SOVIET CONCEPTIONS OF COEXISTENCE AND DETENTE:
A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY

by

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The winds must come from somewhere when they blow
There must be reasons why the leaves decay
Time will say nothing but I told you so.

If I Could Tell You
by W.H. Auden

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This thesis is my own original work.

John Fitzpatrick
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ABSTRACT

The thesis is concerned primarily with the objective credibility or realism of the official Soviet account of Peaceful Coexistence, detente and related issues. This question of credibility is regarded as methodologically prior to the question of the reliability or otherwise of Soviet doctrine as an index of Soviet intentions. But the concern of the current American debate on Soviet doctrine has been overwhelmingly with the second question, reflecting an apparent consensus among otherwise opposed groups that Soviet doctrine does not provide a realistic perspective on the problems of the contemporary great power relationship. The epistemological and substantive assumptions implied in such a consensus are considered and rejected; and it is argued that the 'schizophrenic' Soviet account, with its combination of a limited commitment to stable great power coexistence and a continuing expectation of revolutionary ferment in the Third World, does provide a generally realistic perspective on the problems in question. It is further argued that the process of adaptation to the unique features of international relations is continuing in Soviet doctrine, and that arguments which seek to demonstrate on doctrinal grounds a clear Soviet rejection of stable great power coexistence are untenable.
NOTE ON REFERENCES

The bulk of the references employ a modified Oxford style, with the full citation being given on the first occasion, and all subsequent citations, except those immediately following, giving author's surname and a recognizable shortened form of the title. Citations from Lenin are normally from the 50 volume, English-language edition of the collected works published by Lawrence and Wishart, London, designated simply as Works, with the appropriate volume number. Citations from Stalin (similarly designated) are normally from the incomplete, 13 volume English-language edition of the Works published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, or from the three volume, Russian-language supplement to this published as Sochineniya (I-3, XIV-XVI) by the Hoover Institution, Stanford. Citations from Marx and Engels, and from the later Soviet leaders, are from a variety of sources, though in the case of Brezhnev I have used the six volume, Russian-language collection Leninskik Kursom (Politizdat, Moscow) where appropriate. I have also used materials from several translation and digest services dealing with the Soviet press: Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP); Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS); Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS IIF); and BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC/SWB/SU). The Soviet journal Mirovaia Ekonomika i Meshdunarodnye Otnosheniya (the organ of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations) is designated simply as MEMO. References to International Affairs, unless otherwise specified, are to the English-language, Soviet journal of that name, published in Moscow.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is addressed to the contemporary American debate over the significance of official Soviet doctrine on Peaceful Coexistence, detente, nuclear deterrence and related issues for the interpretation of Soviet behaviour and intentions in these areas. In particular, it opposes the hostile 'reading' of Soviet doctrine advanced by the influential group of American analysts designated here as the 'hawk' group (in the sense that they ascribe hawkish intentions to the Soviet Union, not that they necessarily prescribe hawkish policies for the United States). But, more generally, it also seeks to open out the polemical confrontation between Soviet and American perspectives by locating this in a wider debate over the adequacy of contemporary Western international theory - a debate which calls in question several of the basic criteria against which Soviet doctrine is implicitly assessed in much American discussion. Indeed, this dual focus of the thesis constitutes its chief claim to originality in an otherwise well-trodden field. For the argument is that Soviet doctrine is most usefully considered not as an isolated body of ideological formulae, whose truth content is to be assessed by reference to a genuinely 'theoretical' Western standpoint, but as a contribution in its own right to the evolving body of contemporary international theory; and that the confrontation of Soviet and mainstream American assumptions raises serious questions for both sides of the debate.

The broad implications for the thesis of defining it as a study of international theory rather than as a study merely of Soviet doctrine will be explored below. However, this definition also has important specific implications for the internal structure of the argument, in respect both of the type of material presented and of the order of its presentation, and it may be best to approach the wider theoretical issues through a brief consideration of these questions of structure.

Part I (Chapter 1 only) surveys the postwar American literature on the Soviet approach to interstate coexistence and detente, relating developments in that literature to more general trends in American political thinking, on the one hand, and to the changing context of

* The term doctrine is used here in a general sense. The thesis does not follow the sharp distinction between doctrinal and other elements of Soviet discourse sometimes proposed in the American debate.
Soviet-American relations, on the other. In particular, it attempts to account for the re-emergence, in the era of formal detente, of intense debate about the significance of Soviet doctrine as an index of Soviet intentions, and for the victory in this context of the hawk image of a settled Soviet rejection, allegedly confirmed from the 'horse's mouth', of the essential prerequisites of stable great power coexistence - a victory capped by the movement of leading hawk analysts into important posts in the defence and foreign policy apparatus of the Reagan administration. The argument here is that this victory was greatly facilitated by the pervasiveness in the American debate of ethnocentric assumptions about international 'stability', which retained their power even in the decade or so before 1972 - when concern about Soviet doctrine temporarily gave way to a focus upon 'objective' constraints on Soviet behaviour - and which in turn allowed the hawk group to reconstitute the debate about doctrine around a very narrowly defined set of questions.

In this sense, Part I also attempts to reconstruct the basic American 'problematic' of coexistence and detente: the shared constellation of questions which defines for most American analysts what is, and is not, a thing-to-be-explained in this regard. In turn, the major discrepancies between this and the apparent Soviet problematic provide the point of departure for Part II (Chapters 2-4), which attempts to situate the problem of Soviet-American coexistence against a rudimentary model of contemporary world politics fashioned around two sharply-counterposed 'spheres' of social interaction - the 'states-system' and 'transitional development' - characterized respectively by exceptional continuity and exceptional change. This Part constitutes the most obvious excursion into formal 'international theory' in the thesis, and much of the detailed argument takes the form of an immanent critique of the relevant segments of Western theory, both classical and behavioural. But the positive model developed here is consciously derived from a fundamental tension in the Soviet account - what William Zimmerman once described as an 'intellectual schizophrenia' regarding the relative conceptual claims of two competing 'scenarios': 'international relations' and the 'world historical process'. It would seem to be precisely this persistence of an attenuated doctrine of world revolution alongside the insistent Soviet advocacy of Peaceful Coexistence (and the associated predilection for a strictly limited,
'compartmentalized' view of detente) which accounts for much of the suspicion with which the coexistence doctrine is viewed in the American debate. However, I will be arguing that this 'schizophrenic' Soviet perspective, by effectively grounding the political continuities of the states-system in a wider historical context of fundamental socio-economic transformation, actually provides a more realistic depiction of the contradictory parameters of Soviet-American coexistence than does the general 'equilibrium' model which evidently informs most American analyses.

Although Part II thus involves an extended, if indirect, exploration of the basic categories of Soviet doctrine, the detailed exposition and critique of that doctrine is left to Part III (Chapters 5-7). The emphasis here is on the ongoing adaptation in the official Soviet account to those crucial structural features of interstate relations not accommodated in the original Leninist doctrine of world revolution. This adaptation, moreover, is depicted as continuing within the basic categories established by the Khrushchevian 'Peaceful Coexistence synthesis', adding significantly to the 'states-system' component of the Soviet perspective, though still falling far short of the convergence upon Western/American assumptions apparently anticipated by some American analysts in the 1960s.

Three points should be noted about this discussion of Soviet doctrine. First, it is limited in extent (comprising less than half of the total thesis) and very selective in regard to the themes explored. There seems little point in adding to the already exhaustive exegesis of Soviet doctrine produced by the detente-era debate, which has itself largely reproduced the results of earlier endeavours predating the relative loss of American interest in doctrinal issues in the 1960s. However, the selection of themes here directly reflects both my reading of the American debate and my own judgement about the essential conditions of Soviet-American coexistence. Thus a full chapter has been allotted to Soviet military doctrine, because its implications stand at the very centre of the hawk argument, and because some measure of agreement on nuclear issues in particular is clearly essential to any form of stable coexistence at the great power level. By contrast, the important area of Soviet international law is touched on only incidentally here. This is in part because the already well-charted contradictions of the Soviet
legal position have not emerged as a serious new issue in the contemporary debate. But it also reflects the judgement - the grounds for which are explored in Part II - that a large measure of Soviet-American disagreement over issues such as non-intervention is virtually inevitable in the present environment of world politics, and that such disagreement need not in itself preclude a condition of stable coexistence and limited detente between the two powers.

Second, the chief concern here is to elucidate the basic categories of Soviet doctrine, and to trace the evolution of the basic Soviet line on the issues under discussion. There is little attempt to examine in detail particular doctrinal nuances (with the partial exception of the chapter on Soviet military doctrine) and still less to distinguish between 'genuine' and 'propagandistic' elements - or, to borrow a distinction popular in American strategic discourse, between 'action' and 'declaratory' doctrine. Thus the approach largely by-passes a central preoccupation of the American debate, which has been dominated by the hawk tendency to dismiss 'detentist' Soviet pronouncements as propaganda, while attributing special significance to formulations suggesting an intractable hostility to Western 'imperialism'. I do attempt to demonstrate that the hawk case rests upon the arbitrary selection of the most unchanging elements of Soviet doctrine, as opposed to the growing evidence of innovative developments of the theme of coexistence. But more generally I would argue that the influence of ethnocentric assumptions in the American debate has obscured the objective basis of the contradictions in official Soviet doctrine, and the fact that the consistency of its basic categories actually facilitates substantial flexibility in the prescriptions - ranging from detente to militant struggle - advanced in respect of particular 'concrete' political situations.

Third, the endeavour here is to present a consciously historical treatment of Soviet doctrine, which places its evolution against the evolving context of contemporary world politics and the changing Soviet role therein. This is a dimension which is, in general, very inadequately handled in the American debate - by the hawk group as much as their opponents, despite the former's own emphatic claims to be redressing the a-historical treatment of the Soviet Union in the strategic debate of the 1960s. Indeed, I would argue that the continuing a-historical
character of dominant American conceptions like deterrence provides the 
most obvious reason for the exaggerated American emphasis upon the 
distinction between genuine and propagandistic elements in Soviet 
document. This is not to ignore the obvious aspect of manipulation 
of Soviet doctrine from above, in accordance with the changing tactical 
interests of the Soviet regime. But it is to suggest that a concentration 
upon this aspect alone, which ignores the ongoing engagement with 
reality of a crude but genuine scheme of historical explanation, is 
likely to miss the most important dimension of the problem.

This last point leads back to the central theoretical thrust of 
the thesis as a whole. It is explicitly envisaged as an exercise in 
'taking Soviet doctrine seriously' - a designation which the hawk 
analysts have attempted with considerable success to reserve to their 
own endeavours. But it construes this task in quite different terms 
from those which have typically characterized the issue in the 
American debate. There the chief concern has been with the hawk 
contention that Soviet doctrine (or more precisely its most threatening 
components) is taken seriously by the Soviet leaders themselves, and 
hence provides an important guide to their intentions and possible 
behaviour. At the same time, there has been little direct attention 
to the question of whether Soviet descriptive and analytical claims 
warrant serious attention in their own right - though it is possible 
to detect an implicit consensus between the hawk group and many of 
their opponents that the Soviet world view, by virtue of its foundation 
in the Leninist theory of world revolution, is dangerously at variance 
with the complex realities of an inescapably pluralist world.7

This thesis, by contrast, focusses above all upon the issue of 
the credibility of the Soviet picture of world politics, arguing that its 
dualistic perspective offers a genuine theoretical contribution 
to our understanding of this complex area. And though it seems 
reasonable to assume that the Soviet leadership does subscribe in 
broad terms to the main elements of its doctrine as set out in this 
thesis, the issue of leadership beliefs is dealt with only incidentally 
here.

There are several important reasons for placing the issue of 
analytical credibility in the foreground of this general debate. To 
begin with, the question of whether the Soviet leadership still believes 
its own analytical claims assumes a quite different aspect if one
accepts that these claims are, in general, believable rather than unbelievable. Such a judgement is not in itself incompatible with the emphasis on the legitimating function of ideology common among those American critics who accept the continuing importance of Soviet claims about world revolution and the anti-imperialist struggle. But it does provide a more obvious and straightforward reason for assuming that the Soviet leaders take their own doctrine seriously: namely that, like any set of policy makers, they require a conceptual framework in terms of which to impose some intellectual order on the international environment, and that the framework which they claim to espouse is, in general, an objectively plausible one.

Similarly, the question of adaptation, as well as continuity, in Soviet doctrine becomes less problematic when that doctrine is regarded as providing a reasonably credible account of the world. If no 'fit' between doctrine and reality is acknowledged, it is logical to expect that the doctrine will either be retained in toto (because of its legitimating or other functions) or jettisoned in toto, when its barrenness finally becomes inescapably plain. If, however, the doctrine is believed to combine major incoherencies with genuine explanatory power (a judgement which might be made of several national 'world-views'), then one might reasonably look for an ongoing interplay of theory and practice, with continuity predominant in some periods and change predominant in others, but with the two elements closely interwoven in a complex historical dialectic.

Judgements on these issues may also do much to shape one's basic expectations about the Soviet Union as an international actor. If the regime's assertions about an unfolding world revolution are regarded as both analytically ridiculous and illustrative of a continuing deep alienation from the prevailing international order, one might expect to see myths about the objective course of history deployed as sanctions for subjective Soviet actions of a crudely imperialist kind - with the recent dramatic extension of Soviet military power offering special temptations to give the historical process a push. If, however, it is accepted that there is in some significant sense, a 'world revolutionary process' (even if its impetus is primarily anti-Western, rather than directly pro-Soviet) the question becomes more complex. A degree of 'voluntarist' Soviet activity aimed at enforcing incremental change in the international status quo might still seem
likely. But overall, one might expect the Soviets to be readier to wait on the course of history, less inclined to force square pegs into round holes, less disposed to imperil projected long term gains by the short term exploitation of raw military force. Of course, this distinction might appear irrelevant from a standpoint concerned primarily with the defence of 'American values'. But it is a crucial one for any discussion concerned with the general prospects for reasonably stable coexistence in a world of heterogeneous value systems.

Finally, I would argue that the question of credibility of Soviet doctrine is a more manageable question than those which have, in effect, dominated the American debate. It may initially seem much more modest to skirt the credibility issue - with its apparent implications of prior ontological judgements on the totality of world politics - and to confine oneself merely to setting out the most important elements of what the Soviets actually say. However, I will be attempting to show that far-reaching ontological judgements are already implied in the selection of 'important' elements of Soviet doctrine in the American debate; and since what the Soviets say must often appear blatantly contradictory in terms of these assumptions, the question of importance inevitably merges with the question of who believes what within the Soviet policy making elite. It is difficult to see how such a question could be usefully answered in regard to, say, Carter administration pronouncements on 'human rights' or Reagan administration pronouncements on 'international terrorism'. In the Soviet context, it involves an excursion into the most speculative of all areas of Kremlinology.

By contrast, judgements on the credibility of Soviet doctrine do not require a complete ontology of contemporary world politics, but merely the identification of its most basic structural parameters - the underlying skeleton to which both great powers must adapt in a world in which power is dispersed and values heterogeneous. Thus delimited, the question of coexistence is a staple question - perhaps the staple question - of political theory. If there is any validity to the enterprise of social science in general, and Western international theory in particular, useful answers to it should be possible.
For these various reasons, I believe that an important area of inquiry still remains in the heavily ploughed domain of 'taking Soviet doctrine seriously', and that the key to the enterprise lies in the recognition of that doctrine as a significant contribution to the general body of contemporary international theory. Admittedly, the Soviet theory identified here is far cruder and more impressionistic than its apologists could admit - the fruit, in Martin Wight's words, of 'a theory of domestic politics ... cut and tugged about to cover a much wider range of circumstances than it was originally designed for'. However, the argument here is that all political theory is constructed in large part by analogous processes of *ad hoc* 'bricolage' with such intellectual materials as lie to hand; and, more particularly, that theoretical perspectives on international politics must inevitably draw heavily upon the rationalization of particular domestic experiences.

The argument thus entails the rejection of any positivistic distinction between 'value-free' scientific theories and value-laden, action-oriented ideologies, identifying instead a single theoretical process of reflection upon previous practice and prescription for future practice. It is in this sense that the thesis as a whole may be characterized as a study in international theory, for the distinction between the overtly theoretical inquiry of Part II and the more polemical materials considered in the other two parts is one of degree rather than kind - between levels of abstraction within the one mode of discourse rather than between different modes of discourse.

The only type of theory/ideology distinction acknowledged here is a practical one: between relatively 'open' problematics, in which the scope of a 'theoretical practice' is relatively free of constraints generated by a corresponding 'political practice', and relatively 'closed' problematics, in which the theoretical practice is largely circumscribed in this sense. All social theory must be substantially influenced by such practical closure, which is a much more pervasive feature of mainstream American international theory than the characteristic self-definition of American 'pluralism' would suggest. Nonetheless, it is essential to emphasize the special intensity of the closure effected in the Soviet case by the political practices of Stalinism, and the enduring legacy of this for Soviet international
Thus contemporary Soviet bricolage on the coexistence issue is heavily circumscribed not just by the inevitable restrictions on the range of historical practice 'available' to theoretical reflection at a given moment, but also by specific political prohibitions on the range of concepts which may be borrowed from 'bourgeois' (and indeed other Marxist) sources; and an important goal of this thesis will be to explore the theoretical potential of the basic Soviet categories when these political inhibitions on ideological 'boundary crossing' are removed.

This rejection of any true/false, theory/ideology correlation may seem to undermine from the outset the prospect of a principled verdict on the objective credibility of Soviet doctrine. However, this hinges on the meaning attached to 'objectivity'; and the key consideration here is the above-mentioned notion of objective social structures. I will be rejecting the logical-empiricist identification of science with the piecemeal testing of discrete propositions against a realm of objective (in the sense of theory-neutral) facts, identifying it rather with the intersubjective validation of truth claims through the hermeneutic mediation of competing 'frames of meaning' (problematics, 'paradigms', 'conceptual worlds', etc.). However, since frames of meaning remain effectively 'incommensurable' if treated as irreducible wholes, the notion of such a scientific mediation process also implies the belief that their core truth claims are comparable in terms of reductionist assertions about basic structures which they explicitly or implicitly endorse. Thus, insofar as this thesis proposes its own composite 'conceptual world', the credibility of Soviet doctrine is assessed by reference to basic structural factors which, in this conceptual world, are said to have an objective (i.e. real) existence.

It is also important to recognize two different kinds of structural factor implied in a given theoretical perspective on social life: other frames of meaning, which are said to have a real existence because of their reality for the actors concerned; and material structures, which are said to have a real existence irrespective of the perceptions of the actors concerned. From the 'third party' perspective of this thesis, therefore, an understanding of Soviet and American 'strategic cultures' is seen as essential to an understanding of Soviet and American perceptions of the geopolitical, developmental or other parameters of specific international situations. But beyond the
hermeneutic task of elucidating such culturally specific determinants of action, there is also the structuralist problem of identifying those most basic parameters of action whose inherent logic any rational actor would have to recognize; and it is, once again, this conception of inherent structural logic which provides the yardstick for the evaluation of Soviet doctrine in this thesis.

The most important point about all this is that the argument proceeds upon two inter-related levels more or less simultaneously. On the one hand, it attempts to 'decodify' or 'round out' the Soviet and American problematics of great power coexistence by identifying the most important 'absences' or 'silences' in each case: those assumptions which seem crucial to the positions actually articulated on the coexistence issue, but which are not themselves directly articulated in this context, and may even be directly suppressed by the kind of ideological closure discussed above. On the other hand, it attempts to formulate an 'independent' perspective on the basic parameters of Soviet-American coexistence which is itself derived, in large part, precisely from an immanent critique of Soviet and American perspectives and the mediation of them one against the other.

In this latter endeavour, I have of course resorted to already established independent perspectives where these seemed appropriate. In particular, Part II draws heavily upon the 'classical paradigm' of the European states-system, which reflects the practical experience of some three centuries of relatively ordered relations among the major European powers, and whose central themes are inadequately represented not merely in the Soviet account but in the 'Realist'/'geopolitical' rubric under which they have characteristically appeared in the American debate.* But while the classical paradigm does indicate with relative precision the extent and the limits of agreement which might be expected between the great powers on distinctively state-to-state issues, it has little cf value to say about the international

* 'Classical' seems to me a much better term for this approach than 'traditional' (the term commonly used in the American debate), since it is useful to be able to speak also of a 'behavioural tradition', and indeed pluralist and Marxist traditions, in international theory.
implications of revolutionary change within states, nor about the general phenomenon of a multi-level inter-penetration of 'states-system' and 'world-economy' issues in the contemporary era. In addressing these questions, one must desert the relative elegance and coherence of the classical paradigm for the complications raised by pluralist development theory and the transnationalist/interdependence perspective in the American case, and by the 'Leninist' theory of imperialism and the General Crisis of Capitalism in the Soviet case.

I will be suggesting that Marxist approaches are, in general, superior to pluralist ones in this regard; and though the argument will at times rely upon 'neo-Marxist' analyses of the contemporary world-economy, the primary emphasis will be upon the adaptation of the Soviet account itself. The most important such adaptation will be the abandonment of the concept of a single, 'unfolding' world historical process for an emphasis upon the manner in which a massive transformation process (initiated in Europe by a complex of factors which need not be directly considered here) was extended over the whole globe by the rapid expansion of European economic and military power in the late 19th century - creating what might be called a 'contingent but given' framework for contemporary world politics. This adaptation, of course, could hardly be accepted by the Soviets themselves; but I would argue that the basic Soviet claims become much less vulnerable to the standard pluralist critique when expressed in this historically specific fashion. For the Soviet international perspective, though obviously influenced by a broader Russian inheritance, refers above all to this global transformation process of the past century; and it is therefore pointless to denigrate Soviet doctrine merely on the grounds that it acknowledges no prospect of open-ended, stable equilibrium, based on a condition of multiple balance, in international affairs. The international practice to which such a theory would be relevant forms no part of the Soviet historical experience, nor does it seem likely to re-emerge before the end of this century at least.

This point emerges still more clearly if the current Soviet-American polemics over the meaning and content of detente and the 'rules' of nuclear deterrence are referred to in their immediate temporal and spatial context. Temporally, the central concerns of the American debate may be situated roughly in a period stretching from the late
1960s to the early 1990s. On the one hand, true global parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., on both the nuclear and conventional level, did not arrive until the late 1960s, and it is the implications of this phenomenon, coupled with the coincidence of increased Soviet military activism in the Third World and post-Vietnam American retrenchment there, which have preoccupied the contemporary American debate. On the other, not even the strongest American critics of Soviet 'expansionism' have been prepared to concede that the Soviet Union enjoys a permanent advantage in the global contest for power and influence. Rather, the common line is that the Soviet Union remains much the weaker power in a number of crucial respects, but that, through a combination of its own ruthlessness and American indecision, the Soviet regime will be presented during the 1980s with a transient 'window of opportunity', the predictable brevity of which may actually encourage Soviet risk-taking of a hitherto unprecedented kind. Given this rough delineation of the period at issue, any prescriptions for great power co-existence which assume a kind of natural equilibrium must be regarded as seriously misleading. Rather, it seems possible to identify several crucial factors making for tension between the great powers, each roughly traceable to the end of the 1960s and likely to intensify for at least a further decade to come: the qualitative strategic arms race; the process of radical socio-economic change in the Third World, intersecting with the vestiges of the anti-colonial revolution in Southern Africa and elsewhere; and the dependence of the advanced industrial economies on Third World sources of certain raw materials, especially in the field of energy.

Spatially, the focus of the contemporary debate is primarily determined by the perceived nexus between the great power military relationship and the practice of great power intervention in Third World development. The essence of the hawk case is that the Soviets openly treat nuclear war as a viable instrument of policy; but no arguments worthy of consideration have been advanced that this alleged perception would lead the Soviet authorities to launch 'out of the blue' a nuclear attack on the United States, or even a massive nuclear or conventional attack on Western Europe, merely because they enjoyed a temporarily favourable correlation of military forces. The real concern is with the dangers of escalation resulting from great power
involvement in a lesser conflict; and though the possibility of Soviet action against China or against dissident East European states has attracted much speculation, it seems fair to say that the issue presented as the greatest source of uncertainty and danger has been that of Soviet intervention in the Third World. Moreover, the American concern has been not so much with the Third World as a whole as with certain crucial Afro-Asian regions - and above all with the challenge to American interests posed by Soviet 'geopolitical momentum' in the so-called 'arc of instability' in West Asia and Africa. Aside from its relative proximity to the Soviet Union, this region is distinguished by the prevalence within its constituent states of problems of radical socio-economic change, massive ethnic barriers to the process of 'state-making', and residual anti-colonial conflicts - and more generally by its acute strategic and resource significance to the advanced industrial powers.

All these issues will be discussed in detail in Part II. But, even in outline, they suggest that the process of 'rounding out' the problematic of great power coexistence involves situating the states-system within a wider context of massive and ongoing socio-economic transformation, and that, to be adequate to contemporary realities, a theory of relations between states must be compatible with an explicitly historical theory of the state in 'transitional' situations. Moreover, the task of formulating an adequate theory of the state is not advanced by the recent ascendancy of interdependence themes in the American debate, where the emphasis on the interpenetration of domestic and international politics has rather helped to obscure the crucial role of the state as the nexus between these spheres of interaction, and to reconstitute a disguised equilibrium model embracing each. By contrast, it seems desirable to preserve a clear conceptual distinction between these two spheres, to recognize that the relative stability of the states-system is attributable mainly to the special structural characteristics of international relations, and to acknowledge, in turn, the existence of forces making for radical change in Third World societies which are substantially independent of the actions of the great powers.

The suggestion, therefore, is that while it is no doubt politically expedient for the Soviet leadership to adopt a compartmentalized approach to the issue of great power detente, this position also constitutes a
reasonable response to the genuinely contradictory character of contemporary world politics. Moreover, I would argue that Soviet international theory/doctrine reflects these contradictions because it rests upon an experience of international relations which is more inclusive than that of the United States, in the sense that it incorporates not merely the problems of acting as a fully fledged great power, but also those of transforming the position of a weak power within a turbulent and hostile international environment.

This suggestion challenges the conventional post-1945 American wisdom that the United States, as the most powerful legatee of the European (and especially British) tradition of balance in international relations, had a special responsibility to educate the Soviet authorities, by persuasion and constraint, in the basic rules of the international system. Even at the level purely of great power relations, this notion seems debatable; for both the Russian/Soviet and the American experiences of international relations have been highly idiosyncratic, and it is arguable that, of the two, the former reflects a good deal more of the complex history of the modern states-system than the latter. As regards the second issue of Third World development, it seems clear that the Soviet historical experience is more representative of the problems confronting 'transitional' Third World states than is that of the United States.

This is certainly not to suggest that Soviet policy reflects any special altruistic concern for the weak and disadvantaged in contemporary world politics. Soviet development theory and practice remains to a large extent Stalinist, and Soviet policies towards specific Third World states have often been characterized by a brutal realpolitik. The Soviets have been powerful, and they have been weak, and Soviet doctrine itself clearly implies that, all things considered, powerful is better. However, this much granted, the central point about the unique range of Soviet experience remains valid. Given the relationship between theory and practice sketched above, it would be logical to expect the Soviet perspective to offer a valuable contribution to a debate of the problem of contemporary great power coexistence, precisely because it reflects aspects of contemporary world politics which have been notably absent from the historical experience of the opposing great power - the United States.
It remains to sketch the relationship between this approach to Soviet doctrine and the wider reappraisal of Western international theory mentioned at the outset. Epistemologically and methodologically, this thesis rejects positivistic approaches - whether of the 'historicist' Soviet variety or of the a-historical, 'systemic' variety characteristic of American behaviouralism - pursuing instead a mode of analysis which is envisaged as both hermeneutic and structuralist. It seems fair to say that these latter approaches have still received little direct acknowledgement in the mainstream American debate, where positivistic assumptions have retained much of their sway despite 'the pseudo-drama of the "post-behavioural revolution"' - above all in the narrowly defined area of strategic studies. However, if there has been relatively little rethinking of American perspectives within the dominant behavioural tradition, a more systematic development of theoretical alternatives has occurred within the classical tradition - whose defenders had earlier been content merely with the negative task of repudiating the behavioural conception of international theory - and in the broad neo-Marxist school of 'structural dependence'/'world-systems' theory, which remains outside the American mainstream but which, in the era of 'interdependence', has become increasingly difficult to ignore outright.

The classical approach has both a structuralist and hermeneutic component. On the first count, there has been a sophisticated reassertion, most notably by Hedley Bull, Kenneth Waltz and Robert W. Tucker, of the structural considerations which always lay behind the Realist perspective on the states-system. The work of these theorists - with which one might loosely associate the reformulation of a 'statist'/mercantilist' perspective on international economic issues by writers such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Gilpin - has an ambivalent aspect. They may reasonably be classified, following Ralph Pettman, as pluralists in respect of their general substantive bias. But their practical achievement is to highlight the importance of the distinction (enunciated explicitly by Bull) between international order, and world order, to expose the theoretical imprecision of those transnationalist/interdependence perspectives which imply the normality of a pluralist world order, and to demonstrate that the persistence of a pluralist international order is most readily accounted for by reference to the overall structure - both anarchical and hierarchical - of international military power.

Though American writers have figured prominently in the above developments, the upsurge of an essentially hermeneutic approach has been largely the work of classically-oriented British theorists. The most notable development here has been the fuller publication of the
highly influential work of Martin Wight; but other important contributions have been made by Bull, and by the collective authors of a work entitled *The Reason of States*, which represents perhaps the most sustained effort to date to explore the epistemological underpinnings of the classical paradigm. Several contributors to this work appear to share Wight's equation of international theory with 'the kind of rumination about human destiny to which we give the unsatisfactory name "philosophy of history"'; and, in addition to more proximate influences such as Wight himself, C.A.W. Manning and Michael Oakeshott, the volume reflects a strong interest in the potential of Hegelian philosophical perspectives for the establishment of a coherent 'framework for choice' in international affairs.

The implications of the classical approach are ambivalent here also. On the one hand, these works generally reflect a substantive bias towards pluralism; and insofar as they do invoke a wider historical perspective, that perspective is essentially an idealist one, in which bodies of ideas - such as Wight's three great 'paradigms' or 'traditions' of Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism - are represented in historical conversation with one another, but not with an identifiable material environment. Particularly significant in the context of this thesis is Wight's characterization of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism as merely the latest manifestations of an age-old Revolutionist impulse, without reference to the massive historical transformation which Marxist-derived doctrines themselves profess to interpret. On the other hand, there is no intrinsic reason why an acknowledgement of the striking persistence of certain broad frames of meaning in international affairs should preclude an acknowledgement of changes at the level of material structures: indeed, the fruitfulness of such a contrast has long been evident in the work of E.H. Carr and F.H. Hinsley, though it has received remarkably little development in classical theory in general. The real problem in Wight's case (as also with Rheinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, the doyens of American Realism) appears to be in an independent attachment to a religious or quasi-religious philosophy of history, which sanctions high-level conservative assumptions about *social life in general*, and thus obscures the real significance of that *unique repetitiveness of international relations* which is, on the surface, one of the most insistent themes of the classical approach.

The problems posed by the structural dependence/world-systems
approach are almost the exact opposite of those involved in the classical approach. Though in many respects a highly diverse group, theorists of this persuasion are unified in two respects crucial to this argument: in their sensitivity to the question of the structural/material determinants of contemporary world politics; and in their identification of the world-wide extension of modern capitalism as the central structural transformation of modern history. But they can be convicted in turn of seriously under-rating the autonomous structural dimension of the states-system, just as classical theorists largely ignore the autonomous structural dimension of the world-economy; and except for the postulate of the emergence of a 'global bourgeoisie' with substantially shared values, the structural dependence literature shows little interest in the possibilities of a hermeneutic analysis of international and world society. Thus, although this approach figures in Pettman's classification as the structuralist approach to world politics, counterposed in all essential respects to the pluralist approach (both classical and behavioural), I would argue that its full analytical potential can be realized only in association with an avowedly structuralist restatement of the core classical themes of geopolitics and the balance of power, and with an emphasis upon the crucial structuring role of broad political traditions in international affairs.

This thesis will attempt to demonstrate that a serious consideration of the analytical merits of Soviet international theory can contribute to the kind of theoretical reappraisal discussed here, and actually help to bridge the gaps identified in the various positions considered. This claim, it must be reiterated, rests on a more rudimentary conception of social theory than that advanced in both Soviet and American behavioural literature - as an inherently metaphorical attempt to gain a crude and temporary 'fix' upon an ever-changing historical process. Indeed, I will consciously be approaching the various materials considered in this thesis in the spirit of the Leavisite injunction to the aspiring literary critic to 'scrutinize the imagery'; and assuming that the more sophisticated the rhetorical defences established against the analysis of social life as structured human activity, the less the perspective in question warrants serious consideration as social theory. Thus the increasing flirtation with 'cybernetic' and 'general systems' themes in Soviet
doctrine - its most obvious area of rhetorical 'convergence' upon American approaches - will be treated here as an ideological strategy calculated to shroud the contradictions in the Soviets' own domestic and international situation, while the analytical strengths of Soviet doctrine will be located in precisely the area often regarded as pre-scientific by Western critics: in the crude, 19th century images of the great 'transition' to which contemporary Soviet analysts are still linked through the conceptual language of the Marxist-Leninist 'classics'.

Finally, it is also important to reiterate the fluidity of the relationship between social theory and polemical controversy, and the commitment here to evaluating Soviet doctrine not merely in terms of a consistent and widely 'available' rhetoric of argument, but also by reference to a delimited and historically specific constellation of problems. The further definition of these problems, primarily through their reflection in the American debate, will be the task of Chapter 1.
Notes

1 I have in mind writers such as Richard Pipes, Stephen Gibert, William Van Cleave, Joseph Douglass, Amorettta Hoeber, Francis Hoeber, Michael Deane, Foy Kohler, Leon Goure, and the various associates of the two last mentioned at the Institute for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami. Closely associated with this group, though less directly concerned with Soviet doctrine, are Paul Nitze, Eugene Rostow, T.K. Jones, W. Scott Thompson, Albert Wohlstetter, Edward Luttwak, Robert Conquest and Colin Gray.

2 Thus Pipes became the Soviet affairs specialist in the office of the National Security Adviser (with the latter post being held, after the brief tenure of Richard Allen, by William Clark, who evidently combined strong influence with the President with a remarkable personal ignorance of world affairs). Rostow became head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Jones an Assistant Secretary of Defence, and Nitze chief negotiator for the talks on arms reduction in Europe. Prior to the Reagan administration, the senior political figure with the closest affinity to the hawk position was perhaps James Schlesinger.


6 For a recent brief discussion of the theoretical implications of Soviet international law, see V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, *Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations*, Routledge, London, 1980, pp. 129-132. This work is much the most substantial general study of Soviet international theory yet published.

7 Zimmerman has recently argued that the divergences in published Soviet assessments of the 'lessons' of Vietnam 'call into question the whole idea of a "general line" - at least as specialists have thought of the term. The Soviet reading of Vietnam was sufficiently diverse to the best depicted, not as a line, but as a platform with something for everyone'. However, he is chiefly concerned to demonstrate the 'unrealistic' nature of the hawk image of militaristic and undifferentiated Soviet expansionism, and his rejection of the 'general line' concept is perhaps chiefly a reflection of the narrow way in which this has been interpreted.

8 Thus Foy Kohler argues that 'unlike the primogeniture system of the Czars or the constitutional systems of the West', the current Soviet system can be legitimated only in terms of a thoroughly 'Russified' version of Marxism that is constantly declining in ideological effectiveness. Testimony to hearings on *The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policy: Present and Future*, US House of Representatives Committee on Europe and the Middle East, Washington, 1978, p. 4.


10 On the concept of *bricolage* as the 'science of the concrete', see Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 16-33.


13 If [Stalin's] ideological writings had been those of a man with no political claim to fame', Leszek Kolakowski observes, 'they would scarcely deserve mention in a history of Marxism. But since, during his years of power, there was scarcely any other brand of Marxism than his, and since the Marxism of those days can hardly be defined except in relation to his authority, it is not only true but actually a tautology to say that for a quarter of a century he was the greatest Marxist theoretician'. *Main Currents in Marxism: Volume 3, The Breakdown*, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 16. The importance of Stalinist categories to contemporary Soviet international theory is emphasized in Kubalkova and Cruickshank, *Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations*, pp. 118-129.


Taking Gellner's distinction between Hegelian 'acorn-to-oak-tree' and Weberian 'gatekeeper' accounts of the emergence of the modern industrialized world, this thesis may be seen as an attempt to 'translate' the basic Soviet account of contemporary world politics from the former idiom into the latter. Ernest Gellner (ed) Soviet and Western Anthropology, Duckworth, 1980, pp. XIV-XV.


Cited in Bull, 'Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations', p. 114. Bull himself favours recasting 'international theory' more narrowly as 'theory of international relations', on the grounds that 'it is the Relations that are International not the Theory'. I would contest this argument on both counts. The enterprise attempted in this thesis might be defined more fully as 'international theory about world politics, with special reference to great power relations'.

See particularly the articles by Donelan, Paskins, Windsor and Savigear.

Porter, 'Martin Wight's "International Theory"' pp. 64-74; Bull, 'Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations', pp. 104-113.

F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Cambridge University Press, 1978 (first published 1963); E.H. Carr, The Twenty-Years Crisis, Macmillan, London, 1974 (first published 1939). The treatment of Carr in Anglo-American international theory is particularly revealing. He is portrayed as a founder of contemporary Realism on the basis of this early, polemical work, but his later grappling with the dialectic of continuity and change in the massive History of Soviet Russia, and explicit development of the theoretical problems thus highlighted in What is History? (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964), is all but ignored in the mainstream debate.


Pettman, State and Class, especially pp. 105-179.

Among the many works which have recently emphasized the need to come to terms with the 19th century origins of contemporary social theory, those of Ernest Gellner and Anthony Giddens have been particularly influential on the theoretical perspective developed in this thesis.
PART I

Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take
Towards the door we never opened
Into the rose garden ...

Burnt Norton

by T.S. Eliot
CHAPTER 1

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

This chapter is intended primarily as a 'survey of the literature'. It attempts to provide, first, a brief outline of the basic Soviet account of interstate coexistence and detente; and second, at much greater length, a discussion of the context and pattern of the debate over Soviet ideology and Soviet intentions which preoccupied the American 'strategic community' after the signature of the SALT I agreements and the Basic Principles of US-USSR Relations in 1972. Finally, certain persistent anomalies in the treatment of the Soviet Union in the American strategic debate are identified, and elaborated on in the further definition of the approach to be employed in this thesis.

The discussion of Soviet doctrine inevitably anticipates, in extremely truncated form, many points which will be dealt with at length in Chapters 5 - 7, and is intended merely as a basic reference point for the first two parts of the thesis. The concentration here is on themes which have attracted particular attention in the American debate. But the mode of presentation of these themes reflects the assumption, which is central to the whole thesis but has not normally been evident in the preoccupations of the American debate, that Soviet international theory should be regarded as explicitly historical in character.

The distinction between 'context' and 'pattern' in the treatment of the American debate is a somewhat arbitrary one. The two relevant sections in fact present a broadly chronological account of the development of American perspectives on the Soviet Union and its international role throughout the post-1945 period; and at one level, the earlier developments are treated as the context of the latter in the simple sense that they came before. I would also distinguish three, rather than merely two, broad phases in the entire post-1945 debate. 1945-62 may be regarded generally as a period of Cold War orthodoxy. 1962-72 was a decade of transition, in which developments in several areas, including that of social science methodology, came together in the late 1960s to produce an intellectual atmosphere supportive of detente - though its direct contribution to American detente policies was probably limited. The post-1972 period - the period of the more narrowly defined 'American debate' normally discussed in this thesis - initially seemed likely to produce a further strengthening of pro-detente sentiments. But, virtually from
the time of the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit and the conclusion of SALT I, an analytical counter-attack emerged, based on disturbing estimates of Soviet capabilities and Soviet intentions, and by the end of the decade it had effectively established itself as the new orthodoxy.

In addition, both sections attempt to place the apparent perspectives of American policy makers in a wider intellectual and material context. Thus I have attempted to relate trends at government and quasi-government level to developments in the academic and quasi-academic study of the Soviet Union. Without any sense suggesting a one-to-one correspondence of ideas between the two domains, it does seem clear that governmental attitudes were substantially influenced by - and in their turn exerted an influence upon - the analysis of academic specialists in this period. Indeed, in regard to the linked areas of 'national security' policy and policy towards the Soviet Union, there appears throughout to have been a particularly close government-academic interdependence, including the rotation of key personnel from one sector to the other. Similarly, I have emphasized the interplay between international political developments and the shifting 'correlation of forces', changing theoretical perspectives on international security issues, and assessments of the Soviet international role. 'Perceptions' have clearly been of great significance in this regard, and often they seem to have operated at several removes from the most obvious evidence. For the most part, the evaluation of Soviet behaviour has been heavily dependent upon prior assumptions about the nature of the Soviet system. Conversely, Daniel Tarschys points out that specialist analyses of the Soviet system in these years have been 'strongly influenced by the international political atmosphere', as also by conceptual shifts deriving from 'the internal development of the social sciences'.

However, having noted the broadly chronological nature of the discussion in these two sections, I also wish to suggest that pre-1972 developments provided the context for the later debate in a more specific sense: that they established the basic parameters within which the battle over American approaches to the great power détente of the 1970s was fought out. There was, I would argue, little that was new in the détente-era debate: it was marked not by the further evolution of American perspectives on the Soviet Union and its international role but by the replay of earlier themes. This was true above all of the analysts
referred to here as the 'hawk' school, who resurrected, in near identical terms, orthodoxies established in the immediate post-war years. But it was also true of the majority of their opponents, who took their stand primarily on assumptions derived from the 1962-72 period; and one reason for the success of the hawk campaign, I would argue, was that the shift in mainstream American perspectives in the 1960s itself derived less from a direct reappraisal of the Soviet role than from a general shift in American preoccupations, which temporarily downgraded the importance of Soviet policies and Soviet perceptions in the American scheme of things.

Moreover, I would argue (in broad agreement with the Soviet regime's own claims about a decisive shift in the correlation of forces) that the basic material context of Soviet-American relations during the 1970s was established at the outset of the decade - above all with the achievement of a rough 'parity' in nuclear forces and global projection capability, and the beginning of the post-Vietnam retrenchment of American power in Asia. The Soviet Union's new 'great power' assertiveness in West Asia and Africa and its readiness to exploit the opportunities provided by revolutionary turmoil in those regions should not have been especially surprising in the light of this altered power structure, nor in the light of the dualistic perspective on detente consistently advanced in Soviet statements from the 1971 Twenty-Fourth Congress onward. The invasion of Afghanistan, admittedly, was a qualitative extension of Soviet activities in this regard: but the watershed in American attitudes to the detente seems to have occurred before that invasion. Once again, the point to emphasize is the continuing influence of pre-1972 practices and concepts, which evidently established strong inhibitions on American acceptance, not so much of Soviet-American parity in the abstract, as of the political implications of parity in the turbulent environment of contemporary world politics.

Finally, there is a contrast to be drawn between Soviet and American perspectives, and between the underlying assumptions which seem to have shaped their development, over this period. The argument of this thesis is that official Soviet perspectives on the great power relationship have not remained frozen in essentially Stalinist stereotypes, but have evolved quite substantially within the basic categories of Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence synthesis. Thus I am suggesting that, in some
respects, the 'ideological' Soviet approach has actually been more conducive to the marriage of continuity and flexibility than the 'pragmatic' American one. Admittedly, differences in power position are extremely important here. Because of the exceptional power of the United States, its leaders could attempt to deal with the Soviet Union first by containment and later by accommodation, and then seriously contemplate a return to the former when disillusioned with the results of the latter. By contrast, Soviet global power grew much more slowly and remains more fragile, and this factor has established more clearly defined 'objective' limits within which Soviet policies have evolved. However, there remains an important difference in conceptual approach. The official Soviet perspective incorporates fairly clear distinctions between short and long term, between tactics and strategy, and (though this is not directly articulated) between international and world order. These distinctions are not systematically addressed on the American side, and this difference in approach, I would argue, has substantially exacerbated the problems deriving from the competing world order values of the two powers.

The Basic Soviet Account

To repeat the point made in the Introduction, the subject of concern here is not merely the Soviet doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence (with capitalist powers), but the Soviet account of interstate coexistence and detente in general. Of course, the particular focus of the thesis is on the conditions of Soviet-American coexistence, not on the state of the 'international system' as a whole. But by virtue of their size and their global 'reach', the two great powers inevitably interact in some measure in all the major arenas of their foreign policy activity; and, as is argued at length in Part II, the complex structures of contemporary world politics ensure that their interactions have an important world order, as well as international order dimension. Moreover, as the following pronouncement in the 1977 constitution indicates, Peaceful Coexistence by no means exhausts the officially proclaimed major goals of Soviet foreign policy:
The foreign policy of the USSR shall be aimed at ensuring favourable international conditions for the building of communism in the USSR, at strengthening the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of the peoples for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, and consistently implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.\(^2\)

The order in which the policy goals appear in this statement is also significant. In the Khrushchev era, Peaceful Coexistence was typically presented as the 'fundamental line' of Soviet foreign policy. In the major pronouncements of the present regime it has typically been ranked, as here, in fourth position after the objectives of building Communism in the USSR, strengthening the world socialist system, and supporting the national liberation movement. The importance of this change should not be overstated.\(^3\) Peaceful Coexistence remains unequivocally the professed Soviet posture towards the capitalist powers; and, conversely, Khrushchev at no stage repudiated the Soviet commitment to the national liberation struggle. But the present regime has nonetheless displayed a conscious determination in its major pronouncements to emphasize the inextricable linkage of co-operation and struggle in East-West relations. The tensions inherent in this concept of coexistence are very clearly exemplified in Brezhnev's formulation at the Twenty-Third Party Congress in 1966 (the first Congress since the fall of Khrushchev, and an event held in the shadow of the widening American involvement in Vietnam):

In exposing the aggressive policy of imperialism, we at the same time consistently and unswervingly pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. This means that the Soviet Union, while it regards the coexistence of states with different social systems as a form of the class struggle between capitalism and socialism, at the same time consistently advocates normal, peaceful relations with capitalist countries and the settlement of controversial issues between states by negotiation and not by war ... Naturally, there can be no peaceful coexistence when it comes to internal processes of the class and national-liberation struggle in the capitalist countries or in the colonies. The principle of peaceful coexistence is not applicable to the relations between the oppressors and the oppressed, between the colonialists and the victims of colonial oppression.\(^4\)
These tensions may be approached on three levels. One approach might treat the question as an issue in international law, and emphasize the undoubted contradiction between the state-to-state obligations which the Soviets claim to recognize under the 'state' principle of Peaceful Coexistence, and the rights to set aside such obligations which they claim under the 'class' principles of Proletarian and Socialist Internationalism. In one sense, this focus is invited by the Soviets' own predilection for the legalistic expression of international relationships, as evidenced by the inclusion of a special chapter on foreign policy in the 1977 constitution, the pressure for a statement on Peaceful Coexistence in the 1972 Basic Principles of US-USSR Relations, and the long campaign for a conference on European Security to codify the territorial status quo in Europe. Thus they can hardly object when their behaviour is judged against the sweeping criteria for state-to-state relations (in general, not just with capitalist states) set out in the constitution:

Mutual renunciation of the use or threat of force, and the principles of sovereign equality, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, co-operation between states, scrupulous fulfillment of principles emanating from universally recognized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties signed by the USSR.\[5\]

The modification of these principles in relations among the states of the Socialist Commonwealth inevitably follows, on the Soviet account, from the existence of a number of states which express by their internal political and economic structure the common interests of the working class. The basic theoretical position here was established by the 1957 Moscow Congress of 12 Communist Parties, which presented Socialist Internationalism as incorporating all the commitments to sovereign equality, non interference and the rest, plus 'close fraternal co-operation and mutual assistance'.\[6\] This, in itself, seems innocuous enough. But the declaration was, of course, issued after the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising; and in the wake of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, statements by Brezhnev and leading Soviet theorists elaborated a doctrine of collective responsibility for the defence of
socialism which effectively over-rode the legal sovereignty by of individual socialist states. This notion was expressed with particular clarity by the Soviet international lawyer S. Kovalev:

There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decisions of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of other socialist countries nor the world-wide worker's movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that every Communist party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement. The class approach to the matter cannot be discarded in the name of legalistic considerations. Whoever does so and forfeits the only correct, class-oriented criterion for evaluating legal norms, begins to measure events with the yardsticks of bourgeois law.

The Soviet authorities have never retreated from the position expressed here, though they have consistently repudiated Western talk of a 'Brezhnev doctrine' of 'limited sovereignty' for socialist states. The generality of the language, moreover, raises the question whether the notion of collective responsibility applies only to Warsaw Pact nations, or to any states which the Soviet Union chooses to regard as socialist. The question remains unsettled. But it should be noted that the Soviet regime has not to date invoked such a justification for the intervention in Afghanistan; and that, since 1972, it has consistently indicated a willingness to settle relationships with China on the basis of Peaceful Coexistence, even though Soviet commentary has never formally indicated that China is no longer regarded as a socialist country.

Soviet relations with progressive forces in the non-socialist world come under the venerable principle of Proletarian Internationalism. Since the time of Lenin, this principle has been extended to embrace the 'national liberation movement'; and there is little doubt that, in the Peaceful Coexistence era, this movement has assumed greater significance than the proletariat of the advanced capitalist countries in Soviet expectations regarding the struggle with imperialism. There are two points to be made about this. First, Soviet statements insist upon 'the sacred right of all oppressed peoples' to employ armed struggle in the cause of their liberation.
and commit the Soviet state to provide assistance to this struggle -
including military assistance where appropriate. Thus it is often
claimed that, while excluding war from East-West dealings, the Soviets
have reintroduced the idea of the 'just war' in regard to the Third
World. Second, 'national liberation' in the Soviet definition has an
economic as well as a political dimension, and no definite commitment is
acknowledged to the integrity of established regimes in post-colonial
situations. In practice, Soviet policy towards established Third World
regimes has proved very flexible: but in principle, Proletarian
Internationalism provides a potential sanction not merely for military
assistance to established 'progressive' regimes (which can also be
rationalized on traditional grounds as assistance against foreign
intervention), but also for assistance to insurgencies struggling
against 'reactionary' established governments.

The application of separate 'class' and 'state' principles to the
various major areas of international politics, if interpreted in essentially
synchronic terms, can make for a very complex 'model' of international
relations. Kubalkova and Cruickshank, who attempt to construct
such an abstract model of the Soviet account - in terms of a 'participant
determined typology of international relations' - argue that Soviet
assumptions logically require nine different types of international
relations, and claim to identify 'six or seven' such types in actual
Soviet commentary. On a more general level, the Soviet claim to apply
different principles to different types of relations has been strongly
criticized by American analysts in the past; and the argument that the
Soviets insist upon a 'compartmentalized' detente, or seek to establish
rules for Peaceful Coexistence designed to place the West under 'unilateral
constraints', remains a subordinate but still important part of the hawk
case today.

These criticisms seem to me to be overstated. There is no doubt that
the Soviet position on non-intervention and related issues involves
blatant contradictions. However, non-intervention cannot be regarded as
an undisputed master principle of international behaviour. Rather, it is
an extremely important prudential rule which is sometimes over-ridden, in
great power interaction, by other prudential considerations such as the
reciprocal acknowledgement of 'spheres of influence', or competitive
intervention in areas of uncertain power relationships. Furthermore,
there are obvious structural reasons why the degree of consensus between
the great powers on the rules of 'within-system' competition should be much lower today than in the mid 19th century - the high point of positivist international law. One could certainly argue, from a position which openly valued the positivist legal tradition, that Soviet doctrines have helped to ensure a general devaluation of the language of international legal discourse in this century: but it is essential to acknowledge the other factors - including the comparable gap between theory and practice on the part of the United States - which have also contributed to this result.

A second approach to Soviet doctrine - and one which will receive more attention in this thesis - would be concerned with the evidence, or lack of evidence, for an evolving Soviet recognition of prudential rules of great power coexistence in the contemporary international environment. At the grand level, of course, the doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence is itself a declaration of the need to direct the socialist-capitalist conflict into channels which do not involve the prospect of central war. At the lower level, however, the investigation of the question of prudential rules involves one in the 'decoding' process mentioned in the Introduction, since in many instances - such as the delineation of spheres of influence - there are powerful ideological barriers to the discussion of the issue in 'neutral' language.

The indirect character of this decoding operation makes it very difficult to cite examples of Soviet recognition of prudential rules in this brief introductory outline. But the basic argument - advanced primarily in Chapters 6 and 7 - is that the Soviet literature evinces in general a growing interest in great power management without abandoning the long-term commitment to a fundamental 'restructuring' of international relations; and that it recognizes more specifically the need for reciprocal arms race restraint in order to preserve the existing deterrent relationship, without accepting either 'stable deterrence' or the 'balance of power' as a desirable end in itself.

One problem with this second approach is a certain predilection among American analysts to associate the realistic acceptance of rules of interstate coexistence with the articulation of a basically 'systemic' approach to international politics. Thus considerable attention has been paid over the last two decades to the emergence of more 'systemic' language in Soviet quasi-academic literature, and questions about the influence of
this strand of analysis have formed one part of the debate over whether Soviet elite attitudes are becoming less ideological. This does not seem to me a very fruitful line of inquiry, since the point at issue is not the idea of 'system' as such, but the pluralistic assumptions which typically underlie this motif in American political theory. Soviet theorists could not endorse these assumptions without abandoning their entire epistemology; and as the following notably 'modernist' Soviet formulation indicates, the shift in terminology does not represent a major shift in substance:

... one must not think that [long term] trends and processes manifest themselves in the same way in every case. Actually, they develop in highly diversified conditions. Any international situation within the framework of one and the same system of international relations, even within the same period of time, or in a locally limited territory, will always be practically unique. No matter how favourably the main trends of world development may be appraised from the point of view of socialism, it is clear that their embodiment in international relations is becoming, at the same time, a direct and highly sensitive mechanism in the struggle between the two systems in the world revolutionary process. This calls for the careful analysis of every concrete international situation, taking into account nonidentical, external and internal conditions of its development.

This is certainly a highly developed instance of the 'intellectual schizophrenia' - between 'international system' and 'world historical process' - mentioned in the Introduction. But it clearly does not constitute a surrender of the basic assumption of an underlying capitalist-socialist polarization of world politics; and its most interesting feature - the emphasis upon the uniqueness of specific international situations - is replicated in many pronouncements relying more obviously upon the history-oriented doctrine of the correlation of forces. Moreover, unless one assumes a static world, there is no reason to suppose that the wholesale conversion of the Soviets from one determinist model - of revolutionary change - to another determinist model - of systemic equilibrium - would encourage more realistic judgements on their part regarding appropriate rules for contemporary great power coexistence.

The third approach, and the one most relevant to the basic theoretical concerns of this thesis, involves placing both the legalistic and prudential
aspects of Soviet doctrine bearing on coexistence within the wider Soviet account of trends in contemporary world history. I would argue that the inadequate recognition in the American debate of this dimension - and of the related question of the international order/world order dichotomy - accounts for a good deal of the incredulity, and even incomprehension, which Soviet doctrine evokes in that context.

The first point here, and one point which is repeatedly emphasized in the American debate, is that the historic struggle between capitalism and socialism is destined, on the Soviet account, to end in the world wide victory of socialism. Thus, by definition, Peaceful Coexistence between states with different social systems is a temporary historical phenomenon, relevant only to the present 'period of transition'. On the other hand, the practical significance of this premise seems very limited. The present regime has quietly retreated from Khrushchev's optimism about early Soviet victories in the contest with capitalism; and Soviet pronouncements on the ending of the transition period are now both infrequent and so vague as to place the goal well outside the range in which one might usefully speculate about 'long term' trends in world politics.

For instance, Brezhnev's 1977 speech on the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution - an occasion on which an emphasis on this theme might have been expected - did indeed conclude with an assurance that 'we are advancing towards the epoch when socialism, in some specific, historically determined form or other, will be the prevailing social system on earth ...'. But Brezhnev also stressed that 'our world today is socially heterogeneous - it is made up of states with different social systems. This is an objective fact'. And - pointing to a series of 'very real and serious problems' of a world order variety - population pressures, food and energy shortages, economic inequalities, environmental degradation - he warned that 'with every decade they will become more acute, unless a rational, collective solution is found for them through systematic international co-operation ... In this [co-operation] - if one looks deeper - lies the essence of the foreign policy course that we refer to as the policy of peaceful coexistence'.12

However, neither Soviet vagueness regarding the positive dimension of the transition to socialism nor the intermittent emphasis on broad cooperation in the discussion of Peaceful Coexistence should obscure the more substantial theoretical analysis of the negative aspect of the
transition period - the deterioration of world capitalism. Indeed, as Robert C. Tucker has observed, the doctrine of the General Crisis of Capitalism may fairly be characterized as the Soviet 'working theory of contemporary world history'. Together with that other highly characteristic feature of Soviet analysis - the notion of a moving correlation of forces in the long term struggle between capitalism and socialism - this concept has played a central role in the theoretical rationalization of Peaceful Coexistence and detente with the West. Under Khrushchev, the onset of the Third Stage of the General Crisis was retrospectively identified in the middle or late 1950s, resulting from such phenomena as the ending of the effective American nuclear monopoly, the economic and military consolidation of the socialist camp, and the breakup of the colonial empires; and a further qualitative deepening of this Third Stage was clearly associated, in Soviet statements, with the renewed detente offensive launched by the 1971 Twenty-Fourth Congress.

Two points may be made here. On the one hand, although the strategy of Peaceful Coexistence is overtly predicated on the assumption of a continuing shift in the correlation of forces in favour of socialism, this does not logically entail a commitment to Soviet 'superiority' in the military sphere. Khrushchev's late 1950s 'rocket rattling' notwithstanding, Soviet military superiority has become a serious issue only in the 1970s; and since the 1972 SALT I Agreement, the Soviet leaders have become increasingly specific in their denials that this constitutes a Soviet goal. If Soviet intentions are to be inferred from Soviet statements, it must be accepted that victory in the struggle with capitalism is supposed to emerge from broad socio-economic trends in world politics, not from the direct great power military contest.

On the other hand, one central feature of the broad coexistence strategy has always been a vigorous campaign to undermine Western power and influence in the Third World. The General Crisis of Capitalism is seen, after all, as a crisis of capitalism in its 'highest stage' of imperialism. The goal of undermining the imperialist edifice through its colonial outreaches was an integral part of Lenin's long term strategic conception; it was enthusiastically reawakened by Khrushchev to meet the conditions of the nuclear age; and the present regime, able for the first time to challenge Western military hegemony in Asia and Africa, has added a new emphasis upon the 'internationalist' dimension of Soviet
military power. But it must be noted that, although the Soviet authorities point to an intensification of the national liberation struggle in the era of détente, they have abandoned the optimism about rapid, unilinear advance towards socialism in the Third World exhibited in the Khrushchev era doctrine of 'national democracy'. Despite the proliferation of self-styled Marxist-Leninist regimes in the 1970s, the general Soviet expectation appears to be one of prolonged struggle, with ample scope for retrogressive developments, and with the Soviet working goal the essentially negative one of encouraging more and more Third World nations to pursue anti-imperialist political and economic strategies.

The over-riding issue is that Soviet analysis presents international relations merely as one particular, more or less insulated aspect of the wider world historical process. This perspective is nicely expressed by the leading Soviet 'Americanist' G.A. Arbatov in a formulation which offers a more useful insight into the substantive content of Soviet 'schizophrenia' on international issues than does the overtly systemic formulation quoted earlier:

What is involved here is essentially different spheres of political life in our time (though they may influence one another in various ways). One of them is the sphere of social development, which steadily makes headway in any international conditions - whether détente, 'cold war', or even 'hot' war ... The other is the sphere of interstate relations, in which other extremely important questions are resolved - questions of war and peace, methods of resolving controversial foreign-policy questions, and possibilities for mutually advantageous international cooperation. The drawing of a clear line between these two spheres is one of the basic premises of the Leninist foreign policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.  

This distinction, which may be related to the international order/world order distinction mentioned earlier, is of great significance for the American critique examined in the remainder of this chapter. There is clearly a major world order conflict between Soviet aspirations for the national liberation movement and the deep-seated American preference for an 'open' or 'pluralist' world order, involving the free movement of capital, persons and ideas across state boundaries. But although it seems
natural for American observers to assume a connection between such a pluralist world order and an international order based upon a plurality of sovereign states, no such connection necessarily obtains. There is no reason, from a purely international order perspective, why a state should not employ its resources of external and internal sovereignty in the promotion of a collectivist and solidarist domestic order. More specifically, there are strong reasons why certain nationalist regimes in the Third World may wish to severely curtail the scope of private economic activity within their countries. It could well be argued that, to date, the primary impact of Soviet economic and military policies upon Third World development has been to increase, rather than decrease, the diversity among new states, by allowing greater scope for the emergence of collectivist social orders than would have been possible under the continuing hegemony of powers devoted to a pluralist world order.

The Context of the American Debate

There is a considerable paradox in the pattern of American responses to the Soviet Union since 1945. Except, perhaps, for the middle and late 1960s, the Soviet Union has provided the central focus of American foreign and defence policies; and this focus has done much to define the way in which other international issues, especially in regard to the Third World, were approached. But American perceptions have shown only a limited responsiveness to the development of the Soviets' own self-account.

From the time of Stalin's death, the Soviet authorities pursued a major, though undeniably erratic campaign for a relaxation of tensions in relations with the West. From 1956 onward, Khrushchev vigorously promoted the notion of Peaceful Coexistence as the 'fundamental line' of Soviet foreign policy—a drastic revision of doctrine which might have been interpreted as a serious attempt to articulate criteria for a minimalist international order, within the context of which the long term capitalist-socialist struggle for a preferred world order could be carried on. But the basic Cold War orthodoxies, codified and entrenched by the time of the Korean War, maintained a largely unchallenged domination of the American debate until the Cuban Missile Crisis. There were, of course, several variations on the central theme of 'containment',
and an intermittent descant regarding 'liberation' and other 'forward' strategies. But the fundamental notion that the Soviet international posture demanded a resolute and far reaching policy of military containment was virtually unaffected by the Soviet change of line.

Moreover, when serious questioning of this approach did develop in the mid 1960s, it took its primary point of departure not from the Soviets' own well established doctrinal revisions, but rather from the identification of 'objective' forces related to the Soviet Union's maturation both as an industrial society and as a nuclear great power - forces allegedly impelling the Soviet leadership towards more realistic international policies for which the Peaceful Coexistence doctrine merely provided an ideological rationalization. And, conversely, when the hawk school successfully reawakened the debate over the relation between doctrine and intentions in the 1970s, they felt able to dismiss the Peaceful Coexistence component of Soviet doctrine virtually out of hand as propaganda, concentrating their main attention on the far more esoteric question of the compatibility of Soviet military doctrine with the rules of stable deterrence.

The key to the paradox, I would argue, is that the Soviet-American conflict is at bottom a world order one, and that for much of the postwar period the preponderant power of the United States made possible an essentially instrumental approach to the management of the conflict. As a result, in Walter Lafeber's words, 'the debate over the nature of the Communist threat usually lagged behind the debate over which weapons to use against that threat'. This has been true for the most part, of the American strategic debate in the 1970s just as it was in the later 1950s, the other occasion on which an apparent trend towards great power parity produced an extensive detente offensive from the Soviet side. However, there is one major difference. In the 1950s, the specialist study of the Soviet Union and Soviet foreign policy was still relatively underdeveloped, and its conclusions generally reinforced the perspectives of those who were primarily concerned with the technical problems of containing a taken-for-granted Soviet threat. Today, the specialist 'Soviet studies' literature presents a far more complex and differentiated picture; but the assumptions about Soviet policy which dominate the mainstream strategic debate still largely reflect the judgements of the 1950s, when its basic intellectual structures were still being established. In the
remainder of this section, I will attempt to indicate how these judgements were formulated, 'encapsulated' in American thinking on issues such as deterrence and limited war, and 'carried over' into the 1970s despite all the changes of the intervening period.

To begin with, it is quite inadequate to approach the long-standing Soviet-American world order conflict in terms of any facile distinction between rhetorical, 'ideological' issues, on the one hand, and power political, 'national interest' realities on the other. Such distinctions, deriving from the venerable Realist-Idealist controversy in American international theory, have become less simplistic with the passage of time. But they remain influential in American discussions of Soviet policy; and are, moreover, characteristically given a differential application in this context. The powerful tradition of 'Wilsonian' idealism, it is suggested, has consistently hampered the United States' ability to respond adequately to international aggression, while the Soviet Union is often credited with an instrumental realism of the most vulgar-Machiavellian kind, however unrealistic its announced ideological goals may be judged to be.

This approach is misleading on both counts. As Geoffrey Barraclough emphasizes, the immediate aftermath of the Russian revolution produced, on both the Soviet and American side, a clear repudiation of the special traditions of the European balance of power and of the imperialist world order which it had nurtured. Both Lenin and Wilson set forth rival doctrines of national self-determination; and both must be judged (on any other than narrowly Euro-centric criteria) to have evinced a perfectly realistic perception of the changing structures of world power and of the strategies best tailored to their respective national assets. Moreover, both the Soviet and American approaches must be regarded as deeply revolutionary in respect of the established world order, though this was substantially obscured in the American case by the fact that Wilson's self-determination campaign, and Truman's later Open Door policies, were each emmeshed in the wider process of post-war reconstruction.
The question of reconstruction after World War II - when the old international structure had finally been brought down in ruins - leads, of course, into the fiercely contested area of the origins of the Cold War. There are substantial grounds for arguing that the more immediate issues of this period need not have become so closely emmeshed with the wider world order conflict as in fact occurred. The Soviet Union was in most respects on the ideological defensive against the United States, which, in addition to the prestige of its enormous material achievements, also possessed a distinct 'leftish aura' deriving from the social and political vision of the 'New Deal'; and Stalin's conduct at this time is arguably best explained in terms of a rather brutal realpolitik in the service of the Soviet state. On the American side, as Daniel Yergin has recently emphasized, Roosevelt's concern with power realities inclined him strongly towards a settlement which would accommodate the USSR's 'legitimate' interests - including its interest in a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe - while Cordell Hull and the State Department, the chief bureaucratic standard-bearers of the Wilsonian faith in the wartime years, had much less direct influence than some revisionist historians have implied.

However, this argument should not be pushed too far. As Yergin himself puts it, Roosevelt was compelled to pursue both a 'foreign foreign policy', in his dealings with Stalin, and a 'domestic foreign policy', to accommodate the 'fervent rebirth of Wilsonianism' which gripped the United States from 1943 onward; and the concern for Soviet legitimate interests was swiftly eroded under his successors. Still more important, the fate of Eastern Europe was merely one element of a far reaching American world view, and if one looks at post-war American policies in the global context, interpretations which emphasize the commitment to an 'open' world order, secured against the challenge of political and social revolution along Communist lines, acquire more cogency. On the Soviet side, Stalin's pessimism about the national liberation movement seems to have been deeply ingrained. But tradition, ideology and the 'logic of the situation' would have drawn his successors into the attempt to exploit the anti-colonial revolution, whether or not they had previously been 'contained' in Europe. This is not to deny that a Soviet-American diplomatic accommodation, if achieved, might have turned the later global struggle in a far less militaristic direction. But an active 'world order' dispute
over the future of the Third World was virtually guaranteed by the rival historical traditions of the two great powers and the changing structures of world politics.

If this argument is accepted, the intellectual shift involved in the postwar American acceptance of a wholehearted peacetime involvement in the European 'balance' appears less radical than is usually suggested. The developments of this period are often described, in accordance with the self-interpretation of leading protagonists, in terms of a campaign on the part of the dominant section of the American foreign policy elite to imbue the nation with a realistic appreciation of the central role of military power in structuring the anarchical international environment. It is certainly true that the 'legalistic-moralistic' component of the Wilsonian tradition - the assumption that a viable framework of political order could be sustained in the international, as in the domestic domain primarily by legal means - was decisively overthrown by the Realist critique of the early postwar years. But the notion that a rival great power might 'legitimately' expect not merely to order its own society as it saw fit, but also to exert an influence upon the wider system commensurate with its power - a notion which a thorough-going Realist analysis might logically have supported - found few serious advocates at either government or academic level. Rather, the basic American world order expectations remained unchallenged, but were now married to a preoccupation with the military, rather than the legal instrument as the prime means of contesting the determined challenge to international order presumed to derive from the USSR.

There were various reasons for this. First, the foreign policy elite was in good part the prisoner of a volatile public opinion. American leaders, recalling the 'isolationist' trend after World War I, oversold the Soviet threat in their efforts to secure a national consensus behind an open-ended commitment to Europe - most notably in the 1947 Truman doctrine. On this occasion, as the 'internationalist' Republican senator Vandenberg approvingly noted, the President 'scared hell out of the American people'. But the public mood was already shifting rapidly towards complete disillusionment with Soviet policy; and within a few years the Truman administration was badly on the defensive against the McCarthyite onslaught characterized by Secretary of State Acheson as 'the attack of the primitives'.
Second, the Realist orientation of the elite itself was essentially an instrumental one. As far as the limited question of power management was concerned, Realism was readily accepted as a 'sharp instrument of criticism', and a 'convenient crib of European wisdom' for an 'American audience in need of a crash course in statecraft'. But with almost all of the other major powers economically and/or physically prostrate - mendicants for reconstruction assistance to a United States of unparalleled wealth and power - American policy makers had no reason to question their belief in the value of an open world order, to which the one great obstacle - once the residual problems of European colonialism were cleared away - seemed likely to be the ideological intransigence of the Soviet Union.

Third, there was a crucial ambiguity in the European balance of power tradition which was greatly amplified when mediated through the dominant pluralist assumptions of American political theory. The latter, after all, commonly associated domestic political coexistence with the operation of a flexible balance of power among many competing 'interest groups', buttressed by a general consensus on the 'legitimacy' of incremental, as opposed to fundamental change. The power of these conceptions can be seen in the work even of those Realists commonly regarded as the most European in orientation. Thus Henry Kissinger placed the idea of 'a legitimate general consensus' at the centre of his conception of international order. And Hans Morgenthau, accepting at face value the 'checks and balances' principle of the Federalist papers as the principle underlying the 'relative stability and peaceful conflict' of the American political system, argued that 'if the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be duplicated on the international scene, similar conditions of peace and stability will then prevail there, as they have over long periods of history and among certain nations'.

Fourth, American policy makers, with the spectre of appeasement in the 1930s constantly before them, were inevitably preoccupied by the fear that the democratic nations, through their desire for a quiet life, might again make only a belated challenge to the aggressive aims of an expansionist dictatorship. Once again, a thorough-going Realist analysis might have concentrated merely on the actual and potential structure of power, and refused to shape its policy on the assumption that certain international actors were special. But, again, this assumption received
strong support at academic as well as government level: for example, in the status quo/imperialist and legitimist/revolutionary dichotomies proposed respectively by Morgenthau and Kissinger, and in the special category of 'natural aggressors' invoked, in support of candidly anti-Soviet policy prescriptions, by Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan Possony. \( \text{\footnotesize 30} \)

Finally, there were the more specific intellectual factors which encouraged the classification of the Soviet Union as a 'natural aggressor'. The notion of 'totalitarianism' - as a quality inherent in the goals and political structures of the Soviet, as much as the Nazi state - was already being formulated; and it appeared to enhance the intellectual coherence of the links instinctively drawn between totalitarian domestic policies and 'totalitarian' (i.e. militantly expansionist) foreign policies on the basis of the 1930s experience. But still more important, in terms of the trends in the American debate in the 1970s, was the extent to which analogous notions about the impact of Russian historical development had been absorbed into the American intellectual framework through the impact of liberal (and other) emigres from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Such emigres were directly influential in the original formation of a Soviet studies community in the United States. \( \text{\footnotesize 31} \) But their most intense influence, Yergin argues, was upon the intellectual 'set' of the small, closely knit group of State Department analysts who observed the Soviet Union from Riga during the 1920s. Indeed, Yergin argues, the effect of this period of immersion in the concerns of the large emigre community at Riga, reinforced by diplomatic service in Moscow itself at the height of the Stalinist purges, was so powerful for this group that the 'Riga Axioms' - which supplanted Roosevelt's 'Yalta axioms' immediately after the war - had been codified in full, in the writings of men like George Kennan, even before World War II broke out. \( \text{\footnotesize 32} \)

Even more clearly than the formal totalitarian model, the 'Riga Axioms' identified the Soviet Union as a special threat to international stability, while at the same time flatly denying the Soviet regime's own pretensions to political and social radicalism. Their triumph within the Washington bureaucracy was sealed by Kennan's 1946 Long Telegram from the embassy in Moscow; and they were given an elegant public restatement, along with the policy prescription of 'containment', in the famous 'X' article by Kennan - now head of the new Policy Planning Staff - in the July 1947 edition of *Foreign Affairs*. Because of their original significance,
and their uncanny resemblance to themes which re-emerged in the 1970s, Kennan's arguments of this time warrant quotation at some length.

The Long Telegram insisted that Soviet attitudes and policies were shaped by 'basic inner-Russian realities', and not by an 'objective analysis of the situation beyond Russia's borders'. 'At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity', Kennan argued. But that in turn impelled Moscow to be permanently on the attack, 'in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it'. The 'X' article added to this theme an emphasis upon the internal structure of the Soviet political system, and the need for Stalin to exploit the doctrine of 'capitalist encirclement' to regiment the cowed Soviet population. Conspicuously absent from both statements was any suggestion that Soviet conduct reflected serious historical or political analysis. The revolutionary goals of Marxism-Leninism received considerable emphasis, especially in the 'X' article. But Kennan treated Marxism-Leninism as a kind of perverted theology, for which 'truth is not a constant but is actually created for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It varies from week to week, from month to month'. In keeping with this basic premise, Kennan felt no need to spell out identifiable Soviet goals, other than the long term one of world domination, which was pursued with a tactical flexibility so great as to be almost non-directional:

Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, towards a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power.

This notion of Soviet tactical flexibility, linked to the view that the survival of the Soviet system was ultimately dependent upon the possibility of limitless expansion, provided the basis for Kennan's prescription for a 'policy of firm containment designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world'.
Pointing to the enormous toll already exacted on Soviet society by industrialization, the purges and the war, Kennan drew the moral for American policy:

The United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.\(^3\)

Despite the strength of his language, Kennan seems to have envisaged 'containment' as an essentially political operation. He had been disturbed by the military overtones of the Truman Doctrine, and over the next couple of years increasingly moved to a dissident position within the Truman administration.\(^3\)\(^8\) But the trend towards a military, and increasingly global conception of 'containment' was strengthened in 1949-50 by the 'loss' of China, the successful Soviet atomic test, and the outbreak of the Korean War. A key expression of administration thinking was provided by NSC-68, an overall review of defence and foreign policies which Truman commissioned in the wake of the soviet atomic test, and whose major budgetary recommendations he pushed through Congress in the atmosphere created by the Korean War. Drafted under the general supervision of Paul Nitze (who was to become a major figure in the American defence community and a leader of the hawk school in the 1970s), NSC-68 recommended a 'bold and massive program' to rebuild the degree of superiority which would allow the West to meet 'each fresh challenge promptly and unequivocally'; and it explicitly distinguished the USSR from 'previous aspirants to hegemony' by reference to its 'fanatic new faith, antithetical to our own'. In sum, it argued:

The Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is inescapably militant because it possesses and is possessed by a world wide revolutionary movement, because it is the inheritor of Russian imperialism, and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis, conflict and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin's militancy ... It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its domination by the methods of the cold war.\(^3\)\(^9\)

The Korean War saw the final consolidation of the notion of extended military containment, linked with the insistence that the United States
would negotiate only 'from positions of strength'; and this provided  the dominant theme of American approaches to the Soviet Union throughout the next decade. Admittedly, the Eisenhower administration proved fairly flexible in its direct dealings with the Soviet Union, despite its initial promise to replace the 'negative' and 'immoral' policy of containment by a policy of 'liberation'. 'Liberation' was tacitly abandoned when the Soviets suppressed uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1953 and 1956; and in 1956 Eisenhower, who in the previous year had participated with Khrushchev in the first post war 'summit', was re-elected on a peace platform. More tangibly, he was evidently strongly concerned to limit military spending, both from a general fiscal conservatism and from a fear of the development of a 'garrison state' mentality in the United States. He therefore initiated major cuts in American conventional forces, substantially greater than those projected by Truman in the aftermath of the Korean war - rationalizing these, under the 1954 New Look defence posture, by a much greater overt reliance on nuclear weapons. And in the mid 1950s, in response to the developing Soviet capability for intercontinental nuclear strikes, the administration proposed a doctrine of 'adequacy' or 'sufficiency', which affectively accepted that American security from nuclear attack should rest on the possession of a secure second strike.

As against this however, the diplomatic conception of the anti-Communist struggle was becoming increasingly global in scope. An attack on Truman's 'Asia last' policy had been a central feature of the Republican campaign in 1952; and although the stalemate in Korea relieved fears of a major campaign of direct Communist aggression, the war also encouraged the belief in the 'monolithic' unity of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and intensified the expectation of a far reaching campaign of subversion in Asia and the Middle East. This perception, together with a sense of the rapid crumbling of European imperial control in these areas, encouraged the bout of 'pactomania' which characterised Dulles's period at the State Department. The United States' vital interests were very liberally defined. In Congressional hearings on SEATO, Dulles characterized the American position as a declaration, along the lines of the Monroe Doctrine, 'that an intrusion [in the treaty area] would be dangerous to our peace and security'; and the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine, as Lafeber observes, effectively made the same claim in respect of the Middle East.
Such pronouncements, of course, could be dismissed as largely rhetoric. But even in the closed forum of the 1955 and 1956 meetings of NATO foreign ministers, Dulles emphasized the perils of Communist economic and political penetration of the developing nations. If the Communist indirect tactics succeeded, he argued 'the world ratio as between Communist dominated peoples and free peoples' would change from 'a ratio of two-to-one in favour of freedom to a ratio of one-to-three against freedom. That would be an almost intolerable ratio given the industrialized nature of the Atlantic Community and its dependence upon broad markets and access to raw materials'.

Thus there was a basic discrepancy between the United States' military capabilities and its greatly expanded diplomatic commitments. At first, Dulles attempted to cover the gap by his manipulation of the 'massive retaliation' doctrine, which was ostensibly intended to do duty for a wide range of diplomatic objectives, in addition to the direct deterrence of Soviet offensives against NATO. But the emergence of a direct Soviet threat to the United States undermined the credibility of this position; and the Administration's defence policies came under increasingly strong attack on two related counts.

On the one hand, 'massive retaliation' was attacked by academics like Bernard Brodie and Henry Kissinger on the grounds of its inflexibility and lack of credibility as a response to anything other than a similarly massive Soviet challenge; while Generals Maxwell Taylor and Matthew Ridgeway resigned from the army in 1955 on broadly similar grounds. On the other, the prospect of a direct Soviet threat prompted growing attention to the problems of mutual deterrence, and in particular, to the distinction between 'first strike' and 'second strike'. Studies conducted by the RAND Corporation from 1954 onward produced the conclusion that American nuclear forces overseas, and increasingly nuclear forces stationed in the United States itself, would become 'inviting' targets for Soviet first strike, precisely because they were themselves organised only with a view to a first nuclear strike, in retaliation for a major conventional challenge from the Soviet Union. Deeply alarming projections about the security of the American 'deterrent' were publicised by the leaking of the top secret 'Gaither Report' in January 1957, one month after the Soviet Sputnik success, and the publication in January 1959 of Albert Wohlstetter's Foreign Affairs article on the 'Delicate Balance of Terror'.
The ending of American nuclear invulnerability was presumably one of the major reasons why a long term Peaceful Coexistence strategy could be considered on the Soviet side; and under the administration's 'adequacy' criteria, an American acceptance of this fact might have been possible. But in the context of these new controversies, linked to the 'missile gap' scare of the late 1950s, there were extremely strong inhibitions against acknowledging the 'nuclear stalemate' as one of the preconditions of stable coexistence.

These developments illustrate one crucial aspect of the emergence of a civilian 'strategic community' which has again assumed great importance in the 1970s; namely, that 'worst case scenarios' for a Soviet-American nuclear exchange, which might otherwise be confined primarily to intra-military and intra-government discussions, were established as an integral part of the general political debate over relations with the Soviet Union. A second, closely related point is that the psychologistic approach of the American civilian strategists inevitably encouraged a preoccupation with Soviet intentions - with the question of Soviet propensities towards a first nuclear strike (or the military 'superiority' which might make one possible) becoming intertwined, in practice, with that of the long term Soviet commitment to the overthrow of capitalism.

As regards the latter point, the academic Soviet studies literature of this period showed relatively little concern to place the Soviet account in its broad historical context, concentrating instead on the special inner dynamic which allegedly underlay the Soviet threat. The totalitarian model of Soviet politics received its fullest academic exposition at precisely the time when, by virtue of the post-Stalin thaw, it was most likely to obscure the very real changes occurring in the Soviet Union. For the most part, the totalitarian concept encouraged very simplistic analyses of Soviet politics; and this was particularly true of most studies of Soviet foreign policy, which, in William Welch's term, presented an 'Ultra-Hard image' of intense and unyielding opposition to the Western powers. In particular, the literature of this time relied upon three ill examined propositions which remain an important component of the hawk case today: that there was a direct connection between the Soviet regime's totalitarian inability to accept 'peaceful coexistence' with its own population and its inability to accept stable coexistence with the West; that the regime was capable of holding to its basic goal
of world hegemony through an indefinite number of reverses and zig-zags; and that it was capable of orchestrating a vast campaign of subversion and aggression by its 'proxy' forces (at this stage including China) throughout the Third World. Even the two substantial studies of Soviet doctrine in this period, by Wladyslaw Kulski and Eliot Goodman, clearly reflected the prior assumption of an infinitely expansionist Soviet foreign policy - with Goodman in particular relying upon an extremely one-sided interpretation of its allegedly 'Aesopian' terminology to substantiate his case that Soviet policy had been consistently directed towards the single goal of a centralized, Russian dominated 'World State'.

Prescriptions for American/Western conduct in this 'universal, unitary, unending war to the finish' were quite common in the literature. Even Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, in a work devoted primarily to the domestic face of totalitarianism, insisted that:

The possibility for peaceful coexistence of nations peopling this world presupposes the disappearance of the totalitarian dictatorships. Since according to their own loudly proclaimed professions, their systems must be made world-wide, those who reject the system have no alternative but to strive for its destruction.

But the most self consciously 'policy oriented' of all these studies were those produced by Strausz-Hupé and his associates at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Conceiving themselves to be prescribing for a democracy hampered by its pluralistic policy making process, and its idealistic, all or nothing approach to the use of force in international politics, the Strausz-Hupé group counselled an agressive 'Forward Strategy' which - while eschewing direct support for 'wars of national liberation' within the Communist bloc - would in other respects carry the fight to the enemy both in his own camp and in the Third World. In particular, they rejected outright any notion of detente:

The argument that the captive peoples or the Free World would benefit from a relaxation of international tensions is contradicted by incontrovertible facts ... The Soviet and satellite rulers seek relaxation of tensions - a term of Communist coinage - as a means of relaxing Western pressures. Relaxation of tensions - the flagging of Western will and vigilance - demoralizes all peoples opposed to communism.
As suggested earlier, this basic image was effectively encapsulated in the general 'strategic studies' literature of this period, whose authors tended to take over, largely unexamined, the most conservative prevailing assessments of Soviet motives and conduct as background assumptions to their own more technical, instrumental concern with appropriate American foreign and defence postures. The Strausz-Hupe works were particularly relevant in this connection. Presented as a synthesis of the result of an extensive program of debate and analysis on the part of numerous academic and bureaucratic members of the national security community, they occupied something of a middle ground between Soviet studies as such, and the influential group of 'limited war' analysts whose work is commonly regarded as having inaugurated the 'golden age' of post-war American strategic thinking.\(^5\)

These latter writers, who included figures of great importance in future American foreign and defence policy, adopted several of the basic assumptions of the Strausz-Hupe group, albeit in less extreme formulations. On the one hand, they plainly regarded the Soviet/Communist mastery of the indirect approach, linked to the emergence of an apparent nuclear stalemate, as the great problem confronting American strategy. Soviet expansionism was taken as given, with Kissinger - in perhaps the single most influential work of this school - again resorting to his basic legitimist/revolutionary dichotomy. On the other hand, these analysts also assiduously cultivated the central 'myths' about traditional American strategy handed down to them by the Realist critique of the immediate post-war years.\(^5\)\(^7\) Relying on a selective reading of the American international record in general, and of the Eisenhower years in particular, they portrayed American strategy as seriously defective in precisely that area in which the Soviets were allegedly supremely effective - in establishing a coherent, instrumental relationship between military force and political objectives in both peace and war.\(^5\)\(^8\)

Their central task they saw as the restoration of an essentially Clausewitzian perspective for the nuclear age, which would equip the United States with the doctrine and forces to enable it to conduct a protracted struggle without any single, decisive military clash. From 1956 to 1962 three variants on the limited war theme were extensively canvassed: tactical nuclear war, limited strategic nuclear war, and
limited conventional war (which later found its institutional expression in the doctrine of 'flexible response'). But the central theme in all cases was that the United States could circumvent the multi-faceted Communist threat only by creating what Kissinger called a 'spectrum of capabilities with which to resist Soviet challenges'.

Finally, surprisingly little consideration was given, in the search for Soviet intentions, to the Soviets' own military doctrine. The stereotyped and highly politicized style of the Soviet literature failed to impress most American analysts. But in fact, Raymond Garthoff and Herbert Dinerstein, the two RAND analysts who did address this literature, produced several interesting conclusions, and anticipated most of the major themes of the 1970s debate.

By tracing the 'revolution' in Soviet strategy following on the death of Stalin and the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons, they demonstrated that the doctrinal shifts involved represented a rational military response to fundamental problems of the kind which American theorists had themselves been confronting. In particular, they showed that the Soviet strategists - who, unlike their American counterparts, had been faced from the outset with the threat of an enemy 'first strike' against their vulnerable nuclear forces - were acutely aware of the enhanced significance of surprise in the nuclear era - although they did not of course approach this as an abstract problem of mutual deterrence. They also indicated that the Soviet military were inclined, logically enough, to respond to this problem of vulnerability with a doctrine of 'pre-emptive' strike in a situation of intense crisis.

The evidence in the literature surveyed by Garthoff and Dinerstein for an operational Soviet goal of military superiority was ambiguous at best - especially in the context of the substantial reductions in conventional forces undertaken by Khrushchev. And conversely, their analysis might logically have suggested to American planners that a determined American drive for nuclear superiority would increase the Soviet sense of vulnerability and inclinations towards a pre-emptive strategy, thus decreasing the prospects of a stable 'balance of terror'. Moreover the nuclear policies of the second Eisenhower administration - in particular the development of the Polaris SLBM system - had largely removed the spectre of the vulnerability of the American 'second strike' deterrent.
But the incoming President Kennedy had campaigned strongly on the 'missile gap' issue; and both he and Defence Secretary McNamara were evidently strongly impressed by the arguments of the limited war school.\(^63\)

In the context of a general worsening of the East-West climate in 1960-61, the new administration undertook an expansion of the strategic nuclear forces far in excess of that initiated in Eisenhower's last years, with the result that, by late 1961, administration spokesmen were able to insist that the United States possessed a *second strike* capability at least equal to the *first strike* capability of the Soviet Union. In 1962 McNamara formally advanced a doctrine of limited strategic nuclear war (the so called 'No Cities' or 'counterforce' doctrine). But by the end of 1963, a range of international and domestic considerations - including the fact that the Soviet Union showed no inclination to accept rules of warfare so obviously biased against it - had compelled an official retreat from counterforce in the direction of massive retaliation (though now in the ostensibly quantifiable formula of 'Assured Destruction').\(^64\)

A major expansion also occurred in American conventional forces, with the army alone temporarily exceeding one million; and the doctrine of the 'flexible response' was strongly promoted in NATO, being finally accepted as alliance policy in 1967. The new administration also turned its attention to the problem of 'sub-limited', or counterinsurgency warfare, with McNamara characterizing Khrushchev's famous January 1961 speech in support of 'wars of national liberation' as potentially 'one of the most important statements by a world leader in the decade of the sixties'.\(^65\) An early test of the new doctrines, and of the forces developed to meet them, was provided by the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, where there were already 23,000 American advisors by the time of Kennedy's death. In conclusion, then, the Kennedy administration, like most academic commentators, tended to respond to the nuclear stalemate - and the Soviet shift to a more dynamic indirect strategy in the Third World - not by an attempt to rethink the *political* categories of the Cold War, but by a further immersion in the technical problems of adapting the basic containment strategy to a more amorphous, protracted, and, above all, global East-West struggle.
The period 1962-72 produced major changes, at both academic and governmental levels, on the question of coexistence with the Soviet Union. The reasons for this are obviously very complex and inter-related, but three broad issues stand out: the changes in the United States' own strategic preoccupations; the increasingly obvious changes in the position of the Soviet Union and of 'World Communism'; and the impact of changing preoccupations in American social science upon the way in which Soviet domestic and external policies (and world politics in general) were interpreted. The first two issues are broadly similar in character and will be considered together here. But the third is concerned not so much with specific substantive changes and perceptions of those changes, as with the contribution of the specialized conceptual language of behaviouralism to the process by which already established 'images' and 'axioms' were encapsulated and carried over to future stages of the debate. The key argument will be that the advance of behavioural methodologies militated against a genuinely historical understanding of the major changes of this period; and this argument will be developed separately in the concluding part of the section.

As regards the first issue, American thinking in this decade about international relations (and inferentially about relations with the Soviet Union) appears to have been strongly influenced by the 'lessons' of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War. The Kennedy administration's conduct of the Missile Crisis was widely regarded at the time as an exemplary exercise in 'crisis management' through skilful bargaining based on the manipulation of the threat of force. But it was also argued, in retrospect, that incautious generalization from this very special confrontation had encouraged the rush into Vietnam, a quagmire which in turn severely challenged American assumptions about the efficacy of military force in achieving political objectives. The symmetry of these interconnections should perhaps not be overdrawn. But the extent of the 1960s transition from expansionist *hubris* to disillusion and retrenchment was none the less extraordinary, and its very rapidity contributed to a striking inconsistency in the criteria by which the international position of the Soviet Union was assessed in the earlier and later parts of the decade.

Thus the early years of the Vietnam involvement now appear as the high point of a de facto marriage between the 'Wilsonian' vision of a
preferred world order and the neo-Realist, 'limited war' conception of the role of force in the management of international order. Even in the Johnson administration's public pronouncements, the Vietnam involvement often assumed a clearly instrumental dimension, as 'the war to end all wars of national liberation'. In the administration's internal debate on the issue, as the editor of the New York Times edition of the *Pentagon Papers* observes, this instrumental approach is even more clearly discernible:

... Behind the foreign policy axioms about domino effect, wars of liberation and containment, the study reveals a deeper perception among the president and his advisers that the United States was now the most powerful nation in the world, and that the outcome in South Vietnam would demonstrate the will and ability of the United States to have its way in world affairs.

In this context, the Soviet Union - temporarily eclipsed in both strategic and long range conventional capabilities, and smarting under a series of major reverses in the Third World in 1965-66 - appeared for a few critical years to be largely irrelevant to the United States' preoccupations in Asia. This view was reinforced by the continuing lack of proportion in American assessments of the threat from Communist China, which was in turn exacerbated by a misreading of Chinese pronouncements on 'Peoples' War'. As late as October 1967, at a time when the USSR was acknowledged as Hanoi's leading military supplier, Secretary of State Rusk brushed aside a reporter's challenge to his emphasis on Chinese expansionism:

*Well, I believe that the Soviet Union is supporting Hanoi, at least with respect to any action which we ourselves are taking against North Vietnam. I think that is, perhaps, not so clear about what is happening in South Vietnam. But ... I pointed the finger at what I called Asian Communism because the doctrine of Communism as announced and declared in Peking has a special quality of militancy within the Communist world, quite apart from the problems it has created with many other countries. So, I would suppose that if Asian Communism, that is Hanoi-Peking, were prepared to move this Viet-Nam problem towards a peaceful settlement it could in fact move towards a peaceful settlement very quickly ...*
By the advent of the Nixon administration, of course, it was abundantly clear that the Soviet Union was very relevant indeed to developments in Indochina, and increasingly in the Afro-Asian region in general. But now Nixon, and to a lesser extent his National Security Adviser Kissinger, had become convinced that Soviet co-operation was crucial to the goal of successful American disengagement from Vietnam, as also to that of stability in the Middle East. Therefore, when the problem of Soviet power once again became a central focus of American attention, it was in the context of a conscious effort to establish 'linkages' between SALT and detente, on the one hand, and issues like Vietnam and the Middle East, on the other. The basic goal of containment was essentially reformulated in terms of a new task of establishing a strong Soviet stake in a stable 'structure' of international order, even as the United States itself increasingly withdrew from its former role as 'global gendarme'.

Roughly comparable trends could be observed in American attitudes to the strategic balance in this decade. In the late Khrushchev years, there was actually speculation from McNamara and some academic commentators that the Soviet Union - faced with an enormous American strategic lead and many competing demands on its resources - might be prepared to accept an indefinite position of strategic inferiority, rationalized by a Soviet version of a 'minimum deterrence' doctrine. There was even some initial uncertainty on this score in the early stages of the succession to the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, though by 1967-8 it had become clear that the Soviets would strongly contest American strategic superiority (and American superiority in long-range conventional power as well).70

However, by this stage the Johnson administration was also attempting to balance expenditure on strategic arms against other pressing claims on its resources: the ever growing drain of Vietnam, and the 'Great Society' programs. And McNamara, in particular, moved towards the view that - without the acceptance of sensible political limits - the Soviet-American strategic competition could become an openended 'race' with its own inbuilt 'action-reaction' dynamic. This view was clearly expressed in a speech in San Francisco on September 18, 1967:

What is essential to understand here is that the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans. Whatever be their intentions, whatever be our intentions, actions ... on either side relating to the buildup of nuclear forces ... necessarily trigger reactions
on the other side. ... it is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race.\textsuperscript{71}

In addition, the Vietnam experience was challenging earlier assumptions about the value of strategic superiority. Thermo-nuclear power, McNamara declared in the speech quoted above, had 'proven to be a limited diplomatic instrument'; and the United States' existing superiority did 'not effectively translate into political or diplomatic leverage'.\textsuperscript{72} To this judgement should be linked McNamara's concern - strong since the retreat from the counterforce doctrine in 1963 - that an operational goal of superiority would present an open cheque to military interest groups for the promotion of favoured projects.\textsuperscript{73} This concern was strongly in evidence in McNamara's attempts to defuse proposals for an American ABM system. Not only would ABM procurement, on the Defense Secretary's analysis, greatly exacerbate the cost of the strategic competition with the USSR, without adding anything to United States security. In addition, the links between the ABM proposals and those for the 'MIRVing' of the offensive forces appeared to fit the arguments of those who claimed that the United States, as the leader in the strategic competition, was actually engaged in a 'race' with itself - or more precisely between the competing potentials of its own evolving offensive and defensive systems.\textsuperscript{74}

There seems little doubt that this concern with the inner dynamics of the arms race and their implications for 'stable deterrence' was an important factor of restraint upon United States strategic policies in the middle and late 1960s. But it clearly was not - as some writers of the hawk persuasion have implied - the sole, or even the dominant influence. Even McNamara did not formally abandon the goal of superiority, and it was pushed with much greater vigour both by his immediate successor Clark Clifford and by the incoming Nixon administration, at a time in which the Soviet Union was passing the United States in crude ICBM totals. Throughout 1969, the new administration gradually evolved a new, and appropriately vague, goal of strategic 'sufficiency'; and on November 17 1969, the long delayed SALT talks finally commenced. But by this time testing of United States MIRV systems - potentially as 'destabilizing' as ABM in terms of strict Assured Destruction criteria - had virtually
been completed, and they began to be deployed on both the ICBM and SLBM forces in mid 1970.75

Whatever might be said of McNamara's last years, the Nixon administration approach to the strategic contest was from the first a pre-eminentely political one. But initially it seems to have been shaped by the belief that the Soviet authorities could be required, through linkage, to pay a substantial political price for an arms agreement which, along with generally enhanced economic co-operation under detente, would release some of the pressures on their seriously strained economy. Only as the prospect of a successful Soviet MIRV program became imminent were the SALT talks viewed increasingly as a crucial venue for the restraint of potential Soviet gains in the area of offensive weapons. Thus in the strategic field, as in the wider political domain of the Soviet-American contest, the Nixon administration policies capped a gradual evolution away from the posture of negotiation only 'from strength' towards an endeavour to use negotiations to secure Soviet restraint even as the distribution of power moved markedly against the former American preponderance.

It is significant that this process was consummated under the aegis of Nixon, a quintessential Cold Warrior in American politics, and of Kissinger, whose published assessment of both the Soviet Union and of world politics had changed remarkably little in the preceding fifteen years. This fact reflects the substantial core of truth in the insistent Soviet propaganda claims that the change in American policy was an enforced adjustment to 'objective' circumstances. But there is also little doubt - to turn to the second of the considerations outlined earlier - that a changing perception of the Soviet Union and its international role had helped to generate in the United States a general intellectual atmosphere supportive of the idea of detente.

There were two features, in particular, which encouraged a reappraisal of the Soviet international role in the decade after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The first was the evidence of a more extensive and intensive Soviet participation in the network of state-to-state relations. Though the SALT negotiations themselves did not become a serious prospect till late in the decade (not surprisingly, given the extent of Soviet inferiority before this time), the USSR participated in the Partial Test Ban Treaty
and 'hot line' agreement of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968. In addition, the Soviet attitude to the United Nations became noticeably more positive as the swelling of the Afro-Asian bloc increasingly placed the West on the defensive in the world body. More generally, with the dissolution of the greater part of the European colonial empires, the Soviet Union's campaign for influence in the Third World seemed increasingly focussed on established national governments rather than insurgent liberation movements (in regard to which it seemed likely to be outflanked by the greater militancy of Chinese Communism); while, in their promotion of the Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan in 1965, the Soviet authorities appeared to be demonstrating a classic great power concern with the stability of their general region.

The second feature was the now unmistakable dissolution of the always implausible Communist 'monolith'. The long running dispute with China finally erupted into a substantial military clash on the countries' joint border in 1969, while the Moscow World Conference of Communist parties in the same year demonstrated the substantial limits upon the Soviet ability to marshal the rest of the movement for a condemnation of the Chinese line, even in the most general terms. And if it seemed outflanked by China on the left, the Soviet regime was also plagued by 'revisionist' stirrings in Eastern Europe and on the part of the powerful Italian Communist party. Of course, the East European reform movement received a major setback with the military suppression of the 'Prague Spring' in 1968; but even this development, which was followed soon after by an intensified Soviet campaign for the normalization of relations with Western Europe, may have contributed something to the general image of an essentially conservative great power, concerned above all to hold its established positions in an increasingly complex international environment, and faced with very severe constraints in any attempt to fundamentally restructure that environment, even if its leaders should still desire to do so.

These developments were reflected in the academic Soviet studies literature. This period produced several important studies bearing wholly or partly on Soviet foreign policy, ranging from Adam Ulam's account of its evolution throughout the entire period since 1917, to the more detailed studies of late-Stalin and post-Stalin policy by Marshall
Shulman and Michael Gehlen respectively. There were also studies by Thomas Wolfe and Roman Kolkowicz of developments in Soviet military doctrine, and by Zimmerman of the new body of theoretical and analytical literature on international relations produced, primarily, by the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). Collectively, these studies elaborated certain basic themes: that the Soviet Union should generally be viewed as a 'normal' - if difficult - great power concerned to defend an extended conception of its own national interests, rather than as a revolutionary power out to overthrow the entire system; that the Soviet regime's conduct was substantially modified not just by the general experience of protracted state-to-state relations with the capitalist powers, but also by the far-reaching implications of the new military technology and the problems of managing a modern (or near-modern) industrial society; and that the indefinite elongation of the regime's perspective on world revolution, together with the elevation of Peaceful Coexistence from a tactical expedient to a general strategic 'line' of Soviet policy, reflected a qualitative shift in the basic Soviet approach to world politics.

Welch actually distinguishes two different 'images' among the major works on Soviet foreign policy in this period: the 'Neurotic Bear' image, which pictured the Soviet Union generally as cautious and defensive rather than militant and aggressive, with its major challenge to international order deriving primarily from an excessive preoccupation with security rather than from an ideologically motivated drive towards world hegemony; and the 'Mellowing Tiger' image, which did indeed credit the Soviet Union with aggressive intentions and militant methods throughout all or most of the first 35 years of its existence, but which saw its policy as secularly moderating since the early 1950s under the impact of international and/or domestic constraints such as those mentioned above. Of the two images, however, it seems clear that the latter was much the more significant in regard to the development of official American attitudes, and amongst its proponents those who addressed themselves most directly to the basic concerns of the strategic debate were Kennan and Shulman (who, in addition to his more detailed study of late-Stalin policy, produced a short book and several important articles on the 'limited adversary relationship' emerging between the U.S. and the USSR).
Perhaps the most important point about Kennan's and Shulman's arguments was that they were grounded in a moderate realpolitik which assumed no necessary connection between international posture and domestic social order. To employ Kennan's original terminology, they sought the prime cause of the 'mellowing' of Soviet foreign policy not in the internal 'breakup' of the Soviet order (which Shulman described as 'passing into some mature form of totalitarianism') but in 'the process of adaptation to the external environment, which is often overlooked in the study of Soviet policy'. A subordinate aspect of this approach was that they took a generally positive view of the early American measures to contain the Soviet Union in Europe and in East and West Asia, while at the same time arguing that the progressive shift towards a global and highly militarized approach to containment had been a mistake based upon an over-simplistic reading of Soviet revolutionary goals, and that even in the European theatre — in regard to which Kennan had begun to advocate a 'disengagement' strategy as early as 1957 — the altered alignment of military, political and social forces made containment an inadequate basis for future American policy.

Shulman specifically addressed the question of mutual nuclear deterrence, arguing that the 'dominant characteristic' of the decade 1955-65 had been 'a tendency toward the acceptance of a certain strategic stabilization as between the United States and the Soviet Union', in which each side had 'slowly begun to accept the realization that more military power does not always produce more security, that there is an interacting process at work between the adversaries, and that in an ultimate sense the security of each is interlocked with that of the other'. He also emphasized that the trend towards strategic stabilization had itself allowed more room for manoeuvre to the lesser members of the two great alliance systems, so that except in the narrowly strategic sense 'international politics is not bilateral but polygonal'; that the nationalist ferment in the Third World was a crucial new factor which neither great power could really shape to its own ends; and that technological and other factors were creating an increasingly interdependent world in which local problems could seldom be insulated from world politics and traditional geopolitical concepts were 'losing some of their significance'. Finally, while he certainly did not present the Soviet Union as a status-quo power, Shulman did argue that the 'transitional development in Soviet
foreign policy over the past decade or more has been increasingly towards traditional nation-state diplomacy', and that, within this general context 'the dominant trend ... has been towards an atmosphere of detente'.

Shulman showed less scepticism about the analytical significance of Marxism-Leninism for Soviet policy than was evident even in Kennan's immediate postwar statements, arguing that the broad theoretical analysis of capitalism/imperialism remained important even though 'the goal of world revolution' had become 'operationally irrelevant'. But he did emphasize the need to distinguish the 'operational principles' and 'realities of Soviet behaviour' from the 'shadow play of verbal symbols' couched in the 'symbolic language of Marxist proletarianism', and Zimmerman, who also took the position that the Soviet international posture was being very substantially modified by the constraints of the external environment, attempted to demonstrate in detail the emergence of a 'modernist' strand in the official Soviet literature in which such environmental realities were addressed with relative freedom from the rigid ideological categories of the Stalin years. He devoted most attention to the more obviously substantive questions: the indefinite elongation of the transition period; the doctrine of a new Third Stage of the General Crisis of Capitalism; and the growing focus on the state as the primary international actor, with the associated notion of the relative autonomy of the political sphere in the major Western societies. But he also emphasized the development of a more neutral 'systems' language for the discussion of international issues, and the emergence of the embryonic notion of a 'world political system' embracing both the capitalist and socialist camps and the Third World.

Moreover, though Zimmerman carefully avoided overtly ethnocentric judgements and warned that the Soviet acknowledgement of a world political system did not imply an acceptance of the normality of social and political equilibrium, his overall message was that the conflict between 'ideology' and 'reality' was pushing Soviet analysts towards a world view more acceptable to the West. In the earlier-mentioned schizophrenia between 'international system' and 'world historical process', the former was winning out. The specialist Soviet analysts were developing a concept of 'post-imperial' international relations which no longer fitted any simple 'two person, zero sum' schema, and a 'view of the contemporary system
which differed radically from the conspiratorial Bolshevik view and conformed instead with reality, or with Western notions of reality'.

If the expectation that Soviet international perspectives would 'converge' upon their Western/American counterparts received a rather guarded expression from Zimmerman, it was stated more forthrightly by Roman Kolkowicz in regard to the narrower question of military doctrine. In 1964, Thomas Wolfe had written of a 'crossroads' for Soviet strategy, involving a choice between the acceptance of military inferiority and a 'minimum deterrence' doctrine or a costly attempt to match the intensive and extensive expansion of American capabilities under the Kennedy administration. By the end of the decade, the Soviets had more or less closed this gap. But Kolkowicz argued that, having once caught up, 'the Soviet Union strongly desire[d] to maintain the stability of [the] deterrence relationship', and that the new situation, which for the first time saw a 'rough symmetry' in the 'capabilities, postures and doctrines' of the two powers, provided a generally favourable basis for significant arms control. One of his major concerns was with the shifting balance between 'conservatives' (including particularly the military) and 'pragmatists' (whose pronouncements on the arms race were 'strikingly similar' to the position of McNamara in his last years of office) within the Soviet establishment. Here he argued specifically that whereas the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime (like that of Khrushchev), had been constrained to conciliate the conservatives while establishing its authority, it was (like that of Khrushchev) now being impelled towards 'a gradual reversal of attitudes and priorities from the conservative to the more pragmatic approach, in order to retain a workable internal and external balance of resources and allocations'. But he also offered a double barrelled argument about the external determinants of Soviet doctrine and capabilities, which he saw as typically following those of the United States with a general five year lag:

First, modern defense technology determines to a large extent the kind of strategic doctrines and policies that will be adopted by the superpowers. Thus technology seems to have a levelling effect which subsumes political, ideological and social differences in various political systems. Second, Western strategic doctrines have had an 'educative' effect on Soviet political and military leaders, persuading them to exchange their own ideas and programs for 'capitalistic' and 'bourgeois' ones.
In addition to this question of convergence of world views, there was also that of the convergence of domestic social orders. This second notion was either not addressed or treated with some scepticism in most leading studies of Soviet foreign policy in general (though Gehlen, who also produced a functionalist analysis of the role of the CPSU in the maintenance of the Soviet system, did attribute what he saw as the foreign policy caution of the post-Stalin leadership substantially to the complex demands of managing an increasingly pluralist society). However, the notion of convergence, linked to the wider concept of 'industrial society', was very much 'in the air' at this time; and it had obvious affinities with the sort of assumptions implied in Kolkowicz' argument for the emergence of a 'pragmatist' strand in the debate over Soviet military doctrine and policy. Moreover, there were two important factors which were calculated to make this issue a 'salient' one for the American strategic community: on the one hand, the powerful belief, encapsulated in the assumptions of mainstream strategic thinking in the 1950s, that Soviet 'militarism' and 'expansionism' were directly rooted in the political structure and ideology of the Soviet state; and on the other, the ideological impact of McNamara's drive to rationalize American strategic planning by the large scale application of systems theory, especially in the form of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS). Within the narrowly technocratic horizons of the strategic debate proper, where the historical perspective of Kennan and Shulman (or even the much more instrumental concern with history exemplified by Kissinger) was the exception rather than the rule, it seems likely that convergence assumptions formed an important part of a general ethos supporting the expectation that, on nuclear matters at least, the Soviets would in time be compelled to abandon their ideological preconceptions for a rational (i.e. American) view of the international situation.

In fact, there were at least two major versions of the convergence thesis in the wider Soviet studies literature: the one that the Soviet Union and the United States would each converge upon a third model of the industrial society of the future (more or less planned, more or less pluralist, but certainly highly bureaucratized); and the other that the Soviet Union, as the less advanced society, was destined to converge upon the more advanced social order of the United States, the leading historical exemplar of that pluralistic democracy which Talcott Parsons depicted as one of the 'evolutionary universals' of societal development.
Similarly, there were two alternative models applied to the Soviet Union itself as the totalitarian model fell into disfavour in the middle and late 1960s. The first was the bureaucratic model, which could be traced back through leftist critics such as Barrington Moore and Herbert Marcuse (himself an advocate of the first convergence thesis) at least as far as Trotsky, but which was pioneered in the mainstream American debate by the work of Albert Meyer in the 1960s. The second was the interest group/pluralism model, pioneered by Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, who in 1969 co-edited a landmark volume on this theme, with contributions from specialists (such as Kolkowicz) on different aspects of the modern Soviet social order.

While the full pluralism thesis appears to have been wholly premature, a much stronger case could be made for the emergence of a 'bureaucratic' or 'institutional' or 'controlled' pluralism, deriving from the interplay between the specialized advice on context and policy execution emanating 'from below', and the broad political goals laid down 'from above' in at least general conformity with the dictates of Marxism-Leninism. Such arguments have been developed, with varying degrees of emphasis on the two sides of the equation, by several Soviet studies specialists in the 1970s. However, there were two major factors militating against a serious consideration of their implications within the narrower strategic debate. First, Marxism-Leninism was simply not regarded as a plausible foundation for rational foreign and domestic policies for a modern industrial/nuclear power. Second, the idea of bureaucracy as either an efficient instrument of policy execution or as an unbiased source of information on policy options had been severely battered by the manifest failures of the 'systems' approach to American foreign and defence policy in the 1960s; and the newly fashionable 'bureaucratic politics paradigm' strongly emphasized the constraints imposed by bureaucratic routine and inter-bureau bargaining upon the prospects for any overall rationality in policy formation. Therefore, as the pluralist thesis receded in the 1970s, and the attention of the American strategic community was increasingly focussed on the practical problem of the significance of the formidable Soviet military arsenal, the debate tended to polarize around arguments attributing it to a more or less aimless process of bureaucratic drift, on the one hand, and to the totalitarian rationality of a Soviet regime still dedicated to the goal.
of world hegemony, on the other, with the prospects for political success weighted heavily on the latter side.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the above trends by no means represent the full scope of the developments in Soviet studies in the 1960s, to say nothing of the 1970s. Because of the nature of its subject, this field has always retained a strong nucleus of historically-oriented scholars (especially outside the United States, where the general impetus towards a 'behavioural' science of politics was always less overwhelming); and it has produced many works which recognized the historical specificity of the Soviet Union without necessarily portraying it as a totalitarian anomaly among modern industrial societies. Of particular importance here has been the re-evaluation of the 1920s, most notably by E.H.Carr (whose massive 14 volume *History of Soviet Russia* had reached the most crucial questions of economic decisionmaking by the middle and late 1960s), but also by Alec Nove, Alexander Erlich, Moshe Lewin, Robert C. Tucker, and Stephen Cohen. These studies had three important implications for the topic of this thesis. First, they seriously undermined the view that Stalinism represented the 'inevitable' outcome of the attempt to bend a recalcitrant social reality to Marxist/Leninist specifications. Second, they indicated that the conceptual changes enshrined in the Khrushchevian Peaceful Coexistence synthesis represented not merely an enforced adjustment to the realities of containment, nuclear deterrence, and the like, but also the recovery of a more flexible Leninist perspective abandoned during the Stalin era. Third, they suggested that the Soviet historical experience might provide an insight into the problems of developing countries superior in several respects to that provided by theories of 'modernization' derived from the more privileged Anglo-American experience. Moreover, this last point (which received an early general acknowledgement from Tucker and Meyer) was developed in detail from the mid 1960s onwards by scholars who addressed themselves to the growing volume of specialist Soviet literature on the Third World, showing that, while the Soviets certainly presented their own historical experience as an important reference point for developing countries, they were far from seeking to impose a simple Stalinist development model upon them.

All these issues (which are considered at length in Chapters 5 and 6) have been further explored in the last decade, while scholars such as
Jerry Hough have devoted much attention to reformulating the 1960s models of post-Stalin change in less ethnocentric and empirically more satisfactory terms. But it seems fair to say that that growing complexity of the wider Soviet studies debate (in the United States and elsewhere) has had very little impact upon the way in which Soviet-related issues have been discussed in the narrower context of the American strategic debate. Indeed, the impressively successful hawk campaign of the 1970s to re-establish an essentially totalitarian model of Soviet policy-making was conducted almost as if there had been no significant developments in Soviet studies since the 1950s - or even the late 1940s. To account for this development, I would argue, one must look to the earlier-mentioned process of encapsulation, and particularly to the process by which the search for a comparative/behavioural approach to Soviet politics helped to carry over certain basic images from the early to the later period. Moreover, this is a question with implications for the related questions of American perspectives on the Third World and on international relations in general; and it will be considered here as a final aspect of the context of the 1970s debate.

The study of the Soviet Union, of the Third World, and of international relations constituted three linked areas of academic inquiry of obvious significance for the general world order preoccupations of American policymakers after 1945; and it seems fruitful to think of all three as examples of 'area' studies which became fully subject to the impulse towards 'comparative' analysis only in the 1960s, at the high tide of the 'behavioural revolution' in American political science. In one sense, admittedly, Soviet studies and international relations had always been comparative. The totalitarian approach entailed an explicit comparison of the Soviet Union with the Fascist regimes of the 1930s, and an implicit contrast with the pluralist model of the Western democracies. Similarly, Realist international theories were comparative in the sense that they sought to demonstrate that international politics was not like domestic politics. However, the advance of the more formal comparative approach was delayed
in both fields by the strength of analytical traditions (partly European-based) which emphasized the special character of the object of study, while Third World studies as a general enterprise did not really get under way until the great burst of decolonization in the 1950s. In all three areas, therefore, the comparative movement was dominated by a behavioural approach which had already been exhaustively articulated in regard to the domestic American social order; and, in several respects, the result was not to widen the scope of historical and cultural comparison but to further entrench ethnocentric assumptions about social and political 'normality', which were rendered less open to criticism precisely because they were now less visible.

To appreciate this paradox it is necessary to consider both the methodological and substantive assumptions behind the behavioural approach, though these were closely linked in practice. At the former level it seems fair to speak of a mainstream consensus, at least until the late 1960s, on a positivistic approach to social and political theory - an approach based upon the marriage, or rather illicit cohabitation, of the logical-empiricist/hypothetico-deductive philosophy of explanation with the synchronic analysis of social systems. There were, of course, substantial differences in the formal claims of structural-functionalism and the various forms of 'systems' theory; but the validity of 'system' as a basic tool of analysis was hardly questioned. 'The concept of system is so fundamental to science', Talcott Parsons insisted, 'that, at levels of high theoretical generality, there can be no science without it. If there are no uniformities involved in the interdependence of components there is no scientific theory'.

This positivistic consensus, moreover, was just as important for what it excluded as for what it endorsed. The hermeneutic approach survived primarily in a 'thoroughly purged' conception of verstehen as an auxiliary process useful only for the generation of hypotheses which must then be tested in accordance with rigorous deductive criteria. And the Marxist analysis of class struggle and modes of production could now be firmly dismissed as 'ideological' (in the sense of non-scientific), a view buttressed by the prestige of Karl Popper's critique of 'historicism' (from an explicitly hypothetico-deductive position) for its alleged reliance upon unfalsifiable assumptions about social 'essences'. In related fashion, the formal definition of the systems approach reflected
Weber's criticism of the 'pernicious' Marxist tendency to invest modes of production with material reality, and the notions of 'ideal type' and selection through 'value relevance' which he emphasized instead. 112 Thus David Easton, perhaps the leading theorist of political systems, insisted that all systems (short of the totality of the universe) were constructs of the mind, and that the relevant distinction was not between 'natural' and 'constructive' systems, but between 'interesting' and 'trivial' systems within the latter category. 113

However, there were basic problems with this broad systems approach (to say nothing of the logical-empiricist account of explanation, even in Popper's falsificationist reformulation). Once one rejects the validity of synchronic analysis for social phenomena (and I will be arguing in the next chapter that it is untenable), the notion of a functioning social system can be seen as one more grand 'historicist' generalization, with its own implied teleology of continuity or 'stability'.114 More specifically, a synchronic perspective provides no adequate framework for the systematic discussion of structural contradiction, uneven development and the coexistence of diverse social forms within a given social order, since comparison of the system with itself must be handled in terms of a series of synchronic 'snapshots' of its progress from 'tradition' to 'modernity', 'totalitarianism' to 'industrial society', or whatever.115 Similarly, the 'ideal type' mode of analysis becomes highly questionable when it is employed, as it was employed in much comparative analysis, for the construction of typologies within which to locate a variety of distinct social systems. The most plausible rationale of the ideal type is that, precisely because it does not have to conform to any concrete reality, it can provide a rigorously defined criterion against which specific aspects of concrete social orders can be discriminately compared. But where two or more ideal types are used to classify a range of social systems, the temptation to appeal to privileged knowledge of social 'essences' is given an unusually free rein. This procedure does nothing to obviate the necessity to make impressionistic judgements about concrete social systems, which must still be summed up en bloc as more or less totalitarian or pluralist, traditional or modern, and shifted en bloc to the appropriate end of the ideal type spectrum. But it does provide a rationale for substituting rigour in the definition of the ideal type for sensitivity to the empirical complexity of concrete
social forms, and on such ideologically charged questions as the classification of the Soviet order the potential for analytical distortion is further enhanced.\textsuperscript{116}

As regards more directly substantive questions, it is possible to distinguish three important intellectual influences which predisposed American comparative theorists to emphasize the normality of evolutionary, relatively harmonious social change emanating from below. First, there was the 'unfolding' model of change inherited from 19th century social theory. As Krishan Kumar points out, all the great 19th century social theorists, including Marx, were deeply influenced by a particular, and in many respects unrepresentative, 'image of industrialism' derived from the experience of early Victorian England; and the non-Marxist strand of this tradition, shorn of the notion that massive discontinuities and revolutionary leaps might be a normal part of the unfolding process, was absorbed into the synthesis of 20th century American functionalism, above all through the work of Parsons.\textsuperscript{117} Parsons' particular achievement - aside from highlighting the conservative concern with normative solutions to the problem of social order - was to translate the 19th century concern with a specific historical transformation (though one characteristically endowed with world-historical significance) into a set of abstract analytical categories of ostensibly universal import. But in practice, Kumar suggests, no serious revision was ever made to the classic evolutionary conception:

All that happened was that the topic of social change was put in cold storage for a time. In fact the prevailing functionalist approach of the first half of this century was itself heavily permeated by evolutionist assumptions ... only now in relation to persistence rather than to change ... When stimulated by the rise of the new post-colonial states after 1945, the theory of social change (in the guise of the 'sociology of development') picked up again the evolutionary form of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{118}

Second, there was the indigenous pluralist tradition, looking back to Tocqueville and the Federalist papers, which emphasized the American achievement in combining order and progress within a framework of checks and balances among competing social groups. Third, there was the
tradition of liberal political economy, with the strictly delimited role prescribed for the state. In the context of the new concern with Third World development, this perspective received a further endorsement in Walt Rostow's influential 'non-Communist manifesto', *The Stages of Economic Growth*, which presented a theory of self-generated industrial 'takeoff' heavily influenced by the Anglo-American experience, and in which Communism appeared as an unfortunate and avoidable 'disease of the transition'. But more generally, the moral judgement of liberalism/pluralism that the state should keep out of the substantive organization of civil society was effectively encapsulated in the analytical categories of systems theory, and specifically in its 'insistence upon the need to define the boundaries between the political system and other social systems'.

Ostensibly, the boundaries so conceived were between complexes of *roles*; and each man in his life plays many roles, constantly crossing and recrossing boundaries in his manifold exits and entrances. But 'in practice', Hough points out, 'it is extremely difficult to restrict analysis consistently to the level of abstract roles [and] social systems tend to become associated with more concrete institutions... Thus in examining a society such as the Soviet Union, the comparative systems theorist must see the political system (read state) invading the whole of society in a totalitarian fashion; and this must remain the case so long as the state undertakes to organize the social division of labour in the pursuit of centralized goals, *irrespective of the means* - police terror, ideological exhortation, material incentives, or whatever - employed for this purpose.

This complex of methodological and substantive assumptions, I would argue, produced a situation in which the Soviet Union, Third World societies and even, in a curious sense, the contemporary states-system, were each compared to a model of political and social order derived, in large part, from an idealization of the Anglo-American historical experience. As regards the Soviet Union, the major point of the argument has already been foreshadowed. The totalitarian model of the Soviet social order was in practice the obverse side of the coin from the pluralist model of the American social order; and the hidden assumptions of leading comparative theorists ensured that their work (which presumably was more accessible to the a-historical mainstream of the American strategic community than the specialist Soviet studies literature) carried forward
a simplistic image of the Soviet reality which was being abandoned in the latter field. But it is also important to note that the comparativist penchant for typologies, involving the impressionistic location of entire social systems at different points on an ideal type spectrum, involved an interest in \textit{sequential} as well as \textit{lateral} classification in the Soviet case. The concern, which was explicitly manifested in the convergence thesis, was not merely to contrast pluralist and totalitarian systems as they currently existed, but to establish whether the Soviet Union, as a partly developed country which had taken an initial wrong turning during the 'transition' period, could find its way back to the developmental high road marked out by the pluralist democracies as it acquired the objective material prerequisites of advanced industrial society.

The notion of 'modernization', that is to say, tended to be encapsulated in that of pluralism; and if the empirical evidence of change in the post-Stalin era could not be assimilated to a broadly pluralist schema, it must be suspected that the increasing complexity of the socio-economic 'base' was not being matched by developments in the political 'superstructure' - a situation calculated to produce severe internal 'strains' which might, as in the Stalin era, be directed outwards in a campaign of intense ideological hostility against alleged foreign enemies. Moreover, while the notion of 'bureaucratic politics' was often invoked to account for the defence procurement policies of both the United States \textit{and} the Soviet Union, the differential master images of the two societies promoted a different mainstream appreciation of the role of bureaucracy in either case. As regards the United States, the bureaucracy was viewed primarily through the pluralist filter, as a channel which \textit{carried up} the interplay of private interests into the realm of government itself, making the formation of coherent national security policies a particularly difficult affair. But even where bureaucratic politics arguments \textit{were} accepted about Soviet policies, they tended (once the brief flirtation with a general image of incipient Soviet pluralism had been abandoned) to be assimilated to a residual totalitarian/'directed society' approach, with the bureaucracy being seen as the mature institutional expression of the regime's centralizing preoccupations, which \textit{carried down} its largely unchanged socio-economic priorities into the general reaches of Soviet society.\textsuperscript{123}

There were, admittedly, important differences among American theorists
about the efficiency with which this was done; and in the late 1960s, some conservative American theorists - such as Samuel Huntington - displayed an open interest in Leninism (the organizational Leninism of What is to be done?) as a possible solution to the institutional problems of mass society and rapid social change. Huntington was unusual in his candid acknowledgement that the Soviet political order had certain advantages, even from a domestic viewpoint, over its 'antique' American counterpart (though the idea that the United States was in many ways hampered by its pluralist/democratic organization in the foreign policy contest has been a recurring one in the strategic literature, from NSC 68 through to the arguments of the hawk school today). The more common position on the comparative efficacy of the two social systems was that charted by Brzezinski, when he began to distance himself from his original advocacy of the totalitarian model. In their 1963 comparative study, Political Power: USA/USSR, he and his co-author Huntington rejected the notion of convergence, but spoke of the further evolution of a Soviet system which had 'in its own way ... been highly successful', and an evolution in which the aspirations of the 'young technocrats' seemed likely to be a significant factor. But Brzezinski described Khrushchev's fall the following year as a 'victory for the clerks' and a triumph for 'bureaucratic conservatism'; and in 1966 he suggested two alternative futures for the system: either its 'transformation', in a more or less pluralist direction, or its bureaucratic 'degeneration'. The latter image required only the addition of a renewed emphasis on the weight of traditional Russian political culture (which Brzezinski, among others, supplied in due course) to produce the assessment of the Soviet Union which has come to dominate the American strategic debate in the late 1970s.

As regards the question of Third World development, the teleological character of much mainstream comparative analysis was even more obvious. The question at issue was the movement from a 'traditional' to a 'modern' social order, and as Donal Cruise O'Brien points out, the early American modernization theorists, led by Gabriel Almond, had little doubt about the empirical character of this process:

Political modernity is representative democracy, and the practical achievement of the democratic ideal has reached its highest point in the United States of America. The process of modernization,
in less advanced areas of the world, is therefore very simply to be understood as one of 'transition' in which backward polities will grow increasingly to resemble the American model.

Almond and his associates drew primarily upon established political and sociological concepts: in particular, upon Easton's input-output model of the political system (with the inbuilt assumptions about the proper scope of political action mentioned above); and upon the Parsonian 'pattern variables' which were taken as defining the contrast between tradition and modernity (and behind which lay Durkheim's preoccupation with the problem of establishing, in a modernizing society, a viable 'organic solidarity' based upon the awareness of interdependence and a common fate dictated by the complex division of labour, to replace the 'mechanical solidarity' disrupted by the undermining of the traditional social order).

But another important influence on the general pattern of American thinking on development issues was the emphasis of economists such as Rostow on the 'trickle down' effect of modern industrial sectors and transport networks on the rest of a developing economy. Moreover, since Rostow emphasized that 'the existence or quick emergence' of an appropriate 'political, social and institutional framework' was essential for the effective exploitation of the economic impact of leading sectors, the two sides of the analysis were mutually reinforcing.

In practice, the record of Third World development in the 1960s conspicuously failed to conform to this original pluralist scenario; and especially in the Vietnam era, American comparative theorists became increasingly concerned with the social and political dislocation occasioned by rapid economic development and the opportunities this created for political revolution. However, though their focus of interest shifted and their political optimism sharply declined, the underlying assumptions which shaped their analyses remained largely unchanged. As Charles Tilly points out, American theories of revolution now drew on that aspect of the Durkheimian perspective which emphasized the problematic character of the 'transition' from mechanical to organic solidarity and the danger that the dislocation engendered by rapid industrialization and urbanization could produce massive anomie or normlessness, which might find its outlet in revolutionary action. A subsidiary influence, he argues, was the
Weberian notion of the role of 'charismatic' leadership in the creation of alternative definitions of reality and on the founding of new social movements. But the common strand was the perception of revolution not as rational collective action by groups and classes subjected to objectively definable exploitation - as Marxist theories would have it - but as an unnatural and essentially irrational activity - a reflection of the 'breakdown' of the normal functioning of the social system as a whole. Thus the bias of such analyses was strongly away from questions of socio-economic structure and strongly towards speculation about the psychological states of revolutionary actors - whether directly, as in Ted Gurr's elaborate investigation of the concept of 'relative deprivation', or indirectly, as in Chalmers Johnson's preoccupation with 'deviant' political responses to the phenomena of the 'disequilibrated social system'. Indeed, Johnson explicitly maintained that revolution constituted the 'morbid' condition of society, whose 'healthy' condition is equilibrium, and implied that the 'macro' analyst of strain in the system as a whole should look to his 'micro' colleague 'to know what psychological needs may be met by subversive political activities for outcasts, declasses, undesirables, and the "maladjusted"...'

Once again, Huntington constituted a substantial exception to this pattern, advancing a strongly political concept of revolution which had significant affinities with the Marxist-oriented theories generally followed in this thesis, and taking a favourable view of 'Leninist' Communism as a force capable of re-establishing viable political order in circumstances where an *aïen regime* had irretrievably broken down. However, Huntington discounted the core Marxist emphasis on the socio-economic foundation for revolution; and his central notion - that political instability resulted when social mobilization outran political institutionalization - lay within the basic Durkheimian tradition. Moreover, while Huntington himself recommended both measures to slow the rate of social mobilization and the utilization of the Leninist theory of the vanguard by non-Communist Third World regimes, the general tenor of the argument also provided a rationale for support for apparently cohesive military juntas and 'modernizing autocrats' such as the Shah, and it was for an ad hoc reliance upon such clients that American Third World policy was chiefly remarkable in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Finally, there is the question of the impact of comparative/behavioural
preoccupations in carrying over pluralist assumptions about domestic politics into perspectives on international relations, as such in the mainstream American debate. The argument that there was such an impact must be more speculative than in the two earlier cases, given the apparent strength in the 1950s and the 1960s of a Realist tradition implying a radical discontinuity between domestic and international politics. However, I have already suggested that American Realism itself tended to be filtered through indigenous pluralist assumptions about politics in general, and there were two more specific aspects of the indigenous tradition which retained their vitality throughout the period of apparent Realist hegemony. First, there was the venerable Anglo-American attachment to 'commercial functionalism': the belief, in its 19th century variant, that the mutual benefits of free trade would render war obsolete, or, in mid-20th century American parlance, that the 'positive sum' dimension of economic relations between states would come to outweigh the 'zero sum' dimension of their military relations.  

Second, there was the international strand of pluralist political theory developed under Charles Merriam at Chicago in the 1930s, which, with its pragmatist, 'problem solving' approach, and its explicit attempt to draw a comparison between world politics and urban politics as two different examples of 'politics in the absence of central authority', anticipated many of the 'transnationalist' themes which became so prominent in American international theory in the 1970s. This approach was carried on in the 1960s by those writers who sought to replace the 'state-centric paradigm' with the concept of a far more inclusive world political system. But it also received a more specific and substantial referent in studies of the prospects for integration in Western Europe - notably in the neo-functionalist approach of Ernst Haas, and the cybernetic approach of Karl Deutsch, who coined the term 'pluralistic security community' to describe a social group divided into separate political units but linked by a single set of transactional boundaries, and marked by a degree of community feeling which 'eliminated war and the expectation of war' within those boundaries.

These different components appear to have come together into a 'global interdependence' perspective in the early 1970s, when the oil crisis and the NIEO debate added an urgent North-South dimension to the already established preoccupation with the interdependence of the
advanced industrial societies and with the prospects for converting economic interdependencies into political 'linkages' in dealing with the Soviet bloc. This global interdependence perspective, I believe, might fairly be characterized as general systems theory under another name. Like the bureaucratic politics perspective which flowered at the same time, it was a characteristic product of the misnamed 'post-behavioural revolution' in American international theory, in that it involved a more candid emphasis upon normative and 'policy-relevant' concerns, without any serious reconsideration of the normative bias built into its essentially unchanged methodology (a problem which could now be finessed by abandoning the rigorous Popperian aspirations for a pseudo-Kuhnian image of a hundred paradigms ranged in creative contention).

If this argument is correct, the ingrained positivistic conception of a functioning social system encouraged a diffused but powerful sense of an imminent 'transformation' of world politics, in which the growing complexity and intensity of international interdependence was in itself helping to generate a new world order whose essential features were misrepresented by the classical 'state-centric paradigm'. However, this expectation also received crucial support from the similarly entrenched translation of the commonsense notion of mutual deterrence into the abstract, mathematical formulae of Mutual Assured Destruction, especially since the Soviet acceptance of an ABM ban in SALT I was often interpreted as an acceptance of the core MAD doctrine. Insofar as the innate logic of nuclear technology was itself expected to 'eliminate war and threat of war' among the major powers, it became the more attractive to identify the growth of 'interdependence' with the prospect of an embryonic 'security community' over the world as a whole. Indeed, this vision received at least rhetorical support from the erstwhile Realist Kissinger, who had also taken up McNamara's theme of the meaninglessness of nuclear superiority in his defence of the SALT I agreements.\(^{139}\) As John Vincent points out, Kissinger's last years in office involved an increasing diversion from the carefully articulated 'minimalist' programme of international order towards 'globalist' world order concerns, in regard to which he fell back on a pluralist 'one worldism' of a characteristically American kind, and an 'extraordinary belief in a new harmony of interests', allegedly demonstrated in unmistakeable fashion in the field of energy.\(^{140}\)
To say only so much would be to endorse the hawk contention that an a-political MAD 'theology', which catered more generally to 'the traditional American dream of a non-strategic world order', had promoted a dangerous abdication of American military responsibilities in the face of the continuing harsh realities of power politics. But this would be to quite ignore the role of the corresponding 'theologies' of limited nuclear war and extended deterrence in shaping the general intellectual climate of the American strategic debate. The adherents of these two closely related approaches were just as committed as the advocates of MAD to the pursuit of technical solutions to intractable political problems, whether through the manipulation of the threat of nuclear force in 'brinkmanship' crisis strategies, or through the escalatory use of nuclear force in post-crisis limited war. They were just as prone to misleading suggestions that such solutions could be determined with some kind of 'scientific' precision (indeed, the wide popularity of 'second wave' deterrence theorists such as Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn, in contrast to 'first wave' predecessors such as Brodie, would seem to be attributable in roughly equal measure to their emphasis on extended deterrence issues and their pretensions to a systematic 'game theoretical' approach to these issues). And behind a positivistic screen of value-freedom, they appealed to an essentially pluralist vision of a political universe without highly structured objective interests, and to a bargaining culture in which the most intensely held national values could be modified or negated by the astute manipulation of a wider calculus of costs and benefits. The crucial difference was that the MAD approach at least started from a strictly limited area - namely, the avoidance of central war - about which it was genuinely plausible to postulate a common interest over-riding the geopolitical, developmental and other conflicts among the great powers; whereas the extended deterrence approach sought to stretch the common interest in war avoidance so far as virtually to deny these other conflicting interests a politically significant reality.

It seems clear that limited war strategies remained an operational component of American nuclear policy throughout the 1960's despite the retreat from a declaratory commitment to them, while the extended deterrence theme maintained a consistent, if temporarily muted, presence
in the public debate. Both themes flowered again in the mid 1970s, along with the growing concern over a Soviet first strike threat to the Minuteman ICBM force. Indeed, as Lawrence Freedman points out, it was only by virtue of the increasing emphasis in this period on the preservation of a credible limited war capability (as opposed to a simple Assured Destruction capability, which would be much less susceptible to erosion by Soviet technological advance) that the furore over Minuteman vulnerability made any real sense.

The hawk group were in the forefront of the campaign to establish a limited war capability as the true criterion of a viable deterrent posture, invoking scenarios for graduated Soviet-American nuclear exchange which were both 'astonishingly abstract in nature' and totally at variance with the kind of nuclear warfighting suggested in the Soviet military literature. These arguments thus had very little to do with the introduction of more genuinely political criteria into American strategic policy: but they did have important political implications for American posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. From the time of the first successful Soviet MIRV test in 1973, Defense Secretary Schlesinger campaigned for improved American 'limited options' to 'shore up deterrence across the whole spectrum of risks' - without which, he argued, a future United States leadership might be 'self-deterred' in a nuclear crisis. From this point onward, the issue remained a focal point of the public debate, and though the formal promulgation of an American limited war strategy occurred only in 1980 - with the Carter administration's Presidential Directive 59 - Schlesinger could then claim that the relevant policies had been '80% in place' since 1973.

Finally, it should be noted that these developments occurred against the background of a 'third wave' critique in mainstream American deterrence theory - a critique which, though in many respects most notable for the continuing ethnocentricity of its underlying assumptions, at least acknowledged the enduring reality of substantive and intrinsic conflicts of interest even in the nuclear era. Similarly, the later 1970s produced a renewed emphasis on economic and geopolitical conflicts in the wider foreign policy debate, with the pacific connotations of interdependence being downplayed even by the concept's leading defenders, and Kissinger (now out of office) leading the call for a 'geopolitical' perspective to replace the 'idealistic', 'legalistic' and 'pragmatic' approaches which had allegedly dominated the history of American foreign policy. Thus the pluralistic model
could be convicted of a basic failure to predict trends in international politics, just as in Soviet and Third World politics; and given this comprehensive failure, one might have expected a broad reappraisal of the model itself, and a new readiness to credit the analytical claims of perspectives emphasizing structural contradiction rather than functional harmony as the key to social analysis. In practice, however, the American strategic debate remained to a striking extent confined within the framework of traditional pluralist assumptions; and if the harmony of interests motif receded once again in discussions of Third World affairs and international relations in general, the most popular explanation of its inappropriateness was once again, as in the Cold War era, the atavistic intransigence of the Soviet Union, expressed precisely in the official Soviet insistence on the inherent dimension of contradiction and conflict in the established world order. Moreover, this general perception of a special Soviet inability to adapt to the changing international environment meshed neatly with the specific hawk thesis of a Soviet doctrinal commitment to military superiority and to the preservation of nuclear war as a potential instrument of policy. The implications of this pattern in the post-1972 debate will be considered in the final section.

The Pattern of the American Debate

As suggested above, the detente-era debate proceeded along two central axes: the one broadly concerned with the overall 'correlation of forces' in contemporary world politics, the other focussed more narrowly upon trends in the Soviet-American strategic balance. But the two axes were linked by an over-riding concern with the nature of the Soviet Union as an international actor, judgements about which were crucial to the significance accorded to developments in either context. And the most important factor here was the growing influence of the hawk argument - expounded most insistently and with the greatest show of authority by Richard Pipes - for a refurbished totalitarian model of the Soviet order in which traditional Russian, rather than Marxist, influences were now clearly accorded explanatory pride of place.
The major divisions in the debate over broad international trends are usefully summed up in Ole Holsti's distinction between Cold War Internationalists - for whom the hallowed verities of the East-West confrontation still hold good despite the illusory slogans of detente - and Post-Cold War Internationalists - for whom the importance of this confrontation is now eclipsed by North-South problems and the imperatives of the 'management of interdependence'. The categories by no means provide a cut-and-dried home for all leading figures in the debate (Kissinger, for instance, has apparently moved from the first to the second category and back again over the past decade or so, while Brzezinski has contrived to straddle both throughout); and Holsti's (1979) argument would appear to understate the strength of the general trend back to a neo-Cold War perspective. However, the scheme does provide a useful starting point for locating the hawk group - as the most extreme of the Cold War Internationalists - in relation to other major participants in the debate.

The hawk group themselves have presented this relationship rather differently, generally laying claim to the mantle of Realism (to the extent of solemnly invoking the wisdom of Kennan the late-1940s advocate of containment to refute Kennan the late-1970s advocate of a fundamental reappraisal of American perceptions of the Soviet Union). This approach was evidently very successful as a rhetorical strategy; but it was also nothing more than a rhetorical strategy. For all the emphasis in the hawk literature upon the obstacles which a 'pragmatic' or 'mercantile' or 'bargaining' political culture places in the way of a genuine comprehension of a state such as the Soviet Union, there was remarkably little acknowledgement that this basic perspective (designated earlier as 'commercial functionalism') might be inappropriate to contemporary world politics irrespective of the Soviet role. Indeed, the issues of the 'North-South conflict' and of the autonomous sources of 'instability' in Third World states were not explained away but simply ignored in the hawk literature, with the current malaise of the American international position being effectively attributed to two all-purpose causes: inherent Soviet expansionism, and 'the collapse of Western will'.
However, although the hawk group showed much less concern even than the immediate post-war Realists with the complexity of underly­ing structures in contemporary world politics, they could point to both a level of Soviet military power relative to the United States and a readiness to employ that power in disputed Third World areas which were qualitatively new. In addition, the promise of detente as a constraint upon Soviet power, as also the promise of a new stability in an allegedly 'multipolar' world, had been seriously oversold in the early 1970s by the Nixon Administration, opening the way to charges that Soviet conduct in the Yom Kippur War and the Angolan crisis had flagrantly violated the 'code of detente'. Kissinger initially resisted these attacks, arguing that hard-line policies which had failed when the United States enjoyed clear military superiority would not work when that superiority had disappeared, that Soviet behaviour must be judged against specific contexts and not by criteria appropriate only to 'an ideal world', and that the United States could not regard detente as a 'means of asking the Soviet Union to take care of all of our problems'. But he also moved increasingly towards a new emphasis on the deep and persistent ambiguities of the detente relationship; and in his final year of office he (and his deputy Helmut Sonnenfeldt) sketched the image of a 'flawed' imperial power, with strong proclivities towards 'geopolitical' expansionism, which was fleshed out in Kissinger's increasingly hardline analysis of Soviet policy in the Carter era.

Moreover, this 'geopolitical' perspective was of relatively little significance as a counter within the Cold War Internationalist camp to the simplistic hawk concentration on the innate drives of the Soviet Union. For 'geopolitics', in Kissinger's lexicon, did not involve a structuralist emphasis upon a logic of geographical position to which any power in that position would be subject, but merely constituted an alternative label for his long-standing concern with the 'requirements of equilibrium' and the restraint demanded of all parties to a 'legitimate' international order. Thus, in a period in which American retrenchment from the globalism of the 1960s was matched by a new Soviet 'geopolitical momentum' in Africa and West Asia, the formula was perfectly compatible with the notion of a special threat to international equilibrium posed by innate Soviet expansionism -
especially where the origins of that expansionism were directly traced, as most notably by Pipes, to the geopolitical environment of the early Muscovite state.\textsuperscript{157}

On the Post-Cold War Internationalist side, the central motif of interdependence was also, in an indirect fashion, accommodating to the hawk picture of an inherent Soviet challenge to a stable world order. Admittedly, some Post-Cold War Internationalists showed far more sensitivity than any of their 'Realist' opponents to economic and developmental contradictions in world politics – especially where, as with Shulman and Robert Legvold – they had come to wider international concerns primarily through a focus upon Soviet foreign and Third World policy.\textsuperscript{158} But the general tenor of interdependence rhetoric – especially in the first half of the 1970s – was calculated rather to obscure these contradictions, and to facilitate a left-handed assertion of an international harmony of interests in terms of mutual vulnerability. Given the further association of the 'new' interdependence with the emergence of new constraints upon the legitimate use of force increasingly similar to those acknowledged in the domestic sphere, this perspective implied a much more sweeping censure of any major power which disregarded these alleged constraints than would have been appropriate to the lightly mediated milieu of power politics depicted in the 'state-centric paradigm'.\textsuperscript{159} And once again, the hawk literature portrayed the USSR as just such a maladaptive power, trapped, in Eugene Rostow's words, 'by the traditional aspirations of the Czars and by the newer ambitions of [its] Communist ideology... in the imperial mood of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - a mood which the Western nations have rejected with relief and conviction.'\textsuperscript{160}

Thus, by early 1977, Legvold could already point to a 'remarkable consensus' in the American strategic debate on the nature and international implications of Soviet power:

The common portrait is of a late-arriving military leviathan, in the bloom of military expansion, self-satisfied at last to have matched the power of its great imperialist rival, and fascinated by the potential rewards in the continued accumulation of arms. But most are also agreed that the Soviet Union is a seriously flawed power: economically disadvantaged, technologically deficient, bureaucratically scelerosed, and threatened by a society which is, in Zbigniew Brzezinski's words, 'like a boiling subterranean volcano [straining] against the rigid surface crust of the political system'.\textsuperscript{161}
Brzezinski himself appears to have vigorously promoted this line in his capacity as National Security Adviser in the incoming Carter administration. Not long before assuming that office, he had speculated about the possibility of a military takeover as a solution to Soviet internal contradictions, and even about 'the disappearance of the Soviet state' - a goal which the United States might promote by 'some realistic encouragement of pluralism via nationalism and separatism'. And in office he similarly declared (with a shrewd echo of Trotsky's relegation of the non-Bolshevik left to the 'dustbin of history') that the United States was 'challenging the Russians to co-operate with us or run the risk of becoming historically irrelevant to the great issues of our time'.

Admittedly, Brzezinski's direct political role was countered by that of Shulman, as Soviet affairs adviser to Secretary of State Vance - a situation conducive to a certain 'schizophrenia' in the posture of the early Carter administration on Soviet-related issues. But the secular trend was towards the Brzezinski line, which had evidently triumphed well before the Afghanistan invasion, nominated by the President himself as the watershed in his assessment of Soviet policy. And the situation was much less equivocal under the Reagan administration, in which the notably hawkish Secretary of State Haig figured as a 'moderate', engaged in a continuing and ultimately unsuccessful contest for influence with the office of National Security Adviser (where Pipes had become Soviet affairs specialist), with Defense Secretary Weinberger, and with (among others) Eugene Rostow as the new head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. President Reagan's own early pronouncements differed remarkably little from his earlier campaign statements in their strongly negative portrayal of both Soviet policy and the Soviet social order; while Pipes (in an 'off the record' but widely attributed interview) declared that 'nothing [was] left of detente', that the administration believed that broad negotiations were pointless until the Soviets abandoned 'the most brazen imperial drive in modern world history', and that the Soviet Union's economic problems would eventually confront its leaders with a choice between reform along Western lines or going to war.

A final point about this broad picture of an unequivocal imperial thrust by the Soviet Union concerns the dubious character of the
evidence on which it ostensibly rested. There is, to begin with, the general problem of the extravagant implications drawn from the direct Soviet military activity in the Third World over the past decade, which had undoubtedly added a major and disturbing new dimension to earlier Soviet activity in this context, but which also remained, even after the Afghanistan invasion, less extensive than the comparable activity of the United States itself through to the early 1970s. But more specific instances of this problem are provided by two official government claims which, launched in the crucial years 1976-77, helped to fix a highly unfavourable image of the internal dynamics of Soviet power upon the American debate.

The first was the CIA's 1976 announcement that its estimates of the Soviet 'defence burden' should be increased by approximately 100% for the whole period since 1970. It must be emphasized that this revision was not based on any substantial new evidence about observable Soviet capabilities, but rather on a change in the techniques employed to estimate the economic costs to the Soviets of capabilities already attributed to them. Moreover, the change in estimating technique was evidently the result of intra-bureaucratic struggles; and, according to the economist Philip Hanson, the limited information which emerged about the competing techniques was primarily indicative of the 'precarious nature' of all such economic estimates, and suggested that 'rolling dice to determine the Soviet defence burden would have been about as reliable'. But though the status of such estimates has remained highly controversial, the insistence upon an inordinate Soviet defence burden has become a standard component of the official American position, culminating in the claims made in the glossy monograph on *Soviet Military Power* released in 1981 by the Reagan administration Pentagon.

According to this volume (which again contained nothing new about actual Soviet capabilities, but which was liberally sprinkled with *obiter dicta* reflecting the basic hawk case about Soviet policy and the Soviet social order) 'the estimated dollar costs of Soviet military investment exceeded comparable U.S. spending by 70 percent in 1979', capping 'a decade during which Moscow's policy has been to stress guns over butter'; and since the Soviet authorities, unlike their Western counterparts, saw defence spending not as a burden but as a 'necessity
and a priority above everything else', further percentage increases could be expected even if declining productivity should confront the regime with 'a negative growth rate'.

The speculation about a negative growth rate raises in turn the other major claim mentioned above: the prediction of a new Soviet dependence on imported oil in the 1980s, which formed the centrepiece of the highly unfavourable picture of Soviet economic prospects promulgated in CIA reports from 1977 onwards. This oil claim was even more controversial than the military burden one; and by May 1981 the CIA had reversed its own position, predicting that the USSR would remain a net oil exporter throughout the 1980s. But the earlier prediction had already provided ample fuel for 'grand design' speculation regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and had been adduced by both the Carter and Reagan administrations as one factor justifying an increased American military presence in the Persian Gulf - where, according to Weinberger, the Soviets' emerging 'economic necessity' for imported oil dictated 'their long-range objective of denying access to oil by the West'. Since the Reagan administration was at the same time proclaiming its own readiness to intervene directly should that be necessary to preserve the existing Saudi regime from Iranian-style revolution, the vision of Soviet intervention in a dispute over oil showed considerable potential for self-fulfilling prophecy.

If the problem of self-fulfilling prophecy is important in regard to this image of an internally generated Soviet imperial thrust in the broad political domain, it is still more acute in regard to the hawk thesis of a determined Soviet drive for a usable 'superiority' in the more specific context of the strategic balance. Here, also, the detentist/arms control 'orthodoxy' depicted in the polemics of the hawk group was a notably transient and narrowly based phenomenon (as Freedman notes, the Pentagon was making 'crude, contrived and unconvincing' assertions about a Soviet first-strike goal as early as 1969); and here, also, the general return to a hard-line perspective in the later 1970s must be attributed primarily not to the emergence of new evidence about Soviet capabilities but to the renewed influence of highly pessimistic, Cold War assumptions about Soviet intentions. The problem which preoccupied the 1970s debate - the long-term threat of highly accurate 'MIRVed' missiles to the 'survivability'
of fixed-based ICBMs on the opposing sides—was already clearly implied in American capabilities at the start of the decade; while Soviet capabilities in this respect actually grew more slowly than expected, at a rate which seemed to push the problem of 'Minuteman vulnerability' back to the mid-1980s at least. But 'though the arrival of the Soviet MIRV was delayed', observes Freedman, 'the [American] advance publicity (stretching over five years) meant that it had been as important, if not more so, than the U.S. MIRV in shaping attitudes on the impact of multiple, accurate warheads on the strategic balance'.

As Freedman's account makes clear, the attack upon the SALT process by hawk critics outside the Nixon and Ford administrations was matched by a conflict within both administrations over the underlying 'adversary images' of the official intelligence agencies: between the CIA, which saw the Soviet Union as open to genuine negotiations based on a shared acceptance of the need for basic stability in the nuclear balance, and the Pentagon, which 'emphasized a Soviet drive to military superiority' and which, 'in the build-up to, and aftermath of SALT I... was a source of unyielding suspicion of Soviet motives'. Freedman further argues that the CIA's adversary image was much more independent of specific institutional requirements than was that of the defence intelligence agencies, but that during the 1970s (and in part because of this very lack of a strong institutional base) the CIA analysts progressively lost ground to their opponents in the 'battle... for the soul of U.S. strategic arms policy'.

A landmark in this process was the 1976 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), formulated in the last days of the Ford administration. The deliberations behind this estimate effectively brought together the official and unofficial strands of the hard-line position on Soviet intentions, through the appointment of a 'Team B' group of analysts, chaired by Pipes, to draft a 'competitive estimate' to balance that provided the CIA's 'Team A'. Team B was composed of known 'pessimists' on the question of Soviet intentions (since Pipes claimed that there was 'no point in another optimistic view'), and though ostensibly independent of the intra-bureaucratic conflict, several of its members were closely linked to the Defense intelligence agencies—and especially to Air Force intelligence. In addition, argues Des Ball,
there was a direct input into the estimating process by General Keegan, the outgoing head of Air Force intelligence, whose general position - backed by an exotic array of specific claims - was that the United States had already 'lost the strategic balance' by 1972. This combination of influences produced a final estimate which was reported to be 'more sombre than any for a decade', and which 'flatly stated that the Soviet Union [was] seeking superiority over the United States forces'.

The general handling of the 1976 NIE (including its subsequent disclosure to the press by Team B members) clearly suggested an attempt to head off any 'dovish' initiative on the part of the incoming Carter administration. There was, perhaps, no great reason for hawk concern on this score: for the much publicized early proposal for 'deep cuts' in SALT II was allegedly drafted by Senator Jackson, the leading Democratic 'hawk', in terms which the Soviet authorities were almost certain to reject; while the hard-line perspective on Soviet motives also had an influential champion in Brzezinski, who in 1977 commissioned a study, chaired by Huntington, which concluded that the Soviets were committed to the achievement of a 'true' nuclear warfighting capability. In the middle of its term, however, the Carter administration did appear committed to a SALT II agreement within the broad framework of the 1974 Vladivistock accords; and in this context the 'external' hawk campaign reached a new pitch, particularly under the aegis of the Committee on the Present Danger and through the medium of calculations by Nitze and T.K. Jones (a Boeing Aerospace analyst who became an Assistant Secretary of Defence in the Reagan administration) which presented a far more alarmist picture of Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities than that presented by the administration itself.

Once again, the arrival of the Reagan administration resolved the residual tensions between the hawk argument and the official American position - as evidenced in the central propositions of the Pentagon monograph on Soviet Military Power. Thus the Soviets were said both to be reliant upon 'force as a tool of domestic control' and to regard 'military force [as] the major propellant of change in international affairs', being buttressed in their adventurism by their current 'belief that the correlation of forces has shifted in Moscow's favour'. Though desiring to achieve their ends without 'nuclear war and its
debilitating results', they rejected both 'Western notions of strategic sufficiency [and] the concept of assured destruction', seeing 'the development of superior capabilities wedded to a strategy designed to achieve military victory and a dominant post war position as the only rational approach to nuclear forces'. And, as regards nuclear war itself, the Pentagon study claimed, 'Soviet strategic operational employment plans, based on Soviet writings, point to seizing the initiative through preemptive attack [as] the preferred Soviet scenario'. 

This document, of course, was closely related to the new administration's campaign for a major increase in the American defence effort, and most specifically for the more rapid development of the contentious and extremely expensive MX missile system - an issue on which the Carter administration had moved rather cautiously. However, the MX issue also raised the most acute questions about the entire hawk position on the central issue of ICBM vulnerability, since the Reagan administration immediately abandoned, on internal political grounds, its predecessor's plans for a mobile basing system for the new missile, and thus the rationalization for it as more 'survivable' than the existing Minuteman force. Of course, the MX (with its ten extremely accurate and powerful warheads) would still have a greatly enhanced offensive capacity against 'hardened' Soviet missiles: but in terms of the commonly accepted logic of the American strategic debate, this would actually make it a more 'attractive' target for a Soviet first strike in an intense crisis situation. Moreover, since the long-term threat of ICBM vulnerability was a more comprehensive problem for the less 'balanced' Soviet forces than for the American nuclear 'triad', and since the now openly proclaimed American concept of limited nuclear war had always attracted a much more unequivocal Soviet rejection than the basic American concept of mutual deterrence, there was, once again, the prospect of hawk-influenced American policies directly promoting the kind of Soviet response they were ostensibly designed to counter.
As suggested at the outset of the chapter, the pattern of the middle and late 1970s debate substantially reproduced that of the middle and late 1950s, the earlier occasion on which the prospect of strategic 'parity' stimulated an intense American concern with the danger of Soviet gains at the 'margins' of the great power relationship and a preoccupation with the technical problems of preserving a credible extended deterrent (and limited warfighting) capability. Admittedly, there were important practical differences between the two contexts. On the one hand, the Soviet pretensions to an effective parity were now much less fragile than in the Khrushchev era, while the Soviet challenge in the Third World was now buttressed by a genuine, and highly visible, capacity for the extended projection of conventional military power. On the other, the highly threatening 'adversary image' espoused by the hawk group no longer enjoyed its almost unchallenged status of the 1950s; and it seems fair to attribute its increasing sway in the late 1970s in part to the internal sociology of the American foreign policy process, which allowed a disproportionate influence to a relatively small but highly organized and articulate constellation of 'enemies and sceptics of detente'. However, this much granted, the larger truth remains that a broadly similar stimulus from the Soviet side produced a broadly similar response on the American, and that the existence of a formalized detente process and an established SALT framework exercised surprisingly little constraint upon the drift back to a Cold War ethos.

A corollary to this is that the hawk group were never, as their own publicity suggested, an isolated chorus of voices crying in a wilderness of detente illusions. Rather, they were merely the most extreme proponents of a position which remained influential even at the height of the 'detente era'; and they were able to ground their campaign in a basic core of methodological and substantive assumptions which were effectively shared even by most of their immediate opponents, and which predisposed a general reversion of the American debate to deep suspicion of the Soviet Union, in proportion as the continuing idiosyncracy of the latter became more widely acknowledged. The most general of these assumptions - the pluralist image of a 'natural' equilibrium in conditions facilitating the free play of competing groups - has already been discussed; and it will provide a continuing
motif of the critique of Western theory in Part II. But there were also more specific assumptions - about the nature of ideology/doctrine, about political 'rationality' and about the inner dynamics of social systems - which allowed the hawk group to make unjustified but (in the American context) effective claims that they were avoiding the ethnocentricity of their opponents, and paying due regard to the historical specificity of the Soviet Union and the specific content of the Soviet self-account.

In the first place, the positivistic, computerized strategic analysis of the 1960s had driven a conceptual wedge between what one hawk analyst of doctrine coyly calls 'the arcane arts of comparative force posture', and what, in the hawk literature proper, is presented as the equally arcane art of deciphering the 'Aesopian' communications of the Soviet political and military elite. This division, in turn, has permitted a practical division of labour among the hawk group in the presentation of what is, in effect, a 'package deal' interpretation of the joint and reciprocal significance of Soviet posture and Soviet doctrine: such that Pipes can buttress his analysis of Soviet doctrine by citing the arguments of Jones, Luttwak and Nitze - 'an accomplished expert in these matters' - about the commitment to superiority discernible in Soviet posture, while Nitze, for his part, can take as given the testimony of similarly accomplished experts on doctrinal issues - such as Pipes - that the Soviet Union is 'doctrinally committed to achieving world hegemony'.

This division of labour is crucial because it allows hawk analysts in either area to 'factor in' the extraneous assumptions without which such an unequivocal interpretation of either doctrine or posture would be impossible, while at the same time avoiding the genuinely reciprocal, hermeneutic approach to the two areas which their own substantive claims imply. Moreover, there is no obvious justification, except in the skewed analytical categories of the American strategic debate, for treating these two areas of inquiry as so arcane that they cannot be brought within the one unified and coherent conceptual framework. Thus, as will be argued at length in Chapter 4, there are only a few crude propositions about nuclear deterrence and warfighting which can usefully be related to the general political problems of the contemporary great power relationship - propositions which are much too crude to be
amenable to the kind of sophisticated mathematical computations favoured in the American debate. And similarly, as will be argued in Chapter 7, the contemporary hawk literature of doctrinal exegesis has added remarkably little — even at the level of detailed nuance — to the account of Soviet doctrine presented by Garthoff and Dinerstein twenty years earlier (while Garthoff himself has cogently argued that, insofar as there has been innovation in Soviet doctrine, the trend has generally been away from those more threatening elements consistently emphasized in the hawk literature).

The second point concerns the mainstream American concept of ideology, and the latitude which this has provided for hawk arguments discounting those elements unfavourable to their case within the broad corpus of Soviet doctrinal statements. The immediate target of such arguments has been the more overtly 'detentist' Soviet political doctrine and commentary on international issues, which — as American analysts such as Zimmerman and Morton Schwartz have demonstrated — has increased in both volume and complexity over the past decade or so; but which is typically dismissed in hawk discourse as a mere propaganda screen for a continuing Soviet commitment to world hegemony. But even this latter judgement rests on a conceptual divorce between doctrinal and other evidence analogous to that already noted in regard to the issues of military capabilities and intentions. On the one hand, hawk analysts have displayed an almost obsessive concern with the Soviet doctrine of a shifting correlation of forces, and have invoked the concept of an overarching 'grand strategy' to justify a conspiratorial reading of recent Third World developments which would not have been out of place in the Strausz-Hupe works of the 1950s. On the other, they have displayed an ostentatious contempt for the analytical significance of the Soviet 'working theory' of modern history, within whose framework both the specific political doctrines of Peaceful Coexistence and detente, and specific military doctrines on the issues of deterrence and warfighting, are ostensibly to be accommodated. Indeed, for Pipes — perhaps the most articulate exponent of the hawk position — Soviet Marxism-Leninism has done no more than intensify the 'extreme Social Darwinist outlook on life', permeating both elite and mass consciousness, ingrained in the political culture of the old regime. 'There has never been', he argues,
a political doctrine or a government with a keener sense of power relations... than the Soviet. The Soviet system is and always has been distinguished by extreme pragmatism. It is indeed the classic example of authority which, facing gigantic tasks of harnessing human resources, has utterly lost sight of its original aims'.

During the general shift in American perceptions of Soviet policy in the 1960s, such an emphasis on power political and traditional 'Russian' themes had normally been associated with either a 'mellowing tiger' or a 'neurotic bear' image of the Soviet Union: with the implication either that it was settling down to a traditional and predictable great power role or that it had all along been animated by an excessive (and geopolitically determined) preoccupation with defence. But Pipes emphatically rejected both these positions, in favour of a near-verbatim restatement of the image of unlimited and undifferentiated expansiveness articulated by Kennan immediately after World War II. While readily agreeing that 'Communist theory... provides no guidelines for the conduct of a rational foreign policy', he also insisted that Western conceptions of national interest were 'altogether alien to the Russian mind'. Thus there is no predictable pattern to Soviet expansionism - other than that of its 'pendulum' swings between 'targets of opportunity', and no identifiable set of concessions which would lead to an acceptance of the principle of stable coexistence. 'The evidence suggests that Russian expansion is motivated less by needs than by opportunities, less by what the elite wants than by what it thinks it can get... [and] is in large measure determined by internal rather than external factors, above all, by the tragic relationship of the regime to its people'.

This raises the third issue, regarding the criteria of 'rationality' applied to Soviet doctrine and behaviour in the American debate. The above account of Soviet expansionism may be classified (in Waltz's terminology) as a 'second image' one, in that it explains Soviet conduct not as a rational, realistic or appropriate response to objective environmental factors (the 'third image') but rather as the product of the inner dynamics of a special kind of power which is constitutionally incapable of appreciating environmental constraints other than the overwhelming preponderance of a determined adversary. However, in the strategic debate proper, this image of mindless expansionism is
characteristically associated with 'the rational actor approach', which is viewed in turn as 'fall[ing] within the framework of the "totalitarian" perspective on the Soviet system'. Conversely, arguments emphasizing the moderating impact upon Soviet foreign and defence policy of competing demands for socio-economic reforms have normally appealed to the allegedly pluralizing impact of bureaucratic politics within the Soviet system; while even those analysts - such as Zimmerman and Morton Schwartz - who have most strongly emphasized Soviet adaptation to the external environment have grounded their case substantially in arguments about 'systemic' or 'cybernetic learning' through the internal structural differentiation of the Soviet policy making process, as opposed to the more obvious learning of a regime striving to adapt an overarching analytical framework to a complex of problems about which that framework was, in the first instance, notably silent.

The most obvious source of this paradoxical situation lies in the specific interpretation of Soviet goals encapsulated in American adversary images of the Cold War era, which identified 'rationality' in the Soviet context as a totalitarian rationality in pursuit of the one undifferentiated goal of world hegemony, and effectively screened out the Soviet authorities' own insistence on the domestic welfare goals of Communism from the core of Soviet doctrinal claims accepted as 'meaningful' in American strategic circles. But this influence is reinforced by the ambivalent handling of the rationality issue in American strategic theory in general. On the one hand this has followed the broad pattern of behavioural social science in formally eschewing judgements about the substantive rationality or irrationality of major social and political goals, and concentrating instead on the criteria of instrumental rationality implicated in judgements about the most efficacious choice of means to ends which can be taken as given. On the other, it has proposed criteria regarding appropriate and inappropriate styles of strategic decision making which covertly presume a pluralist ontology, and which imply that an 'ideological' (in the sense of monistic) approach to strategic issues must, ipso facto, be substantively irrational.

This point has already been made in regard to the ostensibly generic Strategic Man of second wave deterrence theory, with his (liberal)
The economist's commitment to utility maximization and his appropriately flexible calculus of costs and benefits. But the problem has, in one sense, been exacerbated by the third wave critique of this model. For though the issue of objective interest has at least been raised in the third wave literature, the primary focus has remained the question of decisionmaking style, and the primary innovation has been the replacement of the maximizing image of a rational or appropriate decisionmaking style with a 'satisficing', 'incrementalist' or 'cybernetic' one. 205 Behind the portentous - and sometimes circular - theoretical language, such arguments are fully in accord with the classical pluralist demand for a pragmatic, piecemeal approach to major social issues. 206 Thus the 1970s, when the intellectual idiosyncracies of Russian Strategic Man finally became a matter of sustained and widespread concern in the mainstream American debate, brought that debate no closer to a truly generic conception of rationality for General Strategic Man. 207 Similarly, there was from this perspective no real contradiction in the hawk argument that the Soviet leadership displayed a relentless instrumental rationality (i.e. consistency) in the pursuit of a single, substantively irrational 'grand strategy' - for the two were ostensibly quite separate issues. And since any monistic world view must have irrational implications for practical decisionmaking, there was no need to consider whether the specific core claims of Soviet military and political doctrine were or were not appropriate to the specific structural contours of contemporary world politics. The only relevant question was whether or not those claims reflected the basic thrust of actual Soviet policy.

This leaves, finally, the question of the inner dynamics of Soviet politics: the question, in Pipes' words, of 'why the Russians act like Russians'. 208 And in this regard, as already noted, the most striking feature of the contemporary hawk account is the extent to which traditional Russian, rather than specifically Marxist-Leninist, elements are given pride of place in its refurbished totalitarian model of the Soviet social order. The Russians, in effect, act like Russians because they are Russians - endowed, in Pipes' influential account, with all the less desirable attributes of the Tsarist political culture and the ingrained suspiciousness of the general peasant mentality to boot. 209
This shift of emphasis, with its radical devaluation of the Soviet Union's pretensions as the patron of world revolution, is not an incidental one. Indeed, there would seem to be a direct connection between the renewed emphasis after Vietnam and Watergate upon the genuinely revolutionary character of the United States (which, President Carter asserted, was 'again a beacon to the world') and the rapid flourishing of the curious image of a Soviet Union both threatening and somehow ludicrous - an unfortunate arriviste, always caught with last year's fashion in socio-economic structure, in levers of international influence, in world-view. But this shift also raises serious problems for the argument that Soviet expansionism is predetermined by internal structural factors (since, insofar as the Soviet social order is seen not as an alien imposition but as essentially continuous with deep-seated Russian traditions, it becomes the more difficult to argue that the regime can 'legitimate' that order only by turning domestic opposition outwards against a permanent apparatus of imagined foreign enemies). And, behind this lie more fundamental questions about the consistency and accessibility of the essentially reductionist reasoning used to establish this image.

This point may best be clarified by reference to Pipes' own brilliant history of the 'patrimonial' political culture of the Russian old regime. This work explicitly seeks 'the roots of twentieth-century totalitarianism [not] in Western ideas... [but] in Russian institutions'; and, while acknowledging the complexity of trends and counter-trends in the long sweep of Russian history, is admirably clear in tracing the genesis of patrimonialism to a highly constricting complex of economic and military pressures which attended the birth of a large Muscovite state in the early modern period. Thus Pipes's case for the cultural/superstructural determination of Soviet international behaviour depends in turn on a genetic reduction, primarily at the superstructural level, back to this earlier period, and a further reduction to the infrastructural level at this point. And in the earlier context it utilizes what might (for exposition purposes) be called an anyone-into-Russians machine, seeking to demonstrate that any people (endowed with 'general rationality') would have acquired a distinctively Russian political and strategic culture had they been exposed to a similar complex of material pressures. It
might therefore be expected that, at the contemporary 'end' of his argument, Pipes would grant careful consideration to arguments proposing industrialization, great (as in super) power status, and mutual nuclear deterrence as powerful Russkins-into-ccnyone machines at work on the Soviet social order today. But he does not do this, instead terminating his argument in the 1880s - when both the industrialization of Russia and the contemporary transformation of world politics were just beginning - on the grounds that 'the ancien regime in the traditionally understood sense died a quiet death in Russia at this time, yielding to a bureaucratic police regime which in effect has been in power there ever since.'

This criticism, of course, is directed not against the perfectly reasonable boundaries established for Pipes' specific study of the old regime, but rather against the lacunae in his general body of polemical argument on the issue of adaptation in Soviet doctrine and political life. Though the basic thesis of a Tsarist-Soviet continuity is plainly crucial in the validation of this polemical argument (and, indeed, of the arguments of hawk colleagues with less impressive claims to an intimate acquaintance with Russian history and culture), Pipes has nowhere explained in satisfactory detail why the massive socio-economic transformation of the past 50 years should leave this continuity thesis effectively unscathed. However, in a recent reply to Kennan's assertions about major change in the post-Stalin era, he has indicated his general belief that meaningful change - as opposed to 'mere fluctuations in the political climate, external appearance, and even direction of national policy' - would require 'transformations in the basic institutions of state and society' extending, inter alia, to the centralized Soviet economy.

[But] no such innovations have occurred. In 1978, the central institutions of the Soviet state remain what they were in Stalin's day, and, for that matter, they are not all that different from the ones Lenin had created in 1917-18, when he gave shape to Communist Russia... This being the case, it seems entirely inappropriate to speak of 'changes' of any magnitude having occurred in the Soviet Union since 1953.

By insisting in this fashion upon specific institutional changes, Pipes effectively repudiates for the post-Stalin era the very process of interpretation by which the totalitarian image of the Soviet Union
was established in the first place: the process of 'reading behind' the formally democratic institutions of the Stalinist state to the dictatorial rule of a self-perpetuating elite, and also - in Pipes' own analysis - behind the partly-obscured outline of the Soviet party-state to the still more fundamental realities of the Russian state tradition. I will be treating interpretative reduction of this sort as an inescapable feature of the analysis of all complex social orders; but it must be governed by basic rules of consistency. Insofar as Pipes and his colleagues violate those rules, their claim to address the historical specificity of the Soviet Union is unjustified, and their argument for the 'Russian' derivation of Soviet policy devolves upon assertions about unchanging (and inaccessible) 'essences' very similar to those implied in the fully-fledged totalitarian model of the 'Soviet system' in the 1950s.

I have attempted to demonstrate a basic circularity in the development of American attitudes to the Soviet Union in the post-World War II era, which has recently brought the strategic debate back to Cold War orthodoxies which had apparently been out of favour for over a decade, and for which there was no compelling justification in the objective development of great power relations in the 1970s. I have also argued that the hawk campaign contributed significantly to the re-establishment of those orthodoxies, and that its success is partly attributable to the influence of a body of shared positivistic assumptions which transcend the more obvious differences between the hawk group and their opponents. Thus the problem. What, then, is to be done?

The key point to emphasize is that the hawk insistence upon the need to address the historical specificity of the Soviet Union is an entirely valid one, however tendentious the practical development of this theme in the hawk literature may be. To say that a given analysis of the contemporary great power relationship is primarily a 'second image' one is not necessarily to say - as Waltz himself has recently suggested - that it is an invalid, 'inside out' explanation of the
dynamics of the 'international system.' The 'abstract' structure of world military power underpinning the states-system (and the associated 'logic' of abstract great power status) is undoubtedly a crucial starting point for the investigation of the parameters of Soviet-American coexistence. But, as noted in the Introduction, it is no more than a starting point; and there is no reason why considerations about the geopolitical and developmental situation of both great powers, and about the dominant features of their respective political cultures, should be divorced from the multi-level structural analysis advocated there. Nor is there any justification for converting the problem into a formal 'levels of analysis' one, such that the movement from 'domestic' to 'international' considerations becomes a progression through a hierarchy of conceptual systems which remain, for all practical purposes, insulated one from another. Such formal distinctions between systemic levels, I will attempt to show, reflect an untenable, positivistic concept of social systems; and they become irrelevant when theoretical inquiry is directed, as here, towards identifying the specific choices which social actors confront by virtue of their location in specific temporal and spatial contexts.

On the other hand, the problem of historical and cultural specificity should not simply be translated into one of contrasting 'perceptions' in the Soviet-American relationship. This concept, indeed, has provided the chief rubric under which hermeneutic themes have appeared in the positivistically inclined American debate; and in the 1970s, the dangers of misperception have been stressed by analysts who acknowledge the tensions of the great power relationship but contest the one-sided hawk explanation for it. However, important though the issue of misperception and distorted communication undoubtedly is, it is by no means the whole story. As Brian Fay observes, in regard to the pure hermeneutic model:

An interpretive social science promises to reveal to the social actors what they and others are doing, thereby restoring communication by correcting the ideas that they have about each other and themselves. But this makes it sound as if all conflict (or breakdown in communication for that matter) is generated by mistaken ideas about social reality rather than by tensions and incompatibilities inherent in this reality itself.
It is thus hardly surprising that the misperceptions argument has had little more impact on the mainstream American debate than the work of the 1960s Cold War revisionists, some of whom anticipated its basic case. To be told that a political adversary genuinely sees the world differently does not dispose of the question why it should see the world differently, especially when the adversary relationship entails a continuing threat of utter destruction to one's own civil society. There are major contradictions within the Soviet-American relationship, and unless the objective basis of these contradictions is directly addressed, the assumption that the source of all major problems lies in unreasonable, culturally determined assumptions on the Soviet side will be granted victory by default.

Ultimately, then, it is necessary not merely to acknowledge the distinctiveness of Soviet (and American) international perspectives, but to assess the appropriateness of those perspectives to the objective realities of contemporary world politics. This entails a commitment to a 'realist' epistemology, in terms of which the search for such realities may be justified, and the attempt to establish clear and delimited methodological principles with which to discipline the intense selection among substantive historical/sociological accounts which it demands in practice. It also entails the attempt to establish a truly generic (because essentially vacuous) notion of strategic rationality as action in the actor's own real interests, so that the burden of practical explanation may be transferred from self-sufficient 'systems' and 'processes' - whether of an 'equilibrium' or 'revolutionary' variety - to the tension between specific cultural frameworks and the objective logic of historically specific material structures. The establishment of these principles, and the development of their most general substantive implications, will be the task of the next chapter.
The dimension of change is emphasized by some American analysts, notably those of the hawk school. For instance, one such study states that the current regime 'has very substantially and importantly changed the content of the [peaceful coexistence] concept'. Foy Kohler (et.al.), *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Coexistence*, University of Miami, Coral Gables, 1973, p. 39.


21 For a balanced and moderate 'economic interpretation' of the Cold War, see Lafeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*.


23 This view was supported in the government by the veteran Henry Stimson, a temporary holdover from the Roosevelt era, and in the academic field by Walter Lippman, immediately, and in the 1950s by Morgenthau and Kennan.

24 Cited in Lafeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, p. 45.


29 There were also geopolitical arguments which suggested that any power in the Soviet Union's post-war position might be drawn into expansion. Thus Kennan, as head of the Policy Planning Staff, identified four major 'strategic aggregations' (after the United States) in the world: Japan and England, 'off the shores of the Eurasian land mass', and the Soviet Union and Central Europe, on that land mass. 'Viewed in absolute terms' he continued, 'the greatest danger that could confront United States security would be a combination and working
together for purposes hostile to us of the central European and the Russian military industrial potentials'. Cited in Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, p. 48.


31 On this question, see James Billington, 'Six Views of the Russian Revolution', *World Politics*, April, 1966, pp. 456-458. Billington argues that the emigre influence reinforced a natural tendency among Anglo-American scholars towards an 'accidental-pathetic' view of the revolution - a feeling of 'bewilderment and helpless outrage' at an event which was seen as having 'no deep meaning' in itself.


33 John Gaddis and Thomas Etzold, *Containment: Documents on American Foreign Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1978, pp. 52-55. Yergin comments: 'The Long Telegram was not, truly, a fresh evaluation of a complicated situation, but rather a restatement of the Riga Axioms ... The reaction to the telegram in Truman's Washington was swift and extraordinary ... (It) became the bible for American policy makers'. *Shattered Peace*, pp. 168-171.


36 Ibid., pp. 177-178.

37 Ibid.

38 See the discussion of this issue by Gaddis in *Containment*, pp. 30-37.

39 Cited *ibid.*, pp. 393-396.


41 Lafeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, pp. 150-151, 183-196.


43 Ibid., pp. 26-34.

44 Lafeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, pp. 167, 198.
Ibid., pp. 176-177.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 178-179. Kissinger's first substantial statement on this question was an article entitled, 'Military Policy and the Defense of the "Gray" areas', in the April 1955 issue of Foreign Affairs.


Perhaps the single most important work in this genre was Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Praeger, New York, 1966. (Second edition, revised by Friedrich. Originally published in 1956). Two important works which used the totalitarian concept but were noteworthy for their sensitivity to the historical and political complexities of the 'Soviet system' were Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965 (revised edition); and Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Methuen, London, 1970 (revised edition). First published 1953 and 1959 respectively.


Ibid., pp. 61-99.


Bertram Wolfe, cited in Welch, American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 87.

Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 365.

Robert Strausz-Hupé, William Kintner and Stefan Pozsony, A Forward Strategy for America, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1961, p. 4. This work was a sequel to an earlier more specific study of 'the operational code ... of the Communist "scavengers of revolution"'. Strausz-Hupé (et.al.), Protracted Conflict, Harper and Row, New York, 1959.

Kaufmann was a key adviser to both Robert MacNamara and James Schlesinger during their years as Secretary of Defense. Schlesinger himself was engaged in limited war studies at RAND in the 1960s, and other prominent theorists of the concept, such as Morton Halperin, also held significant posts in the Washington bureaucracy in the 1960s and 1970s.


For a vintage statement of this theme, see Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. 21-61, 316-361.

Ibid., p. 20. At this stage, Kissinger himself advocated a limited nuclear war strategy. By 1961, he was arguing for a greater emphasis on conventional weapons, 'not as a substitute for a limited nuclear war capability, but as a complement to it.' The Necessity for Choice, pp. 75-94.


Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, pp. 84-89.

Of the two, Dinerstein was the more inclined to speculate about such a goal. For instance, he concluded a 1958 Foreign Affairs article on 'The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking' with the suggestion that the Soviets 'must strain to reach' a disarming first strike capability. 'If they should acquire such preponderant military strength, they would have policy alternatives even more attractive than the initiation of nuclear war. By flaunting presumably invincible strength, the Soviet Union could compel piecemeal capitulation of the democracies. This prospect must indeed seem glittering to the Soviet leaders'. The Soviet Union: 1922-1962, p. 372.

As President Kennedy declared: 'We have been driving ourselves into a corner where the only choice is all or nothing at all, world devastation or submission - a choice that necessarily causes us to hesitate on the brink and leaves the initiative in the hands of the enemy'. Cited in John Garnett 'Limited War', in John Baylis, (et al.) Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, Croom Helm, London, 1975, p. 119.

Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age, pp. 84-96. For a detailed discussion of the various forces behind MacNamara's policy, which emphasises that the abandonment of 'counterforce' was a matter of 'declaratory' policy, and not a change in actual targeting policy, see Desmond Ball, 'Deja Vu: the Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration', in Robert O'Neill (ed), The Strategic Nuclear Balance: An Australian Perspective, ANU Press, Canberra, 1975, pp. 163-173.
Cited in Phil Williams, 'United States Defence Policy' in Baylis (et.al.), *Contemporary Strategy*, p. 209.


70 In April 1965, McNamara observed that the Soviet leaders ‘have decided they have lost the quantitative arms race, and they are not seeking to engage us in that contest .. There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours’. Cited in Roman Kolkowicz, 'Soviet-American Strategic Relations', in Kolkowicz (et.al.), *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma*, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1970, pp. 68-69.


73 On this see Ball, 'Deja Vu', pp. 170-171.


78 Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations.*


Beyond the Cold War, p. 39.

Ibid., p. 31.


Beyond the Cold War, pp. 12-14, 22-24. At the same time Shulman warned (p. 94) against 'a false sense of confidence' in the necessary continuance of the strategic stabilization.

Ibid., pp. 18-32.

Ibid., p. 77.

Ibid., pp. 53-55, 76-77.

Ibid.


Ibid., pp. 244-249.

Ibid., pp. 275-282.

Ibid., p. 138.


Ibid., pp. 38-57.

Ibid., pp. 36-37.


On this see Williams, 'United States Defence Policy', pp. 209-212.

'The USSR', Meyer asserted, 'is best understood as a large complex bureaucracy comparable in its structure and functioning to giant corporations, armies, government agencies, and similar institutions ... in the West'. The Soviet Political System, Random House, New York, 1965, p. 467. The earlier roots of the bureaucratic model are discussed in Tarschys, 'The Soviet Political System: Three Models', pp. 312-313.


Tarschys, 'The Soviet Political System: Three Models', pp. 313-318; Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, Harvard University Press, Massachussetts, 1979, pp. 525-543. This work is a major revision and enlargement, by Hough, of Fainsod's classic, How Russia is Ruled.

The canonical work here is G.T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little Brown and Co., 1971.

E.H. Carr, A History of Soviet Russia, (fourteen volumes), Macmillian, London, 1978. All future references will be to this edition of the work (initially published in stages over the years 1950-1978) and will refer only to the title of the relevant part of the whole, for example, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1928, Volume Three, Part I.


See, for example, Roger Kanet (ed), The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1974; Roger Kanet and Donna Bahry (eds), Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World, Praeger, New York, 1975; W. Raymond Duncan (ed), Soviet Policy and Developing Countries, Ginn and Co., Baltimore, 1974.


Parsons, 'The Point of View of the Author' in Max Black (ed), The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1961, p. 337. Parsons further claims, in the same place, that 'theoretically, the concept of equilibrium is a simple corollary of that of system, of that of the interdependence of components as interrelated with one another'.


See the discussion of this problem in Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory, pp. 227-228.


Ibid., p. 190.


Ibid., p. 226-227.


'Not revolution and the destruction of established institutions', Huntington argued, 'but organisation and the creation of new political institutions, are the peculiar contributions of Communist movements to modern politics'. *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, p. 335.


The term 'commercial functionalism' is taken from Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations*, pp. 93-101.


140 R.J. Vincent, 'Kissinger's System of Foreign Policy', Seminar Paper, Department of International Relations, ANU, June, 1976, pp. 18-21.


142 The distinction between first, second and third 'waves' in American deterrence theory is discussed in Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence Theory Revisited', ACIS Working Paper No. 14, Centre for Arms Control and International Security, UCLA, 1978. The substantive issues involved are also considered at length in Chapter Four of this thesis.

143 On the persistence of limited war approaches, see Ball, 'Deja Vu', pp. 171-174.


145 Alan Tonelson, 'Nitze's World', Foreign Policy, Summer, 1979, p. 8.

146 On this see, Ball, 'Deja Vu', pp. 150-155, 220-221.


150 Ole Holsti, 'The Three-Headed Eagle: the United States and System Change', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1979, pp. 339-359. Holsti also (drawing primarily on Kennan's recent writings) identifies a third major category of Isolationists; but these do not seem to me to have the importance of the other groups.

151 See, for instance, Stephen Gibert (et.al.), Soviet Images of America, Crane Russak, New York, 1978, pp. 11-19. Gibert divides the American debate into 'orthodox detentists' (symbolized by Kissinger's stance when in office), 'revisionist detentists', (a much smaller group, with little support among policymakers), and 'realists' (whose 'detractors call them cold warriors'); and he clearly places himself and his colleagues in the last-mentioned category. The 'realist' motif also comes through strongly in Schlesinger (et.al.), Defending America. For the appeal to Kennan's past wisdom, see Richard Pipes, 'Mr X Revises: a Reply to George Kennan', and 'Leopold Labedz, 'The Two Mind's of George Kennan', Encounter, April, 1978, pp. 18-21, and pp. 78-86.
152 This is a recurring theme of Pipes' writing, and is also evident in several of the articles in *Defending America*.


156 Kissinger, *The White House Years*, pp. 55, 914.

157 For Kissinger's warnings on the danger of Soviet geopolitical gains, see *International Herald Tribune*, 6 December, 1978. Pipes' argument on this score is considered in some detail below.


159 See, for example, Seyom Brown, 'The Changing Essence of Power', *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1973, pp. 289-299. Brown's argument clearly demonstrates the way in which the Soviet refusal to play by 'interdependence' rules could be judged to be 'systemically' inappropriate. After extolling the pacific bias of interdependence, he states that even 'a few instances of high-level military coercion by one or some of the most powerful actors could engender a retrogressive chain-reaction of coercive diplomacy ... The system of multiple interdependence would soon contain multiple arms races and multiple paranoia', creating 'strong temptations' to resort to 'a global "leviathan"', and a substantial risk of world war.

160 Eugene Rostow, 'The Soviet Threat to Europe Through the Middle East', in Schlesinger (et al.), *Defending America*, pp. 50-51.


163 Interview in Urban (ed), *Detente*, pp. 277-278. Brzezinski did, however, warn that the nationalities issue could become an 'unguided missile'.

165 See, particularly the President's Anapolis speech, with its combination of support for detente with charges that the Soviets saw detente as 'a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage', and remained committed 'to export [ing] a totalitarian and repressive form of government, resulting in a closed society'. International Communication Agency, 7 June, 1978.

166 For Haig's early claims that the Soviet Union was sponsoring international terrorism, planning to 'strike at countries on or near the vital resource lines of the Western World', and following 'a hit list ... for the ultimate takeover of Central America', see The Age, 20 March, 1981. The background to his eventual resignation, in which his relatively softer line on the administration's attempt to block technology for the Soviet-West European oil pipeline was evidently a key factor, is discussed in Time, 5 July, 1982, pp. 10-16.

167 Thus Reagan claimed in mid-1981 that 'the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on', and described communism as 'a sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written'. Cited in The Age, 31 August, 1981, and 18 June, 1981.


169 Philip Hanson, 'Estimating Soviet Defence Expenditure', Soviet Studies, March, 1978, p. 410. The CIA estimates were apparently designed to establish what it would cost the United States to duplicate the Soviet defence establishment, with the result, as Congressional critic Les Aspin observed, that Soviet soldiers were effectively placed on American salaries. At that rate, he argued, 'the Chinese would be spending us into oblivion'. International Herald Tribune, 3 September, 1980.


172 New York Times, 19 May, 1981. The same article cited the view of 'some State Department officials' that the upgraded CIA estimates for Soviet production might still prove to be underestimates.

173 Ibid. The Pentagon study, Soviet Military Power, similarly claimed that 'the Soviets are also seeking to develop a viable oil and strategic minerals denial strategy, either through physical disruption, market manipulation, or domination of producing or neighbouring states', p. 87.
Thus Reagan asserted that the United States 'would not let Saudi Arabia become another Iran', or allow it to fall to 'anyone who might shut off' vital oil supplies. A White House aide later described this as 'the Reagan codicil to the Carter Doctrine', and explicitly stated that it promised support against internal threats to the Saudi regime. International Herald Tribune, 3-4 October, 1981.


Ibid., pp. 176-177.

Ibid., pp. 184-196.

Ibid., p. 195.

Ibid., p. 197. Des Ball, who emphasizes these intelligence links of Team B, asserts that its 'members were not just "pessimistic" regarding Soviet intentions; they [were] extremely hard-line'. 'General Keegan, Team B, and the NIE of 21 December, 1976', *Discussion Paper, Department of International Relations*, ANU, July 1977, p. 3.

Cited in Freedman, *US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat*, pp. 195-196. In regard to Keegan's specific arguments, which included the claim that the true Soviet defence burden was 40 per cent of GNP, Ball remarks that 'it is difficult to decide whether he is merely ignorant, or stupid, or in fact lying'. 'General Keegan, Team B ...', p. 4.

Cited *ibid.*, p. 2.


Ibid., p. 40.

Compare, for instance, Harold Brown's assessment of the balance in the *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1978* (Washington, 1977) with Nitze's 'Consequences of an Agreement: Such as That Foreshadowed by the Current SALT II Negotiating Posture', Washington, March, 1978. The conflict between the calculations of Jones and his colleagues on Soviet civil defence capabilities and the statements of the CIA, is discussed in Chapter Seven.

*Soviet Military Power*, p. 86.

Ibid., pp. 54, 95.
In abandoning mobile basing, argued William Von Cleave, a foreign policy adviser to Reagan's Presidential Campaign, the administration had abandoned 'the only feasible solution' to the vulnerability problem. The administration's preferred alternative was simply to deploy the MX initially in existing Minuteman silos. Only when this proved totally unacceptable to Congress did it adopt a 'dense pack' alternative. The rationale for this alternative was wholly dependent, in turn, on the controversial theory of 'fratricide' which had earlier been urged, without much success, as a factor seriously limiting the threat of Minuteman vulnerability. The Age, 12 October, 1982.


Gibert, Soviet Images of America, p. 152.


Pipes, 'Mr X Revises', p. 20


Pipes himself observes that Garthoff and Dinerstein's work 'produced a remarkably prescient forecast of actual Soviet military policies of the 1960s and 1970s'. 'Why the Soviet Union ...', p. 27.


Thus Kohler claims that Soviet spokesmen 'have started to use the term 'detente' ... only in the past couple of years, since they discovered what an effective intoxicant it is when ingested by Westerners'. The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policy, p. 38.

See, for instance, Rostow, 'The Soviet Threat to Europe Through the Middle East', pp. 51-64; Pipes 'Detente: Moscow's View', in Pipes (ed), Soviet Strategy in Europe, Crane Russak, New York, 1976, pp. 22-44.


For Waltz's exposition of the 'second image' approach, see *Man, the State and War*, pp. 80-123.


Ibid.

Zimmerman and Axelrod, 'The "Lessons" of Vietnam', pp. 17-21; Schwartz, *Soviet Perceptions of the United States*, pp. 160-164. Schwartz does not explicitly use such terminology, but the message is the same. Soviet writings, he suggests, should be viewed primarily as political arguments, rather than as 'a search for some objective reality'.


'To apply cybernetics to the understanding of society is almost a joke', Alan Ryan observes, 'when it is remembered that the term "cybernetics" comes from the word which designated a human controller', *The Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Macmillan, London, 1970, p. 193.

The notion of Russian Strategic Man, which is implicit in all the hawk literature, is usefully spelled out in Jack Snyder, 'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options', *Rand Paper*, R-2154-AF, September, 1977.

Pipes, 'Why the Russians Act Like Russians'.

Pipes, 'Detente: Moscow's View', pp. 7-12, 19-21.


Pipes, 'Mr X Revises', pp. 18-19.


About suffering they were never wrong,
The old masters ...
This part of the thesis sets out my own position on the central issues at stake in the contemporary Soviet-American debate on coexistence and related themes - the position, that is, which seems to me most readily defensible in the face of a broadly based intersubjective critique. The enunciation of such a position, to reiterate the argument so far, would seem to be demanded by the very terms in which the American debate over Soviet doctrine and Soviet intentions has been cast: one cannot adequately interpret Soviet doctrine without some attempt to establish what its basic 'problematic' might be, and one cannot evaluate its realism, or appropriateness to context, without attempting to sketch the most fundamental features of that context. Nonetheless, the attempt here to identify central 'realities' of contemporary great power coexistence, and to assess the legitimacy of political action in terms of those realities, involves broaching highly controversial issues which have been skirted by most participants in the American debate. It therefore seems desirable at this point to specify the limits upon the theoretical enterprise attempted in this part of the thesis.

First, I am assuming that the central issues at stake concern the social world, the world of intentional behaviour. Natural science issues clearly do fall into the Soviet-American debate (for example, the performance characteristics of weapons systems). But as was noted in Chapter 1, radically different conclusions on these issues have been reached even within the confines of the American debate, and the issues themselves acquire their special significance only in the context of assumptions about the social world. Thus methodologies commonly associated with the natural sciences are here accorded no privileged status in their own right. They are relevant only insofar as they are also appropriate to the investigation of the social world, for it is with the scientific status of beliefs about that world that this thesis is concerned.

Second, the concern here is not with the status of total 'world views' but with different approaches to a specific issue - great power coexistence -
within a specific historical context. As Ernest Gellner observes, 'in our world it is not merely rulers and regimes, but also types of ownership, production, education, association, expression, thought and research which can have, or fail to have, legitimacy in the eyes of beholders or practitioners'; and this general phenomenon of contemporary life has been writ large in the contemporary Soviet-American ideological struggle. But the only referents of that struggle relevant to this particular argument are those which would license relatively unambiguous statements that both sides ought to conform with certain prudential rules, because these rules were in the long run, or over-riding, or underlying interest of each. This certainly does not mean that all developments within states may be ruled out of court, as irrelevant to the international issue of great power coexistence. But it does mean that a lot of developments within states and a lot of international relations may be treated as essentially irrelevant to the argument, whose core focus will be the two 'spheres' or 'realms' mentioned in the Introduction: the politico-military relations of the two great powers, and the developmental politics of a limited group of economically and strategically crucial Third World states.

Third, it should not be necessary, even within the fairly strict limits defined here, to take an unambiguous position on all significant issues, but only on those over which an apparent conflict between American and Soviet viewpoints exists. Moreover, I would argue that the degree of congruence between these viewpoints is in fact quite substantial, even on the major substantive issue over which they would appear, on the surface, to be most in conflict: the preferred and anticipated direction of the 'world historical process'. For instance, while both sides may, in their ploys for support among crucial Third World states, court groups which might be described as 'Islamic fundamentalist', neither would be prepared to suggest that such states should or could revert to the social order which a truly fundamentalist Islamic programme would require. Rather both are effectively united in endorsing a vision of industrial society for the world as a whole, and divided only in regard to the type of industrial society which they claim to envisage and the means of realization.

Of course, a central component of the mainstream American case is that the United States is committed to promoting international conditions
in which this new world society can emerge in an unplanned, pluralistic fashion, with due allowance for national, religious and other sources of diversity, whereas the Soviet Union allegedly claims the right and the duty to lay down, by force if necessary, a monistic, all embracing vision of world order supposedly sanctioned by scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis. I will be arguing that this distinction is a largely specious one. But it does offer a useful conceptual focus for the argument of these three chapters, not least because it provides the basic rationale for an American hawk reading of Soviet doctrine against the grain of its strong and reiterated insistence on the paramount importance of the avoidance of nuclear war, and of the likely occasions for nuclear war, in the continuing East-West struggle. Moreover, this focus can, for the purposes of conceptual analysis, usefully be linked to two specific philosophical charges against Marxism in general, which imply that a theoretical and political orientation of such a monistic kind must have totalitarian consequences in practice. The first charge is summarized in Popper's rigorous distinction between the genuinely scientific hypothetico-deductive approach to the analysis of social issues, and 'the historicist approach ... which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable only by discovering the "rhythms" or the "patterns", the "laws" or the "trends" that underlie the evolution of history'. The second (which also appears in Popper's related attack on 'utopian social engineering') receives its clearest formulation in Michael Oakeshott's onslaught on the outright folly of Rationalism in politics, with its characterization of Marxism as 'the most stupendous of our political rationalisms ... composed for the instruction of a less politically educated class than any other that has ever come to have the illusion of exercising power'.

The following discussion attempts a somewhat complicated double-sided enterprise: on the one hand, to establish a limited model of contemporary world politics which draws upon the resources of each of the two analytical traditions - the hypothetico-deductive and the hermeneutic - represented in extreme form by Popper and Oakeshott respectively; and on the other, to defend a modified conception of historicism and rationalism against the general critique encapsulated in the earlier, more polemical work of each thinker. To do this in a reasonable space, I have accorded them a special prominence in this chapter as representatives
of two anti-monist perspectives on social and political theory which I wish partly to endorse and partly to reject. This procedure inevitably involves a good deal of simplification of complex issues; but I believe it to be justified on at least three grounds.

First, the work of each thinker has a clear substantive relevance to the general trends of modern pluralist argument which this thesis attempts to engage. The contribution of the Popperian philosophy of science to the general scientific/behavioural project in American political and international theory has already been noted; and, on the other hand, Popper is still widely credited in Anglo-American discourse with having pronounced 'the last word' on the intellectual poverty of historicism. Oakeshott's influence is less immediately obvious, perhaps. But his general perspective appears to me to be clearly apparent in the more sophisticated modern defences of the classical/traditionalist approach to international theory; and in his treatment of the concept of tradition, he provides the fullest philosophical exposition of a concept which appears to me to be vital to the American hawk case for the Russian derivation of Soviet foreign policy, but whose implications are never adequately faced up to by any of these writers, including Pipes.

Second, Popper and Oakeshott are important to this argument in a broadly symbolic sense. The former has been intimately associated with the attempt to specify rigorous logical criteria for acceptable modes of causal explanation, whereas the latter appears to regard causation as a subject into which a gentleman would not enquire. Yet though they proceed from ostensibly polar epistemological assumptions, they converge in striking fashion upon a strong defence of piecemeal, as opposed to utopian or holistic, social engineering in political practice. This phenomenon implies that both these critiques of Marxism are strongly coloured by independently held political values, and this implication is strengthened by the fact that Popper and Oakeshott merely represent the extreme limits of what Gellner has called the 'pluralist chorus' - a 'remarkable consensus' among a diverse array of modern thinkers on the dangerous irrationality of monistic forms of social thought.

Third, and without surrendering the above claim about the importance of their independently held political values, I wish to suggest that a further cause of the convergence between the political prescriptions of Popper and Oakeshott is that their epistemological assumptions are in
fact a good deal less divergent than the rhetoric of either would suggest. Though both might balk at the characterization, each undertakes, in effect, to demythologize Marxism in terms of a radical empiricist definition of reality; and each is inevitably confronted by the problem, long ago pointed out by Hume, that an empiricist account of explanation must rest ultimately on nothing more precise than the association of ideas - and hence upon precedent, tradition, and the prejudice that things will continue to happen as they have been observed to happen before. Of course, Popper's falsificationist adaptation of the logical-empiricist programme was designed to get around precisely this problem: but, as will be argued below, it is impossible to establish a sufficiently rigorous criterion of falsification to meet this goal, despite the very considerable virtues of the concept as a more loosely formulated 'ethic of cognition ...'. By contrast, I would argue that Oakeshott is the legitimate 20th century heir to the tradition of Humean empiricism; and that if one did wish to defend a purely empiricist definition of reality, and simultaneously to account for the obvious competence of the human mind in gaining knowledge of that reality, one would have no other course than to resort to the extreme intuitionist doctrine propounded by him.

This is certainly not to endorse the Oakeshottian position, but rather to emphasize the point that a purely empiricist account of explanation will not stand up to scrutiny, and that if the purely empiricist account falls, so too does a good deal of the mainstream epistemological case against Marxism. This is a difficult and contentious issue, and it will in one way or another provide the theme for most of this chapter.

**Explanation in Natural and Social Science**

This section has a dual aim: to outline the characteristics common to explanation in both fields, and to establish in what senses the social sciences are different. These two themes are deeply interpenetrated in practice, and there will be no attempt to establish any formal separation of them here. Moreover, though I will be defending the goal of scientific analysis of social life, the scientific approach will be identified not with a rigorously defined methodology but with a distinctive 'ethic of
cognition' which demands the intersubjective validation of knowledge claims among the widest possible (informed) audience.

On the one hand, this position entails the rejection of the logical- empiricist attempt to establish a specific logical form of explanation - centred upon the 'covering-law' account of causation - as the touchstone of genuinely scientific argument. Even in the natural sciences, explanation should be seen as at bottom a hermeneutic activity, in which unfamiliar or puzzling phenomena are rendered intelligible by subsuming them within a given frame of meaning (accompanied always by some concomitant modification of the frame of meaning itself), and in which the conclusions reached are always provisional and related to the prevailing concerns and standards of intelligibility of the relevant 'scientific community'. The distinctive feature of the social sciences is their involvement in a 'double hermeneutic', involving a further encounter with the constitutive meanings of the wider social community under investigation; and their conclusions are therefore provisional in the second and more fundamental sense that shifts in consciousness within the wider social community may undermine the very regularities on which the arguments of the scientific community have been predicated.  

On the other hand, I also wish to reject the verstehen / eklären distinction advanced by many hermeneutic theorists in an attempt to defend the special status of the human studies against positivistic claims about the unity of the natural and social sciences (together with the related idiographic/nomothetic distinction sometimes invoked to distinguish history from generalizing social sciences like sociology and economics). The assumption of this thesis is certainly that human behaviour must be accounted for in terms of human meanings, with methodological priority being accorded to the notion of rational action, or action in the agent's own real interests. Conversely, analyses which treat human beings as the puppets of impersonal historical or 'systemic' forces must be regarded as unscientific in precisely the same sense as appeals to the alleged purposes of a transcendent deity - in the sense that they are fundamentally inaccessible to intersubjective critique. But the same is equally true of all idealistic or psychologistic accounts of verstehen as a process of empathy with the subjective mental experiences of others. Therefore, so far from taking the commitment to hermeneutic and rational analysis as the charter for an idealist form of social
theory, I will attempt to show that such a commitment can be realized only in conjunction with a modified variant of 'the materialist conception of history'.

In developing these arguments in detail, it seems useful to begin with the notion of science as an *ethic* of cognition, which, on Gellner's account, derives its thrust from the intersecting claims of the two great 'selector' doctrines which have dominated modern Western epistemology:

1. **Empiricism** A claim to knowledge is legitimate only if it can be justified in terms of experience.

2. **Materialism** (alias mechanism, structuralism, with other possible variant names). A claim to knowledge is legitimate only if it is a specification of a publicly reproducible structure.

There are special problems with this distinction in the social sciences, in that the question of constitutive meanings enters into the identification both of the grandest 'material' structures and of the smallest items of 'empirical' data. These problems will be considered in the following section; but for the moment I should like to note the two-fold relevance of Gellner's concept of a cognitive ethic to the general pluralist/monist controversy in social theory. First, it helps to distinguish the basically commonsense, but extremely valuable, notions which lie at the heart of the empiricist and materialist traditions from the elaborate and sophisticated, but 'unattractive and implausible' doctrine of 'logical form' so strongly promoted in 20th century philosophy as the selector of knowledge claims. And second, it emphasizes the crucial point that the ontological claims of empiricism and materialism are at bottom metaphysical in the sense that religious and mythological ontologies are. Though both these doctrines offer separate (and, in part, mutually contradictory) criteria which deny legitimacy to religious and mythological accounts of reality, their own fundamental assumptions about reality are not directly testable in terms of their own criteria. Thus, as Alan Ryan suggests, assertions about the phenomenalist character of reality or the existence of determinate physical causes for all events are most usefully interpreted in a normative vein, as 'methodological
instructions ... about the way to conduct science', which 'like any advice ... are to be assessed as more or less fruitful or fruitless'.

It may seem pedantic to belabour this point, while at the same time endorsing the view that such instructions have proved, on balance, extremely fruitful in the natural sciences, and that they should, with due recognition of their ambiguities, be taken as the founding charter of the social sciences as well. However, while the empiricist and materialist world views may both be regarded as extremely important - and indeed as jointly indispensable to science despite the serious aspects of tension between them - it matters a great deal, for one's approach to the issues discussed in this thesis, which of the two perspectives is accorded the greatest deference in practice. And in the Western, and particularly the Anglo-American tradition, empiricism has very much received the inside running. It is not merely that the empiricist position has been far better represented in abstract philosophical argument, whereas the materialist one has received its strongest defence from thinkers such as Hobbes and Marx, whose real eminence was not in formal philosophy but in other fields. It is also that the modern empiricist tradition has quietly expropriated part of the materialist patrimony in the form of the 'mechanistic' model of explanation, and deployed it in polemics over social and political issues as a genuinely empiricist device, guaranteed - if employed in a discriminating, piecemeal fashion - to 'demythologize' the grand theoretical structures erected by full-blooded materialists such as Marx.

I wish now to argue that the modern empiricist contrast between genuinely 'mechanistic' social theories, which acknowledge the irreducible plurality of the social world, and 'mythological' or 'essentialist' theoretical structures like Marxism, which allegedly do not, is greatly overstated. Indeed, in its strong Popperian form, this contrast seems to me to be inconsistent both with the observable practice of the natural sciences, and with the falsificationist ethic which informs Popper's attempt to establish strict logical criteria distinguishing science from non-science.

To begin with the empiricist insistence upon the sovereignty of the facts. Empiricism offers an 'objectivist' criterion of truth as correspondence with the facts; but this position is tenable only on the
basis of the prior metaphysical postulate of another correspondence between
the facts (understood as sense-data) and the facts (understood as the
'reality out there'). If this postulate were false (if reality did involve
crucial features such as angels and interventionist deities which were
inaccessible to human sensory equipment), the foundation would be cut
away not merely from 'verificationist' versions of the empiricist case,
but from Popper's 'falsificationist' reformulation of it as well. For
while the latter carefully substitutes 'verisimilitude' for absolute
truth as the goal of the scientific enterprise, it is perfectly conceivable,
from outside the empiricist metaphysic, that an infinite number of
falsifications by reference to the facts - as-sense-data could fail to
provide any greater insight into the facts - as-reality.\footnote{14}

Moreover, this anomaly of the empiricist position cannot be resolved
by a stance of outright phenomenalism, because to insist that one can
know only the phenomena, in all their plurality and uniqueness, is to
insist upon a formless and unstructured reality which could not be known
at all. There must be selection and categorization of the phenomena if
any sense is to be made of them; but if the selection criteria are not
in turn linked to general statements about the way observable reality is
structured into more and less fundamental relationships, there can be
no way of assessing their fruitfulness relative to all the other
selection criteria which might conceivably be employed.\footnote{15} The account
of such structuring which empiricism can generate from its own resources
- the 'analysis of covering-laws as contingent universal statements of
regularities in the natural order'\footnote{16} - is far too restrictive to account
for the far reaching theoretical achievements of the natural sciences
themselves. As is clearly acknowledged by the absorption of the rhetoric
of mechanism into the orthodoxy of modern empiricism - to say nothing
of the elaborate hypothetico-deductive assault on the follies of the
inductivist strand of the empiricist tradition - the explanatory
competence of the natural sciences can be understood only in terms of
the creative, metaphorical activity of the human imagination, constantly
striving to 'get behind' the facts and identify the deeper principles by
which they are ordered or structured.

The key question, for the purposes of this argument, concerns the
scope and level of abstraction of the 'deep structures' postulated
behind the facts. And it is at this point that serious anomalies in
the empiricist (and more specifically Popperian) case against Marxism begin to emerge. All the logic of Popper's falsificationist position requires that he should support theoretical abstraction of the widest scope practicable, for the most powerful and falsifiable theory (the one which generates the largest number of empirically testable hypotheses) should be the one which subsumes as many facts as possible under as few basic principles as possible. And in his approach to the natural sciences, where he comes out strongly against the instrumentalist view that theories are no more than ad hoc tools of research to be evaluated by their success in solving particular problems, he insists that the historical evolution of theoretical knowledge has accorded with the logical requirements of this falsificationist ethic, being 'largely dominated by a tendency towards increasing integration and towards unified theories'.

However, when Popper turns to the question of our knowledge of the social world, the only type of theoretical activity which he is prepared to endorse is activity of an ad hoc, applied or technological kind. Grand theoretical structures like that of Marx are repudiated, and the preferred alternative is characterized in terms of an imagery of piecemeal social engineering which is strikingly reminiscent of Oakeshott's pronouncements on the same theme (if less determinedly pre-industrial in flavour). As H.T.Wilson points out, 'it is precisely the holistic and historicist commitment to the goal of conceptual and theoretical unity' which underlies the 'unremitting criticism' by Popper and his supporters of social theory conceived in terms of a reflexive and dialectical interaction with social practice.

Moreover, this contrast reflects a fundamental dilemma arising from the insistence upon strict logical criteria for what are to count as scientific assertions in the mainstream hypothetico-deductive account. The first point to emphasize is that, even according to that account, laws do not of themselves explain anything. To explain the occurrence of something, in a reasonably uncontroversial statement of this position, is 'to show why, given the circumstances, it had to occur - to show that nothing else could have occurred under these conditions'. But a statement of a law is merely a generalization that a de facto regularity, observable in the past, can be expected to hold good for the
future as well; and this is just as true of nomothetic or covering laws, which assert the invariant (or probabilistic) co-appearance of certain types of phenomena, as it is of historicist laws, which purport to reduce an observable pattern of change to a basic progression or 'series', and to demonstrate that the series can be projected into the future. One of Popper's strongest criticisms of historicism is that it confuses causal explanation with the mere identification of trends: but it is important to recognize that historicist analysis (except as defined in Popper's custom-built straw man) need not fall into this trap, and that covering-law analysis need not avoid it.20 The key question is whether the analysis also involves the attempt to get behind the facts and demonstrate, by reference to mechanistic or structuralist explanations, why the patterns in question must necessarily occur. If the analysis does attempt this extra step (as Marx's analysis obviously did) it meets the basic requirements of the deductive explanation: if not, it does not meet those requirements, whether or not the laws proposed are of the historicist or the covering-law variety.

Thus the covering-law model provides no positive assistance in formulating plausible deductive explanations of phenomena, but merely sets out criteria regarding the logical form in which explanations independently arrived at must be cast if they are to be convincingly tested. There is also no a priori reason why one should not identify a given structure as the underlying 'generative' cause of various important patterns of continuity in social life, while simultaneously predicting the dissolution of that structure, and the patterns of continuity sustained by it, through the working out of its inherent contradictions in the longer term. Indeed, I would argue, following Marx, that without some concept of structural contradiction there could be no adequate account of some of the most fundamental features of large-scale historical change.21 However, once one considers the problem of adapting statements about large-scale social change to the covering-law approach, the logical distinction between that and the historicist approach begins to dissolve. Whatever else may be said about the former account of causation, it presumably must entail the view that the cause-effect relationship is a transitive one, such that the effect of a cause is also the effect of the cause of that cause (and of the cause of that cause, and so on, as Weber has observed, back to eternity).22 Therefore, a
relationship between states of affairs A, B, C, and D which may be expressed in the covering-law form - Whenever A then B, Whenever B then C, Whenever C then D - may equally be expressed in the historicist form - A leads (indirectly but inevitably) to D.

Irrespective of the formal idiom involved, therefore, the basic question remains the same: is one to pursue the goal of an over-all coherence among small-scale explanations of social phenomena, or confine oneself solely to the investigation of small, isolated 'islands of intelligibility' within the ocean of social life, adopting an essentially agnostic attitude to large-scale issues such as the development of Western capitalism? And insofar as one does address the larger issues, are they to be conceptualized, along Marxist lines, in terms of real, historically specific structures, or merely, as Weber suggests, as a 'finite segment', selected on subjective grounds of value relevance, of 'the vast chaotic stream of events, which flows away through time'?23

It is possible to identify two broad responses to this dilemma which have been influential in contemporary pluralist approaches to international relations. The first, and the most consistent with empirical principles, leads towards the technological perspective advocated by Popper. Since 'historicist' statements are repudiated, and non-trivial covering-law statements about human affairs are always limited to a specific historical and social context, the only appropriately modest goal for social theory is 'success', while the moment lasts. One is thus left with the image offered by Cornelia Navari, in a recent attempt to spell out the implications of the 'mechanistic' viewpoint for international theory, of a multitude of 'small ... cause-and-effect machines', living in an untroubled condition of peaceful coexistence with one another but demythologizing grand theoretical structures by their 'single-stage' preoccupation with the particular.24 But if all the big myths have been demolished, and all the little mechanisms (to mix a metaphor) are left marching to the beat of their own private drummer, what practical advance has been made over the unstructured confusion of the pure empiricist view of a world of sovereign facts?

In practice, this simple equation (mechanistic=small-scale=good) would be sustainable only if it were possible to test individual mechanistic explanations definitively against a realm of theory-neutral facts. However, one need not embrace the more extreme implications of
the Kuhnian notion of 'incommensurable' paradigms to hold that such a definitive testing process is unattainable. As Imre Lakatos puts it (in the context of a general defence of 'sophisticated methodological falsificationism', and one drawing primarily on examples from the 'harder' of the natural sciences), 'there are no such things as crucial experiments', in which promising theories are shot down in a two-sided encounter with a set of recalcitrant facts. Rather, the encounter is always at the very least a three-sided one between the facts, 'an explanatory theory to judge by the "facts" delivered from outside, and 'an interpretative theory to judge the "facts" delivered from outside'. The respective roles assigned to the different theories are contextually determined by the problem under discussion, and the partisans of a beleaguered explanatory theory have always the option of attacking the explanatory credentials of the (till now unproblematic) interpretative theory.  

Moreover, the inadequacy of the piecemeal, technological approach is further illustrated by Lakatos' positive arguments for the possibility of rational testing in science. The object of testing, he argues, is not an isolated theory but a 'research programme' - a 'series of theories' linked together by a common 'negative heuristic' or 'hard core' of assumptions which cannot be surrendered without abandoning the programme altogether. This hard core is defended tenaciously against empirical 'anomalies', with tests being directed to the 'positive heuristic' or 'protective belt' of 'auxiliary hypotheses which may be adjusted and readjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus hardened core'. Falsification has an essentially 'historical character', occurring only occasionally and in retrospect, when a theory which has already survived multiple anomalies because of the lack of a more promising alternative is 'refuted' by another which can accommodate both the successful predictions of its predecessor and its failures as well. The basic criterion for a 'progressive problem shift' within a research programme plagued by growing anomalies is the development of new theories which combine greater empirical content with successful predictions, without either introducing ad hoc assumptions which erode the simplicity and economy of the hard core or introducing assumptions which directly contradict the hard core and thus prefigure the emergence of a new research programme altogether.  

Clarity in the definition of the hard core is thus of great importance in identifying the full implications of theory-
saving proposals, in making retrospective judgements on falsification, and in prising apart for testing purposes explanatory and interpretative theories which may become 'soldered together' in the practical development of a given research programme.²⁸

Thus the central paradox of the Popperian position is that, by repudiating for social theory the kind of over-arching, 'essentialist' concepts implied in Lakatos' notion of the hard core, it effectively confines the social theorist to the application of trained 'judgement' to the interpretation of more or less 'intelligible contingencies' among particular clusters of events - a theme which has been developed most strongly by hermeneutically inclined opponents of the attempt to apply the covering-law model to the question of historical explanation.²⁹ I certainly do not mean to reject all the arguments of this latter group: indeed, this thesis will closely follow their emphasis on the centrality of the actor's reasons to assertions about social action, and on the primacy of description and narrative in the practical explanation of social phenomena (from the most extended account, fleshed out with a mass of taken-for-granted 'corroborative detail' to the most minute dissection of a no longer taken for granted 'event' into a multitude of intersecting chains of 'sub-events').³⁰

However, in the Anglo-American context, the defence of the traditional historical method has usually drawn upon some version of the verstehen/eklären and idiographic/nomothetic distinctions, together with a more or less explicit appeal to the notion of 'methodological individualism' - identifying the historical above all with the unique and the mutable, and rejecting not merely the covering-law approach to generalization but generalization in general as a major component of historical argument.³¹ Insofar as such a concept of intuitive judgement is extended to the problems of generalizing social theory, it focusses attention above all on the dialectical process by which each new element of experience entering the realm of intelligibility in turn alters the entire conceptual field in terms of which it is rendered intelligible. In such a perspective-expressed in Oakeshott's account of human understanding, and in Pragmatist reformulations of the empirical approach in the American context - there can be no general criteria other than internal 'coherence' (and perhaps 'elegance') for evaluating the knowledge claims implicated in a given 'conceptual world'.³²
Such frank relativism in the face of large-scale social issues has indeed been an important feature of the classical approach to international theory - which has been strongly influenced by the sceptical empiricism of diplomatic history, with its concern with the wisdom or folly of individual statesmen, on the one hand, and by quasi-idealist accounts of the broad traditions of European international society, on the other. However, as will be argued in later sections, an implicit appeal to a monistic conception of the states-system can be discerned even in leading statements of the classical approach; and the tendency to make such leaps of faith was even more marked in the mainstream American debate, in which the influence of the behavioural aspiration towards a far-reaching body of 'empirical' social and political theory was especially marked. In this second, more overtly theoretical response to the dilemma mentioned above, the discrepancy between epistemological premises and substantive results was particularly profound; but the anomalies of the enterprise were shrouded from its partisans, for several related reasons.

First, there was the widespread acceptance of the synchrony/diachrony distinction, which in turn masked the dubious character of the distinction between covering-law and historicist modes of argument. The one substantial body of non-trivial covering-laws produced in the social sciences - the laws of market equilibrium in marginalist economics - was hedged about in practice by so many ceteris paribus assumptions as to imply a grand historicist argument (though in this instance about continuity rather than change) accounting for the persistence of the broad social and political conditions which would render an equilibrium model of the market plausible. In turn, the historicist argument thus implied was explicitly enunciated (in a highly revealing division of labour in modern pluralist theory) by a variety of functionalist and systemic theories which, whatever their formal differences, were united by their assumption of the validity of formal synchronic analysis, with the implied corollary that continuity, unlike change, required no special explanation. Of course, the proponents of such theories were not blind to the fundamental empirical problem of change in the modern world. But the covering-law campaign, by focusing so strongly on the illegitimacy of extended narratives anticipating massive change in social and political conditions,
also helped to disguise the fact that narratives about social and political continuity were narratives (i.e. accounts with a temporal dimension) at all.

Second, the wholesale transfer of mechanistic and organic analogies from the natural to the social sciences has made it difficult to think through the full social implications of theories couched primarily in these terms, and to identify the crucial anomalies within and between them. For instance, if the central propositions of marginalist economics, on the one hand, and of Parsonian 'normative functionalism', on the other, are expressed in terms of their distinctive 'models of man' and models of social structure, the above mentioned division of labour in modern pluralist theory can be seen to involve basic incoherencies. Both perspectives conceal beneath their ostensibly universal terminology a teleological assumption about the historical givenness of a very specific social order. But the economist's ideal construct assumes a population of calculating, utility-maximizing individuals confronting one another as free, equal and atomistic individuals in the market place - a combination which, if not confined to a very narrow range of 'economic' activities, would rapidly reduce society to a Hobbesian 'war of all against all'. Parsonian functionalism implies that the economy (the 'adaptive sub-system') can be effectively insulated within a cocoon of traditional and affective social and political relationships: but it solves the 'Hobbesian problem of order' only by a circular argument which assumes that the normal individual's need disposition towards personal psychological 'equilibrium' will lead to the widespread internalization of the prevailing social norms, with psychologically derived 'deviance' the main source of threats to the continuity of such a social order. However, these glaring discrepancies between Economic Man and Sociological Man shelter behind the more opaque relationships between concepts such as functional equilibrium and market force equilibrium - concepts whose relative 'cash value' cannot readily be assessed precisely because they are not really meaningful descriptions of social life at all. The result is that fundamental anomalies within the broad corpus of pluralist/behavioural theory have often been obscured, while essentially cosmetic distinctions - as between functionalist, cybernetic and general systems approaches, for instance - have been greatly exaggerated.
Third, there was the influence of the sophisticated methodological nominalism invoked, explicitly or implicitly, by the more ambitious behavioural theorists. This doctrine, together with the assumption of the availability of a theory-neutral observation language, provided for the development of far-reaching taxonomies and 'conceptual frameworks' which were rationalized as nothing more than sets of tautologies or definitional truths—filing systems for ordering (but not prejudicing) the data, whose utility could be indirectly assessed by the empirical testing of operational propositions developed in terms of them. More specifically, it licensed the influential Eastonian defence of 'constructive' as against 'natural' systems noted in the previous chapter. Enquiry into the real or natural existence of complex entities such as systems was a blind alley, Easton argued. 'Any aggregate of interactions that we choose to identify may be said to form a system'. And though this strategy necessitated a further distinction between 'interesting' and 'trivial' systems, the former criterion would be met by any set of interactions which were 'relevant [to] some theoretical problems ... show some degree of interdependence, and seem to have a common fate'.

On the surface, this sceptical approach to major organizing concepts solely in terms of their 'heuristic' usefulness would appear directly contrary to the reification of mechanistic and organic metaphors alluded to immediately above. But in practice, as M.Hollis and E.J.Nell point out, reification is the inevitable result of the attempt to construct rigorous conceptual models without committing oneself directly on the question of their correspondence with the real world. For the logical rigour of such a model depends upon the armoury of ceteris paribus assumptions with which it is hedged about, and the facts which would test its predictions must always be open to 'adjustment' on the grounds that ceteris were not paribus. 'Tests are thus decisive only when the facts fit the model', for only then is it clear that ceteris are paribus, and the positive predictions of the model, therefore, are 'standardly irrefutable'.

Moreover, although this problem exists even for the natural sciences, as Lakatos' argument acknowledges, there is for social theory the special problem of ongoing historical change—in part because of purposive action directly inspired by various theoretical models—in the regularities of the social world. It is in this regard that the synchronic assumptions
encapsulated in formal systems theory are crucial. Theoretical
prescriptions of the Eastonian variety have the effect both of making
the 'boundary' between 'system' and 'environment' crucial to the
explanation of the 'normal' functioning of the system, and of removing
the identification of that boundary from the area of empirical inquiry
by building it into the original definition of the system (for instance,
by relegating the 'economic system' along with the 'ecological system',
to the general environment of the 'political system', thus making a
major economic crisis as random an 'input' into the political system
as, say, an earthquake). The basic rationale for this procedure -
that all boundaries are essentially analytical conventions - does make
sense within the context of an assumed infinity of potential 'social
systems' revolving in a synchronic universe outside historical time.
But once one rejects this for the view that patterns of continuity, like
patterns of change, must be demonstrated and accounted for over time,
the problem of boundaries - as between polity and economy in domestic
social orders, for instance, or between states-system and world-economy
in an allegedly 'interdependent' world order - can be recognized as the
crucial theoretical and empirical issue that it is.

In summary, I would argue that neither of the two broad responses
to the empiricist dilemma reviewed here is adequate; and that, insofar
as even ostensibly a-theoretical pluralist thinking on international
issues has normally assumed some kind of 'international system', both
approaches have led towards general organizing concepts which, on the face
of it, are immune to empirical challenge and criticizable only in terms
of their internal coherence. Moreover, I would argue that the plausibility
of small-scale explanations ultimately cannot be assessed without relating
them to large-scale organizing concepts; that definition, description
and explanation are inter-related at all levels of abstraction; and that
all three are implicated in narrative as the dominant mode of social
analysis. Within this general commitment to the narrative mode, I will be
further identifying social systems as structured historical 'episodes',
and attempting to establish the reality of the states-system - the only
truly plausible political system in modern history - as the pivotal
support of the over-arching theoretical perspective on contemporary world
politics developed in this thesis. This implies a concept of system
very different from the behavioural one; and one which, while rejecting
the teleological implications of mechanistic and organic analogies in the social sciences, presumes the explanatory power of 'real', historically specific social structures. It thus involves a general defence of methodological realism, to which we must now turn.

The argument here for methodological realism is a limited and, so to speak, left-handed one. It is directed not against the nominalist principle as such, but against the contrast drawn by empiricist thinkers such as the early Popper between the mythological or 'essentialist' character of such Marxist concepts as 'the capitalist mode of production' and the genuinely scientific tendency to regard major organizing concepts merely as devices for handling the data and for generating conditional or counterfactual statements. The case for a thoroughgoing nominalism seem to me incontestable: but it should be a thoroughgoing nominalism, which extends right back to the primary convention that the facts (understood as sense-data) are the facts (understood as reality).

From this position of universal scepticism, the epistemological path would seem to divide in two radically different directions: the one towards the world-denying idealism of some Eastern religions, the other towards Western science with its continued assertion of an 'intersubjectively available' world. Under the latter metaphysic, the statement of universal scepticism may be reinterpreted in practice as a plea for the universal suspension of a priori disbelief, and for the assessment of all organizing concepts, from the smallest 'fact' to the largest 'material structure', solely in terms of their utility in advancing intersubjectively validated knowledge of the world. The ruling convention, that is to say, is actually a dual one: de jure nominalism combined with de facto realism. After the first blanket statement of scepticism, therefore, any further piecemeal expressions of the nominalist principle (to which the Popperian school has inclined in practice if not in theory) are not merely redundant but actually
subversive of the scientific enterprise. For they represent the piecemeal application of the realist subterfuge to certain concepts ('hard facts') at the expense of others ('essentialist' material structures).

Another useful way of expressing this point is in terms of Oakeshott's analysis of human understanding. The key proposition is that understanding is 'a continuous, self-moved, critical enterprise of theorizing'. Every distinction between a 'this' and a 'that'—every identification of a specific 'going on' by abstracting it 'from all that may be going on', in terms of its own 'ideal character' as a 'unity of particularity and genericity'—is a theoretical exercise. Conversely, every stage in the open-ended process of theorizing, whatever its level of abstraction, represents no more than a 'conditional platform of understanding', at which the theorist may either turn aside and explore in greater detail the characteristics of an entity whose character as an intelligible entity is taken to be unproblematic, or else resume the theoretical enterprise by questioning the (now problematic) assumptions or postulates in terms of which the former intelligibility was constituted.

From this perspective, the distinction between description and explanation is always in part a contextual one, depending on the situation and on the judgements of individuals and communities as to what is problematic. One might, for instance, be involved primarily in either description or explanation in addressing any of the following distinctions: between a congeries of drunken street brawls and a political riot; between a fortuitous conjunction of essentially separate rebellions and a general revolution; between a proto-national, proto-bureaucratic modernizing empire and a modern nation-state; between a Chinese states-system in the era of the Warring States and a thousand year breakdown of effective central control within a nominally continuous Chinese world-empire. One might expect that the 'goings on' identified at the latter end of this spectrum would normally be regarded as far more problematic than those at the former. But for certain theoretical purposes 'historical states-systems' might well be taken as more or less given data, while the assumptions involved in classifying small-scale instances of 'collective violence' might be subjected to searching inquiry.
Conceived in these terms, therefore, scientific inquiry appears as a process of thinking through the implications of a given 'conceptual world'—on a multiplicity of inter-related levels, from the most abstract to the most detailed, and with the aid of certain over-arching metaphors which are, normally, readily recognizable as such. Moreover, this perspective undermines the empiricist attempt to dismiss historicist reasoning as incompatible with the crucial operation of counterfactual analysis. The impression is sometimes given that this notion is relevant only to statements which can be rendered in covering-law terms. However, Ryan argues that even in the natural sciences counterfactual statements are more properly interpreted as 'causal narratives'; and as regards social analysis, there is a particularly strong case for identifying them with an extensive range of 'imagined effects'—including historicist predictions and Rationalist utopias—whose common characteristic is that they tell a story about what would happen, or would have happened, if certain conditions were fulfilled. Thus it would be perfectly possible to construct a counterfactual 'decoding' of Marx's analysis of capitalism along the following lines: 'If it were the case that we had access to reality through sense-data, and that we could get behind the sense-data to the deeper principles by which reality was ordered, and that I was right about what those deeper principles were, then this is what would be going on in the production and reproduction of capitalism'. One would scarcely bother with such an abstruse decoding operation in practice. But it is no more abstruse, I believe, than that proposed by the covering-law theorists for historical explanation in general and considerably more to the point.

There remains the problem of establishing the 'commensurability' of rival conceptual worlds, and securing their (relative) openness to the test of experience, rather than merely to criticism in terms of their own internal coherence. The most promising strategy here, drawing upon Lakatos' notion of a research programme, appears to be one which makes the interpenetration and internal structural divisions of such worlds the key to their hermeneutic mediation one against another. However, it is necessary to qualify Lakatos' basic picture to account for two special points about social theories: first, that the distinction between hard core and protective belt is inevitably more fuzzy than for natural science theories; and second, that a crucial index of their
fidelity to experience is their commensurability with the conceptual worlds of the social actors whose universe they purport to describe. I will now consider the implications of this double hermeneutic for the comparison of the two concepts proposed in this thesis as a decodification of the Soviet duality of 'international system' and 'world historical process': the modern states-system and the 'transitional' world-economy. In the course of this argument, I will also attempt to clarify and delimit the commitment to historicism and monism implied in the earlier critique of pluralist approaches, both classical and behavioural, to international theory.

The first point concerns the importance of 'excess empirical content', linked more or less closely to hard core assumptions, as the key to the long-term evaluation of research programmes. It seems fair to argue that major social theories are confronted with new empirical challenges not, as with natural science theories, primarily through the ongoing development of experimental techniques, but rather through the historical ramifications of complex social structures, through historical shifts in the consciousness (or conceptual worlds) of social actors, and through the emergence of 'new' social actors as a result of major structural change. Thus classical Marxism is relatively 'testable' precisely by virtue of those features commonly attacked as unscientific by pluralist theorists: namely, its monistic and historicist concern with developments within, and transformations of, large-scale historical structures. Conversely, the behavioural tendency to assume system boundaries and a synchronic dimension as a matter of definitional convenience (to say nothing of the pure pluralist rejection of any overarching theoretical concepts) militates against such 'testability' as is possible in the social sciences.

Of course, there can be no question of testability in regard to historicist concepts which are so all-embracing as to make it impossible to 'stand outside' and criticize them from any substantially independent position; and the formal Soviet doctrine of the world historical process must be regarded as methodologically indefensible in precisely this sense. But except for the ideological pieties which Soviet authors must observe on political grounds, there is no reason why the central analytical core of the Soviet position - the Leninist theory of imperialism and the accompanying 'world crisis' of capitalism - should be subsumed under such an all-embracing rubric. It is possible instead to relate the
Leninist picture to the notion of a global 'transition' to industrialism which is regarded as contingent but given - leaving aside the question of whether such a structural break in modern history had to occur, while still maintaining that it is occurring and that it constitutes a general bounded framework for contemporary world politics.

The appeal here is to the notion of episodic analysis, and to the possibility of evaluating a bounded historical 'episode' both against conceivable futures which it excludes and against those past courses of events from which it is alleged to constitute a distinct break. As Gellner argues, this notion is applicable even if one takes the great modern transformation in economic, political and intellectual structures back to its origins in early modern Europe. The result, 'however large and fundamental ... is an episode in the philosophically relevant sense that it is an event in a wider world: literally and conceptually, it is not coextensive with that world'. However, a much more immediately relevant framework for the evaluation of the Soviet version of Leninism is Barraclough's notion of the 'transition' from modern to contemporary history - a fundamental realignment, initiated in the late 1880s and more or less completed by the late 1950s, of the underlying 'skeleton' or 'framework' of contemporary world politics. With this narrower focus upon the dialectic of European imperial expansion and the political and economic responses it evoked in the colonial and semi-colonial regions, the episodic nature of the transition becomes much more clearly defined. So conceived, it cuts across a very different course of events formerly unfolding in much of the non-Western world, and the proposition that this transition has fundamentally changed the structure of world politics commits one to the exclusion of fairly clearly definable future courses of events in both the Western and the non-Western context.

It is still necessary to indicate what relevance the basic Marxist-Leninist perspective on the dynamics of world capitalism has to this theoretical enterprise, and to suggest a useful reconciliation between that perspective and the rudimentary notion of 'international system' soldered onto it by Soviet spokesmen over the Peaceful Coexistence era. To do this, one must address a second and more complex question about the 'research program' concept: that of the inherent plausibility or implausibility of hard core assumptions themselves. In the natural sciences, there would seem to be no reason for regarding any one hard
core proposition (for example, 'no action at a distance') as inherently more or less plausible than any potential competitor. But in the social sciences, it does seem possible to pass judgement, if not on the inherent plausibility of basic explanatory assumptions, at least on the adequacy of the basic 'problematics' to which different social theories are addressed.

As Hollis argues (in an analysis with important affinities to that of Lakatos), the process of gaining access to a foreign conceptual world (or a foreign 'form of life' or 'tradition of behaviour') is analogous to that of decoding an unknown language. The 'Enquirer' can make no progress without establishing an initial 'bridgehead', involving 'definitive interpretations of enough terms [or practices] to restrict possible meanings of others', and this must be done a priori, by identifying certain fundamental issues which must be addressed in any language' and imputing rationality (i.e. a mode of rationality accessible to the Enquirer) in the treatment of those issues by the 'Other Mind'. Like Lakatos' hard core, such a bridgehead can generate a multiplicity of empirically testable hypotheses which may be retained, discarded or recycled in the detailed exploration of the new world; and if this exploration reveals excessive deviations in practice from the Enquirer's expectations about normal relationships between terms (or practices) and situations, it may lead in turn to retrospective changes in the bridgehead itself. 'But there are wholly crucial limits' to the extent of such changes tolerable without the effective abandonment of the decoding proposal defined by that particular bridgehead, and there is no way round 'the a priori character of the original starting point:

[The Enquirer's] only access to the Other Mind's experience is through interpreting behaviour and utterance. If he had to get at the phenomena before he could interpret and had to interpret before he could get at the phenomena, there would be no way into the circle. He assumes a single world being described in two languages less because there is than because there will have to be. On any other assumption he cannot begin at all.

The methodological implications of assuming rationality will be considered in the next section. At this point, however, it is important to consider whether there are any major substantive issues which one might reasonably expect to be addressed in any social order incorporating
(as do the various orders considered in this thesis) a complex, over¬
arching division of labour. I would argue that two such issues are
identifiable: the maintenance of political order, through hierarchical
patterns of power and authority; and the appropriation by restricted
groups of a socially produced surplus. If one also adopts the generic
terms authorization and allocation to refer to these respective processes,
it should be possible to make a broad substantive distinction between
redistributive social orders (whether 'national' or 'imperial') in which
allocation is a sub-set of authorization and ultimately reflects the
overall distribution of coercive power, and essentially capitalist social
orders, in which allocation is substantially independent (and perhaps
even predominant) principle, which reflects ultimately a distribution
of economic power substantially independent of any centralized coercive
authority.

Such a formulation helps to highlight the historical specificity
of modern capitalist social orders. But, more crucial to the present
discussion, it also indicates a basic structural difference regarding the
'givenness' of contemporary capitalism in the international as against
the domestic arena. In the international sphere, the independence of
transnational capital from any over-arching political authority directly
reflects the fundamental political fact of a plurality of 'sovereign'
states, together with a sufficient equality of power among the great to
render the reduction of that plurality to a single central authority
extremely unlikely without a devastating general war. Thus the
structural pre-requisites of the modern capitalist world-economy (as
emerges clearly from Immanuel Wallerstein's arguments on this point) might
also be regarded, from a different standpoint, as the structural pre-
requisites of the modern states-system. And indeed, Martin Wight, the
most impressive contemporary exponent of the latter concept, not only
designates as a 'states-system' essentially the same politico-economic
entity which Wallerstein designates as a 'world-economy' but like him
points to the progressive expansion of that entity - always divided
internally between 'core' and 'periphery' - from its European origins in
the late 15th century to its global extension in the present day.

In the domestic sphere, by contrast, essentially redistributive
social orders have been the norm rather than the exception, even for
most of the history of the modern world-economy; they remain in evidence,
in the shape of the socialist states, over a good part of the advanced industrial world today; and the barriers against a return to a redistributive order within established capitalist societies are not so much structural as political, reflecting the active preferences of ruling elites, and at least the passive acquiescence of broad masses, in those societies. Moreover, while one might reasonably conclude that these political restraints will remain extremely powerful, at least for the period considered in this thesis, in the advanced capitalist societies themselves, the same is not obviously true of those 'transitional' states which have been fully drawn into the orbit of the modern states-system and world-economy only through the rapid and traumatic developments of the past century. On the one hand, the impact of transnational capital has effectively disrupted the traditional social order in many of these societies, generating far-reaching social tensions without in itself promoting new political structures which might contain these tensions, or even the clear prospect of offsetting material improvements in the lives of the masses. On the other, these societies still retain major links to the great tradition of 'politics in command' from which the Western capitalist drive to 'insulate' economics from politics constitutes a recent and geographically-limited departure; their indigenous political cultures, for the most part, seem less conducive to an individualistic 'capitalist ethic' than were those of Western Europe; and insofar as their ruling elites have supplemented these traditional values by a 'nationalist' consciousness of their position in a highly competitive states-system, that consciousness in turn is likely to provide important incentives for attempts to bend the course of economic development to 'national' political ends.

In summary, I would argue that the apparent stability of the capitalist world-economy as a whole is belied by the potential instability of its parts, and that both aspects of this phenomenon may be directly related to the same basic structural features of contemporary world politics. Moreover, a similar assertion may be made in regard to the contemporary states-system, insofar as the stability of the great power relationship could be sharply affected by radical shifts in the politico-economic orientation of a number of leading transitional states. Indeed, it is precisely the phenomenon of a world politically plural—dominated by competing 'sovereign' authorities—yet economically more or less unified under the over-arching allocative framework of a single world
market, which is constitutive both of the broad international status-quo and of the chief threats to that status-quo, and which makes it still illuminating to speak of an ongoing, but piecemeal, process of 'transition' in contemporary world politics.

It is now possible to summarize this discussion of the problem of bringing social 'research programmes' before the bar of historical experience. To begin with, theories which finesse the basic historical tension between authorization and allocation by a resort to synchronic assumptions and to definitional boundaries between political and economic systems may be regarded as not merely untestable but grounded in an inherently inadequate problematic. These considerations license the rejection of the recent 'interdependence paradigm', at least as a grand theory of world politics; for though its adherents have loudly proclaimed the current interpenetration of international politics and economics, the relationship which they depict is not a truly dialectical one but rather a mechanical juxtaposition of the established pluralist images of a political and an economic system, leaving effectively untouched the conceptual divorce between politics and economics which permitted each sphere to be conceptualized in 'systemic' terms in the first place. Similarly, mainstream American modernization theory may be rejected as a description of the internal dynamics of transitional states, both because it too incorporates the substantive implications of this conceptual divorce between politics and economics and also because, as Wallerstein emphasizes, it effectively assumes that each national 'transition' can be treated as a discrete phenomenon, without significant reference to the wider international structures which create such major discrepancies in the options open to early and late entrants on this process.

However, Wallerstein may himself be criticized for arbitrarily attributing to the allocative principle a general supremacy in the modern world which is belied by his own insistence that a pluralistic political configuration is a fundamental distinguishing mark of a world-economy. Moreover, despite his insistence on historically grounded theory, Wallerstein in fact relies heavily upon a synchronic approach to capitalism as a world-system and upon teleological arguments about system-maintenance which militate against an examination of historically specific relationships within the period of the capitalist 'system' itself. And despite the avowed Marxist orientation of his work, he shows less concern
with structural contradiction than with the functional interdependence of the various actors in the respective roles - core, semi-periphery and periphery - in which they are cast by the allocative demands of the world market mechanism, with the result that the Soviet Union is formally classified as merely another core state of the capitalist world-economy, while China is relegated to the semi-periphery along with such a political minnow as Australia.\footnote{56}

By contrast with these approaches, this thesis will emphasize the lagged and contradictory character of social change (including the way in which different societies have tended to 'leapfrog' one another in the ongoing process of political, military and economic transition of the past few centuries),\footnote{57} while still seeking to highlight the bedrock determinants of this process in the broad structures of military and economic power in the modern world. However, even given this strong emphasis on historical specificity, the notion of a 'global transition' still presents the problem of 'standing outside' a monistic concept which effectively refers to the entire socio-political environment of the contemporary era. Though any attempt to reach a this/that verdict on whether the contemporary United States, for instance, was 'really' a nation-state or a multi-national empire would be monistic in its way, judgements on such an issue may at least be related to a range of material and cultural factors which are substantially external to the phenomenon in question. But how is one to refine the concept of 'global transition' in the direction of either 'states-system' or 'world-economy', when both the 'this' and the 'that' appear, on the accounts of their respective defenders, to fill out the entire conceptual space so as to allow no independent ground for criticism?

In the recent history of Western (including 'structuralist' and 'neo-Marxist') international theory, the confrontation between states-system and world-economy perspectives has indeed suggested a clash of incommensurable paradigms - with the committed on either side talking past their opponents in self-contained theoretical languages, and the occasional attempts to bridge the gap relying on ad hoc judgements about the superiority of one or other perspective in illuminating specific substantive problems.\footnote{58} However, the argument here is that the 'schizophrenic' pattern of Soviet international theory points the way towards the appropriate position on the states-system/world-economy
relationship, and that the appropriate position is not either/or but both/and, across the entire spectrum of contemporary world politics. The states-system and the world-economy are two aspects of the one great historical episode, reflecting respectively the fragmentation of the authorization principle and the essential unity of the allocation principle. And so far from introducing irremediable confusion into the analysis of world politics, this duality allows one to 'stand outside' each concept and criticize it from an independent base (or, to return to Lakatos' terminology, it provides at the highest level of abstraction alternate touchstones to which explanatory and interpretative theories soldered together in lower level analysis may be referred).

If the above strategy is to be a coherent one, both states-system and world-economy must be related to basic organising concepts of the same kind. Ultimate conceptual primacy must be granted to either cultural or material determinants: to account for the states-system on the former grounds, for instance, and the world-economy on the latter would merely reproduce the problem of incommensurable paradigms within the one allegedly unified theoretical perspective. In this thesis, as indicated earlier, ultimate conceptual primacy is accorded to material factors. The states-system proper is identified as an essentially cultural phenomenon: an unusually discrete system of practices which provides (or rather mediates) the political order of an 'international society' of sovereign states. But these practices in turn are held to be structurally 'generated', in the centuries-long accommodation of international society to the over-riding structural features of anarchy among member states in general and hierarchy between the great and the rest. The particular methodological problems of equating structural generation in this sense with material determination will be considered in the next section, along with the related problems involved in attempts to specify the 'logic of the situation' for collective actors in contexts of large-scale strategic interaction. However, in order to demonstrate the continuity between these two sets of problems, it is
necessary first to elucidate the broader meaning attached here to the concept of structural (as opposed, to functional) generation of practices, and the distinctions proposed between the closely related concepts of system, structure and society.

In a very general sense (the sense which gives 'social contract' theories their central core of meaning), 'society' is the most fundamental explanatory concept in social theory. The various theoretical entities identified therein all involve human association in some measure; and if their characteristics cannot be explained as either intended or unintended consequences of the 'skilled and knowledgeable' interaction of social actors with a substantial ability to 'see through' the conditions of their social existence, they cannot be explained at all. In particular, attempts to explain the persistence of practices by reference to their 'latent functions' - to their fulfillment of system 'needs' of which the human actors in question are unconscious - represent exactly the same kind of unacceptable teleology as the direct reification of mechanistic and organic metaphors.

On the other hand, the notion of a 'social contract' between free and equal contracting partners would be highly misleading in regard to any of the social orders, domestic or international, considered here. This raises the simplest, and perhaps the most fundamental, aspect of social structure: namely the implications of an hierarchical distribution of wealth, coercive power, and access to the sources of moral and ideological influence. This concept of hierarchy will be central to the perspective on contemporary world politics developed in this thesis: and I will also be drawing at times upon a basic distinction between society in general and the much more restricted polity of actors with privileged access to the centralized levers of political power and influence. Given this simple distinction, the issue of 'latent' versus 'manifest' functions may be restated substantially in structuralist terms, in that the 'integrative' functions of apparently irrational practices and institutions may be perfectly manifest to those elites who benefit most from the social order in question and who dispose of the greatest resources, ideological and other, with which to make their preferred definition of reality stick.

Of course, not even the most powerful and privileged groups make their history 'exactly as they please'; and the notion of structure further entails the recognition, at all levels of social hierarchy, of
the tendency for social action to 'escape' from the control of human agents. One major aspect of this phenomenon—the unintended consequences of action—is very familiar in Anglo-American social theory: for instance in the micro-economic model of the competitive market or the 'action-reaction' model of international arms races. These two examples demonstrate not merely the point that the collective interaction of self-interested agents can generate structural constraints which are 'external' to the consciousness and purpose of the agents individually, but also the direct connection between the concept of structure and that of logical or rational action. Indeed, if it were not for the daunting stylistic problems, it would be best to speak not of structures as such but of the structural (i.e. logical) properties of situations or relationships. Thus to explain an arms race in action-reaction terms is to assert that, at least at one level, the actors are responding rationally to the logic of the situation in which they find themselves, and to expound more generally on the 'security dilemma' in international relations is to make a similar assertion about the general structuring logic of anarchical interaction between sovereign states.*

But, important as these points are, formal models of this type are not in themselves adequate to the range of structural issues considered here (a point recently illustrated by Waltz's rigorous, but ultimately unsatisfactory, attempt to construct a structure-only analysis of the 'international system' on the analogy of micro-economic theory). In the first place, such models are necessarily abstracted from any concrete historical and spatial context, so that, for instance, one might conclude that the overall situational logic for all actors in the class 'great power' was effectively the same, and entertain unrealistic expectations about a transcendence of the 'security dilemma' through the higher logic of co-operation lying behind the more obvious logic of competition. By contrast, the argument here will emphasize the substantive and intrinsic opposition of interests between actors by virtue of their location at differing positions (with contradictory situational 'logics') in several overlapping social structures. Thus, as will be argued in Chapters 3 and 4, the prospects for detailed Soviet-American 'rules of the game' are sharply circumscribed by the opposing interests associated with the different geopolitical and developmental situations of the powers—to say nothing of the basic tensions generated by the contradictory structures of military and

* These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
economic power underpinning the states-system and world-economy respectively.

Second, these formal models tend to promote a synchronic, 'all-or-nothing' perspective, which either endows major structures with an a-historical image of permanence (as in the treatment of the market in liberal economic theory) or else implies that they can be transcended all at once (as in the 'Idealist' strand of international theory after World War I and some of its 'world order' echoes today). In one sense, such a perspective was also a feature of classical Marxism, since, despite Marx's strong concern to establish the historical specificity of capitalism, he also implied that the socialist revolution would usher in an age in which the great structural constraints on human self-determination would be definitively transcended. However, Marx's comments on Germany and Russia also contained an embryonic 'second theory of revolution' in terms of uneven development; and it is this theme, developed more fully by Trotsky and Lenin, which primarily informs the conception of historical development in this thesis. In certain contexts (as in regard to the dramatically fluctuating fortunes of European colonial power over the past century), one may reasonably speak of the 'rise' and 'fall' of major social structures, but the more pervasive phenomenon is an ongoing, dialectical process of structuring - a pattern of piecemeal emergence and transcendence in which an over-arching 'entity' such as the states-system may retain its basic identity despite very great substantive changes at lower levels of organisation.

The analysis of this structuring process (exemplified, for instance, in Pipes' study of the rise of the 'patrimonial state' in Russia, in Perry Anderson's study of the lineages of European absolutism, and in Barrington Moore's study of the contribution of contrasting agrarian class structures to the development of contrasting patterns of economic and political 'modernization' among major states) involves recourse to 'middle range' concepts bridging the gap between grand structures and detailed courses of events. I would argue that this role is filled by the Soviet concept of the 'correlation of forces', and also by the analysis of 'conjunctures' in the work of avowedly structuralist historians. But more familiar in the Anglo-American context is the notion of colligation, applied by W.H.Walsh to 'concrete universal' concepts (such as 'the Industrial Revolution') which designate 'complex states of affairs ... with both a temporal and a spatial spread ... which
are systematically changing as a result of human effort or lack of effort'.\textsuperscript{68} It might seem that these qualifications to the idea of structure effectively return the argument to the relativistic perspective criticized earlier in regard to pluralist social theory. However, even the systematic acceptance of colligation involves a commitment to historically grounded generalization well beyond that acknowledged in pluralist methodologies, and the concept of slowly changing 'deep structures' (such as the basic economic structures underpinning Pipes' complex narrative about the Russian old regime) remains essential to the wider approach. This is essential, as Braudel argues, not because such structures provide the whole story or anything approaching it, but because they provide a basic 'reference grid' around which one can organize a more systematic study of all the different historical 'levels' which coexist in reality.\textsuperscript{69}

Third, such formal models, especially insofar as they reflect 'methodological individualist' assumptions, tend to identify structure solely with constraints upon action, and freedom for social actors with the absence of structural constraint. The argument here, by contrast, follows Giddens' emphasis on 'the duality of structure' and the 'mutual dependence of structure and agency'. Structure is seen as both 'enabling and constraining', not merely as a barrier to action, but 'as essentially involved in its production'.\textsuperscript{70} This is most obviously true of the structuring power of ideas (or more correctly, of the thought embodied in social practices, for the traditions and conventions which shape much everyday activity operate primarily at the level of 'practical' rather than 'reflexive' consciousness).\textsuperscript{71} But it is also true of such gross material factors as the inequality and hierarchy which, along with similarly material considerations of geopolitics, have provided for the basic stability of expectations, centred around more-or-less agreed perceptions of competing 'national interests', underpinning the modern international society of sovereign states.

The above distinction between practical and reflexive consciousness leads into the second aspect of the 'escape' of social action from reflexive human control: the unacknowledged conditions of action.\textsuperscript{72} Three broad types of conditioning factors are relevant here: personal psychological, ideological and traditional/conventional. The first (which raises most directly the question of motivation which is not merely unacknowledged but in some sense unconscious) will be ignored in this thesis, on practical grounds discussed in the next section. The second
is plainly crucial to the argument; but insofar as it spills over extensively into the area of reflexive or discursive consciousness, it may be more appropriately handled in the ensuing discussion of the theory/practice relationship. The third involves precisely the sort of actions which could be defended as a rational response to publicly accepted rules and norms but seldom are rationalized in this way because of their conventional character; and it provides a very familiar theme in the discussion of structure in the Anglo-American context (to the extent that 'social structure' and 'normative structure' are virtually synonomous in mainstream functionalist theory). In this thesis, also, normative factors are considered as an aspect of structure, but as a 'second order' one in methodological terms. And as a distinctive focus of attention, I would argue, they cast more light on the (notably limited) role of 'system' as an explanatory concept in social theory.

To begin with, it is worth reiterating the unacceptability of teleological appeals to system 'needs' (whether expressed openly or in the language of 'latent functions'), as also of the notion that system boundaries may be established as matters of definitional convenience. However, this much said, such formulations at least point towards the basic criteria which a system should fulfil to be a worthwhile candidate for social analysis. Put simply, a social system must run itself, in the sense of sustaining itself as a discrete and coherent set of practices over time. Moreover, this notion of practices 'running themselves' may also be applied, in a weaker sense, to the definition of a tradition; and both versions of the argument are functionalist in the one acceptable sense of this term: in that they account for the persistence of the various practices by reference to the mutual support which each receives, via a complex web of functional interdependence, from all the rest. Thus to attribute current Soviet and American policies towards their respective 'spheres of influence' not to a realistic response to the logic of nuclear-era international politics but to the largely unreflecting acceptance of traditional notions about great power rights in general and core national interests in particular, would be to explain those policies as 'functionally generated' whether the formal language of functionalism was employed or not.

However, if functionalist explanation in this version is valid, it is also, in this version, very limited in scope. It can account for
the persistence of an established set of practices, as also for the
generation of particular actions by the inertial weight of such practices
on the practical consciousness of human actors. But it can provide
no meaningful account of the generation of practices in the first instance,
nor of any large-scale, directional change in a set of established
practices (whatever the claims made for the concept of 'dysfunction'
on this latter point). On both these questions it is necessary to turn
to notions of structure and structural contradiction: for instance, by
explaining the spheres of influence convention as a rational response
(from a great power perspective) to the logic of anarchical power
politics as modified by geopolitical considerations, or by pointing to
the declining security importance of direct territorial control and
the deep-seated social forces behind contemporary small-power national
sentiment as factors rendering the ideologically-charged spheres of
influence claims of the current great powers increasingly irrational.

The methodological underpinning for these rather bald assertions
will be set out more fully in the next section. For the moment, I
wish further to explore the relationship between 'system' and 'tradition'
in this theoretical perspective, and to suggest that the latter is
much the more important theme in functionalist arguments of the type
sketched above. Indeed, as regards social practices with an extensive
substantive content, there would seem to be only one kind of entity
which can meaningfully be described in systemic terms: the kind of
small, isolated and economically primitive community described by
Wallerstein as a 'mini-system' and designated elsewhere in this chapter
as a discrete 'form of life'. Functionalist accounts of such entities
are useful because their specific complex of cultural elements is
normally more interesting than the primitive material 'base' which
they share with many others of their kind; and the question of
boundaries reduces, in large part, to one of physical isolation from
outside influence, without which their fragile networks of interdependence
would not retain such integrity as they do in the contemporary era.

Once one moves to the level of large, diverse entities with a
complex division of labour, a direct conflict emerges between the issues
of functional interdependence, on the one hand, and of the maintenance
of boundaries vis-a-vis the 'environment', on the other. The truly
important social boundaries in the modern world are those of the
territorial state, which persistently cut across and disrupt the 'natural' pattern of functional interdependence - reflecting above all crude material aspects of geography, and the distribution of wealth and coercive power which has allowed particular dominant groups to have their way at critical phases of the 'nation-building' process in particular areas. Moreover, there is at the 'national' level such a tangle of extant material interests, historically developing traditions, and purpose-built but possibly antiquated institutional frameworks, that to appeal to a systemic monism is to abandon the search for 'efficient' causes (or more and less fundamental relationships) in favour of a simple mystique of interdependence as such. There can be no real objection to the use of the term 'social system' instead of the terms 'social order' or 'society', as an alternative label for the same entity which conveys a general flavour of dynamic interdependence as against the respective connotations of structure and human agency in the other two cases. But, in contrast to the other two terms, 'system' has no genuine explanatory force in this context.

This leaves the level of 'world-system'. As Wallerstein rightly insists, this is the only plausible stopping-point after the 'mini-system' level for the identification of substantive social systems organised around functional interdependence. But couched in such terms, the concept of the world-economy does not eradicate the confusions introduced at the national level, but rather increases them in proportion to the extreme scale of abstraction involved. The modern world-economy is not a social system, nor a society, nor even a single civilization of the kind which characterized mediaeval and early modern Europe. The world-economy is 'a world' (and in the contemporary era the world) considered from the aspect of one of its two great over-arching material structures: the allocative structure of world economic power. The importance of this structure is very great, as Wallerstein's own work shows: but the notion of a world-system, with its residual links to the teleological aspirations of functionalism, serves only to confuse the issue.76

Finally, I would argue, there is only one large-scale entity in the modern world which may usefully be theorized in systemic terms: the states-system. Here is a set of practices - most fundamentally war, the balance of power, diplomacy, international law and great power hegemony - which have sustained their basic integrity and cohesion without
the intervention of any central 'authorities' for between three and five centuries, according to historical taste. Moreover, these practices warrant the more specific designation of 'political system': first, because they stand out from their wider economic, cultural and religious environment far more distinctly than do so-called political systems in the domestic realm (even where, as in modern capitalist societies, the collective weight of the polity has been thrown strongly behind the 'insulation' of politics from economics); and second, because they not only 'run themselves' in this sense but also 'run' their wider environment, in the sense of providing very loosely articulated rules of the game within which the substantive social order generated by the ongoing domestic and international struggles of the various powers may be accommodated. This abstraction from substantive issues is crucial. The states-system is a viable political system precisely because it is not a substantive social system, and its central practices have provided viable rules of the game precisely because they have been primarily procedural in character and have for the most part intruded relatively little on the substantive enterprises of the great and major powers. As a formal part of this argument, therefore, 'states-system' designates a far more restricted aspect of the modern world-historical 'transition' than 'world-economy', and is even narrower in reference than 'international society'. In practice, the terms 'system' and 'society' will be treated as loosely interchangeable, as indicating the political association of sovereign powers whose interactions are regulated by the above set of practices. But the states-system proper consists in the practices alone, which have endured so long precisely because they have been able to float, like lightly-burdened rafts, above the turbulent currents of the 'world historical process'.

It is now possible to summarize the relationship between system and structure envisaged in this thesis. In many ways, this is the direct opposite of the relationship identified in mainstream American functionalism. In that theoretical context, the true weight of explanation is carried by system, which functions 'offstage', so to speak, behind the backs of the human actors, while structure is a largely superfluous concept, referring to the 'surface pattern' of relationships observable - from a necessarily synchronic perspective - in a functioning social system. In this thesis (leaving aside the special problem of the
'purpose-built' institutional frameworks extant at any given point) the connotation of surface pattern is carried by system, though the patterns in question are not simply 'observed', but rather 'interpreted' or 'read' as a significant composition of 'presences' and 'absences' manifesting themselves over time. Moreover, the weighting of present and absent elements in this process of hermeneutic reconstruction necessarily involves explicit or implicit reference to 'offstage' deep structures - as when the historical irruptions of massive ideological conflict into the international arena are treated as less significant than the alternating intervals of 'balance of power politics', because the latter are held to reflect the 'true' logic of international anarchy whereas the former run counter to that logic. Finally, structures (or rather structural properties) carry the central burden of explanation in this perspective. But they must be inferred from the surface patterns they are believed to generate and weighted in importance by reference to the temporal and spatial 'spread' of those patterns - and thus the hermeneutic circle is closed.78

As regards complex domestic social orders, there will be such a multiplicity of practices - reflecting a multiplicity of structures 'living' and 'dead' - that not even the most ruthlessly selective interpretation could plausibly impose a single, systemic pattern upon them. However, while 'social system' is only a courtesy title in such a context, it remains vital to chart the contradictions and complementaries between the most fundamental aspects of extant material structure, on the one hand, and the 'great tradition' mediating the religious-cum-political order of the society on the other.79 This great tradition may be equated with the central corpus of organizing and legitimating practices which define, at least for the majority of the 'polity', accepted ways of handling major recurrent issues - practices, for instance, such as the party control of the bureaucracy through the nomenklatura, which has remained a constant feature of the Soviet political order through massive substantive changes at the economic, social and cultural levels, and constitutes, in a more general sense, an important element of continuity with the 'patrimonial' traditions of the Tsarist state.80

It must be emphasized that such a domestic great tradition is distinguished from the great tradition (née system) of international society only by its relatively amorphous character; by its deep and continuous involvement in substantive issues; by its inherent
vulnerability to manipulation by 'members' of the polity and especially by 'state managers'; and by the competition which it faces from a plurality of partially independent 'little traditions' holding sway over various segments of the society at large. If (to reverse the aquatic analogy employed above) the international great tradition has until recently resembled a single deep river with a clearly defined watercourse, joined only occasionally by tributary inflows from the domestic great traditions of the various leading powers, a domestic great tradition itself is more like a shallow river with levee banks, only the largest of many such in the immediate vicinity, intermittently dividing into multiple branches or losing its way in swamps, and subject to a variety of dams and artificial diversions in the interests of those with the 'engineering' resources to undertake such projects.

This distinction is important, since domestic as well as international traditions will loom large in this thesis, and it is necessary to reject the view - expounded most unequivocally by Oakeshott - that 'the tradition' of a properly constituted society should be inexhaustible, unfettered, and self-evident in its 'intimations', at least to the 'cognitively and otherwise well-born'. However, the basic characterization of system as a sub-category of tradition is even more important in evaluating Soviet (or other) theory and practice regarding interstate coexistence. As an analytical focus, the states-system constitutes a unique 'platform' of continuity in a torrent of historical change, and it thus provides an indispensable starting point for the analytical 'disaggregation' of the global transition attempted in Chapter 3. As an explanatory formula, by contrast, 'the rules of the system' signifies nothing more than 'the arrangements by which international conflicts have traditionally been mediated'. In the classical 18th and 19th century phases of the system, moreover, the endurance of these rules and practices reflected in turn the endurance of the basic structure of military anarchy-cum-hierarchy which generated them; and the relatively simple, if momentous problems of conflicting 'national interests' to which they were addressed. Today, however, the tradition bearing them flows into a much more complex and contradictory material grid than it has so far been required to negotiate, and the consequent tensions between inherited practices and current structural logic in turn make an important input into the tensions of the contemporary great power relationship.
Although the perspective proposed here is sharply at variance with that of American functionalism, it does draw upon several themes associated with European 'structuralism', particularly as developed in the avowedly Marxist synthesis of Louis Althusser.\textsuperscript{83} Into this category fall the notion of structural as opposed to 'transitive' causation and of a structure which is present only in its 'effects'; the emphasis upon the 'over-determination' of particular historical developments by a multiplicity of causal factors originating in different 'levels' of a given social structure; and the recognition that the interplay of major social contradictions at crucial historical junctures may produce not merely revolutionary change but also the long-term 'blocking' of such change. As against this, however, I will be rejecting Althusser's radical demotion of human agents to the position of mere 'bearers' or 'supports' of the social structure. In this thesis, 'contradiction' - like 'structure' itself - refers to the logical properties of situations and relationships, and references to it presuppose bridgehead assumptions about rational human action, whether the referent be as narrow as the conduct of the Soviet leadership during the Cuban missile crisis or as wide as the centuries-long 'generation' of the traditions of the Russian patrimonial state.

Finally, then, the core claim for the superiority of a structuralist perspective in social theory is that it allows one to combine generalizing argument with a focus upon the choices before temporally and spatially situated agents in a way which is constitutionally impossible for a functionalist/systems approach. The former approach itself involves synchronic assumptions in the sense that it invites a 'contingent but given' verdict on the complex of traditional 'rules' and situational 'logics' extant at any given 'point of time'. But these synchronic assumptions, which must be all-pervasive in discussions of a functioning social system, here involve merely a temporary methodological bracketing of the 'shifts' in material structures and 'flows' of practices which inform the structuralist image of the longer term.\textsuperscript{*} Similarly, although there are obvious affinities

\textsuperscript{*} Some inconsistency in metaphors will be apparent in the handling of these issues over the last few pages, but the problem is mainly one of time-scale. For a given 'point of time', it may be useful to think of a single structural hierarchy, ranging from the most basic material 'skeleton' to the most complex 'networks' of constitutive meaning. The middle term, or 'conjunctural' dimension, may be represented by a 'lava-flow' model, suggestive both of a hierarchy of 'levels' and of differing tempos of development among them. As regards the long-term, one might say that structures shift, as with movements of the earth's crust, and practices flow, picking their way like rivers along the contours established at the structural level, but intermittently running out into the sand.
between the concept of a multi-layered social structure and that of 'levels of analysis' in American international theory, the former can accommodate not merely the concept of multiple contradictions but also, through the practice of colligation, that of differential tempos of development among the various layers. With 'middle range' theories of a functionalist variety, however, no amount of attention to detail can provide a more detailed resolution of a temporal course of events, since such theories can only endow the facts with significance by confining them within the straitjacket of a timeless present.

Above all, I would argue, a structuralist approach allows one to reject the 'levels of analysis' distinction which has most bedevilled the American theoretical debate: that between domestic and international systems. I have already suggested that there are fundamental substantive differences between interstate relations, on the one hand, and relations among collectivities within states, on the other. But it is no part of the argument that these relationships should be conceptually separated on methodological grounds. Rather, it is only by conceptually 'situating' the actors of a national polity simultaneously within both contexts that one can fully appreciate the contradictory options among which they are required to choose. In regard to such actors, only two basic questions need be asked. At which point on the domestic and international grid of economic and military/police power are they located? To which confluence of central organising practices, domestic and international, are they exposed? In principle, these two questions should allow one to examine both the objective situational logic confronted by such actors and the major traditional or ideological pressures upon them to deviate from that logic in practice. The extensive claims for rational action and material necessity involved in this position will be defended in the next section.

The Logic of the Situation

Like the earlier defence of methodological realism, this argument for rational and materialist explanation is a limited and indirect one - an argument not about how the world is but about how it should be regarded in social theory. The starting point is one made by Vico over 250 years
ago, but obscured in the Anglo-American context by the long ascendency of positivistic philosophies of science. If we are to assume that the natural world was purposefully made by anyone, we must assume that it was made by God; and God, precisely because He is God, cannot be expected to submit to intersubjective debate about the mysterious ways in which He has chosen to move. This consideration accounts for two of the most distinctive characteristics of modern Western science: its drive to rid the natural order of purposive but super-national actors and to 'people' it instead with tiny purposeless particles and vast impersonal forces; and the related insistence that any connections or relationships discerned in that order be acknowledged as heuristic devices imposed by man, not as part of any inherent logic of nature. Only in this way can accounts of the natural order be made accessible to intersubjective critique. 'Observable behaviour' and 'observable effects' are (more or less) accessible to such a critique: divine purposes are not.

There can be no denying the practical fruits of this theoretical strategy. But it seems fair to attribute the successes of natural science not directly to its metaphysic of powers and forces - which is, at bottom, a confession of ignorance - but to the real (or de facto real) regularity of the natural world. The position for social theory is almost the reverse of this. The social world exhibits fewer significant observable regularities than the natural world, and such regularities as do obtain have a disturbing tendency to change (with changing human consciousness) over time. Moreover, social theorists cannot avoid the issue of intentionality - and that on the evidence of both introspection and the senses. For if there is one fundamental, empirically observable characteristic of the social world it is the unique capacity of human beings for the purposive making and remaking of their social and physical environment. Thus the abandonment of statements about meanings and intentions for a natural science metaphysic of powers and forces does nothing to create a social world of stable and precisely observable regularities: but it does gratuitously abandon the most powerful means of access to social phenomena, and rule out the possibility of addressing the central issues in other than an ad hoc and theoretically inconsistent fashion.

These considerations, I believe, indicate a relatively powerful role for the principles of 'economy' (or 'parsimony') and rationality as
criteria of theoretical adequacy in social, as opposed to natural science. In the natural sciences, a bland and general concept of rationality - the postulate of a world accessible to human reason - would seem to be a *sine qua non* for the intersubjective validation of knowledge claims; and the economy principle may be regarded as little more than a refinement of this.\(^8^5\) The basic proposition, so to speak, is that God moves with sufficient reason, and with *no more than* sufficient reason - a proposition which leads directly only to fundamentally aesthetic criteria such as 'elegance' and in consequence leaves a strong practical requirement for standardized and rigorous testing procedures.

The social sciences, however, can draw (and can hardly avoid drawing) on a second, more specific concept of rational human action in accounting for the phenomena which concern them. And in this context, a much stronger claim may be made for the principle of economy. 'Rational action [or action which is perspicuous as a response to the most obvious "logic of the situation"] is its own explanation'.\(^8^6\) If a given action was obviously the most rational (or realistic) response to the given situation, the one response which *any* rational actor ought logically to have made in that situation, there is no need to appeal to psychological or traditional/ideological factors to explain it. For each of these approaches is less economical than the identification of the action in question as the *logically obvious* response to the objective situation; and the further complications which they entail are justified only insofar as the problem moves away from this admittedly rare paradigm case, requiring explanation of an actor's choice of one particular option - within a range of more or less rational options, or else for the choice of an *objectively irrational option* - one which *no* rational actor ought logically to have chosen.

It is important here to emphasize two aspects of scope in the subject-matter of the thesis which, I would argue, reinforce the practical case for close adherence to the methodological criteria sketched above. First, the primary concern here will be with large-scale instances of substantially *strategic conduct*: great power relations, and the internal dynamics of 'transitional' states. There will be no consideration of enclosed and stable 'forms of life', or even of complex but slowly changing old regimes (contexts appropriate to a primary focus on rules, practices
and institutions); and the problems of the advanced industrial societies (which would seem to lie rather closer to the middle of the institutional analysis/strategic analysis spectrum) will appear only tangentially in regard to the domestic imperatives of the great powers.\textsuperscript{67}

There should be little difficulty with the claim that the great power relationship itself is primarily a strategic one: but the use of this term for the relations of contending groups and classes in transitional states may be far more contentious, and the latter claim may be clarified by casting it in a form structurally similar to the former. Great power relations might be formally defined as the competition of coexistent forms of life (or of congeries of forms of life held within over-riding political and cultural frameworks) in a condition of relatively stable, anarchical inter-action over time. Analogously, a transitional situation might be defined as one in which: (1) forms of life (or congeries thereof) succeed one another in rapid and traumatic fashion; (2) the formerly dominant political and cultural framework (or old regime) has been effectively undermined, and coercive action will help to determine which of several competing frameworks is established in the future (or whether any over-riding framework can be sustained at all); and (3) the hold on state power of the present incumbents is sufficiently tenuous to allow a substantial chance for rival groups to seize the state apparatus and lay down their preferred alternative. This is obviously a much weaker concept of a strategic situation than that applicable to the great power relationship, and it raises major theoretical problems which will be progressively addressed in this and the following sections. However, these problems will be held aside initially, and the evaluation of strategic conduct considered with great power relations as the paradigm case.

Second, though reference may be made for illustrative purposes to specific actions by identifiable individuals, the real concern here is with a generalizing theoretical framework for the prediction and evaluation of classes of actions or practices relevant to the problems of great power relations and transitional development, and the interaction between these two spheres. I have therefore rejected the notion of instrumental rationality (implied, for instance, in Popper's handling of the logic of the situation concept)\textsuperscript{88} in favour of the more controversial problem of judging whether actions are rational or irrational in themselves.
Insofar as judgements about instrumental rationality presuppose knowledge of identifiable ends being pursued by identifiable agents, the notion constitutes a prescription for case-by-case empiricism only; and even case-by-case judgements about instrumental rationality are virtually impossible for such questions as the role of wars on a 20th century scale of destructiveness (conventional as well as nuclear) as instruments of national policy, or the rationale for the sacrifice of generations implicit in any form of comprehensive 'modernization' for most contemporary Third World nations.

In attempting to address these questions, therefore, I have linked the notion of situational logic to one which transcends the specific intentions presumed to underlie specific actions: namely, the notion of the actor's real interests. Moreover, to provide a convenient shorthand reference for the movement from identifiable individuals to typical actors required by a generalizing theory of this kind, I have formalized the comparison between General Strategic Man and Russian Strategic Man which, it was argued in Chapter 1, is already implicit in much of the contemporary American debate over Soviet intentions. The first distinguishing characteristic of General Strategic Man is self-evident. By definition, he always acts rationally, in accordance with the logic of the situation. However, if to act rationally on a continuing basis is to act in accordance with one's own real interests, it also follows that General Strategic Man must have real interests of his own to defend and promote; and these, I would argue, can derive only from his location in a particular social structure and his attachment to a particular form of life. General Strategic Man thus emerges as Russian (or American, or other) Strategic Man without his counterpart's distorting 'perceptions' - a formulation which, while not really precise, captures the essence of the argument. General Strategic Man does have perceptions (since without preconceptions of some kind he could not structure the field and identify the logic of the situation); but his perceptions are by definition correct, and provide the yardstick against which the influence of specific ideologically and culturally formed perceptions are to be measured. Whereas Russian Strategic Man acts to defend and promote a specific (Russian) form of life, sometimes rationally and sometimes irrationally under the influence of his specifically Russian perceptions, General Strategic Man acts, rationally by definition, to defend and promote
an unspecified form of life; and to act thus, in concert with those of similar interests and against those with opposing interests, is to exemplify 'general rationality' as this concept is used, formally or informally, in this thesis.

The mode of analysis suggested here will be set out more schematically later in the section, together with some simple observations on its relevance to the analysis of major international and domestic crises. However, rationality assumptions of this kind have become highly controversial, and it may be useful first to consider the basic objections which might be offered from a contemporary pluralist standpoint. The issues in question might be summarized under four broad headings: collectivism, reductionism, materialism and determinism.

To begin with, it might be argued that collectivist assumptions are built into the above definition of general rationality; and insofar as that definition assumes an orientation towards some collective social form or forms, the charge is correct. In fact, I would argue, the definition encapsulates the minimum assumptions required for a pluralist theory of either domestic or international politics; but it involves reasoning processes decidedly at variance with those ostensibly employed by most pluralist theorists, at least as regards the former sphere. The question at issue may be dramatized by counterposing Marx's justification for predicting the historical behaviour of collective actors such as 'the proletariat' - on the grounds that 'private interest is itself already a socially defined interest which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and within the means provided by society' - with Popper's methodological individualist insistence 'that the "behaviour" and "actions" of collectives, such as states or social groups, must be reduced to the behaviour and actions of human individuals'.

The argument advanced here grants the substance of Marx's case, by accepting that there could be no generalized discussion of individual needs and interests without the assumption that objective interests may be deduced in some fashion from an individual's location in an objective social structure and network of constitutive meanings. Such an approach
seems necessary to make sense of substantive judgements of the kind commonly encountered in pluralist political analysis: that a given set of political leaders, through the 'appeasement' of an expansionist adversary, were 'betraying' the (objective) national interest; that the Soviet population had an objective interest in the maintenance of a stable second strike deterrent on the American side, though the bulk of them probably had no notion of the concept and would reject it if they had; that unrepresented interests existed on a massive scale in the Soviet social system, though the level of overt dissent there was in fact much less than in its more 'open' and 'responsive' American counterpart. Moreover, one might conceivably interpret the methodological individualist position in this way, since its modern defenders have usually rejected psychological reductionism (a point on which Popper has expressed strong agreement with Marx) and accepted that generalizing arguments can deal only with anonymous and typified individuals. But this in turn would reduce the whole anti-collectivist campaign to a 'sham battle', turning on a terminological quibble to the effect that Marx could predict the revolution against capitalism of a multitude of proletariat but not that of a single collective actor called the proletariat.

The alternative course is to interpret the methodological individualist position as a commitment to a subjective notion of interests, identified with individual wants or desires which are by definition unstructured by collective influences (as a substantive commitment, in effect, to the individualist 'model of man', which Marx rejected, employed by the classical political economists). Given such a model, Marx's analysis would have been invalid even if his expectations regarding the material development of capitalism had been wholly realized. For a proletariat composed of maximizing (or even satisficing) individualists would not revolt against an entrenched power structure, however oppressive: each member would consult his own individual logic of the situation and conclude that likely costs outweighed likely benefits. Nor would the enormous sacrifices involved in forced-draught industrialization on the scale of the first Soviet Five Year Plan be called forth, even in part, by moral exhortation about collective tasks and the general good: only massive and unremitting coercion would fill the bill. But equally armies, for the most part, would not fight; and, as recent attempts to develop
a 'rational choice' theory of democracy have indicated, the bulk of citizens would not vote except under compulsion.\(^9\)

Behind these implausible (not to say falsified) negative implications of the pure individualist model looms the positive 'Hobbesian problem of order': that a society of truly self-interested individuals (or even of truly self-interested groups of approximately equal size and strength) would tear itself apart unless their competition were radically restricted by the overwhelming power of a Leviathan state. This problem is logically prior to any conclusions about the results of the free play of individual interests within a narrowly defined 'economic' realm in an established society; and there are, moreover, only two real alternatives to the Hobbesian solution, both of which return to 'collectivist' assumptions. Either order is indeed maintained by a powerful, coercive state, but one which is the instrument of a politically unified dominant class with a common interest in protecting the conditions for 'free' economic competition; or there is a fundamental consensus throughout the society both on the legitimacy of unrestricted self-interest in peaceful economic activities and on the necessity to restrict such competition to that sphere.

The normality of such a consensus, as William Connolly observes, is one of the most important assumptions in the pluralist account of contemporary American politics, and one of the least examined.\(^9\) Codified in the earlier-mentioned division of labour between utility-maximizing Economic Man and norm-internalizing Sociological Man, this assumption has presumably helped to obscure the significant contribution of simple inequalities in power to the maintenance of order in the advanced capitalist societies. But more important in this context is the curious echo of this assumption in 'second wave' deterrence theory - whose (American) Strategic Man operates, on the one hand, with a flexible cost/benefits calculus which is remarkably free of any 'come-what may' attachment to fundamental, culturally specific collective values, and on the other, within an impressive network of constitutive meanings, apparently shared with the adversary, about the legitimacy of a bargaining process in which even 'demonstration strikes' need not necessarily lead to general nuclear war. In conclusion, I would reiterate that general theoretical statements about interests presuppose some degree of collectivist orientation in the actors in question; and that theories built upon
individualist models of man, so far from cutting back to the bedrock of human behaviour, actually incorporate high-level assumptions about the normality of a very specific social order.

As regards reductionism, it is important to distinguish two kinds of assumption in social theory which might be classified as reductionist. The first, which I wish to reject, is the notion that certain imperatives – normally economic or psychological – constitute the 'real' wellsprings of human behaviour, and that explanations which fail to come to grips with these imperatives are inherently inadequate. I will be attempting below to defend a variant of materialist (though not merely economic) reductionism purely on grounds of parsimony; but the question of psychological reductionism should perhaps be addressed directly at this point. The proposed mode of analysis provides for judgements about culturally and ideologically determined 'false consciousness', but excludes on practical grounds judgements about psychologically determined false consciousness. The approach thus contrasts with the intermittent appeal to psychological concepts such as 'paranoia' (not to say 'schizophrenia') in some American discussions of Soviet strategic attitudes; and, more significantly, with the tendency for Realist perspectives on international relations to be associated with a strong pessimism about human nature and to take the phenomenon of endemic conflict in international affairs as a kind of paradigm for the human condition in general. On the face of it, this Realist position might be taken as an argument from Original Sin, and one which, while explaining nothing of international affairs which could not adequately be accounted for by reference to their anarchical structure, can function as a 'joker in the pack' for trumping Marxist and other doctrines of progress in regard to social life in general. However, if it were possible to provide persuasive psychological arguments that aggression and lust for power were innate human characteristics, this aspect of the Realist metaphysic might be less easily dismissed.

In addressing this question, a further distinction should be made between a physiological psychology and all those approaches which may be broadly grouped together as psychoanalytic. The latter have nothing, except of the most plainly metaphysical kind, to say about the human condition in general; and they cannot be regarded as being in any sense closer to the natural sciences in either their objects or their methods.
than the other social sciences. Insofar as schizophrenia in individuals, for instance, can be brought within the scope of a generalizing psychological theory, it must be by treating it as an 'authentic frame of meaning' to be rendered intelligible by the hermeneutic and structuralist techniques of the qualified specialist. Thus the enterprise is no different in character from the study of the tensions and contradictions (or in ironic terms 'schizophrenia') of Russian Strategic Man: the difference is that the first enterprise must deal with the detailed case histories of individuals, the second with the centuries-long history of whole peoples and elites, and that the first can therefore have no place in a generalizing theory of large-scale strategic conduct. It makes sense, difficult though it is, to discuss the coherence and appropriateness to context of the apparent world-view of the Soviet elite: but to discuss the individual psychological makeup of that elite would be to surrender any pretense to serious analysis.

Quite different issues are raised by the question of a demonstration of the innateness of human aggression in terms of a physiological psychology. This would involve general statements about mankind, or about large segments of mankind, and on the basis of theories which claimed to have genuinely bridged the gap between the study of intentional behaviour and the study of physical phenomena. But this would entail, at minimum, the demonstration of links between physiological 'events' with a determinate time span and a determinate physical location in the brain, and hermeneutically perceived 'states of mind' such as aggression. It is almost impossible to conceive of this being demonstrated persuasively, and certain that this goal has not been remotely approached as yet. It still seems reasonable, therefore, to regard all Realist injunctions to the political theorist to gaze fearlessly into the dark recesses of the human heart as appeals to Original Sin, and to reject them as inaccessible to intersubjective critique.

However, if the argument here is not reductionist in the foregoing sense, it does imply an attempt to reduce the densely textured interdependence of social life to much simpler sets of relationships, or structures. Indeed, I would argue, following Gellner, that all genuine explanation must be reductionist in this sense. Nothing can be explained in terms of itself, and nothing can be explained in terms of everything else. Arguments which insist on either the uniqueness of
everything or the interdependence of everything amount effectively to the same thing - a restatement of the basic problem which theoretical analysis is supposed to address. There remains, admittedly, the crucial problem of where a potentially infinite regress should be halted in any given case. But this must be a matter for practical judgement, based on the nature of the thing-to-be-explained and the nature of the evidence which can be brought to bear on it; and I will be assuming, on grounds already indicated, that the appropriate focus for the issues considered in this thesis is upon large-scale aspects of social structure, both 'material' and 'moral' (with even the proposed 'models of man' involving generalizations about social structure at one remove).

Even this form of reductionism, however, has attracted strong criticism from pluralist theorists. For instance, Maurice Keens-Soper, in an explicitly Oakeshottian treatment of the 'practice' of the classical European states-system, has attacked the whole activity of 'model-building' in international theory for 'contriving an unnecessary divorce between theory and practice, and so licensing an inconclusive and wanton dilemma about "isomorphism"'. Keens-Soper's identification of theory solely with the exploration 'of the thought already embodied and at work in practice', certainly provides a useful corrective to the kind of behaviouralist model-building which abstracts the 'entity' being theorized from any recognisable historical and moral context. But his argument in turn glosses over the importance of another kind of contextual issue - that of the distinction between primarily institutional and primarily strategic situations - in evaluating accounts of actions and practices solely in terms of their relevant constitutive meanings.

For instance, there is a great practical difference between 'accounting for' a particular aspect of religious ritual in a relatively enclosed form of life by the assertion that 'the Azande typically behave in that fashion in situations of that kind', and accounting for recent Soviet military activities in Africa and West Asia with the assertion that 'Russians typically behave in that fashion in situations of that kind'. In the first case, one can claim to be bringing a specific practice into a coherent relationship with an encompassing form of life already extensively described by oneself or others. The second involves confronting an extremely selective distillation of Russian/Soviet perceptual and behavioural characteristics with a strategic situation only lightly
mediated by the over-arching practices of the modern states-system - and
a situation which (as will be argued at length in Chapters 3 and 4) is in
many respects unprecedented in modern international history. Therefore,
if evidence about the traditional practices of the European great powers
in general and of Russia in particular is to be brought to bear on this
situation, it must be by arguments which assert a substantial degree of
structural continuity despite the obvious elements of change, and it is
only in terms of massively simplifying models that the comparisons demanded
by such arguments can be organized.

Implicit in this commitment to explanatory models as such, I would
argue, is a further commitment to assertions about fundamental/derivative
relationships among what John Plamenatz has called 'the larger sides of
social life'. Plamenatz' own opposition to this approach is partly
grounded in the general pluralist argument from the interdependence
to the practical uniqueness of everything. But he also mounts an important
argument specifically against the kind of materialist reduction advocated
by Marx; and since I wish to preserve an attenuated claim for the
methodological priority of a 'material infrastructure' over an 'ideal
superstructure', its basic thrust should be considered here. Because
all social relationships are to some extent clothed in constitutive
meanings, Plamenatz asserts, it is possible to turn Marx's argument
effectively on its head, through the recognition of one very special
fundamental/derivative distinction in social analysis. In his view,
it can validly be maintained that 'co-operative forms of production
and exchange', on the one hand, and custom and morality, on the other, are
pre-requisites of the kind of complex social order which produces classes
and formal legal systems alike.

But basic or fundamental, in this sense, means
only primary or universal. Morality and custom are,
for example, fundamental in relation to law because
they must exist before there can be law, and because
they are common to all societies while law is not;
they are not fundamental in the sense that, where
there is law, they determine its character while it
do not determine theirs.

With this argument, Plamenatz evidently intends to relegate the
fundamental/derivative distinction to an abstract, vacuous world outside
history and culture, which is relevant only to formal arguments designed
to establish that norms as such are essential to social life. And it is
certainly true that, as regards complex domestic social orders, one can derive substantive conclusions from an analysis of primary or universal elements of social life only by importing - as did the classical social contract theorists - hidden cultural assumptions into one's treatment of the State of Nature. But, as Hedley Bull demonstrates, there is one society in regard to which a rigorous analysis in terms of elementary or primary goals can lay bare a good part, though by no means the whole, of the substantive story: the anarchical society of sovereign states.

Yet this context is also precisely the one in which it is impossible not to recognise the determining impact of grossly material factors upon social roles and norms and practices: in the division between great powers and the rest; in the divisions between industrially developed powers and the rest, in the divisions among great powers upon geopolitical grounds; in the great differences in freedom of manoeuvre between those small powers which fall within great power spheres of influence and those which do not, and so on.

The example of the states-system also exemplifies the wider problem of the strain towards idealism in pluralism/empiricism in general. It is certainly true that a concern with material 'deep structures' can degenerate into a claim to a privileged knowledge of mysterious essences at work behind the screen of mere experience; and the evolution of classical into Soviet Marxism is in many respects a good example of such a degeneration. But the practical requirement for large organising concepts is equally pressing for any avowedly empiricist analysis which strays into such a wide-ranging area as contemporary world politics; and where reference to material structures (other than geopolitical) is ruled largely out of court, a disproportionate emphasis will fall upon those organising features - such as ethnic, racial and religious differences - which can readily be observed on the surface, so to speak, of world politics. Given the existence in the international arena of collectivities so readily visible even to the naked empiricist eye, the injunctions of methodological individualism have usually been honoured in the breach rather than in the observance. But their residual influence has tended to push pluralist explanations of the collective loyalties at work in a distinctly psychologistic direction - as with Morgenthau's explanation of modern nationalism in terms of the 'compensatory' projection onto the state of 'individual power drives',

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the frustration of which has allegedly been 'magnified enormously' by
the atomizing processes of contemporary mass society.\textsuperscript{104} Such arguments,
by implicitly deciding the fundamental/derivative issue on empiricism-
cum-idealistic terms at the outset, beg the prior question of whether
national and other collective loyalties can be accounted for on more
economical and available grounds.

It is now necessary to consider directly the question of materialism,
and indeed to reconsider the materialist/empiricist dialectic which, at
the outset of the chapter, received qualified endorsement as the founding
charter of the social as well as the natural sciences. This in turn
involves linking the earlier argument for methodological realism to the
double hermeneutic identified as the distinguishing characteristic of
social theory, and defending materialism purely as an epistemological
'selector' of theoretical adequacy. Strictly speaking, the dialectic
underpinning social theory is not between grand theoretical structures
and inescapably theoretical statements about discrete 'facts', but
between grand theoretical structures and inescapably theoretical
statements about tiny clusters of constitutive meanings. The materialist/
empiricist relationship is thus more properly identified with the
interplay of structuralist and hermeneutic techniques for ordering and
interpreting an assumed social reality. But, this much granted, the
concept of a material foundation to that reality remains integral to the
concept of autonomous, rational human action.

\textbf{Figure 2.1}

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<th>STRUCTURALISM</th>
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<td>MATERIAL STRUCTURES ('THE INFRASTRUCTURE')</td>
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<td>LOGIC OF MATERIAL SITUATION</td>
<td>MORAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHOICE</td>
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<td>STRATEGIC ANALYSIS</td>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKELETON - GRID - FRAMEWORK - NETWORK</td>
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The relevant distinctions are set out in Figure 2.1. It is essential to reiterate that the distinction between material structures and frames of meaning is not intended as an ontological one; and, similarly, that the distinction between strategic and institutional analysis implies nothing more than a 'methodological bracketing' of one or other of two modes which are both involved in some measure in all areas of social inquiry. The argument is merely that distinctions between primarily strategic and primarily institutional contexts are sustainable at the 'macro' level; and a rhetorical key to the use of such distinctions in social theory is provided by characteristic metaphors of the kind at the bottom of Figure 2.1. As one moves across the spectrum from 'skeleton' to 'network', one is moving from primarily structuralist to primarily hermeneutic analysis: from an evaluation of particular responses to material situation x against a yardstick conception of what any rational actor would do in that situation, towards a general understanding of the major practices constituting form of life y.

Thus, as regards the primarily strategic arena of great power relations, one might distinguish between 'ideal' and 'material' elements in contemporary Western accounts of Soviet conduct in the Afro-Asian region: between appeals to cultural/ideological imperatives or the expansionist hubris of a 'latecomer' great power, on the one hand, and references to geopolitical logic, an altered balance of great power forces, and 'pull' factors deriving from structurally induced disorder in key Third World states, on the other. Such distinctions are crucial to the evaluation of the overall hawk interpretation of Soviet policy, and I would argue that materialist arguments have methodological priority, in two different but related senses.

First, as already indicated, arguments about what any great power would do in a given situation are more economical than arguments which assume (or invite one to take on faith) a particular understanding of a highly complex cultural and ideological formation, and require the mediation of the 'perceptions' derived therefrom against the objective logic of the situation. Of course, it may well be that an adequate account of much Soviet behaviour can only be had on these latter terms. But this raises in turn the second point: that the required knowledge of the alternate cultural formation must be based, via 'bridgehead'
assumptions about rationality, on materialist reasoning at a further remove.

The relevance of this second point is clearest where the materialist bridgehead is sharply separated in time from the context of the cultural/ideological determinism which it is called upon to support, as with the explanation of contemporary Soviet expansionism offered by Pipes. There are really only two alternatives to the kind of materialist reduction involved in Pipes' attempt to ground the Russian patrimonial tradition in the early history of the Muscovite state. On the one hand, one might confine the argument solely to the 'superstructural' level by refusing to admit that any period or context made a greater contribution to the formation of the 'seamless web' of Russian political culture than any other. Such an appeal to a 'tradition of pure usage' (exemplified most clearly by Oakeshott, and in part by Pipes himself in his treatment of the Soviet, as opposed to the Tsarist era) effectively translates the functionalist stress upon the interdependence of everything into a diachronic idiom; and it may be rejected, like any other species of radical functionalism, on the grounds that it provides not an explanation but a restatement of the problem. On the other, one might conceivably deny this particular material derivation of the Russian political tradition by grounding it primarily in another superstructural influence, such as the centuries-long contact with the political practices of the Muscovite's Tatar overlords. But this in turn would entail either a materialist reduction at some further remove, such as the derivation of Tatar practices from the problems of extending a tribal system of rule to the governance of a massive empire; or else a reductio ad absurdum which brought the argument finally to rest with some tribe in Central Asia about which nothing empirical was known, but whose political practices could allegedly be inferred from the political practices of the contemporary Soviet regime. In short, unless the chain of cultural determinism is to reach back to eternity, the generation of the practices in question must be traced to a material 'initial condition' which is identifiably inside the historical process, and not outside as in the State of Nature variant proposed by Plamenatz.

The argument, therefore, is very much a methodological one; and insofar as it preserves a residual distinction between infrastructure and superstructure, as notional extremities of the spectrum of 'levels' in...
any complex social order, the infrastructure is defined by the distribution of both economic and directly coercive power. As regards the breach thus entailed with the Marxist concept of 'the base', I would simply argue that the latter reflects the highly specific political and social order of early industrial capitalism (especially in England), and that for the issues considered in this thesis it is also essential to highlight the material underpinnings of the far more pervasive historical phenomenon of 'politics in command'. However, while this 'materialist conception of history' is clearly much weaker than the Marxist one, the dilution of the claim for economic factors does not render the argument merely trivial. At least it makes the moral dimensions of social authority methodologically subordinate to its basis in coercive power, whereas pluralist theorists, insofar as they have treated power as a property of collectivities rather than merely of relations between individuals, have tended to reverse these methodological priorities. Thus Parsons (in perhaps the most substantial such an analysis, and one followed closely by Johnson in his 'breakdown' theory of revolution) employs a monetary analogy for the relationship between power, authority and force - suggesting that in a properly value co-ordinated society individuals will readily 'invest' their 'confidence' in the capacity of the authorities to pursue collective goals, thereby rendering resort to coercive measures unnecessary.\footnote{108}

Such an analysis automatically casts revolution as an unnatural phenomenon, explicable only in terms of a massive 'power deflation' in which legitimate authority loses its value and the authorities are increasingly driven to a desperate reliance on the cruder medium of force. However, as Giddens points out, Parsons' emphasis on the symbolic role of force in 'stable power systems' effectively ignores the crucial historical process of 'power inflation', whereby 'confidence' in the authorities 'is developed and expanded in societies'.

But in power inflation coercion and force may be the foundation of a consensual order in a very different way. The history of societies shows again and again that particular social forms are often at first implemented by force, or by some other form of definite coercion, and that coercive measures are used to produce and enforce a new legitimacy. It is in this sense that power can grow out of the barrel of a gun. Force allows that manipulative control which can then be used to diminish dependence on coercion.
This point is directly applicable to the forcible pursuit of 'a new legitimacy' in transitional situations, as well as to the sphere of great power relations, where the established balance of 'legitimate' interests is routinely subject to 'renegotiation' on the basis of shifts in the material balance of forces; and thus the notion of material determination - in the first, if not the last instance - is crucial to the argument of this thesis.

Finally, there is the issue of determinism. The proposed mode of rational analysis might also be called a 'quasi-causal' one, in that it rests on a concept of 'practical necessity' as a 'logical or conceptual link between an actor's situation, goals and actions'; and the same point applies, on a larger scale, to the concept of the structural 'generation' of practices, traditions and forms of life. Appeals to necessity have commonly been attacked as determinist by pluralist thinkers, with Popper, for instance, insisting that 'any unprejudiced view of politics' must recognize 'that anything is possible in human affairs'. However, it is difficult to take this statement seriously, at least as a methodological prescription for social theory, since it would have precisely the same practical implications as the assumption that everything is determined by the (in human terms arbitrary) will of an interventionist God. By contrast, the assumption of a world ordered by determinate, structural relationships at least provides the basic 'regulative principle' for an analysis dedicated to establishing the most obvious structural factors which sharply reduce the range of human choice in practice.

Such an approach is not determinist, in the sense of making human actors the puppets of impersonal forces or subordinating them to a teleology of social systems and processes. It merely asserts that, given a deductively bounded situation with identifiable structural properties, it should in principle be possible to determine (in the sense of thinking through) all the choices which a rational actor might make, up to and including - but not beyond - a successful attempt to break out of the identified boundaries of the situation. Moreover, the crucial notion of contradictions in the logic of the situation implies that the great majority of cases will present a range of alternative, more or less contradictory options all falling within the broad spectrum of rational action. But even where one particular course of action is identified as the logical one - for instance, the avoidance of nuclear war on relatively
trivial matters of national honour or 'credibility' - no denial of human free-will is necessarily implied. One can maintain that an action or practice is objectively irrational without in any sense suggesting that it is impossible.

However, insofar as the concept of practical necessity lends itself to assertions about 'true' and 'false' consciousness, the argument might also invite Isaiah Berlin's complaint about determinist theories which effectively collapse their 'is' and 'ought' claims together, purporting to identify in the regularities of social life 'not merely something given, brute fact, something unchangeable and unquestionable', but also 'values which are either somehow "embedded" in the facts themselves or "determine" them from some "transcendent" height or depth'. The practical danger noted here is very real: but an element of moral intervention in the reality being described is inherent in any social theory. It is evident in the positivistic tendency to reify social systems in terms of 'balancing mechanisms', 'feedback mechanisms', and the like; in the extreme hermeneutic approach which, by assuming 'an inherent continuity of practices ... systematically ignores the possible structures of conflict within a society, structures which would generate change'; and in the effective combination of these two kinds of reification, via a circular concept of social role, in Parsonian normative functionalism.

The real need, therefore, is not for illusory attempts to escape this interventionary dimension of social theory but for a disciplined awareness of the problems, especially reification, which it entails. Such an awareness, paradoxically, is best promoted by a 'realist' approach to the notion of interests and the structured opposition of interests - without which, indeed, the notion of 'rule-governed' behaviour is itself incoherent. If the logic of the situation were always self-evident and the same for every actor, there would be no need to postulate the existence of rules telling the actors 'how to go on'. Norms or rules may thus be associated with the common need to mediate contradictory or opposing interests which different actors have by virtue of their location at different places in an overall social structure. Moreover, insofar as norms are directly related to the opposition of interests, they 'have at every moment to be sustained and reproduced in the flow of social encounters'. From the viewpoint of strategic conduct, as
Giddens points out, the 'normatively co-ordinated legitimate order' of institutional analysis 'represents claims, whose realisation is contingent upon the mobilization of obligations through the medium of the responses of other actors'. 117

Once again, the example of the states-system nicely illustrates the importance of a materialist conception of social structure in making assertions about cultural and ideological determination accessible to intersubjective critique. It demonstrates with special clarity the distinction between the meaningful content of a set of practices and the location of that set of practices within a social structure, and the parallel distinctions between being structurally located in a particular social role, acting in a manner appropriate to that role, and contributing, by the performance of a role or roles, to the integrated functioning of an ongoing social system. The connections between these different aspects of a social role must always be regarded as contingent and problematic; and, as G.A.Cohen argues, the key point to remember is that for any analysis of social roles in terms of 'rights and duties' there can also be a parallel analysis in terms of 'powers and constraints'.118 Thus it is in principle perfectly reasonable to say that an actor is conforming to the established 'rules' only because it is as yet unaware of its own true strength, or that it has at present an accurate awareness of major constraints upon its aspirations but will seek a radical revision of its situation when it judges that those constraints have largely diminished or disappeared. Though such statements are still often regarded with suspicion when applied to, say, the struggle of classes within states, they have been commonplace in the discussion of relations between states for centuries.

It must be stressed that the mere opposition of interests - even on a large scale - does not necessarily signify a fundamental structural contradiction threatening the entire social order; as the longevity of the states-system, based upon the routinized incorporation of organized violence within a basic corpus of 'conflict resolution' procedures, once again graphically illustrates. It also seems clear that the contradiction between socialized production and privatized appropriation identified by Marxism as the chief internal engine of the breakdown of capitalism has been crucially 'overdetermined' by international factors in the history of the advanced capitalist societies; while contemporary socialist
revolutions have been substantially shaped by international pressures which, mediated by the indecisive but disruptive reforms of old regime 'state managers', have thoroughly 'preempted' the unfolding conflict of bourgeoisie and proletariat depicted in the classical Marxist scenario.

However, this much granted, it also seems fruitful to emphasize the deep contradictions involved in the attempts of ruling elites in transitional societies to defend the existing social order simultaneously against external pressures and against the threat of domestic revolution. Moreover, the states-system in its present phase exhibits a structural contradiction commensurate in its enormous implications with the structural solidity which has ensured the longevity of the system to date: in that central war remains indispensable as the ultimate sanction of diplomacy and the balance of power, yet has finally become a manifestly irrational instrument of policy in this regard. Since the moderating influence of the long-standing opportunities for imperial expansion into 'peripheral' regions - logically contingent but historically crucial to the balance among the core powers - has also recently 'turned into its opposite', the contradictions of international and domestic politics are coalesced in a manner which makes the reification of equilibrium 'systems' in either realm singularly inappropriate.

The notion of rational analysis will now be developed in two stages: first, with regard to the actions of great power decision-makers in situations of international crisis; and second, with regard to the challenge posed to established practices by disruptive outside influences upon transitional states. The distinction between actions and practices is a somewhat arbitrary one, since, as Giddens emphasizes, social action is in general best conceptualized as a 'continuous flow' - from which conscious decisions to act (or not to act) constitute a temporal break of 'reflexive ... attention' into the ongoing practical consciousness underpinning day-to-day activity. However, an emphasis upon conscious reflection is peculiarly appropriate to international crisis situations, consideration of which may lead in turn to the more complex
problems involved where the 'rationality' of traditional arrangements is called fundamentally into question in the domestic context.

Figure 2.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVELY RATIONAL (General Rationality)</th>
<th>OBJECTIVELY IRRATIONAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MANIFESTLY RATIONAL:</td>
<td>MANIFESTLY IRRATIONAL:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any rational actor would do x, and only x.</td>
<td>Any rational actor might do x, among other alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPROPRIATE OR REALISTIC (Special Rationality):</td>
<td>No rational actor would do x.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RATIONAL EXPLANATION</td>
<td>RATIONAL EXPLANATION (Plus traditional/ideological explanation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conforms with logic of situation and actor's own real interests.</td>
<td>Contrary to logic of situation and actor's own real interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducive to stable expectations and perceptions of legitimacy</td>
<td>Subversive of stable expectations and perceptions of legitimacy</td>
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Figure 2.2, then, presents schematically the proposed criteria for the evaluation of a major instance of strategic conduct (such as the Soviet regime's conduct during the Cuban missile crisis). The central proposition is that such conduct may be evaluated by reference to a set of factors (primarily material, but also ruling international conventions on matters such as spheres of influence) which are objective in the sense of having a reality independent of the 'perceptions' of the actors in question, and which collectively provide the situational logic with which the actors must come to grips. None of these factors, strictly speaking, should be regarded as causes of the action in question. Rather, they collectively structure and limit the range of options which a rational
actor, possessed of all the relevant information, would have to regard as viable; and where the action does fall within that range, it may be regarded as both autonomous and rational.

Where the situational logic is so stark that there is really only one viable option - as in the Soviet leadership's decision to back down over Cuba in the face of American 'escalation' - there is little more to be said. The most economical and satisfactory explanation of such a manifestly rational action is that it was the obvious thing to do in the circumstances. More commonly (as, for instance, with the Soviet leadership's initial decision to introduce the missiles into Cuba) the problem will be to account for the emergence of one among a range of more or less appropriate or realistic responses to a hierarchy of more or less contradictory situational 'logics'. Such accounts appeal to what might be called 'special rationality', in that assertions about what any rational actor would do are refined by assertions about specific traditional/ideological influences on the actor's judgement. (e.g. by reference to a traditional Russian penchant for cutting corners in 'catching-up' situations, to account for the initial, relatively high-risk Soviet strategy in the Cuban crisis). Finally, the argument also recognizes a third class of actions (such as a putative Soviet decision to initiate military conflict rather than back down in the Cuban crisis) which are manifestly irrational, and for which the only really accessible explanation is in terms of the weight of specific traditional/ideological influences which blotted out the logic of the situation, and the distinction between objectively viable and non-viable options, in the perceptions of the actors concerned.120

Of course, the categories are set out in such procrustean terms merely to exemplify the underlying structure of the argument; and in practice most actions would appear as more or less rational, realistic or appropriate - as partially, but only partially, attributable to traditional/ideological influences. However, it must be emphasized that the application of the term 'special rationality' to such actions is not meant to suggest any notion of the 'logic of the situation as the actor saw it'. The logic referred to here is in the situation, whatever the actor's perceptions of that might be. Moreover, explanations of such actions are structurally similar to those involved in the simpler case of manifestly rational action. In addition to objective factors
(including objective lack of information and the objective 'pressure of events'), subjective 'perceptual' factors are now invoked to account for the practical closure of various options. But the actor is said to have recognized at least part of the range of viable options and to have chosen autonomously and rationally within that range. And insofar as the wider question of interests is involved, it is the actor's real, and not merely perceived interests which are said to have been served.

Perhaps the most important claim in all this is that questions about the traditional/ideological motivation of essentially strategic conduct are different in kind to questions about its objective rationality or irrationality, and are also second order questions which need be addressed only insofar as inferences about situational logic fail to produce an unequivocal answer.\textsuperscript{121} In practice, as noted above, it will normally be necessary to invoke these second order considerations: indeed, the problem of establishing a satisfactory picture of other actors' perceptions is one of the most enduring in practical diplomacy. But an equally crucial problem is that of establishing the extent of the other's 'legitimate' (i.e. objective) interests; and if the preceding argument is valid, these are both hermeneutic enterprises which must take their starting point from the identification of a bridgehead of 'general rationality' in the other's conduct - most obviously in regard to fundamental shared problems such as nuclear 'crisis management'. For diplomacy as for social theory, therefore, the prescription is to work outwards from the bridgehead, not inwards from the furthermost reaches of special rationality (or even manifest irrationality) in the conduct of the other. Insofar as the hawk emphasis on the extreme ethnocentricity of Soviet policy effectively reverses this prescription, it virtually guarantees a hostile verdict on that policy, allowing even such a plausible instance of manifest rationality as Khrushchev's retreat over Cuba to be reinterpreted as further proof of the need for enduring American military preponderance to ensure Soviet adherence to the most elementary rules of international prudence.

We may now shift the focus from great power relations to inter-group contention in these larger transitional states whose economic and/or strategic importance makes them especially vulnerable to 'external' pressures from the modern states-system/world-economy. As suggested earlier, this is a shift from an unusually stable to a highly unstable pattern of strategic interaction: from a context in which individual
crises occur against a backdrop of relatively stable 'core' interests among a relatively stable great power 'polity', and in which the status quo ante is a meaningful if always contentious point of reference, to a context which is defined precisely by the irretrievable dissolution of the status quo ante, and in which not merely the balance of core interests but the composition of the polity and the very cohesion of major collectivities are brought fundamentally into question. In the first context, the extreme improbability of any one actor definitively resolving the clash of core interests on its own terms is a powerful incentive towards long-term moderation: in the latter the strong prospect that a clash of core interests will be so resolved (by one's opponents if not by oneself) is a powerful incentive towards the all-out pursuit of the most obvious prerequisite for success in this struggle - namely, control of the state.

This basic strategic logic would have no obvious revolutionary implications if those who already controlled the state (namely the 'dominant class' or the core members of the polity) could unite around a 'modernizing' strategy calculated to provide the economic, organizational and military resources necessary to meet the external challenge without fundamentally altering the established property and power relations within the society itself. However, measures adequate to the first criterion are almost certain to violate the second over the longer term, confronting the dominant class with an historically-unfolding contradiction in their real interests, such that a 'rational' case may be made both for major reforms to avert greater dangers and for holding the line at all costs. Thus even the most impressive examples of 'revolution from above' have been pushed through by determined 'state managers' against the resistance of substantial sections of the dominant class, and where either the strength of this internal resistance or the intensity of the external pressures is particularly great, the intra-polity conflict may open the way to full-scale 'multiple sovereignty' and to possible 'revolution from below'.

The basic structure of such a revolutionary situation is suggested by Figure 2.3 (which follows Charles Tilly's 'polity model' of domestic contention, with modifications to highlight the importance of external pressures and the potential autonomy of semi-professional 'state managers' in regard to the dominant class as a whole). The model indicates the possibility of at least a three-fold split within a transitional polity:
between the state managers, who are most directly exposed to international pressures and most favourably placed to initiate major political and economic reforms; those core groups of the dominant class not directly linked to the state as such, who are most likely to have the will and the capability to resist such efforts at reform; and the dissident elites (such as the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia), whose vision of more fundamental change and marginal status in the polity makes them most likely to widen the intra-polity conflict by forming coalitions with mass
actors in the society at large. The combination of such a split with the social dislocation produced at the mass level by forced-draught economic and political 'modernization' may thus satisfy Lenin's 'absolute law' that revolution can occur only when a social order is disrupted both from below and from above - 'only when the "lower classes" do not want the old way and when the "upper classes" cannot carry on in the old way'.

The importance of this crude schema (whose relevance to the more diffuse class structure of the contemporary Third World will be considered at length in Chapter 3) is that it allows one to relate specific revolutionary conjunctures to the over-arching structures of the 'global transition' without invoking any concept of an unfolding 'world revolutionary process', and without attributing to any of the crucial group actors (with the exception of the dissident elites) any motivation other than the desire to defend already established interests and positions within the constraints of a structural transformation largely beyond their control. As regards the contemporary Third World, however, this picture of an 'unmediated' structural logic substantially understates the pressures for far-reaching change, since traditional legitimating ideologies are now challenged by at least three types of doctrinal rationalization of different historical features of the modern transition: Marxist-Leninist theories of revolution; pluralist (and especially American) 'development' theory; and the 'state-centric paradigm' of modern international society. The implications of this multiple theoretical intervention in the 'normal' course of Third World development, and the inadequacy of those pluralist arguments which see in Marxism a special source of ideological distortion in contemporary world politics in general, will be considered in the next section.

Tradition, Theory and Practice

Two basic issues are addressed in this section. The first, and most general, is the inescapable tension between formal theoretical analysis and traditional legitimating concepts implied in the above account of the structural 'generation' of practices. Although this emphasis upon the innate 'logic' of social structures entails no presumption of strict
necessity, the argument has relied on other terms such as rational, realistic and appropriate which have inescapable normative overtones. If it is fair to say that what is rational, realistic or appropriate changes with changes in historical context, then this consideration applies not merely to the explanation of actions and practices but to the judgement of them as well.

Of course, the issue is never simply one of a direct confrontation between 'irrational' inherited practices and 'rational', 'demystifying' analyses of prevailing structural logic. Every theoretical paradigm involves a massive, and disputable, simplification of reality; and every theoretical paradigm, whatever its pretensions to 'value-freedom', is also in some measure a moral paradigm, which either endorses aspects of an existing social order or prescribes alternatives to them. As Oakeshott observes, the notion of a purely 'empirical' style of politics, unmediated by any such moral paradigm, is 'merely impossible, the product of a misunderstanding'; and even in primarily strategic contexts there is a lot to be said for Wight's claim about the long run superiority of 'the idea of a common moral obligation' over 'the idea of a common material interest' in keeping open 'the crack ... through which civilization can creep'. However, the practical effectiveness of such moral claims is likely to be greatest in contexts - such as the traditional state-system - where they conform most closely to the logic of a relatively stable social structure, and least in highly unstable contexts - such as domestic revolution - where corresponding prudential constraints on the all-out pursuit of strategic advantage are lacking.

The second, more specific, issue is whether analyses of contemporary great power coexistence can be situated against an international 'framework for choice' at all commensurate with the framework normally acknowledged in the sovereign state - the concept of which, Michael Donelan argues, has loomed in traditional political theory (domestic and international) as a kind of epistemological equivalent of the Hobbesian Leviathan, 'bristling with ideas against the outsiders' as the former bristles with guns, 'porcupine, powerful and good'. There are really only two consistent positions on this question, which may be described - using Wight's terminology for the competing 'paradigms' or 'traditions' in Western international theory - as (pure) Revolutionism and (pure) Realism. For the former, 'separate states are but an arrangement of [the] primordial
moral community of mankind', and a temporary and unsatisfactory arrangement which must be replaced - by violence if necessary - with a political, economic and cultural framework truly expressive of the immanent reality of 'world society'. For the latter, the only genuine community 'given to us by history' is the separate state - with 'international relations ... a mere space between states, a desert of crude power, mitigated at best by a network of pragmatically customs and by pragmatically, unstable co-operation'.

Both Realist and Revolutionist approaches are readily identifiable in the history of the modern states-system: the former as one enduring strand in the attitude of all great powers; the latter as an intermittent but occasionally dominant theme, and one modestly exemplified in the 'world order' preoccupations of both the Soviet Union and the United States in the contemporary era. However, the greatest importance, on Wight's account, attaches to the Rationalist via media between these two extremes: the central constitutive tradition of international society which recognizes that society, with all its imperfections, as a major social achievement to be safeguarded against excesses of national egoism, on the one hand, and of solidarist aspirations for the transcendence of its anarchical limitations, on the other. I have no wish to deny the centrality of this Rationalist tradition to the European states-system, nor even its continuing relevance today. But I would argue that it represents not a genuine via media but a necessarily incoherent compromise between opposing elements: a muted realpolitik in respect of the basic logic of international relations, coupled with an appeal to extraneous moral sanctions grounded in the common elite culture of a Europe of multiple great powers (a phenomenon which itself originally constituted a revolutionary breach with the political and cultural universe of mediaeval Christendom). This uncertain and fluctuating compromise (which is also characteristic of most soi-disant Realism in the Anglo-American context) has thus much greater affinities than commonly acknowledged with the 'schizophrenic' Soviet oscillation between the future goal of world socialism and the present reality of coexistence with capitalism - once the far-reaching structural and cultural crisis engendered by the recent global extension of states-system and world-economy is taken into account.

The relevance of these two issues to the current American debate about Soviet doctrine and intentions needs no emphasizing. But it also
seems fair to say that both have been inadequately addressed in the mainstream of American international and 'development' theory. As regards the 'normative/empirical' relationship, the continuing influence in American international theory of the positivistic drive to separate these elements has most recently been demonstrated in the work of Waltz, who mounts a telling critique of the incoherence and theoretical imprecision of the whole behavioural movement, but nonetheless attempts to sustain a clear distinction between his own concern for a genuinely scientific theory dedicated to the 'prediction' and 'control' of 'system-level' developments in international politics, and the approach of 'traditional political theory, which is more concerned with philosophical interpretation than with theoretical explanation'.

Moreover this aspiration towards a 'policy science' based upon the reification of social systems is even more pervasive in the pluralist theory of domestic social change, where the fundamental historical continuities represented by the states-system are conspicuously absent, and a Popperian rhetoric of piecemeal social engineering is belied by a theoretical dependence on the overtly holistic and covertly historicist perspective of functionalism. Thus Robert Merton classifies the pursuit of social change without regard to latent functions as 'social ritual rather than ... social engineering'; while Johnson portrays revolution as an unnecessary and 'morbid' rejection of the inherent commitment in social organization to the restriction of violence, 'both purposefully in terms of the conscious policies pursued by a society's members and functionally in terms of one of the unintended consequences of the value-coordinated division of labour'. Without the positivistic evasion of the inherent tension between 'facts' and 'values', neither of these claims is at all persuasive. The first is merely an assertion about the obvious fact of functional interdependence, linked to a covert value premise in favour of non-intervention; and it may be directly countered by Lenin's injunction, in response to the analysis of functional interdependence which he found in Hegel, to 'get hold of the "basic link" and you will be able to move the whole chain'. The second rests on little more than the definitional truth that self-equilibrating systems ought to be self-equilibrating. Moreover it bears a striking resemblance to the proto-functionalist argument which led Burke to imply that the French Revolution, but for an inexplicably successful conspiracy of intellectuals, need never have
happened - though Burke's frankly religious teleology is transmuted into an abstract teleology of social systems, and the retreat to synchronic analysis replaces his confident depiction of a great self-regenerating social organism, 'a permanent body of transitory parts ... at one time never old, or middle aged or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, mov[ing] on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation and progression'.134

In turn, this positivistic tendency towards reification and the evasion of value questions directly prejudices the treatment of the state/states-system relationship in much American analysis. The most obvious problem here is that of the 'billiard ball' model of the state, which - as Navari points out - can disguise the fact that both the modern sovereign state and the international 'state of nature' were to some extent historically 'instituted'. The billiard ball model does indeed provide a crude hold on the reality of international relations, but it does so partly because of an intra-system convention 'that the state is for certain purposes a billiard ball' - with the system being both emptied of extraneous non-state interactions and filled with conventions supporting the identification of 'state' and 'nation' as international actors. Insofar as the simpler variants of Realism have passed over the historical specificity of those conventions and the historical specificity of the social structures which lie behind them, they have tended to derive allegedly essential rules of coexistence, in circular fashion, from the original 'compact which began the great state of nature'.135

Of course the inadequacies of the billiard ball model have been strongly attacked by behavioural theorists and, with less theoretical rigour, by the recent interdependence school. However, the solution has been either to treat the state as merely one international actor among many, or to relegate it to the status of a 'levels of analysis' problem, thus surrendering the relative clarity of the Realist picture without moving any closer to an historically adequate theory of the state. As will be argued at length in Chapter 3, the modern states-system is incomprehensible except by reference to the modern state as the central political nexus between the individual's sense of 'general obligation' (to the community of mankind) and 'involuntary special obligation' (to relatives, neighbours and fellow citizens).136 Only by highlighting the historically specific and problematic character of this nexus - and not by ignoring it on methodological grounds - can the contemporary
position of the state be brought into true perspective.

In the following discussion, therefore, the logic of the pluralist position will be explored not in its characteristic American idiom but through a language which both acknowledges the innately historical and moral character of the theory/practice relationship and permits a simultaneous focus on the substantive problems of international and domestic politics: the language of international and domestic traditions, expounded most notably by Wight and Oakeshott respectively. At once, however, a fascinating and revealing contrast appears in the meaning attached by each thinker to the key term 'Rationalist'. For Wight, as already noted, Rationalism is the central constitutive tradition of modern international society - a subtle, fluid and ill-defined body of wisdom reflecting centuries of practical and undogmatic search for the middle way between the extremes of Realism and Revolutionism. For Oakeshott, by contrast, Rationalism is precisely that dogmatic elevation of technical over traditional or practical knowledge which has allegedly flowed from the 'incursion' of inexperienced elites and classes into European and world politics since the 16th century onward; and it is precisely the Rationalist's inexperience in the political milieu - akin to that of 'a foreigner or a man out of his social class', with less true understanding than 'a butler or an observant housemaid' - which dominates his approach to politics, generating a fetishism of, and fanaticism about technique which reaches its most dangerous proportions in Marxist revolutionary theory.

This contrast might seem merely a matter of idiosyncratic terminology on either side, especially given the prominence of Oakeshottian themes in contemporary statements of the classical approach to international theory. However, I would argue that the real explanation lies in the contradictory implications, for the broad structures of international as against domestic politics, of the ever-growing concentration of economic, coercive and ideological resources in the modern territorial state. In the international realm, this phenomenon has generated the paradigm case of the rationality of tradition, and has, on balance, made the characteristic pluralist theme of piecemeal engineering the most realistic or appropriate response to the over-riding logic of the situation. But in the domestic sphere, the transformative capacities of the state, the general spur of uneven development, and the example of specific 'great' revolutions have
effectively made it impossible to defend the self-sufficiency of tradition without resort to the kind of elaborate mystification practised by Oakeshott.

The crucial point is that pluralist international theory - both behavioural and classical - has not adequately confronted the theoretical implications of the point so often emphasized by Wight and others in arguments for the uniqueness of international politics: that unlike domestic politics it is not readily susceptible of a progressive interpretation. Moreover, this failure may be attributed to basic organizing assumptions - the behavioural assumption of synchrony, or the pessimistic, quasi-religious view of human nature held by several leading classical theorists - which have already been rejected here on methodological grounds. By contrast, the following discussion will emphasize those shared structural factors which have promoted both an impressive continuity in international political arrangements and an ongoing transcendence of domestic political frameworks which feeds back, more or less decisively in different historical contexts, into the international sphere.

In essence, the dominant Western moral paradigm of interstate coexistence can be traced back to the recognition at the Peace of Westphalia of the disastrous consequences, in a morally diverse community of states, of warfare over ultimate values. The solution, initially ad hoc but with 'momentous implications', was to establish a compact which embraced war itself, and which recognized the inescapable necessity of a 'morality of consequences'. Thus, James Mayall argues, 'necessity was recognized as a legitimate reason for restraint, for the avoidance of war over ultimate values. But the princes retained the right to go to war among themselves over secondary questions, that is, in support of another kind of necessity, reasons of state'.

The same preoccupations are readily apparent in 'mainstream' Anglo-American thinking today. Kenneth Thompson states baldly that, 'since nations in the present anarchic world society tend to be repositories of
their own morality, the ends-means formula has prevailed as an answer to the moral dilemma'.\textsuperscript{141} Kissinger identifies the statesman's task as the reconciliation of 'what is considered just with what is considered possible', but reduces the sense of justice to a simple outgrowth of 'the domestic structure of [the] state', and its implementation to the discovery of the leeway offered by the clash of competing national interests.\textsuperscript{142} Wight and Bull both offer more complex accounts than this, the former addressing the order/justice issue in terms of the interplay of 'the moral order, the legal order, and the balance of power', the latter emphasizing the tension between international and world order, and between individual justice, interstate justice, and world justice. But even Bull insists that 'unlike order, justice is a term which can ultimately be given only some kind of private or subjective definition', and that, in a general sense, order can be regarded as 'prior' to justice, in that 'it is the condition of the realization of other values'.\textsuperscript{143}

These various statements indicate the essential core of the agreement between the Realist and Rationalist positions on the structural distinction between international and domestic politics: a distinction, in Wight's words, between the issues of 'man's control over his social life' and those of the 'ultimate experience of life and death, national existence and national extinction', between a domestic 'realm of normal relationships and calculable results' and an international 'realm of recurrence and repetition - the field in which political action is most necessarily repetitious'.\textsuperscript{144} In terms of practical claims, as noted above, Realists have been more consistent in their insistence on justification by necessity and on the individual state's need for freedom to pursue its own self-interest without reference to customary constraints. But this very consistency derives substantially from a 'pessimistic' model of man; and without this unwarranted, high-level assumption, the Rationalist concept of international society may be seen as a truer reflection of the contradictory logic - of conflict and cooperation - inherent in the international anarchy.

Moreover, as Bull has cogently demonstrated, a structuralist defence of the Rationalist position can also be mounted against the Revolutionist perspective on world society, on the grounds that a minimal, procedural order among states (which safeguards the substantive order within states) is preferable to any currently feasible alternative.\textsuperscript{145} But such an
approach entails abandoning any attempt to expand the case against international Revolutionism into a proscription of domestic revolutionism, for the general importance of custom and tradition as historical 'carriers' of the logic of international cooperation does not entail the appropriateness, *sine die*, of the historically specific traditions of European/Western international society. The fundamental dilemma remains. Either Rationalism rests on a specific value preference for the international ethic of a world of princes - the 'special morality of satisfied powers', and of satisfied groups within powers. Or it asserts, an enduring common interest of states as such in what Burke called 'one of the greatest objects of human wisdom - to mitigate those evils which we are unable to remove'.146 This in turn divorces the logic of a world of sovereign states from the problem of revolutionary transcendence within states, and leaves the necessity of existing domestic arrangements to be established in its own terms.

As regards this latter issue, Oakeshott's argument is particularly interesting for its apparent reconciliation of Burke's defence of prejudice - 'the bank and capital of ages and nations'147 - with the much more radical (not to say rationalist) variant of historicist functionalism advanced by Hegel. In both respects, the positive echoes of the earlier thinkers are less significant than the 'absences' dictated by Oakeshott's need, in developing their themes, to finesse the massive structural transformations of the intervening period. Where Burke could still combine a 'frankly irrational' political theory with an 'economic ideology of pure Adam Smithianism', in a single, if incoherent, image of the social organism,148 Oakeshott narrows the focus drastically to an ethereal tradition or 'practice' - a 'flow of sympathy' which is such 'a tricky thing to get to know' that it must not even be cribbed by its defenders, let alone wrapped in the rawer breath of Rationalist detractors.149 The liberal/pluralist position on the economy appears covertly in a stipulative distinction between the centrally directed *policy* of the state conceived as 'enterprise association' and the genuine *politics* of the state concerned as 'civil association' - in which individuals are associated, as equal individuals, solely in terms of their subscription to common moral practice and not at all in terms of their subscription to common substantive purposes. But Oakeshott's concern to defend the latter solely in moral, rather than prudential or consequential terms, in turn leads him to rule out of court the fundamental politics/economics
nexus of the Industrial Revolution era. Terms such as Capitalism, Bureaucracy, Centralism and Pluralism, he argues, are 'totally irrelevant' to the distinction between the two moral paradigms of civil and enterprise association. Civil association is not a 'free enterprise' association, with which it is often confused, but a 'no-enterprise' association. Thus the concept of tradition - ostensibly historical in its very core - is reduced to an idealist orthodoxy which is in practice as abstract and timeless as the behavioural concept of system. Moreover, this same paradoxical combination of a functionalist mode of argument with a denial of the collective implications of functional interdependence would seem to be inherent in all pluralist accounts of the 'watchman state' holding the ring for the free play of competitive interests. It is no accident that modern pluralism has developed elaborate theoretical rationales for ignoring the substantive content of institutions in domestic social orders. It makes some sense to speak of a minimum procedural order in regard to the anarchical society of sovereign states. But under conditions of modern industrial capitalism, a commitment to domestic political pluralism (or alternatively to piecemeal social engineering) is a commitment to a substantive social enterprise.

The transmutation of the Hegelian notion of philosophy as 'afterthought' is even more revealing. This allows Oakeshott to insist that ideologically-inspired political planning can never rest on genuine prediction, but merely on a 'crib' or 'abridgement' of tradition; and to satirize Rationalist expectations of progress as mere 'illusions that wait for the ignorant and the unwary'. But behind the stylish rhetoric lies some basic sleight of hand in regard to the concept of tradition, which oscillates between the entire culture of society, on the one hand, and a narrowly defined political tradition, on the other. Oakeshott's own prescription for political innovation through the 'pursuit of intimations' either means nothing or else prediction and planning on the basis of past practice, the practice of a 'traditional' ruling elite. Rationalist prediction and planning is not a wholly different enterprise, but the same enterprise incorporating the practices and the material conditions of a far larger sector of society, which are ruled out of consideration in Oakeshott's account on the definitional grounds that they are not part of the tradition. However, it is precisely the capacity of traditional institutions and established moral paradigms to accommodate major new social contradictions that is at issue in periods of major structural transformation. This is the real significance of the Hegelian doctrine of transcendence, whose implications, when detached from Oakeshott's
sliding-scale definition of tradition, are deeply revolutionary. In Windsor's words:

...not only does mind develop over time; it continually transcends itself ... This means that moral laws are now laws only in a limited sense. They are the codification of what we have achieved so far. They are open to transcendence as we go on discovering. Discovering how the moral order has demanded victims whose own potential for transcendence has been sacrificed to the maintenance of a social framework. In other words, society becomes inherently oppressive.

Finally, Oakeshott's obiter dicta on revolutions in general and the Russian revolution in particular indicate very clearly the implications of divorcing the notion of tradition from an identifiable material context in periods of great structural change. Whereas Johnson merely claims that revolutions are unnatural events which need not happen, Oakeshott implies that they do not happen. His assumptions forbid the possibility that ideology may be not merely a crib but a critique of tradition, and that the Rationalist's programmatic concern with the whole of society may be an index not of political inexperience but of sensitivity to the inadequacy of existing political frameworks in an increasingly complex society. Therefore, he insists that a revolutionary ideology can be only the exported crib of another tradition; that the programmes it generates will prove basically irrelevant to what actually happens (the French and Russian revolutions, for instance, involving merely the 'modification' of ancien regime conditions); and that 'salvation' (presumably a restoration) must ultimately come from 'the unimpaired resources of the tradition itself'. As for the Soviet regime - those 'private enterprise usurpers, operators of the most fraudulent coup d'etat of modern times' - their only claim to authority 'is the dwindling asset of being able to be mistaken for the legitimate successors of the Tsars, made plausible by their conduct, by their direct inheritance of an apparatus of government, and in the recognition they have received from other governments'.

This judgement is only a more extreme version of that offered by writers such as Pipes and Brzezinski, for whom the Bolsheviks merely 'perfected', or at most temporarily 'revitalized' the Tsarist system. Moreover, though Pipes is as discreet as Oakeshott about the Industrial Revolution in his own major statement on the development of the Russian political tradition, he has elsewhere invoked the thesis of Tsarist-
Soviet continuity in support of an unfavourable contrast between modern Russia, where militarism allegedly produced industrialism, and modern Germany, where the reverse relation obtained. It may therefore be useful to compare this continuity thesis to E.H.Carr's discussion of why Oakeshott's 'salvation' (a Thermidorean reaction) did not occur in the Russian case.

At the very centre of Carr's account lies the notion of structural contradiction, and of the state as an agent of social transformation. He emphasizes the isolation of the Bolshevik party by the mid-1920s. He acknowledges that all previous lawlike generalizations (including Marxist theory) about the course of revolutions, plus the general surrender under NEP of 'the radicalism of revolutionary doctrine [to] the conservatism of administrative empiricism' suggested that 'the country would settle down into a modified bourgeois capitalism on a Russian national pattern'. But the ultimate result - 'a paradox which falsified every current prediction and appeared to frustrate every attempt at rational analysis' - was the massive Stalinist drive for collectivization and industrialization, with its enormous attendant costs. And though Carr's analysis pays due regard to specific Russian factors such as the established tradition of convulsive modernization through 'revolution from above' and the paucity of surviving ancien regime institutions, he presents his most 'profound' cause - the weakness relative to the party of both proletariat and bourgeoisie, which both permitted and demanded a new Bolshevik initiative if fundamental revolutionary advance were to be resumed - as an extreme example of a more general 'altered balance of social relations' demanding an increasing dominance of politics over economics in all modern states. The collectivization programme is thus, on Carr's account, both the conscious choice of a ruthless elite, pushed through against the resistance of the very masses of which it claimed to be the vanguard, and also a genuine reflection of a situational logic which mass action had helped to create - 'few great men hav[ing] been so conspicuously as Stalin the product of the time and place in which they lived'.

There can be few more illuminating insights into the complex interrelations of the terms 'rational' and 'realist' encountered in the foregoing discussion. In Popperian terms, Stalin's 'revolution from above' must appear as the paradigm case of the historicist's catastrophic resort to utopian planning as his own predictions crumble before reality. By Oakeshott's account, the spectacle is of a Rationalist of the most inexperienced stripe, his technique cribbed from alien traditions proving
totally inadequate, reaching back for 'salvation' to the most brutal resources of an autocratic native tradition. Carr's account incorporates both these strictures, but his primary emphasis is very different. He explains the event as a realistic, appropriate, or rational response to an unprecedented situation; he judges it by criteria that are Rationalist in Wight's sense, balancing the massive human costs against the enormous new breach made in the 'laws' of material necessity; and both explanation and judgement are grounded in an historicist perception of the place of the Soviet experience in an ongoing transformation which has produced the modern world. ¹⁶¹

Different judgements could be offered, but not by Oakeshott. Carr presents collectivization partly as a highly structured 'practical necessity', partly as a momentous 'intelligible contingency' of the kind which both Oakeshott and W.B.Gallie regard as the distinguishing feature of historical understanding.¹⁶² But where Gallie recognizes, in addition to sheer accident, contingencies involving the kind of shift in consciousness described by Carr, Oakeshott allows no distinction among contingencies, insisting that no event can be causally related to any other, or placed in, or shown to diverge from any pattern of development.

The historical past is without moral, the political or the social structure which the practical man transfers from his present to his past. The Pope's intervention did not change the course of events, it was the course of events, and consequently his action was not an 'intervention'. X did not die 'too soon'; he died when he did. Y did not dissipate his resources in a series of useless wars: the wars belong to the actual course of events, not to some imaginary illegitimate course of events. ¹⁶³

Oakeshott thus prescribes not only Carr's historical 'framework for choice' (and the alternatives advocated by critics who accuse Carr of collusion in the relegation of the Bolsheviks' opponents to the 'dustbin of history'), but his own as well. For Stalin's massive 'intervention', like every other Rationalist excess before and after, was the course of events. And Oakeshott can criticize them only by reference to 'some imaginary illegitimate [tradition directed] course of events' spanning the 'four, six or eighteen centuries' during which, as Gellner observes, the Rationalist 'poison' variously appears to have entered European politics.¹¹
I have attempted to show that structuralist concepts of 'practical necessity' are essential to both explanation and judgement in any large-scale area of social inquiry, being routinely (if covertly) invoked in pluralist accounts of international politics despite the deep suspicion with which they are treated in pluralist accounts of domestic politics. Indeed, there would seem to be an inverse relationship between devotion to unique facts and sensitivity to historically specific structures and conjunctures, as evidenced by the easy movement from unique events to an all-embracing tradition in Oakeshott's analysis, or from particular institutions to the 'needs' of an entire social system in American functionalism. Pluralist international theory in practice escapes this teleological fallacy, because the 'system' which it invokes is also a structured historical episode unique in its historical and spatial spread. However, while the 'international anarchy' provides for an unusually strong criterion of historical necessity, this criterion is neutral as regards substantive domestic orders. Thus, insofar as one attempts to preserve today the more substantive criteria implicit in the classical paradigm of international society, one must also address the more complex questions of domestic historical necessity so strikingly raised by the Soviet development experience.

Similarly, I would argue that Pipes' comparison of Russia and Germany essentially in terms of the internal dynamics of 'militarism' and 'industrialism' is wrongly formulated, encouraging a narrow focus on specific developments in the interwar period, on the one hand, and extremely general, idealist assertions about the imperatives of deep-seated national traditions, on the other. The missing element in such an account is the critical phase of socio-economic transformation, perhaps a century long in each case, and marked by a series of specific conjunctures often crucially 'overdetermined' by international factors. Given such a perspective, I would argue that the *Weitpolitik* of Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany was both more continuous with traditional great power practice and less appropriate to the emerging structures of contemporary world politics than the Soviet combination of Socialism in One Country, Peaceful Coexistence and indirect pursuit of world revolution.¹⁶⁵

The basic point, to reiterate, is that the relative weight of 'traditional' as against 'theoretical' ideologies in the formation of a
policy, and the objective rationality or irrationality of that policy, are essentially separate questions. However, while it is crucial to emphasize this point against the evaluative criteria often brought to bear on Soviet policy, it is also true that the intensity of the collision between traditional and theoretical ideologies has been of great practical importance in the development of Soviet policy in particular and contemporary world politics in general. Some more specific comments on this collision will therefore conclude this section.

First, social theorizing of the monistic kind is inescapable in periods of structural transformation, and is itself a further transforming agent, which challenges ruling moral paradigms, and helps to undermine the 'givenness' of established social orders. This is most obviously true of self-consciously critical theory, which - on Jurgen Habermas' definition - aims to provide human actors with 'information about lawlike connections' which shape their lives, so that 'the level of unreflected consciousness, which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transformed'. However, this dimension of social theory does not depend merely upon the intentions of the individual theorist: it may also result from the focus of conservative or 'Realist' critics on the enduring need for order. To explain the underpinnings of continuity is also to point to possibilities for change, and all attempts to lay bare the structure of social reality must indicate that some features are less 'invariant' than others. The only varieties of social theory which do not have such implications are those 'non-interventionist' theories which refuse to identify key structural properties or to establish clear hierarchies of causal factors, but rather insist upon the interdependence and/or the uniqueness of everything. Such theories are really sophisticated restatements of dominant moral paradigms, which seek to defend the latter from the inroads of monistic and interventionist analyses, whether radical or conservative in impetus.

In some cases, as with Oakeshott, the tendency of such theories to mystify social relationships and shroud social contradictions is fairly obvious in the form of the argument itself. But a similar result is achieved by a policy science approach, which combines an ostensible commitment to disciplined theoretical analysis with an insistence that issues be considered piecemeal, on their merits, leaving the main structure beyond question. Indeed, I have suggested that the two approaches
perform complementary functions, so to speak, and that the emergence of a kind of division of labour between them has been an important aspect of the Anglo-American liberal/pluralist tradition. On the one hand, there has been the consistent tendency, from Locke through Burke to Oakeshott, to reconcile market morality, in respect of the economy, with traditional morality, in respect of political 'arrangements'. On the other, there has been the evolution of the policy science perspective, with a positivistic notion of rationality spilling over from the 'self-regulating' economy to the modern bureaucracy, precisely to rationalize that political intervention made necessary by the failure of the economy to live up to its self-regulating image. In the approach of normative functionalist theory in the United States, these two trends might be said to have met in the middle.

Furthermore, it must be stressed that these kinds of theoretical mystification are not confined solely to the pluralist approach. Both can readily be observed in the official Soviet self-account. The dominant theme here has been a policy science one, with distinct functionalist and systemic overtones, which implies that the era of dialectical leaps is over, and that the central problems of Soviet development are now ones of piecemeal, though centrally directed, reform of the established order. However, the Brezhnev era has also witnessed an increasingly systematic appeal to tradition, not merely the tradition of 'Marxist-Leninist science' or the Russian tradition as a whole, but also, as Agnes Heller emphasizes, the tradition of Soviet rule, now well into its seventh decade. Of course, there continue to be yawning gaps in the past appealed to for the purpose of legitimation; and in its emphasis on a piecemeal, 'creative' use of precedent and its refusal to seriously address the question of large-scale trends in Soviet history, the official Soviet line contains fascinating echoes of the Oakeshottian approach.

Second, while one must reject the notion that traditional paradigms should be given exclusive rights to explain phenomena which they also act to perpetuate, 'the essential importance of tradition and routinization' in social reproduction must be given full acknowledgement. In Giddens' words:

The sedimentation of institutional forms in long-term processes of social development is an inescapable feature of all types of society,
however rapid the changes they may undergo. Only by grasping this conceptually, rather than by repudiating it, can we in fact approach the study of social change at all.

It is also necessary to reiterate the dual dimension - both enabling and constraining - of tradition, and of social structure in general. The notion of political 'languages', and of politics as a 'conversation', primarily captures the former dimension; and it is most obviously applicable to those contexts in which, for structural reasons, no one authority is able to lay down the law without significant competition - as with the evolving practices of the European states-system or the international 'tradition' of political and social revolution of the modern era. However, even such loosely articulated practices as these involve a major constraining dimension, and even a limited control over their evolution may be regarded as a major power resource, as the Soviet and Chinese contest over the 'language' of international Communism indicates.¹⁷⁰ In regard to the dense social structures of complex domestic societies, it is absurd to speak, as does Oakeshott, of a central political 'practice' as a 'vernacular language' whose resources are equally available to all.¹⁷¹

Moreover, it is necessary to recognize that where the constraint of established norms and practices falls excessively upon one particular segment of society, they may be not so much internalized as recognized as 'external' obstacles to be manoeuvered round - as Waltz speaks of small powers seeking to 'manoeuvre in the interstices of [the] balance of power'.¹⁷² This is particularly obvious in the case of small nations in a great power's sphere of influence, enmeshed, for objective structural reasons, in someone else's web of constitutive meanings. But as Percy Cohen suggests, there is reason to suspect that the same is true in a number of domestic contexts, such as the position of the black community in South Africa.¹⁷³ In both contexts it seems reasonable to speak of potentially strategic situations, in which established obligation claims are heavily dependent upon the sanction of raw force.

Third, although both the great power relationship and the politics of transitional Third World states are here treated primarily as areas of strategic interaction, this strategic logic is reflected in the dominant moral paradigm only in the former context. In Third World states,
as Gellner suggests, the contradiction between inherited assumptions and situational logic is one of the more obvious sources of revolutionary tension:

It is virtually a tautology that the transition cannot be peaceful and smooth, and that it must at some stage involve treason and violence: for it must involve transfers of authority which cannot be validated, and which can scarcely be conceived, in terms of the concepts of the ancient order. 174

This is certainly not to suggest that traditional concepts are irrelevant to the course of development in such contexts. They are clearly of profound importance, particularly since, as in the case of Islam, they are likely to invoke still potent transcendental sanctions. But it does seem fair to expect such concepts to figure primarily as resources employed in the struggle to establish conflicting versions of the material transformation rather than as the dominant framework within which the material transformation must be confined. This expectation is only partly dependent on an estimate of the material imperatives likely to be faced by the elites of strategically placed Third World countries. There is also the multiplicity of traditions in complex, literate but 'pre-modern' societies, allowing for divergent modes of 'traditional' legitimation for competing political responses to what is, after all, an unprecedented material situation.175

In addition, there is the further impact of the response, until recently 'specific to the modern West', which 'involves the disavowal of tradition as such as a form of legitimation'. As Giddens argues, this goes beyond the general phenomenon of 'disenchantment' emphasized by Weber, and involves the direct application of monistic reasoning about change to the production of change:

Its most acute expression is found in the ascendancy of historicity as a mode of historical consciousness: the active mobilization of social forms in pursuit of their own transformation. Whatever the precise nature of the relation involved, there is no doubt that the triumph of historicity in this sense accompanies the rise of modern capitalism. The age of modern capitalism is the age that marks the dominance of two distinctive kinds of collectivity: the 'legal-rational' organization and the secular social movement.
Finally, one must note the role played by such movements and organizations (and movement-organizations) as superstructural 'carriers' of concepts and organizing structures across temporal and spatial 'gaps' in the contemporary world. Kenneth Minogue has observed that to speak of a tradition of revolution is to invoke the notion of tradition jumping gaps. But this notion fails to capture the extent to which political action has systematically transformed material conditions in recent history - as in the role of the Bolshevik party in the Soviet Union or, on a wider scale, as in the extension of Western diplomatic and economic practices and structures to the post-colonial Third World. A more appropriate analogy for such phenomena lies in Perry Anderson's discussion of the mediaeval Christian Church as 'the one single institution [which] spanned the whole transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages in essential continuity ... the main, frail aqueduct across which the cultural reservoirs of the Classical World now passed to the new universe of feudal Europe ...'.

Western critics might balk at describing the Bolshevik party as a frail aqueduct. But frail it certainly was, being deeply interpenetrated with Tsarist 'bureaucratic culture' in the 1920s, and effectively smashed in the 1930s during the consolidation of the (in many respects very traditional) Stalinist system. Conversely, while Western theorists are acutely aware of the fragility of the web of conventions which mediates the stable order of a now global states-system, they often seem notably unaware that, from some Third World viewpoints, that system must seem a towering structure of inequality rather similar to that depicted in the totalitarian model of the Soviet Union.

The point is that neither the future of the modern states-system nor that of transitional Third World societies can be discussed adequately in terms of 'unfolding' conceptions of change. In both contexts processes of structural transformation are at work, in which 'traditional' and 'scientific' features are likely to be 'spot-welded' together in the emerging social structures, and in which far-reaching ideological conflict is part of the logic of the situation. Any 'rules' for Soviet-American coexistence in such a context must be at the bottom rules of prudence, and they must rest upon something more solid than mere tautologies about interdependence. One must, in effect, demonstrate 'something given, brute fact, something unchangeable' - something which,
to paraphrase Hegel, is the more manifestly rational for being the more persistently actual. I believe that the only serious candidate for this position remains the classical concept of the states-system. But neither its strengths nor its weaknesses in this role can be adequately appreciated unless it is clearly detached from the attempts to establish the notion of an equilibrium system as the master concept for contemporary world politics.

State and Society in Pluralist and Marxist Prospective

This final section attempts to relate the Soviet account of world revolution to the wider Western tradition of speculation on state and class formation, and to highlight in particular its contrasts with the American pluralist perspective. This represents something of a digression from the primarily methodological issues discussed so far, but it seems important at this point to defend the relevance of the official Soviet account to the states-system component of the states-system/transition model of world politics sketched in the next two chapters. If practical, and indeed theoretical statism is the test of fidelity to the states-system, then the Soviet Union may be counted among the first of the true believers - ranged, along with China and the majority of Third World states, against the growing chorus of transnationalist and interdependence rhetoric emanating from both government and academic sources in the West in general, and the United States in particular. However, many Western critics have taken this very statism as convincing evidence of the analytical sterility of Marxism and the irrelevance of formal Marxist values to actual Soviet policy, both domestic and foreign. On the one hand, totalitarian theorists have hammered away at the contradiction between an entrenched Soviet Leviathan and the regime's alleged commitment to the 'withering away' of the state. On the other, pluralist critics of Soviet foreign policy have claimed to discern under the fog of Soviet rhetoric a kind of vulgar-Machiavellian Realism, attributable to the attempt to operate in the international arena without any meaningful conception of international society. And both images have recently been strongly reinforced by the hawk picture of a Soviet elite mouthing the phrases of Marx but inextricably linked, through Stalin, to the traditions of Russian autocracy.

This critique rests upon a powerful half-truth. But it also
involves a highly simplistic view of the Marxist perspective on state and revolution, and reflects in turn an ethnocentric American perspective on these issues. It is not, I would suggest, a matter of a simple contrast between the Soviet approach to world politics and a Western tradition embracing the United States. Rather, Soviet and American perspectives should be seen as the polar extremes of a crucial transcendental/instrumental division, reaching back at least as far as Hegel, on the nature of the modern state, with the European tradition of international society falling more or less in the middle.\textsuperscript{180}

I have already suggested that there were three major intellectual sources of the American pluralist perspective: classical political economy, with its emphasis on the 'insulation' of economy from polity; the Whig-Liberal political tradition, with its emphasis on constitutional checks and balances; and the sociological tradition of normative functionalism. In all three cases, the original source incorporated a recognition that the transcendence of conflict within 'civil society' was a serious political problem. The treatment of civil society by Adam Smith and his colleagues of the Scottish enlightenment partly anticipated Hegel in demonstrating the polarizing impact of the modern division of labour,\textsuperscript{181} and this point appeared even more clearly in the work of David Ricardo, who, Marx noted, 'consciously [made] the antagonism of class interests the starting point of his investigations'.\textsuperscript{182} Throughout the 19th century, of course, liberal economists moved progressively away from a concern with society as a whole towards the totally a-historical marginalist approach - whose ostensibly rigorous analysis of the economic 'mechanism' implicitly assumed a political order in which major class divisions would not be permitted to impede the objective operation of the free market.\textsuperscript{183} As regards liberal political theory, the problem was even more starkly expressed in Hobbes' argument from an atomistic model of man to the necessity of a Leviathan state, while Locke's rationalization of limited constitutional government was achieved only by building class division and class cohesion, and a basic inequality in political right, into the heart of his model.\textsuperscript{184} Finally, functionalist sociology had important roots in the response of conservative European thinkers to the dual challenge posed by the French and Industrial Revolutions to traditional social orders. Mediated by Durkheim this response found its way into modern American social theory above all in the Parsonian preoccupation with normative consensus as the solution to 'the Hobbesian problem of order'.\textsuperscript{185}
Thus the innocence of modern American pluralism about the state as an object of class struggle is something of an anomaly even in regard to its more obvious historical sources. In Britain, to say nothing of continental Europe, the 19th century doctrine of the watchman state was strongly challenged - and modified - by the continuing power of paternalistic conservatism, by rising socialism, and by the interventionist Benthamite strand within the liberal tradition. In United States itself, the traditional Whig concern to combine constitutional government with the use of state power in defence of unequal property divisions was a dominant theme in the moderate Realism of the Constitution and the attendant constitutional debates.\textsuperscript{186} And though the pluralist image of a self-regulating system of interests loosely structured by a weak state appeared in its essentials as early as Tocqueville's analysis of Jacksonian America,\textsuperscript{187} the specific political framework of modern American capitalism was finally decided only by the massive and partisan use of state power in the Civil War and Reconstruction era.\textsuperscript{188}

Thus the characteristic pluralist synthesis of democratic and 'stake in society' themes - with its refusal to consider seriously the question of objective interests not articulated in group activity, and its easy shift from the earlier fiction of freely competing \textit{individus} to the notion of (more or less) freely competing \textit{groups} - reflects a highly selective reading even of the uniquely privileged history of American capitalist development.\textsuperscript{189} Nonetheless, it seems clear that the enormous material strides of the post-Civil war period provided a secular confirmation for a distinctively American value system already partly established in the colonial era: a basic consensus around an individualistic, property-oriented concept of democracy; a powerful commitment to the virtues of unity-in-diversity; an assumption of the unproblematic character of material and social progress; and an overt distrust of 'utopian' theory, linked to a deep commitment to the theory embodied in American practice.\textsuperscript{190} Even the two manifestly revolutionary aspects of the later American experience - the successful absorption of a huge and varied intake of immigrants and the economy's exponential strides in technological innovation - helped to reinforce the dominant moral paradigm. Altogether, there were strong incentives to classify the American experience as one which (always excepting the Civil War) had transcended the violent conflicts of European politics to establish a condition of continuous 'revolution by consent'.\textsuperscript{191}
The impulse to universalize this already selective reading of the American experience has proved a potent one in this century, generating the expectation of natural harmony in a freely-trading world, and of the ready progress of 'underdeveloped' nations towards an established (pluralist) model of modern society. Of course, the United States' new world role entailed a growing involvement with antithetical value-systems, and the post-1945 vogue for Realism was envisaged as an attempt to combat the oscillation between the extremes of 'isolationism' and 'messianism' which this experience had allegedly produced. However, as was suggested in Chapter 1, the more significant point is the ease with which the Realist concern with political balance (based in turn upon the assumption of an unchanging human nature) could be assimilated to the 'messianic' vision of a stable, harmonious, pluralist world order.

Indeed, in the ambivalent character of the adulation extended to the American constitution - on the one hand as a pragmatic, but enormously successful balancing mechanism, and on the other as a symbol of the United States as a kind of 'moral cosmos' for its citizens, one might discern the reason why order as such, rather than a specifically state-centred international order, became the central preoccupation of American foreign policy. There must always be a certain Gestalt-like field/ground relationship between political order and the 'pursuits of happiness' which it is supposed to facilitate, but this has a special dimension in the American tradition which is nicely demonstrated in W.W. Rostow's 1971 pronouncement, after his own intimate involvement in the Johnson Administration's prosecution of the Vietnam war:

In the end, the glory of America has been not its relative material wealth but the sense of its transcendent political mission in reconciling liberty and order. However imperfectly fulfilled, this transcendent mission has been recognized in the end, by Americans and by peoples in every part of the world.

A very different relationship between order, freedom and progress - revolving round the perception of solidarist, rather than cross-cutting,
conflict in civil society - is depicted by the Hegelian-Marxist tradition. Despite its overtly idealist framework, Hegel's vision of dialectical progress was also grounded in an immanent critique of classical political economy which - with its account of the dynamics of pauperization, social polarization, and economic imperialism - anticipated many of the conclusions of Marx. Indeed, as Shlomo Avineri points out, this analysis of the ills of modern civil society was the only area of Hegel's work in which a problem was consciously left unresolved. But the overall thrust of his social philosophy was undoubtedly an 'integrative and mediating' one, which looked to the transcendence of the contradictions of civil society, partly through the integrative role of corporations, partly through the operation of a representative political pluralism, and above all by the unifying modern state, administered by the bureaucratic 'universal class'. And given his own methodology, with its denial of the possibility of a standpoint outside history and the unfolding historical consciousness, Hegel was thus compelled, in effect, 'to assume that history had already come to an end'. With the French Revolution and the establishment of the modern rational state, the definitive model of social transcendence was now generally available, the medium through which, in the ensuing 'appendix to history ... history fulfills itself'.

Marx's materialist inversion of the dialectic - the centrepiece of his fusion of German philosophy and British political economy, and 'the guiding thread for my studies' - was forthrightly expressed in the 1859 Preface to his Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. Having asserted the determinate relationship between the ideological, legal and political superstructure and the 'real foundation' of production relations which 'are indispensable and independent of men's will', Marx went on to identify structural contradiction as the central engine of historical development:

At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins the epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.
Even here, however, Marx insisted upon the distinction between 'the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science', and the manifold 'ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out'. And his work in general certainly provides no warrant for the reduction of the superstructure to a mere 'epiphenomenon' of the economic base. The distinguishing characteristic of man for Marx was forethought, the ability 'to raise [a] structure in imagination before he erects it in reality; and his emphasis on the link between historical forms of consciousness and social being was an integral part of the claim that, within the structural constraints engendered by their social interaction, 'men make their own history'. More specifically, Marx's rejection of the Hegelian vision of the state transcending the conflicts of civil society, and of the supposed universality of the bureaucracy, in no sense constituted a denial of the crucial importance of political action to the question of historical progress. Rather, 'the Hegelian idea of a "universal class" stripped of its hypostasis, becomes a vehicle for historical explanation', and the partisan employment of the state by such a class the central feature of the 'epoch of social revolution'.

On this account the normal role of the state, assisted by a complex network of ideological and interest group forces, was the maintenance of the existing order. But, argues John McMurtry, in those specific instances in which a 'fundamental contradiction' in the mode of production had arisen, Marx saw the state as 'an agency for the qualitative alteration as opposed to maintenance of the economic order, in accordance with the requirements of productive force development'. This could occur only when the state had been seized by a fully self conscious revolutionary class, and in this role the state was clearly a progressive force. For the success of the revolutionary class depended precisely on its capacity temporarily to unify civil society, to appear 'from the very start ... not as a class, but as the representative of the whole of society. For Marx of course, the end result of the bourgeois revolution remained the triumph of a new particular interest in civil society, with the state - its executive 'but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' - reverting to a role of simple class coercion. By contrast, the proletariat was 'a class which is the dissolution of all
classes', and although the proletarian revolution would be followed by a period of political 'dictatorship', in which the residual elements of the old order were eradicated, this would be merely the transition to a condition in which the conflictual basis of the state was finally transcended.  

This identification of social revolution above all with the political action of a rising class reflected a broader tendency, in the special circumstances of the early 19th century, to assimilate the experience of the 'bourgeois' political revolutions to the greater transformation apparently pre-figured in the early stage of the Industrial Revolution in England; and it left little of substance to be said about the post-revolutionary role of the state. Marx clearly recognized the complexity of class differentiation in capitalist society, for which his 'two-class model' sought only to delimit the dominant trend, and also, with the establishment of the Bonapartist Second Empire, the opportunity for a quasi-independent role for the bureaucratic state in conditions of temporary balance between competing classes.  

But the problem of an 'independent' post-revolutionary state could not arise so long as the proletariat actually came to power as 'the self-conscious, independent community of the immense majority'; and despite Marx's recognition of counter-trends, the grounds for this fundamental assumption were graphically derived in Capital from the 'immanent laws of capitalistic production itself'. On the one hand there would be continuous 'centralization of capital' in the hands of an ever-narrowing circle of monopolists, increasing socialization of the labour-process, growing dislocation in national economies, and the 'entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market'. On the other, the proletariat - its numbers constantly swollen by recruits from other classes - would grow in uniformity and wretchedness, but also in revolutionary consciousness, 'disciplined, united and organized' by the very process that was simultaneously driving the capitalist system to its final crisis:  

The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.
This theory, it must be reiterated, offered not a teleological but a structuralist, quasi-casual explanation of revolution, in terms of the political action of historically situated social groups. Marx's doctrine of an objective proletarian interest actually indicated the problematic character of class consciousness, implying an 'historical conflict between theory and practice', whose resolution depended upon the proletariat's subjective recognition of that interest. Even Marx's vagueness regarding the period after the socialist revolution was consonant with a refusal to predict historical developments which fell outside the structural parameters he claimed to have identified.

'Precisely because the transition from capitalism to socialism was the historical function of the proletariat as a revolutionary class', Herbert Marcuse points out, 'the specific political forms of this transition appeared as variables which could not be fixed and established by theory'. And, conversely, the proletariat could be expected to discover appropriate forms precisely because the 'objective historical coincidence' between the breakdown of mature capitalism and the revolutionary action of the entire proletariat was the revolution. 'If this class does not exist, that is, act as a class, then the socialist revolution does not exist'.

Moreover, Marx specifically objected to the attempt of a Russian critic to transform his 'historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe' into 'an historico-philosophical theory of the path of development prescribed by fate for all nations', while his embryonic 'second theory of revolution' as a product not of mature capitalism but of the impact of uneven development upon more backward societies obviously had much more complex implications for the post-revolutionary relationship of state and society. But he did offer a 'scientific' prediction regarding the development of the Western proletariat, and he did, in general, reflect the prevailing 19th century assumption that developments in Europe would determine the fate of the rest of the world. And it is, therefore, fair to say that an important part of the Marxist legacy - especially as mediated through the positivism of the later Engels - was the conviction that history would come to an end with the triumph of the proletariat.

But not with a bang. For Marx's successors faced the very situation which his own reconciliation of theory and practice could not accommodate.
With the growing evidence of the ability of capitalism to improve the material well-being of the mass of the population, the crucial revolutionary coincidence 'passed', and 'the revolutionary potential of the working class seemed to recede throughout the developed world'. This constituted a fundamental change in the subjective and objective conditions for the revolution which 'in the long run decided the fate of Soviet Marxism' - and led to a total reappraisal of the period of transition in terms of a Soviet task of 'building a socialist society coexistent rather than subsequent to the capitalist society, as the competitor rather than the heir to the latter'.

The theoretical starting point of this reappraisal was provided by Lenin's threefold adaptation of classical Marxism. There was the theory of imperialism, which accounted, on the one hand, for the temporary ability of monopoly capitalism to export its own structural contradictions and to secure a period of 'class peace' through the bribery of the 'upper stratum' of the working class, and, on the other, for the impending emergence of a different kind of revolutionary situation arising from the inter-imperialist conflict. There was the tentative elaboration of a 'dialectics of backwardness', by which the uneven development of capitalism was shown to have shifted the revolutionary frontier to the less developed nations. And finally there was the doctrine of the vanguard party, which, given the Russian combination of an immature proletariat and an ineffectual bourgeoisie, would both precipitate the democratic revolution and organize the ensuing 'revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry'.

While in one sense freely adopting Marxism to the Russian Populist tradition, Lenin was also, like Trotsky and Rosa Luxembourg, reviving the original Marxist concern with subjective political action as against the economic determinism of Social Democracy in the advanced nations. But this new synthesis of theory and practice still rested on the assumption that the phenomenon of 'class peace' in those nations was temporary, and that the democratic revolution in Russia would trigger the wider socialist revolution in Europe, upon which not merely the success, but even the survival of the Bolshevik experiment would depend. When the long-term future of the isolated Soviet state within a hostile capitalist environment was finally resolved in favour of the Stalinist version of Socialism in One Country, the authoritarian potential of Lenin's
approach was realized in full. The dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry resolved itself into a dictatorship of the Bolshevik party over the proletariat and the peasantry, and the very concept of revolution, 'which in 1917-1918 ... still meant to Communists the liberation of society from outworn political and spiritual fetters ... came to stand for the reshaping of society by a dictatorial regime in control of a centralized state apparatus and an all pervading party organization'.

This marked the final abandonment of any genuine concern with the unity of theory and practice, which gave way to a blatantly manipulative combination of voluntarism for the party and determinism for the masses. The concept of objective class interest, which for Marx was subversive of the established order, became the bulwark of Stalinist positivism. With subjective interpretation of that interest now the exclusive prerogative of the vanguard party, the 'objective' requirements of the revolution were determined by the practical policies which the regime found it necessary to adopt in the course of its project of 'socialist construction'. Thus the extraordinary Soviet claim 'to be living in the middle of a period of transcendence, and yet to be able to foresee the end'; for the transition period now became a new 'appendix to history', whose end was effectively defined by its beginning - by the basic self-definition of the Bolshevik revolution as a self-sufficient socialist revolution.

However, this has had different implications in the domestic and international spheres. In the former, a basic picture of non-dialectical progress - of a Soviet society 'transcending en bloc' - has been invoked both to sanction official ideological innovation, and to prescribe private debates with alternative futures and - what is in many respects the same thing - with historical possibilities foreclosed by Stalinism. Above all, this has involved an emphasis on the transformative role of the superstructure, with the unprecedented Soviet Leviathan being justified by its role not merely in 'the abolition of classes and the elimination of foreign aggression', but also in 'the creation of a material basis [for Communism] and the education of a new man'. Under Stalin, given his all purpose use of 'capitalist encirclement' and his insistence on the intensification of the class struggle with the closer approach of Communism, the reconciliation of the reality of an 'independent' state with the utopian vision enshrined in Lenin's State and Revolution was relatively simple.
Soviet policy, Stalin argued, aimed at 'the highest possible development of the power of the state, with the object of preparing the conditions of the dying out of the state', a 'contradiction' which 'completely reflects Marxist dialectics'.

But with Khrushchev's 1959 announcement both of the ending of the capitalist encirclement and of the creation of a 'state of the whole people', and the subsequent retreat from his promise of an early achievement of Communism to that of an indefinite period of 'developed socialism', the transition period and the 'transitional' stage have tended to acquire a conceptual self-sufficiency totally at variance with their Marxist origins. Indeed, in their deterministic linking of 'developed socialism' to the imperatives of the 'scientific-technological revolution', and their bland categorization of the political dissent as, in effect, merely 'deviant' social behaviour, contemporary Soviet ideologists often display an overt concern with the maintenance, rather than the transformation, of the existing 'system' reminiscent less of Marx than of Western functionalism. As one statement of the emerging moral paradigm expresses it:

The undisputed superiority of socialist democracy, which is inspired and directed by the Communist party, consists of the fact that it guarantees social progress in conditions of political stability, unshakeability, and is based on the close union and unity of all classes and strata of the population, of all nations and nationalities.

In the international sphere, by contrast, the Soviet Union has faced the enduring reality of a capitalist world-economy, and the master concept has been that of the General Crisis of Capitalism, with the opportunities that this creates for political action to break the links in the chain of imperialism. This was of limited significance during the Stalin era - when the 'Capitalist Encirclement' held theoretical sway; and Stalin's theory of world revolution was aptly caricatured by Trotsky as a 'building-block' one, which envisaged the piecemeal construction of 'a world socialist economy, after the manner in which children erect structures with ready-made blocks'.

However, the position of Stalin's successors has been a good deal more complex. On the one hand, the anti-colonial revolution greatly

* These ideological developments are discussed at length in Chapters 5 and 6.
increased the plausibility of the negative revolutionary goal of detaching vulnerable building blocks from the edifice of world capitalism; and one important part of Khrushchev's justification of Peaceful Coexistence with the capitalist powers was a renewed emphasis on revolutionary advance both among the Western proletariat and in the Third World. On the other, it became increasingly clear in the 1960s that this had given two important theoretical hostages to the fortune of the historical process: that China, not the Soviet Union, might well appear a more relevant model of the 'national-liberation' movement, and that burgeoning Communist movements in the developed world might provide ideological support for 'revisionism' within the Soviet bloc. Thus, while there has been no actual repudiation of Khrushchev's doctrine of 'different roads to socialism', there has been an increasing tendency to emphasize that basic development patterns such as 'developed socialism' are essential to the process, to limit the Soviet 'internationalist' commitment to governments (or credible alternative governments) which seem likely to accept close links with Soviet policy, and to insist that any 'fundamental restructuring'of international relations must be duly planned, controlled and corrected. 217

Any inferences drawn from these comparisons must inevitably be tentative. There is, clearly, a great deal of manipulative, post facto rationalization in the Soviet employment of the Leninist world-view: and in the American case one should speak less of a unified world-view, than of a particular ethos. However, given the unprecedented interpenetration of 'states-system' and 'world-economy' issues, both great powers' inherited conceptions of a preferred world order must reasonably be expected to retain an analytical significance quite different from that which would have been appropriate in the earlier 'multipolar' system of European nation-states. Insofar as both the Soviet Union and the United States have each borrowed their more formal international order values from that now partially superseded system - of which neither has had extensive practical experience - a belated, and only partial integration
of these with their respective world order values should not be surprising.

Furthermore, on the methodological argument advanced here, the
dimension of historicity in both world order perspectives is extremely
important. The complexity of the forces in contemporary world politics
suggests that their future course must be more than ever an area of
'radical uncertainty'. In such a situation, as Arthur Burns suggests,
political 'rationality' has two crucial senses: 'internal self consistency',
and 'openness to information, and a propensity to adjust one's opinions
and plans to it', which are potentially incompatible. And while the
Soviet postulate of a transition towards an historically determined
socialist world order is often unfavourably contrasted - on such criteria
of rationality - with the American expectation of a 'pluralist' world,
a focus upon the notion of transition itself suggests that this issue
is far more complex.

First, the Soviets do postulate a distinct transition period, which
both Soviet historical experience and the inescapable identification
of socialism/communism with a certain level of economic development have
alike contrived to invest with a degree of genuine historical depth. By
contrast, the American intellectual inheritance, and pre-1945 experience,
has encouraged rather the identification of pluralism as the natural
condition of modern society - with 'transition' a largely residual category.
And while both leaderships may be said to display a notably 'voluntarist'
attitude to international affairs - over and above the normal management
pretensions of great powers - the Soviet doctrine of the 'correlation
of forces' does constitute a theoretical acknowledgement, however crude,
of structural parameters for which there is no clear counterpart in
American thinking.

Second, the general commitment to pluralism in American theory tends
to obscure the contingent relationship between domestic pluralism and a
plurality of states. A pluralist world may be conceived of in two basic
ways: as an international order, with sovereign states as the pivotal
actors; or as an 'interdependent' world order, with states merely one
set of prominent actors in competition with a range of transnational
groupings. Insofar as the Soviet Union has adopted a building-block model
of world revolution, identifying the class struggle in the Third World
primarily with the struggle of 'progressive' regimes to emancipate their
countries from capitalist domination, it actually offers a theoretical
rationale for international pluralism in the transition period. By
contrast, the assumption that national independence, domestic pluralism and an Open Door world-economy could all flourish together was a major prop of the Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy; and the continuing strength of this tradition has been exemplified in the upsurge of interdependence theory and rhetoric in the post-Vietnam era.

Third, the negative (anti-imperialist) dimension of the statist Soviet approach to Third World issues is supplemented by a positive developmental rationale for the state which is applicable, if sometimes tenuously, to the policies of numerous authoritarian but strategically placed Third World Clients. Lacking such an official 'transition ethic', United States policy makers have tended to waver between an espousal of democracy and human rights which proves difficult to implement in practice, and a generalized commitment to order (or stability) often not congruent with a genuine acceptance of the implications of a plurality of states. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 1, this concern for 'order' can be traced to the 'legalistic-moralistic' Wilsonian tradition, as readily as to its Realist critique - the most significant aspect of the post-1945 preoccupation with 'national security' being a change in American assessments of the instrumentality appropriate to the establishment of a desirable 'world order' framework. The belief in the attainability of such a comprehensive framework proved much more durable, and even, as was indicated by the Johnson Administration's Indo-China policy, capable of coexistence with a self-consciously Realist approach to the question of limited war. The point is reinforced by the most recent swing back from the interdependence paradigm towards a self-conscious Realism, which has been expressed most dramatically in the foreign policy posture of the Reagan Administration. Despite some sophisticated academic restatements of classical 'states-system' themes, and of statist/mercantilist perspectives on the world-economy, the dominant current has been a return to the globalist rhetoric of the 1950s and the 1960s, with Soviet expansionism returning as an all purpose threat to a stable order in the Third World.

Finally, therefore, the argument comes back to the relationship between international theory and the theory of the state. American theory and American rhetoric on international issues have exhibited a series of Gestalt switches on the issue of political order. Now you see the state; now you don't. And this pattern can be directly related to the inadequate concept of the state in American perspectives on domestic politics.
American pluralism, to borrow Macpherson's comment on pluralist theory in general, 'cannot afford' a grand theory of the state, because such a theory would expose the incompatibility between the model of man upon which pluralist theory rests and the model of society which it depicts. Even more obviously, the Soviet authorities cannot afford, while professing their allegiance to Marxism, to develop a fully fledged theory of the state under 'real existing socialism'. But as regards the Third World, I would argue, the (essentially Stalinist) Soviet theory and practice of state-making is a good deal more relevant, and addresses an issue which is met by neither the American pluralist perspective nor the traditional European concept of international society.

It must be acknowledged that the concept of states-system detectable in the Soviet account is rudimentary in the extreme. But a rudimentary concept of the system is all that can reasonably be expected. The name of the game, in C.A.W. Manning's words, is 'let's play sovereign states'? the game of 'let's play states-systems' merely follows as a corollary of this. The need is not for the elaboration of formal rules for an elaborate formal system existing outside time, but rather for the investigation of the tensions between the inherited practices of European international society and the structural logic of contemporary world politics. A valuable starting point, I believe, lies in a states-system/transition decodification of the long-running Soviet drama of the international system and the world historical process. The story is extant, and is written in very choice official Soviet. The text undoubtedly needs much cutting and shaping to meet the interests of a wider audience. But the basic theme is arguably more compelling than ever.
Notes


2 Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, Routledge, London, 1957, p.3. The critique of Popper offered in this chapter refers primarily to the position advanced in this book, and in *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Routledge, London, 1974 (5th Ed., 2 vols.). I do not mean to suggest that these works represent fully the subtlety of Popper's philosophy of science, or its development over time. But it is his case against historicism which I am concerned with here; and insofar as Popper has moved over time from a strong emphasis on falsification to a more general advocacy of criticism, that case is correspondingly weakened. For Popper's later position, see *Objective Knowledge*, Oxford University Press, 1972.


8 See Gellner, *Legitimation of Belief*, p.56.


11 Ibid, pp.56, 66-70.

13 Gellner, Legitimation of Belief, p.82.

14 For Popper's commitment to the goal of verisimilitude, and to a 'correspondence' theory of truth, see Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, London 1963, pp.223-37. For a critique of this position see Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method; pp. 144-148.


17 Popper, Objective Knowledge, p.262.


20 For a defence of Marx (and Mill) against Popper's accusation about the confusion of laws and trends see Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, pp.213-18.

21 For a detailed elaboration of the concept of structural contradiction, see Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, Macmillan, London, 1979, pp.131-64.


24 Cornelia Navari; 'Knowledge, the State and the State of Nature', in Donelan (ed), The Reason of States, p.115.


26 Ibid., pp.117-8, 132-5.

27 Ibid., pp.117-22.

28 Ibid., pp.129-30.


For the latter, see particularly Maurice Keens-Soper, 'The Practice of a States-System', in Donelan (ed), *The Reason of States*, pp.25-44.


'The social system's own equilibrium', Parsons asserts, 'is itself made up of many subequilibriums cutting across each other, with numerous personality systems more or less in internal equilibrium, making up different kinds of equilibrated systems such as kinship groups, social strata, churches, sects, economic enterprises and government bodies. All enter into a huge moving equilibrium in which instabilities in any one system in the personality or social sphere are communicated simultaneously to both levels, either disequilibrating the larger system or part of it, until either reequilibration takes place or the total equilibrium changes its form'. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds), *Towards a General Theory of Action*, Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 226-227.

Two important works which do address the tensions between economic and sociological models of man are Brian Barry, *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy*, Macmillan, London 1970, and Hollis, *Models of Man* (the latter in the context of a much more wideranging discussion of social science methodology).


Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, pp. 29-34.


See Easton's diagram representing the political system and its various 'environments', in *A Framework for Political Analysis*, p.75.
Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, pp.120-143. Popper's more recent argument in defence of 'commonsense realism' and against 'the commonsense theory of knowledge ...that all experience consists of information received through our senses', seems to me compatible with the limited argument for 'realism' advanced in this thesis. See *Objective Knowledge*, pp.37-67 (emphasis in original).


For an instance of the former approach, admittedly drawing on more detailed studies of states-systems by Wight, see Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, pp.10-13. For the latter, see the appendix on 'sources and methods' for the comparative study of collective violence in France, Italy and Germany in Tilly, *The Rebellious Century*, pp.313-24.


Barracough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History*, pp.16-17,24-42.


For a similar use of the authorization/allocation distinction, see Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, pp.97-108, 162-4. A related distinction between redistributive 'world-empires' and capitalist 'world-economies' is offered by Immanuel Wallerstein, who argues that 'capitalism as an economic mode is based on the fact that the economic factors operate over an arena larger than any political society can totally control'. *The Modern World-System*, Academic Press, New York, 1974, pp.348.


For an argument along these lines, see Richard Leaver, 'Towards a Political Economy of International Relations', Seminar Paper, Department of International Relations, ANU, October 1978.


For a critique along these lines, see Theda Skocpol's article,'Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: a Theoretical and Historical Critique, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 82, No. 5, pp.1075-89.


The need for recognition of these factors in generalizing theories of social change is argued in Giddens, *Central Problems of Social Theory*, pp.226-30.
The most notable work in this latter category is Pettman, *State and Class*. See particularly pp.263-6.

For an argument linking a 'generative mechanism' notion of causality to a structuralist and materialist approach to history, see Benton, *Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies*, especially Chapter 9.


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For this distinction, see Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, pp.52-4. Tilly defines a polity 'member' as any 'contender' seeking to influence the government 'which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the government'.

For such a conception of structural properties which 'provide the "binding" of time and space in social systems', see Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, pp.63-4.

*Waltz*, *Theory of International Politics*, see especially Chapters 4-6.


For a sustained discussion of such a 'problematic of structuring', see Phillip Abrams, *Historical Sociology*, Open Books, Bath, 1982. A more formal 'theory of structuration' similarly provides the unifying theme of Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*.

Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*; Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969; Perry Anderson *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, New Left Books, London, 1974. Of the three, Pipes might be least disposed to accept the 'structuralist' label, while Anderson is the most explicit in embracing that approach and the crucial corollaries emphasized here: the multiplicity of 'levels' and 'tempos' in historical development. 'The times of the great European absolutisms were, precisely, very diverse', he argues, 'and this diversity was itself constitutive of their respective nature as State systems ... The wide disjunctions in the dating of these great structures inevitably correspond to deep distinctions in their composition and evolution ... [The] underlying unity [of European Absolutism] is real and profound, but it is not that of a linear continuum'. (p.10).

Walsh, 'Colligatory Concepts in History', in Gardner (ed) *The Philosophy of History*, pp.127-44. The term colligation has also been used in a much narrower sense, to signify a practice of 'linking events to events by events', which allegedly stands at the opposite extreme from any kind of structuralist argument, or argument in principle. But as Abrams, who himself employs this narrower usage, points out, such
a practice is only possible where larger issues of principle are not seriously in question among historians. Where they are in question, it soon becomes clear that the best colligation is 'largely concealed explanation in principle'. Historical Sociology, pp.201-18.


70 Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp.69-70 (emphasis in original).

71 For a distinction between practical and reflexive or 'discursive' consciousness, see Ibid., p.5, 25-28.

72 Ibid., pp.56-9.


74 For an account of functionalist explanation in these terms, see Gellner, Thought and Change, p.19.

75 Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy, pp.155-6. Wallerstein himself claims that the entities studied by modern anthropologists are not 'truly autonomous systems', since they are already penetrated by the imperial control of 'a larger political entity' located 'within a far wider division of labor'.

76 Again, Skocpol's critique, with its particular emphasis on the autonomous influence of the 'European states system' is valuable on this point, pp.1077-87.

77 For an argument that 'the framework of ideas relating to international society has survived because it is procedural', see James Mayall, 'International Society and International Theory', in Donelan (ed), The Reason of States, pp.59-65.


81 The last phrase is Gellner's, Legitimation of Belief, p.53. The 'pursuit of intimations' is expounded by Oakeshott in Rationalism in Politics, pp.127-35.

82 The argument that the contemporary international context resembles the disordered environment of the early modern period rather than that of the 18th and 19th centuries, will be developed in Chapters 3 and 4.


The strategic analysis/institutional analysis distinction follows Giddens, *Central Problems of Social Theory*, pp.80-1.


The case for evaluating the rationality of actions in these terms is elaborated in Hollis, *Models of Man*, pp.123-41.


The judgement that the individualism/holism dispute is 'largely a sham battle' appears in Ryan, *The Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, p. 173.

For a discussion of this last problem, in an analysis which strongly emphasizes the centrality of 'models of man' in social analysis, see Moon, *The Logic of Political Inquiry*, pp.196-204.


The phrase is Carr's, referring to appeals to Providence in historical writing. *What is History*, p.74.


These implications are discussed in Ryan, *The Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, pp.104-110. For a general discussion of attempts to apply psychological and biological insights to human behaviour, see Ralph Petman, *Human Behaviour and World Politics*, pp.91-105, 153-75.

'Reductionism, roughly speaking, is the view that everything in this world is really something else and that something else is always in the end unedifying. So lucidly formulated, one can see that this is a luminously true and certain idea. The idea that it could one day be denied or refuted is absurd'. Gellner, *Legitimation of Belief*, p.107.

100 For an influential argument assimilating social analysis generally to such an approach, see Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, Routledge, London, 1971.


102 On this see, Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, pp. 17-70.


104 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 102-105.

105 Giddens, Central Problems of Social Theory, pp. 80-81.

106 The approach here follows the emphasis on the importance of a consistent rhetoric of social explanation in Philip Abrams, History, Sociology, Historical Sociology, Past and Present, May, 1980, pp. 3-16.

107 The notion of a 'tradition of pure usage' is discussed in Pocock, Politics, Language and Time, pp. 245-248.


113 Thus the analysis here does not aspire to 'map the transitions' from determined to autonomous action in the way suggested in Charles Taylor's discussion of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel and Modern Society, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 159-151.


115 Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, p. 90.

116 This is treated as the essence of rule following in Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, pp. 24-33.

117 Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 86.

119 Giddens, Central Problems of Social Theory, pp. 55-7.

120 Hollis, Models of Man, pp. 107-41; Hollis rejects 'logic of the situation' arguments as such in his exposition of rational explanation, but the term seems to me still a valuable one, if clearly separated from those subjective overtones which it has acquired in the work of writers such as Popper, see, The Open Society, Vol. II, pp. 97, 265.

121 Hollis, Models of Man, pp. 140-1. Hollis himself presents this second order of explanation (appeals to the sway of tradition, etc.) as causal rather than rational explanation.

122 'Multiple sovereignty' (an elaboration of Trotsky's notion of 'dual power') is identified as the defining feature of a revolutionary situation in Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, pp. 190-93.

123 Ibid, p. 53. The emphasis on state-managers and external factors follows Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China, Cambridge University Press, 1979. For a related analysis, in regard to revolutions which, as in Japan and Turkey - are carried through without real mobilization of the masses, see Ellen Trimberger, 'A Theory of Elite Revolutions', Studies in Comparative Economic Development, Fall, 1972, pp. 191-207.


126 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 115.

127 Wight, Power Politics, p. 293.


129 Ibid, p. 78-91. For an account of Wight's characterization of the traditions of international theory, see, Porter, 'Martin Wight's "International Theory", and Bull, 'Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations'.

130 For Wight's most specific exposition of this via media tradition - in this instance called the 'Whig' or 'constitutional' tradition, see 'Western Values in International Relations', in Butterfield and Wight (eds) Diplomatic Investigations, pp. 89-131.

131 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 6.


137 Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', pp. 92-102.


139 Wight, 'Why is there no international theory?', pp. 26-7.


141 Cited in Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', p. 121.


143 Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', p. 106; Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, pp. 77-98.

144 Wight, 'Why is there no international theory', pp. 26-33.


147 Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution*, p. 84.


159 Ibid, 126-136.

160 Ibid, 185-186.

161 Carr's judgements in this regard are set out with particular clarity in the concluding chapter of *Foundations of a Planned Economy*, Vol. Two, and their philosophical basis defended in *What is History*, pp. 80-84, 109-146.


167 For an argument along these lines see, Stretton, *The Political Sciences*, pp. 143-149.


174 Gellner, *Thought and Change*, p. 120.

175 For a discussion of the connection between literacy and multiple interpretations of tradition, see Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time*, pp. 245-272. Pocock notes (pp. 247-248) that radical critics may respond to traditionalist conservatism by a strategy of 'return to sources', seeking to occupy 'the headwaters of tradition' and maintain 'that the stream had been diverted from its proper course'.

176 Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, p. 221.

177 K.R. Minogue, 'Revolution, Tradition and Political Continuity', in King and Parekh, *Politics and Experience*, pp. 302-305. Like Johnson, but upon the basis of the Oakeshottian position that a tradition can never be truly exhausted, Minogue claims that 'modern revolutions are not, then, historically necessary'.


179 For the idea of such 'spot welding', see Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, pp. 228-229.


The United States, Tocqueville stated, was 'a society proceeding all alone without guide or support by the single fact of the concourse of individual wills, [where] there is no public power and, to tell the truth, no need of it'.


For an argument to this effect, see Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, pp. 111-155.

For an analysis of pluralism as such a refurbished version of liberal individualism, which in turn provides for the rejection of collectivist social orders as 'totalitarian', see Benjamin Barber, 'Conceptual Foundations', in Carl Friedrich, Michael Curtis and Benjamin Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views, Pall Mall Press, London, 1969, pp. 32-37.


The term is used by Lerner, in his editor's introduction to Democracy in America, Vol. I, p. LXXIV.

This was a notable theme of Kennan's, taken up by Hartz in The Liberal Tradition in America, pp. 285-286.

Windsor, 'The Justification of the State', p. 175.


Ibid, pp. 155-175.

Windsor, 'The Justification of the State', pp. 184-185.


Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p. 58.


'Manifesto of the Communist Party'; *Selected Works*, p. 37.


Cited in Umberto Melotti, *Marx and the Third World*, Macmillan, 1977, p. 129. This work is a detailed study of Marxist (including Russian Marxist) approaches to the problem of the 'Asiatic mode of production'.


These adaptations are usefully discussed in Meyer, *Leninism*, pp. 235-273.


Windsor, 'The Justification of the State', pp. 184-185.


See Brezhnev's comment at the 1966 Twenty-Third Party Congress:
Here we see veterans of the Party who have gone through
three revolutions, Communists tempered in the struggle for
the industrialization of the country and the collectivization
of agriculture, for the great socialist transformation of
the homeland, we see here also those who linked their lives
with the Party in the arduous years of the great Patriotic
War and who after the war raised the Soviet homeland up from
ruins and ashes. All of them, in a single army of political
fighters, are now actively building a Communist society.

CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 13, p. 3.

C.B. Macpherson, 'Do We Need a Theory of the State?'

CHAPTER 3

THE 'INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM'
AND THE 'WORLD HISTORICAL PROCESS'

Structures and Historical Change

Chapter 2 attempted to establish the requirements for a theoretical perspective upon Soviet-American coexistence which would, first, locate the problem in its specific historical context and, second, address itself simultaneously to the issues of continuity and change. This chapter will attempt to sketch such a perspective, and, by placing the modern states-system in an historical context of industrialization, imperialism, and political and social revolution, to indicate the narrow boundaries within which the patterns of continuity designated by the term 'states-system' should be sought.

The perspective envisaged here may most usefully be classified as a world-historical one - a term recently revived by several theorists, not merely of Marxist persuasion.\(^1\) Though the argument developed here takes its starting point from the official Soviet account, it is predicated upon an emphatic rejection of the Soviet claim to scientific knowledge of an all-embracing unilinear and teleological pattern of historical development. But on the other hand, it also involves the rejection of those synchronic modes of analysis which tend to divorce contemporary world politics from their concrete historical context. This is most obviously the case with behavioural systems theory; but it is also true in some measure of most classically oriented accounts of the states-system, of interdependence theory, and of structuralist and world-systems approaches to the contemporary world-economy. The aim here is neither to collapse the states-system into an all-embracing historical process nor to reify it as an entity abstracted from historical time, but rather to consider it as a bounded world-historical episode, and one part of the wider episode of the global transition to industrialism.

The notion of episodic analysis is, in itself, useful primarily in a negative sense, as a cautionary reminder of the historical contingency of the phenomena in question. The argument here shares Wallerstein's assumption that contemporary world politics must be conceived of as a totality; and if the proposal were merely to
substitute the term 'global transition' for the term 'world-system', there would be no change to the basic problem - of theorizing the historical development of a single entity - which originally directed Wallerstein towards a synchronic analysis on the explicit analogy of the solar system. The positive methodological point, to reiterate, lies in shifting the weight of explanation from system to structure, and to the presumption of rational action within structural constraints. It is this shift which allows one, in principle, to preserve the concept of an overarching, total framework while simultaneously disaggregating that framework into a number of competing situational logics and frames of meaning which can provide mutual checks upon each other's mythic pretensions to exclusive explanatory status.

The practical problem is to achieve this disaggregation without lapsing back into an essentially unstructured pluralism. There are, I believe, two crucial entering wedges available for this purpose in the present argument. The first is the modification of the general concept of the transition by Barraclough's notion of a more specific transition, from around 1890 to the mid 1950s, which established the new framework of contemporary world politics. On the one hand, this entailed the rapid incorporation of the remainder of the globe within the orbit of the European states-system and the now industrialized world-economy. On the other, both states-system and world-economy were themselves radically transformed - not least because they were now finally brought together on a global scale around a common 'reference grid' with at least four major components: the 'abstract' structure of military power; the structure of geopolitics; the 'abstract' structure of economic power and the structure of differential stages of economic development. The discussion here is predicated on the view that this 'grid' has provided the basic framework of great power relations, whether of cold war or detente, since at least the mid-1950s, and that it will most likely continue to do so until the mid 1990s - for instance, that the global configuration of military power will remain fundamentally bipolar, and that the Soviet Union will remain much more obviously an 'advanced industrial society' than China, yet less 'advanced', in several important respects, than the leading capitalist states.

Of course, there are major empirical complexities shrouded by
these extremely generalized categories. One might, for instance, reasonably expect very great differences in consumer expectations in the Soviet 'industrial society' of the early 1980s as compared to that of the early 1950s, with concomitant implications for the regime's room for manoeuvre on major issues of resources allocation. Similarly, the broad concept of a bipolar military balance is not meant to deny the modified hegemony enjoyed by the United States throughout much of the non-European world during the 1950s and 1960s, nor to preclude the possibility that one or other great power might establish a limited military preponderance in the next 10-15 years. Moreover, the time-span suggested here for this current framework of world politics - roughly 40 years - is hardly a longue durée as the world in general has gone. But it does represent considerable stability in basic structures as compared to the massive dislocations of the first half of the 20th century. And such a perspective establishes much more clearly the basic point made earlier about the transition in general: that it may be regarded as both contingent, in the long sweep of history, and given, as an overarching framework for the issues discussed in this thesis. As Barraclough has argued, the question of European origins, which has preoccupied most Western historians as well as theorists like Wallerstein and Wight, is less important than these fundamental structural transformations which have established the new 'skeleton or framework within which political action takes place'.

This point is a complex one, and it may be made clearer by considering the grounds for Wallerstein's argument that the term 'transition' should not be used either for the process of global 'incorporation' discussed by Barraclough or for what I have called the transitional development initiated in the newly incorporated Third World. 'In fact', Wallerstein asserts,

these two processes do not involve the transformation of feudalism into capitalism but are aspects of the development of the capitalist world-economy which, over historical time, has expanded extensively (incorporation) and intensively (the progressive proletarianisation of labor and commercialisation of land).

This point is of major importance in countering the assumptions of
those 'modernization' theories, such as Rostow's 'stages of growth' schema, which treat the transition of individual national societies as a process largely independent of the specific international context in which such transitional societies are situated. However, the paradox of Wallerstein's position is that the untenable assumptions of 'unfolding' development which he rejects in regard to individual societies are reproduced in his work in regard to the world-system as a whole. In fact, the early history of the world-economy and states-system, so far from revealing an innate, mechanistic principle which has gradually manifested itself on an ever-increasing temporal and spatial scale, is important precisely because it allows us to disentangle the general, reproducible logic of states-systems and transitional development from those historically specific features of the wider environment which have undergone such basic transformations in the contemporary area.

The second entering wedge is the specific, limited notion of political system developed in the previous chapter, and the associated claim that the states-system is the only genuine political system in the modern world. The point is not merely that the states-system is important in itself, as the fundamental framework of such international order as has been achieved in the modern era; but also that this importance of the states-system provides an independent criterion of 'value relevance' for the disaggregation of the world-economy as a subject for theoretical analysis. Unlike the states-system, which is properly identified solely with the practices of interacting sovereign states, the world-economy, as Wallerstein insists, is a genuine world; and precisely because it is a genuine world it is far too complex to be usefully theorized in systemic terms. However, by counterposing the basic practices of the traditional states-system to the four-fold material 'reference grid' for contemporary world politics nominated above, it should be possible to select out from this wide world a small group of national entities which, by virtue of their location at the intersection of various crucial material frameworks and frames of meaning, are of special importance to this analysis because of their importance for the stability of the states-system in general and of great power coexistence in particular.

The basic selection requirement is for middle-ranking powers which are strategically and/or economically important to the great power relationship, on the one hand, and are located in politically ambiguous
regions outside established spheres of influence, on the other. Such criteria would select, first and foremost, the major states in the African and West Asian 'arc of instability; and second, their counterparts in an East Asian arc stretching from the Koreas to Indonesia (but excluding China and Japan). Moreover, I would argue that this mirrors a selection process going on, so to speak, in the contemporary world. States with great economic significance, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, become by that fact strategically significant; states whose initial significance is primarily strategic, such as Egypt and Taiwan, attract the economic ministrations of the great and major powers; and both categories are thereby selected for a process of transitional development which, I will attempt to argue, carries with it a substantial bias towards extreme, and possibly revolutionary politics.

This may seem a longwinded way of establishing what is, after all, a commonplace of the contemporary American debate: that 'instability' in such crucial Third World regions is threatening the stability of the Soviet-American relationship. However the key point is not merely what areas are selected but upon what principles they are selected, and the extraneous assumptions attached to the selection principles commonly employed in the American debate. In that context, there is a strong tendency to advance ground rules for the great power relationship which effectively assume the general value relevance of 'stability' not merely within the states-system as such but also within the domestic affairs of transitional states and in their orientation towards a predominantly capitalist world-economy. The argument here, by contrast, is that the one clear ground of common value-relevance on these questions lies in the structural logic and established practices of the states-system, and that these certainly do not support the view that stable great power coexistence can best be ensured by attempts to preserve the status quo within the world-economy and within individual transitional societies.

This is perhaps the major reason for insisting upon the world historical reality of the modern states-system, as a discrete system of practices which has retained its general identity throughout several centuries of far-reaching economic, social and political change. Though the substantive theme of the importance of interstate relations is not a noticeably Marxist one, the methodological assumptions employed here are closer to those of Marx than to those most apparent in the mainstream
American debate. I have assumed that a 'realist' perspective on the states-system is more conducive to clarity than an 'ideal type'/constructive system' approach - the latter being more sceptical in theory but often more permissive in practice, allowing the behavioural bias towards synchrony and 'equilibrium' to fill out the conceptual universe. On the other hand, I have tried to avoid the strain towards an essentially idealist explanation of international conflict, in terms of permanent, innate characteristics of human nature, detectable even in ostensibly Realist works of international theory. The point to emphasize is not just the importance of the political order represented by the states-system but also the narrow limits of that political order in the material context of contemporary world politics. Only by emphasizing the material foundations of the states-system, as a unique pattern of continuity within a real global transformation, can one place the relationship between transition within states and stable relations among states in a genuinely historical perspective.

Several important points may be made about the way that relationship is treated in this argument. First, I would argue that - once the equation of continuity (or stability) with a synchronic dimension and change with a diachronic dimension is rejected - one can identify a common logic of explanation involved in the discussion of future trends in regard to both the states-system and transitional development. In each case it is important -

(a) to identify in the contemporary world reproducible grand structures (or more precisely situational logics) which limit the range of human choice in specified situations and cause outcomes to fall within specified limits:

(b) to examine the plausibility of these structures by reference to similar situations in the past, which we can now to some extent 'stand outside': earlier stages of the modern states-system and earlier states-systems; and earlier instances of transitional development within the great modern transition:

(c) to distinguish general manifestations of the structures in question from more specific historical phenomena attached to earlier instances of them; and
(d) to situate these structures, thus delimited, once more within the specific temporal and spatial context of contemporary world politics.

Second, as the last of these points makes clear, the proposed mode of analysis is inevitably a circular, hermeneutic one, in which the disaggregation of the global transition is preliminary to its reaggregation around more clearly delimited points of reference. As one recent writer, in an attempt to define the 'essence of Marx's dialectical methodology', has put it, 'the abstract is made concrete only when integrated into a concrete whole from which the initial abstraction was originally made - a process involving a constant shuttling about between parts and whole'. The argument here is emphatically not that the phenomena of the states-system and transitional development represent the whole of contemporary world politics. The argument is rather that they constitute two islands of intelligibility which can be defined with particular clarity, and which are especially relevant to the central concerns of this thesis: the minimum prudential rules for stable Soviet-American coexistence, on the one hand, and the most likely source of recurrent challenges to the two great powers to depart from these rules, on the other.

Third, this approach seeks to avoid that oscillation between an indiscriminate monism and an incoherent pluralism which, I have argued, has often characterized the treatment of these issues in the American debate. On the one hand, in contrast to those analyses which effectively subsume Third World 'instability' within the all embracing logic of a global geopolitical struggle between the great powers, it asserts the substantially autonomous roots of such instability in the process of socio-economic change within transitional states. On the other, it rejects the view that radically different patterns of interaction can legitimately be accounted for by individual explanations incorporating radically different a priori assumptions. Though falling far short of a 'general theory' of contemporary world politics, the interpretative framework sketched here does involve the assertion that the very different patterns identified - of exceptional continuity in the case of the states-system and exceptional change in the case of transitional development - can be derived from the same set of assumptions about the nature of man and the logic of strategic interaction.
So far, in justifying this attempt to incorporate a prediction of extreme, even revolutionary social change within an analysis of the parameters of contemporary great power coexistence, I have emphasized the common logic of explanation involved in discussing both the states-system and the process of transitional development. If one can generalize (make predictions) about the development of the former, one can also generalize in a similar fashion about the development of the latter. However, the case can be stated with equal force in terms of the pivotal role of the transitional state as a common substantive focus in both scenarios. If shared norms of Soviet-American coexistence are to be identified, they must be sought above all in the limited, instrumental order traditionally provided by the states-system, at the basis of which lies the assumption of the givenness of a world of sovereign states. Yet in certain crucial areas of contemporary world politics, it is precisely the continuance of formally constituted states as discrete, relatively 'hardshelled' and relatively stable units which is problematic; and the central problem lies in the implications of historical processes of economic development and state-making. Therefore if one cannot generalize (make predictions) about the development of the 'world historical process', one cannot generalize about the development of the 'international system'.

These observations apply most obviously to the position in the states-system of societies deeply caught up in the process of transitional development - societies which, as Reinhard Bendix observes, 'have perhaps been called "the new states" prematurely. For that designation presupposes what is still at issue'. However, the problems so starkly in evidence in such societies have a much wider resonance, for under global conditions of uneven development and leapfrog patterns of social change, all societies are to some extent faced with the continual need to accommodate 'the disruptive impact of ideas and industrial processes taken over from abroad'. The capacity of a given society to handle this ongoing challenge, Bendix argues:

is conditioned to a considerable extent by the social and political structure it has inherited from the past ... today, even economically developed countries struggle with the unresolved legacies of this process although they have achieved a functioning political structure, i.e., the state. Accordingly, the achievement of 'the state' is always provisional ...
Moreover, while the process of uneven development is of fundamental importance in this context, it must also be emphasized that for transitional Third World societies this process is telescoped together with the initial process of state-building itself, which for the great 'founder' states of the European system - such as Britain and France - was spread out over several centuries and substantially completed before the great economic transformation got underway. As F.H. Hinsley points out, the nation-state (or more correctly the state-nation) is the key to the modern states-system - not merely in the general sense that nationalism and international relations are 'inseparable, if different, facets of a single phenomenon of the division of men into political groups', but also in the more precise sense that the central practices of the states-system depend upon the general acceptance of the 'political and territorial' as opposed to the 'cultural and linguistic' concept of the nation. The former 'framework of political organization and political loyalty', Hinsley asserts, is the only one within which - given the very existence of diverse political entities - 'the unavoidable conflict between them can be made productive and kept restrained'.

Therefore, while the states-system may reflect the 'natural' logic of anarchically interacting units, those units themselves are very much human artefacts, the result of a lengthy clash between rival imperialism which, at a crucial historical conjuncture, was arrested before the establishment of a single world-empire. Indeed, Hinsley argues, the notion of arrested imperialism is virtually synonymous with the notion of the nation-state, for state government is that pattern of government through the administrative principle which must be developed when government through the social principle - characteristic of single tribes or city-states - is impossible. Thus 'the key to the nature of the state, and in its turn ... to the movement of the political loyalty of a society into the national stage', lies in the 'distinction or divergence between society and government which is the raison d'être of the state'. And thus every state, whether self-generated by a collection of communities or imposed on them by conquest, 'has begun as an empire in the one unimpeachable definition of empire - the rule of the government over more than one social community'.

The problems of uneven development and state-making have been deeply intertwined in the history of the modern states-system since at
least the late 18th century, with the advent, in Britain and France, of the "Dual Revolution" - economic and political - of the modern era. On the one hand, the relations of the major states have been bedevilled by an ongoing and 'serious redistribution of their relative power', a pattern which, as A.F. Organski has argued, is in general much better captured by the term 'power transition' than by the orthodox notion of the balance of power. On the other, the at least nominal incorporation within the system of a great many entities at the most primitive level of national integration has provided a permanent source of potential catalysts for great power tension generated by the former factor. The two World Wars stand as reminders to the perils inherent in this combination; and although, as Hinsley argues, the great power relationship today is one of more genuine balance than has existed for almost a century, at the level of state-making the system has, in large part, reverted to the disordered situation associated with its origins in early modern Europe. Most obviously, there is the extraordinary proliferation of 'new states' since 1945. But the European nation-state - the hard-won core unit of the traditional system - has been transcended at the great power end of the spectrum as well, with the passage of great power status to two great, continental and multi-national empires. That the contemporary great powers are both empires rather than nation-states in the established European sense - a point much emphasized in Western commentary on the Soviet Union, though much less commonly acknowledged in respect of the United States - carries with it serious immediate problems for the legitimation of traditional 'national interest' styles of foreign policy, if not, in the longer term, for the legitimation of the state itself.

These themes will be developed more fully later in this and the following chapter. But the argument so far should indicate why I believe it is both necessary and possible to break with those forms of analysis which, whether or not they explicitly rely upon a synchronic notion of social systems, abstract the modern states-system from its specific
historical context of profound socio-economic transformation, with all its far reaching implications for that system's constituent unit - the nation-state. Of course, American international theorists have been more overtly concerned with problems of social change and with the interplay of domestic and international levels of analysis, than have their classically-oriented British counterparts. But, as I have argued in the preceding chapters, the pervasiveness of behavioural assumptions and synchronic models in their work has caused them to surrender the clarity of the classical perspective on the states-system as such without the compensation of genuine insight into those transitional processes which make a simple states-system perspective inadequate today.

Indeed, whether the explicit focus is upon the transformation of international politics or upon the 'modernization' of domestic societies, the characteristic American analysis is remarkably similar. Because the dominant methodology can deal only with functioning social systems, and because social structure is identified merely with surface patterns which are meaningful only on the assumption of the functioning of synchronic systems, the notion of transition can mean nothing more than an interregnum between 'traditional' and 'modern' states of society - an interregnum which may be theorized only by the identification of various synchronic 'snapshots' along the way as more or less traditional or modern. Where a major subject of analysis, such as the Soviet Union, persistently fails to fit either stereotype, it must inevitably appear as an aberration from the normal pattern of development, permanently struck down by a 'disease of the transition' - just as the recent reversion, in American international theory, to themes of geopolitics and mercantilism often carries with it the implication that such primitive approaches are necessary only as a realistic response to an atavistic Soviet refusal to acknowledge the requirements of order in an interdependent world.

I propose here to take a directly opposite tack, both substantively and methodologically. Although I will be attempting to establish a specific and bounded paradigm case of 'transitional development' in newly industrializing societies, the argument here is that, in a more general sense, transition is the normal condition of all modern societies. Conversely, instead of measuring the progress of more 'primitive political
systems' - domestic or international - against a model of systemic equilibrium for which the only compelling empirical referents are the United States and perhaps Britain for limited periods of their modern history, the states-system will be taken as a paradigm case of political continuity in the modern world. By equating structure not with the surface patterns observable at a given moment in time but with the underlying situational logic organizing such patterns over time, and by focussing upon the historical interplay of particular change-inducing and continuity-inducing structures, it should be possible to grasp what can never be adequately grasped in synchronic analyses - whether of individual 'modernizing' societies or of contemporary world politics in general - the many layered persistence of traditional practices through periods of fundamental change.

To emphasize once again, the explication of the abstract logic of the states-system and of transitional development is no more than a beginning. Those concepts acquire significance only when re-integrated into a specific historical context; and to satisfactorily explain a specific momentous event, such as the Soviet regime's great leap into a crash programme of industrialization and collectivization in 1929, one must go beyond abstract models to a detailed quasi-causal analysis of the complex intersection of material structures and the confluence of inherited practices to which the actors in question were exposed. But because the states-system/transition model provides an empirically grounded contrast between an abstract logic of continuity and an abstract logic of change, it helps one to prize apart for analytical purposes those crucial elements of continuity and change which are soldered together both in practical activity and also in those colligatory concepts - such as imperialism, industrialization and bureaucratization - which provide an indispensable preliminary purchase on Weber's 'vast chaotic stream of events'. Such use of dramatic contrast to 'sharpen our understanding of the context in which more detailed causal analysis can proceed' is held by Bendix to be the main use of comparative analysis; and his explicit strategy for a comparative study of transitional societies which avoids the stultifying influences of the simplistic tradition/modernity dichotomy may also stand as a statement of the approach envisaged in this chapter.
By means of comparative analysis I want to preserve a sense of historical particularity as far as I can while still comparing different countries. I ask the same or at least similar questions of divergent materials and so leave room for divergent answers. I want to make more transparent the divergence among structures of authority and among the ways in which societies have responded to the challenge implicit in the civilizational accomplishments of other countries.

Of course the contexts compared here are far more abstract and the treatment of them is far sketchier than is the case with Bendix's detailed study of certain key modernizing societies. However, situations of large scale strategic interaction are more susceptible to characterization in terms of a few bold strokes, precisely because they are situations in which the material skeleton stands out with special clarity from the various networks of constitutive meanings. Indeed, I would argue that the states-system's unique character as a fragile social artefact clearly reflecting an over-riding material necessity is precisely what makes it a powerful searchlight into the problems of domestic politics - rather than, as has sometimes been suggested, the essentially untheorizable 'untidy fringe' of the latter.

Giddens rightly points out that 'if routine is such an important feature in the continuity of social reproduction, we can approach an account of the sources and nature of social change in the industrialized societies through attempting to indicate the conditions under which the routinized character of social interaction is sustained or dislocated'. But the states-system is a context in which strategic interaction is the routine, and the periodic disruption by war and crisis of 'normal' intercourse between states is one of the fundamental ways in which the continuity of international society is reproduced over the longer term. In Bull's words:

It may be argued that it is perverse to treat war as an institution of the society of states, but in the sense that it is a settled pattern of behaviour shaped towards the promotion of common goals, there cannot be any doubt that it has been in the past such an institution, and remains one.

An explicit contrast between this situation and that produced in newly
Industrializing societies by the collision of new material structures with established frames of meaning should illuminate not merely these two limiting situations but also the densely institutionalized world of the modern industrial state.

The next two sections, therefore, will approach the issue of the states-system and transitional development in terms broadly reflecting a common constellation of questions. What is the relevance to political order of stable and unstable hierarchies of military and economic power? Of the scope of the relevant 'polity' and the size of its accredited membership? Of coercion, consensus and consent? Of economic interdependence and the modern division of labour? Of uneven development? After these separate discussions, designed to elucidate the logic of each situation in a hypothetical ceteris paribus world, I will attempt to re-integrate them into the general context of contemporary world politics, and finally to consider the general implications of the picture thus sketched for the process of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The States-System

If one is to establish fundamental norms of coexistence, one must demonstrate in some measure what Murray Forsyth calls 'the inner necessity of a society of states'. The obvious place to begin this enterprise is with the classical paradigm of the modern states-system as a single, continuous, political association of armed sovereign states, which jointly manage their anarchical interaction around a common core of institutionalized practices: the balance of power, diplomacy, war, international law, and the special status of the great powers. This paradigm is plainly superior to the behavioural 'systems' approach pervading much American international theory in that it neither, as with Kaplan, confines itself to demonstrating the internal necessity of wholly vacuous formal models, nor, as with Rosecrance, proposes a new system to accommodate every substantial variation in the general empirical pattern of interstate relations over the past three centuries. Admittedly the traditional paradigm does incorporate a significant dispute over the chronological limits of the system; ranging all the way from the claims of Wight and Garrett Mattingly on behalf of the late 15th century to Hinsley's claim on behalf of the mid 18th; and it leaves open the
entire question of the world-economy, which as argued earlier, may be regarded as the other side of the coin from the states-system. These issues will be taken up later. But for the moment it seems useful to see how far the states-system depicted in the traditional paradigm can be accounted for by the 'pure' logic of anarchical interaction without recourse to the geopolitical, economic or ideological considerations around which disputes about origins, and about the discrete character of the states-system, revolve.

It is, I think, fair to say that the classical paradigm locates the inner necessity of the states-system in the balance of power. This is most obviously true of Waltz (who despite his overt 'systems' approach, may be regarded as a classicist malgre lui). Indeed, it is striking how completely his ambitious attempt to bring off the 'Copernican Revolution' so lacking in the work of earlier behavioural theorists of international systems reduces to a rigorous explication of the necessary relationship between anarchical interaction and power balancing behaviour. But it is hardly less true of Bull, who provides the most systematic recent statement of an overtly classical approach. War between states, for Bull, is an institution of the society of states because it can serve the requirements of both international law and the balance of power; but international law, in turn 'depends for its very existence ... on the balance', while the steps necessary to maintain the balance' (such as war) 'often involve violation of the injunctions of international law'. Moreover, it is clear that Bull is not merely concerned with the appropriateness of balancing behaviour for individual states, but wishes to establish 'the general balance or equilibrium of the system as a whole' as in some sense a basic goal of international society. Drawing a distinction between this general balance and any 'particular balance', including the 'dominant' (or 'central') balance between the great powers, he continues:

It is part of the logic of the principle of the balance of power that the needs of the dominant balance must take precedence over those of the subordinate balances, and that the general balance must be prior in importance to any local or particular balance. If aggrandisement by the strong against the weak must take place, it is better from the standpoint of international order that it should take place without a conflagration among the strong than with one.
This statement exemplifies both the strengths and the weakness of the classical paradigm. In contrast to behavioural systems theory, it offers a clear sighted acknowledgement of the logical, and empirically observable, implications of a profoundly unequal distribution of military power. But the clarity of this picture is compromised by the residual tendency towards reification of the system exemplified by the notion of the 'general balance or equilibrium of the system as a whole'. The redundancy of this notion can best be shown by reconsidering Bull's point in terms of the situational logic confronted by the great powers, on the one hand, and the small and 'middle' powers which ostensibly comprise the bulk of international society, on the other.

Plainly, the notion of a general balance adds nothing whatever to that of the dominant or central balance in elucidating the logic of the great powers' relations among themselves. And if the question is why the great powers should choose to interfere in some local or particular balances rather than others, one must surely look not to some aesthetic concern on their part with overall equilibrium but to those specific considerations - economic, geopolitical or ideological - which lead them to assume that identifiable interests of their own are involved in certain cases and not in others.

As for the small powers, they must accept that their own relationships are always potentially linked to the dominant balance through the possibility of great power intervention; but the traffic in this regard is almost exclusively one way, downwards from the great, not upwards from the small. A small power might actively encourage individual great power interventions which seemed likely to further its own interest, or seek to mobilize international opinion and an extended concept of international law against great power intervention in general, or merely 'hope ... to lie low and escape notice'. But there are no grounds (on the basic assumption of general rationality) for assuming that the behaviour of small states in general should exhibit any consistent pattern in this regard, nor for assuming that small states should necessarily take any position at all in regard to the dominant balance (and a fortiori to the 'general balance ... of the system as a whole'). It is not that the state of the great power balance is unimportant to the small. It is rather that, fundamentally important though it is, there is, in general, nothing effective they can do about
it; and therefore no clear reason why they should try to do anything consistent about it. They have, for what it is worth, the freedom of impotence.

These considerations license a modification of the classical paradigm which is crucial to the whole argument of this chapter. A balance or 'equipoise' among the great (in the simple sense of the absence of an enduring individual preponderance) is the *sine qua non* for the emergence of an international order - the order of a states-system as opposed to that of a world-empire. But the central structural principle of an established international order is *hierarchy* - the preponderance of the great as a group over the rest; and unless the great powers are regarded as the only genuine members of international society, it must be acknowledged that the traditional practices of this society have depended fundamentally upon the inequality of its members. This point is most directly acknowledged by Tucker, in his attack on the expropriation of the doctrine of the equality of states by the weak in a system with a 'history of inequality par excellence', tempered only by a 'rough and precarious equality of the strong'. Moreover, Tucker clearly identifies inequality as a key feature of the structural logic (or inner necessity) of interstate relations. 'The international system', he argues, 'has always been in essence oligarchical (unequal) because it has been anarchical'.

Superficially, Tucker's position appears directly opposed to that of Waltz, who attempts to draw a fundamental distinction between hierarchical and anarchical systems. But the opposition is only superficial. Waltz draws heavily (if implicitly) upon the economists' picture of perfect competition in establishing the notion of a structure of international relationships beyond the control of any individual actor, just as Bull relies on essentially Hobbesian reasoning to establish that an international order, sustaining the 'elementary or primary goals of social coexistence', is an interest of men in general. But in describing the *empirical reality* of international order, Waltz relies upon the concept of oligopolistic competition; and Bull depicts not a Hobbesian 'war of all against all' among equals, but a structured Lockean society of unequals, whose central 'goals' might be more accurately characterized as the goals of the hegemonic powers. The great powers, Bull argues, contribute to international order not just by the management of their
mutual relations but 'by exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole'.

The inequality of states in terms of power has the effect, in other words, of simplifying the pattern of international relations, of ensuring that the say of some states will prevail while some will go under, that certain conflicts will form the essential theme of international politics while others will be submerged.

Thus Waltz's hierarchical/anarchical distinction may be replaced with a distinction between two patterns of hierarchy: hierarchy with a single effective sovereignty (as in world-empires and nation-states); and hierarchy with dual or multiple sovereignties (as in a states-system or a temporary 'revolutionary situation' within a given world-empire or nation-state). Such a reformulation, I believe, offers a much clearer insight into the character of the modern states-system in at least four important respects.

First, it directs attention to the lengthy process by which the states-system initially became established as a going concern in Europe before its expansion onto the global stage - a process involving an 'extraordinary decline' in the multitude of states inherited from feudalism, as large states endeavoured 'to absorb small ones while at the same time following the principle of compensation so as to maintain a balance of power'. This process of reduction (which has of course been radically reversed by the more recent break-up of empires, first inside Europe and then without) was itself one important way in which the initial inequality of states worked to further simplify their interactions during the classic period of the European states-system. An even greater simplification, of course, would have been the establishment of a single world-empire, which as both Wight and Wallerstein note, from their respective sides of the question, has been the characteristic development of states-system/world-economy situations before the modern era. And indeed it was no foregone conclusion, in the early centuries of the European international anarchy, that it too would not be resolved in this fashion, a point strongly emphasized by Hinsley. Not until the mid-
18th century, he asserts,

"did the actuality and conception of a collection of great powers in Europe finally replace the earlier framework of existing fact and inherited thought in which, while more than one state had always existed, it had been natural for one power to be rated above the rest, and impossible for that power's pretensions - resisted though they had always been by other states - to stop short of the control and protection of Christendom." 33

This raises the dispute over chronological origins mentioned earlier. But the dispute is of limited significance only for the argument developed here, which rejects the notion of a single unfolding principle of the modern states-system for an emphasis upon the dialectic of structural change and political practice. Hinsley's general argument, with the special weight which it accords to multiple balance as the signature of the modern states-system, should be rejected in favour of Wight's argument for the basic internal coherence of the entire period from the 1490s onward, in contradistinction to the mediaeval period preceding it.34 But the connection drawn by Hinsley between the consolidation of European absolutist states and the consolidation of the structure of anarchical interaction between them is itself a compelling one; and this in turn pushes the maturing of the states-system forward towards the advent of the Dual Revolution, and towards the ongoing challenge of uneven industrial development in Europe and latterly in the world at large. On the central implication of these overlapping phases of the system's development, Wight is, if anything, even more emphatic than Hinsley: 'The most conspicuous theme in international history ... is the series of efforts, by one power after another, to gain mastery of the states-system - efforts that have been defeated only by a coalition of the majority of the other powers at the cost of an exhausting general war'. 35

Second, therefore, the notion of the balance of power may be regarded as an inadequate description of the basic relationship even among the great powers of the 'mature' states-system. Of course, the concept of great power itself assumes, in tautological fashion, that the capabilities of the powers so designated are essentially 'in balance'; and where such a situation does hold in practice for an extended period, there are
obvious incentives (which will be discussed at length in the next chapter) for the powers in question to work towards policies of contrived balance informed by the moderating notion of 'legitimate' self interest. More generally, however, the balancing imperative which Waltz seeks to establish as the underlying principle of anarchical interaction may be more accurately rendered as an imperative towards competitive emulation; and this imperative, operating within the broad context of industrialization and global expansion which has characterized the last two centuries of the system, has produced a dominant pattern not of balance but of 'power transition'.

As employed by Organski himself, this concept is excessively simplistic - essentially an extrapolation of the Rostovian stages of growth thesis into the area of international theory. But a consideration of the dialectical character of uneven development and the geopolitical complexity of the present system merely reinforces the significance of those 'transitional' phases in which powers are rising to or declining from great power status, or threatening to break out of the ring altogether to establish overall hegemony. It has characteristically been in such periods of uncertainty that major conflicts have occurred; and even in a period in which new challengers emerged fairly slowly, and in which international 'power' was a fairly unidimensional and calculable quality, it often proved notoriously difficult for European statesmen (and for historians in retrospect) to determine whether a given challenge was directed towards a 'legitimate' rearrangement of the existing pattern of costs and benefits or towards overthrowing the system itself. In contemporary world politics, in which major challenges to the existing pattern of economic costs and benefits can come from states with negligible weight in the states-system as such, the effects of, say, Western uncertainty about the character of the Soviet challenge are greatly compounded.

Third, an emphasis upon hierarchy (and on the relationship between rights and duties and powers and constraints) is necessary to explain the character of international law and the paradoxical character of the doctrine of the equality of states. International law, as Bull points out, must be defined tautologically, as that 'body of rules' governing international relationships which 'is considered to have the status of law'. The special characteristic of international law, he argues,
is that it consists solely of 'primary rules' prescribing particular modes of behaviour, without any of the 'secondary rules' or 'rules about rules' which in domestic societies provide for the recognition, adjudication and, where necessary, change of primary rules.40 Where problems demanding these procedures arise - and they must arise repeatedly in a context of power transition - they must be solved by joint or unilateral self help on the part of the powers involved. And though this does not necessarily imply a special 'affinity of right and power' which is absent from domestic legal orders, it does mean that no criteria exist 'to distinguish right (and law) from a particular exercise of power provided only that the exercise prove[s] effective'.41

For the great powers of the traditional system, therefore, the international legal order rested not upon coercion (in that they could each respond to attempted coercion in similar vein), nor upon consensus, but upon consent.42 Their mutual engagement provides the only truly plausible empirical analogue in modern history of Oakeshott's notion of politics as civil association; and this free association of equals in respect of an enduring common practice was possible precisely because the members of the great power 'polity' were so few and the inequality between them and the rest of international society so marked. Conversely, if the position of the smaller powers is to be explained in terms of consent ('implied' or otherwise) this must be recognized as consent to an order which, by virtue of the imbalance of coercive power, they had no hope of changing. Among the near-great, individual challengers could push their way, or be co-opted, into the winners' circle. But the small as a group, unlike a disadvantaged class in domestic society, had no prospect of altering their situation through collective action, whether of a 'revolutionary' or 'trade union' character.

Of course, the inequality of powers also cushioned the conflicts between the great by the prospects it provided for aggrandizement against the weak. This was especially true of those colonial regions where even the limited constraints of international law did not apply. Emphasizing the prevalence in the 19th century great power balance of the compensations principle as a 'principle of equal aggrandizement', Tucker continues:

Indeed, it is only in retrospect that we can fully appreciate the extent to which such moderation as the balance of power introduced in Europe depended upon the immoderation of its working outside Europe.
It is in the closing period of the traditional system, roughly in the three decades preceding World War I, that a structure of imposed inequality between the core of European states and the Asian and African periphery of colonies, protectorates and semi-sovereign entities became the most pronounced.

Fourth, the perspective advanced here helps to clarify the problem of economic interdependence in contemporary world politics. The point made above about the great powers as a civil association could also be stated in terms of a distinction between formal/instrumental and substantive aspects of order: to the extent that each power is free to determine its own substantive domestic order, there is a meaningful prospect of stable agreement on instrumental order (Bull's minimum goals of social coexistence). Thus it may be argued that the relative absence of economic interdependence among the great powers has been an important contributing factor to the unique longevity of the political order represented by the traditional states-system.

Waltz, in his own criticism of American interdependence theory, has attempted to establish low functional interdependence as a natural concomitant of the international anarchy. Because states cannot afford a position of large scale dependence on potential enemies, he argues, they are driven to develop a broadly similar range of capabilities; and, conversely, they are free 'to leave each other alone' in regard to substantive issues. However, while this argument is applicable to the mutual relations of great powers, there were no comparable inhibitions on the development of great power dependence upon the resources of subordinated colonial regions. And it is precisely the case that the abstract logic depicted by Waltz has been subverted by the rapid transformation of these colonial regions into a militant majority of notionally equal members of contemporary international society.

With the emergence of this pattern of grossly asymmetrical global interdependence (or more accurately, with the ending of the long standing 'insulation' of states-system and world-economy), there emerges a genuine prospect of successful trade union activity by the mass of weak states. On the one hand, they have the ideological resources of the doctrine of the equality of states - originally a claim 'advanced by the strong against the strong', but now a key principle upon which
the unprecedented expansion of the earlier states-system depends. On the other, the substantial asymmetries between the structures of the states-system and the world-economy militate against a common front of the strong against the weak. Though the economic requirements for contemporary military capability would probably preclude any genuine great power support for drastic redistribution of the world's wealth, ample potential exists for the kind of dissension among the great, permitting increased assertiveness at the lower levels, against which Churchill implicitly warned Stalin at Yalta:

... the government of the world must be entrusted to the satisfied nations, who wished for nothing more than they had. If the world government were in the hands of the hungry nations, there would always be danger. But none of us had reason to seek for anything more. The peace would be kept by peoples who lived in their own way and were not ambitious. Our power placed us above the rest. We were like rich men dwelling at peace within their habitations.  

To summarize this argument, the true 'inner necessity' underpinning the framework of a states-system is the imperative towards competitive emulation among the great and the near great. In certain specific historical contexts, the mutual costs involved in the untrammeled operation of this imperative may encourage more conscious policies of moderation and contrived balance among the great. But there is no necessary connection between such policies and moderation of the great towards the small: in fact the reverse has often been the case. Drawing upon Tilly's terminology for the discussion of political contention in domestic social orders, we may say that the states-system has been characterized by a particularly clear distinction between the wider society of formally acknowledged sovereign states and the effective polity of great and near great powers. It is by no means clear this arrangement can be sustained in the contemporary era. But the fact remains that the linchpin of the more settled periods of international order to date has been great power hegemony, whether formally expressed in terms of concert or through diffuse and tacit understandings about spheres of influence, joint 'management' of crisis situations, compensations, and the like.
Moving from the abstract question of logical necessity to the states-system as a contingent historical phenomenon, it is also clear that the cohesion of the European society of states was heavily dependent upon the continued existence of an 'outside' world, which both provided a field for colonial expansion and helped to define Europe as a political and cultural entity. This geographical division has now been terminated, at least for the foreseeable future, with implications which will be discussed in the last two sections of the chapter.

Finally, there is the question of the system's constituent unit, the dynastic-cum-national state. The traditional states-system, in Manning's phrase, was 'a true society of notional entities'. More simply, it was a club for princes; and its continuing viability has been dependent upon the continuing ability of increasingly complex states to manage their most vital interactions in terms of the practices appropriate to a political association of princes. Of course, this has not been a completely static association. As noted above, it has been consistently faced with the problems of unequal development among its members, and its capacity to accommodate these problems has been in large part due to the very looseness of its central practices. But nonetheless, one can usefully draw a distinction in this respect between the states-system and its alter ego, the world-economy. The world-economy is the realm of uneven and combined development - a realm of diverse social forms, and of politics in the Leninist sense, which 'begins where the masses are'. The states-system is the realm of development which is uneven but not combined - a realm of politics in the Oakeshottian sense, 'another country' in which the masses and the diversity of social forms are 'packaged' by the sovereign state. Of course, this is merely a graphic way of expressing the basic theory of the game of the states-system - the convention that states have to do with each other solely as states. This is a convention which has been massively breached at various points in the system's history, and which may be unsustainable in future. The central issue here is that of transitional development and state-making, to which we now turn.
The Transition

A useful place to begin this discussion is with Hinsley's emphasis upon the imperialist origins of the European nation-state. Hinsley's argument is valuable because it indicates clearly that neither the triumph of raison d'état nor the emergence of nationalism is sufficient in itself to account for the stable political order achieved by the European states-system. For the raison d'état principle set no obvious bounds to the process of dynastic imperialism by which the earliest great powers had emerged from their mediaeval environment; and the linguistic and cultural patchwork of early modern Europe was calculated to provide endless occasions for conflict between rival nationalisms conceived primarily in linguistic/cultural terms. These twin dangers could be averted only by the emergence of a national loyalty focussed primarily upon the state as a discrete political and territorial entity - a development which, Hinsley argues, was in general the product of the 16th to the 18th centuries. National consciousness itself had much earlier roots, in the lengthy process of mutual adjustment between states seeking to break down competing loyalties within their asserted boundaries and subordinate communities seeking to resist their encroachments. But it was only in this latter period, when 'relations between states replaced relations within the body - politic as the paramount influence on the concept of the nation', that there occurred 'a steady shift away from the cultural and linguistic criteria of the nation as a concept, towards the definition of the nation in political and territorial terms'. This development, in turn, was inextricably connected with the 'shift from imperialism to coexistence [which] inaugurated or heralded the modern career of the states-system'. For only through lengthy practical experience of 'the law of diminishing imperial returns' among a constellation of states of approximately equal weight and territorial efficiency could the newly exalted principle of raison d'état be tamed by the corollary principle that each state's 'imperialism' could not legitimately exceed its established boundaries.49

Thus the emergence of reasonably integrated national communities focussed around newly powerful proto-bureaucratic states made possible a situation in which, on the one hand, the goal of the 'control and protection of Christendom' could gradually disappear from practical
political calculations without, on the other, giving way to a simple scramble among major states for outlying territory untempered by any conception of 'legitimate national interest'. But this process also meant that 'national' objectives could no longer remain the exclusive preserve of hereditary monarchs, and that the state itself became an unprecedented prize in the internal struggle to realize such objectives. The 'modern career of the states-system', therefore, was linked directly to the career of an even more modern phenomenon - the political and social revolution. In Tilly's words:

> In the West of the past five centuries, perhaps the largest single factor in the promotion of revolutions and collective violence has been the great concentration of power in national states. ... over the span of European history, one can see a long slope of resistance to central control followed by a fairly rapid transition (mainly in the nineteenth century) to struggle for control over the central state. In the records of collective violence, this shows up as a decisive shift away from localized tax rebellion and the like to conflicts involving contenders articulating national objectives, organized on a national scale, and confronting representatives of the national state.

Of course, if the consolidation and territorial spread of the modern bureaucratic state has been one of the great world-historical themes of the last two centuries, the consolidation and territorial spread of the modern industrial economy has been the other. In this regard (as indeed in regard to the development of the modern state) the crucial phenomenon is uneven development; and here too we can observe a complex dialectic between the processes of domestic and international politics.

On the one hand, as Hinsley points out, uneven development has persistently threatened the always provisional achievement of the territorial state and the selfconscious notion of stable interstate coexistence built upon it. This conception of the states-system survived, and was indeed strengthened by, the challenge of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; but it was seriously threatened, throughout the ensuing century, by a resurgence of the linguistic and cultural concept of the nation. Separate in origin to, and never acquiring 'any but a coincidental association' with, the contemporaneous movement for the democratization of the state unleashed by the Dual Revolution, this concept nonetheless flourished, and inflicted defeats on both liberalism and socialism, wherever economic
development was both 'sufficient to produce discontent with existing political forms [and] insufficiently advanced or insufficiently rapid to permit the state to make progress with the assimilation of its various peoples'. However, its achievement, in Alfred Cobban's words, was almost totally confined to 'state breaking', as opposed to 'state making'. Its inadequacy in the latter role was graphically illustrated by the fortunes of the East European succession states established by the World War I settlements. These certainly left 'far more individuals ... ruled by their "own people" than previously'. But, in the near total absence of social and economic conditions conducive to integration, they provided fertile ground for the spread of quasi-Fascist ideologies, and vulnerable targets for the Nazi regime which, in its own exploitation of pan-German sentiment, realised the full potential of cultural nationalism as an engine of universalist imperialism.

These problems persist in the contemporary states-system, and on a vastly expanded scale. Admittedly, there has been the impressive durability, noted by Mayall, of the convention of mutually recognized 'stateness' among the constituent units. The fragile legitimacy of many post-colonial regimes has ensured that European state theory - 'necessarily scornful of culture' - achieved a 'success in non-European markets [which] has been overwhelming'; and this has helped to buttress a Third World consensus that self-determination should be a once only process, which to date has withstood all major secessionist challenges which have not attracted the active support of a substantial outside power. But, equally, the positive process of 'state-making' necessary to supplement such a position has scarcely begun in many areas. For these states, as Hinsley points out, have emerged in conditions reminiscent not of 19th century Eastern Europe, but of Europe in general before the first wave of modernization in the 17th century; and within their societies the existing 'political loyalty wavers uneasily between pan-ism and tribalism' - forces with which the existing regimes are often impelled to compromise, despite the negative implications for their task of national integration.

However, while uneven development has in this sense generated powerful centrifugal tendencies within many of the weaker and more vulnerable units of the modern states-system, it has on the other hand called forth, among backward but potentially great powers, successive demonstrations of the transformative capabilities of the centralizing
state applied to the industrial economy. First in Japan and a newly unified Germany, and then more profoundly in the Soviet Union and China, it was demonstrated that *laissez-faire* constituted not the essential model for all successful attempts at large-scale industrialization, but more simply the only economic framework within which such industrialization could have emerged in the first instance. 'Initially', as Gellner observes,

there is no question of doing it collectively because there was no question of doing it knowingly at all ... But once the opportunities, the enormities, and also the dangers and difficulties are appreciated, it is far more plausible that the effort should be inspired and supervised from above. Who is to wait for the operation of the Hidden Hand? It is in the main conspicuous by its absence.

Moreover, the Soviet achievement - despite its enormous costs and its manifest links to the earlier tradition of 'revolution from above' - established not merely the state but the revolutionary party as a plausible protagonist of this process. As Otto Kirchheimer points out (and as Lenin himself readily acknowledged) the transformation of the state by crises such as World War I has also effected a major breach in the 'confining conditions' which earlier revolutionaries faced even after the successful seizure of power. While, on the one hand, the dislocation of war and economic crisis provides revolutionary movements with special opportunities to seize the state, on the other they stand to inherit the intellectual, technical and organizational equipment to direct the country's human and natural resources towards planned programmes of social transformation, as well as 'endlessly and technically refined' propaganda supports for their task of mobilizing the masses. Thus

the revolution of the 20th century obliterates the distinction between emergency and normality ... Under these conditions Soviet Russia could carry through simultaneously the job of an economic and political, a bourgeois and a post-bourgeois revolution in spite of the exceedingly narrow basis of its political elite.

Of course, it would be ridiculous to predict a rash of such great
revolutions in the Third World over the next 10-15 years, or to depict Communist-style revolutions as the obvious strategy for overcoming the confining conditions of transitional development in general. Despite the exceptional national resources underpinning them, both the Soviet and Chinese revolutions were profoundly shaped, and deeply compromised, by structural constraints reaching back to the initial emergence of a revolutionary situation; and the Kampuchean tragedy has demonstrated that an attempt to disregard domestic confining conditions by an ill prepared and extremely unrepresentative elite, catapulted into power by circumstances largely extraneous to the society in question, can lead to unmitigated disaster. Nonetheless, there are reasons for believing that the telescoping together of the processes of state-making and economic development in contemporary transitional societies may also lead to a corresponding blurring of the distinctions between 'normal' and revolutionary politics in such contexts.

The key to the argument is the acceptance of an essentially political view of the revolution. Great revolutions, like the great wars with which they are often associated, are 'distinctive conjunctures of socio-historical structures and processes' which must be comprehended 'as complex wholes ... or not at all'. But they are extraordinary because they reflect an extraordinarily complex conjuncture and not - as the 'breakdown' theories of mainstream American social science would have it - because they represent an aberrant or diseased state of social interaction. Revolution, like war, is the continuation of politics by other means, reflecting 'ongoing contests for resources, influence and hegemony previously managed within existing diplomatic channels'. From such a perspective, Rod Aya argues, it is possibly to identify 'three distinct explicanda' typically collapsed together in breakdown theories of revolution, - 'each of which can occur (and has occurred) without one or both of the others happening as well: the disintegration of the central state authority into multiple sovereignties; the transfer of power; and the capacity of ruling groups to foster societal transformation'.

Each of these three phenomena is to some extent observable in the situation of the 'new states', not as a result of revolutionary upheaval per se but as part of their direct inheritance from the colonial or semi-colonial past. In many instances, the initial transfer of power from the colonial rulers has been only the first, indecisive step in a series
of equally indecisive transfers among competing sections of the indigenous elite. The prospect of rapid degeneration to full-scale multiple sovereignty has also been an ever-present threat, above all for those states grappling with the legacy of the unusually arbitrary boundaries established by the European colonial powers in Africa. And at least for those larger Third World states whose resources and/or geographical position accord them a central place in the calculations of the major powers, the choice of withdrawing from the roller coaster of industrial development is arguably not a genuine one. Their situation may fairly be described by Elbaki Hermassi's comment on the situation of the Bolshevik rulers in Russia: 'the goal of narrowing the economic gap [is] not arbitrarily imposed by ... the elite, it [is] rather a fundamental claim on the regime and a condition of its ultimate viability'.

Moreover, the international environment in which these states have been established arguably shifts the balance of costs and benefits in regard to the seizure of the state significantly in a revolutionary direction. One obvious implication of Tilly's and Kirchheimer's arguments is that, in long established nation-states, the very capabilities which make the state a glittering prize for groups seeking social transformation will also make it very difficult to seize from the existing power holders - which accounts for the close connection between great revolutions and the turmoil engendered by great wars. But most post-colonial elites have inherited 'the ready-made framework of a dirigiste state', thinly disguised by a 'patchwork' of democratic forms hastily manufactured in the last years of colonial rule. In such situations the potential value of the state may well appear to much outweigh the costs of attempting to seize it, particularly when the prospect of asymmetrical - or asymmetrically effective - support for contending factions by outside powers is added to the account. Of course, such outside intervention might decide the issue in favour not of revolution but of counter-revolution. But, from the perspective of this argument, the fundamental point is that the incentive to encourage it exists, and constitutes an autonomous 'pull' factor exacerbating great power competition in regard to 'unstable' regions of the Third World.

For these reasons, I believe that it is valid to regard revolution as an extreme instance of the logic of transitional development in general, and to use the notion to identify features which may be present in wider
transitional contexts, though not in the same critical conjuncture. In the remainder of this section, therefore, I will attempt to work outward through three concentric circles of phenomena involved in the concept of transitional development: revolution, which may reasonably be expected in one or two important Third World countries in the next decade; forced-draught industrialization, which may be regarded as a likely project for all the major 'new influentials' in the Afro-Asian region; and state-making, which may be regarded as a problem for Third World states almost without exception.

The political concept of revolution adopted here has been developed in several recent works of comparative sociology and political theory whose authors have rejected both Durkheim-influenced 'breakdown' theories of revolution and the simple 'rising class' schema of classical Marxism, while at the same time strongly endorsing Marx's general approach to revolution as a rational political activity explicable in terms of the balance of class and state forces. This perspective has been most formally expounded by Tilly, whose 'polity model' of revolution was referred to in the previous chapter. Building upon Trotsky's notion of dual power, and also upon the notion, originally advanced by George Lefebvre in regard to the French Revolution, of 'multiple semi-autonomous revolutions converging into a single Revolution', Tilly has identified the phenomenon of 'multiple sovereignty' as the key issue for the investigation of both revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. Multiple sovereignty, on Tilly's account, commonly occurs when the normal pattern of competition among 'member' groups in the polity - the collective elite enjoying routine, low cost access to the government apparatus - degenerates into outright conflict resulting in coalitions between one or more member groups and outside 'challenger' groups seeking to press redistributive demands from below. 'In any event', as Aya observes in his succinct summary of this position,
tactical coalition of the two - are rebuffed in their bid for authority - sharing by incumbent power holders, and then obtain practical recognition for their claims to exclusive legitimacy from important segments of the population at large. When, in other words, strategic groups in a given country are confronted with conflicting demands from both government and rebel authorities for taxes, troops, supplies and continuing allegiance - and deliver to the rebels, the revolution is on. It ends when, by victory, defeat, or partial accommodation of the alternative coalition, one group or alliance commands a stable monopoly over the concentrated means of coercion and taxation.

This is a fairly simple and commonsense schema. But as Tilly points out, it emphasizes and predicts very different features of revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes than do theories of the breakdown variety; and its implications also fit rather neatly with the inferences about the sources of political stability and instability which I have derived from the above discussion of the states-system. First and foremost, the political model emphasizes the basic point that in societies marked by a substantial degree of integration and economic interdependence, on the one hand, and by sharp inequalities in the distribution of costs and benefits, on the other, a centralized apparatus of coercion, redistribution and administration must always be a potential object of solidarist class struggle. This certainly does not mean that highly unequal social orders are incapable of long-term persistence - a proposition that is refuted by the most casual survey of the record of ancient regimes throughout the world. 'Repression works', as Tilly bluntly observes. Or as Moore, approaching the subject through the difficult notion of legitimacy, puts it:

People are evidently inclined to grant legitimacy to anything that is or seems inevitable no matter how painful it may be. Otherwise, the pain might be intolerable. The conquest of this sense of inevitability is essential to the development of effective moral outrage.

However, one can say that a broadly stable hierarchy of power, and a general cohesion on the part of ruling groups in dealings with the rest
of society, are fundamental to the long-term continuity of such social orders. The potential for violent change is therefore inherent in those developments - central to the modern transition - which disrupt the cohesion of ruling groups while simultaneously altering the balance of forces throughout society. 'In the longer historical view', Tilly comments,

the changes which have most often produced the rapid shifts in commitment away from existing governments and established polities are processes which directly affect the autonomy of smaller units within the span of the government: the rise and fall of centralized states, the expansion and contraction of national markets, the concentration and dispersion of control over property ... Over the long run, the reorganization of production creates the chief historical actors, the major constellations of interests, the basic threats to those interests, and the principal conditions for transfers of power.

Second, to consider this question from the bottom up, it can be expected that the crucial mass actors in revolutionary situations will be those with some assets to defend, some resources to defend them with and some social 'space' in which to mobilize. This point has been extensively documented in regard to the urban crowd, the declining artisan class, and the emerging industrial proletariat; and it seems equally true of the peasantry - the one invariant contributor to the coalitions which have made great revolutions to date. Both the view that peasant rebellions are merely elemental, unthinking responses to intolerable social conditions and the view that such rebellions reflect the impact upon a normally acquiescent peasantry of the moral dislocation and anomie induced by transition seem equally false. Within the context of an acceptance of the inevitability of the overall social order, the traditional peasantry sustains its own conception of a social contract in regard to its specific interests, and has its own 'little tradition' of rebellion - 'collective bargaining by riot' - in defence of those interests. Moreover, Eric Wolf points out that it is precisely the middle peasantry - 'the main bearers of peasant tradition' - who are 'most exposed to influences from the developing proletariat', and who, through their propensity to form coalitions with urban radicals, are 'the most instrumental in dynamiting the peasant social order'.
Emphasizing the 'decisive' importance of the peasantry's relation 'to the field of power which surrounds it', Wolf concludes:

There is no evidence for the view that if it were not for 'outside agitators' the peasant would be at rest. On the contrary, the peasants rise to redress wrong; but the inequities against which they rebel are but, in turn, parochial manifestations of great social dislocations. Thus rebellion issues easily into revolution, massive movements to transform the social structure as a whole.  

Third, there is the whole question of the relationship between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. As Tilly points out, the psychologistic underpinnings of breakdown theories suggest that the revolutionary situation itself must be marked by explosive violence, which, by providing a mechanism of 'tension release' for a morally disrupted society, should in turn give way to a fairly rapid decline of violence and a 'return to normalcy'. By contrast, the political (or 'contention') model denies that large scale violence is necessary for the emergence of a situation of multiple sovereignty, but predicts that, once such a situation has emerged and been resolved in favour of the revolutionary coalition, a high level of violence will continue for an extended period as different segments of the coalition strive to realise their particular objectives in competition with erstwhile allies. Furthermore, this emphasis upon the complex interplay of competing groups against the background of an extraordinarily dynamic and unpredictable course of events also repudiates the kind of reasoning which derives Stalinist totalitarianism from the 'ideological imperatives' of the Leninist (or Marxist) view of revolution. A revolutionary intelligentsia - cum - party is the most likely source of an overarching, future-oriented definition of a desirable revolutionary outcome (which will certainly not be produced by the ubiquitous revolutionary protagonist, the peasantry); but the definition so produced is likely to owe at least as much to the logic of the particular situation as to any directives enshrined in an ideological 'crib' of previous revolutionary experience.

A related, and highly important point is that if the initial success of a revolutionary coalition is not to produce merely the permanent fragmentation, or foreign takeover, of the state power for which the
various contenders have fought, one group or faction must restore
general order, contain the 'revolution in the revolution', and direct
the entire upheaval towards more or less coordinated national goals.
It has been above all the attempt to do this, without surrendering in toto
their initial vision of socialist transformation, which has ultimately
brought successful Communist parties into partial or total collision
with the peasant forces whose actions have, in large part, produced
the situation which initially enabled them to seize power. This need
not always involve the party's attempt to smash peasant resistance to
its desire for far-reaching social transformation, as in the Soviet case.
The party may also see itself as battling with 'adventurist' excesses, as
when peasant radicalism threatened Chinese Communist efforts to conciliate
the 'national bourgeoisie'. But from either perspective the process
involves both the attempt of a small elite to impose its programmes
upon those masses which it claims to represent, and the attempt by the
legatees of the state power to impose national priorities upon groups
whose basic goals are not merely parochial but also, given the international
conjunctures in which such revolutions typically occur, in large measure
anachronistic.

This last point is developed most fully in Theda Skocpol's analysis
of the three unquestionably 'great' modern revolutions: the French, the
Russian and the Chinese. Skocpol's argument is particularly significant
here because of the emphasis she places upon both the international
dimension of revolutions and the potential autonomy of the state - and
upon the intrinsic connection between these two factors. Criticizing
Tilly and the recent group of structural Marxist theorists for failing to
go far enough in this direction, she insists that the 'state's involvement
in an international network of states' shapes its development as 'an
autonomous structure, with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily
equivalent to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant class in
society or the full set of member groups in the polity'.

The specific interests of state managers are above all diplomatic
and military, and when confronted with international crises they may
initiate reforms and impose new financial demands which, because they
threaten the established position not merely of subordinate but also of
dominant classes, may in turn produce a revolutionary situation within
the society. Moreover, she argues that such great revolutions have
resulted in the emergence of a new, more professional group of state managers, who take up the uncompleted task of political and social reform in a context still deeply influenced by the structural constraints which had caused the attempts at reform to issue in revolution in the first place. 77

Though Skocpol suggests that 'in some sense, potential for social revolution has been built into all modernizing agrarian bureaucracies', she is in general cautious about extending her approach from large and politically ambitious states like France, Russia and China to the post-colonial states of today. But her emphasis upon international, and more specifically geopolitical pressures does seem applicable to the situation of the group of Third World 'new influentials' upon which I have focussed here; and the notion of transitional state as an amphibious creature grappling with the multiple contradictions of the the two very different environments is clearly reflected in her description of revolution-prone ancien regimes. 'The state', she argues, 'is fundamentally Janus-faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class divided socio-economic structures and an international system of states'. It is not the activities of domestic social groups alone, but their intersection with international pressures, and the manoeuvres of state managers to extract resources 'precisely at this intersection', which account for 'the political contradictions that help launch social revolutions and for the forces that shape the rebuilding of state organizations within social revolutionary crises'. 79

This point leads outwards to the second set of issues mentioned above, concerning the project of rapid industrial development in leading Third World states. These 'follower' states, as Bendix has called them, are placed in a deeply contradictory relation to the 'pioneer' states which have industrialized before them, and one can discern a sharp dialectic of necessity and choice in the situation confronted by their ruling elites. 80 They are impelled towards the industrialization project by the pressures of a deeply hierarchical states-system and world-economy, by domestic population growth and the 'demonstration effect' of advanced industrialism on the expectations of their own populations, and - though this is the most contradictory factor - by developing national pride. They have, on the one hand, strong incentives to exploit the developmental advantages of 'backwardness' - the opportunities for 'skipping stages' in regard to technology, principles of industrial organization, scale of
enterprises, and the like - noted by Alexander Gerschenkron in the experience of Germany, France and Russia. But, on the other hand, they encounter a far more highly structured world-economy than the first great 'late-industrializers', a situation in which, many left-wing critics have argued, extensive control of advanced technology by transnational corporations is one more factor helping to lock Third World nations into a pervasive situation of structural dependence. Finally, the great Communist revolutions of this century have presented contemporary follower societies not merely with the opportunity to take over specific techniques from pioneer societies but also with the prospect of choosing between profoundly different modes of economic, social and political organization.

It is possible at the outset to specify one pattern to which the development of these countries in the next couple of decades will almost invariably not adhere: the combination of economic laissez-faire and liberal-constitutional government broadly exemplified in the Anglo-American experience. 'At bottom', as Moore observes, 'all forms of industrialization so far have been revolutions from above, the work of a ruthless minority' and where industrialization must proceed amid intense pressures for rapid growth and without the environmental cushioning which assisted much of the Western process, an extensive resort to political coercion and to solidarist ideologies for the purpose of surmounting 'the rigours of the hump' seems inescapable. But even leaving aside this point - and Moore's impressive argument that a revolutionary assault on ancien régime social structures was a necessary preliminary to the emergence of the great Western democracies - the prospect of liberal-constitutional solutions in traditional societies is undermined by the simple necessity to choose, on the run, between modes of development with very different social implications for the foreseeable future. The logic of this situation has been nicely summed up by Gellner:

The crucial power in transitions is the power to decide which turning to take, being at the wheel at the big and rare road forks: generally, these turnings are approached only once, and the decision determines just what subsequent road forks if any, will be available ... In stable contexts, one can play for marginal advantages and accept defeat, tolerate opposition
and refrain from pushing every advantage to the utmost, in the knowledge that tomorrow is another day. In transition, tomorrow is not another day: it is an other day altogether. He who is in power now will mould that tomorrow, and hence control now is incomparably more valuable than the quite spurious hope of a later turn. Rival politicians in transitional societies like to think of each other as the local Kerensky. 83

These arguments accord with the general experience of Cold War incursions into the pattern of Third World development, in that the clients of the great powers have characteristically been distinguishable not in terms of democracy or totalitarianism, but of the more or less capitalist or socialist orientation of their similarly authoritarian regimes. However, it is also abundantly clear by now, the Soviet 'model' per se is unlikely to attract much direct imitation in the Third World, any more than the Anglo-American example. Rather, there would appear to be three broad developmental patterns extant, which may be classified, following Hermassi, as national popular, state capitalist, and periphery capitalist.84 Of course, these are inevitably somewhat procrustean categories, which drastically simplify the contradictory political demands of a highly complex military, economic and social situation. But with this proviso, I would argue that the larger and strategically more significant states considered here are likely to adhere, in general, to the middle ground of this developmental spectrum for the next decade or so.

The two extremes, for various reasons, both seem likely to attract a smaller number of consistent followers. The national popular road, with its emphasis upon 'self-reliance, egalitarian patterns of development, and a fair amount of mass participation',85 has normally been associated with political revolution; and though Tanzania stands as an exception to this generalization, it is supported by the record of Soviet illusions and disillusions about 'national democratic' states in the 1960s (an issue discussed in Chapter 5). Moreover, the goal of extensive self-reliance does impose heavy costs on all but the largest states, such as the Soviet Union and China; and China itself - which, Hermassi argues, is usefully regarded as the leading exemplar of the national popular road - has recently acknowledged these enduring costs with its limited opening to the capitalist World.
At the other extreme is the alternative of periphery capitalism: 'development through greater integration within the world capitalist system' with heavy reliance upon export-oriented industries and upon adaptation to the investment strategies of transnational corporations. This strategy would seem an unsatisfactory project for the populous and/or politically ambitious states considered here, despite the extensive support currently accorded it by Western economists and Western-dominated financial institutions.86

In the first place, it is highly vulnerable to the vagaries of demand, and to political decisions on protectionist issues, in the advanced industrial nations; and it is also arguable that its most impressive exemplars to date - such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea - have been successful not merely because they benefited from a period of sustained boom in the world economy, but also because there were initially so few nations actively taking this road. Second, this strategy presents in its most extreme form the phenomenon of encapsulated capitalistic development in the Third World - a phenomenon which Clifford Geertz, has christened "Singaporeanization", to emphasize that Singapore has succeeded in part because it 'has actually managed to do what it is a practical impossibility for Manila, Jakarta, Delhi-Bombay, Beirut, Algiers, Rabat-Casablanca, Dakar, Lagos-Ibadan, Kinshasa or Nairobi - politically remove itself from any wider entity at all ...'.87 The two middle-sized countries which have followed this route for an extended period - South Korea and Taiwan - have enjoyed special historical advantages in respect of social and educational infrastructure, and international issues have been a prominent factor making for ideological solidarity at least at the elite and cadre level. But each has been marked by a 'dualistic' social structure, and by the 'marginalization' of the masses which accompanies encapsulated development; and South Korea has already experienced major revolts against the established regime. Third, extended subordination to outside investment strategies is likely to be unacceptable to states which, I have suggested, are impelled towards industrialization in part by international and geopolitical pressures. Again, Taiwan and South Korea are exceptions whose peculiar features support the wider argument. For their initial burst of industrialization took place in the context of direct geopolitical pressure from the two great Communist powers, while of the two great
capitalist powers intimately involved with their development, the United States was a geographically removed patron in a period of global ascendancy and Japan, for its own complex of reasons, was not seeking a military position at all comparable to its economic capacities. Even in East Asia, the clarity of this situation is likely to be increasingly eroded in future, and the fluid power relationships in West Asia and Africa will make some measure of industrial self-reliance a probable goal for the more important states of the region.

All this suggests that the most likely broad strategy for such 'semi-periphery type countries sufficiently large to aspire to regional hegemonic roles' is state capitalism - a strategy which, Hermassi suggests, involves 'a conflictual mode of participation in the world-economy'.

It seeks to secure an independent developmental base for a country in the name of nationalism and populism. In this option a state seeks to redefine the terms of dependence through control of the foreign sector, economic diversification, the adoption of high technology, and at least a partial incorporation of a significant portion of the working population. 88

The most substantial experience of state capitalism to date has been in Latin America, where the record indicates that it is an unstable mode of development, subject to the emergence of major crises in the populist coalitions underpinning it, and an 'unintended alternation between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary elites'. The most recent overall trend has been towards reactionary stabilization policies in societies which have exhausted their early potential for 'easy' industrialization based on import substitution, and whose movement towards more export oriented strategies has overlapped with a period of world economic downturn. The result, in many important cases, has been 'the juxtaposition of renewed economic growth with deepening poverty' - with 'roughly 75 per cent of the populace excluded from the fruits of economic progress' - and with extensive political efforts to demobilize a working class partially mobilized in the earlier period. 89

Somewhat paradoxically, the case for state capitalism, and even periphery capitalism, as a potential engine of independent capitalist development has recently been taken up by dissenting voices within the structuralist and neo-Marxist debate. The point at issue is the implicit functionalist cast of much dependency and world-systems theory, which,
taken to the extreme, suggests that it would be virtually impossible for individual nations to break out of the straightjacket of dependent development except in the context of the downfall of the system as a whole. This implication has been challenged, from a more conventional Marxist perspective, by Bill Warren, who argues that independent development - involving growth in strategic sectors, and growing host-country control over technology and foreign capital input - has begun to occur 'rather rapidly' in a number of Third World capitalist countries, opening the possibility of revolutionary change in the longer term. This position remains controversial within the neo-Marxist debate, but it has been cautiously supported by, among others, Wallerstein himself. Semi-peripheral countries, he argues, are by virtue of their intermediate position better able to take advantage of a period of general downturn in the world economy than either the core countries or those of the periphery tout court. However, there are also the strong pressures of 'competition between semi-peripheral states', and the fact that the successful 'promotion' of one or more countries to core status progressively raises the threshold for equivalent gains on the part of the rest - factors which may encourage a 'more politically "radical" stance' on the part of some semi-periphery elites:

Fearing that they may lose out in a game of 'each on his own' against the core powers, they may come to favour a strategy of collective transnational syndicalism which inevitably pushes them 'leftward' more in terms of international policy, but with perhaps some carryover in terms of internal redistribution. (A good example might be Algeria's aggressive role in the Group of 77, OPEC and elsewhere, combined with the moves internally towards 'land reform').

I will return to these questions at the end of this section. But first it is necessary to consider the last complex of issues nominated above, those of state-making and nation-building. I have already foreshadowed my acceptance of the argument that states make nations and not vice-versa, and that the sources of modern nationalism are to be located primarily in the social impact of the uneven development of capitalism - an argument which, as Tom Nairn puts it, accounts for 'the most notoriously subjective and ideal of historical phenomena [as] a
by-product of the most brutally and hopelessly material side of the last two centuries'. Uneven development, Nairn argues 'is a politely academic way of saying "war" .... that "development war" (as one might call it), which has been fought out consistently since the eruption of the great bourgeois revolutions'. And within this framework of ongoing conflict, nationalism stands 'over the passage to modernity ... as human kind is forced through ... it must look desperately back into the past, to gather strength wherever it can be found ...'.

Thus, when advancing capitalism 'smashed the ancient social formations surrounding it, they always tended to fall apart along the fault-lines contained inside them' - lines which 'were nearly always ones of nationality', occasionally ones of religion, and 'never ones of class'.

This is a complex position, which is set out more formally by Gellner, who endorses Nairn's general argument, while denying that it has any particular connection with Marxism. 'The theory', Gellner points out,

does not replace 'class' by 'nation' as an explanatory notion: It makes the crystallization of 'nations' a consequence of (a) inequality, (b) the situation in which, unlike pre-industrial conditions, inequality can no longer be easily tolerated, and in which (c) the significance of culture ('nationality'), in an economy requiring literate educated personnel, is very great.

The same basic logic, Gellner argues, accounts for both the state-making and state-breaking dimensions of modern nationalism. On the first count, transitional development, by dissolving the cohesive structures of traditional societies, creates for the first time a genuine sociological imperative for a 'co-cultural' relationship between elite and population at large. The key to the satisfaction of this requirement, he suggests, is universal education in a common literate language. This language may normally be derived by raising to literate status a prominent vernacular of the territory in question: but in other aspects this 'nation-building' process has very little to do with the cultivation of existing ethnic and cultural differentia, which are often precisely what must be transcended. However, such differentia may promote powerful divisive forces, where 'the uneven diffusion of industrialization and modernization' impacts upon a pre-industrial 'empire' in such a way as to leave a large
and culturally distinct group excluded from the developmental benefits beginning to accrue to the population of the more advanced section (or, alternatively, where the advanced section is itself a minority, and subject to political discrimination). Then, the emergence of a mass 'national' discontent will coincide with an overwhelming incentive for the intelligentsia of the disaffected group to mobilize a struggle for that 'national liberation' which - given the fact that intellectuals are no longer 'substitutable across frontiers' - promises to convert them from second class citizens to the ruling class of a new state. But in either case, such 'nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness': rather, in response to the 'needs for growth', it 'invents nations where they do not exist'.

This argument, to reiterate, accords a pivotal role to the state in the development of nationalism in general. Indeed, even the formation of 'old, continuous nations' such as Britain, France and Spain can be seen as a contingent process which might well have produced very different territorial arrangements, and in which the state's violent extirpation of competing loyalties through pogroms, internal crusades, mass expulsions, 'Russifications' and the like was a central feature. However, in much of the contemporary Third World the potential importance of the state, and of the orientation of state managers, is enormously enhanced by the fact that not merely a national community but also a coherent class structure in the Marxist sense remains to be created. 'Depending on the action of the state', asserts Alain Touraine, 'classes take one form or another. They do not preexist as political agents to the intervention of the state: they are determined by it'.

In certain isolated instances, such as Saudi Arabia, a traditional ruling elite has survived to preside over a dramatic leap in economic power; but in general 'the weakness of traditional social classes and the distorting impact of uneven development have created conditions of political initiative and ideological space' in which political power passes to that least defined of all social groupings - the petit bourgeoisie.

These considerations also suggest that, in those circumstances where the system of rule is something more than a thinly disguised military dictatorship, there will be strong tendencies towards one party states with a quasi-revolutionary ideology and organizational structure. Especially in Africa, a multi-party system is liable to institutionalize ethnic and
tribal divisions. And, more positively, the characteristic political tasks of a revolutionary party - of mobilizing previously marginal strata, on the one hand, and reducing the condition of multiple sovereignty through which it came to power, on the other - are tasks with which, I have suggested, the political leadership of almost all new states must grapple in some measure. One characteristic of extensive revolutionary situations, Tilly argues, is that they provide the revolutionary coalition with extensive experience 'in forging its own instruments of government independent of the existing holders of power. The party, the army, or the insurrectionary committee becomes the skeleton (or perhaps the blueprint, or both) of the new government'.\textsuperscript{102} Given the fact that most new states can look back to some form of 'revolutionary struggle' in the pre-independence era, and the continuing example of a small group of states in which the concept of revolution has a much more substantial empirical referent, the attractiveness of the 'vanguard party' concept is hardly surprising.

Finally, it is important to reiterate Hinsley's distinction between the political/territorial and linguistic/cultural concepts of the nation. The consolidation of existing Third World states within their established boundaries is in many respects an ugly and problematic process. But it conforms to the pattern by which nation-states have often been established in the past; it is in part a direct response to the pressures of the system of advanced industrial states in which the new states find themselves; and the defence of established territorial entities, against the multitude of irridentist and national-liberation claims to which they might plausibly be exposed, has been strongly endorsed by the regional organizations most obviously affected - notably the OAU. Within this context, I would argue that Third World ideologies which incorporate a substantial component of Marxism in their definition of 'national' goals are less of a threat to the stable operation of a global states-system than those which draw primarily upon the kind of religious pan-ism represented by the recent upsurge of 'political Islam'.

This argument should not be over-stated. Marxism-Leninism itself is ostensibly a pan-ism of a special kind. And, furthermore, Soviet foreign policy (like American foreign policy) has been quite opportunistic in this respect, readily exploiting pan-Islamic and pan-Arab sentiment against Egypt, for instance, when the Sadat regime chose to define
Egyptian national interests in a way which enhanced American objectives in the Middle East. Nonetheless, I would argue that the Soviet 'building block' approach to world revolution is, if anything, a factor supporting the integration of these transitional states into the network of the states-system - not merely because of its general statism and its emphasis upon matters of party organization, but also because of its bedrock association of economic - rather than religious, racial or ethnic - goals with progress towards socialism.

It is now possible to draw together the threads of this argument about transitional development. The overriding point is that it is meaningful to speak of a 'national-liberation' struggle for states in this situation - a struggle involving, as Marxist-Leninists of all stripes have long insisted, both a political and an economic dimension. Hermassi expresses this point by contrasting Third World 'national revolutions' with both the democratic revolutions exemplified by Britain and France and the developmental revolutions exemplified by the Soviet Union:

What is at stake becomes clear through [a] brief delineation of intrasocietal backwardness and intersocietal dependency. Considering the weight of those confining conditions, the real task of revolutions in the new states can neither be to carry out the program of early democratic revolutions nor to fulfill the later developmental ones, but to create societies in which both kinds of accomplishments become possible ... the legitimacy of new regimes is primarily future-oriented and can only call for the most stupendous tasks of creative societal construction.

Such a perspective suggests that, while the Soviet experience is patently not an appropriate blueprint for contemporary Third World development, it does remain an important general reference point, which illustrates an encounter with basic problems largely absent from the American experience. The claim that the Soviet ideological offensive in the Third World involves merely the attempt to graft an alien class-based
doctrine onto essentially nationalist struggles rests upon a serious oversimplification of both Soviet Marxism and modern nationalism. As several writers have observed, the search for legitimacy in transitional societies effectively recreates the Slavophil/Westerner problem of 19th century Russia on a world scale; and Third World elites must (as did the Soviet regime in practice) grasp both horns of the dilemma simultaneously.¹

Second, the complex structure of contemporary world politics makes it especially necessary to today conceive of revolution not as a 'single dramatic event' but as 'an extremely long-term struggle within and between increasingly more complex societies'; and to recognize in the spectrum of Third World development 'a plethora of possibilities for which the dichotomy - revolution/reform - is simply too restricted ...'¹⁰⁵

Even in Latin America and East Asia, to say nothing of West Asia and Africa, the processes of transformation discussed here must be regarded as far from completed; and the onset of more independent economic development among leading Third World nations must be situated against the enlarged social space created by the ending of Western/American hegemony in the Afro-Asian region, and by the striking access of economic power to the OPEC nations. Therefore, given the earlier argument that revolutionary action results primarily not from moral dislocation and anomie but from a dramatic extension in the opportunities available to previously subordinated groups to press their demands for radical change, there is no justification for assuming that the more advanced Third World capitalist states have passed the point at which their internal political processes can administer major shocks to the capitalist world order.

Of course, one must distinguish in this context between full-scale revolution from below and major changes of direction initiated from above as the result of a coup or a shift in allegiance on the part of an established regime. However, the concern here is not with social revolution as such but rather with the kinds of shift of economic and/or strategic alignment which are likely to provide occasions for confrontation between the great powers. Such shifts, I would argue, are likely to come from above in considerable numbers over the next 10-15 years; and even a couple more upheavals of the dimensions of the Iranian revolution may have a potent demonstration effect in encouraging bids for power by disaffected elites, and hedging of bets by established elites, in
countries where similar constellations of factors appear to obtain. In this connection, also, it is worth noting that the *sui generis* situations in Southern Africa and the Middle East have caused a carry-over of 'first stage' national liberation issues into an era of growing Third World hostility to the operations of what remains an essentially capitalist world-economy. The Palestinian issue has already had the effect of pushing even conservative Arab states into more radical postures *vis-a-vis* the West than they might otherwise have adopted; and the South African issue can be expected to have a similar effect upon African states in the 1980s, while a revolutionary transfer of power in that country must be regarded as a serious prospect in the longer term.106

Third, (and this is a further general reason for believing that radical initiatives may come even from apparently conservative elites in the forthcoming period) it is essential to remember that they are exposed to a variety of contradictory situational logics and inherited frames of meaning, which cannot adequately be depicted in terms of any one all-embracing scheme (whether of the states-system or of the world-economy). Thus, while it is in one sense true to say that such elites have been successfully co-opted into the states-system by the attractions of the convention of sovereignty as a bulwark of their own positions against domestic rivals and against each other, it is also true that they have increasingly demonstrated their ability to utilize that convention as a collective resource in pushing for alterations in the world structure of economic power. Conversely, while the control of strategic economic sectors or the political mobilization of the masses might be supposed to be of no concern to mere 'liaison elites' presiding over a particular segment of the world-economy, such issues might be expected to be prominent concerns of state managers disposed to assert a claim to regional autonomy and/or hegemony within a world of states. Moreover, as Hermassi suggests, the fluidity of class structures greatly increases the importance of culture and ideology as factors in the development of Third World states;107 and here too it might be expected that African and Asian elites will have, in general, much less reason to identify themselves with the values and structures of a Western dominated states-system/world-economy than those Latin American elites in regard to whom the notion of 'liaison' status was initially formulated.

Finally, the concern here is not merely with what is actually done
in the Third World but with great power perceptions of what is done and expectations about what might be done in the future. Although the arguments advanced here do suggest a continued erosion of a Western political and economic position which remains, on a global scale, a highly privileged one, they do not necessarily suggest substantial direct gains either to the Soviet Union itself or even to a distinctively socialist world revolutionary process. However, as Burns has emphasized, world politics is a 'conversation' operating on a multiplicity of levels and in a context of 'radical uncertainty', in which all participants are compelled to impute not merely current but future intentions and capabilities to their various co-respondents. Thus in an era in which revolution has once more been placed 'on the agenda' of world politics, and in which, moreover, one of the two great powers still professes its commitment to world revolution as a central goal, while the other has evolved an elaborate doctrine of multi-level 'deterrence' of threats to the status-quo, the great power relationship may be severely strained by contingencies much below all-out revolutionary change. As Hermassi puts it:

The world historical character of revolutions means, among other things, that they introduce political ideals and principles of legitimacy to existing power arrangements that are threatened by their explosive novelty and demands for societal restructuring. They exert a demonstration effect far beyond the boundaries of their country of origin, and have a potential for triggering waves of revolution and counter revolution within, as well as between, societies.

In this section, I have considered this phenomenon from the inside, attempting to show that international pressures are calculated to promote extreme, and possibly revolutionary politics in contemporary transitional states. In the two remaining sections, I will attempt to re-establish the wider context, placing the phenomenon of transitional development first against the backdrop of the evolution of the states-system in general, and second against the evolution of great power relations in the post-World War II era.
The States-System in Transition

The notion that the contemporary era has witnessed or is witnessing a fundamental transformation of the 'international system' has been a common one in the mainstream American debate, with three major factors being variously adduced to account for this development. First, there is the emergence of bipolarity, which, Waltz maintains, has been regarded by 'almost everyone' as constituting a change of system - with a concomitant amount of attention being paid to the alleged return to the condition of multipolarity in the 1970s. This issue will be left to the next chapter, where I will be following Waltz in treating the great power configuration as fundamentally bipolar now and for the foreseeable future, but following more overtly classical theorists such as Bull in regarding the Soviet-American bipolarity as no more than an important stage in the evolution of a single modern states-system. Moreover, in keeping with the argument that hierarchy, not balance, is the central ordering principle of the system as a whole, I will be suggesting that the technical point of bipolarity is less significant than the concrete fact of the passage of great power status to two continent-spanning empires with very different orientations towards a predominantly capitalist world-economy.

Second, there is the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence, which again will be left to the next chapter. This is clearly of fundamental importance, but here too I will be downplaying those issues commonly emphasized in the American strategic debate - sophisticated strategies for crisis bargaining, signalling, and the manipulation of 'credibility' and 'commitment' in the cause of extended deterrence. Rather, I will be suggesting that the truly crucial theoretical question involves not these mechanics of deterrence - about which only a few obvious things can usefully be said - but the impact upon states as social and political entities of a situation in which preparations for central war are kept before the public consciousness as never before, but in which neither side can now embark upon such a war with any reasonable expectation of emerging with a recognizably intact civil society - even in the event of its own 'victory'.

These qualifications lead on to the third major factor commonly invoked as a cause of actual or potential system transformation in the
contemporary era - global interdependence. The concept is a vague one, in which the new tensions of the 'Trilateral' relationship, the 'North-South' confrontation, and the still limited participation of the socialist countries in the capitalist world-economy are reconciled at the level of rhetoric rather than that of theoretical analysis. But the vagueness is in part the result of an attempt to address a number of genuinely crucial structural changes in terms of a concept which - because it is essentially abstract and synchronic in character - cannot adequately accommodate them. Insofar as there is a concept of global interdependence (and such a concept would seem essential to any claim on these grounds about the transformation of the international system as such) it must in turn incorporate a recognition of the interplay among three aspects of the global transition described by Barraclough: the qualitative alteration in great power strategic interdependence resulting from nuclear weapons; the universalization of the great power adversary relationship resulting from the global extension of the states-system; and, also stemming from this latter factor, the emergence of a multitude of 'new states' in an extensive region of the world-economy which lay, until recently, largely beyond the boundaries of 'international society'. Without the assumption that the great powers now effectively checkmate each other on a world scale - while still jointly providing a structure of constraint upon undue military adventurism by powers of intermediate rank - it would be logical to expect the growing 'salience' of economic issues to result not in a more pacific era of international 'low politics' but in an era of neo-mercantilist imperialism. And without an acknowledgement that the basic novelty of North-South interdependence lies in the fact that there are now, in at least some instances, two effective sides to an economic relationship - between core and periphery - which was always intensely politicized, the true character of the growing salience of economic issues in this context is distorted beyond recognition.

Stated in these terms, the notion of interdependence does direct attention to fundamental aspects of contemporary world politics which are, in general, merely kept at arms length rather than genuinely confronted in recent restatements of the classical paradigm of the states-system. But the interdependence argument is not normally stated in these terms. In the first place, as Tucker points out, interdependence theorists have never really come to grips with the problem of order in an international
environment which, even if increasingly interdependent, remains fundamentally anarchical. Rather, relying implicitly upon a kind of Cobdenite commercial functionalism (and, one might add, upon Durkheimian assumptions about the growth of 'organic solidarity'), they have assumed 'that interdependence itself is largely constitutive of order, that an interdependent world must establish its own set of rules and constraints, and that this order does not include force, the *ultima ratio* that characterized and defined the traditional system'. Admittedly the association of 'complex interdependence' with harmony of interest has recently been downplayed by Keohane and Nye, and there has emerged a 'managerialist' school on this question analogous to the managerialist school of modernization theorists. But even these more sophisticated accounts tend to evade questions of structure, and to obfuscate the central role of inequality, of both military and economic power, in the contemporary world order.

In the second place, interdependence theorists have sought to establish the novelty of their theoretical enterprise by contrasting it to a *machtpolitik* caricature of Realism, which ignores the notion of international society so central to the more substantial accounts of the classical approach to the states-system. Thus Keohane and Nye, starting from the standard behavioural dichotomy between structure and process, insist upon the need for a concept of international *regimes* as 'intermediate factors between the power structure of an international system and the political and economic bargaining [process] that takes place within it'; and they argue that Realism cannot adequately explain contemporary 'regime change' because it fails to 'differentiate significantly among issue areas in world politics', and assumes as the 'basic dynamic' of the system that changes in the 'overall structure' of military power will lead directly to appropriate changes in 'the rules that comprise international regimes'. However, the Rationalist strand of the classical tradition already offers its own richer and more historically grounded conception of 'international regimes' - in the sense of the institutionalized practices of the states-system. And so far from taking the structure of military power as the key to international order, theorists of this persuasion have sometimes placed such emphasis upon the importance to the traditional system of an elite 'international culture' of Christendom/Europe as to imply that the absence of such a unifying culture constitutes the key to the manifold challenges to the global
international order of today.*

These criticisms point the way to an alternative approach which preserves the recognition of the fundamental importance of economic interdependence (combined with massive inequality) in the contemporary world, without postulating the transformation of an all-embracing 'international system' abstracted from its concrete temporal and spatial context. First, it is important to focus upon the specific and limited concept of the states-system outlined earlier. Strictly speaking the states-system is nothing more than a persistent system of political practices (or pivotal, and exceptionally durable 'international regime'); but, more loosely, it is a political association of states ('a real society of notional entities') whose interactions as states are characteristically managed in terms of its central practices of war, great power hegemony, the balance of power, diplomacy and international law. The central feature of the contemporary system is that the formal membership of its political association has expanded enormously, and that its practices have been greatly extended in geographical scope to become the putative foundation of a global political order. The question at issue, therefore, is not the transformation of an all-embracing international system, but the place of the states-system in 'the transition' occasioned by the global outreach of European economic and military power in the last century - and it is a question to which the Leninist theory of 'imperialism' and the accompanying 'world crisis' of capitalism has obvious relevance.

Second (and in keeping with the position developed earlier on the monism/pluralism debate), a conception of overall structure remains indispensable to clarity in the investigation of individual issue-structures. But it is necessary to insist upon two 'overall' structures in contemporary world politics - the structures of military and of economic power, underpinning the states-system and the world-economy respectively. This approach entails rejecting, on the one hand, the attempt to directly confront an unmediated multitude of issue structures and, on the other, the inclination of classical theorists to apply an impressionistic conception of 'overall power' to the ranking of states within the single framework of the states-system.

As regards the latter, admittedly, it is possible to discuss the 'classical' period of the European system in terms which combine the sense

* This comment is also applicable to ostensibly Realist theorists such as Morgenthau and Kissinger.
of paying due attention to the complexity of overall power with a generally coherent ranking of powers based ultimately on estimates of their military efficacy. This is in part because differences in organizational effectiveness among the absolutist monarchies (as between Prussia and Russia, for instance) could have a substantial impact upon their relative military effectiveness; in part because the enormous impact of differential industrial capacity did not make itself truly felt until the advent of the 'second' Industrial Revolution in the late 19th century; in part because Britain, the one power which did gain an early lead in industrial development, had strong geopolitical incentives not to throw its full weight into the continental struggle; but above all because the world-economy of this period was 'another country' from the states-system not merely functionally but always to some extent geographically. 'Throughout its development', Wight observes,

the economic horizon [of the modern states-system] has stretched beyond the limits of diplomacy. Commerce has cast a nimbus of activity and connexions round the political system prefiguring as it were the next stage of its outward growth, whether that came about through colonial expansion or the admission of peripheral states to membership.  

In other words, the periphery of the world-economy has always run ahead of the periphery of the states-system (a factor which in part accounts for the special relationship of Britain to the other powers of the European core). But this geographical asymmetry was terminated by the 'new imperialism' and the subsequent anti-colonial revolution; and this development, together with the insatiable resource demands of the advanced industrial societies, has bestowed upon a number of 'new state' actors in contemporary world politics a degree of economic power grossly disproportionate to their present and foreseeable military power. Of course this new 'power of the weak' is ultimately dependent upon the persistence of an international order in which their assertion of sovereignty over resources within their territorial scope is normally respected by the strong. And while one certainly should not discount the importance in this connection of egalitarian sentiments within the advanced societies, or the recognition on the part of the leaderships of those societies that the alternative to an international regime of general non-intervention might be chaos, it seems fair to argue that the bedrock constraint upon
the strong is the Soviet-Western division on the future of the world-
economy mentioned earlier.

Moreover, this division, in turn, directly reflects the structural
transformation in the relationships of great and major powers in the
contemporary era. Precisely because the Soviet Union is so large (and
also because of the nuclearization of military capabilities) it can
effectively match an American rival with almost twice its GNP, and
overshadow major European and Japanese neighbours which are much more
developed in overall terms. Because it stands closer to the 'hump' of
industrialization and its leaders can call upon the political structures
and solidarist ideologies forged while surmounting that hump under
adverse conditions, they will probably be able to sustain the
disproportionate burden involved in maintaining great power status in
the intervening period before Soviet economic actuality truly begins
to reflect Soviet economic potential. For the duration of this power
transition, and of the associated power transitions of China and the
leading Third World powers, the conception of the states-system and
the world-economy as two interdependent but partly contradictory 'realms'
occupying the same geographical space will remain an indispensable one.

Third, it must be emphasized that, since economic interdependence
is not in itself constitutive of political order, the persistence of
reliably 'hardshelled' and self-centred states is a structural prerequisite
for the persistence not merely of the contemporary states-system but also
of the contemporary world-economy. If it were the case, as many
interdependence theorists imply, that the state was being 'slowly but
surely drained of its autonomy' as an actor in a world of states, then
the end result of this process (in a world of massive cleavages along
economic, racial, religious and ideological lines) would be not a Cobdenite
utopia of pacific free trade but a 'new mediaevalism' which, as Bull
suggests, would be likely to produce 'more ubiquitous and sustained
violence and insecurity than does the modern states-system'.

The quality which, for the purposes of this argument, makes for
a hardshelled state is one quality which is susceptible to empirical
testing, but only intermittently and on criteria much cruder than the often
favoured ones of 'sensitivity' and 'vulnerability' interdependence,
communication flows, and the like. The basic issue is patriotism, or
whether, in the last analysis, the nation will fight for the state as a
territorial and political entity (and also, for the major powers today, whether the relevant populations will continue to support defence postures involving the continuing risk of utter destruction to their civil societies). If states in general do remain hardshelled in this sense, then the system can be overthrown only by the physical destruction of its leading members or the successful imperialism of a dominant power (which may in future amount to much the same thing). If they do not - if, for instance, 'revolutionary defeatism' becomes a general phenomenon - then the states-system as such ceases to exist.

For the next decade or so, it seems safe to rule out any fundamental retreat from the use of coercive power by the great, and with it both the 'new mediaevalism' and the Cobdenite utopia (to say nothing of that perennial vision of world government which has enjoyed another resurgence in recent years). However, a much more plausible possibility is a modified version of the kind of intra-system imperialism, by assertive powers with only a tenuous sense of international society, exemplified in the history of early modern Europe. There would seem little reason for the great powers themselves to seek general territorial expansion (as opposed to the forcible control of specific supplies of important resources) in this period; but there is considerable reason to suppose that, given a general deterioration in the existing order, military expansionism would become a significant factor in areas (such as Africa) where national entities are as yet largely unformed. And among the great and major powers, such a deterioration could easily see an upsurge of mercantilist and ideological conflicts (with the second, perhaps, rationalizing the first), which were geographically overlapping rather than, as in the early modern era, largely confined to separate geographical arenas. For these reasons, therefore, I believe that the contradictions of contemporary 'global interdependence' and the prospects for accommodating them within established 'international regimes' should be placed against this wider historical background. In the remainder of this section I will briefly consider the evolution since the early modern period of two crucial relationships: between the states-system as framework for its constituent states and the state as framework for its constituent communities; and between the advance of the states-system and, running always before it, the advance of the modern world-economy.
The point made above about the crucial importance of patriotism to the operations of the states-system may be expressed more fully as follows: for stability of expectations in a context of 'power politics' it is necessary that ruling elites be able to 'deliver' their respective populations in military contests for reasons of state, and be able - and willing - to keep them out of military conflicts over ultimate values. It is often implied that this power politics pattern is the 'normal' condition of relations between states, from which 'revolutionary' eras of major ideological conflict constitute an unnatural departure: but, as Wight points out, this is not an historically-grounded inference but merely 'a statement of belief about the way international politics ought to go'.\textsuperscript{116} In terms of his 'long' history of the states-system (which encompasses the Reformation/Counter-Reformation era), he distinguishes three great periods of revolutionary power politics, roughly equal in time-span, collectively, to the three periods in which pursuit of reason of state has prevailed;\textsuperscript{*} and if one actually takes the embryonic system back to the early 15th century, as both Wight and Mattingly are at times inclined to do, the enormous upheaval of the Hussite rebellion in central Europe also comes into the picture.\textsuperscript{117} In each of these 'recurrent waves of international revolution', Wight observes, the prevalent aspect of international society has moved from that of a 'loose company of sovereign states' to that of a 'more organic unity' - but a 'unity sharply broken by a horizontal fracture', which transforms the balance of national and international loyalties and 'blurs the distinctions between war and peace, international war and civil war, war and revolution'.\textsuperscript{118}

Several important points may be made about such periods of international conflict over ultimate values. First, there has characteristically been a close association between the ideological conflict and the conscious imperial thrust of a temporarily dominant power; and such periods are sometimes characterized as a simple struggle between revolutionary forces, seeking to overthrow the system in general, and legitimist powers, seeking to defend it. But while this may be true of the conflict over the socio-political fabric of international society, the revolutionary challenge to the principles of the states-system is inherent in the nature of the conflict itself. The \textit{cuius regio} principle

\textsuperscript{*} Wight's suggested divisions are: non-revolutionary, 1492-1517, 1648-1792, 1871-1914; and revolutionary, 1517-1648, 1792-1871, 1914-60. He also suggests 1559 as an alternative date for the beginning of the first revolutionary period.
(in regard, each time, to a different manifestation of ultimate values) is effectively repudiated on both sides, and its reinstatement is primarily dependent on the conflict's being fought, or deterred, to a draw. The most serious challenge to the system, therefore, would be posed by the combination of an ideological sense of mission with preponderant national power; and in this respect the high Cold War period would seem to correspond more closely to the Hapsburg-Protestant struggle, where dominant power resided on the 'counter-revolutionary' side, than to the more commonly adduced example of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

Second, the most obvious reason why major movements for social transformation issue into international military conflicts is that this is the only means by which they can make their way in a social milieu encased in the concentric structures of state and states-system; and the more firmly consolidated state and states-system become, the more inevitable it becomes that those movements which do make their way will be attached in some fashion to the national goals of a major power. In the still embryonic power structure of the early 15th century, the radical wing of the Hussites in Bohemia maintained themselves for almost 15 years as an independent military force whose field armies defeated five crusades and ultimately 'threatened all the surrounding countries'. In the Reformation/Counter-Reformation era, the social revolts against the onset of landlordism and absolutism - as distinct from the religious struggles which served the political needs of the Protestant princes - were isolated and suppressed with relative ease. The organizational reforms of the French Revolution, and its mobilization of the 'nation in arms', fuelled a further imperial thrust under Napoleon by a French state which had long been the dominant continental power, but only after the revolution as a movement for extensive social reform had already suffered its own domestic Thermidorean reaction. In this century, the Soviet experiment existed in a state of intermittent siege from 1917 until, it might be argued, the early 1950s - a factor which must be accounted, along with the Tsarist inheritance and the aims and methods of the Bolsheviks, as an important cause of the extreme statism which has characterized the Soviet variety of 'real existing socialism'. And similarly intense international pressure was exerted upon China and Vietnam, with China being invested in sequence by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and Vietnam by both the
United States and China (in addition, of course, to the long rearguard action by the original colonial power - France). In the modern states system, and above all in its contemporary phase, it is possible to extend to far-reaching domestic change Carr's comment about change with an overtly international dimension:

Power used, threatened, or silently held in reserve, is an essential factor in international change; and change will, generally speaking, be effected only in the interests of those by whom or on whose behalf, power can be invoked. 84

Third, the issue is not solely one of the justice or unjustice of demands for domestic change, but also of the impact of massive social change upon the 'legitimacy', and ultimately the stability, of established regimes. Although the imperial challenge issuing from the French Revolution was itself defeated, Wight observes, the 'theoretical attack upon the foundations of international society' with which it was associated - the replacement of 'tradition by consent, prescription by national self-determination' - ultimately became 'the new orthodoxy' on questions of international legitimacy. Indeed, if the concept of a world-historical transition proposed here is a valid one, the continued efficiency of a states-system dependent upon the existence of reliably hard-shelled and self-centred states could only have been imperilled by the triumph of the whole-hearted legitimist policy of the Holy Alliance. And similarly, without in any sense endorsing the Soviet position on national liberation as the wave of the future, it is arguable that the Soviet Union, by making a space in the international order for the emergence of collectivist forms of socio-political organization, has actually enhanced the prospects for its further evolutionary development as a system of states.

To pronounce upon what might have happened without the Soviet role would be straining the claims of counter-factual analysis. But the historical record does not offer very much support to gradualist perspectives on this question, whether in regard to the American role since World War II or to that of the great powers of the 19th century European Concert. Wight himself appears to support a gradualist position in regard to the delaying role of the latter, arguing that because the 'second international revolution had been contained and long drawn out, it had not been so destructive as the first' (i.e. the Wars of Religion). 123 Commenting upon Burke's ability to recognize that the religious wars
had not dissolved, but merely introduced a degree of diversity into, international society, and his inability to recognize that a similar judgement might be applicable to the French revolutionary challenge, Wight warns of 'the danger of certain kind of historicism' in the assumption that Burke's intransigence was entirely inappropriate. A 'central paradox' of international society, he suggests, may be that the modification, rather than the dissolution, of its principles of legitimacy depends upon the existence of forces ready to fight against any change.124

It is, of course, part of the logic of this position that such modification would not occur at all in the absence of forces prepared, initially, to fight for total change. But furthermore, one's estimates of the costs of the 19th century delaying action against the movements for democracy and national self-determination must depend very substantially upon one's judgements about the relationship between this process and the great European upheavals of the early 20th century. Wight states a fairly representative Anglo-American position in his emphasis upon the Bolshevik revolution as an outstanding 'example of how personal force and doctrinal fanaticism can cut across the regularities of power politics', and in his argument that 'Communism evoked Fascism', with the two ideologies thereafter feeding on each other's hostility and polarizing international society.125 However, this interpretation would seem to overstate the independent contribution of the Soviet Union to the final breakdown of European international society, and to understate the contribution of those very forces of ancien régime persistence which had held in check the advance of liberalism during the 19th century. On balance, the more persuasive picture is that of Mayer, for whom the two world wars were 'umbilically tied' together as 'nothing less than the Thirty Years' War of the general crisis of the twentieth century', and were attributable above all to the persistence of a 'pan-European' ancien régime into the era of large scale capitalist industrialization by all major powers:

The Great War was an expression of the decline and fall of the old order fighting to prolong its life rather than of the explosive rise of industrial capitalism bent on imposing its primacy. Throughout Europe the strains of protracted warfare finally, as of 1917, shook and cracked the foundations of the embattled old order, which had been its incubator. Even
so, except in Russia, where the most unreconstructed of the old regimes came crashing down, after 1918-1919 the forces of perseverance recovered sufficiently to aggravate Europe's general crisis, sponsor fascism, and contribute to the resumption of total war in 1939.

The above comments on the question of the hardshelled state are concerned primarily with the development of 'mass' consciousness — with the attitude of various communities to nation and state, as opposed to religion, race or class, as militarily effective objects of loyalty. But the issue can also be stated in terms of 'prince' consciousness — in terms of the attitude of state managers to their relationships with their national communities, on the one hand, and with their colleagues in international society on the other hand. The latter issue, in turn, may be divided into two: the conception of a neutral or instrumental international order, involving shared norms about legitimate limits on national self-aggrandizement, and the substantive 'international culture' deriving from the states-system's origin as the legatee of the ecumenical civilization of mediaeval Europe.

I have already argued that a consensus upon legitimacy in Kissinger's sense is an inner (or logical) necessity of international relations only among great powers in a period of extended equipoise, that such a consensus has in practice obtained only for limited periods in the history of the European states-system, that where it has obtained it has been confined primarily to the dealings of the great among themselves, and, indeed, that such moderation as has been achieved among the great has depended in part upon the prospects for compensations at the expense of the weak, above all on the ever-expanding colonial frontier. This last point will be resumed below, in the discussion of the states-system/world-economy relationship. But it is also worth emphasizing here that during the most obvious period of formal great power cooperation — the Concert of Europe years, 1815-1854 — the moderation of the ruling elites in regard to one another was further buttressed by their common fear of revolutionary movements, whether liberal or nationalist or both, within their own societies. Admittedly, the attempt of the Holy Alliance powers to employ the Congress system for the active suppression of domestic change broke down, both because their own ideological solidarity was undercut by more immediate national interest considerations and because the British were
unwilling to be drawn into such a far-reaching interpretation of the
defence of the status quo. But as Carsten Holbroad points out, the
basic British position was not a liberal one, but a more circumscribed
form of conservatism; and until mid-century the great powers 'were
all ranged, if in varying degrees, against dissidence in their own
societies ... If they would rarely act together against revolution
because of their rivalries, they would never act against each other
for fear of encouraging revolution'.

In this sense, the European lower class filled the role of intra-
system 'barbarians' for the ruling elites of the Concert powers, serving,
as had the Turk in an earlier period, to moderate inter-elite conflicts.
Of course, after the general failure of the 1848 revolutions, the intense
fear of radical social upheaval went into a lengthy recession, and
nationalism was harnessed to conservative causes by politicians such as
Bismarck and Cavour. But even the constitutional advance of liberalism
and democracy, Mayer argues, was perceived by aristocratic state managers
as a fundamental threat in the longer term; and the resurgence of this
fear, in the 'latter-day aristocratic reaction' of the late 19th century,
was a potent factor fuelling the imperialist fever and the intense
national rivalries leading up to World War I.

Mayer's position - which identifies the 'over reaction of old elites'
to their exaggerated fears of capitalist modernization and popular ferment
as 'the inner spring of Europe's general crisis' - is a consciously
polemical one, which may in turn understate the genuinely destabilizing
impact of the new social forces. Moreover, it must be emphasized that it
was not merely because of a changed social environment that fear of the
masses no longer exercised a restraining influence upon great power
relations, but also because, from at least 1900 onwards, the balance
among the great powers was fundamentally disturbed in a way that it had
not been during the Concert period. However, Mayer is persuasive in his
insistence that 'the cult of war was an elite, not a plebeian affair'
which, while successfully communicated to substantial sections of the
middle and lower classes, did not arise as a 'spontaneous clamour ...
among the presumably aggressive and blood-thirsty masses'. Moreover,
since World War I, mass-based pacifism has become a significant factor
in the relations of the core powers of the states-system, initially
among the Western democracies of the interwar period, and now again among
Western European populations which see Europe as the one certain casualty of any head-on collision between the great powers.

This of course, leaves open the proposition that the Soviet Union, by virtue of its 'totalitarian' political organization, will be able, like the Axis powers, to exploit a one-sided abdication of military commitments on the part of the Western Powers. This proposition will be considered in later chapters; but for the moment I wish merely to emphasize the inadequacy of the view, advanced more or less strongly by writers such as Kissinger and Morgenthau, which establishes a link between the immoderation of contemporary world politics and the decline (usually antedated) of the aristocratic international society of the traditional system.133 No doubt the emergence of mass politics has imparted an overtly 'ideological' tone to the relationships of the great and major powers. But the more fundamental point is that those relationships have undergone structural transformations to which the practices of the traditional system and its central 'morality of consequences' provide no satisfactory answer. Above all, as Mayall points out, the enormous implications of nuclear war impose upon potential belligerents 'two conflicting demands': on the one hand, they must fight for 'limited political ends' which do not threaten the central nuclear balance; and on the other, they must fight only in defence, and not for self-aggrandizement, however ambiguous these concepts may be. 'Nowadays, it seems, states must fight only over fundamental questions, which they cannot safely do for the very reasons that were recognized in the Peace of Westphalia:132 and if they cannot actually fight over fundamental questions, state managers are inexorably driven, in their attempts to justify the existence of weapons whose use could be justified only on such grounds, to direct against the opposing side the fear and loathing which might otherwise be directed against the weapons themselves.

Similar considerations apply to the evolution of the substantive international culture underpinning the prudential norms of the modern states-system. As Hinsley points out, both Christendom and the early concept of Europe had a strong contra-barbarians element, and an ambivalent relationship to the concept of international order as such. On the one hand they clearly buttressed the consciousness of a single international society among the European states; but on the other, they looked back to the single world society of medieval Christendom, and provided a
natural reference point for would-be imperial powers proposing to restore Europe to its lost unity. In the 19th century, a more sophisticated conception developed which incorporated the operations of the states-system within a vision of Europe as a uniquely advanced unity-in-diversity. But this vision also carried a strong, albeit disguised, bias towards a particular kind of substantive world order, especially when filtered through the more pervasive pluralist assumptions of Anglo-American social and political theory. Ideas of this sort contributed one strand to the Social Darwinist ideologies which sanctioned the imperialist outburst of the late 19th century. And they also cast the 'semi-Asiatic' Tsarist empire in a distinctly ambiguous light, somewhere between the genuinely European members of international society and the Turk himself - a perspective which has been strongly revived in recent discussions of the Soviet 'bureaucratic police state' by Pipes and his colleagues of the hawk persuasion.

This issue is important because the Soviet rise to full great power status in the contemporary system has coincided with the formal incorporation within its political association of the multitude of Third World states. It is now plainly impossible for a European international culture to provide the cohesive influence which it provided in the traditional system, and the 'diplomatic culture' of the world's diplomatic elites, while obviously significant in its own sphere, is too narrow (and indeed too European) to fill the gap. If contemporary international society is to recover some of the coherence of its predecessor, it must draw upon social and political ideals which directly acknowledge the unprecedented interpenetration of states-system and world-economy in the contemporary era. 'Such a perspective', argues James Mayall,

is provided ... by what may be called without undue exaggeration, the imperative of modernization ...

This new world view involves a set of shared positions and aspirations, which regulate or at least support participation in international society. They include a rather specialised notion of national self-determination as the basis of legitimate authority; a secular and materialist approach to social and economic affairs; a belief in and a desire for technological advance, and an ethical position which is, notionally at any rate, egalitarian.

I have already expressed the view that the modernization imperative
is an imperative for at least the strategically placed Third World states upon which the argument of this thesis is focussed. Nonetheless, it is difficult, after recent developments in Iran and elsewhere, to fully accept Mayall's contention that 'this myth of the modern industrial state transcends even quite deep ideological differences', along both East-West and North-South lines, 'about the route to be taken to the earthly paradise'. 136 It is therefore significant that the growing evidence in recent years of fundamental hostility to Northern modes of development by influential forces in the Third World should have coincided with a resurgence of Soviet-American conflict over world order issues; and that the initiative in this resurgence has lain primarily on the American side, where exaggerated expectations of Soviet convergence in the 1960s and early 1970s have given way to an equally exaggerated characterization of the Soviet social order and the Soviet world view as atavistic survivals from a reactionary and imperialist past.

This is a difficult and contentious question, and the above judgement is directed less towards the concrete foreign policies of the great powers - for both have been notably opportunistic, if in a rather floundering fashion, in their responses to the growth of forces such as 'political Islam' - than to the direct ideological struggle between them, and its role in the legitimation of their respective defence postures. In this regard, a fine but important distinction can be drawn between the Soviet and American positions, along the lines of Waltz's distinction between second and third image explanations of international aggression. Soviet apologists, though very strong on the aggressiveness of American policy, have characteristically related this not to national characteristics but to the structural factors of capitalism and imperialism; and, as will be indicated in Chapter 6, the last decade has seen a growing flirtation with the none-too-Leninist notion that a capitalist United States, properly contained, might be indefinitely divested of its worst imperialist characteristics. By contrast, the view of the Soviet order as Tsarism writ large is a classic second image one, in that it identifies the Soviet Union as a special, maladjusted kind of state, with which stable coexistence is effectively impossible, and whose world order claims are no more than the latest rationalization of the ongoing alienation of a power permanently incapable of adjusting to the development of modern history.
We may now turn to the second important relationship mentioned above, between the advancing states-system and the advancing world-economy of the modern era. One strand of thinking on this relationship may be dismissed at the outset - that which construes the military and political expansion of the Western nations as essentially a reflection of the innate expansionist dynamic of the developing capitalist economy. Not even the 'informal imperialism' of 19th century Britain or the 20th century United States can be satisfactorily explained without reference to the idiosyncratic goals of the relevant state managers; and, conversely, none of the postulated structural imperatives of capitalism - such as Lenin's emphasis upon the drive towards the export of surplus capital - can be convincingly reconciled with the record of the advanced capitalist societies in the post-colonial era. However, this does not dispose of the link between capitalism and imperialism. It does not provide 'much solace', Pettman notes, to be told that capitalists do not have to behave in exploitative ways, that they simply prefer to do so, like 'water seeking its own level ... [looking] out the paths of least resistance to profit - the most lucrative markets and investment opportunities, the least costly source of raw materials'. The line of least resistance (and maximum return) drawn across the last four hundred years by sharp capitalist practice may still lead to the inequalities apparent today.

Indeed, the argument can be made in rather stronger terms than this. Ultimately, it is 'real existing capitalism', like 'real existing socialism', whose characteristics are crucial to this analysis; and if those who seek to establish the imperialist dimensions of capitalism cannot legitimately appeal to the inner dynamics of a reified capitalist 'system', neither is this recourse open to those who would argue that capitalism, in its 'pure' form, has no connection with imperialism. Modern capitalism is the social order which has been developed in and promulgated by the leading capitalist states of the modern era. And even in the case of Britain, which, as the first industrializing state, inevitably came at the process in a substantially laissez-faire fashion, the contribution of the state, and of the empire carved with the aid of the state, was crucial.
Of course, in Britain's own case, mercantilism did give way in time to a golden age of domestic *laissez-faire* and of primarily 'informal' empire; and her economic predominance, combined with her partial detachment from the European balance of power, made possible a quarter-century period, roughly from 1848 to 1873, in which free trade 'became sovereign in the political economy of European and world capitalism ... a brief parenthesis in the persistent reality of government regulation of economic life'. But this period, Hobsbawm argues, was an essentially transitional one, 'when both developed and underdeveloped sectors of the world had an equal interest in working with and not against the British economy, or when they had no choice in the matter ...'. And one crucial underdeveloped sector which had no choice in the matter was India, 'the only part of the British Empire to which *laissez-faire* never applied', and a 'gold-mine' so vital to the empire's overall payments pattern 'that a great part of British foreign and military or naval policy was designed essentially to maintain safe control of it'.

The Indian situation was merely an extreme example of the fundamental importance of naval power to Britain's wider imperialism of free trade. In its dealings with the underdeveloped world, notes Hobsbawm, British industry 'in a sense ... expanded into an international vacuum, though parts of it were empty because they had been cleared by the activities of the British navy, and were kept empty because rival trading powers were unable to leap across the British-controlled high seas'. This British hegemony, of course, did not survive the challenges from other rising industrial powers. But an impressively similar general pattern appeared in the next major interlude of international free trade, inaugurated by the global preponderance of the United States in the generation following World War II. The relationship between the strategic reach of the American state and American economic expansion has been succinctly summarized by Huntington:

... the power of the United States government in world politics, and its interests in developing a system of alliances with other governments against the Soviet Union, China, and communism, produced the political condition which made the rise of transnationalism possible. Western Europe, Latin America, East Asia and much of South
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa fell within what was euphemistically referred to as 'the Free World', and what was in fact a security zone. The governments within this zone found it in their interest: (a) to accept an explicit or implicit guarantee by Washington of the independence of their country and, in some cases, of the authority of their government; and (b) to permit access to their territory by a variety of U.S. governmental or non-governmental organizations pursuing goals which those organizations considered important. 142

The link between preponderant power and relatively free trade is no accident. 143 If one looks to the traditional states-system for practices designed to regulate military competition in the peripheral regions of the world-economy, it is difficult to find anything other than a tentative agreement to insulate struggles in this region from the balance in the core. Some writers, indeed, have depicted the advance of the states-system as a simple expansion into a 'periphery of politically empty spaces'. 144 Wight has contested this 'orthodox answer', arguing that the states-system had, from the outset, a 'dual' or 'stereoscopic' aspect, involving 'two concentric circles, European and universal'. 145 However, though he notes the tentative attempts by various European theorists to assert the natural law rights of infidels and barbarians, and the intermittent tendency of European sovereigns to treat on equal terms with formidable outsiders like the Turks, he suggests that the 'more regular and important' expression in diplomatic practice of the dual character of the states-system was the distinction between paix maritimes and paix continentales - most formally associated with the wars of the 18th century, but effectively dating back to the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559. On this occasion, France and Spain needed to safeguard their European peace from their continued conflict in the Americas, and settled on 'a verbal arrangement, which formed no part of the treaty', to establish a geographical line beyond which 'acts of hostility would not violate the treaty nor constitute grounds for complaint, and whoever was strongest would pass for master'. This concept of 'the "amity lines", which divided the zone of peace from the zone of war', was increasingly appealed to by other powers, especially England.
Its original meaning was negative and concessive; it acquired a new interpretation, positive and permissive. 'No peace beyond the line' became almost a rule of international law, giving freedom to plunder, attack and settle without upsetting the peace of Europe. Its original application, moreover was to the West Indies, the realm of those whom Lorimer was to designate as savages; but it was soon extended to the East Indies, where the great European companies circled round the kingdoms of the barbarians. 146

But what if there are no barbarians? The implications of the closure of the colonial frontier - which loomed large in the thinking of both Lenin and German geopoliticians - have unfolded in stages throughout the century: the belated abandonment by the democracies of the Hoare-Laval proposal on the 1936 Abyssinian crisis (a quite reasonable 'compensations' measure by the canons of traditional great power practice); the decolonization process, which produced the phenomenon of an intra-system periphery of formally equal new states; the Suez crisis, which demonstrated the limits upon independent interventionist action by major powers below the rank of the great; and the further prospect, with the emergence of Soviet-American parity in the late 1960s, that outright intervention even by the great powers, clearly outside their respective spheres of influence, could be attended by unacceptable political costs. Wight himself comments (writing in 1971) that 'the amity lines have reappeared' in the Soviet-American contest, one of whose 'unwritten understandings ... has been that the peace of Europe shall be warily preserved while the struggle is pursued for influence and position throughout the Third World'; 147 and I will be suggesting in Chapter 6 that the Soviet detente offensive, developed after the 1971 Twenty-Fourth Congress, incorporated some notion along these lines. However, the vehemence of the American response to Soviet assertiveness in the Afro-Asian 'arc of instability' - culminating in the extravagant claims made about the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - indicates rather that the general insulation of the central balance from Third World conflicts before the 1970s should be attributed primarily to the existence of an American global preponderance which the Soviet Union was initially in no position to challenge. In the event, the development of 'rules of the game' in respect to the Third World contest was one of the more conspicuous omissions
from the rapprochement of the great powers even during the high detente years, and the problem was carried through into an era in which not merely the tensions between the great but also the contradictions in the Third World have again been thrown sharply into relief. Some considerations on this issue will conclude the chapter.

Transition and Detente

A detente is a relaxation of tensions. An international detente is a relaxation of tensions between states. It should therefore be possible to reject at the outset the complaint sometimes voiced in the American debate that the Soviets offer no serious theoretical account of the substance of detente, elaborating instead on the dialectic of conflict and cooperation which, in their lexicon, constitutes Peaceful Coexistence. The concept of detente, like that of deterrence, involves little more than the definition of a situation; and there is, therefore, very little theoretical to be said about the substance of detente as such, though there is a good deal to be said about the kind of framework of interstate coexistence in which an extended relaxation of tensions among leading powers might be expected to develop.

Second, it should also be possible to dismiss a much more persistent American criticism which is one basic strand of the overall hawk case: that Soviet attempts to 'compartmentalize' detente, restricting it solely to the sphere of interstate relations, render the concept meaningless except as an instrument of propaganda. Thus Theodore Draper likens 'detente' to 'appeasement' as a 'perfectly good word ... made unusable because it had been perverted in practice', attacking the 'schizoid' attempts to distinguish between spheres of interstate and intra-state relations, or between elements of conflict and cooperation in the former sphere, as 'semantic games' which 'are hopelessly muddling and are contaminating all discourse on world affairs today'. However, this position reproduces in regard to the specific issue of detente the general error involved in extending the idea of an international system to embrace the whole of world politics. I certainly do not mean to endorse completely the official Soviet position on the distinction between interstate and intra-state relations, which is undoubtedly self-serving and often contradictory.
But it follows from all the previous argument about the logic and traditional practices of the states-system that, in a conflict-ridden international environment such as the present one, the prospect for a significant detente between the great powers must rest in large part upon their ability to distinguish a limited range of their interactions as states over which they can agree to cooperate despite extensive conflicts on other issues.

One important qualification should be made to this characterization of detente as an essentially tautological concept. An international detente is a relaxation of tensions without war; and a generalized detente among the leading powers of the system - as opposed, for instance, to the periods of relaxation among the powers of the European concert which followed the Napoleonic Wars and the Prussian wars with Austria and France - would be an unusual achievement. But such a detente was widely envisaged in the early 1970s; and, moreover, it was held to reflect the successful negotiation of a period of structural transformation which would, in the previous history of the system, probably have occasioned a major war. Indeed, it seems useful to adopt Alistair Buchan's description of this process - 'change without war' - as a touchstone for evaluating 'the detente' between the Warsaw and Nato alliances in general, and the Soviet Union and the United States in particular. But the argument here is that the most striking external manifestations of change in the early 1970s - the Soviet Union's emergence as a true global power and the new assertiveness of leading Third World states in their dealings with the developed world - were the reflection of a more fundamental realignment in the underlying structures of world politics which had been largely completed by the late 1950s and which, reaching back as it did to the turn of the century, had itself involved two world conflicts of unprecedented scale. Moreover, until the late 1960s the primary American response to the rise of Soviet power, and to the threat of Soviet/Communist gains in the Third World, was one of political and military containment; and the new Soviet military assertiveness in the Afro-Asian region, coming on top of the 1973 Middle East war and the associated oil crisis, would seem to be the largest single factor behind the rapid souring in the approach to detente of successive United States administrations from 1975 onward. The basic contention, therefore, still stands. The detente, to date, has been not the basic framework of change, but rather
a particular, and possibly transient reflection, in the relations of the leading powers, of a basic, long-developing, and often violent change of framework.

If it is not very useful to attempt to theorize the substance of detente as a relationship between the great powers, one might focus instead upon the substance of detente policies pursued by one or other of the great powers. Such an approach is adopted by Coral Bell. She defines detente as 'a mode of management of adversary power', and attempts to establish the factors which led, after 1969, to a shift from cold war to detente as 'the dominant mode or strategy of managing adversary relations in the central balance' - with special emphasis upon an American strategy, developed by Kissinger, which sought to employ a two-pronged detente offensive to maximize American flexibility in the developing triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and China.150

The question of concrete detente policies is obviously an important one, and will be one consideration in the later discussion of the evolution of Soviet doctrine in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. But it would not be satisfactory as a primary focus for the argument developed here. On the one hand, overt policy positions on this question - especially on the American side - have fluctuated widely over the last decade, with both great powers reacting not merely to established capabilities and behaviour, but to imputed intentions and imputed future behaviour on the part of the adversary. On the other hand, I would argue, a preoccupation with the shifting surface of policy tends to distract attention from the underlying continuity of both the broad material situation and the broad world views of the respective leaderships - including, on the American side, the successive administrations from Nixon to Reagan. For these reasons, therefore, it seems more useful to relate the issue of detente to the broad structural concerns of this chapter as a whole, asking to what extent the altered material framework of contemporary world politics might be expected to create a mutual interest in extended detente between the great powers, and to what extent perceptions of such an interest might be modified by dominant conceptual frameworks in either case.
I have already suggested that contemporary world politics may usefully be considered in terms of a material grid with four major components: the abstract structure of military power; the structure of geopolitics; the abstract structure of economic power; and the structure of differential stages of development. As regards the first, the argument here is that the global power configuration remains essentially bipolar, although the great regional strength of China and the growing conventional power of Japan have clearly established a multiple balance in the East Asian region, and the emergence of a United Europe would create a multiple balance on a world scale. In addition, the bipolar balance of the post-World War II era has been much more stable than the multiple balance of the preceding fifty years; and the Soviet-American relationship itself is now more symmetrical than it was during the first post-war generation. It may therefore be stated that the 1970s, when the themes of emerging multipolarity and emerging Soviet preponderance vied for prominence in much of the American debate, actually saw the maturation of a bipolar configuration which had already provided the longest period of stable great power relations in this century.

These structural considerations help to clarify what might otherwise seem an anomalous notion: that of extended, generalized detente at the great power level. Both sides have invoked such a concept during the more optimistic years of the 1970s detente, with the Soviet authorities speaking of there being 'no alternative' to detente, and of making detente 'irreversible', and with Nixon and Kissinger speaking in rather similar terms about their proposed 'stable structure of peace'. In a situation of multiple balance, such statements would be questionable. In such situations, detente is probably best thought of as a transitional stage in relations between powers, which might either lead on to entente and perhaps to informal or formal alliance, - as did the Anglo-French detente on colonial issues in the early 1900s - or else give way to a renewed period of heightened tension and perhaps, ultimately, to open conflict. However, this is not obviously true of a bipolar context, for it is part of the logic of such a situation that the great power relationship should also be, in Arnold Wolfers' words, 'the relationship of major tension'. It would normally require a large measure of
ideological solidarity - such as plainly does not obtain in the Soviet-American case - to truly override such tension; and if such solidarity did obtain, the resulting entente between the great powers would bid fair to become a condominium of the great vis-a-vis the rest of international society - which might well seem from the latter perspective an even more nakedly hierarchical arrangement than that of a concert among the great powers of a multiple balance.\textsuperscript{153}

Thus the view, sometimes encountered in the American debate, that a relaxation of tensions can have no lasting significance if it does not lead on to genuinely cordial relations ignores the special qualities of a bipolar configuration of power. On the other hand, it is also incorrect to suggest that there is no alternative (other than war itself) to an extended detente between the great powers. This is an alternative, which arguably has been more common in the historical record: namely, extended cold war. However, it is still reasonable to regard cold war as an unsatisfactory and perilous solution to the Soviet-American relationship in the period immediately ahead of us. In the first place, major cold wars of the past, such as 20 years' struggle between Elizabethan England and the Spain of Philip II, have characteristically ended in full scale conflict. Second, in the geographically circumscribed context of the traditional European system, direct military clashes 'beyond the line' could be insulated for lengthy periods from the struggle in the core - an option which is effectively unavailable to the great powers today. Third, cold war in a bipolar situation places a premium upon arms racing (since the opportunities for improving one's position through alliance movements are necessarily limited); and an indefinite arms race in the present context, complicated by the problems of continuous innovation in weapons systems and of the major disparities in the economic situation of the great powers, must be regarded as increasing the overall danger of war.

As regards the structure of geopolitics, it is possible to distinguish two different kinds of problem. The first is the relatively special one, which has none the less received considerable attention in Anglo-American international theory, of the relationship between the leading sea power and the leading land power of any given era. I will leave this question to the general discussion of balance in the next chapter, merely noting here that perspectives which accord to the United States the kind of
'balancer' role often attributed to Britain in the 19th century system are highly questionable in regard to the 'closed', global system of the contemporary era. The second, more general issue is often discussed in terms of mechanistic analogies about 'power vacuums', but may usefully be conceptualized here in terms of the simple question whether the international environment, in a given era, is relatively 'empty' or relatively 'full'.

It is a fairly commonsense proposition that a relatively empty power environment should allow scope for the protagonists to a conflict to disengage, if they have the political will, and to redirect their energies in alternative directions. This is perhaps most obvious in the relations of large world-empires in the pre-modern era. 'The relations between the Roman Empire and the Persian empire in its successive manifestations', Wight observes, alternated between periods of 'mortal conflict' and 'periods of high mutual esteem'. Similarly the lengthy struggles between Egyptians and Hittites during the 14th and 13th centuries B.C. were terminated in 1272 B.C. by a treaty of peace and friendship which appears to have held good for around fifty years, and which, Holbraad suggests, constitutes one of the earliest identifiable examples of a great power condominium.\textsuperscript{154}

Of course, these are not examples of detente as defined here, but rather of the succession of periods of amity and cooperation upon periods of exhausting war. But more to the immediate point, such lengthy periods of relative disengagement were possible because the 'worlds' in question were not integrated within the framework of a single states-system, and the physical space between them, at the prevailing levels of technology and political organization, could in any case not be 'filled' with contending forces on a permanent basis. Admittedly, the Egyptian-Hittite relationship represented a transitional situation in this respect. 'The revolution in communications' of the late second millennium, Wight argues, went some considerable distance towards integrating these two worlds, together with the lesser ones of Babylonia and Crete, producing 'a virtually unique example of ... a secondary states-system, that is to say, one whose members are themselves not unitary sovereign states, but complex empires or suzerain state-systems'.\textsuperscript{155} However, this shadowy entity was relatively soon overthrown by the further manifestation of the very forces which had initially brought it into being, as its various worlds
were more completely integrated into the expanding Assyrian world-empire. The point is that, in the longer term, space has normally encouraged expansion rather than the conscious limitations of goals, and that, with the advance of military technology and military organization, empty worlds have consistently been filled up. This process reached its apogee in the imperialist outburst which laid the foundations for the contemporary global system. The existence of so much room for manoeuvre might allow room for individual detentes between specific powers - as when France and England subordinated their colonial rivalries to their greater fear of Germany. But the overall dynamic of the new imperialism was towards a heightening of the tensions leading to World War I.

It is possible to identify more plausible examples of conscious political initiative towards relaxation of tension, within the framework of a developing states-system, in situations where the international environment might be perceived as uncomfortably full. I have already noted Hinsley's argument that the 'modern career' of the states-system, based on a conscious commitment to coexistence as opposed to intra-system imperialism, originated in the response to the evident dangers of untrammelled raison d'etat in the conflicts of the 18th century great powers - dangers highlighted by the successive partitions of Poland, which ultimately removed this buffer between Austria, Prussia and Russia totally from the European power equation. Similarly, there was a revival of the practices of the European Concert in the 1870s, after the wars of the previous decade had created two new great powers, Italy and Germany, in the heart of Europe.156

Once again, these developments were not 'pure' examples of detente, in that they each represented the accommodation of political leaders to an altered structure of power established by central war; and as the stability of these structures was eroded over time - primarily by internal developments within France, in the former case, and Germany, in the latter - they gave way to renewed tensions and war. But the post-1870 period also demonstrates how, in periods of rapid fluctuation in the relative power of states, the perception of a crowded international environment can provoke an aggressive imperialism, as well as a moderate commitment to coexistence. For within a generation, the German leadership was turning away from Bismarck's concern with the legitimation of the new European distribution of power towards a preoccupation with the prospect
of a crowded international environment on a global scale. This concern with the structure of the emerging global system eventually issued in a project 'to weld together in the heart of Europe the core of a German-dominated empire strong enough to compete on terms of equality with the other great world powers of the time, imperial Russia, the United States, and the British empire' - a project which was spelled out in the secret war aims of Imperial Germany and openly proclaimed as a centrepiece of Nazi ideology.157

In summary, then, a substantial relaxation of tensions within an integrated structure of great powers is likely to require that each party be aware of considerable pressures, emanating from the others, for it to moderate its own ambitions, but at the same time feel that it is not being driven into a corner. Furthermore, extended periods of moderate 'power politics' are most likely where the leading powers are operating within the kind of stable framework established by a decisive war: a generalized and extended detente, growing out of a major period of 'change without war', would be a rare achievement (though perhaps an essential one in the contemporary international situation). On both these grounds, it is arguable that the optimum time for a generalized detente in the post-war period - and a major lost opportunity in this respect - was in the middle 1950s. On the one hand, the broad geopolitical skeleton of post-war world politics had by then been clearly established: in East Asia with the consolidation of communist power in China, the economic revival of a capitalist Japan, and the stalemate in Korea; in Europe with the de facto division of Germany, the neutralization of Austria and Finland, and the effective demonstration that American rhetoric about the 'liberation' of Eastern Europe was merely rhetoric. Some of these developments were unsatisfactory to the United States, which was arguably rather more revisionist than the Soviet Union in regard to the core elements of the de facto World War II settlement. But that settlement itself, as Hinsley suggests, had a structural significance similar to that of Westphalia or Vienna:

Unlike the inescapably artificial settlement of 1918 - a settlement which was made at the point in the period of transformation when international instability was at its height, and which made the instability all the greater by trying to shape the world to the wishful thinking of its makers - that
Of 1945 was made when the disparities previously set up by the uneven development of power and of the modern state were at last being brought to an end, at least for a long time to come, by the passage of time. It may even be said that it made itself, so much is it the case that its most solid parts are those which have not been ratified.

On the other hand, the middle 1950s were also a unique time in which the international environment could be perceived as both dangerously full and comfortably empty. Once the Soviet Union had established a credible nuclear capability against the North American continent, the two great powers were locked into a situation in which any direct conflict between them involved the possibility of destruction on an unprecedented scale for each. But they had, nonetheless, an option for physical disengagement never possessed by their European predecessors (with the partial exception of Britain); and the liquidation of the European colonial empires was producing over much of the globe a relatively empty world of new states which in themselves offered no pressing challenge to the existing power structure. Moreover, insofar as this region was already overshadowed by power projected from the core, that power was projected by the United States itself and by a still formidable Britain and France. However, over the next decade, the United States raised its military arsenal, both nuclear and conventional, to new heights of power and sophistication; and extended its global reach to a stage which saw the deployment of half a million troops in a region—Indochina—which on any concrete geopolitical or economic grounds appeared peripheral to American interests. Of course, this was not simply a calculated strategy of escalation on the part of American leaders. They were responding to Khrushchev's early 'rocket rattling', to his adventurist initiatives on Berlin and Cuba, and to a doctrine of national liberation which they interpreted as a global challenge to 'stability' in the non-communist world. But the fact remains that the United States took the initiative in raising the global contest to a higher plane, and that when a comprehensive great power detente was attempted, it was attempted in a global environment 'crowded' not merely by the global reach of the United States and the Soviet Union, but also by the rise of China and of other aspirants for regional hegemony.

The other two elements of the world political grid mentioned above—the abstract structure of economic power and the structure of differential
stages of development - may be taken together here. I have already suggested that the Soviet Union does not have an interest in the preservation of the present distribution of economic power at all commensurate with its interest in the present distribution of military power. This statement requires some qualification. It is hard to believe that the Soviets would seriously welcome the prospect of a major depression among the core capitalist states - not least because they may suspect that a movement towards fascism, rather than towards revolutionary socialism, would be the more likely response to such a development in key societies such as the United States and Germany. And even in regard to the Third World, the Soviet Union's posture has changed with its own internal development and its growth as a world power. In the last decade or so, to use Richard Lowenthal's term, it has increasingly appeared less as an anti-imperialist than as a 'counter-imperialist' power, concerned not merely with 'winning political or ideological influence in the Third World, but [with] strengthening the Soviet bloc's economic basis and [with] reducing the West's economic superiority' - a strategy which has involved a campaign for closer economic ties with neighbouring Western clients such as Iran (under the Shah) and Turkey, as well as with 'socialist oriented' states such as Syria, Iraq and Algeria.160

However, the basic asymmetry of interest remains, and in the original detente policies of the Nixon administration there was a direct acknowledgement of the desirability of shaping American economic contacts with the Soviet Union so as to offset this. American leaders spoke of building up 'in both countries a vested economic interest in the maintenance of an harmonious and enduring relationship', or, more baldly, of using economic ties as 'a tool to bring about or to reinforce a more moderate orientation of [Soviet] foreign policy, and to provide incentives for responsible international behaviour'.161 And though the implicit liberal optimism about the pacific implications of economic interdependence (with its similarity to the expectations often held for great power relations before World War I) might well be questioned,162 the basic strategy indicated in such statements was a logical corollary to the Nixon doctrine. In the era of post-Vietnam retrenchment, the United States was increasingly impelled towards a strategy of indirect 'management' in the Third World through the co-option of prominent regional powers. This was the continuing reality behind Kissinger's belated adoption of the rhetoric of global interdependence after the 1973 oil crisis; and it could hardly
be expected that the Soviet Union would consent to play by the rules of this American designed game unless it, too, was co-opted by major economic incentives specifically tailored towards that end.

However, the post-Vietnam atmosphere also made this proposition a very difficult one to effectively 'sell' in the American political debate. From the Angola crisis (and indeed from the 1973 Middle East War) onwards, a chorus of dissent swelled against the policy of expanding economic ties, while from the Soviet viewpoint the promise of this relationship had been compromised from the outset by the American Congress's action, through the Jackson-Vanik amendment, in tying MFN status to changes in Soviet domestic policy. Moreover, although the Nixon administration had strongly denied that it was contemplating technology transfers of a kind that would be damaging to American security, its opponents attacked in much more general terms, suggesting that the United States, by offsetting Soviet inefficiency in crucial areas such as agriculture and advanced technology, was assisting the Soviet regime to circumvent an otherwise essential reform of an economic order which channelled a great proportion of resources into defence and defence-related industries. With the growing perception of Soviet military adventurism in the Third World, this view rapidly gathered strength, and it had effectively triumphed with the Carter administration's new restrictions on sensitive technologies even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

As was noted in Chapter 1, the plausibility of this general argument was substantially dependent on two specific CIA assessments: one of which, the drastically upgraded estimate of the Soviet 'defence burden', has remained highly controversial; and the other of which, the prediction that a decline in domestic oil production would make the Soviet Union a net oil importer by the mid 1980s, was finally reversed by the CIA itself in early 1981. More generally, it appeared to involve the assumption that the Soviet Union's economic weakness vis-à-vis the United States was not merely a reflection of an earlier stage of economic development, but rather the reflection of fundamental flaws in the Soviet economy which could not be rectified without the effective dismantling of the prevailing social and political order. The Soviet requirement for advanced Western technology was seen not as an instance of the pattern to which the major industrial societies, such as the United States, had all conformed at an earlier stage of their development, but rather as a
confirmation of a sustained Soviet incapacity for innovation in this area; and the general sluggishness of the Soviet economy after 1973 and the consequent setbacks to a decade or more of impressive improvement in general Soviet living standards were taken as a further confirmation of this thesis – although this period had produced a deep ongoing malaise in the leading capitalist economies as well. These judgements, together with the perception that the Soviet Union faced an early fundamental challenge from China, and that it had very few assets in its dealings with the Third World other than raw military power and the will to use it, all dovetailed to produce the notion – to which Kissinger himself subscribed after leaving office – of a 'window of opportunity', in which the Soviet leaders may be attracted towards an aggressive military posture in order to exploit a fortuitous, and transient, period of superiority and momentum over an intrinsically stronger but temporarily lethargic West.

However, if one takes the line adopted here – that Soviet economic problems, while deep-seated, are not crippling, that a truly independent Chinese challenge to the Soviet position is a matter for the longer term, and that there are autonomous forces in the Third World working towards a further erosion of the formerly hegemonic American position, even if they do not promise any substantial direct access of strength to the 'socialist camp' – one will see Soviet interests – even on the most simple calculations of realpolitik – as best served by a relatively moderate military profile over the next decade. Not only would an aggressive military posture be likely to provoke an extremely strong response from the United States, given the record of American responses to much more ambivalent challenges in the past; it would also be calculated to weld together the other major industrial powers and China in that anti-Soviet 'strategic consensus' which is an avowed objective of current American policy. By contrast, a lower Soviet profile would allow free play to the unmistakeable divisions between the advanced capitalist societies over their 'Trilateral' relations, North-South issues in general, and policy towards West Asia and Africa in particular; while at the same time maximizing the prospects for involving the Europeans and Japanese in the development of the Soviet Union's enormous resource base, thereby building up Soviet strength in the longer term. Finally, it seems clear that the Soviet authorities have an objective economic
interest in containing the economic burden of armaments, which is at least comparable to that on the American side. Whatever the true cost to the economy of the Soviet military establishment, it must be proportionately much higher than the comparable American figure; and though the Soviet authorities have demonstrated their willingness to impose this cost over a lengthy period in order to match the United States militarily, there are obvious adverse social implications of this which have received increasingly open Soviet acknowledgement. Only if one takes the position that the domestic stability of the Soviet regime would be directly threatened by the diversion of resources away from the military and heavy industry and into the consumer sector - a position which rests essentially upon an unreconstructed 'totalitarian model' of the Soviet social order - can one reject outright the notion of a Soviet interest in detente as a means of containing the burden of the arms race.

These points will be developed further in Chapters 4 and 6. However, I should like to conclude this discussion with some brief remarks on the possible impact of broad world views upon American and Soviet perceptions of their 'objective' interests as sketched here. The basic proposition is that an extended detente might be combined with major great power disagreement on world order questions if each side believed that a stalemate in the 'short term' (especially in the area of direct military interaction) was compatible with the victory of its own preferred world order in the longer term. Both the Soviet and American regimes do formally claim that they believe this; but the Soviet position, on balance, seems more consistent. It is grounded, via a doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence, in a working theory of history which emphasizes long-term struggle for the world-economy, (and, more generally, in a centuries long Russian tradition of 'catching up' with the West); and it has remained remarkably consistent since 1956. The American position is more ad hoc, and has exhibited great fluctuation on the question of the world-economy. In particular, the high detente period in the American political debate was closely associated with the proliferation of pacific expectations about
interdependence, which gave way in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis to a new emphasis on security of supply for key resources. Economic questions suddenly shifted from the realm of the longer term, in which they were viewed through deterministic liberal assumptions about harmony of interests, to become short-term political issues which increasingly appeared as the most pressing sources of likely great power conflict.

These developments were in part a manifestation of the paradox discussed in previous chapters; that precisely because of its empiricist repudiation of the notion of deep structures mainstream American thinking inclines, in one way or another, to subsume all significant aspects of contemporary world politics within a single international (or world) 'system' - making it very difficult to accept the notion of separate spheres of conflict and cooperation in the great power relationship, or to contemplate that analytical separation of world political tempos which becomes increasingly important as the tempos themselves become increasingly intertwined. By contrast, the Soviet preoccupation with the interconnectedness of everything, being combined with a preoccupation with structure and contradiction, in practice focusses attention on these separate spheres and tempos in a fashion which must appear illegitimate from an American perspective.

The Soviet approach will, of course, be discussed in detail in Part III. However, we may briefly note here its continued attention to the fourfold concern which Albert Meyer depicts as the essence of Leninist analysis: 'long range strategy, short range strategy, concrete analysis of the current moment, and abstract theory'. Moreover, such an analytical predisposition does not necessarily imply a predisposition towards unwonted expectations of revolutionary advance. Lenin also analysed phenomena such as capitalist 'stabilization' in this manner; and Soviet analysts of the contemporary correlation of forces must accommodate a Soviet great power stake in the transition period quite beyond Lenin's own terms of reference. Thus, for example, a decision between a cautious or activist approach to a particular Third World conflict might invoke a wide variety of goals and related tempos; the world wide triumph of Communism; the setting of ever more countries securely on the non-capitalist road; the erosion of the stability of the imperialist edifice through the piecemeal removal of its 'neo-colonialist' underpinnings; the establishment of a bandwagon effect among the uncommitted, by building a reputation for effective and reliable political and military support - for backing, or perhaps for creating, fewer Kerenskys than the opposition;
and the consolidation of the position of - in Gromyko's authentically 19th century formulation - 'a major world power [with] widely developed international ties, which cannot remain indifferent even towards events which might be territorially remote but which affect our security and the security of our friends'. It seems fair to assume that day to day considerations would concentrate at the latter (raison d'etat) end of this spectrum. But the point is that both detente and competitive, intra-system imperialism reside in this region, the distinction between the two being primarily determined by the degree of genuine balance within the system, and the degree of genuine international society supporting it.

Finally, the Soviet line on the recent detente has involved not a rejection of the whole idea of international society, but rather an insistence that it can be built only from the inside out, with currently possible agreements, based on relatively clear mutual interest, not being tied to developments in areas where possibilities for early agreement are minimal. This position accords with the general perspective on the history of the states-system developed in this chapter. But even the core question of what would constitute a mutually acceptable relationship of balance and deterrence has in practice occasioned major contention between the great powers. This question will form the centrepiece of the next chapter.
Notes


3 Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History, pp.9-42.

4 Ibid, p.16.


6 Once again, Morgenthau provides a particularly prominent example of this inclination. See Politics Among Nations, pp.97-105, 241-9.

7 For a related, though not exactly similar, discussion of the problems of interpreting 'the transition', see Gellner, Thought and Change, pp.139-44.


10 Ibid. A similar point is made by Tom Nairn, in his discussion of the 'modern Janus' of nationalism. 'Uneven development', Nairn maintains, 'is a dialectic. The two sides involved continuously modify each other'. The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, New Left Books, London, 1977, p.344.


12 Hinsley, 'The Impact of Nationalism', pp.188-191.


For a good discussion of the inadequacy of this type of analysis, see Bendix, 'Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered'. In this essay, however, Bendix still maintains that ideal types of 'tradition' and 'modernity' are indispensable to the analysis of social change, a position I wish to repudiate here.

Bendix, 'The Mandate to Rule', pp.246-7 (emphasis added). This article sets out the approach to Bendix's larger study Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978.

Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p.219.


See in particular Bull's The Anarchical Society, in which separate chapters are devoted to each of these pivotal supports of international order.


Waltz, Theory of International Politics, see especially chapters 5 and 6.


Ibid., p.108.

This is Wight's description of the policy of neutralist states. See Power Politics, p.160.

Tucker, The Inequality of Nations, pp.4,15.


Ibid. For Waltz, see especially chapter 9, 'The Management of International Affairs'; For Bull see especially chapter 7, 'The Great Powers and International Order', and pages 46-51, in which he explicitly states that the appropriate analogue for the society of states is the Lockean rather than the Hobbesian concept of the state of nature. It should be noted that Bull himself does not characterize this argument about the bedrock importance of order as Hobbesian, but appeals rather to 'the "empirical equivalent" of the natural law theory'.


Ibid., pp.107-8.

33 Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, p.153. Hinsley claims that 'the present day structure of world international relations is a structure between Great Powers, and it has come down in unbroken descent from the days when such a structure first materialized in Europe' (i.e. the mid 18th Century).

34 Wight, *Systems of States*, pp.110-53. As is noted below, Wight appears to waver between the 1490s and the period of the Council of Constance (1414-18) as the starting point of the modern states-system.


37 Organski argues that 'for convenience, the power transition can be divided into three distinct stages: (1) The stage of potential power, (2) The stage of transitional growth in power, (3) The stage of power maturity'. The characteristic of the present period of global power transition is the uneven, but sequential development of industrialization throughout the world. 'It is like a race in which one runner after another goes into a brief sprint'. *World Politics*, pp.340-344.

38 On the uncertainties of such developments, see Wight, *Power Politics*, pp.30-40. As Wight observes (p.46), 'The self revelation of a great power is completed by war. If we ask when the older great powers achieved their rank, such as France, Spain and Austria, we may find the most satisfactory answer in the slow process of territorial amalgamation through dynastic inheritance. But, at least since the Peace of Westphalia, it has been true that, as the head hunters of Borneo entered manhood by taking their first head, so a power becomes a great power by a successful war against another great power'.


42 See Bull's attack upon the notion of an international law of consensus in *The Anarchical Society*, p.160.


44 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p.113, 'Hierarchic systems' Waltz argues, 'change if functions are differently defined and allotted. For anarchic systems [this] criterion of systems change ... drops out since the system is composed of like units'. p.101.

An early exposition of the concept of uneven and combined development was provided by Trotsky. Pointing to the pressure 'to make leaps' which uneven development exerted on backward nations, he then defined combined development as 'a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms'.


Hinsley, 'The Impact of Nationalism', pp.193-195. Of the earlier period Hinsley observes that 'the object of every state was to attach any outlying community, to its existing communities by any method that lay to hand ... Europe at that time, or, as we should more properly say, Christendom, lacked the political and social ingredients for the rise of a states-system'. p.193.
See, in particular, the works of Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, Eric Wolf, James Scott and Elbaki Hermassi. These authors, all of whom are quoted here, certainly do not present a homogeneous viewpoint. But their internal differences are a good deal less important than the characteristics which set them off from theorists like Johnson, Smelser and Gurr.

For an extended exposition of the polity model and its implications, in regard not just to revolution but to 'collective action' in general, see Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, pp.52-97.

Aya, 'Theories of Revolution Reconsidered', pp.45-6.


Aya, 'Theories of Revolution Reconsidered', pp.72-75. For a formal discussion of 'the opportunity to act together', see Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, pp.98-126, 133-42.


Scott, 'Revolution in the Revolution', pp.115-123. On peasant tendencies towards anarchism and the desire for a 'closed' rural economy, Scott observes: "While dissident urban elites, linked to the "great tradition" of the center, rebel to reconstitute the state, the peasantry, linked to the"little tradition" of the periphery, often rebels to evade or destroy the state'. p.117.


For Skocpol's argument about the constraints of post-revolutionary construction, see 'Old Regime Legacies and Communist Revolutions', pp.284-316.

'A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions', p.181.

Skocpol, *Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises*, p.15 (emphasis in original.)

Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1962, pp.5-30. 'The industrial history of Europe', Gerschenkron observes, 'appears not as a series of mere repetitions of the "first" industrialization but as an orderly system of graduated deviations from that industrialization', p.44.


Ibid., p.181.

Ibid., pp.183-85.

Cited Ibid., p.174.

Ibid., pp.182-3.


Bill Warren, 'Imperialism and Capitalist Development', *New Left Review*, September-October, 1973, pp.3-44. Warren's argument is set out more fully in his posthumously published work *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism* (edited by John Sender), New Left Books, London, 1980, which includes a detailed attack on Lenin's claims about the parasitic nature of capitalist imperialism. 'Direct colonialism', Warren argues (p.9), 'acted as a powerful engine of progressive social change, advancing capitalist development far more than was conceivable in any other way, both by its destructive effects on pre-capitalist social systems and by its implantation of elements of capitalism. Indeed, although introduced into the Third World externally, capitalism has struck deep roots there and developed its own increasingly vigorous internal dynamic'.


Ibid., pp.339-45.

Ibid., p.353.


Thus Seton-Watson, in reference to the 13th century crusade against the Albigensians, and the defeat by the northern French of the coalition between the Count of Tolouse and the King of Aragon, remarks: 'This must be regarded as an historical landmark, comparable to Bannockburn a century later but leading to the opposite result. A state based on Mediterranean sea-power, extending from Catalonia to the Rhone and including the Balearic Islands, is something which might have happened, in no way more impossible than the survival for four hundred years of an independent Scotland. If so, the history of both France and Castile would have been different', Nations and States, p.45.

Cited in Hermassi, The Third World Reassessed, p.178.

Ibid., pp.177-79.

Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p.212.

Hermassi, The Third World Reassessed, p.61.


Hermassi, The Third World Reassessed, p.62.


Burns, Of Powers and Their Politics, pp.4-5, 213-20.

Hermassi, The Third World Reassessed, p.47.

Tucker, The Inequality of Nations, p.100.

For a criticism along these lines of Keohane and Nye, see Stanley J. Michalak Jr., 'Theoretical Perspectives for Understanding International Interdependence', World Politics, Vol. 32, No.1, 1979, pp.145-148.

Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp.20-21, 42-43.

Wight, Systems of States, p.33.

This is Tucker's summary of the interdependence position, The Inequality of Nations, p.100.
Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p.255. A 'new mediaevalism', in Bull's terms, would involve the state's simultaneous loss of ground to both supra-national and sub and trans-national actors. He acknowledges some *prima facie* evidence of trends in this direction while predicting on balance the persistence of an identifiable states-system.

Wight, *Power Politics*, p.94.

Wight, *Systems of States*, pp.131-4, 150-3; Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp.32-48, 115-25. 'In the fifteenth century' Mattingly comments, 'European states experienced a change of phase, like the crystallization of a liquid, like the changing of a gear'.


On the popular revolts of the turbulent century 1550-1660, Henry Kamen comments: 'At the years 1648-60 there is a watershed which affects both eastern and western Europe. This is not to say that no rebellions occurred after these dates. On the contrary there were major rebellions in both France and Russia in the late seventeenth century and so on continuously through to 1848. The difference is that whereas the revolts before 1648-60 were struggles against the onset of landlordism and absolutism, by the late seventeenth century the struggle was over, and the people rose up in rebellion within a structure that had already engulfed them ... All the rebellions had been inconsequential: it had not been a century of revolution, but a century of defeat'. *The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe 1550-1660*, Cardinal, London, 1976, p.413.

Carr, *The Twenty-Years Crisis*, p.218.


Ibid.

Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', pp.97-101.


Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, pp.220-3. Hinsley emphasises that it was the *combination* of this fear of revolution with the near-equality of the continental powers (plus Britain's interest in a general balance on the continent) which kept peace in this period.
Mogenthaul, for instance, declares that 'the moral limitations upon the struggle for power on the international scene are weaker today than they have been at any time in the history of the modern state system'. The 'one international society of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' has disappeared, and the limited nationalism of the nineteenth century has given way to 'nationalistic universalism ... a secular religion, universal in its interpretation of the nature and destiny of man and in its messianic promise of salvation for all mankind'. The Communist powers are at present the leading exponents of this attitude, and the ideological struggle of the Cold War 'has dealt the final, fatal blow to that social system of international intercourse within which for almost three centuries nations lived together in constant rivalry yet under a common roof of shared values and universal standards of action'. 


It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century, Hinsley claims, 'that the notion of Europe as interchangeable with Christendom or as a geographical expression finally gave way to a quite new conception of Europe as a system that was the sum of its historical and political parts'.

For a discussion of the development of this European self-conception in contradistinction to Tsarist Russia, as well as to the Turkish and Moghul empires, see Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, pp.462-Pipes himself, it should be noted, draws a clear distinction between the Russian, 'patrimonial state' and the pattern of 'oriental despotism' depicted in Karl Wittfogel's book of the same name. His preferred analogy is with the quasi-planned societies of the Hellenistic Middle East. Russia Under the Old Regime, pp. 19-24.


Ibid.


Ibid., p.135.

'Whether one is talking about seventeenth-century merchant adventurers, nineteenth-century finance capitalists, or twentieth-century multinational corporations, transnational actors have been able to play an important role in world affairs because it has been in the interests of the predominant or hegemonic powers for them to do so. As political circumstances have changed owing to the rise and decline of hegemonies or to political realignments in the hegemonic power itself, transnational processes have been altered or have ceased altogether'.


Wight, Systems of States, pp.117-118.

Ibid., p.125.

Ibid.


Alistan Buchan, Change Without War; the Shifting Structure of World Power, Chatto and Windus, London, 1974. It should be noted that Buchan himself portrays the detente as one part of a larger process of structural change.

Bell, The Diplomacy of Detente, pp.1-6. Bell argues that it was 'this basing of the relationship on the triangular balance that in my view distinguishes the successful detente after 1969 - Dr. Kissinger's detente - from the less successful efforts at detente in the period from 1963, or indeed from 1953'.

As criticism of his policies swelled in mid-1975 Kissinger commented that 'critics of detente must answer: what is the alternative that they propose? What precise policies do they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increasing danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of the cold war? Does detente encourage repression - or is it detente that has generated the ferment and demands for openness that we are now witnessing? Department of State Bulletin, 4 August, 1967, p.166.


On this question, see Carsten Holbraad, 'Condominium and Concert', in Holbraad (ed), Superpowers and World Order, ANU Press, Canberra, 1971, pp. 8-10.

Wight, Systems of States, pp. 24-25.

Holbraad, 'Condominium or Concert', pp. 4-5.

Wight, Systems of States, p. 25.
One of the major statements on this theme is Fritz Fischer's *World Power or Decline*, Norton, New York, 1974.

It was worth noting that the major foreign policy statements articulating the first Nixon administration programme for a 'stable structure of peace' indicated a concern with the prospect of a newly 'crowded' world, and specifically proposed that Africa should be a sphere of mutual great power restraint. See 'The Emerging Structure of Peace', DSB, 13 March 1972, p.364.


Cited in Kohler, in *The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policy*, p.33.
I have argued that, insofar as Soviet accounts of world politics suffer from 'intellectual schizophrenia' regarding the respective claims to conceptual primacy of the 'international system' and the 'world historical process', they in fact reflect the contradictory reality of the contemporary era. In particular, I have suggested that the world political 'environment' of the contemporary states-system is more appropriately construed in terms of a constantly shifting 'correlation of forces' than in terms of concepts - such as the more formal interdependence paradigm - which incline towards an assumption of the normality of 'homeostatic' equilibrium in world politics. But there remains the question of the Soviet picture the states-system itself - a picture which must be acknowledged to be a very rudimentary one. While the notion of a system of states is certainly not absent from Soviet commentary, the major emphasis, especially in high-level official pronouncements, falls upon dominant reality of the unceasing struggle between the opposed camps - or social systems - of capitalism and socialism. Since it has long been acknowledged that these systems are composed in turn of sovereign states, it is possible to interpret such Soviet assertions as a de facto recognition of a bipolar structure of great power relations. But to the extent that a broader notion of international system appears in the Soviet account, it still appears primarily as an addendum to the historical working theory of imperialism and the General Crisis of Capitalism.

However, this rudimentary Soviet conception, with its emphasis upon basic aspects of structure, provides a better starting point than the complex 'system of action' concept which informs much American analysis. As has been argued, the states-system is most usefully thought of merely as an unusually discrete and persistent system of practices which is indeed an addendum to a wider historical process - in the sense that the practices in question have not sprung fully-armed from the 'functioning' of the system, but are rather the contingent product of the lengthy adaptation of the techniques of mediaeval (and above all papal) 'world government' to the very different structural requirements of the developing international anarchy of early modern Europe.
Moreover, this initial process of adaptation is replicated in part by the momentous process of structural readjustment confronting international society today. Of the central institutional pillars of the European states-system, the compact on the legitimacy of war for reasons of state is no longer tenable in the dealings of the great and major powers; the hegemony of the great powers has become very difficult to avow openly and, in some crucial cases, to implement in practice; and the relevance of the classical doctrine of the multiple balance and of the positivist doctrine of international law is increasingly open to question. Given the additional factor of the unprecedented interpenetration today of states-system and world-economy, it becomes especially necessary to insist upon the contingent relationship between the material structures of contemporary world politics and the inherited practices of European international society.

This chapter will be concerned primarily with the structural logic of the contemporary situation, especially as regards the relationship of balance and deterrence between the great powers, rather than with their approach to the more formal 'rules' of international law. It will be taken for granted here that the Soviet and American positions on such questions as 'wars of national liberation' are widely divergent and that this divergence is the predictable outcome of very different historical experiences and current material interests on each side. The basic question of this thesis is whether the great powers are also at loggerheads about the more basic rules of prudence which constitute the bedrock requirements for stable coexistence in the contemporary era. However, I will also be attempting in the last section of the chapter to relate the structural analysis of balance and deterrence to the broad question of international society; and it may be useful, before moving on to these structural concerns, to offer a brief defence of my earlier contention that the basic Soviet position on Peaceful Coexistence and detente does not involve a rejection of the notion of international society as such. The question may be divided into two parts. Does the Soviet Union accept the underlying 'theory of the game' of coexistence between sovereign states? Is Soviet behaviour generally supportive or subversive of a common practice of civilized intercourse within a society of states?

As regards the first, it seems undeniable that the Soviet regime
officially recognizes the basic 'theory' of the modern states-system - *cuius regio ejus religio*. Our world today, Brezhnev recently declared, 'is socially heterogeneous ... This is an objective fact'. That this fact is accepted only reluctantly, and only for the 'period of transition', is largely beside the point. 'In the light of all history', as Hinsley points out, 'we must accept the fact that men have usually regarded their own hegemony over their various worlds as the natural and logical solution to the international problem', with 'special circumstances, working massively in the opposite direction', being required before 'the more sophisticated notions of coexistence and a balance of power' could take root. Since 1956, the Soviet authorities have clearly and consistently stated their recognition both of the fact of coexistence and of the 'special circumstances' underpinning it: in the thermo-nuclear era, central war is 'inadmissible' as a means of solving the historic conflict between capitalism and socialism.

As against this, however, the Soviet Union's formal adherence to the principle of 'non-intervention' is substantially modified by its insistence upon the principles of Proletarian and Socialist Internationalism, which are asserted to be 'dialectically connected' with and, in the latter case, 'higher' than that of Peaceful Coexistence. This issue opens the wide ranging dispute over international law mentioned above, but some brief comments may be made here. First, while it can fairly be argued that non-intervention in general represents a more practicable response to the problems of interstate coexistence than would any general principle of intervention (whether to defend 'legitimate' regimes, to promote 'just' change or whatever), it is by no means self-evident of states, as it is held by liberal theory to be of men, that they should, as far as possible, leave each other alone to pursue their separate ends. Rather non-intervention should be seen merely as a vital part of the prudential compact by which states seek to simplify their general relations by 'emptying out' historical complications - including domestic genocide, for instance - from the structure of the system. 'The underlying point ... is that states have agreed, for the sake of convenience, to recognize one another's existence, to provide a minimum degree of non-intervention in one another's affairs, and in particular, to agree that what is done domestically is not normally brought to international account.'

Furthermore, the ordering of international society in terms of the notional equality of states, which non-intervention implies, inevitably conflicts at various points with the pattern of hierarchical ordering
which reflects the real inequality of power in international politics. This is most evident, on the one hand, in 'spheres of influence', where the great powers more or less openly acknowledge the respective hegemonies, and exclusive rights of intervention, of their counterparts, and, on the other, in perennial 'flashpoint' areas like the Middle East, whose special significance for their mutual relations produces, in addition to unilateral and competitive support for favoured contestants, joint 'managerial' intervention designed to prevent local conflicts from escalating to uncontrollable dimensions. But more generally, 'the sovereignty of the weak is held as it were under license from the strong', by virtue either of the latter's prudential concern for the countervailing power of their fellows, or of their more general respect for the settled norms of international society.

The conditions favouring great power forbearance are eroded today by the enormous increase in the number of weak powers 'within' the system, by the great significance of a number of these powers as proprietors of natural resources, by their involvement in a radical transformation process in respect of which the great powers profess deeply conflicting ideological convictions, and by the chronic instability of regimes in these new nations, which makes the unequivocal identification of intervention against 'established' regimes next to impossible. Given these considerations, the most striking factor about great power intervention since 1945 is how limited, relative to earlier periods, the phenomenon has been. Of course, some instances of such intervention have been tragically costly; but this is mainly attributable to those enormous strides in military technology which have also provided one obvious deterrent to widespread intervention by virtue of the prospects of rapid escalation involved.

Finally, the Soviet authorities have generally seemed less comfortable with the *cuius regio* principle as the charter of the society of states than as the charter for the competitive coexistence of capitalist and socialist camps. But the same might be said of United States policymakers during the decades of containment; and despite the explicitly pluralist values of the latter, they have not been noticeably more flexible than their Soviet counterparts in adapting to the increasingly manifest reality of a *state-centred* pluralism over the last decade and a half. This general issue has been confused not merely by the far reaching ideological claims of both great powers, but also by the tendency of many
American theorists to extrapolate from the apparent conditions of
the Cold War to the alleged solidarity enforcing dynamics of a
bipolar world, and hence to assume a basic incompatibility between a
bipolar structure of military power and a large measure of pluralism
in the diplomatic and economic orientation of the members of international
society. However, there is no obvious reason why a bipolar power
structure should impose more fundamental restrictions upon the ability
of smaller states to 'manoeuvre in the interstices of the balance'
than a multipolar one. And if this much is accepted, it is possible
to distinguish two aspects of this question which are relevant here:
the attitude of the great powers to their respective spheres of
influence, on the one hand, and their attitude to the 'nonaligned' or
tenuously aligned states comprising the bulk of the Third World, on the
other.

As regards the latter, I have already suggested that the scope,
if not the intensity, of direct great power interventionism has been
relatively limited in the post World War II era; and there is no
persuasive evidence in Soviet practice - any more than in Soviet doctrine
- of a belief that the official goal of world communism can be achieved
by force of Soviet arms. It is true that the last decade has seen a
relative increase in Soviet military assertiveness in the Afro-Asian
region, together with a relative retrenchment on the part of the United
States, and that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is in many
respects analogous to the American intervention in Vietnam. But the
Afghanistan involvement (which after two years remains substantially
more limited than the United States' Vietnam involvement at a comparable
stage) should not obscure the wider connection between the growing Soviet
access to traditional levers of great power influence and the increasing
Soviet emphasis upon the convention of sovereign equality as a weapon by
which 'progressive' Third World regimes might emancipate themselves
from the politico-economic domination of capitalism, even where this
process carries no obvious promise of reliable direct gains to the
socialist camp.

The question of the Soviet and American spheres of influence is
a more specialized one. The basic reality for smaller states within such
regions is that their geography imposes fundamental restrictions on their
ability to manoeuvre in the interstices of the balance. But there is no
logical reason, or invariant historical precedent, for supposing that their limited diplomatic freedom must necessarily be associated with a requirement to accept the 'religion' - or 'social system' - of the hegemonic great power. In practice, however, this extra requirement was imposed during the Cold War era, and by both great powers. Soviet actions in this respect have been a great deal more visible, of course. But this was largely because the Soviet sphere lay in a region of much greater strategic significance than the American, and having far less margin for error in the 'management' of challenges to their authority, the Soviets have had periodic recourse to the massive use of military power. By contrast, the United States has had much greater opportunities for removing unwanted regimes by covert 'destabilization' or by limited military probes-techniques which have succeeded in a number of instances, but which, in the one instance in which they went spectacularly wrong, also produced the anomalous case of Cuba, which has contrived to protect its alternative social order only by attaching itself firmly to the opposite camp.

Over the last decade or so, the impact of pluralizing forces within the Soviet and American spheres of influence has become increasingly marked, yet neither power has clearly demonstrated a readiness to dissociate diplomatic from 'religious' hegemony in its dealings with the smaller states in question - though there was evidence of a serious attempt to revise American policy in this respect under the Carter administration. Today it would seem that both powers are at a crucial turning point on this issue, though because of the particular salience - strategic, historical and cultural - of the East European states in the relations of the great and major powers, a Soviet failure to break with past practices in this respect is likely to have much more momentous general consequences than an American one.

Turning now to the question of the Soviet impact upon the broad diplomatic-legal practice of international society, it must be reiterated that there are basic structural reasons, quite independent of the subjective approach of the Soviet regime, why that practice should be in a condition of intense flux. It does seem clear that the Soviet regime has, from its inception, made a substantial contribution to what Wight sees as the serious corruption of the European diplomatic system - 'the master institution of international relations'. But it is also clear that other leading powers have played an important role in
this process, which is perhaps most reasonably viewed as a general reflection of a revolutionary era in international politics. Moreover, some new developments evidently reflect the genuine requirements of a new situation. Thus the enormously increased importance of technological surprise has converted certain forms of externally conducted espionage, under the rubric of 'national-technical means of verification', into a linchpin of the process of strategic arms limitation; the crucial psychological dimensions of nuclear deterrence have promoted 'crisis management' techniques such as the Soviet-American 'hotline', and also, perhaps, the renewed prominence of 'summit conferences', and the desire of Third World states to offset their individual weakness by collective exploitation of the diplomatic resource of notional state equality has produced a great deal of generally anti-Western 'propaganda' in the United Nations and related forums.

In respect of the first two of these innovations, the Soviet Union has increasingly discovered an interest in cooperation with the United States; and while it has in some measure profited from, and endeavoured to exploit, the third, it has in general been a peripheral figure, and even, as with the Third World campaign for a New International Economic Order, an ambivalent one. Wight maintains that the primary focus of Soviet diplomacy has exhibited a secular evolution from espionage and subversion towards propaganda: but it is important to add that, with the development of 'parity' with the United States, this evolution has continued towards a 'great power' stance of traditional, if formalistic, kind.

Indeed, it is a basic paradox of the Soviet Union's present situation that at the very point at which it has unequivocally staked its claim to an equal great power role with the United States - and in part because of that very fact - the overriding significance of that traditional great power role has been partially eroded by the emergence of the 'North-South dialogue' on the reform of the world economy. The Third World use of UNCTAD and related forums for this purpose is one more aspect of the contemporary situation which recalls the original transition from the world society of mediaeval Europe to the international society of European states, and suggests, in a strictly limited sense, a replay of that transition in reverse. In that earlier period, as Wight points out, the General Councils of the Church 'were all concerned with political as well as doctrinal business', with the
political aspect growing 'larger as time went on'. This conciliar movement petered out in the 15th century with the consolidation of national divisions and the decline of the 'world order consensus' of mediaeval Christendom, giving way to the pattern of secular congresses which reached its apogee in the first half of the nineteenth century. Thus, he suggests, the 'Wilsonian view' of contemporary world politics — with its aspiration for a movement from the balance of power via international organization and collective security to world government — 'prescribes for the future a reversal of the historical development of the past', and in a general environment as conflict-ridden as any in the entire history of the states-system.

However, if the prospects for true world government 'have never seemed more bleak', there is some prospect that the United Nations, originally envisaged primarily as an agency for the reform of the states-system, may yet provide the springboard for a substantial proliferation of institutions designed to regulate the world-economy. As was argued in the previous chapter, the world-economy has been intensely politicized throughout its history, in that its expansion was coeval with the expansion of the European states-system; and the minimalist institutional structures established during the generation of American political hegemony following 1945 have proved incapable of accommodating even the recovery of the advanced industrial powers, let alone the complex problems posed by the great colonial empires. The irony of this situation is most acute for the United States, which has seen its own favoured instrument of 'world order' deployed by the Third World states in support of very different visions from its own, first in regard to questions of violent 'national liberation' and then in regard to the transformation of the world-economy. But the Soviet position also has its ironical aspect. If the redistributive programme of the radical wing of the Group of 77 should bear fruit, it would constitute a more comprehensive change in the capitalist world-economy than was ever effected by the emergence of the essentially inward-looking economies of the socialist states; and the institutional structures so established would constitute a venue in which the Soviet Union's traditional great power assets would carry relatively little weight. Of course, without the political framework established by the emergence of a Soviet-American balance, there would not even be such prospect as does exist for substantial institutional change forced upon the leading capitalist powers 'from below'. But
granted this, and granted that the Soviet Union on balance benefits from the contest between the Third World and the West, it does so because, having neither an obvious colonial past nor a major 'neo-colonial' present, it is, in large measure, irrelevant to the issues involved.19

This brings us to the central concern of this chapter, the military-political substructure of international order upon which elements of the larger edifice of a reformed world order - such as the putative institutional structures of a New International Economic Order - must be established, if they are to be established at all in the present context. The following will essentially be a development of themes broached in the earlier discussion of 'The States-System in Transition' with special reference to the great and major powers in the contemporary era. As before, I will attempt to focus on two basic issues: upon the political framework which these powers, by their interaction, establish for themselves and for the other members of international society; and upon these states as frameworks for the various communities within their own domestic societies.

At its most abstract level the framework of international order can usefully be thought of in terms of John Herz's concept of the 'security dilemma'.20 For the great powers in particular, international politics remain a 'self-help' situation, in which power must be balanced by power, and since states continue to define their 'interests' in ways which clash with the self-defined interests of their fellows, a central goal of many states must be the acquisition of those coercive capabilities which will permit the promotion of their more substantive goals in the face of opposition from other states. The essence of the security dilemma, therefore, is that the armaments by which one state seeks to defend itself against encroachments, and to shape the behaviour of other states in desired directions, must necessarily threaten the security and diplomatic freedom of the rest and encourage them to arm in their turn. Given the continued existence of separate states, this dilemma can partially be transcended only by a general recognition of the impossibility
both of 'absolute security' and of absolute realization of goals, and by an implicit or explicit compact upon the need for 'legitimate' limits to conflict.

On the face of it, there is no fundamental incompatibility between this perspective upon great power relations and the Soviet acknowledgement of the necessity for Peaceful Coexistence in the 'socially heterogeneous' environment of contemporary world politics. However, American theorists have often argued that, although the avowed Soviet goal of the ultimate world-wide victory of Communism may be dismissed as cloudy rhetoric, the repeated invocation of this goal does signify a general absolutism in the Soviet (or Russian) world view which is incompatible with acceptance of 'legitimate' solutions to the security dilemma. In one way or another, such arguments appeal to the kind of distinction drawn by Morgenthau between traditional nationalism and 'nationalistic universalism'.21 The former, it is suggested, is undeniably the expression of group egoism and self-assertion; but precisely because its egoism is freely acknowledged, it can generate that 'essential reciprocity which saves the idea of the national interest from itself'.22 The latter, by contrast, clothes its egoism in an appeal to allegedly universal moral values, and thus renders the achievement of a stable compact, based upon mutually recognized interests, virtually impossible.

I have already suggested that the weight attached to this nationalist/universalist dichotomy by theorists such as Morgenthau and Kissinger depends upon an unduly selective reading of the history of the traditional system, and also that there are objective structural factors making it difficult for either great power to adhere to limited 'national interest' goals today. One major consideration (discussed further below) is that neither is a nation-state in the established European sense. The second is that, given the present interpenetration of states-system and world-economy, each must grapple with a transitional environment in which interests, in many cases, have no more obvious permanence than friends or enemies.

This latter point may be refined by reference to Arnold Wolfers' distinction between 'possession goals' and 'milieu goals'.23 In the 18th century, and for a good part of the 19th, the leading powers clashed primarily over possession goals, in respect of which the relative
balance of interests could be calculated with some precision, while milieu goals - such as the preservation of an underlying international order - were likely to command a good deal of common assent throughout international society, or at least among the polity of great powers. Today, the significance of direct possession has been much eroded both by the long-range destructive power of thermonuclear weapons and by the unprecedented ability of the leading powers to increase their capabilities by internal means. On the other hand, the radical transformation process within strategically placed states establishes the broad milieu or environment as a far more prominent, and far more fluid, arena of great power competition (which embraces the one area in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest in possession goals, namely security of supply for vital raw materials). Together with the near impossibility of justifying their nuclear policies solely in terms of reasons of state, these factors inevitably encourage the great powers to appeal also to the universalistic imperatives of their respective visions of a just world order.

At a more concrete level, the contemporary framework of international order is inseparable from the contemporary distribution of military power. On the surface, it might seem that the recent resurgence of 'realist' approaches in the United States might make for a greater meeting of minds with the Soviets as regards the basic contours of the great power relationship. For, as Zimmerman noted over a decade ago, when the behaviouralist methodological assault on the 'state-centric paradigm' was in full flood and the substantive themes of transnationalism and interdependence were gathering force:

[Soviet] Marxist-Leninists have been more royalist than the King, more realist than the anthropomorphic realists. The distribution of power between the main protagonists constitutes the core element in the description of a given international situation.

Indeed, it seems probable that the new American assertiveness about national interests, and the associated themes of geopolitics and mercantilism, are more comprehensible to the Soviet leadership than the 'human rights' globalism of the early Carter Administration (just as American critics find Soviet globalist rhetoric incomprehensible in its own terms). However, there remains the problem of an international environment which can no longer be adequately discussed purely in terms
of stable national interests. In this regard, the crucial question is not the use or non-use of anthropomorphic language about the state or any other collective actor, but the number of 'overall structures' identified and the relationship envisaged between them. In this respect, the differences between the Soviet line and mainstream American approaches remain basic.

The Soviet perspective as it has emerged since 1956 broadly reflects the distinction between the structures of states-system and world-economy developed in Chapter 3, with a rudimentary conception of the former being 'soldered' onto the long standing Leninist conception of the latter. On the one hand, Soviet commentators insist that the 'basic contradiction' (or relationship of major tension) in contemporary international relations is that between the capitalist and socialist camps, and by inference between their two leading powers, the United States and the USSR. As Zimmerman notes, this formulation attracted strong criticism from the Chinese during the 1960s, for it indicated that the inter-imperialist contradictions had been effectively neutralized as a likely source of major war, and also implied that the Soviet Union's active commitment to the cause of world revolution must be subordinated, in the last analysis, to the management requirements of its relationship with the United States. On the other hand, while not envisaging any short or middle term prospect of military clashes among the advanced capitalist powers, the Soviets have been very alert to growing conflicts of interest between them, and to the value of a climate of detente in allowing these divisions more opportunity to manifest themselves. The United States' hegemony in the capitalist camp has been definitively eroded, they argue, and American objectives are increasingly compromised by the emergence in Europe and Japan of capitalist powers 'which are capable of competing with the USA economically ... [but] have not yet found a place appropriate to their new power in the political structure of international relations'.

American leaders, for their part, have emphasized the one major aspect of the contemporary structure of military power which the Soviets prefer to play down - namely the rise of China to putative great power status. But they continue to treat the world-economy in functionalist rather than structuralist terms; and, at least in their public pronouncements on obviously political issues, they have welcomed the economic recovery
of Europe and Japan as a major contribution to international stability. Both these themes were brought together in Nixon's famous 1971 pronouncement on the advent of 'a safer world and a better world' based upon the relationship of 'strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China and Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance'.

As Alistair Buchan then noted, Nixon's claim that situations of multiple balance had typically produced more peaceful conditions in the past was 'historically untrue'. But more important, his description of the emerging international power structure was, and remains, basically inaccurate. Contemporary international relations can be construed in this way only by counting different forms of power - above all economic - in the central military balance; and in this sense the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of multipolarity might be seen as a kind of way station to the full blown interdependence paradigm of the middle 1970s, in which the structural significance of military power was drastically downgraded. But, as has already been argued, this latter picture is quite implausible. There are no persuasive reasons for anticipating the early demise of the deeply hierarchical order of the contemporary states-system; and though there are already multiple balances of great local and regional importance - above all in East Asia - their impact still falls well short of terminating the structural bipolarity of the system as a whole. For the next 10-15 years, the framework of world politics seems likely to be dominated by the central balance between two great powers which are also 'superpowers' in the only useful meaning of that term - in the possession of strategic and conventional capabilities, and a supporting level of economic development, resource base and technological infrastructure, which lifts them quite out of the ranks of the other major powers.

In part, these differences in official Soviet and American perspectives may be attributed to the self-interested manipulation of important political symbols on both sides. The Soviets clearly have no interest in compromising their hard won equality with the United States by acknowledging a basically much weaker China as a full member of the great power club, while they do have an interest in encouraging a more independent policy orientation by the Europeans and Japanese, so long as this does not produce formidable new centres of military power on their immediate flanks. On the other hand, policies designed to bolster
the diplomatic weight of new 'great powers' constitute one of several possible American strategies designed to exploit more effectively the capitalist world's economic superiority over the Soviet bloc; and it is noteworthy that recent American policy has swung back from the Carter administration's attempt to give priority to Trilateral partnership over the East-West struggle, to the Reagan administration's attempt to cajole its major allies into carrying a share of the joint defence burden more in keeping with their economic capacities, but within the framework of an anti-Soviet 'strategic consensus' fashioned after the American world-view. Thus developments in the 1970s have once again confirmed the general postwar pattern of oscillation in American policy between the 'uneasily reconciled' goals of American hegemony and an expansion of the great power ranks. Both goals, as Waltz argues, have been 'revolutionary', straining against the more obvious structure of power towards the containment of the Soviet Union. But both have characteristically been rationalized in the language of balance.

However, while the contrasting political objectives of American and Soviet pronouncements are clearly important - so too are the conceptual divisions underlying them - between a functionalist pluralism, emphasizing harmony of interests, on the one hand, and a structuralist emphasis on contradiction and revolutionary change, on the other. It must be emphasized that the real conceptual difference is not - as accusations traded back and forth would have it - that one side recognizes the complexity of power in the contemporary world, while the other concentrates narrowly on the balance of military force. Both sides clearly acknowledge the importance of economic and ideological factors, but because of their different approaches to underlying structures, they count them in different 'scenarios'. The Soviets purport to separate out the socio-economic struggle from the military struggle, and maintain that, within a continuous political framework of Peaceful Coexistence guaranteed by Soviet power, the world historical process will ultimately grant general victory to socialism. Western critics reject this division as arbitrary and self-serving, and have been increasingly explicit in turning the Soviet emphasis on socio-economic factors back on its authors. An elegant statement of this position, which reflects the arguments of Kissinger and others, has recently been offered by Bell, who distinguishes between the narrow balance of military forces and the true balance of
power - the latter encompassing the 'economic and political and diplomatic factors [which] have more bearing on the shape of long-term relationships'. The likely asymmetry between 'the short-term balance of forces' (favourable to the Soviet Union) and 'the long-term balance of power' (favourable to the West), she argues, may provide in the 1980s 'a sort of "launch window" for diplomatic enterprises of a "now or never" kind'. The same case has been argued in more concrete geopolitical terms by Colin Gray, who attributes to the Soviet leaders a perception of their situation strikingly reminiscent of the fears of German geopoliticians before World War I. Dismissing 'the (long-run) optimism of their political philosophy, in which they probably do not genuinely believe', he continues:

Any competent Soviet security analyst must recognize the bleakness of his country's long-term future. As China modernizes, as Japan eventually rearms, and as the United States and NATO Europe mobilize their defence potential even modestly, the USSR becomes more and more genuinely encircled. The temptation to restructure the terms of this unequal competition, before it places the Soviet Union in an enduring condition of inferiority, has to be substantial.

The most important point about these latter arguments is that they tacitly assume that the social and economic changes necessary to shift the existing military balance so decisively against the Soviet Union could occur without commensurate shifts in the existing pattern of economic and political alignments. This assumption flows naturally from the pluralist emphasis upon 'the conception of overall power and influence' - incorporating military, economic, political, ideological and diplomatic elements - as the indispensable 'common denominator in respect of which we say that there is balance or preponderance' in the system as a whole. But I would argue that this is a mistaken emphasis. The 'schizophrenic' Soviet perspective seems likely to provide more clues to the pattern of world politics for the next 10-15 years, and the official Soviet optimism about the non-military correlation of forces would itself appear to warrant at least qualified endorsement.

There are two broad 'scenarios' to be considered here. The first assumes what I have suggested is the most likely result - that the major socio-economic changes of the next 10-15 years will continue to be
contained within an essentially bipolar military framework, based upon a crude and dynamic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States in strategic power and global projection capability. In such a context, the non-military correlation of forces will almost certainly 'run against' the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, will probably remain unfavourable to it, without necessarily deteriorating radically, in East Asia, and will probably run against the United States, on balance, in Western Europe, West Asia and Africa. Of course, these are extremely broad-brush predictions, and I certainly do not mean to deny the possibility of further serious reverses to Soviet positions in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The point is rather a negative one: that in a predominantly capitalist world-economy, the really big prizes are still to play for, and that the Soviets are likely to benefit indirectly from the intensification of that general erosion of American hegemony which has been under way since the late 1960s. As regards the Afro-Asian 'arc of crisis', the domestic transformation processes discussed in Chapter 3 seem likely to produce a growing array of statist barriers to the United States' ability to guarantee secure 'access' to vital regions, not merely for itself but also for its European and Japanese allies. As regards Western Europe (and perhaps even Japan), there is likely to be a growing confluence between neutralist and 'third force' sentiments on the political level and economic conflicts with the United States over markets and crucial resources. Moreover, there would seem to be a crucial nexus between the developed world and Third World challenges to the American position, above all in the special vulnerability of the Europeans and Japanese to the prospect of loss of access to Middle East oil. The Soviet Union stands to gain from this nexus, both indirectly, because of the inhibitions it places on the allies' support of contentious American policies in the 'arc of crisis' area, and directly, because the desire to reduce dependence on the Arab oil states may encourage the Europeans, at least, towards more extensive, long-range cooperation in the exploitation of Soviet energy resources.

It must be emphasized that although the initial emergence of Soviet-American parity was essential to this scenario, it does not depend upon a major intensification of the Soviet military threat. An open-ended military buildup, or the aggressive exploitation of military power in Eastern Europe or the Third World, would very likely be counterproductive for the Soviets, encouraging the Europeans and Japanese either towards
renewed attempts to strengthen an American-led alliance or towards major bids for military power in their own right. If, however, the Soviet Union complements its present formidable power with a relatively conciliatory approach on arms control and economic issues, the next 10-15 years may well confirm 'a secular trend' towards the kind of partial neutralization of a still disunited Europe which, in the American hawk literature, goes under the extravagant title of 'Finlandization'. Indeed, one index of the basic plausibility of Soviet claims about the non-military correlation of forces is the deep ambivalence on this question of the hawk school, which, on the one hand, is heavily dependent on the window of opportunity argument to justify its predictions of aggressive Soviet expansionism, and, on the other, is prone to persistent fears about the peaceful Finlandization of Europe and to intermittent alarms about the impending Soviet achievement, primarily through indirect means, of a 'Communist international system' on a global scale.

The second, and less likely, scenario is one in which the socio-economic change is accompanied by a genuine movement towards a multipolar structure of global military power. It is important to note that this would remain an incomplete, transitional process during the maximum period considered here, through to the mid-1990s. Indeed, there would seem to be fundamental economic constraints upon the growth of Chinese military capacity in this period, such that if China did mount a qualitatively new military challenge to the USSR, it would be as a direct client of the Western powers, and any Soviet obsession with the prospect of encirclement would be grounded in observable facts. Of course the economic potential for a qualitative leap in military capability, given a major change of political direction, does exist in Western Europe and Japan. But such a development, in turn, would probably betoken a qualitative deepening in the divisions within 'the West' itself.

In both cases a determined bid for great power status would probably be triggered only by a series of traumatic political shocks, in Western Europe to overcome the manifest centrifugal tendencies at both national and sub-national level, and in Japan to overcome the legacy of Hiroshima and the plainly unfavourable situational logic which would confront the nation - by virtue of its acute resource dependence, small physical size, and highly concentrated population and industrial base - in an
intensifying competition among global nuclear powers. It seems most unlikely that the *fait accompli* of Soviet global power - which may in any case be vigorously contested by the United States in the 1980s - will provide an adequate incentive for such traumatic initiatives. Therefore, unless the Soviet Union does embark upon a campaign of unequivocal expansionism in the 1980s, it seems likely that any European or Japanese bids for great power status would be triggered by a general and rapid deterioration of existing frameworks of 'world order', in which economic conflict between the advanced capitalist powers would play a pivotal role. This case has been strongly argued by Mary Kaldor in regard to a united Europe - a more plausible protagonist than Japan for a truly global power relationship. To assume that an emerging European great power would remain faithful to its alleged Atlantic heritage, she argues,

is to misunderstand the nature of a European Union - something which is altogether different from the sum total of nine unstable European States. A future European government will be moulded as much by its immediate political environment as by European tradition. And that environment will encompass the various crises - about oil and dollars and food and conflicts in the Third World - through which Atlantic conflict will evolve. In its very creation, in other words, a European government will be anti-American.

These considerations on the relationship between basic changes in the international power structure and basic changes in the domestic socio-political structure of the great powers lead into the second major question mentioned above: the role of the leading states in the contemporary system as frameworks for their constituent communities. It is a common thesis of the hawk literature that the Soviet Union is not a viable framework in this sense, and that its consequent lack of domestic 'legitimacy' provides an inbuilt motor for Soviet expansionism. In Gray's words:
The USSR is not merely a country surrounded by potential enemies; it is an empire that virtually by definition can have no settled relations of relative influence with its neighbours. It is the geopolitical inheritance of the USSR to believe that 'boundaries are fighting places'.

This 'imperial thesis', he claims, 'is vital because it settles, persuasively, arguments about Soviet intentions'; and indeed, as was noted in Chapter 1, this thesis is vital to the hawk attempt to save the earlier argument deriving an inbuilt expansionist drive from the dynamics of Communist 'totalitarianism'. Although the emphasis upon the essential continuity of the Soviet order with its Tsarist predecessor provides a more plausible explanation for its persistence - almost thirty years after the dismantling of the apparatus of Stalinist terror - than the pure totalitarian argument, it makes it correspondingly difficult to represent Soviet Communism as an alien imposition on the Russian people, which must be enforced by a mixture of direct repression and persistent appeals to the need to counter massive external threats. But if it is possible to represent Russian Communism as the latest variant of a traditional Great Russian messianism, and an alien imposition on a vast array of non-Russian peoples, a recycled version of the earlier thesis can be neatly meshed with those themes of geopolitics and the Soviet search for absolute security which figure prominently in the wider American debate. To quote Gray again:

As with all empires, the Great Russian has a core area (Muscovy, Byelorussia) and succeeding layers, each protecting the others ... The Soviet empire has to expand, in influence if not physically, or risk collapse. At home and abroad the entire structure rests on force, though generally latent force. Soviet leaders are more fearful than ambitious. They know they cannot govern a universal empire, even if they could establish one, but they are condemned by circumstance to try. The world beyond Moscow's control threatens, if only by its manifold attractions, the world Moscow does control.  

However, if the imperial thesis is vital to the hawk case, it is also less than persuasive. The image of the Soviet Union as the great surviving 'prison house of nations', is fairly plausible in terms of an implicit contrast with, say, 19th century France or Britain. But the
contemporary international environment is structurally analogous not to that of 19th century Europe but to that of early modern Europe, in which even France and Britain had not fully emerged from their imperial phase. In evaluating the Soviet situation, one should therefore note the imperial past of the European nation-state (whose suppressed legacies may be re-emerging today) and the manifest imperial present of both contemporary great powers.

From this perspective, it seems possible to identify four different aspects — with very different structural connotations — of the growth of Gray's multi-layered 'Soviet empire'. First, there was the expansion of the Muscovite state from the 15th to 17th century, a process analogous to the earlier consolidation of the great West European states, though in a geopolitical environment less conducive to the establishment of a stable 'national' entity. Second, there was the eastward expansion into a sparsely populated Siberia, from the 17th to the 19th centuries, which was broadly analogous to the westward expansion of the United States. Third, there was the post-World War II consolidation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. Except for some direct acquisition of territory—notably in the Baltic states — this process is not usefully described as an extension of empire. Rather, it represents, as in the United States approach to Central America, the combination of a traditional sphere influence claim with an attempt to enforce ideological conformity in the societies in question.

On this analysis, then, the Soviet Union's claim to be an unusually imperialist power rests primarily upon the territories acquired by conquest in the 19th century, above all the Islamic regions of Central Asia. And, indeed, as British statesmen argued in the early years of the de-colonization process, the fact that the Soviet Union largely escaped censure in this regard exemplified a 'blue-water fallacy' in which colonies were deemed to be genuine only if they were not held in territorial contiguity. However, this 'fallacy' accurately reflects the new structure of world politics, for the Afro-Asian states — the chief proponents of 'national-liberation' — are themselves in most cases engaged upon the attempt to consolidate 'empires' more obviously fragile than that of the Soviet Union. As Wight puts it:

The blue water fallacy has become orthodoxy, in the form of the right of territorial vicinity, and this is growing into a principle of continental solidarity ... In the sphere of legitimacy, if not yet in the sphere of strategy, land power has triumphed over sea power.
There remains the question of whether such a huge and complex political entity may not be rendered unworkable by domestic centrifugal forces. As to the longer term, leading into early decades of the 21st century, this is effectively an unanswerable question. This period will probably involve fundamental changes not just in the Soviet Union but throughout the existing world order; and whether the pattern of existing political units is likely to be influenced primarily by fission or by fusion, or by some 'neo-mediaevalist' combination of the two, would seem to be a matter for pure speculation. But for the period considered here, and leaving aside the question of central war, there is no persuasive reason for expecting the Soviet Union to break up under domestic pressures by 1994, to say nothing of 1984. And during this period, it will continue to confront an American adversary which - although it reached the destination by a very different route - is also a multi-racial empire in which the shift in the demographic balance against an already diverse European core is, in its own way, as striking as that in the Soviet Union itself. Moreover, if a united European great power should emerge in this period, it would be a third empire, bedevilled by a variety of peripheral conflicts which are already apparent in the constituent nation-states and which would not disappear merely because they were subsumed into the politics of a larger unit.

Although the Soviet Union seems destined for very considerable internal stresses in the coming decade, it is by no means clear that these will be of a qualitatively different order than those which will confront the United States or a putative united Europe. Indeed it is arguable that one of the most popular scenarios for Soviet 'imperial' problems currently on offer in the West - namely major unrest in Central Asia - is one of the least plausible in the immediate future. I have suggested that the 'state-breaking' dimension of modern nationalism is best attributed to the coincidence of clear ethnic and cultural differentia with the material grievances deriving from uneven economic development. The Soviet Central Asians certainly possess the ethnic and cultural differentia (together with a specific territorial base, which does not apply to the non-European populations in the United States). But they have also been, on balance, major beneficiaries of a redistributive central planning process which has directly countered the effects of uneven development. Whether they compare their conditions across generations in their own homelands, or across state boundaries to that of their co-religionists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, they
can as yet have no compelling material reason to reject their involvement in the Soviet state.\textsuperscript{44}

As for the Soviet Union's European populations, they may become increasingly exposed to challenging cross-national comparisons, especially if there are major deviations from the Soviet model among the East European states. But for the Russian majority of these populations, the deep roots of Soviet rule in the traditional political culture and its achievements in strengthening a Russian-dominated Soviet state will presumably remain important pluses; and broad cross-generational comparisons in regard to material living standards will presumably remain favourable for some time to come. Indeed, it could be argued that a much more traumatic cross-generational judgement confronts the peoples of the United States, who must accommodate to a rapid and bewildering degeneration from what, even twenty years ago, appeared as a position of near omnicompetence in domestic and international affairs.

The last point is not meant to suggest that the United States is itself on the verge of fundamental internal disarray, but rather to suggest that the whole question of the link between 'legitimacy' and Soviet foreign policy is normally posed the wrong way round in the American debate. Any reversion to a much more confrontationist foreign policy is likely to exacerbate, rather than to contain, the substantial domestic problems faced by both great powers, and there is, at the moment, little evidence that the leaderships on either side seriously envisage a major role for such a foreign policy in the 'legitimation' of their domestic rule. But domestic divisions do provide both leaderships with a major problem in 'legitimating' foreign policies whose 'national interest' component is in practice an expression of the interests and traditional preoccupations of the respective Russian and Anglo-Saxon political elites.\textsuperscript{*} This factor, along with the aspects of international structure discussed earlier, will lend a universalist 'world order' flavour to the Soviet-American confrontation, in the 1980s just as when it was first joined in earnest after World War II.

\textsuperscript{*} Indeed, this problem may be more immediately acute for American governments than for the Soviets, given the disproportionate influence of the Jewish and East European 'diasporas' in the American political process. Certainly, this is one more factor suggesting growing foreign policy divisions between the United States and its West European allies in the next decade or so. Some forty years after World War II, the latter may be expected to favour pragmatic 'national interest' stances on European and Middle Eastern issues which may be strongly opposed by East European and Jewish opinion in the United States.
However, although a substantial world order conflict is virtually a given of the Soviet-American relationship, there is room for dispute over the extent to which it can be kept separate from the management of the military confrontation between the two powers. Partly for ideological reasons, and partly because it has 'come from behind' in the military competition, the Soviet Union has tended to stress the desirability of keeping these two aspects separate. American leaders, by contrast, have tended to regard these elements as inseparable; and in the era of American preponderance they could draw upon a battery of concepts which suggested an instrumental role for military force and the threat of force in the promotion of American world order goals. The implications of these concepts will be considered in the next two sections. Precisely because the United States was preponderant for the first post-war generation, they were influential in shaping the environment in which the Soviet-American competition developed; but I will be arguing that, on balance, they were not conducive to stability of expectations, and a sense of international society, between the two great powers.

Balance

The concept of balance has obvious mechanistic overtones. Moreover, these have been accentuated in the postwar American debate by the extensive attention given to the alleged differences between multipolar and bipolar 'international systems' and to the strategic arms race as an allegedly self-sustaining competition. Such approaches inevitably distract attention from the fundamentally political character of the military competition between the United States and the USSR, and from the wider geopolitical and economic issues with which it is inextricably associated. The following discussion will attempt, through a focus upon the structural logic of the situation, to accord such questions their due prominence.

Whether under a bipolar or multipolar power structure, the underlying logic of great power relations remains the same. It is the principle of competitive emulation or, as Raymond Aron puts it, 'the simple principle of equilibrium': oppose actors tending to assume a position of predominance in the system as a whole. As has been argued, this active concern with overall power structure is perforce a matter chiefly for the great and the near great, and there is no necessary
incompatibility between bipolarity at the great power level and a plurality of political and social alignments among the lesser powers. But, whereas a multipolar central balance can be influenced both by competitive improvements in capability and by changes in politico-military alignments among the great, only the former resource is fundamentally significant for the great in a bipolar power structure.\textsuperscript{46} Arms racing, therefore, is the 'normal' condition of such a relationship. Moreover, an arms race protagonist which does not simply pursue the 'absolute extension of its power, (but) seeks to limit it in relation to the power of the other', even if no formal measures of arms control are involved, is pursuing a simple policy of balance of power.\textsuperscript{47} Until the 1970s, both the Soviet Union and the United States have characteristically insisted that a clear preponderance of power on their respective sides was vital to the preservation of peace; but both have, at various stages, exhibited elements of such a policy of contrived balance in their unilateral arms procurement decisions, as well as in their joint arms control initiatives.

It is in this context that the arms race as a political phenomenon should be placed. To say that arms race is the 'normal' balancing relationship in a system of only two great powers is not to suggest that either the intensity of the Soviet/American contest over the last three decades or the dimensions of the strategic and conventional arsenals now possessed by both powers are part of the ineluctable logic of the security dilemma. Both sides have acquired conventional capabilities which, on the one hand, have permitted the military promotion of goals well beyond the arena of their obvious security interests, and, on the other, have ensured that direct conflict between them in areas where the 'balance of interests' is fluid and ambiguous can no longer be discounted. Both have pursued certain strategic policies which, given the special characteristics of nuclear weapons, can be characterized with reasonable confidence as particularly prejudicial to their mutual security. Since both have also exhibited a limited capacity for restraint, it is fair to ask why, in areas of relatively clear mutual interest, that restraint has not been greater. And a satisfactory answer to this question seems impossible without appealing, finally, to considerations of political judgement and political will.

Moreover, it is important to note the very different options before the two powers for much of this period - at least in regard to strategic
arms and global projection capability. The chief opportunity for initiatives towards a common approach to a contrived balance lay with the United States, as the clear quantitative and qualitative arms race leader until the late 1960s. In the absence of such American initiatives, the choice before the Soviet Union was simple: it could pursue a balancing policy of trying to cut down the American lead, or it could resign itself to a modified American hegemony. The situation is, of course, far more ambiguous today. But one notable aspect of the contemporary relationship, which gives considerable point to Soviet suspicion of the American rhetoric of balance, is that statements heralding either the end of bipolarity or the emergence of Soviet preponderance have proliferated at the very time at which the overall power structure has finally become truly bipolar.*

Before developing this theme, it is necessary briefly to consider the chief arguments which in addition to interstate action-reaction, have often been adduced to explain the independent momentum of at least the strategic arms race.48 Perhaps the most persuasive of these relate to the enormous importance of the qualitative competition.

The supremely important qualitative change, of course, has been the original combination of thermonuclear weapons and near instantaneous means of delivery. But, more generally, the strategic environment is one of 'continuous innovation'.49 Therefore, given the phenomenon of long lead times in the conceptualization, development and procurement of new weapons systems, attempts to maintain the 'delicate balance of terror' solely by unilateral measures must involve 'reaction' not merely to those arms already deployed by the adversary, but to those which he might be expected to deploy within a 5-10 year period. These considerations lead to the view that the only reliable method of avoiding 'technological surprise' is to push forward as fast as possible with a continuous and broadly-based program of research and development. For a power which, like the United States for most of the postwar strategic competition, is generally much closer to technological frontiers, this can mean, paradoxically, that the 'real' R & D race is not with the rival power, but between the developing potential of offensive and defensive systems on its own side.50

* See the discussion of this point in Chapter 3, pp.304-5.
While development need not necessarily lead to deployment, an internal stimulus to this transition derives from the 'follow on' imperative, the need to provide continuity of employment to the specialized production lines which come to be regarded, like the research teams, as assets crucial to the security of the country. Moreover, these groups, together with the armed forces which commission their services, can be expected to form a natural alliance - often referred to as the 'military-industrial [scientific] complex' - in the struggle to defend or expand the military proportion of total budgetary allocations. Finally, a great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to the apparent impact upon force postures of bureaucratic bargaining between the different armed services. While such 'bureaucratic politics' analyses are of little help in explaining the overall dimensions of a state's military endeavour, they may reveal elements of its composition which have important implications for arms control.

Some of these models - most notably those of 'bureaucratic politics' and the 'military-industrial complex' - have been adapted to the explanation of Soviet arms race behaviour. But they were developed primarily with reference to the United States; and they contributed in the late 1960s to the argument, supported in part by Secretary of Defense McNamara, that United States strategic developments, driven by their own internal dynamic and rationalized in terms of exaggerated projections for Soviet deployments, had provided the major driving force of an action-reaction arms race. However, with the Soviet deployment, first, of missile launch numbers well in excess of the long stationary American total and, second, of MIRVs upon its new generation of heavy ICBMs, this view was subjected in the 1970s to an increasingly powerful counter-attack. Perhaps the most effective statement of this case was by Albert Wohlstetter, who rejected the whole notion of an American-led arms race. 'Starting in the early 1960s', he argued, 'we systematically underestimated how much and how rapidly the Soviets would increase their strategic offense forces. Moreover, for an even longer time, our own spending on strategic forces has been "spiralling" down rather than up'.

Though Wohlstetter - along with hawk colleagues such as Pipes and Gray - seriously exaggerates the extent of the 1960s 'arms control' consensus and its impact on American policy before Salt I, and though
his choice of statistical indicators has been challenged in detail, he does effectively demonstrate that the arms race cannot be reduced to a simple mechanical model or models. However, he fails to dispose of it as a wider political phenomenon. In this regard, the most striking aspects of the strategic competition have been occasional dramatic surges which, on one side or the other, have transformed the 'normal' process of weapons acquisition and improvement. The greatest of these expansions (with counterparts in the conventional field as well) were the massive American build-up during the Kennedy administration, and the equally massive Soviet response from the mid 1960s onward. But the 1970s have been marked in their turn by a barely restrained qualitative surge on both sides, for which the introduction of MIRVs might reasonably be regarded as an essential trigger. The record suggests, indeed, that there are 'lead times' in the political as well as in the technological sphere - lengthy cycles of mistrust about the adversary's intentions and his very interpretation of the relationship, which seriously prejudice the prospects for substantial arms control understandings even in periods when the 'objective' conditions for such understandings appear favourable.

The notion might be clarified by considering the relevance for the Soviet-American strategic competition of four possible arms race 'scenarios':

(i) Leading power with capability and will to outdistance second power. Second power accepts this. Modified hegemony.

(ii) Second power with capability and will to overtake leading power. High risk of war.

(iii) Leading power which both powers believe can maintain lead, but elects not to pursue hegemony, and sees appropriate opportunity for provisional halt. Strong foundation for arms control, if second power responds with restraint. Opportunity enhanced, if clear qualitative 'plateau' reached.

(iv) No clear leader. Indefinite race. Both powers able and willing to stay the course. Some heightened risk of ultimate war.
The first scenario is roughly that proposed by several observers, including McNamara, in the middle 1960s. Indeed, Soviet strategic and conventional power (with the exception of the immediate European balance) was quite eclipsed by the United States in those years, and a comprehensive 'catch-up' effort was clearly calculated to place considerable strain on the much weaker Soviet economy. But such an effort was indicated by the logic of the balance of power; and to assume that it would not be forthcoming was to assume that the Soviets would be content to entrust their interests, on the one hand, to the allegedly favourable trend of non-military forces, and on the other, to the unforced restraint of their 'imperialist' rival.

The second picture is inherently implausible for the very reason which allowed the first to be seriously entertained: the economic and technological superiority which the United States could, in principle, bring to bear in an unrestrained race. But it does not greatly exaggerate the picture recently offered by numerous right-wing critics of American military posture during the period of detente - of a weary and confused democracy in danger of donating a condition of military superiority to its totalitarian rival in a fit of absence of will. At a less polemical level, however, it seems most reasonable to describe the current situation in terms of the fourth alternative presented above. There are clearly major 'asymmetries' today, both in geographical concentrations of power and in the type of weapons deployed on either side, but the uncertainties of the present decade are, for the first time in the Soviet-American relationship, those of a rough overall balance of power.

It must be reiterated that a continuing arms competition is one side of the normal balancing process in such conditions, and that there is no convincing evidence to suggest that arms races lead inevitably to war. But general situations of heightened tension, in which each side comes to believe that its own 'legitimate' interests are being denied by the other, do appear to provide an environment in which specific major crises can trigger open conflict. Therefore, given the high level of tension currently associated with the extension of the qualitative competition in strategic arms, it is especially interesting to consider the extent to which conditions favouring the third alternative, of a calculated halt by the leading power, have obtained in the postwar period. Such conditions appear to have arisen twice, in the late 1950s, when the Soviet Union began to acquire a nuclear capability against the
North American continent, and in the late 1960s, when the Soviet arsenal finally approached a form of parity, in numbers and 'survivability', with its American counterpart; and, on each occasion, the United States responded by lifting the competition onto a quite new plane.

In the first case, certain technical arms control considerations might be advanced as a partial, though far from adequate explanation of the Kennedy administration expansion: the inadequacy of 'national-technical means of verification', even on the American side; the confusion in regard to Soviet capabilities and intentions created by Khrushchev's verbally aggressive 'Sputnik diplomacy'; and the contention of influential arms control theorists that deterrent 'stability' required not merely invulnerable forces, but also substantial numbers of forces, on either side.\textsuperscript{56} In the second instance, none of these considerations was relevant, and the discussions which led to the formal SALT process were already in train. Yet actual American policy ran directly counter to the theoretical prescriptions of the minimum deterrence outlook which, in the hawk account, then constituted the dominant arms control orthodoxy. By initiating the deployment of MIRVs, the United States authorities altered the potential ICBM 'exchange ratio' - in the first strike - from one favouring the defence to one favouring the attack, and thus created the basic preconditions for the significance of those auxiliary issues, such as accuracy and throw-weight, which bedevilled SALT prospects in the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{56} Therefore, without embracing the idea of a natural 'technological plateau' in the arms race, one may question why political action has worked against, rather than with, such limited opportunities as have arisen for stability in this regard. In particular, it is important to consider the adequacy of certain long-standing judgements about the political significance of nuclear weapons which have tended to militate against major restraints on the exploitation of American technological superiority. These judgements, whose continuing influence is readily apparent in the current orientation of the Reagan administration, are neatly encapsulated in a statement by Gray, himself a leading advocate
of 'more energetic American arms race behaviour' in the 1970s and 1980s. Great geopolitical insight is not required to perceive that a status quo, ocean-empire superpower needs more raw strategic power than does a dissatisfied heartland superpower.

To begin with, then, there is the basic preference for superiority. This preference rests upon what Wight has called the 'bank balance' conception of the balance of power, which asserts the desirability of a favourable balance of power on one's own side, upon which to draw in situations of crisis. And indeed, the notion that the status quo will suffer least disturbance when the beneficiaries of the status quo are clearly predominant is, within its limits, perfectly true. This is demonstrated, as Geoffrey Blainey points out, by the relatively enduring periods of peace consequent upon decisive wars where one side is able to dictate, and subsequently to police, its own preferred terms of settlement. More generally, the operation of the principle can be observed in the absence of warfare among the small states within a great power's sphere of influence, even where, as in Eastern Europe, the region may be littered with potential irredentist conflicts. But the sphere of influence analogy also suggests why, in the wider system, such a condition of hegemonic 'peace and security' is likely to prove intolerable to rising or temporarily defeated major powers which possess the resources to back their revisionist ambitions.

In the pre-nuclear era, this was a likely prescription for an arms race, leading either to some form of accommodation or to ultimate war. However, the instantaneous destruction threatened by nuclear weapons would appear to short circuit this process. The achievement by the inferior power even of a small and vulnerable deterrent ought logically to encourage the superior power to consider arms restraint, since the greater the threat posed to the former's nuclear force, the greater its 'incentive to pre-empt' in an intense crisis. Indeed, in the specific geographical context of the US-Soviet conflict, this logic could be applied even to the period when the Soviet Union could threaten the United States only indirectly, through a conventional and/or nuclear threat to Western Europe. The demonstration of a maximum capacity for a lightning thrust against the latter in a crisis situation was a natural
centrepiece of the Soviet effort to deter an American nuclear attack; and this in turn reinforced the case for complete Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Yet in the era of American invulnerability, when the immediate rationale of the American nuclear capability lay in the area of 'extended deterrence', the mitigation of the Soviet threat to Europe was presumably among the foremost diplomatic objectives which the American arsenal was supposed to advance.

Finally, attempts to bypass the nuclear stalemate by greater emphasis upon conventional power are subject, in their turn, to the normal logic of the arms race. The build-up of American conventional forces under Kennedy, initiated after a period of substantial Soviet reductions in this sphere, was matched by a comparable Soviet expansion later in the decade, which has come to fruition in a period marked both by increased complexity in the strategic balance, and by post-Vietnam uncertainty in American foreign policy. The present situation, indeed, lends some credibility to Gray's suggestion that 'the most dangerous condition of the strategic balance [may be] one of a generally acknowledged parity', in that 'unless one party has a clearly marked stake in the issue under dispute ... neither side can be certain who ought to give most'. But, as noted earlier, the objective conditions for direct great power collisions in areas of major uncertainty are also of a quite different order today than might have obtained if a condition of parity had been secured without the original American build-up.

As regards the issue of geopolitics, I have already suggested that the resurgence of this theme in the recent American strategic debate has sometimes provided little more than a self-serving ideological code whereby the Soviet Union can be simultaneously portrayed as seriously challenging the stability of the states-system, yet also - in contrast to its own protestations of continued revolutionary elan - as an old fashioned imperialist power profoundly out of tune with the movement of history. But, seriously considered, as a structural perspective on the distribution of power, the geopolitical approach offers more ambiguous implications. The continued importance, despite nuclear weapons, of the geographical distribution of power is undeniable. Even leaving ideological conflicts aside, this in itself would probably make the Soviet Union the sole or primary target of the three existing 'independent' nuclear
deterrents, as well as that of the United States, and require the extension of an American 'nuclear umbrella' to Western Europe and Japan. More generally, while Soviet authorities will tend to identify a permanent threat of diplomatic-military encirclement in their enormous land borders, their American counterparts will generally be more impressed with the abundance of opportunities for low cost Soviet incursions into surrounding regions. In this sense, indeed, geopolitical contradictions are built into the Soviet-American relationship. But to cast that relationship in the supposedly traditional mould of land power-insular power conflict or to depict the overall American position as merely one of 'balancing' disproportionate Soviet power in Eurasia, is to enter far more questionable territory.

The notion that such a 'balancer' role had fallen to the United States does appear to have been influential in the Realist realignment in American perceptions after World War II. The historical referent was, of course, 18th and 19th century Britain, just as Wilhelmine Germany seems increasingly to be the implicit referent for the explanation of the *arriviste* 'imperialism' of the contemporary Soviet Union. However, the special significance of Britain (as, perhaps, of Venice in the Italian city-state context) was that, in a multi-polar power structure with a single 'core' and an extensive periphery, she disposed of a different kind of power than that of her peers. On the one hand, therefore, she was substantially exempt from the omnipresence of the security dilemma, being normally secure against invasion herself, yet unable to threaten the other powers with direct military hegemony. On the other, since her primary diplomatic objectives lay outside the core region, a balance in that area, giving her a free hand in the periphery, was her most enduring interest.

Even under these special conditions, the advantages conferred by Britain's 19th century 'balancer' role were so marked as to lead many historians to treat the period as 'the age of British predominance'. In the present system, where nuclear weapons have established the general application of the security dilemma in its most absolute form, where the Far East has definitely joined Europe as a core region of the dominant balance, and where a 'within-system' periphery has become a primary arena for the great power contest over milieu goals, the notion of the insular power as balancer becomes quite untenable.
Insofar as it influenced postwar American policy, helping to give concrete geographical and military expression to the concept of 'containment', it functioned as a rationale for American hegemony, reaching its apogee with the Vietnam intervention - which Eugene Rostow, then at the State Department, justified by reference to North Vietnamese violation of 'the first and most basic rule of Peaceful Coexistence: 'that the frontiers of the two systems not be altered unilaterally or by military action'.

The other side of the hawk argument from geopolitics - the implicit comparison of the contemporary Soviet Union with early 20th century Germany in terms of its incentive to forcibly 'restructure' a power environment which threatens to become increasingly unfavourable - is also basically implausible. The most important general point about the successive German bids for European hegemony was that they occurred at the height of a period of structural transition, in which German leaders had to look simultaneously to the logic of a relatively discrete European framework, within which Germany was potentially predominant, and an emerging global framework, within which Germany might be swamped by the world power of Britain, Russia and the United States. The Soviet Union's rise to global power status, on the other hand, occurred after the transition to a single global power structure was completed; and if the Soviet authorities face continuing problems in sustaining that status against the United States, these are not problems which can be mitigated by the control of more territory. On this more specific point, the challenge which the other great 'World Island' power, China, poses to the contemporary Soviet Union is not really comparable to that which the Soviet Union (or Russia) posed to Germany in the earlier period. The 'now or never' geopolitical arguments for German action against Russia were plausible because the latter, though backward, possessed major long-term advantages in area, natural resources and population. The Soviet Union's position in regard to the first two of these categories remains unparalleled, and its continuing need to improve the exploitation of its agricultural and mineral resources is a powerful incentive both towards greater concentration on domestic development efforts and towards closer cooperation with the advanced capitalist countries. And though China far surpasses it in population, it seems more reasonable - given the implications of nuclear weapons and
the \textit{absolute} size of the Soviet population - to regard this as a liability rather than an advantage for China in the foreseeable future.

In summary therefore, the geopolitical argument for an impending burst of Soviet expansionism rests on a poorly scrutinized analogy, rather than on a serious consideration of the structural contours of the contemporary situation. This leaves, finally, the appeal to the distinction between status quo and revisionist powers. This distinction (with its multiple variants such as satisfied, deterrer/dissatisfied, initiator, aggressor, revolutionary, imperialist, expansionist) has been one of the most prominent conceptual tools of American foreign policy analysis since 1945 - and one of the least adequate. The notion that the Soviet Union was unambiguously a power of the second type, driven, in Kennan's words, to fill 'every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power', was a central pillar of the rationale of containment.\textsuperscript{66} Similarly, one important assumption of 'second wave' deterrence theory was that challenges to the status quo would be readily identifiable as the conscious initiative of particular agents, and that, in terms of the dichotomy proposed by Thomas Schelling, deterrence would be an easier form of coercion than 'compellance', since it sought merely to preserve a status quo independently supported by custom and general political inertia.\textsuperscript{67} However, such distinctions are largely meaningless in the contemporary context unless considered in terms of both possession and milieu goals, or more broadly, of the structure of the states-system and its specific historical environment; and, in this light, much of their apparent clarity melts away.

In the sphere of possession goals, great power revisionism - which was such a crucial aspect of the nexus between the two world wars - has been of only minor significance in the post-1945 system. In regard to the basic territorial and political settlement emerging from World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union were essentially satisfied powers, with the uneasy stalemate over the division of Germany constituting only a partial exception to this generalization.\textsuperscript{68} It is true that the Soviet Union was deeply revisionist, in the first postwar decade, in respect of the specific distribution of military power, bending all its efforts towards ending the American nuclear monopoly - a 'strategic transformation', Kissinger wrote in 1957, which would have inevitably resulted in war had it been attempted by territorial expansion
but which, because it 'took place within sovereign territory ... produced an armaments race as a substitute for war'. However, as argued earlier, the Soviet approach was no more than normal 'balancing' behaviour, while United States efforts to evade the implications of a bipolar power structure militated against the possibility of a more general Soviet identification with the status quo.

In the sphere of milieu goals, Soviet doctrine and Soviet practice both indicate that direct military assistance to favoured regimes and insurgencies is regarded as a legitimate part of the Soviet contribution to the world-wide struggle of 'progressive' against imperialist forces. But, as the last chapter attempted to demonstrate, Soviet claims that their actions are merely assisting an autonomously developing historical process are not wholly without content. Moreover, unless one rules the activities of American-based transnational actors out of the equation, it can fairly be argued that the United States' approach to Third World political and economic structures was substantially more dynamic and initiatory than that of the Soviet Union for much of the postwar period - especially since the achievement of the transnationals was closely dependent upon the framework of political and military order established in the 'free world' by the American government's determination to hold the line against the encroachments of Communism.* Although this factor has commonly been ruled out in Western discussions of challenges to the international 'status quo', such judgements may be said to reflect, once again, the application of criteria derived from an idealization of the 18th and 19th century states-system to a contemporary situation which more closely resembles that of early modern Europe.

* See the discussion of this point in Chapter 3, pp. 298-9.
a virtual abdication of the field to Soviet adventurism, arguments
which claim that the current situation reproduces that of the 1930s,
with 'detente' serving merely as a cover term for the piecemeal
'appaisalment' of an insatiable Soviet imperialism, are a distinct
hindrance to serious analysis. 'Containment' and 'appeasement' - if
the notions have a genuine theoretical content - are not exclusive,
but rather complementary, aspects of a single process of the co-option
of rising or returning great powers to the existing system - the one
seeking to demonstrate that absolute security and absolute diplomatic
goals are unattainable, the other offering reassurance that, within a
framework of mutual restraint, legitimate security and diplomatic goals
will not be denied.

Whether such measures are sufficient to achieve adjustment without
war depends in part on the actual distribution of power in the system.
And from this standpoint, perhaps the chief lesson of the inter-war
years is that a potentially dominant power - such as Germany was within
the artificially limited European system of that period - can be neither
appeased nor contained, because a dominant power cannot be co-opted to
a status quo which does not reflect its own dominance. Despite its
disproportionate weight in Europe, the Soviet Union cannot seriously be
regarded as a dominant power in the present global system. Unless -
as seems implausible on the historical record - Soviet expansionism is
seen as driven by an inner dynamic which is insensible to external
restraints, its future course would seem, in principle, susceptible to
modification both by a growing Soviet stake in the international status
quo, and by the combination of containment and appeasement implied in
Kissinger's 1975 statement that 'the problem of our age is how to manage
the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower'.

Second, however, there are the special problems of bipolarity which
Kissinger's formulation so clearly exemplifies. In earlier periods, the
legitimate rights of an aspirant great power would have been the subject
of negotiations with a committee of several of its prospective peers.
Today, a new central balance of interests must be struck between one
power, formerly a near hegemonist, which is conscious above all of the
magnitude of its unforced concessions, and a second power which is
inclined, both by ideology and experience, to regard its own military
strength as the sole guarantee that its interests will be seriously
regarded by the other side.
Third, as Windsor points out, the co-option of the Soviet Union to an international (and world) order congenial to Western interests may be substantially complicated not by Soviet strength, but by Soviet weakness in great power accoutrements other than military force. The point, once again, is not that Soviet economic weakness itself constitutes an independent motor for expansionist drives. The point is that the structural asymmetries of the contemporary world-economy suggest, on the one hand, a continuing likelihood of autonomously generated instability in resource rich Third World nations, which will provide temptations for Soviet military assistance to 'progressive' factions, and, on the other, an inherent difference in the material interests of the Soviet Union and the major capitalist powers in preserving 'stability' in such regions. Two factors, in particular, might weigh against the potential for conflict in this situation: the development to a high level of consciously cultivated East-West economic cooperation, and a mutual recognition by the great powers of a link between the stability of the strategic relationship and the observance of certain 'rules of the game' in respect of their wider competition. The first issue, and the practical political problems raised by it in the 1970s, have been discussed in the previous chapter; the second requires an examination of the general implications of nuclear deterrence, to which we must now turn.

Deterrence

The concept of deterrence is not so obviously entwined with mechanistic analogies as is that of the balance of power. There are some indications in the American debate of reliance upon the notion of an abstract deterrence system, especially among the more 'theological' advocates of the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) position. But a much more pervasive concern has been that of 'rationality' in nuclear decision-making. This is a natural emphasis in considering the impact upon the states-system of weapons which – once in the possession of more than one power – effectively negate their own utility as rational instruments for the pursuit of diplomatic goals and raise the 'reciprocal fear of surprise attack' to the first rank of threats to stable relations among the great powers. However, I would argue that the cluster of bargaining and game-
playing metaphors which Robert Jervis refers to as second wave deterrence theory did not in practice constitute an attempt to apply assumptions of general rationality to a specific structural context but rather an attempt to elevate an American special rationality, based upon a 'mercantile' political culture, to universal status. As has already been argued, the commitment to analyse a situation of large-scale political interaction primarily in strategic terms implies a belief in the over-riding importance of material structures in that situation. But in the a-historical confines of the American strategic debate, the concrete material structures of contemporary world politics were generally reduced to a set of simplistic axioms about geopolitics and 'modernization', and the empty space thus provided was filled, in the development of second wave deterrence theory, with a peculiarly American network of constituent meanings.

Although seminal 'second wave' thinkers such as Thomas Schelling and Glen Snyder made important contributions to the refinement of American analyses of the structural changes wrought by nuclear weapons, the central issues involved, including the crucial distinction between first and second strikes, were rapidly grasped by analysts like Bernard Brodie at the outset of the nuclear era.* But, in contrast to their 'immensely popular' successors, these 'first wave' studies had little general impact - in part, Jervis argues, because they confined themselves to 'exploring the implications of nuclear weapons without also developing more explicit and deductive models and linking their arguments to the broader questions of bargaining'. This latter provided the primary focus of second wave theorists, who addressed themselves, more or less explicitly, to the question of how the threat of nuclear weapons could most effectively be manipulated to deter Soviet and/or Communist encroachments on American and 'Free World' interests, contributing significantly, in the process, to the general conceptual vocabulary in which - at both academic and governmental levels - American foreign policy came to be discussed. It seems fair to suggest that one important element of the second wave appeal to the positivist orthodoxy in American political science - which allowed its proponents successfully to ignore,

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* And also, as Chapter Seven points out, by Soviet military theorists when they were allowed to address these issues after the death of Stalin.
rather than rebut, their early critics was its general flavour of 'value free' inquiry and its illusory connection with the mathematical methodologies influential in more established social sciences such as economics. But the degree of genuinely scientific inquiry into the nature of international politics was in fact minimal - the theory remaining, as Alexander George and Richard Smoke point out, 'fundamentally normative-prescriptive, not historical-explanatory'.

Of course, a theory of deterrence must, in one sense, inevitably remain a theory without a practice. As is often pointed out, one cannot demonstrate with certainty that the United States and the Soviet Union have ever, by tacit or explicit nuclear threats, 'deterred' each other from doing anything, nor that any particular force posture or 'declaratory policy has raised or lowered the 'probability' of nuclear war. But the postwar era has produced numerous crisis situations for which it seems reasonable to infer a heightened risk of direct great power conflict and/or nuclear weapons use, and several limited war situations in which coercive strategies reflecting similar bargaining assumptions have been attempted in practice. Until the late 1960s, however, the development of the theory was characterized by a 'startling ... lack of search for supporting evidence'; and when a more empirically based mainstream critique - Jervis's 'third wave' - finally did emerge, it was in general remarkable for a propensity to tinker with, rather than replace, the original conceptual categories. Moreover, since the early 1970s, when the emergence of a relatively settled Soviet-American parity in nuclear weapons rekindled the alarms about the effectiveness of American 'extended deterrence' which had first surfaced in the late 1950s, the enduring concern with coercive bargaining strategies at the American governmental level has become increasingly important. Beginning with the 1973 Schlesinger proposals for counterforce strategies 'to shore up deterrence across the entire spectrum of risk', this theme has never been far from the surface in official pronouncements on nuclear issues, and under the Reagan administration it has burst into full flower.

This point is important because the hawk school have characteristically presented their own approach as an emphasis upon concrete political issues, as opposed to the a-historical abstractions of the MAD orthodoxy which, they claim, has fixed the United States into a dangerously vulnerable 'mutual deterrence' posture which is openly rejected by the
Soviet Union. However, I would argue that the theological approach to MAD and the theological approach to extended deterrence and limited war - which the hawk theorists themselves exemplify - are brothers under the skin, in that each involves the attempt to impose a technological solution on an intractable political problem. By contrast, mutual deterrence arguments have often been grounded less in the desire for a technological fix than in a recognition of the intractability of the problem; but their impact has always been weakened in the American context by the attractions of the extended deterrence approach, with its multiple resonances in the wider American political culture. In fact, as George and Smoke observe, this approach markedly failed to live up to its publicity as a scientific guide to practical policy making.

But while its productive impact upon American foreign policy was limited, it did have the negative effect of reinforcing the policy-makers' tendency to rely too heavily on deterrence strategy and deterrent threats in lieu of the more flexible instruments of international influence associated with classical diplomacy.

Given the impact upon United States elite opinion of the non-convergence of Soviet nuclear doctrine upon American assumptions, the claim that certain of these assumptions are misguided clearly needs substantiation. I will attempt to develop this argument in the ensuing sections, building on the earlier discussion of arms race dynamics and broad political tensions in the Soviet/American conflict, and laying the ground for the concluding discussion of prospects for contemporary international society. In thus seeking to focus upon the problems of securing great power recognition of shared and individual 'legitimate' interests, I will, of course, be pursuing a central concern of second wave deterrence theory - the search for 'salient' solutions upon which the 'rational' protagonists of a military adversary relationship could be expected to agree. But, I will seek to show that the more sophisticated bargaining theories - in their concern with the manipulation of threats to establish the salience of otherwise unpalatable solutions - have tended to obfuscate the central problem of the intrinsic balance of interests in conflict situations, and that, by contrast, the correlation of forces and related Soviet doctrines are rather more hospitable to such a notion than is normally acknowledged.
Deterrence involves, in the broadest sense, the attempt to prevent unwanted actions by threatening that the implementation of such actions will involve 'unacceptable' costs for their initiators. Deterrent threats in international relations need not, of course, be related to nuclear weapons; nor need they be addressed to any specific situation. The great significance of British naval power at its 19th century peak was that - by virtue of the prospective costs with which it confronted potential challengers - its actual employment against rival great powers was not required.81 Similarly, the Soviet Union's 'policing' of its East European sphere of influence depends primarily on the deterrent effect of the combination of massive Soviet capabilities and a demonstrated willingness to use them to forestall unwanted developments; and, if direct intervention were to be required on a regular, rather than an occasional basis, the Soviet position would become a great deal less tenable. The ability of decisive victors to ensure relatively lengthy periods of peace may also be attributed, in large part, to their successful deterrence of possible new challenges from their weakened rivals.

Indeed, a large proportion of the military preparations of most states may be attributed to a concern with the 'general deterrence' of developments regarded as adverse to their interests. As Patrick Morgan suggests, generally satisfied powers practise general deterrence to avoid having to practise 'immediate deterrence' in situations where specific substantial interests are definitely threatened, just as they practise immediate deterrence to avoid facing the choice between armed conflict and a complete or partial surrender on specific issues.82 Moreover, though powers seeking to effect change may be constrained to place greater reliance on the use of force, they too will normally be concerned to extract as much advantage as possible from threats alone. Therefore the deterrence theorists' characteristic image of international politics as a bargaining situation is, in general, a very appropriate one. When the leading states are agreed on their 'relative bargaining power' - and, by inference, upon the kind of claims which each can realistically advance - peace is likely.83 When changes in relative military capability, or major shifts in other elements of the 'correlation of forces', produce deep divergences on these issues, a situation of crisis (or, from a status quo perspective, of immediate deterrence) will arise. If the
more intensive bargaining of a crisis, or series of crises, does not produce a sufficient realignment in bargaining estimates, war - which alone provides for a relatively precise solution to such a 'dispute about the measurement of power' - is a likely result.84

In the prenuclear era, one can readily identify the phenomena both of a general compact among powers designed to promote the accommodation of conflicting interests, where possible, without resort to the costly tribunal of war, and of more specific conventions of crisis - from full-scale mobilization to the sending of gunboats to disputed colonial regions - by which the protagonists to a particular conflict attempted to 'signal' such factors as the intensity of their commitment, and their confidence of a favourable outcome in the event of actual war. However, as Geoffrey Blainey points out, a level of agreement on relative bargaining power sufficient to avert major war seldom obtained for more than a generation:85 and such peacetime bargaining techniques depended for their effectiveness precisely on the knowledge that, in the last analysis, the issue could and would be resolved by war. But this latter prospect, in contemporary great power relations, is effectively ruled out by the disproportionate damage threatened by nuclear weapons. On the one hand, therefore, the emphasis of second wave theorists on the unprecedented significance of peacetime bargaining in the nuclear era is perfectly justified. On the other hand, the range of bargaining strategies typically proposed, and the extent of the deterrence 'compact' with the Soviet Union implied in these strategies, is quite out of keeping with the fact that the underlying threat of military action is credible only in the most extreme exigencies.

The point is that actions such as mobilization or the movement of a naval squadron actually increase a state's capability for military action and their significance in this regard is a precondition of their significance as signals of heightened risk.86 But today's nuclear forces are unprecedented not merely in their destructive capacity, but also in their state of combat readiness. Therefore, all actions short of a significant strike are signals of intention pure and simple, and no amount of sophistication in signalling can lessen the enormity of the gap between declaration and implementation in this context. Because of the magnitude of the risk involved, signals such as the 1973 American 'Stage Three' alert, to say nothing of an actual 'demonstration strike', can of course be extremely potent. But their potency depends
precisely upon a prospect of real, destructive violence which cannot securely be contained by any signalling convention. If it were possible to devise a pure case of 'demonstration strike', and if this could be brought within a clear convention recognized by both sides, it would lose its effectiveness as a generator of risk. Indeed, this argument can be applied to the whole concept of a nuclear 'escalation ladder'. There must be some point of the ladder at which genuine costs begin to be inflicted on each side. If the lower 'rungs' were covered by an accepted 'signalling' convention, then genuine signalling would begin only at that point, with all the incalculable consequences that would entail.88

A related problem is the dubious manner in which prewar 'crisis management' and post-crisis 'limited war' are merged in doctrines proposing escalation as a basic bargaining technique. Both situations, it is assumed, could be marked by similar bargaining logic, combining restraint with competition in 'risk taking' and demonstration of 'resolve'. But the resolve which powers seek to demonstrate in non-nuclear contexts is above all resolve to fight, rather than merely to continue escalation in the intensity of their signals; and while the fighting may have its own limiting conventions, it remains in essence a trial of strength to determine issues which cannot be resolved by 'bargaining' alone. If two major nuclear powers were brought to actual warfare, the same imperative for a definitive solution would apply: but its pursuit would be self-defeating, since the extensive use by each side of its most efficient weapons, even in an ostensibly 'counterforce' mode, would inevitably threaten the virtual destruction of civil society on each side.* There would, therefore, be one supremely important bargaining issue in such a situation - the termination of hostilities without the use, or further use, of nuclear weapons.

Of course, any statements about this fortunately 'undiscovered country' must remain speculative, but it is intuitively difficult to credit the range of prospects envisaged in the American debate. These are usefully summarized in the 'representative taxonomy of limited nuclear conflict' suggested by Jack Snyder, in an examination of the prospects of Soviet acquiescence in the kind of limited nuclear exchanges

* This judgement on the effect of a major counterforce exchange would need qualification if both sides were to move completely to a SBLM based deterrent. But this does not seem likely within the period considered in this thesis.
envisaged in recent American targeting doctrines: (1) strikes limited to a specific region or theatre; (2) demonstration shots aimed at enhancing credibility, showing resolve, and demonstrating a willingness to compete in risk taking; (3) graduated infliction of pain, such as slow motion city trading; (4) attritional counterforce attacks with city avoidance; and (5) massive, pre-emptive counterforce attacks with city avoidance. Snyder concludes that the Soviet 'strategic culture' strongly militates against cooperation in regard to limited options in general. But one might add that, in any event, only the first and last of these alternatives warrant consideration as serious possibilities. The others, with their assumption of a further protracted process of intra-war bargaining aimed at resolving the conflict of interests which had originally caused the breakdown of pre-war bargaining, seem basically implausible.

In sum, therefore, the nuclear aspect of the great power relationship enormously upgrades their common interest in war avoidance and war termination. But it does nothing to remove those factors, such as the historical elasticity of the 'national interest', which have regularly produced great power warfare in the past. Agreed conventions on signalling and other techniques of crisis management are vital to the operation of a deterrence compact, but the compact itself depends upon the identification of a basic core of common interest, whose clarity diminishes noticeably as one moves along a spectrum from mutual deterrence, through questions of defence, warfighting and 'damage limitation', to those of 'extended deterrence', or the diplomatic dimension of nuclear weapons. Each of these areas will now be considered in turn.

Mutual deterrence is the heart of the Soviet-American nuclear relationship. If no other considerations were involved, two judgements could be made with substantial confidence. Objectively, conditions for stable deterrence would be optimal when each side's 'countervalue' capability was at a maximum, and its 'counterforce' capability at a minimum. Subjectively, it would be in each side's interest to convince
the other that it would strike only in retaliation, but that, if subjected to a first strike from the other, it would inevitably retaliate.

One crucial proposition flowing from this is that each side has a direct interest in the security of the other's retaliatory capability, and should not pursue 'active' or 'passive' damage limiting policies (first strike counterforce, on the one hand, or ABM, air defence and civil defence, on the other) to an extent which threatens the other's ability to inflict 'unacceptable' damage in a second strike. This counter-intuitive and politically unpalatable doctrine was held by many American commentators to have been enshrined in the SALT I treaty banning nationwide ABM systems, and the exaggerated claims then made probably contributed substantially to the extent of the disillusionment produced by the growing evidence of a developing Soviet threat to the American ICBM force. However, the notion that American policies have themselves ever reflected a wholehearted endorsement of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' is a serious distortion of the historical record.

Assured Destruction undoubtedly dominated American declaratory policy through most of the 1960s, after McNamara's brief flirtation with a 'No Cities' counter-force doctrine in 1961-62. But the United States' nuclear arsenal in this period greatly exceeded the levels required by its proclaimed Assured Destruction goals, and numerous authorities have testified that, at the level of action policy, the counterforce targeting initiated by McNamara remained unchanged. By the late 1960s, when the Soviet Union appears finally to have acquired an invulnerable second strike capability, the United States was already moving towards MIRV deployment, and since the 1974 unveiling of the Schlesinger doctrine, an American determination not to allow any significant Soviet counterforce advantage has been enshrined even in declaratory doctrine. In general, it can be said that both Soviet and American leaderships have really begun to come to terms with the mutual hostage relationship only in the last decade, and in conditions much less favourable than those which might have been obtained in an 'un-MIRVed' world.

Second, it must be emphasized that the 'theory' of mutual deterrence rests on the commonsense proposition that potential aggressors will be deterred by the prospect of 'a lot' of damage, and that American attempts to give precise operational significance to this basically crude notion have merely served to confuse the issue. The very high Assured Destruction targets proposed under McNamara (25-30% of the USSR's population, and two thirds of its industrial capacity) appear to have been determined primarily on technological, rather than political grounds; and because of the systematic employment of 'worst case' planning
these criteria themselves had very little impact on the determination of the American force structure.\textsuperscript{9a}

With the emergence of a more formidable Soviet nuclear capability, the Nixon administration shifted to an emphasis upon destruction levels equal to anything the Soviets could inflict.\textsuperscript{95} And this relative approach reached its logical culmination - in the context of the recent debate over the Soviet civil defence programme - in targeting programmes designed to ensure that the Soviet Union could not recover from a nuclear war more rapidly than the United States - a policy which, in Bernard Brodie's words, appears to lack 'any political input', and for which 'one would have to go back almost to the fate of Carthage to find a precedent'.\textsuperscript{96} In general, it may be argued that the notion that stable deterrence somehow requires the preservation, in all circumstances, of such massive destructive capabilities, or that these requirements could actually increase in proportion as the Soviet Union's own capabilities increased, has had a corrupting and distorting influence upon a debate that is in any case highly charged with emotion.

These considerations provide the background against which the second complex of issues - concerning defence, damage limitation and war fighting - should be assessed. It is virtually impossible not to recognize the technological reality of the mutual hostage relationship between the great powers.\textsuperscript{97} But it is only in terms of a strict MAD 'theology', which attempts to impose a narrow and abstract notion of instrumental rationality upon a fundamentally intractable situation, that the preservation of this relationship can be said to demand total abstention from defensive measures against attacks on cities and populations. Even leaving aside the fundamental connection between the legitimacy of governments and their commitment directly to protect their societies against external threats, it is an insoluble paradox of nuclear deterrence that the very threats of massive retaliation which seem calculated to maximize deterrence are those whose implementation, if deterrence should fail, would be both morally abhorrent and tantamount to national suicide. Given the inherent credibility problem of such threats, it can be argued that deterrence will be most effective when a state can project the determination to fight a nuclear war, should one eventuate, in such a way as to minimize potential damage to itself. Soviet military doctrine, overwhelmingly shaped by professional military theorists and reflecting
a history in which even ultimately victorious wars have involved
great damage to the homeland, has traditionally adopted just such a
stance;\(^9\) and there are indications, in the era of nuclear parity, of
a significant and growing degree of 'convergence' in American academic
and governmental thinking upon this view.

In this respect, at least, the Soviet-American debate on the
'rationality' of nuclear war, with accusations of continued adherence
to Clausewitz being traded back and forth by commentators on both sides,
would appear to be an essentially bogus one.\(^9\) The view that nuclear
war is a 'rational' instrument of policy is indeed inimical to stable
deterrence: but should nuclear war break out, a commitment on both
sides to the subordination of military action to rational political
control would be an essential precondition of its termination short of
a general holocaust. Thus both the Soviet and American warfighting
doctrines address a crucial weakness in the absolute deterrence/defence
dichotomy promoted by the Assured Destruction concept, though neither
of their radically different solutions - massive counterforce, linked
to 'passive' damage limitation and all out conventional war, on the
one hand, and limited counterforce, selective options, and 'intra-war
deterrence' on the other, provides a nearly adequate solution of this
fundamentally insoluble problem. Soviet prescriptions, if carried out
to the letter, would be likely to produce a situation virtually
indistinguishable from reciprocal massive retaliation.\(^0\) They thus
seem calculated to preserve a high 'nuclear threshold', while at
the same time removing any inbuilt commitment to massive counter city
strikes for their own sake. However, if their goal of unilateral
damage limitation is taken seriously, it must create a strong 'incentive
to pre-empt' in situations of extreme crisis. The Schlesinger proposals
(like their 'No Cities' predecessors) raise the vital question of
cooperative damage limitation. But, by depicting, in effect, a single
escalatory continuum between crisis and war, they contrive both to
lower the nuclear threshold, and to confound cooperation for the single
purpose of war termination with cooperation to sustain an indefinite and
artifically limited process of coercive bargaining.\(^1\)

As was argued earlier, the notion that some form of nuclear victory
could pass to the power demonstrating a tougher bargaining stance, while
the bulk of its opponent's arsenal remained unused, appears quite
Illusory. It seems far more likely that, if a great power nuclear
engagement were not halted after the earliest exchanges, it would
escalate rapidly to all out war. Success in the first alternative
would undoubtedly require a belief on each side that the adversary
possessed both the command and control facilities, and the political
judgement and political will, to enable it to disengage from a situation
of actual conflict. But sophisticated counterforce capabilities and
sophisticated counterforce strategies would probably be quite irrelevant
to the type of signalling required for this; and the prior establishment
of an agreed set of bargaining conventions would merely encourage 'intra-
war' escalation, just as it would render less momentous the original
passage from crisis into war.\textsuperscript{102}

These issues in turn merge with those of extended deterrence and
nuclear diplomacy, which lie at the end of the spectrum of ambiguous
interests mentioned above and in regard to which differences between
Soviet and American approaches are most obvious and fundamental.\textsuperscript{103}
While there are obvious historical and institutional reasons for the
Soviet adherence to traditionalist warfighting doctrines against the
notion of extensive cooperation with a wartime adversary, their hostility
to American limited war doctrines is also a realistic response to the
ambiguous kind of cooperation which it suggests. Indeed, in this specific
area, the Soviet Union would appear to have the better of the argument
over Clausewitz. Pronouncements by the political leadership about the
relation of Peaceful Coexistence and nuclear war, as distinct from
military writings about how a war would be fought \textit{if} it occurred,
invariably emphasize that nuclear war cannot be an instrument of policy.
By contrast, Schlesinger's concern to 'shore up deterrence across the
entire spectrum of risk' might be more accurately expressed in terms of
the \textit{extension} of the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons to a range
of contingencies to which a nuclear response might normally seem
incredible. Moreover, the concern to extract specific diplomatic
advantages from the possession of nuclear weapons, first by tacit or
explicit threats of 'massive retaliation', and later by a variety of
'flexible response' strategies, has been a pervasive concern of academic
and governmental thinking in the United States since at least 1953.

There is, of course, a major structural problem of nuclear deterrence
involved here: the prospect that 'stalemate' at the nuclear level could
allow the piecemeal achievement of substantial gains by actors prepared to take the initiative at lower levels of violence.\textsuperscript{104} Moreover there are inherent reasons why the two powers would be likely to assume clearly opposed positions on the 'extended deterrence' issue. Granted the ostensible Soviet perspective of a world revolutionary process and a shifting correlation of forces, the stability of Soviet-American deterrence would actually be endangered by the 'freezing' of historical change, which would merely create intolerable pressures and major conflagrations in the longer term. By contrast the American tendency to situate the deterrence relationship within a wider international (or world political) system encourages the view that deterrence stability is closely linked to stability in the latter context. More tangibly, the Soviets have been compelled to rely, for most of their history, primarily on indirect means for the long range pursuit of influence; while their most vital interests have been unambiguously 'given' by their geography and historical experience, and have been readily defensible, since World War II, by overwhelming conventional power.\textsuperscript{105} The United States, by contrast, enjoyed for at least a century an impressive real world approximation to 'absolute security', which was rudely shattered by the Soviet nuclear threat a mere decade after it had begun consistently to exercise its full weight in international affairs. Concerned from at least the mid-1950s with the problems of extending credible nuclear guarantees to Western Europe and Japan, and lacking any immediate compulsion to draw clear distinctions between vital and other interests, American policy makers naturally inclined towards concepts which promised that their still extensive strategic preponderance and conventional reach could be effectively deployed in defence of a favourable international milieu.

It must be acknowledged that the defence of West European and Japanese territorial integrity clearly constitutes a vital American interest. But, in a sense, it is precisely this consideration which has been obscured by the absolutization of the notion of 'credibility' in American deterrence theorizing. An American threat to 'commit national suicide' in defence of Western Europe, after all, is only relatively less credible than an American threat to commit national suicide in defence of the 'United States'; and it is arguable that there is a greater qualitative resemblance between these two threats than
between such threats in respect of Western Europe and, for instance, South Korea. The great intrinsic significance, economically, strategically and culturally, of Western Europe to the United States suggests a level of intrinsic risk in a Soviet attack which any prudent decision-maker would reject: and Soviet military writings, in contrast to limited war theorizing in the United States, have characteristically discussed such an attack only in the context of all out war between the great powers.*

However, as George and Smoke point out, the question of intrinsic interests as the basis for commitment to third parties was largely ignored by second wave theorists, in favour of a concentration upon complicated strategies by which credibility could be imparted to guarantees which would otherwise lack it.106 The neglect of distinctions between vital and other interests was in fact a natural concomitant of the propensity to view the great power relationship as a vast ongoing game of bluff, strikingly exemplified in the following discursus by Schelling on the Chicken Game analogy:

What is at stake is not only the risk of being exploited by one's partner. There is also the risk that the other will genuinely misinterpret how far he is invited to go. If one yields on a series of issues, when the matters at stake are not crucial, it may be difficult to communicate to the other just when a vital issue has been reached ... It may be safer in the long run to hew to the centre of the road than to yield six inches on successive mights if one intends to stop yielding before he [sic] is pushed off the shoulder. It may save both parties a collision.107

The rationale for this insistence upon the importance of apparently trivial issues lay in Schelling's definition of bargaining credibility as simply another term for the 'interdependence of a country's commitments'.108 But in practice such conceptions of commitment, by reducing 'a complex political fact to a military or diplomatic process', actually obscured, in the United States' most crucial third party commitments, those very features most likely to impress an adversary claiming to ground all its actions in a careful analysis of the correlation of forces.109

Both the doctrine of closely interdependent commitments and the specific bargaining strategies emphasized by second wave theorists have received little support from the general record of direct Soviet-American crisis behaviour. Second wave arguments implied that statesmen

* The argument that this has begun to change in the last decade will be considered in Chapter 7.
would attempt to exploit the appearance of 'irrational' commitment, that they would consciously foreclose options and initiate risk processes which they themselves could not fully control, and that they would be prepared to move towards the brink on relatively trivial issues rather than compromise their bargaining reputation by retreating under pressure.\textsuperscript{110} But the plausibility of 'brinkmanship' as a general strategy varies inversely with the adversary's freedom to pursue the competition in risk taking on an equal basis. The concept thus assumed what Hermann Kahn called 'escalation dominance' on the American side, and was already being rendered obsolete by the developing Soviet nuclear capability by the time it began to receive this full theoretical exposition.\textsuperscript{111} While the nuclear era has indeed produced a lengthening of the escalation ladder, as Glen Snyder and Paul Deising suggest,\textsuperscript{112} it has been a lengthening downwards, not upwards, facilitated by a considerable incentiveness in 'issue splitting' in the signalling behaviour of both sides.\textsuperscript{113} Overall, as Aron observes, great power interactions have observed the most basic rules of prudence, and 'have shown more signs of conforming to the crude, even primitive Russian doctrine than of drawing their inspiration from the subtleties of the American analysts'.\textsuperscript{114}

This can hardly be surprising. Nuclear deterrence is not a subtle strategy, but a crude, even primitive threat to impose intolerable damage if certain limits are transgressed. The 'strategic man' of the deterrence theorists, equipped with a clearly defined costs/benefits calculus, does not exist, least of all in a situation of major crisis.\textsuperscript{115} And if he did, and if he believed his opponent to be similarly equipped, he would not be deterred by threats whose credibility, in the last instance, rests upon the power of emotional values not reducible to such a calculus. The very idea of nuclear deterrence, as Morgan argues, involves the tacit assumption of 'sensible' (or, in the favoured Soviet terminology, 'realistic' or 'sober') decision-makers, aware that national suicide in defence of intensely held values is not an impossibility.\textsuperscript{116} This being so, nuclear crises are likely to be influenced far less by 'histrionic talents' than by each side's 'estimates of the opponent's value system',\textsuperscript{117} and of the balance of 'legitimate' interests in the issue under dispute.\textsuperscript{118}
The elusive notion of legitimacy raises in turn the question of the more general world view promoted by second wave deterrence theory. Ostensibly value free, it appears effectively to have operated, by virtue of its symbiotic relationship with the more simplistic variants of Cold War Realism and the ideology of containment, to promote an image of East-West relations in which an intense degree of conflict between two discrete actors, one of which could consistently be identified with attempts to overturn the legitimate status quo, could be taken as given. Later American critics have argued that this approach construed the situation of general deterrence in terms which are appropriate only to immediate deterrence. But this criticism is itself too weak, for it fails to take account of the importance of autonomous factors, over which neither actor has effective control, even in direct confrontations between the great powers. The neat, two actor, aggressor/deterrer schema is questionable, for instance, even in the case of such superficially unambiguous Soviet initiatives as the 1948 and 1961 Berlin crises - to say nothing of the Indo-China crisis of 1953-54, whose 'structure' and 'root causes', George and Smoke conclude, 'were such as to make it a non-deterrable phenomenon'.

Even in some crisis situations, therefore, though far more obviously in the wider Cold War context, American policy can be seen as concerned not with deterring an identifiable adversary from doing something, but with deterring 'something' (at the level of mass action) from happening. This, of course, has by no means been an exclusively American preoccupation. Soviet 'deterrence' in Eastern Europe is directed less against the regimes in question than against those popular forces which might, if given their head, impel the latter towards changes unacceptable to the Soviet regime. Nor is such deterrence an impossible enterprise. But as current developments in Poland graphically demonstrate, such situations are far more problematic than domestic situations in which a strong and determined regime has direct and consistent access to established organs of repression, redistribution and indoctrination in support of its campaign for a certain pattern of social development. As Western observers very readily note in the East European case, deterrence of this sort is really a holding operation which, unless accompanied by a significant accommodation to the legitimacy of change, is likely merely to focus and intensify opposition to the status quo.
While the interplay in American thinking between deterrence theory and the general containment ideology is most obvious in regard to the structure of international relations as such, a similar comment applies to the implicit picture offered of the domestic political structure of the opposing state. I have already emphasized the unreality of the abstract strategic man of the second wave theorists. But in any case this abstract utility maximiser was not the adversary which their prescriptions for American policy (the evident concern behind the screen of their alleged ethical neutrality) demanded in practice. Rather the required adversary might be characterized as a 'realistic totalitarian nationalist' - on the one hand endowed with a clear set of transitivity ordered national goals and a tight control over potentially pluralist forces at both popular and bureaucratic level, and on the other capable of reordering specific priorities with great flexibility in the fact of an altered 'costs/benefits calculus', with scant regard either to the demands of entrenched domestic constituencies or to the conception of credibility as the interdependence of commitments. There was, in fact, a reasonable 'real-world' approximation of these traits in the chief regimes against which the United States directed deterrence-related strategies: the Soviets, above all, but also the Chinese and the Vietnamese; and the plausibility of such strategies seemed to receive special confirmation from the Soviet regime's readiness, at the Cuban Missile crisis, to restructure its immediate priorities and back down unceremoniously in the face of a sharply unfavourable correlation of forces.

However, the irony of this situation is that the very characteristics which have facilitated ruthless reappraisals of immediate objectives by Communist governments - their tight control of domestic politics, their strong sense of instrumental rationality and of the 'trade-offs' between the short and the long term - have also made them especially inclined to respond to the 'escalation dominance' of an adversary by determined efforts to overturn that situation in the long term. Whatever impact the Cuban fiasco may have had upon the ultimate fall of Khrushchev, there is little doubt that it caused a basic reappraisal by the Soviet elite of the stakes needed to fully enter the great power game - if indeed Cuba did not merely confirm a reappraisal already triggered by the Kennedy force expansions themselves. And while the North Vietnamese
regime could never hope to overturn the American escalation dominance, they could, and did, reverse the American calculus of costs and benefits by a combination of endurance in the face of enormous casualties and an ultimate readiness to accept the formula of a negotiated settlement to remove the United States physically from the field of battle.

It was, indeed, in the Indo-China war that the anomalies of American conceptions of extended deterrence were most clearly exemplified. It must be emphasised that their influence there was primarily at the level of general ethos. The more specific deterrence-related strategies of 'coercive diplomacy', as William Simons argues, appear to have been confined to the bombing campaigns preceding the involvement of American ground troops in 1965. But a central thrust of American deterrence/limited war theorizing was the concern to identify a meaningful political role for weapons of inordinate force. In Vietnam, a massive double asymmetry obtained, of potential force on the American side, and of motivation on the North Vietnamese side - and American decision-makers could draw upon theories which appeared to demonstrate how the former could be made to compensate for the latter.

One of the most revealing, and ugliest, paradoxes of second wave deterrence theory is that sophisticated bargaining strategies too perilous to implement in their prescribed environments could be applied with impunity in a situation to which they were even less appropriate, and that, as their prescriptions gave ground to more traditional military interpretations of warfighting, their 'value-free' terminology continued to provide a rationale for a brutal and increasingly meaningless campaign of bombing. Moreover, the Nixon administration, faced with the problem of 'decoupling' the United States' bargaining reputation from an otherwise peripheral conflict to which it has been persistently and consciously 'coupled', settled upon the crudest strategy of all: the 'Vietnamisation' of the ground war, the intensification of the air war, and the definitive widening of the conflict throughout Indo-China, in order to facilitate a settlement allowing the maximum time between the American withdrawal and the probable collapse of the southern regime.

The resultant debacle has had a deep impact not merely upon the American foreign policy outlook in general but upon the Soviet-American relationship in particular. At the simplest level, there has been the obvious temptation to employ a revamped Soviet threat as the central
focus around which to refashion a post-Vietnam and post-Watergate consensus in American - and indeed in NATO - policy. But, in addition, the doctrine of credibility as the interdependence of commitments has demonstrated an impressive staying power, despite the less than impressive career of the intellectual structures erected upon it. One of the initial core premisses of the Nixon-Kissinger policy was that American interests should shape American commitments, rather than the other way around; yet in his attack on Congressional opponents after the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Kissinger in his turn insisted that 'given our central role, a loss in our credibility invites international chaos'.\textsuperscript{125} This was already, as John Vincent observes, a notably 'dog-eared card'.\textsuperscript{125} But the conjunction of American indecision and Soviet activism in the later 1970s has gone a long way toward restoring it to its former sovereignty in the American strategic debate.

In fact, it seems most unlikely that the failure of American guarantees in IndoChina has affected their credibility in Europe. But this presumably has very little to do with the efficacy of American 'decoupling' strategies and everything to do with the refusal of either the Soviets or the West Europeans to accept American contentions that the separate guarantees were coupled in the first place. On the other hand, the Vietnam analogy has obvious implications for the United States' credibility as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union elsewhere in Asia and Africa. And not the least of the uncertainties surrounding the upsurge of Soviet military activity in these areas is the apparent inability of American policy makers - more than a decade after Kissinger first gave official expression to the problem - to establish a relatively consistent balance between commitments and interests.\textsuperscript{127}

\textbf{International Society}

As was noted at the outset, the chapter has concentrated on the more basic structural features of contemporary world politics, taking as given a large measure of great power conflict over legal norms which were much less subject to dispute in the classic era of European international society. In concluding the argument, it is worth emphasizing that this conflict over higher-level norms is not primarily attributable to the dictates of disembodied 'ideologies' on one or other side. Rather, the
prominence of ideological conflict in the Soviet-American relationship itself reflects the struggle of elites on both sides - on the basis of very different historical legacies - to come to terms with the structural transformations and telescoping of international tempos characteristic of the contemporary era. I have already suggested that the dialectic of detente and competitive 'imperialism' in postwar Soviet-American relations is partly analogous, despite the absence of an open colonial 'frontier', to the process by which the European nation-states ultimately were brought to a general recognition of the 'law of diminishing imperial returns' within Europe and to a conscious acceptance of coexistence and the 'rules' of a multiple balance of great powers. But the former process was spread over more than two centuries of endemic warfare; the periods of intense doctrinal conflict and untrammeled \textit{raison d'état} were fairly clearly separated in time; and the crucial conception of a Concert of Europe was established in embryo before the system was faced with the dual challenge of renewed ideological upheaval and military revolution unleashed by revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Today, by contrast, the great powers must adjust simultaneously to the logic of a bipolar balance and to the implications of the nuclear revolution; while the novel problems posed by their joint possession of extensive long range intervention capabilities are seriously exacerbated by an unstable international milieu which seems likely to keep the level of ideological tension between them relatively high for a good time to come.

It is, of course, often argued that it is precisely the incalculable risks associated with nuclear weapons that have averted a direct Soviet-American clash before now, and that the 'stability' of this relationship, barring an unforeseen technological breakthrough, can be expected to continue. However, the continuing manifest tensions of a detente grounded in strategic 'parity' testify to the vital importance of psychological, as well as technological, factors in this context. Perhaps the single most influential claim of those who have currently revived the question of an ingrained Soviet doctrinal hostility to the West has been the assertion that the Soviet authorities refuse to acknowledge the essential mutuality of nuclear deterrence - an issue which, as Alton Frye observes, 'has created a festering mistrust in the United States which is feeding back into increased military efforts to counter
the Soviet Union'.\(^{128}\) This phenomenon, and its apparent counterpart in the Soviet Union, seem increasingly to indicate that the prominence of the 'balance of terror' imposes very real limitations on the prospects for any comprehensive relaxation of international tensions. As Bull remarks:

> The preservation of peace among the major powers by a system in which each threatens to destroy or cripple the civil society of the other, rightly seen as a contemporary form of security through the holding of hostages, reflects the weakness in international society of the sense of common interest, [and] obstructs the long-term possibility of establishing international order on some more positive basis.\(^{129}\)

However, the most credible goal for the foreseeable future would seem to be not an outright escape from the thrall of nuclear weapons, but the more successful management of 'an inventory of horrors which will not go away'.\(^{130}\) The most pressing problem - whose solution *ought* to be much facilitated by the stark quality of the nuclear necessity - therefore remains the identification of the essential structural features of international politics upon which both great powers might reasonably be expected to agree. The question is, first, whether they possess, at least potentially, a common conceptual language in which to discuss these issues; and, second, whether the apparent depth of their value conflict is such as to preclude a meaningful compact on the need for balance, moderation, and mutual recognition of legitimate interests.

All the preceding argument should make clear my view that value premisses cannot be completely isolated from more specifically analytical components in the respective 'world-views' of the Soviet and American elites, and that these elements are both in turn bound up with the respective perceptions of material interests fashioned by each state's geopolitical and developmental situation and its location in the global structure of military and economic power. It should also be clear that I regard the conflict between these two world-views as genuine and deep. However, the conflict of values and interests is *not* such as to suggest that either side could fix on nuclear war as a settled policy option for the resolution of their differences. More specifically, a basic argument of this chapter has been that the conceptual gulf between the Soviet combination of a political doctrine of Peaceful
Coexistence with a military doctrine of nuclear warfighting, and those American versions of the mutual deterrence position which recognize the 'technological fact' of mutual deterrence as a bedrock constraint on the political competition of the great powers, is much less fundamental than the hawk school have asserted. There is, by contrast, a basic gulf between the Soviet position, on the one hand, and either the theological approach to MAD or the theological approach to extended deterrence and limited war, on the other. However, I would argue that the Soviet position is preferable to either of these latter approaches, each of which, in different ways, pursues a concern with technological solutions well beyond the bounds of political realism.

These specific questions of military doctrine will be taken up in detail in Chapter 7. However, it may be useful at this point to draw out more explicitly the implications for the foregoing argument of the political doctrine of the 'correlation of forces', which provides an important part of the general context against which the hawk school's hostile interpretation of Soviet military doctrine is fashioned. The basic point is that there is no reason to regard a propensity to think in terms of an historically shifting correlation of forces as intrinsically incompatible with the notion of balance in the military sphere. Like 'the balance of power', 'the correlation of forces' is capable of multiple meanings; and it can, as readily as the former notion, describe a distribution of power such that 'no one power ... is preponderant and can lay down the law to the others'. Of course, the Soviet term is typically used to refer to a wide range of 'forces', from military technology to general 'moral factors' and, in contrast to the mechanical or 'systemic' imagery of balance, it implies both constant motion and direction. However, I have attempted to argue that these are, in general, virtues rather than defects, of the concept, which contemporary Western theory has to some degree come to emulate. While the laying bare of the basic structure of the states-system, untrammelled by historical complexities, is a major function of international theory, the resulting picture must not - today least of all - be mistaken for the whole of reality.

This argument might initially seem less tenable in respect of the insistent Soviet claims that the world situation has been qualitatively altered by a decisive shift against American preponderance in the military
realm, and that, this shift having already been achieved, the Soviet Union remains committed to 'ceaselessly strengthening' or 'perfecting' its armed forces. But the first type of proposition involves, in essence, a simple statement of fact; and the second (besides exemplifying a characteristic trick of Soviet expression, which appears in many non-military contexts) offers a reasonably accurate picture of the 'balancing' behaviour required of any power involved, as the Soviet Union currently is, in a primarily qualitative arms race. The Soviet insistence that all elements of the correlation of forces are in continuous motion, and that the total trend is inexorably towards the definitive victory of socialism over capitalism, is thus quite compatible with the notion of an indefinite, though dynamic, 'parity' in the military field, by which imperialist aggression is kept in check while the socialist victory is consummated by the broader movement of historical forces; and this has in fact been the dominant theme of top level Soviet statements since the conclusion of the SALT I treaties.

I would therefore argue that the broad categories of Soviet doctrine are not incompatible with the reciprocal recognition of vital interests and a working compact on basic rules of the game in the great power relationship; and that they are, if anything, more compatible with such agreement than the doctrines of containment and extended deterrence which dominated American international discourse during the period of American strategic preponderance. However, the last decade has witnessed not merely the ending of American preponderance over the Soviet Union but also an intensifying challenge to the collective hegemony of the great powers over the rest of international society. The sharpest uncertainties in the present Soviet-American relationship derive from the latter challenge, whose broad implications are briefly discussed below.

Looked at from below, the central issues here are those of transitional development and statemaking, with the destabilizing implications of these processes for the political orientation, and even the cohesion, of crucial collective actors in the Third World. Looked at from above, the central
issue is the rapidly changing pattern of the Third World's 'incorporation' over the last century into the political and economic order of the developed world: the rise and subsequent demolition of the European colonial empires; the rise and substantial erosion of the 'informal empire' of the United States; the shaky beginnings of a Soviet 'counter-imperium'; the revitalization and expansion of old influence networks by the economically resurgent Europeans and Japanese; and the recent emergence of 'sub-imperial' patron states - such as Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Iran (under the Shah) - in the Third World itself. From either perspective, two important points may be made. First, these issues take the argument beyond the international society of states to a conflict-ridden 'world society' in which transnational and subnational actors also loom large. And, second, the broad dynamics of this world society cannot adequately be grasped in terms of economic determinist assumptions. Certainly the incorporation of the Third World states in an essentially capitalist world-economy continues to provide the bedrock determinant of their material circumstances as a group. But the changes in the political dimension of their incorporation over the past decade or so may have a profound impact not merely upon the developmental possibilities of particular, strategically placed members of the group, but also upon the great power relationship and the prospects for war and peace in the world as a whole.

Therefore, although these issues lie quite outside the area illuminated by the classical paradigm of the states-system, they also require greater attention to political factors than is provided by the two broad approaches which, in Western international theory, currently emphasize the dimension of world society: the interdependence/developmental pluralism approach, on the one hand, and the structuralist/world-systems approach, on the other. Of the two, the latter - with its Marxist-derived stress on structural contradictions - offers a superior insight into the relationship of Third World states to the modern world-economy. But, as was argued in Chapter 2, it is compromised by a residual functionalism, and by a reification of the 'system' of world capitalism which implies that it must be transcended in toto or not at all. The importance of political hierarchies, and of breaches in these hierarchies, is better depicted in the concept of 'imperial' patronage networks proposed by John Girling, in an explicit attempt to overcome the
Inadequacies of the established pluralist and neo-Marxist approaches. (Though Girling's direct concern is with United States - Third World relations, he notes that 'the Soviet Union, of course, has its own, though less extensive patronage network').

In addition to the bilateral relationship between imperial power and individual regimes there is an entire hierarchy of patron-client relations spreading downward from international superpower to the indigenous power of local elites. Within the hierarchy there is an intermediate range of great and middle powers - patrons in their own right, with their subordinate following, but (at least in one essential respect: strategic or economic) clients in relation to the supreme patron. Similarly, every client, however lowly in international terms, is also the 'lord' of his own domestic hierarchy ... The profitable functioning of the international hierarchy of patron-client relations depends on the proper functioning of all these subordinate patronage systems.

However, even Girling's picture is unduly functionalist, conceding too much to the behavioural concept of system, on the one hand, and to the political vision and competence of the imperial patrons, on the other. Since his own detailed analysis clearly indicates that the American patronage 'system' has persistently failed to function 'properly' over the last decade and a half, it seems better to insist that the imperial patronage networks are networks only, patchworked together in ad hoc fashion according to time and circumstance, and vulnerable, in an era of great power parity, to sudden massive rents caused by political action at the lower level.

In the first place, it cannot simply be assumed that each client regime is 'lord' of its own domestic hierarchy. Both great powers - the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union currently in Afghanistan - have been confronted with the prospect that even their direct, large scale, and lengthy involvement in a client regime's military struggle against its domestic opponents may be insufficient to ensure its reliable lordship at a cost which would be politically acceptable to their own various domestic and international constituencies. And this problem is correspondingly exacerbated with the imperial patron shifts to, or back
to, an indirect strategy reliant on the independent management capacities of local clients, as the United States did in the wake of Vietnam. This point is nicely illustrated by Tom Farer's 1975 proposal for an 'accommodationist' American response to Third World pressures for a restructuring of the international economic order. In what was, in effect, a 'management of interdependence' gloss on the basic text of the Nixon Doctrine, Farer argued that this challenge to the capitalist order could be diffused in the same way as class conflict within the great capitalist states had been diffused by the 'creaming off and co-optation of the natural elite of the working class'. Indeed, Farer argued that the process should actually be less complex in the international than in the domestic sphere, given the 'very small' number of states 'that have to be co-opted into senior decision making roles in the management structure of the international economy. In Africa only Nigeria ... In Latin America, Brazil and Venezuela, perhaps Mexico. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran. And in Asia, India and Indonesia'. And the very fact that the targets for co-optation were state managers rather than representatives of the more amorphous collectivities of domestic politics, Farer argued, simplified the process still further.

There is, moreover, no reason to doubt whether the negotiators can deliver their constituents ... Our conflict is not with huge anonymous masses whose demands have to be aggregated through fairly uncertain representational arrangements. For the most part, Third World elites are even less committed to human equality as a general condition than are we. They are talking about the equality of states. And in their largely authoritarian systems, the state is they.

A few years after this confident prognostication, the action of 'huge, anonymous masses' in Iran had knocked out a linch-pin of the United States' indirect strategy (on both East-West and North-South issues); and the American government even found itself embroiled in a humiliating, year-long struggle to protect its own nationals, in which one of its basic problems was the difficulty of establishing whether it was dealing with one Iranian government, or several, or none.

In the Iranian case, the Soviet Union has in general been able to
sit back and watch the American discomfiture (though it has suffered the loss of profitable economic arrangements concluded with the Shah's regime). But, in Poland, the Soviets in turn have been faced with acute problems concerning the disintegrating lordship of a client regime within the very heart of their own patronage network; and one of the most crucial determinants of this situation is likely to be the ability or inability of the Solidarity leadership to contain its own 'revolution in the revolution', and to present the working masses as a reliably 'packaged' collectivity in their dealings with the Polish government, and indirectly with its patrons in Moscow. Indeed, both the Polish and Iranian examples indicate that the earlier observations about the paradoxical 'suitability' of Communist regimes as targets for American deterrence strategies may be extended to the general question of great power 'management' of crises stemming from mass-based upheavals in other countries. Both leaderships at times clearly act on the premise that they do have conflicts of interest with 'huge, anonymous masses'. But, whatever combination of coercion and accommodation they may attempt in a particular case, they can implement an indirect strategy in such situations only through a relatively clear hierarchy of collectivities reaching down to the sub-national level. The paradox, therefore, is that a counter-revolutionary great power seeking to contain such a situation without direct intervention may find itself dependent in the short-term on the cohesion and effectiveness of a revolutionary movement, even though the success of the latter promises to radically reduce the great power's local influence in the longer term.*

A second major weakness of the rival patronage networks is that, at least in the Third World, they are heavily dependent upon the great powers' readiness to supply their respective clients with arms. This point, of course, is insistently made in Western commentary about Soviet Third World policy; but, as Girling points out, the 'militarization of allies and "friends"' was an inherent part of the logic, and practice, of the American encouragement of 'self reliance' under the Nixon Doctrine. At the domestic level, the result of this competition in military 'assistance' has been to increase the repressive capabilities of Third World regimes, without necessarily ensuring their durability, as the Iranian experience demonstrates. At the international level, the medium and longer term result will probably be to enhance the military independence

* This section, along with the rest of Chapters 3-7, was completed in late 1981, before the military crackdown in Poland. The comments on Solidarity evidently require revision in the light of subsequent developments. But I would still hold to the wider argument about international 'management', and it seems best to leave specific judgements derived therefrom exposed to such 'falsification' as has occurred in the interim.
of those 'client' states with intermediate 'patron' status - especially since the growing economic importance of arms sales ensures that not one but several alternative sources of supply will usually be available to those with the ability to pay. The prospect has been summed up well by Girling:

But the greater the build-up of regional patrons, the more these patrons are empowered to pursue policies of their own, which may either clash with one another (say between Saudi Arabia and Iran) or may no longer coincide with those of the imperial patron. Moreover the future leadership of such heavily armed states is, to say the least, problematic. Thus the long-term prospects of great powers, like Germany and Japan, and even of regional patrons, like Brazil and Iran, lie in ever greater autonomy of action ... Such divergence will eventually spell the end of the post-war American patronage system ...

Since there has been little in the briefer career of the Soviet Union as a global patron to indicate that it will be notably more successful than the United States in this regard, the prospect is that the great powers' own actions will help to produce a substantial diffusion of centres of military decision-making in the world (though still within an essentially bipolar global power structure). And whatever one may think of this on general grounds of equity, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, other things being equal, it will increase the level of uncertainty, and the prospects for direct confrontation, between the great powers in crucial areas of the Third World.

Both these factors - the vulnerability of client regimes within Third World societies and the greater opportunities now open to such regimes for the independent pursuit of substantial military ventures - may constitute important 'pull' factors encouraging future great power involvement in Third World conflicts. As regards 'push' factors on the great power side of the equation, one consideration in particular seems likely to play a qualitatively new role in the next 10-15 years: namely, security of access to vital raw materials, and above all to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf region. And contrary to the recent rash of Western speculation about Soviet attempts to seize the Gulf oilfields, there seems little doubt that the greater 'objective' interest in possible interventions along these lines lies on the side of the United States.
Two qualifications must be made here. First, the goal of security of access to raw materials does provide the most plausible candidate for an 'economic imperative' of American foreign policy in this century; but, as Stephen Krasner has demonstrated, it appears that the primary motive of American interventionism to date has been the pursuit of general political goals, which in the postwar era of American hegemony, has meant essentially the global containment of Communism.\textsuperscript{140} Second, although the United States is substantially more vulnerable than the Soviet Union to the threat of loss of access to foreign energy sources, it is substantially less vulnerable than the Europeans and the Japanese, so that the oil price rises of the early 1970s actually helped to protect American industry against the rising tide of competition from its major capitalist trading partners. However, these qualifications, though important, do not dispose of the larger argument. If, as Krasner himself argues, the American readiness to give priority to the containment of Communism, even in areas of low intrinsic interest such as Indochina, was the luxury of a state whose political and economic predominance was such that it did not need to concentrate directly on the defence of more obviously vital interests,\textsuperscript{141} it may fairly be expected that the general habit of intervention will carry across into a period in which vital interests seem, quite suddenly, to be very much at risk. Moreover, the threat to the vital economic interests of Europe and Japan, through the incentives it provides for the latter to seek a political accommodation with Arab oil producers and with the Soviet Union itself, can be read as an indirect threat to the vital political interest of the United States in the cohesion of an American-led Western alliance. As Tucker puts it:

\textit{At issue are essentially the same security interests that were at issue in the years immediately following World War II. If the locus of the now most likely threat to those interests has shifted from Europe to the Persian Gulf, the vital interests at stake in the Gulf are unchanged from the vital interests that were earlier at stake in Europe ... No one seriously argues that the loss of Western access to the Gulf could eventuate in anything short of a mortal blow to the post-war structure of America's global interests.}\textsuperscript{142}
Tucker's argument on these grounds for a return to 'limited' or 'moderate' containment is a rigorous and self-aware one, which is notably free of the recycled globalism which characterizes many of the 'realist' contributions to the post-Vietnam American debate. Since it also concentrates on the Persian Gulf region, in which the structure of great power interests is relatively clear, it may provide a useful yardstick against which to assess the prospects for a mutual recognition of legitimate interests in contested Third World areas. Tucker acknowledges that the Soviet Union has 'on balance' been 'quite cautious and tentative' in taking advantage of the declining Western position in the Gulf; that a 'direct Soviet armed intervention' in the area (which the United States could contest only with nuclear means) is 'only one' of many possible threats to Western access in the future; and that, 'more likely, a threat to access will derive primarily from developments indigenous to the Gulf'. However, he insists that the issue of Western access cannot be separated from the Soviet military capacity 'to inhibit and, it may be, openly challenge the attempted reassertion of Western power in this vital region'. The United States, in effect, cannot accept even an equal balance with the Soviet Union in this region, because it must build up an American military capacity for possible intervention in internal developments in Gulf states which threaten Western access.

In the Gulf, we are necessarily concerned with internal order because this issue cannot be separated from a vital interest in access to oil supplies. The same vital interest bids us oppose the extension of Soviet influence in that region. Were it not for this interest we could view changes in the internal order and, for that matter, the extension of Soviet influence, with relative detachment.

There are several important reasons for assuming that the Soviet authorities could not accept this assessment of the balance of interests in the Persian Gulf, even if they were in general disposed towards the establishment of basic 'rules of the game' in respect of the competition in the Third World. First, while the Western countries may be said to have a disproportionate economic interest in access to Gulf oil, the Soviet Union may be said to have a disproportionate geopolitical interest in the political disposition of an unstable region close to its own borders. Second, Tucker's real concern is not merely with Western
'access' as such, but with access 'on terms compatible with the substantial economic growth of the industrial democracies'. And while the Soviet authorities might fairly be expected not to collude in the outright 'strangulation' of the advanced capitalist powers, it is less obvious that they should accept the vital interest of those powers in the often wasteful use of other states' natural resources to support a living standard well in excess of that of the Soviet bloc countries themselves - especially when United States policy is directed at denying the Soviet Union access to Western technological cooperation in the further exploitation of its own natural resources. Third, the really crucial oil-related threat, as has been noted, is not to the United States, but to the West Europeans and the Japanese; and the alternatives before the latter are not simply Western control of the Gulf or economic strangulation. They can also attempt to manage their economic problems through increasing political accommodation with Arab oil states and the Soviet Union; and there is no reason why the Soviet authorities should share in American perceptions of this as an unacceptable deterioration in the foundations of the post-war international order. Finally, there is the question of direct American intervention in internal political developments. As Tucker acknowledges, and as I have argued at length above, such developments in themselves can bring about a major deterioration in the established American position, provided only that countervailing Soviet power in the region is sufficient to frustrate American (or Western) attempts to reverse them by force. If the Soviet Union did acquiesce in American policies directed towards this end, it would effectively be surrendering both its claim to global equality with the United States and its claim to be the chief bulwark against 'counter-revolution' in the contemporary world.

If these reservations may be lodged against Tucker's carefully delimited proposal for a revived containment policy, they apply with greater force to the 'global containment' policies proposed by some hawk theorists, and indeed to the public posture of the Reagan administration, which has, on the one hand, once more established Soviet expansionism as the over-riding threat to world peace and, on the other, already committed itself publicly to the defence of the Saudi regime - the new linch-pin of American strategy in the Gulf - against overthrow from within along the lines of Iran. A strong case can be made that the
establishment of Soviet-American rules of the game on Third World issues will require, as a first step, an end to the uncertainty of American policy over the past decade and the establishment of relatively clear limits beyond which the direct extension of Soviet military influence will meet with a firm American response.\textsuperscript{147} But though the short-term prescription might be for a rather more definite engagement of both sides in defence of their more prominent interests against the other's encroachment, the longer-term need is for them to disengage their relationship from internal developments in transitional states which neither side can effectively control. Any attempt to construct rules of the game which ignores the fundamental importance of autonomous domestic factors will be founded in quicksand.

Are there any metaphors which might assist in the comprehension of the complex dynamics of a states-system whose inner structure is only seldom - but is now - in transition, and whose world political environment is always - but is now more than ever - in transition? Stanley Hoffmann has advanced the attractive notion of games on 'different chessboards'. But his later work, which accepts the proposition that interdependence promises 'a new kind of structure', emphasizes 'the fluidity of games, without any single minute of truth or clear cut boundaries, played by many players, over many issues allowing for multiple strategies'.\textsuperscript{148} As has been noted, such an emphasis upon the multiplicity of issue structures easily translates into a prescription for case-by-case empiricism, with 'interdependence' reduced to a ritual assertion of ineffable connections between everything and everything else. Bull's delineation of nuclear, conventional military, economic, ideological and diplomatic chessboards, whose 'interrelatedness provides the conception of overall power and influence in international politics' is rather more useful.\textsuperscript{149} But it too strains towards the interdependence of everything, and fails to address the distinction - which, I have attempted to argue is the distinction - between relatively static and relatively dynamic games. As regards the great power relationship, at least, it seems best to collapse these five games into two: the politico-military states-system game, and the politico-economic game of world-economy.
Moreover, if the basic Soviet accounts of Peaceful Coexistence were treated in this overtly metaphorical fashion, it might yield the interesting notion of games on different chessboards, in different time scales, with different rules. The states-system game would only partly resemble a single 'two person, zero sum' game of chess. Rather it would be a kind of indefinite tournament, characterized by a marked preponderance of draws, and the protagonists' ability to agree on its most basic rules would be a precondition of their access to the all important world-economy game. The latter would indeed be zero-sum, but in the 'long-term'. Run by a computer called History, it would actually be programmed to produce a victory for one specific side; but this would have no obvious effect upon either side's ability to enhance its 'short-term' position by skilful play. The games would be interdependent, victories or favourable positions in the one conferring advantages in the other, and would ultimately reach a joint conclusion.

The interesting point about this picture is that it stands on its head the characteristic American tendency to think of the military adversary relationship essentially in zero-sum terms and the economic relationship essentially in 'positive sum' terms. Moreover, it is the Soviet, rather than the American perspective, which seems closest to the perspective on these questions implicit in the practices of the traditional states-system. In that context, international economic relations were approached, for the most part, in mercantilist, zero-sum terms, and were, on occasion, determined by military conflicts fought out 'beyond the lines', where the norms of European international society did not apply. By contrast, the pressure upon the great powers to regulate their direct military interactions in the European core impelled them towards a general recognition of the positive value of a common framework of procedural rules and practices, within which major changes in their substantive relations could be accommodated.

I certainly do not suggest that a general return to mercantilist approaches would be a desirable response to contemporary economic conflicts - whether East-West or North-South. But if a greater harmony of interest is to be achieved on these issues, it must come from conscious political action, involving, in particular, major substantive concessions on the Western side: the notion that harmony should obtain naturally, within existing economic structures, is seriously misleading.
And, as regards the military competition, the notion of a set of
basic regulative procedures, more or less insulated from the vagaries
of a fluid historical environment, is today more important than ever.
But whereas the Soviet doctrine of the correlation of forces can be
accommodated fairly readily to this schema, the second wave doctrine
of extended deterrence, which evidently continues to exert a significant
influence on official American thinking about the indirect military
competition with the Soviet Union, presents a fascinating inversion of
it. The various stages of the great power contest are set in the
timeless environment of an unproblematic status quo; and the temporal
dimension appears not in the emergence of new issues leading to
new crises - for each crisis, in the chicken game analogy, is merely
a different manifestation of the one great issue - but in the running
'bank balance' of credibility which will determine the outcome of the
entire struggle.

The implications of this approach have been pinpointed by
Morgenthau, in an early critique of deterrence theory from a more genuine
Realist perspective than that which informed the prescriptions of the
second wave. A policy of bluff whose viability was overwhelmingly
dependent upon the bluff's never being called, he argued, must ultimately
prove self defeating:

Inherent in that dynamics [of deterrence] is a dual
escalation, one feeding on the other: the ever
diminishing plausibility of the nuclear threat
and ever bolder challenges to make good on it.
The effects of deterrence are likely to decrease
with the frequency of use, to the point where,
as it were, the psychological capital of
deterrence has been nearly expended and the
policy of deterrence will be brought to bankruptcy. 150

This prediction, which has been echoed by several other commentators in
the era of Soviet-American parity, undoubtedly expresses the inner
logic of second wave theorizing. For, in regard to credibility at least
this did present the Soviet-American contest effectively in zero-sum
terms, with crisis credits to each side's reputation for 'resolve'
representing debits for its opponent. But the earlier discussion of the
structure and environment of the contemporary states-system suggests an
alternative approach which, though also an oversimplification, is more
compatible with both traditional notions of international society and the record of direct great power crises interaction since 1945.

On this account, crises may be seen as merely more intense manifestations of the general problem of international relations: how to resolve major conflicts of interest without resort to war. Especially in periods of great change in the structure and environment of the system, great power crises can be expected as normal manifestations of a changing balance of interests, quite apart from the aggressive initiatives of a dissatisfied power. Such situations, by virtue of their tendency to clarify the balance of interests, can actually facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflict; and in the nuclear era the significance of this aspect of crisis management is greatly enhanced. Therefore, even the resolution of a crisis by the unambiguous 'backing down' of one side might produce enhanced credibility all round, since credibility relates not merely to firmness and resolve, but also to moderation and to the capacity to judge the legitimate extent of the adversary's interests and the legitimate limits of one's own.

In the increasingly 'crowded' contemporary environment, it is hard to be optimistic about the ability of the great powers to extract a relationship of enhanced mutual understanding from their uncertain encounters in a volatile Third World. But I would argue that 'stability of expectations' in such a context would more likely be promoted by the doctrine of the correlation of forces, with its emphasis upon intrinsic material interests and the normality of radical social change, than by the American interpretations of balance and deterrence discussed in this chapter. There is a substantial element of paradox in this assertion; and it is clearly of great significance whether Soviet attention to the correlation of forces is associated with expectations of an impending massive crisis of capitalism/imperialism, or with a growing acceptance of the normality of the current 'transitional' era in world politics. The latter is the contention of this thesis: but this question has so far been considered only tangentially, because of the prior task of elucidating the criteria against which the basic Soviet categories might be assessed. It is now necessary to examine in detail the relationship between those categories and the evolving account of the terra incognita of classical, and New Found Land of Soviet Marxism - the period of transition.
Notes

1 The best discussion of this is still that of Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, pp.75-158.

2 See the superb discussion of this in Wight, Systems of States, pp.129-52.

3 Bull distinguishes between three types of rules in international relations: rules expressing the 'fundamental or constitutional normative principle' of a society of states; rules of coexistence; and rules of co-operation. The concern here is broadly with the first two of these categories. The Anarchical Society, pp.67-71.

4 Lenin's Kursom, Vol.6, p.598.


6 As John Vincent comments: 'The truism that among men some minimal form of institution of property is required before they can live together in society is more difficult to establish of states in international society. Whereas men are permanent and irreducible units, the basic atoms of social life, states are the inventions of man and have no such natural existence. There is no reason to suppose that men must always choose to live together in states, and no warrant for the claim that there is some natural law suggesting the necessary conditions of existence for international society'. Non Intervention and International Order, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1974, pp.338-9.


9 ibid.


11 Perhaps the most influential example of such thinking was Morton Kaplan's distinction between 'balance of power' and 'loose bipolar' systems. For Kaplan's fourteen 'essential rules' of the loose bipolar system, see System and Process in International Relations, Wiley and Sons, New York, 1957, pp.36-42.

12 For a discussion of this question see Vincent, Non Intervention and International Order, pp.349-62.

13 Wight, Power Politics, pp.113-21. Wight further suggests (writing in the late 1960s) that 'it is indeed a question whether traditional diplomatic practices have become obsolete, and may be succumbing to revolutionary politics, as bad money drives out good'. p.121.
Wight points out that 'in mediaeval diplomacy [summit] meetings were as common as modern', and that they acquired a special significance in the 15th century, when, as today, international practices were undergoing a major transformation. *Systems of States*, p.142.

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Wight, *Power Politics*, p.117.

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On this question, see Toby Trister Gati, 'The Soviet Union and the North-South Dialogue, *Orbis*, Summer, 1980, pp.241-70; Helen Defosses, 'North-South or East-West? Constructs for Superpower African Policy in the Eighties', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1980-1, pp.369-85. Gati observes (pp.242-4) that in one sense 'the actual beginning of the North-South negotiating process has signified a setback for the Soviet Union ... [which] must find a place for itself in a dialogue not of its own making, on subjects not of its own choosing, or risk considerable loss of influence within the Third World'.

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*Ibid.*, See also Stanley Hoffman's article 'Weighing the Balance of Power' in the same issue, pp.618-43.
Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp.129-94. See also Michael Mandelbaum's arguments for the persistence of the first nuclear regime, with its three 'pillars' of anarchy, equilibrium, and hierarchy, throughout the 1980s. Like Waltz, Mandelbaum suggests both that the present regime is likely to persist and that it is desirable that it should do so. He does, however, suggest that 'by the year 2000, if they were determined to have one, the Chinese could probably deploy a force comparable to present Soviet and American forces'. *The First Nuclear Regime*, in Mandelbaum (et.al.), *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1977, pp.15-80.


*Ibid*, pp.199-202. George Liska attempts to place this tension between balance and hegemony within a much longer standing pattern of oscillation in American foreign policy between these two policies and the pursuit of an isolationist path, which he sees as represented today by the interdependence doctrine, 'a vain pursuit ... of economic policies and emphases in more or less complete separation from contemporaneously pertinent strategic frameworks and commitments'. *Quest for Equilibrium*, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1977, p XI.


On this question see Walter G. Levy, 'Oil and the Decline of the West', *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1980, pp.999-1015.

For a good discussion of this prospect, which avoids the alarmist 'Finlandization' line, see Uwe Nerlich 'Change in Europe: a Secular Trend?', *Daedalus*, Winter 1981, pp.71-103. Nerlich suggests that the 'strategic purpose' of Soviet nuclear strategy 'in most conceivable contingencies is to deter American intervention, thereby protecting favourable political changes' (p.85). For a statement of the hawk position on this question, see Eugene V.Rostow, 'The Soviet Threat to Europe through the Middle East', in *Defending America*, pp.49-64. Rostow claims that 'the United States and its NATO partners have identical interest in the Middle East ... They are equally threatened by the possibility of Soviet hegemony in the area, a position of dominance that would permit the Soviets - perhaps by intimidation rather than war - to require the dissolution of NATO, the retreat of the United States from Europe and the Mediterranean, and the reduction of Western Europe to the status of Finland or Poland'.
38 W. Scott Thompson, 'The Projection of Soviet Power', in Defending America, pp. 22-35. Thompson claims that 'the creation of a Soviet international system has proceeded much further than is generally recognized'. p. 35.


40 Gray, 'The Most Dangerous Dangerous Decade', p. 14. The internal quotation is from the German geopolitician, Karl Haushofer.


42 Wight, Systems of States, p. 171.


44 For an argument that the likely intensification of development programmes in Central Asia in the 1980s will increase social and ethnic tensions, see Serwyn Bialer, 'The Harsh Decade: Soviet Policies in the 1980s', Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1981, pp. 1009-11.


46 Ibid., pp. 102.

47 Ibid., pp. 104-5.

48 The following is an extremely sketchy treatment of issues which have attracted an enormous literature, in approaching which I have been greatly helped by the critical and bibliographical advice of Ron Huisken. The most comprehensive critique of these and other explanations of the strategic arms race, which emphasizes both the normality of the arms race, and the need to evaluate it, ultimately, as a political phenomenon, is Colin S. Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race, Saxon House, Westmead, 1976. A valuable account of the history of American strategic policy, rather than the arms race as such, is Kahan, Security in the Missile Age. In contrast to Gray, Kahan presents a moderate 'arms control' perspective, but he also advances, as 'the premise of this book', the view 'that the substantive merits of alternative strategic policies have significantly influenced past US courses of action in this field and will continue to do so'. p. 6 (emphasis in original).


James Kurth, 'Why we buy the weapons we do', *Foreign Policy*, Summer, 1973, pp.33-56.


Albert Wohlstetter, 'Racing Forward or Ambling Back?' in *Defending America*, p.111.

For criticism on both these grounds see Michael Nacht, 'The Delicate Balance of Error', *Foreign Policy*, Summer, 1975, pp. 163-177.


Wight, *Power Politics*, p.175.


Gray, 'Foreign Policy and the Strategic Balance', *Orbis*, Fall, 1974, p.726.

On the notion of the 'balance holder', and its special articulation in respect to British policy, see Wight *Power Politics*, pp.159-161. The new Wilhelmine Soviet Union appears to have made its semi-formal debut, under the auspices of Kissinger and his deputy Helmut Sonnenfeldt, in December 1975. See the official State Department summaries of the speeches then made by Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt to a meeting of American ambassadors in London. *New York Times*, April 6, 1976.


66 Kennan, 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', p. 178.
73 Jervis, 'Deterrence Theory Revisited', pp.5-8.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 As Burns exhaustively demonstrates, the true significance of game theory in this context lay in demonstrating that international politics could never adequately be discussed in purely positivist terms. Of Powers and their Politics, pp.169-254.
78 Jervis, 'Deterrence Theory Revisited', p.29.
80 George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, p.2.
81 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.186.

82 Morgan, Deterrence, pp.25-43.

83 Blainey, The Causes of War, pp.112-19.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., p.118. Blainey's generalization is based on a study of all major European wars since 1700.

86 See the useful distinction between 'signals' of intent and 'indices' of capability proposed by Jervis in The Logic of Images in International Relations, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1970, p.18-38.

87 As Jervis observes (ibid., p.229), a device such as an ICBM alert, or, in an earlier period, a dispersal of bombers, 'could be replaced, in principle, by any artificial device. The United States could announce that whenever it raised a flag with a mushroom pattern over a missile base, this meant that it was taking an international event very seriously. Of course, this does not seem the equivalent of the dispersing of bombers which intuitively seems more credible because it appears more closely connected with the use of weapons. But as long as both sides understand the code, the flag can convey the message as well. The Russians would have as much - or as little - reason to believe the one as the other'. This argument satirizes very effectively the academic nature of much American analysis of signalling in nuclear situations, though it is not clear that Jervis himself regards it as a satire.


91 For a detailed attack on the idea that Schlesinger's concern with flexible options constituted a new departure in American policy, see Desmond J. Ball, 'Deja Vu: the Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration', in The Strategic Nuclear Balance: an Australian Perspective, ANU, Canberra, 1974, pp.149-232. The continuation of the trend towards declaratory acknowledgement of counterforce targeting can be seen in Harold Brown, Secretary of Defence, Department of Defence Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980, 25 January 1979, pp.76-78.


94 Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 94-96, 139-143. The levels nominated by McNamara (and afterwards somewhat reduced) were essentially those at which 'diminishing returns' from the further use of nuclear warheads would begin to set in.


97 For an argument that 'this relationship is a matter of physical fact and is thus grossly insensitive to any change in strategic policy', see Wolfgang Panovsky, 'The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia', *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1973, pp.109-18.


99 Soviet military writers often claim that the socialist camp would be victorious in a nuclear conflict. This issue will be discussed properly in Chapter 7, but it can be suggested here that this claim is more properly viewed not as a commitment to a Clausewitzian 'political philosophy of war', but as a remnant of the Leninist 'eschatological philosophy of war' abandoned by Khrushchev. This distinction between political and eschatological philosophies is made by Anatol Rapoport, in his editor's introduction to Clausewitz, *On War*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1978, pp.11-17, 31-80.

100 For speculation about a possible 'emerging Soviet image' of a 'limited nuclear operation', centred upon massive pre-emptive strikes in Europe and the United States, see, Benjamin S. Lambeth, 'Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy', *RAND Report*, R-2034-DDRD, Santa Monica, 1976, pp.44-52.

101 Snyder notes that, given the vast differences in capability of the opposing forces, the 'No Cities' doctrine was actually an attempt 'to combine the unilateral and cooperative approaches. In effect, McNamara urged the Soviets to accept ground rules whereby they would forbear from destroying American cities while the United States gradually destroyed most of their retaliatory force'. 'The Soviet Strategic Culture', p.3.

102 Schlesinger, who was asked by a member of the House Armed Services Committee whether his policy would increase the chances of nuclear war, replied: 'I think that is a fair, logical inference'. Cited in Ball, *Deja Vu*, p.224.

103 This has also been the area of greatest division among Western commentators themselves. In his summary of the debate at the 1979 IISS Conference on 'The Future of Strategic Deterrence', Christoph Betram observed that the conference had demonstrated that 'doubts over the effectiveness of deterrence are essentially doubts over the effectiveness of extended deterrence'. *Adelphi Papers*, No. 160, IISS, London, 1980, p.2.
For an early, and highly influential, statement of this argument see Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*.

Snyder, 'The Soviet Strategic Culture', pp.22-3. Snyder suggests that Cuba may have been the only major exception to this judgement.

George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, pp.64-5; Jervis, 'Deterrence Theory Revisited', p.51.


Ibid.


Jervis, 'Deterrence Theory Revisited', pp.32-34.

Kahn defines escalation dominance as 'the capacity ... to enjoy marked advantages in a given region of the escalation ladder'. He claims that it is a 'complex concept' to which 'assurance, morale, commitment, resolve, internal discipline, and so on', are relevant, as well as 'simple military factors. But he acknowledges that the side that has least to lose in warfare at the level of violence in question 'will automatically have a level of escalation dominance'. *On Escalation*, pp.23, 290. 'Brinkmanship', which is virtually the theme of Kahn's whole book, is also discussed at length in Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp.90-125.

Snyder and Deising, *Conflict Among Nations*, p.453.

The term 'issue splitting' is Young's. He points out that it can also be used as an offensive tactic, but in general stresses the caution of the great powers in crises. *The Politics of Force*, pp.217-243, 311-336.


Great decisions between peace and war, Bull argues, 'do not always reflect a careful weighing of long-range considerations, or a mastery of the course of events ... governments ... appear to stumble about, groping and half blind, too preoccupied with surviving from day to day to perceive the direction in which they are heading, let alone steer away from it'. *The Control of the Arms Race*, p.49.

Morgan, *Deterrence*, pp.77-97.

Maxwell, *Rationality in Deterrence*, p.11.
Snyder and Deising conclude, of a wide range of crisis situations throughout the century: 'Perceptions of legitimacy are potent in determining bargaining power and outcomes. That is, the party which believes that it is in the right and communicates this belief to an opponent who has some doubts about the legitimacy of his own position, nearly always wins', Conflict Among Nations, p.498.

Morgan, Deterrence, pp.25-43.

George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p.259 (Emphasis in original)

See, for instance, Sonnfeldt's claim that the 'inorganic, unnatural relationship' between the Soviet Union and its East European satellites is a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West'. New York Times, 6 April, 1976.


For an ingenious, but unconvincing, contemporary discussion of 'decoupling' strategies which the United States might use in Vietnam, see Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, pp.254-76.


Ibid.


For a useful survey of these contrasting approaches, see Pettman, State and Class, especially Chapters 2 and 5. Pettman generally takes the line that the pluralist approach gives a better account of international society, and the structuralist/world systems approach a better account of the world society dimensions of global class formation.


139 This latter point is important. Tucker, for instance, in his case against Western concessions to Third World demands for a redistribution of economic power in the world, argues that this must lead to a redistribution of military power, which will undermine the existing basis of international order. (*The Inequality of Nations*, p.90). But while this argument seems valid for the longer term, in which one might also expect the development of genuine multipolarity at the great power level, the uncertainties of a militarized Third World in the next decade will flow primarily from the military patronage of the great and major powers.


143 As Girling observes: 'Despite the intention of the Nixon Doctrine to discriminate between one commitment and another, universalised fears continue to dominate American policy ... The threat to the global balance remains, it is the nature of the threat that has changed. To the Cold War ideologists subversion leading to insurgency was primarily the threat - 'sweeping' through the developing world - which the adversary could then turn to his advantage. To the post-Vietnam 'realists', reverting to a more traditional stance, the power of the (rival) state is the threat: subversion is not so much the instrument as the opportunity. Yet if the focus has altered, the end result is much the same'. *America and the Third World*, p.190.


147 For a good statement of such a case, linked to a call for an American commitment to a 'sound, resurrected detente, based upon military strength, but not superiority, on the one hand, and co-operation over economic issues and the search for 'rules of the game', on the other, see Robert Legvold, 'Containment Without Confrontation', *Foreign Policy*, Fall, 1980, pp.74-98.


PART III

In the beginning there was Aristotle
And objects at rest tended to remain at rest
And objects in motion tended to come to rest
And soon everything was at rest
And God saw that it was boring.

Then God created Newton
And objects at rest tended to remain at rest
But objects in motion tended to remain in motion
And matter was conserved and momentum was conserved
and energy was conserved
And God saw that it was conservative.

Then God created Einstein
And everything was relative
And short things became straight and fast things became curved
And the universe was filled with inertial frames
And God saw that it was relatively general
But that some parts were especially relative.

Then God created Bohr
And there was the principle
And the principle was Quantum
And all things were quantified, but some things remained relative
And God saw that it was confusing.

Then God was going to create Ferguson
And Ferguson would have unified
And he would have fielded a theory, and all things would have been one
But it was the seventh day, and God rested
And objects at rest tended to remain at rest.

Unified Field Theory

by Tim Joseph
CHAPTER 5

THE EVOLUTION OF A 'PEACFUL COEXISTENCE'
SYNTHESIS: LENIN TO KHRUSHCHEV

This part of the thesis deals with the Soviet Union's doctrinal accommodation to the protracted experience of coexistence with the major capitalist powers, as a state in a system of states. The argument so far has emphasized that the basic categories of the Soviet analysis are not, in themselves, incompatible with the recognition of the unique and relatively 'static' structural realities designated by the term 'states-system'. These concluding chapters will attempt to chart in Soviet 'doctrine' on international relations a substantial and ongoing declaratory adaptation to these realities, such that the 'Leninist' theme of the world revolutionary process - though by no means entirely repudiated - has been very significantly modified.

The treatment of Soviet doctrine in this part, and above all in this chapter, will inevitably be highly selective. In the light of the charge of arbitrary selectiveness earlier laid against the hawk interpretation of Soviet doctrine prominent in the current American debate, it is therefore necessary to establish at the outset the criteria employed here. However, I would argue that the critique of this interpretation, and the delineation of an alternative, involve essentially the same operation, since its adherents tend to invoke in theory the necessary selection criteria - which are those implied by the kind of hermeneutic and structuralist analysis discussed in the previous part - but effectively ignore them in practice.

Thus it is accepted here that, while the hawk picture of a dominant 'arms control' orthodoxy in the American debate regarding the Soviet Union's inevitable accommodation to the 'rules' of mutual deterrence and stable coexistence was always a polemical exaggeration, their basic argument that the Soviets' own self account should not be gratuitously ignored in favour of a concentration upon the supposedly universal 'rationality' of deterrence remains a valid and highly important one. No such abstract rationality exists: nor do states pursue stable coexistence as an end in itself, but rather as a condition which is normally more conducive to the pursuit of
other primary goals than is a condition of endemic conflict. Therefore, especially in regard to a state with such an individual historical experience, and with such an overt commitment to the primacy of domestic over foreign policy as the Soviet Union, it is essential to consider whether it has indicated in actions and in words a deep commitment to policies which are not compatible with stable coexistence.

However, as was argued in Chapter I, it is precisely the question of overall Soviet policy goals which is obscured in the arguments of the hawk school. The rationality ascribed to Soviet policy is a purely instrumental one, revealed in its pristine form in Soviet military doctrine, which is alleged to demonstrate a readiness to resort even to nuclear war, in favourable conditions, in the furtherance of Soviet interests. But the vital question of the concrete policy aims in support of which the Soviet regime would accept such enormous risks is simply ignored. Rather, it is assumed that there is no basic Soviet policy goal, other than the ultimate elimination - or at least the secure subordination - of all rival power centres, and that this is dictated not by any rational calculation but by the inner dynamics of the Soviet polity.¹

This image of the Soviet Union as a special kind of actor to which normal international constraints do not apply is grounded, as has been noted earlier, in the identification of an unchanging Soviet essence which is strikingly similar to that first formulated - in the 'Riga axioms' of Kennan and his associates - some forty years ago. The major instances of a strong Soviet inclination towards a 'forward' international policy - the abortive calls to world revolution and revolutionary war in the 1917-21 period, Stalin's political exploitation of the Red Army's World War II gains, and the current regime's activist exploration of the possibilities of a shifting correlation of forces - are regarded merely as different manifestations of the one underlying drive for world dominion. Similarly, the embattled revolutionary 'vanguard' of the War Communism years, the mature Stalinist police state, and the complex 'mono-organizational society' of today,² are all subsumed under the single totalitarian classification. The result of this extreme application of the 'special approaches', which, as Stephen Cohen observes, 'are reserved for interpreting Soviet history',³ is to vitiate the original insistence upon the historical specificity of the Soviet Union, since the Soviet Union is presented, in effect, as impervious to historical change.
The following discussion is based upon the judgement that the historical development of the Soviet polity is indeed of the utmost importance for the understanding of Soviet foreign policy. But it attempts to grasp the dialectic of continuity and change emphasised in Robert C. Tucker's plea to reconsider 'what we carelessly call the "Soviet political system" ... as an historical succession of political systems within a broadly continuous institutional framework'. Moreover, instead of establishing the 'political system' as the sole 'independent variable' in Soviet foreign policy, with external and internal (resource) constraints accorded only a contingent influence - able temporarily to check, but not genuinely to modify, its expansionist thrust - an intimate and dynamic interrelation between the structures of international politics, Soviet domestic politics, and the Soviet economy will be assumed. Indeed, it will be suggested that the 'political system' itself - in its dominant Stalinist variant - was in substantial part the product of far-reaching decisions on economic policy which can scarcely be understood except by reference to the complex interplay of these various factors.

Similar considerations apply to the question of policy goals as such. It must be emphasized that world revolution, as the goal of an isolated Soviet state, was no more part of original Bolshevik policy than was the construction of socialism in one country. Without at least a substantial early instalment of the former, the Bolsheviks, by their own lights, ought not to have survived to contemplate the latter. Both policies were, in effect, the product of the 'anomalous' constellation of forces which confronted the Bolsheviks, by 1921, with the unforeseen task of building 'a socialist society ... coexistent rather than subsequent to capitalist society', and the approach to the one was very largely conditioned by the development of the other.

Finally, these considerations suggest that particular attention should be paid to the two periods which, in both domestic and foreign policy, appear most incompatible with the 'straight line', totalitarian interpretation of Soviet history - the NEP era, and the Malenkov-Khrushchev years. There is no need here to stress the importance of the latter, for the most obvious theoretical focus of the current debate is the question of whether 'de-Stalinization' did or did not constitute a major and lasting break with the Soviet past. But it is clearly of great significance whether the Soviet shift to a settled policy of 'Peaceful Coexistence' under Khrushchev is seen as essentially a response to the
determined 'containment' policy of a strategically superior adversary, or whether it is regarded as a latter-day manifestation of an earlier conclusion that the pursuit of the Soviet Union's historic tasks could be best facilitated by an indefinite stabilization of relations with the capitalist world. And in this regard the interpretation of the 1920s, when the party fought out the great issues of economic development whose drastic resolution, in the great leap of 1929-33, in turn constituted the 'formative period of Stalinism as a system',7 is absolutely crucial.

The preceding discussion should indicate that the central subject of this chapter is not the evolution of a 'Peaceful Coexistence' doctrine of the full blown, legalistic kind which the Soviet Union has espoused since 1956. Despite all the efforts of Soviet apologists, this cannot be shown to have a Leninist pedigree.8 But the problem of what Lenin called 'existence side by side' with the capitalist powers imposed itself upon the Soviet leadership from its earliest years, and inevitably assumed central importance once the prospect of long term socialist construction 'in one country' began to be seriously entertained. In this and subsequent chapters, I will attempt to show that this has continued to be the essential meaning of the Soviet doctrine of coexistence, but that changing international conditions have encouraged a transition from the sense of an inevitably temporary condition - a breathing space for the consolidation of longer term objectives - towards the conscious incorporation of other aspects of Soviet international theory 'within a broad concept of competitive coexistence as a dynamic system of international relations'.9

It should also be stressed that the domestic referents of the Soviet coexistence synthesis are here regarded as extremely important - not merely the goal of the preservation of the established political order, but also the developmental tasks which, as has been suggested, have been so intimately related to the formation of that order from the outset. Given the special assumptions required to substantiate the 'mindless expansionism' thesis, there would seem to be no more justification for the selection of the 'meaningful' elements of Soviet international doctrine solely with reference to an assumed master goal of imperialist 'world revolution', than for relating everything to the 'peaceful construction of Communism' in the USSR.

This is certainly not to suggest that all Soviet pronouncements should be accepted at face value. There are, clearly, special incentives for governments to avoid saying what they mean in many of
their international dealings; and the Soviet regime, with its long-standing devotion to the arts of 'agitprop', must be particularly suspect in this respect. Nor, on the other hand, can Soviet statements simply be dismissed as 'ideological' when they conflict with abstract, and in practice ethnocentric, conceptions of 'rationality' held by outside observers - the central weakness of much American thinking on arms control in the 1960s. As Alec Nove observes, in relation to the Soviet industrialization dilemma of the 1920s, 'there are a number of solutions ... which the Communists could not have chosen because they were Communists'.10 This judgement may be extended to the present day, though with due recognition of the intervening factors - above all Stalin's second revolution - which have substantially altered what it meant, in various historical periods, to be a Soviet Communist.

The central requirement, to repeat, is for a hermeneutic and structuralist analysis, which attempts to reconstruct the 'logic of the situation' as the Soviet authorities themselves might have been expected to see it. I will be assuming that 'rational action' (or action which appears as an intelligible or appropriate response to the most obvious structural constraints of a given situation) is its own explanation. In practice, of course, it will constantly be necessary to consider the 'special rationality' - both Communist and Russian - which inclined the Soviet leaders to define both ends and means in ways very different from the leaders of the major Western powers. But I will be assuming that interpretations which focus primarily on this dimension are not appropriate where Soviet actions are of the kind which 'anyone' might have been expected to take in similar circumstances. Moreover, the period since the revolution has produced an abundant, and impressively coherent, corpus of Soviet doctrine on the structural phenomena most obviously at issue here: the Soviet economic 'base', the Soviet political 'superstructure', the 'network of states', and the world-economy. It is towards this basic reference grid of concepts, rather than towards the 'schizophrenic' opposition between the central formal doctrines of Peaceful Coexistence and Proletarian Internationalism, that the following discussion is primarily directed.
There are substantial reasons for approaching this subject initially through a consideration of the economic 'base' - not least because the Bolsheviks themselves did so. Of course, the Stalinist state, which did so much to determine the character of Soviet coexistence with the capitalist powers, was itself the supreme embodiment of the principle of the dominance of politics over economics, which, Lenin insisted, constituted in contemporary conditions, 'the ABC of Marxism'. But this principle, in turn, was a not unreasonable response to the great trends in the world-economy which facilitated the Bolshevik seizure of power. Of the two forms of 'substitutism' which reached their culmination under Stalin - of the 'vanguard' party (and ultimately a single leader) for the masses as the agent of political revolution, and of the modern state for market forces as the agent of industrialization - the second was no special creation of the Bolsheviks, but rather, as was argued in Chapter 3, a general phenomenon of the movement of the industrial revolution into regions in which the pre-established structures and culture of mercantile capitalism were almost wholly absent.

This is certainly not to argue that questions of ideology and political culture are unimportant in this context. They are clearly of fundamental importance to an understanding of the Soviet social order; and this is true not only of the Marxist legacy openly claimed by the Soviet regime, but also of those features of the indigenous political culture emphasized by critics such as Pipes: the 'patrimonial' tradition of Russian state power, and the conspiratorial 'Jacobin' strand of the Russian revolutionary tradition. However, the practical importance of such factors cannot be measured except by reference to the specific historical context in which the Soviet order took shape; and analyses which draw a straight line from the organizational structure and ideology of early Bolshevism to mature Stalinism, and from the latter to the unchanging 'expansionism' of Soviet foreign policy, ignore what is arguably the most crucial 'situational' determinant of all. As Carr argues:

No doubt, the party owed much, in the form which it ultimately assumed, to the foundations laid in the conspiratorial period before the revolution. But it owed more to the peculiar position in which the victory of the revolution

The Environment of the Revolution
Two vital questions are implied in this. Why did the 'proletarian' revolution break out in Russia? And why did it not break out in some or all of the advanced capitalist countries? Closely inter-related, they have profound implications for the analysis both of the Soviet system in general, and of the differential appeal of the Soviets' own self-interpretation in Western and Third World contexts.

The foundation of this self-interpretation was Lenin's 'absolute law' of the uneven development of capitalism in the era of imperialism. On its 'briefest possible definition' Lenin asserted, 'imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism'. In this last, 'parasitic' stage of their development, the leading capitalist powers, by carving out new areas of political control for the investment of surplus capital, and by bribing the 'upper stratum' of the working class with a portion of the 'super profits' so derived, had contrived temporarily to export the basic contradictions of the capitalist system and to obtain a temporary period of 'class peace'. However, a stable system of imperialist exploitation - such as that suggested in Kautsky's concept of 'ultra-imperialism' - was impossible, because the uneven development of capitalism would ensure continuous changes in the relative 'strength of those participating', which was 'the only conceivable basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies etc.' Thus, not only would the capitalist powers as a group prey on the rest of the world, but the strongest among them would prey upon the weaker. With the original division of the colonial spoils completed, a new era of inter-imperialist wars to redivide the globe was inevitable.

The actual presentation of these views in the 1916 *Imperialism* pamphlet was clearly much influenced by the tactical requirement to identify World War I as an inter-imperialist war, and a potential Europe-wide revolutionary situation which the proletariat - in contrast to the 'defencist' line adopted by the major parties of the Second International - should exploit by a policy of 'revolutionary defeatism'. Lenin's theoretical analysis of the dynamics of imperialism, moreover, was highly derivative. But, on another level, the work merely drew
together the threads of his impressively early recognition of the revolutionary potential of national movements in 'the East', whose political awakening, via the colonial expansion of the Western powers, marked the beginning of a 'new phase in world history'. This recognition, together with the shift towards a strategy of worker-peasant alliance for Russia itself after the abortive bourgeois revolution in 1905, constituted a major de facto revision of the Marxian analysis. Although the doctrine that revolutionary advance would first occur at the 'weakest link' in the imperialist chain - later exploited by Stalin in the elaboration of the doctrine of Socialism in One Country - technically originated with Trotsky, 'the whole trend of Leninist thought from the beginning is in this direction'.

On the other hand, the full explication of a 'dialectics of backwardness' was inhibited by the doctrine of the 'labour aristocracy', through which Lenin sought to save the original Marxian estimation of the revolutionary potential of the broad mass of the Western proletariat. The Bolshevik experience under the Tsarist autocracy, indeed, made it extremely difficult to recognise that the reformist orientation of West European Social Democracy, far from being a betrayal of the workers by a corrupted leadership, constituted a genuine response to mass aspirations within a relatively settled parliamentary environment. At the same time, however, Lenin had from the first sought to establish the Bolsheviks' own 'aristocratic' claims within the Russian workers' movement, arguing - with a specific appeal to the 'profoundly true and important words' of Kautsky - that the working class could 'exclusively by its own effort ... develop only trade-union consciousness', and that a correct understanding of the political tasks of the revolution must be brought to them from without, by an elite of non-proletarian professional revolutionaries armed with scientific Marxist theory.

Despite these rather schizophrenic implications, Lenin's identification of monopoly capitalism as the characteristic form of the epoch of 'transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system' retained a certain plausibility in the years 1914-20. But his serious 'underestimation of the economic and political potentialities of capitalism, and of the change in the position of the [Western] proletariat', persisted into the new era of 'stabilization' and coexistence. Together with the increasing tendency to project the Bolshevik experience as the model for successful revolutionary action,
it destroyed from the outset any prospect for fruitful collaboration between the Bolsheviks and the European democratic left. 'In fact', argues Marcuse, 'the refusal to draw the theoretical consequences from the new situation characterises the entire development of Leninism, and is one of the chief reasons for the gap between theory and practice in Soviet Marxism'.

To understand the factors, other than World War I, which worked to implant these erroneous perceptions in the Bolshevik outlook, it is necessary to make a detour through the question of the uneven development of the Russian economy itself. This factor, a major structural influence not merely upon the original revolution, but upon the subsequent development of the goal of socialist construction, confronted the Bolsheviks with an exceptionally difficult theoretical problem. The 'anomalous' balance of class forces suggested indeed that a potential revolutionary situation did exist in Russia; but the upheaval portended could be identified neither as unambiguously bourgeois nor as unambiguously proletarian in character, nor yet as merely an 'elemental' peasant uprising in the Pugachev tradition, but rather as a complex mixture of all three.

The conditions for such a development were, in large part, created by the Tsarist regime itself, in the piecemeal programme of economic reforms initiated in the wake of its disturbing experience of the adverse military implications of uneven development during the Crimean war. These reforms, and above all the industrialization and railway-building programme, were designed to consolidate the power of the Russian state, and were initiated 'in the traditional Russian fashion as a "revolution from above"'. But, by the turn of the century, Carr argues, they were 'for the first time creating some of the conditions for a "revolution from below"'.

One crucial factor was the abolition of serfdom in and after 1861, which 'opened a new era in Russian social relations' and, together with the rapid increase in the rural population in the later 19th century, sharply increased the weight of subsistence peasant farming in the Russian economy. This situation promised to perpetuate the inefficiency of Russian agriculture; and it ran directly counter to the logic of industrialization, which required an expanding and marketable agricultural surplus to accommodate the needs of a continuously growing urban population. Therefore the regime, which had already alienated the peasantry by imposing redemption dues upon their land
in 1861, and by leaving much of the land in the hands of the landlords, adopted under Witte a conscious policy of taxing the peasantry to compel them to sell more - and therefore consume less - of their grain. This attempt to make the peasants bear an unequal share of 'the material and financial costs of industrialization' Nove comments, had 'more than a purely superficial similarity [to] that adopted by Stalin over thirty years later'.

A complementary series of agricultural reforms was initiated by Stolypin in the years 1906-11. By finally allowing the peasants the right to withdraw from the village commune, and to buy and sell land, these measures were calculated to intensify the already existing process of economic differentiation among the peasantry. Thus they provided a supply of landless labourers to the towns, and promoted the growth of a kulak class of efficient and prosperous peasant capitalists, who could be expected to increase the volume of marketable grain, and also, Stolypin argued, to constitute a secure political base for the regime. But the fundamental peasant land hunger remained unappeased, as the holdings of the large landowners were left untouched; class divisions within the peasantry were increased; and, whatever the long-term prospects for the political success of Stolypin's 'wager on the strong', they were finally cut off by World War I.

In the industrial sphere, patterns which later became notorious were prefigured from the outset. Because of both the weakness of peasant purchasing power and the foreign policy motivation of the industrialization program, it was strongly biased towards heavy industry, and particularly towards the production of 'war potential'. Given the type of production involved in Russian industry, its latecomer role in the European context, and its state promoted 'hot house' development, it 'skipped over' the gradual evolutionary stages by which West European industrialization had progressed from small scale, entrepreneurial workshops towards the 'giant agglomeration employing hundreds and thousands of workmen. Russian industry, the youngest in Europe and in other respects the most backward, was the most advanced in respect of the concentration of production in large scale units'.

In these circumstances, Carr argues, the Russian proletariat - which had in any case begun its career as an undifferentiated mass of landless peasants, who were subjected to a 'harsh and relentless
discipline' in order to break them to the routine of the factories - readily developed the intensity and uniformity of class consciousness which Marx had mistakenly expected as the product of advanced capitalism. Moreover, the industrial bourgeoisie appeared 'from the first' in the guise of 'the administrator, the organiser, the bureaucrat', with none of the early Western entrepreneurial tradition of direct contact with the workers. The absence of an established mercantile culture, finally, meant that there were no indigenous roots for a strong liberal tradition in politics. From both the economic and political equations, 'the middle term was absent'.

These various factors helped to establish the limits upon Bolshevik maneouvre both before and after the 1917 Revolution. In common with all variants of Russian Marxism, the Bolsheviks were convinced that the road to socialism in Russia lay through industrialization. Thus they rejected outright the narodnik commitment (inherited by the later Socialist Revolutionaries) to a peasant based socialism growing out of the indigenous collectivist tradition of the village commune, even though this goal had received a tentative endorsement in Marx's own comments regarding the possibility that Russian socialism could bypass the capitalist stage exemplified by Western Europe. Conversely, they supported the Tsarist regime's own modernising policies, with Lenin insisting that 'the direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious supporters of the bourgeoisie [are] our temporary or partial allies in the struggle against the remnants of the serfowning system'.

However, the 1905 revolution convinced Lenin that the bourgeoisie was too weak, and too fearful of more radical change, to consummate its own revolution. At the same time, he maintained that the proletariat had already shown itself to be a powerful 'third force', capable ultimately of defeating both the autocracy and the bourgeoisie, while the peasantry were 'at the present moment less interested in the unconditional defence of private property than in taking away the landowner's land, which is one of the chief forms of that property'. Thus he proposed, in Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, a major revision not merely of the proletariat's tactical alliance policy, but also of the very conception of the forthcoming revolution:
The proletariat must carry the democratic revolution to completion, allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush the autocracy's resistance by force and paralyse the bourgeoisie's instability. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population, so as to crush the bourgeoisie's resistance by force and paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.

There can be little doubt that this change of line was a major factor in the Bolsheviks' success during the crucial period in 1917-18, leading up to and immediately following the fall of the Provisional Government. One implication of the patrimonial character of the Russian ancien regime was that genuine opposition to state power came not from any of the traditional social and economic groups, whose power might have provided the backbone of a liberal-constitutional alternative to Tsardom, but primarily from the revolutionary intelligentsia. At the 'upper' level of the struggle for national power, therefore, the ultimate collapse of the Tsarist regime left 'the revolutionary socialist parties, would-be consolidators of alternative regimes ... to contend in a virtual power vacuum'. By contrast, at the 'lower' level of independent action by workers and peasants, 'Russia was rapidly developing an enormous network of popular institutions, leading, in fact, to a more thoroughly "structured" society than ever before in Russian history'; and the Bolsheviks' success in outflanking their opponents in the 'upper' struggle is attributable not merely to their ruthlessness and superior organizational skill, but also to their populist responsiveness to the demands emanating from below - including, above all, the peasantry's demand for the land.

However, in the longer term - and even leaving aside the harsh exigencies of War Communism - the need of the Bolsheviks was to re-establish a centralized political order on terms which did not irremediably compromise the vision of a socialist transformation of Russia. And from this perspective Lenin's concept of the 'revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry' was replete with contradictions. First, there was the problem of the time-scale of the transition envisaged, under the proletarian-peasant
dictatorship, between the 'bourgeois' and 'socialist' revolutions. Lenin had formally dissociated himself from Trotsky's thesis that the 'logic of the revolution itself' would compel an automatic transition from one to the other, but he 'adopted in 1917 what was virtually the same expedient of making the Bolshevik seizure of power do simultaneous duty as the last act of the bourgeois revolution and the first of the socialist revolution'. However, the proletariat's qualifications for the maintenance of a vanguard role in this latter process were extremely dubious. While it was indeed possessed of a potentially revolutionary class consciousness, it was anything but the 'immense majority of the population'; and it was also woefully lacking in that depth of political culture which, in the Marxian schema, was to have been a natural concomitant of its maturity as a revolutionary agent.

Second, the entire logic of the Bolsheviks' position required them to place industrial development at the centre of the tasks of the socialist revolution. Their belief in the feasibility of socialist industrialization in the backward Russian environment was, of course, directly dependent upon the conviction that the spark of the bourgeois revolution in Russia would ignite the socialist revolution in Europe, and that the subsequent assistance of the victorious European proletariat would make good the deficiencies of the Russian economic base, as well as the Russian proletariat's lack of political culture. In the event, the already war-torn country passed, with only a brief respite, into a further three years of civil war and foreign intervention. Together with the economic dislocation caused by the revolution itself, and the major resource losses occasioned by the Brest-Litovsk settlement, these strains ensured a situation in which, so far from socialist construction proceeding upon the basis of prior material abundance, 'only want [was] made general'.

Third, although an insistence upon tactical flexibility was one of Lenin's trademarks, the alliance with the peasantry was potentially an instance of the one type of compromise which he did regard as inadmissible - one which involved a surrender of the ultimate goals of the revolution. By acquiescing in the outright expropriation of the landlords in 1917, the Bolsheviks outflanked the Socialist Revolutionaries, and secured not merely the peasants' sufferance of
the new regime, but also their indispensable military support in the struggle against the Whites.\footnote{40} However, the peasantry were also deeply alienated by the institution of forcible grain requisitioning in the War Communism years; and as Lenin observed in 1921, the 'very simple, and even crude' basis of the wartime alliance with the peasantry could not be expected to persist into the new period, when the latter were likely to identify the regime's own socialist aspirations as the new threat to their control of the land.\footnote{41}

Moreover, the massive expansion of peasant land-holding in 1917 had merely intensified the old problem of the checks imposed by subsistence agriculture on the development of industry, and confronted the regime with economic incentives to follow the Stolypin path. Already, in the disastrous winter of 1918-19, they had substantially diluted the avowed policy of splitting the peasantry by alliance with its semi-proletarian elements, disbanding the countryside committees of 'poor peasants' as part of a campaign to conciliate the 'middle peasants';\footnote{42} and with the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921, they accepted an indefinite period of market relations in agriculture, and the inevitable strengthening of the kulak element. In the countryside, as Carr observes, 'the revolution [had] passed a sponge over the immediate past', and when the intra-party battle on the issue of Socialism in One Country was finally joined in 1924, 'the problem had once again to be faced from the beginning'.\footnote{43}

The Period of Transition

The Bolshevik acceptance of ad hoc solutions to these crucial problems must be related to the peculiar theoretical and practical 'necessity' of the world revolution. 'Our salvation from all these difficulties', Lenin told the Seventh Party Congress in 1918, 'is in all European revolution ... regarded from the world-historical point of view, there would doubtlessly be no hope of the ultimate victory of our revolution, if it were to remain alone, if there were no revolutionary movement in other countries ... '\footnote{44} The very character of the Russian proletariat's tasks, he argued, could not be calculated except in this context:
We have only just taken the first steps towards shaking off capitalism altogether and beginning the transition to socialism. We do not know and we cannot know how many stages of transition to socialism there will be. That depends on when the full-scale European socialist revolution begins and on whether it will deal with its enemies and enter upon the smooth path of socialist development easily and rapidly or whether it will do so slowly. We do not know this ...

This was to be a constantly reiterated theme. However, from the time of Lenin's victory over his opponents on the Brest-Litovsk issue, one task - that of national survival - inescapably assumed an identity of its own. Soviet Communists had been 'defencists' since 25 October 1917, Lenin insisted, when they had won the right to be 'defencists' of the socialist fatherland. From that moment of the emergence of a single socialist state, he argued, relations with imperialist powers must be judged not 'from the point of view of whether this or that imperialism is preferable, but exclusively from the point of view of the conditions which best make for the development and consolidation of the socialist revolution which has already begun.' In a party manifesto justifying Brest-Litovsk, this point was driven home in terms which clearly anticipate Stalin's doctrine of the supremacy of the Soviet 'base':

By upholding Soviet power we render the best and most powerful support to the proletariat of all countries in its unprecedently difficult and onerous struggle against its own bourgeoisie. There can be no greater blow to the cause of socialism than the collapse of Soviet power in Russia.

The longer the isolation of the Soviet state continued, the greater became Lenin's concern for tactical flexibility and his reliance upon the 'two tendency' analysis long applied to the domestic class struggle. The war 'for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie', he asserted in 1920, would be 'a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complex than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states'. Therefore, to renounce in advance the prospect of compromises, or of shifts in policy to exploit the divisions in the enemy camp, however
limited the likely gains, would be 'ridiculous in the extreme'. This negative policy of 'utilizing the discord among the imperialist powers' - grounded both in the theoretical analysis of imperialism, and in Lenin's reading of the lessons of the Intervention - provided the dominant theme of his foreign policy statements in this period. But the seeds of a more positive approach to the question of direct cooperation with the capitalist powers were contained in the very self definition of the revolution. If socialism (and, indeed, the consolidation of Soviet power) could not be secured without industrialization, and if the regime could not, for the moment, deal with socialist governments in the advanced countries, assistance in this enterprise must be sought from the capitalists themselves.

Indeed, in the period immediately after Brest-Litovsk - when, according to Lenin's later testimony, 'we expected a period in which peaceful construction would be possible' - he became embroiled in a second major controversy with the Left over the issue of economic cooperation with big capital. Seizing upon his opponents' warnings of a degeneration into 'state capitalism', Lenin argued that state capitalism would represent 'a step forward for us', for it constituted 'a regime of centralization, integration, control, and socialization [which] is exactly what we lack'. As such, he insisted, it was nothing less than the 'threshold' to socialism:

Is it not clear that, from the material, economic and productive point of view we are not yet 'on the threshold' of socialism? Is it not clear that we cannot pass through the door of socialism without crossing 'the threshold' which we have not yet reached?

The point is that the Bolsheviks had seized power primarily to effect a material and social transformation of their own society; and that, from their earliest days in power, the conditions were developing in which world revolution, no less than stable coexistence, could be viewed primarily in terms of its contribution to this domestic goal. Of course, as so often with Lenin, this interpretation involves assigning particular weight to positions adopted, and sometimes later controverted, in the course of intermittent polemics with his various political opponents. But, to repeat, since selection of this kind is inescapable, it seems most reasonable to relate it to the more persistent structural features of the Soviet experience. In this
regard, it is noteworthy that one of the most frequently quoted of Lenin's pronouncements on coexistence dates from the quite unrepresentative year of 1919, at the height of the allied Intervention, and was particularly related to the rebuttal of the charge, advanced by Kautsky, that the Bolsheviks were creating a militarist state:

> We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states, and it is inconceivable for the Soviet republic to exist alongside of the imperialist states for any length of time ... And before the end comes, there will have to be a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet republic and the bourgeois states.  

> With its formal 'states-system' language and its over-riding 'inevitability of war' thesis, this almost selects itself as a representative Leninist assertion of the impossibility of inter-state coexistence with the capitalist world (Pipes, for instance, describes it as 'an uncharacteristic outburst of candour' in which 'Lenin articulated his vision of the future'). However, the expectation of an inevitable capitalist-Soviet clash was not an application of Lenin's formal 'inevitability of war' thesis, which related specifically to the capitalist powers, with their conflicting imperialist drives towards the export of surplus capital. It was rather a practical judgement that the international bourgeoisie would not tolerate the continued existence of an independent socialist state; and in 1919, the year both of 'Soviet Russia's most complete isolation from the outside world', and of its 'most outspokenly revolutionary' foreign policy stance, this expectation must have seemed all too correct. By 1921, with both the Intervention and the failure of 'revolutionary war' in Poland behind them, the Soviet regime faced a situation whose basic structure was to persist well into the future, and Lenin offered an assessment of it which brought together in a striking way most of the major themes discussed above:

> Without having gained an international victory, which we consider the only sure victory, we are in the position of having won conditions enabling us to exist side by side with the capitalist powers, who are compelled to enter into trade relations with us. In the course of this struggle we have won the right to an independent existence. Thus a glance at our international position as a whole will show that we have achieved tremendous successes and have won, not only a breathing space
but something more significant ... We have entered a new period, in which we have won our right to our fundamental international existence in the network of capitalist states ... Today we can speak, not merely of a breathing space, but of a real chance of a new and lengthy period of development. Until now we have actually had no basis in the international sense. We now have this basis.

Lenin made no further advance upon this still limited conception of interstate coexistence. But in his last years he did establish, through his elaboration upon the themes of uneven development and the national liberation movement; much of the foundations of the current Soviet 'working theory' of world history in the transition period - the General Crisis of Capitalism. The West European countries, he argued in 1923, were not completing their development towards socialism 'as we formerly expected. They are not consummating it through gradual "maturing" of socialism, but through the exploitation of the first of the countries vanquished in the imperialist war [i.e. Germany] combined with the exploitation of the whole of the East'. This permitted 'some semblance of "class truce"' within the imperialist nations, but at the cost of irrevocably drawing 'the East ... into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement'-a 'process of development that must lead to a crisis in the whole world of capitalism'.

Elsewhere, Lenin specifically situated Russia on 'the borderline' between the civilized countries and the colonial world, suggesting that her revolutionary process, while still 'in keeping with the general line of world developments', must 'introduce certain partial innovations as the revolution moves on to the countries of the East'. Admittedly, Lenin's argument retained the notion that the class truce in the West was a temporary aberration. But in practice, as Tucker points out, it transferred 'the epicentre of world revolutionary development ... to the backward, agrarian, colonial, but increasingly rebellious East', and presented 'the world revolutionary process not as an all-European proletarian revolt on Marx's model, but as a long drawn out revolt of the colonial East against European hegemony on the model of the revolution in semi-Asiatic Russia'.

However, the shift in strategy implied here in no sense modified Lenin's concern with stable coexistence. In the first place -
and in a pattern which would become common in Soviet political
discourse - it mobilized an optimistic appraisal of the broad sweep
of history in support of an indefinite accommodation to unpleasant
political realities. In the Long-term, the Soviet Union could
aspire to a definitive erosion of the colonial underpinnings of the
capitalist stabilization. It could also hope that developing colonial
unrest, together with the interimperialist contradictions, would
secure for it an extended 'respite' from concerted imperialist attack.
But, for the present, the fact that 'the imperialists have succeeded
in splitting the world into two camps', was a 'disadvantage' under
which 'we are labouring'.

Second, the new doctrine may be seen as a direct reflection of
Lenin's preoccupation with the Soviet Union's pressing domestic
problems, and above all the very factor most conducive to the parallel
with 'the East' - the confirmation by the revolution of the dominance
of peasant agriculture in the national economy. 'We, too, lack
enough civilization to enable us to pass straight into socialism',
Lenin admitted, 'although we do have the political requisites for it'.

In fact, even the latter were gravely threatened. The Russian
proletariat had been deeply affected by 'a long process of quantitative
and qualitative deterioration'. Through its physical losses in the
Civil War, the co-option of its upper ranks into the party and
administrative hierarchy, and the re-absorption of large numbers into
the peasantry as a result of the collapse of heavy industry and the
famine conditions in the cities, 'it seemed', in 1923 'to have touched
the nadir of its prestige and influence'. Despite the substantial
levies on the proletariat, moreover, the regime was compelled to rely
heavily on pre-revolutionary 'experts' in all areas of administration;
and their Tsarist 'bureaucratic culture', for want of any genuine
competition, was an increasingly pervasive force in the government.

Finally, the very economic success of the NEP was creating, in the
growth of rural and urban small capitalist strata, an alternative ally
for the mass of the peasantry. The Communists themselves, Lenin
acknowledged in 1922, were but 'a drop in the ocean of the people'
and the soi-disant dictatorship of the proletariat was now left
'suspended in the void'.

The over-riding issue was the 'link' with the peasantry. 'So long
as there is no revolution in other countries', Lenin maintained, 'only
agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia'. Indeed, in some later-published notes, he explicitly reversed the earlier priorities of revolutionary advance. 'Ten or twenty years of regular relations with the peasantry', he observed, 'and victory is assured on a world scale (even if there is a delay in the proletarian revolutions, which are maturing); otherwise 20-40 years of tormenting whiteguard terror'. As Moshe Lewin points out, Lenin's now envisaged 'building not socialism at once, but a society in transition' - a programme which could, indeed, be directly related to the needs of the wider national liberation movement.

His concern was now to effect 'the radical modification in our whole outlook on socialism' necessary in a country which lacked the material base envisaged by Marx, and in which 'the political and social revolution preceded the cultural revolution'. The Communists' whole emphasis should be shifted from revolutionary political struggle, towards 'peaceful organizational, "cultural" [and] educational work', though this must inevitably be circumscribed by 'our international relations, [by] the fact that we have to fight for our position on a world scale'.

It is true that Lenin himself raised the fateful prospect that the Soviet state, by its own resources, could first acquire the necessary level of culture, and then 'proceed to overtake the other nations', and that he asserted that proletarian state power, state control of large scale industry, and the voluntary acceptance of cooperatives by the mass of the peasantry, was 'all that is necessary to build a complete socialist society'. But the realization of the last goal would itself require 'an entire historical epoch'; and the industrial expansion which was essential both to avoid a 'reign of peasant limitations' and to assure the long-term security of the Soviet state, was to be financed essentially by the 'greatest possible thrift in the economic life of our state', within the context of the voluntary link with the peasantry. In this conception of the transition period, therefore, coexistence, and indeed cooperation with the capitalist world, was little short of an objective requirement of Soviet foreign policy.

Socialism in One Country

The 'subtle and undeclared' rapprochement between 'the cause of
Russia and the cause of Bolshevism', of which Lenin's last writings were one instance, reached its culmination in Stalin's doctrine of Socialism in One Country. More than anything else, this represented the supremacy of domestic tasks - with their associated implications for coexistence - in the party's mind.

This is illustrated by Stalin's employment of the ostensibly militant doctrine of the 'weakest link'. Under conditions of imperialism and uneven capitalist development, he argued in 1924, 'individual countries and individual national economies have ceased to be self sufficient units, have become links in a single chain called world economy ...' Formerly 'the proletarian revolution was regarded exclusively as the result of the internal development of a given country'. Now, it must be seen 'primarily as a result of the development of the contradictions within the world system of imperialism, as the result of the breaking of the chain of the world imperialist front in one country or another'.

This ought logically to have implied both a strategic orientation towards the national liberation movement, and a recognition of the drastic limitations on the prospects for socialist development - as Marxists had so far understood it - in Russia. But Stalin showed little interest in consistency in his speculations about the future course of world revolution, being primarily concerned to establish the socialist credentials of the October Revolution. Indeed, his full 'Socialism in One Country' synthesis offered a 'building block' theory of the world revolution, which effectively denied the reality of the unified world-economy upon which the 'weakest link' doctrine was predicated.

The essential point, on Stalin's account, was to distinguish between two sets of contradictions: those between the proletariat and the peasantry in the Soviet Union, which could 'be overcome entirely by the efforts of one country'; and those represented by the capitalist encirclement, 'the solution of which requires the efforts of the proletarians of several countries'. Given the distinction, he asserted, the Soviet Union could achieve unaided the complete construction of socialism within its boundaries, though its final victory, in the sense of security against an enforced capitalist restoration, would require the general victory of the international proletariat. Moreover, the prospects for further defections from 'the system of imperialist states' were directly dependent upon the achievements of
the Soviet 'advanced base' itself:

... there can also be no doubt that the very development of the world revolution, the very process of the breaking away from imperialism of a number of new countries will be more rapid and thorough, the more thoroughly socialism becomes consolidated in the first victorious country, the faster this country is transformed into a base for the further unfolding of the world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism.

As Carr points out, the significance of this doctrine lay not in the arcane theoretical distinctions regarding the 'final' victory of socialism, but in the psychological impact of its expression of faith in the Soviet future even despite the now generally acknowledged stabilization of capitalism.\(^8\) In May 1925, pointing to the impressive economic recovery under NEP, Stalin maintained that 'we have two stabilizations: the temporary stabilization of capitalism, and the stabilization of the Soviet system'. In contrast to Trotsky, whom he successfully saddled with the stigma of excessive reliance upon 'world revolution', and of defeatist underestimation of the independent resources of the Soviet worker-peasant alliance, Stalin insisted that the condition of dual stabilization could provide the foundation for successful socialist construction in the Soviet Union.\(^8\) And at the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925, when he had effectively established his supremacy over both Trotsky and his former colleagues of the Politburo majority, he explicitly drew the connection between Soviet development and coexistence:

The basic new feature, the decisive feature... in the sphere of foreign relations during this period, is the fact that a certain temporary equilibrium of forces has been established between our country, which is building socialism, and the countries of the capitalist world, an equilibrium which has determined the present period of 'peaceful coexistence'... What we at one time regarded as a brief respite after the war has become a whole period of respite.\(^8\)

The question of the changing meaning of Socialism in One Country in Soviet political discourse is thus a vital one for any attempt to
chart the evolution of the Soviet approach to 'existence side by side' with the capitalist states. As Kubalkova and Cruickshank point out, Stalin, through his codification of the hints in Lenin's later pronouncements about the indefinite continuance of such a situation, became 'the first marxist writer to formulate a theory of international relations that would not explicitly incorporate a theory of the end of international relations' in world revolution and the establishment of a socialist world order. Moreover, by attaching the doctrine of Socialism in One Country to that of uneven development and the 'weakest link' — thereby reconciling it, however ambiguously, with the Leninist theory of imperialism — Stalin 'established a point of departure in Soviet theory that leads directly to contemporary thinking on the subject of international relations'.

Although the classic Stalinist perspective was modified after World War II by a de facto concept of 'socialism in one sphere', which in turn gave way, with Khrushchev's reformulation of Peaceful Coexistence, to a doctrine more attuned to the growing importance of international relations at large to the developing Soviet great power, it is nonetheless true that, in its basic categories, the contemporary Soviet perspective clearly betrays its Stalinist heritage.

On the other hand, the doctrine of Socialism in One Country should not be interpreted solely by reference to developments in Soviet domestic and foreign policy in the Stalin era proper. At the time of its emergence in the mid-1920s, it must be emphasized, the majority (and Stalinist) line on 'building socialism' was a direct continuation of the peasant-oriented NEP strategy outlined in Lenin's last statements. Bukharin, then Stalin's ally and the chief economic theorist of Socialism in One Country, insisted that the party must advance 'at the pace of a tortoise', and ride 'towards socialism on a peasant nag'. Even Trotsky, Preobrazhensky, and the 'super-industrialization' left — whose political handicap was their denial that Russia could achieve socialism merely on its own economic base — expected the indefinite continuation of market relations in the countryside, and agreed that collectivization must be gradual and voluntary. Moreover, a limited synthesis of Right and Left viewpoints appeared to have been achieved at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927; and 'when Stalin abandoned this programme a year later he abandoned mainstream Bolshevik thinking about economic change'. As has been suggested earlier, the transformation in the meaning of Socialism in
One Country led in turn to a transformation of the Soviet system and, in large part, of its relationship with the outside world; and the complex mix of objective and subjective factors involved in the decisions of the late 1920s is crucial to the assessment of that relationship.

First, the period of postwar recovery in industry, with dramatic productivity increases from relatively modest capital investments, was reaching its end. The need now was for a major expansion of the industrial base; and, especially in the absence of extensive foreign loans, this required an associated expansion of marketable agricultural surpluses. But the Bukharinite recipe of according priority to consumer goods, as an incentive to the peasants to sell more, clashed directly with the priority to heavy industry which was dictated by the concern with longer-term self sufficiency. Moreover, since a modern heavy industry sector was one of the most important legacies from Tsarist Russia, the Bukharinite approach would have involved dissipating a crucial existing asset which, the Right freely admitted, would in any case need to be expanded at a later date.

Second, there was the international situation, in which, Stalin pronounced at the Fifteenth Party Congress, 'the period of "peaceful coexistence" [was] receding into the past, giving place to a period of imperialist assaults and preparation for intervention against the USSR'. The major war scare of 1927 certainly appears to have been seriously exaggerated for the purpose of creating a siege mentality conducive to a massive new development effort; and, if Stalin had really believed that the country faced an early invasion, 'the policy of the First Five Year Plan would look very much like suicide prompted by a fear of death'. But it seems likely that the party in general did regard war as inevitable in the longer term, and, as Nove points out, this perception dictated both a heavy industry priority and rapid development tempos, each inimical to the NEP strategy.

Third, the regime already faced a 'goods famine' in the consumer sector; and by the end of the 1920s the market system had produced a 'chronic and irremediable crisis of grain collections'. This situation, exacerbated by politically inspired and self defeating pricing policies, mobilized behind collectivization 'the same empirical argument once used to justify NEP - the dire need for grain to feed the towns and factories'.
Finally, there was the political requirement for a 'Communist' solution. Even if the immediate crisis could be transcended, a longer term developmental success on the Bukharinite model could only be purchased at the cost of a major expansion of kulak power and influence. As Nove observes, 'a strong group of independent, rich peasants was Stolypin's dream [but] the Bolsheviks' nightmare, as totally inconsistent in the long run with their rule or with a socialist transformation of petty bourgeois Russia'. 97 Furthermore, the War Communism years had already provided a highly centralized and collectivist model of 'socialist construction' which fitted well with the potentialities of Stalin's political base. The ideology generated by this militant and 'heroic' period, Tucker argues, retained its power over important sections of the party even at the height of NEP, and again assumed a dominant role in the crisis atmosphere of 1928-29. 98

In sum, therefore, the change in the Bolshevik approach to 'building socialism' in one country is most readily explicable as an intelligible, though extremely drastic, response to the logic of an unprecedented situation. Ideology was undoubtedly important in narrowing still further the party's range of 'available' alternatives. But there is no persuasive reason to invoke the notion of an ideological 'blueprint', partially implemented in War Communism and now given full scope under Stalin. 99 Rather, the party's definition of Soviet Communism was itself being improvised, 'on the run', throughout the first decade of its rule; and by the late 1920s the combination of factors enumerated above had created a situation in which, given the emerging terms of reference supplied by that definition, there appeared no real alternative to the brutal Stalinist 'breakthrough':

This amalgam of fears, hopes and revolutionary faith had begun to dominate Soviet policy in the summer of 1929. If industrialization was a condition of collectivization, collectivization was a condition of industrialization. ... In the two preceding years disaster had been narrowly averted. Gradualism was not enough. The position could, and must, be taken by assault. It was in this mood of mingled desperation and optimism ... that the fateful decision was taken, suddenly and with little apparent debate, to collectivize the mass of the peasantry by force and to liquidate the kulaks as a class.
Collectivization was thus a political *choice*, which a different regime might successfully have avoided. But it was a choice within an extremely limited range of options. And the same parameters which shaped the original decisions helped to push their implementation into disastrous channels which, it is reasonable to suppose, the decision-makers cannot wholly have foreseen. Especially in its earliest stages, Lewin emphasizes, the industrialization drive 'was accompanied by an astonishingly inadequate development of theory ... There is no doubt that the whole process was an immense improvization, guided by the rule of thumb, hunch, and all too often by despotic whims'.

There were several immediately disastrous results: massive *disinvestment* in agriculture, through the peasants' slaughter of their livestock, so that for many years new mechanized inputs were merely repairing the deficiencies created at the outset; extensive waste of new capital equipment (itself financed by the sale of expropriated grain) in industry; a decline even from existing levels of consumer goods production; widespread famine, confined chiefly to the countryside by the regime's requisitioning policies; and the loss, through the 'liquidation' of the *kulaks*, of the most efficient agricultural producers in the country. In the long term the ongoing malaise in agriculture was perhaps the most pressing economic problem bequeathed by Stalin to his successors. And, most crucial of all, the methods employed to enforce collectivization - originally something of an ancillary issue to that of industrialization - marked the real beginning of the Stalinist system.

The consummation of that system came with the Great Purge of 1937-39, when Stalin turned the police terror above all on the leading state and economic functionaries, and upon the party *aktiv* which had loyally enforced the policies of the First Five Year Plan. The link between collectivization and the terror is an extremely complex one. Each can be presented as a 'political necessity' in the context of evolving Soviet Communism. But whereas, in the first instance, the necessity was for a 'Communist' solution to the problem of Russian backwardness, in the second, it was for the preservation of the Stalinist system (and Stalin himself) against all effective opposition, in the party and elsewhere. A central paradox of Stalin's rule,
indeed, is that in driving the country through a great 'modernizing' revolution from above, he also contributed directly to the 'archaization' of the Soviet state, reaching back to the tradition of earlier modernizing Tsars to establish a 'neo-Tsarist version of the compulsory service-state'.

Two conclusions, foreshadowed earlier, must be emphasized here. First, while Stalinism still casts a large shadow over Soviet relations with the outside world, it was not simply the logical culmination of Bolshevism, but a specific historical phenomenon susceptible to change as its underlying conditions changed. Second, although Soviet doctrine throughout the Stalinist period was strikingly consistent in its 'zero-sum' depiction of both international and domestic politics, this phenomenon itself appears to reflect primarily an extreme introversion in Stalinist politics. Peaceful Coexistence was indeed presented throughout in tactical terms, never challenging the over-riding expectation of a violent denouement to the capitalist-Soviet conflict. But, for the transition period, the master concept was neither Peaceful Coexistence nor world revolution, but the 'capitalist encirclement' of a vulnerable Soviet Union.

Throughout its history, the 'capitalist encirclement' retained a direct connection with the possibility of a capitalist restoration in the USSR. Stalin initially advanced the concept as a kind of by-product to Socialism in One Country, to emphasize that this was the sole obstacle to the final victory of socialism which the Soviet Union could not overcome by its own resources. However, it soon acquired the character of an all purpose justification for Stalin's revision of fundamental Marxist tenets concerning the revolution. In 1936, Stalin declared that the Soviet Union had competed the building of socialism, and at the 18th Party Congress in 1939, he claimed that 'we are moving ahead, to Communism'. But he had already announced, in his justification of the purges, that the class struggle would intensify, not die down, with the closer advance of Communism; and in his 1939 report, he undertook to revise 'Engels' formula' of the withering away of the state. 'Unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and unless the danger of foreign military attack has been eliminated,' Stalin argued, the state would remain even under Communism.

Indeed, Stalin clearly found it advantageous to retain the sanction of the 'capitalist encirclement' even as external circumstances increasingly challenged the simplicities of the doctrine. In 1937,
after a brief period of restraint in Soviet discussions of the Western democracies during the 'collective security' offensive, he returned emphatically to 'the real and unpleasant phenomenon' of capitalist encirclement. The bourgeois states continued to surround the Soviet Union, waiting for an 'opportunity to attack it, to crush it, or in any event to weaken or undermine it', and 'no economic successes, however great', could annul this fact and its consequences. Moreover, he had already, in 1930, established the claim that 'capitalist encirclement' must not be regarded simply as a geographic concept but rather as signifying the links between hostile foreign forces and class enemies within the USSR. And as late as 1950, after the addition of the East European countries and 500 million Chinese to the 'socialist camp', the party journal Bolshevik reiterated this caution.

However, while the manipulative elements of the doctrine are readily apparent, it seems probable that it expressed a broad analytical perspective as well. Stalin's personal attraction towards a strongly dichotomous world view was already evident in 1919, in his argument that the world was now 'definitely and irrevocably split into two camps' of imperialism and socialism, whose struggle 'constitutes the hub of present day affairs ...' Moreover, though he accepted the theoretical possibility that the colonial regions - now a 'reserve' of imperialism - could ultimately be brought into the socialist camp, Stalin was substantially more non-committal about this than was Lenin, while caution about the prospects for European revolution was one of his distinguishing features. Theoretically, he argued in a 1925 speech on the link with the peasantry, the Soviet revolution had three foreign 'allies': the inter-imperialist contradictions, the Western proletariat, and the colonies. But, whatever their great importance for the future, these were of little relevance to the immediate problem. Only from the peasantry could the proletariat obtain assistance 'at this very moment'. Given that the next decade produced a condition of virtual civil war, first against the peasantry, and then against the 'proletarian' party itself, it is entirely plausible that the threat of the capitalist encirclement, and not the opportunities for breaching it, should have governed Stalin's outlook.

Indeed, Marcuse has persuasively argued that the Soviet outlook throughout the entire Stalin period was primarily defensive, being
dominated by the perception of a long-term capitalist stabilization, a major cause of which was the 'neutralization' of the inter-imperialist conflicts by the effects of a shared antipathy to the Soviet Union. On this Soviet analysis, Marcuse points out, the rise of Fascism constituted merely a heightened phase of the national and international class struggle, and the wartime Grand Alliance represented merely a temporary triumph of the inter-imperialist over the capitalist-Soviet contradictions, being forced on the democracies by the failure of their strategy of turning Nazi aggression solely against the Soviet Union.\(^{114}\)

One apparent objection to Marcuse's thesis stems from the ostensibly revolutionary goals of the Comintern, especially in the great 'left turn' of 1929-34, when the campaign against the 'Social Fascists' of the democratic left contributed directly to the success of Hitler in Germany. But as Franz Borkenau points out, the Comintern had long since lost any real rationale as an engine of world revolution. Indeed, 'when the Comintern was born the revolution in the West was already at an end ... As an organization under the sway of Moscow ... it was itself a product of defeat' - that very defeat which itself shaped the anomalous character of the Bolshevik revolution.\(^{115}\) In his notorious 1927 definition of proletarian internationalism Stalin emphatically drew the moral from this situation:

An internationalist is one who is ready to defend the USSR, without reservation, without wavering, unconditionally; for the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and this revolutionary movement cannot be defended and promoted unless the USSR is defended. For whoever thinks of defending the world revolutionary movement apart from, or against, the USSR, goes against the revolution, and must inevitably slide into the camp of the enemies of the revolution.\(^{116}\)

In addition to their role as tools of Soviet foreign policy, the foreign Communist parties were also significant as pawns in the factional struggle within the Soviet elite; and the great Comintern 'left turn' was clearly influenced by the exigencies of Stalin's struggle with the Bukharinite Right. More generally, however, it was simply an extreme instance of the pattern of militant, but essentially defensive,
reactions to the perceived danger that the continuation of 'Rightist' strategies might lead to the effective merging of Communist cadres with the forces of Social Democracy.\textsuperscript{117}

Even Soviet policy in the immediate postwar period appears to have been primarily a holding operation - though in respect of the much more extensive assets acquired during World War II. Stalin may have been attracted towards the wider prospects of 'world revolution': but he seems, in retrospect, to have adopted a generally conservative approach to the cause of Communist movements in Western Europe, the Balkans, and Asia. Moreover his attitude to Eastern Europe appears to have been substantially shaped by two interlocking 'defensive' concerns: the protection against perceived Western encroachments of the glacies recently established by Soviet arms; and the protection against the challenge of Titoist revisionism of his own brand of Communist orthodoxy.

Finally, the emerging American role in this period lent a good deal of plausibility to what Soviet analyses presented as the logical further development of the General Crisis of Capitalism: the political, military and economic consolidation of the capitalist world, for the better prosecution of the struggle against Communism, under the leadership of its major economic power.\textsuperscript{118} At the time of its promulgation in 1947, the Zhdanov doctrine was regarded in the West as an aggressive declaration of Cold War. But Marcuse argues that - with its implicit allocation of the Western proletariat to the imperialist camp, its denial of the possibility of a middle road for independent Third World regimes, and its reiteration of the Soviet recognition of the 'fact of coexistence for a long time of the two social systems' - it came closer than any other major Soviet pronouncement to 'the open recognition of international capitalist unification, and thus to discarding the traditional notion of the interimperialist contradictions'.\textsuperscript{119}

As against all this, it must be noted that Stalin, in his last published article, himself attacked the belief of 'some comrades' in the prospect of a long-term capitalist stabilization, and insisted that the interimperialist contradictions 'had proved in practice to be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp'.\textsuperscript{120} Also, as Marshal Shulman has emphasized, Soviet foreign policy in Stalin's final years, and especially the line laid down at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952, indicated
a greater capacity for flexibility and manoeuvre, in an attempt to minimize the impact of American leadership of the West and of the developing policy of containment.\footnote{121} However, even Shulman is concerned primarily to emphasize the continuity in Soviet foreign policy, to demonstrate that the transitional stage exhibited under Malenkov did have roots in the late Stalin period, and not to suggest that this period produced any major change on the general question of coexistence with the West.\footnote{122}

Overall, the legacy of the Stalin era was a deeply ambivalent one. On the one hand, it had established some of the most enduring themes of both domestic and foreign policy: the fundamental Soviet statism, both practical and theoretical; the obsessive need to catch up, economically and militarily, with the capitalist powers; the deeply Russian character of the orientation towards 'world revolution'. Moreover, the politico-economic base created under Stalin brought the Soviet Union through both the tremendous test of World War II and its period of maximum vulnerability in the immediate postwar years, so that in the 1950s it could begin to confront the West on the basis of at least notional nuclear equality.

On the other hand, the economy was plagued by the inefficiency of the collectivized agriculture, by the quantitative and qualitative weakness of the consumer sector, and also (though this was not fully recognized till the 1960s) by a general slowdown in productivity growth.\footnote{123} The Stalinist political order was also grossly out of tune with the emerging needs of the complex industrial society which was, in large part, its own creation.\footnote{124} Stalin's reaction, at the end, had been to prepare the ground for a new bout of terror: but under his successors the powers of the police were drastically cut back, while the party again assumed its central role. Both to combat the growing malaise in the economy, and to shore up the legitimacy of Communist rule (in Eastern Europe as well as in the USSR), it was now essential to provide positive incentives to the population. And this meant, above all, some relaxation of internal tension, and the long-delayed shift of resources away from the heavy industry and military sectors of the economy.\footnote{125}

At the same time, however, the Soviet leaders were faced with the existence of a NATO grouping which might soon include West Germany, and a rearmed, and militantly containment oriented United States. In the longer term, the introduction of nuclear weapons - at present a serious liability for Soviet policy - could be expected to yield
positive dividends as well: for the prospect of a nuclear stalemate might both allow some reduction in the conventional military burden, and lend itself to the exploitation of a Leninist 'indirect approach' in foreign policy. But this latter was precisely what had stagnated in the Stalin era, and the process of Soviet accommodation to the new tempo of anti-colonial ferment in the Third World - a crucial venue in the struggle for influence at a time of impressive economic advance by the capitalist powers - had barely begun. In sum, the Soviet Union at the end of the Stalin period might be seen as emerging from a long tunnel; and its leaders, having ruthlessly driven the society through a tremendous metamorphosis, found themselves grappling with an array of contradictions which in part reproduced, 'on a higher level', those which had largely triggered the great experiment some twenty years earlier.

Peaceful Coexistence

Stalin's immediate successor, Malenkov, is noteworthy for the initiation of moves to increase the weight of the consumer goods sector, and for his brief espousal of the claim that general nuclear war would mean 'the destruction of world civilization'. He also expanded upon Stalin's return to the theme of the inter-imperialist contradictions, pointing out the tactical advantages to the Soviet Union of a period of detente:

... if today in a strained international relationship, the North Atlantic bloc is rent with internal strife and contradictions, a lessening of this tension might lead to its disintegration.

In the event, of course, Malenkov proved to be only an interim leader; and, as Malcolm Mackintosh notes, his overall role was limited to the elaboration of Stalin's postwar foreign policy, together 'with the modifications introduced in the autumn of 1952', rather than initiating a major break with the past. However, the whole period 1950-56 might be viewed in terms of the gradual maturation of the sea change finally undertaken at the
Twentieth Party Congress; and the importance of the objective factors, foreign and domestic, behind this change is suggested by the fact that it was executed by Khrushchev, who had presumably been made well aware of the need for reform by his dealings with agriculture, but who had also come to power with evident debts to the heavy industry/military lobby. Over the period 1955-63, Khrushchev secured substantial reductions in the size of the conventional armed forces - while simultaneously improving their mobility and firepower - and initiated the definitive nuclearization of the overall Soviet military posture. He also launched a vigorous, if erratic, campaign for arms control agreements with the Western powers, and came to accept, in all but name, Malenkov's destruction of civilization thesis. Finally, he sponsored an extensive, and in some respects creative, adaptation of Soviet doctrine to the constraints and opportunities of the nuclear age.

The centrepiece of this revision was the new strategic conception of Peaceful Coexistence as the 'fundamental line' of Soviet foreign policy. 'Either Peaceful Coexistence', Khrushchev declared, 'or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way.' But together with this negative sanction, he also placed an optimistic stress upon the potential for socialist/progressive gains under such a strategy. 'The correlation of forces', he declared, was 'shifting all the time in favour of socialism', allowing the anti-imperialist forces increasingly to determine the general direction of world development, so that 'there will arise a real possibility of excluding world war from the life of society ... even with capitalism still existing in a part of the world'.

This ostentatious revision of the 'inevitability of war' thesis was a central feature of the attempt to establish the credibility of the Khrushchevian coexistence doctrine in the West. A second element, introduced at the Twentieth Congress, was the prospect of different roads, and indeed of a peaceful transition, to socialism in various countries. In terms which recalled the discussion by the later Marx and Engels of the same question, Khrushchev sought to distinguish situations which might and might not demand a revolutionary solution, arguing that the role of violence in the transition to socialism would depend less on the proletariat than on the relative predilection to violent resistance of the bourgeoisie in different countries:
The winning of a stable parliamentary majority, backed by a mass movement of the proletariat and of all the toiling people could create for the working class of many capitalist countries and for former colonial countries conditions needed to secure fundamental changes... In the countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will, of course, offer serious resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp revolutionary struggle.132

This argument was linked to the rosy predictions now offered about the Soviet Union's own development. In 1959, Khrushchev announced that the capitalist encirclement, and with it the possibility of a capitalist restoration in the USSR, had finally been liquidated; and the 1961 Party Program declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat was transformed into a 'state of the whole people'. Khrushchev now rashly predicted that the Soviet Union would outstrip the United States in per capita production within a decade, and establish, 'in the main', the basis for a Communist society by the early 1980s.133

This last claim was probably provoked by the Chinese Great Leap Forward, when prophecies were offered of a direct transition to Communism, despite the relative backwardness of the Chinese economy, through the commune system. But it also lay squarely within the Lenin-Stalin tradition of 'catching up' with the West, and the basic optimism which it reflected would seem to have been genuine. Moreover, it was desirable to stress that the Soviet Union's contribution to the class struggle in the West would be primarily catalytic - through the impact of its gains in peaceful economic competition - because the notion of economic cooperation with the capitalist powers was once again, as in Lenin's day, a major element in Soviet thinking on coexistence.

Perhaps the most far-reaching revisions were those in respect of the non-aligned nations of the Third World, which at the Twentieth Congress had been formally accepted (along with the colonies themselves) into the Soviet led 'zone of peace'. As these new states grew in number, they seemed increasingly to provide a more important focus for Soviet strategy in regard to the national liberation movement than did the revolutionary movements in the surviving colonial and quasi-colonial regions. On the one hand, they could be expected to adopt a generally 'anti-imperialist' diplomatic stance in the United
Nations and elsewhere. On the other, the widespread acceptance by such regimes of the 'non-capitalist path' of development would not merely increase Soviet prestige, but would progressively undermine the out-reaches of the imperialist world economy, and with it the whole foundation of the long-term capitalist stabilization.

As Tucker points out, this 'basic conception ... of long-range economic competition' was thoroughly Leninist, being 'a novelty only in relation to later Stalinism'. Even the acceptance of a progressive role for bourgeois nationalist movements after political independence could be partially justified in terms of Lenin's concessions on this issue in the 1920 Comintern Theses on the National and Colonial Questions. These had allowed the possibility that - with the achievement of 'full, that is economic independence', and the support of the proletariat of the advanced countries - newly independent nations could circumvent the normal two-stage revolutionary process and proceed 'through definite stages of development to Communism without going through a capitalist stage'. Of course, just as in the Soviet Union's own case, the foundation of a truly advanced socialist proletariat was conspicuously lacking in these countries. But the non-capitalist option was nonetheless held out to those Third World regimes which maintained close links with the socialist camp, resolutely rejected all forms of political, military and economic dependence upon imperialism, and pursued a progressive, socialist oriented regime of state capitalism. For the place of the international dictatorship of the proletariat was now supplied by the world socialist system, which was becoming an ever more 'reliable shield, protecting not only the peoples of the socialist countries but all mankind as well, from the military adventures of imperialism'.

However, the Soviet Union's own Stalinist development experience was reflected in the new concept of National Democracy evolved to describe the type of state capable of making this transition. This owed far more to Stalin's extraordinary upgrading of the superstructure as the protagonist of revolution from above than to any notable class analysis of the societies in question. The 'national bourgeoisie' - normally envisaged as the main indigenous agent of development on the non-capitalist path - possessed indeed a certain identity in contrast to the imperialist oriented 'big' or 'comprador' bourgeoisie.
But it appeared in general to be a catch-all category which, as the editor of *World Marxist Review* put it, 'can include all sections of the bourgeoisie, industrial and commercial. What counts is its attitude to imperialism'.

National Democratic status was accorded only to a small number of economically backward countries (all, with the exception of Burma, in the Arab world or in Sub-Saharan Africa). And Soviet expectations for the non-capitalist path appear to have been highest in regard to the latter region precisely because - with virtually no bourgeoisie or extant capitalist formations - such societies seemed to offer unique opportunities for the unchecked implementation of state capitalism by a Soviet oriented 'progressive intelligentsia'. But such societies also had virtually no proletariat, and it was now suggested that the proletariat's leading role in such situations could pass to the 'revolutionary democrats, who have assumed the historical mission of breaking with capitalism, [and often] carry out the same basic social and economic transformations that have been advocated for decades by Communists'.

These heights of optimism were reached only in the period 1963-64 - during which the UAR, Algeria and Mali were actually depicted as having 'embarked on the path of socialist construction' - and did not long survive Khrushchev's ouster. Aside from the general movement towards greater doctrinal conservatism under Khrushchev's successors, 1965 produced the phenomenon, devastating for a doctrine that laid such great stress on the subjective element, of the overthrow, in quick succession, of three leading revolutionary-democratic regimes - in Indonesia, Algeria, and Ghana. Together with the developing American role in Indochina and the now open conflict with China for influence in the Third World, this raised most serious questions not merely about the viability of the non-capitalist path, but about the basic 'working theory' of history behind the Khrushchevian coexistence synthesis.

**Strains in the Coexistence Synthesis**

The central issue here was that of the significance of the Third Stage of the General Crisis of Capitalism, which was held to have originated in the middle or late 1950s. This Third Stage could
not be linked to any major historical upheaval resulting in major revolutionary advance (as the First Stage had been initiated by World War I and the breaching of the imperialist world system by the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Second by World War II and the consequent great extension of the socialist camp). Instead, it was identified with a decisive qualitative transformation of the international environment, evidently resulting from the ending of American strategic invulnerability, the ever-growing strength (economic, political and military) of the socialist camp, and the effective secession from the imperialist camp of a large number of independent, non-aligned states.

This changed assessment of the 'nature of the epoch' was central to Khrushchev's attempt to reconcile a policy of detente towards the West with the Soviet claim to continued leadership of the world revolutionary movement - now openly challenged by the Chinese. The latter adhered to the traditional formulation of 'an era of imperialism, wars and proletarian revolutions'. But Khrushchev maintained that the world had 'fundamentally changed' since Lenin's time; and he was able to offer his own plausibly Leninist 'package deal' whereby Peaceful Coexistence would be combined with steady revolutionary advance on three fronts: socialist construction within the USSR and the socialist bloc; the non-capitalist path in the Third World; and (partly as a consequence of this erosion of the imperialist world-economy) the deepening class struggle in the capitalist world. Moreover, this was an objectively determined process which imperialism - short of a suicidal resort to all out war - could no longer contain, for not imperialism but socialism was now 'determining the main trend of world development'.

However, there were two major weaknesses in this scenario. First, given the excessive optimism of certain key assumptions, its very integration was destined to work against it. The commitment of the 'revolutionary' and 'national democrats' to Soviet-style socialism, to say nothing of their hold on power, proved disappointingly ephemeral, while the economic burden of aid to the Third World was an uncomfortable present reality. As for the Soviet economy, it remained, in the mid-1960s, subject to severe structural imbalances, and the problem of slowing productivity growth was now inescapably plain. Moreover, the dialectic of 'modernization' confronted the Soviet and East European regimes not merely with growing consumer demands, but also
with the kind of fundamental socio-political strains which Khrushchev had anticipated in the West. Substantially outflanked by China as a model for revolution in predominantly peasant societies, the Soviet system was increasingly challenged within the immediate bloc by pressures for a more democratic socialist order, culminating in proposals for political and economic reform in Czechoslovakia - the only East European state, other than the GDR, with an advanced industrial base before its 'revolution' - which effectively repudiated the whole concept of democratic centralism. Finally, the comprehensive force expansions of the Kennedy era and the effective extension of American 'flexible response' strategies to the Third World sharply increased the objective military costs of any Soviet attempt to exert a major determining influence on international developments.

This raises the second major weakness of the Khrushchev approach: its tacit reliance on the cooperation of the United States. Though he formally insisted that not imperialism, but the world situation, had changed, Khrushchev had in practice indulged in a significant 'prettification' of imperialism - most notably in his treatment of the United States, in regard to which he laid implicit claim to a joint, and potentially harmonious, 'management' role in international affairs. 'History', he maintained, 'has imposed on our two countries a great responsibility for the destiny of the world. Our interests do not clash directly anywhere, either territorially or economically'.

As Paul Marantz notes, the rationale of this conciliatory approach to the capitalist powers, while ostensibly grounded in Lenin's 'two tendency' analysis of contradictions in their attitudes to the Soviet state, was distinctly revisionist in the sense that it placed much greater stress upon political divisions within Western 'ruling circles'. Indeed, he argues, the Khrushchev regime's elaboration on this theme, and on its implications for the question of disarmament prospects and the causes and consequences of international tension, constituted a doctrinal revision 'even more important', though less spectacular, than the pronouncements on the 'non-inevitability' of war and the ending of the capitalist encirclement during the period of the Twentieth and Twenty-First Congresses. For the new treatment of Western ruling circles struck directly at the basic assumption which had precluded the possibility of meaningful disarmament agreements or 'irreversible detente' with the capitalist powers: the assumption of an essentially
unified 'monopolistic bourgeoisie' with a direct material interest in an imperialist and militarist foreign and defence policy. From 1960 onwards, after a major Khrushchev speech on military policy signalling the change of line, a succession of Soviet articles argued that a substantial proportion, and perhaps even a majority, of the monopoly bourgeoisie in the leading capitalist countries was losing its economic interest in 'the arms drive'; and drawing the obvious political lesson from this analysis, some commentaries of the late Khrushchev era came as close as possible, within the confines of Marxism-Leninism, to acknowledging the desirability of Soviet restraint in promoting the influence of this segment of the bourgeois elites vis-a-vis their 'adventurist' counterparts. As one prominent analyst asserted:

Communists, and all progressive forces are interested in an intensification of the moderate-sober tendency in bourgeois policy dictated by an understanding of the hopelessness of thermo-nuclear war ... Communists take into account Lenin's teaching about the need for flexibility of tactics in order to attract to the side of peace not only the broad masses but also certain bourgeois circles not directly interested in the arms race and preparation for war.

As will be argued in the next chapter, this strand of Soviet analysis has reappeared in the post-Khrushchev era; and in the 1970s, when it could plausibly be maintained that the Soviet Union had achieved an overall military equality with the United States, the theme of the divisions in capitalist ruling circles over the economic impact of the arms race was given more systematic and detailed exposition by the new corps of specialist analysts of American politics. However, in the wake of the dramatic military build-up by the Kennedy administration, equality in this field is precisely what the Khrushchev regime could not plausibly claim; and in this situation the contradictions involved in Khrushchev's attempt to establish Peaceful Coexistence as a reliable vehicle for revolutionary advance were soon made uncomfortably plain. Given the argument that great power involvement in local conflicts was extremely likely to result in escalation to general nuclear war, the Soviet strategic capability was supposed to deter not merely direct attacks upon the USSR and the socialist bloc, but also the general run
of imperialist counter-revolutionary activities in the Third World.

But the same logic of escalation gave the Soviet Union an equal (or, if Soviet military capabilities remained inferior, a greater) interest in the restraint of local conflicts which might ultimately imperil Soviet security. After the Cuban Missile Crisis - a graphic reminder of the continuing asymmetry of the great power relationship - Gromyko returned emphatically to the theme of joint Soviet-American management. But perhaps the most striking comment on this subject was advanced, under the important pseudonym 'Sovetov', some two years earlier, at the height of Khrushchev's ostensible optimism about the Soviet Union's relative power:

In the atmosphere of rapid social development characteristic of the present era, peaceful coexistence, while not retarding social change in countries where these changes are ripe, must at the same time ensure a situation in which the internal processes in particular countries do not lead to military clashes of the antipodal social systems.

In fact, assertions of Soviet military superiority by the political and military leadership were typically much more circumscribed than was commonly recognized in the West, while Soviet 'academic' commentary was more cautious still. Pronouncements on the correlation of forces, Zimmerman points out, had always been carefully framed - in terms of changing distribution of power and an emerging balance in favour of socialism - to acknowledge that, while things were getting better all the time, the existing distribution of power still favoured the capitalist camp. After the Cuban crisis, the suggestion of a favourable trend was itself tacitly abandoned by a switch to a formula depicting a temporary stabilization, and by a renewed emphasis on the meaninglessness of estimates of the correlation of forces based solely on military indicators.

The commentary of the immediate post-Khrushchev period, Zimmerman argues, indicated an awareness that even the notion of stabilization had been too optimistic; and Khrushchev was obliquely attacked for the folly of a passive reliance on 'the automatic action of a preponderance in the distribution of power'. 'The enhancement of the might [of socialism] in and of itself, and the change in the distribution of the economic forces in the world arena in favour of socialism', one 1966 MEMO editorial observed, 'does not decide automatically in which direction, peace or war, international relations will develop.'
Moreover, though the argument that Soviet and American interests did 'not collide either globally or anywhere regionally' was repeated in a major IMEMO study signed to press a month after the initiation of concerted American bombing in Vietnam, the 'modernist' interpretation of imperialism thereafter gave way rapidly to a renewed emphasis on more traditional themes. A new military 'debate' about the possibility of victory in nuclear war evidently resulted in a repudiation of the Khrushchev line;* and Peaceful Coexistence itself - designated as the 'fundamental line' of Soviet policy under Khrushchev - 'quickly sank to fourth position behind the goals of building Communism, consolidating the socialist camp, and supporting the national liberation movement'. The change in rhetoric was supported by a stepping up of existing programs of military procurement - a move which could, indeed, reasonably be seen as an essential prerequisite for either the promotion of 'world revolution' or the pursuit of a detente with the United States on equal terms.

The new regime also seemed disposed to a more disenchanted and self-centred approach to the potentials and costs of world revolution. The initial post-Khrushchev reappraisal produced attacks on the 'petty bourgeois, nationalistic theory of the decisive role of the national-liberation movement in the world revolutionary process', a 'widespread ideological trend' which sought to deny the obvious fact 'that the socialist states, as before, are shouldering the principal burden in combating imperialism'. And this was linked with a conscious diminution of direct Soviet responsibility to the national liberation struggle:

It is first of all the peoples of the young national states who can put an end to all forms of colonialism and raise the economy and culture of these countries ... the socialist countries ... cannot take the place of the peoples of the young national states in solving the tasks of the national liberation movement.  

Discussion of the non-capitalist path now tended to concentrate on its length and its difficulty, rather than on its ultimate destination - and especially upon the continuing danger of 'regressive phenomena in social development' in countries where the leadership was in the hands not of the proletariat but of the 'revolutionary democrats'.

* See the discussion of this in Chapter 7.
This was in effect to deny the doctrinal basis of the 'National Democracy' concept; and the practice of identifying individual regimes as national or revolutionary democracies in the May Day and October slogans was finally discontinued in 1968.\textsuperscript{157}

The significance of this development was enhanced by the apparent resolution, in 1966, of a lengthy controversy over whether or not newly independent states which failed 'to come out against imperialism' remained in a state of effective colonial dependence - the conclusion being that their condition should be defined 'not as a transitional form of state dependence but as a transitional form of state independence'.\textsuperscript{158} Thus all Third World regimes (and even semi-colonies) were placed in one broad transitional category; and all alike were faced with the fundamental tasks of raising the productive capacity of their economies and closing off all remaining avenues of imperialist control - 'two indivisible tasks [which] together ... determine the main direction of the present day national liberation movement - the road to full economic independence'.\textsuperscript{159} This 'new, long range perspective of revolutionary transition', as Raymond Yellon observes, was well suited to the increasingly 'pragmatic' orientation of Soviet aid policies, in that it 'considerably fore-shortened' the distance between progressive and other Afro-Asian regimes, and hence significantly lessened the immediate priority attaching to the development of closer ties with the former at the expense of wider ties with the latter.\textsuperscript{160}

At the same time - as part of the metamorphosis of China into a 'military-bureaucratic state' animated by a petty bourgeois ideology of 'Great Han chauvinism' - it was emphasized that even nominally Marxist-Leninist Third World regimes could not successfully pursue a course of scientific socialism in opposition to the Soviet camp. As one Pravda article declared:

In such a backward country as China, with its mediaeval survivals, socialism cannot be built without relying on the support of the world proletariat and its chief achievement - the socialist commonwealth - without making use of the creative experience of states that are economically, politically, and culturally more advanced. For an under-developed country, rejection of co-operation with the Socialist countries means rejection of advance along the path of social and economic progress, renunciation of socialist ideals.\textsuperscript{161}
In large part, of course, this was a purely manipulative response to the phenomenon of 'polycentrism' - a more sophisticated reassertion of what Wight has called the 'neo-dynastic' Soviet principle of Communist legitimacy. But it also accorded with the 'industrial society' commitment of Soviet Marxism and the catching-up motif so dramatically emphasized amid the euphoria of the Twenty-Second Congress. And though Khrushchev's successors carefully retreated from his incautious predictions about the date of the Soviet Union's achievement of Communism, they did not repudiate his depiction of the road it would follow to that goal.

Further, one aspect of their more hardheaded approach to this issue was the unambiguous priority accorded to socialist construction within the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's hymn to the coming era of Soviet affluence had at least been qualified by the perfunctory suggestion that - with adequate assistance from the advanced to the less advanced - all members of the Socialist Commonwealth could 'attain communism' virtually simultaneously. Even by 1963, however, Pravda was pointing out that Soviet aid to under-developed nations was not drawn from 'a surplus of funds for which there is no application within our country, [since] in a socialist society ... there can be no surpluses that require export overseas'. And a 1965 editorial on 'The Supreme Internationalist Duty of a Socialist Country' declared outright that 'the best way to fulfill our internationalist duty to the working people of the entire world is the successful construction of socialism and communism in the socialist countries'.

A particularly authoritative pronouncement on the nature of this task appeared in a 1968 speech by Suslov on the Karl Marx Sesquicentenary:

Socialism is not a short stage, but a whole historical phase in the development of a communist society. The economic rules of socialism and its superiority show themselves at their best in the mature socialist society. The full and all embracing realization of the social and economic possibilities and requirements of socialism assures the regular, gradual and natural transition to communism. The road to communism lies through the complete victory of socialism. There is no other way.

Though all pilgrims must tread the same path, Suslov emphasized, their rates of progress must necessarily differ: and 'countries starting
socialist relations with under-developed material and technical bases will have to travel a longer historical path and solve more problems'. And since a major thrust of Suslov's speech was presumably to disabuse the industrially advanced Czechs of the notion that they could find a Marxian route to Communism ahead of the Soviet Union, the utopian prospects for Third World Communist regimes were clearly less than bright, while mere non-capitalist roaders seemed destined to wander for an indefinite period in the outer darkness.

The inescapable inference is that the Soviet leadership had 'explicitly elongated [its] revolutionary-time-perspectives' - and in such a way as to make the time scale of Socialism in One Country seem brief by comparison. One writer even took comfort in the fact that the 'replacement of feudalism by capitalism occupied an epoch which embraced several centuries', asserting that, by comparison, the transition to socialism was 'taking place at a significantly more rapid tempo, spreading simultaneously over an immeasurably larger [geographical] zone'. Or as another formulation, even less theoretically precise, had it:

Ultimate victory on a world scale belongs to socialism as the most progressive social system ... The operative word there is ultimate. Meanwhile, it is the ups and downs of the struggle that constitute the main content of international affairs.

The central importance of the 'interaction between Western and Soviet developments', not just in the narrowly defined area of foreign policy but in shaping the whole of 'Soviet Marxism as well as the reality expressed by Soviet Marxism', has been impressively stated by Marcuse:

From the beginning, the specific international dynamic released by the transformation of 'classical' into organized capitalism (in Marxist terms, monopoly capitalism) defines Soviet Marxism - in Lenin's doctrine of the avant garde, in the notion of 'socialism in one country', in the triumph of Stalinism over Trotskyism and over the old Bolsheviks, in the sustained priority of heavy industry, in the continuation of a repressive totalitarian
centralization. They are in a strict sense responses to the (in Marxian terms, 'anomalous') growth and readjustment of Western industrial society and to the decline in the revolutionary potential of the Western world resulting from this adjustment.

This 1958 judgement retained its broad validity a decade later. There is no denying the important component of 'self moved' expansionism in Soviet foreign policy, nor the significance, in this respect, of the peculiar synthesis of Russian and Marxist elements in the official Soviet ideology. But, I would argue that the Soviet approach must be understood primarily in terms of a 'situational' determinant: the central problem - constant, yet continually changing in its historical aspect - of building a 'socialist' society in a country where most of the objective requirements were lacking, while the other advanced industrial states remained - in reality only somewhat less than in Soviet perceptions - distinctly hostile to the enterprise.

In the mid to late 1960s, both the 'Soviet system' and its international relationships were again in transition, while the great, central 'period of transition' had indeed assumed the character of an 'entire historical epoch'. However, certain vital structural changes had taken place. History had so far developed that the idea of a monolithic Communist bloc (to say nothing of a monolithic world revolutionary movement) was revealed as quite illusory. Furthermore, the Soviet regime was becoming aware of a technological revolution in the advanced industrial societies, which threatened to add a new dimension to the perennial task of catching up with the West. On the other hand, partly through its own efforts (and at the cost of reinforcing the distortions in its economy), and partly through the impact of changing American world order preoccupations, the Soviet Union was for the first time within striking distance of a crude parity with the United States in the overall indices of military power. The Soviet leadership's apparent assessment of this changed correlation of forces - the concomitant of a renewed, but different, detente offensive - will be considered in the next chapter.
Such arguments have been considered at some length in Chapter 1. A particularly clear example is Pipes' insistence on the absence of any 'discernible pattern' in Soviet foreign policy and the irrelevance to it of either 'Communist theory' or the concept of national interest. 'Russian expansion', he argues, 'is motivated less by needs than by opportunities, less by what its elite wants than by what it can get ..., and is in large part determined by internal rather than external factors, above all, by the tragic relationship of the government to its people'. 'Why the Russians Act Like Russians', p. 55.


Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 8.

The notion of a 'straight line' interpretation is used by Cohen to describe interpretations of Soviet policy in terms of the inexorable working out an 'inner totalitarian logic'. For his survey of the 'voluminous scholarship' devoted to this approach, see 'Bolshevism and Stalinism', pp. 5-11.

Ibid, p. 25.

As Paul Marantz observes:
Although Lenin's speeches and writings fill more than fifty solid volumes, his direct remarks on peaceful coexistence are barely enough to comprise a single page. It appears that Lenin used the term peaceful coexistence on only five different occasions. On none of these occasions was Lenin's reference to peaceful coexistence anything more than a passing comment of insignificant importance.


'Once Again on the Trade Unions', Works, XXXII, p. 83.
On these issues see Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*; and Tibor Szamuely, *The Russian Tradition* (edited by Robert Conquest), Secker & Warburg, London, 1974. Szamuely provides a particularly detailed discussion of the political tradition of the intelligentsia, tracing the 'roots of Leninism' in the conspiratorial theories developed by P.N.Tkachev, 'the legatee of Populism and the precursor of Bolshevism, the man who distilled the experience of the past into a forecast of the future. Of all the skeletons in the Bolshevik cupboard', Szamuely observes, 'Tkachev's is the most embarrassing - it rudely intervenes into the apostolic succession of Marx-Engels-Lenin'. (pp.286-7).


'Slogan for a United States of Europe', *Works*, XXI, p.432

'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism', *Works*, XXII, pp.252-85.


'The Awakening of Asia', *Works*, XIX, p.86.
Lenin also mentioned 'the beginning of the struggle for power of the advanced proletariat in Europe' as a second determinant of this historical shift.


For a discussion of this question, see Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, Vol. Three, pp.177-87. It is interesting to note that Engels, from whom Lenin took the 'labour aristocracy' theory, had originally suggested that the English proletariat *as such* was 'in reality becoming more and more bourgeois'. Only later did he produce the qualification that the benefits of 'England's industrial monopoly ... were distributed among the workers very unevenly; the lion's share was snatched by a privileged minority, though something was kept over from time to time for the broad masses'. Cited ibid.

'What is to be done?', *Works*, V, pp.374-6, 383.


Ibid.

Carr, *Socialism in One Country*, Vol. One, pp.13-14. A similar judgement is offered by Gerschenkron: 'Industrialization, the cost of which was largely defrayed by the peasantry, was itself a threat to political stability, and hence to the continuation of the policy of industrialization'. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, p.130.

27 Ibid, pp.22-3.
31 'The Agrarian Program of Russian Social Democracy', Works, VI, 125.
32 'Two Tactics of Social Democracy', Works, IX, 100 (Entire passage italicized in original).
33 Pipes, Russia Under The Old Regime, pp.249-53; Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, pp.143-179. Both authors suggest that the intelligentsia was, of its nature, opposed to the state, that this was what defined the intelligentsia as a social grouping.
34 Skocpol, 'Old Regime Legacies and Communist Revolutions', p.300.
36 Ibid, pp.256-263.
38 See the discussion of both Lenin and Trotsky's views on this issue in Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. One, pp.56-63.
39 'If you are unable to adapt yourself, if you are not inclined to crawl on your belly through the mud, you are not a revolutionary but a chatterbox ...' 'Report to the Seventh Congress of the RCP (B), Works, XXVII, 101.
40 As John Keep puts it: 'The land reform gave the Soviet regime a trump card in its three year struggle with the Whites ... In so far as the civil war was a contest for men's minds its outcome was seldom in doubt'. The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1976, pp.464-65.
41 See the discussion of this in Lenin's Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P. to the Third Comintern Congress, Works, XXXII, 485-94.
44 'Report to the Seventh Congress of the RCP (B), Works, XXVII, 95.
Ibid.


'These on the Question of a Separate Peace', *Works*, XXVI, 445.


"Left Wing" Communism - an Infantile Disorder', *Works*, XXXI, 70.

'Report on Concessions to the 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets', *Works*, XXXI, 466.

'The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments', *Works*, XXXIII, 62.

"Left Wing" Childishness and the Petty Bourgeois Mentality', *Works*, XXVII, 338-42.


On this question, see Frederick S. Burin, 'The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 1963, pp. 334-8. Burin notes that Lenin never made any effort to justify his predictions of a capitalist-Soviet clash in terms of his theory of imperialism, and suggests that the former were 'nothing more than *ad hoc* slogans presumably designed to promote national unity and a militant spirit in the Soviet population'.

Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, Vol. Three, pp.109-31. Carr argues (p.109), that 'the two circumstances were inter-connected, and it would be a mistake to attribute to pre-meditation the prominence assumed by the revolutionary aspect of Soviet policy at this time'.


Ibid., pp.122-127. Lenin at this time compared the impact of the old state apparatus and its functionaries upon Communist rule to the 'conquest' by a vanquished nation of superior culture of its erstwhile conquerors. The culture of the former specialists was at 'a miserably low and insignificant level', he remarked. But 'miserable and low as it is, it is higher than that of our responsible communist administrators, for the latter lack administrative ability ...' 'Report to the Eleventh Congress of the RCP (B), Works, XXXIII, 288-9.

Ibid., p.290.

The phrase is Moshe Lewin's. See Lenin's Last Struggle, Pluto Press, London, 1975, pp.3-19 for a discussion of this question.


Plan of Pamphlet 'The Tax in Kind', Works, XXXII, 323.

Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle, p.108.

'On Co-operation', Works, XXXIII, 474-5.

Ibid., pp.478-9.

Ibid., p.468.


In the same speech Stalin suggested that the next break in the chain (after Russia) could be in India, or it could be in Germany, 'because the factors that are operating, say, in India, are beginning to operate in Germany as well ...' Admittedly he acknowledged that the 'enormous difference in development between India and Germany must affect the future progress of the revolution'. But later, in the dispute with Bukharin he insisted that the 'weakest link' theory did not necessarily imply that revolution would first occur in the underdeveloped world, but merely 'that the imperialist chain breaks where it (the chain) is weakest'. 'A Necessary Correction', Works, XII, 143-5.

The criticism is Trotsky's. It has already been noted in Chapter 2, p. 213.

'Results of Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the RCP (B)', Works, VII, 110-22.

'The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists', Works, VI, 417.


'Results of Work of the Fourteenth Conference', Works, VII, 94-6, 110-22.
Ibid.


Cohen, *'Bolshevism and Stalinism'*, p. 23.


Nove, *Was Stalin Really Necessary?*, p. 23. This question has occasioned much debate, with conclusions apparently being shaped substantially by prior assumptions about the well-springs of Soviet policy. Ulam, for instance, insists strongly that neither the threat of intervention, nor the prospect of a coming capitalist crisis were taken seriously by the party, claiming that frustration at the prospect of indefinite stabilization abroad and the need to rechannel the regime's 'power drive' led directly to the excesses of the First Five Year Plan. Carr, who presents the economic problem as paramount, considers that the longer-term expectation of intervention was undoubtedly genuine, but that the immediate war scare had largely passed by the time of Stalin's Fifteenth Congress pronouncement. 'From the end of 1927 the anxieties of the Soviet leaders were directed to internal problems, which temporarily relegated issues of foreign policy to second place'. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, pp. 181-3; Carr, *Foundations of a Planned Economy*, Vol. Three, Part I, pp. 6-15.

Nove argues that the pricing policies 'could of themselves have destroyed NEP, even if no other complications had ensued'. *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 159 (Emphasis in original).


Tucker argues strongly for Stalin's continued identification with this ideology, even during his 'Bukharinite period'. See Stalin as Revolutionary 1879-1929: a study in History and Personality, W.W. Norton, New York, 1973, pp.395-429. Stephen Cohen also emphasizes the importance of this War Communism ideology, and its appeal among the Bolshevik leadership. But he emphasizes that Stalin's defeat of the Right was based not just on bureaucratic power, but on the appeal of his policies, and that up until the summer of 1929 he was still seen 'not as the reckless architect of "revolution from above"', but as a leader of the middle ground who could make the NEP work. Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: a Political Biography 1888-1938, Wildwood House, London, pp.312-29.

Pipes, for instance, asserts that the War Communism period 'in the course of which were laid the foundations of the communist state, represented a grandiose effort to mobilize and unite under a single management the entire human and material resources of the country for the purpose of waging war - both the Civil War then in progress and the projected long-term war against international capitalism'. Militarism and the Soviet State', p.5.


Schapiro argues that 'Stalin's revolution in agriculture and industry and his assault on the party which consummated this process must be seen as integrated parts of one and the same process'. But his argument is based essentially on the primary role of the terror in Stalin's power, which drove him ultimately to attack the Party itself. Nove, who accepts the view that there was evidently a substantial move inside the Party to relax the terror in 1934, insists that 'one cannot possibly argue that all the immense evils of the Stalin era flowed inescapably from the policy decisions of 1928-29'. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, pp.432-5; Nove, Was Stalin Really Necessary?, p.27.


Ibid.

'STATEMENT TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE', Sochineniya XIV, pp.194-5, 210. (This reference is to the three volume, Russian language, edition of Stalin's later works, edited by Robert McNeal for the Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1967. The volumes carry the dual numbering 1-3 and XIV-XVI.)
At the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923, only weeks after the publication of Lenin's last articles, Stalin 'expressed himself ... with exemplary caution' on this question:

One thing or the other: either we succeed in stirring up, in revolutionizing, the remote rear of imperialism - the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East - and thereby hasten the fall of imperialism; or we fail to do so, and thereby strengthen imperialism and weaken the force of our movement. That is how the question stands.


Borkenau, *The Communist International*, pp.416-25. For a more general discussion of the Soviet employment of both Right and Left tactics in either offensive or defensive modes, see Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, p.5.


The concept of peaceful coexistence, Shulman comments, 'has always had a variety of meanings, both before and after Stalin. In the sense in which it was used at the Nineteenth Congress, it implied no conciliation with the West, no prospect of settlements, no soft words for Western leaders'. *Ibid.*, p.252.

124 Ibid, pp.249-64.

125 For an interpretation of Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence policy which concentrates particularly on domestic considerations including the relaxation of terror and the recovery of the party, see Gehlen, The Politics of Coexistence.

126 This point is emphasized by Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised, p.270.


129 Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p.87.

130 'Report to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU'; in Current Soviet Policies, I, pp.36-38.


134 Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind, p.277. One striking 'gradualist' scenario was offered by Bukharin in 1920, at the time of his own close association with the Left position:

   Former colonies and backward agrarian countries, where there is no proletarian dictatorship, nevertheless enter into economic relations with the industrial socialist republics. Little by little they are drawn into the socialist system, approximately in the same way that peasant agriculture is drawn into it in individual socialist countries. Thus does the world dictatorship of the proletariat grow little by little. As it grows, the resistance of the bourgeoisie weakens, and towards the end the remaining bourgeois complexes will in all probability surrender with all their organizations intact.

   Cited ibid., p.270.

135 Report of the Committee on the National and Colonial Questions', Works, XXXI, 244.

136 This argument was advanced in K.Brutents, 'Contemporary Stage of The National Liberation Movement', Kommunist, 1964, No. 17, p.31.

137 'Resolution on the Central Committee Report' (Twenty-Second Congress), Current Soviet Policies IV, 222-3.
For a general discussion of this concept see Lowenthal, *Model or Ally*, Chapter 3. This chapter is an extended version of Lowenthal's article 'On National Democracy', originally published in *Survey*, April 1963, pp.119-133.


For a discussion of this concept see Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations*, pp.131-36.


Paul Marantz, 'Prelude to Detente: Doctrinal Change Under Khrushchev', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1975, pp.508-12. In 1960, for instance, Khrushchev argued that 'two trends can be observed in the policy of the capitalist camp in relation to the socialist countries: one bellicose and aggressive, the other moderate and sober. V.I. Lenin pointed to the need of establishing contacts with those circles of the bourgeoisie which are inclined towards pacifism "be it even of the worst kind". He said that in the struggle for the preservation of peace we must also utilize the sensible representatives of the bourgeoisie ... (In) the ruling circles of these countries there are also forces which understand the danger of a new war to capitalism. Hence the two tendencies: one leading towards war and the other towards accepting, in one way or another, the idea of Peaceful Coexistence'. Cited *ibid.*, p.516


History has so far developed that without mutual understanding between USSR and the USA, it is impossible to resolve a single serious international conflict, impossible to reach agreement on a single important international problem ... Even when the interests of these two powers are not directly involved in this or that region, the development of events there is not unaffected by the way in which Soviet-American relations take shape. If the USSR and the USA unite their efforts for the purpose of settling the conflicts and complications that arise in these regions, the thrusting flame of war dies out and tensions go down. Laos is an example.

149 A. Sovetov, 'Leninist Foreign Policy and International Relations', *International Affairs*, 1960, No. 4, p. 9. Zimmerman observed (in 1969) that Sovetov had 'been perhaps the name most consistently associated with major articles treating the ramifications for Soviet foreign policy of changes in the foreign policies of the "imperialist" powers'. *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations*, p. 16.


152 Cited ibid., p. 232. Zimmerman comments that 'the works conceived during the Khrushchev era that went to press during 1965 constituted the high mark of Soviet perspectives on American foreign policy. From approximately September 1965 on, the modernist tide ebbed. Primarily, it would seem, this was a result of the Vietnam war'.

153 Marantz, 'Peaceful Coexistence: From Heresy to Orthodoxy', p. 307.


156 K.Brutents, 'Developing Countries and the Breakup of the Colonial System', *International Affairs*, 1966, No. 1, p. 7. This, it should be noted, involved the effective repudiation of the argument earlier propounded by Brutents himself about the opportunities opened to progressive Third World regimes by the Third Stage of the General Crisis.


166 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2763/C/7 (7 May 1968).


170 Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, pp. 6-7.
CHAPTER 6

POST-KHRUSHCHEV REASSESSMENTS OF THE 'CORRELATION OF FORCES'

The Concept of the 'Correlation of Forces'

It seems fair to say that the concept of the correlation of forces - important though it undeniably still is in Soviet commentary on international relations - has actually lost some ground in comparison with its position in the Khrushchev period, as Soviet analysts expound upon the application of the much enhanced resources of the Soviet state to the management and 'restructuring' of its international environment. As Vernon Aspaturian puts it: 'Soviet writers have been focusing on the changing "correlation of forces" for decades, but only recently have they been discussing the transformational processes at work in the international system'.\(^1\) On the other hand, Western attention to this trait of Soviet analysis has undoubtedly increased in the last decade, with emphasis often being laid not merely on the distinctiveness of the concept, but also on its alleged incompatibility with basic Western assumptions. It may therefore be appropriate to preface this chapter by expanding upon the discussion in earlier chapters of the type of conceptual orientation which might reasonably be inferred from the correlation of forces doctrine.

The first major point is a negative one. The doctrine does not signify a unique Soviet propensity - among the governments of modern industrial powers - to impose a single revealed truth upon the inescapably plural phenomena of world politics. Of course, Soviet commentary still implies that there ought theoretically to be one single correct reading of the correlation of forces in any given historical situation; and if one starts from a characterization of Marxism as a latter-day millenarian theology, whose totalitarian essence merely received full expression in Stalinism, it is easy to insist that nothing has really changed in this respect in the post-Stalin period. However, as I attempted to indicate in Chapter 2, the evolution of Soviet-style 'scientific Marxism-Leninism' has been more complex than this. It is undoubtedly true that the Marxist inheritance contained a large infusion of 19th century positivism; and
that under Stalin this was combined, in the crudest fashion, with Lenin's doctrine of the vanguard to establish historical truth as the monopoly of the party, and indeed of Stalin himself. It is also true that Khrushchev's fitful, and often contradictory, appeals to the sense of unfolding mass consciousness in Marx and Lenin have been largely abandoned by his successors; and that the 'scientific' social analysis to which they officially aspire is overwhelmingly positivist in orientation. But with the passage of time Brezhnevan positivism increasingly seems to be evolving away from Stalin's version of 'historical materialism' and towards the positivism of mainstream American social science. Indeed, the Brezhnev regime appears to be elaborating its own brand of 'Leninism', which is as distinct from the Leninism of Stalin as it is from that of Lenin himself. A key indication of this process, as Hough pointed out in 1976, is the changing use of the word 'scientific':

In the last decade the word has increasingly assumed a different meaning in political discourse: the making of decisions through a balanced weighing of evidence rather than on the basis of a priori values and insights of the decision maker (regardless of the source of these values).

Nor has this change been confined to the level of rhetoric. One impressive feature of the post-Stalin era has been the reorganisation and expansion of the quasi-academic apparatus in a wide range of policy related areas, in an effort to rectify those deficiencies in Soviet scholarship which were candidly acknowledged at the Twentieth Congress. In some areas, such as economics - which, Nove comments, has been 'rapidly transformed from dreary scholasticism to the status of a real and even exciting discipline' - the progress has been more striking than in others. But even in the general international relations/world-economy area, the 'expert' advice available to the regime - to judge solely on the evidence of published materials - has become increasingly complex and sophisticated. Therefore, to the extent that the regime attempts to live up to Brezhnev's equation of Leninist style with the 'realistic evaluation of existing possibilities' - based upon an 'all sided deep analysis' which carefully weighs the 'objective processes and phenomena of socio-economic life and their inter-connection and inter-relationships' - its assessments of particular situations are unlikely to be characterized by dogmatic certainty, while the predicates of its 'grand strategy', as
A recent characteristic formulation acknowledges, must be regarded as still more impressionistic in character:

Incomparably more complex is the overall correlation of forces in the world. It is difficult to give a calculation of the number of factors partaking in its formation. Some of them have changing significance and are capable of behaving in an unpredictable manner.

On the other hand, it does not follow that the whole doctrine has become nothing more than a grandiloquent camouflage for a wholly a-theoretical, 'pragmatic' pursuit of 'national interest'. Such a judgement, indeed, is really the obverse of the argument that the Soviets still insist upon forcing the facts into a rigid ideological strait-jacket: both alike stem from the rejection of the attempt to say anything systematic about patterns of historical change as the most dangerous form of the monist fallacy. But, to repeat the argument of Chapter 2, an organizational or critical monism is an essential prerequisite for constructive long-term thought on any international issue, including the 'national interest'; and despite the continuing extravagance of its formal claims, it is essentially this to which the current regime appears to lay claim in practice. 'Naturally', Brezhnev conceded, in a 1970 speech on the essence of 'Leninism':

Nobody can foretell in detail the course of events at any moment of future development. But if we approach the problem not from the standpoint of details or fortuitous occurrences which are always possible, if, as Lenin put it, the matter is taken on a broad scale, then particular and trifling details recede into the background and the chief motive forces of world history become apparent.

This apparent readiness to separate 'particular and trifling details' - which may, indeed, largely dominate the formulation of 'short term' policy - from the general strategic line might be attributed to the Soviet regime's instinctive aversion to 'cognitive dissonance', to its largely unreflecting attachment to an inherited 'operational code', or to its need to defend a crucial legitimating ideology from the uncomfortable complexities of real life. There is clearly some truth in all of these
interpretations. But a more illuminating comparison, which indicates that considerable tactical flexibility on cognitive issues may in fact be the natural concomitant of a settled strategic orientation, is with the Kuhnian notion of a scientific paradigm. In the schizophrenic environment of contemporary world politics, a systematic overview of the 'nature of the epoch' is no less essential than a systematic overview of the 'dynamics of the system': indeed, I have argued that the states-system itself should be considered as one dimension of a great historical episode. Moreover, the Marxist-Leninist theory of the process of world revolution is of comparable historical and sociological sweep to the classical theory of the states-system; and caution in regard to the general implications of specific contrary evidence is, in principle, as reasonable for the adherents of the one as for the adherents of the other.

Turning now to the positive implications of the correlation of forces concept, it remains true to say that change, and not stability, provides the dominant theme of the official Soviet account of international politics. Although the process of doctrinal adaptation to the phenomenon of the states-system has continued in the post-Khrushchev era, there has been no wholesale convergence upon Western assumptions (Realist or other); and Soviet doctrine still assigns a major place to Lenin's expectation of a sustained, if long term, revolt against existing political and economic structures in the underdeveloped world.

Moreover, there is no reason to attribute this persistence of Leninist themes solely to their importance as legitimating symbols for Soviet power. First, despite the considerable efforts of Soviet apologists in this direction, the highly diverse phenomena of the contemporary 'national-liberation movement' cannot be fitted comfortably into a simple two-camp view of the world, and the efficacy of 'national liberation' as a legitimating symbol (as opposed, say, to Stalin's 'capitalist encirclement') is open to serious question. Second, one must take note of the concerted effort to achieve a more direct and positive legitimation of the Soviet political structure in terms of the party's developmental achievements and its central role in the 'scientific management' of society. These claims, it will be argued below, have become the dominant motif of the new 'Leninism' in the domestic sphere, and - as might be expected of an established great power - are assuming
increasing prominence in Soviet commentary on international relations as well. That the Leninism of Lenin has held much of its ground in this situation may be attributed largely to its ability to explain important forces in world politics which the Soviet regime, in the great power competition within the United States, cannot afford to ignore. Conversely, insofar as the international turmoil of the past fifteen years has prompted a quest for new grand 'paradigms' in the American debate, and insofar as the two major contenders - interdependence and geopolitics/mercantilism - are neither new, nor mutually compatible, nor capable of accommodating the phenomenon of radical socio-political change within states, it might be argued that the Soviets still retain an analytical advantage in this respect.

If one accepts that, in principle, it is equally valid to abstract from history for patterns of change as for patterns of continuity, the notion of the correlation of forces - mediating between the grand Soviet theory of the transition and specific, 'practically unique', historical situations - can be seen as fulfilling a role analogous to that proposed for 'middle range theories' by American systems theorists. In practice however, the Soviet approach grapples with a dimension of historical change which is largely ignored in the synchronic approach of systems theory; and this Soviet attempt to freeze a dynamic historical process at especially important points, or to extract the long-term significance of specific historical 'conjunctures', has several distinctive implications.

In the first place, such 'readings' of the correlation of forces, if they are to be analytically useful, must provide the dominant strategic perspective for a lengthy period: even the 'short term' may normally be regarded as a matter of years rather than of months. Second, the degree of detached deliberation suggested in the Soviet self-account is highly unlikely. Rather, new 'readings' may be expected, in large part, to impose themselves - like Kuhnian paradigm shifts writ small - as the accumulation of previously disregarded contradictions suddenly produces a qualitative change in perceptions. Third, although major shifts of this kind need not entail the jettisoning of the overarching grand theory, they may well involve significant alterations in emphasis among the different explanatory elements within it. Finally, such periods of flux in the area of formal theory would seem to offer special opportunities for the advance of powerful, though less articulated, traditional
ideologies - especially if, as is likely, these ideologies already hold substantial bridgeheads within the grand theory itself.

All of these phenomena, I believe, may be observed in the Soviet experience. Lenin has been presented by some Western scholars as the epitome of 'pragmatic' communist opportunism. But, in fact, the policies implemented and advocated by him were deeply influenced by two major 'middle range' theoretical reorientations: in the early 1900s towards a worker-peasant strategy for the revolution in Russia, and in the early 1920s towards a reappraisal of the whole concept of socialist revolution in the light of the failure of the revolution in the West. This reappraisal, of course, remained incomplete at Lenin's death; and, if the argument of the previous chapter is valid, the displacement over the period 1926-29 of the originally favoured gradualist strategy for industrialization and collectivization by the ultimate Stalinist solution provides a particularly striking instance of the interplay of 'scientific' and inarticulate elements in the formulation of a new line, as also of the sudden qualitative leap from one set of perceptions to another. Similar factors evidently operated in the years before the Twentieth Congress, though in this case exacerbated by the exceptional immobility enforced by Stalin in the post-war period. The original great Stalin revision helped to fix the basic assessment of the 'nature of the epoch' for over two decades; that of Khrushchev, perhaps more arguably, did the same. Finally, with Lenin's compromises on the peasant question and, still more strikingly, with Stalin's appeal to Tsarist precedents for his revolution from above, the deeprooted traditions of Russian history can be clearly seen consolidating their claims on the Soviet self-interpretation of the revolution and its place in world history.

After an initial period of transition, the Brezhnev regime has produced its own new reading of the correlation of forces. Less momentous than those discussed above, but highly significant nonetheless, this combines the basic Khrushchevian perception of the central importance of domestic and international detente with some important shifts of emphasis among the elements of what was earlier called Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence 'package deal'. Here, too, the maturation of the new line may be traced to a relatively discrete period - roughly the years 1969-72, with the 1971 Twenty-Fourth Party Congress as their centrepiece. Here,
too, the new line, once established, has exerted an impressively uniform sway. Whereas the Twenty-Fourth Congress produced important innovations in both domestic and foreign policy, the Twenty-Fifth Congress, in 1976, was chiefly remarkable for the 'businesslike' continuation of the line laid down at its predecessor; and the 1981 Twenty-Sixth Congress, despite a markedly more 'subdued and conciliatory tone' in regard to international issues, also demonstrated a striking continuity in general approach as compared, for instance, with the fluctuations of American policy in this period. Here, too, the influence of traditional ideologies was evident. Indeed, if the Brezhnev regime represented the mature face of post-Stalin Soviet Communism, it seemed to portend a more distinctively Russian approach, in style if not in formal ideological claims, than had been indicated under Khrushchev; and its international posture suggested a deeply held belief in the leading role rightfully due to Russia after fifty years - and five centuries - of 'catching up' with the West.

The selection of Soviet materials in this chapter is substantially influenced by the considerations sketched above. As regards time scale, most pronouncements cited date from the earlier part of the 1970s, and especially from the period bounded by the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Congresses, when the new line was consolidated. This is certainly not to suggest that there have been no changes in the last five years. Indeed, there have been numerous high level suggestions of serious dissatisfaction with both the Carter and Reagan administrations; and it may well be that the general souring of detente, the sharp conflicts within the Soviet bloc, and the growing turmoil in the Third World are prompting a substantial reappraisal of the opportunities and costs of the Brezhnev policy. But there is, as yet, no persuasive doctrinal evidence of such a change. Moreover, if the analytical confusion currently prevailing in the West is any indication, it seems likely that the Soviet leadership itself - especially a generally ageing leadership nearing the end of its collective career - may find it far from easy to stand back from the welter of events and formulate a coherent reappraisal of their 'broad scales'.

As regards general themes, I have concentrated on the 'broad scales' of the coexistence issue; the general problem of the balance of forces in the world, on the one hand, and the particular fronts of anticipated revolutionary advance - the socialist camp, the capitalist system, and
the Third World - on the other. However, I have also attempted to highlight the tendency to view the problems and prospects of world revolution more and more from the perspective of the great power interests of the Soviet Union, as a state in a world of states. Finally, this emphasis on Soviet 'national interests' may be related to the above suggestion that earlier periods of political flux have witnessed the advance of traditional over 'scientific' elements in Soviet Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, given the growing consensus in the West on the importance of atavistic elements in current Soviet policy, it seemed desirable to include, in the concluding section, a brief discussion of the possible relationship between such elements and the official Brezhnevian world view.

The Nature of the Epoch

'The relaxation of international tensions', Brezhnev declared in 1975 was made possible because a new balance of forces was established in the world arena. The leaders of the bourgeois world can no longer expect in earnest to decide the historic dispute between capitalism and socialism by force of arms. The absurdity and extreme danger of any further heating up of the atmosphere, when both sides possess weapons of colossal destructive power, are becoming all the more obvious. 11

This equation of detente with an enforced Western adjustment to altered international realities is perhaps the most pervasive theme of Soviet commentary on international affairs in the last decade. It is true, of course, that the 'Peace Program' of the Twenty-Fourth Congress has been strongly promoted as a major Soviet initiative in the international arena, and that Brezhnev has explicitly linked this new Soviet diplomatic offensive to the conclusion, allegedly derived from the evaluation of 'the overall balance of forces in the world ... that there was a real possibility for bringing about a fundamental change in the international situation'. 12 But whereas the Peace Program is portrayed merely as an
important new dimension of the persistent Soviet campaign in support of Peaceful Coexistence, the readiness of the imperialist powers (and above all the United States) to change 'from a policy of confrontation to one of negotiation with the USSR and the other socialist states', is presented as a wholly new departure involving a profound (and agonizing) 'reappraisal of values'.

The most crucial element of this change, for Soviet commentators, has been a new 'awareness by the USA of its limited possibilities to influence diverse events in the world by means of military force', and the most crucial determinant of this change the Soviet achievement of a broad 'parity' in the military field. This does not mean that the Soviets formally accord a special priority to military power. In fact, one distinctive feature of their treatment of the correlation of forces is their emphasis on the determining role of non-military forces. But there has been, under Brezhnev, a renewed insistence that the military containment of imperialism is essential if these other forces are to do their work. Moreover, a new, selfconsciously 'great power' note entered Soviet discussion of this issue around 1969-70, when the leadership was still professing deep scepticism about the prospects for a genuine reappraisal by American policy makers. Soviet policy, Brezhnev then argued, was predicated on the belief 'that we will win also in peaceful competition'. But it also recognized that 'imperialism, which has reached its highest stage, has become more reactionary and aggressive ... [and] still possesses great strength'. It was therefore critically important to the forces of progress that a counterweight to this strength now existed in the Soviet Union - that 'at the present time no question of any importance in the world can be solved without our participation, without taking into account our economic and military might'.

A still more far-reaching statement of this theme (which has attracted considerable adverse comment in the West) is Gromyko's assertion that the progressive forces now have 'the opportunity of laying down the direction' of world developments. But it must be emphasized, first, that such statements are nothing new, being merely a reassertion of the Khrushchev line in a new context; and second, that the present leadership has not suggested that the Soviet Union could or would 'lay down the law' to individual states on the basis of preponderant military power. Initially, the approach to this question was primarily an indirect one.
After the Twenty-Fourth Congress the political leadership (and, more gradually, the top military leadership) simply stopped talking about the need for Soviet military superiority. But the upsurge in 1976 of American debate about Soviet intentions evidently prompted the decision to address the question more positively, for the next five years produced a succession of high level statements which explicitly characterized the existing military balance as one of 'approximate equilibrium', and which explicitly expressed a Soviet desire not to upset this situation.  

This focus upon the supreme politico-strategic importance of Soviet-American military parity has been accompanied by a denial of the validity of an interpretation of the balance of forces toyed with in American circles - namely the notion of an emerging multipolar world. This notion - which one commentator attributed both to 'some bourgeois theoreticians', and to the 'Peking leaders' - was characterized as merely a more sophisticated variant of the traditional ideologies of the status quo, which ignored the fact that 'the principal tendencies of socio-political development are determined not by the contradictions and interrelations between individual states, but by the development of the basic class antagonism of our epoch - between world socialism and world capitalism'.

Of course, the Soviets have been very ready to point to new evidence of exacerbated inter-imperialist contradictions. 'By the early 1970s', Brezhnev declared at the Twenty-Fourth Congress, the USA, Western Europe and Japan had emerged as the 'clearly defined ... main centres of imperialist rivalry', and 'the economic and political competitive struggle between them [was] growing ever more acute'. Moreover, it was argued that movements towards economic integration in the capitalist world could solve none of the 'basic vices' of the capitalist system - such as the 'anarchy and disorderly development of capitalist production, and the struggle ... for the division of markets and spheres of influence' - which merely reappear 'on a new scale and in different forms'. However, there has been no serious suggestion that this economic conflict could assume a military dimension, or that there might be a major challenge to the United States' position as the leading imperialist power, within the foreseeable future.

As regards China, which American policy makers allegedly seek to establish as 'a structural element in the "balance of power" system',
the Soviet position is emphatic. They have signalled, by a number of ostentatious proposals for a normalization of relations on the basis of Peaceful Coexistence, that China cannot be regarded as a 'normal' socialist state (while still declining to officially read it out of the socialist camp). Of more practical significance perhaps, they have refused to accept that it is now a non-aligned actor genuinely independent of imperialism. This view was expressed with special force by Brezhnev at the Twenty-Fifth Congress:

Relations with China, of course, are a special and separate question. The policy of its present leaders is openly directed against the majority of the socialist states. More, it merges directly with the position of the world's most extreme reactionaries ... This policy is not only entirely alien to socialist principles and ideals, but has also, in effect, become an important aid to imperialism in its struggle with socialism.

Soviet statements have implied that the capabilities of China alone are no great source of worry: but they have also emphasized - most notably in a major 1978 interview with Arbatov designed for the Western press - the dangers involved in China's becoming 'some sort of military ally to the West, even an informal ally'. If this occurred, Arbatov claimed, 'the whole situation would look different to us. We would have to re-analyse our relationship with the West. If such an axis is built on an anti-Soviet basis then there is no place for detente, even in a narrow sense'.

The complementary tack of stressing Soviet options was adopted by Brezhnev in his speech on the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution. Observing that 'some leaders of capitalist countries' now obviously counted on continuing, and even worsening, Sino-Soviet conflict, he suggested that this was 'a shortsighted policy', and that 'those who pursue it may miscalculate'. But he also concluded (somewhat lamely for a practitioner of Marxist-Leninist science) that 'there is no point trying to guess how Soviet-Chinese relations will shape up in the future. I would merely like to say that our repeated proposals to normalise them still hold good'.

At the Twenty-Sixth Congress, he similarly observed that it was too soon to tell the 'true meaning' of the changes taking place in the domestic policies of China, but conceded that, 'unfortunately, as yet one cannot speak of any changes for the better in Peking's foreign policy. As
before, it is aimed at exacerbating the international situation and at making common cause with imperialist policy'.

Aside from the transformation of the strategic balance, pride of place in the Soviet assessment of the nature of the epoch has almost inevitably been accorded to capitalism's ever popular General Crisis. At the Twenty-Fourth Congress, Brezhnev conceded some success to 'the bourgeoisie's striving to use more camouflaged forms of exploitation and oppression of the working people', and to the monopolies' 'extensive use of scientific and technical progress to strengthen their positions, to enhance the efficiency and accelerate the pace of production ...' But 'adaptation to new conditions', he insisted, 'does not mean that capitalism has been stabilized as a system. The general crisis of capitalism has continued to deepen'.

The next three years, of course, provided abundant ammunition for arguments depicting an ever greater interpenetration of Western resource and monetary problems, conflicts with the Third World, and the general post-Vietnam 'crisis of US alliance systems'. The result, Brezhnev asserted in 1974, was a new level of 'crisis of bourgeois democracy, accelerating the disintegration of the political machinery of capitalist rule ...'. The same year also produced major pronouncements on the subject by Suslov and Ponomaryev, the party's leading ideologues; and the latter, in particular, portrayed a truly comprehensive 'combination of crises unique in the history of post-war capitalism':

Never before have the crisis processes in the economy and the factors that deepen the political crisis in individual imperialist countries been so closely inter-related, and never have they so powerfully affected each other. And if we examine these sharpening crisis processes in their aggregate, we shall find that what we have is not merely the further deepening, but a definite qualitative change in the development of the general crisis of capitalism within the framework of its Third Stage.

This broad line was widely echoed at the time. But a major 1975 debate on the question by the MEMO and USA institutes produced the conclusion that the crisis remained 'cyclical, and therefore transient', and that, though the capitalist world's withdrawal from the recession would prove exceptionally prolonged, its deepest point had now been reached and left behind. And this interpretation was endorsed by Brezhnev at the
Twenty-Fifth Congress. Recent developments, he maintained, 'forcefully confirm that capitalism is a society without a future'. But he added that 'Communists are far from predicting an "automatic collapse" of capitalism. It still has important reserves'.

Soviet awareness of the reserves of capitalism is perhaps most clearly evident in the treatment of the third great feature of the contemporary epoch: the 'scientific-technological revolution', with its associated implications for what is now referred to, in terms of approbation, as the international division of labour. 'The notion of the STR', Paul Cocks observes, 'has become the buzzword of the Brezhnev regime in the 1970s':

but it also appears, unlike the preoccupations with the strategic balance and the global fortunes of imperialism, rather to have crept up on the regime's consciousness in the preceding decade. Of course, the Soviet self definition had always involved a strongly technocratic strand, and the expectation of major scientific-technological advance had figured prominently in Khrushchev's Twenty-Second Congress predictions. But, as Philip Hanson points out, the official perspective then involved a 'burst of once-for-all catching up in certain previously neglected sectors, to be followed quite quickly by a general "over-taking" of the West'. Beginning in Khrushchev's last years, and gathering momentum under his successors, a different perspective evidently emerged:

that there was a continuous and extensive process of technical change going on in the Western world ... that 'catching up' meant aiming at a moving target, that 'catching up' was extremely difficult and would take time, and that it could best be done by large scale Soviet participation in many of the international commercial practices by which Western countries normally acquire new technology from each other, rather than by other, more 'arms length' approaches.

This question clearly bears directly on those problems of Soviet economic development which have led many Western observers to conclude that the superiority of Western technology could be translated into a source of major leverage upon the present regime, on the grounds that the Soviets have been forced into the pursuit of greatly expanded economic contacts as a preferred alternative to major political and economic reforms which would otherwise be necessary.* Indeed, the Soviet leadership

* These arguments have been reviewed in Chapter 1.
has openly acknowledged the fact—emphasized, for instance, in the 1977 CIA report on the Soviet economy—that the era of unchecked 'extensive' growth is over. Increasingly, regime statements have focussed on the key factors of 'intensive' growth: modern technology and modern management (which in turn implies a computerized planning process). A major turning point here, Cocks suggests, was the 1969 Central Committee plenum, where Brezhnev insisted that 'intensification becomes not only the main way but the only way of developing our economy and solving such fundamental socio-political tasks as building the material technical base of communism, raising living standards, and achieving victory in the economic competition between the two world systems'.

Moreover, there was an evident recognition that the challenge of contemporary science—now recognized as a direct productive force, and therefore part of the economic base—could not be adequately met merely by ritual assertions of the inherent superiority of socialist forms of organization. At the more explicitly ideological level, admittedly, such assertions remained the rule, as the following pronouncement by Ponomaryev indicates:

The scientific-technological revolution is a powerful ally of socialism, [but] under capitalist conditions the collectivization of its production erodes further and further the foundations of the existing order, and gives birth to new forms of antagonisms.

However a much more complex perception of the problem was suggested not merely by the extensive specialist literature on it, but also in Brezhnev's own statement at the Twenty-Fourth Congress establishing the conquest of the STR as one of the central tasks of future Soviet development:

Before us, comrades, is a task of historical importance: organically to fuse the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system, to unfold more broadly our own, intrinsically socialist, forms of fusing science with production.

The international implications of recognizing the STR as a major historical force substantially autonomous from socialism were further
developed in the explicit revision by N. Inozemtsev (the head of IMEMO) of the Stalinist doctrine of the two parallel world-economies of socialism and capitalism. The two were now inevitably becoming joined by a 'conglomeration [of] economic ties', Inozemtsev argued, since under the conditions of the STR 'no single country ... can develop the production of all types of output with the same effectiveness'.

This basic message was also promoted in Brezhnev's televised address during his 1973 visit to the United States. Observing that 'the Soviet Union and the United States are self-sufficient countries, so to speak', Brezhnev went on to say that the rejection of economic, scientific, technological and cultural ties would deprive both sides of important additional benefits, and 'would be an absolutely purposeless rejection, which could not be justified on any sensible grounds'. More strikingly, the Soviet leader chose an earlier meeting with American business leaders to deliver an unprecedented acknowledgement of his side's contribution to the Cold War ethos. After vehemently answering in the negative his own rhetorical question as to whether the Cold War was a 'good period' which served 'the interests of our peoples, of all the peoples of the world', he continued:

In the past, in the field of ... economic ties, we adapted ourselves to one system of relations, and we stopped short right there, and for some time refused to move onward to new forms ... We have ... been prisoners of ... old tendencies, old trends, and to this day we have not been able fully to break those fetters and to come out into the open air.

Of course, one must not attach too great weight to such a directly political appeal to a Western audience (which was, incidentally, rendered in a less compromising paraphrase in published Soviet versions of this speech). However, it remains fair to say that the Soviet leadership has clearly established as an official line its support for the 'participation of every state in the international division of labour on an equitable basis and under conditions that are advantageous for all and that do not permit violation of sovereignty and interference in internal affairs'. Moreover, while on the one hand vehemently rejecting the notion that economic exigencies render the Soviet Union peculiarly susceptible to the 'linkage' of international economic and political issues,
Soviet spokesmen have, on the other, themselves depicted a general connection between economic cooperation and political detente which resembles that proposed in the Nixon-Kissinger strategy. 'Stable economic ties', Kosygin told the Supreme Soviet in 1971, 'are exceedingly important ... from the point of view of creating favourable conditions for the solution of ... international problems'.

Three comments may be made about this basic Soviet account of the nature of the epoch. In the first place, although patently self-serving and selective, it is not - so far as it goes - unrealistic. That the 1970s have witnessed an unprecedented state of economic and political disarray within the Western alliance has been a standard theme of much Western commentary, which often, indeed, contrives to outdo the Soviets themselves in this respect. That the emergence of a broad Soviet-American military parity constitutes the greatest transformation of the world strategic environment since World War II is a simple fact, which few would bother to deny. That on balance, the major changes of policy behind the late detente lay on the Western side - in a retreat from earlier commitments to the military/political containment and economic isolation of the Soviet Union - is a more contentious proposition: but, as I have attempted to indicate in previous chapters, it is the most reasonable reading of the historical record.

This is not to deny the existence of powerful strategic and economic imperatives for a more cooperative stance on the part of the Soviet Union. As regards the former, it seems obvious that one central aim of Soviet detente policy has been to inhibit too close an American rapprochement with China; and there is no reason why the United States should surrender its flexibility in this area merely to accommodate Soviet objections. But, as was argued in Chapter 4, the 'emergence' of China has not genuinely altered the bipolar structure of world military power and its determining impact upon the prospects for more general detente. Nor can extensive American-Chinese military collaboration be justified in terms of a policy of 'balance', unless one proceeds from the untenable assumption that the United States - and still less the United States with its NATO and Japanese allies - is now inferior to the Soviet Union in respect of the global balance.

Similarly, it is distorting to attribute the Soviet interest in detente primarily to an urgent need for Western assistance to 'bail out'
the Soviet economy and system. The more sweeping Western predictions of irremediable Soviet productivity problems appear to rest upon culture determined, and as yet largely untestable, assumptions about the inability of predominantly planned economies to surmount the challenge of the 'post-industrial' era. The CIA's specific prediction of an absolute decline in Soviet oil production after 1980 - a keystone of the complex and inter-related economic crisis depicted in its 1977 report - has now been retracted. As for the question of Western technology, Hanson argues that on the available evidence, the Soviet leadership itself, as well as its Western critics, may well have substantially over-estimated the gains which it would bring; and, indeed, Brezhnev's Report to the Twenty-Sixth Congress laid a new emphasis on the need for internal reforms to allow for the effective diffusion of Soviet technological achievements, which in themselves allegedly were fully equal to those of the West, throughout the Soviet economy. In sum, it seems fair to assume that 'the Soviet economic interest in detente [is] strong and less qualified by the most obvious strategic considerations than the corresponding Western interest'; and that a significant loosening of centralized controls might be necessary to allow a truly effective participation in the processes of technological exchange characteristic of the rest of the developed world. But the image of a Soviet economy critically dependent on Western technology - whether the implication is that the West possesses important new sources of leverage in favour of major changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policy, or that existing economic contacts constitute a major indirect subsidy for the Soviet war machine - appears to be a misleading one.

A second important point concerns the likely 'audience' of Soviet pronouncements with an evidently manipulative content. It is indeed reasonable to discount the insistence upon the USSR's unswerving devotion to Peaceful Coexistence and detente as propaganda directed primarily at Western and Third World audiences. But it is also reasonable to assume that the equally insistent linking of the Western interest in detente with an altered correlation of forces is at least partly designed to neutralise the objections of elements within the Soviet elite who consider (as did some of Khrushchev's early opponents) that a detente policy threatens to weaken the Soviet international position.

This would seem to be especially true of the 'objective factors' adduced to explain the United States' enforced abandonment of a 'positions
of strength' policy. As Morton Schwartz points out, the specialist Amerikanisty of the USA and MEMO institutes - the most consistent advocates of detente within the published literature - have also been in the forefront of this argument from objective factors.\(^51\) Essentially, their argument is an elaboration of Khrushchev's defence of the Peaceful Coexistence line on the grounds that not imperialism, but the world situation, had changed. And though Khrushchev's alleged tendency towards an excessive reliance upon the 'automatic' movement of the correlation of forces is now studiously avoided by all parties, with due recognition being accorded to the pivotal role of Soviet military power,\(^52\) it must be reiterated that military parity, not Soviet superiority, is now presented as the Soviet objective in this area. Similar considerations, moreover, would seem to apply to Soviet discussions of the economic aspects of detente. It may be surmised that the Soviet authorities did not require the predictions of Western convergence theorists to alert them to the challenge posed to the Soviet social order by extensive economic interaction with the capitalist powers; and much contemporary Soviet discussion of this issue - and especially of the scientific-technological revolution - appears designed, in part, to demonstrate that such risks can be kept within acceptable limits.\(^53\)

Third, if the chief objection to this overall account of the correlation of forces is not its inaccuracy, but its arbitrary selectiveness, this latter objection is partially met by the more specific Soviet discussion of historical processes in the socialist, capitalist and 'Third' worlds. As was noted in Chapter 5, the expectation of steady advance on these three fronts was an integral feature of Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence 'package deal', which in turn had its theoretical roots in Lenin's sketch of the developing 'crisis of world capitalism'. The importance officially assigned to this expectation has not diminished under the present regime, as evidenced in Brezhnev's statement to the 1969 Moscow conference of Communist and Worker's Parties, at the onset of the period under review:

*The rising might of socialism, the liquidation of colonial regimes, and the pressure of the worker's movement increasingly influence the internal processes and policies of imperialism. Many important features of modern imperialism are to be explained by the fact that it is compelled to adapt itself to new conditions.*
to the conditions of the struggle of the two systems.

However, the Soviet authorities have also clearly acknowledged the inadequacy of several Khrushchev era predictions; and despite their continued insistence on the existence of objective limits to detente with the Western powers - above all in regard to the competition in the Third World - Soviet pronouncements during the detente era did provide evidence of a significant reappraisal of the broad concept of the anti-imperialist struggle. In the remaining two sections, I will attempt to outline the main features of this reappraisal, which evidently reflects an increasingly complex and differentiated approach to the problems and prospects not merely of contemporary imperialism but of 'actual, existing' Soviet-style socialism as well.

Detente and the Correlation of Forces

I have already argued, in Chapter 3, that 'detente' is an essentially vacuous or tautological concept, and that since an international detente is a relaxation of tensions between states, the bedrock determinant of the prospects for such a development is the distribution of power among the leading protagonists of the states-system. However, although there are no persuasive logical or historical reasons for the positive assumption that a genuine Soviet-American detente must be associated with some form of convergence between the respective 'social systems', one might still hold the negative position that idiosyncratic foreign policy perceptions, grounded essentially in domestic political factors, would make it impossible for one or other side to participate in a genuine relaxation of tensions, however favourable the external 'correlation of forces' might appear. This section will consider the evidence in the Soviet self-account for two separate but related assertions along these lines. by the American hawk school: that the Soviet regime is directly impelled towards open-ended expansionism by its own lack (and perceived lack) of internal legitimacy; and that it is indirectly impelled towards the same practical result by a demand for absolute security based upon the conviction that the internal dynamics of imperialist states make stable coexistence with them impossible.
The discussion of the first issue will involve a considerable digression into the 'nuts and bolts' of Soviet domestic policy in the Brezhnev era. However, as was emphasized in the previous chapter, arguments about the dynamics of the 'Soviet system' are apt to be seriously misleading if they are excessively divorced from the changing logic of those major political issues - such as resource allocation and consumer expectations - which have done so much to shape the development of political structures in the period of Soviet rule.

This point is particularly important in regard to the drawing of inferences about the 'inner dynamics' of Soviet foreign policy from Soviet moves - directly in Afghanistan and indirectly, so far, in Poland - to buttress by military force the position of Communist regimes faced with imminent dissolution from within. Indeed, developments in the Polish crisis testify eloquently to the deep vulnerability of 'real, existing socialism' in Eastern Europe, and also to the deep Soviet distrust of the internal correlation of forces in this respect. But even in regard to Poland, and still more in regard to Afghanistan, it remains essential to distinguish between the weaknesses of the wider 'world socialist system' and those of the Soviet Union itself; and I would argue that interpretations of these examples of direct or indirect Soviet interventionism in terms of the Soviet regime's own lack of domestic legitimacy are less than persuasive. In particular, the explicit or implicit assumption of several hawk critics that there has been no significant move towards a more settled basis for domestic legitimacy in the post-Stalin era is simply untenable.55 The domestic record of the Brezhnev regime (as, indeed, of the Khrushchev regime) has been nothing if not complex and contradictory. But despite the heavy burden of military expenditure, and a more systematic crackdown on dissent after the vagaries of the Khrushchev era, the present regime has presided over a period of substantial gains not merely in living standards but also in the fields of social equality and, more arguably, of individual freedom.56

The most obvious area of advance has been in the general improvement of, and greater equality in, material living standards (an advance checked, but not yet reversed, by the serious economic problems which have plagued the Soviet Union, along with other major industrial societies, since the mid-1970s). The Brezhnev era has seen a particularly marked
levelling tendency in income distribution, in which field, Peter Wiles concludes, the overall 'statistical record since Stalin has been very good indeed. I doubt if any other country can show a more rapid progress towards equality'. Various explanations might be offered for this policy, which inter alia, has eroded the comparative material advantages of the more privileged strata of the intelligentsia. It does not seem unreasonable to assume a genuine regime conviction (evident, for example, in Khrushchev's memoirs, as well as in his and Brezhnev's speeches) that mature socialism ought to provide improved living standards for the mass of the population. But a more hard headed motivation is also discernible. In the Brezhnev era, Eastern Europe has again provided evidence of the dangers posed by massive disaffection with the system on the part of pivotal social groups: the intellectuals, above all, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the workers in Poland in 1970, 1976 and, most fundamentally, in 1980-1. The possibility of concerted 'class conscious' action by either group in the Soviet context - let alone their coalescence in such action - may still be remote. But, Archie Brown suggests, that possibility appears to have encouraged a leadership attempt 'to form a closer alliance with workers against possibly dangerous heterodox ideas emanating from the intelligentsia ...'.

Even more than the industrial workers, however, the greatest beneficiaries of income equalization policies have been the peasantry, who also benefited from their belated acquisition of internal passports, and from the extension of the old age pension to members of collective farms (a reform foreshadowed by Khrushchev). Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev at an early stage established agriculture as a key area of personal responsibility. But he has tended to eschew the 'hare-brained schemes' and constant interventions of his predecessor, relying instead upon the systematic reorientation of resources towards heavy investment in inputs like fertilisers and mechanization, on the one hand, and towards the provision of greater material incentives for the agricultural workforce, on the other. Of course, the rise in peasant incomes since Stalin has been from a very low base: but by the early 1970s, as Alec Nove points out, the results were quite striking:

Indeed, if one adds income (in cash and kind) from private plots, there is now only a quite small difference between rural and urban incomes. From this a very important conclusion follows: that the long period of 'exploiting' agriculture for the benefit of industry is over.
In fact, Nove argues that agriculture has now become 'a burden on the rest of the economy', especially when account is taken of items like the heavy support for retail meat prices. The latter may, of course, be regarded as a more general subsidy of the consumer; and the campaign to expand agricultural output must be related to the need to redress decades of neglect in the consumer sector as a whole, without which mere increases in money wages would be meaningless. One major long-term Brezhnev promise has been to raise Soviet per capita meat consumption to 'Western' levels (a major cause of the new Soviet dependence on grain imports in poor harvest years). And in 1971, in the wake of the Polish riots, the regime unveiled for the first time a Five Year Plan in which 'Group B' (consumer) industries were scheduled to grow more rapidly than heavy industry. Brezhnev's report designated the improvement of living standards as 'the main task of the Five Year Plan', declaring that the party aimed at an economy capable of 'saturating the market with articles of consumption', and explicitly stating that the establishment of conditions for the expansion of agriculture, light industry, housing and services was 'precisely the ultimate function of heavy industry'.

However, promise has continued to exceed performance. Despite the major gains in the Brezhnev era, Soviet agriculture remains notably inefficient compared to that of other developed nations, both because of the failure to grapple with such organizational problems as the excessive size of farms, and because of intractable climatic conditions, which produced disastrous harvests in 1972 and 1975 (the latter constituting, in Gregory Grossman's estimation, perhaps 'the largest single blow suffered by the Soviet economy since the German invasion of 1941'). In part because of these harvest failures, the Ninth Five Year Plan was not fulfilled and the consumer sector once again grew more slowly than heavy industry. Moreover, the Tenth Five Year Plan not only projected lower overall growth rates, but also reinstated the traditional priority of heavy industry. In Brezhnev's words:

The pivot of the Party's economic strategy both for the Tenth Five Year Plan and for long-term development is a further build up of the country's economic might, the expansion and basic renewal of production assets, and the maintenance of stable, balanced growth for heavy industry - the foundation of the economy.
This Tenth plan, which Brezhnev dubbed a 'plan of efficiency and quality' was in turn much underfulfilled; and with its successor, which proposed more modest official targets again, the regime returned to the promise of an expansion of the consumer goods sector greater than that of heavy industry. The uncomfortable example of events in Poland may well have provided a spur in this regard. But already at the November 1978 Central Committee Plenum, Brezhnev had returned, in tones of considerable urgency, to the problems of the consumer sector. Attacking the alleged tendency of some planners 'to regard Group "B" as a sort of balancing wheel', whose allocations could be cut 'to overcome disproportions in the plan', he insisted that 'the entire course of economic development confirms again and again that Group "B" industries ... constitute an important factor without which the economy as a whole cannot function effectively and material incentives cannot be improved'.

A similar pattern has prevailed in regard to agriculture. At the Twenty-Fifth Congress, Brezhnev defended with particular force the basic 'inter-related aims' of agricultural policy - the expansion of output and the 'levelling up' of living conditions in the countryside. At the same time, he closely associated himself with proposals for massive land reclamation and irrigation (based upon river diversion) in Central Asia - proposals which, together with those for Siberian development, are perhaps the most expensive of all the measures envisaged to enhance 'the country's economic might'. The massive direct and indirect claim of agriculture upon resources (estimated by Nove at 33 per cent of all investments) continued in the Eleventh Five Year Plan; and in November 1981, in response to the third poor grain harvest in a row, Brezhnev announced an alteration to the plan to allocate 'somewhat more resources' to agriculture to counter what he frankly acknowledged were significant food shortages. On this occasion, he blamed the influence of 'factors which are entirely or partially beyond our control'. But at the 1978 Plenum he had also attacked as 'intolerable' the continuing agricultural losses due to inadequate storage and distribution facilities, adding revealingly:

Soviet people can understand difficulties. But they cannot and do not want to accept mismanagement, irresponsibility and negligence as the explanation of existing difficulties. This is why we now say with
full reason that the question of losses ... is not only an economic matter. It is also an important political matter which directly affects the mood and labour activity of the Soviet people.  

Overall, therefore, there are abundant indications that the present regime recognizes the existence of major economic problems which cannot adequately be addressed by Stalinist methods, and that its interest in conciliating the consumer has if anything increased in the face of the domestic reverses and rising international tensions of the past six years. However, it also seems clear that a basic concern with social stability and bureaucratic compromise has now become a major barrier to flexibility on domestic issues, and that what Brezhnev characterized in 1976 as the 'urgent' and 'unpostponable' task of management reform, to 'fundamentally improve' an 'economic mechanism [which] has become too tight for the developing economy', will not be realised during his tenure of office.

On the issues of political participation, and political and intellectual freedom, the record of the Brezhnev regime is far more mixed. But it is mixed, and some positive trends should be recognized. Above all, the phenomenon of mass terror, and the concomitant large scale use of slave labour, have now been absent from Soviet life for over two decades. If only for their own protection against a repetition of the great purges, Stalin's successors have dismantled, and kept dismantled, the separate empire of the secret police. In one sense, this abolition of totally arbitrary arrest can be regarded as an essential prerequisite for the emergence of dissent as a politically meaningful act. More generally, as Peter Reddaway points out, the subjection of the KGB to more or less defined bureaucratic norms has created inhibitions on its freedom of action which the various dissenting groups have been able to exploit even in the face of the general hardening of regime attitudes since the late 1960s.

Of course, this is far from providing that genuine 'stability of expectations' for the general population which, as noted in Chapter 2, has begun to figure in the regime's own rhetoric. But, again, the top leadership's requirements in this respect do appear to have filtered down to the general environment of the political elite. There is now
an established precedent for non-violent leadership succession and,
despite the evident power of Brezhnev, a genuinely operational pattern
of collective leadership. For many Western observers, this stabilization
has been purchased only at the cost of the emergence of an immobilized
'gerontocracy' in the Politburo and the Central Committee which has,
indeed, barely been disturbed even by the Twenty-Sixth Congress. But
as Hough, in particular, points out, mobility has been much greater at
the middle levels of the state and party apparatus, from which the
next major leadership generation might be expected to emerge. Moreover,
some greater stability in cadre policy was a necessary antidote not
merely to the traumas of the Stalin era, but also the arbitrary actions
of Khrushchev in this area; and, more lately, Brezhnev has taken pains
to emphasize that the established policy of 'trust in cadres' provides
no warrant for the retention of leading posts by 'those who fail to
pull their weight ... who display irresponsibility and live on their
old merits'.

In the field of party membership, a similar concern to balance
mobility and stability has been evident. The party has continued to grow
absolutely, to a total membership of over 18 million, even though its
rate of growth has slowed noticeably since the Khrushchev years; and
the latter phenomenon seems attributable primarily to a regime desire
to control more strictly the quality of those seeking to enter the party
as an adjunct to their careers. The result, despite a conscious policy
of attempting to provide a balancing intake of genuinely 'proletarian'
elements, is a party which is more highly educated than ever before, and
which presumably offers the intelligentsia channels for influence upon
policy which reinforce the effects of the regime's growing predilection
towards reliance on expertise in management. 'The old dichotomy between
"Red" and "expert" becomes meaningless', Hough argues, 'as the elite
becomes Red and expert, with its expertise being established before
membership in the party is admitted'.

If these developments have provided important benefits to the upper
intelligentsia, to balance the decline in their relative material position,
those not involved in active dissent have also benefited from a continuing
trend towards greater intellectual freedom in some areas. It is
undoubtedly true that repression of open dissent has increased under
the present regime, especially since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and
that literary and cultural freedom have generally declined since the
Khrushchev period. But the current leaders also appear to have accepted more systematically that greater intellectual freedom in many areas is essential to the efficient functioning of a complex modern society. In Brown's words:

They have attempted to make a much clearer dividing line than was ever made under Khrushchev between what kind of intellectual activity is essential for the economic progress of the Soviet Union and what is not, and between what is essential for the existing structure of power within the Soviet Union (as well, of course, Soviet power in an international context) and what might threaten this. It can be argued, and indeed has been argued by some Soviet dissidents, that intellectual freedom is indivisible. The fact is that the present Soviet leaders have divided it.

A formal framework for the discussion of these various issues has been established in the significant ideological innovation mentioned in Chapter 2: the doctrine of developed socialism. In a sense, this represents merely the codification of a number of elements (including the notion of a 'mature' or 'developed' socialist society) advanced in ad hoc fashion in the late 1960s. But from its first actual appearance in 1971, developed socialism as a distinct 'stage' within the wider 'phase' of socialism has been accorded an intensive, officially sponsored exposition. It quickly became a major leitmotif of Brezhnev's own speeches, while Suslov designated as the 'main guidelines ... set for our social scientists' by the Twenty-Fourth Congress, 'the theoretical elaboration of the fundamental problems of a developed socialist society and the scientific substantiation of the ways and means of its gradual development into Communism'. Such issues have become part of the staple fare in Kommunist, the Party theoretical organ; they have been the subject of important monographs and 'theoretical conferences'; they have been directly addressed in the new (1977) Soviet Constitution, and in related pronouncements by Brezhnev; and they have formed a backdrop for discussion in all major policy areas, not excluding the military.

Certain key themes, all exemplifying the trend towards a more developmentalist and technocratic ideology which was discussed in Chapter 2, should be mentioned here. First, it is made clear that the period of
developed socialism will be long. Some authors have suggested several
decades, while Brezhnev has even implied (speaking before the new
term had been introduced) that the construction of Communism might
take 50 years. More generally, it is simply asserted that the stage is
a 'relatively long period of development on the road from capitalism
to communism'. Varying the image, Brezhnev declared in 1977 that the
Soviet Union had everything necessary to advance to 'our cherished goal
of Communism' (whose appearance, on Khrushchev's timetable, should
already have been imminent) and 'to attain ever new summits of progress'.
'But comrades', he added, 'these are indeed summits. And the paths
leading to them may be steep and difficult'.

Second, the transition to Communism, however difficult, will be
smooth and gradual, growing out of roots established in the present
stage. The era of qualitative leaps in Soviet development is past. In
the economic field, the pattern is to be one of 'complex, harmonious
economic development', with continuous improvement of the general welfare
of the population. Class differences will continue, but are no longer
a source of conflict; and Khrushchev's previously neglected doctrine of
the 'all people's state' has been effectively resurrected with the formal
inclusion of the 'people's intelligentsia' in the 'unbreakable alliance'
of workers and peasants. Despite calls for a deepening of 'socialist
democracy' and for more participatory patterns of decision making, neither
state nor party are about to wither away. The party aims at 'further
strengthening the Soviet state and perfecting the entire political
organization of our society', though the primary justification for
this time - honoured policy is no longer the threat of class conflict
or of capitalist encirclement, but the complex 'management' problems
created by the new stage of socialist advance.

Third, the most important single determinant of the new stage is
'the economy's entirely new magnitude', which creates both greater
possibilities (for meeting the population's material and cultural needs)
and new problems (of scientific economic management). Its possibilities
emerge only where both a modern, planned industrial sector and 'large
scale, highly mechanized agriculture built on collectivist principles'
have been established; and, indeed, one shorthand definition of its
essence is 'the combination of the scientific and technological revolution
with the advantages of the socialist organization of society'.
claims are clearly meant to establish the exemplary status of the USSR, where developed socialism has already 'been built', as opposed to the 'several other countries of the socialist community', which are merely successfully embarked upon its construction. Moreover, although such economic criteria provide directly for the rejection only of Chinese-style 'barracks socialism', the doctrine is also clearly designed for use against 'market socialism' heresies among the more developed states of Eastern Europe. 'Countries which have taken the path of socialism with an underdeveloped or moderately developed economy', Brezhnev argues, 'will evidently have to follow the same road' as the Soviet Union. But even already developed aspirants to socialism must master

the difficult science of organizing all social life on socialist principles, including the science of planning and managing the national economy, the bringing together of all classes and social groups on the basis of socialist interests and communist ideals ... We are profoundly convinced that no matter what the specific conditions in the countries building socialism may be, the stage of its perfection on its own basis, the stage of mature, developed socialism, is the essential link between social transformations, a relatively long period of development on the road from capitalism to communism.

A final related issue (also with ramifications for the Soviet relationship to the rest of the 'Socialist Commonwealth') is the 'national question', which, Brezhnev announced in 1972, 'has been solved completely, solved finally and for good'. The essence of this alleged achievement, which he asserted, 'may rightly be ranked with such victories ... as industrialization, collectivization and the cultural revolution', had been proclaimed at the Twenty-Fourth Congress:

A new historical community of people, the Soviet people, took shape in our country during the years of socialist construction. New harmonious relations of friendship and co-operation were formed between classes and social groups, nations and nationalities, in the struggle for socialism and in the battles fought in defence of socialism.
This is clearly a significant ideological innovation: but it would seem, none-the-less, to fall within the wider pattern of a consistent elongation of the perspective on socialist transformation in the USSR. Soviet theorists have long maintained that the constituent nations of the Union would proceed from a stage of independent 'flourishing', through one of 'rapprochement' or 'drawing-together', to an ultimate condition of 'merging'. In his presentation of the optimistic CPSU Programme in 1961, Khrushchev claimed that the Soviet nationalities had already entered the 'rapprochement' stage, and that 'complete unity of nations will be achieved as the full-scale building of communism proceeds. But even after communism will have been built in the main', he cautioned, 'it will be premature to speak of a fusion of nations'. Brezhnev has continued in much the same vein. In particular, his speech on the new Constitution rejected the 'incorrect conclusions' of some comrades that the document should include 'the concept of an integrated Soviet nation', and that it should proclaim an avowedly unitary Republic, or at least remove from the Union Republics such formal trappings of independence as the right to secede from the USSR. The appropriate formula, he made clear, was still that of rapprochement:

The Soviet people's social and political unity does not at all imply the disappearance of national distinctions ... The friendship of the Soviet peoples is indissoluble, and in the process of building communism they are steadily drawing ever closer together and their spiritual life is being mutually enriched. But we would be taking a dangerous path if we were artificially to step up this objective process of national integration. This is something Lenin persistently warned against, and we shall not depart from his view.

As several Western analysts have pointed out, these formulations, developed in respect of the domestic 'national question', have been explicitly extended to the problem of relations between members of the 'Socialist Commonwealth'. A crucial trigger of this development (as indeed of the wider 'developed socialism' doctrine) would appear to have been the Czech crisis: for this confronted Soviet theorists with the uncomfortable fact that the greatest successes of revisionist ideology had been scored in a nation which had typically been acknowledged as
second only to the USSR itself in its level of attained socialist development.

A variety of reasons, including the harmful influence of chauvinist nationalism, were produced in theoretical glosses on the Brezhnev Doctrine to account for the potential Czech defection. But, as R.Judson Mitchell points out, these failed to conceal a most embarrassing dilemma. Either socialist nations were somehow more vulnerable to erosion from within the higher their level of socialist development, or else an increasingly defensive imperialism was now more capable of negating the gains of socialism - through tactics of 'creeping counter-revolution' - than it had been with its earlier tactics of direct frontal assault. Thus the determining significance of 'objective' historical factors, so important in Khrushchev's depictions of the struggle between the two systems, was effectively devalued; and such subjective factors as 'organizational cohesion and ideological dynamism [became] the crucial variables of historical development'.

At the practical level, it seems clear that the Soviet response to this situation involved a systematic effort to strengthen and refine the processes of economic, political and military coordination within the Warsaw Pact/CMEA bloc. And this has been accompanied by a persistent doctrinal campaign - beginning with the 1969 Moscow World Conference of Communist parties, and gathering momentum after the Twenty-Fourth Congress - aimed at establishing the 'objective' and 'law-governed' necessity for foreign policy unity within the bloc. By 1973-74, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone argues, this had produced a 'coherent theory of relations between socialist states', which depicted the bloc nations as embarked on the same movement towards eventual merger as that proposed for the Soviet nationalities, and which asserted that the stage of rapprochement was already manifest in existing patterns of Eastern European integration. However, by the end of the decade the Polish crisis had provided abundant confirmation - if any were really needed - of the vast gap between Soviet propaganda in this regard and the internal correlation of forces within the East European states. And Brezhnev's pronouncement on this question at the Twenty-Sixth Congress, while relatively moderate as regards implied threats of Soviet intervention, combined a grossly inadequate description of the social forces involved in the Polish workers'movement with a further de facto acknowledgement of the innate vulnerability of
Soviet-style socialism in the smaller bloc countries. As with the Czech case, he emphasized that 'the imperialists and their accomplices systematically conduct campaigns of hostility against the socialist countries' - campaigns which grew increasingly 'sophisticated and insidious' as the imperialists learned 'from their defeats'. But Polish developments also demonstrated that in 'strengthening ... its leading role' the Party must 'pay close attention to the voice of the masses', avoid 'red tape and voluntarism, actively develop socialist democracy' and pursue 'realistic' economic goals:

Wherever imperialism's subversive activity is compounded by mistakes and miscalculations in domestic policy, conditions arise for the activation of elements hostile to socialism. That is what has happened in fraternal Poland, where opponents of socialism, with the support of outside forces, are creating anarchy and seeking to turn the development of events into a counter-revolutionary course.

In sum, therefore, the Brezhnev regime has evolved a considerable body of related doctrine with two apparent ends: to provide 'a more adequate theory of political change, one that would allow for both development and decay in not only capitalist but non-capitalist (including socialist) systems'; and 'to delineate more clearly the limits of permissible change not only in the Soviet Union but in the socialist bloc as a whole'.

As regards Eastern Europe, one may say that the theory of change remains basically inadequate and that, the 'legitimating' doctrine of developed socialism notwithstanding, the most obvious factor operating to contain change with 'permissible' limits is the continuing threat of Soviet intervention 'in the last resort'. It is not merely that Soviet-style social systems are imposed on these societies from outside. There is also the availability to them of 'imagined alternatives' to the Soviet model both in their own history and in their substantial and growing contacts with Western Europe. This latter comment would seem applicable primarily to the more developed 'Northern Tier' of the Soviet bloc - Poland Czechoslovakia, the GDR and perhaps Hungary. But it is also these

* One might argue that Poland, with an orientation towards Latin Christendom reaching back to the Middle Ages, and a 'national' struggle with Russia reaching back almost as far, is a special case even among the Northern tier. But Czechoslovakia, which before 1948 was probably the most favourably disposed to both Russia and communism, has the strongest indigenous democratic tradition and the GDR, though without any substantial democratic legacy, presumably inherits some of the historic German contempt for the leading Slav power, and is also most directly exposed to the example of German Federal Republic.
nations whose potential defection must presumably arouse the greatest alarms on broad security grounds within the Soviet leadership.

The situation, however, appears quite different in regard to the Soviet Union itself, which (insofar as this slippery concept may be used with any degree of precision) may fairly be regarded as a 'substantially legitimate society'. In the first place, the Soviet order is in this case an indigenous creation, and after almost sixty-five years of rule the regime can draw upon quite obvious and straightforward sources of legitimacy, not merely from the very fact of its longevity but also from its achievements in both the domestic and the international sphere (achievements which are presumably a considerable source of Russian and, to a lesser extent, 'Soviet' national pride). However, there is also the factor - obscured in much Western commentary by the residual tendency to regard pluralist and individualist values as natural concomitants of genuine 'modernity' - of the 'very considerable degree of accord which appears to exist between the political system of the USSR and its political culture'. This is not to say that the Soviet population have taken to their hearts the full panoply of official Marxism–Leninism: as Stephen White observes, the regime's achievements in this regard, in comparison to the effort expended, have been distinctly modest. However, the traditional (Russian) political culture would appear to combine a high valuation of social order with an essentially 'collectivist and welfarist' approach to social issues; and the emerging ideology of developed socialism, with its own combination of 'welfare authoritarianism' and a technocratic emphasis upon the 'scientific management of society' appears to be a fairly shrewd response to these basic values. Of course, the 1980s seem likely to confront the regime with the need for major political decisions on structural change for which neither its evolutionary, determinist ideology nor its practical inclination towards piecemeal reformism constitute an adequate response. But as Seweryn Bialer, having acknowledged the importance of these challenges, puts it: 'Time is not running out on the Soviet system. The regime still possesses enormous reserves of stability ... '.

If these arguments are valid (and they are broadly supported by many leading students of Soviet society), they suggest that, for the next decade at least, there will be no direct imperative for the Soviet regime to intervene in other societies to protect its own social order from the corrosive example of 'socialist renewal' along Czech or even Polish lines,
and still less from that of Islamic revolution of the sort presaged in Afghanistan and Iran. I have also suggested, in Chapter 4, that the Soviet 'strategic culture' does not seem to incorporate a concept of international credibility as the blanket interdependence of commitments analogous to the notion developed in American strategic thinking in the nuclear era. However, there is strong evidence that the Soviet authorities do believe in the interdependence of commitments within their Eastern European sphere of influence; and the example of Afghanistan, like that of Cuba, does suggest a belief that Soviet credibility is substantially involved where officially proclaimed Communist regimes are threatened with imminent overthrow, even if the initial establishment of such regimes had little obvious connection with direct Soviet action. In Eastern Europe, moreover, there is also the factor of an established habit of intervention, based upon an extensive definition of Soviet national security which seems, on an 'objective' reading of the situation, both excessively conservative and increasingly unrealistic. As Brown remarks, the 1968 Czech crisis has already provided one great potential European turning point 'at which history (in the shape of the Soviet Union) refused to turn'; and a continuing Soviet refusal in the 1980s to disengage its security demands upon the East European states from its demand to restrict their domestic evolution seems likely to impose a burden on Soviet relations with the West much greater than it has in the preceding decade. 108

The second major question of this section concerns the ostensible Soviet perceptions of the policies and intentions of the leading capitalist powers, and above all the United States. At the most general level, a 'potted history' of such perceptions over the last decade might be assembled from the keynote phrases of Brezhnev's pronouncements on this question to the last three Congresses of the CPSU.

At the Twenty-Fourth Congress, despite the fanfare over the new Soviet 'Peace Programme', the current state of East-West relations was treated in generally negative terms. The issue was addressed under the headings Imperialism, Enemy of the Peoples and Social Progress, The Peoples Against Imperialism, and The Soviet Union's Struggle for Peace and the Security of Peoples. Rebuff to the Imperialist Policy of Aggression. Brezhnev acknowledged that 'positive changes had recently taken place in Europe' without, as yet, fully resolving 'the problems Europe inherited from the Second World War'; and he emphasized the Soviet 'assumption that it is
possible to improve relations between the USSR and the USA' upon the basis of Peaceful Coexistence and 'mutually advantageous ties ... making our relations ... as stable as possible'. But he also expressed suspicions about a continued American desire 'to conduct a "positions of strength" policy', and to 'revive the "Soviet menace" myth' to justify interventionism in Vietnam and elsewhere. 'In the past five-year period', he asserted,

imperialist foreign policy has provided fresh evidence that imperialism has not ceased to be reactionary and aggressive. In this context one must deal above all with US imperialism, which in the last few years has reasserted its urge to act as a kind of guarantor and protector of the international system of exploitation and oppression.¹⁰⁹

At the Twenty-Fifth Congress, East-West relations appeared under the neutral and 'businesslike' heading Development of Relations with Capitalist States; and Brezhnev noted that the preceding five years had produced 'considerable progress' in the struggle for Peaceful Coexistence, which remained 'the main element of our policy towards the capitalist states'. These 'changes towards detente and a more durable peace' were, he maintained, 'especially tangible' in Europe. But he also emphasized that 'the turn for the better in our relations with the United States of America, the biggest power of the capitalist world, has, of course, been decisive in reducing the danger of another world war and consolidating peace'.¹¹⁰ And although he noted that the 'essentially positive development of Soviet-US relations' was marred by the anti-detente activities of 'influential forces' within the American polity, the speech in general, as Paul Marantz observes, was 'rather extraordinary' in tone and style (if 'rather unexceptional' in substance) for the fact that 'Brezhnev went out of his way to avoid using the term "American imperialism"'.¹¹¹

At the Twenty-Sixth Congress, Brezhnev employed a rubric for his discussion which effectively 'split the difference' between those employed on the two earlier occasions: Relations With the Capitalist States. Countering the Forces of Aggression. The Policy of Peace and Cooperation. He left little doubt that the 'stormy and complicated' international environment of the period since 1976 could not be laid to the charge of
the Soviet Union, which had 'persistently continued the struggle to eliminate the threat of war and to preserve and deepen detente'; and he claimed that 'adventurism and readiness to gamble with the vital interests of mankind in the name of narrow, selfish goals' had once again 'become especially evident in the policy of the most aggressive circles of imperialism. The speech also directly blamed both the Carter and Reagan administrations - respectively for 'trying to put pressure on us [and] to destroy the positive elements that had been created, with considerable difficulty, in Soviet-American relations in preceding years', and for 'openly bellicose appeals and statements, specially designed, as it were, to poison the atmosphere of relations between our countries'. And it involved an unusually clear distinction between relations with the United States and those with Western Europe, where 'despite the efforts of the enemies of detente, peaceful cooperation between countries of the two systems is, generally speaking, developing rather well', with 'broader and more meaningful' political contacts, and the emergence of 'a common language on a number of major problems of foreign policy'.

On the other hand, however, Brezhnev expressed the hope that American policy makers would 'ultimately be able to see things more realistically' and effectively reversed the earlier Soviet refusal to renegotiate the stalled SALT II treaty, as well as pressing for arms limitation talks in Europe (to contain what he depicted as a distinctly 'action-reaction' arms race) and a substantial extension of 'confidence building measures' in the European theatre. In general, the speech emphasized the Soviet commitment to peace and 'de-emphasized the anti-imperialist struggle and the USSR's role in it', while the 'world revolutionary process', which had figured prominently in the Twenty-Fifth Congress address, was not directly mentioned at all. And despite the considerable nuances in his treatment of the capitalist powers, Brezhnev directly acknowledged the bedrock importance of an understanding with the United States:

It is generally recognized that the international situation depends in large part on the policies of the USSR and the US. In our opinion, the state of relations between the two at present and the crucial nature of the international problems dictate the need for active dialogue on all levels. We are ready for such a dialogue ... The USSR wants normal relations with the US. From the standpoint of the
interests of the peoples of both our countries and of mankind as a whole, there is simply no other sensible way. 115

At one level, these quotations merely indicate the readiness of the Soviet leadership to manipulate major symbolic elements of Soviet discourse - such as 'imperialism' - in order to communicate specific political messages about their perceptions of relations with the capitalist powers. However, Soviet leaders are also, in general, careful not to allow too great a divergence between doctrine and policy (which is one reason for the visibility of the manipulative element in Soviet political discourse, as compared with its more loosely structured Western counterpart); and if the present regime is able to be rather cavalier in its use of terms such as imperialism, it is because there have already been major adjustments in the theoretical significance accorded such terms, dating back, for the most part, to the first major detente offensive in the Khrushchev era. A brief consideration of this theoretical underpinning, therefore, may provide a less ephemeral focus for examining the Brezhnev regime's response to the fluctuating fortunes of detente in the 1970s.

First, leading Soviet theorists of imperialism had, by the mid-60s, effectively dropped the idea of a necessary drive towards imperialist expansion grounded in the economic structure of the advanced capitalist states, suggesting that imperialism, in any of its concrete historical manifestations, need not involve such phenomena as the possession of colonies, or even the export of capital. 116 As James Roberts observes, the term has now become little more than a conventional description.

The term 'theory of imperialism' is no more than the operational equivalent of 'the theory of modern capitalism', or 'the correct view of modern capitalism'. Imperialism is not something the Western countries do: it is a state of being, it is what they are. They have reached the stage of state-monopoly capitalism, this by definition, is imperialism. 117

However, if the concept of imperialism has been emasculated in this fashion, the associated notion of 'state-monopoly capitalism' has been 'infused with new meaning' much along the line of the analyses of Western 'structural Marxists'. In specialist analyses, the state is now presented
not as the passive instrument of an essentially cohesive elite of monopoly capitalists, but as a relatively autonomous political actor which 'performs the function' of coordinating, reconciling and at times over-ruling the demands of an internally divided business elite in 'the prevailing - either immediate or long run - general interests of state-monopoly capital as a whole'. Once again, the development of this perspective stretches back to the Khrushchev era, and indeed to the arguments on these lines unsuccessfully advanced by the economist Varga in the late Stalin era (arguments which were in turn justified by a revival of Lenin's 'two tendency' analysis of divisions within the capitalist camp). But, as Schwartz points out, the existence of such a doctrinal rationale provides the basis upon which the new corps of Amerikanisty in the Brezhnev era have established an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the political processes of the leading capitalist power.

Second, the emphasis upon the relative autonomy of the political superstructure has led Soviet analysts, in practice, to accord surprising weight to subjective factors - such as the general influence of political culture and the weight of the Cold War ethos - in accounting for the 'imperialist' dimension of American foreign policy, while the material interests of a large section of the American ruling class are increasingly presented as factors dictating a more moderate posture in an era in which American military power is checkmated by its Soviet counterpart. Of course the 'military-industrial complex' is still viewed as a potent political force with a direct material interest in the exacerbation of international tension; but the majority of the monopoly bourgeoisie, Soviet Americanists argue, not only derive no direct benefit from the military economy, but are actively penalized by its growth 'from a relatively small sector, which the ruling class even regarded as a useful "balance wheel" ... into an enormous unproductive part of the economy, disturbing the normal operation of the economic mechanism'. This factor, along with the multiple external crises faced by the United States from the late 1960s onwards, could not plausibly be attributed to an all embracing Soviet threat by 'even the most thick-witted representatives of U.S. imperialist circles'. 'Needless to say', Arbatov continues,
this does not mean that the American monopolies revised their attitude towards socialism and communist ideas ... But the stubborn facts of life taught the U.S. ruling class to realize that, in basing its policy wholly on a platform of bellicose anti-communism, the American bourgeoisie not only does not protect itself against other, quite real threats, but can also do substantial damage to its own class interests. 

A crucial aspect of this complex of American crises was, of course, Vietnam, which the Soviet analysts have tended to present (in a manner reminiscent of 'statist' American theorists such as Krasner) as a prime instance of ideological commitment overcoming the rational pursuit of American material interests. Moreover, in analysing the impact of the Vietnam involvement on American society, they have conceded a significant role to the impact of public opinion, mobilized both outside and within the parliamentary process, in forcing a change of direction upon the American leadership. Once again, sections of the business community are said to have been particularly alert to the need for such a change. 'In a stunning reversal of form', as Schwartz observes, 'the social stability of "monopoly capitalism" in the United States - as well as its economic well being - is now believed to require a tranquil international environment'.

Third, the obverse side of the argument that the arms race has become a burden on the American economy is a substantial departure from the Stalin-era orthodoxy regarding the inevitable shrinkage and collapse of capitalism, which was alleged to be one of the prime internal forces driving capitalist regimes in an imperialist and militarist direction. As has been noted, the specialist Amerikanisty, in their exploration of the 'considerable reserves' of capitalism alluded to by Brezhnev at the Twenty-Fifth Congress, have laid particular emphasis upon the efficacy of 'state-monopoly regulation of the economy' in the interests of monopoly capitalism as a whole. In addition, as Schwartz points out, their treatment of the American economy has accorded considerably less importance to the problem of impending raw materials shortages than have many Western analysts. Soviet spokesmen have certainly been alert to the raw materials issue, especially as a factor capable of undermining the international cohesion of the major capitalist powers. But the Amerikanisty, besides emphasizing
the great reserves of most crucial natural resources still in American hands, also appear persuaded by their own reverence for the scientific-technological revolution 'that problems [of resource substitution] which would strain the economy of a lesser nation are soluble for the United States'. Finally, along with this general perception of the resilience of American capitalism goes a correspondingly 'dim view of the revolutionary potential of the American people'—a view which, it may be noted, is continuous with Stalin's practical attitude to the Western working class in the heyday of official Soviet certainty about the inevitable inner decay of capitalism, if rather less continuous with the visions entertained by Khrushchev in the heyday of official Soviet optimism about an early Soviet victory in the peaceful competition of the two social systems.

I would argue that this partial reappraisal of the potentialities of capitalism lends credibility to the broad political message of a strategic commitment to detente set forth in major Soviet pronouncements on the fluctuating fortunes of East-West relations over the past decade. Taken together with the current regime's general inclinations towards an indefinite elongation of the transition period and its markedly more sober, but still optimistic, assessment of the prospects of Soviet socialism, the reappraisal of capitalism does suggest the expectation of an indefinite period of state-to-state relations with the leading capitalist powers in which a limited relaxation of tensions would hold greater promise of Soviet gains than would a more confrontationist relationship.

What is particularly important about the revisionist treatment of capitalism and imperialism is that it does not insist that the only way to contain the aggressive tendencies of the Western powers (and in particular the United States) is to render them impotent. During the mid 1970s, at the height of the innovative trend, the analyses of the Soviet Amerikaniat generally presented the United States as 'a declining threat to the basic security interests of the USSR', without also presenting it as 'weak, passive, or isolationist'. Rather, the image was 'of a still powerful, more restrained, more circumspect, less menacing United States, a nation with which one [could] do business, but one not to be regarded lightly'. Of course, the possibility that American policymakers might respond to their more circumscribed situation by a resort to more flagrantly 'adventurist' methods was by no means excluded. But it was presented as a possibility rather than, as in the Stalin era, a certainty, and a possibility, moreover, which the Soviet Union could combat with policies calculated to strengthen the position of moderate-sober elements on the
other side. There was no open repudiation of the received doctrine on imperialism. But, in Bhabani Sen Gupta's words, 'Soviet analysts now [made] a clear distinction between the United States as a capitalist and as an imperialist power. Detente with the capitalist America, struggle against the imperialist America'.126

The other vital component of this scenario was, of course, the expressed confidence in the present and future strength of the USSR. Even the most innovative of the specialist studies insisted that the new realism making the United States an 'acceptable partner' for a detente relationship was a response to a new correlation of forces, which had compelled the American leaders finally to abandon both their direct 'positions of strength' policy and their indirect 'bridge building' strategies aimed at promoting internal unrest within the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc.127 Just as Lenin had spoken fifty years earlier of having 'won our right to our fundamental international existence in the network of capitalist states', so now the Soviet Union - which, according to Arbatov had often been regarded in the United States as 'a kind of illegitimate child of history ... a "historical misunderstanding" which has to be ended in one way or another as quickly as possible' - had now established its right to treat on equal terms with the greatest capitalist power over the broad range of global issues.128

Even in this respect, however, the perception of American strength and staying power is crucial, and it must be reiterated that it is equality with, not superiority over, the United States upon which the Soviet regime has insisted over the previous decade. Moreover, the Soviets evidently desire American recognition not merely of their equality in raw military terms but also, as Arbatov's comment clearly indicates, of their 'legitimate' great power status - a concern which reflects in turn the ambivalences of the deeply-ingrained 'catching-up' motif in Soviet (and Russian) history. In the 'long term', the Soviets may hope and expect to decisively supplant the United States as the primary great power influence upon the contemporary world order; and their most immediate and concrete interests in detente may lie in the desire for economic assistance and for limits on the burden of the arms race. But, as Bialer observes, there is also a 'more fundamental' psychological source 'of the Soviets' overwhelming preoccupation and concern with US-Soviet relations', which seems likely to hold good for some time to come. 'They
see in the United States the prime measuring rod of their own developments and achievements.\textsuperscript{129} Finally, as noted above, the consideration of this theoretical background provides for a more satisfactory assessment of the shifts in the official line sketched in the earlier quotations from Brezhnev's successive Congress addresses. There would seem to have been two basic watershed periods in Soviet assessments of American attitudes and policies during the 1970s, the first leading to a 'strikingly positive' picture during the years 1973-5, and the second leading to deep disillusionment in the last 18 months or so of the Carter administration.\textsuperscript{130}

As Schwartz points out, the specialist Amerikanisty, no less than the political leadership itself, took a sceptical view of the advertised changes in American policies under the Nixon administration until the Moscow summit of 1972. Before that landmark, even the most optimistic of them had refused to acknowledge a clear-cut victory for the forces of moderation in the United States, and it was only in retrospective commentary on the 1972 achievements that 'a distinct change of tone emerged'.\textsuperscript{131} Moreover, Soviet commentators characteristically emphasized not merely the concrete achievement of SALT I but also the 'Basic Principles' Agreement, with its formal recognition of the Peaceful Coexistence concept and the commitment to 'equal security' in US-USSR relations that it was supposed to enshrine. They persistently looked back to these agreements as the relationship began to deteriorate again in the middle 1970s, with the furore over the Soviet role in Angola, the Ford administration's abandonment of the very word detente, and the 'human rights' campaign of the incoming Carter administration. Those original agreements, Arbatov argued in early 1978, had given 'Soviet-American relations a stability that is not easy to shatter, even for the most inveterate enemies of detente', and even though the movement of the detente process from 'generalized principles ... to their implementation in concrete deeds requires the accomplishment of increasingly complex tasks'.\textsuperscript{132}

However, there was a distinct narrowing in the immediate scope of the detente envisaged in Soviet pronouncements from 1976 onwards. And though Brezhnev made an early public offer, in January 1977, 'to cooperate with the new [Carter] Administration ... in order to take a major step forward with regard to relations between our two countries',\textsuperscript{133} the early conclusion of a SALT II agreement based essentially on the long-stalled
Vladivostok accords seemed to be regarded increasingly as the touchstone of American readiness to continue on the path of equal security. Towards the end of 1977, when the SALT talks had been reopened within such a general framework - following the hostile Soviet response to the Carter administration's first proposals for a radically new approach - Brezhnev stated the Soviet perspective in terms which were widely echoed throughout Soviet commentary:

International relations are now at the crossroads, as it were, which could lead either to a growth of trust and co-operation, or to a growth of mutual fears, suspicion, and arms stockpiles, a crossroads leading, ultimately, either to lasting peace or, at best, to balancing on the brink of war. Detente offers the opportunity of choosing the road of peace. To miss this opportunity would be a crime.  

Several months later, writing in the context of a further American outcry over Soviet actions (and alleged actions) in Africa and new American overtures towards China, Arbatov linked this motif with the 'equal security' theme. The SALT II negotiations could constitute 'a real turning point on the path to military detente', he maintained. But they had now 'reached a kind of frontier'; and the major issue was not a technical one but a 'fundamental political decision by the US government on whether or not to conclude an agreement at this time at all'. By late 1979 a SALT II treaty had been concluded, but ratification by the US Senate was emerging as a further major barrier which the Carter administration seemed ambivalent about attacking. Moreover, as Legvold points out, the whole issue was intensifying American debate not merely about Soviet actions in Africa but also about 'non events' such as the alleged presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. In this context, with the growing evidence of a distinct American tilt towards China, and sharply upgraded US arms procurement in the 1980s, Levgold suggests that even a ratified SALT treaty may have looked an excessively costly achievement in Soviet eyes. The United States, it was concluded, had effectively made its choices regarding the early prospects for American-Soviet relations, and when the question of intervention in Afghanistan had to be considered, the impact upon detente of such a move was no longer a substantial consideration.
This interpretation of Soviet perceptions, to reiterate, does involve taking seriously those specialist Soviet analyses of American capabilities and internal dynamics which suggest that the goal of equal security would seem a logical one for the Soviets to pursue. At the same time it must be acknowledged that this question of Soviet perceptions of the United States does pose special difficulties for the attempt in this thesis to refute the hawk argument that Soviet doctrine itself demonstrates a rejection of the concept of stable coexistence. The argument that the Soviets are impelled towards an imperialist course by the perceived weakness of their own position goes directly against the basic tenets of Soviet doctrine, and can be sustained only by assuming that the Soviets do not in practice believe in the optimism of their official historical perspective. By contrast, the argument that they are impelled to seek 'absolute security' by their conception of Western imperialism can be supported by references to basic doctrinal tenets, at least as those were codified and rigidified in the Stalin era. The revisionist perspectives on imperialism and state-monopoly capitalism have not, in general, been openly publicized by the leadership, either under Khrushchev or under his successors. Rather, the traditional rhetoric has been maintained while the theoretical arguments supporting it have been unobtrusively dropped, and the traditional rhetoric has been fairly consistently exploited by groups in the Soviet elite which insist that the 'aggressive essence' of imperialism remains unchanged despite the new restrictions on its more flagrantly militarist tendencies. By focussing primarily on this latter group, hawk analysts are able to depict Soviet claims about the changed correlation of forces in a highly threatening light. As Gibert puts it, in a relatively moderate statement of this position, the Soviet insistence on the link between American interest in detente and the changed correlation of forces is 'especially damaging to viable Soviet-American peaceful coexistence'.

Thus Soviet leaders do not perceive the attempts of the American government to negotiate issues, to ameliorate the arms race, to encourage trade and so on as indicating any genuine desire for peace. On the contrary, those are involuntary acts forced on a still hostile and aggressive America. Accordingly, indications that the United States really would like to improve superpower relations do not induce reciprocal feelings on the part of Soviet leaders.
Two comments may be made about this and similar hawk analyses. First, they discount the arguments advanced by specialist Soviet analysts of the Western powers and concentrate instead upon the arguments of those whose expertise lies elsewhere, such as the military and the party's ideological watchdogs. This pattern of selection flows naturally from the hawk emphasis upon the legitimating role of Soviet ideology, and on the centrality of a 'perceptual process' in which aspects of reality which contradict the core propositions of the Soviet 'belief system' are allegedly screened out of Soviet analyses of domestic and international politics. However, I have attempted to argue that the Soviet 'belief system' has been much more fluid than is acknowledged in Western accounts which emphasize its peculiarly 'ideological' character, and that - with the major exception of the high Stalin period - the relationship between grand theoretical propositions and piecemeal analytical bricolage has been a dynamic and reciprocal one.

Second, by postulating an essentially static dichotomy between genuine and propagandistic elements in Soviet pronouncements, the hawk analysts have glossed over the extent to which the Soviet line in general (including that of detente-oriented groups such as the Amerikanisty) has shifted over time in response to changing international conditions and, in particular, to the changing posture of the United States. As was noted earlier, the writings of the specialist Amerikanisty have conformed quite closely to the general movement of the official line, including the shift back to a much harder line in recent years. Equally important, the position espoused by the military itself has shifted during the detente era; and, in particular, their support for the preservation of an established military 'equilibrium' has continued in the most recent commentary on the policies of the Reagan administration.

In conclusion, then, the real distinction is not between distinct 'hard' and 'soft' lines in different areas of Soviet commentary, but rather between an interpretation of the one broad line which sees Soviet hostility to the West as fundamentally insensitive to questions of structural change in world politics, and an interpretation which takes seriously the evidence of sensitivity to such change in Soviet commentary itself. Even on the latter interpretation, the official Soviet perspective on American policy over the past seven to eight years,
when set against the currently dominant American perspective on Soviet policy over the same period, does not augur well for an early resumption of detente between the two great powers. The scepticism about such a prospect is most obvious on the American side, where a series of largely incoherent approaches have replaced the original Nixon-Kissinger detente strategy, which had begun to unravel well before the latter's final exit from office in 1976. However, as Legvold observed in late 1980:

What is seldom noticed is that Soviet policy towards America has also disintegrated. It happened later; indeed, the disintegration has been under way for only a year or two. And it shares none of the domestic features that have played so prominent a role in the unraveling of U.S. policy towards the USSR. But the loss of direction, the narrowing of perspective, and the consternation that follows when the premises of a policy begin to collapse are all severe.

To point to this disintegration is not to repudiate the claim made earlier that the Soviet authorities still appear to hold to the same overall reading of the correlation of forces as lay behind the original 'Peace Programme' of the Twenty-Fourth Congress. Rather, it is precisely because of their apparent belief in the essential continuity of the 'objective' parameters of the great power relationship that such factors as a renewed American interest in military superiority must seem especially ominous to them. For, given Soviet assumptions about the implausibility of such a goal, an American drive in this direction must be read either as an indirect attempt to exacerbate Soviet internal problems by intensifying the already unequal economic burden of the arms race, or else, more simply, as the instinctive recidivism of a power which, having enjoyed the experience of largely unchallenged security and influence, ultimately proves incapable of sharing its eminence with a major competitor. On either reading current American policy-makers are cast in a directly opposite light to the sober realism which Soviet commentators held in such high regard in the treatment of the Nixon administration.

On the other hand, the Soviets continue to insist that detente remains their core objective in dealing with the capitalist powers; and
their objections to recent American policy have focussed not just on its renewed assertiveness - for an extensive Soviet-American value conflict is allegedly taken as given - but on its inconsistency and its failure to treat the Soviet Union seriously as an equal negotiating partner. Indeed, when Soviet leaders began to directly articulate their approach to detente (as distinct from Peaceful Coexistence) they did so in strikingly traditional terms. Detente, Brezhnev asserted in early 1977, meant an end to the cold war and 'a transition to normal, stable relations among states', involving a commitment to the negotiated settlement of differences and 'a certain degree of trust and willingness to take into account each other's legitimate interests'. Similarly, Gromyko, in justifying the Soviet rejection of the initial Carter administration SALT proposals, emphasized that the new leadership had abandoned an established basis for agreement in pursuit of its own unilateral advantage. 'In this particular case', he asked rhetorically, 'what kind of stability can one talk about in relations between the US and the USSR?'. Statements along these lines continued throughout the Carter administration, culminating in the response to the American sanctions over the invasion of Afghanistan. 'The sum total' of American measures, Brezhnev maintained, constituted an attempt 'to talk to us in the language of the cold war'. The Soviet Union could do without the suspended ties, and had 'never begged for them', regarding them as mutually advantageous. But the U.S. had proved itself 'an absolutely unreliable partner', capable of 'violating its international agreements' in a fashion which must have 'a dangerous destabilizing influence on the entire international situation'. Moreover,

Washington's arbitrary arrogation to itself of some kind of 'right' to 'reward' or 'punish' independent sovereign states poses a question of principle. In fact, these actions of the US government strike a major blow at the system of relations among states regulated by international law.

Despite the tendentiousness of such language in regard to the Afghanistan issue, the broader Soviet objection to the pattern of American behaviour does have a valid point, at least as regards the chequered history of the SALT II treaty. And if this reading of the basis of
Soviet discontent with American policy is valid, it is possible that more normal, if not yet cordial, great power relations could be restored by an American approach which was both more assertive in respect of defined American interests and more consistent in defining those interests and the limits of them. However, some of the deepest tensions between the great powers derive not from their direct interaction but from their interaction with strategically placed third parties; and Afghanistan and Poland have demonstrated anew that the internal correlation of forces in such societies places important restrictions upon the great powers' ability to ensure a stable context for their own relations. The Soviet approach to these third party limitations on detente will be considered in the final section.

The Limits of Detente

There are at least three major issues in regard to which Soviet spokesmen have attempted to specify limits to the process of detente with the Western powers. The first is the matter of Western relations with China. This has been discussed already, and little need be added at this point. The Soviet concern appears to have little to do with the maintenance of ideological hegemony over China, which - insofar as it ever existed - is now long gone, and a great deal to do with traditional security issues, overlaid by a deep historical residue of animus against 'Asian hordes'. There is no reason why the Western powers should allow Soviet phobias about China to impede the normalization of their relations with that country. But a formal or informal military alliance could not be justified as an attempt to preserve the balance of world power, and would inevitably evoke well-founded Soviet fears of geopolitical encirclement.

The second issue concerns the alleged Western attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and the rest of the Warsaw Pact. As regards the smaller bloc countries, it may once again be sufficient to reiterate the conclusions drawn earlier. Direct security concerns and demands for ideological hegemony have been closely intertwined in the Soviet approach to these countries since at least 1948, and there is as yet no clear evidence that the Soviets are prepared to redefine their demands upon this region in more limited 'sphere of influence' terms. At the same time, the impact upon the more advanced East European
states of economic and cultural links with the West is growing, and is almost certain to continue growing in any context of detente. The Soviet concern about this prospect is well founded, in terms of their own preoccupations. But the explanation of adverse trends in Eastern Europe primarily in terms of *externally-inspired* 'creeping counter-revolution' involves a gross misrepresentation of the mass forces involved, and the prospects over the next decade for containing these mass forces within the old framework seem highly dubious.

The Soviet social order itself, if the earlier arguments on this point are valid, should be much less vulnerable to the impact of Western pluralist values over this same period. Yet Western attempts to 'interfere' in Soviet internal politics, such as the Jackson-Vanik amendment and the Carter administration's 'human rights' campaign, have produced an extremely hostile Soviet response, exemplified by Brezhnev's statement in March 1977, at the height of the human rights controversy:

> Washington's pretensions to teach others how to live are, I am sure, unacceptable to any sovereign state ... I repeat: we will not tolerate interference in our internal affairs by anyone, no matter what the pretext. Any normal development of relations on such a basis is, of course, unthinkable.

There seems little doubt that the Soviet response reflected a genuine sense of affronted national dignity, and a suspicion that the United States was turning away from its early-1970s acceptance of equal state-to-state dealings and back towards an approach to the Soviet Union as an 'illegitimate child of history'. But it also reflected a basic contradiction in the official Soviet position that Peaceful Coexistence and detente were fully consistent with intense ideological struggle - a contradiction which was not resolved by tendentious Soviet attempts to distinguish between legitimate (Soviet) forms of ideological struggle and illegitimate practices of distortion and 'psychological warfare' employed by the other side. Moreover, this contradiction was highlighted by the Soviet line on the Helsinki CSCE Final Act. 'The main conclusion' of the Final Act, Brezhnev asserted, was that 'no one should try, on the basis of foreign policy considerations of one kind or another, to dictate to other people how they should manage their internal affairs ...'
approach is a flimsy and perilous ground for the cause of international co-operation'. But while this did provide for a rhetorical defence against Western criticisms of Soviet internal policies in terms of the Helsinki agreement, it also added to the case against Soviet pretensions to regulate the internal affairs of the other members of the 'socialist commonwealth'.

The third issue - and the primary focus of this section - concerns the relationship between great power detente and the shifting correlation of forces in the Third World. The Soviet position on this question involves two important claims which, if not directly contradictory, are certainly in substantial tension. On the one hand, there is the long-standing distinction between class struggle and state-to-state relations, given a vintage expression by Brezhnev at the Twenty-Fifth Congress. Attributing Western objections to Soviet support of the 'world revolutionary process' to 'outright naivety, or more likely a deliberate clouding of minds', he continued:

It could not be clearer, after all, that detente and peaceful coexistence have to do with interstate relations ... Detente does not in the slightest abolish, nor can it abolish or alter, the laws of the class struggle. No one should expect that because of the detente Communists will reconcile themselves with capitalist exploitation or that monopolists will become followers of the revolution. [But] strict observance of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states and respect for their independence and sovereignty is one of the essential conditions of detente.

On the other hand, there is the more recent insistence on the great power rights of the Soviet Union, which implies a commitment not to the status quo in general but at least to the orderly 'management' of challenges to the existing framework of international relationships. Admittedly, the question of joint management is raised directly only in one of the two main strands of this theme: namely, the proposition that today 'no question of any importance in the world can be solved without [Soviet] participation'. The other - the proposition that the Soviet Union 'cannot remain indifferent' even to territorially remote
events that 'affect our security and the security of our friends'—might be interpreted as a prescription for unilateral action, and for action in support of friends whose objectives and modus operandi place them outside the pale of international society (which is precisely the charge which the Reagan administration has been trying to pin on the Soviet Union in its campaign to associate the latter with 'international terrorism'). But even this Soviet claim is in itself a very traditional one, and the Soviets would appear, in general, to define the term 'friends' in the traditional sense of 'licensed international actors', applying it primarily to established regimes and 'registered' national liberation movements such as the PLO and SWAPO. There is, indeed, a rhetorical reconciliation of this broad position with the Soviet Union's self advertised stance as the guardian of world revolution, in the argument (mounted against 'ultra-leftist assertions that peaceful coexistence is the next thing to "helping capitalism" and "freezing the socio-political status quo"') that 'every revolution is above all a natural result of a given society's internal development'. But at the level of political practice the tension remains considerable.

I wish to argue that the Soviet oscillation between 'great power' and 'revolutionary power' approaches, while undoubtedly self-serving, is also in part a direct reflection of the contradictory character of contemporary world politics: the phenomenon which Khrushchev sometimes called the 'dynamic status quo', or which I have conceptualized as a relatively stable structure of world power (though one resting on a dynamic balance among the great) and a process of massive socio-economic change among Third World countries held within this structure. This contradictory situation provides an 'objective' basis for both conflict and cooperation among the great powers, for the pursuit of detente and the recognition of limits to detente, and for the basic tension observable in Soviet policy.

Before developing this argument, however, it may be useful to consider the hawk claim that no such great power/revolutionary power tension exists in Soviet policy, because the former theme is clearly predominant over the latter. There is nothing new about this assessment of Soviet priorities: indeed, the argument for the reverse ordering has never really been taken seriously throughout the post-war debate. But it is worth reiterating that in the 1960s and early 1970s the Soviet Union's great power preoccupations were widely expected to make it a more 'normal'
international actor, with a major stake in the status quo. Thus, the hawk achievement has been to revive and refine the earlier tradition which saw the Soviet Union's ostensibly revolutionary political doctrine as rationalizing and intensifying an ingrained Russian messianism which was itself incompatible with normal international relations based upon the recognition of limited and definable 'national interests'.

Of course, for some leading hawks, such as Pipes, Soviet political doctrine is largely irrelevant, and Soviet intentions are laid bare by military doctrine alone, when interpreted with due reference to considerations of geopolitics and Russian political culture. But there have also been arguments, drawing upon precisely the sort of 'scientific management' themes which I have emphasized here as the rhetorical trademark of the Brezhnev regime, that the goal of empire is explicitly stated in Soviet political doctrine. Thus Mitchell argues that 'it is largely irrelevant whether or not the Soviet Union remains a "revolutionary" society or whether it has lost its "revolutionary dynamism". The exclusive conceptual framework of all Soviet thought on politics and society dictates the ultimate domination of the world by a single social structure'.

Pointing to the undoubted emphasis on the role of the super-structure in Soviet treatments of both domestic and international politics, and to the recent extension of arguments about the 'rapprochement' of nationalities within the USSR to the rapprochement of nations in Eastern Europe, he argues that Soviet theorists have now extended this concept to the world as a whole, through their insistence on the 'organic' links between Peaceful Coexistence and Proletarian Internationalism and on the prospects created by the altered correlation of forces for a decisive 'restructuring of international relations'. The latter concept, he argues, is nothing less than 'a new Brezhnev doctrine', to the effect that

rational action by both capitalists and revolutionists will lead to Soviet world dominance, provided the cohesion of the socialist center is maintained ... Western apologists for detente may wishfully indulge in the assumption of a Soviet desire for parity with the United States; the new Brezhnev doctrine explicitly refutes that assumption. In their reconceptualization of doctrine, the Soviets have proclaimed the imminence of world hegemony - usually with clarity, always in resounding tones.
This highly formalistic argument distorts both the 'text' and the context of Soviet pronouncements on international politics over the past decade. To begin with the matter of formal claims. Soviet spokesmen have not claimed, or claimed to seek, military superiority over the United States, let alone over all the other major powers together, which would be the minimum requirement for an attempt on their part to enforce from above the desired 'restructuring' of their international environment. Moreover, when confronted by the Afghanistan crisis with the need to rationalize their first unequivocal intervention outside their established sphere of influence, they have not had official recourse even to the 'first' Brezhnev doctrine, although Afghanistan was already ruled by a self-proclaimed Communist regime and the sphere of influence question was itself somewhat ambiguous. Rather, they invoked the very traditional defence of 'counter-intervention'. As Brezhnev put it at the Twenty-Sixth Congress:

Imperialism unleashed a real undeclared war against the Afghan revolution. This created a direct threat to the security of our southern borders. The situation compelled us to provide the military assistance that this friendly country asked for.

Even on the most permissive definition of imperialism, this was a patently dishonest account of the circumstances surrounding the Soviet invasion. But it was the kind of dishonesty upon which great powers have traditionally relied to rationalize actions of this type in the past.

As regards practical issues bearing more directly on the apparent Soviet reading of the contemporary correlation of forces, it is slighting the well attested realism of the Soviet leadership to suggest that they expect to secure, in the foreseeable future, even the kind of modified global hegemony which the United States enjoyed for most of the 1950s and 1960s, unless the latter effectively withdrew from the great power contest. It is also slighting that realism to suggest a Soviet belief that, in conditions anywhere approaching military parity, the non-military correlation of forces would deliver even the 'arc of crisis' region securely to Soviet hegemony. Even in Eastern Europe, where the Soviet Union does possess overwhelming military preponderance, plus highly
developed military and political patronage networks and very considerable economic leverage, the insistent claims of the last decade about the 'unshakeable' and 'law-governed' unity of the socialist bloc look increasingly like whistling against the wind. To expect a goal unattainable there to be attainable on a world scale would be ridiculous, and the extensive Soviet literature on Third World development plainly acknowledges this fact. Such literal and forced readings of selected aspects of Soviet doctrine as that quoted above, I would argue, are tantamount to treating Soviet doctrine in general as meaningless. It is much more reasonable (in the sense of economical) to assume that the 'restructuring' theme is 'management' rhetoric translated into a peculiarly Soviet idiom, and infused with a 'new' global power hubris analogous to that so evident in American management rhetoric in the 1960s.

If one adopts this position, it is also reasonable to view the contemporary Soviet Union primarily as a great power and in many respects a conservative great power, but one which - by virtue both of its present disadvantaged position in the world-economy and the historically conditioned self-image of its regime - retains a long term commitment to radical socio-economic change at least in certain crucial regions of the Third World. The anomalies of this position may be considered under three broad headings.

First, there is the general politico-diplomatic campaign to expand Soviet great power influence in the Afro-Asian region. The most visible manifestation of this campaign has been the establishment of a major naval presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian and Pacific oceans, a development partly rationalized, in the writings of Admiral Gorshkov and others, in terms of the traditional role of navies in the peace-time building of 'influence'. In addition, the Soviet Union has, over the last decade or so, established an extensive network of bilateral treaties in West Asia and Africa, and this has been accompanied by a major expansion in the role of Soviet and allied 'advisers', both military and non-military, in this region, even leaving aside the more spectacular
Soviet démarches in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan.

However, the policy of close bilateral ties has its own serious problems. In addition to those specific instances, such as Egypt and Somalia, where an effective reversal of alliances has taken place, the tortuous character of West Asian politics in general has created ongoing dilemmas for the Soviets in the reconciliation of their commitments to their various clients. And throughout the 1970s, Soviet spokesmen have devoted a great deal of rhetorical energy to collective initiatives, in Brezhnev's ill-fated proposal for an Asian collective security pact, in their support for an Indian Ocean 'zone of peace', and in their insistence on the need for collective solutions to the security problems of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. There is obviously a large element of straight propaganda in this latter approach, and it clearly fits into a general strategy aimed at containing and 'rolling back', American and Chinese influence in the regions to the south of the USSR. But the penchant for collective and legalistic solutions also accords with Soviet diplomatic style in Europe, in regard to which the regime's satisfaction with the recognition of Soviet great power status seems most evident. Moreover, the emphasis upon collective solutions does not necessarily imply the rejection of an associated role for joint great power management. Indeed, in regard to the pivotal Middle Eastern problem, the basic Soviet objection to American policy since the 1973 war is that it has turned aside both from collective considerations and from the acceptance of an equal great power contribution on the Soviet side, attempting to establish a unilateral role in this area. Thus, at the Twenty-Sixth Congress, Brezhnev asserted the need to return to 'honest, collective searches for a comprehensive settlement on a just and realistic basis', including possible contributions from the European states and the UN. But he also emphasized that 'We are prepared for such a search in conjunction with the US - may I remind you that we had a certain amount of experience in this respect some years ago'.

The second broad question concerns Soviet judgements on the position of Third World states in the contemporary world-economy. One major consideration here is the Group of 77 campaign for a New International Economic Order, which received a notably perfunctory endorsement in Brezhnev's Twenty-Sixth Congress speech. As was noted in Chapter 4, this development has proved in some respects an embarrassment for the Soviet regime, in that its desirable anti-Western aspects are substantially
offset by the rationale it has provided to both Western and Third World spokesmen for subsuming the Soviet bloc countries into the rich 'North', thus placing them in a similar position to the Western countries as regards the alleged systemic exploitation of the South. Moreover, this is one area in which the Soviet predilection for multilateral approaches has been less marked, as evidenced by the failure even to attend the recent 'North-South summit' at Cancun.

The basic Soviet position has been that the blanket North-South distinction on economic issues distorts the reality of the global class struggle; that the Soviet Union, which has not exploited the Third World as the 'imperialist' powers have done, does not have the same moral responsibility to make restitution; and that a 'restructuring' of international economic arrangements which remained within an essentially capitalist framework would be an illusory solution. However, the Soviet notion of 'mutually advantageous ties' within the 'international division of labour' - counterposed to the Western notion of interdependence - has been strongly criticized by Third World (and, of course, Chinese) spokesmen; and in their lukewarm approach to issues such as the Common Fund, and their direct resistance on issues such as a debt relief and increased multilateral aid, the Soviets have found it difficult in practice to distinguish their position from that of the Western nations. Therefore, suggests Toby Gati, the inclination is still to keep a relatively low profile in a debate which the Soviet Union did not initiate and cannot reshape to its liking:

> It is, in turn, an enthusiastic proponent of economic redistribution [from West to South], a grudging supporter of continuing dialogue, and an unyielding defender of its own interests ... On balance, the Soviet Union is participating in the NIEO discussions more but enjoying it less.  

In the specialist literature, indeed, there are trends towards the justification of the Soviet position in less orthodox terms, which draw upon the revisionist approach to imperialism and the notion of a unified world economy discussed earlier in this chapter. Moreover, the influence of these concepts is evident in the current Soviet approach to another major aspect of the Third World's economic situation: namely
the non-capitalist path of development. In the 1970s, this goal appears to have been downgraded in Soviet prescription for 'progressive' or 'socialist oriented' countries. In keeping with the altered perspective on the tempo of the advance towards Communism in the developed socialist societies, 'current Soviet development theory ... stresses the sequential nature of growth as well as the material prerequisites essential for steady and genuine progress'. And though the Soviet Union's own experience is still held out as a basic reference point for socialist oriented states, the recommendation is not for rapid, autarkic industrialization along Stalinist lines but rather for an indefinite resort to NEP-style strategies, with 'the utilization of foreign capital and the market mechanism'.

Already, by the late 1960s, Soviet theorists were acknowledging the 'objective basis' of the orientation towards the 'world capitalist market' on the part of the majority of former colonies; and they emphasized not merely the inability of the socialist countries to replace the West as a primary source of investment and markets, but also the inaccuracy of the assumption that capitalist investment in developing economies necessarily yielded 'super-profits' to its originators. With the internal resources of state-monopoly capitalism and the ongoing trend towards greater transnational investment among the capitalist powers now acknowledged, the implied policy prescription was that progressive states might need, in certain situations, actively to court foreign capital while at the same time carefully exploiting their own political resources to ensure that investments served their own long term requirements. Moreover, the emergence during the 1970s of a number of new, self-styled Marxist-Leninist regimes does not seem to have altered this basic perspective, with Cuban troops actually guarding the installations of Gulf Oil in Angola.

A final point on the question of Third World economic relationships is the increasing attention paid in the last decade to economic ties with states in the South, Central and West Asian regions, whether or not these could be convicted of any kind of socialist orientation. Thus at the Twenty-Fourth Congress Kosygin named Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, along with India and a clutch of progressive Arab states, as states with which the Soviet Union now enjoyed 'firmly established mutually advantageous economic ties'.

Our co-operation with these countries, based upon the principles of equality and respect for mutual interests, is acquiring the nature of a stable division of labour, counterposed to the system of imperialist exploitation in the sphere of international economic relations. At the same time through the expansion of trade with the developing countries, the SU will receive the opportunity to satisfy the requirements of our economy more fully.

Lowenthal has coined the term 'counter-imperialism' for this strategy, though the notion of imperialism seems even less applicable in this context than in regard to the politico-economic expansion of the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, in that the Soviet Union is most unlikely to be able to support its alleged bid for reserved 'zones of political and economic influence' along its southern borders with the kind of preponderance in global projection capability which the United States then enjoyed. However, Lowenthal's argument does highlight two important new trends in Soviet policy towards the developing countries: the much more open interest in profiting from the exploitation of their resources of valuable raw materials and cheap labour; and the more positive estimate of the prospects for foreign policy independence on the part of substantial state capitalist societies, provided that their regimes could be offered a reliable alternative to complete economic dependence on the West. And though Lowenthal is himself sceptical about the prospects for any exclusive Soviet sphere in this region, he does suggest that the policy has proved 'more realistic and more successful' than earlier approaches in eroding Western influence there. In particular, he suggests that the Soviet approach enhanced the room for manoeuvre of the OPEC countries in the crucial years 1971-73 (though the success of OPEC, of course, has meant in turn that the room for manoeuvre of the oil rich states and their clients has been enhanced against both great powers).

The third broad issue is that of the political development of Third World states - the issue on which Soviet policy in the 1970s seems, on the face of it, most at variance with the essentially gradualist perspectives and strategies sketched above. One reason for Western surprise at Soviet action in Angola in 1975 (leaving aside the simplistic assumption that it violated established 'rules' of detente) was the view
of many Western analysts that sub-Saharan Africa lay outside the basic
Soviet 'target area' and that the Soviets had become thoroughly
disillusioned with the prospects of the 'non-capitalist path', which
had provided the chief rationale for their involvement in that region
in the late Khrushchev period. The first part of this judgement was
probably true (for the United States as well as the USSR) for the years
1964-74, though it was presumably anticipated that Portugal's African
empire must be liquidated some time, and the Soviets had maintained ties
with liberation movements in the Portuguese territories even during
this 'low profile' period. But the second part, insofar as it equated
the more hard-headed approach to the cause of Third World revolution with
a propensity towards 'disengagement', was much more questionable, and
glossed over important elements of the Soviets' own treatment of this
issue. Thus, the basic line at the Twenty-Fourth Congress explicitly
combined two major elements: the campaign for better relations in direct
dealings with the capitalist powers; and continued assistance to the anti-
imperialist struggle, buttressed by the Soviet Union's new credibility as
a global military power. Moreover, Soviet statements emphasized not
merely the struggle of established Third World regimes for national
independence, but the deepening class struggle within Third World societies
and the links between these two dimensions. 'The main thing', Brezhnev
asserted at the Twenty-Fourth Congress, 'is that the struggle for
national liberation in many countries has in practical terms begun to grow
into a struggle against exploitative relations, both feudal and capitalist'.

The major lessons which Soviet analysts appear to have drawn from
the fate of national and revolutionary democracies in the 1960s, and
latterly from the Chilean experience, concern not the hopelessness of
socialist revolution in the Third World, but the need for a strong party
organization under secure Communist influence, on the one hand, and for
effective assistance from the socialist bloc against the 'importation of
counter revolution', on the other. As regards internal factors,
developments in Chile indicated 'the extreme difficulty of radical
revolution ... where capitalist relations are firmly established and a
strong middle class exists'. But the record of the much less advanced
national democracies also indicated the dangers of excessive reliance
upon individual charismatic leaders, while the need to exert close
political control over the army was a lesson common to both. The result,
Bialer argues, is a special concern in Soviet analysis with the political and organizational possibilities of early 'basically anti-feudal revolutions'. The concept of 'growing over', as an 'uninterrupted though gradual transformation of non-socialist revolutionary developments into a socialist revolutionary phase', has become a major theme in the 1970s, which 'sensitizes Soviet policy makers to the ultimate potential of movements and regimes whose immediate goals and socio-economic orientation have little to do with socialist reconstruction but whose political orientation can outpace their socio-economic environment'.

This certainly does not imply a blanket Soviet endorsement of the prospects of such situations. Another key theme of the specialist literature is that of 'multi-dimensionality' - referring to the fluidity of class structure and the specificity of cultural and ideological factors in Third World countries. This militates against excessive, generalized optimism, and is presumably of special concern by virtue of the upsurge of 'political Islam' throughout the major regions of Soviet concern. However, it does seem clear that the concept of 'politics in command' remains an essential component of Soviet perspectives on revolution, and that, together with the preoccupation with the export of counter-revolution, this may dispose Soviet leaders towards decisive action in particular situations in which the prospects for establishing the political prerequisite for long term advance towards socialism seem unusually favourable.

In summary, this 'complex and contradictory' picture of contemporary Soviet attitudes to the Third World inevitably has contradictory implications for the prospects for Soviet-American accommodation in this regard. On the one hand is excessively simplistic to argue, as several Western analysts have done, that the 'resurgence' in the 1970s of Soviet optimism on Third World issues can be attributed essentially to the Soviet acquisition of global military capabilities and the perceived lack of will on the part of the Western powers to seriously contest the employment of those capabilities. Such an interpretation underestimates both the broad continuity of Soviet assessments of Third World prospects (within a deeply ingrained tradition of thinking in both the short and the long term) and also the specificity of the historical conjuncture (namely, the simultaneous collapse of the Portuguese empire and of the exceptional 'feudal' and 'imperial' old regime in Ethiopia) which
transformed the political face of Africa during the mid-1970s.

Similarly, there seems little reason to invoke the notion of a geopolitical 'grand design' in regard to Soviet military activism in the 1970s, except in the obvious sense of a long-term project to expand the Soviet Union's influence in the area directly to its south. Perhaps the most unsatisfactory aspect of the 'arc of crisis' notion (aside from its tendency to rule out generalized analysis of the internal dynamics of the states in question) is that it effectively subsumes situations such as Afghanistan, where the Soviet Union had established interests stretching back to the mid-1950s, and Angola, where Soviet and Cuban action exploited a specific, newly created opportunity in an area where no clear markers of great power influence existed, into one general category of geopolitical expansionism. Finally, there is no evidence, either in Soviet pronouncements or in Soviet conduct to date, of a desire to orchestrate a campaign by producers of key raw materials to hold the advanced capitalist nations to ransom, even in the highly unlikely event of the Soviet Union obtaining sufficient influence on crucial Third World 'clients' to put such a goal into action.

On the other hand, Soviet policy is evidently directed to encouraging the conflictual dimension of the relationship between Third World state capitalism and the advanced capitalist powers; and in particular cases where the overall correlation forces seemed particularly favourable the Soviets have not hesitated to throw extensive military and political resources behind avowedly revolutionary regimes, which are allegedly regarded as an important 'vanguard' of the anti-imperialist struggle in the major regions of Soviet interest. Furthermore, the restoration of southern Africa to an important role in the calculations of both great powers appears likely to persist throughout the next decade, with a major political and economic issue - the future of South Africa - being at stake in the longer term. Lastly, whereas Soviet options in the Middle East and Persian Gulf are circumscribed both by the complex international politics of the regional states themselves and by the long-standing knowledge that the clash of major power interests in this region always carries with it the possibility of general war, Soviet interests in supporting liberation movements against South Africa are fairly unequivocal, and the countervailing considerations regarding great power management are correspondingly fuzzy.
Once again, therefore, we are brought back to the question of rules of the game in regard to the struggle in the Third World — or rather to the absence of them. Bialer has argued that the Soviet Union approaches the great power conflict in terms of a 'series of concentric rings', spreading outwards from the NATO and Warsaw pact territories.

The closer the ring of conflict is to the center, the more it impinges on the vital interests of the adversaries and the greater is the potential for an all out war. [But] the outer rings of conflict are legitimate areas for the competition of the superpowers and, by definition, of progress and reaction, as long as no direct military confrontation between the two superpowers takes place.

If this characterization is correct, the Soviet approach involves a modified version of a very traditional practice of great power management; the insulation of conflict 'beyond the lines' from relations within the core of the system. Moreover, the current Soviet position is a less extreme one than that of the United States during the era of global containment, which effectively sought to reserve the area beyond the lines to itself and its Western allies, and fought a major 'limited war' in Indochina in an apparent attempt to demonstrate just where the lines were to be drawn. Thus it is quite misleading to attribute the deep tensions which have recently developed between the great powers on Third World issues solely to the conflict between an American commitment to the status quo and a Soviet desire to profit from instability. The problem is as much that the two have been 'out of phase with one another' in regard to current political climate and assessments of the correlation of forces. Thus, while the Soviet regime undoubtedly sought to use detente to minimize the risks attendant on the exploitation of its newly enhanced power, the American government, struggling with the international and domestic costs of its earlier over-extension, was 'looking for a new form of containment more within its means'.

It is possible that short-term American and Soviet approaches to the Third World will become more in phase in the 1980s, as the one side begins to reassert itself and the other experiences in its turn the costs of extended commitments. It is also at least conceivable that the two sides
may acquire a more stable perception of each other's interests in currently uncertain areas, and a more realistic sense of the objective limits on their joint and unilateral 'management' possibilities. Admittedly, it is difficult to discern any prospects for mutual understanding in the fog of rhetoric currently emanating from both Moscow and Washington. However, as was argued in Chapter 4, the Soviet doctrine of the correlation of forces should not be regarded as an insuperable barrier to such recognition of mutual interests, and it might in fact be an aid to it. At any rate, it cannot plausibly be argued that an American attempt under detente to establish rules of the game in regard to the Third World was undermined by Soviet intransigence. The attempt has simply not been made, on either side.

I have attempted, in this and the preceding chapter, to trace an extensive and ongoing adaptation in Soviet doctrine to the experience of protracted coexistence with the major capitalist states, though an adaptation which, since 1956, has involved an impressive consistency with the fundamental categories of the Khrushchevian Peaceful Coexistence synthesis. The discussion has indicated that substantial differences still exist between the ostensible perspectives on contemporary world politics of the Soviet leadership and their American counterparts, and that these differences seem likely to exacerbate the effects of objective 'pull' factors tending to encourage Soviet-American confrontation in the Third World. But I have argued against the view that Soviet ideology constitutes a uniquely important 'push' factor in this regard. Neither in the general attempts of Stalin's successors to promote the ideological legitimation of the Soviet social order nor in their portrayal of contemporary imperialism are there persuasive grounds for asserting that the Soviets themselves openly reject the goal of stable inter-state coexistence.

This broad assessment of the significance of Soviet 'political doctrine' and of current Soviet pronouncements on the short and medium term correlation of forces will provide the context for the discussion of the last major topic of this thesis, and the centrepiece of the hawk
interpretation of Soviet policy - Soviet military doctrine. However, it might be argued that by concentrating, in this chapter, so much upon the process of piecemeal analytical bricolage within the framework of official Marxist-Leninist categories, I have ignored the possibility of a pervasive structural crisis in the 1980s, to which neither analytical bricolage nor 'muddling through' policies will constitute a nearly adequate response. In addition, there is the point made at the outset about the apparent links between earlier structural crises and the covert advance of traditional Russian elements within the official belief system. Therefore, given the importance attached to such atavistic elements in the hawk reading of Soviet doctrine, it seems desirable to conclude this chapter with a brief consideration of the prospects for their further advance during the next decade.

There would seem to be two basic premises upon which an argument to this effect could be grounded. On the one hand, it is clear that there will be major problems of structural readjustment for the Soviet economy in the 1980s, even if one discounts the more apocalyptic Western predictions on this score. There will be sharp constraints on new 'extensive' inputs - especially of energy and labour - and correspondingly sharp pressures for a serious attack on the problems of low productivity, over-manning, excessive centralization and 'diseconomies of scale'. There will be major sectoral competition for resources; and since the most recent expedient of pruning new industrial investment to meet the needs of the agriculture and consumer sectors is fraught with peril in the longer term, there must be very serious questions about the privileged position of the military. There will also be major regional competition on the resources issue, with the traditional claims of the European heartland being powerfully challenged by those of Siberia, whose development must be a major goal on both economic and security grounds, and of Central Asia, the one region where demographic trends promise a substantial growth in the potential labour force. The policy of expanding capital infrastructure in Central Asia itself may seem more attractive than the alternative of trying to bring Central Asian labour to the European regions: but either alternative is likely to be very expensive, and to promote an intensification of social and ethnic tensions.167

On the other hand, there is the imminent prospect of a 'succession crisis whether this takes the form of an interim succession to Brezhnev from
among his current peers, followed by a more extensive change at a later
date, or - if Brezhnev continues in power for several more years - an
immediate and far reaching change of political 'generations', for which
no clear 'front runners' are currently in evidence. As T.H.Rigby has
argued, some degree of crisis is indicated in this context by the apparent
dynamics of the 'mono-organizational' Soviet system, which objectively
requires strong direction from the top, but which has no clearly established
leadership position and which, since the dismantling of the foundations
of Stalin's personal dictatorship, militates against the rapid
accumulation of power by one leader. To date, he suggests, there have
been two broad patterns of leadership succession: the slow emergence of
Brezhnev, based upon bureaucratic compromise, conciliation of interests,
and piecemeal policy changes; and the more polarizing style, based upon
the divisive use of patronage and the mobilization of supporting coalitions
around far-reaching and contentious new policies, exemplified in their
different ways by both Stalin and Khrushchev. There are *prime facie*
grounds for believing that the Soviet Union, confronted with a complex of
fundamental problems in the 1980s, cannot afford a repetition of the Brezhnevian
pattern, which for several years during the 1960s would appear to have
left the country without a leader whose individual power was comparable
to that even of a Western prime minister or president. Thus 'there might
be strong backing for an emergent leader with a more assertive, imaginative
and dominant approach'.

This leaves open the question of whether the *policy* orientation of
such a leader would be towards structural reform, linked with a bid for
greater economic co-operation with the West, or towards a more traditional,
autarkic and security-oriented approach which might be labelled 'neo-
Stalinist'. The case for the latter possibility has been strongly argued
by the exiled Soviet dissident Alexander Yanov, in terms which provide
a more tangible reference point for the ideological 'absences' assumed
in the hawk reading of Soviet doctrine. He maintains that the current
centre-right coalition (with Brezhnev the supreme representative of the
'aristocratic' or 'new class' centrist bloc) cannot cope with the
structural problems of the system. The alternatives, therefore, are a
centre-left coalition, in which the centre would safeguard its aristocratic
privileges, but the policy and ideological thrust would come from the
leftist 'technostructure', or for a triumph of the right, in which the
neo-Stalinist contingent in the current Soviet establishment would be reinforced by an alliance with the orthodox, Russian nationalist 'New Right' within the dissident movement. In this latter alternative, the moribund Marxist-Leninist ideology would finally wither away, and an exclusivist, messianic doctrine of Russian manifest destiny would provide the spiritual force behind the practical return to Stalinist techniques of coercive mobilization.169

These considerations provide an important counter to 'business as usual' assumptions in regard to Soviet domestic and foreign policy in the 1980s. But, I would argue that they fall well short of a justification of the hawk case considered in this thesis, for several important reasons.

First, it must be emphasized that the hawk theorists themselves have neglected to 'display the mechanism' which would account for the formation of quasi-Stalinist/Russian nationalist alliance at the pinnacle of power in the Soviet Union. Though sometimes making perfunctory gestures towards the notion of an impending economic or geopolitical crisis for Soviet policy, they seem in practice to assume that such an alliance, which even Yanov depicts only as one future possibility, already exists and was at most briefly disrupted during the Khrushchev era. This is a position which has virtually no support among serious students of Soviet domestic politics. Moreover, Yanov, by forthrightly displaying the mechanism of his own argument, has indicated more clearly the extent of the assumptions required to substantiate a 'radical right' scenario for the future. For his argument rests heavily upon appeal to analogies from earlier 'succession crises' in Russian history, and assigns a strongly determining role to spiritual and cultural factors which virtually discounts the impact of a material transformation in the Soviet era which must surely be rated as unprecedented.

Second, even as regards future developments, Yanov is virtually alone among students of Soviet domestic politics in predicting such a radical shift to the 'right'. A much more common view is that, in terms of organizational structure, balance of interests and ideology, the present social order could accommodate quite substantial shifts in either a reformist or an authoritarian direction without the necessity for a total redefinition of Soviet reality.170 Moreover, though suggestions of an imminent transformation of the Soviet system along Western-style pluralist lines have effectively disappeared, there is no need to resort to unjustifiable assumptions about 'convergence' and the imperatives of
'modernization' to support a prediction of a substantial reformist movement within the basic parameters of the established Soviet order. On the one hand, there are the objective structural problems mentioned above, and the powerful situational logic they may generate for a move against the privileged position of the 'military-industrial complex'. On the other, there is the likely subjective orientation of the next major generation of Soviet leaders. Speculation about individual members of this group must be extremely chancy. But it seems fair to assume that as a group they will be the most educated leadership generation yet, that they will have spent most of their adult lives in the post-Stalin era and most of their higher political careers in the professional, administrative ethos of the Brezhnev era, and that, having built their careers in domestic politics and in peacetime they are not likely to have close, pre-established links with the military. There is thus a prima facie case for expecting that they would be more responsive than the present leadership to the more differentiated perspectives on the West, the Third World and the Soviet economy itself advanced by specialist advisers in these various areas.

Third, there are no persuasive grounds for assuming, as the hawk analysts appear to do, a connection between a quasi-Stalinist/Russian nationalist social order and a policy of military activism in uncommitted areas. Rather, the overall record of the Stalin period suggests that a sectarian political stance would involve a siege mentality directed towards autarkic development, combined with a ruthless determination to hold existing positions in Eastern Europe and perhaps a more openly confrontationist attitude towards China. By contrast, the combination of detente with the West and activism in the Third World has been in evidence in both the Brezhnev and the Khrushchev eras (and embryonically in the early 1920s), and the tensions between these two elements would seem to be basic to the more 'open' periods of Soviet policy.

An associated point is that the hawk analysis may have the character of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Since it indicates that the Soviet Union is already comprehensively alienated from the existing international order, the implicit or explicit policy prescription is for a renewed containment drive, based upon American military superiority and perhaps the de facto addition of China to the 'Western alliance'. However, the argument here is that the future direction of Soviet politics is very much
open; and all Soviet history suggests that an attempt to reduce the Soviet Union once more to the status of a 'second rate' great power would ensure a Soviet commitment to stay in the race whatever the cost, and thus be most calculated to bring the radical right alternative to fruition. (Indeed, Yanov is himself emphatic on this point.)

Finally, and most crucially for the specific concerns of this thesis, the argument for the present or future triumph of the radical right entails repudiating completely the Soviet regime's own self-account and concentrating almost totally upon the 'absences' from that account which are presumed to lie in the traditional Russian political culture. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the official account of Soviet reality (as opposed to international politics) is a very unsatisfactory one, which is much more obviously concerned with legitimation than with explanation, and which indicates a campaign to de-politicize issues which are of their nature intensely political. But it seeks to legitimate the Soviet order in terms of an evolutionary, technocratic determinism which is distinctly reminiscent of mainstream behavioural social science in the United States, and it provides no support for arguments about the hegemony of atavistic beliefs among the Soviet elite.

Of course, this is in no sense an objection to Yanov's analysis, since he makes no pretence to take official Soviet ideology seriously. But the hawk argument is pre-eminently a 'horse's mouth' argument, which asserts that the evidence of a Soviet goal of world hegemony is available in the Soviet authorities' own pronouncements, if only the West will abandon the illusions of detente and take Soviet pronouncements seriously. As regards the broad sweep of Soviet 'political doctrine' and current Soviet pronouncements on the short and medium term correlation of forces, this 'horse's mouth' argument will not stand. If the hawk thesis is to be substantiated, therefore, it must be by reference to the far reaching implications of Soviet military doctrine. This topic will be considered in the final chapter.
535.

Notes


2 On a similar note, Sewery Bialer observes: The Brezhnev era signifies a major step in the transition from the revolutionary ethos of Leninism, from the leadership ethos of Stalinism, from the populist ethos of Khrushchevism to a professional-administrative ethos. The growth of professionalization in the Soviet political process and the institutionalization of Soviet politics and administration are positively correlated. Stalin's Successors: leadership, stability and change in the Soviet Union, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, p.177.


4 For a summary of the criticisms aired by leading speakers at the Congress, see Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, pp.32-37.


6 Discussing the changes in the Brezhnev era in Soviet approaches to the Third World, Bialer remarks on the 'much greater sophistication on the plane of scholarly and policy-oriented discourse below the level of major pronouncements where an effort is made to understand the internal dynamics of development in Third World countries. On this level of discourse, Soviet discussions are extraordinarily lively, and the writings display a degree of refinement hitherto absent'. Stalin's Successors, p. 271.


12 Ibid., pp.76-7.
13 G.Trofimenko, 'From Confrontation to Coexistence', *International Affairs*, (Moscow), October, 1975, p.38.
14 Ibid.
17 See Brezhnev's speeches at Tula (18 January, 1977) and on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the October Revolution (2 November 1977), *Leninskim Kursom*, Vol. 6, pp.296,597. This development is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
22 See, for instance, Brezhnev's statement at the Soviet Trade Unions' Congress in March 1972:

> Official Chinese representatives tell us that relations between the USSR and the CPR should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Well, if Peking does not consider it possible to go any further than this in relations with a socialist state, we are now prepared to build Soviet-Chinese relations on this basis ... we not only proclaim our readiness to do so, but also translate it into the language of fully concrete and constructive proposals on non-aggression, on the settlement of trade questions and on the improvement of relations on a mutually advantageous basis. These proposals have long been known to the Chinese leaders. The matter rests with the Chinese.

*Leninskim Kursom*, Vol. 3, pp.495-6. Even at the Twenty-Sixth Congress, however, China was still discussed primarily under the heading of the world socialist system.


31 *Leninskim Kursom*, Vol. 5, p.480. At the Twenty-Sixth Congress, Brezhnev pointed to a 'Further exacerbation of the general crisis of capitalism' in the preceding five years, adding that 'capitalism's development is not frozen, of course. But it is going through its third economic slump in the past 10 years'. CDSP, Vol. 8, p.10.


35 Cited *ibid*.


37 For a review and critique of the recent literature, see Erik P. Hoffmann, 'Soviet Views of the Scientific-Technological Revolution', *World Politics*, Vol. 30, 1978, pp.615-644. Hoffmann concludes that 'the books under review make it clear that the Soviet leadership has sanctioned a certain degree of ideological innovation, cognitive reorientation, and conceptual search' in this area.

38 *Leninskim Kursom*, Vol. 3, p.257. This claim was repeated at the Twenty-Fifty Congress, with Brezhnev adding that 'only on the basis of accelerated scientific and technical progress can the end objectives of the social revolution - the building of a communist society - be attained'. *Leninskim Kursom*, Vol. 5, p.501.


42 See *Leninskim Kursom*, Vol. 4, p.162.
See, for example, this 1975 statement by the prominent radio commentator V. Zorin:

The Soviet Union became a mighty industrial power without help from outside. Anyone who really believes that the future of the Soviet economy depends on American technology is thinking like a small shop-keeper. Judging by what we now read in the American press, it is the American and not the Soviet economy that is in dire straits.


See the comment of Alec Nove:

Khrushchev would have been happy to sign an agreement over Berlin if the West had recognized the GDR and the status quo in Europe. He would have been delighted to obtain long term credits. These things we denied him. Western policy changed much more than did the Soviet attitude. We may have been wrong to change, but change we did. Surely future historians will thus interpret the often contradictory policies of the great powers in the first half of the 1970s'.


See, for instance, Robert W. Tucker's comments on this issue, in his argument in favour of a return to limited containment:

If it is at all prudent, a refurbished containment will, wherever possible, avoid measures which once sharply exacerbate the relationship with the Soviet Union and make the prospect of its future amelioration virtually impossible. Nothing would be more likely to have these affects than a military alliance, even if only de facto, with China. Yet this is the direction in which American policy has been inexorably moving in the last year or so.


Hanson, "The Import of Western Technology", esp. pp. 42-44. Similar conclusions are offered by Nove, "East-West Trade", p. 61, and by Abram Bergson, "Soviet Economic Slowdown and the 1981-85 Plan", *Problems of Communism*, May-June, 1981, pp. 30-33. Nove remarks that "the Soviet economy's weaknesses are not critical. They are certainly serious, and while it is true that Western technology is regarded as an important way of coping with them, the system can survive without it, if necessary'.


Hanson, "The Import of Western Technology", p. 19.

A good example of the balancing of the 'objective' motif with the need for a resolute stance by the progressive forces is provided in Arbatov's evaluation of the 1972 Moscow summit:

Since the causes of these changes are objective factors of a long term nature, the above mentioned changes in the international situation can be regarded as logical and as having a firm foundation, though, since these changes arose as the outcome of struggle, they will remain an object of struggle.

'The Strength of a Policy of Realism', Izvestia, June 22, 1972; CDSP, Vol. XXIV, No. 25, p. 4-6.

For an argument along these lines, see Hoffmann, 'Soviet Views of "the Scientific-Technological Revolution"', pp.625-7. Hoffmann notes that specialist Soviet writers on this theme stress the neutrality of techniques in a manner 'reminiscent of the controversial Western positivist distinction between "facts" and "values", suggesting that [they] may be employing a distinctly Western mode of thought to deny Western influences'.


See, for instance, Pipes' claim that 'in 1978, the central institutions of the Soviet state remain what they were in Stalin's day ... This being the case, it seems entirely inappropriate to speak of "changes" of any magnitude having occurred in the Soviet Union since 1953'. 'Mr X Revises', p.19.

Perhaps the strongest statement of this view, dating, admittedly, from 1976, is given by Hough, in 'The Brezhnev Era', p.8:

The Brezhnev era has not been a period of growing repression of individual freedom; it has not been a period of declining citizen participation; it has not been a period of greater privileges accorded to the "New Class" in comparison with other strata of society; it has not been a period of neglect of the consumer; it has not been a period of recentralisation of the Soviet political system. On the contrary, the trend in policy has been in the opposite direction in these areas.

(Emphasis in original)

Cited, ibid., p.10.


Alec Nove, 'Agriculture', ibid., p.7.

61 Leninskim Kursom, Vol. 3, pp.234-244.


63 Leninskim Kursom, Vol. 5, p.495.


65 L.I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism (speeches and articles from 1978), Novosti, Moscow, 1979, p.224.

66 Leninskim Kursom, Vol. 5, pp.303-4. 'These guidelines', Brezhnev declared, 'are entirely consistent with the basic interests of the collective farm peasantry and the working class, have stood the test of time and received nationwide approval. This means they are correct. This means that the party will continue to abide by them'.

67 See the discussion of this issue in George Breslauer, 'Domestic Issues', in Dallin, The Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU, pp.20-22.


73 See the essays 'Petrification or Pluralism?' in The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory, pp.19-49; and 'The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession' in Problems of Communism, July-August, 1979, pp.1-16.

74 Leninskim Kursom, Vol. 5, p.529.

75 Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory, p.7.

76 Brown, 'Political Developments', pp.230-1.


78 CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 51, p.10.

79 Two important articles here, the second dealing specifically with the international dimension of developed socialism, are P. Fedoseyev, 'Theoretical Problems of Developed Socialism and the Construction of Communism'; and N. Inozemtsev, 'Problems of Contemporary World Development and International Relations', Kommunist, 1976, No. 15, pp.40-54 and 71-85 respectively.


83 *Ibid.*, p.584. At the Twenty-Sixth Congress, Brezhnev spoke of the need to draw up a new Party Programme, which suggests a readiness to address the anomalies in regard to the Khrushchev era programme more directly.

84 See Evans, 'Developed Socialism in Soviet Ideology'.


94 The status of Union, or even Autonomous Republic is not, in fact, a meaningless one. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, one of several Western analysts who depict a conscious policy of Russification under the present regime, suggests that the possession by numerous nationalities of such 'a strong administrative, territorial base' has been a key factor in facilitating an upsurge of minority nationalism in the USSR. See 'The dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR', *Problems of Communism*, May-June, 1974, p.10.

95 *Leninskim Kursom*, Vol. 6, p.525 (emphasis in original). Brezhnev was if anything more cautious on this question at the Twenty-Sixth Congress, at which some reference was made to the problems posed by uneven population growth among European and non-European nationalities. See Boris Meissner, 'The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Domestic Politics', *Problems of Communism*, May-June, 1981, pp.19-22.

97 R. Judson Mitchell, 'The Brezhnev Doctrine and Communist Ideology', Review of Politics, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1972, pp. 190-209. Mitchell distinguishes six areas of political contradiction to which Soviet (and allied) commentators appealed in discussing the Czech crisis: (1) class antagonisms and bourgeois and imperialistic resistance; (2) nationalism and national interest; (3) levels of economic development; (4) organisational problems; (5) revisionist ideology; (6) exposed positions and proximity to the capitalist camp.

98 Ibid., p. 206.


101 CDSP, Vol. XXXIII, No. 8, p. 6.


104 Ibid., White argues that 'there would seem to be no reason to assume, therefore, that the traditional features of Soviet political culture will shortly be replaced by those supposedly more appropriate to a "modern" polity'.


106 Bialer, Stalin's Successors, p.305.

107 In addition to the authors quoted immediately above, Hough and Cohen have both argued strongly along these lines. Hough is considerably the more optimistic about the prospects for wide-ranging reform in the post-Brezhnev era, but Cohen's caution on this question is grounded in an emphasis on the deep currents


112 *CDSP*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 8, pp. 3-11.

113 Ibid., pp. 11-15.

114 Hassner, 'Moscow and the Western Alliance', p. 37.

115 *CDSP*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 8, p. 11.


117 Ibid.


119 Ibid., pp. 33-41.

120 Cited Ibid. p. 20.

121 Cited Ibid. p. 120.

122 Ibid., p. 29.


124 Ibid., p. 30.

125 Ibid., pp. 157, 164-165.


A useful check upon the hawk assumption of a clear propaganda/doctrine distinction was provided by the appearance in mid-1981 of three major statements on military/political issues, respectively by A. Arbatov, son of G. Arbatov, the dean of the detente-oriented civilian specialists, by Ustinov, the civilian Defence Minister, and by Ogarkov, the armed forces Chief of Staff and the highest military figure in the Defence hierarchy. Arbatov's argument, predictably enough, was the most nuanced, and Ogarkov's, on balance, the most simplistic and hardline. But even these two did not present totally different positions: rather they broadly followed the line laid down by Brezhnev at the Twenty-sixth Congress, with a 'standard deviation' to either side. Ogarkov appealed to a classic image of inter-imperialist conflict and a global weakening of imperialist positions to account for the desperate campaign of a unified American elite to reassert its global hegemony, and he emphasized the obligation on the Soviet Union to keep abreast of all the latest developments in military technology. Arbatov argued that there were still substantial sections of the United States elite who preferred more moderate and realistic policies, that part of the problem in United States' strategic policy was the 'self propelling character' of arms development and procurement, and that security problems in the nuclear age demanded political not military solutions. But both reiterated the Soviet commitment to detente; both suggested that current American policy indicated a desire to seek military superiority; both insisted that abroad military equilibrium currently existed, and that the Soviet Union would neither seek to upset it or allow it to be upset; and both depicted the ultimate prospect of nuclear war effectively in 'destruction of civilization' terms.

Legvold, 'Containment Without Confrontation', p. 83.


Cited in Aspaturian, 'Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces', p. 5.


163 As Gejevosse observes: 'Almost all of Moscow's interests converge on the side of supporting African liberation movements against apartheid. Moscow's main problem, in fact, will be acting with enough restraint so as not to jeopardize its more basic interests elsewhere, especially vis-a-vis the United States', 'North-South or East-West', p. 392.


165 Ibid.

166 Legvold, 'Containment Without Confrontation', pp. 75-76.

167 For an impressive account of these problems, see Bialer, 'The Harsh Decade', pp. 999-1020.


170 See, for instance, Hough's argument that, because of 'the ambiguous nature of the Soviet political tradition, any future evolution is highly likely to retain the framework of the present system in one form or another'. Hough and Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, p. 560.

171 On the career paths of the post-Brezhnev leadership generation, see Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, pp. 57-149.

172 Yanov, *Detente After Brezhnev*, pp. 61-65.

173 Ibid., pp. 74-87.
CHAPTER 7

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

The Context of Soviet Military Doctrine

I have attempted so far to establish two propositions: that the Soviet Union's 'Leninist' account of the world historical process provides, in several important respects, a more adequate treatment of the forces for change in contemporary world politics than is offered by more 'systemic' perspectives' and that, within this wider context, the Soviet doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence (and latterly detente) represents a substantial and ongoing declaratory adaptation to the unique and persistent structural realities of international relations. This final chapter will examine those aspects of Soviet military doctrine adduced as evidence for the hawk argument that no meaningful adaptation has in fact occurred. The basic claims at issue here have been stated with particular force by Pipes: that the Soviet leadership regards nuclear war as in some meaningful sense winnable; that it is not prepared to exclude nuclear war as a potential policy instrument in the all out struggle with 'imperialism', and that it remains, in the SALT era as before, deeply committed to the pursuit of strategic superiority over the United States. Given these factors - allegedly deducible 'with a high degree of confidence' from Soviet military doctrine - Pipes concludes that 'mutual deterrence does not really exist. And unilateral deterrence is feasible only if we understand the Soviet war winning strategy and make it impossible for them to succeed'.

This chapter, like the earlier, more general discussion of Soviet doctrine on international relations, will focus not on the search for subtle doctrinal nuances, but on the criteria by which the realism, or appropriateness to context, of the major Soviet propositions might be evaluated. One justification for this lies in the striking consistency - especially in comparison with the vagaries of American 'declaratory policy' - with which the basic themes of nuclear warfighting, unilateral damage limitation, and 'combined arms' strategy have been handled in Soviet military writings since their assimilation of the implications of the 'nuclear revolution' more than two decades ago. But a second
justification lies in the character of the contemporary American debate. For despite the recent dramatic success of their campaign to 'take Soviet doctrine seriously', the hawk school have added little to the early work of pioneering analysts such as Garthoff, Dinerstein and Wolfe; and they have rejected as irrelevant the indications, admittedly scattered and ambiguous, of a greater accommodation to mainstream American notions of deterrence in the 1970s.

Behind both these points lies the basic issue of context. The simplest, or most economical starting assumption for a 'serious' examination of Soviet military doctrine is that it is primarily indicative of a military viewpoint on essentially military matters. To deduce from Soviet military doctrine a general Soviet rejection of the prospect of stable coexistence with the Western powers, one must at least demonstrate that it is incompatible with the explicit rejection of direct military conflict with the West so prominent in the wider Peaceful Coexistence doctrine, and with the basic situational logic of nuclear-era international relations to which the Peaceful Coexistence doctrine so explicitly refers. But in the heavy emphasis in the hawk argument on the idiosyncracy of Soviet world views and on the need for clear distinctions between doctrine and propaganda several crucial contextual issues are either glossed over or actively obfuscated.

First, there is the question of the basic material structure - the underlying 'grid' or 'skeleton' of contemporary world politics. There is no doubt that the Soviet-American nuclear relationship, by virtue of its potential for the effective 'destruction of civilization', is the most fundamental aspect of this structure, and that a clear Soviet denial of the mutuality of nuclear deterrence would constitute a clear rejection of the prospect of stable coexistence. However, as was argued at length in Part II, there are objective contradictions in the geopolitical and economic situation of the two great powers; and the whole history of interstate relations indicates that it would be unrealistic to expect the mere fact of a shared interest in the avoidance of mutual nuclear destruction to completely neutralize the very
substantial conflicts of interest between them on other issues. Rather, the enormously heightened risks of central war in the nuclear era might work in either of two contradictory directions. On the one hand, there must always be an implicit 'linkage' between the nuclear relationship and conflict on other issues, which would normally impel each side towards greater moderation than it might show in a non-nuclear context. But on the other hand, if one or other side were perceived to be making explicit and excessive use of such linkage to deny the 'legitimacy' of rival interests, the tendency towards mutual paranoia inherent in the security dilemma would be exacerbated in proportion to the qualitative change in the nature of the threat involved. A related point applies to the political structure of the great powers themselves. There is a basic link between stable international coexistence and the persistence of 'hardshelled' states making effective claims on the political loyalties of their citizens which is fudged by the obsessive attention paid in hawk arguments to Soviet damage limitation claims, and in particular by the failure to discriminate between civil defence proposals for the protection of populations and proposals which suggest a serious expectation of preserving a functioning military-industrial base for the aftermath of nuclear war. The threat posed by nuclear weapons merely gives heightened emphasis to the most fundamental of all claims that a regime can make on the loyalty of its citizens: namely, to protect them from the wholesale destruction of their life and property. Moreover, as was argued in Chapter 4, it is only in terms of a strictly 'theological' interpretation of MAD (which the hawk analysts themselves claim to reject) that stable mutual deterrence can be said to require the abandonment of all measures designed to protect one's own society if deterrence should fail. When one adds the Russian historical experience of endemic invasion at the hands of a veritable 'Who's Who of military aggress[ors]', the often noted paucity of Soviet claims to constitutional legitimacy on either representative or traditional grounds, and the novel problems (shared in large measure with the United States) of legitimating an 'imperial' system of rule in an age of 'mass society', the pressure for the regime to highlight its 'vigilance' in this substantive area is all the more compelling. Indeed, the continuing erosion of the simple MAD orthodoxy by warfighting doctrines in American 'declaratory' policy over the past seven years - and it must be reiterated that it was only at the
declaratory level that a MAD orthodoxy ever obtained - would appear to confirm the intensity of the psychological obstacles to a declaratory defence posture based upon the abdication of the traditional aspirations of defence. It seems likely that the pure MAD doctrine was the intellectual luxury of a power enjoying a temporary period of overwhelming strategic superiority, just as Dulles' resort to massive retaliation threats for extended deterrence purposes was the product of a period of almost total American invulnerability. Thus a degree of American 'convergence' upon Soviet damage limitation assumptions may be a natural concomitant of the emergence of nuclear parity, and the United States' belated exposure to the sense of nuclear vulnerability with which its Soviet rival has been required to live for a good three decades already. Moreover, since the leading Cassandras of the debate on Soviet military doctrine have also been in the forefront of the demand for an American warfighting posture, they can scarcely cite the mere fact of Soviet non-adherence to the full MAD theology as evidence of anything more than an excessively 'prudent' concern with the fragility of a deterrent relationship in which even a single breakdown would be likely to involve unprecedented disaster.

This raises the second issue, of the wider doctrinal context in which Soviet military writings are to be placed. The central point is that nuclear strategy in the Soviet Union has remained, with some modification in the 1970s, overwhelmingly the province of the professional military establishment, and that the overall result, as Pipes himself notes, has been very much what the American military - given similar institutional freedom and a comparable historical and geopolitical environment - might themselves be expected to produce. The absence of a powerful civilian influence upon the development of Soviet strategy has indeed meant that the traditional military propensity to regard all weapons as potentially employable has experienced little constraint even in the nuclear era. But it is equally true that Soviet military writers have typically confined themselves to a traditional, narrow range of military concerns associated with the deterrence and possible conduct of war, and have generally avoided the complex issues of the political exploitation of military force which have been such a major preoccupation of the American strategic community.

Conversely, the political leadership has discussed warfighting only
in the most general of terms; and from the very outset of the 'nuclear revolution' in Soviet military doctrine the political doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence, with its absolute priority on the avoidance of nuclear war, has been consistently advanced as the 'fundamental line' of Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, the basic Peaceful Coexistence schema of conflict and cooperation with the capitalist world has increasingly been fleshed out with a mass of detailed and relatively sophisticated specialist analysis both of the capitalist powers themselves and the Third World. Thus, the key question for the hawk argument remains. Upon what grounds is a body of military doctrine which can be recognized as a natural, if not exactly appropriate, military response to an essentially insoluble problem, to be interpreted as either conclusive or presumptive evidence of Soviet political intentions radically at variance with those indicated by official Soviet political doctrine - to say nothing of the dictates of simple prudence in the face of the nuclear revolution.

This issue is commonly handled by the assumption that the open military literature faithfully reflects Soviet intentions in a way in which many pronouncements of the political leadership, plus the bulk of the output of quasi-academic institutes like IUSA and IMEMO, do not. First, it is asserted that the military's own viewpoint can reasonably be inferred from the military literature, because it would be quite impossible to indoctrinate and inform the massive Soviet officer corps solely through non-public channels of communication. And, second, the congruence of the military viewpoint with that of the political elite is deduced by reference to the powers of the party's censorship apparatus, and to the Soviet military's own pronouncements on the status of military doctrine. Defined by Sokolovskiy as 'the system of officially approved, scientifically based views on the basic fundamental problems of war', doctrine is elevated to the apex of a formal structure of military theory, incorporating at its lower levels the elements of 'military science' and 'military art' to which the imprimatur of Marxism-Leninism does not apply, and about which, therefore, active debate remains appropriate.

Thus it is argued that Soviet military doctrine reflects, in Pipes' words, that 'Soviet military planning [which] is carried out under the close supervision of the country's highest political body, the Politburo ... [and] is regarded as an intrinsic element of "grand strategy", whose arsenal includes a variety of non-military instrumentalities'.
But adherents of this viewpoint typically fail to address the complexity of the Marxist-Leninist historical analysis in terms of which the 'grand strategy' amalgam of militant struggle and 'objectively' determined cooperation, designated as Peaceful Coexistence, is officially explained. Rather, Leninism figures somewhat peripherally, along with the traditional sources of Great Russian chauvinism, as the essentially irrational determinant of an 'extreme social-Darwinist outlook'. Given the prior assumption of a basic Soviet alienation from the established international order, the characteristic militancy of Soviet military literature is confirmed as the touchstone by which genuine statements of political intent - which reflect that militancy - can be distinguished from the propaganda and misinformation involved in formulations reflecting a readiness to explore the prospect of an open-ended modus vivendi with the capitalist world.

Some such hard/soft, doctrine/propaganda correlation is, indeed, essential to the kind of argument advanced by Pipes and his colleagues. For if the entire corpus of Soviet pronouncements on international affairs does constitute a monolithic unity, carefully orchestrated from on high, there is no effective way to dispose of the complications created by the substantial 'detentist' strand in the political and quasi-academic literature, other than by the flat claim to know propaganda when one sees it. However, I have attempted to demonstrate that if one must choose between stereotypes in this field, simple dichotomies of this kind are in fact a good deal less plausible than the Soviets' own claim to a dialectically unified world view. That the Soviet literature contains major incoherencies, and important manipulative elements, seems undeniable. But more striking is the fundamental consistency of categories, the attention paid to the basic elements of conflict and cooperation in all contexts, and the extent of the endeavour to bring the complexities of contemporary international relations within the purview of an attenuated, but still identifiable, Leninist framework of analysis.

Thus there is no obvious reason why, for instance, the reflections of Admiral Gorshkov on the role of naval power in peacetime 'grand strategy' - which, on the formal criteria for doctrine mentioned above, must be relegated to the 'soft' domain of military science, if not of inter-service propaganda - should be regarded as intrinsically more revealing than specialist studies on the prospects for Third World non-capitalist development, in which the military instrument is considered only indirectly if at all.
More generally, the arguments regarding the regime's need for public channels of information and direction (and, indeed, debate) in respect of the military, can surely be applied to the vast Soviet bureaucracy as a whole. Soviet dealings with the capitalist world today inevitably involve the management of a shifting balance of interests in domestic development, 'great power' claims, support for 'progressive' forces, etc; and the capacity of the regime systematically to manipulate the media for the purpose of shaping Western perceptions must be correspondingly circumscribed.

A third major contextual issue, again closely related, concerns the distribution of power within the Soviet elite. This issue has attracted considerable attention from American analysts. Indeed, within the more narrowly defined strategic debate, the chief opposition to the hawk viewpoint has come from those who regard the current Soviet arsenal not as the product of a determined drive for meaningful strategic superiority, disclosed in Soviet military doctrine, but as the largely fortuitous outcome of such 'institutional factors as program momentum, bureaucratic politics, technological determinism, and reactions to perceived external threats, factors which, by and large, shape the defense policies of all modern industrial powers, the United States not excluded'. Arguments of this sort, together with the identification of the tension between the resource demands of the heavy industry and military sectors, on the one hand, and those of the agricultural and consumer goods sectors, on the other, as perhaps the central issue of intra-elite politics, are clearly extremely important. But it is a striking anomaly of the current American debate - and an index of its essential ethnocentricity - that such arguments have typically become associated with the application to Soviet conditions of some variant of the fashionable 'bureaucratic politics paradigm'. Formally, at least, the primacy of domestic over foreign politics and the supreme importance of internal economic development are among the most fundamental tenets of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. But because the existence of major domestic constraints upon unrestricted Soviet arms race behaviour has been identified, not with the rational Soviet pursuit of long terms goals of 'socialist construction', but with the unintended outcomes dictated by bureaucratic infighting, and because such theories have been associated, at least in a general sense, with the wider doctrines of convergence and industrial society, the claim to a 'rational actor' interpretation of Soviet conduct, which pays due regard both to the
Soviets' individuality and to their own self interpretation, has passed by default to the partisans of the refurbished 'totalitarian' model articulated by Pipes.

As has been argued earlier, the pretensions of the bureaucratic politics approach to self-sufficient explanatory status must be regarded as highly dubious even in the United States context; and its application to the far more closed world of Soviet decision making has inevitably proved inconclusive. In addition, the more specific thesis of a fundamental tension between party and military, as the two great organized entities in Soviet politics, has tended to lose ground in the 1970s, partly because the relatively abundant indications of conflict - doctrinal and other - which characterized the Khrushchev era have been less noticeable under his successors, and partly because, with the onset of parity and the emergence of a Soviet military capability more congruent with the long-standing warfighting doctrine, it has become increasingly plausible to identify 'a remarkable consistency between what we see the Soviets doing militarily and what they say they are doing'.

Thus the adherents of the totalitarian model have been able, with considerable force, to attack the uncritical 'mirror-imaging' of essentially bureaucratic explanations of Soviet strategic policy. But it must be added that their own claims to the avoidance of ethnocentricity are highly suspect. First, the rationality which they ascribe to the Soviet leadership is a narrowly instrumental one: and that leadership's goals are regarded as deriving not from reasoned responses to changing historical circumstances, but from an essentially unchanging xenophobia dictated by the one party structure of Soviet politics, and the atavistic survivals of centuries of Russian history. Second, by absolutizing the pluralist/totalitarian dichotomy, they have ignored the middle ground of 'controlled pluralism' - a notion which recognizes the undoubted complexity of modern Soviet society without succumbing to unrealistic expectations of massive break with Soviet and Russian traditions.

In particular, it seems possible that the very significance of expanding military capabilities in the Soviet Union's accession to an undisputed world power role - which provides the most obvious referent of Western arguments for the emergence of a unified 'political-military amalgam' under the current regime - may also be promoting the gradual erosion of the 'military's virtual monopoly of strategic thought and substantive analysis'. In the past, Wolfe argues,
it would appear that the relationship between the political leadership and the military command has involved essentially what amounts to a division of labour, with the former tending to leave the professional details of security policy, as Kosygin once put it, 'to the marshals', while reserving to itself the right of final decision, especially on matters involving large resources and on issues of war and peace.

However, as the regime seeks, on the one hand, to explore the dimensions of the novel opportunities now presented for the wide-ranging exploitation of military influence, and, on the other, to come to terms with American attitudes to the strategic balance and their implications for strategic arms limitation, it faces a growing range of military-related issues to which the specialized expertise of 'the marshals' has only limited relevance. Thus the increasing prominence of 'academic' commentary upon strategic issues in the 1970s, and the limited emergence - in such commentary and in the pronouncements of the political leadership - of formulations reflecting a greater acceptance of the mutuality of deterrence, might reasonably be attributed primarily to the leadership's genuine need for a wider basis of advice, in the 'task of sorting out and reformulating the meaning of the physical changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union's power position' over the last decade.

Fourth, and finally, the significance of the more obviously 'operational' aspects of Soviet doctrine, as distinct from its broad analytical categories, cannot meaningfully be assessed without reference to the changing context of the strategic balance. As the current upsurge in the American debate testifies, the central strategic environment of each great power is provided, not merely by the mutual deterrence relationship in the abstract, but also by the relative capability, and apparent doctrine regarding the exploitation of that capability, of the adversary power. Moreover, since the basic operational propositions of Soviet nuclear doctrine were formulated when the United States not only enjoyed a great strategic preponderence, but was openly committed to the military containment of Soviet/Communist 'expansionism', attempts to derive current Soviet intentions from these propositions must pay regard to the novelty of the present strategic environment.
In particular it must be recognized that the new significance of the long-established Soviet warfighting doctrine derives not merely from the belated Soviet acquisition of an overall nuclear capability roughly comparable with that of the United States, but also from the emergence of new - and, initially, American dominated - technologies which substantially increase the potential advantage of the offensive in an exchange between the ICBM forces. It seems inherently implausible to suppose that Soviet doctrine was originally formulated in the expectation that the Soviet Union would one day enjoy even the very limited first strike advantage - applying solely to the ICBM forces - currently postulated for a part of the 1980s, let alone a truly comprehensive and enduring strategic 'superiority' over a technologically superior rival. A more plausible view is that a 'natural' military response to the perceived fragility of deterrence acquired new significance through a largely fortuitous combination of technological advance, differential procurement patterns, and limited American restraint. And, in this light, there were two really striking changes in the Soviet strategic environment by the early 1970s: first, the acquisition of a clearly invulnerable retaliatory capability, and second, the formal acceptance by the United States of the principle of 'equal security' in Soviet-American relations. From the Soviet viewpoint, indeed, it could be argued that the preconditions for 'stable deterrence' have only just arrived; and the doctrinal evidence that the military is inclined to lag behind the political leadership in accommodating to this phenomenon, and is generally more suspicious about American attempts to reverse the situation, can hardly be surprising.

It is precisely this issue of the changing 'operational' context of Soviet military doctrine which is glossed over by the hawk tendency to treat it as an abstract, monolithic statement of the Soviet position. On crucial questions such as 'preemption' in crisis situations and the goal of 'superiority', Soviet statements from the 1960s are effectively taken as equally valid for the 1970s and beyond, despite the basic change of context which occurred from around 1969. Indeed, this tendency has been exacerbated by the recent declassification of the CIA translations for the 1960s of the confidential General Staff journal, Military Thought. Since this is not merely a military source but a restricted military source, it has naturally been taken, on hawk selection criteria, as an important 'new' source which confirms the gap
between the Soviet leadership's detentist public pronouncements and its internal deliberations. But from the point of view of context, it is an old source, which on the one hand merely confirms Soviet consistency in the handling of basic categories, and on the other presents evidence on the preemption and superiority issues which, I will attempt to show, may reasonably be viewed as outdated in the light of developments in the 1970s. Thus on the specific question of the evolving Soviet-American nuclear relationship, as on the wider question of the broad structural context of contemporary world politics, the hawk approach to Soviet doctrine may be characterized as a basically a-historical one, exhibiting the same sort of 'technical' preoccupations as the American 'arms control' orthodoxy which it claims to repudiate.

Given all these considerations, it may be useful to think in terms of 'strong' and 'weak' variants - which indeed appear to coexist in much of the cautionary American literature - of the argument that Soviet doctrine reveals an aggressive, instrumentalist conception of military power, which bodes ill for the stability of coexistence under the new strategic balance. The strong thesis rests upon the assertion that, from the Bolshevik revolution onward, 'nearly all communist expectations - except the reliance on the mailed fist - have been disappointed'.

Similarly, the 'phenomenal' and 'relentless' military buildup of the 1960s and the 1970s is interpreted as the conscious decision of a leadership which possesses virtually no genuine non-military assets to support its profound commitment to world hegemony:

The Soviet leadership seems to strive to obtain a marked superiority in all branches of the military, in order to secure powerful forward-moving shields behind which the politicians could do their work. To reach this objective, the Soviet Union must have open to it all the options - to be able to fight general and limited conventional wars near its borders and away from them, as well as nuclear wars employing tactical and/or strategic weapons.
The weak thesis similarly emphasizes the 'flawed' nature of the emerging Soviet world power, and its disproportionate dependence upon military influence. But it acknowledges a substantial overlap - if only an 'adventitious and often fortuitous' one - between Soviet and radical Third World interests in certain crucial areas, and is also prone to frisson over such primarily non-military scenarios as the long-term 'Finlandization' of Europe. In this view the true significance of Soviet doctrine is not that it presents central war as a meaningful policy option, but that it indicates a basic disposition to interpret the great power relationship in terms of 'zero-sum' conflict. It is further assumed that, given the perception of a major shift in the correlation of force against a demoralized and disorganized West, the Soviet leadership may be encouraged into a far more activist pursuit of what are essentially old-fashioned imperialist goals, that miscalculations of Western tolerance may ultimately produce a situation of intense crisis, and that a rejection of the notion of mutual 'crisis stability' may then encourage a Soviet resort to a pre-emptive strike.

The first argument depends on a number of highly ethnocentric assumptions about the constituents of 'success' and 'legitimacy' in the Soviet context, on an arbitrary reading of the Soviet historical record in regard to the use of the military instrument, and on the selective employment of Soviet military doctrine to substantiate propositions which, as I will attempt to argue below, it simply will not support. The second is a good deal more plausible: but in its pristine form, it also sits ill with the widespread consensus among students of the Soviet Union (including Pipes) about the basic conservatism of Soviet decisionmaking as manifested to date.

Adjusted to accommodate several of the issues discussed in earlier chapters - such as the apparent depth of the forces for instability in the Third World politics, the questionable nature of influential American assumptions regarding political stability and extended deterrence, and the wider doctrinal evidence of the Soviet regime's sensitivity to the complex balance of constraints and opportunities now confronting them - such a thesis does indeed address some of the more threatening problems of contemporary power politics. But it also becomes a vastly more complex proposition, concerned not merely with unilateral Soviet exploitation of a shifting strategic balance, but with the responses of both great powers to crucial aspects of 'transitional' development in both world politics.
in general and the structure of the states-system in particular.

The remainder of the chapter will seek to deal, in the light of these considerations, with some of the more detailed themes commonly advanced in the discussion of Soviet military doctrine. As before, the emphasis will be upon a rational analysis of the Soviet account. But this will involve the rejection of each of two modes of doctrinal analysis prominent in the American strategic debate: the comparison of Soviet statements with a static checklist of propositions derived from the allegedly value-free rationality of American deterrence theory; and the attribution to the Soviets of a vulgar-Machiavellian instrumental rationality, in the pursuit of unchanging and implausible goals which must be taken, in the last analysis, as a kind of revealed truth. Rather it will be assumed that the primary task of analysis is to 'make sense' of Soviet behaviour in terms of the best available evidence of existing opportunities and constraints, and of Soviet perceptions of these; and that, where developments in doctrine and procurement can be understood as 'realistic' or 'appropriate' responses to their environment, there is no reason to have recourse to the kind of special assumptions regarding Soviet motivation which characterize much of the present debate.

War and Politics

Two different kinds of issue are addressed in Soviet discussions of nuclear war: the essentially military questions of defence against surprise nuclear attack, and the prosecution of nuclear war if one should occur; and a range of primarily political considerations on the relation of the nuclear threat to the ongoing struggle between socialism and imperialism. In the first area, it seems possible to identify the evolutionary development of a comprehensive doctrine of deterrence and warfighting, which, given its own basic assumptions, has adapted quite logically to the progressive development of Soviet and American nuclear capabilities. In the second, by contrast, the pattern is of the intermittent recurrence of essentially the same debate, which is characterized by a general, though by no means rigid, civilian/military division of opinion, and which, though ostensibly concerned with high theory, appears rather
to be a 'political argument with considerable potential importance for military programs if not policy'.

This distinction, like the earlier-mentioned distinction between basic categories and operational propositions, is certainly not an absolute one (a point which will be resumed later in the chapter). But it does offer a useful starting point for an attempt to place Soviet doctrine in its specific historical context; and it seems best to begin with the second, more general question of the relationship between war and politics.

The over-arching theoretical question of this latter debate concerns the contemporary status of the Clausewitzian definition, adopted by Lenin, of war as the continuation of politics by other means. This proposition - placed by Pipes and likeminded commentators at the 'centre of the strategic debate' - is assumed by them necessarily to imply an instrumentalist approach to nuclear war; and a great deal of energy is therefore devoted to demonstrating the incontestable fact that it constitutes an officially endorsed tenet of Soviet military doctrine. However, analyses of this kind seriously distort the character of the Soviet debate. As Raymond Garthoff points out, both the general character of war as a political act, and the unacceptibility of nuclear war as an instrument of policy, are accepted by all participants. 'The real underlying debate', with 'profound implications for military requirements', is over the question 'whether war is recognized as so unpromising and dangerous that it can never occur'.

It must be acknowledged that the Soviet insistence that individual wars must be judged not merely on 'technical' grounds, but by reference to the reactionary or progressive character of the general policies pursued by their participants, does indeed have implications for mutual deterrence, in the sense that it upholds the 'justice' of national liberation wars even in the nuclear era. However, the link is an indirect one, through questions of extended deterrence which will be discussed in the final section. By contrast, the corollary proposition that justice would inevitably reside on the side of socialism in any central nuclear war can have little practical significance other than its putative value in the 'moral-political' indoctrination of the Soviet armed forces. For the Soviets insist that such a war would be fought for 'decisive' aims - with each side committed to the final destruction of the adversary's social system - and with 'decisive' weapons; and
it is straining credulity to suggest that the Soviet leadership would be encouraged to initiate such a conflagration merely by the reflection that it would, on its own criteria, be in the right.

As regards the second, more specifically Clausewitzian, proposition that political control cannot stop short even at boundaries of nuclear war, its acceptance is an essential prerequisite for the ending of such a conflict, should one occur, short of a general holocaust. Of course, insofar as the only political aims officially envisaged for such a conflict involve the decisive destruction of the opposing social system, the opportunities for a limited solution may appear little better than under a simple doctrine of Assured Destruction. However, as was argued in Chapter 4, any prospects for such a solution would probably depend less on preconceived 'limited options', than on the existence of the political will to improvise under extreme pressure; and, as William Van Cleave justly notes, the fundamentals of Soviet doctrine 'connote selectivity of targeting, although not necessarily limited strategic options, and an appreciation of strategic goals as opposed to indiscriminate mass destruction'.

Both these meanings of the link between war and politics are accepted throughout the Soviet literature: and these meanings are the only ones so accepted. Soviet acceptance of nuclear war as a rational policy instrument can be inferred only by abstracting these other arguments from their context, and by ignoring clear Soviet pronouncements on this issue, such as the following statement in a work cited extensively by Pipes, Goure and others, and described by Harriet Fast-Scott as 'the Communist Party's latest word on the official views of contemporary war':

Marxist-Leninists do not confuse the problem of the essence, the class content and character of war, and the forms of its links with politics with another close, but not identical problem of the admissibility or inadmissibility of a given, specific war as a means of policy. Communists resolutely condemn nuclear war, view it as the greatest crime against mankind, and are in favour of total prohibition and destruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as securing a solid, durable peace.

Approving references to the CPSU Programme's rejection of central war 'as
a means of solving international disputes' are common, even in the most hawkish military literature; and where Soviet commentators insist that nuclear war is not abolished, but only 'limited as a weapon of politics', the reference is clearly to the danger that it might be so employed by imperialism, and the question of a Soviet struggle for nuclear victory is discussed only in this context.38

It may be objected that, since the Soviet Union is by definition peaceloving, the truly important argument is that concerning the winnability of nuclear war, and not the sophistries over which side would initiate it. But the kind of nuclear 'victory' implied by such Soviet commentators, as distinct from the 'best possible case' scenarios constructed for them by their American counterparts, remains the most incredible of all policy options. As the standard Soviet text, Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy, put it in the 1960s:

The losses in a world nuclear war will not only be suffered by the USA and their NATO allies, but by the socialist countries. The logic of a world nuclear war is such that in the sphere of its effect would fall an overwhelming majority of the world's states. As a result of a war many hundreds of millions of people would perish, and most of the remaining alive, (sic) in one respect or another, would be subject to radioactive contamination. This is why we are talking of the unacceptability of a world nuclear war ...

This basic line has repeatedly been endorsed, most recently in a major article by Marshal N. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defence, who asserts that 'the very character of modern weapons is such that, if [a new world war] is set in motion, the future of all mankind would be placed at hazard'.40 On any normal criteria of political judgement, therefore, the Soviets' own account clearly suggests that the concern is not with the preservation of a 'nuclear option', but with the kind of military posture most appropriate to a situation in which nuclear war is considered unlikely but not impossible.

The first aspect of this question is the 'moral-political' one. Of course, for the Soviet leadership to admit outright the impossibility of victory in a nuclear war would be to acknowledge that the historically inevitable triumph of socialism could be prevented by purely technical means. But perhaps more immediately significant, from the military
viewpoint, is the consideration that to tell the population, let alone
the armed forces themselves, that there could be no meaningful defence
against nuclear attack, would lead 'to moral disarmament, to disbelief
in victory, to fatalism and passivity'. Thus, as a Deputy Commandant
of the General Staff Academy argued in the confidential journal Military
Thought, it was only by inculcating in the masses an understanding
both of the 'criminality' of imperialism in launching a nuclear war,
and 'the justice of the corresponding retribution against the aggressor',
that the problem 'can be posed and solved from the view of defending
the socialist homeland and the interests of international communism and
all progressive mankind'.

This writer also expresses very clearly the more tangible military
concern that, without the recognition of the prospect of military victory,
the theoretical basis of the Soviet military posture would be eroded.

In other words, the armed forces of the socialist
states at the present time, in principle, will not
be able to set for themselves the goal of defeating
imperialism and the global nuclear war which it
unleashes and the mission of attaining victory in
it, and our military science should not even work
out a strategy for the conduct of war since the
latter has lost its meaning and significance ...
In this case, the very call to raise the combat
readiness of our armed forces and improve their
capability to defeat any aggressor is senseless.

This statement indicates, more clearly than is usual in the open
'military literature, the 'profound implications for military requirements'
of this debate. Though one might legitimately question the argument
that American strategic programs were in practice significantly restrained
by the prominence of the Assured Destruction doctrine during the 1960s,
the argument that 'stable deterrence' is possible, and should be pursued
through such a posture, does in theory lend itself to the establishment
of finite limits for strategic force requirements. By contrast, an
insistence upon the fragility of deterrence, and upon comprehensive
goals of damage limitation, constitutes a perfect rationale for the
characteristic military demand for 'superiority'. In this sense, Wolfe
argues,
If the inevitability of war/destruction of civilization debate is a 'largely instrumental' one concerned primarily with the military's desire to protect such a satisfactory rationale for its claims upon Soviet resources, its persistent recurrence in various guises would appear to testify to the depth of intra-elite tension on this issue. There have, indeed, been three major 'debates' around this theme: the first, conducted directly by the political leadership itself, in which Khrushchev, after ousting Malenkov with apparent military/heavy industry support, effectively took over the latter's 'destruction of civilization' line, and established the non-inevitability of war as a linchpin of the general reorientation of Soviet foreign policy doctrine; the second, in 1965-6, in which the participants on both sides were military, and which resulted in the repudiation of the direct attack by General Talensky, a leading military theorist of the Khrushchev era, on the notion of war as the continuation of politics; and the third, in 1973-4, when the same basic theme was reopened, this time with the military defending the 'winnability of nuclear war' thesis against the criticisms of several prominent civilian commentators.

Insofar as it was conducted between different sections of the elite, this third 'debate' may be regarded as inconclusive in itself. But, while the present political leadership has generally continued to express a less sanguine view of the possibility of war than had been characteristic of Khrushchev, the last decade has seen the re-emergence of formulations which express the substance of the 'destruction of civilization' proposition without completely adopting its politically compromising terminology. And on the 'operational' question of superiority, the issue is even clearer. In the SALT era, the political leadership ceased
to talk of military superiority, and with the upsurge of the American
debate over SALT II, shifted towards increasingly deliberate disavowals
that this constitutes a Soviet goal. The pattern was set by Brezhnev's
statement - in a speech in February 1977, on the morrow of the Carter
administration's inauguration - that the Soviet Union aimed not at
superiority, but at a reduction in armaments consonant with a 'defence
potential ... sufficient to deter anyone from disturbing our peaceful
life'. This formulation was widely echoed, notably by Defence
Minister Ustinov, in a 1978 Army Day speech; and Brezhnev, in the
major speech on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the October Revolution,
undertook to 'reiterate as clearly as possible' his earlier pronouncement:

The Soviet Union is effectively seeing to its own
defence, but it is not striving for and will not
strive for military superiority over the other
side. We do not want to upset the approximate
equilibrium of military strength that now exists
... But in return we demand that no one else
seek to upset it in his favour.

The military press has of course been particularly insistent that
the arms race initiative comes from the attempt of aggressive Western
circles to 'repudiate the principle of parity of strategic forces which
has become a reality, and on which relations between the Soviet Union
and the United States have been based in recent years'. But despite
the polemics, such overt defence of an existing 'parity' is a significant
development, which has become as characteristic of major military
pronouncements - such as the O'garkov article cited above - as of the
pronouncements of the political leadership. One noteworthy military
'convert' to the new line has been Colonel Ye. Rybkin, a leading hard-line
protagonist of the 1965-6 and 1973-4 debates. Rybkin similarly emphasizes
the existence of 'an acknowledged equilibrium of forces, which was
officially recognized in the Soviet-American negotiations of 1972-74,
along with mutual agreement not to destroy it'. Furthermore, he explicitly
argues that 'nuclear weapons have reached a level at which further
deployment of them in practice changes nothing' - citing Brezhnev's
comment that existing stockpiles could 'destroy every living thing on
earth several times over' - and concludes that 'rejection of nuclear
war therefore is not some kind of free choice of political leaders [but] is dictated by the new realities of the epoch'.

It may be objected that such generalities do not dispose of the formidable reality of observable Soviet military capabilities. But it is precisely such generalities - of a more militant kind - which have been adduced by the hawk school as convincing evidence that existing Soviet capabilities are merely the entering wedge of a determined drive for superiority. Moreover, an attention to context would suggest that the shift is a perfectly logical one. As has been noted, Khrushchev's claims for Soviet military power were quite unrealistic even before the Kennedy administration force expansions; and if the 'finite deterrence' strategy to which he seemed inclined had then prevailed, it would have constituted the acceptance of a position of comprehensive inferiority in the great power relationship. In the 1970s, a credible balance had been established for the first time; and given the major technological advantages likely to accrue to the American side in a race for the Chimera of a meaningful counterforce advantage, it is entirely plausible that the Soviet leadership should regard the espousal of parity as the most realistic response to the prevailing correlation of forces.

In a very general sense, this emphasis over the past five years on the preservation of the existing equilibrium might be regarded as a Soviet movement towards a concept of 'sufficiency' or 'arms race stability'; though such broad statements of political intent carry little credence in the conceptual context of the American strategic debate, and have simply been ignored by some hawk commentators. A much more recent development has been the apparent decision to address American complaints on the issue of 'crisis stability', again through the medium of general statements by Brezhnev and others on the 'thoroughly defensive orientation' of Soviet military doctrine. This leads into the more plainly operational questions of the deterrence and conduct of nuclear war, which are discussed in the next section.

The Problem of Nuclear War

The question of impact of an 'acknowledged equilibrium' of forces on Soviet doctrine concerning the mechanics of deterrence and 'crisis
stability' is a more complex one, which is further confused by the very real problem of the lack of a common Soviet-American conceptual vocabulary. First, as P.H.Vigor points out, the Russian language simply does not possess a word which adequately translates the English 'deter', and the Soviet 'strategic community' has only gradually progressed through a condition of reliance on various 'clumsy paraphrases' to an agreed neologism for the specific concept of 'nuclear deterrence'.

Second, there is the above mentioned fact that the institutional environment of Soviet military doctrine is basically inhospitable to the conception of deterrence as a separate phenomenon. Third and perhaps most important of all, there are basic ideological inhibitions to the open acceptance of a 'neutral' concept of deterrence which implies 'that the Soviet Union [is] a potential aggressor and thus needs to be deterred'.

Consequently, the term 'deterrence' continues to be used rather sparingly in the Soviet literature; and its employment in contexts which closely parallel American usage appears to be confined to naval officers, whose service capabilities would naturally incline them towards a clear emphasis on second strike retaliation. However, it is the Strategic Rocket Troops which are officially designated as 'the most important means for restraining the imperialist forces' aggressive aspirations and routing the aggressor in the event of his attacking our country'; and descriptions of the Soviet deterrent capability still tend, in general, to involve a short paragraph incorporating a reference to the 'combined arms' character of the proposed response:

The high combat readiness of the armed forces in its contemporary significance must be understood as their state which insures the fulfilment of tasks in repulsing strikes at any moment and under the most complex conditions, the rapid delivery of retaliatory strikes against the enemy, and the successful performance of subsequent operations.

Some Western analysts, dutifully applying the procrustean categories of 'deterrence' and 'warfighting' to such pronouncements, profess to find them disturbingly ambivalent. However, while it is true that the Soviets appear to think primarily of deterrence through 'denial' rather
than through 'punishment',\textsuperscript{65} their vision of the warfighting process - as is shown in the following authoritative pronouncement by former Defence Minister Grechko - implies a level of ancillary punishment such that the putative nuclear threshold would seem little different from that involved in an Assured Destruction posture.

The Strategic Missile Troops, which comprise the basis of the military might of our Armed Forces, have the mission of destroying the enemy nuclear attack means, large groupings of enemy troops and military bases, destroying the military installations, disorganizing state and military administration, and the work of the rear services and transport of the aggressor.\textsuperscript{66}

Moreover, the message conveyed by such positive descriptions of the Soviet conception of counterforce operations is strengthened by the uniformly negative treatment of 'limited' or 'flexible' options in regard to nuclear war. Both on the political grounds that decisive goals must be expected to be at issue in any major war, and on the military grounds that withholding attacks on the opponent's nuclear forces - where these can be acquired - is 'absolutely inadmissible',\textsuperscript{67} Soviet sources insist that American conceptions of intra-war restraint are simply unrealistic. Of course, the Soviet Union, in contrast to its 1960s position, now has the capabilities to engage in significant counter-force trading with the United States. But although Soviet responses to the revival by Schlesinger of overt counterforce proposals were substantially less polemical than those which greeted the McNamara 'No Cities' doctrine, the basic message remained unchanged. Indeed, Benjamin Lambeth, who is himself substantially in sympathy with the Schlesinger approach, concludes that 'of all the conceptual and weapons asymmetries that currently obtain in the US-Soviet strategic confrontation, the one which rests on the question of targeting limitation and intra-war "crisis management" seems to be the most dominant and irreconcilable'.\textsuperscript{68}

In the last decade, nonetheless, several Western analysts have suggested that the Soviet stance on limited options may be becoming less categorical. Such arguments tend to emphasize the basic Soviet concern with the political control of nuclear operations, the developments -
in numbers, accuracy, and command and control - which have created a
Soviet nuclear force clearly capable of selective counterforce strategies,
and the ambiguous evidence of recent Soviet exercises, which, Schlesinger
tested in 1974, were held to indicate 'far greater interest in the
notions of controlled nuclear war and non-nuclear war than has ever before
been reflected in Soviet doctrine'. The basic appeal in such arguments,
therefore, is to the probability of a distinction between 'declaratory'
and 'action' policy similar to that which prevails in the United
States; and the reading of Soviet doctrine is much influenced by
intuitive perceptions of what alternative courses the Soviets might wish
to pursue with the arsenal now at their disposal. But even on this basis,
the most substantial conclusions reached have been that the Soviets
might be coming to acknowledge a 'potential ... escalation boundary'
between 'theater' (i.e. European) and intercontinental nuclear war; or else, more likely, that they might envisage a 'limited nuclear
operation' in terms of a nuclear blitzkrieg against NATO coupled with
simultaneous, massive counterforce attacks against the United States.

Whatever the plausibility of such inferences (and both have been
persistently repudiated in recent statements by the political and
military leadership), they can hardly be said to indicate a lowering of
the Soviet nuclear threshold with the onset of parity. The first
assumption has in fact been a staple of Western analysis since the late
1950s, when the emergence of an intercontinental Soviet strike capability
first raised fears of the 'de-coupling' of the U.S. deterrent from the
defence of NATO. Yet it is a measure of the enormous risks involved in
an invasion of Europe that Schlesinger could suggest - in his campaign
in support of limited options - that the Soviets might elect to precede
it with a counterforce attack on the United States. As regards the
latter, there is simply no doctrinal evidence of a Soviet perception -
of the kind hypothesized by Schlesinger and various hawk theorists -
that an American president would be 'self deterred' in the face of an
alleged choice between inaction and massive retaliation, and abundant
evidence that massive retaliation is precisely the response that the
Soviets would expect.
Thus the charge of an instrumentalist Soviet approach to nuclear war devolves ultimately upon those aspects of Soviet doctrine which are held to suggest a coherent design for the survival of Soviet civil society even in the event of massive American retaliation. There are several issues involved here, but the discussion can perhaps be confined to the most prominent ones: preemption and civil defence. The logic of the general argument is exposed in the treatment of these issues, and may be seen to involve a gross insensitivity to the political context of Soviet doctrine.

The argument for a fixed Soviet attachment to preemption - advanced by many American analysts - has been stated with particular clarity by Kohler and Goure:

Nuclear weapons, in the Soviet view, have made the attack the 'decisive form of military action', and made it necessary to conduct defensive tasks by means of active defense, i.e. by means of nuclear strikes ... Furthermore, to assure destruction of the enemy and the survival of the USSR, the doctrine calls for a first Soviet counter force strike.

However, two vital qualifications must be made to this simple picture. First, as almost all serious analysts have acknowledged, there is no doctrinal evidence of a Soviet commitment to 'preventive war', or to a first strike 'out of the blue' to exploit a favourable military balance. Second, the evidence for a doctrine of preemption in extreme crisis conditions has declined noticeably with the Soviet Union's acquisition of deterrent forces calculated to withstand a preemptive attack by the other side.

Indeed, the original 1954-55 debates on this issue - which introduced the 'frustrating', 'breaking up' and 'nipping in the bud' formulations which Western analysts have commonly taken as synonyms for preemption - took place in the context not merely of a continuing American monopoly of intercontinental delivery systems, but also of the declaratory exploitation of that monopoly by the Eisenhower administration's deliberately ambiguous doctrine of massive retaliation. Moreover, they represented the first major breach in the Stalinist orthodoxy of the 'five
permanently operating factors', with its associated denigration of surprise, which was seriously inhibiting the adaptation of Soviet strategy to the implications of nuclear weapons. But even so, as Garthoff points out, 'the change in doctrine [was] far from revolutionary'.

The highest priority was accorded to the problems (including preemption) involved in countering the threat of surprise from the opposing side. But surprise was definitely not elevated into a self sufficient Soviet strategy, since, in the words of a leading participant, it 'cannot ... yield a conclusive result, cannot bring victory, in a war with a serious and strong enemy'.

The problem of the assymetrical vulnerability of Soviet forces to American surprise attack continued in one form or another till the late 1960s, and hints about preemption continued to be prominent in this period. However, as C.C.Jacobsen points out, such indications as exist of Soviet approaches to the crucial question of nuclear command and control would seem to belie such an orientation. No major nuclear alert was called even during the Cuban missile crisis; and, according to the 1966 account of Marshal Krylov, the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Soviet ICBM force was not, in fact, characterized by 'instant readiness to take off' for most of the first half of the 1960s. Moreover, when faced with the alternatives of devoting scarce resources to programs for shortening ICBM alert times - an essential prerequisite of any serious preemption strategy - or to the addition of 'cumbersome extra control procedures' which cut down the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch, but 'militated against fast reaction prospects', the Soviets evidently decided to accord priority to the latter. By 1966, Soviet sources were claiming with apparent confidence that they had mastered both the command and control and survivability problems of their missile forces; and from this time, there was also a sharp decline in references to preemption.

A further crucial factor which may have allowed the Soviets to revise their approach to preemption was the acquisition of effective early warning facilities in the late 1960s. The significance of these in disabusing an aggressor of illusions about the prospect of a successful first strike was emphasized in a number of articles in Military Thought; and Garthoff suggests that these discussions, together with several exchanges during the opening stages of SALT, indicate 'that the Soviet
authorities, at least in 1969-70, were prepared to consider seriously a launch on warning concept' as a new response to the problem of surprise attack. While constituting a clear advance on preemption, this is also a disturbing approach, which the American delegation sought unsuccessfully to have both sides disavow during SALT. However, at least the hint of launch on warning is probably inevitable in the present context of developing ICBM vulnerability on both sides (being, indeed, recently invoked by the United States authorities in precisely this context); and, as Garthoff points out, the Soviets' basic recognition of the reality of mutual deterrence through the reciprocal threat of second strike retaliation was unequivocally expressed in a prepared statement, 'cleared by the highest political and military leaders in Moscow', delivered at the outset of the SALT I negotiations:

> Even in the event that one of the two sides were the first to be subjected to attack, it would undoubtedly retain the ability to inflict a retaliatory strike of crushing power. Thus, evidently, we all agree that war between our two countries would be disastrous for both sides. And it would be tantamount to suicide for the ones who decided to start such a war.

Moreover, there appears to be nothing in the contemporary military literature to contradict this view of Soviet perceptions. Kohler and Gouré fail to produce a single post-1970 pronouncement which clearly supports their categorical assertion of a Soviet first-strike doctrine. The same is true of the slightly more guarded claims about a Soviet preemption strategy advanced by Joseph Douglass and Amoretta Hoeber, in a recent study which heavily emphasizes the importance of the declassified volumes of Military Thought. And Roger Barnett, in an exhaustive and hostile review of Soviet pronouncements for the years 1972-75, can identify only a single 'isolated example' of the 'nipping in the bud' formulation (which could, of course, signify launch on warning as readily as preemption).

In sum, the most reasonable interpretation of the doctrinal record is that preemption was never considered as anything more positive than 'the least miserable option at the brink of a hopelessly unavoidable nuclear catastrophe', and that the significance of this theme has
diminished in proportion as the Soviets' confidence in the credibility of their own second strike posture has grown.

By contrast with the preemption issue, there seems to be little doubt that the official Soviet emphasis on civil defence has, if anything, increased in the 1970s. According to the programme's chief, General A. Altunin (elevated to the rank of Deputy Defence Minister after the conclusion of SALT I):

The CPSU and the Soviet Government have set civil defense extraordinarily important and crucial tasks such as protecting the population from the enemy's weapons of mass destruction, insuring the steady work of projects and sectors of the national economy in wartime, and performing rescue and immediate emergency repair work. It must be stressed that the protection of the population is the main task.  

Moreover, though the Soviet press responded aggressively to the 1976 publication of two major American studies (by Goure, and by a team of Boeing Aerospace analysts under T.K. Jones) which sought to establish the civil defence programme as the centrepiece of much upgraded Soviet threat, no attempt whatever was made to downplay the Soviet commitment to war survival, which was merely treated as totally irrelevant to the issue of first strike intentions.

In the light of this, and of the massive and increasingly sophisticated Soviet air defence network, it seems wholly reasonable to conclude that the Soviet change of direction on ABM during the SALT negotiations was motivated primarily by a pragmatic concern with the excessive costs of competition with the United States in this area, rather than by any conversion to a MAD philosophy of complete mutual vulnerability. But the arguments of Goure, Jones and Pipes go far beyond this judgement, and are characterized by assumptions, both about the technical effectiveness of the Soviet programme and about the motivation of the Soviet leadership, that are questionable in the extreme.

On the first issue, the Boeing Study claimed to establish, by a process of scientific testing, that the basic Soviet prescriptions for civil defence could achieve quite remarkable levels of protection for both population and industry. But the assumptions upon which the
computations were based involve glossing over a striking range of contradictions, from such specific logistics problems as the provision of uncontaminated food and water for the rescue teams, to the vast and complex challenge posed for civil defence by the Russian climate; and American government studies have flatly contradicted the basic conclusions reached, above all as regards the prospects for protection of the Soviet Union's social and economic infrastructure. But even if these calculations were plausible in themselves, there remains the fundamental political question: on what grounds could the Soviets be expected to initiate, as a matter of conscious policy, a conflict calculated to produce civilian casualties which remained enormous by any normal reckoning, coupled with the wholesale destruction of the hard won infrastructure of modern urban life, and the most cherished monuments of an ancient and complex civilization?

Such answers as are offered to this question are totally inadequate. It is simply asserted that the Soviet definition of victory would be couched in terms of relative destruction, and, in particular, of the relative time required for the post-attack recovery of each side. It is assumed that the rarified cost/gains calculus of American deterrence theory - so little in evidence even in superpower crisis behaviour and directly repudiated in all Soviet writings - will be applied by the Soviets to the evaluation of the costs and benefits of nuclear warfighting. And, most revealing of all, the Soviet leadership is portrayed as particularly indifferent to human suffering even on their own side, undeterred by the prospect of general population losses because their chief concern is with the political, military and industrial cadres 'who could re-establish the political and economic system once the war was over', and inured by the experiences of World War II and Brest-Litovsk to the need to accept massive losses in the interests of long term victory.

This handling of the civil defence issue provides a particularly clear insight into the special pleading that characterizes much of the hawk treatment of Soviet doctrine. There is the bland refusal to distinguish
between temporary loss of territory and permanent loss of life and material accomplishments, or between piecemeal and involuntary losses in wars initiated by others and massive instantaneous losses consciously accepted as part of a conscious decision to initiate war oneself. There is the twisting of the most obvious link between past Soviet experience of war and present preoccupations with civil defence - that the extent of past suffering has made extensive preparation for future 'damage limitation' a political imperative however unpromising the likely results - into its virtual opposite. And behind everything, there is an assumption of 'moral asymmetry' in regard to American and Soviet intentions which is in practice as simplistic as that to be found in hard-line Soviet statements. As Gray succinctly puts it: 'U.S. political culture, unlike Soviet political culture, does not take an instrumental view of the lives, and quality of life, of its citizens'.

More generally (to draw the overall discussion of nuclear issues to a close) the preoccupation with technical distinctions in the American debate produces some odd responses to the admittedly imprecise political distinction suggested earlier between general categories and operational propositions in Soviet doctrine. On the one hand, the hawk analysts have dismissed the pragmatic Soviet acknowledgement of an indefinite military equilibrium in relations with the United States, because it has not been associated with the abandonment of the commitment to a long-term and indirect world order struggle. But, as I have attempted to argue, such a struggle is virtually a structural 'given' of contemporary world politics, and its modification by a mutual operational acceptance of military equilibrium would be a substantial advance on the approaches adopted by both sides in the first postwar generation. On the other hand, the civil defence issue has been treated as a wholly technical one in hawk discourse, whereas it involves fundamental philosophical questions which cut to the heart of the justification of the state in the nuclear era.

None of this is to deny that the civil defence issue has an operational aspect, or that the combination of Soviet civil defence and air defence programmes with the projected decline in the survivability of the fixed based ICBMs poses disturbing problems for American planners. Nor is it to fall back merely upon bureaucratic/institutional explanations of the current Soviet force structure - though these certainly cannot be
It seems undeniable that the Soviet literature manifests a deep-seated intellectual rejection of any notion of an abstract deterrence 'system', which is fully shared by those commentators who are most forthright in accepting mutual deterrence as an inescapable fact, and which provides a powerful rationale for the rejection of attempts to circumscribe unilateral damage limitation options in the interests of mutual vulnerability. There seems to be no early prospect for change in this basic orientation, despite the limited evidence that the Soviet leadership may be groping its way, under the impact of American criticism, towards its own conception of 'arms race stability', and towards a more detailed and less polemical consideration of precisely which technologies, and which weapons systems, may be regarded as particularly destabilizing.

Soviet criticisms of 'the concept of deterrence' as a 'concept of peace built on terror', which will always be 'an unstable and a bad peace', and insistence that 'maintaining the existing equilibrium is not an end it itself', but only the necessary prerequisite to the longer term elimination of the threat of nuclear war, may be seized on as evidence that the Soviets reject the concept of deterrence stability, or, a good deal more plausibly, dismissed as high sounding propaganda. But such comments now occur very much in the context of calls for immediate attention to limited and concrete problems, and it could be argued that they accurately reflect the essence of the nuclear dilemma. There is no system of mutual deterrence: nor are there any unequivocal technical criteria for stability. There is a crude structure of reciprocal threat, whose momentous implications inspire prudence without real trust; and while the force of the threat does appear likely to remain 'grossly insensitive' to foreseeable technological developments, the recent upsurge of the great power debate would seem to suggest that the psychological stability of deterrence is highly susceptible to the uncertainties which these may generate.

Indeed, it seems increasingly clear that the phenomenon of 'moral asymmetry' in the motivations ascribed to the adversary is inherent in the dynamics of nuclear deterrence; and that, if the Soviet military has generally preserved an extremely hostile image of 'imperialism', into the detente era and beyond, its leading American critics - whether openly, or in the ostensibly neutral language of 'decision-logic' - present an almost identical view of the Soviet leadership. When each regime must
justify to its citizenry - or at least to its 'politically relevant strata' - the preservation of a military posture involving an irreducible risk of immediate total destruction, the development of a neutral, not to say benevolent image of the adversary seems highly improbable.

This would seem to be especially true of the vexed first strike issue. Under the existing and foreseeable strategic balance, a first strike by either great power would be fraught with enormous, and quite incalculable risks. But striking first must inevitably be more 'attractive' than being left to strike second, should the other side ever elect to accept those risks. Thus each side's apparent working hypothesis - that deterrence is preserved by the ascendancy of 'sober', 'realistic' or 'sensible' decisionmakers in the councils of the adversary - must always be susceptible to the argument that his 'militarist circles' are fashioning new schemes to render nuclear war 'acceptable'. Moreover, since the Soviet obsession with strategic defence does not really 'make sense' except in the context of an assumed intention to preempt, and the prevailing American scenarios for limited war are both inherently implausible and virtually indistinguishable from second wave strategies for coercive crisis bargaining, it is hardly surprising that each side's approach assumes a sinister aspect when viewed through the conceptual lenses of the other.

In sum, Soviet warfighting doctrine is most reasonably viewed as a genuine attempt to grapple with the 'worst possible case' of deterrence breakdown. It is, certainly, an inadequate response, but the problem does not admit of adequacy. There is no support in Soviet military doctrine for the strong thesis that the Soviet leadership is prepared to contemplate the initiation of nuclear war as a conscious act of policy. One is left, therefore, with the weak thesis that Soviet perceptions of a shifting correlation of forces will encourage a level of activism and risk-taking likely to result in escalation to nuclear war - an issue to which we must now turn.

The Role of Non-Nuclear Force

In this case, also, the question of the changed context of Soviet military capabilities naturally looms large in the evaluation of the
significance of Soviet doctrine. However, two important caveats may be entered. First, it does not constitute a sufficient demonstration of Soviet insincerity about detente to point to the growth of a Soviet military establishment for which, in Pipes' words, 'no reasonable defense justification exists'. Observations of this sort have regularly been made both by civilian critics in the United States and by leading spokesmen of the Carter and Reagan administrations; but except in regard to the European theatre, they may be discounted as true but trivial. In the European context, indeed, an already formidable Soviet threat has been substantially intensified - most notably by the deployment of the SS20, and by significant qualitative improvements to the Soviet capacity to conduct a theatre blitzkrieg - after the shift in the strategic balance and the Quadripartite Treaty had largely removed the two most cogent 'defensive' rationales for Soviet regional preponderance. However, with this important qualification, it can be said that the Soviet Union has followed the general logic of great powers - which characteristically define their security in terms not merely of defence, but also of the promotion and/or preservation of a favourable international milieu - and that it has, moreover, conformed to the particular requirements for contemporary great power status already established by the United States.

Second, it seems appropriate once again to emphasize the pattern of change at the operational level linked to continuity in broad political goals. Some Western commentators propose a clear distinction between the 'minimum deterrence' orientation - accompanied by strong military dissent - of the Khrushchev regime, and the militant, globalist consensus established by his successors on the foundation of a definitive party-military concordat in the early years of their rule; but a consideration of the probable lead times of major Soviet procurements would appear to suggest greater continuity, in Soviet policy as opposed to the external influences upon that policy, throughout this period. On this view, the constant Soviet problem has been to balance the need for improved performance in the consumer and agriculture sections with an abiding 'determination to achieve the security and policy choice flexibility reserved to true superpowers'. Similarly, the crucial change in the equation has been an altered perception of the military requirements for this latter goal, which apparently emerged, in response to the Kennedy force
expansions, in the late Khrushchev era.

As has already been suggested, it was evidently a central objective of Khrushchev's own detente policy to stabilize the military balance on terms which preserved, as far as possible, the fragile gains of the early Soviet successes in ICBM technology; and when this goal was undermined - in part through his own 'adventurist' diplomacy - he would seem to have drawn the relevant lesson on the need for softer language and a bigger stick. The most obvious Khrushchev legacies were the definitive nuclearization of the Soviet armed forces, and the quest for a controllable and survivable, if relatively small, retaliatory capability. But the readiness to concentrate immediate efforts on such obvious priorities does not necessarily signify a lack of interest in more expansive long term goals. As Edward Warner suggests:

A landmark decision appears to have been taken sometime in 1963 to commence a general expansion of Soviet strategic capability ... This decision has all the earmarks of an emulative reaction triggered by the over-reactive build-up of American strategic power that had begun three years earlier. Upheld and perhaps expanded by the collective leadership which succeeded Khrushchev in October 1964, it produced a steady expansion of the Soviet strategic missile capability throughout the decade.

Moreover, Jacobsen argues, the impressive, though 'not precipitate', expansion of Soviet 'non-strategic systems and interventionary-type forces' appears to have been facilitated by the fact that 'the necessary research allocations had already been enacted by Khrushchev'. And, as Wolfe points out, the basic 'combined arms' posture of the Soviet forces was clearly established by the late Khrushchev period:

In short, rather than reduce the theater forces to a small appendage of the Soviet military establishment, limited essentially to mopping up operations in the wake of nuclear blows delivered by the strategic striking forces, Khrushchev through his reforms in effect endowed the theater forces with dual capabilities for both conventional and nuclear warfare and left them to play a continuing role as a central
element of Soviet military power. In so doing, Khrushchev moved, at least part way, towards recognizing the arguments of those who feared his excessive emphasis upon strategic deterrence would prove harmful to the Soviet Union's war-fighting preparedness and might even vitiate the country's deterrent posture itself. Conversely, there are indications that Khrushchev's successors may have been moving, in 1965, to implement his final projected troop cuts, but were dissuaded by the worsening international environment associated with the Vietnam crisis. The United States' role in Indochina, and the weapons systems deployed there, would also seem to have encouraged the efforts to improve Soviet conventional 'reach'. And more generally, Jacobsen suggests that the diversion of American resources there, together with the USSR's improving economic situation, enabled the Soviets to 'catch up' without excessive economic burdens - the main U.S. achievement in Vietnam being 'the final destruction of her unchallengeable military superiority'.

Of course, such inferences from lead times are inevitably problematical, and some leading analysts have laid greater stress on the initiative of the present regime in accounting for the determined Soviet drive to catch up militarily. Moreover, to the extent that one accepts the retrospective increase in the CIA's estimates of the Soviet military 'burden', one's estimates of the ease of the catching up exercise must be correspondingly modified. Nonetheless, the above considerations, together with the recurrence of doctrinal 'debates' on superiority and nuclear victory, suggest that although the present leadership has given every indication of placing a high valuation upon military 'clout' as a bulwark of Soviet great power status, the actual dimensions of the arsenal at its disposal reflect a considerable more reactive pattern of military decisionmaking than is often allowed. A corollary of this is that the strongly land power oriented, warfighting core of Soviet military doctrine provides little guidance on the flexible exploitation of non-nuclear capabilities. Indeed, as Robert Weinland comments, while 'the political leadership had already endorsed the expansion of the "internationalist functions" of the Soviet armed forces at least as early as the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress ... the military leadership in general, and Marshal Grechko in
particular, appeared reluctant to even discuss, let alone embrace that issue. Over the next three years, the general concept gradually gained formal military support. But, with the notable exception of Gorshkov's important series, 'Navies in War and Peace', the most substantial studies in this area have been primarily 'academic' in origin.

Of course, military doctrine remains highly relevant to the question of conventional war in Europe, and this question has lately attracted substantial Western commentary, which has focussed particularly on the inevitable ambiguity in regard to preemption involved in the strongly offensive orientation of Soviet prescriptions for 'theatre' warfare. But there is no substantial doctrinal evidence that the Soviets envisage a major European conflict remaining non-nuclear; and the Reagan administration's recent public flirtation with the notion of a limited nuclear exchange in Europe called forth a categorical rejection from Brezhnev and other spokesmen. Thus the comments made earlier about nuclear preemption in general apply also in this case. Moreover the 'theatre offensive' Soviet strategy for Europe - as distinct from the widespread concern with it among Western civilian commentators - is far from novel, being rooted in a military tradition established in the Civil War, and confirmed both by the Soviets' World War II experience and their lengthy period of enforced reliance upon a 'European hostage' deterrent against an invulnerable United States.

In addition, the 'side benefit ... of very significantly improved conventional capabilities' which the Soviets have derived from their combined arms approach to nuclear operations existed in embryo in the Khrushchev period. Yet they were at that time simultaneously increasing their nuclear threat to Europe, even as NATO moved towards a 'flexible response' strategy to counter the greater threat of Soviet conventional attack which was supposed to derive from the declining credibility of American 'extended deterrent' threats. The exercise of drawing inferences about present Soviet intentions from present Soviet capabilities is, of course, an enormously complex one. But on the simpler question of the light cast by published Soviet doctrine on the prospects for a premeditated attack on Western Europe, there would seem to be no real shift from the 'high threshold' perspective implied in Sokolovskiy's comment on Western approaches to limited war:
Various limitations are mostly forced and conditional. A limited war is fraught with a tremendous danger of escalating into general war, especially if tactical nuclear weapons are used. ... In spite of all these theories and concepts, one can state with assurance that [this] strategy ... will involve the dangers analogous to those connected with the strategy of 'massive retaliation'.

The wider issue of the 'international' functions of Soviet power has been approached with particular vigour by the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the armed forces, General A. Yepishev:

Today the defense of the socialist fatherland is closely tied to giving comprehensive assistance to national liberation movements, progressive regimes, and new states which are fighting against imperialist domination ... This activity of our army, directed to cutting off the export of imperialist counterevolution under current conditions may with full justification be regarded as one of the most important manifestations of its external functions.

However, the novelty of such pronouncements lies primarily in their expansiveness. As Garthoff points out, the 'counter deterrence' of American 'flexible response' strategies was one of the functions anticipated for the Soviet nuclear force under Khrushchev. However, this was then 'only an auxiliary instrument for constraining Western resort to military means to meet non-military moves'; and its underlying rationale - that any substantial local conflict was extremely likely to escalate into central nuclear war - was in fact a prescription for Soviet impotence in conditions in which the United States enjoyed the advantage of 'escalation dominance' and appeared determined to employ it. By contrast, Grechko was pointing to a genuinely comprehensive 'counterdeterrent' when he asserted in 1971 that 'the military might of the USSR ... is one of the most significant factors assuring favourable foreign conditions for the building of communism in our country and the
development of all socialist countries, for the struggle for independence of the peoples'. But, like Yepishev, he was speaking essentially within a well established tradition.

Of course, recent Soviet 'internationalist' activity has gone well beyond mere counterdeterrence; and some Soviet writings on this subject, as the following comment on the significance of the major OKEAN exercises illustrates, have demonstrated a relative unconcern with the justificatory constraints of Marxist-Leninist ideology:

Facts are facts - the Soviet Union is truly a great air and sea power. This fact alone... clearly reveals that the Soviet Union not only can but already has begun to resolve the task of furnishing military-technical support for its military presence in rather remote regions of the world.  

Moreover, this is merely a more specific expression of the general claim to great power rights noted in the early discussion of the correlation of forces. But to move from such generalized pronouncements to the identification of recent Soviet actions in Africa and West Asia as merely the first step in a coherently planned and officially articulated policy of expansion is to enter the realm of pure speculation. The most important single statement in this area — that of Gorshkov — places a great deal of emphasis on the peacetime importance of the assertion of naval 'presence', but gives very little indication of Gorshkov's own—let alone the Soviet leadership's—perceptions of the role of an established capacity for the 'projection of power ashore' in the pursuit of Soviet interests in the Third World. In general, both Soviet naval doctrine and (to date) Soviet naval procurements suggest a concern with 'sea denial' rather than 'sea control', which, despite its more activist orientation, still conforms to the basic objective of ensuring that regimes and movements favourable to the Soviet Union do not fail simply for lack of military support against the forces of 'counter-revolution'. As Michael McCGwire comments:
The Soviet Union is not challenging the United States for command of the sea. But it is challenging the command that the Western navies used formerly to exercise through default of any opposition. And she [sic] is posing this challenge partly by means of the forward deployment of her own forces and partly by providing third-world countries with navies whereby to defend themselves.

However, the paucity of indications for an imperialist strategy in the Soviet literature has not deterred some Western analysts from drawing their own far reaching inferences in this regard. A particularly striking example of this activity is presented by Douglass as an addendum to a study overwhelmingly concerned with Soviet doctrine on theatre warfare in Europe. Among his 'major conclusions', Douglass states that 'local wars [away from Europe and the Soviet borders] appear to be regarded as a principal mechanism to be exploited by the Soviet Union in expanding its interests and hegemony'; and that, while 'these local actions are generally seen as conventional actions ... the Soviets also appear to have recognized explicitly the limited use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in local wars'. He concedes that 'the evidence supporting this possibility is thin ... [but] the worldwide implications of such a development are sufficiently important to warrant its consideration as a major conclusion'.

This is an undeniably important conclusion, which may already be finding its way into the general strategic literature. But, in fact, the evidence deployed by Douglass in support of it is not so much thin as non-existent. The sole example cited of 'certain recent statements which indicate an interest in the capability to employ nuclear weapons in limited localized actions', is a 1975 article by General I. Shavrov, Chief of the General Staff Academy, on 'Local wars and their place in the global strategy of imperialism'. But unless Shavrov's language is to be regarded as 'Aesopian' in the extreme, his subject would appear to be precisely that indicated by his title, and his principal theme encapsulated in the contention that, in conditions of detente, an upsurge in the national liberation movement, an altered correlation of forces and the rest, 'the imperialist strategy of local wars is going through a crisis'.
Despite a number of tendentious claims about the scope of direct imperialist aggression against young sovereign states, Shavrov builds a not implausible argument that whereas Western strategists had formerly considered local wars an 'acceptable' means of containing unfavourable developments in the Third World - 'in conditions when ... a direct armed clash with the countries of socialism threatens catastrophe for imperialism itself' - they are now finding the strategy increasingly counter-productive even in the latter arena. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Shavrov asserts, there has been both a decline in the number of local wars, and an increase in the proportion of such conflicts resolved in favour of the national liberation movement: and it is in this sense, and only in this sense, that they are presented as 'profitable' from the progressive/Soviet viewpoint.¹²⁵

Not only does the Shavrov article explicitly emphasize the bankruptcy of a local war strategy. It also introduces the specific issue of nuclear weapons as evidence of the great dangers of escalation from local into general conflict - an argument which, far from being new, was a commonplace of the Khrushchev era. Shavrov attacks as imperialist ideology - which creates a 'wilfully falsified and distorted image of the experience of local wars' - the notion that they can be kept within strict limits, and need not endanger world peace. He notes that what is a limited war for one side may be anything but limited for the other. With special emphasis on the Vietnam conflict - a 'partial task of global strategy' for the United States, but a matter of 'very existence' for the Vietnamese - he argues that imperialist powers have already demonstrated their readiness to use all modern forms of mass destruction short of nuclear weapons in local wars, and that for the national liberation forces, compelled to respond to this asymmetry of force with the very different strategies at their disposal, 'any form of limitation' would be 'unnatural'.¹²⁶

It is undeniable that Shavrov's picture of the socialist camp as merely a source of material and moral support to indigenous forces struggling against a vastly more powerful external adversary has been increasingly belied by the Soviet Union's own exploitation of massive military force to determine the course of local conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. But Shavrov also points to important constraints upon large scale military intervention - such as the limitations imposed
by terrain on the use of modern weapons systems, and the advantages accruing to the national liberation forces in a prolonged struggle—which would be as significant for a Soviet strategy of imperialism as for an 'imperialist' one. Moreover, this question should be considered in the wider context of political restraints on the use of military power. As Christopher Jones points out, Soviet military writing on this topic has 'increased considerably ... [in] breadth and depth' since 1960, and one important concern of Soviet commentators has been to assess the implications of the American experience in Vietnam. Given the widespread assumption among American critics of a Soviet desire to emulate the former 'imperial' pre-eminence of the United States, and the readiness of some analysts to manipulate Soviet pronouncements to demonstrate official articulation of such a desire, it is especially significant that Soviet discussions of constraints in this area should, in Jones' words, have been 'virtually ignored' by Western observers.

Jones argues that the 'moral-political factor', and especially the central Stalinist concerns of 'the stability of the rear' and 'the morale of the Army', retain great importance in contemporary Soviet thinking on limited or local war. 'Implicit in Soviet writing', he suggests, 'is the recognition that it is extremely difficult to explain to one's soldiers and civilians that a war can be both just and limited at the same time'. Moreover, behind the obvious Marxist-Leninist equation of just = historically progressive, Soviet military theorists have also settled on a 'working definition of a just war as one that the population regards as just'; and to Schelling's four possible outcomes to the 'dice game' of limited war—win, lose, draw, and disaster (through nuclear escalation)—'the Soviets add two other possible outcomes: a collapse of army morale and a domestic political crisis'.

Three aspects of Soviet commentary on this issue seem especially relevant here. Soviet writers effectively acknowledge that nationalism is a central element in any population's assessment of the 'justice' of a war, and may well overcome class divisions when a direct threat to the motherland is identified; that multi-national states are especially susceptible to the erosion of support for 'unjust' war aims among the population and army; and that the dangers of such a development are much increased by the phenomenon of long and inconclusive foreign wars.

* As in the arguments of Douglass cited above.
These observations accord both with the general record of colonialist/nationalist struggle, and the specific experience of Russia and the Soviet Union in this century. When combined with the recognition of the serious 'technical' constraints upon the ability of great powers to enforce their own 'ground rules' in limited conflicts, and such specific aspects of the Soviet strategic culture - discussed in Chapter 4 - as a propensity to over-insure in military engagements and a relative lack of concern with 'face' in the specific sense of future 'bargaining' reputation, they suggest that the Soviet Union may be rather less prone than the United States to acquire its own 'Vietnams' and more disposed to cut its losses at an early stage should a commitment appear likely to assume this character.

The situation in Afghanistan obviously constitutes a crucial test case for these propositions, and the evidence to date remains ambiguous. On the one hand, the Soviet armed forces remain directly embroiled, more than two years after the initial invasion, in an apparently open-ended conflict against a deeply fragmented but undeniably genuine 'national liberation movement'. On the other hand, there has been no major increase in the Soviet troop commitment since the invasion, and the Soviet campaign has so far remained very different in character to that of the United States in Vietnam - reminiscent of the actions against Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the early, massive display of force, and reminiscent of traditional British practices on the North-West frontier in the sharply limited military goals apparently being pursued. Thus while the Soviet authorities have so far been prepared to accept an extended 'limited war' of dubious 'justice' with little obvious concern for the loyalty even of their Central Asian soldiers and citizens, they have avoided the scale of involvement which might weld the opposition groups together into a coherent liberation front. At the very least, the proposition about Soviet caution regarding the size of the military commitment necessary to secure a given objective remains unchallenged. If the Soviets are prepared to do so relatively little with almost 100,000 troops in Afghanistan - a virtually uncontested region directly on their borders - they seem unlikely to undertake a commitment of the scale which would presumably be regarded as appropriate to a major action in the highly volatile Persian Gulf region, except in the context of a major East-West confrontation with at least partially independent roots.
More generally still, there is the basic Soviet doctrinal tenet that 'the question of use of armed force' must be considered in relation to the entire correlation of forces, and that an individual war may both be 'just and legitimate', and offer 'promise of success at a given time within a certain country', and yet be undesirable because it 'may result in substantial negative consequences for the world revolutionary process'. This argument has, of course, often been employed in a clearly manipulative manner - especially against the Chinese in their militant phase - to justify the tailoring of the 'world revolutionary process' to the more obvious Soviet national interest. But the constraints which it indicates are none the less real for this, especially in regard to actions, such as a clear military encroachment in the Gulf, which would be seen as directly threatening vital Western interests. There is thus a dual aspect to the claim that 'the weakening of the positions of imperialism and the doom of the capitalist system intensify the aggressiveness and adventurism of reactionary monopolistic circles' - providing on the one hand a military rationale for high preparedness against the eventuality of a trend towards 'fascism' and 'revanchism' in the West, and on the other an argument against pushing too hard lest this should actively promote such a development. As has been argued in earlier chapters, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the Soviet regime does regard detente as the most effective strategy for advancing both its internal and external interests, and that its rejection of 'linkage', while genuine, is far from a complete denial of the general constraints which a commitment to detente imposes.

Finally, if published Soviet statements will not, on the face of it, support the thesis of a settled commitment to military-based expansion in the Third World, their most obvious material context provides no warrant for twisting them till they do. Indeed, as regards the crucial Middle East/Persian Gulf region, the reverse would seem to be the case. As was argued in Chapter 4, the 'internal' correlation of forces seems to promise a further deterioration of a still highly privileged American
position in this region. And while the Soviet Union's physical proximity to the Gulf may do little to remove the perils involved in a major military initiative on its own part, it does greatly enhance the plausibility of Soviet counter-deterrence of American intervention to contain unwanted internal developments there. As Uwe Nerlich puts it, the Soviet 'strategic purpose in most conceivable contingencies is rather to deter American intervention, thereby protecting favourable political changes', and the Soviet Union is less reliant than the United States on nuclear threats because it 'has superior forces that would be in place first in contingencies where it would have to shoot second'.

Moreover, one does not have to delve very deeply in the work of leading American commentators (or in the rhetoric of the Reagan administration) for evidence that a good deal of the current American concern about the supposed threat to crisis stability from the Soviet military buildup is really a concern - analogous to that which first surfaced in the 1950s - with the dubious credibility of much of the extended deterrence objective of the American nuclear arsenal. Thus Gray states candidly that 'for reasons of extended deterrence duties, the United States cannot afford a crisis stability that precludes first use of nuclear weapons'. And Kissinger, in one of his recent attacks on the 'geopolitical momentum' of current Soviet policy, adds the revealing judgement that the strategic balance early in the 1980s will give 'the Soviets a high degree of confidence in stability in a crisis [and] that confidence, in turn, may make crises more likely'. Such statements lie squarely within the mainstream tradition of American strategic theorizing, one strand of which has always been concerned with the exploitation of uncertainty regarding the range of contingencies for which a nuclear response is possible. There are, of course, identifiable historical and geopolitical reasons why a concern with the political exploitation of nuclear weapons should be more developed in the United States than in the Soviet Union; but the point here is that, at least on the published record, the relationship is this way around and not, as hawk arguments would imply, the reverse.

In conclusion, neither the strong nor the weak thesis that Soviet military doctrine indicates an adventurist approach to the risks of nuclear war would appear to be supported by the record. It is true that the earlier pattern of concentration on the extreme contingency of nuclear
war has been modified by the increasing emergence of quasi-doctrinal studies on the prospects for the lower level exploitation of force. But this is compatible with the activist conception of detente identified in this thesis; and moreover, it implies the leavening of purely military judgements by consideration of the political restraints involved in the management of a relatively stable *modus vivendi* with the leading capitalist powers. This is not to say that the risks of nuclear war may not be increased by parity, by greater Soviet assertiveness, and by the uncertainties which the new 'correlation of forces' may create in the policies of both great powers; nor that 'geopolitical' or other imperatives may not quite override doctrinal considerations in the determination of Soviet policies. But it is to say that the 'horse's mouth' argument for a settled campaign of Soviet expansionism will not stand. Soviet military doctrine is, in general, both internally consistent, and consistent with the wider body of Soviet doctrine on Peaceful Coexistence and detente; and insofar as doctrinal evidence provides the basis of arguments for a Soviet rejection of the central realities of coexistence in the nuclear age, such arguments are untenable.
Notes

1 Richard Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War', Commentary, July 1977, pp.21-34; see also Pipes' reply to letters on this article, Commentary, September 1977, pp.22-25.


3 This argument is advanced in Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race, pp.149-60.


5 This point is acknowledged even by Gray. See 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered', Daedalus, Vol 109, No 4, 1980, p.139.

6 Van Cleave, 'Soviet Doctrine and Strategy'; pp. 43-44.


8 Harriet Fast Scott (ed), Soviet Military Strategy, Macdonald & Jane's, London, 1976, p.38. (This work, hereafter referred to as Soviet Military Strategy, is a translation of the third edition of the authoritative Soviet text, Military Strategy, edited by Marshal Sokolovskiy, with annotations showing additions to, and deletions from, the two earlier editions.)

9 For a useful brief summary and evaluation of Soviet claims on this issue, see Benjamin Lambeth, 'The Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine', in Frank Horton, Anthony Rogerson, and Edward Warner (eds), Comparative Defence Policy, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1974, pp.200-203. Lambeth comments that 'there unquestionably exists in the Soviet Union a highly integrated and widely acceptance notion of what constitutes military doctrine, and the taxonomy of Soviet military theory is probably more elaborate and institutionalized than that of any other country'. But he rejects the view of 'some Western analysts' that 'the formulation of Soviet military policy is a sort of conspiratorial palace intrigue' directed with 'relentless rationality' by a totally dominant party elite.

10 Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union ...', p.27.

11 ibid., p.26. Pipes observes that the Marxist stress on class warfare 'has merely served to reinforce these ingrained convictions'. See also the very similar analysis advanced by Kohler in his testimony to the hearings on The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics.

12 See, for instance, Pipes' comments on the irrelevance of 'the public pronouncements of a Brezhnev, Arbatov, or some retired general working for Arbatov's institute', where these are at variance with his own interpretation of Soviet doctrine. Reply to readers' letters, Commentary, September 1977, p. 24.


16 Pipes, for instance, asserts that Soviet foreign policy is subordinated to domestic policy; but the only major domestic objective considered by him is the preservation of the existing centralized political structure, which, he argues, provides a positive incentive for the leadership not to shift more resources into the consumer sphere, since this would detract from the siege mentality required for unchallenged party control. For the rest, he finds the well springs of the Soviet foreign policy outlook in deep seated aspects of national character: the 'patrimonial' tradition of government, 'the persistent tradition of Russian expansion' established in the 16th and 17th centuries; the peasant background of the Soviet elite; and the schooling of that elite in the brutal traditions of Stalinist Machtpolitik. 'Detente; Moscow's View', in Pipes (ed.) Soviet Strategy in Europe, Crane Russak, New York, 1976, pp. 7-12, 18-21. Similar arguments are advanced by Kohler, in, The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policy, pp. 9-25, and by other writers of this school. As was noted in Chapter 1, the similarity of such arguments to the 'Riga Axioms', first formulated by American observers at the height of the Stalinist terror, is striking.

17 The term is Wolfe's; The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policy, p. 90. The argument it designates is expanded in Kenneth Myers and Dimitri Simes, Soviet Decision Making, Strategic Policy and SALT, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, December 1974, pp. 8-11.
For an exposition of this concept, see Odom, 'The Party Connection', pp. 20-26.


Ibid., p.157.

See, for instance, Joseph Douglass and Amoretta Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, Hoover Institute, Stanford, 1979. This study appears with endorsements by Pipes, Nitze and Cline, and with an introduction by Eugene Rostow strongly praising it for demonstrating the Soviet doctrinal commitment to the use of military power 'as an instrument of imperial expansion'. On the preemption issue, the authors assert that public Soviet disavowals of first strike policies have 'nothing to do with Soviet views on striking first when the situation calls for war. The preponderant base of evidence in the Soviet literature designed for internal use calls for their striking first against the West when the situation calls for war and when the factors are in the Soviet favour'. (p.106, emphasis in original).

Pipes, 'Detente: Moscow's View', p.34.

Ibid.


Thompson, 'The Projection of Soviet Power', p.35.

See Pipes' comment ('Detente: Moscow's View', p.28) that although the Soviet leadership seeks 'to create the impression of a relentless advance forward ... it in fact moves very cautiously and slowly [and] it can act decisively only when it has a near 100 per cent assurance of success ...'.

For a striking example of the sterility of this approach, see Roger W. Barnett, 'Trans-SALT: Soviet Strategic Doctrine', Orbis, Summer, 1975, pp. 533-561.

Once again, Pipes provides the most striking examples of this approach.

For a similar, though rather more narrowly directed, argument for the existence of two 'quite separate debates' in Soviet doctrine, see Sienkiewicz, 'SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine', p.85.


Garthoff, 'Mutual Deterrence ...', pp. 114-5.
'Marxism-Leninism asserts that the basic question in an analysis and evaluation of war must be the question as to what is the class character of a given war, what classes are waging it for the sake of what goals, by what classes it was prepared and directed ... war, being as it is the continuation of class politics, always has a class character. Any and every war is inextricably bound up with that political order out of which it flows'. Soviet Military Strategy, pp. 177-78. For an extended discussion of this issue, see P.H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality, Routledge, London, 1976, pp. 14-177.

Soviet Military Strategy, pp. 201-211.


Editor's Introduction to Soviet Military Strategy, p. xxx.


Soviet Military Strategy, p.197. This statement omits the reference in the earlier (Khrushchev era) editions to the existence of scientific calculations that such a war would cause 700-800 million deaths (p.432); but the basic message is unchanged.


Maj-General K. Bochkarev, cited in Garthoff, 'Mutual Deterrence ...', pp. 117-121. Garthoff discusses this and other contributions to the late-1960s Military Thought debate on deterrence-related issues at considerable length in this article.

Ibid., p.120.


These developments are discussed in Chapter 5.

N. Talensky, 'The Late War: Some Reflections', International Affairs, May, 1965, p.15. 'In our days, Talensky declared, 'there is no more dangerous illusion than the idea that thermo-nuclear war can still serve as an instrument of politics, that it is possible to achieve political aims by using nuclear weapons and at the same time survive, that it is possible to find acceptable forms of nuclear war'. The leading response on the 'hawk' side was the


50 Garthoff claims that both 'Soviet military and political leaders have ceased to call for strategic superiority as an objective since the 24th Party Congress in April 1971, which also marked a turning point in SALT'; but in the military case, there would seem initially to have been a diminution rather than a cessation of such statements. 'Mutual Deterrence ...', p.14.

51 Lenin's Kursom, Vol 6, p. 294.

52 Pravda, February 23, 1978; CDSP, XXX, No 8, pp. 3-4.


56 See, for instance, the recent claim of Frances Hoenber and Amoretta Hoenber: 'the Soviets have over two decades both said they wanted and in actuality pursued the goal of strategic superiority, treating parity only as a transition from inferiority'. 'The Soviet View of Deterrence: Who Whom?', Survey, Vol.25, No.3, 1980, p.19. (Emphasis in original.)

57 See the 1979 claims of a 'purely defensive' Soviet doctrine by Brezhnev and Ustinov, cited in Aspaturian, 'Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces', p.6. More recently the American Vice-President George Bush claimed to be 'amused' by such claims, justifying the Trident submarine programme as a counter to the 'aggressive and expansionist' policy of the USSR. The Age, 13 November, 1981.
The phrase is 'yadernoye sderzhivanie', which, Vigor suggests is 'almost untranslatable', but would seem to convey the basic sense of 'nuclear restraining'. 'The Semantics of Deterrence and Defence', in Michael McCwire (ed), Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, Praeger, New York, 1975, pp. 471-478.

Garthoff, 'Mutual deterrence ...'. p. 122.

Barnett, in an extensive survey, found that it was not used by any writers below the rank of admiral or general. 'Trans - SALT ...', p. 543.

See, for example, the following statement by Admiral Gorshkov:

'missile-carrying submarines, owing to their great survivability in comparison with land-based launch installations, are an even more effective means of deterrence. They represent a constant threat to an aggressor who, by comprehending the inevitability of nuclear retaliation from the direction of the oceans, can be faced with the necessity of renouncing the unleashing of a nuclear war.'


General V. Kulikov (then Chief of the General Staff), 'The Soviet Armed Forces and Military Science', Kommunist, 1973, No.3; reproduced in Strategic Review, Winter 1974, p. 82.


Barnett, for instance, cites the above passage as evidence of a Soviet approach 'that goes beyond direct linear deterrence', whatever that is supposed to be. 'Trans - SALT ...', p. 543.

Ross, 'Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy', pp. 9-11.

Marshal A. Grechko (then Minister for Defence), On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism; JPRS, No. 54602, December 2, 1971, p. 32.


Ibid., p. 5.

Lambeth, 'Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy', p. 21. An expanded version of Lambeth's analysis is to be found in 'Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy'.

Ball, 'Deja Vu', p. 224.

'The implicit scenario for the Soviets', argues Sienkiewicz, 'requires successful anticipation of an imminent United States "surprise attack". Thus the strategic forces of the United States, assuming sufficient warning of the impending American attack, would be largely destroyed by a preemptive strike. Those American forces which survived Soviet preemption and were actually launched would be met by Soviet air defense and greatly degraded. Those, finally, which succeeded in delivering their weapons to their targets would have attacked a population effectively organized and, to the degree feasible, protected by a vigorous civil defence program and an economy and political control structure also organized to cope with such an attack.' *SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine*, p. 95. It should be pointed out that Sienkiewicz, who emphasizes the military character of the Soviet doctrinal position, does not himself appear very impressed with its feasibility.


For detailed discussion of these debates, see Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 61-148, and Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*, passim.

*Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, p. 94.

Marshal Rotmistrov, cited *ibid*.


Ibid., pp. 73-75.

Ibid.
'Elaboration on the preemptive attack theme, while hardly dropped from the rhetoric of Soviet strategic discourse altogether, began to appear with sharply diminished insistence and frequency and came to be complemented by increasing Soviet commentary on the alternative theme of retaliation'.


Garthoff, 'Mutual Deterrence ...', pp. 127-133.

Cited ibid., p. 124.

See Kohler, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Foreign Policy, especially pp. 77-78, 104-107; also Douglass and Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War, pp. 98-107.


For an extensive critique along these lines, see the two part article by Fred Kaplan, 'The Soviet Civil Defense Myth', in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March and April, 1978. Kaplan argues that both the Jones and Goure studies are marked by 'unrealistic assumptions, leaps of faith, violations of logic and a superficial understanding of the dynamics of a national economy'.

The Boeing study claimed that with only three days' warning of an American retaliatory strike, Soviet civil defence could reduce population losses to 10-11 million, and Soviet industry would require 'little or no preattack hardening to survive and recover rapidly from nuclear war', provided 'observed examples' of industry dispersion became the pattern for future industrial development. (Industrial Survival and Recovery ... p. 73). A CIA study, by contrast, argued that civilian deaths would exceed 100 million in a 'worst case' situation for the USSR, possibly reducing to 'the low tens of millions' under the most favourable conditions, including 'a week or more' to complete evacuation. But under any circumstances, it concluded, 'the Soviets could not prevent massive damage to their economy and the destruction of many of their most valued material accomplishments'. International Herald Tribune, 21 July, 1978.
For a particularly revealing instance of this approach see, T.K. Jones and W. Scott Thompson, 'Central War and Civil Defense', *Orbis*, Fall, 1978, pp. 681-712. This includes a lengthy and portentous discussion of the relevance of 'the method of science' (i.e. the abstraction and manipulation of such variables as can be put through a computer) to the clarification of the uncertainties inherent in decision-making at the brink of nuclear war. But the authors' justification for their approach hinges on a simple piece of sleight of hand, whereby the assumption that decision-makers will think in more complex terms than simply 'avoiding a "holocaust"' is made to justify the assumption that their decisions could seriously be guided by the kind of abstruse calculations regarding post-war 'strength' and 'recovery' which litter their text.

Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union ...', p. 33.

For the Second World War analogy, see *ibid.*, pp. 29, 34; for the Brest-Litovsk reference, see Barnett, 'Trans - SALT ...' p. 559.

Colin Gray, 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered', p. 140.

See, especially, the discussion of the bureaucratic forces behind the Soviet air defence programme in Edward Warner, 'Soviet Strategic Force Posture', in Horton (et.al.), *Comparative Defense Policy*, pp. 322-323.


Arbatov, 'Strength - Strategy Stalemates', p. 20.


For examples of this approach, see Barnett, 'Trans - SALT ...', pp. 543-546; and Kohler, *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy*, pp. 35-37.

Pipes, 'Detente: Moscow's View', p. 44.


Warner, 'Soviet Strategic Force Posture', p. 314. Jacobsen, in particular, identifies a 'remarkably consistent pattern... [in Soviet policy] Most Western inferences of conflict between the strategic concepts of Khrushchev and those of the post-Khrushchev Party leaders, or between those of the Party at any one time, and the military, have proved to be misleading'. *Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 21.


Ibid., p. 165. For a contemporary interpretation of the 1965 Rybkin-Talenski dispute in terms of military dissatisfaction with the continuation of Khrushchev's 'detentist' military policies, see Kolkowicz, 'The Red "Hawks" on the Rationality of Nuclear War'.


Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 67.

Wolfe, for instance, emphasizes the acceleration of Soviet ICBM deployment in mid-1966, which, he suggests, must be traced to a decision 'not long after the new regime came to power'. Soviet Power in Europe, pp. 452-433.

Robert Weinland, 'Analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's "Navies in War and Peace"', in McCullough (ed), Soviet Naval Policy, p. 569.

See, for example, V.M. Kulish, Military Force and International Relations, Moscow 1972 (Translated JPRS, 1973, No. 59947). Gorshkov's own position is further developed in Morskaya Moshch Gосударства (Sea Power of the State), Ministry of Defence Publishing House, Moscow, 1976.


Thus Brezhnev described talk of limited war as 'dangerous madness', claiming that any nuclear war would be 'suicide' for both sides, The Age, 22 October, 1981.

Douglass, The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive, p. 7. Douglass points out that Soviet nuclear and conventional integration is primarily at 'the higher command level'. But he concludes that Soviet doctrine does not provide any support for the idea of a major 'conventional war option'.

Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 151-156.

Soviet Military Strategy, p. 69.


Grechko, On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism, pp. 16-17.

119 See particularly 'Navies in War and Peace', 'Navies as Instruments of Peacetime Imperialism', and 'Some Problems in Mastering the World Ocean', in Red Star Rising at Sea.

120 Hudson, 'Soviet Naval Doctrine and Soviet Politics'.


122 The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive, pp. 7-8.


125 Ibid. In fact, the claim that local wars are now presented 'as a profitable course' for the Soviets is one key point of Douglass's interpretation (p. 109). The other is that Shavrov presents local wars as an ethically 'two sided process', reactionary on the imperialist side, but 'progressive, just and liberating on the other'. However, this represents not a new approval of local wars as a political instrument, but rather a sensible simplification of Soviet taxonomies, which gained official sanction in the third (1968) edition of Sokolovskiy. Formerly, the Soviets had employed the Western term 'local war' solely as a term of opprobrium, to designate imperialist conflicts. In the Brezhnev era however, they have recognised that, in a conflict between an imperialist power and a national liberation movement, both sides must be fighting in the same (local) war, save that one is pursuing unjust, and the other just, ends. See the useful discussion of this general issue in Vigor, The Soviet View of War, pp. 42-45.

126 Shavrov, 'Local Wars', Part II, pp. 94-96.

127 Christopher Jones, 'Just Wars and Limited Wars: Restraints on the Use of Soviet Armed Forces', World Politics, Vol. 28, No. I, 1975, pp. 44-68. See also Zimmerman and Axelrod, 'The "Lessons" of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy'.

128 See Eugene Rostow's comment that the Soviets 'have been impressed - nearly dazzled - by the recent history of the United States', in 'The Soviet Threat to Europe Through the Middle East', p. 51.

129 Jones, 'Just Wars and Limited Wars', p. 45.

130 Ibid., pp. 45-53.
131 Ibid., pp. 55-61.

132 I am indebted to Geoffrey Jukes for the latter comparison.

133 Milovidov (ed), The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin, p. 36.


135 Nerlich, 'Change in Europe', p. 85.

136 Gray, 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered', p. 147.

137 'Kissinger's Critique', p. 21. (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION

And don't forget, *he wasn't Lenin then.*

Henry Carr, in *Travesties*, by Tom Stoppard.

As noted in the Introduction, this thesis is addressed to the current American debate over the political significance of Soviet doctrine on Peaceful Coexistence and related issues; but it approaches these issues in terms substantially different from those which have predominated in the American context. Thus, the chief concern has not been to distinguish genuine from propagandistic elements of Soviet doctrine or to relate specific doctrinal positions to specific groups within the Soviet political elite, but rather to assess the internal coherence of the broad corpus of Soviet doctrine, the analytical credibility of its basic organizing categories, and the extent of the adaptation in the basic Soviet line to the crucial, and initially unforeseen, international realities of protracted coexistence with the capitalist powers. Similarly, the concern here has been with the realism or appropriateness of Soviet doctrine as a general perspective on the problems of contemporary great power coexistence, not with its specific implications for the full range of 'American values' and 'American interests' (though, of course, one important criterion of realism in this argument is precisely a basic sensitivity to the core 'legitimate' interests of the opposing great power).

Given this core definition of the problem, I have attempted to demonstrate both the broad realism of the basic categories of the Khrushchevian 'coexistence synthesis', and the continuing refinement of the theme of state-to-state relations in the handling of those categories under the present regime. However, even the attempt to identify a 'basic line' involves a high degree of selection; and there is no way to distinguish completely between the process of identifying 'important' elements of Soviet doctrine and the process of identifying 'important' structural realities against which the credibility of that doctrine is to be assessed. The claim is not that this thesis avoids outright the extreme selectiveness and circular argumentation which was identified as a hallmark of the hawk approach to Soviet doctrine,
but that it attempts to discipline the selection process in accordance with coherent and publicly accessible criteria. Therefore, before developing more fully the implications of the above conclusions about the realism of Soviet doctrine, it may be best to recapitulate the broad principles upon which the argument as a whole has been predicated.

First, there is the emphasis upon the logic of 'real', historically specific, social structures. I have assumed that any assessment of the appropriateness of Soviet international doctrine must be grounded in judgements about basic 'rules' of coexistence which ought to be acknowledged by both great powers. However, the rules in question must be derived not from the definitional requirements of an abstract and reified 'international system', but from the structural properties of a specific historical 'episode' of interstate coexistence, and from the shared prudential logic confronting specific (great power) members of a specific 'international society' of sovereign states.

Of course, the basic proposal is still to delineate the inner necessity of a particular, and disputable, conceptual world; and the mere shift from a 'systemic' language to a language of structured political choice provides no inbuilt guarantee that the latter conceptual world has any greater correspondence to the 'reality-out-there' than the former. Thus it must be reiterated that the 'realist' stance of this thesis is not an ontological claim at all, but rather a methodological claim that counterfactual argument should be conducted in a holistic rather than a piecemeal fashion: for instance, that one cannot assess the general adequacy of a 'states-system' image of contemporary world politics without also assessing the adequacy of the more specific image of the 'hardshelled state', which is effectively taken as given in the classical states-system paradigm but which has become increasingly problematic in the contemporary era. It is precisely this practical problem of counterfactual analysis which lies behind the arguments about the disruptive domestic implications of transitional development advanced in Part II. The aim there is not to subsume this highly complex and controversial issue under the formal Soviet teleology of the 'world revolutionary process', but rather to demonstrate that the equally far-reaching teleology of 'stability' implied in mainstream American analyses is also untenable, and provides, on balance, a more misleading practical guide to the problems and prospects of strategically significant Third World regions than does the Soviet account.
Second, there is the commitment to a mode of argument which is not merely 'realist' but 'materialist in the first instance'. As has been repeatedly emphasized, this too is not an ontological claim but a methodological judgement about the most economical mode of social explanation; and it certainly does not rule out a practical elevation of cultural over material determinants in accounting for particular social phenomena. However, the notion of an objective logic of the (material) situation is especially important in evaluating the legitimacy of Soviet (or American) perspectives on the coexistence relationship: first, in identifying the common core of mutual interests which ought logically to be acknowledged by either side; and, second, where interest claims are in substantive conflict, in identifying those core claims on either side which might logically be expected from any great power in that specific geopolitical and developmental situation, and which should therefore be acknowledged as 'legitimate' by the opposing side.

Of course, to state the issue in such simple terms is to assume what has already been rejected as a practical impossibility: namely, a purely strategic situation, in which the clash of opposing interests is mitigated only by purely prudential considerations grounded in the most immediate situational logic. In practice, as has been noted, the enduring international order of the modern states-system has been partly dependent upon the effective moral force which certain traditional rules of behaviour have acquired precisely by virtue of their increasingly traditional status; while traditional values have normally played a major role in determining how the great powers of a particular era defined their own core national interests. However, the primary reason for the force of traditional solutions in the primarily strategic international context has been the broad continuity of the international structures which generated those traditions in the first place. And to ignore the far-reaching implications of contemporary structural change, for issues ranging from the general pattern of great power intervention in the 'periphery' to specific great power 'spheres of influence' claims, would be to ignore the most pervasive international tradition of all: the tradition of flexible adjustment to the changing realities of power.
Third, there is the tautological definition of political rationality as the accurate perception of one's own real interests and of the most appropriate means to advance them - a definition which shifts the emphasis in practical arguments about rationality away from questions about *style* in analysis and decisionmaking and towards questions about the conformity of its results with the objective logic of the situation. I have attempted to show that this definition can provide for a fruitful approach even to situations, such as domestic revolution, where real interests are irretrievably in flux and meaningful distinctions between *instrumental* and *substantive* rationality are virtually impossible to sustain. However, the notion of instrumental rationality clearly remains crucially important for any attempt to identify a core of common interest in basic procedural norms between actors enmeshed in wide-ranging strategic conflict over substantive issues; and I have argued that the paradigm case of such a common instrumental interest is provided by the limited but enduring *international order* of the modern states-system.

Thus the question at issue here is not whether the substantive Soviet vision of a preferred world order is a 'rational' or 'irrational' one (a question which is in practice permeated by idiosyncratic value judgements on either side of the ideological divide), but whether the ostensible Soviet programme for realizing that vision acknowledges the basic prudential constraints which *any rational actor ought to acknowledge* in the contemporary international environment. This latter question often receives an a priori answer in the mainstream American debate, on the ground that the monistic, 'ideological' Soviet vision of world socialism (or Russian manifest destiny) is inherently incompatible with the working acceptance of limited, predictable 'national interest' goals or of an indefinite coexistence relationship. However, this view reflects a general failure to grasp that objective historical tension between international and world order goals which has re-acquired, in the contemporary era, the importance it had in the first centuries of the European states-system; and also a particular failure to recognize the covertly monistic character of the 'pluralist' American vision of world order. To repeat, the most economical and accessible explanation for any particular aspect of Soviet doctrine (or conduct) is that it is a rational, realistic or appropriate response to objective environmental
problems; and less accessible, more 'essentialist' accounts should be entertained only insofar as this simpler premise fails to answer the problem.

These general principles provide the epistemological underpinning for the specific model of the structure and environment of the contemporary great power relationship developed in Part II. It must be emphasized that no claim is made here for an elaborate theoretical apparatus to make sense of contemporary world politics. The proposed model is an avowedly rudimentary one, as it must be if it is to combine a high level of abstraction with historical specificity. If an extended theoretical excursus is nonetheless necessary to clear the ground for this essentially simple approach, it is necessary to counter the elaborate methodological claims of behaviouralism, on the one hand, and to justify the partial acceptance of perspectives that are often dismissed en bloc as ideological, monistic or historicist, on the other. However, since the central theoretical propositions of Part II do run counter to much conventional wisdom in this field, and since they are pivotal to the argument of the thesis as a whole, it is important to recapitulate them at this point.

First, the analysis of the Soviet-American relationship has been grounded in a material 'reference grid' with four constituent elements: the abstract structure of military power, the structure of geopolitics, the abstract structure of economic power, and the structure of differential stages of development. I have attempted to show that this provides a more flexible analytical framework than either the overt monism of neo-Marxist world-systems theory or the covert monism of mainstream American pluralism: both because of its explicit emphasis on discrete episodic 'boundaries' and because of its identification of two 'overall structures' - of military and economic power - which are not, in the contemporary era at least, reducible one to the other. Moreover, while the basic tension between military and economic determinants provides the bedrock of the analysis, the proposed reference grid is 'situated' both spatially and temporally, to reflect
the specific logic of geographical position and developmental tempos, thus resulting in the four dimensions listed above. Only in regard to the first dimension - the locus of the abstract, great power 'security dilemma' - is the situational logic of the Soviet-American relationship essentially the same for both parties; and this consideration must seriously limit the prospects for a genuinely 'comprehensive detente', even given maximum goodwill on either side.

Second, the argument has emphasized the extremist, even revolutionary political pressures generated in transitional states by virtue of their location within this overall framework of contemporary world politics. The analysis here draws explicitly on the 'schizophrenic' Soviet picture of the 'international system' and the 'world historical process', and it further highlights the core of realism in the Soviet preference for a limited or 'compartmentalized' detente in contemporary conditions. But the analysis itself is not a compartmentalized one: rather it is precisely the attempt to provide an integrated overview of the structure and environment of the great power relationship which dictates the emphasis here on radically different patterns of strategic interaction in the international and domestic realms.

At one level, the analysis is integrated through a sharp formal contrast between the basic strategic logic of international power politics and of revolutionary situations within transitional states. In the international realm, the existence of an entrenched plurality of power centres, whose relations are characterized by great inequality but low functional interdependence and relatively stable hierarchies of wealth and power, creates a situation in which conflict - though often violent - is substantially institutionalized, and is normally directed towards limited 'reasons of state' and not towards a fundamental rearrangement of the internal organization of the major competing powers. In revolutionary situations, the emergence of an embryonic and probably transient plurality of power centres, against a background of continuing inequality but growing functional interdependence and unstable hierarchies of wealth and power, generates powerful incentives for the competing collective actors to ignore institutionalized constraints in an all-out struggle to seize the state apparatus and lay down their own particular vision of fundamental arrangements for the society in question.
Thus, in contrast to pluralist conceptions of orderly development - which tacitly assume the 'normality' of the highly specific Anglo-American developmental experience, this thesis argues from the example of the modern states-system - as a paradigm of political continuity - to establish the 'normality' of extreme, even revolutionary political responses to the structural problems of transitional development. But the analysis is also integrated in a more concrete sense, through a focus upon the ambivalent logic confronting established 'state managers' in transitional situations - especially in those larger 'semi-periphery' states most directly exposed to the pressures of the great power relationship. The sources of structural instability in such contexts must be sought not merely in the 'spontaneous' development of domestic social contradictions, nor merely in the exacerbation of such contradictions by transnational pressures from the world-economy, but also in the direct initiatives towards political and economic 'modernization' undertaken by state-managers themselves - initiatives which in turn directly reflect the basic logic of competitive emulation (or 'power balancing') which has shaped the central institutional practices of the modern states-system.

Third, a crucial counterpoint in this argument to the material reference grid is provided by the culturally specific traditions of (European) international society and of the major national societies considered in the argument. The emphasis here upon the material generation of such traditions 'in the first instance' is certainly not meant to deny their effective autonomy as structuring agents in contemporary world politics. On the contrary, it highlights that autonomy: for it indicates that such traditions must always be regarded, in principle, as standing in a contingent relationship to the current logic of the material situation, and as capable of obscuring or even totally over-riding that logic through their sway over the practical consciousness of the relevant human actors. This principle is just as applicable to the traditional practices of the states-system as it is, say, to the traditional practices of the Russian/Soviet 'patrimonial' state. Admittedly the former practices - by virtue of their grounding in the anarchical structure of international power politics - approach much closer to effective neutrality between the interests of major contenders than do the latter; and their development has also been relatively free from that 'spot welding' together of diverse social forms which has been such a striking
feature of the Soviet domestic experience. But the realism (or substantive rationality) of international, as of domestic, practices must ultimately be assessed by reference to their conformity or otherwise with current situational logic; and some key features of the European tradition of multiple balance, with its institutionalization of (limited) central war for reasons of state, must now be regarded as irrational in this sense.

If this is true even of the 'state-centric' pluralism of European international society, it is the more true of the mainstream American perspective, in which a very specialized interpretation of the European tradition of multiple balance has effectively been cobbled onto an indigenous vision of pluralist world order, grounded in an idealization of the American development experience. The result, as has been repeatedly emphasized, is a world-view which is just as 'monistic' in its way as the official Soviet one, but which - because it lacks the 'historicist' Soviet distinctions between different 'spheres' of development, and between long-term and short-term goals - is less conducive in practice to the isolation of minimum international order criteria from the clash of wider world order claims.

At this point we are brought back to a distinctive feature of the argument foreshadowed in the Introduction: that it attempts to evaluate the rationality of Soviet and American world-views as perspectives on contemporary world politics, while simultaneously acknowledging them as fundamental realities of contemporary world politics. In this regard, it may be objected that - having defined an initial constellation of questions by reference to apparent anomalies in the Soviet account, I have then constructed a model of the great power relationship calculated to make that account rational come-what-may. There can be no definitive, formal refutation of such a criticism; for the issue must ultimately be determined on practical grounds, by reference to the scope and coherence of the argument as a whole. I can only restate the view that the argument is adequate in its scope to the complexity of the problem, that it seeks to accommodate contradictions in contemporary world politics which are merely finessed on definitional grounds in mainstream pluralist accounts, and that it works from as limited and explicit a core of epistemological principles as possible. It is not alone in the theory of interstate coexistence, nor in the theory of domestic social
change, but in the inter-relation between these two elements and in their common grounding in recent developments in philosophy of history and philosophy of science, that the analytical claims of this argument reside.

It remains to summarize the judgements on Soviet doctrine as such developed on the basis of these more general epistemological and substantive arguments. I have suggested that the official Soviet account does indicate, on balance, a realistic appreciation of the major 'international order' problems of the Soviet-American relationship; and that where that account is manifestly inadequate, the problem lies primarily in the intractable contradictions of contemporary world politics, rather than in peculiar limitations of the Soviet conceptual framework. To begin with the central question of the nuclear relationship, there is no compelling evidence in Soviet doctrine of a refusal to recognize the practical reality of mutual deterrence and the major implications which flow from it, including the practical impossibility of a successful 'first strike' strategy under present and foreseeable technological conditions. It is certainly true that Soviet doctrine indicates a deep concern with the fragility of deterrence despite the irrationality of the alternatives, and a commitment to fighting a nuclear war if deterrence should break down. But this is most reasonably viewed as a traditional military response to an intractable new problem. It is clearly an inadequate response; but it is less disturbing overall than those American 'limited war' concepts which are much more obviously designed to retain an integral role for nuclear weapons in the flexible 'spectrum of capabilities' underpinning American diplomacy.

This much said, the question of detailed and systematic strategies for nuclear warfighting is pervaded by a general sense of unreality, and the more tangible implications of warfighting goals on either side lie in the convenient rationale which they provide for openended competition in the strategic arms race. As has been noted, the pattern of this arms race is to some extent a 'natural' reflection of the structural logic of the contemporary 'bipolar' system, as both
sides pursue a traditional great power concern with maintaining a favourable 'balance' on their own side, in conditions which place a premium on competitive improvements in capability as a means towards this goal. However, the traditional security dilemma has been given an unusually sinister twist by the anomalous character of nuclear weapons as essentially irrational instruments of diplomacy, in that the intense qualitative competition of the past decade must inevitably prompt suspicions on either side that the other is hankering after the Chimera of a 'usable' first strike advantage. Since this strategic competition has also been accompanied by the globalization of conventional capabilities on both sides - capabilities which do appear, at least superficially, to offer tangible diplomatic rewards - but which also lock the two great powers more closely into the autonomous conflicts of an increasingly 'crowded' periphery - the preoccupation with the use of nuclear weapons 'in the last resort' is further intensified.

There is no doubt that the recent Soviet advance in both the nuclear and conventional areas constitutes a major extension in this general militarization of world politics. But this is substantially explicable as a drive to 'catch up' with already established American capabilities; and it is by no means clear, once account is taken of the inevitable lag between procurement and deployment of major weapons systems, that the chief initiative in this respect now lies on the Soviet side. And on the matter of declared policy (which, to repeat, is a crucial component of the hawk interpretation of the otherwise ambiguous pattern of Soviet procurement) such an assumption is particularly questionable. The Soviet leadership did indeed proclaim its commitment to superiority throughout the first post-war generation: but so, for the most part, did the American leadership, which was much better placed, given the actual balance of forces, to contemplate meaningful initiatives in arms control and reduction. And since the early 1970s, when the catching-up drive had achieved its most obvious goal, the Soviet leadership has shifted towards an increasingly unequivocal disavowal of aspirations towards superiority, and displayed a consistent, if narrowly focussed, declaratory commitment to the SALT process which is in substantial contrast to the ups and downs of official American pronouncements in this regard.
To turn from these more narrowly military questions to the wider questions of the Soviet 'working theory of contemporary world history' is to encounter the area in which Soviet doctrine is most distinctive - and also, I would argue, the area in which its particular contribution to the understanding of international issues is most substantial.

There has been much dissension in the American debate over whether the 'schizophrenic' Soviet picture of world politics reflects the genuine perceptions of the Soviet leadership, but relatively little challenge to the view that the picture itself is a disturbing one which, insofar as it does accurately reflect Soviet perceptions, suggests a basic inability to contemplate a truly comprehensive relationship of coexistence and detente. The argument here, by contrast, is that the contradictions in Soviet doctrine reflect contradictions in the world: in the general history of the modern states-system, whose central core of procedural norms and practices has survived so long because it has been largely 'insulated' from a continuous process of more or less intense change in the system's underlying socio-political fabric; and, more particularly, in the contemporary phase of the system, which is structurally closer to the disordered situation of early modern Europe than to the 'classic' periods of multiple balance and limited power politics of the 18th and 19th centuries. Similarly, the complexity of levels and tempos in contemporary world politics is more adequately represented by the crude, but historically oriented Soviet doctrine of the correlation of forces than by the synchronic image of the international (or world) system which evidently informs American criticisms of that doctrine. And given the persistent elongation of the official Soviet image of the transition to world socialism, its effective acknowledgement of a piecemeal, 'building block' approach to world revolution, and its markedly statist approach to the question of 'national liberation', the Soviets may in one sense be said to provide a positive rationale for a 'state-centric' pluralism in the transition period.

As has been noted, this image of long-term struggle for control of the world economy has a very respectable Leninist pedigree, and it has been constantly promulgated for almost thirty years by the post-Stalin leadership. There has been, for the most part, a striking consistency between the general 'coexistence synthesis' established
by Khrushchev and the doctrinal position of the current regime; and the elongation of the 'transition period', in particular, has now been carried so far as to project the situation of capitalist-socialist coexistence well beyond the scope of any plausibly 'foreseeable future'. But it is also true that the broad Khrushchevian appeal to the concept of 'peaceful economic competition' - admittedly in conditions of relative military weakness on the Soviet side - has given way to an increasing doctrinal emphasis - mirrored in Soviet practice - on the importance of socialist-bloc military assistance to the national liberation struggle. I have suggested that the Soviet attempt to reconcile this approach with support for an 'irreversible' but compartmentalized detente effectively resurrects a very traditional mode of great power conflict management: the insulation of conflicts of interest 'beyond the line' from relations in the core of the system. This is at least an advance on the more exclusivist position on this score of the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. But, as has also been noted, the attempt to insulate conflicts in the periphery has in the past tended to evolve into a positive rationale for unrestricted great power intervention in that region; and in the 'closed' global system of today, such a prospect would rapidly destabilize a great power relationship which, in most other respects, is more genuinely 'in balance' than at any previous point in this century.

This raises, finally, a paradox which has been encountered on several occasions, in regard to the hawk argument for the 'Russian' derivation of Soviet expansionism. Soviet international conduct, and increasingly Soviet international doctrine, have substantially 'converged' in the post-war era on that traditional great power posture which was once widely regarded in the West as the sine qua non of a viable coexistence relationship with the Soviet bloc. But this development has, on balance, increased rather than diminished the Soviet contribution to world military tensions: not merely in the obvious sense that the Soviets now have a greater capability to interfere in military conflicts away from their own borders, but also in the sense that, after a tentative exploration of less militarized forms of struggle in the Khrushchev era, they have increasingly conformed to a more traditional conception of great power management.
rights, and in particular to the standard established in this area by the United States in the first post-war generation. This paradox has been handled in the hawk literature by the assertion that the Russian historical experience has militated against a true great power perspective in Soviet policy, based upon relatively well-defined conceptions of national interest and a general sensitivity to 'how much is enough'. But the polemical deployment of this partial truth (which is also applicable to the United States) has obscured the larger truth that a traditional great power perspective is, in itself, inadequate to the contradictory realities of contemporary world politics.

This, I would argue, is the underlying reason for the resilience of the ideological perspectives of interdependence/developmental pluralism, on the American side, and national liberation/anti-imperialist struggle, on the Soviet. Each perspective is partial and often misleading; and each can be used to rationalize 'geopolitical' and 'mercantilist' policies which are both self-serving in immediate impulse and also based upon anachronistic perceptions of the real long-term interest of either great power. But each perspective, insofar as it implies that states-system and world-economy issues must be comprehended together or not at all, points to a crucial feature of contemporary world politics which cannot be exorcized merely by appeals for a turn back from 'ideological' to 'pragmatic' attitudes in this area. Indeed, given a choice between the broad declaratory stances of the American and Soviet leaderships at the outset of the detente era, one might reasonably prefer the latter. Not the declining viability of all "isms", to which Nixon and Kissinger looked forward with approval, but genuine detente combined with genuine ideological struggle (as opposed to a state-directed ritual rationalizing the suppression of domestic dissent), seems the most appropriate prescription for a healthy future relationship between the great powers themselves and between the great powers collectively and the rest of the world.

In conclusion, it is worth recalling Hinsley's 1962 observation that the Cold War might 'go down in history as another of those periods in which the majority of men have railed against the crisis of their time when, in reality, the crisis had already passed away'. Men are still railing against the crisis of Soviet-American coexistence, and at least partly for that reason the crisis itself has not yet
passed away. But the other, more fundamental crisis emphasized by Hinsley - the crisis in the social, economic and political development of the Third World - has grown still more intense with the passage of time, and it carries with it growing possibilities for the catalytic extension of otherwise containable great power tensions into a general military conflagration.

It would be misleading to suggest that an end to ideological 'misperception' on both sides could remove the real and substantial conflicts of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States. But it would be still more misleading to deny the common core of interest in basic conflict management procedures transcending these specific conflicts between the two powers; and I have attempted to show that these common interests are acknowledged with increasing clarity in the official Soviet account. Moreover, behind this doctrinal evidence of basic prudential realism, I have attempted to show that the Soviet account provides an important, if undeniably partial, insight into those problems of Third World development which will increasingly complicate the great power relationship over the remainder of the century. On balance, there are strong reasons for holding that exercises in 'taking Soviet doctrine seriously' should be directed less towards the search for improbable messages about Soviet intentions concealed behind its 'Aesopian' exterior and more towards a serious consideration of its potential contribution to the common enterprise of understanding the current transitional era in world politics. For it is a common enterprise, as it is an enterprise of the transition. Comprehensive philosophical afterthought will be available only when, and if, the more dangerous rapids have already been negotiated; and the recent history of 'transition - thought' on these questions provides no warrant for gratuitously narrowing on ideological grounds the range of historical experience 'available' to theoretical reflection in the present crisis.

Twentieth century international theory has characteristically resembled Eliot's 'raid on the inarticulate, with shabby equipment always deteriorating' and twentieth century international practice has all-too-often constituted 'a different kind of failure'. This is one kind of novelty that the world can no longer afford.
Notes

1  Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 367.

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