ARMS CONTROL DISCOURSE:
THE SALT
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
1975-1985

By
Jerome Leo EVERARD

January 1992

A Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University
ADDENDUM

1. The current US SCC Commissioner is Ambassador Robert Joseph, his CIS counterpart is Major General Vladimir Kuklev.

2. The current US SCC Deputy Commissioner is Mr. Bensen Adams. His CIS counterpart was, until November 1991 Mr. Viktor Shabannikov. The CIS will have appointed a new Deputy by the time of the next SCC Meeting.

3. There has been one meeting of the JCIC. Russia has suggested that the next meeting of the JCIC, scheduled for January 1992 be moved from Geneva to Moscow. The US is now working out arrangements for the next JCIC.

4. The US JCIC Representative is Ambassador Steven Steiner. His Deputy is Dr. George Look. The CIS JCIC Representative is Dr. Viktor Shabannikov; his Deputy is Colonel A.N. Luk'vanov

This information was kindly supplied by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 24/1/92.
DECLARATION:

This thesis is the product of my own work except where otherwise acknowledged

Jerome Leo EVERARD
For Sharon and Eve
Acknowledgements

A Ph.D. dissertation has both a context and lengthy genealogy. This one is no exception. Along the way a great many debts of gratitude have been incurred. My thanks go first to my wife, Sharon and my daughter, Eve, for their support and patience through a long journey, both figuratively and literally.

My thanks are due to my supervisors John Girling and Moira Gatens for their encouragement and challenging criticism. A special thanks to my external advisor, Mick Dillon who encouraged and sustained me throughout and who made distance very short through the electronic mail.

I acknowledge too, the support of Jim Richardson, whose open-mindedness made possible a space for those who paved my way, especially Jim George and David Campbell, and who, as Head of the Department of International Relations at the ANU provided a generous allocation of resources, including the funding that made possible my overseas fieldwork.

In the course of that fieldwork I derived benefit from stimulating discussions with a number of people who gave freely of their time, and in some cases, accommodation. Among these were Richard Ashley, Rob Walker, Brad Klein, Mick Dillon, Catherine Belsey, Mark Hoffman and Olé Waever.

My thanks too, to my interviewees in the British Ministry of Defence and at NATO Headquarters in Brussels who gave me a valuable insight into how arms control is conducted in practice. I acknowledge too, the generosity of NATO in accommodating me while in Brussels, and of the particular consideration given by Dr. Jamie Shea.

Thanks also to Desmond Ball, Alexei Arbatov, Coral Bell, Ian Bellany, Greg Fry, Andrew Mack, Simon Dalby, Jim George, David Campbell and Trevor Findlay whose discussion and comments were informative and constructive.

I also thank Horst Ruthrof, who in no small way equipped me for this journey.

The responsibility for any errors is, of course, entirely mine.
Abstract

States are dynamic entities. This thesis argues that one of the reasons that States are dynamic is that the processes that underly their formation are essentially dialogic - literally, of dialogue, or discourse. This thesis takes as its starting point the notion that in order to analyse the processes of state-making it is important to take account, not only of the grand foundational practices of establishing constitutions and fighting wars, but of the almost mundane, day-to-day practices that reinstate the state at every turn.

One way to observe the practices of state-maintenance is to note and observe the disruptions and discontinuities by which state-making reveals itself in the patching-up, or maintenance of its notional boundaries. This thesis argues, therefore that the fragility of state-making reveals itself when the state is most loudly maintaining its security and integrity.

One arena in which this can be observed is in the practices that maintain an arms control regime, as, for example, SALT. By observing and analysing the operation of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission through its handling of compliance issues between the US and the Soviet Union, it is argued that one can observe the operation, at a specific site, of state-making, and the effects of a shift in US ideological practice upon the process of state making in the United States.

In the historical changes that came about with the change in administration from Carter to the first Reagan administration, the arms control process was challenged to survive in an era of uncertainty in which discourse about the state invoked a discourse of danger.

Drawing on the broadly-termed 'post-structural' perspectives from literary theory, this thesis undertakes a 'close reading' or textual analysis approach to the empirical texts performed by the arms control community about the relationship between arms control and the notion of the state with which it operates. Contrary to the assumptions of those critical of poststructuralist approaches, this thesis does not reject the empirical along with its rejection of empiricism. Where this thesis uses or implies terms like 'construct', or 'invention' or 'texting' such usage is to be taken to imply the anthropological or sociological senses of these terms, rather than the glib 'common-sense' notion of things being arbitrarily 'made up.' As a result preference is given to the term 'construe' over 'construct' to emphasise the precedency given to meaning over inherent structure.

The analytical approach taken here is rigorously concerned with the kind of world one needs to presuppose in order to make sense of the texts produced by and through arms control discourse. To perform such an analysis one must draw on actual, 'real,' records of behaviours conducted in the name of the state - hence the concern with empirical records that, in the reading, are produced as text. The principal underlying assumption explored in this thesis is that states, like other 'identities' (family, individual, institution etc.) are the products, or symptoms, of those practices that are engaged with the maintenence of boundaries 'in the name of' the state or other 'identity' so produced.

It is argued that such an approach offers a useful explanation of the historically-demonstrated instability of such large-scale identity-structures as states.
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<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ACA</td>
<td>Arms Control Association</td>
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<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>ALCM</td>
<td>Air-Launched Cruise Missiles</td>
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<td>ASBM</td>
<td>Air-Surface Ballistic Missiles</td>
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<td>BMEWS</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Early Warning System</td>
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<td>C^3I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<td>CCD</td>
<td>Charge-Coupled Device</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty)</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
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<td>COMINT</td>
<td>Communications Intelligence</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Committee on the Present Danger</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Directorate of Central Intelligence</td>
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<td>DEW</td>
<td>Distance Early Warning</td>
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<td>ELINT</td>
<td>Electronic Intelligence</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Electro-Magnetic Pulse</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
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<td>GLCM</td>
<td>Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>InterContinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Soviet Committee on State Security)</td>
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<td>LPAR</td>
<td>Large Phased-Array Radar</td>
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<td>LTBT</td>
<td>Limited Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>LWIR</td>
<td>Long-Wave Infra-Red Radiation</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MIDAS</td>
<td>Missile Defence Alarm System</td>
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<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple, Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>MRV</td>
<td>Multiple Reentry Vehicles</td>
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<td>MWIR</td>
<td>Medium-Wave Infra-Red Radiation</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimates</td>
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<td>NRO</td>
<td>National Reconnaissance Office</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NTM</td>
<td>National Technical Means (of verification)</td>
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<td>OSI</td>
<td>On-Site Inspection</td>
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<td>PBV</td>
<td>Post-Boost Vehicle</td>
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<td>RADINT</td>
<td>Radar Intelligence</td>
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<td>RV</td>
<td>Reentry Vehicle</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
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<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-Air Missiles</td>
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<td>SAMOS</td>
<td>Satellite and Missile Observation System</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Synthetic Aperture Radar</td>
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<td>SCC</td>
<td>Standing Consultative Commission</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<td>SLM</td>
<td>Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>SLCM</td>
<td>Sea-Launched Cruise Missile</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty</td>
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<td>SWIR</td>
<td>Short-Wave Infra-Red Radiation</td>
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<td>TLI</td>
<td>Treaty-Limited Items</td>
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<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>Warsaw Treaty Organisation</td>
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Chapter I

Introduction

This thesis is about the processes underlying the question of what constitutes a State. This process is considered in relation to a particular set of historical, empirical practices that have their expression in the arms control process. Specifically, it is located, for the purposes of analysis, within the debates surrounding compliance or non-compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaties (SALT) as mediated by and through the SALT Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC) during the period roughly coinciding with the decade from 1975 - 1985. Its concerns, therefore, are both theoretical and practical.

The 1990s are shaping up, as one wit has described it, to be the decade of Mutual Unilateral Disarmament (MUD). In the half-decade from 1986-1991 the relationship between the superpowers has changed radically, and, it would appear, irreversibly. With the transmogrification (not to say demise) of the former Soviet Union the strategic nuclear picture has also changed, and of the body of nuclear analysts, some have declared that their role is as historians of the 'Cold War.' For others it is 'the end of history,'1 while still others cling to a binary threat in a world that is rapidly becoming multipolar. Within their own frameworks they are all 'right' which is to say that under the sets of

terms within which they operate, events can be read in terms of their self-consistency within the parameters of their analysis.

This thesis is not about the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of any one of those positions. What is of interest in all this are the kinds of structures that enable events to be articulated (narrativised) and the kinds of worlds established as symptoms of particular ways of thinking about events in the world. To do this on a global scale would require as many theses as there are 'realist' case studies. My aim here, and for specific sets of reasons, is to examine one such case in particular.

In the 1990s we are seeing a vertical decline and a lateral proliferation of nuclear weapons. While the present sets of changes in the international/internotional landscape appear categorical, what is emerging is that the conditions under which these changes are occurring have their own history. What we are witness to, therefore, is not the end of history, but its operation. This can be viewed as an alteration in the sets of practices that have enacted, both the State of the Soviet Union and the State of the United States of America.

The Manachæism of the Self/Other dichotomy that characterised the 'Cold War' has been articulated along ideological lines and found its most compelling expression in the nuclear arms race between the former superpowers. After 1945 the nuclear arms race may be said to be an 'expression' (that is, a primarily communicative act) since, despite (and partly because of) the materiality of the weapons themselves, what has counted above all is their overall 'potential' or what their specificities 'signified.' Nuclear weaponry has thus represented, first and foremost, a discursive practice.
Within the conceptual framework of 'security' nuclear weapons have played (and continue to play) an important role in articulating the identity of the state. Since 1946 (Brodie, Schelling) however, their role has been a deeply ambivalent one insofar as deterrence has proved to be a Platonic \textit{pharmakon} - at once poison and medicine. The reversal of the Clausewitzian maxim - from war conceived as an instrument of policy, to policy conceived as a corollary of war (albeit metonymic of its instruments) - forced upon the security state\textsuperscript{2} by the potentially catastrophic consequences of any large-scale use of nuclear weapons, has rendered the notion of force in ironic terms. Force, under the nuclear regime must be seen to remain an enunciative, or illocutionary force, rather than a straightforward physical force.

What is interesting about this is that the modes of power invoked under the nuclear regime of the security state are normative and judgemental rather than coercive. This is especially visible within the domain of policy of arms control. In this domain power and knowledge are coterminous. As practiced within the larger domain of

\textsuperscript{2} Here, the term Security State is used as opposed to other modes of articulating the state in order to discuss those aspects of the state that are constituted in relation to issues of the integrity of the boundaries of the state. In other words this is the aspect of the state with which the military forces have been traditionally concerned.

This thesis uses three terms to refer to the state:

i. the state - this refers to the sovereign state as articulated in international law.

ii. the security state - as defined above

iii. the strategic arms community - those policymakers and their analysts who articulate the security state through their policies and long term strategic goals. Those who are professionally concerned with the territorial integrity of the state.

In short, the strategic arms community are those who are narrowly concerned with the security aspects of the state - the security state. This in turn, represents a subset of the sovereign state as a whole.
the security state, nuclear arms control arguably constitutes one of the sites at which the State is enacted in relation to other states. In the case of the former superpowers during the Cold War, the relationship was constituted in largely bilateral terms.

The first phase of the Cold War, from the late 1940s to the early 1970s was characterised by the constitution of the Soviet Union as Manichaean Other to the United States. With the development of détente in the early 1970s the conditions emerged to allow the negotiation of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, collectively known as SALT I. This set of agreements, designed to enact a regime of mutual vulnerability, marked an historic moment in the history of nuclear weapons for two reasons:

1. as a crisis stability measure, the enacting of a pact of mutual vulnerability in the context of a strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction, the ABM Treaty raised the stakes of nuclear use beyond rational possibility.

2. as a treaty of indefinite duration, a mechanism was established in order to negotiate the meaning of ambiguous elements of treaty language, and in which to voice concerns over ambiguous treaty compliance. The establishment of this mechanism marked the recognition of the historicity of the terms within which the Treaty was to be enacted. At a time when other areas of social science research were establishing a-historical modes of analysis through game-theory models, the practitioners of arms control recognised that in the world of action, change is a categorical condition. The mechanism with the responsibility for negotiating ongoing treaty compliance in the face of technological and historical change is the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC).

II

Reading through any number of United States Congressional Reports and Hearings on arms control and on compliance or noncompliance
with arms control agreements, one cannot help but notice recurrent sets of phrases. These phrases are concerned with 'national security,' with the 'behaviour' of 'the Soviet Union' and with the 'relationship' between the United States and the Soviet Union. Some speak of 'self-interest' that has aligned nations, while others report that 'the US Government has determined that the Soviet Union is violating ... 'various arms control treaties.' Moreover, the consequences of this 'Soviet noncompliance' are represented such that it 'calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks; undermines confidence in the arms control process; casts doubts about the reliability of the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner; and damages the chances for a more constructive US/Soviet relationship.'³

Even from this small sample, several features emerge that warrant closer inspection. When we think of 'behaviour,' or 'self-interest,' or 'noncompliance,' or even 'relationship' and consider what kind of entity might have these characteristics, or be able to act in such a manner, it would seem reasonable to suppose that we are discussing people. When we read the textual context in which these actions take place, the context reveals that these entities are States. There are two possible assumptions that could lead to such a formulation. The first, is that states may be construed as actors and are therefore capable of action. This requires that states operate metaphorically as individual people. The second is that those who carry out the actions are indeed

collections of individual people acting in the name of the state - that is, that the state is metonymic of the people it contains.

Proponents of the first assumption require that states are ontologically prior to their action, and that states interact within a system of states. Foremost among the proponents of this assumption is Hedley Bull. In his Anarchical Society, Bull argues, after Hobbes, that states exist as islands of order in an ocean of disorder (anarchy). He further argues that there exist forms of order (rules) within a system of states that operate outside of international law. Moreover, he argues that whatever the substantive issues of the day, they take place, or are dealt with in the context of the existing political structure of the world. While this represents an oversimplification of Bull's arguments, it remains the case that for Bull, the constitutive practices of states are outside of the bounds of any study of the substantive issues of the day. Such an assumption serves to maintain the theory/practice dichotomy characteristic of 'Classic Realist' political philosophy.

Proponents of the second assumption require the state to be a persona ficta of the people empowered to make policy 'in the name of the state.' For Kenneth Waltz, as with Rousseau and Kant, the state is a product of individuals acting in concert to produce policy 'in the name of the state.' He argues that those so empowered, do so in a manner such that dissenters are carried along, either through their inability to bring force to bear to change the decision, or through 'their conviction,

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4 Proponents of this view include Spinoza and Hobbes.

based on perceived interest and customary loyalty, that in the long run it is to their advantage to go along with the national decision and work in the prescribed and accepted ways for its change. Thus the State, under this assumption is metonymic of the people who enact the State.

Such a view, although more complex than the Hobbesian state-as-actor, is still predicated upon the unitary, rational individual of psychology that is itself constituted as ontologically prior to the activities in which it is engaged. Recent approaches to subjectivity offer a critique of the rational unitary subject of psychology. Insofar as for Hobbes the State functions like an individual person and that person is construed as a unitary individual, and insofar as for Waltz the State is a collection of unitary individuals enacting the state, recent approaches to culturally based subjectivity do not construe the individual as unitary, but rather as a site upon which multiple subject positions may be enacted. Moreover, insofar as the subject is culturally construed by its entry into the symbolic order at a specific time and place, then the available subject positions are historically differentiated such that the foundations upon which action is predicated (including the ethical/moral order) are to a large degree historically contingent.

Such a view would argue that, far from being a unitary and originary source, subjectivity is rather an effect of the process of enacting (by differentiating) the subject. The subject, under this rubric, is a cultural artefact, a symptom of its practices. Subjectivity is therefore a verb (or process) rather than a noun (or object). This account of subjectivity would therefore articulate the state as a mode of subjectivity that is of

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the same kind (if of a different order) as that of the individual. The distinction between the individual and the state, insofar as they can be said to act, is one of locus of practice rather than of ontological difference.  

If this is the case, then analysis of the state should be able to proceed from an analysis of the practices by which the state differentiates itself from its Other. That is to say, by what actions does it enact (and by enacting, maintain) its identity? By what means does the state 'read,' and by 'reading' 'write,' its other. How does the State maintain its integrity? And what do we mean by 'state?' - is the state not itself the kind of multiple subject that individuals are, according to the roles it is called upon to play? This thesis sets out to argue that the state is indeed as multiple a subject as the individual. States are most visible through the sets of practices by which they enact their boundaries. This is what I have and shall continue to term the 'security state' - the military/strategic state. States police their boundaries in both a literal and textual form. This thesis focusses on a set of practices within the security state. Moreover, I intend to argue that, if the security state is a product of the practices that enact and maintain it, then one can examine this process by looking at micro-structures. One such microstructure is the SALT Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC). By examining the activities, context, and conditions that make possible its establishment and operation I intend

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7 While there are clear ontological differences between biological individuals and states, I am dealing here with the cultural individual which is socially produced through communicative acts within a cultural framework. In this sense, states and individuals may both be considered in terms of 'speaking subjects' rather than as biological entities.
to examine and trace the process of change that forms the underlying condition that makes possible the identity of the state.

III

Drawing on the analytical tools of cultural anthropology and discourse analysis, this thesis attempts to trace the process of change in the articulation of the identity\(^8\) of the state within the domain of arms control compliance through the actions and potential to act of the SALT Standing consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC) at a specific historical moment: the decade marked by the transition from the Carter Presidency to the first term of the Reagan Presidency of the United States of America. That is the period covered roughly by the decade from 1975-1985.

By engaging in a practice of reading the development and deployment of nuclear weapons and their associated systems and technologies as cultural artefacts, and, moreover, as artefacts produced and deployed within a culturally coded system, an attempt is made to chart the changing face of the relationship between the entities articulated as the United States and the Soviet Union during the period in question. That these readings become a focus for the attention of the SCC renders these deployed artefacts as embedded within a cultural value system

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\(^8\) Identity: the self or the state construed in cultural terms by invoking the self or the state.

Other: that which is not 'self' or 'core'. One may be accorded the status of Other by marginalisation - relegated to the 'periphery'.

Boundaries - that notional space that divides self from Other. In the case of states these are the borders of the sovereign state plus the boundaries of its operation. Boundaries are defined by the speech acts of the self (on both sides) toward the other. By identifying the other, the self is defined and even bounded and given meaning as a term.
that, in the choices made about development and deployment, they signal, or make visible the conceptual boundaries of the state as enacted in all of the related practices of arms control that are mediated through the good offices of the SCC. Reading the texts surrounding these artefacts, the process of the narrativisation of history is rendered visible. As Greg Dening notes:

> Within any culture an artifact is a manifold text of values, of systems, of perceptions and relations. Beauty, the means and relations of production, ownership and exchange, and morality are written into the cultural things we have in hand [or in silo?] In the context of our culturally given signs and symbols we read the meanings encapsulated within our things. Where things cross a cultural boundary we re-invent their meanings. [Soviet view of Nuclear targeting? - of arms control?, of the SCC?]9

IV

This thesis operates under assumptions that reject the notion of a dichotomy, even a necessary distinction, between theory and practice. This is reflected in the organisational macrostructure of this thesis. There is, therefore, no separate 'theory chapter' as such, as the theory unfolds throughout and forms a necessary part of the practices of reading that are brought to bear on the historical material at hand. In loose terms, the thesis is divided, for analytical purposes, into three sections, (discounting the Introduction and Conclusion) comprising Chapter Two on the SCC's structure and functions, a second section formed by Chapter Three on the operation of the SCC under Carter and

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a third section formed by Chapter Four on the SCC during the first term of the Reagan Presidency.

The first, necessarily a fairly short section deals with the establishment, the structure, and the functions of the SCC as constituted in the agreements that established it. I say necessarily, as little has been written specifically on the SCC. From limited written sources supplemented by interview material the author was able to piece together a picture of the SCC and its operation, and the need for secrecy in its negotiating practices and the products of those negotiating practices.

The second and much larger section deals with the time period surrounding the Carter presidency. Following a brief history of the weapons systems that were subsequently limited by the SALT Treaties, this section deals with the issues and practices of the SCC under Carter. By examining the emergence of specific strategic systems, themselves a product of military/strategic and funding decisions it is arguably possible to read off some of the political perceptions of the capabilities of the Other in terms of the nature of the threat that the developed systems were designed to counter. The importance of perception and its translation into real technical weapons systems should not be underestimated in the constitution of the nuclear regime.

As I have hinted at, these systems required funding. This was at a moment in history when, following the draw-down after the Vietnam War, defence funding was a highly politicised issue. The issue of defence spending as an aspect of the approval process for the development of specific weapon technologies and their support systems serves to demonstrate the role of the domestic polity in the
United States in responding to ideological and discursive threats to the integrity of the identity of the United States security state. At this point in the thesis it is intended to argue that funding decisions for technological research and development were important, not only in and of themselves, but for the purposes of signalling to the 'Other' the intention to provide new paradigmatic choices over the future defence technology structure. It is also intended to show how the issue of defence funding almost a decade before represents part of the process of constituting a political and material reality for those that follow. Moreover, the development of specific forms of technology concretises and encodes the discourse of danger\textsuperscript{10} mobilised to constitute the security state, but also this concretising forms part of the process of constituting the objects of SCC discourse in terms of whether or not they constitute a threat to, or a continuation of, the SALT I Treaties. Thus the story of what makes possible some of Carter's decisionmaking rests on an undof the techno-strategic context in which his decisions were made.

An argument is further made over the issue of the 'standard' of verification to be applied to the arms control agreements signed half a decade before Carter came to power. The standard of verification arguably offers a political barometer of the state of relations between the Treaty partners. But it does much more than that. The standard of verification also offers an indicator of the fragility of the identity of the United States in terms of the degree to which it feels it necessary to

\textsuperscript{10} By posing the Other as threat the boundary making is made 'louder'/stronger. By building actual solid weapon systems in response to the perceived threat then the weapons form solid tokens that stand for and symbolise the threat posed by the other. The discourse of danger is mobilised by those whose job is to professionally police the boundaries between self and other in the name of the state.
monitor the agreed boundaries surrounding the extent of mutual vulnerability inscribed in SALT I. Observing changes in the standard of verification arguably provides an instance at which one can chart a 'wind-change' in the identity-making inscription of the state.

Again part of the constitution of objects of knowledge for the SCC lies in the terms of the treaties and agreements that form the surface *raison d'être* of the SCC itself. Moreover, by examining the accusations made on both sides regarding non-compliant behaviour with respect to the SALT Treaties, that is to say, the content of the accusations, one should be able to construe the range of activities open to the purview of the SCC, thereby comparing this range of actual activity with the potential under the regulations of the SCC. By locating the extent to which the SCC was able to perform in relation to its potential, one has (albeit subjectively) the potential to construct a scale showing the extent to which the SCC was able to negotiate in order to ensure that noncompliant behaviour ceased, or was clarified in a manner so as to resolve questions of ambiguous behaviour.

Chapter Three also points out that the SCC did not function in a vacuum. In order for ambiguous compliance behaviour to be located, the resources of intelligence surveillance satellites and their bureaucracies play their role in the constitution by identification of the Other. By textually constituting the Other through isolating and interpreting their behaviour, the identity of the self is thereby constituted and maintained. This chapter argues that this process is as much a concrete reality as a textual one. It becomes textual through the process of interpretation. In the case of the state this interpretation is performed at a number of sites that comprise specific, though interlocking interpretive communities. Thus the discourses of policy
are characterised by multiplicity, complexity and uncertainty. The authoritative ordering of this complexity, the policing of the boundaries of 'acceptable' international behaviour represents the principle that characterises political life. Finally, this chapter argues that verification of arms control agreements itself constitutes a form of power articulated as knowledge, such that the ability to identify, and thus 'name,' the behaviours of the Other makes possible the invocation of normative and normalising judgement. As a moment of interface between the self and Other, the SCC serves to mediate between multiple sites of discursivity that are, singly and together constitutive of the identity of the strategic arms community, that in its turn forms one of the kinds of practice that constitutes the security state, and ultimately the political community operating under the identity of the state as a symptom of those practices.

The third section encompassed by Chapter Four is concerned with the practices surrounding the SCC under the first term of the Reagan Presidency. Noting that the SCC was considered to be largely ineffective under Reagan, an attempt is made to locate the source of that ineffectiveness. Given that under Carter the SCC appeared to be highly successful within the fairly narrow constraints of its mandate, it would seem surprising if the source of its ineffectiveness lay within the SCC process itself. Chapters two and three suggest that, as with other identities, the SCC may also be conceived as a symptom of, not only its practices, but the political environment in which its activities took place. With the new conservatism ushered in by Reagan's

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11 By 'political environment' is meant the milieu comprising the Cold War, the domestic political community and the politics of the international arms control community.
administration, the seeds of its failure may well be construed as stemming from the changes in the political environment in which it finds itself.

Chapter four opens, therefore, with a passage on the rise of conservatism in the form of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) that served as a mouthpiece for American conservatism. Interestingly, to trace the rise of the CPD one finds, not only its Cold War origins in its first incarnation, but also its rebirth on the eve of the Carter Presidency. That it emerged as a side-effect of the reaction to Détente on the eve of the first Democrat President of the Détente era suggests that its intentions were not as bipartisan as it was made out to be. The account of the failure of SALT II to be ratified attributes much of that failure to the rise of neoconservatism during the beginning of the Second Cold War that arose with the election of CPD member Ronald Reagan to the Presidency.

The chapter goes on to argue that this period was characterised more by controversies over past compliance than by progress towards new agreements. The acrimonious public debate over alleged Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements rendered the SCC powerless in the face of a conservatism not seen since the McCarthy era of the 1950s. Despite all the acrimony, however, Reagan was obliged under the principles of international law to comply, even with the unratiﬁed SALT II Treaty, thus suggesting that there is a palpable normative force even in the so-called realm of international anarchy. This section of the thesis explores the normative power of inscription as expressed through the practice of international law.
Once again the issues raised as ambiguous behaviour, or potential violations are canvassed in order to explore the operation of the SCC during this period. Although there is no access to the processes of the SCC, there is access to the texts surrounding its operation as expressed in the Presidential Reports on Soviet noncompliance and related Congressional Hearings.

Of particular interest here, is the way in which the issue of the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk was taken up as a sign of Soviet intentions to abrogate the terms of the ABM Treaty. This section brings together a number of salient sets of practices, each relatively minor in and of itself, but taken together form a collusion of discourses that made possible the articulation of the Krasnoyarsk radar as a violation and as a sign of political intent. This large concrete artefact was thus endowed with meaning, thus rendering it as a cultural icon. This section argues that the formulation of the Krasnoyarsk radar as a sign required a number of historically prior moves. Central to these moves was, not only the signing and ratification of the ABM Treaty, but the funding and development of national technical means of verification and the associated bureaucratic mechanisms.

The bulk of the literature on the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk LPAR holds that it was found by photo-interpreters examining imagery from a KH-9 (Big Bird) satellite. Again this forms an oversimplification of the process, as, to set the event in its context, it becomes apparent that the KH-9 needed a 'trip-wire' to justify scanning a particular sector of the Soviet Union (as it was then constituted). The evidence suggests that the role of the JUMPSEAT radar 'ferret' satellites has been underplayed. Either way, Krasnoyarsk did not emerge as a 'bolt from the blue' discovery, but was contextually situated in a specific
policymaking community that allowed the radar to be interpreted in a culturally specific way at a specific point in time. Moreover, the construction of the radar, itself the product of political decisions regarding resource allocations, was also constrained by geography.

The section argues that the role of the SCC was rendered problematic by the political posturing of the Reagan administration's renewed Manichaeism. It is argued that, not only was the Krasnoyarsk radar a violation in name, but that in real terms the military significance of the violation was small, and, insofar as the term 'deployed' was never fully defined, the Krasnoyarsk radar does not represent an unequivocal violation.

Chapter Four concludes by examining the relationship between the political process and the community that arises as a consequence of the enacting of that process. The chapter as a whole sets out to show something of the complexity and scope of the range of discourse communities that feed into the process of constituting an event as a potential arms control violation. In so doing, the chapter seeks to establish that the political process and orientation of the administration in each of its bureaucracies, not only influences the interpretation of an event as a violation, but in the way the construction of, for example, a concrete artefact, becomes construed in narrative terms as an event.12

12 By Event is meant: a meaningful act; a topic for discussion. Thus the building of the Krasnoyarsk radar was a material event (something that happened) which generated narratives interpreting the act as a meaningful violation event. In this sense the radar was, in addition to its radar function, also therefore, a 'sculpture' - a meaning-laden artefact.
If this is so, then the SCC is not only a conduit for policy. It is also acts as a sign that represents the constitution of a whole domain of policy, a space for action in which are brought together a number of other policy domains. Moreover, a number of themes arise from this in terms of how the various domains of policymaking build into a picture of the operation of the (virtual) field in which identity is articulated as the practices of military security through the operation of a number of sub-communities distributed across various domains of the defence and foreign policy community at large.

The Krasnoyarsk radar issue, mediated through the Standing Consultative Commission may be viewed in terms of the materiality of discourse. It shall be argued later, that at the cultural level (the level of image and perception in Jervis' terms), the purpose of large, phased array radars was to assist in the disciplining of boundaries between Self and Other - between those on the 'inside' and those on the 'outside.' But maintaining interiority and exteriority can involve more than the systematic maintenance of physical boundaries by observing, identifying and controlling the legitimate passage across the boundaries. The ABM Treaty limitations on LPARs serve a more sophisticated purpose: the disciplining of the disciplining of the boundaries. This is itself a boundary enacting process of the same kind but of a different order.

The role of the intelligence assets, the intelligence community, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the production of knowledge about the behaviours of the Other represents an aspect of the normative power that is invoked through the SCC. The process of narrativising the events produced by the activities of the Other represents a process of virtual spatialisation of the Other. The effect of
this could be construed, through the production of otherness (by specifying), as an aspect of the production of self identity (through being differentiated from the actions of the Other). Thus, it could be argued, that the identity of the self (construed as State) is a symptom of the practice of defining and naming the otherness of the Other. This thesis argues that this process takes place on both sides of the US-Soviet divide. A corollary of this is that the moment that the self ceases the practice of maintaining the boundaries, either within or external to the State, then a new identity will be articulated and the State will no longer be what it was.

At any point in time, this process could be argued to take place at countless sites, articulating for different purposes a range of collectivities or identities. If these could be argued to take place in the symbolic order (and where else does conceptualisation take place?) then this thesis represents a contribution to the literature of 'signalling' and theorists of perception/misperception, of whom Robert Jervis and Thomas Schelling are the chief proponents.

In summary, this thesis sets out to show that states are indexically linked to their practices of boundarymaking; and that these are primarily cultural practices of which states may be seen to be products, rather than as sources (as traditionally conceived in Perception, Game and Psychological theories). This thesis can be distinguished from the work of (i) Jervis, (ii) Schelling and (iii) Larson for the following reasons:
i. Jervis' Perception theory\textsuperscript{13} assumes a relatively unitary actor within its otherwise discursive framework. It also assumes a relatively uniflow model of communication in which a signal is assumed to be sent and received, rather than produced at both the 'sending' and 'receiving' end. Thus Perception theory would find it relatively difficult to cope with or to explain mixed signals or with signal from different sectors of the actor. Perception Theory's key terms can be defined as follows:

Signalling: - statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors. Signals are issued mainly to influence the receivers' image of the sender.

Indices (or indexes): - statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor's capabilities or intentions, and because they are believed to be beyond the ability of the actor to control for the purposes of projecting a misleading image.

Although this is one of the more sophisticated models, it remains incomplete due to its assumptions outlined above. Insofar as discourse theory operates with a non-unitary actor model and a reader-response communication model, it could be said to offer a more useful depth of complexity in its analysis. This thesis assumes that the actor is essentially divided and culturally produced as a product of those who invoke the idea of the actor (themselves a product of historically derived discourse formations).

ii. Schelling's Game Theory also assumes a relatively unitary actor and operates an oversimplified modelling system that assumes a rational actor (one who will always work to maximise self gain to the exclusion of all others). Moreover, it assumes that each other player of the game is rational in the above sense. Finally, game theory operates exclusively to illustrate situations of conflict of interest.

It is therefore, at best a modelling system capable of indicating ideal outcomes (other factors remaining unchanged). Such idealistic modelling systems are apt to over simplify complex situations. It assumes that the the choice of the game is appropriate to to the situation - ie that the 'rules of play' obtain. By assuming that all players are rational (in a narrowly defined sense), then account cannot be taken of non-ration actors. Finally, Game Theory assumes that the players are unitary - ie they are operating only one game at a time.14

iii. Larson's psychological theory15 is probably the closest to the discourse model used in this thesis. The key distinction from Larson lies in the question of the locus of meaning. Where Larson and discourse theory acknowledge that states are cultural products, Larson sees psychological analysis of the key decision makers as the most appropriate mode, whereas discourse analysis looks to the texts produced by the key decisionmakers - their symptoms - as the most appropriate mode of analysis. Since each theoretical position will generate different products, this thesis is offered as a contribution to the work of these theorists, rather than a complete substitution. Political analysis is not a zero-sum game.

Insofar as the assumptions of this thesis articulate an anti-foundationalist position (note that this does not mean without historically, culturally-based foundations) then this thesis contributes to the literature that some have termed postmodern. Moreover this thesis contributes to discourse analysis in terms of the notion of 'reading' or construing meaning from concrete artefacts as a fundamentally textual practice.


CHAPTER II

Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation

2.1 Introduction

To study any aspect of the SCC is a study in [re]constructing a centre from its margins. Indeed the publicly available texts bound a 'centre' that is largely [and literally] erased. This leaves the student of the SCC with a project that is a study in marginality, marked by deletions in the official documentation, leaving only traces and glimpses of the organisation's, arguably central, role in the arms control process.

The secrecy provisions of the SCC, that, arguably allow it to function relatively successfully, permit, at best, only small glimpses of the procedures and accomplishments of the SCC. Although each government announces the conclusion of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, the texts of these, and of the processes used to obtain them, remain classified. As Duffy points out:

[o]ne can sketch a picture of the SCC's internal functions, only by assembling scattered pieces of evidence and relying on the recollections of people who have participated in the process.16

This serves to foreground the view that if, as postmodernists suggest, there is no unmediated, objective history in any field, this is especially the case when applied to any attempt to study the workings of the SCC and in trying to unravel the changes in its effectiveness from 1975-85.

16 See G. Duffy Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University/Global Outlook, 1988, p.165
To construct a framework for the analysis of the SCC and its relations to the shifting political landscape marked by the transition from the Carter administration to the early Reagan administration it becomes necessary to consider several strands of political life each of which borders to a greater or lesser extent on the operations of the SCC. The methodological problem faced by the student of the SCC is that of how to move away from the frameworks of traditional political historians who may be characterised as being presented with an object of knowledge, pre-formed and relatively unitary in character, a centre, which in the course of its operation produces, publicly, the symptoms of its existence. Documented in reports and discussion papers, position papers, accounts, newspaper stories and in the interactions with other agencies, many US government institutions present themselves openly and unproblematically. The SCC, by contrast presents itself as an enigma. A rebus. The symptoms of its existence and functioning are represented by and mediated through such flotsam and jetsam as are projected into the semiotic chora\(^{17}\) of Senate committees, House committees and most especially in the chora of the SALT process.

2.2 Origins/Traces

As early as 1969, during the opening negotiation session on the limitation of strategic arms, the issue of a consultative body or process for consultation was raised. Harlan Cleveland, President Johnson's NATO Ambassador, described one of Clark Clifford's December 15 negotiation objectives as:

\(^{17}\) Space or domain, see: Julia Kristeva *Desire in Language* Tavistock: 1984
...to improve US-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation.\(^{18}\)

R.W. Buchheim\(^{19}\) maintained, from the outset, the usefulness of establishing a permanent bilateral body as a mechanism for discussing and resolving any problems that might arise in order to make arms control agreements more viable. Such a body, it was argued, would serve the functions of:

- a) implementation of an arms control agreement, and
- b) consideration of questions concerning compliance\(^{20}\)

The Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC) was formally called into being on May 26, 1972 under Article XIII of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty\(^{21}\) (ABM) in order to "promote the


\(^{19}\) Source: study presented by Ambassador Buchheim (U.S. Commissioner to the SCC) to the Select Committee on Intelligence when he testified on SALT I compliance on July 18, 1979, cited as Appendix to *Briefing on SALT I Compliance* Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1st Session, 96th Congress, September 25, 1979. Hereafter, the Appendix will be cited as Appendix to *Briefing on SALT I Compliance* while the Briefing shall be cited as *Briefing on SALT I Compliance*.

\(^{20}\) Ibid, p.43

\(^{21}\) Source: ABM TREATY "TREATY ON ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, 26 MAY 1972"


Article XIII describes the functions of the SCC as follows:

1- To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:
objectives and implementation of the provisions of the [ABM] Treaty" and to promote the 'objectives and implementation of the provisions' of the Interim Agreement.'22 The commission was established to consider, among other things, 'questions of compliance'; to volunteer 'such information' that either Party considers 'necessary to assure confidence in compliance; to look at questions of interference with national technical means of verification; to consider the overall strategic situation and possible changes to it; to find agreement upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling ABM systems or their components as provided for in the treaty; and to consider proposals 'for further measures' to limit strategic arms.

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2- The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

22 Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms, 26 May 1972 Article VI.
Even before the Commission was formally established, its existence was invoked in the 'initialled statements pertaining to the Interim Agreement', where, in discussing the procedures for updating of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines, that these were to be carried out "under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission." 23

The timing of the establishment of the SCC was indicated in a statement made by Ambassador Smith (May 24, 1972), in which he suggested that such arrangements (for the establishment of the Commission) be made early in the follow-on SALT negotiations, but that earlier consultation may be made between the two SALT delegations. He further suggested that when SALT was not in session, that normal diplomatic channels would suffice. 24 In his eyes, the purpose of the Commission, is to:

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24 In his Statement, Ambassador Smith said: "The United States proposes that the sides agree that with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms and the Accidents Agreement*, agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is not in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels"

Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding .

*Footnote in the original of Ambassador Smith's Statement read: See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971.
... act as a surveying agent that will watch over the operation of the agreement, to which ambiguous situations can be referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the possible amendments to see how the treaty is working, and to make sure that it stays viable over the years.25

The Commission was formally created in a Memorandum of Understanding seven months after the SALT I Agreement was signed.26 This Memorandum, while establishing the SCC, already marked the beginning of a process to extend the responsibilities of the


26 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission; TIAS 7545 (December 21, 1972). The Memorandum states:


2- The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the US and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the US and the USSR of September 30, 1971, and shall exercise its competence in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures.

3- Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission by a Commissioner, and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such staff as it deems necessary.

4- The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, at the request of either Commissioner.

5- The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters and may amend them as it deems appropriate.

6- The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also meet at such other places as may be agreed.

Signed this December 21, 1972
SCC beyond those initially proposed.\textsuperscript{27} The establishment of the Commission represented a marked shift in relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and may be counted as one of the high points of the \textit{Détente} period. Ambassador Gerard C. Smith described the setting up of this Commission as "...unprecedented in Soviet-American relations."\textsuperscript{28} Henry Kissinger supported this in his statement on the basic principles of the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union where he saw the establishment of the SCC as an 'important precedent' and a useful mechanism that could be carried over into other fields of the U.S.-Soviet Union security relationship.\textsuperscript{29}

The centrality of the SCC to the future of the arms control process lies in the fluid nature of the arms control process itself. That is to say that the establishment of the SCC demonstrated a formal recognition of the need for a mechanism for the ongoing maintenance of a treaty, if that treaty was, and is, to stand the test of time. As Duffy\textsuperscript{30} points out:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Dan Caldwell notes that the "Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation: Memorandum of Understanding", not only 'officially created' the SCC, but also called for its responsibilities to be extended to cover the 'promotion of the objectives and implementation of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Sept.30,1971). See D. Caldwell in W.C. Potter \textit{Verification and Arms Control} Mass:Lexington Books (1985/218).
  \item Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations 29, May 1972 in Labrie, \textit{Op Cit} p.52
\end{itemize}

See Kissinger's tenth principle: "The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure that their ties and cooperation in all of the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interests are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies..." [emphasis mine]

\begin{itemize}
  \item G. Duffy \textit{Compliance and the Future of Arms Control} Stanford University/Global Outlook, 1988/165
\end{itemize}
That the United States and the Soviet Union provided for the SCC through SALT I indicated their recognition that the strategic situation is dynamic and that there is an ongoing need to adapt agreements so that they may endure despite technological change or other developments unforeseen when they were negotiated.

2.3 Composition

In its earliest proposed form, the Commission was to be a compact unit with 'a structure comprising four or five individuals on both sides' (Smith, 1972). It was envisioned that it would be headed by civilians with high level military and technical advisers.\textsuperscript{31} The body would meet three or four times a year depending on needs.\textsuperscript{32} As the negotiations surrounding the establishment of the SCC developed, by the time it was formally constituted, the Memorandum of Understanding indicated that the Commission would consist, for each government, of: a Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner, and 'such staff as deemed necessary' (Caldwell, 1985/2189).


\textsuperscript{32} The Memorandum of Understanding provides that the Commission would meet at least twice a year in Geneva.
Duffy (1988:164) points out that it was left to the discretion of each country to construct bureaucratic support for the SCC in line with its respective governmental structure or style. For the U.S. such staff would include, besides the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, an executive secretary, a deputy executive secretary, and advisers from appropriate departments and agencies. These departments have included: The Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defence, the Organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the intelligence community, along with civilian and military advisers to both Delegations. The intelligence community liaison is conducted by a senior intelligence officer, representing the Directorate of Central Intelligence (DCI) on the Delegation who provides guidance to the Commissioner and the US Delegation on the protection of sources and methods by which

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33 See D. Caldwell in Potter, W.C. *Op Cit* p.219
information, relevant to compliance issues, is gathered.\textsuperscript{34} According to Rowell,\textsuperscript{35} the Commissioner for the United States to the Standing Consultative Commission is appointed by the President on unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff, director of the CIA, ACDA director, and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Table 1  U.S. Commissioners and Deputies to the SCC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U. Alexis Johnson (while SCC was being established)</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Graybeal (ACDA)</td>
<td>1973-Nov76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador Robert W. Buchheim (Acting from Jan, 77)</td>
<td>August 1977-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. General John R. Lasater (acting)</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Richard Ellis (Fmr Cmndr SAC)</td>
<td>1981+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General Frank E. Serio (USN)(Dep.Comm)</td>
<td>1975-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General Harry A. Goodall (USAF)(Dep.Comm)</td>
<td>1978+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Sources: Briefing on SALT I Compliance (see Note1) and G. Duffy Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University/Global Outlook, 1988, p.164]

On the Soviet side, the SCC is taken equally seriously, but with a different emphasis on the civilian/military balance.

\textsuperscript{34} Briefing on SALT I Compliance  Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1st Session, 96th Congress, September 25, 1979. p.21

\textsuperscript{35} W. F. Rowell Arms Control Verification: A guide to policy issues for the 1980s Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986/126
Duffy (1988:165) suggests, that while the Soviet Deputy Commissioners are appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Commissioners and their supporting military staff have been more dominant in SCC negotiations. (see Table 2.)

The Inter-Agency Group, to which the Soviet side of the SCC reports, is fairly stable. This is the group that makes decisions on the working, operational and day-to-day level of the SCC. The group formulates decisions on a consensus basis, and has an input into both arms control negotiations and on matters of compliance.

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36 Source: Transcript of Author's interview with Dr. Alexei Arbartov, Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, at the ANU, Canberra 31/7/91. NB: On Friday 11/10/91 the State Council of the Soviet Union agreed to divide the Committee on State Security (KGB) in order to make the organisation more accountable to the Republics. Several new agencies are to be established and although it remains unclear as to the name of the agency that will take over the KGB's function within the SCC structure, it seems most likely to be the as-yet unnamed independent foreign espionage organisation. Source: *International Herald Tribune* 12-13 October, 1991, p.1.
The SCC Delegation itself is usually quite small, consisting of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, some support staff consisting of some diplomats and their ciphering/deciphering experts. Together, they use the facilities of the permanently based Nuclear and Space Talks Delegation. They send their information from Geneva to Moscow, reporting the positions, arguments and proposals from the other side. In turn, they deliver the replies they receive from the Moscow-based Inter-Agency Group. This process continues on a daily basis for a week or two, twice a year. Each meeting is conducted formally, such that each Commissioner has their directives written for them, with all positions and statements already formulated.

The SCC therefore could be said to function more as a channel for communication, rather than for negotiation, on the Soviet side, since the delegates are given little room to act on their own behalf. That is to say, that the formality of the contact is such that the delegates are not at liberty to discuss things which are not included in their directives.

Table 2  Soviet Commissioners and Deputies to the SCC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Major (Brigadier General) G.I. Ustinov</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General-Major Viktor P. Starodubov</td>
<td>Mar.1979-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Vladimir Medvedev</td>
<td>1986+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor P. Karpov (Deputy Commissioner)</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladim S. Chulitsky (Deputy Commissioner)</td>
<td>Mar.1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: *Briefing on SALT I Compliance* (see Note1) and G.Duffy *Compliance and the Future of Arms Control* Stanford University/Global Outlook, 1988, p.164
2.4 Functions

Under the terms of its mandate, the commission has no decisional or juridical authority with respect to whether 'supreme interests' are involved in any dispute concerning the treaties to which the SCC has responsibilities, being purely consultative in its function. Thus, as a consultative forum, the SCC lacks power or authority to "enforce either compliance with treaties or joint interpretations of agreements reached through the SCC." In any given dispute over compliance issues within the competence of the SCC, the Commission is not empowered to formulate a juridical judgement as to which Party may be at fault. Nor is the SCC empowered to formulate means of ending or correcting any non-conforming behaviour - in this sense the SCC does not have a 'policing' role. Neither is the SCC responsible for resolving specific ambiguities. Its Commissioners' brief is perhaps best described, depending on the instructions received, as to "act as representatives of their respective Governments," and may "intervene as plaintiff, defendant, or negotiator." (Calvo-Goller and Calvo:1987/302).

Its initial intention (since broadened slightly by the provisions of Article XVII of the SALT II Treaty) was merely to look into the questions indicated by the seven sub-paragraphs of Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. This was mirrored in the corresponding Article VI of the Interim Agreement Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. Subsequently, its functions were broadened to include: responsibility

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37 See Ambassador Gerard C. Smith.

38 Duffy, Op Cit 1988/165

39 See Note 1.
for reviewing the ABM Treaty\(^\text{40}\) (1977 & 1982); to promote the obligations and implementation of the SALT II Treaty (under Article XVII of that treaty); to maintain an agreed database on the numbers of strategic offensive weapons subject to the limitations of the SALT II treaty.\(^\text{41}\)

In the Report of Secretary of State William Rogers to President Nixon on the SALT I Agreements, 10 June 1972, Rogers outlined the functions of the SCC.\(^\text{42}\) Besides monitoring compliance issues between the

\(^{40}\) Pursuant to Article XIV, sub-paragraph 2, of the ABM Treaty which states:

"Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty."

Although, not specifying the SCC to undertake this responsibility, the Article does permit the SCC to do so.


\(^{42}\) See: Report of Secretary of State William Rogers to President Nixon on the SALT I Agreements, 10 June 1972. *Department of State Bulletin* 3, July, 1972 pp.3-11. Labrie (*Op Cit*) notes that Secretary Rogers' report was submitted to the Senate and House of Representatives, with the texts of the ABM treaty and the Interim Report, on 13 June 1972.

(In Labrie, *Op Cit* p.60) Article XIII provides that the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) to promote the objectives and to facilitate the implementation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further agreed to use the Commission to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.) The Commission will provide a consulting framework within which the Parties may consider various matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The Parties may also consider these matters in other channels.

A principal function of the Commission will be to consider questions of compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty and the Interim Agreement and also related situations which may be considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily provide through the Commission information it considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance based on information gathered by national technical means of verification and the other Party could provide information to clarify the matter.

Attention was called above to the provisions in Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with its provisions. The Commission is charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to consider any questions of interference with such means. The Commission may also
Parties, the Commission would be charged with a number of other responsibilities. These responsibilities fall broadly into the areas of:

i) providing a consultative framework,

ii) considering questions of interference with national technical means of verification,

iii) considering the general strategic situation and propose ways of improving the viability of the treaty including the provision of agreed interpretations,

iv) negotiation of procedures and dates for implementing Article VIII concerning the destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components.

The expansion of the Commission's role under the provisions of Article XVII of the SALT II Treaty devolves partly through the added complexity and extent of that Agreement. The SALT II Treaty introduces the complexities of qualitative and quantitative provisions on weapon systems, in addition to the quantitative scope of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement.

consider questions of concealment impeding verification by national means. The Commission may also consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is the Commission's authority to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty-such as agreed interpretations after the Treaty has entered into force-and to consider proposals for amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Articles XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also consider other appropriate measures, not specifically enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limiting strategic arms. Finally, through the Commission the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates for the implementation of Article VIII concerning destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM components....

The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for the establishment of regulations for the Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the Delegations during such negotiations or, when they are not in session, through other diplomatic channels.

The Commission is intended as a means to facilitate the implementation of the agreements and would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of other diplomatic channels.
The SCC is neither a judicial body, nor is its function to monitor agreements although monitoring information may be brought in to SCC proceedings where appropriate. As Buchheim and Caldwell point out, the chief purpose of the SCC is to provide a consultative forum to which the parties can come in order to clarify ambiguous behaviours before they lead to irretrievable breakdown of an agreement.

Critics of the SALT process in general and of the SCC in particular charge that of the fifteen articles in the ABM Treaty (eight characterised by Senator Humphrey as 'significant'), as of 1980, serious questions have been raised with respect to Soviet compliance with five:

- testing air defence missile and radars in an ABM mode (SA-5 missile and radar testing, 1973-5 and SA-10 radar testing, 1979);
- deployment of possible new ABM battle management radars;
- development of rapidly deployable (over months rather than years), possibly mobile new ABM system;
- camouflage of certain ABM R&D;

43 Rowell 127
44 Ibid 127
45 Ibid 127
46 Ambiguous behaviours: activities that may indicate moves towards a treaty violation. Activities that may not, in and of themselves, be direct treaty violations but which may establish the preconditions for future violating activity.
47 Ambassador Smith in the 'Initialed Statements' comments: (Labrie, 1980/36)

We are going to set up a Joint Consultative Commission which will in effect, act as a surveying agent that will watch over the operation of the agreement, to which ambiguous situations can be referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the possible amendments to see how the treaty is working, and to make sure that it stays viable over the years.
falsification of number of test range ABM launchers dismantled in 1973.

These critics of SALT charge the Carter regime of unseemly delays in raising questions with the Soviets over the issue of Soviet compliance with SALT. Senator Humphreys charges that with respect to the construction of Soviet launch control silos (III-X Silos), these were first constructed in 1970, and challenged by the US in 1973, and not resolved until 1977, representing a 'delay' of seven years. As Senator Gordon Humphrey puts it:

... while III-X launch control silos first appeared in 1970, we did not question the Soviets about them until mid-1973, and we did not resolve the question to our satisfaction until 1977. Nevertheless, the Administration claims that on detection, all SALT compliance problems have been immediately protested to the Soviets, and then have been promptly resolved in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). ... From first construction of the X-III Silos, it took three years before we detected a problem and even questioned the Soviets, and seven years before we "resolved" the question. And our resolution amounted to nothing more than accepting the Soviet position.49

The strident tone of Senator Humphrey's accusations requires closer inspection. Firstly, the silos were detected at least as early as 1972, and had been erroneously counted among existing ICBM silos for the purposes of SALT I. Secondly, when additional silos were added in early 1973, these were questioned in June 1973 - only 3-6 months after detection. The collection and analysis of intelligence evidence is a time consuming process, requiring judgement and skill to work with often


ambiguous data. To present a case through the SCC requires reasonable certainty that an ambiguous or questionable compliance behaviour is occurring. During the four years in which this question (among a number of others) was discussed, there were just eight routine meetings of the SCC, between which, respective replies to questions would have been analysed by the appropriate organisation (see organisational chart Figure 2.1). That the issue was resolved by 'accepting the Soviet position' reflects and confirms that launch control silos are not restricted by the ABM Treaty and therefore was not a violation in the first instance. The idea that ambiguous (and in fact not a compliance issue) behaviours should be immediately "protested" to the Soviets completely fails to recognise the purely consultative and non-judicial function of the SCC. Finally, to rush in to protest without proper evaluation of the intelligence data would be nothing short of irresponsible. This and other issues will be raised later under the aegis of the respective administrations under review. The point I want to make here, is that any evaluation of the performance of the SCC must keep in mind its purely consultative function. The compliance agenda, however, represents only part of the SCC's function.

Importantly, as Buchheim (1979) points out, the SCC was given a wide brief from the outset as authorised in Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. In addition to its responsibilities relating directly to the raising of compliance questions arising from the ABM Treaty itself, the SCC was also charged with:
consideration of possible changes in the strategic situation, consideration of amendments to the Treaty, and consideration of proposal for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.\textsuperscript{50}

By incorporating such provisions into a treaty of unlimited duration, Buchheim notes, a channel of communication between the parties on the issue of arms control in strategic weapons has become chartered and institutionalised in an arrangement that will always be available to them. Furthermore, by emphasising the distinct and separate character of the SCC from the SALT process, a channel of communication remains available even during times when a difficult negotiating climate prevails.

2.5 Privacy

The SCC has been described as "a silent service of our time."\textsuperscript{51} The resolution of compliance issues is, by nature, a delicate and sensitive process. Recognising this, the Regulations of the SCC\textsuperscript{52} (number 8) stipulate that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} R.W. Buchheim, \textit{Briefing on SALT I Compliance} 1979, p.5 see note1.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid} p.2,
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Standing Consultative Commission Regulations, T.I.A.S. 7637 (May 30 1973) Source: Calvo-Goller & Calvo (1987/301)
\end{itemize}

1 - The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall consist of a U.S. component and Soviet component, each of which shall be headed by a Commissioner.

2 - The Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings.

3 - The Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in advance of the matters to be submitted for discussion, but may at a meeting submit for discussion any matter within the competence of the Commission.
The *proceedings* of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in *private*. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners.\(^{53}\)

This allows the SCC considerable flexibility in its dealings, permitting issues to be raised with a degree of frankness unavailable to many official channels of communication. Buchheim\(^{54}\) (1979) points out that the privacy provisions prevent the SCC from degenerating into a conduit for propaganda while permitting greater scope for exchanging ideas for problem-solving. This way, potentially prejudicial ideas and explorations will not be made public prematurely. Any reports issuing from the SCC are restricted, under Article 7 of the Regulations, to the substantive *results* of the proceedings. Such results are to be made public only with the consent of the Commissioners of both parties.

4 - During the intervals between sessions of the Commission, each Commissioner may transmit written or oral communications to the other Commissioner concerning matters within the competence of the Commission.

5 - Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and experts as it deems necessary to participate in a meeting.

6 - The Commission may establish working groups to consider and prepare specific matters.

7 - The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the Commission may, if necessary, be entered into records which shall be in two copies, each in the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

8 - The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners.

9 - Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected with its participation in the Commission.


Ambassador Buchheim points out that the privacy provisions engage with the U.S. political discourse\textsuperscript{55} in two ways, the first of which, is the enhancement of the effectiveness of the SCC through the 'candid and direct' exchanges that make possible a degree of understanding of each side's negotiating problems and an ability to break down misperceptions and false assumptions that can hinder more formal forums. Such candor, allowed by the privacy provisions comes at the expense of the United States penchant for open, public debate on international dealings.

Recognising the dialogism\textsuperscript{56} of the public/private conversation surrounding the privacy provision, Buchheim points to three aspects of the usefulness of the provision:\textsuperscript{57}

i) current success of the SCC(1979) to which confidentiality has substantially contributed.

ii) Public requirements already met by the reports on the specific understandings resulting from SCC negotiations to several congressional committees: The Committee on Foreign Relations, The Senate Armed Services Committee, The Committee on Foreign Affairs and its predecessor committees, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy until its disestablishment and the Select Committees

\textsuperscript{55} Here, the term \textit{discourse} refers to the U.S. 'frame of reference'. The term is invoked to illustrate the fluid and negotiated nature of discursivity as opposed to the rigidity implied by the term 'frame'.

\textsuperscript{56} From \textit{dialogic}, a term coined by Volosinov (1973) in order to stress the continuous and interactive process of language, as opposed to the Saussurian emphasis on the abstract structural relations of language. Volosinov suggests that all language is expressive of social relations, and therefore he sees each individual utterance as structured as a dialogue with a notional addressee. This, he argues is a feature of all expressive acts, not merely linguistic ones, but any act of signification. In this sense, Buchheim recognises the need to address the publicity requirements of an open democracy, while maintaining the need for secrecy to preserve the functioning of sensitive negotiations and the liminal bounds of American self/other relations. See Volosinov, V. \textit{Marxism and the philosophy of Language} N.Y.:Seminar Press, 1973.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid} p.3
on Intelligence of both the Senate and the House of Representatives since their establishment.

iii) Historical precedent in other negotiations, arguing that negotiations towards international agreements are usually conducted in private, that the SCC is engaged in negotiations aimed at the continuing maintenance and implementation of international agreements, therefore the SCC has every right to conduct its proceedings in private.

Sydney Graybeal, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, while emphasising the privacy clause of the Regulations, pointed out that the SCC has no veto power over either government. Under this provision, he points out that, should the U.S. government consider it to be in its interest to do so, the results and activities of the SCC may be made public, despite the clause in Paragraph 8 of the regulations which states that the results of the proceedings may only be made public under the consent of both Commissioners.58

Sydney Graybeal, in support of Ambassador Buchheim's comments on privacy, maintains that the privacy provisions have allowed for the exchange of considerable useful information in the process of clarifying ambiguous situations. Under the cloak of privacy:

58 Sydney Graybeal's statement reads in part: [d]uring the negotiation of that very controversial paragraph in the regulations, it was made clear that neither Commissioner has a veto power over the U.S. Government in the event that the U.S. Government decides that it is in its interest to make the results, the activities, or even the proceedings of the SCC available.

Source: Briefing on SALT I Compliance Op Cit, p.10
ambiguous situations can be raised, discussed and clarified without outsiders immediately drawing the conclusion that there is a SALT "violation" and that the agreements are coming unglued...The SCC has proven that sensitive issues can be raised, discussed and clarified without revealing intelligence sources and methods.59

Graybeal cites the SA-5 radar issue as an example of this.60 This point is further borne out on the Soviet side. Alexei Arbatov emphasises the importance of privacy on the grounds that it prevents the SCC from being used for political grandstanding out of technical details.61 He argues that technical misunderstandings are common and normal within the complexities of applying arms control agreements to specific circumstances. as he puts it:

[privacy] ... is important so as not to create political problems out of technical details ... every treaty of this kind is so complicated, so technically arcane that misunderstandings are unavoidable, but those misunderstandings are primarily technical.62

Placing these technical misunderstandings in the public arena would serve to make arms control "the enemy of itself."63 He argues that arms control is designed to improve relations between states, so it is important that arms control details do not become "an aggravation of

59 Ibid p.11

60 Ibid p.11 This issue will be raised in a later chapter.

61 By this, he refers to the use of strident accusations of non-compliance over ambiguous compliance behaviour that required clarification. Arbatov, Alexei. Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Research Interview on the SALT SCC. Taped at Australian National University, Canberra, 31/7/1991.

62 Source: Author's interview with Alexei Arbatov at the ANU, Canberra 31/7/91 [transcript of tape].

63 Ibid
relations between states" that can turn into "a source of permanent political conflicts."64

2.6 Procedures

Between 1973 and 1986 the SCC has held 28 semiannual sessions. In addition, there have been two special sessions65 and two ABM Treaty Reviews (1977 & 1982). R.W. Buchheim points out that from day to day, the procedures of the SCC resemble most other international negotiations, insofar as there are:

a) Plenary meetings,

b) less formal executive meetings (comprising the Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Executive Secretaries),

c) Working groups, for drafting and other purposes,

d) Dialogue between Executive Secretaries on procedural and substantive matters,

e) Other low-level interactions.66

The meetings have been held in Geneva (with provision to hold meetings elsewhere by agreement between the two Commissioners in the Memorandum of Understanding, December 21, 197267) generally alternating between the mission of the USSR and an Annex building

64 Ibid

65 1975 and 1986. Source: U.S. State Department A Concise history of the Standing Consultative Commission (Wash. August 6, 1984). These were, respectively, SCC special session convened by the U.S. to discuss Soviet SS19 in relation to the SALT I provision for 'heavy' missiles (January 28-February 13, 1975) and SCC special session convened by the Soviet Union to discuss U.S. decision to repudiate SALT II (July 22-29, 1986).

66 Ibid p.8

67 See supra note 7
of the U.S. Mission.68 These meetings are generally held in Spring and Autumn each year and each last around two months.69

The internal review process, by which information pertaining to possible compliance questions is evaluated, includes all concerned members of the executive branch [see figure 2.1]. Sydney Graybeal70 emphasises the autonomy of the SCC from the SALT negotiation process, stressing that the U.S. Commissioner to the SCC should be kept informed over SALT issues (negotiations and proposed language), in order to have the background to the origins and purposes of each Article, Agreed Statement and Common Understanding, so that they can be assessed in terms of their implementation. This way, he argues, the U.S. Commissioner to the SCC can advise on issues likely to arise from the proposed language. It also ensures that the SCC does not become a forum for resolving problems more appropriately dealt with by the SALT body.

U.S. Procedure

The United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs notes that since the signing of the 1972 SALT agreements, procedures for monitoring Soviet compliance and dealing with related matters:

68 R.W. Buchheim, *Briefing on SALT I Compliance* 1979 p.8
All intelligence information is carefully analysed in the context of the provisions of those [SALT] agreements, and recommendations on questions which arise are developed by interagency intelligence and policy/advisory groups within the NSC [National Security Council] system.\textsuperscript{71}

These comprise an Intelligence Community Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations and the Standing Consultative Commission Working Group of the NSC Special Coordination Committee. In the event of intelligence analysis indicating a question concerning compliance the latter group:

...reviews and analyses the available information and provides recommendations. The President decides whether a particular question or issue is to be raised with the USSR based on the study and recommendations of the Working Group and, if necessary, the department and agency principals who comprise the Special Coordination Committee or the NSC itself.\textsuperscript{72}

Once a question is raised with the USSR through the SCC the positions and actions taken by the US representatives follow the same course.

Procedurally, when the Soviets raise an issue with the United States, it goes to the President's office by priority cable from the delegation. There, it is discussed and the monitoring capabilities of the intelligence community are brought in. The political decision is then made as to the appropriate response, which is then relayed to the U.S. delegation for discussion with the Soviet counterparts.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{71} Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Dept. of State Compliance With SALT I Agreements Special Report no.55 Washington: Dept of State July 1979 p.1, and see also SALT I Compliance: SALT II Verification, Department of State Selected Documents No. 7, Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Communication p.45

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. p.1

\textsuperscript{73} Buchheim, R. Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 p.29
Soviet Procedure

The Soviet Commissioners, according to Sydney Graybeal, take compliance questions equally seriously, but differently, insofar as for sensitive issues, the two Commissioners would work privately and with the Deputy Commissioners, while still formally passing statements. There are indications that these communications reached the highest levels of Soviet leadership including the Politburo and Premier Brezhnev. The reciprocity, or mirror-imaging of the SCC bureaucratic procedures is emphasised by Buchheim in terms of the *image* of balance. As he points out:

... [a]n agreement must not only be good, but it must look good. It must look bilateral.

The importance of bilateral *forms* is taken very seriously, as signifiers of discursive equality. One instance of the extent of this emerged during the course of a session called by the US Commissioner. The Commissioners generally host the sessions on a rotating basis. At one of these sessions, the usual room at the US Mission was unavailable, and the US Commissioner asked the Soviet counterpart to host the session. This meant that the Soviets would have hosted the session twice running. Then, according to the former US Commissioner to the

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74 *Ibid.*, p.29

75 Ambassador Buchheim supported these observations in Buchheim, *Briefing on SALT I Compliance*, p.30


77 Here the term *discursive* is used in the sense of the 'right to speak' denoting, not merely the ability to speak, but a relation of power, such that, in this instance, that which is rendered as a 'speech act' (Austin:1964, Searle:1978) by either party carries equal weight.
SCC, Sydney Graybeal: "Immediately they were suspect. 'What is Graybeal up to? Normally the guest speaks first. Does he want to get something on the table before we have a chance to speak?'" Such close reading of forms suggest that forms themselves are meaningful, in addition to the 'contents' of negotiations. This further supports the view that the analyst must attend to the 'economy of discourse' - the contextual features, the materiality of discourse, - which structures and underwrites the essential features of what is said between states as surely as between individuals.

2.7 Political Functions

Morton Kaplan sustains the thesis that attention to the 'trifling' technical details of strategic armaments cannot be ignored, and that failure to do so "involves a genuine and definite major cost with respect to other important values," He nevertheless quotes Freeman Dyson, pointing out that "political factors are more important than strategic." It is a theme pursued on the Soviet side too, As Arbatov notes:

... arms control is really an instrument - of some peripheral limitations, peripherally improving predictability, transparency, - for the symbolic nature of arms control.

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80 Arbatov, Alexei. Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Author's Research Interview on the SALT SCC. Taped at Australian National University, Canberra, 31/7/91, 1991.
In other words, arms control is a symbolic operation\textsuperscript{81} played out through the negotiation of relatively minor technical details that in themselves do not significantly alter the strategic position of either country, but rather, they signal an intention to engage in the negotiation process, and this is the chief value of negotiating arms control.

The issue here, is one of the political significance of any country's willingness to violate agreements on arms control. As Lowenthal and Wit point out:

\begin{quote}
political significance, refers to the intentions of the non-complying power, regardless of the military significance of the violation. ... in fact the smaller the military significance, the more troubling the political significance becomes. Violating a treaty for some military advantage may make sense, depending on the calculation of risks and benefits. Risking a treaty, or perhaps an entire regime of treaties, for a small military advantage sends a troubling message about the intentions of that party. In essence then, all cases of non-compliance have political significance; some also have military significance. The amount of importance attached to these two factors is a function of political orientation.\textsuperscript{82}
\end{quote}

Hedley Bull argues that, in negotiating strategic arms limitation, attention needs to be given, not only to the technical capabilities of the weapons systems themselves, but that there should also be negotiation on the issue of defence doctrine and force-posture. In the past, arms control agreements have been arrived at, he argues, "essentially by a process of bargaining, in which the rationale of the positions adopted,

\textsuperscript{81} Symbolic operation: That is to say, that arms control plays a role at the level of speech act as a culturally significant (meaningful) practice.

if not actually an obstruction, has been irrelevant to the outcome."83

This view of the relative irrelevance of the rationale behind the bargaining positions can be explained insofar as this occurs between actors that themselves have to be constituted and empowered so that they can actually strike such bargains. Moreover, insofar as he argues for negotiation on force posture and defence doctrine, rather than for some technical fine-tuning performed with all the theoretical aplomb of horse traders, he is also arguing that arms control is more correctly represented as a political, rather than merely technical, process that performs the function of defining in overt terms the relations between nations. Once again it is the symbolic/discursive (articulated as the political) aspect of arms control, notwithstanding the technical limitations placed upon actual weapons systems, that forms the driving force behind arms control. By concentrating on the defence doctrine and force posture, Bull strikes at the heart of the intentionality of the treaty parties. With respect to SALT, he asks:

[should questions of strategic and arms control doctrine (e.g., defence vs mutual deterrence as a goal) and questions of the computation of appropriate force levels enter into the substance of the negotiations? It is important that SALT should be an exchange of strategic ideas and a process of mutual education about the bases of strategic thinking84 in the two countries. ... the issue is ... to explore by negotiation whether there is common ground between two positions arrived at by necessarily separate processes of decision.85
[emphasis mine.]


84 Here, Bull is suggesting that SALT can be more than the mere limitation of arms - it can also become a forum for greater transparency at the level of strategic doctrine.

85 Ibid. p.50
Indeed in the SALT SCC there is precisely the mechanism for such discussion and negotiation. Under the terms of the ABM Treaty, Sections (d) and (g) of Article XIII state that within the SCC's area of competence is the ability to:

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the Treaty. [And] (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

And in the Memorandum of Understanding which established the SCC its terms of reference state in part: "The Commission may also consider changes in the general strategic situation ..." and "Related to this is the Commission's authority to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty..." In other words, the terms of reference granted to the SCC upon its establishment by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement allow the SCC to 'exchange strategic ideas and engage in a process of mutual education'\(^6\) about the bases for strategic thinking in the two countries. The decision to do so or not is a political one, and presents a set of options that arguably have not as yet been utilised. [I shall explore the political uses of the SCC in subsequent chapters when dealing with specific compliance questions raised, and the responses to them, by different administrations.]

Nevertheless, the fact remains that, interwoven with the institutional structures of the Regulations and designated 'areas of competence' the SCC represents a remarkable political achievement given the climate between the superpowers at its inception. Former SALT negotiator, Gerard Smith, characterised the pre-SALT U.S.-Soviet relationship as

\(^6\) See above. \(n. 93\)
"not unlike two boxers in a ring." The SCC, beyond clearing up ambiguities in the implementation of the SALT Treaties, has, arguably, an important political role as a conduit for addressing misperceptions and de-fusing tensions between the Parties. Gerard Smith makes this point:

[I]f talk is a prime tool of international politics, [the SCC] is an ever-ready instrument for talking things out, not just about clarifying the past, but also about how to avoid future dangers. In past years the United States has often tried to signal the Kremlin, through speeches, budgetary actions and private communications between Washington and Moscow, about its interest in mutual restraint and its concern about certain Soviet moves. This has been a somewhat random process without clear results. The Standing Consultative Commission could be used for this purpose, permitting a degree of precision and continuity not possible in ad hoc communication.

This point is taken up by Strobe Talbot, where he emphasises that, not only substantively, but symbolically too, the SCC remains important to the extent to which it is able to raise matters in ways unavailable to traditional diplomatic means. He describes the SCC as:

[a] unique forum in which military officers, intelligence officials, and diplomats from the two sides could sit down with each other on a regular basis and talk about subjects that used to qualify as military secrets-and, in other contexts, still did.

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88 Ibid. p.463

89 Strobe Talbot Deadly Gambits The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control New York:Alfred A. Knopf 1984,p228

90 Talbot Op Cit. 1984 p.228
Despite the interagency process which formulates the instructions of the US delegation to the SCC, the instructions are ultimately filtered through the National Security Council under the advice of the White House. Insofar as the White House represents the highest authority from which the US Commissioners to the SCC receive their instructions, the SCC cannot be seen as a purely autonomous body, but is, rather, a 'pit-face' of political contact between the US and the Soviet Union.

The effectiveness of the SCC therefore depends, to a large extent on the quality of instructions issued to the delegations from their respective governments, and, more importantly, on the political will of both governments to utilise this channel of communication. As we shall see in later chapters, this has led to variable use and effectiveness, according to the political climate of the time.

Both sides agree that within a limited, or restricted definition of its functions, the SCC has been a very successful channel of communication on technical 'book-keeping' matters. For Robert Buchheim and Dan Caldwell, as for Alexei Arbatov, where problems have arisen over the effectiveness of the SCC, these have occurred at a higher level of policymaking, rather than with the SCC itself. As

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91 Duffy Op Cit., 165

Buchheim and Caldwell state, among those features of the SCC which are basic to its record of success is the fact that it:

...does not get involved in aspects of relations between the two governments that lie outside its field of assigned responsibilities.93

Gloria Duffy makes this point on the extent to which the SCC has been used in relation to its designated areas of competence:

The mandate of the SCC is broad, leaving to the US and Soviet governments the choice of whether to use the SCC minimally or maximally as a joint consultative forum to implement the terms of arms control agreements. Historically, the two countries have chosen to invoke only a small portion of the SCC's mandate, employing it almost solely to discuss technical compliance issues and to negotiate practical measures for the implementation of agreements.94 [emphasis mine]

Variations in the quality and style of instructions in many senses reflects the imprecision of the whole arms control process, insofar as clear violations of agreements are rare and the products of verification technologies themselves require interpretation. In other words the choice as to whether or not to bring matters up in the SCC rests upon the political choice of standard of verification (adequate vs effective), interpretive choices made on ambiguous verification data, intelligence community decisions as to whether or not the type of non-compliance charge would reveal too much about the methods used to obtain the evidential data and decisions about whether marginal infringements are worthy of the term 'violation'. All these, at one level or another


94Ibid p.165.
constitute 'political' choices that may, ultimately be seen to owe more to the mechanisms of, that which in earlier times was called, political 'signalling' and in less monologic times may be referred-to as political discourse.\(^{95}\)

Such a view reflects the U.S. position. It is a position that desires the mandate of the SCC to have a broad interpretation. That is, as (notably) Sydney Graybeal and Robert Buchheim have suggested, the SCC has the potential under a wide interpretation of its mandate to engage in a wide range of activities: to discuss ways of improving security, to develop positive ways of improving the effectiveness of the treaties under its charge. The Soviet view, however militates against this as there is a strong preference on the Soviet side to keep the mandate of the SCC focussed upon purely technical details of treaty implementation. While this remains the case it seems unlikely that unilateral efforts on the U.S.' behalf will enjoy either success or reciprocity with the Soviets. The Soviets clearly see the SCC as merely a conduit for communication and not for any form of initiating dialogue that may extend the domain or application of the treaty with which it is principally concerned.

In the following chapters I shall outline the U.S.'s shift in emphasis on the SCC;

i. through the shift in standard of verification,

ii. through the increase in the technical complexity of agreements and their verifiable elements,

\(^{95}\) here used in the sense of 'the social process of making and reproducing sense' between political (read 'nation-state') subjectivities. See O'Sullivan, Saunders, Hartley and Fiske 1983:73 for an elaboration of this use of the term.
iii. through the changes in verification technologies and the constitution of the verification community from intelligence analysts to the intelligence community decisionmakers and decisionmaking context that made possible and problematic certain compliance issues,

iv. through the coupling of the deterioration of détente with the perception of deterioration of deterrence through the work of the Committee on the Present Danger,

v. and finally, [and related to the latter] through changes in the political perceptions of and by, the Carter regime.
Chapter III

The SCC and the Carter Administration: Compliance Challenge and World-View

...is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It certainly has a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.

- Clausewitz

We know precious little about how 'to do' cultural anthropology...

- Amrom Katz

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine and trace the links between US perceptions of Soviet compliance with arms control agreements during the Carter administration and the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC). In so doing, this chapter, and those that follow, take up a range of issues concerning the political/discursive aspects of the use of the SCC to raise compliance issues with the Soviet Union and compare the perceived performance of the SCC in relation to certain assumptions and perceptions of Soviet compliance behaviour as expressed by certain key figures in the Carter administration and in the US Congress. It represents an attempt, in other words to supply in part some of the 'cultural anthropology' desired by Amrom Katz.96 Coeval with this analysis and one of the formative assumptions under which it operates is the argument that the connection between language and politics is inextricably

intertwined with the social world and its history. The consequences of this are reflected - in the context of this thesis - in the study of the deployment of verification technologies (technological and discursive) located in terms of their role in the interpretation/'exegesis' of the activities and motivations of the US' notional adversary, the Soviet Union. That is to say, that the development/ deployment of strategic offensive weapons and their support systems may be seen in terms of being constitutive of the interpretive communities of the respective arms control regimes. By so doing, my intention is to describe the emergence and constitution of a new domain of policy, a space of action constituted by and through a domain of surveillance within the wider networks of the foreign and defence policy community. The effect is to re-work the traditional literature on political 'signalling' in the light of recent developments in discourse analysis, drawing on some insights linked, in part, with the work of Michel Foucault.

Thus discourse theory, as articulated in this thesis adds a metatheory level to examine the assumptions underpinning theories of political signalling. The purpose is to question signalling theory's assumption that signals exist as relatively discrete units in a relatively uniflow communication model.

Its focus in the experiential world shall remain on the issue of SALT compliance and the texts which surround the relationship between security, verification and SALT. Arguing against the simplistic uniflow models of signalling, this chapter seeks to engage with that which Foucault refers to as the 'economy of discourses' that is:
- their intrinsic technology, the necessities of their operation, the tactics they employ, the effects of power which underlie them and which they transmit.97

This encompasses far more than the 'straightforward' assumption underlying political 'signalling' theory, that signals are essentially nothing more than the mere elements of a system of representation. As Robert Young notes:

The Structuralist method assumes that meaning is made possible by the existence of underlying systems of conventions which enable elements to function individually as signs. Structuralist analysis addresses itself to the system of rules and relations underlying each signifying practice.98

Discourse analysis, as described above addresses itself to the analysis of what makes possible these 'underlying systems of conventions' - under what conditions do these emerge, and how these are articulated/invoked in the production of signs.

The connection between politics and strategic discourse has long been recognised. The strategic philosopher Clausewitz, as early as 1834, asks:

...is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It certainly has a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.99

The theoretical ground for this thesis is premised on the commonality of the logic of strategic discourse with that of other forms of life. The underlying logic arguably remains common to the identity-making

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practices upon which all communicative/social forms of life are based. The specificity here, as Clausewitz rightly points out, lies in the articulative frameworks or 'grammars' within which specific forms of life may be meaningfully structured. In order to construct a 'grammar' or syntagmatic frame through which to explore the communicative, or overtly discursive operation of the SCC, I shall outline the performance of the SCC through the examination of:

a. Context

(i) the definition of the standard of verification,

(ii) the coupling of détente deterioration with the perception of deterrence deterioration, and finally, [and related to the latter]

(iii) Internal: changes in the political perceptions of and by, the Carter administration.

b. Forms

(i) Internal: the shift in the complexity of agreements and their verifiable elements,

(ii) External: the changes in verification technologies that made possible and problematic certain compliance issues,

100 Syntagm: Saussurian linguistics argues that all languages and codes are built upon the two dimensions of paradigm and syntagm. While a paradigm is a set of units from which one may be chosen to combine with units from other paradigms, to form a syntagm, a syntagm represents the combination of paradigmatic units into a signifying whole. A sentence is an example of a syntagm, in which a word represents a paradigmatic unit. An advertisement is a syntagm of signs, a melody is a syntagm of notes, arms control treaties are therefore arguably a syntagm of treaty-limited items and their elements. O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske, argue that in a syntagm the meaning of a unit is determined by how it interacts with the others, whereas in a paradigm it is determined by how it is distinguished from the others. For further reading see O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske Key Concepts in Communication London: Methuen 1983/166,237 and Ferdinand de Saussure Course in General Linguistics New York: McGraw-Hill 1966 Section 2.
These levels of analysis offer an interpretive grid that relates political, institutional and technological factors in order to chart the ideological shift in culture from Carter to Reagan.

In the chapters that follow this will lead into a reappraisal of these issue areas during the Reagan administration, developing a comparative analysis of the handling of compliance and related issues, read as symptoms of the shift in world-view between the two regimes. In this sense, the reality of US strategic identity is interrogated not in individual things but in the relationships between them. As the early Wittgenstein noted: "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." And 'facts' are 'the existence of states of affairs.' It is 'the configuration of objects that produces states of affairs' and 'the structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs.'\textsuperscript{101} The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.\textsuperscript{102} It is thus the structures of the relationships between things that constitutes a view of the world, based on practices of inclusion and of exclusion. Arguably, the concepts by which the world is operated are constituted by, and through signs and the relations between signs - signifying systems - of which language is but a part.

This focus on meaning/interpretation, rather than pure 'content' allows Coral Bell to point out that the achievements of SALT are valuable "more on a political than a strategic basis"\textsuperscript{103} and to note that

\textsuperscript{101} Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus London:Routledge 1988/5-8 aphorisms 1.1-2.034.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid p.8 aphorism 2.05

\textsuperscript{103} Coral Bell The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era London:Martin Robertson 1977/56
"arms control proposals must be related to the underlying focus-balance and political reality of their time." Instead, the primacy of the discursive field in which decision-making takes place has long been recognised, as Sprout and Sprout noted in 1957:

With respect to policymaking and the content of policy decisions, our position is that what matters is how the policy maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is. With respect to the operational results of decisions, what matters is how things are, not how the policymaker imagines them to be.

The point here is that in the light of Saussurian linguistics and the discourse theory which developed from it, the second part of the statement above must be seen to refer to the fact of how such decisions are interpreted and acted upon discursively, rather than the putative ontological world it seems to imply. That is to say; that which is constituted discursively cannot leave the discursive realm, such that where meaning is invoked in the order of signification, such acts as follow consequentially are also meaningful in terms of that order of signification. They are, to reiterate Clausewitz, "another kind of writing and language for political thoughts."

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104 Ibid p.56


106 See C.von Clausewitz Op cit. p.402
Language, so construed [as signifying system], may be seen to operate asymptotically\textsuperscript{107} in its relation to the experiential realm. That is to say, that language is socially structured and that social structures are, in turn, construed by and through language. Language therefore plays a constructive, rather than a merely descriptive role. Language can no longer be seen as merely mimicking or reflecting the world, but rather shapes the understanding that the analyst brings to the world. Thus language may be viewed in terms of its tendency towards greater or lesser figurativity, rather than in terms of degrees of mimesis\textsuperscript{108}. It must be said, however, that this is not to understate the materiality of discourse and its effects.

Ole Waever points out that the concept of discourse itself "was introduced exactly in order to underline that there was not an external relationship between mental phenomena and other social relations"\textsuperscript{109} and that to introduce \textit{things} meaningfully into the social realm is to introduce things via language which operates in the symbolic order. That is to say that things are, by language, re-presented. Under this rubric, everything that is ascribed meaning [concepts] is \textit{discursive}. This, as Waever points out, "does not mean that there is nothing but

\textsuperscript{107} that is to say along one axis it tends towards, but never achieves a 1:1 relation to reality (mimesis) and along the other, it tends towards but never achieves pure fantasy (figuration).

\textsuperscript{108} Mimesis: literally 'imitation'. For Aristotle, the use of language meant to mirror, or imitate a pre-existent world. See Aristotle. \textit{Poetics}. Michigan: Ann Arbor/University of Michigan Press, 1973. p.3. For Plato the term was perjorative, holding that since natural objects were themselves mere appearances of the real, then writing or painting were imitations of imitations.

\textsuperscript{109} Ole Waever "Tradition and Transgression in International Relations: a Post-Ashleyan Position" \textit{Arbejdspapirer Working Papers} Copenhagen:Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1989. p.37
discourse in the world" but rather that, phenomena must be dealt with as "material and symbolic"\textsuperscript{110}

In describing the political world as a socially constituted entity, then socially meaningful political acts may be considered in terms of linguistic, or para-linguistic processes. In the traditional literature of International Relations, this aspect has been treated under the rubrics of signalling and perception. By 'signal', I follow Coral Bell's useful definition as the means by which "the powers convey and receive the information vital to their respective assessments each other's capabilities and intentions."\textsuperscript{111} Robert Jervis points out that:

what men [sic] do cannot be explained without some reference to or assumptions about their views about the nature of the world.\textsuperscript{112}

And further, that rather than conceiving human action as the result of environmental pressures, stimuli, motives, attitudes and ideas, his view is far more interactive - human beings are not simply \textit{tabula rasa} to be written upon by largely pre-formed and monolithic environmental factors. Human action, in the words of Herbert Blumer "arises instead from how he [sic] interprets and handles these things in the action he is constructing"\textsuperscript{113} which lends support to the view that

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid} p.37

\textsuperscript{111} Coral Bell "Communication between Powers" \textit{Crisis and Hierarchy} unpublished manuscript, Canberra:ANU 1991/52

\textsuperscript{112} Robert Jervis \textit{The Logic of Images in International Relations} Princeton: Princeton University Press.1970

material political action is predicated on the interpretive act, which is played out on the order of representation, or the symbolic order.

With this in mind the term signal may be characterised as:

... the whole variety of inputs that go to make up the total communication-flow. Signals may be declaratory or operational, verbal or non-verbal, conscious or unconscious, deliberate or inadvertent, bilateral or multi-lateral, direct or indirect, secret or open, official or non-official.\textsuperscript{114}

One potential problem posed by this formulation is that it radically separates the message from the interpretive community, viewing the latter as that which is informed or misinformed by the 'signal'. However, insofar as the interpretive community is construed by signals which, in their turn, and on that basis produce other signals (be they declarative, operational, verbal or non-verbal, conscious or unconscious etc), this formulation renders the separation of signal from discursive community somewhat problematic. 'Signals', so construed embody what Ole Wæver describes as 'the materiality of discourses'.

Why then talk about 'discursive acts' rather than 'signals' other than to use so-called 'trendy' terms? The above discussion hints at two primary reasons. Firstly, the practice of 'signalling' is not monologic, despite the formulation of it in monologic terms (declaratory, operational etc all imply a unidirectional/intensional model of communication). Secondly, insofar as 'signalling' is located as 'practice', its theoretical underpinnings are located as intrinsically

\textsuperscript{114} Coral Bell, \textit{Op Cit.}
separate, rather than as an aspect of the relational processes between and constitutive of the image/identities of 'actors'. Yet, as traditionally articulated, it is possible to conceive of 'signals' only on the basis of a theory of interpretation that assumes:

i) That the sign has a necessary, natural or substantive meaning.

ii) Language is a substance, not a form.

iii) That structuralist models of signals [seeking out recurrent elements and their patterns, resulting in a model consisting of an autonomous entity of independent parts which reciprocally condition each other] assume that meaning and signification are both transparent and already in place, and that these can be objectively and scientifically verified.\textsuperscript{115}

These assumptions have come under consistent challenge from several standpoints. The first two of these, which may be subsumed into an assumption of the monologism of language, has been critiqued by Mikhail Bakhtin in who argued that language is inherently dialogic, that is to say that each 'statement' presupposes its converse formulation (it presumes a receiver which shapes the form of the 'statement'), that to raise a question is to set the agenda for the form of reply, and that each statement contains within itself the seeds for its inversion.\textsuperscript{116}

The second set of assumptions relates to the practice of (or potential for) modelling through structural analysis the structures of meaning/interpretation. The problem with this formulation is that


\textsuperscript{116} See Mikhail Bakhtin \textit{The Dialogic Imagination} 1981
whereas the *model* implies an already constituted product, the more the surface of the text is analysed the more it can be seen in terms of (inter)textuality, which is to say the interaction of reader and text, along with the interaction between texts or textual worlds (by reference explicitly or implicitly to other texts) as a productivity, the production of a multiplicity of signifying effects. In turn, as Young points out, this implies a questioning of the model of communication as a closed system and of the attempt to fix a unified theory of sets of structural relations\textsuperscript{117}

To provide a context to the material under discussion in this chapter I shall outline a brief historical note on the development of the technologies to be limited later by the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement and the SALT II Agreement\textsuperscript{118}. By seeking to explain the changes in the use of the SCC through a range of issue areas, an attempt is being made to establish connections between the semiotic\textsuperscript{119} world of political life and the techno-strategic discourse of national security\textsuperscript{120} as expressed in arms control compliance and verification. This way, political discourse may be seen to shift its emphasis from the


\textsuperscript{118} See section 3.2 Strategic Background: From 'gap' to parity in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{119} Here I stay with M.H. Abrams' 1981:170-172 definition of semiotics as: "a science of signs" according to which "not only explicit systems of communication such as language, morse code, traffic signs and signals, are constituted by signs" but also "a great diversity of human actions and productions-our bodily postures and gestures, the social rituals we perform ... -all convey shared "meanings" to members of a particular culture, and so can be analysed as signs which function in diverse kinds of signifying systems..." [emphasis mine]

\textsuperscript{120} See Bradley S. Klein *Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives* NY:Center on Violence and Human Survival Working Papers 1987/1
traditionally realist concerns with causality along the lines of scientific modeling and towards a politics of meaning.

Quester points to the signalling aspects of arms control negotiations, insofar as their achievements cannot be limited solely to their 'substantive' accomplishments, as he notes:

> The mere appearance of agreement in such negotiations may have beneficial effects *per se*, serving in effect as an exchange of compliments, an exchange of compliments which can in turn trigger new waves of détente and an easing of political hostility.\(^{121}\)

Of course this works both ways, such that the appearance of non-agreement may signal a cooling of détente and an increase in political hostility. In fact, both of these forms can be seen to be in play throughout the whole period of détente. Each can be seen to have had an impact at different times on the SALT compliance debates and the use of the SCC.

As Ryan\(^{122}\), discussing Winch's critique of social *science* suggests:

> [t]he connections which hold between actions are *conceptual* connections, and ... the terminology which we employ in talking about actions is indispensable to our identifying actions as actions.\(^{123}\) [emphasis mine]

and that, inter alia

> Human actions, on this view, are meaningful, and meaning is not a category open to causal analysis; so long as

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123 *Ibid.* pp. 130-131
meaningful actions form the subject-matter of social inquiry, the most important category for our understanding of social life will not be that of cause and effect, but that of meaningfulness and rule-guidedness.\textsuperscript{124}

Between SALT I and SALT II, there are a range of quantitative and qualitative differences, each of which raise a range of verification problems. In addition to domestic political concerns, at an instrumental level it was largely the introduction of new qualitative restrictions that made SALT II problematic for the Carter regime. This, coupled with political problems raised by perceptions of the Carter administration's foreign policy as 'incoherent' and the administration itself as a 'failure',\textsuperscript{125} arguably added difficulties to the ability of the administration to activate the SCC to the fullest extent of its terms of reference.

To canvass these issues it is necessary first to outline the strategic background to the SALT talks, survey the technical differences between SALT I and SALT II with respect to the problems of verification and then look at the compliance record through the language of the Reports to Congress in order to examine how compliance or non-compliance has been invoked and interpreted by the incumbent political communities, that is, at the meaning-potential and rule-guidance principles of these communities and how they have

\textsuperscript{124} Ryan: see note 6 above.

interpreted the role and effectiveness of the SCC in raising these compliance issues with the Soviets.

3.2 Strategic Background: From 'gap' to parity

This section focuses upon the diachronic, or historical, aspect of the constitution and development of an interpretive community, deploying a regime of truth based on a systematic engagement with what becomes progressively defined as the threat of the Other.\textsuperscript{126} This section argues that much of the early development of strategic defence systems was discursively driven by US assumptions of Soviet capabilities. This section further argues that the structural realities facing the opening of the SALT I negotiations in 1969 were brought about, at least in part by the Soviet responses to US responses to capabilities that the US, in the absence of any real information, assumed the Soviets to have. The feedback of the discursive reality acted upon by the US decisionmakers into the discursive economy of defence spending and force posture developments led to a real and expensive arms race. For the purposes of illustration I shall outline the development of those systems that were subsequently limited by treaty through SALT I and II and that thus fell within the purview of the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation established by SALT I. What I intend to establish here is the connection between the 'hard technology' and the 'discursive technology', that is, how the technologies of specific and concrete weapons systems become systematically employed and driven by the technologies of discourse in order to maintain the functionality of the US as 'Self' through the

\textsuperscript{126} The Self/Other distinction is explained in footnote 8 on p.9
maintenance, identification and threat of the Soviet Union as 'Other'. In Clausewitzian terms I am seeking to map the 'language and writing' of political thoughts with reference to the way in which the 'hardware' of security becomes deployed as textual tokens in a way that is analogous to the manner in which physically inscribed symbols become deployed as the physical tokens of writing. This section then canvasses the factors leading to the formation of a particular discursive community within the wider context of a domain of practice of policy: that of the formation of what may be termed the US Security State.

a) Bombers and Radars

The Baruch Plan for the control of nuclear weapons would have allowed for a continued build-up of US atomic weapons, while prohibiting all other countries from developing that technology. Such a build-up would continue until the establishment of an international authority. The compliance provisions were far-reaching and included on-site inspection. Those who violated the proposed treaty would be subject to punishment. With the US as the sole nuclear power, and the USSR as the power principally interested in gaining the technology, the proposed plan was seen as directly manipulating the UN into becoming, in Dean Acheson's words, an "alliance to support a United States threat of war against the USSR unless it ceased its efforts to acquire the bomb"\textsuperscript{127} The political counter-offensive came from Andrei Gromyko just five days after the Baruch Plan. The Soviet proposal lacked a verification clause, thus rendering it unacceptable to the US.

\textsuperscript{127} See Acheson, D. \textit{Present at the Creation} NY:American Library, 1970 p.155
The Bikini Atoll test on July 1, 1946 was interpreted by the Soviets as a signal that the US was not serious in its arms control proposals.

The establishment of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) with 30 modified B29 bombers, in March 1946, saw the start of an on-going nuclear weapons procurement program. This was fuelled by successive war plans and the development of a mass-production bomb.\textsuperscript{128}

By the end of August 1949, with the SAC at 60 aircraft and with a medium-range jet bomber entering trials, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic explosive device. The US reaction to this was to accelerate development of a thermonuclear device (the H-bomb). The US successfully tested such a device at 1st March 1954. The Soviets followed suit in November 1955.

With priority given to the Air Force, 1951-1953 saw a buildup of the SAC to over 1,500 aircraft including 1,000 nuclear-capable bombers. By 1959 the SAC had almost 500 B-52 heavy intercontinental jet bombers, 2500 B-47s and over 1000 other tanker aircraft.\textsuperscript{129}

The Soviets, by contrast, held a bomber air fleet beginning with the Tupolev Tu-4 'Bull' medium range bomber, from 1947, and in the 1950s introduced the Tupolev Tu-16 'Badger' (medium-range) and the Myasischev M-4 turbojet 'Bison'. These, through careful management of the May Day military parades led the USAF intelligence estimates to considerably overestimate the numbers of these aircraft.


\textsuperscript{129} Ibid p.11
The publicly influential "Gaither Report"130 fuelled speculation about Soviet strategic leadership. Its six major points alleged that:

1) Soviet GNP growth outstripped that of the U.S.

2) Soviet defence spending equalled the U.S.

3) The Soviet Union had enough fissionable material for more than 1500 nuclear weapons, which could be distributed among 4500 long or short-range bombers, 250-300 long-range submarines and an extensive air defence system.

4) For more than a year the Soviets had been producing ballistic missiles with a greater than 700 mile range

5) that by late 1959 the Soviet Union would be capable of launching an attack on the U.S. with 100 ICBMs carrying megaton nuclear warheads.

6) That if such an attack came, the U.S. population would be unprotected and the bulk of the SAC bomber force would be vulnerable.131

Then-President Eisenhower commented to his advisers that the report ignored the dispersal of overseas bases and the Allies' role around the Soviet periphery which could pose a threat to the Soviets from a number of points.132 Nevertheless, the report, leaked to the press, applied some public pressure on the leadership. The Eisenhower administration responded by stepping up the state of alert of the SAC and funding an acceleration of the US ICBM programmes.133

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130 Established April 1957 under Mr. H. Rowan Gaither.

131 For more on this see Dwight D. Eisenhower *The White House Years* London:Heinemann 1966, p220.


133 *Ibid.* p.222
The fears of a Soviet-led 'Bomber Gap' unleashed by the Gaither Report stimulated the procurement of a further 538 B-52s. The reality was, however, that by 1961, the Soviets had only about 190 long-range bombers. The US Congress' perception,\textsuperscript{134} engendered by the Gaither Report, of the potential for the Soviets to develop a larger force was sufficient incentive for the US to establish a 150-mile range radar network - the Distance Early Warning (DEW) Line which extended from Alaska to Greenland. The main section of this radar network was completed by 1957.\textsuperscript{135} In this instance the discourse\textsuperscript{136} about the ability to develop weapons constituted a reality to the extent to which it had a pronounced effect upon US policymaking. Arguably, these sets of processes worked to a certain extent [following a mirror image] in Soviet policymaking. It is equally arguable however, that the greater openness of the US policymaking process, and the greater transparency of US military procurement, meant that the Soviets would not have found it so necessary to respond to 'imaginary' technologies or technology-potentials given greater access to actual US developments/deployments.

\textsuperscript{134} Perception: That view of the Other salient to the actions of Self vis-a-vis the Other. Perceptions are based on plausible claims by or about the other. Where perceptions are held by state decisionmakers, this can lead to reactive behaviour which can be directed outward or inward or offensive/non—offensive. In this instance the resultant behaviour was to develop greater attentiveness through the early warning radar technologies.


\textsuperscript{136} Here I use the term discourse to denote "the inscription of a particular knowledge" - see Catherine Belsey's review of Lynda Nead \textit{Myths of Sexuality: Representations of Women in Victorian Britain} in \textit{History of the Human Sciences} Vol. 3, No. 1, 1990, pp. 149-151.
b) ICBMs

The World-War II German V-1 and V-2 weapons represented the prototypical cruise and ballistic missiles respectively. Ironically, in the context of this thesis, these weapons themselves were developed by the Germans to circumvent a previous arms control agreement (the Treaty of Versailles\textsuperscript{137}). By May 1946, the US had begun test-firing captured and re-built V-2s. In 1954 the feasibility of building intercontinental ballistic missiles was established. This led to the development of the liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan ICBMs\textsuperscript{138}. In 1958, work began on the solid-fueled Minuteman ICBM, and, following on from the implications of the Soviet Sputnik launch in October 1957 aboard an SS-6 launch vehicle, some thought was given to housing Minuteman in hardened concrete silos.\textsuperscript{139} Interestingly, the US had begun work on the Nike Zeus ABM project before the Soviets had actually successfully tested an ICBM. Following this, the US explored ways in which a notional Soviet ICBM might circumvent the US ABM defences. This led to research into such technical possibilities as 'spoofing' (decoys, radar deflecting chaff) lowering the radar profile, and the use of multiple warhead launch vehicles.\textsuperscript{140} The US was effectively arms racing against itself via a notional Other. Michael Sheehan points out

\textsuperscript{137} To limit the potential to develop offensive artillery, the Treaty of Versailles placed a 100mm calibre limit on artillery barrels. Rockets, by definition do not have a 'calibre' and were therefore outside of the regime of treaty-limited items.

\textsuperscript{138} Tested in 1959 and 1960 respectively.

\textsuperscript{139} Greville Rumble \textit{Op Cit.} in note 5, p.12

that the US defence community was working to overcome purely discursive problems\textsuperscript{141} generated "not by the Soviet ABM program, of which little if anything was known, but by the US ABM program."\textsuperscript{142} Indeed, as Sheehan notes, this was the primary engine throughout the development of MIRVs.

The Soviets, who had undertaken rocket engineering research in the 1930s,\textsuperscript{143} began developing a medium-range missile (SS-3) in the 1950s. With the launch of Sputnik, it was clear that from that point the Soviets had a potential intercontinental capability.

The US responded by accelerating its missile development programmes, increasing the radar network (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) maintaining the Strategic Bomber Command at a high level of readiness and surveying the Soviets from high-altitude aircraft until May 1960, when Gary Powers, piloting a U-2 aircraft was shot down.

The dominant perception, at the end of the Eisenhower Presidency, was that of a significant Soviet lead in ICBMs.\textsuperscript{144} But this was dispelled following the surveillance evidence of the U-2 surveillance aircraft\textsuperscript{145},

\textsuperscript{141} That is, problems of perception, rather than actuality - hence it is a language-based symbolic-order problem.

\textsuperscript{142} Michael J. Sheehan \textit{Op Cit} 1988 p.46

\textsuperscript{143} Sergei Korolev, among others had developed liquid-fuelled rockets for atmospheric research in the 1930s.

\textsuperscript{144} Greville Rumble \textit{Op. Cit.} 1985 p.15 puts this at a 4:1 Soviet lead.

the CIA's Corona (alias Discoverer) satellites\textsuperscript{146} and the US Air Force MIDAS (Missile Defense Alarm System) geosynchronous infra-red surveillance system\textsuperscript{147} and SAMOS (Satellite and Missile Observation System) reconnaissance which became operational early in 1961\textsuperscript{148} and continued until SAMOS 30 launched on November 27, 1963.\textsuperscript{149} Whilst acknowledging that there were shortcomings in the new observation technologies (twelve out of the first thirteen Corona/Discovery missions failed either to reach orbit or to return images successfully), a new domain of knowledge was underway that would, in later years, provide additional and ultimately central National Technical Means of verification for the SALT arms control treaties.

As Eisenhower later admitted:

\begin{displayquote}
...in the analysis of comparative military power there is never complete certainty...\textsuperscript{150}
\end{displayquote}

Almost daily, from 1959 the Soviet threat was reassessed downward, as Eisenhower points out:

\begin{displayquote}
By January of 1960 new intelligence reports narrowed almost to negligibility the extent of the Soviet lead in long-range and sea-launched missiles; this lead would soon disappear.\textsuperscript{151}
\end{displayquote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Ibid.} p.111
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid.} p.111
\textsuperscript{149} See William E. Burrows \textit{Deep Black} London:Bantam 1988 p.91 Burrows notes that resolution was said to have ranged from 20 feet to about 5 as the program advanced (p.92).
\textsuperscript{150} Dwight D. Eisenhower \textit{Op Cit.} in note\textsuperscript{149} p.390
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Ibid} p.390
\end{flushright}
Indeed, the 'lead' turned out to be a discursive\textsuperscript{152} lead only, largely generated by Khruschev's rhetoric and a U.S. fear of the unknown. The role of the U-2 overflights was highlighted by Eisenhower:

During the four years of its operations the U-2 program produced intelligence of critical importance to the US. Perhaps as important as the positive information - what the Soviets \textit{did} have - was the negative information it produced - what the Soviets \textit{did not} have. Intelligence gained from this source provided proof that the horrors of the alleged "bomber gap" and the later "missile gap" were nothing more than the imaginative creations of irresponsibility.\textsuperscript{153}

The 'horrors' were real enough however, to influence defence policymaking well into the Kennedy administration. Indeed, since Kennedy had come to power, partly on promises to redress the so-called 'missile gap', he felt obliged by his domestic constituency to order a major nuclear build-up to counter the (by then clearly non-existent, or even negative) missile gap\textsuperscript{154}.

Some time after entering office, Kennedy was able to demonstrate that, far from a missile gap favouring the Soviets, the US held a marked lead in both quantity and quality of ICBMs - the solid-fueled Minuteman, for example, was able to be deployed without the 8-10 hours of refuelling required by the Soviets to ready their missiles. By 1964 it was clear that the US ICBM advantage was in the order of 834:200.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid} \textsuperscript{11} - this is not to underestimate the discursive realm in the constitution of realities.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Ibid} n.1 p.547

\textsuperscript{154} See Michael Sheehan \textit{Arms Control: Theory and Practice} Oxford:Blackwell, 1988 p.45

\textsuperscript{155} Greville Rumble 1985 \textit{Op.Cit.} in note 5 p.16
In the ensuing years, the Soviets sought to achieve real parity with the US through both hardened ICBMs and SLBMs on submarines. By 1970 quantitative strategic nuclear parity had been reached (see Table 3.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ICBMs</td>
<td>SLBMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>294</td>
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<td>1963</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>416</td>
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<td>1965</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>656</td>
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</tbody>
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It is not insignificant that as the US and the Soviet Union achieved parity, - in part from the Soviet build-up, and in part from the diminishing marginal strategic returns from the US exceeding certain force-levels - the discursive economies of threat\(^{156}\) dictated that the strategic arms race had reached a quantitative boundary threshold\(^{157}\), making possible the negotiation of the ABM Treaty and the later follow-on Interim Agreement. Thus the ABM treaty itself can be seen

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\(^{156}\) Discursive economies of threat: that which is set in play by invoking the idea of danger, placing into circulation a chain of acts in reaction to the notional danger.

\(^{157}\) Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith *How Much is Enough?* NY:Harper and Row, 1971 p.208, where they point out:

... the main reason for stopping at 1000 Minuteman missiles, 41 Polaris submarines and some 500 strategic bombers is that having more would not be worth the additional cost. These force levels are sufficiently high to put the United States on the "flat of the curve" -that is, at a point where small increases in target destruction capability would require enormous increases in forces, and therefore in cost. The answer to the question of how many strategic offensive forces are enough rests heavily on such flat of the curve reasoning.
in terms of an effect of the political/discursive context, which, by further representing a symbolic boundary between the superpowers in delineating the limits to specific and concrete weapons systems served to add cumulatively to the identity formation of the US and the Soviet Union. That is to say that the ABM treaty (as all treaties do) served, not merely an instrumental role in the relations between the superpowers, but in part, was and continues to be constitutive of their role as such.

c) ABMs, MRVs and MIRVs

Other factors remaining unchanged, the strategic nuclear parity of the end of the 1960s should have sufficed for stable strategic nuclear deterrence, with due and necessary allowance for maintenance/replacement operations on existing stockpiles of weapons. The world, however, refuses to stay as it was. One of the dynamic factors is qualitative change\textsuperscript{158} in strategic forces.

As a contested site at which the multiple meanings of the security state are played out, nuclear deterrence theory represents one of the domains of policymaking in which one might interrogate the identity of the processes that underwrite the security state. Indeed, nuclear security rests upon the concept of the stability of nuclear parity. Moreover, the stability of nuclear parity, arguably rests on the premiss

\textsuperscript{158} Qualitative change: that is, the results of research and development leading to extensions to

i. performance factors (improvements leading to a new capability, or to an extension of the performance envelope)

ii. quality design factors (improvements to the reliability or maintainability of existing capabilities) or

iii. force multipliers (developments external to the specific weapon system, but which enhance its capability).
that the threat context is stable. For John Newhouse this is theoretically possible if the weapons satisfy three criteria:

i) they must be capable of delayed response;

ii) they must be invulnerable (ie survivable) and

iii) they must be incapable of inflicting a pre-emptive first strike to cripple the other side's forces.159

Newhouse argues that the Minuteman missiles fail in the criteria of invulnerability. Not only were the Soviets constructing an Anti-Ballistic Missile defence system (and had been since 1961 160) but the Soviets were also developing the SS-9 long-range heavy missile, with a massive warhead capable of penetrating the most hardened Minuteman shelter. The ensuing action-reaction game saw the US develop, test and deploy, first Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRVs) and, around 1964, as guidance-systems became more sophisticated, the more advanced Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). While some argued in favour of developing MIRVs as 'bargaining chips', Paul Warnke has suggested that this policy can and, in fact has backfired. As he notes:

...it was argued in 1969 that American deployment of missiles with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) would lead to Soviet concessions in SALT I. What US MIRVs led to instead was Soviet MIRVs and a consequent setback for the arms control process.161


160 See Greville Rumble, *Op Cit* in note 5 p.17

MIRVs required a heavy launcher. This point was readily appreciated by the Soviets who had the ideal launch platform in the SS-9. This configuration, as Newhouse points out, led to the perception in the US that "430 SS-9s, armed with three five-megaton MIRVs as accurate as a Minuteman could, for practical purposes, destroy Minuteman. About 300 SS-9s with six MIRVs each would achieve the same purpose." 162 This perception, as Newhouse puts it, gave a great boost to SALT "especially since the large-scale deployment of the SS-9 roughly coincided with the arrival of Mr. Nixon." 163 As Table 1 shows, parity had been reached, each party being able to inflict devastating second strike damage to the other. It was soon clear that, unless an agreement on arms could be reached, the action-reaction cycle would lead to an unacceptably costly and destabilising arms race.

d) Domestic Political Forces

As the decade wore on, it became clear to the US that ultimately, the Sentinel and the later Safeguard ABM systems, despite their wide deployment, would be at best of marginal effectiveness. As Rumble points out:

By 1970 Defence Secretary Melvin Laird was admitting that it could not protect the US missile fields against a fully developed MIRV capability and Congress eventually rejected Nixon's requests for funds to construct ABM sites. 164

There was also an argument to suggest that restricting ABM capabilities would actually enhance deterrence since such restrictions would

163 Ibid. p.21.
reduce retaliatory survivability, and therefore reduce the ability to engage in war-fighting strategy. By raising the costs of deterrence failure it would thus be better to deter than to engage in war-fighting.

With the achievement of numerical parity around the first half of 1967, and with the Soviet deployment of the Galosh ABM system around Moscow, and amongst the early moves by the US to develop an ABM system, Soviet Premier Kosygin indicated a willingness to negotiate on limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. This commenced tentatively toward the end of the Johnson administration. On July 1 1968, at the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Johnson announced that the Soviets had agreed to commence discussions on limiting and reducing strategic nuclear weapons and defences against ballistic missiles.165 Talks were postponed with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and were not resumed until November 17, 1969.

With the Vietnam war becoming costly and politically less sustainable, the Nixon regime was caught between the proverbial rock and the hard place. As Kissinger notes, Nixon was under great pressure to "appear responsive to the pressures for trimming the defence budget" and to reduce military spending as a percentage of GNP.

Indeed, as Figures 3.1 and 3.3 show, there was a real decline in defence expenditure both as a percentage of GNP and as a percentage of the National Budget. Despite the best efforts of Melvin Laird to effect a marginal increase in all strategic programs, the overall effect was, in Kissinger's terms to prevent the US from developing a "coherent response to the growing imbalance in conventional forces." This meant that the Safeguard ABM system, a chief bargaining chip in

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166 H. Kissinger *The White House Years* Sydney: Hodder & Stoughton, 1979/535
167 Ibid. p.536
168 Ibid p.536
SALT I, was under domestic threat from Congress of unilateral elimination. Thus the Safeguard ABM system, having been built up as a value-laden signifier of US resolve and as a potential symbol of US willingness to bargain away a valuable security token for the sake of the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union, it became in addition, a site of contestation for the identity of the domestic US polity as against the SALT negotiating community within the security state. Kissinger describes the problem as a three-way process:

We were negotiating disarmament on three fronts: at Vienna and Helsinki with the Soviets; at home within our government, and with the Congress.\textsuperscript{169} [emphasis in the original]

By this time the Pentagon was seriously reconsidering the expense of the ABM program ($US7b by the time the first ABM site became operational\textsuperscript{170}), with the overall reductions in defence expenditure, as it meant reassessing defence budget priorities. The conservatism bred in the climate of defence contraction, led to serious objections in congress to Phase II of the ABM program which was

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Ibid}

\textsuperscript{170} Michael Sheehan \textit{Op Cit} in note 41 p.58
increasingly being seen as costly and largely ineffective. The system comprised two types of intercept missile: the long-range Spartan for space interception and the short-range high speed Sprint for terminal-phase interception.

These would be guided by Large Phased-Array Radars (LPARs). [Figure 3.2 illustrates the main phases of a ballistic missile's trajectory.] As we can see from this, and from the notes below, terminal phase interception time is very short and is compounded by the deployment of penetration aids (decoys, radar chaff etc) during the midcourse phase. The use of multiple warheads (MIRVs) is thus only one factor
in the difficulties confronting a plausible terminal phase ABM program.

As producers of counternarratives to those of the defense 'hawks', the critics of ground-based ABM interception emphasised the inability to intercept missiles at the boost-phase\textsuperscript{171} and thereby counter MIRVs before their release and while still a highly 'visible' hot spot aiding target acquisition. Their 'visibility' decreases markedly in the post-boost and midcourse phases.\textsuperscript{172} The terminal phase (reentry) allows only a brief time for target acquisition\textsuperscript{173}, making terminal phase ABM defences of questionable utility.

Traditionally, the defence expenditure legislation had become routine and was generally passed without significant amendment, or even extended discussion. But the political climate was changing. As defence

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\textsuperscript{171} The boost phase lasts from launch to burnout of the final stage. Lasting from 3-5 minutes, the hot gases exhausting from a missile booster motor emit hundreds of kilowatts at short and medium wave infra-red (SWIR and MWIR) wavelengths. This radiation plume can be detected by sensors at great distances.

\textsuperscript{172} In the post-boost and midcourse phases surveillance (target acquisition) becomes considerably more difficult. At these phases, the post-boost vehicles cool to around room temperature, emitting long-wave infrared radiation (LWIR). It is possible for this radiation to be detected by sensors, super-cooled (near absolute zero) to prevent their own radiation from swamping the signal. It is technically difficult to put such sensors in space because they require long-lived low-power cryogenic refrigerators capable of keeping them at their operating temperature. Source: Office of Technology Assessment report "Ballistic Missile Defence Technologies" in OTA \textit{Strategic Defences} Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1986.p.160.

\textsuperscript{173} The terminal phase represents the final (reentry) phase of a ballistic missile's trajectory, during which the reentry vehicles enter the atmosphere and detonate at their target. This phase lasts for about 1 minute or less. Detection and tracking systems that could be used for terminal phase ABM target acquisition include ground-based Large Phased Array Radars (LPARs) and airborne optical and infrared (LWIR) detectors. As of 1986 LWIR technology is not as far advanced as that for shorter wavelengths. Source: OTA Report \textit{Strategic Defenses} Op Cit. in note 68.
expenditure became politicised, it became a battleground without clear leadership. Factional in-fighting led to a major congressional assault on the structure of the US military establishment.

![US Defence Spending as % of National Budget](image)

**Figure 3.3**

The issue was described succinctly by the *Washington Post* which declared:

> What was at one time an almost routine piece of legislation - passage of the annual military spending bill - has now been turned into a lengthy and frequently bitter battle over a score of military programs and policies ... [the long ABM debate] has obscured what is in fact the most widespread assault on all kinds of military activities ever made on Capitol Hill.\(^\text{175}\)

In this atmosphere, the Administration was expected to provide a secure defence strategy and a coherent SALT approach. The outcome, regarded by Kissinger as somewhat schizophrenic, was that the Nixon administration presented two inconsistent and incompatible positions

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174 Michael Sheehan *Op Cit* in note 41 p. 536.

on ABM. One, in the defence budget, dominated by the Pentagon, the other in SALT, the result of an interagency process. Postmodern readings of this would be less concerned at the apparent inconsistency, on the grounds that two distinct 'epistemic communities' were being invoked. The first, relating to domestic budgetary concerns, and the second relating to bilateral boundary-making with the Soviets. The Nixon Administration was embodying the Foucauldian turn, occupying distinct subject-positions, ranking the tokens of the discursive economy of SALT over those of the domestic polity in order to maintain the exchange-value of the ABM. As Kissinger emphasises:

> The Administration had to marshal all its strength to keep the Congress from imposing unilaterally what we were seeking to negotiate with the Soviets... when we negotiated its mutual limitation in 1972, ABM was on the verge of being eliminated by the Congress, or sunk to a meaningless prototype.\(^{176}\)

The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement was signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972 after two and half years of negotiations.

In 1975, following the ABM Protocol (limiting each Party to one ABM site) and following significant change in the international political system, the Safeguard ABM system became operational on April 1, 1975, defending the Grand Forks ICBM fields in North Dakota. A year later, following a Congress vote it was closed down.\(^{177}\) The vulnerabilities of LPARs (even with massive 'hardening'), the inadequate missile guidance systems (vulnerable to 'spoofing') and its reliance on nuclear warheads contributed to the system's demise.

\(^{176}\) Kissinger (1979) *Op Cit* in note 29, p.538

Technological development of components continued despite bans on testing 'in an ABM mode'. Sheehan argues that there is a strong link between technological advance and political realities:

Technological advance changes political realities by altering perceptions of what is possible.\textsuperscript{178}

Thus if knowledge is constitutive of realities then new knowledges empower the constitution of new realities. In other words, at the level of what may be described as 'signalling'\textsuperscript{179}, technological R&D can be seen to provide new paradigmatic choices for the articulation of the discursive identity of the security state.

In the sections that follow, relevant terms of the SALT Treaties will be examined more closely in relation to compliance questions raised in the SCC, following some remarks on the standards applied to verification and the issues raised, surrounding R.W. Buchheim's report to Congress on compliance with SALT I. Such issues include the roles of some of the surrounding discursive communities (such as those of monitoring and surveillance) and the intersections of their domains of knowledge on the power of the SCC to raise compliance issues on either side.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid p.60

\textsuperscript{179} See for example Coral Bell President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue? Canberra:ANU Canberra Studies in World Affairs No.1, 1980/15
3.3 Verification Standards

Verification has been defined as

The means by which one party determines whether or not another party to an agreement is complying with its terms.\footnote{G. Duffy \textit{Compliance and the Future of Arms Control} Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988 p.4}

From this follow two functions:

i) to deter cheating on an arms control agreement and

ii) to build confidence between the parties to an agreement.

There are inherent limitations to verification capabilities, intersecting with every kind of verification measure. Such measures include:

1) National Technical Means (NTMS), such as satellite surveillance, radar surveillance from locations outside the boundaries of the countries monitored (SIGINT), radioactive air sampling, teleseismic geophysical observations, and communications interception (SIGINT) [including telemetry monitoring]

2) Cooperative means of verification, such as the deliberate opening of certain features of military systems to surveillance [including military expenditure levels], specific channelling of military products through agreed checkpoints, and non-interference with means of verification [such as non-encryption of telemetry];

3) On-site Inspection (OSI) [various levels of intrusivity]

4) "soft" methods of verification, such as using agents (HUMINT), interviewing émigrés, and analysing information leaks.\footnote{\textit{Ibid} p.4 square parenthetic additions mine.}

The choice of verification standard depends more or less directly on the degree of strategic importance of the agreement proportional to the technical capabilities of the verifying countries, the military cost of
inadequate verification and the political costs of cheating. Assessments of these three elements vary according to perceptions of each Party about the other, assumptions about the state of relations between the parties and perceptions of the domestic political elements within each Party. On these criteria then, verification can be said to be a process of determining compliance with the terms of an arms control agreement to the extent deemed adequate to safeguard 'national security'.

Sydney Graybeal points to several factors to be taken into account when assessing the likelihood or otherwise of Soviet cheating. In so doing, he suggests that in his assessment the Soviets would be unlikely to enter an agreement which required them to cheat in order to attain their military objectives [albeit that they might explore the limits at the margins of an agreement]. He notes that the risk of being caught is always greater than zero and he stresses that there are further costs to cheating:

There are likely delays in the military program; there are likely reductions in the reliability of the system if you cannot test it in the optimum manner; and there are likely monetary costs.

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182 Ian Bellany *How Much Verification?* Unpublished manuscript (1990) and author's interview at the University of Lancaster May 1990.


184 Bellany also emphasised this point. Ian Bellany: author's interview at the University of Lancaster May 1990.

Thus the Soviets would have to assess these costs against the military gains from cheating and the political implications, if caught, versus these questionable military gains.\footnote{Ibid}

The standards applied to verification of the SALT Treaties potentially offer a political barometer of the state of bilateral relations between the US and the Soviet Union.\footnote{Ibid}

To the extent that total verification is impossible, the extent to which data needs to be interpreted, the extent to which 'grey area' violations are considered to be violations and the extent to which these potential violations are raised within the SCC, the interaction of these four elements, arguably, can be used to 'read' the political climate underlying the security state, that is, the political context of arms control and the role of verification in the political process. This is of particular importance when considering verification standards and their application. Between the Carter and the Reagan administrations, the shifts in verification standard are intimately tied to the state of domestic and bilateral relations between the US and the Soviet Union with respect to the SALT I and SALT II Treaties.

Inheriting the SALT I Treaties and the beginnings of the SALT II negotiations, President Carter adopted the standard of verification laid down by Richard Nixon in 1969 when instructing SALT I negotiators, that of 'adequate' verification. The term, as defined by Richard Nixon

\footnote{Ibid}{not necessarily particularly significant by itself, but when read alongside a range of other 'barometric' indicators, this aspect could lend important evidence to assist the analyst's reading of the perception of bilateral confidence in the intentions of the Other to comply with the terms of an agreement.}
relates to the ability to "identify attempted evasion if it occurs on a large enough scale to pose a significant risk, and whether we can do so in time to mount a sufficient response." The term also appears in the Basic Principles of Negotiations in 1973.

This appeared to suffice for the ABM Treaty, by which a whole class of weapons, their deployment systems and the testing of weapons in this mode seemed at that time to be sufficiently well monitored by National Technical Means (NTM). As negotiations progressed with the SALT II Treaty, the standard defined as 'adequate' was continually contested and defended by the US Arms Control community.

The term itself appears in a number of congressional reports relating to verification, and the issue of compliance with SALT I. Sydney Graybeal, in a prepared statement to Congress, points out that verification is linked to the ability to deter a nation from violating the treaty as the political consequences of discovery would be politically more costly than maintaining the agreement. Verification adequate to this task involves a judgement. As he states:

What constitutes "adequate" verification involves a judgement. It depends in part on what one considers constitutes an "adequate deterrent." If one subscribes to the "minimum deterrence" theory, then one may not be too


189 Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation, 21 June 1973 signed by Nixon and Brezhnev Article 4 states: "Limitations on Strategic offensive arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means." [emphasis mine]

190 See for example R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 1st Session, September 25, 1979 (declassified November 7, 1979).
concerned over comprehensive monitoring capabilities for all provisions of the agreement. On the other hand if one is concerned about the viability of our deterrence, then one will probably be concerned about our ability to monitor the specific of all the provisions. 191

A report by the State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (28 February, 1978) stated that the Carter Administration's commitment to a SALT II Agreement was such that it would not "compromise our capacity to independently verify Soviet adherence to the agreement by accepting unwarrantable risks"192 the report went on to state that any violations "of such a magnitude as to modify the nuclear balance193 'would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response194'" All this, as Les Aspin and Fred Kaplan point out, amounts to the "recognition that few things in life can be determined with absolute certainty, that levels of confidence and margins of error are inevitable, and that the important questions are how high we make the levels of confidence and how narrow the margins of error."195

Paul Warnke, presenting a report on the verifiability of the proposed SALT II Agreement, defines adequate such that "any cheating on a


193 Ibid


scale large enough to alter the strategic balance would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response."196 He further points out that judgement of the adequacy of verification must take account of detection capabilities existing and future, and the ability of the other side to evade detection should it attempt to do so, and the US ability to respond to Soviet cheating based on the US technological base, its Research and Development programs (R&D) and existing strategic forces.197

Moreover, assessment of adequacy of verification must also "assess the political and military significance of potential violations and the costs, risks and gains to the Soviets of cheating."198 Such assessment is further complicated by the tradeoff between the US allowing itself flexibility to take certain actions even though allowing the Soviets to take the same action may complicate verification.199

US assessments of Soviet compliance in the face of any US monitoring uncertainties or ambiguities are supplemented by US assumptions regarding the likelihood that the Soviets would cheat, based on the benefits accruing to them from such cheating and the risks of such activities being detected. Among US scenarios of the epistemic context of Soviet decisions to cheat are ranked: i) Soviet uncertainties about

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197 Ibid. p.15

198 Ibid. [Emphasis mine].

199 Ibid.
the overall US capabilities to monitor and analyse Soviet activities; ii) the potential US reaction to the discovery of Soviet cheating; and iii) potential Soviet strategic gains from cheating.200

Arguably, then, the standard of verification selected and applied would affect the extent to which compliance issues arise as such, the extent to which these are pursued through the channel of the SCC and/or the extent to which these issues are seen to be resolved.

3.4 Agreements and Their Verifiable Elements

a) SALT I Provisions

The SALT I Agreements comprise the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement. The two agreements have different duration provisions, the ABM Treaty being of unlimited duration (with a six-month withdrawal provision in the event of a party's supreme interests being threatened by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty)201 The Interim Agreement, by contrast, had only a five-year span. In addition to restricting ABMs to only two sites in each country with a total of 200 ABM launchers on each side, (a later protocol reduced this to one site with provision for 100 ABM launchers on each side202) the ABM Treaty banned the deployment or testing of the inward-looking Large Phased Array Radars (LPARs) required for ABM target acquisition.

200 Ibid.


The ABM system components concerned, included those which were:

a) operational
b) under construction
c) undergoing testing
d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
e) mothballed

Under Article V, paragraph 1, only immobile land-based ABM systems and their components are permitted and authorised, each party having undertaken to not develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components that are sea, air or space based, or mobile land based systems. There was also a provision (Paragraph 2) that launchers were to be single-use items, and that development, testing or deployment of semi-automatic, or rapid reload launchers was prohibited.

Article VI prohibited the adaptation of existing non-ABM systems or radars to ABM use, and the testing of such systems in an ABM mode.

To assure compliance, verification would be by national technical means (NTMs) and deliberate concealment or interference to verification by NTMs was prohibited.

Further Agreed Statements common understandings and unilateral statements were added, as was an Interim Agreement designed to limit the competition in strategic
Table 3.2 SALT I Interim Agreement Ceilings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ICBMs</td>
<td>SLBMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-SALT I⁠a</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>base levels⁠b</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ceilings⁠c</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) includes operational or under construction. The US had none under construction, the USSR had 1060 operational and 558 under construction.
b) US had 656 SLBM launchers based on 41 submarines, the USSR had 740 SLBM launchers.
c) these ceilings were only permitted by replacing older ICBM or SLBM launchers which must be dismantled or destroyed.

Sources: US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements 1980/148
IISS The Military Balance 1968-72
and Greville Rumble The politics of Nuclear Defence Cambridge: Polity 1985

offensive arms in order to provide time for further negotiations²⁰³ pending a more comprehensive agreement to be negotiated within five years. The freeze was somewhat asymmetrical, holding the number of strategic offensive launchers to existing levels, be they operational or under construction, permitting an increase in SLBM launchers only with the dismantling of corresponding numbers of older ICBM or SLBM launchers. These launchers cannot be significantly enlarged or 'light' or older ICBM launchers cannot be replaced by launchers for modern 'heavy' ICBMs under modernization provisions. This provision prevented the Soviets from substituting light ICBMs with the new SS-9 heavy missile. Table 3.2 (overleaf) summarises the Interim Agreement ceilings, showing the extent to which increased levels of SLBMs are available only at the expense of

²⁰³ ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington:ACDA 1980/148
land-based ICBMs. The levels reflect the extent to which a structural imbalance was codified (as some SALT critics have noted) to favour the Soviets.

Significantly absent from SALT I was the issue of long-range bombers. Other issues, discussed but not committed to treaty were: mobile missiles, cruise missiles, forward-based systems and the enhancement of missiles with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). These issues were to be left for SALT II and their definition to the SCC.

b) SALT II Provisions

SALT II negotiations began in November 1972 following the signing of SALT I. The SALT II Agreements differed in several important respects from the SALT I agreements. Article VII of the Interim Agreement committed the US and the Soviet Union to continue to pursue negotiations on strategic offensive arms.204

The Agreement, based on the understandings of the Vladivostok accord comprises three parts:205

i) A Treaty based on the Vladivostok accord [5 years, until 1985].

ii) A Protocol covering specific systems (cruise missiles, mobile ICBMs and qualitative restraints on ICBMs,

204 J.L George makes the point that SALT I was deliberately an interim agreement in order to foster ongoing negotiations as provided by Article VII of the Interim Agreement. See J.L. George The New Nuclear Rules: Strategy and Arms Control After INF and START. London:Pinter 1990/87.

providing for further negotiation on these issues in SALT III) [3 years].

iii) A Joint Statement of Principles being an agreed set of guide-lines for future negotiations.

Agreed Statements covered definitional matters relating to the definition of SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, long range Air-Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), launchers developed and tested for MIRVs and other procedural matters. Later assessments raised some doubts about the value of the associated unilateral statements, following a shift in perception of Soviet commitment to the agreements. These

Table 3.3 shows the aggregate limits established within the Vladivostok accord under which, the principle of equal ceilings for strategic delivery vehicles was established.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Both (a) and (b)+ heavy bombers equipped for long range cruise missiles</td>
<td>1320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) (a)-(c)+launchers of unMIRVed ICBMs &amp; SLBMs + heavy bombers not equipped for long range cruise missiles: aggregate limit to apply from Jan.1,1981 to be achieved by Dec. 31, 1981</td>
<td>2250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Aggregate limit to apply for (d) up to Dec.31,1980</td>
<td>2400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statements will be discussed later in this chapter in the analysis of perceptions of the effectiveness of the SCC and its role in the SALT process.

Within the verification provisions of Article XV, NTMs were to be used and Common Understandings included the undertakings to not

impede or interfere with NTMs, including the encryption of telemetry, and construction of shelters.

Compliance matters, and specific procedural matters were to be negotiated through the SCC.\textsuperscript{207} These included the maintenance of a data base on the numbers of strategic arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of June 18, 1979.\textsuperscript{208}

The qualitative provisions of the SALT II agreements presented a new range of problems for verification by technical means. Whereas the SALT I agreements limited fairly readily identifiable ICBM launchers and large, slowly-built radar structures, the SALT II agreement included identifying missiles equipped with MIRVs. Because of specific difficulties in identifying MIRVed or non-MIRVed missiles, it was agreed that once a missile was tested with MIRVs then all missiles of that type would be considered to be MIRVed.

SALT II verification is by national technical means (photo-reconnaissance satellites, SIGINT, etc) and it was agreed to neither interfere with each others' NTM, nor to use concealment measures. ACDA point out that since 'specific characteristics of some SALT

\textsuperscript{207} These have already laid out in more detail in Chapter 2.

limited systems become apparent during the testing phase, monitoring of testing programs is an important aspect of SALT verification\textsuperscript{209}.

It was important therefore to be able to monitor a test-missile's telemetry (data relayed to the launch-site on fuel consumption, mass, temperature of burn, fuel pressure, speed etc and the in-flight testing of system components [such as warhead release mechanisms]) in order to calculate the throw-weight of the launch vehicle which would enable estimates to be made concerning the MIRV potential of the missile. In the SALT II Second Common Understanding of Article XV, paragraph 3 concerning the obligation to not use deliberate concealment measures, these were described as including that,

\begin{quote}
...neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the terms of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

The NTMs relating to verification of SALT II compliance may be summarised as follows:\textsuperscript{211} At the test stage, missiles are monitored entering and leaving the deployment area, as is any construction activity, thus numbers of deployed missiles can be determined. This is largely done with the aid of photo-reconnaissance.

With increased redundancy, there comes an increase in the confidence of being able to verify compliance. As with any communicative form,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{209} US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington:US ACDA 1980/205
\item \textsuperscript{210} Ibid p.227
\item \textsuperscript{211} Testimony of Dr William Perry, Under Secretary of Defence in SALT II Treaty Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington:USGPO July 16 1979/251
\end{itemize}
the more codes (or communicative channels) used, the clearer the message becomes - thus there is [literally] an increase in the signal:noise ratio. In order to measure the number of reentry vehicles per missile, photographs are taken of both the launch and impact areas. This is also done with infra-red systems which measure the heat of the engines in flight. The missiles are tracked by radar, as are the reentry vehicles as they approach the impact areas. These allow, not only the counting of the reentry vehicles, but also provide a first approximation of their size and shape. Radio receivers collect telemetry data, which among other things, gives a measure of the number of reentry vehicles. These systems also provide collateral information on estimations of the size of the reentry vehicle (throw-weight) and of the accuracy and type of guidance systems [which, as Dr Perry points out, although not covered by SALT, are important for strategic planning]212

The following section shall examine SALT I compliance issues raised through the SCC and the SALT II Treaty ratification debate as applicable to verification during the Carter years.

3.5 Compliance Challenges and the SCC

Until September 25, 1979, the United States had raised eight issues concerning Soviet compliance with SALT I.213 Table 3.4 outlines these eight issues briefly. Comparable issues were raised by the Soviets regarding US compliance with the SALT I agreements. These, outlined in table 3.5 give some indication of the extent of reciprocity within the

212 Ibid p.252-3

213 Testimony of Sydney Graybeal in R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 p.16
liminal space of the SALT SCC ongoing negotiations process. This section discusses some aspects of that reciprocity and the consequences of emphasising legalism over relationalism in terms of the aims and objectives of arms control and related compliance questions.

Of the charges of non-compliance that follow, it may be noted that four of the eight issues raised were not identified as definite violations. Indeed, it needs to be emphasised that the politicaity of compliance issues rests principally on the ambiguities of marginal compliance behaviours and on the ambiguities of the data on non-compliance. Of the remaining four technical violations, two resulted from poor estimates on the time needed to dismantle certain launchers, and one from the use of 'weather protection' yet, since the agreement limits the number of launchers, temporary shelters did not preclude verification by NTMs. The radar at the Kamchatka Peninsula, appears ultimately to be a marginal issue, given that the Soviets have agreed that it be considered an ABM test range as permitted under Article V of the ABM Treaty.

One Soviet view argues that many of the ambiguous compliance activities raised by the United States were a result of poor communication between the Soviet bureaucracies, particularly between the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Department of the Military Industrial Commission.214 The argument was that the Soviet SCC Delegation was consistently misinformed by the Defence Department of the Military Industrial Commission about activities within the Soviet Union. This was said to result in situations in which the SCC would have negotiated a procedure, and that established

214 Author's interview with Alexei Arbatov, Canberra:ANU, 31/7/91.
procedure was simply ignored or garbled by the bureaucratic process. This position could be argued if the SCC was staffed solely, or even principally by Foreign Ministry officials. This is in fact largely the case up

Table 3.4 U.S. Charges of Soviet Non-Compliance with SALT I as at September 25, 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charge</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential violation</td>
<td>Hardened silo construction</td>
<td>Interim Agreement Art I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal &amp; political violation</td>
<td>Concealment measures impeding NTM verification</td>
<td>ABM Treaty,XII.3 Interim Agreement,V.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defeating object &amp; purpose of agreement</td>
<td>Conversion of launchers from light to heavy ICBMs</td>
<td>Interim Agreement, II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Violation</td>
<td>Possible testing of air defence radar (SA-5) in ABM mode</td>
<td>ABM Treaty,VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violation</td>
<td>Excess ABM test launchers</td>
<td>ABM Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violation</td>
<td>ABM Radar on Kamchatka Peninsula</td>
<td>ABM Treaty,VI; Common Understanding C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violation</td>
<td>Exceeding numerical ICBM launcher limits</td>
<td>Interim Agreement,II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violation</td>
<td>deliberate concealment at test range</td>
<td>Interim Agreement,V.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


to the Deputy commissioner of the SCC, but the Commissioner himself is appointed from the Defence Department of the Military Industrial Commission.\textsuperscript{215} This being the case, it seems to stretch credibility that there could be a total breakdown in communication

\textsuperscript{215} See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
between the SCC negotiators and the activities of the Defence Department.216

What is interesting about the treatment of these questions, without denigrating their technical implications, lies in the interpretation of their political meaning. That is, the legal perspective, the SALT SCC perspective, and that of the Committee on the Present Danger, all held specific and widely differing views as to the meaning of these questions when read as political signals. The intersection of these

Table 3.5 Soviet Charges of US Noncompliance with SALT I as at Sept 25, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charge</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violation</td>
<td>Shelters over Minuteman Silos</td>
<td>Interim Agreement, V Common Understanding C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation</td>
<td>Testing Shemya Radar for ABM purposes</td>
<td>ABM Treaty, 1.2 and VI(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation</td>
<td>Privacy of SCC Proceedings</td>
<td>ABM Treaty XIII, SCC Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation</td>
<td>Creation of Large scale ABM Defence system: PAVE PAWS Radar stat(1)</td>
<td>ABM Treaty, 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Violation</td>
<td>Exceeding numerical launcher limits</td>
<td>Interim Agreement, V.1.2,3; Common Understanding C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Violation</td>
<td>Dismantling of Radar at Malstrom AFB</td>
<td>ABM Protocol on Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Violation</td>
<td>Exceeding sublimit on MIRVed ICBMS</td>
<td>ABM Treaty, V.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


216 Source: Author's interview with Alexei Arbatov, Canberra: ANU, 31/7/91.
competing views arguably provides some insight into the multiple and complex subjectivities\textsuperscript{217}, competing for a voice in the Carter security state.

Examining these in more detail, I am setting out to show, not the state as actor, nor even the security state as actor, but that within the security state (insofar as it applies to arms control compliance issues) are always factional identities that mobilise and invoke competing world-views; that these are constantly in play; that each has a foundation in history; that each manifests an identity symptomatic of that history and that each exists in relation to other factional identities the specification of which may be inferred from the language and actions [both operating as forms of signifying system] they invoke.

\textsuperscript{217} Subjectivities: In the context of discourse theory the term represents all that can be signified by a collision/collusion, even conflation of three established senses, described by O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske (1983:231) in terms of i) Subject of political theory: the citizen as subject of the state, implying the positioning of the subject within networks of power relations, ii) Subject of Idealist philosophy: a site of consciousness implying a division between subject and object, between thought and reality, between self and other (an opposition critiqued by Heidegger and Derrida). In this sense, subjectivity has been traditionally represented as a unitary identity which appears as the source of action and meaning rather than as their product. The individualism of this position fails to account for the role of language and social relations in determining, regulating or producing what any thinking subject can be. iii) The subject of grammar: that which the action is about or determined by.

My use of the term subjectivities (or subjects) refers to that identity which emerges as a symptom of the articulation of the difference (or diff\textsuperscript{\textendash}rance [J. Derrida]) between 'self' and 'other' - that product of boundary-making practices which marks a position - upon which further action may be based. The identity so construed is thus historically contingent (insofar as it emerges as a product of historical forces) and socially situated by and through language [or signifying system] (in which naming practices play a significant role).
3.51 US Charges of Soviet Noncompliance:

(a) Hardened Silo Construction

Article I of the Interim Agreement states:

'The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.'

When the Interim Agreement entered into force, the number of operational ICBMs each Party was permitted to have totalled 1618 for the Soviet Union and 1054 for the United States. In 1973, US intelligence sources determined that an additional 150 silos were being constructed by the Soviets at ICBM fields along the Trans-Siberian Railway in Soviet Asia. If these silos were destined to contain ICBM launchers, then they would have constituted a violation of Article I of the Interim Agreement.

The United States raised this concern in the SCC. The Soviets responded that the excavations were for hardened launch-control facilities for 'testing and training purposes.' The intelligence evidence was ambiguous, purporting to show a remarkable degree of similarity between the characteristics of these 'launch-control' facilities and those of conventional ICBM complexes. The characteristics in question included their cylindrical shape, with 'blow-away' doors and launcher-type suspension equipment. The Congressional Record notes this ambiguity as a 'potential cause for concern' on the grounds that these launch-control facilities could be virtually dual-capable. That said, the use of these facilities for the purposes stated by the Soviet Union are permitted under the Interim Agreement, and moreover, are further
justified by the United States' Letter of Submittal for the ABM Treaty\textsuperscript{218} which held that launchers of this type could 'be constructed at operation sites.'

While the U.S. State Department report, taking the view of the SCC (see section Image II in this chapter) concluded that:

"In early 1977, following further discussions during 1975 and 1979 and a review of our intelligence on this subject, the US decided to close discussion of this matter on the basis that the silos in question are currently used as launch-control facilities."

The legalistic view (Image I, this chapter) was presented by the 'hawkish' US Senate expressed in the \textit{Congressional Record} (17/8/78):

It would appear that the Soviets would risk the illegal installation of some 150 new missiles, knowing that a program of such magnitude could not go undetected. However, the Department report does not deal with the question of whether former launch control facilities have been properly dismantled, in the light of which the additional silos could theoretically serve a purpose beyond that specified by the Soviet Union.

That these views coincide with those of members of the Committee on the Present Danger shows the extent to which the conservative backlash to the Nixon-Ford era of arms control was already taking hold in the US Congress. These views are an important factor in understanding the failure of SALT II ratification.

\textbf{(b) Concealment Measures impeding Verification by NTM}

Article XII of the ABM Treaty states:

\footnote{218 US Secretary of State to the President June 10, 1972.}
1. For the purposes of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognised principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article V(3) of the Interim Agreement contains a similar provision:

Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement.

These national technical means, as explained elsewhere in this chapter, refer principally to the use of photoreconnaissance satellites and electronic surveillance systems, so concern with concealment practices can refer to both visual and electronic concealment.

Soviet practices which suggest concealment had been monitored by the United States before and after the conclusion of the 1972 SALT agreements, however, during 1974, the US State Department Report noted that the extent of concealment activities concerning Soviet strategic weapons programs "increased substantially." The Report also noted that these activities did not prevent the US from verifying compliance with the provisions of either the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement. There was concern expressed that if the pattern of concealment continued to expand, then these could impede verification in the future. The United States raised the issue for discussion with the Soviets in the SCC, in particular, there were
concerns over the placing of canvas covers and planking over extensive sections of prefabrication, assembly and re-fit facilities for ballistic missile submarines (Delta Class) at the Severmorosk construction yard on the Kola peninsula. Moreover, similar coverings had been noted at the Khabarovsk facilities in Siberia, in addition to other strategic construction sites throughout the Soviet Union.

A 1975 review of the intelligence information on activities in the USSR led the United States to conclude that there 'no longer' appeared to be an expanding pattern of concealment activities associated with strategic weapons programs.

In 1977, however, US intelligence information noted a large net covering over an ICBM test launcher undergoing conversion at a Soviet test site. The Congressional Record (p.26693) suggests that the site was probably Plesetsk that had been used to test the mobile SS-X-16. Concern was expressed to the Soviet delegation in the SCC that a covering which conceals activities at an ICBM silo from national technical means of verification "could reduce the confidence and trust which are important to mutual efforts to establish and maintain strategic arms limitations."219

Although the Soviets argued that the provisions of the Interim Agreement were not applicable in this case, the nets were subsequently removed.

219 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79]
The point here, is that the authors of the US State Department Report (see note 116) place their emphasis on the ongoing process of arms limitation and arms control, and on the relationship which engenders such arms control. The same cannot be said of the authors of the Congressional Record who dwell, not on the relationship, but on the mistrust that labels any level of verification inadequate. As they express it:

Assuming that the SS-X-16 mobile ICBM is involved, it must be emphasised that the Soviets have been less than forthcoming with regard to information about the production rate and/or deployment posture of the system. As such, any deliberate concealment activity complicates the process of determining whether a permissible replacement has been effected or an illegal expansion of the Soviet land-based missile force is being pursued. It is somewhat problematic to speak of mutually agreed limits, inasmuch as the Soviet Union has provided no hard data concerning its weapons inventories. The figures derive, instead from US intelligence estimates. At any rate the burden of proof that only (legally) acceptable developments are concealed must be held to rest with the Party attempting the concealment. It may be that Soviet compliance was ultimately induced less by American blandishments, and more by the simple fact of their having acquired the level of test information necessary for certain strategic purposes. Moreover, the language of Article V of the Interim Agreement equally obscures interpretations of permissible silo-launcher conversion practices.²²⁰

By focusing blame on ambiguities in the treaty language, the conservatives in Congress were able to erode the efforts of the arms control community to articulate the Other (in this case the Soviet Union) in terms of strategies of inclusion (through the relationship established through the arms control process). By articulating the Other in threat terms (implied by the suggestion that they were operating

²²⁰ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 26693
independently of US 'blandishments') the conservatives seek to build a cumulative weight of instances in which the Soviets may be viewed as expansionist and barely 'contained' by the vigilant gaze of the United States.

(c) Conversion of Launchers from Light to Heavy ICBM

With the aim of restricting Soviet missile payload, and hence its hard-target counterforce potential, limits were placed upon the numbers of 'heavy' ICBMs it could have under SALT I (313 SS-9s and follow-ons). The definition of precisely what constituted a 'heavy' ICBM however was left ambiguous.

Under Article II of the Interim Agreement:

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Common Understanding 'A' to the Interim Agreement was based on Ambassador Smith's statement on May 26, 1972 which states:

The Parties agree that the term "significantly increased" means that an increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers.

Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

However, although agreement was reached on the restrictions to the dimensions of launchers there was to be no such agreement on a definition for 'heavy' ICBMs. The frustration of the US side is evident in their Unilateral Statement (May 26, 1972) on 'heavy' ICBMs:
The US Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the US Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any missile having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The United States proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration.

When it was established that the SS-11 ICBM system, the largest light ICBM then operational on either side with a volume of 69 cubic metres, was being replaced with the SS-19 'heavy ICBM whose volume was approximately 100 cubic metres, The United States charged the Soviet Union with violating the Interim Agreement. The conservative 'legalists,' served notice that:

[the United States] would consider any missile with a volume exceeding 70 cubic metres to be a 'heavy' missile, thus absolutely qualifying the SS-19 for inclusion in this category.

The fact remained that the Soviet Union had not violated the letter of the Interim Agreement or the Common Understanding, insofar as they had not increased the dimensions of the silo launchers beyond 10-15 percent.

The Soviet Union maintained throughout SALT I that an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM was unnecessary in the context of the Interim Agreement and made clear that they did not agree with the US Unilateral Statement. That said, however, the US State Department, in raising the issue was less concerned about the SS-19 in relation to SALT I, but rather sought to "emphasise the importance the US attached to the distinction made in the context of the SALT II agreement under negotiation at the time. This was surprisingly thin ground on which to base a charge of violation, given that practitioners
on both sides of the SCC attribute, in large measure, the success of the SCC to its restriction to clarifying the strict terms of the treaties within its mandate. Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in the draft agreements of SALT II, on a clear demarcation, in terms of missile launch-weight and throw-weight, between light and heavy ICBMs.

(d) Testing of Air Defence Radar (SA-5) in an ABM Mode

The ABM treaty states that both parties agree under Article VI that for the purposes of enhancing assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the treaty:

...each Party undertakes: a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles, or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode... [and] ... b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outwards.

Radars used for purposes such as range safety and instrumentation are exempt from this ban. The SA-5 Griffon radar and the SA-2 Guideline radar are conventional air-defence radars deployed throughout the Soviet Union at a number of sites, including, the Sary Shagan test range. The Soviets have periodically operated surface-to-air missiles (SAM) radars at the Sary Shagan test range during ABM test flights.

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Operating these radars concurrently with testing of ballistic missiles raised US concerns that the Soviets could be testing the potential for using air-defence radars for ABM defence.

On April 7, 1972 the United States had made a Unilateral Statement to clarify their interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode." They noted, that they would consider a radar to be so tested if, for example, it makes measurements on a 'cooperative target vehicle' during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. They further stated that they would consider an infraction to have occurred if "an interceptor missile ... [was] flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defences are deployed." US satellite reconnaissance of Soviet SA-5 test firings at the Kapustin Yar desert range north of the Caspian Sea gave "circumstantial indications" that the missile's radar system may have been tracking ballistic vehicles during the reentry phase of their flight trajectory into ABM test ranges. They added that radars used for purposes such as range safety, or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

The Soviet Union argued (May 5, 1972) that high altitude non-ABM radars were permissible in 'range safety and instrumental' roles for purposes of precision tracking and data collection outside of agreed test sites such as Sary Shagan. The Senate Congressional Record account argued that the Soviets, while rejecting any inference that they might

222 This refers to testing at altitudes in excess of 30,000 metres.

223 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 26693
be developing ABM capabilities through the conversion or upgrading of current surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, remained 'noncommittal' over the types of radar technologies (phased or non-phased array) that were acceptable for deployment at facilities outside those of the agreed ABM test ranges.

The US were concerned in 1973 and 1974 when Soviet test ballistic missiles were tracked using the SA-5 radar. The US State Department Report\textsuperscript{224} notes that the importance of this issue was the question of whether or not the Soviets were attempting to either upgrade the SA-5 for ABM capability or to obtain data for useful in developing a new dual-capable SAM/ABM system. The Report (section III(D)) points out that after formal representations by the US delegates to the SCC "...the radar activity of concern during Soviet ballistic missile tests had ceased." The \textit{Congressional Record} dismisses the Soviet argument that, as the SA-5 radars had been used only to track the incoming reentry vehicle during the test, this did not constitute testing 'in an ABM mode' on the grounds that other radars on the test range rendered use of the SA-5 radar redundant for instrumentation purposes.

One reason for this, given in the \textit{Congressional Record}, refers to Section V(c) of the State Department Report which deals with ABM testing of air-defence missiles:

\begin{quote}
Our close monitoring of activities in this field has not indicated that ABM tests or any tests against strategic ballistic missiles have been conducted with an air-defence missile;
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{224} US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79
specifically, they have not observed any such tests of the SA-5 defence system missile, the one occasionally mentioned in this connection in the open press. 225

The *Congressional Record* noted that the SA-5 defence system is two-pronged, having both a radar component and a missile component. That one component of this system was tested extensively, (the radar component) the other, 'necessary for its effective functioning' was alleged by the State Department Report to have not been tested in this period, was held by the *Congressional Record* to 'seem strange.' The Soviets argued that to have done so, would have been in contravention of the Article VI of the ABM Treaty.

An agreement reached in the SCC in 1978 redefined the phrase "in an ABM mode" to ban any concurrent testing of ABM and air defence components other than for the detection [and presumably tracking] of potentially hostile aircraft that are clearly and demonstrably in the area.” The *Congressional Record* points out that the Understanding requires a party seeking an exception to provide justification for the exception within a period of thirty days or at the next SCC meeting whichever occurs first.226 Duffy (1988) argues that the US concerns over the SA-5 issue were "debatable from the start" on the grounds that:

The SA-5 system is marginal for intercepting ballistic missiles with a high weight-to-drag ratio.

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225 (Congressional Record p. 4964).

226 This understanding languished in the SCC from 1982 until 1985 because of interagency disputes in the United States over the appropriate US approach to the SCC. Finally, at the spring 1985 SCC session, the United States and the Soviet Union signed this common understanding. In its December 1985 noncompliance report, the US administration classified this charge as based on evidence“insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM treaty.”
Further evidence that the violation, if it was one was marginal at worst, comes from the US State Department Report (1979). This report held that if the activity in question was designed to upgrade the SA-5 system, then it would have only been one step in an effort that would require substantial and, more importantly, observable modifications to other components of the system. It points out that these modifications have not occurred. It must be noted, however, that although the Soviets did indeed cease the activity of concern, more than a dozen tests had been conducted before the United States made their formal notification demanding suspension of the activity. The Congressional Record assesses this as 'a number sufficient to accumulate the information desired'.

The US continued to monitor Soviet activities related to this issue, but none was noted until 1985, when the Soviets once more resumed operations of the SA-5 radar during missile tests. The US raised the issue in the SCC and the Soviet activity ceased.

(e) Excess ABM Test Launchers

Article IV of the ABM Treaty states:

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

The detailed procedures regulating the dismantling of test launchers beyond the agreed limit were developed in the Standing Consultative Commission and entered into force on July 3, 1972.

In 1973, the Soviet Union advised the US SCC Delegation that excess launchers had been dismantled in compliance with the provisions of Article IV of the ABM Treaty. US intelligence information determined,
however, that several launchers were still in place. That is, they had not been dismantled in compliance with the procedures established in the SCC, but rather, had been deactivated\textsuperscript{227}. As the US State Department Report notes:

"Even though the launchers were deactivated prior to the entry into force of the procedures, and their reactivation would be of no strategic significance, the US raised the matter as a case of inaccurate notification or reporting to make known our expectation that in the future care would be taken to ensure that notification, as well as dismantling or destruction, was in strict accord with the agreed procedures." (CRp.6963)

This was a way of putting the Soviets on notice that the US intended the dismantling procedures to be adhered-to strictly, and that the national technical means of verification would reveal any activities that could be construed as inconsistent with the Treaty. By regarding the infringement as 'inaccurate notification' the US State Department, once again, is placing emphasis on the ongoing relationship represented by the treaty, rather than as a structure which permits of behaviours as absolute adherence or non-adherence to the law.

This latter view emerges in the Congressional Record\textsuperscript{228}

Given the Soviet propensity to exploit loopholes to the outer limits of legal acceptability, this admonition has a somewhat hollow ring. Even though the alleged infraction was not considered strategically significant, the implications of even minor deviations are of greater interest for what they reveal about Soviet behaviour than is the fact of temporary Soviet compliance. [emphasis mine]. The inaccuracy of preliminary Soviet notifications inevitably calls into question the USSR's

\textsuperscript{227} See US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS. HEARING BEFORE THE US SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79

\textsuperscript{228} Congressional Record 17/8/78 p.26693
commitment to arms control measures which strengthen mutual confidence and promote "equal security."

(f) ABM Radar on Kamchatka Peninsula

Article IV of the ABM Treaty states:

"The limitations provided for in Article III [on deployment] shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges."

In October 1975 a new radar was installed at the Kamchatka impact area of the Soviet ICBM test range. Since Article IV exempts from the limitations of Article III only those ABM components used for development or testing at current, or additionally agreed ranges, the United States became concerned that the location of this radar, which the United States identified as an ABM radar, on the Kamchatka Peninsula, could have constituted establishment of a new Soviet ABM test range.

Questions arose over the newness of this Soviet test range, and for two reasons. Firstly, in 1972, just prior to the conclusion of the SALT negotiations, the US delegation provided a list to the Soviets, of US and Soviet test ranges. This list did not include the Kamchatka impact area. The Soviet side was under instructions to neither confirm nor deny the accuracy or completeness of the list, claiming that 'the use of national technical means assured against misunderstandings of Article IV; and secondly, by noting that there was a previous and older type ABM radar on the site, this could be construed as having established the presence of an older type of ABM radar at the date of signing.

Although not strategically significant the location of the radar was deemed by the US to warrant raising with the Soviets in the SCC for clarification.

Noting that a range containing a radar instrumentation complex existed at that site on the date of signature of the ABM Treaty, the Soviets stated that they would be prepared to establish that the Kamchatka range a 'current test range' within the meaning of Article IV of the ABM Treaty. The United States continued exchanges within the SCC to establish Kamchatka as test range within the meaning of Article IV of the ABM Treaty and that this, with the Sary Shagan range are the only two 'current test ranges' within the meaning of the treaty. Article IV requires agreement over the establishment of new, or additional test ranges.

There is agreement between the US and the Soviet Union concerning the two points (recognising the Kamchatka range as an ABM test range, and that the Kamchatka and Sary Shagan are the only two ABM test ranges in the Soviet Union. On the third point, however, discussions are continuing on the protocols and procedures for discussing and agreeing upon the establishment of an ABM test range.

(g) Exceeding Numerical ICBM Launcher Limits

Under the terms and provisions of the Interim Agreement Article III states:

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and, in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of
older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

and its Protocol of May 26, 1972, the Soviet Union was permitted to deploy no more than 950 SLBM launchers and 62 modern, nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines -up to 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational only as one-for-one replacements for ballistic missile launchers on older submarines which would be dismantled or destroyed under agreed procedures. "The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted" for each side.

Under the Agreed Interpretations, Initialed Statement K of the Interim Agreement emphasises the timing of the dismantling or destruction of older ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers on older submarines, stating that:

The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

These dismantlement procedures were developed and agreed in the SCC and came into force on July 3, 1974.

In 1976 the Soviets had 'developed a requirement' to dismantle 51 replaced launchers. The United States determined that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to complete the prescribed dismantling in
accordance with the procedures specified in the SCC agreement, within the required time. Accordingly, the United States decided to raise the issue in the SCC. The Soviets, however, raised the question on their own initiative, explaining that technical obstacles had delayed progress on dismantling. They set a target date of June 1, 1976 for completion, and agreed that no new submarines with replacement SLBM launchers would begin sea trials before such completion. The US State Department report confirmed that both conditions were subsequently met.

As Sydney Graybeal described the issue:

As a submarine leaves for sea trials - that means, when it leaves its port and not when it moves within the port - that is the starting date from which you begin to dismantle or destroy the ICBM launcher, which is the replaced launcher for the SLBM that is going to sea. So, the idea is that 4 months from the date the ICBM launchers, which were SS-7's and SS-8's, would be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with agreed procedures and within 4 months those would go out of the inventory and the submarine launcher would begin to count when the submarine went to sea. In the Jack Anderson article230 he is stating that those that went to sea counted, but the ones that were being dismantled or destroyed had not been dismantled or destroyed, and therefore they were still in the inventory and therefore you had an excess of ICBM and SLBM launchers.231

Graybeal argued that, despite the fact that the Soviets had an excess of launchers, the excess launchers were far from operational232. He stated


231 Ibid.

232 According to Graybeal, the missile launchers were about 80% dismantled according to the procedures. Op Cit. p.24.
that the purpose behind the procedures that had been worked out in the SCC was to assure that the launcher in question was put into a condition that precluded its ability to launch missiles in less time than it took to build a new one. This involved the removal of a whole series of items.

Mr. GRAYBEAL. [Deleted.] So, I think this is one case where the Soviets were in clear violation of the SCC procedures - it is the only case of a violation - in the sense that they did not dismantle or destroy these launchers within the 4 months prescribed period. I do not believe that they had an excess of operational launchers during that particular period, 233

The State Department report concluded that:

Since that time, although we have observed some minor procedural discrepancies at a number of those deactivated launch sites and at others as the replacement process continued, all the launchers have been in a condition that satisfied the essential substantive requirements, which are that they cannot be used to launch missiles and cannot be reactivated in a short time. As necessary we have pursued the question of complete and precise accomplishment of the detailed requirements of the agreed procedures. 234

In short, for all practical purposes the US State Department were satisfied that there was compliance with the agreed procedures.

Once again, however, the Congressional Record, with judicious use of double negatives seems intent on emphasising the potential for marginal infraction by the Soviets:

The acknowledged "procedural discrepancies" suggests that the Soviets are not unprepared to take incremental

233 Ibid

234 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79 p. 3
advantages of what may be perceived as a relaxation of its surveillance efforts ... Viewed against the backdrop of overall Soviet strategic efforts, the Administration cannot dismiss lightly even minor abridgements of provisions governing the launcher replacement process.235

Such a formulation as "not unprepared to ..." fails to specify what the Soviets are prepared to do. While not directly slanderous, this statement is clearly designed to imply patterns of behaviour that are not spelled out in the US State Department report. These patterns support an adversarial image of the Soviets.

**(h) Development and Testing of Mobile ABM Radars**

Article V(1) of the ABM Treaty states:

> Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

Definitional ambiguity emerged over the term 'mobile.'

In an attempt to clarify the matter Common Understanding C of the ABM Treaty, which relates to mobile ABM systems, was made by the US Delegation on January 29, 1972.

Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the US side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the US side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

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235 *CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 "PRINCIPAL ALLEGED SOVIET VIOLATIONS RELATING TO THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY"* p.26691.
On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

According to the Congressional Record several radars associated with an ABM system have been installed at designated ABM test sites since 1971. Those at Sary Shagan reportedly 'possess properties which obscure the necessary distinctions between normally verifiable stationary systems and those with mobile capabilities236' which could presumably evade detection. The ambiguity rested upon the relative rapidity with which the new radars could be assembled. That is, they could be assembled over a period of months rather than years. These phased-array radars employ electronic steering of the beam for direction and elevation. That is important, because the older, mechanically- steered radars would have been too slow for ICBM tracking. Electromagnetic steering of the beam enables fast and multiple target acquisition and tracking.

Evidence given by Senator Percy237 indicates that the radar was judged to be 'rapidly deployable' rather than 'mobile' and that was still built on a substantial concrete base 'that requires an excavation.' According to the Congressional Record the US intelligence community wanted the issue raised in order to gain a negotiated definition of 'mobile' and, by settling this matter, to avoid the potential for exploiting the ambiguity in the treaty language, not only for the ABM Treaty, but,

236 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE. 17/8/78. p. 26693

237 Briefing on SALT I Compliance HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 96th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION, SEPTEMBER 25,1979, DECLASSIFIED AND MADE PUBLIC NOVEMBER 7, 1979. p.26
more importantly, for the SALT II Treaty that was under negotiation at the time.\textsuperscript{238}

3.52 Soviet Charges of US Noncompliance

a) Shelters over Minuteman Silos

Paragraph 3 of Article V of the Interim Agreement states:

Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion or overhaul practices.

From 1962 to 1972 the United States used shelters of either 300 or 700 square feet over Minuteman ICBM silos to provide weather protection during initial construction and modernisation. From 1973, substantially larger prefabricated shelters were used that were some 2,700 square feet. These were, again primarily for weather protection, or, as the US State Department puts it "environmental protection" shelters. From four to twelve of these were placed over silos for periods of time ranging from 10 days to 4 weeks "depending on the severity of the weather."\textsuperscript{239}

\textsuperscript{238} CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 26693

\textsuperscript{239} US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79 p. 4. Duffy, in Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.50, notes that the United States claimed that these shelters were designed to protect workers against the weather and to assist the curing of the concrete, while hardening bases in the Midwest areas that are subject to heavy winter snow.
The Soviets raised the issue, first in 1973 through diplomatic and political channels, then, from 1975 in the SCC on the grounds that these shelters could be construed as deliberate concealment and therefore as inconsistent with the provisions of Article V of the Interim Agreement. If this were the case, they argued, then the shelters must be removed. The United States disagreed, on the grounds that the shelters were for weather protection and were not therefore for concealment. On this basis, the United States side argued that the shelters were not inconsistent with Article V of the Interim Agreement.

In early 1977, after four years of Soviet negotiations, the United States decided to modify the shelters by reducing them in size by almost 50%. The Soviets continued to object in the SCC on the grounds that the shelters impede verification by national technical means. The United States maintained that the shelters were not for deliberate concealment and, in Duffy's words, "stalled on making further changes." 240

In November 1978 the Soviets raised the issue in terms of their ability to distinguish between launchers equipped with Minuteman II (non-MIRVed) and those equipped with Minuteman III (MIRVed) ICBMs. They argued that the problem was exacerbated by the use of shelters over the Minuteman launchers. While the United States side maintained their position that the shelters were for environmental protection they recognised the difficulties they were making for their own ability to raise similar questions about Soviet launcher

240 Duffy Op Cit p.51
coverings.\textsuperscript{241} The United States then "in the interests of satisfying both sides' verification concerns" indicated that they would be prepared to remove and operate without the shelters. By May 1979, at the end of the SALT II negotiations, and after the silo modernisation program was completed, the United States ceased using the shelters.

The United States and the Soviet Union issued a common understanding to Paragraph 3 of Article XV of the SALT II Treaty that prohibits the use of shelters over ICBM launchers in such a way as to impede verification by national technical means.

b) Shemya Radar (COBRA DANE)

Article III of the ABM Treaty states:

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except:

a) within one ABM system deployment area ... centred on the Party's national capital ... and

b) within one ABM system deployment area ... containing ICBM silo launchers ... [and no more than two] large phased-array ABM radars.

In 1973 the United States commenced construction on a new large phased-array radar on Shemya Island in Alaska at the western end of the Aleutian Islands.\textsuperscript{242} According to the US State Department Report, the radar was to be used for national technical means of verification, deep space tracking, and early warning. The radar became operational

\textsuperscript{241} See Briefing on SALT I Compliance Op Cit.

\textsuperscript{242} US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9/79 p. 4.
in 1977. In 1975, the Soviet Union questioned this designated use and requested clarification of the issue, as the radar appeared to be potentially an ABM radar which would not have been permitted at this location under the terms of Article III of the ABM Treaty. After representations by the United States Delegation, the Soviet side considered the issue to have been resolved. One may note, however, that this Soviet charge arose at about the same time that the United States raised the Kamchatka radar issue with the Soviets. It is possible, therefore that the Soviets chose to raise this issue in the spirit of reciprocity.

c) Privacy of SCC Proceedings

Paragraph 8 of the Protocol, with Regulations, regarding the US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission states:

The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners.\textsuperscript{243}

In 1975 a number of articles were published in the popular press which alleged Soviet cheating on the SALT agreements.\textsuperscript{244} These appeared not long before the special SCC session on compliance issues. The Soviets expressed concern about the importance of confidentiality in the work of the SCC and in particular, concern about press items that appeared to have been officially sanctioned by the US government.


\textsuperscript{244} The most notable of these being the article by Melvin Laird that appeared in the Reader's Digest
The United States reaffirmed the usefulness of maintaining confidentiality, while noting that in the United States the public had a right to be kept informed in an open society. The US further noted that although the public had a right to an informed opinion, that the proceedings themselves would continue to remain private.

d) Dismantling of Radar at Malstrom AFB

At the time of the signing of the ABM Treaty on May 26, 1972, the United States had ABM defences under construction at two ICBM deployment areas. Under Article III(b) each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components at more than one ABM system deployment area "containing ICBM silo launchers."

Construction, at that time, was in its early stages at the Malstrom Air Force base in Montana. Procedures were negotiated for the dismantling or destruction of the ABM facilities as part of the Protocol on Procedures for ABM Systems and their Components, which was signed on July 4, 1974.

The required dismantling was, according to the State Department Report, completed by May 1, 1974. Sometime in late 1974, the United States notified the Soviet in the SCC that the dismantling had been completed. The Soviet Delegation raised one question about a detailed aspect of the dismantling procedures. The United States produced photographs of the before, during and after phases of the dismantling process. This resolved the question.
e) Creation of Large-Scale ABM Defence System (PAVE PAWS)

In 1972, when the ABM Treaty was signed, the United States had deployed two large radars on its territory as part of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). These comprised the FPS-85 phased-array radar in Florida and a non-phased-array radar in Clear, Alaska.

Article I (2) of the ABM Treaty states:

> Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defence, and not to deploy ABM systems for defence of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

In Article VI (b) each Party undertakes:

> ... not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Agreed Interpretation [F], initialed by the Heads of Delegation, on May 26, 1972 states:

> The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square metres) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

The BMEWS system complied with the provisions of the ABM Treaty and Agreed Interpretation as set out above. Since then, the United States has built a large phased-array radar (LPAR) on Shemya Island.

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245 This system was an upgraded version of the Distance Early Warning (DEW) system of the late 1950s.
and commenced construction of two other LPARS (PAVE PAWS) for SLBM early warning. These were based at Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts, and Beale AFB, California.

LPARs can perform a variety of military functions. In October 1978 the Soviets noted their concern that the PAVE PAWS radars, coupled with other US LPARS, could constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty's prohibition on laying the base for an ABM defence. The United States declared that the purpose of the PAVE PAWS radar network is to provide early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack (which is permitted under the terms of the ABM Treaty), and that the radars in question were simply replacements for older early warning radars that had become obsolete. The United States argued that as a secondary function the radars would be used to track objects in outer space. The Soviets noted the US clarification of the issue. That said, it is appropriate to discuss briefly the technical features of LPARs with an eye to their potential for a dual-capable role as both early warning, and battle management LPARs.

Early warning LPARs are optimised to operate at the frequencies at which reentry vehicles most efficiently reflect electromagnetic waves. These frequencies allow the clearest detection of a reentry vehicle over the longest range by a radar of fixed antenna size and power. To provide rapid early warning and LPAR must have a high average power and a very large antenna. That is to say, it requires a high potential under the definition of the ABM Agreed Interpretation [F] cited above. The potentials\textsuperscript{246} (watts x metres\textsuperscript{2}) of the PAVE PAWS and

\textsuperscript{246} Sometimes referred to as the 'power-aperture product' - see Duffy, Gloria. \textit{Compliance and the Future of Arms Control}. Stanford: Stanford University and Global
BMEWS LPARs are more than 40 million and 1.8 billion respectively. Duffy points out that basically all surveillance radars that can fulfil a strategic ballistic missile early warning function require potentials far greater than the 3 million specified in the Agreed Interpretation, while those below the 3 million threshold are restricted in the range at which they can operate.

ABM Battle management LPARs need to operate at a far higher frequency than that required by early warning dedicated radars. As the frequency increases, so the range decreases, so that radars optimised for battle management will not give maximum warning, and vice versa. Moreover, in determining the usefulness of a LPAR for ABM battle management, consideration has to given to the extent to which it is networked into a battle management system.

Krass notes that, while radars may be optimised for one or other purpose, their performance characteristics are "virtually indistinguishable from those needed to support an ABM system." The ability of a phased-array radar to function as national technical means of verification, while being an apparent violation of the provisions of an arms control agreement, renders a technical solution to the problem unworkable. Here then, is another instance such which at first sight seems to be a purely technical problem, can be seen, on closer examination to be in fact a political/discursive problem.


247 Duffy *Op Cit.* p.91 cites the figure of ten-times the frequency at which early warning surveillance LPARS operate.
f) Exceeding Numerical Launcher Limits (Atlas, Titan-I)

The detailed dismantling procedures agreed in the SCC governing excess ICBM launchers, includes the principle that reactivation of dismantled launchers should take substantially longer to reactivate than to construct new ones. One hundred and seventy-seven obsolete launchers for Atlas and Titan-1 ICBM systems are distributed across the United States continent at various locations. They were all deactivated by the end of 1966.

In 1975 the Soviets' Delegation raised a question concerning the status of these launchers with respect to their potential for reactivation. According to the State Department report the United States were of the view that, as the launchers in question were obsolete and had been deactivated prior to the signing of the Interim Agreement, they were not governed by the accompanying protocol on deactivation and destruction of excess launchers. The United States provided information on their status and condition which supported the view that they could be neither activated quickly nor easily. In mid 1975 discussion on the question ceased.

Compliance challenge and identity

Non-compliance is an issue of security, and by extension, of identity. Non-compliance threatens, not just marginal aspects of strategic stability but the image of sovereign integrity - it represents a notional potential for penetration by the Other. Such a view is predicated upon the traditional realist state-centric theory of the dyad: domestic order/international anarchy. Thus, in symbolic terms, even at the levels of overkill available in the nuclear equation, any arms control 'breakout,' no matter how marginal, represents a symbolic victory of
the other, without a physical shot being fired. The same arguably holds for advances in verification technologies such as to raise the level of deterrence of noncompliance, as applied to the relationship between so-called 'Hiders' and 'Finders'.

Image I: The legal view

The legal view holds that any violation of a legally binding agreement, no matter how small is still a violation in principle. This view applies, moreover, to "the application of mandatory norms" rather than to the application of what are, strictly speaking, "confidence building measures" which are not, in themselves contrary to the law.248 UNIDIR separates the verification aspect of agreements from CBMs, defining these CBMs in terms of establishing "primary obligations" - what must be done or not done [facts, data, or situations] - which are ends in themselves. Verification, on the other hand, establishes "secondary obligations," that is, norms that operate by virtue of other norms, making verification a form of 'meta-norm' or legal norm.249 This problem has become particularly apparent with respect to so-called 'tacit understandings' in terms of the application of unilateral statements, such that a party issues a unilateral statement which, if left unchallenged by the other party, is understood to become the basis for a new behavioural norm.

It is particularly in this arena that Trimble argues that "the emphasis placed on Soviet 'violations' of 'agreements' is at best highly

248 UNIDIR A Legal Approach to Verification in Disarmament or Arms Limitation NY: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 1988/3-4

249 UNIDIR in note 99 p.4
misleading, in that the important distinction between legally binding agreements and political commitments has been muddled.\textsuperscript{250}

For the purposes of analysing the legal image the distinction between legally binding agreements and political commitments is an important one. In the light of the Carter administration, and particularly the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on \textit{Soviet Compliance with Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements} and the 1979 Buchheim \textit{Briefing on SALT I Compliance}, this issue emerges from the outset as highlighting the political over the strategic implications of arms control, with respect to structural ambiguities in the texts of the Agreements and with respect to the use of unilateral statements to indicate political intention.

Senator Henry Jackson stated on March 6, 1975:

\ldots a significant part of the problem we face in assessing whether the Soviets are in compliance with the 1972 agreements is of our government's own making. By resorting to so-called unilateral statements as a device for building into the 1972 agreements limitations that could not be negotiated, the Nixon administration set the stage for the current drama of ambiguity and confusion.\textsuperscript{251}

The matter was raised with specific reference to the issue of the definition of 'light' versus 'heavy' missiles. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger noted that in a unilateral statement, the US defined a heavy ICBM as one which had a volume 'significantly greater than the


\textsuperscript{251} Testimony of Senator Henry Jackson \textit{Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements} Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control 94th Cong. 1st Session March 6, 1975/2
largest 'light' ICBM then deployed (1972) which at that time was the Soviet SS-11\textsuperscript{252}. In 1972, defence Secretary Melvin Laird interpreted that statement to mean a 30\% increase was construed as 'significant'. The new Soviet SS-19 ICBM was some 50\% larger by volume than the SS-11. Thus the Soviets were accused of violating 'the spirit of the Agreement', in the absence of any formally agreed definition. The issue was 'resolved' in the SCC by accepting the SS-19 as the ceiling size for a 'light' ICBM.

As one of four instances of 'ambiguous' compliance\textsuperscript{253}, James Schlesinger suggested that for legal purposes there should be "more specificity in the provisions and more comprehensive collateral restraints" and that the US "should not make unilateral statements in association with future agreements."\textsuperscript{254} The point he makes is that the difficulty with charging the Soviets with non-compliance is that unilateral statements are not legally binding documents. As Schlesinger points out:

\textsuperscript{252} See President Richard Nixon's \textit{Letter of Transmissal} to Congress in transmitting the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement June 13, 1972 p.16:

"The United States has also made clear that it would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side, which is the SS-11, to be a heavy missile."

\textsuperscript{253} Schlesinger invokes a distinction between two types of ambiguity in compliance problems - those that are 'inherently ambiguous' and those that are 'deliberately ambiguous', in which the former are said to 'lend themselves to solutions over time' and the latter which arguably do not.

\textsuperscript{254} Testimony of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger \textit{Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements} Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control 94th Cong. 1st Session March 6, 1975/4
... the expectations that the administration had went unfulfilled. But that is not a violation by the Soviet Union

Schlesinger, wants to distinguish the use of unilateral statements from the treaty, thereby placing into separate realms for analysis the realm of the legal and the realm of the ongoing relationship between the parties to the treaty through ongoing arms control negotiations, which may be termed the 'political', viewing the use of unilateral statements as having sent the 'wrong' signals. As he puts it:

we had a propensity to indulge in fairly strong statements on the premise that it would put us in a position of seeming very firm, and in fact it probably turns out to indicate its reverse.

What seems to be at issue here is the degree of focus and intended outcome or purpose of arms control agreements and their associated texts. Those in the SCC negotiating community, and many in the arms control community at large support the view that arms control agreements are merely (albeit important) staging points in an ongoing process. This view in fact appears to have been dominant in the formation of the arms control 'epistemic community' from Ford to Carter, especially throughout the SALT I negotiation process.

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255 Testimony of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control 94th Cong. 1st Session March 6, 1975/8


The legal view is primarily document-based and event-driven. Whilst, tactically important, such a view is limited and tends to neglect the broader political context - the *raison d'être* of arms control itself. As Lowenthal and Wit point out, treaties are commonly thought of as the 'end product of a process' - the 'conclusion of a negotiation') whereas this view holds for the majority of treaties, arms control treaties (among others as for example environmental emissions treaties) require ongoing and constant supervision. As Lowenthal and Wit state:

"In the case of arms control agreements, the actual signing and enactment of treaties are largely transition points in the negotiations."

From the latter part of the Carter administration, the political stakes of verification were raised, from those of deterring or detecting treaty violations, and strengthening domestic support for arms control, to a point where this issue has risen into virtual opposition to the broader aims of arms control.

Nevertheless the view held consistently by the SALT negotiators and the US SCC delegations has emphasised the ongoing nature of arms

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259 *Ibid*

260 in other words, the profile of verification was raised from that of an instrumental assurance of compliance into that of a political device which prevented the conclusion of new arms control agreements.
control - seen in terms of an ongoing process rather than as a dispersed set of completed treaty negotiations.

Henry Kissinger makes this point with respect to the distinction to be drawn between the legal view and the 'confidence-building' view:

...the two countries have a unique opportunity right now to move into an entirely different relationship of building additional trusts. If it turns out that through legalistic interpretations of provisions that - through failing to specify the numbers about which we have absolutely no doubt as to our interpretation, and which are hereby reaffirmed. If it should turn out that these numbers are being challenged in any significant way at all, then this would cast a doubt. It would not only threaten disagreement, but it would threaten the whole basis of this new relationship which I have described. [sic]

The view of the SCC (established to oversee the SALT treaties) hinges on the concept of adequate verification: that is, on the ability to detect violations of "such a magnitude as to modify the nuclear balance... in time to make an appropriate response." One of its key assumptions is that the emphasis rests on the relationship between the Parties rather than on the treaties themselves - that militarily significant non-compliance would reduce the confidence-building function of the arms control process. This is underlined by Sydney Graybeal in his testimony on Soviet compliance with SALT I, where he stresses the importance of raising issues relating to compliance questions as an aspect of maintaining the relationship between the parties:


There must be a will to raise compliance questions or ambiguous situations as soon as we have our facts straight. The viability of any arms control agreement requires early clarification of compliance questions. Raising and clarifying such issues contributes to the confidence in the agreement. Deferring or delaying adds suspicions and uncertainties and could encourage the Soviets to test our will and our intelligence capabilities even more.\textsuperscript{263}

Here, the legal provisions represent the currency of interaction between the US and the Soviet Union. Implicit in this statement is that both action and inaction hold consequences - each, subject to interpretation - which, in Coral Bell's terms constitute a mode of 'signalling'. Clearly something is communicated by action or inaction on questions concerning compliance. Moreover, this 'something' is communicated along a minimum of three directions: US Domestic polity, US Officialdom and to the Soviet Union, setting up perceptions in each of these realms. Assuming the Soviet Officialdom represents the only operative perception on that side, the Soviet perception is taken to be undifferentiated. Classical signalling theory might grid this as follows:

\textsuperscript{263} Graybeal in Buchheim \textit{Briefing on SALT I Compliance} 1979. p.12 [Emphasis mine]
Table 3.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>US (Domestic)</th>
<th>US (Official)</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P=A(1)</td>
<td>P=A(2)</td>
<td>P=A(R)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inaction</td>
<td>P=I(1)</td>
<td>P=I(2)</td>
<td>P=I(R)</td>
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Moreover, this 'something' is communicated, not merely to the Soviets by the US, but also within the administration in terms of what is assumed to be communicated by specific action or inaction. This set of perceptions in itself constitutes an engine for action or inaction in response to perceptions within the administration of the domestic response to perceived action or inaction. Finally, there can be no certainty as to the definition of what may or may not be communicated in these cases on the grounds that already several quite distinct epistemic communities have been invoked and are implicated in the production of meaning surrounding the specific sets of signs set in play by action or inaction on questions of compliance. As John Behuncik notes:

[the] US insistence on legalistic defenses can be self-defeating if sufficient account is not taken of the political context within which strategic arms control negotiations are conducted.\(^{264}\)

This point is borne out by Joseph Kruzel, who stresses the problems engendered by overemphasising formal negotiations and in particular, formal agreements which attempt to buy security with the

establishment of precise and formal limitations on military hardware, in his terms:

   arms control may have been impeded by too mechanistic a view of the process\textsuperscript{265}

which he sees as "an effort to give coherence and structure to an interstate relationship that involves the risk of war."\textsuperscript{266}

This is borne out in the military posture documents\textsuperscript{267} in which capability is closely linked with assumptions about intention and about a binary world order. Examples of this can be found in the US Military Posture document for FY 1978 in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown refers in his introduction to "the continuing challenges to our national security." He refers to these as having been "brought about by the increasing capability of the Soviet Union and other nations to project their national power and influence and the growing dependency of the United States on the rest of the world." Here, intention, equated with the ability to project 'national power' articulated as military force, portrayed in the report in terms of a direct comparison of weapon system for weapon system, is one indication of a perception of the Soviet Union as monolithic. In another sense this document further demonstrates the US military tendency towards 'mirror imaging' of force posture. That is, to match


\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.

the Soviets on a system by system basis with little demonstrated regard for the different foreign policy goals of the two named powers. Such a view is reflected in the Statement of John T. Hughes to the House Committee on Armed Services (December 1975) and many others. This stands in contrast with the more sophisticated declaratory position of the US as articulated by Amos A. Jordan, Principal Assistant Secretary of Defence, International Security Affairs, Department of Defence during the same hearings. As he put it:

We are talking about an art, not a science. We are talking about a relationship that has many dimensions... Any statement about American military policy, is to some degree a statement about the role the United States will play in world affairs. This is true not only in the sense that the policies unsupported by means court failure; but also in the sense that other states will condition their actions and policies upon their anticipation of US actions, anticipations which, in turn, reflect their estimates of the ability of the US to act.

This is double-edged insofar as there is a perception of the US role in world affairs, such that either action or inaction will send signals (construe signs) that are the subject of interpretation at the interstate and intra-state levels - and therefore any policies which affect defence spending in quantity or direction will to some degree alter:

a) the US position in the world,

b) the US' need to occupy that position and

c) its relation to other states.

As Amos Jordan noted:

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program decisions which affect our military capabilities determine not only our ability to influence events, but to some degree the need to do so as well.269

Given that these program decisions are based upon perceptions and assumptions regarding the foreign policy objectives of [principally] the Soviet Union, these decisions, which in themselves are discursively based, become, in turn, constitutive of the world as seen by the US military administrators. This is a world in which the Soviet Union is seen as "clearly the focus of our national security concerns" by posing the "primary military political and economic challenge" against which the US must "protect US interests" while seeking to "lessen the danger of war."270

The mirror-imaging of the US-SU dyad can be illustrated by the note of emphasis implicit in the statement that:

"It is evident that the Soviet leadership sees no inconsistency between calling for a relaxation of international tensions and simultaneously increasing its military capabilities. In fact Moscow appears to view its increased military capabilities as the foundation of such a policy."271

The tone of surprise indicated by selecting as a 'marked option' the phrase: "sees no inconsistency" [as though they should in the US' view] and through the emphasis created by the use of "in fact" and "appears to view its increased capabilities as the foundation of such a

269 Ibid.

270 Ibid. p.144.

policy" [as though logically it should not] bears interesting comparison with the US perception of itself as indicated in the statement:

Our policy is a two-track policy, which seeks to relax tensions, largely through the medium of arms control; while at the same time that we pursue a policy of preparedness in an effort to buttress the policy of détente and to hedge against the failure. [emphasis mine].

by which the US statement of its own policy appears to differ only in its presentation through an apparently 'neutral' language which treats as positive its "two-track policy" [as against Soviet 'inconsistency'] and its euphemistic "preparedness," "buttress," and "hedge against failure" as thin substitutes for increased military capabilities. It is hard to see where the one set of behaviours differs in any significant way from the other.

There is a difference, however, and that is a difference in the use of language which highlights similar behaviours as articulations of difference. What is 'neutral' for 'us' is a marked option for 'them'. This is an instance of boundary-making practices that mark off self from other and in the process adds to the other boundary making processes that go together to construe and delimit identity. In this case it marks off the identity of the US security state from that of the Soviet Union.

Despite James Schlesinger's 1975 reservations, it should be kept in mind that of the eight compliance issues raised by the US in 1978 (see

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272 Ibid. p.97

Table 3.4), not one was considered, by the US delegation to the SALT SCC, to be an unequivocal violation of the SALT Agreements.

To correlate better, events in the SCC with wider aspects of Carter's foreign policymaking, it may be useful to divide the period in question into four sections roughly correlated with the four years of the Carter presidency. Before doing that, however, an interesting general point may be gleaned from looking at the period in question in terms of the agreements produced through the SCC in relation to other periods.

In the seven years between 1969, when the idea of the SCC was first put forward and 1976, four agreements were produced. During the period from 1977-1980 inclusive, three agreements were produced - a rate nearly double that of the previous seven years. From 1980-1985 no agreements were produced, with two formal agreements finally achieved in June 1985. While this may be a small point, it serves to illustrate the usefulness of examining the SCC as a barometer of political change and at the same time, it underlines the political nature of the arms control process.

Carter came to power in January 1977, inheriting a SALT I agreement and ongoing negotiations for SALT II, which were, in the words of Melvin Laird "90 percent complete." During his four years in office he turned around the steady decline in defence spending, mounting an average three percent increase in real dollar terms each year that he was in office. Moreover he moved resources into non-nuclear

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modernisation programs, the MX was given a 'survivable' basing mode, new Trident submarines were built, nuclear response doctrine was modernised (*Countervailing Strategy*), new emphasis was placed on arms control through SALT II, he encouraged NATO to develop a new Long Term Defence Plan, he upgraded the Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces and he countered the Soviet development of the SS-20 in 1979 with the decision to deploy 572 Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in concert with arms control talks on the possibilities for limiting these weapons.275

While emphasising conventional forces in the Carter defence appropriations, the Carter administration set about reversing the generally downward trend in US defence expenditure precipitated by the end of the Vietnam War. This was in full recognition of the scale of the Soviet defence buildup:

> there is no evidence from past history that unilateral reductions in our posture will produce Soviet reciprocity. An important function of our various arms control negotiations is precisely to achieve equitable and verifiable mutual reductions without undue risk. ...The steady real increase in the size of the Soviet defence program since the early 1960s, and the concurrent decline in real US baseline outlays (defined as outlays which exclude the incremental costs of war in Southeast Asia), mean that we have a certain amount of catching up to do.276

All of which tends to run counter to the charges of 'failure' in military/strategic terms of "maintaining prospects for peace, and in

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maintaining Western ascendancy in the overall balance of power."^277 Carter's failure in this respect, if one needed to be found, was not in the reality of the force posture, but in the image with which he campaigned prior to his presidency, of lowering military expenditure by restructuring the military force posture to take account of threat assessments that suggested a new emphasis on conventional forces.^278

The Reaganaut critique of Carter rested largely on quantitative analyses of strategic nuclear forces alone, rather than looking at the overall force posture. This will be analysed in subsequent chapters.

![Figure 3.4 Comparison of US Defence Outlays and Estimated Dollar Cost of Soviet Defence Programs](image)


278 Other types of foreign policy 'failure' can, however be located in perceptions of Soviet adventurism in the Horn of Africa, in the loss of intelligence facilities in Iran, the Iran hostage crisis, and in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The point I make here is analytically restricted to military force structure as this has the most direct bearing on the issue of SALT, and US-SU compliance behaviours.
Sydney Graybeal, discussing the treaty language of SALT, considers the question of precision. He points out that while it is essential to have clear and mutually agreed definitions of treaty limited items in order to maintain the viability of an agreement and to avoid misunderstandings, he warns of the problems of being too specific.

Firstly, he suggests that too much specificity can "invite the other side to design around the limitations" pointing out that by leaving some of the language general then greater flexibility is permitted in challenging the activities of the other side. He cites the phrases: "not to test in an ABM mode" and "deliberate concealment measures" which impede verification by national technical means as examples. In the latter case, with respect to the telemetry question, the phrase; not only allowed flexibility in challenge, but was important in relation to the protection of sources and methods of verification.

Secondly, and this arises from the aspect of the protection of sources and methods of verification, general language allows the arms control process to cope with technological innovation, both with respect to the question of 'designing around' treaty limitations, but also with respect to improvements in verification technologies. Over-specificity of treaty items invokes the problem of 'observable difference'. Knowing what is observable can reveal much about the methods of data collection, and again invite the other to design around such technologies of observation.

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279 Graybeal in Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979/14
Graybeal goes on to point out that such deliberate 'vagueness' leaves the U.S. "in a better position to challenge future Soviet actions of concern" than if they had "tried to get a very specific definition of 'deliberate concealment measures' or to determine precisely what telemetry data or channels are necessary for monitoring the agreement and must not be denied the other side."\textsuperscript{280}

His point is that the element of indeterminacy surrounding the ability to determine compliance raises the risk/cost of being caught if cheating should be contemplated. In this sense, Graybeal argues that uncertainty of the precision of the monitoring technologies is itself a deterrent to cheating.

Mark Lowenthal and Joel Wit underline this, pointing out that when the U.S. presents a case to the Soviets at the SCC it is always "very careful about the evidence it presents, always trying to preserve intelligence sources and methods so as to keep the Soviets uncertain about what we know and what we do not know and how the information was obtained."\textsuperscript{281}

This illustrates the point that Foucault makes regarding the operation of power, namely that it is 'tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.'\textsuperscript{282} It is, in part, the doubt about the extent and

\textsuperscript{280} Ibid p.14.


\textsuperscript{282} Michel Foucault \textit{History of Sexuality: An Introduction} Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1985/86
precision of verification technologies that, arguably, contributes to the operation of such technologies as a deterrent to large-scale cheating, along with a reluctance on both sides to precipitate a wholesale breakout and consequent costly arms race. Ironically perhaps, the doubt over the precision of verification technologies is itself made possible by the virtual impossibility of total accuracy in the verification technologies themselves and in the technical and discursive means by which the technical evidence is interpreted.

SIPRI further supports this view, referring to the requirement for confidentiality with respect to national technical means of verification and their efficiency, accuracy, resolution and so on:

The theory behind this requirement is that the prospective violator, being verified by unknown means, is likely to ascribe to those means capabilities greater than they possess, and is thus deterred to a greater extent from violating the agreement.283

3.7 Verification Technologies, Compliance and Power: Disciplining the Boundaries

The game of 'Hiders and Finders' is a game of power played out at the level of verification technologies between bilateral or multilateral parties to arms control agreements. It is a game, this section argues, that along with other defence and security practices, is coterminous with structures of political identity, forming one of the myriad practices by which a state polices its boundaries and underscores the political costs of cheating in such a way as to deter the 'Other' power from circumventing the terms of an arms control agreement. Insofar

as this entails the ability of one state to influence another, positively, verification technologies can be conceived in terms of power. Moreover, insofar as they operate through the ability of that state to 'know' the other, verification technologies can be analysed in terms of what Michel Foucault calls 'power/knowledge.' This section is therefore not so much an exploration or survey of the technologies of verification, nor is it about power per se but rather it is about the equiprimordiality of verification technologies and the forms of power which they invoke and which invoke them.

The impetus for the development of these technologies rests with the dual nature of the arms control process, that is, to reduce the danger/cost of war and to maintain stability. As Brodie pointed out in his now famous statement: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now its chief purpose must be to avert them."284 With this classic reversal of the Clausewitzian formula of war conceived as an instrument of policy,285 nuclear weapons have become a symbol for the emergence of the Postmodern world.286 This has been brought about, partly through the nuclear problematisation of the traditional exercise of power, and partly through the 'calling into being' of new regimes of articulating political boundaries that have involved, in part the development of unchallengable means of transgressing political boundaries through the instruments of photoreconnaissance satellite technology and

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signals intelligence (SIGINT). It has also been predicated upon the constitution of new forms and regimes of knowledge through the establishment of corps of analysts invoking an expertise in photointerpretation. With the advent of what has been described as the 'epistemic transformation'\textsuperscript{287} of the face of modern political identity, the meaning of power itself has become radically problematised. In deconstructing power as classically defined, it might be useful to step back to a re-examination of the teleological orientation of power. That is, to examine power conceived as the power to enact boundaries, power as sets of practices arraigned within and policing the boundaries of forms of knowledge, forms of life. At which point, power becomes coterminous with knowledge.

With the development of increasingly sophisticated national technical means of verification (NTMs), since the early 1960s, such an analysis of power might usefully serve to raise the question of the operation of verification articulated as a form of deterrence. The question of whence comes the power to deter treaty violations, remains problematic. Foucault frames the connection between power and knowledge on the grounds that they are mutually constitutive:

Power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not pre-suppose and constitute at the same time power relations\textsuperscript{288}


\textsuperscript{288} Foucault: \textit{Discipline and Punish} Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1977. p.27
Verification technologies, by pin-pointing the Other within a field of observation, establish a field of knowledge about the activities of the Other. With a history of repeated observations then deviations from established 'norms' of behaviour can be readily registered and thereby brought to account. The targeting of these observations upon activities that are functionally related to compliance with arms control agreements presupposes both a pre-constituted field of knowledge established by those precursor activities that established the arms control treaty regime in the first instance, and the forms of normative power that led to these agreements and which maintain them.

3.72 Disciplinary Power and Verification Technologies

To discuss the technologies of arms control verification articulated as a form of power, it is useful to look at verification under the rubric of 'disciplinary power'. Foucault isolates three forms of disciplinary power, each interrelated as we shall see. These are:

i) hierarchical observation,
ii) normalising judgement, and
iii) examination

3.721 hierarchical observation

This signifies the connection between visibility and power, such that not only does an apparatus designed for observation induce effects of power, but also that a means of coercion makes those subject to it

289 That is to say, verification technologies and institutions are designed to collect specific kinds of data toward a specific end (to catch Treaty violators and to ensure compliance). Thus, coupled with the institutions of verifications they constitute a source and a domain of knowledge.

290 Coercion is not an abstract term - it is about coercion of someone. Thus technologies of coercion imply at least the potential to identify the one to be coerced. Insofar as the
potentially visible. In this, the Other is constituted by the means to
isolate and identify, and, further, the operation of deterrence depends
upon making visible that 'Other' so construed. Thus, a politics
conceived as the power to coerce is also a politics of identity and
identity formation.

Foucault takes the example of a military camp as an illustrative model
articulated through the operation of a principle of 'general visibility.' 291
Such an observational regime can be seen to have organised and
arranged space to facilitate observation of those within, and by
rendering people visible, it in turn made it possible to know them and
to mould them. As Richard Barnett noted in 1981: "The US-Soviet
rivalry will continue. The identity of each system depends too much
upon its opposition to the other to permit anything more than
antagonistic collaboration between the superpowers." 292 The
technologies for making-visible the Other, are best characterised by the
surveillance technologies used in National Technical Means (NTMs)
of verification in which we can note some parallels with, for example,
the operational limitations of sweep-areas of surveillance satellites:

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very existence of technologies of verification can deter cheating (by raising the risk of
being caught) then one state is exerting power over another.

291 Ibid.

The American KH-11 imaging satellite, for example, can gain its highest resolution photographs with a sweep width of only some 1-3 Kms on a 'close-look' mission. Such trade-offs are catered for by using a wide variety of imaging methods spread over a range of platforms.

U.S. and Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites, orbiting at altitudes of between 200 and 500Kms are equipped with wide-angle cameras for area survey work, whilst close-look cameras are designed for detailed inspection of features of interest. Typically, these have been locii of military significance. These 'close-look' satellites have been estimated to obtain resolutions in the order of 10-15cms on the ground under favourable conditions.293 These however, relying on visible light, have been typically unable to penetrate fog, haze, smoke, cloud or

293 Source: Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1160, "Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the council" 7th November 1988, p.9 quoted in "Verification in Conventional Arms Control" by Volker Kunzendorff Adelphi Papers 245 Winter 1989 p.53
rain. Given Europe's weather, the limitations of this system become obvious.

To offset these difficulties, other technologies have been developed and deployed, including Thermal imaging sensors (better penetration but at the expense of much lower resolution in the order of 10-15 metres) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellites which are reported to

**Synthetic Aperture Radar** These overcome the problem of antenna size, by making use of the antenna's movement relative to the ground track. The satellite (or aircraft) passing over the target area, emits radar pulses directed downward and to either side of the ground track. Reflections of these pulses return to the satellite where they are detected and recorded. The shaded area on the ground shows the width of the strip defined by a single radar pulse. Two objects within that area and equidistant from the satellite (A&B) cannot be distinguished by a single pulse from the radar, however if all the pulses reflected back from both A and B while the satellite is passing overhead are stored in the satellite and processed, then these objects can be resolved. Objects A and C are at different distances from the satellite and can be resolved easily in the normal way.
achieve "probably" 1.5-3 metres resolution\textsuperscript{294} (with the potential for achieving resolutions of around 1 metre\textsuperscript{295} sometime in the next decade). Although both the U.S. and Soviet photoreconnaissance satellites are manoeuvrable, two further difficulties confront the so-called close-look satellites. The first, now largely overcome through electro-photographic technologies, was the time-lag between obtaining photographs and their secure delivery (the choice was either to wait for satellite re-entry or to have the films ejected in re-entry capsules, representing a delay of several days, down to several hours depending on the option taken, a third option, used on the U.S. KH-11 satellite and since, was to use electrophotographic techniques to produce high quality video pictures which could be transmitted directly to ground stations. With the advent of the U.S. KH-11 satellite, the use of CCDs [Charge-Coupled Device] give high quality imaging in real-time (without shutters) which, when used in conjunction with photomultipliers can use low-intensity light for night use, (and with different scanners can also 'see' in invisible wave bands); and the short life-span of low-orbit close-look satellites (by effectively skimming the highest levels of the atmosphere, the rate of orbital decay is rapid - around 8-14 days unless manoeuvered to a higher orbit). A further point to make is that any non-geosynchronous satellite will only pass over a given object periodically. The paths of such satellites are easily tracked and therefore the length of time between observations is predictable (with the potential for evasive concealment of treaty-limited items [TLI]). To counter this, since 1981, at least two KH 11

\textsuperscript{294} Ibid. p.53

\textsuperscript{295} A. Krass Verification: How Much is Enough? Lexington/ SIPRI, 1985, p.46
satellites have been in orbit at any given time\textsuperscript{296}. This would mean that the frequency of observation of any given area is increased - with one satellite the interval between observations is approximately 92 minutes, whereas with two or more satellites, this frequency would be increased depending on the relative positions of the orbital planes. A further consideration is that, with spaced orbits, more of the Earth's surface is covered at the same time.\textsuperscript{297} To supplement these systems, and to provide continuous, low-resolution surveillance, geosynchronous satellites (such as the U.S. 'Rhyolite') are able to detect the nuclear 'flash' produced by tests, but their primary role lies in intercepting telemetry, from missile tests.

The technology of course is only one side of the material ability to look at and to define the other. The data from these satellites - the images themselves, operating at the very limits of the technically visible - is itself not unambiguous. The data requires interpretation as the satellites themselves represent mere extensions to human sight, and human intelligence is required to make sense of and provide meaning for the contents of the images. This brings us into another domain of policy, one that feeds into the SCC in terms of the provision of evidence for non-compliance activities.\textsuperscript{298}

\textsuperscript{296} From 1981 there seems to have been a pattern of KH11s being orbitted in pairs with a spacing of 46°-49°. Sipri suggests that no such relationship appears to operate between KH11s and Big Bird satellites, the former operated by the CIA while the latter are operated by the US Air Force.


Tied into the technical apparatus (itself the product of a finance and resource economy within an international political economy) is an economy of discourse, the product of specialised knowledges, which forms a context and a methodology in and with which the satellite images can be interpreted.

This ability to 'see' and 'hear' the Other illustrates well the capacity for the sort of disciplinary power available in the process of 'objectifying' the other. The Soviets, of course, have their comparable systems of space-based photoreconnaissance satellites. Since the Soviets' first and second-generation photoreconnaissance satellites were launched in 1962-3, based on the Vostok and Soyuz launch platforms, Soviet satellite technology has developed rapidly. Joined by a third generation in 1968, (non-manoeuverable) low-resolution satellites continued regular operations until 1985.

Medium resolution satellites, characterised by the regularity of their manoeuvres, typically conduct fourteen-day missions during which time they obtain complete global coverage, before the satellite is recovered. Fourth-generation close-look and area survey satellites began operations in 1975 and 1981 respectively. The first long-life fifth-generation satellite was launched towards the end of 1982. Whilst fourth-generation satellites offer limited-term missions, extended duration satellites, powered by solar panels, possibly transmit their information digitally, relayed by geosynchronous data relay satellites.

This ability to 'see' and 'hear' the other constitutes a realm of knowledge deployed as a form of power. Insofar as such technologies have been deployed to verify particular types of arms control agreement (ABM Treaty, for example), and insofar as the deployment
of these technologies (regimes of the 'gaze') represent a deterrent to the breaking of arms control agreements, such deployment can be seen as an articulation of disciplinary power.

3.73 The Role of the Intelligence Community

To maintain these structures of 'other-ness definition' requires a series of supports or relays which take the form of a hierarchy of continuous and functional surveillance (which, in the case of photoreconnaissance satellites has potentially been available since 1977).

Potentially. As Florini points out, no amount of satellite imaging can be completely sufficient. To be useful, collateral information is needed from the ground to target the imaging systems and to interpret the data once received. The Command, control, communication and information (C3I) hierarchy would seem to support this function particularly well, although, for some specific purposes, other organisations involved in the verification of specific agreements, such as the IAEA Safeguards Committee, can be seen to occupy the same discursive position. Such specialised agencies can be useful for certain types of Agreement, as their infrastructure is suited to the particular demands of their brief. Another reason for the limited utility of

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299 This section shows that the intelligence community mediates the data on which verification of compliance is based. The section shows that despite the technology the data is often ambiguous and requires enhancement and interpretation within a community of people (who are themselves selected and trained through specific interpretive screens). Their product for the SCC is the information on which the SCC relies for judgement about whether to raise issues, and in what manner. For this reason it is relevant to the thesis. It is also an aspect of the 'gaze' - the generation of fields of knowledge that constitute the behaviour of the Other as a 'case.'

satellite imaging alone lies in the sheer quantity of data generated by these systems, that "would simply overwhelm the processing and interpretive capabilities of their operators." 301.

Given the extent to which the SCC's ability to raise issues is intertextually dependant upon the evidential information provided by the intelligence community it is worthwhile to take a short _excursus_ into the ways in which the intelligence analysts themselves are trained within their specific field of knowledge, or regime of truth.

The constitution of a domain of surveillance/monitoring as a disciplinary practice is particularly relevant to the function of the SCC insofar as it calls upon and invokes the institutionalising of new forms of knowledge, expertise, and interpretive challenges. I shall examine therefore some of the modes and practices within which such knowledges are produced and contextualised.

The evidence used by the SCC is primarily that of photointelligence (PHOTINT) and electronic signals intelligence (ELINT) the latter relating to the acquisition of telemetry data on the testing of missiles. By examining the organisational and training processes of the photo-interpreters one can understand in part how their analyses become constituted as a form of knowledge that in turn becomes a basis for compliance challenge within the SCC.

There are two aspects to this: the structure and organisation of the institutions in which intelligence analysis takes place and the interpretive practices themselves. Both are of course, interrelated, but

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301 Ann Florini in Mandell _Op Cit._ 1989. p.175
for the purposes of analysis it is useful to separate these out in order to specify better, the relationship between the interpretive practices themselves and the dissemination of the products of these practices into the wider discursive economy of the arms control community as a subset of the security state. Moreover, by specifying the relationship between the interpretive practices and the dissemination of their products, it becomes possible to specify the role of the supporting institutions which form the context in which the SCC can operate as a space for the playing out of the contestation of political identity. It forms, in other words, a boundary space in which the notion of boundary is itself contested and negotiated as an aspect of the relations between states (in this case the US and the Soviet Union).

**Photointerpretation**

Photo-interpreters are trained to make assumptions based on association and orders of probability. Their data is based on repetition and accumulation, that is, it is based on frequent and routine observation of the routine practices of the one under observation. As a result, photo-interpreters become skilled at observing and interpreting changes in routine.\textsuperscript{302} The not unreasonable assumption behind this is that command organisations - especially the military - base their operations on routine practices and procedures. To do otherwise would lead to inefficiency. On that basis, if the routines are known then these can be used by the analyst to make assumptions about the intentions of the observed. Moreover, if the styles of routine are known and these

are noted in non-routine places then the photo-interpreter makes assumptions about what is occurring in the new location.

The analysis itself involves the process of locating, recognising, identifying, and describing objects, activities, and terrain represented on images. The quality of the product of imagery analysis, imagery intelligence, is subject to a number of variables, including: sensor coverage, the availability and quality of image enhancement facilities, the time available and the abilities of the analyst.303 Photo-interpreters are guided in their 'reading' or identification of images by 'the five S's': "size, shape, shadow, shade, and surrounding objects."304 Thus objects are located in terms of their placement within the environment and the repetition of general forms establishes recognisable patterns.305

PHOTINT is supported and deployed by and through a bureaucratic and institutional process. This process is sometimes referred to as the 'intelligence cycle.' Briefly, this cycle of activities represents an information flow-chart that may be entered at several points.


304 Ibid.

305 Ibid
Although clearly an oversimplification it serves to illustrate the kinds of stages through which intelligence (and such verification monitoring as is conducted by the intelligence community) passes. The length and sequence of the cycle varies, but there are fairly clearly defined points at which there is an interface between the intelligence community and the policymakers who rely on the information. Within this cycle there may be many sub-routines at each step before the 'product' is passed on to the next segment of the cycle. Arthur Hulnick\textsuperscript{306} is quick to point out that, while some parts of the process do work sequentially, others are more or less autonomous and therefore "the process might be best understood as a matrix of interconnected parts, rather than a simple sequence of connected functions."\textsuperscript{307} Such gilding of the lily should


\textsuperscript{307} Ibid. p.136
not, however, be allowed to cloud the point that these tasks, however schematised, are widely accepted as the principal parts of the traditional view of the intelligence process or cycle.

In the context of arms control verification, these processes are reflected in the processes used to determine compliance or non-compliance, (or more precisely the degree of compliance). With the signing of an arms control agreement, the 'initialising function' has commenced, in that, since the SALT I agreements, the verification requirements have been, in broad terms, defined. The 'tasking function' is two-fold, that of continuous low intensity monitoring, and that of specific, short-term confirmatory missions, based either upon anomalies revealed by area-sweep surveillance that requires closer inspection, or from collateral information that suggests the occurrence of non-compliant behaviour, that requires closer inspection. Thus the practical distinctions between the intelligence gathering processes and the verification process are often interconnected.

Krass points out that the monitoring process itself often begins with the gathering of data, or 'collection function' involving activities as general as reading the scientific journals of the 'other' country and as specific as photographing specific military installations by satellite. Collection, too, then is bifurcated into the more or less distinct processes of surveillance and reconnaissance. Krass defines these activities in these terms:

Surveillance is the systematic observation of some place or activity on a continuous or periodical basis.... In contrast, reconnaissance is carried out in the form of missions or ad hoc activities, generally aimed at a specific objective which has for some reason attracted attention. For example high-resolution photographic satellites only take pictures when ordered or programmed to do so from the ground. The areas
photographed are chosen for their particular interest at a particular time.\textsuperscript{308}

In the pre-interpretive stage the basic data is processed and assembled into an analysable form: photographic images are enhanced by a range of techniques to assist photo-interpreters, raw data from infra-red sensors must be processed into digital data that computers can use to determine temperature, speed, location and altitude of an infra-red 'event' and so on. This sub-stage can take place as an aspect of the collection phase or the analysis phase, or more properly, during both, since computer image enhancement can be performed in near real time by the photo-interpreter using a range of screening techniques.\textsuperscript{309}

We have seen some of the work processes and assumptions that underpin photo-interpretation. What remains to be added here is that throughout the 1980s developments in information processing technologies have taken some of the routine repetition/recognition work away from the human interpreter, allowing far greater quantities of information to be processed automatically, flagging variations from statistical norms.

Evaluation, or identification of events as to whether or not they constitute a violation is the phase in which the overtly political assessments are made. Up to this point much of the work would have been performed by members of the intelligence community. At the evaluation stage, the intelligence product is distributed for consideration by the Intelligence Community Steering Group on

\textsuperscript{308} Krass, A. \textit{Verification: How Much is Enough?} Massachusetts: Lexington Books and SIPRI, 1985. p.8

\textsuperscript{309} See Krass, 1985 Chapter 2,
Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations. Here, information from other sources is brought to bear on a suspected violation, as a single source of information, even with considerable technical enhancement is rarely unambiguous.

SALT verification, as Robert F. Pfalzgraff Jr suggests, is, along with definitions of what constitutes 'adequate verification':

... both a political and technical issue, as well as an intelligence problem... the degree of verifiability is a domestic political issue ... [and] to a certain extent, verification adequacy is subjective in nature.\textsuperscript{310}

Verification and its political counterpart, compliance, is thus at the intersection of a range of discursive practices - the technical, the intelligence analysis community and the security dimension of the executive political community that institutionalises the 'security state'.

The Intelligence Community's\textsuperscript{311} monitoring information is considered by the office of the Executive Secretary/Deputy Executive Secretary (see Fig. 2.1 in Chapter II) along with inputs from the Organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the SCC Working Group of the National Security Council Special Coordinating Committee, the Office of the Secretary of Defence, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State. But the end-point of this process,


as Krass notes, is that, despite the best efforts at identification of a suspicious event, the result will be "some probability" that the event represents a violation. To complicate matters further, the human factor in intelligence analysis has its part to play. Not the least of which is that, not only is the data often ambiguous to a greater or lesser extent (either through technical imperfections, or, more commonly, hard evidence of activity and no clear explanation as to the meaning of such activity), but such intelligence can be based upon preconceived notions (a product of rigorous and routine training) that may be reinforced by the analyst's desire to please a superior. Perhaps more problematic is the tendency to present intelligence estimates that run few risks of being wrong. Such a tendency provides the policymaker with estimates that are unhelpful as guides to clear policy formation, or in the case of arms control issues, no clear answer to the question 'have they been cheating?'

The form of power, thus realised, is neither a possession, nor a property, but rather, "has the character of a machine through which power is produced and individuals are distributed in a permanent and continuous field." The field in which is distributed the Other state, the other object of security, with its boundaries similarly 'SPOT-lighted', involves the opening up to a whole regime of inspection the


security artefacts of the other, by which its boundaries are policed with gestures of nuclear deterrent threat, so that the now-objectified subject may yield forth the symptoms of its growths - defined in terms of any attempt to break out of the treaty regime.

Discursively, these modalities of observation are inscribed and legitimated through non-interference clauses reified in arms control treaties since the ABM Treaty (1972), where article XII states:

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognised principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

These non-interference clauses represent the codifying and legitimating of national technical means (NTM) in law.


3.722 International Norms/normalising judgement

For Foucault, the 'normalising judgement' is the "infra-penalty" or "extra-legal penalty" exercised over a mass of behaviours which police the boundaries, or the liminal regions of the agreements. This form of disciplinary power was arguably exercised to extraordinary lengths during the Reagan era at the height of the second Cold War. This time was regarded by arms control historians as the period of the "compliance crisis." Normalising judgement, as the second arm of disciplinary power, may be seen in essentially institutional terms, invoking the rhetoric of a 'society of states', the 'international community of states', or 'common security'.

The punitive mechanisms of normalising judgement; to be judged "not good international citizens"; to be judged "not sharing the burden," or pulling one's weight, are expressions of the 'correctional aspects of disciplinary power.' The object, in this instance is to 'single out' instances of 'non-conformity' within a normative structure, or system.

The goal of these correctional aspects of disciplinary power is therefore, neither "expiation" nor "repression," but "normalization." Within regimes of verification, the disciplinary mode refers to modalities of


318 Invoking international norms Reagan made accusations outside of the legal arms control regime over behaviours that were at worst ambiguous and had not at the time been construed as violations. This period of 'beat up' was known by some as the 'compliance crisis.'

"non observance." It is measured by the degree of departure from the rule. Thus, errors of omission become subject to disciplinary penance - increased surveillance, greater attention to records, closer monitoring of signals and so on through a whole range of diplomatic modalities. These regimes address themselves, not to larger concerns of concept or principle, but with the letter of the regulation. Krass\textsuperscript{320} sees this as characteristic of the "legalistic school" which sees all violations as important even if these are not seen to be militarily significant. The reasoning behind this view is political, since rigorous adherence to all the provisions of a treaty is "an important measure of the goodwill and trustworthiness of the Parties."\textsuperscript{321} The normalising judgement is addressed to matters of procedure - the methods of counting, the types of seals or tags, the notificatory procedures for testing, or time limits during on-site inspections. Under the INF inspection regime, for example, the Treaty specifies that "an inspector's movement will be at the discretion of, and under the escort of the inspected parties." This means that the inspectors are escorted at all times, such that billeting, transportation, inspection activities, meals and leisure time is closely supervised.\textsuperscript{322} In other words, for a state to open its borders to disciplinary boundary penetration, that state may set up a special boundary, surveilling the surveillors. The state is subject to institutional gaze, whilst retaining a token power of subjecting the


\textsuperscript{321} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{322} "Insights of an On-Site Inspector" Arms Control Today November 1988/6
individually sanctioned medium of the gaze (the inspection team) to the institutional gaze of the state.

The discourses of policy are characterised by multiplicity, complexity and uncertainty. The authoritative ordering of these forms of life, the policing of the boundaries of 'acceptable' international behaviour has been the principle of political life. The establishment of the Normal thus remains a "principle of coercion."323 By mobilising a constitutive discourse of political community in the international realm, through imputing membership to the 'community of nations' the disciplinary gaze also sets up tables of rank and hierarchy: constituting a field of knowledge, and situating states within that field. The Euro-centricity of this normalising field of relations is well recognised in articulations of "Core-Periphery" status, or "third-World" status. Moreover, this is clear, too, in the field of US - Soviet relations, with respect to their strategic 'superpower' status. In this sense then:

...the power of normalisation imposes homogeneity; but it individualises by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels to fix specialities and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another. It is easy to understand how the power of the norm functions within a system of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences.324

Thus the discursive equality of states under international law allows distinctions to remain and gaps to be measured, not only in terms of structural economic imbalances, but also in terms of access to


324 Ibid.
technology transfers and access to control of techno-strategic regimes of surveillance. This, moreover, is inclusive of the question of access to national technical means of verification, leaving open the question of verification as an aspect of the constitutional processes of security and identity, namely, those of interiority and exteriority.

3.723 Examination

Hierarchical observation and normalising judgement may be said to combine under the rubric of examination to effect a 'normalising gaze'. In its techno-strategic form it constitutes "a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, classify and punish."325 It is a process by which the behaviours of individual states can be classified or judged within the terms of specific Treaty Articles. Articulated as a regime of discipline, this cuts two ways: 1) through the subjection of those who are perceived as objects, and 2) as the objectification of those who are subjected. That is to say, that:

i) these mechanisms operate to ensure that the Parties to an agreement abide by the agreement and ii) it forms a way of reducing the domestic polity of the Other state to a discursive entity known as a 'Party' to an agreement, thus forming or playing a constitutive role in identifying self as opposed to those others by which the self forms its boundaries. In short these form devices for "disciplining the plurality of the discourses of policy."326

325 Ibid.

The operation of the disciplinary forces of verification conceived as examination occur within three fields. These involve:

a) the transformation of the field of visibility into the domain of power,

b) the operation of an economy of record-keeping through the collection and collation of files and documents and

c) the constitution of individual cases to allow greater specificity of the individual state and its techno-strategic behaviours.

ii) Traditional conceptions of power were measured in terms of the visible use of force - the deployment of weapons, expeditionary task forces - by which the principle of its force lay in the physical deployment of that force. Its power lay in the expenditure of its potency through mass exercises and display. Other indices of power included 'resources' - economic strength, demographic cohesion, political stability and so on.

Disciplinary power, on the other hand is exercised precisely through its invisibility, whilst at the same time imposing visibility on those whom it seeks to subject. In the context of the deployment of NTMs there is a cautionary note: Insofar as disciplinary power operates by its very invisibility, certain kinds of marginal infringement of Treaty limited items detected by certain kinds of surveillance technology may go unreported since, to expose the infringement may well reveal something of the capabilities of the technologies used in the detection of the infringement. Thus, in this sense, the disciplining side is also to a certain extent constrained by its disciplinary technologies of surveillance.

iii) The regimes of verification each and together generate data, an entire archive of texts, photographs, seismic traces, signals recordings,
reports etc which constitutes a table, or field of knowledge, situating a range of practices across time. The examination locates the Other (constituted as a State) in a textual network of definition, identification and location designed to capture and fix the other within a regime of treaty limitations to bind and limit the development, testing or deployment of specific weapons systems or classes of weapon system. The effect of this is to fix the other, the individual State within a web of power relations. The collation of these records into databases allows two other possibilities:

a) the state under inspection becomes analysable in its specificity - it is the military practices of that state and not others, its force capabilities, its troop deployments, its force posture that is rendered visible in its specificity, as rendered by a body of knowledge comprising those features that are verifiable;

b) secondly, the collation of such data allows the operation of comparative schemata across a range of actual and possible arms control agreements, highlighting potential problems with the verification of new agreements, while also establishing verification precedents, the experience from which, can assist in negotiating arms control verification for new signatories. Thus the collation and centralisation of verification records can allow the constitution of a whole comparative system upon which to compare the performance of previous instances of inspection or surveillance. This further allows for distributive analyses of 'gaps' between states' force potentials, and of greater significance to the verification question is the ability to analyse gaps in verifiability between states. One instance of this was
highlighted by the gap in On-Site Inspection technology between the U.S and Soviet inspection teams in verifying the INF agreement.327

iii) The constitution of individual sovereign states as individual cases, through the mechanisms of arms control agreements, and instances of inspection, articulates states as objects for a branch of knowledge and as the recipient of a 'branch of power.'328 No longer can these practices of observation be seen as merely descriptive of a state of affairs, but rather, they seem more appropriately conceived as among the myriad practices which are constitutive of the political identity of those states themselves, hence, for example, the particularity of the bilateral relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. The rapid development of verification techniques, effectively lowers the threshold of what may be described and observed. Such settings allow for the verification of an increasingly wider range of weapons, at far earlier stages in their development or production, where in the past, such weapons could only be detected upon deployment. This may be exemplified in the photoreconnaissance resolution requirements for the detection of specific treaty violations as shown in Table 3.6

327 OSI was discussed by the SALT II negotiating team during the Carter administration.

### Table 3.6: Ground Resolution Requirement for Verification\(^{329}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target a</th>
<th>Detect’n  (^{b})</th>
<th>Gen ID (^{c})</th>
<th>Precise ID (^{d})</th>
<th>Description (^{e})</th>
<th>Tech Anal (^{f})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
<td>1.5-3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Units (in bivouac/or road)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield Facilities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets &amp; Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command/Control</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Sites</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SSM/SAM)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Ships</td>
<td>7.5-15</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapon components</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Minefields</td>
<td>3-9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ports &amp; harbours</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coasts, Landing</td>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaches</td>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail yards &amp; shops</td>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Areas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surfaced Submarines</td>
<td>7.5-30</td>
<td>4.5-6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

a. Minimum resolution in metres required to detect target.

b. Detection: location of class of units/object/activity of military interest.

c. General Identification: to determine general type.

d. Precise Identification: Discrimination within known target type.

e. Description: Size/dimension/configuration/layout/components, construction/equipment count /etc.

f. Technical analysis: Detailed analysis of specific equipment.

The question of state's political identity as constituted through the practices of arms control agreements may be illustrated as follows:

The examination, - the fixing, at once ritual and 'scientific', of individual differences, as the pinning down of each individual in his [sic] own particularity, clearly indicates the appearance of a new modality of power in which each individual receives as his [sic] status his own individuality, and in which he is linked by his status to the features, the measurements, the gaps, the 'marks' that characterise him and make him a [sic]'case'.

Thus verification establishes, not only an 'architecture' of observation, but also a locus for the production of knowledge about those under observation. Insofar as the means of observation, and the knowledges produced by those means represent a form of power crucial to an understanding of the formation of political subjectivity/identity.

Deterrence theory has focused on the threat of nuclear weapons and on the scale of their effects should they ever be used again in war. Arms control regimes such as the SALT have attempted to systematically reduce the dangers of accidental warfare, and to maintain a gulf between so-called 'conventional weapons' and nuclear weapons. That is, to engage in a constructive form of boundary-making between the regime of conventional warfare and that of nuclear warfare. Verification measures have been put in place to address the problem of maintaining 'national security' in the face of weapon-system limitations and reductions. Little, however, has been done to interrogate the term 'national security' itself. As R.B.J. Walker notes:

Global patterns there may be, but there exists a vast disjunction in the modern world between the global scope of the problems and dangers before us and established forms of

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political identity, community and authority ... however seriously we may take specific global problems, political life remains organised within sovereign states.\textsuperscript{331}

Insofar as verification may be shown to be an aspect of disciplinary power, and insofar as such power is implicated in the articulation of the boundaries between states, verification, technologies and institutions can be seen to be intimately tied to the constitutive processes of political identity. As Todorov notes:

the discovery \textit{self} makes of the \textit{other} - is so enormous that any general formulation soon ramifies into countless categories and directions. We can discover the other in ourselves, realize we are not a homogeneous substance, radically alien to whatever is not us... I can conceive of these others as ... the Other - other in relation to myself, to \textit{me}; or else as a specific social group to which we do not belong. This group can be interior to society: women for men, the rich for the poor, the mad for the 'normal'; or it can be exterior to society, ie another society which will be near or far away, depending on the case.\textsuperscript{332}

Insofar as the processes of identity making are never 'complete' (since, being processes, they are everchanging, ever in need of active maintenance) then the practices of arms control verification are rightly connected with the security concerns of these identities which are most generally articulated as states.

Since the practices of verification typically operate on the basis of mutual interpenetration of the other, what remains at issue is sovereignty, conceived as a form of relation between states so construed.

\textsuperscript{331} Walker, RBJ \textit{Contending Sovereignties} Boulder: Lynne Reinner. 1990. p.163.

As all kinds of other practices operate through interpenetration, such practices, although global, require those entities articulated as states to act in mutually cooperative ways as they too become implicated as foci of forms of knowledge and as instruments of and subjects of global environmental changes.

Verification technologies, interestingly, traditionally conceived as instruments of military security, may also have a role to play in wider definitions of security. But equally, their role in the identity-making processes of states remains focused upon the discourse of weapons of mass destruction (with the exception of the CFE). Since Brodie's paper in 1946, nuclear weapons have become an issue of global security, requiring a new articulation of Clausewitz's formulation of war conceived as an instrument of policy. With the advent of sophisticated technologies and institutions (let us not forget the human aspects of verification) the technologies of verification may serve in part to operate a regime of power as forceful as the discourse of nuclear weapons themselves, by playing a role in war conceived as a form of language. As Clausewitz himself pointed out:

War is nothing but the continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means... is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It certainly has a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.

Accordingly, War can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are,
to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.\textsuperscript{333}

The same question arguably arises for the technologies of verification and their relationship to the politics of compliance, and the way this relationship in its turn relates to the discourse of national security/identity.\textsuperscript{334}

3.8 Détente and Deterrence: The Vance/Brzezinski Divide

From the beginning, Cyrus Vance shared many goals and perceptions in line with Carter.\textsuperscript{335} These were responses to an image, or worldview that saw the world as a complex interdependent global community.\textsuperscript{336} Consequently, foreign policy was pursued with this image of the world in mind. I want to argue in this fairly short section that Carter's responses to potential violations of SALT I in the SCC and Carter's overall use of the SCC was linked to the broader Carter administration's image of the world, and, related to that, the Carter administration's image of the Soviet Union as exemplified in the statements of Secretary of State Vance and National Security Adviser Brzezinski. As a corollary, it may be assumed that the Carter administration's overall set of behaviours towards the Soviet Union


\textsuperscript{334} ...national security/identity: is predicated upon the integrity of the boundary between Self and Other. The boundary being a cultural construct, is argued to be inherently prone to dissolution and must therefore be constantly maintained - 'stated' - yet always subject to being 're-stated' by alternative voices within and between states. The war-like tension between boundary maintenance and boundary rearticulation leads to the reformulation of Clausewitz.

\textsuperscript{335} Cyrus Vance \textit{Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy} New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983 pp.31-32

\textsuperscript{336} Rosati, Jerel A. \textit{The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community}. Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1987. p.39
was conditioned, even constituted by images of the Soviet Union as principal adversary.\footnote{337 See, for example General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff \textit{United States Military Posture for FY 1978} Washington:US Congress January 1977 p.1.}

One complicating factor in this was the shift in perceptions by the US Congress. Arguably, this divergence of image, [within a largely shared discursive community] became reflected in the 1979 shift in NSC Adviser Brzezinski from a view that had been close to that of Secretary of State Vance, to one that was highly divergent. With respect to the SALT I treaty and the negotiations surrounding the SALT II Treaty, several key players emerge, along with a divergent set of operant images of the Soviet Union as Other. From this, 1979 emerges as the transition year into a hard-line, negative image of Soviet behaviour which put in place many of the military developments that were claimed by Reagan.

Rosati's analysis of frequency distributions of perceived Soviet intentions and of positive/negative evaluations of Soviet behaviours based on the public statements of Carter, Vance and Brzezinski, yields the following table:
What emerges most clearly from this is the large shift evident in the year 1979-1980 shown by a marked downturn in the degree of cooperation coupled with the abrupt appearance of a perception of expansionism precipitated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Overall evaluation of Soviet behaviour shows a turnaround almost two years earlier, in 1978. From this it becomes evident that US perceptions of the Soviets had deteriorated by the time Carter entered his second year of office, and that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan simply confirmed for the Carter regime suspicions that were already held about Soviet political intentions.

This, coupled with domestic perceptions of the Carter team, as expressed in the words of CBS news announcer Dan Rather: "they mean well ... they just don't know what the hell they're doing" underlay a poor prospect for SALT II ratification.

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338 Ibid, p.53

3.9 Carter: Perceptions, Assumptions and the Reader's Construction of Political Identity

The late Daniel Frei notes that "whatever a person does refers to an environment as he or she sees it. For any person, 'reality' exists only as reflected in the image he or she has of this reality." This represents another way of expressing the significance of Tzvetan Todorov's remarks on the discovery of America - that the making of the self is both implicitly and explicitly tied to the idea of identity, which, in turn is tied to the idea of difference. Indeed one cannot have the one without constituting the other.

The discovery self makes of the other ... soon ramifies into countless categories and directions. We can discover the other in ourselves, realize we are not a homogeneous substance, radically alien to whatever is not us ... But others are also "I"s: subjects just as I am, whom only my point of view ... separates and authentically distinguishes from myself. ... I can conceive of these others as a specific social group to which we do not belong. This group can be interior to society, or it can be exterior to society, another society which will be near or far away: beings whom everything links to me on the cultural, moral, historical plane; or else unknown quantities, outsiders whose language and customs I do not understand.

This, he describes as the 'problematics of the exterior.' Strategic reality, as an extension of this, is thus predicated upon perceptions and assumptions about the other. As this chapter has sought to show, such perceptions and assumptions also underwrite the manner in which marginal compliance issues become interpreted - as violations or as

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resolvable ambiguities. The discursive realities that construe and are construed by compliance issues raised through the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation, are in their place an aspect of the larger strategic community whose behaviours are played out in the intersecting agencies and legitimating bodies that mediate compliance issues in both directions. Thus, far from a binary relationship between the US and the Soviet Union, the SCC represents an interface mediating between multiple sites of discursivity that are, singly and together, constitutive of the identity of the strategic arms community located as a subset of the larger but no less discursively construed political community identified as US or Soviet in their place.
CHAPTER IV

The SCC and the First Reagan Administration

We have never found anything that the Soviets have successfully hidden...

- Amrom Katz

4.1 Introduction

As we saw in the previous chapter, the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC) established by the SALT regime was particularly active under the Carter administration. Between 1981 and 1985, throughout the first term of the Reagan administration, the role of the SCC was heavily downplayed. Allegations of increasing Soviet 'cheating' on the SALT agreements in the public press further constrained the abilities of the SCC to engage in useful dialogue toward resolving these allegations. This chapter seeks to explore the effect on the SCC of the new conservative regime and its impact on the issue of the altered status of US-Soviet relations as reflected in the first Reagan administration's use of the SCC, and through specific instances in which the US patently failed to use the SCC to resolve compliance issues, and in so doing, this chapter examines aspects of the US in terms of its defence policy image and its image of the Soviet Union. To explore this, it is important to trace the rise of conservatism as it was played out before Reagan came to power and to look at those forces within US governmentality that, although in the minority, had their effect upon the ability of the Carter

administration to function in the manner which their electoral mandate should have allowed them to do. That is, in Jervis' terms, to say that the conservatives managed to generate so much noise, relative to their size that Carter's signals were rendered unclear.

4.2 Prelude: Seeds of Conservatism

The first term of the Reagan administration may be characterised in terms of continuities and discontinuities. As noted in the last chapter Reagan continued the bulk of Carter's military initiatives as expressed in Defence Appropriations for FY 79, and Military Posture Statement FY78. These remained largely unchanged despite the rhetoric of Reagan's 1983 speech initiating the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). There were additions to strengthen the nuclear posture, but these were emplaced without any reductions to the conventional programs initiated by Carter.

By allocating resources for the MX cruise missile, the development of the B-1 Bomber represented unnecessary and expensive duplication. The B-1's cancellation was not so much an act of unilateral restraint, but rather, as Richard Barnet points out, it was "... a very expensive weapons system basically conceived in the absence of the cruise missile factor..."344

With strategic nuclear parity and a certain level of qualitative evolution of nuclear weapons systems the extent to which further


'overkill' can be justified is a matter for political and discursive analysis. The former, insofar as perceptions of 'nuclear readiness' can be invoked to exert diplomatic influence internationally and domestically, and the latter, insofar as to invoke an image for the sake of perception is a communicative act, predicated upon the symbolic order [notwithstanding the 'real' or actual potency of the weapons systems themselves]. At this point it is worth discussing the formation of this symbolic order.

One of the key factors affecting the shape of the symbolic order throughout the Reagan Administration was the emergence and primacy of the Committee on the Present Danger. Its roots go back to the beginning of President Carter's term in office. I argued in the previous chapter that the emergent conservatism in security matters became prevalent from 1978, around half way through the Carter Administration. It was this conservatism, most readily observed in the operations of Congress that arguably led to the failure of SALT II ratification and the downfall of the Carter Presidency. The appointment of large numbers of Members of the Board of Directors of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) to the Reagan administration attests to the extent of their ascendancy and their

345 Here I agree with Jim George (ANU, personal communication, 16/9/91), that the emergence of the CPD was symptomatic of the conservative forces that led to the rise of neo-realism in the 1980s.

346 There were 60 Members of the Board of Directors of the Committee on the Present Danger appointed to the Reagan administration, including Ronald Reagan himself. Five of these members were women, and of these, three were deployed in traditionally 'soft' policy areas as for example, Task Force on Food Assistance, National Commission on Social Security Reform, US Representative to the [then emasculated] United Nations. See Tyroller, Charles II, ed. Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1984. pp.ix-xi.
ability to constitute a domain of practice in which the terms of debate render the discourse of arms control as outside of the domain of the 'realistic'. This section shall argue that the CPD's power lay in its ability to marginalise, even silence, the arms control agenda. In Lyotard's terms, arms control became construed as a victim of *différend.*

Before examining the Reagan administration's handling of SALT compliance issues, therefore, I shall trace briefly the rise and rise of the CPD as it plays an important role in structuring the domain of policy in which the SCC came to operate under the Reagan Administration.

**4.3 The Advent of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD)**

The story of the CPD can be traced back well before the Carter administration came to power. One of the key players was Paul Nitze whose history in the Pentagon goes back to the 1940s. In 1950, at the Metropolitan Club in Washington, the first Committee on the Present Danger was convened, Paul Nitze was among the committee

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347 See: Lyotard, Jean-Francois. "The Differend, the Referent, and the Proper Name." *Diacritics* 14.3, Fall (1984): 4-14. And Lyotard, Jean-Francois. *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. p.xi where he defines *différend* as follows: "As distinguished from a litigation, a differend [différend ] would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. One side's legitimacy does not imply the other side's lack of legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of judgement to both in order to settle their differend as though it were merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of them."


349 See: Herken, Gregg. *Counsels of War.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p.274. The Committee on the Present Danger derived its name from a remark attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes who held that no one had the right to shout "Fire!" in a crowded room unless there was a clear and present danger. The 1950 CPD had among its membership, in addition to Paul Nitze, James Bryant Conant, Tracy Voorhees, Robert Patterson and others. See Nitze, Paul H., A. Smith, Steven Rearden. *From Hiroshima*
members. This Committee had been formed to lobby President Truman to persuade him to take a harder line toward the Soviets and to increase defence spending on the Korean War. With the implementation of Nitze's NSC-68, and a heightening of the Cold War the group had succeeded beyond their expectations, so they disbanded.350

After 1972, the conservative opposition to SALT grew slowly and without a unified voice. Its growing momentum surfaced with the call for the so-called 'Team B' inquiry to cross-check the CIA's intelligence analysis. The National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) had been criticised after the 'bomber gap'351 and the 'missile gap' for overestimating Soviet capabilities352. As a response to this the intelligence community progressively downgraded their estimates until, in 1974, Albert Wohlstetter alleged publicly353 that the NIEs were grossly underestimating the Soviet threat. This was echoed by the Members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board354. Pressure was brought to bear for the CIA to permit a parallel assessment of CIA

350 Herken Op Cit. 1985, p.275

351 A 'hawk' from the beginning, this was Paul Nitze's own overestimation. See Barnet, 1981, p.57


354 The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee was a sixteen member body, of whom six were original members of the CPD. These included Edward Teller and John Foster. Source: Barnet, Richard J. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. p. 57.
intelligence data. As George Bush, the head of the CIA had himself become critical of the agency's critics. This led him to choose from among the agency's most vociferous critics to form 'Team B' to review evidence of the Soviet threat. Gregg Herken notes that several of the members of Team B, including its Director, Richard Pipes, had been founding members of the Committee on the Present Danger.355

The Team B report was submitted to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on December 2, 1976. Its conclusions about the extent of the Soviet threat directly contradicted the CIA's own assessment. Team B challenged the notion that the United States had superiority in missile accuracy,356 that the Soviet civil defence preparations would prove futile and asserted that the Soviets were seeking strategic superiority over the United States.357

Although the Team A/Team B debate was ultimately inconclusive in objective abstract terms, Herken notes that from a political viewpoint, Team B won decisively.358 The outcome was that with the public divergence of views between the 'experts', and

355 According to Paul Nitze (1989 p.351) the Team B members were: Paul Nitze (CPD), Richard Pipes (Head of Team B, CPD), General Daniel O. Graham, (former Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency), Professor William R. Van Cleave (Defence expert, CPD), Paul Wolfowitz (ACDA), Thomas Wolfe (RAND) Seymour Weiss, and General John W. Vogt Jr. (Commander of US Forces in Europe, Ret.).


... a series of steady, wearing attacks and disappointments ... the public attitude towards both the Russians and arms control had been transformed.359

This transformation, Herken argues, led, by the mid 1970s to a "new reality" for arms control.360 What had previously been a marginal, minority view361 was slowly transformed from "heresy to respectability, if not orthodoxy."362

The Carter administration denounced the Team B report, and in so doing set in train a set of conditions under which the CPD could flourish, and ultimately provide fertile ground in which the new conservatism could take root.

After preliminary discussions throughout 1975 between Paul Nitze, Eugene Rostow, Henry H. Fowler, Charls E. Walker, Richard V. Allen, Lane Kirkland and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt and after consultations with then Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger, an organising meeting was held at the Metropolitan Club in Washington363, to discuss the formation of a formal organisation to "facilitate a national discussion of the foreign and national security policies of the United States directed towards a secure peace."364 The meeting, chaired by

359 Herken 1985 p.278

360 Senator Daniel Moynihan, quoted in Herken, 1985 Op Cit. p.278.

361 That the Soviet intentions were to surpass the United States in strategic capability. Ibid.


363 March 12, 1976

364 Nitze, Paul H., A. Smith, Steven Rearden. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision - A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989. p.353. see also
Eugene Rostow discussed the first draft of what would become the CPD manifesto "Common Sense and the Common Danger." After ten more meetings and a number of private contacts during which the Rostow manifesto went through thirteen full drafts there was agreement to 'go public' on November 11, 1976. The first funds had been raised in August of that year, and by the time of the public launch at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. had raised less than $US 80,000.

The date chosen was to be two days after the election which saw Carter become President. Despite a large Press turnout, little publicity was forthcoming until two months later with a small excerpt from the 'manifesto' in the New York Times. By January 1977 little had changed. The CPD then began work on a series examining the Superpower military balance. The first appeared in October 1978. By their own admission, the CPD had its greatest impact on SALT II


366 Some $US 37,000 was raised by Charls Walker and former Texas Governor John B. Connally over coffee. By the CPDs November launch, the CPD had received $US 79,608.

ratification, beginning with public statements to prominent editors in 1977.\textsuperscript{368}

Although not the only interest group concerned with the SALT II negotiations, the CPD was one of the best organised and most vocal opponents of SALT. Being a 'public education' group, the CPD was able to debate issues openly long before the Carter Administration was able to do so. As Dan Caldwell points out:

By the summer of 1977, the "facsimile ratification debate" had begun, a full two years before the treaty was signed. The Committee on the Present Danger was widely acknowledged as "the brains behind the opposition," and the press conferences that it held were characterised as "more like academic seminars given by Nitze to a small, select group of Washington-based journalists covering the national security beat for their papers, journals and wire services."\textsuperscript{369}

As we saw in the last chapter, public opinion had swung firmly behind the CPD by the end of 1978, to the extent that the CPD could conduct a poll in March 1979 that showed that public support had moved away from SALT II ratification. General Edward Rowny has been quoted as saying:

SALT II was dead in the water in the late Summer or early Fall [of 1979], and the removal [of the treaty from the Senate] from active consideration by Carter after Afghanistan was


just an easy way for him to recognise the obvious: SALT II didn't have a chance.370

Another opponent of SALT II, CPD member Eugene Rostow stated:

We had the [SALT II] Treaty beaten by mid-August [1979]371

Moreover, by the time of the 1980 Presidential elections, the stage had been set for the emergence of CPD member Ronald Reagan as President.

The quantity of public output by the CPD was substantial, and demonstrated their ability to develop coordinated responses to any move by the Carter administration. As Caldwell documents:

From the time of its founding in 1976 through the end of December 1979, members of the executive committee and the board of the Committee on the Present Danger participated in 479 TV and radio programs, press conferences, debates, public forums, and speaking engagements. The committee distributed more than two hundred thousand copies of its pamphlets and reports. During the Senate’s hearings on the SALT II Treaty, executive committee and board members testified on seventeen different occasions before the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees.372

It is worthwhile taking a brief look at the rhetorical strategies invoked by the CPD to determine and augment the shape of the political realities of the late 1970s, from the last half of the Carter Administration to the first Reagan Presidency.


372 Ibid. p.104.
There was also considerable coordination with other allied interest groups that had been set up with related but different agendas, such as the American Security Council\(^{373}\) and the American Conservative Union\(^{374}\) and the Coalition for Peace through Strength\(^{375}\). The CPD concentrated on elite decisionmakers, while others took on the wider brief of direct mass public contact. As Kupperman notes in Caldwell:

> ...when the Committee received a request for information from the general public, it passed this to the American Security Council for a response.\(^{376}\)

The CPD was thus well coordinated with other interest groups and this would have enhanced the effectiveness of their not insubstantial resources.

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374 Having spent $US1m opposing the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties, they turned their attention to SALT II, producing a thirty-minute anti-SALT film that, according to Dan Caldwell was shown on more than 200 television stations across the United States.

375 The Coalition for Peace through Strength was formed in August 1978 as an umbrella organisation to oversee and coordinate the activities of like-minded groups and individuals concerned with US defence policy and especially SALT II. This, according to Caldwell *Op Cit.*, 1991, p.105-6., arose out of the previous experiences of conservative groups during the Carter administration, that had opposed both Paul Warnke’s appointment to ACDA, and the ratification of the Panama Treaties. They had learned that they could be more effective if their activities were coordinated.

The CPD announced itself with a policy statement that established and summarised its politics in the title "Common Sense and the Common Danger." Colonising for itself the realm of 'common sense' in much the same manner as the 'realists' sought to colonise 'reality' in the interwar period, the CPD mobilised a discourse of threat, largely directed towards a systematic demonisation of the Soviets, with the express aim of 'changing the course of US policymaking'.

Whilst, in terms of their stated modus operandi the CPD was not to engage in formal lobbying, the CPDs published views were presented as the 'rational' approach, with the implication that other approaches might not be so 'rational'. Following the meeting between Carter, Warnke and Nitze in which Nitze gave an impromptu, but detailed briefing arguing that defence expenditure should be substantially increased, Nitze's view was seen as a minority and extreme view. Carter was not impressed. In response to what has been characterised as Nitze's 'humiliation' Eugene Rostow wrote:

A strong and angry tide of concern about the safety of the nation is running throughout the country...

377 This is also condensed into the title. For a useful textual analysis of this policy statement, see Dalby, Simon. Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics. London: Pinter Publishers, 1990. especially chapter 2.


379 August 1976.


Significantly, perhaps, Rostow's remarks were closer to describing a 'significant absence' rather than the reality of the time. Masking his lack of evidence for this 'tide', he mobilises metaphors of natural disaster, invoking the mythology of the futility of Robert the Bruce in the face of a 'strong and angry tide' coupled with the Biblical Flood 'running through the nation' in order, presumably to claim some sort of moral high ground.

The manifesto "Common Sense and the Common Danger" opens strongly with a message about danger. In case we miss the point, the word 'danger' is repeated five times in as many lines, and twice in the opening sentence:

"Our country is in a period of danger, and the danger is increasing."382

Dalby points out that the 'common sense' referred to in the title represents a distillation of the mix of US hegemony and containment militarism that characterised NSC 68. From far Right to common sense shows the extent to which US society had come to naturalise the US as metonymic of The West, metaphoric for order, security and rationality, and whose 'natural adversary' was the Soviet Union specifically named as the Other and primary threat to the established order, to the US and its allies.

The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup ... The Soviet Union has not altered its long-held goal of a world

dominated from a single center-Moscow. It continues, with notable persistence, to take advantage of every opportunity to expand its political and military influence throughout the world: in Europe; in the Middle East and Africa; in Asia; even in Latin America; in all the seas.\footnote{383}

This presumably differs from the actions of the US and its relations with "the democratic countries with which we are 'naturally and necessarily allied' and in the developing world" although it remains unclear about the nature of the differences. The 'Asia' spoken of in terms of the Soviet threat remains undifferentiated, despite the presumably ally status of Japan, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Thailand, and the Philippines. The reader is further left to assume that there is some distinction between the Soviets' taking "advantage of every opportunity to expand its political and military influence throughout the world"\footnote{384} and the US engaging in "effective action to ensure the peace and prosperity of the nation" (US) through "peaceful deterrence and \textit{concerted} alliance diplomacy.\footnote{385} For such a distinction is not easy to locate.

One key question remains that underpins the credibility of the presented statements, and that is the question of the identity of the unnamed 'we.' It seems that at least two 'we's are discernible, one is that of the CPD and the other is that of 'Washington.' If it is the former, then a lot of power is assumed for an organisation that professes to be not even a lobby group. If, however the 'we' refers to Washington [metonymic of place and metaphoric for government],

\footnote{383}{"Common Sense and Common Danger" in Tyroler, \textit{Op Cit.} p.3}

\footnote{384}{\textit{Ibid.}}

\footnote{385}{\textit{Ibid.}}
then the accusation directed at "Moscow\textsuperscript{386}" works equally within the text to portray Washington and US hegemony. Indeed, in the context of the opening to the second section, the 'we' most probably refers to the US (which metonymically condenses into Washington). With that single substitution, the reader is left with the following choice, between:

The Soviet Union has not altered its long-held goal of a world dominated from a single center-Moscow. It continues, with notable persistence, to take advantage of every opportunity to expand its political and military influence throughout the world.\textsuperscript{387}

and:

... a conscious effort of will is needed to restore the strength and coherence of [Washington's] foreign policy; to revive the solidarity of [Washington's] alliances ... acting together, work with the developing nations to create a just and progressive world economy-the necessary condition of [Washington's] prosperity.\textsuperscript{388}

On these terms it is possible to see how, through a rhetoric of 'us' versus 'them' articulated through a discourse of danger, the CPD sought to constitute a domain of policymaking driven by 'moral panic' in the guise of 'common sense.' It does not end there.

With the suggestion that the Soviets have been systematically engaged in 'subtle and indirect' threats, driven by a 'long-held goal' of world domination, then the détente that brought the Carter Administration to power can be seen as illusory. Moreover, the Carter administration

\textsuperscript{386} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{387} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{388} Ibid.
is implicitly seen to be a victim of the 'unawareness' to danger that, the
CPD implies, blinds the rest of America. For this reason, the Carter
administration is construed as lacking the 'conscious effort of political
will needed to restore the strength and coherence of [US] foreign
policy.' The final condemnation of the Carter administration lies in
Carter's own set of agendas, insofar as it is only by addressing the stated
lack of political will, can the US 'promote human rights, and help deal
with the great and emerging problems of food, energy, population, and
the environment.' In the same rhetorical move, the CPD claims for
itself, these self same agendas as Simon Dalby puts it:

This move puts the CPD in a space of superior knowledge. It
is aware of the real state of the world, not taken in by an
'illusory détente. Reality is thus defined as a military strategic
one. Political détente is unreal, illusion. The CPD alone
understands the presence of the as yet unnamed 'threat'
which lurks unseen on the world stage. The implication is
that those currently in charge of government policy are likely
to make serious blunders because of their failure to
appreciate the impending threat to the USA. The only
solution is the adoption of the CPD 'common-sense'
perspective.

The logical inconsistencies in the paper are, as Dalby puts it, ignored. But that does not mean that it was without effect. What is of interest
here, is how its effects operated in the face of some quite dramatic
logical flaws. To follow this through it is worthwhile situating this text
in the genre of 'persuasive rhetoric.' For, despite the CPD's

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389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
392 Dalby Op Cit . p.50.
protestations to the contrary, the CPD manifesto "Common Sense and the Common Danger" is a text with an ideological message that goes beyond abstract reason. It is a text that is designed to go beyond mere information. Its function is to persuade, against the weight of informed opinion. Its function in many ways is to work in the realm more traditionally associated with figurative activities like art or religion in order to create structures of meaning. It does so precisely by leaving gaps in its logical structure, in order to invite the reader to insert him/herself into the text in such a way as to bridge the gaps.

In the case of "Common Sense and the Common Danger" the reader is invited to understand the threat in terms of one that operates subtly and indirectly, leading to the conclusion that without substantial policy change, it may soon become too late. Importantly, the CPD maintains, no matter how subtly the Soviet threat operates, the CPD is able to mediate the threat and render it visible. "There is still time for effective action" the CPD reassures us, holding that "...there is no higher priority than peace with freedom and security for our country."

That there is no causal connection between these priorities and the statements about the 'danger,' actually matters less in this type of discourse than that the two semantic fields can be juxtaposed in a manner that allows the reader to make whatever connections may be necessary to understand this text as a coherent piece of language. It is a text therefore, that operates on a connotative rather than a denotative

level of cognition. For Barthes, the operation of this connotative system yields, at the third order of signification the system of ideology. Here we see then, the formal apparatus with which the CPD set about persuading the US to effectively undo a decade of détente and arms control, with the help, one must add, of a receptive audience.

The CPD and Warnke

Paul Warnke's confirmation hearings for his appointment to the directorship of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) represents one of the early signs of the growing power of the CPD to catalyse the 'hawkish' conservative voices within the US. Warnke had worked with Paul Nitze at the Pentagon. Known as 'the two Pauls' they were philosophically opposed on Defence force posture. Warnke did not subscribe to the apocalyptic thesis of the Pentagon 'hawks,' believing that the strength of the submarine and strategic bomber forces (two legs of the strategic triad) more than compensated for any weakness in the land-based forces. Strobe Talbot characterised Paul Nitze as

Warnke's most vociferous detractor—and one of the administration's most formidable opponents on SALT [and]

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394 *Denotation* is, for Roland Barthes, the first order of signification. It refers to the simple or literal relationship of a sign to its referent. It assumes that this relationship is objective and value-free, whereas *Connotative* represents the second order of signification. It occurs when the denotative meaning of the sign is made to stand for the value-system of the culture or the person using it. It thus produces meaning by association, locating attitudinal or evaluative shades of meaning. See O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske. *Key Concepts in Communication.* London: Methuen, 1983. p.215-216 and Barthes, Roland. "Myth Today." * Mythologies.* Ed. Roland Barthes. St. Albans: Paladin, 1973. 109-159.

... a founder ... of the Committee on the Present Danger, a private, unabashedly hawkish lobbying group. Nitze, according to Talbot "had become increasingly disillusioned with SALT" and "appalled at what he regarded as American complacency in the face of 'a clear and present danger' from the Soviet Union." He saw Paul Warnke as representative of that "complacency."

Warnke was appointed to ACDA, but the vote margin for his appointment as chief SALT negotiator was narrow (58-40). Talbot notes that Senator Henry Jackson and Paul Nitze "along with other SALT skeptics" read into that vote margin a symbolic victory for the CPD. They noted and made much of the fact that the vote for Warnke as chief SALT negotiator represented less than the two-thirds majority required for SALT II ratification (the treaty to be negotiated by Paul Warnke).

The anti-SALT II lobby groups had, in sum four main advantages, according to Dan Caldwell:

First, they were united in their opposition to SALT II; the same kind of unity did not characterize the protreaty groups. Second, the anti-treaty groups had superior resources and were more effective in organizing public opinion. Third ... a group's likelihood of success is enhanced if it focuses on blocking rather than initiating action. The opponents of SALT II therefore had the advantageous position. Fourth, scholars have found that conservatives tend to write [to] their legislators more than liberals and those who are opposed to a policy tend to write more often than those who favor a policy. SALT II was a case in which the conservatives were opposed to ratification of the treaty and, not


397Ibid.
surprisingly, mail to senators ran strongly against ratification.398

By 1978 the SALT process was losing momentum, while the litany of criticisms of Carter's administration was growing. With negotiations continuing in private, the Carter administration was somewhat at the mercy of the public debate over SALT, and Paul Nitze's CPD399, as Talbot notes "had been in existence—and on the attack—for more than a year, arguing that the United States was falling dangerously behind the Soviet Union in military might and that SALT was part of the problem."400


399 For an extended exposition of the role of the Committee on the Present Danger, in galvanising the conservative 'hawkish' lobby, see Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics London: Pinter 1990.

The Emergence of the Second Cold War

Halliday notes that the elements of the second Cold War were in place by the mid-term of Carter's Presidency. To look for the causes, however, in a monolithic Soviet push for supremacy, Halliday argues, is to gloss over the US' own role in provoking reaction from the 'Eastern Bloc.' As he states:

... the tensions of this period have their root in the attempt by the USA in the early seventies to use SALT talks and trade as a means of controlling Soviet foreign and defence policy, and in the rebuffs which this attempt encountered-on the battle fields of Indochina and Angola, and in the continued enhancement of Soviet military capacity within the framework of the SALT I agreement. In essence, the New Cold War is a response by the USA and its allies to the failure of détente as a means of waging globalised social conflict to their own advantage.401

The failure of détente, as it applied to SALT II, was also in part the result of Carter's own penchant for 'open government' and much of the momentum for SALT II was lost in Vance's initial approach to Moscow in March 1977. Moving substantially beyond the limits of the Vladivostok Accord, Carter sent Vance in with a proposal for deep cuts in strategic arms. The public release of the proposals before raising them officially with the Soviets was read by the Soviets as a direct piece of moral posturing. The vehemence of the rejection meant that there could not even be a return to the Vladivostok limits and the negotiations were substantially set back.402


Subsequent negotiations eventually resulted in agreement on a general framework for negotiation that took account both of the Vladivostok ceilings and of the US desire for more comprehensive limitations. This framework yielded a three stage set of agreements. These were:

i) a Treaty based on the Vladivostok Accord, to remain in force until 1985;

ii) A Protocol of three years' duration to constrain cruise missiles, mobile ICBMs and qualitative restrictions on ICBMs to allow for later negotiations on these matters in a SALT III; and

iii) A Joint Statement on Principles that would represent a set of guidelines for future negotiations.403

Following a series of high-level meetings in Washington, Moscow and Geneva during 1978 and 1979, the SALT II agreement was signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. President Carter transmitted it to the Senate on June 22, 1979 for consent and ratification.404

Despite the many successes in the ongoing aspects of arms control, compliance with previously established treaties and regular dialogue through the SCC, events seem to have conspired against Carter when it came to 'closing the deal' as it were, on SALT II. In many ways Carter's far-sightedness on arms control issues rendered him pragmatically impaired. His vision of a changing, postmodern world405 meant that


404 Ibid. p.203.

405 Campbell, David. Security and Identity in United States Foreign Policy: A Reading of the Carter Administration. Australian National University, 1989. And see
he could not rest content with a treaty that had been under negotiation through two previous presidents, even if it was by then "ninety percent complete."\footnote{Melvin Laird "A Strong Start in a Difficult Decade: Defence Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years." \textit{International Security} 10.2 (1985): 5-26.p.5.} His decision to start afresh meant that the treaty was delayed and was left without the bipartisan support that Carter had inherited. Additional delays were caused by the pace of technological development that meant debates on cruise missiles, by then accurate enough to be taken seriously,\footnote{MacKenzie, Donald. "The Soviet Union and Strategic Missile Guidance." \textit{International Security} (1988): 5-54.} the Backfire bomber, and verification procedures of the treaty.\footnote{With the fall of the Shah of Iran, the US lost a major intelligence monitoring post that would have contributed to verification of the SALT II treaty. Although the loss was not critical, the issue was given considerable debate in Congress, and was yet another contributing factor to the loss of confidence in the treaty expressed in its imminent failure to be ratified at the time it was withdrawn from Senate. See: Blacker, Coit D. "The Soviets and Arms Control: The SALT II Negotiations, November 1972-March 1976." \textit{The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet approach to Arms Control}. Ed. Michael Mandelbaum. New York, London: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990. Caldwell, Dan. "Verification and SALT." \textit{Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception}. Ed. William C. Potter. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. Humphrey, Senator Gordon J. "Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verification." \textit{International Security Review} 5.1 (1980): 1-26. Talbot, Strobe. \textit{Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II}. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.} Caldwell notes that other contributory factors included the sequencing of the Panama Canal Treaties and SALT II, such that considerable political capital and momentum was lost on the Panama Canal Treaties that were ratified with a narrow margin. The political reserves were thus not available to the same extent for SALT II.\footnote{Caldwell, Dan. \textit{The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate}. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. p.187.} This held also for the ratification debates themselves, as William Hyland notes in Caldwell:
The [Carter] Administration's handling of the ratification process was badly botched; no president should have allowed the Senate to dally over such a critical treaty.410

But, of each of the elements noted above, none of them alone would have prevented SALT II ratification, indeed, Caldwell suggests that even when taken collectively there was still a chance that SALT II would have been ratified, but these, when taken together with three external events appear to have driven the final nails in the coffin of SALT II ratification, and into the chances for Carter's reelection as president.

These events were; the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and the politicisation of this issue which delayed the vote on SALT II, the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran during the first week in November 1979 which weakened public perceptions of the competency of the Carter administration, and finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Again, it is not so much the events in themselves, but the public perceptions of the Carter administration's responses to each of these situations that, having been fed on well organised and concerted conservative interpretations of Carter's handling of these events, led finally to Carter's withdrawal of SALT II from the ratification process. It was in this political climate that Ronald Reagan was elected President. As Richard Barnet describes it:

On November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected in a landslide. The world view of the Committee on the Present Danger, it now appeared, was national policy.411

410 Cited in Ibid. p.187.

My point in labouring the articulations of SALT II ratification failure is to provide a contextual basis with which to explain aspects of the remarkable shift in US articulations of its national security identity, to show that Reagan was not so much the instigator of this, but a product of this process, and to establish the context in which the SCC was to perform its task in the face of this shift.

Although never ratified, both the US and the Soviet Union agreed to respect and abide by its provisions, and to add its provisions to the agenda of the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC) that was established under the auspices of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement of 1972.

4.4 The SCC and the Politics of Reaganosaurus Rex

While at one level it could be argued that force levels are 'concrete facts' that bear little on 'theory', one must recall that the processes that lead to these force levels, that even the styles of technology development are themselves the result of negotiation and the production of text. This point is further underscored by Strobe Talbot who notes that

412 See particularly Article XVII, Paragraph 1, which states:

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972.

What utility nuclear weapons have ... is not so much military as political. Nuclear missiles and bombs are symbols of power. The way in which their custodians, the leaderships of the US and the Soviet Union manipulate these symbols is a key factor in how successful their other policies will be. In that respect, nuclear weapons exist to be talked about, not to be used. Largely for that reason, it is another central and, again, paradoxical part of their nature that they exist to be controlled. At least implicitly, the terms for the non-use of these weapons are always on the agenda of the superpower relationship, no matter how tense and antagonistic that relationship may be.414

One of the patterns of dispersion to be found in the arms control arena is thus that of compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of arms control agreements. It is the possibility of non-compliance that makes possible the space provided by and for the Standing Consultative Commission as an important domain of policymaking. It is a domain that occupies a singular space on the boundaries between the superpowers. It is a highly regulated space, given that its privacy provisions allow it to interpenetrate the other's private space of defence policymaking. It is of importance because it represents one of the sites at which, in the symbolic domain, the US and the USSR negotiate their boundaries with respect to their compliance with the management of the nuclear symbols of power. As Talbot points out:

Nuclear arms control has been one of the most critical enterprises in American foreign policy since the early 1960s. Like the Soviet-American relationship itself, arms control involves both cooperation and competition. Because the weapons under negotiation symbolize power of the most awesome kind, each side can use them as part of its ongoing effort to gain political advantages over the other, even as it seeks to avoid direct military conflict. An American administration's handling, or mishandling, of nuclear arms control has a major bearing on how that administration is judged by its constituents in the polls, by its legislative

partners in government, by its allies in the councils of NATO, and also, of course, by its rivals in the Kremlin.415

Gloria Duffy and Vitali Loukiantzev note that the first term of the Reagan administration was characterised "more by controversies over compliance with past agreements than by progress toward new limitations."416 This period has been referred to as the "compliance crisis"417 which was a period in which the SCC channel was virtually ignored, while public accusations were repeatedly levelled at the Soviets over alleged non-compliance with a range of arms control agreements, SALT being the most notable. Moreover, old issues of ambiguous compliance behaviours which had been settled through the SCC were now raised again as violations, reclassified from 'possible' to 'definite' violation.418 This was a period in which US-Soviet relations were at a low ebb. Indeed, 1983 was characterised, perhaps ironically, by the Reagan administration as "the year of the missile."419 With CPD members Fred Iklé and Richard Perle formulating arms control policy, former ACDA Director, Paul Warnke, among other former Carter

415 Ibid.


418 see Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p. 31. where she states that among the categories of non-compliant behaviour raised by Reagan were "cases in which Soviet behaviour has improved after a period of questionable compliance; charges retained by the Reagan administration despite a burden of evidence to the contrary; charges based upon a worst-case interpretation of soviet behaviour that differs little from US behaviour; and relatively minor disputes over treaty interpretation in which the US bases a charge of Soviet noncompliance upon its a own unilateral treaty interpretation, without seeking a new common understanding with the Soviets through the SCC."

administration officials spoke of "foxes guarding the henhouse"\textsuperscript{420} and "when you have [Retired Army Major General] Ed Rowney reporting to Dick Perle there's no chance of getting anywhere."\textsuperscript{421}

From the start of the Reagan Presidency the question of SALT was high on the agenda with considerable debate within the administration about whether or not to continue to adhere to the provisions of SALT II. Seemingly by default the US administration took the view that "there's not even a marginal military reason for exceeding the SALT limits, if the TTB [threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974] disappeared we'd test weapons over 150 kilotons, but if SALT II disappeared, there's nothing we'd do differently."\textsuperscript{422} Casper Weinberger disagreed. There were divisions over whether the Soviets had complied with the SALT treaties in the past. With the first SCC session to be held under the new administration approaching in March 1981 the first decision taken by Haig and backed by Reagan was a non-decision. It was a decision to postpone the SCC meeting until May, and it took so long to make that the meeting was not postponed until just before the scheduled meeting was due to take place. As Strobe Talbot put it, "there was a delay in proposing a delay."\textsuperscript{423}

Part of the problem facing the conservative Reagan team revolved around a set of concerns that centre, in part, on the kinds of signals to


\textsuperscript{421} Quoted in: \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{422} David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted in Strobe Talbot 1984 \textit{Op Cit}. p.226

send, both to the US' NATO allies and to the Soviet Union, and in part with the lack of firm evidence of Soviet cheating. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, suggested a departure from the established SCC practice of providing the Soviets with a written statement of the steps the United States was taking to remain in compliance with SALT I by providing a spoken statement only. When the issue arose of re-raising the old issue of the SS-19 missile in the SCC, Burt sidestepped, and raised the issue through other diplomatic channels. This was done to avoid further sullying of the waters of the SCC.424

As it happened, there were other issues that were more pressing to raise in the SCC meeting in May let alone any provocative and not fully substantiated additions. Among these was the question of Soviet telemetry encryption in missile tests of the SS-NX-20 SLBM. In a climate in which senior members of Reagan's administration (as, for example, Casper Weinberger and John Lehman), were arguing for a complete abandonment of SALT II and for recognition that the Interim Agreement had expired, the United States was not in a strong position to press for strict compliance with SALT II. Moreover, as calls for a wider interpretation of the ABM Treaty became louder there was also a growing awareness that under the wider interpretation the Soviets were not in breach of its provisions as its ambiguous compliance behaviour might have suggested.

424 Ibid.
**Pacta sunt servanda**

Furthermore, there were consistent charges from the far right that United States compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty was unconstitutional. Nevertheless, since June 18, 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union were obligated under international law, through the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, to "do nothing which would 'defeat the object and purpose' of the SALT II Treaty" despite its being unratified.


426 This is the general presumption against unilateral termination. According to Lord McNair. *The Law of Treaties*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. pp. 493-505 - "...no government would decline to accept the principle *pacta sunt servanda*, and the very fact that Governments find it necessary to spend so much effort in explaining in a particular case that the *pactum* has ceased to exist, or that the act complained of is not a breach of it, either by reason of an implied term or for some other reason, is the best acknowledgement of that principle. A long series of inter-governmental discussions of this nature can be invoked to show that there is a general presumption against the existence of any right of unilateral termination of a treaty." - p.493.

Among the cases cited by Lord McNair supporting this principle with respect to United States practice, these include the *Memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet dated 20 May 1880 on the Proposed Abrogation by the United States of The Clayton - Bulwer Treaty of 1850*.
Rebus sic stantibus

On the subject of international law, the other approach, should the United States have chosen that route, would be to effect changes to the treaty (revision) which, under international law, through the principle of rebus sic stantibus, would require agreement between both Parties. This suggests that if such changes were negotiated through the SCC then the criterion of agreement by both Parties could be met. Such a move, arguably lies behind the negotiation of protocols for dismantlement procedures, for example. Any move beyond technical fine-tuning of the original Treaty, would however, constitute a new treaty. This would not be suitable practice for arms control agreements by which such changes could only be brought about through a recognition that the circumstances under which the Treaty had been negotiated had changed substantially. Such a clause was included within both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement such that:

Each Party shall have the right to withdraw from this (Treaty) (Agreement) ... if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this (Treaty) (Agreement) have jeopardized its supreme interests.427

As Calvo-Goller notes, the political aspects of this leave wide scope for each Party to determine how it defines or interprets the meaning of "extraordinary events," how one conceives of one's "supreme interests" and how each Party defines "threat." Calvo-Goller further notes that:

None of the withdrawal clauses in the SALT Agreements can be viewed as permitting denunciation due to a change of

circumstances unless the new circumstances constitute extraordinary events.\(^{428}\)

Thus the clause of *rebus sic stantibus*, could only be applied to exceptional circumstances under the Vienna Convention on Treaties, if "it is absolutely impossible for a state to execute a treaty or if a treaty is found to be in conflict with its most vital interests."\(^{429}\)

"Window of Vulnerability"

Reagan's rhetoric of danger served to further demonise the Soviet Union. It did nothing to ease growing Soviet concerns that the United States was working to develop a first-strike capability. From the beginning of his presidential election campaign the term "window of vulnerability"\(^{430}\) was mobilised to condense the idea that Carter had let the country down, that by cancelling the MX missile program the US had effectively unilaterally disarmed, and that the Soviet Union would soon reach such strategic superiority that the United States would soon become vulnerable to a pre-emptive nuclear attack. On the basis of this catch-phrase, Reagan was set to justify his opposition to SALT II and to a nuclear freeze. That this rhetoric was not unlike the 'missile gap' rhetoric that brought Kennedy to power should not be so surprising as it was promulgated by Paul Nitze's Committee on the Present Danger - Nitze himself having been the architect of the rhetoric of the original bomber and missile 'gap' of the 1950s.

\(^{428}\) *Ibid.* p.178, see note 797.

\(^{429}\) *Ibid.* p.177-8

The so-called 'window of vulnerability' held that the Soviet Union was acquiring the capability to pre-emptively destroy the bulk of United States land-based ICBMs. The theory being that, at some point in the near future:

the Soviets will have a strategic advantage of such magnitude that they can launch a first-strike sufficient to prevent a devastating U.S. response\textsuperscript{431}

The Reagan administration seemed in this to ignore the fact that earlier administrations had planned for such a possibility by developing two other legs to what had become known as the strategic triad. The triad consisted, not only of land-based ICBMs, but also of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), both of which were widely considered to be 'survivable.'\textsuperscript{432} However, as late as 1983, David Sullivan observed:

Beyond American numerical inferiority, Soviet strategic forces of 1980 have already opened a "window of vulnerability" on all US strategic forces, and this window will gape open all the wider throughout SALT II. The SALT process itself has contributed to US strategic vulnerability by offering the false promise that somehow the Soviets would agree to limit their threat to American land-based missiles. ... The "window of vulnerability" once again leaves America open to Soviet nuclear blackmail, as in the period of Krushchev's rocket rattling in the 1950s and early 1960s.\textsuperscript{433}


\textsuperscript{433} US Senate. \textit{Congressional Record}. September 23, 1983. p.S 12840. This article also completely ignores the air and submarine legs of the triad, dwelling instead on throw-weight and megatonnage without regard to the survivability of their basing platforms.
With statements like these in the public arena, the prospects for effective negotiations on arms control compliance were not good. As Thomas Schelling lamented in 1985:

For several years what are called arms negotiations have been mostly a public exchange of accusations; and it often looks as if it is the arms negotiations that are driving the arms race.434

This was brought out through studies of Soviet responses to Reagan's policies and rhetoric as expressed through, for example, Bialer and Afferica where they note:

President Reagan's concentration on the Russian danger as the fundamental issue in world politics is matched in intensity by Russia's preoccupation with Reaganism as a clear menace to its internal stability and international authority. ... Like American commentators on international problems, they regard as the key aspects of policy the direction of military decisions, the use of economic power, the climate of relations and the approach to negotiations and to regional conflicts. ... In Soviet eyes, the most significant element of the Reagan approach is its attempt to alter the balance of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union.435

As Coral Bell points out, by 1983 relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were "at their lowest point since the death of Stalin 30 years earlier."436 That said, she also points to Reagan's first term as fundamentally a continuation of the foreign and defence policies of Carter, with a discursive overlay of moral panic. For Bell the principal difference lay in the symbolic order, or to use her phrase "on


the rhetorical front."\textsuperscript{437} The key difference, for her, lay in the declaratory policy rather than in operational policy. The Foucaultian sophistication of her *Foreign Affairs* article lies in her inclusion of the Reagan defence budget within the discursive framework of a "strong declaratory signal" insofar as it represents "a statement of intent about the future balance of forces—rather than a transformation of the existing balance of the 1980s."\textsuperscript{438} Hinting at the power of the Committee on the Present Danger and of their continuing role in the Reagan presidency, Bell argues that

...since the image of US military weakness was created chiefly by words (mostly from the Reagan camp from the Republican nomination fight of 1976 onwards) it is logical that more words from the same sources should have been effective in readjusting that somewhat distorted image to reflect the reality of effective (though asymmetrical) superpower parity.\textsuperscript{439}

In following sections I shall examine some of these 'words' and their effect (reception) on the arms control process as expressed through the SALT SCC. The importance of the rhetorical in constituting the political reality is strongly hinted at in Bell:

... from the point of view of the theory of foreign policy, the greater importance of declaratory over operational signals in an age of surveillance may be the idea to be noted.\textsuperscript{440}

Although discourse theorists may put it more strongly and with greater confidence, Bell nonetheless recognises that declaratory and

\textsuperscript{437} Ibid. p.496.

\textsuperscript{438} Ibid. p.492.

\textsuperscript{439} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{440} Ibid. p.510.
operational policy, insofar as they are politically meaningful, can both be considered as species of the genus 'discursive practice.'

What is important here, is not that the 'Soviet threat' was a 'mere product of words,' but that for compelling domestic reasons a particular representation of Soviet strategy was necessary in order to draw together the disparate frameworks that constituted the United States under the unifying rubric of security against a common and 'present' danger.\textsuperscript{441}

\textsuperscript{441} For an elaboration on a similar point made regarding the NATO alliance see: Klein, Bradley. "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO" ISQ 34/3 September 1990 pp.311-315. p.313.
SCC Activity from 1980-1985

At the Spring session of the SCC in 1980, work was suspended on SALT II implementation procedures following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the failure of the US Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

As noted earlier in this chapter the 18th SCC meeting scheduled for March was delayed until May 27, 1981. This was due to internal debate within the newly elected Reagan administration over whether or not to continue to uphold the SALT Treaties and whether or not to continue using the SCC.

During the October round of the SCC (19th meeting) the Soviet SCC delegation responded to US concerns regarding the location of Soviet LPARs by stating that their placement took account of "technical and practical considerations."

In the September 1982 round (21st meeting) the United States asserted that Soviet SS-16 ICBMs were secretly deployed at Plesetsk. The Soviet maintained that they were neither deployed, nor in production. They further contended that no clause of the SALT II treaty applied to those missiles. The two sides deadlocked on the issue and held a recess until December when the SCC convened an ABM Treaty review.

In October of the same year the Soviets flight-tested their SS-24 MIRVed ICBM.
US Charges of Soviet Noncompliance
with SALT Agreements 1980-1985

This section provides the empirical data on which the analysis of the political shift between the Carter and Reagan Presidencies is based. It serves to reinforce the thesis that there is an indexical link between arms control policy (a subset of national security policy) and state-making viewed through the activities which maintain the state boundaries.

This record of SALT compliance in the first Reagan term draws principally, but not exclusively upon the 1984 and 1985 Congressional Hearings before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on Soviet Treaty Violations with additional background material as required to examine the degree to which compliance concerns are raised in this period, coupled with an examination of the manner and rhetoric with which often ambiguous behaviours are construed in this period as concrete examples of Soviet violations of the SALT Agreements.

Overall, as Duffy points out, of the twenty arms control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union, fewer than half have been "the subject of significant, unresolved complaints regarding compliance." Eight agreements have been the subject of some forty United States and Soviet reciprocal charges of noncompliance since 1983, reflecting the deteriorating political climate of the time. Of those, we are concerned here only with those agreements that fall within the mandate of the SCC. It is also relevant to consider the legal status of these agreements

as this may have some bearing on the implications of noncompliance. Those that fall within the purview of the SCC are the ABM Treaty, 1972; SALT I Interim Agreement, 1972; SALT II Treaty, 1979. The ABM Treaty is a fully ratified treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement was an executive agreement in force until November 1986, and the SALT II Treaty holds the status of a treaty for which the ratification process had been discontinued. \(^{443}\) Although the first two can claim a similar degree of authority, SALT II falls into an ambiguous category, without the full binding force of a ratified treaty, yet laying claim to some force on the basis of the international law principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. According to Duffy, expectations for compliance with SALT II are based on the declaratory political commitment of the Parties. \(^{444}\)

By 1982 the conservatives, including the CPD, had become increasingly strident, forming a suitable context within which Reagan could establish an arms control working group, as Reagan put it, "to examine verification and compliance issues." With some sixty CPD members, drawn from both Democrat and Republican sides, it seemed only a matter of time before Congress should call on President Reagan to report to it on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements under the FY 1984 Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Even the negative titling of the report that was submitted seemed to prejudge, not the degree to which the Soviets complied with their obligations


\(^{444}\) *Ibid.*
under the various arms control agreements, but the degree of 
noncompliance.445

In 1984 the United States reviewed seven initial issues of concern and 
charged the Soviet Union with "violations and probable violations 
with respect to a number of Soviet legal obligations and political 
commitments in the arms control field."446 The relevant concerns for 
our discussion here, bear on compliance with the SALT agreements 
that fall under the purview of the SCC.

The 1985 President's report on Soviet noncompliance provided 
'updated' information on the seven issues raised in the 1984 report 
and added six others covering aspects of compliance with the SALT I 
Interim Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the ABM 
Treaty.

Of the four issues of concern in the 1984 Report that pertain to the 
SALT Agreements; one was of the ABM Treaty - the Krasnoyarsk radar 
issue - and represents probably the only full violation of a legally 
binding agreement, while the other three were grey area violations of 
the unratified SALT II Treaty. These concerns were (i) the encryption of 
telemetry, (ii) SS-X-25 missile, considered to be a second new type 
(where only one was permitted) and (iii) SS-16, possibly representing a 
banned deployment of an ICBM. The Krasnoyarsk radar issue is of 
particular interest, and for that reason I shall defer its exploration until


446 Ibid. p.1.
after a brief review of the other SALT-related issues raised within the SCC.

Conversion of launchers from 'light' to 'heavy'

Article II of the Interim Agreement states:

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.\(^447\)

GAC Report (1983) cites as violation of SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972 the Soviet deployment of the large-throw-weight SS-19 and SS-17 ICBMs from 1972 to the time of the report. The charge alleged circumvention defeating the stated US object and purpose of limiting throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs and breach of the 1972 Principles Agreement.

This charge did not arise in the 1985 President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, and appears to have been an attempt to resurrect an issue that had been settled long before, as documented in R.W. Buchheim's *Briefing on SALT I Compliance* in 1979.\(^448\)


Use of telemetry encryption: 'Deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by NTMs

Article XV(3) of SALT II states in part:

Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

The Second Common Understanding states:

Each Party is free to use various forms transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

a) GAC Report (1983) cites as a violation the encryption of telemetry which impeded the ability of the US to determine the characteristics of test missiles, including those characteristics prohibited by SALT II.

The 1984 President's Report to Congress concerning Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements notes that, as the SALT II Treaty had not been ratified, and that, as of 1981 the US had made it clear that ratification would not take place, then two degrees of noncompliance could be applied. Before 1981, both nations would be obligated under the conventional practice of international law to comply with the Treaty's provisions (under the principle of pacta sunt servanda ). After 1981, both the United States and the Soviet Union declared their political commitment to 'refrain from actions that undercut SALT II' for as long as each other continued to comply. Under this set of unilateral declarations, any breach of compliance with SALT II would thereby constitute violations of a political commitment.
The 1984 Report concluded that 'Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment subsequent to 1981' with particular reference to the Soviet SS-X-25 missile. This charge was reaffirmed in the 1985 Report, emphasised in the 1986 Report, and noted again in terms of a 'deliberate denial of missile test information.' The Soviets countered by asking the US to supply details of which telemetry channels need to be de-encrypted to complete the requirements for verification. Unfortunately, for the US to reveal those details would, by implication, reveal the sources by which the US determines compliance - thus providing the Soviets with the information they would need to design around the US' national technical means of verification of compliance with the Treaty.

**The SS-X-25 Missile: Second new type**

Article IV(9) of the SALT II Treaty states:

> Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM

The Second Agreed Statement attached to Paragraph 9 of Article IV of the SALT II Treaty states:

> The term 'new types of ICBMs,' as used in paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those flight-tested as of MAY 1, 1979 in any or more of the following respects:

> a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile;

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b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages.

The First Common Understanding attached to Paragraph 9 of Article IV of the SALT II Treaty states:

As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term 'different,' referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of five percent.

The Second Agreed Statement attached to Paragraph 9 of Article IV of the SALT II Treaty states:

Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have the same number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of each stage as the first ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that Party. In addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be different in any one or more of the following respects: the length, the largest diameter, the launch weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile.

The reason for this set of provisions, as expressed in the President's Report on Soviet non-compliance 1985, is that these represented an attempt to 'constrain the modernisation and the proliferation of new, more capable types of ICBMs.' By constraining the 'one new type' of light (that is, single-warhead) missile, such that the post-boost reentry vehicle must not be less than fifty-percent of the throw-weight (defined as the weight of the warheads and the mechanisms that target and

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release them\textsuperscript{451} it was intended that single-warhead ICBMs should not be readily convertible to MIRVed systems. The throw-weight allowance differential between the post-boost vehicle greater than fifty percent, but less than one hundred percent of the throw-weight would, however allow for a limited degree of penetration aids ('spoofing,' in the form of radar chaff, or light-weight decoys).

As Duffy points out, 'modernisation' of existing types did not mean that the modernised version had to be specifically related to a previous type. The constraints are merely that:

\begin{quote}
\textit{as long as the launch-weight, throw-weight, length, and largest diameter of a missile tested are within 5 percent of those of any missile of an existing type, (and the kind of propellant and number of stages are the same) [then] ... the new missile is for treaty purposes to be considered a modification of that existing type...}\textsuperscript{452}
\end{quote}

With the flight testing of the SS-N-24 in October 1982, the Soviet Union declared that this was to be the 'one new type' as allowed by Article IV of the SALT II Treaty. The SS-N-24 was MIRVed with ten warheads, and designed to be rail-mobile and silo-based. The United States in turn designated its MX [Missile: Experimental] missile as its one new type under SALT II.

In February 1983 a missile was flight-tested from Plesetsk. Designated the SS-25, it was thought to represent the first of a second new type of ICBM, although heavy telemetry encryption made it difficult for the

\textsuperscript{451} See John Newhouse \textit{The Nuclear Age from Hiroshima to Star Wars} London: Michael Joseph p.242

\textsuperscript{452} Duffy, Gloria. \textit{Compliance and the Future of Arms Control}. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.64. Duffy notes further, that the new missile could even be the product of a different design bureau.
US to be able to state unequivocally that the missile represented a new type, and hence a treaty violation.

Although stating that the evidence was 'somewhat ambiguous,' the GAC Report (1983) cited the SS-X-25 as a possible second new type of ICBM and therefore a 'probable violation' of the provisions of the SALT II Treaty. From 1985 onwards the charge was listed as a definite violation and was reaffirmed in every subsequent report to the present (1990).

The December 1985 report charged that the throw-weight of the SS-25 exceeded by more than five percent the throw-weight of the SS-13 ICBM. This would mean that the SS-25 could not be considered a permitted modernisation of an earlier type, as permitted by SALT II and as claimed by the Soviets. Its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS-X-24 (the Soviet's stated 'new type') would render the SS-25 a prohibited second new type. This was claimed by the US to be a 'violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the 'new type' provision of the SALT II Treaty.' The December report goes on to add to this a related violation by the deployment, in 1985, of the SS-25.

The Reagan administration charged that the SS-25 was a violation of both the 'new type' rule and of the 50% rule. The 'new type' charge

453 Later named the SS-N-25

454 The February 1984, and February 1985 reports did not specify the manner in which the SS-25 constituted a violation

arose from claims that the throw-weight of the SS-25 was estimated to be around 90% greater than the SS-13 that the Soviets held up for comparison. The Reagan administration further alleged that the reentry vehicle of the SS-25 violated the 50% rule on the grounds that it constituted only about 45% of the missile's throw-weight.

The process of determining throw-weight from flight-test telemetry is neither easy nor straightforward, especially when there is a high level of telemetry encryption.

At a press conference on June 4, 1986, a Soviet official stated:

At variance with [the throw-weight definition] provision, the weight of certain elements which make up the throw-weight of the old missile [SS-13] (means to overcome ABM defence and the warhead guidance device) is not included by the United States.

What he was pointing out is that the United States had overestimated the throw-weight of the SS-25 by including the weight of an instrument package used during testing that would not be included in the actual deployment of the missile, and that other components had been excluded in estimates of the throw-weight of the SS-13. The net analysis, according to Marshal Akhromeyev is that the US assessment

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457 Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, chief of staff of the Soviet military

was in error, not because of faulty measurement, but because of inappropriate calculations which apportioned the ratio of throw-weight to launch-weight.

Duffy notes that the US has to rely on 'best estimates' of throw-weight derived from the analysis of test data, which operates with a broad margin of uncertainty. The Stanford Research Group observes that there is still some overlap of the distributions which allow for a small percentage chance that the parameters of the SS-25 may fall within the five-percent limit, and that the apparent differences may be due to measurement or statistical errors. They note, however, that the chance is small, and that the 1985 Report's use of the phrase 'based on convincing evidence'\textsuperscript{459} suggests that the Reagan administration was confident that the difference was real and significant. Moreover, the Reagan administration charged that, whether or not the SS-25 constituted a violation of the re-entry vehicle to throw-weight ratio, the encryption of the test telemetry was "illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of the USSR's political commitment.

The Arms Control Association's staff assessment of the charge concludes that:

Until the administration is prepared to explain on what basis it excludes ... additional devices from its calculation of the SS-13's throw-weight, and on what basis the instrumentation package on the SS-25 should be included in the missile's throw-weight, its case will remain weak. Whether or not the SS-25 fits within the five-percent limit on throw-weight using the Soviet reading of the treaty language depends upon

the weights of the various elements of the throw-weight. This information, which the United States may not know in detail, has not been volunteered by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{460}

The Stanford Research Group came to similar conclusions, suggesting that the evidence that the SS-25 represents a violation is not at all clear cut. In concluding comments reviewing both the US and the Soviet positions they note:

It appears that a reasonable though legalistic case can be made for the Soviet position. Secretary of State Schultz in effect conceded as much when he stated in a television interview, "there are questions about whether in a purely technical sense, the SS-25 fits within the treaty language as might be interpreted by a lawyer."

A reasonable case can be made for the administration as well. The situation appears to be one in which a literal reading of the treaty language and a common sense interpretation of its intent lead to opposite conclusions. A more forthright presentation of the issue would have at least made it clear that there is a Soviet side to the story, a side not totally devoid of substance.\textsuperscript{461}

Military significance

The issue of verification standard has been canvassed in earlier chapters. However, the application of these standards requires an assessment of the alleged non-compliant behaviour in terms of military significance. Particularly, but not exclusively, with respect to the standard of 'adequate verification' (this also applies to Reagan's standard of 'effective verification') the object of verification is to detect non-compliant, or potentially non-compliant behaviour before the


effect of such behaviour becomes 'militarily significant.' This in itself can be the object of intense debate over how one applies the term 'military significance,' but at some point these behaviours require some form of proportional response. This again is a political issue, as even technical breaches of a treaty can be assessed in multiple ways as regards their military significance.

If one assumes that the SS-25 issue represents a clear violation of the SALT II Treaty, the question arises as to the military significance of this breach. Such an assessment has to take account of the manner or style of breach, and it has to take account only of that aspect of the missile system that is in breach of the treaty. Finally the breach needs to be assessed in terms of the value of its contribution to the strategic capability of the notional adversary and assessed in terms of what the degree of change indicates about the intentions of the other side. Note that the overall capability itself need not be taken into account with respect to the 'intentions' of the other, but the direction and degree of change to the other side's force posture. In this sense, what is significant is the degree and manner in which a breach can be read in terms of gesture. In interpersonal terms (as we are dealing with subjectivities, however multiple and contradictory) one does not read the other in terms of whether or not they possess arms, hands or face, but in the movements of these parts by which they signal their intentions - their gestures. In this sense, then, the other's responses to the formal behaviour codes instituted by an arms control regime are enunciated by gestures that can be 'read' by and through various interpretive schemata in terms of compliance/violation, enunciative force of the agreement (whether formal ratified treaty or political commitment) modality and degree of violation (is it a material breach
by extension (vertical proliferation); that is, by exceeding numerical limits; or by lateral proliferation, that is, by developing and deploying prohibited new types).

In the case of the SS-25, as Duffy notes,\(^{462}\) the significance lies in the differential in throw-weight between the SS-13 and the SS-25, rather than in the significance of the total package of the SS-25. If the mass of the SS-25's reentry vehicle were held down to SS-13 specifications as read by the US, then there would be no technical violation and the SS-25 would have represented a permitted modification of the SS-13. If that were the case, Duffy argues, although the nuclear yield would be 'somewhat less' than the actual SS-25, this would be readily offset by developments in yield-to-weight ratios and improvements in targeting accuracy\(^{463}\) that would more than offset any marginal decrease in the warhead's fissile mass. Duffy points out that the real significance of the SS-25 is its mobile basing mode which would enhance its survivability. As Duffy notes:

> Whatever the strategic significance of the SS-25, very little of that significance is attributable to the extra throw-weight that constitutes the compliance issue.\(^{464}\)

Assuming that the SS-25 is a violation in the terms stated by the Reagan administration assessments of the RV:Throw-weight ratio, then the question remains as to the extent of the violation in terms of


the potential to derive a MIRVed mode for the SS-25. If the US figures are correct and the RV represents between 40-50% of the throw-weight, then two immediate questions arise:

i) why go to all the trouble of violating a treaty for the sake of an ambiguous ability to add only one extra warhead. Duffy argues that if the RV had been only 10% of the throw-weight then it would seem logical to assume MIRV capabilities for this missile.

ii) It is not at all clear that it would be possible to mount an extra warhead in any case, since to do so would require the addition of yet another post-boost vehicle (PBV), with a corresponding increase in instrumentation - itself no light weight. A second reentry vehicle (RV) would leave only about 10-15% of the throw-weight for the additional post-boost vehicle. Duffy notes that it seems unlikely that the Soviets would have one light enough to fall within these specifications. Therefore, claims made by the Reagan administration that "the SS-25 also could be modified to carry more than a single warhead" seem to be more a case of imputing to the other capabilities one does not possess oneself.

The political climate in which the SCC was expected to operate at this time was at its most confrontational as we have seen for reasons given at the beginning of this chapter. According to Duffy:

The SCC has discussed the SS-25 but has made no progress toward resolving the dispute. Apparently, the United States has simply accused the Soviets of a violation and insisted that they terminate the SS-25 program. For their part, the Soviets have not provided any information that might be

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helpful, such as the nature and weight of the SS-13's "guidance device" or the nature of the penetration aids that they claim it carries and that the United States has not detected.466

This instance is one of many that reflect the political nature of what has often been described as a technical issue. That no agreements were signed in the SCC during the first term of the Reagan administration was no accident. Nor did this reflect a failure in the SCC process itself, but rather an unwillingness to utilise the SCC for that for which it was intended.

Grey-Area Disputes

There were a number of issues raised in the SCC as potential violations of the SALT Treaties that fall under the purview of the SCC. In many cases, the manner in which they were approached by the Reagan administration followed closely the pattern of responses set out in the SS-25 issue above.

Non-permanently fixed ABM radar

GAC Report (1983) cites as a violation the development and deployment of a non-permanently fixed ABM radar on the Kamchatka peninsula in 1975 and 'continuing developmental activities between 1975 and the present (1983).

These issues are largely a raking over of old issues - the 'Pawn Shop' and 'Flat Twin' radars were more than a decade old at the time of the allegations. At no time were they mobile in any meaningful sense of

the word. While they could be erected in a shorter time than previous ABM systems, they still needed to rest on prepared concrete foundations, and, according to the ACA assessment of the 1987 President's report on Soviet noncompliance:

... a single operational site would take about half a year to construct. A nationwide ABM system based on this new system would take a matter of years to build

The Arms Control Association assessment concludes:

Apparently, very little activity with regard to these two radars has taken place since the 1978 report was written and none of the radars have been deployed at the permitted Moscow deployment area or elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Therefore there is little evidence for the administration's charge that these radars represent a "potential violation" of the treaty.

Exceeding launcher limits

GAC Report (1983) cites as a violation the deployment of DELTA submarines resulting in exceeding the limit of 740 launch tubes without dismantling sufficient older ICBM or SLBM launchers. This accusation represents a review of the 1975 violation, but now suggesting that the actions were 'probably not inadvertent but rather part of a deliberate Soviet challenge to US arms control verification capabilities.

Deployment of SS-16 ICBMs at Plesetsk

GAC Report (1983) cites as a violation the 'probable continued deployment' of the Soviet SS-16 ICBM at Plesetsk. The report charges

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that Soviet 'deliberate' use of concealment which impedes verification of compliance by US national technical means has been associated with probable SS-16 deployment. After 1979, modifications of sites that had been associated with the SS-16 ICBM, and the lack of evidence that the SS-16 missiles had been destroyed, led the United States to assume the SS-16 was still deployed.

Duffy notes that US surveillance satellites have reportedly never actually observed SS-16 missiles at the Plesetsk site. Duffy also notes:

In late 1985 US intelligence observed the Soviets moving warhead transporters and other support equipment for mobile missiles onto rail-cars at Plesetsk. Much of the intelligence community drew the conclusion that the Soviets were removing the SS-16s from Plesetsk and sending them into storage. This charge therefore, does not currently represent Soviet non-compliance, if it ever did.468

Mobile Missile Base Construction at Dismantled SS-7 ICBM Sites

The 1985 report on Soviet non-compliance reaffirmed the February 1985 report that the Soviets had been using former SS-7 ICBM facilities for the storage, support, or launch of SS-25 mobile ICBMs in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement. This issue was again reaffirmed in the 1986 report. What needs to be remembered here, is that under the SALT I Interim Agreement there is no limitation to the deployment of mobile, land-based ICBM launchers. Moreover, the 1985 report, while raising the issue, concludes that:

...Soviet activity apparently related to SS-X-25 ICBM deployments at two former SS-7 bases does not at present violate the agreed implementing procedures of the SALT I Interim Agreement. However, ongoing activities raise

concerns about compliance for the future, since use of "remaining facilities" to support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 sites would be in violation of Soviet commitments. The US will continue to monitor developments closely.469

Reconfiguration of Yankee-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines

The 1985 Report raised the issue of whether the reconfigured Soviet 'Yankee' class submarine violated the SALT I Interim Agreement under which submarines limited by the Interim Agreement must be dismantled or reconfigured into submarines without ballistic missile capabilities. The report concluded that the reconfiguration of this submarine into a longer, cruise-missile-capable one was not a violation of the Soviets' political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement.

The 1985 Report also added three issues concerning the ABM Treaty:

i) whether the Soviets had concurrently tested SAM and ABM components,

ii) whether the Soviets had developed, tested, or deployed mobile ABM components, and/or

iii) whether the Soviets had provided a base for territorial defence.

Mobility of New ABM System

The 1985 report raised questions over the issue of whether the Soviet Union had developed a mobile ABM system in violation of its obligations under the ABM Treaty. The report concluded that the activity in question was 'ambiguous,' and remained cautious over the

potential for a system which was reportedly deployable at sites with relatively little preparation. Again the problem arises over the lack of a definition for the term 'mobile'.

Concurrent Testing of ABM and SAM Components

The 1985 report examined the issue of whether the Soviets had concurrently tested ABM and SAM elements in contravention of Article VI of the ABM Treaty and Protocol. This issue was raised again in 1986 and 1987.

The 1985 report concluded that there was 'insufficient evidence ... to assess fully compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty.' The United States was concerned that concurrent testing, if it should occur, with other activities, meant that the Soviet Union could be preparing an ABM defence of its national territory.

This issue first arose over questions to do with the Soviet SA-5 SAM system in 1973-1974. As noted in chapter three of this thesis, the issue was raised in the SCC and the concurrent testing ceased shortly afterwards. A classified Agreed Statement was negotiated in the SCC and signed in 1978. The Statement regulated the concurrent testing of air defence and ABM components.

Operation of air defence radars at the Sary Shagan range led to this issue being revived in the SCC. This, in turn, led to a Common Understanding signed in 1985. The Understanding reportedly bans all use of air defence radars during ABM testing, except in the unlikely event of a hostile aircraft being clearly in the vicinity. This should have brought the matter to a close.
However, the December 1985 Report does not mention the Common Understanding reached in 1985 in the SCC, which was designed to resolve the problem, preferring to note publicly that the Soviets have 'probably violated' the ABM Treaty. The ACA expresses this in stronger terms:

This issue is a prime example of the administration's tactic of making public charges on issues that could be (or in this case apparently already had been) resolved in the SCC. The SCC's record in handling this has been impressive: The Soviets ceased their initial activity soon after the question was raised, and two subsequent agreements have been negotiated. The 1985 understanding ... should resolve the issue once and for all. Despite this constructive history, the administration has consistently referred to this issue as a 'highly probable' violation in its compliance reports.\(^\text{470}\)

**ABM Territorial Defence**

The February 1985 report examined the issue of whether the Soviets had, by the combination of a number of factors, deployed or provided a base for an ABM defence of their territory. Citing radar construction, concurrent testing SAM upgrading, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility, concluded that the Soviet Union may be in the process of preparing such a defence system for its national territory. This conclusion was reaffirmed in the December 1985 report, and expanded in the February 1986 report.

That these conclusions were drawn does not, however, render them conclusive. While noting that some of the activities are permitted within the ABM Treaty, when considering those activities that fall outside of the Treaty the language changes in tone to the less certain

register of 'potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity. Each of the charges laid was qualified by modal auxiliaries 'apparent', 'probable,' 'may have' and so on. The 1986 report concludes with a statement of the dire consequences for the West, if the Soviets should develop an ABM defence for their national territory. Citing 'profound implications for Western security and the vital East-West strategic balance' and concluding:

A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could reorder our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility. such a capability might encourage the Soviets to take increased risks in crises, thus degrading crisis stability. [emphasis mine]471

The ACA assessment of the 1987 Report on Noncompliance concludes that, despite the seriousness of the charge, the evidence on which it is based 'rests on old and largely discredited or irrelevant assertions.'472

At this point it is relevant to consider the trajectory of the most significant of the claimed violations - that of the Krasnoyarsk radar - in the context of an examination of the extent to which even the seemingly most obvious violation is itself the product of a range of political processes, from the allocation of resources for the acquisition of the intelligence assets, through the production of the intelligence product as such, through the decision to raise the issue in the SCC, the Soviet responses, the US responses to the Soviet responses, both within the SCC and in the mobilisation of this issue as a sign through


which the Soviet Union has been demonised as threat and as other, and how this sign has been juxtaposed with other signs to construe a virtual reality space of threat and, within the United States, of security articulated as identity.

Krasnoyarsk: Collusion of Discourses.

Large phased-array radars were limited by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because, if properly located, they represented a necessary element of ABM battle-management and, if constructed, were therefore indexical of an intention to deploy an ABM system. They would have to be very large, permanent structures with attendant long construction times spanning a number of years. Peter Zimmerman notes:

> They were recognised during the negotiations of the ABM Treaty as the key elements of an ABM system which would most severely limit the rate at which one of the Parties could 'break out' to provide a missile defence for all of its territory.\(^{473}\)

Being very large structures, they would be verifiable by national technical means of verification (NTMs), and being slow to build, they would be detected before becoming operational, and detectable with a sufficient time-margin to react to possible treaty violations with consultation to clarify ambiguous behaviour, and such other action as may be necessary to prevent a violation from occurring. Whether the Krasnoyarsk radar is considered to be a full violation of the ABM Treaty depends upon one's definition of the word 'deploy,' but if the purpose of limiting LPARs is to have an indicator of an intention to

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construct an ABM system, then logically, the lead time should be construed as detection time, and deployment should, as with the submarine missile launchers, be construed as any time after the radar is tested as such and becomes ready for operation. Although considered to be a violation of the most conclusive kind, this section shall argue that deployment is the point at which a violation should be charged, while any time after detection falls within the boundaries of 'potential violation' or 'notice of intent to violate,' rather than as a violation in itself. This would give both Parties the opportunity to make use of the Standing Consultative Commission as a forum in which private negotiation can take place over whether or not an activity represents a violation or an activity which, if continued could become a violation. Although this seems to be the intention of the treaty, the issue of definition is extremely important. The choice to limit LPARs is based on their potential for use as ABM battle-management radars. LPARs, however, have other functions which fall outside the boundaries of the ABM Treaty. Any understanding of the specific terms of the ABM Treaty with respect to LPARs rests upon an understanding of the relation of particular specifications to the kinds of uses to which they can be put. That is to say, what are the characteristics held in common by LPARs for ABM battle management, for early-warning of ballistic missile attack, or for space tracking as national technical means of verification? The following table lists the characteristics required for each of the potential
Table 4.1 LPAR Functional Characteristics

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<tr>
<th>ABM battle-management</th>
<th>Early warning</th>
<th>Space-tracking</th>
<th>Krasnoyarsk</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Structural hardening against blast</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Hardening against Electromagnetic Pulse</td>
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<td>• Independent power generation</td>
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<td>• Underground facilities</td>
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<td>• Frequency in low hundreds of megahertz</td>
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<td>• Frequency in high hundreds of megahertz</td>
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<td>• Periphery location looking outwards</td>
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<td>• Southward orientation to face most space orbits</td>
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functions of an LPAR, showing how the Krasnoyarsk radar compared with those characteristics.

This table points to the kinds of ambiguities that can arise when US assumptions about the required characteristics of a particular radar system are used to 'read' the intended use of a non-US system. Clearly, according to the table, the 'closest fit' of characteristics to function is with space tracking and NTM. The problems with that assessment are that the frequency is not optimised for space tracking (according to US experts, the frequency of 180 megahertz is too low for space tracking) and the radar faces almost directly away from the majority of space orbits. (Northeast, instead of South) and the radar is oriented toward the horizon, an orientation more suited to the detection of missiles at
the earliest possible moment, whereas a space track radar looks directly up through the thinnest possible slice of atmosphere.\textsuperscript{474}

The Krasnoyarsk radar case is important for several reasons. Firstly, of all the charges brought by the US against the Soviet Union of violation of the ABM Treaty, the Krasnoyarsk large phased-array radar is the most widely acknowledged, even, since 1989,\textsuperscript{475} by the Soviets themselves. Secondly, this case raises significant issues regarding remarkably similar activities conducted by the United States at Thule in Greenland, and at Fylingdales Moor in the United Kingdom. Thirdly, although the reports and other writings surrounding the issue of arms control compliance, that raise the issue of Krasnoyarsk, take as their point of entry the discovery of the radar as the starting point for their narrative, a discourse analytic approach would not be satisfied with such sharp and clear beginnings. For a play to begin \textit{in medias res} is fine for the encouragement of the willing suspension of disbelief, but politics is about the discourses that shape political reality; and arms control, as we continue to see, is very much about politics. Fourthly, what is particularly interesting about this case is the way in which, through the medium of the virtual space between states represented by


\textsuperscript{475} Although it had been argued earlier that the Soviets \textit{implicitly} acknowledged a violation by offering to cease work on the Krasnoyarsk radar in the October 1985 round of the SCC if the United States ceased work on their 'upgrade' of the Thule and Fylingdales Moor radars, the Soviets only acknowledged the radar as a violation \textit{explicitly} when then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze noted in 1989 that "the Krasnoyarsk radar had been built at a location not permitted under ABM and was a technical violation of the treaty." See: Garthoff, Raymond. "Case of the Wandering Radar." \textit{Bulletin of Atomic Scientists} July/August (1991): 7-9. p.7. In 1991, Garthoff notes, the Soviets agreed to dismantle the radar, thus removing it as an obstacle to further strategic arms negotiations.
the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) the Krasnoyarsk radar was made to acquire levels of meaning beyond that of a fairly plain trapezoidal concrete structure the size of the Great Pyramid at Giza, into an issue of sovereignty and of ideological Manachæism. Krasnoyarsk, over a period of years, and within a specific political context became a symbol of Otherness for the US, that led weight to assumptions already held, in which belief systems were confirmed and boundaries maintained. Moreover, in order to show that events do not simply appear without context, without prior discursive structures being in place, this section shall bring together some relevant traces of those formations that made possible the raising of Krasnoyarsk as an issue and as a sign.

Chapter three teased out two major themes: Carter's commitment to a world view of a world in flux. It was a complex world view that flew in the face of the modernist conceptions of linearity and progress. Partly as a reaction to the Realpolitik of Nixon and Kissinger's foreign policy, Carter's was a world view that valued diplomacy, that valued a commitment to security through arms control and the processes of dialogue based on his reading of the signals of détente established by and through the two Republican presidencies that preceded his own. That commitment and that vision was reflected in his administration's use of the Standing Consultative Commission to discuss and, where necessary to react to ambiguous compliance behaviour. During his term of office there were no unequivocal breaches of any legally binding arms control agreement. The other major theme, rendered explicit in the intertext on the rise of the Committee on the Present Danger, represented the reactionary and conservative force of modernism at its most dogmatic, leading to what
has been characterised as "the irrational presidency." In the clash of world views between Carter and Reagan, what is often forgotten are the continuities, the longer cycles of defence capital acquisition and intelligence assets acquisition for example, that, in the Krasnoyarsk case, made possible the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk radar, and provided the institutional/discursive framework around which Krasnoyarsk as sign could be set in play.

Two sets of intelligence assets that are central to the Krasnoyarsk narrative are the development of the 'JUMPSEAT' radar 'ferret' satellites and the development and acquisition of photoreconnaissance imaging satellites. Their respective histories go back many years before the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk radar, yet the use of the two types in concert, in 1983, made possible the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk radar.

March 21, 1971, marked the launch of the first operational JUMPSEAT satellite. It was designed for the interception of Soviet ABM radar signals. The JUMPSEAT occupies a highly elliptical orbit with its apogee (highest point) of about 24,000 miles reached as it passes over the Arctic region. This not only allows the JUMPSEAT to remain over the Soviet Union for around eight or nine hours, but also, because the orbit is identical to the Satellite Data System (SDS) satellites [that

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478 Ibid.
relay intelligence data from imaging satellites], the Soviets can confuse the JUMPSEAT with a data relay platform.479

While photoreconnaissance satellites date back to the SAMOS ('Keyhole' or KH-1) series in the early 1960s, detailed imagery from orbit became finely honed with the advent of the Lockheed-designed KH-6 (operated by the CIA, rather than the US Air Force) which was a manoeuvrable, 'close-look' satellite, first launched in 1963 aboard a Thrust Augmented Thor. With orbits as low as 76 miles, excellent resolution was available, although at the price of short life-span (averaging just 5.3 days each.).

With the advent of the fourth generation KH-9 (Hexagon, more widely known as 'Big Bird'), the dual-function surveillance satellite had come of age. Primarily an 'area-survey' satellite, the KH-9 was made capable of close-look missions as well. With an impressive array of sensors, the image could be directed to infra-red sensors, multi-spectral scanner, thematic mapper and photo-multipliers for enhanced night vision.480 With image-splitting through the use of a second mirror, a three-dimensional effect could be produced, that would enhance the ability of analysts at the National Reconnaissance Office to determine the heights of buildings and the depths of holes. Central to all this was the Perkin-Elmer Cassegrain telescope, that had a focal length of about twenty feet (three metres), and a primary mirror, some six feet (two metres) in diameter.


The whole thing was made relatively compact by having a so-called 'folded' focal length, by which the light collected in the primary mirror was reflected, via a secondary mirror, through a hole in the primary mirror to the focal plane (see Figure 4.1). With the use of prisms and small mirrors the light at the focal plane could be redirected onto any of the array of sensors, providing multi-spectral scanning for greater discrimination of the target image.

Photographic images would be wound onto spools and later ejected in capsules from orbit to be collected by specially equipped aircraft as they parachuted to earth. Ground resolution, according to Burrows was in the order of one foot.\textsuperscript{481} It was this quality of resolution that allowed the US to discover the Krasnoyarsk radar under construction deep in Siberia, in 1983.\textsuperscript{482}

\textsuperscript{481} \textit{Ibid} p.238. Other authoritative accounts put the resolution a little lower, at about two feet, either way the resolution would have presented no problem in the identification of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which measured in the hundreds of feet. See Richelson, Jeffrey T. \textit{America's Secret Eyes in Space: The US Keyhole Spy Satellite Program}. Grand Rapids, London: Harper and Row, 1990. p.361.

\textsuperscript{482} Other accounts suggest that the Krasnoyarsk radar was discovered after test transmissions had been detected by a 'Jumpseat' Signals Intelligence satellite. This would make some sense, given that, in order to target a 'close-look' mission, the photoreconnaissance satellite needs fairly precise coordinates of where to gather its images. See, for example: Mack, Andrew. "Threats to the ABM Treaty." \textit{A.C.} 9.2 (Sept.) (1988): 99-115. p.101, n. 6. Mack points out, that this seems to run counter to the report of Downey, Thomas J., Bob Carr, and Jim Moody. "Report from Krasnoyarsk." \textit{Bulletin of Atomic Scientists}. November (1987): 11-14. in which these US Congressional visitors to Krasnoyarsk in 1987 reported that they "...saw no no installed antenna elements, computers, or other electronic equipment anywhere. The transmitter had a completed antenna face and extensive plumbing and electrical power wiring (but no electronic cables); the receiver did not." (Downey, et al., 1987 p.13). This does not preclude, however the gathering of site-location test transmissions used to test wave propagation characteristics and other transmissions used to optimise the frequency, pulse-rate, band-width etc. that would optimise the characteristics of the completed radar. Further test transmissions would be used to determine interference patterns set up during the course of electronically steering the several thousand LPAR elements. These tests would have taken place over a number of years dating from the time of site choice, with calibration tests continuing long after the LPAR had been built. That these tests from mobile radar transmitters were not picked up by a US Jumpseat ELINT satellite
At some point, probably around the end of May, 1983, a the radar microwave frequency sensors aboard a JUMPSEAT satellite, (one of probably two in orbit at the time) collected suspicious radar test transmissions from a site in central Siberia. The signals would have been part of the preparation for the construction of a large phased-array radar, designed to test the atmospheric wave propagation properties of different radar wavelengths of a type suited for early warning. RADINT analysts at the National Security Agency's SIGINT complex at Fort Meade would have been alert to the fact that, if a large phased-array radar were undergoing preliminary site tests at a site as far inland until mid-1983 is probably due to a combination of the small number of Jumpseat satellites (2 at any one time) and to the practice of conducting such tests during the period when the ELINT satellites are not overhead or within range of the signals. (Source: author's discussion with Desmond Ball, ANU, 26/11/91).
as central Siberia, then it was possible that such a radar could, if deployed represent a potential violation of the ABM Treaty.

On June 20, 1983, a Big Bird (KH-9) satellite was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, by a Martin-Marietta Titan 3D, into a 96-deg. inclined, elliptical orbit with a closest approach (perigee) of 163 km. (101 mi.) and an furthest reach (apogee) of 218 Km. (136 mi.). Image analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency's National Photographic Interpretation Centre located the new radar almost three weeks later in mid July.

The radar was located near the village of Abalakova, in south-central Siberia, at a latitude of approximately 58.08 N. and longitude of 92.4E., near a spur line running north from the Trans Siberian Railroad. It is about 750 kilometres from the nearest Soviet border, and the radar is oriented away from the nearest border, that of Mongolia and towards the north-east where the next border is some 4600 kilometres away. This would enable it to detect Trident missiles launched from submarines in the Bering Sea or Gulf of Alaska. This has important implications for the ABM Treaty, in which Article VI(b) states that the Parties undertake:

not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the

483 Jeffrey Richelson has slightly different figures for this mission. He cites the orbital inclination as 96.45 degrees, with a perigee of 105 miles (169 Kms) and an apogee of 142 miles (228 Kms). This KH-9 remained in orbit for 275 days. See Richelson, Jeffrey T. America's Secret Eyes in Space: The US Keyhole Spy Satellite Program. Grand Rapids, London: Harper and Row, 1990. p.361.

periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.  

Other relevant provisions of the ABM Treaty and Agreed Statements that refer to the deployment of large phased-array radars and that have been invoked in the case of the Krasnoyarsk radar have placed emphasis on its potential uses and on its specifications as a large phased-array radar, as these form indicators of the appropriate 'grammar' into which this radar can be situated in order to 'read off' various forms of violation, the specificity of which depends upon its technical capabilities.

Agreed Statement (F) of the ABM Treaty states:

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square metres) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

Its specifications, based on its dimensions and external similarities to other Soviet large phased-array radars (LPARs) suggest that its mean potential would exceed the limitations described in Agreed Statement F. The radar is reportedly around 100 metres in length and 33.8 metres high and similar in design to those at Pechora, Kiev and Komsomolsk. According to the estimates of the team that inspected the Krasnoyarsk site the radar would operate at a frequency in the order of 180

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megahertz in the VHF range. This would limit its ability to discriminate between reentry vehicles and decoys and booster fragments, or to act as a guide for an ABM interceptor. Its design would allow a 120° azimuth (coverage fan). According to the US inspection team the structure was not blast hardened, being constructed from mortared cement blocks, nor was it electronically hardened, there being no sign of metal shielding, and the structure containing windows which would preclude electronic hardening against nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Although the assessments based on national technical means gave the external dimensions of the structures, the subsequent on-site inspection suggested that the Krasnoyarsk structure was in fact poorly configured for an ABM role.

Article III (b) of the ABM Treaty states:

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometres and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (2) two large phased array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the ABM Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers.


490 *Ibid* p.140.
Article IV provides that the Article III limitations shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Article VI includes an undertaking by each Party not to give radars, other than ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode.

The report by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC) of 1983 "A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Agreements 1958-1983," a declassified summary of which was issued in October 1984, listed the Krasnoyarsk radar as a violation of the ABM Treaty Article VI(b) which limits the location and orientation of radar deployment

... by the construction of a large, phased-array radar not located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and not oriented outward, [violation duration:] 1981 to present.

...The design of the facility is substantially identical to another radar declared by the Soviets to be an early warning radar. The Soviets, however, have stated that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a 'space tracking' radar. All early warning radars can also perform limited 'space tracking' functions, and while this radar is no exception, its location and geometry are inappropriate for a dedicated space tracking radar.491

Under the provisions of Articles III, IV and VI of the ABM Treaty, LPARs may be deployed within permitted ABM deployment areas, within ABM test ranges, as early-warning radars deployed along the periphery of its national territory and facing outward, or for space tracking, or for national technical means of verification. At no point is

there an agreed definition of the word 'deployed,' however, and the
case against the Soviet Union in the charges of violation relating to the
Krasnoyarsk radar hinge on the manner in which this term is defined.
This section will return to this question later, but first it is important to
examine the ways in which this case was handled by both Parties.

The United States raised the issue in the September 1983 round of the
Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, along with the
question of Soviet tests of a solid-fueled ICBM\textsuperscript{492} (to be considered
later). The US delegation stressed the similarity of the Krasnoyarsk
radar to other permitted Soviet early warning radars and coupled with
this the fact that, by virtue of its estimated operational frequency the
radar would not be suitable for other permitted functions, as, for
example, space tracking, and for these reasons, the United States
declared the radar a violation of the ABM Treaty and called for it to be
dismantled. The Soviet response was that the radar was for space
tracking and was therefore not in violation of the ABM Treaty.

In the US Arms Control and Disarmament Association (ACDA)
Annual Report 1985 ACDA argued that the Krasnoyarsk radar did not
substantially contribute to existing Soviet capabilities for space tracking.
Since most space tracking radars would need to look to the South,
rather than the Northeast, and since Soviet capabilities were
reasonably well serviced for space tracking equipment, it was argued
that both the location and the orientation of the radar were neither
suitable for spacetackging missions nor for national technical means of
verification (NTM). Moreover, it was argued that the wave band in

which it was designed to operate was considered to be more suited to ballistic missile detection and tracking. As the ACDA report concludes:

It closes the last remaining gap in Soviet coverage. It could have major significance if it is part of a large scale future Soviet ABM deployment. Together this radar and the five others like it form an arc of coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the northwest, around Siberia, to the Caucasus in the Southwest. We have concluded that the Krasnoyarsk radar is not for space tracking as claimed by the Soviet Union.493

Part of the initial concern was that the radar was seen to be in the same region as three of the six Soviet SS-18 ICBM fields and one SS-11 facility494, raising concern over whether the radar represented an attempt to provide battle management for a Soviet ABM system. It was conceivable that the Krasnoyarsk radar could detect launches of US ICBMs, combine the data with that gained from the Pechora radar to provide some limited triangulation and therefore a more accurate attack assessment than could be obtained from a single radar (see Figure 4.2). This led to concerns that this could be translated into better target acquisition and tracking for interceptor missiles. If this were the case, it was argued, that Krasnoyarsk radar would represent a substantial 'break-out' from the ABM Treaty if the Soviets should later opt to develop and deploy ABM interceptors.495


494 Duffy *Op Cit*. 1988 p.111 cites three SS-18 sites to the southwest of Abalakovo at Uzhur, Aleysk, and Zhangiz, and one SS-11 base to the southwest at Gladkaya, and another to the southeast at Svoidy.

However, when considered in strategic terms, any gains claimed for the Krasnoyarsk radar are at best marginal in comparison with the same radar located at the periphery and with the same orientation. Its inland location represents a loss of several minutes of warning time of a missile launched from the northern Pacific, and this loss represents the important several minutes of warning time during the launch phase in which the incoming missile would present its largest radar profile. Moreover, since no major strategic targets are located forward of the area covered by the Krasnoyarsk radar, its usefulness for ABM target acquisition and tracking is doubtful.496

Some analysts have suggested that more prosaic and mundane considerations may have contributed to the siting of the Krasnoyarsk radar in its inland location. These being the not inconsiderable climatic characteristics of the northern Siberian periphery of the Soviet Union. William Durch, for example notes:

> According to Article VI of the ABM Treaty, an early-warning radar with this orientation should have been located on the Pacific coast or in the outer Arctic reaches of Siberia. Terrain, climate and sheer inaccessability may have ruled out the latter location.497

The author's discussions with a political geographer498 revealed that to build a stable structure of the design and mass of the Krasnoyarsk radar requires a stable subsoil for the foundations of an extent largely unavailable east of Krasnoyarsk. As Duffy notes, the heat generated by


498 Author's discussion with Simon Dalby
the radar would be sufficient to melt the upper levels of permafrost, thereby rendering the foundations unstable. The Krasnoyarsk site marks the eastern boundary of continuous [year-round] permafrost of a prevailing thickness in excess of three hundred metres. The Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk boundaries are characterised by discontinuous permafrost, with a further inland belt of continuous permafrost of a prevailing thickness of less than three hundred metres. The argument concerning the relative costs of building on the two types of terrain is significant if the figures given by former air force general Boris T. Surikov, cited in Raymond Garthoff, are accurate. According to Surikov the radar at Krasnoyarsk was originally planned to be sited at Noril'sk to fill a gap in early-warning coverage, inland from the Arctic Ocean, but less further inland than the Pechora LPAR.

The cost of building on the permafrost, however, was estimated to be around a billion rubles (1979). By moving outside the permafrost zone, costs could be reduced to as little as one-third: around 350 million rubles.


501 According to Garthoff (1991) p.8 this figure would have been closer to 500 million rubles.
Permafrost regions in the Soviet Union
The furthest East for such a site was at Abalakova, between Yeniseysk and Krasnoyarsk (see map on previous page\textsuperscript{502}). Moreover, as Duffy points out, a site much further north would have been remote from the rail transport infrastructure that has been associated with the construction of previous LPARs as, for example, at Pechora, Lyaki, Olenogorsk, Sary Shagan, and Mishelevka\textsuperscript{503}

Strategically, the radar, representing a compromise for the Soviet Union, does not necessarily provide an indication of the level of treaty breakout that the Reagan administration's response held it to be. US analysts in 1984 noted:

A single, highly vulnerable radar installation is of only marginal importance in relation to any large-scale breakout from the ABM Treaty\textsuperscript{504}

While in 1987 the Arms Control Association, in their analysis of the Reagan administration's report on Soviet non-compliance concluded that the Krasnoyarsk radar provides neither substantial battle-management capabilities nor does it fundamentally undercut the treaty's objectives in constraining the location of LPARs to prevent


their being used in a battle-management role. The ACA concluded that:

The Krasnoyarsk radar appears to have been placed in its illegal inland location primarily to provide cost-efficient early warning and not to serve a battle management function in connection with a nationwide ABM system ... it would be of very little value as part of a nationwide defence ... it is vulnerable to direct attack and susceptible to degradation from nuclear blackout effects. ... it is not well suited for an ABM role because it does not cover the path of incoming US ICBMs because it is too far east and is pointing in the wrong direction.


506 Ibid.
On the United States' side, assessment of the extent to which, if any, the Krasnoyarsk radar represented a violation of the ABM Treaty was filtered through a set of reading practices, by which the specifications of the radar were set against the potential uses to which it could be put, and in what sense it constituted the violation with respect to the radar's capabilities as against the specific criteria laid down by the treaty.

The institutional technologies of the United States had photographed, noted, analysed and filed the radar. Its resemblances to other Soviet large phased-array radars had been noted. Its physical proximity to...
other ICBM fields was coupled with its notional proximity to the capabilities of ABM radars and noted. Its distance from the national boundary was placed alongside its distance from its potential to perform certain kinds of task. Its transformations from the type of radar that could be labeled 'permitted,' according to whether its function was determined to be for early-warning, space tracking, or ABM battle-management were taken into account. All of these established the Krasnoyarsk radar as discursive object above and beyond its mere Being in the form of a trapezoidal lump of cement. All of these had some bearing on the manner in which the Krasnoyarsk radar was raised as a subject for and of discussion, both inside the Standing Consultative Commission and outside, in Congressional Reports, Senate hearings, the Stanford Research Group and elsewhere. These formed the body of evidence used to determine, on the US side, that the Krasnoyarsk radar was indeed a violation of the ABM Treaty. However, on the basis of the SALT II usage of the term 'deployed' the balance of evidence suggests that the Krasnoyarsk radar, far from being an unequivocal violation was in fact either an example of the grey area known as 'ambiguous compliance behaviour' or it was at best an example of behaviour, which if continued may represent a potential violation in the future. In either event the issue was rightfully raised as an issue within the SCC, and, albeit with some external pressure from the US the issue could be said to have been settled within the SCC, thereby proving its value as a consultative body. This interpretation flies somewhat in the face of the hard liners

507 This schema which situates one discursive object in relation to other discursive objects is adapted from that in chapter three of: Foucault, Michel. *The Archeology of Knowledge.* London: Tavistock, 1977.
who assert that the SCC has been a failure. Nevertheless, if one takes as the object of the ABM Treaty's limitation on LPARs, the setting in place of a provision which is adequately verifiable under the definition of the administrations from Nixon to Carter, such that potential breakout from the treaty could be discovered and raised with the other side before becoming operational and thereby militarily significant, then the Krasnoyarsk radar fits that description.

Politically there are problems with that, since there is no definition; in the treaty, in the agreed statements, or even in the unilateral statements concerning the proper use of the term 'deploy' within the confines of the ABM Treaty. Thus the hardliners in the Reagan administration were able to cite as violations activities that the Central Intelligence Agency had already argued were at best potential or ambiguous violations. The Krasnoyarsk radar was considered, in the President's reports to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control treaties and in the report by the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1983 (declassified version, 1984), to be a violation while still a very incomplete structure. Certainly its presence rated concern, and clearly there were enough elements of its construction that warranted its being raised in the Standing Consultative Commission as ambiguous compliance behaviour, but it was not yet a clear violation of the treaty because it never became operational, and even if it had, as we have seen, its utility in non-compliant roles would have been less than adequate. In many ways though, regardless of the actual strategic implications of compliance at the margins of arms control treaties, such as those represented by the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar, are the questions relating
to the manner in which such a technicality becomes a sign, and more than that, the embodiment of an ideology.

Examining the rhetoric that surrounded the major reports on Soviet non-compliance with arms control treaties from 1983-1986 and beyond, it is worth noting that, in the reports dealing with Soviet compliance, the compliance aspect is played down, the significance being given to potential or material breaches of arms control agreements. This is perhaps not altogether surprising, since the US has more at stake in the event of noncompliance than with compliance. Nevertheless, in seeking to present a 'balanced' report, one could reasonably expect observations on why the Soviet should comply with those treaties with which it has, in the view of the reports authors, complied. Instead, under the heading: "Patterns in Soviet Compliance Practices" in the GAC Report, the interpretation concludes that since 1958 the Soviet Union's actions:

... demonstrate a pattern of pursuing military advantage through selective disregard for its international arms control duties and commitments

after allegations of "deliberate Soviet efforts to counter US national technical means of verification" the report goes on to state categorically that "US verification capabilities have not deterred the Soviets from violating arms control commitments." The report concludes with an attack on the SCC process for attempting to resolve compliance ambiguities outside of the political grandstanding that had, by 1981 come to characterise the US approach to arms control under the guidance of the Committee on the Present Danger. As the report notes:

508 GAC Op Cit p.62
... the near total reliance on secret diplomacy in seeking to restore Soviet compliance has been largely ineffective. The US record of raising its concerns about Soviet noncompliance exclusively in the Standing Consultative Commission and through various high level diplomatic demarches demonstrates the ineffectiveness of this process.\textsuperscript{509}

That the SCC had been rendered largely ineffective by the extensive leaking and public posturing over alleged violations, causing the Soviet Union to raise the issue of SCC privacy in the SCC, did not seem to enter the calculations of the members of the GAC. By 1983 the arms control process had so completely bogged down that the Soviets had walked out of the negotiations on strategic and intermediate nuclear forces. Nevertheless, even with such strained relations the SCC continued to function with each side raising and discussing narrow technical issues pertaining to the SALT agreements.

The point here is that although the GAC report alleges material breaches for four SALT compliance issues that had previously appeared as non violations in the State Department report of 1978, the GAC report places the responsibility for these 'material breaches' in terms of a failure of the SCC to resolve these problems. The previous report, not only denied that there had been material breaches of the treaties but that "in every case [of a questionable practice raised by the US in the SCC] the activity has ceased, or subsequent information has clarified the situation and allayed our concern."\textsuperscript{510} Yet, we have seen in

\textsuperscript{509} \textit{Ibid.}

chapter two of this thesis that privacy of the proceedings, and even, in many instances of the outcomes of those proceedings, is crucial to its operation in order to prevent precisely the sort of political grandstanding embodied in the GAC Report.

The question remains as to the extent to which the political climate of the time influenced the extent to which the Krasnoyarsk radar was used and re-used as a sign of Soviet willingness to abrogate the terms of the treaty, and the extent to which it served the purposes of the US hard liners to construe this as a violation in order to push for their own abrogation or 'wide definition' of the ABM Treaty in order to pursue development of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), following Reagan's famous 'star wars' speech in 1983.

We have seen earlier how a particular lobby group, the Committee on the Present Danger had exerted a great deal of influence on rendering the Carter administration SALT II arms control program ineffective through a set of well coordinated media campaigns, and we have seen how this same group, which included Ronald Reagan amongst its members had helped the Reagan administration come to power on a platform of anti-Soviet ideology and rhetoric. When Reagan invoked the independence and bipartisanship\(^{511}\) of the General Advisory Committee on Arms control (GAC) to lend credibility to the charges of Soviet treaty violations and to the ineffectiveness of the SCC, one

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\(^{511}\) In his Letter of Transmittal of the report *A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983* Reagan stated: "The General Advisory Committee's report to me resulted from a year-long analysis, by this *bipartisan and independent body*, of Soviet practices with regard to arms control treaties ... Neither the methodology of analysis nor the conclusions reached in this report have been formally reviewed or approved by any agencies of the US Government." [emphasis mine]
should perhaps note that of the twelve members of the GAC, nine, including the chairman, were members of the board of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). Not surprisingly, the members of the GAC were themselves appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The report produced by the GAC, unlike the reports submitted by President Reagan to Congress, were not the result of interagency clearance and agreement, and hence is not considered to carry the same weight as the Presidential reports. Nevertheless, that President Reagan invoked their independence from the administration in order to assert their 'objectivity,' somewhat stretches the concept of independence.

The point that was missed by the General Advisory Committee is that the SCC has no powers of enforcement and it cannot impose sanctions. Its success, therefore is entirely dependent upon the political will of the treaty partners to negotiate solutions to the problems that ambiguous compliance behaviours impose upon the treaty regime. As I have pointed out in Chapter two of this thesis, the US and Soviet Commissioners are dependent upon their instructions from their respective leaders. Graybeal and Krepon note that during times of friction the negotiation latitude allowed the Commissioners to resolve disputes tends to become narrower. The same holds true for frictions

512 The CPD board members who were on the GAC were: Chairman William R. Graham, Colin S. Gray, Francis P. Hoeber, Eli S. Jacobs, Charles Burton Marshall, Jaime Oaxaca, John P. Roche, Donald Rumsfeld and Laurence Hirsch Silberman. The three who were not were: Harriet Fast Scott, Roland P. Herbst and Robert B. Hotz.

within the US administration, thus, as we have seen before, the SCC operates its boundaries, not merely between states, but also within them. As Graybeal and Krepon suggest:

When friction within the executive branch is pronounced, instructions tend to become increasingly rigid. If, for example, government agencies cannot agree on a proposed course of action, the US Commissioner at the SCC is not free to suggest one to his Soviet counterpart. What flexibility the US Commissioner has relates to his choice of tactics to implement negotiating instructions.514

When, in the same year that the US raised the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Soviets raised similar complaints regarding the so-called 'modernisation' of US LPARs at Thule and Fylingdales Moor, the US displayed precisely the same intransigence over the correctness of their own position as the Soviets had, and more, since the modernisation has gone ahead without regard for the views of many analysts that these radars constituted a greater contravention of the ABM Treaty, than had the Krasnoyarsk radar.

Thule and Fylingdales Moor Radars

Significant questions are raised by the 'modernisation' of the radars at Thule, in Greenland, and Fylingdales Moor, in the UK. These questions concern, not merely whether or not they were in fact technical violations of the ABM Treaty, but more importantly, from the perspective of the SCC is the question of response to 'violations' of this kind. Whereas the Soviets ultimately 'backed down' over the Krasnoyarsk radar issue, the US has not been so forthcoming with

respect to its two LPAR radars that are not on the periphery of US territory.

This section shall argue that, in terms of US approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of the SCC the key issue is not necessarily the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar, which ultimately was declared a technical violation of the ABM Treaty and which, at the time of this writing, is in the process of being dismantled, but rather, if the SCC is to be considered in any sense 'ineffective' it is over the issue of the Thule and Fylingdales Moor LPARs. Moreover, this issue raises the question of how one is to define the term 'effectiveness' with respect to the SCC. This is the central question for this section as it concerns the politics and ideology of treaty compliance more than any narrowly defined technicality resulting from inconsistent definition of the basic terms of the treaty.

The Soviet view of SCC, based on Graybeal and Krepon (1985) and on the author's interview with a Soviet arms control expert (1991) holds that its effectiveness rests on the degree to which the SCC functions as a conduit for communication between governments, and not on the ability of the SCC to 'resolve' disputes. This view falls more closely in line with the parameters under which the SCC was first established (See the MOU concerning Regulations of the SCC in Chapter two).

The issue of the Thule and Fylingdales Moor LPARs rests on the definition of the term 'modernisation' which was invoked by the US as justification for their construction. Their stated intention was to replace two conventional, mechanically steered early warning radars that had been in existence since the late 1950s.515 According to

Zimmerman they had been planned to be replaced with updated versions of the same technology, that is to say, with modern, mechanically steered conventional radars.

That these radars had specific drawbacks over the new type of phased-array radar led, in 1979 and 1980, to consideration of replacing these mechanically steered radars with the new LPARs.\textsuperscript{516} The benefits of LPARs over conventional mechanically steered radars were threefold:

- that they operated with electronic speed,
- that they could track multiple targets and
- their lack of moving parts rendered them less susceptible to mechanical breakdown under adverse weather conditions.

The drawbacks at that time were considered to be the long lead time (the primary reason for limiting LPARs in the ABM Treaty), their high cost, and, according to Lt. General Kelly H. Burke in testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee, "potential ABM Treaty conflicts."\textsuperscript{517} Clearly, the Carter administration was concerned to uphold the letter of the ABM Treaty, even if it meant forgoing the benefits of LPAR technology for Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS). Just three years later, under Reagan, when the time came to call for tenders for the upgrading of the Thule and Fylingdales Moor radars, the same considerations held a different priority.

Reagan had come to power under an anti-SALT banner, and with open criticism of the way in which Carter had managed the evidence of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{516} Ibid. p.9.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{517} Lt. Gen. Kelly H. Burke, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for research, development and acquisition, in testimony given before the Senate Appropriations Committee on April 18, 1980, cited in Peter Zimmerman, \textit{Op Cit.} 1987, p.9.}
alleged Soviet violations of the SALT Treaties.518 By 1983, as the rhetoric of the second Cold War was being fed with accusations of Soviet violations of SALT and other arms control agreements, the contract for the 'modernisation of the Thule and Fylingdales Moor radars was let to the Raytheon Company, for a PAVE-PAWS-style large phased-array radar, the AN/FPS 115. The Central Processing Unit (CPU) comprises two CYBER 174-12 computers which perform the tasks of beam steering, the storage and display of data, and post-mission data reduction and analysis. The Thule radar, like the PAVE PAWS, has two circular planar phased arrays approximately 30 metres in diameter, inclined about 20° from the vertical, yielding a combined coverage of the two beams of about 85° elevation and 240° azimuth, and a range of around 4,800kms these will replace the older AN/FPS-50 and AN/FPS-49a radars. The Fylingdales Moor radar, when complete will be a modified AN/FPS-115 with three faces, rather than the usual two, yielding an azimuth of 360°, replacing the older AN/FPS-50 and AN/FPS-49 radars. The Thule radar became operational in 1987, while work continues on the Fylingdales Moor site.519

Article IX of the ABM Treaty states:

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other states, and not to


deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.520

The issue of Thule and Fylingdales, with respect to the ABM Treaty is that, being located, respectively, in Greenland and the United Kingdom, neither of these radars is located on the periphery of the United States, nor are they oriented outward as required by Article VI(b) of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the only radars excluded from this provision are the original BMEWS radars. The US argues that these new LPARs are just sophisticated modernisations, rather than total replacements (which would not be permitted under the provisions of the ABM Treaty). Zimmerman sums up the problem, arguing that the Thule and Fylingdales Moor radars are not mere 'modernisations' of old radars, rather:

They incorporate entirely new technologies and wholly different operating principles, a fact not missed by the ABM Treaty, which clearly treats [LPARs] differently from other types of radars. Nor will the new radar at Fylingdales directly replace the old one. It will be built on a different site, and the old radar will operate concurrently for at least a year after the new one is finished.521

This interpretation of 'deploy,' implying a definition after the style of the SALT II definition of deployment of submarine launched ballistic missiles; such that deploy means after 'sea trials,' flies in the face of the definition that the Reagan administration operated with respect to the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar.


At issue here, too, is that of the definition of the word 'modernise.' According to the Stanford Research Group's 1988 report, the Reagan administration argues that:

... the ABM Treaty generally permits modernisation. Proponents of this view note, for example, that Article VII explicitly approves modernisation of components or systems that are identified as primarily associated with ABM systems. The United States argues that the BMEWS radars were originally designed as and continue to be early-warning facilities. The ABM Treaty is silent with respect to modernisation of early-warning systems. Therefore, the Reagan administration argues, since the treaty generally permits modernisation of permitted systems and does not specifically prohibit the modernisation of BMEWS, the LPARs at Thule and Fylingdales are entirely legitimate.522

However, in the case of Fylingdales Moor the LPAR is being built at a different site from the older AN/FPS-50 and '49 radars. This would seem to stretch the notion of modernisation to its elastic limit at the very least.

This debate hinges on how one is to read the material texts of radar deployment and of LPAR deployment in particular. It rests upon whether one is to accept the US Reagan administration's reading of the Thule and Fylingdales Moor radars as a metonymic transformation - more of the same, just more refined - or whether one reads the Thule and Fylingdales Moor LPAR deployments as a metaphoric transformation, in which case one stands-in for the other - a process of replacement while invoking a different, if parallel, discursive order. Using the [literally] concrete examples of the deployment strategies of large phased array radars, it is possible to see, as with any other cultural

artifact, such as a statue, elements of the world-view or *épisteme* within which these artifacts were and are produced.

In the same way, the dispute over the Krasnoyarsk radar represents the same sets of choices within the 'grammar' of arms control. The question of compliance with the ABM Treaty centred upon whether the Krasnoyarsk radar represented a metonymic transformation of the concept of early-warning radar, extending the notion of territorial boundary to take account of technical problems of siting, or whether the radar represents a transformation on the metaphoric plane in which the radar is construed as an early-warning token standing-in for an ABM battle-management radar. The choice between these positions is ultimately political rather than technical.523

**The Formation of Enunciative Modalities: A Semiotics of Arms Control**

This section is about the texting of history, the use of a discourse analytic approach to the study of the operation of a political community in the context of the sets of relations between that political community and those other political communities that, through a complex of kinship networks makes possible the operation of this particular political community. That community is the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC). And finally this section is about the materiality of discourse and the view of text seen as an essentially political activity - a process, rather than a noun, a process that is, moreover, constitutive of the specific domain of political

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523 that is to say that it is a matter of interpretation which changes according to the 'screen' through which it is viewed - it is not, therefore, an objective, technical issue.
practice delineated by the broad term 'arms control.' Kenneth Dyson states:

Words are a part of human behaviour. They are mental categories which both represent, and are part of, the world and which impose intentionality and coherence on that world. Language is not just an intellectual activity distinct from the reality of the material world. Concepts and contexts are inseparable. Language is part of the social and political structure; it reveals the politics of a society. Hence analysis of political discourse will indicate how the political world is perceived, and a diachronic analysis of concepts can be helpful in uncovering long-term structural changes by showing how words acquire new meanings in the context of such changes.524

This chapter has set out to show something of the complexity and scope of the range of discourse communities that feed into the process of constituting an event as a potential arms control compliance violation. This section seeks to explore some of the deeper issues at work in constituting an event in this way. I want to argue here that the political process and orientation of the administration, in each of its bureaucracies, not only influences the way in which an event is treated as a violation, but in the way in which the event is constituted as such - an event. This section is not only about the SCC as a conduit for policy, but about the SCC as representative of the constitution of a whole domain of policy, a space for action in which are brought together a number of other policy domains. The chapter as a whole has sought to bring together a range of sub communities, within the wider domains of the defence and foreign policy community. At this point it seems reasonable to draw together a range of themes arising from these various domains of policymaking into building a picture of

the operation of the field in which identity is articulated as the practices of military security.

Reading a set of concrete practices authored by one state, through the framework and ideological habits of another state give rise, not only to the potential for conflict, but these practices of reading in themselves, are constitutive of the reality in which arms control is itself articulated as a practice of boundary-making and therefore of identity-making. By identifying (and demonising) the Other, the sense of Self is strengthened and security, (itself articulated as the integrity of the state), is, thereby, maintained.

The narrative I have been engaged in writing to this point concerns, broadly speaking, an examination of the changing conditions that make possible the turning of an event (such as the building of a large concrete structure) into an issue (a sign worthy of the gaze of those concerned with arms control compliance). In the course of this narrative I have examined some of the factors driving the constitution of the 'world-view' of the administration, and the role of the Committee on the Present Danger in promoting a particular ideological view of the Soviet Union as Manichaean Other. In so doing, I have examined the factors leading to the rise of what has been termed the 'second Cold War.' I have briefly looked at the principles of international law that led both the United States and the Soviet Union to continue to uphold the SALT II Treaty, despite its non-ratified status, and the SALT I Interim Agreement, and I have analysed some of Ronald Reagan's rhetoric and that of the Committee on the Present Danger that brought him to power. Within the context of these developments, the analysts within the intelligence community, who, in their turn have been formed within, and who in their turn
reproduce the ideological formations that influence the manner in which the raw intelligence data is interpreted.

We have see also, how the decisions concerning resource allocation that author-ised the development of specific intelligence asset forms, are themselves the product of specific and ultimately political decisions, taken many years before. These intelligence assets, in the technological forms that permit, or privilege, the gathering of specific kinds of information, as opposed to other kinds, provide the raw data for interpretation by intelligence analysts, who, themselves are the product of particular kinds of schooling, of selection criteria set by the intelligence organisations themselves and of the regime to whom the final, digested intelligence product is submitted.

We have seen also, how these satellites, their support systems, and the specificities of their technologies made possible the discovery and observation of activities and events within the Soviet Union (and, by the Other, of the United States) that could be compared with past patterns of behaviour (situated within discursive continuities, or identified as discontinuities with past practices) in order to constitute these events as meaningful within the discursive constellation of activities inscribed\(^\text{525}\) in terms of arms control compliance. As Dyson notes:

> Reality is a function not just of sense data but also of the conceptual apparatus that men [sic] have developed, for concepts shape experience by providing categories in terms of which, men [sic] see and understand the world.\(^\text{526}\)

\(^{525}\) Here I use 'inscribed' rather than 'described' as the latter implies a separation between the events in themselves and the process of ascribing meaning top the events.

Disciplining Space: LPARs and boundary-making practice.

The dispute over LPARs and ABM treaty compliance, mediated through the Standing Consultative Commission represents an example of the materiality of discourse. The purpose of the LPARs was to discipline and maintain the integrity of the boundaries between Self and Other. The ABM Treaty limitations on LPARs, in turn, serve to discipline the practice of disciplining the boundaries. By situating the LPARs away from the territorial peripheries, either by placing the LPAR gaze within the boundary - as in the Soviet Union - or outside the territorial boundary - as in the United States' Thule and Fylingdales Moor radars - the boundaries become problematised. At this point a process of boundary-making negotiation is indicated. The forum for this negotiation is required to be a liminal space between boundaries. The Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC) is the space designated by the ABM Treaty regime to serve this function. It can serve this function because it exists between states, like an amoebic pseudopod extending out across the boundaries to 'test the waters' as it were. This space is especially disciplined because it lies at the cutting edge of the boundaries between states\textsuperscript{527}, particularly as its functions concern the issue of narrowly defined security of states - military security.

\textsuperscript{527} Perhaps a more apt metaphor would be 'liminal space' rather than cutting edge, for at this locus, the boundaries are constantly under negotiation, like the wash between high and low tides - the edge is, therefore, fuzzy and often ill-defined. Indeed, the political and ill-defined nature of these boundaries is, I argue, precisely the reason for the existence of negotiating bodies designed to operate these sets of negotiations in order to maintain the integrity of those boundaries. I argue further that, by operating at/across the boundaries, in the space of anarchy between states, that this is the reason for the highly ritualised and formalised sets of behaviours that characterise the negotiation process.
Interestingly, and the reason for dwelling at some length on the issue of the Krasnoyarsk Radar, the constitution of that event as an ambiguous event and therefore an object of interest to the Standing Consultative Commission (represented as a possible violation) reveals the gap between the event and its interpretation. That is to say, that the technology was not merely 'objectively there' but functioned as a cultural artefact that required interpretation according to a set of interpretive schema. That the technology was produced by a culture other than the United States rendered the object of knowledge, in part, incomprehensible, as it did not neatly fit the interpretive schemata of the United States according to which particular characteristics were required for particular functions. What has clearly happened in this instance is that, by existing outside of the United States' interpretive schema, the Soviets' radar at Krasnoyarsk was rendered as ambiguous.

This raises the question of

the extent to which it is safe to assume that Soviet designers with the same goals as their American counterparts would make the same technical decisions 528

In the case of the Krasnoyarsk radar it is clear that the Soviets made quite different technical decisions to their American counterparts - a point seemingly lost on the team of US observers who visited the Krasnoyarsk radar site in 1987. Their surprise seemed greatest at the lack of blast or EMP hardening exhibited in the Krasnoyarsk structure. However, as Desmond Ball529 pointed out, it remains doubtful how


529 Author's discussion with Desmond Ball 25/11/91.
long even a hardened LPAR could remain functional in the face of quite modest overpressures, so it seems not unreasonable that the Soviets could have decided that the potentially marginal benefits of hardening did not justify the cost. This is borne out in the decision to build outside of the permafrost zone, sacrificing around six minutes of warning time for a saving of two-thirds of the cost of building on permafrost. Cost was a clear factor in the decision to build at Krasnoyarsk, rather than at Noril'sk; cost may well have been a factor in the decision not to harden the structure.  

What seems increasingly clear from all of this is that the SCC is engaged in both the operation and application of sets of knowledges, while at the same time it is engaged in the production and dissemination of knowledges. The SCC in this sense is constituted by and constitutive of particular subject positions. The SCC Commissioners literally 'speak the state' - hence their status as Ambassadors. As the Commissioners deal with the negotiation of activities that affect [ultimately] the integrity of the state, they are therefore constitutive of the boundaries between states. This analysis of the role of the SCC thus ontologically goes beyond traditional frameworks of interpretation and interpretive communities. It goes beyond simple policy analysis, instrumental rationality and problem solving, although the SCC is, as we have seen, engaged in all of these. It goes beyond traditional frameworks of interpretation by linking the macro and microstructures of state making and institutional practice as viewed through the SCC.

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The United States and the Soviet Union, having been constituted throughout the Cold War as Manichæan Other to each other - in a system dependent upon modernist conceptions of power articulated as military force - the advent of nuclear weapons was early recognised as the postmodern wild-card in the modernist world order. As Bernard Brodie recognised as early as 1946, nuclear weapons were and remain too powerful, too potentially destructive to ever be used again as weapons in the modernist sense of the word. Their value lay in their use as tokens of discourse, as signifiers of power, of superpower status. Moreover, the shift in world-view ushered in by the 'postmodern' weapon led, in an ironic twist, to the notion that military security depended upon ensuring that nuclear weapons would not be used.

The consequences of this shift in thinking led to a view that ultimate security lay along the path of ultimate vulnerability. With the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction coupled with the limitation on antiballistic missile systems through the ABM Treaty, it was clear that if the Treaty were to remain for all time in a changing world, it was clear that a space was needed in which the United States and the Soviet Union could explore the extent to which a jointly produced discursive economy could be established and maintained such that these states as speaking subjects could be construed as self-policing subjects within a new regime of normalising and disciplinary control. The SCC established this space. Although other international fora existed, the SCC was and is unique insofar as it represents a space in which the two

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531 they are postmodern weapons because their value is greater as a sign than as a weapon. This does not alter the fact of their destructive potential, merely that the modalities of their use dictate a strategy of war avoidance rather than of war-fighting.
adversarial powers could negotiate on an ongoing basis their mutual vulnerability to each other.532

The maintenance of such a space exacts a price - the ability to raise issues that at times has required the exchange of information that remains classified to their own side, but is necessary in order to account for behaviours that would otherwise be construed as ambiguous with respect to compliance with the Treaty. In order to protect that level of openness, the space itself must be highly disciplined, maintaining full confidentiality with respect to the negotiations, the procedures and, in many cases, with respect to the agreements themselves that are negotiated within the SCC.533

The ABM Treaty formalises more than one kind of vulnerability, insofar as it not only formalises the principle of defencelessness, but it also formalises vulnerability to the gaze of the Other through the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of national technical means of verification (NTM) and through non-interference clauses with respect to this vulnerability.534

While it lacks specifically juridical powers to sanction violations of arms control agreements, the SCC is not without power. Taken in

532 Although the SCC represents only a small contribution to the arms control process, its uniqueness is in the indefinite functioning of the ABM Treaty - it will therefore be available for use continuously, while other negotiating fora may come and go.

533 While the ultimate decisionmaking is not separate from the governments that established and that maintain the SCC, the body does have an existence mandated by the ABM Treaty and by norms of international law through the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda.

534 thereby abdicating the sovereign nation's right to visual privacy for the sake of an international security regime.
concert with the other arms of the security state that is articulated as much through arms control as through military power, forms of normative power operate to maintain compliance with at least the spirit of the agreements and Treaties that stand between unrestrained arms racing and a fairly stable deterrence regime.

What is not addressed adequately in the literature on arms control is the operation of compliance with arms control agreements in the absence of specified sanctions. While this is not central to this thesis, some aspects of the kind and scope of analysis used in Section III of this thesis may go some way towards pointing toward the mechanisms at work behind the operation of compliance. Here I refer to the disciplinary power embodied in the verification regime of observation, and the normalising gaze of 'world opinion' articulated at several levels, from quiet diplomacy within the SCC that has operated to great effect over, for example the SA-5 radar issue and the concurrent testing of air defence elements with elements of a ballistic missile defence, to the publication of treaty 'violations' over a period of years, to, ultimately the expression of normalising judgement in terms of the potential for trade sanctions, tit-for-tat counter-violations, or at the extreme, abrogation of the Treaty under the principle of *rebus sic stantibus*. Interestingly, even in the most oppositional times of the first term of the Reagan administration and its rhetoric of the 'evil empire,' both Parties to even the unratified SALT II Treaty gave unilateral undertakings not to undercut the terms of the Treaty under the international law principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. Could it be that the Word is mightier than the Bomb?

At the heart of this range of options for response, the SCC operates as the front-line forum for response. It is a space in which ambiguous
compliance activities are raised before they are fully formed - names - as violations. The need for such an organisation, small as it is, arises because, despite the technical form of the treaties under its care, arms control is more about human behaviour than about the purely technical. The decisions about whether or not a particular activity is to be deemed a violation are ultimately political, and rest with the White House and the Kremlin respectively. These decisions are informed by a range of inputs from a variety of sources, ranging from the intelligence community to the representatives of the military industrial complex, to security analysts within the State and Defence Departments, and, in the case of the United States, from community lobby groups that themselves seek to promote particular political positions. Each of these groups represents a knowledge-producing community with a range of backgrounds and political positions. As MacKenzie notes:

What we find ... is that there is no simple continuum whereby the closer we approach to 'use' the less problematic becomes the knowledge generated. Knowledge is indeed a network wherein different kinds of tests are performed against differently constructed backgrounds, with no one test ... and no one background being accepted by all as the ultimate arbiter.\textsuperscript{536}

In each case of a suspected violation of the SALT Treaties, the SCC mediates\textsuperscript{537} between a multiplicity of cultures. Not merely the cultures

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\textsuperscript{535} The point here is that the arms control process is also informed by knowledge producing communities that are outside of the narrow institutional basis of the SALT regime.


\textsuperscript{537} It does this by, and through language as descriptive of action, through interpretation of instructions, presentations at Plenary Sessions, translation and negotiation of meaning of terms and referral back through the Commissioners' chain of command.
of the United States and the Soviet Union, but of the cultures within these larger cultural formations articulated as states: - the culture of the security state, the culture of the policymaking communities, the culture of the strategic analysts, the culture of the arms control communities, the culture of Congress and of the Senate and of the range of Committees that have an input into the arms control process. Also implicated are the cultures of technology that construe the activities of the Other in terms of assumptions about technical facticity that is itself the product of political decisionmaking. At the end of the day, two people face each other across the table as Commissioners in the Standing Consultative Commission, charged with negotiating the meaning of a set of behaviours that are ambiguous with respect to compliance with the SALT Treaties.

These two people operate at the extreme ends of their respective pyramids of bureaucratic and technical support to enact and to maintain the boundaries between their respective states. They represent one site among uncountable sites. For the purposes of the present analysis, and because this site operates to maintain one of the many layers of the boundaries of the security state, this study has focused upon the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). It is part of the mechanism by which two security states secure their identity. This is supported through a network of interlocking knowledge-producing mechanisms, ranging from the electro-optical physics that led to the production of high-resolution surveillance satellites, to the administrative apparatuses that serve to process the surveillance data within a regime of normative behaviours against which the behaviours of the Other, so construed as an object of knowledge and hence of surveillance, may be assessed.
We have, in effect, examined the relations between institutions in terms of how their behavioural patterns and systems of norms, their modes of classification (taxonomy) and the relations of economic and social processes have converged at an historically specific space and time and under specific sets of conditions, in order to produce an object of discourse - the security state articulated in relation to the Other, the non-self. This other has been identified in terms of its resemblances (LPAR design, surveillance technologies, its goals and aims - security, integrity); its proximity as other but still Western, as other but still sharing a common boundary (NATO, WTO); its distance (physically, ideologically); and its transformations - its symptoms of expansionism, of the changes that may presage the development of a ballistic missile defence system, its increased defence spending and production, and so on.

We have seen how the discursive object, so construed, operates as an actant (not as monolithic, unitary actor) in terms of engaging in activities and gestures that the Self (articulated as The West, or The United States) interprets as meaningful behaviour - signals. We have seen how these signals (themselves neither unidirectional, or unitary) are 'sent' or at least received and interpreted (thereby 'produced') at particular sites that legitimate the authority of those signals. Such sites include, but are not restricted to the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC). The SCC is, therefore one of the institutional sites within which particular patterns of discourse are legitimated in order to articulate state interests in terms of the practices of maintaining the boundaries, both physical and notional/conceptual.

Within these formalised institutional settings there are enacted a finite set (at any given place and time) of available subject positions that are
rigidly defined by grids of specification and regimes of interrogation. For each instance of ambiguous behaviour with respect to arms control compliance, the SCC operates as a mechanism within which the Self may interrogate the Other, such that the burden of proof rests with the Other\textsuperscript{538} to demonstrate that such and such behaviour is in compliance with such and such an Article of the SALT Treaties.

As was pointed out before, and running as a thread of continuity throughout the author's interviews with arms control negotiators and policymakers in the US, UK, NATO, and the Soviet Union, the treaty-making process is exactly that - a process. It is not a fixed object. Even after a Treaty is signed, ratified and in force, there are still ongoing regimes of verification to monitor compliance, there are ongoing questions of definition of ambiguous terms within the treaty, and there are ongoing negotiations towards the next treaty. All of these activities (for such they are) represent ways of articulating boundaries - stating and re-stating the State. We have also seen how the very process of constituting an activity as one of 'violation' also represents a practice of boundarymaking.

I want to argue here that the boundary-making process itself is an integral part of the process of 'creating' the Subject - the United States security state, for example. Moreover, I want to argue that the process of enacting the state is analogous to (indeed, is another form of) the process at work in the constitution of the individual subject in classic realist novels. Given the common historical and philosophical ground

\textsuperscript{538} For an explication of the terms Self and Other, as used in this thesis, see footnote 8 and page 190ff.
upon which both the classic realist novel, and classic realist political theory, are based, this should not be too surprising.

Catherine Belsey points out that the conceptual framework of classic realism is founded upon the consistency and continuity of the subject. But, as she further states:

it is characteristic of ... the narrative process itself to disrupt subjectivity, to disturb the pattern of relationships between subject-positions which is presented as normal in the text. In many cases the action itself represents a test of identity, putting identity in question by confronting the protagonist with alternative possible actions ... to this extent classic realism recognizes the precariousness of the ego.539

The importance of returning the subject to a fictive closure is central to the control of anarchy in the subject - the maintenance of identity:

... the movement of classic realist narrative towards closure ensures the reinstatement of order, sometimes a new (world?) order, sometimes the old restored, but always intelligible because familiar. Decisive choices are made, identity is established.540

It was precisely this form of closure that was practiced, by the Committee on the Present Danger, and in the rhetorical strategies of President Reagan in order to maintain an increased level of defence expenditure, while promoting the sense of a strengthened American identity. As Belsey notes:

Harmony has been reestablished through the redistribution of the signifiers into a new system of differences which closes off the threat to subjectivity, and it remains only to make this harmonious and coherent world intelligible to the


540 Ibid.
reader (voter), closing off in the process the sense of danger to the reader's subjectivity.

The US domestic polity as 'reader' of the discourse of danger promulgated by President Reagan, can rest assured that the dangers posed by Soviet noncompliance with arms control treaties will be met, in an 'anarchical' world with

...our own actions, either to produce agreement by the other side to cease and correct the problem, or to offset the consequences by our own unilateral steps.541

What is left to us here is to trace the links between the creation and operation of figurative texts such as novels with the figurative in the constitution of the real that may go some distance towards explaining how subjectivity, central to the formation of identities and speaking positions, is equiprimordial in the formation and constitution, not only of individuals as subjects, but also the formation of states as subjects. I want to stress here, that this represents a departure from classic realist political theory that operates a model of states as (relatively) unitary actors within a uniflow communication model. In the past, analyses of the individual/state dichotomy have tended to look for the sources of change in social theory - in analyses that addressed 'society' rather than the individual. Other modes of addressing the same dichotomy have oversimplified articulations of the state by viewing the state as a unitary and coherent actor, analogous to the modernist, humanist, individual. This thesis has set out to operate a theory of the state which effectively collapses the dichotomy

between state and individual by positing both the individual and the state as *persona ficta* each produced by and through the same sets of processes. That is to say that under this rubric both the state and the individual are at once constituted by, and constitutive of, social practices. The theory of the state as subject operated within this thesis rests upon the premise that the individual is a non-unitary actor, and that subjectivity is construed by and through the signifying processes, of which language forms a part. This formulation combines elements of Lacan's and Foucault's theories of subjectivity. At this point it seems useful to step through the assumptions and argument upon which this premise is based.

**The Individual/State analogue**

1. The individual enters the social world in two ways:
   
   a) via what Lacan terms the 'mirror stage' by which the child sees herself as other, exterior to the child who does the seeing. This necessitates a division between the 'I' that is seen and the 'I' that does the seeing, and
   
   b) through language which necessitates a division between the 'I' of discourse (that is, the socially construed idea of what the term 'I' means) and the 'I' who speaks.

2. Of the two 'I's of language, only the 'I' of discourse (the concept) is fully represented to the conscious self. The self that speaks engages in a selection process in order to speak, necessitating the silencing of the other possibilities in order to construe what is to be spoken. For Lacan the unconscious comes into being in the gap which is formed by the division between the 'I' of discourse and the 'I' that speaks. The unconscious is thus an aspect of the subject's entry into the symbolic (hence social) order. The constitution of the unconscious at the same moment as the subject's entry into the symbolic order, creates a
problem for the subject. By entering the symbolic order the speaking subject can articulate desires and hence assert full consciousness or autonomy over the immediate present. Nonetheless, however desires are articulated, they remain metonymic of the structure of desire itself, leaving unarticulated those aspects of desire that remain in the unconscious, and are thus, by definition, unaddressable. As Belsey points out:

The subject is ... the site of contradiction, and is perpetually in the process of construction, thrown into crisis by alterations in language and in the social formation, capable of change.\(^{542}\)

Moreover:

... the displacement of subjectivity across a range of discourses implies a range of positions from which the subject grasps itself and its relations with the real, and these positions may be incompatible or contradictory. \([t]hese incompatibilities and contradictions within what is taken for granted ... exert a pressure on concrete individuals to seek new, non-contradictory subject positions.\(^{543}\)

3. In the same way in which individuals enter the social world, (in the process establishing/maintaining subjectivity,) so too, the social world construes sites at which subjectivity can be enacted in particular forms. The individual thus represents a social formation within the symbolic order.

4. Individuals articulate their identity across a range of discourses. Among the subject positions available are those subject positions which require the subject to 'speak for' or 'in the place of' other

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\(^{543}\) *Ibid*
individuals (as, for example the family as a site of intervention for a range of practices concerned with health, economic viability, social conformity within normative frameworks, and so on).

5. Insofar as the individual represents and is represented by and in a range of discourses, the subject cannot be said to be unitary, continuous or cohesive, except, provisionally, and for the purposes of analysis, the subject may be said to articulate a particular position at a particular point in time within specific boundaries of operation. It follows, then, that the individual speaking subject may be construed as such only insofar as the subject enacts a specific regime of boundaries, establishing and maintaining the identity of self in opposition to the anarchic exterior.

6. Subjectivity, a function of the socially/historically construed symbolic order, is enacted by individuals or groups of individuals (who in their authorisation are empowered to speak), in the course of which, are produced individuals (through boundaries established between self and other) and collective subjects (through boundaries enacted through 'us' and 'them'). In each case any attempt to maintain the dichotomy between the individual and the social symbolic orders remains artificial and arbitrary.

The linguistic and other semiotic means by which we operate a shared social and political world form in fact the currency by which the values that define our shared sense of community. As Terence Ball argues:

It has long been a truism that our being moral and political creatures presupposes a shared capacity for communication. We therefore live, not as a luxury but as a logical (indeed ontological) necessity, in a world of words. It is by virtue of being communicating creatures that we are tied together not by physical bonds but by the words which are our bonds. ... Who and what we are, how we arrange and classify and
think about our world - and how we act in it - is deeply delimited by the conceptual, argumentative and rhetorical resources of our language. The limits of my moral and political language are the limits of my moral and political world.544

In the context of this thesis it would seem more useful to render Ball's use of the term 'words' as 'signifying elements' insofar as they can, in addition to words, be realised as actions (examples being troop deployments, 'gunboat diplomacy' and so on). Thus Ball's use of language can be broadened semiotically to mean any signifying system.

What is important to note here is that the meanings explored in the articulation of the security state seen through the practices of arms control compliance at the site of the Standing Consultative Commission, is that these meanings are never divorced from the practices that produce them, and that discourse (and its boundaries so enacted) represents an active struggle for and against the production of particular types of statements. Moreover, the state so construed is operable for only as long as particular kinds of representation delimit the state in that form.

These practices of representation are always material. That is to say that they go beyond the bare expression of a system of ideas. They also occur within a context. As Tilley notes:

> The use, production and meaning of material culture is not a context-free event. Equally, material culture does not simply

consist of a set of signs to be read in which inheres a teleology of intentional meaning.\textsuperscript{545}

As a result, the state as a material cultural artefact cannot be reduced to a system of ideas, either at the level of the individual or at the level of social theory. As both product of and producer of practices of representation, the state cannot be reduced to simple utilitarian or social functions. The state is neither a-historical, nor immutable - that is it cannot occur without a context in which it is produced and sustained - therefore it cannot be used or understood in precisely the same way across cultural boundaries.\textsuperscript{546} We have seen how this has led, between the United States and the Soviet Union to much misreading of each other's practices and motives. Nor can the state be construed in evolutionary terms as the 'high-point' for civilised governance. As Tilley notes:

\begin{quote}
Material culture ... exists in a space falling between rules and principles for action and actual social practices ... These practices are to be linked with power-knowledge strategies both producing material culture and constraining the forms it may take according to context. So the use and form of material culture can be understood in relation to power and knowledge as can the social practices producing it.
\end{quote}

In the context of this thesis, the importance of the ABM Treaty was precisely the recognition that meanings can change across time. If the Treaty were to stand for all time (unlimited duration) then mechanisms would need to be set in place for the constant renegotiation of the meaning of essentially or at least contingently


contested terms. That mechanism was, and remains, the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC). The narrative invoked by this thesis is precisely the story of the charting of political change. We have noted the change in how the United States has defined itself in relation to its dominant Other - the Soviet Union - through the practices of one of the mechanisms charged with the enactment of the boundaries of the United States as speaking subject within the discourse of arms control compliance. The time-scale I have examined has been roughly the period between 1975 and 1985 which saw the transition from the practice of the United States under President Carter, to the practice of the United States under the first term of President Reagan. The changes wrought in these states so enacted have been felt in the practice of the ongoing negotiations within the SCC over the subject of compliance with the SALT Agreements. As we have seen this mechanism does not operate in a context-free environment any more than any other practice of identity creation and maintenance.

In the conclusion that follows I shall draw together many of the threads that have been woven throughout the thesis so far. I shall make explicit what has to this point remained largely implicit and set this within the theoretical framework that has underpinned this research. I shall conclude the conclusion with a gesture towards the role played by the SCC and, within the START regime, of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), and their importance for the future of the arms control process.
Chapter V

Post Scriptum

After the Soviet Union: The SCC and the JCIC under the CIS

This post-script examines the role of the SCC-style Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) established by a Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START) on July 31, 1991.

With the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev from the Presidency of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. However, the inheritor body of the Soviet seat on the United Nations Security Council, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) led, at least hegemonically, by Russia, remains. All of the former Soviet Republics that have long-range strategic nuclear weapons have agreed to uphold the terms of all existing nuclear arms control agreements, including SALT and START. Moreover, it appears increasingly likely that control over nuclear weapons will remain centralised under Russian control (albeit with Ukraine, Byelorussian and Kazakh consultative safety mechanisms over their use).

The Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission was established under Article XV of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). The mandate under this Article was threefold:

a) to resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed;

b) to agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of [the START] Treaty; and
c) to resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of [the START] Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with Paragraph 16 of section VII of the Notification Protocol.

With the establishment of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) under START as a forum in which to raise concerns over ambiguous compliance behaviour, the compliance infrastructure is already taking shape. In terms of the identity making processes described in earlier chapters, strategic nuclear weapons can be seen to have had an important input into the process of forming a new union between the former Soviet republics. This can be seen to have operated in two directions. On the one hand, the strategic nuclear weapons have long operated as the dominant sign in the binary equation between East and West throughout the Cold War, they have thus served a unifying function in terms of maintaining a distinctly Soviet identity. On the other hand, control over these weapons would arguably reinforce the individual sovereignty of the States, thereby operating as a disintegrative force.

It can be noted that throughout the breakup of the Soviet Union into its component states the command and control of the strategic nuclear weapons remained under central control. These weapons have remained dispersed among four States: Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. Outside of Russia, the Ukraine, in addition to hosting long-range strategic bombers (Bear-H and Blackjack comprising about 35% of all Soviet heavy bomber weapons and about 3% of all Soviet strategic nuclear warheads), also bases 56 SS-19 and 120 SS-24 strategic long-range ballistic missiles, while Kazakhstan bases 104 SS-18 ICBMs and Byelorussia bases 72 SS-25 ICBMs. These missile forces comprise
about 36% of all Soviet ICBM warheads and about 23% of all Soviet strategic nuclear warheads.\textsuperscript{547}

In part, this is not too surprising since more than ninety percent of the senior personnel of the Strategic Rocket Forces are ethnically Russian.\textsuperscript{548} The same applies to the upper positions of the other armed forces. Thus Russian hegemony, it could be argued, is based on control over the legitimate means of force. Nonetheless, the recognition of the discursive (notional) power of strategic nuclear weapons has made the former Soviet Republics reluctant to relinquish those weapons that are on their soil.

The JCIC, in line with its function has a structure similar to that of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). Each delegation is headed by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner. Under the terms of the START Treaty the names of each Party's Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner are to be notified to the Commission "as soon as practicable, but in any case no later than 30 days after the Treaty was signed."

Each Delegation comprises the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, members, advisers and experts. The Commission may establish working groups in order to consider specific questions raised in the Commission. Assuming that the JCIC functions institutionally in a manner similar to that of the SCC then the teams would include advisers from appropriate departments. On the US side such


\textsuperscript{548} Forum discussion with Mr. Jeffrey Jukes, ANU December 13, 1991.
departments would include the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defence, the Organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the intelligence community, along with appropriate civilian and military advisers. The Russian (formerly Soviet) side, assuming that it too follows the established practice of the SCC would operate with a Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner and a team with input from an Interagency Group that would be drawn from the Department of Defence, the Military Industrial Commission, the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Intelligence organisation derived from the former Committee on State Security (KGB). In line with the operation of the SCC the Commissioner would probably be drawn from the military, while the Deputy Commissioner would probably be drawn from the Foreign Ministry.

Unlike the SCC the JCIC has no regular semi-annual meeting. Sessions of the JCIC are convened at the request of either Party. Such requests must be answered within 14 days. The requests and responses must include the questions that the Party intends to raise, the name of the head representative of the Party (as sessions may be convened without the presence of a Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner), and the date and venue for the session. These sessions shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, or in another place agreed by the Parties. Outside of the formal sessions, questions can be raised and clarified by direct contact between the Commissioners or Deputy Commissioners without calling a formal session. Special sessions can be convened at the request of either Party where there is an urgent concern relating to compliance of the other Party with the obligations assumed under the Treaty.
Requests for a Special Session must include the nature of the concern, including the type of strategic offensive arms related to the concern; the name of the head representative of the Party and the proposed date and venue of the Session. In addition, the requesting Party may propose a specific method for resolving the concern. Such a proposal may include a request to visit with special right of access to the location or facility where, in the opinion of the requesting Party that ambiguous compliance behaviour took place. The response will either indicate acceptance of the date and location for the special session, or will include a proposed alternate date and/or location. This date will be no later than 10 days after the date proposed by the requesting Party.

The response may also indicate acceptance of the proposed method for resolving the concern, or offer an alternative method for resolving the concern. Moreover, if the Parties agree to a visit with special access rights this may make a Special Session redundant. In such a case the Special Session need not take place. Insofar as an onsite visit with special access rights constitutes a permitted way of resolving a compliance concern, such visits may be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol. The maximum duration of a Special Session of the JCIC is restricted to 30 days.

In line with the formal nature of the discursive situation within which the JCIC operates and enacts its national and notional boundaries the agenda for a session of the JCIC is restricted to those questions that have been provided within the communications that led to the convening of the session. Although each Party may raise questions that arise immediately preceding or during a session, subject to the approval of both Parties, and subject to allowing sufficient time for
consideration of the questions or to change the composition of the delegation as necessary.

As with the SCC privacy of the proceedings is important for all of the reasons outlined in Chapter two of this thesis. In general, all of the work of the JCIC is confidential, however, the Commission may record agreements or the results of the work in a document. In line with the need for discursive equality in the Commission, such documents will be done in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, "both texts being equally authentic."

Costs of participating in the Commission shall be borne by each Party participating. If the delegations are of similar size and constitution to those of the SCC then each Party would be bearing a cost of around $US 3.5-4 million per year. A Joint Statement was issued with respect to the costs of convening a session of the JCIC on the territory of one of the Parties to the effect that questions that may arise over the settlement of costs that may be incurred during such a session would be resolved prior to the convening of that session. Communications, as with the SCC, and including encryption of transmissions would be done through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre. This Centre, as for the SCC would also supply clerical support.

Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the JCIC and the provisions of the Protocol establishing the JCIC shall remain in force for a 12 month period. Once the Treaty is in force, the JCIC and the provisions of the relevant Protocol shall remain in force for as long as the START Treaty.

Moreover, the Protocol allows for change across time with a provision for Parties to agree on any additional measures as may be necessary to
improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. In addition, the
Parties agree that if it is necessary to effect changes to the JCIC Protocol
that do not affect the main substantive rights or provisions of the
Treaty, then the JCIC can be used to reach agreement on such changes
without resorting to the procedure for making amendments to the
main START Treaty under Article XVIII.

Interestingly, the domain of the SALT SCC and the START JCIC are
interlocked. This arises because the operation of the START Treaty has
been made conditional, by a Unilateral Statement at the US-USSR
Nuclear and Space Talks, upon the upholding of the provisions of the
ABM Treaty. Moreover, the USSR declared that withdrawal from the
START Treaty based on 'extraordinary circumstances' in which their
supreme interests would be jeopardised would include the US
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty or its material breach. The US
declared that operating to and within the limits of the ABM Treaty or
agreed modifications to the ABM Treaty should not constitute
'extraordinary circumstances' or placing in jeopardy the supreme
interests of the Soviet Union.

With respect to the post-Soviet, post Cold War world, it seems likely
that the START Treaty will be applied and implemented in all of its
provisions. In all probability the only change to the Treaty will be that
the words "Soviet Union" will be removed and replaced by the words
"Commonwealth of Independent States" and similarly, the
abbreviation USSR will be replaced by CIS. Indeed, for the purposes of
ratification, the Treaty itself may remain unchanged in wording, but a
subsequent aide memoire may indicate that the CIS intends to apply
the provisions of those arms control Treaties signed by the former
Soviet Union.
What is important here, is that an additional channel of communication has been established between the United States and the inheritors of the former Soviet Union. What is indicated by this, is that the arms control process is still seen as an ongoing process rather than as a static treaty. The purpose of the treaty is simply to lock-in the process. Treaties of this kind, then, represent the beginnings of a process, as well as the culmination of a process. Moreover, the intention to maintain the process in the face of a world whose condition of being is change is embodied in the establishment of consultative mechanisms, through which ambiguities can be resolved and new measures initiated to improve the implementation of the objects of the Agreement.

Consultations over START compliance are not restricted to the use of the JCIC as there are a variety of diplomatic channels through which consultations can take place. However, many of the notification requirements set forth in the START Treaty are to take place specifically through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre.

Unlike the SALT I and SALT II Treaties, START lists a number of specific instances that would call for consultation within the JCIC framework. Thus the mandate for the JCIC has been rendered far more clearly than that for the SALT SCC. The majority of these may be found in the Agreed Statements Annex to START.

The Agreed Statements clearly indicate the range within which the JCIC is designed to operate. This clarity should overcome a number of the problems of vagueness that plagued, and arguably ultimately narrowed, the operation of the SALT SCC. Instead of the SALT injunction to consider the general strategic situation and propose ways
of improving the viability of the Treaty, the START JCIC has a very specific mandate. The START Second Agreed Statement states:

The Parties agree that, in the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind of arm that one Party considers could be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such an arm for consideration by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article XV of the Treaty.

Under the terms of the Fifth Agreed Statement and relating to the provisions of subparagraph 2(d) of Article V of the START Treaty concerning the replacement or relocation of heavy ICBM silo launchers, agreement was reached that such relocation or replacement may only be done in the case of silo launchers destroyed by accident or other exceptional circumstances. The Fifth Agreed Statement holds that should such relocation be required then "the Party planning to construct the new silo launcher shall provide the other Party with the reasons and plans for such relocation in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to carrying out such relocation."

The Seventeenth Agreed Statement provides that with respect to heavy bombers, if functionally related observable differences (FRODs) are considered by one Party to be insufficient to determine whether a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber is not equipped for a particular kind of armament, then it may raise the issue within the JCIC.

The Nineteenth Agreed Statement records the agreement that in the event either Party wishes to develop mobile space launchers or related space launch boosters then this question may be addressed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Statement goes on to list the circumstances under which such a system would be allowed, and
concludes that additional provisions relevant to such systems could also be agreed within the JCIC.

With such an extensive inspection and exhibition regime as that agreed within the START Treaty, it was noted that there could be seen to be concurrent continuous monitoring activities with those of the 1987 INF Treaty. This led to the Twenty-Second Agreed Statement which states in part:

Issues relating to the concurrent continuous monitoring activities in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty and continuous monitoring in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article XI of the ... INF Treaty, shall be agreed upon, prior to entry into force of the Treaty, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and within the framework of the Special Verification Commission (SVC) [established under the INF Treaty to oversee compliance issues].

The Thirtieth Agreed Statement concerns the conditions under which objects may be delivered into space or the upper atmosphere that are launched from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from aircraft other than heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, which would otherwise be banned under subparagraph 18(a,d) of Article V of the Treaty. Provisions concerning procedures for such launches shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The JCIC also has responsibility for negotiating elements of the important, if mundane questions of who bears the costs, not only of hosting a JCIC session on the home territory of one of the Parties, but of the purchase and copying of telemetry data tapes used in flight tests where a Party provides more telemetry data tapes than the other, such that:
the other Party shall reimburse the tape-associated costs resulting from the difference in the number of flight tests. The costs associated with the purchase of the tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto the tapes, as well as the procedure for the reimbursement, shall be subject to agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Finally, the Thirty-eighth Agreed Statement concerns the procedures for establishing agreed provisions for establishing reference cylinders for the purposes of calibrating national technical means of verification pursuant to paragraph 23 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a liquid-fueled first stage. The Agreed Statement notes that:

...such procedures will be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The mandate then, for the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission is far more specific than that for the SALT Standing Consultative Commission. This reflects a more business-like approach to arms control which in turn reflects the changes in the international climate between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Since the signing of the START Treaty on July 31, 1991, the pace and scope of change has been far reaching. The discursive power of strategic nuclear weapons, reflecting their potential material force is acknowledged in the opening preamble to the START Treaty in which can be read traces of Bernard Brodie's classic statement to the effect that grand strategy in the nuclear age must be geared away from war-winning and towards war avoidance:

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought.
The START preamble goes on to state that the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms will contribute to reducing the risk of nuclear war while strengthening international peace and security. The preamble adds to this that it is in the interests of the Parties to strengthen strategic stability, and concludes with a statement of the intertextuality of the nuclear arms control agreements with a reinforcing (by reaffirmation) reminder of the other obligations to which the Parties are held, namely; the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and the Washington Summit Joint Statement (in the absence of a binding SALT II Treaty).

This statement of intertextuality serves to situate the START Treaty within a discourse genre of other nuclear arms limitation treaties, thus emphasising the ongoing and interconnected nature of, not only the arms control process, but also of the relationship between the Parties. By carrying out the provisions of the Treaty, not only is there a limitation on strategic offensive forces, but, by enacting that which renders each Party more secure, more stable, the Parties reinforce the practices that maintain their identity as such - as Parties. That is to say that by enacting the terms of the Treaty the two Parties recognise the circumscription of each other's notional and national boundaries. By doing this, the identity of the 'security state' of each Party is reaffirmed.

This last statement may sound ironically hollow when we have observed the demise of the Soviet Union that signed this Treaty - so soon after it was signed. But closer observation serves to confirm the soundness of the basic argument. The Parties defined by the Treaty are
not unitary identities.\textsuperscript{549} We have seen throughout this thesis that I have operated the notion of identity as that which is produced as a symptom of the enacting of site-specific boundaries. Thus the Soviet entity which signed the START Treaty as President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did so in order to enact that part of the Soviet boundary that was notionally concerned with what I have termed the 'security state.' In terms of the specific discourse genre invoked in the preamble of the START Treaty this 'security state' can be defined operationally by the 'strategic nuclear security state.'

In the developments that have immediately flowed-on from the breakup of the former Soviet Union one identity has remained to be reaffirmed within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). That identity is that represented by the Strategic Nuclear Forces. Throughout the upheavals whose finale began with the August Coup the leaders of the former Republics (now Independent States) made many public statements to reassure the West that all strategic nuclear arms control agreements would be upheld, and that the Strategic Nuclear Forces would remain under some form of centralised control. One aspect of the identity of the Strategic Nuclear Forces is the interface between the Strategic Nuclear Forces (whether USSR or CIS) and their Other, the security state of the United States of America and the West in general. One aspect of that interface has been established by the SALT SCC. That interface has been and remains reaffirmed with the establishment of the START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

\textsuperscript{549} ...rather, they are culturally produced linguistic entities. (See Thomas Hobbes' \textit{Persona Ficta}.)
CHAPTER VI

Conclusion

Metapolitics: towards the culture of verification

This thesis offers a philosophical underpinning to national security, even as it is played out in the marginal practices of nuclear arms control. The thesis argues that national security is as much an issue of identity as of realpolitik.

This thesis has set out to show that the state is linked to the countless processes (or acts) that invoke it. To illustrate this I have taken a small and marginal section of state-making activity - the strategic arms control community - in order to examine in some detail the processes underlying state-making. I have set out to show that, in addition to all of the overt, or surface operations of the arms control community, that there is an unstated, but logically prior agenda which is tied to the nature of political community itself.

At this point it may be useful to render explicit what, until now, has been an implicit thread running throughout the course of this thesis. In so doing I shall locate a set of theoretical and methodological questions that have informed and shaped the direction of my analysis. Moreover, I shall explore both the rationale behind, and the usefulness of, this mode of analysis in relation to the discursive environment for which the SALT SCC was conceived. In the process, I shall locate what I believe to be the strengths and limitations of this mode of analysis. Finally, in a work of this scope I have not intended to give a comprehensive history of the sets of theoretical debates, of which this thesis inevitably forms a part - other works have been and are being
devoted entirely to the grand sweep of theory. My aim is more modest. It is to address in a small way the question raised by a specific set of practices within security discourse in terms of the role they play in the constitution of the identity of what I term the 'security state.'

Chapter One introduced the discourse analytic approach, arguing that States become visible through the sets of military/strategic practices by which they enact their boundaries. This is what I have termed the 'security state.' This chapter argues that although States police their boundaries in a literal form, there is, in addition, an underlying and unstated cultural aspect. This cultural 'subtext,' when taken collectively with the countless other state/boundary-making practices, constitutes the identity of the state. Moreover, I have argued that, if the security state is a product of the practices that enact and maintain it, then one can examine this process by looking at political/cultural micro-structures. One such microstructure is the SALT Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC).

Chapter Two has set out the history, structure and overt function of the Standing Consultative Commission. This chapter noted the importance of privacy for its successful operation insofar as this allows for a degree of frankness in the exchanges between the US and the then Soviet Union. In these terms the SCC has been shown to operate as a boundary space between the two then superpowers. The chapter sketched out the structure of the Soviet SCC bureaucracy in a manner not previously covered in the Western literature. The chapter also covers the procedures insofar as they can be ascertained from the open literature. Finally, the chapter compared the political functions of the SCC with its legal mandate, suggesting that the political constraints that
were placed on its operation meant that it was ultimately unable to make full use of its mandate.

Chapter Three expanded the interpretive framework laid out in the introduction. The chapter drew together the relation between discourse analysis and analysis of political 'signalling.' The chapter then considered the conditions that made possible the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that led to the establishment of the SCC. It did this by outlining a brief history of the development of strategic nuclear arms and the accompanying systems required for their functioning. This was necessary in order to show why particular systems were placed under control. These systems were subsequently raised as compliance questions, so it was important that their role was clearly outlined. The chapter concluded that it was the achievement of nuclear 'parity' that, coupled with domestic political and economic factors, made the SALT Agreements possible.

The chapter examined verification standards as an indicator of the state of relations between the Parties. It argued that where a state is considered to be secure, then arms control can be enacted with confidence under adequate verification to ensure compliance. It is argued that these were the perceptions under which President Carter operated. Verification standard is a political issue which, as Chapter Four shows, is subject to change. The chapter also noted that assessments of the limitations of National Technical Means of verification, the US ability to respond to Soviet cheating and the political and military significance of potential violations would all affect the extent to which compliance issues would be raised and the extent to which these would be pursued through the channel of the SCC.
Chapter three also set out the relevant agreements and their verifiable elements as these form the issue framework for the operation of the SCC. The chapter then presents the empirical data on compliance challenges and their responses in the SCC for consideration on their relative merits. The texts surrounding the compliance challenge debates are analysed, not only for their content, but also for the way their discursive forms insofar as they indicate the philosophical assumptions about Self and Otherness that sustain the statemaking apparatus described in this thesis.

Chapter Three then examined the relationship between compliance challenge and state identity and the politics of treaty language itself. This led to a more sustained and detailed theoretical discussion on the foucaultian relationship between knowledge and power as applied through verification technologies. In this section, verification technologies and institutions are considered as a mode of disciplinary power through techniques of; hierarchical observation, through the role of the intelligence community and the technologies of photointerpretation; normalising judgement and the role of international norms; and forms of examination as a mode of Confession. The chapter concluded with a discussion of Carter's construction of a particular political identity for the United States.

Chapter Four examined the political environment that led to a major ideological shift towards the end of the Carter regime. The chapter argues that this was in large measure coordinated by and through the Committee on the Present Danger, founded by Paul Nitze among others. The chapter argues that the CPD, along with other conservative political groups were largely responsible for establishing a climate in which SALT II was doomed to failure.
The chapter further argues that, between Carter's perceived failure on SALT (and on domestic crises, such as the Hostage crisis), coupled with Soviet expansionist activity in Afghanistan, led to the downfall of Carter and paved the way for CPD member, Ronald Reagan. The chapter argues that Reagan's Manachaeist view of US-Soviet relations led directly to the Second Cold War and an almost unprecedented level of rhetorical boundarymaking (leaving Carter's defence policies almost unchanged).

The chapter argued that the decision to uphold SALT II provisions was due almost entirely to the normalising judgement power of international norms under the principle of *Pacta Sunt Servanda*.

Chapter Four considered SCC activity during the Reagan first term and examined the evidence for the US charges of Soviet noncompliance. After considering the long list in general terms on its merits, a detailed discussion of the Krasnoyarsk Large Phased Array Radar was pursued. In so doing, the texts surrounding the dispute were examined both for their content and for their rhetorical modalities that were to indicate in fairly precise ways the shift that had occurred in the state-making practices of the US from Carter to Reagan.

This led to a detailed examination of the structures underlying political discourse, and the relationship between the discursive constitution of the individual and the discursive constitution of states and state-like identity structures.

Chapter Five gestures towards the future. As the Soviet Union was breaking down, or transforming into the Commonwealth of Independent States, this brief chapter discusses the role of the analogous institution to the SCC that was established for START and
considers the benefits of this type of institution, and some of the lessons learned from the SCC experience.

My purpose has been to locate the SCC, both as, and in the context of, a set of representational practices through which the US and Soviet security state identities have been enacted. Therefore, this thesis is concerned less with evaluating the 'success' or otherwise of the SCC, than with the kinds of positions that have been invoked in order to effect such an evaluation.

Lyotard has suggested that to speak is inevitably to do so at the expense of silencing or marginalising other positions. Such a view arises from an attempt to provide a theoretical base with some explanatory power in terms of why large social structures (like states) should appear and behave as they do. In other words behind this enterprise lies an attempt at descriptive, rather than prescriptive philosophy.

As I have shown, The SCC has been, on a number of counts, remarkably successful given the political climate in which it was called upon to operate. On other terms the SCC has been an abject failure. The reasons for this have been offered in terms of the domestic political shift that brought Reagan to power. Behind such evaluations rests a range of perspectives, or to borrow from literary philosophy, a range of discursive positions and rhetorical moves.

Insofar as these rhetorical moves have been shown to condition the conceptual environment within which decisions are made and actions are taken, such rhetorical moves can be seen to form the 'stuff' of political forms of life. The methodology I have used has involved and invoked both historical and discourse-analytic modes of analysis. These offer the benefits of combining both a structural and an
historical schema. Past modes of analysis have tended to concentrate on one at the expense of the other.

As I have stated from the outset, this thesis is based on assumptions that reject the simple binarism and foundationalism implicit in maintaining a dichotomy between theory and practice. As a result, as far as possible, the theoretical implications of specific practices have been noted within discussion about the practices themselves, rather than in a separate chapter on 'theory' or 'methodology' per se. By doing this I have performed two moves:

i) By focusing on the theoretical implications of practices, an emphasis has been placed on the theory-laden-ness of practice, which is a way of saying that practices are always meaningful - insofar as they are performed within a social context in a socially meaningful way. This move leads to the suggestion that 'real-world' practices are not merely the 'objective' domain of 'truth,' but rather, insofar as they are meaningful, they are what might be termed 'concretised textual practices.'

ii) This approach brings to the surface a problem for another dichotomy. If practice is, as it were 'theory-laden,' then practices within the object domain (the 'real world') are not 'objective.' If, as this approach might suggest, there is a problem with the dualism invoked in the subjective/objective distinction, surely this raises equivalent questions for the agent/structure debate and, along with this, questions for those formations announced by the so-called 'anarchy problematique.'

Throughout the Cold War, simplistically speaking, the world was divided, for Western observers, into a largely binary opposition between the notional 'Self' defined loosely (if uncomfortably) with 'the West,' and the Other defined equally loosely as the 'Eastern Bloc.' It was an opposition that at the height of the Cold War was centred largely on two (at least rhetorically) nuclear powers and more specifically on the language by which they were said to possess specific
kinds of nuclear weapon. The actual world was and remains, of course, more complex than that. But the language of the Cold War, that set the terms of debate about the actual world, was ultimately not about the actual world, but the cultural world. Despite the fact that the political world can also be defined as a world of interests and institutions, the political world is perhaps better defined as a conceptual world - a world of meanings - in which action is filtered through institutionalised processes of interpretation on the basis of which other actions are initiated in the actual world. Under this rubric the interests form part of the currency of value and meaning that is exchanged between communities, both within and between states. We have seen also throughout this thesis that institutions can be effectively seen as sub-communities form and are formed by communicative action. The same process, I have argued, forms states and communities of states. This has been shown in Chapter Three, especially in the section on the role of the intelligence community. Thus the world of international relations is also a world of internotional relations. The process of identity-making that this entails, runs as a thematic base throughout human culture in all its formations, from the individual through the family, group, corporation or nation-state. It is a culture based on the twin principles of inclusion and exclusion.

We have seen in this thesis that the process of defining them as opposed to us rests largely upon the perceptions of similarity and difference. Insofar as this process may be seen at the analytic level of the state, the government or chief decisionmakers play an important role in defining the us-ness of us and the them-ness of them.

We have seen that sovereign statehood can be seen in terms of the potential or actual use of the means of force, the study of the means
and modalities of force remain an important aspect of international relations. Yet, insofar as a government's decision to act is determined by the way it perceives the intentions of the putative Other, it is appropriate to analyse the factors affecting the processes of perception and the role of a-priori assumptions in shaping perception. In other words in addition to the material aspects of the strategic behaviours of states, they also signify. Indeed, there is a large body of literature within strategic studies on the subject of the signalling, or discursive behaviours of states.

As Foucault notes:

...it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this very reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies.550

In this thesis I have examined the interactive behaviours of three such sets of discursive behaviours: that of strategic assets (missiles, radars etc), that of NTMs (satellites, SIGINT etc) and that of the deployment of these within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC).

The thesis is intended as a contribution to the 'conversation' that is engaging the study of international relations theory under the rubric of

the 'third debate'\textsuperscript{551} and to ground this conversation within the analysis of certain concrete practices that form part of the central concerns of the traditional conceptions of international relations: namely, the concerns of security within a changing pattern of global interrelationships between peoples.

Since nuclear weapons were first used in war, strategists have been caught up in a triple problem that has forced a major re-thinking of the traditional strategic outlook. That problem lies in the enormous destructive potential of these weapons, the fact of their invention, and in the articulation of security/identity through force \textsuperscript{552}

The late modern, or postmodern inversion of the Clausewitzian formulation stands in recognition of the enormous destructive potential of these weapons, and in recognition of the fact of History: that these weapons, once invented cannot be uninvented, and in the recognition that, beyond a certain point the competitive acquisition of ever larger numbers and increasing size of the these weapons brought decreasing marginal returns in the currency of added security. With

\textsuperscript{551} Yosef Lapid "The Third Great Debate in IR" ISQ Spring 1989

\textsuperscript{552} Max Weber "Politics as a Vocation: Types of Political Authority" The Great Political Theories ed by Michael Curtis NY:Discus Books 1962, p372:

"Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate violence" and

Karl von Clausewitz \textit{On War} Harmondsworth: Penguin books, especially the chapter:"War as an Instrument of Policy" in which Clausewitz states:

"We maintain...that War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means" and that this political intercourse "...does not cease by the War itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the war progress ... are only the general features of policy... p.402
the attendant risks of accidental war, the two largest nuclear powers have come to recognise that these weapons must be made to exist in a liminal space that bounded and separated them from so-called 'conventional' forces. They must be controlled.

At the same time, these weapons have been seen as indispensable insofar as they cannot be uninvented, and therefore 'sufficient' stocks of these weapons are seen to be necessary to 'deter' their used by Other powers. This is the dilemma of deterrence, or, in Plato's terms, nuclear deterrence can be viewed as a pharmakon. That is, as simultaneously medicine and poison.

In order to make nuclear deterrence 'credible' (that is to say, that the preferred reading by the ideal reader is that under certain conditions, nuclear forces will be interpreted as usable), force structures and force postures must be such as to indicate a willingness to transgress the boundaries into the liminal space of nuclear strategy. Given the potential global effects of all-out use of the present and planned nuclear arsenals, that liminal space must be defined and maintained rigourously in order to render the world 'secure'.553

As early as 1946 Bernard Brodie554 foreshadowed the problematic nature of nuclear weapons conceived as such.

The awful menace to both parties of a reciprocal use of the bomb may prevent the resort to that weapon by either side, even if it does not prevent the outbreak of hostilities. But

553 By this I want to suggest that by rendering nuclear weapons as of a different order from conventional weapons and by keeping a wide gap between the two orders, the incentive to cross the gap into actual use in anger might be considerably reduced.

554 See Brodie, Bernard "Implications for military policy" The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order NY: Harcourt, Brace And Company, 1946 p.76
even so, the shadow of the atomic bomb would so govern the strategic and tactical dispositions of either side as to create a wholly novel form of war... The conclusion is inescapable that war will be vastly different because of the atomic bomb whether or not the bomb is actually used. [emphasis mine]\textsuperscript{555}

Arms control agreements are not new, even nuclear arms control agreements are not new, but arguably, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, the Interim Agreement and the SALT I and II Agreements marked a significant shift in strategic thinking about nuclear arms. The difference lay in two critical areas: i) the application of quantitative and qualitative limits on strategic weapons, and ii) in the provisions for verification of the agreement.

The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and related treaties, represented a set of new beginnings for the arms control process, emphasising in their provisions the continuity of arms control as an ongoing process. With the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation and the unlimited duration of the treaty, the pattern was set for arms control to be thought-of as a continuity, punctuated by agreements. These agreements, coming out of ongoing negotiations represent starting points, rather than endpoints of a process.

By framing my work in cultural terms, my intention has been to examine the cultural frameworks surrounding the shift in behaviours represented by the shift in use and function of the SCC between two U.S. administrations under consideration in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{555} See Bernard Brodie (f/n1) p.83
William J. Durch, writing of verification, points out that "verification is a political and judgemental process that uses intelligence monitoring data to reach conclusions about a treaty partner's compliance with the terms of an agreement." Thus, he argues, judgement criteria for verification can change across time despite the relatively stable information acquisition methods. President Carter's criteria centred around a notion of 'adequate' verification (detection of militarily significant breaches within sufficient time to respond) while President Reagan's criteria were more stringent, centring on the term 'effective' verification. This has been interpreted to mean closer to 'absolute' verification (that is, detection of any violation, no matter how small.)

"Once upon a time the world was not as it is." This elegant formulation of the historical process by RBJ Walker (1989) condenses several processes that I have delved into in the course of this thesis. The first of these is the seemingly self-evident one that events happen, and that the fact of these events happening changes things.

The study of International Relations represents a particular genre of sets of organisational structures by which we can construct meaning for, or interpret, a particular subset of events-in-the-world. The interpretive principle referred-to here, is the Peircean one which suggests that "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more." Unpacking Walker's formulation a little further we can see that, in order to construct a schema by which the 'salience'


of specific observable events may be identified, it is necessary to select first the particular articulation of 'world' according to which these events may be rendered 'salient'. International relations then, for all the claims of 'Realism', represents a selection process which also entails a process of interpretation.

As I complete this thesis the world continues to rearticulate its political spaces. In the context of the subject matter of this thesis this process is most dramatically represented by the dissolution of what had been known for more than seventy years as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On December 25, 1991 the era of the USSR ended with the resignation of President Mikhail Gorbachev. In its place, and largely within the old boundaries of the USSR (without the Baltic States and without Georgia) the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) continues to enact the notional boundaries constraining the possession and deployment of strategic nuclear arms. The strategic offensive arms look from this vantage point to be set to remain under centralised control - the one Soviet identity that remains little changed by the emergent independence of the former Soviet Republics. That this has occurred is testament to the continuing power of the referent of the nuclear weapon articulated as a sign system. The establishment of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to complement the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) represents a positive sign of commitment by both Parties, however named, to uphold and continue to maintain the principles enacted within the currently active nuclear arms control agreements. This above all has been the value of the SCC's contribution to the process of state-making initiated by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
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APPENDIX A

TREATY BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972 Entered into force on 3 October 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article 111 of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
   (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode
   (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
   (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph I of this Article include those which are:
   (a) operational;
   (b) under construction;
   (c) undergoing testing;
   (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
   (e) mothballed.
Article III

Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers, and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phasedarray ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the Provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.
Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1 For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph I of this Article.

3. Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:
   (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
   (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
   (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;
   (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty
   (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;
   (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;
(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. 2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
APPENDIX B

INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (SALT I AGREEMENT)

Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972

Entered into force on 3 October 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties

Convicted that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert landbased launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Article III

The Parties undertake to limit submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification
at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph I of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

Article VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

Article VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
II. The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR of September 30, 1971, and shall exercise Its competence in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures.

III. Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such staff as it deems necessary.

IV. The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, at the request of either Commissioner.

V. The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters and may amend them as it deems appropriate.

VI. The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also meet at such other places as may be agreed.
APPENDIX D

PROTOCOL, WITH REGULATIONS, REGARDING THE US-SOVET STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON ARMS LIMITATION

Signed at Geneva on 30 May 1973
Entered into force on 30 May 1973

PROTOCOL

Pursuant to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, dated December 21, 1972, the undersigned, having been duly appointed by their respective Governments as Commissioners of said Standing Consultative Commission, hereby establish and approve, in the form attached, Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters of the Commission, which Regulations shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force until and unless amended by the undersigned or their successors.

ATTACHMENT

REGULATIONS

1. The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall consist of a U.S. component and Soviet component, each of which shall be headed by a Commissioner.

2. The Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings.

3. The Commissioners shall, where possible, inform each other in advance of the matters to be submitted for discussion, but may at a meeting submit for discussion any matter within the competence of the Commission.

4. During intervals between sessions of the Commission, each Commissioner may transmit written or oral communications to the other Commissioner concerning matters within the competence of the Commission.

5. Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and experts as it deems necessary to participate in a meeting.

6. The Commission may establish working groups to consider and prepare specific matters.

7. The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the Commission may, if necessary, be entered into records which shall be in two copies, each in the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

8. The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners.

9. Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected with its participation in the Commission.
APPENDIX E

PROTOCOL ON THE
JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
RELATING TO
THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON
THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between The United States of America and the Union of Soviet socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as The Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions governing the operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty.

I. Composition of the Commission

1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party the names of its designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission. The Parties shall communicate to each other the names of the initially designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission as soon as practicable, but in any case no later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty.

2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a session of the Commission by its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as by their alternates, and by members, advisors, and experts. A session of the Commission may be convened without the participation of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual provided for in this paragraph may be the head representative of a Party to a session of the Commission.

3. The head representatives of the Parties shall alternately preside over meetings during a session of the Commission.

4. The Commission shall have the right to constitute working groups consisting of any of the individuals provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section for the consideration of specific questions raised in the Commission.

II. Convening a Session of the Commission

1. A session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party. No later than 14 days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Requests and responses shall include the following:

(a) the questions that the Party intends to raise;

(b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and

(c) the proposed or accepted date and location for the convening of the session.

Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other Party in the period from the submission of the initial response to the initial request until the convening of the session.

2. A session of the Commission shall be convened as soon as possible after receipt of the response provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section.
3. A session of the Commission shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, or, as appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties.

4. The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of each of the Parties may, without the convening of a session of the Commission, communicate with the Commissioner of the other Party in order to clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions.

III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission

1. A special session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party to address what the requesting Party considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the other Party with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. Such a request shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(a) the nature of the concern including the kind and, if applicable, the type of strategic offensive arms related to the concern;

(b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and

(c) the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session.

The requesting Party may also propose in the request a specific method for resolving the concern. Such a method may include, but is not limited to, a visit with special right of access to the facility or location where, in the opinion of the requesting Party, the activity that caused the concern took place.

2. No later than seven days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Such a response shall include either:

(a) acceptance of the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session; or

(b) a proposal for an alternate date and location for the convening of the special session. The alternate date shall be no later than ten days after the date proposed by the requesting Party.

3. The response of the requested Party may also include:

(a) acceptance of the proposed specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location and procedures for such a visit; or

(b) a proposal for a special method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location and procedures for such a visit.

If the Parties agree to a visit with special right of access or another method for resolving the concern, the Parties may agree not to convene the special session.

Visits with special right of access may be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol, as applicable.

4. Either Party may request additional information related to the concern. A response to such a request shall be submitted no later than seven days after receipt of the request, but shall not affect the time for convening the special session of the Commission, if such a session is held.
5. A special session of the Commission shall remain in session for no more than 30 days.

IV. Agenda

1. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall consist of those questions that the Parties have included in the communications provided to each other in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Protocol.

2. Each Party shall have the right to raise the Commission questions that arise immediately preceding or during a session of the Commission; provided, however, that consideration of such questions during the current session shall be subject to agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of such questions for preparation and any changes in the composition of their delegations that are required.

3. Sessions of the Commission shall be convened irrespective of the number of questions on the agenda.

V. Work of the Commission

work of the Commission shall be confidential except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. The Commission may record agreements or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Such documents shall not be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission.

VI. Costs

Each Party shall bear the cost of its participation in the work of the Commission.

VII. Communications

Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

VIII. Additional Procedures and Provisional Application

1. The Parties shall have the right to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the Commission.

2. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty for a 12-month period, unless before the expiration of this period:

   (a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol; or

   (b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

3. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol
shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages both texts being equally authentic

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
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- Dr. Bruce Mann (Nuclear Division, MoD, UK)
- Dr. David Chuter (CFE Division, MoD, UK)
- Dr. Jamie Shea (Special Projects Officer, NATO, Brussels)
- Mr. J. Pugh (Disarmament & Arms Control Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO, Brussels)
- Mr. McKendy (Plans and Policy Section of Defence Planning and Policy Division, NATO, Brussels)
- Mr. D.F. Bareth (NATO Information Service, NATO, Brussels)
- Dr. Ian Bellany (Lancaster Univ.)

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