RATIONALISATION, RESISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE: A QUESTION OF AUTHORITY

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Except where otherwise acknowledged in the text, this thesis represents the author's original research.

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Chairman of a recent Australian government inquiry into development assistance asked a practitioner "What overall brief do you think you are working to? When you go home and talk to your wife as to what you think you do, what do you think you are doing?" Without hesitation, he responded "We talk about our disillusionment. Seriously, that is what we talk about. We talk about whether we are throwing our lives away in a futile exercise."

This thesis is about that overall brief. It is about development, social theory, and personal conduct. The latter is the purpose, and social theory provides trails along which to explore some recurrent issues in development practice. While the issues are practical and personal, I draw on many theoretical approaches in this thesis. I make no apologies for this. The trails of others do provide routes out of our own troubles, but most social theory, and most of the best of it, does not give straight answers. ‘Straight’ answers are a personal, not a theoretical responsibility. I have Professor David Bettison of Waikato University to thank for that. A good deal of social theory demands a position; the thesis has helped me realise that a good deal of social theory is unsound because of this. In turn, this reconfirms my belief that those practitioners who have not found a position are ethically less authoritarian than those who have. According to Bill, my neighbour, social theory should be a turbo-charge into life; a way of moving, not a way of establishing positions from which to annihilate all doubt.

Along this path, one meets people who share your thoughts and trajectory. Rae Porter is one of these. Peter Robertson is an indispensable other. Supervisors also help in the travails, as traffic wardens, passengers and friends who occasionally relieve in the driving seat. Nigel Thrift, of Saint David’s University College, Lampeter, and his inevitable reading suggestions, was a great help; I sadly missed his departure half-way through the PhD. Dean Forbes provided able guidance. Sometimes the routes he suggested did not seem right; but then many of my choices were not too hot either. Dean, more clearly than I, knew what the signposts meant; whereas many geographers are still sorting out the key to the map. Ben Kerkvliet, of the University of Hawaii, added much to my thinking and not least to flushing out my passive pronouns. Thanks must also go to Bryant Allen for careful reading to see that I kept my purpose in view. He is one of the clearest, most dogged thinkers in that regard.

Some debts accrue over a relatively short time. Jim Lewis of Durham University, Brian Fegan, an anthropologist at Macquarie University and Piers Blaikie of the School of Development Studies at East Anglia, were around at the right moments. The praise, threats and cajolery of Human Geography Department members and other friends; their help with three years of reading, typing, seminars, broken crankshafts and computer terminals, is also grate-
fully acknowledged. In particular I wish to express my sincere thanks to Norma Chin, Sean Foley, Chris Kissling, Harold Brookfield and especially Mike Bourke for their support during the final stages. The generous financial support and facilities provided by the Australian National University must also be recorded.

PhDs have a long gestation. My time at the East West Center in Honolulu with Mike Hamnett, Amarjit Singh and Ed Oasa stirred an interest in ethics and personal conduct. But it is particular events that serve to 'shake down' ideas and draw out prejudices of which we are only dimly aware. Explaining to Tanja and Carly Porter why they should come to cold Canberra while I sit in a shoe box for three years is one of these. Telling employers the next contract will have to wait that long is another. And then there is fieldwork. So many debts to read off and feel guilty about because of lack of space. A moment's humility will produce thesis-length acknowledgements. In Sri Lanka with Leonard Peries and John Curnow, in the Philippines with Karl Gaspar, Romy and Linda Tiongco, in Kenya with James Aremo and Luca Russo. And then all the development practitioners who so freely shared their story with me. How does one account for these debts? Thanks must go to people in non-governmental agencies like CORSO, Community Aid Abroad and Freedom From Hunger who helped this thesis make it back to the ground; without them, I would still be working through my 'recommendations for policy' sections. Because of their efforts, I have no need for such pretence.
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the relations between theory and practice in development. The primary concern is to investigate causes and remedies of a tension between three interests pursued in development, namely: between strategies to achieve material interests (such as economic productivity) and the realisation of personal (such as dignity and esteem) and political interests (such as social justice and liberty). This tension is referred to as the development malaise. Particular attention is given to how the conduct and commitments of development practitioners express different forms of rationality and authority. The argument shifts from practice (five project case studies), to theory (reflection on the project studies) and back to practice (a final case study). This structure corresponds with three broad themes.

Aspects of the development malaise have been well researched. But this literature has reached an impasse; much of it enfeebles rather than enables practical strategies. The rationalisation perspective - assembled from the work of Weber, Marcuse and Habermas - provides an historical context and set of propositions to analyse the development malaise. A distinction between technical and substantive rationality, and different inflexions on the concept authority, are used to explore the ways in which the activities of practitioners, including the techniques, procedures and language they employ, reproduce and sustain the development malaise in project examples drawn from New Zealand, Fiji, Western Samoa and the Philippines.

The rationalisation perspective, however, tends to ignore other aspects of practice which are collectively labelled resistance. Both rationalisation and resistance must be incorporated into any theoretical perspective which seeks to adequately understand the development malaise and establish practical strategies to encounter it. The epistemological and normative issues of incorporating both constitute the second theme. The theory of structuration, as developed by Giddens, helps clarify these issues and indicates a path toward their resolution. However, this second theme maintains that research questions cannot be resolved in theory and then applied in practice. Non-dualist theories like structuration are hermeneutic and therefore do not provide a 'position' in the usual sense of the word.

The third theme therefore is that just as the relations between practitioners and the development malaise are not subject to formulation as a position, structuration theory provides no algorithm for practical conduct. The notion of responsible practice, as a theoretically informed method, involves a continual struggle to reconcile the positive and deleterious aspects of two ethics of practice which reflect
two different rationalities and grounds for authority. Furthermore, this reconcilia-
tion requires a suspension of the usual distinction between theory and practice
which deeply affects the conduct and responsibilities of the development prac-
titioner. Just how this occurs is not amenable to formulation as a series of
precepts; the question is less what responsible practice is, but in what does it in-
here.
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If you are the same sort of person as myself, I will willingly go on questioning you; otherwise I will stop. If you ask what I mean, I am one of those people who are glad to have their own mistakes pointed out and glad to point out the mistakes of others, but who would just as soon have the first experience as the second; in fact I consider the first a greater pain, in as much as it is better to be relieved of very bad trouble oneself than to relieve another, and in my opinion no worse trouble can befall a man than to have a false belief about the subjects which we are now discussing. So if you are of the same mind, let us go on with the conversation; but if you think that we ought to abandon it, let us drop it at once and bring the argument to an end.

Socrates in *Plato*

*Gorgias*
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This thesis deals with two topics. One is development practice. The other is personal conduct and ethics. I argue the two topics belong together. Development practice involves the idea that the natural environment and human affairs can be controlled in order to bring about desirable outcomes. This belief is embodied in a range of institutional arrangements - from international agencies like the World Bank to specific projects - and distinctive techniques and procedures for arriving at decisions. But this would amount to nothing without the actions of bureaucrats, officials, practitioners and those on whose behalf they act. The conduct of such people is therefore crucial. The kinds of commitments they have, their views about themselves and their work bear directly on the success of what is called development practice.

Both topics are of interest in terms of a 'development malaise'. At its simplest, 'development malaise' refers to the tendency for development practice to result in effects which are often contrary to its acknowledged purposes. Development malaise' also refers to a deep sense of cynicism and despair amongst practitioners about the results of their work and the possibility of 'development' at all. My sense of the development malaise is based on personal experiences in development practice in both industrialised and developing countries. This study examines the character of this malaise and the question 'How is the conduct of practitioners related to the existence of the development malaise?' That is, I am interested in exploring how the actions of practitioners reproduce or sustain the development malaise. Two further interests are logically related to this: 'What kind of theoretical perspectives best clarify this aspect of development practice?' and, 'What do these suggest practitioners may do about the malaise?'. I do not intend to provide here a literary review of development practice to locate this research. Literature is reviewed continuously throughout the thesis. The dimensions of this study are best conveyed by anecdotes from experience. The first conveys the political context of the development malaise and the boundaries of this study.

'You'd better wait here till I see what's going on', says Romy who is accompanying me to visit Karl Gaspar. I sit in the jeep while Romy walks the ten metres or so to the main prison entrance. The Davao City gaol has the familiar low-lying cell blocks and creeping mildew-covered concrete walls. Just below the single level roof-line are small barred openings, too high to allow a view in or out. Scattered around the compound are timber outhouses for the guards’ and the detainees’ 'occupational rehabilitation' courses.

While I stand waiting to be admitted to Karl's home for the past eighteen months, our last evening together comes to mind. Karl, a Filipino human rights activist and development worker for over ten years, was my research adviser during a previous visit to Mindanao. The night after I last saw him Karl disappeared,
only to surface at Camp Bago Bantay in Manila two weeks later, after my return to Australia. He had been charged with 'inciting to rebellion' and moved back to Davao for trial. Judicial proceedings had been repeatedly adjourned and obstructed for over six months.

I am anxious about meeting Karl again and nervous about prison protocol. Amnesty International reports and Karl's letters about his 'prison sojourn' as he called it have schooled me a little. But the immediacy of the visit and the alert sirens put me on edge.

'This is Father Porter from Australia, a colleague of Gaspar's', says Romy introducing me to the Prison Superintendent. We're offered Coca Cola between questioning. The Superintendent leaves the office, and is replaced by an agitated guard. Moments pass and our eyes light on the fifteen-plus M16 ammunition magazines in special pockets sewn into the guard's hunting vest. From another door Karl enters, his face alight with joy.

After expressive greetings and reports on mutual friends we settle in to an awkward silence. My earlier anxieties return: the kind one gets during silent moments at the bedside of terminally ill friends.

'What's the chance of release?' Karl is being held under one of the Philippines' notorious Presidential Commitment Orders (PCOs).

'Well, the PCO means indefinite detention until Marcos decrees otherwise'. The 'inciting to rebellion' charge claims that Karl is a "top ranking member of the Philippines Communist Party". 'They say that my trips abroad are to gain underground funding and that subversive documents and ammunition have been found and linked to me. These are all lies of course. I have denied the accusations. But the military are so desperate they have to produce subversives or be accused of sleeping on the job.'

'Karl’s involvement in human rights and development issues automatically makes him a "subversive" Doug, you know that', Romy reminds me.

'OK, so what's the next move for Australians? We heard about the rescheduling of your trial. But what I've seen of the judicial system doesn't leave much room for optimism,' I say.

'Well, first you can give them my warmest greetings and thanks'. Karl smiles. 'Amnesty and the TFD [Task Force Detainees] network played a big part in saving me from salvaging [illegal execution]. Yesterday they brought two detainees in here who weren't so lucky. One had lost his sanity and the other had a broken back. Another fellow was lying in back of a Fiera. When I see this I feel so privileged that I was spared such pain. You can thank them for their help in that regard too. But the best thing you can do is not just to concentrate on my particular case. There's a much bigger story to tell.' Another guard enters and the plastic clunk of his M16 rifle on concrete signals the end of our visit.

'Look I have to go, they've already given us more time. And they're pretty edgy today', says Karl apologetically.

'What about this bigger story Karl?' I ask jumping up, suddenly realising how little we'd talked. Too late, a few parting gestures and he is gone. I stand motionless, numb, as Karl is led back through the drizzle, a towel over his head and the guard's M16 at his back.

The long drive home provided ample opportunity to reflect on the bigger story. Bumping down narrow pot-holed roads past ramshackle dwellings lacking basic sanitation or electricity, part of this story was remembering recent experiences of the Filipino people. According to World Bank figures, the number of families living below the poverty line rose
from 38 per cent in 1971 to around 64 per cent in 1980. Despite impressive economic growth in the early and mid 1970s, between 1971 and 1980, the average income of the poorest fell by 20 per cent while that of the top 5 per cent of families rose by over 30 per cent.

The contradiction between what I knew of the Philippines' national wealth and the poverty outside the jeep window was but another example of the broader development malaise. Since Albert Fishlow's (1973) celebrated article on development in Brazil, the world's attention has been drawn repeatedly to the contradictions between economic growth and increasing absolute poverty. Despite rising national incomes, the 1979 FAO Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development declared, "eradication of hunger and poverty, the ultimate goal, is further away than ever before .... An estimated 750 million people are utterly destitute, lacking the most rudimentary requirements for human dignity."1 Taking food alone, with the exception of the Sub-Saharan region and some emergency situations, hunger and poverty today reflect more on inequitable access to food and productive means than on economic growth and production.

Opinions vary about the causes of these shocking conditions - whether we look at indicators of health, life expectancy, food intake, education or income. But aside from a few optimistic commentators, most observers share van Nieuwenhuijze's sentiments when he says "There is a foreboding that the problems of development, by aggravating and proliferating, will loom ever larger and darker, overshadowing the hope that the world could become a better place to live in."2 And Samuel Brittan in his 1983 Financial Times annual summary had cause to quote Winston Churchill's words, "Today's problems are elusive and intangible, and it would be a bold man who could look forward to certain success."3

But as we rounded a corner to a military road-block another part of the story appeared. The murder of Philippines opposition leader Benigno Aquino four weeks earlier had sparked off major unrest. September 21, the day of our visit, was marked by widespread demonstrations in provincial centres and a corresponding show of military strength.

Aquino aside, September 21 is a National Day of Mourning in the Philippines in commemoration of the 60,000 Filipino citizens who have been arrested and imprisoned since 1972. On this day, Filipinos remember massive increases in military forces and the expenditure diverted from programs for welfare and social justice during Martial Law. From a regular force of around 50,000 in 1972, the combined armed forces stand at over 300,000 today. With United States support, the defence budget has expanded from $US82 million to more than $US1 billion.

Opinions vary about the causes of militarisation in countries like the Philippines. The endemic balance of payments problems in arms-exporting countries are often cited. The failures of post-colonial governments, corruption, nationalism or the frustration of the Third

1. FAO, in Blaikie et al. (1981. 1).
World's early optimism, or its strategic significance, are also part of an explanation. But it is no coincidence that people like Karl are both human rights activists and development workers. There is a close association in their minds between the kind of development strategy foisted on countries like the Philippines and military-backed authoritarian governments. The roots of this link rest not only in the minds of 'subversives', but lie behind the congratulations the United States' Congress extended to President Marcos following the 1972 Declaration of Martial Law. And the links are clear in Marcos' response to the unrest following Aquino's assassination. On the one hand, Marcos' blunt assurances reflect the waning of dictatorships throughout history. "I warn the opposition" he said, "do not force my hand. Do not compel me to move to extremes." Militarisation and the rapid centralisation of power are seen as prerequisites for implementing development strategies. Marcos' avowed thesis, one espoused less publicly in the internal memos of development agencies, is that 'developing countries cannot afford the luxury of both bread and freedom. The country must choose, one or the other.'

The material and political manifestations of the development malaise are easily dismissed as temporary side-effects and not essential or necessarily tied to the particular development strategy. In large part, the centralisation of economic and authoritative power must be explained in terms of global political and economic processes. But the proposition examined in the early parts of this thesis is that these manifestations of the malaise are sustained and reproduced by the techniques and procedures of project practice.

Late in 1981, construction began on two major petrochemicals projects near Waitara, a small coastal settlement of about 6000 people in Taranaki, New Zealand. The projects will in the long term transform the social and environmental character of the district.

Prominent in a vociferous campaign of opposition were young Maori activists of Te Atiawa tribe. They were actively preparing evidence for inclusion in the Environmental Impact Reports (EIRs) and subsequent litigation before a Tribunal which would grant statutory water rights and set conditions on effluent discharge. Their concern, on the whole, increased at pace with assurances from the North American developers that the technology was 'safe' and that ecological impact would be 'negligible'.

Despite this, Te Atiawa elders had remained largely silent and conspicuously absent from political action. Puzzled by this I sought out Arapeta Mataira, a Te Atiawa elder who lived on a ridge overlooking the plant site. During winter months I made numerous visits to Arapeta's house to encourage him to join with others in expressing concern and thereby add legitimacy to the young activists' cause. During each visit, Arapeta listened attentively and patiently to my pleas and projections of the likely social and environmental consequences of the projects.

I found the visits exasperating. Arapeta's aged face showed no surprise at my assertions. At first, I sought to account for this in somewhat patronising terms: ignorance of rights, diffidence, the formidable costs and complex nature of proceedings.

Much later I came to realise that Arapeta had by historical analogy given a complete explanation of what appeared to be his acquiescence. It occurred to me

4. Newsweek, 3.10.83.
that where I kept talking in terms of present issues and future scenarios, Arapeta always steered our tea-cup conversations into events of 120 years ago and through renditions of tribal myth and cosmology. The historical accounts conveyed important messages about previous attempts to resist 'development'. The tales of cosmology and tribal spirituality took this a great deal further.

'The first shots in New Zealand's ten year land war were fired at Waitara on 17 March 1860 over a 600 acre land claim. On that day, 12 and 24 pounder field-guns and a naval rocket tube poured a barrage of shells into a small stockade on the outskirts of Waitara'. Arapeta went on to recount the twelve major battles that occurred over the next year, the courage of reinforcements from Wanganui tribes in the south and the northern Waikato and Maniopoto warriors and the high casualty rates suffered by the imperial forces. But then he listed the costs of this resistance. 'By the early 1860s almost all of Taranaki was proclaimed a confiscation area. The New Zealand Settlements Act in 1863 confiscated three million acres.' In 1865 the Native Lands Act provided legislation for an 'orderly system' for the purchase and settlement of Maori land. 'So by 1960 Maoris controlled less than six per cent of the country', he said.

'Not all Maori resistance was armed'. Arapeta pointed out that it ran the whole gamut from the initial welcoming of missionaries in 1846 through to a pre-Gandhian pacificism led by Te Whiti-o-Rongomai. 'In 1884 King Tawhiao led a delegation to meet Queen Victoria but was denied access to her. In 1924 the prophet Ratana took a petition weighing almost twenty pounds to the British King. Again to no avail', Arapeta recalled. Other institutional battles were sustained through Parliamentary representation.

But as the Hon. Matiu Rata had said on withdrawing from long-time association with the Labour Party.

"The 139 year experience of [the] 'we are one people' concept has for the Maori been a failure. We have as a people never felt more let down, more insecure and more economically and socially deprived than we do today .... We will no longer ... accept being governed or administered by anyone who does not understand the way we think or appreciate our terms and values."5

'Mat Rata is right of course,' I would exclaim. 'But things are quite different in this case.' In previous development projects, whether land development schemes, road building or industrial development, a fixation on economic and technical efficiency had invariably resulted in the negative effects or social costs being borne by groups less able to mobilise the research and skills to influence the bargaining and negotiating process which allocated benefits and costs. However, in this case the Commissioner for the Environment, responsible for setting the scope and auditing of environmental impact research, insisted that a 'comprehensive' assessment be made. At briefings for the research team he insisted that 'all factors would be taken into account'. In particular, Maori resources had emerged as an important category of concern. 'Maori resources, namely the use and importance of marine food resources to cultural esteem and tribal dignity', he said 'would be given equal weight along with the effects on other users - like commercial fisheries, and recreation. These in turn, would be weighed against projected benefits'.

Arapeta had heard me recount this many times. He readily acknowledged the precedent being established but, inexplicably, became more reluctant to lend the prestige of his name to the activists' cause. During my last visit, Arapeta became angry saying, 'you have not understood what I have tried to say either'. Taken aback, I protested that I did not know what he meant by this. To me his lessons

about tribal cosmology and the spiritual importance of the marine ecology reaffirmed the need to fight. As the younger activists had said, 'tama tu tama ora, tama, noho tama mate tamatoa' ('those who stand and fight shall live, those who sit and wait shall die'). To this Arapeta gave the frustrated reply, 'They'll probably win this fight, but fighting that way they'll lose the battle'.

Arapeta's remark for me expresses the greatest challenge of the development malaise. It has become a major source of motivation for this research. His charge was not about the chances of influencing the allocation of costs and benefits associated with the projects. Indeed, he conceded the activists' fight would probably gain significant ground. Neither was he saying that subsequent fights would be lost and therefore also the overall battle. His metaphor of battle referred to something much deeper. His patient hours with me had tried to convey that the meaning of marine ecology to Maori people was defined in terms of a broader cosmology of Maoritanga. To treat these as 'resources' to be quantified, weighed, and taken into account distorted and destroyed this spiritual meaning. Far from a positive step, the liberal-minded reform of 'comprehensive assessment' simply represented the further extension of European rationality into the most sacred realms. The lost battle spelt the final demise of the integrity of his culture and, with it, his personal dignity.

Karl's 'bigger story' provides a notional boundary of the development malaise. This kind of story is of course commonplace today. The technology and forms of economic organisation developed over the past three decades are a double-edged sword. Development has provided unprecedented expansion in agricultural and industrial productivity, but this has not been without costs. Dudley Seers remarked in 1969 that 'economic growth may not merely fail to solve social and political difficulties, but that certain types of growth may actually cause them'. In this vein, considerable research has examined what I have called the material and political dimensions of the development malaise, for example, income distribution, the consolidation of State power, uneven development or the geographic transfer of value.

In recognition of the various social, political and economic contradictions of development, enlightened commentaries in the 1970s argued for more comprehensive methods and techniques. Whether in the assessment of project impacts such as in the Taranaki case, or in planning, implementation or evaluation of development projects, the popularity of expressions like 'incorporating the social factor', 'maximising participation', and 'integrated planning' reflect attempts to overcome the more obvious political and material aspects of the development malaise. But Arapeta Mataira would argue the various methods and techniques whereby these things are 'incorporated' into decisions may actually exacerbate the problem and ensure the development malaise becomes more all-pervasive.

Both anecdotes are value-laden. Even to talk of contradictions in development suggests some standard or view of the purposes of development against which these judgements are made. Rather than add to over 300 definitions of development offered at one time or another, it is more fruitful to identify certain core characteristics or 'interests' which are implicit in most definitions of development.

Whether development is understood as a goal or the process of moving toward this,
three interests are basic to most statements. These I call material life-sustenance, personal self-esteem, and political freedom. The labels are somewhat arbitrary, but the first, material life-sustenance, suggests that a basic purpose of economic activity is to ensure that people have the means of overcoming the indignity and misery arising from lack of food, shelter, health and security. These material interests are necessary but not sufficient conditions of development. Indeed, in most discussions, material interests are considered means towards two more fundamental interests.

Personal self-esteem, as a second interest, is referred to in many ways - dignity, identity, self-worth and self-respect. These personal or even existential interests are difficult to specify in the abstract. Parallel indicators for material interests such as GNP per capita, disease incidence, or calorific intake do not exist for personal interests. Basically, personal self-esteem implies not being used as an instrument of others' interests in a manner which threatens dignity, identity and so on. Denis Goulet, who has written extensively on each of these three interests, notes that,

The relevant point is that underdevelopment is the lot of the majority of the world's population. As long as esteem or respect was dispensed on grounds other than material achievement, it was possible to resign oneself to poverty without feeling disdained. Conversely, once the prevailing image of the better life includes material welfare as one of its essential ingredients, it becomes difficult for the materially underdeveloped to feel respected or esteemed .... Development is legitimised as a goal because it is an important, perhaps indispensable way of gaining esteem. ⁶

The third interest, political freedom, does not necessarily amount to support for any particular regime. But political interests include freedom from alienating material conditions of life, access to a broader range of life choices, the minimisation of externally compelling authority which constrains or fetters this exercise of choice, as well as more common issues of political liberties and justice.

The development malaise suggests that it is necessary to examine the relations between these interests. As a Western conception, it is clear that achievement of the latter two interests, personal and political, hinges on the achievement of the first. But it is necessary to consider whether the manner in which material interests are realised helps or hinders the attainment of personal and political interests.

In Part One I explore the implications of this. At no point is it my intention to provide a social impact assessment of development projects. Rather I focus on development practice and how it reproduces and sustains the well-documented problems encompassed by the expression 'development malaise'. To do so I have had to turn to literature not commonly found in development discussions. The key term is 'rationalisation'. Rationalisation is an historical process in which an increasingly broad range of decisions are made according to technical procedures for the choice between alternative means to given goals or values. These procedures are characteristic of what rationalisation theorists like Max Weber and Jurgen Habermas call technical or instrumental rationality. Technical rationality

⁶ Goulet (1977, 90).
coincides with the central idea of development practice mentioned earlier; the belief that the various factors of development - land, labour, technology and capital - can be controlled and manipulated according to a plan to achieve certain desired ends or values.

Technically rational practices are first instituted to expand economic productivity. But production can be rationalised only under certain conditions, that is, if all the elements of production (for example, the costs and supply of labour, raw materials, investment capital, markets) can be kept within predictable limits. Without State intervention however the price, supply and quality of these elements is inherently unstable. The upshot of this, on the one hand, is increasing concentration of power and State control. On the other hand, politics becomes directed primarily toward eliminating market fluctuations or 'vagaries' that constrain efficient production and enlisting the kinds of political support necessary to ensure a minimum of goods and services for large numbers of people. Politics, like development, comes to be seen as synonymous with the administration of society, that is, a technical activity in which political decisions - like a declaration of martial law - are interpreted in terms of what is most efficient and effective in instrumental terms. One theorist summed the consequences in this way.

Where people arguing politics used to talk of justice, freedom, moral rights and wrongs, the new expertise talks of 'parameters', 'trade-offs', 'interfaces', 'inputs', 'optimizations', 'cost-benefits', and 'cross-impact analyses'.

In practice where decisions may once have been made in terms of politics, personal belief, subjective values or cosmology (what the rationalisation theorists call substantive rationality) increasing credence is given to the view that all this must defer to the needs of efficiency and an overall balanced and objective judgement. More than this, the rationalisation theorists suggest that the incorporation of substantive rationality into the process - Arapeta's cosmology and personal dignity/esteem - leads to its 'eclipse' and displacement by technical rationality. Maori activists may win the fight to have their concerns incorporated in the overall decision, but the means of incorporation distort the interests themselves. From this point of view, efforts to expand production to satisfy the interest of material life-sustenance will lead to the denial of the higher-order personal and political interests.

In Chapters Four and Five I examine development projects (from Fiji, Western Samoa, New Zealand and the Philippines) through a series of propositions culled from the rationalisation perspective. In this analysis I pay particular attention to the role of practitioners. The increasing prominence of development practitioners has been the topic of a variety of critical commentaries. In the macro-level political economy critiques of development, practitioners have been cast as agents of bourgeois State interests, legitimators of ruling class accumulation and its maintenance of social control, and as crucial agents in overcoming the inherent contradictions of capitalism.

Just as I argue that the development malaise goes considerably deeper than overt politics or class conflict, the same can be said about the relations between the activities of development practitioners - including the techniques, procedures and methods of practice -

and the development malaise. This does not discount the broader analysis. Certainly we can find cases where the practitioner's report simply provides ballast for an authoritarian status quo and where projects are eagerly designed around 'public order' objectives, even when the dictator's intention is patently obvious. But previous remarks about the development malaise suggest that such an analysis lacks depth. The way in which practitioners embody the attributes of technical rationality must also be accounted for. The conception of development in technically rational terms is accompanied by a particular set of beliefs like objectivity, impartiality, balance and discipline which are invoked to support the authority of the practitioner. The practitioners' authority is based on an ability to get to the 'facts', not political commitments, beliefs or personal idiosyncrasies. As I show in Chapter Three, these notions about practice are expressed in a variety of ways. But essentially, they amount to a fundamental separation between technical and substantive rationality, or between 'is' (the facts) and 'ought' (values).

Shortly after beginning this thesis, I attended a meeting of the Society for International Development which was addressed by a member of the Jackson Committee on 'What should the Jackson Committee say?'. The Jackson Committee was the latest in a long line of inquiries into the efficiency and effectiveness of the Australian overseas aid program. The speaker, a development economist, was one of three economists and two businessmen comprising the Committee.

The Committee member began his address by noting that over 400 submissions had been received on this controversial issue. "What I find most interesting however is not the number of submissions, but that each had really failed to address the issues. Each submission tried to tell us what aid should be about, where it should go, what the Review should do and what development should be about", he said. "But my beginning point is nothing so emotional. I'm a little sick of all these shoulds". He went on to explain that as an economist he was interested in beginning with how things really were, that is beginning with the facts and then reasoning by evidence to a set of conclusions and recommendations.

Judging by the nodding assent around the table, the audience considered that this was an entirely reasonable approach. We in Australia were fortunate that even if the realities are ugly or irksome, as undoubtedly they are in development aid, practitioners would not rebel against the facts, but would take the world as it is without yielding to the 'shoulds' of nostalgia, ideology or subjective belief.

The speaker provided a particularly vigorous replay of a story which has become increasingly familiar in the last two decades. His authority rests on a view of himself as a prison warden. The 'shoulds' are either passionate, unregenerate sinners or a pack of murderous inmates who must be kept under high security. Fortunately an innate (inmate) scepticism tells us to be wary of savants bearing gifts of truth and privileged insight.

My concern at the meeting was not that the speaker was insufficiently disciplined or skilled. My uneasiness stemmed from an inkling that a significant part of the development malaise could be attributed to this kind of promise. The views of the rationalisation theorists suggested to me that it is precisely the practitioners' commitment to technical rationality that reinforces key aspects of the malaise. In other words, practitioners may
honestly believe their activities serve the common apolitical good yet, in so viewing their task, they are implicated in broader authoritarian politics and technocratic social control. My immediate concern is to clarify and then test this view of the role of the development practitioner in the development malaise. The rationalisation perspective seems to offer a way of going to the heart of relations between the development malaise and the practitioner.

But it is more than an analytical framework. According to theorists the political implications of rationalisation are not incidental but inevitable consequences of technically rational conceptions of practice. They suggest a very persuasive moral judgement. Despite one's best intentions there is very little that can be done about a development malaise within the bounds of conventional practice.

By the time the address had finished, I felt backed into a corner of silence. While I thought then, and still do, that a sanitised 'is' was a pretentious and wrong-headed basis for policy and practice (even if it were possible), I was in no mind to champion the cause of the 'shoulds' either. Development is normative. My three core interests could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered objective, technical statements. Normative commitments are of course essential. But while TV film shots of emaciated Ethiopians provide good heart-twanging motivation for reaching into the public's pockets, they sustain nothing. For most, the passions fade after the next batch of commercials. In other words, part of what the speaker said rang true. Technical rationality is after all central to entertaining the idea of development at all. But the rationalisation perspective suggested some perverse consequences of this view as well. Saying NO to this view of practice is intellectually easy, even if it takes some heroism. But how do you say NO while also saying YES to the possibility of development practice?

This experience indicated to me that while the rationalisation perspective gives critical insight into practice, the analysis itself promotes a despair which enfeebles consideration of strategies to ameliorate the malaise. Unless one is able to resolve this, the effects can be quite debilitating.

Late in 1980 I was part of a twenty-member study team charged with preparing, post-haste, an EIR for a New Zealand aluminium smelter. Financed by Swiss money with infrastructure funded by the New Zealand taxpayer. South Pacific Aluminium's (SPAL's) smelter was one in a long line of 'Think Big' projects championed by the National Party government of the day. Major resource development projects were seen as a panacea for falling agricultural revenues and escalating national oil bills.

My role in the effort was quite explicit. Apart from helping with regional economics, I had to assess the 'effects' of the smelter on the local community. 'Effects' was an understatement. The 200,000 tonne per year smelter was to be built by Fletcher-Challenge Ltd at the entrance to Otago Harbour on a stretch of coastline known as Aramoana. The homes of almost 500 people in the communities of Aramoana and Te Ngarue would be demolished for oxidation ponds and assembly areas. Joe Pert, SPAL's PR man, had promised to relocate the residents on a coastal block to the north. For those unlucky enough to stay he offered a 'substantially improved environment': park benches, better roads and an 'aesthetically integrated' plant.

The residents were largely opposed to this. But they were very unsure about
what effect this opposition could have. The project was to proceed under the new ‘fast-track’ National Development Act 1979 legislation. According to its proponents, this provided residents with ‘adequate protection’. As the Chairman of the Otago Harbour Board, a joint sponsor of the project, told the community, ‘There’s no need to get on the bandwagon, if people are prepared to reason, all will go well.’ The grist for reason was promised by the leader of the EIR team, ‘The Report will provide an independent, well informed and objective analysis of what the project will mean to the area’.

Initially this gave local people some reassurance. What the residents did not know, but soon discovered, was that the EIR was to be financed by the developer. Mr Fletcher and Mr Pert would have a hand in determining the boundaries and character of ‘objectivity’ offered by the EIR experts. Another thing the community were unaware of, and probably remain so to this day, was that transnational corporations like British Petroleum (BP) had actively participated in drafting the legislation which would ‘look after Aramoana’s interests’. BP at this time had proposals before the government for a methanol ammonia and urea complex in Taranaki. EIRs have a mandate to provide ‘the facts’. But the character of ‘truth’, what are (un)reasonable and (ir)relevant considerations are defined by those who can mobilise the rules and resources to control the discourse.

Personal crises take on different manifestations according to the situation and tasks at hand. In this case, my dilemma resided in a clear distinction between ‘good’ research and ‘quick and dirty’ or QUAD research. The character of each is well documented in the annals of social science research ethics, and in practice constitute powerful images of praise and rebuke.

‘Good’ research amounts to ‘telling it how it really is’. In impact studies, it means exposing the facts of the existing situation, the ‘baseline’ as its called, and then ‘scoping’ or fitting the project into the picture and documenting what will happen. Of course, there are always margins of error. As the practitioners will concede, ‘there’s always a certain amount of uncertainty involved’. Good research means plenty of hard data, lots of tables, graphs and authoritative evidence, and naturally requires that one is relatively unfettered by constraints of budget or client interests. On top of this, it means doing the right things ethically - a lengthy residence in the area and presenting in print an accurate image of how it all really is now and will be in the future.

QUAD research is better known by a list of ‘don’t do’s’ which are often invoked to enhance the identity of good research. QUAD research is like the living room after a party; half-empty frequency tables, the dregs of people met on the beach or in the pub, traces of sociological musings, the butts of jokes, laughter, ‘heavy’ scenes, speculations about political interests, misspelt place names, people’s names, the odd typographic error and clear evidence that the boss had been there.

Good impact research is believed to be in the best interests of all concerned, especially the impacted community. The EIR promises to capture their concerns, to provide insights beyond those expressible by the people and estimate the real consequences of the project. This ensures the facts are entered into the overall balance of the ‘national interest’. QUAD research is of little value in this regard. If not rejected out of hand, it would be seen as a distortion of reality. Inevitably, subsequent decisions would weigh heavily against the community.

Put in this way, the options for the researcher are clear. But as I said in relation to the Jackson Committee member, things were none too clear for me. Text book socialisation gives clear instruction, but beyond these comfortable confines, previous EIR experience suggested that perhaps the best I could do for the local people would be a QUAD job.

Consider the two cryptic scenarios then in my mind: Good research is com-
pleted, EIR published and hits the community’s coffee tables. Community reads
document which by some act of literary competence accurately portrays the
community’s reality, starkly measures impact and recommends ‘special inclusion’
of these issues. Community rests assured that their interests are represented, sits
back and waits. Tribunal proceeds to take $1.5 million social costs into account,
measures this against $350-400 million promised national returns of the project
annually and, on the basis of learned and rational judgement, the technically
necessary proposal goes ahead and community is ‘removed’.

QUAD research published in EIR and hits said coffee tables. Community reads,
outraged at flippant distortions and half truths. Mobilises for action around
leadership of those suspicious all the time. A series of direct actions proceed.
Community may or may not win - in fact there’s a good chance they will be
considered ‘unreasonable’ and rejected - but now more experienced and astute,
evaluates considerable ‘out of court’ concessions from government and SPAL. Mr
Pert fired, and community overall in a better position to deal with forthcoming
changes. As the Filipino underground organising manuals say, the community is
‘enlightened, enabled, and ennobled’.

As it turned out, I didn’t have to make the choice. I remember the Executive
Officer of the NZ Social Science Research Committee, a champion of good applied
research, ringing me half-way through ‘preliminary scoping’ to query a remark
she’d overheard.

‘Is it true that SPAL’s going to edit your report?’

‘Well, I guess so. My memos to SPAL are edited anyway, and after all Mr
Fletcher’s got to put his name on the report.’

‘That’s outrageous,’ she replied. Well yes, I supposed it was.

‘How are you going to maintain research standards?’ Anticipating this remark,
I had already drifted away wondering what standards looked like and who thought
they were a good idea anyway. And, from the point of view of the actual
consequences of the project, what was ‘good’ research? It wasn’t going to enable
old Joe Panaterri to continue forty years of flat fishing in the area. Neither was it
going to ensure that Shirley Craig could pass her humble dwelling on to the fifth
generation of Aramoana-ites. ‘You will help us won’t you?’ Shirley had said,
folding away the family photo album.

‘Doug, we’ll have to get this out in the open ... Doug. Hello?’

‘Yes Sandy, I’ll talk to you next week in Wellington.’

Many people have examined aspects of the development malaise. These anecdotes index
broader issues which continue to perplex scholars and practitioners. But I have begun with
these anecdotes, rather than a broad literature review, in order to convey a personal
ambivalence about previous scholarly contributions. Writing this thesis has been an
opportunity to go further into ideas and insights which could not previously be pursued,
could not compete with the immediate demands of ‘work’. My interest has been to explore
how the development malaise, and the personal dilemmas it poses, arise. This implies both
explanatory and practical aims. The explanatory aim, that is, understanding the develop­
ment malaise and how the practitioner is implicated in it, occupies much of the thesis. The
practical aims are not a ‘tag-on’ however.

The latter point becomes particularly relevant in Part Two where I pause to examine
the insights provided by the rationalisation perspective. In Part One I identify ‘tendencies’ in
conventional practice which reproduce the development malaise. ‘Tendencies’ is a deliberate
choice of word. While these must be acknowledged, the word 'resistance' is used to refer to those aspects of practice which receive relatively little attention within the rationalisation perspective. This discussion has implications for both the explanatory and practical aims of the thesis. Despite its obvious merits, the rationalisation perspective, I argue, tends to produce an 'over-rationalised' conception of practice. Not only does this impair understanding of the development malaise, but it significantly affects assessment of practical strategies which may ameliorate it. On the other hand, those aspects of practice which I term resistance do not provide a position from which to reconstruct the earlier account of practice, nor do they warrant grounds for practical strategies. For both explanatory and practical reasons therefore, it is necessary to construct a theoretical framework that incorporates both rationalisation and resistance.

In Chapter Seven I argue the issues which arise in incorporating rationalisation and resistance are germane to recent attempts to develop 'non-dualist' social theories. I consider one example that has gained some popularity in human geography; Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration. After showing how this helps redress the explanatory concerns of the thesis, Part Three turns attention to the practical implications of non-dualist social theory. As I remarked earlier, the practical aims are not a 'tag-on' in the sense of 'policy recommendations' sections customarily appended to scholarly research. Rather, I argue that certain practical considerations are constitutive of structuration theory. More precisely, non-dualist theories like structuration are hermeneutic, that is, their explanatory insights are revealed in practical conduct and not through the establishment of another 'position' from which to prescribe action. 'Position', I argue, is a feature of dualist theory, and as the discussion of rationalisation and resistance shows, is in some measure responsible for the alienation of contemporary research from practice, and of practitioners, who seek insight through the tools and categories of social science.

Consistent with this, the thesis is unable to offer generalised positions about the way in which the development malaise is constructed or sustained; neither does it provide an algorithm for practical strategies. Rather, in Chapter Nine, I show through a case study a mode of practice informed by this theoretical understanding and the method logically connected with it.
CHAPTER 2
DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS AND PROJECTS

When asked by members of an Australian government inquiry to summarise his thoughts on development, Dr Richard Manning, then Acting Director of the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB), replied,

I should perhaps preface my remarks by saying that we are really dealing with a fairly new concept. The whole concept of organised, planned development of the economic and social fabric of societies is something which has really come to the fore only in the last 50 years and most particularly since the Second World War and the gradual independence of former colonies.... Addressing your question, we do see that development is essentially the process of change, that it is change spelled out in economic, social, political dimensions and that it is regarded as desirable change and ... a more stable political and social structure for this region of the world.1

Dr Manning's reply encapsulates the main topics of this chapter. In Section I, I discuss three important features of contemporary development practice: the particular idea about history it embodies, the institutional mechanisms through which it is implemented, and the increasingly broad scope of matters included under its rubric. Section II moves from this context to outline the six project cases used in this study, indicating how the cases were selected and where they will feature in the argument.

1 IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE

The idea of development was formalised by the Allies' Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods in 1944. As Dr Manning intimated, prior to World War II hardly a book had 'development' in its title nor were courses taught in the subject; development primarily denoted the exploitation of natural resources by colonial regimes.2 During the late 1940s and early 1950s a multifaceted idea of development rapidly became the topic of United Nations (UN) Resolutions and United States Presidential Addresses. Roosevelt's 'Four

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1. Manning, 22.4.82. in JCPA, (1983, 53-54).
2. Arndt (1980, 463): and Lea and Chaudhri (1983, 8). Clearly, the term 'development' was in use, particularly in Marx's work where it was a central theme. But overall, major efforts to consider questions now called 'developmental' in nature generally did not label their concern in these terms. For example, Colin Clark's (1957) monumental study of 1940 was entitled 'The Conditions of Economic Progress'. Arndt (1980) reviews a 'semantic history' of development in this light. Cf. Livingstone (1981), Sunkel (1977). Robertson (1984, 7-69, 183), and Adler (1977).
Freedoms' address and Truman's 'Point Four' emphasised the West's 'moral obligation' to help those living in 'primitive and stagnant' conditions by applying technical skills and economic know-how to resources. The urgent task according to Truman was to "create the conditions that will lead eventually to personal freedom and happiness for all mankind".  

Nevertheless, efforts to capture the world's imagination and loyalties did not reflect humanitarianism alone, but stressed the urgent "problem of depriving the communists of their actual and potential 'mass base' by an adequate program of technical and economic reform". Kitching reminds us how important political and strategic interests have been.

Although a great deal of modern development studies literature states or implies that the main aim of development should be the relief of poverty and/or the reduction of inequality, it is doubtful whether this has ever been the main aim of the politicians and statesmen who endeavoured to stimulate development. The 1949 Communist take-over in China, the Russian decision to distribute aid in 1954 and their growing influence in Indo-China were among events which spurred the sense of urgency in the 1950s. Dr Manning's connection between 'organised' and 'desirable' change, political 'stability' and development are contemporary expressions of this legacy.

If the 'urgent task' was clear, so too were the strategies. These required a confident and accelerated transfusion of recent Western economic experience. From Bretton Woods emerged the United States' view that the post-war international economy would be run by expanding Western corporations according to the principles underlying the rapid technological and industrial advance of the West in the early twentieth century. The dramatic recovery of Western Europe under the Marshall Aid Plan taught two persuasive lessons for subsequent efforts at intervention. First, developmental change was achievable through a massive transfer of capital. According to Brookfield, the prevailing view resembled "a development vending machine: you put in the money, press the button and get growth". Second, the Marshall Plan success legitimised the view that national economic growth could be deliberately controlled on the basis of prescriptive economic theory.

3 "Fourth, we must embark in a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement of underdeveloped areas. More than half of the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people ... our imponderable resources in the technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible". As quoted in van Nieuwenhuijze (1969. 15-16).

4 Watnick (1952. 36). The Second Communist International of 1920 had called the colonial world to arms and revolutionary fervour, drawing distinctions between 'oppressing' and 'oppressed' nations and by pointing out that these countries need not pass through capitalism before they could enjoy the fruits of communism. Cf. d'Encausse and Schramm (1969).


6 Preston (1982. 42) and Kolko (1968. 257). There is some debate on the precise nature of the changes and when they took place. Differing views, not of great moment here, are found in Noble (1977), Nelson (1975). and Palmer (1975).

The Idea of Development Practice

Shorn of their moral and political dimensions, these early statements about development expressed one basic idea that persists to this day. Development practice is understood as the systematic application of a universal rationality at a societal level in order to achieve desired states of affairs through the control of human as well as natural processes. Development came to be seen as a 'problem' which could be broken down into a series of elements - such as savings, growth rates, or literacy - according to known causal relations between them. Once identified, these elements could be reassembled and manipulated in a controllable and predictable manner. Although in the seventeenth century Bacon and Descartes had called for the use of science to 'establish and extend the power and domain of the human race over the universe', the intensity, purposiveness and assiduity with which this idea was expressed has no historical precedent.8

Development's designers did place certain caveats on their confidence and they foresaw 'impediments' and 'obstacles'. But most economic theories of the time (such as that of W.A. Lewis), backed up by the national accounting insights of people like Colin Clark, assured them the "technical and organisational imperatives of Western industrial development" when brought to bear on "the material economic environment" would weaken and destroy the obstacles.9

Institutions of Development

The idea of development implied that it was possible to manipulate the future in a planned way. But authoritative intervention on an international scale called for new institutions. Three levels of institution emerged to give effect to the idea of development:

a) international agencies to finance and manage intervention. By design these agencies possessed the degree of leverage necessary to ensure the traditional, particularist or politically idiosyncratic features of a situation ('obstacles' and 'barriers') would not hold sway;

b) national institutions with demonstrable authority to maintain political and economic control over the area in which development was to occur; and

c) specific 'building-block' institutions or projects which provided the practical nexus of capital and technology.

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9. These quotations are drawn from Hoselitz (1952, 15); and Wohl (1952, 4). Cf. Clark (1957), and Lewis (1955). This review glosses over a number of dissenting views that existed at the time in economics (such as between 'capital shortage', 'vicious circle' and Harrod-Domar theory). Cf. Brookfield (1975); Preston (1982); Livingstone (1981); and Arndt (1980). The views of policy makers and politicians were not always as single-minded as these few paragraphs suggest. But to exhaustively review the range would imply an equivocation in what was believed to be required in practice that I suggest did not exist. For instance, one only need read reviews by World Bank staff of Bank thinking at the time to see this. For example, Morawetz (1977, 10) remarks "What was needed was a grand simplification: (in the face of multiple and conflicting theory and views) and it was W. Arthur Lewis who provided it .... Lewis set the tone for the next fifteen years".
The character of these institutions has been well documented, but little attention has been given to how these reflect the broader historical process of rationalisation. Some brief remarks at this point provide a backdrop to the detailed project and practitioner oriented discussion of rationalisation in the next three chapters.

The practices of international development agencies are characteristic of rationalisation. Most prominent among these agencies are the World Bank Group, namely the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now the largest single source of development finance, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established by the Bretton Woods conference. Following this, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Development Association (IDA) emerged in 1956 and 1960 respectively. Along with replicas elsewhere, these agencies are said to give 'complete coverage' in terms of varieties of development finance and in the universal procedures they establish for development. These agencies have been seen as "landmarks on the road to a rationalisation of international decision-making".

An Institutional Ethos

The agencies' various articles of incorporation established an ethos which has been extended to all facets of contemporary development practice. Five attributes of these institutions are relevant, their: administrative rather than political definition of development practice; promethean sense of purpose; leadership responsibility; concentration on orderly and controlled action; and universally applicable institutional procedures.

International, national and project level institutions were designed to ensure that development efforts did not fall prey to particularist, idiosyncratic, traditional or purely political interests. While largely controlled by Western powers, development agencies were important sources of political stability and support for rapidly expanding United States' corporations. They provided a sense of administrative integrity. With post-war decolonisation a strong feeling against Western capital had emerged in the Third World. In 1948, one observer remarked, "the height of feeling against Western capitalism is today so great that it is unlikely ... private assistance from the West in the building up of the underdeveloped world will never again play a major role". Special purpose development agencies proffered an "objective and politically neutral" image and they tended "to neutralize the process somewhat, thus narrowing the field for political critics".

The definition of development in administrative and managerial terms was marked by

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10. The character and operational distinctiveness of these and other agencies is examined in Payer (1974, 215-216), Bello et al. (1982, 22-23), Chernow (1979, 19), Huang (1975); White (1970); and Payer (1982).
12 In all three Bank Group agencies (IBRD, IDA, IFC) the United States wields considerable power - it holds over 20 per cent of IBRD voting power, 37 per cent in the IFC and over 20 per cent in the IDA. (Cf. Williams 1981, 17.)
a strong sense of purpose. This suggests a promethean role for development institutions. Their role, according to an official Asian Development Bank history, lies in “lighting the road to modernization and the ultimate freedom that only modernization can bring”.15

Initially the attention of agencies like the World Bank Group was on long term stability and the efficient expansion of individual firms. But early on it was acknowledged that development policy would result in the political, social and economic transformation of developing countries. Development agencies were also invested with a leadership role which they exercised through their power to grant and withhold finance.

To match this role, development agencies were installed with sufficient authority to facilitate and direct the growth of national institutions and ensure that investment was carried out in an orderly and controlled political environment. Permitted by their articles of incorporation to extend assistance only to sovereign authorities, international agencies were to serve strategic interests. Designers of national ‘institution building’ were susceptible to the conservative ethos of political order in the 1960s. Through such efforts, "the State became ... the active instrument of a new policy aimed at the local reproduction of the characteristics of mature capitalist countries: industrialisation, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, increased provision of social services, and so forth".16 Throughout the developing world, the administrative definition of development, attended by authoritative leadership, supported a rapid concentration of power within nation states. Bello et al. remark this was a precondition for the World Bank experiment in the Philippines (from 1970), and was “seen as prerequisite for a more efficient and all-sided penetration of the Philippines by significantly reducing the ‘irrationalities’ and ‘uncertainties’ faced by foreign investors and aid agencies”.17

Control and order are hallmarks of contemporary development practice. This is expressed in international agencies’ acclaim for the 1972 Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines, through to the establishment of rational and universally applicable investment procedures. An Asian Development Bank historian remarks,

in helping to introduce the practice of fair, objective international competitive bidding in connection with the awarding of procurement contracts, [the ADB plays]
a small but significant part in the erosion of certain unfortunate attitudes and practices which have long been a serious barrier to effective modern growth.18

Each attribute of development institutions reviewed so far is to be found in contemporary project practice, the subject of this study. Projects have become the ‘working face’ of practice, or as is commonly said, the ‘privileged particles’ of development. For many casual observers projects are synonymous with development itself. Nowadays an overwhelming proportion of development finance is destined for project-level activity. The World Bank, wherein over 90 per cent of loans since 1946 have been for specific projects, is

indicative of the general pattern. Rondinelli is correct in stating.

Projects are, and will remain, a dominant feature of organising investment in developing countries ... projects have become one of the most important instruments of public and private management ... and a primary means of activating national and sectoral development plans.  

The significance of projects is in accord with the basic idea of development previously discussed. Projects reflect a hierarchy of logic between the specific locality and international effort. Each project contains a number of 'elements'. They are the minimum 'unit' in a larger 'program' which "consists of an interrelated group of projects". These are matched in a constellation of 'sectors' which direct the overall pattern of intervention. An oft-quoted definition reflects this rationality well.

The development project is a special kind of investment. The term connotes purposefulness, some minimum size, a specific location, the introduction of something qualitatively new, and the expectation that a sequence of further development moves will be set in motion .... Development projects ... are the privileged particles of the development process.

The project approach enables direct State (and through it international) control of investments that might otherwise be dispersed through multiple local agencies, and therefore "invoke direct involvement by high, usually the highest, political authorities". This enables the application of project management procedures and techniques (appraisal, planning, implementation) and discourages traditional, personal or politically idiosyncratic practices, those 'unfortunate attitudes' and 'barriers' to the orderly and predictable manipulation of social change.

On this basis rapid increases in all forms of development investment occurred through the late 1960s and early 1970s. Even in societies where religion and custom would seem incompatible, 'development' has been embraced and faith proclaimed in the efficacy of deliberate action to design and shape human history in accord with preferences.

Broadening the Scope
The development vending-machine mentality has been sorely tested by contemporary history. Although unprecedented investment supported considerable industrial expansion in some countries, the expected spin-offs were slow, at best. Unemployment and underemployment rose dramatically in expanding urban areas, while skills and wealth were concentrated among a small urban elite. Transnational control of local industry did not diversify the export base

24. Direct foreign investment by Japanese, American and European corporations increased from US$45.8 billion in 1960 to US$121.8 billion in 1971. In the 1950s, the World Bank was making less than 20 loans a year, totalling around US$400 million per annum. By 1967, the year prior to McNamara's Presidency, there were 63 loans totalling US$1130 million. by 1976 this had reached 200 loans totalling US$6600 million (Frieden, 1980, 62; and Baum, 1979).
but was geared to capital intensive manufacturing of items of 'conspicuous consumption'. In
the rural areas, the Green Revolution increased yields and labour productivity but benefits
largely accrued to landowners and input suppliers while disrupting rural communities and
reinforcing the flight of the poor to urban centres. One Bank economist observed,

'It became increasingly clear that a large proportion of the rural population lived,
and would continue to live, on a near subsistence level unless development policies
and lending for development were explicitly redirected.\textsuperscript{25}

The 1973 Annual Address of World Bank President McNamara at Nairobi was seen as
providing such redirection. McNamara expressed concern for 'the poor' and identified a
special program to deal with basic needs such as nutrition, health and shelter, combined with
a major shift of focus toward agricultural efforts to raise the productivity of the rural poor.\textsuperscript{26}
In 1975 the Bank announced it would also attempt to deal with the problem of the urban
poor.

This shift in focus must also be seen in terms of rising Third World nationalism and
the popularity of statements such as Nyerere's 1967 Arusha Declaration. But underlying
this - and followed by most agencies - was a political rationale critics termed 'defensive
modernisation'.\textsuperscript{27} This signalled efforts to pre-empt the accumulation of social and political
pressures in rural areas by incorporating marginalised groups more fully into development
processes. It coincided in the early 1970s with a need for greater permissiveness - severely
repressive policies were becoming increasingly untenable for newly independent governments
espousing egalitarianism. Politically, the poor became too great in number to ignore.

\textbf{Consequences: Incorporating More Variables}
The popularity among development agencies of the new language of development - 'basic
needs', 'growth with redistribution', 'social sector lending' - was heralded as reflecting major
changes in thinking. It is true, given the speed at which new catch-cries pass through
development literature, that there have been changes in emphasis over the past decade. As
Juliet Hunt wryly comments with regard to the Australian Development Assistance Bureau
(ADAB) "In fact ... one might be hard put to find many international trends in development
strategies that ADAB has not at some stage or other, incorporated into its policy
rhetoric".\textsuperscript{28}

Although these changes should not be trivialised, the extent to which the basic 'idea'
of development has changed remains open to question. Clearly, the past focus on increasing
GNP was acknowledged as too narrow. Questions of income distribution and employment

\textsuperscript{25} Adler (1977, 34).
\textsuperscript{26} McNamara (1973, 1975). This 'social awareness' has been seen as beginning in practice with
Cochrane and Noronha's (1973) report on the use of anthropologists in the World Bank (Perrett and
Lethem 1980, 2) and shortly thereafter the appointment of a sociologist and an adviser on women's
issues.
\textsuperscript{27} Ayres (1981, 11). Cf. Bello \textit{et al.}, (1982); and Moss (1978). Early Bank promotion of this
thinking spread through most other agencies, eg., FAO (1979); ILO (1977); UK (1975); and ODI
(1978).
generation began to be emphasised. But these had been previously expressed. The First National Development Plan (India, 1951) aimed at 'maximising production, full employment, the attainment of economic equality and social justice'. The first World Bank Mission to a developing country (Colombia, 1950) stated its objectives in terms of meeting 'basic human needs'. Many other problems highlighted during the McNamara years were considered (however cursorily) earlier. The World Bank's 1948 Annual Report cited a range of 'obstacles' to development not unlike those emphasised during the 'more enlightened 70s'. The 1949 Report stated,

Mention must also be made of the difficulties arising from the social structure of the underdeveloped nations where there are wide extremes of wealth and poverty. In such cases, strong vested interests often resist any changes which would alter their position. In particular, the maintenance in a number of countries of inefficient and oppressive systems of land tenure militates against increase in agricultural output and the general standard of living.

Given this, it is more appropriate to see the 1970s as involving a more explicit adding-on of further variables to the existing equation. One practitioner's characterisation of an integrated rural development program is illustrative.

the rural development program contained (in addition to the infrastructural element) the initial agricultural element. Incorporated into that was what we call an engineering extension element, a community health element was built into it, a rural water supply element was also built into it. There may be a number of small elements in there that have slipped my mind.

The core concept remains unchanged, the emergence of multi-sectoral, integrated projects represents the extension of the existing rationality into other areas (education, health, urban site and services) and their incorporation into a single format. Nevertheless, as later analysis will demonstrate, the broadening of scope had important consequences in practice. Before moving to this discussion I outline the particular projects on which the analysis is based.

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29. Morawetz (1977, 10).
30. Quoted in Adler (1977, 32).
31. Ron Staples (1983) talking about the Zamboanga del Sur rural development project discussed in Section II.
32. Williams (1981, 21-2, 25) and Hartman (1981) maintain a consistent pattern existed in 1960s-1970s World Bank lending despite changes in rhetoric. Cf. Black and Rimmer (1983, 10). A comparison of a 'typical project loan' in the 1950s with the 1970s illustrates this. The 1950 loan would be for power generation or port development. The 1970s loan would be for rural development. The most significant contrast however is in the scope of the project. The 1950s project, in a sense would be an 'enclave' project. Focus would be on its technical and financial feasibility and, beyond the scope of operations management, little attention would be paid to its regional, institutional or social setting. The 1970s shift to a more 'integrated package' of goods and services, expressed in rural infrastructure with agricultural extension, credit, and marketing, demands widespread accommodating changes in local and regional, private and public institutions.
II
CASES OF DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE

Knowing when one has enough evidence to support an argument or draw reliable conclusions is a continuing problem in academic inquiry. Problems of epistemology are always central, despite the tendency to conveniently side-step them by invoking some or other statistical measure of confidence. One may, if one possesses the luxury of voluminousness or the arrogance of superficiality, cast the net exceedingly wide and place equal weight on each aspect of development practice. But there is no evidence that a general, all-inclusive study is any more meaningful than a specialised focus on one facet of practice.

This thesis falls between the two extremes, but at the same time it gives particular attention to epistemology. During the years in which the ideas in this thesis took shape, I was involved with a number of development projects. Five of the six cases I draw on arose from this experience. This close personal association makes nonsense of any pretence that 'such and such' conclusion came from 'this or that' particular case. The inquiry is interpretative and guided by explicit theoretical constructs. This recognises that the evidence of 'fieldwork' is deeply and perhaps inescapably equivocal and that the same body of evidence can be used to argue quite different conclusions. I take up the significance of this epistemological presumption in Part Two.

Six project cases are drawn on at three points of the thesis. In Chapters Four and Five, five of these cases are explored through a series of propositions deriving from the rationalisation perspective. In Part Two, I emphasise one project again to consider some aspects of practice which remain unexamined in the Part One discussion. The theme here is 'resistance to rationalisation'. In Part Three I draw on a sixth case study which attempts to illustrate in practice the implications of an alternative understanding of the roles and obligations of practitioners as well as methods and techniques they employ. In other words, the first five cases are used to elaborate a general theoretical argument, the sixth case is used to illustrate theory.

Somosomo Mini-hydro and Rural Electrification: Taveuni, Fiji

According to David Coles, Managing Director of Morrison, Coles and Ball, consulting engineers for the External Aid Division of New Zealand (NZ) Foreign Affairs, Somosomo Mini-hydro had 'political sex-appeal'. It was to be the first mini-hydro of its kind in the South Pacific, located on Taveuni Island, the then Fiji Deputy Prime Minister's home region, and it was to be financed under NZ's Bilateral Aid Programme. For Coles, none of these facts were incidental or unrelated. Since it was conceived in Coles' initial report to Fiji and NZ authorities in the early 1970s, Somosomo Mini-hydro featured in at least ten feasibility investigations and attracted the diplomatic attention of Australian, NZ, Chinese and Indian officials.

33. In order to maintain anonymity, the names of all individuals and firms have been changed. Unless direct quotes are taken from published sources, these cases are presented without references. Full citation is found in Chapters Four and Five.
Taveuni is the third largest island in the Fiji group, located some eight kilometres off the south-eastern coast of Vanua Levu. The Somosomo river is the largest draining the north-western slope of Taveuni island and the southern-most perennial stream. From a weir and power-house above Somosomo village, electricity was to be reticulated eleven kilometres north as far as Welagi village and south three kilometres as far as Tutu Catholic Mission (see Map 2.1), and made available to Fijian villages and Indian settlements, the copra estates and a small commercial centre, a tourist hotel and public works depot at Waiyevo. Somosomo was to be one of three pilot schemes to test the viability of small-scale hydro-electric generation for rural electrification throughout Fiji.

The history of the Somosomo project reflected important shifts in thinking about development during the 1970s. Between 1973 and 1975 when a New Zealand consulting consortium submitted the multi-volume 'Fiji Hydro Power Study', their interest was primarily in the technical and engineering feasibility of mini-hydro power development. A more detailed 1975 feasibility study undertaken by Morrison, Coles and Ball confirmed technical and hydrological feasibility and presented concept plans for a 250-300 kW 'run of river' mini-hydro.

By 1980 when David Coles' firm was commissioned by NZ's External Aid Division to prepare design and tender documents for Somosomo, the earlier Terms of Reference were broadened considerably. Technical efficiency was made subservient to wider economic and social goals. According to the Terms of Reference, Somosomo was to be an 'integral part of Fiji's economic development programme' to attract new industries, promote rural development and arrest rural-urban migration. Allied with this was a new 'social conscience' within NZ's External Aid Division. Policy was now 'concentrating on projects which help the bottom twenty per cent of the population'. Dennis Quigley, then NZ's Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed that all projects should be directed toward 'the poorest sections of society, to those who have basic human needs which are unfulfilled'.

In practical terms a number of 'social' objectives supplemented the earlier 'economic' focus of the project. In addition to civil and electrical engineers, the 1980 Terms of Reference briefed a socio-economist to relate Fiji government rural development policy to the social and economic character of Taveuni, to assess the local demand, and identify the kinds of tariff structure that would facilitate small-scale entrepreneurial activity and promote 'social welfare' by satisfying household electricity demands. Taveuni, with a population of about 8000 in 1980 (3,500 of whom resided in the project area) is characterised by significant social inequalities in income, land ownership and access to other productive means. The wealthiest ten per cent of families have cash incomes greater than the combined income of the poorest sixty per cent.

This juxtaposition of 'social' and 'economic' objectives, while consistent with Fiji government policy and enlightened development thinking of the late 1970s, created a great deal of uncertainty amongst External Aid Division, Fiji Central Planning Office and Fiji Electricity Authority staff. This led to demands for sophisticated techniques of project

34 Quigley (1979, 3)
appraisal. Practitioners stepped into the breech created by uncertainty and technical complexity. The Somosomo experience highlights the increasing prominence of practitioners during the 1970s. The theme 'Creating Development' explores the implications of this.
Apia Water Supply and Sewerage Project: Apia, Western Samoa

Apia, the capital of Western Samoa (Map 2.2), is the only harbour suitable for ocean-going vessels, the centre for government offices, most of the country's commercial and industrial establishments, central hospital and offices of international institutions and private agencies. All of Apia's 33,200 residents (1981) are supplied with piped water, but only commercial buildings and European-style suburban areas have inside connections. The remainder are served by standpipes - one to every family, or about ten persons. Water is not treated, most of the existing distribution system is undersized and in very poor condition. Breaks in pipes are frequent and little is known about the precise location of pipelines, some of which date back to 1920. A maze of illegal connections, ad hoc under- and over-sizing of pipework and pressure fluctuations create nightmare conditions for those responsible for maintaining the system. Bob Wilson, an expatriate NZ public health engineer charged under a bilateral exchange scheme with reorganising the system said, "It's a never ending vicious circle. Scarcely a day goes by when a major part of the town is not without water. It's not unusual to have delays of two to three days before water is restored. And at any time we have no idea how much water is being lost through high pressure leakages". Bob guesses that about fifty per cent of all water is wasted.

There is no public sewerage system in Apia. Major hotels, the hospital and enclaves of European-style housing have septic tanks. Others have Peace Corps toilets or pit latrines. Conditions in the low-lying, swampy and densely populated downtown are such that pollution of ground and surface water constitutes a major health hazard. Each year, between forty and eighty per cent of all typhoid cases in Western Samoa occur in Apia. World Health Organisation (WHO) reports have expressed alarm at the potential for typhoid and cholera epidemics.

In one sense the situation has received a great deal of attention. Prior to commissioning detailed social and economic appraisal and design work (by NZ's External Aid Division) in 1980, some twenty reports had been produced by multilateral, bilateral and local authorities. In 1969 two UN engineers prepared detailed water scheme plans. The capital cost was set at WS$880,000 for a design population of 60,000. The UN report was modified in 1970 by a WHO consultant and again in 1973 by an Asian Development Bank fact finding mission in response to Western Samoan requests for funding. Estimated costs had then climbed to WS$1.63 million. A further appraisal mission revised this to WS$2.69 million for a 120,000 design population. New Zealand became involved in August 1974 when NZ$1.15 million over six years was agreed to for water pipes, a reservoir and the supply of chlorination equipment and bulk meters. A further WHO report in 1975 revised and recommended a new scheme. By 1979, costs had reached WS$2.81 million based on new population projections.

After the first sewerage system report was presented in 1916, it was fifty years before two WHO studies were made at government request in 1967 and 1969. The 1969 report proposed a system of tributary sewers leading to a mechanical treatment plant and disposal via an ocean outfall 800 metres off the reef edge. The cost was WS$1.5 million for a 7500 design population. Due to staff shortages and uncertainty about the technical efficacy of the
proposal, delays occurred until 1976 when NZ agreed to provide a sanitary engineer. Each of seven further reports between 1972 and 1980 made recommendations on funding, treatment methods and disposal options. By 1980 estimated cost had reached WS$3.1 million.

Despite detailed technical investigations, an urgent need, and expatriate employees' threats of resignation, by 1980 progress was popularly agreed to have 'ground to a halt'. Opinions varied about the cause, but it was clear to External Aid Division officials who prepared the Terms of Reference for the 1980 Investigation Report for NZ consultants, Merton, Nash and Parker, that previous efforts had insufficient appreciation of local social and political circumstances. Evidently there was a 'large gulf' between the authors of previous reports and local physical and cultural circumstances. The quarterly reports of disillusioned and frustrated expatriates provided plenty of reminders of the rift between fa'a Samoa (the Samoan way of life) and fa'a Palagi (the European way of life). The Prime Minister's decision in 1974 to order all UN officials out of Western Samoa was still fresh in their minds. Unaware of local political currents and reinforced by narrow Terms of Reference, report after report had failed to progress beyond the bureaucratic filing cabinet.
Consequently, External Aid Division’s Terms of Reference for the 1980 study was broader than any previously undertaken. Three public health and civil engineers were to be accompanied by a socio-economist and a marine biologist to ‘completely revamp’ the scheme. In addition to engineering matters, the brief called for wide-ranging local consultation, detailed assessment of the demographic, cultural and economic factors impinging on the project’s success and the identification of proposals for maximising local participation in implementation.

Hopes were high this report would yield a ‘bankable’ project that could be financed and commenced without delay. For Mark Curtis, Project Leader, it was “imperative that an appropriate programme be instituted immediately”. Bob Wilson, Chief Water Engineer, had written to the team “I can only suggest that your conclusion should include some strong words about the urgency for implementation and the words THIS CANNOT BE ‘ANOTHER’ REPORT - if it is not acted upon quickly a crises [sic] is inevitable”.

The Merton, Curtis and Parker team proposed extensive replacement of the existing water system and a gravity fed scheme drawing on Vaisigano and Fulu’asou rivers and Alaoa springs, with treatment by slow sand filtration and chlorination. Accompanying this was a raw sewerage reticulation scheme, fine screening and offshore discharge 800 metres beyond the reef. This required a first stage cost of US$20 million disbursed over five years with extension after fifteen years bringing total cost to US$26 million.

The Merton, Curtis and Parker report was greeted with derision and criticism in Western Samoa. My investigation in Chapter Four focuses on the theme ‘Managing the Context’, and how the notions of a ‘bankable’ project and the ‘standards’ this required had political consequences at odds with the intention of either those who wrote the Terms of Reference or the report.

Aramoana Aluminium Smelter: Otago, New Zealand

The decision to locate a 200,000 tonne per year aluminium smelter at Aramoana (Map 2.3), and the techniques which figured so prominently in its formulation, are to be seen in a broader context. The smelter was one of eleven major projects promoted by the National Party government from 1979 to early 1984. This so-called ‘Think Big’ strategy, was costed at over NZ$5500 million (1981), included oil refinery expansion, steel works, extensions to an existing aluminium smelter, major coal and lignite conversion projects, hydro-electricity development, and natural gas-based projects.

‘Think Big’ represented a controversial reversal in national development strategy. Just six months prior to the formal documentation of this strategy in the 1980 Energy Plan, the government had published other development reports which stressed ‘independence’, ‘diversity’ and ‘sustainability’. Energy Strategy ’79 indicated a substantial surplus of electricity generating capacity and concluded that no further energy development projects were necessary before the 1990s. It promoted biomass energy farming and outlined a development strategy based on renewable resources. Over the next twelve months policy changed at a pace that stunned even the most politically enlightened planners.
Map 2.3 Aramoana Aluminium Smelter: Otago, New Zealand
The aluminium smelter was among the first to be 'ramped' - in the vogue jargon of the day. During September 1980, a memorandum of intent was signed between the government and the developer, South Pacific Aluminium Ltd. (SPAL); a consortium of Fletcher-Challenge (50%), NZ's largest indigenous company, CSR's Gove Alumina (25%) and Alusuisse (25%), a Swiss-based aluminium transnational corporation. The smelter and related works at Aramoana were the subject of a National Development Act 1979 (NDA) application in March 1981 following a site selection decision in December 1980. As required under Section 5 of the NDA, SPAL prepared an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for an Audit by the Commission for the Environment in July 1981.

Alusuisse withdrew from the smelter consortium in October 1981 when the Audit was nearing completion. SPAL sought a new venture partner but by October 1982 none were forthcoming, the government announced the abandonment of electricity pricing negotiations and the project was shelved. Based on independent assessment and over 470 public submissions, the Commissioner for the Environment concluded that if it had proceeded, the smelter would "have substantial environmental impacts, the majority of which would be felt in the lower Dunedin Harbour area. These include the destruction of the Aramoana and Te Ngarue communities, disruption of the quality of life in other harbour communities, loss of productive tidal habitat, stress on the remaining coastal ecosystem and significant change to the visual and recreational character of the area".

Against this, SPAL claimed the project would contribute NZ$350-400 million annually to national foreign exchange earnings; a figure equal to total national butter export sales and close to seventy per cent of 1980 forest product exports. Additional national revenues would be gained from the sale of 3000 Gwh of electricity; consumption equal to total power requirements in the Auckland region. Location of the smelter in the economically depressed Dunedin region promised significant economic benefits. Business support here was strong. Between 1966 and 1971 the region's population declined by 0.4 per cent compared to a 6.9 per cent national increase, whereas between 1971 and 1976 when the national population grew by 9.3 per cent, the region gained by only 2.4 per cent. The project offered 1200-1500 jobs during construction of wharves and unloading silos, alumina and coke conveying equipment, potrooms, casting facilities and an anode manufacturing plant over a 400 hectare area. SPAL press statements argued that local payments for goods and services and the 1000 operations workforce would lead to regional cash injections of over NZ$300 million annually and a job multiplier of 600. Although each claim was hotly contested, SPAL promised to be 'a good neighbour and good employer'.

For many people the immediate costs and benefits were less significant than changes in legal and administrative procedures prompted by the proposal. As their growth strategy took shape in the late 1970s, the National Party government realised (some said were 'warned' by potential investors) that development planning legislation might not adequately foster investment in Think Big projects. In a blaze of controversy, the National Development Act became legislation in 1979. As argued by the Coalition for Open Government, an activist group formed when the National Development Bill first appeared, 'Fast Track' legislation "clears the way to grant approval to the major projects with the same mixture of
bravado and brawn that has dominated the politicking around the big projects”. For critics the NDA manifested concern on many fronts; the concentration of power in the hands of the government executive, the downgrading of the role of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies and statutory authorities, the loose criteria defining the ‘national interest’ (the keystone of new legislation), the curbing of public participation, administrative inflexibility and restriction on the availability of information.

Concern about the development strategy on the one hand and the limitation of public access to decision making on the other was matched by calls from protagonists of all persuasions for more comprehensive planning procedures. ‘Multiple objective planning’, ‘comprehensive resource management’, ‘weighing up’ and ‘taking all things into account’, became keywords underwriting the development of and increasing reliance on sophisticated techniques of project impact assessment, management and evaluation. In Chapter Five, I trace the consequences of uncritical acceptance of this litany with regard to the development malaise.

Taranaki Petrochemicals Development Projects: Taranaki, New Zealand

Section I noted the broadening of scope and renewed social conscience that emerged in development thinking over the 1970s. In part, interest in what came to be called the ‘social factor’, ‘participation’, and the ‘human dimension’, recognised the consequences of excessive technical sophistication in project planning and assessment. Practitioners and their governmental or corporate employers learnt from bitter experience that projects would be disrupted unless the ‘human knob’ on the development vending machine was turned with a deft hand. On other occasions the need to ‘incorporate the social factor’ reflected genuine humanitarian concern and democratic ideals. Whatever the source, it was believed that without the social factor, an orderly and predictable investment process could not be guaranteed.

I draw on two major petrochemical projects in Taranaki to examine techniques and approaches employed to ‘take into account’ a variety of political interests, values and world-views in the development process. Although different in certain respects, I treat the two projects as one case: they involved substantially the same practitioners, developers and community as well as common planning and litigative processes. The story about Arapeta Mataira in Chapter One has already indicated some of the themes I intend to explore. The case represents the most prolonged, comprehensive, and genuine attempt to ‘incorporate the social factor’ with which I have been involved. Unlike many projects, including the Philippines case discussed next, social concerns were not a ‘tag-on’, once the project had run into difficulties. Prior to the selection of sites for the Taranaki projects, the Commissioner for the Environment had demanded an innovative comprehensive analysis from the research teams. At the first briefings, he said “we know from experience that the most careful projections can be vitiated by unanticipated factors and that qualitative effects such as changes in public attitudes, social relations and local autonomy, can be the most significant and lasting consequences”. The region concerned has a substantial Maori population and he pointed out the obligations of Section 3(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, one of the pieces of legislation subsumed under the National Development Act (NDA). It
declares "The relationship of the Maori people and their culture and traditions with their ancestral land", to be a matter of national importance.

Both of NZ's natural gas fields are located in Taranaki. The Kapuni field has reserves of about 500 petajoules whilst the Maui field, 25 kilometres offshore, contains ten times this. Major gas industries aimed at liquid fuels import substitution and export became a key element in the Think Big strategy. (See Table 2.1 and Map 2.4.) Accompanying these projects were a series of infrastructure developments including port expansion, housing and roading works.

The regional economy is dependent on farming but over the past fifteen years manufacturing employment has increased due to the advent of gas exploitation. The region's 105,000 people are concentrated in closely settled lowland areas and in small rural settlements scattered on the ring plain surrounding Mount Egmont. Waitara and Patea (based on meat processing works) are the only predominantly industrial towns. Maori people are a significant proportion of the north Taranaki region. They comprise 18.5 per cent (1981) of the Waitara population.

Late in 1981 and early in 1982 construction commenced on a 1200 tonne a day chemical methanol plant and a 570,000 tonne a year synthetic petrol plant in close proximity to Waitara. The methanol plant was sponsored by Petralgas NZ Ltd., a consortium of Petrocorp (a NZ government company) and Alberta Gas Chemicals Ltd. It was expected to cost NZ$150 million (1981) and require a construction workforce of 780 peaking in March 1983 and an operations staff of 90. The synthetic petrol plant, the first of its kind in the world, was sponsored by the NZ Synthetic Fuels Corporation (75 per cent NZ government and 25 per cent Mobil shareholding). This had a construction workforce of 1300 peaking between mid 1984 and the end of 1985, and an operations staff of 250.

Together the projects were larger than anything previously undertaken in NZ. During the Synthetic Fuels Tribunal Hearing, one judge remarked "it is difficult, if not impossible to gain any real appreciation of the immensity of this plant. Engineers employed by the applicant conceded it was large even on a world scale". The proceedings and issues associated with this case will be examined later. In brief, the EIRs for these projects identified common issues. The rapid build-up of construction workforces and short duration peak demands suggested a boom and bust effect on the local economy which would disrupt local administrative authorities and social institutions and, without rapid state action, an expected population increase in the Waitara locality of between 2000 and 7000 would result in housing shortages. In addition, both plants are inherently noisy because of the heating, cooling and gas compression processes involved, and have very large water demands for processing and cooling. Industrial wastes contain zinc chromates (corrosion inhibitors), diphosphonates (for prevention of scale formation in cooling towers), and a biocide called Nalco 7330 (to destroy plant and animal life in cooling towers) which cannot be detected in waste water and carries the manufacturer's warning against discharge into natural water systems.

The developers and government authorities, both national and local, all saw themselves as 'going out of their way' to deal with social and environmental issues. Ron
Map 2.4 Taranaki Petrochemicals Development Projects: Taranaki, New Zealand

1. Map shows the location of major settlements and petrochemical projects in the Taranaki region.
2. Key points include:
   - Motunui synthetic gasoline plant
   - Petralgas Methanol plant
   - Possible future petrochemical development sites
   - Gas pipelines connecting various locations

3. Towns and settlements marked include:
   - Auckland
   - New Plymouth
   - Wellington
   - Inglewood
   - Stratford
   - Eltham
   - Hawera

4. Additional notes:
   - 1981 Census results for major settlements
   - Pipeline routes indicated

5. Map scale indicates distances in kilometres.

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TASMAN SEA

1. Map highlights the coastal areas around the Taranaki region.
2. Key features include:
   - Port Taranaki
   - New Plymouth
   - Bell Block
   - Possible future petro-chemical development

3. Additional information includes:
   - Railway network
   - Reefs

4. Map scale indicates distances in kilometres.
### Table 2.1 Taranaki Petrochemicals Projects: Existing and Planned (at 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Construction Workforce</th>
<th>Location (see Map 2.4)</th>
<th>Operations Workforce</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kapuni Development</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Kapuni</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mani Development</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Offshore and onshore Oanui</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1979</td>
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<td>New Plymouth Power Station</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>New Plymouth</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liquid Petrol Gas Extraction</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Oanui</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammonia Urea Plant (155,000 t/yr Urea, 1000 t/yr Ammonia)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Kapuni</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methanol Plant (1200 t/day)</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>Waltara Valley</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1983</td>
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<tr>
<td>Synthetic Petrol Plant (570,000 t/yr)</td>
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<td>Motonui</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1985</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>Gas Processing</td>
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<td>Waitara ?</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>Waitara ?</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethane Processing</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Waitara ?</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** N/A = not available

**Source:** Compiled from EIRs, company statements and interviews in 1983.

Lambert, Director of the Taranaki Museum, said of Maori concerns, a traditionally neglected 'social factor', "Mobil [Synthetic Fuels] have gone out of their way to find out about the historic sites. Under the letter of law they could easily have used legislation to wipe out that site".

In Chapter Five, I examine the attempt to bring social and participatory considerations into the 'overall judgement' using the comprehensive and integrated methods that figured in project practice in the late 1970s: survey research, social and economic monitoring programs, and participatory planning tribunals.

**Zamboanga del Sur Development Project: Mindanao, Philippines**

The Zamboanga del Sur Development Project (ZDSDP), funded under the Philippine-Australian Development Assistance Program (PADAP) since the mid 1970s, is the only case of the six in which I have not had a direct working involvement. My use of it therefore reflects brief field visits, a detailed review of project literature, and interviews since 1982. I
use this case to take the rationalisation argument to a final stage and consider how the development malaise is sustained and reproduced in the language and metaphors of development practice. This analysis is pursued through key phrases which both preoccupy the practitioners involved in this project and were firmly implanted in my mind within two hours of arriving at the project headquarters in Pagadian, Mindanao.

We turned through the main PADAP complex gates past the military detachment and on to the main office. Dismounting, I side-stepped three guards with their sawn-off pump guns and approached the door marked EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. Moments after, a pink slip bearing my name was carried into the Director. I was welcomed by two Australians: Brian Hester, the Executive Director in his late thirties, was then about halfway through his two year contract. Brian has project experience in numerous South-east Asian countries and degrees in engineering and development studies. Also present was Evan Adams, a Director of the project’s agricultural consultants who periodically travels from Melbourne to monitor his staff’s work in Zamboanga and elsewhere in the Philippines and South-east Asia. Evan has been involved in PADAP since he participated in the Pre-feasibility Appraisal Mission in 1973. From his beginnings as a farming adviser in Victoria, Evan’s consultant practice has grown into a multi-disciplinary organisation with contract experience throughout South and South-east Asia.

‘How much do you know about the project?’ asked Evan, my bar host half an hour later.

‘Well, as much as I could glean from the project documentation I saw in Melbourne, and of course from what Community Aid Abroad’s report had to say’. Dr Bob Richards of Community Aid Abroad, an Australian non-governmental aid agency, produced a scathing evaluation of PADAP in 1981. He charged that PADAP’s wide-ranging agricultural activities benefited only the rich farmers and that the extensive reading infrastructure program was assisting the counter-insurgency activities of the Philippines Armed Forces.

‘It’s all changed since that [person] was here’, said Evan. ‘Especially in the last two years. There’s ten years of development thinking written into this project. Appropriate Technology, as far as the technical packages are concerned, underlies all our activities now - multiple cropping, ag-engineering, the lot.’ Dropping these terms indicated that I was about to gain an all important orientation to PADAP. Aware of my ignorance of agricultural projects, Evan continued, ‘Let me explain the aggies’ [agriculturists’] side of things. Harry and Bob over there are Production Agronomists’, he said, pointing to the bar. ‘They run soils testing and crop trials out on the station. The first stage has nothing to do with the farmers, it’s just a matter of getting our facts straight to start with. The next stage is to see if the farmer can handle the situation. But all decisions about fertiliser, insecticide, farm management and other inputs are made by our technical boys. Then, if production yields are up to about eighty per cent of the trials, we know we are on to something. Then we ask for a hundred volunteers to see if they can handle the inputs and decisions. If that works, we extend like crazy to see if others will buy the deal.’

‘And what’s been your adoption rate?’ I asked to show I was still with him.
'Our adoption rate? Well, we have about a forty per cent drop-out rate in each season', he replies.

'But over five years that suggests that less than five per cent of your original volunteers are still in', I remarked, stating the obvious to Evan.

'Yes, but we know a high number of farmers have at least been exposed to the technical packages. The problem is that the bloody extension is lousy.'

'The problem is that the counterparts just don’t want to do anything, there’s no bloody motivation', said Bruce, as he sat down at our table. Bruce was introduced as the Agricultural Engineer and as I learnt, the one responsible for the appropriate technology programme. 'I can suggest new tools and techniques till I’m blue in the face, but unless the extension’s up to scratch, you can forget it.' I broke the ensuing silence with a question about a term gleaned from project literature.

'What’s this institutionalisation problem about?'

'We’ve just been talking about it. The problem of poor adoption rates and of getting the counterpart agencies to pick up on what we’re saying. By the time this job’s finished, no one’ll ever want to talk about institutionalisation again', said Bruce.

Technical packages, appropriate technology, the problem of institutionalisation, and one other we did not discuss that evening, log frame (logical framework programming) are the four key phrases examined in this case. I will not detail the brief chronology in Table 2.2 of the main dates, decisions and present status of this project. Phase I of ZDSDP was to assist in the development of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur (see Map 2.5), by providing specific economic studies on activities relating to roads, irrigation and agriculture, and undertaking the actual implementation of development projects. The first phase was referred to as a ‘blueprint’ project having considerable autonomy in design and implementation, acting independently of the provincial government and local offices of the line agencies. The ‘Ultimate Goal’ of Phase I was ‘Peace and Order in the Province of Zamboanga del Sur’. This was to be achieved by ‘raising the living standards of the majority of the population in the project area’.

While ZDSDP objectives do not mention the ‘poor’, there has always been reference made to the distributional aspects of the program. PADAP’s first agricultural report in 1978 stated that ‘the poorest farmers operating at a near subsistence level are the main target groups of the PADAP agricultural projects’. The Project Director in the seventh year report addressed himself to ‘the poorer inhabitants of the province who are indeed the intended beneficiaries of this program’.

The social and economic circumstances of the province’s 840,000 inhabitants (1980) were addressed in two studies, 1976 and 1981, undertaken by the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC) for ADAB. These reports found very high morbidity rates amongst the population. In 1981 they discovered that 77 per cent of all pre-school children suffered some degree of malnutrition. They estimated that 80 to 90 per cent of all deaths were not recorded, and noted a predominance of communicable, infectious, nutritional and parasitic diseases (so-called ‘diseases of poverty’), a virtual absence of degenerative ailments, and an
Table 2.2 Zamboanga del Sur Development Project (ZDSDP): A brief chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Pre-feasibility and Appraisal Mission comprising Australian Government and private consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1974</td>
<td>Road construction begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Project Identification and Evaluation Study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Livestock Development Project begins (stock farm, bull and buck distribution, pasture improvement). Coconut Lands Project begins (inter-cropping, cacao, coffee, legumes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Multiple Cropping Program begins. Sibuguey Valley Irrigation Project construction begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Multiple Cropping Research Program begins (corn, mungbean, soybean, wheat, sorghum, cowpeas, potatoes, peanuts, 40 varieties of vegetables).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present (1983)</td>
<td>Agricultural Assistance Project comprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Livestock Development Project (monogastrics, ruminants).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Coconut Lands Development Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Multiple Cropping Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Tree Crops Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Fresh-water Fisheries Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure and Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Completion of Provincial, Barangay and City roads from Phase I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Transfer of project office functions to Philippine agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Institution building and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Community development program.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

extremely high fertility rate. The first of the two studies reported that half the households had an income equivalent to less than 300 pesos a month. Taking into account the World Bank’s base poverty line, the Philippine National Office of Census and Statistics estimated that 46 per cent of the families of Western Mindanao lived in poverty. IPC noted in 1976, that ‘some five per cent of the population enjoy incomes more than ten times as much as half the total population’. In 1981 they found that about 38 per cent of the households had zero or negative annual net incomes, and high rate of indebtedness (with 15 to 18 per cent of debts for household subsistence purposes) and a provincial Gini coefficient of 0.549.
On both occasions, 1976 and 1981, respondents to the IPC surveys referred to the 'Peace and Order situation' as one of the most unpleasant things in their area. This included 'militarisation as a result of the conflict between military and subversive elements' and 'plain and simple military abuses on the civilian population'. This has produced significant outflows and, in places, absolute declines in population numbers in areas of military operations.

ZDSDP involves $43 million of Australian bilateral aid. Phase I (1974-1980) saw the completion of 341 kilometres of road building, the development of 300 hectares of irrigated land (of a completion target of 3500 ha), the construction of 100 village wells and commencement of the agricultural projects listed in Table 2.2. At its peak, ZDSDP employed 38 Australian practitioners and 1300 Filipinos. In addition to completing Phase I activities, Phase II
(1981-1985) aims to 'generate a self-sustaining development effort by employing existing institutions'. In the metaphors of project documents, Phase I involved the 'injection' of specialised skills and inputs. Phase II is now dealing with the problems of 'withdrawal'.

ZDSDP is perhaps the most researched and evaluated of ADAB's projects, and whilst sophisticated appraisal and management techniques have figured prominently, it has also drawn the most sustained criticism and scrutiny of any Australian bilateral project. While aspects of this controversy are examined, I emphasise how the difficulties encountered in this project, as part of a broader development malaise, are sustained by the metaphors and presumptions that lie at the heart of most contemporary development practice.

**Sumbaga Fishing Cooperative: Mindanao, Philippines**

Since this case arises at the end of this thesis I give no more than a sketch here. This case and the reasons why it is used are quite different to the previous five. It was not undertaken by consultants drawn from the kind of organisations discussed previously. Nor was the project funded by corporate or bilateral agencies. These are important considerations. Moreover, while it is common to find practitioners departing from a confident faith in the probity of conventional practice, this case began with considerable disquiet and scepticism about its tenets and began to build an alternative approach. For both practical and epistemological reasons, this case involved no cook-book practice designed according to well rehearsed convention.

The contrast should not be overdrawn however. The example shares much in common with the others. It sought to promote 'development', as did all the cases used here. It involved capital, albeit a relatively small amount, special skills and technology. The fact that the case is a fishing cooperative involved in catching, processing and marketing operations organised on a somewhat 'unconventional' basis, or that it affected at most 300 people, should not be used to set it apart too much from the other cases.

As with the other cases, the discussion focuses not so much on details of the project's character or the 'who got what, when and how' of socio-economic impact, but on the process or kind of practice involved. Where previously I have discussed the EIR proceedings of the aluminium smelter, or the appraisal and design stages of the Apia project, in this case I focus on the project evaluation process.

Ironically, the Sumbaga fishing cooperative is located in the Baganian Peninsula of Zamboanga del Sur Province, one of the regions in which ZDSDP has been particularly active (see Map 2.5). Not surprisingly both projects attempt to deal with similar social, political and military situations. It is no coincidence that words like appropriate technology, community development or participation figure in both cases. Indeed, Chapter Nine picks up threads from the discussion of ZDSDP to draw contrasts and establish the identity of this sixth case.
Case Selection and Research Methods

Table 2.3 summarises the main characteristics of the six cases. The cases clearly do not exhaust all of the range found in development practice, but they are representative pieces of the pattern which is contemporary practice.35

The cases lie more toward infrastructure rather than so-called 'basic needs' projects. As I substantiate later, this is representative of practice. Narrowness or all inclusiveness in case selection has important epistemological consequences. But epistemology is not primarily a matter of bias avoidance in sample selection but of interpretation. The inquiry is avowedly interpretive. It makes no pretence to ascribe the same importance to all aspects of practice; that would be nothing more than an enumeration of facts.

The content or substance of these projects is in any event less relevant than the process of practice. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 indicates that the cases chosen cover all of the major stages of project practice. Table 2.5 identifies the main study methods used in each case. In addition to field work these fall into three main categories.

a) Field Diaries: During previous work, I became accustomed, often each night, to recording in field diaries impressions and events incidental to the 'Terms of Reference'. The first, written during an extended stay at Aggie Grey's Hotel in Apia, recorded a host of information: from exchange rates, shadow prices, the incidence of water-borne diseases, to the idiocy of driving a UNDP Range Rover at high speed through villages. The diaries record numerous conversations. Engineers and other colleagues soon became accustomed to my note-taking, and expected, often cajoled me to do so. For most of them, I was that strange, sociologist-economist-PR-opinion-man who was expected to record nuance, trivia and be correspondingly baffled by bore sizes, pump capacities and the vapourisation of NaAlF4. But the diaries noted those titbits as well.

Each diary was surprisingly different: my moods were reflected in handwriting. The Somosomo diary collected formal data - like names of prominent people or Fiji Electricity Authority tariff structures - but was interspersed by occasional ten page indulgences oiled by Fiji Bitter. In like fashion a pile of diaries are available. These record walks along Aramoana beach with the aluminium smelter’s ‘beneficiaries’, talks with ADB officials in Singapore, pool games in the Apia RSA, to two weeks on Sri Lanka’s Mahaweli Scheme escorted by a Roman Catholic priest and a Hindu Swami. Conversations range from project matters - such as employment multipliers and land tenancy - to court hearings, family histories, 'what it was like in the 'thirties', during Japanese occupation, and 'what it will be like in the future'.

One might note (or complain) this 'data' is merely intuitive wandering. Yet it represents for me the lived experiences of each project. They are factual to be sure, but not

35. One important omission must be acknowledged. Development is 'authoritative intervention' in people's lives. Development studies are inclined to ignore the expenditures on military technology which indeed make up the bulk of authoritative intervention. Although I do not include these programs, it is becoming increasingly difficult to provide an adequate account of any aspect of development without taking cognizance of specific local expressions of international militarism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project location</th>
<th>Funding Agency</th>
<th>Project focus</th>
<th>Scale/Approximate Cost</th>
<th>Duration of Involvement of Practitioners</th>
<th>Number Interviewed</th>
<th>Study methods employed(^1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somosomo</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Infra-structure &amp; electrification</td>
<td>$NZ1m</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>field (\ast) * * * * * * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apia</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Urban Water Supply and sewage</td>
<td>$US20-26m</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>interviews (\ast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apia</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Industrial Development</td>
<td>$NZ1150m</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>published reports (\ast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taveuni</td>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>administration and legislation</td>
<td>$NZ240m</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>media/press analysis (\ast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Aid and Multi-lateral loan</td>
<td>Integrated rural development (roads, irrigation agriculture and community development)</td>
<td>$NZ1000m</td>
<td>2-8 years</td>
<td>up to 38</td>
<td>internal documents (\ast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>Private and government corporate</td>
<td>Integrated rural development</td>
<td>$A43-50m</td>
<td>1-4 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>project visits (\ast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki</td>
<td>National and Private</td>
<td>Industrial Development</td>
<td>$NZ1m</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>field (\ast) * * * * * * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitara</td>
<td>National and Private and government corporate</td>
<td>Industrial Development</td>
<td>$NZ15m</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>interviews (\ast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>del Sur</td>
<td>Non-Bilateral Aid</td>
<td>Integrated rural development (roads, irrigation agriculture and community development)</td>
<td>$A20,000</td>
<td>1-4 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>published reports (\ast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>Integrated rural development (roads, irrigation agriculture and community development)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamboanga</td>
<td>Bilateral and Private</td>
<td>Integrated rural development (roads, irrigation agriculture and community development)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamboanga</td>
<td>Bilateral and Private</td>
<td>Integrated rural development (roads, irrigation agriculture and community development)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Importance of source to study: \* major source; \* minor source
the kind that corresponds to the neat calibrations of the surveyor's theodilite. Most often that experience had to be intuitive. Frequently I was thrust into a context that presumed authority when none existed, save for a few hours in-flight cramming of country 'sit-reps'. Early on I recorded a Goon Show line, 'If only they knew how little I know about how little they know'.

b) Interviews: Interviews were conducted with thirty practitioners from consultant firms, government departments, aid agencies, transnational corporations and the Asian Development Bank (Table 2.5). The emphasis lies toward consultants and it is these individuals I have in mind when the word 'practitioner' is used in this study. Only recently have researchers begun to examine the significance of international consultancy. In quantitative terms (including number and size of consultant firms, field of operations.

36 Black and Rimmer (1983b)
Table 2.5 Organisation Affiliation of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Somosomo Apia Water Supply and Sewerage</th>
<th>Aramoana Aluminium Smelter</th>
<th>Taranaki Petrochemicals</th>
<th>Zamboanga del Sur PADAP</th>
<th>Sumbaga Co-operative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somosomo minihydro &amp; rural electrification</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Consulting Firm</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Agency</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Corporation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Corporation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental Aid/Development Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB. some practitioners interviewed were involved in more than one of the project cases.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

contract fees) this is taken as read. My focus is on the process and consequences of development practice in which consultant practitioners are an increasingly significant part.

Consultant is a generic term. Variations within this are wide. The interviews were mainly with practitioners from engineering, urban and regional planning, economics and to a lesser extent, agriculture. Interviews occurred on a number of occasions with each individual - sometimes on three consecutive days, in other cases weeks apart. They began by open discussion of ‘prompt’ questions followed by general comment on ‘what they were doing’ or remember doing in the project. Later interviews ranged over the character of practice and issues or conundrums like ethics, trends in the practitioner’s role, commercial constraints, changing skills and techniques of practice. No formal questionnaires were used; these were not survey interviews. The interviewees had considerable control over the direction of discussions. On the whole, they spoke extremely frankly, partly because I used them as a sounding board for my ideas and impressions to encourage reaction and dialogue. In most cases this was aided by the assurance of anonymity.

c) Documentary sources: As much as possible, I have drawn on publicly available sources. A great deal of literature emerged in the 1970s on project planning and management which incorporate many statements about the practitioners’ role, beliefs and commit-
ments. During interviews I asked practitioners to identify books, reports or other statements which they found most relevant in their work. A second, different kind of documentary source drawn on are the internal documents and correspondence relating to each project. Due to their 'restricted' classification and the confidentiality agreements entered into, these cannot be listed as references in the normal way.

Summary
Although the optimism of the 1950s and 1960s has been checked by contemporary realities, the basic 'idea' of development practice remains intact. Development is a promethean challenge. As Dr Manning said, practice involves the organised manipulation of social, economic and political processes carried out in orderly and stable environments. The 1970s saw a broadening in the scope of development practice. More variables or elements were of necessity brought into the equation and with this came greater emphasis on sophisticated techniques and procedures whereby they could be efficiently and productively managed. The basic idea of development practice was embellished rather than fundamentally changed. This is particularly evident at the project level, the basic building block of practice.

Section II identified the particular cases through which conventional practice will be examined. Later chapters will use these to seek out and clarify the development malaise and then consider the possibilities of mitigation.

The next chapter will further specify this task. This will examine how the ideas and institutions of practice are embodied in concrete individuals: development practitioners. The emphasis moves from the 'what is' development practice, to the 'says who?'. Following this, discussion of the rationalisation perspective will identify analytic propositions to aid an examination of the development malaise.
And I have written many of those things down (purely for myself) to capture and hold those thoughts which otherwise are often lost: some had not come then and still lay in the future. Over much of my voyage my mind was like a child standing on a sweep of garden lawn, clutching at autumn leaves passing in the wind, stretching a hand for one, leaving it for yet one closer, running after another, stooping to capture a bigger, rushing forward to others more golden. They all came from the same tree.

Adrian Hayter

Sheila In the Wind
CHAPTER 3
RATIONALISATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT MALAISE

Chapter One suggests that contemporary development practice is usefully examined in the context of the growing rationalisation of modern life. In this chapter I explain the concept of rationalisation, illustrate it with regard to the notions practitioners express about development practice, and identify a series of analytic propositions for later discussion.

Rationalisation is the process whereby an increasingly broad range of decisions are made according to technical procedures for choosing between alternative means to given goals. Rationalisation is used to describe historic trends of which the emergence of development institutions, and the 'idea' of development itself, are important expressions. But rationalisation does not occur on its own merit. The rational nexus of capital, technology and institution occurs through the practices of individuals imbued with particular skills, allegiances and capability for judgement. The prominence of practitioners (or 'technical assistance experts' in the nomenclature of the 1950s) rests on the view that "successful development cannot be achieved with massive infusions of capital and technology alone".\(^1\) As 'linch-pins of development', 'builders of order', 'catalysts' and 'inducers and stimulators of economic and social change', the key role afforded to practitioners expresses a mandate in keeping with the institutional ethos discussed in Chapter Two.

First, development was primarily a technical matter. A "major obstacle to fruitful development", one commentator remarked, "is founded on defective knowledge and consequent inability to make rational workable plans".\(^2\) United Nations General Assembly Resolutions of 1946 and 1949 endorsed the view that "lack of expert personnel and technical organisation is among the factors which impede the economic development of underdeveloped areas".\(^3\) Second, practitioners were to 'unlock' the world's great resources and productive potential in a new way. In view of the sensitivities of newly independent nations, technical expertise, like the 'administrative integrity' of international agencies, had certain attractions.

Technical assistance has become democracy's route for expediting the goals of underdeveloped nations to achieve increased development. It is not military aggression, nor economic aggression, nor ideological aggression.\(^4\)

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2. Hoselitz (1952. 11).
In line with this, practitioners give the 'cutting edge' to institutional efforts to counter the particularist and idiosyncratic features of traditional decisionmaking. Their activities are counterposed with 'politics', a typically irrational and biased activity based on false and misleading knowledge. On the other hand, practitioners are not simply charged with 'applying' theoretical knowledge. Early direct applications of Keyne's theories, for instance, had "proved disastrous". Rather, as the famous 1951 United Nations' report Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Areas noted, "the experts' 'best judgement' must be used to determine the most desirable direction of movement". The capability for 'best judgement' underwrites a leadership role in the 'development race' or 'technological marathon' that has been running for over thirty years. All nations are compelled to accept this role. Mr S. Rajaratnam, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, conveyed the image well in a recent address to FIDIC, the International Federation of Consulting Engineers.

those nations which opt out of the race opt permanently out of high civilisation. They become the 21st century versions of Stone Age man doomed forever to bay defiantly from outside the periphery of civilisation simply because intellectually and psychologically they cannot make up for lost time because time itself has passed them by.

I

NOTIONS OF PRACTICE

Discussions about practitioners (specialists, experts, or professionals) frequently begin with a series of constructs culled from literature on the 'culture' or 'sociology of professions'. These constructs refer to particular ethical standards, institutional regulation, professional autonomy, intellectual qualification, a fiduciary client relationship and an embargo on some methods of practice. Having identified these, researchers then set about to uncover evidence to refute or verify them.

In itself, this approach is not remarkable. Unfortunately researchers seem perpetually forgetful of the constructs underpinning their conclusions. From the evidence available to me, talk of a practitioners' 'culture' is a taxonomic exaggeration. The category, 'practitioners' does not denote an homogeneous collection of individuals dedicated to identical values and goals or regulated by common overarching norms. In fact, most practitioners find it difficult to express what 'being a practitioner' entails. Evan Adams, with over twenty years' experience echoed many of his colleagues, "A development practitioner? Ah, um, ...". The range of notions, premises and ideas expressed in practice is dauntingly large. Sometimes they are related to a coherent framework, but often as not this is inchoate and inconsistent.

9. Interview transcript. 18.3.84 Pagadian (see fn9. Chap. 4).
There is an important sense in which this diversity is a matter of labelling and packaging. In the sales parlance, diversity fosters 'product differentiation'. Whether designing a three-span bridge, assessing the water needs of a methanol plant, or the most effective combination of rice varieties, fertiliser and farm management skills, practitioners do refer to a common logic which is said to be largely unaffected by variations in task, geography, politics or personality. This rationality enables the practitioner to complete a feasibility study for water and sewerage in Apia on Friday, and, after a round of golf in Sydney on Saturday, turn up fresh and ready to undertake a cost-benefit analysis on a Penang housing project on Monday. Without drawing on exceptional or rare utterances, three broad notions can be discerned in the 'special skills' practitioners bring to bear, the 'attitude' in which these are imparted, and the 'purposes' of their activities.10

The Cutting Edge that Makes Things Work

Practitioners' statements about their activities often dwell on fields of competence, such as tropical agriculture, electrification, or urban site and services. But underlying these divisions is a common, if tacit, agreement about their mandate. A World Bank consultant expressed this in the following way.

If capital and technology were the towels and hot water needed for a smooth developmental birth, then a mid-wife was also needed. The countries concerned were inexperienced in dealing with such changes and neither could they keep up with the anticipated birth rate of projects. Besides, like traditional hilots, they would probably mess it up by deviating from set procedures in preference for custom, sorcery and family tradition.11

All practice is about the broad coordination of 'land, labour and technology' for the purpose of achieving greater efficiency and productivity. The services of many larger firms are no longer limited to specific disciplines, rather the skills themselves become defining features. Business International Corporation, a prestigious world consulting firm, declare in their client briefing folder that their capability lies in,

* providing fast, reliable information needed for corporate planning and decision making
* alerting corporate managers at home and abroad to new opportunities and dangers
* discovering, explaining and interpreting new international management techniques that will advance profitable corporate and economic growth
* analysing governmental measures that will make for sound economic growth and greater international cooperation and that will pave the way for corporations to make their maximum contribution to human welfare and advance their own

10 Throughout the discussions pertaining to development practitioners I have used third person pronouns and collective nouns in the masculine gender. I apologise to those who find this offensive. Unfortunately the alternatives either create confusion, appear tokenistic, or disrupt the flow of language. Having said this, it is worth noting that (bar one) all of the practitioners referred to in this study are males.
11 Field Diary. 11.9.81. Singapore.
survival and prosperity.\footnote{12}

Regardless of the specific geographic or political context, or the nature of the client, these skills amount to a universally applicable set of procedures and techniques. An Australian Professional Consultants Council submission, in a standard phrase, explains how “the Council ... has been at pains to maintain those principles accepted internationally”.\footnote{13} I asked Paul Chesterman, Project Manager on the Somosomo project, whether “his approach to this project would have been different if it had been a commercial job?”. He replied, “Well, from the start this was a social project, it was not supposed to make money for an organisation, it was to help people. But, well, I suppose we didn’t do it any differently”.\footnote{14}

Statements of this universal rationale appear more frequently in the twin guise of efficiency and productivity. The Asian Development Bank \textit{Guidelines for the Selection of Consultants} illustrates how this is reinforced by client demands.

The assistance of consultants is needed by the Bank and its borrowers to ensure \textbf{maximum efficiency} and economy in the preparation, construction and operation of projects .... \textit{Efficiency} and \textit{economy} in any such activity can be achieved through \textbf{careful planning, designing and supervision} and it is important to utilize the services of consultants for this purpose.\footnote{15}

The universal rationality both sustains and enables practitioners to meet the challenge of efficiency. It is seen to provide the ‘cutting edge’ to practice. Any problem, be it land degradation, housing shortages or poor agricultural yields, can be abstracted from its context and solutions posed in a calculated and measured manner. According to Evan Adams, this helps practitioners ‘zero in’. Thus, “When we look at a development problem, what do we find? Low production levels, low living standards, erosion problems, poor health”. These, he said “translate to poor project management and massive inefficiency”. The practitioners skills enable him “to get projects finely tuned”. “After all”, he said “we’re the ones who make it work”.\footnote{16}

Efficiency and ‘making things work’ come together with the notion of speed in work itself. Practitioners here present an image well in tune with investors’ needs. A contract submission draws on this.

We are able to move rapidly and would undertake to start the day following instructions. We would have the project well under way in the first week .... The organisation ... permits a very rapid response to assignments such as this project for which a team of specialists can be mobilised to advise and work on the diverse aspects of the problem ... under the guidance of strong group leadership [while] covering the subjects with the maximum effect in the limited time available.\footnote{17}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item 12. ‘This is ... Business International’. Brochure issued by BIC. New York.
\item 14. Interview transcript. 27.11.82. Auckland.
\item 17. Contract submission to government aid agency. 29.12.79.
\end{itemize}
The idea of 'making things work' is central also in linking notions of special skill with the 'attitude' pervading practice and the third broad notion, that of 'purpose'. Ian Seddon, Managing Director of the Project Management and Engineering Consulting Company, suggests this link.

The special strengths of the private consultant are his ability to isolate specific projects, to help the local people get a coherent view, to sell the project ... and of course to assist in project execution. His motives of survival and profit make him biased, but they also make him mentally aggressive and inventive and can if properly used give a 'cutting edge' to all phases of a project. Mr Seddon is alluding to a major tension in development practice. How does the practitioner ensure that personal motives do not blunt the cutting edge of universal technique and coherent view, or the aggressive challenge of overall purpose?

The Benefit of Arms-Length Advice

If efficiency and the expeditious application of particular skills are the cutting edge of practice, then 'discipline' is seen as its primary vehicle. For many practitioners, the special authority of their practice rests on a distinction between their empirical grasp of 'the facts of the matter' and the knowledge available to laypersons. The discipline this requires is marked by the notions of impartiality and independence. This is enshrined in Professional Charters, as the following extract from the British Association of Consulting Engineers Association Rules illustrates.

A member shall not be a director or salaried employee of any company, firm, or person carrying on any commercial, contracting or manufacturing business which is or may be involved in the class of work to which his appointment relates. A member shall not receive directly or indirectly any royalty, gratuity or commission [etc] in connection with the work to which his appointment relates. These principles are frequently referred to in public assurances of their personal discipline. "The fees of independent consultants", notes one practitioner's submission to a government inquiry, "are independent of purchase and construction expenditures on projects so that their judgements and recommendations are not influenced by considerations of personal gain or loss". That "outside consultants can usually give unbiased opinions and provide objective evaluations", is said to be "one of the primary benefits to the client and a source of comfort to the lender".

Arms-length advice is the key to maintaining credibility. Jim Clarkson, a member of the EIR research team for the contentious Aramoana smelter, said "You asked before about credibility or legitimacy of practice. Well, when it comes down to it, the key to maintaining...
credibility is being seen to give the client arms-length advice”. Independence and impartiality are important commodities in a competitive market. According to Evan Adams, this is a fact of life, “You have to chase the money” he said. “And, ... well, you must know what that means”. The requisites of discipline are demanding. The technical and commercial merge in practice. Paul Chesterman’s view is that “practice is a response to supply and demand, practice takes on the shape of this”. This means that “if you’re involved in marketing your work, which you have to do if you don’t want to end up a one man in the tin shed operation, then you can’t keep the two separate”.

Nevertheless, apart from the occasional wry comment that the interrelations between technical, commercial and political interests in practice ‘would make an interesting study’, the disciplined attitude is said to prevail. Indeed, the contrary suggestion is outrageous to most practitioners. The dispassionate pursuit of rationality, independence and objectivity amount to a deeply internalised constellation of symbols. They seem almost inevitable categories of the human mind. “Politics has nothing at all to do with what we’re doing” said John Williams, Asian Development Bank consultant, “The whole notion of a conflict [between interests] is ridiculous”.

The Velvet Glove Solution
Whatever tensions may exist between the disciplined prosecution of technical skills and less dispassionate pecuniary or political interests, these are more than accounted for by reference to the notion of ‘professional’. Its use to advise, praise, commend, cajole or terminate questionable inquiry, without doubt makes it the single most prevalent notion in the practitioners’ repertoire. Not surprisingly, it is given diverse meaning. Robert Levoy’s book, The Successful Professional Practice, tells much about the ‘professional style’ from alternate client billing formats, to ethics, and suggestions about waiting-room decor and reading material. A Professional Practice Note encourages practitioners to “Always behave in a professional manner, that is: a) Be neatly and soberly dressed, b) Be prompt in attendance ..., f) Never get annoyed and impatient”. That such matters are confidently advised by the notion of professionalism however point to an influential, and not trivial set of supporting beliefs. At heart, professionalism is seen to refer to a “subtle social contract” which “demands a strongly disciplined dedication to the interests of the community”. This service ethic entails three supporting beliefs which are frequently referred to as the ‘professional promise’, the ‘challenge of practice’ and the ‘tall order’.

The major development professions, such as engineering, economics, planning, or agricultural science, pre-date post-war interest in development practice. The 1950s ‘urgent

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23. Interview transcript. 20.3.83. Pagadian.
27. Miller (1983, 68). President of FIDIC.
global imperative' led to their rapid expansion. Simultaneously it cast them as agents of a 
'growing set of world values' comprised of a collage of instrumental skill and pragmatism 
bound by an unshakeable faith in the universal validity and democratic interest of their 
assignment. The architects of contemporary practice reproduce this sense of mission at 
all levels. Guttman's influential text, The International Consultant, for instance, remarks, 

International consultants are increasingly important to our world. They play an 
indispensable role in the pursuit of peaceful coexistence between the powerful 
nations and the less developed countries. The following excerpt from an urban planning brief in South-east Asia requires that 
practitioners work.

To secure social and racial integration, more equitable distribution of income and 
and to inculcate a sense of national unity amongst the community as well as restructure the community in order to correct racial and economic imbalance. Of course, few practitioners seriously expect to realise such ideals. Rather, the power of the 'professional promise' lies in the exclusion of any other means whereby it might be possible to meet the challenge. Geoff Faithfull, former Chairman of the Australian Professional Consultants Council argues that other agencies, especially governments, are either overwhelmed by or unwilling to deal with the problems of development. "The dangers of social and political unrest are colossal", he said. It is essential "that we muster the right combination of professional skills". Practitioners are frequently said to offer 'The Velvet Glove Solution': a middle path between revolution and resignation. Peter Miller, President of FIDIC, suggests this 'solution' involves "the pursuit of excellence ... and competition by mastery over or manipulation of the natural environment, in which term I would include for this purpose all social interaction within the human species".

The professional promise therefore invites a strong sense of 'challenge'. This is 
reflected in practitioners' reactions to brief moments of public scrutiny. Ray Littlejohn, 
Project Manager on a Philippine Integrated Rural Development Project spells this out,

We are professionals, we are doing a difficult job in arduous, frustrating cir-
cumstances ... and the deprivation is probably quite severe ... we have a good team here, hard workers, dedicated to what they're doing, putting in long hours ... and to meet this criticism from armchair critics ... is hurtful and pretty disillusioning.


"You are part of the world and you must participate ... in the solution of the problems that pour upon us, requiring the most sophisticated technical judgement .... The central domestic problems of our time ... relate not to basic clashes of philosophy or ideology, but to ways and means of reaching common goals .... What is at stake in our economic decisions today is not some grand warfare of rival ideologies which will sweep the country with passion but the practical management of a modern economy". The New York Times. 12.6.62.


30. Project files. 31.10.81. (See FN.1. Chap. 4.)


32. Agricultural Consultants International Ltd. (1983. 4-6) and Joachim (1982).


34. Wurth (1982).
By most accounts the promethean mission is publicly accepted. Speaking of the Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC), Australia's largest international firm of practitioners, one journalist writes.

The applause peels like thunder for 'The Man from the Snowy' who is alive and renowned around the world. Like Banjo Paterson's imaginary hero, the men from SMEC are now performing miracles abroad. SMEC engineers, geologists, hydrologists, surveyors, and other scientists are taming the earth's most difficult terrain from Brazil to Bangladesh ... blazing trails through snow, desert and foetid jungle to bring prosperity.35

The discipline, the assignment, the promise, the required skills and the challenge create a 'tall order' at the personal level. To accept the "obligation to help the less fortunate multitude of humanity" and "join the modern crusade ... against backwardness and misery", the practitioner "must be cultured and cross-cultured. He must be disciplined and interdisciplined. He must be well-stocked with empathy and antifreeze. He should be a model himself, and he should know about model-building, institution-building, stadium-building and body-building".36

While often only a 'promissory note' attached to practice, the metaphors 'Mid-Wives of Change', 'The Cutting Edge', 'Arms-Length Advice', and the 'Sense of Mission' may be used to paint a picture of practice. Emphasis is given to these notions on the basis that development problems are technically so complex that a special approach is necessary to unravel them. The practitioners' ability to speak to the facts arrests the tendency for political prejudice, elitism or idiosyncratic interest to hold sway. This reduces dogmatism and underwrites a new democratic consensus about societal development.

II

RATIONALISATION THEORY - BACKGROUND

The prospect of boundless advance in science and technology, tied to ideas about moral and political growth, has been particularly influential in Western thought. The practitioners' notions give contemporary expression to views that emerged during the eighteenth century period of Enlightenment. Enlightenment thinkers, like Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu and Kant, argued that the force of reason would promote freedom and liberate humanity from the 'yoke of traditional authority'.

From the late nineteenth century however a contending stream of thought paralleled this view. Nietzsche for instance traced the advent of nihilism to the roots of Western culture. A radical doubt emerged about the hitherto self-evident relations between technical and economic 'progress' and freedom, justice and human fulfilment.

Extreme divisions between contemporary social scientists' evaluations of the rationality of modern society stem from this time. For social scientists following Talcott

Parsons for instance, modern society is the most rational yet. Technological capacity, specialisation and structural pluralism promote progressive social change. Ultimately, this strengthens individual freedom and autonomy.

On the other hand, there are those like Herbert Marcuse for whom the economic-technical organisation of society has totalitarian tendencies. Advanced industrial society is the most irrational of all. Rationalisation fosters an unsurpassed capacity to manipulate and dominate human affairs. This represses or blocks genuinely progressive change. The relevance of these two points of view should be obvious. Practitioners' notions - the discipline, special skill and professional promise - indeed, the idea of development itself, are connected with the promise of social and political progress. The development malaise sketched in Chapter One expresses a deep concern about the certainty of this promise. I identified three core interests being pursued in development practice - material welfare, personal self-esteem, and political freedom - and have suggested a tension exists between the technically rational means designed to satisfy material interests and non-material ends. Rationalisation theorists refer to this kind of tension by a distinction between technical rationality and substantive rationality. They argue there is an 'irreconcilable antinomy' between technically rational practices designed to expand material welfare and the substantively rational values of human freedom, identity and esteem. In this section I review the 'rationalisation thesis'. On this basis the following section details a series of propositions which will guide empirical discussion in Chapters Four and Five. The relation between these two rationalities and the development malaise is shown schematically in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: The Development Malaise and Rationalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developmental Interests</th>
<th>material</th>
<th>Development malaise</th>
<th>personal</th>
<th>political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forms of Rationality</td>
<td>technical-instrumental</td>
<td>substantive practical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With few exceptions, the rationalisation perspective has received little attention in the analysis of development practice. As background, some attention is given to the work of Max Weber, Herbert Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas. Although there is a common trajectory in their work (and in this sense it is possible to speak of a 'rationalisation thesis') there are important points of disagreement. They do not constitute a 'school' of thought. However, for my purposes, this disagreement has less to do with analysis, than with how they address the question 'what is to be done?', given the analysis. The latter point is only mentioned here as it is investigated in detail in Parts Two and Three.

38. The most comprehensive exception is Preston (1982).
Rationalisation is the major theme linking Weber's work in the early 1900s, the work of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory in the 1930s and 1940s, of which Marcuse was a member, and the contemporary studies of Habermas. The problem of rationalisation has been a 'central preoccupation' not only of Habermas' work, but much of neo-marxism generally since the 1920s.39

Max Weber: The Disenchantment of the World
Max Weber is renowned for his association of the Enlightenment with the curtailment of human freedom which he expressed through the fateful metaphors 'iron cage' and 'disenchantment of the world'. Rationalisation constitutes the core of Weber's work. Wilson remarks, "no concept in the Weberian arsenal is intended to be more all inclusive, more comprehensive in its ability to explain social and historical events than rationalisation".40 Weber sought to identify the impact of modernisation through the rationalisation concept. This paralleled a classical interest in social science. Gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, mechanical and organic solidarity, traditional and bureaucratic authority, sacred and profane, are polar concepts characterising similar changes. Weber's work traced the 'elective affinity' or interrelations between religious forces, ascetism and the rational economic conduct typical of modern capitalism and the State. Rational calculation of profits and losses (such as double-entry bookkeeping) he considered essential to the growth of modern capitalism. Similarly, the extension of the capitalist market has been the dominant impetus to rationalisation.

Today it is primarily the capitalist market economy which demands the official business of the administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed as possible ... the 'objective' discharge of business according to calculable rules and without regard for persons.41

A distinction between two forms of rationality was of central sociological importance for Weber. He referred to these by a variety of dichotomies, but for present purposes, the

contrast between technical and substantive rationality is crucial. Conduct exhibits technical rationality in the degree that it is organised and authorised through calculable, formal procedures. The emphasis on efficiency and productivity in capitalism evinces technical rationality. Bureaucracy represents the most formal institutional embodiment of this rationality. Action is technically rational, when it is oriented to ends, means and secondary results. This involves rationally weighing the relation of means to ends, the relations of ends to secondary consequences and finally, the relative importance of different possible ends. Determination of action either in affectual or traditional terms is incompatible with this type.

By contrast, the meaning assigned to substantive rationality, implicit in the last sentence, is less clear in Weber's work. Substantive rationality, or value-rational action, is that which refers to traditional forms of authority, like social status, ethical absolutes or politics in the classical sense.

Weber argued that, uniform social control and law, dispassionate impersonal administration, technical innovation and calculated economic action increasingly supplanted the traditional forms of life basic to substantive rationality. Substantive rationality loses much of its power, since rationalisation transforms traditional world views, norms and values. They are cast into the realm of subjective, irrational and arbitrary, or seen as constraints to 'progress'.

This trend led to an irresolvable antinomy between technical and substantive rationality. Taking from the poet Schiller the phrase ‘disenchantment of the world’, Weber expected that bureaucracy and secularisation would become universal and displace all meanings of hope and faith. Rationalisation underpinned the most advanced economic system ever developed. The tendency for decisions to be made through the rational use of evidence and technique also strengthened democracy by redeeming political life from opinion and the purely subjective preferences of politicians. However, the rationality which made modern economy and polity possible, Weber said, contravened some of the most distinctive values of individual creativity and autonomy. Domination became subtly institutionalised. The economic and technical domination of nature had, as its counterpart, the legitimation of domination in social life. In this sense, technical rationality is 'irrational'.

Weber's 'iron cage' image of the modern world evokes a new form of slavery in bureaucratic, rational capitalism. Individuals had become bound in terms of manipulability, calculability, measureability, to a worldly domain characterised by a belief in its susceptibility

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42 There is some dispute over how many generic types of rationality are significant in Weber's writing. Sadri (1982, 622-3) identifies six in three counterposing dualities: theoretical vs. practical, formal vs. substantive, and instrumental vs. value rationality. Levine (1981, 12-3) concedes only four generic types. The labels technical and substantive rationality are used throughout this thesis. Technical rationality, a label used by Marcuse and Habermas as well, includes the essential features of both instrumental and formal rationality. Weber often substituted substantive rationality for value rationality, whereas Habermas interchanges substantive and practical rationality, the latter being understood in the Germanic sense, i.e., as not equivalent to 'technical know-how', but referring to the substantive values of classical politics - justice, fairness - in short, the 'good society'.

43. Weber (1948, 293)
to such procedures. Whether Weber was expressing a deep-seated pessimism or simply the stern outlook that characterises a tragic sense of life, he "tended ... to assert that the chances were very great indeed that mankind would in the future be imprisoned in an iron cage of his own making".

No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanised petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance.

While Weber was attempting to provide a sociological explanation of modern civilisation, the tragic metaphors also suggest he was simultaneously engaged in a desperate attempt to come to grips with the meaning and direction of his own conduct. A concern with the practical, personal implications of their analyses is a feature of all rationalisation theorists. There are both analytic and practical reasons why this perspective is of interest.

**Herbert Marcuse: Pessimism and Despair**

Marcuse, along with colleagues Adorno and Horkheimer, shared Weber's concern about the emergence of what they called instrumental reason. Indeed, from the 1930s to 1950s there was a marked shift in the work of the Frankfurt School from Marx to Weber.

Marcuse agreed that technical rationality should be traced to ideas and processes prior to the emergence of industrial capitalism - such as the Reformation and Protestantism. Like Weber, he considered all "the material and intellectual forces which could be put to work for the realisation of a free society are at hand". Technical improvements in productive capacity and increased division of labour carry the promise of greater material wealth, but this potential gives way to greater domination and psychological repression. The unsurpassed capacity to manipulate human affairs suppresses progressive change.

Marcuse went further than this. Whereas many have praised Weber, particularly for his unwillingness to offer definitive solutions to the problems of the iron cage, Marcuse charged him with being a harbinger of an oppressive and meaningless social situation. Weber's pessimism regarding the 'inescapable' iron cage he argued, masked a concept of fate which "generalizes the blindness of a society which reproduces itself behind the back of individuals, of a society in which the law of domination appears as an objective technological law". For Marcuse, it was the organisation of production as capitalist production and not

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44. Robertson (1980, 228).
simply rationalisation which threatens the spirit and even the material survival of humanity. Marcuse considered that contemporary industrial society tended to be totalitarian.

Held has pointed to the 'rule of equivalence' in Marcuse's work. This has two aspects. First, the rationality of capitalist commodity production makes possible the comparability of dissimilar objects or processes (for example, land, labour, capital and then 'human values', needs, or 'the environment'). Matters which cannot be rationally justified or conveniently entered into the calculus become marginalised as matters of 'subjective assessment'. Second, the rule of equivalence can be comprehended by observing how the technical, means-ends rationality undermines or 'eclipses' substantive rationality. In place of the latter, special status is accorded to technical reason: calculability, discipline, control, order, become the 'only reasonable' values. Thus, social practices organised according to this rationality are repressive. Moreover, this repression does not even feature in individual consciousness because it is legitimised as the only reasonable way of conducting life.

Again, Marcuse went further. The mood of his early work (notably Eros and Civilisation) was extremely positive and optimistic about the future. Later however he came to talk of the 'sublimated slaves' who live in the 'Hell of the Affluent Society'. Rationalisation killed the urge and will to resist. We have become reconciled to our plight.

Capitalist progress thus not only reduces the environment of freedom, the 'open space' of the human existence, but also the 'longing', the need for such an environment. And in doing so, quantitative progress militates against qualitative change even if the institutional barriers against radical education and action are surmounted. This is the vicious circle ... and I do not know how to get out of it. The last sentence is indicative of the despair and pessimism characteristic of Marcuse's later work. In his An Essay on Liberation (1969) Marcuse acknowledged the possibilities of revolt and rebellion by ghetto minorities and the student movement, but he did not see any occasion for fundamental change. His closing phrase in One Dimensional Man, 'only for the sake of the hopeless is hope given to us', indicates his belief that even the sincere efforts of those wishing to resist rationalisation merely aided its advance.

Jurgen Habermas: A Renewed Emancipatory Interest

Earlier works of Frankfurt scholars like Marcuse provided the inspiration for Jurgen Habermas. But his work has involved a major reformulation of Marx's theory of historical materialism. Consequently this has drawn him closer to Weberian epistemology than any of

53. Given this despair, Marcuse's earlier objections to Weber's apparent resignation lose much of their weight.
his predecessors. 54

Habermas' work is primarily concerned with the relation between theory and practice. The goals of his critical theory are also the goals of substantive rationality, namely the creation of the 'good society'. 55 His task then, is to develop a theory of society with a practical intent. His interest in self-emancipation from domination arises directly from the analysis of rationalisation.

Two aspects of Habermas' work will be drawn on in this thesis. First, his work on rationalisation which is directly linked through Marcuse with Weber. Habermas shares an interest in the spread of instrumental reason and its effects on politics and societal administration. Second, as mentioned, his work has a practical intent. Given rationalisation, the 'organisation' of capitalism, the expansion of technical rationality and the threats this poses for substantive discourse in the public, political sphere, it is all the more urgent that a 'critical theory' emerges to guide a radical transformation of society. The first, his comments on rationalisation, I consider here. The second is of particular interest when possible responses to rationalisation and the development malaise are considered. However, save for brief resume, this is put aside until Part II.

Habermas' examination of rationalisation occurs at two levels. His first major translated work, *Towards a Rational Society* (1970), is directly linked with Marcuse's earlier critique of Weber. In this book he argues that technical rationality not only serves certain class interests, but also that the increasing tendency to define substantive problems according to the dictates of technical reason affects the very structure of 'human interests'.

Habermas' earlier work documented the extension of technical means-ends rationality into more and more areas of social life; in particular, the increasing interdependence of science, technology, and industry, of State and society and the growth of large commercial organisations. He argued that these events introduced important changes in the 'organisational forms' used to both steer and legitimate development. 56 Nineteenth century competitive capitalism, he said, was legitimated according to the norms of an 'unregulated market'. Steering problems periodically appeared as economic crises', but the legitimating norms of freedom and equality in the market sufficed so long as the market was 'self-steering'. However, the capitalist economy produces 'objective exigencies', or crisis tendencies which must be met if social and political stability is to be maintained. Accordingly, an expanding State is required to intervene through the greater involvement of technicians and administrators in social and economic affairs. A new form of political life emerges to

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54. A cautionary note must be attached to any limited review of Habermas' work such as this. His views have changed considerably over the past two decades and he frequently labels his work 'tentative' and 'programmatic', thus foreshadowing future modification. Apart from its analytic value, my use of Habermas here is an attempt to come to terms with a deep-seated concern about previous encounters (Cf. Porter 1980; and Hamnett et al. 1984). I interpret his work here more with an eye to the analytic interests of my research than with regard to the complex (and largely indeterminant) debates about precisely where Habermas intends to go.


legitimate this interrelation: one which is not oriented "towards the realization of practical goals [of classical politics] but towards the solution of technical problems". Actions of the State are no longer publicly seen as 'political interventions' but legitimised as 'impersonal technically necessary reactions' undertaken by selfless administrators, technicians and politicians to guarantee a minimum level of welfare, manage an 'orderly' economy, and sustain economic growth. Substantive issues, many of them underpinned by particular class interests, are defined as technical problems which the new politics must eliminate in order to reduce the risks which threaten 'the economy'. Disco summarises Habermas' image of modern industrial society in the following terms.

The upshot is a social system which is determined 'from below' (i.e., from its economic base) as well as 'from above' (i.e., in its superstructure and system of legitimation) by instrumental reason in which everything becomes a means to the end of maintaining a certain level of economic productivity. The mode of technical reason employed in the productive exploitation of nature, when applied to the administration of human affairs, leads to a decline in political life based on practical/substantive debate. Technical values of efficiency and economy come to dominate the selection of courses of action. Whereas old style politics was forced, through its traditional form of legitimation (according to mythic, metaphysic, cultural, or religious world views) to define itself in relation to practical goals (the 'good life'), nowadays these realms have been replaced, politics has lost its original political function. The 'peculiar danger' arises when this mode of reason transgresses the limits of technical questions. Consequently.

No attempt at all is made to attain a rational consensus on the part of citizens concerning the practical control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt to attain technical control over history by perfecting the administration of society.

Much of this is based on Habermas' extensive work on the theory of knowledge. He examines the way in which technical reason (in the form of positivism) has dominated modern thought. This he says, threatens an individual's capacity for reflection on his or her activities. To counter this, Habermas has undertaken a systematic examination of the nature of human interests, knowledge and action. Much of this derives from a reconstruc-
tion of Marx's historical materialism which is not relevant here. The results can be summarised as follows.

In *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1972) and *Theory and Practice* (1973), Habermas develops the theory of 'knowledge constitutive interests' in order to justify the emancipatory project of critical theory. These interests are grounded in human experience. Humankind must produce from nature what is needed for material existence and also must communicate with others in order to maintain the rules and institutions of social life. A 'technical interest' derives from the need to control and manipulate the natural, material world. A 'practical interest' derives from the need to maintain communication and social life. According to Habermas there is a third, 'emancipatory', interest which derives from the need to maintain a human capacity for self-reflection and self-determination and enhance autonomy and responsibility. These knowledge constitutive interests are both naturalistically grounded and transcendental, that is, conditions of knowledge. Thus he assigns a quasi-transcendental status to these interests; which, as we will see in Chapter Six, has certain problematical consequences.

Habermas' critique of rationalisation, outlined earlier, is based on this schema. Taking the first two interests, technical and practical, Habermas argues that human activity involves two fundamentally different 'action systems'. Labour, the technical interest, corresponds to technical or instrumental rationality. Interaction, the communicative interest, corresponds to a practical, substantive rationality. Rationalisation undermines the institutional framework through which the communicative interest is advanced, that is, the realm of substantive rationality. Habermas argues that technocratic control and domination implies "an entire organization of society: one in which technology becomes autonomous, dictates a value-system - namely its own - to the domains of praxis it has usurped".

The implications have subsequently been examined by a number of critical theorists. Consistently, they refer to the emasculation of political life: the 'shrivelling' of the public sphere that accompanies the intrusion of technical reason into public discourse. "Public politics is reduced to a parliamentary floorshow in which a media-massaged public is periodically allowed to intervene and the real politics of the society became manifest only as an impersonal and disinterested social technology."  

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61. This involves two levels: 1) critique of political economy. Habermas revises the theory of surplus value, the theory of the falling rate of profit, the theory of crises, the original form of Marx's understanding of class conflict, and the theory of imperialism (Sensat, 1979 and Held, 1980, 267-276, are good summaries). 2) Marx's treatment of the nature of critique itself, i.e., "Marx never explicitly posed for himself the epistemological question concerning the conditions of the possibility of a philosophy of history with political interests" (Habermas, 1973, 242). Although he recognises the influence that historical forms of labour exert on symbolic interaction, he is deeply suspicious of the tendency to think there are historical material conditions that automatically bring about the 'realm of freedom'. A preoccupation with the determinative aspects of economic relations (and a corresponding technical interest) leads to a positivistic Marxism which he thinks results in part from Marx's conflation of technical (labour) and practical (interactive) interests. Cf. Giddens (1982b).


63. Disco (1979, 195).
The practical intention of Habermas' critical theory is to resist this process by releasing people from the 'structures of distortion' and 'distorted communication' which prevail in contemporary life. From this arises a model of practice based on the emancipatory interest. This implies a new form of practice which, recast in the terms of this thesis, aims to eradicate the conditions of the development malaise. Chapter Six will examine the ramifications of this approach.

III

PROPOSITIONS FOR ANALYSIS

Three main dimensions of the rationalisation perspective are of interest in this study. It provides: 1) an historic context in which to locate contemporary development practice; 2) a penetrating critique of the moral and political consequences of historic trends; and 3) a series of pointers about how the adverse affects of these trends may be overcome. On each dimension there are points of agreement and contention amongst Weber, Marcuse and Habermas.

This section deals with the first two dimensions. I identify three sets of propositions about development practice. The first set, collectively entitled 'Rationalisation as an Historic Trend', is descriptive. The second, the 'Transformation of Political Life', is analytic. That is, it ties the descriptive observations to a critique of particular features of the development malaise. The third set, 'De-authored Practice', has not been raised so far. The expression de-authored practice refers to how the development malaise is sustained or reproduced by development practitioners.

The propositions are not exclusive. Furthermore, although I attempt to match propositions to particular cases, each proposition could be investigated by any number of cases. Matching is a matter of heuristic convenience only. Finally, each proposition is presented in an affirmative tenor and largely without exemplification. The reliability and adequacy of these propositions will be considered after the empirical discussion of the next two chapters.

Rationalisation as an Historic Trend

The main features of rationalisation correspond with the features of development practice. Both rationalisation and development practice involve the division and coordination of activities, the exact calculation of human relations, specific tools, natural and social processes for the purpose of achieving greater efficiency and productivity. The distinction between technical and substantive rationality is present in the broad ethos of development institutions and is paralleled in the notions of practitioners.

Technical rationality has a number of attributes. The notions of arms-length advice, independence and dispassionate impartiality accord with a technically rational stress on calculation, measurement and objectivity. The practitioners' emphasis on order and stability, prediction and control, efficiency and economy, are also attributes of technical rationality. The distinction between the practitioners' skill, discipline, and methodical
attitude, and the kind of knowledge available to laypersons underscores the ascendance of technical forms of authority. The attributes of substantive rationality; personal or political values, idiosyncratic, cultural or traditional practices, are 'unfortunate attitudes' which constitute 'barriers' to development.

There is no need to review previous comments on how this rationality was extended through the 1970s 'broadening of scope', the expansion of international financial agencies or the increasing reliance on practitioners. In Chapter Four, I take two project cases to illustrate different features of 'rationalisation as an historic trend'.

**Transformation of Political Life**

I have observed how the 1970s 'broadening of scope' was accompanied by increased attention to project management. With the incorporation of more functions and variables, cohesion is seen to depend on the control and coordination of centralised management. Concentration of power and authority is a logical necessity. These authoritarian tendencies are legitimated by the ethos of universality, administrative integrity and the need for efficient and orderly change. An immediate consequence of applying technically rational procedures is the centralisation of power around those with access to the skills, techniques and knowledge required to make authoritative decisions. This expropriates power from those 'below' and reaffirms dominant-submissive relations in social life. The authoritarian transformation of political life has numerous dimensions. Chapter Five uses three cases to explore three of these.

1. The transformation of issues

   Technical rationality makes it possible to compare dissimilar phenomena, whether these be material objects, social processes or cultural values. This enables, and is essential for, their incorporation into a single calculus. Anything which cannot be conveniently incorporated is consigned to the realm of irrational, or an externality that is to be 'accounted for'.

   In practice, this has two particular consequences: 1) a fundamental transformation of substantive issues; and 2) a detachment of practice from the larger goals or values being pursued. In either event, practice becomes self-legitimating. It provides its own justification because the standards used to assess practice are supplied by the rationality of practice itself. Proposals concerning the right course of action come to be judged true or false according to whether or not they are suitable to the means. This fosters a delusive harmony between the special interests being served by efficiency, order and control and broader substantive common interests.

2. Limitation of Political Horizons

   Alongside this detachment of means from ends and the tendency for means to usurp the ends, it is tacitly assumed that substantive issues are undebateable in a rational manner and therefore beyond the scope of practice. This places limits on the horizon of political action by circumscribing what attributes of any situation are to be considered variables or
constants. This leads to the reification of basic social, economic and political institutions and relations. Reification means 'to make into a thing'\textsuperscript{64} and refers to the tendency to treat what are socially sustained practices as if they were invariant features of society. Proposals regarding appropriate means are made in terms of the continued existence of present arrangements. This supports the earlier-mentioned trend toward authoritarian centralisation of power.

3. Impoverishment of Political Debate

Through rationalisation, politics comes to be thought of as an activity primarily directed toward a smooth productive process: synonymous with administration in which political questions are interpreted as technical questions demanding instrumental decisions. Combined with the transformation of issues and the reification of horizons, this impoverishes political debate.

Analyses at odds with the issues as technically defined, or which question matters beyond their horizon are either ignored or denigrated as 'unreasonable'. Only those with the requisite skills, knowledge and concordant definition of issues are able to participate. Others are deemed incapable of judging the worth of 'technically necessary decisions' and are either marginalised or alienated from the development process.

De-authored Practice

The expression 'de-authored practice' has much in common with the abovementioned propositions, but it explicitly recognises that rationalisation is not an inexorable, self-propelling process. Neither is the development malaise anything but a product of human activity. The three themes considered under de-authored practice seek to explore how the activities of practitioners (including their ideas, techniques and procedures) sustain or reproduce the development malaise.

Rationalisation, in essence, refers to the tendency for decisions to be based on a new form of authority. That is, on factual data derived from universally applicable techniques and methods. Traditional approaches to decisions are 'authorised' by the social, cultural or political status of those making the decision, or the various substantive values, norms or rules of thumb they draw on. Rationalisation leads to a redefinition of what it means to be 'an authority' or to make an authoritative decision. Substantive rationality is stripped of its claim to provide an authoritative basis for conduct.

1. Practitioner De-authoring

The new authority of technical rationality is evident in the notions of practitioners. What Weber called the 'methodical way of life' is increasingly substituted for sentiment, personal conviction and the layperson's common-sense rules of thumb. The metaphoric notions of arms-length advice, midwives of change and professional promise convey a particular normative view of reality. Politics and values are irrational variables prejudicial to efficient and effective practice.

Successful practice is possible only if the practitioner embodies this authoritative rationality. The notions of practice are aspirant values essential for its maintenance and extension. The organisation of practice in this way enables the practitioner to speak to 'the facts', that is, to be authoritative. With this, practice receives the legitimacy of universality, a dispassionate integrity and the aura of the common interest. The authority of practice therefore resides not in individual belief or commitment, but is said to depend solely on its correspondence with that which is empirically available, as fact, in the external world. Authority depends on anonymity. In other words, judgements or statements must appear to be those of 'anyman', who is endowed with the disciplined, methodical attitude. To be the vehicle of external reality, the practitioner must discipline and silence personal manifestations of substantive reality. Conversely, theoretical speculation which can be only partially authorised by the facts, or expressions of personal sentiment threaten the probity of practice. They must be seen simply as 'talk', 'academic', or in terms of the efficiency of practice, as 'down-time'.

Weber argued that rationalisation, in particular the methodical way of life, was in tension with some of the most important values of Western society, namely, creativity, autonomy and spontaneity. Technical rationality promotes the efficient organisation of action toward objective ends. But it does not to the same extent promote substantive rationality, the capacity to act intelligently in a given situation according to one's 'insight'. Rationalisation has a paralysing effect. Due to the decline of reflective thought, individuals become prisoners of a seemingly rational set of ideas. In this sense, 'being reasonable' has irrational consequences. It kills the urge to resist and, thereby, promotes a conservative attitude toward progressive social change. In securing his authority against the pressure and seduction of substantive interests, the practitioner deludes himself about the fundamental authoritarian tendencies of development practice. Regardless of any express intentions to the contrary, de-authored practice reproduces the development malaise.

2. De-authoring the Material/Natural World

Technical rationality was first promoted in capitalist commodity production. Skills, capital, raw materials and other elements of production are transformed into resources or commodities for consumption or further production. Rationalisation extends out from firm-specific economics to other areas by applying the same rationality; what were previously externalities (like farmer attitudes, pollution, downstream effects or ecology) are objectified and reduced to a common (dollar) value. The substantively valued dimensions of these phenomena must be transformed. Qualitative differences among them are recognisable only as differences of quantity to be 'weighted' accordingly.

De-authoring the natural world could not occur without the techniques and methods developed and applied by practitioners; there would be no variables, no inputs, and no equation to constitute their meaning.

3. De-authoring the Social World

De-authoring the social world is an extension of the above. Substantively rational
issues are de-politicised. That is, they are disconnected from the broader world-view, cosmology or situation in which they have a socially defined meaning. Weber used the word 'autonomisation' to refer to this aspect of de-authoring.

De-authoring the social world results in political (substantive) debate being frozen within the technical framework and rules which have created the issues new meaning. Participation in this debate requires at least tacit agreement that the de-authored natural and social phenomena in question retain their original substantive meaning.

Summary
This chapter has explained the affinity between the primary concern with the development malaise and the rationalisation perspective. This affinity has three dimensions. First, the rationalisation perspective provides an historical analytic framework. The idea of development and the institutions established to give it effect, are manifestations of broader historical trends. Technical rationality gained intellectual ascendancy from the Enlightenment period and practical expression with the emergence of modern capitalism and the State. The notions and techniques employed by practitioners are specific contemporary embodiments of this.

Second, the rationalisation perspective entails a particular evaluative stance from which to enquire into the causes and character of the development malaise. Rationalisation theorists argue that substantive rationality is eclipsed in a way that parallels the tension between the interests of expanding material welfare in development practice, and personal and political interests. The rationalisation perspective yields analytic propositions which directly address the development malaise, and one means of examining the role of practitioners in its reproduction.

The affinity between the primary interests of the thesis and rationalisation theory has a third dimension not addressed so far. The critique of contemporary practice presented by the rationalisation perspective has a strong, if implicit, reconstructive turn. That is, theorists like Weber, Habermas, and Marcuse are particularly concerned with the practical, personal implications of their analyses. The relation between analysis and practical conduct is a central motivation for this research as well. This dimension of the rationalisation perspective is put aside until Parts Two and Three.
CHAPTER 4
THE PRACTITIONER AND POLITICS

The broadened scope of 1970s development practice is most readily witnessed by the addition of social equity considerations to the earlier emphasis on expanding technical capacity and economic growth. One immediate consequence was an increasing reliance on development practitioners. Another was uncertainty, even confusion, about how a growing array of disparate variables were to be reconciled. The practitioners' task was to unify this broadened scope in particular times and specific locations. In Section I, the Somosomo mini-hydro project is used to illustrate some of the more overt political dimensions of project practice, with a concentration on the role of the practitioner.

The broadened scope also increased the attention paid to project management. In the first instance, this referred to the need to coordinate and incorporate often quite diverse objectives in project design, planning and implementation. Frequently these objectives were contradictory. For instance, one objective, such as maintaining the high project construction standards expected by international funding agencies, frequently conflicted with another objective which aimed to maximise local community participation in project construction. The Apia water and sewerage project discussed in Section II illustrates this kind of tension. Here I explore how technical rationality penetrates into diverse and often unexpected areas of everyday social life.

In sum, the two project studies attempt to illustrate two sides of the same coin, that is, the politics of practice. Section I emphasises the influence of the practitioner, or of human agency in practice. Section II examines how rationalisation affects the institutional context of practice and contradicts or at least 'bounds' the conscious purposes of those agents.

I
CREATING DEVELOPMENT: THE SOMOSOMO MINI-HYDRO

In many respects, the Somosomo mini-hydro rural electrification project on Taveuni island, Fiji, was a product of the 'enlightened '70s'. As conceived in the early 1970s, this New Zealand (NZ) bilateral aid project was infrastructural, that is, it was oriented to providing relatively cheap electricity to support commercial enterprises. Strictly speaking, this remained the primary emphasis, but during the late 1970s various social equity goals, such as "arresting rural to urban population drift" and providing services to "alleviate a cause of
dissatisfaction among rural dwellers" were appended to it.\(^1\) The External Aid Division of the NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also keen to see that the project was in line with the Fiji government's "determination to see that rural standards of living [are] increased through increasing output, hence income, rather than by mere redistribution of existing wealth".\(^2\)

Electricity was to meet both domestic and commercial needs; for domestic refrigerators, for copra estates, and for production and consumption. Domestic lighting "would alleviate a cause of dissatisfaction" and also "improve rural children's relatively poor school performances".\(^3\)

The Somosomo project was first explicitly identified in appraisal documents of 1975. But its genesis began late in 1969 when Les Morrison, a partner in the large NZ engineering firm Morrison, Coles and Ball, was in Fiji on an assignment to the Fiji Electricity Authority (FEA). Morrison's assignment coincided with a rapid escalation in international development financing. In NZ's case this was signalled when in 1969 the Prime Minister made a plea for private consultants to assist "in mobilising [public sector] resources in the service of countries less fortunate than ours".\(^4\) This plea foreshadowed the provision of commercial incentives which are now important components of world-wide development financing policy.\(^5\)

**Taking the Initiative: 'There is no shelf of projects'**

Under this policy Morrison was encouraged to reassess the commercial potential of hydro-power in Fiji, which a 1951 Report dismissed since "while [it] would be technically feasible, the costs were so high as to make the proposals unattractive".\(^6\) On two occasions, in 1969 and 1970, Morrison confidently reported to the FEA that "methodical investigation" would show that water power in central Viti Levu was economic.\(^7\) Together with a 1970 Commonwealth Secretariat Reconnaissance Report recommendation that "the Government of Fiji take immediate steps [to] implement this project";\(^8\) this prompted a Fiji government request request for NZ aid assistance in 1971. This was followed by Asian Development Bank investigations and a visit by a two-man team from a NZ consultant consortium in 1971 to define the Terms of Reference (TOR) for a 'Detailed Feasibility Study for Power Generation and Distribution in Fiji'. Subsequently, between 1973 and 1975 the multi-volume Fiji Hydro Power Study was produced. This was followed in 1976 and 1977 by feasibility studies of hydro potential on Taveuni, Vanua Levu and Bega. Finally, after an early 1980 investigation, the NZ External Aid Division commissioned Morrison, Coles and Ball to design and evaluate the proposed hydro-scheme utilising the Somosomo River.

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1. Project documents 1977. (NB: Unsourced 'Project documents' or 'Project files' refers to confidential materials held by the practitioner or funding agency.)
Despite what this chronology may suggest, project histories are not a simple matter of TORs, contracts and recommendations. What generally applicable influence did the practitioners have over this period? Three different themes can be illustrated from this experience. The first emerges from Les Morrison’s initiatives in 1969. The second theme concerns the techniques practitioners employed to influence decisions about the project, and the third relates to the context of development practice itself.

Referring to Les Morrison’s early initiatives, Paul Chesterman, Project Engineer on the 1977 and 1980 studies, remarked “Most jobs have been picked up and formed by consultants long before they come up in the bureaucracy”. Morrison’s reports to the FEA in Lautoka in 1969 and 1970 were accompanied by persistent lobbying in Wellington and Suva. Success came in 1971 when the NZ High Commissioner in Fiji telexed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Wellington that “The Fiji Secretary of Finance told us this afternoon’s Cabinet Development Committee has agreed to make a formal request to NZ for assistance”.

Morrison’s lobbying however led to a far more broad-ranging request than he had anticipated. Earlier informal correspondence indicates that the Fiji Government had asked to make a comprehensive preliminary assessment of natural energy resources. It would also be expected to appraise all the factors in Fiji which may be expected to lead to a growth in demand, to forecast the likely future demand and [for “the whole of Fiji”] to recommend possible methods for satisfying projected demand. This was clearly an effort to broaden concern away from Morrison’s interest in securing design commissions for a hydro-scheme in the Monosavu Falls area of Viti Levu. This endeavour foundered however. Although the original intent was reflected in Fiji’s final request, this was only a shadow of the earlier correspondence. One explanation offered by an External Aid Division official was that Fiji simply lacked the expertise to ‘language’ their broad intent with specifics. The Fijian TOR reverted almost completely to the wording, section headings and scope proposed by Morrison’s 1969 report to the FEA. Thus, when the two-man team visited Fiji to ‘clarify the request’ in 1971, a TOR emerged which emphasised electricity power development studies and a feasibility study for a Monosavu Falls hydro-electric project. Fiji government uneasiness about this narrowed scope prompted the NZ consultant consortium to reassure the NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There is little or no difference apparent between the Terms of Reference prompted by the Government of Fiji, those prepared by the Commonwealth Secretariat and those contained in our preliminary proposal.

The correspondant omitted to point out however that individuals from the same

9. Interview, 27.11.82, Auckland, Transcript. (NB: Interview sources are referred to in two ways. Transcript denotes unedited taped interview. ‘Interview’ by itself denotes quotations from handwritten interview notes.)
12. Interview, 23.12.82, Wellington, Transcript.
13. Project Files, 15.10.71.
network of firms participated in each of the cases on which the reassurance rested. The participation of a Morrison, Coles and Ball employee in the Commonwealth Secretariate Mission was, according to project files, designed "to give him the opportunity to write into the terms of reference a specification for a firm of consulting engineers closely resembling Messrs [Morrison, Coles and Ball]." In other words "we expect any discrepancies between [Morrison, Coles and Ball] and Fiji to be resolved in the course of the visit".14

This episode highlights a more general point regarding the increasing prominence of practitioners. Consider a remark by Jim Clarkson, a member of the 1980 Apia project team.

The most significant change [over the 1970s] is that of creating your own market. The old approach of passively sitting down and waiting for the client has gone by the board. Much of the involvement of specialists and complexity of projects is created by the consultants themselves.15

On the same point, Gordon Townsend, team leader for the Aramoana smelter environmental impact assessment, notes "we're starting to tell the client what we're going to do, not waiting to hear the client tell us".16 This is reinforced in Third World countries by the dilemma Rondinelli refers to.

Governments of developing nations are caught in a dilemma: successful project execution requires high levels of management skill, yet one of the major characteristics of nearly all underdeveloped countries is inadequate administrative capacity.17

A number of consequences follow this, all of which enhance the influential role of practitioners. Given the escalation in international investment flows, securing what are called 'bankable projects' has become extremely competitive. Indeed, "there is no shelf of projects waiting to be funded. Even the very ideas for projects are occasionally in short supply".18 Practitioners eschew any suggestion that their initiative simply reflects a commercially fuelled imperative. Paul Chesterman, who works throughout South-east Asia and the Pacific, said, "It's just that there's too much push from the funding agencies, they're pouring the money in. And so what do we do? We write the brief [TOR]".19

Allied with this, funding agencies and government authorities in both the First and Third Worlds are faced with constant changes in priorities, contracting procedures and

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14. Project Files. 22.10.70 and 22.1.71.
15. Interview. 10.12.82, Auckland.
19. Interview. 27.11.82, Auckland, Transcript. Consider the remark by Callan of ADAB to the JCPA (1983. 358). "Tanzania has of the order of 40 significant donors giving aid and of the order of a hundred NGOs [non-governmental organisations] .... There is a certain convergence amongst the donor community as to what constitutes good or effective development assistance. Donors do compete with each other on the ground to get those projects which they would see as being good development assistance ... a few years ago we had evidence that the Tanzanian government received 250-odd program planning missions".
requirements for project design, appraisal and evaluation. Although Fiji’s Central Planning Office was unable to formulate specific details for its original request, NZ’s External Aid Division staff acknowledge they too have “little or no effective control over consultants”. One official made the following marginal notation to an early draft of Morrison, Coles and Ball’s 1980 Report, “We are not at the present time in a position to criticise the consultants on the basis that their costs and resource demands are too great. We are not in a position to know for sure”. Furthermore, at the practitioner’s suggestion, some time prior to the report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had appointed a power engineer to the Fijian line agency responsible for appraising the Somosomo proposal. This was “to assist the Fiji authorities to assess proposals”. This Memorandum continued, “Although the decision will be based on an objective evaluation, the presence of a NZ engineer will ensure [the consultant] every opportunity to present their case favourably”. Placing expatriates in line agency positions has been one response to the dilemma Rondinelli refers to. Frequently this enhances the practitioner’s influence vis-à-vis host country interests. Indeed, referring to the “thickening seam of white faces as you approach the top”, Sheppard’s remark is not far off the mark. “The reins of the country may be in black hands, but it is a white man’s voice that whispers in the driver’s ear”.

The rapid increase in investment flows, the institutional demands that projects be ‘languaged’ (appraised, designed, contracted and implemented) in particular ways, and the dilemma faced by politicians and bureaucrats result, if by default only, in the delegation of critical responsibilities to practitioners. Frequently over sixty-five per cent of the final cost (let alone the character) of an average project is committed during feasibility study stages. Once past this stage, it becomes extremely difficult (and costly) to undo or alter the momentum of earlier precedents.

Determining the Product: ‘To be finalised on receipt of your comments’
The practitioner’s influence does not rest simply on the ‘politics of initiative’. Opportunism succeeds in part by ‘being in the right place at the right time’ and creating a project to suit your needs. But these initiatives would amount to nothing if they were not undertaken in a context characterised by a belief in the ‘professional promise’. On this point an Asian Development Bank evaluation officer bemoaned the fact that there is a tendency to rank their opinions higher simply because they are consultants. One view given me today was that because the consultant was a reputable firm of long standing, it should not be criticised. Here [reading from an internal

23. Project files, no date.
memo], this says ‘... it would therefore be unfair to comment in this way’. Practitioners actively encourage this reluctance (or perceived incapacity) to scrutinise their work by their definitions of what practice entails. “The limits of objective analysis”, notes one text, “should be left to appropriate professionals to define and should not be left to the uninformed opinions of pretentious savants who do not have the requisite professional training”.

In view of the practitioner’s influence, the caveat, ‘To be finalised on receipt of your comments’ which is customarily appended to reports, is ironically an accurate indication of the limited extent to which others can have effect.

It would be misleading to see the practitioner’s influence in terms of their pecuniary or professional interests alone. Their authority may be invoked to further the substantive claims of others as well. This is most readily illustrated by the way various techniques like cost-benefit analysis are invoked in project politics. Broadly speaking, “it is possible to use economics to justify almost anything one wants to by adjusting rates of return or discount rates or by varying which costs are included and which internalised”. But there is an important sense in which the power of the professional promise is not derived from the actual results of the techniques or methods as such. Rather, the essence of the promise lies in the legitimacy of the process that practitioners are said to go through. Consider Van Houten and Goldman’s conclusion.

Does it make sense ... for power brokers to employ experts in political struggles? Probably, whether the final report is unexpectedly too objective or downright poor may present only temporary problems. The legitimacy of the consulting process will only be marred in those cases when (and if) the product gets careful and wide scrutiny by the ‘wrong’ people. Otherwise the process can legitimate whatever was initially intended.

Events during 1980 on the Somosomo project illustrate the subtleties of this process. Recall David Coles’ remark that ‘Somosomo had political sex appeal’. For diplomatic reasons, NZ was committed to funding a pilot project of this kind in Fiji. In effect this meant for Paul Chesterman, author of the 1977 Feasibility Study of three possible sites, “we had to change our report to say they were economic and that was so obvious it should be on the file”.

27. Erickson (1979, 209). 
28. Fitzsimmons (1982, 173) Cf. Silver (1975, 11) “Every slight variation in the methods of analysis and calculation will affect the results of the analysis and without any intentional bias at all a great variety of outcomes are usually possible and plausible”. 
29. Van Houten and Goldman (1981, 482). Emphasis added. Gerardo Sicat, former Philippines Minister of Economic Planning (1979) provides an anecdote on this theme. “There was a time when I was reviewing the work of a consulting group and I did review their analysis of the industrial sector of the Philippines. I was fascinated by some of the tables that were presented and upon cross-examination, I tried to rework the numbers. I discovered to my great surprise that the table was constructed out of a sheer belief that identification numbers for industries meant more than just identification numbers. The consultant had added up the ISIC known as International Standard Classification Numbers, got the percentage distribution and some nice information that government and other decision makers should be impressed with. Well, I was not as innocent as that” (Sicat, 1979, 192). 
30. Interview, 27.11.82. Auckland. Transcript.
By 1980 however circumstances had changed. External Aid Division had some cause to regret previous efforts to 'make the numbers speak'. In terms of a new interest in less infrastructurally oriented projects, Somosomo had become slightly anachronistic. Moreover, about the time of the 1980 contract, they realised, with some embarrassment, that more had been spent on consultant fees than the total estimated capital cost of the project. Given previous commitments however, External Aid Division officials knew that 'if we were to say 'No' on the Somosomo scheme, then we needed pretty good grounds. Therefore we called for an independent assessment on both engineering and economic concerns'.

The usual recourse in these circumstances would entail a full cost-benefit analysis applied in a 'hard-nosed', but legitimate, manner. Strictly applied, costs can be made to dwarf benefits. Costs are 'hard' and predominantly current phenomena. In this case they would include construction costs, compensation claims, consultant and contractor fees, foreign exchange shadow costs and capital opportunity costs. Benefits, on the other hand, are less easily determined since they are predominantly realised in the future. Moreover, analysis must show a clear line of causality between the project and certain beneficial future events (like 'arresting rural to urban migration', 'improving school performance' or 'commercial productivity') which is difficult in most circumstances. In short, for benefits to be ascribed the same status as the ready 'facts' of costs, there must be the political will to do so. However, the TOR did not call for cost-benefit analysis. External Aid Division realised that a 'full consideration of costs and benefits' would have been seen for what it was, that is, the transparent use of cost-benefit analysis for political advantage.

As mentioned previously, the TOR for the 1980 investigation placed great stress on social equity considerations. In short, this meant that electricity tariffs should be designed with the financial capacity of domestic users in mind. On this basis research established that in order to have a viable initial electricity load, tariffs would need to be considerably less than those currently required by the FEA who were to operate the scheme. Reflecting the social equity considerations, the Morrison, Coles and Ball report designed an appropriate tariff structure and, through a novel but economically sound method of project accounting, demonstrated that the project was viable.

External Aid Division endorsed this report. They argued that while the needs of commercial enterprises were legitimate, serious consideration of social equity demanded this departure from normal economic practice. They appeared committed to a project which efficiently and economically reconciled 'growth with equity'. The final decision now lay with Fiji authorities.

32. Interview, 23.11.82, Wellington.
33. Cost accounting for commercial electricity schemes requires that tariffs cover: generation and transmission capital costs; system operation and maintenance expenditure; distribution and management costs; and capital servicing charges (including interest, loan redemptions and depreciation charges). A balance of revenue must also provide a reserve against unforeseen operating costs and contribute to capital expenditure for system expansion. The 1980 Report argued that since Somosomo was an aid project, capital amortisation costs and commercial rates of depreciation did not apply. Cf. Porter (1980c, 39)
FEA had to decide whether to vary their Dominion-wide tariff structures to account for the Somosomo case. This action lay within their authority. The report made it clear that without the recommended tariffs, the FEA, a public corporation, would reap unjustifiable profits in excess of sixty per cent of their normal margin. Moreover, Dominion-wide tariffs would lead to reduced electrical load since few domestic users could afford to consume. Consequently, electricity unit costs would climb and nullify the scheme's overall viability.

The proposed accounting method was however quite at odds with comparable techniques used by the FEA. In their eyes this precedent would jeopardise the commercial rationality of their Dominion-wide operation. The effect, quietly anticipated by External Aid Division and the consultants, was that FEA rallied against the scheme. Their General Manager, in a statement quite at odds with his previous vigorous promotion of the scheme, recommended to the Fiji government that the scheme should not proceed on the basis that electricity was not a 'justifiable' expenditure of aid monies in view of Fiji's other pressing developmental priorities.34

Project Reports: The Context and Situation of Practice
A cynical view is that development practice is about the production (and shelving) of reports. The character of project reports provides a useful means of summarising previous points and a background to the next section.

Almost regardless of the project or stage of investigation, project reports follow a standard format. There is commonly a short statement of project purpose, the objectives, and then either in appendix or summary form, a review of the TOR. A short statement of geography follows, "Taveuni is the third largest island in the Fiji group and is located approximately 8 kilometres to the south of Vanua Levu ..." before an introduction to the economy and various statements from the relevant National Development Plan attesting to the appropriateness or timeliness of the project. What follows depends on the particular mandate of the report - for instance, financial appraisal, options and opportunity costing, or transmission design. Most reports are distinctively similar in three other respects. Generally, aside from essentially cosmetic modifications, the efficacy of the project is largely taken for granted. Second, they express unacknowledged presumptions about the social and political realities of the project's context. Third, project reports are similar in the way initial substantive goals are displaced or at least become disconnected from the matters which constitute the main body of the report.

There are at least four reasons for these attributes. Firstly, practitioners have a distinctive orientation to their work (Chapter 3). The 1970s' debates led to widespread recognition of the need for extensive involvement of intended beneficiaries in the development process. In part, Somosomo's social equity considerations reflected this. Against this however is the practitioners' view that development is something done by one group to

34 Project files. 24.3.81.
another: an attitude which observers have labelled 'heteronomy'. The ability to make an authoritative judgement lies with the practitioner and it is difficult for them to see how ‘extensive involvement’ of others can be anything but prejudicial to their efforts. However, the difficulties of heteronomy lie much deeper than this, as will be seen in the next chapter. It was self-evident for the creators of the Somosomo project that “rural electrification is an essential link in development”. By such metaphors, the beneficiaries' needs were defined long before this particular project began. The practitioners saw their task in terms of appraising a particular site and technology that would fulfill this self-evident need, efficiently and effectively. The prevalent remark, ‘I’d written half my report on the plane’ is at least metaphorically accurate.

Secondly, the limited appreciation of what might be called 'alternative authorities' also reflects the 'geographic' or situational constraints of practice. An informed and reflective analysis takes a great deal of local knowledge and shrewd assessment. Much has been said about how practitioners’ cultural, class or educational background constrains their close identification with the people with whom the professional is said to share a ‘subtle social contract’. Perhaps more significant are the time-frames and circumstances of practice. The socio-economist assigned to Somosomo in 1980 initially indicated that eight weeks fieldwork would be required. With David Coles’ remark, “I could walk around the island and talk to every bloody native in that time”, this was whittled down to two weeks, with more “if necessary later”. Once there, rarely does the practitioner move beyond expatriate circles, people met in expensive hotels, on the roadside, or those progressive farmers, merchants, men, teachers, officials or others sufficiently interested or capable of bridging the social distance.

A third feature of practice also conditions the character of reports. Those who employ practitioners are aware of their pecuniary interests and that “they introduce a layer of interests” into the project in addition to those of client, official agencies or beneficiaries. After the Somosomo experience, one External Aid Division official remarked “we have learnt to be more hard-nosed”. In order to increase their control over practitioners, investors have begun to ‘rationalise’ selection, contracting and monitoring procedures. The Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB), for instance, has initiated comprehensive screening procedures. Reflecting on this, the head of ADAB’s Agents, Consultants and Experts Section remarked that in the mid-70s the proposals and practices of consultants “were all over the place”. In other words, proposals for work reflected many different conceptions and analyses of the relevant problem and approaches to design, planning and implementation. The approach, he said, “depended on individuals which is a totally inappropriate way of

41. Interview, 23.12.82, Wellington. Transcript.
doing anything rationally". Now, after the rationalisation of procedures, reports and approaches are "very similar". This is hardly surprising since practitioners have clearly "got the picture of what's required". One consequence is that TORs are frequently limited to project-specific technicalities. In the Somosomo case this was reinforced by its 'political sex appeal'. It was clear that the major beneficiaries were likely to be commercial interests (the hotels and copra estates) and that gross inequalities in land-ownership and access to capital were the primary 'developmental constraints'. When this was related to a local Fiji government official, he remarked, "Say that and you'll be shown the door". Paul Chesterman pointed out that the TOR "made no reference to such matters, and neither do previous reports", but that it did state "... you shall be expected to maintain at all times a standard of conduct that shall not bring discredit ... or impair the value, or usefulness ...".

A fourth point concerns the 'function' or purposes which the practitioner intends to serve by producing a report. It is the case, as we have seen, that practitioners may have private purposes which are not automatically in accord with the project's explicit substantive goals. Options are 'selected and sorted': but this may not simply be designed to serve pecuniary interests. Rather, given the time constraints and 'geography' of practice it is often an attempt to cut through the confusion and inadequacies of information by imposing an order which is consistent with one's own definition of the situation.

It is common to find reviews of project documents by outside agencies - such as non-governmental groups, academics, or advocates of special interests. Quite naturally, they focus on the report's adequacy or on the matters which remain undisclosed. Their aim is to correct inadequacies in a manner that suggests the report's meaning lies in its being a 'technical' document. While the report may be formally understood in this way, it is doubtful whether this is the only or even primary meaning it has for practitioners. Practitioners see themselves at the centre of a web of confused and conflicting interests. Their instructions make no reference to these conflicts, although it is implicitly expected they will resolve them. The uncertainty this creates in actual practice has been exacerbated by attempts in the 1970s to include various social, political and environmental considerations in projects. The earlier logic of 'economic growth leads to development' was attractive in part because of the simple causality this provided at the operational level. The added uncertainty in contemporary practice is not simply due to the fact that current techniques are unable to reliably incorporate diverse variables: rather it reflects the fact that the new variables express conflicting political interests. Regardless of the substantive values in conflict, in practice the situation is confused. One World Bank Department director was reputed to remark in the late 1970s, "I don't know what the hell the goals are, but I'm moving ahead with projects". An ADAB officer similarly reports "The situation is very confused.

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42. Interview. 22.10.82, Canberra.
44. Ibid. and Project files, April. 1980.
45. Cf. Coffey and Partners Ltd (1983) submission to the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program.
46. Quoted in Moss (1978, 94).
Overall, there is no standard, clear line of approach to spell out what are the objectives .... It is hit and miss. It is a bit here, it is a bit there .... Over a period of time you simply lose policy coherence and that is precisely what has happened". 47

The tendency is indeed to 'move ahead with projects', thereby passing the uncertainty in rhetoric on to the practitioners. Based on previous experience, and however short, the practitioner's engagement with the parties which hold conflicting interests, the practitioner is aware that there are certain methods of analysis and even wording of statements which constitute the 'bottom line' acceptable to most groups. Certainty is never assured, since unlike other groups, the practitioner's power rests on persuasion rather than on coercion or bureaucratic and political fiat. By presenting a report, the practitioner ensures that the direction of discussion will most likely occur through the ideas, structure and language of this vehicle which is 'to be finalised on receipt of your comments'.

The conservative effect this has on the character of reports (and so projects) ought to be clear. Practitioners will tend to move as quickly as possible toward the technical specifics of a project. Here they can deal more readily with 'the facts', that is, enhance their authority. The broader substantive issues incorporated in project goals and objectives are less easily referenced. This is the meaning of the practitioners' frequent remark that 'you've got to have an end point in mind'. Dwelling on broader substantive issues increases uncertainty and anxiety, because speaking with authority is less easily referenced to indisputable facts. In this light, it is understandable that broader social and political objectives become disconnected from the report's focus on technical means. Consequently, the supposed beneficiaries (the hapless referents of the broad objectives) come to be irrelevant, even nuisances to the kind of bargaining and compromise the practitioner faces.

II
MANAGING THE CONTEXT: THE APIA WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE SCHEME
I have argued that the broadened scope and increased pace of development efforts in the 1970s reaffirmed the tendency for essentially political responsibilities to be delegated to practitioners. This includes the initiation of projects, the determination of their focus and character, and the processes of bargaining and compromise through which the benefits and costs of development are assigned to various groups. This trend is politically conservative in many important respects. Chapter Five will explore this further through the theme 'de-authoring' outlined in Chapter Three.

The broadened scope also increased the attention paid to development management. In part, this reaffirmed earlier views that development was essentially a 'management problem'. This was made more explicit however. The 1969 Pearson Commission for instance argued that an expanded effort needed to be backed at all levels by improved

47. Vale (Development Assistance Officers Association) to JCPA (1983. 453)
management.\textsuperscript{48}

The realities of two previous development decades sorely tested the early optimism. Rather than prompting a re-examination of the basic tenets of practice, the difficulties encountered led to a re-emphasis on the post-World War II emphasis on order and stability. With this need taken for granted, the 'real difficulties' remain simply "the result of the accumulation of seemingly prosaic problems".\textsuperscript{49} The practitioner's efforts needed support by cohesive project management and more sophisticated techniques of project appraisal and evaluation.

Calls for 'more efficient and effective management' were manifested in three aspects of project practice. The broadened scope led to a proliferation of project elements such as health and education, in addition to infrastructure and agricultural production. In many cases each element was further disaggregated into research, training, administration, extension, or marketing components. The popularity of 'integrated' rural development projects in the late 1970s illustrates the \textit{horizontal} dimension of project management. Alongside this occurred increasing \textit{temporal} differentiation in project management. Whereas projects were once distinguished according to identification, design and implementation stages, management now involves control of up to thirteen specific stages. Figure 4.1 illustrates the project cycle used for project management by ADAB.

\textbf{Figure 4.1 Project Planning and Management Cycle: Australian Development Assistance Bureau}

12. Follow-up Analysis and Action

11. Project Evaluation

10. Output Diffusion and Transition to Normal Administration

9. Project Completion or Termination

8. Project Supervision and Monitoring

Project management was also more closely integrated with higher levels of development administration. Procedures to enhance \textit{vertical} control were designed to integrate

\textsuperscript{48} Pearson (1969)

\textsuperscript{49} JCPA (1983, 13)
projects (and each element) with broader programs at sectoral, national, and by accumula-
tion, international levels. Summarising this dimension, one practitioner said, "The move is
from packages [seeds, fertiliser, credit, for example] in projects, to bundles of programs". 50

At least two effects were intended by proponents of project management. First, it was
hoped that vertical linkages would increase the control international investors had over
project-specific activities. This would by-pass or at least neutralise the political and
idiosyncratic 'obstacles' that were seen to contribute to the 'accumulation of prosaic
problems'. Second, this control would enable international standards in project design,
contracting and overall performance to be universally applied. Both effects it was hoped
would enhance order and stability and thereby reduce the uncertainties facing investors.

The Apia water supply and sewerage project is an instructive example to begin
exploring the consequences of this institutional rationalisation. The Apia case is in many
respects a traditional 'enclave' project. In other words, it is a single-purpose project
focusing on infrastructural services. The links between activities to achieve this purpose and
the broader social and political consequences of interest here are more easily traced than
with multi-purpose, integrated projects. The fairly specific and narrow mandate of this
project can be linked with the wide-ranging management and control precipitated by
rationalisation. In particular, the theme 'managing the context' focuses on the implications
of particular standards of technical rationality for the social context of the project.

A 'Bankable' Project and Fa'a Samoa

Like the Somosomo project, the 1970s shifts in development thinking were also reflected in
the Apia project. In the Somosomo case, the 1970's concern with 'the social factor' was
expressed in social equity considerations. In the Apia case, this concern grew more from
recognition that unless 'social factors' were taken into account, any project would be
obstructed or even sabotaged before it began. Mindful of how many previous reports had
met this fate, and the sense of urgency conveyed by public health authorities, the five
member Merton, Curtis and Parker team were acutely aware of the 'social factor' in 1980.
From the beginning, considerable efforts were made to impress upon the team those aspects
of the External Aid Division TOR referring to local autonomy, participation and the
protection of cultural practices. The investigation team included a marine biologist and a
sociologist. The former reflected Samoan sensitivities about the consequences of sewerage
disposal near ocean reefs. The sociologist's responsibility included identification of
'culturally appropriate' water and sewerage technologies, a health education programme, and
formulation of a plan whereby project construction would not be disrupted by protracted
compensation claims or negotiations for pipe laying and reservoir easements. The consul-
tants were also instructed to maximise local participation in project construction. On all
points, experience from other similar projects underscored the importance of certain substan-
tive values for realising technical purposes. It has often been said that Western Samoans
face the modern world with an unshakeable faith in fa'a Samoa, the Samoan way of life.

50. Interview, 17.2.84, Canberra.
Political control and authority is still largely exercised through traditional lineage. The project had to be 'institutionalised', that is, integrated within fa'a Samoa, at all stages in order to encourage community and local agency responsibility for the scheme.

In addition to the objective of improving "the social and economic welfare of the residents of Apia", the practitioners were instructed to prepare "a proposal to be presented to an as yet unidentified funding agency for the purpose of obtaining a loan or grant for the implementation of the scheme". 51 Previous reports, it was said, had failed to be enacted both because of their insensitivity to fa'a Samoa and their failure to produce a 'bankable' project. Merton, Curtis and Parker were expected to incorporate all of the relevant demands of likely funding agencies. Accordingly, the NZ External Aid Division's TOR advised, "the consultants are required to carry out this commission at all times as expeditiously as possible and in accordance with the highest standards of good engineering practice". 52 In line with this aim,

All materials and equipment ... shall be ... the very best of their respective kinds ...
All nails and spikes shall be the best available ...
All pipe laying shall be carried out by people experienced and qualified ...
Bedding to concrete pipes shall be granular ... with the following grading ...

Engineering standards were supplemented with universal code requirements for fire fighting water pressures; project construction required certain rates of capital disbursement; scheme operation had to perform according to certain acceptable procedures of monitoring, financial control and legislative responsibility.

A Rolls-Royce Scheme
Two distinct consequences of the emphasis on the standards required for a bankable project will be considered here. First, the 'standards' approach affected the way in which the problem was defined and solutions proposed. The problem was conceived in technical terms and indisputable first-order linkages, that is, infectious diseases and industrial wastes. In part this reflected the conventions established by the engineers' education and the momentum of previous reports which had approached the problem in the same way. The previous section also suggested some reasons why projects quickly become defined in relatively narrow technical terms. The emphasis on a bankable project however was of particular importance. The standard procedures of appraisal, design, or financial analysis effectively bound the approaches a practitioner can adopt. Paul Chesterman from the Somosomo project, drew on the following analogy to explain the consequences of vertical integration.

In the old days a greater proportion of time was spent in designing according to the particulars of the situation. For instance in hydro studies, you designed the machine [hydro electric, civil and mechanical works] to fit the river bank. Now you're more inclined to find the site to fit, or make it fit, the machine. That way you can keep your man-months down and make yourself appear more favourable at

52. Project files. 12.2.80.
the bottom line.\textsuperscript{53}

The investor's interests in maintaining control have a profound effect on the latitude or scope available to the practitioner. Discussing the Apia project, an External Aid Division official remarked.

A good project is, I suppose, one that's slightly different among its identical similars. A strange one is a real problem, although it may be creative, innovative, because we really don't know how to control it. that is, we don't know what to expect.\textsuperscript{54}

In fact, a technically rational project, one that is predictable in its consequences and readily controlled, is considered a primary reason why practitioners are employed. An Asian Development Bank official brought this out in no uncertain terms.

The whole tendency, even objective, of employing consultants is to convert all possible systems into a stereotypical view. So its not surprising that reports, country programs, all look much the same .... You just have to sing the song the Bank wants.\textsuperscript{55}

When Merton, Curtis and Parker's report was presented to the Western Samoan government in 1980, it drew immediate condemnation. Its technical recommendations regarding the scheme were unexceptional and need no further review here (see Chapter Two). The Western Samoan authorities claimed it was "a Rolls-Royce scheme when a Ford will do", and demanded a review of "the considerable detailed calculations" on which Merton, Curtis and Parker's proposal was based.\textsuperscript{56} Mark Curtis, the investigation team leader, responded that such a request was 'unethical' and argued that the cost and scope was inevitable. "If the proposal is to achieve what it sets out to do, which is to provide the population of Apia urban area with a safe drinking water system and adequate sanitation methods, there is virtually no scope for a reduction in standards".\textsuperscript{57} Later scrutiny of these calculations by independent authorities vindicated his claim. The practitioners had begun with the required standards of a bankable project, and 'efficiently and professionally' applied the appraisal design techniques.

The message in the Rolls-Royce metaphor is well known in development practice. An anecdote related by one practitioner sums up this dilemma well and deserves quoting at length.

Let me tell you about these bloody appraisal standards. I talked to the Deputy Chief Minister in Sarawak the other day, a bloke I went to varsity with. He said to me that quite frankly there's got to be a rebellion against the pressure the major agencies apply. He said, 'Look, why is it that if you look at development in New Zealand you people started off with gravel roads and you had timber-trestle bridges. But', he said 'why is it that when I go to get a loan for a gravel road from the Bank I'm told that I've got to have concrete bridges and asphalt roads to satisfy the provisions of the Bank and their rate of return requirements? Then my

\textsuperscript{53} Interview, 27 11 82. Auckland. Transcript.

\textsuperscript{54} Interview, 22 12 82. Wellington. Transcript.

\textsuperscript{55} Interview, 24 9 83. Manila.

\textsuperscript{56} Project files, 3 10 80.

\textsuperscript{57} Project files, 15 10 80.
supervisors say, we're getting so much demand for concrete that we better set up a cement plant’. So where he started out looking for road money he's involved in getting loans for a whole list of things and new skilled people both to get the money and run the things. 'I've got to remember who I'm elected by', he said. 'I've got to remember that I'm elected by those guys who still live down the river in a long house'. You know, that jungle of jargon hides so many things.58

The Merton, Curtis and Parker report, strictly speaking, was not 'just another report'. It did result in funding agency interest and further reports. But at time of writing, scheme implementation has not begun. To explain some of the reasons for this it is necessary to consider the question of fa'a Samoa again, and other meanings conveyed in the Rolls-Royce metaphor.

The process whereby broader substantive interests or objectives of projects become disconnected from and then eclipsed by the demanding technical considerations has been described. The 1970s saw attempts to overcome this by appointing sociologists, or as their engineering colleagues called them 'conscience-men', to project teams. It is commonplace today to find reports specifically dealing with the social and cultural dimensions of projects. The participation of a sociologist in the 1980 Apia investigations was intended to produce a scheme that integrated both the technical rationality of standards and other strictures of bankable projects with the substantive rationality of fa'a Samoa.

Two general points can be made from this experience. Technically rational conceptions of practice presume that any problem can be fragmented into various specialisms. Then, having accomplished the necessary research, the results can be entered into an overall equation, and subsequently 'solved' for a bankable project, in the sense of differential mathematics. More will be said about the consequences of this view later. Here it is sufficient to observe that the increasing fragmentation of specialisms to deal with the added variables has not been matched by an increased competence to solve the equation. On reflection the Apia investigation practitioners were acutely aware of what had happened.

Increasingly, fewer people have an idea of the whole deal. The old engineer used to just be able to stick his finger up to guage if it was 'on' or 'off'. Now everyone's fitting into boxes and somehow the project manager's supposed to put the plus signs in the right places. And I don't care what you say, it takes a pretty special bloke to do that.59

In the Apia case, it might be concluded that that special person was not present. We would need also to enquire into the relative authority of the various specialisms involved in terms of their supposed 'factual' referents. Nevertheless, there is another sense in which the Rolls-Royce metaphor helps explain the Western Samoan reaction.

58. Interview. 16.12.82. Wellington. Transcript.
59. Interview. 28.11.82. Auckland. Transcript.
Standards and 'Local Influences'

Recall that the acceptance and implementation of the proposed project hinged on the maximisation of community participation in technology selection, in construction labour and in overall scheme control according to traditional practices. In short, the 'urgent challenge' expressed in the TOR could not be met without explicit attention to the scheme's substantive dimensions. For the practitioners there clearly was a sense of urgency to 'get something done'. But the immediate task in terms of their brief was to create a bankable project, not to protect the substantive rationality of fa'a Samoa. Nevertheless, this was not just a matter of emphasis. Rather, it is useful to consider how the institutional requirements of a bankable project were actually in tension with other substantive objectives.

First, investors will only extend funds if the project activities are undertaken in a controlled and orderly institutional context. In the first instance, this requires certainty. The Merton, Curtis and Parker report noted that existing 'water management' largely involved fragmented responsibilities based on traditional authority. This, it concluded, "does not make for the most efficient operation of the undertaking. We believe that the implementation of the proposed scheme is an appropriate time to institute a more suitable single organisation". Scheme control could only be effective if the overall context in which it fitted was 'effectively managed', that is, formally rational. It was therefore logically necessary to have "someone remote from local influences in overall control".

These institutional arrangements furthermore needed insulation from the vagaries of traditional politics. The key expression here was "there is insufficient legislative support for the successful carrying out of the work or its subsequent operations and maintenance". The report therefore found an urgent need for "a system of controls of water resources" including catchment control (of customary land), reconciling competing water use demands, and the drafting of legislation to provide "stringent control". This included a Water Act, Sewerage Act, Water Resources Act, and amendments to the Taking of Lands Act, 1964.

Second, the TOR insisted that particular attention be given to Samoan water use practices and the social and economic situation of potential users in order to design an 'appropriate' scheme. Existing levels of water usage were known to be excessive. In part this was due to unlocated breaks in underground water pipes and the general deterioration of the system, but it also reflected Samoan women's practice of leaving standpipes running. In part this was to flush through materially contaminated water, but more so it was in keeping with a strong cultural preference for 'running' as opposed to 'standing' water. Furthermore, research concluded that people in areas of highest risk from infected water and inadequate sewage systems were also those least able to financially contribute to the proposed service.

In order to maintain the 'commercial integrity' of the proposed scheme - that is, one that could become operationally self-financing - the report's authors were forced to conclude that, regardless of financial position, all individuals would be legally required to be connected

60. Project report. April. 1980
61. Project report. April. 1980
and contribute financially to the scheme. Existing household water use practices could no longer be tolerated. International per capita water use standards required significant reductions in use, reinforced by "adequate penal provisions [so that] the position can be kept within tolerable limits". In both cases, compulsory connection and water demand legislation needed the backing of political will to overcome the "lack of enforcement and a tendency to give precedence to the traditional standing of individuals".

Finally, given the financial disbursement rate required by potential investors, the project construction schedule was considered beyond local capacity. Opportunities for local labour participation were restricted, again by required standards.

A further matter bearing on this subject is the desired standard of construction .... A high degree of organisation, skill, and experience down to a relatively low level in the construction team is, in our opinion, a necessity ... and we firmly believe that international tenders should be called for this work.

Summary

In this chapter I have illustrated two sides of the coin which is development practice and thereby set the context for further analysis. Whether to serve pecuniary interests or simply the need to impose order and control on an increasingly chaotic work environment, practitioners have become extremely influential. In itself, however, this aspect I have highlighted through the Somosomo case says little about project practice. Project practice occurs in a context where the institutional imperatives of 'bankable' projects, standards and efficiency mediate this influence. As the Apia case illustrated, these strictures may, in the overall picture, seem entirely reasonable, and yet lead to a variety of unforeseen consequences. In other words, both cases indicate how the substantively rational personal and political interests in development are affected by the technical rationality of project appraisal, design, and implementation. But both cases dwell primarily on the overt, and therefore more idiosyncratic character of project politics and do not indicate the more fundamental ways in which a development malaise is sustained and reproduced.

CHAPTER 5
TECHNIQUES OF PRACTICE

Chapter Four illustrated two aspects of 'rationalisation as an historic trend', that is, the first of three analytic proportions. This chapter maintains these themes, but gives special attention to propositions regarding the 'transformation of political life' and 'de-authoring'. This takes the analysis a step further. I investigate how the development malaise is sustained and reproduced by the techniques, procedures and concepts employed in project practice.

Three cases are used to accomplish this. Section I explores three interrelated sub-themes of the proposition 'transformation of political life', via the Aramoana aluminium smelter project, by focusing on a two-year period from December 1979 to December 1981. Particular attention is given to the way in which reliance on social cost-benefit analysis effectively limited the horizons of political debate and thereby impoverished the process through which the substantive interests of the wider public were incorporated into development practice.

Section II uses the Taranaki petrochemicals projects to continue these sub-themes but gives closer attention to the proposition regarding 'de-authoring' of the social and natural worlds implied by rationalisation. The section presents something of the paradox of contemporary development practice. The 1970s saw increased interest in the social or human dimensions of development. In part, interest in 'participation' and the 'social factor' reflected concern over excessive focus on the technical and material efficiencies of projects and the comparative neglect of non-material interests. The means whereby this concern was incorporated into practice however gave rise to certain paradoxical consequences. Section II examines three techniques and methods commonly employed to 'incorporate the social factor': survey research, social impact monitoring, and participatory planning tribunals.

Section III takes the analysis to a final stage. Here I use the Zamboanga del Sur Development Project to illustrate how the development malaise is sustained by the metaphors and language of development practice.

I
RESTRUCTURING REALITY: THE ARAMOANA SMELTER

Proposals for industrial development at Aramoana have a lengthy history. Throughout the 1970s invitations had been extended by the national government and local authorities to transnational corporations to establish metals smelting and petrochemicals projects. A wide salt-marsh, the Aramoana site was favoured by a deep harbour, a skilled labour force in close
proximity and the unabashed support of business interests in the economically depressed Otago region. But these invitations were unsuccessful. Against these attractions investors had to weigh the determined opposition of residents in communities adjacent to the harbour entrance site. And, prior to 1979, the absence of special 'fast track' legislation increased the likelihood of lengthy litigation.

When South Pacific Aluminium Ltd. (SPAL) expressed their interest early in 1979, they drew a sharp and immediate protest from these communities. In this section I examine the character of this opposition over the period prior to formal confirmation of the site in December 1980, the publication of SPAL's Environmental Impact Report (EIR) in June 1981 and, thereafter, the public submission and audit procedures undertaken by New Zealand's Commission for the Environment.

**Early Concerns**

Although SPAL's proposal drew swift condemnation (as well as support), early public concerns were characteristically 'unstructured'. That is, rather than being expressed in terms of the quasi-scientific categories of public media, such as 'ecological balance', 'community cohesion' or 'economic risk', local protest largely drew on the mundane language of everyday life. There were of course individuals anxious about the national 'political economy' issues associated with the involvement of Alusuisse, a Swiss transnational corporation, in the smelter consortium. In this vein, the project was disparagingly linked with 'foreigners', 'the IMF', with 'Swiss bank accounts' or 'the Americans'. For some it typified "the economic, and I'm afraid, political and social subservience" of New Zealand.¹ Local opponents regularly drew on nation-wide controversy over the government's 'Think Big' development strategy and the concentration of executive power legitimated by this. As a respondent to one of many community radio talk-backs remarked, "I suppose it is another example of the modern golden rule in action, those who have the gold make the rules."² Another felt "the National government resembles a political bikie gang hell-bent on punching the electorate into insensibility".³

The smelter proposal involved the relocation of dwellings used by some 500 people. Not surprisingly the issues were extremely personal. According to one resident "having Aramoana enabled us to keep our family together and what could be more important in today's world?"⁴ Early concern was broad-based. Residents referred to the dangers of fluoride wastes and atmospheric emissions to flora and fauna in the vicinity and to the social 'catastrophe' of relocation. But the most striking feature of public opposition is the repeated reference to what may be labelled personal, existential and spiritual concerns.

A local Maori person's concern, essentially about 'environmental' consequences, illustrates one aspect of this. "There is an octopus by the sea that thrives on industrial filth;
but the monster at Aramoana potentially devours that which has more substance, the life of the land". Poetic imagery was frequently employed to weld political statement with cultural and existential symbols. Maarire Goodall, resident of Otakou adjacent to the smelter site, wrote.

KIA WHAKA-IHIA A ARAMOANA!

Aue Papatuanuku e takoto mei!
Can you forgive us?
Your body will be desecrated by cruel erections of cabled steel towers!
Your sons have sold you for an electric rape!

Yet more men will come here from another land and trample your breasts.
They will be straddled by huge machines, they will tic tic tic tic never sick.
They are famous for keeping perfect time against the shifting tide-slap of Otakou.

Now you shall groan to the weight of great steel whales warping in to Aramoana to be fletcher-flensed.

You will shudder e Papa!
They will squeeze the glistering aluminium from your flesh like fat in electric try-pots.

Their machines will excrete clotted lumps of electrocuted earth to foul the water of Hui-koau and poison Ka-tamariki-a-Rarera.

No doubt official inspectors will inspect the floatage, but we shall never feed on the tuatua or tuangi you laid out for us on your bounteous table before the presence of our enemies.

E Papatahuaroa hear the tangi of your fosterling afraid now, and alone.

Can you still forgive us Mother now you retch at cyanide-slag even Earth cannot swallow?

From the outset, there was no shortage of eloquent statements of this kind. One local had the prescience of mind to note,

Men have often been ready to die for the right to enjoy land .... Aramoana is not simply a place, an ecosystem, a unique and precious strip of South Island littoral. Once the giant foot of Fletcher-Alusuisse [the consortium principals] is wedged across that sill, no strip of unspoilt shore, no area of New Zealand wilderness will be safe. If we flinch from making a stand and fall back from this threshold we shall lose face as a people and our future will be as a long retreat ... we see Aramoana as timeless, integral, inviolable. Those who are bedazzled by the shimmer of aluminium hear no such perspective. A giant smokestack fills their

5. Walters (1980).
minds and clouds their vision. The notion of 'trustee-ship' was a frequent theme. "For the sake of short-term gain we shall continue to despoil this country of which we are only temporary trustees" one said, whereas another likened the project to "vandalism - the wilful destruction for no material gain." In view of this, the almost unanimous community rejection of SPAL's offers of financial compensation is not surprising. Gordon Johnston, an Aramoana resident since the 1930s remarked, "You may appreciate that the words 'adequate compensation' (that is, money) constantly used by the consortium in public, are meaningless, almost insulting. No financial offer, in itself would force me to forsake our beloved Aramoana". For many people, Maori and Pakeha alike, their roots with the past were at stake. "Each tree tells a story" one said, "A wattle in the 1850s brought from England on the ship 'John Wickliffe' was given to me for safe keeping". At the heart of these concerns was constant reference to the 'feeling' of Aramoana. Shirley Cameron's submission to the Commission for the Environment's audit of the EIR expressed this well.

We 'spit-ites' [Aramoana residents] have found a special 'something' at Aramoana. What is it? We find it difficult to explain, but we do know that after being there for only a few hours we are aware of having been 'taken over' by a 'feeling' which seems to enter our very soul. It unwinds us completely and makes us feel almost in a spirit world. It is completely enveloping and wonderful. We can't expect outsiders to understand this but we all know and feel it.

Waiting on the Facts

By mid-1980 the orientation and 'language' of public debate began to shift. A national campaign linking site-specific concerns with national development issues gained considerable momentum. Alongside this came calls for a 'full and comprehensive appraisal' of the proposal. Protagonists were encouraged to 'be reasonable'. Anticipating an EIR, the Otago Manufacturer's Association for instance assured the public that "the interests of all can be accommodated by orderly, controlled and realistic weighing of all aspects" of the project. Daily editorials began to speak out against 'loud protest' in favour of effective and more efficient approaches to balancing conflicting interests. And the influential Chairman of the Otago Harbour Board, a joint sponsor of the project, remarked.

The Board will always listen to and respect the views of genuine conservationists with a reasonable approach to such issues, but it is not so impressed with those who climb on the band wagon of the Aramoana environment and wildlife lobby because of their political views on the sale of energy or the importation of foreign

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10. Cameron (1981). As another said, "These things you can't manufacture - peace and serenity, beauty and solitude."
12. E.g., Otago Daily Times, 16.1.80.
Such calls were largely inconsequential however until mid-1980 when consultants associated with the EIR and national economic appraisal of the smelter entered the fray. Gordon Townsend, leader of the twenty member team of EIR specialists continued the themes established by local advocates. "The report", he said, "will spell out the impact that the project will have on the physical, social and environmental fabric of the immediate area around the plant and region". More importantly, in view of local controversy, "The main aim of the report is not to sell the project, but to provide an independent, well-informed and objective analysis of the project and what it will mean to the area". By implication, public debate was too broad-ranging or emotional and reflected insufficient grasp of the facts. Independent and objective analysis would rectify this. Assured that "the full facts [would] be presented", the Otago Harbour Board's General Manager considered "that the anti's are riding on an emotive bandwagon at the moment, relying on the fact that no specific answers to some specific questions are available". He added that "no doubt a full EIR will prove that the smelter is quite acceptable".

At the national level, economic debate had attracted academic and consultant economists. They too looked for a 'sweeping away' of emotive concerns and distortions. Professor Paul van Moeseke of Otago University argued for an independent task force to 'look objectively' at the proposal. "The tools exist to solve these problems", he said, "so let us use them". Economic practitioners became increasingly frustrated that debate did not take sufficient account of "the world's most authoritative sources" and that "some people cannot come to grips with the ... issues, so they drag the debate down to a level they understand - like a pub brawl".

As will be shown below, the 'tools' were based on particularly sophisticated variants of social cost-benefit analysis. This focus had two immediate effects. First, a delusive harmony was promulgated between the apparently technical concerns and the common good or 'national interest'. Aluminium industry consultants argued that their recommendations did "not reflect the views of any pressure group or party concerned". The revelation that transnational corporations had been involved in drafting the special legislation whereby the 'national interest' would be adjudicated was considered unexceptional by government at the time. Substantive debate at the Parliamentary level became increasingly dependent on a small and closely interrelated group who possessed the requisite specialist skills and

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14. SPAL Press Statement, Otago Daily Times, 7.4.81. Emphasis added. These assurances were made on numerous occasions from November 1980 until the EIR publication in June 1981.
15. R.F. de Lautour, Otago Harbour Board, Press Statement, Otago Daily Times, 6.7.80. This sentiment was repeatedly backed up by SPAL's statements that: "The full facts will be presented in our EIR". J. Smith, SPAL, Press Statement, Otago Daily Times, 9.1.80.
18. T.K. McDonald, consultant to New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd., in New Plymouth Mail, 6.8.80.
knowledge. The latter was considered 'non-partisan'. The Prime Minister was encouraged by such reports and said "We've worked through it very carefully and we believe that it's for the good of the New Zealand economy, and therefore good for the New Zealand people".  

The second immediate consequence was a transformation of issues. Having defined earlier substantive concerns as subjective, parochial and emotive, the 'public's problem' became one of insufficient capacity to participate in what were presented as 'technically necessary' decisions. The Director of the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (then an aluminium industry consultant) remarked, "One of New Zealand's major problems has been and is now the insufficient understanding of economic affairs .... The result is a community unable to adequately weigh the merits of competing economic policies and unwilling to give sufficient support to essential policy changes". The 'results' of this problem are put aside until I have addressed what is implied by 'weighing the merits' via the social cost-benefit technique.

Guardians of Welfare: Cost-Benefit in Practice

With similar justifications and political consequences, variants of cost-benefit analysis feature in each of the projects drawn on in Chapters Four and Five. In practice variants of cost-benefit analysis "are sanctioned before us as scientific techniques globally applicable - here, there, and everywhere, as if they were politically and ideologically neutral and theoretically unambiguous". The comments below are therefore applicable beyond the smelter case.

The past fifteen years have seen considerable refinement of this technique. Originally cost-benefit analysis was employed to maximise efficiency within the totally managed environment of the individual firm. Later variants, collectively labelled 'social' cost-benefit analysis (SCBA), apply this logic to the societal scale.

The basic notion is very simple. If we have to decide whether to do A or not the rule is: do A if the benefits exceed those of the next best alternative course of action, and not otherwise. If we apply this rule to all possible choices we shall generate the largest possible benefits, given the constraints in which we live. And no-one could complain at that.

In line with previous remarks, the technical interests in efficiency (maximising the cost-
benefit ratio) merge on an apparently objective and impersonal ground with substantive interests (the 'largest possible benefits'). The technique is bestowed with the dignity of universal reason which it would be logically perverse and unreasonable to object to.  

SCBA explicitly recognises that project decisions have consequences for such matters as employment, consumption patterns, environmental impacts, foreign exchange availability and income distribution. Implicitly SCBA reflects the view that issues need only be reduced to common variables, re-ordered and re-shaped to maximise a common substantive purpose. As the Otago Manufacturer's Association remarked, "the interests of all can be accommodated orderly, controlled and realistic weighing of all aspects".

SCBA takes known data about project inputs and outputs and combines this with what is commonly called the 'planners objective function'. Theoretically this may be thought of as an expression of certain preferences between different states of the economy. In practice it is a statement of which economic (substantive) values (for example, full employment, or maximum GNP growth) should be maximised. This combination makes it possible to determine the most optimal allocation of resources and to identify the shadow prices essential to project decisions.

The central problem is how the objective function is to be derived and what weights are to be attributed to the variables it contains. As the authors of the UNIDO project appraisal guidelines observe, it is not just a matter of ascertaining the facts about a project's effects (although these are typically imprecise) but of obtaining the values necessary to "ascertain the meaning" of the facts. Recognition of this opens up a range of questions about how such judgements are to be made. Frequently, technical methods are employed to give the analyst privileged access to surrogates of 'true' or universal values. Most however accept that practical and ethical judgements are central, although these are commonly defended as "subjective judgements of fact". In the text-book ideal these judgements are to be solicited from the political realm. In practice however, "precision is as necessary to economic analysis as vagueness is to politicians": the realities of political life discourage systematic and quantitative expression of substantive values. Moreover it is uncommon to gain political assurance that all the ceterus paribus variables of the national economy will be confined within the bounds of the analyst's assumptions. A surrogate lies in

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25. Dasgupta et al. (1972, Chaps. 11 and 12).
26. Dasgupta et al. (1972, 13).
27. Cf. Pearce (1971, 52). "There exists, then, some set of prices called 'shadow' or 'accounting' prices, which reflect the true social opportunity costs of using resources in a particular project. These shadow prices are not necessarily observed in actual market behaviour. As their name implies, they exist rather like Plato's universals".
28. Dasgupta et al. (1972, 135) and Parrish (1978, 313).
29. Self (1975, 152). Sen (1969, 25-36) has listed the kinds of parameters politicians must provide for SCBA to proceed: 1) the relative weights to be attached to different national objectives; 2) the social rates of discount; 3) the rates of social return on investment; 4) the pattern of reinvestment and return on investment and; 5) the shadow prices of key imports. On this, Phelps-Brown (1972, 2) remarks, "Those who have to bear the responsibility for policy actually to be applied (the politicians) do not trust the systems fitted by econometricians to establish relations or coefficients on which that policy can be based".
the practitioners' assessment of society's 'revealed preferences' based on past or existing governmental policy, or some characterisation of the status quo as reflecting the national interest. Implicit in the former is the view of government being above the fray, an impartial if sometimes misguided arbiter of the common interest; whereas the latter translates what 'is' into what 'ought' to be.

These problems, however, are rarely encountered in practice. Pragmatically, it is "difficult, if not impossible in many cases to apply such a procedure under 'real world' conditions". But the primary issue is not simply that the basic substantive values are distorted or inadequately expressed in monetary terms. Recall the practitioner's 'professional promise'. The authority of techniques like SCBA does not reside in their capacity to 'get to the facts', but rather in their 'promise' to do so. When practitioners are asked (and proffer the capacity) to take everything into account, they invariably find a technique to do so. As I argue in Chapter Three, few practitioners truly expect to fully realise their promise, but practice does not reflect this. When asked, "Should this smelter proceed?" they are seldom in a position, given their 'authoritative' role, to reply 'Don't ask me, but I can help you design a procedure whereby these substantive issues can be negotiated and resolved'.

Ironically, that this "puts the initiative in the hands of project formulators and evaluators" is said to have beneficial political effects. It "ensures that all relevant alternatives are viewed by politicians", thereby "focusing choice on the relevant variables". This "forms the basis for deliberate, systematic determination of national parameters when the day finally dawns that these can be specified in advance of project formulation and evaluation". In other words, techniques like SCBA in practice foster the transformation of subjective and emotive biases into 'technically necessary' decisions.

**Constructing a Parliamentary Floorshow**

In the smelter case, reliance on this initiative had ramifications well beyond simply 'getting the facts straight' and into an appropriate discounted order. Technically rational methods like SCBA necessarily reify the basic political and economic institutions of society. Increasing reliance on the practitioner's 'tools' is in large measure attributable to tacit acceptance of a well defined set of assumptions regarding the optimal operation of 'the economy'. Of projects like the smelter we are told 'This is the way development, as a state of the economy, occurs and operates. We have certain levels of investment (in capital, infrastructure, labour, welfare) with characteristic interest rates, consumption functions and so on, which may be interlocked in the following way. Given this set of development priorities - weighted in this manner - then the decision should be ...'. The point is not that certain assumptions are made, some are of course inevitable, but that they are treated as logical

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30. Schneider (1975, 17). Cf. Self (1975, 26) and Worswick (1972, 77) that economists "are not, it seems to me, engaged in forging tools to arrange and measure actual facts so much as making a marvellous array of pretend tools which would perform wonders if ever a set of facts should turn up in the right form".

31. Dasgupta *et al.* (1972, 247, 139-140) Emphasis added.
necessities reflecting the way things naturally are because it is only in terms of these 'basic aspects' that the calculation can be accomplished. Regardless of whether these 'natural necessities' are deemed so by the public at large, the consequence is that such matters as are 'accounted for' in the model are effectively removed from public scrutiny.

On this basis, public attention from mid-1980 centred on the reports of four economists. An April report seriously questioned the smelter's national benefit, another in July countered, followed by a series of disputations until September, when each protagonist participated in a national seminar. Compared with the substance and process whereby early public concerns were articulated, this period has a number of remarkable attributes. In keeping with the authority of technical rationality an entirely new political symbolism came to the fore. One seminar participant noted his "analysis doesn't canvass all the questions that need to be raised" ("like environmental and social impacts"), since "we don't have the time or resources to go into all those sorts of things". With each protagonist presenting calculations, the 'smelter debate' became preoccupied with the relative merits of various scaling factors, discount rates, world aluminium spot market prices and marginal cost curves for electricity. Authority here was not rooted in any discourse about how their 'objective functions' were politically or ethically legitimate, but rather was referenced to 'more sensible' sources or sophisticated permutations of technique. In terms of the character of the early concerns of those most directly affected, this transformation of political discourse is a convincing reminder of Max Weber's sentiments about technical rationality's 'shallow clinical light' "before which fly poetry, faith and myth ... reason is its own justification, the legitimator of its own necessities". The substance of the early concerns was not excluded because they were considered incalculable. In this case the practitioners just 'lacked the time and resources'. As Weber said of the disenchanted world, "there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play ... one can, in principle, master all things by

32. Cf. Knutsson et al. (1979) and Wynne (1975, 125).
34. Cf. Ericksen (1981, 142). An excerpt regarding the foreign exchange content of project inputs is illustrative of the character of this new discourse.

"Mr Ellis: That $120 million, does it include the foreign exchange content of electricity?
Mr Carrie: Yes, certainly. I'm glad you mention it; 40 percent - that is the exact figure we use ... working out the foreign exchange content of these things is a big job. Luckily, the Department of Statistics do a very thorough job in working out input-output tables, and the Department of Statistics goes across the whole economy once every five years. They measure every good that goes in and out and through the economy, and it is broken down into two thousand different commodities. We have got all the material sitting on a computer and when we want to find out what the foreign exchange content is, you can work out exactly where it has gone to in the economy.
Dr Bertram: I probably don't need to tell you there are some serious errors involved in using those tables for that sort of thing.
Mr Carrie: Yes I know, too true, too true". (Ericksen 1981, 143-144).
35. MacRae (1974, 86).
calculation".36

Other matters clearly lay beyond this dominant discourse. Evidence suggested that the massive investment in hydro-generating infrastructure could be supported only by rapid disinvestment in social welfare sectors. Furthermore, how could the increasing centralisation of state and corporate power, which the smelter seemed to irrevocably confirm, be represented in the neo-classical scheme of 'This is the way the economy functions ...'?37 In effect political debate was circumscribed by a mystifying concern with the accuracy of data or the correct application of techniques and formulae.

Fundamentally, such techniques require agreement that conflicting sets of substantive values can be synthesised in a single set of equations. This 'ideology of synthesis' attempts to,

secure our subconscious agreement on the basic premises of such techniques by getting us to define political life as only about material acquisition in economic competition with others and to define ourselves as mere economic calculators pursuing these ends.38

Surrounded by the supposed neutral authority of practitioners, the transformation of issues takes the stress of accountability from controlling institutions - public and corporate. Simultaneously, for those beyond the narrow circle of initiates, comprehension becomes rapidly impossible.

Public politics is thus reduced to a parliamentary floorshow in which a media-massaged public is periodically allowed to intervene and the real politics of the society become manifest only as an impersonal and disinterested social technology.39

With these issues circumscribed, their meaning transformed and politics inaccessible, the public become estranged and, as Habermas remarked, "enjoy the status of passive subjects with only the right to withhold acclamation".40 A political cartoon of the time (below) perceptively portrayed this estrangement.

Alongside nation-wide debate, significant changes were also occurring in local action. Surveys were being commissioned to demonstrate the 'degree of public opposition'. specialists were being pushed forward to re-categorise early concerns about the smelter's atmospheric, agricultural or health impacts. Amidst the roar of acclamation and denial, a few did recognise the manner in which the process was being transformed. One expatriate, resident in Canada, had sufficient 'distance' to note "Even opponents of these projects have largely accepted as common ground the rationalist, quantitative methodology from which the 'Think Big' mentality grows".41 In different terms, a single voice in over 470 public submissions to the EIR audit remarked, "I am not a scholar, but I am f----- off attempting to

40. Habermas (1975, 37).
be the one .... I am starting to be rational, stuff it. We came to live on this Peninsula because its a beautiful place".  

For such observers their substantive expectations had been lost to a technical decision process interested in gaining the 'measure of things'. Dignity and personal esteem were important among these expectations. Joe Karetai, from Otakou Marae immediately adjacent to the smelter site, echoed the unease felt by many about the process that had evolved at a hui late in 1980.

There is a Maori word, mana. It has a far reaching influence over our Maori people. It means dignity, it means courtesy, it means correctness of procedure. ... one thing we will have is mana, you can jump up and say what you want to say. You can wave your hands around, but you do it with dignity.

The transformation that occurred in national debate I have argued was sustained and created by the reliance on econometric techniques. Local debate changed largely in accordance with the comprehensive alterations promulgated in national planning and legislative

mechanisms. But certain features of the local scene serve to summarise how the political transformations discussed above are underwritten by the specific demands and character of techniques. ‘Normative planning’ at the national level demands that the entire ‘economy’ - production, utilisation and consumption - is comprehensively managed. The smelter was one aspect of this.

In planning terms, the smelter proposal was understood as a ‘problem’ with hierarchical - site specific, local, regional and national ‘elements’ - and horizontally related elements - for example, estuarine ecology, landscape amenity, fluoride emissions or transmission line easements. To achieve a ‘proper balance’ each element needed to be categorised as a commodity and attributed with a ‘value’ commensurable with all others. Moreover, this kind of rationalisation had to be bounded according to previously agreed upon considerations as to what was a ‘reasonable’ inclusion. The EIR for instance was circumscribed horizontally (it could consider project specific impacts but not upstream effects), vertically (site, local and regional impacts, but not national, international linkages) and finally, substantively (local employment multipliers gained attention but not their socio-economic distribution). Figure 5.1 attempts to illustrate this. The same rationalisation occurred within each ‘element’. If one recalls the sense of ‘feeling’ central to early concerns, the EIR section relating to the visual/aesthetic impact of the smelter illustrates this well. First, the ‘problem’, labelled ‘landscape impact’, was fragmented.

Landscape classification systems based on landscape tracts, landscape units and landscape identity areas have a visual basis and their perception as entities is related to particular viewpoint, location, elevation and distance. To aid the attribution of objective values to landscape, it was necessary to remove its subjective dimension, that is, as much as possible of that which was not immediately available as fact. In this vein “the character of the Otago Harbour landscape [is] created by the contrast of water, land-form, vegetation and land-use activity”46. This focus on functional and supposedly objective meaning is one instance of the ‘de-authoring’ referred to in Chapter Three and which the next two sections examine in detail.

Gordon Townsend, EIR Team Leader, promised to establish what the smelter would ‘mean to the area’. Operationalising this promise required fragmentation and de-authoring in order to achieve ‘re-integration’ and balance. The following conclusion, paralleled in all other sections of the EIR, ‘naturally’ follows.

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44. These changes are more relevant in the following section. The key changes in New Zealand, not a central concern of this thesis, are discussed in Cleveland (1979, 137); Bedggood (1980, 156-165); and Palmer (1979, 77-89). Cf. OECD (1980, 75). CFE (1983, 7, Table I). and Lewthwaite and Porter (1982, 20). In planning terms, the changes were summarised in 1981 by the Minister for Energy and National Development. “Broadly speaking there are two ways to view planning. The first is ‘normative’ where a judgement is made as to what will benefit future New Zealanders and that future is consciously created. Secondly, we have ‘descriptive planning’ in which we try to provide for needs as they arise. Planning in New Zealand has traditionally been descriptive ... Now, however, we are consciously entering a new era in New Zealand, that of normative planning.” Birch (1980, 169-170). Emphasis added.


Figure 5.1 Potential versus Actual Area of Scrutiny in Impact Reporting.

The development need not be seen as an incongruent element in the landscape. While the introduction of the smelter will add a significant visual element to the landscape, the resultant change in the balance between visual elements need not be viewed as intrusive. The principal design objective will be to integrate the development into the landscape.\(^47\)

The Otago Manufacturer's Association, quoted earlier, anticipated that 'all interests could be accommodated by orderly, controlled and realistic weighing of all aspects'. Mr Pert of SPAL confidently reported that as a result of the techniques available to their team "We believe we can offer something which is comparable or better in terms of living environment to what those in the locality already have".\(^48\)

II
PARTICIPATION AND THE SOCIAL FACTOR: TARANAKI PETROCHEMICALS
"One cannot help but wonder" Clark writes, "if the rigid nature of many analytical methodologies cures problems through rearrangement and reconceptualisation rather than by addressing the issues as recognised in the political sphere".\(^49\) This remark links the themes of Sections I and II.

Chapter Two noted how the scope of development practice was broadened in the 1970s. Whether expressed in social sector lending, community development, 'basic human needs', or the advent of social impact assessment, words like 'participation' and the 'social

factor' became dominant themes in development literature. In large part, these themes were recognition of the excesses of techniques like social cost-benefit analysis. In this, many practitioners realised that "quantitative techniques have taken over, making reality invisible". While humanitarian considerations were important in this new social conscience, by and large, the practitioners' interest has been pragmatically motivated. This pragmatism arose from the following kind of attitude.

There is a recurring tendency for development studies at the present time to explain the failure of predominantly economic development plans (as most plans are), by invoking the following reason. There must have been a troublesome knob on the development machine, marked 'the human factor', which was twiddled wrongly, inadequately or not at all, and therefore, somehow, 'the non-economic variables' were left out of account.

In short, practitioners' interest in the 'social factor-participation- opinions' complex was prompted by the need to overcome obstructions to project implementation - whether in the form of community opposition to development projects or poor rates of beneficiary participation in projects ostensibly designed in their interests. In terms of overcoming opposition, Paul Chesterman remarked that the social factor needed consideration because "somewhere along the line, someone didn't want their lawn cut". And on beneficiary participation another practitioner said, "We need sociologists to convince people of the need to change their way of life". More formally, an interest in social factors arose from "the need to understand the minimum social conditions that must exist for a project to attain its goals"; therefore, "social inputs properly tailored to project resources and needs are not 'icing on the cake', but basic ingredients of successful projects and are of direct and practical use".

Taking the keywords of these remarks, this section examines three primary means whereby development practitioners have attempted to achieve the participation of the social factor. Each instance is drawn from the Taranaki petrochemicals projects. From the EIR research for the methanol plant, I make some brief remarks about survey methods. From the experience of the Taranaki Monitoring Project established by the Social Needs Action Committee with government sponsorship, I examine social impact monitoring. Finally from the National Development Act Planning Tribunals convened for both the methanol and synthetic fuels projects, the process of public participation in development planning is considered. Through the three instances, I move from the overt political consequences of rationalisation to show how the development malaise is sustained by the process of de-authoring discussed in Chapter Three.

52. Interview. 27.11.82. Auckland. Transcript.
53. K. Keeling, ADAB. Interview. 27.10.82. Canberra
Petrochemicals Development in Taranaki

In Chapter Two I have described something of the scale, local context and issues associated with decisions between mid-1980 and March 1983 to locate two major petrochemicals projects in north Taranaki. Over the twelve months prior to commencement of the methanol plant's construction (mid-1981) local concern arose over three broad issues. Increased noise levels during construction and operations became the rallying point for those living in proximity to the projects. EIRs for both projects had indicated that the large incoming construction workforce would severely tax housing and services and result in qualitatively new demands on local authorities and welfare support networks. The consequences of the plants' industrial wastes discharge for marine ecology drew intense opposition led by local Maori people's concern over the threat this posed to traditional sea and river food sources and, by implication, to tribal prestige and esteem.

In terms of participation and the social factor this experience contains interesting contradictions which are worthy of remark. It is fair to say that local participants in the EIRs and Planning Tribunals were treated to some of the worst excesses of 'invoking the technique' discussed in Section I. In part this was due to the unprecedented speed and resultant pressure on decision making that occurred under the untried National Development Act (NDA). One Tribunal judge was heard to remark that the NDA was more akin to an 'icy slope' than a 'fast track', while another, in opening remarks to the synthetic petrol plant Hearings, said "I am conscious that objectors at the Petralgas [methanol] hearing became a little confused with the speed at which the matter progressed and found difficulty adjusting". 55

This pressure on local participants was exacerbated by increased reliance on technical expertise and methods which seemed necessary given the untried and largely 'unknown quantities' of the plants' technology. Whereas proponents' evidence before the Tribunals often began with two or three pages establishing their transnational experience and authority, local people were, as they said, 'only locals'. The evidence of one local authority for instance noted "the County was faced again with the problem of a lack of internal expertise in formulating a proper condition and more particularly any specialist knowledge". 56

This placed important initiatives in the hands of practitioners commissioned by the developers. The Somosomo hydro case and the Aramoana experience explores some consequences of this. A few instances from Taranaki underscore earlier points. Local Waitara business people, whilst supportive of 'progress', were particularly concerned about the rapid inflow of construction workforce migrants. However, the local chemist's exasperated remark, "I'm becoming flat-out, hardly have time to breathe, let alone get up for Mrs Jones' emergency needs in the middle of the night", became, in the EIR's assessment, "A survey of businesses was undertaken (see Appendix 2 for details) over North Taranaki and indicated spare trading capacity of the order of 20% overall. Substantial differences

55. Sommerville (1981. 5) and Minister for National Development (1981. Appendix II) respectively.
between different trades appeared, but these may not be statistically significant". 57  

On noise levels, an important issue since the synthetic fuels plant was to be located immediately adjacent to rural residential dwellings, an interesting re-categorisation - and resultant 'domestication' - occurred as well. While the developer's acoustic engineers conceded that the plant was 'inherently noisy', they compared the projected decibel levels with what was 'typical for crickets in the summer season' and intimated that if residents kept their windows closed, the increase would not exceed the 'margin of acceptability'. Their evidence was backed by statistical 'annoyance curves' based on an 'educated extrapolation' of the attitudinal responses of another community elsewhere for lower noise levels. 'Statistically speaking' they argued, noise standards should be set at a level the majority (that is, 50%) found acceptable. By combining the 'annoyance curves' with statistical democracy, they argued that a 53 decibel standard was appropriate - to the developer as well, since it coincided with the manufacturer's estimation of the plant's noise levels. 58 One objector, Mrs Bidois, had been particularly intransigent in her opposition to the projected noise levels. She was singled out for attention, but not with quite the effect she intended. The Tribunal's recommendation, in keeping with the acoustic practitioner's testimony, set conditions of,

53 dBAL at a Notional Boundary 20 metres from any wall of occupied residence not owned by the grantee [excluding Mrs Bidois' residence at present erected on Lot 1, DP10081. LTC1/1527.59 Under the multiple objective balancing scheme, individuals emerge as identifiable subjects only when it is necessary to isolate their complaints. Thereby they are labelled 'subjective' and 'unreasonable', usually as a prelude to understanding their difficulties as problems of 're-integration'. 60

Other events appeared to contradict these excesses. As I remarked in Chapter Two, the petrochemicals projects, from the outset, featured earnest attempts to incorporate the 'social factor'. In part this reflected government concern that the so-called 'fast track', so important to foreign investors, could be delayed by litigation. But agencies like the Commission for the Environment were acutely aware of and sympathetic to local issues. So on the one hand, interest in participation and social factors reflected the need to gain data about 'the minimum social conditions' necessary for the projects to succeed. On the other hand, this interest was underpinned by the belief that participation was essential in helping the 'impacted community' cope with rapid change by strengthening their capacity to respond. 61 How this was to be achieved remained relatively un-theorised. Most literature

61. This belief is expressed in both Third World and Western orientated discussions of social impact assessment (Cf. Porter 1980b; Cortese 1979; Wolf 1980); and Craig and Tester 1980).
on the subject "adopts a practical rather than theoretical approach". When expressing the commitment needed, the Commissioner for the Environment said practitioners have to build up ... a very rigorous framework for numbers and they may have to add to the numbers aspects of the quality of life and the human factors because this seems to be inevitable if social science input is to be taken seriously.

Survey Research: 'Factoring-in Participation'

Given the imperative to quantify, the predominance of survey research techniques in development practice is not surprising. Indeed, as with social cost-benefit analysis, survey research was at some stage undertaken in each of the projects of Chapters Four and Five.

The easy and willing commitment to surveys has been challenged on numerous grounds: the inaccuracies or biases, the frequently fraudulent sampling and the tendency toward excessive 'data-mining'. But survey research, like cost-benefit analysis, remains attractive. It is perhaps the simplest, least controversial and cheapest way to gain quantitative data at the level of aggregation necessary to satisfy the political and policy needs of administrative agencies. In turn, reliance on this technique is supported by the practitioner's penchant for objective, that is, 'reliable' information, and by tacit beliefs about participation as something which must be 'tailored' into 'inputs' for an 'overall balance'.

The use of survey research to this end in the Taranaki projects is unexceptional. The first survey began by noting that "During the first two weeks of May 1980 a number of residents in the North Taranaki area participated in a telephone survey ... to help in planning for the future of their community". Survey participation was to "assist in planning the development in a way that is compatible with local interests". The survey revealed that most people (81%) were 'very satisfied' with the area as a place to live, that 68 per cent had 'no problems' and nearly half (43%) thought the methanol plant a 'good idea'. Over 50 per cent however were 'uncertain' or had 'no opinion' whereas the 'negative responses' to the plant were based on a 'variety of reasons' rather than 'common themes or problems'.

The analytic character of this kind of research leaves itself open to ridicule. But that is not my intention here. Neither are comments about sampling method, questionnaire

62. Conyers (1982, xi). This is in keeping with the emphasis of most authors on the subject of 'social planning'.


64. Study of the frequency of use of this technique seems not to have been made. However, in tandem with the proliferation of other factors - such as agriculture, health, education - to the development equation, increasing demands for social data have arisen. The predominance of survey research in western planning is however quite clear. Cf. Bailey (1975) and Whip (1977). Burton and Cherry (1970), in a text concerned with research techniques in planning, devote 120 of 130 pages to survey techniques. Hursh-Cesar and Roy (1976); Bulmer and Warwick (1982); Conyers (1982); and Loughlust (1981) show the trend toward greater use in Third World settings. The use of this technique in the Zamboanga del Sur Project is discussed in Porter (1984).


construction or bias avoidance relevant. The survey was probably ‘accurate’ - in the sense that rural people responded to questions asked by trained surveyors over the phone. Certain other attributes of the survey are relevant and like the previous commentary on cost-benefit analysis, provide a context for the rest of this chapter.

In keeping with other critiques of the technique one could expect that the survey fundamentally simplified social reality. Survey research in the Taranaki case, as elsewhere, was legitimised by the belief that in order to have ‘participation’, at some time people have to be asked their views on the issues at hand. The belief is naive on a number of counts. Most obviously it assumes that people have a grasp of the ‘issues’. Individuals may have a good idea of their concerns and interests, but ‘public opinion’ simply does not possess these attributes of individual consciousness. As defined through the research contract negotiations, ‘public opinions’ are simply assumed to exist, ready-made in the minds of the respondents from which they are extracted and tabulated as ‘data’. Views which depend on group, community or class dialogue, or ‘impacts’ which result from negotiation and bargaining between competing interests are effectively atomised into fragmentary ‘attitudes’. Later these are summed, and homogenised as “43% said they thought [the project] was good”. 67

Although ample evidence suggests the ‘impacted community’ have quite different conceptions of ‘issues’ reflecting their life expectations and political interests, the key point concerns how this method results in the rationalisation of participation. That is, survey research of the Taranaki kind inherently reflects and sustains particular patterns of power and control. Survey research corresponds to a decision process whereby information relating to one group is recategorised (or created by split-choice questioning), analysed via a battery of mystifying instruments and then offered to a political elite. Insofar as the ‘audience’ is executive, survey research transfers power to that level. As with the Aramoana case, the technical secular interests are tacitly believed to coincide with the common substantive good. Given that the survey’s audience is corporate and governmental (a co-sponsor of the projects) who view the community as a potential ‘cost’ in litigative terms, this view is absurd. And yet the results of these investigations were handed to these levels in the tacit belief they would give them ‘due regard’ in their ‘overall judgement’. It was expected that, subject to the appropriate manipulation of national or project variables, in time, adjustments would filter down to the target population.

Ironically survey research does nothing to facilitate the supportive environment or local skills for such an active appropriation of the benefits which may filter down. Rather, it offers a one-way process whereby political interests are extracted as information. In conjunction with what has been said earlier about the transformation and bounding of issues (Aramoana) it takes no great imagination to see how participation in survey research tends to support particular kinds of political order and economic life.

The Taranaki survey reports did however make recommendations about public review and other programs through which participation could occur. While largely unheeded, the idea of social impact monitoring was institutionalised. The experience of this program

67. Auckland Research Group Ltd. (1980. 9)
assists in taking these comments about the political model constituted by survey research a stage further.

The Taranaki Monitoring Project: 'Show me the figures'

Despite the efforts of 'socially conscious' practitioners, the surveys, EIR procedures and community meetings came to be seen locally as mechanisms of government control. The procedures were widely considered to simply 'sap one's energy' and, rather than facilitating democratic processes, reaffirmed a local sense of powerlessness in relation to remote and powerful agencies.68

One response was for the Commission for the Environment's Audit of the synthetic petrol plant EIR to recommend an action-research project.69 As a result, the Taranaki Social Needs Action Committee established, with government funds, the Taranaki Community Monitoring Project. The committee took a fairly progressive approach to its role: acting as an advocate for local concerns, facilitating community organising to strengthen abilities to negotiate with state agencies and the developers, and providing an information base appropriate to this mandate. The committee sought to draw the community into participatory modes of research. Project staff were conscious that most local issues did not 'fit the statistical boxes' used in formal EIR and litigation research. Traditional modes of research were seen to 'atomise' or fragment issues and segregate 'attitudes' from the broader political processes through which the benefits and detriments of the projects (that is, their impacts) were allocated. Participatory research which began with the substantively defined local issues, it was hoped, would strengthen rather than debilitate local capacity to respond.70

The Project was however funded by central government. The committee was therefore aware that their 'bottom line' was a final report to be presented to government on the completion of one year's activity. In keeping with its participatory focus the report dealt with experience of soaring rents, eviction, loneliness, people living in garages, and like issues. It pointed to the lack of tenancy protection associations and instances of increasing state and developer power. Government reaction was swift. The Minister for Housing for instance "slammed the report as exaggerated opinion".71 Given the government's co-sponsorship of both projects, the dismissive reaction is unexceptional. Two points about the character of this reaction are relevant however. Aware of the persuasive judgements of formal EIRs that the projects could be 'accommodated' and 'integrated' within the 'overall balance', the anecdotal case-study basis of the report was defined "largely an emotive response to a few hard luck stories". This, predictably, was followed with the Minister's demand "show me the figures".72 In the sense of technical rationality, the report was not 'reasonable': it was about substantive issues which were (conveniently) considered undebateable in a rational manner and therefore unworthy of consideration.

69. CFE (1981. 87).
71. The Daily News, 28.9.82, and New Zealand Times, 3.10.82.
72. New Zealand Times, 3.10.82.
Second, government reaction indicates something about participation. Given the understanding of participation as 'data inputs' (discussed earlier) it is 'good' if it is constructive criticism, that is, tailored to project demands and capable of integration within a pre-given framework. Participation is irrational if it moves beyond the bounds of that 'element' of the project for which it is invited. Public concerns which lie outside these bounds, as in the smelter case to raise issues of 'trusteeship' or materialism, are translated to 'emotional grandstanding' which is prejudicial to the overall balance. The 'public's problem', in the phraseology of the smelter economist, is to be constructive by acceding to the unitisation of their political interests. Failing this, data does not exist in a form which can be inserted into the development calculus along with foreign exchange premiums, discount rates or externalities like ecological damage.

So far I have used the Taranaki experience to reaffirm earlier themes regarding the transformation of politics. These instances however indicate how non-material interests are peripheralised and transformed. Further appreciation of the development malaise can be gained by considering cases where such interests are, in the practitioner's terms, 'successfully' incorporated. The Tribunal Hearings associated with the two Taranaki projects illustrate this point.

A Substantive Problem: 'All One Before the Technique'

Map 2.4 (p.33) shows the location of littoral reefs from New Plymouth to Urenui. Most of these are contiguous with the shoreline and exposed at low tide. Although reefs adjacent to New Plymouth have high coliform pollution, those offshore the methanol and synthetic petrol plant sites are largely uncontaminated. Both projects have heavy water demands for process cooling and waste discharge. In both cases contaminants will pass over reef areas and it was originally proposed that the methanol plant would discharge directly into the Waitara River.

For Te Atiawa tribal people the reefs are extremely important in transmitting cultural values. While providing a dietary supplement, kaimoana (sea food) has an intrinsic cultural value manifested in manaaki (token of esteem) for manuhiri (visitors): this makes kaimoana far more valuable than produce of the land in maintaining tribal mana and esteem. The Waitara river personifies the spirit of the Te Atiawa people through an alliance between an ancestor Maruwaranui and the taniwha (river spirit). Any contamination pollutes the taniwha and so the spirit of the people.

The events whereby Maori interests were brought to participate in the 'overall balance' provide an avenue to begin a deeper analysis of the development malaise. Prior to beginning environmental impact research, the Commission for the Environment demanded 'an integrated planning approach in incorporating all factors'. In particular, research was to incorporate "Maori resources [since they] had emerged as an important category of

concern" both politically, and in terms of legislative requirements. Alongside this, Maori activists had remonstrantly opposed any intimation of waste discharge. Encouraged by EIR researchers, they had begun to prepare evidence to present their case through the EIR Audit and subsequent Planning Tribunals whose task was to set conditions on waste discharge and provide for their enforcement. In Chapter One, I recounted some prophetic remarks of tribal elder Arapeta Mataira regarding the outcome of these endeavours. "They'll probably win this fight" he said, "but fighting that way they're sure to lose the battle".

During August 1981 proponents of the methanol plant sought the Planning Tribunal's consent to discharge industrial wastes into Waitara River. Although submissions of water authorities led the Tribunal to disallow consent, the company promptly withdrew its application and negotiated with Waitara Borough to discharge through their outfall under an existing water right, effectively foreclosing litigation by objectors. Six months later, the synthetic petrol plant company applied to the same Tribunal to discharge via an independent outfall adjacent to the site and over Te Atiawa reefs. Expert witnesses went to great lengths to discuss near- and off-shore circulation zones, shoreline gradients, surf zones, current velocities and diffuser locations and concluded they were "confident of adequate dispersion and dilution". While noting that "there appear to be a series of unknowns in respect of these matters", the Tribunal did not consider legislative precedents "call[ed] for planning consent to be refused because the mere presence of the proposed use would offend the Maori customary way of life". The Tribunal had to balance competing uses for the water resource and granted discharge rights providing for an extension to the outfall pipe.

Failing to gain a 'fair hearing' through two Tribunals, two EIRs and submissions to two Audits, Te Atiawa people challenged the Tribunal's decision before a Court of Appeal. The Court ruled that the Tribunal had not acted unlawfully and that a 'fair hearing' had been given. By now however, a political momentum had been established and Te Atiawa people were successful in gaining a hearing before the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal, under the provisions of an unratified colonial treaty of 1840. The Tribunal heard evidence from all parties over three weeks at Manukorihi Marae using a mode of enquiry closely aligned to traditional Maori decision making. The Tribunal questioned the degree of credence placed on scanty scientific evidence, noting that "Maori lore ..., as inherited by word of mouth, represents the collective wisdom of generations of people whose existence depended upon their perception and observation of nature." It concluded that the outfall "will result in the physical destruction of [the] reef" and recommended the outfall proposal be discontinued and that changes in planning legislation be made in order to remove the present prejudice against Maori people's rights. A week later the government decided to continue with the Motunui outfall and, ignoring the Tribunal's recommendations, prepared the Synthetic Fuels Plant.
(Water Rights) Bill to provide for this.\textsuperscript{78}

Although this summary fails to do justice to over two years of events, interest here is not primarily with the overt political processes involved, but rather with those dimensions of social life which are sublimated or become disconnected, despite sincere attempts to 'factor' everything in. At the earlier Planning Tribunal Hearings few Maori elders had participated. This was taken by some to be a measure of their concern; 'they didn't even bother to attend'. The meaning of this silent protest did not become\textsuperscript{79} evident until the Waitangi Tribunal Hearings. Even here, where the faces were predominantly brown rather than white, Aila Taylor, a younger activist explained, "It has been quite an exercise to get the elders to participate in an exercise like this. We are a proud people".\textsuperscript{80} Previous EIRs and Tribunals had earnestly attempted to incorporate Maori interest into the overall balance. The Commissioner for the Environment (quoted earlier) for instance had demanded an 'integrated' approach that would 'incorporate all factors'; 'Maori resources' he said were, 'an important category of concern'. Aila Taylor's reference to pride however gave some insight into the elders' outrage at being incorporated or having to 'fight' in this manner. The Tribunal's explanation of 'resources' may be contrasted.

In its simplest form, such customs are an outward manifestation of the respect paid by Maori people to the sea and its food resource. It is probably more important to note however that such customs are a manifestation of a far more complex Maori spiritual conception of life and life forces which compels them to insist upon a much higher standard in the maintenance of clean water and the preservation of natural states than that to which we are accustomed.\textsuperscript{81}

In an important sense, the Maori people were arguing it was irrelevant whether effluent or human wastes were virtually pure before discharge. The crux of Arapeta Mataira's 'fight' was not whether 'due protection' would be given to the sea resource or Te Atiawa reefs, although citing historical experience, Te Atiawa people were sceptical about the likelihood of this. More fundamentally their protest was that efforts to scientifically incorporate resources or categories of Maori concern would be sacrilegious. The very notion of resources and categories reduced issues in a way that mistook their underlying structure and ignored the broader 'world-view' which gave them their total meaning. In this light, the manner of 'fighting', of bringing their concerns to 'participate', would result in decisions grounded in the bloodless idiom of 'competing uses' and weighing of 'resource utilities'. Whatever the decision, under the regime of rational, reasoned debate fundamental dissimilarities (of substantive rationality) could be recognised and evaluated only as a difference of efficiency and quantity.

This instance illustrates the depth of Weber's metaphor 'disenchantment of the world'. But it is important to recognise that such disenchantment did not flow from the practitioner's desire to corrupt these values or to deceive in the pursuit of class or pecuniary

\textsuperscript{78} Despite the fact that at Select Committee Hearings into the Bill, the New Plymouth City Council offered the use of its land-based waste treatment system to the two companies (ECO. 1983).
\textsuperscript{79} In Minister for Maori Affairs (1983, 13).
\textsuperscript{80} Minister for Maori Affairs (1983, 13).
\textsuperscript{81} Minister for Maori Affairs (1983, 13).
interests. Rather, in accord with the 'idea of development', it was a consequence of an institutional context which demanded an objectivist pretence - weighing of categories, arms-length advice and the corresponding bloodless idiom Arapeta Mataira so feared. The Taranaki Catchment Commission, for instance, showed great concern for the meaning Maoris attached to the reefs, but was constrained to consider many other categories - surf riding, boating, rock scrambling, skin diving, industry, etc. According to frequency and value of use, each had to be weighed and balanced. They acknowledged, in effect, that the 'due process' required the autonomisation of Maori values.

On the other hand, for Maori objectors to be 'reasonable' was impossible since the very means of technical reason would violate the substantive ends being pursued. But those who chose not to acquiesce simultaneously chose to be rejected by virtue of the lack of common grounds to 'participate'. The conventional notion of participation, like 'being reasonable' or other key words of technical rationality's litany, forgets its specific cultural, economic and historical roots.

One instance toward the end of the Waitangi Tribunal sums up the issues very well. With some exasperation, planning counsel for the Ministry of Works and Development stated "Planning Statutes apply to all - Maori and Pakeha. As has been said, 'we are one people'". Reflecting on the rationality which presumes all-encompassing 'one-ness', the Waitangi Tribunal judge retorted "Perhaps it is that presumption that is the cause of a substantial problem".

For numerous reasons, some of which this section has touched on, the recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal were ignored. From a tactical point of view the overt politics of project practice reconfirmed the material inequities of a development malaise. The experience demands that we look further than this however. Herbert Marcuse's despairing conclusion was that even those enlightened practitioners who seek a more 'comprehensive' incorporation of substantive rationality, unwittingly aid in the advance of rationalisation. Ironically, due to technical engineering difficulties, the proposed outfall has not been constructed. Here then the 'fight' was won on a technicality, but what of the broader character of the 'battle'?

82. The Taranaki Catchment Commission and the Regional Water Board administer the Soil and Water Conservation Act 1967, which mandates responsibilities for water resource management including water abstraction and discharge applications. It is expected to consider water ecology, disposal and use options, along with recreational, fisheries and commercial needs (Cf. Taranaki Catchment Commission, 1982).

III
METAPHORS OF AUTHORITY:
THE ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

To a degree all development projects can be examined in terms of the particular constellation of political, strategic, or commercial imperatives they serve. The Zamboanga del Sur Project (ZDSDP) is no exception. It was conceived shortly after the 1972 Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines and coincided with the US demise in Indochina, the new 'broadened scope' signalled by McNamara's 1973 Nairobi speech, and with an escalating 'peace and order' problem in Mindanao. As the 1975 Project Identification and Evaluation Study concluded, albeit some time after the project had begun, "the improvement in peace and order which the extension of the road system is expected to bring, must be regarded as a major social benefit over and above any economic benefits derived". 84

In the decade since inception, ZDSDP has taken on many of the features of the World Bank's integrated rural development model. Brian Hester, Phase II Executive Director remarked, "There's ten years of development history written into this project". 85 To the initial roading 'element' others have been appended; irrigation, village wells, a multiple crops program, coconut lands development, livestock, tree crops, fish ponds and latterly, institution building, appropriate technology and community development.

Development projects can also be examined in terms of two particular problems, both of which were raised in Chapter Two. The first is known by practitioners as 'the rip-off upwards problem'. ZDSDP, like most integrated development projects, has been consistently criticised for failing to improve the welfare of the poorer majority of the province's population. Indeed, it has been argued that income inequalities have increased to the benefit of rich entrepreneurs and the detriment of landless and tenant farmers. 86 ZDSDP's second problem, again in common with other projects, is referred to as 'the problem of institutionalisation'. This has two aspects, both of which are summarised metaphorically as the difficulties of 'injecting' expertise, capital and technology and, later, of 'withdrawal', that is, facilitating sustainable development activities. Phase I of ZDSDP (1974-1980) was designed according to the World Bank's 'autonomous project model', and was conceived, planned and implemented independently of existing Philippine line agencies with comparable functions. As a result, little technology and skill transfer occurred and the project was therefore extended into Phase II (1980-1985) with the express purpose of achieving institutionalisation. According to the Phase II Planning Study, institutionalisation is,

the process by which, through the instrument of organisation, new ideas and functions are integrated and fitted into developing societies, are accepted and acquire the capacity to sustain themselves, and in turn influence the environment in

85. Interview, 17.3.83, Pagadian. Transcript.
86. Literature on this is listed in Shoesmith (1982).
Despite earnest efforts on the part of some Australian practitioners, this has been unsuccessful for all but the most peripheral aspects of the project. As one agriculturalist despaired, "Bloody institutionalisation. It hasn't worked and never will". The problem of institutionalisation has another equally important aspect. The agricultural programs of ZDSDP have suffered consistently low levels of farmer adoption of new agricultural 'packages' and a high proportion (averaging 40 per cent per season) of adopting farmers have withdrawn. The institutionalisation problem refers to both these project activities and line agency functions. According to the Executive Director, "an interesting and almost exact parallel can be drawn between project activities and efforts to develop the capacity and capability of line agencies to take over project functions". Both aspects of the institutionalisation problem sustain the practitioners' rip-off problem. Rather than creating self-sustaining locally controlled activities that benefit the poor majority, project activities have on the whole reproduced the concentration of wealth and power and thereby the authoritarian character of Philippine social life.

So far I have explored various 'levels' and manifestations of the development malaise. At one level the development malaise is sustained by project politics, including the influence of practitioners, the geography, and institutional context of practice. Less overt, but equally important, are the ways in which the authoritarian tendencies of practice, including the transformation of issues, limitation of political horizons and impoverishment of political debate, are sustained by the techniques and procedures commonly employed. This section takes analysis to a final stage. My purpose is to show how these dimensions of the development malaise discussed so far are reproduced by the language and metaphors of development practice.

Previous discussion has deliberately employed the categories used in language of everyday practice. Most of these, like arms-length advice, the professional promise, or the rip-off upwards problem, are metaphoric. They give a thing-like facticity to human practices. Sometimes these become reified, like 'the economy' or 'national interest and often, as I have argued, this has politically authoritarian consequences. This section makes analytical use of what has previously been a descriptive device.

88. Only time will test the reliability of this assertion. There is dispute amongst the project's Australian practitioners about which activities may be sustained. But the assertion is representative of opinions expressed by most Australian staff.
89. Interview, 19.3.83, Pagadian.
90. Project files. 15.4.82. Pagadian.
91. I remarked earlier that despite obvious differences, the project cases share much in common: the issues arising, techniques employed and 'character' of the practitioners are remarkably similar. Indeed, the matching of project cases to particular themes has been for heuristic convenience. The ZDSDP could have been examined to illustrate any of the previous themes. The focus on metaphor and language in this case reflects more than convenience however. Unlike previous projects, ZDSDP has received considerable critical research and publicity, much of which I have actively contributed to. Most of this has however concentrated on what I have referred to as 'overt politics' of the 'rip-off upwards' and institutionalisation problems. This section argues that further analysis is necessary, beyond questions of ideology and political economy.
Given what appears to be endless philosophical debate on the matter, I offer no definition of metaphor here, but note a few relevant points. An interest in metaphors simply underscores the view that all knowledge is perspectival. That is, everything is 'known' from some point of view. Metaphors are a primary means whereby practitioners establish their authority and make sense of, or account for development practice. This is not the same as saying the practitioners' understanding is impaired or incorrect. Nevertheless metaphors delineate what is to count as worthwhile or reasonable, peripheral or subjective in practice. By omitting and highlighting certain aspects of a situation, metaphors create 'facts' and define their quality and meaning. Thus, when prior to beginning appraisal of the Somosomo project Paul Chesterman remarked 'electricity is a key link in the development chain', the conversation did not falter for a moment. The metaphor was so self-evident it required no verification. Tacitly, metaphors constitute the starting point of 'what is' and simultaneously convey a normative sense of 'what ought' to be done. It is impossible to collapse the meaning of a metaphor into a single literal statement. Meaning depends on context and it is appropriate that this discussion follows the previous levels of analysis of the development malaise.

Why take analysis to this level? For rationalisation theorists, rationalisation implies domination and authoritarian social life. They analysed rationalisation in bureaucracy, economic affairs, and as is done here, in the procedures and techniques employed to administer contemporary society. Herbert Marcuse at various points argued that technical rationality extended 'tentacle-like' into the very language and categories through which we know the world. Domination is not just an overt political process whereby one individual or group dominates another. Rather it is present wherever practices come to rest on rationalised categories of thought which are taken beyond doubt and acquire the stability of natural and incontrovertible facts of life.

Blind Freddy and his Dog

After discussing the infamous rip-off upwards and institutionalisation problems, I asked Evan Adams, the Agricultural Director with over twenty years' practical experience, "What turns up on this and other projects is a key operating principle. In another project it was 'electricity is a key link in development'. Here it was 'the most pressing requirement is the development of an adequate road feeder system'. That's prior to the eloquent project purpose statements that turn up later on. But how was this conclusion reached?" "Well, you know", he replied, "blind Freddy and his dog could just about see that, its like the yields problem".

Although candid and colourful, Evan's reply was unexceptional. Blind Freddy and his dog, like the 'yields problem', convey a number of messages. They denote a particular approach to problem identification. Overall, the vital needs of development are technical in character. Roads, along with special expertise, will enable new technical packages (fertiliser, insec-

94. Interview, 18.3.83, Pagadian. Transcript.
Pesticides, HYVs, new attitudes and management skills) to be communicated, yields will increase, the products marketed and increased income thereby give the beneficiaries access to road-conveyed goods and services.\textsuperscript{95}

**Figure 5.2 Agribusiness Methodology in Practice.**

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Figure 5.2 portrays the ZDSDP 'agribusiness systems methodology' which gives broader meaning to these metaphors.\textsuperscript{96} The steps on the horizontal axis are derived from ZDSDP's methodology for managing agricultural development. The vertical axis represents the degree of 'distance' or abstraction from the everyday reality of small farmers, that is, the social (for example, household characteristics, work preferences), economic (for example, indebtedness, tenancy, landlessness), political (for example, local patronage, dependency relations) and environmental features of their situation. In terms of the trajectory of development practice (shaded curve) through the project, 'distance' can be understood in a number of ways. I have discussed the considerable time, geographical and cultural constraints which distance the practitioner from appreciation of the local reality. This distance is also conceptual, that is, reinforced by the de-authoring implicit in notions of professional practice. My point here however is that 'distance' is in large measure created by metaphors like 'blind Freddy and his dog'. These three senses of distance pre-ordain the nature of 'the problem' prior to the formal stage of Problem Identification. Problem analysis, given the self-evident 'yields problem', becomes a matter of 'getting your facts straight', that is,

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\textsuperscript{95} Summary of Project Consultants' Report (1974, 15).

\textsuperscript{96} Government Project Report (1980) and Aberdeen (1983, Fig. 3).
establishing scientific research trials on isolated stations unfettered or blurred by the broader realities of the local situation. In an important sense, authoritative practice - the extent to which yield-specific facts or the world’s ‘authoritative sources’ provide the touch-stones of judgement - is defined in terms of its distance from the beneficiaries’ everyday lives, and the ‘corruption’ or ‘inefficiency’ of counterpart line agencies. Almost inevitably this distance ensures that the rip-off upwards and institutionalisation metaphors will need to be invoked to explain difficulties encountered during the downward movement of the curve.

ZDSDP practitioners nevertheless express an “unshakable faith” in this methodology; with it they argue “if you allow us to control all the factors of production then we can increase the production of the province two times, three times, four times”. The emphasis is an important link with earlier themes regarding de-authoring and the authoritarian tendencies of conventional practice. The need to ‘control all the factors’ indicates a caveat on the practitioners’ promise. The “essential point is that the total system will only function correctly when all the elements of the system (Inputs-Farm Production-Processing-Marketing-Consumption) are functioning correctly”.

A Two-Pronged Approach

Two things are essential to controlling all factors and correct functioning of the system. The practitioner’s focus on yields (or any other single variable) is centred on a field of vision comprised of ‘developmental constraints’ or ‘bottlenecks’. The agribusiness systems model attempts to move subsistence farmers, by some quantum jump, along a scale toward modern agricultural practice. This involves not just more inputs, but their systematic application according to technical rules within the margins of weather, market conditions, capital and labour availability. All inputs must be applied at the right place and time, with the right prices, quantities and combinations.

At the institutional level, this requires an orderly and predictable environment. Reality departs from the field-trial ideal. Logically, the control of all factors necessitates centralisation. Observing the lack of co-ordination and programming, one ZDSDP evaluation noted “it is desirable that centralisation of service facilities should be encouraged .... It should be an objective of PADAP planning to encourage such centralisation”.

Consequently project control becomes further removed from local agencies, including line agencies, and placed in the hands of those with sufficient authority to manipulate all factors; in the ZDSDP case, this was the National Council of Integrated Area Development, chaired by President Marcos. Practitioners remark that this has done little to mitigate the rip-off upwards problem and, for their part, Filipino line agencies have strenuously resisted signing Memoranda of Agreement that would expropriate their control over their

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activities. Thereby, the institutionalisation problem is reaffirmed. The links between the agricultural yields focus, control of all factors, and correct functioning of the system through centralisation is repeated for other project 'elements' as well - such as health - and in multi-element projects like ZDSDP, each new element necessitates a new level of authority to 'integrate' the expanded base.

This authoritarian tendency, as I have said before, is accompanied by de-authoring. The relationship between practitioner de-authoring and 'getting your (yields-specific) facts straight' has been discussed. The second prong of the approach necessary to 'make the system function' illustrates a further dimension of the de-authoring proposition. The purpose of ZDSDP's Multiple Cropping Project is to "package and extend to small upland farmers sets of technology". These technical packages will only be efficient if certain 'deficiencies' of the farmers' local situation are rationalised in complementary ways.

He is poor - so he is provided with a low interest loan by the Philippine National Bank under special banking conditions. The loan is not in cash but in the form of appropriate quantities of the correct amount for his crop. of fertiliser, seeds, pesticides and herbicide. The appropriate materials are the product of painstaking research at the Betinan Research Station. He is unfamiliar with modern technology - so he is assisted by trained plant industry technicians of the Ministry of Agriculture, backed by the resources of the research organisation. He is often the victim of unscrupulous middlemen - so his crop inputs are provided under the supervision of technicians, who also ensure that his crop is marketed under favourable conditions. He is to be in a situation of greater risk - so suitable crops are selected on the basis of good profit potential ... and good yield reliability i.e., low risk.

For so long as these conditions are met, that is, for as long as the expanded field-trial situation can be controlled, the system will 'function'. The problem of institutionalisation by definition attests to the difficulty of maintaining this. But the 'technically necessary' changes in the farmers' behaviour are of more interest here. Just as physical inputs must be in the right place, time and quantity, so too must the farmer perform rationally. Whereas the subsistence mode of production is quite resilient to variations in the farmers' work patterns, recreation/leisure needs or subjective idiosyncrasies, the technical packages require that life becomes rationalised to a new rhythm over which they have no effective control. Their performance must be de-authored, that is, become another 'input' bound by the strictures of all other inputs. The technician's role predominates, a role farmers dare not violate lest they overstep the margin between efficiency and catastrophe. In practice, 'performance' varies. As one agricultural economist despaired, "They don't always realise that when you're using that big package, you just can't use fertiliser and not do the weeding". Given farmer 'inefficiencies' in management, it then becomes necessary to

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100. Late in 1983, three years after Phase II's institutionalisation program began, only one of more than a dozen Memoranda of Agreement had been signed.
103. Interview, 19.3.83. Pagadian, Transcript.
"change those aspects of the lives of these people which are likely to be impinged upon". 104
This is achieved by a travelling publicity caravan, by community ‘participation’ programs and, not the least important, visits by technicians with the dual role of advisers and credit repayment collectors.

In the ZDS DP case, as with similar projects of the late 1970s, an appropriate technology program was initiated to overcome poor rates of adoption and high drop-out rates in the agricultural project. It could be argued this nullifies the above analysis. It is true that early proponents of ‘approtech’ saw it as one means of countering the material and political dimensions of the development malaise. 105 ‘Approtech’ was centrally concerned with the political and economic control of production in recognition of the more obvious authoritarian tendencies of conventional strategies.

In practice however, the incorporation of ‘approtech’ has occurred in ways similar to the incorporation of the ‘social factor’. The metaphors which defined yields and road access as ‘key inputs’ in development also transposed the political character of approtech into ‘another input’. In grammatical terms, the earlier use of ‘approtech’ as a verb, whereby people come to ‘appropriate’ their means of livelihood (and if you like, ‘author’ their own lives), was transformed into a noun. ‘Approtech’ in projects like ZDS DP became synonymous with the ‘lo-tech’ option; a lower order, less ‘efficient’ input to be ‘fitted-in’. 106 Given this, it is not surprising that the ZDS DP agricultural engineer’s efforts to design and manufacture appropriate hand-tools have left a stock which by his own admission ‘can’t be given away’. Poor farmers’ low adoption rates indicate not their misguided response to an economically and technically sound package, but in part their reluctance to be incorporated into a system of authority and lifestyle of dubious integrity over which they have no control. This ‘resistance’ to rationalisation will be considered further in Chapter Six.

Logical Framework and the Systems Metaphor

With moves to institutionalise ZDS DP there emerged a project planning technique called Logical Framework Analysis - Logframe. Logframe is essentially a series of steps whereby project purposes, inputs and outputs are interrelated. It is designed to “introduce order and discipline into the intellectual processes” of practitioners. 107 Brief examination of this technique and the systems metaphor underpinning it ties together the themes of this section.

Logframe, initially developed by USAID in 1973, 108 reflects a long-established view that project problems - such as the kind faced by ZDS DP - stem from design and
management difficulties, or as one Australian practitioner argued, "the accumulation of seemingly prosaic problems". 109 Accordingly, Logframe,

- Defines project inputs, outputs, purpose, and higher sector/program goals in measurable or objectively verifiable terms;
- Hypothesises the causative (means-end) linkage between inputs, outputs, purpose, and goal;
- Articulates the assumptions (external influences and factors) which will affect the causative linkages;
- Establishes the indicators which will permit subsequent measurement or verification of achievement of the defined outputs, purpose, and goal. 110

The logframe matrix (Figure 5.3) is used in planning, implementation and evaluation according to a vertical and horizontal logic. The vertical logic defines the causal links between inputs and outputs whereas the horizontal logic is concerned with verifying progress. Like SCBA, logframe is considered to be ethically and programmatically neutral. 111 But as with other techniques it has certain ramifications in practice. Two aspects of its meaning-in-use rather than text-book ideal are of immediate interest here: the determination of goals and purposes and second, the assumptions of the fourth column. Figure 5.4 summarises the logframe used since 1980 in ZDSDP.

The bold and universalistic character of the goals and purposes hierarchy underscores two previous points. Goals are self-evident ends toward which all activities are directed. They are those of the project and thereby non-partisan expressions of the common interest. The goals have authority by virtue of their 'distance' from political interests or subjective fancy. They are ascribed from the facts. Logically, goals may be fragmented into 'technically necessary' elements which are to be brought under centralised control. Logframe goals and elements - following practice with other techniques - are articulated by project analysis experts' to reveal practical activities which "in their totality satisfy needs". 112 From yields to production efficiency and economic growth, the project goals both require and reproduce an orderly and controlled environment. This reaffirms, ironically, a mode of economic and political life which historically has created disorder and unrest in Zamboanga del Sur. Order and efficiency are simultaneously the main project purposes and, in practice, the primary requirements for realising the same.

The project management techniques necessitated by the 'broadened scope' of the 1970s consistently appear in conjunction with two beliefs. First,

The concept of project management is complex - in the sense that project management is a cumulative process of reciprocal interactions among the links in the chain of causality toward the realization of policy objectives. 113

110. USAID (1973. 2).
111. USAID (1973. 2).
113. Whang (1978. 1). These two beliefs are found in references taken from ZDSDP management training materials, e.g., Guzman (1978) and Corpus (1978).
Figure 5.3 The Logical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NARRATIVE SUMMARY</th>
<th>OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS</th>
<th>MEANS OF VERIFICATION</th>
<th>IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program or Sector Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes:</td>
<td>Measures of Goal Achievement:</td>
<td>Assumptions for achieving goal targets:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Purpose:</td>
<td>Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved: End of project status.</td>
<td>Assumptions for achieving purpose:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs:</td>
<td>Magnitude of Outputs:</td>
<td>Assumptions for achieving outputs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs:</td>
<td>Implementation Target (Type and Quantity):</td>
<td>Assumptions for providing inputs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USAID (1973, 3)
### Figure 5.4 ZDSDP II Logframe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOALS HIERARCHY</th>
<th>MEANS-ENDS RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS RELATING TO THE MEANS-ENDS RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>INDICATORS TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES. THE REQUIREMENT IS TO MONITOR THE ASSUMPTIONS AND TO EVALUATE THE EXTENT OF THE MOVEMENT BETWEEN THE HIERARCHY OF GOALS THROUGH TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE PROJECT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Order in the Province of Zamboanga del Sur.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROJECT PURPOSE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To raise the living standards of the majority of the population in the project area.</td>
<td>• That the deprivation of development is a cause of unrest in the Province.</td>
<td>• That indicators selected must reflect whether the raising of living standards in the Province of Zamboanga del Sur has an impact on Peace and Order in the Province.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To generate a self-sustaining development effort employing existing institutions.</td>
<td>• That a stable environment is one in which development takes place.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROJECT OUTPUTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The creation &amp; maintenance of effective infrastructure assets.</td>
<td>• That the outputs produced are having an impact on the majority of the people in the province.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The transfer of theoretical, practical &amp; organisational skills.</td>
<td>• That the infrastructure assets produced do have a socio-economic impact in the Province.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The build in capacity &amp; capability of the responsible line agencies to perform functions for which they are responsible but are being presently performed by the Project.</td>
<td>• That the transfer of theoretical, practical &amp; organisational skills have an effect on generating a self-sustaining development effort.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To minimise the extent of the involvement of the project in Provincial development.</td>
<td>• That the line agencies are the avenues along which Philippine development policy is implemented.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To identify a role for the BAO base complex.</td>
<td>• That institutions and political decentralisation and devolution does not create institutions in addition to the Regional Autonomous Government and the existing line agencies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To develop a co-ordinated planning &amp; implementation approach to infrastructure construction &amp; maintenance in the Province to assist in achieving the above.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROJECT INPUTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Personnel (as specified in this study).</td>
<td>• Studies to identify line agency capacity and capability.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Plant &amp; Equipment (as for ZDSDP-I with minor modifications to be determined by a separate study).</td>
<td>• Staff development and training program is planned for the line agencies and the Project.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training as specified in the study.</td>
<td>• The strategy for ZDSDP-II (the concept of phasing out) is accepted by both GOP and GOA.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Spare parts as specified in the study.</td>
<td>• That Australian project personnel are capable of working in a dual development environment of production and technology transfer.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Funds.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ADAB 1980, Table 49.
Second, given the complex and selfless, de-authored nature of the ends being served, project management,

desire[s] to achieve overall effectiveness [and] not to have the parochial interests of one organisational element distort the overall performance. ... this means that some functional unit may not achieve its parochial objectives, for what is best for the whole is not necessarily best for each component of the system.\(^{114}\)

The systems metaphor, basic to most project practice, has received various criticisms. But, like logframe, its advocates argue that in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness, it focuses attention on the "salient characteristics and relationships which may be blurred in the mind of man".\(^{115}\) The systems metaphor is the common touchstone of logframe, institutionalisation and centralisation in Phase II of ZDSDP. A previous reference deserves repeating here.

During the course of ZDSDP-I a management logic has evolved for the development of better farming systems .... The essential point is that the total system will only function correctly when all the elements of the system (Inputs - Farm Production - Processing - Marketing - Consumption) are functioning correctly.\(^{116}\)

### Summary

In this chapter I have examined the authoritarian consequences of rationalisation in contemporary practice at different levels. The context for this was provided by Chapter Four where I illustrated how the overt features of the development malaise are sustained by the political activities of practitioners, and by the geography and institutional environment of practice. I have examined some reasons for the narrow focus of development practice and how even the most obvious features of a development malaise are side-stepped or ignored in the interests of 'authoritative' practice. In the case of ZDSDP (PADAP) the social impact assessment noted,

The level of overall improvement in local living standards and social well-being will depend on the extent to which the economic benefits of road and irrigation works are distributed equitably ... distribution of wealth of course is beyond the influence of the PADAP project.\(^{117}\)

Available evidence cited earlier and the practitioners' rip-off upwards problem suggests the distribution of wealth is directly influenced by ZDSDP. But I have argued the malaise goes considerably further than its material manifestations. Analysis must also go further than political economy.

The broadened scope of the 1970s increasingly rationalised development practice. In practice, proliferation of project elements increased complexity. This required the centralisation of institutional and legislative authority. In ZDSDP, as in the other cases, the

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\(^{114}\) Cleland and King (1968, 10. 11).


\(^{117}\) Hugo and Tolentino (1976, 2).
"management relationship [has] become so complex that unless someone is in control of the situation, vast amounts of resources can be exhausted before it is possible to effect the necessary retrenchment or redirection". But rationalisation does not just imply any kind of centralised authority: development is a 'management relationship', the purpose of which is 'the correct functioning of the system'. The professional promise of the practitioner offers the technically rational authority necessary to overcome the 'seemingly prosaic problems' and 'obstacles' that stand in the way. ZDSDP practitioners' 'unshakeable faith' leads them "to manipulate all those elements of the agricultural sector involved".

The notion of elements (or variables, resources, inputs, factors) necessitates a de-authoring of the natural and social worlds. In each of the projects discussed I have examined how particular techniques aid in the transformation, categorisation, and bounding of substantive rationality into technically rational elements. This enables their reintegration into the overall balance of technically necessary decisions.

With de-authoring, Zamboanga del Sur farmers (or in other cases the 'impacted community', the consumers, or participants) are reduced to the role of inputs from which data is extracted; recognisable only as differences of quantity and efficiency. They must be brought to participate, especially those aspects of their behaviour which 'impinge on the project'. Uncoordinated participation must be re-integrated lest it subverts reasonable practice and affects 'performance'.

At each step in the analysis so far I have illustrated how the practitioner is implicated in the development malaise. The systems metaphor caps this analysis in many respects. The metaphor persuades the practitioner to see himself as the nerve centre. Only he, surrounded by the traditional, parochial and subjective ways of substantive rationality, can address the facts of the matter. The twist of this metaphor, like the practitioners' notions discussed in Chapter Three, is to 'factor-out' their personal author-ship in favour of the authority of external facts. In this regard, development practitioners may be seen as the contemporary authoritarians.
The theory arrived neither full-blown, like an orphan on the doorstep, nor sharply defined, like a spike through a shoe; nor did it develop as would a photographic print, crisp images gradually emerging from a shadowy soup. Rather, it unwound like a turban, like mummy bandage, started with the sudden loosening of a clasp, a scarab fastener, and then unravelled in awkward spirals from end to frazzled end. Several weeks went by in the unwinding. When at last it was stretched out, it looked like this.

Tom Robbins

Another Roadside Attraction
CHAPTER 6
RATIONALISATION AND RESISTANCE

This thesis pursues two primary interests. First, it examines the nature of the development malaise to see how it is reinforced or mitigated by the actions of practitioners. The theory and empirics contained in this examination are logically related to the second interest in practical strategies through which the malaise may be confronted.

Part One dealt solely with the first interest. There, I established the historical context of development practice, the analytic propositions and cases for subsequent study. The analysis moved through three main stages, each of which correspond to different inflections of the word authority - 'authoritarian', 'authoritative', 'de-authoring'. The first stage examined the overt political consequences of increased reliance on professional practitioners. This expressed the rationalisation argument that technically rational authority gains prominence at the expense of traditional practices imbued with substantive rationality. Although rationalisation encourages the concentration of power, its authoritarian consequences go much deeper than overt politics. The second stage of analysis showed how political life is itself transformed, a point illustrated by the theme 'restructuring reality' and my review of techniques like cost-benefit analysis in the Aramoana smelter case. The Taranaki petrochemicals projects moved the analysis further to illustrate how attempts to mitigate the excesses of technically sophisticated practice (by 'incorporating social factors') often exacerbate the problems. The attempts to 'balance' diverse 'variables' like water-use demands, construction needs, wildlife or the controversial Maori 'resources', further reifies substantive values and paradoxically reproduces the tendencies of rationalisation and the development malaise. In the third stage of analysis (the Zamboanga del Sur Development Project) I shifted attention to the process labelled 'de-authoring' and examined how the more obvious manifestations of the malaise are underpinned by the metaphors and language of conventional practice. In all stages I have shown how practitioners' notions about order, control, efficiency and technical authority denote the ascendancy of technical rationality and, in terms of the rationalisation perspective, reconfirm the development malaise.

This chapter takes stock of this analysis, not by enumerating it, but by two kinds of reflexive examination. Section I begins with a self-evident fact about the relations between theory and explanation. Theory is an indispensable guide to analysis by highlighting aspects of a situation otherwise unnoticed or insignificant. But theory shows only one interpretation: reflexive analysis must ask 'why this interpretation and not some other?'

What aspects of practice are overshadowed in Part One? I consider two points. First, from Part One it is difficult to avoid the impression that rationalisation is historically unrelenting and all-pervasive. Indeed, the certainty with which rationalisation theorists press
their case is in large measure responsible for the pessimism most have about ameliorating the condition I refer to as the development malaise. There is less and less scope for individually differentiated conduct, substantive interests or practical rationality; practitioners are largely circumscribed by the dictates of 'authoritative practice'. In this chapter, however, I show that if other aspects of the earlier case studies are examined, it is possible to see how rationalisation is resisted. My intention is not to comprehensively rewrite the previous interpretation nor repudiate it. Rather, I seek to introduce an important theme of the epistemological discussion. Simply put, unless the rationalisation perspective is used reflectively one risks an over-rationalised understanding of practice. A more embracing theoretical perspective is essential for a reliable response to the primary interests of the thesis. Explanation must incorporate both rationalisation and resistance, that is, an understanding of historical trends and of human capacity to assert their agency over those trends.

The second point to be examined in Section I is closely related. Rationalisation involves the organisation of practice according to tenets which give primacy to technical reason, objective facts, disciplined skill and a detached independence from substantive prejudices. This is basic to the distinction between technical and substantive authority. While this distinction needs to be acknowledged, another look at the project cases reveals this account is incomplete. This points to a particular difficulty of previous analysis. Neither my introduction to the personal and political interests in development, nor rationalisation theorists' discussion of substantive rationality is specific. In part, this reflects inherent difficulties. Whereas material interests like expanded production or improved health have ready technical indices, words like personal self-esteem, dignity or political liberty are more explicitly normative; their referents are more rhetorical and correspondingly less empirically accessible. Due partly to this, many rationalisation theorists have been reluctant to specify the content of substantive rationality.  

The examination of examples of resistance shows they are frequently motivated by a concern to protect or express various personal and political interests referred above. This indicates additional attributes of resistance that must be accounted for in understanding practice and lays the ground for a second primary theme of Part Two.

I demonstrate the significance of this in Section II of this chapter. A more encompassing theoretical framework is essential for adequate explanation. But it is of more significance in terms of the practical concern of this thesis, and it is to this end that I undertake a further kind of reflexive analysis.

All theory contains some image, however ill-defined, of how the critical explanation it offers relates to practice. Put another way, there is at least an implicit relation between the ideas we hold about certain activities and the conduct we undertake in relation to them. In Section II, I unravel the model of practice which derives from the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas. My point here is to show that unless the theoretical framework used to

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understand practice is supplemented, then any strategies of the 'What is to be done?' kind are likely to be ill-conceived. Essentially, the critical model of practice formalises resistance, that is, it seeks to enhance the scope of individual action and the realisation of substantively rational interests. I refer to one of the earlier case studies to illustrate the practical effects of an inadequate understanding of human agency and of substantive rationality as well as the ironic authoritarian consequences of this. I conclude that these similarities between conventional and critical practice necessitate close attention to epistemology.

I

RESISTANCE IN DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE

Development practice rests on the belief that present states of affairs can be managed to bring about desired future events in a controlled and predictable manner. Goal-directed behaviour, the separation of means and ends, is the defining element of development practice and of technical rationality. This presumption is embodied in each report, in each technique employed, and in the distinction between authoritative practice and politics.

Actual practice however departs appreciably from the ideal. One would gain an entirely misleading impression of project appraisal or evaluation for instance, if the UNIDO Guidelines or USAID’s books on Logical Framework Analysis were taken to represent practice. Paradoxically, the ‘mismatch’ between the text-book ideal and practice is most apparent in projects which feature the sophisticated methods of technical rationality. After review of major Australian aid projects like ZDSDP, the Chairman of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts concluded that actual practice was “inherently vague and ambiguous”. He asked practitioners “What are the objectives? Toward what end point are you trying efficiently to go? That is probably the most ungrippable part of the whole thing.” The idea of development practice, conceived as the application of technical rationality, assumes that objectives and tasks can be clearly defined. This is rarely the case, and contrary to expectations of authors' textbook ideals, no amount of technically rational analysis can resolve this. Some years into the project, one practitioner made the following remarks about the Northern Samar Integrated Rural Development Project (which was expected to build on the lessons of ZDSDP).

So in answer to the question which is placed on that Northern Samar road ‘Going Where?’, really I don’t know where the project’s going as a technocrat at this particular point in time. I have a gut reaction to where I think they are going.

The contrast between the apparent goal-directedness of technical rationality and what the Committee Chairman saw as ‘inherently vague and ambiguous’ activities, signals what are to practitioners well-known ‘ills’ of development practice generally. The ills are seen in a lack of coordination between project identification and national planning goals, ineffective communication between agencies, conflict between politically defined national purposes and the technical specificity of development projects, too much subjective assessment and

arbitrary decision-making, lack of standardised guidelines, the inability and unwillingness of policy-makers to define tight goals or policy, and so the list goes on. In fact, it could be said that the problem of institutionalisation discussed in Chapter Five, and the considerable energies practitioners direct to creating order and control, and making 'the system' function 'correctly' are indicators of the extent to which rationalisation is resisted. Rather than dwell on broad examples, two points are relevant to this discussion. The first concerns the kind of knowledge and thought processes which feature in development practice. Here I draw a contrast between technical and practical rationality akin to a ZDSDP practitioner's candid remark that "You can look at all the techniques and things in the reports, but when you get it on the ground it's all bullshit." The second point concerns the tactical as opposed to technically rational purposes to which sophisticated procedures are put. Statements attesting to goal-directed, and therefore, authoritative practice one observer suggests are better seen as 'window-dressing' and 'packaging with a view to satisfying the buyer'. Ahmad remarks, "the more technical and complex the presentation, the more the use of shadow-prices, trade-offs, engineering coefficients, convincing evaluation or investment criteria [all supposed testimonies to goal-directedness] the better the chances of funding". There are of course many explanations for this tactical use of rationality. However, I will concentrate less on this and more on the role of human agency and substantive rationality in contemporary development practice.

**Practical Knowledge in Development Practice**

A remark by an Asian Development Bank evaluation officer helps to orient this discussion.

The textbooks tell us that the assessment systems are tools on which to base conclusions - you know, the Little-Mirrlees and UNIDO systems. But the number of projects that have been dropped is very low, and none on the basis that the IRR was too low. The tools are not independent of the practical goal which is to finance projects.

This remark accords well with earlier comments about the political purposes served by appraisal techniques like cost-benefit analysis. A study of World Bank practice similarly noted the 'disturbing tendency' wherein techniques of analysis are "obviously contrived, at worst calculated and tacked-on after the decision has been made ... the calculation [does] not actually function as a rational mechanism to assist in making choices among alternative projects or within projects among alternative choices".

According to practitioners' notions, practice involves the application of technical rationality to the solution of problems. This implies a linear process which passes from defined problems, to analysis, to conclusions and then to recommendations about project

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4. Cf. Rondinelli and Palia-Ashby (1976). Waterston (1965), and Hirschman (1967) are two of the first analysts of this mismatch, followed by official statements like Pearson (1969); Jackson (1969); USAID (1969). As Griffin and Enos (1970, 196) conclude "In theory, a plan should be comprehensive, consistent and optimal, but in practice none of these conditions is ever met."

5. Interview, 22.2.82, Melbourne.


design and implementation. In actual practice, means and ends, technical and substantive purposes are not separate, but mixed. Problems are rarely self-evident. In view of 'window-dressing' and 'bullshit', there is considerable distance between the reported reality and actuality. An example from the ZDSDP experience, albeit extreme, illustrates this well. Evan Adams participated in the early Planning Mission. On arriving in Manila, the mission gained the impression that the project's prime task would be to extend and upgrade a recently completed road project. However,

[It wasn’t until] we came here [Zamboanga del Sur] that we found out about the disaster of the concrete roads .... Well on the books in Manila, I can’t remember the exact figure, but it was something like 300 kilometres of concrete road, but the guy who ran the [earlier] project had hijacked all the funds and ah, used the dozers to build 1000 hectares of concrete fish ponds.9

It is not intended to imply there is generally no correspondence between the technical rationality of the 'reported reality' and actuality, merely that the distinction between technical rationality and other decision processes is at best 'blurry'. This can be illustrated further by the appraisal and design procedures of this same project. Evan Adams explained this in the following way.

The scale of the project was largely determined by capacity to construct roads in the first five years. And you’ll find a magic calculation in Volume 1 of the '75 design which backs this up [in terms of what was technically rational]. So we divided the Province up into four areas and six levels of road networks. We calculated construction costs, agricultural benefits, transport benefits ... sent all this stuff down to Cooma [consultant head office] on telex ... and back came internal rates of return. And if you used a cut-off rate of twelve per cent, which is what we designed it for anyway, it almost exactly matched construction rate capacity.10

As I indicated with the Somosomo mini-hydro case, project reports are said to reflect the technical rationality followed in actual practice. That is, reports begin with a series of deliberations - about the setting, the problem and project purposes - followed by analysis and logically derivative conclusions. Project design, including its scale and implementation schedule, is considered to be the 'dependent variable'. Evan Adams' recollection of what occurred however indicates how substantive belief ('development requires roads'), practical knowledge (the capacity to construct roads) and technical analysis (rates of economic return) all interact in a hermeneutic way. In an important sense this is merely a microcosm of practice overall. As one practitioner observes.

It is largely hit and miss, frequently without rhyme or reason, and hardly scientific. This consultant's good advice is rejected as impolitic, unfeasible or impractical. That consultant's bad advice is accepted as wise, realistic, or hard-headed. This country likes a certain type of consultant, that country another type altogether .... This donor backs one form of consultancy, that country backs another .... Clearly, even if certain things do not work, their blind supporters will persist with them. Eminently better things will be ignored. Who then is supposed to judge what is

9. Interview. 18.3.83. Pagadian. Transcript
10. Interview. 18.3.83. Pagadian. Transcript
better? And how can anyone know? This does not imply that earlier statements about the technical rationality of practice need to be reversed, but rather that publicly available renditions of what practice involves need to be supplemented. Alongside the certain and predictable image of practice must be considered remarks like "development is very much a matter of taking a punt. You can never be sure what you're going to do is going to be successful". The contrast is encapsulated by an Asian Development Bank consultant's remark.

The life experience of consultants is quite similar. You go to university and study through textbooks. Later, you accumulate all sorts of Bank and agency literature on how it should be done. Then you realize that all that stuff is irrelevant, you offload it, as I have been doing ever since I came for this spell at the Bank. It's funny, but while everything is getting more sophisticated and we're getting loaded down, in actual practice it doesn't count for much. In the end it's about commonsense. You look at a project and know the answer before you begin.

This remark illustrates how technical rationality and rationalisation is resisted by the exigencies of practices which demand 'common-sense'. For many practitioners the technical requisites of their vocation are secondary to the stress on 'common-sense' and the need to "realise that consultants are just ordinary people". Ironically, when called upon to indicate who they consider 'the best' practitioners, they frequently refer to individuals who are 'mad-hatters', able to 'fly by the seat of their pants'. Inevitably these are people imbued with a 'good practical sense'. Although the authority of discipline, skill and facts are called upon to give assurances of universality, privately practitioners note "they will all come up with something different [and] no two will necessarily agree". In one case I responded "Does that suggest that engineering is not dealing with the 'facts of the matter'?", to which Paul Chesterman (Somosomo project) replied, "Ah, engineering's not an exact science. A whole lot's certainly not. That's why we have safety factors of two! So, what you're dealing with is opinion, and each one has a different one." Another point about 'being practical' concerns the relation between science and practice. Science, the bastion of technical rationality, figures prominently in public accounts of development practice. In practice, it is said to be of 'minor importance'. The 'bright boys', as scientists are called, "may come up with a few good theories and formulae, but the bulk of practice doesn't involve them".

The point established by these remarks is not that the constructs derived from rationalisation theory are unreliable. Neither is it to suggest a 'non-rationalised' concept of practice which would highlight practical, at the expense of technical, rationality. This would have to ignore the evidence of Part One. Rather, unless the earlier account of practice is modified, there is a risk of producing an 'over-rationalised' understanding and under-rating

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11. Caiden (1976, 4-5).
12. Interview, 23.12.82, Wellington. Transcript.
15. Interview, 27.11.82, Auckland. Transcript.
17. Interview, 27.11.82, Auckland. Transcript.
the role of intuition, imagination and metaphors and thereby derogating the agents involved. What this implies in theoretical and practical terms is a major preoccupation of following chapters.

**Substantive Rationality in Practice**

A categorical distinction between technical rationality and other forms of knowledge expressed in practice can result in an overestimation of the extent to which historical trends like rationalisation dominate the character of actual events and actions. Similar conclusions can be made about the distinction between technical and substantive rationality. In other words, the derogation of human agency referred to above also affects our estimation of the extent to which practitioners and others have scope to resist historical trends and act to secure their substantive interests.

Having blurred the theoretical distinctions however, the analysis reaches something of a hiatus. My analysis of the development malaise has progressed through two sets of constructs which have considerable overlap; the relations between technical and substantive rationality on the one hand, and material interests and personal-political interests on the other. Given that I have posed the problems of this thesis in terms of these categories, precise statements about the nature of the development malaise requires a high degree of specificity about each category in order to establish the relations between them.

In the following discussion I argue it is possible to specify many cases where practitioners do resist rationalisation, and, acting out of recognition of the development malaise (leaving aside whether they recognise it as such) assert substantive values consistent with the personal and political interests referred to above. However, I also argue it is necessary to be particularly circumspect about drawing general conclusions. Recognition of resistance - whether as agency or substantive rationality - in practice does not amount to a general theory or provide general conclusions. The extent to which acts of resistance do counter the malaise or have the unintended effect of aiding its advance, requires a great deal more thought. This point is underscored in Section II. On the positive side however, the following discussion of resistance is significant in its contrast with the despair and pessimism engendered by rationalisation theory regarding the scope for mitigative actions to overcome the development malaise. Two kinds of resistance repeatedly occurred in the case studies. One illustrates resistance in the practitioner's approach to, and understanding of, practice; the second, resistance in practice itself.

The notion of arms-length advice, objectivity, and dispassionate judgement are essential to 'authoritative practice'. Individual self-interest, especially pecuniary interest, is said to pervert this authority and professional associations, charters and disclaimers are used at all levels of practice to discount such interests. For all practitioners however their personal self-esteem and identity are of prime importance. For commercial consultants, one important index of esteem is financial success (other practitioners, like public bureaucrats will have other, although similar indices). The following remarks begin by indicating the kind of questioning I was pursuing and follows in an oft-repeated vein.

Look, I'm thirty-six, questions of morals, philosophy and so on are irrelevant.
You’re raising consultants up to a different plane. I’m interested in selling a skill for which I make an investment. This investment I will capitalise on and sell when I retire. In the meantime, I will buy a yacht and enjoy holidays. In the end these are the major considerations. You might find all shades of opinion among us but as far as I’m concerned, the successful ones will be out to protect their investment and everything else comes from that.

In important respects this conflicts with the de-authored notions of Chapter Three and the ready distinction between technical rationality and substantive, personal interest. This ‘blurring’ is encapsulated in Paul Chesterman’s comparison of his firm’s image with actuality.

I think it was important for the old school to promote, to create an aura of professionalism, as a separatist thing, to escape the view of say the engineer as a technician. And so you have your Codes of Ethics and so on. When you read them, well its a bit like a Bible. I’ve read them, years ago when I first started and thought tut, tut, nobody would really act like that. But I’m sure that if we adhered to the intent of the Code of Ethics we would be out of work.

In addition to personal self-interest, de-authoring involves the attempt to discipline and shut-out personal commitments, beliefs or preferences which are not those of technical rationality. By implication, this is often said to lead to an uncritical quietism. For Weber, the practitioner is the self-less administrator of rule or technique. Marcuse would go further. The practitioner is an unwitting agent of a Kafka-like version of Huxley’s ‘Brave New World’. The following example drawn from ZDSDP illustrates earlier warnings about an ‘over-rationalised’ conception of practice, the consequent derogation of human agency, and also a second dimension of substantive rationality in practice.

Throughout its ten-year history practitioners associated with ZDSDP have been subjected to the vagaries of bilateral diplomacy, and Philippine national and local politics. There can be no doubt that ZDSDP roads have aided military build-up in the province, just as entrepreneurial elites have been assisted by the high quality infrastructure and special conditions attending participation in agricultural projects. Seen as agents of rationalisation it would be logical to expect practitioners to consciously or unwittingly serve these interests. Indeed, if Marcuse’s view is taken, attempts to subvert this tendency would be unlikely and, if attempted, futile. A dispassionate, apolitical stance would in any case provide a handy escape from charges of compliancy with these interests.

Two instances suggest a different picture. In one instance engineers responsible for determining road location were ‘requested’ by government officials to justify the extension of roads into particular areas and thereby assist military suppression of peasant resistance. In the second instance similar justification was required for a road linking privately owned mineral deposits with corporate port facilities. Needless to say, some project staff were inclined to accede to these demands. The roads could create goodwill amongst the local people with whom the project staff had some peer-group association. The requests could be accommodated without impugning the integrity of ‘authoritative practice’. Other staff who

18. Interview, 25.9.83, Manila, Transcript.
19. Interview, 27.11.82, Auckland, Transcript. Emphasis added.
shared different views faced a dilemma. It was clear that standard application of cost-benefit techniques would have provided sufficient justification to proceed. As the practitioner quoted earlier remarked 'you know the answer before you begin'. On the other hand to publicly object to such requests would not be 'a viable option'. The objection would appear to be a matter of 'preference' and therefore lack authority in terms of the 'grounds' on which practitioners can be authoritative.

It transpired that both road requests were withdrawn. The dissenting practitioners resolved their dilemma, in effect, by further rationalising practice. The details of their moves are not important here. Essentially they increased the sophistication of their analyses to the degree necessary to downplay benefits, increase costs and place the analysis beyond the scrutiny of those lacking the requisite skills and training. On this basis their judgement had authority: the roads were deemed 'not viable'. Continued official pressure would have been seen as blatant political interference to serve sectional interests. A remark of one dissenting practitioner sums up the ironic twist of this case of resistance to the authoritarian tendencies of rationalisation, "One of the most important things is to develop a technical system that can be used to defend your judgements".20 Once again this illustrates the complex relations between technical and substantive rationality that must be accounted for in a theoretical perspective on practice. Put another way, it demonstrates that the relations between the techniques developed to assist in expanding material interests, and political interests such as justice or fairness are not unilinear. In either wording, the case underscores the caution necessary when addressing the development malaise and the role of practitioners in its reproduction.

Impartiality, arms-length advice and other aspirant values are indeed part of a posture which allows, even encourages practitioners to wash their hands of substantive issues. This conservatism is reinforced to the extent that authoritarian tendencies are embedded in the techniques of practice. But in certain respects there is nothing immutable about these tendencies. Technical rationality can be both enabling and constraining with regard to the substantive interests of development.

Understanding Resistance in Practice
In Part One the themes of authority and de-authoring identified the overt political consequences as well as the deeper ramifications of rationalisation. Technical rationality, in practice, displaces traditional world views, methods of decision-making and life rhythms, and significantly transforms the norms and values of politics. To be reasonable is to be calculating, efficient and dispassionate in one's approach to what have become 'technically necessary' decisions. Yet the persistence of a self-interested, practical common-sense orientation contrasts with technical notions emphasising the self-less, detached attitude of authoritative practice. Moreover, we also find that the conservative tendencies of rationalisation which give tacit support to authoritarian political processes are frequently resisted. A sense of justice or fairness can lead to retributive action even while the practitioner maintains the authority of impartial application of techniques.

20. Interview, 20.3.83. Pagadian.
The instances from practice are largely unexceptional and well-known to anyone familiar with practice, but they highlight two particular points. First, in contrast to the notions about practice conveyed by both practitioners and rationalisation theory (Chapter Three), resistance alerts us to those significant aspects of practice which have their origin in the practitioners' personal interests or commitments, in practical knowledge and volition rather than the dictates of historical trends like rationalisation. This is what has been referred to by the expression 'human agency' and my suggestion that the rationalisation perspective can lead to an over-rationalised understanding of practice.

Nevertheless, I have argued this conclusion does not provide a case for an 'agency-centred' account of practice divorced from the obvious historical tendencies of rationalisation. What has been termed practitioner resistance is certainly an antidote to the despair and pessimism engendered by the rationalisation perspective about the inevitability of the development malaise. But words like commitment, creativity or spontaneous resistance are as potentially romantic as the iron-cage and estrangement metaphors are disillusioning. In short, the extent to which practitioners' resistance may mitigate historical trends of rationalisation is a moot point. As Cohen has remarked about protest action in general, we can unwittingly "overestimate the political significance of everyday protests that, by their very nature cannot but be disconnected, individualistic and conducive only to short-term effect."21 Kate Millet's warning is particularly relevant to my concerns here, "to be a rebel is not to be a revolutionary. It is more often but a way of spinning one's wheels deeper in the sand."22

Reliable conclusions about the way practitioners' actions contribute to and/or mitigate the development malaise do require a more adequate theoretical framework than has been used to this point. This will need to incorporate both resistance and rationalisation: both an understanding of human agency and the historical trends which provide the context of individual actions yet are also largely outside their control. This is a necessary condition for addressing the concern of this thesis.

My discussion of resistance has attempted to open up a further requirement. It is necessary to discriminate between actions that are 'wheel spinning', and therefore reproducing the malaise, and those that lead to progressive change. But analysis of the reproductive and/or mitigative effects of actions also requires some specification of substantive rationality (including the ways in which personal and political interests are manifested in specific cases) in order to provide standards for judgement.

This raises the second point highlighted by this chapter. Unlike their statements on technical rationality, rationalisation theorists have largely neglected to specify its correlate. Indeed, the dimensions of substantive rationality are not amenable to concise, universal definition. I have however given two instances of substantive rationality which were repeatedly observed in the case studies. The practitioners' personal pre-occupation with self-esteem and self-interest (regardless of its index) on the one hand, and other actions

22. Millet (1971. 349)
which express some sense of justice or fair play, on the other, exhibit some correspondence with the personal and political interests discussed at many points previously.

The topic of resistance has recently received much attention. Farmers' continuing reliance on traditional knowledge and belief systems in the face of rapid social and economic changes is a popular interest. Other research points to a long tradition of peasants resisting authority by concealing crops, under-reporting the area of land cultivated, or over-estimating flood or drought losses. Evidence suggests that passive resistance to development programs, and to the centralisation of political power and surveillance accompanying them, is also common. Previous discussion noted how roads, duly evaluated on completion, were later found not to exist. The Apia project was continually delayed by Samoan 'work habits', their 'lack of responsibility' and had to be insulated against 'political traditions'. And local residents encouraged to participate in the Aramoana and Taranaki projects' EIRs frequently refused access to researchers, gave 'inaccurate' responses to surveys, and continued to write poetry where 'reasoned responses' to the surveyor's 'categories of concern' were called for.

Although there are severe definitional problems regarding the meaning of resistance (which I will discuss shortly), there is an interesting convergence between this literature and the personal and political interests displayed by practitioner resistance. Research by Kerkvliet and by Fegan, amongst others, has addressed the motivation behind seemingly disparate individual acts of resistance. Surveying the range, both researchers are reluctant to attribute any single set of motives or 'interests' to acts of resistance. Instead they note common bi-polar interests. Fegan remarks "what baffled me repeatedly was the switch, within one individual's discourse [accounting for resistance] and within a few minutes, between Hobbesian pragmatism and Rousseauian idealism". Similarly, in his examination of Tagalog and other Filipino cultures, Kerkvliet notes that alongside a pragmatic concern to protect personal interests, we find a contending interest in equality (political and economic) and obligations to assist others. These he terms 'entitlement norms'; or what Fegan calls the altruistic pole of common good and justice.

In view of these conclusions there are certain convergences between theoretical

25. Hyden (1980); Robertson (1984, 30); and Mamdani (1972).
26. A common complaint of practitioners. "Cox remains disappointed in the performance of his counterpart ... who dislays little interest in his work and is frequently absent. Cox admits that he has given up hope of teaching ... anything worthwhile during his assignment". And another bemoaned, "The local staff lack a sense of responsibility. Most jobs must be checked by myself as many times I have been told jobs are finished when they have not been started". Government Project Files (1980).
27. Fegan (1983, 46).
28. Kerkvliet (1983, 7) and Fegan (1983, 9-10). The notion of entitlement norms is similar to Sen's (1983) discussion. A parallel not examined here is found in Wicker's (1979) book on the Attica prison riots. See Denhardt and Denhardt's (1979, 111) discussion of this. "In their revolt, the prisoners rejected an imposed image of themselves as semipermanent fixtures in a bureaucratic system and, rather, asserted their own view of themselves as human beings with rights and dignity". See also Chinoy's (1982) work on labour resistance.
statements about substantive rationality (including personal and political interests) and empirical observations. Figure 6.1 depicts this convergence.

**Figure 6.1 Resistance and Rationalisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Developmental Interests</th>
<th>2. Forms of Rationality</th>
<th>3. Forms of Resistance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Chapter One)</td>
<td>(Chapter Three)</td>
<td>(Chapter Six)</td>
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<tr>
<td>material * life sustenance</td>
<td>technical rationality</td>
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<td>. dignity-esteeem</td>
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<td>political</td>
<td>substantive rationality</td>
<td>personal self-interest</td>
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<td>. justice-liberty</td>
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The first two columns have been discussed at length. The development malaise concerns the relation between the technical rationality employed to satisfy material interests and other substantive interests. 'Forms of resistance' refers to the discussion of this section. It points to the rationality (practical and substantive) which must be incorporated into a perspective which seeks to account for both practice and the development malaise. Some convergence is suggested between the substantive interests of columns 1 and 2 (which have been less clearly specified than technical rationality/material interests) and column 3 based on evidence from practice and the resistance literature.

There is need for caution at this point however. It would be easy to proceed from this kind of convergence to analyse the case studies further in terms of the extent to which practitioners' actions promote or deny these substantive interests, and from this, to general conclusions about the malaise. However, this would ignore important epistemological issues. Simply put, conclusions about the extent to which practitioners contribute to or counter the development malaise cannot be wholly derived from empirical observation of events. Conclusions require interpretative judgements on the observer's part about what constitutes resistance. For instance, in the ZDSDP roads example, to say that the dissenting project engineers 'avoided' the pressure of military and corporate interests is quite different from saying they 'resisted' them. Regardless of their actual intention in acting in the observed manner, understood as 'avoidance' we might be inclined to see the practitioners as weak-kneed or culpable individuals who chose to hide behind their techniques. To conclude they
... resisted’ these pressures implies another, quite opposite conclusion. Interestingly, disagreements in the literature about resistance seldom arise over factual issues (for example, what an individual did and with what effect) but stem from different normative judgements on the author’s part regarding the significance of these facts and the substantive interests being served. What this means is that conclusions about the role of practitioners in transforming or reproducing the development malaise, while of course dependent on a reliable theoretical framework and adequate data, ultimately rest on normative commitments of which the author may be only dimly aware.

In summary, my discussion of resistance has raised two matters of prime importance. The first is analytic and of theoretical relevance. Both resistance and rationalisation, acknowledgement of human agency and historical-institutional trends must impinge on a reliable understanding of the reproduction and transformation of the development malaise. The second matter is essentially normative. Analysis requires standards for judgement and the normative character of these standards is nowhere more apparent than in the development malaise. Chapter Seven clarifies the implications of both these points. The purpose of Section II of this chapter is to press home the fundamental need for addressing these issues by demonstrating the practical consequences of not doing so.

II

RE-AUTHORING PRACTICE

Despair and pessimism pervade rationalisation theory. Disenchantment, domination and estrangement are signal terms in an analysis of contemporary history which gives little hope of a positive response to the ‘What is to be done?’ kind of question. For Weber, rationalisation is the ‘fate of our times’, there is very little room to move since, the very rationalisation of social life ... has consequences which contravene some of the most distinctive values of Western civilisation, such as those which emphasise the importance of individual creativity and autonomy of action.... This whole process of rationalisation [is a] universal phenomena [which] more and more restricts the importance of individually differentiated conduct.31

But for all their critique of the ways in which practice has degenerated into technique, the theorists do not think we have yet arrived at that ‘cosmic night’ in which technical rationality expands into ‘total technocracy’. Horkheimer and Adorno, early critical theorists, often referred to ‘the residues of freedom’ and ‘tendencies toward true humanism’ even if these seem powerless in the main course of history.32 At various points, Habermas notes how deeply practical reason and substantive norms are embedded in human life. There is resistance even where the interests this reflects are violated again and again.

29. A good parallel example here is the mid-1970s concern to understand ‘deviant’ behaviour in terms of resistance - i.e., the delinquent as rebel, social critic, revolutionary. Cohen and Taylor (1976, 4) note that on closer study however, “our early romantic wish to impress ideological, political and aesthetic meaning into a whole range of deviant behaviour began to diminish”. See also debate concerning the meaning of bandit activity (Hobsbawm, 1969, and Blok, 1972).


Prior to Habermas, rationalisation theorists concurred that resistance was either palliative and in the longer term counterproductive, or that it was doomed to remain disconnected and individualistic. Habermas has attempted to move beyond this impasse. His critique of rationalisation attempts to identify those constraints on human agency which are contingent and whose removal would enlarge freedom. The goals of critical practice are the goals of substantive rationality: the enhancement of personal autonomy, identity, self-determination and the creation of a ‘just and good society’. In Habermas and secondary authors we find epistemological and empirical discussion of these personal and political substantive interests and explication of a method of practice directed toward these goals.

In this section I examine the critical model of practice pre-figured in Habermas’ work, paying particular regard to: 1) the question of human agency, 2) the derivation of substantive interests and, 3) taking these two points together, the practical, political tendencies of critical practice.

Habermas and Critical Practice

In Chapter Three I noted Habermas’ view that human life and experience is ordered in terms of a priori interests (or ‘knowledge constitutive interests’). These are said to have a ‘quasi-transcendental’ status. That is, while they are expressed in historically specific ways, they nevertheless are fundamental conditions of human existence. This follows from the fact that humans must produce from nature what is needed for material sustenance, and must communicate with others in order to sustain the institutions and practices of social life. The material need corresponds to Habermas’ notion of technical rationality, the communicative need to what he calls a practical interest. A third, emancipatory, interest is added to this. This reflects a human interest in self-reflection and autonomous self-determination, that is, freedom from domination and injustice.

Judging by the number of critical commentaries since his notion of ‘knowledge constitutive interests’ was first translated in 1968, this is perhaps the most problematic aspect of Habermas’ work. Subsequently he made important modifications, among which was a distinction between ‘critical self-reflection’ and ‘reconstruction’. Critical self-reflection designates the practical freeing of individuals, corresponding, in the language of this thesis, to a re-authoring of practice and overcoming the domination of technical rationality. More will be said about this. Reconstruction involves theoretical enquiry which has been uncoupled from practical considerations. Since making this distinction, Habermas has focused on the reconstructive dimension of critical theory rather than on developing the

34. Cf. Barnes (1977, 13, 90, 196-7); Bernstein (1976, 192); and Ottmann (1982, 82-86) as representative. A major concern not relevant here, is the ‘derivative’ versus ‘primary’ status of emancipatory interests (Habermas, 1973, 176; 1975, 24-27. Cf. Van den Berg 1980, 460; and Held 1980, 318-19) and the ramifications this has for the distinctions between work and interaction (Cf. Giddens, 1982, 155-56), and sciences (Cf. Giddens, 1977, 211; Disco, 1979, 209).
practical political dimensions.  

Consequently, numerous lines of investigation have developed from Habermas' work. What follows is based on those authors who have focused more on 'critical self-reflection', that is, the relations between theory and practice. I refer to Habermas' current works only where necessary to clarify the critical model.

Critical practice, based on the emancipatory interest, hinges on psychoanalysis and an extended critique of ideology. Both topics are beyond the scope of this discussion. Suffice to say that the critical model applies the individual psychoanalysis of Freud to group situations. Critical practice seeks to address the social, economic and historical conditions of its subjects and thereby to facilitate their critical awareness of these conditions.

Critical theory aspires to bring the subjects themselves to full consciousness of the contradictions implicit in their material existence, to penetrate the ideological mystifications and forms of false consciousness that distort the meaning of existing social conditions.

Although considerably more complicated than outlined here, the relations between theory and practice in the critical model are said to have three essential stages.

The mediation of theory and praxis can only be clarified if to begin with we distinguish three functions, which are measured in terms of different criteria: the formation and extension of scientific discourse; the organisation of processes of enlightenment, in which such theorems are applied and tested in a unique manner by the initiation of processes of reflection carried on within certain groups toward which these processes have been directed; and the selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical questions, and the conduct of political struggle. On the first level, the aim is true statements, on the second, authentic insights, and on the third, prudent decisions.

The first stage is a scientific discourse which "ties its knowledge claims to the satisfaction of human purposes and desires". It seeks to uncover those systems of social relationships which determine the actions of individuals and the unanticipated, though not accidental, consequences of these actions [this] requires that its practitioners seek to discover quasi-causal laws and

36 Reconstruction has taken Habermas into Chomskian linguistics, and Piaget and Kohlberg's work on genetic and evolutionary development.

37 I refer to Fay (1975); and Shirley (1982) as representative of this work. Some argue that Habermas' distinction between two lines of inquiry, and his subsequent focus on 'reconstruction', reflects a turning away from his earlier work (Forester and Roweis (1983, 488) suggest this). I doubt this, and cite Ottmann (1982, 86, 292 [FN. 25], 88-97) on this point. Perhaps the major change in terms of the practical concerns of this thesis has been to further distance Habermas' 'practical intent' from realisation. On his recent work, Preston (1982, 250) remarks 'discussion has become increasingly detached from the 'real world', and is, in any case, overly self absorbed ... (for example, a democrat confronted by, say, a General Somoza might be well advised to set aside anxieties in respect of elucidation of Habermas in favour of securing a ready supply of Kalashnikovs)". Cf. Porter (1980, 140) and Held (1980, 329).

38 Keat (1981) discusses this in detail.

39 Bernstein (1976, 182).

40 Habermas (1973, 32).

41 Fay (1975, 95).
functional laws of social behaviour in particular social contexts.\footnote{Fay (1975. 94)}

The second stage is the 'organisation of processes of enlightenment' through which these analytic insights are brought to 'intervene in daily life'. Self-reflection is said to assist in exposing illusions, by revealing "disguised but real needs which underly the [illusory] ideas of the actors", by pointing out "the error in the ideas men have [while] it attempts to reveal the truth".\footnote{Fay (1975. 99). Cf. Held (1980. 317) and Porter (1980. 138)} The process which this second and subsequent stages is said to involve closely parallels the 'consciousness raising' pedagogy of Paolo Freire. His concept of conscientisation,

refers to the processes in which men, not as recipients, but as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the socio-political reality which shapes their lives and their capacity to transform that reality.\footnote{Freire (1970, 452). Cf. Fay (1975. 102-3) and Hamnett et al. (1984. 100-102).}

A vision of free and uncoerced communication is said to underly the critical model.\footnote{Fay (1975. 100).}

In turn this implies a fundamentally different political process to that of conventional practice. Rather than providing prescriptive results which are handed over to other (higher) authorities, critical practice is said to be non-authoritarian. The third stage of critical practice makes this clear.

the organisation of action must be distinguished from this process of enlightenment. While the theory legitimizes the work of enlightenment, as well as providing its own refutation when communication fails ... it can by no means legitimize a \textit{a fortiori} the risky decisions of strategic action. Decisions ... cannot at the outset be justified theoretically and then carried out organizationally. The sole possible justification at this level is consensus aimed at practical discourse among participants who, in the consciousness of their common interests and their knowledge of circumstances, of the predictable consequences and secondary consequences, are the only ones who can know what risks they are willing to undergo, and with what expectations.\footnote{Habermas (1973. 253).}

There are at least four summary features of the critical model of practice. First, the use of quasi-causal laws which aim to explain the hitherto unrecognised social forces of domination or oppression which 'work behind the backs' of the subjects. Second, the enlightenment process which seeks to uncover the false needs, wants or attitudes resulting from rationalisation. These illusions are replaced with the insights of critical science regarding the subjects' material, personal and political interests. Third, strategies are determined by the participants in terms of their new understanding and assessment of the risks. A fourth feature follows from this: the truth of the knowledge generated in critical practice is partially dependent on whether the earlier stages occur and subsequent practice proves successful in offering participants a way out of their situation.\footnote{Fay (1975. 109). Cf. Heller (1982, 25-6). The fourth point is found in Fay's work, but it is not altogether reliable to assume it is Habermas' view. His 1973 'Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests' categorically rejects the 'actionism' (that is, that rational political praxis can only be judged retroactively) of Klaus Offe (Habermas 1973b. 179. 1975. 142-3. 162 [FN. 1]).} Each of these points will be addressed below.
Brief reference to the Zamboanga del Sur project case will by contrast illustrate what this critical model implies. The ultimate goal of ZDSDP was to 'raise the living standards of the majority of the people of Zamboanga del Sur province'. This was acknowledged to refer to the 'poorest majority' and therefore, primarily to upland rice and corn farmers with household incomes less than 3,600 pesos (1983 A$450) per year. In terms of abstract 'developmental interests' the material poverty, the human indignity and military atrocities suffered by these people is undeniable. In Chapter Five I considered ZDSDP's approach to enhancing these people's interests. From what 'blind Freddy and his dog' saw, it was evident to practitioners that agricultural yields needed to be maximised in order to increase disposable household income and, with reading, make goods, services and markets accessible. In order for the technical packages to be applied efficiently and farmer performance improved, the 'system' required centralisation so that all factors (credit, fertiliser, high yielding seeds, agricultural extension and farmer attitudes) could be controlled in a predictable manner. I have noted the authoritarian tendencies of this approach (Chapter Five) and also the way in which de-authoring constrained the practitioner's capacity to move beyond the technical dictates of his unshakeable faith in the facts. The way in which farmers, as 'inputs', were de-authored similarly supported an expropriation of authority and hierarchical centralisation.

Critical practice implies a quite different process of problem identification and solution and, with this, different roles for the practitioner and participants. What are the implications of this four stage approach? Numerous points could be made but to maintain the link with earlier themes, I focus on two issues only. The first concerns the relations between human agency and the historical-institutional context of action. The extent to which new ideas can lead to transformative action rather than palliatives which ultimately reproduce the problem, is grossly over-estimated. Ironically, we have the reverse of Marcuse's despair about the transformative potential of ideas and action. The criterion of validity (successful action) ignores the fact that many of the 'causal relations' theory must account for are simply beyond the groups' control and lie outside the arena within which they might reasonably hope to have an effect. National policy and IMF dictates on fertiliser subsidy are a case in point. It may well be that the most fundamental reasons for the farmers' plight result from some sleight of the econometrician's hand or the vagaries of world oil spot market prices. Yet, in essence, optimism is an epistemological precondition of 'correct theory'. A 'truthful' recognition of the bounds of possible action would appear to be

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48. For example, the fourth stage (the means whereby critical practice is validated) deserves some mention. Consider a situation in Zamboanga del Sur where the critical practitioner adopts a group of upland farmers who feel frustrated by the increasing control of ethnic Chinese over credit, inputs and marketing. Together, practitioner and farmers develop a theoretically informed explanation and strategic action within the capacity of the farmers' results. They predict that ethnic tensions and subsequently armed conflict will emerge. Predictably, for the theory is valid, the farmers organise and confront the 'goons, guns and gold' of their oppressors. Blood flows. The theory is epistemologically vindicated - its translation into strategic action being its prime criterion of validation. The example is not unlikely. But the theory's validation is curious. Rather than validating the theory, the said events might be more accurately understood as confirming a theory (which may or may not have been advanced) about the effects of dissemination of a theory of a predictive kind (Cf. Keat 1981. 154-158).
incorrect and inadequate.\textsuperscript{49} Rationalisation theory risks an over-rationalised conception of the scope of individual action in conventional practice. Critical theory which commendably seeks to re-author practice, swings the other way and forgets the import of Kate Millet's remark about spinning wheels in the sand.

At this point I want to address remarks made in the summary of Section I regarding substantive rationality, the normative commitments ultimately expressed in judgements about the development malaise and transformative practice. These matters will prove to be of lasting significance in later chapters.

\textbf{Authority and Tendencies in Critical Practice}

The authority of critical practice rests on a distinction between illusory and real interests. The practitioner is to discern the latter from the false consciousness and mystification surrounding the former. The practitioner requires some 'pre-notion' of people's real interests or at least what substantive norms are genuine or common as opposed to the false or secular ones. How this insight is gained is revealing, both of Habermas' understanding of substantive rationality and ultimately of the political implications of critical practice.

Like other critical theorists, Habermas rejects the usual ways in which standards for judging substantive interests are established (like Hegel's State, or Lukacs' vanguard party). But unlike his colleagues' rejection of all philosophical first principles, Habermas has said there are 'just' norms and that these can be established in a similar way to true statements.\textsuperscript{50} Substantive questions 'admit of truth' and can be rationally grounded and differences resolved. Logically this position is essential in order to speak of real or generalisable interests and distinguish those which are secular and simply legitimate existing relations of power. Rather than identifying these interests in Archimedean fashion, Habermas offers a method whereby the practitioner can ask how the subjects would have collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs (and which norms they would have accepted as justified) if they could have and would have decided on organisation of social intercourse through discursive will formation, with adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives of their society.\textsuperscript{51} This method is called 'the ideal speech situation'. Herein there are no constraints on communication and strategies arise from the unconstrained consensus and force of better argument. In this method of dialogue reason prevails over the prejudices of class, special status or secular interests.\textsuperscript{52}

The obvious question, asked by many, is how can we be sure the consensus reached

\textsuperscript{49} Keat (1981, 158).
\textsuperscript{50} Habermas (1975, 23-24). Cf. Slater (1977, 22-25, 39-40); Jay (1973, 44); and Turner (1981, 78 ff). This view is most evident in Habermas' theory of communicative competence on which McCarthy (1973) is accredited as the best source (Habermas, 1982). See also Lukes (1982, 134) and Habermas (1975, 111).
\textsuperscript{51} Habermas (1975, 113).
\textsuperscript{52} This is a highly abridged version of Habermas (1975, 107-8) and McCarthy (1978, 292).
reflects valid, common interests? Habermas' theory of 'universal pragmatics' addresses this. In brief, he argues that certain validity claims are universally pre-figured in all human communication. To the extent that people enter communication aimed at understanding, they automatically raise four different types of validity claim: correctness or rightness, comprehensibility, truth, and truthfulness or sincerity. In other words, he ties the vision of freedom and justice (emancipation from material and ideological constraint) to the basic character of human interaction. In short, substantive rationality lies in human nature. Heller has summarised the substantive values which underpin this critical model. "Rational discourse stands for practical activity and is the supreme value; domination-free communication stands for freedom; the ideal speech situation for equality; consensus for truth".

Next to the model of knowledge constitutive interests, this aspect of Habermas' work is the most hotly debated. Here I will address four issues: 1) the practical requirements of an ideal speech situation; 2) the presumptions that appear to be made about the status of substantive interests; 3) the possibility of critical practice; and 4) the authoritarian character of that practice. Each point is closely related and leads to conclusions which have a major bearing on following chapters.

In summary, Habermas implies that if in the course of everyday critical practice the participants are unable to reach consensus or understanding, then they will have to move to the discourse of the ideal speech situation. Here it is said the 'unforced force' of better arguments prevails. The key norm here, as Heller notes, is equality (no relations of domination, equality of opportunities to participate, no barriers to openness due to self-interest or repressed motives). In a practical context, however, it is highly likely that this would dissolve the conflict which constrained understanding to begin with. The absence of self-interest and unconscious personality drives, guaranteed equality (in access to the means of articulating views, etc.) would likely undermine the individuality or distinctiveness of the participants' original positions. In effect, as Keat's psychological critique points out, none of them could or would want to contribute anything to the discourse that would differ from anyone else. In terms of earlier remarks about the de-authoring of conventional practice, this contains a paradoxical twist. Critical theory seeks to 're-author' practice. But in meeting its own conditions it would contribute more to de-authoring the participants than the conventional practitioner's survey questionnaire ever would.

Logically, my concern about the status of the norms of emancipatory reason is prior to this. The substantive norms (freedom, justice, truth) are presupposed as constitutive of all communication. But judging from history, communication seems to lend itself just as well.

56. For example, Keat (1981, 183-4) and contributors to Thompson and Held (1982) survey most of the concerns. Rorty (1980) presents a general philosophical critique of the quest for a set of rules pertaining to a rational agreement on conflicting statements or truth claims.
57. Which consists in 'the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust and accord with one another' (Habermas, 1979, 2).
or perhaps better to distortion as to rational emancipatory discourse. As Richard Bernstein points out, "The appeal to something like a rational consensus has always been used to block, stifle, or rule out revolutionary turns in conversation." Besides, it is difficult to be convinced that all occasions of resistance are motivated by the norms of emancipatory reason. Certainly, as Section I suggested, some evidence might indicate this is one way of understanding resistance. But as anthropologists acknowledge, one cannot be sure to what extent this reflects the intention of those involved or the researcher’s normative commitments. The idiosyncratic actions of practitioners or others may reflect norms of entitlement or justice. But they may equally reflect passing emotions, habits or sheer blood-mindedness. Some ZDSDP engineers did resist the military’s road location requests. They were indeed aware of the kinds of community organising underway in the areas the road was destined for, and on this basis, their actions could be understood as motivated by a sense of justice. But their actions may also have been explained by their personal repugnance for particular military individuals, and no more. For Habermas and his followers this raises no problems. We do not choose to overcome rationalisation (such as systematically distorted communication), it simply is the case, because we are rational beings.

A third, pragmatic problem leads toward more serious concerns. Advocates of the critical model never seriously address the difficulties likely to be encountered and neither, therefore, the political consequences of these. First, the practitioner is asked to turn attention to substantive rationality; to questions of norms, values, enlightenment and so forth. A critical practitioner would then have to evaluate values, reveal false ideas (wants and interests) and replace them with accounts of a truth that works behind the subjects’ backs. In practice it would be absolutely impossible to assess the degree of distortion in particular cases, or the generality of one norm, ideal, or belief over another. In an epistemological discussion Richard Bernstein makes a point which is relevant here.

To speak of the argumentative redemption of validity claims through an appropriate type of discourse is either potentially stifling or sheer bluff. It becomes either a glorification and reification of existing, normal, contingent social practices or a pious and vacuous generality. Before the fact, one can have only a vague idea of what will prove a ‘reasonable’ form of discourse. Indeed even in Habermas’ philosophical works, reason lacks definition and substance. It is defined as the outcome of truly rational, unconstrained discourse; yet at the same time it is in unconstrained discourse that reason is said to prevail.

Again this is no difficulty for advocates of the critical model. Their epistemology is said to reflect a priori features of human nature. No means of verification are offered outside the method which begins from these presumptions. Habermas has said the norms of the substantive interests cannot be reduced to an ‘empirical status’ by anthropological inquiry. This accords with my earlier remarks about the lack of concise, universal definition.

59. Bernstein (1983, 198). Cf. Van den Berg (1980, 470). This seems to imply that the domination of technical rationality is to an extent self-imposed and/or that overcoming it is naturally intended. The way that inequality is maintained through control and manipulation of communicative resources is ironically a primary concern of Habermas (1975).

But in effect this conveniently removes the basis of critical practice from rational scrutiny.61

Even supposing these 'universal propositions of human interaction' which he 'tentatively advances' prove empirically valid, seldom do we learn how these are to be established in practice. Responsibility, justice and freedom are fine, who would disagree? But however much use in philosophical debate, abstract categories of this kind are of little help in facing the bargaining, compromise and conflict that all practitioners acknowledge underlie practice.

What then is likely to happen in practice? Habermas is committed to the view that ultimately, substantive/practical questions must be left to the people concerned. On the other hand, he equally believes that practical questions cannot be left to the "arbitrariness of uncontrolled value judgements" but must be settled by a "scientifically explicated understanding of the world".62 Clearly the practitioner and those he works with are to be encouraged to make the necessary judgements; yet simultaneously cautioned that they are likely to be ideologically suspect. Commentators have suggested a variety of possible outcomes in practice.63

One is that the real generalisable norms would be settled by enlightened critical practitioners. After a little discourse, practitioners would present the truth and this would guide the actions of soon-to-be-enlightened subjects. But this would not lead to self-reflective nor autonomous emancipation. Another possibility is that everyone gets involved (within what boundaries?) for a free and unconstrained debate (leaving aside how and who shall determine when this condition is satisfied), after which substantive/practical questions are settled and become binding. It is doubtful that Habermas implies this either, since truth arises and can be sustained only when individuals are freed from compulsion.64 A third possibility amounts to continuous dialogue with nothing being 'settled' because nothing is binding on an individual who disagrees in good faith. This option opens the possibility of value relativism and endless regress.

The second and third possibilities are clearly unworkable. The demands of practice are likely to favour the first. If compared with Part One this clearly departs very little from the essence of conventional practice. The difference is simply in the grounds whereby each approach is authorised. The conventional practitioner aspires to an image of de-authored practice. Judgements appear to be immunised against substantive interests and reflect a discipline which enables him to speak to the facts. The critical practitioner seeks to substantively re-author practice. His authority rests on special theoretical insight into what would be in people's real interests if only they could see beyond their distorted, false images. Both are authoritarian. But ironically, in critical practice these authoritarian tendencies are more naked since the theoretical grounds of the practitioners' authority are beyond rational, empirical scrutiny. Speaking of critical theory, Heller expresses the crux of my concern.

63. Disco (1979); Keat (1981); Barnes (1977); and Van den Berg (1980).
64. Habermas (1973, 168-69, 179).
the theorist's pretension to know the interests of others better than they do themselves, and the claim that others can recognise their real interests only through the interpretation of the theory (indeed, through one single theory) - these claims must be renounced. The imputation of needs and interests cannot and should not be the task of theory.\textsuperscript{65}

Summary

Part Two began with Tom Robbins' remarks about the 'unravelling of theory'. I pursued this theme in two ways. The rationalisation perspective highlights some indisputable aspects of the development malaise, but analysis must reflexively examine the shadows this light casts on other aspects of development practice. If resistance is ignored then analysis risks an over-rationalised account of practice, unreliable conclusions about the development malaise and inappropriate strategies to overcome it.

Individual's resistance shows they know a great deal more about the consequences of and constraints on their actions than the rationalisation perspective is inclined to credit. Unravelling both rationalisation and resistance therefore provides raw materials for a more adequate epistemology.

A second theme in this chapter involved unravelling the relations between theory and practice and with this some of the assumptions that tend to be made about substantive rationality. I have given examples of how the personal and political interests subsumed under the concept of substantive rationality may be expressed. But, I have urged caution and through the discussion in Section II illustrated the authoritarian consequences of ignoring this.

The import of this chapter has been to demonstrate the need for a more sensitive theoretical framework both in order to reliably account for the development malaise and consider alternative modes of practice. In the following chapter I take the next step toward these ends, while also demonstrating the considerable difficulties in achieving them.

\textsuperscript{65} Heller (1982, 30) Emphasis added. Cf Van den Berg (1982, 461) "... every time in history when norms and values were considered to be absolutely valid, capable of some kind of irrefutable verification or other, a massacre has resulted".
CHAPTER 7
DUALISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

In Chapter Six I identified two epistemological constraints on explanation of the development malaise. The first is analytic and stems from the need to incorporate both rationalisation and resistance in understanding development practice. The second concerns the normative dimensions of analysis and how these impinge on both explaining the development malaise and constructing modes of practice to encounter it.

In this chapter I argue these issues are current in other fields of social inquiry and that recent convergences in thinking help chart a new theoretical course for the remaining chapters. The theory of structuration, which I review in Section I, addresses an age-old concern, namely, to what extent are individuals’ actions (or social life generally) a product of their intentions, interests and capacity (agency), and to what degree is it a reflection of, or determined by, their membership of collectivities (like class, profession), particular institutional circumstances, or by broader historical trends like rationalisation.

Despite the insights non-dualistic theories like structuration provide, I argue in Section II that empirical work is limited by the lack of methodological propositions from this perspective. However, to confront this problem, it is necessary to also return to the second theme of Chapter Six. Structuration theory is epistemologically helpful. But to apply it, one must specify how the various developmental interests I have been discussing (material, personal, and political) are manifested and interact in particular instances. Once again, I find current debates in related areas of social science assist in clarifying, if not resolving, these normative concerns. After illustrating this by referring to the so-called ‘power debate’. Section III draws two conclusions from structuration theory. The first is about the constraints on general, and verifiable, propositions of the relation between the actions of practitioners and the development malaise. The second conclusion concerns the practical implications of non-dualist social theory and thereby establishes the direction of Part Three.

I
GIDDENS’ THEORY OF STRUCTURATION

The issues of rationalisation and resistance are manifestations of an epistemological problem that plagues all Western social theory. In this section I review relevant features of the theory of structuration which reconceptualises this problem and goes some way toward its resolution.

The epistemological problem is captured in remarks by Marx and Weber. Marx observed, "Men make history, but they do not make it as they please ... but under
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."¹ Weber's oft-quoted 'switch-man' metaphor points to the same duality and interdependence of individual and society.

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.²

Philosophical Dualism

Philosophical dualism is present in all Western social theory. There are theoretical perspectives which emphasise the primacy of the 'subject' (human volition, cognition, agency) in explaining social life, and those which focus on the 'object' - beginning, that is, with the social and natural world in which human experience is formed. On the one hand, structuralist and functionalist theories tend to give social structural or institutional phenomena a self-propelling life of their own; acting subjects are virtually lifeless dupes of forces beyond their control. On the other hand, human agency predominates in interpretive or phenomenological inquiry: social structure is relevant to explanation only to the extent that it is constructed and sustained by that agency. As Thrift has pointed out, these contrasting perspectives can be understood in terms of the historic origins of social science.

Social theory born under capitalism must reflect many of the features of capitalism ... capitalist society is both collectivist and individualistic. On the one hand, each individual lives in a highly socialized world; on the other, each individual lives in a privatised world .... Thus each particular social theory tends to stray, in varying degrees, towards either the determinism of capitalist society or to the voluntarism of capitalist individuality.³

Dualism appears under many prominent names and guises⁴ and is particularly well represented in human geography. The man-environment theme oscillates between idealism

¹ Marx (1972, 10)
² Weber (1948, 280)
⁴ Prominent social science keywords indicate the scope of issues implicated by dualism:

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<td>explanation</td>
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See Rubinstein (1981, 9-26) for a summary review.
and materialism, or between determinism and possibilism. The ritual clashes between structural Marxism and phenomenology in the discipline also reflect the same confusions of dualism. The implications however go much further than academic ideology and affect all aspects of inquiry. Golledge characterises the subject-object dichotomy that plagues the discipline in the following terms.

The Dr Jekyll in us wants to be objective, general, concrete, factual, holistic, empirical, pragmatic and certain. But the Mr Hyde insists that we be subjective, particular, abstract, ambiguous, belief-laden, fragmented, and uncertain.

A convergence in attempts at overcoming dualism, in all its manifestations, is a striking feature of recent social science. There is said to be a common ground reflecting "a new problematic [which] has to steer a course between the scylla of determinism and the charybdis of voluntarism."

Prominent in this common ground is geographers' reference to a 'structuration school' who, despite important differences and little 'school-like' cross-referencing, share common concerns. All are attempting to overcome "the perceived excesses of those theories which either treat society as a supra-individual entity or uphold a naively individualistic position." Berger and Luckman, in one of the earliest statements (1967) argued for a three phase dialectical understanding of social life; first, society is a social product - that is, of human activity. Second, society is an objective reality, in the sense that it is perceived as an objective and undeniable fact apart from individuals. Third, man is a social product, since everyday practice reflects (in biography and knowledge) the objective facticity of the world.

Anthony Giddens has been a prolific contributor to this literature. Reviewers suggest his work appears as a kind of Hegelian Aufhebung in social theory (that is, preservation and


6. Compare, e.g., Duncan and Ley's (1983, 54) remarks about the former with Pred's (1983, 50) comments on Tuan (1975; 1977; 1979); Relph (1976); and Buttimer and Seamon (1980).

7. Golledge (1982, 21). See also Gregory (1978); Sayer (1980); Entikin (1976); and Christensen (1982). There is an uneasiness that has spread throughout intellectual and cultural life. It affects almost every discipline and every aspect of our lives. This uneasiness is expressed by the opposition between objectivism and relativism, but there are a variety of other contrasts that indicate the same underlying anxiety: rationality versus irrationality, objectivity versus subjectivity, realism versus antirealism' (Bernstein, 1983, 1).


9. Reference to structuration is to be found on the following geographic examples: Gould and Olsson (1982); Forbes (1984); Thrift (1983); Pred (1981, 1981b, 1983). Regarding the structurationist perspective itself, it is frequently said to begin with the work of Berger and Luckman's (1967) "phenomenal constructivist" approach (cf. Thomason, 1981). Kosik (1976). Bourdieu (1977); Touraine (1977); Williams (1977); Bhaskar (1979, 1983); and Giddens (1976, 1979, 1981, 1981b, 1982, 1982b, 1983) are generally considered the core of this approach. As to the notion of 'school', it is notable that apart from recent work (Bhaskar 1983, and Giddens 1983), it is secondary authors who have played on the common ground between the primary authors. Secondary interpretations of their work offer a confusing array of conclusions regarding the deterministic or voluntarist tendencies in the primary statements. For instance, on Bourdieu's 'determinism' see Dimaggio (1979, 146-69), or Acciaioli (1981). Similarly Berger and Luckman (1967), considered 'too voluntarist by some (e.g., Bhaskar 1983) are criticised as 'determinist' by others (e.g., Grimshaw 1980 or Outhwaite 1983, Chap. 5).

annulment, continuity and suspension: leading to some higher synthesis). His extremely broad ambit is subject to diverse understanding, partly because concepts and themes are frequently left unconnected. In this section I select some of the central elements of Giddens' perspective, not solely in terms of representativeness, but more with an eye to the interests of this thesis.

Duality of Structure
The dialectical conception of social life is central to Giddens' notion of 'duality of structure'. This refers to the fact that social structures are, simultaneously, both the medium and outcome of social action. Neither subject (that is, human agents) nor the object (social institutions, structures) have primacy. Structures must be reproduced by human actions; they cannot exist independently. Whilst the "notions of action and structure presuppose one another", to speak of praxis "is to reject every conception of human beings as 'determined objects' or as unambiguously 'free subjects'. The point here should be familiar after the earlier discussion of resistance. Giddens stresses that, "at any point in time, the agent 'could have acted otherwise': either positively in terms of an attempted intervention in the process of 'events in the world', or negatively in terms of forebearance."

By introducing the twin concepts of 'knowledgeability' and 'capability', Giddens argues much social theory fails to acknowledge that individuals know a great deal about what they do, the interests at stake and the context and institutions in which they act. Capability refers to the human capacity to 'do otherwise' - even if only by withdrawing or refraining from action - individuals always retain the capacity to 'make a difference'. These precepts carry the rider that knowledgeability is situated; it is always bounded by the place, time and institutional context in which it occurs. Two additional concepts refer to this boundedness: 'unintended consequences' and the 'unacknowledged conditions' of action. No one can completely anticipate the consequences of action nor be fully aware of the conditions bearing on their act. Moreover, the consequences of previous activity (including others' actions) form the basis for current action, in both acknowledged and unacknowledged ways. Only certain things can be known - reflecting personal biography, life history, intentions and purposes at hand.

12. Consider Miller's (1980, 1055) rather disparaging remark. "Complex thinkers are rushed on stage for two paragraphs, thanked for an insight or scolded for an error, and then ushered to the exit ... Giddens' own theory tends to get lost in the shuffle. It is never simply stated and defended. Its possible uses are never explored in detail."
13. Those familiar with his work will note that no mention is made of Giddens' contribution regarding space and time which have had particular interest for human geographers, but cf. Collins (1983, 365).
14. Giddens (1979, 5; 1976, 103). Cf. Bhaskar (1979, 43). "Society is the ever-present 'condition' (material cause) and the continually reproduced 'outcome' of human agency" and "Society appears as the unmotivated condition and non-teleological product of our substantive productions (praxes), which in turn reproduce or transform their own conditions" (Bhaskar, 1983, 84).
Practical knowledge is not reflexive, but refers to "what actors know, but cannot necessarily put into words, about how to 'go on' in the multiplicity of contexts of social life". In other words, practical knowledge is "tacit knowledge skilfully applied in the enactment of courses of conduct, but which the actor is not able to formulate discursively". Discursive knowledge comprises a more or less articulated (often theoretically informed) body of knowledge, "all those things that actors can say, can put into words, about the conditions of their action".

The practitioners' notions (Chapter Three) which stress special skill, objective knowledge and discipline - indices of technical rationality - exemplify discursive knowledge. The more difficult to elaborate, tacit knowledge about 'common-sense' and the metaphors of practice refer to the inchoate, practical knowledge beyond discursive rationalisations.

Giddens' dialectical approach leads to the view that "the notions of action and structure presuppose one another" and therefore the conclusion that overcoming dualism "necessitates a reworking both of a series of concepts linked to each of these terms and of the terms themselves." However, turning to the structure side of the dialectic, Giddens addresses the persistent ambiguities surrounding the concept of social structure in social science. Social structure is conceptualised as produced in and through the medium of practice and reciprocally supplies the limits of enablement and constraint on action. But there is no logical relation between agency and structure. For Giddens, structure exists on a different ontological level than social practices and has what he calls a 'virtual existence'. Indeed, the attributes of agency and structure are quite different; intentionality is a feature of agency, whereas structures do not have needs, do not cause or constrain action, and have no teleology. The concept 'duality of structure' refers to the fact that "social structures are both constituted 'by' human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution". The link between agency and structure is not logical but is grounded in the knowledgeability of individuals. In other words, like Max Weber, Giddens believes "the relations between practical consciousness and the structural properties of social systems are founded above all in the routinisation of day to day life".

Giddens uses an example of language and speech to illustrate the way in which social structures are, as he says 'instantiated' in social practices, and contrarily, how those practices reproduce the attributes of social structures. When we utter a grammatical sentence, we contribute to the reproduction of language as a whole. Language enables speech, but for speech to have any 'sense' it must reproduce (and therefore be constrained by) the broader framework of language. This is what Giddens refers to as the 'recursive'

18. Giddens (1979. 57). In Giddens (1976. 115) this is referred to as 'mutual knowledge'.
20. This parallels remarks by Schutz (1967) about 'cook-book' knowledge.
nature of duality of structure. Judgements about the extent to which language constrains, as opposed to enables, speech are similar to the various 'moods' attending the rationalisation and resistance perspectives. The degree to which Marcuse believed even radical action simply reproduced the broader rationalised society was the source of his despair. Contrarily, the optimism of those advocating critical practice reflects their faith in the transformative potential of (enlightened) human agency.

In place of an either/or (rationalisation or resistance; structure or agency) emphasis, Giddens' concept of 'structuration' underscores the mutual dependence of structure and agency.

... to talk of structuration ... is to say: a) that social systems are structured only in and through their continual and contingent reproduction in day-to-day social life; and b) that the capability/knowledgeability of social actors is always bounded (though in historically mutable ways).

The speech/language illustration is relevant to two further key concepts in structuration, namely 'rules' and 'resources'. Drawing on Wittgenstein and Weber, Giddens argues rules may be seen as conventions that guide and enable practice. Rules underscore how social life is a product of human agency (and therefore capable of being changed), while also enveloped in patterns which constrain possibilities for change in varying ways. There is no real definition of rules. Quoting Wittgenstein, Giddens remarks "remember that in general we don’t use language according to strict rules - it hasn’t been taught to us by means of strict rules either".

Giddens places considerable emphasis on an analytic distinction between allocative and authoritative types of resource. Allocation refers to the human capability to control the external 'object-world'. He suggests that three forms of allocative resource may be found in any society.

a) Material features of the environment (raw materials, material power sources).
   Means of material production/reproduction (instruments of production, technology).
b) Produced goods (artefacts created by the interaction of (a) and (b)).

Authorisation refers to the human capability to control the humanly created world of society itself. The corresponding forms of resource are:

a) Organisation of social time-space (the temporal-spatial constitution of society).
b) Production/reproduction of the human body (the distribution, organisation and relations of human beings in society).
c) Organisation of human life-chances (constitution of chances of self-expression.

27 Giddens (1981. 51).
This discussion arises in Giddens' most recent work and is closely connected with largely under-developed concepts like signification, legitimation and modalities. The relevance of what has been said thus far can be exemplified by my previous discussion (Chapter Four) of the Somosomo mini-hydro project and the Apia water supply and sewerage scheme. The Somosomo and Apia projects were emphasised in different ways to illustrate two 'sides' of development practice. I used the Somosomo project to show how, in many important respects, this instance of 'development' was initiated, conceived, and then halted by the practitioners involved. From the outset, they defined 'what was required' by mobilising certain rules which both stipulated the attributes of a 'reasonable' solution to what they also had defined as a 'self-evident' problem. These rules were largely beyond the capability of Fiji counterpart agencies to scrutinise. Moreover, the apparently precise and universal criteria and rules - although part of a standard approach - could be manipulated and reinterpreted in terms of the particular interests of the practitioners.

The Apia project illustrated how this influence is 'bounded'. The rules and resources institutionalised in development practice, while they enable practice, simultaneously provide the limits of enablement. The authoritative nature of practice cannot exist independently of the techniques and procedures which embody the structurally derived rules. To be authoritative, that is, 'influential', the practitioner must work within and thereby reproduce pre-existing definitions of 'what has to be done'. Consequently, while practitioners have a vantage point in defining development, the very exercise of this vantage point has various unintended consequences. A 'bankable project' in Apia embodied a host of structural properties, for instance the capital disbursement rates and other 'non-negotiable' imperatives of international financial agencies. The practitioners were keen to produce a project which was in accord with Samoan culture. However, the weight of previous reports, which defined the problem and solution, became an unacknowledged condition of action. Together with the standards required for a bankable project this had various unintended consequences. The possibility of strengthening Samoan participation in and control over project implementation was foreclosed. Indeed the project had to be 'insulated' from traditional authority, and water use customs had to be altered by legislative fiat. Capital return periods and disbursement rates required a speed of construction which could be achieved only by foreign contractors. Project standards were dependent on skills which were largely beyond local capacity.

Essentially, the Apia project illustrates how the duality of structure relates the smallest item of behaviour to attributes of more inclusive systems. However, while both projects could be extensively re-examined in terms of structuration concepts, they would also give substance to a rather puzzling aspect of Giddens' epistemology. In these projects we see both structure and agency. That is, we see how apparently inconsequential standards - like pipe depth or pipe bedding materials - serve to reproduce broader structural processes.

28. Giddens (1981, 51-2) a) refers to his discussion of 'locale' (1981, 39, 45). All collectivities are said to have defined locales of operation, ranging from confined settings like offices or factories to the large-scale territorial aggregations of nation states or multi-national corporate empires. Cf. Thrift (1983, 40-1).
like rationalisation. But the Somosomo project shows how the link is not exhaustive and is, therefore, uncertain. In line with Giddens, practitioners are 'knowledgeable and capable', and 'there is considerably greater potential separation between the practices actors sustain in day-to-day social reproduction and overall symbolic orders [of structure] normatively sanctioned' than is commonly realised.²⁹

I have yet to introduce Giddens' remarks about power, and the linked concepts domination/exploitation and sectional/universal interests which are particularly relevant to analysis of the development malaise. But with the previous discussion in mind, the next section pauses to examine some of the methodological issues raised by structuration theory.

II

SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN STRUCTURATION

The notion of duality of structure forms the link between agency and structure (or more accurately, 'structural properties'). Knowledgeable/capable individuals engage in both routine and transformative social practices which create the 'visible pattern' of social life. Simultaneously, when actors engage in practice they draw on rules and resources which may both reaffirm and transform the structural properties of broader institutional processes like rationalisation.

What does non-dualist epistemology imply in methodological terms? The first implication concerns the propositions of analysis. Given the social scientific interest in causation, dualist social theories have always had some methodological attraction. They are capable of providing clear methodological guidelines or propositions. For structuralism, these propositions are based on a clear sense of determination - the Marxian notion of relations of production for instance, provides a powerful lever for analysis. In voluntarist theories these propositions centre on human intentionality - as in Schutz' explication of 'in-order-to' and 'because-motives'. According to Giddens, such dualistic epistemologies distort the 'recursiveness' of social life. Dualism must be replaced with the notion of duality.

The dualism of popular social theories exactly parallels the contrast between rationalisation and resistance. The rationalisation perspective enabled analysis to proceed on the basis of propositions (Chapter Three) which show how specific practices instantiate, in Giddens' terms, broader historical processes of rationalisation. Similarly, interpretative inquiry of resistance seeks to account for behaviour in terms of the actor's motives or intentionality.³⁰ Based on countervailing evidence, I noted in Chapter Six how the recursiveness of practice was distorted by exclusive reliance on either point of view.

Yet, while the evidence and theoretical argument supports Giddens' epistemology, my conclusion is that structuration theory can be used to highlight only intermittent aspects of the question this thesis addresses. Essentially, this question requires that we theorise how

the development malaise is reproduced and/or transformed by the actions of development practitioners. To answer this I argue below that Giddens' epistemological duality must of necessity be replaced by methodological dualism in actual analysis. Furthermore, how this is achieved, or more specifically, at what point the researcher 'cuts-into' the duality, is of crucial significance for the conclusions one draws about the extent to which conventional practice reproduces or transforms the malaise. This conclusion, as I will show in Section III has fundamental implications for the practical concerns which are linked to analysis.

**Duality Versus Methodological Necessity**

Earlier reference to Marx and Weber indicated that attempts at overcoming dualism are as old as social theory itself. The persistence of dualism however, also shows that it is one thing to make duality an epistemological starting point, and quite another to show how this occurs in particular situations. Recently, this has been impressed upon contemporary researchers, not the least human geographers, who have traditionally found it difficult to relate the generalisations of theory to particular places and times involving specific individuals or groups.31 As one recently concluded.

In each and every case [of research informed by structuration], the reader is left suspended and unenlightened as to precisely the means by which the everyday shaping and reproduction of self and society, of individual and institution come to be expressed as specific structure-influenced and structure-influencing practices occurring at determinate locations in time and space.32 Instead of specifics we have continually repeated programmatic statements about what needs to occur at the empirical level. In this regard we find the above author repeating (a year later) the same kind of programmatic statement he first presented some four or five years previously. Oddly enough, his programmatic demand appears in a special volume purporting to deal with empirical applications of the structuration approach. It deserves quoting at length.

The project-defining, or place-creating, goals and decisions arrived at by individuals holding institutional positions of varying importance cannot be severed from the awareness of local and non-local resources and opportunities those people have built up through their limited acquisition of imperfect information; from the way in which they reflectively or unselfconsciously interpret and react to political, economic, and other occurrences outside the institution; from any anticipation they may hold of rewards or penalties; and from their absorption or rejection of prevailing group or cultural values. And, all these things, in turn, cannot be divorced from the uniquely accumulated path histories of those same individuals, or the temporal and spatial details of their own past involvement in the dialectical process of structuration.33

My point is not to criticise the author (the research program is not at issue) but rather to acknowledge the difficulties posed by structuration, or any non-dualist theory for that matter. As Gunnar Olsson has remarked, "The relations which tie the one to the many and the many to the one are at the same time determining culture and determined by culture.

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Writing those words is easy. Reading them is incredibly difficult. More simply put, empirical analysis requires a methodological starting point. Analysis, like reading, requires counter-factual conditions and linear logic. The consequence, as Olsson points out, is that "any social scientist is handicapped by the methodological praxis which requires him to be more stupid than he actually is".

Be that as it may, the methodological problem remains no matter how often we may concur that the lack of a dialectical, relational language constrains us, and no matter how frequently structuration theorists invoke the remark that their formulations are 'programmatic' or represent a tentative 'scaffolding from which to build specific analyses'. The fact remains that no empirical research, to my knowledge, has clearly spelt out how individual practices intersect with structural properties at specific times and places in a dialectical non-dualistic manner. Duality of structure spans both possibilities of intersection, but it provides no methodological grip on which is likely to prevail, agency or structure, transformation or reproduction, under what conditions or circumstances. As others have remarked, the theory of structuration, unlike its 'lesser' dualistic predecessors, is fundamentally non-propositional.

To be fair, Giddens has acknowledged the methodological difficulties involved. Two of his responses are relevant, the second more fully developed than the first. First, Giddens stresses the hermeneutic character of descriptions of social conduct and notes that to produce an adequate account of practice, the researcher has to learn what it is to 'go on' in the activities which constitute that form of life. This enables the researcher to 'circle in and out of' these forms of life. Research involves "picking up, developing, scrutinising the mutual knowledge" which is the means to understanding. This he notes has important implications for the kind of descriptions that may be derived from such research. For just as mutual knowledge (practical) is never wholly propositional, frequently inchoate and seldom fully worked out, the same applies for the analysis of empirical situations. As Shotter, one of the few structuration authors with empirical experience within the structuration approach, remarks, "there can be no final conclusions to a paper on duality of structure", a point discussed in the following section.

Returning to the methodological difficulties however, Giddens' second response to the analytic demands of empirical research is more fully worked out. In order to address the research question, we seek theoretical propositions of methodological value regarding when

34 Olsson (1982, 227).
37 Cf. Archer (1982); Shotter (1983); and C. Smith (1983). This has led to charges that Giddens' work is individualist and voluntarist by those used to applying a great deal more 'determination' to their analysis of social action. Cf. Thrift (1983, 33); Sayer (1983, 111-2); and Forbes (1984, 138). I believe this misjudges Giddens' work.
38 Giddens (1983, 75-6). Mutual knowledge is discussed by Giddens (1976, 88-9). Basically this concerns 'what any competent actor (given time, place, community and circumstance) can be expected to know'. Thrift (1984) presents one of the clearest formulations of 'knowing' and 'unknowing'.
(more) recursiveness or (more) transformation will prevail. That is, when practices (and practitioners in particular) are more likely to reaffirm the tendencies toward a malaise to a greater extent than on other occasions, when a greater degree of transformative potential can be or is realised. In understanding the intersection of agency (interaction) and structure (structural properties), Giddens introduces a distinction between social integration and system integration. Social integration refers to reciprocal relations of autonomy and dependence between actors. System integration refers to reciprocity in the relations of autonomy and dependence between groups or collectivities. This distinction he says, is "the nearest I shall come in this book to admitting the usefulness of a differentiation between 'micro-' and 'macro-sociological' studies", that is, to dualism. Clearly, the 'systemness' of social integration is fundamentally linked to collective, societal integration. Recall that the duality of structure relates the smallest item of day-to-day behaviour to attributes of far more inclusive social systems.

Of more interest is that this is closely related to a methodological distinction Giddens draws between institutional analysis and the analysis of strategic conduct. Here Giddens implicitly acknowledges it is necessary to create this dualism to proceed with the analysis of actual practices. Analysis requires a methodological epoche, a bracketing out of one or the other.

To examine the constitution of social systems as strategic conduct is to study the mode in which actors draw upon structural elements ['properties' elsewhere] - rules and resources - in their social relations. 'Structure' here appears as actors' mobilisation of discursive and practical consciousness in social encounters. Institutional analysis, on the other hand, places an epoche upon strategic conduct, treating rules and resources as chronically reproduced features of social systems.

A parallel with earlier chapters will clarify what is meant here. By regarding development practice in terms of the concepts of the rationalisation perspective. Part One focused on how everyday project practices reaffirm the tendencies toward a development malaise. Instead of 'reaffirm the tendencies', following Giddens, read 'chronically reproduce'. For instance, it was observed how the institutionally required application of survey or cost-benefit techniques reaffirmed dominant-submissive political relations and, ultimately, the interests of particular social groups. Following the concerns of rationalisation theorists through the three stages of analysis in Part One, I was able to illustrate how the 'smallest items' of practice reproduced certain broader institutional features of society.

The discussion of resistance, by comparison, indicated that Part One reflected a particular point of view, or more particularly, a mode of analysis. The insights of that mode were not rejected. But a focus on the strategic aspects of everyday practice pointed out, as Giddens would say, that there is considerably more 'discursive penetration' of his 'chronically reproduced' tendencies than the rationalisation mode of analysis would have us realise. By

40. Giddens (1979, 76-7).
41. Giddens (1979, 77).
42. Giddens (1979, 80).
shifting attention, that is by bracketing the 'institutional' kind of analysis of rationalisation, the knowledgeability/capability of actors and the 'transformative potential' of everyday practice could be seen.

The problem however (and the reason I turned to Giddens' structuration), was a matter of recombination. For just as there are dangers in accepting too much of the rationalisation perspective (with words like domination, legitimation, authoritarian), so too could the analysis of resistance, as strategic conduct, be taken too far. The metaphor 'spinning one's wheels in the sand' alerts us to the fact that the analysis of strategic conduct needs to incorporate the 'chronically reproduced' tendencies toward a malaise which had previously been observed.

Conceptually this recombination is aided by Giddens' notion of 'duality of structure'. The problem, however, is that while we must acknowledge that this coupling of rationalisation and resistance takes place (that is not at issue), we are still unable to formulate general propositions (either from theory or the empirical cases) of how this occurs. By implication, save for the intermittent insights into particular aspects of practice, we are still unable to: a) formulate general answers regarding how conventional development practice reaffirms or counters tendencies toward a development malaise, or b) to determine the extent to which alternative modes of practice may capitalise on the degrees of freedom that may exist wherein the transformative potential can be realised.

Giddens' work invokes two images which directly parallel what has gone before in earlier chapters. One begins with his theory of action. To be an agent is to be 'capable of making a difference', that is 'to do otherwise'. Practitioners enjoy relatively high degrees of freedom to interpret rules, to convert resources and 'discursively penetrate' the bounds of rationalised practice. The "possibility of change is recognised as inherent in every circumstance of social reproduction". The other image (or side of the duality of structure) is of chronic recursiveness. The practitioners' inescapable use of structural rules and resources implicates them in the reproduction of the development malaise.

That both images are to be interconnected is not contested. Rather, we require theoretical insight into the respective weightings of each in particular situations. Some structural resources are clearly quite malleable. For instance, the tariff structure to be applied in the Somosomo hydro project could, within limits, be changed according to the predilection of the practitioners involved. Others would take longer to change; for example, the domestic water demands of the people of Apia. Some are highly resistant to change, as the ZDSDP consultants learnt when they tried to 'inject' new management practices into the Philippines development bureaucracy. And still others, no matter how capable and knowledgeable the practitioner, are unchangeable; for example, the fact that previous farming systems on the steep slopes of Zamboanga del Sur have stripped most of the fertile soil from the horizon.

The following conclusion, incidentally reached after considerable empirical research, seems both responsible and accurate.

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43. Giddens (1979, 210).
In the complex interplay of intentions, contexts and practices, there exists no set pattern of dominance: the intentionality of actors may dominate, socially defined context may dominate, or established practices may dominate e.g., in routinized behaviour established practices dominate, intentionality tends to loom large when actors confront anomalous and ambiguous situations, whereas contexts tend to dominate when situations are recognizable but novel as grounds for conduct.\textsuperscript{44}

*Cutting* and Recombining Epistemology

I do not wish to imply, however, that the question of how structure and agency are to be recombined is simply a matter of determining empirically testable propositions. For this reason I have not re-viewed all the previous project cases in a search for such propositions. Worthwhile as this may be, the major difficulty lies elsewhere. One excellent example of the structuration approach, (although based on Bourdieu rather than Giddens) in which these propositions' were derived, shows this. The study *Learning to Labour* by Paul Willis, illustrates the 'duality of structure' well. Willis shows how working class school-boys' sub-culture of resistance to mental work at school is carried over into employment. Their resistance to school authority leads them to imbue manual work with positive qualities like aggressiveness, masculinity, or sharpness of wit. Their resistance leads them to reaffirm the group's historic tendency to accept manual labour; their 'free choice' leads them to willingly embrace their own repression.\textsuperscript{45}

The reception given Willis' study is of particular interest. No-one to my knowledge questions its empirical adequacy, although some have argued (in the face of the book's contrary evidence) that Willis' structuration approach cannot 'work'.\textsuperscript{46} However, some observers have noted serious "lacunae in his analysis" and conclude "that it clearly is not generalisable".\textsuperscript{47} These lacunae concern the way Willis moved from duality, as an epistemological starting point, to the dualism which is necessary in order to actually undertake analysis. In other words, on what basis did Willis 'cut-into' duality, and later, how did he put its two parts back together? Ultimately, Willis' conclusions about the transformative (agency) or reproductive (structure) character of the boys' resistance reflect how he recombined the two aspects of his analysis. The most crucial point here is that Willis' grounds for doing this were neither theoretical nor empirical. In other words, the counterfactual conditions of the methodological propositions are normative. As one reviewer concluded,

Clearly, it is the case that which epistemology one opts for [where one 'draws the line'] must largely be a matter of personal conviction - proof, like beauty, lying in the eye of the beholder.\textsuperscript{48}

In sum, while structuration appears epistemologically necessary, empirical analysis requires a relaxation of the demands of duality because dualism is a methodological

\textsuperscript{44} Smith (1983, 6).
\textsuperscript{45} Willis (1977).
\textsuperscript{46} Connell (1983, 228-9).
\textsuperscript{47} Jenkins (1982, 278).
\textsuperscript{48} Jenkins (1982, 278). Brackets added.
necessity. This is the only way that propositions regarding the transformative or reproductive tendencies of practice can be derived. The recombination subsequently achieved in order to move to general conclusions will fundamentally depend on where one has drawn the line in creating the methodological duality. And this, in the final analysis, reflects extra-theoretical commitments of the observer. Ironically while the conceptual insights of Giddens' theory of structuration have enabled a clearer view of the issues involved in the research questions, we have in a sense turned a full circle. In the final section of this chapter I show exactly what this implies for the methodological and practical concerns of this thesis.

III
ON THE BOUNDARIES OF THEORY
So far I have suggested: a) that Giddens' theory of structuration provides a better framework for understanding development practice than the rationalisation perspective; b) despite this, it fails to provide methodological propositions: c) because of this, epistemological duality of necessity must be translated to methodological dualism; and d) that the question of how this dualism is created and then recombined is of crucial importance.

To show what the latter point means in terms of the specific concerns of this thesis, I will draw on two closely related sets of concepts from Giddens' work, namely sectional and universal interests, and domination and exploitation. Rather than returning to Giddens' theoretical works, the distinction between sectional and universal interests can be readily explained in terms of earlier discussion. There are two ways in which these categories can be applied.

The first is relatively straightforward. To what extent does development practice promote the universal interests of the community or society over the sectional interests of particular social groups? The practitioners' 'rip-off upwards problem' discussed in Chapter Five acknowledges the tendency for power (in terms of allocative or authoritative resources) to become concentrated and expropriated from less powerful groups. This is a largely incontrovertible observation. Empirical evidence from diverse sources underscores this basic contradiction of development.

Now if my analysis was concerned with this use of the distinction between sectional and universal interests, the case studies would have been examined to determine in whose interests practitioners could be said to act. Analysis would have moved between the largely Machiavellian notion that they serve the interests of a potentially lucrative profession, the view that they are members of, or a fraction of, a dominant class, or that they serve state interests which are 'relatively' discrete from particular class interests.49

When allied with explicit remarks in Chapter One, the fact that earlier chapters have not entertained this kind of analysis underscores my contention that this reading of a development malaise is, comparatively, trivial. I should not have to point out that the actual

49 Cf. Robertson (1984, 94-5) on this.
effects of the sectional or class serving nature of practice are anything but trivial for those adversely affected. Nevertheless, I have said that the development malaise is broader and much deeper than this. The same can be said for this first reading of the distinction between sectional and universal interests.

At various stages I have restated the view that the materialist understanding of the purposes of development needs to be supplemented with an appreciation of less easily defined substantive ends. The materialist conception of development is writ large in every development document; that is, the emphasis on the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services pertaining to human welfare. At one level, and as I have said, a comparatively trivial one, a development malaise suggests that while the production of goods and services has expanded greatly, human material needs continue to go unmet. The old food and hunger adage, 'It's not a production problem, but a distribution issue', applies here.

The conception of a development malaise used in this thesis goes further. Material productivity and consumption is best regarded as a means to other ends. I have suggested these ends of human dignity, autonomy, esteem, or the more collective ends of liberty, justice and freedom, tend not only to be set aside, but also to be jeopardised by the consequences of the technical rationality employed to expand material welfare. The second use of the distinction between sectional and universal interests can now be considered. Expansion of material means - witness the extent of poverty - is no doubt a universal interest. However, it becomes a sectional interest to the extent that attempts to satisfy it are made at the expense of other universally acknowledged substantive ends. At this point we can turn again to Giddens' epistemology, in particular, to the concepts of domination and exploitation.

**Domination and Exploitation**

"All forms of domination" Giddens argues, "can be adjudged in terms of how far they are harnessed to the sectional interests of particular social categories and how far they serve the universal interests of the broader communities or societies of which they are a part". 50 Domination, as the structural correlate of the exercise of allocative and authoritative resources, may be transformative (enabling) or reproductive (constraining). That is it may serve universal interests. Exploitation, however, is a sub-category of domination. "Exploitation may be regarded as domination which is harnessed to sectional interests". 51 Figure 7.1 illustrates this relation.

These concepts aid a useful restatement of this research. They also highlight its most fundamental problems. It is necessary to assess how the rules and resources of development practice have exploitative effects and serve sectional interests at the expense of substantive personal and political interests. Similarly, it is essential to distinguish the reproduction of these tendencies from events which may transform the malaise and serve universal interests (as I have defined them).

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50 Giddens (1981. 61)
51 Giddens (1981. 60)
There are two crucial points. First, I have noted that without dualistic propositions it is impossible to proceed with analysis. And propositions must bear in mind that whilst the ‘smallest item of behaviour implicates more inclusive structures’, so too is there ‘considerably more separation’ between structure and agency than is commonly allowed for. The chief rider is that neither theory nor empirics offer grounds to determine the relative emphasis to be given to each point.

Second, the distinction between sectional and universal interests raises precisely the same difficulties. Just as there are inevitably normative dimensions to any analysis of the reproduction and transformation of the development malaise, they also arise when sectional and universal interests are employed as analytic devices. In an almost exasperating aside, Giddens remarks, “it can be taken as axiomatic that sectional and universal interests are never wholly exclusive”. The so-called ‘power debate’ classically illustrates the consequences of this and serves to orient the issues dealt with in the remaining chapters.

The Power Debate

Much contemporary debate on power begins with Steven Lukes’ three dimensional view of power which highlights the unobservable, unconscious and unarticulated grievances which are concealed within routine social practices. “What one may have here is a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude”.

Lukes’ use of the term ‘interests’ raises issues that should be familiar from discussion of resistance and the critical model of practice in Chapter Six. The emphasis on real interests links the concept of power to the difficult question of subjective and objective interests. In turn, this raises knotty problems concerning objective standards for assessing them, the distinctions between true and false consciousness and the social conditions pertaining to each. The various ways in which these problems are dealt with once again reflect the
pervasiveness of dualism. Many authors maintain the distinction between subjective and real interests by reading 'real' off from the participants' class or socio-structural position. Others adopt ethically transcendent positions to anchor their identification of real interests. For others no ethical justification is considered necessary since 'historical necessity' will vindicate their claims. Shades of each are present in the critical model of practice (Chapter Six).

Ted Benton has offered a further response (although in the final analysis a mixture of the above three) to the problem of interests. Benton, like most Marxists, is embarrassed by the value basis of Lukes' work, although he wishes to retain the three-dimensional view. Abandoning Lukes' reference to interests, Benton focuses on 'objectives', which he says are revealed in the 'symbolic content' of social practices. Thereby the analysis of power is "no longer anchored in the shifting sand of a transcendent value-standpoint". The difficulty here, as others have pointed out, is that this merely shifts the problem to one of discerning the value standpoint necessarily involved in determining what shall count as 'evidence' for objectives (as with 'interests'). For instance, Benton uses the example of working class objectives in resistance which in Gramsci's work (he cites) are derived from the 'symbolic content' of social practices. The problem here, as Isaac notes, is that Gramsci is able to interpret class resistance "precisely because he already possesses a theory of capitalist social relations which understands these relations in terms of the domination of capital".

The problem therefore remains, both for the power theorist in determining the extent to which s/he can speak about 'objective' interests (needs, objectives); and for this research, in determining the status of sectional or universal interests and, therefore, domination and exploitation in development practice. In two works Giddens has approached this problem. However, his attention to it is cursory and far from unequivocal.

Giddens on Interests

Without restating the concepts associated with Giddens' theory of structuration, we can simply note that they span the power debate. Power, as denoted by his concept 'dialectic of control', involves relations of autonomy and dependence. Power can be related to interaction in a dual sense: as involved institutionally in the reproduction of domination, and as a transformative potential used to accomplish outcomes of strategic conduct.

Power, clearly, is not limited to those situations involving a conflict or tension between material (sectional) and substantive (universal) interests. This is a particular sub-set. But this does not mean the interests problem can be avoided. 'Interests' are the keystone of methodological use of concepts like domination and exploitation. And, in so far

56 Isaac (1982. 442). Emphasis added. See also Knights and Willmott (1982. 580, 584); Abell (1977. 20), and Connell's (1983. 229) remark (on Gramsci's interests) "The problem this creates for the reader of their work is that there is no criterion of proof for the 'reading' that discovers footprints of the underlying structure in the superficial complexity".
as domination and exploitation involve authoritative and allocative resources which both enable and constrain practice, interests are central to a concern with the development malaise.

As I have noted, Giddens' approach to interests involves a good deal of equivocation. In essence there are three aspects of his approach. He notes, predictably, that basing interests on evolutionary schema (Habermas), on an individual's 'structural location' (Althusser), in the Party's fiat (Lenin or Lukacs) or historical inevitability "must be scrapped". As he says with regard to Marxism, "there seems to be no point in beating about the bush". 58

Giddens' view is that wants are the basis of interests. Wants are said to be hierarchically ordered, and involve a core 'basic security system' largely inaccessible to consciousness. 59 But he clearly takes interests to refer to more than wants, since if interests were logically equated with wants they would only be 'subjective'. This will clearly not do, since Giddens' wish is to refer to sectional and universal (that is, more than individual) interests in the institutional analysis of domination and exploitation. In order to base his view of interests on wants while retaining the possibility of speaking of 'objective interests' (whether sectional or universal), Giddens refers to the notion of 'individual' or 'agent'. 60 Giddens rejects the view of methodological individualists (like Karl Popper) that social life should be understood in terms of the decisions, intentions or wants of individuals and that we should shy away from explanations in structural or collective terms. This he says reflects the presumption that the term 'individual' stands in no need of explication. However, recalling his notion of duality, the 'individual' is a social product. Individuals in this sense have interests by virtue of their membership of particular groups, communities or classes. To this extent it is possible to speak of 'objective interests' "and these can be determined as 'objectively' as anything else in social analysis". 61

These two aspects of Giddens' view of interests correspond with the agency-structure dichotomy. Logically, interests are grounded in individual wants or agency, since structures (classes, society) have neither wants nor interests. But by virtue of the recursiveness which binds individual and society together, individual interests reflect their location in groups, places and times. The third aspect of Giddens' view of interests is the most crucial in terms of my point here and, unfortunately, given only cursory attention in his work. The question of how agency (wants) and structure (objective interests) are to be analysed and combined arises again. Here he makes two brief concessions to my earlier theme. First, in a footnote, "However, in my opinion, the idea of interest always involves the postulation of goals and needs that are attributed to the individuals in question by the social analyst". 62 His second

59. Giddens (1976, 117; 1979, 189). He does not expand on this remark. Whether he has Abraham Maslow's (1970) hierarchy in mind is uncertain. On this, see the classic work of Bay (1970) and Fitzgerald's (1979) review.
60. Giddens (1979, 189, 95).
remark continues that "The elaboration of a theory of exploitation seems likely to pre-suppose counterfactual conceptions of a normative kind".63

Summary
In terms of the need to incorporate aspects of rationalisation and resistance, structuration theory serves as an antidote to the excesses of both, while retaining the insights offered by each mode of analysis. However, despite the soundness of duality as an epistemological starting point, structuration theory is essentially non-propositional. Consequently, without propositions the analyst is unable to formulate general conclusions about the way in which the development malaise is reproduced or transformed by the actions of practitioners in specific cases. As a methodological necessity, Giddens' duality of structure must be replaced by the dualisms he seeks to avoid. The reception given Paul Willis' Learning to Labour served to point out that the issues raised by structuration are only partly amenable to methodological and empirical resolution. Ultimately all of the key concepts of structuration theory (and by extension, this thesis) are normatively contestable. First, the distinctions one must inevitably make between structure and agency, rationalisation and resistance, reproduction and transformation, cannot be legitimated by reference to theory and empirics alone. Second, even if this was satisfactorily resolved, the same dilemma must be faced when addressing the relations between material, personal and political interests being pursued in development. Specification of these interests is a prerequisite for general answers to the primary question of the thesis.

I have explored the relations between these interests in various ways. The tension between technical and substantive rationality provided surrogate concepts which illuminated a great deal of practice (Part One). But in Chapter Six other evidence blurred the categorical distinction between the two rationalities. Giddens' distinction between sectional and universal interests also served to recast the tension between material, personal and political interests. But here, following Giddens, I noted sectional and universal interests are never 'wholly exclusive'. Put another way, the kinds of analysis I have conducted to this point highlight intermittent aspects of an answer to the primary research question. But I am logically led to concur that there can be 'no final conclusions' to analysis that is informed by the recursive nature of social life and the traps of dualistic thinking. In line with Max Weber's famous remarks about the 'eternal youth' of social science, we can, at best, provide an account and never the account.64 This simply confirms the fact that the content of analysis (what is to count as evidence for the transformation/reproduction of sectional/universal interests, or for domination/exploitation) is normatively contestable. Conclusions based on the aggregation of specific cases moreover imply a normative discourse in which the commitments and interests of the author come to the fore.65 As Rome Harre has pointed out, this kind of analysis is "rhetorical, not referential": macro concepts like the above function in social discourse not so much as terms with an empirical referent.

64. Weber (1949, 104).
"but as a device for making points, for taking up a stance and so on; in short, [they] form part of an apparatus of the expressive order." 66

This leads to some important conclusions. First, acknowledging the rhetorical, normative — indeed 'social' — character of research does not point to a deficiency which must be purged. This is both dangerous and trivialises the issue. I have illustrated the dangers of two predominant forms of 'purging' in contemporary society. I have shown the authoritarian tendencies of conventional practice. It is not necessary to universalise the instances I have used to conclude these tendencies are sustained and reproduced by the aspirations of practitioners to de-author practice. The authority of objective facts, sanitised techniques and self-less professionalism all too easily legitimate the manipulation of others and the denial of self-esteem, dignity and traditionally cherished political liberties. The efforts of those informed by the critical model to re-author practice by reference to equally objective (although theoretically derived) 'real' substantive interests and to purge 'illusory' values or interests, ultimately have the same authoritarian consequences.

This does not mean that social scientific inquiry ought to be reined-in or that we are left only with the relativistic statements of 'individuals'. Neither does it invite an idiosyncratic, subjective mode of practice. In view of what theorists like Giddens have said, the tendency to equate 'individual' with 'subjective' must be scrapped.

The following statement by Outhwaite summarises my approach to the issues.

it is not a matter of deciding to make or not to make value judgements; to get one's concepts totally value-free or to put up with a certain amount of normative contamination; this is a trivialisation of the problem. The real issue is that to think seriously about society involves, as well as some new techniques, the same sort of intellectual operations as have traditionally been performed under the heading of social or political theory and, in particular, a 'reflexive' grasp of the extra-theoretical context in which social theorising is embedded and the associated practical commitments. 67

Outhwaite's remark implies two things which have not received the attention they deserve. The first relates to the kind of knowledge which social research can provide, the second to the practical implications of non-dualistic social theory.

An interest in questions of exploitation and domination, in the extent to which development practice serves sectional and universal interests, and finally, in how the conduct of practitioners reinforces or counters these tendencies, is most reliably approached from a non-dualistic point of view. But as has been recently expressed by Oliver, this newer tradition of social theory may falsely encourage a "step beyond what, logically speaking, may be said" from social science and extend our "knowledge claims into issues best regarded as matters of belief." 68 General, unequivocal conclusions about the development malaise and about the 'interests' being served or denied by practice may be 'right' and there can be no objection to them. The objection is to the claim that these are guaranteed by theoretical or

68 Oliver (1983. 519. 521).
empirical insight. The positive value of scholarship is more likely to be realised if unencumbered by the pretensions of having grasped the facts of people's real interests or structural processes working behind their backs.

The second point I take from Outhwaite's remark concerns the relation between research and action, in particular, between structuration theory and development practice. My conclusions about the boundaries of my account of development practice are problematic only if one sees the establishment of generalised accounts as the end rather than the means to other purposes. Observers of recent developments like structuration theory note that it is "not just a product of the groves of academe, but is linked to practical political imperatives".69 In a sense this is true of all research. It can make explicit all kinds of things not articulated or known by others, especially those pre-occupied with 'going-on' in the activities which are the topic of study. Nevertheless, I believe that non-dualistic theories hold important insights not just about the content of 'what goes on' but more particularly for personal conduct in development practice. This of course raises the second interest of my research. Throughout, my intention has been to identify a theoretical framework not solely in terms of the need to produce an account of the development malaise, but also to directly encounter it. Part Three 'revisits' practice by drawing on this hitherto unexamined practical dimension of non-dualist theory.

A scientist should recognise in his philosophy - as he already recognises in his propaganda - that for the ultimate justification of his activity it is necessary to look away from knowledge itself to a striving in man's nature [which is] not to be justified by science or reason, for it is in itself the justification of science, of reason, of art, of conduct.

Arthur Eddington

Philosophy of Physical Science
CHAPTER 8
THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY

The anecdotes I used in Chapter One to illustrate various aspects of the development malaise convey three relevant messages. First, they underscore the close links between this research and practical concerns. That is, my sense of the development malaise arose from practical experiences rather than from academic disputes about the relative merits of one theory over another. The fact that much of the subsequent discussion has been theoretical simply points to the wider currency of these concerns; it does not obliterate or lessen their practical origins. Whereas previous discussion moved from practice to (often intractable) theoretical debate, I now turn from that theory to its implications in practice.

The second message conveyed by the anecdotes is the personal sense of the development malaise. This has implications for the approach taken in moving from theory to practice. My choice of personal anecdotes rather than categorical statements was intended to avoid the presumption that the development malaise is of concern to practitioners in general. Indeed, what unsettled me at first was the fact that the questions which I posed did not preoccupy those about whom they were posed. Excerpts from dialogue have shown that for many practitioners these questions constitute 'down-time' or worse, simply moralising about largely irrational metaphysical questions unworthy of discussion. In this light, the practical implications of theory developed to understand a development malaise are relevant to practitioners only if the 'problem' the theory addresses has meaning.

It follows that a series of assumptions lie behind the research interest. These assumptions amount to an ethical imperative present in the anecdotes. This is made more explicit in this chapter. I take as imperative a personal desire for situational freedom. That is, a desire (and an effective capability) to identify and maximise one's 'room to move' in order to pursue one's practical and substantive value commitments.

This implies more than the satisfaction of personal ends. It would be illogical and indefensible to pursue lines of conduct which deny this capability or opportunity to others. This does not amount to saying that development practice is simply about getting everyone to pursue their subjective preferences. As I now argue in Part Three, the idea of 'responsible practice' which incorporates this imperative, does not amount to relativism or subjectivism. It has been argued previously that the tendencies toward de-authoring in conventional practice go directly against this imperative. The same can be said for the critical model of re-authored practice. This chapter spells out more clearly why this is so.

Now it may be that many readers will find this imperative in tune with their own dispositions. But the discussion of responsible practice does not presume to speak to the myriad commitments and personal ethics of others, despite a personal belief that the
The approach taken is relevant beyond my narrow experiences and interests. Indeed, while it is true that no-one to my knowledge has examined the practical implications of theories like structuration, Section II uses essays by Max Weber and V.I. Lenin to show that these issues are not new to social theory. The three points above (the research origin, the extent of interest to others, and the ethical imperative) should, however, be borne in mind. Because, backed up by the discussion in Section II, they are relevant to the argument in Section III that no general model or algorithm of responsible practice is possible or desirable. Concepts are drawn from structuration theory to defend this view.

The chapter, in summary, has three sections. The first draws together two previous discussions on the practical implications of rationalisation and resistance and reviews relevant aspects of the terms de-authoring and re-authoring and their common authoritarian tendencies. Against this background, Section II interprets two essays, Weber’s *Politics as a Vocation* and *What is to be Done?* by Lenin. Their concern with the relations between theory and practice and their profoundly similar way of approaching these bolster the argument regarding responsible practice in Section III. This involves a discussion of the relations between technical rationality and substantive commitment which, hopefully, makes the idea of responsibility less of a hollow cliche than currently appears to be the case. Chapter Nine links this to a particular case study.

## Theory and the Practitioner

The word ‘rationalisation’ highlights a number of features of conventional development practice. It refers to the idea of development practice itself, the central role of technical rationality and the international, national and project level institutions which are designed to establish the controlled and managed environment necessary for the implementation of the idea. Previous chapters used the term de-authoring to refer to the practitioner’s stance in conventional practice and the authoritarian tendencies of this.

But this characterisation of practice I argued in the discussion of resistance is an ‘ideal type’. I do not mean though, it ought to be discarded. The word ‘tendency’ was used to indicate that what has been called de-authored practice is simply a logical extension of certain notions about practice and their embodiment in particular techniques and procedures. The concept of de-authored practice bears an analytical rather than actual relation to reality.

The model of re-authored practice was also an ideal type constructed from statements of authors informed by the critical theory of Habermas. I showed that both conventional (de-authored) and critical (re-authored) practice engender an authoritarian attitude that practice cannot be left to the ‘arbitrariness of uncontrolled value judgements’ but must be settled by a ‘scientifically explicated understanding of the world’ (Habermas). In conventional practice authority is established by reference to external facts and technical necessity. In critical practice, authority rests on generalised norms, evolutionary ideals and privileged insight into people’s real interests. Both are elitist and essentially authoritarian.

I have suggested that non-dualist theories like structuration hold important implica-
tions for a mode of practice which addresses the development malaise. In view of what has been said about the previous two positions, this argument implicitly concerns the question of authority and some sense of non-authoritarian practice. The structuration approach takes what is relevant from each position. It implies a positive kind of polemics: one that is 'responsive' to the necessary and deleterious aspects of both. However, this approach does not result in a new Archimedean point on which to ground authority in practice. It offers no 'position' in the sense which the word may be applied to de-authored or re-authored practice. A review of relevant aspects of the theory of structuration will provide a background for this argument.

The central concepts of knowledgeability and capability point to the fact that human agents, even the most powerless, can 'make a difference' and carve out 'spaces of control'. Within the rationalisation perspective, individual autonomy, capability or creativity tend to be swept aside, either by the notions of practitioners or by the overbearing historical and institutional processes theorists see 'working behind the practitioners' backs'. The actions of practitioners simply reproduce the broader tendencies toward a development malaise. In Giddens' view, this understanding amounts to a derogation of human agency.

The theory of structuration serves to arrest the opposite tendency too. While human agency has a transformative potential, our knowledgeability and capability is always bounded by the place, time and institutional context in which it is exercised. Both rationalisation and resistance, reproduction and transformation, must be brought together. Giddens' concept of 'duality of structure' rejects every conception of human beings as 'determined objects' or as unambiguously 'free subjects'. Technical rationality enables development practice (since this rationality is central to the idea of practice). But the use of certain techniques and procedures, to a greater or lesser extent, reproduces the process of rationalisation and thereby a development malaise. Nevertheless, whilst practice is reproductive, Giddens reminds us that there is often considerable separation between individual practices and the broader development malaise.

The circumstances in which practice is likely to be (more) transformative or (simply) reproductive is a crucial methodological issue which (as the discussion of Paul Willis' Learning to Labour illustrates) will not be resolved by theory and method alone. The need to confront the normative dimensions of theory and description in this thesis was brought to the fore by the discussion of interests, domination and exploitation. Development practice necessarily implies domination - in Giddens' sense of the term - since the resources of technical rationality involve control over material and social processes. To the extent that this may threaten personal and political interests, practice may tend to be exploitative (again, in Giddens' use). But this, that is the development malaise, is not inevitable.

Determining when, and under what circumstances the domination of technical rationality leads to the exploitation of other universal interests assumes that one can show how these various material, personal and political interests are manifested in particular cases. The power debate, reviewed in the previous chapter, shows the knotty problems here. The problem is compounded by Giddens' axiom that 'sectional and universal interests are never wholly exclusive'. The point here is not just that it will be difficult to judge the degree
of tension between technical and substantive rationality, or between material, personal and political interests, but that in making these judgements, the researcher draws on normative commitments which are always more or less contestable and verifiable. In other words, analysis, is hermeneutic.

These conclusions are basic to the approach to practice established in this chapter. I have shown that dualistic conceptions of practice (de-authored and re-authored respectively) are authoritarian. Neither is an ‘individualistic’ approach sensible. The same applies to any approach that naively attempts to purge, or to lay out normative commitments. As Giddens’ distinction between practical and discursive knowledge implies, only certain (perhaps the most superficial) norms are discursively available. The more fundamental and consequential norms remain largely unacknowledged conditions of academic accounts, and conduct in development practice. The real challenge is to acknowledge that practice involves, as well as some techniques and rational procedures (whereby we gain an imperfect understanding of the facts), a grasp of one’s extra-theoretical practical and substantive commitments and an understanding of their possible consequences. How this mix is to be achieved was precisely the concern of both Weber’s reference to ‘judgement’ and Lenin’s concern with the ‘conscious element’.

II
WEBER AND LENIN ON PRACTICE
Weber and Lenin were both social researchers and political actors deeply concerned about the relations between theory and practice. In quite different ways each had considerable influence on social theory and political practice. As Bernstein rightly notes, many contemporary attitudes about the relations between theory and practice are a series of footnotes to Weber.\(^1\) And the extent to which Lenin’s thoughts have animated revolutionary practice hardly needs mention.

My intention is to identify common themes in two essays: Weber’s *Politics as a Vocation* (1919) and Lenin’s *What is to be Done?* (1902). I am not concerned with the particular ‘model’ of practice that might be culled from their work,\(^2\) but with how two authors who were extremely different in academic and political ideology came to surprisingly similar conclusions about the relations between theory and practice.

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2. Indeed, if it were, the discussion would be more a contrast of extremes. Lenin pilloried Weber as a ‘cowardly bourgeois professor’ and considered his political assessment (of the Dec. 1905 Russian uprising) to be a ‘subterfuge on the part of the representatives of the cowardly bourgeoisie’ (Lenin, 1960, 840). Similarly, Weber’s disdain for the ‘sterile excitation’ engendered by revolutionary Social Democrats made his thoughts about Lenin quite clear (cf. Runciman, 1978, 209).
Weber’s ‘hot passion and cool judgement’

Some argue that Weber’s work should be understood in relation to Marx and Nietzsche as well as the historical and personal circumstances of his January 1919 address. Because Weber’s views on the relations between social theory (or science generally) and political practice were incomplete and occasionally ambivalent, readers often have conflicting interpretations, particularly with regard to the two concepts discussed here; the ethic of ultimate ends and the ethic of responsibility.³

Weber’s historical view of the ‘fate of our times’ (Chapter Three) is an important backdrop. Rationalisation leads to disenchantment and abandonment of any sense that the world is ultimately meaningful beyond that which is humanly created and sustained.⁴ But Weber continued to search for release from the harsh consequences of rationalisation. For the usual escapes he had nothing but contempt. In cults, churches and prophets he saw ‘swindle’ and outmoded ‘self-deception’.⁵ Neither could science provide respite from the ultimate meaninglessness of the world. “It can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived.”⁶ The only viable option is to face up to the fate of our times.

The fate of an epoche which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create the meaning itself.⁷ Though he denied that anyone could objectively justify value choices, choice and commitment remained an ethical imperative. This involved accountability to the social and political forces of one’s age and to one’s self. These two aspects of accountability (or responsibility) were underlain by his belief in human capability. The struggle this represented in practice was “simply how both passion and cool judgement can be made to combine in the same personality”.⁸ Both must somehow be combined, whilst both had tendencies which must be struggled against. As Loewenstein remarked,

This combination of hot passion and cool judgement set Weber apart from both the revolutionary fanatics who knew only hot passion and the reactionary conservatives who possessed only cool judgement. The former thought it necessary to employ terror in a transitional phase in order to force the realm of freedom; the

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³ Where relevant this will be acknowledged. Cf. Mitzman (1970); Turner (1981); Loewenstein (1980, 109-124); Roth and Schluchter (1979); and Lowith (1982).
⁴ "There are in principle no mysterious incalculable powers that play a role [in human history]. Rather, we can master by calculation everything.” But that means: “the disenchantment of the world. No longer must we - like the savage for whom such powers exist - grasp at magical means to master or implore the spirits. But technical means and calculation can also accomplish that” (Weber as translated by Mitzman, 1970. 226).
⁵ Weber (1948, 126-7).
⁶ Weber (1949, 63).
⁷ Weber (1949, 57). Cf. Weber (1949, 18) “The fruit of the tree of knowledge, which is distasteful to the complacent, but which is nonetheless inescapable, consists in the insight that every single important activity and ultimately life as a whole, if it is not to be permitted to run on as an event in nature but is instead to be consciously guided, is a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul ... chooses its own fate, i.e., the meaning of its activity and existence.”
⁸ Weber as translated by Loewenstein (1980, 119)
latter regarded people as too stupid to be capable of freedom.\textsuperscript{9}

By urging his audience to 'swim against the stream' of history, Weber revealed his ultimate faith in the transformative potential of human agency whilst recognising, within the reproductive metaphor of 'fate', what Giddens has called the recursiveness of social life. Closest to development concerns, his detailed criticism of the three main schools of political economics brought this out clearly. Each case - the classical, the Marxist and the historicist - enfeebled human capability, the very factor that mattered most to Weber.\textsuperscript{10} This commitment to human capability and the belief that practice involved commitment and a constant struggle to balance cool judgement and hot passion "expresses his view of the society that should be, a society in which the participating individuals have recovered control of their own action and of the institutions created by that action".\textsuperscript{11}

In view of our autonomy from 'mysterious forces', individuals must face the question 'What should determine action in a given case; its outcome, or its intrinsic ethical value?' A mode of practice oriented toward outcomes referred to an ethic of responsibility. An ethic of ultimate ends was guided according to an action's intrinsic value.

The speech, \textit{Science as a Vocation} diagnoses modernity and the limits of science.\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Politics as a Vocation}, applies this to the post-WWI situation in Germany and appeals to the proponents of the ethic of ultimate ends - those 'crusaders' and 'warriors of faith' (revolutionaries and anarcho-syndicalists) motivated by moral sentiments - to consider carefully the consequences of their actions.

In spite of some ambivalent remarks, Weber considered only the ethic of responsibility an adequate basis for conduct in the face of increasing rationalisation and bureaucratisation.\textsuperscript{13} As the expression suggests, the ethic of ultimate ends is absolute: it seeks to impose a new meaning on the world without regard to the rational calculation of means and largely oblivious of the immediate political consequences of action. Weber saw this as blind to reality in two ways. Adherents to religious or mystical absolutes flee from the rationalised world and thereby perpetuate its advance. Similarly the revolutionists' 'all or nothing' maxim takes no account of the immediate consequences of an action for the larger cause.

\textsuperscript{9} Loewenstein (1980, 119-120).
\textsuperscript{10} Cf. Lowith (1982, Chap. 4) and Giddens (1971, 134). Weber examined the determinism of traditional political economy and rejected their analogies with natural laws. Marx's political economics held greater interest for Weber because it recognised the uniqueness of historical laws in the dialectic. But whether treated as determinate in the sense of natural law or as \textit{a priori} in the sense of Marx's Hegelian dialectic, he found that human freedom was eliminated. A third school he examined, the historical economic school of Schlosser, Roscher and Knies, was concerned with the supposed irrationality of human personality. They argued historical events could be understood, but never causally explained. As Loewenstein (1980, 112) points out 'This complacent satisfaction with mere understanding seemed to Weber no less crippling to freedom because it accustomed man to a relativistic resignation' to the status quo'.
\textsuperscript{11} Dawe (1971, 48).
\textsuperscript{12} Runciman (1978, 210) provides the background to this lecture.
\textsuperscript{13} Schluchter (1979, 88) and Beetham (1974, 173). There is some dispute on Weber's position here. Some point to parts of Weber's text which suggests the two ethics are somewhat complementary (Roth and Schluchter. 1979. 55. Loewenstein. 1980. 119).
In the first case, Weber referred to the pacifists of his time. Their actions he said would not bring about peace, but make war more likely, because their only consistent position was complete retirement from the world. Weber was equally disdainful of the popular revolutionary position.

You may demonstrate to a convinced syndicalist, believing in the ethic of ultimate ends, that his action will result in increasing the opportunities of reaction, in increasing the oppression of his class, and obstructing its ascent - and you will not make the slightest impression on him. If an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor’s eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God’s will who made them thus, is responsible for evils.14

Both positions made sense in terms of the ethic of ultimate ends, but Weber said that those who held them should not pretend that their aim was ‘this worldly achievement’. Weber also believed this ethic manifested the way in which rationalisation debilitated our capacity for judgement.15

The ethic of responsibility tries to recover the art of judgement in political life. This involves the balance between cool technical judgement and the hot passion of commitment, and recognition of what Weber sometimes called the ‘paradox of consequences’. The balance between technical judgement and passionate commitment can be understood in terms of Giddens’ unintended consequences of action. The actual consequences of action may be quite at odds with the individual’s intentions in perpetrating the action. Being responsive to this, the political actor governs his/her action not solely by the integrity of commitment (passion) but also by rational calculation of its likely consequences. The paradox of consequences refers to earlier remarks about the ‘fate of our times’. Action may have immediate unintended consequences, but by employing purposive means-ends kinds of rationality, action also reproduces the broader process of rationalisation.

To deny or neglect these unintended and paradoxical consequences is to “deny our intellect” (and knowledge of historical trends) and show an incapability of bearing “courageously the fate of our times”.16 In sum, the ethic of responsibility “builds on what is given and proceeds with the knowledge that, though everything can be changed, not everything can be changed simultaneously and without contradictory consequences. Its political maxim is ‘in spite of’”.17

Building on ‘what is given’ must be distinguished from pragmatism. There is a logical gulf between what is practical and ethical or ‘right’. Responsible conduct cannot at all be determined simply by rational calculation of what will work in any situation.18 This will be discussed further in Section III.

15. The same sentiments are found in Mannheim (1940, 58).
17. Schluchter (1979, 90).
Lenin's 'conscious element'

Lenin's *What is to be Done?* is most often understood as an organisational manifesto, or more narrowly, as a contribution to an ongoing diatribe between two papers, *Rabocheye Dyelo* and *Iskra*, regarding Social Democratic Party policy. But Lenin's concerns parallel Weber's struggle between the pragmatist's awareness of social contingencies and the absolutist's commitment to substantive principles. *What is to be Done* deals with the idea of revolutionary practice in an effort to counteract both the pragmatist tendencies of the 'Economists' (variously termed 'reformists', 'opportunists') and the terrorism Lenin sees in some militant anarchist trade-union activity.

Lenin presents the tendencies of reformism and terrorism as perpetual possibilities, that is, ever present temptations to the revolutionary. But it is a relationship of tension; while both should be resisted, each has aspects of good in them. Lenin's polemic is therefore positive: he does not try to smash or obliterate each position, but rather to resist their 'provocativeness' and enhance what he calls the 'conscious element'.

Every man with convictions [of either position] who thinks he has something to say writes 'provocatively' and expresses his views strongly. Only those who are accustomed to sitting between two stools lack 'provocativeness'. Reformists' action is said to be "determined by the interaction of material elements and the material environment". Reformism is opportunistic since it simply responds to immediate material dictates (what the workers demand or circumstances provide for) and "goes hand in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest forms of practical activity".

As with the tendencies of de-authored practice, reformists avoid considering how they could 'make a difference' by simply referring to the externally given facts of the matter. Reformists simply 'wait for the breaks'; by letting the situation control them they fail to see themselves as responsible (engaged, capable) features of the situation. The practitioner simply adapts 'self' (capability, commitment) to 'other' (the environment, or facts of the situation).

At the other extreme, but bowing equally to spontaneous dictates, the terrorist considers "all we need to do is snatch up our old friend, the 'accessible cudgel'. To drop metaphor, it means we must ... stimulate the 'spiritless' progress of the working class movement by means of excitative terror". The terrorist equally fails to act responsibly by simply bowing to the opposite tendency: the heat of 'self-indulgent passion', thereby failing to confront the conscious element of judgement. If the reformist allows the external/other to rule his/her action, then the terrorist can be seen as allowing the impulses of self (passion, belief in the absolute ideal) to provide grounds (or authority) for action.

Lenin sees essential similarities between what appear to be two different 'stools' or positions. "Speaking generally" he says, "between the two there is not an accidental, but

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22. Lenin (1947, 205).
necessary, inherent connection." Their common root is the worship of spontaneity and a belittling of one's responsibility. Stewart summarises Lenin's approach in the following terms.

So the praxis of the revolutionary resists the extremes of subordinating other to self (terrorism) and subordinating self to other (reformism). The revolutionary seeks to transform the excesses of thinking that self is responsible for all that is other (terrorism) and that self is responsible for no other (reformism) by the exercise of responsible praxis .... Lenin moderates his extremes, holds the middle, by restraining yet acknowledging them. The revolutionary owns himself, rather than owning nothing (reformism) or owning everything (terrorism).

Despite the different audiences they addressed, the two essays have striking similarities. Weber's concern is an ethic of responsible conduct, Lenin's is revolutionary practice. Both recognise that practice must refer to commitment (self) and also address the exigencies of the situation (other). Both use the words struggle and tension; neither refer to a 'position' in terms of which a series of precepts or rules of struggle can be determined. Both thereby refuse the temptations of dualist thinking, emphasising instead elusive terms like judgement and the conscious element in a non-dualist way.

III
THE TENSION OF DUALITY IN RESPONSIBLE PRACTICE

In this section I attempt to specify the idea of responsible practice more systematically. The phrase, 'attempt to specify' is deliberate. I previously noted the difficulties of using non-dualist theory in the description of concrete situations. Dualist social theories, like structuralism or voluntarism, provide a firm sense of determination, beginning from either structure or agency. Non-dualist theory like Giddens' structuration may be epistemologically attractive, but concepts like duality of structure do not easily provide propositions. This creates methodological difficulties.

Parallel concerns arise in any mode of practice consistent with a structurationist understanding. Previously I have discussed the kind of propositions for practice that follow from conventional or alternative (critical) notions of practice. Each provides a reasonably clear sense of the rationality to be applied (technical/instrumental in one, substantive/emancipatory in the other), the appropriate stance of the practitioner, and the primary techniques to be employed (for example, cost-benefit analysis versus the ideal speech situation).

Whilst each position has features which are relevant to responsible practice, by themselves there is little to arrest their surprisingly similar authoritarian tendencies. The task of defining responsible practice parallels that confronted by Lenin and Weber: responsible practice is not another 'position', but must be considered via a polemic which both draws upon and yet resists these two positions.

23 Lenin (1947, 200). It must be acknowledged that this remark may also be read as an attempt to discredit the 'reformists' by connecting them with the previously discredited anarchists.

24 Stewart (1979, 98). This work provided the main insight for my analysis of Lenin's essay.
This section deals with three concepts: the ethic of ultimate means, the ethic of ultimate ends, and the notion of tension in responsible practice. Only cursory remarks are made about the first since it encapsulates what has been said about tendencies toward de-authoring in conventional practice. The second, the ethic of ultimate ends, is largely consistent with Weber’s use, although I draw together and add to previous remarks about its contemporary manifestation. The last part of the section uses words like ‘struggle’ and ‘tension’ to give accent to the ‘responsive’ (rather than morally virtuous) sense in which responsible practice should be understood.

The Ethic of Ultimate Means
As the practical embodiment of technical rationality, the ethic of ultimate means conjures images of the kind found in the writing of Koestler, Kafka or Dostoyevsky. Less frightening images are intended here.

The Allies 1944 conference at Bretton Woods gave formal acknowledgement to the idea that history could be managed on a broad scale. As subsequent documents sketched out, development was a problem of management, of designing the means whereby technology, capital and skill could be most efficiently brought into productive union. Whilst the early optimism has faded, contemporary development conferences continue the search for the right means (policy mixes, administrative mechanisms, efficient techniques) whereby an increasing array of variables can be managed and controlled.25

Previous chapters have said much about this ethic, particularly as it affects, and is affected by, practitioners’ notions about themselves, their work and those on whose behalf their services are applied. Whatever their personal commitment, practitioners feel compelled to present a public image highlighting a professional kind of knowing that has eliminated all elements of taste, feeling, moral disposition or sentiment by discipline, technique and skill. Only then is legitimacy given to ‘arms-length advice’ and their claim to be ‘the cutting edge that makes things work’. While a challenging task, the professional promise conveys the conviction that nothing short of this ethic will work. Although the first part of the thesis highlighted some of the tendencies of this ethic, it began by pointing out that the technical rationality of means is essential to the idea of development practice itself. A polemic which completely denies this ethic ironically also denies the possibility of development practice.

The Ethic of Ultimate Ends
Given their special emphasis on ‘warriors of faith’ and ‘terrorists’, the ethic of ultimate ends appears to have been well represented at the time Weber and Lenin prepared their addresses. By comparison, the contemporary international ‘bureaucracy of means’ was in its infancy and apparently no rival to the attention demanded by revolutionary or mystical eschatologies.

There are of course references to the ‘no compromise, all or nothing’ ethic in the

sporadic popularity of anarchism, but an observer of contemporary politics could not now fairly give the same prominence to the ethic of ultimate ends. Thankfully, the Cultural Revolutions and Pol Pots stand out because they reflect aberrations and not dominant themes in the contemporary scene. But it should be evident from my discussion in Chapter Six that variants of the ethic of ultimate ends are not altogether absent from development-oriented debates. Chapter Six considered in detail the authoritarian consequences of those models based on some of Habermas’ work which, despite his subsequent reservations, prescribe a re-authored critical practice. And Habermas’ less charitable critics have considered how amenable his critical practice would be to terrorist ends.

Weber’s concern was not simply with revolutionary extremism. Mystical ethics equally represented a flight from the fate of our times and a failure to make judgements in the knowledge of the paradox of consequences. An ethic of ultimate ends could be equally represented by either terrorism or ‘world flight’. The latter mystical option in the search for meaning was in fact characteristic of the generation of rationalisation theorists who followed Weber. Adorno and Horkheimer for instance increasingly came to look to the ‘inner sphere’ of the individual as the only resistance and escape from the rationalised world. Mysticism represents the ultimate aversion to technical rationality. The mystic “removes the distinction between himself and that which is not himself [subject and object] and experiences himself in other things, and these things in himself”. By definition, this amounts to complete rejection of technical rationality since the separation it requires between individual and society (economy or polity) or facts and values, destroys the purity of the unified world. Similarly, we find here a rejection of the kinds of rationality essential to development practice.

Now, this may seem somewhat marginal to the present discussion. During the 1970s however critiques of development (particularly in the West) were sustained by this kind of epistemology; the tendencies or practical consequences of this ethic deserve some attention.

In the 1970s critique of positivism much of the momentum was provided by phenomenological and reflexive social science. The latter was part of a liberal critique which reminded social science that when applied to social investigation, positivist method fundamentally distorted social reality. Accordingly, social science accounts needed to acknowledge their hermeneutic character; the researcher’s values (self) and tradition were an important aspect of social inquiry that should be ‘recovered’. Now while this is essentially
the point I established in Section III of the last chapter, the overall argument went considerably further. 'Theorising' and 'analysis' took on new meaning in some quarters. In each, "the theorist searches for his self, and his achievement in theorizing is a recovery of this self". The facts that social scientists naively believed to be attributes of the external world were merely a reflection of 'self' mediated by method and tradition. In other words, "the method may be said to constitute that to which it attends".

This perspective underpins a number of important statements about development. Sitting at the opposite end from the ethic of means, it is argued that the "ideological notions [of positivist technical rationality] themselves engender the basic forms of the conflicts and expressed dissatisfactions".

This is consistent with the discussion in Chapter Five of the way in which metaphors frame and set the boundaries of issues in development practice. But the critique is taken a step further.

While 'everybody knows' that there are problems with scarce resources and effective management, with the balancing out of conflicting values [this is only] a way of looking at the world [it] is ONLY an idealism. Although serving to arrest some of the excessive tendencies of positivist science, we can begin to appreciate some of what Alvin Gouldner called the 'pathological potentialities' of this ethic. The search for ultimate meaning, becomes an unending regression, an eternal search for the assumption behind the assumption, so that one is continually moving backward into the mind, without pausing to move forward into the data and without seeking confirming inference.

Critics have pointed out how, in practice, this trend results in a 'paralysis of the critical will'. Ironically, although this perspective seeks to recover the substantive dimensions of political practice threatened by rationalisation, it leads the practitioner to relinquish all practical commitments. As one critic said, it "leads to a narcissistic indulgence with one's self, which is essentially nihilistic".

In this expression, the ethic of ultimate ends represents the final vindication of those who reject any search for alternative modes of practice outside the conventional management view of technical rationality. The philosopher Eccleshall sums up the pathological potentialities at length.

the consequence is a mixture of nihilism, in which an alternative society is

32. Clegg (1976. 70).
38. Clegg (1976. 65). He went on to note "Sociology could justly be termed the sophistry of a decadent academy consigned to the interminable chatter of 'Babel', until the world around it grows weary of its presence. Sociology could be finally cast as conservatism's eunuch, powerless and impotent as an insubstantial transmagoria" (Clegg. 1976. 78).
projected not because it is perceived as a potential to be attained by the Aufhebung of existing structures, but because it provides a mentally satisfying construct for the despairing intellect, and a peculiarly subjectivist conception of human freedom, a solipsistic affirmation of the inner life .... Apparently impotent ... the unhappy consciousness seeks refuge in mystical flights of fancy, or, what amounts to the same thing, contents itself with constructing the blue-print of a non-attainable utopia.  

Responsible Practice

Responsible practice unfortunately sounds like a moralistic cliche. But it is an approach to practice which attempts to be responsive to an awareness of the tendencies of both the abovementioned ethics, while also drawing from each that which is essential. Despite contemporary transformations of the meaning and scope of the practical/substantive and technical aspects of practice, the point to be aware of is that the danger is not from technical rationality, but our tendency to reify the categories of dualist thinking to create positions which obscure understanding of social reality and engagement in it. The failing in practice is expressed in Habermas' remark that the real difficulty does not arise from the function of technical rationality "but rather from the fact that we are no longer able to distinguish between practical/[substantive] and technical power". Indeed, to be practical is frequently considered equivalent to possessing technical know-how.

There are important cultural and historical reasons why it is difficult to speak precisely about practice in a non-dualistic way. In contemporary debates, the only reasonable understanding of practice that seems to make sense is one defined in terms of technical efficiency and the application of technical means of manipulation and control. As soon as one steps aside to question this tradition, one's reflection comes under threat of being labelled subjective and synonymous with private, idiosyncratic and arbitrary. The idea of balanced reconciliation between the technical/instrumental and practical/substantive seems confused. Redefining what it is to be responsible to 'self and other' for instance is portrayed as irresponsible mind playing. This attitude is itself a feature of rationalisation: all countervailing values, ends or personal stances are expected to fall within and be judged according to one calculus.

In view of the adverse tendencies of the two ethics, it is clear that the issues surrounding a development malaise are not to be resolved in either direction. Moreover, the struggle to resolve these two - a task to which non-dualist theories like structuration must be put - is probably as old as social theory itself. Weber, Lenin and, latterly, people like Giddens are contemporary expressions of a struggle as old as the Greeks.

More recently it has been recognised that while the problems of dualism may be attenuated by theorising (whereby the positions and relations between them may be altered), resolution is to be achieved only in practice and not through the creation of another theoretical position. Olsson's remarks point in this direction.

I no longer situate human thought-and-action within the paradigm of scientific or instrumental reasoning, which we in the universities preach and obey. Neither do I place it within the paradigm of practical reasoning and teleological understanding, which is advocated in the various books of wisdom. Rather than being in the realm of either/or, it instead seems to contain crucial elements of both. From this Olsson concludes that we must "go beyond stultifying definitions into the level of experience"; a point similar to Wolin's remark about 'political wisdom' that "it is an unfortunate phrase, for ... the question is not what it is [as a 'position'] but in what does it inhere." The logical consequence of this is that without a 'position' per se there is no algorithm to dictate responsible practice; there are no technical rules. Responsible practice is understood much less by precepts and propositions than by case histories and precedents. Whilst some general, but specific, remarks can be made about the relations between the technical and practical/substantive rationalities in responsible practice, the above conclusion invites misinterpretation. Indeed such is the influence of the ethic of ultimate means - especially in development practice - that points of view which are only partly amenable to propositional, prescriptive statement are frequently given only partly serious consideration.

Some specification of the relations between the two ethics and their attendant rationalities can begin by recalling a distinction made in Chapter Six between problem setting and problem solving. Embodied in practitioners' notions is the view that practice is primarily about the application of technical rationality to the solution of problems. The ends this serves are taken as self-evident and impinge on practice as goals of efficiency and successful control.

This emphasis ignores the fact that problems are not given but are constructed from the practitioner's biography, knowledge and practical purposes at hand. The discussion in Chapter Five of the Zamboanga del Sur project illustrated how the problem of 'agricultural yields' was underpinned by particular metaphors about the purposes and demands of development. These were self-evident; what 'blind Freddy and his dog could see'. Problem setting refers to practical, tacit knowledge whereby certain features of a situation are taken to be 'variables' (and subject to manipulation), others as constants, and boundaries are created through which some coherence or sense is made of any set of circumstances. Insofar as problem setting involves tacit assumptions about what is possible or needed in any situation (specialised inputs or skills, a controlled environment, centralised management) it reflects certain substantive commitments. The practical/substantive distinction is arguably false - a point implicit in the Germanic sense of 'practical'.

Strictly speaking the problem setting and solving processes are iterative or recursive rather than discrete. Means and ends are interactive, not bound by distinctions between

42 Olsson (1979, 87).
43 Olsson (1979, 88) and Wolin (1972, 44-45).
44 Erich Fromm (1967, 129-30) calls this the 'marketing orientation' of modern societies. By this he means that our sense of personal credibility (in what we do, are, or say) depends on how successfully we objectify and externalise our qualities as commodities. Success in this venture depends in turn on "how fickle the judgements of the market are at the time".
practical, substantive or technical rationality. But once the problems have been set or, as Schon says, 'named' and 'framed', a problem exists which can be approached by the application of certain techniques and procedures. But even here, problem solving is not simply a matter of applying technical rationality. Frequently the unique features of a situation constrain the straightforward application of technique or 'what the book says'. What occurs may be subsequently rationalised by reference to discursive, theoretical knowledge, but in practice technical, social, geographic, economic and other issues are mixed together. As one practitioner remarked, a 'good' practitioner must be able to 'fly by the seat of his pants'. If this interpretation of practice is reliable, then some remarks can be made about responsible practice in terms of the stance of the practitioner and the particular method it involves.

My attitude is that attempts to authorise practice according to some external reference to 'the facts of the matter' not only misrepresents the reality of practice but has certain authoritarian consequences. On the other hand, recognition of the substantive dimensions of practice and then setting about to locate some Archimedean point of authority in 'real interests' is similarly perverse in consequence. The lesson of Weber is that neither empirics nor theory but individual choice and commitment are the only defensible basis for non-authoritarian modes of practice. This is not at all to suggest an unalloyed relativism, but neither does it yield to terse prescription. For the practitioner, Weber's work suggests three qualities of decisive importance: commitment, a sense of responsibility, and judgement.

Without substantive commitments practice is inherently meaningless, or worse, we come to see our technical means as merging with or replacing commitments either neglected or of which we are only dimly aware. In this sense, responsible practice is wary of those who extend the notion of dispassionate independence and impartiality beyond the application of techniques and formulae. Indeed despite its superficial prominence, only a small part of practice involves technical rationality as such.

Weber's passionate commitment has a further aspect, namely his unshakeable faith in human capability. Despite his views on the paradox of consequences, he would have agreed with Giddens' view of the transformative potential of human agency and that there is considerably greater potential separation between individual practices and the broader historical processes of rationalisation.

Commitment must however be 'responsible'. Recognition of capability must avoid the kind of 'sterile excitation' that tends either toward terrorism or the 'solipsistic affirmation of the inner life'. Commitment would 'run away to nothing' unless one was responsive to certain conditions of action. Giddens refers to these as the unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of action. For instance, one may be committed to people's participation in projects as a way of arresting the centralisation of power which denies their interests. But there is always a fine line between participation which actually enhances their interests (and one's commitment) and that which simply emasculates their personal or

political interests as merely another 'input'. The latter will likely follow if one blindly pursues the commitment to participation without judging the context and potentially paradoxical consequences. Rather than arresting the development malaise, commitment can merely reproduce it.

Judgement and responsibility resist the pretension that substantive commitments can be pursued outside of rather than within the process of rationalisation. Development practice attempts to attain certain ends, but the basic idea of practice requires these be pursued through technical rationality. This control of material and social processes brings with it domination. But the link between domination and exploitation is neither certain nor generalisable. In this sense, judgement refers also to a sense of proportion borne out of an orientation to concrete situations, rather than the dictates of abstract ethic or position.

It makes no sense to speak of a single or the correct interpretation of 'what is to be done' in any situation. But acknowledging this and the elusive nature of the qualities referred to above, does not imply relativism or the subjective view that all practices are of equal merit. Judgements about better or worse practices are not assimilable simply to private likes or dislikes. There are perhaps two senses in which the word 'subjective' is relevant here, the second of which leads again to the relation between technical and substantive/practical rationality in practice. In one sense subjective refers to matters of sensation or emotion. One's aesthetic taste is a good example. The statement 'I like an area of native bushland' is largely uncontentious - unless someone claimed we were simply deceiving ourselves, no-one could disagree with the subjective expression. But subjectivity is frequently judgemental or evaluative. For instance, stating that an act is exploitative calls for justification. Unless this is forthcoming, one cannot be expected to be taken seriously.

This brings attention to the role of technical rationality in substantive commitments. Whilst judgement cannot be decided by technical means, this kind of rationality is crucial to responsible practice. It is a resource to be employed in practice, one which is both enabling and constraining as far as one's practical/substantive commitments are concerned. If seen as a resource, rather than a dictate, technical rationality enables a recovery of authorship of action. It is constraining, in the sense that the assessment of substantive commitments in terms of the reliability of strategic action must be accomplished in technically rational terms. Despite the paradoxical consequences of this, responsible practice is advanced by empirical, technically rational knowledge. This is the meaning of Lenin's 'conscious element' and Weber's remark that,

we associate the highest measure of an empirical 'feeling of freedom' with those actions which we are conscious of performing rationally - i.e., in the absence of physical and psychic 'compulsions', vehement 'affects', and 'accidental' disturbances of the clarity of judgement in which we pursue a clearly conceived 'end' through 'means' which are the most adequate according to our empirically grounded knowledge.

More specifically, the use of technical rationality can identify, or be directed towards

47 As discussed in Bernstein (1983, 55-6).
identifying, the costs of the selection of particular means with regard to: 1) the partial rather than complete realisation of a desired end (interests); 2) the unintended additional consequences which deleteriously affect other ends (interests); and 3) to a certain extent, an evaluation of the ends being achieved at all given the particular circumstances. This does not mean that judgements and actions correspond with the most technically efficacious. On occasions the opposite may apply when, as Weber says, we must say 'here I stand, I cannot do otherwise'.

But as I have been at pains to demonstrate in previous chapters, the kinds of judgement made in points 1 to 3 are inescapably normative. To this extent, responsible practice cannot imply 'decisionism' or an individualist monologue carried on by the practitioner within him/herself. More than a personal stance, responsible practice requires a particular method. This simply makes explicit my previous remarks about the social character of judgement. Bernstein says of judgement, it is not the expression of private feelings or idiosyncratic subjective preferences [a point made above]. Neither is it to be identified with the type of universality ... characteristic of 'cognitive reason'. Judgement is communal and intersubjective; it always implicitly appeals to and requires testing against the opinions of other judging persons. Weber also argued that judgement is social in that it is formed in struggle and dialogue with others. In the context of development practice, where practitioners' decisions always implicate or affect others, this dialogue implies an explicit methodology. As a method, dialogue is the only way the unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of possible action can be tackled and the normative commitments of the practitioner, so often buried in practical knowledge, can be brought to the fore.

Summary
This chapter outlined two ethics of practice corresponding to two analytic perspectives, each of which highlight and obscure aspects of practice. As ethics, each has features essential and deleterious to responsible practice. Responsible practice attempts a non-authoritarian combination of both. It is not a middle course since such a course cannot be charted as a set of propositions, but exists as a tension to be resolved in the concrete situations of practice. Figure 8.1 summarises the relations between the concepts that have featured in the discussion to this point.

It must be expected that technical rationality - essential to entertaining the idea of development practice at all - will be allied with processes of control. Development practice will involve the segmentation, separation and classification of phenomena since rationalisation is essential to control. Words like manipulation and domination will characterise more of development practice than their opposites.

To this extent technical rationality constrains and bounds the realisation of substan-

tive commitments. But technical rationality is also enabling, yet only if it is recognised that substantive commitments cannot be realised in development practice outside the bounds of technical rationalisation.

This assessment of rationalisation is allied with a particular normative or ethical imperative. We can allude to Giddens' theoretical statement about the primacy of autonomy, capability and knowledgeability in human agency. But the idea of maximising freedom and disdain for the countervailing tendencies of a development malaise is derived from beyond the boundaries of theory and empirics. Nevertheless I have shown here and in Chapter Seven that my notion of responsible practice is a logical, and therefore defensible extension of recent developments in social theory.

The balance of the descriptive discussion in previous chapters, the emphasis on Giddens' recursive view of social life and Weber's paradox of consequences, lies more toward the rationalisation thesis than the hopes of resistance in Chapter Six. But just as the link between structure and agency is contingent rather than deterministic, the ethical imperative argued here suggests that succumbing to pessimism will cripple one's capability and commitments. What is pessimism and despair in terms of the rationalisation thesis, must in terms of the realities of practice, be more a matter of humility.
Unlike most social theory, development practice involves not just an understanding (framing, setting) of social problems but a mandate to remedy them. This is a more difficult task. It is easier to fail as a practitioner than as a social theorist. Seizures of pessimism are, in this sense, occupational hazards.

We find today practitioners who believe that the incorporation of each new variable into the calculus will inevitably solve social problems. Similarly we find those looking to theorise the issues to discover 'real interests' and an ultimate substantive basis in terms of which social life may be engineered. Both with some confidence posit this is what others should believe. This is the essence of 'posit-ion'. Both lack an appreciation of the human scene and reflect an out-dated mode of thinking. Overconfidence in the end is likely to result in frustration which, at best, will generate a despair more damaging than pessimism and, at worst, an authoritarian practice.

Within the limits of what can be known, responsible practice neither underestimates the possibilities nor glibly glosses over the difficulties. Its authority does not rest on positions which remain the prerogative of a few by virtue of the special technical skill or theoretical insight necessary to know them. Responsible practice implies a dialogue, a method whereby the authority of 'what is to be done' is negotiated out of a struggle between substantive commitment and technical reason, self and other. Chapter Nine illustrates such an approach to the development malaise.
CHAPTER 9
PRACTICE REVISITED

Penultimate chapters carry the expectation of certitude, of positions established from the previous melee and of prescriptive policy offered. A case study at this point could tend to be read as a pretentious surrogate which meets this expectation. No such proxy is intended here.

Previous discussion has identified two divergent positions, each containing insights about practice but, when expressed as ethics or modes of practice, neither is adequate for dealing with the development malaise. Responsible practice refers to the dialogue between various aspects of these positions. This does not allow one to write another position: a synthesis in theory to be applied in practice. And, while it is possible to specify the process, it is not possible to foretell what this will yield.

The character of the case history follows logically from this. It is intangible rather than determinative. The case records how a number of issues in conventional practice were resolved. But it also raises numerous issues which lie beyond the thesis. Food for thought but only partially for action. These suggest a personal addendum: recommendations for the author's further attention, nothing more.

Case studies of this kind are also hazardous. Researchers normally bracket out their presence in what they write. This is particularly so for the customary 'policy recommendations' types of conclusions. Policy is for them 'out there'. It rarely implicates the author. The policy may be unsound, but then if the author is not 'out there' too, it is of no account. The author bracketed from the policy statement and its practical consequences is invulnerable. This is not possible in hermeneutic inquiry. In this case the author is in the statement and the consequences.

Mid-way through field research on the Zamboanga del Sur Development Project in Mindanao, I made contact with various local non-governmental development organisations (NGOs) financially assisted by counterparts in Australia and New Zealand. Early discussions revealed a common dissatisfaction with conventional development strategies and in particular with current approaches to project evaluation. With the possibility of project evaluation funding from an Australian NGO, each of us were forced to address the question 'You're always critical of conventional ways, now's the chance, how can we put an alternative on the ground?'

After reviewing some of the background to the people, project, and purposes of the evaluation, Sections II and III record this experience. My purpose is not to present the results of the evaluation as such, but to highlight the process which evolved over seven
months. In Section II, I illustrate the focus of the evaluation by utilising the distinction between material, personal and political interests. This discussion is less relevant than Section III where I highlight the process of evaluation. Here I review how the ‘topics’ of the evaluation were determined, the methods used for assessing ‘impacts’ of the project, the relationship between judgement and strategic action, and finally the role of the practitioner and the conditions bearing on responsible practice in this case.

PROJECT EVALUATION: THE SUMBAGA CASE

Background
The evaluation involved the Australian Freedom From Hunger Campaign (AFFHC) and three Filipino groups in Mindanao. The latter included a communications support and organising NGO and two groups from their network: a Muslim women’s literacy and co-operative group in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur Province, and a co-operative fishing venture in a barangay called Sumbaga in Zamboanga del Sur Province. For the present purposes the primary interest is in the Sumbaga co-operative and the role of the Australian and Filipino NGOs.

Sumbaga is part of Waling Waling, one of thirteen barangays which comprise the municipality of Vincenzo Sagun in the Baganian Peninsula (see Map 2.5). Sumbaga covers an area of 125 hectares within the coconut hacienda Elago. It is located on the coast and connected by track with a road, constructed under the ZDSDP project, four kilometres distant. Primary public utilities and services are at Margosatubig, fourteen kilometres away: no regular medical, veterinary or agricultural services exist and most commercial services are located seventy-one kilometres away in Pagadian. At the centre of Sumbaga are a co-op store, a chapel and a basketball court.

Almost all of the 320 people of Sumbaga (65h.h) are tenants who receive one third of the hacienda’s gross copra sales plus the produce of cassava, corn and bananas grown on small assigned lots (averaging 1.29 ha). Agricultural productivity is extremely low: a reflection of poor soils, erosion and an extended dry season. Infant mortality rates (114 per thousand) are twice the Philippines’ national average. This reflects poor sanitation and dependence on milky water from open wells that dry up two months into the four month dry season. In turn these conditions are reinforced by extremely low cash incomes (average P747 [$A1 = P9. 1983] p.a./h.h) and lack of basic medical facilities.

There have been numerous developmental initiatives in the area - by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Ministry of Agriculture and latterly under the auspices of ZDSDP’s multiple cropping program - all have had negligible success. Sumbaga people attribute this to their tenancy status, government corruption, the high risk of new programs and inadequate servicing. In ZDSDP’s terms, lethargy, lack of initiative and misplaced suspicion are offered as explanation.

Since the war between the Philippines Armed Forces and the Moro National Liberation Front during 1972-4, military activity has increased dramatically. As Newsweek puts it “a
varied mix of gangsters, renegade soldiers and religious fanatics terrorise the island [Mindanao].\(^1\) Over the seven month period of the evaluation, and in the immediate vicinity of Sumbaga for instance, two of the three researchers were detained for questioning; one of the research advisors was detained for trial (and released after two years detention); a nearby school house was fire-bombed; three kidnappings occurred; four military personnel were killed in an ambush; and, as a result of the evaluation being labelled 'subversive' by the authorities, a military detachment visited Sumbaga and questioned co-op members.

In 1980, a small group of tenants organised a co-operative fishing venture. A number of events stand out in the co-operative's formation: early experience with a co-op store (established in 1978), the continuous decline of copra prices (to P0.30 per kilo in 1980), a number of altercations with the hacienda owner which threatened tenancy rights, and the involvement of staff from the Filipino NGO late in 1980 and, through this, the availability of a small financial grant from the AFFHC. This grant was used for a revolving capital loan fund on which co-op members drew to release themselves from debt bondage,\(^2\) purchase fishing nets and small boats and establish a marketing capital fund. Originally (1981) ten nets and twelve boats were purchased at a cost of P24,500. At the time of the evaluation (1984) there were twenty-five member households, twenty of whom had boats and nets.

The co-op operations include fish catching, processing and marketing. Once landed the catch is weighed, cleaned and dried on solar trays. Fishers and those involved in processing and marketing receive a guaranteed price and wage throughout the year. They sell most fish locally at thirty to forty per cent below market prices, with an increasing proportion traded at more distant locations, through a federation with high-country farmers' co-operatives organised along similar lines.\(^3\)

Initiatives for the evaluation arose from three quarters. Staff from the Filipino NGO, together with co-op members had undertaken regular reviews of progress, but were anxious to begin a more systematic examination of the previous three years in order to plan future activities assisting other groups. The AFFHC were also keen to begin evaluation of their partnerships in Mindanao. The 1970s saw important changes in the agency's thinking about development translated into patterns of program funding. Whereas NGO funding previously contrasted with official aid efforts largely according to scale (for example, village wells as opposed to major dams or irrigation), in the late 1970s they developed an increasingly, critical stance toward the effectiveness of conventional strategies,\(^4\) and growing support for adult education, farming and fishing co-operatives, union and village organising and primary health care. But NGOs like AFFHC see themselves as embarrassingly unaware of how such programs operate, their social and economic impact or the peculiar difficulties that arise.

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1. Newsweek, 16.4.84, p.9.
2. The evaluation indicated that over eighty per cent of the Sumbaga community were, for all intents and purposes, in perpetual debt. Money lenders were reported as requiring a sixty-four kilo sack of shelled corn as interest on a two-three month loan of P100, or 1000 ears of corn for every P40 loan per month.
3. This information is a summary of Porter (1983) and Porter and Clark (1985).
4. This is discussed in Porter and Clark (1985). Cf. NGO criticism of ZDSDP cited in Chapter Five.
Evaluation was seen as one way to rectify this whilst also responding to public demands for accountability and, with increasing government funding of Australian NGOs, meeting government review requirements. The third set of 'interests' in the evaluation derived from the author. No detailed elaboration of this interest is necessary here. The evaluation was a practical opportunity to clarify some of the issues discussed in the thesis. Figure 9.1 below summarises the activities relating to the evaluation.

**Evaluation: Aims and Purposes**
A number of unique conditions directly affected the focus and method of the evaluation. Of most importance was the basic agreement on the evaluation's aims and purposes. This is not to say that each group simply mirrored the other's expectations nor that consensus prevailed at all times. At heart this accord reflected a view of development along the lines suggested by Filipino Blondie Po.

> Development is increasingly being defined as the process whereby people progressively achieve control over the social and material conditions which determine their life, work and environment; benefit from a wider distribution of basic necessities and opportunities resulting from such control; and become capable of self-determination and realization.\textsuperscript{5}

Not all parties would attach the same meaning to such a statement. It uses the language of the theorist/activist and experience underscores the frequent gap between their interests and those of at least two other groups. Individuals concerned with policy - AFFHC administrators and to a lesser extent their counterparts in the implementing MGO - read such statements in terms of results, policy-relevant conclusions and, ultimately, with a view to 'keeping control of the situation'. Another reading of the statement reflects the interests and priorities of the Sumbaga Co-op members. For them, the translation of theoretical statement into evaluation practice reflects the day-to-day immediacy of keeping their enterprise afloat in a hostile environment; not the machinations of funding policy or the academic's theoretical conundrums.

The focus of the evaluation closely approximated Po's statement. It aimed to assess the co-op project in terms of the satisfaction of material necessities (for example, technical and economic efficiencies and distribution of benefits) and how these were related to the dimensions of organisation and control in the co-op and its relations with external agencies (including funding and implementing agencies, government authorities and private corporate interests). A review of the focus is presented shortly.

While the common view of development gave a clear indication of the focus of evaluation, it was readily agreed it also implied something about the process and organisation of the evaluation as well. The distinctive feature of this view is not so much its focus on the products of development - the distribution of material or political benefits - but on the process through which they are achieved. While this view of development led to a different focus to that characteristic of evaluation of mainstream (official) development projects, it also had far-reaching consequences for the process itself. Recognising that the evaluation

\textsuperscript{5} Po (1980, 2).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 months</td>
<td><strong>Preliminary discussions regarding evaluation</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1 week | **First visit by AFFHC representatives.**  
Workshop with implementing NGO.  
Initial assessment of issues in evaluation practice (including purposes, use of results, responsibilities and obligations) |
| 1 week | **Workshops with project groups.**  
Discussion of priorities, issues in evaluation practice, responsibilities and obligations. |
| 1 week | **Workshop with implementing NGO**  
- identify research focus  
  (issues and priorities)  
- guidelines for analysis  
- methods (for clarification of focus, data collection, analysis)  
- responsibilities (for communication between groups, training in research skills, analysis, and use of information) |
| 1 week | Return to project groups to clarify 4. above. |
| 5 months | **Training of project groups in data collection and analysis.**  
Data collection.  
Preliminary analysis by project group. |
| 3 weeks | **Collection of additional data.**  
Combined analysis involving AFFHC, implementing NGO and project groups. |
| 4 days | **Post-evaluation workshop**  
- review of process  
- evaluation results and future strategies |

* author present
process should reflect the methods of project initiation, planning and control, a number of process-related aims were added to those concerned with focus.

1. The evaluation priorities should be determined first in terms of the control and management interests of co-op members and second in terms of the administrative, policy and research needs of other participants.

2. The evaluation should be participatory and controlled in its design and execution in an equitable manner.

3. In order to achieve 1) and 2) the evaluation should facilitate the transfer of relevant skills and knowledge between participants.

For most participants, this meant that previous experience with conventional evaluation had to be scrutinised. It also implied that we were embarking on a process for which there were few role models; consequently, false starts, mistakes and misunderstandings were bound to occur.

II

FOCUS OF THE EVALUATION

I have continually referred to the various material, personal and political purposes of development practice. While the focus of the Sumbaga evaluation was not categorised in these terms, there is sufficient overlap that continuity with previous discussion can be maintained without distorting the actual focus of the case. I do not intend to exhaustively review the matters examined in the evaluation, but give examples of these three dimensions and the relations between them.

Material Interests

Aside from a special interest in the distribution of benefits and costs, the evaluation of material interests followed fairly standard lines. Material benefits and costs refer to private goods which are assessable in terms of increases in production and consumption (including income and assets).

The co-operative venture was related to production increases in direct and indirect ways. Evaluation of direct increases involved assessment of the fish catching, processing and marketing operations. For instance, evaluation of the fish catching stage included the technical performance and suitability of equipment (lifespan, ratio of repairs to capital outlay); the use of the revolving capital fund; and the type of fish caught (availability, competition with other fishers, for example, Japanese trawlers). Processing was evaluated in terms of losses due to incorrect preparation, drying techniques and labour costs. Marketing evaluation included assessment of market demand, competition with other suppliers, weight loss of dried fish during transportation, control over transport costs and marketing capital needs.

Various indirect consequences of the co-op operations on production were considered. For instance, the fishing co-op had encouraged other co-operative ventures in land prepara-
tion, planting and harvesting. This had increased labour inputs, extended the area of planting and thereby increased production. Similarly, increased incomes increased the turnover of the co-operative store and the dividends paid to members.

Consumption increases also had two aspects. First, increases in food intake (and continuity of supply) from fishing and farming and second, through increased income, improved school attendance, mobility, supplementary foods and assets (housing, clothing, household and farming equipment).

In each of production and consumption, attention was paid to the distributional aspects. For instance, food consumption, income and asset profiles of co-op members were assembled and contrasted with non-members. And within the household (the basic unit of assessment) the question of who benefited (labour contribution versus control over material benefit) also received attention. Interest in distribution of production and consumption benefits clearly overlapped with the personal and political dimensions. Evaluation of these areas however focused on other guidelines.

**Personal Interests**

I have frequently specified personal interests by words like personal esteem, sense of worth, or capability. In practice it was difficult to maintain a distinction between personal and political interests. Partly for convenience, the former was taken to refer to effects within the community whereas the latter was examined in terms of relations with external agencies. The two are closely related. Personal esteem and sense of capability are closely related to externally oriented political initiatives an individual or group may consider. Similarly, self-esteem is closely related to material welfare; both analytically, and in terms of the referents an individual may use to explain self-esteem.

The evaluation had to: a) identify what were the most 'important' (discussed below) aspects of this personal dimension, how they were manifested; and b) examine how they were enhanced or constrained by the project’s material or political impacts. Self-esteem, dignity, confidence, capability are all difficult to assess. Assessment cannot seriously contemplate a summary measure of the kind that might be attempted by material cost-benefit analysis. Three examples will illustrate how this dimension was dealt with: skill transfer, cultural reciprocity, and views of the future.

The kind of skills available in any group bear directly on their ability to analyse situations and formulate and implement decisions. In turn success or failure in this activity enhances or reduces personal esteem, sense of worth and confidence. Simply put, the evaluation considered the 'what, who and how' of skills within the co-op and, albeit briefly, compared this with those who were not co-op members. **What** refers to the kinds of skills; these could be addressed in terms of material, personal and political dimensions. For instance, material skills related to fishing, processing and marketing techniques, including repair and maintenance of equipment. Personal skills referred particularly to literacy and numeracy levels (related to co-op accounting, purchasing and letter or proposal writing), communicative ability (facilitating meetings) or organisational skills in group leadership, appraisal of commercial ventures as well as political skills in dealing with outside agents.
Who refers to the distribution of the above skills according to age or sex, length of residence or co-op membership, place of residence (for example, distance from fish processing area), land tenure and education. How refers to the process of skill transfer and included assessment of the individual (informal) or collective (formal workshop) basis of skill transfer, the role of outsiders, and the motivation and duration of training.

Case examples were used in Part I to illustrate the vulnerability of indigenous cultural values in conventional development practice. An example best explains the guidelines followed in the evaluation. Observers of traditional rural life have noted how sharing and reciprocity, once common practices, are fast disappearing. This has had immediate effects on the livelihood of those who benefit materially, but more importantly the cultural esteem of giver and receiver are undermined and with this, the communal sense of solidarity. Whilst commonly discounted in project evaluation, the way in which the co-op arrested this trend and reinstated traditions was repeatedly cited by co-op members and non-members alike as their single most significant achievement. As one member remarked, "We used to consider the co-operative as a way of accumulating capital, now we see the capital in terms of keeping the co-operation alive".

Skill transfer addressed capability and confidence, and cultural reciprocity was used to inquire into self-worth and esteem. Each of these were closely related to individual and group sense of potency (or what Giddens calls 'making a difference'). Ultimately this could be assessed in political terms (attitudes toward elites for example). Similarly, the successes and failures of the commercial operation are a surrogate measure. An alternative way of coming to grips with this aspect of the evaluation was assessment of what was called the groups' 'future orientation'. Much has been written about the passive and acquiescent orientation of the poor. Whether one attributes this to religion, a colonial legacy, or regards it as a highly rational form of escape or resistance (Chapter Six), prior to the co-op venture Sumbaga people frequently described their 'state of affairs' in terms of 'God's will' or 'fate'. As is implied in the view of development discussed earlier, a change from a passive to an active future orientation is of prime importance. This was at least partly assessable through examination of the way in which the group had dealt with recent crises (for example, the drowning of a fisherman - was it understood as fate, natural calamity or inadequate group surveillance at sea?) and in terms of how the group established boundaries on what advances in commercial and political activities were possible in the future.

**Political Interests**

The guidelines for evaluation of both the material and personal interests provided the basis for assessment of political interests. Recognising the close links between the three interests, the evaluation recast most of the previous guidelines in terms of political interests. For example, skill transfer was recast in terms of political participation in wider issues, such as barangay and municipal politics; the improved economic resilience of co-op members in terms of the kinds of issues taken up with government authorities and opposition forces; the role of outside agencies (for example, NGOs) in terms of dependency and autonomy; and the sense of personal dignity in terms of possible obligations to take action against social injustices affecting others.
As these examples indicate, the evaluation at this point came to focus more explicitly on the relations between the three interests. As with all the dimensions of the evaluation, priorities were primarily defined in terms of the co-op members' interests. However the relations between the economic and technical aspects of the co-operative and broader organisational and political concerns were of particular interest to all three groups involved. I have argued a tension frequently occurs between what is economically efficient and technically rational on the one hand and certain substantive values such as participation on the other. As Weber pointed out, the most technically efficient organisational structure is the bureaucracy. The hierarchy, specialisation and centralisation of power this implies is immediately in conflict with direct, participatory decision processes and broad-based control over production and consumption. The following section gives examples of how technical rationality and substantive commitments were interrelated; only two of the general guidelines are presented below.

Characteristics of technology and distribution of benefits: Co-op members were acutely aware of the relations between technical decisions based on economic productivity criteria and the distribution of material and non-material benefits. For instance, prior to the decision to use co-op capital to purchase owner operated boats and nets, the group had considered the purchase of a single trawler. While a reasonably sound commercial venture, one of the reasons for rejecting it was that the operation of such technology (navigation, mechanical and managerial skills) was beyond the capability of all but a small group and would have depended on outside expertise. The trawler venture could potentially decrease absolute poverty, but increase relative inequalities in terms of political and economic control amongst the group.

Organisational characteristics and group size: The co-op's commitment to collective management had a number of consequences: limitations on group size, rates of capital formation and, thereby, their ability to expand the existing operation or move into new ventures. Similarly, an efficient organisational structure (in terms of speed of decision making based on specialised knowledge) implied clear distinction (and continuity) of those responsible for executive functions (President, Treasurer, Secretary). Increased size and economic expansion supported this, whilst it was at odds with participatory interests and commitments to skill transfer and education.

This review of the focus and guidelines of the evaluation illustrates an important aspect of the 'responsive' character of the mode of practice argued for in the previous chapter. Against the tendency to define one's focus in terms of the criteria of technical rationality - such as maximising productivity and efficiency - there is a continual effort to cast these criteria in terms of other non-material interests. But the review in itself says nothing of the process whereby the guidelines and priorities were established, how standards for assessment were determined, or how judgements were made and then related to strategic action. As I have said before, it is in the process rather than content of practice that the most significant questions of authority arise.
III

PROCESS, METHOD AND PERSONAL STANCE IN EVALUATION

The focus of the evaluation was designed to assess the impact of the Sumbaga Co-op and determine the factors which enhanced and constrained this impact. Of equal importance was an attempt to reconstruct an evaluation process in accordance with the view of development that lay behind this focus. Beyond agreement in principle, there was initially little understanding of what this meant in concrete terms. Most participants had no idea of what evaluation implied save for its being 'an intellectual thing' shrouded in the mystique of expertise. Those that did were extremely sceptical about the conventional meaning of the term but, largely, had not moved beyond the stage of critique. We were wary of words like domination, manipulation and control but their alters, like autonomy, facilitation or enhancing local capacity, did not yet constitute a program for action.

With hindsight, the definition of the process can be seen in terms of three sets of practical and theoretical knowledge. One was the critique of conventional practice and my previous experience in project evaluation and impact assessment. Another was the practical experiences of the Filipino field staff in community organising - a label which covers a vast range of skills - and the prior involvement of Sumbaga Co-op members in these activities. Finally, the evaluation drew on the advice of people experienced in participatory research methods.6

The following discussion overviews three major stages of the evaluation process: the establishment of priorities and issues, the assessment of impacts, and judgements about future actions. This linear treatment risks conveying the impression of certainty and ready replication. A replicable method was involved, but not one that moved from clear hypothesis-like beginnings through data collection, analysis and on to strategies. The method was imprecise, iterative and full of gaps, false starts and mistakes. But we judged it highly successful in terms of our initial expectations. Bearing in mind one participant's remark, "next time we'll do it different", I try to indicate some of the reasons for this judgement.

Some preliminary remarks should be made about three things. First, the range of techniques used in the evaluation. Previous discussion of material interests would suggest that conventional accounting, cash flow analysis or crude cost-benefit analysis were prominent. These were however only a small part of a range that included workshops (at all stages from issue setting to post-evaluation review), comic broadsheets (explaining the research framework), seminars (training in data collection) and surveys (for household social indicators on assets and consumption). In part, this emphasis on non-quantitative techniques reflected the existing skills and strengths of implementing NGO staff and, given the wish to maximise involvement of Sumbaga people, an acknowledgement of the latter's low literacy and numeracy levels.

Second, while both significant reasons, the qualitative, participatory emphasis said more about the orientation of the evaluation. Early discussion established the principle that any program changes the evaluation might suggest should be part of the process itself and not be consequent upon the production of a report or schedule of directives. The latter approach was deemed inappropriate to local conditions and furthermore had manipulative overtones contrary to the co-op members' insistence that they maintain control over the use of information. This orientation meant that conventional techniques of evaluation played a minor role. Most conventional techniques are geared to meeting the aggregate data needs of centralised project management. Put another way they tend to have a 'product' orientation which best serves the needs of centralised manipulation of policy, administrative and fiscal variables.

Third, this orientation of the evaluation was sustained by the prominence of what has been called 'local knowledge'. While consistent with the participatory aims, this was more a recognition of the fact that local people have a more detailed and differentiated knowledge of their situation than can be achieved by outsiders. Two points should be made about this. First, it was soon discovered that local knowledge could not reliably be treated in propositional terms. That is, it was not a matter of 'fitting-in' local knowledge to a pre-existing research agenda. The latter reflects an analytic kind of reason (discursive in Giddens' sense) which did not accord well with the analogic, anecdotal expression given to local practical knowledge. The previous categories of material, personal and political interests for instance, while matching with this thesis, belie the actual framework involved.

Another point about local knowledge provides a lead-in to the rest of this section. The recent attention given to local knowledge in development literature is part of a general critique of Western technical rationality. In turn this can readily fall into an either/or position which splits the rationality of local from scientific knowledge in irreconcilable terms. This reflects a rather peculiar twist of de-authoring, that is, a giving over of truth to what 'the people' say is true.\(^7\) Chambers' remark is meant to arrest this tendency.

Both outsiders' knowledge and the knowledge of the rural people can be wrong. The key is to know which is wrong when. It would be foolish here to do a complete reversal in favour of rural people's knowledge as it has been so often in the past to suppose that professional outsiders have the monopoly of insight.\(^8\) The phrase 'knowing which is wrong when', has both empirical or technical, and normative dimensions. Reference to qualitative techniques and methods of dialogue says nothing about how the questions implied in this phrase were addressed.

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7. This is relevant to the 'rationality and relativism' debate in philosophy and the sociology of knowledge (cf. Hollis and Lukes, 1982) which is beyond the present discussion.
Naming Issues, Setting Priorities

Conventionally understood, development practice is about problem solving; the application of technical forms of rationality to the solution of pre-existent problems. A distinction between problem setting and problem solving was made earlier to highlight important aspects of practice which reflect the rationality of practical and substantive knowledge and the importance of metaphors. It has been shown how the relative neglect of the latter in conceptions of practice reinforces a tendency for the values of technical rationality to displace the substantive ends. The case studies have also indicated the paradoxical and authoritarian implications of this.

Problem setting, or more precisely the formulation of priorities and issues, was given special attention in the Sumbaga evaluation. This involved both substantive and technical reasoning in a process labelled by Filipino organisers as 'structural analysis'. Their field manual describes this in the following terms.

Structural analysis aims to provide a critical understanding of the socio-economic-political-cultural structures of society. This comprehension is the end result of the content and process. Both have [to be] given due importance because the quality of the content depends on the quality of the process.9

The broader implications of the last sentence will be taken up later. For the moment content and process is of interest in terms of how the issues and priorities of the evaluation were established. Structural analysis is linked with what Filipino practitioners call 'problematising', which corresponds with Paolo Freire's use of the term and implicitly draws upon but is not limited to Marxist structuralism.10 The way in which this affected the setting of evaluation priorities and guidelines can best be illustrated by example.

In Chapter Five I discussed the themes of technical packages, appropriate technology and the problem of institutionalisation in the Zamboanga del Sur project. The themes are linked. Interest in appropriate technology arose from the broader institutionalisation problem, namely the low farmer adoption rates of technical packages. Consistent with the 'yields problem' and focus on technical inputs, appropriate technology was defined in terms of providing new technical packages which would 'fit-in' to the local scene; in short, it was a matter of trading the tractor for the hand-tiller.

In view of this, ZDSDP's evaluations logically focused on the technical and economic efficiencies of the new hardware supplied under the appropriate technology program. I noted that judging by continuing low adoption rates and the surfeit of hand-tools in the Agricultural Engineer's office that this exercise had proven frustrating and disappointing for the practitioners. I suggested that at least part of this problem reflected the manner in which problems were set, that is, the tacit acceptance of 'blind Freddy and his dog' and the 'yields problem'. The program was designed in accordance with the need to 'package and extend to small upland farmers sets of technology'. The task of community development and agricultural extension staff was to change 'those aspects of the farmers' lives that impinged on the project'.

10. Freirean problematising is discussed in Hamnett et al. (1984, 100-102).
Appropriate technology was an important theme in the Sumbaga evaluation as well. Indeed, Sumbaga was part of an overall program entitled 'Appropriate Technology for Mindanao'. But the meaning of this term and process whereby this was defined differed from ZDSDP in important respects. At the risk of over-stressing the contrast, if ZDSDP can be characterised as being oriented toward the management of technical inputs, the Sumbaga project is concerned primarily with questions of power and control. Each reflects contrasting views of development.

With ZDSDP the word 'appropriate' is largely a synonym for technical fit. In Sumbaga, 'appropriate' is understood not just as an adjective but as a verb concerned with how people appropriate and control their means of livelihood. This is not to say that the technical 'fit' or suitability of the fishing equipment, processing and marketing operations was not of interest. It is a matter of emphasis; one which is summed up in one fisherman's remark 'When we're cleaning fish, we're not just cleaning fish'. Apparently technical activities like fish processing are also to be assessed in terms of how they further or constrain the achievement of personal and political interests.

Understood as a verb, 'appropriate' also says something about the process through which issues were defined. There are two aspects of this. The first relates to the earlier theme of authority. ZDSDP was used to illustrate one dimension of de-authoring in conventional practice. In this case it referred to the way in which development strategies were defined in terms of the practitioner's assessment of the 'facts of the situation'. What was appropriate logically followed tacit acceptance of what 'blind Freddy and his dog' could see. The farmers participated in this process to the extent that their attitudes were surveyed and entered as one variable in the overall management equation. However, despite the efforts of extension staff, the packages that followed did not take hold with the farmers.

A remark by one of the Filipino field staff suggests a distinctive feature of the Sumbaga process.

Experts have agonised for a long time to conceptualise their views, the listeners are deprived of the same process. The instant conversion do not sink down deep roots [sic].

This does not mean that the practitioner should be especially persuasive; although persuasion is necessarily a part of all discourse. One way of seeing the meaning intended in the above remark is in terms of Weber's distinction between 'hot passion' and 'cool judgement'. Field staff associated with Sumbaga are well aware that structural analysis implies more than a new set of development strategies. Analysis contains an implicit evaluative stance or normative claim about people's interests as well. A key factor in this kind of practice is facilitating a process through which the co-op members can be encouraged to lay bare these substantive claims and undertake their own 'conversion'. Following on from the above remark about 'conversion', one practitioner pointed out,

Charismatic experts can generate tremendous response, but the conversion do not last long [sic]. What appears as quickly as a bubble disappears in the same way.

One is reminded here of Weber's remark that without cool judgement the passions 'run away to nothing'. In this vein one of the evaluation researchers continued.
Some changes are within our control, others are not. Some are big, some are small. Some are planned, others are unplanned. But the clarity of vision and the purity of the intention are NO guarantee to achieve the objectives. The appropriateness of the action depends on the soundness of the analysis of the situation or social reality. The perception of reality can lead to proper or improper action.

As the last sentence suggests, the passions of substantive rationality require 'cool judgement' regarding what is possible in particular situations. In the evaluation it was necessary to examine, with the benefit of hindsight, whether or not particular judgements had proven 'appropriate', that is, how the two had been brought together. What, in terms of this thesis, were the unacknowledged conditions which bore on the success of the actions? What were the unintended consequences of these actions? Were any of these conditions or consequences within the means of the group to anticipate or rectify? Furthermore, given that 'intention' and 'analysis' may have been more or less appropriate in the past, this had important implications for the relations between the evaluation (reflecting the same process) and strategic actions subsequently taken by co-op members. Before considering this it was necessary to determine how particular 'impacts' were to be assessed.

The Social Construction of Impacts

The two ethics of practice presented in the previous chapter suggest two different ways of dealing with the question of impacts in evaluation. One is largely consistent with conventional practice. The other corresponds with the critical model of practice discussed in Chapter Six.

In Chapter Five I exemplified the tendency in conventional practice to define impacts in terms of existent phenomena in the external world. 'Authoritative impact assessment' invokes notions of practice which stress impartiality, objectivity and judgements uncontaminated by the practitioner's subjectivity. Impacts are a measure of quantitative changes between two points in time. The archetype of this is found in 'impact schedules' developed in the United States which assess project impacts in terms of the rate of change of key social indicators such as population growth rates.\(^\text{11}\) The qualitative dimension of impacts is of course recognised (for example, changes in life-style, work patterns or political processes) but these are relevant only as additional variables to be entered into an 'overall assessment'.

The fact that the same physical events can be judged and responded to quite differently in two communities for all intents and purposes the same, has in recent years led researchers to acknowledge the social nature of impacts.\(^\text{12}\) In other words, impacts have both an external, objective referent (for example, change in population density) and a substantive value dimension whereby the meaning of these events is created and sustained.

The critical model of practice in effect begins with recognition of this. But whereas conventional impact assessment seeks an external referent (facts) to measure impact, the critical model attempts to identify substantive grounds to give authority to impact assess-

\(^{11}\) See reference 61 in Chapter Five.

\(^{12}\) Discussed in Porter (1980b).
Impacts tend to be judged in terms of theoretically derived standards, the most frequently identified being people's 'real interests'. Impacts are measured-off as good or bad in terms of these.

Previous argument has established that both positions contain elements of truth, but that neither is by itself adequate. Giddens' remarks about interests are relevant here since they reflect attempts to overcome the kind of dualism present above. In brief, interests must be understood as an amalgam of individual wants; the social and economic location of the group concerned; and, inevitably, assessments of interest attributed to the group and their location by the researcher. In the Sumbaga case, an attempt was made to assess impacts with regard to the co-op members' judgements about the meaning and significance of events. This, was in turn informed by assessment of the significance of the events in terms of the social and economic context of the group. Finally, it was acknowledged that in addition to the practitioners' discursive (theoretical and empirical) knowledge, their assessments willingly and unwittingly involved their practical/substantive knowledge. The last point was of special significance in terms of the method of dialogue whereby this 'amalgam of assessment' occurred. Being responsive to these three dimensions (rather than grounding the authority of assessment in any single one) is not reliably achieved through a monologue whereby the practitioner 'weighs things up'. The meaning of impacts are inter-subjectively created; dialogue is an explicit methodological recognition of this.

The process is difficult to describe. The reproduction of 'pre-judice' on the part of the practitioner is above all grounded in the routinisation of practice. It is necessary therefore to create a situation in which those hidden 'authoritative claims' of the practitioner can be scrutinised. This cannot be 'engineered' in a technical sense. Neither could it be achieved by designing and following a set of rules. As Wittgenstein established, we do not act according to rules, and action is not taught by rules either. Some sessions proved extremely productive, others were popularly acclaimed unmitigated disasters. One finds expressions of what is involved in Galtung's understanding of dialogue and in Freire's work.\(^\text{13}\) It is akin to what is called the 'mosaic pattern' in feminist circles and contrasts with the linear process of conventional evaluation (that is, hypothesis, method, data, assessment, judgement). Elaine Leeder says.

The mosaic pattern ... includes a supportive structure with considerably less competition. The style uses anecdotal material, encourages the interjection of comments into conversation, accepts emotional data as a legitimate part of intellectual discussions, uses narratives, paraphrases, shifts directions and moves the group together toward a mutual search for understanding. It is an organic process, non-hierarchical and non-competitive. It could in fact be called anarchist because the values of leaderlessness, lack of hierarchy, co-operation and spontaneity have historically been associated with the term anarchism.\(^\text{14}\)

Put another way, the kind of reason expressed in dialogue does not depose or deny technical rationality as an authoritative source. It is aware however that there are different ways in which reason can be used to make authoritative judgements.

\(^{13}\) Galtung (n.d.) and Freire (1970)

\(^{14}\) Leeder (1980, 49).
The considerable energy put into training in research skills, along with the emphasis on non-quantitative methods was in part recognition of the fact that the 'ideal conditions' for a 'free and uncoerced dialogue' (Habermas) do not exist and furthermore that it would be naive to base the process on hope that they might. No-one, least of all the Sumbaga participants, imagined that the evaluation could proceed without bargaining, persuasion and rhetoric. But these words were not understood simply in their pejorative sense. Rather they recognised that anything less than a completely frank testing and scrutiny of each others points of view would produce a kind of mid-way consensus meaning all things to everyone, but basically of little use. The transfer of research skills and use of non-quantitative methods that had the familiarity of 'their turf' arose from recognition that without this the evaluation ('participatory' and 'joint' labels aside) would inadvertently be lop-sided. That is, whatever the practitioners' best intentions, it would reflect the rules and resources through which they defined each stage of evaluation as meaningful.

Judgement and Strategic Action
The active involvement of Sumbaga people stemmed from their expectation that the evaluation would help resolve some contentious and pressing issues. An example of how one of these was dealt with illustrates the relation between the practitioner and strategic action taken by co-op members. This relationship was consistent with Habermas' summary remark.

The sole possible justification at this level is consensus, aimed at practical discourse, among the participants who, in the consciousness of their common interests, and their knowledge of the circumstances, of the possible consequences, and secondary consequences, are the only ones who can know what risks they are willing to undergo, and with what expectations.15

This underscores a key aspect of responsibility as far as the practitioner is concerned. Theory and empirics, substantive/practical and technical rationality are central to judgement. But this is bounded by certain times, places and circumstances. Subsequent action must be cognisant of its unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences. In the final analysis, as Weber pointed out, it is a matter of individual choice; action at heart cannot be authorised by reference to anything other than this.

Co-op members were concerned about their economic and political vulnerability. Economically this was translated into a quest for increased markets. Politically these markets were of interest in terms of federation with kindred groups. With the criteria of efficiency, increased profitability afforded by an expanded scale of operation and market diversification came to the fore. The latter referred to criteria of political federation, solidarity and reciprocal security. Discussion had arisen over how these should be brought together. Given transport costs and market prices, the groups of interest in political terms were in the co-op's assessment, beyond their threshold of profitability. Some argued they were compelled to bear the commercial costs; a view supported by the fact that the potential partners (upland farming co-ops) were at the time severely affected by drought. A decision

15 Habermas (1973, 33).
to advance fish, on what amounted to extended credit, would testify to their political commitments - and hopefully provide some insurance should similar adversity befall them.

In terms of this thesis, the situation could be seen as a rather classic example of the tension between technical/economic rationality and substantive/political commitments. Either one could be pursued separately only to the long-term detriment of the other. With some trepidation, I agreed to assist in clarifying and resolving the issue. We approached this from two directions. First, taking technical/economic criterion (efficiency and profitability) an estimate of average costs and revenue was constructed from existing records. Transportation costs included constant costs and variable costs (including weight loss of dried fish which increased with distance). Then estimates were made of the marginal costs (at varying quantities) of trading with the upland farming co-ops and its effect on profitability.

Beginning from the other direction, co-op members were encouraged to clarify the political advantages of trading with the upland co-ops. Trading at these locations were taken as part of fixed costs. It was possible then to estimate the volume of additional local trading required (that is, expansion of market necessary where transport costs were negligible) to absorb the economic overheads of political commitment. The estimates and method of calculation were widely discussed with co-op members. A key part of this was explication of the unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of each estimate: in other words, financial sensitivity analysis. For example, what effect would variation of fish catch or delays in delivery have? How would a reduced supply be apportioned during low catch seasons? What if jeepney owners took advantage of the co-op's increasing dependence on transport? Would it be better to purchase their own vehicle? What if their apparently 'uneconomic' trading with distant groups led to questioning and surveillance by the authorities?

The assessment enabled the substantive commitments to be scrutinised in technically rational terms. But it also brought the co-op's attention to the large number of variables and consequent uncertainty involved. This translated into risk. With this came the realisation that in the end the decision must be authorised by group choice - not by faith in the analysis or purity of commitment.

Subsequently the co-op decided to trade at one of the distant locations. One suspects, however, that the murder of Benigno Aquino a few weeks beforehand and a particularly volatile local situation during the September 21 anniversary of martial law had important affects on the decision.

16 Not simply because of transport costs as such, but also because: 1) with increasing distance (time) the weight of dry(ing) fish declined; and 2) increased distance meant that the time period between payment of fish supplied by co-op members and receipt of payment at the market point increased, thereby stretching their marketing capital beyond its limits.
Summary: On the Stance of the Practitioner

Project evaluation has become a popular addition to a host of sophisticated specialisms in development practice over the past decade. Like project impact assessment in the West, it is now championed as essential to successful project management. Paradoxically, aside from those whose careers feed on evaluation, it is an extremely unpopular activity in practice and is being resisted at every turn. Rondinelli's remark is worth repeating.

That better projects will emerge from proposals subjected to highly technical and economic feasibility analyses, that optimal choices will emerge from appraisals using an elegant rate of return, shadow pricing and social cost-benefit analysis, that projects will be implemented efficiently if planned and controlled through PERT, CPM and systems analysis, that greater impacts can be achieved by integrating projects with sectoral and national development plans, are merely assumed. Little evidence supports the assumptions. However evaluation is becoming another part of the 'window dressing' and 'dual systems' that characterise rationalised practice.

As I noted in Chapter One, there are many possible paths to explanation of the development malaise. One avenue looks beyond the overt manifestations of political economy in development. This enables one to see how practitioners are party to a more fundamental reproduction of power and authority than a glance at the overt politics of the development malaise would suggest. Insofar as it refers to tacit and unscrutinised practical knowledge, problem setting reproduces a conservative assessment of what are constant and invariable features of society and what are open to manipulation. In accordance with the issues so framed, impact assessment tends to reflect the interests of those who can mobilise the rules and resources whereby some judgements are deemed authoritative, and others unreasonable or subjective. This is aided by a professional form of persuasion that problems, impacts, and judgements reflect the dictates of material circumstances. All else is considered marginal to the urgent task at hand; unless it 'impinges' on the project. And, in keeping with management orientation, an authoritative evaluation requires a quantitative, or at least written, product: typically a report. The audience of conventional practice are those who command the policy and fiscal mechanisms to which aggregate data refers. Each stage involves a transfer of power and authority and the reproduction of dominant-submissive relations between the developers and those being developed.

The Sumbaga evaluation was not the mirror opposite of this. Indeed previous chapters have continually pointed out that such an opposite leads us to relinquish the possibility of 'development' at all. But the Sumbaga evaluation did 'make a difference' in the transformative sense. For instance, financial accounting procedures were restructured so that members could better account for (and thereby control) the consequences of different activities; a marketing and federation strategy began to take shape; new conditions were determined for the use of the capital revolving fund. And significant changes have occurred in the relations between the co-op and the Filipino and Australian NGOs.

Since undertaking this evaluation, I have thought much about how the process it

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involved was determined by my role, or agency, and to what extent this was aided by the broader social conditions prevailing in Sumbaga. Implicitly, my conclusions about this are also conclusions about the possibility of repeating this approach elsewhere.

Beginning with agency, or my role, Chambers has summed up the point of departure in these terms. "Outsiders should start not with their own priorities but those of the poor, although however much self-insight they have, outsiders will still project their own values and priorities." However, by itself this could be a rather paternalistic remark. Priorities are not necessarily existent in the minds of people waiting to be extracted as data. 'Priorities' can no doubt be solicited, but there is no necessary correspondence between the responses gained and, dare it be said, people's real priorities. Neither can the practitioner know his or her priorities/values with any certainty. As has been said repeatedly, most of the most significant commitments remain hidden aspects of an individual's practical stock of knowledge. In any case, the meaning of priorities (issues, impacts or judgements) is socially constructed; that is, a peculiar amalgam of empirical and 'theoretical' knowledge and the practical purposes at hand. Dialogue in responsible practice simply makes this explicit.

Dialogue is not about a freely formed consensus based on everyone's subjective preferences. It is a co-operative process but not one without persuasion, negotiation or moments of conflict. For this to work requires a high degree of trust and frankness amongst participants. Mutual trust cannot be sustained through intention alone however. Unless the participants have access to the skills required to effectively participate, trust can be perverted and dialogue will have only the veneer of participation.

The transfer of skills and knowledge - both to and from the practitioner - requires time and flexibility. The value of this method is jeopardised the moment the practitioner moves to control this time and flexibility. From what has been said, this does not mean that the practitioner becomes a selfless tool of circumstances.

From the Sumbaga case, it would appear that some of the notions practitioners use to describe conventional practice remain, but with a different meaning. The notion of detachment remains important, but in the sense that the practitioner is forced to detach his/her a priori authority to insight and judgement. In terms of replicability the method is fairly unreliable, in the sense that if another or the same practitioner repeated the evaluation, the outcomes would not be the same. The reason for this is simple. If the process has been successful neither the practitioner, the participants, nor the situation would be the same. The criteria of validity does apply however and probably to a much greater degree than in conventional practice. First, the process of scrutinising the theory, empirics and substantive commitments of all participants serves to unearth a good deal of what normally remains tacit and hidden. Second, practice becomes a dialogue; not a monologue whereby the practitioner pretends to suppress his-self or elevates it to a special plane in order to claim authority. And third, the method begins with what can be done, not what should be possible in terms of efficiency or technical assessments of 'acceptable' impacts or 'justifiable' risk.

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Finally, in the kind of practice suggested by the Sumbaga experience there are some new obligations and rights for the practitioner. I have discussed the 'professional promise', 'linchpin' and 'cutting-edge' metaphors that sustain a mystique about conventional practice which for some is extremely burdensome. In the Sumbaga case, I enjoyed the right to be less ethereal and was accepted simply as an outsider who wished to do useful work but who would also make mistakes according to his experience, commitments and knowledge of the local situation. This 'right' accompanied a particular obligation to others. Early on, one of the Filipino field staff reminded me that "the so-called experts are not teachers who give knowledge to dumb listeners". On repeated occasions it became evident just how knowledgeable and capable the co-op members were. At the post-evaluation workshop, one of the NGO staff noted how "shocked and ashamed" he was during the evaluation. "Shocked at how capable they were at challenging us and taking the opportunities up. Ashamed that I don't deal with my personal crises so well". Chambers puts this in perspective well.

There are some stupid and lazy poor people, just as there are stupid and lazy rich, and poor people can miscalculate, make mistakes, get drunk, and forget things, as others do ... [but] the evidence speaks for itself. Again and again and again, observers have remarked on the toughness, application and ingenuity of the poor ... people so close to the edge cannot afford laziness or stupidity. In conventional practice the capability and knowledgeability of those variously labelled the poor, the target group or the impacted community is grossly underrated. Indeed the practitioner is not obliged to see them in any other way. For in an environment which needs to be controlled and manipulated according to the dictates of technical efficiency, human agency is relevant only insofar as it 'impinges on the project'. At that moment it becomes a resource to be categorised, averaged or normalised, or another vagary of the environment that needs to be 'factored-in'.

Participants in the Sumbaga evaluation were keen to examine the conditions which enhanced what I have termed a 'responsive' or dialogue mode of practice, and would bear upon its extension elsewhere. The post-evaluation workshop repeatedly stressed two conditions, the character of the community and the development strategy being pursued. Defining each condition was difficult. 'Community', as one recent review noted, is a "horribly open-textured concept ... there is not and cannot be an exhaustive specification of the conditions for its correct use". There is some agreement about core characteristics possessed to some degree by all communities: the existence of shared beliefs and values; a rough equality of material conditions; direct and many-sided relations between members; reciprocity; and a high degree of community control over the means of production and

20. Taylor (1982. 2)
relative institutional autonomy.\footnote{21}

Workshop participants were extremely sceptical about the possibility of extending these conditions elsewhere, either by duplication, increased scale, or federation. Put simply, the bridge between micro and macro, specific and aggregate, has been poorly sketched in theory and, so far, ill-conceived in practice.\footnote{22} There is, in any case, a basic contradiction between community (with autonomous, place-specific, independent self-reliance) and the centralised engineering of these conditions by technical and administrative means. The disastrous attempts to engineer and fabricate 'structural' conditions for the manipulation of human 'agency' show this precisely.\footnote{23} Moreover, one does not have to be a rationalisation theorist to see that historical trends are quite at odds with the conditions which enhance responsible practice. Thrift, for instance, has observed the tendency toward the ever-greater scale and extent at which the production and reproduction of society takes place: a tendency marked off by such indicators as the continuing concentration of capital; the dramatic increase in and concentration of people; the growth of the state and the penetration of bureaucracy into every corner of our lives; rapid time-space convergence and the formation of all those 'masses' - mass audiences, mass consumption, mass culture and so on.\footnote{24}

But, as I said in Chapter Eight responsible practice, Lenin's 'conscious element', or Weber's balance between 'hot passion' and 'cool judgement', is not for a moment reducible to the pragmatic or technically efficacious. A recent discussion by Richard Bernstein expresses my sentiments about this and deserves careful reading.

What we desperately need today is to learn to think and act more like the fox than the hedgehog - to seize upon those experiences and struggles in which there are still the glimmerings of solidarity and the promise of dialogical communities in which there can be genuine mutual participation and where reciprocal wooing and persuasion can prevail. For what is characteristic of our contemporary situation is not just the playing out of powerful forces that are always beyond our control, or the spread of disciplinary techniques that always elude our grasp, but a paradoxical situation where power creates counter-power [resistance] and reveals the vulnerability of power, where the very forces that undermine and inhibit communal life also create new, and frequently unpredictable, forms of solidarity.\footnote{25}

\footnote{21. Taylor (1982, 26-32); Sahlins (1974, Chap. 5); Robertson (1984, 142-146); and Shaffer and Lamb (1981, 105, 112). My interest in 'community' in the present discussion is epistemological (i.e., the grounds or conditions pertaining to a mode of practice), rather than an expression of normative commitments I may have. Furthermore, given the characteristics cited, I am not considering community in terms of that attributed to a scientific or specialist group, but that attributable to the Chapter Nine case study.}

\footnote{22. There is no shortage of anarchic-type movements seeking to enhance participant control over the forces and relations of production and this features in development practice in places like Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Eritrea (Cf. RICE, 1984). But it is fair to say that the issues of aggregation/scale have not been seriously addressed in anarchist literature (Taylor, 1982, 168; and Kamenka, 1983, 1920. Cf. Roszak, 1978; Davis, 1981, 235-260; Ward, 1977; and Guillaume, 1977).}

\footnote{23. Cf. Shklar (1976, 97-140).}


\footnote{25. Bernstein (1983, 156).}
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION

The argument in this thesis has shifted from practice to theory and back to practice. The three part structure roughly corresponds with three themes running throughout.

Many people have examined aspects of the development malaise. The anecdotes of Chapter One index broader issues which continue to perplex scholars and practitioners alike. However by beginning with anecdotes I sought to convey a personal ambivalence about previous scholarly contributions. To have begun by locating myself within a broad literature review would have belied this feeling. There is much insight in development literature, but by and large my work experience confirmed a belief that much of what passes for development studies alienates rather than enables one’s practical management.

The work of rationalisation theorists illustrated this while also providing an analytic perspective which speaks directly to the development malaise. Rationalisation theory provides an historical context and evaluative standpoint from which to view contemporary development practice. The instances of rationalisation I examined in the case studies are part of historical trends whereby material progress is deified, quantitative science and exploitative economics gain dominance, rationality is redefined and transformed into a set of strategies aimed at maximising efficiency and institutions of social life are increasingly reified. In stressing the techniques and procedures of technical rationality, development practice potentially advances material well-being. But in subordinating substantive interests development practice arrests rather than enhances the realisation of personal interests like dignity, self-esteem and autonomy and classically valued political liberties and freedoms.

The three interests in development, what I have termed the material, personal and political, must be realised through the mechanisms of technical rationality. This certainly imposes constraints or limits on their achievement, but to presume that practice can occur without technical rationality is to dismiss the idea of development itself. Contrarily, to conclude from this that the development malaise is inevitable is to deprive us of our human capacity and character without justification. The acknowledgement of resistance, implicit in this last point, served to place my unease about contemporary social theory on a sounder footing.

The certainty with which rationalisation theorists press their case, reflected in the strength of analytic propositions, is in large measure responsible for their frequent despair and pessimism. Metaphors like disenchantment and fate indicate powerful analytic constructs, but equally they debilitate those who seek strategies to overcome, or at least ameliorate, instances of the development malaise. Furthermore, those theorists who demand we step outside current practice to revitalise human agency and the interests of substantive
(emancipatory) rationality, offer models equally fraught with contradictions. Whereas the emphasis on institutional processes like rationalisation can enfeeble ameliorative strategies, efforts to re-author practice can grossly under-estimate the extent to which innovative practice is bounded by institutional circumstances and situations. More significantly, efforts to reinstate substantive interests are founded on an epistemology which would result in the same authoritarian tendencies observed in conventional practice. The chief difference is only that conventional practice derives its authority from the claims of external facts, whereas critical practice points to a privileged theoretical insight into those facts (like people's real interests) which remain hidden from others. And, in terms of the authoritarian theme I have used to explore the development malaise, that is no difference at all.

My second theme emerged from attempts to incorporate both rationalisation and resistance in understanding development practice. Bound into these words are distinctions between material interests and personal/political interests, between technical and substantive rationality, and between structure and agency. In view of the anecdotes I began with, the discussion became increasingly theoretical. However, this illustrated that the issues, looked at from another plane, are also encountered in most contemporary research. All social science is plagued by dualisms which stem from a classic object-subject dichotomy. By definition, dualistic positions reflect the need for certainty, for a foundation on which to annihilate doubt. ‘Positions’ as such fetter inquiry and in practice have authoritarian consequences. Preserving a balance seems most difficult in this age. Contemporary development practice is the most unbalanced instance of the role of technical rationalism and materialism in history. Technical rationality is not new, but the purposiveness and assiduity with which it is promoted is unprecedented. Neither are the contradictions of the development malaise new, they have just increased and gained attention in pace with the resources devoted to the idea of development.

Giddens' theory of structuration is one expression of a new convergence in attempts to redress the imbalances of dualist thinking. The 'duality of structure' reconceptualises the contrast between rationalisation and resistance in convergent rather than antithetical terms. Social life is recursive, individual actions 'instantiate', to use Giddens' expression, and reproduce the institutions and structures of society. Development practitioners utilise certain technically rational skills and techniques which reproduce the development malaise. To this extent, domination is inherent in the idea of development practice.

But the duality of structure does not end with 'fate': human agency has a transformative capacity. Even the most powerless are able to resist, to carve out spaces of control in which they can 'make a difference'. Determining when practice is more transformative than reproductive, when resistance advances substantive interests or merely reproduces rationalisation is not something to be judged by theory and empirics alone. Understanding is not a matter of putting aside our meanings or prejudices to grasp the facts. Neither is it achieved by a theory which discovers an Archimedean point from which we can lever the truth from the world. We are rooted in the world and without this understanding would be impossible. I did not return from fieldwork with the facts of practice. My interpretation represents an encounter between myself and the topic. This point connects with the first theme and introduced the third.
My insistence that this study arose from practical personal concerns, and my decision to be engaged in it, simply makes explicit what goes on in all social inquiry. With the third theme, the turn from theory to practice, I argued that if the way in which rationalisation and resistance are combined or balanced is not amenable to formulation as a position (or series of propositions) then, logically, no algorithm or rules for personal conduct are adequate or desirable. The first step in establishing this theme called for a clarification of two ethics of practice from the analytic positions that had featured earlier. Weber's balance between 'hot passion' and 'cool judgement', and Lenin's 'conscious element', paralleled my conclusion that the tension of responsible practice is best expressed in practice, given the dualistic predilections of theory, which as Olsson said, require us to be 'more stupid than we really are'. This is not to say the non-dualist conception of practice has no relevance to discourse about development. The first thing to realise is that most contemporary debate is presented in dualistic terms. The conflict between advocates of economic growth and those who stress equity and basic human needs closely parallels the dualisms discussed earlier.

Figure 10.1 Dichotomies of Development Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>top-down ('trickle down')</th>
<th>bottom-up ('grass roots')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>elite</td>
<td>participatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centralised</td>
<td>decentralised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dependence</td>
<td>self-reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short term</td>
<td>long term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efficiency</td>
<td>structural change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>narrow</td>
<td>comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manipulation</td>
<td>facilitation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10.1 identifies some of the many dichotomies which express the contrast between the two development strategies. Aside from the fact that these dichotomies are sustained only by a good deal of selective recall of evidence and of what each protagonist has to say (an index of the adversarial nature of 'positions'), a structuration approach helps: 1) clarify the status of these dichotomies; and 2) indicate a path toward their resolution in practice.

First, the frequency of these terms in development plans, project objectives or development literature is accompanied by a clear sense that one side is 'bad' and the other 'good'. Yet it is fair to say that aside from a short period in the 1960s, when the ideas of people like Samuel Huntington were in vogue, the 'bad' side today exists more as a set of attributes created out of efforts to establish the identity of the 'good'. This is not to say attributes of the bad side cannot be found in contemporary practice. But as the affective 'good' suggests, the right side represents substantive commitments from which particular strategies may be determined. Evidence suggests the left side cannot be fruitfully considered in the same way. They reflect consequences of conventional strategies, not substantive

commitments of those strategies in themselves. My remarks about the paradoxical and unintended consequences of technical rationality are relevant here. The categories of the left side represent tendencies of conventional practice. On the other hand, transformative actions based on the alternative commitments of the right side will tend to reproduce the left side. The dichotomies have a close and necessary relation. Following on from this is the second point; a non-dualistic practice will see the right side not as commitments to be pursued 'at all costs', but as values to be scrutinised in terms of the unintended consequences that may arise through the application of technical means in particular tasks and situations.

Structuration theory deals with both recursiveness (above) and contextuality - that is, my remark about particular tasks and situations. Development debates would benefit from a shift away from macro-theory - which is essentially dualistic and rhetorical - toward more place-specific and therefore referential research and practice. This is not to question the probity of the development strategy marked out by words like participatory, decentralised, equity, and so on, but rather that these commitments are more likely to be achieved if unencumbered by the 'at all costs, all or nothing' maxim. Then we would see, for instance, that the rhetorical 'poor' are a highly differentiated and problematic mass. We would learn that what are frequently 'highly successful projects' in their eyes, are often accompanied by empowerment of local elites; that certain tasks and situations are just not suited to participatory approaches; and that if one has the question of benefit distribution in mind, then the 'interests' of the poor are in some cases better served by centralised control. An emphasis on economic and technical efficiency does tend to reproduce centralised, elite-led, and top-down political economics. But what I have just said does not mean that this paradox should simply be accepted. For instance, if highly input-dependent agricultural projects tend to be intercepted by capitalised farmers, or if cattle projects and pasture improvement force the eviction of share tenants, this is not to be resolved by the polemics of 'maximising participation' but by redefining the technology and means whereby the poor will be reached. This requires a development research which is highly attuned to variations in place, context and task.

Similar remarks can be made about other dichotomies. Space permits mention of only a few. The contrast between what is seen as the narrow focus of conventional development

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2. Cf. Tendler (1982). And that some tasks can be viable only by eliciting elite involvement, or where elites, acting out of their own self interest will automatically benefit the poor. For example, in programs to eradicate contagious diseases (livestock and human) unless poor and elite are vaccinated, the elite will remain vulnerable to contagion. Cf. Franke and Chasin (1980), and Coombs (1981). Tendler (1982, 38) cites the example of elites supporting a health project targeted and controlled by the poor because they expected it to relieve them of patron-client obligation to meet the poor's health expenditures.

3. For example, complex technology like water purification or pumping stations necessitate skill and organisational specialisation and this has a degree of incompatibility with participatory control.

4. Rural electrification and irrigation projects are replete with this kind of evidence. Cf Hunter (1981). In other cases, a community may be especially adept at controlling some activities - like sanitation or well-use - but when additional activities are grafted on - like credit or subsidy control - jealousies and conflicts surface which undermine both new and existing patterns of local control and, in the longer term, debilitate self-esteem and autonomy.
strategies (Part One) and more comprehensive, 'total human development' approaches still has currency. But there are contradictions to be wary of here, as projects like ZDSDP and the Taranaki petrochemicals EIRs show. Comprehensiveness, when translated into multi-element projects like ZDSDP, tends to favour hierarchies and centralisation, and on the other hand, the de-authoring of intended beneficiaries. In the Taranaki case, I showed how the Commission for the Environment's substantive commitment to take Maori interests 'into account' led to their categorisation as 'resources' and emasculation of the human interests the Commission sought to comprehensively protect.

These points are not simply an agenda for scholarly inquiry, but are closely related to practical strategies. The oft-quoted distinction between technical, short term efficiency and long term structural transformation will illustrate what I mean here. It is the case that certain standards, return periods on capital and political expediency favour bankable and immediately gratifying projects. While most observers agree that long term horizons are essential, the fact that these are usually associated with calls for social and economic structural transformation does however raise important ethical questions about the role and responsibility of those who make these prescriptions. Table 10.1 points out that as one moves down the list toward structural or transformative actions, there is a corresponding increase in risk as far as the beneficiaries are concerned.

Contextually sensitive research could indicate which of these strategies could best facilitate transformative processes and which would result in a palliative accommodation to present injustices. But enough has been said in this thesis of the paradoxical and unintended consequences of action to arrest the presumption that 'palliative' necessarily applies to the top end of this range, and 'transformative' to the bottom. Given the practitioner's remarks that 'development practice is very much a matter of taking a punt', the authority of prescriptions, containing as they do assessments of people's interests, must be in terms of those taking the risks and not according to authoritative versions of the facts or theoretical insight.

This third theme contains my suggestion that engagement in practice is a necessary and not supplementary or contingent aspect of non-dualistic social theory. Scholars are today begged for advice on all manner of things. Structuration theory is non-propositional and at a general level says nothing about the relative weight to be given to any of the dichotomous issues considered under the rubric of rationalisation and resistance. But unless the hermeneutic and engaging nature of all social inquiry is recognised (and only non-dualist, contextual theory seriously does this) we will continue to produce only programmatic and transformational statements or platitudes about social factors, participation, or people's real interests based on fraudulent authority. One could produce rule-books for practitioners but these are likely to be trivial, epistemologically unsound and a dangerous step beyond what social science can reasonably say. And, for those who see some practical future in structuration theories, rule-books will distance them from practice and ensure this important convergence in thinking is consigned to the shelf.

Is the practical potential of a non-dualist responsible practice likely to be realised? It is true that personal conduct is constructed out of intention and choice (and not merely a
Table 10.1 Acceptability of rural development approaches to local and other elites

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension to rural deprivation</th>
<th>Examples of direct approaches</th>
<th>Acceptability to local and other elites</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical weakness</td>
<td>Eye camps</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feeding programmes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Family planning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Curative health services</td>
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<td>Isolation</td>
<td>Roads</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Extension</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Seasonal public works</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Seasonal credit</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Crop insurance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventive health</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Distribution of new assets</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redistribution of old assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerlessness</td>
<td>Legal aid</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enforcement of liberal laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political mobilisation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-violent political change</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent political change</td>
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'subjective register' of structure), but the promulgation of this stance and method depends on the social context of practice. I remarked in Chapter Nine that the immediate context of the Sumbaga project evaluation helped rather than hindered the mode of practice I engaged in there. But I also remarked that those conditions were peculiar and not at all characteristic of the context of practice encountered by most practitioners.

What then are the broader institutional conditions impinging on the conduct of practitioners? The first point to acknowledge is that elements of the approach I argue for are present in others' writings. Robert Chambers' point is relevant here. "It is easy to write about what ought to be. The hard question is how, in the real, messy, corrupting world to encourage, and enable more people to move in these directions". In practice, the urgency and pace of international development efforts places a premium on quick and decisive action.

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Authoritarian styles seem more than entirely reasonable, they become synonymous with the 'only way'. Practitioners become encapsulated in a monologue with themselves and their peers. Truth, in this environment, is merely one of the possibilities, not necessarily an ideal, or preferred outcome.

Institutionalised discourse about development is adversarial; 'positions' are standard fare. Debates rage in the abstract, the concrete situation of people in places is a distant, passing referent. When the concrete does surface, it is the 'policy-relevant' concrete. 'How far should policy go, given the constraints?' Given this quantum jump from the dualistic abstract to concrete, it is difficult to avoid falling into or being allotted a position on the growth versus equity scale or myriad equivalent dichotomies. So easily does one become resigned to 'the importance of achieving efficiency' and even to invoking impartiality, the realist's last line of defence.

I began this thesis in the belief that social science speaks directly to the problems of everyday life and would assist in addressing the problems posed by the anecdotes of Chapter One. Having done this, I can close with some speculation about how the results will be received. Implicitly this tells us something about the conditions bearing on responsible practice.

Albeit with important exceptions, there are two kinds of research in disciplines related to development studies. In geography these are couched in pejorative terms - one is called 'hobby geography', the other, 'useful geography'. The distinction is of course overdrawn, but nevertheless relevant here.

'Useful' geography on the whole corresponds with the managerial view of technical rationality found in development practice. Numerous remarks have been made about the indispensibility of the techniques and empirics of this position. But in terms of the problems addressed in this thesis, this strength is also a major weakness of 'useful' geography.

Most useful research is deemed so because it begins with apparently real problems. Real problems are considered to be pre-existing attributes of an external world from which variables and causal links may be extracted. These may be further segmented, refined and, once the flaw has been identified, prescriptions can be plugged back into real practice.

Two things need to be said about useful geography. First, useful research is perpetually forgetful of that which provides for its production and authority. What is ignored is exposure of the concepts whereby the researcher comes to know these problems. Like the practitioner's 'blind Freddy and his dog', useful research underscores a tacit consensus among researchers about the 'given' nature of development problems. Research becomes a matter of refining methodologies and the incorporation of taken for granted facts in a process that can only be regarded as re-naming 'what is'. And 'what is' is often authorised by reference to others who have claimed authority in the same tautological manner.

The usual response to this kind of remark is that it is of more use to get on with the job of 'making development better' than with debating the relative merits of the constructs.
through which we presume to do so. But the strength of such argument would depend on the effects of the research output in relation to its instrumentalist aims. This is the second point to be made about useful research. Certainly it is the case that many of the research products figure in development agency literature. But I have not found evidence of the systematic use of this material in practice; indeed many practitioners would agree with Robertson's conclusion that this kind of research is "now morally depleted, irresponsible, and a most unpromising source of inspiration for a bleak future". Insightfully, Schon remarks, "the niche no longer fits the education, or the education no longer fits the niche".

Whereas the reception given by 'useful' geographers to my discussion of responsible practice is unlikely to be positive, it is more difficult to assess the reaction of 'hobby' geographers. It is the case that these geographers have been prominent in the convergence which argues for greater attention to structuration, hermeneutics, human agency and the specifics of place and circumstance. But rather than treat this convergence as a new set of theoretical tools for analysis of problems 'out there' (and tagging on political action once they are presumed to have been resolved), I have argued non-dualist theories are inherently linked to a more engaging interest in the topic of study. It would be unfair to prejudge the extent to which this area of the discipline might respond, since these practical, strategic implications have not been fully thought through. But the approach argued for in this thesis has some affinity with the slogan 'the primacy of personal politics' in feminism, and the reception given to this in the past decade provides an instructive analogy.

Gail Chester makes the following remarks which in the final analysis express the personal stance implied in responsible practice. She says, in a way that echoes Weber's maxim 'in spite of'.

even though all the changes are unlikely to happen in my life-time, the small advances I have contributed to will have made life better for some people, and most importantly myself. Others, particularly Marxist feminists, have argued that this focus on personal politics and on creating 'room to move' is only "at the expense of macrosystemic, historical and class views". Criticism swings immediately into dualist terms. Mention of the personal is taken as a testimony to voluntarism, piecemeal change, and an underestimation of the determination of class and macro-economic historical forces. Analyses geared toward personal action are irrelevant and useless. Worse than useless, they distract attention from the revolutionary processes whereby structural changes will occur. The difficulty with this kind of Marxist feminist critique is that there is presumed to be some fundamental strategic insight in such literature. Richard Higgott's remark about development literature is relevant here. He notes "a period of pessimism in which any kind of synthesis and progress beyond the work of the last two decades seems unlikely". Put simply, those engaged in practice

cannot wait until another category is designed to capture surplus value as it scurries under another pile of articulations.

Behind this derogation of personal, practical orientation seems to lie the assertion that 'All this talk of responsible practice is OK, but really it's something that needs to be taken into account'. That is, something to be sorted out and then one can get on with the theoretical and policy tasks in earnest. It should go without saying that for me there is no such thing as a 'sorted-out' practitioner because responsible practice involves a continual 'non-sorted-out' struggle. Responsible practice must draw upon but be cautious of two kinds of effect with regard to macro theory. One is a resigned disengagement from practical concerns. Much macro theory implies a dualistic separation of individual and society. Alongside a derogation of human agency arises a very circular kind of theorising; one change effects all, but nothing can change without all other. We could do well to recall Marcuse's despairing conclusion, 'It is a circle and I know not how to get out'. Another kind of disengagement comes from a 'paralysis of the critical will' and the researcher's wish to protect uncontaminated the virtues of theorising. A second, opposite effect in practice is more dangerous and is found in action based on the hot passion Weber feared or the terrorism that angered Lenin.

But in view of earlier remarks about the actual relations prevailing between research and practice, this caution is perhaps a little dramatic. The following remarks of a women's refuge worker more accurately convey the actual effects of theory.

There's a problem with theorising, there has to be a relationship between ideas and real experience, and if you're just sitting somewhere where you don't see what's happening to people and you don't know what kind of incredible struggle people have to just keep going, things just get over-intellectualised and all that's going on is just ideas feeding off each other and it's got nothing much to do with any understanding of reality. I've sort of got to the stage now where I find it really hard to relate to things like that. I just tend to make that sort of judgement and tune out.12

Responsible practice is not a matter of pragmatically responding to the dictates of opportunities. Neither is it a matter of 'ideals' or 'morals', or of finding a middle course between them and 'opportunity'. And, given the delicate conditions required for genuine conversation and dialogue based on a willingness to listen to one's own prejudices and respect for others, it would be a distortion to imagine an entire political realm organised in this way. But if we examine what is required to seize upon these experiences, we will discover a powerful mode of practice that can orient our personal conduct.

In the meantime, like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea without yet discerning its ideal design, we must simply do the best we can - realizing always that the best will not be good enough.

L. Tribe,
Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality
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