such a claim. The point, rather is that their theory and practice can be interpreted in this way and some extrapolations can be drawn from these interpretations. I am perhaps taking a few more interpretive liberties here than Walker did in One World Many Worlds under the auspices of The Committee for a Just World Peace.

131 They confront the "givens", of course, in both their Traditional power politics formulation and in their orthodox revolutionary counterparts.

aspirations as providing a sense of what a post-modern politics might look like, as a counter to the Traditional theory and practice of International Relations.

In this regard it is acknowledged that critical social movements will, and must, continue to struggle against the most obvious and reprehensible injustices and dangers in the "One" world, e.g. against nuclear arms, apartheid, and brutal military repression in Africa, and Central and South America. But these struggles, while connected to the broader "radical movement", will be energised directed and articulated by "meaning" and "knowing" derived, not from some sovereign centre, some privileged omnipotent presence, but from the creativity and critical capacities of people learning about their world, in their own ways, through their own struggles. In this way, a broader more profound potential for "meaning" and "knowing" might be realised, in which:

People learn to recognize not only the authoritarian state "out there" - the identifiable events of armoured vehicles and dawn awakenings, of censorship and beatings, of propagandistic images and inaccessible decisions - but also the authoritarian state "in here" - the routines taken for granted, the conventions of forgetting, the capitulation of apathy.133

For all the enormity of the task, there were signs, suggested Walker, that this kind of politics of difference, of empowerment, of resistance, is beginning to emerge. One dimension of this emergence concerns the way that the "givens" of a Cold War generation are now being questioned in International Relations. There is, for example, an increasing appreciation that questions of war and peace - the central questions of the Realist agenda - cannot, any longer, "be separated from questions of development, ecological degradation, abuse of human rights [and] loss of cultural identity".134 Similarly, questions of security, the primary locus of Realist research attention for so long, are now in the process of reconceptualisation. In particular the power politics commitment to a state centric security format is under challenge by those who maintain that it is no longer credible to reduce

133Ibid.
134Ibid, p.121.
insecurity in the modern world "to the necessities of life in a system of states". Instead, it is argued:

[s]uch a reduction was always an oversimplified fiction. It is now a wilful obscurantism [thus] the distinction between friend and foe, citizen and enemy, inside and outside belong to an earlier era.\textsuperscript{135}

This insight, is increasingly evident as peoples around the world emphasise the need to "understand the connections between different conceptions of security appropriate for different situations rather than to search for a single concept or source of security".\textsuperscript{136}

Under challenge, too, in this context, is the anti-democratic nature of strategic and security debate, closed off by exclusivist strategies invoking notions of "national interest"/"national security" and a logic and language which has rendered "technological" that which is integral to political praxis. The experiences of a range of critical social movements have illustrated the dangers of this Traditional insistence on secrecy and exclusivity. In Central America, for example, (as Shapiro indicated above) the connections between "national interest" and "security" is at best highly problematic for the great mass of people struggling to survive under military regimes and/or authoritarian elites, and the influences of U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, as many indigenous movements of change have insisted, any meaningful notion of security must be re-connected to an open structure of theory and practice, to participatory politics and radically enhanced "thinking space". In the West, too, the space opened by anti-nuclear movements, for example, has resulted in challenges to the anti-democratic nature of strategic/security thinking and policy making, and a closed Traditional discourse in general. This, suggested Walker, is a positive and necessary incursion into closed space because it confronts a "traditional habit that can prove fatal" - the habit of abandoning responsibility for thinking on strategy and security issues "to others who claim to know best". Rather, as critical social movements (and Critical Social Theorists) have argued in

\textsuperscript{135}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{136}Ibid, p.122.
a diversity of ways, these are not issues that can be left to someone else because "effective security must mean democratic security".  

The question begged here - about what democracy "means" - is, of course, of major significance for post-modernists concerned with the process by which powerful Enlightenment themes impose themselves as oppressive practices. It is acknowledged, for example, that formal political democracy is often connected to life experiences dominated by bureaucratic stultification, authoritarian state rule, elite sponsored apathy and cynicism and conditions in which "many, or even most, people are excluded from making decisions about things that control their lives". Thus, in confronting the question of democracy in contemporary times, critical social movements, like Critical Social Theorists, and post-modernists in particular, have become engaged in a broader agenda involving:

- the rearticulation of political space, the discovery of new forms of political practice, the exploration of new horizons of knowing and being...[and] the struggle to establish new forms of human solidarity.

The tendency toward a democratic politics of difference, is particularly evident, argued Walker, when Traditional issues of strategy and security are connected to questions of economic development. In this context there is an increasing acknowledgement that, in the age of monopoly capitalism and a world wide transformation in productive processes, (as described by Cox, for example) the "rhetorical power" of Traditional concepts are shown to be increasingly "at odds with [their] conceptual, political and ethical incoherence". This is clear enough in regard to the concept of meaningful state participation in an interdependent world economy, where "the very idea of a national

137 Ibid, p.126.
138 Ibid, p.133.
139 Ibid, p.128.
140 Ibid.
economy is rapidly becoming a contradiction in terms". Accordingly, peoples everywhere are engaged in a search, not for greater hegemonic stability in a state centric universe, which traditionally has condemned millions to "live in poverty, ill health, and cultural deprivation, engage in hard labor and suffer premature death", but toward a reconceptualisation of some of the basic categories of modernist "meaning" concerning the "reality" of a contemporary international political economy.

Challenged, most immediately, is the homogeneity of the modernisation discourse, still dominant at the core of the Realist image of a world of sovereign states hierarchically located in power politics terms. In countering this with alternative developmental strategies "rooted in the needs of specific communities", critical social movements have challenged also much of the modernist historical narrative and its associated philosophical wisdom. Consequently, for many in the 1990s "so called traditional ways of life become at least as important for understanding the potentialities of different kinds of human community as the lure of modernization" and "development ceases to be seen as a process imposed from the top down, something that is done to, rather than by people". It is in this context that reconceptualised development strategies become part of an inherently democratic process:

in which people participate in the making of their own communities, one in which economic life is intrinsically connected to the social, environmental, and cultural processes that are essential to a sustained and meaningful way of life.

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141 Ibid, p.129.
142 Ibid. The point here is not that Traditional strategies of growth cannot be "successful" but that their "success" is so often associated with great structural inequalities. As Walker notes in India, currently, about 40% of the population are now benefiting from increased national economic growth, while simultaneously, about 40% are becoming even worse off. In Africa meanwhile, about 80% of peoples don't even have access to the basic resources that are deemed necessary in conventional economics to begin the development process; ibid, p.130. This, added to the demands of an industrialised world and its various agencies of capital and production, for profit, in a single world market, simply increases the prospects that the "wretched of the earth" will remain "wretched" even as the rhetoric of economic development and free market and Hegemonic Stability Theory is proclaimed as the only "realistic" solution to the problem.
143 Ibid, p.131.
It is in engaging in this theory as practice that critical social movements activate post-modern images of a politics of resistance. In reclaiming for themselves the process by which the notion of democracy is made meaningful, by reconceptualising development and security, they are engaged not only in an immediate challenge to power politics but in challenging "the presumptions of a civilisation".  

More explicitly than anywhere else in the post-modernist contribution to International Relations, Walker's *One World, Many Worlds* articulates this diverse deconstruction of modernism and Realism, as part of a politics, not just of difference, but of post-modern resistance. It is *post-modern* resistance in the sense that while it is directly, sometimes violently engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the dominant (repressive) ways of thinking, speaking and acting in modernist political society. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand scale emancipation, or of conventional radicalism imbued with the authority of one or another sovereign presence. It is, nevertheless, a resistance that must include an opposition to the most "intolerable" features of contemporary human society, to processes that restrict peoples lives to misery and basic survival. At this level it means unremitting resistance to "torture, disappearances, and the abuse of human rights, particularly the rights to food, shelter and other subsistence needs". And, more generally, it means resistance to:

any autocratic presumption of the right to rule, whether this presumption is defended with crude force or by appeal to some natural superiority given by gender, race, class or expertise.

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144Ibid, p.130.

145The connection in Walker's thinking is clear enough in *One World, Many Worlds*, but just as he makes clear that critical social movements are not the only agencies engaging in the struggles outlined here, there is no suggestion that the only way to understand critical social movements is through a post-modernist lens; ibid, pp.157-160.

146Ibid, p.158. Nor is it concerned to "impose a common vision" of resistance upon people's struggles, nor in any institutionalised sense to "forge a united front capable of storming existing citadels of power".

147Ibid, p.159.
Just as importantly, a post-modern resistance is active at the everyday, community, neighbourhood, and inter-personal levels where it confronts those processes which close off potential for people to give meaning to their lives, and change that meaning; which, anywhere, and at any level, systematically exclude people from making decisions about who they are and what they can be. It is at this level, argued Walker, that power politics operates most insidiously and potently, and if there is one lesson to be learnt from the activities of critical social movements, at this level, it is that people, given the opportunities to understand the processes by which they are constituted (as, for example, subjects in an objective world of anarchical power politics) can become aware that they "are not always as powerless as they made to feel".\textsuperscript{148} In such circumstances, as peoples around the planet have illustrated in recent times, it becomes possible to say \textit{no}; to ask \textit{why}; to understand \textit{how}.\textsuperscript{149}

Walker is at pains throughout \textit{One World, Many Worlds} to stress that neither critical social movements, nor post-modernist perspectives on them, have any monopoly of wisdom when it comes to understanding and/or responding to the complex issues of international theory and practice. Critical social movements are nevertheless of particular importance, he suggested, because their practices deal with the world, not as "a future abstraction but as a process in which to engage wherever one is".\textsuperscript{150} This too, it seems to me, is a principle integral to any sense of what a post-modernist politics of resistance might be. This is indicated by Walker, also, in terms which emphasise the "concreteness" of post-modernist perspectives in refuting any abstract regime of theory

\textsuperscript{148}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{149}A range of resistances can flow from this, suggested Walker, people can: refuse the "absorption of military production and culture into everyday life"; they can resist the dangers of national chauvinism, the fiction of nuclear deterrence theory; the transformation of politics into the construction of Otherness; they can help prevent their social and environmental structures being destroyed in the name of efficient productive practices; they can oppose inappropriate technologies "and the exploitation of more vulnerable social groups"; and they can intervene in the processes of production, consumption and distribution, and thus, "extend processes of democratization into realms where it has never been tried: into the home, into the workplace, into processes of cultural production", ibid, p.160.

\textsuperscript{150}Ibid, p.157.
and practice in favour of "reclaiming the potential inherent in existing practices, institutions and values".\textsuperscript{151} This is an important theme in any discussion of post-modernism, because it locates a post-modernist politics of resistance, be it articulated at the dissenting margins of academic life, or as part of a more direct social movement of change, as engaged with the language, logic and power relations of modernity, not as (somehow) detached from the modern world, part of Peter Dew's "philosophy of the avant garde".\textsuperscript{152}

Walker stressed this point in the concluding passages of \textit{One World, Many Worlds}, when, reflecting upon the significance of the new politics of critical social movements, he mused that it was:

\begin{quote}
not necessary to reject the [modernist, Realist] concept of security in order to think [critically] about peace and justice, just the particular understanding of security through which the concept has been more or less turned into its opposite.\textsuperscript{153}
\end{quote}

This is a principle developed further to encompass the Realist agenda as a whole - the dominant Tradition of International Relations. Indeed, argued Walker, traditions too must be "reclaimed", though not in the Traditional way associated with International Relations. Rather, traditions must be "reclaimed" through opening up "the potential vitality of histories", not by closing down those histories or reducing them to the caricatured enscription of a particular "meaning of humanity".\textsuperscript{154}

It is not surprising, therefore, that central to the concerns of a post-modern politics of resistance within the Third Debate has been the attempt to go beyond the Tradition of simplistic and dangerous closure represented as Realism. There should be no surprise either that post-modernists are at the forefront of a proliferating Critical Social

\textsuperscript{151}Ibid, p.161.


\textsuperscript{153}Walker, \textit{One World, Many Worlds}, p.161, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{154}Ibid.
Theory literature aimed at that disciplinary ritual which, via primitive reading/writing practices, continues to represent "reality" in terms of "recurrence and repetition", structural necessity, the Anarchy Problematique, and endemic relations of Otherness. Least surprising of all, of course, has been the response of an entrenched Tradition and discipline to challenges from post-modernism. This is because, to a greater extent that other Critical Social Theory approaches, post-modernism has exposed International Relations for what it is: a textual Tradition become "reality": a particular reading of (Western) philosophy and history, become transhistorical/transcultural "fact": a way of framing "meaning" and "knowing" shaped by Newtonian physics and Cartesian rationalism, become meaning and knowing in the world of nuclear weapons, AIDS and ozone depletion. What post-modernism has exposed, more directly, is International Relations as a discursive process: a process by which identities are formed, meaning is given, and status and privilege is accorded; a process by which threats to identity and its meaning are both disciplined and punished; a process of knowledge as power.

This is what is at stake in the post-modernist challenge to the Tradition and discipline of International Relations as International Relations. This is what is at stake when those whose identities (literally and figuratively) are dependent upon the Traditional knowledge as power, seek to exclude post-modernism from serious analysis, marginalise the significance of its arguments, and/or ridicule its attempts to go beyond the boundaries of Traditional concepts and language. In short, at stake in the post-modernist politics of resistance in International Relations is that "something" that is "happening" in the modern world, that Jane Flax pointed to in Thinking Fragments. It is the acknowledgement, positively endorsed by some, lamented and resisted by others, that "a shape of life is dying", that a profound shift is taking place in contemporary social life as a generation understands that the Enlightenment dream (and the unquestioned hegemony of its modernist discourse) is over. At a more prosaic level it is the acknowledgement, in

Holsti's terms, that a "three centuries long intellectual consensus" has broken down in International Relations, leaving exposed the "assumptions and world views" upon which a Tradition, a discipline, and a particular "meaning of humanity", were constructed.\textsuperscript{156}

This final Chapter has sought to illustrate how post-modernist scholarship has responded to this "breakdown" in International Relations and to the broader "something" that is happening in the contemporary world. It has done so in terms consistent with my view that, in the exciting and dangerous spaces now opening up, post-modernism is the most exciting and least dangerous way of understanding and responding to a changing world.

CONCLUSION

This is a difficult work to conclude, in conventional terms, given that one of its explicit purposes has been to eschew any notion of final words or syntheses, and, instead, open to further questioning a "preface" agenda that for so long has remained unquestioned, effectively "concluded". A final summarising discussion is appropriate, nevertheless, and something more needs to be said about the critical perspectives highlighted in the final chapters of the thesis in particular.

The thesis began by explaining why it was important that a "preface" be written for International Relations, and why the critical approaches utilised in this work were most appropriate for such an enterprise. The task, it was suggested, was to fill in the silences between theory and practice, interpretation and action, and knowledge and power in an International Relations scholarship which has provoked lamentations about its "backwardness", and an increasing appreciation of the dangers associated with its narrow, intolerant and caricatured analysis. This led to a discussion on the "primitiveness", in general, of perspectives which "disallow reflection" on the process by which knowledge is constituted, and which dismiss alternatives as irrelevant and/or peripheral to research into a real world existing "out there", independent of and/or resistant too, the interpretive position of the observer/researcher. It led, more specifically, to a connection between this "primitive" position - designated as positivism - and the dominant perspective in International Relations - designated as Realism.


3This is R. N. Berki's theme in On Political Realism (London: J.M. Dent, 1983).

This positivist-Realist connection, it was argued, is as fundamental to International Relations in the 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, as it was from the moment systematic study of contemporary global politics began after World War Two. The unselfconsciousness associated with this situation, and the silence attending its replication in so many areas of theory and practice by otherwise intelligent scholars, was interpreted as evidence that the issues at stake on the "preface" question, went beyond the immediate historico-intellectual context (Cold War/U.S. social sciences) and necessitated a critical inquiry of a scope and magnitude previously not experienced in International Relations.

The proposition, more precisely, was that International Relations represents the site of a much larger philosophical commitment in modern Western life set upon the foundationalist paradox associated with post-Cartesian thought. This modernist commitment renders all knowledge not foundationally derived as, by definition, irrelevant, peripheral and "meaningless", and limits the capacity to think and speak outside a narrowly and rigidly defined boundary of "knowing" and "meaning". Expressed in positivist terms (and via its neo-Kantian equivalents) it has framed the way that the great modern ideological traditions have asked their questions of the world and constructed their answers. Subsequently, at the core of Anglo-American social theory there has been a dichotomised, logocentric logic set primarily upon the distinction between the sovereign figure of post-Cartesian rationalism and the world "out there".

This subject/object dichotomy has been the font of "real world" analysis ever since for orthodoxies seeking foundational knowledge in a world where omnipotence has lost its traditional (pre-modern) focal point. It has, consequently, been at the metatheoretical core of that whole framing regime that has shaped and defined International Relations (e.g."idealism"/Realism, fact/value, theory/practice, domestic/
international, self/Other etc) in a period punctuated by two World Wars and the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the boundaries of reality in International Relations have been those encompassing the enduring struggle between the sovereign individual (state) and the objective forces of anarchy (represented either in Traditional or neo-Realist terms). Intrinsic to this image of "reality" has been the figure of the sovereign (individual) Realist scholar earnestly testing (or intuiting) the world for its anarchical essence. The point, more precisely, is that the modernist way of framing International Relations has *become* International Relations, the positivist-Realist image of the world "out there" has *become* reality, and the foundationalist approach to "real" knowledge has become the *only* legitimate way of "knowing" and giving "meaning". All other approaches have, on this basis, been excluded, by definition, as "metaphysical", "speculative", "theoretical" abstractions, as inhabiting the realm of the "meta-everything".

This thesis sought to open up this closed framing regime, albeit not in the conventional way - on behalf of an alternative "realism" imbued with all the insight and truth lacking in the dominant Realism - but by exposing the discursive process by which Realism represents "reality" - the process of making a particular philosophical meaning universally "real". Here, the discussion turned to the interrogative perspectives of Critical Social Theory approaches (and post-modern perspectives in particular) to engage the silences and probe the unreflected inner sanctums of International Relations with approaches which confront the modernist image with its "other side" - that which has been left out of the process by which reality is *made* in modern Western life. It sought in this way to counter the universal, the essential and the objective with perspectives illustrating the fallibility, contingency and heterogeneity of all social life. It sought, moreover, to re-locate the sovereign subject - the transparent "knowable" agency of

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6This, significantly, has also been the way that the disciplinary "alternatives" to the dominant perspective have been framed. (e.g. conventional Marxism, pluralism, structuralism etc).

modern rationality - as an always pre-interpreted, always textually represented figure of a particular discursive practice dominant in the post-Enlightenment era. It sought, in short, to illustrate that it is the process of textual representation that is the site of "real" knowledge in modernity and of the "unwritten preface" in International Relations. In seeking, simultaneously, to problematise any sense of "real-worldism" beyond socio-cultural and linguistic practice, the thesis outlined its concern to open up a more tolerant and inclusive agenda on global society capable, perhaps, of understanding and communicating beyond the closed and dangerous parameters of the power politics Tradition.

Chapters One to Four of the thesis were concerned, accordingly, to explain the process by which a particular kind of philosophical "meaning" and a particular approach to "knowing" had become transformed, in the post-Cartesian period, into the meaning of modern social life and the only legitimate way of "knowing". Central to this transformative process, it was argued, was positivism - a synthesis of empiricist epistemology and Cartesian rationalism - which, in its many variations, most powerfully represents the modernist attempt to detach the "real", the "foundational" and the "essential" from that prejudiced by history, culture and language. The positivist approach has been acknowledged as an inadequate source of "real" knowledge from the time of its emergence in the Enlightenment (e.g. by Hume) but this has rarely hindered its influence upon those seeking the existential, political, and professional security afforded by its "correspondence rule" logic. The controversy over positivism has not gone entirely unheeded, however, and as Chapter Three indicated there have been many attempts to detach contemporary analysis from its more obvious problems and proclaim "post-positivist" status while continuing the quest for (social) scientific knowledge. This, nevertheless, has been a largely unsuccessful enterprise with major "post-positivisms" remaining committed to the modernist/positivist framing regime with all the implications this entails for analytical narrowness, intolerance and unselfconsciousness.
The thesis turned to the question of these implications in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, in particular, when it critically reassessed some of the major concepts, themes, issues, and analytical perspectives of International Relations, with Critical Social Theory concerns in mind. Chapter Five had both general and specific purposes in this context. In general terms its aim was to locate the Tradition and discipline of International Relations within the larger discursive confines of modernism. It did this in the first instance by illustrating the exemplary modernism of the way that International Relations has Traditionally framed the questions it asks of history and philosophy. This, it was suggested, has been an almost entirely ethnocentric enterprise carried out in rather crude logocentric terms. Consequently, contemporary "reality" has been framed as a singular, self-affirming, narrative of Western (primarily Western European) eternal wisdom, derived (very selectively) from the scattered textual utterings of the Greeks, Christian theology and post-Renaissance Europe. The "facts" of this narrative of universal reality have been organised, also, in exemplary modernist manner - via positivist retrospective procedures which accord them their "real" meaning. For Realists of the Traditionalist ilk, consequently, (e.g. Wight, Bull) the "facts" represent themselves in the enduring evidence of inter-state anarchy and a pattern of "recurrence and repetition", which one discovers by reading the "great (historical) texts" in the present, and corresponding their universal meaning with the world "out there". For structuralist or neo-Realists of the 1990s (e.g Waltz, Krasner) the modernist/positivist framing regime is continued, but in the "post-positivist" era more emphasis is placed on the methodological procedures by which the "facts" are organised and explicated.

The limitations and silences of this approach were further illustrated in relation to the unselfconsciousness it evoked in disciplinary self understanding. The focal point here was the most potent of Traditional dichotomies - between Realism and "idealism". The counter proposition presented in the thesis was that, contrary to orthodox perception, the great "alternatives" of the International Relations have always been intrinsically connected - as two variations on the dominant modernism/positivism theme. The first variation has
generally framed its "reality" in terms of the struggle of democratic consciousness to overcome the irrationality of the world "out there", while the second has retained precisely the same structure of understanding but has inverted the progressivist logic in favour of conservative certainty about the (anarchical) world "out there".

The more specific purpose of Chapter Five was to indicate the direct implications of this closed "theoretical" agenda for the most important arena of "practice" in post-World War Two history - the Cold War between the two superpowers and their alliance blocs. The arguments presented on this issue indicated how crucial "thinking space" and policy options were emphatically and irrevocably closed off within an International Relations community confined within the discursive practices it left unquestioned. Unable to think and speak outside a "primitive" logic of (objectified, externalised) reality it could not question the discursive process by which a range of interpretive alternatives - all articulating the "facts" - were reduced to an unambiguous, singular narrative of "fact", which gave unity and identity to Western scholars and policy practitioners, and a simple self-enclosed "meaning" to the Cold War and to the "reality" of a generation to follow.

Chapter Six explored some of the most important modernist themes on the Cold War generational agenda. It located the Modernisation debate and the debates over security and nuclear strategy as particularly significant in this regard. Indeed the narrowness and simplicity of thinking on "history", order, and international political economy has never been more evident than when Anglo-American scholars turned their attention to the "developing" societies of the Third World in the 1960s. Here, ethnocentric arrogance intersected with the certainties of techno-rationalist process and crude ideological bias to replicate, in a more precise arena, the Realist commitment to order, hierarchy and rational action, and the positivist (e.g. behaviouralist) insistence on a modelled correspondence with "reality".

These were themes integral also to the questions of Western security and the Cold War nuclear confrontation with the forces of disorder and anarchy "out there", in the "golden age" of positivist-Realism and strategic analysis in the 1960s. The result, when
all the pseudo-scientific jargon is stripped away and a critical perspective is taken to the
"givenness" of the whole enterprise, is a body of knowledge, at best, ambiguous and
inconclusive, at worst, resonant with the dangers and paradoxes of the general attempt to
transform already highly problematic Traditionalist premises into a rational science of war
and peace. Another significant implication of the positivist-Realist "golden age" is that it
emerged a generation of International Relations scholars in its training rituals and Realist
folklore, and this legacy has remained a dominant factor in the neo-Realist era.

This legacy is evident in the "politics of forgetting" within mainstream Realism
which allows the crudity and silences of the erstwhile Wizards of Armageddon to be
replicated in the false rigour of neo-Realism's updated invocation of U.S. hegemonic
rule. "Forgotten" in this regard has been the analytical inadequacy of the whole
(Traditionalist) Realist conceptual lexicon - with its notion of an anarchy "out there"
necessitating balance of power structures and alliance relations - practices which, as
Vasquez illustrated, are "part of the very behavior that leads to war".8 "Forgotten" too has
been the (at best) problematic nature of the Realist rational-actor model, which underpins
neo-Realist dictums about the universal nature of human/state behaviour, but which in its
strategic dimension cannot account, in any consistent way, for behaviour in crisis
situations and/or at the onset of war.9

Chapter Seven dealt directly with the tendency to "forget" in neo-Realism. Here,
it was argued, at the core of the International Relations discipline the implications of the
"unwritten preface" have never been starker in a period in which innovative thought and
research has never been more vital. Consequently, and in a replication of the
"primitivism" of the past, arrogant unselfconsciousness has abounded as those who
disallow, disavow and decry "reflection" have illustrated their overwhelming need for it.
Arguments, therefore, designed to provide anti-reductionist and structuralist explanations


9Ibid, pp.210-21. This is a bit of a problem, of course, for a grand theory of human/state behaviour at
the International level.

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of the world have been invoked in the crudest of reductionist and atomised terms (e.g. by Waltz); while proposals for a sophisticated Realist theory, detached from the "inappropriate" premises of Newtonian physics, have been advanced in terms derived directly and unproblematically from Newton (e.g. by Keohane). Moreover, in the age of internationalised processes of production, explosive nationalist re-awakenings, globalised drug cartels and the predicted perils of the "greenhouse effect", the new Realist mainstream has continued to represent its analytical insight in terms of the "billiard ball" logic of the 1950s and a simple utilitarian model associated with the behaviouralist grand theory of the 1960s. Large scale works on the International Political Economy, meanwhile, are projected in terms which effectively ignore and/or marginalise the impact of global capital upon the lives of the great majority of humans (e.g. by Gilpin); while suspicion persists that neo-Realism represents nothing as much as it does an interest in status quo order, Traditional patterns of domination and control (e.g. Western politico-economic rule) and more specifically, at the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy interests of the United States as world hegemon.

Chapters Eight and Nine addressed this situation from a Critical Social Theory perspective. In Chapter Eight, for example, from a Critical Theory perspective sensitive to rational-scientific incursion into social life and honed, dialectically, to counter dichotomised representations of "reality", interesting alternatives were presented to the "given" conceptual framework, and a more inclusive and genuinely political economy approach was introduced. The "poverty" of neo-Realism was here contrasted to approaches which sought to explicitly connect theory to practice in order that the implications of "practice" be always open to the critical reflection of "theory" - never

10 In Waltz’s case, see Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); on Robert Keohane, see "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in Neorealism and its Critics edited by Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). For a broader discussion of their insights and those of others who have dismissed the need for "reflection" see Chapter Seven of the thesis.


detached from it in some naked power politics vacuum. Thus, instead of seeking merely to "describe" and/or interpret and organise the facts of global hegemony (e.g. in neo-Realism) a Critical Theory perspective emphasises the creative power of the process of interpretation, description and organisation, and insists that the "creators" be always accountable for their role in that process.

In this sense, and in Bradley Klein's terms, a Critical Theory approach gives "power no place to hide"\(^{13}\) thus opening up a series of questions otherwise not asked. Questioned for example is the knowledge/power of the "detached" Realist scholar - be it the neo-Realist engaged in the falsificationist ritual, or the Traditionalist proffering "rough and ready judgement" on the "facts".\(^{14}\) Either way, from a Critical Theory perspective, Realism is perceived not as a voice of moderated intellectual debate but of complicity in and reinforcement of a global structure of great inequity and manifest injustice. The significance of this Critical Theory approach to International Relations is that having opened one dichotomised region of the "unwritten preface" (e.g. theory/practice - subject/object, knowledge/power) other previously closed and silenced spaces can be filled with the voices, orientations, capacities, insights and questions of previously marginalised or excluded perspectives. In this way the discursive conditions for critical argument might be changed to the extent that when a Robert Cox indicates, in great detail, a whole matrix of social, political and economic behaviour in the contemporary world that defies representation in (neo) Realist terms, it would receive a careful and serious investigation of its immediate and long term implications, rather than some ritualised resort to foundationalism articulated in exclusionary terms.\(^{15}\)

\(^{13}\)This is a theme introduced by Klein in *Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives* Centre on Violence and Human Survival (Occasional Paper Number 3, New York: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1987), p.5. It is used in reference to post-modernist scholarship in this context, but my position is that at its best (e.g. in Robert Cox's work) Critical Theory approaches are similarly oriented and, effectively so.

\(^{14}\)This was the way that Hedley Bull represented the Traditionalist position in "International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach", *World Politics* XVIII (April 1966), pp.361-377.

\(^{15}\)The point here is not that Cox's position would be beyond criticism in this changed discursive situation, it would, on the contrary, be subject to a more profound critical scholarship than ever before in International Relations. The point, rather, is that Cox's important contribution could not be dismissed in crude Traditional terms - as "irrelevant" to the "reality" of an international political economy whose
This was a theme developed further in Chapter Nine in a discussion of the post-modernist search for "thinking space" in the era of neo-Realist closure. Here, the Tradition and discipline of International Relations was confronted with the most sophisticated and potent Critical Social Theory perspective on modernism, foundationalism and a positivist-Realist "politics of forgetting". Applying deconstructionist techniques to International Relations, post-modernist scholars have exposed the narrowly focused and arbitrary nature of the discursive process which has transformed "a historical problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of the present".16 Post-modernist critiques of Realism's "great texts" and "heroic figures", for example, have undermined the notion of any universal or essential wisdom at the historico-intellectual core of International Relations, revealing instead a contested terrain of textuality, represented by Realists as a single, coherent Tradition of "real' knowledge. The "practical" significance of this politics of representation is clear enough given the intrinsic connection drawn by Realists and neo-Realists between the eternal wisdom of a Thucydides or a Machiavelli and the contemporary "reality" of the state system, of power, hegemonic control and the enduring anarchy "out there".17 The silences, omissions and basic inadequacies of mainstream scholarship become much easier to understand in this representational context, particularly if one reflects that there is no historical, philosophical or textual foundation to Realism, other than that constituted by a post-Cartesian assumption about the existence of foundations and a crude positivist reading regime which makes that assumption "fact".

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17The point here, of course, is that this connection is as strong (and as illusory) in the 1980s and 1990s as it was in the Traditionalist period of dominance between (approximately) 1945-1960. See the discussion on this issue in Chapter Nine of the thesis.
The limitations of Realism have been revealed in their starkest form in post-modernist critiques of two of the most powerful themes in International Relations - those of sovereignty and anarchy. Both themes are direct derivatives of a logocentric framing regime which provides unified rational meaning to a world of diversity and difference. And both, consequently, represent powerful sites of conceptual closure on the International Relations agenda. The sovereignty theme - articulated, for example, as the state, the individual, the system, the facts, the class, the (analytical/behavioural) model, the method, the Tradition and the discipline, has acted to close off a question of human discourse intrinsic to a Western philosophical tradition otherwise celebrated by International Relations. The question, simply put is this: how is it that this sovereign voice/theme/figure became sovereign? Or, more precisely, how is it that the particular questions we ask in sovereign terms are included and legitimated on the International Relations agenda, while others are not? These are questions considered unnecessary, of course, from a self-enclosed logic set in foundationalist terms. But having undermined any sense of foundationalist certainty in International Relations post-modernists have insisted that they must be asked, and that their asking provides important "thinking space" for the future.

Post-modernist questioning of the Anarchy Problematique is of particular significance in this regard. The anarchy theme - defined by the sovereign voice of "domestic" society - has been an integral feature of International Relations "reality" since Traditionalist Realists proclaimed it so on the basis of their (dichotomised) reading of the "great texts". It has continued to represent a point of unreflected foundationalism for Realists, the point at which "theory starts" for a Hedley Bull or a Martin Wight, the keystone of structuralist grand theory for a Kenneth Waltz, the "basic assumption" of the market analogy for a Stephen Krasner or a Robert Keohane.

Accordingly, the question of the Anarchy Problematique has been probed from many angles by post-modernists, aware not only of its "theoretical" inadequacy but of the dangers and power politics complicity associated with Realist silence on it. As Michael
Shapiro has illustrated it is the unspoken backdrop to the representation of Guatemala as a potential enemy of the United States (in a world of potential enemies) and as David Campbell has shown it underpins and legitimates U.S. foreign policy in general, constituted as the defence of "a particular meaning of humanity" in an anarchical world of threats to that "meaning". The work of these and other post-modernist scholars has underlined the urgency of the need for more serious and self-reflective scholarship in International Relations, particularly in relation to the question of how the American "self" is constructed via a discursive process which privileges a narrative of (illusory) unity and identity over excluded "facts" of Otherness, deprivation and struggle. Having opened up this process, however, post-modernists have begun to also articulate the "other side" of the Neitzschean genealogical approach - that which via its understanding of the process of closure celebrates the space for openness and resistance.

The opening of Cold War strategic discourse has excited post-modernist interest, in this regard, and in this "thinking space" post-modernists have begun to reconceptualise the "givens" of a generation in order that, at the very least, the resort to simple, sloganised rhetoric and power politics crudity will be less effective, more keenly challenged and less destructive of peoples lives in the future. The search for "thinking space" and the possibilities for a post-modern politics of resistance have also become an issue for debate in relation to the struggles, achievements and potentialities of critical social movements around the world. Here, in their different ways and diverse contexts peoples have begun to question not only the immediate circumstances of power politics, but the whole process by which a discourse affording identity, influence, credibility and power to *some* is represented as universally and unproblematically "real" (e.g.the national interest, the new world order, state security, common sense, the revolutionary manifesto). Here, in their re-possession of culture, history and language; in their challenges to developmental models; in their insistence on participation; in their questioning of the expert; in their dissent against gendered and class "givens"; and in their confrontations with "big brother"; peoples have illustrated their desire to think and speak for themselves, to face their worlds as creative, imaginative human beings capable both of
understanding the processes which "objectively" define them, and changing those processes.

In this sense, as One World, Many Worlds indicated, there is a post-modern dimension to critical social movement dissent, as peoples engage politically, sometimes violently, with modernity in the attempt to go beyond its taken for granted "reality", its boundaries, dominant vocabularies and its restrictive "art of the possible". In this sense, more pertinently, the post-modern dissent at the margins of International Relations is intrinsically connected to the everyday political resistance of those, at all levels and in their different ways, who refuse the imposition upon them of preposterous certainty, of ritualised hierarchy and the language and logic of closure. Consequently, in its struggles to open the closure of an International Relations community steeped in discursive illusion and strategic silence, a post-modern politics of resistance can do no better than remember Foucault's injunction against "universal intellectuals" who detach themselves from the larger struggle for freedom and openness while ostensibly committed to it. Foucault's point, of course, was that traditionally those who have spoken for the "people", the "state" (and state system), the "free world", the "marginalised", the "oppressed", have done so in universalised, essentialised and ultimately exploitative terms.18

A post-modern search for "thinking space" in International Relations must, consequently, retain its commitment to the struggles of the One World, while enabling those in Many Worlds to speak and think for themselves. Unlike the purveyors of power politics dogma it must orient its analytical efforts towards the facilitation of alternative ways of thinking speaking and behaving in order that space be available for continued resistance to the discursive practices of closure. This is no paradoxical reinvocation of the notion of "free floating intellectuals" selflessly articulating knowledge for the good of humankind. It is precisely the opposite. It is an acknowledgement that none of us can "float" above or detach ourselves from a global political existence that is for so many

18Foucault's statements on "universal" and "specific" intellectuals are scattered through his works, particularly those devoted to interviews. See his comments in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings trans and ed. by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).
unremittingly bleak and terrifying. It is to recognise that to one degree or another we, as modern peoples, are part of the problem as well as contributors to any solution.\(^{19}\) It is, more precisely, to accept that any alternative we offer, must, of necessity, be offered in ambivalent terms, in terms of a historical moment in which the narratives of triumph and achievement in Western modernity must be reconnected to the unspoken, unwritten, unreflected narratives of the dispossessed and silenced.

The search for "thinking space" by Critical Social Theorists in International Relations represents an important dimension of the larger crisis we face at this moment. Post-modernist scholarship represents the most sensitive acknowledgement of this crisis and its ambivalence, in the face of Traditional insistence upon simplistic responses to the "problem", further underlines the integrity of its critical and political commitment. This thesis has sought to make a contribution to the larger Critical Social Theory enterprise in International Relations by confronting International Relations with elements of its "unwritten preface". It has done so in the critical spirit and with the commitment of a post-modernist perspective on knowledge and human society.

\(^{19}\)At a broader level one of the issues that a Critical Social Theory perspectives must address is the continuing Western centric nature of the debate, even in its most sensitive critical dimensions. Developments in feminist literature are, perhaps, of value here, particularly in regard to the "difference" of a scholar such as Spivak and her dialogue with Western feminism. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* edited by C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1988); and Spivak, "Imperialism and Sexual Difference", *Oxford Literary Review* 8 (1986) pp. 223-240.
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