CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A Study of trade union leadership ideologies.

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The investigations reported herein represent the unaided efforts of the author.

WINSTON SMALL
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In the course of undertaking this research, I have accumulated intellectual and social debts too innumerable to mention. It would, however, be remiss of me if I did not acknowledge the invaluable assistance I received from Dr. Don Rawson, especially in the early stages of thesis preparation. Most importantly, this study would have been infinitely more difficult to complete without the enormous support and encouragement of my other thesis supervisor, Prof. George Zubrzycki. I thank them both and also completely clear them of responsibility for any of its arguments or shortcomings. Finally, I should like to thank the many trade union leaders in Sydney without whose co-operation the empirical concerns of the study could not have been investigated.
# GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<td>ACSPA</td>
<td>Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations</td>
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<td>ACTU</td>
<td>Australian Council of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANU</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
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<td>CAGEO</td>
<td>Council of Australian Government Employee Organisations; formerly known as:</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPSO</td>
<td>Council of Commonwealth Public Service Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Commonwealth Public Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>L-NCP</td>
<td>Liberal - National Country Party coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLC</td>
<td>Trades and Labor Council</td>
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The survey of trade union leadership attitudes reported in this study marks an attempt to empirically investigate two central theoretical propositions about unions and union leaders. The first of these concerns the question of whether manual and non-manual unionism are associated with different forms of consciousness. The second objective involves an empirical test of the claim that the influence of the 'dominant ideas' penetrates trade union leadership thinking and that this basically accounts for their economistic and reformist industrial strategies. The study outlines the many sources of variation in trade union leadership attitudes and highlights their ambiguities and contradictions in trade union leadership consciousness. A particular theoretical concern of the study is the attempt to identify the structural possibilities for class consciousness and class action on the part of organised labour. To this end, the objective conditions for class consciousness and its institutional expressions in the form of trade unions and industrial relations are highlighted by means of analysis of fundamental changes within the labour process of the prevailing mode of production. This conceptual approach contributes greatly to sociological understanding of the subjective implications of the economic recession for the consciousness of the leadership of organised labour.
INTRODUCTION

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Australia began the 1970's with an economy over which the first shadows of the international recession were already looming. By the mid-seventies, ominous signs of economic turbulence appeared in the form of rising levels of inflation and unemployment and in a growing incidence of poverty and homelessness. The present crisis within the Australian and the world capitalist economies, climaxing more than a generation of unprecedented economic growth, has restored the question of radical social upheaval to the agenda of sociological debate.

For decades now, it has been a conventional wisdom that fundamental social transformation as envisaged by revolutionary Marxism, has long ceased to be a serious possibility in advanced capitalist societies like Australia. Characteristically, the failure of class conflict in these societies to assume revolutionary forms has focused theoretical concern in some quarters on the ideological mechanisms underlying the incorporation of the 'historic' agents of revolution, the working class, into the prevailing institutional order.

Basically, the problem that such approaches set out to address is how does the working class and, especially, organisational expressions of it like the trade unions, come to systematically define their interests largely in material terms and to perceive such interests as being attainable within the present social
system? In other words, why do subordinate groups tacitly acquiesce in their own subordination? The answer suggested by formulations such as Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' is that working class attitudes and behaviour reflect to a considerable degree the pervasive influence of 'ruling class' definitions of reality.

In essence, what the notion of 'hegemony' suggests, is that those who control the dominant institutions of society are able to secure their power (to a significant extent) by virtue of their ability to impress their definitions of the situation upon those subject to their rule. Effectively, therefore, what keeps the system from falling apart is not the brute physical repression of oppositional tendencies; force, in fact, is mainly an instrument of last resort, to be deployed only when the consensus-generating mechanisms fail. Rather, the perpetuation of the system rests primarily on the moulding of mass consent to the established order.

Accordingly, 'hegemony' is a ruling class's (or coalition of ruling 'fractions') control of subordinate classes and social strata through the formulation and insinuation of its 'ideology' viz. its assumptions and ideas, into the very minds of the latter, where it serves to underpin and inform their everyday behaviour. Hegemony thus constitutes a particular 'slant' or way of perceiving social reality which is disseminated throughout society by the organs of ideological control, most notably, the mass media, so that it eventually comes to be sedimented into the bedrock of 'commonsense' itself.
By pervading virtually every aspect of social life, hegemony functions to safeguard the dominant institutions of society from the radical consequences of its deep and abiding tensions. This is epitomised by the 'institutionalisation of class conflict' whereby the class struggle comes to be deflected mainly into compromise economic bargaining.

Fundamental to the 'institutionalisation' of conflict is the structural separation of the 'industrial' and 'political' spheres of action. This separation serves to ensure that basically political concerns like the power to control production and appropriation which underpins the whole workplace struggle over domination and subordination, are channelled into largely 'industrial' forms of bargaining which do not call into question prevailing property rights.

Significantly, the economistic behaviour of trade unions acts to endorse and reinforce the formal distinction between 'industrial' and 'political' action contributing in the process to the stability and perpetuation of the system. Since the presumption that social order arises out of shared normative understandings is central to the idea of hegemony, the relative absence of radical worker and trade union protest might suggest that the prevailing system is accepted as natural, right and proper by the Australian labour movement.

Yet, it is also clear that while ruling class hegemony extensively permeates the thinking of subordinate groups, it does not completely determine such thinking. For, characteristically, the
structural locations, concrete experiences and social networks of workers serve to provide the underlying 'meaning systems' through which 'ruling class' definitions of social reality are perceived and assessed.

Ultimately, therefore, it would appear that whether the 'ruling ideas' are accepted or not by the working class crucially depends on the extent to which they correspond with important aspects of working class life and/or aspirations. On this basis, the onset of a period of profound economic decline after many years of growth and prosperity can reasonably be expected to carry profound repercussions for working class consciousness.

THE STUDY

The study sets out to investigate the class consciousness of the leadership of organised labour in Australia. Unlike conventional 'industrial relations' approaches, this study does not attempt to provide a mass of empirical detail on the internal activities of unions. Rather, what it principally endeavours to do is to relate the theoretical analysis of trade unionism to broader sociological questions of class formation and class alliance.

The study consists of two parts. The more substantial part, comprising the first four chapters, consists of a sustained, theoretical analysis of the implications of the economic recession and, above all, the changes within the labour process for the long-term size and strength of the trade union movement.
Needless to say, the pivotal importance of the union leadership in the continuing crisis of Australian capitalism made it clearly desirable to establish how this leadership perceived the changed material and ideological context in which it functioned. Thus, the remainder of the study consists of a survey of trade union leaders which was designed to cast some light on this problem.

Chapter 1 examines the mounting wave of hostility to the trade unions evidenced in the mass media during the seventies. Possibly the most unremittingly virulent articulation of anti-union rhetoric in the mass media during this period came from political journalists like Paul Johnson. Characteristically, sociological discussion has generally tended to be dismissive of views like Johnson's, believing them to be not worthy of serious intellectual consideration.

Yet, what is often overlooked, is that it is precisely this tendency for anti-union ideologies to be elaborated from 'commonsense' assumptions which are already 'taken-for-granted' that accounts for their popular appeal - as shown, most notably, by the widespread public acceptance and support of formulations about 'excessive union power' whereby union 'militants' and 'agitators' conspire to 'hold the country to ransom'.

Chapter 2 deals with the economic crisis and the collapse of both Keynesian and neo-Marxist presumptions that advanced capitalism could almost indefinitely postpone serious economic dislocation. Coming after a prolonged period of economic prosperity, the crisis raised the possibility of intensified class struggle as Australian
trade unions were propelled into more militant confrontations with employers and the State.

Yet, if the 'post-industrial society' theorists of the sixties were to be believed, the structural transformation of the labour force - exemplified by the growing shift from manual to non-manual work, made rising unemployment a less politically-explosive phenomenon in the 1970's than in the 1930's! Clearly, however, the implication that white-collar employment spells the rejection of the collectivist organisational patterns of manual labour has been rendered untenable by the steady expansion and rising militancy of white-collar unionism.

Chapter 3 explores the prospect of trade union militancy assuming radical political forms by examining the comprehensive and insightful theoretical contributions provided by classical Marxism on the role of trade unions as agencies of struggle. In particular, it notes the contrasting positions taken by Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky on the one hand, and revolutionary syndicalism on the other, over the question of the ability of trade unions to radically transform capitalist society without the guidance and support of a 'vanguard' political party.

Chapter 4 considers the objective possibilities for alliance between manual and non-manual trade unions in response to the wage cuts and declining living standards imposed by the economic crisis within Australian and world capitalism.

Significantly, the work of contemporary Marxist writers like Braverman, Carchedi and Poulantzas offers a useful means of
conceptualising the potential for alliance between manual and non-manual occupational categories. Briefly, their approaches locate occupational categories or parts thereof - not on the timeworn and oversimplified Marxian basis of property ownership and non-ownership, but by identification of their function within the production relations of advanced capitalism. The merit of such approaches is that they serve to highlight the structural bases for alliance between manual workers and segments of the non-manual labour force.

Chapter 5 discusses the survey of union leaders which was based on a questionnaire distributed to the 100 largest unions in New South Wales.

Chapters 6-9 report on the main findings of the study. These deal with the respondents' attitudes to worker and trade union solidarity; their feelings about the Arbitration system and about strikes; their perceptions of the role of trade unions and of union affiliation with political parties; their views on private enterprise, on multinational corporate ownership of Australian industry and resources and on the prerogatives of management to which such ownership gives rise. The final section of the study summarises the conclusions and outlines the implications for the future of industrial and political struggle in Australia.

**THE SURVEY OF UNION LEADERS**

In the continuing debates over the changing composition of the labour force and trade union movement, an important point of dispute
has been whether or not non-manual trade unions are very different in character from their manual counterparts. Certain writers, of course, have claimed that variations in the character of non-manual employment are associated with very different forms of union character (c.f. Blackburn, 1967; Prandy, 1966; Prandy, Stewart and Blackburn, 1974). Notably, what these writers suggest, is that the degree of 'unionateness' (their term) of a non-manual labour organisation, is to be judged in terms of the extent to which it satisfies the following seven criteria:

i) recognition of collective bargaining and protection of its members' interests as its prime responsibility;

ii) independence of employers;

iii) militancy;

iv) declaration of itself as a trade union;

v) registration as a trade union;

vi) affiliation to the T.U.C.;

vii) affiliation to the Labour Party.

Undeniably, the concept of unionateness provides a handy tool for assessing how closely various worker associations approach being full-blooded trade unions. However, while it usefully distinguishes different levels of trade union consciousness, it remains highly-inadequate as an indicator of more intrinsically-radical expressions of working class consciousness. In this context, the work of Michael Mann (1973) goes some way to remedying such limitations.
Briefly, Mann envisages working class consciousness as involving four essential components. They are:

i) 'class identity', i.e. an awareness by workers of themselves as working class;

ii) 'class opposition', viz. a recognition by them of the fundamental opposition of interests which exists between workers and employers;

iii) 'class totality', i.e. an awareness on their part that their grievances and deprivations form a totality in the sense that these are anchored in the basic structure of society;

iv) 'class alternative', viz. a belief in the possibility of an alternative social order.

A broadly-similar view of class consciousness is presented by Wild in his book *Social Stratification in Australia* (1978). Basically, he identifies three dimensions of class consciousness which he labels respectively:

i) 'Limited awareness' - indicating simply a recognition of the existence of class and class differences in society;

ii) 'Systematic awareness' - suggesting the perception of antagonistic interests and the idea of class conflict;

iii) 'Revolutionary awareness' - embodying the possibility of radically restructuring society through collective action on the part of the working class.
According to the prevailing consensus, the trade union movements in Western industrial countries exhibit little sign of revolutionary class consciousness - at least in the sense suggested by the formulations of Mann and Wild. Even so, the situation may be further compounded by differences between manual and non-manual trade unionists in their levels of class consciousness. For example, logic suggests that the traditional manual working class should have a more strongly developed sense of class identity and class opposition than their non-manual counterparts. Indeed, such beliefs clearly underlie some of the 'new working class' speculations.

Basically, the argument is that the historic market, work and status advantages enjoyed by non-manual workers have contrived to hinder a consciousness of class identity and class opposition among these privileged strata. Admittedly, 'new working class' analyses do concede that many of the advantages of non-manual employment have become largely illusory in the case of contemporary routine white-collar workers. For, not only has such employment ceased to confer higher earnings relative to manual occupations but many white-collar 'fringe benefits' e.g. sick leave, long service leave, superannuation etc., are now enjoyed by many manual workers. At the same time, the nature of much white-collar work has changed dramatically as increasing numbers of office workers find their jobs subjected to processes of mechanisation, work measurement and tight supervisory control more reminiscent of manual employment.

Accordingly, if some of the 'new working class' theorists are to be believed, while non-manual employees may be impelled to form trade
unions and to act in industrially-militant ways, such behaviour is not necessarily a reflection of class identity or class opposition. On the contrary, what prompts such action is an attempt by non-manual employees to halt the erosion of traditional non-manual advantages by manual workers. From this perspective, therefore, white-collar unionisation represents not an identification with manual workers but an affirmation of the social distance which exists (or ought to exist) between the two groups. Similarly, since the target of resentment underlying white-collar unionisation is primarily manual workers rather than employers, then the emergence of a genuine sense of class opposition among the former is also seriously undermined.

On the other hand, as the 'new working class' thesis suggests, a sense of 'class alternative' symbolised by orientations toward control over the conditions and nature of work tends to be much stronger among non-manual than manual employees. For, where much of white-collar work was once relatively free of close supervision, increasingly such work has become subject to more restrictive forms of control. Under such circumstances, therefore, the salience of managerial prerogatives and fundamental questioning of the purposes of work organisation assume a more acute expression in non-manual industrial agitation than manual unionism has ever been able to sustain.

The purpose of this survey then is to investigate the nature of class consciousness among the leadership of manual and non-manual trade unions. This is undertaken by means of an examination of their attitudes to a variety of industrial and political issues.
In this way it is hoped to gain a fuller understanding both of the ideological currents within trade unions and, perhaps more importantly, of the extent to which trade union leadership thinking reflects the influence of the dominant ideology.
1. TRADE UNIONS AND MEDIA ARTICULATIONS OF THE DOMINANT IDEAS

The mass media and the trade unions

It is a sociological commonplace that the mass media, most notably, television, newspapers and radio, play an enormous part in the shaping of and, arguably, even in the creation of 'public opinion'. Understandably, therefore, sociological analysis of media treatment of trade unions and industrial relations has generated widespread discussion of the ways in which trade unions and their activities are generally understood, explained and responded to, by and within the mass media.

Tellingly, emerging out of this debate is a growing scepticism concerning the extent to which media news reports of industrial relations and trade union actions represent reliable and true accounts of 'what actually took place'. Indeed, a key finding of much of the contemporary sociological research on the media, is that a pronounced and systematic bias permeates the orthodox media discourse on trade unions and industrial conflict. Certainly, to the degree that the media generally acts to sustain certain understandings of society and the way it operates, then bias is inevitably incorporated in the very processes of selection, interpretation and presentation of media accounts of the world.

Characteristic of the way that the media attempts to shape public understandings of various issues is its predisposition to present strikes as 'bad news'; as actions to be censured, irrespective of the reasons which precipitate them or the intrinsic merits of the
strikers' claims. Even when the media does concede the justice of the strikers' cause, the discussion is often framed in terms of moral regret. Such reactions are perhaps only to be expected. For, in the main, strikes are presented as demonstrably "silly", wasteful and economically damaging - ultimately to the 'nation as a whole'. Above all, they 'achieve little' and are largely 'pointless exercises'.

Predictably, therefore, worker and trade union action are rarely perceived by the mass media to be the natural consequences of legitimate dissatisfaction - let alone as expressions of the inevitable conflict of interests inherent in the employment relationship. Rather, industrial action and strikes in particular, are far more likely to be attributed to such base motives as union 'greed' and 'bloody-mindedness', or, alternatively, to the devious machinations of small groups of union 'agitators'.

These processes of selective emphasis and exclusion are clearly-evident in the media's preference for publicising certain types of union action rather than others and in its tendency to discuss industrial disputes in terms of such inflammatory formulations as the 'inconvenience to the public'. It is therefore not without significance that the media generally assigns prominence to the more sensational aspects of strikes in their news reports of such phenomena. The vivid imagery evoked by the crowds of stranded commuters, the piles of uncollected garbage, the lengthy queues of motorists engaged in the desperate search for petrol and the clashes between police and union picket lines is, of course, beyond dispute.
Needless to say, such selectivity of focus is often rationalised on the grounds of 'newsworthiness' - a judgement reflecting prevailing media norms concerning what makes for 'good journalism'. However, in basing the collection and selection of news material mainly on considerations of journalistic impact, the central issues at stake in industrial disputes are often obscured in news reports. More importantly, the popular image of strikes as an 'expensive waste of time, money and effort', so dear to the hearts of employer representatives and conservative politicians, is lent enormous credibility.

Clearly, in the reporting of trade unions and strikes, the media play a critical role in the creation of 'public knowledge' about such matters. Yet, what is also plain, is that the process of 'reality construction' for most people is more often a reflection of media emphases and concerns than an objective consequence of 'what's really going on'. For instance, there is no denying that the construction of strikes as issues of public discourse has much less to do with the objective facts of their frequency and seriousness than with the amount of media coverage that they attract.

Accordingly, the understandings most people have of trade unions and strikes are largely derived from the mass media whose role in creating stereotyped images about such phenomena should not be underestimated. For, once certain stereotypes become incorporated into people's 'world-view', it is possible for all sorts of conclusions to be reached. Thus, to be repeatedly told by the mass media that strikes are 'irrational' and 'disruptive' and largely the work of 'militants' and 'extremists', makes it only too easy to submerge the justice of the workers' claims under the convenient stereotype label which tells
us 'all we need to know'.

In effect, then, the mass media and their news reports, far from 'telling it as it really is', systematically purvey quite a one-sided view of the world. However, this is not to suggest that such distortion is the product of deliberate attempts to mislead, or that it is the outcome of bias on the part of any particular individuals or sections of the media. Rather, what needs to be clearly grasped is that the limited and inadequate character of media explanations of social reality derive mainly from the framework of assumptions normally employed by the media in their interpretations of the world. Almost inevitably, therefore, media presentations privilege certain social understandings and social prescriptions over others.

In particular, the ideological significance of the media is basically traceable to its critical role in upholding and propagating the dominant ideas - ideas which essentially serve to legitimise the existing social arrangements. Not surprisingly, in its dissemination of the dominant structure of definitions and images the influence of the media over the ideas, beliefs and, in effect, the consciousness of individuals makes it a highly potent instrument of social control in society.

**Paul Johnson and the media assault on the trade unions**

Possibly one of the most immediate and striking consequences of the economic recession convulsing the developed Western nations since the seventies has been the intensified hostility of the media to the trade union movement. In this context, the work of Paul
Johnson, a political journalist and disillusioned former 'socialist', exemplifies the lengths to which sections of the media are prepared to go in their bid to persuade people that the trade unions are mainly to blame for the present crisis.

From the mid-seventies, Johnson unleashed a series of remarkably-ferocious attacks on the labour movement. Johnson's prime target is the political Left and his overriding passion is with the menace to individual freedoms supposedly posed by the trade unions. Predictably, Johnson soon came to be regarded by the conservative press as easily the favourite authority on the trade unions and Labour Party. Interestingly enough, although it is the British trade union movement and Labour Party to which Johnson directs his unflattering comments, there is the clear implication that his assessments are equally applicable to their Australian counterparts. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that articles which first appeared in the British press were reprinted in their entirety in some of the Australian press. Even more importantly, Johnson was brought to Australia on various speaking visits to spread the message of the global dangers to democracy represented by militant unionism.

Characteristically, those who seek to give credibility to Johnson's views have been at pains to emphasise his 'left-wing' background and qualifications: an ex-editor of a leading left-wing journal, a person who has been on close, first-name terms with leading members of the Labour Party and, indeed, someone who had been 'one of Britain's leading left-wing intellectuals'. (Nation Review, 1975: 830-1) The net effect of all this has been seemingly to convey the impression that if someone with his political background and
associations proclaims union power to be a threat to democratic institutions and economic well-being, then, presumably, there must be some substance in his claims.

By and large, the few, feeble attempts to refute Johnson's arguments have left such beliefs largely undisturbed. Further, the generally-conciliatory tone of much of this criticism - instanced by the tendency to preface comment with acknowledgement of Johnson's 'breadth of knowledge', 'sincerity' and 'fortrightness of expression', has failed to produce the intended 'calming effect' on the debate. On the contrary, such approaches appear only to have incited Johnson to even greater excesses of verbal hostility toward unions and the Labour Party.

Yet, paltry and inadequate as such opposition to Johnson has been, it represents a considerable advance on the social science literature which has steadfastly ignored Johnson's arguments altogether. Needless to say, the extremist and polemical character of Johnson's writings can hardly fail to offend academic sensibilities. But to regard Johnson's newspaper commentaries as mere 'journalism' and, as such, completely undeserving of serious academic attention, is to be manifestly blind to the hegemonic implications of his formulations.

Johnson's descriptions of trade union leaders, in fact, provide some of the most-unambiguous demonstrations of the manner in which the mass media sets about creating 'folk devils' and orchestrating the resulting 'moral panics'. Here, for instance, are samples of the technique, developed to perfection by Johnson, in which union leaders are portrayed as:
the complacent, the conservative, the unimaginative, the lazy-minded; men soaked in old prejudices and habits of mind, Bourbons to the core, forgetting nothing, learning nothing, negative, obstructive, slow, dull, long-winded, unadventurous, immensely pleased with themselves and quite willing to resist planned change of any kind.

(Nation Review, 1975: 831)

But it is the British trade union leaders in particular who are the hapless victims of Johnson's fury and scorn; they, he proceeds to condemn root-and-branch as:

Smug and self-assured, oblivious of any criticism, they have encouraged British industrial workers in habits and attitudes, in rules and procedures, in illusions and fantasies which have turned the British working class into the coolies of the Western world, and Britain into a stinking industrial slum.

(Nation Review, 1975: 831)

More revealingly, still, is his invocation of the popular mass media stereotype of the 'all-powerful' union leader. As Johnson rhetorically puts it:

How are we to describe a band of determined men occupying key positions in society and using their power to raise their incomes regardless of the needs and interests of the rest? Powerful men who conspire together to squeeze
The assertion that trade unions are the power in the land is, of course, manifestly absurd when set against the truly awesome and repressive powers of the police, judiciary, military and secret intelligence agencies of the state. Indeed, beside the vastly-superior powers of the huge multinational corporations, union power is but puny and insignificant.

Nevertheless, Johnson's preoccupation is with the union bogey and his main target is union belligerence. Thus, for example, we read of trade unionists "smashing their fists in the community's face". However, Johnson's stand as a defender of the rights of the individual would carry much more conviction were he genuinely endeavouring to pinpoint the real sources of threat to individual freedoms. But his strictures are directed solely at the trade unions with never a hint of the ways in which personal liberties are daily eroded; e.g. by the growth of data banks and the new developments in computer and surveillance technology, all of which conspire to create the apparatus for an Orwellian police state already in most developed societies.

For, Johnson, of course, problems of industrial unrest and economic inefficiency are simply sheeted home to labour intransigence with scant regard to management inadequacy, investment policies or the global recession. Thus, we learn that: "British Leyland was badly run because management had to spend far too much of its energy and resources on labour relations and on mitigating the consequences
Likewise, in Johnson's view, the low levels of industrial productivity can be ascribed largely to the 'restrictive practices' of the trade unions. Accordingly, worker resistance to technological innovation is purely:

*a mixture of hatred of management, dislike of change of any kind, fear of unemployment, unwillingness to adapt to technological improvement, and an almost child-like faith that the system will somehow continue to provide for them.*

(Nation Review, 1975: 831)

The oversimplification and distortion implicit in such interpretations of industrial and economic affairs is further evident in Johnson's attempt to attribute inflation to the so-called 'wage explosion'. Significantly, the propagation of such a view of inflation is hegemonically important by virtue of its attempt to legitimise both its diagnosis of what the problem is and the prescribed remedy for it.

Certainly, to the extent that the idea of pay increases for workers can be successfully portrayed as the basic cause of inflation, then public support for 'wage restraint' may well be forthcoming - despite the obvious implications of such action for the maintenance of existing patterns of income inequality. More ominously, by presenting the causes and solutions to inflation in terms of wage movements, such an approach serves to invest wage controls and inaction on the rising levels of unemployment with the legitimacy of economic 'realism' and 'rationality'.
As noted earlier, Johnson's pre-eminent fixation is with the power of the trade unions. Needless to say, as the opinion polls indicate, the mythology of union power exercises a powerful hold over the popular consciousness. Johnson thus shows himself fully alive to the political possibilities of this situation when he sets out to play (or prey!) on the normative concerns of large segments of the population. Yet, in seeking to portray 'the community' as being at the mercy of the trade unions, Johnson is so preoccupied with presenting the issue as one of 'the unions versus the community', that he never considers for a moment that trade unionists and their dependants form a significant proportion of the 'community', on behalf of whose rights he so passionately protests.

The notion that trade unions possess or wield massive power in relation to governments or big business has arguably always been a fiction. Indeed, possibly the most pointed commentary on trade union 'power' within recent years, has been the inability of the unions to halt unemployment and the slide in the purchasing power of many of their members' pay packets. Above all, trade unions seek but generally fail to gain control over working conditions - let alone over the right to hire and fire. Nevertheless, such is the moral indignation that such action provokes from Johnson that he sees it as nothing short of a totalitarian threat to the rights of the individual.

Characteristically, the immensely greater power of those who own and control industry or run the public corporations entirely escapes Johnson's critical gaze. In fact, vast numbers of people can be thrown out of work, entire industries dismantled and whole regions
left to decay without Johnson appearing to notice any erosion of individual liberty. Rather, all his invective is reserved for people struggling to exist and the industrial and political organisations which they form to articulate their struggles.

In view of this, it would be easy to dismiss Johnson as part of the 'lunatic fringe' whose ideas have little support in society. But to do so would be to fundamentally misunderstand the ideological significance of his views or the reasons for their promotion in the mass media. Since the seventies, the key ideological problem confronting the dominant groups in the developed Western nations has been to secure the consent of the mass of the people for the prevailing politico-economic system while simultaneously seeking to persuade them to sacrifice many of the material rewards which formerly bought their allegiance. Johnson's unique contribution to this task of maintaining hegemony is his ability to plausibly represent the reductions in living standards and welfare services and the attacks on trade union rights as a sacred quest for national economic salvation whose acceptance by those affected constitutes a patriotic duty of the highest order.

The Media and the Legitimation Crisis

It is a conventional wisdom that in the main the agencies of hegemony like the mass media function to win popular support for the established social order. But when fundamental transformations such as those which have been taking place throughout the Western World since the seventies occur, new ideas must be formulated and 'sold' to the public in order to minimise resistance. This has
been plain to see in Australia. After more than thirty years of consensus on full employment and the construction of a hegemonic order based on limitless economic growth, the political commitment to the principle of providing 'work for all who wanted it', has been allowed to lapse.

The fundamental move away from the post-war liberal consensus is perhaps most-evident in the field of economic theory, where after thirty years of hegemony in policy-making circles, the Keynesian approach came under sustained attack from the apostles of 'monetarism'. The hegemonic crisis within academic economics, of course, only reflects the hegemonic crisis within the wider society. Certainly, it is not without significance that the threat posed to the nation by trade union 'militants' emerged into popular media discussion in Australia during the seventies. The collapse of the mechanisms which underpinned the stability of the system for over three decades, viz economic growth, full employment and welfare reforms, has clearly made the process of securing the legitimacy of the present order infinitely more precarious.

Precisely because of the threat of social upheaval posed by the worsening economic recession, the logic of capitalist survival underlines the imperatives of accumulation. Yet, at the same time, the necessity to organise mass consent cannot be overlooked for any extended period. The problem of how to reconcile the demands of economic management with those of political legitimacy has become a central feature of the crisis facing Australian capitalism, confirming it as, above all, a crisis of hegemony.
As previously mentioned, the hegemonic crisis pervades economic theory and is visible in the struggle for ideological supremacy between the exponents of the Keynesian and monetarist approaches. Needless to say, this struggle is not simply an abstract economic dispute which need not unduly concern us. On the contrary, it has widespread implications for the way the crisis is perceived and acted upon. Notable in this regard, has been the standing on its head of the conventional Keynesian wisdom about the role of the State; to monetarists, far from being the basic remedy for it, State intervention is regarded as a major cause of the present economic crisis.

The monetarist attack on the size of government 'budget deficits' thus needs to be viewed in the context of the hegemonic struggle waged within the mass media and elsewhere to win popular support for cuts in government spending on essential services like health, education and welfare. Likewise, it is no accident that the equation of 'inflation' with 'excessive wage claims' came to feature prominently in the ideological offensive waged by the mass media against the trade unions. Certainly, with journalistic attacks on the union movement like Johnson's, we can readily observe the mechanisms through which trade union wage increases have become constructed ideologically in the mass media as a 'national' problem, thereby rendering them subject to specific and intense forms of control and repression.

To begin with, the widening economic recession and the ensuing fears of social collapse have combined to create an ideological atmosphere where the routine trade union struggle to protect and improve the pay and conditions of their members has come increasingly to be
interpreted as jeopardising the stability and even the survival of the social order. This is epitomised in the very terms in which media discussion of such union activities has tended to be framed: 'the conspiracy against the nation', 'holding the country to ransom'; the stereotypes of 'decent' and 'hardworking' workers being manipulated by 'militants', 'agitators' and assorted 'subversive elements'.

The clear implication of such descriptions of the trade unions, is that they had come to possess 'too much power' and thus constituted a danger to 'society'. Such attacks confirm the tendency of the mass media to create 'folk devils' - particularly in periods of crisis. Trade unions, of course, have traditionally been favourite targets for media anointment as 'folk devils'. The ensuing 'moral panic' which this inevitably creates functions to uphold the dominant social norms and to legitimise the intensification of social control. In other words, if the dominant groups in society with the support of the media can successfully stereotype certain groups as 'trouble makers', they will more easily secure public support for taking action against them.

The construction of trade union action as a 'problem', then, has emerged from a whole series of struggles, advances and reverses which have characterised the development of the economic crisis. The situation this has created of a system increasingly unable to fulfill its economic promises to vast numbers of people, coupled with the recognition of the need for social unity in order to survive, has made the issue of 'union power' an important signifier of the crisis. However, the essence of what Habermas and others
have called the 'legitimation crisis' in the developed Western nations arises from the fact that the proposed remedies for the recession viz. wage control, rising unemployment and reduced government spending on essential services are not policies which can simply be imposed from above. Consent for them has continually to be won. It is within this process of winning consent that the purpose of media attacks on the union movement is plainly-evident: to neutralise trade union opposition so that policies which fundamentally erode the living standards of workers can safely be pursued.

All of this serves to raise the question of the possibility of unified counter-hegemonic struggle under the leadership of the forces of organised labour. In this context, it is clear that the class consciousness of organised labour needs to be understood historically as well as theoretically. Typically, class consciousness does not develop in a linear way but is subject to breaks and discontinuities - particularly in periods of economic crisis, which produce changes in a wide range of class relations.

Certainly, such consciousness is not the sole prerogative of manual workers but encompasses the experienced reality of wage labour in general at different levels of the labour process. Basically, of course, the substantial transformations of industrial and occupational structure prevailing during the seventies are not, in the main, the outcome of the recession. Rather, they reflect fundamental changes in the labour process which increasingly find expression in the growing automation of factory and office.
Accordingly, the economic crisis and the computer revolution in industry demand sustained theoretical analysis of the processes of class formation and class alliance in the face of increased threats to workers' living standards. In fact, as sociologists like Terry Johnson (1977) has argued, the issue of class consciousness cannot be meaningfully addressed without considering the 'prior theoretical question of the structural determinants of class which constitute the conceptual base from which problems relating to the ideological commitment of class groups and factions can be posed'. Additionally, it remains to consider the extent to which worker institutions like trade unions are capable of posing a fundamental and sustained challenge to the established social order. These key issues are explored in the following three chapters.
THE CRISIS AND THE PROBLEM OF WORKING CLASS POLITICAL MOBILISATION

Capitalist Crisis and class-consciousness

The spread of economic recession throughout the capitalist world has, as Dowd (1976) remarks, largely demolished the concept of a permanently 'slump-free' capitalist economy. In the process, it has fundamentally called into question many of the sociological orthodoxies about the stability and cohesiveness of advanced capitalist societies.

Undeniably, the intensification of the economic crisis threatens to accentuate the inherent class-based tensions between capital and labour. Yet the fact that capitalism is 'in crisis' does not mean that it will simply fall apart under the weight of its own 'contradictions' (see below). On the contrary, any radical transformation of capitalist society still requires political 'grave-diggers' - as Karl Marx designated his agents of revolution - the industrial working-class.

To Marx, the political mobilisation of the working-class was an essential pre-condition for socialist revolution. Basic to this

In fact, as the historical record shows, the death-throes of even a moribund capitalism may be very prolonged.
process of mobilisation is the development of working-class consciousness whereby the working-class comes to be transformed from a 'class-in-itself' into a 'class-for-itself'.

Paradoxically, although it is central to an understanding of the dynamics of revolution, the sociological study of class-consciousness, as Maravall (1976) notes, remains relatively-unexplored theoretical terrain. Likewise, as he discloses, with the notable exception of the work of Lukács, Gramsci and Althusser, there has been little systematic attempt by Marxism to theoretically analyse the nature of class consciousness.

However, as Maravall stresses, notwithstanding the theoretical contributions of Lukács, Gramsci and Althusser, there exists within Marxism as within Sociology, a sharp contrast between the rigour of theoretical work on the 'objective conditions' for social revolt and the relatively-cursory treatment given to analysis of the subjective factors. In essence, claims Maravall, this concentration of theoretical focus on the objective aspects of class conflict by both the 'sociology of revolutionary conflict' and the Marxist tradition presupposes that the level of class-consciousness is simply a mechanical i.e. 'unproblematic' response to underlying social realities. But what such deterministic conceptualisations tend to ignore is the Weberian question posed by Sartori and echoed by Maravall:

... namely, how do we pass from class conditions to class consciousness and actions?

(1976: 23-24)

Further, even though Marxist writers like Lukács, Gramsci and Althusser
have attempted to deal with the problem of class consciousness in a theoretical fashion, invaluable as their contributions are, they too exhibit, as Maravall contends, one of the distinctive conceptual weaknesses of the Marxist approach; specifically:

The social determination of antagonistic interests is assumed to be the relevant question in the study of conflict: the social determination of antagonistic ideologies is seen as a secondary and as a dependent problem. Thus the analysis of ideologies (and the study of their political significance) is based on a generally implicit paradigm of the 'adequate' ideology corresponding to externally assessed objective interests.

(1976: 27)

However, as Maravall notes, what is manifestly lacking in such analyses of the development of 'revolutionary ideologies' is any critical consideration of the process by which 'objective reality' is subjectively understood. (1976: 27) On the contrary, such perspectives tacitly assume that the same social forces which initially spawn the working class as a 'class-in-itself' would ultimately generate its conversion into a 'class-for-itself'.

Thus, to the extent that Marxism is primarily concerned with identifying the structural conditions for revolt, its dominant focus, understandably, tends to be on the social contexts in which, as Maravall puts it, "antagonistic ideologies emerge and develop" (1976: 29). Characteristically, this preoccupation with the underlying structural precipitants of social change leads Marxism to convey a rather deterministic picture of the individual as victim of impersonal social forces which are inherent in the very nature of social arrangements in capitalist society. But this by no means implies that the problem of the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat
is only a peripheral concern in Marxist theory. On the contrary, it is of central importance to Marxist analysis insofar as this purports to embody a theory of transcendence. Thus, immanent in Marxism also, we find a voluntaristic conception of the individual as relatively 'free' to initiate and indeed, to shape events. As Marx himself put it, "men make their own history" - though as he simultaneously warned, "but they do not make it just as they please" (cited in Hyman, 1975: 5).

It is evident therefore, that in the Marxist approach, to quote Richard Hyman, people are not merely "impotent playthings of impersonal forces" (1975: 5). On the contrary, the individual's capacity for autonomous activity is readily acknowledged. Yet, while Marx himself was prepared to concede a measure of choice in human affairs, at the same time, he strenuously emphasised that such choice was itself ultimately subject to certain structural constraints - as the foregoing citation of his remarks makes clear. Consequently, although Marx grants that the unfolding of the historical process is by no means inevitable, that, indeed, history is the product of the actions of autonomous beings, what he also was at some pains to stress, is that the actual forms human actions assume are in part structurally-conditioned.

Accordingly, Marxist theory classically epitomises the embodiment of the dialectical themes of free will on the one hand and determinism on the other - though, seemingly, it is the second tendency that is analytically dominant. It is this methodological propensity which incessantly generates the proliferation of critiques of the Marxist perspective. For example, in summing up the limitations of Marxian
explanations of class consciousness, one writer is moved to suggest that:

In his theory of class consciousness Marx does not allow much room for analysing how people see themselves in society. Because it is based on their productive relationships, his theory can only hint at how people actually view their social situation ... (and) while the concept of 'false' consciousness goes some way towards providing indications of measurements, it is still too crude a category for assessing political behaviour.

(Davies, 1970: 17)

In a similar vein, Wright Mills, remarking on Marx's conception of class consciousness considers:

How it will develop he does not make as clear as why it will for according to his analysis of their condition, as the interests of the two classes are in objective and irremediable conflict, their members will eventually become aware of their special interests and will pursue them.

(1963: 87)

Although Wright Mills' interpretation imparts a highly-mechanistic and misleading flavour to the Marxian conception of the process in which class consciousness evolves, nevertheless, one cannot quarrel with his essential point: in the final analysis we need to theoretically grasp how workers make sense of those elements of their social world which impinge upon their activities. In particular, it is vital to understand how they subjectively come to terms with the contradictions between their daily experiences as workers and the image of social reality presented in bourgeois ideology - aspects of which they tend to internalise the course of their socialisation in capitalist society.
In view of this, it is probably correct to suggest that the 'sociology of revolutionary conflict' requires, as Maravall maintains, critical examination of both the objective conditions for class antagonism and the subjective prerequisites for revolt. Most notably, there would seem to be an evident need for systematic investigation of the "processes whereby ideological radicalism emerges and is transmitted". (Maravall, 1976: 32). Certainly, any adequate analysis of the 'subjective conditions for revolutionary conflict' intrinsically entails consideration of the 'meaning-systems' workers use to construct their social worlds. As a result, it can plausibly be argued that:

A theory of 'subjective conditions' should not be limited to reflections about the social determination of objective interests and about situations of ideological monopoly but should shift a greater deal of its attention to the study of the political praxis related to the emergence, persistence and development of political ideologies ...

(Maravall, 1976: 32)

Needless to say, this redirection of conceptual focus urged by Maravall is a very tall order indeed.

**Ideological struggle and the vanguard party**

Significantly, a basic Leninist dictum is that where the working class lacks access to socialist ideas and influences, their values, attitudes and beliefs will tend to reflect the assumptions of 'bourgeois ideology'. To counter the pervasive influence of 'bourgeois ideology', Lenin advocated the formation of a socialist political party to which, to use Parkin's words, "workers may look ... for political guidance in the attempt to make sense of their social world". (1971: 99)
This vision of the workers' political party as a source of counter-ideology in capitalist society however, as Parkin notes, has to a large extent been abandoned where social-democratic and labour parties constitute the main institutional expression of working class politics. According to Parkin, the policies and actions of such parties only serve to highlight that in broad outline they accept the legitimacy of capitalist institutional arrangements and are quite prepared to work within their constraints.

Predictably, the political incorporation of the major working class party represents a fairly serious obstacle to the development of a politically-informed and radical working class. For, as Parkin warns, the failure of such parties to present a "radical class-oriented meaning-system to their supporters" basically deprives the working class of vital "sources of political knowledge and information which would enable them to make sense of their situation in radical terms". (1971: 98)

Characteristically, the provision of what Berger and Luckman (1977) term 'counter-definitions of society' is perhaps most important when capitalism is in a state of crisis. Certainly, access by the working class to alternative and especially to radical interpretations of the crisis would mark a significant contribution to undermining the hold of bourgeois ideology upon their attitudes and actions. Above all, the pervasive ideological impact of conservative notions that rising wages are the 'cause' of the present crisis underscores the necessity of counter-ideology in the political mobilisation of the working class. Predictably, conservative attempts to saddle the workers with the blame for the crisis highlights an underlying tendency to perceive the crisis
in purely technical terms. As such, it is therefore seen as being amenable to technical solutions derivable from the 'tool kit' of bourgeois economics.

Unfortunately for such outlooks, however, the prevailing features of contemporary economic life in the advanced capitalist nations - high inflation coupled with rising unemployment - have so far proved highly-immune to technocratic remedy. More importantly, what is manifestly obvious from the conventional diagnoses and proposed solutions to the crisis, is the methodological deficiency of much of so-called 'mainstream' economics. Premised on the assumption that non-economic factors are largely 'extraneous' variables, these are nevertheless assumed by this perspective to be mysteriously responsible to purely-technical economic remedies. Conversely, however, it is plain that to conceptualise the crisis as a crisis of capitalist political economy is basically to focus worker discontent upon the priorities of capitalist economic and social organisation.

Clearly, what is important to bear in mind is that these 'counter-definitions of society' comprise a potential source of threat to the existing social order in that they can be employed to mobilise political opposition to that order. For as Connell observes:

The class structure does not exist and probably could not exist as a system of naked power. It is based on a system of property rights and these are much more readily enforcible if they are widely believed to be legitimate. Common beliefs surrounding the subject of private ownership are thus important to the stability of the class structure. If a system of mass
belief compatible with private ownership is successfully maintained, the bases of ruling class power are effectively unassailable. If important divisions appear in mass beliefs concerning these issues the class structure is in danger.

(1977: 180)*

The significance of ideas in social and political struggles is, therefore, manifestly not to be underestimated.

As yet, however, little indication of a consistent, radical and organised expression of the economic grievances of the working class has been forthcoming from labour and social-democratic parties. (On this score, the actions of social-democratic governments during the Great Depression provide little cause for optimism). Certainly, to date, there has been no attempt to translate the workers' industrial struggle against inflation and unemployment into a full-blown challenge to the system of capitalism itself.

Enough has been written to underline that the working class does not develop revolutionary consciousness simply because it is oppressed. To transcend the existing social order, the working class requires more than a sense of deprivation or of economic exploitation.

* While as Connell rightly argues, the rule of a ruling class is not maintained solely (or even, most importantly) by coercion, it is however quite misleading to make the assumption of legitimacy central to the definition of domination. As one writer suggests, underlyng such a conceptual approach is the "unwarranted rationalist assumption that the ruled do not rebel only, or mainly, because they consider the rule of the rulers to be justified", (Theborn, 1978: 171). Plainly, however, as this observation serves to underline, there is a world of difference between conformity and legitimacy.
Perhaps, nowhere is this point more powerfully made than in Robert Tressell's novel "The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists". (1965)

Set in Edwardian England, this book presents a harrowing picture of the poverty, misery and sheer brutalisation of working class life at the height of Britain's imperial greatness. Poorly-clad, poorly-fed, poorly housed, frequently unemployed and in debt, these workers are nevertheless staunch defenders of the system which exploits them economically and condemns them and their families to lives of destitution and early graves. It is this which leads Tressell to describe them as 'ragged trousered philanthropists': in effect, altruists in rags who stubbornly see no irony in working themselves to exhaustion for the enrichment of those who employ them at barely subsistence wages.

Perhaps, most importantly, what Tressell's novel manages to brilliantly convey is the scale of the ideological struggle that has to be waged and won before the existing social system can be overthrown. Illustrating this through the experiences of Owen, the central character in the novel, Tressell writes:

> Usually whenever Owen reflected upon the gross injustices, and inhumanity of the existing social disorder, he became convinced that it could not last; it was bound to fall to pieces because of its own rottenness. It was not just, it was not commonsense, and therefore it could not endure. But always after one of these arguments - or, rather disputes - with his fellow workmen, he almost relapsed into hopelessness and despondency, for then he realised how vast and how strong are the fortifications that surround the present system; the great barriers and ramparts of invincible ignorance, apathy and self-contempt, which will have to be broken down before the system of society of which they are the defences, can be swept away.

(Tressell, 1965: 364)
How frequently the insights of the great novelist suffer little by comparison with those of the sociologist is indicated by juxtaposing Tressell's remarks above to those of Professor Bob Connell. For example, commenting on the long-held expectation of capitalism's collapse, Connell has this to say:

> Socialists of the nineteenth century, though disagreeing in every conceivable way about how it should happen, were reasonably agreed that the collapse of capitalism would happen and probably in their own lifetimes. A system so morally ugly could not last long ... (yet, W.S.) twentieth century socialism has been forced to recognise in a much sharper way the resilience of capitalism and the strength of its non-economic defences ...

(1977: 205)

It is thus with remarkable perceptiveness that Tressell manages to portray in his book how the consciousness of the working class is moulded in an environment of social institutions controlled by the ruling class. Basically, these mechanisms of ruling class 'cultural hegemony' as Connell terms them, serve to condition the working classes to regard the social arrangements within capitalist society as though they were simply part of the 'natural', if not divinely-ordained, scheme of things. In the words of that still-popular hymn, 'All things bright and beautiful':

> The rich man in his castle,
The poor man at his gate,
God gave each his station,
And ordered his estate.

Maybe in this modern age in which we now live, not too many people believe that the class system in capitalist society has the direct sanction of the deity. Yet, it is interesting to reflect that the secular ideologies which have replaced religion in explaining the
world have been no less concerned to emphasise the legitimacy of
the existing social order. This is underscored, for example, by
D'Urso's biting attack on the educational system:

The 'hidden curriculum' of the school leads the young to
internalise such norms as the hierarchical disposition of
power and the acquiescence in one's own powerlessness,
compliance with authority, job fragmentation and extrinsic
job motivation, external direction and evaluation of one's
work and worth.

(cited in Connell, 1977: 180)

While agreeing with D'Urso's general line of argument, Connell disputes
that the 'norms of compliance' are 'internalised' to quite the extent
suggested. Rather, what is significant about the schools' 'hidden
curriculum' is that pupils are implicitly drilled in the "practice
of compliance, whether they like it or not". (1977: 180)

The pervasiveness of bourgeois ideology and the early state at which
it affects the individual's perception of the social world is sharply
brought out in Connell's survey of 'class consciousness in childhood'.
(1977: 135-51) Perhaps the most striking aspect of this study is
Connell's demonstration of the way what he calls 'middle class
culture' - mediated through the institutional agencies of socialisation,
provide working class children with negative images of themselves.
Not unexpectedly, such children tend to internalise these negative
self-images. Thus, as Connell shows, these children come to believe
that they are inferior - as evidenced by their widespread tendency
to explain their relatively-low occupational aspirations in terms of
not 'having the brains'. (1977: 163)

Persons with such an outlook, as Connell's conclusions
are unlikely to respond positively to attempts to politically organise against their unequal share of society's resources. On the contrary, as his empirical research confirms, they have basically been conditioned to accept that their deprived position in society is a reflection solely of personal inadequacy.

Needless to say, the media of mass communication play a crucial part in the daily conditioning and manipulation of individuals into unthinking acceptance of the value-system which underpins the existing structure of power and privilege in society (see Connell, 1977: 204). (An interesting, if understandably, hardly dispassionate sidelight, on the role of the media in the conditioning of the working class in capitalist society is to be found in Robert Tressell's novel "The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists" (1965). Tressell's opinion of the ideological functions of the capitalist press is amusingly but unequivocally revealed in his sarcastic designation of such newspapers as the 'Obscurer', the 'Ananias' and the 'Chloroform'.)

If the existing institutional order is to be overturned therefore, it can only be realised through the organised action of a working class - conscious not only of its own subordination in capitalist society - but of the alternatives to such a system of social production. However, any assumption that fundamental social change is going to be easy merely because an economic crisis adversely affects the material well-being of the working classes is hardly justified on the facts of history. As Tressell's grim tale highlights, revolutionary consciousness and organisation are not the automatic products of material deprivation.
Put simply, the working class does not automatically become revolutionary because it is exploited and dehumanised. Rather, since its consciousness continues to be basically mediated through the existing institutions and forms of bourgeois ideology, extreme deprivation may breed - not revolutionary politics, but resignation and despair - classically epitomised in the 'it's not for the likes of us' mentality of Robert Tressell's "Ragged Trousered Philanthropists".

At the same time, it is necessary to avoid being overpessimistic about the prospect of ideological struggle in contemporary capitalist society. Indeed, on this score, it is relevant to recall that the working class movement emerged in the 19th century under conditions of infinitely more hegemonic influence for ruling class ideas (see below). Fittingly, as Tressell's novel serves to remind us, the hold of religion and nationalism on the working class underlines the fact that the problem of ideological domination - far from being a novel one, has perhaps existed for as long as the working class itself.

Ultimately, therefore, the question of ideological struggle will resolve itself in the following uncompromising formulation: which factor will in the long-run prove more decisive in shaping the worker's

This lends support to Connell's contention that ideological domination while 'pretty thorough' is 'never total'. (1977: 207)
outlook towards the existing social system - the bits and pieces of bourgeois ideology he absorbs from the 'mindbending' institutions of capitalist society - church, school, mass communication media - in fact, the whole cynical paraphernalia of capitalist 'public relations', or the stubborn reality he daily confronts as a worker (see below). To pose the question in this way however, is not to minimise the importance or the necessity for leadership and organisation. On the contrary, Lenin's unique contribution to revolutionary theory was to empirically give force to the postulate that where the working class is not organised by a socialist 'vanguard' party, its consciousness is likely to remain stunted by the cultural milieu of bourgeois society.

Accordingly, if the present economic crisis in advanced capitalist societies provides any possibilities of fundamental social transformation, its realisation will critically depend (as Lenin's model of revolution suggests), upon the existence of a political leadership which can theoretically grasp the potentialities for change implicit in the underlying crisis and impart this consciousness to the protest activities of the masses (see below 2). Indeed, to the degree that

In effect, the inherent instability of the situation is to borrow Tony Lane's phraseology, "precisely what one would expect to find where one class is ideologically dominated by another and yet finds itself periodically hard up against the exploitation of which the ideological dominance is but a veneer". (1974: 71-2)

2. It cannot be too strongly stressed that "men's consciousness of the socially-contingent nature of the conditions under which they live, and their familiarity with alternative conditions and the means of attaining them - all this clearly varies over time and circumstance, and is determined by many factors, one of which at least being the kind of political leadership that is present at moments of particular class tension". (Coates, 1975: viii)
the collective power of the working class is expressed, in the main, largely through its own distinctive institutions - the trade unions and the labour party, the attitudes of the leaders of these organisations must, ultimately, crucially affect the situation of the class. Above all, to the extent that any thoroughgoing social transformation requires the generalisation of economic dissatisfactions into political grievances the problems posed for such change by the growing reformism of the labour party need careful examination.

Labourism and Reformism

It has become a venerable part of the political mythology in certain socialist circles, that the failure of socialism to eventuate in the advanced capitalist countries can basically be attributed to the endemic 'class treachery' of the Labour Party and its leaders. While such oversimplifications may give solace to those who hold such opinions, as an explanation of why socialism has not come about in the industrial West, they are clearly inadequate. To begin with, to ascribe the absence of socialism in these societies to 'treacherous acts' on the part of the Labour Party and its leaders is clearly to beg the question of what it is about this party and its characteristic mode of operation which leads it to produce leaders who perpetually 'betray' the working class struggle?

To pose the problem in this way is naturally to raise a highly-pertinent question: what underlies the persistent failure of the Labour Party to give political expression to any radical impulses for change? It follows that, to frame the question in this form is to seek answers - not in the psyches of labour leaders, but in terms
of the structural context of party politics in capitalist society. Hence, to explain "why the Labour Party has so systematically disappointed its supporters", one needs to centrally examine, not so much the psychological predispositions of individual Labour leaders, as the "logic and limits of social-democratic politics". (Coates, 1975: ix-x)

Inevitably, to adequately do so involves examination of the role of the state in capitalist society. Writing over a century ago, Marx and Engels made the famous observation that: 'The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie'. (Cited in Hyman, 1975: 121) In recent times, of course, this opinion has come in for a great deal of criticism. For example, a popular conservative view is that the growth of State power signifies not the preservation of capitalism but its fundamental transformation.

In this regard, much is made of the fact that in contemporary capitalist society business enterprises are subject increasingly to a whole variety of forms of State regulation. However, such arguments tend to miss the fundamental point. For, whatever curtailment of individual capitalist 'freedoms' has resulted from various state interventions, such interventions serve - not to challenge the capitalist mode of accumulation but to express it. Indeed, one of the major impulses behind the increased role of the State in economic affairs has been the changes which have occurred in the capitalist mode of production. As Göran Therborn explains it:
State intervention has grown to meet the need for large-scale, long-term investment that is too risky for private capital to undertake, and the need for a degree of economic coordination that cannot be realised by the market. The dependence of monopoly capitalism upon a few giant corporations has further encouraged ad hoc state action to rescue ailing companies.

(1978: 67)

Likewise, contrary to conservative fears, "state intervention in the field of 'social welfare' is not necessarily an obstacle to capital accumulation: as Bismarck already understood, it can even strengthen the capitalist regime against challenge and revolt". (Therborn, 1978: 72) (see below).

Put simply, the "enlarged role of the State" in modern capitalist societies reflects not merely its position "as controller and part-owner of the national economy": equally-important, is that its "role in the 'social field outside production proper, complements this role within production" since such services - notably education, "run by the state have a function both in producing labour-power and in controlling and manipulating labour in and out of the production process". (Shaw, 1975: 32) To say therefore that the steady growth of state power will be used to ensure the viability of the existing social system is to do no more than to recognise the "policy constraints (on the state - W.S) which stem necessarily from the capitalist context

This is not to imply that the ruling class will necessarily perceive a certain state intervention to be in their interest. In fact, the case of Roosevelt's 'New Deal' is cited by Therborn to make the point that "a certain intervention may well go against prevailing ruling-class opinion, (emphasis added) while objectively furthering or maintaining its mode of exploitation and domination". (1978: 148)
of political life". (Hyman, 1975: 121) Prominent among such constraints, Hyman considers:

'Economic stability' is the precondition of all the other goals which governments pursue, whatever their political complexion; yet (in the absence of mobilisation to overturn capitalist economic relations) this inevitably entails the stability of a capitalist economy. Hence private profit - the barometer of economic 'health' and the source of new investment - has to be encouraged; and with it, intentionally or not, the associated inequalities of power and material advantage. More generally, policies must be pursued which maintain what is termed 'the confidence of industry' (which means, not the majority who work in industry but the minority who own and control industry.

(1975: 125)

To some degree, these 'limits to radicalism' are inherent in the logic of parliamentarism itself. In the first place, as Claus Offe has noted, "the voting constituency of the parties does not have a clearly delimited sociostructural composition, but in fact displays extensive overlappings". (1972: 91) Put simply:

The constituencies from which parliamentary representatives are elected are defined by more or less arbitrary lines on the map; they contain no necessary internal homogeneity, no patterns of internal relationships which are a source of organic unity (as is to some extent the case, say, of the workforce of the factory).

(Hyman, 1975: 123)

Significantly, moreover, not only is a heterogeneous grouping of "employers and workers, housewives and shopkeepers, landlords and tenants - not a meaningful entity outside the election period itself", (Hyman, 1975: 123); but more importantly, as Therborn observes, "once elected they (parliamentarians - W.S) are not answerable to their constituents". (1978: 106) Interestingly, as Richard Hyman
The argument that parliamentary representatives must, between elections, be immune from popular control was originally explicitly anti-democratic. It is ironical that this should now be a central proposition of 'parliamentary democracy'.

(Hyman, 1975: 123)

Accordingly, what the perennial attempts by contemporary parties to capture the political 'middle ground' classically exemplify is at least an awareness that, as Offe puts it, "the ability to permanently sustain a broad appeal beyond class, strata, or particular interests has become a sine qua non for the success of the party as such". (1972: 84) Thus, insofar as such parties comprise the effective universe of political choice in capitalist society, changing governments has become essentially a meaningless spectacle - a choice, as Catley and McFarlane (1974) sardonically put it, between 'Tweedledum' and 'Tweedledee'. Making due allowances for exaggeration, it is difficult to dispute the broad implications of Catley and McFarlane's observation. As spelt out by Offe, what parliamentary elections basically serve to underline is that "differences between parties lie not so much with divergent overall conceptions as with ad hoc, played-up timely issues of high press value, which of course must never compromise any actual or potential coalition truce". (1972: 84) Although one might question that considerations of potential coalition - either explicitly or implicitly form part of political motivations in electioneering, plainly, the political preoccupation with media 'image' - of the parties and especially their leaders, to which Offe draws attention - should, in view of his foregoing comments, come as no great surprise.
One of the bitterest and most persistent criticisms of social-democratic politics concerns the ability of the parliamentary party to flout arguably, even the 'binding' decisions of its own party conferences. However, what needs to be realised, is that to a large extent, this relative independence of the parliamentary party from direct control of the party rank-and-file is not unique to social-democratic politics. Rather, it is rooted in the institution of parliament itself.

Put simply, the parliamentary system of political representation tends to create and institutionalise a line of division within political parties into 'parliamentary wings' and organisational or 'administrative wings'. It is, therefore, not without significance that "party leaders and prime ministers are usually made and unmade by parliamentary groups, rather than by the extra-parliamentary bodies of their party" (Therborn, 1978: 106). Fundamentally, what this serves to signify is not simply the degree to which "the centre of power has been firmly located within their parliamentary bodies". (Therborn, 1978: 106) Equally important, what underlies the pre-eminence of the parliamentary sphere, is, what Richard Hyman calls, the "ideology of the independence and autonomy of the State". (1975: 129)

Translated into an elaborate framework of parliamentary rules and procedures, this ideology has facilitated the incorporation of "Social-Democratic parties into the political order" as successive of these administrations and their leaderships have allowed themselves to be persuaded that "they are responsible first of all to parliament and secondarily to their own party membership".
(Therborn, 1978: 106) (see below) This pressure to demonstrate that they are not merely the representatives of some 'sectional interest' has traditionally been deployed with considerable skill and success against Labour and Social-Democratic administrations. Therborn, for example, cites the case of the first social-democratic government in Sweden. As he tells it, one of the first requests of the party by the Swedish monarch was that, as Therborn puts it, "it should act quite independently of the influence of 'external bodies'". (1978: 106)

Needless to say, swearing allegiance to the institutions of capitalist society is hardly compatible with commitment to radically transform them. It is therefore not surprising that this kind of criticism has been often used to considerable effect as a political weapon.

Certainly parliamentarism tends to accentuate the division between parliamentary branch of a labour or social-democratic party and its working-class and trade union base. But this is part of a more general tendency which has been compounded by the relative political powerlessness of the parliamentary back-bencher. Indeed, what mystifications about 'responsibility to parliament' serve to conceal is that, as Offe (1972) notes, the nature of the parliamentary system acts increasingly to hinder parliamentary backbenchers from performing their formal roles within the legislature as independent watchdogs of government action. In fact, as he argues, "in the institutionalised permanent electoral struggle, the government and parliamentary fraction of the government party are dependent on one another in a way which prohibits the participation of the latter in the public regulatory functions of the parliament". (1972: 90). Offe thus concludes that insofar as it makes sense "to speak of an institutionalised line of conflict within the political system, it is certainly not drawn between the parliament and the government, but between the government and the government fraction on the one hand, and the parliamentary opposition on the other". (1972: 90). It is therefore such factors which largely explain the basic political ineffectiveness of the so-called 'parliamentary left' of labour and social-democratic parties, and why, as David Coates (1975) so brilliantly shows, ideological postures and radical reputations gained in opposition are such poor guides to action when the party comes to office.
against labour and social-democratic governments. Yet, at the same
time, to the degree that these parties encounter such forms of political opposition it is clear that "Labour governments have not been without problems for the ruling class" (Therborn, 1978: 209).

Conversely, however, it is a by now familiar observation that several years of social-democratic government in various societies have not succeeded in eliminating the capitalist economic basis of these societies. True, they have managed to mitigate some of the uglier features of the system. But they have not abolished it. For many, failure of these parties to do so is seen as confirmation of the belief that to seek to change the system through parliament is to condemn such efforts and their advocates to political impotence. Although such a view is overpessimistic, nevertheless, the cautionary tale of the Allende government in Chile serves as a forceful reminder that the 'parliamentary road to socialism' is a rocky one and one fraught with political dangers for the unwary and the unprepared.

Yet having said all that, it must also be admitted that the failure of social-democratic governments has resulted - not from the fact that the 'parliamentary road to socialism' has been tried and found wanting. Rather, more likely than not, it has been found wanting and not tried. The technocratic enthusiasms of contemporary social-democratic politicians are thus - not an aberration but a logical development of reformist politics. In fact, the deletion from the party platform of the Australian Labor Party of its traditional objective to 'socialise the means of production, distribution and exchange; at the federal conference of the party at Terrigal, N.S.W. in February, 1975, only served to formalise the de facto abandonment
of socialist aims which had been gradually taking place over many years.

Characteristically, with the advent of economic crisis in the industrial West during the mid-1970's, the Australian Labor government - like all social-democratic governments, has found that working for reforms within the existing social order obeys certain impersonal laws of the capitalist market. Basically, the most important lesson the crisis teaches is that as a general rule, social and economic reforms presuppose the necessary material prosperity to sustain the required concessions. An economic crisis therefore which can only be made worse by the making of reforms only serves to highlight the inherent limitations of reformist politics.

Thus, as Labour and social-democratic governments found during the Depression of the 1930's and as they are rediscovering again today, given their acceptance of the permanency of the capitalist system as a framework for political action, when the system is in crisis, they are obliged by the logic of their ideological position to institute policies which would ensure its survival - even where this means sacrificing the interests of the working class whom they purport to represent. In effect, therefore, the economic policies pursued by governments during the Great Depression were basically the same - whatever the political complexions of such governments.

Similarly, the economic policies being pursued by governments of capitalist societies during the present economic crisis - although differing in minor details and modes of implementation, are broadly alike. Regardless of their subjective wishes or desires, the
policies of labor governments must in the final analysis obey the same relentless logic of the capitalist mode of accumulation.

To economists like Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972), the crisis typically presents itself as a 'profit squeeze' being experienced by capitalist industry. Accordingly, they see the inevitable solution as involving a fairly massive transfer of resources from wages back to profits. Characteristically, Glyn and Sutcliffe's thesis on the cause of the economic crisis has been fiercely disputed by their fellow economists. Notably, the observation is made that their argument is based overwhelmingly on the evidence of British economic conditions which are not necessarily representative of other capitalist societies. (See Holland, 1975: 394-8) Such claims, notwithstanding, it is very significant that the economic interventions of the state in the various crisis-ridden capitalist countries have, by and large, been remarkably similar.

To sum up therefore, the failure of social-democratic governments to effect drastic social change reflects all too clearly, what David Coates calls, the "fundamental incompatibility between the goal of socialism and the basis of power of the Parliamentary State".

In reply to such criticisms of Glyn and Sutcliffe's argument, two points should perhaps be made. Firstly, the economic crisis is a generalised one in the capitalist world. As the U.S. magazine 'Time' (December 22, 1971: 41) reported, not even such traditional bastions of capitalist economic 'success' like Switzerland, have managed to remain exempt from the problems of high inflation and high unemployment. Secondly, the misleading nature of international comparisons of economic conditions is superbly disclosed by the same 'Time' story. Briefly, it relates that Switzerland was attempting to solve its unemployment problem by seeking to repatriate its 'guest' workers. What moreover, should be noted is that in certain European countries, Switzerland included, 'guest workers' are not included in official unemployment statistics.
In short, to the extent that such governments have traditionally sought to transform capitalism from within, they have found repeatedly that such attempts tend to founder because the administration of a capitalist system intrinsically entails obeying its economic dictates. If, therefore, the present economic crisis in the capitalist world serves to make one thing very clear, it is this:

... in situations in which the national capitalism is too competitively weak to pay the price of ambitious programmes of social reform, Labour Governments that depend on the voluntary co-operation of the senior echelons of the capitalist command structure will fail to deliver that which they promised, and in the process undermine their credibility with their own electorate ....

(Coates, 1975: 222)

Accordingly, what is important to bear in mind is that under such conditions, "the Labor Party will doubtless be brought up against, and be obliged to challenge, the industrial power and degree of job control of its own working class electorate. And it will come to that confrontation not as the passive tool of an unseen capitalist elite, but on its own initiative and out of the logic of its own dependence on State power". (Coates, 1975: 223) (emphasis added).

Characteristically, the resulting frictions between Labor governments and the trade unions likely to find their fullest expression in the trade union leaders - caught up as they are between the conflicting pressures from the government to hold down wage demands and from their rank-and-file to protect their jobs and living standards. However, if the response of trade unions and trade union leaders to the present economic crisis is to be adequately understood, it is imperative to have some insight into the nature of trade unionism under capitalism.
and the way this influences the role that the trade union leadership plays.

Trade unions and trade union leadership: The paradoxes of organisation and protest

Like the Labor Party, trade unions and trade union leaders also come in for a great deal of criticism. A significant feature of much criticism of union leaders however, is that it rarely explores the fundamental issue: namely, what social forces actually shape the role played by trade union leaders in capitalist society? Rather, the emphasis tends to be placed on the various factors which distinguish the union leadership from the rank-and-file. Thus, frequent resort is made to the union leader's 'middle class' life style, his virtual entrenchment in office and the like. But, important as such factors doubtlessly are, to adequately comprehend the role of union leader in capitalist society, it is necessary to critically examine the structural context in which trade unions operate.

In the first place, it is relevant to note that trade unionism originally emerged as a collective working-class response to capitalist exploitation in the workplace. Yet, while it intrinsically represents an institutional expression of working class opposition to capitalism, trade unionism is simultaneously as Gramsci observed, "a reflection of capitalist society" (cited in Hyman, 1971: 12). By this he meant that trade unionism "organises workers, not as producers but as wage-earners, that is as creations of the capitalist system of private property, as sellers of their labour-power" (cited in Hyman, 1971: 12).
Since, as their very name implies, the basis of their organisation is the trade, it is scarcely surprising that trade unions should reflect, as Richard Hyman puts it, "the industrial and occupational divisions of capitalism rather than uniting workers as a class". (1971: 12)

Fundamentally, therefore, trade unionism is simultaneously an expression and a critique of capitalist property relations.

... on the one hand a protest and defence against the economic and human deprivations imposed on workers by their role in capitalist industry; on the other a means of accommodation to the political economy of capitalist industry. This in turn reflects the contradictory pressures inherent in trade union organisation and collective bargaining activity: on the one hand the expression of the basic conflict of interest between employers and employees ... on the other the development of a stable and compatible bargaining relationship. Hence the curious phenomenon of 'antagonistic co-operation' ... the constant interpretation of conflictual and collaborative aspects of trade unionism.

(Hyman, 1974: 257-8)

Characteristically, the contradictions of trade unionism under capitalism tend to find their most acute manifestation in the role of union leader. This involves all union leaders - regardless of political ideology. Underlying it, as Hobsbawm observed, is the elemental fact that:

even the most revolutionary must fight the battles for improvement and reform according to the nature of the terrain, which is that of 'realistic' calculation in a capitalist economy and a capitalist state. That is to say they must compromise, make allies, and in general act as reformists. If he is to be effective in a stable capitalist economy, even the communist union leader must do this, whatever his private reservations and calculations.

(cited in Lane, 1974: 234-5)
Put simply, the struggle to win economic concessions from the system is as imperative for the radical union leader as it is for his conservative colleagues. Indeed, as Tony Lane puts it, "the leader who hoped for the dissolution of capitalism nevertheless had to come to terms with a capitalist reality in his daily round". (1974: 228).

For all that, the ideological position of the union leader is not completely irrelevant.

While it did not alter the fact that a capitalist reality had to be coped with, some scope still remained. The reality did not have to be embraced: it was entirely possible to regard it as provisional.

(Lane, 1974: 229)

As Lane proceeds to further explain, even such an ostensibly innocuous activity like where the union chose to invest its funds was of 'symbolic' importance.

It did at least signal a refusal to regard capitalism as an immutable object - and to that rather quiet extent helped ensure that ideas resembling socialism stayed alive.

(Lane, 1974: 230)

However, while capitalism may not necessarily be thought of as 'immutable', it does not avoid the constant need for radical union leaders to engage in the fight for material concessions from employers.

Certainly they were in no position to tell the members to put up with the problems of the day because the morrow would see the dawning of a socialist society. Such a statement would have been met with baffled incredulity - and quickly followed by the sound of feet tramping off in the opposite direction.

(Lane, 1974: 241)
As one might therefore reasonably gather from this, whatever his politics, the primary task of the union leader is inevitably to get a better deal for his members from their employers. Put bluntly, unless he wishes to be dumped as their industrial representative and the articulator of their economic grievances, the union leader plainly cannot defer the problem of material improvements in his members' economic conditions to the coming of the socialist millennium.

To the extent that this is true, the actions of trade union leaders are largely dictated by the logic of unionism in capitalist society. This centrally implies that to gain better wages and working conditions for their members, trade union leaders must have some institutional means of negotiating with employers. The importance of this is self-evident.

Negotiations, by virtue of deciding what went out of the till and into members' pockets, simultaneously decided the fate of the union as an organisation and the leader's place within it.

(Lane, 1974: 242)

Yet, the process of negotiation itself poses a dilemma for the trade union leader. By its very nature, negotiation involves mutual compromise. Rarely does the initial claim by unions and counter-offer by management bear much relation to the eventual settlement. Characteristically, this need to reach agreement frequently gives rise to accusations of 'sell-outs' which union leaders frequently experience from disgruntled members of their own rank-and-file. Exploding this criticism however, Lane suggests that it signifies a fundamental inability to grasp that "working within the system meant making compromises with it". (1974: 177) In fact, as he
goes on to disclose:

What 'selling out' most typically meant (blatant cases of treachery apart) was that opinions differed as to what was a 'reasonable' compromise. That labour leaders were ready to compromise rarely had anything to do with their political morality. Indeed most frequently it was, more than anything else, a reflection of the dilemma that mutually embraced both leaders and followers.

(Lane, 1974: 177)

To a large extent, this 'dilemma', as Lane calls it, is rooted in the logic of the bargaining relationship itself. As Fox reminds us, underlying any system of industrial conflict settlement is a measure of normative consensus between the contending parties about the rules - provided, of course, that they are "congruent with the aspirations of both sides". (1971: 149) More importantly, to the degree that "there is normative agreement about these behaviours, it embodies a recognition by both sides that any immediate tactical advantage resulting from violation of shared expectations would be outweighed by damage to the system within which they had hitherto accomplished satisfactory results". (Fox, 1971: 149)

Characteristically, the trade union leader's acute sensitivity to such problems quite frequently gives rise to charges of 'attachment to the status-quo' (see Cliff, 1975: 126) from his critics. This point is well made in an amusing but probably apocryphal story related by Tony Cliff. As he tells it, a union leader was addressing a mass protest meeting of his members.

He asked them: 'Do you want more money?' And to his surprise the shout came back loud and clear: 'No'. 'Do you want more holidays?' Again the answer came: 'No!' Baffled he asked: 'What do you want?' The reply was, 'We want the revolution.' He retorted: 'But that's not on. Management will never agree to that.'

(Cliff, 1975: 126-7)
It is, of course, fairly easy for their critics to satirise the concern of union leaders with maintaining the bargaining relationship by at least keeping the lines of communication with management open. The really important question which this type of criticism begs however, is what are his options if he totally refuses to negotiate with management? To pose the question in this way, is to call attention to the relatively limited resources that he can mobilise - particularly in the face of determined opposition from both employers and the state - rather than to indulge in simplistic speculations about the quality of his moral courage - which underlies the popular 'lack of guts' hypothesis. (See below)

What is essential to realise is that the basic dilemmas that trade union leaders must continually confront reside in the institution of wage-labour itself.

The trade union leader, in other words, experiences a commitment to the existing bargaining arrangements and the terms of collective agreements. This commitment, moreover, is attributable less to any personal characteristics of the official than to his function: the negotiation and renegotiation of order within constraints set by a capitalist economy and a capitalist state.

(Hyman, 1975: 91)

These points are further rammed home by Tony Lane.

This is by no means to deny that the union leader is uniquely placed to influence his members' perceptions of what constitutes a 'reasonable compromise'.

Union leaders had to pursue the immediate interests of their members, and to do that they had to establish reasonable working relationships with employers. If personal bitterness, hostility and acrimony continually punctuated their meetings, then efficient negotiations would have been almost possible. That, presumably, would only have suited trade union leaders had they been operating in a near revolutionary situation with the working class prepared in outlook and organisation. With the working class prepared in neither of these respects, even the union leader who would have had it otherwise had no choice but to become a professional, a master of what George Woodcock called the 'shabby compromise'.

(1974: 248)

A recurring criticism of modern trade unions is that their increasingly bureaucratic character assigns 'too much power' to the union leaders and inhibits rank-and-file members from exercising democratic control over the actions of their officials. The question of democracy in trade unions is, to be sure, a problem which troubles many people - including union leaders themselves. Yet, it is important to recognise that the bureaucratic tendencies within trade unions are unlikely to be simply a result of the 'power-hungry' proclivities of union leaders - as many of their conservative critics fondly imagine. Rather, as Lois MacDonald (1959) insists, the bureaucratic nature of the trade unions is largely a reflection of their vastly altered functions as a consequence of employer and state acknowledgement of their legitimacy. As MacDonald goes on to explain:

Collective bargaining processes and duties in administering contracts place a premium on skills of negotiation and administration with the result that the type of 'agitational and organisational' leader is in less demand than he was in the formative period of union growth. Therefore, the agitator is replaced by the administrator, who in dealing with employers and in directing the organisational life of the union gains valuable experience and entrenched position.

(1959: 6)
But, whatever the underlying causes for its emergence, there is no
doubt that the bureaucratisation of trade unions raises profound
questions about the power of union leaders. Much has been made of
the 'oligarchical' nature of trade unions in which a relative lack
of direct membership control over internal union administration has
allowed a strong and largely self-perpetuating leadership to emerge.
Scepticism about the possibility of striking a balance between the
demands of administrative efficiency and those of internal democracy,
of course, finds theoretical underpinning in Michels' 'iron law of
oligarchy' which articulated the celebrated aphorism: "Who says
organisation, says oligarchy".

Since Michels' famous theoretical observations on the shrinkage of
democratic control in trade unions, this problem, as Hyman notes,
has tended to be conceptualised in terms of such subjective categories
as membership 'apathy' or alternatively, leadership 'corruption' or
'careerism'. To the extent that this approach represents even a minor
tendency in trade union analysis, Hyman's warning is very timely.
As he rightly says: "To remain at this level of analysis is ... to
moralise rather than to explain". (1975: 69)

Taking a hard look at much of the analysis of trade union leadership
power, we see that fundamental to the notion of an 'iron law of
oligarchy' is the assumption that there exists a basic line of cleavage
within trade unions between their leaders and their rank-and-file. For
writers like Tony Cliff (1975), the objective conditions for this gulf
between leadership and led are to be found in the relatively privileged
economic position of the leader vis-a-vis his members and the bureau-
cratic nature of his organisational role. These factors are thus seen
as contriving to create an elite within trade unions with distinctive interests of its own, not the least of which is perpetuation of itself in office.

However, what should be forcefully emphasised is that what distinguishes trade union leaders as a social category is not so much that they may have interests that are qualitatively different from those of their members. Rather, the distinction lies in the exigencies of their role. Accordingly, whether or not trade union leaders support the workers' struggle is intrinsically a function of the degree to which their actions are subject to the control of the workers.

Arguably, many of the factors which are seen to differentiate union leaders from their members are, to some extent, symptoms rather than causes of oligarchic tendencies in trade unions. Admittedly, compared with their members some union officials are very favourably placed financially, but as Hyman cautions:

_The attractions should not be exaggerated: the hours of work are often long, the pressures considerable, the pay (for junior officials at least) rarely much above the earnings of the higher-paid sections of the membership._

(1975: 78)

Although Hyman is here referring to the British union movement, his comments would seem to be broadly applicable to its Australian counterpart also.

Underlying the dialectics of oligarchy and democracy within trade unions is the curious phenomenon to which Lois MacDonald calls our attention where:
On the one hand, members seek to impress the leaders with constant reminders that they are the servants of the workers and, on the other, they bestow on the officials ample status and power to act on occasion with considerable indifference to the interest of members.

(1959: 76)

Even so, it is clear that in the final analysis there are inherent contradictions within trade unionism that prevent union leaders from totally functioning as 'managers of discontent', as Wright Mills (1948) wryly dubbed them. Indeed, as Hyman has insightfully suggested:

If excessive discontent and conflict is disruptive of established bargaining relationships - excessive passivity is equally unpalatable - depriving the whole institution of its basic raison d'etre. The union official cannot suppress 'rebellion' entirely without rendering his organisation and himself redundant: his task is to sustain a delicate balance between grievance and satisfaction, between activism and acquiescence. Potentially, at least, this must be regarded as a highly-precarious enterprise.

(1971: 37)

Or, to put it in the rather more colourful terminology of C. Wright Mills, "the labour leader can play the role of brakeman only at the risk of losing his seat as engineer". (1948: 288)

Finally, it remains to be said that inherent in Michel's 'iron las of oligarchy' is the presupposition that trade union leaders have been rendered incapable of radical class action by the structural constraints in which they operate. Put simply, the basic implication of Michels' excessively gloomy conception of social change, is that political visionaries who wish to radically transform society should refrain from seeking election to full-time office as this inevitably generates bureaucratic pressures which culminate in the
abandonment of their revolutionary zeal. (See below) But underlying the 'iron law of oligarchy' with its postulate of leadership 'corruptibility', is an assumption that suspiciously resembles a doctrine of organisational 'original sin'.

However, as Hobsbawn has recently written, "if the left may have to think more seriously about the new society, that does not make it any less desirable or necessary, or the case against the present one any less compelling". (1978: 64) Fittingly, with the crisis in advanced capitalist society revealing 'the system's' decreasing ability to make concessions of any sort to pressures 'from below' (Hobsbawm, 1978: 66), it is perhaps timely to critically re-examine the classical Marxist views of trade unions as instruments of socialist transformation.

In effect, to accept formulations such as Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' is to foster defeatism about the prospect of genuine social change. For, in essence, 'oligarchy' is seen in this approach as an inevitable tendency of any movement for radical social change - in short, an immanent 'law' of historical development. Viewed in these terms therefore, revolutionary change is simply an illusion, as in Michels' view, it is predestined to culminate in oligarchy, leaving the masses as equally powerless to influence events after the revolution as before it.
That the work of Karl Marx has made a valuable contribution to the study of trade unionism is a statement which is likely to provoke little dissent among sociologists. Certainly, not even the fiercest opponents of Marx's ideas would go so far as to deny that the sociology of trade unionism is greatly in his intellectual debt.

Basically, Marx's views on trade unionism are situated, and so have to be understood, in the context of his wider analysis of the revolutionary potential and historic tasks of the proletariat. Significantly, a key element in Marx's conception of revolution, outlined in "Capital" and the "Communist Manifesto" is that capitalism not only pauperises the working-classes and polarises society - it also creates its own executioners in the form of the proletariat. In analysing Marx's vision of the class war, Joseph Banks points to the emphasis he placed on "the part to be played in the class struggle by organisations - trade unions, international working men's associations, political parties". (1970: 46)

Nevertheless, as Banks readily admits, despite his voluminous writings on the working-class and his long and intimate association with the leadership of the European trade union movement in the First International, Marx never addressed himself theoretically (at least, not in a systematic way), to the question of trade unions or the specific
part they were to play in the revolutionary struggle of the working-class. Accordingly, it has been left to later writers to piece together Marx's scattered references to the subject. Much of the credit for this work belongs to Lozovsky (1935) whose book, despite its partisan and adulatory treatment of Marx, remains the most comprehensive attempt so far to discuss Marx's views on trade unionism.

In examining Marx's conception of the role of trade unions in the proletarian struggle, Lozovsky affirms that:

*Marx, first and foremost, considered the trade unions organising centres for collecting the forces of the workers, organisations for giving the workers an elementary class training.*

(1935: 15)

As Lozovsky discloses, Marx and Engels in their correspondence ceaselessly emphasised the view that trade unions not only provide a basis for working-class unity but are also 'schools of socialism'. (1935: 15-16). Citing Marx's resolution on the role and functions of trade unionism under capitalism at the Geneva Congress of the First International in 1866, Lozovsky underlines Marx's perception of the political task of trade unions as being primarily to "emancipate the downtrodden masses". (See Lozovsky, 1935: 16-18)

Certainly, in his 'Instructions for delegates to the Geneva Congress', Marx clearly envisages trade unions as agencies of political socialisation which serve to alert the working-class to its revolutionary responsibilities. For instance, in dealing with the "past, present and future" of the trade unions, Marx identifies the basic impulse behind the formation of trade unions as the economic exploitation
To Marx, therefore, the principal significance of trade unions for class struggle lay in the fact that they constitute embryonic manifestations of working-class solidarity - even though the unions themselves may be subjectively unaware of such implications of their existence. Expanding upon this notion, Marx hypothesises that "unconsciously to themselves, the trade unions were forming centres of organisation of the working class, as the medieval municipalities and communes did for the middle class". (Marx, 1974: 91)

Trade unionism thus contributes to the development of working-class consciousness by virtue of the unceasing economic struggle it is compelled to wage against the bourgeoisie. In Marx's view, such "activity of the trade unions is not only legitimate, it is necessary". (1974: 91) Nevertheless, as he emphasises:

> If the trade unions are required for the guerilla fights between capital and labour, they are still more important as organised agencies for superseding the very system of wage labour and capital rule.

(Marx, 1974: 91)

In brief, then, Marx's conception of trade unionism envisions that trade unions under capitalism initially emerge as defensive organisations at the point of production to protect and secure the economic interests of the workers. However, in the course of the economic struggle, the workers progressively become aware of their distinctive class interests vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. This transformation of the working-class from a 'class-in-itself' into a 'class-for-itself' simultaneously translates the class struggle from a fragmented
industrial battle aimed at wringing economic concessions from the existing social order into a full-blown political movement which will confront and ultimately overthrow the entire system of economic and social oppression. (See Hyman, 1971: 6-8)

Generally-speaking, however, Western trade unions have manifestly failed to fulfill Marx's expectations of them. As Hyman (1971) reminds us, even during his own lifetime, the trade unions evidenced little inclination to assume the revolutionary role assigned to them by Marx. Yet, as Hyman goes on to say, although Marx and Engels were fully aware of the lack of revolutionary fervor on the part of the 19th century trade union movement, they did not fundamentally alter their theory of revolution. On the contrary, suggests Hyman, they were inclined to regard the non-revolutionary character of the fledgling trade union movement as at worst a temporary deviation from the predicted evolutionary process. (See Hyman, 1971: 8)

Hyman contends that the presupposition by Marx and Engels that the absence of a revolutionary or even vaguely socialist outlook, (especially on the part of the early British trade unions), was simply a transient phenomenon, led them to cast around for explanations of the problem based largely upon the unique historical circumstances of British capitalism. Thus, as he points out, they tended to excuse the lack of revolutionary zeal of the British trade unions on the grounds that the existing unions were an 'aristocracy of labour' comprising only the most skilled and privileged sector of the working class. This condition, "was seen as eventually self-correcting" as unionism was extended to the semi-skilled and un-skilled
In effect, then the imperviousness of the 19th century British trade union movement to revolutionary socialism was ascribed by Marx and Engels to the opportunism and class-collaborationism of some union leaders - an accusation not entirely without substance. As David Fernbach explains in his introduction to Marx's "The First International and after", a number of British trade union leaders "had quite literally 'sold-out' to the bourgeoisie and after the passage of the 1867 Reform Act they worked secretly and successfully - in exchange for Home Office bribes - to mobilise the working-class behind the Liberal Party in the 1868 general election". (1974: 25)

Moreover, Fernbach indicates that despite Marx's efforts, British trade union leaders were basically inhospitable to the idea of socialist revolution. (See below) In fact, he suggests that for a number of these union leaders, affiliation with the First International represented a pragmatic evaluation of the practical advantages accruing from membership rather than a declaration of political belief. As Fernbach notes the First International played an important part in checking the practice of international strike-breaking by "preventing the import of foreign workers to break strikes" - a not

Such an interpretation is shared by Collins and Abramsky who in their examination of the impact of Marxian ideas on the First International Comment: "It seems paradoxical that it was in England where the General Council of the International ... (was based and) ... where Karl Marx came into contact with leading trade unionists that his direct influence was so small". (1965: vi)
infrequent practice in the Victorian era. (1974: 10). Thus, according to Fernbach, such forms of practical assistance to the union movement by the First International encouraged "English trade unionists ... (to use) the International as a surrogate international department of the newly-formed T.U.C.". (1974:25)

Finally, Hyman discloses that Marx and Engels tended to view the reformist outlook of British trade unions as basically a reflection of the bourgeoisification of the English working-class stemming from "the monopoly position of British capitalism in the world economy". (Hyman, 1971: 9) Central to this interpretation of the revolutionary inertia of the British proletariat is Engels' sardonic observation that the British working class was:

becoming more and more bourgeoisified, so that this most bourgeois of all nations in the end apparently wants to have a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie. For a nation that exploits the whole world this as a matter-of-fact is more or less natural.

(See Lozovsky, 1935: 58)

However, regardless of whether such behaviour is 'natural' or not, it certainly is the case that Marx and Engels envisaged the bourgeoisification of the British working class as a passing phase, destined to disappear, as Hyman puts it, "as the British economy faced increasing international competition" which would inevitably erode "the privileged position of British workers". (1971: 10) By and large, therefore, Marx and Engels did not visualise the conditions which gave rise to trade union reformism as permanent. Consequently, they presumably saw little reason to drastically revise their theory of the
transition to socialism. (See below) At the same time, it is
difficult to quarrel with Hyman’s assertion that there is in
certain Marxian writings at least some recognition of the intrin-
sically reformist tendencies of trade unions. For example, as
Marx wrote in ”Wages, Price and Profit”:

Trade unions work well as centres of resistance against
the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from
an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally
from limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the
effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously
trying to change it, instead of using their organised
forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the
working class, that is to say the ultimate abolition of
the wages system.

(See Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972: 208)

But, notwithstanding such insights, ”At the level of general theory,
their early revolutionary interpretation of trade unionism remained
unquestioned by Marx and Engels”. (Hyman, 1971: 11)

Yet, as Marcuse notes: ”The failure of the proletariat to act as
the revolutionary class is anticipated in Marxian theory; per se,
the above conditions - W.S. do not constitute events which must
refute the theory. (Emphasis added) In Marxian theory, they are
generally explained by objective and subjective ‘immaturity’ and
considered as a temporary regression, after which the revolution-
ary trend will be resumed with a subsequent growth in the class
consciousness of the organised proletariat. But the situation is
quite different if, with or without a defeated revolution, the
development of mature capitalism shows a long-range trend towards
class collaboration rather than class struggle, towards national
and international division rather than solidarity of the proletariat
in the advanced industrial countries. In Marxian theory, capital
and (wage) labour define each other, or, more specifically, the
growth of the revolutionary proletariat in the long-run defines
the irreversible direction of capitalist development. Consequently,
if the trend is reversed on the side of the proletariat, the
capitalist development reaches a new stage to which the traditional
Marxian categories no longer apply. A new historical period begins,
characterised by a change in the basic class relations. Then
Marxism is faced with the task of redefining the conception of the
transition to socialism and of the strategy in this period.”

(1971: 22)
Of all the writings on trade unionism in the Marxist tradition, possibly few are better known or more controversial than Lenin's book 'What is to be done?' first published in 1902. Here Lenin specifically undertook to expose the reformist and inherently utopian assumptions pervading Russian and German Social-Democratic thought at the turn of the 20th century. Basically, these found expression in the notion that the trade union struggle could serve as a means of significant advance to socialism. Reviewing what he termed the 'revisionist' tendencies within the Russian and German Social-Democratic parties of his day, Lenin mercilessly attacks their ideological commitment to the trade union struggle as the primary means of liberating the working-class. Denouncing such approaches as mere 'economism', he embarked upon an attempt to explode the reformist credo that trade union demands inherently pose a fundamental challenge to the system of class exploitation.

As Lenin argues, trade unionism, at best, signified a rudimentary form of class consciousness. To emphasise this point, he drew a sharp analytical distinction between 'trade union consciousness' and 'Social-Democratic' i.e. 'revolutionary socialist' consciousness. (See below) Furthermore, in categorically rejecting the

As the translator of Paul Frölich’s biography of Rosa Luxemburg informs us, prior to the First World War and the disintegration of the Second International, "the term social-democratic meant quite simply 'revolutionary socialist'. It was only after the founding of the Third (Communist) International that 'social democracy' finally became totally identified and equated with reformism". (See Frölich, 1972: 19)
claim of the 'Economists' that the working-class would 'spontaneously' develop revolutionary socialist consciousness in the course of the trade union struggle for material improvements, Lenin emphatically asserted that:

The history of all countries shows that the working-class, exclusively by its own effort is able to develop only trade union consciousness.

(1952: 52-3)

Thus, while he saw revolutionary socialist consciousness as an essential precondition for socialist revolution, Lenin simultaneously rejected the idea that the working-class, unaided, could develop such consciousness. As he forcefully affirmed: "It could only be brought to them from without". (Lenin, 1952: 52). Unlike the Social-Democrats therefore, who insisted that the leadership of the working-class should come from within its own ranks and who visualised intellectuals as playing an advisory and essentially auxiliary role in the proletarian struggle, Lenin maintained that the capacity of the trade unions to serve revolutionary ends was basically contingent upon the degree to which they were subject to the direction and control of a political party lead by revolutionary socialist intellectuals.

In seeking to rationalise his ascription of the proletarian struggle to the intelligentsia, Lenin cites the fact that the idea of socialism was developed - not by the workers, but by the intellect-
uals. (See below). Additionally, he proceeds to justify his seemingly elitist organisational principles by invoking the presumed precedent set by Marx and Engels. Thus, as he writes in defence of his view of the 'vanguard' party and its leadership:

The theory of Socialism ... grew out of the philosophical, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. According to their social status, the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia.

(Lenin, 1952: 52-3)

Needless to say, Lenin's distinctive conception of the class struggle, (in particular his view that the working-class left to their own devices were incapable of evolving socialist consciousness and, more importantly, his transfer of the revolutionary initiative from the masses to the vanguard party), has been a perennial source of discussion and dispute. To be sure, there is something supremely

Even though Lenin’s conception of revolutionary organisation attributes a crucial role in the class struggle to intellectuals these intellectuals are defined primarily in terms of their objective revolutionary function and subjective readiness to assume the role Lenin assigns to them. In short, Lenin basically perceives the 'socialist intellectual' as someone who is totally dedicated to one overriding aim - that of socialist revolution. Fundamentally, therefore, the Leninist vision of the revolutionary party embodies two central propositions. (1) Professional revolutionary intellectuals of bourgeois social origins form the nucleus of the vanguard party and through them socialist ideas are taken to the working class; but, at the same time, (2) the work of this revolutionary party intrinsically abolishes the distinction between 'intellectuals' and 'workers' among its members. Expressing these ideas, Lenin wrote: "The organisations of revolutionists must be composed first and foremost of people whose profession is that of revolutionist .... As this is the common feature of the members of such an organisation, all distinctions as between workers and intellectuals must be dropped". (See Conquest, 1972: 43)
ironical in Lenin's charges of 'revisionism' which he levels at the Social-Democrats in 'What is to be done?' For despite his professions of fidelity to Marxian orthodoxy, Lenin's work represents a radical departure from the theoretical approach of Marx. (See Hyman, 1971: 11-4)

In fact, symptomatic of Lenin's modification of Marxian tenets is his view that trade union reformism is immanent in the economic struggle rather than being the product of exceptional historical circumstances, as believed by Marx and Engels. (Hyman, 1971: 12)

Another notable point of difference between Leninist and Marxian perspectives on unionism is the distinction Lenin makes between the economic and the political in relation to trade union activity. In the classical Marxian approach, as Tony Cliff reminds us: "An economic demand, if it is sectional is defined as 'economic' in Marx's terms. But if the same demand is made of the state it is 'political'." (1975: 81)

Elaborating upon this issue, Cliff makes the point that claims made upon individual employers for amelioration of the conditions of particular groups of workers - by the very sectional nature of the demands, are defined by Marx and Engels as primarily economic acts. By contrast, however, trade union agitation to secure an 8-hour day law, for example, was essentially interpreted by these writers as a political act. Accordingly, as Cliff sums up, "in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up everywhere a political movement". (1975: 81)
Significantly, therefore, as Hyman shows, where to Marx and Engels union agitation to secure a legal limitation of the length of the working day "represented a significant heightening of the class struggle", Lenin conceived of such initiatives as simply manifestations of 'trade union consciousness'. In his view, "trade union politics of the working class is precisely bourgeois politics of the working class". (See Hyman, 1971: 12). Thus, central to Lenin's approach to the question of class struggle is the idea that the socialist revolution can be achieved only as a result of purposive political action. Such a position has allowed Lenin's many critics to claim, as one of the more influential of these puts it:

This theory enabled him to substitute for the proletarian masses whom Marx had seen as the engine of social progress, a small elite of professional revolutionaries, possessed of superior theoretical insight ... who for this reason were fitted to provide leadership for the workers. Lenin held - quite reasonably, as one may think - that ordinary working men would never make the kind of revolution he wanted if they were left to their own resources, but had to be cajoled or coerced into doing so.

(Keep, 1967: 135-6)

Notably, moreover, for Marx and Engels, the state was simply an epiphenomenon of the underlying economic sub-structure. Consequently, as Keep reveals, the class struggle was conceptualised by them principally as a "socio-economic phenomenon, a war of classes for control of the means of production". (1967: 136). By contrast, however, as Keep indicates, Lenin envisaged the conflict basically as a "political phenomenon, a war of organisations which supposedly embodied the will of the classes they represented and its purpose was to destroy the bourgeois state and transfer power to those who
could speak for the proletariat". (Keep, 1967: 136)

In essence, therefore, where the classical Marxian approach locates the revolutionary impetus firmly within the working class, Lenin's perspective counterposes the idea of what may best be described as 'revolution from above'. Indeed, this is implicit in his conception of a highly-centralised, tightly-disciplined political party controlled by people for whom, in the words of Joseph Banks, "revolution is a vocation" (1972: 27). Clearly, to Lenin, socialism was by no means an historical inevitability. On the contrary, its achievement required conscious political struggle. Accordingly, for him, the conquest of state power could not be left to the 'spontaneous' upsurge of the masses. Rather, the working class had to be politically organised for struggle through conscious understanding of their social situation. To Lenin, the principal agent of the political education and revolutionary mobilisation of the working class is the socialist 'vanguard' party.

Thus, while he perceived the struggle of organised labour as forming an important basis for the development of class antagonism, nevertheless, the conquest of state power by the working class, in his view, required political education and organisation of a qualitatively different and infinitely more intense order. Put simply, the Leninist approach basically considered that the level of consciousness and organisation necessary for revolution required the existence of a monolithic and disciplined political party. Such organisational principles found expression in the Leninist dictum of 'democratic centralism'. By this he meant that although the party may be the creation of a body of professional revolutionists, it must be firmly
rooted in the proletariat by a multiplicity of personal and organisational bonds so that it is accepted by them as their political representative. Put another way, the vanguard party, in Lenin's view, is not a substitute for the working class as the agent of socialism. On the contrary, it is an integral part of the political struggle of the working class.

Generally speaking, perhaps Lenin's greatest single contribution to the Marxist theory of revolution has been to rid Marxism of its mechanistic and deterministic ramifications by clearly apprehending and emphasising the role of consciousness in social change. But, at the same time, embodied within this approach is Lenin's unique contribution to revisionism - namely, his theory of the vanguard party which would spearhead the revolution in the name of the working class.

Not surprisingly, Lenin's conception of the revolutionary party has generated a great deal of controversy. Cliff, for example, has noted the tendency for some of Lenin's detractors to portray his principles of party organisation as serving to elevate the intellectuals above the workers in the revolutionary struggle. (1975: 87) Others, seizing upon Lenin's decree that revolutionary socialist consciousness had to be brought to the working class 'from without' have tended to interpret this in the literal sense as 'from outside the working class', rather than in the more specific theoretical sense in which Lenin employed the phrase to refer to such consciousness as coming from "outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers", in effect, "outside the economic struggle", as Gareth Stedman Jones has
so lucidly and succinctly expressed it (1975: 48).

Predictably, such misunderstandings of Lenin's 'theory of consciousness' as Keep (1967) calls it, have given rise to simplistic counterpositions of the 'mindless masses' and the 'omniscient party' which are then held to crystallise Lenin's views on the nature of the relationship between the revolutionary party and the working-class. However, contrary to the asymmetrical implication of such misconceptions of the Leninist view of the relationship between the workers and the revolutionary intellectuals, a major principle enshrined in the Leninist guidelines of party organisation was that the party leadership needed not only to teach the masses, but equally-importantly, to learn from them.

Indeed, Lenin's own political behaviour prefigured the formal articulation of such ideas in 'What is to be done?' For example, Cliff (1975) instances the fact that between 1891 and 1896 both Lenin and his wife Krupskaya were involved in a Marxist organisation in Russia called the St Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class - known somewhat less cumbersomely (if satirically), as the 'Evening Sunday School'. Describing the activities of this organisation, Cliff writes:

The school served as a source of recruitment for revolutionary workers and ... also played a central role in gathering information about factory conditions for use in the League's leaflets and in organising distribution of the leaflets in the factory.

(1975: 54-5)
In this involvement in organisational activity, Lenin was simply following the classical pattern established by Marx and Engels and reflected, for example, in their active participation in political bodies from the Communist Correspondence Committees to the League of the Just to the First International. (See Therborn, 1976: 334)

Accordingly, the Leninist concept of revolutionary organisation, far from setting out to entrench an intellectual elite which would stand above the working class, on the contrary we are informed "perceived the moment of reciprocity in this relationship and very soon came to emphasise the central working-class contribution to the revolutionary leadership". (Therborn, 1976: 326-7). As a consequence, Lenin is seen to have "insisted that the revolutionary cadres should be drawn mainly from the ranks of the workers, who possessed the necessary 'class instinct' and practical experience of the class struggle". (Therborn, 1976: 326-7)

Admittedly, as Therborn concedes, faced with the practical demands for effective revolutionary organisation, 'Lenin was soon to qualify in word and deed' many of the organisational principles that he enunciated in 'What is to be done?' But, despite his many twists and turns on organisational policy and strategy, Lenin never precluded workers from being part of the revolutionary leadership. For example, as Conquest points out, "he was to insist that worker revolutionaries should be withdrawn from actual factory work to become full-time party operatives, living on party funds". (1972: 43)

Despite the clarity of his views on this question however, Lenin's
concept of the intellectual elite who would direct, guide and control the spontaneity of the masses and lead them in the revolutionary overthrow of capitalist society has been greatly misunderstood by some of his opponents. (See below) As Therborn observes, in sharp contrast to Kautsky who viewed this leadership basically as a 'bourgeois intelligentsia', Lenin's view of them is broadly similar to the way this group were perceived by Marx and Engels in the 'Communist Manifesto': that is, as intellectuals of bourgeois origin who embrace completely the revolutionary struggle of the working-class. Or, to use the elegant terminology of Therborn, as a "declasse and radicalised section of the petty bourgeoisie". (1976: 326)

For Lenin, of course, the difference with Kautsky's definition of the party leadership is not simply one of semantics, but signifies a radically different conception of the political struggle of the working class and the role of the intellectual in it. To Lenin, the conquest of state power cannot be achieved merely by education and propaganda among the working class by revolutionary intellectuals - important as such activities unquestionably are. Rather, radical

There is probably no clearer indication of the fact that Lenin's concept of the intellectual leadership of the revolutionary socialist party (to whom he assigns the vital function of ideological indoctrination of the masses) does not exclude the workers, than his explicit statement on the question of revolutionary socialist consciousness in 'What is to be done?' As Lenin wrote: "This does not mean, of course, that the workers have no part in creating such an ideology. But they take part, not as workers, but as socialist theoreticians ... (emphasis added) ... in other words, they take part only when, and to the extent they are able, more or less to acquire the knowledge of their age and advance that knowledge". (1952: 67-8)
social change is seen as the product of conscious and deliberate struggle by the working class under the active and disciplined leadership of a political party dedicated to socialist revolution. In essence, therefore the Leninist approach to revolution firmly emphasises the unity of theory and practice - an idea that found its most complete embodiment and ultimate vindication in the success of Bolshevism in Russia in 1917.

Significantly, although 'What is to be done?' represents perhaps Lenin's classic statement on trade unionism, his views on the subject are by no means confined to this polemical pamphlet. In point of fact, as Richard Hyman affirms, "the inflexible position adopted by Lenin in What is to be done? accords ill with certain of his earlier and later writings, where the potential of the trade union struggle for raising workers' consciousness received considerable emphasis". (1971: 41). For example, illustrative of Lenin's far more positive evaluation of the significance of the trade union struggle for the development of worker political consciousness is the draft programme for the Russian Social-Democratic Party which he wrote around 1895. (See Hyman, 1971: 41)

Commenting upon this, Tony Cliff maintains that in this programme, Lenin articulated the belief that the trade union struggle served a three-fold purpose for the working-class individual. Firstly, it unequivocally showed him how he was being economically exploited by the existing system; secondly, it bred a sense of class resentment in him and thirdly, it politically sensitised him to his overall class position in society. (Cliff, 1975: 52). Cliff further makes the point
that at this stage in his revolutionary career, Lenin envisaged that
the futility of the economic struggle would serve to convince the
workers that their only hope of significantly bettering their position
lay in political struggle to radically alter the existing social order.
As Cliff reveals:

Lenin pursued this line of thought consistently in the
agitational leaflets and pamphlets which he wrote during
1894 to 1896.

(1975: 52)

By 1902, however, Lenin was to completely disavow such ideas in the
course of his polemical onslaught against the 'Economists' in 'What
is to be done?' Basically, he now argued that the trade union
struggle merely allowed the working class to, as Hammond put it,
"obtain slightly better terms of sale for their commodity - labor
power". (Hammond, 1957: 19). In blunt terms, Lenin now gave short
shift to any idea that revolutionary socialist consciousness can
'spontaneously' develop out of the economic struggle waged by the
workers through their trade unions. Rather, he sharply polarised
worker consciousness into trade union consciousness and revolutionary
socialist consciousness - asserting for good measure that there can
be 'no middle ideology'. Thus, for Lenin, the uncompromising choice
for the working class movement was between 'bourgeois ideology' or
socialist ideology. (See Hyman, 1971: 40-1)

Interestingly, however, with the 'spontaneous' eruption of revolution-
ary activity among the Russian masses in 1905 (and which reportedly
captured Lenin completely by surprise by its 'suddenness'), Lenin, as
Hammond among others discloses, totally repudiated the gloomy assess-
ment of the revolutionary potential of the working-class which he had so vigorously upheld only three years earlier in 'What is to be done?' (See Hammond, 1957: 19-23). As a matter of fact, as Hyman stresses, faced with such dramatic and incontrovertible evidence of the revolutionary capacities of the Russian masses, Lenin swiftly reversed his earlier opinion and was now prepared to concede the ability of the working class to become in his own words, "instinctively, spontaneously Social-Democratic" (See Hyman, 1971: 42); in other words, 'revolutionary socialist'. (See below)

It is this evident adaptability of Leninist tenets that has obstructed, or at least complicated, objective analysis of his work and which basically accounts for the controversy surrounding theoretical discussion of his ideas. Yet, what should be kept in mind is, that, as one writer notes:

> Whatever Lenin's merits as a philosopher, historian, or literary critic, he was pre-eminently a politician, and it was as a master of political tactics who skilfully manipulated men and ideas to win power for his party that he won the greatest success. (Keep, 1967: 135)

Whether or not we accept Keep's evaluation of Lenin's significance, there is no denying that tactical considerations do much to explain

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Broadly speaking, Lenin's change of heart on the revolutionary potential of the working class does not ipso facto entail any fundamental alteration of his view concerning the leading role of the party in the revolutionary struggle. In fact, the distinction drawn by Althusser between 'class instinct' and 'class position' serves to emphasize the continuing necessity of the revolutionary party in the Leninist approach. As Althusser states: "Class instinct is subjective and spontaneous. Class position is objective and rational. To arrive at proletarian class positions, the class instinct of proletarians ... needs to be educated". (1971: 16)
the expendability of certain of his doctrines, formulated as they were - to employ a Marxism - not simply to interpret the world, but to change it. (See below) Consequently, his ideological shifts on the question of whether or not socialist consciousness arises spontaneously within the working class serve to confirm that his writings were conceived - not primarily as dispassionate contributions to 'value-free' scholarship, but as ideological weapons to enhance the political consciousness of the working class and precipitate socialist revolution.

To Lenin therefore, the weapons of criticism which he utilised were seen as merely a prelude to the criticism with weapons. It thus comes as no surprise that Robert Conquest draws attention to Lenin's complete dedication to the notion that the success of the revolution is the supreme law. For, as Conquest suggests, not only did he regard the ends as justifying the means, but as we are further informed, "Lenin was prepared to use any means whatever to forward the struggle". (Conquest, 1972: 42). Conquest is thus moved to summarise the Leninist postulates on revolutionary organisation as "a theory of extreme tactical flexibility". (1972: 117)
Broadly speaking, therefore, in his concept of the vanguard party, what Lenin created was - to borrow a phrase from Paul Wilkinson, "the decisive instrument for the fulfillment of Marx's theory of class struggle and proletarian revolution". (1971: 129) Yet what should not be overlooked is that:

The construction of the Leninist party (or party leadership) as the real representative of the proletariat could not bridge the gap between the new strategy and the old theoretical conception. Lenin's strategy of the avant-garde acknowledged in fact what it denied in theory, namely, that a fundamental change had occurred in the objective and subjective conditions for the revolution.

(Marcuse, 1971: 33)

Accordingly, it is in this elevation of the revolutionary party to a political principle that the Leninist departure from Marxian tenets most clearly reveals itself. More importantly, despite any suggestion to the contrary, the Leninist doctrine of the centralised party sketched out in 'What is to be done?' cannot be regarded as simply a product of organisational expediency - an historical (but essentially temporary) necessity imposed upon the revolutionary struggle by social circumstances in Czarist Russia. For there is in Lenin's resolution to the Comintern? in 1921, fairly convincing evidence that his theory of party organisation had been translated into a universal imperative of socialist revolution. As Lenin's resolution declared:
The main principle of democratic centralism is that of the higher cell being elected by the lower cell, the absolute binding force of all directives of a higher cell for a cell subordinate to it, and the existence of a commanding party centre (whose authority is) indisputable for all leaders in party life, from one congress to the next.

(See Conquest, 1972: 45)

To sum up, the Leninist conception of the vanguard party was, arguably, no mere strategic reaction to a particular historical state of affairs; rather, it was advanced as the sine qua of revolutionary struggle. (See below)

But this is not to imply that Lenin's vision of the specific form the party was to take was entirely uninfluenced by external social realities. In point of fact, Lenin's conception of the form of political organisation required for the conquest of State power in Czarist Russia, as Conquest points out, "was based in part on the idea that repression made conspiratorial tactics necessary, in part on the backwardness of the Russian working-class, but also as a means of counteracting the inefficiency and backwardness of the Russian intelligentsia". (Conquest, 1972: 44). Similarly, his schematic view of party organisation and especially his 'arbitrary assumptions' about intellectual leadership, which he sought to institute as a basic and internationally-valid principle of revolutionary struggle are perhaps more intelligible in the context of the economic and political isolation of the Soviet Union following the failure of the forces of international capitalism to crush the Bolshevik revolution. More importantly, Lenin's remarks on political organisation and world revolution need to be seen in the light of the class-collaborationism of the leaderships of European Social Democratic parties, which expressed itself in chauvinistic support for their respective ruling classes in World War I and which coupled with the defeat of the subsequent German revolution and the crushing of the Spartakus League by the post-War German Social-Democratic Government resulted in the disappointment of Lenin's hopes for revolution in the advanced capitalist nations. If nothing else, these events served to emphatically demonstrate to Lenin the futility of a strategy of socialist revolution based upon reliance on 'reformist' Social-Democratic parties and their leaderships. To sum up: "The conception which was initially aimed at the 'immaturity' of the Russian proletariat became a principle of international strategy in the face of the continued reformist attitude of the 'mature' proletariat in the advanced industrial countries. To counteract the integration of a large sector of organised labour into the capitalist system, the 'subjective factor' of revolutionary strategy is monopolised by the Party, which assumes the character of a professional revolutionary organisation directing the proletariat."

(Marcuse, 1971: 39)
Like Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg waged vigorous and relentless ideological warfare against the inherently revisionist character of European Social-Democratic politics - a tendency which to her found its classic theoretical exposition in the work of Eduard Bernstein. Briefly, in his book 'Evolutionary Socialism', Bernstein not only expressed considerable doubt about the continued validity of the revolutionary perspectives of Marx and Engels, but, even more controversially, sought to argue that in the changed social and material circumstances of the advanced industrial societies, a gradual (and largely) peaceful transition to socialism was not only possible but desirable.

Central to Bernstein's prescription of a gradual 'evolution' to socialism however, as Geras (1975) indicates, lay his conviction that the industrial working-class was as yet historically unprepared to either assume State power or to exercise it. Consequently, in his view, to prosecute the proletarian revolution in the manner envisaged by the original architects of Marxism, was simply to engage in political adventurism and thus foredoom the working-class struggle to defeat and demoralisation. (Geras, 1975: 8).

Fundamentally, Bernstein's thesis was predicated on the optimistic deduction that "capitalism could generate mechanisms of adaptation which suppressed or attenuated the contradictions which Marx had seen as integral to the system". (Looker, 1972: 16) Accordingly, consistent with his assumption that socialism could be achieved by evolutionary rather than revolutionary means, Bernstein, as Looker
notes, placed considerable importance upon the trade union struggle as a major instrument for the peaceful transformation of capitalism (1972: 17).

However, replying to Bernstein in her pamphlet 'Social Reform or Revolution', Luxemburg began with the observation that, in essence, Bernstein's work constituted an extremely misleading way of formulating the problem facing the Social-Democratic movement, in that it artificially polarised the issue into one of reform or revolution and moreover, ruled out the latter alternative as a realistic option. To Rosa Luxemburg, such analysis only served to confirm Bernstein's inability to comprehend the essential nature of the problem. As she pointed out:

"Legislative reform and revolution are not different methods of historic development that can be picked out at pleasure from the counter of history, just as one chooses hot or cold sausages. Legislative reform and revolution are different factors in the development of class society. They condition and complement each other, and are at the same time reciprocally exclusive, as are the north and south poles, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat .... It is contrary to history to represent work for reforms as a long-drawn out revolution and revolution as a condensed series of reforms. A social transformation and a legislative reform do not differ according to their duration but according to their content. The secret of historic change through the utilisation of political power resides precisely in the transformation of simple quantitative modification into a new quality or to speak more concretely, in the passage of an historic period from one given form of society to another.

That is why people who pronounce themselves in favour of the method of legislative reform in place of, and in contradistinction to the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society they take a stand for the surface modifications of the old society. If we follow the political conceptions
of revisionism, we arrive at the same conclusion that is reached when we follow the economic theories of revisionism. Our program becomes not the realisation of socialism, but the reform of capitalism; not the suppression of the system of wage labour, but the diminution of exploitation, that is, the suppression of the abuses of capitalism instead of the suppression of capitalism itself.”

(Luxemburg, 1969: 59-60)

Moreover, in her view, Bernstein's apostasy fundamentally reflected his intellectual innocence of the complexities of the dialectical process. Indeed, as she sarcastically observed:

It is surprising that Bernstein has so little acquaintance with his material. And it is astonishing how poorly he utilises the existing data in his own behalf.

(Luxemburg, 1969: 43)

Bernstein's real heresy however, as Luxemburg made abundantly plain, lay not in his suggestion that Marx erred in the detail of his prognosis of the dynamics of capitalist development. On the contrary, his heretical position emanated from his implied view that the Marxian theory of capitalist development was inherently defective and that this basically accounted for its predictive deficiencies. Taking Bernstein severely to task for such unabashed elaboration of what she doubtlessly construed as a pernicious form of Marxless Marxism, Luxemburg indignantly declared:

If Bernstein's revisionism merely consisted in affirming that the march of capitalist development is slower than was thought before, he would merely be presenting an argument for adjourning the conquest of power by the proletariat, on which everybody agreed up to now. Its only consequence would be a slowing up of the pace of the struggle. But that is not the case. What Bernstein questions is not the rapidity of the development of capitalist society, but the march of the development itself and, consequently, the very possibility of a change to socialism.

(Luxemburg, 1969: 12)
It was thus in the light of such perceptions of socialist strategy that Luxemburg was to clash heatedly, first with Bernstein, and then with the politically 'moderate' leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party, over their attempts to ascribe primacy to the struggle for reforms while simultaneously seeking to relegate the struggle for socialism to some indefinite future. (Geras, 1975: 10).

Among other things, she radically contested the following propositions which she saw as implicit in the political presuppositions of the party leadership, namely:

1) "that the trade unionist and parliamentary struggle for the minimal demands could be a substitute for a strategy of mass struggle leading to the conquest of power;

2) that secreted within that day-to-day, bread-and-butter struggle was some automatic trajectory towards socialism;

3) that the trade union and electoral strength of the working-class could 'become', through organic growth and a Social-Democratic majority in the Reichstag, the dictatorship of the proletariat;

4) that bourgeois parliamentarism itself might be the organ of proletarian dictatorship and democracy."

(Geras, 1975: 10)

Against such assumptions Luxemburg advanced the view that the "trade union struggle for improved working-class conditions and for social reforms, and the parliamentary struggle for democratic reforms took on a fundamentally socialist character only if their final aim was socialism". (Frölich, 1972: 53)
Predictably, this conception of the intrinsically reformist character of the trade union struggle leads Frölich to point to the obvious parallels between Luxemburg's approach and Lenin's general critique of 'economism' and 'spontaneity'. (1972: 53). Yet, although she considered that from the viewpoint of the achievement of socialism, trade union activity per se is as inherently futile as what she calls, the "labour of Sisyphus" (Luxemburg, 1969: 53), what should not be ignored is that "Rosa Luxemburg was - by no means an opponent of reforms. She regarded the struggle for reforms - for the improvement of living standards, for the protection of labour, and for the extension of democratic rights within the framework of the bourgeois state - as the very means of preparing the working class for the revolution, of educating and organising it, and of making it realise through practical experience that the capitalist state had to be overthrown if the proletariat were ever to be freed from the bonds of wage-slavery". (Frölich, 1972: 53).

It is noteworthy, however, that despite a certain degree of agreement with Lenin on the political potential of trade union agitation, Rosa Luxemburg nonetheless clashed violently with Lenin over the dominating role he assigned to the socialist party in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in 'What is to be done?' Basically, at the heart of this quarrel lay quite different conceptions of the process of ideological development. Specifically, what was at issue was whether the working-class in the course of strictly (and entirely) proletarian forms of activity such as trade union action, could unilaterally develop a revolutionary socialist consciousness. (Hyman, 1971: 40-3; Nettl, 1966: 223-30).
Lenin's view firmly emphasised that trade union activity could develop only 'trade union consciousness' - a phenomenon he viewed as an inverted reflection of bourgeois ideology. A distinguishing feature of the Leninist conception of revolutionary organisation in 'What is to be done?' therefore, is that it not only assumes socialist intellectuals to be the catalysts of revolution, but more importantly, his schematic perspective fundamentally deprives the trade unions of any autonomous significance. In fact, in this approach, trade unions are basically envisaged as subordinate agencies or appendages of the socialist party. (Nettl, 1966: 223-30)

Certainly to Luxemburg (as indeed to Lenin), the trade union struggle for material improvements was not, and could never be, a substitute for the political liberation of the working class. In fact, to suggest otherwise, as Bernstein and the 'revisionists' were seemingly doing was to deny the necessity for socialism, which she contended formed the very foundation of Marxism. (Nettl, 1966: 223-30)

Simultaneously, however, Luxemburg sharply disagreed with Lenin's somewhat mechanistic interpretation of the revolutionary process in 'What is to be done?' and in particular, soundly condemned his attempt to transform his ultra-centralist vision of political organisation into a fundamental axiom of revolutionary struggle. As we have been told:

*Rosa Luxemburg regarded the existence of an all-powerful central committee as a danger to the development of the struggle itself. Experience in Russia and in other countries showed that every new form of struggle had not been invented by leaders, but had arisen from the creative initiative of the masses. Here too, she wrote, unconscious action preceded conscious action; the logic of the objective historical process preceded the subjective logic of those bearing it. (Frölich, 1972: 85)*
Predictably, Luxemburg's biting criticism of his viewpoint stung Lenin into endeavouring to stigmatise Luxemburg as an advocate of 'spontaneity'. Characteristically, this interpretation of Luxemburg's position has been uncritically accepted by successive generations of his adherents. Like their ideological master, the Leninists have ritualistically reaffirmed the distortion of Luxemburg's view, by seeking to depict her revolutionary precepts as entailing a reliance on the spontaneous activity of the masses to achieve revolution, while basically ignoring the problem of the political organisation of these masses.

Such aspersions however, were explicitly controverted by both Luxemburg's own political behaviour and in her numerous writings where she incessantly stressed the need for organisation. In fact, Frölich maintains:

Rosa Luxemburg was in agreement with Lenin that the revolutionary party had to be the vanguard of the working-class, that it had to be centralistically organised, and that the will of its majority could be carried out by means of strict discipline in its activities.

(Frölich, 1972: 84)

At the same time in fiercely resisting, what Paul Wilkinson calls, "Lenin's conception of the exclusive, disciplined, professional, revolutionary organisation under strict centralised control" (1972: 142), there is no doubt that Luxemburg was, above all, totally repelled by the dictatorial implications of Lenin's exaltation of iron discipline and centralised authority over the party by its executive. Moreover, in Luxemburg's mind, Lenin's over-schematic view of revolution and revolutionary tactics in 'What is to be done?' gave the impression of what can best be described as political Canutism - an illusion on Lenin's part that he could make the flow of history unfold according
to his master plan in much the same fashion that the legendary and deluded King Canute believed that he could command the flow of the tide.

Sharply rebutting Lenin's organisational rigidities in her essay 'Leninism or Marxism' (1961), Luxemburg proceeds to show that the authentic alternative to the Leninist model of party organisation is not a less-structured party, but a more flexibly and democratically-controlled party. (See below) Thus, in opposing the principle of the control of the party from below to Lenin's idea of party control vested in the leadership, Luxemburg basically envisioned the primary duty of the party as being not to hegemonically direct the working-class struggle, but to guide it in such a way that the revolutionary overthrow of the old order fundamentally expressed the democratic content and aspirations of socialism.

For Luxemburg therefore, as Wolfe observes in his introduction to her pamphlet 'The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism' (1961), socialism and democracy are not incompatible - on the contrary, they are inseparable. From this it followed that if the essential aim of socialism involved the realisation of a fully self-managing industry and self-governing society, the revolution itself must entail not merely an assumption of power by a socialist elite, but a complete democratisation in the exercise of such power. More importantly, since democracy, in her view, had to be constantly exercised to avoid

This essay was first published in 1904 by Luxemburg under the title of 'Organisational Questions of Russian Social Democracy'.

the danger of atrophy, then the democratic process could not be put in cold storage until after the revolution, but had to be made part and parcel of the organisational practice of the vanguard party.

By contrast, as she pointed out, the political party organised on Leninist principles inherently stifled the prospect of democracy by its autocratic structure, which, in turn, underlined the subordination of the rank-and-file and bred contempt for their views among the executive. As she warned:

Nothing will more surely enslave a young labor movement to an intellectual elite hungry for power than this bureaucratic straitjacket, which will immobilise the movement and turn it into an automation manipulated by a Central Committee.

(Luxemburg, 1961: 102)

To her, therefore, while the intellectual elite was essential to the proletarian revolutionary struggle, she basically conceived its role as being - not so much to command as to convince.

Furthermore, as she reminded Lenin, the history of mass protest in Russia conclusively highlighted the fact that these uprisings had perennially eventuated independently of any Bolshevik influence. Indeed, to Luxemburg, such incidents provided eloquent testimony to the frequency with which the Russian populace had 'spontaneously' revolted, thus, in the words of Wolfe's introductory commentary on 'The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism', "surprising the party and making a mockery of its pedantic formulae and recipes". (Luxemburg, 1961: 15).
In Luxemburg's view, such developments only confirmed the imperative necessity for the party to, above all, be highly-sensitive to potential revolutionary opportunities and be in a constant state of readiness to transform any such possibility into reality. Thus, for Luxemburg, no predetermined strategy of revolutionary advance - regardless of its intellectual cleverness or impressiveness, can basically mean very much unless it enables the extensive and informed participation of the masses in the struggle for their political emancipation.

Characteristically, underlying this outlook lay her firm conviction that the masses had to be allowed to make their own mistakes. To her, this was the very essence of democracy and she vigorously opposed any attempt on the part of a party leadership to abridge this basic right. As she trenchantly declared:

> Historically, the errors committed by a truly revolutionary movement are infinitely more fruitful than the infallibility of the cleverest Central Committee.

(Reprinted from Luxemburg, 1961: 108)

Despite such criticism, Luxemburg was by no means unaware or unsympathetic to the immense problems faced by Lenin in seeking to accomplish a socialist revolution in a backward absolutist state like Czarist Russia. But she suspected that in advancing his ideas on party organisation in 'What is to be done?', Lenin, essentially, was not seeking to rationalise his dictatorial formulations as merely an unfortunate but unavoidable necessity imposed upon the proletarian struggle by the nature of the situation in Russia. Rather, she feared that he was proposing to enunciate general principles of revolutionary action and such beliefs lent special point to her dispute with him.
TROTSKY

Trotsky's analysis of trade unionism is in many respects a curious blend of Marxian optimism and Leninist pessimism about the revolutionary capacities of organised labour in capitalist society. For example, in his exposition of the political significance of trade unionism under capitalism - namely, the polemical essays published in 1925 under the title 'Where is Britain Going?' (and since republished and introduced by George Novack, 1973), Trotsky was to argue, in a manner reminiscent of Marx, that the mere fact of their existence confirmed trade unions as a basis of opposition to capitalism. As he wrote:

"The trade unions are an organisation of wage labor against capital. On the basis of the trade unions we have the growth of the Labour Party". (1973: 77)

In fact, for Trotsky:

There is no other country in the world in which the class character of socialism has been so objectively, obviously, unquestionably revealed by history as in England. For in this country, the Labour Party grew out of the parliamentary representation of the trade unions, i.e. the purely class organisations of wage labour.

(1973: 70)

To the extent therefore that he regards trade unions as a latent threat to capitalism, this is because, as he explains: "The danger from the trade unions consists in the fact that they - hitherto only partly, irresolutely, and in a half-and-half manner - are advancing the principle of a workers' government". (Trotsky, 1973: 126)
Like Lenin, however, Trotsky recognises that in the main, trade unions in capitalist society do not serve as instruments of class warfare but as agencies of reform. But whereas Leninist explanation of trade union reformism implicitly conceives of it as having occurred by default - an inevitable result of their structure and function in capitalist society, Trotsky viewing the phenomenon from a radically different vantage point stresses the pressures to which trade unions are subject in the form of what Hyman calls, "an active and deliberate strategy by government and industry to emasculate the threat inherent in unionism". (1971: 17)

Accordingly, while he visualised that the "trade unions will become schools of education for the proletariat in the sense of socialist production", he readily conceded that they were at that moment "in a blind alley", from which "only revolution can save the English working class, and with it its organisations". (Trotsky, 1973: 128-9).

Trotsky, however, harboured few illusions that the social transformation he hoped for was going to be easy. In fact, he saw the chief obstacles to proletarian revolution as being the leadership of the industrial and political wings of the labour movement itself. Thus, as he contended:

_In order to seize power, the proletariat must have at its head a revolutionary party. In order to make the trade unions capable of undertaking their future function, they must be freed from conservative office-holders, from superstitious fools, who ignorantly expect 'peaceful' miracles from somewhere._

(Trotsky, 1973: 129)
By and large, such formulations reflected Trotsky's belief that "to be capable of offering revolutionary resistance, the masses must be prepared for such action, mentally, materially and by organisation". (1973: 103). Consequently, to the degree that the British labour movement was non-revolutionary in nature, this only served to underline the fundamentally reformist character of its leadership. In Trotsky's view, the existence of such leadership not only inhibited the development of revolutionary consciousness on the part of the British working class, but acted essentially as a brake on radical working-class political activity.

To Trotsky, the conspicuous political retardation of the British labour leadership was highlighted by their internalisation of bourgeois values. Typically, he saw graphic evidence of this in their slavish attachment to 'national' i.e. 'bourgeois' traditions and institutions. For Trotsky, of course, nowhere was the political witlessness and cringing servility of the labour elite more manifest than in their attitude to the institution of royalty. Ridiculing their rationalisations that the monarchy is politically innocuous and moreover is less-expensive than the presidential system characteristic of republicanism, Trotsky declared that in times of great social upheaval, "the bourgeoisie will make use of the royal power with great success as a concentration of all non-parliamentary i.e. real forces aimed against the working-class". (1973: 62) Furthermore, adverting to the labour leadership's aspirations to socialism while simultaneously rejecting republicanism, Trotsky makes the incisive and witheringly-sarcastic observation that:
To proclaim a socialist platform and at the same time to declare that the royal power does not 'interfere' and is actually cheaper, is equivalent, for instance, to a recognition of materialistic science combined with the use of magic incantations for toothache - since the latter are cheaper. Such little 'insignificant' traits fully characterise a man by showing the complete emptiness of his recognition of material science and the complete fallaciousness of his system of ideas. The socialist cannot consider the question of monarchy from the point-of-view of present-day bookkeeping especially with doctored books. The matter at stake is a complete transformation of society, a purification of all elements of serfdom. This task, both politically and psychologically, excludes any possibility of conciliation with the monarchy.

(1973: 62-3)

Accordingly, not only does he thus pillory the attitudes of the leadership of the British labour party, but even their style of dress arouses Trotsky's scorn. For example, he delivers a scorching verbal broadside against what he calls the "clownish court dress" of Labour Party cabinet ministers which he intuits as being basically symptomatic of their utter political and ideological bankruptcy. Predictably, to Trotsky, such aping of ruling class manners and mores by the labour leadership underlined the fact that far from challenging the values, conventions and institutions of the bourgeoisie, the so-called 'socialist' leaders were their staunchest upholders. For, in essence, even their affectation of bourgeois forms of ceremonial regalia proclaimed their passionate desire for the approval of the bourgeoisie.

Conversely, as he shrewdly observed:

When the young bourgeoisie was fighting the nobility, it renounced side curls and silk doublets. The bourgeois revolutionists wore the black raiment of the Puritans. As opposed to the Cavaliers, the Puritans enjoyed the
nickname of Roundheads. Each new content always seeks its new form. Of course, the form of dress is only a detail, but the masses simply will not understand—and they are right—why the representatives of the working class should submit to the complicated pomp of monarchic masquerade. And the masses are gradually beginning to learn that those who make mistakes in little things will also be undependable in big things.

(1973: 63)

Unquestionably, the subsequent history of the British labour movement has amply confirmed Trotsky’s diagnosis, viz. that its ‘socialism’ is largely an imposture. For the same cloying obsequiousness, which Trotsky noted, had led certain of its leaders to bedeck themselves in the ceremonial finery of the ruling class has increasingly found expression in an equally-craven attitude to bourgeois titles and honours with which they have since eagerly sought to invest themselves. As Trotsky correctly discerned, this monumental inability to transcend even the social norms and customs of the ruling class makes a hollow pretense of the labour leadership’s professions of socialism. In fact, just as Trotsky foreshadowed, the British labour leadership, arguably, has traditionally been far more concerned to imitate the bourgeoisie than to eliminate it.

Significantly, the preoccupation of the British labour leadership with demonstrating their ‘responsibility’ and ‘respectability’ to the bourgeoisie has, on occasion, as Trotsky observed, taken rather bizarre form. Characteristic of this has been the tacit acceptance by this leadership of the conservative view, that political contributions by trade unions to the Labour Party from their members’ subscriptions, constitute a “crying violation of individual liberty”. (Trotsky, 1973: 119).
Basically, such attitudes had, as Trotsky noted, allowed the conservative parties to enact a law in 1913 permitting individual trade unionists to opt out of paying the political levy. Exposing the hypocrisy of Conservative and Liberal Party commitment to the principle of 'individual liberty' upon which they stridently expressed their opposition to compulsory political contributions by trade unions, Trotsky insightfully remarked:

The Conservatives defend against the trade unions the 'right' of the worker to vote for any party he may wish, these same Tories who for centuries refused to grant the worker any suffrage right at all ... The reform of 1832 was instituted early when it was no longer possible to avoid it, and the extension of the suffrage right was introduced as a matter of direct calculation, for the purpose of separating the bourgeoisie from the workers. There was in reality nothing that divided the Conservatives from the Liberals, who, having attained the electoral reform of 1832, left the workers in the lurch. When the Chartists demanded from the Tories and Whigs the granting of the right of suffrage to the workers, the opposition of the parliamentary monopolists became positively furious. And when the workers finally secured the vote, the Conservatives came out in defense of their 'individual liberty' against the tyranny of the trade unions.

(Trotsky, 1973: 121-2)

Trotsky, thereupon, thoroughly castigated Labour Party parliamentarians for failing to see through the conservative cant of 'democracy', 'equality' and 'individual liberty' - asserting for good measure: "Even a blind man can here perceive the purely class character of the principle of personal liberty which in the present concrete conditions means nothing more or less than an attempt by the possessing classes to expropriate the proletariat politically by reducing its party to nothing". (1973: 12-2) But the timeless relevance of Trotsky's writings can perhaps best be seen in his comments on the significance of the principle of worker solidarity which under-
The trade unions are - in spite of all the subtleties of liberal casuistry - a class organisation of wage workers for combating the greed and avarice of capitalists. One of the most important weapons of the trade unions is the strike. Members' contributions go to support strikes. In times of strikes, the workers are engaged in a fierce struggle with strike-breakers, who are the product of another Liberal principle, that of the 'right to work'. In any great strike, the union needs political support, it must turn to the press, the parties, the parliament. The hostile attitude of the Liberal press toward the trade union struggle was one of the causes impelling the latter to create a Labour Party.

(1973: 124)

Needless to say, Trotsky's remarks are especially pertinent to the contemporary opposition to 'trade union power'. (See 1 below). Noting that in times of strikes such forces are invariably hostile to the cause of the workers and would exercise every effort to defeat a strike, Trotsky underlined the need for worker unity via compulsory unionism by making the elementary but vitally important point that "what may appear from the point of view of capitalist democracy to be personal liberty appears from the point of view of proletarian democracy to be the liberty of political strikebreaking". (1973: 125) Trotsky is thus grandly contemptuous of assertions of commitment to abstract principles of 'democracy'. (See 2 below)

1 In fact, in its affirmation of principles and with some modifications in minor details, Trotsky's statement could have been written in response to the current attack by the conservative forces on 'compulsory unionism'.

2 As he points out in relation to Tory outrage at the political contributions by trade unions to the Labour Party, "parties can be made, (and) they can be made with the aid of money, that funds play a decisive part in the mechanism of democracy. Must we point out that the financial resources of the bourgeoisie are incomparably more plentiful than those of the proletarians? This simple fact should be sufficient to disperse the hypocritical vapors of democracy". (Trotsky, 1973: 123-4)
For him, therefore, to simply accept the "fictions and sophisms of bourgeois democracy" (1973: 129) is to conspicuously ignore that the "half-truths of the Conservatives have the quality of Machiavellianism; the half-truths of the Labour Party are the child of contemptible cowardice".

Put simply, Trotsky's thesis is that bourgeois democracy is politically valuable to the proletariat only to the extent that it permits the advancement of the class struggle. Accordingly, any working-class leadership which meekly allows the bourgeois state to acquire ever-increasing power to control the trade unions only serve to perpetuate and reinforce the system it purports to detest. More importantly, Trotsky perceived that the working-class movement faces a constant and mortal threat from two directions; first, from the bourgeois state and second from its own leadership. In particular, Trotsky maintained that under monopoly capitalism, trade union leaders have increasingly become part of the repressive apparatus of the bourgeois state through helping monopoly capitalism to diffuse worker dissent and ideologically disarm the working class. (See below)

For Trotsky, the leadership of the trade unions and the Labour Party by diverting the energies of the working class into economism and reformism are largely to blame for its political immobilisation. Consequently, in order for the working class to assume its historic mission, it is necessary to dispose of the reformist leadership of the British Labour movement. As Trotsky explains "The Labour Party and the trade unions - these are not two principles, they are only a technical division of labour. Together they are the fundamental support of the domination of the English bourgeoisie. The latter cannot be overthrown without overthrowing the Labourite bureaucracy". (1972: 59)
Elaborating his notion of the political integration of the trade union hierarchy into the bourgeois state in his pamphlet 'Marxism and the trade unions' Trotsky contended:

There is one common feature in the development, or more correctly the degeneration, of modern trade union organisations in the entire world: it is their drawing closely to and growing together with the state power. This process is equally characteristic of the neutral, the Social-Democratic, the Communist and the 'anarchist' trade unions. This fact alone shows that the tendency towards 'growing together' is intrinsic not in this or that doctrine as such but derives from social conditions common for all unions.

(1972: 5)

Basically, Trotsky's explanation of this phenomenon is that because of the monopoly character of late capitalism, the trade unions "find themselves deprived of the possibility of profiting by the competition between the different enterprises. They have to confront a centralised capitalist adversary, intimately bound up with state power" (Trotsky, 1972: 6). In order to counteract their disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the monopoly capitalists therefore, it is essential for the trade unions "to adopt themselves to the capitalist state and to contend for its cooperation". (Trotsky, 1972: 6)

Assuredly, such 'adaptation' is made easier by the reformist orientations of the trade union bureaucracy which accepts the principle of private property and tirelessly seeks to demonstrate its loyalty to the bourgeois democratic state. But pressures for the political incorporation of the trade unions also come from the state - acting as an agent of bourgeois interests in times of profound economic crisis for capitalism. (See Hyman, 1971: 19). As Trotsky makes plain, severe economic dislocation fundamentally rules out reformism
"because the objective conditions leave no room for any serious and lasting reforms". (1972: 9) Under such conditions, in fact, the continuation of capitalism demands either the fascist solution of the destruction of independent trade unionism or the political castration of the unions through the transformation of the union leadership into agents of labour discipline. (See Hyman, 1971: 19).

By and large therefore:

Monopoly capitalism is less and less willing to reconcile itself to the independence of trade unions. It demands of the reformist bureaucracy and the labour aristocracy who pick the crumbs from its banquet table, that they become transformed into its political police before the eyes of the working class. If that is not achieved, the labour bureaucracy is driven away and replaced by the fascists.

(Trotsky, 1972: 11)

Revealingly, Trotsky's argument represents an implicit contradiction of Leninist orthodoxy. For, in essence, his approach acknowledges the possibility that the normal, reformist activities of trade unions can, under certain circumstances, pose a serious threat to the existence of capitalism. (See Hyman, 1971: 19). Hence, the attempt by the monopoly capitalists to politically and ideologically decapitate them by seeking to turn their leaderships into the accomplices of bourgeois rule.

Simultaneously, however, Trotsky's analysis embodies many fundamental Leninist presuppositions. For example, as Hyman (1971) notes, underlying the attractiveness of union incorporation to the bourgeoisie is the fact that reformism had achieved a measure of plausibility in the past by its success in raising the material living standards of the working class. As a consequence, the reformist union leadership and indeed, the ideology of reformism itself, had managed to
command a fair degree of support and thus, legitimacy. (See Hyman, 1971: 19-20). As a consequence, the gradual transformation of trade unions into what Trotsky calls "organs of a labour aristocracy" (1972: 9), facilitated their outright conversion into 'stockholders' of the imperialist designs of the bourgeoisie (1972: 12). As Trotsky concluded:

the whole task of the bourgeoisie consists in liquidating the trade unions as organs of the class struggle and substituting in their place the trade union bureaucracy as the organ of the leadership over the workers by the bourgeois state. In these conditions, the task of the revolutionary vanguard is to conduct a struggle for the complete independence of the trade unions and for the introduction of actual workers' control over the present union bureaucracy.

(1972: 15-6)

The social development of the advanced capitalist societies in the three or four decades since Trotsky wrote as Hyman (1971) observes, abundantly confirms his view that intensified efforts will be made by the bourgeoisie to politically absorb the trade unions, in order to hobble any latent revolutionary potential they may possess. Characteristically, there has been a marked redoubling of such initiatives in periods of major crisis for capitalism. Significantly, however, Trotsky's analysis tends to overexaggerate the likelihood that such moves will be successful. (See Hyman, 1971: 32-5)

Admittedly, Trotsky's perspective has been partially confirmed by the growing involvement of the union hierarchy in government economic policy through their participation on various 'planning' committees, and in some cases, by their acceptance of responsibility - grudging or otherwise for administering government 'income policies'.

(Hyman, 1971: 32). However, what Trotsky's approach basically assumes is that trade union leaders possess such a degree of "immunity from rank-and-file control that they could with equanimity embrace the role of agents of an assault on their members' conditions". (Hyman, 1971: 34).

That this is patently not the case, is powerfully indicated, as Hyman (1971) shows, by the numerous attempts on the part of the State to legally control, and thus, presumably eliminate, the 'disruptive' manifestations of union rank-and-file activity such as 'wildcat' strikes. (See below) Ironically, however, as Hyman notes, such action by the state only accentuates the contradictions of a reformist union leadership by forcing it either to defend its membership against such attack or risk forfeiting its authority over them (1971: 35). Accordingly, in the light of such considerations and more particularly, in view of the abundant empirical evidence to the contrary, Trotsky's pessimistic hypothesis that, as Hyman put it, "the trade unions - in the absence of the 'alternative leadership' of a revolutionary party - would automatically succumb to the incorporating embrace" (1971: 35), basically remains

Hyman contends that while many of these judicial and legislative attempts to 'gulliverise' the trade union movement by tying it down with legal restrictions are, arguably, impelled partly by an underlying "ideological hostility to trade unionism as such", these efforts represent, more importantly, "a more forceful variant of the incorporation strategy: an attempt to compel union leaderships, on pain of severe financial penalties, to assume and apply powers to discipline and control their workshop representatives". (1971: 34)
the elaboration of a tendency rather than a description of fact.

SYNDICALISM

Syndicalism, or more precisely, revolutionary syndicalism, represents arguably one of the most visibly militant expressions of working class radicalism. (See below) Essentially a movement of action rather than of ideas, it shares with classical Marxism the traditional socialist objective of the abolition of capitalism and the inauguration of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Significantly, however, like Leninism, it totally rejects the seemingly deterministic implications of Marx's conception of social change. To the syndicalist - as indeed to the Leninist, the transcendence of the capitalist order is not a mere end-product of some impersonal and automatic process of historical evolution. Rather, socialism had to be won by conscious struggle: in effect, by those who experience most acutely the endemic exploitation and class oppression of capitalist society - the working classes.

The syndicalist approach to revolution therefore, in its grasp of the importance of the subjective element in social change partly rests on a similar concept of revolution as its Leninist counterpart. Certainly, it assents equally-vigorously that ideological preparation is a crucial prerequisite for orienting the masses toward revolutionary means of solving their problems.

As Ridley (1970) explains, the term 'syndicalism' stems from the French term 'syndicat' which literally translated means 'trade union'. 
Yet, despite its superficial affinities with Leninism, what sharply distinguishes the syndicalist conception of social change from the Leninist perspective is, pre-eminently, its methodology of revolution.

Characteristically, the Leninist model of revolution envisages the process of socialist transformation primarily in terms of the capture of State power by a well organized and highly disciplined political party—officered mainly by professional revolutionary intellectuals. Underlying this approach, of course, is the assumption spelled out unambiguously by Lenin in 'What is to be done?' that the only consciousness developed by the working class solely from its own ideological resources is 'trade union consciousness' i.e., consciousness of its narrow, sectional, economic interests.

Accordingly, in the Leninist view, to acquire a socialist revolutionary consciousness, it is essential for the working class to be guided by those who can best give radical purpose and direction to its struggle. From this perspective therefore, the political party is visualised as the most appropriate and effective institutional means for supervising the political education of the working class and for spearheading its liberation from capitalist domination. Fundamentally,

Neither Leninist or syndicalist creeds doubt for a moment the indispensability of the consciousness of the proletariat to a socialist revolutionary transformation. However, they both are unconvinced by any suggestion that such consciousness is an historical inevitability. Thus, whatever their disagreements, they both subscribe to a view of class consciousness as the driving force of history.
this concept of revolution suggests a tendency favourable to - rather than antagonistic to centralisation. As such, it implicitly embraces the broad political orthodoxy regarding the centrality of the State - as indeed is evident from the Leninist preoccupation with the capture of the machinery of the State as the prime means of redressing class injustices.

Syndicalism, conversely, totally rejects the Bolshevik concept of the vanguard party as the embodiment of revolutionary initiative. It thus intrinsically denies the necessity for socialist consciousness within the working class to be mediated by disaffected bourgeois intellectuals. On the contrary, it envisions the central revolutionary reality to be the daily struggle of the proletariat against the fact of its economic exploitation and consequent social subordination. This is underscored in the syndicalist contention that it is basically out of the elemental economic struggle that the consciousness of the proletariat emerges. There is thus in syndicalist doctrine no question of a revolutionary party that is the source and arbiter of class consciousness. Rather, class consciousness itself is perceived as the product of the omnipresent struggle between capital and labour. Essentially, therefore, where Bolshevism conceives the achievement of socialism principally in terms of the disciplined political activity of a revolutionary elite, syndicalism places its confidence in the spontaneous revolutionary impulses of the working masses.

Generally, the syndicalist credo acknowledges that capitalist society cannot be radically transformed except by the most determined struggle waged by the working class acting as a conscious and organised force.
However, it contends that authentic proletarian revolution is dependent upon the efforts of the working class itself. It therefore had little time for Leninist notions of 'socialism from outside' and even less for any idea of the subordination of the trade unions to the dictates of a political party. In particular, animated by a profound distaste for party politics and parliamentarism, syndicalism predicated its revolutionary activity on the complete prohibition of political involvement across class lines.

Characteristically, the syndicalist edict of proletarian exclusiveness reflected its pessimism that fundamental social change could be achieved through parliamentary means. Indeed, in conceptualising itself as an exclusively proletarian movement, syndicalism served to underline the class-divided nature of capitalist society.

Carrying the doctrine of class war to its extreme ... syndicalists drew a line between the proletariat and the rest of society ... not only did syndicalism deny 'outsiders' the right to intervene in its affairs, it also refused (theoretically) to be associated with members of another class or institutions not its own.

(Ridley, 1970: 95)

Syndicalism, in effect, strenuously affirmed the right and duty of the working class to speak and act for itself - to be the subject - not the object of the process of revolutionary transformation. Predictably, underlying its postulates of direct action, mistrust of State authority etc., lies a profound commitment to the principle that workers actively exercise the right to determine for themselves the objectives of their struggle. Thus, it is to the trade unions that the syndicalist looks for the means by which the working class would organise itself
into a fighting force in order to launch the mortal struggle against capitalism.

Characterised by a deep-seated suspicion of intellectuals and by implacable opposition to party politics, syndicalism is thus the diametrical opposite of Lenin's notion of trade unionism. Notably, it asserts the paramountcy of the economic struggle and conceptualises the trade union as the basic instrument of proletarian revolution. Implicit in this approach, is the assumption that the "socialist society could be achieved by the seizure of the means of production without recourse in the first instance to seizure of the political machinery of the State". (Lane, 1974: 177). To be sure, syndicalist militancy is impelled by a commitment to class war. For the syndicalist, however, such war is waged by industrial rather than political means. Among the industrial methods it advocates are the boycott, strike and industrial sabotage. In the syndicalist view, these are regarded as weapons of revolt, and of these, perhaps the most important is the strike.

Basically, the syndicalist tends to regard all strikes as dress rehearsals for revolution. From this perspective, industrial strikes are not simply designed to extract economic concessions from employers. Rather, their essential purpose is visualised as being to ideologically condition the working class to fulfill its revolutionary mission (see below).

Contrary to the conventional view which sees trade unions simply as organisations for defending workers' jobs and industrial conditions, syndicalism emphatically maintained that in trade unions, workers were provided with the basic organisational means for effecting the transition to socialism.
Viewed in these terms, the strike is not an end in itself but a prelude to proletarian self-emancipation which it is believed will ultimately be achieved through a General Strike. (Ridley, 1970: 35-8) (see below). Following the collapse of capitalism, syndicalist formulations posit that industry would be run on democratic lines with ownership of the means of production collectively vested in the workers through their trade unions. (MacDonald, 1912: 3-4) The trade union, in syndicalist terms, is thus conceived "both as an organ of struggle (with the general strike its most potent tactic), and also as a foundation on which the future free society might be constructed". (Woodcock, 1971: 18-19)

Contrary to Leninist tenets therefore, the syndicalist approach robustly affirms that the revolutionary struggle of the working class does not require any orchestration from above by professional revolutionary intellectuals. In fact, not only does it envision the prospect of the working class contriving to create a truly emancipated and democratic socialist society, but it also radically disputes the Leninist suggestion that the working classes are incapable of liberating themselves without the dedicated assistance of their own band of dissident bourgeois advisers.

However, the differences between Leninism and syndicalism are far more profound than a simple disagreement over revolutionary strategies.

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To the ardent syndicalist, every industrial dispute cumulatively served to bring closer the day of reckoning for capitalist society.
In fact, their revolutionary tactics really epitomise totally divergent conceptions of the State, and, perhaps, even of the fundamental nature of socialism itself. Unlike party-oriented models of socialist politics, syndicalist insurgency aims to destroy the capitalist State - not to take it over and adapt it to its own purposes (see below 1). To the syndicalist, socialism means and requires the abolition of all systems of discrete political authority - no matter how revolutionary. More specifically, it conceives of socialism as denoting above all the condition of common ownership and control of the means of production (see below 2).

From the syndicalist standpoint, since all alienation ultimately emanates from economic exploitation, this condition can only be effectively remedied by the abolition of wage slavery and the

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1 In all fairness, however, Leninism sought not so much to 'adapt' the existing State as to demolish it and create an entirely new political structure i.e. one more appropriate to the needs and aspirations of a socialist society. Significantly, though, syndicalist struggle contemplates the liquidation of the State - not merely its capture.

2 Its revolutionary aspirations thus largely found expression in the idea of universal workers' control. To the syndicalist, workers' control basically provided the answer to the problem of authority: in a socialist society constructed upon cooperative principles, authority, plainly, would derive not from the summit of institutional structures but from their base. By such means, the existing social arrangements would presumably reflect the influence of democratic decision-making. For, to put it simply, the syndicalist organization of industry and society presupposed a system of direct grassroots democracy.
socialisation of the means of production. It is therefore not without significance that syndicalist doctrine designates the workplace as the principal arena of class struggle. Indeed, in syndicalist eyes, if the purpose of socialism is to achieve a self-governing society with self-managing industry, then authentic revolution involves a complete democratisation of all authority relationships in industry and society - rather than connoting simply a transfer of power between elites. Thus the socialist utopia prefigured in syndicalist thought is one in which political power - to the extent that it is institutionally enshrined in the State had become anachronistic and irrelevant.

Naturally, syndicalism has not been without its detractors. Its unconditional hostility toward party politics and its preoccupation with direct action on the part of the trade unions as the means of abolishing capitalism, has predictably generated considerable controversy. Inevitably, also, the syndicalist position has come to be characterised as 'antipolitical' or 'apolitical' by even sympathetic critics like Campbell (1945) and Schumpeter (1970). Likewise, Ramsay MacDonald, (who as British Labour Party leader and later as Prime Minister symbolised the gradualist politics reflected in the concept of the 'parliamentary road to socialism'), ironically depicted revolutionary syndicalism as a 'revolt against socialism' (1912: 6-8). Significantly, moreover, syndicalism as a method of class struggle came under attack from no less a revolutionary than Leon Trotsky (1972).

However, with the exception perhaps of Trotsky, few critics of syndicalism appear to have grasped that its political agnosticism can only be adequately understood in the context of its fundamental anti-authoritarian ethos. Within the dream of total emancipation envision-
ed by revolutionary syndicalism, there is no place for the central committee autocracy of a Bolshevik 'vanguard party'. On the contrary, the self-liberation of the working class demands primarily the direct method of the strike and other indigenous forms of proletarian revolt. In such forms of direct action all could participate. There was therefore no call for a socialist intelligentsia to think and plan for the working class (see below). From their own resources they possessed the necessary means to liberate themselves and to remodel society along more egalitarian lines.

Characteristically, revolutionary syndicalism imparts to the attempt to formulate the outlines of a liberated and democratic society, a vision of the prominent part to be assumed by the trade unions in post-revolutionary social institutions. It also imparts to revolutionary praxis a reminder of the ultimate futility of political strategies for the capture of the State. In its view, the real revolutionary task to be undertaken is to be the dismantling of the relations of power instead of the conquest of power.

Predictably, however, revolutionary syndicalism sought to deal with the ramifications created by the complexity and centralisation of

Rather, to a syndicalist way of thinking, the relation of intellectuals to the working class struggle presupposed in Bolshevik theory, announced a highly dictatorial perspective. From their viewpoint, central to the Bolshevik concept of revolution is the notion of an ideologically inert working class which has to be prodded into revolutionary activity by an intelligentsia who are the generators and custodians of 'socialist consciousness'. Needless to say, the authoritarian tendencies disclosed in the Bolshevik postulate of 'socialism from outside' find little nourishment in syndicalist practices.
highly industrial society - not by confronting them - but by attempting to evade them altogether with impassioned appeals for 'decentralisation'. Thus it dismissed the problem of the prevailing capitalist state by simply endowing the trade union movement with the ability to carry out the tasks of government without the irksome responsibility to constitute itself specifically as such.

Certainly, syndicalist enthusiasm for 'direct action' is well-epitomised in its conception of the General Strike. For, in the General Strike, syndicalists perceive a force of almost unsurpassed potential. In fact, as syndicalist rhetoric would have it, the General Strike will contrive not only to abolish the existing State and the authoritarian economic infrastructure of capitalist society, but in vesting the control of industry and society in the trade unions, it lays the foundations for a new and egalitarian pattern of social relationships both within the workplace and in the wider society (see below).

To some extent, the syndicalist failure to demonstrate any real grasp of the magnitude of the problems posed by the existence of the State is partly a reflection of its general indifference to political theory. Yet, it is far too facile to write off revolutionary syndicalism as simply the blunt and politically-illiterate edge of proletarian

Despite its pretensions to an unsentimental 'practical' view of the phenomenon of socialist revolution, nothing so demonstrates the latent utopianism of syndicalist diagnosis as the exaggerated importance it attached to the General Strike and its romantic assumption that the State would simply disintegrate with the overthrow of capitalism. (See Campbell, 1945: 66-8).
rebellion, as its portrayal as 'anti-intellectual' by critics like Schumpeter (1970) suggests. For, although not noticeably exercised by any compelling urge to give systematic philosophical expression to its ideas, nevertheless, in George Sorel (1974), syndicalism found a theoretical exponent of formidable talent (see below 1). Sorel's essential revolutionary genius was to theoretically apprehend that in order to translate the elemental sense of class discontent of the proletariat into active political protest against the existing system, the working class needs to be possessed of what he terms a 'great myth'. (By 'myth', he does not mean the conventional idea of a fanciful construction; rather, in Sorelian terms, a myth is essentially a rallying cry to action). To Sorel, the working class had within its indigenous industrial culture just such a myth in the General Strike.

For Sorel, capitalist rule could only be broken by force (see below 2). Indeed, as he writes: "The strike is a phenomenon of war" (1974: 274). This tendency to construe class struggle in militaristic terms is further evident in his view on the General Strike. As he argues:

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Ironically, Sorel's own bourgeois social origins would, in principle, have debarred him from playing a prominent or active role in syndicalist labour movements. Ridley, therefore, may well be right when he claims that Sorel was "at best an interpreter of the movement" (1970: 3-5). Be that as it may, what is significant about the Sorelian contribution, is that it flatly contradicts any suggestion that syndicalism was devoid of theoretical content. On the contrary, the Sorelian perspective manages to create a syndicalist theory that is a synthesis of Marxism and anarchism.

2

In Sorel's hands, the syndicalist impulse is essentially a critique by clout.
The Syndicalist general strike presents a very great number of analogies with the first conception of war: the proletariat organises itself for battle, separating itself distinctly from the other parts of the nation, and regarding itself as the great motive power of history, all other social considerations being subordinated to that of combat; it is very clearly conscious of the glory which will be attached to its historical role and of the heroism of its militant attitude.

(1974: 167)

Basically, it is remarks like this which have led to Sorel’s portrayal as an apostle of violence for violence sake. Yet there is in his glorification of violence, a highly-literal rendering of the Marxian concept of violence as the ‘midwife’ of history. In fact, far from being anti-Marxist or un-Marxist, as critics like MacDonald (1912) imply, revolutionary syndicalism, in its emphasis on the proletariat as the author of its own liberation – and even more significantly, in its declared aim to abolish wage labour – echoes Marxian tenets at their most fundamental. Similarly, in its intention to supplant the State with the decentralised authority of the trade unions, there is plainly a highly fundamentalist interpretation of the Marxian concept of the ‘withering away of the State’ (see below). Certainly, such evidence readily lends credence to Ridley’s characterisation of revolutionary syndicalism as ‘hyper-Marxist’ i.e. ‘more Marxist than Marx’ (1970: 103-4).

Significantly, despite their apparent mutual antipathy, the abolition of the State was an idea ostensibly shared by Bolshevism, as witness its revolutionary slogan of ‘all power to the Soviets’. Yet, it is in syndicalism that the Marxist edict of the dictatorship of (rather than over), the proletariat, finds its most loyal expression.
If the revolutionary impulses of revolutionary syndicalism were more empirical than theoretical, its origins were distinctively French. However, the influence of syndicalist ideas were by no means confined to France, or even to Europe (see Schumpeter, 1970: 336-7). On the contrary, syndicalist notions made their presence felt as far afield as the United States and Australia where they played a large part in the industrial movement to create 'one big union'. Known as the International Workers of the World (I.W.W.), or more affectionately, as the 'Wobblies', they sought through worker solidarity to achieve the millenarian dream of an end to class exploitation. As Paul Brissenden describes the objectives of the American 'Wobblies':

The idea of the class conflict was really the bottom notion or 'first cause of the I.W.W. The industrial union type was adopted because it would make it possible to wage this class war under more favourable conditions.

(1957: 108)

Significantly, however, for all the controversy it generated, the appeal of the Wobblies - as measured by active support of it, was relatively modest. For example, according to one estimate, the Wobblies in the U.S.A. never managed to attract more than 5 per cent of the organised workforce (Renshaw, 1967: 23). Likewise in Australia, despite the stir its existence created (see Turner, 1967), the evidence suggests that the influence of the Wobblies was minor and relatively short-lived (Turner, 1965).

To sum up, this chapter set out to examine some of the classical Marxist approaches to trade unionism. In outlining the ideas of Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg etc., the intention is not to suggest that
the observations of these writers completely exhaust the Marxist tradition. Rather, the purpose has been to point to the central significance of the contributions of these writers - both in their own right, and as continuing sources of intellectual inspiration for contemporary researchers.
4. CLASS, WORK AND UNIONISM

TRADE UNIONS AND THE 'INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS' PARADIGM

The normative frame-of-reference

There is a pervasive belief - some would say an orthodoxy, among many of the academic experts on industrial relations, that the anti-capitalist formulations of the Marxist tradition are largely irrelevant to research and totally inimical to any real understanding of the complex nature of modern industrial realities. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the apocalyptic anticipations of Marxism tend to generate a distinct lack of sympathy within conventional academic discourse on industrial relations. Ironically, however, the aversion to Marxism, (as shown by the intensive efforts to discredit it as a valid conceptual tool for the analysis of industrial relations), only serves to underline the continuing influence of Marxist ideas. (See below)

In the main, the industrial relations literature evidences little indication of concern with theory - Marxist or otherwise. On the contrary, the discipline seems to be based upon an ethos of unapologetic pragmatism. With few exceptions, most of the academic exponents of industrial relations see it as being primarily concerned with the practical problems and issues arising out of the organisation of industrial life. Predictably, therefore, sustained theoretical concern with the social potential for fundamental change is hardly a prominent feature of its research priorities. Yet, despite its empiricist preoccupations, it is clear that industrial relations investigations are not immune from theoretical influences. Indeed, the claim of theoretical uncontamination often reflects an ignorance of, or reluctance to acknowledge, the theoretical assumptions inherent in both the treatment and selection of social data.
To a large extent, the anti-Marxist stance that characterises much of the writing on industrial relations, seems to rest on the dubious supposition that political value-questions lie outside its legitimate domain. Yet, even allowing for its unremitting hostility to 'ideology', what is abundantly clear from the microanalytical orientation that informs conventional accounts of industrial relations, is the lack of any serious attempt to situate analysis of trade unions within a theoretical framework "which grasps 'industrial relations' as an element in a totality of social relations of production". (Hyman, 1975: IX). Much less is there any attempt to systematically explore the transcendent possibilities embedded in the existing social order. (See below)

Quite the contrary, the dominant tendency to project trade unions as ends in themselves only serve to express an underlying conception of industrial relations as a phenomenon 'sui-generis'. As a consequence, such approaches give rise to the portrayal of capitalist society as a relatively-neutral back-drop to essentially 'industrial' problems and conflicts - instead of as a centrally-relevant variable for comprehending and analysing these antagonisms. Put simply, the study of industrial relations has conventionally dwelt on the network of arrangements and problems arising out of workplace relations. Absent from such endeavours has been any attempt to trace the implications of work-

The traditional academic view of Marxism as a time-bound 19th century political ideology offering little of real value to the serious student of modern industrial relations, has powerfully impeded dispassionate academic analysis of the utility of Marxist approaches to the study of industrial relations - a shortcoming that many writers are belatedly trying to remedy.
place relations, and especially of industrial conflict, for class relations - other than to simplistically attribute the decline of class conflict to the establishment of institutionalised mechanisms for mediating industrial disputes. In effect, as one critic of conventional 'industrial relations' bluntly explains the limitations of this perspective:

The focus is on how any conflict is contained and controlled, rather than on the processes through which disagreements and disputes are generated. From this perspective, the question whether the existing structure of ownership and control of industry is an inevitable source of conflict is dismissed as external to the study of industrial relations - which must be concerned solely with how employers, trade unions and other institutions cope with such conflicts.

(Hyman, 1975: 11)

Not accidentally, the 'industrial relations' view of trade unions inherently disputes the classical Marxist concept of them as potential instruments of socialist transformation. As a leading British exponent of the fledgling 'science' of industrial relations strenuously maintains:

Workers do not join unions because they think alike or share the same political outlook. They do so for the sake of gaining immediate improvements in their lot which can only come from collective action. Their unity, that completeness of the organisation of trade unions which is the foundation of their strength must always be imperilled when they import political faction fights.

(Flanders, 1972: 18)

Accordingly, as he fumes:

What I find so objectionable as well as invalid in the Marxist view is its implicit contempt for 'pure-and-simple' trade unionism.

(Flanders, 1972: 18)
Typically, therefore, Flanders' reply to the Marxist approach is framed in a waspish, discursive style that substitutes epithets for rigorous analysis. For example, as he asserts with withering sarcasm:

"Trade unions, by doggedly sticking to their immediate ends and refusing to be captured and exploited by any political party have gradually transformed society. Only not according to dialectical laws! That they may be right in preferring reform to revolution and unity to discord never crosses the mind of those whose theory tells them all the answers."

(Flanders, 1972: 18)

Contrary therefore to the classical Marxist view of trade unions as rudimentary institutional expressions of working class consciousness, Flanders envisages them principally as sectional organisations. As he flatly declares, "trade unions exist to promote sectional interests - the section of the population they happen to organise." (Flanders, 1972: 20). Now, it is one thing to see trade unions as occupational pressure groups, indeed, as instrumental bargaining agencies rather than as necessarily integral parts of a wider working class movement. In fact, as Richard Hyman reminds us, the fragmentation of the workforce, and the sectional basis of trade union organisation conspire to blind workers to "consciousness of class identity" (1975: 42). Yet as he warns, "the notion of working-class unity is more than a wild fantasy. The notion of the working class .... denotes the basic similarity of all who lack ownership and control over the means of production, who are forced to sell their working capacity in the labour market, who are subordinated to a hierarchy of managerial control". (Hyman, 1975: 41).
The structural implications of the lack of ownership and control over the productive resources of society are, as Hyman shows, "many common grievances in terms of insecurity of employment, lack of autonomy in work, dissatisfaction with pay and conditions and so on" (1975: 41-2).

From all of which it is plain to see that:

There is thus, objectively, a common relationship of opposition and antagonism to capital, and to the owners of capital and their functionaries. (It is indeed precisely this relationship of opposition which gives the notion of a working class its coherence and meaning). This objective community of interest is the source of the unifying tendencies in trade unionism: the extension of organisational boundaries; recruitment of non-unionised workers; mutual support and solidarity; amalgamation, federation, and the creation of such all-embracing bodies as the T.U.C. It is this common situation and common interest which gives the notion of a labour movement (Hyman's emphasis) its meaning and appeal.

(Hyman, 1975: 42)

Put simply, then, in denying any wider political significance to trade unions, Flanders appears to be using the yardstick of a 'class-for-itself', as classical Marxism terms it, while overlooking the (probably) antecedent situation of a 'class-in-itself'. Or, to put it in the parlance of French Marxists like Bettelheim (1971) and Peulantzas (1976), 'class position' (how a class politically behaves) does not automatically follow from 'class determination' (its objective existence).

Characteristically, from the 'industrial relations' standpoint, any suggestion that the working class should mobilise its political strength in order to politically overturn the prevailing social system is invariably denounced as a thoroughly 'improper' use of worker organisations like trade unions. (There is, to put it mildly, more than a little trace of hypocrisy in some of the arguments that
trade unions should confine their attention to purely industrial matters. Clearly, many of the staunchest opponents of union involvement in 'politics' appear to be only too ready to unquestioningly support the domesticated trade unions of the Communist world - should they ever take up the political cudgels against their own totalitarian political masters. Perhaps, even more ironically, while pre-World War II Spanish, Italian and German trade unions deservedly stand condemned before the bar of history for failing to spear-head the political struggle against fascism, the detractors of contemporary trade unions have elevated political agnosticism to the status of a moral imperative for the 'industrial wing' of the working class movement.

Predictably, Marxist tenets like 'worker self-management' have generally received little serious consideration in 'academically respectable' approaches to industrial relations. If anything, the industrial relations orientation appears to give tacit encouragement to the simplistic platitude that just as there cannot be cops without robbers, so too, there cannot be workers without capitalists. (See below)
Not unexpectedly, as sociological studies confirm, workers' political attitudes occasionally tend to mirror such conditioning. This propensity is perhaps best illustrated in Zola's 'Germinal' where the author has one character assert, "the bosses are often swine, but there will always be bosses won't there? What's the good of racking your brains to try to make sense out of it?" (Cited in Nichols and Beynon, 1977: 180)

It is pertinent to note however, that Flanders' critique is, to say the least, equally uncomplimentary to both Marxist and conservative visions of union purpose. Notably, he vehemently rejects the conservative doctrine of 'responsible trade unionism' which he sees as an attempt to blackmail trade unions into acting obliquely as agents of labour discipline by "keep(ing) the chaps in order and the wheels of industry turning" (Flanders, 1972: 19). In a stinging rebuttal of this view, Flanders maintains that the "first and overriding responsibility of all trade unions is to the welfare of their own members." (1972: 19)

Curiously enough, there are parallels between this view of union purpose and the conservative standpoint that:

Few trends would so thoroughly undermine the foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as they possibly can.

(Friedman, 1962: 133)

However, such similarities in perspective on 'public responsibility', while striking, are purely superficial. Unlike Friedman's unconditional support of unfettered 'free enterprise', Flanders, by contrast,
seemingly perceives the trade union right to self-determination as an abstraction: it is something of which he approves - but largely in principle. This is underscored in his subsequent remarks. For example, at one point he writes that the prime responsibility of trade unions is "not to be firm, not to an industry, not to the nation" (1972: 19) but to their own members, only to contradict this later by proposing that trade unions should 'voluntarily' accept pay restraint.

The essential inconsistency of Flanders' position is that having identified 'collective bargaining' as the pre-eminent purpose of trade unions, he now seeks to urge upon these organisations acceptance of an 'incomes policy' which virtually amounts to a suspension of their right to collectively bargain. The cant about an incomes policy being a mechanism of wage 'justice' and 'order' and the feeble surmise that trade unions cannot reject limitations on their freedom to bargain collectively and "remain true to their own purpose" (Flanders, 1972: 26), are indicative of the shallowness of an analysis, which from all appearances, is oblivious to anything as inconvenient as fact and evidence. Certainly, the uncritical acceptance of wage pressures as the primary cause of 'inflation' helps to explain Flanders' complicity with the capitalist solution to the problem: an incomes policy.

Equally, the inexcusable humbug of Flanders' discussion of 'what are trade unions for' is that having blisteringly condemned the conservative notion of 'responsible trade unionism', he winds up by insinuating virtually the same idea into his account of their functions. For implicit in the very notion of an incomes policy is the supposition that when the future of the system is at stake, the trade unions are
in some mysterious way 'responsible' for ensuring its survival. In fact, much of the debate from the 'Right' and 'Centre' of the political spectrum seems devoted to propagating the impression that keeping capitalism afloat is no less than the simple patriotic duty of the trade unions.

However, by accepting that it is the workers who must make the major sacrifices - in the 'national interest' - so to speak, the only question that remains to be decided with regard to an 'incomes policy' is who shall administer it: the government or the trade unions themselves.

(See below) Naturally, Flanders is quick to make the point that:

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Characteristically, to the self-admitted supporter of an incomes policy like Flanders, who implicitly accepts the bourgeois premiss that the fundamental cause of inflation is excessive pay claims, the implementation of such checks on collective bargaining is self-evident 'common-sense'. Apart from which, such restrictions on free wage bargaining are demonstrably 'reasonable and fair' because after all, "trade unions ... get more for their members at the expense - let us face it - of members of other unions". (Flanders, 1972: 28). It follows from this therefore, that the better-paid workers should exercise moderation in their pay demands in order to allow the lot of their less-fortunate counterparts to be improved. However, in the first place, we should beware of falling victim to capitalist mythology and believe that the proportional share of the national product between capital and labour is fixed and immutable and that redistribution of surplus-value can only take place within, rather than between, relative shares. Secondly, and more importantly, to see an incomes policy as a mechanism for producing distributive justice by enforcing 'restraint' on the better-off sectors of the workforce, is simply to ignore that the wage increases foregone by them rarely find their way into the paypackets of the more-poorly remunerated. In fact, it is plausible to suggest that where the most pivotally-placed and strongly-organised groups of workers manage to win only modest pay increases, those less favourably-situated are likely to fare even worse.
The T.U.C. objects to a government-imposed incomes policy and insists that, so far as wages are concerned, a voluntary policy operated by itself is the right answer. Clearly this would be preferable.

(1972: 27)

Put bluntly, such statements tell us more about the author's value-preferences than about the reasons for union acceptance of a 'voluntary' incomes policy in the first place. Certainly, it is quite understandable that faced with the prospect of either 'voluntarily' administering an incomes policy or having one statutorily imposed, unions should opt for the former course of action. But this is quite a different matter from saying that they favour an incomes policy without qualification - as Flanders' comments slyly suggest. (In fact, the very way he frames the discussion represents a shabby and underhanded attempt to 'sell' pay restraint to the trade unions. Further, it makes his allegations of ideological bias against the conservative and Marxist stances a monumental hypocrisy.)

It comes as no surprise therefore, that trade union wage militancy to counteract the effects of inflation on their members' earnings (which, in effect, only reflects the legitimate desire of working people to be paid a living wage) is stigmatised by Flanders as a 'free-for-all' and an 'industrial jungle war'. Significantly, such phraseology clearly identifies him with the conservative position he purports to anathematise and underscores the fact that when the chips are down, certain so-called academic 'liberals' swiftly abandon the role of detached expositor for that of staunch defender of the existing order.

Plainly, the implication of inflammatory terminology like 'free-for-all'
and 'industrial jungle war', is that greedy, selfish, unreasonable, irresponsible and bullying trade unions are endangering the well-being of decent, ordinary folk and wrecking the country. Such beliefs only serve to confirm that the trade unions are everybody's favourite punching bag. Yet, a cynic might say that if bullying, holding to ransom and defiance of the law are really what is required or expected of trade unions, then they certainly require expert tuition, because so far they have revealed little real aptitude in these directions.

There is no doubt that Flanders' thinking on trade unionism is as locked into the existing system and accepted modes of thought as that of any of the conservative ideologists he criticises. Like theirs, his approach is devoid of any recognition of the fact that the institutional matrix within which 'industrial relations' takes place can be drastically altered. (See below) Characteristically, therefore, the dominant tendency of this approach is to suppose that apart from minor reforms, any threat to the existing social order must be resisted.

Clegg's (1960) concept of 'industrial democracy' in which the trade unions are cast in the role of a perpetual countervailing force to managerial domination, epitomises the tendency of 'establishment' academics in the field of industrial relations to project capitalism as an eternal human necessity. In this context, Marx's sardonic observation on evolution is particularly apposite:

"Darwin did not know what a bitter satire he wrote on mankind and especially on his countrymen, when he showed that free competition, the struggle for existence, which the economists celebrate as the highest historical achievement, is the normal state of the animal kingdom."

(Cited in Meek, 1954: 185-6)
However, it will simply not suffice to assert that:

Only those who hold the Marxist view can brush it (the need for an incomes policy - W.S) aside until - on some glorious but unspecified date in the future - we enter the promised land and the day of a fully socialist planned economy dawns.

(Flanders, 1972: 26)

For to seek to establish the necessity of an 'incomes policy' simply by caricaturing Marxist objections to it, is to maintain as cavalier an attitude to 'mainstream' economics as to the more profound facets of the Marxist critique. Certainly, the implication that Marxism conceives of revolutionary social change as a sudden, miraculous occurrence must represent the nadir of intellectual commentary. It says something, incidentally, for the level of debate within academic 'industrial relations' that its protagonists can, seemingly without any necessity to provide logical justification for them, present capitalist social arrangements as inevitable and permanent.

Interestingly, the celebration of the status-quo in the industrial relations literature finds forthright expression in the work of one New Zealand writer. Drawing a sharp distinction between a 'social revolution' and an 'industrial relations dispute', the author - clearly at intellectual loggerheads with radical criticism of the industrial relations perspective, contends that:

if one of the actors developed as its major objective the destruction of another actor (for example, if the government wanted to destroy all trade unions as did Germany in the 1930's, or if the workers decided their major objective was to destroy the managerial class), then the situation is too large to be considered simply 'industrial relations.'

(Geare, 1977: 281)
The disposition of 'industrial relations' advocates to accept at face-value the existing institutional structures, inevitably spurs the familiar reflex to annihilate such resonances of Marxism as ideas of radical social change from academic debate. Thus, for example, Geare decries "the radical's belief that capitalism should be overthrown ... (and that) there should be a Marxist revolution and the democratisation of 'society as a whole.'" (1977: 281)

Naturally enough, from such a perspective, any fundamental questioning of the legitimacy of the existing social order is inherently mischievous if not malevolent in motivation. Geare, for instance, in dismissing radical criticism of existing social arrangements alleges in self-justification that "there is more than a slight implication that conflict is desirable - as a means of raising consciousness and thus bringing the hoped-for revolution." (1977: 281)

By contrast, the study of industrial relations is conceived to be more properly concerned with specifying the normative bases underlying the existing social order. This is evident from the tendency of its pundits to define industrial relations in terms of 'collective bargaining' which, as we are told, is essentially a 'rule-making process'. In fact, as Flanders stoutly affirms, "one of the principal purposes of trade unions in collective bargaining is regulation or control. They are interested in regulating wages as well as raising them; and of course, in regulating a wide range of other issues appertaining to their members' jobs and working lives". (1972: 21)

This orientation is also evident in the work of other academic industrial relations stalwarts. For example, it finds
exposition in the work of Fox and Flanders (1969). Briefly, their analysis of industrial relations is approached by way of Durkheim through the concept of 'anomie' or normative breakdown, which they insist characterises the state of industrial relations in Britain.

The focus of their theoretical endeavours is, of course, the Donovan Report and its concept of 'two systems' of industrial relations: a centralised system of industrial bargaining between employer representatives and their trade union counterparts and an informal system of shop-floor bargaining between the managements of individual firms and their shop stewards.

It is the contention of the Donovan Report that the growth of shop-floor bargaining in Britain has put immense power into the hands of the shop stewards and thereby weakened the authority of the official leaders of the trade unions over their own rank-and-file. To Donovan, this situation is not only undesirable: it is clearly detrimental to 'good' industrial relations. In his view:

The informal system undermines the regulative effect of industry-wide agreements; ... (and should be discouraged because of - W.S) the tendency of extreme decentralisation and self-government to degenerate into indecision and anarchy; the propensity to breed inefficiency; and the resistance to change.

(Cited in Hyman, 1975: 156)

Fundamentally, this is a conclusion with which Fox and Flanders
largely concur. (See below) To them, 'collective bargaining' constitutes the major norm-generating agency in industrial relations "because the rules it produces, expressed in collective agreements and in unwritten understandings, are supported by a sufficiently high degree of consensus among those whose interests are most affected by their application". (Fox and Flanders, 1969: 160) Hence, to the extent that shop-floor activity poses a challenge to centralised agreements between capital and labour, the 'normative basis' of industrial relations is assumed to be eroded. The result is a situation of disorder or 'anomie'.

Despite the laudable efforts of Fox and Flanders to move beyond a merely empirical concern with the nature and ramifications of economic bargaining to an explicit theoretical consideration of the 'rule-making process' itself, the conceptual poverty of their approach has rightly been deplored. Goldthorpe (1974), for example, has taken these authors severely to task: basically, he charges them with possibly misconstruing, and certainly, with misapplying

At the very least, Fox and Flanders' article contrives to endow the Donovan angle of vision on industrial relations with a measure of sociological legitimacy. Revealingly, as certain critics of their paper have noted, the writers even manage to out-Donovan Donovan himself in the conservative way in which their analysis of industrial relations is formulated. This is instanced in their rejection of Donovan's concept of an 'informal' system of industrial relations on the grounds that such a notion tacitly overstates the extent of normative integration within the industrial sphere. Put bluntly, what they are in effect saying is that Donovan's diagnosis of the problem is overly optimistic in that the state of industrial relations is more chaotic than his analysis suggests.
the Durkheimian concept of anomie. To put it bluntly, what Goldthorpe in effect suggests, is that Fox and Flanders' formulation of the concept of anomie is framed in a manner that is fundamentally inconsistent with the Durkheimian meaning.

Admittedly, in the Durkheimian perspective, anomie signified a state of social disorder. However, embodied in the concept is a view of anomie as essentially a pathological condition of the externality of social constraints. In other words, it is the coercive influence of prevailing societal arrangements upon individual behaviours that is fundamental to his analysis. From this standpoint, therefore, the anomie condition symbolises that situation where normative bonds have been undermined or dissolved.

However, apart from the inadequate rendition of Durkheim's concept of anomie, Fox and Flanders' conceptual approach classically reflects the epistemological deficiencies of the Durkheimian gaze. For example, as Horton (1964) has so timely reminded us, Durkheim's concept of anomie intrinsically addresses itself to the problem of the 'adequacy' of social control - rather than to the 'legitimacy' of it. More importantly, perhaps, what needs to be kept uppermost in mind, is that it is not the absence of norms but the mere fact of their existence that accounts for the possibility of class domination. At the same time, as John Rex has fittingly emphasised:

There is room for normative elements in a Marxist type theory. Indeed, they are quite essential to any account of the development of class-solidarity. But a conflict of interests or ends is put at the centre of the model of the system as a whole. The result of this is that the model is directly applicable to the kind of social system which we find in industrial society. Such systems do not have to be treated in an appendix as abnormal.

(1965: 102)
Characteristically, such considerations are remote from the Fox and Flanders perspective. For them, the chief defect of British industrial relations is the want of normative consensus. The visible manifestation of this defect was, they affirmed, to be seen in the chaotic, dispute-ridden state of industry. (See below) Not unexpectedly, the ideological character of these premisses - in particular, the implicit emphasis they place on the pre-eminence of order and consensus has been called into sociological question. As Goldthorpe, for example, was to bluntly suggest: "Order looks rather different, depending as it were on which

In effect, such an interpretation renders farcical the claim elsewhere of one of the authors to view Sociology as an instrument of 'demystification'. (See Wood and Elliott, 1977: 108). Likewise, if as the other author once claimed, an essential purpose of collective bargaining is to provide workers with 'participation in job regulation' in order to 'gain more control over their working lives' (Flanders, 1972: 22), it is difficult to see why a centralised system of industrial bargaining that is remote from the workaday world of the worker can better serve these purposes than shopfloor bargaining with its potential for greater grassroots worker involvement. Plainly, what Fox and Flanders' article does is to uncritically accept the basic outlines of the Donovan Report. The ideological character of this report and its political sequels has been exposed by Richard Hyman who writes: "In brief, its (Donovan's) definition of the central 'problem' of British industrial relations was the 'anarchy and disorder' - in other words, the undermining of managerial control - at factory level. To assist managements in recovering control, two main lines of attack were proposed: the greater involvement of full-time union officials (in conjunction with higher management) in supervising industrial relations at the point of production, and the closer integration of shop stewards within the official structure of trade unionism and the official institutions of collective bargaining (1971: 34). As Hyman further makes plain, the 'voluntary' aspect of the Donovan proposals was soon supplanted by legal compulsion in the form of the Industrial Relations Act which sought to 'compel union leaderships, on pain of severe financial penalties, to assume and apply powers to discipline and control their workshop representatives."

(1971: 34)
Generally, such criticisms have been echoed and expanded upon by both Eldridge (1973) and Hyman (1975). Hyman, for instance, has drawn attention to the conservative idiom in which Fox and Flanders basically frame their analysis. As he notes:

In practice, the existing forms of material inequality and capitalist control constitute the taken-for-granted framework for conventional industrial relations analysis. Their perpetuation and stabilisation are presupposed in the various proposals for the 'reconstruction of the normative order' in industry. More specifically, the prescriptions for the reconstruction of control by managements and (in so far as they accept a quasi-managerial role) trade union leaders, necessarily assume that the natural condition of the ordinary employee and union member is one of subjection, subordination and passivity.

(1957: 157)

Under the banner of the 'normative regulation of industrial relations', Fox and Flanders invest with sociological credence the Donovan proposals to modernise and streamline the British system of industrial relations. (See below) The irony, however, is that traditionally, much of the

As his critics report, Fox claims in his subsequent writings to have parted company totally with the pluralist orientation toward industrial relations which characterised his collaborative enterprise with Flanders. Notably, in his more recent work, which he dramatically represents as a 'radical' critique of the pluralist perspective, Fox proposes to situate analysis of industrial relations within a structural context which, in his view, more accurately reflects the realities of power in capitalist society. Certain of Fox's critics, however, remain unconvinced that his more recent efforts represent a decisive break with pluralism. In fact, some question "whether the debate between 'pluralists' and 'radicals' may not ultimately be a debate within the orthodoxy of industrial relations rather than a debate between competing theories". (Wood and Elliott, 1977: 109).
opposition to the kind of centralised industrial bargaining that Donovan advocates has come - not from the trade unions - but from employers. Research on managerial attitudes confirmed that many had a "preference for informal bargaining with shop stewards and not the official trade union officer". (Ingham, 1974: 83) The apparent paradox however, is soon resolved. Basically, it transpires that:

Many customary practices were viewed as managerial concessions which employers were reluctant to see become institutionalised rights and, if this were to occur, it was feared future generations of shop stewards might use such rights as a basis for more demands.

(Ingham, 1974: 83)

Arguably, the conception of industrial relations in predominantly normative terms has special applicability to Australia where the antagonistic interests of capital and labour are mediated by a centralised system of conciliation and arbitration. What needs to be kept firmly in mind is that:

Compulsion is of the very essence of the system and was a material element in its origins. The law compels the recognition of trade unions registered under the various statutes. ... Neither unions nor management can, at law, avoid the obligation of conciliation or, where that fails, arbitration. And when an agreement or an arbitral decision is embodied in an award, the terms, unlike those of the typical British collective agreement, become enforceable through processes of law. Whatever may be the voluntarist elements in the system, in practice, at each stage they have the compulsions of law behind them.

(Sorrell, 1977: 251-2)

The legalistic character of industrial relations 'rule-making' in Australia derives to some extent from the salience of arbitration. As we are told:
Arbitration dominates the scene despite the importance of conciliation on particular occasions. Basic to the arbitration function, of course, is the power to make rules specifying pay and working conditions. Such rules are set out in the awards of commission-type tribunals or in the 'determinations' of wages boards (which are not arbitral bodies in conception but operate as such in practice). Awards and determinations have the force of law; that is, they are legally enforceable against employers and employees subject to them.

(Martin, 1975: 25)

The pre-eminence of arbitration in the Australian system of industrial relations is also indicated by the fact that even where unions and employers have reached a private agreement it will frequently be referred to an arbitrator for ratification. (Martin, 1975: 25). Fundamentally, this power to confer legitimacy on even the outcome of private bargaining between employers and trade unions highlights the position of arbitration as the major 'norm-creating' agency in Australian industrial relations. However, the 'rules' it formulates with respect to the employment relationship depend for their observance less upon the willing consensus of the parties involved than upon administrative and legal coercion.

Perhaps one of the most significant features of industrial relations in Australia is the scope of legal control over the activities of organisations like trade unions. For example, as Rawson observes, the degree of "regulation of unions' internal affairs ... has no parallel in similar capitalist countries." (1978: 57). Their administration, their financial management and even the election of their officers are, as Rawson points out, subject to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court which has the competence to rule on such matters. (Rawson, 1978: 58-60).
Fundamentally, arbitration serves to institutionalise the subordinate status of labour in capitalist society.

Perhaps best symbolising the ideological element is the attitude of tribunals towards encroachment upon what are quaintly known as 'the prerogatives of management ... One such encapsulating phrase used in all jurisdictions is 'industrial matters' which are 'matters pertaining to the relations of employers and employees.' Those matters that are thought to lie properly within the exclusive powers of management do not, it seems, pertain to such relations and are not, therefore within the purview of the tribunals.

(Sorrell, 1977: 253)

Put simply, then, such propensities underline the role of arbitration in legitimising and reproducing the existing social order.

Possibly one of the most remarkable developments in modern Australian industrial relations has been the growth of a system of collective bargaining alongside the formal arbitration system. The spectacular upsurge of direct negotiation has spurred considerable academic debate in Australia (see, notably, Portus, 1971; Hancock, 1962; Hince, 1967; Hughes and Rawson, 1960; Isaac, 1974; Kirby, 1965; Moore, 1973; Niland, 1976; 1978 and Woodward, 1970). Equally, it has prompted academic speculation that a process of 'hybridisation' between arbitration and collective bargaining is in train. (See especially Yerbury and Isaac, 1971: Niland, 1978.)

Emphatically, by the mid-1960's, Australian industrial relations were also experiencing the problems of 'wage drift' (ie. payments extracted from employers over the Award rates set by Arbitration), and the erosion of managerial control - as a consequence of the spread of decentralised collective bargaining. Thus, it is no accident that
Australian academics like Foenander (1965) were no less exercised by the question of 'shop steward power' as were Donovan and Fox and Flanders in Britain just a few years later.

The consensual ethic

"The significance and meaning of conflict in industrial society", writes Alan Fox, "has received widely-differing interpretations". (1971: 144). Indeed, as he instances, for Marx, conflict not only served to enhance class solidarity - it was the basic generator of fundamental social change. (Fox, 1971: 144). To begin with, in Marxian eyes, conflict was rooted in the antagonistic material interests of capitalists and workers. Further, by virtue of its pervasiveness and its ineradicable nature in capitalist society, it facilitated the political mobilisation of the working class for their assigned revolutionary confrontation with the forces of capital; from which, Marxian theory decreed, they would emerge victorious.

Characteristically, the Marxian viewpoint on the structure of society and the mechanisms of social change is totally at odds with those conventional sociological standpoints like structural-functionalism which envisage order and stability as 'desirable' - even 'natural' social states.

The structural-functionalist rejection of the Marxist conflict model of society in which the themes of social conflict and social change are accorded analytical prominence has generally been mirrored in industrial relations research through such influential schools of thought as 'scientific management' and 'human relations' - as well
as their more contemporary offshoots like 'organisation theory' and 'systems theory'. Tellingly, however, as Richard Hyman (1972) discloses, whereas the currently unfashionable approaches like 'scientific management' and 'human relations' at least acknowledged the existence of class conflict - even if simply to deplore it - more 'modern-sounding' perspectives like 'systems theory' refuse to analytically entertain the notion of conflict - preferring to invoke such vacuous euphemisms as 'sub-optimal system functioning'.

It is nevertheless noteworthy that the consensual view of society which treats conflict as a negative force i.e. as disruptive and fundamentally 'abnormal' has been theoretically challenged - most notably by Lewis Coser in his much-discussed book, 'The functions of social conflict' (1956). Briefly, Coser's thesis is that the expression of conflict, far from conducing to the disintegration of society, may, paradoxically, contribute to its integration. Echoing Simmel, he adjudges conflict to be 'functional' for society in so far as its articulation provides outlet to 'dissociating elements' which would otherwise imperil the basic consensus that is the presumable 'normal' condition of social systems. From this viewpoint, it would seem that the real source of instability in society derives - not from the articulation of conflict - but, on the contrary, from its repression. Opposed to the 'commonsense' notion of conflict as being destructive - Coser proposes that it may be constructive. In effect, what Coser has continued to do is to stand Karl Marx on his head: for he transforms conflict from a weapon of revolutionary change into an instrument for perpetuating the status-quo.
Critics of the functionalist perspective on conflict have observed that:

Such arguments owe much to the evidence of the history of industrial relations: the development of trade unions from apparent organs of protest and revolt into respectable components of the social fabric of capitalism.

(Hyman, 1971: 24)

As the conventional wisdom would have it, the decreasing intensity of class hostilities in post-Marxian capitalist societies reflects the success of capitalism in localising class conflict as industrial conflict so that industrial disputes no longer involve a direct challenge to the stability of the whole social system. In the words of one of the most influential propagators of this position:

Increasingly, the social relations of industry, including industrial conflict, do not dominate the whole of society but remain confined in their patterns and problems to the sphere of industry. Industry and industrial conflict are, in post-capitalist society, institutionally isolated i.e. confined within the borders of their proper realm and robbed of their influence on other spheres of society.

(Dahrendorf, 1965: 268)

Or, as 'mainstream' sociology succinctly and platitudinously asserts, class conflict has been 'institutionalised'. Typically, institutionalisation is seen as centrally entailing an institutionally-reinforced dissociation of industrial and political conflict.

In practical terms, the worker is exhorted to pursue his economic and political goals through separate institutional mechanisms for mediating dissent. Predictably, the fragmentation of class conflict into industrial conflict and political conflict profoundly undermines the effectiveness of working class protest. Not surprisingly, the
leaders of working class organisations have fallen victim to the "dominant ideology through which industrial action for industrial ends is deprecated but accepted, whereas industrial action for political ends is totally unacceptable". (Allen, 1975: 246).

As this writer further notes: "According to the dominant ideology, political decisions must be made within the rule of law through the parliamentary process". (Allen, 1975: 246). Yet as he reports: "Governments, however, are increasingly intervening in industrial relations and in economic and social affairs in such a way as to influence the industrial objectives of unions". (Allen, 1975: 246).

The case against workers pursuing their economic goals and political goals separately has been put even more strongly by Richard Hyman. As he vehemently maintains, "the increasing intervention of the state on the side of employers in industrial relations means that the traditional trade union segregation of 'industrial' and 'political' activities has become largely meaningless". (Hyman, 1972: 171).

Set against this, it is widely-believed that the political quiescence of contemporary trade unions in advanced capitalist society is due in no small part to the 'legitimacy' they have managed to attain in such systems. As one notable sociological pundit alleges, "industrial conflict has become less violent because its existence has been accepted and its manifestations have been socially regulated ..... By collective bargaining the frozen fronts of industrial conflict are thawed."

(Dahrendorf, 1959: 257, 260). For another 'opinion-maker' in academic social science, the mere presence of tension-management mechanisms in a society acts to powerfully inhibit impulses for radical social change. In fact, he even goes so far as to conjecture that:
Communist movements have developed in countries which were most inclined to deny legitimacy to unions and other democratic expressions of working class aspirations.

(Lipset, 1959: 113)

Clearly, to hold that radical dissent is mainly a product of the absence of institutionalised dispute-settling procedures, is to beg the question of whether the conflicts that a social system generates are necessarily resolvable within its own confines. Put another way, if Tsarist Russia (say), had possessed institutionalised means of handling class protest, would that fact alone have guaranteed the perpetuation of the regime? There is thus no denying that the notion of the 'institutionalisation of class conflict' has assumed the function of a potent stupefier in academic social theory as well as in more practical orientations toward industrial relations. This is illuminated in the popular sociological assumption that the recognition of divergent class interests and their deflection into formalised modes of collective bargaining or State-mediated forms of arbitration (as in Australia), acts to stifle workers' political insurgency by providing a safety-valve for class tensions.

Inevitably, however, such approaches tend to overstate the extent of consensus and stability underlying 'institutionalisation'. Typically, moreover, they all but ignore the degree to which the elemental social abrasions which produced organised worker opposition in the first place continue as powerful barriers to the complete assimilation of such institutions into the capitalist framework. (Hyman, 1971: 25).

(See below).

In short, the capitalist mode of production itself provides an enduring basis for worker-employer conflict.
Conversely, the "institutionalisation of industrial conflict does indeed achieve a provisional containment of disorder; but where workers' grievances and discontents are not resolved, they give rise eventually to new forms of conflict." (Hyman, 1975: 199). Given the fact that institutionalisation of industrial conflict in essence entails a 'dialectical' process of confrontation and compromise, it is easy to see why the overall impression of even highly-formalised modes of industrial relations more nearly suggests a state of 'antagonistic co-operation' than of peaceful co-existence.

Certainly this is true even for societies like Australia where the state maintains a fairly high profile in the regulation of industrial relations. To be sure, the manifest function of the Australian system of arbitration is to nullify the class struggle in the sense of denying it any wider significance than economism. Indeed, arbitration arguably serves to institutionalise the relations of domination and subordination inherent in wage labour by ruling fundamental questions of class power - the so-called 'prerogatives of management', as outside the legitimate arena of industrial dispute.

Significantly, there is a piece of sociological mythology which maintains that the institutionalisation of industrial conflict has accomplished the decline of trade union strike activity. Expressed in the form of the 'Ross-Hartman thesis', this view posits the 'withering away of the strike'. Fittingly, this argument has been comprehensively debunked by Geoffrey Ingham (1974). Plainly, moreover, the Australian experience provides convincing refutation of any idea that the provision of formal channels for settling industrial disputes has resulted in a reduced incidence of strikes. For, even
allowing for the definition problems that plague the making of cross-
country comparisons, it is still strikingly evident that Australia has
arguably one of the highest strike-rates of any advanced capitalist
society. Accordingly, as one Australian academic commentator concludes,
"it is still fair to say that Australia's record would place in the
folk-lore category the belief that compulsory arbitration effectively

Such evidence completely explodes the supposition that the attenuation
of class conflict is attributable to a decline in industrial conflict.
In fact, as more sophisticated theorists recognise, it is the
qualitative transformation of class conflict - specifically, its
expression in predominantly industrial terms - rather than a quantitative
reduction of industrial conflict per se that is central to the postulate
of institutionalisation. For example, in the context of Australian
industrial relations, institutionalisation involves the mutual legitim-
ination of the so-called 'two sides of industry'. In effect, the
Australian arbitration system simultaneously highlights and neutralises
the irrepressible conflict of interests between capital and labour by
its orderly canalising of class resentments into economic bargaining -
thus in essence depriving such grievances of political outlet.

Through arbitration, Australian trade unions are offered some power-
ful incentives to work within the system instead of actively seeking
to precipitate its overthrow. Rawson, for example, has drawn attention
to the extent to which the organisational fortunes of Australian trade
unions are dependent upon the functional requirements of the arbitration
system. As he writes:
Although many unions pre-date the arbitration system, there is a sense in which the majority of them have been, in the literal sense, the creatures of that system. This helps to explain the extent to which (willingly for the most part) they have submitted to its regulation and control.

(Rawson, 1978: 25)

Certainly, the arbitration system has some very effective means of persuasion to secure trade union compliance with its authority. An enticing carrot it holds out is the recognition it can confer on a trade union as the sole legitimate organisational representative of particular categories of workers. Alternatively, it wields a mighty big stick in the form of its power to deregister a trade union or to withhold recognition of it - thereby effectively consigning it to the industrial wilderness where it may face an acute struggle to survive.

It is not surprising therefore that, as Rawson notes:

The unwillingness of even radical-led unions to cut themselves off from arbitration suggests that the advantages of registration are great. They are certainly very important for unions which have accommodated themselves to the system and come to rely on its protection. Many of the smaller unions, whose members are too few in number and too poor in resources to maintain a substantial organisational structure, would simply vanish if larger, and in some cases more appropriate, unions had free access to their members. Most of the larger unions themselves have adjusted their level of organisation and financing to a system which requires a minimum of effort from them, either in enrolling and holding members or in the negotiation of conditions.

(1978: 49-50)

Clearly, the depoliticisation of class conflict depends ultimately for its effectiveness on the extent to which the industrial militancy of organised labour can be deflected into, what industrial relations writers generally describe as 'compromise bargaining'.
Correspondingly, however, as more insightful sociological observers have noted, the 'stability' which emanates from the institutionalisation of industrial conflict tends to be notoriously fragile.

Paradoxically, despite such concessions to 'reality', much of the conventional sociological analysis of conflict presumes that it is ultimately resolvable within the confines of the existing social system. Tellingly, this 'consensual ethic' underlies both the so-called 'equilibrium' and 'conflict' models generated by functionalism. Fundamental to the functionalist approach, as Gunder Frank rightly points out is the surmise "that there is, and indeed must be, a long run tendency toward social integration in all existing social systems. But functionalist analysis does not, and due to its own short-run basis cannot, present any empirical evidence in support of the supposed fact of long run integration". (1969: 101)

Characteristically, much of the debate within functionalism between 'equilibrium' or 'consensus' models of society and 'conflict' models is invalidated by the common problematic within which they are framed. Put simply, they both tend to envisage society as a basic consensus wherein conflict is generated but ultimately reconciled. Certainly, functionalist conflict models have no conception of a system in which opposing interests are so starkly defined that the ultimate resolution

Fundamentally, moreover, the implied toleration of strikes and opposition political parties signifies the success of 'institutionalisation' in deflecting class antagonisms into relatively-autonomous spheres of economic and political protest.
of social conflict involves the destruction of one of the parties. 
(See below) On the contrary, as Gunder Frank observes, "the function 
of social conflict for functionalists is only social integration. 
All other social conflicts - revolution and social disintegration - 
are off-limits for functionalist theory and practice". (1969: 103)

A very useful way of conceptualising functionalist 'conflict' models, 
is in terms of Allen's distinction between a conceptual innovation and 
a conceptual adaptation. In his view, a "conceptual innovation (is) 
an alteration in the conceptual basis itself while an adaptation makes 
it more efficient" (1975: 47). To the extent that the 'conflict' 
models thrown up by functionalism seek to divest functional theory of 
its more utopian connotations rather than to question what Gunder Frank 
(1969) calls its 'structural fundamentals', they are clearly 'conceptual 
adaptations'.

According to Allen (1975), two of the sociological examples, par 
excellence, of 'conceptual adaptations', are Coser's 'The functions of 
social conflict' and Dahrendorf's 'Class and class conflict in industrial

In fact, it might well be argued that the very notion of radical 
change within the prevailing system is an absurdity given the 
fact that the conditions which most often require urgent change 
are exactly those upon which the system's preservation is 
predicated. Typically, the functionalist approach to conflict 
tends to treat struggles and, by implication, the vested interests 
against which they are waged in ahistorical terms, ie. as permanent 
aspects of all social systems. Since 'stability' is generally 
regarded by this approach as a universal functional prerequisite, 
the containment of conflict is inevitably accorded at least tacit 
approval. Rarely do functionalist formulations centrally examine 
the specific causes of conflict - let alone consider the necessity 
for the use of violence to shift an incumbent political administration.
society'. In Allen's view, "the conceptual adaptation to which Coser contributed was the introduction of conflict into the system frame of reference". (1975: 48). As he further reports, Coser's work was greeted with relief, if not enthusiasm, by many academic commentators, who saw it as a refutation of the lacerating taunt that functionalism lacked the ability to 'handle conflict'. (Allen, 1975: 48)

However, it was Dahrendorf's epic analysis of 'class and class conflict' which really set academic sociology buzzing with excitement. Like a breath of fresh air after the crippling conceptual aridity of cold War-era sociology, Dahrendorf's work, predictably, stirred wide interest upon its publication in the late 1950's and profoundly influenced sociological thinking and research for more than a decade.

To disenchanted liberals, critical of the static, consensual orientation of the dominant paradigms in academic sociology, Dahrendorf's work had an instant appeal: here at last was a rigorously analytical study which spoke of class rather than 'stratification'; which was not afraid to face up to the challenge posed by Marxist ideas, and which, equally-importantly "treated (conflict) ... systematically as a permanent feature of reality rather than as a minor remedial friction". (Allen, 1975: 49). Conversely, to the 'conservatives' within sociology, Dahrendorf's analysis although contradicting many of their ideas nevertheless provided a powerful defense of the existing social system: notably, it epitomised the emphatic theoretical laying to rest of the Marxist bogey which had so bedevilled academic sociology.

As Allen (1975) contends, Dahrendorf's approach comprised a highly significant 'conceptual adaptation' to the body of sociological theory.
Its major accomplishment was to:

Analyse conflict as a consequence of authority relations rather than as the result of the social relations of production on the one hand or disturbed equilibrium on the other. He assumed that there had been a divorce of ownership from control in industry and that the controlling managerial class possessed its own values, but that these did not place employees and their unions in implacable opposition to management. Authority-derived conflict, therefore, was not seen as a disintegrating force, dividing classes and providing the stimulus for structural change but as an adapting one through which institutionalisation and democratisation contributed toward the achievement of equilibrium within the existing social relations of production.

(Allen, 1975: 49)

Characteristically, perhaps, presupposed in the idea of conflict 'institutionalisation' is the assumption that the existing system is dynamic by virtue of its containment of the various forces that threaten to explode it. Naturally, the question of whether managed change within a system is capable of remedying its own fundamental inequalities is rarely in doubt in Dahrendorf's text. For example, he advances the claim that in the advanced Western countries: ownership of capital is 'widely dispersed'. To support this view, he mentions that 3 per cent and 8 per cent respectively of the populations of West Germany and the U.S.A. "own one or more shares of joint-stock companies". (Dahrendorf, 1959: 42). Like Nichols, one might be forgiven for asking "whether the figures cited are evidence of dispersion or concentration." (1970: 42) (See below)

In fact, the spuriousness of Dahrendorf's 'dispersal' thesis is highlighted by the increasing tendency of large corporations to buy back their own publicly-held stocks. As a consequence, while the number of stockholders has risen, the proportion of individually-held corporate stock has actually declined (see Domhoff, 1967). Further, while 8 per cent of the U.S. population may own stock, the proportion of stockowners who derive the bulk of their incomes from shareholdings is very much less. As one economist estimated, approximately 40 per cent of the income from property in the U.S. went to only 1 per cent of the population. (See Lampman, 1962)
For Dahrendorf, however, the spread of the joint-stock form of enterprise has led, in Nichols' words to "the emergence of a new kind of industrial order in which ownership and control are separated and for which the term 'capitalism' is no longer appropriate" (1970: 42).

As Dahrendorf himself tells us:

> if we want to retain the concept of a capitalist society at all .. (it seems advisable) .. to insist on the union of private ownership and factual control of the instruments of production as the distinguishing feature of a capitalist form of society.

(1959: 40)

Thus, Marx's concept of capitalism as a transitory historical stage has been completely inverted by Dahrendorf. For to suggest that the industrialised Western countries are no longer capitalist is to imply, contrary to Marx, that such societies have completely transformed themselves - indeed, capitalism itself has been transcended - without the unpleasant necessity to fire a shot in anger. (This is not to deny that corporate capitalism does differ from its laissez-faire predecessor, but as critics like Hacker (1965) pointedly observed, the change has been more in the adjective than in the noun). In view of his fundamental amendment to the Marxian notion of capitalism, Nichols' interpretation that "Dahrendorf's own views are in consonance with what he takes to be the 'Marxist' tradition" (1970: 41), only goes to illustrate the inherent capacity of a 'conceptual adaptation' to mislead.

Revealingly, moreover, Dahrendorf's redefinition of class in terms of 'authority relationships' has important implications for his treatment of social conflict. As Nichols rightly points out, the simple-minded view "that since the managers are not property owners the conflict of
interest between owners and workers is no longer present" (1970: 45) is certainly not endorsed by Dahrendorf. On the contrary, "the major function of class and class conflict was to establish that authority is the major determinant of class and also of class conflict". (Nichols, 1970: 45-6). Yet, what the conception of class in terms of authority does is to drastically revise Marx's idea of class and class conflict. Notably, instead of the projected polarisation of society into two huge mutually-antagonistic camps as envisioned by Marx, Dahrendorf sees 'class conflict' as becoming more diffused as a result of the basic line of cleavage created by authority within every institutional hierarchy.

Critics of this view like Parkin (1971) and Giddens (1973) have drawn the obvious inferences from it in making the point that such a perspective is intrinsically at odds with the classical Marxian notion of a unitary ruling class - or, indeed, a unitary working class for that matter. But then Dahrendorf seems quite happy to concede the idea of 'pluralistic' class struggles within 'industrial society'. As he affirms: "In theory, there can be as many competing, conflict-ing, or coexisting dominating conflict groups in a society as there are associations". (Dahrendorf, 1959: 198)

Inevitably, the trivialised empiricism of U.S. sociology has made its characteristically-shallow contribution to the authority/class debate in the form of a survey conducted by Lopreato (1968) in - of all places, Italy! Briefly, the researcher sets out to test Dahrendorf's premiss of the dichotomous division of industry between those with authority and those without. The 'findings' are yawningly predictable: 'authority'
(at least in the highly-superficial way it is operationally-defined by Lopreato), is pluralistically distributed in industrial enterprises; those who are most resentful of its exercise are not the regimented, alienated workers on the shopfloor and in the office (in Lopreato's parlance, the 'obey class') but the lower rungs of the so-called 'command class' i.e. junior management and supervisors.

This emphasis on how the various parties within industry subjectively perceive their situation manifestly neglects what is central to Dahrendorf's analysis of authority: the objective structural factors which constitute the framework within which the attitudes and outlooks of superordinate and subordinate groups in industry are formed. By contrast, Crouch grasps the point perfectly when he states that the "exchange relationship around employment provides the basis for the fundamental dichotomous class model .... The inequality of the exchange implies at one and the same time an inequality of economic reward and an authority relationship; and it is the capacity of these dimensions to have major consequences for the lives of actual persons that the tendency for class relations to assume an empirical form consists". (1977: 7)

On the other hand, given the 'pluralistic' connotations of his model of class and class conflict, Dahrendorf is hardly in a position to complain when more conservatively-inclined writers make use of his work to support their simplistic thesis that class struggle in advanced Western societies has been totally transformed into competition and conflict between various institutional pressure groups.
The significance of viewing class and class conflict in pluralistic terms has been analysed by Allen in a penetrating critique. As he warns us:

Pluralism assumes permanent diversity of interests, objectives and power within groups, organisations and society and between them. Thus every conceivable tension, friction or conflict can be acknowledged. All situations are diffused, fragmented and competitive. There are rival sources of power, of leadership and attachment. The diversity, however, is reconcilable by assumption. The different interests are assumed to comprise coalitions or viable collaborative structures in which the diversity can be maintained, freedom of action can be provided, consistent with the preservation of the system or society under consideration - in which, in other words, balance can be achieved. Pluralism is a particular expression of equilibrium analysis; it represents permanent aberrations from equilibrium positions in which the possibility of achieving them is always present.

(Allen, 1975: 50)

Such insights however are clearly foreign to the work of researchers like Higley et.al. (1979), Fox (1966), and Fox and Flanders (1969).

To assume as Dahrendorf evidently does, that the Marxist concept of a capitalist ruling class is invalidated unless one can clearly demonstrate an "axiomatic identity between the managers or capitalists of industry and the ministers or highest civil servants of the state" (1959: 141), is to ignore that what holds the various vested interests together is ultimately an attitude of mind rather than social ties.
The purpose of Eigley et. al’s research is in itself unexceptionable: to uncover the "structure and behaviour of Australian national elites" (1979: 3). Typically, 'power in society is seen by the researchers as being pluralistically distributed among a number of elites viz. the 'business elite', the 'trade union elite', the 'political elite' etc. Unbelievably enough, Eigley et. al. even manages to identify a 'voluntary association elite' - a concept which implies that the leading personnel of any institutional hierarchy ipso facto constitute an 'elite'. This impression is reinforced by the authors' statement that "there must be hierarchies of power in all large and complex organisations". (Eigley et. al. 1979: 3) (Emphasis added) Why should this be so? Simply because, as the writers assert, organisational "size and complexity necessarily creates elites". (Eigley et. al., 1979: 3) Clearly, to argue in this fashion is to uncritically accept Michels' glib epigram: 'who says organisation says oligarchy.' Although offering a degree of insight, this aphorism assumes that functional specialisation necessarily entails social domination - a view which to say the least, is highly-debatable. Significantly, the problem of class conflict is extinguished as a question in Eigley et. al's study: instead, what we are offered is a characterisation of trade unions as simply one of a number of competing pressure groups. Predictably, the image of social conflict which emerges from Eigley et. al's analysis of elites, is of a diffuse power struggle among shifting coalitions of interest. It is further noteworthy that in including trade union leaders in their pantheon of 'national elites', the researchers implicitly assume that such officials necessarily share the prevailing ideological consensus. For example, as they write: "The presumption underlying this study is that these distinctive features of Australian society -- (political stability and democratic practices) -- derive primarily from the consensual unified structure that its elites have always formed". (Eigley et. al., 1979: 21). Surely, however, the existence or not of ideological consensus is a question for empirical investigation rather than 'a priori' assertion. Further what Therborn (1978) calls the 'subjectivist' methodological approach is evident from the questions these researchers ask: Who runs Australia? How is it run? - as the blurb on the cover of their book so helpfully informs us. Criticising the subjectivist orientation which suffuses the pluralist/elitist debate, Therborn maintains that the question of "who rules: a unified elite or competing leadership groups?" has to be viewed in the context of far more important structural considerations viz. "What kind of society and what basic relations of production are being reproduced? By what mechanisms? etc." As he concludes: "The analysis of reproduction enables us to explain how the different moments of the exercise of power in society may be interrelated, even in the absence of a conscious inter-personal connection." (Therborn, 1978: 137-8)
ideology' which permeates 'scientific management' and 'human relations' perspectives on the employer/employee relationship. As noted, Fox has subsequently repudiated the 'pluralist' position, arguing that it presents a highly-misleading picture of the realities of power in capitalist society. Critics of his 'radicalisation of industrial relations theory' are, however, frankly sceptical that his new-found 'radical' approach does more than simply "develop and modify pluralism in response to changing conditions". (Wood and Elliott, 1977: 109).

In a sense, such an orientation typifies the sparse sociological attempts to theorise either about society in general, or about industrial relations in particular. Even where a genuine effort is made to address the fact of social conflict, the attempt is inevitably aborted by the consensual ethic which suffuses much of academic sociological theory. Yet, despite such criticisms of their conceptual inadequacy, these theoretical initiatives are to be welcomed - particularly in the field of industrial relations. For, all too often, a gross empiricism characterises discussion of the subject. Indeed, the study of industrial relations is noted for its reluctance to acknowledge any necessity for 'theory' - let alone Marxist theory. The typical approach is still regrettably the superficial standpoint spelled out by a leading academic expert on Australian industrial relations. Writing about the problem of 'effective conflict resolution', he proceeded to simplistically argue:
Where industrial capitalism is considered to produce inevitable and revolutionary class conflict, the question of whether compulsory arbitration or collective bargaining better facilitates dispute resolution between employers and employees becomes largely irrelevant. Marxists would no doubt point out that both modes require the parties' acceptance of a stable non-Marxist framework for effective operation. Those rejecting capitalism or one of its modifications might prefer one process of dispute resolution over the other for strategic reasons in interim, but over the long run both arbitration and bargaining would be rejected, equally, as instruments of capitalism. But to the extent that we are prepared to endorse a non-Marxist economic and social framework, the significant differences between compulsory arbitration and collective bargaining in enhancing genuine dispute resolution take on an abiding relevance.

(Niland, 1978: 35)

Having thus presumably 'disposed' of Marx, this researcher can then get on with the serious academic business of minutely describing how the system manages to endlessly resolve its industrial frictions. However, to situate the academic study of industrial relations in this fixed and limited concept of social reality is to entrench the tunnel-visioned focus and crude empiricism of the discipline. As we can see from Niland's statement, 'pragmatism' in the academic study of industrial relations almost inevitably seems to involve a taken-for-granted view of the existing institutional structure and a corresponding presumption of a basic consensus in society.

Put simply, capitalism sets the terms of debate in industrial relations. Accordingly, the role of the researcher is delimited by this assumed 'reality'. Additionally, 'industrial relations' thinking about conflict is premised upon a 'consensual ethic' which presupposes that compromises between warring factions are not only possible but desirable. To the extent that the basic methodological assumptions of industrial relations accept as given, the legitimacy of the existing power structure,
they are the assumptions - not of a scientific endeavour but of apologetics and ideology. As Allen has usefully reminded us:

An ideology is essentially a mechanism for social control. It works by producing a uniformity of responses about the primary activities in a society. In other words, in various ways it imposes a conformity on a society. This is necessary for the protection of the dominant power interests. --- Unless power is to be perpetually retained through the crude use of armed might the members of a society must be convinced of the legitimacy of the power structure.

(1975: 230)

For the exponents of industrial relations like Niland, who are 'prepared to endorse a non-Marxist economic and social framework' (perhaps it is too innocent of the scientific enterprise to suggest that the basic task of the researcher is not to 'endorse' any particular methodological perspective but to critically analyse its advantages and limitations for explaining particular phenomena), no other options to the given institutional structure can be considered. But this is to say, in essence, that a capitalist framework is a necessary pre-requisite for the production of goods and services. To pose the issue in these terms is to immediately apprehend the discredited, ideological character of industrial relations premisses.

Clearly, if the academic study of industrial relations is to contribute anything of scientific value to our understanding of it, then it will need to keep in mind that "science --- can only pose problems on the terrain and within the horizon of a definite theoretical structure". Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 25). Or, as Einstein's famous dictum asserts: "It is the theory which decides what we can observe". (Cited in Bell, 1976: 9). However, like the person who spoke prose
without realising it, the 'pragmatic' view of industrial relations similarly ignores that: "Empirical data are interpretations within the framework of previous theories; as a result, they themselves share the latter's hypothetical character." (Habermas, 1974: 199). Possibly, however, one of the most compelling reasons for the need for systematic theoretical thinking in industrial relations is that, as Paul Hirst observed of sociological theory:

\[
\text{The lower the general level of theoretical culture the more difficult it becomes to continue and to develop advanced theoretical work.}
\]

\[(1972: 216)\]

The stratification explanans

Since the Second World War; the occupational structure of Australia has, like that of most economically-developed countries, undergone a profound transformation. Notably, all these societies have experienced a dramatic and continuing rise in the 'non-manual' segment of their workforces. Significantly, 'white-collar' employment has expanded not only numerically but as a proportion of the labour force. The Australian data on occupational change are illustrative of the fundamental shifts in employment which have occurred in the advanced industrial nations.

Between 1947 and 1971, professional, executive and clerical employment increased by 122 per cent while labour force growth as a whole expanded by only 66 per cent. Even more tellingly, the proportions of workers employed in manufacturing rose by only 44 per cent, while
those in primary industry actually fell by 7 per cent. (Lansbury, 1977: 186-7). In the grandiloquent prose of this writer:

The archetypal Australian is no longer a sunburt pioneer of the outback but a grey-suited, white-collar worker in the plate-glass offices of the fast-growing cities.

(Lansbury, 1977a: 184)

What this thicket of cliches serves to reinforce is the fact that the occupational composition of Australia has markedly changed. Inevitably, the rapid expansion of the white-collar sector in the developed countries has generated speculation about the implications of this trend for the growth and indeed the very character of trade unionism.

Initially, the rise to prominence of the 'service sector' was viewed by some commentators as heralding the demise of the trade union movement. Predictably, such ideas gained credence from the steady and virtually universal contraction of union growth throughout the developed capitalist world from the mid-1950's to about the early 1970's. Typically, a pessimistic but, nevertheless, highly-influential interpretation suggested that trade union growth in the so-called 'post-industrial' societies had reached 'saturation point'. (Bell, 1974). Stated simply, the contraction of employment in the heavy industries in which unions have traditionally enjoyed their greatest strength has meant that the established centres of union influence are on the decline.

Further, since the bulk of the employees in heavy manufacturing, mining, railroad and similar types of employment were already
unionised, the only scope for further unionisation was to organise
the employees of the small, scattered firms in this sector which
still remained outside the union orbit. However, the gains of such
an operation are likely to be offset by its potential cost and by
the effort it requires in terms of time and manpower.

In effect, while unionisation was expected to make a significant
headway in the more proletarian segments of the service sector, these
advances would be counter-balanced by the shrinkage of membership in
traditional areas like the docks, railways and mining as technological
change and economic considerations made their impact felt. Finally,
the unhappy prospects for further growth in trade unionism was indicated
by the fact that it was precisely among the most rapidly increasing
sections of the labour force i.e. professional, administrative and
technical employees - particularly those employed by private industry,
that union recruitment experienced least success. (Bell, 1974: 140)

For British writers, the inability of the trade unions to attract
white-collar and professional workers was seen to be a product of the
poor image these institutions had in the eyes of such workers. To
such enthusiasts of union reform like Eric Wigham (1961) and Michael
Shanks (1967), trade unions had to cast off the 'period' flavour that
still clung to them. Indeed, in the public mind, so it was argued,
the trade union movement was epitomised by Lowe's cartoon portrayal
of the T.U.C. as a carthorse: solid, ponderous, dull and out-of-date
in the technological era. As Michael Shanks ridiculed, the organis-
tional structures and the political rhetoric of the trade unions were
hangovers of a bygone age. To survive in the brave new technological
world of the second half of the 20th century, the trade unions would
have to adapt - and quickly, or perish. No less impressed by the challenge facing trade unions, Eric Wigham (1961) was to put forward no fewer than twenty-five recommendations - or more accurately, 'cures' for their backwardness. (See below 1)

What is significant about this debate is that the trade unions have totally confounded their critics. Not only have the reports of their death been greatly exaggerated, but far from becoming moribund, as the professional jeremiahs predicted, the trade unions have grown considerably in size, influence and importance. The exception in this regard (if Bell's (1974) figures are to be accepted), is the U.S.A. where the percentage of union members in the labour force has declined. (See below 2)

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1 As Rawson points out, little of this kind of discussion took place in Australia, partly because, as he suggests, "concern about declining union density during this period was largely muffled by the effects of a rapidly growing workforce". (1978: 29). In other words, as Rawson reports, while the percentage of the unionised workforce fell, the raw numbers of trade unionists had actually risen quite significantly (1978: 29).

2 It would arguably be as misleading to overemphasise the influence of managerial antipathy towards trade unionism in explaining the proportional decline of unionisation in the U.S.A. as it would be naive to completely deny it of any significance. Plainly, if trade unionism in the U.S.A. has failed to make any headway among certain categories of white-collar workers, some part of the blame for this can justifiably be attributed to the attitudes and policies of U.S. managements. To put it bluntly, the acceptance of trade unionism by U.S. employers has traditionally been, at best, grudging. For example, Bell himself, in his earlier and equally-controversial magnum opus was moved to comment on the 'uneasy partnership' which prevailed between management and union in the U.S.: "uneasy because in many cases employers would still prefer to exercise sole power, although the more sophisticated employers know the value of such powerful allies as the unions in safeguarding their interests; uneasy too, because there is still the historic tendency of labour (continued next page)
Characteristically, Bell has sought to draw all kinds of question-
ably pessimistic inferences from the data. However, certain points
need to be kept firmly in mind. Firstly, the percentage of trade
union members in the U.S. has rarely exceeded 25 per cent - thus
invalidating any implication that the decline of class polarisation
is a product of the 'coming of post-industrial society'. Similarly,
the 'decline' in trade union membership, as Bell's own figures
confirm, has, to say the least, been slight - from 22.9 per cent
in 1947 to 22.6 in 1970. Revealingly, moreover, the decline has
been anything but uniform. Taking Bell's figures again, we see
that from a high point of 25.2 per cent in 1956, trade union member-
ship declined to 23.6 per cent and 22.2 per cent in 1960 and 1964
but rose again in 1968 to 23 per cent, finally falling back to
22.6 per cent in 1970. Typically, Bell's explanation of the
reasons for the fluctuations in union membership is far from
satisfactory - a feature it shares with much of the Australian

acting as a social movement to oppose employers as a class". (1960: 216)
To be sure, the vast sums spent by U.S. industry on social science
research into 'labour problems' since the celebrated 'Hawthorne
studies', epitomises this concern. Significantly, however, despite
the massive efforts to improve 'human relations' between managers
and workers and to train factory supervisors in 'communication
skills' in the wake of the Hawthorne studies, U.S. employers have
not managed to eliminate blue-collar unionism. Further, despite
the infinitely more sophisticated techniques of behavioural
manipulation that contemporary social science has placed at their
disposal, it is doubtful whether U.S. managements will ultimately
be any more successful in permanently repressing white-collar and
professional unionisation in commerce, finance etc. as Bell (1974)
so obviously believes.
writing on this problem. (See below)

Leaving aside the plainly exceptional case of the U.S., it is noteworthy that trade union membership in both Australia and the U.K. has risen considerably. Basically, much of the reason for this has been due to the success of the trade unions in organising groups of workers previously thought to be immune to unionisation viz. professional, technical and administrative employees and more particularly, women white collar workers. (Bain and Price, 1972; Lansbury, 1977a, 1977b; Rawson, 1978). The upsurge of union growth is all the more remarkable because it has taken place against a simultaneous decline of employment in the industries where the unions have traditionally enjoyed their greatest strength.

According to the conventional academic wisdom, the permanent and continuing shift from manufacturing to service employment ipso facto

For example, to argue as such writers do, that the impetus to the unionisation of the new categories of 'white-collar' workers came basically from union officials, employers and the State is to cloud rather than clarify discussion of white-collar unionism. To begin with, such an argument completely devalues the rising industrial militancy of many segments of the white-collar rank-and-file. Equally importantly, it evades examination of the structural changes to white-collar work, which, in drastically and permanently undermining the work conditions, pay and prestige of such employees created the objective preconditions for their organisation. Characteristically, the image presented by Rawson (1978) of passive white-collar workers in Australia being dragooned into joining trade unions by 'compulsory unionism' clauses in their employment contracts gives methodological priority to the psychological predispositions of such workers without troubling to analyse the structural context in which such outlooks are formed and, more importantly, are changed.
spelled the decay and ultimate disappearance of the trade union movement. To those renowned experts in the art of instant prophecy like Bell (1960, 1974) and Galbraith (1967) the future of unionism was bleak. Basically, their argument could be summarised as follows: trade unions were predominantly associated with secondary industry and with manual employment; both these areas were on the wane hence trade unions could be expected to experience a drastic decline in membership.

As noted, this simplistic syllogism has been decisively refuted - at least in Australia and the U.K., for reasons which have very little to do with their 'public image', as the likes of Wigham (1961) and Shanks (1967) once fondly believed. (See below) In their singular preoccupation with whether or not the trade unions could attract the more prestigious categories of non-manual employees, what these writers neglected to consider were the objective features of the non-manual work situation which might lead such workers to join unions. Put bluntly, in their zeal to demonstrate that trade unions held little appeal for the white-collar workers, what such writers conveniently overlooked is the historical fact that perennially, workers have been - not so much attracted to trade unions as driven to them.

In particular, Shanks expressed considerable disappointment that the trade union movement had not managed to produce a 'Winston Churchill' - an organisation which also 'badly needs its Walter Reuther' and an 'able and well-paid staff to map out the future and plan strategy' (1967: 97-114).
Likewise, to seek to explain the processes of decline and growth in particular segments of the Australian labour force in terms of State support or the lack of it, as writers like Howard (1977), Lansbury (1977a; 1977b) and Rawson (1978) do, is to beg the question of why the State should voluntarily wish to foster the development of trade unionism. (See below) More importantly, in confining their discussion of union growth to proximate causes - such as the attitudes of employers and the State, what these analyses neglect to do is to examine how, for example, the industrial and political attitudes and behaviour of various categories of 'white-collar' labour are likely to be affected by changes to their objective class situation.

In tracing the sources of support for the introduction and extension of 'arbitration' in Australia, Howard (1977) points to what he evidently regards as a paradox, viz. that the creation of the system though stemming initially from trade union pressure, was readily accepted by the State. Characteristically, he fails to draw the obvious implications of such support. Likewise, although he notes the constitutional sanctions for the system, the point that arbitration is a mechanism for reinforcing the capitalist system in Australia is all but lost on this writer. Moreover, he talks about arbitration giving unions "government protection from employers and from rival unions" (Howard, 1977: 265) and cites approvingly Higgins' (the second President of the Arbitration Court) grandiose view of arbitration as a metaphor for equity and social justice, while blandly overlooking the fact that arbitration inhibits trade unions from contesting the right of owners of capital to appropriate surplus-value. In fact Howard's account of how the arbitration system came into being is most revealing. As he informs us: "In the Australian case, the society passed to governments the task of creating an industrial relations mechanism which would provide a measure of peace and which would shield the whole society from the distasteful effects of industrial struggles". (1977: 273). Such mystifications about 'society' however, leave unanswered fundamental questions about the nature of power in capitalist systems; in effect, the problems of the ownership of the means of production and the appropriation of surplus-value - central to any real understanding of the structure of economic power - are tacitly reduced to the status of inconsequences.
In fact, contrary to the euphoric predictions of the 'post-industrial society' thesis, the generalised upgrading of labour in response to the needs of a 'technological' society has simply not eventuated. Rather, as Braverman (1974) reports, the introduction of new work technologies has led to a progressive 'deskilling' of labour which he insightfully characterises as the 'degradation of work.'

Tellingly, clerical, professional and technically-qualified employment has not escaped the effects of these changes within the labour-process. Thus, while such categories of workers have grown numerically more prominent in advanced capitalist societies, the identity of vast slabs of this new strata as distinctively-privileged occupations has been made a hollow pretence by objective changes in their work situation and the consequent decline in pay, prestige and job security of such employment. (It is also noteworthy that in the present economic crisis in Australia, such presumably high-status professions like architecture and engineering as well as those classic models of professions viz. law and medicine, are experiencing relatively-high levels of unemployment. The ultimate irony of 'post-industrialism' is the incipient growth of unemployment among computer specialists!)

What all of this adds up to, is that Bell's (1974) grandiose (and flawed) vision of benevolent technocratic hegemony has been completely exploded. As was obvious from the outset to those whose vision was not blurred by the rose-tinted prisms of Bell's recklessly-optimistic futurology, the scientists and engineers instead of becoming a new ruling class were essentially being transformed into the 'servants of power' - to use Baritz's (1965) very apt expression. In effect, as
Giddens (1973) noted, 'post-industrialism' really meant that the 'powerful have knowledge' rather than that the 'knowledgeable have power'.

To put it another way, the assimilation of science and technology within the existing framework of capitalist power relations symbolises - not the creation of a qualitatively-different social system but the entrenchment of the existing system of power and privilege. Thus, the expansion of the ranks of 'intellectual' labour heralds the extension of traditional oppressions rather than the birth of a new millenium. To understand the altered situation of white-collar and professional employment and the potential for enhanced class-consciousness on the part of these groups, it is vital to grasp the phenomenon of 'stratification in the labor process' as Wachtel (1974) dubs it. Before proceeding to do so, however, it is necessary to dispose of some of the misleading formulations which are propagated by the contemporary 'Left'.

The static orientation

There is a vast amount of academic literature providing a wealth of information on various aspects of 'industrial relations' in capitalist society. In fact, few areas have been more thoroughly studied, measured, tabulated and reported on - even though significant gaps remain to be filled. Yet, for all the massive documentation and, in some cases, the undeniable technical virtuosity of conventional industrial relations research, it is highly-debatable whether this perspective offers (or, indeed, even claims to do so), an adequate
intellectual basis for the theoretical understanding of working class institutions like trade unions - let alone the factors which conduce to their development and subsequent possibilities.

Characteristically, the industrial relations perspective, as earlier emphasised, is predicated upon the assumption that capitalism is basically unproblematic. Fundamental to this approach, is the presumption that the capitalist system has the ability to endlessly reproduce its productive relations. Trade unionism therefore, not surprisingly, is axiomatically viewed as part of a broad ideological consensus which assumes the inviolability of the capitalist framework of industrial relations and simply devotes its energies to getting the best terms within it.

Significantly, the attempts to develop 'Marxist' approaches to 'industrial relations' ironically embody many of the conceptual deficiencies of the latter. Illustrative of this is Richard Hyman's (1975) 'Marxist introduction' to industrial relations. Briefly, and very promisingly, the stated aim of Hyman's book is to "sketch an approach which grasps 'industrial relations' as an element in a totality of social relations of production" (1975: ix). In particular, as he further tells us, his approach "seeks to develop an analysis which is firmly rooted in the Marxist perspective, and is necessarily influenced by the attempts of others to apply this perspective to the field of industrial relations" (Hyman, 1975: 6).

Essentially, what Hyman claims to be offering is a "political economy of industrial relations". (1975: 31) Central to this perspective, is a definition of industrial relations as the "processes of control
over work relations". (1975: 12) More importantly, these 'processes of control' take place within a distinctively capitalist context.

This means that much of the productive system is privately owned, with ownership concentrated in a very small number of hands, that profit - the pursuit of economic returns to the owners - is the key influence on company policy (whether or not top management actually possesses a financial stake in the firm); and that control over production is enforced downwards by the owners' managerial agents and functionaries.

(Hyman, 1975: 19)

Typically, Hyman makes much of his 'dialectical' approach and insists upon according conceptual primacy to the 'social relations of production'. Yet, he neglects to demonstrate precisely how the changes within the capitalist labour process which are presently transforming the occupational structures of capitalist societies and drastically altering the patterns of union growth and activity are mediated by the social relations of production. More precisely (and bluntly), Hyman's approach evidences little concern with bringing Marxism up to date in the face of the profound structural transformations which have been generated by the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, other than occasionally acknowledging that 'clerical' and 'technical' workers exist, Hyman does not explore the significance of the structural locations of such layers in the labour process for either their unionisation or their industrial behaviour.

Certainly, he gives little analytical attention to the degree to which the stratified nature of the labour process generates divergences of interest between the various segments of the labour force thereby
conducing to sectionalism in their organisational activities. (See below 1.) Consequently, while he advocates greater trade union and worker solidarity, he can provide no inkling as to the actual or potential structural bases for such alliances. Thus, although the value of 'industrial relations' in its bourgeois forms is interrogated and even condemned as irrelevant by Hyman, all that he can seemingly offer in the final analysis is a vague wish for the "abolition of 'industrial relations' as it exists today through working-class struggle". (1975: x) (See below 2.)

The limitations of current Marxist efforts to provide a theoretical approach to industrial relations are even more glaring apparent in

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1 Clearly, the ramifications of the tendency for the hierarchical form of the labour-process to stratify not only between but within occupations would seem to require at least some theoretical explanation.

2 Despite such criticisms, Hyman's work is a great advance over the descriptive, empiricist approaches which tend to predominate in 'industrial relations', since it offers much-needed theoretical insight into the complex contradictions which underlie the wage-labour relationship under capitalism. It is quite true, as Hyman indicates, that the 'institutionalisation of class conflict' is highly-precarious in that such conflict is inherent in the class relationship. But if the sectional nature of such conflict is not spelled out in more detail, the limits (and possibilities) of such struggle is almost impossible to assess. Admirable though his aims are to provide an approach to industrial relations which is 'explicitly theoretical', Hyman's basic failure to relate his analysis to any empirical reality results in a fundamentally untenable level of generality and abstractness in his social gaze. While it can readily be conceded that theory may assume a wide variety - both of forms and of levels of abstraction, the validity of a theory with pretensions to informing radical social action, basically resides in its capacity to clearly grasp the nature of reality and to delineate the conditions for its change. Putting it simply, if we are going to aspire to change reality, it is imperative that we are first able to make sense of it.
the work of writers like Allen (1971) and Lane (1974). Stated simply, Allen sets out to formulate a 'sociology of industrial relations', while for his part, Lane modestly proposes to investigate the 'politics and trade unionism of the British working class'. Allen's basis premiss, as he confides "is that movement is generated and perpetuated by the existence of contradictions at every level of social behaviour and in all its aspects. --- It is on the notion of contradiction that the possibility of model building for a dynamic analysis really rests."

(1971: 8-9). Yet, as he simultaneously reveals, "there is little evidence of the use of such a model" (Allen, 1971: 9) in his book. Sadly, for Marxist theoretical advances in 'industrial relations' Allen is perfectly correct in this judgement.

Accordingly, in place of any coherently worked-out theory, we are offered the feeble argument that "implicit in the book is the assumption that movement occurs through contradictions". (Allen, 1971: 9). However, this statement only begs the question of what conceivable purpose can there be in having an assumption - implicit or otherwise - which has no basis in the overall analytical framework.

Interestingly, in both Allen's and Lane's books, the trade unions are cast in leading parts in the industrial relations drama. Allen, for example, is of the opinion that the "central institutions in the sociology of industrial relations are trade unions". (1971: 20)

Likewise, Lane insists that: "Absolutely central to an understanding of the political condition of the working-class is a clear and unembittered appreciation of that class's one durable monument: the trade unions". (1974: 28) The basic inadequacies of these 'Marxist'
approaches are especially-evident in their exponents' concept of 'industrial relations'.

Most notably, to Allen, "industrial relations arise out of the prime economic relationship in society which is the buying and selling of labour-power". (1971: 9) Ironically, by giving analytical prominence to labour as a commodity, Allen's methodological approach explicitly highlights the market or distributive aspects of social class as the central reality of 'industrial relations' - contrary to Marx's own view, which gives theoretical primacy to the antagonistic relations of production in explaining capital-labour interactions. (See below) As Marx himself was at pains to point out, the locus of worker oppression under capitalism is to be found - not in the sphere of market relationships but in the realm of production relations. From Marx's theoretical perspective, the market relationship a fortiori mirrors the fundamental polarity in capitalist production relations i.e. between those who

Although the buying and selling of labour power is a necessary prerequisite for the appropriation of surplus-value, such appropriation is not determined by it. To acknowledge this fact, is merely to recognise that wage-labour may prevail in the absence of capitalist relations of production. Accordingly, Allen's claims to be presenting a 'Marxist' interpretation of industrial relations are undermined by his very perception of this phenomenon, which has much more in common with a Weberian than a Marxian perspective on class relations. The centrality of the mode of production in determining fundamental class formations is in fact emphasised by Marx himself. As he wrote: "The essential difference between the various economic forms of society, between, for instance, a society based on slave-labour, and one based on wage-labour, lies only in the mode in which this surplus-labour is in each case extracted from the actual producer, the labourer". (1967: 217) At another level, to say that market relations derive out of production relations - the marketplace essentially being the site where surplus-value is realised, is not to imply that the relationship between market sphere and the sphere of production is asymmetrical.
produce surplus-value and those who appropriate it.

This point has been brilliantly driven home in a revelatory passage in 'Capital' which should also serve as a salutary reminder of the dangers of confusing appearance with reality.

Accompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the possessor of labour-power, we therefore leave for a time this noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in view of all men, and follow them both into the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there stares us in the face "No admittance except on business". Here we shall see, not only how capital produces, but how capital is produced. We shall at last force the secret of profit-making.

(Marx, 1967: 176)

Clearly, then, any analysis of the employer-employee relationship under capitalism that lays claim to be 'Marxist' must intrinsically transcend the 'limits of the market' and the 'sphere of circulation' if it is to get beyond discussion of surface appearances. By such criteria, Allen's 'sociology of industrial relations' is manifestly-deficient.

The static nature of both Allen's and Lane's conceptions of 'industrial relations' is vividly-reflected in their treatment of the trade union and the trade union leader. Fundamentally, such worker organisations and their officials are envisaged as being trapped within an institutional framework which completely voids any potential for revolutionary activity. Thus, to Lane, "trade union leaders (are) professional compromisers" (1974: 282), while Allen considers "the behaviour of any person who becomes an official (as) almost entirely predictable". (1971: 51)
Despite such pessimistic evaluations, working-class consciousness among the union rank-and-file is arguably, far from dead. Indeed, there are seemingly times when the class resentments of the rank-and-file "could apparently explode the limitations of trade unionism pure and simple and unconsciously engage in activity of considerable political moment". (Lane, 1974: 177). It follows, therefore, that to adequately assess the impetus for radical transformation of prevailing 'industrial relations', analysis must 'leave for a time this noisy sphere (of trade union activities) where everything takes place on the surface' and seek answers in the highly-promising realm of production relations. Fittingly, the selection of the mode of production as an analytical focal point provides a far more adequate basis for investigation of the relationship of work, class and unionism. In one sense, study at this level of analysis is relatively-new in the social sciences; yet, in essence, the general approach represents a re-awakening of interest in conceptual problems which were central to the work of the 'founding fathers' of sociology. Not only does Durkheim's concern with the 'division of labour in society' underline this but not for nothing did Marx sub-title his first volume of 'Capital': 'A critical analysis of capitalist production'. 
PRODUCTION RELATIONS AND SOCIAL CLASS

Social class: The problem of definition

In general, popular discussion of the working class inevitably tends to be framed in terms of the pervasive stereotype of the manual worker employed in manufacturing industry or in mining or construction etc. Unquestionably, three or four decades ago, this industrial worker epitomised the 'working-class'. Today, however, the situation has become a great deal less clear-cut.

To begin with, the contemporary worker in the advanced capitalist society is nothing like the proletarians whom radical social theorists like Karl Marx anointed the ultimate redeemers of human civilisation. On the contrary, the changing composition of the labour force in such societies has given rise to a vast new army of professionals, technicians and white-collar workers whose attitudes and in some cases, lifestyles, may differ substantially from those of the traditional blue-collar worker.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the problem of the class determination of the new occupational categories of 'white collar' and service labour has compelled a fair degree of attention from contemporary social theorists. Possibly, two of the most comprehensive and widely-debated analyses of class formation and its social implications have come from Braverman (1974) and Poulantzas (1973a, 1973b, 1975). Of the two, Poulantzas's work is more explicitly theoretical and owes much to the ideas of Louis Althusser (1969, 1970). But the work of both these writers has been enormously influential - inspiring a great ferment of debate and creative theoretical thinking on the phenomenon of
Significantly, although both Braverman's and Poulantzas's work are rooted in the Marxist tradition, there are major conceptual differences between the two in their articulation of the problem of class formations. True, basic to both approaches is a concern with the structural determination of class. To put it another way, a central objective of both approaches is to delineate - to use Wright's (1976) phrase, the 'class boundaries in advanced capitalist societies'. Essentially, therefore, the methodological task is to highlight the contours of the working class and to identify (explicitly in the case of Poulantzas, indirectly in the case of Braverman), the probable supporters of this class in its struggle against 'monopoly capitalism'.

Fundamental to Poulantzas's approach, as Wright (1976) has observed, is the idea that classes are structurally-determined - not only economically, but ideologically and politically as well. In Poulantzas's view, the primary determinant of a class is its relationship to the means of production. However, although ascribing conceptual primacy to the economic level, Poulantzas insists that the political and ideological aspects are also critically-relevant in determining class formation. By way of illustrating the point, he cites the existence of a 'new petite-bourgeois' class of intellectuals, state employees and similar occupational groupings. As he then emphasises; economically, these groups are wage-earners, yet politically and ideologically their behaviour in many respects reflects the outlook of the traditional petite-bourgeoisie in terms of the similar preoccupation with individualistic status-striving and uncritical acceptance of the status-quo.
Consequently, unlike certain other Marxist theorists - notably, Mandel (1975), whose focus is predominantly economic and who assigns to the 'working class', all wage-earners in the productive sphere (including, paradoxically such strata as engineers and some managers), Poulantzas, by contrast, stoutly maintains that while occupational categories like engineers and managers are undeniably wage-earners, they are not part of the working class. Rather, as he firmly declares:

Technicians and engineers do tend to form part of capitalist productive labour, because they directly valorise capital in the production of surplus-value. If they do not as a group belong to the working class, this is because in their place within the social division-of-labour they maintain political and ideological relations of subordination of the working class to capital (the division of mental and manual labour), and because this aspect of their class determination is the dominant one.

(Poulantzas, 1975: 242)

As is evident from the foregoing quotation, for Poulantzas, the structural location or 'place' of a group - or, to use his term, 'fraction', in the labour-process is a reflection of its function and, in turn, fundamentally determines its objective class situation. In simple terms, social class is constituted by the relations of domination within the mode of production. Centrally-relevant to the issue of class determination, however, is the distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' labour. Using these two yardsticks i.e. whether a particular occupational category does productive or unproductive labour and, further, whether in the authority relations of the enterprise, it is part of the dominant group or of the subordinate group, Poulantzas's conception of class determination may be summarised as follows. To begin with, paid employees like managers and engineers, although situated in the sphere of production
are, nevertheless, part of either the capitalist class proper, or of the "petite-bourgeoisie".

Likewise, foremen and technicians within this sphere, plus clerical, sales and similar types of employee in the sphere of circulation (i.e. 'unproductive' workers) belong to the petite-bourgeoisie. Thus, only the wage-earners in the sphere of production are, in Poulantzas's view, entitled to be designated 'working class'. The equation of working class with 'productive labour', to be sure, reflects Poulantzas's conviction that only productive labour produces 'surplus-value'. Since, to him, the key to class exploitation in capitalist society is the bourgeoisie's power to appropriate surplus-value, then since only productive labour produces surplus-value, emphatically, only this class can be, as he puts it, "directly exploited in the form of the dominant capitalist relation of exploitation, the creation of surplus-value" (1975: 242).

However, as he readily concedes, this is not to say that 'unproductive' workers are not taken advantage of economically by capitalists: indeed, as Poulantzas would have it, while 'productive' labour is economically exploited, 'unproductive' labour is economically-oppressed - a distinction which hinges on the critical difference, as he sees it, between the expropriation of surplus-value and the expropriation of surplus-labour. For Poulantzas therefore, what essentially distinguishes 'circulation workers' from the working class is the mode of their remuneration. Stated simply, unlike the working class who directly produce the means whereby they are remunerated i.e. surplus-value, circulation workers derive their incomes from the surplus-value appropriated by the
capitalists from the working-class. Put crudely, like the capitalist, they too 'live off the working class'. (What is not to be overlooked, however, in formulations like this, is that such workers themselves are generally not employers of labour or appropriators of surplus in any meaningful sense of the terms.)

In summary, the Poulantzas distinction between productive and unproductive labour hinges upon a fine analytical division he draws between what can best be described as 'primary' and 'secondary' exploitation. (See Carchedi, 1975a, 1975b; Johnson, 1977.) Sympathetic critics of Poulantzas like Wright (1976) have nevertheless deplored the restrictive view he takes of productive labour. As Wright points out, Poulantzas quite dogmatically views productive labour purely in terms of material production. The consequence of this, as Wright discloses, is to place non surplus-value producing wage earners outside the working class - simply by virtue of their structural location outside the primary relation of exploitation. (Wright, 1976: 7).

Predictably, the irony of so narrow a definition of the working class is that it inadvertently gives intellectual respectability to the vacuous formulations of the 'post-industrial society' theorists. For, fundamental to this latter perspective, is the presumption that the proportional decline of the 'real' working class serves to nullify the objective basis for social revolt. The pessimistic implications of Poulantzas's analysis are only too apparent - given his argument that classes are only effectively-constituted by class struggle. In other words, he is seemingly of the firm belief that in the final analysis, social aggregations become classes only by virtue of political
struggle. It thus follows from this that class is not antecedent to the existence of class consciousness. However, such an interpretation, while superficially-evocative of Marx's own views, nevertheless, manifestly dissolves the classical Marxian dichotomy (or, perhaps more accurately) continuum, between a 'class-in-itself' and a 'class-for-itself'.

Braverman, on the other hand, is frankly sceptical of the significance of analytical categories like 'productive' and 'unproductive' labour as determinants of class boundaries. Rather, he gives theoretical focus to the relations of domination and subordination within the capitalist labour-process and the contradictions which arise from them. Thus, while he recognises the technical distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' labour, Braverman insists that "the two masses of labour are not otherwise in striking contrast and need not be counterposed to each other. They form a continuous mass of employment which, at present and unlike the situation in Marx's day, has everything in common". (Braverman, 1974: 423)

Put in a nutshell, Braverman's thesis is that capitalist control over the labour-process gives rise to forms of work organisation which serve to simultaneously unite and fragment the workers subject to such authority. In other words, the development of the forces of production within capitalist production relations entails the reinforcement of the dictatorship of capital. The obverse side of this coin, is the 'proletarianisation' of ever-widening segments of the labour force, as even such traditionally privileged arenas of employment like clerical, technical and professional labour, in turn yield to the
blind and relentless dictates of capitalist ‘rationalisation’.

As Braverman makes plain, central to capitalist control over the labour-process are three essential elements: the separation of the conception of work from its execution, the stratification and hierarchical control of the labour force and the deskilling of jobs. Consequently, to adequately assess the potential for class unity among workers and their 'combat' organisations like the trade unions, it is vitally important to comprehend the significance and implications of the social processes identified by Braverman.

Technology, the labour-process and occupational change

Possibly one of the most riveting aspects of Braverman's analysis of the capitalist labour-process, is his uniquely-insightful exposition of the deleterious impact of technology under capitalist conditions, on the jobs, skills and incomes of countless thousands of wage and salary earners of all kinds. Braverman, to be sure, makes no bones about his feelings toward the way in which the capitalist labour-process systematically atomises, deskills and cheapens work activity. The full sub-title of his book: 'The degradation of work in the twentieth-century', epitomises the depth of his passion at the pervasive debasement of work under the brutal imperatives of capitalist accumulation and reproduction.

To begin with, what Braverman emphatically underlines throughout his book is that the introduction of technology under capitalist relations of production is designed - not to enhance the versatility, or creativeness or autonomy of the worker but to subject him to ever more
repressive methods of control in order to optimise the 'productivity' of his labour. By way of substantiating this proposition, Braverman takes us through the introduction of technology in capitalist industry and documents with remarkable clarity the effects of such technology. In particular, he addresses two fundamental issues: firstly, the much-heralded decline in the proportion of the traditional working class in advanced capitalist society (specifically, the U.S.A.), and, secondly, the monumental contradiction between conventional sociological formulations of 'technological' society which stress the urgency for improved levels of education, training and skill among the labour force and the indisputable empirical evidence of the continuous fragmentation and routinisation of work.

Basically, the focus of his approach is the objective development of the working class. In the process, he spurns any attempt to be drawn on the question of the subjective consciousness of this class. As he loftily declares in the introduction to his book: "This is a book about the working-class about a class-in-itself, not a class-for-itself" (Braverman, 1974: 27) (emphasis author's). But while methodologically, such a restriction on the scope of investigation is plausible, even excusable, theoretically, this limitation of analysis involves considerable difficulty for Braverman when he seeks to explain the class situation of certain of the intermediate strata, which he labels the 'middle layers' - a term perhaps more redolent of aviaristic concerns!

Predictably, Braverman seeks to rationalise such a major shortcoming of his work by feebly equating the analysis of class consciousness with the superficial attitudinal surveys favoured by much of academic
social science. Thus, the much-criticised stratification surveys of the redoubtable Lloyd Warner are once again singled out for attack. Characteristically, what Braverman chooses to ignore in his futile demolition of such straw-men (straw persons?), is that the study of class consciousness does not have to assume the trivialised empiricist form established by Warner and his subsequent imitators.

None of this, however, is intended to diminish the profound theoretical importance of Braverman's work. On the contrary, the clarity and insight he imparts to the analysis of class formation is difficult to gainsay. Fundamentally, he begins his analysis by pointing to the original unity of the functions of conception and execution within the work process. From this he goes on to outline the destruction of this unity as the forces of capital increasingly assert their dominance over the labour process, consequent upon their appropriation of the function to conceive and organise work. As Braverman shows, by gaining direct control over the labour-process, capital has been able to ensure that the trajectory of development in work methods - in particular, the application of science and technology to work processes, serves its needs and reflects its priorities.

Using the work of James Bright, Braverman cogently demonstrates the 'deskilling' consequences that mechanisation and automation have had for the bulk of the workforce. By 'deskilling', he means the substitution of semi-skilled and unskilled labour for skilled. Strongly rebutting the pervasive mythology that the introduction of new technology while destroying traditional job skills creates a demand for new skills e.g. in the servicing and repair of the new technology,
Braverman cites Bright's conclusion that an automated technology requires - not more education, training and skills, but less.

The apparent paradox is resolved by recalling Bright's observation that the more sophisticated the new technology, the less-dependent it is upon an extensive infrastructure of skilled personnel to service it because not only does such technology inevitably embody the function of self-monitoring but, in many cases, it tends to be constructed on modular principles which negate the necessity for skilled personnel to replace the defective parts. (Braverman, 1974: 222-3). Certainly, Braverman's background as a skilled metal worker uniquely equips him to discuss and critically-evaluate the half-truths and absurdities many academic sociologists have propagated about the issue of technology and skill. Fittingly, he points to the sociological tendency to romanticise about the presumed dealienating effects of continuous process technology. Equally-important, he calls attention to the propensity of such work to confuse the functional requirements of labour under continuous process technology, e.g. maintaining charts, reading dials etc., with skill or technical knowledge. As he sarcastically remarks of this perspective, "few have stopped to think whether it is harder to learn to read a dial than to tell time". (1974: 224)

Braverman underscores the minority control of industry and the centralisation of skills and knowledge relevant to the operation of industry by pointing to the extent to which automation increasingly places control of the system in the hands of the engineers and correspondingly obliterates the need for the workers who attend the new machines to have much skill or education (1974: 225). Even more devastatingly,
he shows that for the U.S.A., in any case, the data upon which many presumptions of an increase in skill due to technological development, is to say the least, highly-questionable.

Underlying the misconceptions, as he shows, is the fact that much of the assumed 'upgrading' of the U.S. labour force in terms of its skills, has been due to the revamping in the 1930's of occupational classifications by the compilers of official statistics. Revealingly, traditional classifications of labourer and craftsman have been augmented by an intermediate category viz. 'operatives' - a 'catch-all' division encompassing all those whose job involves working with machines. Such workers, as Braverman sarcastically notes are designated 'semi-skilled'. Accordingly, the act of mechanisation even though it creates only machine-minders axiomatically increases the skill levels of the labour-force according to such methods of classifying it.

The spuriousness of the concept of 'semi-skilled', as Braverman further reports, is evident from the period of training received by such workers which, as he emphasises, may vary from a few hours to perhaps a month - with most having a few days at the maximum. As he contends, the employment of the term 'skill' in the official statistics even though adjectively-qualified by the word 'semi' is plainly incongruent with the notion of skill derived from the concept of a 'craft'. To the degree, therefore, that academic sociology accepts official statistics on job classification at face-value, despite abundant empirical evidence to the contrary, it is little wonder that much of the research on 'mobility' has been so optimistic and so profoundly misleading.
Significantly, the 'deskilling' of labour and large-scale structural unemployment as a result of technological change does not only affect the manual i.e. 'blue-collar' segments of the labour force. On the contrary 'white-collar', technical and professional jobs are now being subjected to much the same technological pressures that have previously preponderated in the factory. The progressive reduction in the skill required of office jobs has led many writers to characterise the process as one of 'proletarianisation'. Essentially, what is meant by 'proletarianisation' is that the nature of the labour-process to which office workers are subject increasingly resembles that of the factory.

The propensity of capitalist production relations to 'deskill' and 'degrade' all jobs does not, as Braverman reports, take place all at once. Indeed, factory labour was the first to feel the blast of capitalist methods to reduce labour costs while simultaneously raising labour productivity. At the turn of the century, of course, when such techniques for intensifying work output like 'scientific management' first made their appearance, 'office labour' comprised a miniscule proportion of the labour force. With its proliferation, however, it too was subjected to the imperatives of 'rationalisation'. The result was the systematic dismantling of its privileged status. To begin with, the replacement of male labour with female in many office jobs inevitably meant lower levels of pay. The process of deskilling and cheapening of office labour power has been further accentuated by the application of 'time-and-motion' study techniques to re-organise office jobs and make them more efficient. The culmination of the process is now to be seen in the rapid automation of many office operations which is
now displacing the deskilled, cheapened, female labour (as well as supervisory male workers). Consequently, factory and office labour - originally so different in character, has become increasingly more alike.

As Braverman makes plain, there is simply no comparison between the contemporary clerk and his 19th century predecessor. The 19th century 'black-coated worker' enjoyed a level of pay and prestige far superior to that of manual labour, worked in close proximity with his employer and most importantly, his job involved a career with clear opportunities for promotion and even marriage to the boss's daughter as the ultimate reward for diligence. In modern times however, the job of the clerk has been transformed from such exalted heights into an atomised, deskilled position with little autonomy and even less room for initiative. Most damning of all, it has plummetted from being one of the best paid occupations to one of the worst paid. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that trade unionism has made considerable inroads among office workers.

The drive by capital to extract every last ounce of 'productivity' from its office labour is increasingly evident in the machine pacing to which office work has been systematically habituated. Indeed, the 'paper conveyor belt' is no less remorseless in its demands for speedy responses than is its metal counterpart on the factory floor. Moreover 'factory despotism' has its parallel in office despotism: in fact, the pervasive supervision of labour in the office has been greatly extended by technological change. Notably, with computerisation, the overseeing function of supervisors, is increasingly being built into the machines. For example, many of the new machines being
adopted have the facility for providing management with a detailed record of the output of its operator (including the number of mistakes he/she has made).

Characteristically, the development of microelectronics typified by the microprocessor or the ubiquitous silicone 'chip', contributes greatly to the potential for a further exacerbation in the nature of work conditions. Rarely are the deskilling effects of the new technology conceded before its adoption. Rather, as Braverman sardonically observes, "the public unveiling of the new devices is accompanied by much self-congratulation and by philanthropic phrases about the lightening of the toil of the worker, the ease with which laborious tasks are accomplished, and so forth". (1974: 205)

The point, however, is that, as Braverman is at pains to stress, is that it is not the technology that is to blame for the deleterious effects on jobs and employment - it is the way it is used by capital to entrench and accentuate its control over the labour-process.

In reality, machinery embraces a host of possibilities, many of which are systematically thwarted, rather than developed, by capital. An automatic system of machinery opens up the possibility of true control over a highly-productive factory by a relatively small corps of workers, providing these workers attain the level of mastery over the machinery offered by engineering knowledge, and providing they then share out among themselves the routines of the operation, from the most technically advanced to the most routine. --- Yet this promise which has been repeatedly held out with every technical advance since the Industrial Revolution, is frustrated by the capitalist effort to reconstitute and even deepen the division of labour in all its worst aspects.

(Braverman, 1974: 230)
Putting it bluntly, technology tends to be used by capitalism not to free workers from the drudgery of hard, unpleasant and unsafe jobs but to deskill labour and cheapen labour costs. Certainly, as Braverman has minutely documented, the displacement of labour by technology has been a perennial feature of industrial capitalism. What is unique about the development and application of microelectronics is the rapidity and pervasiveness of the process. Over the past decade, a bewildering array of new products based on microelectronics have emerged: radios, T.V.'s, digital wrist watches, pocket calculators plus a profusion of electronic games and toys.

Much of the impetus for these developments has come from the 'space race' as well as from more direct military considerations. It is therefore hardly surprising to find that some of the more sophisticated electronic applications are devoted to improving the means of destruction in the military field: the ability to wage a 'push-button war' is no longer in the realms of science fiction. But it is in the workplace that the structural dislocations resulting the 'micro-electronic revolution' are readily apparent. In the field of mechanical engineering, the design of a whole range of products as well as much of their assembly is done by computer. The levels of accuracy in metal cutting in this field no longer depends of human skill: numerically-controlled machine tools now make it possible to achieve the high standards required with a minimum of error. In turn the 'brains' i.e. the tapes for these ingenious devices are themselves now prepared by computer.
The impact of the new technology is not only increasingly transforming the bulk of manufacturing from 'batch' production to 'continuous process' e.g. chemicals, steel etc., but administrative operations e.g. stock control, payroll processing, data collection, production scheduling, time keeping, performance evaluation, have progressively been computerised. All these technological changes have profoundly affected the nature of jobs and given rise to tremendous debate on the social implications of automation. On the one hand, the utopians envisage a glorious future being opened up for man by the 'computer revolution'. Among the glorious vistas held out by this perspective are such dubious benefits as being able to work at home - maintaining contact with the office through visual communication devices, being able to completely program household activities by computer etc.

Conversely, the pessimists speak of a 'computer holocaust' conjuring up a frightening caricature of a malevolent technology which is reminiscent of the diabolism of medieval fears. What unites both the hyper-optimistic and hyper-pessimistic discussions of the new technology are the sensational terms in which debate tends to be framed and the shallowness of analysis. The 'reification' and 'fetishism' justifiably deplored by Braverman, are evident in such simplistic formulations as 'the computers are taking over our jobs'.

As Braverman critically remarks:

It has become fashionable, however, to attribute to machinery the powers over humanity which arise in fact from social relations. Society, in this view, is nothing but an extrapolation of science and technology, and the machine itself is the enemy. The machine, the mere product of human labor and ingenuity, designed and constructed by humans and alterable by them at will, is viewed as an independent participant in human social arrangements.
It is given life, enters into "relations" with the workers, relations fixed by its own nature, is endowed with the power to shape the life of mankind, and is sometimes even invested with designs upon the human race.

(1974: 229)

'Bourgeois ideologists' have initially assumed that computer development and specifically, microelectronics would not adversely affect employment levels. As the prevailing complacency would have it, jobs would be created in the manufacture of microelectronic components themselves, these components would lead to the development of new products which would in turn create new jobs, jobs would be created in programming the new computer (the so-called expansion of 'software' requirements) and finally, that workers displaced by technology would find jobs in servicing the new machines. (See below).

Over and above all, the panacea for the 'short-term' problems created by computerisation was to 'understand' and become proficient in the use of computers, rather than 'fearing' them. Yet, while 'software' applications have provided some jobs, these are nowhere in proportion

Characteristically, the naive presumption prevails that the massive increases in productivity made possible by automation can of itself negate what Marx called the 'laws of motion' of capitalism. Thus, by some mystical process, automation is seen as being capable of reversing the tendencies toward recession and guaranteeing perpetual economic growth. (The sense of déjà vu and déjà écoute are overwhelming when one recalls the extravagant claims made not so long ago for Keynesian economic techniques.) Accordingly, individual countries are seen to have no option but to override Luddite fears of their workers and to expand automation, lest they lose out to their economic competitors. Rarely is the question posed as to what happens when all these nations automate: instead the vacuous epigram of 'automate or stagnate' is uncritically assumed to be the grim reality.
to those lost by the introduction of computers. Perhaps the greatest irony of all is that 'the computers' (sic) have now begun to wipe out jobs in the computer field itself. Thus, the splendid vision of a vast upgrading of education and skills as increasing numbers of people 'worked with computers' has proved to be an illusion. As Joan Greenbaum (1976) reveals, the same processes of job fragmentation, hierarchical control, speed-ups, the automation of the labour-process and structural unemployment are now part and parcel of the experience of what she calls, 'the division-of-labour in the computer field'. Again light relief is provided by Lansbury and Gilmour. Discussing the computerisation of the accounting operations of an enterprise, which results in the consolidation of this work into one section rather than the five that previously existed, the writers hail this development as fostering 'job enlargement'. (1977: 159-60).

To summarise then, the occupational structure of the advanced capitalist countries has been fundamentally transformed by technological change. The decline of labour in the goods-producing sector (consequent upon the introduction of new technologies) vis-a-vis the expansion of work in 'tertiary' industry, originally led to a welter of misleading pronouncements of 'occupational mobility' from the social science pundits. However, the notion that office employment represents upward mobility has been completely debunked by the 'proletarianisation' of many so-called 'white-collar' jobs. In the process, many of these workers have been forced by the relentless logic of the capitalist 'rationalisation' of work to abandon their status pretensions and to join trade unions and engage in industrial action to preserve their jobs and living standards.
Production relations and the class determination of professional employees

The rise of salaried professionals and the steady expansion of their ranks under 'monopoly capitalism' raise some very thorny analytical problems for social theorists. Of particular concern, is the question of whether such strata are to be categorised as a 'new middle class', as some writers argue, or whether, conversely, they constitute a 'new working class', as others maintain. (See below) Naturally enough, answers to this question differ - which perhaps is only to be expected, given the profound divergences of theoretical and ideological perception which inform discussion of this subject. Nevertheless, the critical implications of social class for industrial and political behaviour, contrive to ensure that the problem of the class determination of professional employees is not simply to be discredited as a mere pedantic quibble of traditional stratification dispute.

Revealingly, however, the issue of the structural locations of social formations like salaried professionals has, apart from the odd exception,

There is a pronounced tendency within conventional sociological literature to use the term 'profession' as almost a synonym for privileged occupational and social status. This mode of conceptualising the professions is typified by Dunkerley, who after echoing the familiar platitudes about the high economic rewards and social prestige of the professions, goes on to assert that "there is something to be said for regarding the professions as a social elite". (1975: 58) Predictably, what is ignored in such facile views of professions, is the internal differentiation within the professions due to their contradictory structural locations within the spheres of appropriation, realise and reproduction, which contributes toward making some members of professions far more 'privileged' than others.
not been seriously addressed by either contemporary Marxism or academic sociology. On the contrary, as one critic perceptively notes, the "dominant theoretical focus has been at the level of 'consciousness' - it is here that the crucial determining factor has been sought". (Johnson, 1977: 195) (See below). But, as this writer is quick to point out, the basic flaw in such a perspective is that "to focus on the forms of consciousness exhibited by agents and the associated question of how individuals achieve class membership through mobility --- leaves the prior question of the determination of class positions unanswered and, therefore, subject to arbitrary operationalism". (Johnson, 1977: 195). (Emphasis author's.)

One of Karl Marx's profounder insights was the observation that the elemental economic relations of society occur out of the sight of the producers. By that he meant, most importantly, that the class structures

The tendency for sociological research to uncritically accept the prevailing organisation of work and to focus instead on how the worker subjectively 'reacts' or 'adjusts' to it - so thoroughly condemned by Braverman (1974), nevertheless continues to influence study of manual workers and 'bureaucratized professionals' alike. (c.f. Argyris, 1964; Blau and Scott, 1962; Blauner, 1964; Chinoy, 1955; Dubin, 1956; Gouldner, 1960; Kornhauser, 1962; Thornton, 1970) The net result of this approach, is that the objective sociological question of the relevant circumstances which call for one type of authority rather than the other within bureaucratic settings - i.e. authority based on 'imperative co-ordination' instead of on 'specialist knowledge' has been completely submerged by the reductionist methodological preoccupation with how 'professionals' employed in bureaucracies conceive of their roles. As Braverman pungently remarks about this general methodological orientation: "It is therefore not at all fortuitous that most orthodox social scientists adhere firmly, indeed desperately, to the dictum that their task is not the study of the objective conditions of work but only of the subjective phenomena to which these give rise: the degrees of 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction' elicited by their questionnaires." (Braverman, 1973: 139-41)
fabricated by these economic relations are obscured by the multitude of social and ideological fissions that are created by the productive and reproductive apparatuses of the system. Naturally, these divisions become increasingly more complex as capitalist development proceeds. Typically, the development of 'monopoly capitalism' sees the multiplication and expansion of those sectors devoted to the 'realisation of surplus-value'. (Included here are functional areas within the productive enterprise engaged in the 'accounting of value' e.g. the sales and accounts divisions of business firms. Also encompassed in the 'realisation' process are agencies which are external to the firm, whose main job involves the 'allocation of surplus-value' among the various segments of the capitalist class. Notable examples of these are banks, insurance companies and similar financial institutions.)

Likewise the dramatic growth in the government sector reflects the progressive inability of 'private enterprise' on its own to resolve the contradictions and disruptions created by the rise of monopoly capitalism. (See below) Put simply, monopoly capitalism requires a more-interventionist State - not a less-interventionist one - as the more backward sections of capital and their ideologists assume. (See, for example, the various pronouncements of the inappropriately-

In effect, 'monopoly capitalism' marks the exacerbation of the inherently anarchic nature of capitalism. Putting it simply, the inbuilt tendencies of the system toward inflation, unemployment and crisis are, arguably, magnified under 'monopoly capitalism', posing even more of a threat to its survival. Notably, therefore, the interventions of the State in the everyday functioning of the economy are dictated by the need to keep the mechanisms of capitalist accumulation and reproduction well-oiled, as well as to deal with any problem that threatens the viability of the system.
named and presumably now defunct, 'Workers' Party' in Australia. This self-appointed mouthpiece of 'small business' stridently proclaimed that the arena of business should be left to businesspeople and proposed confining the activities of the State to a handful of 'essential functions' e.g. defence, foreign affairs etc.)

Characteristically, the continuous improvement of the forces of production and the extension of capital into new fields generates new functions and occupations within capitalist society. Or, to put it another way, the dynamics of capitalist development necessitates the performance of a number of functions which are crucial to its reproduction. Accordingly, changes in the structure of capital have impelled changes in the structure of the labour force giving rise to new categories of workers viz. clerical, service, professional and similar types of employee. Significantly, the growing complexity of capitalist forms and social arrangements does not spell any fundamental changes in the elemental class relations. To put it bluntly, the development of the forces of production which is responsible for the proliferation of new categories of, takes place within a pre-existing set of production relations. The result is that the way in which such labour is organised and used, reflects the priorities of capitalist accumulation and reproduction.

The central contradiction of capitalist development resides in the tendency for capitalist expansion to fragment the labour-force while simultaneously unifying it by virtue of its common subjection to capitalist production relations. Carchedi (1975a, 1975b) in his studies of class 'identification' envisages a fundamental line of
social division within the capitalist mode of production between those agents who perform either the 'global functions of capital' or who simply function as agents of the 'collective worker'. To Carchedi, the concept of the 'global functions of capital' signifies the dispersion of ownership powers over the productive process to agents who do not own the means of production. Correspondingly, the concept of the 'collective worker' refers to the fragmentation of the labour process into a collection of minutely-specialised and interdependent tasks - each performed by a different worker. Interestingly enough, for Carchedi, the 'collective worker' encompasses not only manual labour but includes professional categories like engineers and technicians who are involved in the process of material production.

Revealingly, the origins of the 'collective worker' and of the agents who perform the 'global functions of capital' are traceable to a common source of innovation within the capitalist mode of production viz. the separation of the functions of conception and execution. (See below) As Braverman (1974) cogently demonstrates, capital's monopolisation of the function of conception not only endowed it with direct control over the labour-process but predictably resulted in a highly-elaborate division-of-labour, as capitalism set about the task of 'rationalising' production in order to enhance its accumulation of

The phenomenon of 'multinational' capitalism is simply the bland way much of academic social science chooses to depict and analyse what Carchedi (1975b) more accurately describes as the 'internationalisation of the global capitalist and 'the collective labourer'.

surplus-value'. Thus was born the 'collective worker'.

Significantly, however, such task specialisation is by no means a one-way process. Within the ranks of capital the growing importance of the functions of control marketing etc. found diffuse expression in such work activities as planning, record-keeping, and similar operations which are central to the conception function of capital. The rise of 'monopoly capitalism' heralding the growing centralisation and concentration of capital is paradoxically accompanied by profound complexity and differentiation of functions within the ranks of capital. Thus, there emerges a highly sub-divided 'white-collar' and professional labour force whose jobs have been created by the conception function of capital. While some of these agents, strictly speaking, perform what Carchedi calls the 'global functions of capital', by far the great majority are engaged in a labour-process and subject to broadly similar modes of control and regimentation as any manual factory worker. (See below)

Typical of the failure of much of 'bourgeois sociology' to grasp the essential significance of capital's control over the labour-process, is the work of one Australian-based, U.S. sociologist, who in a review of Bell's (1974) work on 'post-industrial society', saw the major problem posed by a large 'non-manual' labour-force as being "the difficulty of holding persons not engaged in measurably productive work to the minimum standards of sobriety, diligence, and prudence necessary to the effective functioning of the complex organisations in which most material production occurs in such societies". (Higley, 1975: 6). This paper is, moreover, studded by such gems as the following:

"The inability to be certain of their own or their fellow workers' productivity inclines non-manual workers toward various combinations of frivolous and defensive occupational behaviour, according to what they think is expedient at any given time." (Higley, 1975: 6)
The expansion of "tertiary" employment which "bourgeois sociology" celebrates as the "coming of post-industrial society", naturally raises the vexed question of the class determination of the new occupational strata. The problem, as writers like Bell (1974) apparently imagine, can be simply disposed of, without any great necessity to engage in profound class analysis. Thus, for example, in referring to technicians and salaried professionals, Bell talks grandly about a "professional and technical class" (1974: 125). Plainly, such uncritical and profligate use of the term 'class' only serves to beg the question of what is meant by it. (See below 1.)

Fortunately, this conceptual problem and the massive complexities it raises, is taken rather more seriously by Marxist-inclined social theorists like Braverman (1974), Carchedi (1975a, 1975b) and Poulantzas (1973a, 1973b, 1975). Carchedi (1975a, 1975b), as we have

and:

"Because they can never be certain that they are currently applying themselves effectively to tasks set for them, non-manual workers tend to embrace very broad definitions of acceptable behaviour on the job -- much of which is more playful than productive." (Higley, 1975: 6-7)

This catalogue of absurdity goes on. Completely ignored is the fact that increasingly, much of office labour has assumed the attributes of the factory assembly-line. Indeed, Braverman's (1974) masterly exposition of the 'degradation of work', carefully documents that with the expansion of the office sector, the same principles of 'efficiency' so successfully applied to manual work, have been introduced to non-manual. In effect, Taylor's 'work-study' techniques of the factory floor have found their office counterpart in 'time-and-motion' studies.

1 Certainly, the 'latent' effect, if not the 'manifest' aim, of conceptualising occupational categories like technicians and professionals as 'classes' is to completely obscure the objective basis for unity between such class 'fractions'. 
seen, conceptualises the class determination or, 'identification' as he calls it, of any particular social strata, in terms of the elemental distinction between the 'global functions of capital' and the functions of the 'collective worker'. From his standpoint, therefore, to neglect to differentiate between the functions of capital and the functions of labour not only misses the essence of class identification but renders virtually unanswerable the question of which 'fractions' or segments of a particular social formation are potential allies of the working class and which are the likely social supports of the bourgeoisie.

Needless to say, as far as the class determination of salaried professionals are concerned, these functional distinctions are of crucial importance if we are to avoid the uncritical assignment to the same social class, agents whose labour has objectively-different social implications. To begin with, 'professionals' are employed in a diverse range of activities within the spheres of 'appropriation', 'realisation' and 'reproduction', that is to say, in such areas as production management, marketing, financial control and administration as well as in various agencies of the state like welfare departments, education, and health services. Such employees are, strictly-speaking, wage-earners. Yet, as virtually every observer concedes, they are not part of the 'real' working class.

To writers like Poulantzas (1975), most of these bureaucratically-situated 'professionals' are part of a class of 'new petite-bourgeoisie': in effect, 'unproductive' workers. In Poulantzas's view, the distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' work is of critical significance in determining class boundaries. (This emphasis by Poulantzas on the
surplus value creation attributes of work as the basic determinant of class leads to his exclusion of wage-earning 'unproductive' labour from the ranks of the working class.) (See below)

By contrast, Braverman (1974) is totally unconvinced of the usefulness of the productive/unproductive distinction as criteria for differentiating between the working class and non-working class. Indeed, as he shows in a closely-reasoned analysis of the new 'middle layers', such intermediate strata - unlike their forerunners i.e. the 'old' petite-bourgeoisie of shopkeepers etc., are structurally-located within the prevailing class polarisation of capitalist society instead of being partly external to it. Consequently, they are affected by the forces of class polarisation from which they derive and into which they are placed. Hence the tremendous heterogeneity of the 'middle layers'. Basic to the differentiated character of the 'middle layers' are differences in 'authority'.

Since the authority and expertise of the middle ranks in the capitalist corporation represent an unavoidable delegation of responsibility, the position of such functionaries may best be judged by their relation to the power and wealth that commands them from above, and

In equating 'productive labour' with material production, Poulantzas's approach - far from being congruent with the theoretical standpoint of Marx - is intrinsically at odds with it. As Carchedi very usefully reminds us, for Marx, it was absolutely immaterial to the production of surplus-value, whether a capitalist - in Marx's own pungent phraseology "laid out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a sausage factory". (Cited in Carchedi, 1975b: 405) Nor, indeed, does Poulantzas's additional distinction i.e. between 'mental' and 'manual labour' adequately serve to differentiate between the working-class and other class fractions.
Likewise for Wright (1976) the key to understanding the class situation of professionals and other segments of the 'middle layers' is to be found in analysis of the authority relations which serve to internally differentiate such class 'fractions'. Following Poulantzas, Wright conceptualises 'authority' from the standpoint of the production relations of capitalist society. Thus he draws a fundamental distinction between 'economic ownership', i.e. not legal title but, as Terry Johnson explains it, real economic control in the sense of "the power to exploit the direct producers by the appropriation of surplus-labour/surplus-value" (see Johnson, 1977: 209), and 'possession' - in effect, "direct control over the means of production in its operation". (Johnson, 1977: 209)

Put another way, 'possession' confers control over the labour-process and, as such, constitutes the basic source of authority relations. Significantly, perhaps, the rise of 'monopoly capitalism' has contrived a growing divorce between 'possession' and 'economic ownership'. Tellingly, however, 'possession' itself has not remained immune to fission. On the contrary. Overall control over the labour-process devolving upon top managers has become progressively separated from the direct control over work activities i.e. the supervisory function.

Undeniably, Wright's approach provides considerable insight into the class determination of such categories as professional employees. Arguably, however, further refinements of his analytical framework
are necessary before meaningful distinctions within such occupational strata can be drawn. In this context, the work of Carchedi (1975a, 1975b) is of inestimable importance. Basically, Carchedi's concept of the 'global functions of capital' identifies two vital capitalist functions: the functions of 'surveillance' and 'control'. These functions, in Carchedi's view, arise out of the social division-of-labour and are associated with the prerogatives of capital. However, counter-posed to these, are the functions of 'co-ordination' and 'unity', which he envisages as arising out of the technical division-of-labour and thus, ipso facto, are properties of the 'collective worker'. (See below) Carchedi has also forcefully made the point that the distinction between the 'function of capital' and the 'function of labour' is central to class identification. Further, he maintains that there is a qualitative "difference between the expropriation of surplus 

Tellingly, Carchedi's concept of the functions of capital ('surveillance and control') points up the repressive and politico-economically specific character of such functions. By contrast, the functions of the 'collective labourer' ('co-ordination and unity') are universal imperatives of work organisation. It is thus vitally important to recognise that, as Carchedi stresses, the "same technical division of labour --- originates the same structure of operations but not necessarily the same structure of positions --- the latter structure is also determined by political and ideological factors". (1975b: 368) (Emphasis added.) To put it another way, it is quite feasible to erect quite different production relations on the same technical division-of-labour. Interestingly, perhaps, with the rise of the 'collective labourer', it might plausibly be argued that 'monopoly capitalism' has significantly advanced, rather than diminished, the objective basis for worker control. To begin with, the technical knowledge and control of the labour-process, of which the worker was divested by 'family capitalism', has under monopoly capitalism, passed to a collectivity of supervisory employees, who, in a narrowly-objective sense, are potential allies of the working-class by virtue of their common subjection to the wage-relation and the capitalist labour-process.
labour of those who perform the function of labour (irrespective of whether such labour is 'productive' or 'unproductive' - W.S) and those who perform the function of capital". (1975b: 367)

However, although such functional distinctions go some way toward explaining the processes of stratification within the ranks of salaried professionals, they clearly fail to apprehend the qualitative difference in actual work roles between the 'conceivers' and 'executors' of surveillance systems. (Johnson, 1977) In fact, a clear demarcation line can be drawn between professionals in the appropriation process who conceive (say) job enrichment programs, or time-and-motion systems of job redesign and those whose occupational task it is to give practical effect to such 'innovations'. Likewise, within the realisation process, as Terry Johnson shows, a similar line of cleavage bisects the profession of accountancy: "for as well as those accountants who execute the day-to-day routines of cash and stock control there exist those who frame systems of financial and stock control and supervise their implementation. Such accountants --- (are) socially-distinct from the 'colleagues' and potentially members of an antagonistic class grouping". (1977: 219). (See below)

This notion of intra-professional class differences comes very close to confusing between class role and class membership. For example, the class role of an agent of repression e.g. a member of the police force or the military, is not necessarily coincidental with his/her class membership. This, however, is by no means to deny Johnson's suggestion of polarisation and friction within professional occupations.
Such variations within professional ranks are also evident among such categories who are occupationally-situated in the reproduction process carrying out the social maintenance functions of capital. Thus, within both medicine and social work, a similar basic line of functional division between 'conceivers' and 'executors' can be traced. As a result, the lower echelons of such occupational strata have now become a curious blend of professional and proletarian as their jobs increasing assume the atomistic, controlled character of routine clerical work.

Contrary to such sociological complacencies as the 'knowledge society' and the 'professionalisation of everyone', the proliferation of professional and technical employment does not ipso facto portend any general requirement by modern technology for an upgrading of education and skills. In fact, every advance in technology heralds an even greater concentration of knowledge, skills and control over the new system, in the hands of a minority at the apex of occupational pyramids. For the vast majority - professional or otherwise, the net result of technological innovation is what Braverman calls 'deskilling'.

This process has been illustrated in respect to professional employment like computer programming and engineering by Greenbaum (1976) and Braverman (1974) respectively. For example, citing the findings of two researchers, Braverman notes that the "index of the ratio of median engineering salaries to those of the full-time manufacturing wage-earner shows that if the 1929 ratio is taken as 100, by 1954, the ratio was only 66.6" (1974: 243). This steady downward drift of engineering salaries to a situation where the gap between them and the wages of a manual 'blue-collar' worker are considerably narrowed reflects
fundamental changes within the labour-process of engineering - rather than simply being a consequence of the 'oversupply' of engineers - as the researchers quoted by Braverman naively assume.

Likewise, the conventional sociological wisdom that an increasingly technological society basically requires a better-educated labour-force in toto, is strangely at variance with the objective realities of the nexus between education and jobs. As researchers like Berg (1973) have shown, the link between education and jobs has grown progressively remote: in fact, he reports a tendency for many people to be overqualified for the jobs they hold - a situation he whimsically describes as the 'great training robbery'.

Further, as both Braverman (1974) and Carchedi (1975b) point out, although the educational standards demanded by employers for many jobs have risen dramatically, such requirements increasingly have less to do with the intrinsic degree of education required to perform the job. Rather, the easy availability of a pool of highly-qualified labour enables an employer to use education as a screening device for job applicants.

Clearly, if a job requiring only a level of secondary education is, due to the existence of a surplus of graduates, filled by an individual with a bachelor's degree, then it is not that the job has been educationally upgraded, as the proponents of the 'knowledge society' thesis so speciously assume. On the contrary, it is the level of education which has been devalued: both in terms of the kind of job and the level of pay that now accrues to it. In fact, what is involved here is mere credentialism - the use of the education process as a
screen within the labour market.

Thus, to assume that the pressures for educational upgrading necessarily reflect the greater complexity of relevant jobs is quite false. Indeed, the educational upgrading of accountancy and teacher education in Australia convincingly underscore this. To begin with, much of the impetus for the upgrading of education in accountancy came from the professional association. A not unimportant consideration in this struggle to improve the educational standards to graduate level for entry into the profession was, predictably, the question of professional status and, by implication, economic rewards.

The Vatter Report (1964) which surveyed the state of accountancy in Australia, was candid enough to admit the importance of such factors in pressing for the educational upgrading of the profession. However, the Martin Report (1964) which recommended such upgrading, chose to base its decision on rather abstract and unspecified claims of 'complexity' resulting from 'changes in the nature of the work of accountants'. When one bears in mind that a not-insignificant part of accountancy is bookkeeping, i.e. routine recording of cash and/or stock flows and that computers have already made tremendous inroads into this area, the necessity for the educational system to turn out large numbers of graduate accountants is somewhat questionable.

Equally, it is significant that much of the evidence to the Davidson Committee (1972) urging the up-grading of teacher education in Australia from three years to four, took it as self-evident that such an extension in the length of the course resulted in 'better' teachers. Significantly, despite the massive consensus on the desirability of
such upgrading of teacher education, nothing in the way of firm
evidence was presented to the Committee to demonstrate the necessity
of 4 years of teaching training for the intrinsic needs of schools.
Rather, it was widely-presumed that tremendous educational benefits
would automatically flow from such improvement in 'human capital'.

It is hardly necessary to belabour the point that credentialism has
done much to debase the nature of education. When employers for no
reason related to the intrinsic requirements of the job demand
educational qualifications in excess of it, is it any wonder that
the bachelor's degree has increasingly become a 'worthless piece of
paper' - both economically and educationally? Or, that where a job
calls for a bachelor's degree - in order to ensure that the applicant
possesses the necessary skills, it has become increasingly more
judicious to demand post-graduate qualifications. Naturally, the
response of employers and the media has been to blame the educational
system for producing 'virtually illiterate' and 'innumerate' matric-
ulants and graduates. From such perspectives, it is the educational
system which is at fault - which, indeed, is 'out of step with the
needs of industry', which is 'failing society', which is failing to
produce people who can 'cope with the increased demands of a modern
 technological society'.

Conversely, a cynic may be justified in suggesting that devalued jobs
in advanced capitalist society only get the devalued education they
deceive. In fact, such a claim would not be too far from the truth.
Increasingly, the process of technological innovation under capital-
ism serves to devalue the labour-power of workers. That this phenomen-
on is now taking place in professional employment is clearly demonstrated by Joan Greenbaum (1976) in her discussion of the 'computer field'. As Greenbaum shows, in little over two decades, computer programming has been transformed from a highly-skilled, highly-paid occupation that offered tremendous 'diversity', 'challenge' and autonomy, to a routine, uncreative and progressively deskillled occupation.

Underlying the increasingly alienated and proletarian character of computer programming has been the separation in this activity of the functions of conception from those of execution i.e. the "separation of analytical tasks from those that required only translation into programming" (Greenbaum, 1976: 48). The result has been a polarisation within this occupation between programmers as such and a newly-created category - the systems analysts.

The job of systems analyst became the highest level in prestige and salary, as systems analysts were separated from programmers. Although both job descriptions still required technical expertise and thought processes, the systems analyst was to develop procedures to process information and determine the method and solution to business problems, while the programmer was to translate these solutions into a language the machine could understand.

(Greenbaum, 1976: 48)

However, even the programming function of translating instructions into computer language has, as Greenbaum further discloses, been undermined by "the introduction of pre-planned application languages, where programmers need only insert a pre-arranged series of codes."

(1976: 48) Moreover, not only have such innovations meant "the total removal of technical skill from some of the tasks of programming"
(Greenbaum, 1976: 48) but the 'job degradation' of computer programming has begun to reveal itself in the salaries they are now able to command. In effect, the difference in pay between a computer programmer and a computer operator has progressively declined: indeed, as Greenbaum tells us, with overtime the operators frequently earn more than the programmers.

This devaluation of the labour-power of the computer programmer, to be sure, is repeated in the case of many other types of technical and professional employment. The much discussed 'proletarianisation' of office labour simply refers to the growing similarity of work conditions and narrowing income differentials between many 'white-collar' and 'professional' workers and their 'blue-collar' counterparts. Other indications of the growing 'proletarianisation of the new middle class', as Carchedi (1975b) suggests, are, reduced autonomy at work, a decline in status, lessened job security, the decrease in their pay 'relative to the average' and their growing unionisation and industrial militancy.

Carchedi (1975) maintains, however, that the proletarianisation of the 'new middle-class' is not simply the product of the devaluation of workers' labour-power, as some writers assume. As he rightly indicates, such a process has been going on since the birth of industrial capitalism. What is now, has been the steady transformation of ever-widening segments of clerical, technical and professional employment from agents performing the 'global functions of capital' to agents whose task it is to discharge the functions of the 'collective labourer'. To the extent that, what Carchedi calls, this 'technical dequalification of positions', occurs, such workers are propelled downwards into an
increasingly-oppressive labour-process - with all the predictable proletarianising consequences that have been noted.

Plainly, then, in attributing the growth of 'professional unionism' to factors such as the size and 'impersonal' character of the workplace etc. (c.f. Goldstein, 1954, 1955; Kassalow, 1965, 1969), academic social science thus deals with the symptoms of 'technical dequalification' rather than its causes. The importance of the work of Braverman, Carchedi and Poulantzas is that by bringing such 'class fractions' as technicians and salaried professionals within the focus of the analysis of production relations, it is possible to reveal the significance of the work situation for the kind of industrial organisation which they form, for the strength it commands and for the types of industrial and political activity in which it engages.

However, this is not to suggest that worker consciousness is constituted purely within the sphere of work. On the contrary: indeed, the work of Goldthorpe, Lockwood et. al. (1968, 1969) completely falsifies any such implication. At the same time, the salience of work for people's industrial and political attitudes and behaviour renders the analyses of Braverman etc. of profound importance in attempting to grasp the relationship between class determination and class action.

To begin with, as their conceptualisations suggest, the traditional manual worker whose economic exploitation by capital is plainly-evident has been traditionally mobilised on the basis of opposition to the brute fact of economic exploitation. Conversely, however, while salaried professionals are also economically-oppressed, such oppression
may not be quite as obvious thus the organisations they form in the industrial sphere may differ both in terms of fundamental ideologies and strategies pursued.

Certainly, the unionisation of 'white-collar' and professional workers has expanded considerably within recent years. More importantly, the industrial militancy of such unions is no longer in doubt. In fact, an increasing number of them have now lost, what Hyman (1975) sarcastically terms, their 'industrial virginity' by going out on strike. Yet, whether the formation of trade unions and the willingness to engage in the full range of direct industrial action signifies an upsurge of 'working class consciousness' on the part of unionised professionals, or whether such activity simply represents a form of pragmatic 'instrumental collectivism' - to use the marvellous expression of Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963), requires - not speculation but empirical investigation. To this end comparative survey of the industrial and political attitudes of the leaders of 'blue-collar', 'white-collar' and 'professional' trade unions reported on in the succeeding sections was undertaken. Plainly, how such officials view their organisations in relation to the industrial organisations of other workers and particularly how they socially-define these organisations vis-a-vis the prevailing social order is of crucial importance - not only for understanding the immediate concerns of such institutions - but for assessing the potential for worker unity and collective action by the movement as a whole.
5. RESEARCH STRATEGY

Data Collection

The data to be analysed in this report consist of information collected between July and August, 1975, from the full-time secretaries of trade unions in Sydney by means of a questionnaire survey. Basically, the choice, both of respondents and research setting, was dictated by a combination of methodological and practical considerations. To begin with, the effective operational base of Australian trade unions is the State. The state basis of Australian unionism is reflected in the institutional framework within which the unions operate and which legally-defines the scope of their activities.

Apart from the fact that many unions in the various Australian states have members working under the awards of the state tribunals, many of the essential activities of trade unions e.g. a wide variety of negotiations and most-importantly, strikes, involve the state rather than the federal organisation. Likewise, as Martin reports, "it is the
state organisation alone which is eligible to affiliate to such major interunion bodies as the trades and labor councils and the A.L.P." (1975: 38) Furthermore, it would appear from what Martin says in a footnote, that the state branches of federal unions have considerable autonomy over such matters as amalgamation with other unions. (1975: 36) Needless to say, there is considerable dispute among the various 'experts' on the Australian trade union movement over whether the power of federal union leaders is actually greater than that of their state counterparts.

Accordingly, while on the surface the research focus on the state leadership of the unions may appear paradoxical in view of the 'national' flavour of many of the questions it poses, there is a certain logic in this approach. As we have seen, many of the organisational and industrial initiatives a trade union in Australia can take are essentially a state responsibility. Secondly, the complex interplay between state and federal institutional structures within which trade unions operate is highly-productive of a national orientation on the part of their leaders in the various states.

In choosing to conduct this survey in Sydney, the decision was influenced by two further factors. Firstly, by the
fact that the state of New South Wales contains nearly a half of the trade union members in Australia; in fact, Rawson and Wrightson (1970) and Rawson (1973) estimate it to be approximately 40 percent. Secondly, on the basis of practicality; the relative closeness of Sydney to Canberra made it a feasible setting for the study, particularly in view of the vast distances between capital cities in Australia.

Indeed, the dispersion of the federal offices between capital cities (mainly Sydney and Melbourne) ruled out, on the grounds of cost and time, the study of federal union Secretaries.

The research design was further influenced by a number of other external constraints. Ideally, the study of trade union leadership attitudes should be based largely on in-depth, open-ended interviews. However, the substantial workload of the average Australian trade union Secretary effectively precludes such a research strategy. In fact, overworked union Secretaries can scarcely be expected to devote any great amount of their valuable time to completing extensive questionnaires. Relative brevity of the research instrument was therefore a prime consideration in the circumstances. Such conditions seemed to indicate the need for either a brief interview which would obtain detailed information on an extremely narrow range of subjects or a self-administered questionnaire
consisting largely of 'forced-choice' items which would permit more extensive coverage of the issues involved. Accordingly, the mail questionnaire seemed the more desirable alternative both from the standpoint of satisfying the basic requirements of the research design and because it could be more effectively used within the limited resources available to the researcher.

Traditionally, however, the use of the mail questionnaire, as numerous writers have warned, has one major drawback, a low response rate. (c.f. Denzin 1970a; 1970b; Galtung, 1967; Goode and Hatt, 1952; Hyman, 1967; Kerlinger, 1973; Moser and Kalton, 1971; Stacey, 1969) In fact, the experience of pre-testing the questionnaire on which the study is based revealed that Australian trade union leaders while highly-sympathetic to sociological research are reluctant to respond to anonymous requests to complete mail questionnaires. Indeed, it would seem that not even a researcher's imposing sociological reputation alters this situation very much. It is noteworthy, for example, that in his study of trade union leaders in the United States, C. Wright Mills (1945; 1948) was only able to obtain a response rate of about 50 per cent.

What such factors suggested therefore, was that a more personalised approach might improve the response rate and thus enhance the representativeness of the sample. To this end, the trade union leaders selected for study were contacted by letter (see Appendix 2). This briefly explained the purpose of the research and sought their participation in the survey. Happily, a swift response was received from the majority of union leaders indicating their willingness to
complete the questionnaire and arranging suitable times for the researcher to make personal contact. Essentially, the purpose of these visits was to distribute the questionnaires along with stamped, addressed envelopes for their return. Additionally, this approach meant that any difficulties experienced by the respondents with the questionnaire could be clarified by the researcher on the spot.

The personal visits were also useful for making contact with union leaders who had not responded to the letter. This served both to minimise refusals and to discover whether the particular union existed as an organisational entity at state-level. In the distribution of the questionnaire, the prospective respondents were assured that the research was independent and that the information obtained would be treated as confidential and presented basically in statistical form. It is believed that by giving these assurances some of the hesitancy on the part of one of two union leaders was overcome thereby improving the overall response rate.

Since a key concern was to ensure confidentiality of the information given by the trade union leaders, it was felt that the use of names on the questionnaire would result in a low response rate. Accordingly, to prevent identification either of the leaders or their unions by third-parties, the respondents were given numbered questionnaires to complete. Indeed, given some of the information which this study hoped to elicit, confidentiality seemed essential to its success. The numbered questionnaires moreover, enabled the researcher to determine which leaders had not returned the questionnaire. These were sent reminder notices (see Appendix 3) in which was enclosed another copy of the questionnaire and stamped addressed envelope for its return.
By these means, the non-response rate was kept fairly low.

In summary, the research approach employed in this study was, as a basic data-gathering device, far superior to the conventional mail questionnaire. Simultaneously, it possesses one of the major advantages of the mail-questionnaire approach in that it avoids the not unimportant problems of alternative research methods such as the problem of interviewer effect. By and large then, given the limitations of money, manpower and time to which this study has been subject, the research methods chosen were the most effective, if not completely satisfactory means of obtaining the required data.

Description of sample

As mentioned, the data for this study comes from trade union Secretaries in the state of New South Wales. At the outset, a major problem facing researchers on trade unions in Australia is the absence of detailed information on their size and the distribution of the membership of a union between the various states. In fact, there is disagreement about even how many trade unions there actually are in Australia.

The key source of information on trade unions is the Australian Bureau of Census and Statistics which publishes this data in its annual 'Labour Reports'. Significantly, however, the legislation by which the Commonwealth Statistician gathers his information from the union also precludes him from giving any information about the individual unions or from even revealing the names of those from
which he compiled his data. (Rawson, 1970). Fortunately, this situation has been remedied to some extent by the publication of two handbooks on 'trade unions and employees' associations'. (Rawson and Wrightson, 1970; Rawson, 1973). These handbooks provide a list of the names and overall membership of each of the trade unions. They also give certain other details like the affiliation of the union with the A.C.T.U. and the A.L.P.

Although these handbooks are a significant improvement on the 'Labour Reports' for the researcher on trade unions, nevertheless, they have a few limitations. Notably, we have no way of knowing exactly the size of many unions in New South Wales. (See below) Accordingly, using the national membership figures for each union given in the handbooks, 'guesstimates' of their New South Wales membership were made on the basis that, reflecting national trends, 40 per cent of a union's membership could be expected to be in this state.

This method of estimating union size proved wildly inaccurate in a few cases, as certain unions with a substantial national membership had only a token membership in New South Wales. Where detected early enough, the next largest unions derived from the 'guesstimates' were substituted. By such means, a list of the largest 100 unions in the state of New South Wales was drawn up (see Appendix 1). There are at

This problem relates essentially to the New South Wales branches of federally-organised unions rather than to unions organised on a state-basis only.
least two notable omissions from this list; the Shop Assistants Union, which at state level declared that it had merged with the state branch of the Australian Workers Union. Secondly, in view of the inappropriateness of many of the items in the research instrument, it was decided to exclude the New South Wales Police Federation from the survey.

Given the fact that almost half the trade unions in Australia are tiny in size, a sampling of 100 unions in a state like N.S.W. conceivably should include every active trade union. This assumption proved correct. In fact, of the 100 trade unions, 22 of them did not have a full-time Secretary in New South Wales or could not be contacted, either by the Post Office or the researcher. However, since the research design of the study calls for completion of the questionnaire by full-time union Secretaries, part-time officials were excluded.

This was done on the grounds that little valid information could be gained from this group about aspects of professional union leadership such as union careers, incomes. Characteristics of the sample are shown in the tables which follow.
TABLE 5.1  RESPONSE RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answered questionnaire</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-return of questionnaire</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 5.1 indicates, the survey of union Secretaries had a response rate of 78% which is relatively-high for a study of this kind.

The sample, moreover, included 9 of the 10 largest non-manual unions i.e. those with a national membership above 20,000. Disappointingly, however, of the 10 largest manual unions (i.e. those with a national membership in excess of 50,000), only 4 Union Secretaries completed questionnaires. Nevertheless, since union influence is not simply a function of size but also of strategic location, the sample, significantly, included virtually all of these unions which have an organisational presence in New South Wales. (See below).

It is thus fairly-representative of the trade unions in New South Wales.
The distribution of the sample by the type of union is shown in Table 5.2.

**TABLE 5.2 DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Union *</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As classified by the respondents.

The under-representation of the professional group is essentially a reflection of the minute size of professional unions as a whole. In effect, this means that most unions of professionals are too small to support full-time union Secretaries at state-level.

Characteristically, the unions sampled reflect the national trend for membership to be concentrated in a few large unions while the remainder of union members are scattered among a multitude of relatively small unions.
The Research Instrument

The many demands upon the time of a full-time trade union official then, played a large part in the choice of the research instrument. Basically, what the situation required was an instrument which would yield the maximum amount of information while offering significant advantages in time saving, convenience and ease of administration. One research technique which adequately fulfils the above conditions is the Likert attitude scale.

Scale Construction and Scoring

Essentially, the procedure for constructing a Likert-type scale involves assembling a series of items or statements considered relevant to the attitude being investigated. The subject is then asked to respond to each in terms of a number of categories ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. These categories are assigned scores ranging from 4 or 5 for strong agreement (depending upon the number of response categories) to 1 for strong disagreement. An individual's total score is the sum of these individual scores.

Item Analysis

Following administration of the scale, the list of statements is subjected to analysis in order to select items
which will provide an internally-consistent scale. Correlating the average item score for each individual with each of the actual item scores provides one way of assessing this internal consistency. Another approach and, indeed, the one used in this study, involves the elimination of statements with little discriminating power in the sense that they fail to discriminate between people with very high and very low scores namely, for instance, the top and bottom 25 percent of the respondents. The remaining items with good discriminatory power are then combined to form the scale and the score for each individual is derived from totalling their scores on each of the remaining items which make up the scale. Because of its basic characteristics Likert scaling is generally acknowledged to produce summated rating scales.

Among the many advantages of the Likert scale is that it permits a measurement of the intensity of opinion as well as being generally simpler to construct than the Thurstone scale and perhaps even the Guttman scale. Furthermore, unlike the Thurstone scale, the Likert scale provides a more reliable and sensitive measure of attitudes by virtue of the fact that each Likert-type scale item allows expression of various degrees of agreement and disagreement whereas the Thurstone scale item permits a choice of only two responses. Certainly, Likert-type scales are not without their disadvantages but for the purposes for which they were utilised they adequately met the needs of the present study.
6. THE CONCEPT OF CLASS IDENTITY

**Operational Definitions**

A basic precondition of class consciousness in capitalist society is that workers and certainly, the leaders of the organisations that they form, are possessed of a sentiment of solidarity, of sharing a common social situation and, therefore, of common bonds with others subjected to the wage relation. To envisage class consciousness in this manner clearly creates immense methodological difficulties. At the very least, it requires the identification of the particular categories of workers and of worker organisations with which this sense of a shared condition is considered to exist.

This problem of class identity is rendered enormously difficult by the skill, status, sexual, ethnic and national divisions within the labour force. Needless to say, a basic line of division results from the changes in the occupational composition of the working population. Inevitably, these changes have been reflected in the heterogenous occupational character of the trade union movement. To the extent that organisational fragmentation constitutes
an obstacle to the unity of workers as a class, the attitudes of union leaders to greater trade union integration are obviously critically-relevant to the question of class identity. Indeed, viewed within the context of organised labour, the concept of class consciousness intrinsically presupposes a recognition by the union and its leadership of the similarity of its interests to those of other trade unions and a willingness to ally itself with them. Thus a key indicator of class identity is to be found in trade union leadership attitudes toward union amalgamation.

Another indicator is the extent of their identification with the wider trade union movement represented by the affiliation of their unions with the A.C.T.U. Arguably, such affiliation or the willingness to affiliate may be more instrumentally motivated than expressive of class unity. Yet, insofar as the labour movement also has its political aspect then such affiliation arguably encompasses also a more distinctively ideological dimension. This is perhaps most salient in the case of union affiliation with the Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.).

It is of course a commonplace that trade unions represent the fundamental basis for the organisation of workers as a class. Thus, these institutions have a pivotal role to play in underlining and achieving the essential unity of interest which exists between all workers. Traditionally, this notion has found expression in the idea of 'worker solidarity' - a concept which denotes the fundamental unity between working people and which is held to overshadow the sectional divisions of craft and skill.
Indeed, it is because of the existence of such sentiments - no matter that they are often acknowledged more in their breach than in their observance - that it makes any sense at all to talk of a trade union or labour 'movement'.

Historically, union solidarity inevitably meant the solidarity of largely manual worker organisations. However, in the past decade or two, the advanced industrial nations - Australia among them, have experienced a vast expansion of non-manual employment. This period has also seen an unprecedented growth in the unionisation and industrial militancy of this segment of the labour force.

In Australia and elsewhere, the significance of these trends is plain to see. To begin with, were it not for the influx of non-manual workers, the Australian union movement would have declined rather than grown. Furthermore, if present trends continue, non-manual workers and their organisations are likely to predominate in the industrial scene in Australia within a generation or less.

Clearly, what impact such developments makes on the character of Australian unionism is likely to be crucially-influenced by the social images manual and non-manual workers hold of themselves and of each other. Needless to say, trade union leaders are in a unique position to influence the social perceptions of their members. Accordingly, the concept of class identity would appear to suggest a sense of collective solidarity between manual and non-manual workers and the industrial organisations they create to represent their interests.
However, apart from organisational divisions and manual and non-manual differences within the trade union movement, there are two major potential sources of worker disunity. The first of these concerns the vexed question of pay differentials and the second relates to the notion of compulsory unionism or 'preference to unionists' as it is often euphemised. Clearly, therefore, any meaningful concept of class identity must address these two issues - given their potential to corrode worker unity.

Possibly nowhere is the fragmentation of the working class more strikingly evident than in the division of the labour force along sexual lines. In common with most industrial societies, there has been a dramatic rise in the workforce participation of women in Australia since the Second World War. For instance, between 1947 and 1974, the proportion of women in the Australian workforce almost doubled; from 22.4% to just over 42%. In effect women comprise more than one-third of the Australian workforce. In addition, during the period of economic growth in the two decades following the end of World War II - the so-called 'long boom', the female component of the workforce grew much faster than the male rate. (Cass, 1978; Mercer, 1975) The attitudes of union leaders toward women workers and their needs are thus a key criterion of their sense of class identity.

Likewise, migrant labour, as writers like Collins (1975) have noted, has created an important line of social cleavage within the Australian working class. This objective division within the working class between what Collins (1975) perceives to be a 'labour aristocracy' of indigenous workers and a layer of socially-underprivileged migrant workers, poses special problems for the
consciousness and unity of the class. The attitudes of union leaders are therefore of pivotal importance in counteracting ethnocentrism and promoting the solidarity of all workers regardless of cultural differences. Indeed, the concept of class identity would seem to presuppose such unity.

Although immigration has been exceptionally important for post-war economic growth in Australia, changes within the contemporary Australian economy indicate a diminishing need for large-scale infusions of immigrant labour. To begin with, Australia's economic future is increasingly being seen in terms of the massive development of its mineral resources by international corporations. Being capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive, the so-called 'resources boom' is not expected to generate any great demand for labour. Moreover, not only has Australian manufacturing industry experienced severe contraction but there is an increasing tendency for this sector to shift its operations to low-wage Asian countries.

The production of manufactured goods overseas with low-cost Asian labour, which are then imported into Australia, has seen the virtual disappearance of the clothing, textile and footwear industries in Australia. These industries which, interestingly enough, are the largest employers of migrant labour - particularly female migrant labour, have been forced to follow suit and go 'offshore' or go out of business. The demand for these forms of factory labour in Australia thus progressively diminishes, as instead of bringing labour to capital, many segments of Australian industry resort to taking capital to labour.
The implications of the political decision that Australia's economic future lies mainly in primary production - especially of mineral development and export, are serious for the Australian working class and its institutions like trade unions. Certainly, the internationalisation of capital poses acutely the questions of united action and active solidarity between workers and labour organisations of developed capitalist nations and their counterparts in the 'Third World'. It follows therefore that in the present context of the international division-of-labour, a sense of class identity among union leaders implies the transcendence of national frontiers.

In effect, then, as the foregoing discussion suggests, the concept of class identity embodies at least seven different components. They are:

i) union amalgamation;
ii) affiliation with the A.C.T.U.;
iii) affiliation with the A.L.P.;
iv) manual and non-manual worker solidarity;
v) solidarity with women workers;
vi) solidarity with migrant workers;
vii) international worker solidarity.

Accordingly, in operationally-defining class identity in terms of these seven variables, what we have formulated is a single
concept with seven distinct indicators of it - each, moreover, potentially an independent measure.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

For the purposes of this study, we sought to measure class identity with a twenty item Likert scale. These items or statements were framed either in a positive form, e.g. 'Clerical and professional unions should affiliate with the A.C.T.U. and the Trades and Labour Council', or in a negative form, e.g. 'It is of no concern to Australian trade union leaders if multinational companies which have branches in Australia, or Australian-owned firms, treat their workers poorly in other countries'.

Respondents were required to make one of four possible responses to each statement: strongly agree; agree; disagree and strongly disagree. These responses have been scored from 1 to 4 so that the response indicative of the most favourable attitude is given the highest score. The total score can thus range from twenty to eighty, the upper level indicating a strong sense of class solidarity or class identity. Very importantly, the 'uncertain' response category which is often a feature of Likert scaling was omitted in this study. Briefly, the reasons for this is that the issues on which trade union leadership opinion was sought were such that the respondents might reasonably be expected to hold a view on them one way or the other.

Accordingly, the union leaders surveyed were asked to indicate the direction and intensity of their feelings with regard to
union amalgamation, union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. and A.L.P., as well as to the idea of unity with workers across status, ethnic, gender and national boundaries. As explained in more detail in Chapter 5, the questionnaire was presented to two groups of trade union leaders. One group numbering thirty-three people comprised leaders of 'blue-collar' trade unions. The other group consisted of twenty-eight leaders of 'white-collar' and 'professional' trade unions.

The classification of the unions as 'blue-collar', 'white-collar' and 'professional' was made by the respondents themselves in answer to a questionnaire item asking them to indicate which of the three terms would best describe the type of union they led. In view of the very small number of respondents in the 'professional' category, this group was combined with the 'white-collar' group for the purposes of analysis.

In setting out to determine whether the initial group of 20 items could validly be added together to form a scale of class identity, it is first necessary to ensure that the items are internally consistent. Put simply, the items or statements need to be subjected to a procedure which tests whether they all lie on the same dimension. By these means statements which in the present case do not lie on the dimension 'class identity' would be identified and eliminated from the scale.

Item analysis is the usual means by which scale items are checked for dimensionality. Presently there exists a variety of proposed methods of item analysis. In fact, complex multi-
dimensional analyses such as factor analysis might be considered to be the ultimate in item analytic procedures for the precision it is capable of achieving. However, while factor analysis is not an absolutely necessary prerequisite for selecting items to be included or omitted, at the very least, a comparison between the scale items for the top and bottom twenty-five percent of the respondents who completed the questionnaire is essential for ensuring that there is empirical as well as theoretical rationale for combining the information contained in the various items.

Briefly, the procedure involved in this form of item analysis is as follows. First, the total score for each respondent is calculated by aggregating the respondent's scores on each of the items. From this, the twenty-five percent of respondents with the highest total scores and the twenty-five percent with the lowest total scores are selected. Having done this, every item used to construct the scale is examined to determine how it was answered by the two groups. Next, the mean score on the item for the upper and lower group is calculated.

Whether the two mean scores are statistically significant may then be tested. The test usually employed for this purpose is the t-test. The statistical procedures used to calculate the t-test are set out in Appendix 5. The calculation is made for all the statements or items in the scale. This allows every item to be given a t-value. Items selected in the final scale are thus selected on the basis of their t-scores. Those items with the highest t-scores, in effect, indicating that they discriminate well between upper and lower groups are retained to form the final
CONSCIOUSNESS OF CLASS IDENTITY: TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP
ATTITUDES TO LABOUR UNITY

Class identity and type of union

The thirteen items comprising the final class identity attitude scale are shown below and overleaf.

'In place of the 300 or so unions which exist in Australia, a single large union in each industry would serve the workers much better.'

'Clerical and professional unions should affiliate with the A.C.T.U. and the Trades and Labour Council.'

'Small unions will need to amalgamate or federate with larger unions in order to survive in a society dominated by large-scale business and government concerns.'

'Generally speaking, clerical and professional trade unionists have more in common with employers than they do with manual trade unionists.'

'The presence of more clerical and professional unions in the A.C.T.U. and the T.L.C. would reduce the militancy of these organisations.'
'If women want jobs then they should accept the same conditions as men and not expect the union to get special conditions for them.'

'Unions should provide special opportunities for women to enable them to achieve full-time official positions.'

'Trade unions in Australia should avoid affiliation with political parties.'

'When a parliamentary election is about to be held unions which are affiliated with a political party are less free to take industrial action, than unions which are not so affiliated.'

'Trade unions which are affiliated with a particular political party are generally at a disadvantage compared with non-affiliated unions when that party is out of office.'

'It is not in the best interests of trade unionism for senior union officials to simultaneously hold senior positions in a political party.'

'It is of no concern to Australian trade union leaders if multi-national companies
which have branches in Australia, or Australian-owned firms, treat their workers poorly in other countries.'

'The activities of multi-national corporations call for co-ordinated international trade union action.'

The distribution of scores for the blue-collar and white-collar union leaders surveyed is shown in Table 6.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Union</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Score 23-29</th>
<th>30-36</th>
<th>37-43</th>
<th>44-50</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue-Collar</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>39.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>37.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance of difference of Means

\[ t = 1.72 \]

\[ p > .05 \]

N.B. Owing to the approximations involved in rounding to whole numbers, the above percentages do not sum to exactly 100.

Scores on the scale can range from thirteen to fifty-two, the upper level indicating a strong sense of class identity. As might be expected, the range of scores among white-collar...
union leaders was much broader than among blue-collar officials - 24 to 50 compared with 29 to 50. However, while in percentage terms some of the score differences between manual and non-manual union leaders appear to be substantial - given the relatively small numbers involved, no conclusive interpretations can be drawn from the data. Nevertheless, the mean scale scores for the two groups were calculated from the actual scores recorded and are shown in Table 6.1.

It will be recalled that according to certain versions of the 'new working class' thesis, class identity is expected to be much weaker among non-manual trade unionists than among manual unionists. Indeed, as we have seen, the motivations for non-manual unionisation are said to be quite different than for manual forms of collectivist organisation. Certainly, there is a widespread academic and public belief that 'white-collar trade unions are different'. However, in regard to their level of class identity, measured by the attitudes of union leadership to the industrial and political unity of working people regardless of status, ethnic, gender and national differences, a specific test of the effects of the type of union viz. white-collar vs blue-collar, failed to show any significant statistical difference in the mean scale scores of their respective leaders; $t = 1.72, p > .05$. 
Union affiliation with the A.C.T.U.

Apart from the blue-collar/white-collar difference, there are various ways in which unions and union leaders are divided. Within the Australian labour movement, a key difference between trade unions is between those which are formally associated with the major umbrella organisation of trade unions, the A.C.T.U. and those which are outside it. Another difference between trade unions involves those which are affiliated with the Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.) and those which are not.

However, while unions which are affiliated with the A.L.P. are usually also affiliated with the A.C.T.U. or with one of its state branches such as the various trades and labour councils, there are a number of unions which are affiliated with the A.C.T.U. but which have avoided affiliation with the A.L.P. Although the A.C.T.U. has traditionally been a stronghold of blue-collar trade unionism, recent years have seen a tendency for increasing numbers of white-collar unions to affiliate with the A.C.T.U. - despite the fact that many of these unions also had, until comparatively-recently, their own peak organisations such as the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations (A.C.S.P.A.) and the Council of Commonwealth Public Service Organisations (C.C.P.S.O.)

There are, of course, strong practical grounds for trade unions to seek affiliation with the A.C.T.U. As the major
federation of trade unions in Australia, the A.C.T.U. has inevitably been the body which governments and business leaders have consulted on a range of matters affecting the welfare of workers. Hence, there are powerful instrumental reasons for white-collar unions to affiliate with the A.C.T.U. However, affiliation with the A.L.P. implies quite different considerations. In brief, many writers would claim that this form of association by trade unions suggests a more specifically ideological commitment on the part of these organisations than does their affiliation with the A.C.T.U.

Characteristically, given the tendency to perceive the affiliation of white-collar trade unions with the A.C.T.U. in instrumental terms, we would expect the leadership of such unions to hold much weaker attitudes toward labour unity than do their manual counterparts. For, if the assumption of white-collar union instrumentalism is true, the affiliation of these organisations with the A.C.T.U. is not impelled by considerations of class solidarity with manual workers. The comparisons between manual and non-manual unions which are affiliated with the A.C.T.U. are shown in Table 6.2.
TABLE 6.2 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON SCALE OF CLASS IDENTITY BY UNION AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Blue-Collar</th>
<th>White-Collar</th>
<th>Significance of difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.C.T.U.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>39.45</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-A.C.T.U.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance of difference of Means  

(N=33)  (N=27)

Predictably, within the sample of trade union leaders, the blue-collar unions are all affiliated with the A.C.T.U. which only serves to confirm the general tendency for such organisations at large to be affiliated. Among the white-collar unions in the sample however, while nearly two-thirds were affiliated with the A.C.T.U., a sizeable proportion were not. Interestingly, however, of the unions not affiliated with the A.C.T.U., all but one were affiliated with one or other of the white-collar union federations viz. A.C.S.P.A., C.C.P.S.O., etc.

However, what is of critical theoretical importance is the attitudes of the leaders of the various types of unions on the scale of class identity. As shown in Table 6.2 the
mean score of blue-collar and white-collar leaders of trade unions which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. were virtually identical with manual scores exceeding non-manual by a mere 0.86 points (39.45 for manual union leaders compared with 38.59 for non-manual). This difference is manifestly not significant statistically at any level, $t = 0.526$. It is therefore clear that within the sample, non-manual union leaders whose unions are affiliated with the A.C.T.U. do not differ to any great extent in their attitudes to labour unity from their manual counterparts heading A.C.T.U. affiliated unions.

Indeed, where measurable differences in leadership attitudes exist, these tend to exist between the leaders of non-manual unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and their non-manual counterparts which are not. As mentioned, only one of the white-collar unions in our sample was not affiliated with a union federation of some kind. In order to determine whether the type of federation with which a non-manual trade union is affiliated affected leadership attitudes, the scores of leaders of A.C.T.U. affiliated unions were compared with the scores of A.C.S.P.A./C.C.P.S.O. affiliates.

As shown in Table 6.2, the leaders of white-collar unions which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. achieved a mean score of 38.59 on the scale compared with a mean score of 35.4 for unions affiliated with the white-collar union federations. However, although the mean difference in their scores was 3.19, again statistical tests revealed
that this difference was not significant, $t = 1.44$, $p > .05$. Accordingly, despite differences in their forms of affiliation with central union federations like the A.C.T.U. or A.C.S.P.A., the level of 'class identity' among white-collar union leaders in our sample is remarkably similar to that of the manual union officials.

Union affiliation with the A.L.P.

However, the extent to which such attitudes are influenced by the political affiliations of the union need to be examined. As mentioned earlier, a basic form of political affiliation which trade unions in Australia tend to have is affiliation with the Australian Labor Party. It is a commonplace that the trade unions played a major part in the founding of the A.L.P. and continue to exercise considerable influence within the party apart from being major financial supporters of it.

Although party affiliation is not without benefits for trade unions and their officials, nevertheless, these are not as industrially apparent for trade unions as is affiliation with the A.C.T.U. Accordingly, while a substantial proportion of manual trade unions are affiliated with the A.L.P., very large numbers of non-manual trade unions - especially those formed within recent years, have remained outside of the A.L.P. To some extent, the higher proportion of manual unions affiliated with the A.L.P. relative to non-manual unions is a product of their different histories. In fact,
when it first became possible for trade unions to affiliate with the A.L.P., there were proportionally far greater numbers of manual trade unions in Australia than non-manual ones.

Furthermore, while it may have required little effort of will for most manual unions to perceive their political interests as best being served by the A.L.P., the still privileged position of the bulk on non-manual employees some decades ago would perhaps have entailed a considerable degree of explicit class identification for non-manual trade unions to perceive their political fortunes as being tied up with the A.L.P. Accordingly, the real cause for comment is the significant proportion of white-collar trade unions which have been affiliated with the party almost from its inception.

Clearly, if the foregoing speculations about union affiliation with the A.L.P. have any substance, we would expect to find stronger attitudes toward labour unity among the leaders of non-manual unions which are affiliated with the A.L.P. than among the leaders of manual unions which have such affiliations. These associations are examined in Table 6.3 where the attitude scores of blue-collar and white-collar leaders of A.L.P. and A.C.T.U. affiliated unions are compared with A.C.T.U. affiliated unions only.
Predictably, the overwhelming majority of blue-collar unions in the sample were affiliated with both the A.L.P. and the A.C.T.U. In fact, the proportion of the blue-collar unions which were affiliated in this way was more than double that of the white-collar trade unions. By contrast, where only 9% of the blue-collar unions in the sample were affiliated only with the A.C.T.U., 59% of the white-collar unions were so affiliated. In essence, as the table clearly demonstrates, white-collar trade unions were much more likely to affiliate with the A.C.T.U. than with the A.L.P. However, what is most noteworthy about this is that the mean scores of white-collar leaders whose unions were affiliated with both the A.L.P. and A.C.T.U. exceeded those of leaders of
the blue-collar A.L.P. and A.C.T.U. affiliates. In fact, the mean scores of the white-collar group were 42.86 compared with 39.53 for their blue-collar counterparts - a difference of 3.33 points. However, in subjecting the scores to statistical testing, the difference in the mean scores between the white-collar and blue-collar union leaders failed to reach significance, \( t = 0.66, \ p > .05 \).

Furthermore, although the mean scores of blue-collar union leaders whose organisations were affiliated with both the A.L.P. and A.C.T.U. exceeded those of A.C.T.U. affiliated only unions, the difference was very slight, viz. 39.53 compared with 38.67 and, predictably, not statistically significant, \( t = 0.26, \ p > .05 \). The real difference between the unions in the sample was between the white-collar unions which were affiliated with both the A.L.P. and the A.C.T.U. and those which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. only.

Among the former, the mean score achieved on the attitude scale was 42.86 compared with a score of 35.6 for those whose organisations were affiliated only with the A.C.T.U. This difference in mean scores of 7.26 between A.L.P. and A.C.T.U. affiliated and A.C.T.U. only unions, proved to be statistically significant; \( t = 3.26, \ p < .05 \). This suggests that affiliation with the A.L.P. is associated with much stronger levels of class identification among leaders of white-collar trade unions.
In fact, as Table 6.3 shows, non-manual unions affiliated only with the A.C.T.U. have much more in common with similarly affiliated blue-collar trade unions than they do with fellow white-collar unions which are affiliated with the A.L.P. Thus, party political affiliation of their organisations is clearly linked with more positive attitudes toward labour unity by the union leaders in our sample.

Union Size

Apart from affiliation with the A.C.T.U. and the A.L.P., trade unions in Australia differ in a variety of other respects. Most fundamentally, they differ in size. Size of union membership may be an important influence on leadership attitudes - not only in terms of the organisational constraints this may have on the behaviour of leaders within the organisation but because of its implications for a wide ranging number of issues. The influence of union size on leadership scores on the scale of class identity is examined in Table 6.4.
TABLE 6.4 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON CLASS IDENTITY SCALE BY SIZE AND TYPE OF UNION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Blue-Collar</th>
<th>White-Collar</th>
<th>Significance of difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* %</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>* %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38.93</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-15,000</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36.17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 15,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42.33</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Due to approximations involved in rounding to whole numbers the above percentages do not sum to exactly 100.

Characteristically, the unions in the sample reflect the trend in Australia as a whole for union membership to be concentrated in a few large unions while the remainder of union members are scattered among a multitude of relatively small unions. For example, Rawson (1978) estimates that nationally more than a half of the trade unionists belong to only 16 unions, while just 36 trade unions account for nearly 80 percent of the workers who are unionised. By contrast, under 4 percent of the total union membership in Australia is distributed among 172 trade unions.
As Table 6.4 reveals, nearly a half of both the blue-collar and white-collar unions in the sample had memberships below 5,000. However, at the other extreme, where only 18 percent of the blue-collar unions exceeded 15,000 members, a quarter of the white-collar unions did so. Altogether, the unions in the sample ranged in size from as few as 500 members on the one hand to as many as 45,000 members on the other, the median size being 8,000 members. However, while white-collar unions were bigger in size than blue-collar unions - ranging from 600 to 45,000 members, compared with 500 to 38,000 members, the median size of the blue-collar unions was slightly higher than that of the white-collar unions, viz. 6,000 members, compared with 5,500 members.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the table is that class identity is strongest among the leaders of the largest unions viz. those with memberships above 15,000 people each. Characteristically, moreover, except for unions with memberships between 5,000 and 15,000 members, class identity was stronger among blue-collar union leaders than among white-collar union leaders. However, a specific test of the effect of union size on trade union leadership attitudes failed to reach significance at any level for unions of any size (see Table 6.4).

The inconclusive nature of the results on union size suggests that this variable needs to be examined in the context of factors which carry greater salience for trade union leadership attitudes. The concept of 'unionateness' is relevant
here. As mentioned earlier, unionateness refers to how much a worker industrial organisation resembles an ideal type trade union. Within the framework of Australian industrial relations, the indicator par excellence of unionateness is union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. The results yielded by examination of these variables are outlined in Table 6.5.

**TABLE 6.5 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS IDENTITY BY SIZE, AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38.93</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-15,000</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36.17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 15,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42.33</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=33) (N=17) (N=10)

* Due to approximations involved in rounding to whole numbers, the above percentages do not sum to exactly 100.

Among the unions in the sample as Table 6.5 reveals, class identity generally increased with union size except for small-scale white-collar unions which were unaffiliated with the A.C.T.U. and medium-sized white-collar unions
which were affiliated. Paradoxically, moreover, medium sized white-collar unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U. displayed the strongest levels of class identity - substantially exceeding those of other medium sized unions and indeed, exceeding that of any category of blue-collar union. However, the differences in the mean scores while impressive proved not to be statistically significant. For example, between white-collar and blue-collar, medium-sized unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U., the test yielded the following result; \( t = 0.74, p > .05 \).

Conversely, between medium sized white-collar unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and those not affiliated the result was \( t = 1.61, p > .05 \). Similar comparison of the differences in the means of the various types and affiliations of the unions in the sample also failed to yield statistically-significant results. However, a great deal of caution needs to be exercised in interpreting such conclusions. To begin with, it might plausibly be argued that broad classifications of trade unions of the kind examined in these tables leave a great deal unsaid about the social situations of those who happen to lead them. In particular, the data considered so far tell us little of the ways in which various factors in the individual's background influence his perception of the role of his organisation.
Social backgrounds of leaders and class identity

There are four aspects of the union leader's social background we take as basic. They are age, income, length of time a union leader and political party member. The most obvious of the four background factors is age and its importance for the class attitudes of trade union leaders is examined in Table 6.6.

**TABLE 6.6 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS IDENTITY BY AGE OF LEADER AND TYPE OF UNION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Blue-Collar</th>
<th>White-Collar</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 and under</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40.53</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 51</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39.47</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=30)</td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trade union leaders in our sample ranged in age from 24 years to 65 years with a median age of 51 years. White-collar union leaders were on average younger than their blue-collar counterparts with a median age of 44 years and a range from 24 to 62 years of age compared with a median of 52 years and an age range from 29 to 65 years.

As the table indicates, class identity tended to weaken with age. However, it remained stronger for blue-collar officials
than for white-collar officials. Again, the difference in the means for the blue-collar and white-collar leader scores on the scale were not significant at the five percent level.

The next background factor to be considered was that of income. The income of trade union leaders is important as an indicator of their life-styles and the degree of their social differentiation from their members which in turn as Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' contended generations ago carries some profoundly conservative implications for trade union leadership ideologies. The effects of income on class identification are shown in Table 6.7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Blue-Collar %</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean</th>
<th>White-Collar %</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $8,000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8-$9,999</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41.08</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37.75</td>
<td>$t = 1.04; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10-$14,999</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37.31</td>
<td>$t = 0.33; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000 +</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table points up some interesting contrasts. Notably, while well over half the blue-collar union officials earned
below $10,000 per year only 14 percent of the white-collar leaders did so. Even more revealingly, where under one-third of the blue-collar leaders earned above $10,000 per year, close on 90 percent of their white-collar counterparts had earnings above this figure — with 39% of the latter earning in excess of $15,000 per year compared with the solitary blue-collar official who did so. As far as class identity is concerned, there was a general tendency for it to decline with income. However, the conclusions are not readily interpretable. For, whereas class identity was stronger among blue-collar leaders earning between $8,000 and $10,000 a year than among white-collar leaders, the exact opposite resulted among those earning between $10,000 and $15,000. Needless to say, in neither case were the mean differences in the scores statistically significant.

Central, of course, to the notion of oligarchic control of trade unions as formulated by Michels, is the idea that trade union leaders not only have superior material living standards to those of their members but also that they tend to be fairly entrenched in their positions — even though they may have to contest such positions at regular elections. To test whether 'oligarchic tendencies' influence class identity, we divided the sample into those who had held their present positions for 5 years or less and those who had done so for more than 5 years. The results are set out in Table 6.8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blue-Collar</td>
<td>White-Collar</td>
<td>Blue-Collar</td>
<td>White-Collar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under $8,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8-$9,999</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37.75</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10-$14,999</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38.11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36.87</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35.14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=19)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the sample, there was a tendency for class identity to decline with income for those who had held office for a period of 5 years or less, the decline being sharpest among those earning above $10,000 a year in the case of the blue-collar leaders and above $15,000 a year for their white-collar counterparts. Predictably, when income category is taken into account, class identity is shown to be marginally stronger among the blue-collar officials than among the white-collar officials in the sample.

Further, while class identity tended to decline over time, it is worth noting that this decline was entirely confined to the manual union leaders earning the lowest salaries of
the sample. Among both manual and non-manual leaders in the sample earning above $10,000 a year, class identity actually increased with time in office. Thus, contrary to the claims of the 'iron law of oligarchy', class identity among the best paid union leaders in the sample who had held their positions for more than 5 years was stronger than for those earning similar amounts but who had held office for much shorter periods. Michels' thesis, of course, assumes that the greater the length of time in office and the better the pay of the union leader - particularly the blue-collar union leader, the more ideologically conservative she/he becomes and the weaker his/her sense of class solidarity.

Such claims, however, are not borne out by the responses of the union leaders in the sample. It is not so clear what can be learnt about class identity from the fact that the sharpest decline in it occurred among the lowest-paid but longest-serving blue-collar union officials. It is, however, interesting to note that when income alone was considered (Table 6.7), class identity among the lowest paid manual union leaders was much higher than among those blue-collar officials on the highest income level in the sample. In fact, as we saw from Table 6.7, there was a general tendency for class identity to decline with income for both groups.

It is, of course, possible that other variables are at work in producing the results shown in Table 6.8. One variable
which might be expected to have an influence on the level of leadership earnings and the length of time in office is age. Of the two factors, age is more closely related to the length of time in office than it is to the level of earnings. Furthermore, as we saw in Table 6.6 there was a tendency for class identity to decline with age for both the manual and the non-manual leaders in the sample. Other background factors which might be expected to have an influence on the class identity of union leaders are their political party memberships and their party preferences. The party membership of the sample and its effect on class identity are shown in Table 6.9.

**TABLE 6.9 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON CLASS IDENTITY SCALE BY PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND TYPE OF UNION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Blue-Collar %</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>White-Collar %</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Significance of difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>39.75</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>39.78</td>
<td>$t = 0.02; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-A.L.P.</td>
<td>35.17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>$t = 0.95; p &gt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=30)</td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance of difference of Means

$t = 2.19, p < .05$, $t = 5.39, p < .05$

* Non-A.L.P. blue-collar category excludes those giving Communist Party of Australia or one or other of the Socialist Parties of Australia as the party to which they belong.
The political party to which the vast majority of the union leaders in the sample belonged was the Australian Labor Party. Nearly three-quarters of the manual union leaders and almost two-thirds of the non-manual officials acknowledged being members of the party. Of the blue-collar union leaders who did not belong to the A.L.P., nearly 10 percent belonged to either the Communist Party of Australia or to one or other of the Socialist parties of Australia. Overall, less than a fifth of the entire manual union leadership in the sample said that they were not members of a political party. Finally, of the white-collar union leaders who were not members of the A.L.P. only one admitted to being a member of the Liberal Party.

The A.L.P. as Table 6.9 shows held the allegiance of not only the majority of the blue-collar union officials but also the majority of the white-collar leaders in the sample. It is noteworthy that while 91 percent of the blue-collar trade unions were affiliated with the A.L.P. only 73 percent of their leaders were themselves members of the party. By contrast, where only 25 percent of the white-collar unions in the sample had formal ties with the A.L.P. in the form of affiliation with it, nearly two-thirds of the white-collar union leaders were themselves members of the party.

This fact raises a number of interesting questions for the future directions of non-manual unionism in Australia. While many Australian writers readily concede the possibility of non-manual unions increasingly affiliating with the A.C.T.U.,
most are openly sceptical that a similar trend might occur with affiliation with the A.L.P. It has been observed that traditionally affiliation with the A.L.P. is pre-eminently a blue-collar union phenomenon. It has further been noted that the party has generally failed to gain affiliates from among the new and growing sectors of non-manual unionism. Furthermore, it is claimed that party political affiliation on the part of trade unions, in effect, affiliation of the union with the A.L.P., is unpopular with the members of the new non-manual unions.

However, if these claims are true, then the white-collar union leaders in our sample do not appear to share their members' chariness of the A.L.P. The implication, moreover, that in the long run it is going to be the influence of the members of these non-manual unions rather than that of the leaders which proves decisive on the question of whether or not they affiliate with the A.L.P. remains to be demonstrated.

Class identity, as one might expect, is strongly associated with party membership. For example, while there were no statistically significant differences between the scores of blue-collar and white-collar union leaders who were members of the A.L.P. on the one hand, or between their counterparts who were non-A.L.P. members, significant differences were recorded between the A.L.P. and the non-A.L.P. members of both the blue-collar and white-collar groups in the sample. For example, within the blue collar group, a statistical test
of the difference in class identity between A.L.P. members and non-A.L.P. members proved highly significant at the 5 percent level; \( t = 2.19 \). Likewise, among the white-collar officials, the difference in class identity achieved even higher levels of significance; \( t = 5.39, \ p < .001 \).

It might be expected that class identity would be stronger for union leaders who were members of the communist or socialist parties than for those who were members of the A.L.P. or non-party members. This proved to be the case. For example, the mean score of union leaders who were members of the communist and socialist parties on the scale of class identity was 45.67. This compares with mean scores of 39.75 and 39.78 respectively, of blue-collar and white-collar union leaders who were members of the A.L.P. These differences, moreover, were statistically significant. For example, when communist and socialist union leaders were compared with blue-collar labor party union leaders the difference in scores reached significance at the .05 level; \( t = 2.23 \). These statistical differences were even greater when such union leaders were compared with white-collar, labor party union leaders reaching significance at the .01 level; \( t = 3.05 \).

From these results, it would appear that the more radical the political party to which a union leader belongs, the stronger is his sense of class identity. Admittedly, in view of the fact that all of the union leaders who belonged to communist and socialist parties headed blue-collar unions,
it might be questioned whether the type of union influenced the level of class identity. However, as we earlier saw, not only was there no statistical difference in class identity between A.L.P. affiliated blue-collar and white-collar unions in the sample, but the scores of the white-collar officials actually exceeded those of the blue-collar leaders.

Finally, as far as the question of party loyalty is concerned, it should be noted that the A.L.P. was the preferred party of all the blue-collar union leaders who were not members of it—apart from the handful of officials who were both members of, and politically-committed to one or other of the communist or socialist parties. By comparison, half of the white-collar union leaders who were non-party members indicated a preference for the A.L.P. Of the remainder, one gave his political allegiance to the Liberal Party and the rest were uncommitted.

Blue-collar union leaders in this sample, not surprisingly, scored slightly higher on the scale of class identity than white-collar officials with a mean score of 35.17 compared with 34.8. However, the difference between them (0.37) was much too small to be statistically significant; \( t = 0.12, \ p > .05 \). Characteristically, class identity was weakest among the white-collar group in the sample whose preferred political party was either the Liberal Party or who expressed no party preference at all. However, when compared with both the blue-collar and white-collar union officials in the sample whose preferred political party
was the A.L.P., statistical tests in both instances failed to reach significance; $t = 1.36, p > .05; \quad t = 1.64, p < .05$ respectively. Thus, while the level of class identity among union officials is closely associated with political party membership, as shown in Table 6.9, mere preference for the A.L.P. does not produce statistically significant differences in the officials' levels of class identity.
A class perspective on industrial relations conventionally envisions the employment relationship as a form of unequal exchange in which those who purchase labour-power and determine the uses to which it is put comprise a dominant class, while those who sell their labour power and place it at the disposal of others constitute a subordinate class (Crouch, 1977:7). Typically, the 'inequality of the exchange' finds expression in an 'inequality of economic reward' and a relationship of power (Crouch, 1977: 8).

The subjective implications of class exploitation receive perhaps their most basic articulation in the existence and activities of trade unions. Accordingly, the way that the employment relationship is perceived by union leaders critically determines whether the existing economic and social arrangements are regarded as natural and inevitable or whether they are subjected to strong and unremitting ideological challenge. Clearly, therefore, the
degree of legitimacy assigned to the existing distribution of rewards (both within industry and the wider society) by trade union leaders is a basic determinant of the existence or not of an oppositional ideology. It follows from this that the degree of acceptance of the existing distribution of income by union leaders provides a very useful measure of their level of class opposition.

Characteristically, trade union leadership attitudes toward the distribution of the overall social product between profits on the one hand and wages and salaries on the other have assumed considerable significance in the context of the growing instability of Australian and, indeed, world capitalism. The impact of the recession is evident in the pressures exerted by employers and the state on union leaders to accept, among other things, restraint on workers' incomes. Within Australia, this strategy of shifting the burden for inflation on to workers finds expression in the concept of 'wage indexation'. The attitudes of union leaders to the question of pay restraint are thus centrally-relevant to any discussion of the level of class opposition.

However, even more fundamental to the concept of class opposition are the attitudes of workers and their representatives to employers. Not so long ago, it was popular to argue that trade unions could be classified in terms of their attitudes toward employers. Specifically, manual trade unions were believed to be more likely to hold a systematic and developed oppositional ideology. In essence, this is presumed to derive from a greater awareness on the part of such unions that the deprivations of their members spring from the class nature of society and require collective struggle to alter it.
By contrast, non-manual unions are widely perceived to lack the acute awareness of their blue-collar counterparts of the conflict of interests which exists between employers and all workers—regardless of status differentiation. But whether or not a conflict orientation is the exclusive property of manual workers, what is undeniable is that such an orientation is a vital indicator of class opposition.

Another important measure of class opposition among Australian trade union leaders is to be found in their attitudes to arbitration. The system of compulsory arbitration which lays down the broad principles whereby labour power is sold and put to work has become something of a sacred cow in Australian society. Indeed, whatever its critics might say, there is a pervasive mythology that the existence of the system serves as a guarantee of justice and equity in the settlement of industrial disputes between employers and employees. Yet, what is particularly noteworthy about arbitration, as many observers have noted, is the intrinsically-coercive nature of the system. For example, its widespread powers include the power to extend or withhold recognition of trade unions with all that such actions imply for trade union structure and growth. Above all, the legally-binding nature of arbitral decisions serves as a powerful reminder that despite its 'voluntaristic' appearance, arbitration rulings have the force of law to sustain them.

Although it is not without its advantages to the trade union movement, the arbitration system in Australia has resulted in an industrial relations environment where decision-making is highly-centralised. Most pertinently, however, from the standpoint of
class opposition, is the tendency for the arbitration system to render the prerogatives of management sacrosanct. Typically, as its many critics have observed, the arbitration system acts to suppress or neutralise any fundamental challenges to the existing power relationships.

Characteristically, implicit in the system of arbitration, is the idea that there are intrinsically 'two sides' to industry and that any resulting class conflict is resolvable within the present social order. Accordingly, any discussion of the level of class opposition among union leaders must crucially call into question the degree of their commitment to arbitration as the basic framework for worker protest in Australia. Specifically, to meaningfully assess the extent of class-opposition among union leaders we need to determine their views concerning in whose interests the system of arbitration operates.

Possibly, the most direct and recognised expression of class opposition from the forces of organised labour is the strike. Although the strike is acknowledged - even by critics of such action, to be a fundamental right of trade unions, nevertheless, the exercise of that right inevitably produces strong condemnation from the media and conservative politicians. Often, too, criticism comes from fellow unionists who are not directly involved in the strike but who are nevertheless affected by it.

Certainly, few countries have made a more determined effort to eliminate strikes than has Australia. Yet, despite an extensive network of arbitration tribunals designed to abolish the need for
them, strikes have stubbornly persisted. Not only have all attempts to outlaw strikes failed but even when strike action was subject to severe legal penalties, the Australian strike rate was one of the highest in the world. Generally, this trend has continued, leading one writer to suggest a few years ago that 'Australian strike figures are such that no militant unionist need hang his head in international company'. (Martin, 1975:128)

Central to the notion of class opposition, of course, is the view that conflicts of interest exist between capital and labour and that such conflicts are a pervasive feature of capitalist society. Certainly, trade unions have to present an industrial challenge to employers if they are ever going to achieve their demands. To this extent, a conflict perspective characterises any trade union with pretensions to legitimacy. Although strikes are the most visible expression of this conflict of interest between employers and workers, it is also clear that the capitalist framework in which Western trade unions normally operate constrains the possibilities of oppositional activity. Yet, what is also plainly-evident is that in the final analysis the limiting consequences of the 'industrial relations' environment critically depend on the degree to which trade unions and, especially their leaders, continue to accept the prevailing situation as a durable framework for action.

To measure class opposition among trade union leaders, we sought to tap their attitudes toward the four dimensions of the employment relationship which we have identified. Specifically, the union leaders surveyed were presented with a questionnaire
containing fourteen Likert-type items which sought to measure their attitudes to employers, to arbitration, to the distribution of the social product between capital and labour and, finally, to strikes (see Appendix 7 for a list of the preliminary scale items). Union leaders were asked to record their degree of agreement or disagreement with these items in four response categories. The items were then scored from 1 to 4, and added to give each respondent's overall score on the scale.

Following item analysis of the responses, eleven items were used in the final scale on the basis of selecting those items with the highest t-values (see Appendix 7). The eleven items comprising the class opposition scale are as follows:

'Wage and salary earners in Australia receive a fair return from employers for their efforts.'

'The share of the National Income between profits on the one hand, and wages and salaries on the other has become more fair.'

'Most employers would be a lot happier if trade unions did not exist.'

'Arbitration is preferable to collective bargaining with individual employers.'
'Most private employers are more concerned with making profits than with their employees' well-being.'

'In the main, the Arbitration System serves the interests of employers better than it serves the interests of trade unions.'

'Industrial action generally ensures unions of more favourable decisions from the Arbitration of their grievances.'

'Generally speaking, workers can improve their conditions without going on strike.'

'Strikes unnecessarily antagonise employers and delay the improvements workers are seeking.'

'Industrial action on the part of trade unions should be confined to work place issues.'

'Wage and salary restraint is necessary if Australia's current economic, difficulties are to be overcome.'
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

Class opposition and type of union

In considering the overall levels of class opposition, it is useful to examine the differences in scores between the leaders of the different types of trade union in the sample. The distribution of scores as well as the mean scale scores for the sample are shown in Table 7.1.

TABLE 7.1 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY TYPE OF UNION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Union</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES (%)</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19-23</td>
<td>24-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-Collar</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance of the difference between the Means: $t = 1.63 \quad p > .05$

* Due to the approximations involved in rounding to whole numbers the percentage does not sum to exactly 100.

Since there were eleven items in the scale and four response categories for each item giving a possible range from 4 to 44, it is noteworthy that while the scores of the blue-collar
officials in the sample ranged from 20 to 43 with a median score of 30, the white-collar scores ranged from 22 to 37 with a median score of 28.5. Further, while more than a third of the manual union leaders scored 34 or higher on the scale of class opposition with nearly a half of these in turn achieving a score of 39 or better, only a tiny fraction of the non-manual scores on the scale exceeded 33 points.

In fact, nearly all the non-manual scores on the scale fell between 24 and 33 compared with less than half of the manual scores. Blue-collar union leaders, then, scored on average higher than their white-collar counterparts - both in terms of their median scores as we have seen, and in terms of their mean scores as shown in Table 7.1. In the latter case, the mean for the blue-collar group was 31.06 compared with 28.53 for the white-collar group.

However, while this suggests that class opposition was stronger among manual than among non-manual union leaders, a statistical test of the difference between the means failed to reach significance; \( t = 1.64, p > .05 \). The fact that there is no significant difference in class opposition between the different types of trade union suggests that similar factors are likely to be at work and indicates the need to examine other aspects of union organisation in order to determine whether pronounced differences in class opposition exist between the leaderships of manual and non-manual trade unions. The importance of this last point is clear when we consider the two types of trade union in terms
of their various forms of affiliation.

Union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. and A.L.P.

As we have seen, trade unions in Australia differ in a great number of respects. However, a key distinction between Australian unions is between those unions which are affiliated with the central inter-union body viz. the A.C.T.U., and those which remain outside of it. Typically, affiliation with the A.C.T.U. is presumed to signify identification with the wider trade union movement - a step some would see as indicative of increased 'unionateness' on the part of a trade union.

In fact, in terms of the typology of 'unionateness' formulated by Blackburn and his colleagues at Cambridge University, affiliation with the central inter-union organisation like the T.U.C. or, in Australian terms, the A.C.T.U., represents the penultimate step on the continuum of unionateness. As conceptualised by these writers, this form of affiliation is a key dimension of what they term 'society unionateness' which they claim embodies a recognition by the union of the community of interest it shares with other unions and which is manifested in the willingness to ally itself with them.

In addition, 'society unionateness' as these writers view it, entails a perception on the part of the union of the differences of interest which exist between employers and itself. As a consequence, we might expect affiliation with the
A.C.T.U. to be associated with heightened levels of both class identity and class opposition. Table 7.2 examines the effect on class opposition of union affiliation with the A.C.T.U.

**TABLE 7.2 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY UNION AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Significance of difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.C.T.U.</td>
<td>31.06</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>$t = 1.23$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-A.C.T.U.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28.18</td>
<td>$t = 1.26$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td>(N=27)</td>
<td>$p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table indicates, class opposition was stronger among leaders of blue-collar unions which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. than among white-collar union officials generally. Such differences, however, were not statistically significant. What is perhaps more surprising is that when we compare the leaders of white-collar unions which are affiliated with the A.C.T.U. with those which are not, we find that their levels of class opposition are virtually identical. Clearly, therefore, for the union leaders in our sample, affiliation with the A.C.T.U. per se is not associated with significant differences in class opposition.
All of this suggests that identification with the wider labour movement - symbolised for example, by affiliation with the A.L.P., may be an even more sensitive indicator of class opposition than affiliation with the A.C.T.U. or the fact of being a manual or non-manual trade union. As earlier indicated, affiliation with the A.C.T.U. does not necessarily carry the same explicit ideological implications for political action in support of group interests as does affiliation with the A.L.P.

It is relevant in this context to note that affiliation with the A.L.P. represents the ultimate stage in the continuum of 'unionateness' and constitutes one of the most important dimensions of 'society unionateness'. As we saw earlier, there are important differences between trade unions which are affiliated with the A.L.P. and those whose affiliation is with the A.C.T.U. only. The extent to which such differences are reflected in the attitudes of the leaders of these unions is shown in Table 7.3.
TABLE 7.3 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY UNION AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Significance of difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P. and A.C.T.U.</td>
<td>31.63</td>
<td>30.28</td>
<td>$t = 0.53; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.C.T.U. only</td>
<td>25.33</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>$t = 0.39; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td>(N=17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance of difference of Means $t = 1.66; p > .05$. $t = 1.35; p > .05$

Not surprisingly, within the sample, class opposition was much stronger among the leaders of trade unions which were affiliated with the A.L.P. than among those whose unions were affiliated only with the A.C.T.U. Typically, moreover, class opposition was strongest among the leaders of blue-collar unions which were affiliated with the A.L.P.

Paradoxically, however, among the unions affiliated only with the A.C.T.U., class opposition was slightly stronger among the leaders of the white-collar unions rather than the blue-collar unions. In general, the type of affiliation of the unions was more important for the strength of class opposition among their leaders than was the fact of being a
blue-collar or white-collar trade union. For example, the differences in class opposition between leaders of blue-collar and white-collar unions affiliated with the A.L.P. were very slight as, indeed, were the differences between leaders of such unions which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. Needless to say, such differences were not statistically significant.

Likewise, while the differences within both blue and white collar unions affiliated with the A.L.P. and those affiliated with the A.C.T.U. alone were substantially higher than the manual/non-manual differences when affiliation was controlled, nevertheless, the inter-union differences also proved not to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In fact, even statistical comparison of the difference in class opposition between leaders of blue-collar A.L.P. affiliated unions and their white-collar counterparts heading unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U. only failed to reach significance; $t = 1.82; p > .05$.

**Union size**

One of the most elementary and visible differences between trade unions, as earlier noted, are differences in size. In seeking to explore the implications of union size for the strength of an oppositional ideology among union leaders, it must be borne in mind that the size of union membership may have important ramifications for the overall strength of the union as well as for the degree of control the leadership
is able to exercise over the rank-and-file. Table 7.4 shows the effects of union size on class opposition among union leaders.

**TABLE 7.4** LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY SIZE AND TYPE OF UNION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Significance of the difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 5,000</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>( t = 0.89; \ p &gt; .05 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-14,999</td>
<td>32.33</td>
<td>28.14</td>
<td>( t = 1.68; \ p &gt; .05 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 +</td>
<td>29.17</td>
<td>28.12</td>
<td>( t = 0.65; \ p &gt; .05 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see from the table, except for leaders of medium-sized blue-collar unions, there was a tendency for class opposition to decline with size of union membership. Predictably, class opposition was stronger among the manual rather than the non-manual union leaders. Again, the greatest difference was between the leaders of medium-sized blue-collar and white-collar trade unions. However, it is also relevant to note, that when union size is controlled for, the differences between the leaders of blue-collar and white-collar unions failed to reach significance at the 5 percent level. This suggests that broadly-similar factors are likely to be
at work in producing this result.

There is some evidence for this belief when we take into account the affiliation of unions with bodies such as the A.C.T.U. As we might expect, the existence of formal links with the A.C.T.U. is associated with clear differences in class opposition (see Table 7.5).

**TABLE 7.5 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY SIZE, AFFILIATION AND TYPE OF UNION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Blue-Collar</th>
<th>White-Collar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean Score</td>
<td>Mean Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5,000</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-14,999</td>
<td>32.33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 +</td>
<td>29.17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td>(N=0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, for the trade unions in the sample, class opposition was weakest among the leaders of white-collar unions which were not affiliated with the A.C.T.U. Since all the blue-collar unions in the sample were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. comparisons cannot be made within the blue-collar group in order to explore the general influence of affiliation on class opposition when union size is controlled.
Again, as the table indicates except for the leaders of medium-sized unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U., there was a definite tendency for class opposition to weaken with union size. This finding is highly-interesting in view of the common accusation made by the media and conservative politicians about leaders of large, powerful unions 'holding the country to ransom'.

While the greatest differences in class opposition were between the leaders of blue-collar unions which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and the leaders of the white-collar unions which were not, even the biggest difference between the two groups viz. those heading medium-sized unions was, when subjected to statistical testing found to be not significant; $t = 1.42; \ p > .05$.

Needless to say, the differences between the leaders of manual and non-manual unions which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. were almost non-existent in the cases of the small and large unions in the sample. However, even among the medium-sized A.C.T.U. affiliates, the difference in class opposition between their leaders was not statistically significant; $t = 1.0; \ p > .05$. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the table is that the differences in class opposition within the white-collar group between those affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and those not, were much the same as between the white-collar group and blue-collar group which were affiliated with the A.C.T.U. Bearing in mind
that all of the white-collar group in the sample which were not affiliated with the A.C.T.U. were however affiliated with one or other of the major white-collar union federations like A.C.S.P.A., perhaps the result is not so surprising after all.

Social backgrounds of union leaders and class opposition

Since class opposition is likely to be influenced far more directly by the life experiences and political outlooks of the union leaders themselves than by the type and institutional links of the organisations they lead, we set out in this section to explore the influences of a number of social background factors on the class ideologies of the officials in the sample. Table 7.6 shows the effects of age on class opposition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Significance of difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51 and under</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>$t = 1.73; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 51</td>
<td>31.07</td>
<td>27.33</td>
<td>$t = 0.36; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=30)          (N=28)
Contrary to the prevailing business and media stereotypes of older trade union leaders having rigid, inflexible, class antagonistic outlooks, what is noteworthy about the union leaders in the sample is that there is a noticeable drop in class opposition as age increases. Among this group, class opposition is strongest among blue-collar union officials aged up to fifty-one years and weakest among white-collar leaders aged above fifty-one years. Within both age categories, i.e. those aged 51 and less and those aged above 51, class opposition was markedly stronger among the blue-collar leaders than among the white-collar leaders. The differences, however, as shown in Table 7.6 were not statistically significant at the five percent level.

Since the formulation by Michels' of his 'iron law of oligarchy', a prolonged period in office by a union leader has been presumed to result in a lessening of class antagonistic ideology. As Michels' saw it, extended incumbency in union office eroded commitment to fundamental social change; as union leaders developed the aptitudes necessary for bargaining successfully with employers over the distribution of rewards to labour, their orientations shifted, according to Michels', from seeking to transform the existing social order to working within it. Whether the length of time they have held their present positions is associated with growing 'conservatism' as suggested by Michels' thesis is explored in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7 Leadership Scores on the Scale of Class Opposition by Length of Time a Union Leader

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time in present position</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Significance of difference by Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 years and under</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>28.47</td>
<td>$t = 1.45; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 5 and under 10</td>
<td>29.89</td>
<td>28.86</td>
<td>$t = 0.54; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 10</td>
<td>31.67</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>$t = 0.75; p &gt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, what we find is that the length of time they have been in office made little difference to the strength of class opposition of the union leaders in our sample. Further, although class opposition was stronger among manual union leaders than among non-manual union leaders, the differences were not statistically significant. In sum, then, not only are the attitudes of opposition remarkably similar but for the union leaders in our sample, anti-employer sentiment has not diminished the longer that they have remained in office.

However, it is not merely the length of time that union leaders have held their positions that is thought to lessen their class antipathies toward employers. Rather, the presumed
'conservatism' of union officials is also believed to be strongly associated with the type of income that they enjoy which, in turn, permits a life-style similar more to employers and their representatives than to their own rank-and-file. The question of whether size of income produces a lowering of class opposition among trade union leaders is examined in Table 7.8.

### Table 7.8: Leadership Scores on the Scale of Class Opposition by Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $8,000</td>
<td>31.89</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8-$9,999</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>29.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10-$14,999</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>28.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000 +</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>27.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, as Table 7.8 shows, there was a tendency for class opposition to decline slightly with increased income among the union leaders in our sample. This trend applied equally to leaders of manual and non-manual trade unions. Further, although at each income level, class opposition was stronger among blue-collar officials than white-collar
officials, such differences were too marginal to be statistically significant. For example, even in the case of union leaders earning above $15,000 p.a. where the difference in class opposition was greatest, statistical tests of this difference failed to reach significance: \( t = 0.47; p > .05 \).

Likewise, although a composite measure of 'oligarchy' such as income and length of time a union leader might be expected to have an effect on class opposition, as we saw in the case of class identity no clear trends emerge from such a table and consequently, we shall not reproduce it here but go on to examine the effects of political party membership on attitudes of class opposition among the union leaders in the sample.

**TABLE 7.9 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Significance of difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P.</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>29.28</td>
<td>( t = 0.46; p &gt; .05 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-A.L.P.</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>27.55</td>
<td>( t = 1.39; p &gt; .05 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist/Socialist</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(N=33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the table indicates, class opposition was stronger among union officials who were members of the A.L.P. than among those who were not. Predictably, the strongest levels of class opposition were to be found among the leaders who were members of one or other of the Communist or Socialist Parties of Australia. These officials, it must be pointed out, were all leaders of blue-collar trade unions. Characteristically, the only statistically significant differences in class opposition were to be found among the leaders of unions who were members of the communist and socialist parties and those who were not. For example, the difference in class opposition between these officials and the blue-collar A.L.P. group reached statistical significance when tested: \( t = 2.64, \ p < .05 \).

The difference was much greater when communist-socialist union officials were compared with the A.L.P. non-manual union officials: \( t = 4.63, \ p < .001 \).

As might be expected, such differences between the communist-led unions and both the A.L.P. and non-A.L.P. led unions in the sample remained high when party preference was taken into account (Table 7.10).
### TABLE 7.10 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS OPPOSITION BY POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party preference</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P.</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>28.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-A.L.P.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist/Socialist</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td>(N=27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 7.10 shows, all the manual union officials in the sample gave the A.L.P. or one or other of the communist parties as their preferred party. By contrast, while the A.L.P. was the preferred party of the overwhelming majority of white-collar union officials, the rest were politically-uncommitted - apart from the lone Liberal Party white-collar union official who has been excluded from the table. Party preference as can be seen from the table makes little difference to the strength of class opposition among the union leaders in the sample over that recorded for party membership (see Table 7.9). Again, the major differences in class opposition were between the communist and socialist-led unions and the rest. For example, the difference between such unions and the blue-collar, A.L.P. supporting unions in the sample was statistically significant; \( t = 2.66, \ p < .05 \). It was even more so, when communist-led
and white-collar A.L.P. supporting unions were concerned; 
$t = 4.99, \ p < .001$.

Such results, however, should occasion no great surprise. 
Given the nature of their party ideologies, it is natural 
to expect class opposition to be strongest among communist 
trade union officials. Rather, what is interesting is 
that there is no statistically-significant difference in 
class opposition between the A.L.P. supporting blue-collar 
unions in the sample and the presumably politically-neutral 
white-collar unions; $t = 1.3, \ p > .05$. 
8. **THE CONCEPT OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE**

**Operational Definitions and Method of Analysis**

The themes of industrial democracy, worker participation and worker control have received much discussion and varying amounts of support and criticism within and outside the trade union movement in recent years. There is little doubt that in this discussion, many of the critical issues relating to trade union and workers' struggles have involved in one way or another the question of democratic control over the workplace.

Characteristically, the concept of 'industrial democracy' is one which evokes widespread support in many quarters. For many employers, the involvement (albeit, limited) of employees in the process of decision-making in the workplace is viewed as a positive means
of integrating them more closely into the enterprise by enhancing their identification with managerial goals. Likewise, many social reformers see in industrial democracy the means whereby both managerial authoritarianism and worker alienation may be curbed. Even elements of the 'New Left' have generally regarded industrial democracy with favour - envisaging it as a key instrument for achieving the goal of the workers' control of industry.

The centrality of job control issues to the concept of class alternative is clearly indicated by the degree to which much of industrial conflict involves not simply wage demands but problems arising from changes in work methods, the introduction of new technology as well as the intensification of the pace of work and structural unemployment. Accordingly, any meaningful notion of class alternative must take into account the extent to which ideas of workers having a say in questions of working conditions and investment decisions of industry are salient concerns for the individuals in question.

It has been a perennial criticism of Australian radicals that Australian trade union officials have succumbed to the pressures for co-optation and have changed into technocrats interested only in gaining a greater share for labour in the existing system. Certainly, under the leadership of Bob Hawke, the main trade union central organisation, the A.C.T.U. embarked upon a wide range of commercial enterprises stretching from a retail store to holiday travel and petrol discounting. These manifestations of union capitalism were seen by many as another avenue for trade unionists to compete with (hopefully, successfully) some of the agencies of
private enterprise. Accordingly, in setting out to investigate the extent of radical alternative orientations among trade union leaders, their attitudes to the business ventures launched by the trade union movement are clearly important.

A much more direct indicator of alternative ideologies, however, is the perception of union leaders of the 'proper' role of the unions. Here the key issue is whether the major energies of the unions should be devoted to obtaining better wages and conditions for their members even if this means leaving entirely the running of the workplace to management. Clearly, too, any alternative conception of work relations needs to address the nature of the participation of employees in the running of the workplace. To begin with, is such participation to be confined purely to staff matters such as employee safety, health and welfare or should such workers also have a say in policy formulation for the enterprise by sitting on its Board of Directors.

Most importantly, the notion of a radical shift in the way industry is run would seem to call into question the extent to which enterprises should be required to disclose details of their commercial operations to their employees. Finally, of course, central to the idea of job control is the degree to which employees are able to constrain managerial attempts to unilaterally alter the way work is organised and performed.

Clearly, however, worker radicalism entails more than support for changes in the authority relations within the workplace.
Fundamental to the concept of class alternative, in fact, is the conception of an alternative economic and, indeed, social order. Accordingly, any coherent conception of an alternative system intrinsically involves a fundamental restructuring - not simply of the authority relations of the existing social order but also its property relations.

Characteristically, it is a conventional wisdom that class conflict has been 'institutionalised'. In effect, so the argument goes, even the most radical of trade unions despite their militancy and anti-employer rhetoric cannot avoid integration into the capitalist system. There is no denying that the capitalist context in which trade union demands are framed profoundly affects both the nature of their goals and the manner in which they are pursued. Indeed, trade union structure itself basically reflects the contours of the capitalist division of labour.

Certainly, the sectional and essentially reactive character of the trade unions should occasion little surprise. Yet, while trade union action may be curtailed by the institutional context in which such organisations typically function it does not automatically follow from this that organised labour accepts the existing framework as a permanent state of reality. Accordingly, to explore the existence of alternative concepts among union leaders, it is necessary to examine the degree to which the property relations of Australian society are radically called into question by them.
The sense of 'class alternative' among trade union leaders was measured by means of a Likert scale. What we did was to present the officials with a number of statements relating to control over the workplace and to private property. On this initial list of twelve items, the respondents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement on a four point scale.

Following item analysis of the responses, nine items were selected to form the final scale of class alternative on the basis of the level of their t-scores (see Appendix 8). The nine items which went to make up the composite measure of 'class alternative' are as follows:

'The economic prosperity of Australia depends upon a more vigorous expansion of private enterprise.'

'Large scale private foreign investment is in the best interests of Australia's economic development.'

'Private ownership of Australia's natural resources should be nationalised.'

'Private business companies should be allowed to grow as large as they can.'

'Replacing the private ownership of the means of production by public ownership is of little relevance to the Australia that exists today.'
'Trade unions should devote their energies to getting better wages and working conditions for their members and leave the running of the workplace to management.'

'Private and nationalised industries should be legally required to furnish their workers with full details of their operations, subject to reasonable security safeguards.'

'Managerial proposals concerning any alterations in the staffing, speed, or content of work should be implemented, while workers objections to them are being put through the grievance procedures.'

'Pending union agreement, no proposed management change which affects employees should be introduced.'

Since there were nine items in the final class alternative scale and four response categories for each item, the scores on the scale have a possible range from 9 to 36, indicating low and high orientations toward the idea of class alternative.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

Class alternative and type of union

To obtain a picture of the general sense of class alternative, it is necessary to begin by examining the differences in scores between the leaders of the different types of trade unions. Table 8.1 reports on the score distributions and mean scale scores for the blue-collar and white-collar union leaders in the sample.

TABLE 8.1 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE BY TYPE OF UNION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Union</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-22</td>
<td>23-29</td>
<td>30-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-Collar</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance of difference of Means $t = 0.58; p > .05$

As we can see from the table, more than half the scores of both the manual and non-manual union leaders fell into the 23-29 range. Apart from the similarity in their modal scores, the table shows that more than a third of both groups achieved a score of 30 or better on the scale.
In fact, on the scale with a possible score range from 9 to 36, the non-manual scores ranged from the midpoint on the scale to the maximum possible score, i.e. from 18 to 36. Likewise, the manual scores ranged from just above the midpoint scale score to the maximum possible score, i.e. from 20 to 36.

Further, while the mean scale score achieved by the blue-collar officials was slightly higher than that recorded for the white-collar group, the difference was too small to be statistically-significant; \( t = 0.58; \ p > .05 \). Contrary therefore to the assumption certain variants of the 'new working class' thesis, a sense of class alternative has not been shown to be stronger among the non-manual than among the manual union officials in our sample. To these new working class theorists, it was, of course, the technically-trained workers in the most advanced and automated sectors of the economy among whom the vision of an alternative society is more likely to develop and flourish.

Basically, the logic of this argument is that since such workers occupy strategic locations within the labour process where issues of control and alienation are most readily apparent, their protests are much less likely to be defused within the conventional economistic bargaining framework. In fact, as mentioned, it is among these groups rather than the traditional manual workers that the concern with alternative systems of industrial and societal control is
expected to be most evident. The character of employment in the technologically-advanced and automated areas of industry suggests that the trade unions formed by engineers, technicians, computer experts and other 'white-collar' specialists will generally tend to be small. The effects of union size on the leaders' sense of class alternative are examined in Table 8.2.

### Union size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Difference in Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 5,000</td>
<td>28.93</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-14,999</td>
<td>28.25</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 +</td>
<td>28.33</td>
<td>27.57</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown by the table, neither the size nor the type of union made much difference to the sense of class alternative among the union leaders in the sample. Indeed, if anything, alternative orientations tended to be slightly stronger among the blue-collar officials than among their white-collar counterparts. More importantly, the differences within blue-collar and white-collar unions of different sizes are
almost the same as the differences between them. It is, of course, possible that other characteristics of trade unions apart from membership size could influence the development of an ideology among union leaders which emphasises a strong orientation to issues of control rather than to the quantitative economic issues typical of much of 'industrial relations'.

As mentioned earlier, one of the most important institutional ties to be found among trade unions in Australia is affiliation with the A.C.T.U. How this affects leadership ideologies is shown in Table 8.3.

**Union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. and A.L.P.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Difference in Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.C.T.U.</td>
<td>28.61</td>
<td>28.94</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-A.C.T.U.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=33) (N=27)

It is interesting to note that among the leaders of trade unions affiliated with the A.C.T.U., the white-collar officials outscore their blue-collar counterparts on the
attitude scale by the narrowest of margins. Likewise, of the white-collar organisations not affiliated with the A.C.T.U., all but one were affiliated with one or other of the main white-collar trade union federations like A.C.S.P.A. This possibly explains why the scale scores of this group of union officials although lower than either the manual or non-manual groups affiliated with the A.C.T.U. were not statistically-different. For example, comparing the scores of the white-collar, non-A.C.T.U. group with the blue-collar A.C.T.U. group in the sample yielded the following result; \( t = 0.93, \ p > .05 \). Although the difference in white-collar scores between those affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and those not affiliated was slightly higher, the difference was also not statistically-significant; \( t = 1.14, \ p > .05 \).

Accordingly, as we have seen so far, neither union size or union affiliation with the A.C.T.U. is associated with marked differences in alternative ideologies among the leaders of the trade unions in our sample. It might be expected, however, that a sense of class alternative encompassing both the idea of democratic control of industry and public ownership will be much stronger among trade unions which are politically-partisan than among those who are not. The formal expression of this political partisanship among Australian trade unions is trade union affiliation with the A.L.P. Since such affiliation suggests the seeking of changes which extend beyond the conventional wages and working conditions struggles, it is plausible to expect that
affiliation with the A.L.P. is associated with differences in ideological orientations among the union leaders.

**Table 8.4** LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE BY UNION AFFILIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Difference in Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P. and A.C.T.U.</td>
<td>28.63</td>
<td>29.57</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.C.T.U. only</td>
<td>28.33</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results are shown in Table 8.4. What is particularly noteworthy is that the effect of A.L.P. affiliation on the sense of class alternative exhibited by the union officials in our sample is for practical and statistical purposes, quite insignificant. Likewise, while the differences between manual and non-manual union leaders were to, say the least, extremely small, it is nevertheless interesting to note that the non-manual officials manage to outscore their manual counterparts.

Social backgrounds of union leaders and class alternative

To a large extent, however, orientations toward radical social change are likely to be influenced more directly by
attributes of the union leader in question - rather than by the nature of the organisation she/he leads. Characteristically, given the implications of income for people's political outlooks, it is relevant to question whether the incomes of union officials are linked to differences in their levels of commitment to alternative social arrangements in industry and in the wider society (Table 8.5).

### Table 8.5 Leadership Scores on the Scale of Class Alternative by Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $8,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8-$9,999</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10-$14,999</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000 +</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>27.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=33)</td>
<td>(N=28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown by Table 8.5, increasing income is associated with a slight decline in the strength of alternative ideologies among the union leaders in our sample. The apparent contradiction of this trend viz. the case of blue-collar union officials earning in excess of $15,000 per annum, comprises only one person and is thus hardly representative of the
category as a whole. Again, where direct comparisons are possible, it is notable that the white-collar union leaders have a slight edge over their blue-collar counterparts in terms of the strength of their orientations toward fundamental social change. Needless to say, the differences are far too tiny to be statistically significant.

Since, trade union officials in their everyday activities are implicated in bargaining processes which legitimise the existence of capitalism, it is reasonable to question what effect the length of time a person has been a union leader has on his/her vision of an alternative social order. The results are outlined in Table 8.6.

**TABLE 8.6 LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE BY LENGTH OF TIME A UNION LEADER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Difference in Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 years and under</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>27.53</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 5 and under 10 years</td>
<td>29.33</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 10 years</td>
<td>27.55</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=33) (N=28)
As indicated by the table, the sense of class alternative was strongest among the union leaders in the sample who had been in leadership positions in their unions for between five and ten years.

Overall, there was a tendency for conceptions of alternative social arrangements to decline with the length of time a union leader had been in office - though it must be stressed that the differences between officials who held office for less than five years and those who did so for more than ten years were marginal. More importantly, perhaps, there was virtually no difference in attitude between the manual and non-manual union officials who had been in leadership positions in their organisations for longer than five years. Further, although the sense of class alternative was stronger among the blue-collar officials who had been in office no more than five years was stronger than for similar white-collar union leaders, the difference was not statistically significant; \( t = 0.76, \ p > .05 \).

Characteristically, since income and length of time in office are partly related to age, it was decided to examine the effects of age upon the attitudes toward fundamental social change of the union leaders in the sample (see Table 8.7).
As shown by the table, there was a general tendency for orientations toward alternative social arrangements in industry and society to decline with age - more so, in the case of the non-manual union officials than among the manual where there was virtually no difference in attitude between union leaders aged 51 or younger and those over 51 years of age. Likewise, the only substantial difference in outlook was between blue-collar and white-collar union leaders over 51 years old, though here again this was tested and found to be not significant statistically: $t = 1.19, \ p > .05$.

Naturally, the political allegiances of union leaders might be expected to have considerable impact on their ideological orientations. The extent to which political party membership influences attitudes to fundamental social change is examined in Table 8.8.
### Table 8.8: Leadership Scores on the Scale of Class Alternative by Political Party Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>Difference in Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P.</td>
<td>28.58</td>
<td>28.94</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-A.L.P.</td>
<td>27.33</td>
<td>26.89</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist/Socialist</td>
<td>31.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(N=33) (N=27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated by the table, the scores for the blue-collar and white-collar union officials on the scale of class alternative were virtually identical. Predictably, unions in the sample whose leaders were members of the A.L.P. slightly outscored those whose leaders were not.

Not surprisingly, communist-led trade unions in the sample had the strongest views on the need for an alternative social order. However, statistical tests of the differences between both communist and A.L.P. union officials and communist and non-A.L.P. union officials failed to reach significance. For example, between the communist-led and the A.L.P.-led blue-collar trade unions the result was as follows: $t = 0.98, p > .05$. Likewise, between the communist-led and the A.L.P.-led white-collar unions;
$t = 0.98, \ p > .05$. Rather, more surprisingly, there were no statistically-significant differences between the communist union officials in the sample and the non-A.L.P. union leaders, e.g. comparing the communist with the non-A.L.P., white-collar union leaders yielded the following result; $t = 1.06, \ p > .05$. When compared with the non-A.L.P. blue-collar union leaders, the result although marginally better was still not statistically significant; $t = 1.17, \ p > .05$.

Much the same picture emerges when the party preferences of the union officials in the sample are taken into account (see Table 8.9).

**TABLE 8.9** LEADERSHIP SCORES ON THE SCALE OF CLASS ALTERNATIVE BY PARTY PREFERENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Blue-Collar Mean Score</th>
<th>White-Collar Mean Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.L.P.</td>
<td>28.33</td>
<td>28.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-A.L.P.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist/Socialist</td>
<td>31.33 (N=33)</td>
<td>0 (N=27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As we can see, there is virtually no difference between the scale scores obtained for party membership and party affiliation. To begin with, and as already mentioned, all the blue-collar union officials in the sample except those supporting the communist or socialist parties gave the A.L.P. as their preferred party. Of the non-manual union officials, the majority gave the A.L.P. as their party of preference. Accordingly, the category 'non-A.L.P.' comprises essentially those union officials who did not indicate a party preference. Whether this group is genuinely politically uncommitted or not is impossible to say. What is noteworthy about their responses to the various components of the attitude scale is that their scores are lower than for comparable A.L.P. supporting groups. Before going on to assess the results of our survey for theoretical claims about the nature of trade union leadership ideologies, it is necessary to consider one further line of theoretical argument viz. the presumed hold of the dominant ideas on the thinking of union officials.
TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES; THE IMPLICATIONS FOR HEGEMONY

REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT

Over the past decade or two, a minor theoretical industry within sociology has arisen to grapple with the question of the capacity of Western trade union movements to sustain a radical challenge to prevailing property and authority relations in the industries and societies of their respective countries. Although there is no denying the general tone of pessimism emanating from many of these analyses, an interesting feature of the whole debate is the unfavourable comparisons which might reasonably be drawn between the political dynamism of the French and Italian trade union movements and the general political quiescence which characterises organised labour in much of the rest of the Western world. Certainly, it is within this context that many writers have attempted to account for the reformist and economistic tendencies within Western trade unions in terms of Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony'.

Basically, hegemony refers to the penetration of certain values and beliefs into the consciousness and behaviour of the vast majority of the population. As Gramsci argued, in the advanced Western nations, ruling class power rests predominantly on the consent of the mass of the people to its rule. In effect, therefore hegemony suggests the idea of class domination in society by means other than force.
Fundamentally, the ideological hegemony of the dominant class is reflected in the way in which the prevailing ideology regarding the nature of capitalist social arrangements becomes ingrained in the consciousness of workers and their industrial and political representatives. These dominant values legitimise the private ownership of the means of production, the organisation and operation of managerial authority, and the presumable 'mutual' interests of owners, managers and workers in the perpetuation of the system. Further, they serve to sustain an unproblematic conception of 'national interest', 'reasonable demands' and of the kinds of actions, e.g. strikes, which threaten these absolutes.

Understandably, any discussion of hegemony essentially calls into question the extent to which the dominant value system manages to pierce the consciousness of subordinate groups in society. To those who envision the stability of Western societies in terms of the concept of 'hegemony', there is little doubt that the ruling ideas are deeply-entrenched into the thinking of these groups. Yet, while hegemony connotes the systematic though not necessarily, overt, engineering of mass consent to the established order, it does not imply wholesale acceptance of such ideas by workers or the leaders of their organisations.

Certainly, as many hegemonic theorists would readily acknowledge the influence of the 'ruling culture' although pervasive is not absolute. Notwithstanding this, the basic implication of the very idea of hegemony is that the essential aspects of the ruling culture receive widespread endorsement throughout society.
Central to any attempt to empirically investigate hegemonic influences within the trade union movement is the problem of determining exactly how much union support for the dominant ideas is necessary in order to accept or reject the claims that are advanced. Since there are very few guidelines on what constitutes an appropriate level of support for the ruling ideas, clearly any chosen level is bound to be arbitrary and subject to dispute. Yet, insofar as our concern is with empirically assessing the effects of the dominant ideas on the outlooks of the leadership of organised labour, the problem of measurement is critical to the investigation.

Since even the most ardent protagonists of the hegemony thesis do not go so far as to claim complete support for the ruling ideas, it is clearly inappropriate to either expect or require 100 percent trade union leader endorsement of the dominant value system. Simultaneously, however, it is equally plain that the notion of hegemony connotes not simple majority support but substantial, indeed, overwhelming support.

Accordingly, it might plausibly be argued that support for the hypothesis that trade union leadership thinking essentially reflects the influence of the dominant ideology requires at least about 75 percent acceptance of key elements of the dominant value system in relation to the particular issue in question. Undeniably, such a level of acceptance would constitute 'substantial' support, thereby
lending credibility to the notion of a 'ruling' culture.

To substantiate the claims that trade union leadership ideologies reflect the influence of the dominant value system we would therefore expect to uncover somewhere in the vicinity of 75 percent trade union leadership support for such values in relation to selected aspects of the capital-labour relationship. That is to say, support of this order of magnitude for the dominant ideas should exist in relation to:

i) the purposes of trade unions and trade union activities like strikes;

ii) the institutional framework in which industrial and political relations in Australia are set and;

iii) the property relations which prevail in Australian society and the authority relations in industry to which they give rise.

SOME DOMINANT THEMES IN THE RULING CULTURE

Hegemony, as we have seen, essentially refers to a ruling class's domination through ideology; in effect, through the shaping of popular consent. However, since the 'ruling class' is not a homogenous group but essentially an alliance of powerful and sometimes conflicting interests, the securing of hegemony involves a constant search for an enduring basis for legitimate authority.
Despite their divergent interests, what makes possible the 'rule' of the ruling class is the high degree of consensus which exists among the competing groups on certain key ideas about the nature and operation of society.

To the extent that the 'ruling ideas of society are the ideas of the ruling class', it is clear that such ideas are defined within the hegemonic cultures and form the horizon of thought about the world for the vast majority of the population. Possibly, the cornerstone of hegemonic control in societies like Australia is the success of the ruling bloc in gaining large-scale acceptance for the notion that the present economic arrangements constitute the best of all possible worlds.

Typically, the taken-for-granted nature of such beliefs operates to inhibit the possibility of change and to 'naturalise' the social order by obscuring the historical struggles which produced the present disposition of social forces. The fact that the private ownership of the means of production is popularly accepted as the 'natural' framework for the production of goods and services in society rarely requires explicit justifications to be made for private enterprise and the market economy. This does not however mean that such justifications do not exist and are not made. They do and are made in the context of debate about 'enterprise', 'industriousness', 'efficiency', 'success' and 'economic and social development of society'.
Thus large private profits are generally represented as a just reward for enterprise, industriousness and efficiency in grasping economic opportunities and making the most of them. However, another twist often given to this argument is that large profits benefit not only those who own private property but contribute to the economic well-being of society as a whole. Nevertheless, although much is made in the ruling ideas about the 'partnership' between employers and employees, ownership is still seen to confer exclusive rights over the uses to which property is put.

Effectively, what this means is that within the industrial sphere those who own the enterprise have the undisputed right to determine how it should be run, what should be produced, as well as such basic issues as investment decisions, the recruitment of labour and the uses to which it is put and, of course, when it is no longer required. The right conferred by ownership to dictate how property is used is further legitimated by legal sanction.

Consequently, while elements of the dominant ideas might seek to portray the capital-labour relationship in terms which emphasise 'co-operation' and 'joint interests', it is also noteworthy that such perspectives are careful to avoid any suggestion that responsibility for the way industry operates should be a matter of joint involvement. On the contrary, on this issue the message of the ruling culture is abundantly clear: within industry, legitimate control and legitimate authority accrue to those who own it by virtue of the fact of their ownership. Accordingly, the attitudes
of union leaders to the system of property and authority relations are critical to empirical investigation of hegemonic influences within the forces of organised labour.

To begin with, however, the dominant ideas on the role and functions of trade unions are particularly crucial in any examination of the attitudes of union leaders. Characteristically, the question of trade union rights tends to generate sharp contradictions within the ruling culture. For example, while it is readily conceded that trade unions in a 'democratic' society have the right to freely exist and to strike, it is simultaneously often maintained that unions are a source of social unrest in society, that they often act 'irresponsibly', that their economic demands 'hold the country to ransom' and that their activities like strikes 'inconvenience the community' and 'harm the national interest'.

This tendency to portray trade unions as a problem takes many forms. In fact, if many sections of the mass media are to be believed, trade unions are entirely to blame for most of the ills which presently beset the economy and undermine the well-being of the society. In this view of the unions, they are seen to threaten the viability of industries and imperil economic growth by their 'greedy' demands; to compel workers to go out on strike against their will; to get involved in issues which are of no concern to them e.g. the nuclear energy debate and the question of the mining and export of uranium.
Consequently, while the principle of free trade unions is constantly celebrated in the ruling ideology as one of the hallmarks of a free, open and democratic society, at the same time this ideology goes on to emphasise what a problem such unions really are and the enormous social costs they entail for society. Thus a key element of the dominant value system concerns the question of nature and purpose of trade unions in society. Needless to say, the attitudes of trade union leaders to this problem will help to vitally establish the validity or otherwise of claims about the 'hegemony' of the ruling ideas.

The final area within the ruling culture where the ideational framework is most systematically developed concerns the separation of the economic and political spheres and the development of distinctive institutional frameworks for the management of industrial and political struggles. Thus, the system of industrial arbitration is generally perceived as the appropriate arena for workers to pursue their demands for economic justice while parliament should be the place through which they make their political dissatisfactions felt.

Fundamentally, the ruling ideas generally present the system of arbitration as being neutral, as concerned only with settling industrial disputes, as a place where even-handed adjudication of conflict occurs. There is thus a very clear implication in the dominant ideas that the system of arbitration not only does not deliberately advantage either of the parties before it at the expense of the other but, more importantly, that fundamental conflicts of interest between
capital and labour are ultimately resolvable within its institutional framework. Certainly, the existence of such a system was (is) thought to make the need for strikes completely unnecessary; for, essentially, it was supposed to establish a basis for industrial order and economic justice. Certainly, the idea of a union going out on strike as a means of obtaining a speedy resolution of its dispute within the arbitration system is almost universally condemned by disseminators of the ruling ideas like the mass media.

Even more importantly, the use of the strike for any other than narrow, bread-and-butter industrial purposes is generally represented within the ruling culture as posing a threat to political authority and encouraging 'anarchy'. In fact, the dominant ideas about political activity are fairly explicit. Notably such ideas emphasise parliament as the essential site for political struggle and the political party as the means through which the struggle is waged. At the same time, however, the 'political partisanship' of Australian trade unions in supporting the A.L.P. financially and otherwise through formal links between them and the party is seen to be essentially undemocratic because it forces union members who may not be supporters of the party to become reluctantly so by automatic deductions of a percentage of their union dues for payment to the party. Thus how far trade union leadership thinking is influenced by such ideas constitutes another key dimension of investigation of the penetration of the dominant value system.
LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES TO LABOUR UNITY

Attitudes to union integration

A pervasive theme within the ruling culture concerning trade unions in Australia is that there are simply too many of them. To its critics, the Australian trade union movement is widely regarded as an institutional 'Topsy' which 'just growed' into a riotous profusion of organisations many of which cover only tiny members of workers.

Typically, the multiplicity of trade unions and the way in which they are organised are generally viewed as creating enormous complexity and confusion. To begin with, there are very few unions which are 'vertically' organised, i.e. organised on single industry lines. Rather, they are organised on a 'horizontal' basis, i.e. on craft and occupational lines which invariably overlap industrial boundaries.

Inevitably, those who expound ruling ideas tend to view this pattern of organisation as a hindrance to 'orderly' industrial relations. Not surprisingly, reform of Australia's allegedly 'antiquated' union structure is generally conceived in terms of the creation of single industry unions. But while enthusiasm for industrial unionism comes mainly from employers and media commentators, it is noteworthy that industrial unionism was one of the founding aims of the A.C.T.U. on its formation in 1927.
Predictably, those who advocate industrial unionism generally tend to see it as leading to a sharp decline in union demarcation disputes. But while union leaders may concede that there are 'too many trade unions', it may be questioned whether they necessarily visualise closer union organisation in terms of industry-based unions and the absorption of small trade unions into larger ones. We put these issues to the union leaders in our sample. Their replies are given in Table 9.1.

### TABLE 9.1 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON UNION INTEGRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small unions need to amalgamate or federate with larger unions in order to survive in a society dominated by large-scale business and government concerns.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=27) (N.S.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$X^2 = .505$</td>
<td>p &gt; .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In place of the 300 or so unions which exist in Australia, a single large union in each industry would serve the workers much better.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=21) (N.S.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$X^2 = .118$</td>
<td>p &gt; .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N.S. means not statistically significant i.e. p &gt; .05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen that there was virtually unanimous support among both the manual and non-manual union officials for the idea of absorption of small trade unions into larger ones.
By contrast, both groups in the sample were much less favourably disposed toward the idea of industrial unionism. While the attitudes of non-manual union leaders to both items were slightly more favourable than those of their manual counterparts, such differences, as indicated in the table were not statistically-significant.

However, although the support for industrial unionism and union amalgamation is substantial, it cannot simply be construed as evidence of the ruling ideas on trade union leadership thinking. To begin with, such attitudes also suggest that despite the factional rivalries and jealousies that undoubtedly exist within the union movement, the leaders of these organisations do not necessarily perceive the present fragmented state of Australian unionism to be in its best interests. Most importantly, the massive endorsement for the principle of union amalgamation and the smaller but still sizeable support for the notion of industry-based unions is encouraging in view of the vested interests these officials presumably have in the existing union set-up.

**Attitudes to manual and non-manual worker and union solidarity**

The distinction between manual and non-manual labour is constantly emphasised by the ruling ideas. The notion that manual and non-manual workers are 'different' is advanced from various perspectives. Manual workers, we are told are exposed to
harsh, dirty, and tiring working conditions; they are vulnerable to risks of injury, disease and death at work in a way that is quite alien to the work experiences of manual workers.

Further, it is argued that the unemployment rate of manual workers is higher; they work under more oppressive systems of supervision and control; their career patterns are more limited. Above all, as the ruling ideas maintain, even the most 'degraded' non-manual job is carried out in an office setting so that the physical conditions of work are better than those which manual workers commonly experience.

Consequently, from the standpoint of the ruling ideas the differences between manual and non-manual workers have always been and continue to be very wide. Although it is conceded that the introduction of office machinery and the pressure toward an increasing division of labour has largely robbed non-manual jobs of some of the advantages which they formerly enjoyed, nevertheless, a central element in dominant values continues to assign higher prestige to such jobs and to encourage a view of such workers as 'middle class'. In effect, what such formulations are designed to do is to keep alive the traditional hostility between manual and non-manual workers thus obscuring from them both their collective interests against their mutual exploiter - the employer. The extent to which such hegemonic themes find expression in trade union leadership attitudes is examined in Table 9.2.
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generally speaking, clerical and professional trade unionists have more in common with employers than they do with manual trade unionists.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and professional unions should affiliate with the A.C.T.U. and Trades and Labor Council.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The presence of more clerical and professional unions in the A.C.T.U. and the T.L.C. would reduce the militancy of these organisations.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.S. means not statistically significant i.e. p > .05

It can be seen that while nearly half the union leaders questioned believed that clerical and professional workers have more in common with employers than they do with fellow workers from manual backgrounds, this level of agreement falls a long way short of that 75 percent which would be required to accept as evidence of hegemonic influence.
Further, it is noteworthy that despite the social distance which was perceived to exist between manual and non-manual workers there was overwhelming support for the idea that clerical and professional trade unions should affiliate with the A.C.T.U. on the part of both manual and non-manual union leaders. It is also interesting to note that hegemonic influences fail to make any great headway either on the issue of the likely effects on the militancy of the A.C.T.U. and its affiliates by expanded clerical and professional union membership. For by a margin of two to one the union officials in the sample completely dismiss any notion that increased non-manual union membership of the A.C.T.U. and T.L.C. is likely to be detrimental to their militancy.

The importance of these attitudes on the part of union leaders needs to be seen against the background of occupational and organisational change in Australia within the past decade or two. This period, as mentioned earlier, has seen a vast expansion of non-manual employment. In fact, employment in non-manual occupations now comprises the most dynamic sector of the labour market. By contrast, the same period has seen a proportional decline in the number of manual jobs.

Organisationally, we have also begun to witness an unprecedented growth in the unionisation and industrial militancy of the white-collar segment of the labour force - despite predictions of the 'post industrial society' thesis to the contrary.
Needless to say, the significance of these trends is plainly evident. As pointed out earlier, the growing unionisation of white-collar employees has served to halt the decline in the size of the Australian trade union movement.

Since in the foreseeable future, non-manual workers and their unions are likely to dominate the industrial scene, a critical element in determining what impact such development makes on the character of the union movement is likely to be the perceptions that manual and non-manual workers hold of themselves and of each other. In this regard, union leaders are perhaps uniquely placed to influence the social perceptions of their members.

Certainly, the objective basis for unity between manual and non-manual workers is already present in the proletarianised condition of large strata of non-manual employees. But this potential for unity is clearly undermined if the unionisation and militancy of the non-manual segment of the labour force is simply regarded by themselves and others principally as a rearguard struggle to preserve or restore their cultural distinctiveness from manual employees.

In endeavouring to ascertain the degree to which white-collar union affiliation with predominantly manual inter-union bodies like the A.C.T.U. is viewed as desirable, we touch on a highly-salient element in the ruling ideas. For in a context in which non-manual trade unions had their own white-
collar inter-union federations like A.C.S.P.A. etc., the relevance of A.C.T.U. identification for worker unity is plain to see.

**Attitudes to women workers**

An increasingly potent source of worker disunity stems from the gender divisions within the working class and the ways in which the political implications of such divisions find expression in the ruling ideology. The deep sexual division of labour within the Australian labour force is highlighted by the tendency for women to be found in low-paid jobs. Estimates suggest that as high as 64 percent of women workers are in the narrow band of occupations designated 'clerical, sales and services'. In fact, it has been claimed that Australia has possibly the highest level of sexual segregation by occupation among the dozen or so most industrially-advanced member countries of the O.E.C.D.

To critically-analyse female wage labour under capitalism is to confront the central contradiction surrounding the position of women in the capitalist mode of production. This contradiction is rooted in the structural conditions operating to maintain women's role in the sphere of domestic labour while simultaneously facilitating their entry into various forms of wage labour. As a result, women have been exploited as wage workers at lower rates of pay than men, drawn into the workforce during periods of economic expansion or war, and pushed back into the home during slumps.
Underlying this pattern of exploitation is a tendency to view female wage labour as essentially a secondary activity—women's 'proper place' being seen as being in the home. Such ideas found institutional expression in Australia in the famous 'Harvester judgement' of the federal arbitration commission in 1907. Basically, what this judgement served to do was to give legal respectability to the idea that women were simply transients in the labour force, filling in time prior to undertaking their domestic responsibilities.

Accordingly, the Harvester judgement established differential pay rates for males and females. It designated the adult male as the family breadwinner and he was therefore paid a 'family wage'. By contrast, women were paid at a rate appropriate to a single woman without dependants. The essence of this decision was to lay the foundations for the exploitation of women in Australian society by embodying within the principles of wage fixation blatantly patriarchal attitudes toward family life and the role of women.

The logic of this situation has been for successive generations of union leaders to define their role as involving principally the protection of the industrial interests of 'breadwinners' i.e. male workers. But to the degree to which union leaders still do not recognise that women have a primary right to work, the prospects for true worker solidarity are hopelessly undermined. The attitudes of union leaders toward women workers
and their needs are therefore a key factor in determining whether the rising rates of female unemployment in Australia generates large-scale union opposition. The extent to which sexist notions penetrate the thinking of trade union leaders is examined in Table 9.3.

### TABLE 9.3 LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES TO WOMEN WORKERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If many women regard their employment as only a temporary state, it is a waste of union time and resources to try and organise them.</td>
<td>9 (N=3)</td>
<td>3.6 (N=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions should provide special opportunities for women to enable them to achieve full-time official positions.</td>
<td>45 (N=15)</td>
<td>75 (N=21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\chi^2 = 5.47 \quad p > .05
\]
As we can see from the table, the idea that it is a waste of union time and resources to try and organise women who regard their employment as only something short-lived is almost unanimously rejected by the union leaders in our sample. However, the issue of whether unions should provide special opportunities for women to enable them to achieve full-time official positions elicited a marked difference of opinion between the manual and non-manual union officials. For example, where three-quarters of the non-manual union leaders agreed with the statement, more than half the manual officials expressed disagreement with it.

Needless to say, the difference of opinion between the manual and non-manual union officials on this issue was statistically-significant. In effect, what this means is that the leaders of non-manual unions are far more favourably inclined to making changes in union organisation which would facilitate the access of women to full-time official positions in the union movement.

However, whether such responses by union leaders can be read as rejection of the dominant ideology can only be determined in terms of some of the socially-constructed definitions of the role of women in Australian society. Central to the image of the role of woman constructed and disseminated by the dominant culture is that her primary task in life is the emotional (and physical) care and support of the family unit.
Typically, while this does not rule out her taking a job outside the home, the idea of a 'career' in this arena is seen as subsidiary to her central and composite role of wife, mother and homemaker. From this standpoint, work, in the sense of paid employment, is not viewed as providing the central definition of identity for her. Rather, her identity is constituted principally by and within the domestic sphere which is regarded as her 'true' domain. Allied with this view of the female role is an ideology of 'femininity' and 'motherhood' which has traditionally served to severely curtail the life-chances of women in Australian society. This is reflected in the overwhelming concentration of women in the Australian workforce in a narrow range of occupations characterised by inferior status, low pay and poor career prospects.

Needless to say, the ruling ideas about the 'place' of women in society are not without their contradictions. To begin with, despite the importance attributed to domestic labour within the dominant ideology - as witness the celebration of homemaking and the nurturing of children as the 'fundamental basis of our way of life', housework is not regarded as 'real work' because it is not seen to be 'productive' in the sense of contributing to Gross Domestic Product - that much used but highly misleading index of a country's state of economic and social well-being.
Yet, for all its contradictions, the dominant culture creates a definite set of expectations concerning the appropriate roles of female and male in society. Notably, for the male this involves being cast in the role of 'breadwinner' while the main responsibility of the female is one of support to this core role. By presenting the sexual division-of-labour as 'natural' and 'inevitable', these dominant ways of seeing serve to condition attitudes and expectations held by both women and men about women's relation to paid employment and/or domestic labour. Specifically, it creates a situation where because the participation of females in the labour force is generally perceived more as a privilege than a right, women tended to be shunted mainly to jobs which offer comparatively fewer opportunities for challenge or advancement.

Additionally, the dominant view of women serves to condone their treatment as what Marx once described as a 'reserve army of labour'. Typically, this reserve army of female labour is encouraged into the workforce in times of war or when a shortage of male labour confronts employers with escalating rates of pay. Since, however, women are not perceived within the dominant culture to be in the workplace as a right, their participation can and is often used to set men and women workers or potential workers against each other thereby fundamentally eroding their unity as workers. A particularly cynical example of this exercise was the campaign which surfaces sporadically and which seeks to lay the
blame for the high levels of youth unemployment in Australia on so-called 'greedy and selfish' women who are claimed not to need paid employment.

Effectively, what such campaigns which are vigorously promoted in the mass media seek to do, is to deflect criticism and social protest against unemployment by workers and their organisations like trade unions, away from government and large companies which created it and on to women. It is in this general context of the scapegoating of women that the responses of the union leaders to the items in Table 9.3 assume significance.

The items concerned touch on key elements of the views within the dominant culture on female participation in the sphere of paid employment and careers. As noted, the union leaders in the sample emphatically reject the suggestion that unions should be unconcerned with extending their protection to women workers who may not perceive holding a job as a permanent state of affairs. While from one perspective the responses of the union leaders represent a decisive rejection of the implications of hegemonic views of women, from another standpoint, the situation is not as clear-cut as it might appear. For example, it might be argued that there are very good instrumental reasons for union leaders to view favourably the idea of a high degree of union 'density', i.e. the proportion of the potential membership that is actually unionised.
Conversely, the other item in the questionnaire would seem to require that union officials transcend the narrow view of the role of women propagated by the dominant ideology. While three-quarters of the non-manual union officials were ready to endorse the principle that 'unions should provide special opportunities for women to enable them to achieve full-time official positions', more than half the manual union leaders rejected this notion. Although this proportion disagreeing with the statement does not approach the level selected as 'evidence' of hegemonic influence in this study, it is nevertheless, a majority opinion and should be noted.

**Attitudes to union affiliation with political parties**

One of the more controversial aspects of trade union behaviour in Australia is their political partisanship. By 'political partisanship' is meant the continuous and visible support by trade unions for a political party. In the Australian context, the political party in question is the Australian Labor Party and union partisanship is normally expressed in the formal alignment of unions to the party.

Characteristically, the links between the trade unions and the A.L.P. are loudly deplored by agencies of the dominant culture like the mass media. To begin with, union
affiliation with the party tends to be presented as being fundamentally 'antidemocratic' as witness the shabby attempts by conservative politicians during parliamentary elections to convince voters that election of a labour government spells rule by trade union leaders.

Typically, ruling class ideas that it is somehow 'improper' for union officials to have any significant degree of influence within the various councils of the A.L.P. like the constituency, state and federal branches, have seen attempts by the parliamentary leadership of the party to 'broaden its appeal' by seeking to reduce union representation on the decision-making bodies of the party as a whole. Ruling class ideas about 'democracy' and 'individual liberty' however reach their most strident expression in the castigations of the trade unions for their financial support of the A.L.P. through contributions made from the union subscriptions of their members.

Such ideas occasionally inspire calls in various conservative circles for parliaments to pass legislation which would permit individual trade unionists to opt out of making a financial contribution to the A.L.P. through the union affiliation fees to the party which are usually paid out of the general funds of the union. Somehow to the protagonists of this campaign against the suppression of 'individual liberty' within the trade unions, the financial support of the A.L.P., is
to use a once-popular catchword, infinitely more 'reprehensible' than the substantially greater support of the conservative parties by big business. It is hardly necessary to stress the ideological character of notions of 'personal liberty' which in this context amounts simply to 'an attempt by the possessing classes to expropriate the proletariat politically by reducing its party to nothing'. (Trotsky, 1973:122).

Trotsky's claim is not rendered invalid in Australia by the fact that, as Rawson (1978) points out, the courts have acknowledged the right for trade union funds to be used to support the A.L.P. For, as Rawson indicates a similar move by certain unions to financially support the Communist Party out of union funds was ruled 'tyrannical' and 'oppressive' by the Conciliation and Arbitration Court in 1946. (1978:61) Effectively, therefore, despite official sanction, a powerful theme in the ruling ideology asserts in various subtle and not-so-subtle ways that union affiliation with the A.L.P. is 'not in the interests of democracy' and is thereby 'undesirable'.

Predictably, the force of such ideas is reflected in the reluctance found among non-manual unions in many studies to affiliate with the A.L.P. For example, research by Rawson (1978) confirms that many rank-and-file trade unionists disapprove of the affiliation of their unions with the A.L.P.,
with opposition being stronger among the white-collar than
the blue-collar union members. In view of such findings
we set out to examine the extent to which union leaders -
as opposed to the rank-and-file, support the link between the
union movement and the A.L.P.

Apart from the question of union affiliation with political
parties as such, we wanted to know whether union leaders
perceived any major disadvantages for the unions (as suggest-
ed in the dominant ideology) as a consequence of their party
affiliation. The results are set out in Table 9.4.

**TABLE 9.4 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON UNION AFFILIATION WITH THE A.L.P.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions in Australia should avoid affiliation with political parties.</td>
<td>9 (N=3)</td>
<td>46 (N=13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X² = 10.916</td>
<td>p &lt; .001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| When a parliamentary election is about to be held, unions which are affiliated with a political party are less free to take industrial action than unions which are not so affiliated. | 30 (N=10) | 61 (N=17) |
| X² = 5.687 | p < .05 |
As highlighted by the Table, there were statistically-significant differences between manual and non-manual union officials over the question of union political affiliations. Notably, while only 9 percent of manual union leaders accepted the view that unions 'should avoid affiliation with political parties', nearly half of their non-manual counterparts held this belief.

Likewise, non-manual union leaders were about twice more likely to accept the claim that the calling of a parliamentary election tended to constrain to a greater degree the taking
of industrial action by unions affiliated with a political party than among unaffiliated unions. Additionally, white-collar union leaders were much more prepared to accept that 'unions which are affiliated with a political party are generally at a disadvantage compared with non-affiliated unions when that party is out of office'. Finally, manual and non-manual union leaders were equally against the idea of union officials holding senior positions in a political party, with over half of each group being opposed to it.

Although not reaching the 75 percent level of agreement with the dominant ideas set in this study as indicative of hegemonic influence, it is nevertheless clear to see that the dominant ideology has made major inroads especially into the thinking of the white-collar group in our sample. The implications of these attitudes for the future of the A.L.P. are not encouraging. For, given the fact that the trade unions still provide the backbone of support - financial and otherwise, for the A.L.P., the failure to attract support from non-manual trade unions (in terms of affiliation with the party), threatens the future viability of the party. This is especially so in view of the long-term tendency for decline among its traditional sources of support - the manual workers and their unions.
Attitudes to international trade union unity and action

During the past decade or so, there has been a pronounced tendency for a number of business concerns in the developed Western nations to 'relocate' in the countries of the 'Third World'. As even a cursory glance at the financial pages of the newspapers reveals, investment in 'Third World' has become immensely profitable for a whole range of Australian-based enterprises.

Although the emergence of an international division of labour is not new, nevertheless, the contemporary situation represents a qualitative change in the internationalisation of capital. To begin with, where traditionally raw materials production represented the principal form of foreign investment in 'Third World' countries, the present investment trends differ from previous patterns not only in terms of scale but more fundamentally in the switch from primary production to manufacturing.

The multinational mode of production in effect enables capital to become international in its operations while retaining a 'base' in developed countries like the U.S.A., Great Britain, Germany, Japan or even Australia, depending on the national origins of the corporation. But these gigantic corporations are notable not simply because of their size and in many cases, monopolistic power, but more for the fact that the
multinational character of their operations allows them to largely evade the control of any single national government.

One of the functions of myths, of course, is to provide support and reinforcement for a dominant ideology. Possibly one of the most pervasive and enduring myths concerning the large scale transfer of manufacturing industry from Australia to Asian countries is that Australian wages and salaries are excessively-high. Yet, as the figures on wage movements in Australia continually confirm, nearly three-quarters of the Australian labour force earns below the average weekly wage. Nevertheless, the conservative economists and other ideologists for the economically powerful continue to propagate the view that Australians are 'pricing themselves out of jobs'. The real situation underlying the shift of industrial production from Australia to countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, the Phillipines, etc. is conveniently obscured; namely, that the prosperity of these multinational companies is being increasingly based on the super-exploitation of the workers in these so-called 'developing' countries.

Certainly, there is no mystery about the massive transfer of labour-intensive Australian manufacturing industry to Asia. For many of these countries do have wage rates massively below those prevailing in Australia and which are further kept artificially low by authoritarian governments anxious to attract multinational capital. Many, in fact, provide a wide
range of investment incentives designed to encourage multi-
national companies to establish their operations in these 
countries. Coupled with low wages, weak or non-existent 
trade unions, such countries provide an irresistible lure 
for the 'vagrant' corporation.

Needless to say, the option of relocating their operations 
in the 'Third World' where the labour costs are much lower 
and the labour force far more tractable has provided manage-
ment with a major weapon with which to extract industrial 
concessions from the trade unions in the developed Western 
nations. In effect, the 'overseas alternative' presents 
management with extra leverage in the industrial balance of 
power. For it allows them to impose to a much greater 
degree their terms on the unions by blackmail or threat. 
Or, where such strategies fail, to simply pack up and set 
up business where the industrial climate is more to its lik-
ing. Either way, some groups of workers in the developed 
nations lose out: for them the alternatives posed are either 
inferior wages and conditions or the dole queue.

For some writers, the new multinational mode of production 
has facilitated the prospect of international worker unity. 
This principle has traditionally been a cherished socialist 
objective and is enshrined in the classical Marxian rallying 
cry: 'Workers of the world, unite'. However, the massive 
loss of jobs in Australian manufacturing industry due to
firms moving their operations to Asia and then exporting their goods to Australia offers the potential for eroding rather than strengthening international worker solidarity. For a central theme in the dominant ideology which is disseminated by the mass media is that the problem facing these Australian workers is one of 'unfair' competition from 'cheap Asian imports' and 'cheap Asian labour'. It is therefore important to examine the extent to which such potentially hegemonic notions exercise a hold on the thinking of Australian trade union leaders. Accordingly, the issues of the activities of multinational corporations and what union responses were necessary were put to them. Their answers are shown in Table 9.5.

**TABLE 9.5  LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage agreeing that:</th>
<th>Manual (N=2)</th>
<th>Non-Manual (N=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is of no concern to Australian trade union leaders if multinational firms which have branches in Australia, or Australian-owned firms treat their workers poorly in other countries.</td>
<td>6 (N=2)</td>
<td>3 (N=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The activities of multinational corporations call for co-ordinated international trade union action.</td>
<td>94 (N=31)</td>
<td>100 (N=28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in the Table, there was virtually unanimous rejection by union leaders in the sample of the idea that it 'is of no concern to Australian union leaders if multinational firms which have branches in Australia, or Australian-owned firms treat their workers poorly in other countries'. These responses are important if for no other reason than that a basic theme of the ruling ideology is that the right of a business company to produce where, what and how it pleases is simply 'none of a trade union's business'.

Clearly, the union leaders who responded to our questionnaire did not share this view of their role. Likewise in agreeing almost totally with the notion that the 'activities of multinational corporations call for co-ordinated international trade union action', the officials concerned plainly reject the assumption articulated by the ruling ideology that union concerns should be confined mainly to the industrial interests of their own members. Such beliefs have often formed the basis for attempts to outlaw union actions such as 'secondary boycotts' where a union whose members are not directly involved in a dispute nevertheless takes industrial action in support of a fellow union.

To the extent that such views inevitably meet with resistance from union leaders, they only serve to underline that people do not unquestioningly accept the dominant ideology. Rather, what it clearly suggests, is that people themselves construct their own view of the world out of what they perceive in their
own practical experiences. It is this factor which helps to explain why people may basically consent to the existing social order yet simultaneously hold particular oppositional views.

**LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES TO THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP**

**Attitudes to labour's share of the economic cake**

In this section we examine the perceptions that trade union leaders have of the employment relationship. It is a sociological commonplace that acceptance of the dominant ideology by subordinate groups and their leaders contributes greatly to the perpetuation of the existing social order. For it shapes how such groups see the world and critically conditions what they believe to be natural and inevitable.

Above all, it profoundly influences their perceptions of how society operates and how it can be transformed. As writers like Hyman (1975) have observed, ideological factors play an enormously important part in industrial relations. For example, he notes the extent to which the industrial behaviour of workers is governed by their internalisation of concepts like 'fairness'. Notably, he makes the point that although it may generally operate in a 'conservative' fashion, the concept of fairness has 'potentially radical implications'. Specifically, it provides a basis for mobilising worker dissent against conditions and arrangements which are perceived
to violate the principle of 'fairness'.

Needless to say, the degree of legitimacy accorded by union leaders to the existing distribution of the economic cake between labour and capital provides an important insight into the degree of penetration of the dominant ideology into their consciousness. We began by seeking their opinions on the fairness or otherwise of labour's share of the distribution of income. Their answers are set out in Table 9.6.

### Table 9.6 Leadership Opinions on the Distribution of Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage and salary-earners in Australia receive a fair return from employers</td>
<td>24 (N=8)</td>
<td>39 (N=11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for their efforts.</td>
<td>$X^2 = 1.601 \ p &gt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The share of the National Income between profits on the one hand and wages and salaries on the other</td>
<td>58 (N=19)</td>
<td>75 (N=21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has become more fair.</td>
<td>$X^2 = 2.038 \ p &gt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is obvious from their answers, the union leaders did not believe that distributional equity existed between workers and employers. On the contrary, over three-quarters of the blue-collar and almost two-thirds of the white-collar union officials in the sample did not consider that 'wage and
salary earners in Australia receive a fair return from employers for their efforts'. Understandably, manual union officials were more dissatisfied with the workers' share of the 'effort bargain' and were thus inclined to doubt its fairness.

Somewhat, paradoxically, however, more than half the manual union leaders and three-quarters of the non-manual officials were later ready to accept the idea that 'the share of the national income between profits on the one hand and wages and salaries on the other has become more fair'. Since in essence the national income is divided roughly between what is paid in wages and salaries and what accrues to employers by way of profits, the contradictory nature of their replies cannot be easily explained.

Suffice it to say, however, that if the union officials appear to be 'confused' on this point, such confusion is greatly helped by the lack of accurate figures on what the true situation is regarding the economic shares going to labour and capital respectively. For instance, the official statistics tend to include the salaries of directors and top managers with workers' wages in determining the wages and salaries bill. Interestingly, however, incomes from property is not specified.
More to the point, perhaps, is the fact that in the ideological climate in which trade unions typically operate, the wage relationship constitutes not only the central mode of their oppression but also the main preoccupation of their struggle. However, the trade union wages struggle seldom succeeds in altering the workers' share of the national income. Despite what union leaders may say, the pay increases that they gain for their members are gained mainly at the expense of other workers.

To the extent that trade unions have become part of the system, they have been compelled to become reformist in order to survive. Clearly, in a society which prizes material possessions and which defines personal worth in similar terms, it cannot occasion any great surprise if institutions which are part of it like trade unions come to embrace some of these values. But there are also sound, strategic reasons which only indirectly have to do with the influence of the dominant ideology why such emphasis is placed by unions on 'economistic' wage issues. In effect, they are readily grasped, measurable and theoretically at any rate, erode profits thereby shifting the economic imbalance in the worker's favour. In practice, however, and especially when levels of inflation are high, wage demands far from adversely affecting profits simply lead to a collapse of investment and deepening recession.
Accordingly, the attitudinal responses by union leaders to the question of pay restraint are of critical importance for the ideological struggle against the dominant value system which seeks to present the existing social order as fundamentally unalterable - indeed, as the only social order possible. The views of the union leaders in the sample to the issue of pay restraint are summarised in Table 9.7.

**TABLE 9.7 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON PAY RESTRAINT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage and salary restraint is necessary if Australia's current economic difficulties are to be overcome.</td>
<td>61 (N=20)</td>
<td>68 (N=19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2 = .345$ $p &gt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the Table indicates, a remarkably-high proportion of the union leaders surveyed, allowed themselves to be persuaded by the argument that pay restraint is a necessary prerequisite for surmounting the present economic recession in Australia. Needless to say, the level of agreement on this item is only marginally-below that set for acceptance of hegemonic influence and points strongly to it. Such attitudes, in fact, serve to highlight the force of the dominant ideas in shaping the way subordinate groups conceptualise their social situation and articulate their aspirations.
To the degree that these union leaders widely accept an obligation to curb the pay demands of their members, they effectively come to share the dominant groups' priorities concerning the survival and stability of Australian capitalism. Certainly, what the attitudes of the respondents help to indicate is the extent to which the hegemonic understandings within society make it possible to present the narrow interests of a privileged and powerful minority as being for the good of everyone. The pervasiveness of this dominance is reflected in the seeming readiness of people to adjust to situations and alter their goals in serving the needs of the socially advantaged at the expense of their own and those of their fellows. Plainly, working people with the blessings of their union leaders, are being made to pay for a recession not of their making while a process of conditioning is already in train to try and convince them that full employment is a thing of the past.

Attitudes to employers

For many writers, a key distinction between manual and non-manual workers lies in their attitudes to employers. Notably, manual workers are viewed as having few illusions about their subordinate and exploited status in the employment relationship. The subordinate and exploited condition of manual labour tends to be reflected in the uncongenial nature of their jobs, the long hours, the poor pay, the unsafe or unhealthy working conditions, the insecurity of earnings and
employment. Coupled with these disabilities are the myriad social constraints under which such work is performed, such as the requirement to 'clock in' and the close supervision of the work activities of the manual employee.

By contrast, non-manual employees are commonly-viewed as having comparatively pleasant working conditions in jobs which are reasonably well-paid and which offer employment security, pensions, sickness pay and a wide range of allied benefits. As mentioned earlier, a basic strand in the dominant ideology concerning the present economic system postulates the expectation that the relationship between employers and employees should mainly be cordial rather than conflictual. In this view of the employer-employee relationship a basic community of interests exists between the two groups.

At the level of the individual enterprise such interests are thought to involve improving its level of profits which is seen to be beneficial to both parties. Yet, while one facet of the dominant value system stresses the need for 'co-operation' and 'greater understanding' between employers and employees, another strand of the ruling ideas simultaneously attacks unions as 'self-interested', 'greedy wreckers' which create enormous problems for society. We therefore set out to examine the opinions of union leaders toward employers in order to determine the extent to which ruling class notions of the
'partnership of capital and labour' permeates their consciousness. Their replies are shown in Table 9.8.

TABLE 9.8 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS OF EMPLOYERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most employers would be a lot happier if trade unions did not exist.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=23)</td>
<td>(N=20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most private employers are more concerned with making profits than with their employees' well-being.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=29)</td>
<td>(N=23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the Table indicates, judged by the criterion that a 75 percent level of support for the ruling ideas about the 'proper' relationship between employers and employees is necessary to sustain the claims of 'hegemonic theory', these responses denote emphatic rejection of them. In fact, what the attitudes of the union leaders in the sample clearly suggest is that a conflict orientation is by no means the exclusive property of manual workers. On the contrary, as Mann has noted, what the idea of non-manual employees having a 'harmonistic' relationship with employers typically ignores is that: "Unions are ... conflict organisations, incongruent with any extreme view of industrial harmony." (1973:22)
Attitudes to arbitration

Characteristically, the system of compulsory arbitration which regulates the conduct of industrial relations in Australia exercises a profound influence on the structure, actions and objectives of trade unions. Traditionally, as we have seen, conflict has inevitably arisen over the distribution of material rewards between employer and employee. In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the vast majority of industrial disputes generally also involve - whatever their other reasons, questions of pay and working conditions. As mentioned, there are powerful forces impelling workers and their leaders to voice their dissatisfactions and claims in material terms rather than seeking to challenge the basic economic exploitation and alienation that is the lot of 'rationalised' employment in the large factory or office. Such pressures find strong backing in the institutional procedures governing industrial relations. Under Australia's system of compulsory arbitration, for example, as certain critics have observed, while pay claims are readily negotiable, managerial prerogatives are regarded as sacrosanct and outside the authority of the arbitral agencies. (Sorrell, 1972) The distinctiveness of the system of industrial relations in Australia is however epitomised by "the primary use of arbitration for the resolution of disputes about 'interests'." (Sorrell, 1972: 252)
Disillusionment with the system of arbitration is not new. Generations of union officials and activists have made statements and carried motions charging arbitration and arbitrators with being too legalistic, too-costly, time-wasting, short-sighted, unfair and anti-union. Such charges have often been accompanied by the suggestion that the unions would be better-off without arbitration tribunals: if they were left, that is, to deal with employers face-to-face. Less frequently, but often enough, there have been express threats to abandon arbitration if a better deal is not forthcoming.

(Martin, 1975: 100)

The significance of arbitration as various of its critics have pointed out lies in its ability to provide Australian industry with a stable and predictable national wage structure. Needless to say, it provides the most effective means of holding down the wages of Australian workers during periods of economic difficulty. Perhaps its most important function, however, has been to incorporate the trade unions and to deflect their potentially explosive protests into a legalistic mould whereby class peace is bought with economistic concessions.

It is noteworthy in this regard that arbitrators have traditionally sought to distinguish 'industrial' from
'managerial' affairs. Typically, only the former are viewed as falling within the legitimate realm of the trade unions and, coincidentally, the arbitration machinery. In this manner, the system has served to enforce and guarantee the prerogatives of management to hire, fire and make use of employees' labour power as it sees fit. The net effect of the system of arbitration is a tendency by unions to see the economic struggle in terms of the arbitration system to the exclusion of the employer for whom this system acts.

Despite the rhetoric about the 'neutrality' of arbitration, it is clear that the divine right of private property constitutes the fundamental value assumption upon which its decisions are ultimately premissed. This is most clearly-evident during periods of economic crisis when it generally acts to maintain or restore profits at the expense of wages. Underlying this approach to economic problems is the fact that the dominant position of the private sector in society means that it is essentially a business solution to the crisis that is imposed. In effect, the ideological hegemony of the dominant elite is assured to the extent to which it manages to gain popular support for its definitions of social reality. It is thus in this context that we endeavoured to ascertain the opinions of union leaders to arbitration.
As shown by the Table, what is remarkably-evident about the views of the union leaders in the sample is the similarity in outlook between the manual and non-manual officials on certain items. For example, more than half the respondents were not taken in by the claims of impartiality made for arbitration, believing as they did that 'in the main, the arbitration system serves the interests of employers better than it serves the interests of trade unions'. But by the same token half the union leaders were persuaded by its
claims to legitimacy as a 'neutral' referee which are propagated by the media and other agencies of the dominant culture. Yet, although this represents a high level of support for the ruling ideas, it hardly constitutes 'proof' of the validity of 'hegemonic theory' as operationally defined in this study.

It is perhaps somewhat ironical that more than 70 percent of both manual and non-manual union officials believed industrial action necessary to 'ensure more favourable decisions from arbitration of their grievances'. For the explicit reason for the creation of the system was to lessen the possibility of industrial conflict.

Characteristically, the only statistically-significant difference in attitudes between manual and non-manual union leaders arose over their opinions on the amount of conflict which would have arisen between employers and unions had not the arbitration system existed. While 55 percent of manual officials felt that the presence of arbitration had helped to lessen conflict between unions and employers, a staggering 82 percent of non-manual union leaders agreed with this view. Yet, while non-manual union leaders were more likely to see the existence of arbitration as leading to a more peaceable relationship between employers and trade unions, it does not follow that they are any more or less 'pro-arbitration' in their overall attitudes than their manual colleagues.
Certainly, while their views represent a general attachment to the Arbitration system, they are neither entirely oblivious to its real 'class' character.

**Attitudes to strikes**

Trade unions, it has been widely-remarked, have a poor media image. Never is this fact more glaringly apparent than when they engage in strike activity. Although few media commentators seriously contest the right of trade unions to strike, the exercise of that right nevertheless tends to be generally deplored. Even where it is conceded that strikes are occasionally justified, it is still seen as 'regrettable' that they should occur at all. This negative attitude to strikes is evident in the media coverage of them. Rarely is such reporting confined to a factual account of the conditions which give rise to them. Rather, the outbreak of a strike tends to be treated as a cause for moral indignation. Thus strike action is often depicted as 'holding the country to ransom', 'senseless disruption', 'the cynical abuse of union muscle' and similar polemical formulations. Since media characterisations of strikes inevitably affect how they are publicly-perceived, it is little wonder that there is widespread antipathy towards them.
To test the extent to which these and similar 'ruling class' notions penetrate the consciousness of organised labour, we posed a number of questions to trade union leaders. Their responses are shown in Table 9.10.

**TABLE 9.10 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON STRIKES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generally speaking workers can improve their conditions without going on strike.</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2 = 7.558$ p &lt; .01</td>
<td>(N=19)</td>
<td>(N=25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes unnecessarily antagonise employers and delay the improvements workers are seeking.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=10) (N.S.) (N=8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions which are not prepared to go on strike are unlikely to have their demands taken seriously by employers.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=22) (N.S.) (N=19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike decisions should be made by a secret ballot of union members.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=13) (N.S.) (N=12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial action on the part of trade unions should be confined to workplace issues.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=13) (N.S.) (N=13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the Table shows, the only statistically-significant difference to emerge in the attitudes of manual and non-manual union leaders arose in relation to the strike as a mechanism for improving workers' conditions. Specifically, 58 percent of manual union officials but 89 percent of non-manual leaders agreed with the statement that 'generally speaking, workers can improve their conditions without going on strike'.

Interestingly, while the response of the non-manual union officials on this item seems to conclusively support the thesis of 'hegemonic' influence, it is noteworthy that equal proportions of non-manual and manual union officials thought that 'unions which are not prepared to go out on strike are unlikely to have their demands taken seriously by employers'.

On balance, the fairly heavy support given to this statement by the union leaders seems to point in the direction of the dominant value system. By contrast, the general view that 'strikes unnecessarily antagonise employers and delay the improvements workers are seeking' managed to attract less than half the level of support necessary for the assumptions of hegemonic influence to be made. Only a minority - even though quite a large one, of the union officials in the sample were prepared to sanction the idea which is given wide currency in the media that 'strike decisions should be made by a secret ballot of union members'.
However, it is difficult to know quite how the responses to this item ought to be evaluated. Certainly, it is likely that some union leaders interpreted the question to mean having a secret ballot by union members to determine whether to strike. Conversely, it is equally-plausible that, as stated, the item may be interpreted by some officials to mean holding a secret ballot of members to determine whether to end a strike. Typically, it is relevant to note in this context that one of the contradictions of the image presented of union leaders by the dominant culture is that union leaders are expected to act 'democratically', carrying out the wishes of their members. Simultaneously, however, they are also expected to control those members 'responsibly', in the 'national interest'.

Finally, and most revealingly, leaders of non-manual unions are no more likely than the leaders of the manual unions to favour restricting industrial action to workplace issues. But while the view that union action should be confined to industrial matters is shared by only a minority of manual and non-manual unions, nevertheless, it is again a sizeable minority. What this serves to suggest, is that the attitudes of the union leaders in our sample to strikes can only be adequately-understood in terms of the dominant meanings through which much of the public discussion of strikes is framed.
It is a commonplace that public attitudes to strikes are, as Hyman has pointed out, "at best ambivalent and in most cases unreservedly hostile." (1972: 140) In Hyman's view, such attitudes reflect the influence of the dominant social values which "tend to define open industrial conflict as illegitimate." (1972: 140) Further, as he argues, these 'dominant social values' find expression not only in the media hostility to strikes but even in the tendencies for academic sociologists to perceive industrial conflict as being "by definition a social problem." (1972: 140)

Hyman goes on to argue that such understandings of strikes serve to shape the attitudes of people to them and influencing the way even workers come to view them. As a consequence these dominant ideas exercise a powerful influence on the ways in which strikes are presented and understood. As Hyman maintains, the dominant view of strikes rests on three basic premisses. "First, that industrial conflict is outdated, unnecessary and irrational. Second, that strikes result directly in severe economic disruption. Third, that they are evidence of excessive union power." (1972: 140)

The extent to which such definitions of reality have come to be accepted by even trade union leaders themselves is clearly-evident from the responses to some of the items in Table 9.10. For example, as we saw, almost 90 percent of
the non-manual union leaders in our sample considered that 'workers could improve their conditions without going on strike' - a view, as we saw, was shared by 58 percent of the manual union leaders.

However, while the extremely high degree of support for this idea by the white-collar union leaders suggests a strong commitment to the dominant social values by this group, this cannot be as we saw, automatically assumed. Admittedly, there has been a traditional tendency for certain white-collar groups and their industrial organisations to view strikes as wrong and unnecessary whatever the problems and frustrations. Likewise, the alleged weakness of the collectivist traditions of the manual working class among the white-collar group and the influence of such notions as 'respectability' on its thinking, may, in fact, be indicative of an identification with the dominant ideas.

Conversely, however, the overwhelming belief by the white-collar union leaders (and the substantial proportion of manual officials), that, in general, 'workers can improve their conditions without going on strike', may simply reflect the fact that such unions have been able to wield considerable influence over the processes determining the pay and the conditions of their members without needing to engage in anything so 'distasteful' as a strike. Certainly, the union leaders in our sample do not rule out the
importance of the strike as a strategic weapon with which to win concession to their demands from employers. As we saw, over two-thirds of all the union leaders readily acknowledged that unions which 'are not prepared to go on strike are unlikely to have their demands taken seriously by employers'.

Likewise, the dominant belief that strikes only serve to 'antagonise employers' and hinder the improvements workers are seeking is rejected by over 70 percent of the union officials. However, as we've also seen, other aspects of the dominant value system make their influence felt even within the ranks of union leadership. For example, as shown, a sizeable minority of union officials - approaching nearly 50 percent in the case of the white-collar group accepted the idea of secret ballots of union members as a way of deciding strikes. Although, as pointed out, it is not easily determined whether the 'strike decisions' they have in mind to be decided by secret ballot refer to the starting or ending of strikes or both.

As we have seen, underlying the antipathy to strikes found in the dominant value-system is the idea that not only are strikes enormously disruptive but also enormously costly. However, it is interesting to note that "Australian employers tend to agonise more over production loss through industrial disputes" (Niland, 1978: 4) than that which occurs through industrial injury and illness which some
Nevertheless, the idea of 'secret ballots' is seen in the dominant value system as essential for lessening the incidence of the strikes which are thought to mainly occur through workers being forced to do so by excessively-militant union leaders. For these reasons, the responses of the union leaders to the item on the introduction of the secret ballot for making strike decisions within the union are most revealing.

Even more so, is the level of support among these union leaders for the view that 'industrial action on the part of trade unions should be confined to the workplace'. A major theme in the ruling ideas, as we have seen, asserts not only that unions are 'excessively powerful' but, more importantly, that they are only too ready to involve themselves in matters which are not of direct concern to their members. This notion that trade unions are only too willing to exceed their 'mandate' is given widespread currency by the mass media. For these reasons, the views of the union leaders on the limits of industrial action are most enlightening. For, while their responses fall short of the level whereby we can argue that the ruling ideas exercise a 'hegemonic' hold on their thinking, simultaneously such thinking, as we have seen, is not entirely immune from the influence of these ideas.
LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES TO PRIVATE PROPERTY AND MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY

Attitudes to private property

It has long been popular to argue that class conflict has been institutionalised; that, in effect, despite their militancy and anti-employer rhetoric, even the most 'radical' of trade unions cannot avoid the integration of the interests of their members within capitalism. There is no denying that the capitalist context in which trade union demands are framed profoundly affects both the nature of their goals and the manner in which they are pursued. What this means in effect, as Hyman (1975) observed, is that essentially the productive resources of society are privately owned by a tiny minority of people, that profit constitutes the basic goal of economic activity and that the workplace is hierarchically-organised, with power concentrated in the hands of management.

Furthermore, Hyman asserts that even where the state in such countries 'owns' a sizeable stake of the economic resources of society, the operations of its enterprises differ little from private sector concerns. On the contrary, their internal organisational forms and organisational values, says Hyman, are closely modelled on those of the private sector.
Accordingly, trade union structure tends to reflect rather than challenge the contours of the prevailing division of labour in Western society in organising workers not as a class but as sectional groups of 'wage earners'. In other words, as 'sellers of labour power' and, in effect, creations of a capitalist system of private property. The sectional and essentially reactive character of trade unionism has led critics of the union movement to view trade union action as being founded on acceptance of the prevailing property and authority relations in society. Thus, for many, the division of activity within the labour movement into the political sphere (which essentially was to be the responsibility of the labour party) and the economic sphere (which was to be taken care of by the trade unions), simply reflects the extent to which many workers and their leaders themselves have come to accept the present divisions within society as 'given'.

Since how people act is partly determined by the nature of the understandings that they develop, it is clear that trade union leaders no less than other members of society necessarily operate with their respective stocks of commonsense knowledge which they cannot help but use to make sense of the reality they encounter. Indeed, it is a necessary banality to observe that to the extent that the existing economic, political, social and industrial arrangements in society have come to be accepted by the vast mass of people
as 'natural', 'inevitable' and perhaps even 'immutable', then we can legitimately talk about the 'hegemony' of the ruling ideas.

As we saw earlier, the central element on which the ideological dominance of the powerful and privileged in Australian society is founded is the idea that the perpetuation of the present economic order is self-evidently necessary, worthwhile and beneficial for the whole society. Although it provides the basis for the political outlook of these elites in Australian society, it is only on rare occasions that systematic articulation of private enterprise values is glimpsed - and this is usually when some part of the system is perceived to be under threat, as with the attempted nationalisation of the banks, the introduction of Medicare etc. Rather, since private enterprise and the market economy constitute facts of everyday life in Australia, such ideas do not have to be explicitly and constantly spelt out.

It is this feature of hegemony which helps to explain why trade unionists seemingly acquiesce to the present social order - or, at least, do not openly and radically confront it politically. However, the fact that radical and sustained political challenges to the system do not arise from organised labour does not mean that people like workers and trade union leaders are 'brainwashed' into accepting the
system by the mass media or such social institutions as the school, church etc. On the contrary, the basis of consent rests on the fact that the system of social and economic arrangements which workers and people generally, confront in their daily lives come to be viewed by them as 'commonsense'.

Typically, there is a tendency for people to accept the system of private enterprise and the market economy without giving it much thought. In effect, this amounts to tacit acceptance of an essentially capitalist value-assumption. But, in the main, such people do not do this because they have been deliberately misled by the media or other 'hidden persuaders' against their will. Rather, they do so because in the material and social world they inhabit and in which they daily interact, the system whereby goods and services are produced, exchanged and consumed is natural and only 'commonsense'. For them, it is enormously difficult to conceive of any other way of doing these things. Such understandings of their social world go to construct 'commonsense' for them and find expression in sentiments which lend support to the present economic, social and political order. In this context, the economistic and reformist nature of traditional trade union demands and goals should not occasion any great surprise.
It is, however, one thing to acknowledge that trade union action is generally curtailed by the institutional and cultural contexts in which such organisations normally function. But it does not automatically follow from this that the leaders of trade unions accept the existing system as a permanent fact of life. Indeed, whether they do so or not is essentially an empirical question. In setting out to examine the degree to which the property relations of Australian society are fundamentally called into question by trade union leaders, we are provided with a useful opportunity to observe the level to which their thinking reflects the influences of the dominant ideas. Their answers are shown in Table 9.11.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The economic prosperity of Australia depends upon a more vigorous expansion of private enterprise.</td>
<td>61 (N=20) (N.S.)</td>
<td>64 (N=18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale private foreign investment is in the best interests of Australia's economic development.</td>
<td>9 (N=3) (N.S.)</td>
<td>14 (N=4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private ownership of Australia's natural resources should be nationalised.</td>
<td>88 (N=29) (N.S.)</td>
<td>79 (N=22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private business companies should be allowed to grow as large as they can.</td>
<td>45 (N=15) (Sig.)</td>
<td>14 (N=4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacing the private ownership of the means of production by public ownership is of little relevance to the Australia that exists today.</td>
<td>27 (N=9) (N.S.)</td>
<td>36 (N=10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 6.859 \ p < .01 \]

N.S. = Not statistically significant.

Sig. = Statistically significant.
A basic theme of the dominant ideas is that Australia is a free enterprise society whose economic growth and social well-being is critically dependent upon the efforts of private business. The necessity of governments to keep the interests of business uppermost in mind in their decision-making is emphasised to such an extent that it has come to be accepted almost an article of faith by many people. The dominant culture, financed and controlled by the wealthy, powerful and educated creates the meaning-system within which the principle of private enterprise is constituted as the basis of 'our way of life'.

The oppressive dominance of the market economy is reproduced and perpetuated in the financial press and by 'expert' mainstream economists. Its assumptions, moreover, transcend political party lines, in many instances coming to shape government policies in ways which are seen by the political incumbents as only 'commonsense' or 'economic realism'. Characteristically, fundamental criticism of this exploitative ideology is generally derided by its intellectual defenders as being either 'misinformed', 'utopian', 'socialist' or all three.

Accordingly, the dominant ideology constrains us to think of our material and social welfare as being linked umbilically to the fortunes of private enterprise. This mode of economic organisation results in the production
of commodities and services that are produced, distributed and consumed within an overall framework of 'hegemony'. In association with this particular organisation of society, economic activity, in fact, the process whereby economic resources are utilised to satisfy social needs is seen to largely imply private initiatives - as witness the cries of 'unfair competition', 'socialism' etc. when governments seek to establish their own operations in the more profitable sectors of the economy. For all these reasons and more then, it is perhaps only to be expected that a high proportion of union leaders would support the view that the 'economic prosperity of Australia depends upon a more vigorous expansion of private enterprise'.

Certainly, not only is the 'divine right' of private property generally assumed and enshrined in the dominant value system but the underlying principles of private enterprise are inevitably presented as the predominant means of achieving national economic growth and prosperity. Consequently, the essence of the hegemonic argument is that under such circumstances, there is likely to be a high measure of acceptance among people of the ideas of private enterprise and the activities which sustain it. From this viewpoint, the replies of the union leaders in our sample indicate a leaning toward the hegemonic position, showing as they do almost two-thirds support for a fundamental component of the dominant ideas.
Conversely, few of the trade union leaders favoured the idea of extensive foreign investment in Australia. In fact a mere 9 percent of manual and 14 percent of non-manual union officials supported the view that 'large-scale foreign investment is in the best interests of Australia's economic development'. Again to understand such responses they need to be seen against the backdrop of debate concerning the questions of foreign ownership and control in Australia.

To begin with, foreign investment has traditionally played a substantial part in Australia's economic development. Since the Second World War the penetration of the Australian economy by American and, more recently, Japanese capital, has increased significantly. Such is the extent of foreign ownership and control in Australia that it is said to account for an estimated quarter of manufacturing industry, about a half of the financial and insurance sector and well over half of the mineral resources.

In the main this pattern of extensive foreign ownership and control has been ascribed to the reputed difficulties economic enterprises in Australia are said to experience in attempting to raise investment capital locally. Whatever the reasons, the idea of foreign investment as 'necessary' and 'beneficial' has become an important theme in the dominant ideology, finding expression after World War II in the Australian government's celebrated 'open door' policy on foreign investment.
However, despite such government policies, there have always been deep and fundamental divisions within the dominant value-system over the question of large-scale foreign investment in Australia. Notably, while the principle of foreign investment is not necessarily dispute, the scale of it has provoked widespread criticism within the dominant ideology which is also suffused with a strong streak of economic nationalism.

This theme of economic nationalism pervades the three major political parties in Australia to varying degrees as witness the unsuccessful attempts of the Country Party under Sir John McEwen, the Liberal Party under John Gorton and the A.L.P.'s minister in the Whitlam government, Rex Connor, to 'buy back the farm'. In fact, it is noteworthy that certain policy initiatives taken by one government have been continued by its opponents - perhaps with modifications, when they achieve office. The Foreign Investment Review Board which is a federal body which was set up to scrutinise proposals for foreign investment in Australia. Essentially, the guidelines on foreign investment seek to encourage foreign economic ventures in Australia to seek significant private economic participation in their operations by Australians.

The concern therefore articulated in the dominant ideology about the risk of Australia becoming an economic satellite
of the U.S.A. or Japan, with economic decisions about Australia being taken in these countries, thus fundamentally contests the idea that foreign investment is in Australia's 'national interest'. These contradictions within the ruling culture are particularly evident in discussion of the question of ownership of Australia's natural resources. This is accentuated by the growing questioning of the technological utilisation of raw materials such as 'uranium'. As a consequence, although the union leaders surveyed overwhelmingly agreed that the 'private ownership of Australia's natural resources should be nationalised', the ambiguities within the ruling ideas themselves makes it difficult to accept their responses as either supportive or not supportive of such ideas.

A clear picture however emerges when we consider the general question of the public ownership of industry. As we can see both manual and non-manual union officials emphatically rejected the notion that 'replacing the private ownership of the means of production is of little relevance to the Australia that exists today'. Since a key theme in the dominant ideology is that private property is sacrosanct, such replies suggest strong rejection of the ruling ideas.

Finally, we considered the question of the size of business companies. Interestingly enough, the only statistically-significant difference to emerge in the attitudes of manual
and non-manual union officials was over whether 'private business companies should be allowed to grow as large as they can'. As shown in Table 9.11, nearly half the manual union leaders were prepared to agree with this, compared with a mere 14 percent of non-manual officials. It may be that this difference reflects fundamental differences in the way managerial authority is experienced by manual and non-manual workers. Traditionally, non-manual workers have enjoyed much greater control over their own work than have manual workers. Thus, it is plausible to assume that such control would be seriously eroded were the size of the enterprise to be significantly increased.

As far as the implications of their replies for 'hegemony' are concerned, it is noteworthy that while in theory the dominant value system would support the principle of private business being allowed to expand, a contradictory theme within the ruling ideas is sharply critical of 'monopolies'. Accordingly, once again the replies of union leaders are not easy to interpret on this issue.

In summary, the ambiguities within the ruling ideas on private property are to a large extent reflected in the attitudes of the union leaders. To begin with, given their view that Australia's economic prosperity depends upon a more vigorous expansion of private enterprise, it would seem that a large proportion of union leaders are
prepared to accept the legitimacy of capitalist property relations. Conversely, however, these officials are plainly-unconvinced by the argument that the nationalisation of industry is 'old hat'. Altogether, then, the replies of the union leaders, far from representing support for dominant ideas, seem to epitomise, what has been called 'pragmatic acceptance' of existing realities.

Leadership attitudes to managerial authority

The notion that there is a distinctive 'national interest', that the interests of those who control society are identical to those of 'the nation as a whole' is one which has its echoes at the level of industry. The assumption that the interests of employers and employees are basically the same has been described as a 'unitary ideology'. Characteristically, such an ideology conceives of the relationship between employers and employees as being ideally harmonious. In this view of the employer-employee relationship, the two parties are seen to have common objectives in making industry efficient and profitable because they are both said to benefit from this.

In effect, the 'unitary ideology' tends to represent employer and employee as being part of a team. But they are said to be on the same side - not different sides. To the
extent, that the view of industry as one of 'unitary' harmony gains widespread credence, it serves to provide legitimacy for a system of minority control of industry, and so performs essential hegemonic functions. Widely held among conservative politicians and media controllers, the view that industry is a haven of co-operation is also embraced by many industrial managers.

Yet, as mentioned earlier, while this aspect of the dominant belief system highlights the community of interest between employers and employees an equally potent element in the ruling ideas emphasises that the ownership of property confers automatic rights on the individual in deciding the uses to which it is put. In effect, then, while the prevailing view of industry may be presented in harmonistic terms in which both employers and employees are exhorted to 'work together as a team', it explicitly rules out any assumption that the responsibility for the running of industry should be shared. On the contrary, the control of industry is firmly vested in the hands of management by virtue of the fact that they exercise the delegated 'rights of property'.

Accordingly, the very internal organisation of the workplace as well as the disciplines they propagate serve as efficient, though generally hidden, mechanisms of ideological control. This control essentially has as its
object the profitable exploitation of the 'factors of production' as well as the equally-important hegemonic task of progressively incorporating people's behaviour and belief patterns into a value-system that continues to make the private appropriation of profits possible.

Needless to say, the ways in which contemporary work is organised might accurately be said to reflect a pattern of 'hegemonic domination'. Certainly, the division-of-labour in modern industry, exemplified by the minute subdivision of work from which virtually all meaning has been drained, has come to be portrayed as a natural if not inevitable consequence of increasingly automated technologies. However, as numerous critics of the prevailing 'mode of production' have pointed out, the specific forms of the division-of-labour and the introduction of automated technologies have been intended to a large extent to give management greater control over the labour process.

Not surprisingly, the past few years have seen the explosion of a variety of new managerial techniques and 'organisation' theories to counter the growing resistance of workers to the patterns of hierarchical domination. An important function of these 'ruling ideas' is to reconcile the workforce to organisational patterns whose primary purpose is control. By refusing to see the structure of industrial authority
itself as 'problematic', ideas like 'job enrichment', 'worker participation' etc. conceal hegemonic functions since they operate to divert worker attention from alternative possibilities of what the organisation of industry could be like. It is in this context that we set out to examine trade union leadership attitudes to the general problem of the managerial control of industry by questioning the extent to which ideas of workers' control over working conditions and investment decisions are salient concerns for them. Their answers are shown in Table 9.12.

Table 9.12 LEADERSHIP OPINIONS ON THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions should devote their energies to getting better wages and working conditions for their members and leave the running of the workplace to management.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=3) (N.S.)</td>
<td>(N=1)</td>
<td>(N=26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private and nationalised industries should be legally-required to furnish their workers with full details of their operations subject to reasonable security safeguards.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=30) (N.S.)</td>
<td>(N=26)</td>
<td>(N=26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A prominent theme in the ruling culture is that wages and working conditions basically constitute the only legitimate demands that trade unions should entertain and articulate. However, well over 90 percent of the union leaders in our sample rejected the notion that 'trade unions should devote their energies to getting better wages and working conditions for their members and leave the running of the workplace to management'. Such responses clearly indicate an emphatic rejection of the ruling ideas concerning the authority of management.
It is a fundamental tenet of the ruling ideas regarding how industry is run that the details of their financial operations are sacrosanct. This ideological position is generally defended by recourse to formulations about the need to preserve secrecy so as not to betray the competitive position of the enterprise to market rivals. Accordingly, where workers have been appointed to the Board of Directors, as in West Germany, they tend to be bound to rules of secrecy concerning the financial operations of the enterprise to which they become privy.

However, as can be seen from Table 9.12 the union leaders in the sample overwhelmingly endorse the view that 'private and nationalised industries should be legally-required to furnish their workers with full details of their operations subject to reasonable security safeguards'. Clearly, too, such answers reveal little support for dominant values.

Another proposition which is deeply-embedded in the dominant values about the present economic and industrial arrangements is that control of property confers virtually absolute rights in determining how it is used. Prominent in the view of managerial prerogatives is the belief that management has a unilateral right to initiate change. Although this right may be contested by workers, arbitral systems tend to require that workers return to work while their grievances are heard.
From Table 9.12, we can see that 88 percent of the manual and 93 percent of the non-manual employees totally rejected the notion that 'managerial proposals concerning any alterations in the staffing, speed or content of work should be implemented while workers objections to them are being put through grievance procedures'. Likewise, virtually all the union leaders in the sample supported the idea that 'pending union agreement, no proposed management change which affects employees should be introduced'. Although such replies suggest the absolute rejection of the ruling ideas, another theme in these ideas suggests that while a state of democracy in the workplace is manifestly undesirable, yet workers ought to be consulted beforehand about matters which directly affect them. In summary, the evidence indicates little difference between manual and non-manual union leaders in attitudes to the 'rights' of property. Certainly, it is evident from their responses that neither manual or non-manual union leaders unequivocally accept the dominant ideology on workplace control - despite the claims of their radical critics that they do through not openly contesting this control.
10. CONCLUSIONS

The main objectives of the overall study have been to examine the implications of the global economic recession, conceived within the wider framework of fundamental changes within the capitalist labour-process, for the nature of trade unionism and industrial relations. A further aim was to explore the impact of these changes on the class consciousness of organised labour, through empirical investigation of the attitudes of trade union leaders.

In the foregoing chapters, we have attempted to derive a number of operational measures with which to test certain theoretical propositions concerning the nature of trade union consciousness. Such a procedure is, of course, hardly novel; indeed, it is basic to the scientific method.

To begin with, the survey of union leaders sets out to test the argument that blue-collar and white-collar unionism are associated with qualitatively-different forms of worker consciousness. It has become part of the academic sociological consensus to view white-collar unionism as a 'different', perhaps even inferior form of trade unionism. This ideological perspective has quite an interesting pedigree. Back in the heyday of 'end-of-ideology' analyses within sociology, white-collar employment was widely-believed to confer 'middle class' status and to result in disinterest in the collectivist traditions of the trade union movement. The subsequent upsurge in white-collar trade unionism and industrial militancy largely undermined the tenability of this facile hypothesis.
Nevertheless, this assumption about the white-collar condition has been maintained, albeit in somewhat different form. Basically, the argument now is that although non-manual workers might unionise, the character of the organisations they form is quite distinct. One strand of this argument suggests that the impulses to form unions among white-collar workers or for white-collar unions to seek affiliation with predominantly manual inter-union organisations are predicated on largely instrumental considerations of self-interest. This is seen to contrast with the 'principled' solidarity which is presumed to typify manual trade unionism.

However, as our findings reveal, there was no statistical difference in attitudes toward labour unity between the leaders of manual and non-manual A.C.T.U.-affiliated trade unions in our sample. As indicated, if the assumption that white-collar trade unions perceive affiliation with the A.C.T.U. in instrumental terms is correct, we would expect the leadership of such unions to hold much weaker attitudes toward labour unity than do their manual counterparts. For, if the assumption of 'instrumentalism' is true, then the affiliation of such organisations with the A.C.T.U. is not impelled by sentiments of solidarity with manual workers. Our findings, however, as mentioned, call into question the credibility of this simple proposition.

At the basis of this particular postulate of the 'differentness' of white-collar unionism lies a highly-idealised image of 'traditional' manual working class solidarity. What this vision of the manual union experience however refuses to admit is that a strong element of
self-interest has traditionally characterised trade union action. Put simply, trade union formation among blue-collar, as among white-collar workers has usually been predicated on the need to secure or defend the industrial interests of its own members. Consequently, not only has sectionalism been a central feature of trade unionism, but wider ties of worker solidarity were never spontaneous.

Nevertheless, the presumption that manual and non-manual unionism reflect forms of worker consciousness which are quite distinctive is perpetuated in the theoretical formulations of the 'new working class' proponents. Essentially, as certain variants of this view imply, non-manual unionism is predominantly impelled by strong resentment toward the growing 'degradation' of white-collar jobs resulting from their re-design and the increasing introduction of automated technology into the workplace. The undermining of the white-collar worker's traditional level of autonomy at work, the destruction of career prospects and the subjection to closer forms of supervision, it is claimed, conspire to make the issue of control in the workplace a particularly salient consideration for white-collar trade unions. At the same time the tendency to perceive themselves as 'middle class', i.e. as an intermediate group between management and manual workers is believed to inhibit their development of strong feelings of class identity with manual workers. Likewise, an effective sense of class opposition is said to be hindered since their major concern in unionising is not to abandon their cultural distinctiveness and separateness from manual workers but to highlight them.
Accordingly, the survey of union leaders set out to test the proposition that manual and non-manual unions differ in regard to class identity, class opposition and class alternative. However, what our findings indicate is that factors like political party affiliation and size of union as well as the age, income, length of time in office and political party affiliations of the union leaders were far more important sources of variations in attitudes to class identity, class opposition and class alternative than was the blue-collar white-collar difference per se.

In fact, the major statistical differences between trade union leadership attitudes to class identity arose within rather than between blue-collar and white-collar union leaders - sharply separating attitudinally those who were members of the A.L.P. from those who were not. A similar situation was found in relation to attitudes to both class opposition and class alternative. It is hardly necessary to add that the strongest attitudes on the three composite measures of class consciousness were found among the trade union leaders who were members of one or other of the communist parties.

Altogether, the failure of significant differences in attitudes to emerge between the leaders of manual and non-manual trade unions would appear to reflect the growing structural similarities in the blue-collar and white-collar work experience.

The final problem which the survey attempts to address relates to the question of the extent to which the thinking of trade union leaders is penetrated by the 'ruling ideas' of society. It has become something
of an intellectual fashion among the progressively-ageing ranks of the Australian 'New Left' to allege that the dominant value system has been remarkably successful in penetrating the thinking of organised labour thus effectively undermining any serious possibility of a radical worker challenge to the present social order.

Although such claims are perpetually trotted out in the 'theoretical' literature, little attempt has been made to empirically investigate their validity. What this study endeavours to do is to develop operational criteria for assessing the validity or otherwise of claims that the political quiescence of organised labour in Australia reflects widespread acceptance of the dominant ideas by trade union leaders.

Our survey of Australian trade union leadership attitudes yielded results in the main that, according to our criteria for evaluation, did not support the theory of 'hegemony' for any of the three major areas investigated viz. the purposes of the trade unions and trade union activities like strikes, the institutional framework in which industrial and political relations in Australia are set and, the property relations in society coupled with the authority relations in industry to which they give rise.

Yet, even if it were conceded that, as their critics suggest, trade union leaders do, to a degree, accept elements of the dominant ideas, it needs to be kept in mind that the hold of ideas is neither total nor necessarily permanent. Rather, this ideological domination depends a great deal on objective conditions and is open to challenge by the advocates of different ideas.
Most importantly, the fact that, as our findings show, trade union leadership thinking is characterised by elements of inconsistency, should caution against the making of too sweeping generalisations about their capacities for political combat. Indeed, the very contradictory nature of their consciousness amply underlines the possibilities of change - given a suitable set of circumstances.
APPENDIX 1

LIST OF UNIONS *

1. A.B.C. (AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING COMMISSION) STAFF ASSOCIATION
2. ACTORS AND ANNOUNCERS EQUITY ASSOCIATION
3. ADMINISTRATIVE AND CLERICAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
4. AIRLINE HOSTESSES ASSOCIATION
5. AMALGAMATED METAL WORKERS UNION
6. AMALGAMATED POSTAL WORKERS UNION
7. AMALGAMATED SOCIETY OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS
8. A.M.P. (AUSTRALIAN MUTUAL PROVIDENT) SOCIETY STAFF ASSOCIATION
9. ASSOCIATION OF ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, SURVEYORS AND DRAUGHTSMEN
10. ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS
11. ASSOCIATION OF RAILWAY PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS
12. AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS
13. AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNION
14. AUSTRALASIAN SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS
15. AUSTRALASIAN TRANSPORT OFFICERS FEDERATION
16. AUSTRALIAN BANK OFFICIALS ASSOCIATION
17. AUSTRALIAN BOOT TRADE EMPLOYEES FEDERATION
18. AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION WORKERS FEDERATION
19. AUSTRALIAN COAL AND SHALE EMPLOYEES FEDERATION
20. AUSTRALIAN FEDERATED UNION OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEMEN

* Some of these unions have since changed their names.
21. AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF AIR PILOTS
22. AUSTRALIAN FOREMEN STEVEDORES ASSOCIATION
23. AUSTRALIAN GLASS WORKERS UNION
24. AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF MARINE AND POWER ENGINEERS
25. AUSTRALIAN INSURANCE STAFFS FEDERATION
26. AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION
27. AUSTRALIAN LICENSED AIRCRAFT ENGINEERS ASSOCIATION
28. AUSTRALIAN RAILWAYS UNION
29. AUSTRALIAN SHIPPING OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
30. AUSTRALIAN TEXTILE WORKERS UNION
31. AUSTRALIAN THEATRICAL AND AMUSEMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
32. AUSTRALIAN TIMBER WORKERS UNION
33. AUSTRALIAN TRAMWAYS AND MOTOR OMNIBUS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
34. AUSTRALIAN WORKERS UNION
35. BAKING TRADE EMPLOYEES UNION OF NEW SOUTH WALES
36. BREAD INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES AND SALESMENS ASSOCIATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES
37. BUILDING WORKERS INDUSTRIAL UNION
38. CLOTHING AND ALLIED TRADERS UNION
39. COLONIAL SUGAR REFINING CO. LTD. PROFESSIONAL AND CLERICAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
40. COMMONWEALTH BANK OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
41. COMMONWEALTH FOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA (COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE)
42. COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE ASSOCIATION (FOURTH DIVISION OFFICERS)
43. COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE ARTISANS ASSOCIATION
44. COMMONWEALTH TELEPHONE AND PHONOGRAM OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
45. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
46. ELECTRICAL TRADES UNION
47. FEDERATED BRICK, TILE AND POTTERY INDUSTRIAL UNION
48. FEDERATED CLERKS UNION
49. FEDERATED CONFECTIONERS ASSOCIATION
50. FEDERATED ENGINE DRIVERS AND FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION
51. FEDERATED FURNISHING TRADE SOCIETY
52. FEDERATED GAS EMPLOYEES INDUSTRIAL UNION
53. FEDERATED IRONWORKERS ASSOCIATION
54. FEDERATED LIQUOR AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION
55. FEDERATED MARINE STEWARDS AND PANTRYMEN'S ASSOCIATION
56. FEDERATED MILLERS AND MILL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
57. FEDERATED MISCELLANEOUS WORKERS UNION
58. FEDERATED MOULDERS (METALS) UNION
59. FEDERATED MUNICIPAL AND SHIRE COUNCIL EMPLOYEES
60. FEDERATED PASTRYCOOKS EMPLOYEES, BISCUIT MAKERS EMPLOYEES, AND FLOUR AND SUGAR GOODS WORKERS UNION
61. FEDERATED RUBBER AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION
62. FEDERATED SHIP PAINTERS AND DOCKERS UNION
63. FEDERATED STOREMEN AND PACKERS UNION
64. FEDERATED TOBACCO AND CIGARETTE WORKERS UNION
65. FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITY STAFF ASSOCIATIONS
66. Firemen and Deckhands Union of New South Wales
67. Flight Stewards Association
68. Food Preservers Union
69. Gass Industry Salaried Officers Federation
70. Health and Research Employees Association
71. Hospital Officers Association of New South Wales
72. Local Government Clerks Association of New South Wales
73. Marine Cooks, Bakers and Butchers Association
74. Merchant Service Guild of Australia
75. Municipal Officers Association
76. National Union of Railwaymen
77. New South Wales Commercial Travellers Guild
78. New South Wales Nurses Association
79. New South Wales Public Service Professional Officers Association
80. New South Wales Teachers Federation
81. Operative Painters and Decorators Union
82. Operative Stonemasons Society of New South Wales
83. Plate, Sheet and Ornamental Glass Workers Union of New South Wales
84. Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union
85. Postal Telecommunications Technicians Association
86. Printing and Kindred Industries Union
87. Professional Officers Association (Commonwealth Public Service)
88. Professional Officers Association of New South Wales
89. PROFESSIONAL RADIO EMPLOYEES INSTITUTE
90. PUBLIC SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES
91. RACECOURSE TOTALISATOR EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES
92. RURAL BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
93. SEAMENS UNION OF AUSTRALIA
94. SECRETARIES AND MANAGERS ASSOCIATION
95. TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
96. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
97. UNION OF POSTAL CLERKS AND TELEGRAPHISTS
98. VEHICLE BUILDERS EMPLOYEES FEDERATION
99. WATER AND SEWERAGE EMPLOYEES UNION
100. WATERSIDE WORKERS FEDERATION
Dear

I am a Ph.D. student at the Australian National University and am doing a thesis on Australian union officials which is being jointly supervised by Dr. D.W. Rawson (Political Science) and Professor J. Zubrzycki (Sociology) of the A.N.U.

In connection with this research, I am writing to seek your co-operation and participation in a survey I hope to undertake shortly to study the social backgrounds, attitudes, and goals of union secretaries.

Your organisation is one of a number which have been selected for this survey which is designed to yield basic information on how union officials view the purpose, goals, and scope of trade unionism, as well as to examine their conceptions of economic and political institutions and the nature of industrial relations in Australia.

The information that I require will be treated with absolute confidentiality and no individual's answers will be revealed in the thesis. Rather, such answers will be expressed in the form of statistical tables.

Briefly, the study will require your completion of a questionnaire which will take about fifteen minutes to do. However, I would like a few minutes of your time to explain the questionnaire, and to answer any queries you may have about it, or about the study in general.

I am hoping to be in Sydney between mid-July and early August and if you can participate in this study, please indicate, if possible, what date and time would be most convenient for you.

Thanking you in anticipation,
Dear 

A few weeks ago while in Sydney I left a questionnaire for you to complete. The questionnaire seeks your views on various issues and forms the basis of a thesis I am writing on the industrial, economic, social and political attitudes of union officials.

As explained, the concern of the study is with the collective attitudes of union officials. Accordingly the opinions of a particular union official while important in their own right, are not the central focus of the study. Rather the purpose of the study is to statistically determine the extent to which unions and union officials sharing common social characteristics e.g. affiliation to ACTU/ACSPA etc. also share similar attitudes in relation to industrial and political matters etc.

In view of statistical nature of the study it is important to obtain a fairly large response to the questionnaire. I would therefore very much appreciate your completion and return of the questionnaire to me as soon as possible. I am enclosing with this letter another copy of the questionnaire (in case the original has been mislaid) as well as a stamped addressed envelope for its return. I fully realise that you may have been too occupied to pay much attention to the questionnaire.

However, if time permits and you are willing to fill out and return the questionnaire I would be most grateful. On the other hand if you are opposed to completing the questionnaire, or if you have already returned the original questionnaire, please disregard this reminder.
OPINION SURVEY OF AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNION OFFICIALS

INSTRUCTIONS

The statements contained in the first part of this questionnaire are related to various aspects of industrial, economic, and political and social issues in Australia. Please indicate your opinion in each statement by putting a circle around the response which you feel best expresses your view.

The four responses are:

SA - strongly agree
A - agree but with some reservations
D - disagree but with some reservations
SD - strongly disagree

Please indicate a response to every statement. There are no right or wrong answers. The purpose of this survey is not to test your knowledge but to give you an opportunity to express your opinion.

There is no need to spend much time on any one question. Your responses should be made as quickly as possible. The whole questionnaire should take only a few minutes to complete.

Finally, to preserve confidentiality, please do not put your name on any of the sheets.
1. In place of the 300 or so unions which exist in Australia, a single large union in each industry would serve the workers much better.

2. It would be in the best interests of the trade union movement if the ACTU were the sole central body representing the interests of all unions.

3. Clerical and professional unions should affiliate with the ACTU and the Trades & Labor Council.

4. Small unions will need to amalgamate or federate with larger unions in order to survive in a society dominated by large-scale business and government concerns.

5. Generally speaking, clerical and professional trade unionists have more in common with employers than they do with manual trade unionists.

6. The presence of more clerical and professional unions in the ACTU and the TLC would reduce the militancy of these organisations.

7. Trade unions should seek to reduce the gap between highly paid and poorly paid workers by seeking National Wage increases which pay the same amount to all employees regardless of skill, or occupational and educational differences.

8. If many women regard their employment as only a temporary state, it is a waste of union time and resources to try and organize them.

9. If women want jobs then they should accept the same conditions as men and not expect the union to get special conditions for them.

10. Unions should provide special opportunities for women to enable them to achieve full-time official positions.

11. Workers who are not prepared to join a union should be barred from enjoying the benefits won by the union for its membership.
12. Non English-speaking union members should have strike issues put to them in their own language by trade union officials.

13. Unions with significant migrant worker memberships would be better served by having migrant union officials.

14. Migrant unionists should be given the same treatment as other union members in the union and not expect it to make special provision for them.

15. Wage and salary earners in Australia receive a fair return from employers for their efforts.

16. The share of the National Income between profits on the one hand, and wages and salaries on the other has become more fair.

17. Most employers would be a lot happier if trade unions did not exist.

18. Arbitration is preferable to collective bargaining with individual employers.

19. Most private employers are more concerned with making profits than with their employees' well-being.

20. In the main, the Arbitration System serves the interests of employers better than it serves the interests of trade unions.

21. Industrial action generally ensures unions of more favourable decisions from the Arbitration of their grievances.

22. There would be more friction between employers and unions if the Arbitration system did not exist.

23. Generally speaking, workers can improve their conditions without going on strike.

24. Strikes unnecessarily antagonise employers and delay the improvements workers are seeking.

25. Unions which are not prepared to go on strike are unlikely to have their demands taken seriously by employers.
26. Strike decisions should be made by a secret ballot of union members.

27. Trade unions in Australia should avoid affiliation with political parties.

28. When a parliamentary election is about to be held unions which are affiliated with a political party are less free to take industrial action than unions which are not so affiliated.

29. Trade unions which are affiliated with a particular political party are generally at a disadvantage compared with non-affiliated unions when that party is out of office.

30. It is not in the best interests of trade unionism for senior union officials to simultaneously hold senior positions in a political party.

31. Industrial action on the part of trade unions should be confined to work place issues.

32. The economic prosperity of Australia depends upon a more vigorous expansion of private enterprise.

33. Large scale private foreign investment is in the best interests of Australia's economic development.

34. It is of no concern to Australian trade union leaders if multi-national companies which have branches in Australia, or Australian-owned firms, treat their workers poorly in other countries.

35. Private ownership of Australia's natural resources should be nationalised.

36. Private business companies should be allowed to grow as large as they can.

37. Wage and salary restraint is necessary if Australia's current economic difficulties are to be overcome.

38. The activities of multi-national corporations call for co-ordinated international trade union action.
39. Union organisations should spend more time on issues of real importance to workers such as a bigger say for them in the workplace, and less time on commercial activities like Bourke's store, holiday travel etc.

40. Replacing the private ownership of the means of production by public ownership is of little relevance to the Australia that exists today.

41. Trade unions should devote their energies to getting better wages and working conditions for their members and leave the running of the workplace to management.

42. Worker participation in the workplace should only be concerned with staff matters such as employee safety, health, and welfare.

43. Worker representatives elected by workers and directly responsible to them should sit on the Board of Directors of all large-scale enterprises, whether private or public.

44. Private and nationalised industries should be legally required to furnish their workers with full details of their operations, subject to reasonable security safeguards.

45. Managerial proposals concerning any alterations in the staffing, speed, or content of work should be implemented while workers objections to them are being put through the grievance procedures.

46. Pending union agreement, no proposed management change which affects employees should be introduced.

And now, just a few pieces of information about your union in New South Wales, and about yourself.

47. How many members are there in your union?

48. What proportion (approximately) of your members are non-British migrants?
49. What proportion (approximately) of your members are female? 

50. How many full-time organisers does your union employ? 

51. How many of these are female? 

52. How many of your full-time union organisers are non-British migrants? 

53. Is your union affiliated with any of the following organisations? (Please circle the appropriate number) 

If yes, please circle, with which of the following organisations has your union affiliations?

The Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations (ACSPA) -- 1

The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) -- 2

The Australian Public Service Federation (APSF) -- 3

The Council of Commonwealth Public Service Organisations (CCPSO) -- 4

The Council of Professional Association (CPA) -- 5

The New South Wales Trades and Labor Council (NSW T & LC) -- 6

The Australian Labor Party (ALP) -- 7

Other (Please specify) -- 8

54. Which of the following terms would best describe the type of union you lead. (Please circle the appropriate number) 


55. How long have you held your present position in your union?
56. Is it full-time or part-time?

1. Full-time 2. Part-time

57. Were you elected or appointed to this position?

1. Elected 2. Appointed

58. As State Secretary of your union, into which of the following categories does your yearly income fall? (Please circle the appropriate number)

- Under $5,000 per year
- Over $5,000 but under $6,000
- Over $6,000 but under $7,000
- Over $7,000 but under $8,000
- Over $8,000 but under $9,000
- Over $9,000 but under $10,000
- Over $10,000 but under $11,000
- Over $11,000 but under $12,000
- Over $12,000 but under $13,000
- Over $13,000 but under $14,000
- Over $14,000 but under $15,000
- Over $15,000 per year

59. Prior to taking up your position as State Secretary of your union have you ever held any other position, full-time or part-time, in this or any other union, either in Australia or overseas?

1. Yes 2. No

if yes, please give details of all positions held, (including unpaid positions like office representative or shop steward), whether the position was in Australia or overseas, and your age when you first took up these positions.

NAME OF POSITION and Country where held

AGE at first taking position
60. Are you a member of any political party?

1. Yes  
2. No

61. (If yes) to what political party or parties do you belong?

62. Do you have any preference for a particular political party? (Circle as appropriate)

1. Yes  
2. No

63. (If yes) which political party is that?

Now, just a few questions about your background. (Circle where appropriate)

64. In what year were you born? 

65. Are you male or female?

1. Male  
2. Female

66. In which country were you born?

1. Australia  
2. Great Britain  
3. Eire  
4. Western Europe  
5. Eastern Europe  
6. Other

67. (If born outside Australia) how old were you when you first came to Australia?

Under 6 years old - 1
Between 7 - 12 - 2
Between 13 - 18 - 3
Between 19 - 25 - 4
Over 25 years old - 5
68. At what level did you **complete** your formal education?

- Attended Primary school - 1
- Attended Secondary school - 2
- Passed Intermediate - 3
- Passed Leaving - 4
- Matriculated - 5
- Some university or other tertiary - 6
- Completed Bachelor's degree/or diploma - 7
- Completed postgraduate degree - 8
- Other (please specify) - 9

69. Were your parents born in Australia?

- Father 1. Yes 2. No
- Mother 1. Yes 2. No

70. (If born outside Australia) how old were they (approximately) when they first came to Australia?

- Father  
- Mother  

71. At what level did your parents complete their formal education?

- Father  
- Mother  

72. Have either of your parents, or any member of your family ever been a trade union official?

- 1. Yes 2. No

if yes, please give details.

Thank you very much for seeing this through to the end. Any comments you may wish to volunteer which can possibly assist this survey will be most welcome. Space for your comments is provided on the next page.
a) **The calculation of significance for the Likert method**

Given two groups, an upper group and a lower group, the means for the two groups can be calculated using the formula:

\[
\bar{X} = \frac{\sum X}{n}
\]

Let \(\bar{X}_1\) represent the mean of the upper group and;  
\(\bar{X}_2\) stand for the mean of the lower group.

The statistical difference between the two means may now be calculated using the following formula for \(t\):

\[
t - \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{V_1^2 + V_2^2}{n(n-1)}}}
\]

where \(V_1^2\) and \(V_2^2\) represent the sum of the square of the deviation from the mean in the two groups and;  
\(n = \) number in the group.

In effect,  
\[t = \frac{\text{Difference in means}}{\text{Standard error of the difference in means}}\]
APPENDIX 6

**t-scores of items in the scale of class identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
<th>t-scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. In place of the 300 or so unions which exist in Australia, a single large union in each industry would serve the workers much better.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>3.7 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It would be in the best interests of the trade union movement if the A.C.T.U. were the sole central body representing the interests of all unions.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Clerical and professional unions should affiliate with the A.C.T.U. and the Trades and Labor Council.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>2.52 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small unions will need to amalgamate or federate with larger unions in order to survive in a society dominated by large-scale business and government concerns.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>2.89 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Generally speaking, clerical and professional trade unionists have more in common with employers than they do with manual trade unionists.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>3.08 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM</td>
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<td>t-scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The presence of more clerical and professional unions in the A.C.T.U. and the T.L.C. would reduce the militancy of these organisations.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>2.42 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Trade unions should seek to reduce the gap between highly paid and poorly paid workers by seeking National Wage increases which pay the same amount to all employees regardless of skill, or occupational and educational differences.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. If many women regard their employment as only a temporary state, it is a waste of union time and resources to try and organise them.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. If women want jobs then they should accept the same conditions as men and not expect the union to get special conditions for them.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>3.53 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Unions should provide special opportunities for women to enable them to achieve full-time official positions.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>2.42 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Workers who are not prepared to join a union should be barred from enjoying the benefits won by the union for its membership.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Non English-speaking union members should have strike issues put to them in their own language by trade union officials.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Unions with significant migrant worker memberships would be better served by having migrant union officials.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Migrant unionists should be given the same treatment as other union members in the union and not expect it to make special provision for them.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Trade unions in Australia should avoid affiliation with political parties.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. When a parliamentary election is about to be held unions which are affiliated with a political party are less free to take industrial action than unions which are not so affiliated.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>4.71 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Trade unions which are affiliated with a particular political party are generally at a disadvantage compared with non-affiliated unions when that party is out of office.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>4.61 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. It is not in the best interests of trade unionism for senior union officials to simultaneously hold senior positions in a political party.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>3.94 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. It is of no concern to Australian trade union leaders if multi-national companies which have branches in Australia, or Australian-owned firms, treat their workers poorly in other countries.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>3.47 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. The activities of multi-national corporations call for co-ordinated international trade union action.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>2.55 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(+) indicates that positive responses are scored highest.

(-) indicates that negative responses are scored highest.

* indicates the items included in the scale of class identity.
APPENDIX 7

**t-scores of items in the scale of class opposition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
<th>t-scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. Wage and salary earners in Australia receive a fair return from employers for their efforts.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>6.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. The share of the National Income between profits on the one hand, and wages and salaries on the other has become more fair.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>3.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Most employers would be a lot happier if trade unions did not exist.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Arbitration is preferable to collective bargaining with individual employers.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>7.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Most private employers are more concerned with making profits than with their employees' well-being.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. In the main, the Arbitration System serves the interests of employers better than it serves the interests of trade unions.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>5.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 7 (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
<th>t-scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21. Industrial action generally ensures unions of more favourable decisions from the Arbitration of their grievances.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. There would be more friction between employers and unions if the Arbitration system did not exist.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>-2.5 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Generally speaking, workers can improve their conditions without going on strike.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Strikes unnecessarily antagonise employers and delay the improvements workers are seeking.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Unions which are not prepared to go on strike are unlikely to have their demands taken seriously by employers.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>1.76 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Strike decisions should be made by a secret ballot of union members.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>-1.98 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ITEM Scoring t-scores

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Industrial action on the part of trade unions should be confined to work place issues.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>9.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Wage and salary restraint is necessary if Australia's current economic difficulties are to be overcome.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(+) indicates that positive responses are scored highest.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32. The economic prosperity of Australia depends upon a more vigorous expansion of private enterprise.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>8.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Large scale private foreign investment is in the best interests of Australia's economic development.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Private ownership of Australia's natural resources should be nationalised.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Private business companies should be allowed to grow as large as they can.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Union organisations should spend more time on issues of real importance to workers such as a bigger say for them in the workplace, and less time on commercial activities like Bourke's store, holiday travel etc.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>40. Replacing the private ownership of the means of production by public ownership is of little relevance to the Australia that exists today.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>6.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Trade unions should devote their energies to getting better wages and working conditions for their members and leave the running of the workplace to management.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Worker participation in the workplace should only be concerned with staff matters such as employee safety, health, and welfare.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>1.78 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Worker representatives elected by workers and directly responsible to them should sit on the Board of Directors of all large-scale enterprises, whether private or public.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>1.31 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 8

(Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
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<tr>
<td>44. Private and nationalised industries should be legally required to furnish their workers with full details of their operations, subject to reasonable security safeguards.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Managerial proposals concerning any alterations in the staffing, speed, or content of work should be implemented, while workers objections to them are being put through the grievance procedures.</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Pending union agreement, no proposed management change which affects employees should be introduced.</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>6.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* indicates the items excluded from the scale of class alternative.
ABEGGLEN, J.C. 
1957 

ABEL-SMITH, Brian and 
1965 
TOWNSEND, Peter 
The Poor and the Poorest, Bell, London.

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1965 
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1972 
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1967  

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1975  

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1932  

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1954  
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1959  

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BLACKBURN, Robin
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and workers', in American Journal of Sociology,
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