UNITED STATES POLICY AND
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN
ASIA

BY

ROBERT F. HOWARD

This thesis was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University.

December 1972.
I certify that this thesis is my own original work.

R. F. HOWARD.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Appendices</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventions</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precis</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PART I: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY, 1946-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter I</th>
<th>The Techniques And Objectives Of American Nonproliferation Policy, 1946-1968</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>The Rationale And Motivations of American Nonproliferation Policy</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PART II: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN ASIA

| III       | The Chinese Nuclear Force                                               | 83 |
| IV        | The Potential Nuclear Powers Of Asia: India                            | 105|
| V         | The Potential Nuclear Powers of Asia: Japan                            | 146|
| VI        | The Potential Nuclear Powers Of Asia: Australia                        | 187|

## PART III: AMERICAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN ASIA, 1964-1971

| VIII      | Ballistic Missile Defence And American Nonproliferation Policy in Asia, 1967-1971 | 261|
| X         | Nonproliferation And American Security Policy in Asia, 1969-1971         | 320|
| XI        | The Peaceful Atom And American Nonproliferation Policy In Asia            | 355|

<p>| Summary And Conclusion | 391|
| Appendices             | 400|
| Bibliography           | 419|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIST OF APPENDICES</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand And The United States</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Treaty Of Mutual Cooperation And Security Between The United States Of America And Japan</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Treaty On The Nonproliferation Of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>United States Declaration On Security Assurances To Non-Nuclear Nations, June 17, 1968</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Signatories And Ratifications To The Treaty On The Nonproliferation Of Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was commenced while I was a Research Scholar in the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. For the opportunity to study at the Australian National University and to visit the United States on field work I am, needless to say, immensely grateful.

In the preparation of the thesis I benefited from the help of numerous individuals in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University. Principal amongst these were my supervisor, Professor Hedley Bull, and Dr. Ian Bellany, a Research Fellow in the same department. In addition, Dr. Hugh Smith, Dr. John Vincent and Dr. John Welfield, all former Research Scholars in the Department of International Relations, drew my attention to several important points of detail.

After leaving Canberra, access to much-needed source material was facilitated by the generous efforts of Elizabeth McFarlane of the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Dr. Hugh Smith of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, and by Dr. Hanno Weisbrod in Washington. Also, I am grateful for the hospitality extended to me by Dr. Hugh Smith and his wife Viv on those occasions when I found it necessary to re-visit Canberra to further my research.

Finally, I must acknowledge the very special contribution of my wife Vera without whose support and understanding this work could not have been completed.
CONVENTIONS

1. In many discussions about the subject matter of this thesis those states which possess nuclear weapons are often referred to as "nuclear weapons powers". (The purpose of this usage is to distinguish the countries which possess nuclear weapons from those which possess only reactors and other peaceful nuclear facilities.) In this thesis the less clumsy term "nuclear power" is used to describe only those countries which possess nuclear weapons.

2. Strictly speaking the term "enriched uranium" refers to uranium which has been enriched in its isotope U235 beyond the naturally occurring percentage of 0.7. However in many works on the subject the terms "U235" and "enriched uranium" are used interchangeably. This is the convention adopted in this thesis.
Opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons has been a major objective of U.S. policy since the end of World War II. During this time Washington has devised a range of policies designed both to prevent other states from acquiring the wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons and to deter states with those capacities from converting them into military nuclear capabilities. The United States has sought to rationalise its opposition to nuclear spread in a number of ways but principally on the grounds that the more nuclear powers there are, the more there are likely to be, and that the more there are, the greater the risks of nuclear war. Underlying much of Washington's concern has been the fear that nuclear spread might reduce America's capacity to regulate crisis situations and to prevent them from developing into general war.

To date, China is the only country in Asia which has developed nuclear weapons. Since 1964 Peking has acquired a modest stockpile of nuclear and probably thermonuclear warheads and has made considerable progress in the development and deployment of a missile delivery system. Three other countries in the area, India, Japan and Australia have, in varying degrees, the potential to eventually follow China in the development of nuclear weapons.

Despite Washington's long-standing opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, the record of American policy in Asia in the period 1964-71 suggests that the goal of nonproliferation in that area at least did not enjoy a very high priority in the hierarchy of U.S. policy objectives. The Nixon Administration seems to have accorded the goal of nonproliferation in Asia an even lower priority than had its predecessor. This appears to have been related to recent changes in the structure of world politics and to the Nixon Government's perception of these changes.
INTRODUCTION

The spread of nuclear weapons represents one of the most important developments in post-war International Relations. Beginning in 1945 the nuclear club has grown to include the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. In addition, a number of other countries have acquired the potential to develop nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time. Nuclear weapons have come to occupy a central place in the military plans of those powers which possess them and their presence has had a profound impact on the global balance of power. Since acquiring its own nuclear capability in 1945 it has been the policy of the U.S. to oppose the further spread of nuclear weapons. However, for about the first twenty years after World War II America's efforts in this regard were focussed primarily on Europe. But China's first nuclear test in October 1964 tended to alter this picture. Thereafter, the problem of proliferation in Asia in particular became a distinct concern of American policymaking.

This thesis has three aims. In Part I an attempt will be made to examine in a general way United States efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons during the period since the end of World War II to the time of the signing of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (N.P.T.) in July 1968. The emphasis throughout this first part of the thesis will centre on the techniques developed by Washington to counter the threat of proliferation, the rationale and underlying motivations of America's opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, and the significance of America's opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons for relations between Washington and its allies and between Washington and Moscow.
In Part II of the thesis an attempt will be made to examine the history and the present extent of proliferation in Asia and to assess the potential for further nuclear spread in the area from the viewpoint of about mid-1971. As the only nuclear power in Asia so far, China will of course occupy a special place in this analysis. The history of the development of the Chinese nuclear force to about mid-1971 will be examined and an assessment made of its present scale and likely future character. An effort will also be made to examine the rationale for the development of the Chinese nuclear force. As regards potential nuclear powers in the area, India, Japan and Australia have been chosen for consideration. Observers are virtually unanimous in regarding these three states as the only ones in Asia with, in varying degrees, the potential to eventually follow China in acquiring nuclear weapons. The history of the development of peaceful nuclear capabilities in each country will be examined and an assessment made both about the sort of nuclear force that each could construct and how soon these might be built. Consideration will also be given to the political, economic and strategic factors which have helped to shape each nation's particular stand on the question of the acquisition of national nuclear forces. So far as each country's attitude to the issue of arms control helps to explain its attitude to nuclear weapons in general, then this matter will also be discussed. The analysis of nuclear capabilities and incentives in India, Japan and Australia will not go beyond mid-1971.

Part III of the thesis deals with America's response to the problem of nuclear proliferation in Asia from about 1964 to mid-1971. The approach will be thematic rather than chronological and a number of questions will be examined. These will include: What methods have been used by Washington to counter the problem of proliferation in Asia? What has been the relative importance of the goal of nonproliferation in Asia in the hierarchy of
U.S. policy objectives? How has Washington reconciled the goal of nonproliferation in Asia with other objectives of U.S. policy? Has the problem of proliferation in Asia been viewed differently by different American Administrations? It must be emphasised that the analysis in this part of the thesis will be concerned primarily with American policy rather than with Asian reactions to that policy, though, for the sake of analysis there must, from time to time, be at least some reference to the latter.

The year 1964 has been chosen as the starting point for the analysis in Part III of the thesis because of the importance for the question of proliferation in Asia, as well as for America's response to this problem, of China's entry into the nuclear club. But this is not to suggest that reference to developments prior to 1964 has been entirely precluded. The various security assurances and guarantees that the U.S. has entered into with its Asian allies, as well as certain arrangements in the area of co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy can be rightly regarded as part of Washington's effort to limit proliferation in Asia. Many initiatives of this sort originated before 1964 and it has consequently been necessary to make at least some reference to developments which took place before China entered the nuclear club. Notwithstanding this, the major emphasis in Part III of the thesis is on the period from about 1964 to mid-1971.

Towards the very end of this period a number of developments took place which, by their very nature, were of seemingly great significance for the matters under review in Part III of the thesis. Chief amongst these were the announcement of President Nixon's decision to visit China, the decision by the U.S. Government to share the secrets of its gaseous diffusion technology with countries abroad, and the first indications that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union promised to produce an agreement substantially
limiting American (and Soviet) antiballistic missile (A.B.M.) deployments. To the extent that it has been possible these developments have been taken into account in the analysis. However, especially in the case of recent changes in U.S. policy towards China, it is still too early to say very much about the significance of this development for U.S. nonproliferation policy in Asia.

A word of explanation seems in order regarding the treatment of the N.P.T. Obviously, the latter agreement has been an important element in American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia and elsewhere. But because of the very nature of the issues under discussion it has been necessary to refer to different aspects of the N.P.T. in a number of different places throughout Part III (as indeed, throughout the thesis as a whole) rather than in a single chapter.
PART I

THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

1946-1968
The appearance of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II was interpreted by most American policy-makers as a development capable of having a very profound impact on the future course of international relations. Though at the time, speculation about the role of the atomic bomb lacked the sophistication characteristic of subsequent thought on strategic matters, it was nevertheless appreciated that the new weapon was one of immense military and political significance and could pose unprecedented problems for international stability and for the security of states everywhere. Propelled by these considerations, the United States Government concluded that it was in America's interests not to assist other nations to acquire nuclear weapons. This was clearly reflected in measures adopted by Washington during the immediate post-war years.


The aims of American policy at that time were to protect the nuclear monopoly which the U.S. then enjoyed and to lay the foundations for the eventual international control of atomic energy. The first of these objectives was the special target of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which was passed by the American Senate in June of that year. This act contained two main provisions: first, it established a government monopoly in the production of fissionable materials throughout the United States;
and second, it prohibited the transfer to foreign powers of nuclear information, equipment and materials.¹

This action had an immediate impact on America's relations with Great Britain. London complained that the Atomic Energy Act was an abrogation of the Quebec (August 1943) and Hyde Park (September 1944) agreements.² In January 1948, partly in response to these complaints and partly because of America's urgent need of uranium ore held by Britain, the U.S. Government agreed to resume collaboration with the U.K. in the nuclear field. However, the exchanges were to be strictly limited and were not to include any information on weapons development.³ It was clear that Washington had no intention of helping Britain to acquire the atomic bomb.


2. At Quebec, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that the U.S. and Britain would never use the atomic bomb against each other, and that neither without the consent of the other would use it against a third nation. The two leaders also set up the Combined Policy Committee to give broad direction to the effort to produce the bomb. At Hyde Park, Roosevelt and Churchill initialed an aid memoire calling for full co-operation in the development of the military and peaceful uses of atomic energy. See, Francis Duncan, "Atomic Energy and Anglo-American Relations, 1946-1953" in Orbis, Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 1969, pp. 1191-1192. Duncan suggests that the Atomic Energy Act was drawn up in almost total ignorance of the details of these wartime arrangements. See, ibid., p. 1191.

But why was the U.S. reluctant to help even its closest ally to acquire the bomb? One explanation of course, was that Washington was currently supporting proposals for the international control of atomic energy. To have openly assisted Britain to acquire the atomic bomb at this time, would have cast serious doubts on America's sincerity.\(^1\) Another important reason for America's attitude seems to have been the fear that information passed to Britain might eventually find its way to Russia. In February 1946, news of the Gouzenko spy ring and the confessions of Alan Nunn May alerted many Americans to the security risks involved in collaboration with other powers.\(^2\) In talks in the U.S. prior to the agreement of January 1948, "there was some discussion of the fact that fissionable material and atomic energy installations in Britain were more vulnerable to Soviet pressure and that American security from a military view would be best served if the British had no atomic energy programme."\(^3\) Russia's explosion of a nuclear device in August 1949 largely shattered the basis for this concern and after October 1951 there was some softening in the American attitude to Britain's nuclear programme.\(^4\)

Concurrently with the preparation of the Atomic Energy Act, the U.S. Government worked out a plan for the international control of atomic energy. The Baruch Plan, as it came to be called, was presented to the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (U.N.A.E.C.) on 14 June 1946. The scheme called for the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, the powers and responsibilities of which would include: (1) the managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security, (2) the power to control, inspect and licence all other

---

2. ibid., pp. 480-481.
4. ibid., pp. 1201-1202.
atomic activities, (3) the duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy, and (4) the conduct of research and development so as to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge. It was anticipated that once a system of controls and sanctions had been established and was effectively operating, further production of atomic weapons by states everywhere would cease, existing stocks would be destroyed, and all technological information relating to atomic energy matters would be communicated to the Authority.¹

At the second meeting of the U.N.A.E.C. on 19 June 1946, the Soviet Union submitted a draft convention prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons and providing that within three months from its entry into force, all atomic weapons were to be destroyed. At subsequent meetings of the Commission both the Russian and American proposals were developed and elaborated, but by the end of 1947 the two powers remained deeply divided on the matter.² In the first place, Washington insisted that there should be no provision for the exercise of the great power veto in cases involving Security Council action against states which violated their undertakings not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. The Soviet Union, which even at this time had already made abundant use of the veto, interpreted the American initiative as an attack on the underlying basis of the post-war settlement and consequently resisted the move. Second, Moscow objected strongly to America's insistence on international

2. For an excellent account of these differences, see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961, pp.54-77. The material in this paragraph is drawn from this source. For an extended discussion of the Baruch Plan, see Joseph P. Murray, From Yalta To Disarmament, London: Merlin Press, 1963.
ownership of practically all materials and facilities concerned with nuclear fission. Such a scheme, the Soviets objected, would lead to unwarranted interference in the economic affairs of states everywhere and would allow the U.S. to secure for itself a world monopoly of the industrial uses of the atom. Third, Moscow was only prepared to accept "periodic inspections" of declared nuclear facilities. This was far less than the scale of inspection which the U.S. thought necessary to ensure the observance of commitments. Fourth, the U.S. wanted all nuclear research and development of a "dangerous" character restricted to the proposed Atomic Development Authority; Moscow would have allowed such activity to be carried on in national states. Finally, Washington insisted that international controls should be established before nuclear weapons were prohibited; the Soviet Union insisted that "prohibition" must precede "controls".

The divergences between the Soviet and American plans for the international control of atomic energy reflected very real differences in the security interests of the two powers. The U.S. wanted international control because it feared that, in time, additional states would become capable of developing the bomb. As early as June 1945 the Franck Committee's report to the American Secretary of War had stressed that the U.S. could not hope to avoid a nuclear armament race, "either by keeping secret from competing nations the basic scientific facts of nuclear power, or by cornering the raw materials for such a race."¹ In March of the following year the Lilienthal Report was released. These findings, which foreshadowed the Baruch Plan itself, emphasised that the basic science upon which the new development rested was largely known to competent scientists throughout the world and that the industry and technology

---
necessary for the production of atomic bombs was essentially no different from that which was already in general use.\(^1\) But regardless of its desire for international control, Washington wanted to see controls established to ensure that the sharing of nuclear knowledge did not endanger America's security; until such guarantees were effectively operating, the U.S. was not prepared to surrender its nuclear monopoly. As former Secretary of State Byrnes said in 1947:

> It would be unfortunate if hostile governments possessed atomic bombs. But, it would be even more unfortunate if we threw our bombs away, gave over information to an international organisation with inadequate power to exercise effective control, and thus enabled another government [the U.S.S.R.] to manufacture bombs without our knowledge far sooner than otherwise would have been possible.\(^2\)

But Moscow's attitude to proposals for the international control of atomic energy was strongly influenced by security considerations too. Russia viewed the inspection provisions of the Baruch Plan as an attempt by the U.S. to spy on Soviet military and industrial facilities. More to the point, however, the U.S.S.R. was at that time striving to develop an atomic bomb of its own and was understandably quite reluctant to agree to any proposal which would have thwarted these efforts. The failure to impose international control on the atom was clearly one of the early indications of the deepening post-war rift between Russia and the U.S.

In May 1948, the U.N.A.E.C., in its third report to the Security Council, acknowledged that an impasse had been reached in progress towards a draft treaty on the international control of atomic energy.

---

of atomic energy. The Commission did not meet again after July 1949 and in January 1952 was dissolved by a resolution of the General Assembly. However, at subsequent meetings of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, the question of international control of atomic energy was often discussed. The Baruch Plan remained the basis of American policy on the matter, though President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" plan of 1953 seemed to imply the abandonment of at least one of its major provisions. The approach embodied in the Baruch Plan was not formally abandoned till September 1955. By then, the development of thermonuclear weapons had "destroyed the concept of securing the elimination of nuclear weapons through accounting for all past production of nuclear materials. The margin of error in any system of accountability had become too great a risk."

The American position on the control of atomic energy was arrived at only after long and at times bitter debate. Two major disputes highlighted the nationwide dialogue. First, there was considerable disagreement about the control of America's own nuclear industry. Though it seems to have been widely held that atomic energy was not a proper field for private exploitation, not all Americans were agreed as to where authority for control of the new development should reside. During the latter part of 1945 and the early months of 1946 a bitter political fight was waged in the United States to determine whether atomic energy development in that country

1. The United Nations and Disarmament, p. 20.
2. ibid., p.24.
3. For details of the "Atoms for Peace" plan, see below, p.18.
should be controlled primarily by the military or by civilians. The issue was eventually resolved by the passage of the Atomic Energy Act which guaranteed civilian control through the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Since that time the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy have emerged as the guardians of American interests in the nuclear field. Both have proved "considerably more conservative and skeptical over extending the areas of atomic cooperation than the White House".¹

But more divisive than this dispute over domestic control was the argument about America's response to the exploitation of atomic energy on the international level. Few Americans questioned the need for some form of control over the use of the atomic bomb, and it was generally agreed that the United States should not share with other nations the information necessary for the manufacture of the new weapon.² But a dispute arose over collaboration in nuclear research not specifically related to the construction of the bomb. There were many Americans, particularly in scientific circles, who believed that people everywhere were entitled to share in the fruits of nuclear science and that the benefits to be gained from research could be maximised by a free exchange of information between all nations. Moreover, it was argued that such an approach could be expected to preclude the many suspicions which might otherwise surround national research in this field.

² It should be noted, however, that the Smyth report, the first comprehensive description of the wartime atomic project was released in 1945. This work was of a fairly general nature but it did give "guidance in the general paths to follow or not to follow in an atomic weapons program." The report was quickly translated and published in Russia. See, Arnold Kramish, "The Emergent Genie" in R.N. Rosecrance, The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, N. York: Columbia University Press, 1964, p. 264.
Others emphasised the value of such a move in terms of Soviet-American relations specifically. Indeed, Dr Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, warned that the alternative to a free exchange of scientific information with Russia was a nuclear arms race.\(^1\) It was an essential part of the argument for a free exchange that a distinction could be drawn between information of a general "scientific" nature on the one hand and "engineering" details more specifically related to bomb construction on the other.\(^2\)

But there was widespread opposition to suggestions that America should share even some of its nuclear information with others. Foremost amongst those who advocated a policy of secrecy were the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was their view that any collaboration with the Soviet Union was especially dangerous. Washington, they argued, should refuse to reveal any of the country's nuclear secrets while at the same time pressing for urgent controls on the use of the atomic bomb.\(^3\)

The debate over the direction of American policy was not unrelated to assessments about the prospects of nuclear spread. Those who supported a policy of openness emphasised the view, widely held amongst scientists, that any attempt by the United States to maintain its nuclear monopoly would be futile.\(^4\) But the opponents of openness were confident that their country's nuclear monopoly would not be destroyed in the immediate future, and that consequently there were real gains to be had from a policy of secrecy. Even amongst those who believed that other nations would eventually be able to

---

2. In later years this distinction was recognised by successive U.S. Administrations also, and served as a partial guide to the type of nuclear information America was then prepared to share with other states.
4. See above, p. 5.
build nuclear weapons there was a tendency to exaggerate the financial, engineering and technological gap which was assumed to exist between the United States and the rest of the world. It was widely predicted for instance that the Soviet Union could not acquire nuclear weapons for many years. The explosion of an atomic bomb by Russia in 1949 came as a shock to more than a few American scientists and statesmen. This belief that technological and financial constraints would contribute substantially to limiting or retarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states characterised American policy till well into the following decade.

In terms of the controversy over the appropriate American response to the control of atomic energy in the post-war period, the Atomic Energy Act and the Baruch Plan together represented a victory for the advocates of an American monopoly, at least in the short run, in both the military and civilian uses of the atom. Not only were other nations to be denied information relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but in addition, the United States did not intend to exchange any information or material related to the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy pending the establishment of effective international control. This insistence on international control as a precondition for any exchange of information or material was later abandoned under the "Atoms for Peace" programme.

Though it is apparent that from 1945 onwards the U.S. was concerned with monopolizing the bomb, it would be erroneous to suggest that America had a "nonproliferation" policy right from the start. The term "proliferation" suggests an awareness of

1. A committee assembled in 1945 by Secretary of War Stimson, and which included an impressive array of scientists such as Fermi, Oppenheimer and Lawrence, concluded that it would probably take the Soviet Union ten years to produce an atomic bomb. See Bader, op. cit., p. 21.
the problem of nuclear spread in the large, and a belief that any increase in the number of nuclear powers presents dangers. This idea certainly characterised official American thinking in the late 1950's, but it is doubtful whether it was there when the Baruch Plan and the Atomic Energy Act were being first presented. It is true of course that some Americans at this time saw the possibility of nuclear weapons being eventually acquired by quite a number of states. But Washington's attitude to nuclear spread in the immediate post-war years was primarily a reflection of more immediate and specific considerations, viz., its concern not to help Russia acquire the bomb. Its failure to assist Britain reflected not concern about "proliferation", or even about a U.K. nuclear capability, so much as fear that to help Britain might result in help to the Russians.

B. The Atomic Energy Act and America's Cold War Strategy.

From the time of its ratification in 1946, the Atomic Energy Act quickly became the cornerstone of American efforts to limit nuclear spread. It has been noted that the Act prohibited most forms of nuclear collaboration between the United States and other nations and during the early post-war years was invoked against America's most trusted ally, Great Britain. Throughout the 1950's the Atomic Energy Act, despite its amendment on more than one occasion, remained the principal instrument of American efforts to maintain its nuclear monopoly. The circumstances surrounding the amendments reflected the demands of Washington's cold war strategy. In order to understand more fully the role of the Atomic Energy Act in American policy during this period it will be necessary to review briefly the place of atomic weapons in European defence.

The abortive attempt by the United States to achieve agreement with the Soviet Union over international control of
atomic energy was pursued against a background of worsening relations between the two powers. Since the end of the Second World War a succession of crises in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Berlin highlighted a growing rift between Russia and America which developed into the Cold War of the 1950's. This deepening confrontation profoundly influenced American thinking about the role of nuclear weapons in world affairs. The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 marked the commencement of a new era in the evolution of America's post-war diplomacy. Thereafter, thinking in the United States about nuclear arms control was conducted in a political and strategic environment vastly different from that in which the initial decisions about the control of atomic energy had been made. At the time the Baruch plan was introduced, American strategy was not heavily dependent on nuclear weapons. As Hedley Bull has suggested, "nuclear weapons were few, their military implications had not been thought out, military planning and organisation had not been built around them, and they were largely extraneous to military policy." But in response to the deepening Cold War, and in support of its commitment to N.A.T.O., the United States evolved a strategy which accorded a major role to its nuclear armaments. The movement of these weapons to the very centre of American military policy was a development destined to influence, both directly and indirectly, the course of thinking in the United States about the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

From its inception N.A.T.O. suffered from a shortage of conventional forces and tended to rely heavily on the threat of nuclear retaliation. During the alliance's early years this capacity was provided exclusively by the strike forces of the

United States Strategic Air Command (S.A.C.). By the mid-1950's tactical nuclear weapons were becoming available in quantity: these included bombs deliverable by light bomber or fighter bomber; variants of the short-range rocket or guided missile; and, the 280 mm. nuclear cannon, about 30 of which had been supplied to N.A.T.O. forces by late 1954. In December of that year, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, it was decided that the alliance should plan on initiating the use of these weapons if ever necessary. This decision led to the diffusion of tactical nuclear weapons within N.A.T.O. and necessitated the amendment of the United States Atomic Energy Act to allow for the transfer to America's allies of information necessary for the carrying out of a tactical nuclear strategy. Finally, in the wake of Russia's technological breakthrough in 1957, symbolised by the launching that year of the world's first earth satellite, the United States decided to seek the deployment of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe. It was hoped that this move would eliminate the dangers inherent in any possible 'missile gap'. During 1959 and 1960, four American I.R.B.M. squadrons were placed in Britain and agreements were negotiated for similar installations in Turkey and Italy. Throughout the 1950's then, nuclear weapons, the overwhelming majority of which were American owned, were accorded a key role in the defence of Western Europe. Indeed, during most of this period, N.A.T.O. strategy called for the almost immediate use of nuclear weapons in response to any but the most limited of Soviet incursions.

The first major amendment to the Atomic Energy Act was made in 1954 and allowed for the sharing of information necessary

for the execution of a tactical nuclear strategy in Europe. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitted Washington to acquaint its N.A.T.O. allies with information on the external characteristics of nuclear weapons, such as "size, weight and shape, yield and effects, and systems employed in the delivery thereof."¹ But care was taken to exclude the transfer of information which was thought may have facilitated allied manufacture of nuclear weapons and to ensure that control of American warheads would not pass from Washington's hands. 

To this end the amended act stipulated that the United States was to retain physical possession at all times of the warheads dispersed throughout N.A.T.O.² As a further precaution, the Act of 1954 ensured that Congress (through the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) was given considerable control over executive agreements to disseminate nuclear weapons.³ This addition to the powers of the Joint Committee assisted the emergence of that body as the guardian of America's atomic energy legislation. In 1957, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy moved to block an executive proposal to transfer custody of nuclear stockpiles to N.A.T.O. itself,⁴ and in 1958 and again in 1960, objected strongly to suggestions that the United States assist France in the development of a nuclear submarine engine.⁵ In more recent times the Joint Committee has continued to urge restraint in the dissemination of nuclear information. The character of the 1954 amendment suggests that Washington, while anxious to find some solution to N.A.T.O.'s military problems, was nevertheless reluctant to do anything which could help other states to acquire nuclear

². ibid., p. 216.
³. ibid., p. 386, fn.21.
⁴. ibid., p. 220.
⁵. ibid., p. 226.
weapons of their own. But as Secretary of State Dulles recognised, this was difficult to avoid. In commenting, in 1954, on the proposed amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, he said:

The art of telling people what a weapon is like, what it can do to you, how you can protect yourself, and at the same time not tell anybody how you produce the weapon, that undoubtedly is a difficult task of definition.¹

The outcome of this attempt to reconcile the demands of strategy with the desire not to help others produce nuclear weapons will be reviewed later in this chapter.

The second major amendment to the Atomic Energy Act was made in 1958. Mainly in response to the concern stimulated by the launching of Sputniks I and II, Washington decided to deploy I.R.B.M.s on allied soil and to establish in Europe stocks of nuclear warheads intended for release to N.A.T.O. commanders in the event of hostilities. An agreement along these lines was reached at a N.A.T.O. Council meeting in December 1957² and approval confirmed when the Atomic Energy Act was amended in July of the following year. The Act authorized, under certain specific conditions, the transfer to America's allies of: (1) the non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, (2) fissionable nuclear materials suitable for the development of, or use in, nuclear weapons, (3) sensitive information concerning nuclear weapons, and (4) nuclear equipment such as military reactors.³ As in the case of the 1954 amendment it was not intended that this latest revision of the Atomic Energy Act should make it easier for additional states to acquire nuclear weapons. In submitting the proposed legislation to Congress, the Atomic Energy Commission emphasised that:

¹. ibid., p. 401, fn.3.
². ibid., p. 221.
³. Bader, op. cit., p. 29.
It is not intended that manufactured components of weapons could be transferred under this amendment, nor that we promote the entry of additional countries into the field of production of nuclear weapons.\(^1\)

Care was taken to ensure that under the terms of the new agreement warheads would continue to remain in the custody of American personnel. I.R.B.M.'s deployed in Europe were to be operated accordingly to a "two-key" arrangement in which Washington controlled the warheads and the host country the missiles. Joint action by both parties would be required to activate the weapons. In addition, the provision in the new legislation relating to the transfer of atomic secrets and material was limited to those countries which had displayed "substantial progress" in the development of a nuclear weapons capability.\(^2\) It was generally understood by those responsible for the framing of the legislation that this concession was to apply only in the case of Great Britain and was not to be interpreted as a willingness on the part of the United States to assist other nations in the development of nuclear weapons.\(^3\) An offer to assist the United Kingdom was extended only after Britain, in May 1957, had successfully demonstrated its own thermonuclear capacity. Finally, it should be noted that this latest revision of the Atomic Energy Act was accompanied by numerous claims that an upgrading of the nuclear factor in America's European strategy was necessary partly in order to forestall any movement towards independent nuclear capabilities in Europe.\(^4\)

---

1. ibid.
2. ibid., p. 30.
3. Mr Harold S. Vance, a commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, was particularly candid about this discriminatory policy. In testifying before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, he said:
   
   Now our dilemma is this: We admit, to ourselves, that we want to discriminate among our allies, but we cannot admit it to them. Now the way to handle this situation is for you gentlemen to write some criteria into this law that we can use as a basis for our refusal to treat all of our allies alike. Quoted in, ibid.
Throughout the 1950s then, Washington remained firmly committed to a policy of not helping other states to acquire nuclear weapons. The two amendments to the Atomic Energy Act in this period enabled America to maximize its strategic flexibility and to provide its European allies with a sense of confidence that they could be defended. However, there was clearly no intention of facilitating any increase in the total number of nuclear powers. Nevertheless, it can be reasonably argued that the increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in planning the defence of Western Europe only stimulated the desire amongst some N.A.T.O. members for their own independent nuclear capabilities. This development will be analysed later in the chapter.

C. The "Atoms for Peace" Programme and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It was noted earlier that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited the exchange of any nuclear information or material between the United States and other countries. In the absence of enforceable and effective international safeguards this refusal to assist other states in the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy was viewed by Washington as an essential element in its effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. During the first half of the 1950s, however, this approach was reversed, and following the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, the United States began assisting other governments in the development of peaceful nuclear technology. The first bilateral agreements were authorized by President Eisenhower in 1955 and provided for the export of research reactors and small quantities
of enriched uranium.  

1. During the late 1950s alone, America sold about 25 research reactors abroad.  

2. By 1968, the U.S. was cooperating in the civil uses of atomic energy with no less than 29 individual countries and two international organizations (EURATOM and the I.A.E.A.).

This departure from the previous policy of secrecy was fore­shadowed in President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal of December, 1953. During an address to the General Assembly, the American leader proposed that the governments "principally involved" make joint contributions from their stockpiles of fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.). It would be the responsibility of this agency to allocate the fissionable material to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.  

There were a number of reasons for the "Atoms for Peace" initiative. It is clear that Eisenhower was anxious to inject an element of optimism into the gloom, engendered by the current impasse in progress towards disarmament. The proposal to share the fruits of nuclear science was comfortably humanitarian, and at the same time, offered the prospect of new channels of communication between Washington and Moscow.  


2. ibid., p. 609.


probably also motivating factors and there were possibly some Americans who saw in the scheme a means of discovering how far the Russians had advanced in the nuclear field. But it seems that the "Atoms for Peace" plan was primarily an attempt by the United States to replace secrecy with influence. It appears to have been anticipated that in some way Washington could promote a system of international controls while simultaneously encouraging the spread of nuclear technology. This can certainly be deduced from some remarks during 1965 by Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. In discussing the "Atoms for Peace" proposal he said:

We ... considered that if we did not cooperate in sharing our peaceful nuclear technology and nuclear materials, there would be other countries - not all of which would necessarily agree to the need for safeguards - other countries which might be willing to provide nuclear materials and technology without a firm assurance as to their eventual peaceful end use.¹

The "Atoms for Peace" programme involved the abandonment of the central feature of the Baruch Plan, viz., the concept of international ownership or operational control of all atomic energy activities considered dangerous to world security. The reason for this change in American policy is obvious: by 1953, national ownership or control of atomic energy activities was an established fact and consequently the idea of ownership by the proposed International Atomic Development Authority seemed impracticable. But if the concept of international ownership had been abandoned, that of supervision had not. With few exceptions, the assistance in the peaceful nuclear field which the U.S. has extended to foreign powers has been accompanied by safeguards arrangements to ensure that the materials and

¹. Quoted in, ibid., p. 614.
facilities supplied are not used for military purposes. These safeguards arrangements provide the United States with the right of on-site inspection of reactors and other equipment to determine that the commitment to peaceful uses is being observed. In addition, the recipient countries are obliged to keep records and submit periodic reports on the relevant undertakings. The U.S. also has the right to review the design of facilities in order to ensure that effective safeguards can be applied. In addition to applying safeguards to its own bilateral transfers of nuclear material and equipment, the United States has encouraged other suppliers to do likewise.

Through its bilateral assistance programme, the U.S. has provided foreign countries with access to much of America's vast knowledge in the peaceful nuclear field. But in some areas of peaceful nuclear technology, considerable secrecy has been maintained. Nowhere is this more so than in the field of uranium isotope separation (enrichment) technology. Enriched...

1. In 1957, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was accorded the privilege of self-inspection, but in accordance with American standards. Prior to this, Canada and Britain, which were already competitors in the peaceful nuclear field, were the only recipients of American assistance to have been exempted from bilateral, on-the-spot supervision. See, Arnold Kramish, The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy, N. York: Harper and Row, 1963, pp. 155-156.


4. Very recently, there have been indications that the U.S. is now prepared, subject to certain conditions, to share some of its secrets relating to enrichment technology. This development has a large bearing on one of the basic themes of this thesis and will be taken up in some detail later in the discussion. See below, Chapter XI.
uranium is used as the fuel in a large majority of the world's nuclear power reactors. However, the material can also be used as an alternative to plutonium in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and is regarded as highly suitable, if not essential, in the production of thermo-nuclear weapons. The United States manufactures enriched uranium by using the gaseous diffusion method. Traditionally, Washington has maintained a strict classification on this process and has banned the export of specialized equipment which could be used in diffusion plants. In July 1965, work in the U.S. on the gas centrifuge technique, an alternative method of uranium isotope separation, was also classified. Earlier, in August 1960, the United States Atomic Energy Commission (U.S.A.E.C.) had asked the West German Government to classify work in that country too. Concern about the centrifuge process stemmed from certain advantages it enjoyed relative to the diffusion method; in particular, operations could be concealed more easily and could be conducted on a smaller scale. But despite these efforts by the U.S., as well as those by Britain and Russia, the diffusion

6. Both countries have classified their diffusion technology. See Kramish, op. cit., p.15.
process has been developed by France and China. But the virtual impossibility of thwarting the spread of enrichment technology has been demonstrated more vividly by recent developments in the centrifuge field. These developments, and their impact on American nonproliferation policy, will be the subject of more detailed analysis later in the thesis.¹

From the start, Washington claimed to regard its bilateral nuclear assistance programme as an interim measure pending the establishment and effective operation of the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency. It was especially envisaged that the I.A.E.A. would assume responsibility for administering the safeguards and control arrangements which had been created.² (Spokesmen for the American Government have claimed to see special advantages in a multinational system of safeguards: they have been regarded as more uniform and economic than bilateral ones; as more credible to the world at large, since, theoretically at least, they are more objective and disinterested; and as less likely to be watered-down in the interests of commercial or some other gain.³ There is evidence that the United States has also viewed the safeguards system of the I.A.E.A. as a possible framework for the implementation of wider disarmament measures such as a "cut-off" in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.⁴)

The I.A.E.A. was eventually established in 1957 but it was not till 1960 that a safeguards system was devised and approved by the Board of Governors. During the next three years Washington's attitude changed from one of support for I.A.E.A. safeguards to one of insistence on their application. In January 1963 the American Government decided to place most of its bilateral nuclear assistance agreements under I.A.E.A. supervision. Agreements were to become subject to I.A.E.A. safeguards as they came up for renewal. As a corollary to this, new agreements would also provide for I.A.E.A. safeguards. At the same time, America called for the removal of limitations on I.A.E.A. safeguards which had previously restricted their application to reactors of 100 M.W. capacity or less. Since 1963, the United States has urged that nuclear transfers everywhere take place under effective international safeguards and has engaged in vigorous diplomacy to persuade its allies at least, to insist on I.A.E.A. safeguards on all materials and equipment supplied by them. As an indication of its approval of the I.A.E.A., and in order to assist in the development of the Agency's safeguards system, the United States has placed a number of its own reactors under I.A.E.A. safeguards and has encouraged other countries to do likewise. The U.S. Government has also offered the I.A.E.A. access to one of America's

3. For details of these arrangements, see statement by Henry D. Smyth, in D.o.S.B., 3 January 1966, p. 32. See also, Statement by A.C.D.A. Director W.C. Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee : Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons, July 2, 1964. Reproduced in D on D., 1964,
chemical separation plants so as the Agency might develop and test inspection techniques relevant to this particular type of nuclear facility.¹

Ironically, the "Atoms for Peace" programme, by contributing to the world wide spread of nuclear knowledge, equipment and material, has made it easier for additional countries to acquire nuclear weapons. As Arnold Kramish noted in 1963:

We are confronted with the stark reality that as a direct consequence of the Atoms for Peace program the United States, aided and abetted by the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia, has given the world an uncontrolled technology - the technology of plutonium - with which any nation, with time and sacrifice, can make atomic bombs.²

It is true of course that controls designed to inhibit the diversion of nuclear equipment and material to military purposes have been a feature of most bilateral agreements. But the experience gained by any state through participation in peaceful nuclear activities, and which could be utilized


in any weapons programme, cannot be similarly controlled. Moreover, as Leonard Beaton observed in 1967, "the real danger with growing stockpiles of plutonium is not diversion but the denunciation of international agreements."\(^1\)

D. The Emergence of the "Nth. Country" Problem.

During the closing years of the 1950s there were indications that some American policy makers were beginning to have second thoughts about the adequacy of their country's traditional approach to the problem of nuclear spread. The first flickerings of doubt were visible in 1958 and during the next few years a series of developments reinforced the mounting conviction that the United States should adopt a more categorical stand on the matter. Two major developments may be said to have nourished this re-examination: a reappraisal of the nuclear qualifications of a number of states which suggested that the capacity to build atomic weapons could become more widespread than previously imagined; and, an indication that some of America's European allies, dissatisfied with arrangements for the control of the N.A.T.O. deterrent, might be persuaded to follow the French example and embark on their own nuclear weapons programme.

The belief that technological and financial barriers could effectively limit the spread of nuclear weapons has been a feature of American thinking about the problem since the days of the Baruch Plan. But towards the end of the 1950s it was becoming apparent that more than a few states could be expected to acquire the resources necessary for an atomic armaments programme. A report sponsored by the National

---

Planning Association in Washington, and published in January 1960, surveyed the capacities of 26 countries to manufacture nuclear explosives. It was estimated that twelve of these states were "able to embark on a successful nuclear weapons programme in the near future."¹ The first French nuclear test in February 1960 added new significance to the latest assessments of world wide nuclear potential. Not only did it demonstrate that a nation of France's size and level of development was capable of building atomic armaments, but also, it had increased the possibility that other countries of similar status might be persuaded to do likewise. It is difficult to exaggerate the significance that Washington attached to the development of the French bomb. The American Government had been unenthusiastic about France's weapons programme from the start and had consistently declined to assist its progress. By 1962, the U.S. had developed a fairly sophisticated, strategy-oriented case against the French deterrent. But during 1958 and 1959 most American policy-makers viewed France's nuclear weapons programme primarily in terms of its possible effect on other potential nuclear states. As Secretary of State Dulles said to President de Gaulle in 1958: "the United States would have no objection to France becoming a nuclear power, if the nuclear race would stop there."² In discussion in the United States prior to the explosion of the French bomb the possibility of nuclear spread was usually referred to as the "fourth country" problem; thereafter, it was known as the "Nth country" problem.³

The second major reason for America's re-examination of its attitude to nuclear spread stemmed from the increasing

1. These were: Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, West Germany, East Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. See, The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control, quoted in Bull, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
2. Bader, op. cit., p. 34.
agitation in Europe for a larger say in the control of the N.A.T.O. deterrent. The dispersion of tactical nuclear weapons amongst N.A.T.O. units and the decision to initiate their use at an early stage in any hostilities made many of America's European allies almost wholly dependent on a strategy, the implementation of which, could result in unprecedented destruction of life and property in the states involved. But custody of the nuclear warheads assigned to N.A.T.O. units resided wholly in American hands and consequently it was Washington alone which had the final say on their use. The dissatisfaction with which many Europeans viewed the arrangements for the use of allied nuclear power was well reflected in a statement in 1958 by the Western European Union's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The committee said:

As the employment of an A or H weapon by aircraft or missile against a Russian site today spells immediate counter bombardment on targets in the entire free world, the monopoly of two countries to decide unilaterally on the destiny of themselves and others cannot any longer be maintained lest the alliance be weakened.

The development by the Soviet Union of an I.C.B.M. capability and the successful launching in 1957 of the world's first artificial earth satellite was an additional source of dissatisfaction amongst America's European allies. Misgivings in Europe about the credibility of U.S. guarantees had first been raised in 1955 following Russia's acquisition of an

1. "A vivid suggestion of the kind of destruction that a nuclear war in Europe might inflict was conveyed by the S.H.A.P.E. war game "Carte Blanche", held in West Germany, the Lowlands and north-eastern France in June, 1955. In this game it was announced that, hypothetically, 335 bombs had been dropped on military targets, killing 1,700,000 and wounding 3,500,000, not to mention the numbers affected by radioactivity." See, Osgood, op. cit., p. 126.

2. ibid., p. 224.
inter-continental bomber force. The latest Soviet achievement, which brought with it an even greater threat to America's cities, only reinforced these misgivings. Doubts about the credibility of America's guarantee helped to create a rationale for the British and French deterrents and there were fears in Washington that the same concern might stimulate other European states to embark upon similar programmes.

Since 1946, American efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons had been characterised by two strategies: strict enforcement of the Atomic Energy Act; and, more recently, insistence on the application of safeguards to ensure that assistance in the peaceful nuclear field was not used for weapons purposes. However, by the late 1950s there were indications that the possibility of further nuclear spread was greater than had previously been imagined. This prompted a reassessment of official American thinking on the matter. Hitherto, Washington's primary concern had been the possibility of nuclear spread to particular countries, especially Russia and France. Forebodings of this sort have remained a feature of American thinking; the possibility that West Germany might acquire nuclear weapons became a special source of concern. However, from the late 1950s onwards, Washington has tended to view the problem of nuclear spread in more general terms. Policy-makers have come to emphasise the possibility of rapid and widespread proliferation and have increasingly warned that any increase in the number of nuclear powers presents dangers. This has given rise to a more categorical stand by Washington.


on the question of nuclear proliferation.

Some reaction to the emerging "Nth country" problem was discernible during the closing years of the Eisenhower Administration, but it was not till after President Kennedy took office that the trend became clear. Kennedy, it seems, came to office deeply concerned about the problem of nuclear spread and was determined to get "the nuclear genie back in the bottle." The new administration's interest in arms control in general and the problem of nuclear spread in particular, was apparent during its first year in office. In 1961, Washington established the Arms Control And Disarmament Agency (A.C.D.A.), included a nonproliferation clause in its latest disarmament proposals, and decided to support Ireland's General Assembly resolution on nonproliferation. During the next five years America's concern about proliferation was clearly reflected in a number of major policy initiatives. These were: support for a nuclear test ban agreement; increased co-operation with the I.A.E.A.; a diplomatic offensive aimed at discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe; and finally, the pursuit of a nuclear nonproliferation agreement. One of these, the question of vigorous American support for the I.A.E.A., especially after January 1963, has already been mentioned. The others will be reviewed in the remainder of this chapter.


During the early 1960s, the region of most immediate concern to Washington so far as proliferation was concerned, was Western Europe. There, for the reasons already mentioned, incentives existed for the acquisition of national nuclear deterrents. Moreover, as the National Planning Association's

report had indicated, there were no less than six countries in the area capable of building nuclear weapons "in the near future."  

At the centre of American concern about proliferation in Europe at this time was the spectre of a nuclear armed Germany. Because of its significance in the cold war, Germany's acquisition of nuclear weapons was expected to have a devastating effect on the peace and stability of Europe. Admittedly, Bonn had declared itself against the production of nuclear weapons, but many Americans were nevertheless fearful that it might be tempted to emulate the French example. This was viewed as especially likely if other countries in Europe such as Sweden, Switzerland or Italy went nuclear.

Washington's first response to the threat of proliferation in Europe was to intensify its propaganda offensive against the growth of independent capabilities. American spokesmen, both official and unofficial, expounded a mass of sophisticated argument and scientific analysis designed to show that the states of Western Europe not only had no need of nuclear weapons of their own, but also, that it would not be in their interests to develop such forces. The high point in this campaign was

1. One of these was France which conducted its first nuclear test in January, 1960.
2. Germany's undertaking "not to manufacture in its territory ... atomic, biological and chemical weapons" was made on 3 October 1954, in an appendix to the treaty providing for West German membership in the Western European Union. See, Theo Sommer, "The Objectives of Germany", in Alastair Buchan (ed.), A World of Nuclear Powers?, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 40.
reached by Secretary of Defence McNamara during a speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in June 1962. Mr. McNamara emphasised that independent deterrents would threaten N.A.T.O. unity and endanger the strategy of "controlled response". Limited, independent capabilities, he insisted, would be "dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent."¹

The campaign against independent deterrents in Europe was accompanied by measures aimed at enhancing the credibility of the U.S. commitment. To this end, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and their senior officials constantly reaffirmed America's support for N.A.T.O. Moreover, during 1962 and 1963, the number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe was increased by sixty per cent, and in 1962, Washington earmarked a fully operational Polaris force to the N.A.T.O. Command.²

But the anxiety in Europe over dependence on American nuclear forces, and the consequent threat of further proliferation, required that the U.S. find some solution to the problem of nuclear sharing within the alliance. This gave rise to a number of suggestions involving some form of joint allied control of nuclear weapons. The most seriously canvassed of these schemes was the proposal for a Multilateral Nuclear Force (M.L.F.). In November 1960, General Norstad, then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, advocated the creation of an I.R.B.M. force under his control.³ One month later, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the United States Government announced its endorsement of the idea of a N.A.T.O. medium-range ballistic missile force.⁴ In May of the following year, President Kennedy

1. The text of Mr. McNamara's speech is reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, pp. 127-132.
enlarged on the idea and pointed to "the possibility of eventually establishing a N.A.T.O. sea-borne missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control."¹ In February 1963, the U.S. Government suggested that the proposed multilateral force should consist of surface ships armed with Polaris missiles.² The M.L.F. proposals which from the very beginning received strong support from elements in the State Department, was intended primarily as a way of preserving the effectiveness and cohesion of N.A.T.O. In particular, it was hoped that the scheme would go part of the way towards meeting the concern in Europe about America's nuclear monopoly. But the M.L.F. was supported by different people for different reasons and undoubtedly some of its backers saw in the scheme a way of heading off any drift towards national nuclear capabilities in Europe. This idea was implicit in the initial thinking about the proposed force and was a recurrent theme in statements on the plan by American spokesmen. As late as March 1965, the Secretary of State noted that the M.L.F. had been suggested as a way of precluding the spread of national deterrents in Europe.³

The proposal to establish a multilateral nuclear force was coolly received in many quarters. In Europe, opposition to the scheme in France, Britain, and at a later date, in Germany, undermined the arguments of its American supporters that Washington needed the M.L.F. to placate its European allies. In addition, the scheme ran into serious trouble in the United States itself. By 1964, widespread opposition to the M.L.F. had developed in Congress. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs, who had never been enthusiastic about the idea, eventually advised

1. Quoted in Bader, op. cit., p. 46.
McNamara not to commit the United States to an agreement. One of the loudest critics of the scheme was the Arms Control And Disarmament Agency, whose chief project was seen as threatened by the M.L.F. A.C.D.A. was anxious to achieve a nonproliferation treaty and was currently supporting negotiations with Russia to this end. However, Moscow had insisted that the M.L.F. would allow America's allies, especially Germany, access to nuclear weapons, and that Russia would therefore oppose any nonproliferation agreement which did not preclude such a force. In their public utterances American spokesmen denied that there was any conflict between the M.L.F. and a nonproliferation treaty, since the M.L.F. would not result in any increase in the total number of independent nuclear decision makers. However, it seems that within the councils of the Administration, W. C. Foster, director of A.C.D.A., argued that Soviet opposition to the M.L.F. was so insistent that any decision to establish the force would bury all chances of a nonproliferation treaty. In November 1964 a committee was established under the chairmanship of the former Deputy Secretary of Defence Roswell Gilpatric, to enquire, amongst other things, into the question of American nonproliferation policy. Though

4. Steinbruner, op. cit., p. 188.
its findings have still not been released, the committee seems to have concluded that measures such as the M.L.F. should not be allowed to hinder progress towards a nonproliferation agreement. In a directive published late in December, President Johnson made it clear that Washington would no longer encourage the establishment of the M.L.F. 1

Washington was still conscious of the need to make at least some concession to European demands for a larger say in the control of the N.A.T.O. deterrent. To this end, the U.S. took the lead in the establishment, in November 1965, of the N.A.T.O. Special Committee of Defence Ministers. 2 This committee, which included ten members of the alliance, immediately sought additional information on the nature of the N.A.T.O. deterrent, the potential use of it, the likely results of such use, and the plans for future changes in the force. 3 In December 1966, the N.A.T.O. Ministerial Council, on the recommendation of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers, established two permanent bodies for the handling of alliance nuclear planning. These were: a policy-making body called the Nuclear Affairs Defence Committee which was open to all N.A.T.O. members; and, the Nuclear Planning Group of seven members. 4 This consultative machinery has served the tremendously important function of providing Washington with a face-saving formula for the abandonment of the M.L.F. Moreover, through participation on the various committees, America's allies have no doubt been reassured about the strength of the deterrent and their access to nuclear planning and policymaking has probably gone some of the way towards salvaging European prestige. But so long as the United States is free to accept or reject the views of its

2. See, statement by Defence Secretary McNamara, in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, pp. 82-83.
3. ibid.
fellow committeemen, the Europeans must remain content with the status of advisers only. Clearly, in the expansion of allied participation in nuclear planning and policymaking there has been no dilution of American control over its nuclear weapons.

F. Nonproliferation and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The increasing concern with which many Americans viewed the problem of nuclear spread was clearly reflected in Washington's support after 1957, for a test ban agreement. The first important proposal on the subject was made by the Indian Prime Minister in April 1954. Mr Nehru called for a 'stand-still agreement' in respect of atomic explosions and suggested that such a measure need not be part of a general disarmament programme. However at this stage, and again in 1955, the United States indicated that it would be forced to reject all such proposals on testing unless they were included as part of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. In October 1956, in response to a Soviet proposal to stop testing, the U.S. reaffirmed its position. On this occasion President Eisenhower said:

> We must continue - until a properly safeguarded international agreement can be reached - to develop our strength in the most advanced weapons - for the sake of our own national safety, for the sake of all free nations, for the sake of peace itself.²

But this insistence by Washington on coupling a test ban with a larger disarmament programme was soon to be dropped. The development of thermonuclear weapons⁴ and a realization

2. Bader, op. cit., p. 25.
of the inability to account for all past production of fissionable material had made it necessary for the U.S. (and Russia) to review its whole disarmament negotiating position. Washington was fast inclining towards the view that the fruitless search for a comprehensive disarmament agreement would have to give way to the pursuit of partial "confidence-building" measures. The results of this reappraisal were announced in January, 1957. In a statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, the American delegate presented a package of partial disarmament measures which he indicated could be considered separately rather than as a single indivisible scheme. One of these measures was a proposal linking a test-ban to an inspected "cut-off" of nuclear production for weapons purposes. In negotiations later that year, however, Washington proposed that a test cessation become the first step in an agreed series of partial measures. In October 1958, America followed the Soviet Union in a voluntary cessation of all nuclear tests and in the same month, negotiations for an agreement prohibiting testing were commenced in Geneva.

The search for a test ban was long and frustrating and was dogged by recurring crises in East-West relations. Moreover, from the beginning, the discussions were marked by serious disagreements over inspection. In particular, the Soviet and Western delegates found it impossible to agree over the question of on-site inspection. Throughout the negotiations, the Western powers insisted on a minimum number of on-site inspections for the detection of suspected underground tests. However, the Soviet Union denounced such inspections as unwarranted and as a potential threat to its

1. For an account of these developments, see Bechhoefer, *op. cit.*, pp. 241, 243-47, and 256-58.
security. Eventually it was resolved to defer the question of underground tests and to proceed to the formulation of a partial ban. Under the terms of the treaty agreed to in August 1963, signatories undertook not to conduct nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, including outer space; underwater; or, in any other environment if such explosions could cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state concerned. The agreement is of unlimited duration, but each party has the right to withdraw, on three months notice, "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."

In explaining why the U.S. supported the test ban treaty, President Kennedy said:

First, this treaty can be a step toward reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement. Second, the treaty can be a step toward freeing the world from fears and dangers of radioactive fallout. Third, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. Fourth, and finally, this treaty can limit the nuclear arms race in ways, which, on balance, will strengthen our nation's security far more than the continuation of unrestricted testing.

On another occasion, President Kennedy remarked that, in his judgment, "the major argument for the test ban treaty [was] the limiting effect it might have on proliferation." The view that a test ban could prove a useful nonproliferation measure was a common theme in American statements on the matter. During the early deliberations of the Eighteen Nation

1. For the full text of the treaty, see, Appendix III.
Disarmament Committee (E.N.D.C.) in 1962, the American representative emphasised that a test ban was probably the earliest practical action that the committee could take to limit further proliferation. Later in the year the same spokesman reminded the committee that even a partial ban would make weapons development so difficult "that a significant portion of the nuclear arms race could be prevented from spreading to other countries." The American Secretary for Defence also shared this view. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 1963, Mr. McNamara argued that:

With testing limited to the underground environment, the potential cost of a nuclear weapons development programme would increase sharply for all signatory states. And, since testing underground is not only more costly but also more difficult and time consuming, the proposed treaty would retard progress in weapons development in cases where the added cost and other factors were not sufficient to preclude it altogether. One of the great advantages of this treaty is that it will have this effect of retarding the spread of nuclear weapons.

1. Verbatim Record of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Geneva (hereafter referred to as E.N.D.C./P.V.), 31, p. 23.
2. E.N.D.C./P.V. 75, p. 11. For other official U.S. comments on the usefulness of a test ban treaty in limiting the further spread of nuclear weapons, see testimony by A.C.D.A. Director Foster before the J.C.A.E. on 11 March 1963. Reproduced in D on D., 1963, p. 100. See also, the remarks by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk on 11 March 1963. Reproduced in ibid., p. 109.
But is the test ban treaty as effective a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons as many Americans imagined? It certainly did not prevent China from acquiring nuclear weapons and has not inhibited France from continuing to test in the atmosphere.\(^1\) Furthermore, though the advantages to be gained from testing would in most cases be fairly great—the added confidence that the weapon will work,\(^2\) and the prestige benefits of a demonstrated capacity—it is nevertheless possible that potential nuclear powers might find it in their interests not to test: Israel, for instance, would almost surely incur great losses as a result of a test explosion. For another thing, it is not at all certain that the financial and technical requirements for underground testing make the test ban treaty a wholly effective barrier to proliferation. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1963, Dr. Edward Teller argued that an underground test of a magnitude that has been traditional for the first test of any nation would cost only slightly more than a test of comparable proportions in the atmosphere.\(^3\) In any case, as Dr. Teller argued:

1. Neither France nor China are signatories of the test ban treaty.

2. It should be emphasised in this regard, however, that the first U235 bomb was "tested"over Hiroshima. See, Bader, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

3. McBride, *op. cit.*, p. 138. There seems to be evidence to support this claim, in a U.N. report on nuclear weapons released in 1967. Certainly, the cost estimates in this report, of activities specifically related to underground testing (such as drilling), are not excessively high. See, Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications of the acquisition and further development of these weapons, United Nations, General Assembly document A/6858, October 1967 (hereafter referred to as *U.N. Report on Nuclear Weapons*), Annex IV, pp. 8-11.
... no matter how [the] two costs compared, once a nation has gone to the expense of developing a nuclear explosive, the additional single million dollars that is needed for underground testing will certainly not be a financial deterrent.1

As to the technical problem of underground testing, it has been suggested that details of the various techniques are no longer secret and can be gleaned from a perusal of hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.2 Another defect in the treaty is the absence of any prohibition on the receipt of nuclear weapons from abroad. But the possibility of renunciation remains the strongest reason for doubting the long-run effectiveness of the treaty. Any party to the agreement has the right to withdraw if it considers its national interests are jeopardized by extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the treaty. Moreover, it seems unlikely that any state, having made the momentous decision to go nuclear, would be deterred by the uncertain consequences of renunciation.

The proposal to ban weapons tests was unfavourably received in some quarters in the United States. Chief amongst those wary of the move were the Joint Chiefs. It was claimed by these and other critics of the proposal that a test ban could jeopardize American security. However, it is interesting to deliberate on just how little the United States eventually conceded under the terms of the treaty. By the time the agreement entered into force America had perfected a wide range of highly sophisticated tactical and strategic weapons. The gains to be had from further testing in the atmosphere were, by this time, surely marginal. Moreover many experts argued that, by underground testing alone, America could

1. Quoted in McBride, op. cit., pp. 138-139.
continue to develop its weapons capability. Dr. N. E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, said:

Underground testing will permit, I am convinced, essentially every technical warhead development which would be possible with atmospheric testing up to yields as great as a megaton ... With underground testing, I believe we can develop and test whatever type of warhead may be required for an anti-ballistic missile system if one is required. Small weapons to the extent that any of these are needed and practical, can be worked on and improved. 1

It is clear from this that the test ban agreement contained an element of discrimination which was also to characterise the nonproliferation treaty. Non-nuclear states were, in effect, being asked to renounce their options on going nuclear. At the same time, there was no obligation on the nuclear powers to disarm. Indeed, the superpowers hardly disguised the fact, that through underground testing, they would continue to enlarge and diversify their already vast stockpiles.

But the test ban treaty was a forerunner to the nonproliferation agreement in more ways than this. The former agreement was a tremendously important development in relations between the United States and Russia. Through their negotiations and signature of the test ban treaty, both countries clearly reflected their joint interest in resisting the spread of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it was apparent that the U.S. was prepared to co-operate with Moscow on this matter even at the cost of some weakening of its relations with certain of its friends and allies. America's vigorous pursuit of a nonproliferation agreement was a further blow to the already strained state of relations between Paris and

1. ibid., p. 58.
Moreover, by failing to adequately consult Bonn over the status to be accorded East Germany in the accession clauses of the proposed test ban treaty, Washington seems to have antagonised the West Germans. Finally, by bowing to Soviet demands that peaceful nuclear explosions not be allowed under the treaty, Washington damaged its position with a number of aspiring non-nuclear states. The lengths to which Washington was prepared to go in order to strengthen the detente between it and the Soviet Union became an even greater source of disagreement between the U.S. and some of its allies during negotiations leading to the N.P.T.

G. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Implicit in a number of the disarmament and arms control measures proposed by the U.S. since the end of World War II, has been the idea of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. This was true of the Baruch Plan, and of course, of the test ban treaty. Similarly, President Eisenhower's proposal of March 1956 for a "cut-off" in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes had, as one of its aims, the restriction of nuclear weapons to those powers which already possessed them. But the first nonproliferation proposal of

1. President Kennedy is reported to have said that "Charles de Gaulle will be remembered for one thing only, his refusal to take that [test ban] treaty." See, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, N. York: Fawcett, 1967, p. 835.
3. ibid., p. 53. For a more lengthy discussion of the problems facing the United States in regard to its relations with the Soviet Union on the one hand and America's European allies on the other, see Curt Gasteyger, The American Dilemma: Bipolarity or Alliance Cohesion, Adelphi Paper No. 24, London: The Institute For Strategic Studies, 1966.
4. President Eisenhower's proposal was made in a letter to the Soviet Premier, Mr. Bulganin. In July 1957, it was formally presented to the Disarmament Subcommittee. See, International Negotiations on the N.P.T., p. 2.
a non-dissemination, non-acquisition type was presented in the package of Western disarmament proposals submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee in August, 1957. This was a suggestion that each party to the proposed disarmament agreement should undertake "not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons", except under arrangements which would assure their use only for defensive purposes. ¹

Similar provisions were included in plans for general and complete disarmament (G.C.D.) presented by the U.S. in September 1961 (to the General Assembly) and April 1962 (to the E.N.D.C.).²

Though apparently interested in a nonproliferation agreement, the U.S. was nevertheless cautious about proposals on the matter which could threaten America's strategic flexibility. In December 1961, Washington came out strongly against a Swedish suggestion that the non-nuclear states form a "non-nuclear" club. America objected that this proposal shifted the emphasis in the matter entirely to "non-acquisition" of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states and could consequently prejudice existing defense arrangements.³ Clearly, Washington was reluctant to accept any nonproliferation measure which promised to interfere with its alliance nuclear arrangements, especially those in

1. ibid., p. 3.
2. ibid., pp. 4 and 6.
3. ibid., pp. 4-5. In March 1962, the U.S. Government expressed similar views in a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General. The letter was in reply to one sent to all members of the U.N. and which sought to determine "the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of other countries." See, Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, N. York: United Nations, 1963 (hereafter referred to as Reply to the Secretary-General), pp. 52, and 100-102.
respect of N.A.T.O. The question of alliance nuclear arrangements hindered negotiations on a nonproliferation agreement till well into 1967.

Since about 1958, however, America's primary arms control objective had been the test ban treaty. Agreement was reached on a partial ban in August 1963. However, clear differences still remained between the U.S. and Russia over the issue of on-site inspection, thus making early agreement on a comprehensive ban unlikely. Consequently, a nonproliferation agreement seemed the logical next step in the direction of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. From the very beginning there were strong pockets of support for a nonproliferation treaty within the American Administration. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (A.C.D.A.), where the proposals for a treaty probably originated, was anxious to cap the successful test ban negotiations with a formal agreement prohibiting the dissemination and acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Pentagon was similarly inclined and it is obvious that President Johnson himself attached special importance to the achievement of a nonproliferation treaty.1 China's first nuclear test in October 1964 was an additional and powerful stimulus to those in the U.S. pressing for a ban on the spread of nuclear weapons.2 America's first draft nonproliferation treaty was presented to the E.N.D.C. in August 1965. One month later Russia tabled its first draft at a meeting of the General Assembly. Almost

1. For a comment on President Johnson's attitude to the N.P.T. and to the problem of proliferation in general, see below p. 57.

2. In an article published in July 1965, A.C.D.A. Director W.C. Foster claimed that the Chinese tests (October 1964 and May 1965) had partly contributed to considerably increased concern about proliferation. Other contributing factors cited were: an appreciation that general and complete disarmament would not be achieved quickly, and a realization that an increasingly large quantity of plutonium was being produced in reactors around the world. See, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, July 1965, p. 588.
three years of negotiations followed before the final version of the N.P.T. was opened for signature on 1 July, 1968.\textsuperscript{1}

The core of the N.P.T. is to be found in the non-dissemination and non-acquisition obligations contained in Articles I and II respectively. These provisions were worked out only after years of discussion on the matter between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and between the two superpowers and their respective allies. Attention in these discussions was focussed mainly on the question of the transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons through international organisations or multilateral frameworks. The first American draft\textsuperscript{2} left open the possibility of a nuclear-sharing arrangement in Western Europe such as the M.L.F.\textsuperscript{3} According to Washington, this or similar proposals for meeting N.A.T.O.'s nuclear defence problems would not result in proliferation because no transfer of control over nuclear weapons was envisaged: "control" was defined by the U.S. in March 1966 as the "right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State."\textsuperscript{4} The American draft also allowed for a "European

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] The text of the N.P.T. (July 1968) is reproduced as Appendix IV.
\item[2.] The first American draft nonproliferation treaty was presented to the E.N.D.C. on 17 August 1965. The text of this draft is reproduced in International Negotiations on the N.P.T., pp. 133-135. The Soviet draft of 24 September 1965 is reproduced in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 135-138.
\item[3.] Steinbruner explains that though the M.L.F. was relegated to the status of a low priority item after December 1964, it nevertheless remained official policy. See, Steinbruner, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 194. Moreover, it seems that certain people in Washington, especially in the State Department, were very reluctant to part with the idea of the M.L.F. One of these was Mr. George Ball, Under Secretary of State. See his statement in D.O.S.B., 25 October 1965, p. 654.
\item[4.] See, Article IV of America's amended draft nonproliferation treaty, which was submitted to the E.N.D.C. on 21 March 1966. Quoted in International Negotiations on N.P.T., p. 36.
\end{itemize}
option", i.e., the possibility that some future European union might acquire nuclear weapons turned over to it by a nuclear power member which gave up its own independent nuclear force. Such a development, Washington claimed, would not constitute proliferation either, because the total number of entities with independent power to fire nuclear weapons would not be increased.¹

Moscow vigorously objected to America's emphasis on "control" and to Washington's definition of what constituted proliferation. Russia insisted that mere "access" to nuclear weapons was sufficient to constitute proliferation and that consequently no transfers of these armaments whatsoever should be allowed. The Soviet Union was especially concerned that the Federal Republic of Germany should not gain access to nuclear weapons through some alliance sharing arrangement.²

This impasse blocked progress towards a nonproliferation agreement for two years (August 1965 - August 1967) but during this time Washington and Moscow were able to work out a form of words which resolved the problem and which was eventually incorporated into Articles I and II of the final draft of the N.P.T. But in agreeing with the Soviet Union not to transfer "to any recipient whatsoever" nuclear explosive devices or control over them, directly or indirectly, and not to assist any non-nuclear state to acquire such devices, Washington clearly sacrificed some of its freedom of choice in regard to alliance nuclear planning. Schemes such as the M.L.F., or any other arrangement involving joint control, or the transfer of


². For an excellent statement of the Soviet position, see E.N.D.C./P.V. 252, pp.4-12.
nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states, now seem to be precluded by the N.P.T. The non-dissemination and non-acquisition obligations of the N.P.T. are reinforced by the safeguards provisions of Article III. Two requirements are contained in this Article. First, all signatories must undertake to apply safeguards to nuclear facilities or materials supplied to non-nuclear states. Second, all non-nuclear signatories must accept safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. These safeguards are to be "set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguard system." Negotiation of the safeguards article proved especially difficult and the superpowers did not reach agreement on this aspect of the treaty till January 1968. Russia insisted all along that there should be no inspection of the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear states. At first glance this might not seem a wholly unacceptable demand: after all, the primary aim of the treaty was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to states which did not already possess them. But the requirement that non-nuclear states only should accept safeguards was condemned by a number of non-nuclear countries which already were, or promised to be, major competitors in the peaceful nuclear field. They complained that the system was discriminatory and could cause them to suffer commercially. In an effort to make the inspection provisions of the N.P.T. more acceptable, the U.S. announced in December 1967 that it would permit the I.A.E.A. to apply safeguards to nuclear activities in the U.S. except "those with direct national security significance." Another problem in the safeguards

1. The views of some non-nuclear states on the safeguards and other provisions of the N.P.T. will be examined in greater detail later in the thesis. See Part II.

2. See, address by President Johnson, quoted in International Negotiations on N.P.T., p.82.
field was that concerning the relationship between the I.A.E.A. and regional organisations such as EURATOM. The U.S. regarded EURATOM safeguards as equivalent to those of the I.A.E.A., but Russia objected on the grounds that the EURATOM system amounted to inspection by "allies".¹ The safeguards article which was eventually agreed upon provides that non-nuclear signatories should negotiate inspection agreements with the I.A.E.A. either individually or together with other states. The actual extent of EURATOM's role in the inspection of its members remains to be worked out in these negotiations between that organisation and the I.A.E.A.

The discrimination inherent in Articles I, II and III of the N.P.T. also characterises the peaceful uses provisions of the agreement. Non-nuclear states are forbidden to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices: the U.S. was the first to push for the inclusion of this ban, on the grounds that the technology necessary for making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes was essentially indistinguishable from that required for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.² However, the treaty stipulates that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear signatories on a non-discriminatory basis. The charge for such services will be as low as possible and is to exclude any charge for research and development. The treaty also affirms that states have an "inalienable right" to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and stipulates that signatories must facilitate "the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."³ Hedley

¹ ibid., p.70.
³ See Article IV of the N.P.T. (July 1968).
Bull has suggested that the promise of the nuclear states to perform peaceful nuclear explosive services for non-nuclear countries has about it the suggestion of a bribe. It could be added, that implicit in the peaceful uses provisions of the treaty generally, is not just the promise of rewards for those who sign, but also the threat of punishments for those who do not.

Another discriminatory feature of the N.P.T. is that relating to the disarmament obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear parties to the treaty respectively. While non-nuclear signatories must renounce their options on building nuclear weapons, there is no corresponding obligation on the nuclear powers to reduce their armaments. During negotiations leading to the N.P.T., some non-nuclear states sought to link the proposed treaty to specific collateral disarmament measures such as a comprehensive test ban and a "cut-off" in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The U.S. firmly resisted these moves on the grounds that only one measure could be dealt with at a time and that to attempt more would damage the prospects of the N.P.T.

Under Article VI of the present treaty the nuclear powers have undertaken to pursue arms control negotiations "in good faith". However, apart from the reference to general and complete disarmament, there is no mention of any specific disarmament measures which might be negotiated; nor is there any suggestion of a time limit within which progress towards arms control must be registered.

The N.P.T. is not just the latest in a series of devices employed by the U.S. to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It is, in addition, the clearest indication so far of America's changing relationship with the Soviet Union. More so than the

test ban treaty, it reveals Washington's determination to reach agreement with Moscow even at the cost of some deterioration in relations with its friends and allies. Bonn was especially suspicious of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations, a fact which is hardly surprising in view of Russia's persistent denunciation of the Federal Republic. The West German Government was unhappy about the ban on the development of peaceful nuclear explosives by the non-nuclear states and the discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear countries in the matter of safeguards. More importantly, however, Bonn was concerned that the N.P.T. seemed to rule out the "European option." Underlying these misgivings, was the fear that the agreement between Washington and Moscow somehow implied a lessening of America's commitment to the defence of Western Europe in general and Germany in particular. France was even more critical of the N.P.T.

2. ibid. See also, International Negotiations on N.P.T., pp.63-65 and 70-71.
3. Young, op. cit., p.8. Article I of the N.P.T. prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to any recipient whatsoever. It seems then, that any signatory of the N.P.T. would be unable to turn over its nuclear weapons to a future European union. Earlier, the American Ambassador to West Germany had assured the German people that the U.S. draft nonproliferation treaty of August 1965 had "taken full account" of the possibility of greater German participation in the nuclear defence of the alliance and of the ultimate development of a European nuclear force. See, D.O.S.B., 6 December 1965, p.905.
4. In December 1965, the U.S. Ambassador to West Germany referred to the "persistent cries of alarm [in West Germany] that the Americans are so interested in a nonproliferation agreement as to be willing to endanger European and German security in its behalf." See, D.O.S.B., 6 December 1965, p.905. The same matter was the subject of some discussion during hearings on the N.P.T. in 1968. See, Nonproliferation Treaty, hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 19-12 and 17, 1968, Washington, 1968, pp.80-82.
than Germany did not sign the agreement.

One further issue relevant to this discussion of the N.P.T. is that of the security assurances given by the nuclear powers to the non-nuclear countries in return for their signature of the treaty. The role of security assurances in American efforts to limit proliferation in Europe has already been noted. There, Washington has attempted to persuade its allies that the U.S. commitment to N.A.T.O. is a credible one in all circumstances and that consequently the countries of Western Europe have no need of their own nuclear weapons. In October 1964, President Johnson declared that:

... the nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.¹

This declaration was very general in its terms and must be viewed as part of Washington's global nonproliferation strategy. However, coming as it did just two days after China's first nuclear test, and bearing in mind America's existing defence commitments in the area, it is clear that it was primarily designed to influence the non-aligned, non-nuclear states of Asia, especially India.² The question of the non-proliferation treaty raised important security problems for the non-nuclear states, and after the presentation of the first U.S. and Soviet drafts in August-September 1965, many of these countries began to agitate for assurances or guarantees from

¹. See, Address of the President, October 18, 1964. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.120.
². This matter will be taken up in detail later in the thesis. See Chapter IX.
the nuclear powers. In February 1966, the Soviet Premier Mr. Kosygin offered to include in his country's draft nonproliferation treaty a clause "on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory."\(^1\) This offer amounted to what has been called a negative assurance to the non-nuclear states.\(^2\) However, the implementation of such a scheme would have seriously disrupted American defence arrangements in Western Europe, and though the offer was enthusiastically received by a number of non-aligned states, the U.S. rejected it.

Washington was reluctant to include a security guarantee in the text of the N.P.T. Such a step might have resulted in a considerable extension in the nation's commitments and would almost certainly have been rejected by Congress.\(^3\) America's clear preference was for an arrangement involving the U.N. In March 1968, the two superpowers, together with Great Britain, declared that they were willing to recommend to the Security Council a resolution in which the Council would: (1) formally recognise the gravity of any aggression or threat of aggression with nuclear weapons, and (2) welcome the intention expressed by "certain States" to provide or support immediate assistance to any non-nuclear signatories of the N.P.T. who were victims of such aggression.\(^4\) A resolution along these lines was subsequently adopted by the Security Council on 19 June, 1968. In conjunction with this action, Britain, the U.S. and Russia made formal declarations of their intention to support the principles of the resolution.\(^5\)

---

3. The question of Washington's attitude to security guarantees will be examined in greater detail later in the thesis. See Chapters IX and X.
4. The text of the tripartite resolution is reproduced as Appendix V.
5. The text of the American declaration is reproduced as Appendix VI.
The tripartite resolution on security assurances does not impose any new obligations on its three sponsors, but merely reaffirms those they already have under the U.N. Charter. The nuclear powers have not indicated what type of assistance they would be prepared to render, and in particular, have not committed themselves to the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, as Hedley Bull has argued, "they do not say they would act in the case of nuclear attack, but merely in the case of nuclear 'aggression', a term notoriously subject to private definition." Finally, any decision to support a victim of nuclear aggression will be determined by the nuclear powers in the light of how they see their interests at the time and not by a prior undertaking like the tripartite declaration.

In recent years the N.P.T. has been accorded great prominence in most discussions of American nonproliferation policy. However, the analysis in this chapter suggests that the N.P.T. is only one of many measures which Washington has mobilized in its campaign to limit proliferation. Broadly speaking these measures may be divided into two main categories. In the first place, there have been those policies aimed at denying other nations the capacity to build nuclear weapons. This was the major aim of the Atomic Energy Act and, more recently, of Washington's support for the application of safeguards to international transfers of nuclear facilities and materials. Second, there have been those policies designed to

1. This was confirmed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See, Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., September, 1968 (hereafter referred to as Senate Report on N.P.T., 1968), p.11.
3. This point was emphasised by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See report of his testimony, in Senate Report on N.P.T., 1968, p.11.
persuade states not to take up the nuclear options they already have or will probably come to possess. One of these has involved the extension, to a number of non-nuclear states, of assurances and guarantees of support against aggression. Another has involved the sponsorship of formal arms control agreements such as the test ban and the N.P.T. Also, in an effort to encourage other states to remain non-nuclear, the U.S. has tried to exercise some restraint in its own nuclear weapons policies. President Kennedy in particular seems to have realised that some reduction in America's dependence on nuclear weapons to resist aggression was an essential element of any campaign to get "the nuclear genie back in the bottle."¹

It should be clear from the analysis in this chapter that the policy of nonproliferation has not been pursued in a vacuum. Since the end of World War II, the aim of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons has had to take its place with other objectives of American policy. Moreover, it is clear that the aim of nonproliferation has, on a number of occasions, conflicted with some of these other U.S. policy goals. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which halted for the time being co-operation in the nuclear field between the U.S. and Britain, was inconsistent with the promotion of good relations between London and Washington. Later, America's opposition to the French nuclear programme helped to strain relations between the U.S. and

¹ Brodie, op. cit., p.6. It is important to note, however, that Washington's efforts to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons, has been inhibited by America's declared policy of reliance upon nuclear weapons for local defence, at least in certain situations. See, Morton H. Halperin, "A Ban on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," in Luard, op. cit., pp.151-152. The question of America's dependence on nuclear weapons in its Asian strategy and the significance of this dependence for U.S. nonproliferation policy in Asia and the Pacific will be the subject of analysis in Part III of this thesis. See especially, Chapters VIII, IX and X.
another of its European allies. Further, for a while at least, there was a conflict in the U.S. Administration between those who wanted a nonproliferation treaty, and those elements, principally in the State Department, who wanted to retain the option of establishing some form of alliance nuclear force in Europe.¹ Finally, in its negotiation of both the test ban treaty and the N.P.T., Washington was prepared to suffer some set-back in its relations with France and Germany.

This chapter has looked at the various techniques and objectives of U.S. nonproliferation policy; the next chapter will review the rationale and motivations.

¹ As late as 1966, Under Secretary of State George Ball still held out hopes for some form of alliance nuclear force. For evidence of this and of his lack of enthusiasm for the nonproliferation treaty then under discussion, see United States Policy Towards Europe (and Related Matters), hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 20-23, 27-28, 30, and July 13 and 22, 1966, Washington, 1966, pp.294-6, 335-6, 342-5.
CHAPTER II

THE RATIONALE AND MOTIVATIONS OF AMERICAN NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

It was noted in the previous chapter that opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons has been a cardinal objective of United States Policy ever since the end of World War II. Successive American Governments have regarded the prospect of nuclear proliferation with the gravest forebodings. During the Kennedy and Johnson years, this concern was often expressed in the most explicit and desperate terms. In July 1963, President Kennedy noted that the four nuclear powers then in existence could soon be joined by a "small but significant number" of other nations which were also capable of developing nuclear weapons. Commenting on this prospect, the President said:

I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.¹

But if the prospect of nuclear proliferation could be said to have greatly worried President Kennedy, it seems to have fairly obsessed his successor. In 1965, President Johnson described

the problem of nuclear proliferation as nothing less than the "gravest of all unresolved human issues".¹ In a message to the E.N.D.C. in January 1966, the President emphasised that the United States had "with all mankind, a common interest in acting ... to prevent nuclear spread".² Such was the importance that Johnson attached to the task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, that in a message to the U.S. Senate in July 1968, he said:

I consider this treaty [the N.P.T.] to be the most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began. It is a triumph of sanity and of man's will to survive.³

---


Earlier, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1968, the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk, advanced four main reasons for his country's opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons. First, proliferation made international relations more complex and more dangerous, and substantially increased the risks and dangers of war. Second, if the number of nuclear powers continued to increase it would become more difficult to negotiate nuclear arms control agreements. Third, America's efforts to maintain friendly relations with as many nations as possible would become more difficult by virtue of nuclear weapons spread. Fourth, proliferation would interfere with economic growth in the less developed countries.¹ This was a reasonable summary of the rationale then being used by the U.S. to support its campaign against nuclear spread. However, on other occasions since the end of World War II, the U.S. has advanced different reasons for its stand against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries. Moreover, it is apparent that underlying the officially stated rationale, have been considerations of American national interest which constitute an important basis for Washington's opposition to proliferation. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to examine both the formal rationale and the underlying motivations of America's opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons since 1945.

A. Initial Thoughts About The Need For Control Of Nuclear Weapons

Fear of the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons has always been a motivating factor in American efforts to

control atomic energy. But this was probably never more so than during the immediate post war years. The development of the atomic bomb came towards the end of the most destructive war in history. Long before the first test of the new weapon at Alamagordo in July 1945, the terrible effectiveness of modern conventional weapons had been amply demonstrated in many theatres of conflict. Air attacks alone had devastated hundreds of cities and towns in Europe and Japan on a scale hitherto unknown. But the assaults on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 were of a different order altogether. In raids on these cities the damage inflicted by just two atomic bombs was equal to that which could only have been achieved by the use of hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands of tons of conventional high explosive. Moreover, as the American Government contemplated the full significance of these latest attacks on Japan, it did so in the knowledge that another scale of magnitude in nuclear weapons was capable of being evolved.¹ It is hardly surprising then, that most scientists and statesmen were preoccupied with the destructiveness of the atomic bomb. Few were prepared to speculate about the implications of the new weapon except in the most pessimistic terms. In the weeks and months following the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, official and semi-official statements warned of the unparalleled destruction of life and property and even of the annihilation of civilization itself in any future global war. President Truman's remark that, "the atomic bomb [was] too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world"² may be said to have reflected the views of most Americans at the time.

² Quoted in ibid., p.107.
Flowing from an awareness of the tremendous destructiveness of the new weapon was a belief held by many that there could be no adequate military defence against atomic weapons. In reaching this conclusion, American policy-makers were no doubt mindful of the fact that henceforth, nothing less than one hundred per cent effectiveness would be required of a nation's defence system if its cities were to avoid damage on the scale suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, there was a tendency at the time to imagine that nuclear weapons would prove especially potent in more novel forms of attack. It was believed by many, for instance, that atomic bombs, either surreptitiously placed on an opponent's territory or delivered there by unconventional means, could overwhelm even the most strongly protected state. The usefulness of tactics such as these has been subsequently questioned, but at the time, speculation of this sort only added to the feelings of insecurity accompanying the development of atomic weapons.

This awareness of the tremendous potential for destruction of the new weapon appears to have precipitated two strands of thinking amongst American policy-makers. First, there was considerable fear and apprehension about a future in which atomic armaments were accepted as legitimate weapons of war. As the Lilienthal Report said:


2. See, for example, testimony of Dr. Harold D. Urey, Professor of Chemistry, University of Chicago, in Creating a Special Committee to Investigate Problems Relating to Development, Use and Control of Atomic Energy, hearings before the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, December 1945, Washington, 1946, pp.81 and 86.
Enough has been said to make unnecessary a repetition of the probable horrors of a war in which atomic weapons were used by both combatants against the cities of their enemy. But it is hardly possible to overestimate the deep impression of horror and concern which insight into these future possibilities has made so widespread.¹

This feeling gave rise to the rather generalised notion that the atomic bomb was so frightful a weapon that it would be best done away with completely. There seems to be an analogy here with the world-wide response in former times to the development of poison gas. The second strand of thinking was of a more specific nature. Many Americans quickly appreciated that the atomic bomb was a weapon of unprecedented military significance and that no effort should be spared in an attempt to keep it from the country's major potential enemy, the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that for about four years after the end of World War II, this was the primary stimulus behind America's efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Russia's acquisition of the atomic bomb in 1949 largely undermined this motivation. However, by this time, the policy of not assisting other states to acquire nuclear weapons seems to have developed a momentum of its own.

B. The Nth Country Rationale.

It was noted in the previous chapter that during the closing years of the 1950s American thinking on the question of nuclear spread underwent a profound change. Stimulated by a new-found belief that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries was a greater possibility than had hitherto been imagined, Washington embarked on a more vigorous

campaign against proliferation. Accompanying this growing preoccupa-
tion with what became known as the "nth country" problem, there de-
developed in the U.S. a body of ideas about the conse-
quences for world peace and American security of rapid and wide-
ranging nuclear spread. This "nth country" rationale promptly be-
came an important component of American nonproliferation policy and has remained as such to this day.

Stated simply, the nth country rationale has asserted that any increase in the number of nuclear powers presents dangers: the more nuclear powers there are, the more there are likely to be; and the more there are, the greater the chances of nuclear conflict. There are a number of elements in all of this and it will be useful to look at each of these in some detail.

In the first place, it needs to be noted that the nth country rationale has asserted that any increase in the number of nuclear powers is to be avoided. As Defence Secretary McNamara said in 1966:

I do not believe that circumstances will arise in which it is in our national interest to increase the number of nuclear powers, whatever that number may be. [emphasis added.]

Questioned as to whether or not he thought it would make a difference which additional nations acquired nuclear weapons (Sweden and Switzerland on the one hand, and Czechoslovakia and Indonesia on the other, were cited), McNamara answered: "with a minor qualification we can come to if you wish, I would say, 'No; it does not make any difference'." He added:

I do not think it makes any difference whether it be Sweden or Switzerland or any other nation you care to name, because each one of these additions

2. ibid., p.89.
to the number of nuclear powers carries with it implications for other nations. Those implications will move other nations more rapidly to acquire nuclear weapons. And this at a very minimum, increases the danger of accidental detonation.1

This gives rise to the second element in the nth country rationale, viz., the idea that proliferation is a highly dynamic process. As McNamara has put it, "the more nuclear powers there are, the more there are likely to be."2 In 1965, a noted unofficial observer wrote:

We may ... be at a crossroads in which the question of whether there are fifteen or five (or three) nuclear powers in 1975 will be soon determined. If several lesser countries develop nuclear weapons the spread may become very great. 3

In 1966, Adrian Fisher, Acting Director of A.C.D.A., warned that if one more country went nuclear there would be a "chain reaction"; this could soon result, he implied, in the existence of "10, 11, or 12 nuclear powers."4 The same year, A.C.D.A. Director, W.C. Foster, warned that failure to prevent proliferation could result in the emergence of ten new nuclear powers in the next ten to twenty years.5 Though most members of the U.S. Administration who have spoken on the matter seem agreed

1. ibid.
2. ibid., p.74.
5. See his statement in E.N.D.C./P.V. 264, p.11.
on this point, there has been some dissension amongst unofficial observers. James Schlesinger has pointed out that the actual pace of proliferation has been slower than often anticipated and that there are reasons which, in theory at least, increasingly work against further proliferation; recognition that the acquisition of even a minimum deterrent requires a very extensive effort, and a realization that such a deterrent is of dubious military value. Richard Rosecrance has also forecast that the rate of nuclear spread will not be rapid; in 1966 he predicted that "not many more states will join the nuclear club in the next twenty years than did so in the generation after the Second World War."  

But the heart of the nth country rationale lies in the assertion that an increase in the number of nuclear powers increases the chances of nuclear conflict. As Secretary of State Herter said in 1960: "the more nations that have the power to trigger off a nuclear war, the greater the chance that some nation might use this power in haste or blind folly." A somewhat more precise rendering of the idea was provided by Secretary of Defence McNamara in October, 1964. He said:

You can imagine the danger that the world would face if 10, 20, or 30 nations possessed nuclear weapons instead of the four that possess them today ... The danger to other nations increases geometrically with the increase in the number of nations possessing these warheads...  

4. Quoted in Bader, op. cit., p.11.
But just how is an increase in the number of nuclear powers supposed to heighten the risk of conflict, especially nuclear conflict? In recent years, especially in testimony at the many congressional hearings on the N.P.T. and related subjects, spokesmen for the American Administration have gone to considerable lengths to answer this question. Their explanations have been many and varied but may be conveniently summarised as follows.

In the first place, it has been alleged that proliferation tends to make the management of international relations more difficult. As Secretary of Defence McNamara said in February, 1966:

Nuclear weapons in the hands of more countries could have consequences for world security which no one can foresee. Every additional country having nuclear weapons, ... is an additional centre of independent decision making on the use of nuclear weapons. International relations are thereby made more complex and more dangerous, ...1

Later, McNamara stated the same argument in a slightly different way: "the more [nuclear powers] there are, the more unsettling will be the too rapid shifts in the often delicate power balance and political relationships."2 To quote the words of an

1. See his testimony in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.4. See also, Consideration of the Problem of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (a report by A.C.D.A.). Reproduced in Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968, hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 1, 5-8, 19, 20, 1968, Washington, 1968 (hereafter referred to as House Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amend­ments, 1968), p.222. This particular report is one of the most comprehensive official accounts available on U.S. Government attitudes towards the problem of proliferation.
unofficial observer, this line of argument amounted to saying that "a world made up of nuclear powers would be more unfamiliar than our present world (which is unfamiliar enough), more complex in its power relations, and hence more difficult to understand and deal with."¹

Second, it has been further alleged that proliferation increases the risks of accidental or ill-considered use of nuclear weapons. It is generally held amongst American critics of proliferation that the majority of nth countries would be capable of acquiring only relatively unsophisticated deterrents, i.e., capabilities which are unhardened and characterised by poor command and control systems. These forces, it is argued, would be highly vulnerable to a first strike and would depend for their effectiveness on almost complete automaticity of response.² It has also been emphasised by some American spokesmen that the weapons systems which most nth countries would be capable of acquiring would be unlikely to feature the more specific safety features which are characteristic of the American and presumably, the Soviet, deterrents. Mr. McNamara has elaborated this point at some length:


2. This was one of the major arguments in McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor in June, 1962. The speech is reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966. See especially, p.130. Earlier, a similar argument had been explored in one of the most important unofficial contributions to the American case against proliferation. See, Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, April 1961, pp.362-363.
We [the American Government] have spent literally billions of dollars on safety measures. There is no other nation in the world which has spent as much as we have. We know very well that the small nations that are considering acquiring nuclear weapons,... have neither the financial resources nor the technical resources to devote to safety. ¹

But arguments about the increasing risks of accidental or ill-considered use of nuclear weapons have not always reflected considerations about the technical characteristics of nth country capabilities. Often, they have stemmed from American concern about the effects of erratic and unstable political leadership on the management of nuclear weapons.

There were hints of this in a statement by Secretary of State Dulles in 1957. He said: "as matters are going the time will come when the pettiest and most irresponsible dictator could get hold of [nuclear] weapons with which to threaten immense harm."² Later, as has already been indicated, President Kennedy spoke of the dangers of nuclear weapons "in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world."³ Sometimes, these weaknesses in the political leadership of many nth countries have been attributed by Washington to their lack of diplomatic experience. This was clearly apparent in President Johnson's reaction to China's first nuclear test. In October 1964, the President said:

2. Quoted in Memorandum submitted by A.C.D.A. concerning the nonproliferation treaty. Reproduced in ibid., p.28.
3. See above, p. 56.
Until this week, only four powers had entered the dangerous world of nuclear explosions. Whatever their differences, all four are sober and serious states, with long experience as major powers in the modern world. Communist China has no such experience.¹

A variant of this general line of argument which has been sometimes used, is that some nth countries might too easily resort to the use of nuclear weapons because, it is alleged, unlike the Soviet Union and the U.S., they have relatively little to lose.² All of these statements imply that amongst the world's many potential nuclear powers there are some in particular whose political leaderships could not be relied upon to exercise caution and restraint in the management of nuclear weapons. It could be argued that this was inconsistent with the assertion previously noted, that all forms of proliferation were equally reprehensible. This point will be examined shortly.

Third, some American spokesmen have alleged that proliferation would heighten the risks and dangers of war through its effect on regional disputes. As Senator Robert Kennedy said in June, 1965:

There would be no stability anywhere in the world - when nuclear weapons might be used between Greeks and Turks over Cyprus; between Arabs and Israelis over the Gaza Strip; between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. But if nuclear weapons spread, it is dangerously likely that they will be so used - for these are matters of the deepest national interest to the countries involved.³

¹. See, Address of the President, 18 October 1964. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.120.
². See for example, William C. Foster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, July 1965, p.591.
Admittedly, this was a somewhat exaggerated statement of the problem, but it did reflect the deep concern of many congressmen about the possible effects of proliferation on regional disputes. In 1968, A.C.D.A. stated the problem more soberly, though no less emphatically. It was A.C.D.A.'s view that if parties to a regional dispute came to possess nuclear weapons, the results could be quite alarming.

... then there is clearly a risk, and in some cases there would be a high risk, that the nuclear weapons would be used. Also, if nuclear weapons are used in such "local" wars, any assistance from a nuclear-weapon state would very likely begin at that level.¹

There are two ideas contained in the above quote from A.C.D.A. : the notion that nuclear-armed parties to a regional conflict will almost inevitably use their nuclear weapons; and that of the alleged connection between the use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict and the likelihood of great power involvement. On the first of these claims, neither A.C.D.A., nor American spokesmen generally, have had much to say in the way of supporting argument : it has been alleged, though, that the likelihood of pre-emptive attack would be especially high in regional conflicts if nuclear weapons were introduced.² However, the second of these allegations has received considerably more attention in American statements on the dangers of proliferation. McNamara has attempted to explain the theory behind the claim:

2. See, Consideration of the Problem of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (a Report by A.C.D.A.). Reproduced in ibid., p.222. See also, testimony by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in Senate Hearings on Nonproliferation Treaty, Part I, 1968, p.5.
... if country A attacked country B with conven­tional weapons it is unlikely that it would strike at the survival of country B or run the risk of overrunning country B in a short time. The problem could be brought to the attention of the United Nations, and international discussions could take place. It would not be necessary for either the Soviet Union or the United States to intervene militarily, quickly.

In the case of a nuclear attack by country A on country B, the very survival of country B would be immediately at issue and it might well require military intervention by one of the great powers immediately, without time for the negotiation and discussion in international forums that would otherwise take place.\(^1\)

Alternatively, it has been argued that the likelihood of American involvement in regional conflicts will be determined primarily by political rather than strategic factors. The stress in this sort of argument has been on the implications of America's world-wide commitments rather than on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons as such.\(^2\)

To summarise, the nth country rationale asserts that any increase in the number of nuclear powers presents dangers: the more nuclear powers there are, the more there are likely to be; and the more there are, the greater the chances of nuclear conflict. The latter is alleged to happen in three ways: by making the management of international affairs more

---

2. Foster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," p.590. For a contrary view which argues that the risks of localized nuclear conflicts escalating into nuclear war involving the superpowers, have been exaggerated, see Fred Charles Ikle, "Nth Countries and Disarmament" in Fisher and Burns (eds.), op. cit., p.312. See also, James R. Schlesinger, "Nuclear Spread," pp.67-68.
complex and more dangerous; by raising the chances of accidental
or ill-considered use of nuclear weapons; and, by aggravating
regional disputes. The American Government's response to the
prospect of nuclear spread amongst its N.A.T.O. allies embodied
most of the elements which made up the nth country rationale.

In the first place, Washington argued that the spread of nuclear
weapons to even one member of the alliance would stimulate
additional pressures for proliferation; it was stressed, for
instance, that to admit that one member of the alliance needed
nuclear weapons for its own protection was to concede, in
effect, that the others needed them also. This was one reason
why the U.S. was opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons
by Germany and to the continued development of these forces by
Britain and France.¹ But equally important, was Washington's
argument that the existence of independent nuclear forces in
Europe would hinder the rational conduct of any nuclear war
in which the U.S. and Europe might find themselves involved.

In his address at Ann Arbor (1962) on the defence arrangements
of the North Atlantic community, Secretary of Defence McNamara,
said:

1. Morton Halperin, loc. cit., p.137. For an emphatic state­
ment of the American position from a vocal unofficial
observer, see Malcolm W. Hoag, "Nuclear Policy and French
Intransigence" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 2, January
He has recently argued, that the logic of the case made
by certain people during the early 1960s, for national
nuclear forces in Europe, would have led N.A.T.O. to a
need for "fifteen nuclear forces, not three or less." See,
his "Political and Strategic Relations: A View From
Washington," in Bruce Brown (ed.), Asia and the Pacific
in the 1970s, Canberra: Australian National University
There must not be competing and conflicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war. We are convinced that a general nuclear war target is indivisible and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled.

We would all find it intolerable to contemplate having only part of the strategic force launched in isolation from our main striking power. ¹

The implications of this statement are clear to see. The mere existence of a number of decision makers, each with their own plans and targeting arrangements, could mean that any exchange might start in an uncoordinated way. This, it was alleged, would reduce the effectiveness of any strike by N.A.T.O. and almost certainly increase the damage suffered by the alliance as a whole.

In the same speech it was explained how the very nature of nth country capabilities, rather than the simple fact of their existence, could hinder the rational conduct of a N.A.T.O. strike. The jumping-off point for such an assertion was the revelation that the United States had come to the conclusion that the "principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of this [sic] civilian population." ² But, it was an important part of the American argument that nth country capabilities were, or would be designed, to strike primarily at cities. It followed that their use in this capacity would prove disastrous for the whole strategy of controlled response. The

¹ See, text of Mr. McNamara's address. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.131.
² ibid., p.130.
type of argument against proliferation which was advanced at Ann Arbor is, of course, of special relevance to Europe. So far, Europe is the only place where the spread of independent capabilities to additional countries has resulted in the difficulties for American strategy which McNamara outlined. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Britain and France raised the possibility, however remote it may have seemed, of independent action by either or both of these powers during any exchange between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance. It was this possibility which, among other things, haunted American policy-makers and drove them to emphasise the disadvantages of national nuclear forces in Europe.

Hedley Bull has argued that the campaign the U.S. waged against independent nuclear deterrents in Europe was an attempt by Washington to ward off the challenge to American primacy in European political affairs posed by the threat of proliferation.¹ It would be difficult to deny that there were probably some Americans who viewed the prospect of nuclear proliferation in Europe in these terms. But to regard these considerations as the primary, or indeed even a major, motivation for American policy, would be to ignore the large measure of logic and conviction which was apparent in much of the formal U.S. rationale against proliferation in Europe. The American argument that the acquisition of independent nuclear forces by nations in Europe would create problems for both the Europeans and for their American allies is very persuasive, and there seems little reason to doubt the sincerity or clearness of purpose of most of those who advanced it.

Mention of this last matter raises the question of another possible motive for U.S. opposition to proliferation, not just in Europe, but globally as well. It seems reasonable to argue that behind much of the concern in Washington about the nth country problem was the fear, not so much that the spread of nuclear weapons would undermine America's power in the world in some general sense, but that it would reduce Washington's ability to regulate crisis situations, and in particular, to prevent such situations from developing into general war. This concern was clearly one explanation for Washington's emphasis on the doctrine of centralized control of nuclear weapons in Europe. But it seems to have been more generally relevant as well. In 1965, A.C.D.A. Director, Foster, said:

> When we consider the cost to us of trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, we should not lose sight of the fact that widespread nuclear proliferation would mean a substantial erosion in the margin of power which our great wealth and industrial base have long given us relative to much of the rest of the world.¹

James R. Schlesinger, in discussing Foster's remarks, noted that a relative decline in America's power could render the task of "keeping the world relatively stable and peaceful" much more difficult.² An A.C.D.A. report published in 1968, took up the same theme. Commenting on the consequences for the U.S. of a world of many nuclear powers, the report said:

> ... U.S. influence over events in certain areas may well be diminished. U.S. policy choices may become more difficult, and the time period available for successful mediation, conciliation

---

or good offices ... may be drastically shortened should nuclear weapons be employed.1

In 1966, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had put the matter slightly differently. He said:

... one can imagine situations where the irresponsible use of modest nuclear forces could serve as the stimulus that would move events out of control of the major nuclear powers themselves. This is the thing that bothers me - the chain reactions that could be involved. I hate to speculate about such hypotheses, but the instability which is added to the world situation by proliferation creates greater dangers for those who have a tremendous interest in stability in the use of these nuclear weapons.2 [emphasis added.]

Implied in this statement by Dean Rusk was the idea that proliferation posed a threat to Soviet as well as to American interests. Also implicit, was the idea that a bipolar world was a relatively stable one.3 In a situation where the two superpowers retained their margin of power relative to the rest of the world, the U.S. and Russia could exercise some management in crisis situations; they could prevent such crises from moving "out of control of the major nuclear powers." But proliferation, it was alleged, would threaten this relatively stable situation. That the U.S. and Russia had a common interest in limiting proliferation was a popular theme in

3. For a theoretical presentation of this notion, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World" in Daedalus, Summer, 1964, pp.881-909.

The notion that proliferation would reduce America's (and Russia's) ability to regulate international crises has an obvious self-serving ring about it. For this and other reasons, arguments of this sort have usually been kept in the background of America's public position on nonproliferation. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the desire to retain as much control as possible over crisis situations has been an important motivation underlying America's opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons.

Before concluding this analysis of the nth country rationale it will be useful to discuss one further matter. Despite their many assertions to the contrary, it is difficult to accept that U.S. spokesmen really believed that all forms of proliferation were equally reprehensible; that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by say, Switzerland, was regarded as no less menacing than that by say, Cuba. In fact, there is sufficient public evidence to suggest that U.S. officials, implicitly at least, did make hierarchical distinctions amongst various forms of proliferation. In some of the statements already referred to, U.S. spokesmen distinguished between the "stable and the unstable", the "responsible and the irresponsible" so far as potential nuclear powers are concerned. Implicit in these distinctions is the suggestion that American spokesmen regarded the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some countries as more "tolerable" than that by others. The more prevalent theme, viz., that all forms of proliferation were equally reprehensible, seems to be linked to Washington's drive for universal acceptance of the test-ban...
treaty, and more particularly, the N.P.T. To have condoned proliferation to certain countries would have seemed hypocritical and would have undermined efforts to gain the support of those states to which, by implication, Washington considered the spread of nuclear weapons to be undesirable.

Finally, it is worth noting that the emphasis on the idea that all forms of proliferation were equally reprehensible has tended to disguise the fact that Washington's campaign against proliferation was aimed primarily at different countries or areas at different times. It has been noted that in the early post-war years the chief concern was that Russia would acquire the bomb and that this was a factor in Washington's reluctance to assist Great Britain in developing nuclear weapons. Later, the United States came out strongly against France's nuclear force; the force de frappe, it was alleged, was of dubious military value, and in addition, would disrupt both N.A.T.O. strategy and alliance cohesion, and stimulate an interest in independent nuclear strike forces in Germany and other European states. Later still, the spread of nuclear weapons to China became the special concern of many official and unofficial observers in the U.S. More recently, the non-nuclear-countries of Asia seem to have become the primary areas of concern for U.S. nonproliferation policy. This was suggested in 1968 by former Under Secretary of State (1961-1966) George Ball and there is corroborating evidence in the public pronouncements of A.C.D.A. officials, at least. In 1965, A.C.D.A. Director, W.C. Foster, argued that of all the non-nuclear states in the world, India was the one most likely to go nuclear. Such a development, he added, would greatly

1. The American Government's response to the Chinese force will be discussed below in Chapters VII, VIII and IX.
increase the pressure on Pakistan, and even Japan, to do likewise.\textsuperscript{1} The following year, another senior A.C.D.A. official implied that the most immediate threat of proliferation was not in Europe, but in Asia.\textsuperscript{2} An A.C.D.A. report in 1968 cited the Middle East and the India-Pakistan area as regions where proliferation would be especially dangerous.\textsuperscript{3}

The nth country rationale has been a feature of American nonproliferation policy ever since the late 1950s. However, during the same period, two additional arguments have been used by Washington to support its campaign against nuclear spread. Each is of a rather special character and needs to be dealt with separately from those which make up the nth country rationale.

C. \textit{Arms Control Considerations}

One of these arguments alleges that proliferation makes progress in the arms control field exceedingly difficult. This theme has been characteristic of American opposition to nuclear spread from the earliest days of concern about the nth country problem. In a report on disarmament published in 1960 and covering the period from 1955 to 1958, the State Department concluded that "the problem of controlling nuclear weapons would be complicated enormously, if not made impossible, once the capability to produce such weapons spread to many additional countries."\textsuperscript{4} This concern provided at least part of the

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] See his testimony in \textit{To Amend Further the Arms Control and Disarmament Act}, hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., January 26 and 27, 1965, Washington, 1965, pp.47 and 64.
\item[3.] See, memorandum on the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Reproduced in House Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968, pp.78 and 222.
\end{itemize}
stimulus for subsequent American proposals for agreement to halt the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and for a test ban treaty. In 1963, President Kennedy warned that there would be "no chance of effective disarmament" if proliferation continued. The theme has figures prominently in more recent American statements on nuclear proliferation. In testimony at hearings before the J.C.A.E. in 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued:

Efforts of the present nuclear powers to negotiate mutually advantageous nuclear arms control agreements will be more complex and hence more difficult as the number of such powers increases, ...¹

There has been relatively little attempt over the years to explain just how the spread of nuclear weapons would frustrate the achievement of arms control. However, it is reasonable to assume that widespread proliferation would add to international mistrust and suspicion thus making negotiations less likely. In addition, it is obvious that any negotiations which did take place and which had to take account of the special interests of a large number of nuclear weapons powers, would be considerably more complex than discussions involving two, three, or even five such participants. Finally, in those cases where arms control was to be effected through adherence to an international treaty, special difficulties would arise as a result of proliferation. One of these difficulties was highlighted by Senator Robert Kennedy in 1965. He said:

There could be no effective disarmament - when each nation would want guarantees, not from one or two or five powers, but from a dozen or a score or even more nations. But if nuclear weapons spread, such guarantees would be necessary.²

It should be noted in passing that the effort to achieve a non-proliferation treaty was made more difficult by the failure of the United States and Russia themselves to make progress in other areas of nuclear arms control. Throughout the course of negotiations leading to the N.P.T. a number of non-nuclear states alleged that the Soviet and American approach was discriminatory. It was repeatedly argued that while the non-nuclear states were being asked not to produce nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers were themselves not prepared to enter into any specific undertakings to disarm. Special meaning was given to this criticism by Washington's decision, during the closing stages of the N.P.T. negotiations, to deploy a "light" Anti-ballistic Missile (A.B.M.) system.  

D. Economic Arguments

Yet another American argument against proliferation has been based on the cost of nuclear weapons. That the acquisition of national nuclear forces would seriously hurt the economies of many nth countries has long been an important component of America's nonproliferation rationale. It is tempting to think that these economic arguments are only a reflection of concern in Washington that some aspiring nuclear states may be forced to divert resources from much-needed conventional forces. This was certainly true of American thinking about the problem in Europe and has most probably coloured Washington's attitude to the prospect of proliferation to some of the countries around the periphery of China. But there seems little cause to doubt the apparent altruism in

1. The A.B.M. issue and its implications for American non-proliferation policy in Asia will be discussed at some length later in this thesis. See Chapter VIII.
American concern about the economic consequences of proliferation. The cost of maintaining competitive nuclear capabilities was mentioned as a motivating factor when Washington sponsored its first proposal of a "no-transfer" nature in August 1957. The argument became more common as it was increasingly realised in the U.S. that security and other considerations might force a number of poor countries to consider the production of nuclear weapons.

In most cases, the economic argument against proliferation has stressed the unfortunate consequences of the diversion of resources from national development. Sometimes it has been emphasised that many poor countries are already the recipients of large amounts of American aid and that nuclear weapons programmes would cancel out the benefits of such assistance. In a variation of this argument, it has been alleged that widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons would reduce the amount of foreign aid generally, thus affecting the development of poor countries regardless of whether or not they had chosen to build nuclear weapons.

The analysis in this chapter and the previous one suggests that opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons has been a goal of American policy since the end of World War II. However, the motivations underlying this policy have been many and varied. Moreover, from time to time, Washington's nonproliferation policy has been aimed primarily at different

2. ibid., p.222.
4. ibid., p.75.
PART II

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN
ASIA
CHAPTER III

THE CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCE

Nuclear weapons have been a factor in Asian international politics since the American atomic attacks on Japan in 1945. Since that time, the United States has had the capacity to deploy nuclear force in support of its policies anywhere in the area. Russia also, has long been able to project its nuclear power into Asia. More recently, there has also been a British nuclear presence in the area. But indigenous nuclear weapons activity in Asia is of much more recent origin. So far, proliferation in Asia has been restricted to China, but a number of other countries in the area are also capable of going nuclear. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to trace the development of the Chinese nuclear force and then to examine the incentives behind China's decision to build an independent nuclear deterrent. In the following chapters, the nuclear capabilities and incentives of Japan, Australia and India will be examined.

A. The Development of the Chinese Nuclear Force

Since the establishment of Communist power in 1949, China has progressed rapidly in its understanding and exploitation of atomic energy. Until 1959-60, this development drew heavily on Soviet support. Thereafter, China became almost entirely

1. Except in the cases of the nuclear tests at Woomera (Australia) and Christmas Island, the presence of British nuclear weapons in Asia has never been publicly admitted.
self-sufficient in all phases of nuclear weapons research, development, engineering, testing and production. China exploded its first atomic bomb in October 1964 and just over two and a half years later, successfully tested its first H-bomb. It has also made considerable progress towards the development of a missile delivery capability.

China's interest in nuclear research and development was evident as early as 1950. In that year, the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was established in Peking.\(^1\) Also in 1950, Moscow and Peking entered into an agreement for the joint exploitation of uranium resources in Sinkiang.\(^2\) During the next few years, China supplied Russia with 'atomic raw materials' and it seems reasonable to conclude that these originated in Sinkiang.\(^3\) In 1955, Russia agreed to transfer its share in the Sinkiang uranium enterprise to China.\(^4\) Peking thus obtained complete control over these quite considerable uranium deposits together with the associated extraction and separation facilities. Also in 1955, the Sino- Soviet Atomic Co-operation Treaty was signed. Under the terms of this agreement Russia undertook to supply China with a 10 M.W. experimental reactor together with a cyclotron for the Peking Institute.

It has been estimated that, in 1950, China had less than 900 scientists, 170 of whom were studying outside the country.\(^5\) After the Korean War, however, Peking initiated a number of moves designed to provide China with the scientists and engineers

---

4. ibid., p.183.
necessary for a nuclear research programme. Agreements signed with Russia in 1954 and 1955 assisted Peking in developing research facilities and training programmes which later played an important part in China's nuclear weapons programme. In 1956, Russia agreed to supply small reactors for sites in Northwest China and Manchuria. In addition, the Soviet First Five-Year Plan for Foreign Aid, which was also launched in 1956, provided for assistance in the development of 39 atomic research centres throughout China. It is possible that, in view of the alleged cut-back in Soviet assistance after 1958, not all of these facilities were provided. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that Russian assistance was an important factor in the rapid and substantial growth of China's pool of skilled personnel. It has been estimated, that by 1957, there were no less than 10,000 scientists and technicians enrolled at the Peking institute alone.

One of the most important steps in the development of Chinese expertise in nuclear research was taken when Peking agreed to participate in the establishment of the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna, in Russia. This centre which was set up in March 1956, provided research facilities for the training of scientists and engineers from Soviet-bloc countries. The costs of the Institute were borne by member states. In 1956, China's share was 20% of the total and was second in size only to Russia's, an indication of the importance Peking then placed on research in the nuclear field. It was alleged in 1965 that some 950 Chinese scientists had been enrolled in or graduated from the Dubna Institute.

1. Harris, loc. cit., p.95.
3. There is reason to believe that the cut-back in Soviet assistance to the Chinese nuclear programme may not have been as great as previously estimated. See below, p. 87.
An important aspect of the drive for trained personnel was the campaign to "welcome back the Chinese specialists still in the capitalist countries to take part in construction work in China."\(^1\) Apparently Peking achieved some success in this endeavour. The elite group of physicists working in China in 1965 was reported to include Wang Han-chang, formerly of the University of California and now believed to be in charge of China's nuclear weapons programme. Other skilled scientists who returned to China prior to 1964 included Ch'ien Hsueh-sen, formerly of the California Institute of Technology, and Dr Chao Chung Yao, also from that establishment and an observer at the American nuclear tests at Bikini.\(^2\) The first of these, Ch'ien, was an expert in missile technology and became head of China's ballistic missile programme within a decade of his return.\(^3\)

During 1958 important additions were made to China's expanding nuclear potential. Yet another atomic institute was set up, this time at Shanghai and, again, with Soviet assistance.\(^4\) In September 1958, the reactor promised by Russia three years earlier became fully operational. This installation, which was fuelled by enriched uranium, appears to have been used mainly for purposes of research.\(^5\) Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that knowledge acquired in operating the reactor at Peking helped Chinese engineers to design and build the plutonium-producing reactors which appeared later in other parts of China. Finally, in December 1958, the Draft Twelve-Year Plan for the Development of Science and Technology was issued. It established 57 specific priorities, the highest

---

of which were atomic energy, electronics and jet propulsion technology. ¹

Characteristic of the early growth of China's nuclear potential was the heavy dependence on Soviet aid. However, some uncertainty surrounds the extent of Soviet assistance to the Chinese nuclear programme after 1958. In 1963, during one of the verbal exchanges which marked the Sino-Soviet dispute, China revealed that in October 1957 it had signed with Russia an agreement on "new technology for national defence". This agreement, Peking alleged, was unilaterally broken by the Russians in June 1959, when they refused to provide the Chinese with "a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture." ² Moscow confirmed the existence of some such agreement but accused Peking of "presenting the facts tendentiously and in a distorted light." ³ Arnold Kramish agrees that the defence-technology agreement was abrogated in 1959 but that thereafter, Russia continued to go on helping China in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. ⁴ According to the American Government, Russian assistance to the Chinese nuclear-weapons programme was terminated in 1960. ⁵ This is the latest date yet suggested for the severance of Soviet assistance to the Chinese nuclear weapons programme. Whether

3. ibid.
or not Soviet assistance to China's peaceful nuclear programme continued after 1960 is difficult to say. However, there is little disagreement that after that date, if not earlier, Peking was forced to continue its weapons programme unaided.

As the flow of Russian aid petered out, China embarked on a policy aimed at making the country self-sufficient in the production of nuclear weapons. Projects which had been started with Soviet aid were hastily completed, and construction of entirely new facilities commenced. In 1959, the Institute of Atomic Energy created branch institutes or research organs in every province, major city and autonomous region in China. As the flow of Russian aid petered out, China embarked on a policy aimed at making the country self-sufficient in the production of nuclear weapons. Projects which had been started with Soviet aid were hastily completed, and construction of entirely new facilities commenced. In 1959, the Institute of Atomic Energy created branch institutes or research organs in every province, major city and autonomous region in China. In addition, a small research reactor, the first all-Chinese model but constructed from Soviet plans, was completed at Peking. It was fuelled with enriched uranium supplied by Russia before aid was suspended. By 1962, China's nuclear capacity had been immensely strengthened by the completion of additional facilities in many parts of the country. Between 1959 and 1961, small research reactors were built in Wuhan, Shensi and Kirin provinces and the first entirely Chinese designed and produced research reactor was installed at Nankai University. More importantly, during 1961-62, reactors capable of producing weapons grade plutonium in substantially larger quantities than facilities previously in existence, were established in Sian and Chungking.

Probably the most impressive of China's achievements in the field of weapons development prior to 1964 was the construction of a gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow. There is some uncertainty as to when construction of this plant was

2. ibid.
3. ibid.
4. ibid.
started but it is unlikely that China embarked upon such a scheme without some Soviet assistance. Though the existence of the plant was known to Washington prior to China's first nuclear test it had been assumed that it was either not in operation, or in any case, was inadequate for the production of substantial quantities of U235 in the concentration required for nuclear explosions. Consequently, the use of U235, rather than plutonium, in Peking's first test explosion surprised many Americans and gave rise to speculation as to how China came by the material. Some suggested that the Chinese either stole or received the U235 from the Russians. Kramish has advanced the theory that China produced its own U235 using a combination of gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic separation. Whatever the source of this initial quantity of U235 may have been, China has since shown that it can manufacture its own: so far, all of the nuclear devices tested by China have been based on U235.

The use of U235 in their first nuclear devices was an indication that China had chosen the less popular of the two traditional paths to an initial weapons capability. It also

1. Kramish has argued that help in the construction of the gaseous diffusion plant could have been part of the assistance in the peaceful nuclear field which he alleges Russia extended to China even after 1959. See, loc. cit., pp.248 and 250.
4. ibid. See also, Manfredo Macioti, "Scientists Go Barefoot," in Survival, Vol. 13, No. 7, July 1971, pp.232-238. This could possibly account for the relatively small size of the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow. It is interesting to note that it was by a combination of gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic separation that the Manhattan Project produced U235 for the Hiroshima A-bomb.
5. France, the U.S., Russia and Britain all used plutonium as the fissionable material for their first nuclear explosive devices. Plutonium is cheaper and easier to produce than U235. This no doubt accounted for its popularity with the first four nuclear powers. On the other hand, a bomb made from U235, once the U235 is available, is easier to construct than one made from Plutonium. For a note on these relative merits of Plutonium and U235, see Ian Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, Sydney: Sydney University Press, pp.13 and 21.
meant that China had already taken a substantial step in the
direction of a thermo-nuclear weapons capability.¹ Peking's
achievements thus far in the nuclear field represented an
immense effort for a country considered to be backward economically
and industrially. It is true, that during the early stages of the
programme, Russian assistance had been considerable. But after
1960, if not earlier, Chinese scientists and engineers were able
to free their country of dependence on foreign assistance in
the weapons field, at least, and successfully conclude the
development of China's first atomic bomb.

Since October 1964, China has conducted a total of eleven
nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests;² 10 of these tests have taken
place in the atmosphere and one, in September 1969, was
conducted underground.³ The estimated yields of the nuclear
devices China has so far tested are in the 20 - 500 kilotons
range.⁴ China's first full thermo-nuclear device was exploded
in June 1967;⁵ since then there have been three other success­
ful thermo-nuclear tests. All the thermo-nuclear devices tested
so far have been in the three megaton range.⁶ The Institute

1. U235 is considered to be highly suitable, if not essential, for the manufacture of thermo-nuclear weapons. See, ibid., pp.20-21.
3. Strategic Survey, 1970, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, p.34. There were no reports of any nuclear tests in China between October 1970 and July 1971. It has been suggested that one explanation for the underground test of September 1969 may have been China's interest in the construction of tactical nuclear weapons. See, Gelber, loc. cit., p.38.
5. ibid. Thermo-nuclear material was present in two previous tests, one on 9 May 1966, and another on 28 December 1966.
6. ibid. What appears to have been an unsuccessful test of a thermo-nuclear device took place on 24 December 1967.
For Strategic Studies (I.S.S.) noted in 1970, that China's programme of nuclear tests indicated "continuing research on compact weapons suitable for missile or aircraft delivery."\(^1\) Success in this endeavour appears to have been demonstrated in the tests themselves; of the 10 devices exploded in the atmosphere, seven have been air-dropped and one was delivered by missile.\(^2\) Latest estimates by the I.S.S. suggest that China may now have sufficient fissionable material for a total of about 120 fission and fusion weapons.\(^3\)

China has made considerable progress in the development of a delivery system for its nuclear warheads. During the 1950s, Russia supplied China with bomber aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons; these were Il-28s and TU-4s.\(^4\) However, by today's standards, neither aircraft could be considered a truly effective delivery vehicle. The former is only a twin-jet light bomber and the latter (which the I.S.S. claims is a copy of the B-29)\(^5\) is of a type which first came into service with the Russians in 1946 and could therefore be regarded as obsolete.\(^6\) For a while, it seemed that China intended to by-pass the bomber aircraft development stage and proceed directly to the development and deployment of missiles.\(^7\) However, in 1971, the I.S.S. reported that China

2. The Strategic Survey, 1970, p.34.
had begun to build copies of the Soviet TU-16 medium bomber, an aircraft with an operational range of up to 1000 miles and capable of carrying nuclear weapons.¹ Latest reports indicate that China has now produced at least 30 TU-16s and has established a production rate of about five a month.² As Gelber has suggested, this movement into the area of medium range bomber production, as well as China's emphasis in the late 1960s, on the development of M.R.B.M.s, may have been related to Peking's growing perception of a Soviet threat and of China's need for something to counter it.³

Despite its recent activity in the medium range aircraft field, China has been primarily interested in the development of a missile delivery force. The decision to develop such a system was made in 1958 and seems to have been taken in anticipation of Soviet assistance.⁴ The first missile test reported by Peking was carried out in October 1966 in conjunction with China's fourth nuclear explosion. It is believed that the missile used in the test had a range of 600-700 kilometers.⁵ In April 1970, China launched into earth orbit an artificial satellite weighing 173 kilograms. This feat seemed to indicate that China had developed a booster vehicle of somewhat similar proportions to the early American Thor I.R.B.M.⁶ A second earth satellite weighing 230 kilograms was launched by China in March 1971.⁷

The military significance of this activity in the missile field began to emerge in 1971. A report by the I.S.S.,

³ Gelber, op. cit., p.37.
⁴ Halperin, op. cit., p.77.
current to July of that year, indicated that China had deployed, 
mainly in the north-western and north-eastern parts of the country, 
about 20 missiles (M.R.B.M.s) with a range of up to 1000 miles. \(^1\) 
In March 1971, U.S. Defence Secretary, Laird, reported that the 
emphasis in Chinese R and D during 1970 appeared to have shifted 
from M.R.B.M. to I.R.B.M. development. \(^2\) Other sources indicated 
that an I.R.B.M. was certainly being tested on a new range which 
had been brought into use in Manchuria during 1970-71. \(^3\) 
(Suitable deployment of I.R.B.M.s, with a probable range of 
1500-2500 miles, would give China the capacity to reach targets 
in the Urals, India and all of South East Asia.) \(^4\) The develop­
ment, so far, of China's missile force, has accorded well with 
estimates made in March 1971 by U.S. Defence Secretary Melvin 
Laird; Mr. Laird predicted then, that by the middle of 1971, 
China would have "a small number of M.R.B.M.s deployed." He 
also predicted that by mid-1972, China could have operational 
"a modest number of missiles with a mix of M.R.B.M.s and 
I.R.B.M.s." \(^5\)

But what of China's development of an I.C.B.M.? In 1967, 
U.S. Defence Secretary McNamara, said:

With regard to an ICBM, we believe that the Red 
Chinese nuclear weapons and ballistic missile devel­
opment programs are being pursued with high priority. 
On the basis of recent evidence, it appears possible 
that they may conduct either a space or a long-range 
ballistic missile launching before the end of 1967.

\(^1\) ibid.
\(^2\) See, Statement of Secretary of Defence Melvin R. Laird Before 
the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1972-1976 
Defence Program and the 1972 Defence Budget, March 9, 1971, 
Washington, 1971 (hereafter referred to as \textit{1971 Defence 
Posture Statement,})p.48.
\(^3\) See, \textit{Strategic Survey, 1971}, p.57 and The Military Balance, 
\(^4\) \textit{Strategic Survey, 1971}, p.57.
However, it appears unlikely that the Chinese could deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs before the mid-1970s, or that those ICBMs would have great reliability, speed of response, or substantial protection against attack.¹

Since then, the U.S. Government has shown no desire to alter its basic assumption that the development of an I.C.B.M. force is an important goal of Chinese military planning. Official estimates of the date when China could have an operational I.C.B.M. capability have ranged from the middle to the late 1970s.² Recent reports suggest that a reduced


2. In March 1969, Mr. Laird estimated that China could have an operational I.C.B.M. capability (15 or more missiles) by the mid-1970s. See his testimony in Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, March 6, 11, 13, 21, 26 and 28, 1969, Washington, 1969 (hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings on Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, 1969), pp.178 and 181. In January 1970, Mr. Laird predicted that by the mid-1970s China could have a force of some 80 - 100 M.R.B.M.s or 20 - 40 I.C.B.M.s or some six of the two. See, The New York Times, 8 January 1970. However, other official American statements have hinted that China might not have an operational I.C.B.M. capability till the late 1970s. See, President Nixon's News Conference of 30 January 1970. Reproduced in D.O.S.B., 16 February 1970, p.176. In March 1971, Mr. Laird said that China was not likely to attain an initial operational capability (I.O.C.) with I.C.B.M.s till 1974 or 1975. Moreover, he added, "they probably could not have significant numbers of ICBMs deployed until late in the decade." See, 1971 Defence Posture Statement, p.48.
range test of an I.C.B.M. may have been conducted on the new Manchuria-Sinkiang range in 1970. However, the long-awaited oceanic test of an I.C.B.M. has yet to occur, though a tracking vessel for use in such a test seems to have been prepared. It is the view of the I.S.S., that "full development of an ICBM, ... must still be a few years away."

There has been some comment recently on the possibility that China might try to develop a submarine-launched missile force. China already possesses one submarine of Soviet design with facilities for launching missiles. Moreover, it has been noted that Chinese shipyards have begun to build advanced warships, including at least one nuclear-powered submarine. Other questions regarding the future development of China's nuclear force have also been explored recently in Congressional hearings and unofficial writings on Chinese security affairs. These have included issues such as missile site hardening and mobility, and missile accuracy and penetratability. However, as China has not indicated publicly what its intentions are in these areas, foreign assessments must remain highly speculative.

It would be wise not to be too dogmatic in one's assertions about the future of China's nuclear programme; after all, a number of official predictions on the subject have already proved incorrect. Peking may yet have to overcome a

3. ibid.
5. The Military Balance, 1971-1972, p.42. China is not known to have any missiles for this boat.
7. For a comment on some of these matters, see ibid.
8. In 1967, the J.C.A.E. predicted that Peking would have an operational I.C.B.M. capability before 1972. See, J.C.A.E. Report on China's Nuclear Weapons Programme, p.3. Also, it has already been noted that Secretary McNamara predicted that China might conduct a space or long-range ballistic missile launching before the end of 1967.
number of hurdles in the path of its nuclear development. The present scientific community in China appears to have escaped the worst excesses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.\(^1\)

However, as Gelber has pointed out, China's nuclear development may nevertheless be limited, among other things, by a shortage of highly-qualified scientists and engineers, and by the effect of overall resource limitations on weapons-related R and D.\(^2\)

Finally, it needs to be remembered that the eventual size and composition of the Chinese nuclear force will be determined not just by China's scientific, industrial and financial capacity, but also, by its expectations about the future character of Soviet and U.S. strategic systems, and by the role which Peking has in mind for its own nuclear force. It is this latter question which, among others, will now be examined.


Chinese leaders have had plenty to say about the military and political significance of nuclear weapons and about the role they envisage for their own nuclear forces. Information on these matters has been revealed in many contexts: in interviews granted by Chinese spokesmen to foreign journalists and writers; in the official statements China has released to coincide with its nuclear tests; in official pronouncements on arms control; and, in the verbal exchanges which have marked the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking. Much of this material has been well researched by authorities on

---

2. *ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
Chinese security affairs. From a reading of their work, it is possible to construct a list of reasons why China has chosen to develop its own nuclear deterrent.

First, China clearly aspires to the status of a great power and quite correctly believes that the possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for such status. As Premier Chou En-lai said of China's decision to go nuclear: "other great nations had such weapons and smaller ones would have them in due course." Peking is obviously quite unhappy with what it sees as Soviet and American efforts to dominate the world by maintaining a nuclear autarchy. Moreover, it is aggrieved that in the past Russia and the U.S. have not treated with China on a basis of equality. Clearly, Peking sees its possession of nuclear weapons as a means of helping to break


the super-power monopoly, of winning the respect of Washington and Moscow, and of acquiring for China a voice equal with the other major powers in decisions affecting Asia and the world generally.¹

Second, there can be little doubt that Peking views its nuclear force as a means of acquiring greater influence in the Communist world. China has violently split with its major ally on questions of ideology, nuclear strategy and relations with the non-Communist world, especially the U.S. It strongly disagrees that Moscow has any particular right to speak on behalf of the Communist bloc in these matters. Peking has clearly reasoned that only through developing its own nuclear weapons can it secure an independent voice in intra-alliance questions.²

The third reason for China's development of a nuclear force, was its desire for a credible deterrent against American attack. It seems reasonable to assume that this was the most important of Peking's motives. Ever since the Communists came to power in China they have been aware that the U.S. could attack them with nuclear weapons at any time while they could do little in return. Indeed, on more than one occasion, Peking seems to have been the recipient of quite specific American nuclear threats. In 1953, President Eisenhower made it clear that if a truce in Korea was not rapidly agreed upon, the war would be widened and that nuclear weapons might be used against China.³

3. Huck, *op. cit.*, p.64.
During the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1954-55 Secretary of State Dulles threatened the use of tactical nuclear weapons against China. ¹ Finally, during the Quemoy crisis of 1958 Eisenhower seems to have been ready to use nuclear weapons in defence of the island. ²

The desire for a deterrent against American attack was apparent in the New China News Agency's announcement of Peking's first nuclear test. Part of the statement said:

China cannot remain idle and do nothing in the face of the ever increasing nuclear threat posed by the United States. China is forced to conduct nuclear tests and develop nuclear weapons. ... The development of nuclear weapons by China is for defense and for protecting the Chinese people from the danger of the United States' launching a nuclear war. ³

This preoccupation with the possibility of American attack has been a consistent theme in Chinese statements on strategy and arms control and goes a long way towards explaining Peking's attitude to the question of proliferation. In their opposition to nuclear spread, the two super-powers have stressed that there is a real danger of accidental war and that this danger increases as more states acquire nuclear weapons. However, as Halperin has suggested, the Chinese believe that the greatest danger of war stems from the possibility of a deliberate American attack on China and that this danger is not likely to increase with the spread of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, Peking has argued that to the extent that China and other socialist states are able to equip themselves with nuclear weapons the danger of deliberate American attack, and by inference, of war generally, becomes less likely. ⁴

¹ ibid.
² ibid.
³ New China News Agency announcement of 16 October 1964. Quoted in Halperin, China and the Bomb, p.44.
⁴ Halperin, China and Nuclear Proliferation, p.32.
An important factor in China's desire for a deterrent of its own was its refusal to depend on Soviet assurances of support. This was clear at the time of the final negotiations leading to the test ban treaty in 1963. Peking maintained that it would not be a party to the test ban unless it included a prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons by states everywhere. Moreover, it warned Moscow that the test ban was simply an attempt by the U.S. to prevent socialist countries other than the Soviet Union from developing nuclear weapons. That it was proper and necessary for these countries, especially China, to develop nuclear weapons was made apparent in a Chinese Government statement of August 1963. Part of this statement said:

In fighting imperialist aggression and defending its security, every socialist country has to rely in the first place on its own defence capability, and then - and only then - on assistance from fraternal countries and the people of the world. For the Soviet statement to describe all the socialist countries as depending on the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union for their survival is to strike an out-and-out great-power chauvinistic note and to fly in the face of the facts.

The Chinese Government has always fully appreciated the importance of the Soviet Union's possession of nuclear weapons. However, such possession must in no way be made a justification for preventing other socialist countries from increasing their own defence capabilities. ... If the Soviet Government is earnest about abiding by the Moscow Statement and really wants to fight the imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend world peace, there is no reason why it should try so hard to obstruct other socialist countries from increasing their defence capabilities.

1. Halperin, China and the Bomb, p.46.
2. ibid.
Clearly implicit in this Chinese statement was the idea that the Soviet Union might not always be prepared to place nuclear weapons at the disposal of other socialist states. The idea was made more explicit in some remarks by Foreign Minister Chen-Yi in September 1963. He said:

How can any one nation say that they will defend another - these sort of promises are easy to make, but they are worth nothing. Soviet protection is worth nothing to us. Atomic weapons are in use by other powers - so therefore we need atomic weapons for our defence.\(^1\)

But it was not simply a question that the Soviet Union might be unwilling to use nuclear weapons on China's behalf. Peking was fast inclining to the view that Moscow placed the detente between it and the U.S. ahead of the interests of the other socialist states: worse still, that Moscow was prepared to co-operate with Washington in some sort of nuclear plot against China. There was some evidence of this thinking on Peking's part in 1963. As an official Chinese statement of August that year said: "the real aim of the Soviet leaders is to compromise with the United States in order to seek momentary ease and to maintain a monopoly of nuclear weapons and lord it over the socialist camp."\(^2\) Since then, the theme has become more common in Chinese statements. On the occasion of America's decision, in September 1967, to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (A.B.M.) system, Peking said:

Facts have proved to the hilt that the nuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet revisionist clique, like those in the hands of the United States imperialists, are for the purpose of intimidating the revolutionary people of the whole world, ...\(^3\)

But Peking's bitterest attacks on alleged super-power collusion were evoked by the N.P.T. and the Tripartite Proposal on Security Assurances. Its response to these agreements deserves to be quoted at some length:

It must be pointed out that this nuclear fraud of United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism is also a component part of their anti-China plot. They not only want to fan up anti-China feelings internationally through the so-called "treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" but also want to accelerate the rigging up of an anti-China encirclement by providing their "nuclear umbrellas" to India and other countries bordering China. The United States imperialists and the Soviet revisionists have thus taken a big step forward in their military collaboration against China. [They] are incorrigible devotees of nuclear fetishism. They believe that with a scrap of paper such as the "treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" they will be able to preserve their nuclear monopoly and, on the strength of the nuclear weapons in their hands, to hold back the tide of the revolution of the world's people.¹

China's desire for some means to protect itself from U.S. (and Soviet) attack raises the question of the sort of deterrent force Peking might be satisfied with. For the foreseeable future, China cannot hope to develop a force of similar size and composition to those possessed by the two super-powers. But a deterrent of this sort would not seem to be necessary for China's purposes. The capacity to strike at just a few American (or Soviet) cities would be sufficient to make either super-power very wary about attacking China. Obviously, Peking would like a force capable of retaliating against U.S. cities even after an American attack on China. But such a capability will probably be difficult to achieve,

at least in the short-run: indeed McNamara predicted in 1967 that Peking was unlikely to have a second-strike capability for at least 15 to 20 years.\(^1\) Nevertheless, even a force wholly vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike would serve a useful purpose so far as China is concerned. Harry Gelber has said of such a Chinese capability:

\[...\] in a variety of conflict situations short of all-out war, either great power would be faced with the unpleasant alternative of launching a first strike, with all its political and other costs, or accepting some risk of a Chinese strike. The need to avoid such a choice would itself be a powerful constraint in many circumstances.\(^2\)

So far as other possible uses of the Chinese nuclear force are concerned, there is relatively little evidence on which to speculate. One possible motive, which Peking is understandably reluctant to discuss itself, is the belief that nuclear weapons would enable China to more easily establish hegemony in Asia. In 1968, Alice Langley Hsieh predicted that China would give priority to the deployment of a M.R.B.M. system.\(^3\) Such a capability, she argued, could create intense anxiety amongst neutrals and America's allies in Asia and lead them to assert pressure on the U.S. to avoid any confrontation with China - nuclear or conventional.\(^4\) Halperin has argued that a nuclear force would reinforce Peking's conventional

---

4. ibid., pp.45-46. See also, her argument in "China's Nuclear Missile Programme : Regional or Intercontinental?", pp.98-99.
capacity and its ability to support wars of national liberation "by enabling China to make implicit threats of military action against her neighbours while depending on political moves to bring these nations into her orbit." Neither writer thinks it likely, however, that Peking would resort to overt threats or nuclear blackmail. Evidence educed earlier in this chapter seems to have borne out Hsieh's prediction that China would give priority in the short run at least, to the deployment of a regional nuclear capability. However, it must be emphasised that Peking does not appear to have abandoned its goal of an operational I.C.B.M. capability.

Finally in this review of motivations for the Chinese deterrent, it needs to be noted that Peking has hailed its bomb tests as "a great inspiration and support" for revolutionary peoples everywhere. However, despite these claims, China does not seem to contemplate using its nuclear weapons directly on behalf of any revolutionary group.

This chapter has attempted to trace the development of China's nuclear force and to examine the uses to which Peking might put this capability. In the following chapters the focus will be shifted to the potential nuclear powers in Asia, and in particular, to the capabilities and incentives for proliferation in these states.

2. Huck, op. cit., p.69. See also, Halperin, China and the Bomb, p.53 and Augenstein, loc. cit., p.862.
3. Huck, op. cit., p.69.
CHAPTER IV

THE POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS OF ASIA: INDIA

The proliferation problem in Asia arises from the possibility that a number of nations in the area might follow China in the development of nuclear weapons. It is generally agreed, that the nation most likely to do this is India. Though not amongst the front rank of the world's industrial powers, India has long been considered a potential nuclear power. The basis of this potential is the country's quite remarkable progress in the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy. India's development of nuclear technology has been motivated primarily by the need for rapid and substantial industrial growth. Nevertheless, largely as a result of this development, the country has acquired many of the facilities necessary for a nuclear weapons programme. Moreover, there has long been considerable support for nuclear weapons in India. Many have argued that for reasons of political prestige and military security the country should exercise its nuclear option. But so far, the Indian Government has resisted these pressures, though it is by no means certain that it will continue to do so.

A. India's Nuclear Weapons Potential

India's nuclear weapons potential stems from the advances made by that country in the peaceful exploitation of atomic

1. The National Planning Association's (Washington) report of 1960 (The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control) concluded that India was one of the twelve countries "able to embark on a successful nuclear weapons programme in the near future." Quoted in Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, (2nd edition), New York: Praeger, 1965, pp.150-151.
energy. The roots of this development may be traced back to the establishment, in 1945, of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. This body was founded by Dr. H.J. Bhabha, who, for nearly two decades, guided the development of India's atomic energy programme.\(^1\) When the Indian Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1948, it already had available a team of nuclear physicists who had trained at the Tata Institute.\(^2\) By the mid-50s India had been infected by the optimism, then current throughout the world, about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Probably the most immediate reflection of this was the establishment in 1954, of a national laboratory for atomic development at Trombay. Later in the same year, a Department of Atomic Energy was established as a separate Ministry of the Central Government.\(^3\)

India is relatively well placed in regard to the availability of nuclear fuels. Substantial reserves of uranium occur in Bihar, Rajasthan, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. Four deposits in Bihar alone are believed capable of yielding some 20 million metric tons of ore (15,600 tons of uranium concentrate).\(^4\) India's uranium reserves, however, are only about one-third the size of France's, and these, it should be noted, have proved inadequate for the French nuclear programme.\(^5\)

India is one of about six nations in the world capable of fabricating its own natural uranium fuel elements,\(^6\) but it does not have the facilities for extracting U\(_{235}\) from natural uranium. There has been some research on uranium isotope

---

separation techniques, but one report suggests that the Indian Government has ruled out the possibility of constructing a gaseous diffusion plant to produce U235. India's reluctance to enter the highly complex and expensive field of U235 separation has no doubt been influenced by the possibility of utilising an alternative fissile material based on thorium. The thorium process is still being developed, but preliminary work suggests that when combined with plutonium in a reactor, thorium turns into U233, a material which fissions easily like U235. The U233 may then be used on its own as a reactor fuel. It has been estimated that India possesses about 500,000 tons of thorium—roughly half of the world's known resources. It is hardly surprising then, that reactors fueled by U233 are planned for the last phase of India's three-stage nuclear programme. In addition to uranium and thorium, India is well endowed with other materials used in nuclear programmes and strict government

---

3. U233 may also be used with thorium in a "breeder" reactor. Such a reactor, besides producing electric power, will produce more U233 than it consumes. See, ibid., p.209. The whole future of thorium-based breeder reactors is very uncertain and it would probably be decades before India could exploit this path to nuclear self-sufficiency. For a note on the difficulties associated with U233, thorium 232 breeders, see V. Gilinky, Fast Breeder Reactors and the Spread of Plutonium, Rand Memorandum RM-5148-PR, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967, p.7. It is almost certain that a weapon has never been designed around U233. But the possibility that U233 might prove more suitable than plutonium in the fabrication of thermo-nuclear bombs is no doubt being investigated by Indian scientists. Such a discovery would relieve India of the expense and difficulty of constructing a U235 separation plant should the Government ever decide to develop hydrogen bombs.
controls are maintained over dealings in these minerals.\(^1\)

Since the mid-1950s, successive Indian Governments have hoped that atomic energy would eventually account for a large proportion of the country's power capacity.\(^2\) Consequently, an ambitious reactor programme has been embarked upon. India's first research reactor went critical in August, 1956. This was the first reactor to go into operation in Asia outside the U.S.S.R.\(^3\) By 1962, India could boast of three research reactors. One of these, the 40 M.W. Canada India Reactor, was the first major international atomic project anywhere in the world.\(^4\) But it is India's power reactors which are really significant in any discussion of the country's nuclear weapons potential. The only power reactor presently in use in India is the one installed in the power station at Tarapur, near Bombay. This facility, which was supplied by the United States, uses enriched uranium fuel and has an output of 380 M.W. It commenced operations early in 1969. Two other reactors are presently under construction in India. One of these is being built in Rajasthan in collaboration with the Canadians. It will be fuelled with natural uranium and is expected to have an output of 400 M.W. The other is a 400 M.W. natural uranium fuelled facility being built in Madras (Kalpakkam) by the Indians themselves.\(^5\)

---

2. It is planned that nuclear energy will supply five percent of the total installed capacity in 1971, eight percent in 1976, 17 percent in 1981 and 22 percent by 1986. See, Mirchandani, op. cit., p.207.
4. ibid.
India's power reactors, like those elsewhere, can be expected to produce quantities of fissile material. India probably began accumulating its first stocks of plutonium sometime after the Canada India Reactor went critical in July 1960. But output from the country's power reactors can be expected to add greatly to this stockpile. It was predicted in 1967 that the reactor at Tarapur alone would probably produce in excess of 200 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium each nine month period. The Tarapur reactor and the one scheduled for completion at Rajasthan will both be subject to I.A.E.A. or equivalent safeguards. However, the plant in Madras will be subject to supervision only if India agrees to place it under I.A.E.A. inspection. Assuming that India would be reluctant to renounce its agreements with Canada, the U.S. and the I.A.E.A., the plant at Kalpakkam would seem the most trouble-free path to the bomb should Delhi ever decide to develop nuclear weapons.

Two aspects of India's nuclear programme, the drive for self-sufficiency and the early construction of a plutonium separation plant, create the suspicion that a weapons capability may have been specifically provided for. As Ian Bellany has suggested, the impression that India has sought to achieve nuclear self-sufficiency is strengthened by the fact that "almost half of India's spending on research and development of all kinds is in the field of nuclear energy." In addition, of the three research reactors established at Trombay prior to 1962, two were designed and built by Indians.

1. The Canada India Reactor is a research facility but, in continuous operation at full power its fuel elements are capable of yielding up to eight kilograms of plutonium a year. See, Beaton and Maddox, _op. cit._, p.138.
3. A trilateral safeguards agreement covering the station at Tarapur was signed between India, the United States and the I.A.E.A. in January 1971.
Similarly, both the power plant being currently built in Madras and the plutonium separation plant are products of Indian know-how. These achievements reflect both the high standards of Indian science and technology and a desire to be rid of dependence on foreigners and the controls associated with international cooperation in nuclear matters.

The establishment, in 1964, of a plutonium separation plant also gives rise to some suspicion about the future direction of the Indian nuclear programme. It could hardly be argued that the facility was necessary for the provision of fuel for a second generation of reactors. Plutonium burning reactors are not scheduled to be built until the second stage of India's nuclear programme is commenced, sometime after 1971. Furthermore, it is reasonable to argue, that even when its plutonium burning reactors are ready, India would find it cheaper to depend on British or American reprocessing services. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, therefore, that India acquired a plutonium separation plant so as to accumulate, as quickly as possible, a stockpile of weapons grade plutonium which would be free of any restrictions over how it could be used.

India faces difficult problems in respect of a delivery system for any nuclear warheads it might develop. For the immediate future, it seems that the Indian Air Force would have to rely on its Canberra bombers. These are capable of carrying a 4,000 lb bomb load but would need refueling for strikes over long distances. Moreover, they would prove highly vulnerable against modern anti-aircraft defences. It is possible, that should India go nuclear, aircraft such as the Tu-16 or the B-47 could be purchased from overseas. It is unlikely, however, that long range strategic bombers such as the B-52 or the Tu-20 could be obtained. Work on rockets

is being pushed forward at the Space Science and Technology centre at Thumba in Kerala. The work being done there could lead to the development of a short-range missile delivery capability.\(^1\) Early in 1969, an Indian version of the French designed Centaur rocket was successfully flight-tested. This is a two-stage, solid-fuelled rocket, which if converted to military purposes, could deliver a 70 lb warhead up to 200 miles. India has also designed and built a smaller rocket called the Rohini Rh-75. Delhi is planning to develop larger rockets and has hopes of launching an earth-satellite by the mid-1970s. However, there is a real possibility that weaknesses in India's industrial capacity, particularly in the fields of metallurgy and electronics, might yet limit progress in the development of rockets.\(^2\)

India's relatively advanced nuclear industry has certainly provided the foundations for a future weapons programme should this be desired. However, it needs to be emphasised that the country's ability to manufacture nuclear weapons in the very near future is still fairly limited. Indeed, in August 1970, Ian Bellany suggested that India could scarcely assemble enough plutonium for the production of six, 20-kiloton equivalent warheads.\(^3\) Moreover, any attempt by India to use the plutonium producing reactor (C.I.R.) at Trombay for weapons purposes would no doubt be announced to the world in advance by the reactor's Canadian suppliers.\(^4\) Finally, it seems unlikely that India could perfect a long range delivery capability in the immediate future. But the decision to build

---

1. The material in this section is based largely on discussions with Dr. Ian Bellany, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra. See also, Bellany, op. cit., pp.59-60.
2. The Director of India's Atomic Energy Commission has admitted as much. See, The Times of India, 4 June 1966.
4. ibid.
nuclear weapons is not likely to be a function of economic and technical capacity alone. Save for the presence of a number of strategic and political incentives, it is unlikely that the possibility of India going nuclear would have been considered as great as it has. It is these incentives which must now be examined.

B. The Growth of Support for Nuclear Weapons in India

During the first decade after Independence, suggestions that the country should acquire nuclear weapons were rarely heard in India. There seem to have been two main reasons for this. In the first place, few Indians could conceive of any threat to the country's security which would have warranted the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Secondly, the doctrine of non-violence which had characterised the nation's fight for independence still held sway over large sections of the population. Because of this, many Indians, and in particular some of the country's political leaders, regarded the emergence of the atomic bomb as an especially evil development in man's affairs and one with which they did not wish to be associated. Mahatma Gandhi, and his political heir, Nehru, appear to have been particularly concerned about the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons.¹ This concern about the threat posed by nuclear weapons and the special responsibility felt by many Indians for the elimination of these armaments, was reflected in Delhi's early and energetic efforts in support of arms control.²

But from the beginning, India was anxious to exploit the power of the atom for peaceful purposes. Like people in many

---

1. Mirchandani, op. cit., p. 3.
2. India's performance in the arms control field will be discussed later in this chapter.
countries during the mid-1950s, India's leaders were optimistic about prospects in the nuclear energy field. In 1957, Nehru declared that, through the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy, Indians could be assured of higher living standards. But despite its interest in nuclear research at this time, there could be little doubt about India's dedication to the non-military application of the new source of energy. In January 1957, while opening India's first research reactor, the Prime Minister said:

No man can prophesy the future. But I should like to say on behalf of my Government - and I think I can say with some assurance on behalf of any future Government of India - that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes. There is no condition attached to this assurance, because once a condition is attached, the value of such an assurance does not go very far.  

Early in 1958, China's Foreign Minister, Chen-Yi, indicated that his country intended to go nuclear. Knowledge that China had nuclear ambitions precipitated stirrings of dissatisfaction, in the Indian Parliament and press, about the exclusively non-military nature of India's nuclear programme. In the wake of these developments, the Indian Government felt it prudent to restate its position in regard to nuclear weapons. In August 1960, while replying to a debate on the annual report of the Department of Atomic Energy, the Prime Minister said:

1. Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (hereafter referred to as Foreign Affairs Record), July 1957, p.137.
2. Quoted in Mirchandani, op. cit., p.6.
3. ibid., p.11.
4. For a comment on some of this early discussion about China's nuclear ambitions and its significance for India, see ibid., pp.12-14.
So far as we are concerned, we are determined not to go in for making atomic bombs and the like. . . . No declaration that I can make today will necessarily bind people in the future, but I do hope that we shall create an atmosphere in this country which will bind every Government in future, so that it may not use this [atomic] power for evil purposes.  

Apprehension about China's nuclear intentions was heightened following the border clash between Indian and Chinese forces during October and November, 1962. In the press, there was evidence of much uneasiness about the nuclear ambitions of a country which had so dramatically exhibited its hostility towards India. In parliament, the right-wing Jan Sangh formally recommended that India develop nuclear weapons as part of the country's long term defence against China.  

This was the first instance of an Indian political party formally voicing such a demand. However, after sharing the limelight during the height of the border crisis, the issue of nuclear weapons slipped from prominence as a subject of discussion in Indian political circles. Occasional reports of China's progress in the development of an atomic bomb continued to figure in the Indian press but this issue tended to be forgotten in the welter of domestic problems confronting India in the wake of the conflict with its northern neighbour.  

China's first nuclear explosion in October 1964 marked a turning point in Indian thinking about nuclear weapons and, for the first time, the issue became a major subject of consideration for both public and politicians alike. The Indian Government responded calmly to the announcement of China's test. Defence Minister Chavan declared that the atomic bomb would not add to China's military strength and that the short-term threat from across India's northern border . . . .

1. Ibid., p.15.  
2. Ibid., p.21.  
3. Ibid., p.23.
borders continued to be primarily a conventional one. Mr. Chagla, another minister, also doubted whether China's nuclear test represented any real increase in the threat from that country. "If China ever dares to use it against India," he commented, "it will mean a world war, a nuclear holocaust." But there were many in the ruling Congress Party who disagreed with the government's assessment of the situation. Moreover, these dissident members of the Congress Party found support for their position from some of the opposition parties in the Indian Parliament. Reaction to the Chinese test amongst Indians generally is more difficult to gauge. However, a number of prominent public figures came out in support of an Indian bomb.

2. The relative strengths of the various parties in the Lok Sabha in November 1964 was: Congress 362; Communist 31; Swatantra 28; Jan Sangh 13; Praja Socialist 12; Samyukta Socialist 7; Independents 21; Other Parties 41. Source, India: A Reference Annual, Delhi: The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1964, p.34. Following China's nuclear test, the Jan Sangh restated its support for an Indian nuclear force. See, text of resolution adopted by the Jan Sangh in January 1965. Quoted in A.B. Shah (ed.), India's Defence and Foreign Policies, Bombay: Manakatalas, 1966, p.168. Moreover, on this occasion, the Jan Sangh was supported in its call for nuclear weapons by the Samyukta Socialist Party. See, The Times of India, 31 October 1964. The Praja Socialist Party appears to have been somewhat hesitant in arriving at a position on the bomb. In March 1965, the National Executive of the Party decided that there was no need for India to build the bomb. See, Mirchandani, op. cit., p.37. However, in May of the same year, the National Executive resolved that India should strive for "self-sufficiency in every branch of weaponry, conventional as well as nuclear." See, Shah (ed.), op. cit., p.168.
3. Possibly the most important of these was Dr. H. Bhabha, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Agency who broadcast his appeal on 25 October 1964. See, The Times (London), 28 October 1964. In the Lok Sabha, Dr. Bhabha's statement was loudly condemned by opponents of an Indian bomb.
In August 1965, one observer noted that foremost amongst the non-parliamentary supporters of nuclear weapons in India were younger members of the civil service, some military planners, some scientists, and young nationalistic intellectuals. ¹

The controversy which followed the Chinese detonation resulted in a polarisation of forces and opinions which, generally speaking, has characterised the debate over nuclear weapons in India to this very day. An insight into this controversy can be gained from an analysis of the debate on the matter in the Lower House of the Indian Parliament. The arguments advanced by the opponents of traditional government policy in regard to nuclear weapons were many and varied, but may be conveniently summarised as follows. First, it was argued that the Chinese bomb was a threat to Indian security. In its most general form, this argument took refuge in appeals to the alleged tradition of Chinese chauvinism and expansionism.² Of a more specific nature, the threat of blackmail was alluded to by many spokesmen.³ Mr. Nath Pai, a prominent member of the Praja Socialist Party was convinced that China would use its bomb to blackmail "India, Burma and all the Asian nations."⁴ To many Indians, the Chinese bomb was of special significance in respect of the territories lost to Peking in the border conflict two years earlier. Mr. Masani, the leader of the Swatantra Party, and even though himself an opponent of nuclear weapons for India, noted that the Chinese bomb was "not meant for strategic purposes across the Atlantic or the Pacific, it [was] meant for intimidating

---

² e.g., Speech by Mr. Nath Pai (Praja Socialist Party), in *Lok Sabha Debates*, 23 November 1964, Col., 1296.
³ One of the strongest statements along these lines was made in the Lok Sabha by Mr. Masani, leader of the Swatantra Party. See, *ibid.*, 23 November 1964, Col., 1240.
⁴ *ibid.*, 23 November 1964, Col., 1298-9.
neighbours nearer home." One result of this, he added, was clear to see:

So far as we are concerned, Peking has given notice that we might as well forget about any hopes of recovering our lost territory - leave aside liberating our neighbours in Tibet - because if anything of that kind were tried, nuclear force would be used against us. 2

There was some support for nuclear weapons on security grounds which were only indirectly related to the alleged threat from China. Some Indian politicians felt that it was only right that the country's troops should be provided with the most modern weapons. 3 Among other things, the addition of nuclear weapons to India's armoury, it was stressed, would considerably enhance the morale of the country's armed forces. 4 It was more commonly argued that by acquiring nuclear weapons India could reduce its expenditure on conventional forces. 5 Members who argued this way were especially anxious to stress the cheapness of nuclear weapons and drew heavily on estimates advanced in the broadcast by Dr. H. Bhabha, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. 6

2. ibid.
3. Lok Sabha Debates, 24 November 1964, Col., 1470.
4. ibid., 24 November 1964, Col., 1508.
5. ibid., 23 November 1964, Col., 1319 and 24 November, 1964, Col., 1508.
6. In his broadcast on 25 October 1964, Dr. Bhabha stressed the cheapness of building plutonium bombs, and estimated a unit cost of 18 lakh rupees (about 250,000 dollars). K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, claimed recently that Bhabha "was referring to the unit cost of a warhead after all the investment had been made in the reactors." See, Peter King, "How Wide is a Nuclear Threshold? India and the Bomb," in Australian Outlook, Vol. 25, No. 2, August 1971, p.200 (including his fn.6).
Second, many Indian parliamentarians appear to have wanted nuclear weapons for reasons of prestige. China and India, it was argued, were locked in a struggle for status in Asia\(^1\) and the Chinese bomb, it was alleged, had given Peking a substantial lead in this contest: China's prestige in the Afro-Asian world had "rocketed".\(^2\) There were claims that the Chinese bomb would open the way to Peking's participation at disarmament conferences and make it easier for China to enter the U.N.\(^3\) Some politicians had very definite ideas about the consequences for India's prestige should Delhi not also acquire the bomb. A few agreed with Mr. Azad that India would eventually be relegated to a "position in the background" of Asian affairs.\(^4\) A particularly grim warning was sounded by Mr. Trivedi, a member of the strongly nationalist Jan Sangh Party:

> In Asia there are two giants; one of them is India and the other is China. If one giant grows and the other remains a dwarf, certainly the dwarf will be killed.\(^5\)

It is important to note that the preoccupation with prestige characteristic of many supporters of an Indian nuclear force was not wholly attributable to China's nuclear weapons development. Ever since Independence, India's political leaders had harboured aspirations towards great power status for their country. For a while these yearnings appear to have been at least partly satisfied; the respect with which Mr. Nehru was held in many parts of the world was alone a source of great satisfaction to many Indians. In addition, India had long been recognised as a leading spokesman for the non-aligned world and, largely because of this, and its

---

1. Lok Sabha Debates, 23 November 1964, Col., 1308, and 24 November 1964, Col., 1512.
2. ibid., 23 November 1964,Cols., 1276 and 1337.
3. ibid., Cols., 1306-7 and ibid., 24 November 1964, Col., 1484.
4. ibid., 23 November 1964, Col., 1276.
5. ibid., 24 November 1964, Col., 1512.
energetic activity in the United Nations and its agencies, had won the right to be consulted about many of the problems of Asia and of the world in general. But by late 1964, it was being increasingly felt that India was losing the prestige and status it had once enjoyed. It seemed to many that the only way India could recover its former position was to build nuclear weapons. China's acquisition of nuclear weapons was clearly a great stimulus to this growing discontent about India's place in the world.

The third argument in support of nuclear weapons was slightly related to the second. For many years, Indians had looked upon the achievements of their scientists and technicians with immense feelings of pride and satisfaction. It was gratefully acknowledged that through their efforts, the country had become a leader in the exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But the Chinese tests tended to dampen this pride in India's achievements. In the first place, it was widely felt that Peking's single blast had largely cancelled out any prestige India may have accrued on account of its efforts in the peaceful nuclear field. This alone was sufficient cause for regret, but, in addition, the Chinese test had fostered the belief amongst some Indians that, in order to keep abreast of the latest developments in the nuclear field, their country would have to build bombs as well as power stations.

1. In the Indian Parliament, this complaint was taken up especially by some right-wing members of the Congress Party and by members of the Jan Sangh, and Swatantra Parties. See, eg., speeches in Lok Sabha Debates, 23 November 1964, Cols., 1255-7 and 1276.

2. That nuclear weapons were recognised as symbols of great power status was clearly indicated in a statement by Mr. K. Singh, a member of the Swatantra Party. He said: "The N-bomb has a moral aspect. It has the aspect of moral prestige. Those who possess it stand as if they are a class apart, a superior class." Lok Sabha Debates, 27 November 1964, Cols., 2273-4.

Finally, amongst the supporters of an Indian nuclear force, there were some who argued that nuclear weapons would eventually spread to all countries in the world. It was inevitable, they insisted, that India also would one day acquire nuclear weapons and that this day might as well be sooner as later.¹

The case against India having nuclear weapons was usually argued on four grounds; moral, diplomatic, military and economic. There can be little doubt that the moral issue was important to many Indians and the Prime Minister, Mr. Shastri, usually accorded it a prominent place in his statements about Indian nuclear policy.² Often, objections of a fairly general nature were raised. Foremost amongst these were complaints about the contamination of the atmosphere through testing and appeals to the alleged illegitimacy of weapons of mass destruction.³ Frequently, it was argued that it would be especially unthinkable for India to acquire nuclear weapons. Such claims drew heavily on references to the spirit of non-violence which it was alleged had characterised India's recent past and to the country's long and active association with the world disarmament movement. In opposing those who wanted to arm India with nuclear weapons, Mr. Moraji Desai, a former member of the government, declared:

Where is your loyalty to Gandhiji or Nehru if you now demand the manufacture of this weapon which constitute [sic] a big menace to the whole world and is meant to obliterate the human race.⁴

¹, ibid., 23 November 1964, Cols., 1316 and 1335.
², e.g., statement in Lok Sabha, reported in The Times of India, 28 November 1964. For an extreme example of the use of the moral argument against manufacturing nuclear weapons see speech by H.N. Mukerjee, in Lok Sabha Debates, 27 November 1964, Cols., 2279-2282.
³, This point was made with some force by Mr. R.K. Nehru, a former Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs. See his "The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb - 1" in India Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, January-March 1965, pp.9-10.
⁴, The Times of India, 8 January 1965. India's Ambassador to the U.N. had asserted earlier that "the country of Gandhi and Nehru" should not produce nuclear weapons. See, ibid., 15 December 1964.
On another occasion, the Prime Minister reminded those clamouring for the bomb of "India's crusade for world peace". Mr. Krishna Menon, a former Defence Minister, declared that to even consider the production of nuclear weapons, India would be "breaking the promise that [it had] made to the world for the last 15 years."  

The diplomatic and political objections to an Indian deterrent were partly related to the moral arguments. Many Indians were reluctant to see their country acquire nuclear weapons because of the alleged impact of such a move on efforts currently being made in the field of disarmament. Likewise, if India was to continue its "work for peace" it could not be a party to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This last point highlighted one of the most important issues in the Indian nuclear debate. It was an essential part of the anti-bomb case that India's role as "peacemaker" had earned the country much prestige and influence and went some of the way towards satisfying Delhi's great power aspirations. Opponents of an Indian deterrent hastened to remind their listeners that it would be unwise for India to abandon this role in exchange for the uncertain benefits of nuclear status.

The third argument used against the acquisition of nuclear weapons was that they were not justified on military grounds. It was extremely unlikely, some claimed, that China would launch a nuclear attack against India. Peking either did not wish to do so or was deterred from doing so by the certainty that such action would result in a world conflagration.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, 24 November 1964, Col., 1554.
3. The Times of India, 10 January 1965. See also, the views of Mr. R.K. Nehru, in Nehru, loc. cit., p.10.
6. This argument was especially popular amongst Peking oriented Communists.
7. Lok Sabha Debates, 24 November 1964, Col., 1521. The Prime Minister, Mr. Shastri, often used this argument. See, e.g., The Times of India, 10 January 1965.
The latter argument was especially popular amongst some Congress Party spokesmen. It was argued instead, that the greatest challenge to India's security stemmed from the possibility of low level aggression along the country's northern borders; and as a response to this type of threat, nuclear weapons were all but useless. What the country needed, it was usually added, was not nuclear weapons but stronger conventional forces.¹ This was an argument which found ready acceptance in military circles. Consequently, during these early months of the nuclear debate in India, spokesmen for the armed forces usually lent their support to the anti-bomb faction.²

Probably the most strongly held of all objections to India acquiring nuclear weapons, was economic. Few, if any, of the world's potential nuclear powers are faced with developmental problems as great as India's. Moreover, as Gupta has pointed out, even before the debate on nuclear weapons got under way, there had been a preoccupation in India with economic problems and an increasing emphasis on economic growth as the key to political stability.³ Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the cost of going nuclear was greatly emphasised by opponents of the bomb. In a major speech in the Lok Sabha in November 1964, the Prime Minister asserted that an Indian nuclear programme would "criple" the country's economy.⁴ Mr. Masani, spokesman for the Swatantra

2. In December 1964, the Joint Chiefs, after evaluating the effects of the Chinese explosion, concluded: "An immediate and real threat is the conventional threat and any effort to divert our resources from these preparations would weaken our position". Quoted in, Mirchandani, op. cit., p.243.
Party, cited the economic factor as probably the main reason why India should seek an alliance with the U.S. rather than try to develop its own nuclear weapons. India, Mr. Masani argued, would require a fairly advanced nuclear force which included long-range delivery vehicles. Such a force was clearly beyond the country's capacity and any attempt to develop it would ruin the economy and precipitate social and political unrest. The real beneficiary of such "madness" he added, would be Peking. There was yet another angle to the economic argument used against an Indian deterrent. Some Indians were concerned that a decision to go nuclear might inhibit the flow of economic assistance to their country. Mr. Desai argued that if India built nuclear weapons it would no longer have any grounds for seeking foreign aid. Others were convinced that in the event

1. Mr. Masani correctly observed that important targets in China such as Peking and the Manchurian industrial complex were some 2,500 miles from India. On the other hand, Delhi, Bihar and Bengal were only 300 miles from Chinese bases in Tibet. See, Lok Sabha Debates, 23 November 1964, Cols., 1249-50.

2. Ibid. A similar point was made by a former Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry, Mr. M.J. Desai. He said: "India will be playing straight into the hands of China if because of fear of emotional reaction or prestige considerations, it enters into a nuclear race with China. The enormous diversion of resources and talents required will retard India's economic and social development programmes indefinitely and by creating scarcity and economic dislocation and social discontent not only weaken India internally but eliminate it as a political factor in Asia and Africa." See, M.J. Desai, "India and Nuclear Weapons," in Disarmament and Arms Control, Autumn 1965. Quoted in Sisir Gupta, "The Indian Dilemma," in Buchan (ed.), A World of Nuclear Powers?, p.63. It should be noted that not all Indians were convinced that nuclear weapons were beyond the country's means. Some, such as the economist Raj Krishna, argued that historically speaking, expenditure in armaments had accelerated capital formation and a high rate of growth. See, Ibid., p.64.

3. The Times of India, 9 January 1965.
of such a move by Delhi, aid from Russia and America could cease.¹

China's initial atomic tests² were clearly a massive stimulus to whatever sympathy existed in India for a national nuclear force. As a result of the Chinese tests parliamentary support for nuclear weapons, which previously had been confined to the Jan Sangh Party, increased to include members of the ruling Congress Party as well as many Socialists. Outside of parliament, there was a similar upsurge of support for nuclear weapons, especially amongst some members of the Civil Service, scientists, and prominent figures in the academic community. But despite the clamour which built up in the wake of China's first nuclear test, the Indian Government adhered to its decision not to manufacture atomic weapons. Moreover, it is clear that even at the height of the hysteria, a majority of the Congress Parliamentary Party remained loyal to the government.³ The government's decision not to produce nuclear weapons was also supported in parliament by the Communists and by the right-wing Swatantra Party. The latter group was as vocal in its denunciation of China as sections of the pro-bomb lobby. It was Swatantra policy, however, that India should eschew production of its own nuclear weapons and, instead, should enter into a mutual security pact with the United States.⁴ Outside of Parliament, the government position enjoyed fairly widespread support. Most of the country's major national dailies were opposed to India having its own nuclear weapons.⁵

¹ Editorial in ibid., 3 November 1964.
² China conducted its second nuclear test in May, 1965.
³ This was apparent during the debate on the issue in the Lok Sabha in November 1964 and at subsequent non-parliamentary gatherings of the Congress Party.
⁴ The Times of India, 3 November 1964.
⁵ In an editorial on 28 October 1964, The Times of India asserted that two hurdles stood in India's path to the bomb: the agreement with Canada that the reactor at Trom-bay should be used for peaceful purposes only; and India's adherence to the test ban treaty. As late as October of the following year the same paper discounted the idea that China could successfully practice nuclear blackmail against India. See, ibid., 14 October 1964.
This was also the view of some leading army officers and most of the nation's economists.¹

It is clear, however, that Delhi had been shaken by China's acquisition of even a primitive nuclear capability. In the first place, it no longer stressed that India would never produce nuclear weapons.² Speaking at the Annual Session of the Indian Congress Party in January 1965, the Prime Minister strongly endorsed the government's decision not to produce atomic weapons but emphasised that no commitment could be made about the distant future.³ In addition, Indian Government spokesmen used every opportunity to remind their countrymen that India was in no way inferior to China in the development and understanding of nuclear technology. Moreover, the Prime Minister declared that in view of China's emerging nuclear capability, it was necessary for India to be fully acquainted with all aspects of the manufacture of atomic weapons.⁴

Second, the Indian Government's concern about the political and military implications of China's nuclear weapons development was reflected in Delhi's current activity in the arms control field. Just prior to Peking's first test, Indian representatives in Geneva indicated that they were no longer in favour of wholesale and immediate disarmament by the U.S.

1. Sisir Gupta has argued that too much emphasis has been placed on the cost aspects of the atom bomb in the debate over nuclear weapons in India. This he attributes to the "disproportionate importance given in India to the economist's view in determining all major State policies." See, L.B. Shastri, H.M. Patel and S. Gupta, "India and the Bomb," in Survival, Vol. 7, No. 2, March-April 1965, p.63.
2. Assertions that India would never produce nuclear weapons were characteristic of some earlier government statements, especially those by the former Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru.
3. The Times of India, 10 January 1965. Earlier, in a debate in the Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister declared that it was not India's intention to manufacture nuclear weapons "at present".
and Russia. Instead, they now wanted some arrangement whereby
the superpowers would be permitted to retain some of their nuclear
weapons during the early stages of any programme for general and
complete disarmament.\footnote{ibid., 2 October 1964. This matter will be discussed at
greater length later in the chapter.} It seems reasonable to assume that this
was a reaction to Indian fears that extensive and precipitate
disarmament by Russia and the U.S. would leave Asia at the mercy
of Peking. Furthermore, it was at this stage that India began
to adopt a more obstructionist line on the proposed treaty to
halt the spread of nuclear weapons. This was surely an indica­
tion of Delhi's anxiety, particularly in the wake of the
Chinese bomb, to preserve an option on manufacturing nuclear
weapons in the future should this prove necessary. Third, there
is evidence that shortly after the first Chinese test, Delhi
approached the great powers for some form of protection against
a Chinese nuclear attack.\footnote{This matter will be discussed at some length later in the
thesis. See Chapter IX.}

There matters rested for the time being. The Indian
Government had successfully withstood the assault on its
"no-bomb" policy, though efforts were no doubt being made to
reduce the lead-time the nation would require to build nuclear
weapons should it ever decide to do so. In addition, Delhi
had made its first tentative approaches to the great powers
about some form of protection for the non-nuclear states.

On 1 September 1965, fighting broke out between Indian
and Pakistani forces. This bitter and destructive conflict
lasted only 22 days but by the time it had concluded, the
demand for nuclear weapons was again being loudly raised in
India. Once again the Government's nuclear policy was widely
criticised by members of the ruling Congress Party\footnote{Mirchandani, op. cit., pp.39-40.} and a
letter to the Prime Minister, signed by 86 politicians
representative of all parties in the Indian Parliament, demanded the immediate manufacture of nuclear weapons.\(^1\) The conflict with Pakistan involved two features which were seized upon by supporters of nuclear weapons in India. In the first place, evidence of Peking's support for Pakistan heightened Indian fears of collusion between the country's two major antagonists.\(^2\) Such a development it was argued, could only be met by India acquiring its own nuclear weapons.\(^3\) Secondly, many Indians were angered by the British and American decisions to cease arms supplies to India (and Pakistan) during the conflict. This was proof, it was argued, that it was unwise to depend on foreign support and a clear indication of the necessity for India to make itself self-supporting in respect of nuclear weapons.\(^4\)

---


2. One week after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, China demanded that India dismantle certain military structures on the China-Sikkim border, withdraw its armed forces, and "stop all acts of aggression and provocation against China in the western, middle and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border". See, *The Times of India*, 9 September 1965. A demand to dismantle what Peking described as "56 illegal structures" near the Sikkim-Tibet border was later delivered in the form of an ultimatum. See, *The Times of India*, 18 September 1965. Most Indian and foreign observers regarded the Chinese action as highly provocative and as an attempt by Peking to improve its diplomatic standing in the eyes of Pakistan.

3. In their letter to the Prime Minister, the 86 members of the Indian Parliament said: "India's survival both as a nation and as a democracy, in the face of the collusion between China and Pakistan, casts a clear and imperative duty on the Government to make an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons." See, *The Times of India*, 20 October 1965. An informal poll conducted by the United News of India concluded that alleged Pakistani aggression and evidence of Pakistani-Chinese collusion were factors influencing Indian politicians in their criticism of the government's nuclear policy. See, Mirchandani, *op. cit.*, p.40.

Despite the wave of protest inspired by the war with Pakistan, the Indian Government again rejected proposals that the country go nuclear. The reasons given on this occasion included: the cost of nuclear bombs and delivery systems;\(^1\) the folly of defying world opinion on the non-proliferation issue;\(^2\) and, fears that Pakistan would follow India in producing nuclear weapons.\(^3\)

During 1966, China conducted no less than three nuclear tests and each provoked new demands, both inside and outside of parliament, for an Indian bomb.\(^4\) There was particular concern about the implications for India of China's missile test in October,\(^5\) and once again, there was widespread denunciation of the idea of nuclear guarantees from foreign powers.\(^6\) However, the government was not to be shifted from its non-nuclear stand. This was made amply clear in March by the new Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi and was reaffirmed later in the year.\(^7\)

India's Fourth General Election in February 1967 provided a fresh opportunity for the country's major political parties to restate their positions on the nuclear weapons issue. The

---

1. The Times (London), 4 December 1965.
2. The Times of India, 20 November 1965.
3. In arguing this way, the Finance Minister, Mr. Desai, nevertheless claimed that an "overwhelming majority" of people in India wanted nuclear weapons. See, Dawn (Karachi), 14 December 1965.
4. At a meeting in May of the Executive Committee of the Congress Party, the Prime Minister is reported to have faced an "almost unanimous demand" for a change in Indian policy in regard to nuclear weapons. See, The Times (London), 12 May 1966.
5. The Times of India, 29 October 1966.
7. Mirchandani, op. cit., pp. 43 and 46. Mrs. Gandhi became Prime Minister in January 1966 after the death of Mr. Shastri in Tashkent.
election manifestos of two of the major parties - the Jan Sangh, and the Praja Socialist - included explicit demands that India acquire nuclear weapons. Those of the Congress Party, the Swatantra Party and both Communist Parties were devoid of direct references to the nuclear issue. Recent research suggests that in the period since 1967, parliamentary opinion on the question of the acquisition of nuclear weapons has, with minor exceptions, remained fairly stable. Peter King has shown that at the General Elections in 1971, the Praja Socialists and the Jan Sangh, again came out in favour of nuclear weapons for India. Moreover, it seems that to this day, the Congress Party, the Swatantra Party and the Communist Party of India (pro-Soviet) remain officially opposed to India's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Krish Nanda has shown, though, that even within the Congress and Swatantra parties there is substantial "pro-bomb" feeling; to the question of whether, taking everything into consideration, they thought it would be an advantage for India to have atomic weapons, a representative sample of members of the Congress parliamentary party divided 46 per cent for and 49 per cent against. Members of the Swatantra Party divided 36 per cent for and 55 per cent against. Of the sample of parliamentarians as a whole, 49 per cent were against and 47 per cent for India having a nuclear deterrent. These figures are consistent with the point established earlier in this analysis, viz., that since about the time of China's first nuclear test in 1964, there has been substantial (though not majority) support in the Indian Parliament for a national

3. *ibid.*
4. *ibid.*
5. *ibid.*
nuclear force. Though it is still too early to assess the full significance of the 1971 election results for the nuclear debate in India, it seems reasonable to agree with Peter King that "the ruling Congress Party's massive victory will strengthen Mrs. Ghandi's ability to pursue any foreign and defence policies of her choosing, and her choices so far since 1966 have been anti-nuclear." It is also worth noting that the strongly pro-bomb Jan Sangh had Praja Socialist parties lost considerable ground in the 1971 elections.

No analysis of current attitudes in India on the question of nuclear weapons should leave out of account the views of the country's specialist writers on defence and foreign policy. Amongst this group, there has in recent years been fairly considerable support for an Indian deterrent, or at least, for

---

1. King, *loc. cit.*, p.201. The magnitude of the Congress (Ruling) Party's victory can be seen in the following table:

**ELECTION RESULTS, 1967 AND 1971.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress (Ruling)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress (Organization)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India (CPI)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Sangh</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praja Socialist Party (PSP)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others and Independents</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>66(a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 520 515(b)

(a) Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), ruling party in Madras, 23; other parties and independents, 43.

(b) Elections in three constituencies were to be held late; other seats are held by government nominees.

Note: Prior to the 1971 elections, the Congress Party had split into two factions, Ruling and Organisation. The latter faction held 100 seats in the old parliament.

the rapid development of India's nuclear establishment to the point where any decision to embark upon an effective nuclear weapons programme can be put into immediate effect. Generally speaking, the views of these writers have been motivated both by anxiety about the threat to India's security posed by China and by a concern that without nuclear weapons India's influence and status in Asia and the world as a whole will be diminished.  

Clearly, there exists in India, considerable support for the development of a national nuclear force. However, despite these pressures, both inside and outside of parliament, the Indian Government has adhered to its policy of not producing nuclear weapons. Evidence suggests that Delhi is still acutely conscious of the tremendous economic burden which any decision to go nuclear would impose on India, and it is no doubt also inhibited by uncertainties about the likely reaction of the superpowers especially in relation to aid and technical assistance should the decision be taken to acquire a nuclear force. Moreover, Delhi is no doubt influenced by the knowledge that India is not yet in a position to build nuclear warheads in any great number or a missile delivery system capable of reaching important targets in China.  

1. For a strong statement of support for an Indian nuclear deterrent by K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, see his, "India's Security", in Survival, Vol. 13, No. 5, May 1971, pp.154-159. For comments on the Indian nuclear debate which takes account of some of this intellectual opinion, see Sisir Gupta, "The Indian Dilemma" in Alastair Buchan, op. cit., pp. 55-67; Ashok Kapur, "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy: a perspective", in The World Today, Vol. 27, No. 9, September 1971, pp.379-389; and Peter King, loc. cit.  

2. See a comment on this in The Australian, 11 May 1970. See also, King, loc. cit., p.200.  

But though Delhi is reluctant to build nuclear weapons at the moment, it has struggled hard to create and maintain an option on doing so in the future. No effort has been spared to improve the self-sufficiency and the capacity of the country's peaceful nuclear establishment - the basis of any future weapons programme. In particular, work is being pressed ahead on the reactor in Madras: the fissile material (plutonium) output from this facility will be available for whatever use India might want to put it. Finally, as was indicated earlier, India has devoted considerable attention to its space programme and is currently developing a rocket launcher which could be the basis for some future missile delivery capability. The Indian Government is clearly working to reduce the time it would require between any decision to go nuclear and the production of a fairly large number of sophisticated weapons.

The growth of widespread support for nuclear weapons in India dates from the first demonstration of China's nuclear capability. The Chinese bomb has contributed to the growth of support for an Indian deterrent in two ways. In the first place, many Indians have come to believe that the security threat from China or from Pakistan supported by China, has been substantially increased as the result of China's acquisition of nuclear weapons. The only effective response, it has been argued, is for India to acquire its own nuclear deterrent. The second way in which the Chinese bomb has stimulated support for an Indian deterrent concerns the question of prestige. Even prior to the Chinese nuclear tests an increasing number of Indians were inclining to the belief that the maintenance and extension of their country's prestige in Asia

1. After China's satellite launching in April 1970, the Indian Government promised to look into its space programme to see what could be done to accelerate it. See, The Australian, 15 May 1970. See also, ibid., 31 August 1970.
and the world in general necessitated the acquisition of a national nuclear force. The development of nuclear weapons by China has strengthened this belief in two ways: first, by affording Peking an apparent lead over India in the struggle for prestige and influence amongst the other nations of Asia; and second, by drawing attention once again to the significance of nuclear weapons as symbols of great power status.

C. India and Arms Control

The Indian Government has been a regular participant in post-war negotiations on arms control: its representatives have figured prominently in discussions on the subject in the U.N. General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the E.N.D.C., and at meetings of the I.A.E.A. There seem to be three reasons for Delhi's very active role in this field. In the first place, as noted earlier, many of India's political leaders were strongly influenced by the Ghandian creed of non-violence with its emphasis on peaceful co-existence, the superiority of moral force over physical force, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is not surprising that these men should have taken an early interest in disarmament. Indeed, some Indian leaders, not the least of whom was Prime Minister Nehru himself, felt that their country had a special responsibility in this field; a tendency to moralize and to appeal to India's so-called "special responsibility" has characterized official Indian statements on disarmament to this day. Second, Delhi has used participation in arms control negotiations to reinforce its claim to great power status. Its efforts in this regard have been fairly successful. India has acquired an international reputation as a spokesman on disarmament matters, and largely because of this, its standing with, and access to, the super-powers is greater than it might otherwise
have been. The third reason for India's prominence in this field stems from its identification with the nations of the non-aligned world. These countries have tended to view the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, as a threat to their interests. Consequently, they have been conspicuous in urging the need for arms control. As a leading spokesman for the non-aligned group, India has thus had a special role to play in disarmament negotiations.

Delhi's first important initiative in the arms control field related to the issue of nuclear testing. Indeed, it was India which first brought the question of the suspension of nuclear weapons tests before the U.N. In a letter to the Secretary-General in April 1954, the Indian representative referred to his government's wish for some sort of interim "standstill agreement" covering nuclear tests, and requested that these views be communicated to the Disarmament Commission. During subsequent years, in both the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly, India played a leading role in mobilising support for an agreement banning nuclear weapons tests. Like many other states, India wanted a ban on nuclear tests so as to reduce the hazards of fall-out. But in addition, Delhi obviously felt there was a need for an agreement banning nuclear tests in order to prevent proliferation. During 1956 and 1957, India's spokesmen at the Disarmament Commission warned that it was becoming cheaper to produce nuclear weapons and that measures were urgently needed to prevent proliferation. In 1957, Prime Minister Nehru warned, that in time, hydrogen bombs would be produced in "kitchen gardens" and would be

acquired not only by nations but by other "enterprising groups" as well. By the early 1960s, India's preoccupation with the anti-proliferation aspects of a test-ban seems to have increased. This was clearly apparent in statements during the early sessions of the E.N.D.C. in 1962. The mood of the Indian Government was well reflected in a speech by one of that country's representatives in May of that year. He said:

I want to establish this fact, and I beg the three nuclear powers to take note of it: not once in their discussions - not once - either in the Sub-Committee or this room have they been realistic enough to even mention that if they go on talking and talking about this matter other countries will soon start testing weapons. In fact today, three countries are testing weapons, and another country has given an indication that soon it may be testing weapons again; and there are other countries in the world which are able to test weapons. Let us say this quite frankly and brutally to these three countries: if they think that their scientists are better than our scientists - by "our" I mean the scientists of the rest of the world - they are mistaken, plain mistaken. Let there be no doubt about this. They are by their unrealistic talk bringing nearer the time when there will be more testing in the world.

When the Test Ban Treaty was concluded in 1963 India was one of the first nations to sign the agreement and strongly urged that it be extended to cover underground tests as well.

Though it tended to concentrate on the issue of nuclear testing, India has been a vocal advocate of other disarmament.

2. e.g., Verbatim Record of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Geneva (hereafter referred to as E.N.D.C./P.V.), 24, p.26; E.N.D.C./P.V. 28, p.30; E.N.D.C./P.V. 35, pp.35-6; E.N.D.C./P.V. 47, pp.13-14 and E.N.D.C./P.V. 60, pp. 9-10.
3. E.N.D.C./P.V. 34, pp.33-34.
measures as well. On a number of occasions it has loudly applauded
the idea of general and complete disarmament and has expressed
support for various partial measures such as nuclear-free zones
and a "freeze" on the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear
delivery vehicles.¹

By the early 1960s, Delhi's pronouncements on disarmament
increasingly reflected India's concern about the growing power
of China. In an obvious reference to the Sino-Indian situation,
Delhi's representative at the E.N.D.C. referred in 1962 to the
"frightful" trouble "which neighbours could cause to each other
with even primitive nuclear weapons".² In addition, Indian
statements reflected the hope that the conclusion of a non­
proliferation agreement could directly or indirectly deter
China from proceeding with its nuclear weapons programme.³

Just seven months before China conducted its first nuclear test,
Delhi's representative at the E.N.D.C. referred to those states
"possessed by the mad urge to have their own bomb". Continuing,
he said:

They would call it the "Asian bomb". It is our
duty and the duty of the international community
to endeavour to prevent this proliferation of
nuclear weapons; otherwise the world will never
forgive us.⁴

This desire to influence, or at least embarrass China, was
undoubtedly one reason why India signed the Test Ban Treaty
in 1963. When China denounced the latter agreement, India
condemned its giant neighbour in the harshest of terms.⁵

¹ e.g., ibid. See also, E.N.D.C./P.V. 5, p.35.
³ e.g., E.N.D.C./P.V. 5, p.35, E.N.D.C./P.V. 24, p.26;
E.N.D.C./P.V. 28, p.30; E.N.D.C./P.V. 60, p.10.
⁴ E.N.D.C./P.V. 174, p.12.
⁵ See, statement by the leader of India's delegation to the
U.N., in the First Committee of the General Assembly, on
15 October 1963. Reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record,
An interesting and characteristic aspect of India's attitude to disarmament and related measures has been its strong dislike of most forms of international supervision of its nuclear activities. There was early evidence of India's general position on this matter when Delhi came out against the various American versions of the Baruch Plan. Moreover, India was only moderately enthusiastic about Eisenhower's "atoms for peace" plan and warned that it would not be a party to any system "dominated over by certain countries." But Delhi's loudest denunciations of the idea of international control or supervision were prompted by the establishment of the I.A.E.A. Though it agreed to join the new organization, India, along with Russia and other socialist states, was prominent in obstructing progress towards the establishment of the I.A.E.A.'s safeguards system. When the Agency's safeguards system was expanded in 1964 so as to be able to cope with reactors of more than 100 M.W. capacity India still stood out in opposition, though, by this time it no longer had the support of the Soviet Union in these matters.

2. See, statement in Lok Sabha by Prime Minister Nehru. Quoted in ibid.

India's opposition to international control has been partly of a technical nature. It has been alleged, for instance, that safeguards could result in restraints on the liberty of persons trained in the operation, design and construction of reactors and other facilities. In addition, it has been a long-standing Indian complaint that international safeguards, especially those of the I.A.E.A., impose an unnecessary burden by covering the whole nuclear fuel cycle; Delhi has argued that to ensure that material is not being diverted to military purposes, inspection of chemical separation plants and gaseous diffusion facilities alone is sufficient. But the most important Indian objections to international supervision have been those of a political nature. Time and again, Delhi has denounced what it regards as discrimination in the operation of international controls. Not only, it has been argued, must the underdeveloped states accept safeguards on their nuclear activities while many developed states remain free of international control, but in addition, the I.A.E.A. is "dominated over" by the developed states. Indeed India has denounced the arrangements for international supervision as tantamount to "atomic colonialism."2

That Delhi has adopted this particular position on safeguards seems hardly surprising. As noted earlier, India has long been proud of the progress it has made in the development of atomic energy. The reminder, therefore, implicit in the whole concept of safeguards, that India (and other states)


2. See, statement by Prime Minister Nehru in Lok Sabha on 23 July 1957. Reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record, July 1957, p.139.
still occupies a relatively inferior position in the nuclear field, has consequently been difficult for many Indians to accept. But in addition to this, there seem to have been broader political motivations behind the Indian stand. In its criticism of I.A.E.A. safeguards Delhi adopted a line of argument that was popular amongst non-aligned states generally. It seems reasonable to argue that this tactic was not unrelated to India's close identification with, and indeed claims to leadership of, the nations of the non-aligned world. However, this is not meant to imply that in recent years Delhi has not had an additional reason for wanting to keep the I.A.E.A. from meddling in India's nuclear affairs, viz., its desire to retain an option on producing nuclear weapons.

Ever since Independence, India has displayed more than an average interest in arms control and has supported a wide range of measures relevant to both conventional and nuclear weapons. However, notwithstanding this history of support for arms control, and in particular, its early enthusiasm for a non-proliferation agreement, Delhi emerged as one of the world's harshest critics of the N.P.T. and has indicated its intention not to sign the treaty as it presently stands. It will be useful therefore to examine India's objections to the N.P.T.

Delhi objected to the N.P.T. on four counts. In the first place, it was argued that the treaty did not provide for balanced and mutual obligations and responsibilities for both the nuclear and the non-nuclear states. While "horizontal proliferation", or the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries was to be prohibited, no specific limitations were to be placed on "vertical proliferation", or the

1. See, statement by Mr. A. Husain, the leader of India's delegation to the E.N.D.C., to the First Committee of the General Assembly, on 14 May 1968. Reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record, May 1968 (hereafter referred to as Husain Statement), p.113.
continued development of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear powers.¹ To remedy this, India urged, the N.P.T. should include a prohibition on any further production of nuclear weapons. The reduction or destruction of existing nuclear stocks should be dealt with subsequently and in stages.² Delhi's anxiety that something should be done to limit "vertical proliferation" just as much as "horizontal proliferation", was consistent with India's long-standing and vigorous advocacy of disarmament. But there was an additional reason for India's insistence that the nuclear powers should disarm. Indian observers appear to have been particularly conscious of the prestige and influence which has accrued to those states which possess nuclear weapons. As Mr. Trivedi wrote in 1966:

... many people and their Governments, particularly the Big Powers, continue to act in the context of what they call realities, talk in terms of acceptance of faits accomplis and propagate the ideas of exclusive five-power confabulation to solve the problems of the world. There are some who even think of equating possession of these evil [nuclear] weapons with permanent membership of the Security Council of the United Nations, as if the nuclear bomb were a special symbol of the right to enforce the veto.³

Implicit in this and other Indian observations,⁴ is a belief in the existence of a structure of world order which is based on a clear distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. What seems to have troubled Delhi about the N.P.T., was the

1. The terms "horizontal" and "vertical" proliferation were popularized by Mr. V.C. Trivedi, India's spokesman in the E.N.D.C. in 1966. For an excellent account by Mr. Trivedi of India's objections to the N.P.T., see his article, "Vertical Versus Horizontal Proliferation: An Indian View", in James E. Dougherty and J.F. Lehman, Jr., Arms Control For the Late Sixties, N. York: Van Nostrand, 1967, pp.195-203.


belief that it would serve to reinforce the present structure of
world order by making it difficult (in theory, impossible) for
additional states to enter the great-power "club". As an
aspiring great-power itself, this was something about which India
was especially sensitive.

India's second objection to the N.P.T. concerned the question
of the security of the non-nuclear states. In this context too,
Delhi emphasised that the real threat to the security of these
countries came from the "possession, the continued stockpiling
and the further sophistication of nuclear weapons and the means
of their delivery." It followed, that "any real and credible
guarantee of security to non-nuclear-weapon states ... could be
provided only through nuclear disarmament." 1 However, in his
statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly in
May 1968, Mr. Husain conceded that progress towards nuclear
disarmament, even if agreed upon by the nuclear powers, would
take time. As an interim measure, he added, the nuclear states
should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against the non-nuclear states. 2

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of security
considerations in the determination of India's attitude to the
N.P.T. At early meetings of the E.N.D.C., Indian delegates
had often chided their colleagues for hesitating to discuss
measures to prevent proliferation. 3 In their anxiety to see
some halt to the spread of nuclear weapons, Indian spokesmen
seemed prepared to accept an agreement which made few demands
on the nuclear powers, other than undertakings not to dissem-
inate nuclear weapons or know-how. 4 As late as March 1964,

1. Husain Statement, p.117. The demand for nuclear power dis-
armament actually predated India's brief pursuit of a nuclear
guarantee (see Chapter IX.). Thus, for a while at least,
there seemed to be some inconsistency in Delhi's policy: on
the one hand it was asking the U.S. and Russia to disarm,
while on the other it was seeking to engage them in a joint
guarantee of India's security.

2. Husain Statement, p.117.

3. e.g. E.N.D.C./P.V. 34 (1962), p.33; E.N.D.C./P.V. 60 (1962),
p.9; E.N.D.C./P.V. 156 (1963), p.16.

4. See, major speech on non-proliferation by Indian delegate,
the Indian representative reminded delegates to the E.N.D.C. that the answer to the problem of nuclear spread was a non-acquisition, non-dissemination agreement and that what was really at issue was "not the question of dismantling the nuclear weapons apparatus of the present nuclear powers but that of preventing manufacture of weapons by non-nuclear nations". After China's first nuclear test, however, it was possible to detect a change in Delhi's approach to the question of nonproliferation. Both at the E.N.D.C. and in the General Assembly, Indian delegates began to stress the necessity for "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers" in any nonproliferation agreement. In the E.N.D.C., the Indian delegate insisted that there should be "no enshrinement or perpetuation of a privileged status of nuclear Powers" and that "a rational international treaty on non-proliferation should specifically embrace the essential requirements of cessation of production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and agreed arrangements for the reduction of existing stockpiles thereof."  

There was a clear connection between these first indications of Delhi's hesitation over measures to halt proliferation, and the anxiety in India stemming from China's acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Indian Government was obviously looking to its future security requirements and had clearly decided that it would have to purchase and maintain a military nuclear option. During the early months of 1967, Delhi sought from the U.S. and Russia a joint guarantee of protection against a nuclear attack by China. However, as will be noted below, this endeavour had been abandoned by

1. ibid., p.20.
2. E.N.D.C./P.V. 232, p.15.
3. For the details of this development, see Chapter IX.
the middle of 1967. Thereafter, it is unlikely that the Indian Government would have accepted as reliable any foreign guarantee: despite Mr. Husain's suggestion of May 1968, there is no reason to believe that a pledge by the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, would have persuaded Delhi to look more favourably upon the N.P.T. Nothing less than far-reaching disarmament by the nuclear powers, including China, is likely to have satisfied India in this regard. But nuclear power disarmament was, and indeed still is, only a very remote possibility. In the meantime, Delhi has provided itself with an important reason for not signing the N.P.T.

India's third objection to the N.P.T. concerned the issue of peaceful nuclear technology. The restrictions in the treaty on the use of peaceful nuclear explosives, Delhi argued, represented an unwarranted extension of the detested (to India) distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states into the peaceful nuclear field. As India's spokesman in the First Committee said:

Nations everywhere should be free not only to share in the benefits, but also to acquire the knowledge to extract such benefits by themselves and to have the freedom to use such knowledge.

Since nuclear technology is the technology of the future and is likely to become the most crucial and potent instrument of economic development and social progress, it would obviously be invidious for a greater part of the world to be wholly dependent on a few nuclear weapons States for the knowledge and application of this technology. ... And when it is proposed that this should be done for an initial period of twenty-five years regardless of any technological breakthrough during this period, would this not widen the economic and technical gap which already exists and which the developing countries are striving so hard to close?1

Here, Delhi was again giving expression to one of its fundamental contentions about the question of nonproliferation: that the N.P.T. should not in any way discriminate against the non-nuclear states, and should not advance the division of the world into "have" and "have not" nations.

Finally, India objected to the safeguards provisions in the N.P.T. These, Delhi insisted, should be universally applicable, objective, and non-discriminatory. It was especially critical of the fact that the nuclear powers were not obliged to undergo inspection at all, and was concerned that the member nations of EURATOM might be subject to a less severe form of inspection than other non-nuclear states. 1

The analysis in this chapter suggests that a great number of Indians now consider that the acquisition of a national nuclear force would be a tremendous boost to their country's prestige and security. However, for a number of reasons (the great cost of a nuclear weapons programme, the realization that India is not yet in a position to manufacture a sizeable number of fairly sophisticated weapons, and uncertainties about the likely international response to such a move), the Indian Government has resisted the pressures on it to go nuclear. At the same time, though, Delhi has sought to bring its nuclear industry to the point where any decision to develop nuclear weapons could be put into immediate effect. India's determination to create and maintain an option on going nuclear has been a major influence in shaping its attitude to arms control. However, it has not been the only determinant of Delhi's arms control policy. As a developing state, and a member of the "third world", India has joined with others like it in denouncing arms control measures which, it is alleged, discriminate in favour of the developed states. This factor

1. Husain Statement, p.117.
was particularly relevant in regard to India's position on I.A.E.A. safeguards and certain sections of the N.P.T.

India's stand on I.A.E.A. safeguards and the N.P.T. has been a source of friction between Delhi and Washington and has created problems for the United States in the pursuit of its nonproliferation strategy in Asia. This will be a major subject for analysis in Part III of the thesis.
Of the nations in Asia capable of building nuclear weapons, it is Japan which probably has the greatest potential. Already an industrial giant, Japan shows promise of joining the front rank of world powers before the end of the century. During the last fourteen years Japan has laid the foundations of a vast nuclear industry and undoubtedly has the capacity to develop a nuclear weapons capability which, at least in the short run, would be superior to that of China's.

A. Japan's Nuclear Weapons Potential

Nuclear research was commenced in Japan during 1955-56 and in 1957 the country acquired a small research reactor from the United States. After a hesitant start, interest in the use of nuclear energy grew and in 1961 a Long-range Program on Development and Utilization of Atomic Energy ushered in a new era in the development of Japan's nuclear industry. The strategy of the 1961 plan and its subsequent modifications was in line with Japan's traditional approach to the problem of overcoming a modernisation lag. Provision was made for heavy dependence on foreign technology in the short run while domestic research and development prepared the way for long run self-sufficiency.¹

Rapid advances in Japan's nuclear industry during the next few years quickly made the 1961 plan obsolete. In 1967 a new Long Range Program was drawn up. This plan was a more accurate reflection of the improved prospects for civilian nuclear power in Japan and set substantially higher goals in the development of reactor and fuel processing facilities. Eventual autonomy in the exploitation of atomic energy was again stressed and particular emphasis was placed on the development of advanced reactors of Japanese design.

Japan has had little difficulty justifying its nuclear programme on economic grounds. Throughout most of the post-war period the country has been faced with a rapidly increasing demand for electric power. More recently, this has been associated with an increasing dependence on imported oil. It was hoped that the development of atomic energy would lower the cost of electric power and, by reducing the country's overall oil requirements, increase the security of energy supplies. It has also been argued that the widespread utilization of nuclear power would ease the drain on Japan's foreign exchange and have a beneficial effect on the country's technological structure.

Japan's reactor and fuel programme is the basis of the country's nuclear industry and would be an essential part of any plan to produce nuclear weapons. The first reactor in Japan to generate electrical power was established at Tokai-Mura in 1963. This was the Japan Power Demonstration Reactor (J.P.D.R.) and had an output of 12 M.W. The first commercial reactor was also built at Tokai-Mura and commenced operations

3. ibid., p.3.
in 1966. It was a British built, natural uranium-fuelled facility, with an output of 160 M.W.\textsuperscript{1} By June 1971, there were five reactors operating in Japan with a total output of 1,269 M.W.\textsuperscript{2} Ten more were under construction and six on order.\textsuperscript{3} The nuclear power units currently in operation, under construction or on order in Japan are expected to account for a total output of 12,062 M.W.\textsuperscript{4} In the longer run, Japan's utilization of nuclear power promises to be very great indeed. The Central Power Council of Japan announced recently that 32 nuclear power units would be commissioned in the period 1970–79 and that installed nuclear capacity is expected to total 60,000 M.W., by 1985.\textsuperscript{5} In May 1971, a committee established by the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum estimated that the country's nuclear power generating capacity would be 110,000 M.W. in 1990 and 220,000 M.W. by the year 2000.\textsuperscript{6} The magnitude of these figures suggests that the plutonium output from Japan's reactors promises to be quite enormous: official estimates suggest that it could be almost two tons annually by 1975 alone.\textsuperscript{7}

In the short-run, the Japanese reactor programme will rely mainly on the use of "proven" or Light Water Reactors (L.W.R.) with the possible introduction of Advanced Thermal Reactors (A.T.R.) during the late 1970s. But the main aim of Japan's reactor research and development programme is the development of a Fast Breeder Reactor (F.B.R.). These reactors, which are fuelled with plutonium and actually produce

\textsuperscript{1}ibid.
\textsuperscript{3}ibid.
\textsuperscript{4}ibid.
\textsuperscript{5}ibid., p.32.
\textsuperscript{6}Atoms in Japan (official organ of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum), Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1971 (Supplement), p.5.
more plutonium than they consume, will reduce the need for natural uranium and U235. Current plans provide for the establishment of a 1000 M.W. fast breeder demonstrator reactor in the early 1980s.¹

However, despite these rather ambitious plans, Japan is still far from self-sufficient in the nuclear field. Its own supplies of natural uranium are quite meagre and consequently, it will have to depend heavily on foreign sources.² Since 1967 Japan has contracted with Canada for supplies of uranium; at the same time, Japanese mining engineers have begun prospecting for uranium in North America and on the African continent.³ Unlike India, Japan does not yet possess a plutonium separation plant large enough for commercial purposes. However, consideration is being given to the construction of a French designed plant capable of handling about 200 tons of spent reactor fuel per year.⁴ Finally, the reactors presently under construction in Japan will be fuelled by enriched uranium, which, for the foreseeable future, at least, will have to come from foreign suppliers: in 1968, Tokyo entered into a 30 year agreement with the United States for the supply of this material.⁵ These supplies, and almost certainly, any others as well, will be accompanied by restrictions limiting the use of the enriched uranium to peaceful purposes. However, the development of

² As of April 1965 Japan's total reserves, assured, probable and possible of uranium oxide (ore grade 0.05 to 0.06 per cent uranium oxide) were only 2,100 tons. See, Reviews of National Science Policy : Japan, O.E.C.D., 1967, p.107. Quoted in Bellany, op. cit., p.54, fn.19.
³ Cassuto, loc. cit., p.314.
⁴ Gilinsky and Langer, op. cit., p.25 and Bellany, op. cit., p.54.
⁵ For the details, see the text of the agreement between Japan and the U.S. Reproduced in International Agreements for Co-operation, 1967-68, hearings before the Subcommittee on Agreements for Co-operation of the Joint Committee on Atomic
domestic enrichment facilities has long been a goal of the Japanese nuclear programme. Work on the centrifuge technique was commenced as early as 1959.¹ In March 1968, a Nuclear Fuel Committee led by the Acting Chairman of the Japan A.E.C. recommended a fairly substantial centrifuge research and development programme (as well as a gaseous diffusion programme).² It is generally agreed that Japan has the capacity to develop its own enrichment facilities. One report on the Japanese nuclear programme has predicted that an enrichment plant of some sort should probably be in operation by 1980.³

Should it ever decide to go nuclear, Japan, like any other would-be nuclear power, would face the problem of developing an effective delivery system. At the moment, Japan possesses a number of F-86F and F-104J aircraft⁴ which could, if necessary, be made to play a nuclear role. However, these are essentially strike aircraft of a relatively short range and it is unlikely that a serious nuclear weapons system would be built around delivery vehicles of this type. Because of constitutional restrictions, no bomber aircraft have been built in Japan since the end of World War II. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that Japan would be capable of building a wide range of military aircraft, including bombers, should it ever decide to do so. (It is expected that 130 of the 164 new F-4 aircraft which Japan's Air Self-Defence Force is to receive

---

3. Gilinsky and Langer, op. cit., p.45. Recent changes in American policy on uranium enrichment have placed the whole question of the availability of U235 in a state of flux. The details of these policy changes and their significance for American efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (and elsewhere) will be discussed in Chapter XI of this thesis.
under the Fourth Defence Build-Up Plan, will be built in Japan.\(^1\) Anti-aircraft missiles of American design—Hawk and Nike Hercules—have been manufactured in Japan for some years now.\(^2\) But despite this undoubted capacity to develop an aircraft delivery system, it is Japan's expertise in rocketry which is perhaps more important in any assessment of the country's nuclear potential. Since about 1954 Japanese scientists have been developing rockets for the country's space programme and there can be little doubt that the experience gained could be put to a military use.

The Japanese space programme was initiated by a group of scientists at Tokyo University. In April 1955, the first fruits of their labours were unveiled—a tiny sounding rocket measuring nine inches in length and weighing less than half an ounce.\(^3\) Since that time substantial improvements have been made in both the size and sophistication of Japanese rockets. In 1964, Japan successfully tested a three stage, solid-fuelled rocket called the Lambda. It was an improved version of the Lambda, which in February 1970, launched into earth orbit a satellite weighing 51 lbs. Another rocket which has been successfully tested is the Mu. One version of this series, the Mu-1, which was successfully tested in October 1966, has four stages and an over-all weight of 42.5 tons.\(^4\) But other launchers are already being developed. Spokesmen for Japan's Space and Technology Agency have announced plans to launch a 187 lb observation satellite in 1972 with

---

2. Bellany, op. cit., p.56.
a "Q" rocket and a 264 lb communications satellite with a larger "N" rocket in 1974. ¹

The role of Japan's space rockets in any future nuclear weapons programme could be very great. Their solid fuel systems would make conversion to military purposes relatively easy and the largest of these rockets could presumably reach intercontinental distances by flying a ballistic trajectory. ² Japanese scientists currently lack experience in the use of the sort of guidance system which would be necessary for missiles: in order to allay concern about the potential use of the space programme for military purposes Japanese rockets have generally not been fitted with conventional guidance mechanisms. ³ But it is generally recognised that Japan's electronics industry is sufficiently advanced to provide the necessary guidance systems for the country's rockets should their conversion to military purposes be desired. ⁴

Paul Langer has noted that Japanese public opinion is favourably disposed towards boosting the nation's role in space research. Some Japanese view their country's efforts in this field as a way of keeping abreast of the latest developments in science and technology. Others see the space programme as a means of gaining international prestige. ⁵

2. It has been claimed that, if converted to military purposes, the fully developed version of the Mu rocket could launch a 300 lb warhead 5,000 miles. See, Bellany, op. cit., p. 55.
Whatever the reason, it seems certain that interest in space research will continue to grow in Japan. Moreover, recent changes indicate that the Japanese space programme will be more efficiently organised, better funded and more open to foreign know-how than in the past.\(^1\) This promises to guarantee Japan a place amongst the world's leaders in space research. It will also mean that Japan's potential to build missiles for military purposes will continue to grow.\(^2\)

B. **Attitudes in Japan Towards The Development of Nuclear Weapons**

Unlike their Indian counterparts, successive Japanese Governments have experienced little difficulty in adhering to a policy of strict opposition to nuclear weapons. Since the end of the war, the government's stand against nuclear weapons has been strongly supported by the opposition parties in the Japanese Parliament and by the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people. Since the commencement of nuclear testing by China there has been some slight support for a Japanese capability. At the same time there has been some lessening of left-wing opposition to nuclear weapons. However, generally speaking, the Chinese tests caused considerably less concern in Japan than they did in India and, to this day, opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons remains overwhelming.

Abstention from the development of nuclear weapons was implied in Article 9 (the "peace clause") of the Japanese Constitution. This was clearly reaffirmed in 1961 under the

---

1. ibid., pp.29-30. See also, Bellany, *op. cit.*, p.56.
2. Bellany has drawn attention to the development in Japan of nuclear propulsion reactors for, amongst other uses, a submersible oil tanker. As he suggests, developments such as this could place Japan in a position to be able to build nuclear powered submarines for military purposes at short notice. See, ibid.
terms of the Second Defence Build-Up Plan (1962-66). Among other things, the plan stated that Japanese military preparations were to be based on "defence against localized military action using only conventional weapons". ¹ In 1968, Mr. Sato's Government set forth the so-called "three non-nuclear principles", viz., that Japan would not produce, or own, nuclear weapons or permit their entry into the country. ² These sentiments were reaffirmed in Japan's first White Paper on Defence which was published in October 1970.³ In 1966, one authority on Japanese defence questions observed that the policy of nuclear abstention had the "support of the opposition parties and of public opinion as a whole". ⁴ That same year, when Akio Doi, a former brigadier, called for "defensive" nuclear weapons, The Times (London) reported that he was "about the only man in Japan to have put such views publicly". ⁵ In a recent and detailed piece of research, John Welfield has examined current Japanese thinking on nuclear weapons.⁶ He found, that even amongst members of the extreme right wing of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, there has been no open support for a Japanese nuclear capability.⁷ Moreover, though Japan's press has tended to criticise China's decision to become a nuclear power, there have been only a few suggestions in the newspapers that this will make a greater Japanese defence effort inevitable.⁸ Amongst defence and foreign policy specialists and military and political commentators, Welfield again found that supporters of a Japanese nuclear capability were a rare phenomenon indeed.⁹

¹ Quoted in Kei Wakaizumi, "The Problem For Japan," in Buchan (ed.), op. cit., p.76.
² The Canberra Times, 22 March 1968.
⁴ See, Kei Wakaizumi, in Buchan (ed.), op. cit., p.76.
⁵ The Times, 26 July 1966.
⁷ ibid., pp.7-11. ⁸ ibid., p.20. ⁹ ibid., p.29.
So far as the Japanese public generally is concerned, "only a minority ... advocates increased defence expenditure and autonomous nuclear weapons".  

There would seem to be two basic reasons why the non-nuclear policies of successive Japanese governments have received such widespread support. The first of these concerns what has sometimes been referred to as the "inherent" distaste for nuclear weapons amongst the Japanese people. More than one observer has testified to the overwhelming significance of this phenomenon. Kei Wakaizumi has argued that as a result of their wartime experiences, the Japanese have come to hate nuclear weapons "even to the point of neurosis". This feeling, he has added, "is stronger and more deeply rooted among the Japanese than in any other nation", and "is a powerful deterrent to any consideration of national nuclear weapons". Evidence abounds to support this claim. In recent years, many of the anti-

1. Ibid., p.36. Welfield's findings are based on an analysis of public opinion polls which have been conducted by the major Tokyo newspapers, the Prime Minister's Office, and several private organizations. For the details of his analysis, see ibid., pp.35-44. Welfield has offered a word of caution about these polls. He has pointed to the "curious discrepancies" and the "quite contradictory results" which are sometimes obtained. Nevertheless, he has added that "there seems to be enough correspondence between the results of various polls to suggest a certain degree of reliability." See ibid., p.35.


3. Numerous public opinion polls have attested to the strength of feeling against nuclear weapons in Japan. For an analysis based on the results of some of these polls, see Welfield, op. cit., pp.40-44. A survey in 1958 revealed that 21 per cent of the members of Japan's Diet rated the "fear of nuclear war and devastation" as their "primary fear". By contrast, in a similar survey, no Indian Parliamentarians mentioned the fear of nuclear war. See Lloyd A. Free, Opinions of Parliamentarians in India and Japan, Princeton: Institute For International Social Research, 1958, pp.15-16. Quoted in D.H. Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, p.152, fn.2.
nuclear movements have begun to fragment, but the sentiments which gave rise to them continue to find expression in a variety of ways. One has only to recall the turmoil leading to the cancellation, in 1968, of visits to Japanese ports by American nuclear powered vessels. More recently, there was widespread denunciation of suggestions by a small group in the right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party that the U.S. should be allowed to retain nuclear weapons in Okinawa after its reversion to Japan. Moreover political parties of every persuasion remain constantly aware of the need to acknowledge the widespread fear and distrust of nuclear weapons throughout Japan. It seems reasonable to assume that, with the passing of the present generation of Japanese, this somewhat unique distaste for nuclear weapons may diminish. Nevertheless, it is difficult to exaggerate its importance in the shaping of past and current Japanese attitudes to nuclear weapons.

Second, a majority of Japanese do not consider that their security position warrants the development of an independent nuclear deterrent. There would seem to be two reasons for this. First, a reluctance on the part of many Japanese to see China as a particularly grave threat to their security; and second, a belief that any threat that China (or the Soviet Union) does pose, is sufficiently accounted for by Japan's alliance with the United States. Scepticism about the alleged threat from China has been apparent in a number of guises: in appeals to the racial and cultural affinity of the Chinese and Japanese peoples, in reactions of "understanding", though rarely of sympathy towards Chinese nuclear tests; in the widespread acceptance in Japan of the possibil-

1. For a more lengthy discussion of this issue, see below, Chapter IX.
2. This reaction is most noticeable in statements by the Japan Socialist Party (J.S.P.) and the Japan Communist Party (J.C.P.). Both parties "regretted" China's hydrogen bomb test but added that it was "understandable in view of the world nuclear situation". See, Daily Summary of the Japanese Press (hereafter referred to as D.S.O.J.P.), Asahi, 6 July 1967.
ity of peaceful co-existence with China;¹ in claims that China's nuclear posture is no more threatening than Russia's, and is thus no more deserving of nuclear countermeasures by Japan;² and finally, in criticism of America's containment policy towards China.

A tendency to soft pedal in its dealings with Peking has been characteristic of Japanese Government policy for some time. Evidence of this was apparent in official Japanese statements as early as 1952. That year, the Yoshida Cabinet, having been virtually forced by the U.S. into recognising Taiwan, nevertheless advised Washington that:

... the Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China [P.R.C.] which is Japan's close neighbour.³

That Tokyo was in earnest about its desire to have commercial dealings with Peking has been borne out by the facts: since 1955, except for a break between 1958 and 1962, Japan has

¹ Professor Masamichi of Kyoto University has argued that the absence of territorial disputes and the limitless possibilities for trade are a firm basis for peaceful co-existence between China and Japan. See, D.S.O.J.P., Tokyo Shimbun, 13 July 1967.
² Following the explosion of China's first atomic bomb in October 1964, a L.D.P. committee reported on its implications for Japanese policy. The report suggested that: "if the new threat that is posed by the nuclear capability of the Communist Chinese can be treated basically with the same attitude as was applied to the Soviet threat, then we need only be concerned with the further development of our current position". Quoted in Wakaizumi, in Buchan, op. cit., p.79. Similar views were expressed by L.D.P. dietman Ezaki following China's nuclear missile test in October 1966. See, D.S.O.J.P., Mainichi, 28 October 1966.
traded extensively with China according to the principle of the "separation of politics from economics". The reticent characteristic of Japan's official attitude towards Peking in these early years has clearly survived China's acquisition of nuclear weapons. In January 1964, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Ohira, commenting on the prospect of China acquiring nuclear weapons, noted that Japan was already within range of Russian missiles and that the new threat was consequently not too alarming. In the first Sato-Johnson joint communique which was released just three months after China's initial nuclear test, President Johnson loudly condemned Peking's "bellicose policies" and "expansionist pressure"; by way of contrast, Mr. Sato merely referred to Japan's intention to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and to continue its traditional trade policy towards Peking. In March 1967 the Foreign Minister, Mr. Miki, drew attention to Japan's "deep historical relationship with the Chinese mainland" and emphasised the need to "always leave a path open for contact between Japan and Communist China". Later that year, despite the detonation in June of Peking's first thermo-nuclear device, Defence Agency head Masuda went so far as to declare that China's nuclear weapons were "primitive" and dismissed the proposition that they might be used, as "ridiculous". The Great Cultural Revolution in China seems to have had some effect on Japanese attitudes towards Peking: in a speech in Canberra, in July 1968, Mr. Miki intimated that the turbulent events on the

2. Welfield, op. cit., p.5.
mainland has induced a "vague sense of uneasiness" amongst the Japanese people. Nevertheless, he still stressed the "affinity" many Japanese felt towards China and its people and noted the "very strong" feeling in Japan that Tokyo "should play an intermediary role toward improving U.S.–China relations."

Far from denouncing China, Mr. Miki merely observed that, "while recognition of the Peking Government [was] still too premature, economic, cultural and personal exchange and contact should be expanded".

The Japanese Government's policy towards China has received general support from the strong right-wing faction in the ruling L.D.P. However, the relatively small left-wing faction has tended to favour a different line. While rarely advocating the dissolution of the security agreement with the U.S., it has nevertheless been critical of the purely military approach to national security evident in some of the statements and publications of right-wing elements. In regard to China, the left-wing faction has stressed the nationalist character of the Chinese revolution (in contrast to the heavy emphasis on the ideological factor in many of the right-wing faction's pronouncements), the essentially defensive nature of China's military preparations and the importance of trade and cultural contacts in bringing about peaceful co-existence between China and Japan. The left-wing faction's long-held view that Japan should act as a bridge between China and the U.S. has been stressed with even greater firmness since China commenced developing nuclear weapons.

Neither the right nor the left wing factions of the L.D.P. seem to believe that

1. "Japan's Foreign Policy," speech by Foreign Minister Takeo Miki at the Australian National University, 29 July 1968, p.10.
2. For a detailed analysis of views within the right wing faction of the L.D.P. on China and the Japan-U.S. security agreement, see Welfield, op. cit., pp.7-11.
3. ibid., pp.11-12.
China constitutes an immediate threat to Japan. However, they do so for different reasons: the former, primarily because of Japan's alliance with the U.S.; the latter, because China allegedly has no aggressive designs on Japan. As Welfield has suggested, the "precise strengths of the two contending groups and the character and inclinations of the central mass at any given time are very difficult to determine".\(^1\) It is clear though, that the left-wing faction represents a minority. What is really significant about these divisions, is that even within Japan's ruling party, there is some left-wing criticism of what is in any case a relatively moderate policy towards China.

Though the Japanese Government has adopted a fairly low-keyed approach in its relations with Peking, its reluctance to sever the links between Tokyo and Taiwan, and instead, to establish diplomatic relations with the mainland, has brought it in for strong criticism from elements within the Japanese Parliament. Preeminent amongst the parliamentary critics of the government's China policy has been the Japan Socialist Party (J.S.P.), the largest of the opposition parties. The J.S.P. has consistently advocated the admission of Peking to the U.N., the severance of ties with Taiwan, and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Japan and the P.R.C.\(^2\) Though it has condemned China's nuclear tests, the J.S.P. has been careful to emphasise that it is opposed to tests by all other nations as well. Moreover, it has consistently alleged that China has been driven to develop nuclear weapons because of America's military presence in Asia.\(^3\)

---

1. ibid., p.13.
Finally, it is interesting to note that in 1968 some elements in the J.S.P. were critical of the Tripartite Proposal on Security Assurances partly because they believed the measure was too obviously directed at containing China. In addition to the J.S.P., all the other opposition parties, as well as the country's major newspapers, have been pressing for some time for the normalization of relations between Tokyo and Peking. Public opinion polls also show a majority in favour of closer ties with China. The disagreement on the matter, between these elements on the one hand, and the government on the other, has made the question of policy towards China one of the most important issues in Japanese politics. President Nixon's announcement, in July 1971, that he intended to visit Peking acutely embarrassed the Japanese Government; the situation was aggravated by the fact that Tokyo was advised of the American decision only minutes before President Nixon's announcement. The whole affair seemed to indicate that Washington was either insensitive or indifferent to the significance of the debate in Japan over policy towards China.

In summary, though there has been some disagreement in Japan about Tokyo's relations with Peking, there is little evidence to suggest that Japanese people as a whole have

1. D.S.O.J.P., Mainichi, 9 March 1968. The reference to the Tripartite Proposal on Security Assurances is to the resolution on security assurances sponsored by the U.S., Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and which was adopted by the Security Council in June 1968. For the text of the tripartite resolution, see Appendix V.
regarded China as a particularly serious threat to their country's security. This factor has undoubtedly contributed towards the disinclination in Japan towards the development of nuclear weapons.

Evidence suggests that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is another important factor in the opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan. It has been commonly argued that it is unnecessary for Japan to arm itself with atomic and hydrogen weapons as the country is already covered by the nuclear guarantee implicit in the American alliance. This particular justification for a non-nuclear Japan appears to have had the support of substantial majorities in the government, the L.D.P. and the Self-Defence Agency. Moreover, China's development of nuclear weapons seems to have done little to alter this attitude. Three months after Peking's first nuclear test, Mr. Sato made clear his views on the value of the American alliance. The Prime Minister said:

The existing Security Treaty takes all possible contingencies into consideration. I think it is because this Security Treaty exists that Japan has not become nervous about China's nuclear test. There are views in some quarters that the Security Treaty should be abrogated or that some special relationship should be established with Communist China. Yet those who put forward their views should reflect that it is because of the present Security Treaty system that Japanese are not in a state of apprehension.1

Since then, Tokyo has reaffirmed its faith in the alliance with Washington on a number of occasions. In August 1966, the Director of the Self-Defence Agency claimed that any attack on Japan would amount to an attack upon the U.S. 2

---

1. See, statement by Mr. Sato during a press conference in January 1965. Quoted in Welfield, op. cit., p.3.
Following China's test of a hydrogen bomb in June 1967, Tokyo again strongly reaffirmed its faith in the American alliance.1 In August of that year, Japan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Miki, observed that though the draft nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Geneva2 made no provision for the security of non-nuclear states, there was no cause for Japanese anxiety on the matter because of the country's alliance with the U.S.3 During the Upper House election campaign in June 1968, Mr. Sato strongly supported the Security Treaty,4 and the government's success in that poll was widely interpreted as a vote of confidence in the alliance with the U.S.5 Tokyo's attitude to the Tripartite Proposal on Security Assurances is further testimony of its confidence in the American alliance. The three-power initiative, of March 1968, was welcomed by Japan as encouraging evidence of Soviet-U.S. peaceful co-existence and as a useful contribution towards the conclusion of a nonproliferation agreement. However, government spokesmen emphasised that because Japan was already covered by the American nuclear umbrella, the three-power security arrangement represented no real addition to the nation's security.6

During 1969 and 1970, there appears to have been no lessening of support in Tokyo for the alliance with the U.S. When agreement was reached, in November 1969, on terms for

2. This was a reference to the identical but separate drafts submitted by Russia and the U.S. in August, 1967.
5. The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 1968.
the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, Tokyo emphasised that "the presence of United States forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area." Both governments reaffirmed their intention to maintain the existing 1960 security treaty "on the basis of mutual trust and common evaluation of the international situation". About a month after the Okinawa settlement, Mr. Sato's Liberal Democratic Party (L.D.P.) won a convincing victory in Japan's 11th post-war general election. The L.D.P. fought the election primarily on the basis of the government's successful negotiation of the Okinawa issue and on the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. Its victory was widely interpreted as a harbinger

1. For the text of the United States-Japan Joint Communique on Okinawa, see Current Notes on International Affairs, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as C.N.I.A.), Vol. 40, No. 11, November 1969, pp.664-667. The terms of the Okinawa settlement will be discussed later in the context of American nonproliferation policy in Asia. See below, Chapter XI.  
3. ibid., p.665.  
4. The results of the election to the Lower House of the Japanese Parliament were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats held after 1967</th>
<th>Seats held after 1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Socialist Party</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komeito Party</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Communist Party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialist Party</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sixteen Independents were elected in 1969, but 12 of these have since been formally accepted as L.D.P. members, giving the L.D.P. a total representation in the Lower House of 300 seats.

of close co-operation between Tokyo and Washington in the 1970s. In June 1970, the Japan-U.S. security agreement was renewed. A cabinet communique issued at the time faithfully reflected the Japanese Government's thinking on the significance of the alliance for Japan's security. The communique said:

... no nation in today's world can expect to maintain its security by itself. The best conceivable way to secure national existence and development, ... is to build up our self-defence power in consonance with national capabilities, and to ensure the peace and security of the Far East including Japan by the Japanese-American security system.

In the White Paper on Defence published in October 1970, Tokyo reaffirmed that, so far as nuclear threats or large scale conventional attacks were concerned, Japan would continue to rely upon the deterrent power of its alliance with the United States.

Though the government and the L.D.P. seems to have strongly supported the American alliance, there appears to have been much less enthusiasm for the treaty amongst the Japanese people as a whole. The J.S.P. has urged immediate abrogation of the security treaty with the U.S. and the adoption by Japan of a policy of neutralism. (The idea of a four-power-U.S., Russia, China, Japan - treaty to guarantee Japanese neutrality has been official J.S.P. policy ever since 1955.) The Komeito Party ("Clean Government" Party), the second largest of the opposition groups, has, in recent years, also called for the

dissolution of the pact with the U.S.\(^1\) The Democratic Socialist Party (D.S.P.) seems to have fewer reservations about the American alliance but nevertheless favours the gradual withdrawal from Japan of all U.S. bases.\(^2\) The Japan Communist Party (J.C.P.), the smallest of the opposition groups, favours immediate abrogation of the Japan-U.S. security agreement. But this lack of enthusiasm for the alliance does not seem to have been confined to the opposition parties in the Japanese Parliament. Public opinion polls have indicated that, amongst people generally, there has been considerable anxiety about the security treaty system and especially about the presence in Japan of American bases; there has been widespread support, in these polls, for a policy of neutrality for Japan in the confrontation between the U.S. and the Communist powers.\(^3\)

In view of this evidence of antagonism towards the security treaty it seems conceivable that some future Japanese government formed by the J.S.P. or a coalition of left-wing parties might renounce the alliance with the U.S.\(^4\) However,

---

regardless of the fact that the existence of the Japan-U.S. security treaty has been put forward as a reason for Japan's non-nuclear stance, its abrogation by the socialists (rather than, say, by a right-wing group) would probably not, of itself, increase very much the likelihood that Japan would acquire nuclear weapons. There is an acute sensitivity, amongst the socialists, towards the anti-nuclear feelings of the Japanese people. Moreover, pacifist and neutralist sentiment is strong in socialist circles in Japan. Other things being equal, it seems unlikely that a left-wing government, especially one dominated by the J.S.P., would opt for nuclear weapons. It is worth noting, however, that the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, to the extent that such action removed the nuclear cover over Japan implicit in that treaty, would make it easier for those elements in Japan who do support the acquisition of an independent deterrent to say as much openly.

The question about what direction future thinking in Japan about nuclear weapons might take, is one, of course, which deserves closer examination than that which has so far been accorded it. However, before attempting this, it will be useful to look at Japanese policy towards arms control.

C. Japan and Arms Control

For about five years after the end of World War II, discussion of nuclear weapons in Japan was dominated by spokesmen of pacifist-internationalist or "humanist" orientation. There were two main reasons for this:

the country's recent military defeat and the subsequent decline in the prestige and influence of the Japanese military class; and, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which had raised in the Japanese people a unique and profound fear of the atomic bomb. Thinking about nuclear weapons in Japan at this time was characterised by the following assertions: that the atomic bomb was an especially dreadful weapon; that future wars would most likely be nuclear; that consequently, there was an urgent need for international action to prevent war; and that the Japanese people had a special right to a say in matters relating to nuclear weapons. It has already been noted that some of these assertions continue to characterise Japanese thinking about nuclear weapons to this day. It is the purpose of this part of the analysis to examine the impact of these and similar attitudes on Japanese policy towards arms control.

Japan's earliest initiatives in the field of nuclear arms control were aimed at securing world wide suspension of atomic and hydrogen bomb tests. The test explosion issue was of special significance to the Japanese. Since as early as 1946, the U.S. had been conducting nuclear tests in the former Japanese-mandated Marshall Islands. For a while, there was little criticism in Japan of these tests but this altered after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty in 1951, an event which had the effect of releasing many Japanese from their reluctance to criticise American actions. Then came the Fukuryu Maru ("Lucky Dragon") incident. This provoked widespread denunciations of American tests, and thereafter the Japanese press headlined every test series and all

1. ibid., pp.1-4.
2. This occurred when the U.S. conducted a hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific in March 1954. The tuna boat Fukuryu Maru, which was cruising well outside the established danger zone was showered by radioactive volcanic ash from the unexpectedly wide fallout. See, D.H. Mendel, op. cit., p.155.
scientific warnings about fallout damage to crops and fish.¹

In 1956 there were a number of Russian and American tests in Soviet Asia and the Western Pacific respectively. Moreover, British tests, including that of a hydrogen bomb were scheduled for the summer of 1957 in the Pacific. These developments sparked off a new round of Japanese protests in Washington, London and Moscow. In 1961, when Russia resumed testing after a three year unilateral moratorium, Japan bitterly condemned the Soviet decision, adding that it "not only betray[ed] the earnest prayer of all the people of Japan, but mercilessly trample[d] on the prayerful hopes for peace of all people who fear war and love peace."² Throughout this period, the two major political parties in Japan (the L.D.P. and J.S.P.) usually closed ranks to oppose nuclear tests, although Socialist spokesmen sometimes grumbled that the government was lethargic and insincere on the matter.³

In 1957, Japan was admitted to the U.N. and it was obvious from the start that Tokyo was determined to use its voice in the world body to draw attention to nuclear weapons tests, to encourage the establishment of international control over them, and if possible, to help bring about the suspension of atmospheric tests altogether.⁴ In its first year as a member of the world body Japan joined Norway and Canada in sponsoring a resolution aimed at establishing "a system for advance registration with the United Nations of nuclear test explosions."⁵

1. ibid., p.156.
4. Edington, op. cit., p.47.
5. ibid., pp.49-52.
of the General Assembly, Japan submitted a resolution on disarmament which implored the Disarmament Commission to direct itself to the problem of supervision and inspection; another clause in this resolution amounted to an appeal for a one year moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. The following year, Japan joined in co-sponsoring a resolution condemning the projected French nuclear tests. Two years later, in 1961, it participated in sponsoring another resolution which stressed the urgency of halting nuclear tests and which especially appealed to Russia to refrain from carrying out its projected test of a 50 megaton weapon.

Sometimes during this period, Japan's desire for an end to nuclear testing brought it into conflict with the U.S. As Tokyo was reluctant to antagonise its powerful ally, Japan often had to compromise on disarmament matters: the registration proposal of 1957 was a compromise between a Soviet demand for a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests and Western insistence that any such moratorium should be part of a larger disarmament plan; Japan's own moratorium proposal of 1958, which included inspection and supervision provisions, was also a compromise between the Soviet and Western positions. This tension between policy objectives was something with which Japan had to often cope prior to the conclusion of the test ban treaty in 1963.

The latter agreement was thus doubly welcome to Japan. In the first it helped resolve the conflict between policy objectives mentioned above; but more importantly, it ended the struggle for the single most important aspect of Japan's foreign policy in regard to nuclear weapons. Russia, Britain

2. *ibid.*, pp.119-120.  
5. *ibid.*, pp.87-88.
and the U.S. had at last made formal assurances that atmospheric
tests in Asia and the Pacific would cease. Tokyo was consequently
an enthusiastic supporter of the test ban and vigorously advocated
the early conclusion of a comprehensive agreement subscribed to
by all. 1

Though it tended to concentrate on the test suspension
issue, Japan nevertheless agreed that the ultimate goal should
be a comprehensive agreement to control the use and production
of nuclear weapons. It was for this reason that Tokyo empha­
sised the necessity of a comprehensive test ban. Moreover,
in 1957 and 1958, while suggesting various schemes for the
registration of nuclear tests, Japan vigorously supported
Western proposals for a "cut-off" in the production of
fissile material for weapons purposes. 2 In regard to
nuclear-free zones, Japan was somewhat more cautious. Asia,
it tended to emphasise, could not qualify as such an area. 3
It is reasonable to argue that on this issue in particular,
Japan was influenced by its dependence on the United States:
the designation of the Asian and Pacific region as a nuclear
free zone could limit America's strategic flexibility in the
area and consequently reduce its capacity to defend Japan.

Tokyo's interest in nonproliferation, as distinct from
the test ban or wider disarmament issues, probably dates
from about 1960. That year Japan joined four other countries
in sponsoring a General Assembly resolution calling upon all
governments to make every effort to achieve permanent agree­
ment on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear
weapons. 4 Early in 1965 Tokyo indicated that its support for
a nonproliferation agreement would be conditional upon the
participation of all the nuclear powers, including France and China, and on the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban.  

Sometime later, in October 1966, Japan's representative in the U.N. General Assembly's First Committee expressed the hope that the nonproliferation agreement then under consideration would place some obligation on the nuclear powers to disarm.  

During this early period in negotiations about a nonproliferation treaty, Tokyo's say on the matter was limited because it was not a member of the E.N.D.C. However, through vigorous diplomatic activity, particularly in 1967, Japan acquainted itself with current discussions on a nonproliferation agreement and drew international attention to its own views on the proposed treaty. Special envoys were dispatched to discuss the issue with the governments of seven different countries and with disarmament negotiators at Geneva. Apart from the discussions between Japan and the U.S., the most important of these contacts were those with Bonn. Japan and West Germany had much in common in regard to the question of nonproliferation. Both countries planned to be major users of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and consequently had more than a passing interest in the character of the inspection and peaceful uses provisions of the proposed nonproliferation agreement. Moreover, West Germany, like Japan, was not a member of the E.N.D.C. In a statement issued after a visit to Tokyo by the West German Vice Chancellor Willy Brandt in May 1967, stress was laid on the value of collaboration between

2. Ibid.  
3. The U.S., Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, India, Italy, West Germany.  
4. In particular, with the representatives of Roumania, Brazil and Canada.  
5. The level and nature of the contacts between the U.S. and Japan on the nonproliferation treaty is a question of some significance in the context of American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia. The matter will be taken up later in the thesis. See Chapter XI.
Tokyo and Bonn over the nonproliferation agreement. Moreover, it was emphasised that the proposed treaty should in no way hinder the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and should place some obligation on the nuclear powers to disarm.\(^1\)

It was reported that an important objective of Japanese diplomatic activity in 1967, was to prevent the E.N.D.C. from drafting a treaty which would only serve the interests of the nuclear powers.\(^2\)

The draft N.P.T., which was agreed upon by Russia and the U.S. in March 1968 was considered at a special meeting of the General Assembly in May of that year. At this gathering, Tokyo welcomed some of the changes which had been written into the latest version of the treaty and reaffirmed its wholehearted support for the spirit of the agreement. However, Japan was in no hurry to sign the N.P.T. At the General Assembly meeting, the Japanese delegate indicated that his government was still troubled by aspects of the treaty relating to security guarantees, nuclear power disarmament, review conferences, inspection procedures, and provisions for the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy. At the end of the General Assembly debate in May 1968, Japan supported the resolution endorsing the draft nonproliferation agreement. However, Tokyo did not sign the N.P.T. until February 1970 and has still not ratified it.

Tokyo's procrastination over the N.P.T. needs to be explained. After all, Japan had been a keen supporter of many nuclear arms control measures in the past and its response to the test ban treaty in particular had been swift and positive. Amongst the more obvious explanations for Tokyo's behaviour was the general lack of enthusiasm for the

---

N.P.T. in Japan. With one exception,\(^1\) all of the opposition parties were opposed to the agreement,\(^2\) as were large segments of the nation's press. In view of their traditionally strong anti-nuclear stance, the attitudes of the opposition parties seemed decidedly out of character.\(^3\) There seem to be two explanations for their behaviour. In the first place, the opposition parties did not view the N.P.T. as a particularly significant disarmament measure and consequently anti-nuclear sentiment was not a major determinant of their attitude to the agreement. As far as they were concerned it was the nuclear weapons in the hands of the superpowers which constituted the gravest threat to peace, and the N.P.T., they complained, did nothing to reduce these stockpiles. Second, the opposition parties felt, that to the extent that the N.P.T. had any impact at all, it would reinforce the predominance of the nuclear powers over the non-nuclear powers. The treaty would not prevent the nuclear powers from deploying nuclear weapons abroad (such as in Japan) or, from using or threatening to use them against non-nuclear states. Moreover, the operation of the nonproliferation treaty would, it was alleged, be accompanied by the inclusion of more and more non-nuclear states under the so-called "nuclear umbrellas" of the two superpowers. This it was feared would heighten the subservience of the non-nuclear states. Even the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, it was argued, would be controlled by the super-

3. With the exception of the Communist Party which split over the issue, all Japanese opposition parties wholeheartedly supported the Test Ban Treaty.
powers. To support the nonproliferation treaty then, was to acquiesce in the consolidation of superpower predominance. This was anathema to the opposition parties, which since the late 1940s, had pursued policies which were strongly nationalist, and especially, anti-American.\footnote{1}{J.A.A. Stockwin, "Domestic Political Restraints in Japanese Foreign Policy," in Australian Outlook, Vol. 22, No. 2, August 1968, p.183.} In the past, the opposition parties had found that support for disarmament was consistent with their nationalist and anti-American views. In respect of the nonproliferation treaty, however, this was not the case.\footnote{2}{Ibid., p.184.} The performance of these Japanese parties highlights an important feature of attitudes to the N.P.T. generally, viz., that left wing groups the world over have not supported the agreement anywhere near as enthusiastically as they have many other arms control measures. Indeed, many leftist groups have followed Peking in denouncing the N.P.T. as a means by which the superpowers hope to attain control over world politics. Many others, while not actually saying so, have nevertheless been influenced by these sentiments.

Another reason for Tokyo's procrastination over the N.P.T. was that, like a number of other non-nuclear states, Japan was anxious to observe how countries similarly placed to itself in respect of nuclear potential acted. Of particular importance in this regard was West Germany,\footnote{3}{The importance of West German views in Japan's thinking about the N.P.T. has been noted above. See also, D.S.O.J.P., Tokyo Shimbun, 2 July 1968, p.25 and Mainichi, 3 July 1968, p.29.} and when Bonn eventually signed the treaty in November 1969, the political value of Japan's hesitancy partly disappeared.\footnote{4}{Ian Bellany, "Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," in Australia's Neighbours, January-February 1970, p.2. See also, D.S.O.J.P., Asahi, 8 November 1968, p.6.}

Undoubtedly, one reason why Japan delayed signing the
N.P.T., was its very real concern about inspection procedures and the impact of the treaty on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the General Assembly meeting in May 1968, Japan made four suggestions as to how the treaty could be improved in this regard. These were: that the peaceful nuclear activities of all states, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, be subject to identical forms of international inspection; that inspection techniques be simplified and mechanized as much as possible; that the international flow of nuclear materials be further liberalized; and, that provision be made for the unimpaired utilization, where possible, of peaceful nuclear explosives.¹ Japan's objections to the N.P.T. on these grounds had much in common with a number of non-nuclear, West European countries with rapidly growing nuclear industries.² But Japan's objections contained other, more distinctive elements. One semi-official observer suggested that Japan would be uniquely hurt by I.A.E.A. inspections, since EURATOM countries seemed likely to get special treatment under Article III of the N.P.T. In addition, it was argued that the technological "spin-off" from nuclear weapons construction would give the nuclear powers a considerable commercial advantage.³ The changes in the final draft of the

² Bellany, loc.cit., p.1.
³ See, Ryukichi Imai, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan," in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 25, No. 5, May 1969, pp.2-7. (Ryukichi Imai is a consultant on nuclear energy affairs to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.) The preference accorded EURATOM in U.S. policy towards the N.P.T. and towards co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy generally, was a source of considerable friction between Washington and some of the non-nuclear states of Asia. This matter will be discussed in greater detail later in the thesis. See Chapter XI.
N.P.T. went part of the way towards meeting Japanese concern. However, inspection is still an issue in Japan, and Tokyo is unlikely to ratify the N.P.T. till it is accorded what it regards as equality with the EURATOM countries in the matter of safeguards. Tokyo's concern about the inspection and peaceful uses provisions of the N.P.T. is more than just a mask for other unstated objections to the treaty. Japan, it has been noted, is planning quite a considerable nuclear industry for the future. Consequently, it is understandable that it should want to liberalize as much as possible the international flow of nuclear information and material. Moreover, Japan is a potential competitor with both the EURATOM states and the major nuclear powers in what promises to be a very profitable business. Consequently, it has powerful reasons for not wanting to be placed at a disadvantage.

Amongst the most vocal opponents of the N.P.T. in Japan were the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (J.A.E.C.) and sectors of industry such as the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (J.A.I.F.). These bodies were preoccupied with the N.P.T.'s impact on the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy and continually counselled the government to insist on a number of changes in

1. In the revised draft of 31 May 1968, Article IV was changed to stress the right of parties to acquire nuclear materials and equipment. Article V was revised to further ensure that non-nuclear states would have access, through an appropriate international body, to the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.
2. For a view which tends to minimise Japan's peaceful nuclear programme as a factor in Tokyo's attitude to the N.P.T., see Bellany, loc. cit., pp. 1-3.
the agreement. In contrast to this anti-treaty advice from departments concerned with commerce and technology, the Japanese Government tended to receive pro-treaty advice from its political departments, especially the Foreign Office.

So far, discussion has centred on some of the more obvious reasons why Japan hesitated to sign the N.P.T. But there are grounds for believing that the delay itself was a conscious act of foreign policy, designed to demonstrate that Japan was no longer totally devoted to a low posture in international affairs, and more particularly, to improve Tokyo's bargaining position in respect of two policy objectives, membership of the E.N.D.C. and reversion of Okinawa.

1. The J.A.E.C. wanted inspection under the treaty to be limited to inquiries into the purposes for which nuclear fuel was used. Also, it was adamant that there should be no restrictions on the utilization of peaceful nuclear explosions if and when they became a practical proposition. The Atomic Power Industries Council was insistent that during inspections, the reactors should not have to cease operating, and that measures should be evolved to ensure the preservation of commercial secrets. See, D.S.O.J.P., Tokyo Shimbun, 29 August 1967, pp.18-19. The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum listed three basic objections to the safeguards provisions of the N.P.T.: safeguards would foster inequalities between the nuclear and the non-nuclear states in industrial research and development on the peaceful uses of atomic energy; they could be used as a cover for industrial espionage; and their implementation could seriously inconvenience reactor operators. See, Atoms in Japan, Vol. 12, No. 2, February 1968, p.4. For a criticism by the J.A.I.F. of the N.P.T. as a whole, see Atoms in Japan, Vol. 14, No. 3, March 1970, pp.3-6.

2. For a sample of Foreign Office views on the N.P.T. see, D.S.O.J.P., Nihon Keizai, 12 June 1968, p.28; Sankei, 29 June 1968, p.27; and, Mainichi, 3 July 1968, p.12.
Tokyo's desire for membership of the E.N.D.C. stemmed largely from its belief that Japan had a special role to play in the field of disarmament. It should also be seen as a reflection of Tokyo's desire for a say in world affairs commensurate with its rapidly growing industrial and economic power. The emergence of the non-proliferation issue only added to these pressures. There was much resentment in Tokyo that Japan, one of the most important of the non-nuclear states, was being prevailed upon to accept an agreement which was negotiated by a forum in which its spokesman had no say. In May 1967, Japan raised the question of membership of the E.N.D.C. with A.C.D.A. Director, Mr. W. C. Foster. On this occasion, Washington promised to support Japan's request but warned that the Soviet Union was currently opposed to the move. Later, when Moscow pressed Japan to sign the N.P.T., Tokyo asked Russia to support its membership of the E.N.D.C. By July 1968, L.D.P. dietmen were suggesting quite openly that membership of the E.N.D.C. should be demanded by Japan as a condition of its signature of the N.P.T. Just how largely the question of E.N.D.C. membership figured in Tokyo's deliberations over signature of the N.P.T. is difficult to say. Reports indicate, however, that Russia and the U.S. came to view Tokyo's membership of the E.N.D.C. as an important part of their efforts to have Japan accede to the N.P.T. When Japan was eventually invited to join the E.N.D.C. in May 1969, sections of the Japanese press were quick to note that Tokyo was now much more likely to sign the N.P.T.

Since the Sato-Johnson talks of November 1967, the return of Okinawa to Japan had been accepted as a foregone conclusion.

However Tokyo was anxious to secure as favourable a settlement as possible, particularly in respect of the status of U.S. bases in Okinawa after reversion. In November 1969, shortly before the commencement of talks between Mr. Sato and President Nixon, there was speculation in the Japanese press that the Prime Minister would attempt to trade signature of the N.P.T. for concessions on the Okinawa question. Three of the opposition parties (the D.S.P., the J.S.P., and the Komeito Party) believed that this was the case, and they were appalled that the government should try to "curry favour" with Washington in such a way. It would be unwise to be too dogmatic about this matter. However, it is reasonable to speculate that by holding out on the N.P.T., Tokyo strengthened its bargaining position in the negotiations over Okinawa. A settlement, which was fairly favourable to Japan, at least on the question of the status of U.S. bases after reversion, was reached late in November, 1969. Three months later, Tokyo signed the N.P.T.

Probably the most important conclusion to be drawn from this analysis of Japan's opposition to the N.P.T., is that the desire to preserve an option on building nuclear weapons does not seem to have been a particularly important motivating factor. As indicated earlier, support for nuclear weapons in Japan was, and indeed still is, virtually non-existent.

1. e.g., D.S.O.J.P., Asahi, 8 November 1969, p.6.
3. The United States agreed to remove all of its nuclear weapons from Okinawa by the date of reversion. It also agreed that after reversion, U.S. bases in Okinawa would become subject to the same restrictions which applied to American bases elsewhere in Japan. However, the gains from the Okinawa agreement did not flow all one way. Washington seems to have wrung certain concessions from Japan. For a more extended discussion of this matter, see below, Chapter X.
Consequently, one must look to other factors to explain Tokyo's attitude. Probably the most important and credible of these was its concern about the inspection and peaceful uses provisions of the N.P.T. But there is evidence too, that Japan used its signature of the N.P.T. as a means of securing foreign policy objectives of its own. Thus, Tokyo's reaction to the N.P.T. reflected a surprisingly (for Japan) high degree of diplomatic assertiveness and must be seen as an indication of its desire for a louder voice in world affairs.

It has been argued so far in this chapter, that opposition to nuclear weapons has been an important characteristic of Japanese thinking ever since the end of World War II. Successive governments in Tokyo have adhered to a policy of not acquiring nuclear weapons and have been supported, on this issue at least, by the opposition political parties and the overwhelming mass of the Japanese people. But what of the future? Will Japan always remain non-nuclear? This, of course, is a question which cannot be answered at present with certainty. Nevertheless, it is one which would seem to deserve careful consideration. After all, there is every indication that a nuclear-armed Japan would be a power of immense military significance; greater than say, Britain, France, or, in the short-run at least, China. Its emergence would clearly mark an important shift in the world balance of power.

In recent years, there have been some developments which could be interpreted as indicating that Japan might eventually abandon its non-nuclear stance. In the first place, Japan's non-nuclear policy has been part of a wider rejection, in that country, of militarism in general. Ever since 1945, the size and influence of Japan's defence establishment has been kept to a minimum. But there are signs already that this could change. Japan's defence forces promise to grow fairly rapidly in the future. Even if expenditure on defence were not to exceed the
figure of about 1 per cent of G.N.P. as envisaged in the Fourth Defence Build-Up Plan for 1972-76, Japan's likely rate of growth will ensure very considerable absolute increases. Moreover, this growth in expenditure seems likely to be accompanied by an increasingly important role for Japan's defence forces. After the reversion of Okinawa, Japanese forces will take over from the Americans the responsibility for the defence of the Ryuku Islands and, as U.S. servicemen, in conformity with the Nixon doctrine, are withdrawn from Japan proper, local forces will have to take their place there as well. This enlargement of Japan's defence establishment seems likely to be made easier by a growing sense of nationalism amongst the Japanese people. (The White Paper on Defence published in October 1970 noted that during the post-war period there had been a tendency for the Japanese people to suppress their feelings of attachment to the country. It was now time, the paper emphasised, to re-examine this post-war tendency.)

Second, though there are still very few people in Japan who seem prepared to advocate the establishment of a national nuclear force, there has, in recent years, been much more discussion about nuclear weapons and related issues. Such comment has been particularly obvious in the nation's press and in the writings

2. Under an agreement reached in December 1970, most of the American combat units in Japan were scheduled to be withdrawn by mid-1971. This was expected to reduce the number of U.S. military personnel in Japan from 40,000 to 28,000. See, Strategic Survey, 1970, p.37.
4. For a survey of some of this discussion, see Welfield, op. cit., pp.20-35.
of specialist commentators on defence and foreign affairs. Usually, it has taken place in the context of discussion about the N.P.T., but some of it seems to have been stimulated by the controversy in the U.S. about ballistic missile defence. Usually, it has taken place in the context of discussion about the N.P.T., but some of it seems to have been stimulated by the controversy in the U.S. about ballistic missile defence. It is significant in this regard that the recent White Paper on Defence not only left open the possibility that Japan might acquire nuclear weapons in the future, but in addition, reiterated an earlier claim that the development of "defensive" nuclear weapons would not infringe the Japanese Constitution. This increased willingness to discuss

1. The question of missile defence was the subject of much analysis and comment in the Japanese press during 1967. For a sample of this comment, see D.S.O.J.P., Asahi, 24 August 1967, pp.22-25 and 25-28; The Japan Times, 28 May 1967 and ibid., 20 and 21 September 1967. There have been reports that Japanese officials have sought information about ballistic missile defence from the U.S. Government. See, D.S.O.J.P., Asahi, 24 August 1967, p.24 and The New York Times, 7 July 1967. In July 1967, a debate was held in the Japanese Parliament on the development of a non-nuclear ballistic missile defence system. See, D.S.O.J.P., Asahi, 24 August 1967, p.24. During 1967, there were a number of reports that "key elements" in the Self Defence Agency (S.D.A.) and the ruling L.D.P. favoured a ballistic missile defence system for Japan. These "key elements" were said to include General Matsumo, a former director of the S.D.A. Thinking amongst this group seems to have centred largely on some sort of seaborne system, possibly operated in co-operation with the United States. See, Australian Financial Review, 10 August 1967; D.S.O.J.P., Nihon Keizai (evening), 13 July 1967; ibid., Asahi, 24 August 1967; The Australian, 31 January 1967.


3. ibid. The Japanese Government has long held that "defensive" nuclear weapons would in no way contravene Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. See, the views of Prime Ministers Kishi and Sato, reported in The Times (London), 27 July 1966. See also, statement by Mr. Sato, reported in The Japan Times, 28 May 1967.
issues relating to defence and nuclear weapons would seem to indicate, among other things, a decline in the strength of Japan's "nuclear allergy." But even if that uniquely Japanese distaste for nuclear weapons has not yet dissipated very much, it seems likely to do so in the future. Those Japanese who remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki are already giving way to a generation who have no memories of World War II. Moreover, as Ian Bellany has suggested, the growth of commercial, benevolent applications of nuclear energy within the country will probably also help the Japanese to forget their "nuclear allergy."\(^1\)

Finally, there are more general considerations which seem to point Japan in the direction of nuclear weapons. Japan is already a great economic and industrial power (it is presently the world's third greatest economic power) and its potential for further growth seems enormous.\(^2\) This raises the question of whether or not Japan will eventually want to acquire the military accoutrements of a great power, which at the present time include a strategic nuclear force. Mr. Sato has said that his country has no intention of developing military forces commensurate with its economic power. Indeed, he has spoken of Japan's intended path in this respect as "a completely new experiment in world history."\(^3\) Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to agree with Hedley Bull that

2. Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute and James Abegglen of the Boston Consulting Group have predicted that Japan's economy will grow three to five times during the 1970s. Quoted in Ralph N. Clough, "East Asia in the 1970s" in Bruce Brown (ed.), Asia and the Pacific in the 1970s, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971, p. 13. Some observers question whether so high a rate of growth can be continued for another 10 years. See views of Professor James Morley of Columbia University. Quoted in ibid.
"there is no reason to believe that Japan, or any other country, can attain the status of a great power without providing itself with the military means that have been a necessary condition of such a status in the past." 1

The above considerations notwithstanding, it seems unlikely that Japan will decide to develop nuclear weapons in the near future. In the absence of any urgent necessity to do so, the costs of going nuclear would still seem to be too great. Such a move would probably, even now, fracture the country politically and, almost certainly, cause immeasurable damage to Japan's image abroad. The consequences of offending the U.S., Russia and China could be so great as to make any decision to acquire nuclear weapons a very risky one indeed. Moreover, though Japan is technically and scientifically competent it has yet to develop one or two of the facilities normally regarded as essential for an independent weapons programme. (These would include, of course, a plutonium separation plant and, if a force including thermo-nuclear weapons were envisaged, a uranium enrichment complex as well.) Even then, Japan's scientists would still face formidable problems in regard to warhead development, not the least of which, would be that of testing. Finally, amongst the costs of going nuclear, Japan would probably have to accept a lower rate of economic growth than it has enjoyed in the past, as well as reduced expenditure in a number of increasingly important problem areas such as pollution control and urban renewal.

There are a number of possible developments which could make it difficult for future Japanese Governments to adhere to a non-nuclear stance. One of these would be the emergence in the country of extreme nationalist sentiment similar to that which existed before the war. Another would be a rapid escalation in the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. Also,

1. ibid.
Japan's present path will be made more difficult if, while remaining non-nuclear, it is not able to realise some of its great power aspirations such as permanent membership of the Security Council. (The fact that the five powers designated permanent members of the Security Council also happen to be the world's only nuclear powers, must serve as an incentive to proliferation amongst states with great power aspirations such as India and Japan.) But the thing most likely to put Tokyo's non-nuclear policy at risk would be the adoption by China (or Russia) of a more aggressive policy towards Japan, especially, if such a development were accompanied by a diminished sense of confidence in Japan in the credibility of its alliance with the United States.
CHAPTER VI

THE POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS OF ASIA: AUSTRALIA

Any analysis of nuclear capabilities in Asia must take account of Australia's potential in this field. It is true of course that Australia is not nearly so advanced as India and Japan in the exploitation of atomic energy. At the present time Australia possesses only two small research reactors and the contract has yet to be let for the construction of the country's first power reactor. But nevertheless, Australia has long been recognised as a potential nuclear power. The report, in 1960, by the National Planning Association in Washington, concluded that Australia was one of a group of nations which, though relatively limited in scientific manpower were economically capable, fairly competent technically, and thus able to produce nuclear weapons in the near future.¹ In 1969, the United States Atomic Energy Commission claimed that Australia was one of eight nations which had the ability to produce "a substantial number of nuclear weapons with a delivery system in five years".²

A. Australia's Nuclear Weapons Potential.

The first important moves in the development of nuclear research in Australia were taken by the Commonwealth Government in 1946. The budget for that year provided specifically for expenditure on research in the nuclear field.³ In addition,

an atomic energy laboratory was established at Melbourne University and plans were announced for atomic energy research to be carried out at the Australian National University. During the late 1940s additional efforts were made to increase the number of scientists in Australia, especially in areas related to defence. A Defence Research and Development Policy Committee was set up under the chairmanship of a Defence Scientific Adviser. This committee was instructed to give special attention to the need for increasing the number of people trained in scientific research methods. On its recommendation, the government approved the appointment of a Chief Scientist in the Department of Supply and Development, whose first task was to stimulate the recruitment of defence scientists, and to organise the setting up of facilities for defence research.

Characteristic of the early years of nuclear research in Australia was the high level of collaboration with Britain, and other members of the Commonwealth. There were some discussions on atomic energy matters between British and Australian representatives before the end of World War II and, in 1944, the two governments agreed to prospect for uranium ore in Australia. It was envisaged that uranium from Australia could be used to fuel Britain's reactors. After the war cooperation with Britain continued and scientists recruited in Australia for defence work were sent to the United Kingdom for post-graduate training. In addition to its bi-lateral contacts with Britain on matters related to atomic research, Australia was also

represented on the British Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science. This committee, whose other members were the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, was formed in 1947 to consider and review defence research activities.¹ There also appears to have been a separate arrangement for co-operation in atomic energy research between Canada and Australia.²

During this early phase in the development of atomic energy research in Australia no assistance was received from the United States. During 1948 and 1949, the opposition in the Federal Parliament asserted that this reluctance on America's part to share its nuclear secrets with Australia was due to the government's "failure to stamp out the Communist menace".³ But charges of this sort ignored the fact that the American Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited any exchange of nuclear information or material between the U.S. and other powers.

Probably the most important area of collaboration between Britain and Australia was in the area of missile and warhead testing. The first approaches by the U.K. Government on the possibility of using areas in Central Australia for testing guided missiles were made in 1946. In November of that year, the Australian Government announced proposals to establish an experimental range for rockets and guided projectiles based on Woomera. Though not directly concerned with atomic energy as such, the work at Woomera was nevertheless related to the development of nuclear weapons, and as well, was evidence of Australia's early involvement in advanced weapons research.

Symbolic of Anglo-Australian collaboration in nuclear matters was the testing in Australia of British nuclear weapons.

¹ For details of the work of this committee, see C.P.D., H of R., Vol. 196, 29 April 1948, p.1245.
² ibid., Vol. 188, 31 July 1946, p.3421.
³ e.g., ibid., Vol. 204, 4 October 1949, p.796 and Vol. 198, 30 September 1948, pp.1029-1030, 1038.
Britain's first atomic test took place at the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia in October 1952. The test was carried out under conditions simulating an explosion in a port and was designed, amongst other things, to provide information on the measures necessary to protect British and Australian facilities in this type of situation. Three Australian scientists were present at the test and had also assisted in its preparation, as had units of the Australian armed forces and officers of the Department of Supply. In October of the following year, Britain tested another nuclear weapon - this time at Emu Field, west of the Woomera rocket range in South Australia. Following this second test, the Commonwealth Government agreed to permit a series of atomic tests to take place "over the years" in Australia. This agreement was subject to the proviso that no tests were to take place without the approval of a specially appointed safety committee consisting of five Australian scientists. Altogether, twelve nuclear devices, all of low yield, were detonated in Australia between 1952 and 1957. Later, when Britain commenced testing at Christmas Island, Australia was represented by a number of observers. It seems reasonable to assume, that as a result of Britain's nuclear test programme, Australia learned something about the production, use and effects of nuclear weapons; Australian scientists, government officials and service personnel were involved, in various ways, in the preparation and analysis of all of the tests carried out in Australia.

By the early 1950s a start had been made on nuclear research in Australia. The Federal Government had given a lead in the recruitment and training of nuclear scientists and in the establishment of research facilities. These efforts had been supplemented through collaboration with Britain and other members of the Commonwealth. Indeed, it is worth noting that Australia,

mainly because of its relationship with Britain, had an earlier insight than most countries into developments in the field of atomic energy. At a time when the United States was reluctant to assist any state in the peaceful or military exploitation of atomic energy, Britain was allowing Australian scientists limited access to some of its own atomic secrets.

In 1953, the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (A.A.E.C.) was established. This move seems to have been precipitated, amongst other things, by the discovery of uranium. The first sizeable deposits of the mineral so far found in Australia were unearthed in 1951. Thereafter, Australia entered into agreements to export uranium ore to the United States and Britain. But the major responsibility of the A.A.E.C. was to organise research and development leading to the industrial use of atomic energy. The Research Programme of the Commission stated:

The Programme is directly aimed at developing the best methods for producing industrial atomic power from uranium and thorium for ultimate use in Australian industry.

... Based on the advice it has received, it [the Government] believes that the production of electric power from nuclear sources will become an economic proposition in parts of Australia remote from the source of conventional fuels within, probably, the next decade.¹

In October 1958 work commenced on Australia's first research reactor. This was a 10 M.W. installation called HIFAR and was built at the A.A.E.C.'s research establishment at Lucas Heights near Sydney. HIFAR has been in operation since January 1958 and uses fuel manufactured in Britain from enriched uranium supplied by the United States.² It is not capable of producing quantities

of fissionable material sufficient for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In any case, prior to 1966, the fuel supplied for HIFAR was subject to control by the U.S. and Britain. Since then, HIFAR has been subject to I.A.E.A. safeguards.\(^1\) MOATA, the only other research reactor built in Australia, is also fuelled with enriched uranium. This reactor which is also at Lucas Heights, has an insignificant power output (10 kilowatts) and was designed primarily for reactor physics research.\(^2\)

The establishment of the A.A.E.C. was followed by suggestions in parliament and elsewhere that Australia immediately proceed with the construction of nuclear power stations to assist the nation's development. Suggestions such as these were in line with current thinking in many parts of the world and reflected the hopes then held for the successful use of atomic energy in the production of electric power. In 1955, the Australian Government indicated that, for the time being, it was not prepared to encourage the establishment of an atomic power station. It emphasized that much remained to be learned about the production of power from nuclear sources and that in some parts of Australia, especially those rich in coal deposits, it would be many years before atomic facilities could compete with conventional fuel plants.\(^3\)

The collaboration between British and Australian scientists which was characteristic of the early years of atomic energy research in Australia remained a feature of developments in this field after the establishment of the A.A.E.C. In announcing details of the A.A.E.C. Research Programme, Canberra emphasised that work undertaken in Australia:

while being a complete and self-contained programme, [would] be related to the work currently in progress in the United Kingdom in order to avoid duplication of effort and to provide for cooperation and mutual assistance between the two countries.  

To assist in the work of the A.A.E.C., Britain agreed to make available to Australia information on recent developments in atomic energy research in the U.K. and to offer facilities to Australian scientists to enable them to gain first hand knowledge of reactor design and operation. As facilities were completed in Australia, staff trained in England were brought back to form the nucleus of research groups at Lucas Heights. Australia also benefited from agreements reached with the United States and Canada. In June 1956, Canberra entered into an agreement with the United States for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Under the terms of the agreement, Australia was to receive information on the design, construction and operation of research reactors together with supplies of enriched uranium and information on the production and refining of uranium and thorium. Provision was also made for Australian scientists to visit "specialised research establishments in the United States". This initial inter-governmental agreement was amended and extended in September 1960 and again in April 1967. Co-operation with the U.S. in the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy was also provided for in an agreement between the American and Australian Atomic Energy Agencies in 1964. In August 1959, Australia signed an agreement with Canada for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The agreement provided for an exchange of

2. ibid.
3. ibid., Vol. 27, No. 6, June 1956, p. 374.
5. ibid.
information, material and equipment between the two countries and for the use of each other's facilities.\(^1\) There can be little doubt that atomic energy research in Australia has benefited greatly from this cooperation with friendly powers.

In the mid-1960s there was a revival of interest in the prospects for nuclear power production in Australia. In 1965, the A.A.E.C. predicted that nuclear power would have "a significant role in this country [Australia] within the foreseeable future". In South Australia, the A.A.E.C. alleged, nuclear power would prove competitive with that produced from conventional sources by the early 1970s. In addition, by the mid-to-late 1970s, it would be possible to justify the establishment of nuclear power producing facilities in Tasmania, New South Wales and Victoria also.\(^2\) In 1966 the A.A.E.C. repeated these conclusions and emphasised the need for Australia to begin the construction of advanced converter stations as soon as economically justifiable.\(^3\) Speculation about the future of nuclear power in Australia was not confined to the A.A.E.C. In parliament, during 1965 and 1966, a number of members pressed the government to establish nuclear power stations both for the production of electricity and the desalination of water.

The government was not at all sympathetic to suggestions about the use of nuclear facilities for the desalination of water. However, it agreed with the A.A.E.C., that in the "foreseeable future", the production of electric power from nuclear sources was likely to become an economic proposition in some areas of Australia.\(^4\) The decision to build Australia's

---

first nuclear power station was announced in October 1969. The plant is scheduled to be built at Jervis Bay in N.S.W. and is expected to have a capacity of 500 M.W. Tenders for the project closed on 15 June 1970; bids were received from a total of seven different organisations in Britain, Canada, West Germany and the United States. After detailed evaluation, a short-list of four systems was drawn up for further consideration. In June 1971, the Australian Government announced that, in view of the country's current economic circumstances, a final decision on the proposed power station at Jervis Bay would be deferred for 12 months. No decision to proceed with the project has yet been made. From the beginning, government spokesmen denied that defence considerations had entered into Canberra's decision to establish a nuclear power station. Nevertheless, the government insisted that the plant to be built at Jervis Bay should be capable of becoming "fully independent of overseas fuel supplies and services." According to the A.A.E.C.,

2. *ibid*.
4. *ibid*. These were:
   (a) Natural Uranium Pressurised Heavy Water Moderated and Cooled Reactor, pressure tube type (PHWR-CANDU) - Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.
   (b) Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR) - The Nuclear Power Group, U.K.
   (c) Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) - Kraftwerk Union A.G., West Germany.
   (d) Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) - Westinghouse, U.S.A.
   For a discussion of some of the characteristics of the various types of reactors in common use, see Ian Bellany, *Australia in the Nuclear Age*, Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1972, pp.13-17.
6. This requirement regarding fuel supplies was stipulated in the A.A.E.C.'s Invitation to Tender. The relevant clause is reproduced in *ibid.*, p.15.
all four of the short-listed tenderers, in concert with their governments, were able, in one way or another, to meet this condition regarding indigenous fuel requirements. As Bellany has suggested, by seeking to acquire a reactor which would be independent of foreign fuel supplies, Australia has given the impression that it wants to be in a position where it would be able to use that reactor for military purposes, should it ever decide to do so.

The prospect that Australia will eventually acquire atomic power facilities raises inevitable questions about the nation's nuclear weapons potential. It seems generally agreed that Australia could meet the cost of going nuclear without too much difficulty. The country's present G.N.P. of about 33 billion dollars is well above the estimated minimum levels of G.N.P.

1. Ibid., p.16. The Canadian bid was for a reactor which uses natural uranium fuel, hence no undertaking on enrichment was required. The British and German submissions were accompanied by offers of enrichment technology. The U.S. bid is said to have included an offer of "enrichment services". Whether this meant that the American Government was willing to assist Australia in the establishment of an enrichment plant was not made clear in the A.A.E.C.'s report. However, on 20 July 1971, Canberra announced that "the United States Government had offered to discuss with Australia the possibility of making U.S. enrichment technology available outside of the United States for the construction of a uranium enrichment plant on a multi-national basis." See, C.N.I.A., Vol. 42, No. 7, July 1971, p.383. The whole matter of recent changes in American policy on uranium enrichment and the significance of these changes for U.S. nonproliferation policy will be taken up again later in the thesis. See, Chapter XI.


which, in the past, have been considered necessary to support a nuclear weapons programme. Moreover, it seems that the "dollar" cost would not be high in relation to Australia's G.N.P. and defence budget. However, there appear to be deficiencies in Australia's technological resource base which could threaten any future plan to acquire nuclear weapons. Bellany has argued that,

1. According to Ian Bellany, the highest level at which this minimum seems to have been put is about ten billion dollars. (Amounts mentioned in this chapter are expressed in U.S. dollars.) See, Bellany, op. cit., p.65.

2. Harry Gelber has estimated that the annual cost to Australia of producing 100 twenty kiloton bombs and fifty 3000 kilometre surface-to-surface missiles in soft emplacements would be about 118.5 million dollars for ten years. See Gelber, op. cit., pp.44-45. Bellany has estimated that the annual cost to Australia of producing 100 plutonium warheads (probably no greater than 60 kilotons) and 100 short-range (less than 500 nm) ship-borne missiles would be about 95 million dollars for ten years. See, Ian Bellany, An Australian Nuclear Force, Canberra: A.N.U. Press, 1969, p.16. By way of comparison, expenditure on defence in Australia has been estimated at 1,270 million dollars for 1969 and 1,261 million for 1970. See, The Military Balance, 1970-1971, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970, p.111 and The Military Balance, 1971-1972, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, p.61 respectively. Ian Bellany has also costed a somewhat more sophisticated force than the last mentioned one. This would include "eight specially constructed ships or submarines designed to carry between them one hundred ballistic or cruise missiles with a range of up to 1,000 miles and nuclear warheads up to 100 kt, with VFL [very low frequency] navigation and communication equipment, and a protected national command centre." Bellany has estimated that over a ten year period, the annual cost of such a force would be equal to less than twenty per cent of Australia's 1968-69 defence budget. See, Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, pp.79-80.
using the "Kramish" R and D criterion, Australia is "scarcely sufficiently technologically mature to undertake a programme for the manufacture of nuclear weapons." It seems that if Australia wants to be able to produce nuclear weapons in the future, it will probably have to spend much more on R and D than it presently does, and as well, to expand the size of the country's technically qualified manpower force.

Australia will begin to acquire a stockpile of plutonium some time after its first power reactor commences operations. (Just when this might be is impossible to say, pending a decision to go ahead with the project at Jervis Bay. It has been calculated that it will take about five years to build the reactor.) However, Australia's first reactor will be foreign built (most probably by one of the short-listed tenderers mentioned above) and the plutonium derived from it will, almost certainly, be subject to restrictions limiting its use to peaceful purposes. Australia could circumvent these difficulties by building its own reactor and ancillary facilities from national resources. However, it has been estimated that Australia's engineers and scientists would first need at least three years experience running a foreign built facility. Assuming it would take about five years to construct a locally built reactor, Australia could not begin to produce plutonium weapons within about eight or nine years of the start-up of the first reactor bought from

1. It has been suggested by Arnold Kramish, among others, that in addition to having a G.N.P. of about ten billion dollars, a country must be spending at least 0.8 per cent of its G.N.P. on scientific research and development (R and D) in order to be able to manufacture nuclear weapons from its own resources. See, ibid., p.65.
2. Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, p.66. According to Bellany, expenditure in Australia on R and D during 1967 and 1968 was probably somewhere between 0.7 and 1 per cent of G.N.P. ibid., pp.65-66.
3. ibid., p.67.
5. Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, pp.70-71.
overseas.\(^1\) (In sum, this could amount to a gap of up to 14 years between the letting of the contract for the first foreign built reactor and the construction of Australia's first plutonium weapons.)

Recent developments in centrifuge technology have raised the possibility that Australia might be able to choose to base any future nuclear weapons programme on enriched uranium manufactured in a centrifuge plant rather than on plutonium from a reactor.\(^2\) As Bellany has pointed out, such an alternative route to weapons production could have certain advantages: it would allow for simpler weapon design, at least in the initial stages of bomb construction; and would make for an easier transition to the manufacture of thermo-nuclear weapons.\(^3\) However, centrifuge technology has yet to prove itself in practical operation. In any case, Australia would need years of experience running a foreign built centrifuge plant before it could build one of its own; it has been estimated that Australia could not hope to have a locally built centrifuge plant in operation before 1985.\(^4\)

Should Australia ever decide to develop nuclear weapons it would, like any other aspiring nuclear state, be faced with the problem of developing a delivery system. Providing it was

2. For a discussion of some of these recent developments in centrifuge technology, see below, Chapter XI. The A.A.E.C. has been conducting work on a centrifuge programme for some years. See, Australian Atomic Energy Commission, *Seventeenth Annual Report*, June 1969, p.10.
4. *ibid.*, pp.71-72. As mentioned above, the British and West German tenders for the proposed power station at Jervis Bay were accompanied by offers of enrichment (possibly centrifuge?) technology. However, it is almost certain that any enrichment facility built with British or West German assistance would be accompanied by restrictions limiting its use to peaceful purposes.
satisfied with a fairly unsophisticated means of delivering its nuclear bombs, Australia could make use of the Canberra jet bombers already in service with the Royal Australian Air Force (R.A.A.F.) These aircraft are certainly capable of carrying nuclear bombs but nevertheless they suffer from a number of important disadvantages. In particular, they are limited in the number of foreign targets they would be capable of striking from bases in Australia and are vulnerable both to pre-emptive attack and modern air defences. Australia presently has twenty-four F111C aircraft on order for the R.A.A.F. This is a multi-purpose aircraft which could certainly be used in a nuclear role. It can fly at supersonic speeds and, according to Ian Bellany, "has the greatest operational radius of any modern bomber one country has ever undertaken to supply to another." Even so, it would be limited in the number of important foreign targets it could strike from bases in Australia. Moreover, though in many ways a very sophisticated aircraft, the F111Cs would still be vulnerable to modern air defences and to pre-emptive attack by an adversary armed with nuclear missiles.

1. Australia has one bomber squadron equipped with Canberra B-20 aircraft. See, The Military Balance, 1971-1972, p.44.
2. The maximum published un-refuelled range of the F111C is 3,800 miles. See, The Military Balance, 1969-1970, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969, p.56. Bellany has pointed out that with in-flight re-fuelling, the F111C would probably have sufficient range to reach Chinese and Japanese targets, but not to return to Australia. Without re-fuelling, it would be stretched to the limit to fly from Darwin (Australia) to Djakarta (Indonesia) and back. See, Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, p.63 (including fn. 1).
3. ibid., p.63.
Also, as long as the U.S., the supplier of the F111C, remains opposed to nuclear proliferation, Australia could expect to be discouraged from using the F111C as a nuclear delivery vehicle. These and other considerations have prompted the examination of Australia's potential to develop a missile delivery force of some kind. Because of Australia's association with Britain in the development and testing of guided missiles, and more recently, with the U.S. in the maintenance in Australia of American space tracking and communication stations, Australian scientists have no doubt acquired valuable knowledge about electronics, propulsion and other aspects of missile technology. In time, Australia could develop the industrial base and the special facilities necessary for the production of missile components and fuels. The production of I.C.B.M.s like the Minuteman, or S.L.B.M.s like the Polaris, would seem to be well beyond Australia's present capacity. However, Ian Bellany has costed a more modest delivery system which, he claims,

1. The development of the Jindivik target-drone has provided some experience with the problems of un-manned flight. This experience could be valuable if Australia ever decided to develop a stand-off missile or a short-range sea-borne missile. See, ibid., p.67.

2. Bellany has estimated that the production of missile delivery systems of the Polaris or Minuteman type will remain beyond Australia's financial and technical capacity till 1990 at the earliest. See, Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, p.67. Harry Gelber seems more optimistic as regards Australia's capacity to afford a sophisticated missile delivery system; he has costed a force of 50 Minuteman I-type missiles, with a range of 10,000 km. and in hard emplacements at around 130 million dollars annually for 10 years. See, Gelber, op. cit., pp.44-45. He has conceded, though, that the technical and scientific manpower requirements for the development of a sophisticated missile system, even if capable of being met, would detract greatly from other areas of development in Australia. See, ibid., p.46.
Australia could be in a position to produce by the late 1970s. Such a force would be made up of one hundred 1000-mile range ballistic or cruise missiles capable of being surface-launched from ships or submarines.¹

B. The Nature and Extent of Support for Nuclear Weapons in Australia

The Australian public has never displayed much vocal opposition to their nation's involvement in the nuclear affairs of either of its major allies, Britain and the United States. However, this does not mean that Australians have been anxious to see their country acquire nuclear weapons of its own. Indeed, over the years, support for an Australian nuclear force has remained low and constant. Successive governments in Canberra have displayed little enthusiasm for an Australian nuclear force though they have vigorously sought the protection of the American and British deterrents. At the same time, Australia has not undertaken never to produce nuclear weapons. In this and other ways Canberra has, at least diplomatically, preserved an option on going nuclear.

During the whole post-war period no more than about ten or twelve members of the Federal Parliament have openly suggested that Australia should acquire nuclear weapons. Most of these have been members of the Liberal–Country Party coalition, though there have been some advocates in the Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.).² In recent years there has been

¹. Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, pp.79-80.
². Members of the Australian Federal Parliament who, at one time or another, have supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons, include Senator Gorton, in C.P.D., Senate, Vol.S.10, 8 May 1957, pp.608 and 609; Senator Wordsworth, in ibid., p.615; Senator Branson, in ibid., Vol.S.26, 2 September 1964, p.367. See also, Mr. Bruce, in C.P.D., H of R., Vol. 6, 28 April 1955, pp.287-8; Mr. Stewart, in ibid., Vol. 15, 7 May 1957, p.1102; Mr. Bostock, in ibid., pp.1105-6; Mr. Wentworth, in ibid., 8 May 1957, p.1155 and ibid., Vol. 25, 6 October 1959, p.1817; Mr. Beasley, in ibid., p.1810; Mr. Killen, in ibid., Vol. 28, 11 October 1960, pp.1872-3.
strong support for an Australian nuclear force from the Democratic Labor Party (D.L.P.). Outside of Parliament, support for nuclear weapons has been similarly slight and, generally speaking has been limited to the Returned Services League of Australia (R.S.L.), certain publicists, and some members of the Australian scientific community.

There has been very little agreement amongst the supporters of an Australian nuclear capability about the proposed purpose and characteristics of such a force.


2. In 1962, the National Congress of the R.S.L. resolved that Australia should acquire a supply of nuclear weapons and aircraft for their delivery. See, Henry S. Albinski, "Australia and Nuclear Affairs" in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1, Spring 1965, p.44. The 1966 National Congress resolved that Australian troops should be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, and that the R.A.A.F. should be provided with strategic nuclear weapons "at an appropriate time". More recently, the R.S.L. has modified its position, and in its 1969 Defence Statement, urged that it was in Australia's interests to sign the N.P.T. Material supplied by courtesy of Mr. A.G.W. Keys, National Secretary, R.S.L. Canberra.


4. In 1968, Sir Philip Baxter, Chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission declared that Australia must equip itself with the most "sophisticated and effective weapons that man can devise - with no type excluded". See, The Australian, 20 March 1968.

5. This section has been constructed from material drawn from the sources cited above. See p. 202.
Some have been anxious that Australia should acquire a minimum deterrent against China and even Russia. Consequently, weapons capable of delivery onto targets in these countries have been proposed. More usually, it has been suggested that Australia should acquire tactical nuclear weapons for use against invading land or naval forces. Implicit in proposals of the latter sort was the idea that nuclear weapons could compensate for the relative insignificance of Australia's conventional forces. That the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia would be interpreted by the Americans as a challenge to their policy of nonproliferation has gone virtually unacknowledged by many supporters of an Australian bomb. Indeed some have argued that Australia could expect either the U.S. or the U.K. to provide it with warheads, nuclear delivery vehicles and staging facilities. It is indicative of the uninformed nature of much of the nuclear debate in Australia that some people should have seriously suggested that nuclear weapons could be obtained from abroad. Like the other nuclear weapons states, the United States and Britain have never supplied nuclear warheads to anyone and there is no reason to believe that they have ever considered making an exception in Australia's case. Nor is it at all likely that either power would be prepared to do so in the future. In addition to suggestions that such a capability could be obtained from overseas, it has been variously proposed that Australia should manufacture its own, build one in collaboration with neighbouring non-nuclear nations, or induce allied nations to station nuclear weapons on Australian territory.

It is hardly surprising that some uncertainty has existed

1. For a view which questions the military value of tactical nuclear weapons in situations such as these, see Bellany, *Australia in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 96–97.
about how Australia might acquire a nuclear force. Unlike India and Japan, Australia does not yet possess an extensive peaceful nuclear establishment, and consequently, is in no position to manufacture its own nuclear weapons within a reasonably short period of time. The fact that Australia lacks the wherewithal to immediately proceed with the manufacture of nuclear weapons has certainly not gone unnoticed. Many Australians, both those keen to see the country go nuclear and those simply anxious to see it purchase a military nuclear option, have urged the government to at least establish the reactors which would be necessary for any future weapons programme.

Three features of the support for nuclear weapons in Australia are worthy of special mention. In the first place, the initial agitation for an Australian nuclear force predated, by many years, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China. It was as long ago as 1955-57 that certain members of the Federal Parliament first recommended that Australia should acquire a nuclear force. The threats, against which it was alleged Australia needed nuclear weapons, usually went unspecified though occasionally Russia was mentioned as a distinct menace. It was argued then, as indeed it was later, that Australia could not depend in all circumstances on assistance from its allies. The development of nuclear weapons by China certainly provided more grist for the mill of those who have campaigned for an Australian nuclear force. But the actual dimensions of support for nuclear weapons in Australia were virtually unaffected by the Chinese achievement.

A second important feature of the support for nuclear weapons in Australia has been the almost total preoccupation with the security issue; there has been virtually no support for an Australian nuclear force on the grounds of prestige. That this

is so is hardly surprising in a country which harbours few, if any, aspirations to great power status. Moreover, there is little need in Australia, as there is in some countries, for some spectacular demonstration of national self-assertion, such as the development and testing of nuclear weapons, to unite and reassure the country.

Finally, it is important to note that there has been virtually no support for an Australian nuclear force either as a means to enable Canberra to break free of the American alliance altogether, or even, as a way of securing for Australia a greater say in American policy, especially nuclear policy, in Asia. Indeed, the most vocal advocates of an Australian nuclear capability - the D.L.P., certain right wing members of the Federal Parliament and, the R.S.L. - have all been strong supporters of the country's alliance with the United States and, generally speaking, have viewed the costs to Australia of this alliance as small in comparison with the benefits. However, many of these elements have nevertheless alleged that, in certain circumstances, the alliance could break down, and that consequently Australia should acquire its own nuclear force. Ideally, they would like to have the bomb and the American alliance too. What they appear to have overlooked, however, is that in view of the priority America has traditionally accorded the goal of nonproliferation, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia would almost certainly damage its relationship with the U.S.

1. It has been argued by some Australians that their country's alliance with the U.S., and in particular, the presence on Australian soil of American electronic and radar defence installations, (these will be described later in the chapter) serves to expose Australia to Soviet, and eventually, Chinese, nuclear attack. But though these people would like to see the alliance with the U.S. abandoned, they do not advocate that Australia should then acquire its own nuclear weapons.
But what of the Australian Government's attitude to nuclear weapons? It has already been noted that the post-war Labor government was responsible for launching Australia on the path of nuclear collaboration with Great Britain. These early efforts were climaxed by the establishment, in 1946, of the joint Australian-British guided missile range at Woomera. The new Liberal-Country Party coalition government under Mr. Menzies, which took office in 1949, was eager to continue this collaboration, and in 1952, agreed to allow Britain to carry out a series of atomic tests on Australian territory. From the start, the Menzies government seemed quite reluctant to denounce nuclear weapons outright. Indeed, there was a tendency for Canberra to eulogize what it saw as the special advantages of the atomic bomb as an aid in combating Communism. That nuclear weapons enabled the West to counter the overwhelming conventional forces of Russia and its allies, was a recurring theme in Australian statements on disarmament at this time.¹

However, despite Canberra's views about the value of nuclear weapons in combating Communism, especially Chinese Communism, the Australian Government was not anxious to develop a nuclear arsenal of its own; it seemed sufficient to rely upon the strength of Australia's powerful allies. The country's ties with London stretched back into Australia's past and, though shaken somewhat by Britain's inability to help defend Australia during World War II, were still strong. It was especially appreciated in Canberra that, after the war, the U.K. had re-established a strong military presence in the Malaya-Singapore area.² But Australia's security links with the United States

¹. The Australian Government's attitude to disarmament and arms control will be discussed at greater length later in the chapter.
². In 1955, Australian troops were sent to Malaya as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve.
were to prove much more important than those with Britain. In September 1951, Australia joined New Zealand and the U.S. in the A.N.Z.U.S. pact.\(^1\) Under Article V of this agreement, each party undertook to regard an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the other parties as dangerous to its own security and declared that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. This represented about as firm an undertaking of armed support as Australia could expect to get from the world's most powerful nation. In 1954, Australia extended its alliance ties with Washington when it joined Britain, France, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines and the U.S. in the formation of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (S.E.A.T.O.).

For about ten years after the end of the war, Canberra's twin-edged policy of nuclear abstention and dependence upon the nuclear power of its allies virtually went unchallenged. By the mid-1950s, however, there were some stirrings of support in Australia for a national nuclear force and, in 1957, mainly in response to this pressure, the Federal Government felt constrained to outline in some detail its reasons for restricting Australia's defence effort to conventional forces only. In a speech in September of that year\(^2\) the Prime Minister noted that it was "quite impossible from the point of view of the national economy to prepare simultaneously for every conceivable kind of war." Any attempt by Australia to build nuclear

---


2. For the text of the Prime Minister's speech, see *C.P.D.*, H of R., 19 September 1957, pp.795-798.
weapons, he added, would commit the country to "such prodigious expenditures as to involve either an intolerable total defence vote or a heavy degree of abandonment of non-nuclear elements". There were two reasons, the Prime Minister added, why Australia should not make this effort. In the first place, nuclear arms were unnecessary. In South East Asia, the area of greatest concern to Australia from a defence point of view, only limited wars were likely. Australia could best prepare for this type of conflict by strengthening its conventional forces. Secondly, it was in the interests of everyone that the possession of nuclear weapons should be limited to Britain, the United States and Russia. These countries, the Prime Minister argued, were "sufficiently informed about the deadly character of these weapons" and could be expected to act responsibly in matters of war and peace. Indeed, the possession of nuclear weapons by these powers was a deterrent "not only to prospective enemies but [also] to themselves". But were nuclear weapons to be acquired by a "number of other powers", he added, "the chances of irresponsible action with calamitous repercussions in the world would be materially increased." The strategic and tactical considerations then exercising the minds of Australia's policymakers were apparent in this speech by the Prime Minister. Because the three great powers were deterred from using nuclear weapons against each other, global war was considered most unlikely.¹ Moreover, as an ally of two of the great powers, Australia could feel confident of being protected from conventional or nuclear attacks of less than global dimensions. There was no need then for an Australian nuclear force. This reliance upon the nuclear power of its allies, especially that of the U.S., was clearly a major determinant of the Australian Government's

¹. This was made more explicit in a major speech by the Prime Minister in April 1957. See, C.N.L.A., Vol. 28, No. 4, April 1957, pp.319-322.
non-nuclear policy.

China's first nuclear test appears to have done little to diminish Canberra's faith in the credibility of its alliance with the United States. The Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Hasluck, did admit that the Chinese explosion was a "depressing" event and "might cause some disquiet." However, he stressed that what had been tested "was almost certainly a primitive nuclear device only, not an operational weapon." Western military capacity, Mr. Hasluck emphasised, would continue to be greatly in excess of that of Communist China. Indeed, it was his view that "defence commitments given to Communist China's neighbours would not be altered by anything Communist China had achieved or was likely to achieve in the nuclear field."¹

A feature of the Liberal-Country Party government's attitude to nuclear weapons has been its willingness to assist, where possible, in the development and maintenance of the Western nuclear deterrent. There was evidence of this in the cooperation extended to Britain in the 1950s during that country's nuclear test programme. But it has also been reflected in Canberra's willingness to permit the establishment, on Australian soil, of American electronic and radar defence installations. In May 1963, the Australian Government announced that the U.S. would establish a naval communications station at North West Cape in Western Australia.

The North West Cape installation,² which is under total U.S. control,³ was designed to improve communications with

---

2. The base at North West Cape was officially opened in September 1967 by the late Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Holt. Later it was renamed the Harold E. Holt Communications Station in his memory.
3. These were the terms of a memorandum accompanying the agreement which established the base. See, C.N.I.A., Vol. 34, No. 5, May 1963, p.7. For the text of the agreement see, ibid., pp.17-32.
American vessels cruising in the Indian Ocean and the South West Pacific. It is especially useful for transmitting target information and attack instructions to submerged Polaris submarines. Vessels of this type have been deployed in the Pacific since 1964 and the missiles they carry are presumably assigned to targets in China and the eastern part of the U.S.S.R. The installation at North West Cape is thus one of a number of facilities around the world which help maintain America's global nuclear deterrent. In December 1966, the U.S. was granted permission to establish another installation in Australia, this time at Pine Gap near Alice Springs in the Northern Territory. Canberra has refused to elaborate on the function of the facility at Pine Gap, other than to reveal that it is involved in "defence space research". It has been suggested by some observers, however, that current and planned activity at Pine Gap includes monitoring, detection and guidance operations intimately connected with America's defensive and offensive missile systems. Finally, in April

1. Other American installations of this type are at Cutler in Maine (U.S.A.) and in Ethiopia. Ian Bellany has suggested that the North West Cape base is now redundant because there are other methods already in use by the Americans to do the same job. See, "American Bases May Be Good For You," in The Bulletin (Sydney), 22 November 1969, p.53.

2. The Age, 12 December 1966. This installation became operational early in 1969.


1969, it was announced that Australia had agreed to the establishment by the U.S. of a "defence space communications" facility at Woomera in South Australia. The installations at North West Cape and Pine Gap, together with the one planned for Woomera, are the most important American facilities of their type in Australia. In addition to these, however, there are a number of other U.S. installations in Australia. Some of these are the responsibility of a civilian body, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (N.A.S.A.). Nevertheless, they are capable of performing military tasks. The importance of Australia in America's "defence-space" activity has been summed up by one Australian commentator in the following way:

4 contd. some of these assumptions about the use of Pine Gap and suggests that the installation seems more experimental than operational. Amongst the roles which he thinks Pine Gap may have are the following:
1) The provision of continuous contact between the U.S. and any object of military significance stationed more than 22,000 miles out into space. 2) The monitoring and possibly the manoeuvring of certain types of "spy" satellites. 3) Performance as a ground station for the early-warning satellite system the U.S. hopes to have operational by 1975. 4) An adjunct to American experiments designed to test the feasibility of placing A.B.M.s in orbit. See, Bellany, "American Bases May be Good for You," pp.53-55.

1. The Canberra Times, 24 April 1969. Speculation has it that the installation to be built at Woomera will most likely serve as a ground station for a new U.S. communications satellite which will be used for communications between the U.S. and American and allied forces on land or at sea in the Asian area. See, Robert Cooksey, in The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 May 1969; Jonathan Gaul in The Canberra Times, 29 April 1969; Peter Robinson in The Australian Financial Review, 24 April 1969; and, Bellany, "American Bases May be Good for You," p.54.

2. For a list of defence and scientific installations in Australia (current to September, 1969), either under joint control or under the sole control of another power, see, H.G. Gelber, Problems of Australian Defence, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1970, Appendix I, pp.287-292.
Outside the U.S. Australia is the largest centre for American aero-space operations. Because of its technical and logistic facilities, its political stability and external security, this country provides the most suitable piece of real estate for such operations in the southern-hemisphere.¹

In urging acceptance of the base at North West Cape, the Australian Government argued that the new facility would improve America's global deterrent capability and, in particular, its capacity to deter aggression in the Western Pacific region and South East Asia. This, it was urged, was undoubtedly in Australia's interests. Moreover, it was added, through its membership of A.N.Z.U.S., Australia was obliged to do whatever it could to assist the common defence effort.² This line of argument was repeated ad nauseam in government statements on the matter throughout the whole of 1963.³

In March of that year a new element was introduced into the controversy when the Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.) urged the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere.⁴ This proposal was loudly denounced by the government primarily on the grounds that the establishment of such a zone could interfere with the military plans of Australia's two major allies and, in particular, make it difficult for them to deploy nuclear weapons in the nation's defence. Much of the essence of the government position, both on the nuclear-free zone

4. For a useful analysis of this question, see, Albinski, loc. cit., pp.32-46.
issue in particular and nuclear weapons in general, is well illustrated in this extract from the Prime Minister's Federal Election Policy Speech of November, 1963:

Labour [the A.L.P.] proposes to negotiate a nuclear-free zone South of the Equator, with a prohibition of the storing or deployment of nuclear weapons in that area. This is a suicidal proposal. If adopted in the absence of a general world disarmament [sic.] which effectively included the Communist powers, it would certainly imperil the existence of both S.E.A.T.O. and A.N.Z.U.S. Great Britain and the U.S.A. are our allies in S.E.A.T.O., and the U.S.A. in A.N.Z.U.S. Each is a nuclear power. The capacity of the United States, in particular, to use nuclear weapons has successfully deterred the Communist aggressors in the past, and has thereby saved the free world. The Soviet Union has great nuclear power: we may be sure that Communist China will have it before long. Both are North of the Equator; but nowadays nuclear weapons could be delivered anywhere in the world. It follows that Labour's proposals, if successful, would seek to prevent our two nuclear-powered allies from firing nuclear weapons from any point South of the Equator, while leaving the Communists free to fire into this zone without resistance.¹

Throughout the debate over the A.L.P.'s proposal the Australian Government made much of America's opposition to the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the Asian and Pacific area: in June 1963,

an A.N.Z.U.S. communique claimed that the designation of the area as a nuclear-free zone would "not only be illusory but be positively dangerous, would disturb the existing strategic balance and would increase the risks of aggression."  

The debate about American defence installations in Australia flared up again in 1969 following allegations about the purpose of the base in Pine Gap and news of the decision to establish the facility at Woomera. Once again, the government defended its actions on the grounds that cooperation of this sort was a "valuable contribution to the defence of Australia, the U.S., and all free nations". Moreover, it was stressed, to help the U.S. in the matter of bases was to store up credit for the future. As the Minister for Defence, Mr. Fairhall, said in April 1969:

If we in this country find ourselves in the position of being able to make some contribution to ease America's burden in defending the free world and defending Australia under Anzus, and refuse to do so, where do we stand in the future if, having refused this facility, we seek some guarantee from the United States.

This was an obvious appeal to the "Lafayette syndrome" which Harry Gelber claims has been a marked feature of the relationship between American public opinion and foreign policy. That the

4. See H.G. Gelber, The Australian American Alliance, p.121. According to Dr. Gelber, "Americans never forgot the help given to George Washington by the French under young Lafayette." Similarly, America's modern allies would do well to display similar loyalty in order to secure American military assistance at some time in the future.
Australian Government had every intention of continuing this cooperation with the U.S. was made abundantly clear in the Prime Minister's Federal Election Policy Speech of October, 1969.1

It should be noted in passing, that it is not only in respect of bases and other such facilities that Canberra has been willing to assist the U.S. One of the most significant developments in post-war Australian foreign policy was the decision to deploy troops in Vietnam. There were a number of reasons for this decision, but undoubtedly, a major one, was the desire on Canberra's part to enhance Australia's standing as an ally in the eyes of the United States. The decision to commit Australian combat forces to Vietnam was announced in April, 1965. On that occasion, the Prime Minister Mr. Menzies noted, that:

The takeover of South Viet Nam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and South East Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.2

There is evidence here of one important reason for Australia's commitment to Vietnam, viz., the belief that what was happening in Indo-China constituted an indirect threat to Australia's security. But it seems reasonable to assume that Washington brought some pressure to bear upon Canberra as well and that Australia, as T.B. Millar has suggested, "did not resist for reasons of international security insurance."3 That Australia had responsibilities under A.N.Z.U.S. and S.E.A.T.O., and that in any case it was prudent to assist the U.S., were arguments which characterised the Australian Government's defence of its

3. ibid.
position in Vietnam from the very start.\textsuperscript{1}

The analysis so far suggests that the A.N.Z.U.S. pact has long been the cornerstone of Australia's defence policy. The alliance between the U.S. and Australia reflects the large degree of understanding between the two countries about developments in the world in general and Asia in particular. Canberra has been especially conscious of its dependence on the U.S. and has been anxious to display its worth as an ally. It has been especially concerned that the U.S. should maintain an effective presence in Asia. But it is also apparent that Canberra's alliance with the U.S. has been a major determinant of Australia's non-nuclear status. Australia has never exhibited that distaste for involvement in nuclear affairs which has been so typical of say, Japan. Rather, Canberra has tended to emphasise what it sees as the unique virtue of nuclear weapons in preserving world peace and safeguarding Australian security. But at the same time, the Australian Government has been unwilling to develop nuclear weapons of its own. Instead, it has chosen to depend on the American nuclear deterrent, the might and significance of which it readily acknowledges, and has willingly co-operated in the maintenance and extension of this capability.

But how have recent developments in United States policy towards Asia affected the Australian Government's thinking about relations with Washington? Canberra was slow to react to the announcement of the Nixon doctrine.\textsuperscript{2} (As recently as April 1971, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bury, chose to stress the alleged continuity of U.S. policy in Asia; he emphasised that America continued to regard itself as a "Pacific Power" with "deep permanent interests in the future of Asia" and that it


\textsuperscript{2} The Nixon doctrine and its significance for American non-proliferation policy in Asia will be discussed later in the thesis. See Chapter X.
would "continue to support the efforts of the nations of South-East Asia to maintain their freedom and security". Nevertheless, it is possible to detect in the actions and statements of the Australian Government during the last two or three years at least some element of concern and uncertainty about future American policy in Asia. About two months after President Johnson's historic speech of 31 March 1968, the Australian Prime Minister visited the U.S. with the declared intention of assessing "the fears, sometimes experienced and expressed in this and other countries, that the United States might lose interest in the area of South East Asia." One year later, Mr. Gorton again visited Washington; clarification of the new Republican Administration's views about America's alliance with Australia seems to have been a major purpose of the visit. On 10 March 1970, the Minister for Defence, Mr. 


2. In his speech, President Johnson ordered an almost complete halt to the bombing of North Vietnam; announced that the U.S. was prepared to commence negotiations in Paris with representatives of the North Vietnamese Government; and indicated that he would not be a candidate at the forthcoming presidential elections.

3. See, report by the Prime Minister on his visit to the U.S., in C.P.D., H of R., No. 9, 4 June 1968, p.1920.

4. See, report by the Prime Minister on his visit to the U.S., in C.P.D., H of R., No. 8, 15 May 1969, pp.1887-1892. On the basis of views exchanged during the visit, Mr. Gorton was able to report that, in his opinion, there were no longer any grounds for doubting the credibility of America's alliance with Australia.
Fraser, made what is probably the most considered statement yet by an Australian Government spokesman, about future U.S. policy in Asia. In his statement, Mr. Fraser said:

For twenty-five years the United States has carried the main burden of defence of the free world. Today it is a matter of public record that a re-appraisal is taking place of the manner in which American commitments might be discharged in the future. That re-appraisal focusses largely on Asia. The Nixon doctrine, first enunciated at Guam, is full of meaning for the countries to our north and to us. American help will be more readily forthcoming to those countries that help themselves; insurgency situations are expected to be contained - better still, prevented from developing - without U.S. combat manpower. It is to be expected that there will be some contraction of total U.S. forces and installations. However, the Americans have proclaimed that they will stand by their Treaty obligations. Two of these are of major concern to us - ANZUS and SEATO.1

Despite the ritualistic observance of continued U.S. support for A.N.Z.U.S. and S.E.A.T.O., it is not hard to detect in this statement of Mr. Fraser's a very real note of concern and uncertainty about future U.S. policy in Asia.

These comments about future U.S. policy in Asia were accompanied, in Mr. Fraser's statement, by references to Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean. Mr. Fraser noted how Soviet capabilities in the area had increased in recent years and how this was something Canberra could not afford to be disinterested in; Australia, he emphasised, must take account of Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean in planning its own

defence policies. This concern about Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean has continued to grow and amongst some government backbenchers has reached proportions of near hysteria. These considerations about Russia's movement into the Indian Ocean must be seen as reinforcing the uncertainties about the future security of the region which were already present in Australian minds as a result of the Nixon doctrine. Further compounding this situation has been the British Government's decision to withdraw most of its forces from the Malaysia-Singapore area by the end of 1971. This latter development

1. ibid., p.298. For statements on the question of Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean by other government spokesmen, see remarks by the Prime Minister, Mr McMahon, in C.P.D., H of R., No. 3, 19 March 1970, p.677; by the Navy Minister, Mr. Killen, in C.P.D., H of R., No. 8, 14 May 1970, p.2145; and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bury, reproduced in C.N.I.A., Vol. 42, No. 5, pp.279-280. Earlier, in August 1969, the then Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Freeth, in a statement in the Australian Parliament, indicated that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean was not necessarily contrary to Australia's interests. He also noted Russia's proposal for a system of collective security in Asia and revealed that contacts had been made between Canberra and Moscow 'on matters of bilateral interest ... and wider issues'. See, C.P.D., H of R., No. 11, 14 August 1969, pp.312-313. Mr. Freeth's speech was loudly condemned in some circles, especially by the Democratic Labor Party (D.L.P.). In the elections held in November 1969, Mr. Freeth lost his seat in Parliament. Since then the government has taken a noticeably tougher line on Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean.

2. Britain's intention to withdraw from the Malaysia-Singapore area was first announced in July 1967. It was then expected that the withdrawal would be completed by the mid-1970's, and that thereafter, Britain would maintain what was called a "special capability" in the area. In January 1968, however, the Wilson Labour government announced that the date of withdrawal would be advanced to the end of 1971, and that thereafter, only a few hundred troops under training in Malaysia would remain in the area. British troops were also to be withdrawn from the Persian Gulf area by the end of 1971. The British Conservative government, which was elected to office in 1970, has decided to maintain a small permanent British ground force (1000 men) in the Malaysian
promises to further erode the Western military presence in Asia and has contributed to official and unofficial concern in Australia about the future security of the region.

Discussion about present and future American policy in Asia has figured prominently in the writings of academic and other unofficial observers in Australia during the last three or four years. The general conclusion seems to be that the Nixon doctrine and concomitant developments herald a significant change in American policy and one which has important implications for Australia. So far as the more systematic analyses are concerned, the writer who has drawn the most far-reaching conclusions from current developments in U.S. policy has probably been Hedley Bull. He has argued that the Nixon doctrine amounts to "a policy of global retreat and withdrawal" and that what is involved is a change, not just in the means of American foreign policy, but in the ends as well. According to Bull:

It now seems likely that the United States, unconvinced that the global balance of power is at stake, will be prepared to allow aggression to succeed, and communism to expand,

2 (cont.) peninsula and to station a small naval force in the east of Suez area. However, these moves do not really amount to a reversal of the policy of military disengagement from the area. For a note on these developments, see Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, p. 82.


in Indochina and possibly in other areas of Asia and the Pacific, rather than intervene directly to prevent it.¹

Similar, though somewhat less extreme, views have been stated by other Australian writers. J.L. Richardson has characterised the problem as more a middle term rather than a long term one. He has warned that "domestic constraints [in the U.S.] could make for Korea-type miscalculations of American intentions." The inevitable crises (assuming America were to intervene in any future conflict in Asia), he has added, could well bring about an escalation of American disengagement from Asia as a whole. Public pressure in the U.S., he has urged, could also lead to American "diplomatic ineffectiveness."² Finally, of all the Australian writers, Richardson has emphasised most, what he claims, is the incompatibility between the Nixon doctrine and Australia's commitment to Malaysia and Singapore, or more particularly, Canberra's belief that in the event of any emergency arising out of this commitment, it could depend on American military support.³

¹ ibid., p.672. Another Australian writer who interprets current U.S. policies in far-reaching terms is B.A. Santamaria. See his "Into the Seventies", in Australian Outlook, Vol. 25, No. 2, August 1971, pp.115-131. Santamaria has argued that "the USA has fallen behind the USSR in the nuclear race". Should this disparity grow, he has added, the U.S. and its allies will be in no position to withstand Soviet pressure; the position has been aggravated by the growth of Soviet naval power and influence in the Indian Ocean. "The U.S.," according to Santamaria, "is on the retreat everywhere in Asia—from Indo-China to South Korea. Nixon's Vietnamisation programme may ultimately result in sheer 'scuttle'." See, ibid., pp.120-121.


³ ibid., pp.151-153. Canberra decided to retain Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdrawal from the area at the end of 1971. For the announcement of this decision, see statement on defence by the Prime Minister, Mr. John Gorton, on 25 February 1969. Reproduced in C.N.I.A., Vol. 40, No. 2, February 1969, pp.41-44. For
Harry Gelber, also, has pointed to what he sees as important changes in American policy in Asia: a reversion to an offshore policy; smaller U.S. responsibilities in the area; and greater self-reliance by local powers. However, Gelber has insisted that the Nixon Doctrine "is necessarily an exercise in ambiguity, designed to reflect a mood without needlessly narrowing operational possibilities." It remains unclear, he has concluded, just how far the U.S. withdrawal in 1967-70 "was a temporary phenomenon, associated with Vietnam war-weariness or how far it reflected, or would come to reflect, a permanent change in the U.S. view of the world."

It seems clear, then, that the changes in American foreign and defence policies of the last few years have already had an impact on official and unofficial Australian thinking. It has been generally acknowledged, that to a greater or lesser extent, America's presence in Asia in the future will be less conspicuous than it has been in the past. This has helped, however marginally, to undermine Australian confidence in the credibility of U.S. commitments. It would seem proper at this stage, to comment on the likely implications of these developments for Australia's nuclear weapons policy. But before doing so, it will be useful to look briefly at Canberra's record in the arms control field.

2. ibid., p.80.
3. ibid., p.84.
C. **Australia and Arms Control**

It was noted earlier, that ever since the Second World War, successive Australian Governments have been reluctant to condemn nuclear weapons outright, but instead, have tended to eulogise their role in preserving the security of Australia and its allies. This tendency has been evident in Canberra's arms control policy throughout most of the post-war era.

In the early 1950's, Australia was anxious to emphasise that it regarded disarmament as a single problem and thought it proper that both aspects, conventional and nuclear, should be dealt with together.\(^1\) Canberra was especially concerned that the Western powers should not be deceived by disarmament proposals "put forward for the purpose of gaining a strategic advantage."\(^2\) It repeatedly denounced the Soviet Union for its insistence on banning nuclear weapons before a programme of conventional disarmament had been put into effect.\(^3\) At meetings of the Disarmament Commission in 1957, Australia insisted that the prohibition of nuclear weapons under effective international control should go hand in hand with major reductions in conventional weapons and forces.\(^4\) It seems clear, that a major reason for Canberra's insistence on balanced disarmament (nuclear and non-nuclear) was its concern about China's conventional strength. In an address to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly in October 1957, the Australian representative said:

---

Australia is a country situated on the very edge of Asia, a part of the world where many countries' problems of national security are overshadowed by the disproportionate weight of Communist Chinese manpower. ... We have never considered it realistic in any disarmament plans to draw a sharp distinction between conventional forces and weapons on the one hand and nuclear weapons on the other. ... In particular, we in Australia feel that a disarmament agreement that did not impose suitable obligations upon Communist China would not be much use in our part of the world....

In April 1959, China proposed the establishment of an "area free of atomic weapons, ... throughout the whole of East Asia and the Pacific region". Nuclear-free zones had been discussed before, both in the U.N. and elsewhere. Usually, however, the idea had been considered in a European context. China's suggestion that such a zone should be established in the East Asian and Pacific region seems to have stimulated Canberra's thinking on the matter and, during the next few years, Australia clarified its position on the whole question of nuclear-free zones. Canberra's performance on this issue provides another insight into the evolution of the Australian Government's attitude to nuclear weapons in general.

1. ibid., pp.803-4.
2. Quoted in, Morton Halperin and Dwight Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control, New York: Praeger, 1965, p.100. China's original suggestion for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in East Asia and the Pacific region was widened in subsequent proposals so as to include all of China, the U.S., Russia and Japan. See, ibid., pp.100-101.
3. e.g., Walter Ulbricht's proposal for a Baltic "sea of peace" (1955); the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe first put forward by Poland's Foreign Minister Mr. Rapacki in 1957; and, a joint Soviet-Albanian proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the area of the Balkans and the Adriatic (1959). In 1958, a proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone in Asia was advanced rather tentatively by Mr. Nehru.
From the start, Canberra regarded most nuclear-free zone proposals with a great deal of suspicion. In 1961, Australia declined to support a resolution in the U.N. General Assembly seeking to establish such a zone in Africa, and in 1962, in a letter to the U.N. Secretary General, Canberra made it clear that it "seriously doubt[ed] the effectiveness of regional arrangements for the limitation of nuclear weapons in any area of the world". In 1963, and again in 1965, Australia modified its stand a little and actually supported U.N. resolutions relating to nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa respectively. However, Canberra acted on this occasion on the understanding that no precedent had been established for the creation of similar zones elsewhere and only after Australia's representative had reminded the U.N. that "the conditions which must exist before nuclear-free zones can be considered, do not yet exist in the area in which Australia is situated.”

1. In speaking to the resolution, the Australian representative expressed a number of reservations about the proposal. In particular, its failure to provide for sufficient consultation among the states in the region and the absence of any machinery for dealing with the problem of nuclear threats to African nations posed by states outside the area. See, C.N.I.A., Vol. 32, No. 11, November 1961, pp.37-39.


3. See, statement by Australian representative in First Committee of U.N. General Assembly. Reproduced in C.N.I.A., Vol. 34, No. 11, November 1963, pp.35-6. Australia's requirements for a nuclear-free zone were set out in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly in October, 1963. They were: 1) Unanimity (of the states included in the zone). 2) Balance (between nuclear and conventional disarmament in the zone). 3) Verification. 4) Absence within the zone of nuclear targets. See, ibid., Vol. 34, No. 10, October 1963, pp.57-60.
There seem to be two main reasons why Canberra has been so suspicious of proposals to establish nuclear-free zones in the Asian and Pacific region. In the first place, as was indicated above, Australia has never been entirely happy with measures designed to reduce the level of nuclear forces only: such an approach, it has been argued, tends to give the Communist powers a military advantage. Canberra has tended to regard this line of reasoning as especially relevant when speaking of that part of the world in which Australia is situated. During the 1963 session of the U.N. General Assembly, Australia's representative said:

... We believe that the prohibition of nuclear weapons in this [Asian and Pacific] area would create a serious imbalance on account of the enormous manpower resources and the capacity of [sic] conventional warfare of at least one power [presumably China] in this region.¹

In the second place, Canberra has been especially concerned that the designation of the Asian and Pacific region as a nuclear-free zone could interfere with the military plans of its two major allies and, in particular, could make it difficult for them to deploy nuclear weapons in Australia's defence. (It was noted above, that this was the argument used by the Federal Government to attack the Australian Labor Party's proposal in 1963 for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere.) That Australia recognised the "right of the nuclear Powers to conclude agreements for the stationing of their nuclear weapons wherever military necessity require[d]," was made clear in 1962, in Canberra's note to the U.N. Secretary General.²

¹ See, statement by Australian representative. Reproduced in ibid., p.59.
² See, Reply to Secretary-General, p.55.
In contrast to the scepticism with which it regarded most nuclear-free zone proposals, Canberra exhibited wholehearted enthusiasm for the nuclear test ban treaty. Indeed, Australia was one of the first nations to accede to the agreement when it was opened for signature in August 1963.

The Australian Government advanced four main reasons for signing the test ban treaty, viz., that the agreement would reduce contamination of the atmosphere; impose a restraint on the armaments race; open up the way for additional disarmament measures; and, create an atmosphere amenable to better East-West relations.\(^1\) There seems to be no reason to doubt the sincerity of Canberra's publicly stated explanation of its support for the test ban. At the same time, it is useful to remember that signature of the agreement was not difficult to reconcile with many of Australia's long standing attitudes to arms control and nuclear weapons in general. For one thing, the test ban promised to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, an objective which Canberra had long supported. Also, it in no way hindered the capacity of Australia's two major allies to deploy nuclear weapons in the country's defence.

One of the distinguishing features of Australian policy in the arms control field has been its close identification with British and American views. Until very recently, this was especially true in respect of the question of nuclear proliferation. Since the mid-1950's, by which time Britain, Russia and America had all acquired nuclear weapons of their own, Canberra has registered strong opposition

to further nuclear spread. Indeed, it was this reluctance to see nuclear weapons acquired by additional states which, in 1957, the Prime Minister cited as a major reason for Australia restricting its defence effort to conventional forces. Generally, the reasons advanced by Australia for opposing the spread of nuclear weapons have closely resembled those enunciated by its two nuclear allies, especially the U.S. In particular, Australian spokesmen have argued that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries would increase the chances of irresponsible action and hence the likelihood of war. Also, arms control measures would be made more difficult, both to devise and to implement. Finally, Canberra has argued that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would entail the diversion of resources from developmental work, something which is to be regretted everywhere, but especially, in underdeveloped countries. Nevertheless, in regard to the N.P.T., which in recent years has been the most important manifestation of British, American and Soviet concern about proliferation, Australia adopted a somewhat unco-operative stance. In the U.N. and elsewhere, Canberra raised a number of objections to the N.P.T. Moreover, it delayed signing the agreement and has given no indication as to when it might ratify it. It will be useful to examine just why Australia acted in this manner.

The Australian Government harboured four main reservations about the N.P.T. First, it questioned the effectiveness of the treaty as a means of preventing proliferation.

1. See above, p.209.
In a statement to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly in May 1968, Australia declared that in order to be effective the treaty would require the support of "well beyond" 40 states, and that these would need to include the world's many near-nuclear powers. In July of the following year a government minister drew attention to the fact that two nuclear and many near-nuclear states had still not signed. The government, he added, "really [didn't] believe that this treaty [was] likely to be effective."

Second, Canberra was undoubtedly concerned about the implications of the N.P.T. for the country's long term security. There were traces of this concern in the Australian delegate's speech to the U.N. in May 1968, and the issue became more prominent in subsequent government statements. Mr. Fairbairn, the Minister for National Development, appears to have been especially preoccupied with this matter; in July 1969 he complained that signature of the N.P.T. would commit future...

2. In particular, France, China, Japan, West Germany, India, Argentina, Israel and Pakistan. See, speech by Mr. D. Fairbairn, Minister for National Development, before a Liberal Party meeting in Melbourne on 13 July 1969 (hereafter referred to as Fairbairn Statement), p.9. Text of Mr. Fairbairn's speech supplied by courtesy of Dr. I. Bellany, Australian National University, Canberra.
3. Ibid.
Australian Governments "for all time" to refrain from producing nuclear weapons. It must be emphasised, however, that nobody in the government seems to have thought Australia needed to produce nuclear weapons in the near future. The lack of enthusiasm for the N.P.T., at this time, seems to have been more a reflection of the uneasiness in the cabinet and elsewhere about Australia's future security: after all, the enunciation of the Nixon doctrine and Britain's "East of Suez" decision were, for reasons indicated earlier in this chapter, developments of the greatest significance to the Australian Government and were bound to have some impact on Canberra's attitude to the N.P.T. As Hedley Bull has suggested:

In a period in which Australia's confidence in her United States and British allies had received some setbacks, the renunciation of an independent nuclear capability did not seem an attractive course, and appeals by her allies to support the treaty they had sponsored found a less ready response than they might have done in earlier years.

Third, Australia was unhappy with the inspection provisions of the N.P.T. It complained in particular about the vagueness of the safeguards agreements which signatories were obliged to negotiate with the I.A.E.A. and even alleged that international inspection would expose Australia to the danger of communist espionage. Canberra was

1. Fairbairn Statement, p.10. The suggestion that Australian Governments would be committed "for all time" is quite misleading. The "escape clause" (Article X) in the N.P.T. authorises states to withdraw at their own discretion if they judge that their "supreme interests" require it.
2. In 1957, Mr. Gorton favoured the development of an Australian nuclear force but it is not clear that he still does.
5. Fairbairn Statement, pp.9-10.
especially concerned that the inspection system should not "impede or burden nuclear research, development, production or use for peaceful purposes." It objected especially to the application of safeguards to legitimate bona fide activities in the mining and early processing stages of nuclear raw material production and insisted on the legitimacy, under the treaty, of the use of nuclear energy for non-explosive military purposes, such as naval propulsion. ¹

Fourth, Australia was dissatisfied with the peaceful uses provisions of the N.P.T. In particular, it was sceptical about how parties to the treaty in a position to do so intended to meet their obligations to assist other states in furthering the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In addition, it insisted that Australia, a country with "a low rainfall, a poorly indented coastline and little topographical relief" had a special interest in the possible use of nuclear explosions for major engineering projects. Consequently, Canberra believed that all parties to the treaty should have access to nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes and that any international arrangements necessary for the implementation of the peaceful explosives clause of the treaty should "go no further than to provide appropriate assurances on safety and an adequate demonstration that the explosions [would] not be used for nuclear weapons development." ²

The latter two reservations about the inspection and peaceful uses provisions of the N.P.T. figured most often in official Australian statements on the agreement. But these objections, which were largely of a commercial nature, hardly seem substantial enough in Australia's case to account

for its delay in signing the treaty. Unlike other near-nuclear states such as West Germany and Japan, Australia is, and indeed promises to remain for some time, a relatively unimportant competitor in the civilian nuclear field.\(^1\) In any case, Canberra appears to have been unduly suspicious about the impact of the N.P.T. on the nation's civilian nuclear programme.\(^2\) Australia is not necessarily obliged to accept I.A.E.A. inspectors from Communist countries; the treaty is unlikely to restrict the use of power and desalination reactors or limit future research and development projects; and, there is ample provision in the N.P.T. for access to any possible benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions.\(^3\) It seems reasonable to conclude then, that these commercial reservations did not reflect Canberra's real reason for opposing the N.P.T. Australia was probably most concerned about the N.P.T. for security reasons, but so as not to detract from its alliance with the U.S., it chose to attack the treaty on commercial grounds.

Canberra's procrastination over the N.P.T. was aided by the lack of widespread enthusiasm for the agreement within Australia. Admittedly, the Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.), the major opposition party in the Australian Parliament,

---

1. It now seems unlikely that Australia's first nuclear power station could be operating before 1975. By then, West Germany is expected to have 16 reactors and Japan 17. See, Australian Atomic Energy Commission, *Seventeenth Annual Report, 1968-69*, p.15.


3. Under Article V of the N.P.T., parties to the treaty undertake "to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures" to non-nuclear signatories.
gave the treaty its blessing. The N.P.T., Labor argued, was a necessary first step towards nuclear disarmament and a cardinal objective of American policy. Consequently, in the interests of both world peace and continued good relations with the U.S., Australia should sign the treaty and encourage other states in the Asian and Pacific area to do likewise.  

Also, it seems that the Australian people generally were favourably disposed towards the N.P.T.; a Gallup Poll published in October 1969 indicated a substantial majority in favour of signing.  

But this is hardly evidence of a groundswell of support for the treaty. Indeed, there were few signs of real enthusiasm for the N.P.T. in Australia, and the A.L.P.'s effort to make signature of the agreement an issue in the 1969 Federal Election campaign fell rather flat. 

Though there were few real champions of the N.P.T. in Australia, there were many strong opponents of the agreement. At least one government minister was reluctant to see Australia sign;  

so too were some Liberal-Country Party 


2. The question asked in the poll and the results are as follows: 

"We should sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or we should make our own nuclear weapons?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sign treaty</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make weapons</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "On the Nuclear Threshold," p.25. The writer of this tract has emphasised that the above question is open to the criticism that it does not allow for the possibility of doing neither, or of formulating conditions for signature. 

3. Mr. Fairbairn, Minister for National Development.
backbenchers. Moreover, the Democratic Labor Party (D.L.P.), one of the nation's minority parties, was a particularly outspoken critic of the N.P.T. as was one prominent and influential member of the Australian scientific community.¹

But foremost amongst the N.P.T.'s detractors was the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (A.A.E.C.). This body seems to have strongly influenced Canberra's stand on the N.P.T.² It continually questioned aspects of the safeguards, peaceful uses and amendments provisions of the treaty and exhibited a brusque disregard for the broader political issues.

In February 1970, Canberra signed the N.P.T.³ However, it indicated that before ratifying the agreement it would seek further clarification of the I.A.E.A. safeguards system and would want assurances that the treaty had received a sufficient degree of support from other countries.⁴ It is reasonable to assume, though, that Australia's reluctance to ratify the N.P.T. had less to do with these matters, and more, with lingering doubts in Australian Government circles about the implications of the treaty for the nation's long-run security. The decision to sign the N.P.T. was somewhat

1. Professor E.W. Titterton (Director, Research School of Physical Sciences, Australian National University), denounced the N.P.T. as "a worthless bit of paper". See his article in The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 July 1969.
2. This seems to have been the consensus of journalists who have commented on the question. See, "On the Nuclear Threshold," p.28. For details of the A.A.E.C.'s objections to the N.P.T., see, Australian Atomic Energy Commission, Sixteenth Annual Report, June 1968, pp.84-90. From a reading of these objections it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Canberra's stand on the N.P.T. has been strongly influenced by the A.A.E.C.'s attitude.
4. ibid., p.71.
of a departure from the trend of previous government policy on the issue and requires some explanation.

There seem to be three obvious explanations for Australia's decision to sign. First, Canberra was undoubtedly influenced by the similar and earlier decisions of West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and especially Japan. Australia had always insisted that, in addition to other assurances, it would require evidence of widespread support for the treaty before signing. When these important non-nuclear states, some of which had previously raised objections to the N.P.T. similar to Australia's, decided to sign, Canberra's position was somewhat undermined. That Australia continues to insist that the treaty has attracted insufficient support is a reflection of its desire to preserve a reason for not ratifying.

Second, it is reasonable to suppose that Australia's decision was also motivated by a realisation of its dependence on foreign nuclear technology, at least in the short run. It has already been noted that Australia's first nuclear power station will be foreign built. The short-listed tenderers for the project include firms from Canada, Britain, West Germany and the United States - all countries which have signed the N.P.T. There is, of course, nothing in the treaty which forbids a signatory from assisting the peaceful nuclear efforts of a non-signatory. However, Canberra must surely have realised that the countries concerned would have been under considerable political pressure not to assist Australia if it remained a non-signatory of the N.P.T. Indeed there had already been criticism in the U.S. of proposals to provide Australia with peaceful nuclear explosive services while it

1. All of these countries signed the N.P.T. between November 1969 and February 1970. Indonesia's signature on 3 March, just four days after Australia's, seems more than just a coincidence.
remained outside the N.P.T.¹

But probably the most important reason for Australia's signature had to do with the fundamental strategic and political issues implicit in the treaty. The N.P.T., after all, promised to reinforce a structure of world order in which the U.S. (and Russia) enjoyed a position of relative predominance and a capacity to regulate crisis situations. In view of its professed stake in the maintenance of the international status quo (unlike say, India, Australia has not evinced any real interest in a re-ordering of the international political system) and, in particular, its close identification with the U.S., Australia, in the final analysis, would have found it difficult to adopt a wholly antagonistic attitude to the N.P.T.

To conclude. Throughout most of the post-war period, successive Australian Governments have tended to regard nuclear weapons as a uniquely significant contribution to Western security. At the same time Canberra has not manufactured nuclear weapons of its own, but has chosen instead to rely on the nuclear might of its allies, especially the U.S. Whether Australia will continue to eschew the production of nuclear weapons would seem to depend primarily on the nature of its future relations with Washington. Already, the policies of the Nixon Administration have precipitated some uneasiness in Canberra about the future American position in Asia; this development seems to have been a factor in Australia's hesitation to sign the N.P.T. and, probably also, in its continued reluctance to ratify

that agreement. Clearly, the creation of an Australian nuclear force is a less unthinkable prospect now than it was in the past. Should confidence, in Australia, in the credibility of the nation's alliance with the U.S. be further and substantially eroded, the pressure on Canberra to abandon its non-nuclear stance would become very great indeed.
PART III

AMERICAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN ASIA

1964-1971
CHAPTER VII

NONPROLIFERATION AND SOME ASPECTS OF THE
UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE
NUCLEAR FORCE, 1964 - 1967

China exploded its first atomic device in October 1964. Between then, and December 1967, Peking conducted six additional nuclear test explosions; these included the successful test of a nuclear armed missile, and that of a thermo-nuclear device in the megaton range.\(^1\) China's entry into the nuclear club was, without doubt, a highly significant development so far as Washington was concerned. For one thing, Peking's achievement was regarded as a serious challenge to America's long-standing opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons; it was widely believed in the U.S., that China's possession of nuclear weapons would significantly increase the possibility of further proliferation, especially in Asia.\(^2\) In a major statement, just two days after Peking's

---

1. For a more detailed discussion of the Chinese nuclear programme, see above, Chapter III.
2. See, Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control, New York: Praeger, 1965, p.72. This book, which was prepared as a report to A.C.D.A., was based on the proceedings of a conference of top scholars and specialists in Chinese affairs and arms control which was held in Virginia in 1964 under the auspices of the East Asian Research Center and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. Earlier, Henry Kissinger also, had expressed the view that China's acquisition of nuclear weapons might push other states in Asia in the same direction. See, Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, Garden City, New York: Double-day, 1962, p.262.
the time in the U.S. Congress. Also, it is worth noting in this context, that the Gilpatric Committee, one function of which was to evaluate the relative importance of American nonproliferation policies, was convened by President Johnson only weeks after China's first nuclear test.

But, of course, the stimulus that China's entry into the nuclear club was expected to give to further proliferation in Asia was not the only cause for concern about the matter in Washington. The U.S. and China were, after all, the bitterest of opponents. In the past, the U.S. had regretted decisions by France and the U.K. to acquire nuclear weapons. Regret that China was about to follow suit must have been so much greater. Moreover, Peking's initial achievements in the nuclear field were registered during a period of particularly grave concern in the West about China's future policies in Asia and in the world in general. In September 1965, China's Defence Minister, Lin Piao, published his controversial treatise on "people's wars." This was regarded by many senior officials in Washington as a particularly clear indication of Peking's plans, not only to dominate the underdeveloped world (the "countryside"), but to subvert the developed nations (the "cities") as well. Moreover, the

1. For a particularly strong statement along these lines, see speech in the U.S. Senate by Senator Robert Kennedy. Reproduced in The New York Times, 24 June 1965.
2. For a note on the Gilpatric Committee and some of the circumstances surrounding its establishment, see above, pp.33-34.
3. That the U.S. Administration attached particular significance to Lin Piao's treatise was apparent in 1966 in an analysis of the international situation by Defence Secretary McNamara. He said: "This statement [by Lin Piao] should be read by every American concerned with the political aims of Communist China. It is, to quote Secretary Rusk, 'as candid as Hitler's
years 1965-67 witnessed a gradual deepening of the crisis in Vietnam and, in the early stages of that conflict at least, Washington tended to regard China as the inspiration, even the guiding hand, behind North Vietnam and the Vietcong. Also, China's early achievements in the nuclear weapons field coincided with the deepening rift between Moscow and Peking. What impressed (and disturbed) many U.S. observers about the Sino-Soviet dialogue at this time, was Peking's vitriolic denunciation of Russia's alleged sympathy for detente with the West. To many Americans, this seemed like further evidence of Chinese intransigence and aggressive intent. Finally, these were also the years of the "Great Cultural Revolution" which commenced late in 1965 and continued beyond 1967. Throughout much of this period there were civil disturbances and armed clashes in many parts of China and serious damage was done to the country's industrial, educational and governmental structures. These internal disruptions were accompanied by a marked deterioration in China's relations with the rest of the world. To many foreign observers, the whole episode seemed to betray an element of recklessness and irrationality which, in view of China's nuclear aspirations, was regarded as especially disturbing.

1. For some remarks on this by Defence Secretary McNamara, see ibid., pp.13 and 19.
2. Donald Brennan has drawn attention to the flurry of concern in the U.S. early in 1967 over unsubstantiated reports that the military commander of Sinkiang Province in China had threatened to seize the nuclear base there if Maoists attempted to take over the provincial government. See, D.G. Brennan, "The Risks of Spreading Weapons: A Historical Case," in Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. 1, 1968, p.60.
There was ample reason, then, why Peking's effort to acquire a nuclear force should have been regarded in Washington as a more than usually significant development. Earlier in this thesis, there was some discussion of the progress China has made in the development of its nuclear armoury and of the possible uses to which that force might be put. In the present chapter, an attempt will be made to examine a number of aspects of the United States response to the emergence of the Chinese nuclear force and the significance of these developments for American nonproliferation policy in Asia. Chronologically, this chapter covers the period from, roughly, October 1964 to September 1967. Thereafter, America's response, declaratory and otherwise, to the Chinese nuclear force, tended to be dominated by the decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence system. This decision marked the commencement of a new stage in America's response to the Chinese nuclear force and must remain the subject of analysis in another chapter.

In considering its response to the emergence of the Chinese nuclear force, the United States was confronted with two basic choices: either it could adhere to its policy of opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, or alternatively, it could abandon proliferation as an objective in Asia and encourage, or at least tolerate, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some of China's neighbours. So far as can be discovered, no prominent member of the U.S. Administration was prepared to openly support a policy of "selective proliferation" in Asia as an answer to the challenge posed
by China's entry into the nuclear club. It seems reasonable to conclude, though, that there were nevertheless some American officials who were anxious that the U.S. should weigh carefully the costs of a policy aimed at limiting proliferation in Asia. It was noted earlier in this thesis, that so far as American

1. Later, in 1968, when the final draft of the N.P.T. was being considered by Congress, some elements outside of the administration expressed support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, in one form or another, by some of the countries in Asia. The states mentioned in this context included India, Japan, Pakistan, Australia and Thailand. It was usually suggested that "defensive" nuclear weapons (A.B.M.s) rather than offensive systems be acquired. Invariably, it was argued that such a development would improve the security position of the countries concerned, enhance stability in the region, and relieve America of some of its defence commitments. For an account of these arguments see statements by Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe, Hon. Craig Hosmer, and Dr. Edward Teller in Nonproliferation Treaty, hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 10-12 and 17, 1968, Washington, 1968 (hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings on Nonproliferation Treaty, Part 1, 1968), pp.133, 163 and 193 respectively. See also, statements by Dr. James McBride, Hon. Craig Hosmer, Hon. Paul Findley, Congressman Donald Fraser and Dr. Edward Teller, in Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968, hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 1, 5-8, 19, 20, 1968, Washington, 1968 (hereafter referred to as House Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968), pp.39, 99, (132, 119), 77 and 274-8 respectively. In July 1965, A.C.D.A. Director Foster strongly criticised the idea that selected countries in Asia should acquire nuclear weapons to offset potential Chinese threats. See his "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," pp.590-591. The attention paid to the question by Mr. Foster suggests that the concept of "selective proliferation" had more than a few supporters in the U.S. at that time.
relations with Europe have been concerned, efforts to limit proliferation have often caused problems for Washington in respect of other aims of United States policy. For this and other reasons, the policy of nonproliferation has not always had the wholehearted support of all members of the U.S. Government. Later in the thesis, it will be noted that similar problems have arisen in respect of American policy in Asia; despite the administration's commitment to a policy of opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, it seems clear that some U.S. officials have been reluctant, in view of other U.S. policy objectives, to see the American Government take certain steps which might help limit proliferation in the Asian and Pacific region.

It is hardly surprising, of course, that the American Government chose to maintain, in respect of Asia, its strong opposition to proliferation. After all, the arguments the U.S. had used against the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe were just as valid in Asia. These were: that the countries in question had no need of nuclear weapons; that they could not afford them (this seemed particularly valid in respect of Asia); that the spread of nuclear weapons to one country would encourage further proliferation; and, that proliferation would complicate U.S. military action, and in particular, would hamper the central control of war. ¹

¹ Some of these arguments were considered at the conference (see above, p.239) in 1964 on Chinese affairs and arms control. There was a consensus amongst the conference that proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia was no answer to the security problems posed by China's acquisition of nuclear weapons. See, Halperin and Perkins, op. cit., pp.72-73. For a particularly strong statement of the case against "selective proliferation" in Asia, see testimony of Professor Mason Willrich, in Senate Hearings on Nonproliferation Treaty, Part 1, 1968, pp.213-219.
From the moment of the first Chinese test, Washington seemed anxious to promote the idea that the U.S. would not regard as militarily significant any nuclear force that Peking was likely to develop in the foreseeable future. To this end, the U.S. Government reminded China (and the other states of Asia and the Pacific) that the development of nuclear weapons by Peking would in no way reduce America's willingness or capacity to support its friends and allies in Asia against aggression. Alliance commitments were quickly reaffirmed and a unilateral undertaking of support against nuclear blackmail was extended to countries in Asia (and elsewhere) which remained non-nuclear. In addition, there was considerable stress in U.S. pronouncements on America's overwhelming strategic superiority in respect of China. In his statement on the day of Peking's first nuclear test, President Johnson emphasised that the military significance of the Chinese achievement "should not be overestimated." He continued:

Many years and great efforts separate testing of a first nuclear device from having a stock-pile of reliable weapons with effective delivery systems.

Still more basic is the fact that if and when the Chinese Communists develop nuclear weapons systems, free-world nuclear strength will continue to be enormously greater.2

The theme of overwhelming U.S. strategic preponderance was one which recurred again and again in official and unofficial

1. The question of American alliance commitments and other assurances to countries in Asia, and the significance of these measures for U.S. nonproliferation policy in the region, will be examined in some detail in Chapter IX.
American pronouncements during 1964 and 1965. Moreover, it was one which President Johnson himself returned to in October 1966 following China's successful nuclear missile test. As the President said on that occasion: "The leaders of China must realize that any nuclear capability they can develop can—and will—be deterred."2

The question of America's strategic standing viz-a-viz., China received particularly exhaustive treatment, in 1967, in Secretary McNamara's 1968 defence posture statement.3 McNamara noted that though China had successfully tested a missile the previous October, it would still require much time and many more tests before Peking could achieve a truly operational M.R.B.M. or I.R.B.M. capability.4 China, he added, was clearly giving "high priority" to the development of an I.C.B.M., but it was unlikely, he thought, that Peking would pose a nuclear threat to the continental U.S. before the mid-1970's.5 The emphasis throughout McNamara's statement, was on the ease


4. ibid., p.42.

5. ibid.
with which the U.S. could deter China. As the Defence Secretary said:

We estimate, ... that a relatively small number of warheads detonated over 50 Chinese urban centers would destroy half of the urban population (more than 50 million people) and more than half of the industrial capacity. Moreover, such an attack would also destroy most of the key governmental, technical, and managerial personnel and a large proportion of the skilled workers. Since Red China's capacity to attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons will be very limited, even during the 1970's, the ability of even a small portion of our strategic offensive forces to inflict such heavy damage upon them should serve as an effective deterrent to the deliberate initiation of such an attack on their part.¹

Indeed, such was the margin of superiority enjoyed by the U.S.

that, according to McNamara:

"... the [U.S.] strategic missile forces proposed for the FY 1968-72 period would, by themselves, give us an Assured Destruction capability against both the Soviet Union and Red China, simultaneously.²

These efforts on the part of the U.S. to downgrade the military significance of China's emergence as a nuclear power, were reinforced by efforts to persuade Peking that danger and insecurity for China would accompany its development of a nuclear force; as President Johnson observed on the day of China's first nuclear test, Peking's "crude nuclear device... could only increase the sense of insecurity of the Chinese people."³ This line of argument was used repeatedly by U.S. Government spokesmen during the next two or three years. In January 1965, just three months after the first

1. ibid., p.39.
2. ibid., p.44.
Chinese test, A.C.D.A. Director, W.C. Foster, warned that states which chose to acquire nuclear weapons put themselves at grave risk; such choices, he emphasised, "increased the threat ... of nuclear attack by other nations with nuclear capabilities."1 That same year, Assistant Secretary of State, William Bundy, warned that though China might acquire a "token" nuclear force it would "remain highly vulnerable ... for many years to come."2 In October 1966, in the wake of China's successful nuclear missile test, President Johnson again warned that Peking's pursuit of a national nuclear capability "invite[d] danger to China itself."3

These official statements were supplemented by a rash of unofficial pronouncements which also sought to promote the idea of increased risk and insecurity for China as a result of its acquisition of nuclear weapons. Shortly after Peking's first atomic test, Morton Halperin urged, that:

The Chinese must be made to realise ... that their development of a nuclear capability will increase rather than decrease the likelihood of the United States using nuclear weapons against them.4

The question of whether the U.S. should try to halt China's nuclear programme by military force, he added, was one which should be given "careful detailed consideration at

---

the highest level of government."¹ The same year, Charles Wolf argued that Peking's acquisition of nuclear weapons could have the effect of "lowering the threshold of provocation at which use of nuclear weapons against China would be effective and credible."² There were three reasons, he alleged, for this: the stimulus China's nuclear status would give to further erosion of the Soviet nuclear umbrella; the prospect, because of Chinese acquisition, of reduced antagonism, both inside and outside Asia, at the possibility of a second use of nuclear weapons against targets in Asia; and "the incentive to pre-empt against a small and vulnerable force that might otherwise be employed with damaging local military effects".³ In 1966, Klaus Knorr ventured the opinion that "it [was] possible ... that Communist China increased its military vulnerability to the United States when it exploded its first [nuclear] bomb".⁴ Similarly, George Quester argued that China had "become more logically a target for disabling or 'counter-force' operations by the United States".⁵ (The question of "assertive disarmament" or the forcible elimination of China's nuclear facilities was still an issue in 1968, and that year, was the subject of a detailed piece of analysis by two members of the Stanford Research Institute.⁶)

¹ ibid., p.127.
³ ibid., pp.190-191.
American attempts to encourage the feeling in Peking that danger and insecurity for China had accompanied its acquisition of nuclear weapons were reinforced by Washington's verbal pronouncements about the state of relations between Moscow and Peking. From the time the Sino-Soviet rift became public, and especially, after China commenced nuclear testing, official U.S. statements highlighted the split between Russia and China and, in particular, sought to promote the idea that Peking's acquisition of nuclear weapons had exacerbated the rift and had reduced the likelihood of Soviet support for China in any conflict with the U.S.\(^1\)

There is insufficient evidence to enable one to say conclusively that the U.S. ever seriously considered an unprovoked attack upon China's nuclear facilities.\textsuperscript{1} If such an idea ever was considered, there must surely have been many reasons for its rejection: the virtual certainty that such an attack could not permanently prevent China from becoming a nuclear power; uncertainty about Russia's response (U.S. pronouncements about the implications of the Sino-Soviet split notwithstanding); the effect of such action on America's image as an advocate for international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes; and the awkward and unpleasant precedent which such a move would create.\textsuperscript{2} Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that any American Administration would consider the spread of nuclear weapons, even to a country so antagonistic to the U.S. as China, as sufficient justification for so radical a departure from American traditions.

\textsuperscript{1} The columnist Stewart Alsop has alleged that at the time of the completion of the test ban agreement, in June 1963, President Kennedy considered inviting the Soviet Union to co-operate with the U.S. in an effort to bar China's development of nuclear weapons. See Stewart Alsop, "Affairs of State: The Real Meaning of the Test Ban", in \textit{Saturday Evening Post}, 28 September 1963, p.20. Another source suggests that President Johnson, probably towards the end of 1964, presided over top-secret meetings that "war-gamed" the probable results of a pre-emptive strike against China's nuclear installations. "Invariably," the report continued, "preemptive attack was decisively rejected." See, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, \textit{Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power}, London: Allen and Unwin, 1967, p.538.

\textsuperscript{2} Some of these objections were considered in the report by Lawrence and Van Cleave. See, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.13-23. See also, Halperin, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.125-127. For another examination of the disadvantages of such action, see Morton A. Kaplan, "Weaknesses of the Nonproliferation Treaty" in \textit{Orbis}, Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 1969, pp.1043-1045.
as an attack upon another state simply to stem the growth of its power. Whether or not the U.S. did actually consider an unprovoked attack upon China's nuclear facilities, its pronouncements in this period certainly conveyed the impression that Peking's pursuit of a nuclear force had reduced the constraints on American recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of any conflict between China and the United States. It is not a purpose of this thesis to closely examine China's reactions to U.S. policy. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that Peking was indeed impressed by the threats implicit in these American pronouncements. That China clearly acknowledged its high vulnerability to U.S. nuclear attack was emphasised, in 1967, by one of America's leading experts on Chinese military affairs. Furthermore, there would seem to be some force in Halperin's argument, that China's insistence that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons must be seen as part of its campaign to minimize the chances of an American pre-emptive attack.

The analysis so far in this chapter suggests that the American response to China's emerging nuclear capability was primarily one of attempting to downgrade the military significance of that force. Not only did Washington try to promote the idea that China's nuclear capability was a relatively insignificant one, and would in no way alter America's resolve to meet its security commitments in Asia,

but in addition, an attempt was made to persuade Peking that the acquisition of a nuclear force attracted dangers to China. It will be argued that these efforts on the part of the United States to downgrade the military significance of the Chinese nuclear force were thoroughly consistent with the goal of nonproliferation in Asia. But before doing so, it will be useful to consider the American response to Peking's emerging nuclear capability from a somewhat different angle.

In hearings before the J.C.A.E. in 1966, Secretary of Defence McNamara discussed what he believed were the essential features of an effective nonproliferation policy. Such a policy, he said:

... must [among other things] not permit the acquisition of nuclear weapons or a nuclear test to increase the prestige, political influence and power of a nation above and beyond the influence it is due because of its political and economic position.¹

There is ample evidence to suggest that in the years immediately following China's first test explosion, U.S. officials were indeed anxious to minimize the political, as well as the military, advantages which China might have hoped to gain from its achievements in the nuclear field.

In the first place, Peking's initial steps along the nuclear road were accompanied by official U.S. statements which sought to detract from the magnitude of the Chinese accomplishment. A.C.D.A. Director W.C. Foster scoffed that the success of China's nuclear programme was "in large measure due to the very substantial assistance provided by

the Soviet Union during the 1950's". 1 This depreciation of the Chinese achievement was usually accompanied by words of praise for Indian and Japanese efforts in the nuclear field. India in particular, it was stressed, was much more advanced than China in peaceful nuclear technology, but had very wisely refrained from developing nuclear weapons. 2 These tactics were clearly designed to rob China of some of the kudos it might otherwise have hoped to gain from its nuclear achievements and to help compensate for the inevitable loss of prestige in non-nuclear countries in Asia such as India and Japan. Second, U.S. spokesmen sought to emphasise that the development of nuclear weapons was a costly and cruel experience for the Chinese people. As President Johnson said on the day of Peking's first test:

The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program is a tragedy for the Chinese people ... Scarce economic resources that could have been used to improve the well-being of the Chinese people have been used to produce a crude nuclear device... 3

In March 1966, Secretary of Defence McNamara remarked that

2. See, remarks during press conference by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; Reproduced in D on D., 1964, p.441. See also, remarks by A.C.D.A. Director W.C. Foster in his address before the Commonwealth Club. Reproduced in D on D., 1965, p.238.
China was developing nuclear weapons "at a time when millions of her people [were] starving". He added:

In order to develop these instruments of war, she [China] is skimming off the top of her income, removing this from the people who need it to live ... she is doing it not only in terms of financial resources but in terms of human resources because it is the same people who are developing those weapons that could be developing the foundation for an expanding food production in that nation.\(^1\)

In addition to detracting somewhat from Peking's achievement, this line of reasoning, to the extent that it emphasised the costs and sacrifices involved in the Chinese nuclear programme, seemed to be also aimed at deterring other states in Asia from developing nuclear weapons.

Yet another variation of Washington's response to the emerging Chinese nuclear force was evident in the pronouncement by President Johnson on the day China conducted its first nuclear test. In that statement, the President declared that the United States joined with "all humanity in regretting the contamination of the atmosphere caused by the Chinese Communist test".\(^2\) Three days later, A.C.D.A. Director W.C. Foster inferred that China's test had isolated that country "from an overwhelming majority of the nations of the world".\(^3\) In May of the following year, Foster condemned China for its "total disregard of the test-ban treaty to which more than 100 countries [had] adhered".\(^4\) A statement issued by the

---

Department of State after China's third nuclear test in May 1966, said:

The United States Government continued to deplore the disregard of the Chinese Communist leaders for the desires and well-being of people throughout the world who may suffer from the ill-effects of atmospheric nuclear testing, which most of the world has banned by adherence to the limited test ban treaty.¹

The object of these tactics was clear. By the time China commenced its nuclear test program, an overwhelming majority of the world's nations had registered their disapproval of atmospheric nuclear testing through their support of the nuclear test-ban treaty.² Washington's aim was to draw attention to China's contempt for world, and especially Asian, opinion and thus rob Peking of some of the political advantages it might have otherwise hoped to have gained from its nuclear achievements.

It is not clear that Washington's efforts in this regard were very fruitful. In much of the non-European world, disgust with China's contamination of the atmosphere may have been over-shadowed by a sense of satisfaction that the European nuclear monopoly had at last been broken. As Ali Mazrui has pointed out:

... that explosion from China in 1964 had a proud hopefulness for many in Asia and Africa - the sort of hopefulness and the sort of pride not very different from those which accompanied Japan's victory over Russia more than half a century earlier.³

---

2. The U.S., Britain, Russia and 104 other states had signed the test-ban treaty. The signatories included all the non-communist states of Asia except Cambodia.
Moreover, as Ralph Powell has shown, China's nuclear success resulted in considerable support, not only in Asia and Africa, but in Europe as well, for Peking's participation in disarmament discussions and its admission to the United Nations.¹

It would seem reasonable in this discussion of America's response to the Chinese nuclear force to take into account Washington's attitude, in the period presently under review, towards Peking's membership of the United Nations. Less than one month after China's first test explosion, the U.S. Government reaffirmed its opposition to Peking's membership of the world body.² The following year, U.S. spokesmen in the General Assembly elaborated at some length on Washington's reasons for its stand on the matter. To allow the Chinese in, it was claimed, "would be seen by Peiping as a reward for its international misbehaviour".³ Washington clearly implied that it regarded China's testing and development of nuclear weapons as an example of this "international misbehaviour"; there were repeated references in the U.S. statements, both to China's opposition to the test-ban treaty and the proposed nonproliferation treaty, and to Peking's view that the development of nuclear weapons by socialist states was something to be desired.⁴ Such attitudes, U.S. spokesmen alleged, were contrary to the views of an over-

¹ See, Ralph L. Powell, "China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reaction", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, July 1965, pp.622-623. On this point, see also, Halperin, op. cit., p.94.
⁴ ibid., p.943.
whelming majority of the world's nations and ran counter to "the most important activities the United Nations undertakes." It is difficult to determine the precise significance of the nuclear factor in Washington's opposition to Chinese membership of the U.N. Apart from the references mentioned above, U.S. statements on the subject were far from explicit in suggesting that the development of nuclear weapons constituted grounds for China's exclusion from the world body; but then clearly, it would have been extremely difficult for a power like the U.S. to have argued openly that such action did constitute grounds for exclusion. But regardless of the many and varied reasons for Washington's attitude to Chinese membership of the U.N., the policy itself seems to have been consistent with the goal of nonproliferation in Asia (and elsewhere). Notwithstanding the support which existed in some capitals for Peking's membership of the world body, to have admitted China at this time would have seemed like rewarding that country for its nuclear achievements and may have reinforced the suspicions of states elsewhere that the means to great-power status lay in the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

It has been argued in this chapter, that in their comments during 1964-67 on China's emerging nuclear force, U.S. officials sought to minimize the military and political significance of that capability. Clearly, this declaratory policy was thoroughly consistent with the goal of nonproliferation in Asia. Though there was virtually no reason to

1. ibid.
2. The whole question of Chinese membership of the U.N. at this time was, in many respects, a hypothetical one. During 1964 and 1965 especially, Peking exhibited marked hostility to the world body and it is unlikely that it would have accepted any invitation to join.
believe that China could be diverted in this way from its attempt to build nuclear weapons, it was nevertheless reasonable to hope that such a policy could perhaps reduce Peking's expectations about what it could hope to gain from the possession of a nuclear force. This in turn, it might have been reasonably argued, could reduce the value Peking placed on such a capability and lessen the urgency to develop one. But the policy of promoting the idea that the Chinese nuclear force was a relatively insignificant one was just as important from the point of view of its impact on potential nuclear powers in Asia such as India, Japan and Australia. Were such a policy to be effective, it could be expected to reduce pressures for proliferation in these countries in two ways: by affecting (downwards) perceptions about the threat posed by the Chinese force itself; and by reducing expectations about what they, like China, could hope to gain from the possession of independent nuclear capabilities.

With the announcement, in September 1967, of the decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence system, U.S. pronouncements about the Chinese nuclear force assumed a somewhat different character from those examined in the present chapter. The new approach was of major significance from the point of view of American nonproliferation policy and will be examined in the next chapter.
In September 1967, the American Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, announced that the United States intended to deploy a "light" antiballistic missile (A.B.M.) system called Sentinel. The programme announced by Mr. McNamara was designed to provide what was called "area" defence of the whole of the U.S. against the sort of missile attack that China was expected to be able to launch during the second half of the 1970's. Less than two years later, in March 1969, the new Nixon Administration announced details of a revised A.B.M. system called Safeguard. The new programme was designed primarily to protect America's land based retaliatory forces against Soviet attack. However, it was also intended that Safeguard should eventually be able to protect U.S. cities from China. Both the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations argued that the deployment of an A.B.M. system in the United States would, among other things, help to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia; the knowledge that American cities would not be vulnerable to Chinese attack would, it was alleged, enhance the credibility of U.S. guarantees and assurances in Asia and hence discourage the development there of independent nuclear forces.

In this chapter, an attempt will be made to assess the Sentinel and Safeguard programmes from the point of view of American nonproliferation policy in Asia. It will be argued
that America's movement into the A.B.M. field was not primarily motivated by concern about China or the problem of nuclear spread in Asia. Indeed, the whole exercise detracted from efforts to limit proliferation and seemed to indicate that the goal of nonproliferation in Asia, far from what was suggested in the previous chapter, enjoyed only a low priority relative to other U.S. policy objectives.

A. The Sentinel and Safeguard Programmes

Research and development on a weapon capable of intercepting incoming I.C.B.M.s commenced in the U.S. in the mid-1950s. By 1966, a series of technological breakthroughs had opened up the possibility of an effective weapon and the Joint Chiefs, supported by a number of congressmen, were of the opinion that the time was right to deploy. Later that year it was revealed that an A.B.M. system had been built around Moscow. This disclosure, along with evidence of a continued build-up in Russia's I.C.B.M. force, greatly


increased the pressure on the U.S. Administration to deploy an A.B.M. system. But this it was reluctant to do. Members of the government, especially Secretary of Defence McNamara, were of the opinion that any response to the Soviet initiative should be limited to moves aimed at maintaining America's assured destruction capability. A.C.D.A. Director Foster was also of the opinion that continued reliance on deterrence ("associated with a cutback and a freeze") was the most appropriate response to the Soviet challenge. There seemed to be a clear desire, if possible, to avoid a new round in the strategic arms race. Consequently Washington's initial reaction was to accelerate efforts to ensure the penetration capability of American I.C.B.M.s and to call for a halt in the deployment of the Soviet A.B.M. and the development of its American counterpart. But by mid-1967 opposition to the government's stand had increased. Congressmen and military spokesmen critical of the administration's reluctance to deploy an A.B.M. system had now been joined by Republican Party organizers anxious to make the missile controversy an issue in the following year's Presidential election.

4. McNamara made it clear, that in his view, the Soviet Union would react to a U.S. antiballistic missile deployment by increasing its own offensive nuclear forces. See, 1968 Defence Posture Statement, p.46.
5. Lapp, op. cit., p.48.
At long last, the administration bowed to this pressure and on 18 September 1967, Mr. McNamara announced America's decision to deploy a "light" A.B.M. system called Sentinel.¹

The programme announced by Mr. McNamara called for the immediate establishment throughout the U.S. of from 15-20 Spartan missile batteries. These batteries were to provide what was called an "area" defence of the whole of the U.S. Provision was also made for the eventual installation of Sprint missiles to protect both the Sentinel system's radars and some of America's Minuteman I.C.B.M.s. The whole system was scheduled to cost 5 billion dollars and was expected to be fully operational by 1972-3.² The main reason advanced by Washington for the deployment of Sentinel was the alleged need to counter China's potential missile threat. In addition to this, it was claimed that Sentinel would help protect both America's Minuteman force from Soviet attack, and the nation's cities from an accidental missile launching by any one of the nuclear powers. In emphasising that Sentinel was primarily China-oriented, the Administration reminded the American people that China was expected to have a "modest" I.C.B.M. force by the mid-1970s. Such a force, it was alleged, would be capable of inflicting great damage on the American continent; but, by deploying Sentinel, the U.S. would have a good chance of reducing to zero the number

¹ The text of Mr. McNamara's announcement (hereafter referred to as McNamara's A.B.M. Statement) is reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program, 1967, pp.105-113.

² See, statement on Sentinel A.B.M. system issued by the Department of the Army, November 15, 1967. Reproduced in ibid., pp.135-136. For an exhaustive description of the proposed Sentinel system, see testimony by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., in ibid., pp.8-44.
of casualties it could expect from any attack by China during the 1970s.¹

The anti-China rationale came as a surprise to many observers, and, according to one writer on the subject, was received with "down-right disbelief on Capitol Hill".² There had, of course, been some discussion in unofficial circles about the usefulness of ballistic missile defence against China,³ and McNamara himself had often considered such an option.⁴ (He had just as often rejected such a move as unnecessary.)⁵ However, discussion in the U.S. about A.B.M. deployment had more often been linked to calculations about the Soviet threat to America's cities and retaliatory forces;⁶

2. Lapp, op. cit., p.50.
5. Early in 1968, McNamara said:
   It is not clear that we need an ABM defence against China. In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S. ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not be made now. Source: ibid.
6. For example, see W.W. Rostow, "The Great Transition : Tasks of the First and Second Postwar Generations", the Sir
there can be little doubt that the Sentinel decision was motivated by concern about the U.S.S.R. rather than about China. But why, then, did McNamara justify the decision in terms of the alleged threat from China? It would be going beyond the scope of the present thesis to examine this question in detail. However, it is the view of most observers, that McNamara's espousal of the China rationale was simply an attempt to curb domestic pressure for a "thick" anti-Soviet system and to "give the Soviets an excuse against reaction if they would take it." But the fact remains that the decision to deploy


1. The decision to deploy against China, was announced at the end of a long speech which was devoted primarily to Soviet-U.S. strategic relations, and in which McNamara argued persuasively against the deployment of any A.B.M. system at all. See McNamara's A.B.M. Statement. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United States Antibalistic Missile Program, 1967, pp.105-113.

Sentinel was publicly linked to the alleged Chinese threat, and it is this factor, among other things, which makes the move so important from the point of view of U.S. nonproliferation policy in Asia.

In January 1969, the Republicans under President Nixon assumed office, and for a while, the new government seemed prepared to continue work on the Sentinel programme. But by now the latter had run into trouble. There had been considerable opposition to the scheme from people living in cities close to where Sentinel sites were to be installed.\(^1\) In addition, criticism of the programme on strategic and political grounds had increased. All this stimulated debate on the A.B.M. and produced demands in Congress for the postponement of construction pending a full review of cost, safety and diplomatic factors.\(^2\) On 6 February 1969, the new Secretary of Defence, Mr. Laird, suspended work on the Sentinel sites. About a month later, on 14 March, Mr. Nixon announced details of a revised A.B.M. programme. The new scheme was to be called Safeguard and would utilize components scheduled for the discarded Sentinel system. Deployment of the new system was to proceed according to a phased programme. During the first phase, Safeguard sites were to be installed to protect Minuteman fields in Montana and North Dakota. Depending upon the results of annual assessments of the Soviet and Chinese threats, additional Safeguard sites were to be established throughout the country to provide protection for other missile and bomber bases and for the national command centre in Washington. The full Safeguard system (12 batteries) would provide area defence of the whole of the U.S. against the sort of attack China

\(^1\) Lapp, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
was expected to be able to launch during the 1970s. \(^1\) The complete system was scheduled to be operational by 1976-7 and was expected to cost 6-7 billion dollars. \(^2\) Senate approval of President Nixon's Safeguard programme was granted in August 1969 but by the slim majority of 51 to 49 \(^3\) and only after a prolonged and acrimonious debate, not just about the Safeguard system, but about national security and strategic deterrence generally. \(^4\)

Unlike its predecessor, the Nixon Administration made no effort to conceal the anti-Soviet aspects of its A.B.M. plan. Government spokesmen openly admitted that their major concern was Russia's growing missile strength. This, it was alleged, had increased dramatically since the decision, 18 months earlier, to deploy Sentinel. \(^5\) Indeed, Secretary of Defence Laird argued that the Soviets appeared bent on acquiring a first-strike capability vis-a-vis, the United States. \(^6\) Fear of an increasing Soviet threat to America's retaliatory forces clearly dictated the structure of the Safeguard plan; thus, in its initial phases, the scheme

---

4. For a detailed account of this debate, see ibid., pp. 57-89.
provided for protection of America's Minuteman missile sites and strategic bomber bases.

But though Safeguard was to be deployed primarily because of the alleged Soviet threat, the Nixon Administration also intended that the system should protect American cities from China. It seems, indeed, that the new government's assessment of the Chinese "threat" differed little from that of its predecessor. China, it was alleged, would have a "significant" nuclear capability by 1973 or 1974. According to President Nixon, this development would render American diplomacy in the Pacific "not credible", unless of course, the U.S. could defend its cities against a Chinese attack. And that, he added, was precisely what Safeguard was expected to do. That Safeguard would provide close to a damage denial capability against China was reaffirmed by the Deputy Secretary of Defence, Mr. Packard. Indeed, it is apparent that the full Safeguard system was scheduled to provide virtually the same level of "area defence" of the U.S. as had been planned for in the discarded Sentinel system.

Early in 1970, the administration requested funds for the commencement, in the 1970-71 Fiscal Year, of the second phase of the Safeguard programme. This was to provide for

1. Mr. Nixon also noted that Safeguard would protect the U.S. "against any irrational or accidental attack". See, D.O.S.B., 31 March 1969, p.275.
5. See, testimony of Defence Secretary Laird, in ibid., p.181.
the deployment of one additional Safeguard site at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri; the deployment of additional Sprint missiles at the two Safeguard sites previously scheduled; and advanced preparation work for five new Safeguard sites. In urging acceptance of the fiscal year 1971 programme, the administration drew attention, once again, to the need for some counter to the Soviet threat to America's land-based strategic forces. At the same time, the China rationale was stressed as vigorously, if not more so, than previously. Defence Secretary Laird again raised the spectre of "the potential Chinese threat to a portion of our population" and emphasised that the administration's current A.B.M. proposals maintained the option to move towards a full 12-site Safeguard deployment which "would provide substantial area defense of the U.S. population for a number of years against Communist Chinese or nth country attack". President Nixon, in a statement outlining the administration's latest A.B.M. proposals dwelt almost exclusively on the Chinese factor. The administration encountered strong opposition in Congress to its request for additional funds and the planned expansion of the Safeguard system was substantially curtailed. By July 1971, the U.S. Government had commenced

2. See remarks by Defence Secretary Laird, in ibid., p.319.
3. ibid., p.320.
4. ibid., p.320.
work on three Safeguard sites and had requested funds for a fourth.¹

Spokesmen for both the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations were insistent that the deployment of a ballistic missile defence system in the U.S. could be of tremendous assistance in helping to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia. This point was noted by McNamara in September 1967 when he revealed plans for the deployment of Sentinel;² it was later elaborated upon in an address in Detroit by Mr. Paul Warnke, an Assistant Secretary of Defence.³ Mr. Warnke admitted that there had been some speculation in Asia as to whether, when Chinese I.C.B.M.s were targeted on American cities, the U.S. would renegue on its commitments in Asia: whether, in other words, the "United States would really be willing to risk Detroit to save a small Asian nation."⁴ The decision to deploy Sentinel, Mr. Warnke emphasised, would counter these doubts. As he put it:

In deploying this system, we seek to emphasise the present unique disparity in strategic nuclear capability and technology between the U.S. and China and to extend well into the future the credibility of our option for a nuclear response.

⁴ ibid., p.121.
Our deployment will substantially reduce the Chinese Communist capability to threaten American cities and should leave, neither Asia in general nor the Chinese in particular, with any uncertainty as to whether or not the United States would act to prevent the Chinese from gaining any political or military advantage from their nuclear forces.

The implications of this for nonproliferation in Asia were, according to Mr. Warnke, clear to see:

The increased credibility of the United States deterrent, which we expect to result from our deployment [of Sentinel], should make even clearer the lack of any need for independent national nuclear forces in Asia. If any country in the area has been tempted to develop a nuclear capability because of a fear that we would cease to deter China, our actions should have removed these uncertainties.

Similar claims were made on behalf of the Nixon Administration's Safeguard system. In hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations in 1969, Defence Secretary Laird, said:

It [Safeguard] would provide an additional indication to the people of Asia that we intended to support them against nuclear blackmail from China, and thus help to convince the nonnuclear countries that acquisition of their own nuclear weapons is not required for their security.

1. ibid.
2. ibid., p.122.
The following year, Laird told the House Appropriations Committee, that:

President Nixon has assured our Asian allies that our nuclear shield extends to them. The credibility of that shield would be greatly enhanced if our Asian allies knew that because of a SAFE-GUARD defense the Chinese Communists had virtually no prospect of blackmailing the United States by threatening American cities.1

President Nixon emphasised that the U.S. had to have some kind of defence against the sort of nuclear capability China was likely to have in ten years time. This way, he argued:

... nuclear blackmail could not be used against the United States or against those nations like the Philippines with which the United States is allied in the Pacific, not to mention Japan.2

It is not at all clear, however, that the decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence system in the U.S. was consistent with the goal of nonproliferation in Asia. In the first place, it could be argued that America's interest in A.B.M. systems served to draw attention to yet another way in which nuclear weapons might be used, thus adding to their perceived value in the eyes of potential nuclear states in Asia (and elsewhere). More particularly, America's movement into the A.B.M. field seemed inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the

1. House Hearings on Department of Defence Appropriations for 1971, p.185. The reference in Mr. Laird's statement to the "nuclear shield" refers to undertakings made in the context of the Nixon doctrine. The latter question will be examined in Chapter X.
proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty\(^1\) and was consequently poorly calculated to persuade non-nuclear states to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards that agreement. (The announcement of the Sentinel decision on 18 September 1967, just three weeks after Russia and the U.S. had tabled their separate but identical drafts of a nonproliferation treaty, was a particularly poor piece of timing.) This was an especially important consideration in respect of Asia, where India in particular, but Japan also, had long insisted on the need for limitations to the build-up of super-power armouries ("vertical proliferation") as well as measures to counter the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional

\(^1\) A declaration of intention "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race" was written into the Preamble to the Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 24, 1967. The draft of January 18, 1968, which, with minor amendments, became the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, contained Article VI, which read:

> Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

countries ("horizontal proliferation"). That the decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence system would make it more difficult for non-nuclear states to accept the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty, was a view which was quite openly voiced by W.W. Rostow, Special Assistant to President Johnson.

But perhaps more important than the A.B.M. decision as such, was the manner of its justification. The decision to deploy Sentinel raised an important question about American strategic thinking, viz., why the notion of deterrence, which had hitherto operated in the context of Soviet-U.S. strategic relations, was considered inappropriate in respect of China. In answer, Secretary of Defence McNamara spelt out at some length the essence of the Johnson Administration's thinking on the matter. He said:

1. For a reference to the Indian and Japanese positions on this question, see above, pp.139-141, and 172-173 respectively. The Indian Government denounced the A.B.M. decision as a further illustration of superpower indifference about the problem of "vertical proliferation" and warned that it would retard progress towards a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. See, statement by Mr. Husain, leader of India's delegation to the E.N.D.C., before a meeting of that committee, on February 27, 1968. Reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Vol. 15, No. 2, February 1968, p.35. See also, statement by Mr. Husain before the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on May 14, 1968. Reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1968, p.115. Also, statement by Mr. Husain before the Plenary Meeting of the Conference of Non-nuclear-weapon States, Geneva, September 12, 1968. Reproduced in ibid., Vol. 15, No. 9, September 1968, p.200.

276

Why can we deter the Soviets and be confident of it, and not deter the Red Chinese who have a lesser force than the Soviets? The answer is that the Soviets, in effect, have an invulnerable or substantially invulnerable, force; whereas the Chinese in the mid-1970's will have a vulnerable force. The reaction of a party with a small vulnerable force during a period of tension and crisis is likely to be quite different than the reaction [sic.] of a party with a strong invulnerable force [deleted].

This is what we would fear of the Chinese, that in a period of tension - and we have had some recently, and we are likely to have more in the years ahead - they, seeing this huge U.S. force facing them and recognizing that they have but a small highly vulnerable force subject to complete destruction if we were to use but a small part of ours, might be tempted to launch a preemptive strike.¹

McNamara did not suggest that the Chinese leaders were inherently reckless or irrational. Indeed, spokesmen for the Johnson Administration were insistent that China's leaders were just as cautious as those of other nuclear states.² Instead, the emphasis was on what could have


2. See especially, ibid., pp.120-121.
been called "technical irresponsibility" - the idea that because China's first generation of I.C.B.M.'s would be highly vulnerable, there would be a premium, in any period of crisis, on a pre-emptive Chinese attack upon the U.S.

By arguing in this manner, spokesmen for the Johnson Administration were calling into question the whole concept of deterrence, at least in respect of China. They were clearly implying that China was an infinitely more dangerous opponent than Russia. This, it seems reasonable to argue, was hardly calculated to inspire confidence in the minds of America's friends and allies in Asia; it was totally inconsistent with U.S. efforts since October 1964 to minimize the military significance of the Chinese nuclear force\(^1\) and, if anything, stimulated, rather than weakened, the pressures for proliferation in India and Japan.\(^2\) It seems reasonable to conclude that it was considerations such as these that contributed to A.C.D.A.'s opposition to the Sentinel programme.\(^3\) In February 1967,

1. Some of these efforts were discussed in the previous chapter.
2. It has already been noted that discussion in the U.S. about ballistic missile defence, even prior to the Sentinel decision of September 1967, appears to have stimulated interest in A.B.M.'s in Japan. See above, p.183. For more recent evidence of this, see Kawata Tadashi, "Economic Implications of Nuclear Armament," in *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 2, April-June 1968, p.184. Tadashi argued, in effect, that if A.B.M.'s were as useful in an anti-China role as Washington claimed, then some of China's neighbours might want them too. In Delhi, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses argued that if the United States, powerful and all as it was, still needed additional protection against China, then India was not likely to feel confident about foreign guarantees of protection. See, Shelton L. Williams, *The U.S., India, and the Bomb*, Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, p.70.
3. That A.C.D.A. had opposed the Sentinel decision, was made clear in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1968. See testimony by A.C.D.A. Director, Foster, in *Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendment, 1968*, hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 19, 1968, Washington, 1968, pp.7-8.
A.C.D.A. Director Foster had warned that the deployment of a Chinese oriented A.B.M. system would encourage India to take a more serious view of China's nuclear capability. Even Defence Secretary McNamara, the chief spokesman for the administration's A.B.M. programme, is reported to have said in May 1967, that the deployment in the U.S. of a Chinese oriented ballistic missile system would encourage India to want one too. The decision to deploy an A.B.M. system, it seems, not only detracted, in many ways, from efforts to limit proliferation in Asia, but in addition, was a source of disagreement within the ranks of the U.S. Administration.

But if the Johnson Administration was guilty of magnifying the military significance of the Chinese nuclear force, and therefore, of hampering efforts to limit proliferation in Asia, the Nixon Administration, and especially its Defence Secretary, Mr. Laird, was even more so. It has already been noted, that though the Nixon Administration's Safeguard system was primarily Soviet orientated, it was nevertheless partially justified in terms of the alleged Chinese threat. In arguing its usefulness in this regard, Laird upgraded the Chinese threat much more than spokesmen for the previous administration had done. Almost as soon as he assumed office in February 1969, the new Defence Secretary claimed that the Chinese nuclear threat was more serious than he had previously imagined. Laird now believed that

1. See, Foster's testimony in Senate Hearings on United States Armament and Disarmament Problems, 1967, p.27. Given the nature of this particular reservation, he is not likely to have changed his mind on the matter prior to the decision in September to deploy.
China would "fire a test ICBM within the next 18 months" and would "have the capability by 1975 of having from 20 to 30 ICBM launch missiles available that could hit the United States of America".\(^1\) In hearings later that year before the House Committee on Appropriations, Laird claimed that "by the latter part of the decade of the 1970's, the Chinese [could] have the capability of destroying tens of millions of people ... in the United States with a force of less than 100 ICBM's".\(^2\) To meet this Chinese threat, the Defence Secretary argued, the U.S. had no alternative other than the deployment of an A.B.M. system; to rely, as it did in respect of the Soviet threat, on the deterrent power of U.S. strategic forces would, he alleged, be highly dangerous.

To support his argument, Laird produced the following set of figures:\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>30-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>50-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>65-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>80-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>85-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ibid.
3. ibid., p.15.
On the basis of these figures, the Defence Secretary arrived at two important conclusions concerning America's strategic relationship with China. In the first place, he argued, it would be infinitely more difficult to deter China than Russia. As he put it:

..., the thousand largest Chinese cities contain considerably less than the one-third, one-fourth, or one-fifth of the population Mr. McNamara has postulated at various times as the level required for "Assured Destruction" against the Soviet Union.¹

It followed, Laird later added, that:

We [the U.S.] can destroy the Soviet Union even in a second strike, ... The population and industry [of the U.S.S.R.] ... are concentrated in a relatively few urban areas. That is not the case in mainland China.²

This argument of Laird's ran counter to McNamara's earlier claim that China could be effectively deterred by virtue of America's capacity to detonate a relatively small number of warheads over 50 Chinese urban centres (such an attack, McNamara had argued, would destroy half of China's urban population and more than half of its industry, as well as most of the country's key government officials and a large majority of its scientific, technical and skilled workers).³ In answer to this, Laird pointed out that in a time of crisis, China's key government officials and even its skilled workers could be evacuated from the cities.⁴ Moreover, as he argued on another occasion:

1. ibid.
2. ibid., p.58.
3. See above, p. 248.
... China is predominately a rural society where the great majority of the people live off the land and are dependent only to a limited extent on urban industry for their survival. Furthermore, as Mao Tse-tung is reported to have said, China with its high population (now estimated at 800 million) could survive (i.e., as a people but not as a 20th century nation) even with a loss of hundreds of millions from a nuclear attack. And we know from past experience that the Asian Communists are tenacious opponents and are willing to take great losses of life in achieving their objectives. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that our ability to deter Communist China with our strategic offensive forces is considerably less certain than in the case of the Soviet Union.¹

The picture Laird drew of the alleged Chinese threat was considerably more menacing than that presented by his predecessor. The image of a reckless and irrational China willing to sacrifice millions of its citizens was frightening to say the least and, generally speaking, was one which had been avoided by McNamara and other senior spokesmen for the Johnson Administration. Moreover, by emphasising the demographic factor, Laird drew attention to something infinitely more basic in its connotation than the issue of "technical irresponsibility" alluded to by McNamara. After all, though China's first generation of I.C.B.M.'s might well be vulnerable to a U.S. (or Soviet) first strike, later generations will probably not be. China, like Russia and the United States before it, should eventually acquire an effective second-strike capability, and this should reduce considerably the danger that its nuclear forces might be used in a pre-emptive role. On the other hand, though, China seems likely to remain a country where "the great majority of people live

¹. Quoted in House Hearings on Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, 1969, pp.15-16. See also, the remarks of General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in ibid., p.58. Wheeler shared Laird's view that China was a particularly difficult opponent to deter. According to Wheeler, "they [the Chinese] do not have as much to lose as the Soviets or as we [the U.S.] have to lose."
off the land" for a long while yet. Hence, to the extent that Secretary Laird has alleged that this fact constitutes a major difficulty in deterring China, he has drawn attention to an issue of very long-term significance.

The second conclusion Laird derived from his figures concerned the relative utility of the Chinese and U.S. forces vis-a-vis, each other. The Defence Secretary argued that, in contrast to China, the American population was concentrated in a relatively few large cities. Consequently, he urged, "they [the Chinese] could inflict on us a proportionately greater number of fatalities in a small attack than we could inflict on them in a very large attack".1 Or, as he put it on another occasion:

They can do proportionately as much damage to us with a relatively few missiles as we can do to them with a relatively large number of missiles.2

Effective deterrence of Peking, the Defence Secretary implied, would require that the U.S. be prepared to unload "most or all of [its] Minuteman missiles against China",3 and this, he warned, would leave the U.S. "relatively naked as far as the Soviet threat is concerned".4 Again, this served to undermine another impression that McNamara had sought to foster, viz., that China could be deterred with a minimum of interference to America's anti-Soviet deterrent. (McNamara claimed in 1967 that the strategic forces scheduled for FY 1968-72 would provide the U.S. with an "assured destruction" capability in respect of Russia and China simultaneously.)5

3. ibid., p.59. See also, p.16.
4. ibid., p.59.
5. See above, p.248.
Since about late 1969, much of the discussion in the U.S. about ballistic missile defence, has taken place against the background of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.) between the United States and the Soviet Union. Agreement by the two superpowers to hold talks on limiting strategic armaments was arrived at in 1968. However, the talks were postponed following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of that year. In June 1969, the new American Administration proposed to the Soviet Union that preliminary talks on strategic arms limitations should begin by the end of July. The first round of talks was eventually held in Helsinki from November 17 to December 22, 1969. Up until July 1971, four subsequent rounds had been held in Vienna and Helsinki alternatively. The initial session at S.A.L.T. was devoted to an exploration of general strategic concepts. In subsequent sessions, both sides set forth proposals to limit offensive and defensive forces. However, disagreement existed on two issues: on the question of what constituted "strategic" forces (the Soviet Union maintaining that such a term embraced all those weapons which could reach the other side's territory, a definition that would include America's tactical nuclear weapons in the European theatre); and on whether an initial agreement on A.B.M.'s alone would serve the goal of the talks (the U.S. insisting all along, that an agreement limiting defensive systems should be accompanied by one limiting offensive systems as well).

Even before the formal commencement of S.A.L.T., it was clear that Soviet-U.S. negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms would have a strong bearing on American planning in the A.B.M. field. There is much evidence to suggest, that up until about the early months of 1970, some members of the Nixon Administration contemplated an agreement with the U.S.S.R. that would allow both countries to maintain A.B.M. systems which would be effective against China. In March 1969, during a press conference following the initial Safeguard announcement, President Nixon declared that Russia and the U.S. would be reluctant to totally abandon their A.B.M. systems so long as a threat from China existed.\(^1\) Later that year, Secretary of State Rogers also implied that the Soviet and American negotiators at S.A.L.T. would take account of the threat posed to both countries by China.\(^2\) But it was Secretary of Defense, Laird, who most clearly shared these sentiments. In a statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1969, he said:

\[
\ldots \text{I do not want to get the ABM argument completely tied to the Soviet threat because I believe that there is a very good possibility that in these [S.A.L.T.] discussions we will agree upon an ABM force for both countries, and that this ABM force will be agreed to on the basis of the potential threat from } \ldots \text{ the Chinese in the decade of the late 1970's.} \]

---

From about the middle of 1970, however, evidence began to emerge that Washington was now contemplating a S.A.L.T. agreement that would substantially limit A.B.M. deployment in both Russia and the United States. A report published by the Institute For Strategic Studies in London suggests that "on or about 24 July" 1970, Washington offered a package to the Soviet negotiators at Vienna which included, among other things, a proposal on "a limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment to small systems of perhaps 100-125 launchers around Moscow and Washington". Referring to that proposal, in February 1971, President Nixon claimed that the American submission had "incorporated alternative provisions for either limitation or a total ban of ABM" [my emphasis]. The following month, Mr. Laird revealed that the Defence Department was examining alternative A.B.M. plans in the event of an agreement at S.A.L.T. which would preclude full deployment of the Safeguard system. In May 1971, the American leader announced what he described as "a significant development in breaking the deadlock" at S.A.L.T., viz., an agreement by the Soviet and American Governments "to concentrate ... on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems". Two months later, in July 1971, Deputy Secretary of Defence, Packard, clearly indicated that the U.S. Government was no longer

contemplating any substantial expansion of its Safeguard programme. Noting that the administration had so far recommended a four-site deployment only, he added:

... we are not at this time talking about going ahead with the original 12-site program if we can achieve, as I think we can, and hope we can, some agreement in the SALT talks.¹

Though the details of an agreement on A.B.M.'s have yet to be worked out at S.A.L.T., the Nixon Administration has made it clear that it is prepared to accept a level of deployment which falls well short of the full 12-site Safeguard system which was previously deemed necessary for "area defence" of the whole of the United States.

In view of the importance attached to ballistic missile defence by both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, this apparent volte-face in American policy requires some explanation. One possible argument, which can be discounted at the outset, is that there has been a sudden and substantial downgrading of the perceived threat from China. Though, for reasons to be discussed shortly, there has recently been less stress on the Chinese threat, the prediction by Mr. Laird, in March 1971, that Peking could attain an initial operational capability (I.O.C.) with I.C.B.M.'s by 1974-5, and could have significant numbers of these weapons deployed late in the decade,² does not differ too much from earlier official U.S. estimates.³ Clearly, the reasons for the apparent change in U.S. policy have to be sought elsewhere.

3. For a note on some of these earlier evaluations, see above, p.94.
In looking for the truth of the matter, one must acknowledge again a basic fact, which, because of the emphasis in this chapter on the Chinese rationale, may have been insufficiently stressed; viz., that both the Sentinel and Safeguard programmes were motivated primarily by considerations arising out of America's strategic relationship with the U.S.S.R. Moreover, just as it was in the context of Soviet-U.S. strategic relations that America's A.B.M. programme was launched, so, it was in a similar context, that it seems to have been substantially curtailed. Though information on the matter is still very scarce, it seems that Russia and the U.S. both came to S.A.L.T. ready to find a way to halt their increasingly dangerous and costly competition in strategic arms. It is to this end that Washington now seems prepared to accept substantial limits on the scale of its A.B.M. deployment.

It seems reasonable to suppose that recent trends in the Nixon Administration's relations with Peking have also had something to do with Washington's apparent willingness to bargain away the option of deploying a full 12-site Safeguard system. From about the early months of 1971,

1. See above, pp.262-263; 265-266; and 268-269.
3. Concrete signs of an improvement in relations between the United States and China began to emerge late in 1969. During the next 18 months a number of achievements were registered: restrictions were eased on trade and travel between the U.S. and China; the U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial talks in Warsaw were resumed after a two-year lapse; and, there were the first indications of a softening of the U.S. position on Chinese membership of the United Nations. On July 15, 1971, President Nixon announced that he had accepted an invitation to visit China. For text of President Nixon's announcement, see D.0.S.B., 2 August 1971, p.121. For an analysis of the motives for the American move, its
there seems to have been a conscious effort, in official U.S. statements, to play down the alleged threat from China.\(^1\) It seems reasonable to argue that Washington was, at about this time, coming to acknowledge some inconsistency in its desire for better relations with Peking and its portrayal of China as a potential and important military threat. This had important implications for American A.B.M. policy; continued stress on the need for an A.B.M. system against China, especially if such emphasis were accompanied, as it had been in the past, by suggestions of Chinese irrationality, recklessness and predisposition towards miscalculation, could only serve to reinforce Peking's suspicions of U.S. hostility towards China and could hardly make for better relations between the two countries. For the same reason, it was no longer expedient for Washington to promote the idea of a possible agreement with the U.S.S.R. on mutual but exclusively anti-China A.B.M. deployments. Such action would only increase Peking's suspicions of collusion between Washington and Moscow.


1. This was particularly apparent in Secretary Laird's 1972 posture statement. In contrast to previous reports, there was relatively little emphasis on the China threat. See, 1972 Defence Posture Statement. A similar trend was apparent in President Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress in February, 1972. See, Building for Peace.
The latest developments in American policy towards ballistic missile defence are of utmost importance from the point of view of United States efforts to limit proliferation in Asia. Two successive administrations have argued that effective protection of the U.S. against China could be bought only at the price of "area defence" of the entire American continent; in recent years, this level of protection has been said to require a full 12-site Safeguard deployment. "Area defence" of the U.S., Washington has stressed, would, among other things, enhance the credibility of American commitments in Asia and therefore help to discourage states in the area from acquiring their own nuclear capabilities. Because Washington has argued in this way, its apparent willingness of late, to settle for something substantially less than a full 12-site Safeguard programme, has called into question the credibility of its commitment to non-proliferation in Asia; at the very least, it seems to have indicated that there are real limits to the price the U.S. is prepared to pay to achieve this goal.

The record of U.S. involvement in the A.B.M. field is a revealing one from the point of view of Washington's professed concern to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia. The Johnson Administration's Sentinel decision was motivated primarily by concern in the U.S. about the expansion of Soviet offensive and defensive missile systems. However, for reasons of expediency, the programme was publicly justified in terms of the alleged threat from China. The Sentinel plan, which seems to have caused considerable disagreement within the ranks of the U.S. Government, ran counter in many ways, to American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia: it had the effect of considerably enhancing the magnitude of the Chinese threat; and, was poorly designed to persuade potential nuclear states in Asia to support the proposed nuclear
nonproliferation treaty. The Nixon Administration, while openly espousing the primarily Soviet orientation of its Safeguard programme, nevertheless also stressed the utility of the system viz-a-viz., China. Indeed, Defence Secretary Laird's remarks on the latter aspect of the matter amounted to a reckless indifference to previous U.S. attempts to downgrade the military significance of the Chinese nuclear threat. Finally, despite all that had been said about the challenge from Peking, the option of deploying a full anti-China A.B.M. system appears to have been abandoned; not, it seems, because of any sudden and substantial reassessment (downwards) of the perceived Chinese threat, or, because Washington came to acknowledge some of the difficulties its anti-China A.B.M. posed for efforts to limit proliferation in Asia, but, because to do so served wider U.S. purposes, in particular, an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms, and the improvement of relations between Washington and Peking.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that American action in the field of ballistic missile defence was a hindrance rather than a help to the cause of nonproliferation in Asia. Arguments about the need for A.B.M. defence against China took little account of the requirements of an effective nonproliferation policy and, in any case, were abandoned when it was considered expedient, on other grounds, to do so. The whole exercise seemed to indicate that the goal of nonproliferation in Asia enjoyed only a low priority relative to other U.S. policy objectives.
It has been emphasised on a number of occasions in this thesis, that one important incentive for the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the belief that national security is thereby enhanced. Washington has clearly recognised this fact and undertakings to support countries against aggression or the threat of aggression have long been an important element in American efforts to limit the spread of national nuclear capabilities. This has been no less true of Asia than of other parts of the world. On the day of China's first nuclear test, President Johnson said:

The United States reaffirms its defense commitments in Asia. Even if Communist China should eventually develop an effective nuclear capability, that capability would have no effect on the readiness of the United States to respond to requests from Asian nations for help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression.  

Asia and, as was noted earlier in this thesis, extended a unilateral undertaking that the U.S. would protect countries which remained non-nuclear against threats of nuclear blackmail. These assurances of support for its friends and allies in Asia were repeatedly reaffirmed during the years of the Johnson Administration.

In analysing the significance of these guarantees and assurances for U.S. nonproliferation policy in Asia it will be necessary to take account of other aspects of America's security relations with each of the countries concerned, and also, of developments in the wider world of U.S. security and foreign policy in general. Viewed in this broader context, the question of American guarantees and assurances in Asia in the period 1964-68 casts a fresh and revealing light on Washington's efforts to limit proliferation in the area. In the present chapter, developments up to about the end of 1968 only will be considered. After that date, the Nixon doctrine and other aspects of the new Republican Administration's defence and foreign policies opened the way for a substantial change in the character of America's security relations with its friends and allies in Asia. The significance of these latter developments for U.S. nonproliferation policy in Asia will be examined in the next chapter.


Washington and Delhi are not linked by a formal security treaty. At the time of the Sino-Indian border conflict in October-November 1962, the U.S. did provide India with some military assistance and, by the manner of its response

1. See above, p.51.
generally, seemed to indicate that it was not prepared to see India overrun by China. However, this collaboration between Delhi and Washington has not developed into a formal security link between the two capitals such as those which exist between the U.S. and its Japanese and Australian allies.

China's first nuclear test provoked in many Indians a profound concern about their country's security and, as has already been noted, strengthened domestic demands for an Indian nuclear force. Washington clearly acknowledged the challenge that this development posed for U.S. efforts to limit proliferation in Asia; America's unilateral undertaking of support against nuclear blackmail was clearly designed to reassure non-nuclear, non-aligned countries such as India that they had no need of nuclear weapons of their own. However, regardless of this undertaking, many officials in Washington remained concerned about the threat to India's security and about the implications of this for proliferation in Asia.


2. See above, pp.115-120.

3. The American undertaking was announced on 18 October 1964, just two days after China's first nuclear test. See above, p.51.
In a statement in 1965 before the House Appropriations Committee, Secretary of Defence, McNamara, said:

The prospect of an unfriendly neighbour on its [India's] northern border armed with nuclear weapons is understandably disturbing to the Indian Government and people. Although the present Government has stated that it does not intend to respond to that threat by starting a nuclear weapons program of its own, there are pressures within India to do just that. The consequences of such a decision would be very unfortunate. Among other things, it would probably substantially accelerate the spread of nuclear weapons in other countries, not only in Asia but throughout the world. 1

That same year, A.C.D.A. Director, W.C. Foster, also drew attention to the unsettling effect that the Chinese tests had had in India. 2 It was Foster's view that the U.S. might well have to go further than it had so far gone in the matter of assurances to non-nuclear states like India. 3 In 1966, Defence Secretary McNamara again addressed himself to the problem of India's security. He said:

A nation on the border of China, Red China, will need some assurance of protection if she gives up the right to develop nuclear weapons. There can be no question about that. And that need for assurance will increase as the years go by and as China's capability to attack her neighbours with nuclear weapons increases. 4

2. See, William C. Foster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, July 1965, p.588. Foster said: "The reaction there, ... seems to have developed out of fear of the nascent military threat implicit in these tests."  
3. ibid., pp.596-597.  
4. Quoted in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.87. For similar remarks, by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, see The Times of India, 4 April 1967.
In 1967, the U.S. Defence Secretary warned that China was bent on weakening and dividing India and establishing itself as the major political influence in the subcontinent. But despite these expressions of concern about India's security, and the obvious fear amongst many officials in Washington that Delhi might be driven to acquire nuclear weapons, the United States remained unwilling to formally commit itself to the defence of India. This became clear in the years 1964–1967, during Delhi's investigations of the possibility of some form of joint guarantee of India's security. Delhi's initiatives in this matter, and America's response, are issues worthy of close examination.

During a visit to London in December 1964, the Indian Prime Minister is reported to have proposed that the nuclear powers should devise ways and means to protect non-nuclear states against nuclear attack. On his return, the Prime Minister conceded that reports to the effect that he had suggested to Mr. Wilson that the United States and Russia should provide a joint nuclear shield for the non-nuclear powers were "more or less correct". There are indications that India subsequently conducted similar soundings in Washington and Moscow. It is apparent, however, that the Indian proposal was coolly received by the nuclear powers, though the British Government

2. The Times of India, 12 December 1964.
4. ibid., p.493.
5. ibid. This was also apparent in a statement in parliament by India's Minister for External Affairs. See, Debates of the Indian Parliament: Lok Sabha (hereafter referred to as Lok Sabha Debates), 21 December 1964, Cols. 5843–4.
appears to have considered the idea of a guarantee for the non-nuclear states of Asia at least. In May of the following year, Delhi temporarily abandoned its search for some sort of joint guarantee from the U.S. and Russia and instead submitted a five point proposal on proliferation and security guarantees to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. This proposal included two requests to the nuclear powers concerning the security of non-nuclear states: (1) that they [the nuclear powers] undertake "not to use nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess them"; and, (2) that they undertake, through the U.N., "to safeguard the security of countries which may be threatened by Powers having a nuclear weapons capability or about to have a nuclear weapons capability". In February 1966, the Soviet Premier, Mr. Kosygin, made his offer to include in the Soviet draft nonproliferation treaty "a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory". The Soviet proposal partly resembled Delhi's submission to the U.N. in May 1965 and was warmly applauded by the Indian Government. Later, in October 1966, India joined a number of non-aligned states in requesting the Disarmament Commission to consider Mr. Kosygin's offer. The United States, however, was quite definitely opposed to the "Kosygin proposal".

1. The Times of India, 18 December 1964.
2. Quoted in, Noorani, loc. cit., p.494.
6. See above, p.52.
Early in 1967, India's efforts to secure a nuclear guarantee took on a new air of urgency and Delhi reverted to the course it had tried late in 1964, viz., an approach to both the U.S. and Russia for a joint guarantee of support against nuclear attack. It seems reasonable to assume that a major reason for this fresh initiative was China's current and rapid progress in the nuclear weapons field. Not only was Peking intent on building up a stockpile of nuclear warheads, but also, it had recently demonstrated substantial progress in the development of thermo-nuclear explosives and missiles.1 Probably another reason for Delhi's initiative at this time was the current state of the negotiations on the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Early in April, Washington and Moscow presented Delhi with separate but almost identical draft agreements on nonproliferation. This move was seen by sections of the Indian press as being aimed at impressing Delhi of the importance with which the superpowers viewed the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty and with their anxiety that India should go along with the agreement.2 It was obvious, then, that Delhi would soon have to declare its position on the proposed nonproliferation agreement; before doing so, the Indian Government seemed anxious to explore the possibilities in regard to security assurances.

1. China's fourth nuclear test in October 1966 involved the successful use of a missile. The fifth, in December 1966, was a thermo-nuclear experiment and indicated substantial progress toward the development of a thermo-nuclear weapon. For a detailed account of China's developments in the nuclear weapons field, see above, Chapter III.
2. The Times of India, 6 April 1967.
Delhi's ideas about a joint guarantee were explained by Mr. Chagla, the Minister for External Affairs, in a statement to the Washington Post on 13 April 1967. Mr. Chagla dismissed the idea of a guarantee through the U.N. on the grounds that "before the Security Council even called a meeting we might be destroyed." (The reference to the U.N. was no doubt prompted by indications that Washington was currently exploring the possibility of some form of U.N. guarantee of the security of non-nuclear states.) Moreover, he added, President Johnson's unilateral undertakings of October 1964 did not constitute sufficient assurance for India. What Delhi wanted was a "commitment which would stand up ahead of time to 'deter' India's one real threat, Communist China, from making an attack and a commitment for immediate Soviet-American reprisal in case China decided not to be deterred." Shortly after this announcement, a senior Indian civil servant, Mr. L.K. Jha, visited Moscow and Washington to explore the chances of securing the sort of guarantee Mr. Chagla had outlined. In Washington, Mr. Jha


3. Quoted in Williams, op. cit., p.53.

4. While in Washington, Mr. Jha had access to senior members of the U.S. Administration including President Johnson himself; Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara; A.C.D.A. Director, William Foster; and, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Glen Seaborg. See, The New York Times, 14 April 1967 and The Times of India, 21 April 1967.
repeated that the guarantee being sought by India would have to carry the threat of instant retaliation and that any arrangement involving U.N. procedures was considered quite unsatisfactory. Moreover, he added, it was immaterial to Delhi whether the guarantee formed part of the proposed nonproliferation treaty or was negotiated separately. Mr. Jha was insistent, however, that Delhi was not seeking any *quid pro quo* for Indian signature of the nonproliferation treaty. Even if the nuclear powers were prepared to offer credible guarantees of support, India would nevertheless still seek satisfaction on other aspects of the treaty before signing.¹

The discussions Mr. Jha had in Washington about India's proposal for a joint guarantee were shrouded in secrecy. There were few official references to the talks and seemingly none which explained in any detail the contents of the negotiations. In addition, congressional hearings during 1967, on arms control and related matters, were conspicuously void of direct references to the matter. All this makes the task of assessing Washington's response to the Indian initiative very difficult indeed. Nevertheless, it is clear from the public record that the U.S. Government was unenthusiastic about the Indian proposal; Mr. Jha's report to the Indian Prime Minister on his visit to the United States was clearly pessimistic on the question of guarantees.² So far as assurances to India were concerned, the United States seemed prepared to go no further in the matter than the unilateral offer of "strong support" against nuclear blackmail which had been extended by President Johnson in the wake of China's first nuclear test. In view of the importance Washington claimed to attach to the goal of nonproliferation, and of its declared sympathy with

¹. As reported in *The Times of India*, 21 April 1967.
India's security plight, some explanation of America's response is warranted.

In the first place, the whole dialogue between Delhi and Washington seems to have been clouded by India's failure to fully consider the operational arrangements necessary for the provision of effective guarantees. If the reports of India's submissions on the question are to be believed, Delhi wanted an arrangement which would threaten automatic retaliation. But a guarantee of this sort is considerably more binding in its character than most the U.S. had previously entered into; perhaps even more so than say, the N.A.T.O. agreement. In particular, India seemed to be asking Washington to agree to an arrangement which would provide for American retaliation without the prior approval of Congress or any other relevant constitutional body. It is hardly surprising that Washington was reluctant to agree to a device of this sort. Also, there was the problem of just what was considered necessary to trigger the nuclear response. Terms like "nuclear blackmail" and "aggression" have no universally accepted definition and the weight given to them in so binding an arrangement as that proposed by India was no doubt a factor in Washington's rejection of the move.

Also on the question of operational arrangements, Delhi does not seem to have considered the possibility of having foreign defence facilities within India in order to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of the guarantee it was seeking. In particular, Delhi did not envisage the establishment of Soviet and U.S. missile bases on its territory, and was even unhappy about the presence of Polaris submarines
in the Indian Ocean area.\(^1\) One gets the impression that Delhi, though apparently seeking a guarantee, was nevertheless anxious to minimize the degree of direct military involvement with its would-be protectors. It is unlikely, however, that Delhi could have secured an effective guarantee without closer military ties with Washington or Moscow, or both. The credibility of American guarantees in Europe derives partly from the permanent deployment on that continent of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops as well as from other arrangements involving close military links between America and many of the countries of Western Europe.\(^2\) Moreover, as will be noted shortly, American guarantees to Japan and Australia have been accompanied by close military co-operation between the U.S. and each of these two countries. India's reservations about bases and other military links suggests that Delhi was still having difficulty reconciling the idea of nuclear guarantees, even multilateral ones, with its traditional policy of non-alignment and non-involvement in the military affairs of other powers. This did not go unnoticed in Washington and was seen by many Americans, including some who were seemingly sympathetic towards India's security plight, as a major obstacle in the path of effective guarantees.\(^3\)

1. The Times of India, 21 April 1967. Reservations such as these prompted one American observer to remark that India wanted "a nuclear umbrella without a handle". See, \textit{ibid.} India's reluctance to consider the ultimate necessity of stationing nuclear weapons under foreign control on Indian soil was noted by a Times correspondent in 1968. See, \textit{The Times} (London), 10 October 1968.

2. For a comment on this, see Hedley Bull, "Western Policy and Nuclear Proliferation in Asia", in \textit{World Review}, Vol. 6, No. 3, October 1967, p.13. See also, Mason Willrich, "Guarantees to Non-Nuclear Nations", in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 44, No. 4, July 1966, p.686.

3. \textit{e.g.}, see statement by A.C.D.A. Director, W.C. Foster, as reported in \textit{The Times of India}, 6 April 1967.
Second, the provision of a guarantee for India did not depend on agreement between Washington and Delhi alone. India wanted a joint guarantee from both the U.S. and Russia; an arrangement which would have required an unprecedented degree of understanding between the two superpowers. But Washington and Moscow were not ready for this sort of venture. It is true, of course, as the negotiations on the N.P.T. clearly revealed, that when their interests coincided, Russia and America were capable of a high degree of co-operation. But the question of nuclear guarantees was a different matter altogether. To have provided India with the sort of protection it wanted, Russia and America would need to have engaged in a level of joint military planning wholly inconsistent with their respective security roles. Clearly, the detente had not gone as far as this. Moreover, the guarantee being considered was clearly aimed at China, and Russia was not yet in a position where it could safely ignore Peking's charges of collusion with the U.S. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that Moscow regarded the provision of explicit security guarantees to non-nuclear states as an unacceptably high price to pay for nonproliferation.

Third, even had agreement been possible about the operational arrangements necessary for the sort of guarantee

1. So far as can be discovered, India at no time sought a guarantee from the United States alone.
2. This fact was clearly appreciated by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. See his testimony in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.13.
India wanted, and even had Russia's co-operation been enlisted, still another obstacle remained. In March 1967 Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, emphasised that the provision of effective guarantees for non-aligned, non-nuclear countries would "involve a very far-reaching extension of American commitments". Later, the Secretary emphasised that the Senate did not want the U.S. to extend its commitments in this way. There can be little doubt that this reluctance to consider additional commitments was characteristic not just of Congress, but of the majority of the American people as well. America's involvement in Vietnam had already provoked widespread concern in the U.S. about the nation's commitments in Asia and any move to further extend America's responsibilities at this time would almost certainly have been strongly opposed. In hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations in February 1968, Defence Secretary McNamara was very critical of the attacks in Congress the previous year on the scale of America's security commitments overseas. Indeed, such was his concern about this development, that he felt it timely to issue a warning about the dangers of concepts like "Fortress America"; a world from which the U.S. had substantially withdrawn, he noted, would, among other things, be one "in which the pressures for proliferation of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery would be much stronger" than they presently were.

2. See his testimony in Nonproliferation Treaty, hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 10-12 and 17, 1968, Washington, 1968, p.17. For a sample of Senate opposition at this time to the extension of American commitments, see ibid., pp.17, 34, 46-48, 156 and 173.
4. ibid.
It would be going too far to conclude from this that McNamara may have favoured offering India a firm guarantee of its security. One suspects that he might have, but in the absence of additional evidence it is not possible to say so conclusively. Nevertheless, the Defence Secretary's remarks do indicate that he clearly perceived a link between nonproliferation and a continued and active U.S. presence in the world, and was anxious to remind his colleagues of this at a time when many of them were casting an increasingly critical eye on America's foreign commitments.

It would be unreasonable to suggest that it was U.S. opposition alone which caused Delhi to abandon its search for a nuclear guarantee. As already noted, the Indian proposal was in many ways an impractical one and, in addition, was probably not well received in the Soviet capital either. Nevertheless, the American response was significant. It clearly indicated that Washington was prepared to let pass an opportunity to make a seemingly important gesture in the direction of nonproliferation. Obviously, there were at this time, many American policymakers who regarded the goal of nonproliferation in Asia as considerably less important than other U.S. interests.


Washington's formal security ties with Tokyo date from the signing in September 1951 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

1. All the indications are, that by the end of 1967 at the latest, Delhi had abandoned the idea of guarantees which involved any sort of dependence on foreign powers. See, Williams, op. cit., pp.52 and 56. See also, statement in September 1967 by India's Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Moraji Desai. Reported in The New York Times, 13 September 1967.
This pact was designed to serve two purposes; to protect a weakened and disarmed Japan against attack from any quarter and, to provide the U.S. with a base for military operations in the Far East. To facilitate these objectives America was granted the right to station forces in and around Japan both for the defence of the country against external attack and for the suppression of externally inspired civil disorder. In addition, Washington was given wide powers over the use of Japanese territory and facilities for the support of American military activity in other parts of the Far East.¹

In 1960, a new defence arrangement was concluded between Tokyo and Washington. This was called the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security and, unlike its predecessor, placed a firm obligation on the U.S. to defend Japan.²

In October 1964, in the wake of China's first nuclear test, President Johnson reaffirmed America's intention to honour all of its security commitments in Asia;³ the agreement with Japan was clearly included in this undertaking. Three months later, in the communique issued after talks between President Johnson and the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Sato,

---


2. See Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security. The text of this treaty is reproduced as Appendix II of this thesis.

3. See above, p. 291.
the U.S. leader reaffirmed America's "determination to abide by its commitment ... to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside." The communique further noted that it was "essential for the stability and peace of Asia that there be no uncertainty about Japan's security." The view that the alliance with the U.S. constituted a sufficient guarantee of Japan's security, even in the context of China's nuclear development, was one which was repeatedly endorsed in official American pronouncements. In July 1966, the American Secretary of Defence, Mr. McNamara, in an interview with a noted Japanese defence authority, intimated that there were no limitations on the kind of weapons the U.S. would be prepared to use in Japan's defence. Elaborating on the significance of the security treaty, Mr. McNamara said:

I believe that it would be a serious mistake for your country [Japan] or any other nation on the periphery of Red China to develop its own nuclear force.... It's not at all needed, because we have treaty commitments with you, under the terms of which we are bound, within the limits of our constitutional processes, to come to your defence. Under no conceivable circumstances, would you develop as large a nuclear force as we presently have, so it would be an utter waste for you and others who are in a similar position.

In the second Johnson-Sato communique which was released after talks between the American and Japanese leaders in November 1967, note was taken of Peking's efforts to develop a nuclear

2. See, "Interview with Secretary McNamara." Text of an interview by Professor Kei Wakaizumi, Kyoto Industrial University, with Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara, 15 July 1966, Pentagon, Washington, 1966, p.9. (Copy of interview held in Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra.)
3. ibid.
arsenal and of the importance of creating conditions "wherein Asian nations would not be susceptible to threats from Communist China." Washington again reaffirmed its intention to maintain the security treaty between Japan and the U.S.\(^1\) Finally, in Congressional hearings held in Washington during 1967 and 1968, spokesmen for the administration were adamant that Japan's defence needs were adequately catered for by the terms of the security treaty with the U.S.\(^2\)

These assurances of support have undoubtedly been regarded by Washington as an important part of its effort to persuade Japan to remain non-nuclear. Moreover, as was noted in Chapter V, there is reason to believe that they have in fact made a significant contribution in this regard. But the security relationship between Washington and Tokyo is a complex one and it is possible to argue that within the context of this arrangement the U.S. has also adopted policies which have weakened rather than strengthened the forces working against proliferation in Japan. For many years, the U.S. has worked hard to convince Japan to assume a greater defence burden and to persuade Tokyo to take a more serious view of the threat from China. More specifically, Washington has adopted policies which seem calculated to help rid the Japanese people of their nuclear allergy.

---


The idea of enlisting Japan's support for the U.S. defence effort in the Far East first arose in the late 1940's and was reinforced by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Throughout the 1950's Washington pressed Japan to assume a greater share of the burden of its own defence, though generally speaking, Tokyo declined to accept the levels of rearmament suggested to it by the United States. In February 1964, Defence Secretary McNamara urged that Japan was "ready ... to support her own forces and [was] capable of expanding her forces to contribute to the security of the entire area." In hearings the following year on military procurement for FY 1966, McNamara again urged Japan to expand its defence forces. In July 1966 he told the Japanese defence authority Kei Wakaizumi, that: "I think your country will and should play an increasing role in Asia, in organizing the nations of free Asia to defend themselves [my emphasis]." The Defence Department was not alone in its appeals for a greater Japanese defence effort. In hearings in 1967 on the Foreign Assistance Act, Assistant Secretary of State, William Bundy, was insistent that the U.S. "should push them [Japan] to carry the burden of their own defence to a greater degree."

2. Weinstein, op. cit., p.65 ff.
5. See, "Interview With Secretary McNamara", p.7.
Washington has often exhibited displeasure over Tokyo's policy towards China and has tried hard to persuade Japan to take a more serious view of the potential threat from its giant neighbour. This belief in the U.S. about Japan's China policy was particularly obvious in the period 1964-1968 and seems to have been stimulated by two developments; China's entry into the nuclear club, and America's increasing involvement in the war in Vietnam. As has already been noted, the communique released after the first Sato-Johnson meeting in January 1965 clearly reflected the divergent views held by the two leaders about the potential danger from China.¹ Later that year, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy denounced what he regarded as Japan's "dangerously mistaken views" about China.² In December, James Reston, the noted columnist for The New York Times, strongly rebuked Tokyo for its relative indifference towards the American predicament in South East Asia.³ Early in 1966, Philip Quigg, Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Affairs contributed an article to that journal in which he not only attacked prevailing Japanese thinking about China, but also, generally condemned the government in Tokyo for having allowed the initiative on questions of defence and foreign policy to pass into the hands of "leftists and pacifists."⁴ Later that year, in the interview with Kei Wakaizumi quoted above, Defence Secretary McNamara spoke in the gravest terms about the threat from Peking. China, he noted, was "developing nuclear weapons which [were] not required to defend herself." There was a "presumption", he added, that she was "developing

¹. See above, p.158.
³. ibid., 22 December 1965.
them to support a program of aggression."¹ On the occasion of the second Sato-Johnson meeting in December 1967, the Japanese Prime Minister seems to have been persuaded to adopt a tougher stand on China than he previously had. In the communique issued after their meeting both leaders condemned Peking's "intransigent attitude" and agreed on the need for measures to protect nations in Asia from Chinese aggression.²

Few things have created more ill-feeling between Washington and Tokyo than the question of the presence in Japan of American nuclear weapons or nuclear powered vessels. In view of Japan's special sensitivity on the matter, mere rumours of the presence in the country of military hardware of this sort have been sufficient to provoke more than one political storm. But this has not dissuaded Washington from attempting to deploy nuclear weapons in Japan. In the 1950's a vigorous tussle was waged with the Hatoyama Government before it was eventually agreed that no nuclear warheads would be brought into Japan without the consent of both the American and the Japanese Governments.³ (Nuclear weapons have of course been deployed in Okinawa which, because it has been under American control, has been free of the restrictions pertaining to Japan proper.) In recent times, controversy has surrounded the presence in Japanese waters of American nuclear powered vessels. In November 1963 the nuclear-powered submarine Nautilus called at a Japanese port.⁴ By December 1968, a total of 24 calls had been made by U.S. nuclear-powered vessels.⁵

¹ See, "Interview With Secretary McNamara", p.8.
² For the text of the communique, see D.O.S.B., 4 December 1967, pp.744-747.
³ Weinstein, op. cit., pp.80-83.
⁴ ibid., p.98.
A number of these visits provoked vigorous opposition from amongst the Japanese people. This was especially so during the visit to Sasebo in January 1968 of the American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Enterprise; it was widely alleged that during the visit the vessel was carrying nuclear weapons. 1 Demonstrations also occurred after the visit to Sasebo in 1968 of the nuclear-powered submarine, the Swordfish; on this occasion anger mounted in Japan after it was revealed that during the visit radioactive material was discharged into Sasebo Harbour. 2

In view of the commotion and bitterness which has so often surrounded these visits one must ask why the U.S. has persisted in the practice. One obvious answer seems to be that the visits are necessary for the maintenance of America's naval presence in the Far East. However, there have been official indications that this is not so; the visits, it seems, are convenient but not absolutely necessary. 3 Some unofficial observers have suggested that the visits have been sponsored by U.S. officials in order to help rid Japan of its "nuclear allergy" and to

educate the Japanese people about the role of nuclear weapons in their country's defence. Whether or not this was a primary motive for America's action is difficult to say with any certainty; official sources are understandably silent on the matter. But the fact remains that by seeking to deploy nuclear weapons in Japan, and by arranging for port calls by American nuclear-powered vessels, Washington accepted the possibility that the Japanese people would become more accustomed to the presence on their soil of military nuclear hardware. It seems that the United States Government was prepared, in the interests of wider U.S. objectives, to risk weakening a uniquely powerful disincentive for proliferation in Japan.

It has been emphasised on a number of occasions in this thesis that Japanese thinking on defence matters, at least so far as the period under review in this particular section is concerned, was characterised, among other things, by three important features: a strong distaste for militarism; a tendency not to regard China as a particularly serious military threat; and a deep aversion to nuclear weapons. It seems reasonable to argue that the presence of these three features could be expected to predispose Japan towards a policy of not acquiring nuclear weapons and that, given its declared commitment to the goal of nonproliferation in Asia, Washington would have been well advised to exploit this unusually promising (from the point of view of nonproliferation) state of affairs. But quite the opposite has been the case.

Not only has the U.S. pressed Japan to assume a greater defence burden and tried hard to stimulate in Tokyo a concern about China, but in addition, it has adopted policies which could be expected to help erode Japan's special aversion to nuclear weapons. In the interests of wider U.S. goals, principally the containment of Chinese and, to a lesser extent Soviet power, Washington was prepared to adopt policies which could be said to have detracted from the goal of nonproliferation in Japan. There can be little doubt, of course, that the U.S. Administration remained, on the whole, opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons to Japan. However, it is equally clear that there was much support for the idea that the objective of nonproliferation should not be purchased at the price of other United States goals in Japan and the Far East.

C. Nonproliferation and the United States-Australia Security Relationship, 1964-68

The origins of the security link between Washington and Canberra were discussed earlier in this thesis. There it was noted that since the creation of the A.N.Z.U.S. pact (the agreement was signed in September 1951), the United States has been committed, subject only to its own constitutional processes, to defend Australia against armed attack in the Pacific area. It was further noted that Canberra's reliance on the nuclear power of its allies, especially that of the U.S., has been an important determinant of the Australian Government's non-nuclear policy.

During the years since China commenced nuclear testing, the U.S. has repeatedly indicated its determination to defend

1. See above, p.208.
Australia under the terms of the A.N.Z.U.S. pact; this has been implied in general statements reaffirming America's commitments in Asia, and has been noted more specifically in a host of official A.N.Z.U.S. pronouncements (principally in the communi­ques released after regular meetings of the A.N.Z.U.S. Council). At the same time, however, in the period under review in this section, Washington served notice on Canberra that there were clear limits to the extent to which the U.S. would be prepared to become militarily involved on behalf of Australia in the area adjacent to that continent in South East Asia. One such indication of this had its roots in the early 1960's and concerned the squabbles between Canberra and Djakarta, first over West New Guinea, and then over Malaysia. In the former case, Washington declined to be influenced by Australian urgings that Indonesia's attempt to wrest control of the Dutch-held territory of West New Guinea should be resisted; the United States Government considered that resistance to Djakarta's aspirations in West New Guinea could have an unfavourable impact on the internal politics of Indonesia and upset the international balance of power in the area.\footnote{For a discussion of these matters, see Trevor R. Reese, \textit{Australia, New Zealand, and the United States}, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp.213-217.} Moreover, in 1965, when Australia sent troops to Borneo to help Malaysia in its struggle against Indonesian "confrontation", Canberra was unable to elicit from Washington a specific assurance of U.S. military support in the event that the Australian forces in Borneo should need assistance.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, p.224.} According to Norman Harper, Canberra's efforts to secure a U.S. assurance over the Malaysian issue "aroused firm American opposition to what it regarded as a unilateral attempt by an
ally to involve the United States in further overseas commitments.¹

Another indication of America's reluctance to become too deeply involved militarily on Australia's behalf concerned the situation created by Britain's scheduled withdrawal from the Malaysia-Singapore area.² Though the U.S. sympathised with Canberra's opposition to Britain's proposed withdrawal, there were clear indications in 1968 that Washington had no intention of filling the military vacuum which would be left in the Malaysia-Singapore area after the British departure.³ The reasons for Washington's attitude on this occasion are not hard to discover. Concern in the U.S. about the nation's overseas commitments had been stimulated by the war in Vietnam and this feeling had mounted tremendously by 1968; any move at this time to commit American forces to the Malaysia-Singapore area would almost certainly have encountered strong domestic opposition in the U.S. (It is worth recalling in this context that domestic opposition to wider security commitments was probably also a factor in Washington's unenthusiastic response to India's request in 1967 for a joint nuclear guarantee.)⁴

These developments during the period 1964–68 were a reminder to Canberra that except presumably where direct aggression was involved, the U.S. would support Australia only if it suited its wider interests to do so. The demonstration of this reality was particularly ill-timed from the point-of-view of Washington's desire that Australia (and other non-nuclear states) should support the N.P.T.. At a time when the U.S., in

2. For a note on the proposed British withdrawal, see above, pp.220-221.  
4. See above, pp.302-304.
the interests of nonproliferation, ought to have been doing everything it could to reassure Canberra about the efficacy and the credibility of the A.N.Z.U.S. pact, Washington adopted policies which could only have the effect of causing disillusionment in Australia with the American alliance.

Though there was some concern in Australia about A.N.Z.U.S., Canberra does not appear to have reacted by supporting the alliance with the United States any less. On the contrary, Trevor Reese has shown how the rebuff delivered by Washington, especially over the issue of American support for the Australian troops in Borneo, seems to have stimulated in Canberra not only an awareness of the need for a greater national defence effort, but also, an anxiety to impress Washington that Australia was a loyal and useful ally.¹ This latter endeavour was evident both in Australia's strong support for the United States position in Vietnam and in the decisions to allow the U.S. to establish electronic and radar defence installations in Australia.²

Mention of the American installations in Australia raises again the question of whether the security links between Washington and Canberra in the period 1964-1968 were wholly conducive to the cause of nonproliferation in Australia. The naval communications station at North West Cape is clearly part of America's global nuclear establishment and it is possible that the installation at Pine Gap is also. It seems reasonable to argue that the establishment of these facilities in Australia has highlighted for many in that country the significance of nuclear weapons in the defence of the...

¹. See, Reese, op. cit., pp.225 and 290-293.
². For a note on Australia's commitment to Vietnam, see above, pp.216-217. For details about the U.S. defence installations in Australia, see pp.210-212.
Western World generally and of Australia in particular. (The establishment of the rocket range at Woomera and Britain's nuclear test programme in Australia probably had a similar effect.) It seems likely that this has raised the perceived value of nuclear weapons in the minds of many Australians and has consequently strengthened, albeit marginally, the forces for proliferation in Australia. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that in the eyes of many Australians the presence of these installations has enhanced the credibility of the American alliance; not only has Washington's capacity to meet its commitments in Asia been strengthened, but in addition, the U.S. has acquired a further interest in preserving Australia's independence. Issues such as this, point up the fact that in response to the problem of nuclear proliferation, the U.S. has often had to strike a balance between two conflicting considerations, viz., whereas the pursuit of nuclear restraint requires that the United States keep its nuclear weapons in the background of its policies, the provision of guarantees sometimes demands that they be kept at the foreground.

As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, an examination of U.S. security policy in Asia in the years 1964-68 casts a revealing light on American efforts to limit proliferation. To take first the case of Washington's relations with Japan. United States nonproliferation policy with respect to that country would have been well served by a strategy aimed at reinforcing to the full those factors which tended to point Japan in a non-nuclear direction.

1. For details about Woomera and the British test programme, see above, pp.189-190.
2. On this point see, Hedley Bull, loc. cit., pp.6-7.
However, because of pressure in Washington that Japan should do more for its own defence and be prepared to assist further the Western effort in the Far East, policies were adopted which could have the effect of undermining powerful anti-nuclear forces in Japan. It will be noted in the next chapter that the promotion of ideas which could be regarded as inimical to the policy of nonproliferation in Japan became more marked after the Nixon Administration assumed office in 1969.

So far as relations between Delhi and the United States were concerned, Washington was prepared to admit that India had a legitimate security problem and that there was a danger that the country might be forced to acquire nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the U.S. was reluctant to formally commit itself to the defence of India. Delhi's request for a nuclear guarantee came at a time when criticism of America's security commitments abroad was building up in the United States. Though there were a number of reasons for the abandonment of the Indian initiative, Washington's reluctance at that time to further extend its defence commitments abroad was clearly a major one. The same considerations would appear to have been a factor in Washington's reluctance to extend its security commitments into the Malaysia-Singapore area.

The provision of effective guarantees and assurances has long been regarded as a vital element in efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. But by 1968, forces had begun to emerge in the U.S. which were destined to throw a shadow on America's existing commitments and which were already making it difficult for Washington to enter into new ones. It did not bode well for the success of another important element in America's nonproliferation strategy that these developments in U.S. thinking about the nation's commitments abroad should
have coincided with American (and Soviet) efforts to promote the N.P.T.¹

In the present chapter an attempt was made to examine the relationship between nonproliferation and U.S. security policy in Asia in the years 1964–68. The analysis, it is suggested, reinforces a point made earlier, viz., that efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia have often had to take second place to the pursuit of other U.S. policy objectives. In the next chapter the relationship between nonproliferation and U.S. security policy in Asia in the years 1969–71 will be examined.

¹ The N.P.T. was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968, and signed on the same day by the U.S., the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and more than 50 other countries. It was due to enter into force when instruments of ratification had been deposited by the U.S., the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and 40 other governments.
CHAPTER X

NONPROLIFERATION AND AMERICAN SECURITY

POLICY IN ASIA, 1969 - 1971

Since the Nixon Administration assumed office in January 1969, U.S. policy-makers have carried out a thoroughgoing review of America's defence and foreign policies. A major stimulus to this re-evaluation was, of course, the American experience in Vietnam. By the end of 1968 U.S. forces already committed to the war in S.E. Asia totalled almost half a million men and during that year alone the conflict had claimed the lives of some 15,000 Americans. In addition, United States involvement in Vietnam had provoked condemnation of America in many parts of the world and at home had resulted in a bitter polarization of American society. These pressures had, amongst other things, forced President Johnson to announce that he would not seek re-election to the White House and had stimulated widespread disillusionment in the U.S. with foreign commitments. During the campaign for the Presidency in 1968, Mr. Nixon was careful not to commit himself too far on the question of Vietnam. However, there can be little doubt that his victory in the election was at least partly a reflection of the American public's disenchantment with the previous administration's handling of the war and of their hope that the Republicans would lead the U.S. out of its current difficulties in South East Asia and find a means of avoiding similar entanglements in the future.

Another important stimulus to the Nixon Administration's reassessment of U.S. foreign and defence policies was the new government's belief that significant changes had taken place in
the structure of international relations;¹ as President Nixon put it, "the configuration of power that emerged from the Second World War — [was] gone."² The changes cited by President Nixon included the rehabilitation of Japan and Western Europe; the growth of many new nations to a stage where they were capable of shouldering more responsibility for their own security and well-being; the fragmentation of the "Stalinist bloc" and the consequent change in the nature of the communist challenge; the expansion of Soviet military (especially strategic-nuclear) power; and the replacement of the rigid bi-polar world of the 1940's and 1950's by one characterised by "multilateral diplomacy."³

1. The Nixon Administration's views on this matter were set out in some detail in President Nixon's first two foreign policy reports to Congress. See, A New Strategy For Peace: U.S. Foreign Policy For The 1970's, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Washington, February 18, 1970, pp.1-13. See also, Building For Peace: U.S. Foreign Policy For The 1970's, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Washington, February 25, 1971, pp.1-4. That the new government's thinking on this and other aspects of international relations and U.S. foreign policy drew heavily on the views of the President's adviser on national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, is apparent from an examination of some of the latter's writings. See especially, Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, pp.52-97. For Kissinger's views on possible measures for a settlement of the war in Vietnam, see ibid., pp.100-135.

2. See, Building For Peace, p.2.

3. A similar view had previously been developed by Henry Kissinger. According to him, the "age of the superpowers" was drawing to an end and was being replaced by one characterised by what he called "political multipolarity" in which weaker states enjoyed greater influence in world affairs than before even though overwhelming military strength continued to reside with the two superpowers. For an exposition of these ideas, see Kissinger, op. cit., pp.53-90.
According to the President, these changes had undermined many of the assumptions and practices of post-war U.S. foreign and defence policies and had thus necessitated a thoroughgoing review of American thinking in this area. It was the task of the new administration he added, to "lead the nation through a fundamental transition in foreign policy."¹

The purpose of the present chapter is to examine United States security policy in Asia in the period 1969-1971 and to assess the significance of this policy for American efforts to limit proliferation in the area. It will be noted that the Nixon Government's review of American foreign and defence policies had a particularly important impact on U.S. security policy in Asia. More importantly, it will be argued that U.S. security policy in Asia in the years 1969-1971 was, in many respects, inconsistent with the goal of nonproliferation in the area. The approach adopted in this chapter will be as follows. In the first place it must be conceded that the Nixon doctrine has tended to overshadow all other developments concerning U.S. security policy in Asia in the period under review. It seems reasonable, then, that an attempt should be made to analyse the main characteristics of the Nixon doctrine and to assess, in general terms, its significance for American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia. But an analysis which took account of the Nixon doctrine only would be incomplete for the purposes of this chapter. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the issues under review it will be necessary to supplement the examination of the Nixon doctrine with a somewhat more specific analysis of United States security policy towards India, Japan and Australia.

¹ Building For Peace, p.2.
A. The Nixon Doctrine and its Significance for American Nonproliferation Policy in Asia

A major result of the Nixon Government's reassessment of America's defence and foreign policies was the enunciation, during the first year of the new administration, of what became known as the Nixon doctrine. Some writers have used the latter term as a synonym for the Nixon Administration's foreign policy as a whole. However, on the basis of the material contained in President Nixon's first two foreign policy reports to Congress, it seems reasonable to interpret the Nixon doctrine in a more limited way than this, viz., as a statement of the basis on which the United States was prepared to participate in the defence and development of its friends and allies. This is the meaning which will be given the term in this chapter.

The basic ingredients of the Nixon doctrine were officially revealed for the first time in a press conference during President Nixon's visit to Guam in July 1969. They were repeated by President Nixon in an address to the American nation in November 1969. The Nixon doctrine has since been described on a number of occasions: in a host of speeches and interviews by the President and members of his administration; in President Nixon's annual foreign policy reports to Congress; and in a lengthy report on U.S. foreign policy.

1. See for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Half Past Nixon" in Foreign Policy, No. 3, Summer 1971, pp.3-21.
2. Of course, the Nixon doctrine was not the only result of the new government's review of U.S. foreign and defence policies. Among other things, the Nixon Administration's policies towards Russia and China were products of this reassessment also. Some reference has already been made in this thesis to these latter policies.
4. See, A New Strategy For Peace and Building For Peace.
by the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers. The military aspects of the policy have received special treatment in the defence posture statements of the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Laird.

From an analysis of these many renditions of the Nixon doctrine, two basic ideas emerge. In the first place it has been stressed that "the United States will keep all its treaty commitments". America, according to President Nixon, has "no intention of withdrawing from the world". To desert those countries who have come to depend on the United States, he has added, "would cause disruption and invite aggression". In a similar spirit, the U.S. has emphasised that it has no intention of withdrawing its nuclear umbrella. Moreover, this reaffirmation of America's commitment to the nuclear defence of its allies, and those nations whose survival it considers vital to its own security, has been linked, among other things, to the goal of nonproliferation. As President Nixon said in February, 1971:

... we bear special obligations toward non-nuclear countries. Their concern would be magnified if we were to leave them defenseless against nuclear blackmail or conventional aggression backed by nuclear power. Nations in a position to build their own nuclear weapons would be likely to do so.

5. Building For Peace, p.5.
6. ibid.
7. ibid.
By reaffirming its alliance and other commitments in the way indicated above, Washington sought to convey the impression that the Nixon doctrine did not involve any substantial abandonment of the fundamental goals and purposes of post-war American foreign policy. The United States, President Nixon would have the world believe, is still committed to maintaining the global balance of power; is as anxious as ever to counter aggression and uphold international order; is still firmly dedicated to containing communism on a global scale; and, most important from the point of view of this thesis, remains interested in promoting the idea of nonproliferation.

But there is a second and more significant message in the Nixon doctrine. Since the day the new policy was first enunciated at Guam, it has been repeatedly emphasised that America's friends and allies had to do more for their own defence, and that the United States expected to do less. As President Nixon explained it in February, 1971:

... it is no longer natural or possible in this age to argue that security or development around the globe is primarily America's concern. The defense and progress of other countries must be first their responsibility and second, a regional responsibility. ... The United States can and will participate, where our interests dictate, but as a weight - not the weight in the scale.¹

More specifically, the Nixon doctrine makes it clear that, where possible, American forces should not be used in limited warfare situations, such as border skirmishes, internal insurrections, internal subversion supported from outside, and even, straightforward low-level aggression against a friend or ally. Other types of military assistance, as well as economic aid, will continue to be made available. America's strategic role in respect to its friends and allies appears to be limited to

¹. ibid., p.6.
deterring nuclear attack and, possibly, to helping resist massive conventional invasions.

Though the Nixon doctrine purports to be global in its application there can be no denying that its major impact so far has been in Asia. It was no coincidence, it seems, that the new policy was first enunciated during a presidential tour of that region. Almost immediately it provided a framework for what became known as the policy of "Vietnamization"; not only was South Vietnam's contribution to the war in that country substantially increased, but also, the U.S. began withdrawing large numbers of its own forces.¹ Moreover, in addition to the rundown of U.S. forces in Vietnam, Washington announced that large numbers of American troops would be withdrawn from Japan, Okinawa, Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines also.² By way of contrast, Washington appears to have hesitated over applying the Nixon doctrine in Europe. In December 1970 the American President announced that the U.S. "would maintain and improve its forces in Europe and not reduce them without reciprocal action by [its] adversaries."³ In February of the following year he declared that:

accurately or inaccurately, our allies [in Europe] would interpret a substantial withdrawal of American forces as a substantial withdrawal of America's


². Plans were announced during 1970 to withdraw 20,000 men from South Korea, 12,000 from Japan, 5,000 from Okinawa, 6,000 from the Philippines and 9,800 from Thailand by mid-1971. See, Strategic Survey, 1970, p.4.

³. As indicated by President Nixon in Building For Peace, p.12.
This tendency to discriminate against Asia appears to have been further underlined in the Nixon Administration's plans for the long-term overall structure and deployment of U.S. general purpose forces. Secretary Laird has emphasised that, unlike the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations which aimed at a capability for, amongst other things, fighting large Asian and European conflicts simultaneously (a goal which Laird claims was never attained), the Nixon Administration intends to maintain peacetime general purpose forces adequate only for simultaneously meeting a major communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere. However it is clear from Secretary Laird's latest defence posture statement, that the U.S. forces earmarked for, or potentially available for use in Asia, will be held in, or primarily committed to, the N.A.T.O. area.

Moreover, as Earl Ravenal has pointed out, these plans to downgrade America's physical presence in Asia were scheduled at a time when the U.S. was also acknowledging serious deficiencies in its European capabilities.

1. See, ibid. It is clear, though, that there was considerable support, at least in Congress, for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. In May 1971 Senator Mansfield, Democratic Leader in the Senate, was able to obtain significant though far from sufficient support for a resolution in the Senate to halve the number of American troops in Europe. (The resolution was defeated 61-36.) On this occasion, President Nixon stated that a unilateral withdrawal of 150,000 American troops from Europe would constitute "an error of historic dimensions". On this issue see Ronald Steele, "A Spheres of Influence Policy", in Foreign Policy, No. 5, Winter 1971-72, p.108.

2. See, 1972 Defence Posture Statement, pp.13 and 16. See also, remarks by President Nixon in A New Strategy For Peace, pp. 128-129. President Nixon has characterised the change from the strategy of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations to that of the Nixon Administration as a change from a "2 1/2 war" to a "1 1/2 war" strategy.

in its lift resources and when its estimates of Asian communist capabilities had, if anything, edged upward since the previous year's defence report.¹ There can be no denying that, so far at least, the practical effects of the Nixon doctrine have been much more marked in Asia than in Europe. So long as America's military commitment in the N.A.T.O. area remains substantially unchanged it would seem incorrect to describe the Nixon doctrine as truly global in its application.²

But regardless of the nature of America's present and future commitments in Europe, there can be little doubt that the Nixon doctrine represents an historic turning point so far as American policy in Asia is concerned. Ever since the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the U.S. has demonstrated a willingness, if necessary, to deploy large numbers of American forces on the Asian mainland. (Following the Korean conflict, though, there was widespread distaste in the U.S. for the idea of American involvement in land wars on the Asian mainland. However, a substantial U.S. military presence was maintained in South Korea under the terms of the defence agreement between

2. On this point, see Pierre Hassner, "Pragmatic Conservatism in the White House", in Foreign Policy, No. 3, Summer 1971, pp.41-61. Harry Gelber has also remarked on the importance that the Nixon Administration continues to attach to America's commitments in Europe. See his contribution, "The U.S.A. and Australia" in H.G. Gelber (ed.), Problems of Australian Defence, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1970, p.85. These views should be compared with those of Hedley Bull. See above, pp.221-222. However, even Bull has conceded that "Europe has so far been less affected than other areas" by the pattern of United States withdrawal. See, Hedley Bull, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 4, July 1971, p.671.
that country and America. Later, during the war in Vietnam, the U.S. increased its military presence on the Asian mainland to hitherto unprecedented levels.) But the Nixon doctrine appears to have changed all this. The withdrawals from Vietnam and South Korea are concrete evidence that the U.S. is moving away from large scale military involvement on the Asian mainland, and towards what might be called a peripheral or off-shore posture. At the same time, these withdrawals have been accompanied by the most explicit and thoroughgoing enunciation yet of Washington's anxiety to reduce the likelihood of U.S. military entanglement, not only on the mainland, but in other parts of Asia as well.

There seem to be two principal ways in which the Nixon doctrine could be expected to influence United States efforts to limit proliferation in Asia: through its impact on America's alliance commitments and other assurances of support in the Asian and Pacific region; and through the presumption, implicit in the doctrine, of greater U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons in Asia. Each of these needs to be examined closely.

From evidence educed in this and other chapters it is clear that undertakings to support countries against aggression or the threat of aggression constitute an important element in American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia. However, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the Nixon doctrine has inevitably raised questions about the credibility of U.S. commitments in Asia. Through the declaratory aspects of the doctrine alone, Washington has indicated that it is prepared to do much less than in the past to protect countries in Asia from aggression. (The obverse of this, viz., that countries in Asia must do more for themselves, has some intriguing implications so far as nonproliferation is concerned; as Hedley Bull has argued, "'local self-reliance', taken to its logical
conclusion, implies the existence of independent nuclear capabilities.¹ Moreover, the retreat from a "2 1/2 war" to a "1 1/2 war" strategy promises to place far fewer Americans on the ground in Asia in the future. This must inevitably raise doubts about America's willingness (and capacity) to come to the support of its friends and allies in the region² - doubts, moreover, which seem likely to increase as China acquires the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons on to targets in the United States.

The uncertainty which the Nixon doctrine has cast upon the credibility of America's commitments in Asia has been

2. This point has been made by Malcolm Hoag. He has been very critical of the rundown of U.S. general purpose forces in Asia and has argued that the consequent decline in the credibility of U.S. commitments in the area will make the task of containing proliferation much more difficult. See Malcolm W. Hoag, "Political and Strategic Relations: A View from Washington", in Bruce Brown (ed.), Asia and the Pacific in the 1970's, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971, pp.180-182. Significantly, only a minority of unofficial American observers seem to have accepted Hoag's views. Most of those who have written on the subject in the last two or three years have tended to urge that the U.S. should limit its overseas commitments in one way or another, especially in Asia. For a sample of this thinking, see Graham Allison, Ernest May, and Adam Yarmolinski, "U.S. Military Policy: Limits of Intervention", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2, January 1970, pp.245-261; Carl Kayzen, "Military Strategy, Military Forces, and Arms Control" in Kermit Gordon (ed.), Agenda For The Nation, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968, pp.557-559; Paul C. Warnke and Leslie H. Gelb, "Security or Confrontation : The Case for a Defence Policy" in Foreign Policy, No. 1, Winter 1970-71, pp.6-16; Charles W. Yost, "World Order and American Responsibility" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 1, October 1968, pp.1-14.
reinforced by an important and simultaneous development in the area of international security, viz., the emergence in recent years of a situation of strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (It is important to note in this context that U.S. defence arrangements in Asia have operated as a deterrent against Russia as well as against China.) There are, of course, difficulties in using parity in the sense of equality in particular dimensions of military power as an acceptable measure of the balance of military strength between two countries. As Hedley Bull has suggested, such measures are an unreliable indication of "overall military strength" and tell us little about the likely outcome of an armed conflict.\(^1\) However, as the same writer has argued:

Where numbers of men or weapons can be measured and opposing states shown to be equal or un-equal in these respects a yardstick exists by reference to which the impression can be created that strategic power has been gauged in a meaningful way.\(^2\)

In respect of at least two of the measures of Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear power (numbers of I.C.B.M.'s and total deliverable megatonnage), parity could be said to have been achieved already.\(^3\) A similar situation is expected to develop

---

in respect of submarine launched ballistic missiles (S.L.B.M.'s) in the not-too-distant future. Moreover, the Nixon Administration, like the Johnson Administration before it, has accepted this situation, at least in the sense that Washington has rejected attempts at recapturing numerical superiority through accelerated U.S. strategic deployments in those categories where parity has been achieved. As President Nixon himself has put it:

... an inescapable reality of the 1970's is the Soviet Union's possession of powerful and sophisticated strategic forces approaching, and in some categories, exceeding ours in numbers and capability.

It seems reasonable to argue that the position of strategic superiority which the U.S. enjoyed for so long in respect of the Soviet Union, clearly strengthened Washington's bargaining position in relation to Moscow. This factor was vividly demonstrated at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 when America's overwhelming numerical and qualitative superiority in strategic forces undoubtedly played an important part in the successful (to the U.S.) resolution of that confrontation.

But American strategic superiority was important in another respect even more directly related to the issue under discussion; it undoubtedly helped to reinforce America's allies in the belief that they could depend on U.S. guarantees of support. Consequently, the emergence of parity could be expected to undermine some of this confidence in American support. This seems especially likely where the emergence of strategic parity has

been seen to occur in conjunction with simultaneous developments which have also tended to raise doubts about the credibility of U.S. security commitments. It is for this reason that the emergence of strategic parity is significant from the point of view of American commitments in Asia; parity has tended to reinforce the doubts about American will and purpose in the Asian and Pacific region which have arisen in the wake of the Nixon doctrine.

It seems reasonable to argue then that the Nixon doctrine can be expected to detract from the credibility of U.S. commitments in Asia and consequently from the cause of nonproliferation in the area as well. But this is only one way in which the new policy might be expected to influence American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia. Another concerns the place of nuclear weapons in the Nixon Administration's military strategy in that area.

The link between the role of nuclear weapons in the military plans of the existing nuclear powers on the one hand, and efforts to limit proliferation on the other, has been eloquently explained by Hedley Bull. He has argued that:

The more these [nuclear] countries can minimize the role played by nuclear weapons in their diplomacy and military strategy, the less the gap will seem to be that divides the nuclear "haves" from the "have-nots" and the less imperative it will seem to the latter to take steps to cross it. At the minimum this policy of restraint requires that the nuclear powers persist in not using nuclear weapons in the military conflicts in which they are from time to time...

1. On this point see Slocombe, op. cit., p.16.
2. Slocombe has argued that the effects of parity have been most noticeable in respect of America's allies in Europe. See, ibid. However in arriving at this conclusion, Slocombe seems to have under-estimated the impact of parity, in conjunction with the Nixon doctrine, in Asia.
engaged. ... At the maximum the policy of restraint would require the adoption of a commitment not to use nuclear weapons first or not to use them against non-nuclear powers; and would require that the nuclear states conspicuously equip themselves to conduct military operations without recourse to nuclear arms and relegate the latter to the status of weapons of last resort.¹

In the years 1964-68 the Johnson Administration seems to have been anxious to minimize the significance of nuclear weapons in America's Asian strategy,² though Washington's long-standing reluctance to agree to proposals to ban the first use of nuclear weapons in Asia must qualify this assertion to some extent.³ In hearings in 1966 on the following

1. See, Hedley Bull, "Western Policy and Nuclear Proliferation in Asia", in World Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, October 1967, p.6. Morton Halperin has drawn attention to some of the consequences resulting from America's over-emphasis on the place of nuclear weapons in its European strategy. According to him:

... this policy, ... not only vitiated the pressures to create adequate conventional forces in Europe, but also added to the prestige of nuclear weapons so as later to make it hard to prevent their spread in Europe. See, Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, New York: Praeger, 1965, p.114.

2. Writing in 1965, Morton Halperin claimed that the United States had not repeated in Asia the mistake it had made in Europe of emphasising too much the value of nuclear weapons in defence. See, ibid.

3. There is evidence that shortly after China's first nuclear test, Peking proposed to the U.S. that both countries pledge that neither of them would be the first to use nuclear weapons. See, Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control, New York: Praeger, 1965, p.127. A proposal that the nuclear powers should enter into a "no-first-use" agreement has been part of the Chinese position on arms control ever since. For a recent statement on Chinese arms control proposals, see Statement of the People's Republic of China on July 30, 1971, New China News Agency Report, Aug. 7, 1971. Reproduced in Harry G. Gelber, "Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy", in Problems of Communism, Vol. 20, No. 6, November-December 1971, p.42. Washington has consistently refused to enter into a "no-first-use" agreement
year's defence budget, Defence Secretary McNamara said:

...the question of what our theatre nuclear posture in the Far East should be in the future will require continuing study. In this connection, there is one lesson that we can draw from our experience in Europe, and that is to avoid a strategy which relies almost wholly on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to cope with the enemy's "massive" ground forces. 4

In September 1967, in his speech announcing the Sentinel A.B.M. programme, McNamara again emphasised the dangers which would flow from too great a dependence on tactical nuclear weapons in the Asian theatre. 2 That the administration could conceive of no circumstances in which the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam or other parts of South East Asia would serve American interests was reaffirmed by McNamara in congressional hearings in 1965 and 1966. 3

3 contd. with either Russia or China. For a view which suggests that the U.S. should "give serious consideration to the Chinese proposal to ban the first use of nuclear weapons", see Morton H. Halperin, "America and Asia: The Impact of Nixon's China Policy", in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), Sino-American Relations, 1949-71, New York: Praeger, 1972, pp.17-18.


There are reasons for believing that the Nixon Administration has been less concerned than the previous government about minimizing the significance of nuclear weapons in America’s Asian strategy. Mr. Laird’s 1972 defence posture statement was significant, among other things, for the stress that was placed on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in Asia.¹ This, as well as other evidence, has led a number of writers to speculate that the Nixon doctrine involves a greater U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons in Asia than previously.² There can be no certainty, of course, that this is an accurate reading of the Nixon Administration’s intentions. Nevertheless, in view of Washington’s twin goals in Asia (the maintenance of its security commitments and a reduction in the level of conventional forces to support these commitments) it is not a wholly unreasonable interpretation of the American Government’s thinking on the matter.³ It seems, then, that the

1. See, 1972 Defence Posture Statement, pp.18-19 and 75-76.
3. According to one noted U.S. authority on Chinese military policy, Peking has, "to some extent" read the Nixon doctrine in this way. See testimony of Alice Langley Hsieh in ABM, MIRV, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race, hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organisation of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., March-June, 1970, Washington, 1970, p.138. Hsieh has argued that as a result of its assessment of increased U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons in Asia, Peking could be excused for believing that in some future crisis in the area Washington might well be faced with a choice between a nuclear response and no response at all. See ibid. This brings to mind an earlier controversy about U.S. military policy in Europe. In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s U.S. advocates of a substantial build-up in N.A.T.O.’s conventional strength argued, among other things, that an over-dependence on nuclear weapons in European defence planning had narrowed the options available to the U.S. in the event
Nixon Administration may have already upgraded the significance of nuclear weapons in its Asian strategy and, for the reasons stated earlier, contributed in yet another way to strengthening rather than weakening the forces for proliferation in Asia.

In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of U.S. security policy in Asia in the period 1969-71, and to assess the significance of this policy for American efforts to limit proliferation in the area, it is necessary to now turn from this analysis of the Nixon doctrine in general and to consider instead U.S. security policy towards India, Japan and Australia in the years 1969-71.


Since the Republicans under President Nixon assumed office in January 1969, relations between India and the United States have deteriorated considerably. Some indication of the new President's thinking about India was contained in an article he wrote for Foreign Affairs in October 1967.\(^1\) There, Mr. Nixon was far from enthusiastic about India, a country which he called a "staggering giant". Though he conceded that, as the world's largest democracy, India deserved American economic aid, the predominant tone of Mr. Nixon's remarks was one of impatience and frustration: India's population problem was

---


immense; too much importance was attached to industrialization and not enough to agriculture; the emphasis on government rather than private enterprise was all wrong. There was an implied preference in Mr. Nixon's remarks for Pakistan, a preference it will be noted, which has characterised the Republican Administration's approach to the problems of the subcontinent.

Relations between Delhi and President Nixon's Government were unpromising from the start. In August 1969, the American leader was quick to dismiss Mrs. Ghandi's very tentative proposal for a Regional Security Convention. Moreover, there was resentment in Washington about Delhi's criticism of America's role in Vietnam and about India's request to the U.S. early in 1970, to close five of its cultural centres in India. But the issue which proved most damaging to Indo-U.S. relations in the last couple of years was Washington's role in the troubles in East Pakistan. In October 1970, Washington agreed to sell a limited amount of military equipment to the Pakistan Government. This decision was a departure from the policy adopted by the U.S. after the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, of not selling lethal military equipment in the subcontinent, and was loudly condemned in Delhi. In March 1971, the crisis in East Pakistan, which had been building up ever since the victory of the Awami League in elections late in 1970 and the subsequent declaration of the state of Bangladesh, finally exploded. Three divisions of West Pakistani troops were despatched to East Pakistan to arrest the

Awami League leadership and to suppress the revolt. The savage crack-down by the West Pakistani troops, which was loudly condemned in many parts of the world, resulted, amongst other things, in a massive flight of refugees from East Pakistan into India. Though the U.S. was generous in its support of the refugees, it seemed reluctant to castigate Pakistan too severely.¹

Washington's ambivalent attitude towards the crisis in East Pakistan created great bitterness towards the U.S. in India² and has almost certainly further reduced Washington's capacity to influence events in that country.³ It seems reasonable to argue that this development could strengthen, albeit marginally, the forces for proliferation in India. Not only, it seems, will Indian leaders be less likely in future to listen to American advice about the question of nonproliferation in general, but in addition, they will probably be more reluctant than ever to

2. See, ibid., p.132.
3. In August 1971, Delhi signed a twenty year friendship treaty with Moscow. It is difficult to determine at this stage just how much the policies of the current U.S. Administration contributed to this move. One view has it that Delhi's decision to enter into the pact with Moscow reflected India's views about American credibility in Asia. See Ashok Kapur, "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy: A Perspective" in The World Today, Vol. 27, No. 9, September 1971, pp.387-388. However Kapur does not provide any real evidence to support his claim, and in any case, it seems too early to try to reach firm judgements about this matter.
believe in tacit guarantees of American military assistance.  


There seems little reason to doubt that the Nixon Administration, like those before it, would prefer that Japan not acquire nuclear weapons. This has been clearly implied in official U.S. statements about America's opposition to proliferation in general as well as in references to Washington's desire for a non-nuclear Japan in particular. At first glance,

1. Even prior to the events in East Pakistan journalists and specialist writers on defence in India were pointing out that the policies of the Nixon Administration clearly indicated that the U.S. would be reluctant in the future to become militarily involved in Asia on behalf of other states. See for example, Dilip Mukerjee, "India's Defence Perspectives" in Survival, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1969, p.5; and, Noorani, loc. cit., pp.110-117. The Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi noted what he regarded as a decline in U.S. interest in South and West Asia in particular. See, K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Security" in Survival, Vol. 13, No. 5, May 1971, p.156. It is not only Indian observers who have noted this development in American policy. Zbigniew Brzezinski has complained that in President Nixon's 1971 foreign policy report to Congress (Building For Peace), U.S. interest in the future of South Asia was "reduced to three pages of banalities." See, Brzezinski, loc. cit., p.11.

2. On this latter point, see for example, statement by Under Secretary of State Johnson in United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Part 5, Japan and Okinawa, hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., January 26, 27, 28 and 29, 1970 (hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings on Japan and Okinawa, 1970), p.1159.
the goal of a non-nuclear Japan appears to have been assisted by
the two most important developments in Japan-U.S. security
relations in the period under review; the successful resolution
of the Okinawa reversion issue and the renewal in 1970 of the
Japan-U.S. security treaty. Both of these developments served
to strengthen the formal political relationship between Japan
and the U.S., and therefore could be said to have reinforced two
of the practices which have grown up alongside that relation­
ship, viz., the maintenance by Japan of armed forces suitable
only for the conventional defence of the Japanese homeland,
and reliance by Japan on the American nuclear umbrella.

However, closer scrutiny suggests that the security
relationship between Japan and the U.S. in the years 1969-71
was not as conducive to nonproliferation as the reasoning here
suggests. In the first place, notwithstanding the renewal
of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, the Nixon doctrine resulted
in a run-down of American forces in Japan. Under an agreement
reached in December 1970, most of the U.S. combat units in
Japan proper were withdrawn by mid-1971, thus reducing the
number of American personnel there from 40,000 to 28,000.
American forces in Okinawa were also to be cut in 1971 from
40,000 to 35,000. But perhaps equally important as the
reduction of U.S. forces in Japan was the withdrawal, during
the early months of 1971, of 20,000 American servicemen from
South Korea. Japan had long regarded the security of South
Korea as vital to its own defence (a fact which was reaffirmed
in the November 1969 agreement over Okinawa) and the American

4. See below, pp.345-346.
withdrawals, against the wishes of the South Korean President, could be expected to help undermine confidence in Japan about America's defence commitments in the Far East.

It was noted in the previous chapter that during the period 1964-68 (and indeed before then), Washington was anxious that Japan should play a larger role in its own defence. It was also argued there that this policy, to the extent that it promised to help erode the anti-militarist sentiment in Japan, could weaken the opposition to proliferation in that country. But efforts to promote the idea of a wider Japanese security role figured just as prominently in U.S. policy towards Japan in the period 1969-71. It was especially obvious in the terms of the Okinawa settlement.

Okinawa had been under U.S. control since the end of World War II and during that time had been developed into America's most important base in the Far East. Since 1951, successive U.S. Governments had indicated their intention that Okinawa should eventually revert to Japan. It was just as often pointed out, however, that the strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific made immediate return inopportune. In recent years, the question of Okinawa's reversion, and more particularly, the disposition of the American bases on the island after reversion, became explosive issues in Japanese politics. There was mounting public and political pressure on the Japanese Government to insist on an early return of Okinawa without nuclear bases. In November 1969

President Nixon and the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Sato, arrived at an understanding on terms for the return of Okinawa to Japan no later than 1972. An agreement based on these principles was signed by Tokyo and Washington in June 1971.

In their agreement of November 1969, President Nixon and Mr. Sato also reaffirmed their joint intention to renew the Japan-U.S. security treaty. This was done in June 1970. Under the latest arrangement either country can withdraw from the agreement at a year's notice.

The terms of the Okinawa settlement went a long way towards accommodating Japanese feelings, especially on the nuclear weapons issue. America will be allowed to retain non-nuclear bases and installations in Okinawa after 1972 but these facilities will then be subject to the terms of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. This requires the U.S. to consult with the Japanese Government before using bases in Japan for combat operations or prior to any significant weapons build up. The U.S. has undertaken to remove all nuclear weapons from Okinawa by the date of reversion and will not redeploy them there without the permission of the Japanese Government. About a month after the Okinawa settlement, Mr. Sato's Liberal Democratic Party (L.D.P.) won a convincing victory in Japan's eleventh post-war general election. The L.D.P. fought the election primarily on the basis of the government's successful negotiation of the Okinawa issue and on the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. Its victory was widely interpreted as a harbinger of close co-operation between Tokyo and Washington in the 1970's.

2. See remarks by U.S. Under Secretary of State Johnson in ibid., p.1177.
But as suggested earlier, though the successful resolution of the Okinawa reversion issue and the renewal of the Japan-U.S. security agreement implied the maintenance of close links between Tokyo and Washington, the Okinawa settlement in particular seemed to foreshadow a wider Japanese security role. To begin with, after reversion the Ryuku Islands, which include Okinawa, will be brought within the area defended by Japanese forces. This will probably require some expansion of these forces and will involve the Japan Self Defence Agency in the security of an area which will continue to remain highly important for the Western defence effort in the Far East. However, it was the references in the Okinawa settlement to Japan's security interests in areas outside the country which seemed more important from the point of view of future Japanese defence policy.

In the Sato-Nixon communique of November 1969, the Japanese Prime Minister stated that "Japan would make further active contributions to the peace and prosperity of Asia". Japan, Mr. Sato said, "was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability in the Indochina area". But more pointedly, the Prime Minister affirmed that "the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan". It was specifically noted that the security of both

1. See remarks of Under Secretary of State Johnson in his "Backgrounder" of November 21, 1969, explaining the Sato-Nixon communique. Reproduced in Senate Hearings on Japan and Okinawa, 1970, p.1443. It should be noted that though the Okinawa settlement provides for the removal of all nuclear weapons from the island by the date of reversion, the base will continue to play an important role in support of America's military effort in the Far East. It is expected that U.S. forces in Okinawa will remain at about 35,000 after some cuts during 1971. See, Strategic Survey, 1970, p.37.

2. See, Okinawa Communique, p.1426.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.1427.
the Republic of Korea and of the Taiwan area was essential to Japan's own security. 1

These references to Japan's concern for the security of areas adjacent to it in the Far East, aroused the interest of observers who saw in it a departure from previous Japanese policy. Certainly, the Nixon Administration itself seemed to view the Japanese undertakings as uniquely important. In his "Backgrounder" explaining the Sato-Nixon communique, Under Secretary of State Johnson emphasised that this was "the first time in an official Japanese Government statement" that the security of Japan had been related so directly to the peace and security of the Far East. 2 Though it would be wrong to infer from the communique, Johnson added, that Japanese troops might be used in say the defence of Korea, Mr. Sato's statement nevertheless represented "a somewhat considerable change in (sic.) Japanese public position on these matters". 3 Later, in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Under Secretary Johnson elaborated further on the matter. He said,

Although Japan has not assumed any security commitments toward her neighbours, she recognizes a security interest in the maintenance of a non-Communist South Korea and Taiwan. ... Japanese public opinion may not be unanimous in support of the Prime Minister's views, but there is little doubt that most Japanese would be concerned by Communist takeovers in South Korea or Taiwan. 4

It has to be conceded that the Okinawa settlement did not involve Japan in any specific security commitments toward its

1. ibid., p.1426.
3. ibid., p.1444.
neighbours. Indeed, the reference in the Sato-Nixon communique to Japan's concern about the security of certain countries in the Far East related more to potential American military activity than to Japanese; by acknowledging that its own security was linked to that of Korea and Taiwan, Japan implied that in the event of threats to the security of those countries, the U.S. would not be denied the use of bases in Japan and Okinawa to meet such threats.¹ These qualifications notwithstanding, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the wording of those sections of the Sato-Nixon communique concerned with Japan's security interests, gives strong encouragement to the idea of a wider Japanese military role.² This might not be so significant, were it not for the fact that other statements by senior members of the Nixon Administration about Japan's present and future role in Asia have also given encouragement to the same notion.

Mr. Nixon's own thinking on the matter was revealed in the article he wrote for *Foreign Affairs* in October 1967.³ There, the future president drew attention to expectations that Japan would soon become the world's third-strongest economic power. "Along with this dramatic economic surge", Mr. Nixon stressed, "Japan [would] surely want to play a greater role both diplomatically and militarily in maintaining the balance in Asia." [my emphasis.] In view of "the role Japan must play in helping secure the common safety of non-communist Asia", he added, it had to be trusted with its own armed forces and with responsibility for its own defence.⁴

¹. This was made clear by Under Secretary of State Johnson. See his remarks in ibid., pp.1166-1167.
³. See his "Asia After Viet Nam".
⁴. ibid., pp.120-121.
That Mr. Nixon had brought these ideas about Japan's role in Asia with him to the White House was apparent in the President's first foreign policy report to Congress in February, 1970. It was also obvious that these thoughts about Japan fitted in with the plans for a partial American withdrawal from Asia which were worked out in the National Security Council during the first year of the new administration. As the President said in the report just mentioned:

We determined that our relationship with Japan had to be founded on our mutual and increasingly collaborative concern for peace and security in the Far East.\(^1\)

Japan's partnership with the U.S., the President added, would "be a key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia."\(^2\)

Though the stress in the President's report was on Japan's "peaceful" contribution to the progress of Asia, it is possible, without any great difficulty, to construe his remarks as implying a military role as well. The question of Japan's role in Asian and world affairs was taken up again in President Nixon's second foreign policy report to Congress in February 1971. There, the President drew attention to the fact that Japan had "a tremendous stake in the peace and stability of Asia" and consequently had assumed "a major role in the regional activities of the area." But, as if to foreshadow a wider role for Japan, President Nixon declared that "as a permanent method of meeting her [Japan's] interests and discharging her responsibilities, ... these regional activities may not prove adequate."\(^3\)

President Nixon was not the only member of his administration to give encouragement to the idea of a wider Japanese

---

2. Ibid., p.58.
3. Building For Peace, p.34.
security role in Asia. In July 1969, Mr. Joseph Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, tentatively endorsed the notion of a wider political and military role for Japan, perhaps in conjunction with India. The idea of a wider Japanese military role was put much more explicitly by Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1970. He said:

The one thing I am sure of is that they [the Japanese] are going to do more, as you point out—the strengthening nationalism, their growing economy—they are going to be doing more in the military field. [my emphasis.]

Johnson was equally explicit that Japan should spend more on its own defence, though he did admit that expenditure on a strategic nuclear force "would be another matter." Another member of the current U.S. Administration who strongly supported the idea of a wider Japanese security role, is the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Laird. During a visit to Tokyo in July 1971, Mr. Laird warned his hosts that budget restraints and possible arms control agreements between the U.S. and Russia could substantially limit America's future military capacity in the Far East. It was considered likely, therefore, that the U.S. would look to Japan to play a larger part, not only in its own defence, but in the security of other parts of Asia as well. There were vague suggestions in what Mr. Laird said, that this should include a larger Japanese naval role.

3. Ibid. For additional evidence of Johnson's support for a greater Japanese defence effort see, ibid., pp. 1214-1215.
4. See, The New York Times, 8 July 1971 and The Japan Times, 18 July 1971. At least one authority with access to the Nixon Administration had doubts about encouraging Japan to do more in the military field. In an interview published early in 1970, Morton Halperin, former Under Secretary of
The attitude to Japan depicted so far is thoroughly understandable in terms of the Nixon doctrine. As part of its plan to reduce the American presence in Asia, the U.S. has withdrawn some of its forces from Japan and has closed down or relinquished some of its facilities in that country. At the same time, Washington expects Japan to assume a greater responsibility for its own defence and, perhaps eventually, to contribute to the security of other parts of Asia as well. But it would be wrong to view Washington's policy towards Japan in the period 1969-71 in these terms alone; as well as reflecting the Nixon doctrine it was a product also of Washington's views about the changing structure of world politics. It was noted earlier in this chapter that President Nixon and his foreign affairs adviser, Dr. Kissinger, have come to believe that the bipolar structure of international relations which characterised most of the post-war years has given way to some form of political multipolarity. It is apparent also that President Nixon and other members of the administration have come to regard Japan as occupying a key position in this new international power structure.

There were suggestions of this in President Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress in February 1971. There it was stressed that a "new international structure" was emerging in the Pacific region and that Japan along with the U.S.S.R., China, and the United States, would be one of the "major
elements" in the new edifice. A month later, Secretary of State Rogers described Japan as "a major world factor and a source of increasing influence for peace and prosperity in Asia" [my emphasis]. The Nixon Administration's characterisation of Japan as a "major element" in Asian and world politics led one Japanese commentator to question Mr. Marshall Green, America's Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, about the rationale behind Washington's thinking on the matter. In reply, Mr. Green drew attention to Japan's economic power, the size of its population, and its strategic importance. He added:

Surely, the Japanese Government and the Japanese people must now see Japan as one of the great powers in the international sphere [my emphasis].

The Nixon Administration has not been content to simply describe this pattern of major power relationships which it sees developing in Asia and the world. By its pronouncements alone, Washington has sought to encourage the emergence of this new structure. The idea that Japan, along with the U.S., China and the U.S.S.R., should assume some special responsibility for the maintenance of international order in Asia not only sits well with the Nixon doctrine, but also, with the administration's view that some form of "balance" or "equilibrium" amongst the world's major powers is the only real guarantee of peace and stability in an age of "political multipolarity". But the promotion of the idea of Japan as one of these major powers is significant from the point of view...

1. See, Building For Peace, pp.30 and 32.
2. See, Rogers Report, p.viii.
4. See especially, Building For Peace, p.32.
5. Dr. Kissinger has developed these ideas at some length. See, Kissinger, op. cit., pp.53-97.
view of America's commitment to the goal of nonproliferation. As suggested earlier in this thesis, there seems little reason to believe that Japan can attain the status of a great power without also acquiring nuclear weapons.\(^1\) Also, if Japan is to play a true balancing role in Asia (and this seems to be clearly envisaged in pronouncements on the subject by the Nixon Government), and given that the other members of the balance are all nuclear powers, will not Japan feel constrained to acquire nuclear weapons also? Further, Japan's graduation to the nuclear ranks in circumstances such as these could be expected to stimulate pressures for proliferation in India; there, the lure of great power status has had an especially strong appeal amongst supporters of an Indian nuclear force.\(^2\)

The analysis in this section suggests two points about United States policy towards Japan in the period 1969-71: first, that the Nixon Administration, like its predecessor, has encouraged Japan to assume more responsibility for its own defence; and second, that President Nixon and other senior U.S. officials have assiduously promoted the idea of Japan as a great power. For the reasons indicated earlier, both of these actions could be regarded as inconsistent with efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to Japan. There seems little reason to doubt that the Nixon Administration would prefer Japan to remain non-nuclear, but it is equally clear that there is a limit to the price it is prepared to pay in order to achieve this objective. Washington obviously has other goals in respect of Japan and is reluctant to abandon or substantially modify these even though to do so would make the task of persuading Japan to remain non-nuclear an easier one.

---

1. See above, pp.184-185.
2. See above, pp.118-119, and 131.

The Nixon Administration has not modified the existing formal security relationship between the U.S. and Australia. In May 1969, just four months after assuming office, President Nixon vigorously reaffirmed his government's support for the A.N.Z.U.S. pact; a similar expression of support was made on the occasion of the twentieth meeting of the A.N.Z.U.S. Council in September 1970. But despite the evidence of solidarity with its Pacific ally, the Nixon Administration nevertheless refused to allow Canberra to entice the U.S. into a military commitment on Australia's behalf in the Malaysia-Singapore area.

It has already been noted that in January 1968 the British Government indicated that it would withdraw virtually all of its forces from the Malaysia-Singapore area by the end of 1971. In February 1969 the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Gorton, announced that after lengthy consideration of the matter Canberra had decided to retain forces in Malaysia and Singapore after the British had withdrawn. According to the Prime Minister

1. This was during a visit to Washington by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Gorton. For the Prime Minister's account of this visit, including the remarks of President Nixon, see *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives* (hereafter referred to as C.P.D., H. of R.), Canberra, No. 8, 15 May 1969, pp.1887-1892.


... these forces [would] be available to oppose any insurgency which [was] externally promoted, which [was] a threat to the security of the region and which [was] beyond the capacity of the forces of Malaysia and Singapore to handle.  

Most significantly, Mr. Gorton emphasised that in the event of a situation arising which was beyond the capacity of the forces of the three nations to handle, Canberra "would ... look to the support of allies outside the region."  

The Australian Government was clearly hopeful that it could rely on U.S. assistance should it ever be needed. But developments in American thinking at this time provided little basis for Canberra's optimism. Washington had already revealed its distaste for involvement in the Malaysia-Singapore area and under the direction of the Nixon Administration was currently engaged in working out a policy towards Asia and the Pacific which would make additional U.S. commitments in the area most unlikely. During a visit to Washington in May 1969 the Australian Prime Minister discussed the A.N.Z.U.S. pact with U.S. leaders. Though Mr. Gorton received a "strong, forthright and unambiguous re-affirmation of the application of the [A.N.Z.U.S.] Treaty" it is clear that he was unable to persuade Washington that it should be prepared, in an emergency, to support militarily the Australian commitment to Malaysia and Singapore. 

In July, the U.S. President unveiled the Nixon doctrine and six months later, during a visit to Canberra, the American Vice-President, Mr. Agnew, interpreted the new U.S. policy to mean, among other things, that "America [would] honour present treaties, but [would] not enter into new defence obligations in Asia." This seems to have

2. ibid.  
finally precluded the possibility that Washington might be prepared to underwrite Australia's defence commitment to Malaysia and Singapore.

Washington's refusal to give Australia the assurances it wanted in regard to Malaysia and Singapore was thoroughly consistent with the Nixon doctrine. At the same time, however, the U.S. decision disappointed one of America's closest allies and helped to create doubt and uncertainty in Australia about the future direction of U.S. policy in Asia and the Pacific.¹

In the previous chapter an attempt was made to examine the relationship between nonproliferation and U.S. security policy in Asia in the years 1964-68. There it was suggested that efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia often had to take second place to the pursuit of other American policy objectives in the area. In the present chapter it has been argued that this trend has continued unabated during the years of the Nixon Administration. Of major importance from the point of view of U.S. security policy in Asia in the period 1969-71 has been the enunciation and implementation of the Nixon doctrine. Because of its effect in helping to undermine the credibility of U.S. guarantees and alliances in Asia as well as its tendency to upgrade the importance of nuclear weapons in America's Asian strategy, the Nixon doctrine seems basically inconsistent with the goal of nonproliferation in Asia. An examination of U.S. policies in respect of India, Japan and Australia in the period 1969-71 suggests that in many respects these also have been inconsistent with the goal of nonproliferation. Though the Nixon Government remains formally committed to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia it has proved at least as willing as the previous U.S. Administration to allow other objectives of American policy in Asia to take precedence over the goal of nonproliferation.

¹ See above, pp.218-223.
CHAPTER XI

THE PEACEFUL ATOM AND AMERICAN
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN ASIA

The emphasis so far in the present part (Part III) of the thesis has been concerned primarily with U.S. efforts to persuade India, Japan and Australia not to take up the nuclear weapons options they already have or might come to acquire in the future. This has involved a discussion, among other things, of the place in U.S. nonproliferation policy in Asia of matters such as America's military and diplomatic response to the Chinese nuclear force, the question of ballistic missile defence, and the issue of guarantees and assurances for America's friends and allies in Asia. But as the analysis in Chapter I suggested, there has long been another and equally important dimension to America's nonproliferation policy, viz., the attempt by the U.S. to deny other countries the wherewithal to build their own nuclear weapons.

From the earliest days of the nuclear era, however, Washington's aims in this direction were threatened by demands from nations everywhere for access to nuclear technology and by the fact that the latter could be utilized for military as well as peaceful purposes. To counter this difficulty the United States adopted two main strategies. (These have already been discussed in Chapter I, but for the purposes of the analysis in the present chapter it will be useful to briefly recall what was said earlier.) First, Washington reversed its early post-war attitude of nuclear secrecy, and, as was noted earlier in this thesis, actually took a lead in promoting the worldwide spread of nuclear technology. Since the mid-1950's the U.S. has sold reactors and related equipment abroad and has been willing to make available to cooperating states, on a long term
basis and at reasonable prices, quantities of enriched uranium (U235) for use as reactor fuel.\(^1\) Washington has argued that in addition to assisting the peaceful nuclear programmes of cooperating countries, this policy has served the cause of nonproliferation in two ways; by providing an opening for the application of safeguards, and by discouraging the establishment of indigenous uranium enrichment capabilities in countries overseas.\(^2\) Concomitant with the adoption of this policy towards the supply of U235, the American Government has, of course, also attempted to limit the proliferation of enrichment technology.\(^3\) This has resulted in a number of practices: classification of America's own enrichment technology; attempts by the U.S. Government to have other states classify theirs; a ban on exports from the U.S. of specialized equipment which could be used in enrichment plants; and, Federal Government ownership of America's own gaseous diffusion plants.\(^4\)

Second, in conjunction with this willingness to cooperate with foreign countries in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the U.S. Government has attempted to foster a spirit of cooperation that would encourage the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This has led to the development of a number of initiatives, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was established in 1957 to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA is a specialized agency of the United Nations, with its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Its primary mission is to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has a comprehensive set of safeguards to ensure that member states do not divert nuclear materials for unauthorized uses.

\(^1\) For further information on America's "Atoms for Peace" plan, see above, pp.17-25.


\(^3\) For further information on this, see above, pp.20-22.

\(^4\) Obviously, another reason for government ownership of America's gaseous diffusion plants is the fact that they were used to produce the fissionable material for the country's nuclear arsenal.
of atomic energy the U.S. has, at the same time, taken a lead in urging that all international transfers of peaceful nuclear technology be accompanied by safeguards to ensure that the equipment and fuel supplied is not utilized for military purposes. Initially, U.S. assistance in this field was usually accompanied by bilateral safeguards. Since January 1963, however, Washington has adopted the practice of transferring its bilateral nuclear assistance agreements to I.A.E.A. supervision and has encouraged other suppliers also to make maximum use of agency safeguards.¹

The United States has long been a participant in the nuclear programmes of India, Japan and Australia. It is the purpose of the present chapter to examine the nature and extent of this involvement and to examine its significance from the point of view of American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia. It will be noted that the United States has supplied India, Japan and Australia with quantities of U235 and has sold reactors to India and Japan. At the same time Washington has insisted that all three recipient states accept safeguards on the fuel and equipment supplied to ensure that it is not used for military purposes. But an examination of U.S. safeguards policy in Asia suggests, once again, that the American Government has been willing to allow other objectives of U.S. policy to take precedence over the goal of nonproliferation in Asia. Finally, in the last two or three years, important changes have taken place in American policy towards enrichment technology and the supply of U235. These changes have important implications for American nonproliferation policy and no analysis of U.S. efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia would be complete without some discussion of these matters.

¹ See above, pp.23-24.
A. The Nature and Extent of United States Involvement in the Indian, Japanese and Australian Nuclear Programmes

Asian countries have long been numbered amongst those which have received assistance under America's "Atoms for Peace" programme. In 1957, the U.S. supplied the first of a number of research reactors to Japan. Since 1961, America has established similar facilities in Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and South Vietnam. It has also contracted to supply the enriched uranium for these facilities and for Australia's small research reactor as well. But more important than all this, both in terms of co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and potential for nuclear weapons proliferation, have been the power reactor and associated enriched uranium agreements which the U.S. has entered into with India and Japan.

The story of American co-operation with India in the power reactor field revolves around the 380 M.W. facility at Tarapur, near Bombay. The Tarapur agreement, which was signed by Delhi and Washington in August 1963, was regarded as somewhat of a landmark by officials of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (U.S.A.E.C.); it was the first major foreign nuclear power project outside the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) complex in which the U.S. had been a

4. For a note on this facility, see above p.108.
major participant. Under the terms of the agreement approval was given for American participation in the construction of the station itself (the twin reactors were supplied by an American firm, International General Electric) and for the supply by the U.S. over a 30 year period of up to 14,500 kilograms of U235 for use in the station's reactors. To help finance the scheme the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) undertook to lend India 80 million dollars. The station at Tarapur commenced operations early in 1969. America's willingness and ability to co-operate with India on the Tarapur project has not predisposed Delhi towards greater dependence on the U.S. in the nuclear field. As already noted, of the three reactors currently operating or under construction in India, only the facility at Tarapur has been supplied by the United States.

The United States has come to assume a much more important place in the Japanese nuclear programme than it has in the Indian. America supplied the first reactor in Japan to generate electrical power. This was the 12 M.W. Japan Power Demonstration Reactor

---


4. See above, p.108.
(J.P.D.R.) which commenced operations in 1963.\textsuperscript{1} The contract for Japan's first commercial power reactor (the 160 M.W. natural uranium fuelled installation at Tokai-mura) went to a British rather than to an American firm but thereafter the United States established itself as the main foreign supplier of reactors and associated equipment for Japan's rapidly expanding nuclear industry; according to a report published in 1971 by the U.S.A.E.C. there were no less than twenty U.S. type power reactors of 100 M.W. or larger currently operating, under construction, or on order in Japan.\textsuperscript{2} (This is out of a total of twenty-one nuclear power units listed as being in operation, under construction, or on order in Japan as at 30 June 1971.)\textsuperscript{3}

But it is not only through the supply of reactors and related equipment that the United States has come to achieve a position of such great importance in Japan's nuclear programme; in addition, the U.S. has undertaken to supply, on a long-term basis, large quantities of enriched uranium for use as reactor fuel. America first agreed to sell U\textsubscript{235} to Japan in 1958. However, during the next ten years the amount supplied was relatively small and was used mainly for research purposes and for the J.P.D.R. In 1968 the United States Government entered into a new and very substantial U\textsubscript{235} supply

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. Gilinsky and Langer, \textit{op. cit.}, p.3.
  \item 2. \textit{The Nuclear Industry, 1971}, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, 1971, p.107. The designation "U.S. type power reactor", which is a standard form of reference used by the U.S.A.E.C., covers a variety of different arrangements. It can indicate any of the following: construction by a U.S. firm; participation by a U.S. firm through licensing or joint venture arrangements; and participation by a U.S. firm through a foreign subsidiary. U.S. type reactors use slightly enriched uranium as fuel. See, \textit{ibid.}, pp.105-106.
  \item 3. This list was compiled by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (A.A.E.C.). See, Australian Atomic Energy Commission, \textit{Nineteenth Annual Report}, June 1971, p.36.
\end{itemize}
agreement with Japan. Under the terms of this latest undertaking, the U.S. agreed to supply Japan with 161,000 kilograms of U235 and 365 kilograms of plutonium. This was the largest quantity of U235 that the U.S. had so far contracted for in bilateral agreements with individual countries. (It was exceeded only by the contract to supply EURATOM with 215,000 kilograms.) The material was to be supplied over a 30 year period and was calculated to be sufficient to meet the enriched fuel requirements for 13 reactors which Japan then expected to place under construction by 1973. But Japan's latest plans for the expansion of its nuclear power generating capacity assume a faster rate of growth than that on which the agreement of 1968 with the U.S. was based. In consequence of this, the American Government has indicated that it is willing to amend the 1968 agreement so as to provide Japan with an additional 130,000 kilograms of U235.


3. See, Seaborg-Pastore Correspondence on Japan-U.S. Agreement to Co-operate. Reproduced in ibid., p.106.

4. For details of the latest plans for the expansion of Japan's nuclear power generating capacity, see above, p.148.

Commercial considerations clearly played an important part in Washington's willingness to co-operate with Japan in the nuclear energy field. Spokesmen for the U.S.A.E.C. were quick to point out that Japan promised to become one of the world's leading industrial nuclear powers and that co-operation with such a country was consequently very much in America's interest. It was noted that the 1968 agreement was expected to result in an export benefit to the U.S. of approximately 634 million dollars and there were confident predictions that additional and equally lucrative reactor and fuel sales to Japan would follow.¹

Tokyo's willingness to enter into a long-term agreement for the supply of U235 was interpreted by officials in Washington as a sign that Japan had abandoned whatever reservations it had about relying on a single outside source of reactor fuel.² (That it previously held such reservations was the conclusion drawn by many in the U.S. from Japan's earlier decision to purchase a natural uranium fueled reactor from Britain.) However, there is much evidence to suggest that Japan was far from happy about this reliance on America. In a report published shortly before the signing of the 1968 agreement, two American experts noted "a great desire in Japan for reducing the degree of dependence on U.S. enrichment facilities".³ That this desire has increased is evident from statements in recent years by both government officials and the representatives of Japan's nuclear industry.⁴ There seems to be two main reasons for Japan's reluctance to depend wholly on American U235 supplies. In the first place, there has been

---

² See especially, remarks by Myron B. Kratzer, Director, Division of International Affairs, U.S.A.E.C., in ibid., pp.61-62.
⁴ For an example of this, see above, p.150.
increasing concern that U.S. enrichment plants will eventually prove incapable of meeting Japan's fuel requirements. This feeling has grown with every increase in the estimated rate of expansion of Japan's nuclear industry.\(^1\) Second, there has been an understandable reluctance to rely too heavily on one supplier, no matter how reliable it might be, for a commodity which promises to play such a vital part in Japan's future economic growth. Almost invariably, these expressions of concern about dependence on the U.S. have been accompanied by demands that Japan should acquire its own enrichment capability, either through indigenous development or through the purchase of foreign technology. (As noted earlier, both the gas diffusion and centrifuge methods of enrichment have been under study in Japan for several years.)\(^2\) Washington tried hard to persuade Tokyo to classify the work being done in Japan on centrifuges but its efforts in this direction were unsuccessful.\(^3\) (Spokesmen for the J,A,E,C. have argued, among other things, that classification of the work being done in Japan on centrifuges would be contrary to the country's basic atomic energy law.)\(^4\) Clearly, the U.S. has been unable to discourage interest in Japan in centrifuge technology.

By comparison with its involvement in the Indian and Japanese nuclear programmes, American participation in the Australian programme has been very limited indeed. (This is largely a function, of course, of the relative smallness

---

2. For a note on this work, see above, p.150.
of the Australian effort.) The U.S. first agreed to provide Australia with enriched uranium in 1956.\(^1\) Under the terms of an agreement signed that year (and amended in 1963) Australia was to receive up to 500 kilograms of U\(^{235}\).\(^2\) This material was for use in Australia's small nuclear research programme based on the 10 M.W. reactor at Lucas Heights, near Sydney. In 1967 the agreement was extended for 30 years but the ceiling on the amount of U\(^{235}\) to be supplied was not raised.\(^3\) It was noted at the time by the American government, that "while Australia [had] not yet formulated a nuclear power reactor program, assurance of the availability of enriched uranium would be an important factor in developing such a programme".\(^4\) But regardless of what Washington's wishes in the matter might have been, Australia seems to have harboured strong reservations about dependence on American or other foreign fuel supplies. As noted earlier, when inviting tenders for what was scheduled to be Australia's first nuclear power station, the A.A.E.C. indicated that the facility should be of such a type that would not be dependent on overseas fuel supplies and services.\(^5\) The A.A.E.C. of course, has been conducting work on the centrifuge process for some years\(^6\) and it was reported in 1971 that talks had taken place between Japan and Australia about co-operation on an enrichment project.\(^7\)

---

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. See above, p.195.
6. See above, p. 199, fn. 2.
On the basis of the evidence presented here and elsewhere in the thesis, it seems that, though America's capacity and willingness to supply U235 may have reduced incentives in Japan and Australia for the development of indigenous enrichment capabilities, it did not eliminate them altogether. Indeed, with the passage of time, interest in enrichment technology in both countries has continued to increase.

B. Nonproliferation and American Safeguards Policy in Asia

As already noted, it has been the practice of the American Government to insist that safeguards should accompany the aid that the U.S. has offered foreign countries to help them develop their peaceful nuclear establishments. This has been no less true of American co-operation with countries in Asia than with those in other parts of the world. But the U.S. effort to have India accept safeguards was a source of considerable disagreement between Delhi and Washington. An examination of this controversy will not only illustrate a number of important points about India's attitude to safeguards, but in addition, will cast a revealing light on U.S. nonproliferation policy in Asia.

Disagreement between Delhi and Washington over the question of safeguards figured prominently in the discussions about the Tarapur project. Both sides agreed in principle that safeguards should be applied to the enriched uranium fuel to be used in the reactor but there was a difference of opinion between the two governments with regard to the attachment of safeguards to equipment.1 On this occasion, as in the past,

Delhi argued that the application of safeguards to equipment supplied from outside was unfair to developing countries. A mutually satisfactory arrangement was eventually arrived at whereby neither side was required to give up its basic position on the attachment of safeguards to equipment. This was achieved through the insertion of a provision in the final agreement which stipulated that the Tarapur station would be operated only on enriched uranium supplied by the U.S. or on plutonium produced therefrom.

But the issue which proved most contentious in the negotiations between Delhi and Washington was the question of I.A.E.A. inspection of the Tarapur plant. In January 1963 the U.S. decided to place most of its bilateral nuclear assistance agreements under I.A.E.A. supervision. In the negotiations over Tarapur later that year, Washington insisted that the agreement between India and the U.S. should contain provision for I.A.E.A. inspection of Tarapur as soon as possible after the agency had devised a safeguards system capable of being applied to the type of reactor to be installed in the Indian plant. However, Delhi was most

2. See, AEC-State Department Press Release, in ibid., p.64.
3. For a comment on this, see above, p.23.
4. See, Letter from Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S.A.E.C., to Senator Pastore, Chairman, J.C.A.E., March 1, 1963, concerning U.S.-India negotiations on Tarapur project. Reproduced in ibid., p.62. See also, remarks by James T. Ramey, Commissioner, U.S.A.E.C., in ibid., p.4. I.A.E.A. safeguards were then limited to reactors of 100 M.W. or less. The U.S. sought to have this restriction lifted and a proposal to this effect was accepted by the I.A.E.A. in September 1963. See above, p.23, and Henry D. Smyth, "Nuclear Power and Proliferation", in Department of State Bulletin (hereafter referred to as D.O.S.B.) 3 January 1966, p.34.
reluctant to accept I.A.E.A. safeguards. Throughout the negotiations, Delhi sought some kind of arrangement whereby the U.S. might have a continuing association with the implementation of safeguards during an initial trial period while the I.A.E.A.'s expanded system was going through a "shakedown" period.\(^1\) It was not till 1971 (eight years after the removal of the 100 M.W. limit on the I.A.E.A. safeguards system) that India finally signed a trilateral (India, U.S., I.A.E.A.) arrangement for agency inspection of Tarapur.\(^2\)

There seem to have been two main reasons for India's stand on this matter. In the first place, Delhi had been an opponent of I.A.E.A. inspection since the time the question of agency safeguards was first raised in the late 1950's.\(^3\) Indeed, at the very time of the negotiations over Tarapur, Indian representatives at the I.A.E.A. were attempting to frustrate American moves in that organization to have the I.A.E.A. safeguards system modified so as it could cope with reactors as large as those to be installed at Tarapur.\(^4\)

Delhi's opposition to agency inspection of the proposed India-

3. For a note on India's earlier opposition to I.A.E.A. safeguards, see above, pp.137-139.
4. See above, pp.23 and 137.
U.S. reactor was consistent then with India's long-standing opposition to I.A.E.A. safeguards in general. But an equally important explanation for Delhi's stand on the issue concerned the privilege accorded America's European allies in the matter of safeguards. A review of some of the background to this development would seem in order here.

In August 1958 the U.S. concluded an agreement with EURATOM to co-operate in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, as indicated earlier, instead of providing for inspection by the U.S. or, as in the case of later agreements, by the I.A.E.A., the agreement provided for a safeguard system operated by EURATOM itself. A major reason for the favourable treatment accorded EURATOM seems to have been Washington's anxiety to promote the concept of European integration. In addition to this arrangement with the EURATOM organization itself, the U.S. entered into a number of bilateral agreements with individual member states of EURATOM. The responsibility for inspection under these bilateral agreements resided with the U.S. When Washington decided to place its bilateral

2. See above, p.20.
agreements under I.A.E.A. safeguards, an important exception was made in the case of those between the U.S. and a number of the individual members of EURATOM; it was decided that when these agreements came up for renewal they would be allowed to lapse and that the flow of fissionable material between the U.S. and each of the countries concerned would thereafter be channeled through EURATOM.\(^1\) It seems that this action was designed, among other things, to strengthen EURATOM at a time of increasing nuclear nationalism in Western Europe;\(^2\) it was one further indication of Washington's support for the concept of European integration. However, an important consequence of the move was that EURATOM came to be entrusted with safeguards responsibilities in a number of European states which had previously been exercised by the U.S.\(^3\) Alternatively, Washington could have passed these safeguards responsibilities over to the I.A.E.A. By transferring them to EURATOM, the U.S. chose to support the regional body rather than the international one.

The privilege accorded America's European allies in the matter of safeguards was a source of much dissension during the Tarapur negotiations; the idea that Delhi should accept I.A.E.A. safeguards but that the EURATOM states should be exempted from such inspection was clearly regarded as repugnant by Indian negotiators.\(^4\) That facilities in EURATOM countries should be subject to I.A.E.A. safeguards was a regular theme in Indian Government statements on the matter in the period immediately following

1. ibid., and Hall, loc. cit., p.612.
2. Willrich, op. cit., p.60.
3. ibid.
the conclusion of the Tarapur agreement. Washington's willingness to discriminate in the matter of safeguards between India (and other Asian states) on the one hand and America's European allies on the other was clearly a major factor in Delhi's opposition to I.A.E.A. inspection of Indian nuclear facilities. Similar considerations also helped to reinforce the opposition of both Delhi and Tokyo to the N.P.T.

C. Safeguards and the N.P.T.

So far as safeguards were concerned, the original American draft nonproliferation treaty of August 1965 was quite permissive and not discriminatory as between nuclear and non-nuclear states; Article III of that draft contained only a weak obligation that all states "co-operate in facilitating the application of I.A.E.A. or equivalent international safeguards." During the next two and a half years, however, a number of developments took place which helped to drastically reshape the safeguards provision in the


proposed nonproliferation treaty. One of these was the support which developed during this period, both abroad and in circles in the U.S. concerned with atomic energy and arms control matters, for the widest possible application of I.A.E.A. safeguards. This sentiment was well reflected in the U.S. Senate where, on 18 January 1966, Senator Pastore, Vice-Chairman of the J.C.A.E., introduced a resolution supporting the efforts of the administration to secure a nonproliferation treaty. In doing so, Pastore vigorously attacked what he called the "noncommittal phrasing" of the safeguards requirement in the existing (August 1965) U.S. draft and recommended that non-nuclear signatories of the proposed nonproliferation treaty be obliged to accept I.A.E.A. or "similar international safeguards" on all of their nuclear activities.\(^1\) Despite the provision in Senator Pastore's

recommendation for recourse to "similar [to the I.A.E.A.] international safeguards", it is significant that there appears to have been some support in Congress for the idea that EURATOM signatories of the proposed nonproliferation treaty should accept I.A.E.A. inspection of all of their nuclear activities;¹ provision for this was included in the text of a draft Article III which was shown to N.A.T.O. and EURATOM countries in March 1966.² Another relevant development during this period concerned the attitude of the Soviet Union to safeguards. The original Soviet draft nonproliferation treaty of September 1965 had been even more permissive and non-discriminatory in this matter than the first American one.³ However, Moscow had since come around to insisting that all non-nuclear signatories accept I.A.E.A. inspection; the Soviet Union was especially concerned that EURATOM facilities should pass under I.A.E.A. safeguards. The EURATOM states were just as adamant, of course, that the I.A.E.A. safeguards system should not replace their own. It was against the background of these developments that intensive discussions on the safeguards issue took place during 1967 between Washington and Moscow and between Washington and the EURATOM states.⁴

1. e.g., See remarks by Senator R. Kennedy in support of Senate Resolution 179. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.175.
2. The text of this draft is reproduced in Kramish, op.cit., p.4.
After lengthy consideration of the matter a totally revised Article III was included in the draft nonproliferation treaty which was presented by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in January 1968. In the wording of the new Article III, reference to "equivalent international safeguards" (implicitly, those of EURATOM) had been dropped. However, though the U.S. had backed away from the somewhat permissive and non-discriminatory language of its 1965 draft, it had nevertheless preserved much in the matter of safeguards for which its European allies could feel grateful. The latest formulation did not characterise the safeguards under the proposed nonproliferation treaty as "I.A.E.A. safeguards" but merely stated that they had to be safeguards "set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the I.A.E.A. in accordance with its statute and its safeguards system." Moreover, the new version of Article III stipulated that non-nuclear parties to the proposed treaty could conclude their agreements with the I.A.E.A. "either individually or together with other states"; U.S. officials were careful to indicate publicly that the latter could include "regional organizations such as Euratom." It was the view of U.S.A.E.C. Chairman, Glenn Seaborg, that the EURATOM safeguards system was "adequate" for the purposes of the N.P.T. and that in those cases where EURATOM safeguards were already in operation it would be the

1. See, Revised Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, January 18, 1968. Text reproduced in International Negotiations on N.P.T., pp.150-154. Article III in this revised draft was incorporated unchanged into the N.P.T. of July 1, 1968. The latter is reproduced as Appendix IV of this thesis.

function of the I.A.E.A. to simply "oversee or verify" their application.\textsuperscript{1} The precise relationship between EURATOM and the I.A.E.A. in the implementation of Article III has yet to be worked out.\textsuperscript{2} However, it seems unlikely that the regional organization will be seriously deprived of its safeguards function.

It was apparent from the wording of the new Article III that, so far as safeguards were concerned, non-nuclear signatories of the N.P.T. would be divided into two categories: a majority which would be obliged to accept I.A.E.A. inspection of all of their nuclear activities; and a minority, made up of all the EURATOM states except France,\textsuperscript{3} which seemingly would be allowed to escape direct I.A.E.A. supervision and be permitted to utilize, in one way or another, EURATOM's own safeguards system. This development clearly helped to reduce the appeal of the N.P.T. in the eyes of major non-nuclear, non-Euratom states such as India and Japan. Even before the final text of the treaty was published, Delhi demanded that the safeguards provisions should be "non-discriminatory and

\begin{enumerate}
\item ibid., p.106.
\item A report by the Safeguards Committee which was set up by the I.A.E.A. to formulate the structure and content of the agreements between signatories and the agency in connection with the N.P.T. was adopted by the I.A.E.A. Board of Governors in April 1971. The I.A.E.A. is now in a position to attempt to negotiate with states which have ratified the N.P.T. the actual safeguards agreements required by the provisions of Article III of the treaty. See, Australian Atomic Energy Commission, Nineteenth Annual Report, June 1971, p.112.
\item France did not participate in the discussions between EURATOM and the U.S. and probably will not become a party to the N.P.T. Even if it did, as a nuclear power France would not be obliged to accept safeguards under Article III.
\end{enumerate}
universal."¹ Later, in announcing their government's decision not to sign the N.P.T., Indian spokesmen loudly condemned the apparent discrimination in favour of EURATOM in the matter of safeguards. ² Opposition in Japan to I.A.E.A. inspection had been much less obvious than in the case of India. Indeed Japan had been the first nation in the world to enter into a trilateral safeguards agreement with the U.S. and the I.A.E.A. ³ This was in 1963 and since then all nuclear materials and equipment transferred by the U.S. to Japan had been subject to agency inspection. However, Japan's warmth towards the I.A.E.A. inspection system soon cooled. Following agency inspection of the station at Tokai-mura in May 1968 there was some criticism in Japanese atomic energy circles of the methods used by I.A.E.A. inspectors. ⁴ Thereafter, opposition in Japan to I.A.E.A. safeguards grew and focussed increasingly on Article III of the N.P.T. Like their Indian counterparts, Japanese officials argued that, among other things, the safeguards provisions of the N.P.T. discrim-

---

¹ See, remarks by Mr. Trivedi, India's representative to the E.N.D.C., during a meeting of that committee in September 1967. Reproduced in E.N.D.C./P.V. 327, pp.26-27.
inated in favour of EURATOM. On the occasion of its signature of the N.P.T. in February 1970, the Japanese Government indicated that ratification would depend upon Japan being placed on an equal footing with EURATOM in respect of safeguards.

Washington's performance during the negotiation of Article III of the N.P.T. casts a revealing light on the priority accorded the goal of global nonproliferation by the U.S. Government. Throughout the negotiations Washington appears to have been more anxious to accommodate the wishes of its European allies than to champion the cause of I.A.E.A. safeguards. Evidence has already been educed to support this, but the point was made abundantly clear in remarks during 1968 by Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of U.S.A.C.D.A., and a leading U.S. participant in the negotiations with the EURATOM countries. He said:

The problem of negotiating a safeguards article with our NATO allies was as important in our minds as negotiating one with the Soviet Union.

and

We [did] not wish to be a party to any attempt to undermine the structure of Euratom in terms of national programs.

We worked very hard to get an article in the treaty [N.P.T.] which made possible the utilization by the I.A.E.A. of the Euratom safeguards structure.

1. For a note on this, see above, p.176. The importance of this factor in Japan's opposition to the N.P.T. was emphasised in January 1970 by Under Secretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson. See his testimony in United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Part 5, Japan and Okinawa, hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., January 26, 27, 28 and 29, 1970 (hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings on Japan and Okinawa, 1970), p.1160.


3. See his testimony in House Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968, p.60.

4. Ibid., p.61.
America's action in regard to Article III of the N.P.T. was consistent with the preference the U.S. had always accorded its European allies in the matter of safeguards. But one consequence of this approach was to further reduce support for I.A.E.A. safeguards and the N.P.T. amongst non-nuclear, non-EURATOM nations; this was especially significant in respect of India and Japan, two of the most important countries in this category. In negotiating the N.P.T., the United States Government appears to have paid relatively little attention to the wishes of the latter two nations on the question of safeguards; Congressional hearings on this and related issues abound with official references to the interests of the EURATOM states in the matter of safeguards but there is virtually no acknowledgement of Indian and Japanese interests. Moreover, Washington finally settled for a nonproliferation treaty, the safeguards provisions of which, India and Japan could only regard as discriminatory vis-a-vis the EURATOM and the non-EURATOM states (but also, of course, vis-a-vis the nuclear and the non-nuclear nations).

Had Washington pressed throughout for the application of I.A.E.A. safeguards in EURATOM countries, such action would have been consistent with America's avowed support for global nonproliferation and would certainly have made it easier for India and Japan to accept I.A.E.A. safeguards and the N.P.T. However, such action would have been inconsistent with U.S. support for European nuclear integration. The latter, it seems, was a goal Washington was not prepared to sacrifice to the cause of global nonproliferation.
D. Recent Developments in United States Policy Towards Enrichment Technology and the Supply of U235: The Significance of These Developments for American Nonproliferation Policy in Asia

At the beginning of this chapter an attempt was made to characterise America's traditional policy towards enrichment technology and the supply of U235. It was also pointed out there, that in the last two or three years some important changes have taken place in this policy. It is appropriate at this stage to examine these changes and to assess the significance of these developments for United States efforts to limit proliferation in Asia.

In the first place, the U.S. has altered the basis on which it is prepared to contract for the supply of enriched uranium. Previously, the total or ceiling amount of U235 to be supplied in an agreement was calculated on the basis of the enriched fuel requirements for reactors scheduled to be placed under construction by the co-operating country within five years of the signing of the agreement. In March 1970, the U.S.A.E.C. indicated that, in future, it would be prepared to meet reactor fuel requirements consistent with an advance construction period of only two or three years. Moreover, whereas in the past, agreements to supply have constituted firm undertakings on the part of the U.S. to furnish the amounts of enriched uranium stipulated in the ceiling provisions of the agreements, under arrangements announced in June 1971, future commitments to supply reactor fuel abroad will be made at the time supply contracts are entered into for individual

reactor projects. New agreements will continue to contain ceilings, but the latter will merely place an upper limit on the amount of enriching services to be supplied under any particular agreement. This change of policy in regard to the supply of U235 was just one of a number of U.S. reactions to the prospect of an enormously increased world-wide demand for enriched uranium and to the likely implications of this for America's capacity to meet the future needs of its foreign and domestic customers.

In particular, the new policy seeks to match more closely requirements with capacity, and to help ensure that as the full utilization of the present capacity of the country's diffusion plants draws closer, situations will not arise where enrichment capacity might be encumbered but not subsequently taken up by firm contracts.

The second major development concerns the question of participation by private enterprise in America's uranium enrichment industry. Traditionally, the manufacture of U235 has been a Federal Government monopoly; a major reason for this was the belief that participation by private enterprise

2. This brings foreign buyers of U235 into line with the conditions operating in relation to domestic (U.S.) buyers.
3. In 1970 the U.S. diffusion complex was operating at only 40 per cent capacity and even then was producing more enriched uranium than the nuclear power industry (foreign and domestic) currently required. However, the U.S.A.E.C. has calculated that by 1976 the demand for enriched uranium will have saturated the existing (1971) capacity of America's diffusion complex and by 1985 will be about three times this capacity. See, Extended statement of considerations by U.S.A.E.C. concerning private access to America's enrichment technology. Reproduced in AEC Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 1972, Part 4, hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., March 18, 23 and May 13, 1971, Washington, 1971 (hereafter referred to as J.C.A.E. Hearings on A.E.C. Authorizing Legislation, FY1972, Part 4), p.2258.
would increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information and consequently would enhance the risks of nuclear proliferation. However, in November 1969, President Nixon announced that he was in favour of eventually transferring ownership of the nation's three diffusion plants to private enterprise. In June 1971 the U.S.A.E.C., after some hesitation of its own, and in the face of some criticism of the move by the J.C.A.E., announced that it would provide access


2. In 1966, Chairman Seaborg declared that the U.S. should keep secret the details of its enrichment technology. See his remarks in, J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.62. As recently as July and August of 1969, U.S.A.E.C. spokesmen were adamant that private access to enrichment technology would increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information and thereby enhance the threat of nuclear proliferation. The U.S.A.E.C. was especially concerned about the consequences in this regard of private access to centrifuge technology. See, remarks by James T. Ramey, Commissioner, U.S.A.E.C. and Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S.A.E.C. in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Future Ownership of A.E.C.'s Gaseous Diffusion Plants, 1969, pp.57, 58, 94 and 61 respectively. See also, statement by U.S.A.E.C. in answer to questions submitted by J.C.A.E. Reproduced in ibid., pp.103-4. For a note on the special significance of centrifuge technology for proliferation of nuclear weapons, see above, p.21.

to its uranium enrichment technology (both gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge) to a limited number of U.S. owned companies. These firms would be expected to carry out independent research and development work on enrichment technology and to assess the business prospects of uranium enrichment or enriching equipment manufacture.¹ The rationale for this somewhat revolutionary move is not hard to discover. The U.S.A.E.C. has concluded that in view of expected future demands for U²³⁵,² the first increment of new enriching plant capacity will probably be required as early as 1980³ and that additional increments will be needed in subsequent years. But the construction of new enriching capacity promises to be a very expensive business; Chairman Seaborg has estimated that it will require a capital investment of about three billion dollars.⁴ Because of this, and in order to take advantage of the best know-how available in American industry, the government has decided to seek private participation in the future expansion of the nation's enriching capacity.


2. For a note on this, see above, p.380, fn.3.


The third new development to result from the recent review of U.S. enrichment policy has been the announcement of America's willingness to co-operate with interested friendly states in the establishment of one or more multinational uranium enrichment plants. The first indications of the new thinking were apparent about six months after the Nixon Administration took office in 1969.¹ Later, in his foreign policy report to Congress in February 1971, President Nixon revealed that consultations had taken place with the J.C.A.E. concerning ways in which the U.S. might assist its allies to construct a multinational enrichment plant.² In July 1971, the U.S.A.E.C. announced that the U.S. was at last ready to discuss this question with countries overseas which had expressed interest in constructing uranium enrichment facilities based on U.S. gaseous diffusion technology. (It was specifically noted that centrifuge technology would not be included in the proposed discussions.)³ Notice of America's willingness to undertake enrichment cooperation discussions was communicated, in July 1971, to the member countries of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and to the U.K., Australia, Canada and Japan.⁴

It is clear that this latest policy change was, in part at least, a response to the evident determination of a number

of friendly countries to develop independent uranium enrichment
capabilities.¹ Mention has already been made of Japanese and
Australian interest in enrichment technology.² But more important
has been the collaboration between Britain, Holland and West Germany
on the development of the gas centrifuge process for producing
enriched uranium. Agreements relating to the tripartite organ-
isation embracing these three states came into force in April
1971 and plans are already in hand to establish two pilot
centrifuge plants, one in Almelo (Holland) and one in Capenhurst
(U.K.). In addition, Britain, Holland and West Germany
are reported to have offered associate membership in their
enterprise to Belgium and Italy and to have intimated a
willingness to make their centrifuge technology eventually
available to Australia. France has announced plans for a
feasibility study for a large new diffusion plant which, it
is hoped, will involve participation by other countries as well.
Canada also is considering a collaborative effort which will
make use of its own uranium hydro-electric resources. Finally,
South Africa claims to have successfully developed an enrich-
ment method based on an "entirely new principle". So far,
however, it has not released any details about the new process.

1. For a review of recent world-wide developments in the area
of uranium enrichment see, D.R. Griffiths, "A Review of
Overseas Nuclear Power Developments" in Atomic Energy
[Australian Atomic Energy Commission], Vol. 14, Nos. 3 and
4, July-October 1971, pp.10-11; Australian Atomic Energy
Commission, Nineteenth Annual Report, June 1971, pp.34-35;
remarks by Under Secretary of State Johnson in J.C.A.E.
Hearings on A.E.C. Authorizing Legislation, FY1972, Part 4,
pp.2243-2244; and, statement by U.S.A.E.C. in reply to
question submitted by J.C.A.E., in J.C.A.E. Hearings on
Future Ownership of A.E.C.'s Gaseous Diffusion Plants, 1969,
pp.105-106. The material in this section is derived from
these sources.

2. See above, p.150 (Japan) and p.199 (Australia).
That the trend towards a wider diffusion of enrichment technology had impressed U.S. officials, is obvious. As U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said:

These developments abroad are, I believe, impressive. They indicate a desire to diversify their sources of supply [of U235]; a recognition of the need for increased enrichment capacity; a willingness to invest substantial sums to accomplish these goals; and a confidence in their ability to overcome the technological problems — preferably with, but if necessary, without our help.¹

It was widely held by U.S. spokesmen that this trend towards the development abroad of indigenous enrichment capabilities could not be reversed and that the most sensible thing for the U.S. to do in these circumstances was to offer America's diffusion technology to selected foreign countries in the hope of diverting them from the development of the centrifuge process.² This, it was pointed out, would not only help reduce the threat of proliferation, but at the same time, would bring financial gain to the U.S. from the sale of its enrichment technology and help rationalize the expansion of overall enriching capacity.³ The trend towards the diffusion of enrichment technology, and the American response to this challenge, is but the latest example of how technological change has, from time to time, worked to alter American nonproliferation policy.

² See especially, the views of James T. Ramey, Commissioner, U.S.A.E.C., in ibid., p.2246.
One of the most interesting aspects of the move to assist America's allies in the establishment of a multinational enrichment plant was the enthusiasm with which the White House supported the proposal. The underlying rationale for President Nixon's stand on the matter was outlined in his foreign policy report to Congress in February 1971. ¹ There the President loudly condemned the idea of restricting the flow of scientific and technological expertise to other nations; this he denounced as a "Maginot Line" approach to the issue. Only through the broadest possible exchange of information, he emphasised, could American interests and those of mankind as a whole be best served. It was conceded that there would be some areas where restrictions would have to remain. However, it would be American policy "to keep those areas as circumscribed as possible, and to take the leadership in encouraging the exchange of scientific and technological information".² The proposal to co-operate with foreign powers in the establishment of a multinational enrichment plant was also strongly supported by the State Department and the U.S.A.E.C.³

As one might have expected, though, the J.C.A.E. was opposed to the move. Individual members of the committee denounced the proposal in the strongest terms (Vice-Chairman Holifield called it a "civilian version of the multilateral force",⁴ and the J.C.A.E. as a whole has reserved its judgement on the matter.⁵ A major concern amongst committee members...

1. Building For Peace, p.70.
2. Ibid.
3. According to Chairman Seaborg, the plan to co-operate was developed by the U.S.A.E.C. in collaboration with the State Department. See his testimony in J.C.A.E. Hearings on A.E.C. Authorizing Legislation, FY1972, Part 4, p.2242.
4. See, remarks by Holifield on J.C.A.E. reaction to the administration proposal, in ibid., p.2238.
members was the fear that any disclosure of information about diffusion technology would lead inevitably to pressure for access to centrifuge technology as well.¹

Taken together, the three changes outlined above constituted a major shift in U.S. thinking, both about America's own nuclear industry, and about co-operation with foreign countries in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This drift in American policy was reinforced in August 1971 by the nomination of Dr. J.R. Schlesinger as Chairman of the U.S.A.E.C.²

Prior to joining the Nixon Administration, Schlesinger was Director of Strategic Studies at the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, and while there, directed a study on the problem of nuclear proliferation for the U.S. government.³ (In 1968, Schlesinger's views were quoted by Congressman Hosmer to help strengthen an argument the latter was then making against the N.P.T.).⁴ It is Schlesinger's views on the question of proliferation which make his recent appointment so significant for American policy on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.⁵

In contrast to the majority of U.S. authorities on the subject, Schlesinger seems cautiously optimistic about the problem of nuclear spread; according to him, further proliferation is much less likely than some have suggested and, in any case, such a development need not lead to disaster, especially for the United States. Schlesinger has conceded that it is in America's interests to try to limit proliferation but, as he told the Third International Arms Control Symposium in Philadelphia, in April 1966:

... since I believe the effects of proliferation would be less severe than currently anticipated, I would be inclined to set a lower price on what the United States should be willing to pay to prevent proliferation than would some other members of the Panel.¹

Schlesinger acknowledges that the diversion of fissionable material from peaceful nuclear programmes could make it easier for non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, he supports the application of safeguards and believes they can effectively limit such diversion. But at the same time, he has strongly emphasised that the diversion of plutonium from a peaceful nuclear programme is not synonymous with the acquisition of usable nuclear weapons and that to attempt to control proliferation by trying to preclude the development of nuclear industries in modern industrial states is both futile and counter-productive.² America's relationship with Japan, he has suggested, is a case in point; Schlesinger argued in 1967 that "Americans ought not persuade themselves that the denial of assistance to Japan on, say, a plutonium separation plant will prevent her from acquiring one independently."³

¹. See, The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, p.2.
². See, "Nuclear Spread", p.77.
³. ibid.
Schlesinger's nomination to the U.S.A.E.C. would seem to have important implications for United States policy in the area of uranium enrichment technology. The new chairman seems less concerned about the problem of nuclear spread than many other Americans and certainly sets a lower value than most on the price the U.S. should be willing to pay in order to achieve the goal of nonproliferation. On these grounds alone Schlesinger seems predisposed to strongly support current moves to open America's enrichment business to private enterprise and to assist foreign governments in the establishment of multinational enrichment facilities.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the moves to involve private enterprise in the nation's enrichment business and to share the secrets of America's diffusion technology with countries overseas will have the effect of weakening the cause of nonproliferation, not just in Asia, but in the world generally. It has already been noted that one reason for the U.S. Government's long-established monopoly in the manufacture of U235 was the belief that participation by private enterprise would increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information and hence heighten the danger of proliferation. There seems to be little reason to believe that these fears are any less valid now than they were previously. Notwithstanding this, it has now been proposed that American firms be granted access to both diffusion and centrifuge technology with an eye to active participation by private enterprise in the nation's enrichment business. So far as co-operation with foreign countries in the establishment of multinational enrichment facilities is concerned, the prospects that this move will increase the risks of proliferation seem equally great. Though it is almost certain that any assistance in this area will be accompanied by safeguards to
ensure that there is no diversion to military purposes, the record of international co-operation in the field of reactor technology suggests that experience gained through collaboration in the construction and operation of foreign-built nuclear facilities can be utilized to establish indigenous capabilities. As a result of the proposed collaboration on enrichment technology between the U.S. and certain other countries, Japanese and Australian scientists, among others, will inevitably learn much about the construction and operation of diffusion plants.

The changes during the last two and a half years in United States policy towards the supply of U235 and access to America's enrichment technology is a good example of how technological and other developments have, from time to time, worked to alter U.S. nonproliferation policy. Clearly, recent developments in centrifuge technology have opened up the possibility of future widespread proliferation of an alternative (to diffusion) means of enrichment and promise to make redundant many of the present restrictions on access to U.S. enrichment technology. Also, the prospect of a rapidly increased world-wide demand for enriched uranium has caused the U.S. Government to invite participation by private enterprise in America's enrichment business. (Of course American firms needed little persuading that it was in their interests to compete in what promises to be a very lucrative market.)¹ But notwithstanding the significance of these

¹ One of the most characteristic aspects of the J.C.A.E. hearings in 1969 on the future of America's gaseous diffusion industry was the strong representations on behalf of private participation which were made by U.S. industrial interests. See, statement by president of Consolidated Enrichment Corporation, in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Future Ownership of A.E.C.'s Gaseous Diffusion Plants, 1969, pp.236-240. See also, testimony of K.D. Nichols, Chairman, Atomic Industrial Forum Study Committee on Private Ownership and Operation of Uranium Enrichment Facilities. Reproduced in ibid., pp.254-255.
pressures it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the changes in U.S. policy described above were made easier by feelings on the part of certain elements within the administration that the U.S. should not take a strong stand in the face of this latest challenge to America's efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It has already been suggested that though the Nixon Administration has generally supported the goal of nonproliferation, the latter has not enjoyed a very high priority in the hierarchy of U.S. policy objectives. (This emerged in the discussions about both ballistic missile defence and American security policy in Asia in the period 1969-71. It is also worth noting in this context, that though the Nixon Administration itself ratified the N.P.T., it was nowhere near as anxious as the previous government had been to persuade other nations to adhere to the agreement.)

In the area of enrichment technology and the supply of U235 the White House in particular displayed a clear disposition not to maintain traditional U.S. policy in its entirety. President Nixon took a lead in proposing both the opening of America's enrichment business to private enterprise and the sharing of U.S. diffusion technology with countries overseas. Moreover, the appointment of Dr. Schlesinger to the chairmanship of the U.S.A.E.C. ensured that the Commission would be led by a man sympathetic to the views of the White House in these matters.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In keeping with the outline of aims at the beginning of the thesis it seems reasonable to present the conclusions in three separate sections.

I

The desire to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries was present in United States policy from the very beginning of the nuclear era and was the primary motivation underlying both the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the Baruch Plan of the same year. The Atomic Energy Act was amended in 1954 in order to help facilitate America's tactical nuclear planning in Europe. The amendment of the Act also enabled the United States to begin assisting foreign countries in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, with few exceptions, assistance rendered under the "Atoms for Peace" plan has been accompanied by safeguards designed to prevent diversion to military purposes. Concomitant with the launching of the "Atoms for Peace" plan, Washington called for the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency which, among other things, would eventually assume responsibility for the management of a multinational nuclear safeguards system.

As the 1950's drew to a close a new sense of urgency began to characterise American efforts to limit proliferation. This was largely prompted by indications that the capacity to build nuclear weapons promised to become more widespread than previously imagined and by fears that a number of European nations might be tempted to follow France down the nuclear weapons path. Washington's initial response to this challenge took three main forms: renewed efforts were made to support the I.A.E.A. and to encourage widespread acceptance of the
agency's safeguards system; diplomatic and other pressure was brought to bear on America's European allies in an effort to persuade them not to acquire their own nuclear weapons; and, strong U.S. support was given to moves to secure a nuclear test-ban treaty. More recently the United States helped sponsor the nuclear nonproliferation treaty; the N.P.T. was eventually signed by Britain, Russia and the U.S. in July 1968.

Washington's support for the N.P.T. was not only a measure of America's concern about the problem of nuclear proliferation, but also, was the most dramatic indication till then of the changing relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; Washington clearly revealed that it was determined to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the N.P.T. even at the cost of some deterioration in relations between the United States and its allies.

United States spokesmen have sought to rationalise America's nonproliferation policy on a number of grounds. The continued spread of nuclear weapons, it has been alleged, would severely injure the economies of many countries and would make progress in the area of arms control exceedingly more difficult. But the crux of America's stated opposition to nuclear spread has been summed up in what might be described as the "nth country rationale". According to this view any increase in the number of nuclear powers presents dangers, or more precisely, the more nuclear powers there are, the more there are likely to be, and the more there are, the greater the chances of nuclear conflict. Underlying much of the concern in the U.S. about proliferation has been the fear that the further spread of nuclear weapons would reduce Washington's ability to regulate crisis situations and prevent them from developing into general war.
II

To date, China is the only country in Asia which has developed its own nuclear weapons. Peking's first test explosion was in October 1964 and altogether China has so far conducted eleven nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. Concomitant with warhead development, China has made considerable progress in the development of a missile delivery system. About 20 M.R.B.M.'s have been deployed already and tests of an I.R.B.M. have been reported. Indications are that work on an I.C.B.M. is also being pushed forward as rapidly as possible. The primary motivations behind Peking's development of nuclear weapons seem to have been China's desire for great power status and its anxiety to acquire, as soon as possible, a credible deterrent against U.S. (and Soviet) attack.

The proliferation problem in Asia arises from the possibility that a number of nations in the area might be persuaded to follow China in the development of nuclear weapons. It has long been agreed that the country most likely to do this is India.

For some time now, India has been pursuing a fairly substantial industrial nuclear programme which, among other things, has been designed to eventually make the country self-sufficient in reactor technology and the manufacture of fissionable materials other than U235. In addition, principally because of the emergence of China as a nuclear power, widespread support has developed in India for the creation of a national nuclear force. However, Delhi has decided that, for the present at least, the disadvantages of going nuclear still outweigh the advantages. For the time being India seems content to keep open an option on going nuclear by not signing the N.P.T. and by developing its nuclear industry to the point where any decision to develop nuclear weapons could be put into immediate effect.
The situation with regard to Japan and nuclear weapons is somewhat different from that of India. Japan is one of the world's leading industrial and economic powers and has established the foundations of a very extensive nuclear reactor programme. It has also built up considerable expertise in rocketry and other forms of space technology. Though it would undoubtedly experience a number of difficulties, especially in the area of raw materials supply, Japan clearly has the potential to develop a substantial arsenal of nuclear (and eventually, thermo-nuclear) warheads and a missile delivery system. However, despite Japan's potential in the nuclear weapons field, support throughout the country for a national nuclear deterrent, though greater now than previously, nevertheless still remains very limited. The unique distaste for nuclear weapons amongst large segments of the Japanese people, the country's alliance with the United States, and the absence, at least so far as most Japanese have been concerned, of an obvious threat to the nation's security, have all contributed to Japan's non-nuclear policy.

Though nowhere nearly so well advanced as India and Japan in the exploitation of atomic energy, Australia could be rightly regarded as a potential nuclear power. At the very latest, Australia could begin to produce plutonium weapons within about eight or nine years of the start-up of the first reactor bought from overseas. As well as this, it seems that by the late 1970's Australia could be in a position to produce a modest surface-launched, sea-borne missile delivery force. Throughout the post-war years successive Australian Governments have tended to regard nuclear weapons as a uniquely significant contribution to Western security. However, though it has not undertaken never to produce nuclear weapons, Canberra has eschewed the development of its own deterrent and has chosen instead to rely on the nuclear might of its allies, especially the United States.
It seems reasonable to argue that the United States has been opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia since the very commencement of the nuclear era; the goal of nonproliferation in Asia has been implicit in America's policy of global non-proliferation. However, as the analysis in Chapter I suggests, U.S. concern about the spread of nuclear weapons was, for about the first twenty years after World War II, focused mainly on Europe. But China's first nuclear test in October 1964 tended to alter this picture. Thereafter, the problem of proliferation in Asia in particular became a distinct concern of American policymaking.

Washington's initial response to China's emergence as a nuclear power was to try to downgrade the military and political significance of Peking's feat. However, in September 1967 the Johnson Administration announced that it would shortly begin deployment of the Sentinel A.B.M. system. Eighteen months later the Nixon Administration announced details of a revised A.B.M. system called Safeguard. In seeking to justify the deployment of their respective A.B.M. systems both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations used arguments which tended to enhance the military significance of the Chinese nuclear force. This ran counter to previous efforts to minimize the significance of China's capability and tended to reinforce rather than diminish the forces for proliferation in Asia. Ultimately the A.B.M. was substantially abandoned in a manner which seemed to indicate that the goal of nonproliferation in Asia enjoyed only a low priority relative to other U.S. policy objectives.

Some valuable insights into the priority accorded the goal of nonproliferation in American policy in Asia can be gained from an analysis of developments in U.S. security policy in the area. Evidence suggests that so far as the
period 1964-68 is concerned the goal of nonproliferation often took second place behind other U.S. policy objectives in Asia. Washington was reluctant to meet Delhi's wishes in the matter of security guarantees; was a party to moves which could be expected to undermine powerful anti-nuclear forces in Japan; and adopted policies which could only cause disillusionment in Australia with the A.N.Z.U.S. pact. In the years 1969-71 this trend was probably even more evident. The Nixon doctrine, primarily because of its effect in helping to undermine the credibility of U.S. guarantees and assurances in Asia and its tendency to upgrade the importance of nuclear weapons in America's Asian strategy, seems wholly inconsistent with the goal of non-proliferation in the area. U.S. policies in the period in respect of India, Japan and Australia also seem to have been inconsistent with the goal of nonproliferation.

Another useful insight into the priority that Washington has accorded the goal of nonproliferation in Asia can be gained from an analysis of developments in the field of peaceful nuclear technology. The U.S. has supplied India, Japan and Australia with quantities of U235 and has sold reactors to India and Japan. At the same time Washington has insisted that all three recipient states accept bilateral or multilateral safeguards on the fuel and equipment supplied to ensure that it is not used for military purposes. However, in its insistence on I.A.E.A. safeguards, Washington has practised a form of discrimination between the EURATOM states on the one hand and the Asian (and many other) nations on the other as a result of which the EURATOM states appear to have received preferential treatment. This development made it easier for India and Japan in particular to oppose both the I.A.E.A. safeguards system and the N.P.T. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that support for the European integration movement seems to have taken precedence in U.S. policy over the goal of global nonproliferation.
The analysis in Part III of the thesis suggests that in the period 1964-71 the goal of nonproliferation in Asia did not enjoy a very high priority in the hierarchy of U.S. policy objectives. Despite President Johnson's characterisation of the problem of proliferation as the "gravest of all unresolved human issues"\(^1\) there appears to have been a distinct lack of urgency and determination in U.S. efforts to deal with the problem of nuclear spread in Asia. Clearly, the goal of nonproliferation in Asia did not have the wholehearted support of all sections of either the Kennedy-Johnson Administration or of the Nixon Government. At the very least there would appear to have been little agreement about the price the United States should have been prepared to pay in order to secure the goal of nonproliferation in Asia.

Many of the policies of the Nixon Administration appear to have been especially inconsistent with efforts aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia. Admittedly the Johnson Administration found it difficult to reconcile the goal of nonproliferation with the requirements of U.S. security policy in Asia and at times adopted policies at variance with efforts to limit nuclear spread. But notwithstanding this, the general thrust of American policy under that particular government was towards maintaining a strong U.S. presence in Asia and this in itself helped to reinforce efforts to limit proliferation in the area. But the Nixon doctrine represents a major change in the whole direction of U.S. policy in Asia and, for the reasons outlined in Chapter X, is in a very basic sense inconsistent with the goal of nonproliferation in the area. A further consideration is the Nixon Administration's policy in regard to enrichment technology transfer.

\(^1\) See above, p. 57.
The Johnson Administration, like those before it, had, largely in the interests of nonproliferation, gone to great lengths to maintain a high degree of secrecy in this area. By contrast, the Nixon Administration made little effort to resist the challenge of new technologies in uranium enrichment and Washington's latest policies in this area promise to make it easier than previously for countries in Asia (and elsewhere) to gain access to supplies of U235. Finally, it is clear that the Nixon Administration does not share its predecessor's enthusiasm about the N.P.T. and is less inclined to urge states to support the agreement. This is of special significance in the case of India which has yet to even sign the N.P.T.

It seems reasonable to argue that the lower status which appears to have been accorded the goal of nonproliferation in the hierarchy of the Nixon Administration's policy objectives is related to recent changes in the structure of world politics, and more particularly, to the Nixon Government's perceptions of these changes. The idea of nonproliferation was characteristically a product of the era of bi-polarity; it represented an attempt by the U.S. (and the U.S.S.R.) to retain a virtual monopoly in the nuclear weapons area and was conceived at a time when the two superpowers had considerable confidence in their capacity to dictate the course of world affairs. But when the Nixon Administration assumed office not only had the world changed in many ways but, perhaps more importantly, the new government in Washington perceived that it had changed. As the President himself said, "the configuration of power that emerged from the Second World War ... [was] gone" and the bi-polar world of the 1940's and 1950's had been replaced by one characterised by "multilateral diplomacy."\(^1\)

\(^1\) See above, p.321.
There was an appreciation in Washington that America's ability to influence world affairs had been reduced.\(^1\) It was a corollary of this that the Nixon Administration was pessimistic about its capacity to limit proliferation in Asia (and elsewhere) and consequently devoted less attention than its predecessor to this endeavour. But there is a further dimension to this. Running through much of what the Nixon Administration has had to say about the structure of world politics is the belief that in some respects a multi-polar world is preferable to a bi-polar one.\(^2\) Not only has this made it easier for the U.S. to reconcile itself to the reality of a nuclear-armed China, but in addition, could help to explain why Washington has espoused a view of the balance of power in Asia which, taken to its logical conclusion, implies the acceptance of a nuclear-armed Japan.

---


2. Ibid. This idea has been explained in greater detail in the writings of Dr. Henry Kissinger. See especially, his American Foreign Policy, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, pp.53-90.
APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX I

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,
Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan area,
Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,
Therefore declare and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position
to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that area.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.
APPENDIX II

TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN.

Text of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of forces against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.

The parties will endeavour in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this treaty, and, at the request of either party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

ARTICLE V

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of article 51 of the charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of U.S. Armed Forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the administrative agreement under article III of the Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties.
under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, shall expire upon the entering into force of this treaty.

ARTICLE X

This treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United National arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the treaty has been in force for 10 years, either party may give notice to the other party of its intention to terminate the treaty, in which case the treaty shall terminate 1 year after such notice has been given.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.
APPENDIX III

TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:
   (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
   (b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this sub-paragraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions under ground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all the Original Parties.

ARTICLE III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties — the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties of the Treaty three months in advance.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.
APPENDIX IV

TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, JULY 1, 1968

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to
facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any
such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty,
including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the despoti of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United National Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.
APPENDIX V

TRIPARTITE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES, MARCH 7, 1968

The Security Council

Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,

1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;

2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
APPENDIX VI

UNITED STATES DECLARATION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES TO
NON-NUCLEAR NATIONS, JUNE 17, 1968

The Government of the United States notes with appreciation the desire expressed by a large number of States to subscribe to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We welcome the willingness of these States to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The United States also notes the concern of certain of these States that in conjunction with their adherence to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security. Any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States.

Bearing these considerations in mind, the United States declares the following:

Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

The United States affirms its intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
The United States reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The United States vote for the draft resolution before us and this statement of the way in which the United States intends to act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations are based upon the fact that the draft resolution is supported by other permanent members of the Security Council which are nuclear-weapon States and are also proposing to sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that these States have made similar statements as to the way in which they intend to act in accordance with the Charter.
APPENDIX VII
SIGNATORIES AND RATIFICATIONS TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Up to 5th March 1970, the date on which the N.P.T. entered into force, the following 97 governments had signed the treaty and 48 of them had ratified. The ratifying governments are underlined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, Republic of</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Kinshasa)</td>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Maldives Islands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equador</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Roumania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Yemen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following bibliography does not contain an exhaustive collection of all the material relevant to the subject of this thesis. However, it does include all works referred to in the text and those which have assisted generally in the compilation of the thesis.

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

AUSTRALIA

Annual Reports of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, 1964 - 65
, 1965 - 66
, 1967 - 68
, 1968 - 69
, 1969 - 70

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Senate.

Current Notes on International Affairs, Canberra: Department of External [Foreign] Affairs. (Published monthly.)


Speech by Mr. D. Fairbairn, Minister for National Development, before a Liberal Party Meeting in Melbourne, on 13 July 1969.

INDIA

Debates of the Indian Parliament: Lok Sabha (Lower House).

Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (published monthly.)

JAPAN

Japan's Foreign Policy, Speech by Foreign Minister, Takeo Miki, at the Australian National University, Canberra, 29 July 1968.

UNITED NATIONS


Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications of the acquisition and further development of these weapons, General Assembly Document A/6858, October 1967.


UNITED STATES

I. Congressional Hearings, Reports and Prints.


II. Other Official U.S. Publications


The Department of State Bulletin, Washington: U.S. Department of State (Published weekly).


BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS


Australia's Foreign Policy in the Seventies, Townsville, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1968 (mimeographed).


---


---


---


------------- The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, Rand P-3393, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1966.


ARTICLES


--------
"Japan's Legacy and Destiny of Change", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1, October 1969, pp.21-38.


--------


-------- "Strategic Studies and its Critics", in World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4, July 1968, pp.593-605.


Foster, W.C., "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, July 1965, pp.587-601.


Gilinsky, V., and Smith, B.L.R., "Civilian Nuclear Power and Foreign Policy", in Orbis, Vol. 12, No. 3, Fall 1968, pp.816-830.


Green, J.H., "The Australian Atom Bomb", in The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 1965, pp.36-44.


"We Must Retain and Exercise our Nuclear Options", in Organiser (New Delhi), Vol. 11, No. 1, August 15, 1967, pp.21-2.


Hall, H.A., "Atoms for Peace, or War", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, July 1965, pp.602-615.


Hassner, P., "Pragmatic Conservatism in the White House", Foreign Policy, No. 3, Summer 1971, pp.41-61.


"On the Nuclear Threshold", [anonymous], *Current Affairs Bulletin* [University of Sydney], Vol. 45, No. 2, December 15, 1969.


Richardson, J.L., "Controls over peaceful nuclear programs: a review", in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, No. 4; December 1967, pp.497-503.


UNPUBLISHED WORKS


"Interview With Secretary McNamara", text of an interview by Professor Kei Wakaizumi, Kyoto Industrial University, with Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara, 15 July 1966, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Lawrence, R.M. and Van Cleave, W., "Assertive Disarmament: The Unexamined Option in Regard to China", unpublished research paper, 1968. (Copy by courtesy of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra).


Wohlstetter, A., "Good Guys, Bad Guys and the A.B.M.", article submitted to the Los Angeles Times, for publication on 3 and 4 August, 1969.

NEWSPAPERS

Atoms in Japan (Japan Atomic Industrial Forum).
The Age (Melbourne)
The Australian
The Australian Financial Review
The Bulletin (Sydney)
The Canberra Times
The Christian Science Monitor
Daily Summary of the Japanese Press (published by the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo)
Dawn (Karachi)
The Economist (London)
The Japan Times
The Mercury (Hobart)
The New York Times (City Edition)
The New York Times Magazine
The New York Times Weekly Review
Nucleonics Week (McGraw-Hill)
The Sydney Morning Herald
The Times (London)
The Times of India
The Washington Post