JAPAN'S FIRST GENERAL ELECTION, 1890.

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This thesis has been submitted in part fulfilment of the conditions for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University. It is the result of my own independent research, except for general supervision and help with photographing material as acknowledged in the Preface. Unless otherwise stated in the footnotes, I am responsible for the translations.

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Preface.

This thesis is substantially an account of the general election of 1890, based on reports in the newspapers of that time. By this method, it did not prove too difficult to get a reasonably full and accurate picture of events as they occurred. In other words, I have found myself able to give fairly confident answers to the two questions: 'what happened at the election?' and 'why did it happen?' - within the rather restricted framework of the election period itself. Moreover, since to the best of my knowledge this material has not been worked over before, I have tried to let the facts speak for themselves as far as possible; and, with one exception (the last section of Chapter Two), have purposely refrained from blending my own long term interpretations with more concrete reportage on the election. I hope that others will thus feel free to use the substance of what I have to say on the election for their own ends, even if their ideas on the subject do not agree in every respect with mine.

For it is these wider problems of interpretation that remain the most baffling. Why was the election ever held at all? What, if any, axioms of Japanese constitutional development and political behaviour can we deduce from a study of the election? I have my own opinions on these important and controversial topics; and the Introduction and Conclusions have been written partly with a view to expressing some of them. One short, general observation may not be out of place here. A good many books seem to have been written with the theme of the breakdown of parliamentary institutions in Japan in their authors' minds. Perhaps, I began by wondering why the Japanese parliamentary system has worked.

All place names given in the text have been checked for their readings in Yoshida Tōgo's Dai Nihon Chimei Jishō (Dictionary of Japanese Place Names, Tokyo, 1938-40) - a most useful and fascinating work. Personal names were much more of a trouble; often for these too, however, I was able to find somewhere or other a phonetic (i.e. kana) reading. The sources for such readings may not have been authoritative in every case; but, on the whole, I consider them reliable. In an effort to reduce to the minimum possible errors or doubt arising from my renderings of personal names, I have included at the back of this work a list (Appx. XIII) of the names in Chinese script of all those elected to the House

of Representatives in July 1890. Furthermore, Appendix XIV is a 'hard-core' list of the names of persons not elected to the Diet, for which I have not so far discovered phonetic readings. This appendix gives my renderings side by side with the Chinese characters. These are names of people mentioned in the main body of the text, and have been underlined there.

Finally, some acknowledgements. The Australian National University in its corporate capacity made this piece of research possible by awarding me a three-year Scholarship, and by paying my fares to and from Japan. On a more personal level, I wish to express my deep appreciation to the following members or ex-members of the staff of the A.N.U. for the supervision, advice, and encouragement they have kindly given me from time to time: Associate-Professor J.I. Ackroyd, Dr G. Bolton, Dr E.S. Crawcour, and Professor C.P. Fitzgerald. While I was studying at Tokyo University, I was privileged in having Professor Ooka Yoshitake as my supervisor and sponsor; and received friendship, as well as much valuable assistance in hunting out and photographing material, from Mr Sato Seizaburo. Individual members of the staffs of archives and libraries, both in Tokyo and in Canberra, who have always been ready to help me, are too numerous to mention by name; so I hope they will excuse me if I give them a general but very sincere word of thanks. I should like also to take this opportunity to thank formally Mrs M. Cameron for all the hard work she has done with her typewriter.

INTRODUCTION

Japan's first general election took place as a result of the promulgation of the Meiji constitution¹ on 11 February 1889. This constitution allowed for a bi-cameral Imperial Diet. The Upper House (Kizoku-in = House of Peers) of the new Diet originally had 252 members. The majority of these belonged to a hereditary peerage set up a few years before; but this House also contained a considerable number of commoners. The Emperor had the power to nominate distinguished citizens to the Upper House; and the fifteen most wealthy tax-payers in each of the three fu (metropolitan districts) and forty-two ken (prefectures) had the right to elect one of their number to the House of Peers. The Lower House (Shūgi-in = House of Representatives) had a total of 300 seats, all of which were to be filled by direct election from among the people.

Under the terms of the constitution, formal sovereignty resided in the Emperor alone; but actual authority was divided between the Diet and a Cabinet of officials. The Diet possessed certain important rights, which apart from one very minor exception were shared by both Houses in

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For a translation of the text of the constitution, see Itō, Commentaries; or McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., pp. 136-44.

common. The most notable of these rights was the provision that Bills had to have the assent of a majority of members in both Houses before they could become law. The annual Budget, too, was subject to this veto. Moreover, the Government had to assemble the Diet at least once every year. The franchise for the House of Representatives was at first a very restricted one; but, since it was regulated by a separate Law of Election promulgated together with the constitution, increasing the number of voters was to prove a comparatively easy matter.

On the other hand, the statesmen who had been in office since the beginning of the era in 1868 did their best to ensure that the innovations of 1889 would not deprive them of their control of the executive power. The Government was expressly authorized to carry on with the previous year's Budget, in the event of the current estimates being rejected by the Diet. Of even more significance was the fact that the Meiji constitution was clearly written with the idea of 'transcendental' or non-party Cabinets in mind, even though the wording did not rule out the possibility of party Cabinets in the future. The ministers of state were theoretically appointed and dismissed by the Sovereign; and for the first decade or so of constitutional rule, they were most reluctant to acknowledge that they

were also responsible for their actions to the Diet, and so to the people. We shall find the opening stages of this dispute over ministerial responsibility, between bureaucrats entrenched in the Cabinet and politicians elected to the House of Representatives, already much in evidence at the time of the first general election.

The Meiji constitution, as first operated, embodied what was essentially a family conception of the state. The Emperor was an august but somewhat remote Head of the Household. The 'elder brothers' in the Cabinet were empowered to carry on His government under what was hoped would be the friendly scrutiny of the 'younger brothers' in the Diet. This view of affairs was in many ways the one best suited to the political traditions of the nation, and actual domestic and international circumstances in the 1880s; but, in the nature of things, it was bound also to come under increasingly severe pressure from the large body of 'progressive' and Liberal-minded opinion represented in the Lower House.

In the context of overall political development, the constitution of 1889 is perhaps best seen as a conservative but sincere attempt to arrive at a lasting modus vivendi between these two important groups: the bureaucrats in office, and the Liberals in opposition. The latter had

been pressing their demand for a constitution and a representative national assembly since 1874; and their campaign has come to be known as the Jiyū Minken Undō (Liberty and Popular Rights Movement). Thus, the political history of Japan for the sixteen or so years before the election of 1890 had been marked by much tension and conflict; with the advocates of popular rights continually urging the bureaucrats to move more quickly than they wished in the direction of administrative reform, and with the bureaucrats having to use all their skill to avoid the twin dangers of isolation and complete defeat.

Liberal demands were not met in full, but by a policy of piecemeal concessions. Often these concessions were made to appear more substantial than they really were, and the bureaucrats in their pronouncements from the throne always laid great stress on the underlying principle of gradual advance. Nevertheless there was not much doubt from 1875 at the latest - and I personally think from a time several years before this date - that a constitution entailing representative institutions would be inaugurated eventually. From then on, the disputes were mainly over questions of the timing, theory, and provisions of the proposed new system. Therefore though the period from 1874 to 1889 was one of tension and conflict, it was a

special sort of tension and a special sort of conflict. The predominant pattern was not one of head-on collision between two wholly antagonistic and resolutely unyielding sets of forces. Rather, there was a long drawn out process of interaction between two mutually opposed, certainly, but in some ways complementary and not permanently irreconcilable, power groups.

An understanding of the exact nature of this interaction is essential for a proper appreciation of Meiji constitutional problems and history as a whole. At its highest level, it took place within the single group of shizoku (i.e. ex-samurai) administrators and intelligentsia that had come to power as a result of the restoration of de facto sovereignty to the throne in 1868. These men had as their grand aim the thorough reconstruction of the state along Western lines. Prominent among them were: Kido Kōin, Ōkubo Toshimichi, Yamagata Aritomo, Itō Hirobumi, Ōkuma Shigenobu, Inoue Kaoru, Kuroda Kiyotaka, Itagaki Taisuke, Matsukata Masayoshi, and Gotō Shōjiro. The members of this little group of talented nation-builders were often bitterly divided among themselves. Yet most of them were extremely influential in one capacity or another for an interval of forty years or more; and it is my opinion that, on balance, they had more to unite than divide them.

Divisions arose from clan rivalries, personal ambitions, and differences of temperament as well as from open disagreements on matters strictly political. Yet, at the same time, there were other, unifying factors also at work. Nearly all the Meiji statesmen had known in their youth the frustrations and hardships of the life of a provincial and minor samurai under Tokugawa feudalism. As former samurai, they retained much of their sense of themselves as a governing elite. As former dissatisfied samurai, they were only too ready to initiate a policy of wholesale reform once they got the chance. Despite a number of relatively minor upsets and failures, therefore, peaceful and successful change from above was the dominant theme of the Meiji era. It passed quickly from restoration to renovation, and ended up with having accomplished what amounted to a revolution.

There was another youthful experience which the Meiji leaders had in common:- the bitterness of knowing that their country, under the Tokugawa Shōgunate, had been helpless against Commodore Perry and his warships in 1853 and 1854. This meant that they desired to reconstruct the state not only for its internal good, but also for its external safety. Patriotic indignation was married to a concern for personal advancement. Everything pointed to

the need to strengthen the Empire against the West by making it as like the West as possible.

Identical class background, patriotism, and a strong interest in Western civilization - there were other elements, too, in their emotional and political situation to keep the Meiji administrators and leaders of public opinion in fundamental sympathy with one another. The national ideal of service to the throne, to which they ostensibly owed their initial success and which they themselves sedulously fostered, was even for them something more than an obligatory public attitude; and, with it, went a genuine, if not entirely disinterested, sense of responsibility for the welfare and progress of their fellow-subjects and compatriots.

Furthermore, empiricism was a notable trait of the political behaviour of this group as a whole. Both for the bureaucrats who were permanently in office and for the Liberal leaders who several times resigned from the Government only to re-enter it again, politics was pre-eminently the art of the possible. This meant that while the Meiji leaders kept to the end their capacity for quarreling among themselves, each successive dispute usually resulted in some sort of compromise rather than a lasting rupture. To repeat:- the pattern of constitutional development from 1874 onwards is one of intense but localized conflict within

an overall framework of interaction. Behind all this lay the collapse of the Baku-han system (Baku = Bakufu or Shōgunate; han = autonomous fief or Daimiate), and the urgent need to put something in its place. The constitution of 1889 was, in a sense, the delayed but logical response to the restoration of 1868, the achievement of which had not been crowned by any comprehensive or durable settlement. The entire period 1868-1889 has the flavour of an interregnum.

The visible start of the Jiyū Minken Undō was in October 1873, when the Great Council of State (Dajōkan) was divided on the question of whether or not to go to war with Korea, and the minority in favour of war resigned en masse in protest against the majority decision for peace.² The Dajōkan was an ancient Court institution which had been revived in 1868 as the supreme governing body of the Empire. It continued in this role, acting also as a Regency Council, until it was replaced by a modern Cabinet system in 1885. By 1873, the Dajōkan was in the hands of the real makers of the restoration - a handful of the more talented Court nobles, and the group of young but extremely able minor samurai already mentioned. These latter were

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For an account of this dispute, see Ike, *Triumph of the Peace Party in Japan in 1873*, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol.2, May 1942.

all from the four great 'restoration' clans in the southwestern parts of the Empire:- Satsuma in the extreme south of Kyushu; Chōshū in the most westerly part of Honshu; Tosa on the Pacific coast of Shikoku; and Hizen in the north-western region of Kyushu behind Nagasaki. This Satchō-Tohi coalition had been formed in the preliminary stages of the restoration, and had lasted more or less intact until the great split of October 1873. After that date, we tend to find To-Hi 'renegades' in the van of opposition to their former Sat-Chō colleagues in the Government.

The councillors who had advocated hostilities with Korea were: Saigō Takamori (Satsuma), Etō Shimpei (Hizen), Soejima Taneomi (Hizen), Itagaki Taisuke (Tosa), Gotō Shōjiro (Tosa), Furusawa Shigeru (Tosa). Saigō, an outstanding figure in the War of the Restoration, returned home to Kagoshima to prepare for a feudal and militarist reaction against the new regime. His course of action led eventually to the Satsuma rebellion of 1877, in the final battle of which he lost his life. Etō died as the defeated leader of a much smaller rising in Hizen in 1874. It was the Tosa (modern Kōchi prefecture) group of statesmen, headed by Itagaki, that turned to the far less traditional, and ultimately far more successful, method of peaceful, political agitation as a means of prosecuting their case against

the Government. Between them, Tosa and Itagaki gave birth to Japanese Liberalism.

In its origins, then, the Jiyū Minken Undō was a Tosa-regional movement. It was also a samurai-class movement. By 1873, many samurai in all districts were keenly dissatisfied with the Government. Xenophobic and haughty, impoverished and largely ignorant of the real state of the nation and its relations with the outside world - these men had been won over by the restoration cry of 'Revere the Emperor; expel the barbarian!', and had looked forward to seeing the new rulers do just that. Instead, they found the Dajōkan determined to introduce Western ways into the country, as the basis and goal for its programme of complete reconstruction at home. The replacement of independent fiefs (han) by prefectures (ken) in 1871 had been followed by the steady whittling away of the hereditary stipends and special privileges of the samurai class as a whole. No wonder they were discontented, though in the circumstances no special blame can be attached to the Government for what was taking place. It was on these feelings of wrathful disappointment among the members of the only politically conscious class in the nation that Saigō and Etō relied

for their policy of armed force against the Dajōkan, and Itagaki and his colleagues for their policy of Liberal propaganda against the Dajōkan.

Against this background, it was only natural that the earliest Liberal organizations should have been confined in their membership and sphere of action to the Tosa samurai. The first of these organizations was the Aikoku-kōtō (Public Party of Patriots), set up by Itagaki and a small group of sympathizers in Tokyo in January 1874. The Aikoku-kōtō was never anything more than a discussion club and is unimportant in itself; however on 17 January 1874, it sent a memorial to the Dajōkan, asking for the establishment of an elected national assembly. This was the first public statement of the aims of the new Liberal movement. Two months later, Itagaki was back in Kōchi city and busy founding the Tosa Risshi-sha (Society For Establishing One's Aim In Life). This Risshi-sha, though it remained a purely local association, was in many ways the parent-body of the Liberal movement. It had two distinct functions. One was to assist the economic rehabilitation of former samurai of the Tosa clan; the other was to strive for the attainment of the political ideas of the Aikoku-kōtō. Itagaki had formed the Risshi-sha by merging the Aikoku-kōtō with a Tosa patriotic club (the Kainan Gisha).

The next step was the founding of the Aikoku-sha (Patriotic Society) at Osaka in February 1875. The founders of this new society were the leaders of the Risshi-sha. They hoped by transferring the centre of their political activities to Osaka, by tradition the most 'cosmopolitan' and least feudal part of the Empire, to free them from the local ties and economic sectionalism of the parent-body. With this in mind, Itagaki and his adherents sent out invitations to other progressive but regional and samurai-centred clubs in different parts of the country, asking them to send delegates to a meeting to be held in Osaka. A number of them did, and it was from this meeting that the Patriotic Society was born, without in any way disrupting the existence of such groups as the Risshi-sha in Kōchi and elsewhere.

Within three weeks of its founding, however, the Aikoku-sha was dissolved. This sudden dissolution came about partly as a result of insolvency; but the main cause was Itagaki's decision to re-enter the Government. Concurrently with the parleys that had been going on among the leaders of the Risshi-sha and kindred organizations, a completely different set of talks had been in progress between Itagaki and Kido Kōin, on the one hand, and senior ministers still in the Government, on the other hand. This

second set of talks is known as the Osaka Conference; and they resulted in a general agreement between the parties concerned on the desirability of a definite but gradual transition to constitutional rule.³ It was on the basis of this compromise that Itagaki rejoined the Dajōkan, and by doing so left the Aikoku-sha, of which he was the chief architect and chosen leader, with little option but to disband.

This setback to the growth of the popular rights movement, severe though it was at the time, was not a lasting one. In October 1876, Itagaki again resigned from the Dajōkan, this time on the grounds that his Sat-Chō colleagues were not keeping good faith with regard to the decisions made at the Osaka Conference, and resumed his stance of Liberal opposition. Then, in the summer of 1878, the Aikoku-sha was revived. From the time of its re-establishment, the Aikoku-sha, with Osaka still as its headquarters, quickly grew into what its founders had originally meant it to be. That is to say, it became the controlling body of a national movement for popular rights, embracing all sections of the population and super-imposing itself on the old provincial allegiances.

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The fruits of the Osaka Conference were made public in the Imperial rescript of 14 April 1875, setting up a Senate (Genrō-in) and a Supreme Court (Daishin-in). Power of appointment to both these bodies was in the hands of the Emperor. This rescript also announced that a constitutional system would be introduced gradually. See Appx. I below.

The next few years produced a spate of political clubs and discussion groups throughout the land, and many of them were affiliated to the Aikoku-sha. The latter, for its part, embarked on a campaign of radical propaganda with the intention of forcing the Government to give way to its demand for a parliament, and held regular conventions in Osaka for delegates from its affiliated clubs. Closely linked with these developments was the fact that the Liberal movement was tending to draw more and more of its support from the urban middle classes and the rural gentry of the villages, and, conversely, was less and less just a mouthpiece for samurai discontents.

At the fourth of the Aikoku-sha's Osaka conventions, which opened in March 1880, the name of the Society was changed to The Union For The Establishment Of A Parliament (Kokkai Kisei Dōmei Kai). In November of the same year, the title of this - the most prominent still of all the popular rights associations - was altered again to The Great Japan Parliament Supporters Association (Dai Nihon Kokkai Kisei Yūshi Kai). At the same time, it was decided to found 'a party with fixed principles and based upon the idea of freedom.'⁴ This resolution bore fruit on 29 October 1881, when the Jiyū-tō (Liberty Party) was formed in Tokyo,

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Lay, Rise of Political Parties in Japan, TASJ, vol.30, Pt. iii, 1902, p.384.

within three weeks of the promulgation of the Imperial rescript that promised an elected parliament within a given time.⁵ The first president of the Jiyū-tō was Itagaki Taisuke himself. Its vice-president was Nakajima Nobuyuki, later first Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Dai Nihon Kokkai Kisei Yūshi Kai was amalgamated with the new organization.

The creation of the Jiyū-tō was the culmination of all that had gone before. It marked the final stage of the transition from regional samurai clubs to a national political party with no restrictions on membership, clearly enunciated principles,⁶ a properly organized structure, and a great deal of support throughout the country. Itagaki had realized his ambition of elevating the mass of the people to a position from which they could reasonably look forward to participating in the political life of their nation. Thirty years earlier, few, if any, Japanese had even begun to think in such terms; and his pilgrimage of opposition had led him from Tokyo to Kōchi, thence to Osaka, and finally back to Tokyo again. The dissident councillor had returned to his native province, together with his closest associates

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See Appx. II below.

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See Appx. III below.

in the central Government, early in 1874. There, he had set about repairing his political fortunes with the aid of regional loyalism and shizoku hostility towards the Government. Then had come the vital move to Osaka, heralding the Liberal appeal to the wealthier elements in the nation at large. This had led at last to the setting up of the Jiyū-tō, Japan's first political party proper, in what seemed like an hour of triumph, in the capital of the Empire and in preparation for a parliament to be summoned in 1890.

The Liberty and Popular Rights Movement had started as a development of localist feeling and the dissatisfaction of the former samurai with the waning of their class. If it had never moved out of the context of its origins, it would have been capable of producing a vigorous expression of particular grievances, but it would have been without either permanent or national significance. It was the signal achievement of Itagaki Taisuke, and to a lesser extent of Gotō Shōjiro, that they were able out of such relatively unpromising material, and in a remarkably short time, to inspire associations of a less restricted and more durable type. These associations subsisted in the main on an essentially theoretical notion of Liberty, which could be forsaken for collusion with the Government as readily as it

was substantiated by violence against it, and on a natural proneness to make common but ephemeral cause on controversial topics of the day. Moreover, they retained all the stresses of individual temperament and regional affinities that had marked their antecedents. Yet, in spite of this, these groupings were recognizable political parties. They represented, in a general and reasonably unified way, some national or class interest that was itself of importance to the Empire as it was becoming, and was not merely a decayed vestige of what it had been.

Two other important political parties were established in Tokyo within a few months of the founding of the Jiyū-tō. The Rikken Teisei-tō (Constitutional Imperial Party), a Government sponsored body, was launched in March 1882; and Ōkuma Shigenobu, having recently resigned from the Dajōkan, started the Rikken Kaishin-tō (Constitutional Progressive Party) in April 1882.

Ōkuma's resignation had taken place in October 1881, amidst conditions of great popular excitement, and in conjunction with the promulgation of the rescript of 12 October 1881, referred to above. In this rescript, one of the most momentous ever issued, the Emperor Meiji declared:-

We shall, in the twenty-third year of Meiji [1890] establish a Parliament.....and We charge Our faithful subjects bearing Our commissions to make, in the meantime, all necessary preparations to that end.

The departure of Ōkuma, perhaps the most influential figure in the Dajōkan after the death of Ōkubo Toshimichi in 1878, had come about ostensibly because of differences of opinion with his colleagues - notably Iwakura Tomomi, Itō Hirobumi, and Kuroda Kiyotaka - over the pace of constitutional development, and the sale of certain Government properties in Hokkaidō. The real situation may have been that Ōkuma felt himself in danger of political eclipse, as he was by 1881 the only representative of the former fief of Hizen left in the senior councils of what was a predominantly Sat-Chō Government. Moreover, he and Itō were the two obvious contenders for the authority of Iwakura Tomomi, an elderly and failing Court noble, who had played a major part in the restoration coup and subsequent decisions. Therefore Ōkuma might have been feeling tempted to try and secure his own position by riding the new wave of a parliament, when he submitted a memorial⁷ in March 1881 advocating the summoning of an elected parliament within two years, and the transfer of control of the administration to the leader of the party with the largest number of seats in the chamber.

Whatever the case, Ōkuma's views on the constitutional issue, and his protests against the Dajōkan's willingness

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Miyakoshi, *Nihon Kensei Kisō Shiryō*, p.311. Trans. Beckmann, *Making*, Appx. VI.

to let Kuroda have the Hokkaidō properties at a 'give-away' price, were made known in the press. Naturally, they earned him an immense amount of popularity with the growing body of petitioners for a parliament and with the general public. The attitude of the other members of the Dajōkan soon ceased to be a matter just for editorial censure, and became the subject of indignation meetings up and down the land. In Tokyo and Osaka, the political temperature ran dangerously high. Ōkuma's colleagues on the Dajōkan, badly shaken, regarded him as little better than a traitor; and eventually Itō took the lead in forcing his resignation. At the same time, Itō prevailed upon the Council to reverse its previous decision with regard to the Hokkaidō sale, and to mollify public opinion still further by announcing a firm date for the opening of a parliament. Ōkuma had lost a war for himself, but had won an important battle for his country. The whole affair had been one of the most spectacular manifestations of the sustained, but usually muted, clan and personal rivalries that went on within the higher circles of the Meiji leadership.

The Kaishin-tō, then, when it was formed in the March and April of the following year, was pre-eminently Ōkuma's party; and the fallen giant was henceforth to devote some of his abundant energies to retrieving his power by means

of party politics. His principal helpers in his new venture were a group of well-educated and talented young bureaucrats, who had resigned from office in sympathy with him. Among them were Shimada Saburo, Ozaki Yukio, Inukai Tsuyoshi, and Ono Azusa. Ōkuma could also count on a great deal of support from the Tokyo intelligentsia in general, chiefly because of his life-long friendship with that renowned scholar and Westernizer, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the president of Keiō University. In the sphere of commerce and industry, the new party had the even more influential favour of Iwasaki Yataro and his Mitsubishi Company.

The separate worlds of learning and big business were the mainstays of the Kaishin-tō, in its initial stages at any rate. Thanks to its good inner organization and conspicuously able leadership, however, the party also attracted all those, in the country districts as well as the towns, of substantial means and moderate views who were unnerved by the extremism of the Left Wing of the Jiyū-tō. In this manner, it gradually grew into the party of the educated and well-heeled middle classes everywhere, professional as well as business and academic.

As a party of fairly wide appeal and a cautious but sincerely held reformist outlook,⁸ the Constitutional

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For its original manifesto, see Appx. IV below.

Progressive Party was destined to play a vital and, generally speaking, worthy role in the future scheme of Japanese politics. Its underlying spirit is best expressed in some words used by its founder in his inaugural address:-

While I am emphatic in my rejection of precipitous change, I feel that it is important to distinguish our party from those which mask their real conservatism by pretending to stand for gradual progress. 9

The Jiyū-tō and Itagaki's earlier associations had explained John Stuart Mill's philosophy of Liberalism to the people, in terms of Rousseau's doctrine of General Will, and with a fervour that had a revolutionary and unitary side to it. The Kaishin-tō, on the other hand, was much less doctrinaire and, because of its relatively late appearance, had nothing of the Jiyū-tō tradition of protest. The Progressives based themselves firmly on the English model of the sovereignty of king-in-parliament on the one hand, and offered the public a programme of gradual reform on the other. Furthermore, they were openly pluralist, unanimously non-violent, and undeniably plutocratic in outlook.

These differences are partly accounted for by the fact that the great industrialists of the cities, who were the most powerful financial supporters of the Progressives, had little cause to grumble at the Government's policy of subsidies for heavy industry. The rural entrepreneurs and landowners, on the other hand, who paid the land-tax that provided the Government with the greater part of its revenues, were prompted by their pockets to make common cause with the Liberal intellectuals who declared:-

The people whose duty it is to pay taxes to the government possesses the right of sharing in their government's affairs and of approving and condemning. 10

The Kaishin-tō, then, was from the first an organization of political moderates. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that it desired a speedy transition to a parliamentary form of government just as much as the Liberals did. It may seem odd, not to say wasteful of democratic enthusiasm and political talent, that long before the actual inauguration of the representative system, there should have been two separate and often mutually hostile parties in the field, both of which were 'popular' in the sense of standing up for the common people, or sections thereof,

against the Government. Personal ambition and cleavages of material interests, together with innate differences of 'Right wing' and 'Left wing' political temperament such as are found in every country, were clearly responsible to some extent for this state of affairs.

Apart from factors of this sort, the early formation of both a Jiyū-tō and a Kaishin-tō was a reflection of the Japanese political situation at the beginning of the 1880s, and, what is more, an augury of its further development down to the present day. For, given that power is vested in a well-trained bureaucracy seemingly aloof from public opinion, the rise of an organization like the Jiyū-tō, laying great stress on intangible and inviolable rights in theory and sometimes rebellious in practice, is not so surprising. And it can only be termed felicitous that this confrontation of an entrenched officialdom with an opposition of demagoguery should have been resolved, potentially at any rate, by the emergence of another, more moderate, parliamentary group. This second group, striving to consolidate the gains made by the first one, acted as a central and beneficial catalyst - working to make the bureaucrats more receptive to democracy on the one hand, and the Liberals more mindful of the necessities of power and the niceties of parliamentary rule on the other.

Thus, there was already in 1882 a fore-glimpse of the dominant pattern of Japanese political strife since then - strife, that is, between a power-holding public service and an opposition divided into a headstrong radical element on the Left and a party of conservative reform in the Centre. In so far as parliamentary democracy has made advances in Japan, its progress has chiefly resided in the fusion of the bureaucracy with the forces of a proclaimed but restrained Liberalism. These forces were first represented by the Kaishin-tō.

The third national party, the Teisei-tō, was never remotely comparable with the other two, either from the point of view of size of membership, or in terms of crusading vigour. Its leaders were Fukuchi Genichiro, Mizuno Torajiro, Maruyama Sakura, Misaki Kamenosuke, Seki Naohiko, and Watanabe Asaka. The first three were all owners of prominent newspapers, which usually supported the Government. The Imperial Party did not make a great impression on the general public. Nevertheless it did have a number of affiliated societies in the provinces, and a sprinkling of sympathizers coming, in the main, from the lower echelons of the prefectural administrations, and the ranks of primary school-teachers,¹¹ village priests,

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Beckmann, Making, p.63.

and businessmen with an interest in official contracts.

The Imperial Party's programme¹² is worth having a look at on two counts. The first of them is the unexpectedly subdued nature of its conservatism. Here, it is perhaps as well to remember that this party, too, had used the word 'constitutional' in its title. The manifesto was unequivocal in its assertions that the Emperor alone had the power to issue the constitution and decide on its terms. Nevertheless, having made this typically statist pronouncement, it envisaged a bi-cameral assembly, of which at least one House would be elected, and even went so far as to say that this parliament should be able to exercise the legislative power - admittedly, under the necessity of having to secure the Imperial assent to any Bills it might choose to pass. Also, of the three major party programmes, that of the Teisei-tō was the only one to make specific reference to the need to safeguard freedoms of speech, association, and publication.

All this may be taken as a true reflection of mainstream conservative opinion, emanating from key figures like Itō Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, Kuroda Kiyotaka, and Yamagata Aritomo. It must be stressed that this main-stream current

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Appx. V below.

of opinion in the bureaucracy, which was to prevail for the next twenty years or so, was conservative but not ultra-conservative. It accepted the need for a constitution and a national assembly, and was prepared to carry on the business of government within the limits imposed by them. These limits the ruling bureaucrats hoped, of course, to be able to set themselves as far as possible, and they looked with extreme disfavour on the idea of party Cabinets. Yet for all that, they had in the Teisei-tō manifesto and elsewhere signified their willingness to govern under the terms of a constitution, and in accordance with the personal freedoms and parliamentary forms it would guarantee. Therefore, properly speaking, their attitude was conservative but not reactionary; and it should be clearly differentiated from that of the Ultra-Conservatives, to whom any kind of constitutionalism was really anathema, and who wished to halt the process of Westernization over very wide areas of national life. The Ultra-Conservatives were not organized in a party at that time.

The second great point of interest in the Imperial Party declaration was a certain degree of similarity between it and the Kaishin-tō platform. The Teisei-tō, too, was in favour of a restricted electorate and a hard currency. Both manifestos made explicit reference to the throne, in sharp

contrast to the silence of the Liberals on this point. The Progressives declared that they intended to uphold the dignity of the Imperial dynasty; the Imperialists adhered to the doctrine that the Imperial prerogative was the source of all sovereignty. Moreover, in advocating the sovereign claims of the Emperor and the institution of a bi-cameral legislature, the views of the Teisei-tō were somewhat closer to those of the Kaishin-tō, which favoured a two-chamber system and the sovereignty of the Emperor-in-parliament, than to the ideas of the Jiyū-tō. All of the Liberals wished to see the people alone made sovereign, and a section of them was uni-cameralist in sympathy. These traits of identity between the two platforms of the Teisei-tō and the Kaishin-tō portend the eventual coming together of the moderate bureaucrats and the Progressive interests, mentioned earlier.

Finally, even though the Teisei-tō was a failure in so far as it did not go down at all well with the public, it to some extent made up for its lack of popular support by its influence in the field of journalism. Even after the collapse of the party, its former leaders continued to make use of the columns of their newspapers for a generally able exposition of the Government's point of view.

The years 1881-1882 saw a striking efflorescence of political parties in the warm sun of constitutional promise. Apart from the three major national parties already described, there were numerous local political associations. Many of these regional clubs were affiliated to one or other of the big parties; others were not. However, before long, a certain chill bleakness had set in on the political landscape. Widespread agricultural distress, caused by a series of bad seasons from 1881-5 and a deflationary policy enforced by the Government, led to general unrest and a number of small uprisings, planned or actually carried out. The extremist section of the Jiyū-tō was deeply implicated in these emeutes. The revolts themselves were quelled without any trouble; but they stirred the authorities into enacting stringent legislation aimed at the growing influence of political parties. At the same time, there was also a parting of the ways within the Jiyū-tō itself between Itagaki and the moderate officials of the party on the one hand, and the more radical members on the other. Further quarrels broke out within the Liberty Party on the wisdom of Itagaki and Gotō Shōjiro's plan to tour Europe in the early months of 1883. They went; but it was alleged in the Kaishin-tō papers and elsewhere that the Government had secretly given them the funds for their jaunt. The Liberal

press replied with counter-charges that an improper financial connection bound the Kaishin-tō to the Mitsubishi Company.

In this atmosphere of violence, repression, and recrimination, the decision to disband the parties was both wise and timely. The precedent was set by the Teisei-tō which voluntarily went out of existence on 24 September 1883. This was supposedly done at the behest of Itō Hirobumi, who had returned from Germany in a mood of hostility towards political parties. On 29 October 1884, the Liberty Party decided that a temporary dissolution was the best means of avoiding the odium of seeming to be responsible for the scattered outbreaks of rebellion and the hardships of Government vigilance. Finally, though the Kaishin-tō never got to the point of formally disbanding itself, it contained a faction which strongly favoured this course. Moreover, it was seriously disabled as an effective political force by the resignations of its president (Ōkuma Shigenobu) and vice-president (Kōno Binken) in December 1884.

Thus, by the end of 1884, party activity, which had been so much in evidence two or three years before, was moribund. However, it took on a new lease of life before the end of the decade, when both the Jiyū-tō and the Kaishin-tō were revived and other parties formed. As these second

generation parties of the closing years of the 1880s were those that actually took part in the election of 1890, they will be discussed in a later chapter. Here it will suffice to note that the agricultural depression, and the fear of agrarian revolution in the years 1881-5, had increased the power of the conservative and richer village capitalists in the rank and file of the Jiyū-tō, though the leadership of the party kept alive memories of its samurai and radical origins for a decade or so after 1885.

In the meantime, while their Liberal and Progressive opponents were taking shelter from the storms, the bureaucrats spent the years from 1881 to 1889 preparing for constitutional government under the aegis of Itō Hirobumi. The whole relationship of the entrenched bureaucracy to the embryonic forms of parliamentary government is a most interesting one; but, unfortunately, it is not possible to say much about it here. The Meiji bureaucrats, though revolutionary in many ways, were also, as heirs to the Tokugawa Shōgunate, the guardians of a tradition of effective bureaucratic control that went back to 1600. In Japan, a fully developed bureaucracy preceded the creation of representative institutions by several hundreds of years. Therefore, not unnaturally, the bureaucrats felt that they had a more vital and venerable *raison d'être* than the

new-fangled parliamentary institutions and the politicians who sought power through them. After all, the very Diet itself was in a sense a bureaucratic innovation; so, too, were the administrative reforms leading up to the promulgation of the constitution. The bureaucrats represented the established order of things; Liberalism was a new, and possibly disruptive force. This was the exact opposite to the position in Britain, where the older institution, Parliament, has always ranked far higher in terms of power and general esteem than the Civil Service.

Again, I think that it is important to realize that the Meiji bureaucracy was essentially a managerial class. This, too, stemmed directly from changes in the social function and attitudes of the samurai under the Tokugawa regime. During the two hundred and fifty years' peace of the Edo period, the fighting retainers of the late middle ages had become, as a class, a literate and salaried administrative elite. This means that the senior Meiji statesmen were not a landed, or otherwise economically independent, established upper class; and, in my opinion, the term 'oligarchs' which is so often used to describe them is dangerously misleading. These men were either administrators in office or comparative 'nobodies'; and they had nothing else to fall back on, in the event of failure in their public careers. It follows, then, that

they were more ready than other powerful ruling groups - than the French or Russian aristocracies for example - to make concessions to their political opponents. This was one of the reasons for the empirical attitude already noted.

The bureaucrats were also pre-disposed by the Tokugawa past to think in terms of the Confucian ideal of the welfare of the nation as a whole. Of course, the notion that government should be basically for the people does not necessarily mean that it should also be by the people; and the Meiji bureaucrats often took the Cromwellian view that their duty was to do what was good for the people, and not what the people wanted. Yet, on balance, Meiji statism was Confucian benevolence brought up to date; and certain clear-sighted and influential persons, such as Ōkubo and Kido, understood, before the Jiyū Minken Undō began, that the state would function better as a constitutional monarchy under which the subjects would be allowed some say in the handling of affairs.

This appreciation of the situation was deepened by the dangers inherent in the post-revolutionary situation immediately after 1868, and also by a general sense of bewilderment at the disappearance of the familiar regulative machinery of the Baku-han system. The restoration at

first had been nothing more than a successful coup d'etat; and for the first decade of its existence, was threatened by the same tides of frustration and intrigue that had occasioned it. There was a need for the new Government to establish itself more firmly by getting the nation behind it. At the same time, the prospect of indefinite arbitrary rule by the Dajōkan, a body itself unsystematic and difficult to manage at the best of times, was displeasing to members of the inner circle of Sat-Chō bureaucrats, as well as to the little group of enlightened and highly-placed Liberal critics and the nation at large. A predominantly agrarian society, just roused from two hundred years of seclusion and used to having its life determined in all particulars by a mixture of written law, precedent, and custom, found it hard to adjust to a situation of rapid and revolutionary change imposed by decree. This was as much the case for the rulers as it was for the ruled. Thus, we find Kido at one point saying frankly that men would live to regret the restoration, if the only alternative was chaos checked by tyranny. He further stated that he had found the constitutional systems of Europe 'very admirable',¹³ and that 'the Constitution is the mind of the State; the officials are its members.'¹⁴ About the same

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McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., p.572.

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Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.101.

time (1873), we find Ōkubo writing that it was better to retain the system of absolute monarchy (i.e. Dajōkan vested with full powers of sovereignty) for the time being; but that 'in the future, we will not be able to keep the same kind of government.' 15

Parallel with this desire for consolidation and legitimization, and often opposed to it, was the regime's aim of strengthening the Empire by modernizing it through a policy of bureaucratic centralization. In the long run, these two purposes were not so incompatible; in the short run, it was vastly more difficult to combine them. Yet the attempt had to be made. Before representative institutions could be expected to work well at the national level, it was necessary first to do some nation building. On the other hand, it was impossible for the Government to start on its work of nation building, if all sections of public opinion were implacably hostile to it. It lacked the military and financial means to go ahead on its own for very long. From this underlying dilemma flow many of the shifts and changes, as well as much of the fascination, of early Meiji constitutional history. From it, too, came the bureaucrats' characteristic liking for 'gradualism'.

So there was much in the traditions of the Empire as crystallized under the Shōgunate, in its post-restoration

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For a trans. of Ōkubo's memorandum, see Appx. II to Beckmann, *Making*. For the original, see Miyakoshi, *N.K.K.S.*, pp. 106-122.

difficulties, and in its hopes for the future, as well as in the special class background of the shizoku-bureaucrats, to persuade them to follow that path which, as Itō Hirobumi once said, 'slowly but steadily constitutionalized the monarchy.'¹⁶ The process was perhaps accelerated, rather than initiated, by clan rivalries and personal enmities within the Government, and by the rise of the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement. We may see these bureaucratic turnings towards constitutionalism quite clearly in two important aspects of early Meiji political history. One was the attitude of the Dajōkan to the throne. The other is the history of experiments and reforms in the constitutional field before 1889; these latter were introduced by the bureaucrats partly of their own initiative, partly in response to the challenge of the Liberals' agitation and Ōkuma's defection.

With only rare exceptions, autocracy had not been practical politics in Japan for the previous thousand years; and the Meiji statesmen, though they elevated the throne, did so as bureaucrats and not as courtiers. They were never lacking in the outward deference they felt was due to the Sovereign and frequently hid themselves behind his formal omnipotence in times of trouble; but, at the same time, they knew, and acted as if, their real work lay with

¹⁶ Ōkuma (ed.), Fifty Years of New Japan, vol.1, p.126.

the State and people as a whole. Thus, the constitution, when it was promulgated in 1889, was ostensibly a gift from the Emperor to his subjects. In reality, it was some kind of statutory compact between the governing bureaucrats and the newly remodelled nation they had called into being. They had moved from the steps of the throne to the rostrum of a parliament. In doing so, they had led their compatriots from the gloomy caverns of feudal disintegration and aristocratic reaction to the light of bureaucratic modernism.

As for the record of constitutional experiment and reform before 1889, two of its most important items were touched on when outlining the growth of political parties; the Osaka Conference of February 1875 led to the rescript of 14 April 1875; and the events culminating in Ōkuma's fall from power were inseparably linked with the rescript of 12 October 1881. In the first of these rescripts, the Government made known for the first time, in clear and definite terms, its intention to introduce a constitutional system 'by degrees'. In the second, it committed itself to summoning a parliament in 1890. These were milestones along the route that had begun with the Charter Oath, sworn by the Emperor in April 1868, and the promulgation of Japan's first written constitution, the Seitaishō, in June 1868.¹⁷

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McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., pp. 7-15. See also Wilson, Seitaishō, Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 11, 1952.

The Charter Oath¹⁸ was an epoch-making document, in which the new Government pledged itself to have matters decided by public opinion as expressed in assemblies 'widely convoked'; to abolish the Tokugawa class distinctions of samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant; and to seek knowledge throughout the world. All these promises were eventually made good; some sooner than others. The Seitaishō was a rather crude and contradictory scheme of government, which gave consultative powers to a feudal, bi-cameral assembly. The members of the Lower House of this assembly (Kōgisho or Shūgi-in) were nominated by their respective clans. These feudal parliaments proved worse than useless, and were soon abolished. The Government found it impossible to get help with its plans for modernization - these involved, among other things, the destruction of the fiefs and the special status of the samurai class - from the representatives of a milieu of insular and ignorant reaction. The Charter Oath did not go into abeyance, however. It retained its significance as a kind of Declaration of Progressive Intent or Charter of Promised Liberties, to which both sides made trenchant and frequent appeals in the ensuing years of constitutional conflict.

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For the full text of the Oath, see Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.33. For a rather different assessment of its historical significance, see Uyehara, Political Development, pp. 63-70.

Mention has been made also of the recommendations on constitutional policy submitted by Ōkubo and Kido in 1873. Between them, these two statesmen initiated the basic Government policy of a gradual introduction of constitutional forms, starting with local government institutions. In 1874, a year before the Osaka Conference, the Emperor announced that he would summon a Conference of Prefectural Governors (Chihōkan-kaigi), in partial fulfilment of the promise made in the Charter Oath.¹⁹ This was strictly in keeping with one of Kido's suggestions, and the latter regarded the Conference as a sort of prototype parliament. The Chihōkan-kaigi met for the first time in 1875, and again in 1878. Its debates were animated and its trappings dignified; but its occasional nature and the quickening pace of political developments robbed it of any chance it might have had of growing into a proper national assembly.

A more important innovation was the setting up of elected consultative assemblies in the prefectures (ken) and metropolitan districts (fu) in 1878. This was followed by a similar measure for the towns and villages in 1880. These assemblies though restricted in their powers, performed several useful functions - apart, that is, from improving the day to day administration of the

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McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., p.506.

provinces, and their role as a vital but preliminary stage in the administration's long term plans. For one thing, they were an embodiment of those feelings of localism which, as we shall find, were such a widespread and powerful influence at the time of the election of 1890. For another thing, the local assemblies were invaluable as training - grounds for future candidates for the Diet. As first set up, the assemblies were found to be not entirely satisfactory in practice, and the whole system of local government was overhauled by Yamagata in 1888.

In 1879, the Emperor asked each of the principal ministers for his written opinion on the constitutional problem. The answers were unanimous in their desire to keep moving forward, slowly but surely, in the direction of an elected parliament. In other words, the Government was prepared to come to terms with the Jiyū Minken Undō; but in its own way, and in its own time. Yamagata wrote:- 'We need not be wise men to know that it will have to be done sooner or later.'²⁰ In the same vein, Itō declared:-

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Beckmann, Making, p.129. For the original, see Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.274.

At present, it is the responsibility of the government to follow a conciliatory policy.... so that we may control but not intensify the situation, and relax our hold over government but not yield it. 21

It was on this still somewhat fluid stage of planning that the Ōkuma 'bombshell' of March 1881 acted as a crystallizing agent, making concrete a decision that had already been taken in principle.

Before October 1881, the bureaucrats had managed to retain the initiative only by making concessions; after October 1881, they enjoyed the initiative because they had made concessions. That the influence of these men on the making of the constitution was the predominant one is shown by the finished product. This in many ways was more bureaucratic than democratic. As has been noted, it embodied ideas about the nature of sovereignty and ministerial responsibility that were of direct profit to the official class. Less obvious, but just as important and well documented, is the fact that this same group of main-stream bureaucrats was not really forced at the last minute into the decision to grant a constitution and establish a parliament, but arrived at it as a result of their own reading of the situation in which they had found themselves from 1868 onwards.

Nevertheless the significance of the contribution of the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement to constitutional progress should not be under-estimated. It had served to create a public opinion about politics where none had previously existed. By advocating natural rights with their concomitant doctrine of popular sovereignty, by making open opposition to the legally constituted authorities a matter of legitimate convention, and by giving birth to modern political parties, it laid several of the foundations on which a fully representative system could be built in Japan. All this was in addition to its more immediate achievements of advancing the date, and doubtless broadening the scope, of the constitution. In this fashion, the Meiji constitution, in its timing as in its provisions, was more than anything else the product of the interaction of a Government of progressive but prudent intent with an opposition of radical but in some ways opportunist and often irresponsible persuasion.

By no means all the driving force for this movement towards a constitution came from the domestic conditions of uncertainty following on the disappearance of the old order. Western pressures and example will account for much. The problem of 'unequal treaties' was in the forefront of national politics at the time of the first general election.

In 1890, Japan was still in a position of having to grant preferential tariffs and rights of extra-territorial jurisdiction to no fewer than seventeen states. Needless to say, these privileges were not reciprocal. Though other factors entered into it, the restoration movement was in origin and impulse pre-eminently a nationalist outburst against the humiliation of these agreements; and the modernization programme of the new regime was from first to last directed towards making good those weaknesses in administration, armaments, and technical skills that had incurred it. It is against this background of a fervent desire to catch up - or, in Fukuzawa Yukichi's words 'to escape from Asia, and enter Europe',²² - that the emergence of parliamentary institutions must be seen.

For the fact that the great Powers of Europe and America were Liberal was, in the long run, probably even more important than the fact that they were Imperialist. The Meiji Government was certainly anxious to promulgate a constitution, in order to satisfy the treaty Powers that Japan, should extra-territorial rights be abolished, would be able to provide foreign residents with the same safeguards with regard to law and justice as they enjoyed at home. Moreover, the idea put forward by John Stuart Mill

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Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū, vol. 10, pp. 238-240.

and others that a Liberal State was, ipso facto, a strong State quickly took root in Japan, and greatly influenced the thinking of both the bureaucrats and the Jiyū Minken Undō leaders. Thus we find Ōkubo, Kido, Itō, and Yamagata all claiming at different times that it was necessary to have the people satisfied and able to co-operate actively with the administration, in order to reach the goal of modernization and full national sovereignty. On the other hand, the Liberals were always ready to use Japan's weakness vis-a-vis other countries as a stick with which to beat the Government, and agitated for representative institutions on grounds that included appeals to the common good as well as to the dogma of inalienable personal rights. Itagaki, himself, was apt to argue the case for Liberty in these potentially nationalist and neo-Confucian terms.

Yet, in addition to considerations of this kind, the Government and the educated part of the nation seem by and large to have been fired with enthusiasm by what they saw or learnt of the Occident. There was a feeling that Japan was about to be led to a loftier state of civilization. Among the younger leaders of Meiji society, at any rate, the fact that parliaments and constitutions were of importance to the more advanced exponents of that

civilization was sufficient to ensure that they would one day be found in a more prosperous and resplendent Japan. 'Progress is the most beautiful thing in the world' - so ran one of the assertions in an early Jiyū Minken Undō manifesto.²³ Perhaps the idea of progress is the Occident's greatest gift to other cultures. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Liberty was the genius of progress, the industrial revolution its physical embodiment.

Inevitably, the industrial revolution was imported in its capitalist guise, along with a good deal of laissez-faire economic theory. The full effects of these developments was not felt, however, until after 1890. Before then, the Government actively encouraged new industries with its policies of temporary state-ownership, subsidies, and the like. The part played in all this by the large-scale banking and mercantile communities, centred on Osaka and Edo, which had grown up during the Tokugawa period, is obscure. A few of these old concerns, like Mitsui and Konoike, survived the shock of the restoration; but many did not. It seems that the merchant class of the great cities, though it had become financially powerful

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Aikoku-kōtō memorial of 17 Jan. 1874. See McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., pp. 426-433.

under the Shōgunate, had been content to remain a politically subordinate and fully integrated part of the feudal state. At no time did it contemplate revolution. The Tokyo and Osaka traders tended to retain this rather submissive attitude, and with it a noticeable lack of interest in politics, for a generation or so after the restoration.

The businessmen and capitalist landlords of the countryside were of a more independent turn of mind. Their enterprises were far smaller than those of their urban counterparts; but they and their families were often all-powerful in the economic structure of the villages. This important element had a finger in the restoration, supported the popular rights movement, and in some respects dominated the first general election. In terms of the feudal background, the influence of this group was partly the result of capital accumulating in the hands of private individuals, partly the result of Tokugawa regionalism and local village or group autonomy.

Behind many of the contradictory facets of Meiji political history lurked the Tokugawa past. As we have seen, the authority of the bureaucracy and the position of the shizoku as an almost professional elite were attributable to this. So, too, were the guiding principles of harmony between governors and governed, and the rule of law.

The Meiji Japanese were also fortunate in inheriting a convention of conciliar rule, which stood them in good stead amid the schisms and dissensions of the first half of their era. Likewise, Tokugawa rationalism, and the habit of approaching problems of economics and politics in a markedly utilitarian manner, made it comparatively easy for Japan to understand Western science and the material culture built on it.

The importance of regionalism and local autonomy cannot be over-stressed. Itō's description of nineteenth century Japan as 'a vast village community',²⁴ does not seem to have been at all inaccurate. This was one of the strongest forces, even though in the old days it had been maintained by an extensive system of hereditary offices more often than by popular election, to which the centralizing programme of the new Government had to be adapted. To that extent, it was a power behind the Liberal movement - both in its formative years and after 1881. On the other hand, the nascent political parties were divided over and over again along regional or parochial lines. The same was true of the Confucian family system. Its existence more or less precluded the emergence of perpetual

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Okuma (ed.), Fifty Years, vol. 1, p.128.

one-man or arbitrary rule. At the same time, it unfailingly laid stress on duties rather than on rights; and its compulsive parent-child ethic was the source of factionalism in the parties and elsewhere. In short, despite the superficial comprehensiveness of the Emperor-orientated constitution of 1889, the Tokugawa legacy was such as to make the Meiji era nothing more than the starting point of that long process of friction and assimilation, whereby the institutions of Western individualism and the traditions of a family and bureaucratic state are being slowly accommodated - the one to the other.

Special Note On The Municipal Code and
The Town and Village Code of 1888.

Since local government institutions are a prominent feature of the election, a summary of the important enactments of 1888 may be found helpful.

Yamagata's thoroughgoing reform of local administration was one of the most noteworthy achievements of the era. Local government assemblies had been established by the earlier regulations at all levels from the fu or ken down to the village. These assemblies, as a result of the promulgation of the new codes of 1888, were given more independence in the case of cities, towns, and villages.

Mayors of cities (Shichō) were appointed by the Emperor on the advice of the Home Minister, after the city assembly concerned had nominated three candidates for the post. Headmen of towns and villages (Chōchō and Sonchō) were chosen by the town and village assemblies, subject to the final approval of the prefect of the area (Kenrei). These mayors and headmen were full time officials, who shouldered most of the burden of local government in their capacity as executive heads. The city mayors worked in

close liaison with an executive council consisting of themselves, their assistants (chosen by the city assembly), and six or more honorary members (also chosen by the city assembly). These executive councils were the local government authorities of the areas in which they operated. The towns and villages did not have executive councils; in them, the local government authority was the headman and his assistants.

The popularly elected assemblies in all these subdivisions were not exactly impotent, therefore, as they were the prime movers in matters of local appointments. They were also empowered to issue by-laws and regulations, to control local expenditures, and to manage communal property or establishments. Elections to these assemblies were held on the basis of a direct and secret ballot. However the system used favoured the richer inhabitants of a district; since the electors were divided into three (cities) or two (towns and villages) numerically unequal classes in accordance with the amount they paid in direct local taxes. Each of these classes elected an equal number of assemblymen, with the result that the wealthier electors were disproportionately represented. This electoral device was in keeping with the Government's general intention to govern with the support, and through

the agency, of the more privileged sections of the community. On the other hand, the municipal suffrage was quite wide. The tax qualification enabling a resident of a city, town, or village to vote in assembly elections was only ¥2 per annum, as opposed to ¥10 per annum for fu or ken assembly elections, and ¥15 per annum for parliamentary elections.

The institutions of the three larger local subdivisions - the metropolitan districts (fu), the prefectures (ken), and the sub-prefectures (gun) - were much the same as those operating in the cities. Each of them had its own executive council, made up of official and honorary members, with the latter being chosen by the respective assemblies. For the elections to the fu, ken, and gun assemblies, however, the electors were not segregated into classes of richest tax-payers, not so rich tax-payers, and so on. The chief officials in these subdivisions were appointed in a manner that did not admit of any element of popular representation. The Government entirely at its own pleasure nominated the governors of the three fu (Chiji) and the forty-two prefects (Kenrei). The Kenrei in turn appointed the sub-prefects (Gunchō).

THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1 JULY 1890.

History not Theory.

Evolution not Revolution.

Direction not Destruction.

Unity not Disruption.

Joseph Conrad, *Under Western Eyes*.

Gentlemen, this year is truly an auspicious year. It is the year in which we emerge from despotism and slavery, and are born a people of constitutional liberty.

Itagaki Taisuke, election address
given in Mito on 18 June 1890.

CHAPTER ONE

Organization and Administration.

The general election of 1890 was carried out under the provisions of the Law of Election of the Members of the House of Representatives.¹ As mentioned earlier, this law was formally enacted by the Emperor at the same time as he sanctioned the constitution, that is on 11 February 1889. Kaneko Kentaro had been the official mainly responsible for the drafting of the law. In the preamble to the law, it was stated that it had been adopted with the advice of the Privy Council (Sumitsu-in), and on 2 March it was submitted to the Senate (Genrō-in) for inspection. The Senate merely put on record its acceptance of the law, without raising any objection and without entering into any discussion.² Presumably the Privy Council was less perfunctory in its handling of the

¹ McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., pp. 170-211. See also Appx. VI below.

² See Record Of Senate Deliberations (Genrō-in Kaigi Hikki) for 2 March 1889.

Law of Election; but it is still not possible to examine the records of the meetings of the Privy Council in order to ascertain precisely its attitude to the draft. In a brief account of the drafting and ratification of the law,³ Kaneko did not mention that it met with any special difficulties in the Privy Council. The law itself had many points in common with the rules for the election of members of the local assemblies, contained in the Municipal Code and the Town and Village Code of 1888; and, though not without defects, it was in general a sophisticated and well-constructed piece of legislation.

For the purposes of the election, the entire country - with the exception of Hokkaidō, Okinawa, and the Ogasawara islands⁴ - was divided into two hundred and fifty-seven electoral districts. Forty-three of these returned two Members; the remainder one Member each. Thus, there was a total of three hundred seats to be contested; only twenty-five or so of them were completely urban. The various constituencies were grouped together in their respective fu or ken, and given an identification number on the basis of these groupings. For example, the six constituencies in

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Hayashida Kametaro, Meiji Taishō Seikai Sokumen Shi, vol. 1, pp. 172-177.

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These areas were excluded from the election because the system of local and municipal self-government had not yet been extended to them.

Kyoto fu were labelled Kyoto fu First Constituency, Second Constituency, and so on.

The three hundred seats were distributed on a basis of one Member for every 120,000 persons.⁵ This ratio was nothing more than a guiding principle, however, and was not applied with mathematical accuracy. In fact, when they came to draw the electoral boundaries, the authorities found it convenient to make them conform as closely as possible to the already existing lines of demarcation that separated one sub-prefecture (gun) from another in the country areas, or one ward (ku) from another in the great cities. Accordingly, though the theoretical norm of 120,000 inhabitants per Member, was never altogether abandoned, the actual allocation of seats was done in a very flexible, if not haphazard, manner in the interests of adapting it to the permanent administrative framework.

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For information on the way in which the seats were distributed see the following:-

1. Kaneko Kentaro's memoirs in Hayashida Kametaro, Meiji-Taishō Seikai Sokumen Shi, vol. 1., pp. 172-4.
2. Suematsu Kenchō's account of the election in Meiji Bunka Zenshū, vol. 3, pp. 200-221, especially pp. 200-201.
3. Hayashida Kametaro, Shūgi-in Giin Senkyō Hō Kaisei Iken, The Nation's Friend (Kokumin-no Tomo), vol. 13, no.198, Aug. 1893, pp. 170-171.

A single gun or ku, the population of which was more than 100,000 and less than 200,000, was designated as a constituency and awarded one Member. What was far more common was the practice of joining together a number of adjacent gun or ku, with a combined population of between 100,000 and 200,000, to form single-member constituencies. This practice was necessitated by the fact that the majority of gun had fewer than 100,000 inhabitants. Sometimes the upper limit appears to have been fixed at 180,000, and gun with more than this number of people were allowed to return two Members. In other places where gun had been amalgamated to form a constituency, it was discovered that terrain, the inclusion of a fairly large provincial city, or some other factor favoured the creation of a two-member constituency anyway. Such two-member constituencies contained between 200,000 (or 180,000) and 300,000 people. Further departures from the standard of 120,000 inhabitants per Member arose from the fact that a few relatively large islands such as Tsushima (pop. 32,000) or Oki (pop. 34,000) were given a Representative of their own, irrespective of the exact number of people dwelling on them.

Except in the case of those prefectures which embraced these islands, the number of Representatives per head of

population was not allowed to exceed the standard ratio of 1:120,000 when calculated for a fu or ken as a whole though there was nothing to prevent it falling below the theoretical norm. In fact, as a result of the rather rough and ready method of division employed, the majority of constituencies did have more than 120,000 inhabitants per Member. There were variations in the figures of population per Member not only as between one prefecture and another, but also between the different constituencies in a single prefecture. The following table of the average number of inhabitants per Member in each of the forty-five fu and ken shows something of this.⁶ According to it, Yamanashi had the highest average (148,000) and Nagasaki the lowest (107,000). Tokyo had an average of almost 130,000 citizens per Member.

— Fu or Ken	No. of Inh.	No. of Mems.	Av. pop. per Mem.
Tokyo	1,558,454	12	129,871
Kyoto	875,084	7	125,012
Osaka	1,281,150	10	128,115
Kanagawa	947,766	7	135,395
Hyōgo	1,521,817	12	126,818
Nagasaki	752,402	7	107,486
Niigata	1,665,378	13	128,106

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, Meiji Bunka Zenshū (hereafter cited as MBZ), vol. 3, pp.205-6.

Fu or Ken	No. of Inh.	No. of Mem.	Av. pop. per Mem.
Saitama	1,054,483	8	131,810
Gumma	718,215	5	143,643
Chiba	1,172,138	9	130,238
Ibaraki	998,976	8	124,872
Tochigi	684,341	5	136,868
Nara	496,431	4	124,108
Mie	909,702	7	129,957
Aichi	1,444,011	11	131,274
Shizuoka	1,058,226	8	132,278
Yamanashi	445,182	3	148,394
Shiga	667,563	5	132,513
Gifu	909,226	7	129,889
Nagano	1,111,946	8	138,993
Miyagi	736,628	5	147,326
Fukushima	913,459	7	130,494
Iwate	656,047	5	131,209
Aomori	530,292	4	132,573
Yamagata	741,896	6	123,649
Akita	682,928	5	136,586
Fukui	596,704	4	149,176
Ishikawa	745,110	6	124,185
Toyama	738,445	5	147,689
Tottori	394,333	3	131,444
Shimane	692,101	6	115,350
Okayama	1,062,155	8	132,769
Hiroshima	1,289,109	10	128,911
Yamaguchi	914,083	7	130,583
Wakayama	623,842	5	124,768
Tokushima	676,154	5	135,231
Kagawa	660,484	5	132,097
Ehime	906,414	7	129,488
Kōchi	569,874	4	142,469
Fukuoka	1,209,295	9	134,366
Ōita	781,554	6	130,259
Saga	553,423	4	138,356
Kumamoto	1,042,281	8	130,285
Miyazaki	407,827	3	135,942
Kagoshima	985,271	7	140,753
Totals	39,382,200	300	131,274

The national average of 131,274 inhabitants per Member was much higher than the equivalent figure for other parliamentary countries in Europe where Germany had the highest number of inhabitants per seat in the Diet. The German figure was 69,181. In the United States on the other hand, there were 173,900 citizens for every Representative. In his memoirs, Kaneko draws attention to the fact that it took far more people to have one Representative in Japan than in most other countries, and half explains the policy on the grounds that if Japan had copied the West more closely in this matter, her House of Representatives would have contained approximately 520 Members; and 'this would have been inconvenient for our country when it was having its first experience [of a parliamentary system]⁷.' What he probably really meant is that the Government was frightened of having too large a rebellious House to deal with.

This same mood of caution was even more strongly expressed in the restrictions placed on the franchise. In 1890, this was very narrow indeed. Women could not vote, and for men the qualifications were of three kinds:- (i) age, (ii) residence, and (iii) property. To be entitled to the vote, a man had to be more than twenty-five years of age. To be included in the electoral roll of a fu or ken, he had to have his permanent residence there, and to have been

actually residing in the area concerned for a period of not less than one year previous to the drawing up of the roll and to be still living in the same province. In addition to this, the vote was given only to those who had paid at least ¥15 per annum in direct national taxes, in the fu or ken in question, for a period of not less than one year previous to the drawing up of the roll and were still paying the same amount in taxation. In the case of income tax, the minimum time limit was three years.

The effect of these severe franchise qualifications was to reduce the number of voters to a mere 450,365 out of a population of close on forty millions - in other words, to 1.14% of the total number of inhabitants of those regions of the Empire covered by the election. Only Shiga ken had over 2% of its inhabitants on the electoral rolls; and in Tokyo fu, the proportion of voters to residents was as low as 0.38%. Kagoshima ken did hardly better with 0.41%. The number of electors in relation to the number of adult (i.e. over twenty-five) men was one in twenty-five; and for every hundred households, there were approximately six electors. Taking the population as a whole, there were eighty-seven persons for every one elector.⁸

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, pp. 203-4 and 208-9.

The most disabling of these restrictions was undoubtedly the stipulation that in order to be allowed to vote a person had to be paying at least ¥15 a year in direct national taxes. Though every other parliamentary country, with the exceptions of France, Germany, and Switzerland, still had a tax qualification to limit its franchise in 1890, and there was no demand in Japan at that time for unrestricted manhood suffrage, the choice of ¥15 as the minimum requirement made the Japanese electorate inordinately small in proportion to the total population. When discussing the reasons for the choice, Kaneko confined himself to the remark that 'Prince Itō was always a believer in gradual advance.'⁹ Taxation in 1890 was levied either on land or on personal incomes, and the land-tax accounted for by far the greater part of the national revenues. So much so, that at the time in question there were approximately 500,000 people paying ¥15 or more a year in land-tax, but only 14,000 paying the same amount in income tax.¹⁰ This last point is an important one for understanding the overweening influence of the rural areas in the elections. It is less easy to understand why

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Hayashida Kametaro, Meiji-Taisho Seikai Sokumen Shi, p.175.

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Hayashida Kametaro, Shūgi-in Giin Senkyō Hō Kaisei Iken, The Nation's Friend (Kokumin-no Tomo), vol. 13, no.201, Sept. 1893, p.366. The statistics given by Hayashida relate to 1892, but there could not have been much change between 1890 and then.

the income-tax payers should have been further discriminated against by imposing on them a minimum period of payment of three years as opposed to one year. Possibly it was because the authorities felt that since the land-tax was the financial life of the state, the farmers had to be given the impression that they were being treated slightly more favourably than the city dwellers.

The small size of the electorate meant that the total number of voters in any particular constituency was often counted in hundreds rather than thousands. Moreover because the constituencies did not all have the same number of inhabitants, the number of voters differed very sharply from one constituency to another. For the Empire as a whole, the average number of voters per constituency worked out at 1,714; but electoral districts with fewer than five hundred voters were by no means uncommon, especially in the cities. In Tokyo for instance, the constituency with the largest number of electors was Nihonbashi ward, but even it could only muster 604. The Ninth Constituency (Koishikawa, Ushigome, and Yotsuya wards) had only 182 names on its electoral roll, and four other metropolitan constituencies had fewer than three hundred. The reasons why Tokyo had such a small share of the electorate were that the majority of its citizens did not own immovable property within the city

and not many of them paid ¥15 or more a year in income-tax. In the provinces, as the franchise was tied to the amount paid in land-tax and so ultimately to the value of land, a given acreage in well-favoured regions would carry with it the right to vote whilst the same - or an even greater - area of land in less fertile parts would not. Three single-member constituencies - Fukushima ken Fifth Constituency, Shiga ken Second Constituency, and Mie ken Third Constituency - had more than 4,000 voters. As opposed to this, three other constituencies - Shimane ken Sixth Constituency (Oki islands), Nagasaki ken Sixth Constituency (Tsushima island), and Kagoshima ken Seventh Constituency (Ōshima islands) - had fewer than 60 voters each.¹¹

The qualifications for candidates were similar to, but not identical with, those required of voters. To be eligible for election, a candidate had to be:- (i) a male Japanese subject, (ii) over thirty years old, and (iii) paying, and to have been paying for at least one year previous to the compilation of the electoral rolls, ¥15 or more per annum in direct national taxes in the fu or ken where he wished to be elected. (Once again, in the case of income-tax, the minimum time limit was extended to three years.) There was no residence qualification for candidates. In other ways,

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Hayashida Kametaro, Shūgi-in Giin Senkyō Hō Kaisei Iken, The Nation's Friend (Kokumin-no Tomo), vol. 13, no.198, Aug. 1893, p.171.

too, the regulations for candidates were slightly less rigid than might have been expected or, indeed, deemed advisable. Candidates for election did not have to pay any deposit to be forfeited if they failed to secure more than a stipulated share of the votes; and the law did not place them under any restraints with regard to election expenses as opposed to bribes. Moreover, candidates were free to stand for election regardless of whether or not they had been formally authorized by a political party or had been favoured with any kind of organized local support. Thus, the Law of Election was somewhat deficient in safeguards against irresponsible or reckless candidatures.

Certain categories of persons were absolutely disqualified on professional grounds from standing for election. These were members of the Imperial Household Department, judicial officers, auditors employed by the Government, revenue officials, members of the police force, and also Shintō priests, Buddhist clergy, and teachers of religion. Local government officials were not allowed to contest seats in areas under their own jurisdiction.

The ban on the Buddhist clergy was not without repercussions. There were cases of priests renouncing their vocation to take part in the election.¹² According to a

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.216. Also report on the Osaka fu campaigns in TNNS (Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun) for 20-6-90.

newspaper article written in July 1890, petitions for the restoration of the clergy's right to be elected had been submitted to the Senate since the promulgation of the Law of Election with such regularity that, for the convenience of the petitioners, a special inter-denominational correspondence room had been set up at the Kōmyō temple in the Shiba ward of Tokyo.¹³ One of these petitions, recorded a few days later as having been handed in to the Privy Council, originated in two villages in Yamaguchi prefecture and carried 168 signatures.¹⁴

Apart from petitions, the Buddhist priests were capable of adopting more questionable methods to defend their interests. In the spring of 1889, an organization known as the Sonnō Hōbutsu Daidōdan (Confederation for Honouring the Emperor and Revering the Buddha) was formed, including in its ranks both priests and lay-believers, and spread to every province. In some places, the more fervent members of this organization used violence in an attempt to prevent Christians or non-believers from being elected to the town and village assemblies. Though this violence did not always achieve its objective, it was sufficiently successful to suggest suddenly to a number of candidates in the general

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TNNS 1-7-90. (TNNS abbreviation for Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun.)

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TNNS 3-7-90.

election of the following year the wisdom of enrolling themselves in the Sonnō Hōbutsu Daidōdan, or buying Buddhist family altars if they did not already have them, or helping the Buddhist priests to write their sermons. To disturbances of this sort, in favour of the restoration of the right to be elected, some, but not all, of the leaders of the sects were prepared to turn a blind eye. Those who were not willing to condone violence suggested at a conference of representatives from a number of sects, held in Tokyo during April 1890, that the clergy should make every effort to bring about by peaceful means the election of those candidates who were known to be believers in Buddhism.¹⁵

In addition to forbidding candidatures by persons belonging to the categories listed above, the Law of Election also withheld from certain other classes of people both the right to be elected and the right to vote. These were lunatics, idiots, undischarged bankrupts, members of the armed services not on the retired or temporarily retired lists, heads of noble families, and persons who had been deprived of their public rights or whose public rights had been suspended. Those who had undergone imprisonment for one year or more were also in danger of losing their electoral rights, as the law stated that three years had to pass after

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TNNS 1-7-90. See also Kokumin Shimbun 3-6-90.

the completion or pardon of their sentences before they were entitled to vote or be elected. The same rule was enforced with respect to persons who had been punished for gambling. Finally, anybody against whom a criminal charge had been laid, and who was in detention or on bail, could not elect or be elected until the completion of the proceedings.

It was by virtue of this last ruling that Kobayashi Yushichiro, editor of the Tōhoku Nippō (a Niigata prefecture newspaper), nearly forfeited his right to stand as a candidate. He had been sentenced for libel, and was in the process of appealing to the Supreme Court at the time of the election campaign. His lawyer made a special request for an alteration to the time-table of the Supreme Court so that his client's case could be concluded before the election. The Court acknowledged the justice of this request and held an extraordinary sitting on 17 June. At this sitting, the public prosecutor agreed with the defending counsel that the plaintiff had been the victim of a miscarriage of justice and asked for the appeal to be upheld.¹⁶

Other people were not so lucky. In May, the Toyama prefectural office asked the Home Office for a ruling on the legal technicality of whether an offender sentenced to

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TNNS 18-6-90.

concurrent terms of imprisonment for several offences, but later pardoned for the major crime and so released from gaol, was eligible for electoral rights. The Toyama authorities had based their query on the case of certain Liberal militants who had been sentenced in September 1887 to five years in gaol for subversion overseas, and to one month's imprisonment on the minor charge of having harboured criminals - sentences to run concurrently. These prisoners had been released in February 1889 under the terms of a special amnesty for political offences. In his instructions, the Home Minister (Saigō Tsugumichi) said that the amnesty had been for political offences only; and that in the case in question, those sentenced to confinement for one month on 24 September 1887 for the common criminal offence of having harboured criminals would be given back their electoral rights on 23 October 1890, i.e. three years after the expiry of their sentences.¹⁷

It is clear from this that although the general amnesty for political offences given in February 1889 to mark the inauguration of the constitution was more generous than an ordinary pardon in that it was not accompanied by forfeiture of electoral rights for a further three years, it in no way affected the operation of the Law of Election so far as other,

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TNNS 19-6-90.

non-political crimes were concerned. The chief sufferer from this was Ōi Kentaro, one of the most prominent of the radical leaders of the Jiyū-tō. Condemned in 1886 to nine years imprisonment for attempting to stir up a Left-wing revolt in Korea in the previous year, with the idea of effecting the 'liberation' of Japan from there, he had been prematurely released from gaol in February 1889. On 23 June 1890, the Osaka Court of Petty Offences ruled that Ōi was not eligible to stand as a candidate in the election, because other sentences given at the same time for minor felonies had not been absolved by the amnesty. The Court also held that he was not entitled to vote as he had recently changed his permanent domicile.¹⁸

The governor of a fu or ken was responsible for the overall supervision of elections held within the territory under his jurisdiction. These governors had been appointed by, and were answerable to, the Minister for the Home Office. Yamagata had been in charge of the Home Office from December 1885 to May 1890 when he was replaced by Saigō Tsugumichi; and he had had the Prime Minister's portfolio, too, since December 1889. Therefore he was all but doubly responsible for the enforcement of the Law of Election; however, apart from cases like the Toyama query mentioned above, the

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TNNS 25-6-90.

officials at the Home Office did not often intervene in the management of the election, but rather preferred to leave it almost entirely in the hands of the prefectural authorities. The prefectural governors, too, tended to keep themselves in the background. They had to issue a certain number of proclamations, ensure that there was an adequate supply of ballot forms, check the electoral rolls and results of the voting, and generally keep a watchful eye on the way things were developing; but, in essence, a governor's function was to make sure that his subordinate officials were carrying out the real work of the administration of the election in a manner that was both proper and efficient. The burden of this real work undoubtedly devolved on those minor local government officials who were appointed to act as Returning Officers.

If a constituency was limited to a single gun or a single city (shi), its sub-prefect (gunchō) or mayor (shichō) was Returning Officer. When several gun or shi were combined into one constituency, the governor had to appoint one of the gunchō or shichō to be Returning Officer. Likewise, when a city had more than one constituency within its municipal boundaries, the governor nominated one of the urban district heads (kuchō) in each of the constituencies to be its Returning Officer. At a lower level of administration, the

polling stations were put under the authority of the heads of the villages (son), towns (chō), or urban districts (ku) in which they were situated. Thus, in every case, the most onerous tasks of electoral administration - that is, the responsibility of being a Returning Officer, and the supervision of the polling stations - fell to the senior local government official in the area concerned. Gunchō and kuchō had been appointed to their posts; shichō, chōchō, and sonchō had been elected to theirs.

The Government, when drawing up the Law of Election, had taken for granted the honesty of these petty functionaries. Events were to prove this assumption largely correct so far as the Returning Officers were concerned; on the other hand, many of the local dignitaries who were not Returning Officers used their position to influence the outcome of the election. Accordingly, in retrospect, it was felt by commentators on the election that it would have been better if the Government had issued supervisory regulations to prevent improper conduct by the minor officials in charge of, or attached to, the administrative offices in every urban ward, town, or village.¹⁹ An extreme example of this improper conduct occurred in the Fifth Constituency, Saitama prefecture, where the heads of the towns and villages campaigned actively

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.217.

on behalf of certain candidates and even held a meeting to assess their suitability. Reporting this, the pro-Government Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun castigated it as an unhealthy survival of the bad old custom of 'revere officials, despise the people'.²⁰ These local officials sometimes justified their partiality on the grounds that they were acting in their private, and not public, capacities; but the border between legitimate exercise of their rights as citizens and outright abuse of their office by way of fraud or coercion must have been frequently crossed.

The costs of the election in each constituency were to be met out of local taxes. There is no means of ascertaining what these costs actually were, but one may hazard a guess that they were not very high. The Returning officers, the supervisors of the polling stations, and the clerks who worked at the polling stations or the offices of the Returning Officers were all full-time local government officials, and would have received no special emoluments for their electoral work. Similarly, the polling stations themselves were situated in public buildings, and so the authorities would not have had to pay rent for them. Consequently, apart from such things as:- (i) the cost of printing special entry permits and ballot forms, of preparing the electoral rolls,

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TNNS 22-6-90.

and of supplying the requisite memorandum books and writing materials, (ii) the price of the ballot boxes, and the paying for the transport of them from outlying polling stations to the office of the Returning Officer after the voting was finished, and (iii) perhaps, the costs of any legal action arising from the election, it is difficult to see for what money would have been needed. A law suit, of course, if it was chargeable to a constituency, could have involved it in fairly heavy expense; but the cost of the other marginal items cannot have amounted to very much.

The Returning Officer for a constituency instructed its town and village heads to make a list of all persons qualified to be electors who were living in the areas under their control. On this electoral list were inscribed the name, official rank, profession, class, and date of birth of each elector, together with the total amount of direct national taxes paid by him and the place or places in which these taxes were paid. Two copies of the list had to be prepared by 1 April of the year in which an election was held; and the chōchō or sonchō was expected to forward one copy to the Returning Officer by the 20th of that month. The Returning Officer, after receiving the local preliminary lists from the headmen of the towns and villages, made up an amalgamated roll for the entire constituency. A duplicate of this

amalgamated roll was then sent on to the governor of the fu or ken. In the case of the cities, when a whole city or one ward (ku) thereof formed a constituency, the Returning Officer, himself, (shichō or kuchō) prepared the electoral roll without the help of preliminary lists. If several wards were joined together in one constituency, the respective kuchō had to draw up the preliminary lists for their own wards and forward them to whichever one of their number was acting as Returning Officer. When a sub-prefecture (gun) and a city (shi) were united in one constituency for which the gunchō was Returning Officer, the shichō drew up the roll of voters in the city for despatch to the gunchō. If the shichō, himself, was the Returning Officer for such a gun-shi constituency, he still had to make the roll for the municipal part of it.

From fifteen days from 5 May, the Returning Officer of a constituency was compelled to put its completed electoral roll on public display at the office of the gun, shi, or ku responsible for the management of the election. That is to say, at his own 'home' office. Any member of the public who felt that his own name had been wrongly omitted from the roll, or that somebody else's name had been mistakenly included in it, was asked to make representations in writing within the period of inspection. On receiving such

representations, the Returning Officer had to make enquiries and reach a decision on the matter within twenty days. If he saw fit to alter the roll in any way, he was to do so at once and send separate notifications both to the headman of the area where the person concerned was living and to the general body of constituents. The Returning Officer's decision to amend the roll or not to amend it could be contested at law, either by the person who had made the original representations or by the person about whom they had been made. A plaintiff was required to file a suit in the Court of First Instances within seven days of the publication of the Returning Officer's decision. The courts were instructed to hear suits in connection with amendments to the electoral rolls without delay, and to regard them as having first claim on their attention. Appeals against the judgements of the Courts of First Instance could not be brought in the ordinary Courts of Appeal, but the Supreme Court could be asked to consider them. On 15 June, the electoral rolls were to be regarded as settled and complete. Only a judicial decision could change them after that date.

The rules for the preparation and amendment of the electoral rolls were one of the fairest and most carefully thought out features of the Law of Election. Possibly for this reason, newspaper reports of litigation in connection

with the rolls were not very common. The following summary of one of these reports is given as a seemingly isolated example of what could happen, but it is perhaps worth mentioning that this particular item concludes with the observation that 'such suits will be frequent occurrences from now on.'²¹ Apparently, revaluations of property for taxation purposes had deprived a number of influential people of their electoral rights in the previous year, and had caused quite a furore on the occasion of the re-election of half the members of every prefectural assembly in March 1890.²² Perhaps, though, many people reckoned it was worth their while not to have the vote, if that meant they paid less in taxation.

The case in question concerned Kobayashi Kanichiro, a member of the shizoku class in Miyazaki (southern Kyūshū) prefecture. In May, he notified the Returning Officer for his home constituency that his name had been mistakenly omitted from the roll of voters. The Returning Officer refused to enfranchise him; on the grounds that because of a special reassessment of the value of his land, it had been liable for a tax of only ¥13 between 1 January and 22 February 1890. Therefore, the Returning Officer argued, he had not been in continuous possession of land assessed at a rate of

²¹ TNNS 24-6-90.

²² Yūbin-Hōchi 5-4-90.

¥15 or more during the previous year. In point of fact, Kobayashi had paid more than ¥15 in direct taxes over the period in question, the discrepancy being accounted for by the fact that he had acquired some of his property in the previous October and had paid a separate tax on it too. Moreover, his current tax assessment was over the qualifying amount. For these reasons, he filed a suit against the Returning Officer in the Miyazaki Court of the First Instance, but lost his case. In the judgement of the Court, even though it was not disputed that he had never actually stopped paying a land-tax of ¥15 or more, he was not entitled to vote since he had not been in uninterrupted possession of land liable for this amount. Dissatisfied with this decision, Kobayashi travelled to Tokyo to seek legal advice; and at the time of the report, his counsel was preparing an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The connection between the financial year, which ended on 31 March, and the electoral franchise accounts for the choice of April as the month for preparing electoral rolls, and, allowing time for the necessary administrative work and possible judicial proceedings, the fixing of the first day of July as the date of the election. The Law of Election determined this not only for the first general election, but also for every subsequent regular (i.e. quadrennial) choosing

of a new House of Representatives. Thus, at the outset at least, the dates of general elections in Japan were made to conform to the convenience of the financial machinery of the central Government, rather than being left to the less orderly and bureaucratic dictates of political opportunity or party strategems.

On 1 July, the polling stations were to be opened at 7.0 a.m. and were to remain open until 6.0 p.m., though they could be closed earlier than this if all the voters in the area had voted.²³ As a general rule, polling stations were situated in the town, village, or ward offices of a constituency; but they could be put elsewhere at the discretion of the local headmen. For instance, in Tokyo fu, there were approximately ninety-one polling stations distributed among twelve constituencies.²⁴ The nine electoral districts comprising inner Tokyo had only one polling station apiece; in each of these nine cases, it was a ward office (kuyakusho). In the outlying, semi-rural regions of the metropolitan area, however, primary schools, temples, and charitable institutions were all used as polling stations, as well as the more usual village offices (sonyakusho). Speaking of the country as a whole, it is

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TNNS 2-7-90.

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TNNS 15-6-90 and 28-6-90.

obvious that in the truly urban and more populous rural districts, the electors would not have had to go very far in order to vote; but there were instances in less densely inhabited regions of people having to travel considerable distances to the polls. This was because the number of electors in any single village was too small to justify the opening of one polling station in every village. This was the case in Fukuoka (northern Kyūshū) prefecture where the authorities decided to provide one polling station for approximately every fifty-five voters. Even so, some of the electors had to make journeys of more than twenty or thirty miles to get to the nearest polling station.²⁵

As stated earlier, the person in charge of a polling station was the local headman, that is, the kuchō, chōchō, or sōnchō. This official was responsible for seeing that the voting was carried out in the prescribed manner, and he had to keep an election minute book in which details of the voting and any unlooked for contingency or error were to be recorded. To assist him, he had the clerks who were his subordinates in the everyday work of local administration. Furthermore, the Law of Election expressly stated that the headman had to nominate not less than two and not more than five election witnesses from among the electors of the

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3., pp. 203 and 216.

district under his authority. He was to tell the persons whom he wished to appoint as election witnesses, at least three days before the poll, that their presence would be needed in the polling station from the time it opened on 1 July. The persons chosen, for their part, could not refuse the headman's request unless they had good reason. In making this provision for independent witnesses, the Government was clearly trying to forestall any tampering with the votes, or other distortions of the popular will, by the officials in charge of the polling stations. However, as the nomination of these supposedly independent witnesses was left entirely in the hands of these same officials, there remained not a few loop-holes for collusion and unfair practices. A headman who was determined to see his own man win, cost what it might, had only to select witnesses who shared his views and lack of scruple, and the intention of this particular section of the law was undermined.²⁶

The ballot papers were of uniform style in each fu or ken. They were distributed by the metropolitan or prefectural offices to the gun or shi office in charge of the constituency, and from there were sent on to the headmen responsible for the various polling stations. In Tokyo fu, the metropolitan governor's office started sending out the ballot forms to the inner, ward (ku) and outer, sub-prefectural (gun) offices on 13 June.²⁷ The packages of ballot papers

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.217.

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TNNS 14-6-90.

also contained entrance tickets, arrival numbers, special paper for recording the number of votes gained by each candidate, notices of rules and punishments, and notices for the doors of polling booths. At the same time, the ward and sub-prefectural officials were told to return the entire consignment of ballot papers, should any of them be found to be defective. On 16 June, the metropolitan office forwarded copies of the administrative instructions for the actual carrying out of the voting in the polling stations to every Returning Officer under its control;²⁸ and these were followed three days later by regulations of a similar nature for the holding of declaration of the poll meetings.²⁹

Also on 19 June, the ballot boxes were despatched by the metropolitan office to the Returning Officers.³⁰ On 26 June, the various ward offices in Tokyo began the work of handing out entrance tickets to the electors of the metropolis.³¹

This was the time-table for administrative arrangements in connection with the election that was adopted in Tokyo fu. The other two fu (Kyoto and Osaka) and forty-two ken adhered to the same general procedure, though the timing was naturally not exactly identical in every case. For example, the distribution of the ballot boxes in Kōchi (western Shikoku)

²⁸ TNNS 18-6-90.

²⁹ TNNS 21-6-90.

³⁰ TNNS 20-6-90.

³¹ TNNS 25-6-90.

prefecture did not start until 22 June; but in Kōchi city itself, all the electors had received their entrance tickets by 23 June.³² It is a tribute to the high standards of efficiency prevailing in local administration at the time, and to the wisdom of the central Government's decision to leave detailed arrangements for the election to the regional officials, that these arrangements worked virtually without a hitch throughout the Empire. Likewise, the same thing is an unspoken comment on a general state of pacification extraordinary for a country which had been the scene of bitter civil strife not twelve years before and of a number of armed uprisings since then. When the polls opened on 1 July, there was not a single elector who had not been in a position to check whether his name was on the electoral roll and who had not received the necessary entrance ticket beforehand; and there was not a single polling station that lacked ballot papers, ballot boxes, and the other equipment requisite for the election.

Accidents did happen; but they were of a very minor nature, and could easily be put right before any real harm was done. One such accident befell Takada Kiyonobu, the headman of Izumi village in Ehime (western Shikoku) prefecture. About 23 June, he went from Izumi to the sub-prefectural

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Toyō Shimbun 24-6-90.

(Kita Uwa gun) office to collect the voting papers for the village. Having done that, he stopped in Uwajima to do some shopping. While he was in a shop, he put the leather bag containing the ballot forms on the counter only to have it disappear in a moment or two. A search of the premises having failed to reveal it, he was forced to report to the police and the gun office that the voting papers had been stolen.³³

The ballot papers were not printed with the candidates' names. The elector himself had to write down the full name of the person for whom he wished to vote. In the case of two-member constituencies, two names could be written on the paper. Then, the elector had to write down his own name and place of residence, and affix his personal seal. Ballots inscribed in the native kana syllabary, or having names that were clearly recognizable though spelt with the wrong Chinese characters, were to be regarded as valid. Since it was inherently more difficult to write personal names in the Chinese ideograms than it would have been if a phonetic script had been in use, this attitude of accepting anything that was unequivocally intelligible was a fair and sensible one for the framers of the Law of Election to take.

The problem of the legibility or otherwise of the ballots was further complicated by the existence of a number of illiterates among the voters. Illiteracy was still quite common in Japan in 1890, as the modern system of universal and compulsory primary education had started only a few years before that date. Exactly how many of the electors in the first general election were unable to read or write is not easy to say; but there were almost certainly fewer than 10,000 illiterate voters, and very probably fewer than 5,000. The total number of spoiled votes was just under 3,000;³⁴ and it is highly unlikely that many members of the class which paid ¥15 or more per annum in taxes were ignorant of both the kana syllabary and the Chinese characters. The Sanyō Shimbun (an Okayama prefecture newspaper) made this last point when, in a commentary on the application of the Law of Election, it remarked:-

The electors to the House of Representatives are not at all the same as the electors to the above [local government] assemblies. As they pay more than ¥15 in taxes, they cannot be illiterate. 35

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.214.

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Sanyō Shimbun 12-6-90.

However, the paper here might have been flattering its own readers; at any rate, the same editorial went on to cast doubts on the optimism of its opening paragraphs by later explaining in detail the provision made in the Law of Election for the problem of the illiterate voter. Moreover, Suematsu Kenchō, the permanent head of the Local Government Bureau in the Home Office and the candidate returned for one of the constituencies in Fukuoka prefecture, dealt at some length with the same problem in a valuable lecture which he gave on the election shortly after it was finished. Therefore, it would seem that although illiterate voters were not met with so very frequently in the election of 1890, they did exist - in numbers that were probably between several hundred and a few thousand for the country as a whole.

With this in mind, the authors of the Law of Election inserted an article allowing illiterate voters to ask one of the polling station clerks to write their votes for them. After the clerk had written down the vote at the elector's dictation, he was to read it out; then the elector himself had to cast the vote in the normal way, if he was satisfied that the clerk had heard him correctly. Moreover, it had been the intention of the legislators to have the writing by proxy done in such a way as to prevent as many as possible of the bystanders from seeing it. This, of course, was in

conformity with the principle of secret ballots. On the other hand, when both official witnesses and clerks were not above suspicion, the law by discouraging casual spectators to the act of voting by proxy did not provide any real safeguards against double-dealing. Nothing could prevent the local headman or his clerk, with the connivance of whatever onlookers there might have been, from writing what they wished on a proxy ballot; and, in fact, many petty deceptions seem to have been carried out. Suematsu Kenchō declared in his talk on the election:-

There are fears that nothing can remove that, when it came to the actual voting, if an illiterate asked for a proxy, Gombei was written as Hachibei or Gosuke as Rokusuke, as a result of collusion between the headmen and the clerks. I was often a witness to this most baneful, for the electors, practice. 36

The Sanyō Shimbun, denouncing the folly of giving the polling station officials a free hand with regard to proxy votes, said that this section of the law was 'incomprehensible'. 37 Some illiterates, suspecting what would happen, took the trouble to learn beforehand the ideograms used in the names of the candidates, and so became sufficiently literate to cast their own votes unaided.

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.217.

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Sanyō Shimbun 12-6-90.

The ballot boxes were made of wood. They had two lids, each of which was fitted with a different lock. One of the two keys was held by the headman in charge of the polling station; the other was kept by the witnesses. The inner lid was slotted, and the boxes remained locked, with the outer lid off, while the voting was in progress. Before the voting began, the officials and the witnesses publicly opened the boxes to show that they were empty to the electors already gathered at the voting places.

The system of election used in the single-member constituencies was the same as the British one; that is, the candidate with the greatest number of votes, regardless of whether this majority was an absolute one or not, was declared the winner, and each voter had only one vote. In the two-member constituencies, on the other hand, the system of scrutin de liste was employed; that is, each voter could write down the names of two of the candidates, and the two with the highest number of votes were returned for the constituency. In the event of a tie between two candidates, the elder one was to be deemed elected; and should the dates of their birthdays happen to be the same, the election was to be decided by drawing lots.

Only the most salient features of the actual procedure for voting were laid down in the Law of Election itself;

detailed instructions were left to the Imperial Ordinance No. 3 of 9 January 1890.³⁸ The voting procedure is perhaps best made clear by including at this point a translation of part of an item, headed Instructions To Voters, which appeared in several of the leading newspapers towards the end of June:-

1. An elector must put his registered seal under his own name on the entrance ticket which he has already received, and take the ticket with him to the polling station.
2. An elector must take his registered seal, and must himself go to the polling station. It is not permitted to vote by proxy.
3. An elector will be given a number card on arriving in exchange for his entrance ticket, and should wait in the reception room until that number is called.
4. An elector should enter and wait in the reception room after leaving his umbrella, cane, or other hand luggage in the receptacles provided.
5. An elector, when the number on his arrival card is called, must proceed to the ballot paper distribution office where he will be given a voting paper in exchange for his arrival card. Then he must go to the voting booth and first write down the full name of the candidate of his choice, next write down his own dwelling-place and full name, and finally affix his registered seal. Then he must fold the paper in three and, licking the gum at the top and bottom edges, seal it firmly. After so doing, he should drop it in the box. All ideograms should be written in the square printed style.

6. If an elector smears his ballot paper by accident or makes a mistake in the writing, he should report the matter to the authorities and ask for a new one.
7. If an elector is unable to write, on making a report to the authorities to that effect, he will be allowed to write by proxy with the help of a clerk. Therefore [illiterate] electors must decide on the name of the candidate whom they themselves prefer and ask for the writing to be done by proxy. On no account should they adopt an attitude of indifference, thinking anyone will do, and be late in coming to the polls.
8. When an elector has finished voting, since he has nothing more to do, he must leave the polling station at once.
9. While electors are at the polling station, they must all maintain a complete silence and should in no way engage in activities such as quarrels or soliciting other people's votes. 39

The authorized procedure for voting, then, made the actual business of casting a vote reasonably straightforward, and as fair and as private as possible. The arrangements made for the special category of illiterate voters certainly left something to be desired; but otherwise the voting procedure was as foolproof and as corruption-proof as legislation could make it. Perhaps this, more than any other single thing, testified to the essential integrity of the Government's attitude towards the election. Numbered arrival cards were used only in the polling stations which had to handle

a relatively large number of electors. Elsewhere, the elector voted immediately after surrendering his entrance ticket and after having had his name checked on the electoral roll. Needless to say, the voters' names were also checked against the rolls at stations where arrival cards were issued.

The electorate can have hardly been left in ignorance of what was required of it. The articles of the Law of Election relating to the management of the polling stations, together with the prescribed punishments for breaches of the law or other criminal activities in connection with the election, were displayed at every polling station. Moreover, the Law of Election had been promulgated for over a year, and the Imperial Ordinance No. 3 for nearly six months, before the day of the election. Nation-wide local elections, too, had been held in the preceding twelve months. For the rest, the newspapers, as has been indicated, did their share in informing the public. The 'Instructions To Voters', quoted above, have been taken from a Tokyo daily; but this sort of task was not just undertaken by the press of the capital alone. Mention has already been made of the detailed commentary on relevant sections of the Law of Election and the administrative regulations for voting, issued by the Sanyō Shimbun of Okayama prefecture. This commentary was

printed as the paper's editorials for the period 12-15 June; the editor prefaced it with a declaration that it was just as important to have a knowledge of the rules for the election, so as not to make procedural mistakes when voting, as it was to make enquiries about the candidates. In Kanagawa prefecture, the electors in Tachibana sub-prefecture, which formed part of the Second Constituency, met together for a special voting rehearsal on 15 June; because they wanted to ensure a good turn out on the actual day of the election, and so avoid any possibility of disgracing their prefecture or offending their local deity, Hachiman.⁴⁰

Promptly at six o'clock on the evening of 1 July, the managers of the polling stations were to declare the poll closed, and shut the ballot boxes by putting on the outer lids. Thereafter nobody at all could vote; no matter what extenuating circumstances there might have been for those who failed to do so, or were too late in coming to the polling station. During the night of 1 July, the ballot boxes remained at the polling stations where they were kept under strict guard. The guards in some places were local government clerks. They were told to try and sit up all night without falling asleep, and to make sure that they held on to the boxes if in fact they did happen to doze.⁴¹ In the majority

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TNNS 19-6-90.

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TNNS 1-7-90.

of the constituencies, groups of electors also kept watch; and almost everywhere, the police, too, were called on to mount guard. Despite precautions of this nature, there were suspicions in at least one prefecture that the boxes had been illicitly opened, and their contents tampered with, under the cover of darkness.⁴²

On 2 July, the various polling stations forwarded their ballot boxes, together with the minutes of the voting, to the gun, shi, or ku office in charge of the constituency. On this journey, the boxes were accompanied by a police escort and at least one of the official witnesses to the voting. In the case of remote islands where it would not have been possible to send in the ballot boxes on 2 July under the usual arrangements, the prefectural governor was empowered to hold the election earlier, i.e. on any day between 15 and 30 June, and have the boxes sent to the mainland by 1 July. After the Returning Officer had received all the ballot boxes for his constituency, he had to hold a counting and declaration of the poll meeting. This was known as the Election Meeting. In a few places, notably inner Tokyo and the urban constituencies of Kyoto fu and Osaka fu, the counting of the votes began and was completed on 2 July; but over the greater part of the country, the boxes

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.217.

were not opened until 3 July and sometimes the counting went on until 5 or 6 July.⁴³

Having formally convened the Election Meeting and before going on to open the ballot boxes, the Returning Officer was required to co-opt an Election Committee of at least seven persons from among the witnesses assembled from the various polling stations. Then he opened the boxes and counted the votes in the presence of this committee; at the same time, he had to count the total number of voters. Any discrepancy between the two figures was entered in the official minutes of the Election Meeting. After doing this, the Returning Officer inspected the ballots with the assistance of the Election Committee and decided which of them were valid. Invalid ballots were those which:-

- (i) Were written by persons whose names did not appear on the electoral roll. This did not apply, however, to voters who had brought with them to the polling station a Court order to the effect that their name should have been on the roll.
- (ii) Were not made out on the official voting paper.
- (iii) Were not inscribed with the voter's name.
- (iv) Were inscribed with the name of a person not qualified for election; but in the case of a scrutin de liste, such a ballot was to be valid for any person named therein who did have the proper qualifications.

- (v) Were illegible or ambiguous with regard to the name of the voter or the person for whom he had voted.
- (vi) Contained extraneous matter, writing, or drawings. When this additional material was meant to be of help in identification, however, the ballot was to be considered valid.

If the validity of a ballot was in doubt, the Returning Officer was competent to decide the matter after conferring with the members of the Election Committee. The application of the rules with regard to the validity or otherwise of ballots varied somewhat from place to place, in accordance with the differing interpretations of the rules made by individual Returning Officers and their helpers. In some areas, ballots bearing only the surnames of candidates were not rejected.⁴⁴

On completion of the work of adding and sorting the ballots, the Returning Officer announced the result of the election to those assembled at the meeting place. When details of the entire proceedings had been entered in the minute book and signed by the Returning Officer and the members of his Election Committee, the Election Meeting was declared closed.

Electors could attend the Election Meeting for their constituency, but were under strict orders to behave themselves. They had to preserve complete silence at the command of the

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol. 3, p.214.

Returning Officer, and they were not supposed to show either by word or gesture any sign of approval or disapproval when the results were read out. The problem of controlling visitors to the Election Meetings seems to have loomed rather large in the minds of the authorities, and it was discussed at a special conference of the Returning Officers for the Tokyo fu constituencies. This conference was held on 30 June; and a newspaper intimated that such words as 'patrols' 'firemen' 'police' 'clubs' and 'pumps' were overheard while it was in progress.⁴⁵ Even if this report was true, the event proved the Returning Officers' forebodings unduly pessimistic as the Election Meetings in Tokyo and elsewhere passed off without incident.

The general course taken the Election Meetings is well illustrated by the following account of that held in Yokohama, the scene of one of the most bitter of the election contests:-

Yesterday, the 2nd, at 8.0 a.m., the Returning Officer, Mr. Sato Kiemon, opened the ballot boxes in the presence of the witnesses, and counted the total number of votes just as they were, sealed, and the total number of voters. The number of votes was 237. (There were no spoiled ballots.)

Then, the Returning Officer opened the ballots and checked them, after which he handed them over one by one to the witnesses. Then the witnesses checked them, reading out first the name of the elector, followed by the name of the person for whom he had voted. Two clerks entered the scores of the candidates who had received votes in the score book. Such was the procedure.

Well, the Returning Officer, when checking the votes, found nine to be without seals, and asked the opinion of the witnesses. It was decided that they were to be allowed; as even though votes that had not been sealed were not perfect, they did not come within the definition of invalid votes in Article Ll of the Law of Election.

The result of the poll was as follows:-

146	Shimada Saburo.
83	Hiranuma Senzō.

└ The third candidate polled 2 votes; six candidates polled 1 vote each. _7

Mr. Shimada was elected by a majority vote. Accordingly, a report was made of the above names and numbers of votes in accordance with Article Llx of the Law of Election; and at 9.30 a.m., the checking of the votes was finished. After which, the

proceedings were concluded by the Returning Officer reading out the score for each candidate.⁴⁶

The final duty of the Returning Officer for a constituency was to report the result of the election to the governor of the fu or ken. The governor then sent official notifications of election to the successful candidates, asking them to say whether or not they accepted. In Tokyo fu, this was done by 4 July.⁴⁷ The persons elected had to let the governor know whether they were willing to accept election - within ten days, if they were residing in the fu or ken concerned; within twenty day, if they were not. Failure to reply within the stipulated time limit, or a declaration of unwillingness to serve as a Representative, meant that the governor had to order a new election in the constituency unless there had been a tie vote.

If a candidate had managed to get himself elected in two constituencies, he was to tell the authorities which one he wished to represent. Though there was nothing in the Law of Election to prevent a candidate standing in two separate constituencies and a number of them did so, there were in fact only two cases of double election. In Ehime prefecture, Suzuki Jūen was returned for both the First and Fourth

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TNNS 3-7-90.

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TNNS 4-7-90.

Constituencies; and in Ōita prefecture, Motoda Hajime was equally fortunate in the First and Fifth Constituencies. In both instances, the constituency for which they refused election had to go to the polls again.⁴⁸

Once it was settled that he was lawfully and willingly elected, the new Representative received a certificate of election from the prefectural governor. The governor also had to send in a report to the Minister for Home Affairs, detailing the names, qualifications, and personal histories of the Members returned for his province. Thus, in its concluding stages, the election procedure came back into the hands of the Home Office bureaucrats. These were the people who had organized and initiated it, and then withdrawn while the subordinate provincial officials, the candidates, and the electors ran the course they had mapped out. From this rather elevated point of view, the first general election was a masterpiece of impartial and nation-wide administrative organization; and the fact that the arrangements made for the voting, in spite of the numerous upsets of the campaigning, went off like a well-sprung and cleanly oiled clock was a tribute, among other things, to the efficiency as well as the authority of the bureaucratic system.

The Law of Election provided that ballots should be kept for sixty days if they were valid, and for one year if they

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Yūbin-Hōchi 6-7-90.

were not, in the office of the shi, gun or ku in charge of the election for a particular constituency, and then burnt. Another article of the Law allowed anyone who wished to challenge the legality of a result to do so by bringing a suit in a Court of Appeal. These suits had to be filed within thirty days of the official publication by a governor of the names of the elected persons; and the plaintiffs had to deposit a sum of ¥300 with the judicial authorities. This sum was to be used in part payment of the costs of the suit; and if the plaintiff lost his case, he was obliged to pay the whole amount of legal costs. A person whose seat in the House of Representatives was in jeopardy as a result of a legal action, retained it pending the decision of the Court. In fact, none of the elected Members were unseated as a result of legal actions initiated by their defeated opponents. No doubt the ¥300 deposit protected some of them.

To recapitulate for a moment, then, the principal features of the electoral system of 1890, these were:- (i) irregular constituencies; (ii) an electorate that was no more than 1.14% of the total population; (iii) a heavy preponderance of rural voters; (iv) a high property or income qualification for candidates as well as electors; (v) a procedure for the supervision of the actual voting that relied too much on the

probity of town and village headmen or other minor local government officials; (vi) election by simple majority; (vii) signed but otherwise secret ballots; (viii) an over-all efficiency and sense of fair play on the part of the senior officials responsible for the drafting and enforcement of the Law of Election, notwithstanding the limitations inherent in points (ii) and (iv) or the defects arising from points (i), (v), and (vii). The importance of items (i), (ii), and (iii) will become more and more apparent with the development of the story of the election. Therefore there is no need to say anything more about them here, except that they were all subjects of controversy and criticism before and after the election. For example, the manifestos issued by two of the Liberal factions contained proposals for widening the franchise, lowering the qualifications for candidates, reforming the system of seat distribution, etc.⁴⁹

As in all cases where proportional representation is rejected in favour of single-member constituencies and election by relative majorities, it sometimes happened that in a particular prefecture a minority of votes secured a majority of seats. For instance, in Kagawa prefecture, the Progressive Party managed to return only one Representative

with its total of 1,241 votes, whereas the Liberals got three seats for 1,160 votes. In Ehime, the figures were - Progressives, 3,542 votes and two Representatives; Liberals, 3,260 votes and five Representatives.⁵⁰ However, considering the country as a whole, anomalies between voting strength and representation in the separate prefectures tended to balance out; and, certainly, the prevailing sentiment of opposition to the Government was reflected in the numerical strength of the different parties in the House of Representatives. Since political opinion at that time was not marshalled into two large parties, proportional representation could have easily led to a situation in which an otherwise insignificant faction would have had an inordinate power in the Diet by virtue of being able to tip the scales against its bigger rivals. Moreover, critics of the relative majority system were not unaware of the danger of extending the existing scrutin de liste method, by giving all the seats in a prefecture to the group which had polled the most votes there. This would have brought about the swamping of minority opinions by the majority.⁵¹

Nevertheless, on the morrow of the election, there were a number of suggestions for a change to multi-member

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Uyehara, Pol. Dev., p.171

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Hayashida Kametaro, Shūgi-in Giin Senkyō Hō Kaisei Iken, The Nation's Friend (Kokumin-no.Tomo), vol.13, no.198, Aug. 1893, p.172.

constituencies consisting of whole prefectures, and a voting system based on proportional representation. Indeed, the demand for bigger constituencies had appeared in both the party manifestos previously mentioned; and Kaneko Kentaro declared that the choice between big or small constituencies had been the most difficult problem confronting him and his colleagues when drafting the Law of Election.⁵² Critics of the system of small, sub-prefectural election districts argued that it favoured candidates with strong local connections who were resident in the area. Such candidates did not necessarily have in them the making of a good Representative, but they nevertheless came off best when pitted against an outsider - no matter how talented the latter might have been.⁵³ Similarly, it was said that many capable men were prevented from standing as candidates, because of the ¥15 a year minimum tax qualification. This line of argument had especial relevance to Japan, where, as a result of the peculiar antecedents of the shizoku class, wealth was by no means a sure indication of superiority in learning or ability.⁵⁴

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Hayashida Kametaro, Meiji-Taishō Seikai Sokumen Shi, vol.1, p.172.

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TNNS 3-7-90.

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Hayashida Kametaro, Shūgi-in Giin Senkyō Hō Kaisei Iken, The Nation's Friend (Kokumin-no Tomo), vol.13, no.201, Sept. 1893, p.365.

While neither of these objections was without foundation, the first House of Representatives contained not a few men of sterling worth and quick wits, and in this respect did not compare unfavourably with later ones elected on a wider franchise and from bigger constituencies. Also, almost two thirds of its Members belonged to the shizoku class. Another strong argument, in favour of small constituencies as opposed to large ones and having nothing to do with the ¥15 tax qualification for candidates, was the one put forward by Kaneko himself, i.e., small constituencies were more in keeping with the extremely narrow 'village politics' of the time.⁵⁵

With regard to the arrangements for the preparation of the electoral rolls and the casting of ballots, these were on the whole beyond reproach. Their general efficacy was made evident by the very small number of electors who failed to vote, as well as by the paucity of spoiled ballots. Perhaps the only notable defect was the failure to provide adequate supervision for the headmen in charge of the polling stations. It seems that the authorities had intended that policemen should be on duty inside as well as outside the polling stations while the voting was going on; but in many places this scheme was abandoned in face of accusations that

it could have been construed as interference on the part of the Government.⁵⁶ Furthermore, since the headmen had a great deal of social influence in addition to their official powers in the society of 1890, it would have been difficult to devise a set of regulations strong enough to keep them completely in check.

The stipulation that ballots should be signed with the voter's name was attacked in one section of the press.⁵⁷ It was alleged that information about an elector's choice of candidate would almost certainly be divulged by the official witnesses at the Election Meetings. The outcome of this would be that voters would feel themselves obliged to vote in accordance with their material or family interests, rather than in accordance with the less immediate promptings of political principle. Furthermore, it was held, knowledge about who had voted for whom would bring about estrangements and enmities in the social life of a village. Thus the system of signed ballots would seem to have left the way open for coercion or a disinclination to vote at all. No doubt it did in fact give rise to these abuses in a number of instances, but over the greater part of the country it did not have this effect. If such abuses had been widespread, both the rate and the pattern of the voting would have been

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.217.

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Yūbin-Hōchi 3-7-90 and 4-7-90.

different from what they were. The Law of Election imposed heavy penalties on persons found guilty of intimidating or corrupting the electors; and an electorate restricted to the most wealthy tax-payers would, on the whole, have been less subject to unfair persuasion or apathy than one made up of the more impoverished and ignorant. Indeed, far from being reticent about what they intended to do at the polls, many electors up and down the land allowed their names to be used in electioneering advertisements. These announced in advance that Messrs X, Y, and Z, had decided to vote for Mr So-and-so.

The police and the Courts played a vital role in the management of the election - not only a vital role but also a salutary one. Faced with the welter of corruption, trickery, and violence that attended the campaign, one finds oneself wondering what sort of stained monster the infant Japanese parliament would have been, but for the careful midwifery it received from the law and its guardians. It is necessary to emphasize the fact that - in complete contrast to what went on at the time of the second general election two years later - the Government refrained from abusing its executive or judicial powers to secure the electoral defeat of its opponents. The law was neutral, and so was its enforcement by the police and the higher political or judicial

authorities. So far, I have discovered only one example of something that even begins to look like an infringement of this principle. It occurred during a meeting of the Kyōbashi Ward Political Discussion Group, held in Tokyo on 28 June, at which some of the candidates for the House of Representatives made speeches. A newspaper report of the meeting said that the speakers gave full expression to their views, but one of them, Nakajima Matagoro, was cautioned by a policeman for straying off the subject. The report went on to state that the matter at issue was a trivial one, so Nakajima left it at that.⁵⁸

However, before describing other types of activities undertaken by the police in connection with the election, the legal statutes which gave them the power to act the way they did should be summarized. The Law of Election itself contained a section entitled Punitive Rules, which had for its scope the following offences:- fraudulent entries in the electoral roll; bribery of any kind, indirect or direct, and no matter whether the goods, money, or employment were actually given or only promised; acts of violence against electors; mass intimidation of electors; riots at polling stations or Election Meetings; and armed entry into polling stations or Election Meetings. The penalties for such crimes

varied in accordance with whether the objectives envisaged had actually been achieved or not; but, even in the event of the latter being the case, they were hardly lenient. For the more serious ones, such as corruption that had achieved its effect, violence, and creating a public disturbance, the Law authorized the Courts to impose imprisonment for a term of between two weeks and six years depending on the gravity of the offence and a fine of two to three hundred yen. Persons accepting bribes were to be given the same punishments as those who offered them.

Feeling, as the election campaign got under way, that this section of the Law of Election was not achieving its purpose, the Government promulgated on 29 May the Supplementary Penal Regulations for the House of Representatives Election Law.⁵⁹ These Supplementary Regulations made some additions to the list of actions constituting breaches of the Election Law proper.

The definition of bribery was widened to cover the serving of food or drink to electors on their way to or in the vicinity of either the polling stations or the places where the Election Meetings were held; and also to cover offers of transport to or from the polling stations or Election Meeting places, offers of lodgings, and offers of expense

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See Appx. VII below.

money. Likewise, individual, as opposed to mass, intimidation of the electors became a punishable offence for the first time. So, too, did the abduction of electors on election day, or the hindering of their movements with the idea of preventing them getting to the polls. Another new offence was the spreading of rumours about who was or was not eligible for election, and false stories to the effect that a particular candidate would not accept his seat in the House of Representatives if elected. Article IV of the Supplementary Regulations made election demonstrations subject to police control. It read:-

Persons who, in the sub-prefectures and cities where there are polling stations or Election Meetings, assemble in large numbers or go about in bands, or light bonfires or pine torches, or make a noise with bells, drums, or conch shells, or horns, or make use of flags or other emblems, in order to stimulate election fever, and do not obey police orders to desist, shall be sentenced to not less than fifteen days and not more than three months imprisonment with light labour, and shall be fined not less than five yen and not more than fifty yen.

Finally, the Law of Election had made it an offence for anyone to incite others to a breach of the peace either by word of

mouth or through newspaper articles. The Supplementary Regulations prohibited in like manner the display of posters offering inducements to the electors in the form of free refreshment or transport of the sort outlined above.

The Supplementary Regulations were not opposed in the press. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun remarked that it was far from being surprised by the rigour of the legislation.⁶⁰ More significantly, the 'opposition' papers - the Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun⁶¹ and the Kokumin Shimbun⁶² - both admitted the need for such laws in a society where public morality was of a shamefully low standard. The Kokumin asserted that the offences enumerated in the Regulations were a photographic record of what was happening in all districts at the time, and that this was true even in the case of Article 1V which read like a page from a medieval chronicle. The elections of half the members of the prefectural assemblies earlier in the year had afforded abundant proof of widespread chicanery.

The Punitive Rules in the Law of Election, as well as the Supplementary Penal Regulations, were directed primarily

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TNNS 4-6-90.

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Yūbin-Hōchi 31-5-90.

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Kokumin Shimbun 31-5-90.

at the triple abuses of corruption, violence, and public disorder. Here, I believe, it is necessary to draw a fairly sharp distinction between the actual polling and election results on the one hand, and the events of the campaigning that preceded them on the other. These abuses, in my opinion, were not sufficiently serious or effective to have vitiated the outcome of the election as a whole and so have made the holding of it pointless; nevertheless they did occur on many occasions in many different places, and instances of them will be a recurrent theme in the chapters that follow. Therefore at this stage I shall confine myself to no more than one or two examples of each, merely in order to give some idea of the conditions with which the police and Courts were expected to deal.

No part of the country was absolutely free from corruption; but it was perhaps more rife in Saitama prefecture than anywhere else. One case that came to light towards the middle of June involved a number of the inhabitants of two villages - Kambe and Tagaya - in the sub-prefecture of Kita Saitama. These people had been sending out sums of ten sen, together with the visiting card of a local celebrity who was standing for election. The Shintō priest of another village in the area, Sukage, had also been sending out money on behalf of the same man. A confession by one of the electors, who

had accepted the bribe only to find his conscience getting the better of him, had disclosed what was going on. The priest, when summoned by the village office at which the elector had made his confession, sent word that he was not at home, but later told the police that he had received a sum of money to be used as bribes from an agent for the candidate. The agent then had to report to the Court-house at Kumagaya to undergo preliminary interrogation, and at least eighteen other persons were summoned for questioning in connection with the case.⁶³ Later, it was alleged that an opposing candidate had bribed the original informer to make a spurious confession.⁶⁴

There was a similar case in the Fourth Constituency of Ibaraki prefecture, where an agent campaigning on behalf of one of the candidates was interviewed at the police-station in Ishige village, Toyoda sub-prefecture. He was suspected of having bought votes. Once again, the corruption had not been confined to a single village. The Ishige police also saw a Mr and Mrs Hirose who were living in the sub-prefecture adjoining Toyoda. The police, when they had satisfied themselves that there was a prima facie case against the

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TNNS 14-6-90.

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TNNS 18-6-90.

people questioned, had the investigations transferred to the public prosecutor's office in Shimotsuma. Many other citizens were summoned there as time went on.⁶⁵

Violence, like bribery, was endemic; but most of it was petty. Kumamoto, Kōchi, Ishikawa, Toyama, and Niigata prefectures were frequently mentioned as having been particularly notorious trouble-spots;⁶⁶ and one may perhaps add Yokohama city to this list.

In the Fifth Constituency, Kumamoto prefecture, the turbulence of the two rival political parties - Nationalists and Progressives - obliged the police to fall back on their emergency powers, and order them to disband in Yatsushiro sub-prefecture. This order was put out on 24 June; and behind it lay a whole series of minor incidents, culminating in a set fight between adherents of the two factions armed with swords and clubs. The battle, which took place probably on 22 or 23 June, had been started by the Nationalists; but the Progressives do not seem to have been much in awe of the swordsmen hired by their opponents, and rallied well enough to start gaining ground. The newspaper reporting this neglected to say how many combatants were involved on

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TNNS 18-6-90.

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TNNS 4-6-90.

each side; but this was evidently quite a major affray, over a fairly extensive piece of ground, as the correspondent did state that skirmishing had been particularly fierce near the twin villages of Kagumi and Miyanohara. Apparently no one was killed - even in these two settlements where the 'warfare' was at its hottest. Elsewhere, on the evening of 23 June, a member of the Nationalist faction had met with a supporter of the Progressives, and the two had started to fight. By the time the police arrived, the Nationalist had already pushed his adversary over, and had bitten him on his cheek, side, and right arm.⁶⁷

Cases of the police or other executive officials ordering the dissolution of political organizations were extremely rare; and in the above-mentioned instance, the ban applied to only part of the constituency concerned. Earlier in the election campaign, the Home Minister himself had intervened to authorize the total proscription of an association known as the Sanyō Society of Righteousness. This Society was active in Himeji, a medium-sized town in Hyōgō prefecture; and its members had originally belonged to the Unionist Party (Daidō Danketsu) and to the Himeji Young Men's Club. At the elections to the Himeji City Council

in 1889, the Unionists had won twenty-nine of the thirty seats. Thereafter, however, the future members of the Society of Righteousness had broken with the Daidō Danketsu and joined the Harima Club. In October 1889, they quit the Harima Club when it started campaigning against the scheme for treaty revision put forward by the Government, and organized themselves into an association which they called the Sanyō Union of Righteousness (Sanyō Daidō Gikai).

The record of disorderly conduct by members of the Society dated from the following month, November, when they attended a speech meeting on the subject of treaty revision, heckled the speakers, and assaulted a member of the audience. Shortly afterwards, they challenged the writer of a series of articles that appeared in a Kobe paper to a duel. There then came a brief interlude for internal re-organization. In January 1890, they invited Count Itagaki to address them, and held a meeting of their supporters from all over Hyōgo prefecture. It was at this rally that they declared their approval of Itagaki's prospective Aikoku-kōtō (Patriots' Party), and changed the name of their own organization to the Sanyō Society of Righteousness (Sanyō Gikai). In February, a member of the Society assaulted Tanaka Tokitaro, the editor of a Himeji journal, while he was opening a meeting. As a result of this outrage, the police asked the Sanyō Gikai to submit a list of its members' names. In the

same month, the Society appointed a candidate for election to the House of Representatives in the Seventh Constituency of Hyōgo prefecture.

The decision to compete in the parliamentary elections seems to have bereft the Sanyō Gikai of whatever shreds of respectability remained to it. On 9 March, members rioted with drawn swords at a meeting of supporters of the Progressive Party (Kaishin-tō) held in the village of Kokubuji, Shikitō sub-prefecture; and on 25 March, they caused a disturbance during a Progressive Party speech meeting at another place, Masuisan, in the same sub-prefecture. Throughout April and May, they were responsible for a series of similar outbreaks in the constituency, as well as finding time to challenge the Progressives to a debating contest. The Home Office order for the dissolution of the Sanyō Society of Righteousness was issued on 6 June. Undaunted, its ex-members announced their intention of setting up a Hyōgo Prefecture Patriots Club.⁶⁸

Finally, to complete this preliminary sketch of the circumstances in which the police all too frequently found themselves, it is appropriate to include here a verbatim translation of an item which appeared in the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun for 20 June. It was headed 'Violence At A Speech Meeting' :-

At a Kaishin-tō speech meeting held by a certain Mr Kato of Usui village, Nakakanbara gun, Niigata prefecture on the 16th of this month, the audience was thrown into a state of great confusion during the speech of the second speaker, Mr Shigeno Tamaki. (A member of the staff of the Mainichi Shimbun.) A gang of hooligans stood up together and, overturning the dais, assaulted the speaker. In a state of affairs which even the police lacked the means to control, Mr Shigeno had his head injured and his face was dripping with blood. Could anything be more outrageous?

The examples given - one from Kyūshū, the second from the Kansai area, and the third from the Tōhoku region - show that violence was not limited to any one particular district. To repeat, most of the incidents in themselves did not amount to very much; the battle between the Progressives and Nationalists in the Fifth Constituency, Kumamoto prefecture, was on a bigger scale than the great majority of cases where participants in the election campaign took the law into their own hands. Nevertheless the police in all areas were understandably apprehensive lest petty outbreaks of this sort should multiply as the campaign ran its course, and

eventually reach their climax in a deluge of major riots and attacks on or just after the day of the election. Therefore they took great care to guard the polling stations and their environs while the voting was in progress. Similarly, they made efforts to ensure that the ballot boxes would be safe after the polls had closed, and that there would be no disorders at the declaration of the poll meetings. One newspaper forecast that there might be difficulties in supplying adequate police protection for every polling station in the prefectures where competition was at its most keen. Generally speaking, there were between two and three hundred polling stations in each prefecture, and no more than four or five hundred policemen to deal with any disorders that might occur.⁶⁹ This meant that a single polling station would have only one or two policemen to guard it; with the result that there was a loss of the advantage, from the point of view of quelling possible disturbances, of having a lot of polling stations and so making it impossible for the electors to congregate in large numbers at any one particular place on the day. In the event, however, these difficulties, where they existed, were overcome; and the police, by dint of careful forethought and sound preparations

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TNNS 4-6-90.

were able to discharge their duties without incurring any sort of blame or disgrace.

In Tokyo, the fu office ordered the Returning Officer for each constituency to tell the Metropolitan Commissioner for Police by 25 June how many policemen he expected to need on the day of the election.⁷⁰ The Commissioner eventually decided to allocate one sergeant and five constables to every polling station.⁷¹ In Kagawa prefecture (eastern Shikoku), election fever ran high enough to warrant the posting of 'several hundred' policemen to each constituency during the last week of the campaign.⁷² If this report is accurate, one must assume that as there were five constituencies in the prefecture, many of the constables involved must have been 'borrowed' from other prefectures or else had been specially recruited to supervise the election. In Kanagawa prefecture, a total of 200 special force policemen were distributed among the 219 polling stations. These men were to work in conjunction with another hundred who had been assigned to the constituencies earlier. On 29 June, the Chief-Inspector of the Prefectural Police Department, accompanied by the Chief-Inspector of the Public

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TNNS 21-6-90.

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TNNS 27-6-90.

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TNNS 26-6-90.

Peace Preservation Department, set out on a tour of all the electoral districts in order to check the arrangements made for the safe-guarding of both polling stations and ballot boxes.⁷³ For Yokohama city itself, i.e. the First Constituency in Kanagawa prefecture, the police control was especially strict.⁷⁴ The solitary polling station was protected by a force consisting of four police-sergeants, ten uniformed police-constables, and ten constables in Japanese dress. In addition, stationary guards were on duty at thirty strategic points in the city. This show of strength completely demoralized the Yokohama gangsters, who had been actively concerned in the election right down to the evening of 30 June. In Kumamoto prefecture, the police erected guard posts on all the roads into the Fourth and Fifth Constituencies where most of the trouble had broken out during the campaign, and would not let anyone other than voters enter these areas.⁷⁵

These and similar precautions in other parts of the country achieved the desired effect. As will be shown later, the assaults and rowdyism that preceded the voting had been

⁷³ TNNS 29-6-90.

⁷⁴ TNNS 2-7-90.

⁷⁵ TNNS 1-7-90.

perpetrated by a type of person who was not likely to stand his ground when confronted by a superior force. Organized political violence on a really wide scale was hardly ever attempted; and when it was, it met with the fate meted out to the Sanyō Society of Righteousness. Still, there is no saying what might have happened on the day of the election, if the police had not adopted a very firm attitude. As it was, despite the unruliness that had marked the campaign, and despite a number of half-hearted endeavours on the part of known trouble-makers to stir up incidents in front of the polling stations on the day of the election, the voting itself was everywhere peaceable. A Tokyo journalist, reporting the election scene in the capital, was able to write:-

In front of the gate of every polling station, white-uniformed policemen were placed on guard; and beside them, the sparrows pecked for their food and the dogs slept. 76

From the provincial centres, too, the telegrams, without a single exception, all brought the same message:-

Voting completed; no incidents. 77

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TNNS 2-7-90.

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TNNS 3-7-90.

CHAPTER TWO

Parties, Principles, and Issues.

The persons standing for election in 1890 may be conveniently divided into three major groups:- the Liberal-Progressive factions, the Conservative factions, and the Independents. The majority of candidates belonged to the last group, which was, of course, non-party. The principal parties were all, lineally or spiritually, descended from the three earlier national political associations:- the Jiyū-tō, the Kaishin-tō, and the Teisei-tō. Indeed, the Kaishin-tō, it will be remembered, had never formally dissolved itself, even after enduring the resignation of its leader, Ōkuma Shigenobu, in 1884; and it was the same organization and the same platform that bore the label 'Progressive' in the first general election.

(i) The Daidō Danketsu.

The case of the Liberals was very different. After the dissolution of the first Jiyū-tō in October 1884, there

was virtually no legitimate political activity among the ranks of the Government's opponents until 1886 when Gotō Shōjiro started a campaign against the administration's alleged mishandling of the treaty revision problem. All this time, there had been a steady growth in the extent and depth of popular feeling against the existing treaties; and this feeling could be quite easily converted into a formidable and widespread expression of hostility towards the authorities. Inoue Kaoru's scheme for revision had finally broken down in the summer of 1887; partly because of the uncompromising policies of the Treaty Powers, partly because of the antagonistic attitude of Japanese opinion. Sensing this opportunity, and making clever use of the fact that the Itō Cabinet's rather fatuous policy of excessive fraternization with the Occidental diplomatic communities had produced no worthwhile results, Gotō worked hard to combine all the different disaffected elements - conservative, moderate, and radical - in one large body of agitators. The name of this organization was the Daidō Danketsu (Unionist League); its slogan was Unity in Diversity (Daidō Shōi, i.e. 'alike in great matters, of differing views in small'); its avowed aim was the rectification of the diplomatic situation; its real purpose, the unseating of the Sat-Chō cliq¹ue.

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Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol.1, pp. 241-244.

This revival of party activity gained force with explosive speed. Speech meetings were held throughout the country; and in the capital, petitions flowed into the Senate, or else were presented at the private residences of the ministers of state. These petitions were the same in form and substance; and since they were limited to three demands - that is, (i) reduction of the land-tax, (ii) freedom of speech and assembly, and (iii) an improvement in the country's diplomacy - they were collectively known as the Petition on Three Serious Matters. In September 1887, the Home Minister, Yamagata Aritomo, issued orders to the effect that all petitions would be rejected, and that anyone seeking to violate this regulation by handing in a petition would be severely dealt with. The following month, Gotō and his closest confederates founded the Teigai Club ('87 Club), a political but non-party organization designed to hold together the adherents of the Daidō Danketsu movement.²

Meanwhile groups of these adherents were continually moving into Tokyo from the provinces, and the political temperature of the metropolis was rising to heights last reached at the time of the Hokkaidō Development Board scandal in 1881. At the beginning of December, Gotō presented a lengthy memorial to the Lord Chamberlain, asking that it

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Hayashida Kametaro, *Nihon Seitō Shi*, vol.1, pp. 246-247.

should be passed on to the Emperor.³ Immediately afterwards, he (Gotō) left for a highly successful and inflammatory speech-making tour of the north-eastern prefectures, where resentment at the victory of the south-western forces at the time of the restoration still rankled in the hearts of many. The Emperor, it seems, was not allowed to see Gotō's memorial; and on 26 December, the Government struck a hard blow at his movement by promulgating the emergency Peace Preservation Ordinance.⁴

The effect of this ordinance was to shift the opposition from the capital to the countryside. Article 1V of the new law empowered the authorities to order the removal of anybody they considered likely to promote civil strife or disorder to a place more than three ri (about seven miles) from the Imperial palace. Applying the power conferred by this article with prompt and relentless vigour, the police by the evening of 28 December had brought about a mass exodus of upwards of 570 prominent party politicians from the inner regions of Tokyo.

However, the opposition, though foiled in its first objective of putting immediate and unbearable pressure on the Government, proved itself quite capable of carrying on

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Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitō-Shi, vol. 1, pp. 247-248.

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Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol. 1, pp. 248-252.

the struggle from the provinces. Itagaki Taisuke had come out from his political retirement in the previous autumn, and was actively engaged in realising the aims of the Daidō Danketsu. Gotō, himself, revisited the north-eastern regions in the summer of 1888. Prior to this, Ōkuma had re-entered the Government as its Minister for Foreign Affairs. This development, which had taken place in February 1888, had a number of important repercussions; one of them was a considerable relaxation of the hostility so recently displayed by the Cabinet to the Unionists.

The endless scheming and campaigning began to bear visible fruit in October 1888, when the Daidō Danketsu took formal shape for the first time at a series of conventions of local politicians held in Chiba, Osaka, and Kumamoto. The new association, as such, remained a non-political one; but it acknowledged Gotō as its leader, and accepted a common programme of action. It also decided to issue a 'party' journal, known as the Seiron (Political Discussion).

The Daidō Danketsu soon crashed. The Government, conscious of having gained something of a Pyrrhic victory in December 1887, had invited Ōkuma to assume the responsibility for treaty revision as a gesture of conciliation towards its opponents. Though Ōkuma had long since severed his formal connection with the Kaishin-tō, the unofficial links between

him and his sympathizers had not been impaired. Therefore, after their ex-leader had entered the Government, many members of the Kaishin-tō became first of all lukewarm in their zeal for the Daidō Danketsu, and later when Ōkuma's proposals for treaty revision were made the subject of heated controversy, openly antagonistic to the attitude of their political allies. Thus, the situation arose that the Kaishin-tō and its press came out in favour of Ōkuma and the Government on the subject of treaty revision; while the Liberals and the Conservative extremists continued to maintain a stance of unflinching opposition. The promulgation of the constitution in February 1889, together with the special amnesty for political offenders that marked the occasion, also served to ease the strain of the previous year, and naturally won some measure of public esteem for the Government.

The death-blow for the 'Daidō Danketsu, however, was dealt it by its own leader. In March 1889, Gotō Shōjiro suddenly and without any sort of warning entered the Cabinet as Minister of Communications. The motive behind the invitation to Gotō is clear - as always, the Meiji statesmen were not unwilling to win over their most dangerous enemies if the chance to do so offered itself. They preferred reconciliation to isolation. As for Gotō, it seems that he was opportunist by nature, and had used the Daidō Danketsu as a means of advancing his own political fortunes.

The Government, at the time when it had begun negotiations with Gotō, had extended an invitation to Itagaki, too, with the idea of persuading both of them to rejoin the Ministry. If this strategem had worked, it would have been a major tactical victory for the clan bureaucrats. Itagaki refused for himself, however, while advising Gotō to accept. He told Gotō that as the constitution had now been promulgated, it would be better for him to take part in the affairs of state as a member of the Government rather than to stay in the ranks of the people.⁵ From this, it looks as if Itagaki was anxious to oust Gotō from the position of recognized national leader of the party movement, and resume that role himself.

The remaining leaders of the Daidō Danketsu, sorely stricken by their chief's defection, were soon divided into two factions.⁶ The more radical one, under Ōi Kentaro, Arai Shōgo, Ishizaka Masataka, and others, wished to retain the technically non-political character of the organization; opposed to them was a group led by Kono Hironaka, Inoue Kakugoro, Ōe Taku, Inukai Takeshi, and others who wished to turn it into a properly constituted political party. At the beginning of May 1889, Itagaki tried hard to heal the

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Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol. 1, p.258.

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Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol. 1, pp. 258-261.

division between these two sections of his former supporters, making a special journey to Tokyo to do so. His efforts proved unavailing, however, and on 10 May, the 'political party faction', now calling itself the Daidō Club, held a meeting at Tokyo at which a formal statement of policy was discussed and approved. The other branch of the Daidō Danketsu, the 'non-political party faction', adopted the name Unionist Harmony Society (Daidō Kyōwa Kai), and entered into a spirited but sadly wasteful strife with its sister-body in Osaka and elsewhere.

(ii) The Liberal Factions - the Jiyū-tō, the Daidō Club, and the Aikoku-kōtō.

In this way, the once formidable Daidō Danketsu came to an inglorious and rancorous end. It passed beyond recall in October 1889 when the severe wounding of Ōkuma Shigenobu in a bomb outrage brought about the indefinite postponement of treaty revision, and so destroyed the only basis there was for an alliance between the Conservative and Liberal extremists. Itagaki, now that Ōkuma was in hospital and Gotō in the Government, was the only one of the three outstanding leaders of the old popular rights movement who was both fit

and ready for combat. Thinking of the election, he went on trying to get some semblance of order and unity out of the scattered remnants of his former followers. His plan was to re-found the Liberty Party, and make it wide enough to attract both the Daidō Club and the Daidō Kyōwa Kai, each of which would be dissolved. When he suggested this to the various leaders, he encountered many obstacles in the form of regional jealousies and personal rivalries. Undeterred by these, he then sent out invitations to all the prominent leaders of the popular rights movement, asking them to attend a meeting in Osaka on 17 December. He proposed in his letters that the meeting should discuss the formation of a new party.

The Daidō Club leaders travelled en masse to Osaka in response to these invitations; so, too, did their opposite numbers in the Daidō Kyōwa Kai. But the latter, taking offence at Itagaki's professed intention of reconciling the two factions, as revealed in a preliminary interview they had with him, refused outright to attend the actual convention. As a result, only the Daidō Club element was present when Itagaki opened his meeting on 19 December. To them, he explained what he had had in mind when he arranged the conference, and read out a draft prospectus for a new party. This he wanted to call not after the old Jiyū-tō, but after

the still earlier Aikoku-kōtō (Patriots Party). The meeting heard him out; but it came to an end without anything definite being decided. As soon as these proceedings had finished, the Daidō Club opened a separate meeting of its own to discuss the proposed change of name. In the end, it rejected the suggestion that it should start calling itself the Aikoku-kōtō.

This debacle notwithstanding, Itagaki's initiative did lead to something. However this 'something' was not one large and re-invigorated Liberty Party decked out with a 'Patriots Party' label. Rather, it was the formation of three, instead of two, splinter parties. In Osaka, after having brusquely turned down Itagaki's overtures, the Daidō Kyōwa Kai stole his policy and set about reviving the Jiyū-tō. A provisional inauguration ceremony for the new party was held then and there in Osaka; and this was followed by a full-dress affair held in the Kōtō Nakamura Rō, in Tokyo, on 21 January 1890, at which the metamorphosis of the Daidō Kyōwa Kai into the Jiyū-tō was properly effected. The revived Jiyū-tō did not have a single national leadership, but was divided into two wings. These corresponded to the two great geographical divisions of Japan. There was a Kantō Jiyū-tō (north and east of Osaka), the president of which was Ōi Kentaro; and there was a Kansai Jiyū-tō (south

and west of Osaka), under the control of Kobayashi Kusuo. The next step was the holding of a grand convention of all the leading members of the Liberty Party from 21 to 23 February. This convention, which was held in Tokyo, drew up and approved a formal statement of the party's principles and election manifesto.⁷

While the Daidō Kyōwa Kai was busy turning itself into the Jiyū-tō, its rivals in the Daidō Club were also closing their ranks and preparing for the election. The Daidō Club manifesto received unanimous assent at a party convention held on 4 May. Kono Banshū acted as chairman. As with the Jiyū-tō, the Daidō Club policy statement was not just an election manifesto; its leaders took the opportunity to make public for the second time the unchanging axioms of their political beliefs, as well as to put forward a series of vote-catching promises.⁸ Again like the Jiyū-tō, the Daidō Club used the Kōtō Nakamura Rō for their election convention.

The day after this, 5 May, Itagaki, who had not abandoned his scheme for reviving the Aikoku-kōtō after the fiasco of the Osaka conference in the previous December and who had, in the meantime, made a speech tour in the south-western

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See Appx. VIII below.

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See Appx. IX below.

provinces, called a meeting of his closest supporters. More than five hundred of them came to the meeting which took place in the Kōsei-kan, Kobiki-chō, Tokyo, and was the occasion of the official re-birth of the Aikoku-kōtō and also of the publication of that party's general prospectus and election programme.⁹

It was these three splinter parties, then, - the Jiyū-tō the Daidō Club, and the Aikoku-kōtō - which, together with the Kaishin-tō, represented the 'popular rights' end of the Japanese political spectrum in the general election of 1890. Before going on to discuss the different prospectuses and election promises in detail, it is worthwhile pausing a moment to point out that the history of the rise and fall of the Daidō Danketsu illustrates very well the general political temper of the times, and, in particular, the endemic weaknesses of the Liberal movement. The principal opponents of the Meiji bureaucracy could present a united front on a single issue of overriding importance and far-reaching appeal; but they found it next to impossible to coalesce into a broadly based organization, owing allegiance to a single leader. Their popular rights movement was never permanently damaged by official repression; but many of its chief officers were not immune to offers of Government posts.

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See Appx. X below.

The disputes and secessions of the Liberal and Progressive party politicians meant that they faced their enemies in the Government with badly divided forces when it came to the election, and suffered accordingly. On the other side of the political gulf, within the ranks of the bureaucracy, the feeling for a 'transcendental Cabinet' was strengthened by the discords in the 'popular' camp.

While these strictures may be fairly made on one - the organizational - aspect of party politics, however, the theory and content of the election manifestos issued by the Jiyū-tō, Daidō Club, and Aikoku-kōtō in 1890 give a very much better impression of the Liberal half of the popular rights movement. The truth seems to have been that the Liberal cause in 1890 still carried with it the marks of its origins. Having come into existence as an instrument of struggle - struggle to wrest concessions from the authorities on the one hand, and struggle to teach the people basic democratic theory on the other hand - the Jiyū Minken Undō had attracted to its upper echelons not only opportunists like Gotō, but also many men of great talent and imaginative zeal, such as Kono Hironaka, Nakajima Nobuyuki, and Suehiro Shigeyasu. Opportunist or not, all these leaders were persons of strong character and an individualistic bent; many of them had 'done time' in prison. Moreover, in the conditions in which it had taken root, the old popular rights movement had

been forced to put a premium on abstract principles - Liberty Independence Progress - and to rely heavily on its political theorists. This was because its sponsors were seeking a power which they had not yet actually experienced. The wide scope given to theory by the Liberals was made plain in the manifesto of the original Liberty Party. Finally, there was the always simmering clash within the movement between the militant minority in favour of direct action against the Government and the more cautious majority which believed in enforcing its political claims by peaceful means. The history of the dissolution of the first Jiyū-tō afforded ample proof of this basic cleavage.

Thus, in the rarefied 'Fabian' period of 1873-1889, the period of power-seeking without responsibility, the internal ethos of the Liberal movement lent itself to (i) individual initiative and ambition, giving rise to bitter personal rivalries, (ii) the politics of theory and propaganda, and (iii) a serious difference of opinion over the use of force, coupled with armed uprisings by frustrated extremists. In some ways, these tendencies were strengthened by the outside events of the decade of the 1880s, with its agricultural depression, Governmental arbitrariness, and the mounting tension over the treaty problem. Again, over the whole national scene hung the miasma of a vanished feudalism; some of its more inauspicious traits - regionalism and

factionalism - have already been described. Therefore the breakdown of the Daidō Danketsu followed by the emergence of three rival heirs to the mantle of the first Jiyū-tō is quite intelligible; though this does not mean that it and similar disruptions in the future were anything but disastrous for the Liberal cause as a whole. On the other hand, what the advocates of Liberty lost by their failures in the sphere of organization, they to some extent recovered by the good sense that they showed in compiling their respective election declarations. This was a task which they were well qualified to do; and they made the most of both their previous experience in political polemics and the opportunities presented to them by the Government.

The first thing to notice about these manifestos is that, compared with the short, abstract declaration of principle issued by the Jiyū-tō in 1881, they were more moderate, more specific, and a good deal longer. These differences were in part a reflection of the post-1884 resurgence of traditional feeling, and in part a reflection of the imminence of the first parliamentary election. After all, the Liberal leaders would have had a plausible case in 1881, had they argued that as the summoning of the Diet was not to take place until a further nine years had elapsed, it was hardly the time to frame a detailed electoral programme; even though this sort of consideration had not deterred either

the Kaishin-tō or the Teisei-tō from being a good deal more precise about their intentions.

However, even when we have made full allowances for the changes in the country's mood and in the tactical requirements of the situation, we are left, I think, with the conclusion that the comparative conservatism of 1890 arose, at any rate in part, from a falling off of radical, near revolutionary fervour in the Liberal ranks. The principal reason why the Liberal movement underwent this change of spirit in the course of the 1880s - i.e., the growing power of the wealthy rural capitalist element within the party - has already been explained; and here I wish to point to only one of the more obvious touchstones of this trend towards moderation as revealed by a comparison of the manifesto of 1881 with the party declarations of 1890. The old Jiyū-tō three-clause manifesto of 1881 had been rather remarkable in that it had made no mention whatsoever of the Imperial House; now, in 1890, the Daidō Club was implicitly, the Jiyū-tō explicitly, and the Aikoku-kōtō effusively monarchist. Therefore in this respect (and also in others) the Liberal position had moved appreciably closer to that of the Progressives over the intervening years.

The greater pragmatism of the 1890 manifestos is even more readily apparent. The Daidō Club went furthest in this

direction. It introduced its programme to the public in a very cut and dried manner under short headings, such as 'The Strengthening of Independent Sovereignty', or 'The Introduction of Party Cabinets'. The Jiyū-tō did hardly any better, though it did preface its proposals with the general statement that it was a party based on a belief in Liberty. The Aikoku-kōtō stood alone in making a deliberate effort to recapture the spirit and terminology of the earlier and more heroic age of the popular rights movement. Even so, sandwiched between the somewhat highflown perorations on Liberty and Natural Rights that begin and end the Aikoku-kōtō manifesto, there are not a few ca'canny reservations as well as a compact legislative programme.

Another important and obvious feature of the election manifestos is the fact that they all said much the same things. They all came out in favour of:- (i) equal treaties with the foreign powers, (ii) responsibility of the Cabinet to the Diet, (iii) reduction of the land-tax and a policy of financial retrenchment, (iv) extension of the authority of the organs of local self-government, (v) abolition of the Peace Preservation Ordinance and the amendment of other regulations which they held infringed the freedoms of speech and assembly, (vi) a reduction in the number of officials, and (vii) the withdrawal of special Government subsidies for

commerce and industry. In all these matters, there was virtually complete agreement among the three Liberal parties not only about ends but also about means. The solitary slight exception to this seems to have been that whereas the Jiyū-tō and Aikoku-kōtō both asserted the need for specifically party Cabinets, the Daidō Club was content with a resolution that ministers of state should be obliged to acknowledge their responsibility to the Diet as well as to the Emperor. In their attitude towards armaments, too, the Liberal politicians more or less thought alike. The Aikoku-kōtō manifesto said that the party would arm the country no more than was necessary for its own defence, and decisively rejected policies of aggression. Though the Daidō Club, on the other hand, stated that it would enlarge the Army and Navy so far as the gradual increase in the strength of the nation would allow, both it and the Jiyū-tō promised to revise the conscription system in order to shorten the periods of active or reserve service it entailed.

A look through the items listed above shows that the Liberal opposition could launch a shrewd and damaging attack on the Government in matters relating to its personnel as well as its policies. In some ways this attack was an unfair one, but that simply made it all the more effective. As has been demonstrated, the unequal treaties were in many ways

the Achilles heel of those in power; and to raise an unthinking cry for the revision of them was one of the surest ways of winning popular support and at the same time bedevilling the Government's diplomatic efforts. Yet though the Liberal manifestos all contained a clause saying that equal treaties would be signed, none of them went on to elaborate exactly how the foreigners would be brought to view the question with the same urgency as the Japanese did. The promise to reduce the land-tax would produce an equally favourable response from the predominantly rural electorate. Again, though, there was more than a tinge of irresponsibility in this proposal. Granted that the manifestos implied or explicitly declared that economies would be made by streamlining the administration and dismissing supernumerary officials, the amount of money thus saved would have hardly compensated for any large-scale reduction in the land-tax. This was still the Government's main source of revenue. Moreover, the easiest way to secure treaty revision was to have a big Army and Navy, and that took money.

The same general judgements may be passed on two of the other planks in the Liberal platform - consolidation of local self-government and a thinning out of the numbers of Civil Servants at all levels of administration. These pledges were good politics, but both of them were to some extent poor statesmanship.

The process of centralization had gone a very long way in the first two decades of the Meiji period; and this development could be made to seem all the more onerous when contrasted to the fief-autonomy of Tokugawa times. Therefore the Government's opponents were no doubt able to rely on a backwash of regional sentiment. Of course, I do not wish to deny that the opposition had reasonable grounds for complaint in this matter, and that regional loyalties were still one of the main supports of the whole Liberty and Popular Rights Movement. Nevertheless there was something a little unreal in 1890 about some of the more particularist statements to be found in the Liberal manifestos, such as the one emphasizing the separate rights of the provinces or the one to the effect that local custom should be made the basis of the Municipal and the Town and Village Codes. Anything but a uniform and closely supervised system of local self-government would have been hampering and wasteful to a country in the throes of modernization.

Likewise, the demand for a reduction in the numerical strength of the Civil Service might have proved a little more difficult to realise in practice than it had been to make on paper. Certainly, the Civil Service was over-staffed, and the Government itself issued orders for the dismissal of redundant officers in the weeks preceding the election. But

it is probable that the Liberals tended to exaggerate for their own ends the numbers of 'drones' living at the taxpayers' expense; and since the officials, civil and military, were in many ways the standard-bearers of Japan's march to the West, their numbers could not have been cut back too ruthlessly. The Liberals were on very safe ground tactically speaking, though, in making plain their animosity to the bureaucrats. There is no reason to doubt Suematsu Kenchō's word on this matter and he declared:-

[Judging] by the experiences of the recent general election, it would appear to be very hard for an official to become a Member [of the House of Representatives]. Apparently, officials were generally detested so far as the election of Members was concerned. In so saying, I would appear to be praising myself; because I was elected while holding an official post. However, consider my election to have been quite exceptional! 10

In Suematsu's opinion, many of the electors feared that if they elected officials to the House of Representatives, the Government would pass whatever legislation it pleased without paying attention to public opinion. Such a prospect was the reverse of pleasing to the mass of electors. Suematsu himself made this clear when he spoke elsewhere in his talk of the voting public's disenchantment with the fact that:-

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.216.

The present Government, even though there have been some comings and goings amongst the ministers, has been in the hands of the same group of people ever since the restoration. 11

A little earlier than this, but still on the same point of the electors' desire for change, he had said that there was a vague but widespread hope that the political scene would be radically altered as a result of the institution of the Diet, and that the latter 'would be of great use to the people in every way.' Other evidence proves that Suematsu was quite correct in his assessment of the general temper of the electorate in this matter of Government versus people.

It was these circumstances that gave the demand for party or Diet-controlled Cabinets such a prominent place in all three manifestos, and made it the opening shot of a bitter struggle that went on for the greater part of the ensuing decade. Indeed, both in terms of the situation as it existed in 1890 and in terms of future constitutional development, this demand was the keystone of the Liberal (and Progressive) programme. Once the principle of party government was conceded, the rest (reduction of the land-tax, strengthening of local self-government, etc. etc.) would automatically follow in so far as it was practically feasible. Moreover a party Cabinet, if it had still wanted to, would

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p. 202-3.

have had little difficulty in abolishing the more obnoxious relics of the past such as the Peace Preservation Ordinance (the Government had soon allowed it to lapse, but still had the power to re-impose it), and in removing minor irritations like the excessive red-tapism, not to mention the latent tyranny, of the Newspaper, Public Meetings, and Publications Regulations. Naturally, in view of the internecine squabbles of the Liberal leaders and the country's lack of experience in representative government, it was possible for the bureaucrats to argue with a fair degree of plausibility that 'transcendental', i.e. non-party, Cabinets were better for the time being. Yet nothing is perfect, and as has been pointed out earlier, making the Cabinet responsible to the Diet was the next step in securing a fully effective parliamentary democracy for Japan.

Compared with the promise to introduce party Cabinets, the attack on Government subsidies or other forms of protection for private industry was of a lesser order of political magnitude. In 1890, these subsidies were still inconsiderable and they were to be multiplied many times during the following two decades; but throughout the Meiji era, Government assistance formed one of the pillars of industrialization. From the Liberal point of view, however, hostility towards the growing manufacturing and trading combines of the cities

accorded as well with the underlying dogma of laissez-faire as it did with the earlier commitment to cut the land-tax. Moreover, even though a policy of 'no protection' was hardly practical so long as Japan had not regained tariff autonomy and remained in the infancy of industrialization, diplomacy and national economic strength were still the sole concern of the Liberals' enemies in the administration. Similarly, the proposal to dispense with special financial aid to big business was well calculated to appeal to the sectional interests of the rural areas where most of the voters lived, even though it opened a rift between the Liberals and the city-backed Progressives.

As has been noted, the manifestos put out by both the Daidō Club and the Jiyū-tō, but strangely enough not that of the Aikoku-kōtō in spite of its greater emphasis on the theory of Liberalism, contained suggestions for electoral reform. These suggestions consisted in the main of a pledge to make the constituencies bigger - this implied that all future elections would be conducted in accordance with the system of scrutin de liste - and a promise to widen the franchise by lowering the age and tax qualifications for electors. Perhaps the reason why the Aikoku-kōtō did not include electoral reform in its programme of legislation for the first Diet was that this programme was deliberately

restricted to what the party considered to be the most urgent of urgent matters. Be that as it may, there can be little doubt that the Daidō Club and Jiyū-tō politicians were serious and in many ways justified in putting forward these proposals. The existing electoral system cried out for an extension of the franchise in particular.

The general impression left by the three Liberal manifestos as a whole, even after one has taken into account their inconsistencies and electioneering opportunism, is one of solid worth and purposeful zeal. Their over-all efficacy - both as a means of winning votes and as a pointer to future policies - was proved by the results of the election in which the three Liberal parties between them won almost half the seats in the House of Representatives, and by what happened after it was all over. Treaty revision was eventually accomplished by direct and secret negotiations between the Meiji Government and the Powers concerned, without either the concurrence or the interference of the Imperial Diet. The Liberals could have hardly quarrelled with the outcome of these 'private' talks; since they abolished extra-territorial jurisdiction forthwith, and ensured that Japan would regain her tariff autonomy at the end of a fixed number of years. In other matters - notably, the introduction of party Cabinets, the widening of the franchise,

the curtailment of expenditure, and the abolition of the Peace Preservation Ordinance - interested Members of the House of Representatives fought on until they won most or part of what they and their spiritual forbears of 1890 had wanted. Only on the issue of decentralization do they seem to have scored a complete blank; but there, they were to a not inconsiderable extent forestalled by Yamagata's broad-minded approach to the problems of local self-government. The new Municipal and Town and Village Codes were only just going into operation at the time of the election. Then again, as has been explained already, the more regionalist overtones of the Liberal pronouncements on local government were not appropriate to the day and age.

If in the last analysis the Liberal ideas on regional autonomy were somewhat out of date and an unwelcome vestige of the country's own feudal past, yet another and even more important aspect of their election manifestos was, at the time when they were composed, rapidly becoming obsolescent in terms of Western European political development. This was the conviction, running all through the manifestos, that Liberty would of itself and quite unaided cure all the evils of society. Already in 1890, laissez-faire carried to this extent had a taste of mid-century naivete and selfishness. The corollary of this was the Liberals' singular lack of interest in matters of social, as opposed to political, reform.

The Jiyū-tō declared that it would amend the education system and encourage the spread of learning; the Aikoku-kōtō looked forward to improving the prison system, but whether it was actuated by philanthropic motives or by thoughts of saving the tax-payers' money was not clear. Apart from these minor, if not quite meaningless asserations, the Liberal manifestos were bereft of any black and white proposals for the betterment of social conditions. Their prevailing philosophy was that of upper-class individualism; and their overriding objective was to bring about a decrease in the powers and expenditures of the Government.

The ideological sections of the Aikoku-kōtō manifesto raised two or three interesting points. Firstly, it contained a definite attempt to clarify the position of the followers of Itagaki vis-a-vis the Imperial House. Briefly, the argument was that Liberalism by making the monarchy constitutional would strengthen it, whereas absolutism would only endanger it by antagonizing public opinion; and further, that by making the Empire strong and independent by means of the correct application of Liberal principles, the innate glory of its august Sovereign would be put on view for all to see. The Emperor, in other words, was to be the topmost and most resplendent flower on the Liberal tree. Not being permitted to govern himself, he

he was thereby to be made the all the more secure, and still semi-divine, symbol of the greatness and prosperity of his subjects under Liberal rule. For Japan, republicanism was out of the question; and this was probably as good a way as any of trying to solve the knotty problem of reconciling the formal omnipotence of the dynasty with the actualities of constitutional government. In advancing these ideas, the Aikoku-kōtō undoubtedly drew much moral support from the example of England.

Elsewhere in what I have called the 'ideological sections' of its manifesto, the Aikoku-kōtō urged the need for a large united party in the 'popular' camp, so that the radical politicians would be able to meet the forces of the Government on something like equal terms in the Diet. This again was an important issue. Not only would a large number of small parties in the House of Representatives have made it easy for the Government to control the Diet rather than the other way round; but it was of special relevance to the election of 1890, when the Liberals themselves were split into three factions and there were many Independent candidates. More will be said about the influence and attitudes of these Independents later. Mention should be made here, however, of the fact that the whole notion of a political party, avowedly organized to advance personal

ambitions or sectional interests, ran counter to the Confucian and feudal ideal of disinterested public service. As a result of this, there was always a certain antipathy in many minds to the idea of a political party as such, and so an inclination to vote for Independents simply because they were Independents. This sort of antagonism was a constant worry to the advocates of popular rights; and none of them was more conscious of its damaging effects than Itagaki himself. The use of such terms as 'Patriot' and 'Public' (Aikoku-kōtō = Public Party of Patriots; Aikoku-sha = Patriotic Society) in naming his Liberal organizations was one of the means he devised for trying to rid them of the stigma of being thought a cabal.

Finally, at the very end of the Aikoku-kōtō manifesto, there appeared a passage about the possibility of Japan exerting her influence all over the world as the Oriental fortress and protagonist of freedom and independence. This glittering hope was held out in contrast to the existing state of affairs under which

Ah, our land of the dragon-fly is an orphan isle!

Short and vaguely couched, it is hard to know exactly what to make of these sentences; but they would seem to confirm

other evidence that expansionism and a sense of national mission were sentiments affecting all quarters of the political world in Meiji Japan. In this case, though, the implication was that the way to world-wide influence lay through moral leadership rather than military hegemony.

Itagaki, in the speeches he made during the election campaign, played upon these three themes of constitutional monarchy, stable parties, and world influence; as well as dealing with the other main issues such as the necessity for financial retrenchment and the evils of too much centralization. When talking to a gathering at Mito, he used the metaphor of a strong colt to describe the vigour that a constitutional and parliamentary state would derive from its institutions. One of his purposes here was to show that the people could expect an improvement in the country's diplomatic position, and by implication an extension of its international prestige, if they adopted the principles of Liberalism.

At the same time, by saying that the Emperor would be made to accept the honour of riding this strong colt, he was attempting to explain the Liberal conception of the relations that, properly speaking, should have subsisted between the Sovereign and his subjects. In the part of the speech immediately preceding this, he alleged that 'absolutist'

methods of honouring the Emperor would amount to no more than elevating Him by burying the common people under the ground and leaving His Majesty above it. 12

He was uncompromising in his declarations that Liberalism, as it would increase the welfare and happiness of the mass of the Imperial subjects, was the best way of showing loyal respect to the throne. Conversely, the statist thinking of the Meiji bureaucrats he considered to be disloyal to the throne; and, what was more, illogical in itself:-

If it were said, 'you people shall be poor, but your State shall be rich and powerful' - who would submit to such an argument?

Itagaki asked, after stating that:-

The Liberalism which our Party advocates is individualism. That is to say, it is the view that if one sets out to enlarge national rights, one must widen popular rights. If it is desirable to make the State wealthy and strong, one must make individuals wealthy and strong.

It will be seen that the attack was made not so much on the long-term Meiji objectives of strengthening the state and enlarging national rights, as on the means whereby the Government was seeking to attain them. Furthermore, even

though there was an unequivocal assertion of the individualist basis of Liberal philosophy, and even though the idea that a free community would ipso facto also be a powerful one had been popular outside Japan for several generations, Itagaki's words on this occasion would seem to indicate that he still had to appreciate the fact that at the root of Western individualism lay the purpose of realizing the full potentialities of a man as a personal soul rather than as a national subject. This is a point to be made more in sorrow than anger; and it should not be taken as a completely damaging reflection on either Itagaki's outlook or the achievements of the popular rights movement. Just over twenty years had elapsed since the overthrow of feudalism, and the position of Japan in international affairs was still weak. In these circumstances, the fact that Itagaki was able to give such a trenchant exposition of one side of the Liberal case and to insist that individual rights must take precedence over state rights, at any rate in so far as one could not have the latter without the former, was of very great credit to him and the cause for which he had fought.

This speech showed that Itagaki had remained consistent since the birth of the Liberal movement in Tosa to his belief in the need to build a strong Empire on the energies of an emancipated people, living under a representative system.

On the other great questions of parties and the part they should be expected to play in a national assembly, however, there were signs that he had moved away from the doctrinaire, Rousseau-esque approach of the early days. The theory of the General Will, implying as it did that the Members of the House of Representatives would be no more than the delegates of the voters and bound to obey them in every particular, was demolished with the observation that as the majority of electors were fools, this would inevitably lead on to a government of fools. 'The object of a representative system', he declared, 'is to make use of the wise.' The proper task of a Representative was, in his opinion, to represent indirectly the views of his constituents. This trend away from the cruder interpretations of the doctrine of the mandate of the people, interpretations which had been prominent in the by-gone years of struggle for a constitution and a national assembly, was indicative of the power of the upper-class and politically moderate forces behind Itagaki's mainstream Liberalism. At the same time, it displayed a greater understanding of the true nature of parliamentary government as known in England. In less theoretical terms, it was yet another step towards the Kaishin-tō position, and foreshadowed the long period of control of the House of Representatives by two parties that shared the same general conservative point of view.

But, if the Representatives were not to be the talking puppets of their masters in the constituencies, how was the bond of representation to be retained at all, and how were the voters going to be able to discriminate between honest men and dishonest rogues? Itagaki's answer was given in one word - 'principle'. Men of principle, he said, would, if elected to parliament, remain true to their beliefs as a general criterion of political morality while exercising their right to use their own judgement in more mundane matters. Further, by persuading the candidates to make public their principles before the day of the election, the voters would be able to sort out the sheep from the goats. Finally, principles were the thing around which political parties were formed; therefore it was of the utmost importance that electors should vote for candidates who were enrolled in a political party, and not for Independents. Thus, from two points of view - from the point of view of checking the tyranny of government, and from the point of view of obtaining a House of Representatives that would effectively represent the general interests of the electors - 'political parties are the foundation of a representative system of government.'

To recapitulate Itagaki's arguments in favour of a system of strong parties founded on principle, and to get

something of the flavour of his own personality, it is best to let him speak in his own words for a little longer:-

Principles are the compass of the political world. Political parties are founded on them; and Representatives move in accordance with them. The confidence which the electors have in their Representatives is nothing other than a confidence in their principles. Therefore, in electing Representatives, we must first of all discover their principles and ascertain their talents. To ascertain men's talents and to discover their principles is the way to become a people that gives its support to political parties, and to make clear the condition of the political world. Moreover, Representatives must on the one hand stand by their parties and advance their cause, and on the other hand reflect upon the parties and criticize them of their own accord. That is how it is. If the people sees fit to put its trust in principles and to discover men's talents, by means of forming a large and vigorous party, it will ensure the creation of a perfect representative system from the first, without there being any opportunity for ruffians and flatterers to practise their arts.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to give any more extracts from Itagaki's Mito speech, or to go on discussing it in detail; but I hope that enough has been said to show how large these issues of State Rights versus Individual Rights, of theoretical Dynastic Absolutism versus practical Constitutional Monarchy, and of Independents versus Party Candidates loomed in his mind, and presumably in the minds of his hearers too. The passages quoted will also, I trust, have conveyed something of his point of view on these topics, and of the high plane of impartial morality and clarity of thought on which he could conduct a political debate. Some have called Itagaki the Rousseau, but I - at any rate in relation to the positions he took up in 1890 - would prefer the term 'the Gladstone of Japan'.

The Mito speech was delivered on 18 June. On the previous day, Itagaki had covered much the same ground in an address given in Ibaraki prefecture. On that occasion, he started off with a short eulogy of constitutional government, congratulating his audience on the fact that, with the opening of the Diet, they were going to be born as 'genuine human beings.' (He used more or less the same words at the beginning of his Mito speech.) After describing, in a suitably guarded way, his view of how the constitution had been granted, in form as an act of grace on the part of the Emperor but in reality as a result of the unremitting efforts

of the campaigners for popular rights, Itagaki made a series of rapier thrusts at what he held up as examples of the tyrannical and wasteful methods of the pre-constitution bureaucracy. The specific evils named were conscription (blood-tax) and general taxation. While speaking on the theme of burdensome taxation and misuse of public funds by the Government, he was able to give some under-cover rubs to two other sores of the body politic - centralization and the failure to revise the treaties. This is what he said, in part:-

Despite the fact that we, together with you, are burdened with taxes, two-horse carriages are driven round [in the capital_7, fat horses neigh at the gates, the notes of organs resound mightily in the Rokumei-kan, and the currency leaves the countryside to become the plaything of Government contractors in Tokyo. Our manufactures and industries are short of capital and are on the verge of extinction looking at it from our point of view, we are entitled to ask whether the Government does not spend money wastefully. The value of land falls; more and more bank-notes are issued. Our misfortunes pile up; and starvation hangs over us morning and evening. However, we cannot give voice to our complaints. Truly, ours is a miserable and piteous condition. Gentlemen, I hope you will give this your fullest consideration. Could anything be more miserable and piteous? 13

The reference to the Rokumei-kan was particularly astute. This was the name of the pleasure pavilion which had been specially constructed by the Government in Tokyo for entertaining the diplomatic representatives of the Treaty

Powers. There, Inoue Kaoru, Itō Hirobumi, and other high Japanese officials had passed the time in the years 1886-7 by playing cards or dancing with members of the foreign communities, in the hope, of course, of encouraging them to persuade their home governments that Japan was sufficiently Westernized to have equal treaties. Not only had the manoeuvre failed to convince the governments of the Powers concerned of the merits of the Japanese case (history is more or less silent on the subject of what the foreign envoys, their staffs, and their respective families themselves thought of the entertainments), but it made the Japanese Government unpopular with a large section of public opinion that did not like to see the leaders of the country behaving in too Western a fashion. Consequently, the whole Rokumeikan episode could be easily presented by Itagaki and other opponents of the Government as a very extravagant and, what was more, dangerously Western fiasco.

The manufactures and industries mentioned in the above extract can be taken, I think, to mean rural enterprises like the distilling of sake or the making of soy sauce. It was certainly not the case that the Government was withholding much-needed capital from the heavy industries in the cities. Even the rural industries were in much better shape, economically speaking, in 1890 than they had been six or

seven years before at the height of the agricultural depression. Similarly, the complaint that 'we cannot give voice to our complaints' was more a piece of retrospective rhetoric - that is, a casting back to the Government's use of such measures as the Peace Preservation Ordinance or the Public Meetings Regulations in its contests with the Liberals and their extremist supporters over the past ten years - than a valid expression of an existing grievance. Obviously it cannot be taken literally; otherwise, Itagaki and the other opposition politicians would not have been allowed to make anti-Government speeches.

So far, comparing the Ibaraki speech with the one that was given on the following day at Mito, it is clear that the former did not contain any of the latter's analysis of fundamental problems to do with the status of the Emperor or the nature of the State. However, in the second part of the Ibaraki address, Itagaki did enlarge on the dangers of electing Independents. Party men, he said, were honourable, and not prone to theft or telling lies. In this, they stood in flattering contrast to their non-party opponents, in particular to those of them who were retired officials or members of the local assemblies, whom he accused of being both corrupt and stupid. He expressed the hope that at least one hundred and fifty members of his own party would be returned to the House of Representatives; and throughout

his words there ran the idea that parliamentary rule could be expected to function well, only if the parties were represented in sufficient numbers.

Itagaki's strictures and exhortations on these two occasions reached a wider audience than that for which they had been originally intended; as they were re-printed in the newspapers. Moreover, he was by no means exceptional in his efforts to win over the electors by arguing his case. We shall see that speech-making and to a lesser extent public debates were one of the most prominent features of the campaign as a whole. At this stage, however, space permits the mention of only two other examples of campaign oratory. The first is the draft of a speech prepared by Okamoto Takeo for the voters in the Second Constituency of Mie prefecture;¹⁴ the second is a speech given by Matsuo Seijiro, a candidate for the Third Constituency in Tokyo.¹⁵

Okamoto was something of a lone bird, politically. He had fought for the Tokugawa during the War of the Restoration; but later came to terms with the Meiji Government, and served it in various capacities. For a few months in 1872 and 1873, he was a member of the Left Board of the Dajōkan, but lost his post when the Board was re-organized. The next

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TNNS 4-6-90, 5-6-90, and 6-6-90.

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TNNS 28-6-90.

two years he spent working for the local government authorities in Ibaraki and Mizusawa prefectures, but was dissatisfied either with his immediate superiors or else with the type of work handled by prefectural offices. A patriot and an individualist, with a keen interest in educating both himself and his countrymen, neither his temperament nor his ambitions suited him for the routine-ridden life of a local government official. Therefore, when the Imperial rescript of 1875 promising the gradual introduction of constitutional government was published, he left the world of officialdom for good in order to begin a career in journalism.

To his new profession he remained constant for the rest of his life, clearly because he found in it a proper outlet for his talents and aspirations. For several years, he was editor of the Akebono Shimbun (Daybreak Newspaper), a Jiyū Minken Undō journal, but later left it to join the staff of the generally pro-Government Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun for which he was one of the leader-writers at the time of the election. When the Constitutional Imperial Party had been first formed in 1882, Okamoto had become a member of it, but soon resigned because - to put it in his own words - 'I was put off by its inevitable one-sidedness.' Thereafter, though in many ways he tended to find common

ground with the Liberals and Progressives and was strongly in favour of Japan developing a system of united and responsible parties like that to be found in Britain or the United States, he refused to join any other party and stood as an Independent candidate in 1890. Evidently, he objected as much to the factionalism and self-interest of the radicals in 1890 as he had done to the 'one-sidedness' of their political enemies in 1882.¹⁶

It is clear from this record of an inability to see eye to eye either with the Government or its principal opponents that Okamoto was a highly intelligent man of affairs, who had failed in some respects to adjust to the restoration. Having fought, out of a sense of loyalty, for the losing side in the War of the Restoration, he was made to realise that he could never expect to rise to very great heights in the Sat-Chō regime. He had personal grounds, therefore, for throwing in his lot with the popular rights agitators. Moreover, he was genuinely attracted by much of what he had taught himself about the West in long years devoted to study; but it was an idealistic view of the West that had stamped itself on his mind. So, too, with his own country. The Japan of Okamoto's imaginings was as heroic as the best traditions of its own feudal past - a country in

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See Shūgi-in Giin Kōhōsha Retsuden, pp. 220-252.

which everyone's first allegiance was to a particularly enlightened brand of patriotism. It was not the Japan of his own day and age - a country in which, to his way of thinking, both those in power and those seeking power were willing to sacrifice the national good to party interest and individual ambition. In short, Okamoto was an idealist who remained an idealist, and was both behind and ahead of his times. Therefore he discovered his metier, and no doubt his consolation, in educating the people for their future under a constitutional system of government by making constant reference in his own mind to the most altruistic standards of a bygone age.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Okamoto should have preferred to stand as an Independent, when he was asked by a number of people in the Yokkaichi district of Mie prefecture if he would agree to be one of the candidates for their constituency. The address in question was one that he had written for a tour of the constituency (Second Constituency, Mie prefecture) from 25 to 30 May. The purpose of the tour had been to introduce himself to the general body of voters and have his nomination confirmed. Subsequent to his tour, the first draft of his speech was published by the Tokyo Nichi Nichi. His opinions, judging from this document, were straightforward and intelligent,

though characteristically utopian. It was in keeping, too, with what we know of his career and temperament that he should have concentrated on explaining the opportunities and dangers of the representative system as a whole. He spent little or no time in attacking either the Government or the popular rights parties.

He seems to have come close to the thinking of the bureaucracy in stressing the fact that parliament's role was to assist the Cabinet, not to replace it, and to 'rectify the administration.' He did not advocate party Cabinets. Nevertheless, even though the House of Representatives would be the junior partner in the administration, indeed precisely because it would be the junior partner in the administration, it was of the utmost importance to have it as strong and as upright as possible. This could come about only if the right sort of people were elected; and so everything depended on the choice and good sense of the voters.

The rest of what he had to say was chiefly devoted to advising the people on how to regard their responsibilities as voters. The model he wished them to bear in mind was England, where, he said, elections were usually fought keenly but fairly by two candidates representing the Liberal and Conservative Parties, who had been chosen by the local

members of the parties. He realized that it would have been virtually impossible for a country such as Japan, without any previous experience of parliamentary elections and in the grip of a general uncertainty as to the manner in which a representative system would work in practice, to reach in a day the English level of internal stability and political maturity. Nevertheless this realization did not prevent him from urging that the Japanese should make every possible effort to ensure that their first House of Representatives would be an effective and honest one.

An ineffective or dishonest House, he argued, would prove worse in some ways than no House at all, and would be the cause of endless troubles in the future. Therefore as this initial step under a constitutional system was the vital one, and as the takers of this initial step were none other than the electors, and as the situation in the majority of constituencies was far from satisfactory; he considered himself justified in asking his audiences to take their responsibilities as voters very seriously indeed. To help them in their task of selecting worthy Representatives, he offered them four suggestions. These were:- (i) that they should choose competent men, (ii) that they should not allow themselves to be swayed by bribery or intimidation in making their choice, (iii) that they should not surrender

their right to vote, and (iv) that they should not give their votes to a large number of candidates, so that whoever was successful owed his election to what had been in fact a minority vote.

Points (i) and (ii) need no further comment for the moment. The idea behind the other two suggestions was that if for one reason or another the House did not fairly represent the majority opinion in the country, it would be without a *raison d'être* in logic and incapacitated in practice. Generally speaking, Okamoto thought that so long as the electors remembered and conformed to these four rules of conduct, constitutional government would have a fair chance of prospering from the start in Japan. One thing, indeed, he noted, the experiment of 1890 did have in its favour, and that was the fact that the constitution had been promulgated in times of peace and plenty. Japanese democracy, starting under the tranquil mandate of the highest in the land, would not carry with it the poison of having originated in strife or usurpation. This asset to some extent made up for the disadvantages of a tradition of 'dictatorship', and of being 'befogged on a limitless ocean' when it came to discriminating between the multitude of candidates.

A prominent feature of the election of 1890 was the fact that there were usually at least four and often as many

as ten or twelve candidates for each seat. The majority of them had not been nominated by one of the recognized parties; neither had they been asked to stand by a group of responsible public men in the constituency, in the way Okamoto himself had been. They had come forward unasked and completely of their own initiative to stand for election. In other words, they were - in the phrase of the time - 'self-nominated' Independent candidates. The low calibre and questionable strategems of the great majority of these self-nominated Independents, together with the baneful influence they exercised on the election, were denounced, fully and fairly, in the following passage of Okamoto's speech:-

If one goes around the provinces and sees what is happening in them at the present time, either there are people suddenly coming forward as candidates who had no status in political society hitherto, or else there are occasionally people who, belonging to old provincial families, have the singular good fortune [of being able to] rely on their friends among the electors and do not [have to] take into account their own strength even And then, looking at the behaviour of these self-nominated candidates, when one sees that their behaviour is in most cases not straightforward and impartial, such as seeking a large measure of support by getting up on a rostrum and giving vent to their own views on politics, and that for the most part they are planning to get hold of votes in stealth and secrecy, it will be realized that they are having recourse to those measures which, in the normal course of events, should be most avoided in electing Members. 17

The blame for this sorry state of affairs Okamoto laid in part on the leaders of the popular parties; because they had not maintained them at a high enough level of organization, and, in particular, because they had not ensured that there would be a reasonable and proper distribution of reputable candidates among the prefectures. Consequently there were cases of three or four candidates sharing the same political views but contesting with each other for the same seat, while in a neighbouring constituency, perhaps, there was nobody with Liberal convictions and a name for integrity in the list of competitors. He also blamed the local men of affairs in many areas for having failed to form nomination committees to pick men who would, if elected, be of service to their constituents and of credit to their country. In order to rid the political world of the evils of self-nominated Independents and their electioneering methods, he called for the speedy formation of nomination committees of this kind in areas where they did not already exist. He wanted members of the prefectural or village assemblies or other men of local fame to serve on these committees. In addition to nominating responsible candidates, they were also to act as an electors' watch committee, examining the credentials of any others who offered themselves for election and 'driving away' all

those contestants guilty of unfair practices. Only by measures such as these could a clean election be held, and a responsible and powerful House of Representatives returned.

The fact that Okamoto, himself an Independent, could deliver himself of these views, concerning the purposes of parliamentary government in general and the conduct of the majority of his fellow Independents in particular, meant that Itagaki's censure of non-party candidates as a class could not have been applicable in each and every instance. On the other hand, both Okamoto and Itagaki had no time for the usual run of Independent candidatures. Perhaps, as Okamoto suggested, a broad distinction should be made between the numerous self-nominated Independents and the far fewer Independents who had been requested to stand by a responsible group in the constituency.

To continue comparing the opinions expressed by Okamoto with those revealed in the speeches of Itagaki, the former seems to have been rather less contemptuous of the electors. He at no time so much as hinted that he considered most of them to be fools. On the contrary, he was continually stressing the great powers for good or evil that the constitutional system had given to the electorate. Again, while Okamoto made it clear that the supreme value of an energetic, well-informed, and incorruptible House of Representatives would lie in its ability to check stupid or

tyrannical tendencies on the part of the bureaucracy, he did not bother to cite specific examples of Governmental arbitrariness or to delimit the prerogatives of the throne as Itagaki had done. His overriding concern had been to point out the dangers in having so many self-nominated candidates of little worth and no scruple, and to emphasize the importance of electing talented and honest men.

This last was a theme which was given more and more prominence in the candidates' speeches and newspaper editorials as the election campaign neared its end. The tendency was for rather high-minded explanations of the people's rights to give way to outspoken diatribes on electoral corruption. Matsuo Seijiro's speech was one of the diatribes. Matsuo was a Tokyo lawyer and a member of the fu assembly; in politics, he was a Liberal who had for a while dallied with the Kaishin-tō. His speech was one of a series given by the local candidates at a discussion meeting in Kyōbashiward on 26 June. Following the same general line of argument as that used by Itagaki, Okamoto, and many others, he began by drawing the attention of his audience to the important role which the new Diet would play in the affairs of a constitutional country, and, having made that point, went on to stress the need for clean elections. Once again, the high standard of parliamentary life in England was presented

as the objective at which Japan should aim; and, like Itagaki, Matsuo was of the opinion that all candidates should be forced to make a public declaration of their principles. The main part of the speech, however, was entirely given over to bitter denunciations of the dishonest or unfair methods by means of which many of the candidates were running their campaigns. The method he criticized most harshly was the shameless (and illegal) bribing of the electors - that is, the making of agreements 'after the glasses and before the plates.'

Thus, we find that, as well as the larger and more abstruse issues, like the position of the monarchy and the right of the parties to form the government of the Empire, the more circumscribed but none the less significant question of how the election should be conducted, or more properly speaking of how the election should not be conducted, was itself an all-important topic at the time.

- (iii) Attempts To Amalgamate The Three Liberal Parties and To Organize A Coalition Between The Liberals and The Progressives - The Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties and The Kōin Club.

It has already been noted that when the Jiyū-tō, the Kaishin-tō, and the Teisei-tō were formed in the early 1880s, numerous regional clubs and associations, all of them political, came into existence. Most of these had been affiliated to one or other of the big national parties, though some of them had been independent bodies. Exactly the same sort of thing took place after the revival of party activity in the years 1887 and 1888; and these local associations figure prominently in the records of the first general election. For example, in Yokohama city, the seat was fought for by the Kōdō Club on the one side, and the Kōyū-sha in co-operation with the Dōkō-kai on the other.¹⁸ The Kōdō Club (Justice Club) was the local landlords' stronghold and connected with the Liberals, while the Kōyū-sha and Dōkō-kai (both these names mean something like 'Friendly Society') represented the mercantile interest in the city and were linked with the Kaishin-tō.

For our present purposes, however, the most notable of these regional political clubs were the ones to be found in

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TNNS 20-6-90.

Kyushu. There, every prefecture seems to have had at least one 'progressive' association; and as the conservatives were particularly strong in places like Kumamoto and Kagoshima, their opponents no doubt felt all the more keenly the weaknesses of their own divisions. In April 1889, representatives of the various progressive factions had met in Kagoshima and had agreed to form themselves into a Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties. The groups that came together in this confederation retained their separate identities, but they do seem to have had a measure of success in framing an organization that would link them all together and so prevent them from cutting each other's throats. On the other hand, although the Kyushu Confederation of Progressives contained elements that elsewhere would have found themselves under the banners of either the Liberals or the Progressives (i.e. the Kaishin-tō), none of its constituent parts did in fact have anything more than the most tenuous relations with the 'up-country' parties.¹⁹ Thus, the Kyushu Confederation of Progressives was at one and the same time a precedent to show the feasibility of uniting the Liberals and the Kaishin-tō, something which only the Daidō Danketsu movement had attempted before, and

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Kokumin Shimbun 2-6-90.

an example also of the strength of the separatist tradition in the southern island's politics, something which had revealed itself most openly on the occasion of the Satsuma rebellion.

A year after its inaugural meeting, the leaders of the Kyushu Confederation of Progressives met again in Kagoshima on 17 April 1890, and resolved to do what they could to bring about a reconciliation between the Liberal factions and the Kaishin-tō on the national level. In effect, they were anxious to do for the country as a whole what they had achieved in one region of it. Not unnaturally, these developments in Kyushu had been closely watched by observers elsewhere and had attracted much comment. Therefore when, in conformity to the resolution adopted at Kagoshima, four delegates of the Kyushu Confederation arrived in Tokyo at the end of May to open talks on the subject of a National Confederation of Progressive Parties, the newspapers of the metropolis were for a few days full of articles on the matter.

Meanwhile, for some time before this, attentive readers of the press of the capital had been able to follow the somewhat tortuous details of a completely separate series of negotiations. These had had for their aim the more limited, but possibly even more essential, one of bringing

together the three Liberal parties. In other words, in May and early June 1890, there was a definite movement afoot to unite the Jiyū-tō, the Daidō Club, and the Aikoku-kōtō. Since their respective election manifestos had had so much in common, since there was a great deal to be gained from refraining from fighting each other at the polls, and since the potential rewards of making a united and determined stand against the Government in the House of Representatives were plain to see; a basis for this sort of rapprochement clearly existed. Indeed, the only real obstacle was the mutual jealousy and distrust displayed by the Liberal factions' leaders. The fact that union proved so difficult to achieve in practice was a fitting comment in itself on the virulence of those feelings. However three of the most senior people in the Liberal movement - Nakajima Nobuyuki, Takenouchi Tsuna, and Katō Heishiro - busied themselves with arranging an understanding among the three parties.

Nakajima, Takenouchi, and Katō first of all relied on holding private conversations with each of the three parties in turn, so that none of them had a first-hand knowledge of the others' attitudes. These discussions showed that there was a genuine interest in amalgamation on all sides. Nevertheless, there was disagreement over

problems such as the date for making a firm decision on a common programme of action, and the exact form of the proposed organization, i.e. was it to be a political or non-political association?

If yet another election manifesto, this time in the names of all three Liberal parties, had been issued within four weeks of the election, Jiyū-tō, Daidō Club, or Aikoku-kōtō adherents who up till then had been fighting each other in the provinces might well have felt disheartened. On the other hand, the weakest of these three parties would probably benefit from incorporation in the other two, as this would ensure the election of its leaders, at any rate, and, what was more, would give them some followers to lead in the House of Representatives.

In the same fashion, the question of having a political or non-political association depended for its answer on the immediate interests of each of the parties involved. A non-political body would have served to link the Liberal factions together in a very loose way, but would have been powerless to intervene in the election campaign on its own behalf. If it had done, it would have contravened the Public Meetings Regulations which made it obligatory for all organizations with any sort of interest in politics to register themselves with the police as political associations.

A political association, formally constituted as such, would not, of course, have had this disadvantage; but a too vigorous campaign by an association representing all the Liberal parties in their new found unity would have demoralized the existing party organizations in the country.

Behind haggles of this nature, lay the fact that both the Jiyū-tō and the Daidō Club were in relatively good shape to fight the election, and so were not very enthusiastic about putting themselves out of existence before knowing the results of the polls. The Aikoku-kōtō, on the contrary, as the latest arrival in the Liberal family, was still having its teething troubles. Therefore it was far more eager than the other two to have a quick merger.

At length, on 14 May, the three mediators changed their tactics, and brought delegates from the three parties face to face for the first time at a meeting held in the Yanagi-ya (Willow Inn), near the Gofuku-bashi. As a result of this conference, the following agreement was reached:-

1. The existing three party organizations shall be abolished, and a new, comprehensive political party shall be formed.
2. The party to be established as a result of this merger shall be called the Kōin Club /1890 Club_7. It shall be an association of equals and shall have no leader.

3. The Kōin Club declares its support for the principles of Liberalism.
4. The Kōin Club shall appoint nine officers to manage its affairs. They shall be elected in equal numbers from each of the three former parties.
5. The Kōin Club shall be convened again not later than next August to determine its policies, and to carry out the official inauguration of the party. The need to preserve the spirit of the principles that have animated each of the existing parties is hereby affirmed. 20

The general effect of the above was to usher in the union, not federation, of the three Liberal parties in principle, but to delay the practical consequences of this decision until August, that is until after the election. It was rather like a triangular marriage by proxy, with at least two of the prospective partners wanting to have a final 'night out' before settling down to consummate the affair.

In this sort of strained situation, it was hardly surprising that they should have very soon begun to bicker among themselves. By the end of May, a major quarrel had broken out between the Daidō Club and the Aikoku-kōtō over the question of whether the Kōin Club was to be treated as the opening phase of full amalgamation, or simply as the first step towards a federation of the three parties. The

Daidō Club leaders in Tokyo had written to their supporters in the provinces to tell them officially of the formation of the Kōin Club, stressing the fact that their party would continue to contest the election as a separate entity on the strength of the manifesto it had already issued. In addition, this letter even went so far as to say that there would possibly still be a need for the Daidō Club even after the full inauguration of the Kōin Club in August. News of the attitude adopted by the Daidō Club leaders when corresponding with their followers in the country provoked an angry riposte on the part of the Aikoku-kōtō. Two of the leaders of the latter party, Kobayashi Kusuo and Kurihara Ryōichi, sent a written protest to Nakajima Nobuyuki and his colleagues.²¹ In this protest, the Aikoku-kōtō complained that the Daidō Club letter to its supporters had contradicted the spirit of the agreement entered into at the Yanagi-ya on the evening of 14 May, by placing too much emphasis on independent competition at the elections. The Aikoku-kōtō spokesmen insisted that the Kōin Club had been founded to replace the existing parties, not just to associate them in a loose federation.

This dispute quickly developed from a fairly private exchange of letters into a newspaper war; and it seemed for

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a while as if the whole hard won achievement of the Kōin Club was nearing collapse. In the words of one Osaka man of affairs, whose opinion had been canvassed by the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, and who was personally in favour of the idea of federation rather than amalgamation:-

Cats are cats, and dogs are dogs - and, when all is said and done, you cannot keep them in the same cage. 22

Nevertheless, despite these unhappy beginnings, the Kōin Club did survive to play a brief but important part in the reunion of the Liberals after the election. Thus, it was in due course to fulfil the hopes of its original sponsors.

Even before the day of the election, that is throughout the month of June 1890, the Kōin Club was asserting its right to an independent existence in a number of ways. On 17 June, its founders, taking their stand on the phrase 'new, comprehensive political party' in the first article of the Club's constitution, formally notified the police in Kyōbashi ward of their desire to be registered as a political association. Registration with the police, as has been explained, was the sine qua non for participation in the election. The police, after the secretary had sent

them a reminder, officially authorized the Kōin Club on 21 June. This allowed the secretary to start on the work of sending the Club's first and second reports to country members.²³ The Kōin Club's membership, when applications was made to the Kyōbashi ward police for registration as a political association on 17 June, was reported to be only forty-one persons.²⁴ As early as 25 June, however, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun announced that

Applications to join the Club have shown no signs of falling off of late.

Therefore the figure of forty-one must have meant only those who had been formally enrolled by the date of application for registration; and it would appear that reeruiting of one sort or another had been going on for some time in anticipation of the official authorization. In Chiba prefecture, there had been more than three thousand applications for membership by 25 June;²⁵ and in other regions, things were sufficiently far advanced for the Kōin Club to be able to put forward its own candidates in the election. This was particularly true of Aichi prefecture, where the Aichi Kōin Club was very well organized and took

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TNNS 22-6-90 and 24-6-90.

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TNNS 18-6-90.

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TNNS 25-6-90.

the lead in representing the Liberal interest in every constituency.²⁶

From the above details it is clear that the Kōin Club lost little time in trying to get itself accepted as a new and growing political group, with a mind and an organization of its own, and, what is more, was able to shout its name from the hustings in some districts at any rate. Furthermore, within three weeks of its formation on 14 May, the Club had won a rather sudden distinction in a field other than electioneering. This was because the delegates of the Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties approached the Kōin Club direct, without bothering to have separate consultations with the Jiyū-tō, Daidō Club, and Aikoku-kōtō, when they appeared in the capital towards the beginning of June with their scheme for a pre-election understanding between the Liberals on the one side, and the Kaishin-tō on the other.

The Kyushu delegates planned to hold talks with the leaders of both sides and soon got down to business.²⁷ The opening moves in this latest round of inter-party diplomacy had already been played by 4 June, on which date fourteen senior members of the Kōin Club entertained the

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TNNS 12-6-90 and 13-6-90.

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TNNS 3-6-90.

visitors from Kyushu (whose numbers had risen from four to six) to a banquet.²⁸ This banquet took place in the Jubi-ya (Tea-House of Long Life and Beauty), in the Tsukiji district of Tokyo, and lasted from midday. While it was in progress, the Kōin Club hosts told their guests that they personally all approved of federation with the Kaishin-tō, but they would have to have this preliminary decision confirmed by the general body of their members at the first full convention of the Kōin Club in August. During the afternoon of the next day, the standing committee of the Kaishin-tō met privately, and unanimously adopted the following resolution:-

Item. We shall meet the members of the committee from Kyushu to-day, the 5th, at 6.0 p.m. in the Sanen-tei, in Shiba park; and shall make the following reply, which has been agreed on by all the members of the standing committee of the Kaishin-tō. (However in the last ten days of July, we shall hold an extraordinary general meeting, and will ask the party members from the entire country to endorse this.)

Item. Since we have already approved of federation, we cannot leave this work to the gentlemen from Kyushu and just be lookers-on. In order that this intention should be fully seen in practice, we must first of all call on the members of the Kōin Club and make various arrangements with them. 29

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TNNS 6-6-90 and Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun 6-6-90.

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TNNS 6-6-90.

In conformity to the above resolution, three representatives of the standing committee of the Kaishin-tō - Katō Masanosuke, Shimada Saburo, and Ozaki Yukio - went immediately after the end of the meeting to call on the various Liberal leaders. These, in turn, expressed their satisfaction with the way things were developing.

In this way, with or without the aid of wine and geisha, the attempts made by the Kyushu politicians to bring about a coalition of Liberals and Progressives at the national level had met with a success that was as quick as it was unexpected. As with the union of the Liberal factions, however, while the decision in principle to form some sort of institutional alliance had been taken by both sides at the beginning of June, the practical working out of this decision was postponed by mutual consent until after the election. The neutral Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun was quick to point out the lack of logic in this attitude, which it likened to two enemies agreeing to have one more fight to the death before they became friends.³⁰ The same paper reminded its readers that it was highly unlikely that an enduring compact could be made between the Liberals and the Progressives, so long as the treaty revision problem remained unsolved, as only a few months had passed since the time when

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the two parties were at loggerheads on this issue. This raised the question of whether a party Minister for Foreign Affairs could be trusted to look after the Empire's interests as competently as the bureaucrats had done. There were hints, too, in this editorial that:-

The essential element uniting the parties must have been congeniality of temperament rather than identity of principle.

However, this was a rather unfair insinuation, as on the whole the Liberals and Progressives had more to unite than divide them. Though the leader-writer in this particular issue of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi was insistent in his professions of sympathy for the trend towards federation in the popular parties, he concluded somewhat waspishly:-

We simply think that a free wedding is very wonderful, but fear that we shall soon have news of a divorce.

The same day, a member of the Aikoku-kōtō was reported to have expressed himself in very much the same vein.³¹

Not all the newspapers and publicists took this gloomy view of the prospects of the half-negotiated federation of the Liberal and Progressive parties. Admittedly, the leading Kaishin-tō newspaper, the Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun, advised the party leaders in Tokyo to give very careful consideration

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to the Kyushu proposals, and warned against a too hasty acceptance of them; but it was quite ready to concede the necessity for a link of some sort between the major anti-Government parties.³² The Sanyō Shimbun (Okayama prefecture) was far more welcoming than this, and congratulated both the Kōin Club and the Kaishin-tō on having taken the first step towards federation, which it thought would be of benefit not only to the popular parties but also to the Empire as a whole.³³ It was left to the Tōhoku Mainichi (Miyagi prefecture), however, to praise virtually without reservations what had been accomplished so far, and at the same time to argue with the greatest enthusiasm the case for federation. It did so in an editorial entitled 'Whyever Don't The Gentlemen Of Tōhoku Bestir Themselves And Organize A Confederation Of Progressive Parties?', the closing paragraph of which was:-

We are not alone in advocating the need for a confederation of progressive parties. Most of the gentlemen of the Empire have acknowledged this need. The fact that we have gone on to the present day, even, without a confederation was,

³² Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun 27-5-90.

³³ Sanyō Shimbun 10-6-90.

as we have explained, simply due to emotion, to suspicion, and to thinking about what is past and done with. At this juncture, it was the Kyushu Kaishin-tō which, not ready to be controlled by its emotions, not caring to be misled by its suspicions, and not prepared to cling to thoughts of the past, magnanimously broke with the fashion, and by forming a great confederation of progressive parties pitted itself against the various conservative parties of the Government. In view of this, a few of our colleagues could not help but urge the same thing on our Tōhoku Kaishin-tō. This was the general situation in the Empire as a whole. Now the Kyushu Kaishin-tō has sent delegates all the way to Tokyo, in order to bring together all the progressive parties. Therefore our Tōhoku Kaishin-tō must also get a move on, and, by joining forces with the Kyushu Kaishin-tō, work for a grand national confederation of progressive parties. Now is the time! Whyever don't the gentlemen of Tōhoku bestir themselves and organize a confederation of progressive parties? 34

As for the general position of the Liberals at the time of the 1890 election, it is clear that their principal weaknesses were bad organization in the field, and a divided leadership at headquarters. As has been said, some constituencies did not have any Liberal candidates; others had too many. In addition to this, the appearance of no fewer than three different Liberal parties in the six months before polling day was little short of an insult to the gods of politics-with-elections. Yet, despite these handicaps and omissions, the Liberal parties between them had many more candidates in the field than any of the other political parties, and they also had the advantage of widespread popularity among the electors. This popularity was something which the Liberals were able to rely on from the start of the campaign to the time it was completed. To a large extent, the general climate of opinion - with its belief in progress and a considerable amount of Westernization - still favoured them; even more beneficial was the success they had had in establishing themselves in the countryside. Nor should the wide appeal and intrinsic excellence of the Liberal manifestos be forgotten. The Whig philosophy with which they buttressed their attacks on the Government was in many ways as apposite for the times as it was formative for the future. Thus, the reduction of the land-tax or the

shortening of the conscription period were matters of immediate interest to the nation at large; while the introduction of party Cabinets was the necessary next step for its political elite. Moreover, there were in the ranks of the Liberal leaders not a few men of high calibre. Finally, we have seen how the Liberals themselves were not altogether incapable of taking steps to remedy their own failings. A union of the three factions had been half-accomplished, and a coalition with the Progressives was in the offing.

(iv) The Progressive Party (Kaishin-tō).

Unlike the Jiyū-tō, the Kaishin-tō was never a party seriously divided against itself. Not even the shock of the resignations of its president and vice-president in 1884 had managed to bring about its dissolution and the party of the Centre was in 1890 far more united, and so in far better condition to fight the election, than either its Conservative foes to the Right or its Liberal rivals to the Left. It is interesting to try and see for a moment why this should have been the case.

Very probably the nature of the elements that made up the nucleus of the party was what kept it united. Of particular importance was the fact that, though the Progressive influence extended into the countryside, the party never ceased to be first and foremost an association representing the interests of the urbanized middle classes. By comparison with the Liberals, it had little influence with, and so in turn it itself was not much influenced by, the rural capitalists; it had even less in common with the forces of ultra-nationalism. The middle classes of the cities on which the Kaishin-tō relied were naturally less prone to provincialism and obscurantism than the village or reactionary adherents of the other parties. Therefore the Progressive Party was always free, relatively speaking, from the regionalist pressures which often split both the Liberal and the Conservative groups, and also from the heady chauvinism that made some Liberals indistinguishable from Ultra-Conservatives to the detriment of the Liberty Party as a whole.

In the structure of its leadership, too - a leadership consisting in the main of 'radical' bureaucrats, university-trained intelligentsia, and businessmen such as Iwasaki of the Mitsubishi Company - the Progressive Party was very much in the forefront of the modernization taking place in Japan.

An elite drawn from these groups found it much easier to act in harmony with one another than the Liberal leaders did. The latter, as has been said, were often outstanding as individuals; but because of their strong personalities and their impulse to destroy rather than reform what they considered objectionable, they were not by nature so well fitted to work together in a team as their opposite numbers in the Kaishin-tō.

Putting these two points together, one may say that two of the chief characteristics of the Kaishin-tō were a preponderance of well-off and city-dwelling bourgeois in its membership, and a leadership composed of men whose education or business interests had given them a good knowledge of the outside world as well as a strong belief in the essential rightness of the bureaucrats' modernization policies for their own country and its trade. Both in its general membership and in its leadership, the Progressive Party was in the hands of those who preferred government by reason to dictates of emotion. Consequently the dominant impression given by this party at the end of the last century was one of urbane sophistication and carefully thought out modernism. This spirit, which derived from the personnel of the party, enabled its members to retain not only their common objectives but also their unity of

association in the years 1882 to 1890. To summarize briefly by putting the matter in a slightly different way - the Kaishin-tō as it was the most 'modern' of the political parties, was ipso facto the least 'feudal' of them. Therefore it suffered few, if any, of the symptoms of the breakdown of the feudal order - regionalism, excessive factionalism, two-sworded turbulence, and recurrent attacks of xenophobia or other forms of political extremism.

This is not to say that the Progressive Party did not have its handicaps. The greatest of these was the heavy concentration of voters in the rural areas, where, as has been said, the influence of the party tended on the whole to be slighter than that of its adversaries. True, this disadvantage was to some extent compensated for by the fact that any city with a population of 100,000 or more was entitled to its own Member regardless of how many voters actually lived in it. But, in the Japan of 1890, only three provincial cities (Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya) other than Kyoto and Osaka did have populations of more than 100,000. All other provincial centres of any size, such as Sendai, Niigata, and Hiroshima, were linked with part of the surrounding countryside to form a joint ru-ro-urban constituency. Again, in point of total size of membership, though not of course in degree of organization, the Kaishin-tō was probably

rather inferior to the Liberal factions as a group. On the other hand, the Kaishin-tō was bigger than either the Jiyū-tō, Daidō Club, or Aikoku-kōtō by itself; and in regions where it functioned was usually more than a match for Conservative opponents. Though Itagaki was able to tour the country on behalf of his party, the national leader of the Kaishin-tō, Ōkuma Shigenobu, had just left hospital after losing a leg in the bomb attack of the previous October, and was still too weak to take an active part in the election campaign. Whether the Kaishin-tō actually lost seats in the election because of Ōkuma's absence is a moot point; but there can be little doubt that both the party and the public missed some election panache through not being able to hear his oratory as well as Itagaki's.

The general calibre of the Kaishin-tō candidates was very high. A brief account of the careers of two of the most influential men in Japanese politics will illustrate this. Both of them have been mentioned a little earlier as having been chosen by the standing committee of the party to make formal approaches to the Liberals on the question of federations. At the time of the election, they were both prominent members of this standing committee.

Shimada Saburo, who was elected for Yokohama city in 1890, after studying English and working for some up-and-coming

wealthy merchants in his youth, first of all made a name for himself as editor of the Yokohama Mainichi in the early 1870s. The paper had just been founded, so Shimada was its first editor. With his articles on politics and social reform, he made the Yokohama Mainichi a leading and extremely influential organ of moderate-progressive opinion. After 1875, he entered the Government service, and was appointed Grand Chancellor of the Senate (Genrō-in). Later, he became Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Education; but resigned from this post when Ōkuma fell from power in 1881. For the next eight years he worked as one of the founders and policy-makers of the Kaishin-tō, as well as publishing a number of books and taking part in the local government of Kanagawa prefecture. He was elected to the prefectural assembly, and before long was chairman of it. In 1889, he travelled widely in both Europe and North America, in order to study the political systems and actual conditions of the various countries. After being elected to the House of Representatives in 1890, he continued to be a Member until his death in 1923, holding in due course the posts of deputy Speaker and Speaker of the House. He was also a minister in several party Cabinets. Keenly interested throughout his long (72 years) life in social welfare and the future progress of constitutional government

in Japan, Shimada wrote many books and articles on these topics and others related to them. In 1901, he was invited to give lectures in all parts of the United States, and the tour he made on that occasion was highly successful.

Shimada's career in many respects resembled that of his colleague - Ozaki Yukio. Ozaki, too, had spent the earlier part of his working life as an official - he was a senior Civil Servant in the Treasury Department - and had resigned in sympathy with Ōkuma. Then he returned to the Yūbin-Hōchi Newspaper Company, for which he had worked for a short while before entering the Treasury Department. From there he joined the staff of the Chōya Shimbun. His skill in journalism and the close relations he always enjoyed with Ōkuma naturally made him a person of importance in the Progressive Party. In 1889, he visited Europe. He was returned for the Fifth Constituency, Mie prefecture, in the election of 1890, and from that time onwards was a Member of the House of Representatives for more than fifty-five years, that is until he died a few years after the end of the Pacific War. He was an extremely active Member as well as a very long-lived one. Like Shimada, he was a minister of state on several occasions; he also found time to serve as mayor of Tokyo for three separate terms. Ozaki's chief claim to fame, however, was the vigour of his speeches

in the Diet. In these speeches, he consistently put forward a Liberal interpretation of the constitution, and attacked the transcendentalist theories of the bureaucracy. More than any other single person, he was responsible for forcing the resignation of Prince Katsura in 1913 - an event that marked the beginning of the end for the Sat-Chō monopoly of executive power. In his old age, Ozaki continued to defend the canons of parliamentary democracy - this time, against the militarists.

With men like Shimada and Ozaki in the field, then, and they were by no means the only outstanding candidates in Progressive colours, the Kaishin-tō was clearly a formidable party at the time of the 1890 election. The fact that it contained so many gifted politicians able to work in harness together was no doubt one of the reasons why it put up a good showing at the polls, even though it did not have Ōkuma to lead it into battle.

On what principles and objectives did the Progressives take their stand in appealing to the electors, and in what respects did their outlook differ from that of the Liberals? Generally speaking, the Progressives had from the first stood for the same things as the Liberals did; and the differences between the two parties at the time when they were originally formed in the years 1881-2 had been narrowed by the growth of conservative feeling among the

Liberals since then. The two parties had also learnt during the intervening years how much they could lose by fighting each other and not the Government. Therefore when drawing attention to what did distinguish the Progressives from the Liberals in 1890, one must remember all the while that these differences of opinion or emphasis were really no more than small rocks of discord in a placid ocean of agreement.

Even in 1890, the Progressives were still more conciliatory abroad and a little more moderate at home than the Liberals. They seldom, if ever, went to prison for carrying their opposition to the Government too far. Thus, in the previous year, the majority of them had come round to support Ōkuma's proposals for a gradual abolition of extra-territorial rights. The Liberals, on the other hand, had joined with the Conservative factions in a full scale campaign for suspension of the treaty negotiations. In domestic matters, the Kaishin-tō fought the election on the basis of the original manifesto of the party, which had been issued when it was founded in 1882. In some ways, this would appear to have been a mistake, as the 1882 manifesto was already a little out of date by 1890 and was by no means a comprehensive statement of the party's beliefs and policies. Therefore, it might have been better if the

Progressives had brought out a revised edition of their manifesto on the occasion of the promulgation of the constitution or during the months just before the election. But it is very probable, of course, that the electors knew for themselves that the 1882 manifesto was not a complete guide to the thinking and planning of the Progressive Party.

Comparing this 1882 document with the three Liberal manifestos of 1890, there were two major differences not so much of principle as of emphasis, and one serious cleavage of interest. The Kaishin-tō did not give formal, black and white, adherence to two items that figures prominently in the Liberal pronouncements - institution of party Cabinets, and reduction in the land-tax. Moreover, the Liberal censure of Government aid to private industry was a direct blow to the economic interests of the most important group of Kaishin-tō supporters.

To look at the above points in a little more detail for a moment - the lack of a specific reference to party Cabinets in the Kaishin-tō manifesto was, by 1890, a failure to make the official charter of the party correspond as meticulously as possible to the views it held. This lack should not be regarded as an indication that the Progressives were lukewarm in this respect. As much as the Liberals, the Progressives had always regarded the constitution as the bulwark of popular

rights and happiness, and parliament as the means by which government was to be made conformable to public opinion. Indeed, it had been the bald demand for party rule which had made Ōkuma's 1881 memorial so repugnant to his colleagues in the Government. The most that the Progressives were prepared to concede was that there should possibly be a short transition period after 1890, during which the Sat-Chō bureaucrats would govern in coalition with one or other of the popular parties; and after the opening of the Diet, they joined with the Liberals in putting pressure on the Government to accept the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to parliament. Before this, the Progressive attitude of looking forward to the inauguration of party Cabinets among other things had been expressed during the election campaign in words such as these. They are taken from an electioneering song, the full version of which will be given later:-

Time flies like an arrow -
The First of July is at hand!
Soon our hearts' desires will be realised.

Similarly, the omission of any formal proposal to cut the land-tax in the Kaishin-tō manifesto to some extent belied its real intentions. By 1884, an argument had developed within the party on the feasibility of reducing the land-tax; and it was on this issue that Ōkuma and Kōno

Binken had chosen to resign. Both of them had been of the opinion that the existing rate of taxation had to be maintained to keep the Empire solvent. Their departure meant, in effect, that the prevailing view in the higher ranks of the party hierarchy was that the Government could afford to lighten the fiscal burdens it had imposed on the peasants and landowners. To some extent, of course, the whole issue of a reduction in the land-tax was more of an academic one for the Progressives than it was for the Liberals. This was because most of the Kaishin-tō supporters lived in the towns and not the country villages. Nevertheless it would have been reasonably clear to the electors of 1890 that the Kaishin-tō was scarcely less eager than the Liberal parties to do what it could to curtail the costs of administration in general, and achieve some alleviation of the land-tax in particular. So much could have been deduced from newspaper articles, political speeches, and what was known of the views of leading members of the party. This supposition would have been made all the more tenable by the markedly pacific tone of the Kaishin-tō manifesto on foreign relations. Armaments were to be a major item in Government expenditure after 1890.

Since the views actually held by the two parties on the role of parliament under the constitution and a reduction

of taxation were identical or very similar, the only real bone of contention between them was Government subsidies to private industry. This was a relatively minor issue, however, and it would have been by no means impossible for the Liberals and Progressives to settle it amicably. In other points, the Kaishin-tō manifesto agreed well enough with those put out by the Liberals. The Progressives, too, did not want government to become completely centralized; and though they were seven years too early to make any concrete proposals for amending the Law of Election, the hope that the franchise would be gradually widened in keeping with the general progress of the people was a statement in principle of what the Liberals later asked for in practice. Finally, though the Kaishin-tō document did not cover such matters, there was absolutely nothing to separate the attitude of the Progressives from that of the Liberals on matters of basic popular rights - freedom of speech, assembly, and so on.

Therefore, in spite of the facts that the two parties represented rather different social groups and were still in a sense the separately organized following of two rival statesmen, at the time of the election, the general outlook and objectives of the Progressives were very much the same as those of the Liberals. This judgement may be readily

confirmed by reading the editorials published by the Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun of Tokyo in the months preceding the election. The Yūbin-Hōchi was the most influential Progressive Party newspaper; and in its political comments during this period, it usually took a line that was the same as the one adopted by the Liberals. The following extracts from these editorials will illustrate this point, and they may be taken as good evidence of run-of-the-mill Kaishin-tō policies.

Ill-Gotten Gains. (2-4-90)

It is generally held that evil cannot overcome good. Nevertheless when political consciousness is still in its infancy, and has not had time to develop to the full, and one is dealing with a people that is all too quick to cultivate bad habits; there may be a temporary reversal of the usual state of affairs. Upright methods will be hard pressed by dishonest stratagems; and good will be overcome by evil. Of course, it is not to be supposed that the issue will be thus decided for once and for all; but, regardless of whether it is for a long time or a short time, such things as the triumph of trickery over fair play should never be tolerated here in this country of righteousness.

The Period of Non-Party Government (8-4-90).

What sort of policies will non-party Governments adopt towards the Diet? [Government_] strategists [if they try to imitate Bismarck_] will be able to make a Buddha statue, but will not be able to breathe any life into it Though we shall never believe that the schemes of these strategists will all turn out well, looking at the matter from the point of view of a Ministry that wishes to stand aloof from political parties, the best plan would surely be for such a Ministry to form an alliance with a powerful party in the Diet, and to make use of it. However the business of making a full alliance with the chosen party and winning its confidence is not just a matter of adopting the party's view. Its leaders must be prevailed upon to enter the Government; and something like a coalition Cabinet should be formed If it should eventually fall foul of the majority in the Diet, it will simply have to resign. This will be one step towards party Cabinets.

The Constitutional Progressive Party (14-4-90).

Although the fortunes of the Kaishin-tō have inevitably been subject to fluctuations from time to time; looking back over the past ten years, one really cannot but be impressed by the over-all progress made, and the degree of stability achieved. Certainly of all the political parties in our country, the Kaishin-tō is the one that is the most orderly and the furthest developed. Indeed, it is doubtful if there are any others to compare with it in these respects.

Don't Discourage The Industrialists From Thinking About Politics! -(15-4-90).

There is no necessity for industrialists to mix with politicians, and openly engage in political activities of their own accord. Nevertheless it is very important that they should know about politics and take an interest in them. The attitude of taking no interest in politics, on the grounds that since they are industrialists, they need not concern themselves with political affairs, is an evil relic of feudal times. In those days, politics were the preserve of the samurai classes and their superiors alone. The industrialists, being unable to have any say in them, were completely excluded from politics. The industrialists themselves were obliged willy-nilly to put up with this; and,

losing any desire to hear about [politics], as time sanctioned the convention, they virtually gave up thinking about them. So it is hardly surprising that they should have been indifferent to politics in bygone times. But the feudal system has been abolished, and the four classes have been made equal. Moreover a Liberal system of government is gradually being put into operation, and now that we are about to be given the right to participate in the government, it is essential that industrialists should be thoroughly conversant with politics.

Not Biased, Non-Party (16-4-90).

Most of those who call themselves 'not biased and non-party' stink; and it is no accident either If they are not completely without principles, even though they do not set themselves up as [members of] a political party, they will inevitably be partial to one side or another. If they are not partial to one side or another, then they must be men without fixed principles. People without principles drift around like seaweed in the waves; preaching progress to-day, and favouring conservatism to-morrow. They are never constant. Is not this what is meant by 'not biased

and non-party'? Well, what virtue is there in being not biased and non-party?

Hesitant Reform An Evil -(20-4-90).

Following the Government's decision to reform the Civil Service and get rid of superfluous officials, the bureaucracy has been in a state of jittersFrom what we have seen of Government offices during the last fortnight, none of them appears to be over-worked; rather, it would seem that a certain amount of leisure has had to be sacrificed. With regard to this, all but two of the Ministers of State went off to see the military and naval manoeuvres, and then stayed on to make tours of the Kyoto and Osaka regions and so forth. Therefore it is natural that there should not be any great pressure of business. All the same, the days of leisure [the bureaucrats] are enjoying now are not the same as the usual period of mid-summer relaxation from strenuous toil. Their bodies rest; but they are not easy in their minds, and are afflicted by all kinds of doubts. From the point of view of the Government, this can hardly be termed a happy state of affairs; and it is a positively disagreeable one for the individual officials concerned. It is clearly a matter of immediate urgency that the Government should take at once suitable steps to deal with this situation.

In order to cut down administrative expenses, and simplify the management of [Government] business; unwanted officials must be dismissed.

The People's Strength (6-5-90).

Under an absolutist political system, decisions are made in an arbitrary fashion, and once the Government has made up its mind to do something, it can do it as and when it pleases, without having to pay any attention to public opinion. Even serious issues do not require a great deal of delicate handling, and are easily settled. Under a representative system, on the other hand, the people must be consulted, and it is not possible to act unless one has the consent of the majority of them. Consequently a considerable amount of time and trouble has to be spent on getting them to agree to anything. Politicians who have grown used to absolutism may well find these exertions beyond them, and no doubt will be full of complaints about the representative system. Nevertheless the people are on the move, and their advance cannot possibly be checked. The tyranny of a minority will have to defer to opinion of the majority. This is the inescapable outcome of the development of the strength of the people.

Danger of Political World Becoming Abysmally
Degraded (10-5-90).

The world of politics is one that is always apt to be ruled by unsavoury characters; and it is frequently in danger of falling into a bottomless pit of degradation.

True patriots ought to be ever conscious of the need to avoid this danger.....It is natural for politicians to fight each other for the reins of power, and we have no intention of denying them this [right_7]. However they should be expected to conform to certain standards of conduct in their disputes.

The Enemies Of Liberty (16-5-90).

Tyranny is the enemy of Liberty. Tyrannical actions, no matter whether they stem from governments or peoples, are all alike in being opposed to Liberty.....Liberal politics are the politics of discussion. The misuse of force is nothing other than the politics of tyranny. Those who wish to violate in any way the freedoms of speech and action, no matter whether they belong to the Government or the people, must all be thought of as being equally opposed to Liberty. The freedoms of speech and assembly, not to mention the right to life, will be secured under a Liberal system. Those who by any means whatsoever violate them in any way are all enemies of Liberty.

If I were to play the complete politician, and tell you that the taxes levied on the country should be reduced by one half, and that we would cleverly adopt policies that would enable us to meet the costs of government on only one half of the present amount brought in by taxation; my words would be highly gratifying, and would no doubt rejoice the hearts of the more ignorant tax-payers. Yet it is plainly impossible to do any such thing. To prate on about cutting administrative expenditure and reforming the methods of the bureaucracy, when one is in the position of an outsider who knows nothing about the true facts of the political situation, is just irresponsible talk.

(Part of a speech given on the 26-6-90 to the residents of the Nihonbashi ward of Tokyo by Fujita Mokichi, a local Kaishin-tō candidate. The Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun gave a summarized version of this speech as its editorials for the three days 28-30/6/90.)

It will be seen, then, that the Progressive Party, while remaining true to its motto of 'Slow but Steady', was nevertheless an organization that in 1890 fully merited the epithets 'progressive' and 'popular'.

(v) Some Conservative Parties - the Jichi-tō, the Kokumin-ha, and the Hoshu Chūsei Ha.

In its editorial for 7 June 1890, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi remarked that the Conservatives were as divided as the Liberals. It would have been truer to have said that the Conservatives were even more divided than the Liberals. For not only did they resemble their opponents on the furthest Left in having a large number of splinter factions and regional associations, they also made no attempt to join forces before the election. There was never any Conservative equivalent of the Kōin Club. The Conservative factions were, of all parties, the ones most closely linked with the feudal tradition. To an even greater extent than was the case with the Liberals, therefore, they were animated by feelings of attachment to a particular district and a particular leader. This was one of the reasons why they

failed to unite. Yet another reason for the divisions between them was a deep and abiding difference of outlook. There was a moderate, Westernizing, constitution-minded conservatism of the bureaucrats in power; and there was an extremist, ultra-nationalist, absolutist conservatism of a few public figures out of power.

Some of the numerous provincial Conservative parties were well established in their own districts and did well in the elections - notably the National Rights Party (Kokken-tō) in Kumamoto prefecture, and the Miyagi Political Association (Miyagi Seikai) in the area round Sendai. However the influence of these groups did not extend beyond the boundaries of their respective prefectures, and the overall national strength of the Ultra-Conservatives in particular was not very great. Moreover, these regional clubs were not destined to last or grow bigger. Consequently, unlike either the Jiyū-tō or the Kaishin-tō, they cannot be regarded as direct ancestors of modern political parties, though of course, depending on their position in the Conservative camp, they did keep alive a tradition of Right wing extremism or else rallied support to the moderate conservatism of the ruling bureaucrats. On the national level, the Conservatives fared even worse. In fact, the only Untra-Conservative organization with any claim to be

a national, as opposed to a provincial, political party, the Hoshu Chūsei Ha, was just about the weakest electorally. On the other hand, the sponsor of the Hoshu Chūsei Ha was one of the ablest exponents of the Ultra-Conservative point of view during the Meiji period. Therefore an adequate idea of the main strands of Conservative thinking and practice, as revealed by the election and the characters of the principal Conservative leaders taking part in it, can be gained from describing no more than three of the Right wing parties. These were Inoue Kaoru's Jichi Kenkyū Kai (Society for the Study of Self-Government), General Tani Kanjō's Kokumin-ha (National Party), and General Torio Koyata's Hoshu Chūsei Ha (Moderate Conservative Party).

(a) Moderate Conservatism - Inoue Kaoru's Jichi-tō.

Inoue Kaoru was a Chōshū man, a close friend of Itō Hirobumi, and a permanent office-holder in the Meiji administration from the time of the restoration in 1868 to the time of his formal retirement in 1898. Thereafter he continued to wield considerable influence behind the scenes as an aged and respected Genrō until the day of his death in 1915. He founded the Jichi Kenkyū Kai in 1888, intending it to be a comprehensive political body like the

Daidō Danketsu; unlike the latter, however, the Jichi Kenkyū Kai was to be normally pro-Government and not anti-Government. The Society had no fixed programme, and never evolved one. Thus, it entered on the election without a manifesto of any sort. Originally, it had concentrated on studying different systems of self-government, with the help of foreigners who were living in Tokyo either as official advisers to the Government or as lecturers at the Imperial University. The total membership of the Jichi Kenkyū Kai was never anything more than minute, though there were no formal restrictions on entry. It consisted of a number of Inoue's colleagues in the ranks of ministers and deputy ministers of state, together with a sprinkling of leading men of affairs outside the Government. One of these latter was Shibuzawa Eiichi, a prominent banker.

In these circumstances, it is not to be wondered that the Jichi Kenkyū Kai was thought of, by the cognoscenti and by the ignorant, as 'Inoue's party'.³⁵ The capital and the nation as a whole would have none of it. In a sense, it was a revived but even weaker Teisei-tō. It wished to govern in accordance with the constitution to be sure, but in accordance with the most orthodox of

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Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol.1, p.262.

bureaucratic interpretations of the constitution. The Society barely survived the difficulties of its birth and soon broke up. Its speedy disappearance demonstrated once again that there was no room for a party that was both Conservative and truly constitutional to the Right of the Kaishin-tō, so long as the Government intended not to become part of the Diet.

Despite the virtual failure of his schemes so far as Tokyo and the greater part of the country were concerned, however, Inoue's efforts led to the victory of several so-called Self-Government Party (Jichi-tō) candidates at the elections. In some areas where they were particularly successful, such as Kyoto fu, these Jichi-tō candidates do not seem to have had very close links with Inoue, and the Kyoto Kōmin-kai (Citizens Association) which won five seats was probably a fairly autonomous organization in its own right. On the other hand, in his home province of Chōshū (Yamaguchi prefecture), Inoue, acting in conjunction with Itō, had a large personal following. This Inoue-Itō faction was opposed by a group owing allegiance to Yamagata Aritomo, and also by an Ultra-Conservative faction headed by Torio Koyata and Viscount Miura.³⁶

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Chōya Shimbun 25-5-90.

The Jichi Kenkyū Kai or Jichi-tō, therefore, would appear to have had three rather different existences at three separate levels:- i) national, ii) provincial outside Chōshū, and iii) inside Chōshū. In Tokyo, it had been an abortive attempt to re-found a national Government party along the lines of the defunct Teisei-tō; in districts like Kyoto fu or Wakayama prefecture, it reappeared at the time of the election as a convenient vehicle for moderate Conservative opinion; in Yamaguchi, it was a well-established local party comprising the closest adherents of Inoue and Itō in the central bureaucracy as well as in the prefecture.

Although the Yamaguchi Ultra-Conservatives under Torio and Miura had made approaches, apparently without success, to the Yamagata party with the idea of forming an electoral alliance, they were bitterly opposed to the Inoue-Itō party. Thus, in Chōshū at any rate, there was no prospect of an understanding between the Ultra-Conservatives and the moderate Conservatives. This lack of sympathy is important because it delineates the frontier between conservatism and reaction. Bureaucrats like Inoue and Itō were Conservative in the proper sense of the word. That is, they wished to conserve the bureaucratic connotations of the system of government first set out in the constitution. They favoured

non-party Cabinets, formally subject to the Emperor alone, and regarded the people or their representatives as privileged participants in the rites of Imperial administration. Yet, with them, there was no question of revoking the constitution once it had been granted, or of seeking to undermine in practice the popular rights on which it stood. Parliament had come to stay; so, too, had the industrialization and Westernization of Japan.

(b) Ultra-Conservatism - Tani Kanjō's Kokumin-ha, and Torio Koyata's Hoshu Chūsei Ha.

The political world of Generals Tani and Torio was vastly different from this, though they usually took care to hide the discrepancies under a mask of more moderate conservatism. Their real aim was total reaction. They wished to turn back from the whole constitutional and parliamentary experiment to the older collective and hierarchical order. In short, they wished to negate the ideal of Liberty - to stamp out its supposedly noxious effects in Japan, and, by extension, to destroy its original homelands in Europe and the Americas.

Tani Kanjō was born in Tosa in 1837, the son of a samurai of that fief. His formal education began at the age of nine, when he started going to relatives and fellow clansmen for instruction. A great deal of this childhood

training seems to have been spent on acquiring proficiency in the military arts - fencing, archery, and, later on, gunnery. In 1856, he was sent by his clan to complete his education in Edo; and it was there that he embarked on an exhaustive study of the Chinese classics, concerning which he was to become a recognized authority. The next few years saw him travelling constantly between Tosa, Edo, and Osaka, becoming all the while more and more deeply involved in the Imperialist movement. In 1865, he was recalled to Kōchi and made an assistant instructor at the clan school. Before long he was sent to Nagasaki on clan business, and from there managed to visit Shanghai. After his return to Nagasaki, he fell in with Sakamoto Ryūma and Gotō Shōjiro, two Tosa samurai who were already leaders in the restoration plot. In 1867, he visited Osaka to have talks on behalf of his clan with Imperialist samurai from Satsuma; and later in the same year, Tani accompanied the Daimyō of Tosa, Yamanouchi Yōdō, when he journeyed to Kyoto to take part in the deliberations held after the formal resignation of the Shōgun. Tani was a successful commander on the Imperialist side during the War of the Restoration. He captured the castles of Takamatsu and Marugame in Shikoku in January 1868, and later served with distinction at battles near Nikkō and Aizu.

For the next decade, his career lay with the new Army. By 1870, he was a major-general, and held the post of Director-General of the War Department. Shortly after this, however, he was moved away from the capital to be Commander-in-Chief of the Kumamoto (central Kyushu) Garrison. He was on the staff of the punitive expedition sent to Formosa in 1874, and succeeded in adding to his laurels on this campaign. Two years after this, he returned to his former post in Kumamoto; and, in 1877 at the time of the Satsuma rebellion, he earned deserved fame by successfully holding the castle at Kumamoto for over a month against rebel attacks and investment. In 1878, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general, and appointed Director-General of the Eastern Command. He then became Commandant of the Military Academy, but resigned from this post in 1881.

From this time on, he ceased to be a professional Army officer, though he kept his rank, and his interests took him increasingly into the worlds of letters and politics. In 1884, he was made Head of the Peers School, and created a Viscount. He was chosen to be a member of the Imperial Academy in 1885; and in October of the same year, he entered the Itō Cabinet as Minister for Trade and Agriculture. Within a few months of taking office he left for a tour of Europe, and returned to Japan in June 1887. His trip abroad

did not lessen his nationalist sentiments in any way; and in July 1887, he resigned from the Cabinet. He did this ostensibly because he objected to certain changes in agricultural policies, but really because he was profoundly dissatisfied with the Government's attitude towards treaty revision and uncompromisingly opposed to Westernization of the country. Viscount Tani's resignation was the coup de grace for Inoue Kaoru's schemes for treaty revision; they would have necessitated the appointment of foreign judges to the Japanese higher Courts. For the next year or two, Tani tried to follow up this success by joining Gotō's anti-Government campaign. His was one of the most powerful voices on the Right wing of the Daidō Danketsu; and it was about this time that he founded the Meiji Club to give currency to his views. From the opening of the Imperial Diet in November 1890 to the time of his death in 1911, Tani sat in the House of Peers, where he was as eloquent as he was redoubtable in opposing successive Governments, no matter whether they had been formed by the Sat-Chō bureaucrats or the popular parties.

As an organization, the Kokumin-ha, which Tani formed in succession to the Meiji Club, was even more amorphous than Inoue's Jichi Kenkyū Kai, and it received hardly more than a bare mention in newspaper accounts of the election.

True, there was a report in one paper on the day of the election to the effect that a growing number of the supporters of the rival Conservative general, Torio Koyata, were 'surrendering' to General Tani; but the report itself cast doubts on its own authenticity.³⁷ Certainly, it would seem that the members of the Kokumin-ha had little to hold them together, apart from a common allegiance to 'Japanism' and to Tani himself. So far I have not been able to discover a formal party manifesto; and presumably the scattered company of National Party candidates was left to fend for itself at the election.

However it may be that at a time when the electors were overwhelmingly in favour of the Liberal and Progressive parties, Tani was not ill advised to abandon tactics of publicity and direct appeal for the more cautious approach of doing what he could to get his sympathizers, avowed or potential, into parliament by the back door. For at the same time as he kept the Kokumin-ha at any rate in existence for the purposes of the election, he interested himself in a number of regional clubs with nationalist leanings and possibly backed the candidatures of some Independents too. Tani was strongest on his own home ground in Kōchi prefecture, where the Kokumin-ha, calling itself by that name, challenged the Liberals in every constituency. Unfortunately

for the Nationalists, Kōchi was also the birth-place of the Liberal movement and they were defeated in all these contests. A foretaste of what was going to happen at the parliamentary elections had been given to the National Party by the prefectural elections in March 1890. Then, its candidates had been routed, more or less, by their Liberal opponents. So, even in Tosa, Tani's election prospects were not very good, and he seems to have wisely accepted the fact that for him the election had taken on much of the character of a salvage operation. Tani was a prolific letter-writer; and a communication, dated 19 May 1890, which he sent to the Tosa Kōyō Kai gives some evidence of the way he went about things.

The Tosa Kōyō Kai was a local ultra-nationalist society with its headquarters in Kōchi city; and the subject of Tani's letter to it was the collapse of the old Daidō Danketsu and the impending amalgamation of the three Liberal factions. The Tosa Kōyō Kai had apparently formed part of the Daidō Danketsu, and was still linked with the Daidō Club. By 1890, extreme Conservative groups such as it were clearly embarrassed by their continued association with the now predominantly Left wing Daidō movement.

Tani, in his letter,³⁸ put forward two alternative plans for dealing with this problem, and asked the senior officials

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Tani Kanjō Ikō, vol.2, pp. 556-559.

of the Tosa Kōyō Kai (the letter's contents were to be withheld from ordinary members) to consider them.

The first plan was that his followers in the Tosa Kōyō Kai should renounce their allegiance to the Daidō Club, and stand as best they could on their own feet for the time being. In the opening sentences of his message, Tani recalled how the original Daidō Danketsu had been neither too reformist nor too obscurantist. The position had deteriorated, however, and the existing Daidō Club was a group of 'demagogues', whose Liberal principles stemmed from 'blatant individualism'. The disadvantage of this course of action was that the local Ultra-Conservatives would lose what little chance they had of influencing the results of the elections. Too weak to fight for themselves, their only hope lay in maintaining their co-operation with the more powerful radical elements.

Tani was nothing if not realistic about this. He told his henchmen in the Kōyō Kai that before they finally made up their minds whether or not to secede from the Daidō Club, they would have to give careful consideration to the following points:- (i) would the Ultra-Conservative organization be able to keep going in isolation, even for a few months?. (ii) would they be able to secure the election of any candidates at all? (iii) would they be able to

survive the shock of their overwhelming defeat in the recent local elections? If they did decide to secede, he said, it would inevitably mean that they would have to give up their political activities for the time being and return to their professional occupations in agriculture or trade, 'swallowing their shame and putting up with their misfortunes' until a more favourable opportunity arose. Speaking of himself, he wrote:-

Of course, I myself cannot participate directly in political party movements; but, indirectly, I shall help the parties which I consider to be good, and shall do my utmost for the state. Never for one moment shall I forget the principles of 'Japan first!', for which I have made myself a spokesman!

Then he went on to advise them to pay attention to what they would read in the Nippon Shimbun.

As an alternative to the above proposal, Tani also suggested that the Tosa Kōyō Kai members might find it easier to hide their disgust with the Daidō Club and remain part of it - at any rate until after the election. The immediate advantage of this plan was that it would enable them to have some say in who should be elected; and he listed the names of two or three candidates whom he thought it worth supporting. What he was really counting on, however,

was the likelihood of a fresh split in the Liberal ranks when they came together in August to give some substance to their paper federation. It will be remembered that the Kōin Club was merely the first step in the long drawn-out process of Liberal amalgamation; Tani more than once referred to it as being no more than a nominal amalgamation, and confidently predicted that the pattern of party alliances would undergo a further sweeping change later in the summer. When that happened, he argued, societies like the Kōyō Kai would be in a strong position to act as the nucleus of a new, Right wing Daidō Danketsu. As we have seen, Tani was by no means alone in holding these views about the probability of the Kōin Club being overtaken by failure. However, in his case, they were obviously reinforced by conversations he had recently had with two of the leaders of the Daidō Club - Inoue Kakugoro, and Ōe Taku.

Naturally, as Tani pointed out, the same prospect of eventual re-affiliation with the more congenial Liberals still held good, even if the Tosa Kōyō Kai chose to adopt his first proposal and broke with the Daidō Club. Either way, it was merely a matter of beating a strategic retreat; and so the letter really boiled down to a short discussion of two alternative methods of doing just this. It is an

interesting document not only because it showed how Tani played the political game, but also because of the clear indications it contained of the grave electoral weaknesses of Conservatives of Tani's stamp and the extremely fluid nature of inter-party divisions. In short, the Ultra-Conservatives were forced by their general unpopularity to be opportunistic; and their opportunism had some chance of reward by reason of the fact that certain Liberals were only too ready to treat with them.

As might be expected, there were many similarities between Tani Kanjō and his Kokumin-ha on the one hand, and Torio Koyata and his Hoshu Chūsei Ha on the other; but there were also some differences between them. Like Tani, Torio was a soldier turned politician. Born in 1846, he was the eldest son of a Chōshū samurai. As a child, he had been noted for his intelligence and all round ability; and in his early manhood, he joined the kiheitai. Kiheitai (literally 'shock troops') was the name given to a force of samurai and plebeian volunteers, which was raised in Chōshū from 1860 onwards to fight the Shōgunate. These bellicose activities earned Torio the hostility of the greater part of acquaintance, and, in the end, the extreme displeasure of his parents who formally disowned him. Undaunted, he continued

to make himself known as an ardent supporter of the Imperialist cause, surviving all the perils that attended a life of political agitation in those troubled days to take part in the battle of Fushimi at the head of a little band of twenty irregulars. These irregulars were his personal followers, and were known as 'Torio's Twenty'. Fushimi is a place half way between Kyoto and Osaka; and it was there, in an engagement that lasted for two days, the Imperialist forces routed the Shōgun's army in January 1868. This victory, in effect, settled the issue of the War of the Restoration.

After the fighting was finished, Torio was in Kii province for a while, helping with the reform of the fief government. In 1870, he was given a post in the War Department; and during the next few years, he held a number of senior positions in that Department. In 1875, he was appointed to the Dajōkan. In the following year, he acted as Minister for the Army for a few months before becoming Chief of the Imperial General Staff. When the Satsuma rebellion broke out in 1877, he was responsible for sending reinforcements to the Imperial Army. He did this task so well that, after the rebellion had been crushed, he was given a higher Court rank and a special award of six hundred yen. His next post was that of Court liaison officer to the

Imperial General Staff. He held it for only a few months until October 1879, when he was appointed Commander of the Imperial Guards. At this point, there came a break in his official career, apparently because of his ill health. By February 1881, he had resigned from the Imperial Guards and also from the Dajōkan, and had gone to live in Osaka where he was studying Zen Buddhism. A Viscountcy was conferred on him in July 1884, in recognition of his services to the state.

In 1885, he re-entered public life as a member of the National Defence Council. From February 1886, he was away from Japan for a period of thirteen months most of which was spent in Europe. While he was abroad, he was appointed to the Senate. From the relatively undistinguished rank of Senator he was raised in June 1888 to the dignity of Privy Councillor; and so he was one of the persons who were responsible for the ratification of the constitution. In May 1890, just before the election, he resigned from the Privy Council; and later in the same year, he was successful in the election of representative members of his order to the House of Peers. In 1895, Torio took the reverse step to the one he had taken five years previously, and resigned from the House of Peers to become a Privy Councillor for the second time. He continued to serve on the Privy Council until his death in 1905.

As a publicist, Torio was perhaps not so eloquent as Tani; but he wrote well, and was, if anything, even better educated than his fellow general, as he had not only as deep a knowledge of the Chinese classics but also a virtually complete mastery of the Buddhist canon as well. He wrote several essays on political theory, which were a success in their day and are of no little interest to a student of Meiji constitutional developments. In these writings, he sought to preserve unsullied the principles of respect for the Emperor and punishment for the barbarian that had inspired his youth.

Though Torio was more successful as an essayist and a publisher of political reviews than as a leader of a political party, his Hoshu Chūsei Ha was, at any rate on paper, the best organized and most articulate of all the Conservative groups, moderate or otherwise. It was first launched in November 1888, when Torio circulated the prospectus of the new party among his friends. He was reprimanded by the then Minister for War, Marshal Ōyama, for taking part in politics while still retaining his commission in the Army. (This perhaps was one of the reasons why Tani Kanjō felt that he could not intervene openly in politics.) The immediate upshot of this reprimand was that Torio had to issue a statement severing his connection

with the new party; and his closest aide, Fujita Ichiro, did what he could to recover the circulars that had been sent out. Then, Torio resigned from the Army; and on 20 January 1889, he published the same manifesto in a magazine, the New Conservative Review, that he had started to bring out as a journal for his new party.

This manifesto was by far the briefest of all the party platforms prepared especially for the election of 1890. What is more to the point is the fact that it was notably defensive in tone. In a few words Torio cleverly managed to steal some of the opposition's clothes, and yet at the same time made clear the fundamental conservatism of his own position. The Moderate Conservative Party's manifesto was:-

Conservatism has as its aim the preservation of the existing state of affairs, and the acceptance and use of its consequences. Now, in order to elucidate this principle, I shall point to its opposite. The opposite views are those of reformism and radicalism. The advocates of reformism and radicalism abandon the fruits [of the past], and wish to make the reconstruction of the State the basis of their thinking. This idea of

reconstructing the State does not recognize any limitations. (If it did, it would not be reformist, it would be conservative.) Therefore they will always be reconstructing the State and making experiments. If there is no Conservative party to check this, it will be very dangerous for the future. The differences between the two views lie in their principles and objectives. In practice, though, there is also a reforming element in the Conservative parties; and no doubt there is a conservative element in the reformist parties. [Nevertheless] since [the differences between them] stem from their principles and objectives, their intentions naturally cannot be the same. In the following, I inform my political friends of the intentions of conservatism.

General Prospectus of the Moderate Conservative Party.

1. Our Party will stand erect among the parties that are established in our Empire of Japan - loyal and upright, steadfast and indomitable.
2. Our Party will respect the constitution granted by our Emperor of His own free will, will uphold the dignity of the Imperial Sovereignty, and will honour the rights of the people.
3. Our Party will never hesitate nor show any scruple in perfecting moral relationships and advocating righteousness.

4. Our Party, recognizing the fixed rights of the Upper and Lower Houses, holds that the division of power between the legislature and the executive must be made to comply with the constitution in every respect.
5. Our Party will base the national administration on frugality and simplicity. It will reduce government expenditure, foster the strength of the people, and shall be eternally resolved on a policy of sound administration.

November 1888.

Torio Koyata.³⁹

On the fact of it, this declaration, with its promises to respect the constitution and honour popular rights, was conservative rather than reactionary; and the last article, in particular, echoed the propaganda of the Liberal and Progressive parties. Moreover, the very choice of the name 'Moderate Conservative Party' would tend to give the same impression. However, in the circumstances prevailing in the years 1888 to 1890, we are, I think, at liberty to regard the overtones of caution and moderation as a smiling face put on by Torio for the purpose of doing what he could to influence an electorate which he knew was antipathetic to his ideas. In any study of the 1890 election, it must always be remembered that the popular parties, numerous though their mistakes and defects were, never lost the initiative. Therefore Torio chose to make it sound as if

his new party was conservative but constitutional. Certainly, when one compares the Hoshu Chūsei Ha prospectus with other works by Torio, one is forced to conclude that the former was no more than a very attenuated expression of his real opinions.

Torio deceived no one at the time with his unaccustomed air of moderation. On 28 May 1890, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi carried a report about an interview between one of its correspondents and a member of the Kumamoto Progressive Party; the subject discussed was whether groups like the Hoshu Chūsei Ha could be included in the Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties. Their conversation went as follows:-

TNNS Correspondent:- 'With regard to the New Conservative Party led by General Tani (sic), the General himself declared, when he introduced his party to the public, that he favoured a progressive outlook in politics; but what is your attitude to that party?

K.P.P. Member:- 'Quite right! He did say he favoured progressive principles; but, here in Kumamoto, we regard him on a par with the Shimyō faction.'

TNNS Correspondent:- 'In that case, policies such as Moderate Conservatism are altogether outside your objectives of course?'

K.P.P. Member:- 'Of course!'

The correspondent then ended his report by noting that it would be quite impossible for Torio's organization to become

part of the Kyushu Confederation of Progressives. A few days later, the Osaka Mainichi, itself no particular friend of the popular parties, stated that the Hoshu Chūsei Ha had held a business and social meeting in a hotel in the eastern part of the city where Torio was staying. The proceedings of this meeting were a strictly guarded secret, but it was known that the principal item on the agenda had been the election campaign. Not even the names and occupations of those who attended it were divulged to the press; but again, the Osaka Mainichi did state that more than half of them were Buddhist priests.⁴⁰

Thus Torio's attempts to curry favour with the electors and the popular parties were a complete failure. Consequently, like Tani, he was driven back to a position of having to campaign by stealth in those few places where he campaigned at all. Despite his best efforts, the 'moderation' of the Moderate Conservative Party had not convinced anybody. To return to the actual manifesto of the Hoshu Chūsei Ha for a moment, this document itself did contain one slight clue that everything was not what it seemed to be. This clue was the substance and wording of article three taken as a whole. Determination to perfect moral relationships and

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Osaka Mainichi 2-6-90.

a concern for righteousness were one of the hallmarks of the type of conservatism with which we are dealing.

People like Tani and Torio do not seem to have objected so much to the political forms of Liberalism, such as the constitution and the Imperial Diet, though these in their eyes were bad enough, as to its moral spirit. This latter, they felt, would if it went unchecked give rise to an unhealthy sense of individualism among the Japanese, and make each of them think only of himself. The consequence of this would be that the religious ties that bound a man to his family, to his master, and to his Sovereign would snap, and human society would fall into a state of bestial anarchy. In 1890, the nation's moral culture was still pre-eminently Confucian, and it had but recently emerged from conditions of feudalism under which hereditary status and personal service had been immeasurably more important, in terms of prestige at least, than abstract freedoms and private wealth. Therefore the general relevance of this line of reasoning is obvious. Torio was shrewd in insisting too, as he did, that it would be impossible for everyone in a poor and populous country like Japan to secure an adequate gratification of their material desires.

It is in ideas of this kind that we hit on the true strength of the Ultra-Conservative reaction to the Meiji

innovations; and the hints of radicalism in the objection to the economic inequalities that unfettered Liberalism would bring should not be missed. Thus, we are faced with a paradox - the Ultra-Conservatives, though completely reactionary in their political outlook, were by no means incapable of appearing to be the poor man's friend when it came to economic or social questions. This paradox was of course balanced by the other one we have already noted - the Liberal groups, and to a slightly less extent the Kaishin-tō too, as organizations of the rich, were politically progressive but socially conservative. It is important to appreciate these points, in order to gain any real insight into the over-all development of Japanese parliamentary institutions. Because of this, and because the poor electoral performance of the factions led by Tani and Torio tends to overshadow their underlying historical significance, and because it was a remarkably able exposition of the Ultra-Conservative point of view; it is worthwhile having a look at Torio Koyata's essay on Kingship. This essay was originally published in 1880, and a translation of it appeared in the Japan Daily Mail for 19 and 20 November 1890.⁴¹

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See also Lafcadio Hearn, *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan*, vol.II, pp. 676-681.

Order and disorder in a nation ... is determined by the disposition of the people. The pivot on which the public disposition turns towards order or disorder is the point where public and private motives separate ... To regard our family affairs with all the interest due to our family, and our national affairs with all the interest due to our nation, - this is to fitly discharge our duty, and to be guided by public considerations. On the other hand, to regard the affairs of the nation as if they were our own family affairs, - this is to be influenced by private motives and to stray from the path of duty

Selfishness is born in every man; to indulge it freely is to become a beast. Therefore it is that sages preach the principles of duty and propriety, justice and morality, providing restraints for private aims and encouragements for public spirit In the Orient, from ancient times, national government has been based on benevolence, and directed to securing the welfare and happiness of the people ... The inhabitants of this empire live, for the most part, by manual labour. Let them be never so industrious, they can hardly earn enough to supply

their daily wants.....They achieve as much as their opportunities permit.....Yet there is nothing in human society that does not owe its existence to labour. Now, to satisfy the desires of one luxurious man, the toil of a thousand is needed. Surely it is monstrous that those who owe to labour the pleasures suggested by their civilization should forget what they owe to the labourer, and treat him as if he were not a fellow-being. But civilization, according to the interpretation of the Occident, serves only to satisfy men of large desires. It is of no benefit to the masses, but is simply a system under which ambitions compete to accomplish their aims.....It is plain that if the mutual rights of men and their status are made to depend on degrees of wealth, the majority of the people being without wealth, must fail to establish their rights; whereas the minority who are wealthy will assert their rights, and, under society's sanction, will exact oppressive duties from the poor, neglecting the dictates of humanity and benevolence. The adoption of these principles of liberty and equality in Japan would vitiate the good and peaceful customs of our country, render

the general disposition of the people harsh and unfeeling, and finally prove a source of calamity to the masses.....

Though at first sight Occidental civilization presents an attractive appearance, adapted as it is to the gratification of selfish desires, yet since its basis is the hypothesis that men's wishes constitute natural laws, it must ultimately end in disappointment and demoralization.....Occidental nations have become what they are after passing through conflicts and vicissitudes of the most serious kind.....Just now their motive elements are in partial equilibrium, and their social condition is more or less ordered. But if this slight equilibrium happens to be disturbed, they will be thrown once more into confusion and change, until, after a period of renewed struggle and suffering, temporary stability is once more attained.... Perpetual disturbance is their doom. Peaceful equality can never be attained until built up among the ruins of annihilated Western states and the ashes of extinct Western peoples.

This, then, was the voice of genuine reaction - to nineteenth century industrialism as it affected the East.

In 1890, it was little more than a voice crying in the wilderness; but fifty years later, it or something very like it had grown into the battle cry of a nation ready to fight the world if need be. Clearly, Torio's argument was not without its fallacies of one sort or another. The physical obliteration of the Occident, a thing he yearned for, was not feasible unless Japan first industrialized herself along Western, capitalist lines - that is to say, took the course that Torio dreaded most. The principles of Liberal democracy, if carried to their logical conclusions and every indication on the Liberal side of the political struggle was that they would be, would give every subject equal voting rights, and thereby destroy the advantage of the minority over the majority so far as theoretical political power was concerned. Similarly, the author refused to consider the possibility, long since apparent to others of his countrymen, that advances in technology as a result of the industrial revolution would eventually prove capable of creating enough wealth for everybody, and so provide a solution to the problems of social injustice. Finally, by ignoring the whole question of the rule of law before which all men are equal, Torio was able to pretend that Liberalism's greatest safeguard against itself did not exist. These inconsistencies and omissions made his attack seem a good deal more plausible than it really was.

Nevertheless, even after we have taken into full account these and other shortcomings in Torio's essay, it is not hard to see that there was more than a particle of right in what he said. In Japan, as in other countries, parliament was first set up on the basis of an extremely restricted and plutocratic franchise. (Much earlier than this Torio had called the Risshi-sha proposals for a national assembly 'upper-class democracy.')⁴² Moreover, the fact that unlimited political freedom will give rise to intolerable economic privations is the classic dilemma of undiluted Liberalism. The Fabians and others were confronting this kind of problem in Europe during the last decade of the nineteenth century, a period which in many ways was the Indian summer of laissez-faire; and only a few decades had elapsed since Marx had written *Das Kapital* - in part as a protest against the animal conditions of economic life in mid-Victorian England. It should be remembered, too, that these difficulties became even more difficult when transplanted to the Japanese environment. In Western Europe, politics, economic conditions, and general morality all sprang from the same individualistic root, and so could be sorted out without endangering the

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Ike, *Beginnings*, p.59.

whole structure of post-Renaissance civilization. In Japan, on the other hand, the new, imported political and economic apparatus stood at first in raw, and seemingly irreconcilable opposition to the native non-material and collectivist ethic; and the danger there was that a large-scale collision between the two would destroy the unique culture of the archipelago.

It follows then that Torio's stand, mistaken in many respects though it was, was by no means unintelligible. He raised issues that were not only of special significance to Japan at that time, but were also, *mutatis mutandis*, worrying some of the best minds in contemporary Europe. Furthermore, these same issues, again *mutatis mutandis*, are still relevant when discussing the moral basis of present-day affluent societies in the United States and elsewhere. Sooner or later, the rulers of Japan would have to come to terms with some of his criticisms.

To finish by looking at the matter from a totally different point of view for a moment, however, the controlled fury of Torio's reaction does indicate the great influence which Liberalism had come to have on Japanese political thinking by the end of the first half of the Meiji era. Tani and Torio stood virtually alone in the small circle of governing bureaucrats, as well as in the wider world of

the Meiji intelligentsia. It is not surprising therefore that the electors in 1890 should have been so unresponsive to them. The Kokumin-ha and the Hoshu Chūsei Ha, needless to say, were not helped by the fact that the voters all belonged to the classes which had most to gain from a parliamentary system. Among the newspapers, the Ultra-Conservative Nippon Shimbun did what it could to rally support to the generals; but it had little that was original or constructive to say in the weeks immediately preceding the election, though it was full of careful analyses and devious comment after the results were known.

To sum up the general position with regard to the Conservative parties, then:- Those Conservatives who were not also reactionary scarcely existed as a recognizable party at all. Those who were reactionary came to the polls not altogether without a case to argue and leaders to argue it, but divided, demoralized, and for the time being all but impotent.

(vi) Independents.

Of the numerous Independent candidates there is not much more that can be usefully said at this stage. By definition they were non-party; and so it is not easy to pin

them down as subscribers to any particular set of views. In general, however, those who succeeded in getting themselves elected to the Diet tended to side with the Government and against the popular parties. Therefore it is probably correct to think of Independent candidates who took their politics seriously as being on the whole a safe conservative group of the sort favoured by Inoue or Itō, though no doubt a few of them were willing to go to the extremes suggested by Tani and Torio. Among them, and perhaps typical of them, were the forty or so serving or recently retired officials, including one minister of state in the Yamagata Cabinet, who obtained seats in the House of Representatives, after running the gauntlet of general public hostility towards anyone connected with the Government.

Incidentally, Suematsu Kenchō's remarks on this aspect of the election were borne out by the Civil Service regulations of the time, which stated that any official who ran for a seat and lost would be compelled to resign his post. The object of this was to spare, if possible, the bureaucracy from the ignominy of even a single defeat at the hands of the 'people'.⁴³ At the same time, the need for such a drastic provision shows how conscious the Government was of its own weak standing with the electors.

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TNNS 4-7-90.

Suematsu, himself, and the more radical Okamoto Takeo mentioned above, are probably fairly representative of the better type of Independent candidates.

However, the sad fact remains that men of this sort were comparatively few and far between, when one takes a look at the bloc of Independent candidates as a whole. The great majority of them were 'self-nominated Independents' - mere nobodies at the national level, whose qualifications for giving useful service in the House of Representatives were at best only slightly less meagre than their chances of election. Considering what was involved, their numbers came near to assuming plague proportions, and they were spread more or less evenly over the country. The results for Tokyo fu, for instance, show that in the Second Constituency, one candidate polled two votes, and three others one vote each; in the Seventh Constituency, it was the same; in the Eleventh Constituency, seven candidates secured only one vote apiece; and so on. In Okayama prefecture, a certain candidate was dubbed the 'genealogy candidate'. The reason for this was that when the futility of competing against a popular favourite was pointed out to him, he replied:-

I have no expectation at all of being elected. Were I to receive only one vote in the election of Members to the House of Representatives, I should want this for my family tree. 44

As this was the case, the question now arises - why did so many persons embark on what they must have known from the first was an almost hopeless quest for a seat in the Diet? Not only a hopeless one, but also one that could be very costly - particularly for those candidates whose attributes other than their fat purses did not amount to much. (There were a number of stories of wealthy candidates having beggared themselves as a result of their enormous campaign 'expenses'.)

The answer to this question is doubtless contained in the anecdote about the 'genealogy candidate'. It is clear that Japan's first parliamentary election aroused a very great degree of popular interest; and that this interest was not in any way restricted to the electorate alone, but extended to the public at large. Therefore, in the enthusiastic mood of the day, a large number of people were willing to risk both fortune and reputation to achieve what they considered to be the honour of representing their home district in the new legislature. Suematsu Kenchō said as much when he spoke of 'men of property and local repute who did not normally give a damn for political discussion' entering into the fray, and 'fighting for all they were worth.'⁴⁵ Certainly, there was enough in the newspapers of the time to vindicate his judgement.

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3,p.202.

(vii) Summary.

Though the Buddhists were capable of a limited agitation on their own behalf, and Christianity was decidedly unpopular everywhere outside Nagasaki prefecture, religion played no direct part in the election of 1890.⁴⁶ This means that all the great national issues that occupied the minds of candidates and voters alike at that time have been dealt with. (Of course, there were purely local issues; but in this chapter I have tried to steer clear of them.)

In conclusion, then:- the election was contested by a number of distinct groups of politicians and men of affairs, including the Liberal-Progressive Parties on the Left wing, the more respectable Independents and bureaucratic candidates to the moderate conservative Right; and beyond these again the various Ultra-Conservative and reactionary factions, the members of which were reduced by the course of events to the role of little more than scheming observers. Over the whole field, like a cloud of gnats, hung the self-nominated Independents - the majority of whom were destined to be the ephemera of the hour. Put in diagrammatic form, the line of battle looked something like this:-

46

Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.216.

LEFT

CENTRE.

RIGHT.

Liberals. K.C.P.P. ^x

Progress. Party.
(Kaishin-tō)

Some Inds.

Mod. Cons.
Jichi-tō.

Ultra-Cons.
Kokumin-ha.

Inds. &
Officials.

Hoshu Chūsei Ha.

{ Jiyū-tō.
Aikoku-kōtō.
Daidō Club. }

.....'Self-Nominated' Independents.....

Kōin Club.

^x
K.C.P.P. = Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties.

Talking of the main issues raised at the election, Suematsu Kenchō made a general criticism of the party manifestos and the performances of the anti-Government candidates in these words:-

Although all sorts of 'Party Principles' or 'General Principles' were adopted by each party, their wording was for the most part vague and they did not really touch public opinion. Especially in the case of the 'General Principles', they never did anything more than unthinkingly take over each other's opinions, putting them in valueless words to the effect that they would foster the national interest and promote the happiness of the people; because all the parties strove to find a basis for their arguments which would not allow other people to criticize them.... The cry for curtailment of administrative expenses and a reduction of the land-tax was heard virtually everywhere....I did not hear of anyone who produced a satisfactory plan for realizing [these objectives]_7.... Of course, plenty of proposals for equal treaties emerged; but these, too, were vaguely worded. 47

There is some truth in this condemnation. Nevertheless it is by no manner of means the whole truth. We have seen that the Liberal and Progressive opponents of the Government did make what was on the whole a full and intelligent use of their unprecedented opportunity to challenge its policies, and try and influence the future course of events. Of all the questions they raised, perhaps the problem of whether the Cabinet could or should remain 'transcendental' was the most

crucial. Second only to this as an electoral issue of prime importance ranked the problem generated by the election campaign itself - the problem of the fairness or otherwise of electioneering tactics.

(viii) 1890 - Before and After.

What follows is in the nature of a postscript, and a rather speculative one at that. Its purpose is to try and assess the broad historical relationship of the principal groups as they were at the time of the election of 1890 to past and subsequent events. In other words, to try and look outside the electoral arena for a moment, and relate what was happening there to the pattern of Japanese constitutional and parliamentary development as a whole.

The most striking thing about the situation in 1890 is the absence of any party that was both politically and socially Left wing. There was no Socialist party. As we have seen, whatever leanings towards radicalism of a social kind there were, belonged to the Ultra-Conservative and absolutist factions. On the other hand, the Liberals, though, in political terms, they lived up to their title and were the most ardent advocates of a fully parliamentary form of government, were, in social terms, the party that did most to reflect the interests of the conservative rural landlord and village manufacturer class. Three main reasons

can, I think, be adduced for this rather extraordinary state of affairs. (i) The small number of voters in 1890; obviously, an electorate limited to the richest 1% of the adult male population would not have had any immediate interest in social reform. (ii) The fact that both the Liberty Party and the Ultra-Conservatives had their antecedents in the revolt against the Shōgunate in the closing years of the Tokugawa era. (iii) The great influence of the shizoku in forming Meiji Japan. The first of these underlying causes may be accepted as it stands, and there is no need to say anything more about it here. The other two, however, will bear further examination.

Looking back to the decades just before the restoration of 1868, we find that a number of fiefs were controlled by factions which have come to be known collectively as Han Reform Parties. In each case, these Reform Parties were formed as a result of a natural alliance of interest between the lower samurai and the village capitalists who were often manufacturers or traders in their own right. The lower samurai felt themselves politically frustrated (to say nothing of their economic hardships) by a system that had for generation after generation given a monopoly of power to frequently corrupt and inefficient councils of senior samurai at the clan level, and to an exclusive and now nationally dangerous Shōgunate at the centre.

The village entrepreneurs were economically frustrated by clan government and Bakufu policies of protection for local industry and established monopolies in trade. These monopolies were often in the hands of the great business houses of Osaka and Edo; but they also operated in the 'castle-towns' (Jōka-machi) of the daimyō. It has been pointed out, too, that there was a basic conflict of economic interest between the authorities, both national and local, and the village entrepreneurs over the use to which the labour of the peasantry could be put.⁴⁸ The Shōgunate and the feudal daimyates were built on a comparatively simple rice-growing economy. Their main need from the peasants was income in the form of food. The entrepreneurs, on the other hand, were by their occupations committed in principle to a further diversification of industry, and the setting up of 'factories' in their villages. Their principal requirement from the peasants was the work of their hands in these factories.

The precise aims of these samurai-entrepreneur coalitions differed from case to case; but, in general, they were revolutionary, anti-Bakufu and anti-clan 'Establishment' if not anti-feudal, and pro-Imperialist. Whether the entrepreneur element actually looked forward to

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Ike, Beginnings, p.21.

the creation of an absolutist type of government after the destruction of the Shōgunate is not easy to determine.

Nevertheless one fact has been established about the Han Reform Parties; this is that through them, and in other ways too, the rural capitalists were able to play a back-stage part in bringing about the restoration. Writing of them in his Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan, Ike Nobutaka says:

In several ways they actively supported the underground movement directed against the existing regime. They facilitated the work, for example, of the many rōnin and samurai who travelled from locality to locality laying the foundations of revolt by providing them with lodgings. More notable, however, were their financial contributions.....they gave assistance to individual rōnin who were without funds..... provided relatively large sums for various illegal activities, including the purchase of arms. 49

The next thing to notice about the sonnō jōi (revere the Emperor; expel the barbarian!) movement of the Bakumatsu period, which so far as its samurai leadership was concerned was virtually by definition both militarist and absolutist, is that, as well as attracting the rural capitalists (i.e., the richer villagers) to its support, it was also in places able to enlist the aid of poorer commoners - particularly

among the peasants. Peasant revolts were always flaring up in Tokugawa Japan; and sometimes the Imperialist plotters made use of these conditions of recurrent riot to add to the troubles of the Shōgunate. In effect, the restoration underground in some areas acquired the colours of populism. At first sight, it may seem odd that Imperialist absolutism and flickers of a genuine desire for popular rights should have been so linked. Yet, remembering the depressed economic conditions of most of the revolutionary samurai, and remembering, too, that in the abnormal circumstances that prevail just before a major social or political upheaval extremes tend to meet, one may see, I think, that such an alliance of cross-purposes could have come about.

That it did in fact come about in certain districts is shown by the existence of para-military forces like the Kiheitai in Chōshū.⁵⁰ This was organized by the anti-Bakufu retainers of that fief, with the express intention of including peasants and artisans as well as samurai in the fighting strength of the clan. Similar Imperialist militias were created in the fief of the Ashikaga clan (Tochigi prefecture), where the special corps was known as

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Norman, *Soldier and Peasant*, pp. 21-30.

the Seishintai (Band of the Whole-Hearted) and defeated the Bakufu troops at the battle of Kamata in March 1867, and also in the province of Kii (Mie and Wakayama prefectures). In the latter place, the citizen-soldiers were given the name of Tenchūgumi (Heaven's Avengers); and they, too, took part in a local uprising against the Tokugawa. In all these cases, the fighting commoners were kept under the control of their samurai or rural gentry sponsors, and they do not seem to have developed any distinctively democratic ideology of their own. Hatred of the Shōgunate, veneration of the Throne, and a rabid xenophobia were the political ideals that united all ranks. The real importance of the Imperialist militias set up by these clans is that they provide yet more evidence of the ability of the samurai and the commoners to act together if need be. Moreover, they to some extent foreshadowed the abolition of the feudal class distinctions in the very early years of the Meiji period; and they perhaps gave the commoners concerned an enhanced awareness of their own powers.

Though bodies of irregular troops such as the Kiheitai and others mentioned above continued to be dominated politically by their upper-class leaders, there is evidence that in other regions matters had taken a slightly different turn, and that the populist elements in the anti-Bakufu coalitions were starting to assert their own claims on the

future. Perhaps the fusion of the classes, and the evolution of a rudimentary but none the less genuine representative system had gone further in Tosa than anywhere else. There, the 'new' militia locally recruited from all classes was known as the People's Army (Mimpei); and as the clan leaders were on the whole friendly to the Tokugawa until just before the restoration, its main task was to guard the coasts against foreign attack. The real significance of these developments in Tosa, however, was not to become apparent until the rise of the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement five or six years after the restoration.

In Muramatsu (Niigata prefecture), though, the leaders of a peasant rising that broke out in 1868 clarified their aims in ten written demands. The authorship of this manifesto is not clear, but it was possibly drawn up by a samurai. Though there is little or no evidence of a direct link between Imperialist agitators and the Muramatsu revolt, considering the conditions of widespread unrest and the formation of peasant militias in other fiefs, we are at liberty to assume that there may well have been such a connection - not only between the Muramatsu peasants and Imperialist samurai, but also between the latter and other peasant emeutes that occurred just before or during the

War of the Restoration. Anyway, the significant thing about the Muramatsu affair for our purposes is that the rebels' manifesto had definite constitutional overtones. Article four, for instance, was a request that the number of village officials should be fixed after consulting public opinion, and that the officials should usually be elected.⁵¹

Nothing that has been said about the participation of (a) the rural entrepreneurs, and (b) the plebeian volunteers in the events leading up to the restoration vitiates in any way the idea that the restoration itself was essentially a coup d'etat, carried out by a group of samurai conspirators from the four Western clans acting in conjunction with a handful of Court nobles. This is exactly what the restoration was in itself. Nevertheless it is important for a number of reasons, and in particular in order to understand part of the genesis of organizations such as the Jiyū-tō and the Hoshu Chūsei Ha, to realize that behind the Western Clan-Court Noble nexus that produced the restoration, and more or less closely associated with it depending on circumstances of time, place, and personality, there stood two other nascent relationships. One of these was the entente between the rebellious samurai and the rural,

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Tanaka Sogoro, *Ishin Chokuzen-no Nōson*, Rekishi, No.14, March 1938, p.39.

plutocratic entrepreneurs; the other was the contacts between politically active samurai and the poorer commoners, especially the peasants.

After 1868, this complicated network of revolutionary links underwent considerable change, as a result of the policies of Westernization and stabilization carried out by the Meiji Government during the first twenty years of its existence. Old ambitions lingered, and basic economic interests continued to work themselves out. Yet, though we can quite easily see the same spirit or the same material considerations at work at different times over a period of thirty years or more, the formal shape of the political world and the goals devised as remedies for standing grievances altered almost out of all recognition. These alterations corresponded, of course, to the enormous social and political transformations taking place. Briefly, what happened was that a substantial element of the Bakumatsu revolutionary partnership of samurai and wealthy rural entrepreneurs survived the restoration to evolve eventually into the Liberty Party of 1881 and 1890. At the same time, a mere handful of extreme supporters of the sonnō jōi movement not only retained their belief in Imperialist absolutism and their detestation of everything foreign without any diminution of intensity at all, but

also somehow managed to preserve the memory - at any rate - of a connection between ultra-conservatism and social reform.

Naturally, in practice the distinction between the separate development of the Liberty Party on the one hand, and the 1890 Ultra-Conservative factions on the other, was not nearly so sharp as it has been made to seem here.

Ōi Kentaro is an example of a Liberal, whose ardour for constitutional government led him to try and make war on his native country, whose nationalism made him one of the earliest overt advocates of Japan's mission to save Asia for democracy and the Asiatics, and whose concern for his less fortunate compatriots at length took him out of the Liberty Party to found a Right wing activist group of his own. Again, the Daidō Danketsu of 1887 and 1888, with its all-out attack on the Sat-Chō 'Shōgunate' and its bitter opposition to treaty revision on terms that involved any sort of concession to the foreign Powers, was in some ways a throwback to the palmiest days of sonnō jōi.

Nevertheless, in order to summarize intelligibly the process whereby the Han Reform Parties and the Nōhei detachments of the Bakumatsu period grew into or influenced the mid-Meiji Liberals and Ultra-Conservatives, it is better to imagine the two strands of this double evolution as having been in fact separate.

The rural entrepreneurs, as a group, went from strength to strength after the restoration. One reason for this was that they had already acquired a tradition of hostility towards the authorities in the mutinous decade or two before the fall of the Bakufu, and no doubt a certain degree of self-confidence, too, as a result of the successful outcome of the struggles of those days. Another reason was the inherent power of their economic position, as they were favourably placed to lead the nation into the new era of machine capitalism. Just as significant as either of these were two other factors. There was a continuation of the rural entrepreneurs' pre-1868 association with a group of active, talented, and extremely politically-minded samurai. The isolated coterie of ruling bureaucrats in the Dajōkan and elsewhere were before long convinced of the necessity of making capital, urban and rural, one of the bed-rocks of the new state.

In these circumstances, it is not hard to see how large segments of the Han Reform Parties of the 1860s could have turned into the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement of the 1870s. In both cases, the samurai had reasons of their own for opposing the Government of the day; but, in both cases, the rural entrepreneurs were their natural allies. The great difference between the two

movements was that the section of the samurai class (now shizoku) that headed the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement had abandoned its old programme of reverence to the Throne and expulsion for all foreigners for the more sophisticated teachings of Western Liberalism. I doubt if the rural entrepreneurs, as a class, when they realized what advantages a Liberal system would bring them personally, had any regrets at all over this change of heart on the part of their political mentors. The sonnō jōi agitation had proved itself invaluable as a means for toppling the Bakufu; it was useless for anything else.

The other side of the coin to the rural entrepreneurs' deep involvement in the Jiyū Minken Undō was the Meiji Government's willingness to come to terms with its opposition for the sake of consolidation and the realization of its own plans for the country's future. By actions such as the removal of the feudal restrictions on the transfer of land, the sale of Government forests, and the encouragement it gave to modern banking and manufacturing or agricultural techniques, it buttressed the already strong economic position of the rural entrepreneurs. On the political front, too, in a series of skilfully timed concessions culminating in the promulgation of the constitution of 1889, it granted the agitators for popular rights and their landlord backers much, if not most, of what they had been demanding.

The outcome of all this was the somewhat ambivalent attitude of the Liberals in 1890. The Jiyū-tō, the Daidō Club, and the Aikoku-kōtō all spoke in the main for a class that was economically and socially established as a dominant group, and which, in its political aspect, desired no more than a number of additional and comparatively minor reforms. These latter would have topped off its earlier successes, and would have given it a hold over the government of the Empire commensurate with its power and status in other fields. Hence the concern expressed in the manifestos for things like the reduction of the land-tax or the institution of party Cabinets, matters which were narrowly political, and the failure to put forward any proposals for social reform. This acceptance of parliamentary democracy as an adornment to their own privileged economic status rather than as a means to the gradual redistribution of wealth was to remain the distinguishing feature of the Liberty Party (destined to become the Seiyūkai) from 1890 to 1945. When grave social unrest threatened, its members invariably chose to defer to the Ultra-Conservative Right and so run the risk of undermining the parliamentary system, if the only immediate alternative was the safeguarding of parliament at the expense of their properties.

Meanwhile, what was happening to the others - the militarist, xenophobic, absolutist, and sometimes radical elements of the sonnō jōi movement? In the first two decades after the restoration, they suffered from a process of disintegration - extensive but not complete. For them, too, the slogans sonnō and jōi were disappointingly sterile once they had impregnated the anti-Tokugawa movement with sufficient vim to bring it to a successful conclusion. The barbarians had made it quite plain that they neither would nor could be expelled; and when the restoration had been accomplished, nobody was quite sure what they meant by the phrase 'revere the Emperor!' now that the course of events had robbed it of its original anti-Shōgunate connotations. Though it is easy to call the ultras absolutists, they did not really believe in absolutism in the sense of direct personal rule by the monarch. Like any other ruling or would-be ruling group in the last thousand years of Japanese history, the extreme Loyalists and xenophobes in the sonnō jōi movement were single-minded in stressing loyalty to the Sovereign as a means of obtaining political power; but once in power, they intended to keep it for themselves.

In that case, if the 'Right wing' extremists in the sonnō jōi movement were not absolutist in the proper sense

of the word, what were their real aims and the policies by which they hoped to achieve them? Any answer to this question must necessarily be tentative; because this particular group never actually controlled the state. However, it is probable that they wished to preserve as much as possible of what remained of the existing han system and social order after they had eliminated the Tokugawa domain and Shōgunate. In other words, the Kyoto Court was to replace the Edo Bakufu as the 'national Government' of an extremely decentralized polity. Since the Court still lacked an independent financial basis for its authority owing to the small size of the Imperial estates, it would have been far weaker as a feudal overlord than the Bakufu ever was even in its closing years of atrophy. Therefore the Court would have inevitably fallen into the hands of those clans which had chosen to take the lead in advancing its claims against the Bakufu; and within those same clans, the most ardent advocates of the Imperialist cause could look forward to an increase in their own personal prestige and power at the expense of more senior advisers who had been lukewarm to the idea of a complete overthrow of the Tokugawa. Thus, apart from wishing to destroy the Shōgunate which admittedly was a big change, what these particular extremists in the Imperialist movement seem to have wanted were

comparatively minor modifications to the internal national and fief balances of power. All else was to remain unchanged, in particular the four-class social system.

It must be emphasized that the group of sonnō jōi adherents we are talking about here are the ones who were, and were to remain, irreconcilably opposed to Western influence; and it was this uncompromising hostility towards the West which was to distinguish them from the other groups of samurai Loyalists who later led the Liberal popular rights movement or who through the agency of the Meiji Government embarked on the wholesale Westernization of the country. It was these - the irreconcilables - who were the spiritual ancestors of the 1890 Ultra-Conservative groups. In 1868, however, their aspirations for a sort of feudalism without the Shōgunate clearly depended for their realization on one thing - the speedy expulsion of the Westerners and a further closure of the country. In my opinion, with all but a few of the active sonnō jōi partisans, it was because they were vehemently anti-foreign that they were anti-Bakufu, not the other way round. The Shōgunate had failed to maintain the time-honoured ban on intercourse with foreign countries, and this failure endangered the existing political and social structure, which as we have seen, they wished to amend but not destroy.

Therefore the radical groups had taken up arms against the Edo regime; and from the point of view of the most adamant proponents of sonnō jōi, the Meiji Government had been put into power, precisely in order to carry out the policies which the Tokugawa had not been able to enforce. In fact, of course, the Meiji Government, too, was no more capable than its predecessors in office had been of expelling the barbarians.

No governing group could have done this. The extremist sonnō jōi outlook rested on a gross lack of realism in foreign affairs; and this misconception in turn made quite impracticable the desire to retain the general framework of domestic feudal and Confucian institutions. The vast impracticality of the whole Right wing extremist programme must be ascribed, I think, to the fact that the initial reaction to Western intrusion had been overwhelmingly emotional and cultural rather than reasoned and political. 'Japanism' was to be a semi-religious upsurge of basically anti-modern feeling, not a clearcut policy for achieving certain definite and limited national goals.

Anyway, many of the samurai who went on adhering to the xenophobic and ultra-conservative point of view began to wish for a return to a version of the old feudal system after 1873, when the Meiji Government launched its attack

on the military class as a whole, and showed unmistakable signs of a deep and irreversible commitment to Westernization. The feelings of the nationalists had been further outraged by the miscarriage of plans to chastise Korea. Saigō Takamori made himself the leader of this 'feudal reactionary' element; and with his defeat at the end of the Satsuma rebellion, it became thoroughly demoralized and disappeared. This was the first great weakening of the Ultra-Conservatives.

Other weakenings followed. Many of the former samurai militants and 'irreconcilables', after the initial shock of their disestablishment as a separate class, must have arrived at a modus vivendi with the Meiji system, both economic and psychological, and found themselves reasonably remunerative jobs either in the new industries, or else in Government service as school-teachers or policemen. Similarly, the gradual discovery that the West was not going to push its claims on Japan to the extreme of taking over the Empire, so long as it was not unreasonably provoked, and that this same West had in its own civilization much that was of potential benefit to mankind in general, probably caused an increasingly large number of genuine changes of heart.

That other antecedent of mid-Meiji Ultra-Conservatism - the distinctively plebeian mutterings in the sonnō jōi

storm - also grew more muted as time wore on. The scattered peasant agitators had never had the support of more than a tiny minority of samurai sympathizers; and after 1868, this 'plebeian' group as a whole, which had never been very big or articulate, was overwhelmed by the bourgeois nature of the restoration. In some ways, the foremost champions of the common man in the Bakumatsu and early Meiji periods may be likened to the Levellers in seventeenth century England. Too soon, too few, and too crude. Moreover, many of the 'plebeians' naturally found themselves absorbed in the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement, their energies taken up by Itagaki's 'theoretical' struggle for a Liberal constitution and their aspirations satisfied by the one actually achieved.

The Government, too, played its part in turning the tide of agrarian discontent. Peasant disturbances of a limited and local nature, that is to say of essentially the same kind as had occurred at frequent intervals under the Shōgunate, were not uncommon in the early years of the Meiji era. They were usually directed against such necessary innovations as schools, modern taxation methods, and conscription. A little later than this, the agricultural depression of the years 1882-5 produced another flurry of minor outbreaks. This time, the militant wing of the

Jiyū-tō sided with the peasant insurrectionaries. This goes to show that in the early 1880s the Ultra-Conservatives still did not have a monopoly of tender social consciences; they were not to have this until several years later, by which time the Liberals had entered into an indissoluble union with the rich peasants and village manufacturers. The rebellions and riots were no problem in themselves to the Meiji Government, which suppressed them quickly and easily. At the same time, the bureaucrats' programme of reform and modernization - the legal and social emancipation of the commoners, new opportunities for the peasants to find employment in the towns and elsewhere, and the removal of the grosser abuses of officialdom especially in the sphere of local government - tended to reduce the intensity of popular resistance of a direct and truly revolutionary kind. Not, of course, over-night, but over a period of twenty years or so. Finally, the return of better agricultural conditions after 1886 led to the slackening of economic tensions in the villages, and ushered in three decades of comparative prosperity for the mass of peasants.

The governing authorities and the established economic ruling classes succeeded in getting time as well as the greater part of the new-born democratic movement on their side. The Ultra-Conservatives, for their part, had lost out;

because their xenophobic and 'feudal' leanings had been too inappropriate, and because their proletarian 'base' had been too weak. Above all, and in spite of all, the Meiji era was a period of general and intense modernism. The Government was determined to implement its idea of Westernization; and the only great body of opposition, the agitators for popular rights, were equally anxious to introduce their idea of Westernization. Between them, these two groups, the bureaucrats and the Liberal or Progressive politicians, carried most of the rest of the country with them. This trend left little room for the wilful anti-modernism of the Ultra-Conservatives. It is to a combination of the factors outlined above that we must look for an explanation of the electoral insignificance and general unpopularity of the Ultra-Conservative philosophy in 1890. To most observers at the time and afterwards, the reactionary ideas of the Kokumin-ha and the Hoshu Chūsei Ha must have seemed inapposite to the point of being patently ridiculous.

Nevertheless the fact remains that the Ultra-Conservatives remained. What is more, they numbered among their leaders figures of national importance and general esteem like Torio and Tani. Here we come to a notable truth about the Ultra-Conservatives - the ability of some of them to keep

up with the times in their own way. While most of the former unregenerate 'absolutists' of Bakamatsu days had chosen to plunge over the cliff of a false day-dream of restored feudalism, a minority had preferred to set their courses by other stars. We have seen that both Tani and Torio played a conspicuous and talented part in the campaigning against the Satsuma rebels. Their actions on that occasion are symptomatic of an important facet of their thinking - their acceptance of the administrative and technological bases of the Meiji state, especially in so far as these contributed to the over-all fighting strength of the country.

Moreover it is significant that both these national Ultra-Conservative leaders should have been high-ranking Army officers. It is not true that the Army had in Meiji times the independent political power it was to exert later. Yet in a society that was in all its major aspects given over to the antithesis of what it had been previously - to freedom of occupation, to freedom of discussion, to self-advancement, and to a surging belief in general and individual progress - the Army was the only institution of the new state which of its own nature afforded a really secure shelter and resting-place to the fugitive bands of Ultra-Conservatism. The Army was indubitably modern; yet,

as all armies are and must be, it was to a large extent geared to pre-modern ideals of non-materialism, group loyalty, and a fixed hierarchy of command. Therefore, after the great failure of 'feudal reaction' and the decisive movement of opinion in the civil bureaucracy towards an accommodation with the Jiyū Minken Undō, it was natural that the few outstanding 'modern' Ultra-Conservatives should have been found in or close to the Army. Military life was a metier that gave them some consolation for present disappointments, and at the same time was the best vantage point from which they could effect a re-entry into politics should the need or opportunity ever arise. In many ways, the political role of the Imperial Japanese Army was not unlike that of the Ultra-Conservative, Catholic, hierarchic, and intensely nationalist professional officer corps in France under successive republican administrations.

For the rest, Tani, Torio, and their kind were not at all at home with the constitutional innovations and spiritual changes going on all round them. In this respect, it is interesting to note that whereas statesmen such as Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo were wont to argue that as Japan had re-entered a world where Liberalism was in the ascendancy, it was not possible for her to remain untouched by it; their Ultra-Conservative opponents in the Dajōkan

would reply that on the contrary, Japan had to secure her own matchless way of life by cleansing the world of European influence.

The Ultra-Conservatives of 1890 and later were important, then, not for what they did but for what they were. Their essential role was to pass on the most impassioned strains of Bakumatsu feelings for the throne and against all foreigners to the 'secret societies' of the late Meiji and Taishō eras, and to the Shōwa Young Officer Movement. In the intervening period, and more particularly in 1890, they were weak and nearly everywhere at a discount. So much so that one might have said of them that if they drew their inspiration wholly from the past, their moment of destiny lay entirely in the future. They had survived, but only just as a shadowy, scarcely recognizable alternative to the newly created parliamentary and plutocratic institutions. As is known, recourse was eventually had to this alternative; and that is why the Ultra-Conservatives of 1890, negligible though they were in themselves, are worthwhile subjects for study, and it is interesting to assess briefly their potential, as opposed to their actual, strength in 1890.

We have already noted how the Army provided them with a secure and modern base for possible reaction. Under the

surface of mid-Meiji politics and society, there were a number of other factors which ultimately proved to be of use to the Ultra-Conservatives. Some of the most important of these were:- (i) the somewhat warped development of the Liberty Party, with its emphasis on social conservatism at the risk of parliamentary decay; (ii) the heavy overpopulation of the rural hinterland of Japan, with all that that meant in terms of peasant traditionalism, drudgery, and debt; (iii) the very serious psychological stresses that could result from rapid modernization. I do not wish to deny, or even question, the wisdom of and the necessity for the modernization or its rapidity; but it is foolish not to remember that for the last hundred years, modern Japanese chiefly by virtue of the great extent of their modernism have lived perilously close to the mental clime of their feudal forbears. (We can see something of the same condition in modern Turkey, where Islam would appear to have been reinvigorated by Ataturk's attempt to restrict it.) The Japanese Ultra-Conservatives of 1890 and afterwards, then, lay in wait, always ready to make their appeal to those of their compatriots who were most grievously disrupted by the psychological impact of the West, as well as to those of them in the country areas who were hardest hit economically speaking by the rising sun of landlord capitalism.

Over and above all this, the Ultra-Conservatives also got a measure of indirect help from the conservative bias of the state's institutions and ruling classes. The morale of the Meiji constitution was that of the traditional family system; and this same family system was to have its other chief mode of political expression in the militarist and theocratic ideas of the Ultra-Conservatives. The Ultra-Conservatives were also able to take some slight advantage of the fact that for two decades or so after 1890, they were the formulators of the only body of coherent and acceptable criticism directed at the powers and pretensions of the ruling economic class. It is paradoxical, of course, that the same group of Right wing extremists were able to rely on a certain amount of tacit 'moral support' from the bureaucrats and plutocrats in power, and yet at the same time make an appeal over their heads to the most impoverished and disaffected elements in the nation. The explanation of this paradox is to be found largely in the peculiar nature of Japanese Right wing radicalism itself, with its origins going back to the strange fevers of the sonnō jōi agitation and even beyond, and with its social centre in the homes of a conservative-minded but economically exploited peasantry. The very elasticity of their ideal of Japanism was another thing

which enabled the reactionaries to keep a foot in both camps. All in all, it says a good deal for the solidity and general good sense of the major elements in the Japanese polity, including the agrarian class, when one discovers that, so long as times were good or even moderately good, the Ultra-Conservatives, scheming and noisy though they were, never made much of an impression - either on the inner body of captains of state, or on the public as a whole. When times were definitely bad, however, it was a different story.

Tracing the separate streams of Liberal and Ultra-Conservative development back from 1890 to the Han Reform Parties and forwards from 1890 to the present day, one may write the former, Liberal stream so:-

Han Reform Parties (sonnō jōi) - Korean War party of 1873 - Liberty and Popular Rights Movement - Risshi-sha - Aikoku-sha - Jiyū-tō - Kōin Club - Rikken Jiyū-tō - Seiyū-kai - MacArthur's land reform - part of the modern Jiyūmin-tō (Governing Liberal Party).

and the latter, Ultra-Conservative stream so:-

Han Reform Parties (sonnō jōi) - Korean War party of 1873 - Saigō Takamori's Shigaku-in - Satsuma

rebellion - Tani and Torio - Genyō-sha,
 Amur River Society, etc. etc. - Kita Ikki and
 the 'Shōwa Restoration' - pre-war Young Officer
 Movement - post-war disbanding of the armed
 forces - contemporary Right wing extremist groups /
 Zengakuren (the students are nationalist and
 egalitarian but not militarist).

On the basis of the above hypothesis, it has been possible to explain the particular standpoints of the Liberal and Ultra-Conservative groups in the election of 1890, and also the fact that there was no socially Left wing democratic party, in terms of the separate developments of two of the elements in the late feudal sonnō jōi agitation after 1868. Such an explanation has necessarily involved writing about the tenacity as well as the mutability of two Bakumatsu political traditions, and, in the case of the Liberals, the interests of an important and rising economic class. Besides these, there was another major factor which helped to bring about the 1890 situation of (i) socially conservative Liberalism, (ii) radical Ultra-Conservatism, and (iii) no democratic proletarian party. This was the shizoku leadership in all fields of national life.

In the circles of political opposition, we find shizoku at the head of all the factions - from the militarist Right

to the populist Left. Moreover, both sets of leaders, the Liberal and the Ultra-Conservative, first gained their power by exploiting the tides of ex-samurai discontent that were flowing strongly against the Government from about 1873 to 1881 on questions of foreign policy, Westernization, abolition of feudal privileges, and commutation of pensions. Consequently the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement and the Ultra-Conservative activities were basically attempts to bring about a change from above by a former hereditary elite which still retained a sense of its own superiority in social and cultural matters; they were not distinctively proletarian revolutions from below. This predominance of former samurai, in the Government as well as in the opposition, was nothing but the continuation for a generation or so in the new era of the habits and traditions of the old one; and it had its natural counterpart in the post-feudal spirit of submissiveness which characterized the labouring classes for four of five decades after the restoration. Even the peasant rebellions of the early Meiji period were really more of a feudal phenomenon than a modern one; and until well after the end of the nineteenth century, the industrial proletariat was still outnumbered by its agricultural equivalent by something like three to one.⁵² In these circumstances, it is not

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Allen, Short Economic History, p.57.

surprising that Socialism had to wait for the general economic and social patterns of national life to catch up with political developments before it could take root.

Again, there was probably something in the class background of the early and middle Meiji era shizoku-reformers which inhibited them from identifying themselves completely with lower class aspirations, though there was nothing to prevent the eventual merger of the children and grandchildren of these 'first generation' shizoku with the general body of commoners. Traditional feudal society had been homogeneous, but it had also been hierarchic. This produced the noticeably *de haut en bas* tone of Meiji politics even at their most progressive, and many of the underlying conservative assumptions of the transformation. The majority of shizoku reformers with a Liberal bent were predisposed by their upbringing, apart from anything else, to think in terms of an 'upper-class democracy'; and it was just as 'natural' for Ultra-Conservative shizoku reformers to gravitate towards the idea of some sort of Army control of the nation. I do not mean to imply that those of the shizoku who were interested in a greater measure of political liberty or social welfare for the 'ordinary' commoners, were not personally sincere in their aims. Quite the contrary - the sincerity of most of them is patent. But usually it was the sincerity of an upper-class

reformer, something akin in English history to the aristocratic conviction of an Earl of Shaftesbury, or else to the middle class consciences of later Labour leaders.

That most notable of notable Meiji reformers, Fukuzawa Yukichi, has told how on one occasion just after the abolition of the laws relating to the feudal distinctions between the classes, he was walking along a country road and met an old farmer riding a horse. The farmer, recognizing Fukuzawa as a member of the former elite, hastily dismounted and bowed humbly by the roadside as the young ex-samurai approached. This, of course, was in accordance with the time honoured and compulsory gestures of respect that had been made by commoners (heimin) to people of the military class in feudal days. Fukuzawa, one of the earliest and most ardent advocates of European civilization, hated what he regarded as instances of feudal subservience. Therefore he grew angry, and berated the old farmer for having complied with an absurd and out-dated custom. He finished his reprimand with the words:- 'If you don't get back on your horse, I'll beat you.' 53

The Liberals and Ultra-Conservatives occupied respectively the extreme Left and extreme Right positions

in Japanese politics in 1890. One of the major groups in between them was that consisting of the 'main-stream' bureaucrats and their moderate conservative supporters. The existence and weight of the bureaucratic tradition require no further emphasis or detailed comment here. Highly developed under the Tokugawa Shōgunate, it quickly re-asserted itself after the restoration coup, when the bureaucrats fathered modernization, and eventually devised the 1889 constitution as a means for arriving at a hoped-for detente between themselves and their Liberal attackers. These policies of modernization and reform pursued by the bureaucrats after 1868 also had some of their roots in the sonnō jōi agitation of the preceding twenty years. But in replacing the Tokugawa Bakufu, the Meiji bureaucracy had inherited many of its responsibilities and even more of its attitudes. The great difference was that the new rulers had the courage and authority to impose changes which the Bakufu, particularly under Ii Naosuke, had attempted in vain to effect. Therefore their revised version of sonnō jōi - full, peaceful, and permanent relations abroad; Westernization and controlled experiment at home - triumphed because it was more practicable in itself and more immediately enforceable in terms of government power than the ideas of either the Liberal or Ultra-Conservative opposition.

Though as it were occupationally biased in favour of a certain degree of statism and political staticism, the bureaucracy in general was staffed by well-trained and intelligent men, whose chief concern was to find a reasonably satisfactory solution to the problems of the day without thinking over-much of the possible implications of their policies for the morrow. In addition, there were a number of officials who showed themselves capable of radical acts of initiative, either by carrying out worthwhile reforms of administrative policy or procedure within their own departments, or else by challenging the basic tenets of the bureaucracy as a whole. In the former case, these non-conformist efforts have contributed much to the continued smooth running of the Japanese government machine. In the latter case, the outright opposition of men like Shimada Saburo and Ozaki Yukio pointed to the errors inherent in a fully bureaucratic system, and helped to strengthen parliament as a place for correcting them.

Taking the bureaucracy as a whole, however, and considering its general behaviour over the past ninety or so years, its most remarkable attribute has been its careful aversion to extremism or precipitate action of any kind. It is in the ranks of the officials that we find a vital balancing-force of moderate conservative progressivism, the

existence of which does much to account for the over-all constitutional stability and economic success of the Japanese transition.

It is true that the bureaucrats of the 1930s seem to have undergone a collective loss of nerve; but that was at a time when they were caught between the upper and nether mill-stones of a landlord-dominated parliament and a destitution-threatened peasantry, of growths in population and production and shrinkages of lebensraum and markets, of recalcitrant, chauvinistic Service officers at home and endemic civil conflict in China. In short, it was a time that called for a super-man or two, and not a sheltered group of officials acting on the principle of a trading company's board of directors, talented and competent though they might have been. After the Pacific War, however, the bureaucracy remained to resume control of the country, and to salvage what it could from the wreckage of defeat. On that occasion, it was able for the first time in its history to work quite unhindered by pressures from the Army or Navy. Since that revival of its fortunes, it has given if not irrefutable proof at any rate increasing evidence of its ability and desire to carry out its functions of government in open and unreserved collaboration with the Diet.

However, to return to the bureaucracy as it was in 1890. Politically, its topmost echelon was by that time definitely conservative. The leaders of the state had been in office for more than twenty years, and had accomplished all that they had intended to do in the fields of political and social reform. Now, they wanted to grow old in peaceful tenure of power. To achieve this end, they needed to stabilize for once and for all times the political institutions and life of the country. The constitutional history of the years 1881 to 1889 is in many ways a record of the bureaucrats' search for stability. This search ended in the constitution of 1889, which attempted to impose a wide measure of political equilibrium from above by (a) allowing the richest and so the most powerful elements in the nation to participate in the government, and (b) presenting a carefully doctored version of the traditional family system as the moral basis of the national polity. With this conservative attitude of mind prevalent in the bureaucracy, with the transmutation of the erstwhile 'radical' Liberals into a conservative country party already fairly far advanced, and with an Ultra-Conservative and reactionary tradition that was still managing to keep itself in being and was endowed with a quality of latent strength; one might feel that the

outlook for Japanese parliamentary democracy was not all that promising at the moment of its birth in the years 1889-90. It would seem as if it was destined from the start to a lease, long or short depending on the circumstances, of life of conservative inertia which would very probably be ended by an opening to the dictatorship of the Right. Consequently one might wish that the bureaucrats had retained their liking for really radical political innovations longer than they did.

However, this quest for stability and its concomitant conservatism was only one aspect - the political aspect - of the bureaucrats' standpoint in 1890. The picture of the economic aspect of their activities is utterly different. The most enduring and momentous result of the endeavours of the Meiji rulers was the industrialization of Japan; and in 1890, this process still had to go through all but its preliminary stages. Its major effects on constitutional history were not to be felt for another twenty or thirty years. With industrialization came the true and lasting modernization of Japan. Any study of the electoral situation in 1890 must of necessity concentrate on the Liberal and Ultra-Conservative elements. Nevertheless, we must see all things in their proper proportion to one another; and I venture to suggest that were we to take a short journey

in a historical spaceship from mid-Meiji Japan, we should soon discover that both the Liberals and the Ultra-Conservatives were really no more than impressive but minor satellites hurtling round a central sun of continuing bureaucratic control and steadily accelerating industrialization.

This industrialization, proceeding as it did along capitalist lines, produced in Japan as elsewhere two important new social groups. One consisted of large-scale industrial entrepreneurs; the other was the great body of urban and factory workers. These two groups, in turn, gave rise to two new political parties to look after their interests - the conservative businessmen's party, and the Japanese Socialist Party.

The latter did not really begin to take shape until after the end of the Meiji period, that is until after 1912. It suffered considerably in its earlier years from the divisive tendencies common to all Japanese political parties, and also from acts of oppression of varying intensity and scope carried out against it by Right wing forces entrenched in the Diet, bureaucracy, and other branches of the state. Moreover, the Socialists were no more immune than anybody else to the stresses of breakdown and reaction that assailed the country after 1930. Despite all this, the Japanese Socialist Party has come through. Its underlying power has

grown pari passu with the spread of modern industry, and its constitutional position was strengthened by the reforms of the Occupation period. It stands to-day, therefore, as easily the most formidable and legitimate body of opposition to the Government, both inside and outside the Diet. Its great historical significance is that it has provided, and gone on providing with increasing relevance to the changing economic environment, a counter-force that is by and large both politically liberal and socially reformist. In so doing, it has taken more and more of the wind from the sails of the Ultra-Conservative factions, and at the same time has done a great deal to prevent the growth of a big, anti-parliamentary movement to the political Left.

The ancestor of businessmen's parties in modern Japan is the Kaishin-tō of 1882 and 1890. We have seen that the Progressives of those days were politically a little more moderate, in the sense of being more inclined to seek a rapprochement with the bureaucracy, and socially definitely more plutocratic than the Liberals. These facts, though, tend to obscure the true historical role of the Meiji Progressives as the fore-runners of the present governing combination of medial bureaucrats and enterprising big businessmen.

The seeds of this future development lay in the composition of the old Kaishin-tō. Its members were drawn in the main from the professional, intellectual, and wealthy manufacturing classes of the great cities, and also from the least conformist sections of the bureaucracy. In 1890, this Progressive bloc was not so strong as the Liberals to its Left or the moderate conservative Government groups to its Right; but it was destined to grow. The business community has gained as much as the Socialists, in terms of power and prestige vis-a-vis other elements in the nation, from the continuing process of industrialization. The land reform that took place after the Pacific War left the urban entrepreneurs for the first time in undisputed control of the political and parliamentary Right; and the pressing need for increased exports in a world without Manchoukuo has confirmed their pre-eminence. In this connection, it is worthwhile pointing out that everywhere urban, manufacturing conservatives have been more willing than landed gentry conservatives to make concessions of one kind or another to the under-privileged groups in a capitalist community, and thereby enhance the durability and effectiveness of the parliamentary system. The economic reason for this is quite clear. An increase in industrial wages can lead to more sales and, ultimately, greater profits;

a decrease in agricultural rents can only mean a reduction of landlord income.

Therefore, again looking backwards and forwards from 1890, we find that while it was the Liberals who did the most to formulate and popularize the guiding principles of a representative system in the early stages of the democratic movement, it was the Progressives who, in the fullness of time, were to go furthest in attaining to the efficient, equitable, and stable practice of parliamentary rule. This achievement of theirs was not all that easily won. A number of blemishes marred and obstructions hindered the progress of the Progressives. One was the 'high Whig' flavour of the party during the first two or three decades of its existence; another was the deference that had to be paid by the city interests to the intransigent Liberal-landlord bloc in the conservative camp through all the years before the Pacific War; and a third one was the lingering on of memories of the feudal separation of trade from politics, together with the dependence of the Meiji Zaibatsu on the support of their Government sponsors. Yet, as has been said, economic growth, military defeat, loss of overseas territories, and forfeiture of the estates of the rural landlords have greatly altered the internal balance of power; and now we can see that of all the parties

that competed in the first general election, it was the Kaishin-tō which held out most promise for the future.

It is into this always distending and sometimes near cataclysmic pattern of subsequent events, then, that we have to fit our ideas about the four (Ultra-Conservative, Moderate Conservative, Progressive, and Liberal) great political groupings of the election of 1890. In addition we have to see them against their own special historical background the chief elements of which were:- (i) continuous bureaucracy, (ii) the distinctive and unusual morale of a revolution begun and carried through to its logical conclusions from above, together with the concealed stresses of a modernization that was in some ways over-hasty, (iii) the enduring and all-important link between the Liberty Party and the rural entrepreneurs. Seen in these terms, the entire field of constitutional history in the Meiji and later periods down to 1945 may be likened to a forest. The medial bureaucrats were the keepers of the forest. On the whole, they did their job well, but were sometimes over-cautious or else completely unnerved by the complexity of their tasks. The old Liberal movement was a quick-growing but half-rotted tree, which sprang up to a surprising height and sent down roots to a considerable depth over a relatively short period of time in the second

half of the last century. Once it had reached the end of this formative stage, however, its inner rottenness began to wither it, until it at length came in danger of falling over of its own accord or else of attracting the fatal attentions of the bands of wood-choppers outside parliament. Decay and demise did not eventuate, however, until the Liberal tree had given sufficient shade to protect, and by the action of its roots had broken up the soil well enough to nourish, later-planted and slower-growing but far more durable specimens of democratic party vegetation, i.e., the Progressive and Socialist parties. If the Liberty Party was such a tree, then the Ultra-Conservatives of 1890 and onwards to about 1930 were a sort of fungi - always bright and attractive to some, but incapable of any real life and growth unless attached to what was already dead.

CHAPTER THREE

The Election Campaign - General Survey.

The purpose of this chapter is to give an account in general terms of the main features of the 1890 election from the standpoint of relations between candidates and voters. In other words, we shall be dealing for the first time in extenso with the campaigning part of the campaign. How did a candidate come to stand for a particular constituency? In what ways did he seek to make his mark on its voters? But first, before developing this theme, there are a few words to be said about the general body of candidates as such.

(i) Candidates and Nominations.

It is not possible to give an exact figure for the total number of candidates who took part in the election. The details given in various newspapers sometimes conflict with one another, and, what is more, this information is lacking for large areas of the country. At one stage, the

Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun estimated that there was a total of nine hundred candidates for the three hundred seats in the House of Representatives;¹ but since the same report mentions that there were from three to six hopefuls in each constituency, this figure of nine hundred would seem to be far too conservative. Doubtless the Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun was nearer the mark when it reckoned that there were between fourteen and fifteen hundred candidates for the House.²

Certainly, this second and larger estimate is more in keeping with the following table which shows details of the ratio of candidates to seats in a handful of districts. The table has been compiled on the basis of the few reports that do give fairly specific information on this subject; but, even so, the figures in the third column should be treated with caution, as not too inaccurate approximations rather than as statements of hard fact. There were either none or very few candidates returned unopposed.

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TNNS 26-6-90.

2

Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun 5-6-90.

Fu or Ken	No. of Seats	No. of Candidates	Candidates per Seat
Tokyo	12	74	6
Osaka	10	51	5
Niigata	13	27	2
Aichi	11	52	5
Miyagi	5	26	5
Okayama	8	69	9
Yamaguchi	7	16	2
Wakayama	5	12	2
Totals	71	327	5

The quality, as opposed to the number, of candidates is more readily determined. In terms of their occupations or social status, they may be divided into four main categories. In all but the second of these categories, an impressive majority of the people concerned were, or had been, members of the local assemblies.

The first bloc consisted of those whom we may fairly call the professional politicians - the stalwarts of the

Jiyū-tō and the Kaishin-tō. Individuals representative of this group were Kataoka Kenkichi and Ōe Taku in Kōchi prefecture, and Shimada Saburo and Nakajima Nobuyuki in Kanagawa prefecture.

Next, there was a group of 'career bureaucrat' candidates, most of whom had been employed as sub-prefects in the local administration. A number of these officials were still holding their posts at the time of the election, but the majority of them had tendered their resignations just before they stood for the Diet. The reason for this was that the Law of Election forbade local government officials to present themselves for election in the areas under their jurisdiction. In all, upwards of forty candidates of this type were returned to the new House. The most senior of them was the Minister for Agriculture and Trade in the Yamagata Cabinet, Mutsu Munemitsu, who was elected for a constituency in Wakayama prefecture. In addition to Mutsu, there were in this group three former Senators, eleven persons who held or had held high posts in the central government, and twenty-five prefectural or former prefectural officers.³

The third category was made up of professional men - chiefly, if not entirely, lawyers and journalists. One

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Kokumin Shimbun 6-7-90.

constituency had an auditor among its candidates, and a qualified doctor who had held a number of high government appointments was elected for the Fifth Constituency in Niigata prefecture. Sometimes, too, a person in private life was nominated by the residents of a constituency or else attracted attention because of his scholastic abilities. Nevertheless, despite a few aberrations of this sort, professions like school or university teaching and medicine seem to have been hardly represented at all in the lists of candidates; and the wig and the pen between them virtually monopolized this section of the field. Typical of this category of 'professional men' candidates were the journalists Okamoto Takeo and Seki Naohiko, and the lawyers Tsunoda Shimpei and Oyagi B'ichiro. Mention has already been made of Okamoto, who was at the time of the election one of the most important members of the staff of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi. Seki, too, was a prominent newspaperman (in 1890, he was Chairman of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Company), and enjoyed a good deal of fame as a theorist on the moderate Right wing of Meiji politics. He had been one of the leading members of the defunct Teisei-tō during the period 1882-84, and was the translator of Disraeli's novel, Coningsby, into Japanese. Tsunoda and Oyagi were two of Tokyo's leading barristers, who

fought each other for the Seventh Constituency (Kanda ward) in the metropolis.

The fourth, and numerically largest group of candidates, was composed of comparatively wealthy industrialists, merchants, and farmer-landowners. Presidents of the various National Banks were quite conspicuous in this category. This mixed group of 'plutocratic' candidates was on the whole very successful at the elections; and its size and prominence is good evidence of the fairly rapid rise of the Meiji bourgeoisie. In general, their sympathies lay with the popular rights parties; and though in 1890 the shizoku still provided the leadership of the parliamentary movement, its grass-roots strength was already coming from the rural and urban entrepreneurs. The following is a thumb-nail sketch of a typical representative of this plutocratic group and one of the 'new men' of the Meiji era. Its subject is Yumoto Yoshinori, who in 1890 was elected to the House of Representatives where he sat as a pro-Government Member.

This gentleman, who is standing as a candidate for the House of Representatives in the Fourth Constituency (Kita Saitama, Ōsato, Hara, Hanzawa, and Obusuma sub-prefectures) of Saitama prefecture, is a manufacturer of sake in Saitama-mura in Kita

Saitama sub-prefecture and a notable man of property in that area. Rising forty this year, he played a part in politics at the time of the restoration, and gained a great deal of popularity by this. He was a member of the prefectural assembly from the time it first opened; in 1886, he was again elected [to the assembly_7. In the meantime, he became very interested in education and founded a number of schools, followed by a company for employing samurai of the former Oshi clan. He has made the manufacture of Gyōta stockings, which are a product of that area, a very prosperous [industry_7. Although his influence has become so great, he is of a retiring disposition and does not boast.⁴

It is clear, when one considers these four categories of candidates as a whole, that what was being put into operation in 1890 was an upper middle class democracy with respect to candidatures for the Diet as well as in the matter of electoral qualifications. The most immediate reason for this state of affairs was obviously the fact that a citizen had to be paying not less than ¥15 a year in direct national taxes in order to be eligible as a

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TNNS 17-6-90.

candidate. This requirement prevented the great majority of the people from standing for election; and with the poor thus removed, the richer members of any local community had the field to themselves. In terms of round figures, we may calculate the number of persons eligible for election in 1890 as having been roughly 400,000; since the same tax qualification, coupled with a slightly lower age qualification, produced an electorate of 450,000. This figure of 400,000 was exactly 1% of the total population of forty million.

This said, however, it is important to note that within the social classes not excluded by the £15 a year barrier, it was not necessarily the most monied elements that predominated among the candidates as a whole and among the successful candidates in particular. For one thing, the fifteen richest inhabitants of a fu or ken elected their own special representative to the House of Peers, and so were unlikely to be directly embroiled in the House of Representatives elections. Apart from this, persons of the local millionaire class do not seem to have been either very interested in representative institutions or over popular with the general run of electors. A particular contest was sometimes summarized in the press as having been a triangular match between 'money power', 'innate

abilities', and 'physical force' - in circumstances like these, the victory of the first was by no means a foregone conclusion, as the voters' sentiments often lay with the second. Moreover, too rash a use of 'money power' could easily bring down a criminal prosecution on the heads of its manipulators.

Finally, this reading of the electoral situation - that is that the candidates were ipso facto men of means but not, generally speaking, extravagantly wealthy - is borne out by some data supplied by Suematsu Kenchō on the pecuniary standing of the three hundred Members of the first House of Representatives. He has shown that the average amount of tax paid by those Members of the House who sat for twenty-six of the forty-five fu and ken was less than ¥100 per annum, and that the average tax payment per Member for the House as a whole was ¥126 per annum. Only five individuals in the newly elected House paid more than ¥1,000 a year in taxes, and at least forty-eight paid less than ¥50.⁵

Two important elements in the upper and upper middle classes did not appear at all in the roll of candidates. One of these was the officer corps of the Army and Navy, no matter whether its members were on the active list or

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, pp. 204-205, 209-210.

temporarily retired therefrom. The other one consisted of those persons belonging to aristocratic families who did not actually have the title. The first of these two groups was excluded from taking part in the election by law; the second refrained from choice. Aristocratic younger sons descended from the old daimyō stock had maybe a family disdain for associating with other commoners on terms of equality, or perhaps it was simply that they had inherited their forbears' vacuity in matters political. As for the less historic families of the peerage, i.e. those which had been ennobled for services rendered at the time of the restoration or after 1868, since they did not form a landed upper class with its roots deep in the traditions and local hierarchies of the countryside, it is probable that they had neither the wish nor the opportunity to place junior members in the House of Representatives.

We must now turn to consider the ways in which a candidate was appointed to stand for, or otherwise made his candidature known in, a constituency. Broadly speaking, there were three techniques by means of which this was done. A person either simply announced that he was standing for election; or he was adopted as its official candidate by one of the recognized national parties; or else he was nominated

as a desirable Representative by a number of local residents.

Into the first of these categories fell the so-called 'self-nominated' candidates. Candidatures of this sort were usually, though not always, rather hopeless if not downright frivolous. The 'genealogy candidate' in Okayama prefecture, mentioned earlier, was by no means atypical of them. An even more striking example was furnished by Wakayama prefecture, where an otherwise decorous campaign was enlivened by the activities of a person named Shiga Horissei.

This man was the second son of a sake manufacturer, and had been locally famous for his eccentric behaviour for some time. Shortly before the election campaign opened, he spent a week meeting the people of Wakayama city. The reason he had given for doing this was that he was about to depart for Europe in order to complete his studies in philosophy. When he did leave town, however, it was not overseas he went. He merely climbed a not too distant mountain, Koya-san, which is one of the most historic Buddhist sites in all Japan, and started living on its summit - presumably in one of the temples. Once the election campaign had begun ('perhaps under the impression that the time to save all beings had come'), he

suddenly left Koya-san and, returning to Wakayama, established himself in a temple dedicated to the Amida Buddha which stood on an island in the middle of the city. From there, he introduced himself to the Wakayama citizenry as a non-party candidate for the House of Representatives. Horses were tethered and rickshaws lined up inside the temple gate,

while he himself, attired in robes of spotless purple and a white sash, with his hair hanging down two feet at the back gravely occupied a room, and was interviewed by admiring gentry and citizens. 6

Candidatures sponsored by one of the big national parties or else by an influential local club were usually less colourful than this, though they enjoyed of course a better chance of success. In some areas like Niigata prefecture (Daidō Club versus Kaishin-tō), Yokohama city (Jiyū-tō versus Kaishin-tō), Kōchi prefecture (Jiyū-tō versus National Party), and Kumamoto prefecture (National Rights Party versus Kaishin-tō), the competition between candidates affiliated to rival parties dominated the electoral scene, and the campaign resolved itself into what was virtually an orthodox two-party contest. In other

places, notably Yamaguchi prefecture, there was a single well established regional association which was able to field a strong team of candidates. As a rule, the system of party nominations worked tolerably well, always allowing for the fact that it could lead to a situation in which two or even more members of the same party or closely allied parties competed with one another.⁷ There was one case of a Kaishin-tō member in Tochigi prefecture resigning from the party because he disapproved of its choice of candidate;⁸ and at a meeting held in Nagano prefecture, three hundred Liberals unanimously agreed to disown a certain candidate.⁹ Ruptures of this kind were rare, however, even though the parties seemed sometimes ready to give their blessing to likely looking candidates who did not necessarily accept all their policies.

Bona fide party nominations were frequent enough and an indication of the way in which elections were to be held on an increasingly greater scale in the future; but non-party endorsements of popularly chosen Independents were just as common and in many respects more characteristic

⁷ TNNS 29-6-90.

⁸ TNNS 21-6-90.

⁹ TNNS 18-6-90.

of the political conditions of the time. Characteristic, because the history of these local nominations draws attention to two of the outstanding traits of the election campaign, and by implication of the political world as a whole:- the influence of regionalism, and the influence of personality.

Sometimes these two influences, which were present in one form or another in virtually every constituency, were seen to be in conflict with each other, as in a newspaper report on the Second Constituency in Saitama prefecture. In that one area alone, there were no fewer than two dozen candidates for two seats; and though representatives of the Jiyū-tō and Kaishin-tō were among them, the correspondent explicitly stated that:-

The election in this constituency is a contest between personality-ism and regionalism, rather than strife between parties. In other words, those who put their faith in personalities hold that they should return men of the finest possible character, irrespective of whether they are inhabitants of the constituency or not; and regionalism means that at all costs one should elect a native of the district. 10

On the other hand, in other constituencies, for example the Second Constituency in Fukui prefecture, the strongest challenger as a personality was a permanent resident of the area at the time of the election.

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TNNS 29-6-90.

In one respect this sort of confrontation between personality-ism and regionalism was more apparent than real. The Law of Election laid down that a candidate had to be paying his ¥15 a year in direct taxes in the fu or ken for which he wished to be returned. This meant, in effect, that a person chosen for his outstanding abilities was usually someone who had been born in the area and continued to pay taxes on property owned there, but who had actually left it to follow a career elsewhere. Thus Suematsu Kenchō, the Chief of the Local Government Affairs Bureau in Tokyo, returned 'home' to Fukuoka prefecture in order to stand for election. In this context, then, the 'regionalist' candidates mentioned above must be thought of as people who had never lived outside their native districts for any length of time.

Regionalism was by no means confined to the countryside, where it most often appeared in the guise of each sub-prefecture (gun) in a constituency putting forward its own candidate or candidates. Exactly the same general trend was very much in evidence in the cities, too; and there, perhaps 'parochialism' would be a better term. A good example of the sort of situation that could easily arise was provided by the Fifth Constituency in Tokyo. This constituency was made up of the two wards (ku) of Honjo and Fukagawa. At the beginning of the campaign, the

voters in Honjo chose the former mayor of their ward and deputy president of the Tokyo stock exchange, Ōta Sane, as their candidate for the seat; and since he was popular in his own district at any rate, his election seemed certain. The residents of Fukagawa, however, were disappointed at not having a candidate of their own to pit against the one put up by their neighbours in Honjo. Therefore they decided to nominate one of the most notable men in their own midst, Shibuzawa Eiichi, and sent a deputation to him to ask him to agree to stand.

Shibuzawa was one of the most outstanding representatives of the 'new class' of Meiji Japan. His family had been for generations wealthy farmers, indigo manufacturers, and money-lenders in Saitama prefecture. After the restoration, he had held a government post until 1873, and had subsequently pursued a brilliant career in banking. Despite these successes, he was not willing to serve in the House of Representatives. Accordingly, when the delegates of the Fukagawa voters met him, and complained, in words which are themselves quite illuminating, that

if there was a person in Honjo ward, there was also somebody in Fukagawa ward; and that they did not relish the idea of leaving their own shrine in the alcove in order to carry round somebody else's shrine on their backs 11

he rejected their proposal. It transpired that he had already had several invitations to stand before this particular delegation visited him; but he was firm in his resolve not to enter parliamentary politics, even going so far as to declare that he would resign the seat if elected. For their part, the Fukagawa electors, not to be outdone, decided to nominate Shibuzawa as a candidate regardless of his refusal, and sent him a jocular 'ultimatum' in which they said that they intended to vote for 'the late Shibuzawa Eiichi'.

Of course, candidates were usually less reluctant, and the business of sponsoring them a good deal less rumbustious, than the above incident would lead us to believe. Pre-selection of candidates, both party and non-party, by a ballot of voters was quite common, but not the general rule. Okamoto Takeo (Second Constituency, Mie prefecture) and Seki Naohiko (Third Constituency, Wakayama prefecture) were both 'popular nominees', who were invited to stand by the voters of the area concerned without the formality of a pre-selection ballot. On the other hand, elections to choose the local candidate were definitely held in - to name but a few places - Tokyo's Eighth and Ninth Constituencies; the Second Constituency, Fukui prefecture; the Third Constituency, Fukushima prefecture; and the Third Constituency, Shizuoka prefecture.

The situation in the capital's Eighth Constituency (Shitaya and Hongō wards) was extremely confused, with several hopefuls competing for the position of 'favourite son' in each ward without any of them having a clear chance of success.¹² In Hongō, the electors were asked to say in advance whom they wished to elect, but this investigation did not lead to any decisive results. Similarly, in Shitaya, there was an organized pre-selection poll, but neither of the two persons who came top were eager to stand for the constituency. Eventually, three leading local residents in Shitaya decided to hold a 'ward party' at a restaurant in Heno, in order to try and reach some measure of general agreement on the question of who would best represent the ward in the House of Representatives. Invitations were sent to more than two hundred and fifty important wardsmen (there were only 126 voters in the ward), but no more than thirty-eight of them bothered to attend the meeting. Those present listened to a number of individuals putting forward their ideas on how to set about choosing candidates, and there were moments of angry argument. Just when matters were taking a turn for the acrimonious worst, somebody got up and made 'a half mocking,

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TNNS 6-6-90 and 10-6-90.

half jocular, conciliatory speech; and as a result of this, the place gradually quietened down'. The ward party ended happily enough, qua party, with a drinking session; but, as an election nomination meeting, it had done little good.

In the Ninth Constituency (Yotsuya, Koishikawa, and Ushigome wards), Tokyo fu, the position was rather better than in the Eighth Constituency, in that each of the three component wards was able to pin its hopes on a single individual.¹³ Consequently three rival candidates emerged to contest the election itself, and all of them enjoyed the united support of their own particular wards. In Ushigome, the twenty-eight persons who represented the ward in the Tokyo City Assembly, met together and, after a formal and secret ballot, decided that Hatoyama Kazuo (a lawyer) should be the official 'ward candidate'.

These 'ward nominations', by whatsoever methods they were achieved, were clearly important at the time; and, as historical evidence, their importance does not diminish in retrospect. They show better than anything else the intense localism of the campaign of 1890. In the cities, more often than not, it was a case of each ward in a multi-ward constituency putting up its own candidate. In the

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TNNS 27-6-90.

country areas, also, a constituency containing several sub-prefectures (gun) usually had several candidates, each of whom would be a man of note in his own particular sub-prefecture but would probably enjoy little favour outside it. It is against this background of keenly felt and narrow local loyalties that we should see the growth of a parliamentary and party system in Meiji Japan.

There were, of course, a number of exceptions to this general condition of gun or ku localism. A few constituencies, e.g. Yokohama or the Second Constituency in Aichi prefecture, consisted of only one ward or sub-prefecture; and in them, the ways in which candidates were nominated and ran their campaigns naturally differed in some respects from the standard inter-ward and inter-sub-prefectural contests. In other cases, though a constituency might have had a number of gun within its boundaries, one of the competitors was a man of such commanding influence that he enjoyed a wide measure of support throughout the constituency as a whole, and not just in a single part of it. An instance of this was the Second Constituency (Yoshida and Sakai sub-prefectures) in Fukui prefecture. There, the election of one of the candidates, Sugita Teiichi, was a virtual certainty from a time long before the campaign actually opened. Sugita was immensely

popular all over Fukui prefecture, and a prominent member of the national Liberal movement as well. At the time of the election, he was chairman of the prefectural assembly, and living in Sakai sub-prefecture. However his candidature was formally approved on 7 and 8 June not only by the village headmen and voters of Sakai, but also by those of Yoshida sub-prefecture.¹⁴ Here we have an example of the 'local nomination' and 'party nomination' aspects of the campaign becoming indistinguishable.

Constituencies where there was this degree of fusion between the nascent national party movement and older district loyalties were by no means uncommon. To give just one more example - the Third Constituency in Fukushima prefecture returned as its Members two leading Daidō Club politicians and men of affairs, Kōno Hironaka and Suzuki Manjiro. Both of them were locally popular as well as nationally famous; and a formal nomination-of-candidates-meeting held by the Daidō Club in Shirakawa-machi on 19 June was carried out in the spirit of a public endorsement rally.¹⁵ Even though there were five sub-prefectures in this constituency, Kōno alone polled more than 1500 votes.

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TNNS 11-6-90.

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TNNS 21-6-90.

One of the most elaborate pre-selection ballots of the election was that conducted in the Third Constituency, Shizuoka prefecture.¹⁶ The organization which initiated it was known as the Natives Party - clearly a strictly regional body. Since the constituency involved was a rural one, the holding of such a ballot required more time and trouble than it would have done in the towns. What the Natives Party did was to take a poll of its supporters in every village in the constituency. These ballots were then all sent to the town of Fujieda-machi, where on 6 June they were counted at a meeting of all those interested in securing the Natives Party nomination. A total of almost 1,000 votes had been cast in this pre-selection ballot; the counting of them took place in a local restaurant, and lasted some twelve hours. Whether the checking of the votes was so drawn out because the pre-selection candidates themselves were acting as scrutineers, or whether it was because they were working in surroundings conducive to relaxation, is anybody's guess.

These examples of pre-selection of candidates by ballots or other means, and they could be duplicated a number of times, give a picture of fairly vigorous local interest and community participation in the election of 1890. This

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TNNS 11-6-90.

picture itself reinforces other evidence of regionalism and communal self-government under the old feudal order. Moreover, in so far as 'local nominations' were substantially the same as 'party nominations', it is clear that the recently imported party movement was sending down some of its roots deep into the traditional experience of the people. This was happening to some degree in at least one half of the total number of constituencies; and in their case, it is possible to see that Meiji politics were beginning to change the old regional and personal ties into a national and party system of eventual government.

On the other hand, what was the case with the remaining half of the total number of constituencies, where the party movement was either not very strong or not very successful? Did the desire to elect at all costs a local 'somebody' mean that the candidate returned in such areas was usually a national 'nobody'? Not at all. It was perhaps inevitable that an individual's continued residence in his native district should have sometimes outweighed different and possibly more sterling qualifications in other individuals, when it came to making a pre-selection of candidates. Yet the persons nominated by groups of voters with any worthwhile claim to represent the community or communities of the constituency were often men of real

distinction. The few names mentioned so far - Suematsu Kenchō, Okamoto Takeo, Seki Naohiko, Ōta Sane, Shibuzawa Eiichi, Hatoyama Kazuo - were those of people who had all achieved a measure of national fame or worldly success, each in his own way. Likewise, Tsuda Mamichi, the person who was eventually prevailed upon by the electors in the Hongō ward of Tokyo to stand as their candidate, was until his nomination a member of the Senate (Genrō-in) and later became the first Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives. Thus, even in those constituencies where party politics had not yet made much impact, the gulf between local and national interests was often bridged by the fact that the electors for reasons of parish pride preferred to sponsor somebody of widely recognized status. This is true, of course, only of those non-party constituencies where there was a definite attempt by at least one responsible group of citizens to nominate a suitable candidate. In many constituencies, no such attempt was made, and they fell by default into the hands of the 'self-nominated' Independents. The practice of local nomination by a group representing the general body of voters in a district carried with it the obvious danger of splitting a constituency into several mutually antagonistic territorial parts. Nevertheless, in those areas not touched by party politics, it was better

on balance to have such a practice; because the Independent candidates so chosen were usually of higher calibre than their self-nominated namesakes.

All this speaks well for the political good sense of the voters and leading personalities in the areas concerned. At the same time, it should be remembered that their ability to pick the best man for the job was facilitated by the absence of party politics in those places, by the small size of the electorates, and - last but not least - by the seeming infrequency of serious local issues of the sort that would have brought a little community into sharp conflict with the outside world or divided it hopelessly against itself. At ground level, the election may be seen as a complicated tangle of regional and personal rivalries. In those places where the system of local nomination worked best, it was hardly ever regarded as an opportunity to seek redress for injuries suffered by a community (i.e. a city ward, or a rural sub-prefecture) as a whole, or else to find new fields for its internal squabbles to express themselves in. Generally speaking, the most desirable type of candidate for the non-party nominations was one who had established a reputation outside the local community, and yet was prepared to look after its interests if and when he was returned to the Diet. Seki Naohiko owed

much of his electoral strength to the support given him by relatives, who had gone on living in Wakayama after he himself had left it. Yet his bid for the Third Constituency in that prefecture was undoubtedly helped by the name he had made for himself as a friend of the people a few months before the election. In 1889, Wakayama suffered extensive flood damage. Seki had set up a relief fund in Tokyo as soon as news of the disaster reached the capital; and when the Governor of Wakayama, accompanied by the chairman of the prefectural assembly and other delegates, visited Tokyo in order to enlist the aid of the Government, he did all that he could to make their mission successful.¹⁷

For the inhabitants of Shitaya ward in Tokyo, the general election did coincide with a local issue of considerable dimensions. They had set themselves against a proposal by the Japan Railways Company to construct a line across a section of the inner city from Ueno to Akihabara.¹⁸ The Company wished to do this in order to complete its network of lines in that area, and had made plans to lay a surface railway as this would have been the cheapest method of construction. The people of Shitaya,

¹⁷ TNNS 17-6-90.

¹⁸ Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun 25-4-90.

whose homes and businesses lay in the path of the proposed line, objected strenuously to the scheme, on the grounds that it was unnecessary, dangerous, and harmful to the commercial prosperity of their ward. A public petition signed by more than three thousand of them was presented to the authorities in April, and the Government then opened an official Court of Enquiry on the matter. Since it came so close in point of time to the opening of the parliamentary campaign, this purely local dispute was bound to get caught up in the general scrimmaging for popular favour that went on in the ward. At least one candidate (unsuccessful) made as much capital as he could out of his part in taking the lead in the struggle against the Railway Company.

One of the most interesting contests in the election took place in the Twelfth Constituency in Tokyo fu - an outlying, rural region. There, the principal protagonists were Hirabayashi Kyūbei and his nephew Takagi Masatoshi. Both Hirabayashi and Takagi were self-nominated candidates, standing with a good deal of local support; and both of them were members of the fu assembly. Some of the villagers in the constituency were said to have given their support to Hirabayashi; because when the assembly passed a by-law against the carrying of manure during the day-time, he

had been in favour of allowing this so long as the buckets used for the job were covered.¹⁹ Even though the accounts of this particular contest mention this fact, it is clear that the play of legitimate interests of this sort was negligible in comparison with the force of longer standing rivalries between different villages in the area. In the event, after a campaign that involved family quarrels as well as village feuds, Hirabayashi was runner-up.

It could sometimes happen, especially in the single-ward constituencies of the great towns but also in rural sub-prefectures forming part of a constituency, that the same locality would produce two or more popularly-chosen or popularly-favoured candidates. For example, in the Third Constituency (Kyōbashi ward) in Tokyo, there were at least four candidates enjoying approximately the same amount of support from the electors.²⁰ In a few places, the local 'bosses', gangster or otherwise, were strong enough to dictate who should be chosen as candidates, and to affect, if not actually to determine, the results of the voting.²¹ These instances of a number of strong candidates in one small area, or of boss control, were but extreme examples

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TNNS 2-7-90

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TNNS 2-7-90.

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TNNS 24-6-90.

of the influence of personality. This influence - together with a greater one, localism, and a lesser one, sectional interests - was responsible for the general pattern of constituency by constituency nominations and campaigns. These three factors were in their own way just as important as the 'national politics' of the election, i.e. the role of the Diet, extension of national rights, and so on. With them and on them the parliamentary system had to work.

(ii) Speech Meetings and Canvassing.

Certain constituencies, both inside and outside the cities, suffered from a dearth of suitable candidates. The Shibuzawa contretemps, and the unwillingness of some people in the Hongō-Shitaya wards to stand for election, show this. Similarly, no candidates at all had been sponsored or come forward in the Fifth Constituency, Yamaguchi prefecture, as on 10 June;²² and candidates chosen for the island of Sado (Niigata prefecture) and for a district of Hyōgo prefecture did not leave Tokyo until 26 June, because of delays in nominating them.²³

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TNNS 10-6-90.

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TNNS 29-6-90.

Such late starts were quite exceptional, however, and most of the candidates began their campaigns during May and continued them through June. Tactics employed during these campaigns varied widely, covering the whole gamut of the permissible and the not so permissible - from speech meetings, canvassing, posters, newspaper advertisements, social gatherings, and other forms of entertainment on the one hand, to bribery, slander, violence, crude intimidation, and trickery on the other.

With candidates who ran a 'clean' campaign, by far the most popular way of making their views known to the electors and meeting them individually was to organize a speech meeting, followed by a party of one kind or another. A candidate no longer resident in his native prefecture naturally found it convenient to return home for a short while, and base his campaign on a quick tour of the constituency for which he wished to be elected, making speeches and meeting as many of its inhabitants as he could - sometimes finding that he had to leave it at that, and go back to Tokyo before the date of the poll. In such a case, of course, a strong candidate relied on his supporters in the constituency to canvass for him.

Suematsu Kenchō (Independent), who was returned for the Eighth Constituency in Fukuoka prefecture, waged a

campaign along these general lines. He left Tokyo to start nursing his constituency early in May, and apparently did not go away from it again until after the election. During this period of eight weeks or so, he gave a large number of speeches and attended many social functions. A newspaper report gives some details about three of these engagements. On 16 May, he visited the secondary school at Toyotsu, and made a speech to its students at the request of the headmaster. On 18 May, he was invited to a banquet given by a Mr Koimai, who lived in a village called Unshima in Kōge sub-prefecture. The banquet was attended by more than four hundred other guests. Finally, on 21 May, Suematsu was present at a social gathering held at another village (Nishisaigawa) in Nakatsu sub-prefecture, and was asked to address the meeting.²⁴

From this account of his activities, it is apparent that Suematsu's campaign exemplified the method of personal endeavour at its best and most successful. The candidate travelled widely throughout the constituency,

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TNNS 1-6-90.

speaking and meeting people wherever possible. His energetic approach to the problem of electioneering and the general esteem it earned him stirred the opposition faction in the constituency, the Buzen Club, into copying his methods. It, too, held speech meetings in Toyotsu and elsewhere, and tried hard to recruit members.

As has been said, Suematsu Kenchō seems to have spent all of two months on his campaign. This period was probably rather longer than was usually the case with 'outside' candidates, and certainly longer than some of them allowed for their final campaigning. For instance, Suematsu's namesake and fellow official, Suematsu Saburo, did not arrive in the First Constituency, Yamaguchi prefecture, for which he was elected, until after 20 June. His campaign, once it did get under way, resembled Suematsu Kenchō's in that it consisted of a series of speech meetings and parties.²⁵ Though Saburo (a Ministry of Justice official) was so late in putting in his last appearance before the election, he had visited the constituency on a number of occasions in the previous twelve months in order to prepare the way for his candidature.

Okamoto Takeo did not over-favour his constituency with his presence. No doubt, as a newspaper editor, he found

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TNNS 26-6-90.

it difficult to leave Tokyo for any length of time; but the fact remains that he was, so far as can be judged from press reports, in his constituency (Second Constituency, Mie prefecture) for only five days - that is, from 25 May to 30 May.²⁶ On the other hand, he made full use of his five days. He started by holding a speech meeting in a theatre in one of the chief towns of the area, Yokkaichi (Mie gun), entertaining his audience to a party afterwards. Then, he travelled to Tsu (Ano gun), another important local centre, to repeat the procedure. 27 May was taken up with another big speech meeting and party in the village of Isshinden (Ange gun); and two days later, on 29 May, he delivered his final address to an audience in Kameyama village (Suzuka gun), following it, too, with an entertainment. Thus, within a week, Okamoto had visited and talked to voters in each of the main divisions of his constituency. His tour, rapid though it was, was hardly perfunctory.

Speech meetings, when arranged, were popular, and the candidates do not seem to have had any cause to worry about whether they could attract an audience. Of course, the fact that a party generally came after the speeches may have had something to do with this. Nevertheless, disregarding this last point for the moment, the following audience figures are quite impressive, especially when one

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TNNS 3-6-90.

remembers that the average number of voters per constituency was only 1,750:- 25 May, Saitama prefecture, 'more than three hundred'; 17 June, Ibaraki prefecture, 'more than fifteen hundred'; 18 June, Shizuoka prefecture, 'more than three thousand'; 26 June, Fukushima prefecture, 'more than one thousand'. The lowest audience figure I have so far come across is 'twenty or thirty'. This was in a village (Yoshida mura in Mino sub-prefecture) in Okayama prefecture, where a speech meeting on 14 June apparently clashed with a period of exceptional activity in the rice-fields. Those villagers who did abandon their crops for politics heard the speaker talk about the need to elect industrialists (he was one himself), responsible Cabinets, the political systems of Germany and France, and so forth.²⁷ It is clear that the majority of speech meetings were attended not only by the electors of a district but also by other inhabitants as well. This is confirmed by the presence of women in the audiences on a number of occasions.

What appears to have been the most spectacular speech meeting of the entire campaign was held in the main centre of Aichi prefecture - Nagoya city. It was arranged for three successive days - 8, 9, and 10 June. The electoral struggle was particularly keen all over Aichi prefecture, but

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Sanyō Shimbun 17-6-90.

nowhere was it fiercer than in the First Constituency (Nagoya), where the principal candidates for the single seat were Kunishima Haku (Kōin Club) and Horibe Katsushiro (Nagoya Discussion Society, and chairman of the city assembly). The speech meeting was organized by the Kōin Club, and took place in one of the city halls. Though formal invitations were sent to only five hundred voters, more than three thousand people attended on each of the three days. Kunishima himself spoke on three main topics - the reduction of taxes and the position of ministers of state, on the first day; pruning administrative costs and the enactment of new legislation, on the second day; and problems of national defence, on the third day. Other Kōin Club members spoke in support of Kunishima on each occasion, and attacked the opposition groups. After the meeting, printed notes of Kunishima's speeches were distributed to electors throughout the constituency.²⁸

The correspondent reporting this particular speech meeting found time to include a short description of the scene inside the hall where it was held. Such descriptions are not very common.

Across the entrance to the meeting place was stretched a great curtain with the two words LIBERTY FOREVER written on it. In addition, national sun emblems and flags, inscribed with LONG LIVE THE EMPEROR, were standing crossed with each other here and there. Around the dais, there was a big banner with the words SINCERITY MOVES HEAVEN in large letters on it. Moreover, they had added brilliancy by installing electric lights.²⁹

The nineteenth century Japanese were no strangers to the idea of showmanship - in the theatre, religious festivals, and elsewhere. Here, we have an instance of this tradition being successfully married to the more modern requirements of Liberal polemics and national elan.

It was quite usual for more than one speaker to take the platform at a meeting. Generally, the candidate was introduced by a leading local supporter, and after he had made his speech, other sympathizers would speak in turn. Sometimes a single speech meeting or a series of speech meetings would be organized by local supporters of a particular party, without the participation of a candidate. With the exception of Itagaki, who was ineligible by reason of his peerage to sit in the House of Representatives, none of the leading national politicians went on a 'grand tour' to raise support for their cause in all quarters of the Empire; and most of the candidates confined their campaigning to their own constituencies. However, Nakajima

Matagoro, who contested a seat in Fukui prefecture, spoke at a meeting held in Tokyo on 28 June; and well known candidates sometimes spoke on behalf of political colleagues in constituencies adjoining their own. In the villages, the customary venue for a speech meeting was either a private house, a temple, or some sort of public hall; in the cities, speech meetings were held in theatres or in large assembly rooms. Open air meetings were not common. Frequently, a speech meeting was interrupted or brought to a tumultuous and premature close by the intervention of hecklers and semi-professional rowdies (sōshi). This is a point which will be taken up later.

As a variant of the orthodox, one-party type of speech meeting, a public debate between two or more rival candidates was sometimes attempted. One of the more successful of these, comparatively speaking, was organized in the Eighth Constituency, Hiroshima prefecture.³⁰ Persons representing eleven villages asked the three candidates for the seat if they would meet together and publicly state their views on the Imperial Diet in turn, so that the electors in their area would have a chance to decide impartially which of them was the most deserving of their support. One of the candidates, a former local official, replied that he did not yet have any special point of

view on the functions of the Diet. Hearing this, the voters' delegation promptly withdrew their invitation. The remaining two candidates, Inoue Kakugoro (Daidō Club) and Tsugawa Migiyumi (member of the prefectural assembly), both accepted, even though the latter also stated that he did not have any definite ideas on the subject proposed for debate. As a result a public debate was arranged for 13 June - to be held in one of the village temples.

Elsewhere, in the Sixth Constituency of Kanagawa prefecture, some of the local people tried to arrange a similar public debate among the three candidates.³¹ This time, only one of the three agreed to the suggestion. He was Mizushima Yasutaro, a member of the prefectural assembly. Therefore, when the meeting was opened - again in a temple - at Isebara on 16 June, it took the form of a straightforward speech meeting on behalf of the Mizushima faction. The idea of holding these public debates may have been a development of traditional Buddhist practice. Itinerant priests frequently visited local temples, and on occasion there were formal disputations between different groups of clerics.

Mention has been made of the social gatherings that normally followed speech meetings. These parties (konshinkai)

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TNNS 21-6-90.

served an obvious and useful purpose in enabling the candidate to meet his supporters and the voters in a rather less ceremonious atmosphere than that of the debating hall. When the candidate himself was an honest man or capable politician, their function was no doubt restricted to this; but if he was not a very good orator, or if he was not above trying to corrupt the electors, then the *konshinkai*, instead of coming after the speech meetings in the general priorities of campaigning, could easily take precedence over them, and even replace them altogether. The border line between legitimate entertainment and outright corruption was necessarily ill-defined and correspondingly easy to cross. A party could be arranged, with the tacit assumption that those invited would feel obliged to repay their host with their votes in due course.

The absence of any legal limit to campaign expenses encouraged this type of electioneering; and there can be little doubt that it was highly successful in a number of places. For example, a message from Gifu prefecture reported that in conditions of economic depression, the restaurant trade alone was flourishing 'with guests at all hours of the day and night, while singing and music issue forth.'³² A few weeks later, a telegram from Fukui prefecture announced that:-

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Among the candidates in the Third Constituency, the campaign of Mr Nakajima Matagoro's party has been specially noteworthy for its impartiality; but it seems that the banquets of the opposition party are gradually influencing public opinion. 33

Even though a second cable contradicted the first one³⁴ with the news that the 'mobile speeches' of the Nakajima faction had overcome the 'banquet opposition' of the Nagata party, it was all to no avail. Nagata won the election, without having to answer any bribery charges.

On occasion, these methods of persuasion back-fired on their users. One candidate in Tokyo was apparently very doubtful from the start of his chances of election; yet since he was a local 'somebody', he felt that his prestige would suffer if he failed to stand. Consequently, he stuck up posters in his home ward announcing that he was a candidate. This brought most of the electors in the constituency to his door, wanting to hear his views on politics. Naturally, he could not give his visitors the cold shoulder, and -

emptying his purse, which was not so heavy, he treated them to sake and food. For those who were important men, he bought some rather valuable objects. His household became bankrupt before the election, with his wife, children, and entire

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TNNS 28-6-90.

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TNNS 29-6-90.

family giving loud voice to their innumerable complaints, and making his life a misery. Nevertheless, on 1 July, he riskily went out on the spree, diverting others as well as himself. But when the votes were counted on the 2nd - alas, alas - all those on whom he had been counting were turncoats. His own score - a mere three votes! 35

Of similar nature, as it was a case of bread being cast upon the waters and not returning, is a story about the contest in the Twelfth Constituency of Tokyo. This constituency consisted of Ebara gun on the mainland outside the urban limits of the city, and the Seven Islands of Izu at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. As has been mentioned earlier, the chief parties to the contest were an uncle and nephew, Hirabayashi Kyūbei and Takagi Masatoshi. The following account of some of the incidents in the strife between these two is worth re-telling in full. Not just because of its innately humorous qualities, but also because it illustrates practices and conditions which, allowing for change, must have been widespread in many other regions besides the District of Ebara and the Seven Islands of Izu.

A Strange Tale Of Rivalry.³⁶

In the Twelfth Constituency of a locality which we shall not specify, there is an old man called -bayashi. For a long time he has been a member of the local assembly, and since he also served as head-fisherman, he ranked first among the notable men of the District. He had a nephew called Taka-, who, despite the fact that he was very young, had a great deal of ability. So he, too, was elected to the assembly, and the influence of the nephew was not inferior to that of the uncle. These two were on friendly terms in the local assembly, as might be expected seeing that they were uncle and nephew.

Therefore, at the time when the constitution was promulgated last year, they both had the opinion that in that District they were second to none. They were under the impression that running as a candidate for the Diet would in fact present no difficulties, especially if they had the assistance of their relative. Accordingly, they were unable to restrain themselves. First of all, they privately sounded out people to see how the ground lay, and having come to the conclusion that

there were no other candidates and that the moment was a propitious one, they both came out [as candidates] at the same time. Whereupon, [feeling] that the person whose help they had been counting on up till then had failed them... unclenephew....both parted in silence.

After a while, the nephew, Taka-, fell sick; and the uncle, beside himself with joy, made full use of the chance to extend his influence. In the meantime, unfortunately [for the uncle], he [the nephew] soon recovered, and sent out celebratory [presents of] rice-cakes and dried bonito to the electors throughout the District. When he heard of this, -bayashi's indignation knew no bounds. 'You really are a man of gratitude ! After all, those who to-day are in the assembly, and up till now have been thought of as gentlemen by the public, all enjoyed the patronage of this uncle You, in particular, have long since said that you hold to the principle of honouring one's seniors; but what your lips [say] is different from what your heart [thinks], and your action in sending out rice-cakes in order to shut out your uncle is most strange and uncalled for. You'll pay for it, youyoung Taka- you!'

So saying, [the uncle_] summoned a family council on that very day, and declared:- "Well, I am going to seek your advice. As you will already know, I have a popularity in this District quite beyond my deserts, and it is my intention to run for the Diet. However a certain imprudent nephew of mine has distributed rice-cakes throughout the District in celebration of a recovery [from illness_] so that he might cross swords with me, and seems to have had a great effect on public opinion. Since my feelings about this are that for me to be defeated by him would be the mistake of a lifetime, I have decided to spend ten thousand yen out of my own fortune on election expenses. While I do not for a moment expect you to oppose [my scheme_], I am letting you know to make sure." Since there was no reason why the listeners should object to the old man's saying that he would use his own money himself, they all said "Very well." Whereupon old -bayashi, with a broad smile, but without saying 'Bravo, bravo!' or anything at all [of that nature_] said:- "In that case, would you at any rate please put your seals on this document to signify that

you have no objections"; and they all of them covered it with their seals.

News of this quickly spread; and as this was more promising than rice-cakes, -bayashi became popular all of a sudden. -bayashi did not idle his time away; but spent money on a speech meeting in one place and a social gathering somewhere else, and entertained the electors. He also spent money on a second meeting after this. On that occasion, when the second meeting was drawing to a close, people suggested that a third meeting should be held later on in Kitazato. After the hero had agreed to be involved in that, they decided to make a move at once. However one old man (aged sixty) declined, saying:- "I am sixty this year, and have grandchildren. More especially, up till now I have never bought a harlot, not even once, and so I beg you to excuse me in this matter only." Answering "Come, come, don't say such things!", they took him by force to a certain house.

Well, the very old man had a really wonderful time. The previous night's refusal completely

forgotten, he himself insisted on spending the next evening there alone. As a result, the news that he was spending his time out of doors buying harlots came to the ears of his son. After he had at last learnt the full story, the son, flaming with anger, said - "You silly old fool, -bayashi! How dare you lead my pure and spotless father into profligacy! Very well, I, too, know a trick or two." Thereafter the son attached himself to the nephew, Taka-, and it is said that he is working very hard for Taka- and is doing his utmost to bring about the failure of -bayashi. Well, well, well.

As a postscript to this tale of mistaken endeavour, it might be added that Takagi Masatoshi after being elected for the constituency in 1890, was subsequently re-elected no fewer than fourteen times, and had a long and distinguished career in the House of Representatives.

Hirabayashi was reported to have said that he was willing to spend ¥10,000 on his campaign. There is no means of telling whether he did in fact get through this sum. However, to give a rough idea of the amount of money a candidate would normally have to use on trying to get himself elected - the Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun stated

that the minimum figure was ¥600-700 and the maximum figure several thousand yen, with the average expenses per candidate reckoned as ¥1,000.³⁷ The Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun agreed that campaign expenses for each candidate were, on the average, in the region of ¥1,000.³⁸ Converting these figures into pounds sterling, they represent, approximately, a minimum of £60-70, a maximum of several hundreds of pounds, and an average of £100 - all Victorian era currency. One self-nominated Independent in Saitama prefecture was said to have sold all his estates, and devoted more than ¥10,000 (£1,000) to his campaign funds.³⁹ Such candidatures by wealthy self-nominated Independents were, of course, financed by themselves out of their own pockets, with perhaps a few contributions from their backers if they had any. On the other hand, candidates who had been asked to stand by a group of voters in the constituency, or else had been nominated by a party, were probably given a good deal of financial aid by their adherents.⁴⁰

Canvassing was also carried out by means other than entertaining the voters to dinner. In places where the local sub-prefect (Gunchō) had resigned to run as a

³⁷ Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun 7-6-90.

³⁹ TNNS 18-6-90.

³⁸ TNNS 26-6-90.

⁴⁰ TNNS 4-6-90.

candidate, he could often rely on the village headmen and other people who were under an obligation to him to press his case. The Sixth Constituency in Osaka fu was an area where the ex-gunchō was elected in this way.⁴¹

Buddhist priests, too, sometimes helped certain candidates; **but**, in general, the monks did not interfere very much in the electioneering. Then again, candidates would naturally expect that their own families, personal friends, admirers, and possibly trade acquaintances to canvass for them. In the Third Constituency (Kyōbashi ward), Tokyo fu, four or five of the candidates each had his own little band of active supporters. One of these 'militants' was a woman who was a lady's hairdresser by profession.⁴²

In Asakusa ward, also Tokyo, a certain group of people were reported to have given their favour to one candidate and supported his nomination, because they hoped to lend him money after he was elected.⁴³

When a candidate was sponsored by a party or a sizeable political club, his fellow members often joined in the campaign and appealed to the voters to support him. Thus, a contest fought on a party basis would tend to give rise to vigorous canvassing from both sides, though this was not necessarily always the case. In Yamaguchi prefecture,

⁴¹
TNNS 21-6-90.

⁴³
TNNS 2-7-90.

⁴²
TNNS 2-7-90.

the strongly entrenched Bōchō Club seems to have had it all its own way in three of the five constituencies.⁴⁴ On the other hand, in Chiba prefecture, a victory for the Kaishin-tō candidate in the Fourth Constituency appeared certain at one time; largely because there was nobody of like calibre to oppose him. The local Liberals, however, were not pleased with this state of affairs, and eventually found a suitable opponent for the Kaishin-tō champion in a person who was the managing director of a Tokyo soy sauce company - one Nishimura Jinemon. Nishimura, accompanied by a couple of aides, canvassed the two sub-prefectures (Unakami and Sōsa) which formed the Fourth Constituency so thoroughly that he won it in the teeth of fierce Kaishin-tō counter-attacks, and despite the fact that his campaign had lasted less than a month.

Yet it was probably in Aichi prefecture, where election fever was more sustained than in most other places, that organized canvassing was carried furthest. The pace was set by the Aichi Kōin Club, the only political body that was active in all parts of the prefecture; but rival candidates were not exactly negligent, as the following item shows.

The Aichi Kōin Club is publishing the pictures and personal histories of the candidates with whom it has an understanding in the columns of its paper, the Shin Aichi, every day. It is also holding speech meetings in every district, and is working hard to increase its influence. Moreover the other candidates, too, all have their own right hand men; and, at their own discretion, they assemble [them] together, or invite the electors to social parties, or send out canvassers and spokesmen in all directions to give explanations at every door and to seek the approval of each individual.⁴⁵

While much of the canvassing that went on in Aichi and elsewhere was carried out by the candidates themselves and by unpaid volunteer helpers, there was also a class of professional vote-persuaders and election agents. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi, in an article on the election campaign in Saitama prefecture, described the professional canvassers and the candidates who employed them in these terms:-

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TNNS 12-6-90.

In the area around Kodama-machi, in the Fifth Constituency, it was a common practice last year [at the time of the election of half the members of the prefectural assembly] to distribute to the electors presents of cloth or sugar bags, together with visiting cards on which were written the personal histories [of the candidates].....However they [the candidates] have changed their ways since the promulgation of the penal regulations on the first of this month. [Now] they make use of persons who have engaged in pettifogging activities in the past, sending them out everywhere to find the people, give presents of money, goods, or banquets, and prevail upon the electors.⁴⁶

We may distinguish these pettifoggers, whose chief stock in trade would have been a smooth tongue and a fat purse, from another sort of 'agent' not seldom hired by candidates - the strongman (sōshi), with a big stick, who dealt in blows and intimidation. Nevertheless the general standards of the pettifoggers, wherever they were employed, could have hardly risen much above the level indicated by the Tokyo Nichi Nichi.

Some candidates were in the fortunate position of not having to bother much with canvassing, and so were able to do without professional agents altogether. Seki Naohiko, for instance, who had decided to run for the Third Constituency in Wakayama prefecture, was favoured by a seemingly irreversible tide of public opinion. He did virtually all his campaigning from his room in the Fujigen hostelry, in the centre of Wakayama city. There, he was visited, day in and day out, by a stream of relatives, friends, and political supporters, who between them were sufficiently strong in the constituency to secure his election without much trouble. Even so, Seki thought it prudent to set the seal on public approval of his candidature by arranging a special service in commemoration of his dead parents in one of the Buddhist temples in Wakayama. At the service, he gave hulled rice to six or seven hundred indigent citizens.

There was not one who did not weep for joy.
Each took away a bag of rice, and paid
homage to the tombs of his ancestors. 47

Somebody who was perhaps even more popular than Seki was Nakajima Nobuyuki. Originally selected as the Liberal candidate for Yokohama where he had had a redoubtable opponent in Shimada Saburo, Nakajima resigned this candidature half way through June after having

accepted a request from the electors in the Fifth Constituency, Kanagawa prefecture, that he should stand there. Clearly, he cannot have had many doubts about the wisdom of this transfer. He spent the last week of the campaign on daily fishing trips out at sea off the port of Yokohama, clad in a white singlet and accompanied by a student-servant.⁴⁸ Such sang-froid was usually shown only by the very few candidates who had every reason to be hopeful of success, or by the rather more numerous band of those who had every reason to fear the worst.

The effect of all this speech making and canvassing naturally did not follow any one fixed pattern over the country as a whole. In some places - and the contest in Fukui prefecture between Nakajima Matagoro and Nagata Sadaemon was a case in point - a campaign based on lavish entertainment of the voters could rob a well known and upstanding politician of his chance of a seat in the Diet. Nagata, though unheard of outside his prefecture, was a man of some standing and repute inside it. These resident 'local' candidates, enjoying the advantages of permanent influence and connections in the constituency, were often nuts too tough for even the most gifted of 'outside' candidates to crack.

Another example of this happening was the Eighth Constituency in Hiroshima prefecture where, as mentioned earlier, some of the electors took the initiative in trying to arrange a public debate with all three candidates taking part. It will be remembered that the first candidate they approached, a former local government official in the area, refused to participate on the grounds that he did not have any definite ideas about the subject proposed for debate. Even though the topic suggested was the vital and all embracing one of the proper role of the Imperial Diet in the government of the state, and even though the voters disapproved of this candidate's reaction to their request, he - that is, the former local official - did in fact win the election. One of his defeated opponents who had gladly accepted the invitation to a public debate was Inoue Kakugoro. Inoue was a national politician who normally spent most of his time in Tokyo; in 1890, he was a leader of the Daidō Club and noted for his eloquence. On the other hand, the 'outside' candidatures of Suematsu Kenchō and Nishimura Jinemon - to name but two individuals - met with complete success; and Inoue Kakugoro himself was subsequently elected for another constituency in

Hiroshima prefecture, at a by-election held before the opening of the Diet in November 1890.

Stories of voters having been prevailed upon to give their vote to more than one candidate, or having been otherwise bamboozled by the tidal wave of canvassing and the more hidden pressures of village politics, were by no means uncommon, and are not to be dismissed as mere fabrications. Yet the over-all impact of such petty dilemmas or concealed coercions was far from being disastrous to the election as a whole. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi seems to have captured the ambivalence of this situation in a short humorous sketch, published on the morning of 1 July. This showed that progress, in its constitutional aspects, had brought a certain amount of harassment for those citizens it had endowed with the vote; but, at the same time, its technological improvements afforded possible means of escape - at any rate for voters living not too far away from a railway station. The scene is set in the carriages of a train about to leave Tokyo for Yokohama:-

While candidates are chasing round valiantly, the electors are making desperate efforts to escape. [This state of affairs may be likened to a revolving lantern or scissor chess. 'Goodness, Gembei-san, you too?' 'Dear me, Hachiemon-san,

you as well?' 'Ah well, I have just about had enough of ultimatums and boasting from all sides. The election is all very well; but if we poor merchants are silly enough to support one side, we shall lose valuable custom.' 'Neither the Diet nor the Members can take the place of trade.' 'Well, I am just off to lay in stock, and at the same time to Yokohama.' 'Ha, ha, ha, me too!' The departure bell rings, the engine gives a hoot.... Ah! 49

The moral of this particular item is that some electors were able to take care of themselves; and if we apply it to the election campaign as a whole, we shall find that it still held good for many districts outside the capital as well as in it. In the preceding paragraphs mention has been made of the prevalence of banquet competitions, and the unfair influence which the pressures of local interests or potentates could and did have over the minds of electors. All this is true, in a substantial number of cases; but in a - if anything - rather greater number of other cases, things would seem to have worked out somewhat differently.

Thus, there was nothing to stop an elector from being entertained by more than one candidate; and in contests where this form of electioneering was de rigueur, the general effect of these entertainments would have been to cancel each other out. Even if a banquet candidate

triumphed in one constituency, a person who tried the same tactics might well be defeated in another one. A Nakajima Matagoro went down amidst the clatter of plates and clinking of glasses in Fukui prefecture; but a Nakajima Nobuyuki could be returned without having to bestir himself unduly in Kanagawa. Similarly, village and ward politics, or social considerations, did tilt the balance in favour of certain inferior candidates in some places. Yet in others, as we have seen, localism took the far less reprehensible form of an earnest desire to elect the best man available to represent the community as a whole. To take up a slightly different but related point - speech meetings were well attended even when they were not followed by a party.

This sort of evidence, if followed through, will lead us to only one conclusion, and it is the right one. Namely, that despite the large number of particular instances illustrating the contrary, the general body of electors in 1890 did have a mind of its own. Moreover, it was capable of expressing this mind. As a result, the first House of Representatives, in so far as it contained a clear majority of Liberal or Progressive opponents of the Government and also a substantial minority of pro-Government

or Independent Members, represented, crudely maybe but nonetheless effectively, the settled 'public opinion' of the electorate. Dark horses of one kind or another there may well have been, even among the ranks of elected Members; but in terms of real political power, such persons were a negligible quantity. The expected is always less interesting than the unexpected, though it may be truer history; and an account of an election campaign is perhaps more prone than some topics to become no more than a handbook of bizarre happenings here and there. This is alright so far as it goes; but while muttering 'curiouser and curiouser' with some justification, we should not forget the truth of the foregoing statements about the broad outcome of the election. They will be elaborated in a later chapter.

There remains one other form of 'legitimate' canvassing to be noted. This time, it is an indirect one - the ways in which various newspapers were used or lent themselves as a means of communication between the candidates and the voters. Mention has already been made in a different context of the fact that the press frequently carried electioneering advertisements, which simply announced that a voter or a group of voters had decided to vote for a certain candidate. Such announcements

appeared only rarely, if at all, in the big Tokyo papers; but they were very common indeed in the provincial journals. Presumably, they were paid for by the voters concerned, and not by the candidates. Therefore it is possible that the motive behind their insertion was a desire, on the part of the elector, not so much to assist the candidate by actively canvassing for him in print, as to publicize the fact that his mind was made up and so avoid further approaches from opposition factions. Yet I can hardly think that this was so in the great majority of cases, in which, it seems to me, the notices were put in the papers by voters who were actually friendly to the candidates. This would have been done with the idea of bringing their names to the attention of the public, and perhaps also with the idea of indicating to waverers which way the band wagon was likely to move. The following is a typical specimen of these how-I-am-going-to-vote declarations, taken from a Kōchi prefecture paper:-⁵⁰

We hitherto belonged to the NATIONAL PARTY
but have seen the light and now firmly give
our support to LIBERALISM.

Kōchi District, Shimohayama Village, Himenono
Section, Ichikawa Saneyuki.

Ditto District, Ditto Village, Shindokyo Section,
Takahashi Tomiji.

Advertisements like this were usually accepted by newspapers purely as a business proposition. This is proved by the fact that separate notices of support for different candidates sometimes came out on the same page. There was at least one case, however, of a newspaper having refused to publish a voter's announcement.⁵¹ The reason for this was that although many regional papers refrained from taking 'unfair sides' in the electoral struggle, there were some that were violently partisan.

Partisan news-sheets, in the freedom of their own editorial columns, naturally played a part in canvassing the electorate, a part less studiously neutral than the one outlined above. As the campaign grew keener, some of them devoted much space to what was in effect undiluted propaganda. This, it must be realized, was a trait of certain relatively minor provincial papers only. Though the big metropolitan dailies all sided with either the Government or one or other of the political parties, their preferences stopped short of spineless eulogy and they were never rabid in their antagonisms. It was not always the same elsewhere. In the Ninth Constituency, Osaka fu, for instance, the backers of one candidate distributed free copies of the Kansai Nippō throughout the district

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because it gave him favourable publicity.⁵² But once again, it is to Aichi prefecture that we must turn for some of the most striking examples of press intervention in the campaign. There, as stated previously, the Aichi Kōin Club had its own journal, a paper called the Shin Aichi. It, too, was sent as a gift to the home of every elector in the prefecture during the campaign. There were also other local dailies, the Kinjō Shimbun and the Fusō Shimbun, which were just as openly partial to candidates opposing the Kōin Club. Consequently a veritable war of pens developed in the area, with the Shin Aichi on the one side and the Kinjō, together with the Fusō, on the other side. As all these papers were published in Nagoya, the contest between Kunishima Haku (Kōin Club) and Horibe Katsushiro (Nagoya Discussion Society, i.e. Independent) for the seat in Nagoya city (First Constituency, Aichi prefecture) naturally attracted most of their attention.⁵³

Unfortunately, I have not been able to see copies of either the Shin Aichi or the Fusō Shimbun, and can therefore give documentary evidence of the methods employed by only one of the parties to the dispute. However the

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TNNS 21-6-90.

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TNNS 13-6-90 and 17-6-90.

rancour and high feelings displayed in printer's ink in Nagoya during the last few weeks of the election campaign were considered sufficiently remarkable to be retailed in due course in the news columns of the capital too. Therefore it is perhaps safe to assume that the standards adopted by the Kinjō Shimbun were identical, more or less, with those to be found in the Shin Aichi and Fusō newspapers as well. There is, moreover, a certain amount of internal evidence in the pages of the Kinjō Shimbun to back up this opinion.

Let it be said at once that the standards eventually adopted by the Kinjō Shimbun were deplorably low. Up to about 27 June, this paper, while leaving its readers in no doubt about where its sympathies lay, had reported the various campaigns in Nagoya and the other constituencies in a reasonably impartial and non-sensational manner. On 27 June, all this changed, perhaps because it looked as if Kunishima was going to win the seat in Nagoya. On that day, the Kinjō published a venomous attack on him. Its opening paragraph read as follows:-

DISHONEST, UNPRINCIPLED KUNISHIMA HAKU.

In olden days, men said that evil could sometimes look like virtue and a lie perhaps appear to be the truth. In Nagoya, there is a person called

Kunishima Haku. He is evil and full of lies. He is always talking about Liberty and Equality, and though his heart is filthy and black, he wears a mask of integrity and rectitude. What is more, because his heart is filthy and black, he wants to deceive the public and make the people his dupes. But the sun and moon have not yet fallen to the ground, and the gods are still above us. No matter if there is an An Lu-shan in the world, will there not [also] be a Chang Chiu Ling⁵⁴ to prophesy rebellion? Likewise, let there be never so many Wang An-shih's, is it likely that men of the stamp of Lu Hui Ch'ing⁵⁵ to smell out their great lies will be lacking? KUNISHIMA has behaved in a DISHONEST and UNPRINCIPLED fashion before now; and by exposing this to the world we shall disillusion those whom he has ensnared by other acts of trickery and evil-doing. [Furthermore], we shall prevail upon gentlemen who share our feelings to join us in reviling this DISHONEST AND UNPRINCIPLED KUNISHIMA. Let

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Chinese minister in the reign of the T'ang Emperor, Hsuan Tsung.

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Chinese minister in the reign of the Sung Emperor, Shen-Tsung.

him be driven from the woods and forests of self-respecting citizens! Let him be banished to the furthestmost regions of our country - there to become food for wolves and tigers! What follows now is a detailed record of KUNISHIMA'S DISHONESTY and LACK OF PRINCIPLE, and it is on the basis of this that we indict him. We beg the public to pay strict attention, and to take a good look at the working of this DISHONEST and UNPRINCIPLED KUNISHIMA'S heart.⁵⁶

After this there came a further two and a half columns of newsprint. All of it simply boiled down to the accusation that Kunishima, a professional advocate, had been guilty of misleading some peasants and inciting them to public disorder for his own personal gain. He had promised to plead their case in a tenancy dispute without charging them either court costs or a lawyer's fee, and had prefaced this offer with the well known words -

Heaven did not create any man above another, nor did it create any man below another. ⁵⁷

The next article on the same page was headed, pointedly enough:-

WHO WILL HELP DISHONESTY AND BE ASSOCIATED WITH
THE UNPRINCIPLED?

⁵⁶
Kinjō Shimbun 27-6-90.

⁵⁷
Fukuzawa Yukichi, Gakumon-no Susume, p.1.

and ended with the threat:-

If anybody on the first day of next month dares to vote for the DISHONEST Kunishima, the UNPRINCIPLED Kunishima, we will publish his name in the columns of our paper and make it known throughout the length and breadth of the land. Take note of this!

This anti-Kunishima campaign was continued in successive issues of the Kinjō Shimbun up to and including the day of the election. The words DISHONEST and UNPRINCIPLED were splashed across any page containing articles meant to discredit him. When the Nagoya result was announced, it proved to be a victory for Horibe Katsushiro. He polled 236 votes to Kunishima's 134. Both the Kinjō Shimbun and the Fusō Shimbun were said to have proclaimed the news in special extra editions under an identical headline:-

Mr HORIBE BANZAI, CITIZENS OF NAGOYA BANZAI!⁵⁸

To this the Shin Aichi, making the best of a bad job, replied:-

There is yet another Horibe Katsushiro in Niwa sub-prefecture at Inuyama-machi. Therefore, excluding 32 votes which are clearly marked /as having been cast for the Horibe Katsushiro living at 7 Funeiri-machi Nagoya city, 203 votes cannot be confirmed and must be rejected as invalid. In other words, Mr Kunishima has the greatest number of votes that are valid. Long live our party! Liberty forever!

But after announcing a 'victory' banquet for Kunishima, and a further run of bickering, charges, and counter-charges, it was at length compelled to admit defeat.

Before these final skirmishes, and before the voting took place, the public had been told that:- (i) Kunishima had gone mad (Kinjō Shimbun), (ii) Kunishima had been taken into custody (Fusō Shimbun), (iii) Horibe had been put on trial (Shin Aichi), (iv) Horibe had killed himself (Shin Aichi).⁵⁹ Stories of this sort were not as a rule spread by the newspapers; but slandering one's opponent or circulating rumours that would act to his disadvantage was a very common ruse de guerre. Suematsu Kenchō stated that it was used most frequently by self-nominated Independents and by the members of small parties which had little chance of victory, adding the comment that

The parties with a lot of influence wanted the election to take place as quietly as possible, with no aftermath of unpleasantness.⁶⁰

This judgement would seem to be correct as a general summing up of the situation; though in the instance recorded above, one candidate (Kunishima) was a member of the Kōin Club. Campaigning by innuendo was definitely illegal under the terms of the Supplementary Penal Regulations;

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TNNS 5-7-90, also Kinjō Shimbun 30-6-90.

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, pp. 217-218.

but it was an almost impossible task to trace a particular rumour back to its original propagator so that a criminal action could be brought. Consequently this was a way of defying the law and harassing one's opponent that was both simple and safe.

The snakes of rumour could be made to hiss for one side or the other in a number of different ways, ingenious and not so ingenious. In Ashikita gun, Kumamoto prefecture, where, it was said, bribery had become old-fashioned, physical force was no longer interesting, and bottle and candy tactics were also out of favour, falsehood was used in a manner that incriminated the highest in the land. Supporters of the National Rights Party visited the homes of every elector in the sub-prefecture, and carefully but quite mendaciously explained that the Marquis Hosokawa (the former Daimyō of the area) and the Emperor himself had both of their own free will contributed to their campaign funds. Therefore anyone who voted for the rival Kaishin-tō candidates would not only be guilty of disloyalty to the ex-Daimyō, but would also be committing what amounted to high treason.⁶¹ In Osaka, one candidate was everywhere maligned on account

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TNNS 14-6-90.

of the unpleasant friends he had;⁶² and another was wrongly reported to be not eligible for election.⁶³

Suematsu Kenchō himself described a rather more elaborate trick played on him in his own constituency in Fukuoka prefecture. His anecdote is best told in his own words:-

Moreover, in my own constituency, the opposition party - in order to collect an audience for a speech meeting that they were going to have - informed interested persons in the neighbourhood by letter that their candidate and I would hold a public debate. Furthermore, copying the example of the travelling advertisements for the theatre in rural areas, they went from village to village, waving flags and beating drums, to spread the news about the public debate. [By these means, they managed to] ⁷ assemble a large audience. When the time came to open the meeting, they announced 'Suematsu is too frightened to come.' The slander was repeated several times, and, worst of all, they had no scruples about publishing it in the newspapers even. ⁶⁴

The same commentator, when discussing the general part played by rumour in the campaigning, mentioned that an acquaintance of his who was standing for election suddenly discovered that he was the victim of an 'arrest of candidate' story, put about on the day before the poll. In this case,

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TNNS 14-6-90.

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TNNS 21-6-90.

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.218.

all the injured person could think of doing to counteract the damaging effects of the rumour was to hire a rickshaw, and drive around the constituency shouting to all and sundry "I am So-and-so!" ⁶⁵

Suematsu further asserted that in his own campaign, and by implication in other campaigns where one candidate was particularly strong, slanders of this type were of little more than nuisance value; but in places where there were two evenly matched candidates, a rumour could sway the issue.⁶⁶ Once again, as there is not much clear evidence to the contrary, we should accept his verdict; but, at the same time, we should allow for the possibility that two close rivals could be evenly matched in their propensities for making false accusations as well as in everything else. This, as we have seen, is essentially what happened in the Horibe versus Kunishima imbroglio.

Finally, a word about a more straightforward method of garnering votes. Candidates or their agents frequently made out lists of their supporters in covenant form. Thus, Messrs A,B,C,D, etc. pledge themselves to vote for Y. The next step was to get the voters concerned to verify the accuracy of the contents of these lists by affixing their

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.218.

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.218.

legal seals. That done, the list became a sort of covenant. These 'covenants' had no legal validity at all; but they were found to be extremely useful, because (i) they enabled a candidate to see exactly how he stood in terms of popular support, and because (ii) an elector was very reluctant to withdraw his vote after having once promised it in this fashion. It was on the basis of these covenants that two candidates would sometimes decide to do a pre-election 'deal' whereby one of them would resign his candidature and transfer all his 'covenanted' votes to the other. The motive behind such last-minute withdrawals from the fray was in some cases personal advantage, in others party interest.

Mr HORIBE BANZAI, CITIZENS OF NAGOYA BANZAI! These seven words will perhaps, if suitably expanded, give us the gist of the circumstances under which the great majority of candidates ran their campaigns. Public interest in the election was nowhere completely absent; and in areas where it was whetted by talented speakers or a close contest, it could rise to great heights of enthusiasm. Packed speech-meetings testify to this fact. To have a good chance of winning, however, a candidate did not just have to be able to speak well. Even more important was his own standing in the district. Was he popular personally?

How many influential friends did he have? Even if he was both a capable politician and had strong connections with the people in his constituency, he was still not safe. Almost certainly there would be a number of self-nominated and scheming Independents in the field against him; and these men, too, would have their own links with the neighbourhood and maybe what was a virtually unlimited supply of 'money power'. Then, if he were a party man, he might have to contend with one of the other big party organizations, or at any rate a small, but embittered and active, nationalist faction. Or again, his leading opponent might be a person as well qualified to be a Representative and as locally popular as himself.

All this meant that a successful, or potentially successful, candidate had to fight hard for his victory. There was only a handful of exceptions to this rule. In the last resort, no matter whether a contestant was a permanent resident in the constituency or somebody called in from outside, no matter whether he relied on 'mobile speeches' or on 'banquet competition', his own energies and the efforts of his supporters were what usually determined the result. Given the requisite amount of local backing to start with, he had to go on from there and gain the favour of as many electors as possible -

overtly or covertly, by fair means or foul. If his rivals used one tactic against him, he would have to use another and preferably even more efficacious tactic - or perhaps have recourse to the same one, and so pay back the opposition in its own coin.

Thus in conclusion, and not forgetting the all important fact that when all is said and done, the first House of Representatives did reflect with a fair degree of accuracy the political opinion in the Empire as a whole, we may feel that so far as the individual candidate was concerned, the success of his campaign depended on two factors of widespread and overriding significance - his position in the village politics of his constituency, and his own initiative. We have seen already how these two influences gave rise to the general body of candidates, and, in particular, shaped the pattern of local nominations. Therefore, in summing up all that part of the history of the election that does not come under either the provisions of the Law of Election, or the party entanglements and manifestos, or the subsequent behaviour of elected candidates in the House, we shall not be seriously amiss if we quote some words of Suematsu Kenchō's coining. He said of the election campaigning that:-

In Japan, however, [as opposed to the West] 7, candidates at present make local affinities their prime consideration, and it seems that in their campaigns, too, individual endeavour came first. 67

(iii) Bribes and Sōshi.

As has been said earlier, widespread bribing of the electors was a prominent feature of the election campaign. Here, we must draw a formal distinction between the entertaining of the voters and the outright purchase of their votes. Doubtless there is little difference in principle, and often there must have been none at all in practice, between plying the voters with food and drink and actually giving them money. But it is hard after the event to draw the line separating legitimate entertainment from definitely illegal corruption. Therefore we shall be concerned here only with acts of bribery that were punishable under the terms of the Law of Election and its Supplementary Penal Regulations.

Such acts of bribery, committed by the candidates or their agents, were a virtually everyday occurrence, and regularly reported or referred to in the press. The contents of two of these reports have already been recounted elsewhere; and it would be tedious to go on adding to the list of what were essentially the same sort of peccadilloes. Accordingly the general situation may be most conveniently indicated by citing an ironic announcement that appeared in the Matsue Nippō (a Shimane prefecture paper) for 29 May:-

Diet Members' Agency Ltd.

In as much as we shall:-

- Firstly, for those who donate ¥10 or goods equivalent thereto, find one vote - a vote that is under a signed bond not to go astray.
- Secondly, for those who donate ¥5 or goods equivalent thereto, vouch for one vote - a vote that does not have a signed bond.
- Thirdly, for those who donate ¥3 or goods equivalent thereto, procure one vote - a vote that has been riskily half-promised.
- Fourthly, to those who favour members of our company by asking them to meetings free of charge and regaling them with banquets of meat and wine, make a present of a shout to the effect that we shall let them have a vote.
- Fifthly, to those who donate a box of cakes, give a whisper that there is a possibility of a vote.
- We are looking forward to hearing in the near future from those of you who wish to do a deal.⁶⁸

The above was published in a spirit of jest; but, as the Tokyo Nichi Nichi remarked when it reproduced the prospectus in its own columns, some bad jokes strike at the evils of the day. There is no doubt that bribery was rife in Shimane prefecture and in most other parts of the country - notably Saitama, and Aichi.⁶⁹ Concerning the latter area, one report stated that:-

There are incessant rumours here and there about bribery in connection with membership of the House of Representatives.⁷⁰

The next thing to note is that although corruption of the electorate was a tactic used more frequently by self-nominated Independents than any other group of candidates, a number of party contestants, too, were not above greasing a palm. Thus three agents for the Kaishin-tō candidate in Wakamatsu city (Fukushima prefecture) were arrested on 26 June and charged with bribery.⁷¹

Allegations made about Yamada Taizō, Liberal candidate in the Second Constituency, Kanagawa prefecture, seem to have remained unproven;⁷² but there is little reason to

⁶⁹
TNNS 18-6-90.

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TNNS 26-6-90.

⁷¹
TNNS 28-6-90.

⁷²
TNNS 26-6-90.

doubt that the Liberals, too, were willing to hand out bribes in certain areas. The fact that in Aichi prefecture, where the Kōin Club was strong, the candidates were reported to be doing their best to reveal each other's bribes,⁷³ and the nature of the Liberal campaign in Yokohama (about which more will be said later), are grounds for holding this opinion.

Another point in the terms offered by the Shimane prefecture Diet Members Agency Ltd that deserves a little more attention is the fact that the sums nominated were surprisingly small - ¥10 for a guaranteed vote, ¥3 for a half-promised vote. If we allow for the middleman's profit, then the actual purchase price to be paid to the voter would have been even less than this. Of course this reckoning is hypothetical because the report on which it is based was a joke; but at any rate there is an indication here of the amount that might have been expected to change hands at a single transaction. Moreover there is another shred of evidence which would tend to show that this estimate was not far wrong. Most of the bribery cases mentioned in the papers do not say exactly how much money was supposed to have been given to the voters; but

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TNNS 29-6-90.

the Kita Saitama case, details of which were given in an earlier chapter,⁷⁴ is an unusually well documented one. Here, no more than ten or twenty sen was alleged to have been given to each of the electors involved.⁷⁵ A subsequent report mentioned the sum of thirty sen, and added that in some instances the election agent had left ten sen and promised to increase it to fifty sen if his candidate was elected.⁷⁶ Ten sen would have been the equivalent to about 3d. Fifty sen was only one and three.

The electors by definition were not paupers; and it is hard to think that very many of them would have been willing to run the risk of a fine which would have been anything from five to fifty yen for such a paltry bribe. All this raises the problem of to what extent graft, admitting that it was widespread, was actually effective in that it secured the return of candidates using it. In trying to find a solution, however tentative, to this problem, it seems to me that we must first postulate two classes of bribery:- (i) small bribes distributed indiscriminatingly to a large or fairly large number of electors, and (ii) big bribes given on a more selective basis to fewer voters.

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See above, p.108.

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TNNS 14-6-90 and Kokumin Shimbun 14-6-90.

⁷⁶

TNNS 18-6-90.

Small bribes may be taken to mean sums of money of more than ten sen but less than three yen, and also cheap goods that were useful in their way but of a definitely limited value, such as boxes of cake, boxes of dried fish, hand-towels, packets of sugar, sugar pouches, and handkerchiefs. These bribes in places where they were used seem to have been handed out extensively, but in such a way that each recipient was given only one article, or at the most two articles. In view of this method of distribution, it is quite feasible that they were generally regarded by the candidates and voters alike as being in the nature of a discreetly timed present designed to ingratiate the candidate with the voters, and not as a calculated and binding attempt to suborn them. In this connection it should be remembered that the giving of presents is an established convention in normal business and social relationships in modern Japan, and one that derives directly from feudal custom. Certainly, in the Kita Saitama affair, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi at one time expressed its surprise that the candidate who was alleged to have given small gifts of this sort used these methods, because he was not only wealthy but also personally very popular in the area and was believed to have a good chance of being elected anyway.⁷⁷

If an elector was to be visited in succession by two agents representing opposing candidates each of whom left a box of cakes or a towel, what would he do? More often than not, I imagine, he would simply accept and make use of both presents, and then vote for neither of the candidates, or else vote for the one whom he really preferred for quite extraneous reasons. This might have been equally well the case even if only one side was sending presents. The bogus prospectus of the Diet Members Agency Ltd itself suggests that a box of cakes was not worth more than a whisper of the possibility of a vote; and we have already seen that at one stage in the protracted battle fought by Hirabayashi Kyubei and Takagi Masatoshi in the outermost districts of Tokyo fu, the rice-cakes and bonito of the nephew quickly faded from the memories of the electors when they heard of the promised munificence of the uncle.

With regard to bigger bribes - that is, anything from ¥3 to ¥10 - the case was almost certainly rather different; though even on this level of pecuniary inducement, it is worth noting, the Shimane announcement made it clear that at least ¥10 was needed to make sure that a vote paid for would actually be given. The candidates who resorted to bribery on this scale nearly all came from

that group of self-nominated Independents who had little or no chance of winning by any other means. Indeed, one might truthfully generalize to the point of saying - the bigger the bribe, the less popular the candidate. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, reviewing the general progress of the election campaign, said:-

[/Most places_] have put themselves in the hands of self-nominated candidates; and since the general body of electors is in fact being led astray by this, we find ourselves to-day in the melancholy situation that the things which are most abhorrent in elections exist in every region.⁷⁸

Two weeks earlier than this, the Kokumin Shimbun in an editorial entitled Two Hundred Thousand Yen Will Control The Assembly was even more explicit, and stated:-

At present, unscrupulous good-for-nothings are trying to become members of the House of Representatives by the exercise of stealth. The weapons on which they rely are not [/skill in_]

debate, and they are not personal ability. Still less can they claim to have had any experience of politics. Their one weapon is the use of bribes. Consequently ducks that have been long since dead have stretched their wings and taken flight; bottles of beer have grown feet and started walking. Electors - take care! Remember that those who send out bribes of ducks and beer will themselves naturally expect to receive bigger bribes with interest added! How can there ever be any difference between a willingness to send bribes to the electors and a readiness to take bribes from the Government once they have got into the Diet? 79

It is clear, then, that it was on the whole the self-nominated Independents with little else to commend them who made the most frequent and blatant use of money power. Once again, on the evidence available, we must conclude, I think, that with this class of bribing, too, prevalence was well ahead of efficacy. The chief reason for saying this is that not very many of the self-nominated candidates of the lone-wolf type succeeded in getting themselves

elected to the House of Representatives. Judicious graft might well have helped those candidates who had had initially fairly favourable prospects at the start of the campaign and had since got into some sort of trouble; but it would seem very doubtful whether corruption alone ever saved the day for an absolute no-hoper.

We may adduce a number of reasons for this state of affairs. In the first place, the cost of bribing one's way into the Diet would have tended to be prohibitive in most constituencies. Assuming that ¥5 would have been enough to secure a guaranteed vote, then the average ¥1,000 expenses would have bought only two hundred voters; and with the average number of voters per constituency being in the region of seventeen hundred, this method by itself would have not taken a candidate who used it very far towards his goal. Of even greater consequence in acting against the fortunes of self-nominated adventurers were the forces of regionalism and the personal appeal of rival candidates.

In this respect, the history of the election campaign in the Fourth Constituency, Okayama prefecture, is instructive.⁸⁰ There, the person eventually elected,

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TNNS 15-6-90 and Kokumin Shimbun 15-6-90.

Sakata Jōhei, was a much respected local resident and a scholar of Chinese classics. From the outset of the election campaign the favour of the electors in the area had been firmly fixed on him, even though he was not willing to canvass actively on his own behalf. Reports stated that from time to time self-nominated candidates had put in an appearance and, trying to take advantage of Sakata's reticence, had spread false rumours to the effect that he was not really willing to be elected, or else insinuated that a scholar was not the sort of person to make a suitable Representative. To these whispered allegations, Sakata replied simply that so far as the election was concerned, he would not seek it, nor would he compete, nor would he turn his back on popular favour. The self-nominated candidates failed; Sakata won.

Though there is no definite statement that the self-nominated candidates in the above instance added corruption to their methods; the reports do indicate that a large measure of local support and strength of character were sufficient to defeat the more noxious sorts of Independents. Legal action, threatened or actually taken, and the consciences of individual electors must have also served the same end in a number of instances. The whole problem of determining the actual effect bribery had on the results

of the election is an extremely difficult one to resolve with any degree of accuracy. However the essence of the matter would seem to be comprised in the following two statements:-

1. Self-nominated candidates who had little or no popular support or local influence, and so relied heavily on bribing the electors, usually did not get elected.
2. Self-nominated candidates who did have a substantial measure of popular support or local influence and also relied on bribes were not seldom elected.

A brief review of the situation in Osaka, where there were a number of candidates who used money power, would seem to confirm these conclusions.

In the First Constituency, Osaka fu, the winning candidate was an old gunsmith, Awaya Shinazo. He was self-nominated Independent, and a member of both the city and the metropolitan (fu) assemblies. Apparently, he was able to take advantage of his local connections and previous experience in standing for the assemblies to make good in the contest for the House of Representatives against opposition of a rather inferior calibre:-

Mr Awaya Shinazo - the whale member, or bean-jam bun candidate - is not at all liked by the public; but he is not the least concerned about such things. Already, the other day, he invited more than a thousand people - voters from the constituency, newspaper editors, acquaintances, and so on - to the Senshin inn in Naka-no-shima and gave a big banquet, on the pretext of celebrating his sixtieth birthday. Whereupon he became extremely popular with one sort of people. More especially, electoral contests are this old man's forte. Up till now, he has always fought his way through stiff competition and been elected by a large majority - both at the election of members to the city assembly, and at the re-election of members to the metropolitan assembly. Though there is still no definite opinion that it is he who should sit in the Diet, from time to time he has his audiences convulsed with laughter, and at any rate he must be the one who is standing for the Diet with the highest hopes. 81

Elsewhere in Osaka, in the Fifth Constituency, one of the candidates who came from a wealthy local family sent out presents of food to the electors. When his main opponent, a lawyer, heard of this, he summoned electors to his office and warned them of the punishments they would receive if found guilty of breaking the law.⁸² The lawyer won the seat. In the Sixth Constituency, another candidate used his money to try and bring about the defeat of a public notary, who was also standing and who relied on his scholastic abilities.⁸³ In the end, both of these candidates were eliminated by a third one - the former sub-prefect of one of the Districts in the constituency. In the Eighth Constituency, on the other hand, money vanquished a candidate who was an ex-official and an eloquent speaker.

What was happening in Osaka is symptomatic, I feel, of what was taking place generally throughout the country; and corruption, though it must have had its effect on the campaigns in many of the constituencies, did not - in itself, and solely in itself - decide the issue in more than a very small number of them. (Perhaps the eve-of-poll situation in the majority of constituencies

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TNNS 20-6-90.

83

TNNS 21-6-90.

resembled that in the Second Constituency, Tokyo.

There had been no suggestion of unfair practices; and of the 218 voters, 50 had promised to support one candidate and 45 the other one, leaving more than a 100 still not willing to say publicly for whom they would opt.)⁸⁴

It follows, then, that the composition of the House of Representatives itself must have been to some degree influenced by bribery; but was by no means determined by it. This finding of course is confirmed by the information already given concerning the relatively lowly financial status of elected Members.

Nevertheless, while establishing the truth of the argument that the first House of Representatives, as opposed to the election campaign in general, was comparatively free from the taint of unfair practices, we must at the same time admit that it was not wholly free from this taint. This was the most lasting and reprehensible consequence of the widespread use of graft in the election of 1890. In 1892, after a period of protracted contention between the Government and the House of Representatives on the subject of Budget estimates, the Government was at length enabled to pass a modified financial Bill through

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TNNS 1-7-90.

the House after it had secured the consent of a sufficient number of its Liberal opponents by lining their pockets. In this way, the forebodings of the Kokumin Shimbun and other organs of the press were amply confirmed; and an evil precedent was set to be followed with even graver consequences by later administrations and Houses of Representatives. Yet, even though corruption, both at the polls and within the walls of the Diet, was to sink to levels never reached in the opening years of parliamentary history, it is still doubtful if this alone can be regarded as having been responsible for the marked decline in the powers of the constitutional system that occurred after 1930.

To summarize, then, the rather complicated circumstances surrounding election bribes as a whole in 1890, we may say briefly that:-

1. Bribery was prevalent.
2. It was less effectual than might be imagined for a variety of reasons, among which were:-
 - a. The strength of regionalism and personality-ism.
 - b. The fickleness of many of the electors.
 - c. The legal action taken against those found guilty of either giving or receiving bribes.
 - d. The paltriness of many so-called 'bribes'.

3. Nevertheless the miasma of corruption did drift upwards from the election of 1890 to infect the dealings of the first House of Representatives with the Government, and to establish an atmosphere of jobbery. This grew with the years and seriously weakened, though it did not of itself undermine, the parliamentary system as a whole.

The main reasons why Japanese politics should have been particularly prone to corruption may be briefly touched on. The feudal family ethic perhaps had something to do with it. As it was based on feelings of shame before recognized local groups and not on a sense of sin against an all-seeing and all-present God, it was less well suited to the moral problems of electioneering than the more individualistic discipline of certain European nations. Alternatively, the relative lack - not of patriotism in either its local or national forms - but of the sort of regular and unemotional civic morale that would have helped to safeguard the spiritual health of elections and successive Houses of Representatives, might be chiefly accounted for by the political fragmentation of the old feudal order. Certainly, on a rather different plane of values, those bribes which were no more than little gifts sent to all and sundry are virtually indistinguishable in many instances from 'feudal' presents, and so may have not been thought of as bribes proper at all. Lastly and

indubitably, one of the most important causes of electoral corruption in 1890 was the large number of self-nominated candidates.

In conclusion, we should take note of the main methods used at the time to combat the wave of pecuniary misdemeanours. By far the most significant of these controls stemmed from the legal sanctions against outright corruption, contained in the Law of Election and the Supplementary Penal Regulations. These sanctions, as we have seen, were enforced fairly and firmly by the police whenever possible. The authorities were often aided in their efforts to bring the offenders to book by information supplied by rival candidates, or by voters who had accepted bribes and then thought better of it. Newspapers representing all shades of opinion joined together in warning the voters not to allow themselves to be corrupted, and in condemning those candidates who tried to do it. In Saitama prefecture, a number of public-spirited persons founded an anti-corruption association which they called the Saitama Preservation of Righteousness Society; and there are hints of similar moves elsewhere.⁸⁵ However the village in Gumma prefecture, which put up the following

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TNNS 18-6-90 and 21-6-90.

notice at all places where roads entered it, seems to have set a sadly isolated example:-

STRICTLY NO ADMITTANCE TO ALL
ALMS-COLLECTORS, BEGGARS, HAWKERS,
VOTE-BUYERS, etc.⁸⁶

So much for bribes; now for the sōshi. The strongman, with his big stick and his blustering, bullying habits, was a figure that frequently erupted with violence into the centre of the 1890 electoral scene, and was always standing as a dark shadow in its background. Details of some of their outrages have already been given; and easily the most common type of activity was physical disruption of a speech meeting in the manner described on pages 112-114. Here is another standard example of 'heckling' as carried on by a group of sōshi:-

Sixty or so influential people in the vicinity of Sōka-machi, Saitama prefecture, organized a speech meeting in that town the day before yesterday, the 25th. The audience poured in, one after the other, from 1 p.m. onwards; and when it reached a total of more than three hundred souls, a local enthusiast began to give a talk on science.

Whereupon twenty or thirty persons looking like Liberal party sōshi came in, sneered more than once [at the speaker_7], and disturbed the meeting place with their insults and bad language. The political discussion began after this; and while Messrs Kudama Tokutaro and Shinoda [?_7] were taking the platform, they interrupted the speeches in the same way by sneering and shouting abuse. However these two gentlemen took not the least bit of notice of them, and finished their speeches.

Next, Mr Noguchi Honnosuke advanced two or three steps towards the front of the platform, and was just on the point of commencing his speech when the band of sōshi, growing still bolder, took to shouting in unison and tried to create a general uproar. Then Mr Noguchi, raising his voice even louder, said:- "Gentlemen, you are bent on making a disturbance before I have opened my mouth even. No doubt because you feel that it would naturally be of grave disadvantage to you to let me finish my speech without hindrance. But one of my speeches is not worth it." No sooner had he said this than one of the sōshi

(Ebara Senzō), who had crept up alongside of the platform with a bottle in his hand, suddenly stood up, and closing in on the speaker with a flying leap, spluttered out two or three words.

As quick as a flash, all the sōshi got up and started a commotion in every part of the hall. The chairman of the meeting, Mr Udagawa Sonzō, rose to his feet and tried to control them, but the sōshi seized hold of him and assaulted him. The audience all stood up and waded in. Four or five policemen pushed their way into the middle of the scrimmage. The band of sōshi became increasingly destructive. The chairman was hit under the nose and blood trickled out. Bottles flew and were smashed to smithereens. Stones and pebbles were thrown through the air; flower-vases were upset. At last, the police ordered the meeting to be closed.⁸⁷

The rest of the report, after repeating the allegation that the sōshi concerned were connected with the local Liberal party and saying that they had travelled from

Tokyo for the express purpose of attending the Sōka-machi meeting, went on to describe how the sponsors of the disrupted speech meeting immediately arranged to hold a party in a nearby restaurant. About eighty people attended the party; and after the meal had been served, the programme of speeches was resumed and completed - this time without any unseemly interruptions.

Apart from being employed to break up public meetings, the sōshi were also used in attempts to intimidate opposition candidates and to frighten electors. In Tokyo, a sōshi gang known as the Dankyō Gikai seems to have taken a fairly active part in the election. On 23 June, it sent a letter to Takagi Masatoshi in the Twelfth Constituency warning him to yield the election to his uncle, Hirabayashi Kyūbei.⁸⁸ Similar letters were also sent to two of the candidates in Shiba ward, that is the Second Constituency in Tokyo fu.⁸⁹ On 30 June, members of the same gang went to the house of an unspecified candidate in Shiba ward and said that they had come to investigate rumours that he had been offering bribes. The candidate apparently had heard of their intentions and

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TNNS 24-6-90.

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TNNS 26-6-90.

was not at home. The sōshi, furious, conducted a fruitless search for him for the best part of seven hours.⁹⁰

In Yokohama, the bravado of certain sōshi, who were indisputably connected with the Liberal faction, reached heights not attained elsewhere. The citizens awoke on the morning of 29 June to find that members of the Certain Death Compact Society had put up posters at every cross-roads, threatening to kill in their capacity as 'Heaven's agents' anyone who voted for the Progressive Party candidate.⁹¹ On the afternoon of the day of election, the Progressive candidate himself, Shimada Saburo, was visited by three of the most notorious of the Yokohama sōshi, and after a quarrel, subjected to minor assault.⁹²

Though in two of the cases of activity by the sōshi examined so far there are clear indications that Liberals were implicated, electioneering by means of rowdies was a practice by no means confined to the Liberal factions alone. Independents were, if anything, slightly more prone to adopt it; the Kaishin-tō candidates, if anything, rather less. The following few details of particular instances should suffice to show the nature of the situation.

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TNNS 1-7-90

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TNNS 2-7-90.

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TNNS 1-7-90.

In the Third Constituency, Tochigi prefecture, the main contestants were Tanaka Shōzō (Kaishin-tō) and Kimura Hampei (Business Party), and the struggle was a keen one. Both candidates called in sōshi, with the result that there were incidents in the course of the campaign and some injuries inflicted.⁹³ On the day of the election, it was reported, they had stationed sōshi everywhere, but police vigilance prevented any further outbreaks of violence.⁹⁴ In Gumma prefecture, five of the six candidates were still campaigning as hard as they could on the eve of the election, and even though the police supervision was strict, 'fierce quarrels' were occurring everywhere.⁹⁵ In Aichi prefecture (Kōin Club v. Independents), sōshi were generally in short supply because they were being used on such a wide scale by both lots of candidates.⁹⁶ Finally, in Osaka, a certain Independent candidate, whom we have encountered before, took the initiative in enlisting sōshi, only to have his lead quickly followed by his rivals.

The report on this last incident reads:-

The evil tide of threatening ultimatums has reached Osaka, too. A certain candidate in the

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TNNS 1-7-90.

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TNNS 1-7-90.

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TNNS 2-7-90.

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TNNS 29-6-90.

First Constituency, for example - perhaps finding after all that the doctrine of jam bun and banquet entreaties was slow in having effects - whistled up a gang of gambling ruffians, (What a Member!) with whom he had been acquainted on terms of friendship for some time. Having plied them with sake and greased their palms, he formed them into squads of four or five men under squad leaders, and by pushing his claims has brought influence to bear on each elector one by one. His competitors, on seeing this, decided that neither bragging nor speech meetings could match it, and, adopting the same policy, took to the idea of using main force in the form of intimidation and threats. Thus, the rowdies of one side encounter and glare at the bullies of the other side in front of the gate of every elector, and the atmosphere is tense. It is to be feared that, in secret, at any moment now, blood will be shed and flesh will fly. The electors for the most part find a way out by saying that they are not at home, and so up till now have done all they could to avoid

interference in electoral matters. The police, too, fearful of what may happen on the day of the election in these circumstances, have recently taken very strict precautions. Rumour has it that there will also be some unexpected arrests, and there is a general feeling of unease.⁹⁷

Now let us pause to consider for a moment what, if any, effects this widespread intervention by sōshi had on the actual outcome of the elections. Again, it is not easy to give an answer with any great degree of precision; but, speaking in general terms, I think that the sōshi - for all their conspicuity in the accounts of the election - can have gained, or, alternatively, neutralized, a vote in only a very small number of cases. The examples of intervention to which reference has been made so far will illustrate this point.

Thus, the sponsors of the Sōka-machi speech meeting were able to continue with the speeches elsewhere after the sōshi disturbance had forced the premature closure of the meeting, though admittedly the audience had dwindled somewhat in the meantime. Takagi Masatoshi, Shimada Saburo, and one of the two threatened candidates in Shiba

ward were all elected to the House of Representatives, despite the overt hostility of sōshi. The Osaka electors seem to have been quite successful in withstanding the efforts of rival gangs to terrorize them. In short, the sōshi were well able in many areas to exert sufficient force to disrupt speech meetings and impose acute, though generally temporary, physical discomfort on a few unfortunate individuals. But there is little or no evidence to show that:- (i) anyone actually voted in accordance with the dictates of the sōshi, and (ii) any candidate felt it wise to give up his candidature for the same reason.

All this would indicate that the hiring of sōshi was even less effectual than the use of bribes as a means of prevailing upon the electors to give up their right to vote for the candidate they themselves liked best. It is not too difficult to see why. For one thing, the hiring of sōshi was no doubt a good deal cheaper than the paying out of bribes. Therefore if, in a particular contest, one candidate resorted to sōshi, the others could without too much expense do the same. In the majority of instances mentioned, this was indeed the case. As a result one lot of sōshi often found themselves foiled by another gang of sōshi, and the electors were

left in comparative peace. Then again, it was much easier for the police to prevent or, failing that, control outbreaks of overt violence than it was for them to uncover secret transactions in money or goods. As we have seen, the police were by no means negligent in trying to enforce the provisions of the Law of Election, and on polling day itself succeeded in keeping the sōshi ineffective throughout the country. Moreover, the violence displayed in so many incidents in the course of the campaign was of a not very serious kind. Noses might have been punched here, or kicks exchanged there; but certainly, nobody was killed. Very probably, there were no bones broken even.

A possible reason why this should have been so will be suggested in a minute; but first, there are not a few hints in the newspapers that the sōshi were sometimes thought of as not altogether unamusing paper tigers. The following stanzas, from a Kanagawa prefecture Kaishin-tō campaign song, reveal a spirit in which loathing of the sōshi is balanced by self-confidence in face of their threats:-

1. Onwards, ever onwards!

Though [our foes_] be massed [against us_]

And the sōshi blindly rage,

Advance fearing naught.

Never retreat!

For principles and country!

2. Be brave, be brave, be truly brave!

Though the sōshi be such,

The law which shall protect us

Is stronger than iron.

Never retreat!

For principles and country!

3. Think, think, O think!

Though hateful people threaten,

We are resolved

Never to be threatened.

Never retreat!

For principles and country!⁹⁸

The sōshi, then, though fearsome enough in appearance and manner, were not so very terrible in practice. For this and a number of other reasons, the hiring of them was probably the least efficacious of all - legitimate or illegitimate - methods of canvassing. Perhaps their most useful function, from the point of view of the candidates

who employed them, was the fact that they provided a reasonably reliable personal bodyguard in case of need. Looking ahead, however, the calling in of sōshi by Independent and party candidates in 1890 set a bad precedent which was followed with far more serious results by the Government in the election of 1892, when it tried to secure a pliable House of Representatives by mass intimidation of the electorate. Further, it is as well to note that the setting up of a parliamentary system in Japan did nothing to abate a thoroughly reprehensible tradition of political violence which has lasted down to our own times.

Speaking of the sōshi themselves, there is overwhelming evidence to show that the great majority of them were members of the normal, everyday gangs of semi-professional criminals and other congenital ne'er-do-wells. In other words, they belonged to that underworld of racketeers, pimps, and dishonest-penny-turners that exists in Japan or any other large country - particularly of course in the great cities. This would explain why sōshi were for the most part so readily available to those candidates who required them. It would also help to explain - because as members of regular gangs individual sōshi would be well known to the police and members of the public alike - why they did not carry their outrages too

far. Also protection rackets cease to be operable if one is too thorough about eliminating opposition racketeers. But to return to the main point - the following three incidents may be cited to show that most sōshi were no more and no less than common gangsters, and therefore have as much claim to be regarded as a general social phenomenon as a specifically electoral one.

At a speech meeting held at Maebashi in Gumma prefecture on 22 June, a group of sōshi started a disturbance, pulled one of the speakers off the rostrum, and eventually forced the chairman for the evening to declare the meeting closed. The particular speaker interrupted in this way was not the candidate, on whose behalf the meeting had been arranged, but someone who supported him and was also in favour of abolishing licensed prostitution.⁹⁹ It may have been that in this instance the sōshi were acting in defence of their permanent and apolitical interests, rather than for temporary electoral rewards.

The next bit of evidence does not need to have anything read into it, and clearly shows that the sōshi were gangs organized on a fairly long-term basis, and were

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TNNS 24-6-90.

willing to travel some distance in search of congenial employment. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi published the following item on 25 June, under the heading 'Departure of Sōshi'.

Bribery is rife among the candidates and electors at Koshigaya in Saitama prefecture. It is reported that, declaring that to leave things as they were would bring shame on their ancestor, Mr Banzuiin Chōbei, twenty metropolitan sōshi, each with a stick and wearing straw sandals, set off enthusiastically the morning before last to have high words in that area. Magnificent!

Koshigaya is about fifteen miles from the centre of Tokyo. Banzuiin Chōbei was a famous chief of the Edo machi-yakko (a sort of chivalrous fraternity, a number of which were established at the beginning of the seventeenth century to protect the townspeople from bullying by the samurai attached to the Shōgun or from other misfortunes in life) during the reign of the Shōgun Iemitsu (1622-51).

It is the Yokohama campaign, however, which shows the sōshi at their most active, and so throws the greatest light on who they were, how they operated, and their role in the election. The sōshi elements in that city seem to

have been almost all in the service of the Liberal party; but with the transfer of the Liberal candidate, Nakajima Nobuyuki, to the Fifth Constituency (Kanagawa prefecture) in the middle of June, the Liberal camp and its sōshi adherents were sadly divided among themselves.¹⁰⁰ In the end, a section of the Liberal party joined forces with some refractory members of the Kaishin-tō faction; and on 27 June, this coalition of former opponents nominated Hiranuma Senzō to stand against the official Kaishin-tō candidate, Shimada Saburo. Before this, however, some of the sōshi who had been working for the Liberals had taken the initiative, and, calling themselves the Residents Club, held a party for the Yokohama electors on the 22nd.¹⁰¹ At this party, it was decided to sponsor the candidature of a certain Suzuki Inenosuke. At about the same time, another sōshi clique, the members of which were also connected with the Liberals, put forward a Totsuka Sentaro for election to the House of Representatives. Thus in the last ten days of the campaign, Shimada Saburo found himself opposed by three Liberal candidates instead of one. More especially, of these three Liberal candidates, two at least had been championed by rival bands of sōshi; and

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TNNS 29-6-90.

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TNNS 22-6-90.

so on the Liberal side, the Yokohama election after the sudden withdrawal of Nakajima Nobuyuki had taken on many of the characteristics of a gang vendetta.

The following account of an incident which must have taken place just before the nominations of Suzuki and Totsuka makes this clear. The 'hero' of the story, Fukui Mohei, was one of the best known of all the Yokohama sōshi, and was the person who assaulted Shimada Saburo on the afternoon of the day of the election.

Those who are known to be leaders of the ??? in that area, Fukui, Maruyama, Umeda, Nomi, Sakurai, and Takano all considered that the moment was a very propitious one for them to show their influence. They decided to hold a meeting as soon as possible, and as they favoured Mr Suzuki Inenosuke (a member of the Liberal Party), to nominate him as the candidate and tell the electors what they had done. For all those who had been opposed to them for a long time past - Nishimura, Ono, Kurusu, Shimada, Ishikawa, and Watanabe - it was a very serious state of affairs. Saying, "We are local people, so why should we let ourselves be trampled on by those villains

without doing anything at all about it?", they hurriedly sent out a rickshaw-man as a secret messenger, and held a conference of their supporters in a certain place.

However the 'rickshaw-man' - all unbeknown to them - was actually a fully-fledged Liberal party sōshi, and had taken on this disguise for reasons of ??. On hearing these [instructions]_7, he ran of his own initiative to the camp gate of the Liberal party, with news of what was afoot. The chief of staff there, Mr Fukui Mohei, boiled with rage, and shouted - "No matter what sort of wretches they are, it is quite unpardonable of them to have given us no warning at all and to ignore others!" Then having pocketed a hand-knife, he stormed off like a demon, alone on horseback, and when he came to the meeting place of the opposition faction, prepared to burst his way in.

The latter, for its part, seems to have realized that it had no ordinary foe to deal with; and men dressed in dirty clothes and soft sashes were on guard at the gate with big sticks in their hands. Mr Fukui, after taking a look, muttered "Bah, mere greenhorns!". Holding up his knife above

his head so that all could see it, he made a charge. They fell back before a countenance so terrible; but just then, the nearest of the sōshi ran into the house, closed the door with a thud, and snapped the lock shut.

Mr Fukui, nonplussed, made a tour of inspection here and there, and while he was doing so saw Mr Kurusu Sohei standing in the lavatory to relieve himself. The fearless Mr Fukui sprang on him like a shot and gave him a sudden kick. When he had overpowered him with kicks, he got on top of him and hit him with his fists, shouting in a loud voice - "You are carrying a lantern for the Kaishin-tō, but now how about supporting the candidate whom we want to elect?" In the end, the people inside the house ran out, and, coming in between them, quietened them down; but for a while there was a great deal of confusion.¹⁰²

It is just possible that a sōshi of Fukui Mohei's undoubted energies and strength of character was genuinely interested in Liberalism for its own sake; but it is far more likely that Fukui and all the other regular sōshi

in Yokohama and elsewhere were interested in politics only for what they could get out of them, and regarded the general election as a Heaven-sent opportunity for extending their spheres of influence. The reasons why the Liberals seem to have relied rather more heavily than the Kaishin-tō on sōshi support are not altogether clear. Probably they have something to do with the facts that in 1890 the various Liberal factions still had a populist taint about them, and that in the preceding decade militant members of the Jiyū-tō had engaged in many small skirmishes and conspiracies directed against the Government. What is certain about the political affiliations of the sōshi in general is that, in sharp contrast^{to} the conditions in later years when political violence of this or a much more serious type was usually the work of Right wing influences, the situation in 1890 was that the Left and Centre parties between them exercised a virtual monopoly over this kind of tactic.

Few, if any, of the sōshi were motivated, directly or indirectly, by ultra-nationalism. The disturbances organized by the National Rights Party in the Fifth Constituency, Kumamoto prefecture, which have been described elsewhere, may have well been an exception to this; and it is possible, too, that the Sanyō Gikai of

Himeji, in Hyōgo prefecture, had some ultra-nationalist backing. But the existence of a few exceptions or quasi-exceptions of one kind or another does not invalidate the conclusion to be drawn from the bulk of the evidence concerning activities of the sōshi, namely that - as a general rule, the sōshi of 1890 were not connected with ultra-nationalism.

This does not mean that sōshi were not on occasion capable of borrowing the propaganda or demeanour of the ultra-nationalist groups, if and when it suited them to do so; but in such circumstances the ultra-nationalism was clearly spurious. Thus at one stage, the Liberal sōshi of Yokohama publicly accused Shimada Saburo of treason, but this was for their own ends. Likewise, the Kinjō Shimbun of Nagoya threatened that a band of two hundred sōshi would visit the homes of all those who failed to vote; because 'people who disregard the rare and wonderful right conferred on them by tomorrow's voting and do not go to the polls are guilty of extreme disloyalty to their country.'¹⁰³ Yet this particular group of sōshi, if it existed at all outside the columns of the Kinjō Shimbun, was almost certainly one of the regular Nagoya gangs - and therefore apolitical.

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Kinjō Shimbun 30-6-90.

At times, when one comes across reports of more serious outbreaks of violence such as arson or large-scale rioting, the impression arises that these were not so much electoral disturbances as manifestations of a deeper and more menacing social unrest in various parts of the Empire. In this connection, it should be remembered that the Tokugawa tradition of scattered but frequent peasant revolts continued well on into the Meiji period; and in a debate on poor relief held during the opening session of the Diet towards the end of 1890, it was alleged that upwards of 4,000 paupers were dying of starvation every year. Incidents involving damage to property were quite rare during the course of the election campaign; but in order to substantiate the above point, mention will be made of two of them.

On or about the 25 May, a street riot broke out in Iida-machi in the Noto region of Ishikawa prefecture. (This was a district that had been specially noted for similar emeutes in the feudal era.) The Chōya Shimbun, reporting the incident, stated that the trouble had originated in the conflict between local parties, and that among the former Liberals there were 'wild and lawless fellows' who were liable to behave badly. The rioters succeeded in destroying the house of the village Headman,

and had also attacked the village-office and the police-station. The police were compelled to draw their swords, and ten persons were arrested and many more wounded before order was restored.¹⁰⁴ Elsewhere, in the Third Constituency, Tottori prefecture, the village-office and three adjacent houses in Yoneko-machi were burnt down on the morning of 30 May. Later the following notice was put up in every quarter of the village:-

You, Endō Haruhiko, stop forgetting your place as a salaried official and running about on behalf of candidates! Your ardour for the fray will only lead in the end to the burning down of a number of village-offices. Four young sōshi proclaim this.¹⁰⁵

It transpired that Endō Haruhiko, the Headman of Yoneko-machi, had been canvassing the area on behalf of one of the candidates in the parliamentary elections.

We have dealt with sōshi as common gangsters, and with sōshi as putative political militants of one kind or another. There were also other cases of electoral fracas, where the participants seem to have been indulging

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Chōya Shimbun 26-5-90 and 27-5-90.

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Kokumin Shimbun 21-6-90.

more in a species of larrikinism than anything else. The following (final) story will convey this. It will be noticed that at any rate the principal 'sōshi' involved were both men whose everyday jobs were respectable if somewhat humdrum; and that there is no suggestion at all of an under-current of political zeal.

On the evening of the 26th, the Kimura faction held a speech meeting in Umedo village, Inabe District, Mie prefecture. While the speakers were travelling back in a party, in rickshaws, from Umedo village to Kita-Ōyashiro, six or seven sōshi belonging to the Amaharu faction were going along in a group. The first party, however, attempted to overtake without any word of warning. The Amaharu faction's sōshi criticized this rudeness, and started exchanging words with the sōshi guards of the various speakers. A certain Amashiro, a barber of Hachiman-Shinden and a sōshi of the Kimura faction, said that he would cut down the Amaharu party with an unsheathed sword that he was carrying. Whereupon the Amaharu faction retorted - 'just try it, and see if you can!' At once, Amashiro

slashed Hikota, a stone-mason from Minami-
Ōyashiro and a sōshi of the Amaharu faction,
from the left elbow to the wrist with the said
sword - at which, the irresistible Hikota gave
a loud cry and fell down. The Amaharu faction,
seeing his body, seized hold of Amashiro, called
him a vulgar oaf, and took his sword from him.
Then the Kimura faction all fled the spot, raising
a great clamour. Hikota is at present undergoing
medical treatment, and it is reported that his
life is not in danger.¹⁰⁶

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TNNS 1-7-90.

CHAPTER FOUR

Election Results and Composition of the First House of Representatives.

The election itself was a success. Despite a few very minor incidents involving sōshi on the day of the election, the polling everywhere took place as planned and in a general atmosphere of quiet. This is not to say that the high enthusiasm which had marked the campaign in most areas suddenly ebbed away in the early hours of 1 July, leaving the voters to troop apathetically to the polls. On the contrary, the mood of merry-making continued right down to the date of the election and for a short while after. In the Twelfth Constituency, Tokyo fu, Takagi Masatoshi kept open house for all and sundry from the time of the opening of the polling stations at 7.0 a.m. It seems that the local electors and others made full use of his proffered hospitality; for:-

When word went round that the abstemious and drunkards alike could freely indulge in tea, cakes, foreign liquor, etc. in the reception rooms, there was a constant stream of people going in and out. There were ancients flicking their beads and chanting innumerable prayers, and a party of firemen in quilted coats was also seen. We understand that they had not all left by the time the polls closed; but this may be an unfounded rumour. 1

Elsewhere in Tokyo, groups of voters made arrangements to fete successful candidates after the results of the elections had been announced;² and in the Fourth Constituency, Osaka fu, the entire population of the town of Nishihama-machi, Nishi Nari sub-prefecture, stopped work on 4 July to celebrate the victory of Nakae Tokusuke.³

More serious and concrete evidence of popular interest in the election is provided by the number of votes cast. Of a total of 450,365 electors, only 27,636 failed to vote. In other words, for the country as a whole, there was a 95% poll - and this when there was no legal penalty for not voting! The areas with the highest number of non-voters were Nagasaki ken (11.1%), Kyoto fu (11%), Tokyo fu (10.9%), Yamaguchi ken (10.9%), and Yamanashi ken (10.9%).⁴ In Fukuoka ken, on the other hand, fewer than 1% of the voters did not vote. The figures for this extraordinarily high poll must be accepted, I think, at their face value as showing that the election had given vent to a long-cherished and widespread desire to participate in national politics. This same feeling, as we have seen, accounted in part for the large number of candidates who came forward to contest most of the seats;

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TNNS 28-6-90 and 3-7-90.

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Osaka Mainichi 5-7-90.

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, pp.206-7.

now it had been even more convincingly demonstrated by the numbers of people who took the trouble to vote. Moreover, it is probable that this was no mere flash-in-the-pan interest in parliamentary politics. The sixteen year history of the Jiyū Minken Undō and crowded election meetings up and down the land would argue otherwise.

The press, of course, deserves a lot of credit for having tirelessly explained the advantages and responsibilities of constitutional government to the people. Yet even though 'last-minute' exhortations such as the following could not have been entirely without effect, it is likely that by this stage they were reflections of public opinion rather than moulders of it:-

The election of Members is almost upon us. Even though there may be some who are not interested in the election, others who are bewildered by it, others who have been perplexed by dishonest canvassing, others who have been led astray by temporary inducements, others who are unable to distinguish the good and bad points of the candidates, others who have been frightened by the threats of the orators, and so^{on} and so forth, most of the electors are not in this position.

They are all gentlemen If unworthy Members are returned at the coming election, the electors will have to take all the blame for it. On the other hand, if good men are returned, in nine out of ten cases that will be a tribute to the gentlemanly qualities of the electorate. Apart from this, whether the gentlemen concerned [i.e., the electors] will prove enthusiastic or no, whether they will take good care or no, whether they will act with proper rectitude or no, whether the election will be ill-famed or of good repute - all must depend in the end on themselves. So theirs is indeed a great responsibility. Electors and gentlemen, each and every one of you - we beg you - live up to your responsibilities!⁵

2,935 of the 422,729 votes cast were invalid.⁶ This is not a large number by any standards. In this case, it is quite small when one takes into account the facts that it was the first general election ever held, that the method of voting used necessitated the writing in full of both

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Sanyō Shimbun 29-6-90.

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.214.

the candidate's and the elector's names and also the address of the latter, and that not all the electors were literate. It would appear from this that the care taken to provide official scribes at the polling stations was of over-all advantage in that it reduced the number of spoiled votes, despite the opportunity it gave corrupt clerks to hoodwink those of the electors who used this service.

Very little bitterness was left behind by the election. This was so, even though the competition for seats had been nearly always keen and sometimes violent. Personal and parochial rivalries, too, had come to the fore in the eight weeks preceding polling day. Yet by the end of the first week in July, when all the results had been announced, the public excitement had died down, and the political scene, though it had obviously undergone a fundamental change as a result of the holding of the election, was tranquil. Doubtless only very few of the fifteen hundred or so candidates could have fully evinced the feelings of dispassionate amity which the editor of the Kokumin Shimbun wished on them when he wrote on the morning of 1 July:-

We rejoice that they, ever faithful to and utterly single-minded in their high ambition, have

so gloriously undergone this great ordeal;
and we shall pray that winners and losers
will grasp each other's hand, and, putting
foremost the wider interests of our country,
will continue to foster the development of
constitutional democracy. If the clouds and
rain of discontent have no place in their hearts,
above their heads will only be blue sky and a
golden sun.⁷

Nevertheless 'the clouds of rain and discontent', wheresoever
there were any, must have soon yielded to a 'blue sky
and golden sun'; and, allowing for hyperbole, the latter
metaphor is not a bad one to describe the mood of hopeful
and rancour-less quiescence which succeeded the stress
and upheaval of the election.

Moreover, the oft-expressed⁸ fear that the personal
animosities and regional feuds aroused in many places by
the campaigns for the Diet would somehow have an adverse
effect on the workings of local government proved to be
unfounded. The various prefectural, city, town, and village
assemblies did not really function any the worse for having

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Kokumin Shimbun 1-7-90.

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TNNS 3-7-90, Nippon Shimbun 8-7-90, and Sanyō Shimbun
8-7-90.

been involved indirectly in the election for the House of Representatives. The same is true, generally speaking, of individual officials such as village Headmen who had often taken a far more active part in the parliamentary contest. By and large, once the election was over, local affairs returned to being purely local affairs, and the new Diet was left alone to find its own place in the arena of national politics.

There were a number of different reasons for this happy state of affairs. In the first place, many of the candidates - possibly a majority of them - polled fewer than ten votes. These persons must have known from the outset that their chances of being elected were virtually non-existent, and so would have not been too disappointed by their failure. Secondly, interest in the forthcoming Diet tended to efface memories of the polls as soon as the election was over. Both the party politicians and the press had little time for recrimination; from the beginning of July, they were fully occupied in making preparations for, or having thoughts about, what would happen in the following November when the House of Representatives was due to meet for the first time. Thirdly, the Government's impartial attitude towards the election meant that there was no up-surge of popular indignation against the Sat-Chō

bureaucrats. Thus, post-election feeling in 1890 was very different from what it was in 1892, when the Government's open and frequently brutal interference with the electors gave rise to a widespread and by no means transient hostility on the part of the press and the public. Fourthly, on the morrow of the voting, officials and people alike could congratulate themselves on a job well done. Unsavoury incidents and features of the campaign were not overlooked in the spate of 'over the wave' editorials and press comment. But stronger than pricks of shame was a feeling of exhilaration and not unjustifiable pride in having accomplished so much. After all, twenty-two years previously, the nation had barely heard of constitutional government. Finally, and perhaps most significant of all, the general spirit of good humour that prevailed after the first election was indicative of the fact that behind the great political issues of the day as well as behind the innumerable local rivalries, there lay a concealed but considerable and growing sense of national unity.

Of course, the political issues and local rivalries were real enough; but most of those involved were quite willing, when the circumstances demanded it, to subordinate them to the interests of the Empire as a whole. It is not surprising that that extreme Right wing newspaper, the

Nippon Shimbun, should have filled its editorial columns for July 1890 with statements like the following:-

The setting up of a House of Representatives in our country has come about as a result of collaboration between the throne and people. Never can it be compared with the conflicts between royal prerogative and popular rights in European countries. Although it is not the case that there have been no collisions between Government and people, the national condition had already become one of union of Sovereign and subjects. Therefore political evils were the fault of the governing authorities alone. Speaking from this standpoint, our country is indeed superior to any other, and is the one that produced [first] the existing system of making the Monarch sacred and the Prime Minister responsible which has recently become common to all constitutional countries. Of course, many of the trends since the restoration have accelerated this process. Yet it must be attributed, in the final analysis, to what has

been made manifest in the Imperial Way and in the character of the people from the time of the foundation of the Empire.⁹

More interestingly, the Japanism of the Ultra-Conservatives had its echoes in the patriotism of the others. We have already seen that the editor of the Liberal Kokumin Shimbun chose the morning of the election to remind the candidates, and by implication the nation at large, of the need to 'put foremost the wider interests of our country.' On the same day, the Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun (Progressive Party) declared that the principal business of Government, people, and newly elected members of the House of Representatives was to make the state a solid rock at home, and a shining light abroad.¹⁰ This common tendency to think in terms of national problems, and a fairly wide measure of agreement on the question of what constituted the most pressing national problems of the day, must not be taken to mean that there was a similar unanimity with regard to possible solutions for these problems. Obviously, the Ultra-Conservative view of the relationship of the executive to the legislature was quite the reverse of that of the Liberals or Progressives. Nevertheless virtually all of the politicians and publicists of the

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Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun 1-7-90.

age had the same general frame of reference - the overriding and long term interests of the Empire as a whole. The rural gentry Representatives, though their success in capturing a seat had often depended solely on local politics, were themselves accustomed to thinking in this way, too. (As yet there had been no question of land reform or reduction of rents.) This broad sense of national unity was one of the things which enabled the Diet to function as a genuine parliament from the first, and the nation to accept without any great misgivings the verdict of the elections.

The most important fact about the House of Representatives elected in 1890 was that the 'popular parties', i.e. the Kaishin-tō and the Liberal factions, had a clear but not crushing majority. The minority consisted of a mixed bag of Government supporters, Independents, and a handful of Ultra-Conservatives. It is impossible to state with precision the numbers of Members belonging to each of the various parties and factions, as the newspapers reporting these details doctored them in accordance with their own political preferences. The following table,¹¹ published originally by the Tokyo Shimpō, is reproduced here because it contains the fullest account of the state of the parties;

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Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol.1, p.284.

The above table does at least show that all the main strands of political opinion and major party groupings that had appeared at the time of the election campaign were represented in the new House. The Daidō Club had done particularly well in Niigata, Yamagata, and Aomori prefectures; that is, in the area where the defenders of the Bakufu had made one of their last stands and where Gotō Shōjiro had had his most successful campaigns at the time of the organization of the Daidō Danketsu. The Aikoku-kōtō was strong in Hyōgo, Fukui, and Kōchi prefectures; while the Kaishin-tō won three of the five seats in Toyama. On the other hand, the Kaishin-tō fared badly against the Daidō Club in Niigata; and the Kōin Club lost all but two of the eleven seats in Aichi to its pro-Government opponents. Other regions where pro-Government or Independent candidates scored major victories were Miyagi, Shiga, Gifu, Fukushima, Tottori, and Shimane prefectures. One of the most surprising results of the campaign was the comparative success of Inoue Kaoru's Jichi-tō (pro-Government and moderate conservative group). It had won five of the six seats in Kyoto fu, and had virtually swept the board in Yamaguchi and Wakayama prefectures as well. The Ultra-Conservatives had held their own in Kumamoto and had managed to make quite a good showing in Hiroshima; but they ended with an almost

total failure in Yamaguchi (Torio's home province), and did even worse in Kōchi (Tani's home province).

The Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties was returned for all the seats in Saga and Kagoshima prefectures. The result for Kagoshima is somewhat unusual, because Satsuma (the old name for Kagoshima) was one of the two 'home provinces' of the Sat-Chō Government. With the sudden deaths of both Saigō Takamori and Ōkubo Toshimichi at the end of the 1870s, the power of the Satsuma clan in the topmost ranks of the governing hierarchy seems to have declined slowly but surely. By 1890, the chief spokesman for the Satsuma interest, Matsukata Masayoshi, was known to be quite content to follow the lead of his Chōshū colleagues. Therefore the ordinary people of Kagoshima had some reason, perhaps, to feel that they were under little obligation to support the existing regime on grounds of 'clan loyalty'. As Satsuma could no longer lord it over the Government, it chose to enter the ranks of the opposition. Moreover the internal politics of the former fief had been complicated in the previous year (1889) by a serious quarrel on the subject of treaty revision. The younger inhabitants of the district had wished to found a kind of Satsuma-based Daidō Danketsu; but the older men refused to commit themselves to the project which failed for lack of their support.

This timidity on the part of the 'clan elders' weakened the local conservative parties.¹²

By the time of the opening of the Diet in November 1890, the situation in the House of Representatives had become far more coherent and stabilized. In August, the Jiyū-tō, the Aikoku-kōtō, and the Daidō Club all dissolved themselves in order to make way for the proposed amalgamation of all the Liberal groups. This was in accordance with the agreement reached by the three factions at the time of the formation of the Kōin Club in May 1890. The Jiyū-tō and Aikoku-kōtō went out of existence on 4 August; the Daidō Club deferred its demise until the 17th. Meanwhile, the Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties, encouraged by news of what had happened to the Jiyū-tō and Aikoku-kōtō, dissolved itself on 7 August, and once more sent delegates hotfoot to Tokyo to preach the holy cause of a union of all true friends of the people.

Two meetings were then held, on 22 and 23 August, at which representatives of the three former Liberal factions, the former Kyushu Confederation, and the Kaishin-tō discussed the idea of forming one single party. Agreement was virtually reached at the second of these two meetings on a short draft proposal for an entirely new party to be founded on

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Kokumin Shimbun 9-5-90.

Liberal principles. However, the Kaishin-tō delegate, Shimada Saburo, asked that details of this decision should not be made public until after his party had held its general convention on 1 September; he also requested that the new organization should insert in its programme an explicit reference to the fact that it adhered to Progressive as well as Liberal principles. The others rejected his suggestions, and Shimada walked out of the meeting.¹³

The upshot of this quarrel was that the Kaishin-tō, when it met on 1 September, refused to dissolve itself, and so the prospect of a merger between the Liberal elements and the Progressives faded away overnight. The Liberals and their supporters in Kyushu went ahead with the plans for amalgamation, and on 15 September, the new Rikken Jiyū-tō (Constitutional Liberty Party) was brought into existence at a meeting of prominent Liberal leaders in the Yayoi Hall, in Shiba park. The meeting was marked by considerable disorder - heated arguments inside the building, and sōshi fist-fights outside it - but at length the party programme was approved. Thus by the end of September 1890, the position of the popular parties was substantially the same as it had been before the dissolution of the first

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Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol.1, pp.285-7.

Jiyū-tō in October 1884. There was now once more a large and somewhat precariously united Liberal Party; and the smaller, but better organized and powerful Progressive Party continued to be a separate entity.

Both these parties found that for the convenience of conducting their business in the Diet, it was better to have an intra-mural as well as an extra-mural association. Consequently, on 2 September 1890, the Liberal Members of the House of Representatives formed themselves into a society known as the Yayoi Club. The name of this club was taken from the building where it was founded - the same Yayoi Hall in Shiba park, mentioned above. It must be stressed that the Yayoi Club was not really different from the Rikken Jiyū-tō; it was simply the parliamentary branch, so to speak of the latter body. Likewise, on 1 September 1890, the Members of the new House of Representatives attached to the Progressive Party were authorized by the party convention to set up the Giin Shūkaijō (Members' Club). In the case of both the Yayoi Club and the Giin Shūkaijō, membership was available only to those adherents of the two parent parties who also had a seat in the Diet; and in both cases, all those eligible joined.

There was only one exception to this. In October, some Right wing 'Liberals', belonging in the main to nationalist associations which had been affiliated with the former Daidō

Club, held a meeting in Saga city, Kyushu. (There was always an active ultra-nationalist movement in the southern island.) Then in the following month, they and their sympathizers from other regions founded in the metropolis a political party of their own, which they called the Kokumin Jiyū-tō (National Liberal Party). Needless to say, the Kokumin Jiyū-tō was always nationalist and never Liberal.¹⁴ Its sponsors hoped that it would grow into a large association which would be national as well as nationalist, and would link together all the separate Ultra-Conservative factions in the provinces; but this never happened. The Kokumin Jiyū-tō had only five adherents in the House of Representatives; and in 1891, it was dissolved. However, its history though brief is not altogether without significance. For one thing, it is an indication of how many different sorts of eggs had gone into the making of the Daidō Danketsu and hence the Daidō Club, and - to continue the metaphor - the unscrambling of this particular omelette had been one of the problems which had held up the amalgamation of the Liberal factions earlier in the year. Then again, the formation of the Kokumin Jiyū-tō shows that, as always, the Ultra-Conservatives tried to make up for their lack of

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See Appx. XI below.

numbers by engaging in a ceaseless round of high-level activity and bombast. They were cheeky, though weak.

Meanwhile, many of the more moderate Conservatives and supporters of the Government in the new House also came to feel the need for a special intra-mural association. This they founded on 22 August, and gave it the neutral-sounding name of Taisei-kai (Accomplishment Society). Members of the House belonging to this group had all been elected as ostensible Independents (Non-Party and Not Biassed); but in reality, almost all of them had been strongly pro-Government from the first. Naturally enough, it contained a large number of the serving and ex-officials who had been elected to the House. Since the Cabinet was formally committed to the doctrine of non-responsibility to the Diet, however, it was bad politics from its point of view to have an openly pro-Government party in the House of Representatives. Hence the rather cryptic title of the Taisei-kai. Hence, too, the fact that, unlike both the Yayoi Club and the Giin Shūkaijō, the Taisei-kai never had a parent body outside the House. Though it drew up its own short political credo,¹⁵ from first to last, it was never anything more than an association of those sitting Members of the House of

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See Appx XII below.

Representatives who had a general sympathy for the aims and methods of the Government. Members of the House who were not enrolled in either the Yayoi Club, or the Giin Shūkaijō, or the Kokumin Jiyū-tō, or the Taisei-kai, remained as Independents. Most, but not all, of this element also supported the Government. Among the Independents were the Minister for Trade and Agriculture, Mutsu Munemitsu, and other Jichi-tō candidates who had been returned from Yamaguchi and Wakayama prefectures, and also most of the Members belonging to the ultra-nationalist Kumamoto National Rights Party. On the other hand, the five Kyoto Kōmin-kai members, also Jichi-tō, chose to join the Taisei-kai.

When the Diet was formally opened on 29 November 1890, then, the state of the parties in the House of Representatives was as follows:-

Yayoi Club (Liberal)	130
Giin Shūkaijō (Progressive)	40
Kokumin Jiyū-tō	5
Taisei-kai (Pro-Government)	80
Independents	45
	<hr/>
	300
	<hr/>

Since the Yayoi Club and the Giin Shūkaijō were able to co-operate quite successfully inside the Diet, the anti-

Government popular parties had a majority of forty votes. In what seems like tacit recognition of this state of affairs, the Emperor, acting on behalf of the Government, appointed Nakajima Nobuyuki (Yayoi Club), who was a veteran Liberal leader but before that had been a prefectural governor, to be Speaker of the House, and the former Senator, Tsuda Mamichi (Taisei-kai), to be deputy Speaker.

Aspects of the first House of Representatives, other than its narrowly political allegiances and party composition, merit attention. To take three minor ones first:- (i) Of the three hundred Members, 109 were shizoku and 191 were commoners.¹⁶ The days when the former military class had determined the politics of the Empire were over, though the ratio of shizoku to commoners in the House (1:2) was far higher than the corresponding ratio for the population as a whole (1:19). (ii) The average age of Members was surprisingly low, even when one takes into account the fact that expectation of life in Japan has increased by at least fifteen or so years since the middle of the Meiji era. The following table shows that very nearly two thirds of the total number of Members were less than forty-three years of age in 1890.¹⁷

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.205.

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Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, MBZ, vol.3, p.214.

Year Period	No. of Mems. Born In
Bunsei, 1818-29	10
Tempō, 1830-43	59
Kōka, 1844-47	40
Kaei, 1848-53	99
Ansei, 1854-60	85
Manen, 1860	7

The oldest Member of the House was sixty-seven, the youngest just turned thirty. (iii) The average amount paid in taxes by Members of the House of Representatives was ¥126 per annum. As mentioned earlier, most Members were assessed at a lower rate; the average figure is somewhat misleadingly high because one Member paid over ¥2,000 and three others over ¥1,000 a year in taxes. In order to give a clearer idea of the relative position of the Members of the House of Representatives in the financial hierarchy of this period, it is worth mentioning that the average amount paid in taxes by the forty-five 'millionaires' representatives' specially elected to the House of Peers was ¥1,534 per annum. The highest figure in this group was ¥11,282; the lowest ¥262.¹⁸

Of course, only general inferences can be drawn from data of this sort; but allowing for exceptions, we may begin to sketch in the outstanding features of the statistically 'typical' Member of the House of Representatives by picturing him as (i) a commoner, (ii) a person who, though born before the fall of the Bakufu, was in terms of his working life of the first generation of the restoration, and (iii) of modest to comfortable middle class means. Already, the break with feudalism is obvious. Our imaginary Member does not so far appear to have had many links with the Tokugawa past, when (i) the officials of the Shōgunate and fief governments were all samurai, (ii) age almost invariably took precedence over youth, and (iii) those who had amassed fortunes often squandered them on city amusements, and could never use them to acquire political power. With the convening of the Diet in 1890, there marched for the first time to the centre of the stage of national policy-making representatives of a 'new' class, a class which had in fact been waiting in the wings with envy and increasing ferment for some considerable time. To this class we may give the generic title of Men of Enterprise.

All in all, the elections were a triumph for the middle classes, and above all for the village landlords,

who in being returned to the Diet in such numbers had come into their own. The following details of the various occupations hitherto pursued by Members show this.¹⁹

Occupation	No. of Members.
Senior Officials (in office or recently retired).	18
Junior Officials (i.e. Kuchō and Gunchō, in office or recently retired).	22
Agriculture.	125
Trade & Industry.	33
Law.	22
Journalism.	16
Medicine.	2
Others.	62

Included in the 'others' are leading 'professional' politicians, such as Nakajima Nobuyuki or Hayashi Yūzō, and also members of the recognized intelligentsia, using that word in its narrower sense to mean 'thinkers' or 'opinion formers'. Examples of this type of Member are

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Kokumin-no Tomo, No.88, July 1890, p.93, et. seq., and other sources.

Seki Naohiko (Jichi-tō) and Ueki Emori (Jiyū-tō); the latter, of course, has as much claim to be regarded as a professional politician. These are side-issues, however. The main point is that the 'typical Member' would have very probably belonged to the rural gentry class, or failing that, to the commercial and professional middle class of the rapidly expanding cities. Furthermore, the chances are that he either was or had been a member of a local government assembly. The Nippon Shimbun, in one of a series of articles analyzing the results of the election, stated that whereas 68 of the new Members were or had been at one time in the official service, no fewer than 158 of them were or had been at one time members of the local metropolitan and prefectural elected assemblies.²⁰

Both the fact that getting on for half of the total number of Members of the House of Representatives came from the country landlord class, and the fact that more than half of the total number of Members had at one stage in their career been elected to a local assembly, are of the utmost importance. A good deal has already been said here and there about these two crucial aspects of the election. Purely for convenience of arrangement, it is

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Nippon Shimbun 15-7-90.

better to defer further discussion of them to the Conclusions that follow this chapter. Meanwhile, as a general comment on the result of the election of 1890, let it be said that the voters had secured a genuinely representative though not wholly effective parliament, and, by the same token, the Government had confronted itself with a formidable, if divided and as yet untried, opposition.

CONCLUSIONS.

Our starting point must be the hypothesis of interaction. For, it seems to me, Meiji constitutional history, both before and after 1890, is best understood in terms of continuous interaction between Government and opposition forces. Therefore this history follows an inner logic of its own. It is the logic of two voices raised in argument. Now the argument is harsh and bitter with dissent; now it suddenly dies away and there is a reasonably amicable settlement of the matters under dispute; now there is fresh controversy as each side attempts to interpret the terms of the settlement to its own advantage.

The outward form of this inner logic was the process of constitutional evolution by stages; stages, that is, of rising tension, followed by partial relaxation and reconciliation, followed by renewed tension, and so on. While this process was in operation, there were constant changes in its frame of reference. Feudal institutions were disposed of; the foundations of a modern industrial state were laid. A military caste ceased to have any special status as a military caste; in the countryside, another class, the village gentry, came into its own. Rebellion broke out; individuals died, not all of them in

bed. Wars occurred, and treaties were signed. Yet though these 'extraneous' events modified, they did not interrupt the essential argument in the political arena between the Government bureaucrats and the upholders of popular rights. The former wanted statism with an element of Liberalism; the latter favoured Liberalism with an element of statism. The argument persisted, and with it the process of achieving constitutionalism through interaction. In many ways, it was a mistrustful and badly geared process; but it worked, has gone on working, and has accomplished much.

It is in terms of, and as further evidence for, this hypothesis of interaction that I wish to comment on the broad significance of the 1890 election: firstly, as one stage in the process; secondly, as a symbol of the process as a whole; and thirdly, as an important step in giving this fundamental process an institutional form.

Strictly speaking, of itself, the election began nothing and it decided nothing - apart from the composition of the first House of Representatives. The holding of it had been made necessary by the decision to create representative institutions, and it has been followed by other general elections at regular intervals over the past seventy years. Thus, it was not an isolated phenomenon, but one link in a chain of development. It took place in

an atmosphere of comparative calm and goodwill. But the cries from the hustings already contained the battle-notes of future challenges and conflict. The struggle for a representative assembly was over; the fight for party Cabinets was about to commence. Here, we are considering the position of the election in the general sequence of constitutional events - that is, in primarily lineal relationship to what had gone before and what came after. In this respect, it occurred towards the end of a period of low tension, and marked the transition of the evolutionary process from its phase of pre-constitutional contest (Bureaucrats v. Jiyū Minken Undō, 1873-81) to its phase of post-constitutional contest (Bureaucrats v. Popular Parties, 1890-1918).

Yet there was more to the election than this. Did it not also - to a remarkable degree - contain and exemplify in itself all the various strands woven into the pattern of interaction? Each side to the great political debate was concerned with the voting in its own characteristic capacity: the bureaucrats as organizers and administrators, self-appointed guardians of public order and the interests of state; the party politicians as pace-setters and the apostles of a brand of Liberal individualism. Both sides played their part within the general framework provided by

the constitution and the Law of Election; and the whole business of a parliamentary election was indisputably a Western-type innovation. In few situations were the full nature and extent of the confrontation of the two great creative forces in Meiji politics more clearly revealed. The official class was efficient and no doubt deeply interested in the results of the polling, but at the same time it was chary of staking the Government's future on the elector's favour since it was not yet ready to engage in parliamentary politics on its own account. The advocates of popular rights, for their part, had ample supplies of enthusiasm and talent, but were destined, it seems, to strain for ever beyond the limits of what the general progress of society or their own party organizations would allow. The attitudes of the one side had their origin in the attitudes of the other. The very existence, perhaps, of the one side depended on the existence of the other.

This sort of dualism, when made to inhabit a house of equitable law and institutions especially designed for its expression, is, of course, the spirit and structure of representative government as we know it. Parliament is first and foremost a place for discussion; and there can be no doubt that once basic requirements of economic welfare and administrative technique have been met, the

best of all possible political worlds is the one that gives opportunities for useful debate. The election of 1890, therefore, is of interest not only as a stage in the process of interaction and not only as a symbol of that process; it is significant, too, in that it was one of the first acts by which the nation recognized the need to give itself this freedom for meaningful argument, and proceeded to do so in an official and durable way. With the constitution, the right to disagree had been embodied in the highest institutions of state and rule by an elected majority in parliament became a feasible objective. At the election, voters availed themselves of the right in order to draw closer to the objective. Henceforward both bureaucrats and their opponents were going to have to play the interaction game in accordance (more or less!) with parliamentary rules; and 1 July 1890 was the day of the first match under the new dispensation. In other words, this force of interaction had been raised from the dust of rejection, concealment, and political battle, and was being turned into a properly constituted principle of state.

The internal dynamics of the bureaucrats and anti-bureaucrats, at the time of the election and during the previous twenty-two years of constitutional experiment and struggle, are always worth investigating. What gave each of

these groups its power? What drove it to seek some kind of understanding with its opposite number? Why did not the antagonism they felt for each other force them so far apart that any sort of interaction would have been impossible?

As has been said earlier, a correct understanding of the Meiji political world depends on trying to answer these questions. To my way of thinking, the dynamics of interaction grew from a common root of individual ambition and the national experience of the period immediately before and after the collapse of the Baku-han system as a result of collision with the West. The legacy of feudal statecraft, the pressure of day to day problems, concern for personal success, and the appeal of the West combined to build up in the minds of the leading bureaucrats a desire to fashion some sort of constitution and some sort of representative institutions for their reconstructed state. The Jiyū Minken Undō agitators acted on a similar combination of motives. Their political conduct, and that of their followers, was animated by what persisted of the Tokugawa polity and its concepts, by contemporary dissatisfactions and ambitions, and by the example of the West. In what follows, I shall attempt to enlarge slightly on these statements by relating them to the first parliamentary election.

It should not be thought that the influence of the West was somehow slight or superficial. On the contrary, this was probably the factor which more than any other single factor drew the reforming bureaucrats and their Liberal opponents together, and gave them a common goal in a general desire for a Western-type constitution. From 1873 to 1889, the argument was not really about the need for a constitution. When should it be promulgated? How much real power should it put in the hands of the people? These were the issues to which those who stressed state rights and those who stressed individual rights addressed themselves. Both views assumed a good deal of Westernization along with their patriotism; and, as already explained, both the moderate bureaucratic Right and the conservative Liberal Left were deeply involved in the election which they treated with due seriousness.

Moreover, the evidence of the election results, the campaigning that preceded them, and the newspapers that recorded it all, would tend to show that in many respects Westernization had proceeded quite rapidly and penetrated quite deeply. Of course, it is not possible to claim that this process was anything like complete. Nevertheless - to take but one facet of this steady instruction in a hitherto alien culture - there existed by 1890 in all parts of the

country an elite composed of men who thoroughly understood the methods, problems, and opportunities of representative government. These were the men, candidates and publicists, who wrote the newspapers and toured the constitutencies making speeches on Western political theory and its application to Japan. The voters and the general public responded to this initiative from above with enthusiasm for speech meetings, an almost 100% poll, and a win for the anti-Government parties. The electoral weaknesses and confusions of the xenophobic Ultra-Conservative groups are another indication of this same general trend.

This finding would seem to contradict the view sometimes held that during the Meiji era, Japan was - in a manner never fully explained - technologically transformed but spiritually unaffected by the West. I doubt if the Empire will ever lose all traces of its pre-modern identity. On the other hand, the idea that change has been confined to technology, or ought to be so confined, is simply not tenable in the light of the developments of the past hundred years.

However, while all this is to be kept in mind, the essential role of the Occident in Japan during the second half of the last century was that of a mentor. It gave

new forms, a new direction, and something of its own spirit to forces transmitted from the native past. Quite definitely, one of the strongest of these forces was that of localism.

Not long after the Government had abolished the fiefs, Ōkubo wrote:

Although, in the autumn of 1871, a decree abolishing the han was promulgated and an order establishing the prefectural system was issued so that there would be consistency in government instructions, for almost one thousand years, the people have been accustomed to the oppressive feudal system and its unfortunate practices. Given the customs and feelings of the people, how can the country be adjusted to new institutions? Democracy, of course cannot be established in Japan, and the old monarchy can no longer be maintained. We must develop a political system that conforms to the customs, feelings, and conditions of our nation. We must decide on a fixed statute for the state, that is, a system of constitutional monarchy. ¹

These observations show how much the senior ministers had to take into account the strength of an ordinary man's attachment to his native district when contemplating the political future of the country. Likewise, an awareness of this mountain of localist feeling must have lain behind Kido's experiment with the Conference of Prefectural Governors, and behind the Dajōkan's considered policy of setting up

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Trans. Beckmann, Making, p.112. For the original, see Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.108.

representative assemblies in the provinces before it allowed a national assembly to be elected. Conversely, the popular rights movement drew many of its energies from this same force of localism. A sentence or two from the Aikoku-kōtō manifesto of 1890 adequately sums up the situation in this respect:-

In the feudal era, our country went too far in the direction of regional particularism and had an administration which was seriously weakened by decentralization. The system of every little corner of territory maintaining its own independence was abolished at the time of the Imperial restoration; but there was an unexpected tendency for the central Government to enlarge its powers and the provinces gradually grew weaker. Our party is determined to introduce a fair system of local self-government, and to bring about a proper and reasonable division of power.

Therefore we have a situation in which both the bureaucrats and the Liberals were conscious of the regionalism left by the old order. The former, quite rightly, felt obliged to placate it; the latter, equally rightly, used it to turn public opinion against the Government. This regionalism, then, was a potent, though by no means the only, source of interaction. As a corollary to this, it may be mentioned again that the local assemblies set up by the authorities between 1868 and 1890 had a truly useful and vital function. In all sorts of way, they were a

veritable stepping-stone from the feudalism that was dying to the modern parliamentary state that was coming to be.

If anyone should doubt the significance of localism as a major factor in early Meiji politics, let him consider its wide influence and thrusting power in the 1890 election. How many of the candidates of all political colours were members of the local assemblies or else had held posts in the local administrations! How many more besides these relied on parish pride or local connections to see them home! How many of the political parties of the election were nothing more than regional associations! Even the 'national' parties were really federations of like-minded regional associations; and the great Liberal split can be explained to some extent in terms of regional loyalties. This strong and pervasive spirit of localism was at one and the same time the glory and the weakness of the nascent parliamentary movement in Japan.

In few countries attempting representative institutions for the first time can Liberalism have come more easily and more securely to the countryside. Most nations, which though not in the direct tradition of West European culture have experimented with our type of government, have found that it could make some headway among the intelligentsia of the

cities but failed in the rural areas. In Japan, this was not so. The village gentry, who had been projected by localism into national politics, were at least the compeers of, and in some respects ahead of, the city dwellers in their radical leanings. The ready acceptance up and down the land of the new ideas by this important class of persons - who, it must be stressed, were not the younger sons of established landlord and village industrialist families, but were the heads of these families in their own generation - must have done much to foster their rapid growth and practical application from, say, 1873 to 1924. Long enough, that it, for the parliamentary system to become customary for the nation as a whole, and to that extent an established and native institution.

On the other hand, as has been made plain, the economic flesh of the rural proprietors and capitalists was destined to become in some ways the enemy of their political spirit; and, in the twentieth century, men of this class weakened representative government by using it to consolidate their financial hold over the less fortunate group of tenant farmers and village poor. This divergence between the economic interests of the rural capitalists and their Liberalism did not have any serious effects until after the end of the Meiji period; and before then it is the cohesiveness

of their economic power and political behaviour, and not any potential conflict, which is important. However the laissez-faire attitudes of the Liberal manifestos in 1890 contain more than a hint of future developments. Apart from this, it is obvious that, if localism is carried too far, it will disrupt the essential business of the central government, distort the operations of a national parliament, and fragment any movement based on an appeal to the people. In the Japan of the Meiji era, there was always a danger that this would happen. This was probably one of the reasons why the bureaucrats, intent above all on firm national government to handle a national reconstruction, were so reluctant to hand over executive power in 1890. It was certainly one of the reasons why their opponents were not more united.

From whatever angle we look at it, the exuberant and many-sided localism of the first general election was, like its factionalism, a manifestation of a society in transition. It was the mark of the old trying to fashion itself for the new; alternatively, it was the mark of the new trying to adapt itself to the old. Furthermore, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the localism of 1890 was nothing other than a continuation in different forms of the han and village autonomy of Tokugawa times.

Though the connections between the village capitalists and localism are important, their role as supporters of individualism is of even greater significance. Generally speaking, people in this group were not so distinguished as individuals as the top rank of national leaders; but they were the element that gave the Jiyū Minken Undō its popular backing, and provided the new parliamentary system with that backbone of continuous public interest without which it could not have functioned. They were the soldiers whom the generals led to the war. Without them, there might have very well been no war, or else it would have ended rather differently. They were the community which was so well represented in the first House of Representatives.

What motivated them? Basically, their objection to arbitrary taxation coupled with their dislike of centralization. What made them sufficiently confident in themselves to join Itagaki's crusade? Basically, the economic power they had acquired under the old order. As a rule, the village gentry who participated in the election were not shizoku. Therefore under the Tokugawa Shōgunate, men of their station could not have had anything more than an off-stage voice in national or fief politics. Yet the vigour and non-conformity with which they interested themselves in political questions after the restoration

show, I think, that this class must have been a reservoir of latent Liberal-type individualism by the end of the Tokugawa era. This potential for political action the gentry had gained from the freedom they had had before 1868 to make good in the economic sphere. Of many a candidate or elected Member it was reported that his family had been influential farmers (i.e. rich peasants who were also small scale manufacturers) for several generations. This capital, this substance, which underlay the influence enjoyed by a particular family over the others in its neighbourhood, must itself have been obtained by the exercise of a fair degree of individualism - astute and self-interested and mercenary. Accordingly, given the opportunities that came with the restoration, it was a comparatively easy matter for the gentry to extend to the political field attitudes and methods they had inherited in the economic one.

Just as localism was present in the great cities as well as in the villages, so was individualism a power among other groups in the population besides the rural entrepreneurs. Indeed this individualism - sometimes called 'personality-ism' - was one of the dominant themes in national life at the time of the election and during the Meiji era. Inevitably, the way in which it made itself felt differed from group to group.

On the whole, what was true of the rural capitalists was also true of the urban capitalists - but to a noticeably less marked degree. The city merchants, too, espoused Liberal individualism, but their opposition to the bureaucrats was not so vehement. One reason for this was that this class had been more of a constituent part of the Tokugawa system; another reason was that it had less cause for complaint in the policies pursued by the Meiji Government.

The individualism of the shizoku intelligentsia, on the other hand, was different in kind - and not just in degree - from that of the rural capitalists. The training of the military classes had been directed towards making its members despise personal ambition or greed, but it had also sought to fill them with a strong sense of personal responsibility. Before the restoration, a warrior's obligation had been a completely personal one to his lord and fief. After the restoration, many of the more idealistic of the Meiji shizoku were inspired by an equally personal and equally intense commitment to their country, a particular life-work, or a particular cause. It was this that gave men like Ōi Kentaro, Nakae Chōmin, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Okamoto Takeo, Torio Koyata, and Itagaki Taisuke their whole-hearted strength of character. Seen in this light, the individual achievements and endeavours of this

group may be regarded as the last, and by no means the least admirable, flowering of the old chivalry. Reformist leaders from other classes, too, could show the same spirit of endurance and initiative; the career of Sugita Teiichi is evidence of this.²

On a rather different level of emotion and experience, many of the more able members of Meiji society - irrespective of whether they were shizoku or not - seem to have welcomed the chance it gave them to cultivate their own personalities. Feudalism had naturally tended to prevent an individual from developing his own nature outside certain fixed and rather narrow patterns of behaviour; seemingly, the higher the social rank, the greater the constraint. Therefore a great deal of the dynamism of the new era must have come from the breaking down of these restrictions and inhibitions. For the first time for several hundreds of years, people could begin to feel that the world really was their oyster; and society in general perhaps benefited more than it suffered from this liberation of the individual. The career of Ōkuma Shigenobu was especially notable in this respect. He was a man who derived all that he could from the opportunities presented by his age; he was also

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See Appx. A, p.31.

a vigorous personality who did much for his countrymen in that and later periods. But Ōkuma was not alone in this. Coming to the election, it is impossible not to believe that the great majority of candidates like standing for the House of Representatives just as much as they enjoyed travelling abroad when they could and found satisfaction in their careers as lawyers, journalists, or members of the prefectural assemblies, or in sitting on the local school, public health, and conscription boards. So here, in a very real sense, was a frontier zestfully crossed.

The breeze of individualism, then, had entered Meiji politics partly as an extension of, and partly as a reaction to, the ethic and institutions of the Tokugawa state. It blew on bureaucrats and Liberals alike. Ōkubo, Kido, Itō, and the other senior Sat-Chō ministers were not just patriotic statesmen; they were also professional administrators anxious to stay in office. Itagaki, Gotō, and Ōkuma were not just public-spirited denouncers of evil; they were also seekers of power. While all this made for a certain amount of opportunism, it also helped to produce that empiricism which was such an important element of interaction. Moreover, as has been said, with this individualism there went a prevailing mood of rejection of

the past, enjoyment of the present, and optimism for the future; and nearly all the influential men of affairs in the Meiji era shared to some degree in this mood. This was another factor that made it relatively easy for them to come to terms with one another when they so desired. After all, if there is a general though tacit agreement that there is nothing fundamentally wrong and the national future looks promising, why carry your disputes to the point of seriously endangering this state of affairs?

In view of everything that has been said about the feudal past and the way it shaped and coloured the 1890 election, we must assume, I think, that the Tokugawa polity, though all but static in its hierarchy and techniques of political control and virtually closed in its relations with the outside world, was neither monolithic nor absolutist. Rather, it was a honeycomb equilibrium of diverse elements: a compound of law and power; of a formal dictatorship working through the machinery of discussion and based on a doctrine of moral obligation; of Bakufu rights and han rights; of daimyō rights and village rights; of samurai interests and capitalist interests; of emphasis on personal initiative supposedly for the public good; of the Chinese learning as opposed to the National and Dutch Learnings; of total class and regional divisions as a setting for private enterprise, group autonomy, and a slowly growing

national consciousness. This was its considered, institutional nature. At the same time, it was also six or seven generations of ordinary human life - life large enough to include all its customers. The world of restaurants and big-city gangsters had preceded the Meiji restoration.

It was this, richly variegated and pluralist, society that broke under the impact of the West and its own reaction to that impact. But it was the fixed and outward political-social order, with its underlying idea of permanence, that disappeared; not the diverse elements and the basic fact of pluralism. These elements, of course, underwent great modifications and changes of form after 1868 - the Bakufu became the new bureaucracy, the han became the new prefectures, the samurai became the new shizoku elite, the rural entrepreneurs became the backbone of the new Liberal movement, and so on. Nevertheless, despite these transformations, the inner natures and separate existences of these elements did not alter so much. They survived to determine the pattern of the Meiji history of constitutional conflict culminating in parliamentary institutions. Therefore - given always the force, timing, and quality of the contacts with the West - the events leading up to the election and the election itself were

'foretold', so to speak, in the pluralist structure of the Tokugawa state and its political ethic. Meiji interaction was rooted in Tokugawa complexity. This must be our main conclusion.

Finally, a word about mid-Meiji society as observed through a study of the election. As in the preceding period, it was vigorous and many-sided, but even more so. The Tokugawa savants had often indulged in polemics; but their discussions were for a long time strictly academic and usually carried on in discreet seclusion. The mid-Meiji publicists, on the other hand, embraced controversy in the most fervent and open manner imaginable. Their newspapers, memorials, and speeches were full of it. Not even the throne was entirely outside the arena of public debate. The mass of the people ruled by the Shōguns and the various daimyō doubtless maintained a fairly cheerful view of life and their own individual fortunes through each successive generation. The subjects of Meiji inherited this optimism from their forefathers; but they applied it not only to their personal destinies, but also to the common destiny of their nation and society as a whole. This was a big difference. In its two and a half centuries of existence, the Tokugawa polity had experienced some concealed but far-reaching alterations in its economic and social apparatus.

These alterations were frequently not fully recognized by the ruling class; or when they were, they were not welcomed by it. In a near-complete contrast to this, mid-Meiji society was vibrant with change, the knowledge that it was changing, and the will to change even faster. There was some uncertainty about the ultimate destination; but the twin concepts of Westernization and national greatness loomed large in most minds and hearts.

This was the society for which the election and the newspapers that reported it were a fairly faithful mirror: from the prudent and hard-working integrity of Yamagata and Suematsu Kenchō, through the reasoned eloquence and high-minded fulminations of Itagaki and the other Liberal or Progressive leaders, to the spurious sixtieth birthday party and even more nefarious activities of a certain Osaka gunsmith with political ambitions.³ Most assuredly, an entirely new departure was being made in the national life - a departure which, in some ways, opened a new phase of world history. Yet what was happening was as much the outcome of the past as it was an omen for the future.

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See Appx. A, pp. 10-11.

Appendix A.

Election Campaign - Regional Notes.

The following notes have been compiled largely on the basis of reports contained in newspapers available at the Meiji Newspaper and Magazine Archives in Tokyo University. With the exception of Kyoto fu, only those areas for which I could obtain at best a reasonably full and coherent picture of the electoral contests in the region as a whole, or at worst a short notice summarizing this, have been included. The result of this is that no more than ten of a total of forty-five fu and ken are mentioned; and even in the case of these ten, information is far more plentiful for some than it is for others. Despite these deficiencies, however, it is hoped that these notes will serve to confirm and in some instances to elaborate what has been already said about the election campaign in general.

Tokyo fu. (5,715 voters: 12 Members.)

First Constituency. (Kōjimachi, Akasaka, & Azabu wards). One member constituency. 233 voters; 194 votes cast. Polling took place in the council room at the ward office in Kōjimachi. Originally there were seven candidates, of whom only three had any chance of winning. These three were Kusumoto Masataka (Deputy President of the Senate, Chairman of Tokyo city assembly), Yajima Sakuro (President of the Tokyo Electric Light Company), and Hayashi Homei (Liberal politician). Kōjimachi ward supported Kusumoto; Akasaka & Azabu wards

favoured Yajima. Hayashi, a Liberal leader, after leaving a constituency in Saitama ken for which he had stood as a candidate and waging a short but effective campaign in Kōjimachi, suddenly resigned his candidature there, too, on the eve of the election and transferred all his supporters to Yajima. Behind this manœuvre lay a Liberal party intrigue designed to prevent at all costs the election of Kusumoto. Kusumoto, if elected, could have easily become the first Speaker of the House of Representatives, and as he was a high official his appointment to the post of Speaker would have been disadvantageous to the Liberals. Kusumoto elected with 106 votes. Independent.

Second Constituency (Shiba ward). One member constituency. 220 voters; 145 votes cast. Polling took place in the Shiba ward office. There were eight candidates, of whom only two were important. These were Tanimoto Michiyuki (managing director of the Tokyo Horse-Bus Company, and President of the Tokyo stock exchange) and Yamada Chūbei. Tanimoto was powerful in the northern part of the ward; Yamada in the south. Yamada made great efforts in the last two days of the campaign, using Dankyō Gikai sōshi to canvass for him and holding speech meetings. Tanimoto elected with 77 votes. Liberal.

Third Constituency (Kyōbashi ward). One member constituency. 246 voters; 216 votes cast. Polling took place in the Kyōbashi ward office. More than seven candidates contested this constituency, and four of them had a good chance of winning it. All candidates were people with local connections, and had supporters in the ward. On 30 June one candidate, Kitada Masatada, made a sōshi attack on the headquarters of two of his rivals - Kazama Nobukichi and Inada Masakichi. Kazama was a lawyer, a member of the Kyōbashi ward council, and a member of the Tokyo fu assembly. He had come top in a pre-selection ballot held in the ward to choose a candidate for the Diet. Inada had lived all his life in Kyōbashi. Another candidate, Matsuo Seiji, offended many electors at a speech meeting he gave because he implied that they had accepted bribes. Kazama elected with 56 votes. Liberal.

Fourth Constituency (Nihonbashi ward). One member constituency. 639 voters; 469 votes cast. Polling took place in the Nihonbashi ward office. Seven candidates. By far the

strongest of these was Fujita Mokichi. Fujita was a graduate of Keiō University, ex-editor of the Hōchi Shimbun, and author of a number of books. Later, when the Kaishin-tō was formed, he entered that party and became one of Ōkuma Shigenobu's chief assistants. Afterwards he worked for a bank, and also travelled in Europe and America. Chairman of the Nihonbashi ward council; member of the Public Health Association. Member of the standing committee of Tokyo fu assembly, etc. etc. The only effective challengers to Fujita's candidature were a Yasuda Zenjiro (a bank president) and Kikuchi Chōshiro. Yasuda campaigned in secret with the backing of the local landlord faction; Kikuchi had some backing from the owners of local drapery and dry goods stores. However Fujita, too, had a number of influential people on his side and they canvassed as hard as they could for him. On 26 June Fujita, in response to a request from the electors, gave a long political speech to the residents of the Nihonbashi ward. Fujita elected with 308 votes. Progressive.

Fifth Constituency (Honjo & Fukagawa wards). One member constituency. 282 voters; 251 votes cast. Honjo had 159 voters; Fukagawa 123. Polling took place in Honjo ward office. At least seven candidates, but only three of them polled any votes. Honjo ward supported Ota Sane; Fukagawa residents insisted on nominating Shibuzawa Eiichi despite his refusal to stand. Ota was born in Awaji shima (Inland Sea region) and had studied German in his youth. Came to Tokyo in 1876, and then roamed about doing various jobs in industry. Founded the Loyalty Association in 1881 to promote the idea of gradualism in political affairs. Set up a marine products company in 1886. Former Headman of Honjo ward; deputy president of the Tokyo stock exchange. Shibuzawa was a high official in the early years of the Meiji era, and was a financial magnate. This election campaign took the form of a 'local Derby' between the electors of Honjo and the electors of Fukagawa. Ota elected with 156 votes. Government supporter.

Sixth Constituency (Asakusa ward). One member constituency. 331 voters; 265 votes cast. Polling took place in Asakusa ward office. Three candidates - Sudō Tok'ichiro, Umekawa Chūbei, and Tatsumi Kojiro. Umekawa gave up his candidature because of illness, and from about the middle of June his

place was taken by Takanashi Tetsushiro. Takanashi was a lawyer and a brother of Sudō Tok'ichiro. Tatsumi was said to have had the support of the priests and prostitutes in the district at the beginning of his campaign, but his influence weakened as time wore on. Another story was that Sudō had been nominated by people in the ward who were anxious to lend him money after the opening of the Diet. Certainly Takanashi was the most active campaigner in an election which seems to have been conducted entirely on a basis of informal persuasion. Takanashi had learnt English and had worked for a short while in the Treasury, before he took up his legal studies. Takanashi elected with 130 votes. Independent.

Seventh Constituency (Kanda ward). One member constituency. 279 voters; 213 votes cast. Polling took place in the Kanda ward office. At least seven candidates, but only two counted. These were Tsunoda Shimpei and Oyagi Binichiro. Tsunoda was a lawyer by profession, and was a member of the Kanda ward council, the Tokyo city assembly, and the Tokyo fu assembly. His political sympathies lay with the Kaishin-tō; and being well known and popular in the Kanda area, he was reasonably confident of election. Oyagi was also a lawyer, and was a lecturer at the Law School. He had at one time belonged to the Daidō Danketsu, but later became a member of the Right wing Nippon Club. Oyagi did not announce his candidature until after the beginning of June; but once he had entered the lists, he made a vigorous attack on his opponent. Oyagi was helped by the 'scholastic set', and at various times during the campaign Tsunoda was subjected to sōshi-like threats. Oyagi wrote to Tsunoda denying personal responsibility for the intimidatory methods used by some of his supporters, and expressing his regret. Tsunoda replied carefully accepting Oyagi's protestations for what they were worth, and reminding him of a previous statement that he was not going to stand for election in Kanda. Brushes of this sort aroused a good deal of interest in other parts of Tokyo and even so far afield as Osaka. This interest was sustained because both candidates were notable men of differing political views, and in the last ten days of the campaign it was clear that they were closely matched. Oyagi ran a 'door-knocking' campaign, and distributed free copies of the Nippon Shimbun and the Miyako Shimbun, both Right wing papers. Tsunoda's tactics were less brash; but it was

said that if elected, he would have to entertain the owners of the pawn-shops and other important rentiers in the district to dinner. On the morning of the election, Tsunoda received a postcard from a 'patriot'. This announced that his worthless life would soon be cut short in one clap of thunder if he had the good fortune to become a Representative. He sent the card to Oyagi as further proof of the misdemeanours of the latter's sympathizers. Oyagi answered that so far as he was concerned, the Kanda election was a contest between gentlemen, and further suggested that in order to show this they should go to the polls together. Tsunoda accepted the offer, and they walked with each other to the ward office, where they voted for two of the minor candidates. Each faction had supplied its supporters with hired 'rest-rooms' near the polling station, but there was an agreement that the electors should vote before 'resting'. Oyagi elected with 129 votes. Government supporter. (Tsunoda was subsequently returned to the first House of Representatives at a by-election for the Tenth Constituency in Tokyo fu.)

Eighth Constituency. (Hongō & Shitaya wards). One member constituency. 246 voters; 202 votes cast. Polling took place in the Shitaya ward office. Only three candidates of whom one, Masuda Kokutoku, was actually campaigning for a seat in the provinces. Remaining two candidates were Tsuda Mamichi (a Senator, who in the years before the Restoration had studied law in Holland and had occupied high government or judicial posts ever since 1868) and Suzuki Nobuhito. This contest was another 'local Derby'; the number of electors in each ward was almost the same. Both wards had had some difficulty in finding suitable candidates. The two persons who were most favoured by their respective wards had turned down invitations to stand. Polls were then held of the voters in both wards to try and discover whom they wanted to stand as candidates; but none of the people who came top in these pre-selection ballots were willing to be elected to the Diet. Finally Hongō residents asked Tsuda to become a candidate, and he agreed. Suzuki had made a name for himself in a dispute between the Shitaya residents and the Japan Railway Company over a proposal to build a line from Ueno to Akibahara. He was not very popular with everybody in his own ward; but, *faute de mieux*, he eventually emerged as its only candidate with any kind of a following. Thus the election in this constituency resolved itself into a Hongō-Tsuda v. Shitaya-Suzuki duel. There was no open campaigning at all;

but the Hongō voters must have turned out virtually to a man in support of Tsuda. Tsuda elected with 125 votes. Government supporter. Deputy Speaker of the first House of Representatives.

Ninth Constituency (Yotsuya, Ushigome, and Koishikawa wards).

One member constituency. 182 voters; 172 votes cast. Yotsuya had 44 electors; Ushigome had 74; and Koishikawa had 64. (These figures are taken from a Tokyo Nichi Nichi report. The Kokumin Shimbun stated that there were 185 electors in the constituency as a whole, giving Ushigome 76 and Koishikawa 65.) The polling took place in the Ushigome ward office. Five candidates, of whom two did not score any votes. Yotsuya favoured Ugawa Seizaburo; Ushigome supported Hatoyama Kazuo (a lawyer and former Foreign Office official); and the Koishikawa candidate was Yoshino Tsugitsune (Tokyo fu official). Ugawa was in a bad position from the start because of the small number of voters in Yotsuya. Nevertheless he had enough support for the election in this constituency to be to all intents and purposes a triangular contest between the three wards. Hatoyama (member of the Tokyo city assembly, and also of the Tokyo city executive council) had been nominated as a candidate as a result of a formal ballot held by the members of the Tokyo city assembly representing Ushigome ward. Yoshino refused to do any campaigning, and claimed that he had not spent a penny on election expenses. However somebody else in Koishikawa did a great deal of canvassing on his behalf. Hatoyama sent a printed leaflet giving his political views to the home of every elector in the constituency, and had many people campaigning for him. Result: Ugawa 45 votes; Hatoyama 54 votes; Yoshino 58 votes. Yoshino elected. Government supporter.

Tenth Constituency (Higashi Tama, Minami Toshima, and Kita Toshima sub-prefectures). One member constituency. 799 voters; 638 votes cast. There were 27 polling stations in the constituency. The greatest number of electors at any one polling station was 36; the smallest was 5. Seven candidates, but only two of them campaigned openly. No noticeable traits of localist rivalries in this election. Foremost candidate was Mori Tokinosuke. Mori had for a while after the restoration worked as a minor official, but had given up that career for industry. In 1883, he became president of the 60th National Bank. He was a member of Tokyo fu assembly, and of Tokyo city assembly. Mori elected with 405 votes. Independent.

Eleventh Constituency (Minami Adachi and Minami Katsushika sub-prefectures). One member constituency. 1,676 voters; all of them voted. 33 polling stations. At least twelve candidates. Five of them obtained more than a hundred votes; the rest one vote each. Two candidates were strong in Minami Adachi sub-prefecture; three had supporters in Minami Katsushika. Hashimoto Shōgo was particularly powerful in the area round Nishi Shomatsu-kawa village; so one of his opponents, Akiyama Kotaro, sent printed postcards to the electors in that area telling them not to be taken in by Hashimoto's lies. In reply to this, other postcards were circulated to inform the electors that Akiyama was not eligible to be elected. The Akiyama faction then reported Hashimoto to the authorities for an alleged breach of the Law of Election Supplementary Penal Regulations. Strongest candidate was Asaka Katsutaka, a local gentleman who had studied economics for a long time, and had been a member of the Tokyo fu assembly since 1884. Asaka elected with 532 votes. Progressive.

Twelfth Constituency (Ebara sub-prefecture and the Seven Islands of Izu). One member constituency. 611 valid votes cast. 19 polling stations. Eight candidates. Chief among these were Takagi Masatoshi (local landowner, and member of the Tokyo fu assembly), and his uncle, Hirabayashi Kyūbei (local landowner, head fisherman for Ebara sub-prefecture, and member of the Tokyo fu assembly). Takagi had the advantage of a good education in English and Chinese classics; Hirabayashi was prepared to spend, or so he claimed, ¥10,000 to get himself elected. The strife between the two was as intense as it was bitter. The election campaign had been marked by a succession of parties and speech meetings; and sōshi were hired to guard Hirabayashi on the day of the voting. Four villages in the region gave undivided allegiance to Takagi; another four villages were equally firm in their support of Hirabayashi. This meant that the issue, despite all the feverish campaigning, would be finally decided by the remaining non-committed villages. In the end, Hirabayashi got 235 votes; but Takagi was elected with 299 votes. Progressive.

Kyoto fu. (7,515 votes: 7 Members.)

The elections in the Kyoto region aroused very little interest in the Tokyo press; and I have not been able to study a Kyoto paper. Therefore the following notes are

somewhat incomplete. However it is clear from the material which I have read that the over-all pattern of electoral strife in Kyoto fu was one of competition between two local political clubs. One of these was the conservative Kōmin-kai (Citizens Association); the other was the more radical Kōyū-kai (Public Friends Society). The Kōmin-kai succeeded in winning five out of a total of seven seats, whereas the Kōyū-kai managed to gain only one. Accordingly, it would seem that the electorate of the old capital was overwhelmingly pro-Government. On the other hand, there is reason to think that at any rate some of the Kōmin-kai victories were attributable, in the final analysis, to unfair practices. Most of the candidates elected were typical representatives of the upper echelons of the Meiji bourgeoisie. Further, many of them were or had been members of local government assemblies, and three of them had travelled abroad. The rate of abstentions (11%) was higher here than anywhere else.

First Constituency. (Kamigyō ward). One member constituency. Polling took place in the Sōkoku-ji temple. There was competition for the seat, but it was probably not so fierce here as in other constituencies. The two most popular candidates polled only 47 votes between them, so the electorate cannot have been very large. Sōshi, operating on behalf of one of the candidates, visited the electors in some districts of the constituency early on the morning of polling day, and threatened to have their 'revenge' if the electors voted for the 'wrong' candidates. A number of electors were faint-hearted enough to be swayed by this intimidation and decided not to vote; but many more accepted the offer of police escort while on their way to the polls, and duly voted. Elected candidate was Hamaoka Kōtetsu. Hamaoka had been educated in Chinese literature and philosophy, and had later acquired a keen interest in Western learning. He was a noted industrialist. Founded the Kyoto Trade and Industry Society, and became president of a commercial bank. Later set up a cloth manufacturing business. Visited Europe and America. Reputed to have been wonderfully skilful at saving money. Elected with 27 votes. Government supporter.

Second Constituency (Shimogyō ward). One member constituency. Polling took place in the Daiun-in temple. Competition in this constituency was keen. Again, it would appear that the

total number of voters was unduly small. About a hundred policemen were on duty in the vicinity of the polling station on the day of the election. Nevertheless a party of demonstrators managed to appear in front of the gate of the Daiun-in, carrying placards in support of one of the candidates. Elected candidate was Nakamura Eisuke - a native of Shimogyō ward, and a merchant. Deputy chairman of the Kyoto fu assembly, chairman of the Kyoto city assembly. Largely responsible for the installation of a modern drainage system in the city. Travelled in America. On his return to Japan, he became manager of the Kansai Trading Company. Elected with 47 votes; runner-up polled 43 votes. Government supporter.

Third Constituency (Otagi, Kadono, Otokuni, & Kii sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Elected candidate was Matsuno Shinkyūro. Member of the Kyoto fu assembly. Former Sub-prefect of Otagi, Kadono, and Otokuni sub-prefectures. Elected with 886 votes; runner-up polled 468 votes. Government supporter.

Fourth Constituency (Uji, Kuse, Sōraku, & Tsuzuki sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Reports of strong competition between the Nishikawa (Kōmin-kai?) and Itō (Kōyū-kai) factions. One party was said to have preferred criminal charges against the other; and there were certainly violations of the law in the closing stages of the campaign. Elected candidate was Itō Kumao. Itō came from a farming family resident in Tsuzuki sub-prefecture. Member of the standing committee of the Kyoto fu assembly. In 1881, he interested himself in the founding of the Constitutional Party newspaper; and in 1889, he founded a discussion society. Liberal.

Fifth Constituency (Minami Kuwata, Kita Kuwata, Funai, Amata, & Ikuruka sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. The Kōmin-kai candidates were Tanaka Gentaro and Ishihara Hanemon; the Kōyū-kai put up Kawarabayashi Yoshio and Ashida Shikanosuke. At first, the Kōmin-kai assumed that they would have no trouble in winning both seats in this constituency, because they had already had a victory over the Kōyū-kai in the election of the wealthiest tax-payers.

representative to the House of Peers. However the Kōyū-kai fought a vigorous campaign, and there were signs that uncommitted voters were going to favour their candidates. It was rumoured that the Kōmin-kai leaders, alarmed by this trend, had gone to the newly elected member of the House of Peers, and, reminding him that he owed his election to Kōmin-kai support, obtained ¥500 for 'election expenses'. Kawarabayashi was said to be very popular, and it was considered that he would certainly be elected. The Kōmin-kai candidates, Tanaka and Ishihara, won both seats. Tanaka's family had farmed for several generations in Minami Kuwata sub-prefecture. He had been chairman of the Kyoto fu assembly since 1883, and was also chairman of the Minami Kuwata sub-prefectural assembly. On the committee of the local Public Health Association. Had connections with the Kyoto business world, and was president of the Kyoto stock exchange. Ishihara was born in Funai sub-prefecture, and later adopted by a samurai of the Sonobe fief. Studied Chinese literature at the clan school. During the War of the Restoration, he served with the Imperialist forces. In 1870, he entered the Ministry of Education. 1886, appointed education officer for Kyoto fu. Member of the standing committee of the Kyoto fu assembly. Both Tanaka and Ishihara were Government supporters.

Sixth Constituency (Kasa, Yosa, Naka, Takano, & Kumano sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Elected candidate was Kōmuchi Tomotsune. Kōmuchi was a commoner and a native of the district. In 1873, he entered the taxation department of the Treasury. Visited America on official business. 1884, appointed Chief Secretary of the Treasury. 1886, made Deputy Director of the Tax Collection Bureau. 1887, was dismissed from official post. Elected with 669 votes; runner-up polled 435 votes. Independent.

Osaka fu. (15,600 voters; 10 Members.)

First Constituency (Nishi ward). One member constituency. 409 voters; 340 votes cast. Polling took place in one of the local schools. At least nine candidates, of whom five polled more than one vote. Three most important candidates were Ōmiwa Chōbei (bank president), Mori Sakutaro (lawyer), and Awaya Shinazo (gunsmith and gunpowder merchant). Ōmiwa belonged to the Kaishin-tō, but did not have the scholastic

abilities usually associated with members of that party. He was chairman of the Osaka fu assembly, and a member of the Osaka city assembly. In these capacities, he was frequently able to attract attention, but had at the same time acquired a bad reputation for political opportunism. Mori was a member of the Monday Club, a large and active Osaka Liberal association. Awaya sat in both the Osaka fu and the Osaka city assemblies. He was on the education committee for the Nishi ward, and was also one of its conscription advisers. The competition in this constituency was stiffer than anywhere else in Osaka city; and intimidation was attempted, first of all by Awaya and then by his opponents, in the concluding stages of the campaign. It is probable that speech meetings were held by all three of the leading candidates. Awaya had a reputation for being coarse, but his rostrum buffoonery was popular - at any rate, with the plebeian elements in the electorate. He had done his best to improve his standing in more genteel circles by inviting over a thousand of the quality to what was ostensibly a birthday banquet. Awaya elected with 128 votes. Government supporter.

Second Constituency (Higashi and Kita wards). One member constituency. 705 voters; 543 votes cast. Polling took place in the Tsumura branch temple. At least eleven candidates, of whom four polled more than one vote. Ōi Kentaro, a militant radical and president of the Liberty party, had originally intended to stand for this seat, but the law courts ruled that he was not eligible for election. His disqualification left Toyoda Bunzaburo (electric light company director) the strongest candidate in the field. Toyoda was a member of the standing committee of the Osaka fu assembly, and chairman of the Osaka city assembly. He was also a member of the Daidō Club, and belonged to the Monday Club. Toyoda's closest rivals in the election were Taguchi Kenkichi and Akitsuki Seijuro. Each of these three had his own 'stronghold' in different parts of the constituency; but they followed a strategy of attack as well as defence. Thus Taguchi, whose headquarters was the Kōshin-kai (Communications Club) in Uemachi had outposts in Senba (Toyoda's 'stronghold') and Kita ward (Akitsuki's 'stronghold'). Toyoda had the backing of the powerful Monday Club and other city-wide organizations. Akitsuki was supported by the Tōun Shimbun. In its later stages, the campaign developed into a two-party contest between the Toyoda and Taguchi factions. On 25 June, Toyoda's supporters arranged a pre-selection meeting, attended by fifty-seven electors. Not

surprisingly, the majority of these fifty-seven favoured Toyoda's candidature. On the same day, Taguchi gave a political speech to an audience of one hundred voters. (A Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun report states that Kikuchi Kanji, another member of the Monday Club and a candidate for the Fifth Constituency in Osaka fu, decided to run for the Second Constituency as well as the Fifth, and seriously endangered Toyoda's chances of winning. The Osaka Mainichi makes no mention of such an intervention.) Toyoda elected with 267 votes. Liberal.

Third Constituency (Minami ward). One member constituency. 283 voters; 219 votes cast. Polling took place in the Mitsu temple. The voters resident in that part of the constituency lying north of the Dōtombori canal favoured Kameoka Tokutaro; south of the Dōtombori, the voters were unable to interest either of the two persons nominated in standing for election. The Headman of Minami ward, Ukita Keizō, took advantage of this situation, and put himself forward as a candidate. (Ukita was the owner of a long-established medicine store, and had at one time been a member of the Osaka fu assembly.) Before doing so, he resigned from the post of Headman. Although there were three or four other candidates, the contest was really between Kameoka and Ukita, with the latter heavily tipped to win. Ukita elected with 186 votes. Government supporter.

Fourth Constituency (Higashi Nari, Nishi Nari, & Sumiyoshi sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. 1,916 voters; 1,791 votes cast. At least five candidates. Higashi Nari and Sumiyoshi sub-prefectures provided three candidates - Kitamura Sakichi, Sasaki Masayuki, and Shinokawa Risuke - all of whom were of equal influence. Sasaki was a Sumiyoshi land-owner who had been appointed pro tempore Sub-prefect of that area in 1880. In addition to this, he had been a member of the Osaka fu assembly since 1881, and was connected with the Osaka Railway Company which he had helped to found. In Nishi Nari sub-prefecture, no candidates were nominated until after 20 June. By that date, it had been decided to choose one from among the eligible local residents, and one from the ranks of distinguished men living outside the sub-prefecture. In the event, two 'outsiders' were asked to stand by the voters of Nishi Nari. These two were Nakae Tokusuke (a famous political theorist and journalist) and Murayama Ryūhei (newspaper owner). Competition in this constituency was probably keen, but there were no untoward incidents. Sasaki and Nakae elected. Both Liberals.

Fifth Constituency (Shimakami, Shimashimo, Teshima, & Nōsē sub-prefectures). One member constituency. 2,910 voters; 2,828 votes cast. At least five candidates, of whom the most important were Kikuchi Kanji (lawyer), Takai Kozō (local gentleman), Kiji Jirobei (ex-member of the Osaka fu assembly), and Ori Ryōkei (an ex-monk). Kikuchi was a member of both the Osaka fu and the Osaka city assemblies, and was honorary Head of the Osaka School of Commerce. His politics were Left wing, and in 1881 he had been one of the founders of the Constitutional Party. He belonged to the Daidō Club, and he was a member of the Monday Club. There was a good deal of hidden rivalry and manoeuvring in this campaign. At first, Kikuchi was the most popular candidate in the constituency; but Takai and Ori purposely set out to curry favour with the large number of Buddhists in the area. This strategem worked, and Kikuchi began to lose his influence. He tried to regain it by making general attacks on Buddhism and its believers in speeches and in articles he wrote for the newspapers, but succeeded only in giving even greater offence to the electors. It was reported (in the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun) that this faux pas had virtually lost him the seat, and so he had decided to stand for the Second Constituency as well as the Fifth. Takai sent out boxes of food to the electors as an inducement to vote for him. When Kikuchi heard of this, he interviewed people who had accepted Takai's gifts, and threatened to start legal proceedings against them. Ori hoped that the Buddhist monks would campaign for him, but they were reluctant to do so. Kikuchi elected with 726 votes. (Takai had 673; Kiji 603.) Liberal.

Sixth Constituency (Matsuda, Katano, Sasara, Kawachi, Wakae, & Takayasu sub-prefectures). One member constituency. At least five candidates. At the start of the campaign, three of the candidates - Obata Masaki (public notary), Oyama Hikosaburo, and Iwasaki Yasujiro - were all competing actively for the seat. Obata used his eloquence; Iwasaki relied on his money. It was not clear which of them would win. At this point, the village Headmen and other men of influence in the constituency thought that they would do the Sub-prefect of Matsuda, Katano, and Sasara sub-prefectures, Matano Kagetaka, a favour by getting him elected and asked him to stand. Matano, a career bureaucrat, accepted the nomination and resigned from his post as Sub-prefect. He was the probable victor from the moment he entered the ring. Matano elected. Government supporter.

Seventh Constituency (Ishikawa, Yakami, Furuichi, Yasukabe, Nishikibe, Tannan, Shiki, Tanhoku, Ōgata, & Shibukawa sub-prefectures). One member constituency. 2,802 voters; 2,738 votes cast. 65 polling stations. Three candidates with any claim to popular support were Higashio Heitaro (landowner and chairman of the Osaka fu assembly), Ema Chōzō, and Zenda Toshitaro. From the start of the campaign, Higashio was the favourite with electors and non-electors alike, and without having to exert himself, he won a sweeping victory. Higashio elected with 2,144 votes. Liberal.

Eighth Constituency (Sakai city, Ōtori & Izumi sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Principal candidates were Hotta Seichū (retired official), Kitada Toyosaburo, and Yokoyama Katsutaro (landowner). Competition between Hotta and Yokoyama was particularly severe. Yokoyama was a lawyer as well as a landlord; but Hotta, the ex-official, seems to have been the one who relied most heavily on speech meetings. The Yokoyama faction alleged that Hotta was not a suitable person to have as a Representative, because he was a former official and therefore out of touch with the real feelings of the people. They also claimed that he was not eligible to stand as a candidate. When Hotta's supporters heard of this second charge, they made enquiries with the authorities and found that it was untrue. In retaliation, the Hotta faction secretly informed the police that Yokoyama had been sending out boxes of cakes to the electors. Yokoyama was indeed a wealthy man, or maybe it was his supporters who had the money. Anyway, the Yokoyama faction deliberately tried to counter the effects of Hotta's eloquence by making full use of its financial resources. The Hotta party then attempted to match this strategem by opening a 'campaign fund' of its own and asking its adherents for contributions. Yokoyama elected. Liberal.

Ninth Constituency (Minami and Hine sub-prefectures). One member constituency. 1,896 voters; 1,859 votes cast. There were approximately 835 voters in Minami sub-prefecture, and 1,045 in Hine. 40 polling stations. The electoral strife in this constituency was prolonged, fierce, and complex. The campaign had opened at the beginning of May; and though it outwardly had the form of a two-party (Monday Club v. Aikoku-kōtō) contest, in reality it was a case of individual fighting individual, and Minami waging war on Hine. Thus, this particular battle reflects in miniature many of the

outstanding features of the election campaign as a whole. The Monday Club and the Aikoku-kōtō were both radical organizations, but this did not prevent them fighting each other. They were even ready to fight themselves. At the beginning of June, the five principal candidates, together with their occupations, their places of residence, and their party affiliations were:

Name	Occupation or Qualifications	Resident in	Party
Sasaki Seigai	Bank executive	Minami gun	Monday Club (?)
Hara Katsuzō	Mem. fu assembly	Hine gun	Monday Club
Isaka Kōuki	Mem. fu assembly	Hine gun	Aikoku-kōtō
Minami Genjuro	Mem. fu assembly	Hine gun	Aikoku-kōtō
Toguchi Kame-taro	Mem. fu assembly	Hine gun	

In its initial stages, then, the seat was being fought for by a group of men all of whom were living in the constituency; and Sasaki Seigai was in a dominating position because he had the virtually undivided support of one of the sub-prefectures. Isaka Kōuki was the strongest of the Hine candidates. Sasaki, having secured Minami sub-prefecture in May, launched an offensive against his rivals in Hine from the beginning of June and began to try and win votes in that area too. The Hine candidates did their best to resist this onslaught, and Isaka in particular resisted as hard as he could. Their efforts were weakened, however, by the fact that a number of influential people in the southern part of Hine wanted to nominate a candidate from outside the constituency. Though this group was no more than a small minority of the voters in Hine, its suggestion had the enthusiastic support of Toguchi Kametaro, and its members eventually resolved to ask Yamashita Shigetake, an Osaka lawyer and a member of the Monday Club, to stand for the constituency. Yamashita agreed, and, travelling to Hine, was formally adopted as a candidate by his sponsors who now called themselves the Seigi-tō (Justice Party), on

16 June. Thereafter, Yamashita, with the full support of the Monday Club and the Seigi-tō, opened a vigorous campaign. Electors were canvassed in every quarter, and free copies of the Kansai Nippō newspaper were distributed on a wide scale. As a result of these endeavours, the stock of Yamashita Shigetake, hitherto completely unknown in the constituency, began to rise very rapidly. Toguchi, Minami, and Hara all came to secret agreements with Yamashita and stopped campaigning. Consequently in its final ten or so days, the contest in the Ninth Constituency was a triangular match between Sasaki (still master of Minami gun but apparently not very successful in his attack on Hine), Isaka (still holding his own in Hine), and Yamashita (the visiting general who had overwhelmed the weaker candidates in Hine). Sasaki elected with 861 votes. (Isaka polled 718 votes; Yamashita 241.) Though one report listed Sasaki as a member of the Monday Club, in the Diet he was a Government supporter.

Kanagawa ken. (8,521 voters; 7 Members.)

First Constituency (Yokohama city). One member constituency. 287 voters; 237 voted. Polling took place in the city hall. At least nine candidates, of whom only two polled more than two votes. The leading contestants for this seat when the campaign began were Nakajima Nobuyuki (Liberal) and Shimada Saburo (Kaishin-tō). Both of them were professional politicians of national eminence, and so were very evenly matched. Nakajima had long been associated with Itagaki; Shimada was founder of the Yokohama Mainichi newspaper, and one of Ōkuma Shigenobu's right hand men. Nakajima had the support of the landlord party in the city (Kōdō Club); Shimada was favoured by the merchant interests (Kōyū-sha and Dōkō-kai). Towards the middle of June, Nakajima decided to accept an invitation from the electors in the Fifth Constituency, Kanagawa prefecture, to stand there; and on 18 June the secretary of the Kōdō Club called an extraordinary general meeting to tell the members that Nakajima wished to resign his candidacy. The landowners had great difficulty in finding anyone suitable to oppose Shimada, but eventually joined with some dissident merchants in nominating Hiranuma Senzō (Non-party) on 27 June. Meanwhile different gangs of sōshi, who had hitherto been working for the Liberals, chose candidates of their own. The whole campaign had been a vigorous one, with the various candidates opposed to Shimada doing their best to destroy his position of strength.

During the last few days, canvassing went on without intermission. There were a number of acts of violence; however the actual polling was carried out without incident, under strong police supervision. Shimada elected with 146 votes. Progressive.

Second Constituency (Kuraki, Tachibana, & Tsuzuki sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Three candidates - Yamada Taizō (Jiyū-tō) Yoshida Masaharu (Daidō Club), and Ōtsuka Nariyoshi (Non-party). Yamada had been born in Tachibana, and, disliking the life of a farmer, had moved to Tokyo at the age of sixteen or so and became a student. Later, he went to Yokohama where he was adopted by a rice merchant. Abandoning that trade in turn, he began to study law, and qualified as a solicitor in 1874. During the 1880s, he was one of the defence counsel when members of the popular rights movement were put on trial for subversion. He was one of the leaders of the re-founded Jiyū-tō. Ōtsuka was also a lawyer, and he did not enter the campaign until about the middle of June. It was reported that after a slow start he was making a lot of headway. There were also unconfirmed reports that Yamada was about to be arrested at one stage, on account of a suspicion that he had violated the Law of Election. No arrest was in fact made. Yamada elected with 751 votes. Liberal.

Third Constituency (Minami Tama, Nishi Tama, & Kita Tama sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. Apparently, there was hardly any competition in this constituency. Three Liberals contested the two seats - Ishizaka Shōkō, Setooka Tameichiro, and Yoshino Taizō. Ishizaka had been born in Minami Tama, had worked as a local government official in Shizuoka prefecture, and had founded the Mitama Jiyū-tō. Setooka's family were long established farmers in Nishi Tama, and he himself was a member of the prefectural assembly. Yoshino, a former deputy chairman of the prefectural assembly, did not start campaigning until after the beginning of June. Ishizaka and Setooka elected. Both Liberals.

Fourth Constituency (Kamakura & Miura sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Three candidates were Yamada Tōji (Liberal), Kato Taiji (Jiyū-tō), and Kozuka Tatsu (Kaishin-tō). Yamada had been born in Kamakura sub-prefecture, and was a graduate of the Meiji Law School. He lived in Tokyo, and earned his living by publishing magazines and doing some

legal work on the side. Yamada elected with 504 votes; Kato was runner-up with 200 votes. Yamada supported the Liberals in the House.

Fifth Constituency (Kōza, Aikō, & Tsukui sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Seat contested by Jiyū-tō and Kaishin-tō. The Jiyū-tō candidate was Nakajima Nobuyuki, who had been asked by the party's supporters in the area to resign his candidature in the First Constituency (Yokohama) so that he could take part in the election for the Fifth Constituency seat. The Jiyū-tō was very strong in this constituency, and Nakajima was one of the most powerful candidates in the field. He had been born in Tosa but lived in Kanagawa. 1874, prefect of Kanagawa prefecture; 1876, appointed to the Senate. Later, resigned from his official posts, and joined the Jiyū-Minken Undō. Deputy president of the first Jiyū-tō (1881). When the Public Peace Preservation Ordinance was issued in December 1887, he withdrew to Yokohama where he organized the landlord party into the Kōdō Club. The Kaishin-tō put up the Sub-prefect of Kōza sub-prefecture, Imafuku Genei, who was locally born, as an opponent to Nakajima. However Nakajima's election was virtually a foregone conclusion. He became Speaker of the first House of Representatives.

Sixth Constituency (Ōsumi, Yorogi, Ashigara-kami, & Ashigara-shimo sub-prefectures). Three candidates, all of whom seem to have been connected with one or other of the Liberal factions. These three were Fukui Kanekichi, Mizushima Yasutaro (chairman of the prefectural assembly) and Yamaguchi Sashichiro. Electors in the area tried to arrange a public debate with all three candidates taking part, but only Mizushima agreed to speak. Yamaguchi elected. Liberal.

Niigata ken. (17,748 voters; 13 Members.)

The election campaign in Niigata prefecture was a two-party affair, with the Daidō Club fighting the Kaishin-tō for each of the thirteen seats. Jiyū-tō and Conservative interests did not feel that it was worth their while putting up any candidates. The Daidō Club consisted of a number of local political organizations the most important of which were the Essa Dōmei Kai (Echigo and Sado Alliance)

and the Kyūyū Kai (Friendly Society). The Kaishin-tō, too, was in reality a coalition of local groups, i.e. the Dōkō Kai (Congeniality Club) and the Seiyū Dōmei Kai (Association of Political Friends). The Daidō Club elements often fell back on violence in the course of the campaigning. The Kaishin-tō held a large number of speech meetings.

First Constituency (Niigata city and Nishi Kanbara sub-prefecture). One member constituency. The Daidō Club candidate was Yamagiwa Shichiji, and his Kaishin-tō opponent was Tomidokoro Heisaburo. Yamagiwa was born in Nishi Kanbara and had joined the clan army in his youth. During the War of the Restoration, he had fought for the Bakufu. After the restoration, he studied politics. He was appointed mayor of Niigata, but soon resigned from that post and, entering the prefectural assembly, became a member of its standing committee. Politically, he was a supporter first of all of the Jiyū-tō, and later of Gotō's Daidō Danketsu. He published a newspaper called the Tōyō Jiyū Shimbun, in the columns of which he argued the case for political rights. 1882, founded the Hokushin (Northern Dragon) Liberty Party. 1883, imprisoned for subversive activities. 1888, founded the Essa Dōmei Kai. Tomidokoro was a wealthy local resident, but did not have Yamagiwa's political experience. This constituency was from the first known to be a Daidō Club stronghold. Nevertheless the Kaishin-tō waged a vigorous campaign, and organized a great number of speech meetings. One of the most successful of these was held in the village temple at Yoshida mura, Nishi Kanbara sub-prefecture, on 25 June. The neighbourhood seems to have taken the day off for the occasion, and more than three thousand people packed the temple until nobody else could squeeze in and latecomers had to sit outside. There were speeches on:- The Need for Morality in Politics; Preparing Oneself To Vote; Knowing Politicians By What They Say And How They Act; The Right To Vote And What We Expect Of The Electors; and Taking Care. This last was an overt attack on the Daidō Club. The speech meeting began at 1 p.m. and ended at 5 p.m. with three cheers for the Emperor, the Empire, the Kaishin-tō, and Tomidokoro Heisaburo. The Daidō Club had sent a party of sōshi to the meeting to disrupt it; but when the sōshi failed to distract the speakers with their heckling, they fell silent and listened with everybody else. A social

gathering was held in the same temple immediately after the speech meeting had closed; and later, a supper party was given in the village for the visiting speakers and local celebrities. Impromptu speeches were given both at the social gathering and at the supper party. The latter was enjoyed by all (more than a hundred) who attended it, and broke up about 9 p.m. with the singing of political songs. Despite these efforts on the part of the Kaishin-tō, Yamagiwa was elected for the constituency. National Liberal, (i.e. Ultra-Conservative).

Second Constituency (Kita Kanbara, Higashi Kanbara, & Iwafune sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. The Kaishin-tō candidates were Ogura Kōkō (former Sub-prefect of Kita Kanbara and later mayor of Niigata city) and Ichishima Kenkichi (chief editor of the Niigata Shimbun). The Daidō Club candidates were Kato Hisashi and Tango Naohira. Ichishima enjoyed the support of Ichishima Tokujiro (a relative?) who was a wealthy landowner and a nationally known figure. Kato and Tango were less well known and younger than their opponents; but there was a good deal of residual support for the Daidō movement in this constituency. Ichishima attended a number of speech meetings organized by Kaishin-tō supporters in Kita Kanbara on 21 and 22 June. Kato and Tango elected. Both Liberals.

Third Constituency (Naka Kanbara sub-prefecture). One member constituency. The Kaishin-tō nominated Higuchi Genshū (former chairman of the prefectural assembly); the Daidō Club put up Takaoka Chūgō. This constituency was a Kaishin-tō stronghold, and the Daidō Club was not expected to win it in spite of its vigorous campaigning. The Kaishin-tō held a speech meeting at the village of Okanbara on 21 June; another speech meeting, this time followed by a party, was held at the same place on the following day. Both speech meetings were intermittently interrupted by 'vagrant rowdies' who shouted abuse, but they were too few in number to be anything more than a minor nuisance. Earlier, on 16 June, some sōshi assaulted a Kaishin-tō speaker at a meeting held in Usui village. Takaoka elected. Liberal.

Fourth Constituency (Minami Kanbara sub-prefecture). One member constituency. The Kaishin-tō candidate was Kasahara

Bunjiro. The Daidō Club first of all nominated Ōtake Kanichi (former member of the prefectural assembly), but later replaced him with Nishigata Tamezo. Kasahara had gone as an emigrant to Hokkaidō, but still retained property in Niigata and was a man of considerable means. Nishigata had been born in Minami Kanbara of farming stock. In 1868, he acted as the farmers representative in a conflict between the Nagaoka fief officials and the local peasants. Later, he was appointed Headman of his native village and was elected to the prefectural assembly. He supported the Jiyū-tō, and actively campaigned for popular rights. His political activities lead to his arrest on a charge of having violated the Publications Regulations. He was one of the leaders of the Niigata prefecture Daidō Club. Kasahara returned from Hokkaidō to fight as hard as he could for the seat; but Nishigata was elected. Liberal.

Fifth Constituency (Koshi & Mishima sub-prefectures).

Two member constituency. The Kaishin-tō candidates were originally Kusumi Hidesaburo (member of the prefectural assembly) and Mishima Okujiro (president of the 69th National Bank, Nagaoka, and interested in the development of Hokkaidō). Mishima, however, was not very interested in standing for the Diet; and sometime after 15 June his place as a Kaishin-tō candidate was taken by Hatano Denjiro. The Daidō Club candidates were Kobayashi Yushichiro (editor of the Tōhoku Nippō) and Hasegawa Yasushi. Hasegawa had been born in Koshi sub-prefecture, and later practised as a doctor. He soon left the Niigata region to continue his study of medicine in Chiba, and from 1869 was a university teacher of medicine in Tokyo. 1874, appointed Director of the Nagasaki Medical School. 1876, appointed Head of the Tokyo fu hospital. 1886, resigned from his official post to take charge of a welfare home he had established earlier in Hongō (Tokyo). The campaigning in this constituency seems to have been fairly quiet. On 17 June, the Supreme Court in Tokyo quashed a sentence that had been passed earlier on Kobayashi for having libelled officials in the columns of the Tōhoku Nippō. If the Court had rejected his appeal, he would have been unable to stand for the Diet. Kobayashi had written a number of political books and pamphlets, and was said to have been of a somewhat haughty turn of mind. Hasegawa returned home for the first time for over twenty years in order to fight the election. It was reported that he distributed large sums in campaigning expenses. Kusumi, too was a wealthy man. Kobayashi and Hasegawa elected. Both Liberals.

Sixth Constituency. (Kariha sub-prefecture). One member constituency. The Kaishin-tō candidate was Yamaguchi Gonsaburo (former chairman of the prefectural assembly); his Daidō Club opponent was Matsumura Bunjiro (the serving chairman of the prefectural assembly). Both these candidates were locally born of wealthy families. Earlier, Yamaguchi had founded the Dōkō Kai, and he had just recently returned from a trip abroad. Matsumura had been a supporter of the Imperial cause at the time of the restoration. His family had made its fortune from trade, and just before the election, he had acted as a mediator between the Government and some disorderly poor. The Kaishin-tō organized a speech campaign in the district on the 22 and 23 June, with a group of five speakers travelling from village to village and addressing audiences of between 150 and 700. Daidō Club supporters in Nagatori village tried to sabotage the influence of these speech meetings in advance by spreading rumours that the Kaishin-tō had brought in low rice prices and infectious diseases from abroad. These wild stories eventually came to the ears of the Kaishin-tō speakers, themselves, and when they were talking to the people of Nagatori one of them carefully denied the allegations. Daidō Club hecklers in the audience attempted to shout down the speaker at this point, but failed to do so. The hecklers then rushed outside, and, after setting light to a nearby pile of firewood, raised the cry of 'fire, fire!' The meeting was disrupted for a while so that speakers and listeners alike could go and put out the 'blaze'. Matsumura elected. Liberal.

Seventh Constituency. (Kita Uonuma, Minami Uonuma, Naka Uonuma, & Higashi Uonuma sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. Kaishin-tō candidates were Sekiya Magozaemon (former Sub-prefect of Kita and Minami Uonuma sub-prefectures) and Motoyama Kenji (former member of the prefectural assembly and founder of the Seiyū Dōmei Kai). The Daidō Club candidates were Shimada Shigeru and Sato Ryōtaro. Competition in this constituency was very quiet. Sekiya and Motoyama elected. Both Progressive.

Eighth Constituency. (Naka Kubiki & Nishi Kubiki sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. Kaishin-tō candidates were Muro Takajiro (an Imperialist at the time of the

restoration, later a sub-prefect, and leader of the Seiyū Dōmei Kai) and Terasaki Itaru (member of the prefectural assembly) Katō Teimei (former chairman of the prefectural assembly) and Suzuki Shōji (a Daidō Club leader) stood for the Daidō Club. These four candidates were well matched, and the competition in this constituency was keen. Muro and Suzuki elected. The former was a Progressive; the latter Liberal.

Ninth Constituency (Sawada, Kamo, & Hamo sub-prefectures).

 One member constituency. This constituency comprised the island of Sado, and was one of the special 'large island' constituencies. The total population of the island at the time of the election was probably fewer than a hundred thousand; (Papinot gives the 1903 census figure as 115,000). The number of voters then was probably rather smaller than the average per constituency. The islanders did not take much interest in the election, and no nominations at all had been made by 15 June. Eventually a group of voters asked Masuda Kokutoku, a prominent Tokyo industrialist who had been born on the island, to stand as the Kaishin-tō candidate - he did not return there for the campaign until 27 June. The Daidō Club candidate was Ukai Ikujiro. Ukai elected. Independent.

Tochigi ken. (15,543 voters; 5 Members.)

First Constituency (Kawachi & Haga sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Principal candidates were Nakayama Tanjiro (Jiyū-tō) and Yokobori Sanshi (supported by the Kaishin-tō). Nakayama had been the first to declare himself a candidate, and in the early stages of the campaign it seemed fairly certain that he would win. However around the middle of June, the Sub-prefect of Haga sub-prefecture, Yokobori, suddenly resigned and came forward as a strong challenger. Yokobori had been Sub-prefect since 1885, and before that had been chairman of the prefectural assembly. Though he had supported the popular rights agitation and had had connections with the Kaishin-tō, he refused to join that party at the time of the election. Nevertheless the Kaishin-tō endorsed his candidature and campaigned for him. This 'unprincipled' decision on the part of the Kaishin-tō led to the resignation of at least one influential member. Yokobori also had the backing of the local officials and village headmen in Haga. Nakayama

fought hard, and held successful speech meetings at places like Maoka-machi in Haga sub-prefecture; but at other speech meetings he organized in the same area labourers and firemen were hired to create disturbances. There were a number of very minor sōshi incidents on election day; the police lost no time in restoring order. Yokobori elected. Liberal.

Second Constituency (Kami Tsuga, Shimo Tsuga, & Samukawa sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. At first, the only two candidates who had any sort of backing were Arai Shōgo and Iwasaki Manjiro. Both of them were members of the Jiyū-tō. Arai had been one of the most radical adherents of the old Jiyū-tō, and he had been in prison from 1886 to 1889 for attempting to stir up rebellion in Korea. He had been released from prison when political offenders were pardoned at the time of the promulgation of the constitution. He had been born in Tochigi prefecture, and prior to the 1885 incident had sat in the prefectural assembly. Since they had no other competitors for the two seats, Arai and Iwasaki both started campaigning for fellow Liberals in other constituencies. While they were away from the Second Constituency doing this, another local Liberal, Tamura Junnosuke, started campaigning in Shimo Tsuga sub-prefecture. Two anti-Liberal candidates then came forward - one of them was Komine Shintaro (Head of the Trade & Agriculture Bureau in the prefectural government); the other was Anjō Junshiro (Sub-prefect of Kami Tsuga). With these accessions to the body of candidates, the competition in this constituency grew more lively. Arai (2,536 votes) and Iwasaki (1,721 votes) elected. Both Liberals.

Third Constituency (Aso, Ashikaga, & Yanada sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Principal candidates were Tanaka Shōzō (Kaishin-tō) and Kimura Hampei (Business Party). Tanaka had been born in the prefecture and was a former chairman of the prefectural assembly. He was a leading Tochigi ken Kaishin-tō politician, and had made a name for himself as a fearless foe of the local officials, at one time he spent eighty days in prison for denouncing the prefect too often. Throughout his career, he was known for his skill in oratory, and was the only public figure in the area to take an active interest in the treaty revision problem. Kimura was not such a flamboyant character, but

he had a good deal of support in the constituency. Consequently the electoral struggle here was a hard fought one; both sides used sōshi with the result that there were a number of minor injuries. Tanaka elected with 791 votes. (Kimura polled 665.) Progressive.

Fourth Constituency (Shioya & Nasu sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Four candidates - Sakabe Norinobu (Official Party); Shioda Okuzō (Aikoku-kōtō); Fujita Yoshiuki (Kaishin-tō); and Wada Katamasa (Independent). Shioda was a prominent Liberal party politician, and was deputy chairman of the prefectural assembly. He had participated in the attacks on Mishima Tsuyō's governorship of the prefecture. Shioda elected. Liberal.

Itagaki Taisuke visited Utsunomiya, the chief town of Tochigi ken, from 19 - 22 June. During these three days he did what he could to encourage the local Liberal candidates.

Miyagi ken. (7,867 voters; 5 Members.)

The pattern of contest in Miyagi prefecture was one of pro-Government candidates versus popular rights candidates. On the Government side, there was a medley of Independents, Ultra-Conservatives, and Miyagi Seikai (Miyagi Political Association) members; the popular parties were represented by Kaishin-tō, Aikoku-kōtō, and Daidō Club candidates. In the event, the popular parties suffered an overwhelming defeat, as their pro-Government opponents captured all five seats in the prefecture. On the other hand, the Progressive and Liberal candidates polled quite a respectable number of votes in most of the constituencies, and in two of them had a majority of votes. There was one major bribery case in the course of the Miyagi campaign; and numerous allegations of improper conduct by village headmen and other local officials.

First Constituency (Sendai city, Natori & Miyagi sub-prefectures). One member constituency. 1,794 votes cast. At least five candidates. Principal ones were Masuda Shigekō (Miyagi Seikai); Suga Katsunao (Kaishin-tō); Hashiura Sadasuke (Kaishin-tō); and Itate Sōryō (Hoshu-tō). Masuda was chairman of the prefectural assembly. He had been born in Natori sub-prefecture, and at the time of the

restoration, he had been an ardent Imperialist. After 1868, he had worked for the new Government, and had at one time been appointed prefect of a certain area, i.e. Iwaki prefecture (?). Suga and Hashiura were both permanent residents of the constituency. The contest was really a triangular match between these three. Masuda had more than half the voters in Natori on his side, and he also had a good deal of support in Sendai city. He was unable, however, to make any impression on Miyagi sub-prefecture. Masuda was unable to campaign actively on his own behalf because of illness; but he had his supporters on the staffs of the various village offices in Natori gun working hard for him. Hashiura was also influential in Natori and Sendai city. Suga had Miyagi gun virtually to himself, and had many supporters in Sendai city. Both Hashiura and Suga fought hard and met with considerable success. If they had at any time joined forces, the Kaishin-tō would have won the seat. Masuda elected with 723 votes. (Suga polled 683; Hashiura 234.) Government supporter.

Second Constituency (Shibata, Karita, Igu, & Watari sub-prefectures). One member constituency. 738 votes cast. At least six candidates. The most important of them were Musha Denjiro (Independent); Saitō Nobutaro (Miyagi Seikai); Sakata Takahisa (Aikoku-kōtō); and Kusakari Shimmei (Daidō Club). Musha was Sub-prefect of Shida and Tamatsukuri sub-prefectures in an adjacent constituency. Sakata was a lawyer and normally lived in Tokyo. Generally speaking, the campaign was not marked by any untoward incidents, though each of the candidates was anxious to win. Saitō was popular in the area around Marumori in Igu sub-prefecture, but did not have any backing in other parts of the constituency. There were a number of rumours to the effect that he had been reported to the authorities for bribery. Sakata was handicapped by his long absence from the prefecture. Musha had at one time thought of giving up the fight, but decided to stay in it and campaigned as hard as he could by means of agents. Kusakari was the strongest candidate in Karita sub-prefecture, and there were many Daidō Club adherents in Igu. Some of these helped him by going on speech tours in different parts of the constituency. Musha elected with 286 votes. (Saito polled 158; Sakata 116; Kusakari 111.) Though Musha had stood as an Independent, he sided with the Liberals in the Diet.

Third Constituency. (Kurokawa, Kami, Shida, Tamatsukuri, & Tōta sub-prefectures). One member constituency. At least 2,333 votes cast. At least five candidates. Principal four were Tomoji Nobusuke (Independent); Monuki Toshitada (Independent); Fujisawa Ikunosuke (Miyagi Seikai); and Kurosawa Tōzaburo (Daidō Club). Tomoji was a former Sub-prefect of Miyagi gun. Earlier, he had edited a magazine dealing with agriculture, and had been head of the Industrial Research Bureau in Hiroshima. Fujisawa was a lawyer and a member of the prefectural assembly. These four struggled hard against each other, though once again the campaign was superficially quiet. Kurosawa and Tomoji both left their native gun, Tōta, to go canvassing in other parts of the constituency. Monuki took advantage of their absence to start a campaign in Tōta. Fujisawa had at one stage yielded to another candidate, Muramatsu, who had seemed certain to win. Early on in the campaign, however, Muramatsu, had been put in prison for an unspecified offence. Fujisawa had then renewed his candidacy, and was making strenuous efforts to catch up with the other leading candidates. He was particularly powerful in his own native district of Kami sub-prefecture. Kurosawa's stronghold was Tōta where he had a number of Daidō Club sympathizers helping him. Their efforts were said to be producing results in Kurokawa gun, and in this district battle was joined with Fujisawa. Tomoji was reckoned to have about half the votes of Tōta gun. Elsewhere, he was increasingly respected because of his intelligence, and because he had had a fairly distinguished career in public life. As a general rule, both Kurosawa and Tomoji concentrated on attacking Fujisawa to the exclusion of any other candidate, and the latter spent nearly all his time defending himself from their onslaughts. In this situation, Monuki was campaigning as widely and as energetically as possible in the hope of being returned on the strength of votes cast in those parts of the constituency which his rivals had neglected to canvass thoroughly. Tomoji elected with 805 votes. Government supporter.

Fourth Constituency. (Kuribara & Toyoma sub-prefectures). One member constituency. At least 1,687 votes cast. At least six candidates; five most important were Azumi Magojuro (Independent), Hoshi Matsusaburo (Kaishin-tō), Shūdō Rikuzō (Kaishin-tō), Sugawara Shinsaku (Daidō Club), and Chiba Tanemasa (Miyagi Seikai). Azumi had been born in Kuribara gun, and had been a member of the prefectural assembly since 1879. He had been Sub-prefect of Shida and

Tamatsukuri sub-prefectures from 1883 to 1889. Shūdō was an education official and had sat in the prefectural assembly since 1880. At first, the contest was dominated by Hoshi, Shūdō, and Chiba. One newspaper report said that Hoshi depended on his pocket-book, Chiba on the patronage he could dispense, and Shūdō on his ability to present the voters with logical arguments. On 15 June, Chiba was arrested for vote-buying in Kuribara, and was in due course brought to trial in Sendai. He did not return to the campaign. Hoshi had been canvassing since the middle of April, but he had just gone round every village in the constituency announcing his name. The electors had not been very impressed by this procedure; and apart from a few in the area round his own home in the southern part of Toyoma gun, they were not ready to support him on the strength of his name alone. When he discovered his mistake, Hoshi started to canvass the constituency more thoroughly. Shūdō was more reticent about advertising himself, but once he had decided to stand, he campaigned diligently. On 7 June, a party was held by his supporters in Toyoma-machi to introduce him to the electors in the district. Shūdō had many influential people canvassing for him in Toyoma gun - they set up campaign offices in every part of the sub-prefecture, and won over nearly all its voters. Having succeeded in doing this, the Shūdō faction started campaigning in Kuribara during the last two weeks in June. It was said that Shūdō was able to win a large number of votes in a short time because of his straightforward personality, and because many of the electors were Kaishin-tō sympathizers. It seems that Azumi gained considerably from Chiba's downfall, as the Miyagi Seikai supporters transferred their votes to him. Azumi had been a defeated candidate in the Miyagi election of one of the prefecture's fifteen highest tax-payers to the House of Peers. It was said that the Sub-prefect of Kuribara gun organized his campaign for him. The campaign itself did not begin until after the House of Peers election on 10 June. Azumi elected with 736 votes. (Hoshi polled 428; Shūdō 410.) Government supporter.

Fifth Constituency (Momofu, Oshika, & Motoyoshi sub-prefectures). One member constituency. At least 641 votes cast. At least seven candidates. Two leading candidates were Endō Atsushi (Miyagi Seikai), and Matsuda Tsunekichi (Kaishin-tō). Endō was deputy chairman of the prefectural assembly. Previously, he had been an assistant

lecturer at Tokyo University but had later resigned from this post to work as a lawyer. Matsuda had been born in Oshika gun where his family were village merchants. At the age of fifteen, he had been left in charge of the family business, and by dint of unremitting work had made it prosper. He had been a member of the prefectural assembly since 1878, and was later elected to its standing committee. He was also on the committees of the Public Health and Primary Schools associations for his own local district. In 1889, when the treaty revision controversy was at its height, he addressed meetings in Tokyo, Sendai, and elsewhere. Three of the minor candidates were Isawa Sakuji (a lawyer and a member of the prefectural assembly, who stood as an Independent), Akiyama Shun, and Saitō Senemon (a man of great wealth who had been defeated in the House of Peers election). Though this constituency had fewer voters than any other in the prefecture, it had the greatest number of candidates, and competition was keen. Matsuda's stronghold was Oshika gun, and from there he attacked Momofu and Motoyoshi. Endō had no trouble in holding his own in Momofu at any rate. The two of them had been at loggerheads since the promulgation of the constitution in February 1889. The papers had reported that Endō had been giving out presents of piece-goods, and this tactic had involved him in a considerable amount of criticism. Matsuda travelled all over the constituency, holding speech meetings and social parties in as many places as possible. Endō, too, went on canvassing tours. Akiyama was a former Sub-prefect of Motoyoshi gun, and was naturally favoured in that area. He had entered the fray rather later than the others, but he and his supporters in Motoyoshi were doing their utmost to win votes in Momofu. Isawa, based on Momofu, attacked Matsuda's territory in Oshika, and busied himself there with giving dinner parties and holding negotiations. On 19 June, his faction held a speech meeting at Hemita village in Oshika; there were seven speakers. Despite his energetic campaigning, Isawa was not considered to be a likely winner. On 24 June, the Kaishin-tō and the Miyagi Seikai held a joint speech meeting at Fukaya village in Momofu gun. Both Matsuda and Isawa spoke at this meeting. On the day of the election, the Kaishin-tō informed the police that Endō had been bribing the electors, but the police did not act on this information - probably because of lack of evidence. On the afternoon of 1 July, some sōshi stole the book containing

the particulars of the voting in Takaki mura from a polling station clerk, while he was carrying it to the house of the village Headman after the polling had finished. Police were summoned, and the sōshi found hiding in a barn within a few hours. Endō elected with 525 votes. Government supporter.

Fukui ken. (8,628 voters; 4 Members.)

First Constituency (Asuha & Ōno sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Three candidates - Aoyama Shōbei (member of the prefectural assembly), Takeo Shigeru (former member of the standing committee of the prefectural assembly), and Hirose Akira (a former local government official). At first, the contest had been between Aoyama and Takeo; but later, Hirose decided to resign from his post in the prefectural government and come forward as a candidate. Aoyama was influential in Asuha sub-prefecture, and there were more voters there than in Ōno. Earlier, he had helped to finance a Liberal newspaper, and he had been sent as a delegate to Daidō Danketsu conferences in Tokyo. His family were land-owners in Asuha, and were one of the richest in the whole prefecture. Takeo was away in Tokyo during part of the campaign, and it was reported that he had not prepared himself very well for it. Hirose's family was well known in Ōno gun, and so he was able to count on a sudden accession of strength in spite of the fact that he had delayed his candidacy. Aoyama elected with 982 votes. Liberal.

Second Constituency. (Yoshida & Sakai sub-prefectures). One member constituency. 4,701 voters. In this constituency, there took place what was virtually an unopposed election. The candidate so favoured was Sugita Teiichi (chairman of the prefectural assembly). Sugita was a native of Sakai gun; and though in the last week or so of the election campaign, some rival candidates did come forward in Yoshida gun, the latter had far fewer voters than Sakai. Therefore Sugita's chances of winning the seat were in no way threatened by the opposition. At the time of the election, Sugita was living in the prefecture, and at nomination meetings held on 7 and 8 June, his candidature received the unanimous endorsement of those present. The meeting on 7 June was attended by the headmen of the villages and towns in both parts of the constituency; the

meeting on the following day was attended by several hundred electors representing Yoshida as well as Sakai. Sugita was a leading adherent of the Jiyū Minken Undō, and a close associate of Itagaki. His family had been working as farmers and land-owners in Sakai for several generations. At the age of twenty, he went to Tokyo and started publishing a 'Left wing' magazine. In 1878, after the Aikoku-sha was re-established in Osaka, he worked hard for it. Earlier, he had made a lasting name for himself in Fukui prefecture by exerting himself to the utmost in a campaign for the reduction of taxes. His political activities had caused him to be imprisoned on several occasions. In 1884, he went abroad and visited Asia as well as Europe and America. On his return, he was elected to the prefectural assembly. Sugita elected. Liberal.

Third Constituency. (Nanjō; Imatate, & Nifu sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Two candidates were Nakajima Matagoro and Nagata Sadaemon. Nakajima was a Tokyo lawyer, and a prominent Jiyū-tō politician. Nagata was a landowner in Okayama village, Nifu gun, and deputy chairman of the prefectural assembly. He had long been a supporter of the Liberal movement. The situation in this constituency was that the electors were overwhelmingly Liberal in their sympathies; but there was no one national or local figure available for the constituency who was obviously better qualified than anybody else to represent it in the House of Representatives. Therefore the electorate was divided into one party which wished to ask someone who was living outside the prefecture, and who had proved himself to be more than usually able, to stand; and another party which supported the candidature of that worthy but hardly distinguished stay-at-home - Nagata Sadaemon. The 'outsider' group first of all approached Saitō Shūichiro, who had returned home to visit his parents' graves, but he was not willing to be nominated. Eventually, Nakajima accepted their suggestion that he should stand; but in the meantime, many of the voters who had originally wanted to bring in a candidate from outside the prefecture had defected to the Nagata camp. To make matters worse, the Nagata party did its best to win the election by promising to give money to the electors and entertaining them to lavish banquets. The Nakajima faction did not use this kind of tactic. An official complaint was lodged with the authorities concerning Nagata's campaigning methods; but the police did not prosecute him. Nakajima's supporters organized a number of speech tours, but he himself seems to have returned to Tokyo before the end of June. Nagata elected. Liberal.

Fourth Constituency (Mikata, Onifu, Ōi, & Tsuruga sub-prefectures). One member constituency. The first candidate to present himself was Tokioka Bunzaemon (member of the prefectural assembly). Then, the Sub-prefect of Mikata gun, Fujita Magohira, resigned his post and entered the contest. Finally, an organization calling itself The **Shizoku** of Obama Party nominated a lawyer, Tanizawa Ryōkichi, to oppose the other two. It was said that Tokioka was personally in favour of giving way to Tanizawa, but his own supporters would not hear of such a move. The contest was further complicated by the fact that Tokioka and Fujita were friends of many years standing. However this friendship grew rather strained in the course of the campaign. Fujita elected. Liberal.

Yamaguchi ken. (5,806 voters; 7 Members.)

Yamaguchi was an area that had not yet been penetrated by the Liberal or Progressive political parties. The main reason for this state of affairs was the fact that Yamaguchi was the home province of the Chōshū clan and so a major Government stronghold. This also accounts for the presence in the competition of a number of candidates who were senior officials attached to the central Government. The dominant political organization in the prefecture was the Bōchō Club under the patronage of Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru. Another faction in the prefecture was under the control of Yamagata Aritomo, but he was apt to find it difficult to keep a solid following in the area for long. At the time of the election, Yamagata was Prime Minister and had just stopped being Home Minister. Therefore his local stock was reasonably high; but 'the temperature of the relations between the Count and his followers changes so rapidly, that it appears that though he has ten thousand supporters now, before long he may have only one Count.'¹ A third group was an Ultra-Conservative one, led by Torio Koyata and Miura Goro. This Ultra-Conservative party did on occasion make use of what little influence it had to help Yamagata's adherents, but these alliances never lasted for very long. The Ultra-Conservatives were at daggers drawn with the Itō-Inoue faction. Thus, the local electoral

¹

Chōya Shimbun 25-5-90.

situation in Yamaguchi reflected, with a very fair degree of accuracy, the personalities and rivalries of some of the leading Chōshū figures in national political and military circles. Apart from this sort of hidden infighting among the followers of various senior men of affairs, the Yamaguchi campaign was noticeably quiet. The voters seem to have been quite ready to follow the lead given by the Bōchō Club or the village headmen, and were not very interested in the opportunities and issues presented by constitutional government.

First Constituency (Yoshiki, Mine, Asa, & Saba sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. Six candidates, but only three of them had any standing. These three were Yoshitomi Kanichi (chairman of the prefectural assembly), Suematsu Saburo (Ministry of Justice counsellor), and Furuya Shinsaku (member of the prefectural assembly). Yoshitomi and Furuya were supported by the Bōchō Club, and the former was a local politician of some ability as well as a distant relative of Inoue Kaoru. Suematsu had been brought up to be a Buddhist monk, but had no vocation for temple life. He had studied law in France, and after his return to Japan was appointed public prosecutor for the Supreme Court. He had been one of Gotō Shōjiro's leading supporters in the Daidō Danketsu. Yoshitomi and Furuya were strong in Yoshiki and Mine sub-prefectures, where the headmen of the various communities had decided that they should be elected, and where there were not a few Bōchō Club members. Suematsu 'nursed' the other half of the constituency, i.e. Asa and Saba sub-prefectures. He had returned home to this part of the prefecture on several occasions during the previous year, in order to make himself known to its inhabitants by means of speech meetings and parties. His final campaign tour began in the last week of June, when he once more left Tokyo and travelled all the way to Yamaguchi. Yoshitomi and Suematsu elected. Both Independents.

Second Constituency (Amu, Mishima, & Ōtsu sub-prefectures). One member constituency. The Bōchō Club and village headmen nominated Inoue Masakazu (Ministry of Justice counsellor), after the first person whom they had asked to stand had turned down the offer. Inoue had studied law in France for six years from 1875 to 1881, and had returned home with a doctorate. He had not actively sought the Second Constituency

seat; but his backers seem to have been powerful enough to be able to award it to whomever they pleased. Certainly, Inoue's chances of winning were sufficiently favourable to scare off other would-be contestants long before he himself had even begun to campaign in person. One of these people frightened by Inoue's popularity was a colleague of his in the Ministry of Justice. Inoue elected. Independent.

Third Constituency. (Akamagaseki & Toyoura sub-prefectures). One member constituency. Until 10 June certainly, and probably until a later date, the only candidate for this seat was Ooka Ikuzō (formerly a member of the Kaishin-tō, but later joined the Bōchō Club). Ooka had been born in Yamaguchi, and in 1873, he entered the Nagasaki School of Medicine where he studied German. Later, he studied law in Nagasaki and Tokyo. After completing these studies, he settled in Tokyo where he became famous as a leading criminal lawyer. He was a member of the Tokyo fu assembly, and in his Kaishin-tō days, he often spoke on that party's platforms. He had paid a number of visits to the Third Constituency (Yamaguchi) since the promulgation of the constitution, and by means of speech meetings and social gatherings had obtained a solid measure of electoral support. In the end, a rival candidate did come forward, but he polled only 75 votes to Ooka's 578. Ooka elected. Independent.

Fourth Constituency. (Tsuno, Kumake, & Ōshima sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. At least six candidates for the two seats. The first to come forward was Kawamura Hidetoshi (a Tokyo lawyer), who had been campaigning keenly but intermittently since the previous year. He was particularly strong in Kumake gun and had made some inroads into Tsuno. Other candidates with a limited amount of influence in the constituency were Yajima Sakuro (Chairman of the Tokyo Electric Light Company) and Ono Naosuke (an auditor). In the closing stages of the campaign, two new candidates came forward - Kumano Binzō (Ministry of Justice counsellor) and Horie Yoshisuke (member of the Senate). Both of them won a good following in the constituency within a few weeks of starting their campaigns. Kumano had transferred from the Second Constituency; Horie was a major-general in the Army, and a member of Torio Koyata's Moderate Conservative Party. He had been Commandant of the Military Academy; but the Government, disliking his views, moved him to the Senate where he had greater dignity and less influence. Yet another candidate was Nomura

Tsunezō; he seems to have been a nonentity. Horie and Nomura elected. Both Independents.

Fifth Constituency (Kuga sub-prefecture). One member constituency. As of 10 June, this constituency had no candidates at all. Some of the voters had wanted to nominate the Director of the Foreign Office Bureau of Commerce, Kawakami Kinichi, but he refused to stand. Another possible candidate also declined. The person eventually elected was Yoshikawa Tsutomu, who had had no previous experience of political or official life. Yoshikawa elected. Independent.

Kōchi ken. (5,542; 4 Members.)

What Yamaguchi was for the Government, Kōchi (formerly Tosa) was for the opposition. This was the home province of Itagaki's Liberals, and their strength must have been to some extent due to the survival of clan loyalties and pride. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the prefecture was a Liberal stronghold, it also contained a sizeable number of Ultra-Conservative supporters. Tani Kanjō, too, was a Tosa man. Accordingly, the election contest took the form of a bitter struggle, particularly in the Second Constituency, between the Jiyū-tō on the one hand and the Kokumin-ha (Tani's Ultra-Conservative party) on the other. All the Liberal candidates were politicians of the first rank; and the leading Liberal association, at any rate in and around Kōchi city, was known as the Kainan Club.

First Constituency (Tosa and Nagaoka sub-prefectures). One member constituency. The Liberal candidate was Takenouchi Tsuna; his Ultra-Conservative opponent was Shinkai Takeo. Takenouchi came from a family which for generations had been minor retainers in Tosa. He took part in the War of the Restoration, fighting for the Imperialists. After the war had finished, he did not enter the public service, but went to Osaka where he set himself up as a merchant interested in overseas trade. In 1870, he was appointed to a minor post in the Osaka fu local government. By 1885, he was working in the Treasury Department in Tokyo, but in that year he resigned his post and returned to the world of business. In association with Gotō Shōjiro, he became interested in the Takashima coal mine, and was president of Gotō's Hōrai Sha (a business company). In 1877, Takenouchi

was imprisoned for one year for suspected complicity in the Satsuma rebellion. After his release, he joined the Liberal movement, and he helped to found the first Liberty Party. He then extended the scope of his activities to include the press, and took a keen interest in the publication of the Jiyū Shimbun. Later, he was one of the official mediators in the negotiations leading to the formation of the Kōin Club. In contrast to Takenouchi, Shinkai was a virtually unknown figure. Takenouchi arrived in Kōchi from Tokyo on the morning of 20 June, and was welcomed by members of the Kainan Club, and also by representatives of the staff of the Toyō Shimbun. This paper (it changed its name to Kōchi Shimbun later in the month) was a Liberal organ. Takenouchi's campaign consisted of a series of speech meetings and social gatherings in different villages in the constituency. At one meeting, held at Nunoshita mura on 22 June, the audience of 250 or so persons was said to have broken into thunderous applause when he rose to speak. On that occasion, the topics he discussed were (i) the responsibilities of members of the House of Representatives, (ii) his hopes for the coming Diet, and (iii) the general political situation. On 21 June, a group of Liberal supporters held a discussion meeting in a private house at Ryōseki mura, Nagaoka gun. They invited a leading member of the Kainan Club to attend as guest speaker. Since the day chosen was a traditional holiday, a number of women were in the audience on that occasion. After the speeches were finished, the organizers entertained the visiting speaker at a drinking party. The Kokumin-ha, for its part, lacked the popular appeal and good organization of the Jiyū-tō. (The voting figures for Kōchi city were:- Takenouchi 76, Shinkai 3.) It seems to have campaigned by stealth; one of its ruses was to circulate rumours that certain well-known and locally powerful voters had decided to favour it. The Toyō-Kōchi Shimbun carried a number of advertisements put in by the people concerned to deny publicly the truth of these allegations. Takenouchi elected. Liberal.

Second Constituency. (Hata, Takaoka, & Akawa sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. The Jiyū-tō candidates were Kataoka Kenkichi and Hayashi Yūzō. The Kokumin-ha nominated Kataoka Naoharu and Hirota Shōro. Kataoka Kenkichi was a Tosa samurai, who had been associated with Itagaki Taisuke in the anti-Bakufu movement and had taken an active part in the War of the Restoration. In 1870, he was sent abroad by the Government to study the military systems of Europe

and America. After Itagaki's resignation in 1873, Kataoka Kenkichi became one of the leading members of the Jiyū Minken Undō. Settling in Kōchi, he became the first president of the Risshi-sha, and later was active in the Aikoku-sha campaign for representative institutions. In 1877, at the time of the Satsuma rebellion, he was imprisoned for a short period. In 1879, he was elected chairman of the prefectural assembly. Hayashi had had a similar sort of career. At the time of the War of the Restoration, he travelled to England, and on his return to Japan, became one of Itagaki's assistants. In 1873, he went as an adviser when the Foreign Minister of the day, Soejima Taneomi, visited China. He resigned, together with the rest of the 'war party', from his official post later that year. On returning to Kōchi, he was one of the founder members of the Risshi-sha. Hayashi was deeply involved in a plot to ally the Tosa Liberals with the Satsuma rebels. Consequently, in 1877, he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. In 1886, however, he was released under the terms of a special pardon. In 1890, he helped Itagaki found the Aikoku-kōtō. As with the First Constituency, the Kokumin-ha candidates were not nearly so well known as their Liberal opponents. However, the Ultra-Conservatives were strong in this constituency, and so the competition was keen. Kataoka Kenkichi and Hayashi campaigned by means of speech meetings, and in the course of the one month of June, spoke in a large number of different villages. Often, these speech campaigns took the form of an organized tour lasting for several days. For example, between 17 and 19 June, Hayashi attended three different meetings in three fairly widely separated villages. These meetings were held either in private houses or in public halls. Attendances were good, being anything from 150 to over a 1,000. The meeting places were sometimes decorated with flowers and placards or lamps, carrying slogans such as LIBERTY FOREVER. The speeches usually lasted from two to five hours, and they were often followed by a party. In general, there were no interruptions at all at these meetings; but on one occasion, when a speaker was criticizing the Kokumin-ha, two drunks appeared and started brandishing swords. They were over-powered by Jiyū-tō sōshi, however, and handed over to the police. When they saw this, other Kokumin-ha sympathizers who had smuggled themselves into the audience left in a great hurry. This speech campaign by the Liberal candidates seems to have had decisive results. They visited villages which had previously been regarded as

enemy strongholds, and in a number of such places the voters seceded en masse to the Jiyū-tō. The Kokumin-ha, on the other hand, was very much on the defensive, and put up little effective resistance to the Liberal attacks. The skies over the Second Constituency were reported to be in the habit of raining down sake or money when they were not unleashing hailstorms of blows. In the same vein, the springs at Ōuchi-mura, a locally celebrated watering-place in Takaoka gun, were rumoured to have spurted alcohol when the Kokumin-ha held a rally of their supporters there. Despite these bottle and purse tactics, the trend of opinion was clearly against the National Party. This success, the Liberals owed to their own hard efforts. Result - Kataoka Kenkichi 1,297 votes; Hayashi Yūzō 1,323 votes; Kataoka Naoharu 833 votes; Hirota Shōro 856 votes. Kataoka Kenkichi and Hayashi elected. Both Liberals.

Third Constituency (Kagami and Aki sub-prefectures). One member constituency. The Liberal candidate for this seat was Ueki Emori. Ueki was a Tosa man, and Itagaki's chief lieutenant. His main claim to fame, however, lies in his works on political thought. More than any other single person, Ueki was the philosopher of the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement. He was a tireless and extremely able controversialist, both on the public platform and at the journalist's desk. Since his early youth, he had been closely associated with Itagaki; in 1890, he was a leading member of the Aikoku-kōtō. I have not been able to discover any definite proof of the identity of Ueki's Kokumin-ha opponent. It is almost certain that there was such an opponent; and he may well have been Miyazaki Yoshimichi - a former member of the prefectural assembly and founder of the Tosa Kōyō-kai. The competition here was not so fierce as in the Second Constituency. A speech meeting was held by Jiyū-tō supporters in None mura, Aki gun, on the evening of 19 June. There were three speakers, but Ueki was not among them. The audience of a hundred or so persons listened in silence; and after the meeting had ended, the speakers were given supper by one of the organizers. A report from Tateda mura, Kagami gun, stated that the Kokumin-ha, which had previously been very powerful in the village, had recently lost most of its influence. This was because: - (i) They had collected money from their adherents to pay the costs of an appeal against a sentence of several months' imprisonment which had been imposed on two of their members in the previous March. The two had been punished for assaulting a Liberal Party member at the time of the

elections to the prefectural assembly. (ii) They had been involved in the illicit sale and removal of a building in the village. (iii) A Kokumin-ha leader had made over some of his land to be held jointly by eighty-seven of his politically loyal tenants. He had done this with the idea of increasing the power of his party. The tenants had taken advantage of their improved economic position to start selling eggs and toilet-paper in neighbouring villages. While they were hawking these goods, they found that they were everywhere disliked because of their connection with the Kokumin-ha. So, for the sake of securing custom, they began saying that they belonged to the Jiyū-tō. Troubled by the fact that they had to tell these lies, they were seriously thinking of restoring the title-deed to its original owner. The story of their dilemma had lowered the general prestige of the Kokumin-ha in Tateda. Ueki elected. Liberal.

Cartoon Depicting The Complete Defeat Of The Kōchi
Prefecture Nationalists By Their Liberal Opponents.
(Kōchi Shimbun 8-7-90).

Appendix I.

Imperial Rescript of 14 April 1875.

After ascending the Imperial Throne, We called together the entire Court and swore the Charter Oath to the gods, establishing the policies of the Empire and seeking the welfare of all Our subjects. Happily, as a result of the efforts of the Spirits of Our Ancestors and as a result of the efforts of the whole body of Our Court, We have to-day achieved a semblance of peace. Yet the Restoration is not long since past, and there still remain not a few changes and reforms to be undertaken in the internal administration.

We, now, in fulfilment of the principles of Our Oath, hereby set up a Senate to broaden the source of legislation, and a Supreme Court to strengthen the powers of justice. Moreover, by summoning the officials from the provinces, We shall be informed of the conditions of the people, and shall take counsel for the public good.

It is Our desire to introduce by degrees a system of constitutional government for the nation and to join with you, Our subjects, in looking forward to that auspicious event. You must not adhere too rigidly to the customs of former times; neither should you let your zeal for progress lead you into rash actions.

Mark well these Our words, and give Us your support.

(Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.186)

Appendix II.

Imperial Rescript of 12 October 1881.

We, sitting on the Throne which has been occupied by Our dynasty for over 2,500 years, and now exercising in Our name and right all authority and power transmitted to Us by Our Ancestors, have long had in view gradually to establish a constitutional form of government, to the end that Our Successors on the Throne may be provided with a rule for Their guidance.

It was with this object in view that in the 8th year of Meiji, We established the Senate, and in the 11th year of Meiji, authorized the formation of Local Assemblies, thus laying the foundation for the gradual reforms which We contemplated. These Our acts must convince you, Our subjects, of Our determination in this respect from the beginning.

Systems of government differ in different countries, but sudden and unusual changes cannot be made without great inconvenience.

Our Ancestors in Heaven watch Our acts, and We recognize Our responsibility to Them for the faithful discharge of Our duties, in accordance with the principles, and the perpetual increase of the glory, They have bequeathed to Us.

We therefore hereby declare that We shall, in the 23rd year of Meiji, establish a Parliament, in order to carry into full effect the determination We have announced, and We charge Our faithful subjects bearing Our commissions to make, in the mean time, all necessary preparations to that end.

With regard to the limitations upon the Imperial prerogative, and the constitution of the Parliament, We shall decide hereafter and make proclamation in due time.

We perceive that the tendency of Our people is to advance too rapidly, and without that thought and consideration which alone can make progress enduring, and We warn Our subjects, high and low, to be mindful of Our will, and that those who may advocate sudden and violent changes, thus disturbing the peace of Our realm, will fall under Our displeasure.

We expressly proclaim this to Our subjects.

(McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., p.86.)

Appendix III.

Jiyū-tō Manifesto, October 1881.

1. We shall endeavour to extend the liberties of the people, preserve their rights, promote their happiness, and improve their social condition.
2. We desire to establish a constitutional form of government of the best type.
3. We shall strive to realize our objects by uniting with those of our compatriots who approve of our party and its principles.

(Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.385)

Rikken Kaishin-tō Manifesto, March 1882.

The Emperor has graciously given us a constitution. The people of our Empire have been favoured with an unprecedented stroke of good fortune. At this juncture, what plan can we devise, what duty perform, in order that the people of the Empire will not disgrace themselves? There is nothing for it but to join all together in a political party and so make manifest our strength. Come brethren, let us organize a party and do our duty as subjects!

Happiness is something we expect of humanity. However we are not interested in the privileged happiness of a small minority. In the final analysis, this sort of happiness is self-interest, and is contrary to that glory of the Imperial House and prosperity of the people for which we stand. The glory of the Imperial House and the prosperity of the people are what we greatly desire. However we do not want the glory and prosperity of a brief moment. That sort of glory and prosperity are of limited duration, and are contrary to the boundless glory and eternal prosperity for which we stand. Therefore, should there be one or two who make our Empire their plaything, who despise the glory of the Imperial House and the prosperity of the people, and who, basking in the transient ease of the present time, have no thought for permanent injuries, we shall regard them as public enemies. We shall try to form this party from those who hope for a glory that will enable the Imperial House to be maintained forever, and for a prosperity that the people will enjoy forever. Come brethren, join our party and make manifest these hopes!

Political reform and progress shall be our unceasing aspirations. If there is neither reform nor progress in politics, it is futile to look for a boundless glory, and a waste of time to plan for an everlasting prosperity. In the end, it would be impossible to perfect the body politic. Though we hope for political reform and progress, we do not favour violent change. To think in terms of imprudent and sudden transformation is simply to disorganize society and hamper political progress. For the same reason, we reject and cannot share our aspirations with those who, lost in the darkness of their own narrow minds, cling vainly to the past and, emulating the violence of the extremists, like to get

Rikken Kaishin-tō Manifesto, March 1882.

excited. We desire to reform politics by truly proper and orderly methods, and to achieve progress through a policy of steadiness and honesty. The following are the two articles of our covenant:-

- a) Our Party shall be called the Constitutional Progressive Party.
- b) Our Party shall unite those subjects of the Empire who desire the following:-
 - (i) The preservation of the glory of the Imperial House, and the perfecting of the prosperity of the people.
 - (ii) Improvements in the internal administration before any extension of national rights.
 - (iii) The elimination of interference by the central authorities, and the setting up of the basic structure of local self-government.
 - (iv) The widening of the franchise to be in keeping with the general progress of society.
 - (v) The reduction to an absolute minimum of diplomatic bargaining and the strenuous promotion of trade relations, in our dealings with foreign countries.
 - (vi) The maintaining of the principle of 'hard money' in the coinage system.

(Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.403)

Rikken Teisei-tō Manifesto, March 1882.

Our Constitutional Imperial Party humbly bases itself on the Imperial Rescript of 12 October 1881. At home, we shall preserve the national polity unbroken for ages eternal and shall strengthen the rights and happiness of the people; abroad, we shall extend the national rights and look forward to the upholding of the honour of the Empire in every land. We shall follow a path of gradual advance. We shall not adhere too stubbornly to the past; neither shall we commit ourselves to frenzied change. All we desire is that order and progress should go together. In this way, we shall preserve the peace of the country. Accordingly, we consider it to be of the utmost importance that there should be a plan for progress, and have determined the programme of our Party as follows:-

- (i) His Majesty has made it clear that a Parliament will be opened in 1890. Our Party respectfully accepts this, and will not countenance discussion of the terms or timing of the Imperial Rescript.
- (ii) His Majesty has declared that the constitution will be a matter for His own august decision. Our Party will respectfully abide by this, and will not fail to observe the provisions of a constitution sponsored by His Majesty.
- (iii) It is beyond dispute that the sovereignty over the Empire rests in the Emperor alone, but its practical application will be regulated by a system of constitutional government.
- (iv) The Diet should consist of two Chambers.
- (v) In the election of Representatives, there should be a restricted franchise.
- (vi) The Diet should be empowered to frame laws for the internal affairs of the Empire.
- (vii) The Emperor should have the prerogative of approving or rejecting the legislation of the Diet.

Rikken Teisei-tō Manifesto, March 1882.

- (viii) Military and naval officers should not be allowed to intervene in politics.
- (ix) The officials in charge of the administration of justice should be made independent as soon as the legal system has been put in order.
- (x) Assembly and speech, so long as they are not prejudicial to national safety and order, are public freedoms. Speeches, newspapers, and publications should be free within the limits laid down by law.
- (xi) With regard to finance, the existing paper currency should be gradually replaced by convertible bank-notes.

(Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.456)

Appendix VI.

LAW OF ELECTION
of the
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Chapter I.

Election Districts.

Article I.

The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected in the election districts of each Fu (City) and Ken (Prefecture). The election districts, and the number of Members to be elected in each district, are set forth in the Appendix of the present Law.

Article II.

The Governor of a Fu or of a Ken shall superintend elections in the election districts in his Fu or Ken.

Elections in an election district shall be superintended either by the Gunchō (Head of Rural District) or by the Shichō (Head of Municipality) in the capacity of Chairman of Election.

Article III.

When an election district extends over more than one Gun (Rural District) or Shi (Municipality), the Governor of the Fu or Ken shall appoint one of the Gunchō or one of the Shichō for the Chairman of Election.

Article IV.

When there are more than one election district within the limits of a Shi, the Governor of the Fu or Ken shall appoint the Kuchō (Head of Urban District) for the Chairman of Election.

Article V.

Expenses of election shall be defrayed out of the local taxes.

Chapter II.

Qualifications of Electors.

Article VI.

Every elector is required to possess the following qualifications:-

1. He must be a male Japanese subject and be not less than full twenty-five years of age.
2. He must have fixed his permanent residence and actually resided in the Fu or Ken, for not less than one year, previous to the date of the drawing up of the electoral list, and must be still residing therein.
3. For not less than one year previous to the date of the making out of the electoral list, he must have been paying, in the Fu or Ken, direct national taxes to the amount of not less than fifteen yen, and must be still paying the same.

But in the case of income tax, he must have been paying it for not less than full three years previous to the same date, and must be still paying it.

Article VII.

In the case of a person that has succeeded to an estate by inheritance, the amount of taxes paid on the estate by his predecessor shall be counted in for his qualification.

Chapter III.

Qualifications of Eligible Persons.

Article VIII.

Those alone shall be eligible, that are male Japanese subjects of not less than full thirty years of age, and that, in the Fu or Ken in which they desire to be elected, have been paying direct national taxes to an amount of not less than fifteen yen, for a period of not less than one year, previous to the date of the making out of the electoral list, and that are still paying that amount of direct national taxes.

As to income tax, however, it is required that eligible persons shall have been paying it for a period of not less than three years previous to the date of the making out of the electoral list, and that they be still paying it.

Article IX.

Officials in the Imperial Household Department, Officials of Justice, Auditors, Revenue Officials and Police Officials shall not be eligible.

Officials other than those enumerated in the preceding clause may, so long as their official functions are not thereby interfered with, serve as Members, retaining their official position.

Article X.

The Officials of a Fu, Ken or Gun shall not be eligible within the limits of the jurisdiction of their respective office.

Article XI.

The officers of a Shi, Town or Village, engaged in the management of an election, shall not be eligible within their respective election districts.

Article XII.

Shintō priests, and priests and teachers of religion of all kinds shall be ineligible.

Article XIII.

When a member of a Fu or Ken Assembly has been elected Member of the House of Representatives, and has accepted the election, he shall resign his former seat.

Chapter IV.

Rules Applicable in Common to Electors And to

Eligible Persons.

Article XIV.

Any person, falling within any of the following categories, shall be disqualified as electors or as eligible persons:-

1. Lunatics and idiots.
2. Undischarged bankrupts.
3. Persons who have been deprived of public rights or whose public rights are suspended.
4. Those who have been sentenced to confinement, when full three years have not yet elapsed since the completion or pardon of their sentences.
5. Persons who have been sentenced by the old Criminal Law to penal servitude for not less than one year, or to imprisonment for a political offence for not less than one year, when full three years have not yet elapsed since the completion or pardon of their sentences.
6. Persons who have been punished for gambling, when full three years have not yet elapsed since the completion or pardon of their sentences.
7. Persons whose right to elect and to be elected is suspended on account of an offence connected with an election.

Article XV.

Men in the Army or in the Navy can not exercise the

right to elect or to be elected, while they are in actual service. The same rule applies to those, who have temporarily retired from actual service, or who have been suspended therefrom.

Article XVI.

The tōshu (pater-familias) of families of nobility shall be incapable of electing or of being elected Members of the House of Representatives.

Article XVII.

Any person, against whom a criminal prosecution has been brought, and who is in detention or is under bail, shall be incapable of exercising the right to elect or to be elected, until the completion of the proceedings.

Chapter V.

Electoral List.

Article XVIII.

The Chairman of Election shall cause the Chōchō (Head of Town) and the Sonchō (Head of Village) of an election district, to make a list of all the persons in the district having qualifications to elect, and make out two copies thereof by the 1st of April in each year: one of the copies shall be forwarded to the Chairman of Election before the 20th of the same month.

In this electoral list shall be entered the name, official rank, profession, class, residence and date of birth of each elector, and the total amount of direct national taxes paid by him, and the place in which such taxes are paid.

Article XIX.

In a Shi, the electoral list shall be made out in the following manner:-

1. When the whole Shi or a Ku (Urban District) thereof

constitutes an election district, the Chairman of Election shall compile the electoral list.

2. When several Ku of a Shi are united into one election district, the Kuchō of each Ku shall compile the electoral list for his respective district, and forward it to the Chairman of Election.
3. When, in case Gun and Shi are united into one election district, the Gunchō assumes the functions of Chairman of Election, the Shichō shall compile the electoral list and forward it to the Chairman of Election.
4. In the case mentioned in the last clause, when the Shichō serves as Chairman of Election, he shall compile the electoral list of the Shi.

Article XX.

When an elector is paying direct national taxes without the limits of the election district in which he is residing, he shall obtain, to that effect, the certificate of the Chōchō, Sonchō, Shichō or Kuchō, of the place in which he is paying such taxes, and forward it, before the date for the compilation of the electoral list, to the Chōchō, Sonchō, Shichō or Kuchō, entrusted with the management of the voting.

Article XXI.

The Chairman of Election shall amalgamate into one, all the electoral lists forwarded by the respective Chōchō, Sonchō, Shichō or Kuchō, making one list for each election district. He shall keep it in the Gun, Shi or Ku Office, concerned in the management of the election, and send a duplicate of it to the Governor of the Fu or Ken.

Article XXII.

The Chairman of Election shall, during fifteen days commencing from the 5th of May in each year, exhibit for public inspection a copy of the electoral list of each election district in the Gun, Shi or Ku Office, concerned in

the management of the election.

Article XXIII.

When any one possessing the qualifications to elect, discovers an omission or the wrong registration of a name in an electoral list, he may claim that correction be made, by giving to the Chairman of Election, during the period of public inspection, written notice and his reasons therefor, together with corroborative evidence.

After the expiration of the period for public inspection, no notice mentioned in the foregoing clause shall be entertained.

Article XXIV.

Upon the receipt of a notice about omission, the Chairman of Election shall examine the reasons alleged and the evidence adduced, and shall give his decision within twenty days from the receipt of such notice. When he decides the notice to be relevant, he shall immediately register the name omitted, and communicate the circumstances to the Chōchō, Sonchō, Shichō or Kuchō of the place, in which the person in question is residing, at the same time publishing the fact in the election district.

Article XXV.

Upon the receipt of a notice of wrong registration, the Chairman of Election shall examine the reasons alleged and evidence adduced, and in case of necessity shall summon and examine the person, who has given the said notice, and the one, concerning whom the notice has been given. The matter shall be decided within twenty days from the receipt of the notice, and when it is decided to have been a wrong registration, it shall be at once erased, and the circumstances communicated to the Chōchō, Sonchō, Shichō or Kuchō of the place, in which the person in question is residing, at the same time publishing the fact in the election district.

Article XXVI.

When either the person, who has given the notice, or the

person, about whom it has been given, is not satisfied with the decision of the Chairman of Election, he may, within seven days from the day, on which the said decision was given, institute against the Chairman of Election a suit in a Court of First Instance.

Article XXVII.

Upon the receipt of the suit mentioned in the proceeding Article, the Court shall promptly proceed to the trial of the case, irrespective of its calender.

Article XXVIII.

No appeal is allowed against the judgement of the Court of First Instance mentioned in the preceding Article, but it is permissible to bring an appeal to the Court of Cassation for revision.

Article XXIX.

The 15th of June shall be the date, on which the electoral list shall be finally settled, and it shall be maintained as it then may be, until the day of compilation the following year. When, however, any correction is to be made in pursuance of the judgement of a Court of Law, the Chairman of Election shall make the said correction within twenty-four hours from the receipt of such judgement, and shall communicate the circumstance to the Chōchō, Sonchō, Shichō or Kuchō of the place, in which the person, who has given the notice, or the one about whom the notice has been given, is residing, at the same time publishing the facts within the election district.

Chapter VI.

Date of Election and Voting Place.

Article XXX.

Voting shall take place ordinarily on the 1st day of July. In the case, however, of the dissolution of the House of Representatives, the date of an extraordinary election

shall be fixed and proclaimed by Imperial Ordinance, at least thirty days beforehand.

Article XXXI.

The voting place shall be opened in the Town or Village Office or in some other place named by the Chōchō or the Sonchō, and shall be put under the management of the Chōchō or Sonchō.

Article XXXII.

When the number of electors in a Town or a Village is not numerous enough to require the opening of a voting place, several Towns or several Villages or both may be united for the purpose.

In this case, the Gunchō shall, subject to the approval of the Governor of the Fu or Ken, determine the Towns or Villages to be thus united, the voting place, and the Chōchō or Sonchō, under whose management the voting place is to be put.

Article XXXIII.

The Chōchō or the Sonchō shall nominate not less than two and not more than five witnesses from among the electors of the election district under his management, and the notice of the nomination shall be sent to the persons nominated at least three days previous to the day of election, requesting them to attend the voting place on that day.

The witnesses cannot decline their nomination without proper reasons.

Chapter VII.

Voting.

Article XXXIV.

The voting shall commence at 7 o'clock A.M. and be closed at 6 o'clock P.M.

Article XXXV.

The ballot box shall have a double lid, each fitted with a different key. One of the two keys shall be put in the custody of the Chōchō or Sonchō, and the other in that of the witnesses.

Article XXXVI.

Before the commencement of the voting, the Chōchō or the Sonchō shall, together with the witnesses, open the ballot box in the presence of the electors on the spot, and show them that it is empty.

Article XXXVII.

On the day of election, electors shall come in person to the voting place and vote after identifying themselves with their names in the electoral list.

Article XXXVIII.

The voting papers shall be of a uniform style in each Fu and Ken, and shall be given to each elector by the Chōchō or the Sonchō, at the voting place on the day of election.

Every voter shall, at the voting place, inscribe upon the voting paper the name of the person he votes for, then his own name and residence, and shall put his stamp upon it.

Article XXXIX.

When a voter declares himself incapable of forming the characters required, the Chōchō or the Sonchō shall direct an officer to do so for him. The paper shall next be read to the voter, who shall put his stamp thereon and then cast his vote. These details shall be entered in the minutes of the voting.

Article XL.

In an election district where two or more than two

Members are to be elected, the method of "scrutin de liste" shall be employed.

Article XLI.

No person, other than those entered in the electoral list, shall be capable of voting. Should, however, any one come to the voting place on the day of election, bringing with him a judgement of a Court of Law entitling him to have his name entered in the electoral list, the Chōchō or the Sonchō shall give him a voting paper and allow him to vote. The circumstances shall be entered in the minutes of the voting.

Article XLII.

When the time for closing the polling arrives, the Chōchō or the Sonchō shall declare the fact and shut the ballot box. After the shutting of the ballot box, no voting shall be allowed.

Article XLIII.

The Chōchō or the Sonchō shall keep minutes of the voting, in which are to be entered all matters relating to the voting, and to which he shall put his signature as shall also the witnesses theirs.

Article XLIV.

On the day following that of election the Chōchō or Sonchō shall send, in company with one or more witnesses, the ballot box and the minutes of the voting, to the Gun, Shi or Ku Office concerned in the management of the election.

Article XLV.

In the case of an island situated in an election district, whence there are circumstances to make it impossible to send the ballot box within the time mentioned in the preceding Article, the Governor of the Fu or Ken may fix a convenient date for voting, between the day of the settlement of the electoral list and the date of the election, and cause the ballot box to be sent by the date of the election.

Chapter VIII.

Election Meeting.

Article XLVI.

The election meeting shall be held in the Gun, Shi or Ku Office, entrusted with the management of the election.

Article XLVII.

The Chairman of Election shall nominate by lot an Election Committee of not less than three and of not more than seven persons, from among the witnesses assembling from the different voting places.

Article XLVIII.

On the day following that of the transmission of the ballot boxes, the Chairman of Election shall open each ballot box in the presence of the Election Committee, and shall count the total number of ballots and that of the voters. When there is any difference between the total number of ballots and that of the voters, the fact shall be entered in the minutes of the election.

Article XLIX.

When the counting has been finished, the Chairman of Election shall inspect the ballots in company with the Election Committee.

Article L.

The electors may request admission to the election meeting of their respective election districts.

Article LI.

The following ballots shall be void:-

1. Those of persons whose names are not recorded in the electoral list. It is, however, otherwise in

the case of a person, who has voted in virtue of a judgement of a Court of Law, which he had brought with him.

2. Ballots, for which a regular voting paper has not been used.
3. Ballots, on which the voter's name is not stated.
4. Those, on which the name of a person, who has no qualifications for election, is inscribed. But in the case of a "scrutin de liste", such a ballot shall have effect with respect to such of the persons named therein as do possess those qualifications.
5. Those, on which either the name of the voter or that of the person voted for cannot be deciphered on account of erroneous characters used, stains, erasures or injuries. It is otherwise, when the ordinary kana characters are used, or when the name, though formed of wrong characters, may be clearly recognized.
6. Those, in which words other than those specified in the second clause of Article XXXVIII are written. But it is not the same, when the official rank, profession, class and residence of the person voted for, have been added, so that there might not be mistake of identification, or when titles of respect have been used.

Article LII.

When any doubt arises as to the validity of a ballot, the Chairman of Election shall decide, after having heard the opinion of the Election Committee. Against this decision, no objection can be raised at the election meeting.

Article LIII.

Those ballots, that are void, shall be crossed across, and the circumstances shall be recorded in the minutes of election. Such ballots shall be preserved for a year, and at the expiration of that time, shall be destroyed by fire.

Article LIV.

When a ballot contains more than the fixed number of names of persons to be voted for, the names in excess of the fixed number shall be struck off commencing with the last.

When a "scrutin de liste" contains less than the fixed number of names, only those actually put down upon it shall be counted. In case the name of one person is written twice, it shall be counted as one vote.

Article LV.

Ballots shall be preserved for sixty days in the Gun, Shi or Ku Office, but shall be destroyed by fire at the expiration of the said period.

Article LVI.

When, concerning an election suit, either a criminal accusation or indictment has been brought, the ballots shall be preserved until the settlement of the case, without any regard to the expiration of the periods mentioned in Article LIII and in Article LV.

Article LVII.

The Chairman of Election shall make minutes of the election, in which shall be recorded all matters relating to the inspection of the election, and shall preserve them, after putting his signature and obtaining those of the members of the Election Committee to them also.

Chapter IX.

Elected Persons.

Article LVIII.

The individual, who has obtained a relative majority of the total number of ballots, shall be declared the elected person.

When the number of ballots is equal, the individual,

the senior in point of birth, shall be declared the elected person, and when the dates of birth are the same, it shall be decided by drawing lots.

Article LIX.

When the elected person or persons have been settled, the Chairman of Election shall at once communicate his or their names and the number of his or their ballots to the Governor of the Fu or Ken.

Article LX.

Upon the receipt of the communication mentioned in the preceding Article, the Governor of the Fu or Ken shall give notice to each of the elected persons, and shall notify their names throughout the district under his jurisdiction.

Article LXI.

Upon the receipt of notice of election, every elected person shall communicate to the Governor of the Fu or Ken, as to whether he accepts it or not.

Article LXII.

Any individual, who has been declared elected in several election districts, shall, upon the receipt of the notice of election, communicate to the Governor of the Fu or Ken which election he accepts.

Article LXIII.

Those elected persons shall be considered to have declined their election, who, being then within the respective Fu or Ken, have not made the communication of acceptance within ten days, or who, being then out of the respective Fu or Ken, have not made such communication within twenty days.

Article LXIV.

When an elected person either declines the election or

does not send in the communication of acceptance of election within the fixed period, the Governor of the Fu or Ken shall fix the date of election, and cause the respective Chairman of Election to hold a new election. But in the case mentioned in the second clause of Article LVIII, should any individual, who has been declared an elected person by the drawing of lots, either decline or fail to send in the communication of acceptance, the other person, who has lost the election by the said drawing of lots, shall be declared the elected person.

Article LXV.

When it has been settled who are the elected persons in every election district, the Governor of the Fu or Ken shall give them certificates of election, and notify their names throughout the extent of his jurisdiction. He shall then report thereon to the Minister of State for Home Affairs, with the statements of the qualifications of the elected persons.

Chapter X.

Term of Membership and Substitutional Elections.

Article LXVI.

The term of membership shall be four years. After the expiration of their term, Members may again accept election.

Article LXVII.

When, upon the occurrence of a vacancy among Members, the Minister of State for Home Affairs orders the Governor of the respective Fu or Ken to hold a substitutional election, the latter shall cause an extraordinary election to be held in the respective election district for the election of a substitutional Member, within twenty days from the day, on which he received the order of the said Minister of State.

Article LXVIII.

The term of substitutional membership shall correspond to that of the predecessor.

Chapter XI.

Regulation of Voting Places.

Article LXIX.

The Chōchō or Sonchō charged with the management of voting shall maintain order at the voting place, and, in a case of necessity, may deliver an offender to the police authorities to be dealt with by them.

Article LXX.

No person carrying weapons or arms is permitted to enter a voting place.

Article LXXI.

No person, who is not an elector, is permitted to enter a voting place.

Article LXXII.

At a voting place it is forbidden to make speeches, to engage in discussions, to cause an uproar, or to use persuasion for the votes of other people.

Article LXXIII.

When any person disturbs the order of a voting place, the Chōchō or Sonchō shall give him warning, and, when the warning is disregarded, shall cause him to leave the voting place.

Article LXXIV.

A person, who has been compelled to leave a voting place, may, unless he has become an offender against law, again be called therein for the purpose of voting.

Article LXXV.

When any of the electors assembled at a voting place

transgresses either the provisions of the Criminal Law or the punitive rules of the present Law, he shall be forbidden to vote, and his name and the circumstances shall be recorded in the minutes of the election.

Article LXXVI.

As to the decision of the Chōchō or Sonchō on a dispute relating to an election, no objection against it can be raised at the voting place.

Article LXXVII.

Any person, who requests admission to an election meeting held at the Gun, Shi or Ku Office charged with management of election, shall be treated by the Chairman of Election according to the provisions set forth in the five Articles from Article LXIX to Article LXXIII.

Chapter XII.

Law Suits About Election.

Article LXXVIII.

When a person, who has lost an election, considers that there is sufficient reason to make void the election of the elected person in the respective election district, he may institute a suit in a Court of Appeal against the elected person, within thirty days from the day of the notification of the name of the elected person as mentioned in Article LXV.

No suit brought after the expiration of the above mentioned period shall be entertained.

Article LXXIX.

The plaintiff shall, simultaneously with the filing of his petition, deposit as security in the Clerk's Bureau of the Court of Appeal three hundred yen in cash or Public Bonds of equal value.

Article LXXX.

In case the judgement has been given against the plaintiff, should he fail to pay the whole amount of the legal costs within seven days from the day on which the judgement was delivered, the security money shall be appropriated for the purpose, and should there still remain any deficiency, the required amount shall be charged to the plaintiff.

Article LXXXI.

In case two or more than two plaintiffs have brought a suit against one and the same elected person, the Court of Appeal may deliver judgement to all the plaintiffs by one and the same document.

Article LXXXII.

Should the House of Representatives be ordered to dissolve while the trial is going on, the Court of Appeal shall dismiss the suit.

Article LXXXIII.

When the plaintiff withdraws his suit, he shall give public notice of the fact through the medium of a newspaper or by some other method.

Article LXXXIV.

In trying a suit about an election, a Court of Appeal may directly deliver judgement on those offenders against the Criminal Law or the present Law, who are connected with the suit at issue. In this case, however, the Public Prosecutors must be present.

In case he is not connected with a suit about an election, an offender against the present Law shall be tried in the Criminal Court having jurisdiction over him.

Article LXXXV.

When a suit about an election is decided in a Court of

Appeal, a copy of the judgement shall be sent to the Minister of State for Home Affairs; and on the opening of the House of Representatives, another copy shall be sent to the President thereof.

Article LXXXVI.

Against the judgement of a Court of Appeal on a suit about an election, an appeal may be made for revision to the Court of Cassation.

Article LXXXVII.

An elected person, who is the object of a suit, shall not lose the right of a seat in the House of Representatives, pending the final decision of the Court of Law.

Article LXXXVIII.

In connection with a suit about an election, in all matters not provided for in the present Chapter, the process of ordinary legal proceedings shall be followed..

Chapter XIII.

Punitive Rules.

Article LXXXIX.

Any person, who has effected the insertion of his name in the electoral list by fraudulently falsifying the amount of his tax paid, his age, residence, or any other facts necessary for the qualifications of an elector, shall be liable to a fine of not less than four yen and of not more than forty yen.

Article XC.

Any person, who either directly or indirectly has given or has promised to give an elector money, goods, notes, or public or private employment, with the object of obtaining a vote for himself, of enabling another person to obtain the same, or of preventing the elector from voting

for another person, shall be liable to a fine of not less than five yen and of not more than fifty yen.

The same rule applies to the person who has received such gift or promise.

Article XCI.

Any person who has either obtained a vote for himself, or has enabled another person to obtain the same, or has prevented an elector from voting for another person, by either directly or indirectly giving or promising to give the elector money, goods, notes, or public or private employment, shall be dealt with, according to the provision of Art.234 of the Criminal Law.

Any person, who has voted or who has refrained from voting in consideration of such gift or promise, shall be dealt with in a like manner.

Article XCII.

Any person, who has done violence to an elector, with the object of obtaining a vote for himself, of enabling another person to obtain the same, or of preventing an elector from voting for another person, shall be sentenced to a minor confinement without hard labour of not less than one month and of not more than six months, with a fine of not less than five yen and of not more than fifty yen.

Article XCIII.

Any person, who, by doing violence to an elector, has obtained a vote for himself, or enabled another person to obtain the same, or has prevented the elector from voting for another person, shall be liable to be sentenced to a minor confinement without hard labour of not less than three months and of not more than two years, with a fine of not less than ten yen and of not more than a hundred yen.

Article XCIV.

Whoever assembles a crowd of people, for the purpose of

either intimidating electors, of causing disturbance at a voting place or at an election meeting, or of detaining, damaging, or plundering a ballot box, shall be liable to be sentenced to a minor confinement without hard labour of not less than six months and of not more than two years, with a fine of not less than ten yen and of not more than a hundred yen.

Whoever knowingly joins such a crowd and adds to its influence, shall be liable to a minor confinement without hard labour of not less than fifteen days and of not more than two months, with a fine of not less than three yen and of not more than thirty yen.

Should the offender be carrying weapons or arms, one degree shall be added to the principal punishment.

Article XCV.

Whoever at the time of election, by force, or by doing violence to the election officers or witnesses, either disturbs a voting place or a place of election meeting, or detains, damages, or plunders a ballot box, shall be liable to a minor confinement without hard labour of not less than four months and of not more than four years, with a fine of not less than twenty yen and of not more than two hundred yen.

Should the offender be carrying weapons or arms, one degree shall be added to the principal punishment.

Article XCVI.

Whoever commits either one of the offences mentioned in the preceding Article, by assembling a crowd of people, shall be liable to a major imprisonment without hard labour.

Whoever knowingly joins such a crowd and adds to its influence, shall be liable to a minor confinement without hard labour of not less than two years and of not more than five years.

Should the offender be carrying weapons or arms, one degree shall be added to the principal punishment.

Article XCVII.

Whoever instigates a person or persons, by means of speeches, newspapers or writings of any kind, to commit any of the offences mentioned in the preceding three Articles, shall be liable to be dealt with, according to the provision of Art.105 of the Criminal Law. In case the instigation has not produced any effect, the principal punishment shall be commuted by two or three degrees.

Article XCVIII.

Whoever enters a voting place or a place of election meeting, carrying weapons or arms, shall be punished with a fine of not less than three yen and of not more than thirty yen.

Article XCIX.

Should an elected person have been sentenced to any of the punishments mentioned in the ten Articles from Article LXXXIX to Article XCVIII, the election shall be void.

Article C.

Any person who has voted by fraudulently assuming another person's name, or has voted in spite of his disqualifications according to Article XIV, shall be punished with a fine of not less than four yen and of not more than forty yen.

Article CI.

Whoever has, for the commission of any of the offences mentioned in the foregoing Articles, been sentenced to a punishment severer than confinement, or has been twice sentenced to fines, shall be suspended from the exercise of the right to elect and to be elected for a period of time not less than three years and of not more than seven years.

Article CII.

Should a witness fail to discharge any of the duties

mentioned in the provisions of the present Law, without any justifiable reason, shall be punished with a fine of not less than four yen and of not more than forty yen.

Article CIII.

As to offences, other than those for which provisions are made in the present Chapter, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Law, when such provisions are expressed therein, and the severer punishment shall be applied.

Article CIV.

In all offences relating to elections, six months shall be considered as the term of prescription of penalties.

Article CV.

The present punitive rules, as well as the Articles of Chapter XI, shall be pasted up at every voting place and every place of election meeting.

Chapter XIV.

Supplementary Rules.

Article CVI.

In every Shi, there shall be established one voting place, and the management of all votings and elections as specified in the present Law shall be taken charge of by the Shichō.

In the case mentioned in Article IV, one voting place shall be established in each election district, and the management of all votings and elections as specified in the present Law shall be taken charge of by the Kuchō.

Article CVII.

In the case mentioned in the preceding Article, the

Shichō or the Kuchō shall nominate not less than three and not more than seven witnesses from among the electors in the election district under his management, and shall give notice of nomination to them, at least three days previous to the date of election, at the same time requesting them to be present on the day of election at the Shi or Ku Office concerned in the management of the election.

The witnesses shall be present at the voting, and shall also inspect the ballots.

In this case, matters relating to voting shall also be recorded in the minutes of election.

Article CVIII.

In localities where the Toshi (Governor of Island) is appointed, the functions of Chairman of Election mentioned in the present Law shall be discharged by the Tōshi.

Article CIX.

In Towns and Villages where the Law for the Organization of Towns and Villages is not in force, the functions of the Chōchō or Sonchō mentioned in the present Law shall be taken charge of by the Kochō (Headman).

Article CX.

In the first year of the compilation of the electoral list, those persons who have continuously been paying in full amount, since the coming into force of the Law of Income Tax, an amount of income tax equal to that specified in Article VI and Article VIII, shall be considered to have fulfilled the condition as to the period of tax payment required in tax qualification.

Article CXI.

In the Hokkaidō, in the Okinawa Ken, and in the Ogasawarajima, the present Law shall not be carried out, pending the carrying out therein of general laws for the organization of local governments.

(Official translation.)

Appendix VII.

SUPPLEMENTARY PENAL REGULATIONS FOR THE LAW OF ELECTION
of the
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

29.5.1890

COUNT YAMAGATA ARITOMO

PRIME MINISTER.

COUNT SAIGŌ TSUGUMICHI

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS.

COUNT YAMADA AKIYOSHI

MINISTER OF JUSTICE.

1. Persons who provide electors with food or drink while they are on their way to or in the neighbourhood of election meeting places or polling stations, and also those who supply any type of transport by kuruma or horse to or from election meeting places or polling stations with the object of obtaining votes, or obtaining votes for other people, or of preventing votes being cast for other people, and also those who accept such provisions or supplies, and also those who act as agents for or promise to act as agents for electors with regard to the cost of rest, lodging, or food, or travelling expenses, or transport by kuruma or horses to or from the election meeting places or polling stations, and also those who accept such representation or promise shall be dealt with in accordance with the precedent afforded by Article 90 of the House of Representatives Election Law.

2. Persons who obstruct the exercise of the right to vote by intimidating or abducting electors, or by hindering their movements, or by using deceit with the objects described in section one shall be dealt with in accordance with the precedent afforded by Article 92 of the House of Representatives Election Law.

Those persons who behave in the way described in this section and [also] do what is described in section one shall be dealt with in accordance with the precedent afforded by Article 95 of the House of Representatives Election Law.

3. Persons who spread false reports to the effect that [certain people] are eligible for election or are not eligible for election or are unwilling to agree to be elected shall be fined not less than five yen and not more than fifty yen.

4. Persons who assemble in large numbers or go about in bands, or light bonfires or pine torches, or make a noise with bells, drums, conch shells, or horns, or make use of flags or other emblems in the Districts or cities where there are election meetings or polling stations in order to stimulate election fever, and do not obey police orders to desist shall be sentenced to not less than fifteen days'

and not more than three months' imprisonment with light labour and shall be fined not less than five yen and not more than fifty yen.

5. Persons who display public posters for the purposes described in section one shall be fined not less than two yen and not more than twenty yen.
6. If persons elected are sentenced under sections one to four inclusive, it shall be subject to the precedent afforded by Article 99 of the House of Representatives election Law.
7. Offences under this law are subject to the precedent afforded by Article 104 of the House of Representatives Election Law.

(Kampō, No.2,073. 30.5.1890)

Appendix VIII.

Jiyū-tō Manifesto, 21-23 February 1890.

PRINCIPLES.

Our Party is based on Liberalism.

MAIN OBJECTIVES.

Our Party will seek only to enhance the perpetual union of Emperor and people by extending liberty, by protecting rights, by esteeming virtue, and by fostering the common weal.

PARTY PLATFORM.

1. We shall bring in party Cabinets.
2. If the officials of the Court of Administrative Litigation, either deliberately or else by accident, harm the rights of the people, we shall see to it that they are indemnified.
3. We shall make equal treaties with foreign countries.
4. We shall introduce the jury system.
5. We shall improve the education system and encourage the spread of learning.
6. We shall improve the military system and shorten the period of reserve service.
7. We shall abolish the system for retiring public officials.
8. We shall cut the costs of administration and reduce the number of officials.
9. In general, when fixing the rates for taxes, we shall pay attention to profits.
10. We shall reduce the land-tax.
11. We shall increase the number of income-tax grades.

Jiyū-tō Manifesto, 21-23 February 1890.

12. We shall overhaul the arrangements for the upkeep of Government property, and shall pay great attention to the management of this.
13. We shall abolish the tax qualification for election candidates.
14. We shall give the vote to those who pay ¥5 or more in direct national taxes.
15. We shall make the age qualification for election candidates 25 years, and that for electors 20 years.
16. We shall make the election constituencies bigger.
17. We shall do away with special protection for home industries.
18. We shall strengthen the organs of local self-government, and we shall reform the prefectural system.
19. We shall reform the Registration Law.
20. We shall use the property belonging to the Government as the basis for local self-government.
21. We shall enlarge the freedoms of publication and assembly.
22. We shall abolish the Peace Preservation Ordinance.
23. We shall reform the time limit for paying taxes on fields.

(Hayashida, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol.1, p.264)

Appendix IX.

Daidō Club Manifesto, 4 May 1890.

PARTY PLATFORM.

1. We shall uphold independent sovereignty.
 - (i) We pledge ourselves to consult the Imperial Diet in advance on matters of diplomacy or treaty making that affect the liabilities of the nation.
 - (ii) It is necessary to carry out treaty revision by signing completely equal treaties.
 - (iii) We pledge ourselves to improve the organization of the Army and Navy, and to enlarge them gradually as the nation grows stronger.
 - (iv) We pledge ourselves to curtail the period of military conscription, and to increase the number of soldiers available in times of war.
2. We shall introduce responsible Cabinets.
 - (i) We pledge ourselves to make the Ministers of State fully responsible to the Imperial Diet as well as to His Majesty the Emperor.
 - (ii) We pledge ourselves to make clear the distinction between policy-making officials and executive officials, and not to cause them needlessly to rotate at every change of Cabinet.
 - (iii) We pledge ourselves to use the Privy Council purely as an advisory body.
 - (iv) We pledge ourselves to establish the system of administrative litigation on a perfect and enduring basis.
 - (v) It is necessary to amend the regulations governing appointments to the Civil Service,

Daidō Club Manifesto, 4 May 1890.

and to devise ways of appointing men of talent.

3. We intend to put the financial administration in order, and to foster the strength of the people.
 - (i) We pledge ourselves to simplify the structure of government by reforming the Civil Service, by re-arranging the government departments, and by reducing the number of public officials.
 - (ii) We pledge ourselves to make differences of salary correspond to the type of work done, to enact a definitive Civil Service Pensions Scheme, and to abolish the existing retirement regulations.
 - (iii) We pledge ourselves to present a statement of the previous year's accounts to the Diet at the same time as we shall submit the annual Budget estimates.
 - (iv) We pledge ourselves to maintain the independence of the Board of Audit.
 - (v) We pledge ourselves to rescind as far as possible policies that obstruct the enterprise of the people.
 - (vi) We pledge ourselves to reform the tax laws, and to simplify their procedure.
4. We shall make perfect the system of local self-government.
 - (i) We pledge ourselves to reduce to the minimum the interference of the central Government with the local officials and assemblies.
 - (ii) We pledge ourselves to entrust, as far as possible, the management of police affairs, public works, hygiene, education, and other matters to the organs of local self-government.

Daidō Club Manifesto, 4 May 1890.

- (iii) We pledge ourselves to make local custom the foundation of the Municipal and the Town and Village Codes.
- 5. We shall make complete the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association.
 - (1) We pledge ourselves to reform the Speech, Assembly, and Publications Regulations, and to abolish the Peace Preservation Ordinance.

Addenda.

- (i) We pledge ourselves to have election constituencies consisting of one fu or one ken.
- (ii) We pledge ourselves to lower the tax qualifications for candidates and voters.
- (iii) We pledge ourselves to make the age qualification for candidates 25 years, and to let the tax qualification for them be valid irrespective of locality.
- (iv) We pledge ourselves to alter the date of election.
- (v) We pledge ourselves to allow Hokkaido, Okinawa ken, and other places to elect Representatives in proportion to their population.
- (vi) We pledge ourselves to refrain from allowing the Courts and police to make discriminations in their handling of affairs on the basis of social position, Court rank, or official rank.
- (vii) We pledge ourselves to reform the Registration Law.

(Hayashida, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol.1, p.267)

Appendix X.

Aikoku-kōtō Manifesto, 5 May 1890.

On this 5th day of May 1890, having met in Tokyo and formally established the Aikoku-kōtō, we make the following declaration:-

Our party made its first appearance in 1873. At that time, we solemnly swore that we would protect the rights which Heaven has given to all men, and would make the nation free and absolutely independent. Our party was the first to speak the name of Liberty to the Empire, and the idea of making this a principle of national policy was born in those days. Even though many changes have taken place since then and circumstances are different, we have always remained true to our belief in Liberty. So we have now given this party the old name. Its principles continue to be the same.

Liberalism is a fundamental principle of government. There is nothing under Heaven that does not have a fundamental principle. How can it be that government alone lacks a fundamental principle? We desire to inaugurate the best possible type of rule by seeking for fundamental principles and making clear our primary allegiances. Government must be suited to the times, and it is not possible to put all one's fundamental principles into operation at once. Nevertheless, we consider that a political party which, neglecting fundamental principles and subverting its primary allegiances, wants only to govern in accordance with the exigencies of the existing situation, will usually be mistaken in its policies. This is why a political party has need of principles.

A country is made up of its people. As each is dear to himself, it must be that everyone loves our country; and to love that is to have a wide and generous love of humanity. Ah, if all the gentlemen in our party understand that to sacrifice themselves eagerly for their country, with the principles of Liberalism on their lips, is more important than any one individual in the country, then, by extending self-love to the entire country, we shall secure the happiness of the people as a whole. This is what Liberalism really is.

Liberty is bestowed upon us all by Heaven. Our party

will never suppress this truth, and will never follow the precedent of governing by half-measures. The security of the state really lies in making the people free. To pretend that Liberty is dangerous and to deprive the people of their rights is to transgress the universal law of Heaven. Our party's assiduous demand for party Cabinets means that we wish to invest the Prime Minister with the responsibility for the general policies of state, and that we wish to raise the Imperial Household to the lofty peaks of tranquillity, as a result of not allowing this responsibility to devolve upon the monarch. Looking carefully at the state of affairs in the outside world, what really happens to monarchs who have both absolutist parties and Liberal parties? Liberalism is the true support of reigning dynasties. Not only will it enhance the dignity of the Imperial Household above, and improve the welfare of the people below; but also, look where you will, you shall not find outside the Liberal principles of our party the means of protecting the independence of our country and of securing the public peace.

Our party, on this the occasion of its founding, is anxious to attain to these objectives by relying on these its principles. Generally speaking, what a political party needs to do is:- firstly, to establish fixed principles; secondly, to work for the general welfare of the country; and thirdly, to accept the restraints of public opinion. If it fails in any of these respects, it is therefore crippled as a political party. A political party takes its stand on the principles of Liberalism and wishes to join forces with others and so grow into a very large organization. The reason why England has so much success with party Cabinets is that her parties are very large. The reason why Germany still does not have party Cabinets is her great number of small parties. If a Cabinet does not have the support of a large party behind it, it cannot take up a firm position and it cannot carry out its own policies.

As our party is one of established principle, it has to have fixed policies based on those principles. Nevertheless, the actual execution of these policies will be based upon consideration of the circumstances, and our plan provides for this throughout. Moreover, we have no wish to settle with a stroke of the pen weighty matters, the consequences of which will affect the state for a hundred years. Nor do we wish to issue documents of no real worth. However, looking

back over a good many years of experience both in speech and in action, we have found it possible to summarize the fruits of this experience in the form of a public statement consisting of a number of separate clauses and articles. This is:-

1. We shall reduce Government intervention to the minimum.

The business of Government is to further the people's rights and to compel them to discharge their obligations. Moreover, for the good of the general public, the Government must also play some part in the management of education, communications, agriculture, trade and so on. Nevertheless, desiring as we do to govern in accordance with the principles of Liberalism, our party will reduce intervention to the minimum.

2. In internal affairs, we shall avoid the centralization of power and shall emphasize the separate rights of the provinces.

The institutions of the various countries differ in accordance with their general conditions. In the feudal era, our country went too far in the direction of regional particularism and had an administration which was seriously weakened by decentralization. The system of every little corner of territory maintaining its own independence was abolished at the time of the Imperial restoration; but there was an unexpected tendency for the central Government to enlarge its powers and the provinces gradually grew weaker. Our party is determined to introduce a fair system of local self-government, and to bring about a proper and reasonable division of power.

3. In external affairs, we shall maintain relations of equality with every country.

Diplomacy should concern itself with nothing else but the freedom and independence of our country.

Our party will never take it upon itself to flatter the powerful nations while despising the weak, to be of service to the great while oppressing the small, to incur the dislike of one country in the hope of currying favour with another, to break faith, to show partiality, and to indulge in actions that do not of themselves provide their own clear justification. In such matters as those of the treaties and trade, so long as the other parties involved fully and fairly discharge their obligations towards us, we for our part will acknowledge their rights. In this way, we shall mutually protect each other's equal rights. This, indeed, is a basic objective of our party.

4. In military preparations, we shall lay stress on defence.

Since our main purpose in undertaking military preparations will be the defence of our independence against foreign Powers, we must make sure that we shall meet this commitment in full. Yet our party has no intention of defraying enormous sums regardless of the resources of the state, or of adopting a policy of aggression to the detriment of the state. If our country is put to shame and there is no help for it, we shall have to try and avenge this so far as our military strength will allow. But our basic objective shall be the legitimate defence of our national rights.

5. In financial administration, we shall make retrenchment our objective and shall make expenditure correspond to the resources of the people.

Administration of the finances is the thing which most closely touches the life and welfare of the people, or so we think, and it is necessary when managing this to reform all sorts of tax laws, to make the people's burden as light as possible, and to treat all tax-payers with strict impartiality. Moreover, though we shall, of course, meet all essential expenditures of the state, our party will

not needlessly expand the structure of government without regard for the resources of the people. Our party intends to make large reductions in expenditure, and to nourish the strength of the nation.

Our party is anxious to legislate on the basis of the above principles and to bring about a reform of government. The reforms for which our party will surely strive are so numerous that it is scarcely possible to list them all at this stage. But the officials and people of our country are still unaccustomed to parliamentary government; and besides this, the people have not yet completed their exploration of the actual workings of government. In dealing with matters of vital importance to the state, then, the utmost care and accuracy is required both in framing a single parliamentary bill and in subjecting it to several months of painstaking examination. If we try to reform everything at once, there is a danger that our labours will miscarry. Even though we hope to carry out all sorts of reforms, it is not possible to rush our investigations. Consequently, if we are to make thorough investigations, a long time will have elapsed before they are completed and we can table legislation. Only in the case of the most urgent matters shall we table bills; and what is more, as soon as the elections to the Diet are over, we shall announce the results of our investigations, and shall submit them for consideration and debate. Though there will doubtless be additions or eliminations made to this list, the items for discussion that our party wishes to have adopted first are, in general, as follows:-

1. Reduction in the land-tax.
2. Reduction in government expenditure.
3. Reform of the tax laws.
4. Amendment of the Newspaper, Assembly, and Publications Regulations.
5. Abolition of the Peace Preservation Ordinance.
6. Improvement of the police system.

7. Improvement of the prison system.
8. Discontinuation of special protection for private industry.

In the above legislative programme, the reform of the tax laws and related matters are the most urgent pieces of business. Speaking of the existing system, though it is not hard to see what is wrong with it, as we still have not completed all our investigations, we shall decide about this at a later date. The prison regulations are drawn up in the form of an Imperial ordinance; but we shall try to make them matters of law and so be in a position of being able to amend them. The three sets of Regulations [i.e., Newspaper, Assembly, and Publications] are the things we consider to be the most inconvenient when it comes to putting representative institutions into practice and elevating public opinion. Again, the excessive secrecy of the police system has its abuses, and we shall reform it. By making easiness and simplicity our standards, it should be possible to reduce administrative costs.

Furthermore, reduction of the land-tax is an objective long entertained by our party, and is nothing more than what was discussed by its members in every region, when the Petition On Three Serious Matters was published some time ago. Although we do not claim that there are no other taxes which can be reduced, the land-tax amounts to almost one half of the total revenues of the Government. The land-tax for the most part is a tax on agriculture, and the taxes on agriculture are disproportionately heavy when compared with those levied on other activities. As for the great dependence on agricultural taxes, in feudal days, it was easy to use them as the basis of finance and so this sort of unfairness came to be perpetrated. Now, it is not the same as it was in days gone by; similarly, it is impossible to hold that tax laws which place unequal burdens on the citizens of a constitutional state are just. Though a cut in the land-tax will reduce the amount of money coming into the national treasury, one way of making up for this is to curtail administrative expenditures. As for curtailing administrative expenditures, we shall secure a severe retrenchment either by reducing the number of officials or else by re-organizing the government departments.

Moreover, there are other ways of making up for the deficit. Things like giving special protection to private trade and industry account for a great deal of the public expenditures; moreover, they are wrong in principle. In the case of such things as sea traffic or railways which concern the public interest, the grant of subsidies by the Government is wholly for the public good. The giving of special subsidies to private trade and industry is nothing more nor less than a misuse of public funds. As a result of this, industry is turned into the exclusive monopoly of a few, with whom it is impossible for the majority of industrialists to compete. Thus, the development of independent businesses is gravely hampered.

The things which our party, basing itself on the doctrines of Liberalism, would seek to reform when in power are by no means limited to these. The above are really the most urgent of urgent matters. We have decided to table bills on them in this year's House, and hope that they will win a wide measure of support.

Nevertheless, when one looks carefully at these [items], one can see that our party, with a truly heroic restraint and after checking the aspirations of many years, has taken up only these urgent problems. Though we wish for reforms in these matters, we fully realize how very difficult it will be. Why? It is a question of interpreting the constitution. Now, in all constitutional countries, parliament has the right to discuss financial policies. If a parliament does not have this right, it is without any real authority. Moreover, the right of discussing financial policies belongs first and foremost to the popular Chamber. Accordingly, by the terms of our country's constitution, the budget has to be introduced first into the lower House. Further, it is laid down that the revenues and expenditures of the state must receive every year the approval of the Imperial Diet in the form of a budget. Our party, as a matter of constitutional government and as a matter of interpretation of the constitution, believes that the House of Representatives possesses the right to discuss financial policies. However, if some explanations of the words 'previously fixed expenditures' etc. are to prevail, the Diet will scarcely have any right to deliberate on financial policies.

On the eve of standing for the Diet, we desire to affirm

that we shall strive to attain to these objectives by fair and lawful means. The principles, objectives, and programme of our party are of this nature. Our party will defend itself by means of these. It shall move forward by means of these. Expecting those hardships, it hopes to carry out these things. Our party has firm faith in itself. The day when we achieve these objectives shall be the day when the people are truly secured in their Heaven-given universal rights, and the day when they will be made free and completely independent. We assert the rights of the people and their Representatives; we stand for party Cabinets. To use the common phrase - we shall enhance the glory of the Imperial Household on high, and shall foster the prosperity of the nation below. We shall uphold the majesty of our Sovereign, and we shall establish the happiness of our country. If we succeed in putting into general effect the Liberal principles of our party, we shall for the first time stand inviolable on the same lofty peaks as the Western countries and shall be on terms of complete equality with them.

The great spirit of Liberty is a harmonious and auspicious one. Blowing like the soft winds of a vernal day, it shall make the officials and people as one, and, changing the absolutism of former times into a new rule of the constitution, it shall build a great and independent nation in the Orient. Ah, our land of the dragon-fly is an orphan isle! If we are ardent in our devotion to true Liberty, shall we not make our country's glory shine through the five continents?

Our party is steadfastly resolved on this, and will not fail to observe this declaration.

(Hayashida, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol.1, p.270)

Kokumin Jiyū-tō Manifesto, November 1890.

How can we preserve the independence of Japan and extend her influence, in this present age of intense rivalry among the different Powers? Of all political questions, there is none more important than this. Needless to say, we stand for progress. Needless to say, we esteem liberty. Yet, we believe in true progress and true liberty.

When establishing a nation in this world, one must foster its own special qualities abroad and perfect its unity at home. Progress which preserves special qualities is true progress. Liberty which goes with unity is true liberty. Not a day passes but we wish to accomplish this sort of liberty and plan for that progress. Men call the copying of foreign things progress, and the advocacy of personal rights liberty. This will destroy the special qualities of our nation, injure its unity, disrupt and endanger the true spirit of the people, and will eventually bring us to enslavement by other countries. How can that be progress and liberty?

Those who try to protect their political power by making selfish use of military force are public enemies of liberty. Those who want to capture political power by encouraging parties and factions are public enemies of liberty. We shall regard it as our duty under a constitutional system to check these public enemies. The union of Throne and people, and the thing that makes development possible, is what we call the nation. Political power should always be fully and firmly in the hands of the nation as a whole.

Anyone agreeing with these principles is one of us. We believe that all upright gentlemen in the Empire must agree with these principles. The competition of the Powers is indeed a danger to the Orient. Is not a danger to the Orient a danger to the Japanese nation? Those who do not really care for their country vainly bustle round inside its boundaries, boasting of its small reputation; they dare to make a plaything of the constitutional system even. We, for the sake of the future of the Japanese people, wish to pledge ourselves to the duty of stopping this. Our intentions are as herein stated.

Appendix XII.

Taisei-kai Declaration, 22 August 1890.

Briefly, our objectives are the prosperity of the state and the happiness of its people; and we hope to attain to these objectives by upholding righteousness and paying attention to public morality. We are not a Government party; neither are we an opposition party. Though we welcome progress, we shall not push forward too quickly. Though we value law and order, we shall not be blindly conservative. Thinking only of the good of the country and the welfare of the people, we shall confine ourselves to adopting policies that are both sound and honest and shall tread the great road of fairness and impartiality. At the present time, the reduction of the fiscal burden borne by the people is an important task; yet from the point of view of enlarging national rights, we cannot be parsimonious about national expenditures. We look forward to making the legal system as complete and as perfect as possible; but we have to take into account the condition of the country and the state of the people. Naturally, the introduction of responsible cabinets is an urgent matter; but we must see to it that the transfer of governmental power does not lead to bad feeling because of personal greed and ambition. The need for treaty revision is indisputable; yet it must be achieved in a manner creditable to ourselves, and we are against damaging the national interest through rash actions.

In short, statements of general principles are dependent on reality. What is that reality but practical problems? Therefore we have dispensed with a statement of general principles, and hope to bring about parliamentary government by making up our minds about practical problems one by one. This is why we have held this meeting.

(Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitō Shi, vol.I,
pp.298-9)

(日本政治年鑑、政黨史、帝國
議會史、明治政史等參照。)

衆議院議員當選者の人名を掲ぐれば即ち左の如し。

東京府					
第一區	楠本正隆	第二區	谷元道之	第三區	風間信吉
第四區	藤田茂吉	第五區	太田實	第六區	高梨哲四郎
第七區	大谷木備一郎	第八區	津田眞道	第九區	芳野世經
第十區	森時之助	第十一區	淺香克孝	第十二區	高木正年
京都府					
第一區	濱岡光哲	第二區	中村榮助	第三區	松野新九郎
第四區	伊藤熊夫	第五區	田中源太郎	同	石原半右衛門
第六區	神鞭知常				
大阪府					
第一區	栗谷品三	第二區	豐田文三郎	第三區	浮田桂造
第四區	中江篤介	同	佐々木政行	第五區	菊池侃三
第六區	俣野景孝	第七區	東尾平大郎	第八區	横山勝三郎
第九區	佐々木政又				

神奈川縣

第一區

島田三郎

第二區

山田泰造

第三區

石坂昌孝

第三區

瀬戸岡爲一郎

第四區

山田東次

第五區

中島信行

第六區

山口左七郎

兵庫縣

第一區

鹿島秀磨

第二區

堀善證

第三區

法貴發

第四區

石田貫之助

第五區

魚住逸治

第六區

高瀬藤次郎

第七區

内藤利八

第八區

坂野耕三

同

柴原政太郎

第九區

佐藤文兵衛

同

青木匡

第十區

佐野助作

長野縣

第一區

富永隼太

同

家永芳彦

第二區

朝長慎三

第三區

牧朴眞

第四區

立石寛司

第五區

宮崎榮治

第六區

相良正樹

新潟縣

第一區

山際七司

第二區

丹後直平

同

加藤勝彌

第三區

高岡忠郷

第四區

西瀉爲藏

第五區

小林雄七郎

同

長谷川泰

第六區

松村文次郎

第七區

關谷孫左衛門

同

本山健治

第八區

室孝太郎

同

鈴木昌司

第九區 鷗飼郁次郎

埼玉縣

第一區 天野三郎

第二區

高田早苗

同

清水宗徳

第三區 眞中忠直

同

野口 葵

第四區

堀越寛介

同 湯本義憲

第五區

山中隣之助

群馬縣

第一區 新井 毫

第二區

竹井懿貞

第三區

高津伸次郎

第四區 木暮武太夫

第五區

湯淺次郎

千葉縣

第一區 千葉禎太郎

第二區

濱野 昇

同

成島操一郎

第三區 大須賀 庸之助

第四區

西村 甚右衛門

第五區

板倉 中

第六區 板倉胤臣

第七區

重城 保

茨城縣

第一區 渡邊 治

同

松延 玳

第二區

立川 興

同 大津淳一郎

第三區

飯村丈三郎

第四區

森 隆介

第五區 色川 三郎兵衛

第六區

關口八兵衛

栃木縣

第一區 横堀三子

第二區

新井章吾

同

岩崎萬次郎

第三區		田中正造	第四區		鹽田奥造
第一區		奈良縣	第二區		堀内忠司
第三區		櫻井徳太郎	同		本間直
第一區		今村勤三	第二區		堀内忠司
第一區		三重縣	第二區		伊東祐賢
第四區		伊藤謙吉	第五區		尾崎行雄
第六區		立入奇一	同		北川矩一
愛知縣			第二區		永井松右衛門
第一區		堀部藤四郎	第五區		森東一郎
第四區		宮田慎一郎	第八區		早川龍介
第七區		端山忠左衛門	第十一區		美濃部貞亮
第十區		加藤六藏	第二區		影山秀樹
靜岡縣			第五區		西尾傳藏
第一區		井上彦左衛門	同		江原素六
第四區		岡田良一郎	第三區		岡山兼吉
第七區		依田佐二平	第六區		近藤準平
山梨縣			同		

第一區	八卷九萬	第二區	田邊有榮	第三區	古屋專藏
滋賀縣					
第一區	杉浦重剛	第二區	山崎友親	第三區	大東義徹
同	伊庭貞剛	第四區	相馬永胤		
第一區	岐阜縣				
第一區	天野若圓	第二區	清水榮藏	第三區	吉田耕平
第四區	矢野才治郎	第五區	長尾四郎右衛門	第六區	林 小一郎
第七區	中村信夫				
長野縣					
第一區	小坂善之助	第二區	島津忠貞	第三區	堀内賢郎
第四區	小里頼永	同	江橋 厚	第五區	箕輪 鼎
第六區	中村彌六	第七區	伊藤大八		
宮城縣					
第一區	増田繁幸	第二區	武者傳次郎	第三區	十文字信介
第四區	熱海孫十郎	第五區	遠藤 溫		
福島縣					
第一區	佐藤忠望	第二區	安部井盤根	第三區	河野廣中
同	鈴木萬次郎	第四區	山口千代作	同	三浦信六

第五區		白井遠平		
第一區		巖手縣	第二區	伊東圭介
第四區		谷河尙忠	第五區	大江卓
第一區		下飯坂權三郎		第三區
第三區		青森縣		佐藤昌藏
第一區		奈須川光賢	同	工藤行幹
第三區		菊池九郎		第二區
第一區		山形縣		榑喜洋芽
第三區		宮城浩藏	同	
第一區		駒林廣運	同	佐藤里治
第三區		秋田縣		第二區
第一區		大久保鐵作	同	五十嵐力助
第四區		齊藤勘七	同	丸山督
第一區		福井縣		第四區
第四區		青山庄兵衛	同	佐藤敏郎
第一區		藤田孫平	第二區	
第四區		石川縣		第三區
第一區		松田吉三郎	同	永田定右衛門
第一區		同	遠藤秀景	
第一區		同	第二區	相川久太郎

第三區	淺野順平	同	神野良	第四區	小間肅
第一區	關野善次郎	同	石坂專之助	第二區	田村惟昌
第三區	南磯一郎	第四區	島田孝之		
第一區	鳥取縣	第二區	山瀬幸人	第三區	松南宏雅
第一區	岡崎平内	第二區	佐々木善右衛門	第三區	高橋久次郎
第四區	菅了法	第五區	佐々田懋	第六區	吉岡倭文廣
第一區	岡崎運兵衛	第二區	坪田繁	第二區	西毅一
第三區	犬養毅	第四區	坂田丈平	第五區	渡邊磊三
第六區	立石岐	第七區	加藤平四郎		
第一區	豐田實穎	同	渡邊又三郎	第二區	八田謹二郎
第三區	金尾稜殿	第四區	赤川靈巖	第五區	脇榮太郎
第六區	田邊三五郎	第七區	佐竹義和	第八區	倉田準五郎
第九區	三浦義健				

山口縣			第一區	吉富簡一	同	末松三郎	第二區	井上正一
第三區			大岡育造	第四區	堀江芳介	同	野村恒造	
第五區			吉川務					
和歌山縣			第一區	陸奥宗光	同	和田譽終	第二區	兒玉仲兒
第三區			松本鼎	同	關直彦			
德島縣			第一區	井上高格	第二區	守野爲五郎	第三區	川眞田德三郎
第四區			橋本久太郎	第五區	阿部興人			
香川縣			第一區	中野武營	第二區	小西甚之助	第三區	綾井武夫
第四區			三崎龜之助	第五區	伊藤一郎			
愛媛縣			第一區	藤野政高	同	長屋忠明	第二區	石原信樹
第三區			有友正親	第四區	鈴木重遠	第五區	牧野純藏	
第六區			末廣重恭					
高知縣								

第一區	川越進	第二區	安田愉逸	第三區	三宅正意
第一區	佐々友房	同	前田案山子	第二區	木下助之
第三區	古莊嘉門	同	紫藤寛治	第四區	岡次郎太郎
第五區	山田武甫	第六區	松山守善		
第一區	宮崎縣				
第一區	松田正久	同	武富時敏	第二區	天野爲之
第三區	二位景暢				
第一區	熊本縣				
第一區	元田肇	第二區	箕浦勝人	第三區	朝倉親爲
第四區	宇佐美春三郎	第五區	安東九華	第六區	是恒貞楫
第一區	佐賀縣				
第一區	大分縣				
第六區	岡田孤鹿	第七區	堤猷久	第八區	末松謙澄
第三區	榎藤貫一	第四區	佐々木正藏	第五區	十時一郎
第一區	津田守彦	第二區	小野隆助	同	香月恕經
第一區	福岡縣				
第三區	植木枝盛	第二區	片岡健吉	同	林有造
第一區	竹內綱				

鹿兒島縣

第一區

樺山資美

第四區

宇都宮平一

第七區

基俊良

第二區

折田兼至

第五區

河島醇

第三區

長谷場純孝

第六區

蒲生仙

Appendix XIV.

List of Unverified Personal Names Appearing in Main
Body of the Text, Other Than Names of Representatives
Elected in July 1890.

Amashiro.....	天 白
Ebaro Senzō.....	江 原 專 藏
Endō Haruhiko.....	遠 藤 春 彦
Fukui Mohei.....	福 井 茂 兵 衛
Hatoyama Kazuo.....	鳩 山 和 夫
Hikota.....	彦 太
Hirabayashi Kyūbei.....	平 林 九 兵 衛
Hiranuma Senzō.....	平 沼 專 藏
Hirose.....	広 瀬
Kimura.....	木 村
Kimura Hampei.....	木 村 半 兵 衛
Kobayashi Kanichiro.....	小 林 乾 一 郎
Koimai.....	小 今 井
Kudama Tokutaro.....	管 間 德 太 郎
Kurusu Sohei.....	来 栖 惣 兵 衛
Matsuo Seijiro.....	松 尾 清 次 郎
Mizushima Yasutaro.....	水 島 保 太 郎
Noguchi Honnosuke.....	野 口 本 之 助
Satō Kiemon.....	佐 藤 喜 右 衛 門
Shiga Horissei.....	志 賀 法 立 正
Shigeno Tamaki.....	繁 野 珠 城

Suzuki Inenosuke.....	鈴木 稻 之 助
Takada Kiyonobu.....	高 田 清 信
Tanaka Tokitaro.....	田 中 時 太 郎
Totsuka Sentaro.....	戸 塚 千 太 郎
Tsugawa Migiyumi.....	津 川 右 弓
Udagawa Sonzō.....	宇 田 川 孫 藏

Appendix XV.

Selective Bibliography.A. PRIMARY SOURCES.

1. Newspapers: The greater part of the material used in this thesis has been taken from newspapers and magazines made available to me at the Meiji Newspaper and Magazine Archives (Meiji Shimbun Zasshi Bunkō) in Tokyo University. These files were as follows:-

- a. Metropolitan Press: Kampō (Official Gazette); Kokumin-no Tomo (magazine); Kokumin Shimbun; Nippon Shimbun; Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun; Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun.
- b. Provincial Papers: Kinjō Shimbun; Kōchi Shimbun (alias Toyō Shimbun); Niigata Shimbun; Osaka Mainichi; Sanyō Shimbun; Tōhoku Mainichi; Toyō Shimbun (alias Kōchi Shimbun).

Note: The usefulness as well as the political outlook of the above varied to quite a marked extent. For example, the Osaka Mainichi was disappointingly deficient in electoral news and comment. On the other hand, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi proved a veritable mine of information, and gave by far the best overall reporting on the election. Since it often happened that the same item would be reported in the same words in all three major Tokyo papers (Kokumin, Tokyo Nichi Nichi, and Yūbin-Hōchi); I have, for the sake of consistency, referred to the Tokyo Nichi Nichi whenever possible. Some of the articles on the election will be found in volume 7 of Nakayama Yasumasa's Shimbun Shūsei Meiji Hennen Shi (A Chronological Meiji History Compiled From Newspapers), Tokyo, 1935.

2. Suematsu Kenchō, Ni-ju-san Nen-no Sō-Senkyō, in volume 3 of Meiji Bunka Zenshū, pp. 200-221. (Comment authoritative; statistics invaluable.)
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4. Itō Hirobumi, Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, trans. by Itō Myōji, Tokyo, 1906.
5. McLaren, W.W., Japanese Government Documents, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. 42, May 1914, Tokyo.
6. Ōkubo Kagao, Shūgi-in Giin Kōhosha Retsuden (Biographies of Candidates for the House of Representatives), Tokyo, 1890.
7. Ōtsu Junichiro, Dai Nihon Kensei Shi, vol.3, Tokyo, 1927.

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PRECIS

INTRODUCTION: Meiji Constitution - process leading to promulgation of constitution was one of interaction between bureaucrats and their opponents - rise of the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement - early political parties - Government's policy of gradualism - Western influence - traditional background.

CHAPTER ONE: Organization and Administration.

Distribution of seats - franchise qualifications - size of electorate in each constituency - qualifications for candidates - election officers - electoral rolls - polling stations and supervision of voting - ballot boxes - voting procedure - counting of votes and declaration of poll meetings - criticisms of Law of Election - police activities in checking breaches of the law and safeguarding the voting - general success of administrative arrangements.

CHAPTER TWO: Parties, Principles, and Issues.

Daidō Danketsu - development of three Liberal factions - collapse of Daidō Danketsu symptomatic of basic weaknesses of Liberal movement - Liberal election manifestos - Itagaki's campaign speeches in Ibaraki Prefecture - Okamoto Takeo's speech in Mie Prefecture - Matsuo Seiji's speech in Tokyo fu - Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties - Kōin Club - union of anti-Government forces desirable but difficult - policies of the Liberals better than their organization - Kaishin-tō comparatively stable because of the nature of its membership - careers of Shimada Saburo and Ozaki Yukio - differences between the Liberals and Progressives not very serious - Kaishin-tō policies as revealed in the editorials of the Yūbin-Hōchi Shimbun - Conservative forces badly divided and generally weak - distinction between conservatism and reaction - Inoue Kaoru's attempt to found a moderate conservative group - career of Tani Kanjō and his attitude towards the election - career and outlook of Torio Koyata - Torio's attempt to intervene in the election by starting a political party - nature of the Ultra-Conservatism of 1890 - Independent candidates very numerous - reasons for this state of affairs - Liberal and Ultra-Conservative groups of 1890 descended from the Imperialist and anti-foreign agitation of Bakumatsu period - growing power of the socially conservative landlord bloc in the Liberal movement - latent strength of Ultra-Conservative attitudes - medial role of bureaucracy - industrialization - importance of the Progressive Party in the future development of the representative system.

CHAPTER THREE:

The Election Campaign - General Survey.

Ratio of candidates to seats - types of candidates - methods of nomination - importance of localism and personality in places where groups of voters selected candidates - speech meetings and parties - entertainment of voters as major feature of some campaigns - legitimate canvassing - rumours and tricks - newspapers and the soliciting of votes - majority of campaigns run on a basis of local affinities and personal endeavour - corruption widespread but not very efficacious - use of violence and links between politics and the underworld - intimidation not often successful.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Election Results and Composition of the First House of Representatives.

Election itself was orderly - results of voting - amalgamation of Liberal factions - breakdown of negotiations for a union of Liberals and Progressives - party strengths on the eve of the opening of the Diet - social background, age, and financial status of average Member - occupations of Members - rural landlord-entrepreneur interest well represented in the new House - many Members had previously sat in the local assemblies.

CONCLUSIONS:

Meiji constitutional process seen as one of interaction - first general election discussed in terms of this theory of interaction - dynamics of interaction - strength of localism and individualism apparent from history of first general election - Meiji interaction stemmed from Tokugawa pluralism - mid-meiji society as shown in newspaper accounts of the election.