CHUAVE POLITICS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF LEADERSHIP IN THE NEW GUINEA HIGHLANDS

Wayne Warry

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University

April 1983
Except where otherwise acknowledged in the text, this thesis represents my original research.

Wayne Richard Warry
For Dorothy and Bill -
all four of them
I am indebted to the Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, for the generous financial support that made my fieldwork and doctoral study possible. I thank the members of the Anthropology Department for the warmth, hospitality and friendship they extended to me during my stays in Canberra.

I owe a special debt to my supervisors. Roger Keesing gave graciously of his valuable time in order to read and criticize my thesis draft. Michael Young's abiding interest in my work was both personally and professionally rewarding. As both a friend and supervisor he contributed immeasurably to my thesis, and more important, gave me confidence in myself. My principal supervisor, Marie Reay, was instrumental in the selection of Chuave as my field location and became my harshest critic. I wish to thank her for her personal concern with my work while I was in Chuave and Canberra and for forcing me to demand more of myself than I sometimes thought was necessary.

Nerida Cook, Simon Harrison, Martha McIntyre, Yadran Mimica, Ananda Rajah, Bruce Rogers and Jimmy Weiner provided friendship, emotional support and encouragement of my work. Among these friends I must single out and especially thank Jimmy Weiner for reading and criticizing my thesis draft and for tolerating as well as alleviating my despondent moods.

I am grateful also to Paula Brown, Robin Hide and Lorraine Sexton for sharing with me their knowledge of cultures that have much in common with Chuave and to Bill Standish for fruitful hours of discussion concerning Simbu politics and politicians. While in Chuave my research was greatly aided by correspondence with Richard Salisbury. Specifically, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Salisbury for assistance in providing me with detailed information concerning Siane leadership and socio-political organization while I was in Chuave.

In Papua New Guinea I would like to thank the Simbu Interim Provincial Government, in particular, Mr. Siwi Kurondo, Mr. Barunke Kaman, and Mr. David Mai, for permitting me to study in Chuave when there were serious doubts that an inquiring student of anthropology was the last thing the province needed or desired. In Chuave, I am beholden to the big and small men who both talk and play politics for their assistance in my research. Specifically, I would like to thank the members of Elimbari Local Government Council and Duma No. 1 Village Court. I cannot adequately express nor repay the debt I owe to my many friends in Keu village and Duma tribe - I took much more than I gave. But I must acknowledge the constant care and companionship given to me by Dege, Martin and Tabia as well as by their wives, Ruth, Baa and Sabina. They, more than any others, made my stay in Chuave a memorable and immensely pleasurable experience.

Finally, I must say that the four years I took to research and write this thesis have been truly shared with only one person. To Leeanne Greenwood, my wife, co-fieldworker and editor I express my love and devotion. Thank you for going there, for giving up what you did, and for helping me see it through to completion.
ABSTRACT

In this study of contemporary politics and political change in Chuave, Simbu province, Papua New Guinea, I document how the nature of local level leadership has changed since Europeans first entered the area in 1933 and examine how current big men co-operate and compete in everyday political affairs within and beyond their own clan or village.

To a great extent my analysis focuses on the effects of superimposing a state organization on a traditional political system lacking formal leadership offices and representative institutions. The introduction of administrative officials, local government councils and, more recently, village courts has forced people to alter their conception of political authority and has provided big men with new opportunities to achieve influence in political arenas incorporating former enemy groups. Government elections are highly competitive affairs which highlight rivalries between individual big men and traditional socio-political groups. I show how people's perceptions of government institutions and officials are coloured by their allegiance to particular political groups and describe the problems leaders confront when attempting to fulfill the duties of elected offices.

Contemporary politics is in no a way confined to state derived political processes. Christian missions have well established systems of village leadership. Big men also achieve prominence by manipulating wealth in ceremonial exchanges that include both traditional and modern valuables. Furthermore, men now gain recognition as entrepreneurs within the western sector of the Chuave economy. In short, the ways in which a man obtains recognition as a leader are extremely diverse. Traditional-style big men compete with church leaders, store owners or government officials. Chuave women have remained peripheral to mainstream political affairs. But they have created a separate organization that allows them to achieve public recognition and political power at the local level.

My thesis, then, traces the development of new institutions and organizations that have arisen since contact. At the same time I detail the persistence of traditional beliefs and behaviours that continue to influence current political action. In doing so I analyse how both men and women emerge as leaders within a framework of traditional socio-political groups and state political arenas.
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements iv
Abstract v

Chapter One  INTRODUCTION 1
Notes 12

Chapter Two  SOCIAL GROUPS AND POLITICAL ARENAS 13
The Chuave culture area 14
Pan-regionalism 18
Phratry, tribe, and eria 20
Subtribe and ward 26
Village and community 29
The clan 33
Men's house groups 38
'Half-doors' and subclan composition 42
The posts: lineage composition 47
Summary 50
Notes 52

Chapter Three  DESPOTISM AND DEMOCRACY 55
Pre-contact politics: a reconstruction 55
The case for despotism 63
Village officials: post-contact despotism 69
Mission leaders 76
Democracy: local government councillors 82
Despotism and democracy 95
Notes 97

Chapter Four  BISWIS BEFORE POLITICS 99
Economic change: 1933-1980 100
Entrepreneurs: wealth and social differentiation 107
Big men and exchange 119
Bisnis before politics 138
Notes 145

Chapter Five  KAFAINA: FEMALE WEALTH AND POWER 147
Male-female relations 148
Something hidden: female power in Chuave 151
The origins of Kafaina 156
Kafaina organization 162
Inter-group ceremonies 170
Kafaina: female wealth and power in Chuave 176
Notes 183

Chapter Six  LAW, POLITICS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 185
The selection of court officials 186
The village court 193
Dispute processing 198
The spirit and the letter of the law: abuses of power 214
Law, politics and the balance of power 225
Notes 229
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago an expedition led by M.J. Leahy, explorer and gold prospector, crossed the Mount Elimbari ridge - a massive limestone formation that marks the boundary between the Siane and Chuave culture areas. Leahy's patrol passed through territory belonging to the Duma tribe before making camp for the night. A few Duma men from Kaupagam clan travelled the short distance to the Leahy camp where they saw pigs traded for pearl shells, far superior in quality to their own. They watched Leahy's carriers effortlessly chop firewood with axes of 'strong stone' (that is, steel). The following day, after the light skinned men had broken camp, Kaupagam men gathered shavings from the firewood. They took them to their village, bundled them together in pandanus leaves, and hung them from the rafters above one of two fires that perpetually burned in the men's house. Later they used the shavings to rub their own stone axes so that their blades, too, would be strong.

Today Kaupagam men laugh with glee when they hear any of the several versions of that story. They laugh at their own ignorance and gullibility before the white man and gavmen (government) arrived, before they came to know the Law - and the word of God. Men delight in showing their battle scars from wars fought prior to pacification, while stressing that pre-contact life was harsh and, according to many, evil. In a world where Toyota trucks carry people to coastal towns hundreds of kilometres away, and where young educated men debate the merits of United States presidential candidates, the past seems distant, clouded and elusive.

In this society, living with Kaupagam clan, I began 22 months of fieldwork in July 1979. Dr. Marie Reay initially suggested Chuave as a field location for my study of contemporary local level politics and I agreed wholeheartedly with her choice. Chuave had not yet been the subject of anthropological research, though there were excellent ethnographic and other research material available for neighbouring areas in Simbu province. The Chuave area had undergone prolonged economic and political change and was beset by problems of law and order which are inextricably mixed with politics in the New Guinea highlands. Thus, the area seemed ideal for my study of modern political
institutions and processes. In Chuave, Pidgin is the language of politics, being commonly used in local government council meetings and village courts. With rare exceptions, all men below the age of 45 and women below the age of 40 are fluent in Pidgin. Moreover, any man who strives to be a government official is expected to be extremely proficient in this lingua franca. I therefore conducted my fieldwork in this language, while eliciting vernacular categories and expressions for a wide range of topics.

An incident that occurred very early in my fieldwork illustrates a few of the difficulties I confronted while studying political change. The death and burial of an aged sorcerer-magician had just occurred and, reminiscing about his life, several old men came to wax poetic about former times. Seated in the men's house, my eyes watering from the smoke, I inquired about past mortuary practices; but my questions produced very discrepant answers. Men could not agree on whether the corpse of a big man\(^2\) was treated differently from those of lesser men, on precisely how people were buried, or on whether graves were marked or unmarked. One old man even refused to discuss the topic, saying that the remote past was 'Satan's time', and that missions had taught them the correct way to bury their dead. Finally, Maki, a close age-mate of the deceased, responded. In solemn tones befitting the occasion, he explained that men buried a portion of the deceased's valuables - shell pieces and stone axes - with the corpse. They then killed, cooked and distributed his pigs to maternal and affinal kinsmen. When the deceased was a big man, Maki added, the mortuary feast would be very large; on such occasions, they killed many pigs and piled beer high in the men's house! Amidst much laughter at the mention of beer, all present agreed that the substance of Maki's account was true.

Such anachronisms, common in Chuave, are always the source of great amusement. Folktales, for example, sometimes contain references to cash or speak of the 'land of the dead' as heaven - a place where sheet metal roofs and vehicles abound. Anachronisms, however, are often symptomatic of a deeper problem the analyst must face: not only do people inadvertently inject the past with the present, but they also alter or interpret the past to suit present needs.
It is questionable, for instance, how unintended was Maki's reference to beer. Because beer has become an important social gift, it is not only appropriate but also, according to Maki and others, essential to make lavish gifts of beer to celebrate a big man's death. But on this occasion the deceased's son, Bobiange, was a fervent follower of a fundamentalist mission that prohibited beer at mortuary feasts and discouraged displays of grief. Therefore, Maki's reference to beer, however accidental, also reminded listeners of the differences he had with Bobiange, and of the tension existing between the two village factions they represented.

This particular episode presented no major difficulties for my study. But it was not always easy for me to ascertain whether or not men were manipulating the past; that is, whether or not informants' statements constituted historical fact or fiction. Current big men, for instance, sometimes bemoaned their lack of authority by speaking of past leaders as very powerful if not omnipotent. But others argued that it was only present-day leaders who were truly powerful and who so quickly resorted to the threat or use of punishment to ensure orders were obeyed. Likewise, accounts of past wars or pre-contact settlements varied greatly. In short, past events, past political victories and group histories were inexorably tied to present-day political contests between groups and rival big men.

The terms 'traditional' or 'traditional culture' are no longer fashionable in some academic circles. This is simply because an awareness of change as a fundamental fact of life has made researchers wary of implying that any society, at any point in time, is static or unchanging. For example, it is undoubtedly true that, in the highlands, innovations in military tactics, modifications in ritual and exchange, or adaptations in group structure were part of the ebb and flow of pre-contact life. But given what I have already said, it is not surprising that I was unable to document these types of change to my satisfaction. Thus, I could not always determine whether, for instance, differences in informants' accounts of a now defunct ritual were indications that multiple changes had occurred, were the result of variation in behaviour, were the product of faulty recall, or were due to selective altering of the past to suit current situations.
The analyst must establish some baseline even to begin speaking about change. In Chuave, the best-remembered temporal demarcation point is Leahy's 1933 patrol - an event which people themselves use to distinguish between the 'ancestors' time' and events occurring 'after the white man came up'. But problems still arise because men often confuse many early patrols - even those occurring as late as 1940 - with their first contact with whites. Nonetheless, I use 1933 as the baseline for my study of change. I use 'traditional culture', therefore, for people's condensed version of pre-contact life; that is, for the consensus I found in informants' statements about their culture as it existed prior to the somewhat problematic date of 1933.

Difficulties in reconstructing the past are not, of course, always insurmountable. By relying on a wide range of informants, both within and beyond Kaupagam clan, as well as verifying statements by asking people to repeat their accounts on several different occasions, I believe I was able to formulate a reasonably accurate picture of traditional and early post-contact society. Wherever differences in informants' statements about traditional life have a bearing on the degree or type of change occurring since 1933, I have noted them and tried to resolve the discrepancies. What I am describing, however, is a model of traditional society that contains many gaps, and is based on a pre-literate people's impoverished and occasionally distorted perceptions of the past.

If present needs or ambitions often colour views of the past, it is also true that the past leaves its mark on the present. I have recourse in my study to analyse current behaviours, symbolic forms, and political processes which, in bold terms, show continuity with traditional Chuave culture. For example, during feasts leaders often force-fed beer to men who were quarrelling. After inquiring about the reason for this, I was told that traditionally big men pacified men by forcing them to eat pork fat - an act that people say 'calms a man's stomach'. Although the modern method of social control is perhaps more dangerous - encouraging intoxication sometimes creates further disturbances - this behaviour is a simple example of continuity in change. A modern valuable has been substituted for a traditional one without affecting the raison d'être for the act.
Change, however, is rarely so cosmetic or so simply understood. As I show in chapter four, the use of beer in ceremonial exchange has entailed fine adjustments in patterns of distribution which have implications for how men manipulate wealth to enhance their reputations or obtain political influence. Moreover, the use of beer or other consumer goods in political contests is a mere fragment of the study of political and economic change. More generally, I had to try to understand how the shift to a cash economy, or changes in patterns of production, influenced the nature of leadership, or conversely, how political competition has accelerated or restricted the pace of economic change.

Both continuity and change in Chuave politics, I believe, are best understood as the product of a clash between two political systems. Prior to contact, for example, the limits of the polity were small clan-villages. After contact these small-scale political units were subsumed under the umbrella of a larger, dominant political system represented by the Australian colonial administration. My thesis, therefore, concerns what Bailey has called the process of encapsulation (1969: 146-148). At the most general level, I am concerned with demonstrating how Chuave people reacted or adapted to changes imposed from outside their political environment by the encapsulating system. Thus, I show how the imposition of administrative officials, elections and local government councils transformed local political processes. The year 1975 brought independence to Papua New Guinea and, consequently, a transformation of the encapsulating system. Yet, the imposition of political institutions and policies has continued; witness the introduction of village courts and provincial government. I regard the encapsulating system, therefore, as the dependent variable in my study of change: as the source of the major and most dramatic political transformations that have occurred in Chuave (ibid.). This too, corresponds to people's perceptions. They are apt to underestimate the importance of local innovations, and instead, see themselves as simply having responded to changes that external agencies have forced upon them, often without prior consultation with local leaders.

This is not to imply that local populations are totally passive; indeed, continuity in change is often a matter of their resistance to
outside pressures. Nor do I mean to suggest that change is uni-directional or that the two political systems exist independently of each other. The very idea of encapsulation means that it is often difficult to disentangle one political system from another. Thus, a leader may simultaneously be a big man in a rural village and a politician in Port Moresby. His experience in either political arena necessarily influences his behaviour, colouring political processes at both the national and local level. Administrative policies are also modified to meet local conditions and, ultimately, local pressures can force the structure of the encapsulating system to change.

This raises questions concerning the limits of my study. Because my view of politics is village-based, I am content to treat the encapsulating system as homogenous and to a certain extent unchanging. I am more concerned with how people perceive higher government than with policy-making decisions made within these institutions, and more concerned with a leader's use of consumer goods than with the fact that the tax on these goods provides revenue for provincial or national government. Because people are at once members of small-scale political units - each encapsulated in larger more inclusive ones - my study of politics is necessarily situational. Consequently, I take pains to provide a frame of reference for each political situation I analyse, be it a feast affecting only the political goals of a single men's house group or an election concerning an entire census division.

It should be clear by now that the scope of my thesis is broad. My definition of politics is itself open-ended: politics includes all those actions and relationships concerned with the determination and implementation of public goals and the differential distribution of power and authority within this (situational) public. This definition is cognate with Swartz's (1968: 1), and similar to that of at least one highlands' ethnographer (Reay 1964: 240). Power I define in the simplest way: the ability to determine a person's actions; in short, to make him do what you want him to do. A power balance or imbalance, then, is to be found in any dyadic relationship. Where people recognize a leader's power as legitimate, he has the authority to act (on behalf of others). Legitimacy and, therefore, authority are determined by the values of a particular group of followers and sometimes by the society at large. Power and authority need not, of course, be coterminous.
For example, at a feast men may accord a representative a degree of authority to speak on behalf of a particular group on the basis of his age or kinship rank. Yet, in other situations, this man may not exercise any power over a specific following.

In order to understand how people achieve their goals, it is necessary first to understand the processes by which individuals assume positions of power and authority. These processes are competitive. Politics then, focusses on competition for power and authority and on the resources necessary to obtain them. In Chuave both material and non-material resources are important: one leader's power may rely on the control of cash or pigs; another's influence may rest on less tangible bases - oratorical skill, knowledge of the Bible, or physical strength. The ultimate test of power in any relationship, in fact, is a person's willingness to resort to the use or threat of physical force or coercion.

From the wide range of political behaviour available to actors, men repeatedly select certain options that have proved effective over time. In short, political behaviour becomes patterned. Occasionally such patterns are codified or institutionalized, as in the ranking of various government offices. I use the term 'political system' to refer to this patterning of political behaviour. When the resources used by people or the values that they hold change, so too does the political system change. The political system, therefore, is very fluid. It is frozen only by the analyst in an attempt to generalize about behaviour over time. Moreover, political competition itself often generates change: new ideologies or resources become accepted because they prove valuable as a means of defeating rivals in particular political contests.

My approach to politics is aligned with what has been called 'processual analysis' or 'action theory' (Swartz et al 1966; Vincent 1978). The interaction of leaders and their followers is the central focus of my study. Following Van Velsen (1967) I find it particularly useful to describe case studies of events involving a small number of primary actors. Thus, I return repeatedly to the observation of a small number of leaders from the local community in which I resided, and follow their actions and people's judgement of their political
performances as they strive for recognition in several political arenas. In other words, I use observed interaction occurring in a small community to illustrate political processes that recur throughout the entire Chuave area.

Because competition is central to my study, a note concerning the diplomatic style of Chuave politics is necessary. Strict rules of political etiquette apply. Although leaders may silence followers or any younger person, they listen politely and at great length to older men and to their rivals. Though open confrontation between rival big men occurs, it is rarely sought. Thus, where leaders meet and take opposed stands on an issue, they carefully acknowledge the merits of their opponents' position and avoid any open show of hostility.

The moral concept underlying this behaviour is shame (gai). Generally, this includes feelings such as guilt or embarrassment that result from the breaking of any number of normative rules or from failing to meet social obligations. In this way it is similar to the Hagen concept, pipil, and as Andrew Strathern notes, it 'relates to an individual's reactions to his community relationships' (1975: 348-350). However, in political contexts, I would suggest that the Chuave and Hagen concepts seem to differ. The Hagen big man, Ongka, for example, describes a situation in which a man is publicly challenged and his statements found wrong, with the result that he feels 'small shame' in the eyes of those present (ibid.). But Ongka makes no reference to a man's political standing within this community. Chuave people, in contrast, argued that questions of right and wrong are by and large irrelevant. But they automatically link shame to people's respect for a man of high status. It is the very act of publicly confronting a big man that results in shame for both parties. Ideas about shame, therefore, protect established big men from frequent confrontation. Where status differences between ordinary men and those striving to prove themselves as leaders are less sharply defined, the risk of confrontation increases.

Consequently, men avoid confrontation even as they criticize leaders or attempt to discredit their political opponents. I have seen men sit patiently in the men's house throughout a big man's speech and only as he left begin to criticize his words or question his
ability. Leaders also seek to destroy the reputations of their rivals by slanderous attacks upon their character. This is called *ka dimoi denga* (talk-backside-speak) in the vernacular and *tokbaksait* in Pidgin. 'Talking behind one's back', then, is an intrinsic and pervasive part of Simbu political life.

Characteristic of the style of Chuave politics, therefore, is the contrast between formality or restraint in meetings where men seek to mould consensus, and the political infighting occurring in less formal settings as leaders seek to present themselves in the best possible light or attack their rivals. Leaders, of course, often become aware of the gossip or slander their opponents use against them. When criticisms contain an element of truth, leaders are able to respond by modifying their behaviour while avoiding the loss of face that would occur if the accusation was public. But they remain wary of mentioning any rumour, however false, in confrontations with rivals. Instead, they manoeuvre in a self-perpetuating cycle of innuendo and intrigue in order to protect or enhance their reputations.

The Simbu have a passion for politics. Men's house discussions cover a wide range of topics: from the proper way to organize a feast to the problems and failings of the national government. People recognize that criticisms of leaders or competition for power can be nothing less than intense. 'Every man', they say, 'wants to be a big man.' Although this statement is an exaggeration, it indicates a fundamental consequence of 50 years of political change: Chuave leadership has become increasingly specialized, and avenues to political power increasingly diverse. Church leaders, elected officials, or business men all compete for political followings along with traditional-style big men whose authority continues to rest on oratorical skill or the manipulation of wealth in exchange. Like myself, therefore, the Simbu operate with a broad definition of politics. To them, the discussion of mission affairs or the purchase of a vehicle is as intrinsically political as a local council election: all concern public goals and all eventually affect the distribution of power within local communities. Thus, people would not tolerate the suggestion that I limit my study to a particular aspect of political behaviour; they demanded nothing less than a total study of the politics in Chuave.
Although I necessarily regard some aspects of Chuave politics as more central than others, I concur with my Chuave friends' assessment of their political lifestyle. My thesis, then, is an ethnography of present-day politics and political change. In chapter two I outline the Chuave culture area and describe its numerous political arenas. By and large, these arenas correspond to corporate socio-political groups which place constraints on people's behaviour and which serve as frames of reference for much of the action I describe in subsequent chapters. I show how changes in village or clan organization are themselves the product of the process of encapsulation, and how these changes influence current interaction. Chapter three begins with a reconstruction of traditional leadership, and traces the changes in patterns of authority occurring under the Australian administration. I also treat a much neglected aspect of political change: the effect of missionization on local political processes.

The economic basis of power and authority is the subject of chapter four. I first consider the transformation of the Chuave economy and then, for purposes of presentation, draw a distinction between the exchange and business economies. Both these economic sectors are linked by the use of cash, and men manipulate wealth in either sector in order to enhance their status or gain political influence. I show, however, that men's responses to the demands posed by both sectors serve, over time, to limit the degree of authority they obtain and to differentiate alternative types of economic leaders.

In chapter five I am also concerned with economic matters, but there my analysis shifts from male to female power. Chuave women remain peripheral to mainstream political affairs, and their powerlessness is in part due to their inability to manipulate wealth in exchange. Perhaps sensing this, Chuave women began in the 1960s to organize themselves and to assume partial control over the wealth they produce. The result is a social, economic, and political movement known as Kafaina, through which women obtain recognition as producers and redress the imbalance in male-female power relations. The behaviour of Kafaina women is perhaps the best illustration of the blend between tradition and modernity existing in Chuave.

Chapter six concerns the recent implementation of village courts
in Chuave by the Papua New Guinea government. I argue that the introduction of village court officials dramatically affected the balance of power between local leaders. The issue of law and order is fundamentally important to villagers. Consequently, I analyse the interaction between political and legal processes, and demonstrate how the politicization of village courts influences the nature of customary and western law at the local level.

My penultimate chapter is an extended case study of the first election of a Simbu provincial government member. For Chuave people, this election was the single most important event that occurred during my fieldwork. I use this event to highlight many of the issues and behaviours previously discussed throughout this thesis. In sum, I focus my attention on a period of concentrated political competition: on those processes that not only underlie much of everyday political life, but which are also crucial to an understanding of political change in Chuave.
Notes

1. Throughout this my thesis I use Simbu rather than the colonial spelling of Chimbu when referring to a single province or a people who are linguistically and culturally related (see chapter two). The provincial government has adopted the name Simbu because it is a phonetically accurate spelling of a traditional greeting in the Kuman (central Simbu) and Chuave languages. People use both pronunciations in everyday conversations, although Simbu is increasingly preferred by young men. Chuave people also shout 'simbu-u-u' at major ceremonies when accepting food or valuables that do not require a specific return gift.

2. Yar togara and yar wanoba are vernacular terms that translate literally as 'big man'. Both terms are used when addressing a leader or any aged man. In Pidgin people use bik man in both these contexts, but lida solely for a political leader regardless of his age. I ignore the use of 'big man' as an age-marker, and use the words big man and leader interchangeably.
In this chapter, I describe the changes in group structure that have occurred in Chuave and stress the degree to which traditional groups converge with or diverge from political units created during the process of encapsulation. Residence patterns and descent group structure do not always coincide, and this has important implications for corporate behaviour. From the actor's viewpoint, the conception of a political universe consisting of a hierarchy of inclusive and exclusive groups is valid in Chuave. People's social and political behaviour takes place in reference to the groups in which they claim membership.

The emphasis that Chuave people place on groups sets them apart from some other highlands peoples. Wagner has used Daribi ideas of sociality to question the applicability of notions of groups in the New Guinea highlands (1974). At question in his article is the extent to which the anthropologist's own pre-conceptions based on corporate descent theory leads him to find or create groups where none exist. Wagner's argument, based on the Daribi who have exceptionally low population density,\(^1\) ignores the range of settlement patterns found throughout the highlands, and is not strictly applicable to other areas. One of Wagner's examples, for instance, contrasts sharply with the situation in Chuave. He notes that colonial administrative officers who were trained in the 'science of descent theory' found 'a bewildering chaos of scattered homesteads and overlapping names' in Daribi. And because they were committed to imposing political order at the local level, these officers created villages and village officials where none had existed.

In contrast, the traditional settlement pattern in Chuave, observed by Taylor (PR 1933: 110), was one of spatially bounded villages built on sites owned by the men of a single patrilineal group. Rather than imposing western notions of groups, the colonial administration found a pre-existing settlement pattern that sharply delineated a specific political unit, the clan, from other similar groups throughout the area. Despite dramatic changes in village structure, the clan remains a conceptually bounded unit which is of
primary importance for the regulation of socio-political behaviour.

In the emphasis that Chuave people place on the definition of the clan as a political as well as social group they resemble the Siane, and differ from people to the west, specifically the central Simbu (Waiye census division) (Brookfield and Brown 1963: 10-12; see also A. Strathern 1969a: 44-45). Differences also exist, however, between the Siane and Chuave areas. In short, my data on socio-political groups reveal Chuave to be a unique blend of Siane and central Simbu characteristics. Subsequently, when describing Chuave descent group structure, although I occasionally refer to other highlands cultures, I focus primarily on a systematic comparison of the Siane-Chuave-central Simbu areas.

The Chuave culture area

I use the word Chuave in several senses, as the people themselves do. Chuave proper is a government station situated on the Highlands Highway 31 kilometres southeast of Kundiawa (capital of Simbu province) and 47 kilometres southwest of Goroka (capital of Eastern Highlands province). Established in 1939 as a base camp, Chuave was intermittently manned by native police and expatriate patrol officers during the 1940s. In 1953, when the highway linking Goroka and Kundiawa was completed, Chuave became a permanent patrol post. Since then, the station has grown considerably; today it has a population of 738 persons and serves as an administrative centre for three Simbu census divisions: Chuave, Elimbari and Nambaiyufa, with a combined population of 29,624 (1981 census figures, National Statistical Office).

My field site was located five and one-half kilometres south of Chuave station along a secondary road within Chuave census division. The area, 202 square kilometres (Howlett et al 1976: 93), has a population of 9,612, comprising the members of eight groups which I call tribes (see maps). I confined my research to this geographic area, but made sporadic trips to Elimbari and Nambaiyufa census divisions. Most of my data on traditional culture came from informants in the Duma tribe. Villagers living in Chuave census division say they 'belong to' Chuave and readily point out physical landmarks that serve as boundary markers between Chuave and adjacent census divisions. This
area also serves as a provincial electorate. Individual members from Chuave, Elimbari, and Nambaiyufa are elected to the Provincial Assembly in Kundiawa. People identify their birth places by using the terms Chuave, Elimbari or Nambaiyufa, frequently adding the name of a tribe, clan, or village settlement to specify precise locations.

The beauty and splendour of Mount Elimbari dominates the entire Chuave area and people use the names Elimbari and Chuave interchangeably. Elimbari Local Government Council, located at Chuave station, represents the two census divisions (population 21,921) which together form a single culture area 443 square kilometres in size. The inhabitants of this area speak the Chuave language, which Wurm (1971) classifies as a member of the Simbu Sub-Family of the Central Family of the East New Guinea Highlands Stock. In areas to the west people speak the related languages of Sinasina, Dom and Nomane. To the east, in Nambaiyufa census division and across the provincial border, people speak the unrelated language of Siane (Swick 1966: 46, n. 2). Geographic features also define the boundaries of this culture area: to the north the slopes of Mount Kerigomna; to the south the Tua and Waghi River gorges, and to the east Elimbari ridge (2,200 to 2,850 metres high and 19 kilometres long) which, despite mountain passes, effectively separates Nambaiyufa from Elimbari and Chuave census divisions. Only the western edge of the region is geographically unbounded; here only language differences distinguish Sinasina and Chuave groups.

Prior to contact, migrations of entire groups crossed the boundaries I have outlined. For example, the people surrounding the present Nomane station, across the Wahgi River from Chuave, speak a distinct language. Men's house styles and pig festivals also differ markedly from those found in Chuave. Some Nomane groups, however, have a history of migration and mythological charter that place their origins at Mainarao, a site only a few kilometres south of Chuave station. Particular aspects of social organization also resemble those found in Chuave (see below). Intermarriage and a degree of bilingualism exist among border populations. For example, 17 per cent of Kaupagam people (24 of 140 adults surveyed) speak Siane fluently. Similarly, although people in
Duma find the Sinasina language unintelligible, members of the Kebai and Kamara tribes are often speakers of both the Chuave and Sinasina languages. Nowadays men also use Pidgin to overcome such linguistic barriers.

In the past, groups from different culture areas also formed temporary alliances or fought with each other. Thus Sua and Gai, both Chuave villages north of the Tua River, married into, fought, or formed alliances with Gimi speakers in the Beha Valley south of the Tua (Bragginton 1978: 108). Kaupagam clan took refuge with Siane clans following a rout by enemies prior to the turn of the century. They later regained their territory after forming an alliance with these same clans.

Living among potentially hostile clans restricted individual mobility. A person regularly travelled only a few kilometres between village and garden sites. Nonetheless, marriage ties and temporary trading partnerships promoted vast exchange networks linking different regions. Prior to contact Duma men obtained stone axes from Kafetu in the Goroka Valley to the east and, in the west, from the Dom quarry via Sinasina.

These factors guaranteed interaction between members of discrete culture areas. Despite language and geographic barriers, therefore, a certain degree of cultural homogeneity existed between Chuave and surrounding areas prior to contact.

Pan-regionalism

Before I outline the groups extant in Chuave, it is necessary to note how people conceptualize the limits of their political universe. People's awareness of the world has greatly increased during the past 50 years. Today individual mobility is no longer restricted by a concentric environment of hostile groups, but by the cost of transport. Wage labour begun in the 1950s has continued to the present; every village has part of its population residing outside the Chuave area. People now travel to a number of different towns to visit kinsmen, and youths travel to obtain higher education. Local entrepreneurs make frequent, sometimes fortnightly, trips to Lae to
obtain store goods. Each day of the week, save Sunday, at least 15 public motor vehicles (PMV) carry passengers to Goroka from the Chuave countryside. Nor are people's travel experiences confined to Papua New Guinea. A Duma student and a mission leader journeyed to the United States while I resided in Chuave, and men from the Chuave area have travelled to, among other places, Hong Kong, Australia and Israel. In Kaupagam clan various people had taken spouses from Nambaiyufa, Lufa, Sinasina, Kundiawa, Goroka, Madang and Finschhafen. Such marriages represent only a small fraction of the total, but are increasingly common throughout the Chuave area.

Freedom to travel, plus improvements in radio communication, has promoted an awareness of the customs of other areas, and a nascent pan-regional movement has been developing. Villagers greatly misunderstand this movement which seeks to create a new government and administrative structure. The movement centres on the creation of a new province encompassing Chuave and surrounding areas. People say such a province might include Chuave, Elimbari, Siane, Salt-Nomane, Sinasina, Watabung and Lufa census divisions. The impetus behind the creation of 'Bomai' province stems from the complaints of a group of leaders - perhaps 80 men - who are disenchanted with current government and who strive to solidify this potential cross-cultural identity. Thus, although people in Chuave refer to themselves as Simbu - particularly when identifying themselves to members of other provinces - they argue that the Simbu provincial government has not made any serious attempt to develop the Chuave area. They maintain that young educated men from the Kuman or central Simbu area dominate the Kundiawa public service. Chuave people regularly journey to Goroka rather than Kundiawa, for leisure or business trips and many claim that they would prefer to be a part of the Eastern Highlands province rather than Simbu. Many men, in fact, are adamantly opposed to any travel to the 'Kuman side' and describe Kuman speakers as not only different from themselves but also as modern enemies.

As yet, the parochial interests of the area's constituent parts have undermined this pan-regional movement. Councillors from Elimbari census division have threatened to withdraw from Elimbari Council because they believe that Chuave leaders dominate it. Similar accusations led in 1974 to the formation of a separate Siane Council.
after years of complaints that a council controlled by Chuave speakers purposely thwarted the development of Nambaiyufa census division. Nonetheless, the possibility remains that this pan-regional identity may serve in future as the basis for group action which cuts across current political and administrative boundaries.

**Phratry, tribe and eria**

Even the most cursory reading of highlands ethnographies reveals the disarray in terminology anthropologists have created when describing descent groups of similar or different sizes and function. The variety of terms and criteria anthropologists use makes cross-cultural comparison difficult. The problem is especially acute for a comparison of the Chuave and central Simbu cultural areas.

In part the problem arises from actual differences between the two areas. Brown notes that informants did not always agree among themselves when discussing the basic three level descent hierarchy of tribe, clan and subclan (1972: 35). Similarly central Simbu informants gave two different uses of tribal names; the first includes only descent based groups, and the second includes these groups and an unrelated or immigrant group (Bookfield and Brown 1963: 92). In central Simbu a vast number of exceptional cases also exist: groups simply do not regularly fit into the perceived segmentary model. In Chuave, by contrast, people easily rank groups in descent hierarchies that correspond to traditional spatial organization. Furthermore, people neatly explain any exceptional cases by reference to descent histories.

A deeper problem exists, however, because the analysts delineate central Simbu groups so as to include the exceptional cases. Thus, Brookfield and Brown note that clans 'are usually territorial, exogamous, named groups', but add that 'there are exceptions to each of these criteria'. Such cryptic statements leave one to ponder under what conditions the analysts include or exclude these criteria when defining the clan and to ask under what circumstances exceptions to this general rule applies. Elsewhere, the 'clan section' is described as a discrete unit within the clan. But this unit may also correspond to a second, lower level unit, the linked subclan (ibid.: 85, 92-93).
Such flexibility in description, although presumably meant to mirror the loosely structured pattern of central Simbu corporate behaviour, compounds the problems of comparison at a group level. Subsequently in cross-cultural comparison, I have ignored exceptions to those criteria used to define central Simbu groups and show how Chuave units are similar or different to those found in central Simbu on the basis of specific criteria and specific corporate functions.

I use the term 'phratry' to denote the largest Chuave group sharing a putative history of common descent. Between nine and 14 clans comprise a phratry which numbers between 2,000 and 4,000 people and has a common or qualifying name which both members and non-members use to identify the group. The major, named, constituent parts of a phratry I call tribes and these are either dispersed or proximate to each other. However, not all Chuave tribes are part of a larger phratry. The Gomia phratry (see map two) is comprised of three tribes, Gomia Meri (four clans), Gomia Kinogu (three clans) and Gomia Kibi (three clans), whose territories border each other. People say they belong to Gomia or, alternatively, to a particular tribe, for example, Gomia Meri. Today people number these Gomia One, Two and Three, following the example of early colonial officers. Duma tribe, in contrast, is part of a dispersed Duma phratry. A common history of descent links the tribe, consisting of nine clans, to Duma Damagu and Duma Yagari tribes some distance away in adjoining Elimbari census division. Land belonging to other, non-related tribes separates the Duma phratry territories. Phratry myths speak of an ancient quarrel involving a pair of aged brothers that led to fratricide, to a split between their descendants and, eventually, to warfare and the migration of part of the founding unit. Chuave phratries are therefore similar to those found in Kuma (Reay 1959: 28-29) and central Simbu (Brown 1960: 24) and equivalent to the Hagen great-tribe (A. Strathern 1971: 19) in providing a historical rationale for processes of segmentation and migration that these groups have undergone. Such high-level groups do not exist east of Chuave. Among the Gahuka-Gama (Read 1952: 2-3) despite a recognition of common cultural heritage, the tribe - numbering between 500 and 1,000 people - is the largest named group. The Siane, despite the fact that some groups have a history of migration from the Goroka Valley, also do not place emphasis on distant links. Instead Siane people speak of particular tribes as always
having existed on their present territories and of tribal ancestors who emerged from the ground (Salisbury 1962: 13, 70-71).

In the past, the phratry rarely united in any co-operative activity. For dispersed phratries the distance between constituent tribes prior to contact meant that interaction was minimal and the organization of joint enterprises impossible. The constituent tribes of proximate phratries sometimes combined to hold pig festivals.

Today, some politicians attempt to use common ancestry as a rationale for phratry solidarity. In provincial elections, for example, they maintain that all Gomia tribes should vote en bloc for a single candidate. Such appeals are at present ineffective, however, and the phratry remains indistinct as a political unit.

Chuave tribes are equivalent in both size and internal structure to those found in Siane, but origin myths concerning the tribe differ (ibid.: 13). Two to nine clans belong to tribes that range in population from approximately 600 to 2,700 people. The smallest of Chuave phratries, then, is equivalent in size to a large Chuave tribe and a functional overlap exists between these two kinds of groups. Thus clans of a tribe regularly combine to hold their pig festival at the same time; representatives of each clan meet to discuss the synchronization of events at the tribal level. Small proximate phratries, however, unite to participate in this group enterprise normally associated with the tribe - a phenomenon easily understandable in Chuave where the size of group displays and demonstrations of group strength are important aspects of ceremonies.

Tribes are 'big names', and a visitor first learns these names when inquiring about groups in Chuave. Each tribe has a distinct myth of origin. Three tribes - Kamara, Kau and Kebai - trace their origins to Sinasina and ultimately, as with most Simbu groups, to Wokama in the Upper Simbu River Valley. The remaining tribes, however, trace their origins to the Mai River Valley in the north-east and adamantly deny any links to central Simbu, a point which I discuss later. Other stories trace the pattern of segmentation within the tribe. Thus, informants say the Duma tribe was once the Duma clan. Because of population growth and internal quarrelling, this group split after a (now mythical) fight - again involving fratricide - to form two clans,
Gorukabu and Supadurumo. These two groups in turn produced additional clans. Supaduromo, for example, divided into Subagam, a clan that exists to this day, and Durumo. Durumo (a name no longer used save in reference to this group's history) has undergone further segmentation and yielded the three present clans of Kaupagam, Tabiagam, and Komodurumo.

Cordyline, other plants or natural landmarks such as streams or ridges mark the boundaries of a tribe which has a specific, continuous territory. People often dispute tribal borders but tribal territories are solid blocks and no islands of tribal land exist outside this area.

Because the Chuave tribe is always both a descent group and a discrete territorial unit, it differs from groups of similar size found to the immediate west. For the central Simbu, Brown found it necessary to distinguish between descent based groups (phratries) and local alliances of groups (tribes) that form political units (1960: 24-25). The coincidence of these two kinds of groups, the 'phratry-tribe', is rare in central Simbu (ibid.: 30). Similarly for the Kuma, Reay contrasts the phratry, an unlocalized descent group, with the parish, a localized political unit (1959: 25-26). Chuave tribes, in contrast, correspond to the central Simbu phratry-tribe and are more comparable to Hagen tribes as described by Andrew Strathern (1971: 20) though Chuave tribes are smaller in size.7 No pairing of tribal names denoting a semi-permanent alliance between groups exists in Chuave as it does in central Simbu. In fact, permanent alliances were non-existent in Chuave and temporary alliances occurred only between individual clans. Even clans belonging to the same tribe or proximate phratry were as likely to wage war against each other as ally themselves against other clans. Furthermore, all clans of a tribe assert common descent from an original founding unit. Traditionally, groups forced to flee from their territory could maintain their common identity by re-forming in a new location – as in the clans forming a phratry. But men also say that groups and individuals formerly sought refuge with maternal and affinal kinsmen. In some situations, therefore, amalgamation of groups at the level of the clan might have taken place. But, unlike the situation in Siane or central Simbu, no immigrant clans exist within Chuave tribes (cf. Brookfield and Brown
1963: 88-89; Salisbury 1962: 13). Thus, although I often suspected that particular clans might have originated in other areas, people always linked these groups to others within the tribe by way of descent histories to the founding tribal unit.

Since pacification in the 1940s the coalescence of a tribal political identity has occurred. In the following chapter I detail the emergence of government leaders - the first big men who exerted their authority throughout the tribe. Here I note that today the tribe is an important political unit. People travel freely throughout their tribe's territory - a pattern impossible in the past given the enmity between clans. Clans within the tribe combine to prepare and fence huge gardens (over 20 hectares in size). People of all the tribe's clans mourn the deaths of prominent men; they attend common church services; and they join together to celebrate modern holidays such as Independence Day. Although marriage ceremonies remain predominantly an affair between two corporate clans, a few men and women, often only the most distant of kin, from other clans within the tribe attend all weddings. As I show in chapter seven the shared identity of tribal members profoundly affects the nature and outcome of provincial government elections.

The village court area (Pidgin: eria) is a modern political unit. Eleven village court areas currently exist in Chuave with populations of between 1,300 and 3,000 people. Occasionally court areas correspond to tribal boundaries. Kebai and Kamara tribes, for example, each have a single court with tribal plaintiffs travelling twice weekly to one or two central locations and airing their grievances in front of magistrates selected from the various clans of the tribe.

More often, however, the eria cross-cuts tribal boundaries. Ei(gun) and Gomia Meri tribes, for example, originally united together in a single court area. Two court sites, joined by a bush path, existed - one in each of the tribe's territory. But the distance between these court locations proved too great, and conflicts arose between court officials from the two tribes who heard cases jointly. Within a year of implementation (in 1978) this court disbanded and reformed along new lines - totally without administration approval.
Members of Ei tribe and two villages from Gomia Meri tribe joined the pre-existing Duma court. The remaining Gomia Meri clans formed a new eria in conjunction with Gomia Kinogu, Kibi and Kau tribesmen.

The creation of this new Duma eria is understandable given local conditions. A tertiary road built in the 1960s links Ei and the two Gomia villages to the centre of Duma territory. These non-Duma groups frequently travel along this road and have excellent relations with Duma members. Children from Ei and these Gomia villages have attended first mission and later government schools in Duma since the late 1950s. Ei and Gomia people living along the tertiary road frequently travel to Duma markets, and they attend a Lutheran church that ministers to the congregations of the entire area.

Thus, the concept of eria did not follow but preceded the implementation of village courts. In joining Duma court Ei was simply choosing to participate with groups with whom they had developed mutual interests over recent years. The development of eria, therefore, is the result of particular local conditions, and my example of the Duma-Ei eria is only one of many potential variations within the Chuave region.

Today village courts are central meeting places for people throughout the eria. Leaders and other interested parties meet at the court to gossip, to exchange information, and to discuss a range of political issues pertaining to questions of law and order or more generally, to the development of the eria. As such, the court serves as a 'consciousness raising' forum and enhances the corporateness of this new unit. Specifically, leaders (including some councillors) disenchanted with the Elimbari Local Government Council argue for the creation of eria or community governments similar to those implemented in Kainantu in 1973 (Standish 1979a: 124-125). Prior to the implementation of village courts, people had previously assumed that each tribe might form committees responsible for governing its own affairs. Because village courts have succeeded in linking formerly unrelated groups, however, leaders now discuss the possibility of a local government based on existing village court erias. In 1979 and 1980 several councillors succeeded in collecting tax money on an eria basis. They used this revenue for small eria projects (such as the
purchase of coffee processors) rather than contributing it to larger projects that the council as a whole determined.

Villagers do no fully understand the concept of eria government as a potential administrative or political institution. Moreover, many people continue to reject the idea out of hand. This is not surprising given that people often confuse the term *komuniti* (community) with *kumunis* (communist) government and that missions have taught people communism is evil, 'Satan's work', and a portent of the Second Coming. But in 1981, leaders, spurred by the tax sharing scheme, began to see the full implications of this local level government and sought to explain it fully to villagers, frequently using the word eria instead of *komuniti*. Thus, men often suggest that church leaders, entrepreneurs, councillors and magistrates could form a committee to govern the eria. In sum, the eria is an actual spatial grouping drawing together the clans of a single tribe or groups that were formerly unrelated. In addition the conception of the eria is an incipient movement which seeks to formalize and institutionalize an emerging identity at the local level.

**Subtribe and ward**

The Chuave subtribe is equivalent to those found in Siane (Salisbury 1962: 13-14). It also has some similarities to small central Simbu phratries or subtribes as well as large exogamous clans (Brookfield and Brown 1963: 10-11, 92-93). Subtribe members belong to two or three clans, normally reside in adjacent villages, and believe they are related to a single founding ancestor. This group has no common name but the pairing or linking of clan names, as well as the phrase 'close people', denotes the group as a whole. Subtribesmen often describe themselves as brothers. Thus men say Kaupagam, Tabiagam and Komodurumo clans are descended from three sons of a single ancestor, Kaupa. They refer to the subtribe as Kaupa-Tabia (gam) and, today also by the acronym KTK. These clans do not intermarry; rather members of all three groups select spouses from the six other clans in Duma or from other tribes.

Large tribes may contain more than one subtribe. In Duma, for instance, a second exogamous subtribe consisting of Komogam, Marime...
and Koigam clans exists. The remaining Duma clans, Corugu, Suagu and Subagam, however, have only remote links to other clans and are themselves exogamous units. Members of these independent clans, therefore, select spouses from eight Duma clans. While some subtribes have remained exogamous units, others have allowed intermarriage between the subtribe's clans in the recent past (cf. Brown 1972: 36 for a similar process between brother clans; Brookfield and Brown 1963: 93 between the clan sections). Over a period of decades relaxation in the rule of exogamy, in combination with warfare, leads to the abandonment of co-operative activities and claims of brotherhood between clans of the same subtribe: I mentioned earlier Subagam clan which, while related to Durumo in the past, today shares no common relationship to the KTK subtribe.

In Chuave, therefore, there are two distinct types of subtribes. One, the exogamous subtribe, resembles that found in Siane. The other comprises clans that share a history of common descent, collaborate in some corporate functions and may even be called 'brothers' but allow intermarriage. This second type represents a transitional phase in transferring some of the functions of the subtribe to the clan.

Chuave subtribes differ from those Read (1952: 3) and Langness (1971: 298, 314-315) discovered in the eastern highlands. These sometimes act together in war or in ceremonies and yet share no common origins. Such alliances of proximate clans do not occur in Chuave. Clans have tried to establish such relations once in recent times but they used remote ancestral links as a rationale for the alliance.

The subtribe is both a ceremonial and political unit. Clans of a subtribe always co-ordinate their activities during the pig festival and they exchange special gifts of pork to emphasize subtribe solidarity. Traditionally, a single flute per subtribe, called 'the mother of birds', existed, and subtribe members performed special dances which affirmed their ties to each other.10 Similarly, the subtribe occasionally co-operated to plant large gardens and to organize massive food distributions, though particular clans could arrange 'first fruits' ceremonies.

Within the subtribe warfare was and is 'theoretically prohibited'
People say subtribesmen should fight only with sticks - especially reserved for such occasions and stored in the men's house - and never with bows and arrows. In practice, as Salisbury has noted (1960: 256), people frequently broke this prohibition. In an unpublished paper (p. 18) Salisbury notes that members of the victim's subtribe had caused one-fourth of all deaths in battle which he recorded. Despite this prohibition, wars between clans of the same subtribe were exceedingly common in Chuave. Kaupagam clan, for example, had fought both Tabiagam and Komoduromo in the past. In one such war, resulting in at least six deaths, Komodurumo and Kaupagam men united to rout their Tabiagam 'brothers' forcing them to relocate at their present village site several kilometres away.

This difference between actual and ideal behaviour within the subtribe is glossed over in the literature - despite Salisbury's stipulation that the prohibition is 'theoretical'. Thus, Brown in a comparison of highlands cultures, lists the Siane subtribe (phratry) conflicts as restricted to internal 'feuding' (1971: 222-223), and Andrew Strathern (1969a: 45) misleadingly describes this Siane unit as a security circle. Such characterizations are understandable given the nature of warfare in other highlands cultures and, in particular, in the areas that these two authors have studied. For central Simbu, protracted fighting within the tribe was exceptional, and fighting within the clan (usually the exogamous unit) was confined to brief skirmishes (Brown 1964: 350, 353). In the Hagen area groups 'which remain a single exogamous unit do not apparently experience warfare between their constituent segments' (A. Strathern 1971: 22). In Chuave and Siane, however, a clan, whether itself an exogamous unit or part of a larger exogamous subtribe, is the war making unit - a point I discuss further below. Thus, in Chuave warfare occurs between clans who stand in either a putative affinal or agnatic relationship to each other.

The Chuave-Elimbari region includes 29 council wards. Each ward, with an average population of 750, elects a single councillor to Elimbari Council. Because the administration attempted to follow traditional lines when creating the council, the ward often corresponds to the subtribe. Where clans did not belong to a subtribe, the administration grouped two or three of these together on the basis of
both population size and geographic proximity.

Each ward selects a single councillor. In the past ward members also elected komitis or councillors' assistants. Today, a councillor chooses a komiti from unsuccessful candidates within his own clan and from others within the ward. In the next chapter I detail the councillor's role, the limits of his authority and the council election process. Here it is necessary to note only that elections result in intense rivalry between the ward's clans which commonly vote as blocks for their own candidates. Komitis and councillors are often the greatest political opponents - particularly when they belong to different clans. In short, clans of a single ward often become bound in an antagonistic rather than a co-operative relationship with each other. This is true also for wards that correspond to subtribes. Thus, the opposition between segments that arises around council affairs can undermine the cohesiveness of the subtribe. Rather than contributing to subtribe solidarity, therefore, the creation of wards has regularly led to the political fragmentation of this traditional unit.

Village and community

Before discussing the clan and its internal organization, I shall briefly outline the changes to settlement patterns that have occurred in Chuave.

Traditionally the clan was a spatially bounded unit coinciding with a single, continuous village Salisbury has described for Siane (1962: 12). A casuarina fence enclosed the village and stretched some 600 metres along defensible ridges. A street of red clay ran the length of the village and was flanked by irregular rows of women's houses, small and oval shaped. Each house was surrounded by a fence providing a private space for the owner. People still announce themselves to the occupant before crossing the gates to these private yards.

In each village, two or three men's houses with their accompanying courtyards were the centre of ceremonial activity. In the past they were primary targets for night raids and were equipped with escape
tunnels. During periods of hostility, walls (kamur kira) 10 to 15 metres high barricaded the village's main entrance paths, and women and children confined their movements to gardens close to the village.

Taylor (PR 1933: 110) and later researchers remarked upon the differences between this Chuave-Siane settlement pattern and those to the west. In Sinasina Hide (1980: 209-211) has described settlements as 'clusters of hamlets' - distinctive groups of women's houses centred around a men's house. Such hamlets, which number about 45 people, were much smaller than Chuave villages. Hatanaka's (1972: 9, 13) interpretation of traditional settlement is at odds with Hide's. She argues that the traditional settlement pattern in Sinasina was one of dispersed women's houses similar to that found in central Simbu (cf. Brown 1972: 29). It is clear though that both the Sinasina and central Simbu constructed separate ceremonial centres, whereas in Chuave the men's house was the centre of ceremonial activity.

The dispersed-nucleated dichotomy is in some ways imprecise. Thus in both Chuave and Siane the hamlet pattern described by Hide for Sinasina was and is occasionally found. Men seem to have built hamlets for a variety of practical reasons. For example, when terrain was exceptionally rough or when garden locations were located at altitudes much lower than defensible sites, the village occasionally split into two or more hamlets. Members could then sleep in a particular hamlet when fencing or clearing gardens, and yet be assured of a safe refuge in case of attack.

Pig houses also remain scattered throughout the countryside and offer an alternative to village residence. As in Siane as much as 30 per cent of the population may be absent from the village on any given night (Salisbury 1962: 12). Today, during coffee season this percentage increases as people sleep in their pig-coffee houses to harvest this crop. In every clan, furthermore, a small group of aged people (perhaps 5 per cent of the total population) prefer to reside permanently in their pig houses. These men and women remain totally peripheral to the clan's affairs and seldom contribute to ceremonies. In a few instances, they do not own houses within the village, and are in the village at irregular intervals of three months or more.
Settlement patterns have changed greatly. Three phases in this process are distinguishable. First, beginning in the 1940s patrol officers established rest houses and encouraged villagers to relocate near these sites. Second, mission activity in the late 1940s and early 1950s led to the splitting of several clan-villages in the Chuave area. Adherents of particular missions built separate men's houses and accompanying women's houses near the mission site. Within Duma, this sometimes meant a relocation of several kilometres. Other clan members often chose to stay in traditional locations near the clan's major garden sites. Today this process is reversed: new missions are situated near principal settlements. Finally, a system of roads, constantly upgraded and expanded since the 1950s, has been built throughout the area. At major junctions in these roads villages—sometimes accommodating two or more clans—have developed.

The specific pattern of settlement created by the combination of these factors varies immensely in the Chuave area. In tribes that have territories distant from major missions or beyond existing roads, there are still traditional clan-villages. Some clans have managed to maintain distinct villages after relocation. But other villages incorporate two or three clans. In short, residence patterns vary enormously. Figure 1 is a simplified diagram of one such community, Keu, where I lived. The diagram omits many of the women's houses but includes all men's houses.

Keu community contains three villages and four clans centred on one road location. All these clans clashed in warfare in the past. Kaupagam clan and a single Komodurumo men's house group reside in a single village. (Inhabitants describe the area as a single village despite a separation in elevation: Korowa is built 50 metres below Aragor along the road.) A second Komodurumo men's house exists in another community centred on a Lutheran mission station one and a half kilometres east. Similarly, a single Subagam men's house group, Miumabnu, comprises one-half of Nudian village; additional men's houses of this clan are again located in Onama community. Two Komogam men's houses, Aidpost and Nudian, exist in separate but adjacent villages. When two clans share a single village, a fence divides the village into halves. In contrast, spatial markers never define the men's house groups of a single clan village.
Today Keu community shares a common identity. Some men believe that a system providing for representation of clans that share a common location should replace the current system of selecting village court officials and councillors from particular clans. Interaction between the various clans of this community is intense. People from different clans meet on a daily basis to gossip, gamble or pool money for drinking parties. Community members are more likely to attend weddings and other ceremonies which take place at specific men's houses, and, of course, members of the same villages (i.e. Subagam and Komogam members) sometimes intermarry. People of the community join together to attend church services and to sell produce at a single market.

Yet despite shared locality and increased social interaction, political cleavages within the community remain evident. Martin and Dege, for instance, were magistrates from Komodurumo and Kaupagam clans. As the only two magistrates in this community they settled disputes within the entire area. But these men often stressed that they felt uncomfortable when venturing beyond their own clans because non-clansmen were apt to oppose their decisions. On many occasions these magistrates allowed a peace officer (from Nudian) or other leaders from different clans to settle court cases. In short, inter-clan rivalry, similar to that which exists among members of a council ward, occurs within the community. I return in later chapters to the problems leaders face when they attempt to assert themselves in a clan other than their own. Having outlined one variant of the settlement patterns which exist in Chuave, I shall proceed to a discussion of the key political unit.

The clan

Chuave clans range in size from 80 to 488 persons with an average of 282 per clan. They are larger than those found among the Gahuku-Gama, which number about 100 (Read 1952: 3), and those in Siane which average 200 people. They are smaller than clans found in the west in Sinasina (Hatanaka 1972: 18; Hide 1980: 196) and in central Simbu. Brown, for example, states that clans average 600 to 700 people with a range of between 200 to 1,200 (1972: 36; 1960: 24).
These numbers are deceptive, however, because unlike Brown I do not define the clan primarily on the basis of exogamy (ibid.). As previously noted, clans are occasionally linked to others within an exogamous subtribe. The Chuave clan is comparable in size with either the central Simbu clan, clan section or subclan (a unit linked to others to form an exogamous unit), and the Chuave exogamous subtribe is comparable to large exogamous clans found in central Simbu. Thus, if the Chuave figures were adjusted to include subtribes that remain exogamous units, the range in population for these groups would be increased to include units of over 900 people—a figure comparable to the upper limits for central Simbu clans.

It is possible, therefore, to discern a gradual increase in the size of exogamous groups moving west from the eastern highlands. Thus exogamous sections of Hagen tribes sometimes number as many as 3,049 people (A. Strathern 1971: 20). Yet the range in size of these groups overlaps throughout this central highlands region. Just as the smallest of Chuave clans is comparable to those found among the Gahuka-Gama, the smallest of Hagen exogamous units (241 persons) is roughly equivalent in size to the average Chuave clan.

The Chuave clan is a named, patrilineal, virilocal group. Men often affix the suffix gam, meaning line or rope and sometimes translated as a derivative of gan or child, to the name of the founding father of the group. No person, however, is capable of tracing an actual genealogical connection to this founding father. In this way Kaupagam denotes the line or children of Kaupa. Clan members may also refer to each other as 'one man' (towane ari). Within the clan all persons use kinship terms to address other members of the group, though today the use of personal names and nicknames predominates.

The clan consists of all adult males and their resident children of both sexes. Married women have close associations with both their father's and husband's clans. But when Chuave women are asked to identify their group they automatically respond by naming their husbands' clan. Moreover, Chuave men immediately give a new name to a woman who marries into their clan which they and their wives use in address instead of the woman's birth name. This practice is indicative of people's belief that a woman assumes a new identity at marriage and
that her allegiance is to her husband's group. Upon a man's death any clan 'brother', but preferably the deceased's age-mate, is the choice for leviratic marriage.

Based on complete genealogical information for Kaupagam clan, only 8 per cent of all adult males (over 18 years of age) were non-agnates. Because two clans may now share a common village site, exceptions to the rule of virilocal residence are undoubtedly greater than in the past. This figure is higher than Salisbury reported for Siane in 1952-1953 where only 2 per cent of the clan population were non-agnates but much lower than the central Simbu figure of 20 per cent non-agnates for the two equivalent units of subclan and clan in 1958-1960 (Salisbury 1962: 14; Brown 1962: 61, 1964: 337). Brown draws a distinction between those non-agnates who are fully incorporated (10 per cent) and other 'visitors' or men of uncertain allegiance (10 per cent). As in Siane, residence within a particular Chuave clan leads to rapid incorporation of non-agnates and only 2 per cent of such men maintain any dual affiliation with, for example, the clan of their birth. Non-agnates receive practically full rights to land and are expected to contribute to clan ceremonies.

As the main ceremonial and political unit, the Chuave clan is similar to Siane, Kuma and Hagen clans. In Chuave, although a person may belong to other, larger descent groups, he feels no enduring commitment to them, and the clan stands alone as a political unit. As a war-making unit, the clan in the past was responsible for avenging the death of any clan-mate. It combined also to build a war-magic house which was the centre of ritual activity seeking to ensure the clan's strength in battle by appealing to the clan's ancestors. In times of war all other clans were regarded as potential enemies and there was no anticipation of alliance with other groups. When such alliances emerged they were the result of circumstances particular to the hostilities and not the result of any jural commitment or principle linking the allies.

Alliance between clans occurs most often in opposition to clans outside the tribe. Men standing in an affinal relationship to particular enemies choose not to fight in any battle for fear of confronting close kinsmen (cf. Brown 1964). The participation of
specific maternal or affinal kinsmen in the battles of other clans generates a more common alliance pattern. Thus, a man of clan A may choose to aid his kinsmen in clan B against an enemy clan C. If this man died, clan A would unite with clan B to avenge the death of their brother. In many battles the risk of escalation is great as kinsmen from several clans join in the skirmishes. Because marriages are dispersed, furthermore, it is possible for members of a clan peripheral to the main hostility to participate on different sides of the battle. In extreme circumstances two subclans of a single clan may fight on opposing sides - though informants stressed that these units never directly confronted each other. In such cases compensation for aid or for ensuing deaths takes place between specific kin relations and is not a corporate payment between allied clans.

Moral and jural constructs also define clan boundaries. Men distinguish between crimes committed by their own or other clan members. For example, people abhor theft or adultery within the clan. Yet they tolerate these crimes when clan members commit them against other groups. Though fighting between clansmen is common there are strong prohibitions against aiding a clan brother in disputes which effectively prevent the escalation of minor quarrels into major confrontations that would threaten clan unity. In contrast, fights between men of different clans often involve large numbers as people join the dispute to aid their fellow clansmen. Today, of course, inter-clan fights sometimes result in the mobilization of clansmen from different communities: groups of men rush between communities when they hear their clan mates have been physically assaulted.

Men say that traditionally the killing of a non-clansmen was a political act. Clan members protected the perpetrator of such homicides and, in so doing, risked their own lives when the deceased's clan sought blood revenge. But people regarded the killing of a clan brother as a heinous crime; today they describe it by using the English word 'murder'. When such a death occurred clansmen would not touch the body and instead paid other clans to see to its burial. Clan fratricide was rare and there were no regularized means of punishing a murderer. Men say murderers commonly fled the village - sometimes accompanied by their closest agnates - to seek refuge in other groups. They also acknowledge that, when the murderer and victim belonged to
different and major segmentary groups within the clan, full scale con­frontation between these units led to clan fission. Intra-clan homicide, therefore, could result in the creation of new clans, that is, enemy groups. This idea is reflected in tribe and phratry myths where fratricide results in war between new political units containing the descendants of two aged brothers.

Today men do not explicitly distinguish between inter- and intra-clan homicides; instead they argue that all men are brothers and that, ideally, murderers should be dealt with by the courts. But clan solidarity persists. Thus men dismissed the idea that intra-clan killings could ever lead to clan fission given modern conditions. But they readily agreed that blood revenge and full-scale war might arise after any inter-clan homicide.

The clan combined in the past to initiate male youths even though the actual initiation took place in one or more men's houses located in the clan. It also held specific rituals such as the parading of the flutes during the pig festival. Today, the clan as a whole still discusses and decides when to hold a pig feast. Individual men own garden plots but tracts of continuous clan land, dispersed throughout tribal territory, exist. Clansmen join together to clear, fence and plant these in preparation for pig feasts or 'first fruits' ceremonies sponsored by the clan.

There are no ceremonial occasions, however, when all members of the clan co-operate. People are free to contribute to particular ceremonies or to withhold their participation. What participation occurs, however, takes place along clan lines. At mortuary and marriage feasts, for example, clan members join together to enter a village, sing songs that refer to the clan and its relationships with other groups, and sit together in the men's house square. Inter-clan prestations are corporate acts. Thus, although particular persons (for example, a man and his brother-in-law) actually exchange valuables, this exchange is mediated by representatives of two clans (see chapter four).

Traditionally there was no political office or position for the clan as a whole; rather rival big men competed for the allegiance of
followers within the clan. However, exceptional big men sometimes emerged to act as spokesmen for the clan in its dealings with other groups. Today, councillors or village court officials, as elected representatives, often act as their clan's spokesmen. But as I show in chapter four the influence these leaders exercise in the distribution of wealth varies greatly.

One idiom in particular describes the clan as a circumscribed, almost concrete entity. Clan members say they belong to a single men's house even though they may have several (cf. Salisbury 1962: 14). Men commonly characterize behaviour towards agnates in terms of the constituent parts of a men's house. This idiom relates to the two least inclusive descent segments: the lineage and the subclan.

**Men's house groups**

In order to understand the structure of lineages and subclans it is first necessary to outline the composition of men's house groups in Chuave. Men's house affiliation cross-cuts actual or perceived blood ties so that subclan and lineage lines become indistinct. Because men's house residence creates bonds of friendship, it decreases a person's reliance on his close agnates and allows him to escape obligations to his lineage or subclan mates if he so chooses.

The actual men's house (yar igi) is large, oval shaped, on average 13 metres long (circumference 37 metres) and has usually two doors situated on the same side or at opposite ends of the structure. Its name derives from the plot of ground on which it is constructed. This site is the communal property of the men who occupy the house - unlike all other sites within the village which individual men own. When people say they 'belong to' or 'live at' Mamgram (house), they identify a particular location and the smallest group of individuals with whom they interact on a daily basis. The construction of the house mirrors the individual's place within this community setting. Each man who sleeps in the house is responsible for building his particular section of the walls and roof which is opposite to or borders on his bed location.

Conceptually, the men's house is a microcosm of the clan. Members
of a single lineage may reside in different houses, but informants describe the lineage as one of the four structural posts of the house, and the two doors as the clan's subclans. Men say that when a non-agnate first resides in the village, they give him a bed in between the house's four main posts. After he is accepted into the clan and participates in his sponsor's exchanges (that is, those of his wife's father or brother), he moves his bed toward his sponsor's subclan door and lineage post.

These statements, however, are only a conceptual charter; in practice, the pattern is subject to great variation. In some men's houses, there is a rough correlation between bed location and subclan and lineage membership. In others, no such pattern is discernible. One leader, Martin, told me that he had asked the men of his house to rearrange their beds to destroy this arrangement: he believed that divisions within the house led to ill-feelings among members.

Bed location sometimes corresponds to age and status. Old men often sleep in the centre of the house around the two fires just inside the doors so that 'their skins are not cold.' Young men likewise say that they cannot have 'soot on their skins' and sleep near the periphery of the house. Formerly, beds on either side of the two doors were reserved for big men or the 'first man' of a subclan (see chapter three) who were responsible for alerting others when night raids against the house occurred. Today many leaders are unaware of this custom, and men state that personal preference often distorts this pattern in particular situations. But informants always identify one or two men's house leaders and say they belong to the house of a particular leader.

Personal preference in men's house allegiance is also important. Young men frequently reside temporarily in several houses, sleeping one night or week in one house and moving on to another. This practice helps them choose a location where they will later settle. Men say that they live in a particular house because they own land nearby that can serve as a site for their wives' houses, because it is nearer to their gardens, because they like the other men of the house, because they followed a particular leader when the house was built, or because they wish to reside in a particular community. Sometimes disputes make
co-residence impossible; a man may leave the men's house to avoid further confrontations. Affiliation to a men's house is not constant over time. In the past, men completely rebuilt villages at new locations and this created opportunities for re-alignments within the village. Only 23 per cent of all Kaupagam adult males have resided in the same house during their entire lives. But despite these shifts, some stability of residence exists. Only one of 100 resident Kaupagam men changed men's houses during the 22 months I was in the field. While men's house shifts are impossible to date accurately, few men above the age of 40 have relocated more than three times during their lifetimes. On average, periods of ten or more years of continuous residence in a single house seems to be an accurate estimate for the post-contact period.

Table 1 shows the correlation between lineage and subclan membership and men's house affiliation for Kaupagam clan. The figures denote affiliation and not residence, because today men may reside in their wives' houses or sleep in the men's house at irregular periods.

Table 1: Kaupagam men's house affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subclan one</th>
<th>Mamgram</th>
<th>Aragor</th>
<th>Korowa</th>
<th>Total adult males</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lineage A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subclan total</td>
<td>4 (28.6%)</td>
<td>1 (7.1%)</td>
<td>9 ((64.3%)</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subclan two</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage D</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage E</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage F</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subclan total</td>
<td>14 (30.43%)</td>
<td>6 (13.04%)</td>
<td>26 (56.52%)</td>
<td>46 (99.99%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subclan three</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage G</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage H</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage I</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage J</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subclan total</td>
<td>20 (50%)</td>
<td>9 (20.58%)</td>
<td>11 (29.5%)</td>
<td>40 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men's house total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subclans are well distributed throughout the three men's houses. Lineages vary greatly to the extent to which they attach themselves to a single house. In lineage B only one of seven men resides in a separate house, and in lineage D four men out of eleven do. In contrast lineages E, F and H have one-half of their members affiliated with the same men's house.

A similar situation arises in individual families. Forty-three per cent of all men live in houses different from their fathers'. Salisbury saw little evidence of hostility between brothers in Siane, but relations between brothers are often strained in Chuave (1956b: 7, note 9). Sixty per cent of actual brothers lived in different men's houses.

The dispersal of lineage and subclan members in different men's houses is the result of individual choices and personal preferences. But this is not how people explain it. Rather they say this dispersal is purposive: that some fathers actually encourage their sons to dwell in a different house to themselves and that the movement of subclan members prevents the escalation of disputes by ensuring that subclans do not coincide with men's houses. I could not elicit any vernacular expression to describe this dispersal, but today men use the Pidgin miks miks (mixture). As a group strategy, however conscious or unconscious, the dispersal of close agnates is effective. I never witnessed a dispute or fight where men's house groups formally opposed each other. Quarrels between members of different subclans or men's houses result in people having to make particular choices: to align themselves with the disputing parties on the basis of blood ties or to align themselves with relations forged by co-residence. Because either of these options would mean offending one litigant or another, men often chose a safer course. They do not choose sides; they remain neutral or act as mediators to the dispute. The dispersal of men throughout the clan, therefore, decreases the likelihood of escalation and aids in the quick resolution of disputes.

Chuave residence patterns differ markedly from those in Siane. Salisbury has described the opposition of men's house wards in disputes
saying that when litigants are of different men's houses, these
dispute as units (1962: 13). Little divergence between descent group
and men's house affiliation occurs in Siane. Salisbury (personal
communication 1981) states that only four or five instances of non-
patrilineal men's house residence existed in 1953; informants explained
these to him as exceptional cases. Intra-clan structure in Chuave and
Siane are subsequently very different. For the Siane,

The relationship between all groupings are more
concretely expressed in the spatial distribution
of these groups. All descent groups are also
residence groups, which means that lineages live
next to one another in a common men's house area;
men's houses cluster in a village; the constituent
clans of an exogamous group are neighbours, and in
this way set themselves off from other clans of the
same tribe with whom they intermarry; yet the tribe
as a whole is also a residence group. (1956b: 5)

At the level of the subtribe and tribe this statement is also
true for Chuave - though I have noted that exceptions arise among clans
of a subtribe following defeat in warfare. Within the clan no such
spatial correlation between lineage and men's house exists in Chuave.
So strictly do Siane men adhere to this residence pattern that else­
where Salisbury has equated the men's house ward with a subclan (1964a:
169). Chuave men's house groups also reside together in a local ward.
But Chuave men's house groups and subclans constitute completely
different units: the former is a residential group, the latter a
descent group.

Chuave men's house groups differ also from those found in central
Simbu or Upper Simbu. There this unit is smaller and the house itself
is a part-time residence serving men who ordinarily live in houses
scattered throughout the surrounding area (Brown and Brookfield 1967:
131; Criper 1967: 86-88). It is associated with a subclan or, if small,
with a lineage.

'Half-doors' and subclan composition

The vernacular phrase koro guman koro koro, literally door-nose-
half, best translates into English as door division,16 but the Pidgin
term is *hap dua* (half-door). Men of the same subclan say they belong to the same *hap dua* and that a person of a different subclan belongs to 'another door'. References to doors to describe agnatic groups are common throughout Chuave and surrounding areas. Bragginton describes the Beha clan (Lufa census division, Eastern Highlands) as being divided into two doors but does not distinguish the further division of lineage-posts (1978:136-137). References to 'half-doors' also exist in the Salt-Nomane area and in Sinasina, but in this latter area the term does not seem to be used in as strict a sense as it is in Chuave (Hide personal communication 1981). Sinasina subclans are also named. In Chuave some named subclans exist in Kamara, Kebai and Kau tribes, generally among clans with a population of over 350 people. These same tribes have a history of migration from the Sinasina area. Thus Chuave is a transitional area: to the east and south unnamed subclans exist, to the west and throughout Sinasina and central Simbu (Brookfield and Brown 1963: 85) subclans are named.

The half-door idiom was not used in Siane during Salisbury's fieldwork (1952-1953) and Salisbury has explicitly stated that, although he attempted to elicit idiomatic expressions and to discover some sort of dualism in Siane clans, he found none (personal communication 1981). Today the Siane have adopted the Chuave idiom and use both the Pidgin *hap dua* and a new vernacular phrase *kanu firinka farenka*17 to refer to a mid-order group - one larger than the lineage and smaller than the clan.

I have no precise observational data for Siane groups at this level, nor did I collect genealogical information from Siane clans. Siane informants insisted only that the 'door' exists and that members of this group may reside in different men's houses, though they most often share the same house. Given the nature of residence patterns in Siane, therefore, I assume that first, the original merging of lineages into doors took place as the result of shared residence in a single men's house, and second, given the changes to villages throughout the Siane-Chuave region, residence within the Siane clan may be more irregular than in the past. It is also possible that membership in the subclan is much more flexible in Siane than in Chuave. For Kaupagam clan, I know of no instances where men have changed their subclan affiliation. Informants say that this is simply impossible;
membership, except in the case of non-agnates within the clan, is defined by birth.

Most Chuave clans have only two subclans, but very large clans of over 300 people occasionally contain three or four. In these exceptional clans people still speak of the clan as divided into halves; they simply group together subclans and refer to them as one of two doors. When inquiring about subclan leadership and gathering genealogical material, I discovered further divisions. Thus, Kaupagam men commonly identified only their own subclan mates and said all other clan members belonged to the opposite door. But they also identified three subclans by reference to outstanding leaders in each group. Subclans one, two and three (containing two, four and four lineages) listed in Table 1, were respectively associated with Kopon (a councillor), Dege (a village court magistrate), and Mama (ex-luluai). Men subsequently say they belong to Kopon's, Dege's or Mama's door.

More commonly two leaders, one per subclan, exist within the clan. Subclan leaders assume primary responsibility in exchanges and distributions involving their group and act as mediators in disputes between subclans. This person is often referred to as the 'first man' of the door (cf. Reay 1959: 114) and today such leaders assume many of the responsibilities once associated with the lineage head - a point I return to in the following chapter. Subclan leaders often reside in different men's houses from their rivals. Indeed recognized leaders of all types often choose to distance themselves from major rivals. Thus, Peter, a potential replacement for Mama as subclan leader, told me that he resided in Mamgrara rather than Korowa (Mama's men's house) because he did not wish to appear to be attempting to force Mama's retirement by encroaching on men supposedly loyal to this aged leader.

The subclan is also the unit to which an incest prohibition applies. Men state that sexual intercourse between brothers and sisters of opposite doors sometimes occurs, but intercourse between unmarried young people of the same door is strictly forbidden; when such relationships become public they invariably lead to fighting and to large compensation payments (over K200 and several pigs). Although it is permissible for young people belonging to opposite doors to flirt, joke and be seen together at courting parties, those of the
same door must avoid any such public behaviour. This prohibition contrasts to the situation in central Simbu where Brown notes that people do not express concern about incest (1969: 81).

People describe quarrels between members of opposite doors as 'cold' in contrast to those within the door which are 'hot'. When I described outbreaks of physical violence to men in the village, they often showed a lack of interest when the dispute involved men of the opposite door. When the men I was addressing belonged to the same subclan as the disputants, however, they immediately asked for details about the quarrel. Within the men's house itself, the division into halves may become spatially defined. Thus, although there is often only a loose correlation between bed location and subclan membership, men often retreat to one side or fire when discussions and disputes involving their opposite door arise. Sometimes this division becomes so formalized that it is as if an invisible barrier split the men's house in two. Men trying to act as mediators shout angrily across the men's house or walk to the centre of the house, admonish the litigants for disturbing the men's house as a whole, and return finally to their own subclan mates.

In joint action, men's house affiliation often overrides subclan membership. As many as 20 men, for example, band together to construct women's houses within the village. Co-residents regularly comprise 60 to 80 per cent of these work teams, with the remaining men belonging to the same subclan but to men's houses different from the man whom they are helping. Similarly co-residents often combine to fence garden plots, to maintain the upkeep of the men's house area, or to repair fences adjacent to the men's house.

At ceremonies however subclan membership predominates. Men say that at distributions, subclan members should sit together in the men's house or in the men's house square. In practice men seldom do this, but the subclan is the most important agnatic unit contributing to specific exchanges. All clan members may attend and contribute to any exchange a clan-mate sponsors. Because men use modern valuables such as cash and beer in ceremonies, clan members are able to contribute small amounts to exchanges and thus affirm their ties to even the most distant of clan brothers. In chapter four I detail fully how men use
wealth in ceremonial exchange. Here I note only that subclansmen raise the greater part of the payment. The gift of pigs, still a primary valuable in Chuave, forms the central component of any payment and is one indicator of the subclan's importance. Thus, of three marriage payments for which I have complete data, subclan members contributed 70 per cent of all pigs given live or slaughtered. Lineage mates contributed a core payment of between 26 and 30 per cent of their subclan contribution. The remaining 30 per cent of the pay consisted of gifts from members of the opposite door or from kinsmen and affines outside the clan. Co-residence influences contributions, however. Members of the sponsor's men's house donated 42 to 63 per cent of pigs given at these marriages. Thus, members of a subclan who also share common residence form the core contribution of between 40 and 50 per cent.

This pattern of contribution is recent in origin. Men state that formerly, as in Siane (Salisbury 1962: 94), the lineage was the principal pooling unit for exchanges. Lineage mates gave contributions with no expectation of return. But with the inflation of exchanges after contact, the lineage soon found it impossible to raise the valuables needed in intra- and inter-clan prestations. Men state that today they do not expect any return on valuables given to subclansmen and some men argue that aid from clansmen should be 'free'. Informants are explicit about the burdens of large exchanges saying that before they gave to their lineage post, today they give to their door, and that if the inflation of exchanges continues, they will give to their clansmen without expectation of return.

The relationship between exchange and the definition of groups is important throughout Melanesia. In speaking of Hagen marriage prohibitions, Marilyn Strathern notes that when a specific category of kin is defined as ineligible for marriage this is less the result of a conceptualized category of kin than 'it is the existing obligations between specific kinsmen that Hageners see as a bar to marriage' (1972a: 77-78). This observation is also true for Chuave and helps to explain people's changing perceptions of groups within the clan.

Chuave and Siane informants agreed that marriage with a woman of a
man's mother's door was prohibited, stating that they took 'food to the door' of a man's classificatory mother's brothers. I found no examples of marriages which violated this norm. Conversely, men express a preference (but never unsolicited) for marriage with a classificatory mother's brother's daughter, but specifically with a woman of a man's mother's opposite door. But such marriages are exceptional and constitute less that four per cent of all current marriages. A few men, however, argued that this was not always so, and that in both Siane and Chuave the operative unit had once been the lineage. The vast majority of men, however, told me that this was absolutely wrong and maintained that the subclan always regulated marriage. But Salisbury's assertion that, in 1952-1953, Siane men were prohibited from marrying into their mother's brother's lineage gives some validity to these exceptional statements (1956a: 646).18

Because the lineage has declined in importance as the principal pooling or sharing unit in exchanges between affinal kin, the Siane have redefined their marriage prohibition in terms of the new operative unit, the subclan. In Chuave this may also have occurred, yet it is possible that most informants are indeed correct in asserting that the subclan has always been the prohibited unit. It is clear, however, that changes in exchange patterns and reciprocity have resulted in a shift from lineage to subclan, and that this latter group is nowadays more important and formalized than in the past. In the next chapter I show how this process has had fundamental implications for leadership within the clan.

The posts: lineage composition

Lineage mates say they are 'one post' of the men's house or that they are 'one blood' (arginom towane). Whereas in central Simbu where this latter reference denotes many things, including locality and shared residence in a men's house (Brown 1972: 37), in Chuave this term pertains to small patrilineal groups believed to be closely related by blood. During disputes between men of the same subclan, I have seen men trace the veins on their arms to demonstrate their perception of the branches between one blood groups within the door.

Yet lineage composition is not well-defined, and even men of the
same lineage cannot always agree on whether or not particular persons should be included or excluded from this group. Genealogies in Chuave, as elsewhere in the highlands, are shallow. A person may be able to recall at most the name of his grandfather's brothers and only the oldest men of the lineage are able to provide a genealogical rationale for the group as a whole (cf. Reay 1959: appendix; Salisbury 1956b: 4).

As in central Simbu and Siane (Brown 1969: 81; Salisbury 1956b: 5), the Chuave lineage is associated with a pair of ancestral flutes, each with its own name and distinctive tune. In the past, initiation practices made it easier for men to identify their lineage mates. Initiates cradled in their arms the flutes of their particular lineage. As a result they henceforth called themselves members of the Bandi or Koiboiri (flute) lineage, and the ability to trace actual genealogical ties became unnecessary.

Today however, initiation of male youths no longer survives: it ceased in the early 1950s, and men as old as 35 are regularly unable to name their lineage flutes. Most men, in fact, show little interest in lineage membership, and as I have noted, the lineage has lost much of its importance as a ceremonial unit. Based on genealogies and on flute identification by old men, the typical lineage in Chuave comprises six married men, their unmarried children, and two aged and widowed men.

The guardian of the flutes was the lineage's eldest male member. He was addressed as aunam or 'my eldest brother' by all members of his age-group and called 'first father' (awo or nenam) by younger lineage mates. This man, whom I call the lineage head, assumed responsibilities similar to his Siane counterpart, the yarafo (Salisbury 1962: 21-22). In chapters three and four I discuss the succession to this position and the reasons for why the lineage head's authority has declined since contact. Here I note only that even prior to contact the aunam does not seem to have been as significant a political leader as the Siane yarafo. Several indicators support this statement.

First, unlike Siane where lineage property - flutes, lineage land,
ritual knowledge, gerua (ancestor board) designs, and the right to make speeches — comprises an 'entailed estate' with the lineage head as trustee (ibid.:61), all Chuave men individually own property. The Chuave aunam acted as his lineage's representative in ritual, but he did not control gerua designs nor did he possess special ritual knowledge. Rather, specialists in various rituals, garden or war magic existed in each clan. Nor does the aunam make decisions to cultivate land or organize work on lineage land. In Chuave, individual owners of particular plots assume this responsibility.

With respect to land, the Chuave lineage head is a guardian. He is not necessarily the largest owner of lineage land, as in Siane, but he has some control over the alienation of land. Specifically, non-agnates should always consult with the aunam before selling their land and although an agnate may independently decide to alienate his own garden plots, etiquette requires him to clear this transaction with the lineage head — and today with a subclan leader. Similarly when a man dies leaving sons or daughters who are not yet old enough to cultivate gardens, the aunam is often responsible for ensuring that others in the lineage do not use this land or that it is eventually returned to the deceased's offspring.

Today the lineage seldom acts as a unit. Lineage mates occasionally join together in fencing gardens or in constructing women's houses, but in both these situations co-residents who belong to different lineages may aid in the work. Lineage wives frequently join together to prepare communal meals for lineage members — often on Sundays or other Christian holidays. Here again, however, men and women who are not related may participate in these communal meals, and some lineage mates from other men's houses often fail to attend. These occasions then are subject to great variation, and ties of friendship often mean that participants from outside the lineage are present.

The extent to which a lineage head dominates distributions depends on both individual ambition and the relationship between the lineage and subclan leader. Thus, at weddings a lineage head may actively participate in the decisions regarding distribution of foodstuffs, beer, and cash. Conversely, he may allow the subclan leader to assume this responsibility. The two leaders sometimes act in tandem. Today
the effective or operative lineage leader may be a young man. Where
this man hopes to demonstrate his mastery of distribution to the sub-
clan or clan, he may attempt to isolate the subclan leader and prevent
him from acting as representative in the exchange. Such occasions
usually lead to complaints by those involved in the exchange. People
admire co-operation between lineage heads and between a lineage head
and major big men such as magistrates or subclan leaders.

Summary

In this chapter I have outlined the major forces - economic
change, missionization and the introduction of administrative
and legal institutions - that have transformed the nature of Chuave
groups. Later in my thesis I fully discuss each of these factors in
reference to changing patterns of leadership. The expansion and
contraction of effective political groups did not begin with contact.
But the presence of the Australian administration resulted in a
political environment of unprecedented stability; that is, an
environment in which clans could live in close proximity without fear
of major attacks from enemies.

It is now clear that the clan continues to be a conceptually
bounded, agnatic group demarcated by political and jural norms which
isolate it from other groups. Even where clan members live in
different communities clan solidarity remains evident. As a corporate
unit the clan now participates in ceremonies that were once the sole
responsibility of smaller segmentary groups. And as I show in chapter
four, it is the involvement of the clan in competitive exchanges that,
in the absence of warfare, ensures its continued solidarity vis-à-vis
other groups.

Yet ceremonial activity punctuates the calendric year only at
irregular intervals. In the daily flow of events people now interact
with others outside the clan. As is evident in the prohibition against
warfare between 'close people' (the proximate clans forming a subtribe)
Chuave people believe that shared locality requires them to limit and
control tensions between groups so that major disruptions to the social
order do not occur. With pacification, the creation of vehicular roads
and subsequent modifications to village organization the clan as polity
has declined in importance. Just as men's house residence encourages co-operation between members of different lineages and subclans, today shared locality in a single village, community or eria promotes peaceful co-existence between clans. Thus although men maintained that future wars between clans are possible - itself and indication of continued clan solidarity - they do not believe they are likely. During the last 25 to 30 years in Duma there have been only four inter-clan skirmishes - fought with bows and arrows - and no prolonged hostilities.

Despite continued rivalry between clans in ceremonial exchange and between big men of different groups, people now believe in representative institutions that incorporate these formerly autonomous groups. As important, established leaders regularly move between clans. Government officials mediate disputes between unrelated kinsmen and take an interest in the affairs of the ward, tribe or eria. Subsequently, in the next chapter I consider the role of the first government leaders in Chuave and show how the introduction of these officials by the Australian administration radically transformed the nature of political authority and competition at the local level.
Howlet et al (1976:193) provides man-land ratios for Simbu province. The Daribi-Karamui area has a population density of 9 persons per square kilometre, significantly lower than 56 per square kilometre in Siane, 47 persons per square kilometre in Chuave and 132 persons per square kilometre in central Simbu (Waiye census division).

A 1939 patrol report (Downs CPR 1939-40) refers to a base camp at Chuave. A 1935 patrol report mentions two villages on the Maifutigar (now Mai) River but makes no reference to the name Chuave (Black PR B.16: 2). The origin of the word itself is unclear and I discovered no vernacular meaning for it. Rather, people say only that it is a place-name, but villagers living near the station were unable to point out any specific plot of ground or traditional site called Chuave.

Map 1 is adapted from Howlet et al (1976: vii). I composed Map 2 with the aid of Gomia, Kamara and Duma informants. Tribal boundaries may shift slightly according to different informants and are still subject to formal adjudication between members of different clans or tribes.

Siane Local Government Council administers only Nambaiyufa census division. Siane speakers belonging to the Eastern Highlands province elect councillors to Watabung Local Government Council. Salisbury's research was conducted among those Siane groups now belonging to Nambaiyufa census division. Nambaiyufa people stress they are Siane not Simbu, and say only that they 'belong to Simbu' (province).

I gathered this information during a single, three-day visit to the Nomane area in September 1980.

I use the term 'descent group' in the most general sense of a group with an ascription of common descent from a real or mythical ancestor. For the Upper Simbu Valley, Criper argues that men do not employ any descent construct when referring to their main named groups. It sometimes seems possible to suggest resemblances in size or function between Chuave and Upper Simbu groups - for example, between the Chuave tribe and Upper Simbu 'district'. But Criper's perspective makes such comparisons questionable; he is primarily concerned with 'quasi-groups' or temporary ego-based alliances of men that emerge in specific ceremonies or other social situations (see Criper 1967: 116, 291, 316-317). I therefore ignore the Upper Simbu material and focus on a Chuave-central-Simbu comparison.

Andrew Strathern gives a population range of 241 to 6,719 for Hagen tribes (1971: 21). Chuave tribes fall within this range but the average size is considerably smaller; 2,816 for Hagen (based on Strathern's table) as compared to 1,215 for Chuave.

The Village Courts Act makes no provision for the creation of specific court erias. In Chuave, Elimbari Council determined these. The history of these decisions and subsequent changes to court areas are too complex for me to fully detail them here.
9. Salisbury (1962) calls this group a phratry. I have used 'phratry' in a fashion similar to other authors, to describe the largest descent group in Chuave. To avoid confusion I have ignored Salisbury's term in my thesis and refer to subtribes when speaking about both the Chuave and Siane areas.

10. Salisbury has described these and other ritual aspects of the Siane pig festival which closely resemble those found in Chuave (1965: 66-69). Chuave men, like those in Siane, often attempted to synchronize rites of passage with the pig feast. Traditionally however, the Chuave pig festival cycle seems to have been more variable than the Siane; men held pig feasts at intervals of between three and seven years.

11. Brookfield and Brown state that councillors are usually leaders of clan sections and that komiti are subclan leaders (1963: 12). This is another indicator that the Chuave and Siane subtribe can be correlated with the central Simbu clan section. This comparison is questionable, however, because the Australian administrative appointment of leaders and the creation of council ward boundaries is notoriously variable in linking together groups that villagers may not perceive as related.

12. I have taken the Chuave numbers from the 1979 census. Although the figures may be inaccurate, I am familiar with all of the administrative units listed and they correspond to groups I call clans. Using these same census figures for Siane, I obtained an average clan size of 195, a figure remarkably close to Salisbury's estimate (1962: 14). Siane clans range from 66 to 344 people per clan. In both average and range of size, therefore, Siane clans are smaller than those in Chuave.

13. Hatanaka (1972: 13-21) and Hide (1980: 50-53) provide only brief outlines of social groups and, although there appear to be differences between Sinasina and central Simbu, the authors do not elaborate on these and their terminology follows Brown's.

14. After hearing of this association between political status and bed location, one subclan leader promptly shifted his bed to correspond to the traditional pattern, saying he would follow the customs of his ancestors.

15. Because further residence changes may occur, I offer this figure only as an illustration. There is no significant change to the percentage, however, when specific age categories form the sample.

16. The word guman has several idiomatic meanings but men literally translate it as 'nose'. Here, however, it clearly denotes division. Similarly, kon guman borongwa means a fork in a path or road, and the phrase non kion gumanon boro bebinie describes the breaking of a pig's jaw into two halves during a wedding ceremony (the bride and groom then exchange the halves).
17. The Siane *kanu* means door or path, and *firinka* is a boundary mark. Salisbury notes that the phrase *kanu firinka farenka* would translate as 'from the door on this side to the door on that side' and does not believe it could refer to 'halves' as is the case with the Chuave phrase (personal communication 1980, 1981).

18. The central Simbu data are also relevant here. Brown notes that marriage prohibitions are difficult to define and that they may shift occasionally. She states the prohibition as involving a man's mother's subclan section or one blood group. Later she adds that sometimes the prohibition applies to the mother's entire subclan. Unlike Chuave, however, people regularly violate this second prohibition (Brown 1969: 81-82).
In this chapter I reconstruct traditional leadership patterns, and using this baseline, I examine a few aspects of local level political change over a 50 year period, specifically the nature of political competition and the degree of power wielded by leaders during several post-contact periods. At issue is how the colonial administration transformed leadership patterns by introducing government officials and later local government councils (Brown 1963; Salisbury 1964b; Reay 1964; A. Strathern 1966). I also consider a related issue often ignored in the literature: the effect of missionization on local politics.

Pre-contact politics: a reconstruction

Traditionally, a big man's power base lay within his clan. Leaders could enhance their status or reputation in other clans, but a renowned man could not command men outside his natal group. Both fear of sorcery attacks and potential physical assault by enemies curtailed a leader's interaction with other clans. Pig festivals or large food distributions, the two occasions when several clans cooperated, allowed group representatives who were flamboyant orators and wealthy men to 'lift up their names' in other clans. All other exchanges were small in scale, being attended by members of a single lineage and perhaps one or two leaders from other lineages or subclans.

In one respect big men were influential in inter-group affairs. By acting as neutral third parties they encouraged cessation of warfare or minor hostilities and acted as mediators during compensation payments. The effectiveness of a leader on such occasions rested on the extent to which a man's reputation was valued in other clans, and whether he was perceived to be unbiased in his decisions. Moreover, his influence resulted from people's perception of his group's strength. Leaders could threaten to involve their own groups in the confrontation, thereby upsetting the balance of power. The leader's reputation as well as the corporate strength of his clan, therefore, were important factors in the settlement. In the absence of these conditions any leader's attempt to enforce decisions on members of
other groups was doomed to failure simply because 'outside men' were not authorized leaders.

In discussing traditional Madang politics Morauta notes that some communities might have several big men while others have none at all though this is not to say they were leaderless (1974: 21-22).² People in Chuave also stressed that political competition varied in different clan-villages. Characterizations of political competition, however, are difficult to make. Three generalizations, still applicable today, seem justified. First, big men could be associated with particular men's houses and still act as leaders of subclans and lineages. Second, where men of equal power existed they reached tacit or explicit agreements concerning their respective domains. Thus, rivals resided in different men's houses and, in exchanges, dominated only those distributions involving their own social groups. Third, young men first achieved recognition within their own lineage and men's house group and only later became authorized leaders of subclans or extended their authority to other men's houses.

This is not to suggest that political followings correspond to the segmentary structure of the clan; membership in particular units determines only the position of spokesman. Within the clan a man competes with other leaders for the allegiance of followers - first within his own men's house group and then more generally throughout the village. In the past skill or bravery in warfare, physical strength, ritual expertise in garden and pig magic all enhanced a man's reputation but were not sufficient by themselves to build a wide following. Rather, the defining characteristics of a big man were and are oratorical skill, expertise as a distributor or manager of group valuables, and an ability to mediate disputes.

The relative importance of particular skills varies through time. In order to distribute valuables and to challenge the authority of an existing leader, a young man must contribute a large amount of his own personal wealth in given exchanges or sponsor his own ceremonies (see chapter four). Once a big man has demonstrated his ability to provide a fair distribution of valuables and to act as group spokesman, however, he needs only to expend a minimum of his wealth and may even act in this capacity when he has not contributed to particular
exchanges. In the past young men also built reputations as fierce warriors. But an established big man's life, men say, was too important to be risked and a big man rarely, if ever, participated in battle (cf. Bergmann 1971: 194; A. Strathern 1971: 75).

For central Simbu Brown stresses the 'emergent' big man, a leader who achieves his position through personal ambition (de Lepervanche 1973: 3). She argues that there were no 'hereditary positions' and few 'hereditary advantages' - a position she has recently reasserted despite Standish's evidence that the Simbu frequently state that 'in principle' leadership passed from father to son (Brown 1963: 5, 1979: 103; Standish 1978: 15). Salisbury has also explicitly denied hereditary leadership in Siane though he describes a method of succession for the lineage head (1962: 22).

In Chuave a generalized ideology of hereditary leadership and a specific method of succession within the lineage endowed certain individuals with advantages most of their peers did not have and so enabled a few men an easier pathway to power. Burling states that in any hereditary system resulting in the acquisition of real power there are always ways of evading rules of hereditary accession (1974: 163). I would reverse this statement for Chuave. Achieved criteria are the basis for initial recruitment, but when ambitious men emerge appeals to hereditary rules further bolster their status and power, and disadvantage their competitors. Furthermore, where no hereditary advantage exists, or conversely where people regard the advantaged few as inadequate leaders, men adjust beliefs about ascribed status to accommodate or rationalize post facto the status of the emergent big man. This contradiction is real: in Chuave an ideology of hereditary leadership exists, but the nature of succession is such that achieved and not ascribed traits predominate in the selection of leaders.

Brown (1979) correctly asserts that, because promising leaders may have died in warfare or because sons may claim that their fathers were big men when in fact they were not major leaders, it is difficult to accurately test succession to big man status. Yet there is a growing body of evidence which stresses the importance of ascribed status in the selection of Melanesian leaders. Chowning (1979) and Hau'ofa (1981: 291) document many coastal and island examples of
leadership patterns that stress both ascribed and achieved characteristics. While acknowledging the importance of competition and personal ambition in Tauade, Hallpike has gone so far as to label leaders chiefs, thus emphasizing the crucial importance of hereditary ideology (1977: 138-143). For Hagen, Andrew Strathern notes that sons 'emulate' their fathers, and that major big men favour the idea that their sons should replace them as leaders. Major big men are three times as likely to have fathers who were leaders rather than ordinary men. Yet minor big men in Hagen have no more than a fifty-fifty chance of being a leader's son. But Strathern believes achieved, not ascribed status is most important. He states that no hereditary rules exist and describes Hagen society as a meritocracy in which any advantage a son has stems from his aspirations to achieve a status similar to his father's and, perhaps, the 'head start' which a big man can give to his son, through using wealth or by ensuring that his son marries early in his political career (1971: 208-212).

In contrast the Kuma do have a recognized hereditary rule. When the authorized leader of a sub-subclan (equivalent to the Chuave and Siane lineage) dies, his eldest son replaces him as leader (Reay 1959: 114). When a son was unable to replace his father because of immaturity, lack of interest or for other reasons, the position passed to the leader's younger brother or to less closely related kinsmen within the sub-subclan (Reay 1981: personal communication). Sixty-four per cent of leaders in the 1950s had succeeded their fathers to this position (op cit).

For Duma I first attempted to establish the names of pre-contact leaders whose reputations as leaders were unquestionable. People remembered only four such leaders belonging to four Duma clans. Only one of these had a son and grandson who were also major leaders. Ambitious Chuave men, like those in Hagen, do not invariably claim their fathers were big men. But because current leaders or ambitious men may claim such status for their fathers, I decided to survey current leaders who had held government office - a status that I could check with other men throughout the area. Eleven of 52 village court magistrates (21.15 per cent) and 11 of 29 councillors (37.9 per cent) had fathers who had also served as government officials - the majority as either luluais or tultuls. Overall, therefore, 27 per cent of
men currently serving in some government capacity had fathers who had also been government leaders.

To acknowledge, as Brown does, that a test of succession is difficult because current leaders may rationalize *post facto* their fathers' status itself indicates that informants perceive heredity to be important. The following explanation by a Duma leader, age 34, illustrates the mixture of ascribed and achieved qualities preferred as the ideal type of Chuave leader.

> We know a leader's way and look at his child. When a big man has a male child first that boy can be a leader. If four or five big men have children who are age-mates, one will be first [in seniority]. Will he be a leader? We don't know. A leader is a man who is clever, who speaks well and who 'steers' men's work. Is the first man a 'true' leader or a 'nothing' leader? We don't know - that is up to him. But in the lineage the first man is always the leader.

Men have different opinions about the importance of hereditary status. Some men argue that the sons of lineage heads and major leaders automatically become big men. But the general consensus is that men watch closely the sons of leaders for indications of leadership skills. This is the difference between 'nothing' leaders, men who may speak in public or are respected because of their fathers' status, and 'true' leaders who gain power and authority to act on behalf of the group.

While a man gives small allotments of his land to kinsmen sharing a common men's house, he gives most of his land and other wealth to his sons often well before his death. After marriage the eldest son often controls large amounts of land which he may temporarily allocate to gain a political following. Only later, when his younger brothers reach marriageable age, is it necessary to further sub-divide his land according to his father's wishes. Therefore, the sons of wealthy leaders or men owning larger than average tracts of land accrue some early economic advantage. But people also believe that a son inherits both the physical and personality traits of his father or grandfather. Indigenous conceptions of biological and social inheritance are not well-defined, and unlike the Tauade for instance, Chuave people have no native theory of a 'creative force' or power as the basis for their hereditary ideology. Men stress that a son's behaviour tends
to replicate his father's. Humour, anger, good judgement, diligence, and personal strength are a few such characteristics. Men also recognize that a big man encourages and even trains his son to follow in his footsteps. But unlike Hageners who also say sons emulate their fathers, in Chuave a man gains some advantage simply by his birth. Within two men's house groups in Keu, for example, many men bemoaned the fact that their current big men were childless - even though both had adopted sons - and encouraged these leaders to divorce their 'barren' wives so as to produce male children who could carry the name of the clan. The reputation of the group is thus an important consideration in the choice of a leader; the son of a prominent big man more easily enhances the group's name by appealing to his father's former status and exemplary actions.

The quotation above also acknowledges a distinction between age-mates (enambai) and other clan brothers. In the past, as few as five or as many as 15 youths were initiated simultaneously and travelled together to other clans for courting parties. As in Siane, age-mates are the preferred choice for leviratic inheritance of widows (Salisbury 1962: 16). Age-mates play together as children and youths, often forming life-long friendships. True age-mates, men whose births are close together (within approximately a one year period), share a special relationship. They often act as guardians to each other's children or name children after their enambai, thereby creating 'one-name' relationships which their children may call upon for aid in exchange. Age-mates are in many ways socially identical (Salisbury 1962: 16) and in Chuave food prohibitions affirmed the intensity of these relationships. Men could not eat the meat of pigs or game killed by age-mates, nor accept food from an age-mate's wife.4 Today, however, age-mates do not always follow these prohibitions.

Within this subset of classificatory brothers, the first born has a special status. He is the 'first man' and should act as leader and guardian to his peers. Men say particular first born children demonstrate leadership qualities in children's play activities and suggest that they will continue as leaders throughout their lives. Rival big men who are approximately the same age may all produce sons therefore, but one is inevitably born first and may use the term 'first man' to legitimize his political aspirations. Ideally, the eldest of
an age-mate group marries and has a male child before his peers. Thus, when this individual becomes a big man later in his life, his child is the natural successor, not only because he is the son of a big man, but also because he is 'the first man'.

Men often adjust generational boundaries to accommodate men who have demonstrated leadership abilities. When I asked men who would replace Mama, a former government official, as leader of his subclan, they named four minor big men whose ages ranged from mid-thirties to late forties. Three of these men claimed to be the eldest of their age-grades. They paid no attention to the set of men who had been initiated together; rather, each man simply defined the boundary of his age-group downward from his own birth and ignored all older men. Subsequently, the onus is on followers to determine who becomes the subclan leader and who becomes the 'first man' by deciding which claims to first born status are legitimate and which may be ignored. Big men are not always the 'first men' of respective subclans, and it cannot be said that proven leaders acquire this title post facto. Rather, there is an occasional adjustment to the alignment of generations to accommodate capable leaders. When a big man has some legitimate claim as the eldest of his generation, this is unnecessary. But the fact remains that just as men have an advantage because they are 'first', so too - at least in some instances - men become 'first' men because they have proven themselves as big men.

Variations in this belief in both Kuma and Siane help explain succession at the lineage level. As I have noted, Kuma succession for the sub-subclan's 'first man' is from father to eldest son. In Kuma, as in Siane and Chuave a man has many 'fathers' - all subclan members - but commonly only men of the same sub-subclan, who are born about the same time as a man's father, may be addressed by this kin term. An actual brother or patrilateral parallel cousin who may be a secondary leader is technically next in succession to the authorized leader if the leader's son is too young. When such secondary leaders are the most senior of a line other than that of the leader, they are disqualified as 'first' because they were too young when the previous leader died or retired. Alternatively, the secondary leader 'is the most senior of a line junior to that of a leader who has no sons' (Reay 1959: 114).
In Siane the lineage head is yarafo, eldest brother, to his own generation and 'first father' to children in the lineage. Succession to the yarafo's position passes from first father to next eldest brother of the same generation. This new eldest brother then becomes yarafo to his own generation and first father to all children in the lineage. When all members of the parental generation have died or retired, the yarafo of the next generation becomes lineage head. Salisbury states that the 'dividing point between generations is arranged so that the yarafo of the rising generation is a capable person and anyone younger than him is his younger brother' (1962: 22).

Chuave and Siane kin terms are equivalent. In Chuave, within the lineage the aunam, eldest brother, replaces the nenam, first father. Although a man may call any older male of his own generation 'eldest brother' the term is generally restricted to lineage members. People thus equate succession to the positions of 'first man' and 'first father'; the latter is a more specific form of the former. The first father is a leader to younger members of his generation within the lineage, occasionally acts as the guardian of lineage land, and oversees lineage distributions. Today, because of inflation in ceremonial exchange, subclan leaders commonly assume these responsibilities and override the authority of particular lineage heads (see chapter four).

The major difference between modes of succession in Siane and Chuave is that Chuave people believe the shift from first father to next eldest of his generation is a temporary one. Because, as in Kuma, the lineage head's son may not be of an age to act as leader, the headship must pass to the eldest member of the older generation. When the lineage head's son comes of age, he replaces any younger members of the aunam's generation who retire, provided he is a capable man. The division between generations is adjusted to accommodate his new status. Because the lineage has declined in significance as a social group, only old men could accurately assess the former importance of the aunam or describe succession to the lineage headship. Younger men stressed that father-son succession and age-grading were important in the subclan or more generally, throughout the clan.

I have described succession in ideal form in order to show that
a combination of ascribed and achieved status is important in these three societies. In each, I would argue, relationships between men of a single generation, especially between age-mates, and the notion of hereditary father-son succession are important. But in reality particular conditions and political competition distort systems of succession. A lineage leader, for example, may not have a son and so a secondary leader replaces him. Conversely a man may delay his retirement in order that his own son, and not the son of a previous leader, is given the time to demonstrate his leadership capabilities. Within the lineage and subclan it is followers who must determine which of several possible competing claims to authority are legitimate. In the absence of elections the test of leadership was in the actual exercise of authority. People either heeded the aspirant to leadership or ignored his claims to succession. Today, leader and follower alike signal the importance of both ascribed and achieved status when they give or withhold their support, or when they attempt to manipulate the system to fulfill their own or another's political ambitions.

The case for despotism

One central and still unresolved issue in highlands ethnography concerns the degree of power that pre- and early post-contact leaders possessed. Brown argues that the introduction of government officials and institutions by the Australian administration resulted in leaders whose power was unprecedented by traditional standards (1963). Salisbury has contested this by arguing that 'although the indigenous ideology was one of democratic equality and competition, the empirical situation at this time [pre-contact] was one of serial despotism by powerful leaders' (1964b: 215). Salisbury demonstrates how a number of factors - including economic changes as well as the existence of administration sanctions - enhanced the power and sphere of influence of some post-contact leaders. He concludes that anthropologists have ignored these powerful leaders ('directors') in pre- and post-contact society because they are outnumbered by lesser big men ('executives'), whose behaviour regularly accords with the prevailing political ideology of egalitarianism and competition.

Andrew Strathern notes that Salisbury fails to provide an
explanation of how men become directors or how they control managers (1966: 356). Salisbury maintains only that directors do not arise through the 'system', that is, 'by standard procedures for promotion and decision making', and suggests that political patronage may be one important factor in the rise of these men. His sole example of this latter variable is a post-contact one (1964b: 236-239).

I believe that one way real big men succeeded in maintaining power and authority for long periods was by combining the ascribed and achieved characteristics I have outlined above. But unlike Salisbury, I do not believe that pre-contact leaders regularly became despotic or autonomous leaders. Moreover, flaws in Salisbury's argument suggest that extremely powerful highlands leaders could only have emerged under post-contact conditions. Briefly, I re-examine the evidence for traditional despotism.

Watson (1971) wrote his account of the Tairora despot, Matoto, on the basis of people's statements 39 years after contact. This leader's reputation was certainly enhanced over the intervening decades, but Watson clearly distinguishes between the legendary and historical figure. Matoto was both a peacemaker and wealthy man who controlled the entire resources of his local community. Watson argues that the economic benefits Matoto's followers enjoyed were less important than Matoto's personal strength and his reputation as a fierce, feared warrior. His 'unbridled sexuality' possibly added to the aura of strength, for Matoto, unlike other men, was immune to the contaminating influence of women and flagrantly violated the sexual mores of his community. Matoto's control over economic resources, Watson believes, was more the result than the cause of his despotic rule. Nonetheless, if Matoto's aggression helped launch his career, he further consolidated his power later in life by controlling economic resources.

This despot allegedly killed many men in both his own and enemy groups. Yet Watson provides only two examples of 'inside' killings. One was Matoto's wife, and, as Watson acknowledges, this was by no means an exceptional occurrence in the highlands. The second victim was probably Matoto's affine who was residing in Matoto's territory. The stimulus for the killing, furthermore, came from the victim's natal
group. Matoto received payment for this death, and I would argue that it resembled a 'contract' killing similar to Matoto's mercenary acts against enemy groups. Watson notes that the man was a non-agnate yet fails to provide any further examples of killing within the local group - Matoto's major political arena of about 200 people. I believe that any such action would have seriously endangered Matoto's authority and must have been rare indeed.

Matoto's personal network of supporters and his political influence, however, spread beyond his local group. The despot could walk freely over great distances through five different territories, and Watson estimates that 2,000 to 2,500 individuals may sometimes have 'fought or thought of themselves as a part of Matoto's enterprises' at some time during his career (ibid.: 253). Yet Matoto's 'reign' introduced no specific political or military innovations (ibid.: 263). Loyalty and allegiance to Matoto varied over time. Inter-group hostility persisted throughout his career and must have occasionally disrupted Matoto's influence beyond his own group. Matoto's death itself demonstrates that no permanent transformation of the political arena occurred: traditional enemies ambushed him while he was in foreign territory.

Whatever the limits of this despot's influence, he clearly commanded immense power within his own group. Watson believes that such leaders demonstrate the conflict between people's expectations of a big man's behaviour and the military or political needs of their group. Matoto, in fact, began his career shortly after his group returned from exile. Through his strength and skill in battle, he provided security for his kinsmen and enhanced the reputation of the local group in the eyes of communities throughout the Tairora area. In return for these accomplishments, Matoto's supporters paid the high price of their leader's arbitrary and despotic rule (ibid.: 274).

The account of Matoto, written after Salisbury's 1964 argument, is the one classic case of a traditional highlands despot. Salisbury draws on Schäfer's description of the Simbu leader Kavagl as a primary example of despotism. This leader, whose career spanned the years preceding and following the arrival of whites, was, like Matoto, a fierce warrior and an angry, strong man. He too, was abnormal in his
sexual behaviour by community standards. Kavagl openly associated with women and preferred to sleep in his wives' houses rather than the men's house - a preference which people joked about (Schäfer 1975 [1938]: 194). Unlike Matoto, Kavagl's power was not so great that he could command the labour of other men. Schäfer notes that while Kavagl may have had three wives at one point and owned 17 pigs, he was not as wealthy as other men, and did not want more wives because he would have had to make too many gardens (ibid.). Kavagl was a powerful orator, but Schäfer did not believe he was a 'tyrant' because 'he discusses with his colleagues but regards himself as the man who knows everything best' (ibid.: 92). Salisbury, however, regards Kavagl as a despot because of his reliance on personal strength and aggression.

Kavagl was a warrior par excellence, a quick-tempered man who killed two wives in fits of anger and who was feared by his kinsmen. Although Kavagl killed many enemies prior to contact, Salisbury states that Kavagl 'attacked with a club any of his supporters who opposed him, or had a pig or shells he coveted, and had killed many of them' (1964b: 227). While Kavagl did indeed attack men with fence posts - even today a common method of fighting within the clan - Schäfer describes no such assault by Kavagl on 'supporters'. Rather, with the exception of Kavagl's murder of two wives, all his killings occurred in warfare or against members of named groups other than the Korugu, Kavagl's natal unit. Chuave leaders sometimes executed women who were believed to be witches (see chapter five). But as I noted in the previous chapter, the murder of a clan brother is a heinous crime, and with one exception I discuss later - I could not discover any instance where a big man murdered a clan brother. Furthermore, by characterizing Kavagl as a 'highwayman', Schäfer seems to imply that the theft or seizure of valuables was from men outside Kavagl's own group. Schäfer's account is unclear on this point, but it can be safely said that Kavagl directed most of his violence against men outside his own political unit.

Kavagl's pre-contact rule ended when he and his group were routed in warfare. They sought refuge with affines north of the Bismark Mountains, and in this foreign territory Kavagl 'grew quiet'; only upon returning to his own territory did Kavagl reassume his dominance of a large following. But I would argue that during his post-contact rule
Kavagl's power owed much to his affiliation with Schäfer's mission. Here I note only that under pre-contact conditions Kavagl's followers may have paid the ultimate penalty for their leader's aggression against other groups: defeat and presumably loss of life in warfare.

When Kavagl said he wished to murder a Nauru man he believed to have caused his wife's death, Schäfer threatened to call upon the kiap to have him jailed and hanged. To this Kavagl replied, 'That does not matter, I will first have my revenge, and if in the process I lose my life, even that does not matter, since I have a grown up son who can represent me' (1975: 92). As Standish notes, Kavagl's son later became luluai and a member of the Simbu Interim Provincial Government (1978: 21, note 1).

In Chuave people speak of only two men as truly despotic pre-contact leaders: Wahgi of Duma tribe and Amoi of Gai tribe. Many men had reputations as fierce warriors who killed 'hundreds' of men, but these two men clearly used coercion within their own group to maintain their authority. Amoi, like Matoto, was killed in a raid by an enemy clan. Wahgi, on whom I have more detailed information, was killed shortly before contact by his brother, a minor big man, who then took refuge in his wife's village a short distance from his natal group.

Wahgi was a powerful orator and a violent man. Old men say that 'every man' feared Wahgi, that he stole pigs, ambushed and killed his enemies, verbally and physically abused members of his own clan, Komogam. Kaupagam men said they had several times plotted to kill Wahgi 'who made fools of us', but they feared Komogam's retaliation which would necessarily follow the death of a 'true' big man. Though Wahgi never killed a fellow clansmen, his close kinsmen were said to have been 'like police' and Wahgi himself to have physically beaten several rivals within his clan. Wahgi apparently also ordered the theft of garden produce and pigs which he then used to feast his supporters. This despot was not a wealthy man and never had more than two wives simultaneously. I am unable to estimate how long Wahgi ruled, but he clearly based his power on personal strength and the use of physical force.

No one could accurately state the circumstances surrounding
Waghi's death. Men said only that Wahgi treated both people of other clans and his own agnates 'like pigs' and that he had become 'too big'. Wahgi's brother apparently approached him while he was clearing a garden and axed him to death. The brother then fled to Kaupagam where he received a hero's welcome and shells and pigs in payment for the murder. Men denied that they gave any payment in advance for this deed and despite offering refuge to his brother, no confrontation or fighting between Komogam and Kaupagam followed Wahgi's death. Wahgi's body was publicly displayed for several days, and before burial his mother severed his head and then stored it in her house: the only instance of the mutilation of a corpse I ever discovered, and one for which people could offer no explanation.

The death of Wahgi is consistent with general statements concerning the power of pre-contact leaders who used beating and public humiliation of women and youths to punish offenders of traditional law. Men say that, within the clan, the use of force was a dangerous tactic. Kaupagam men, for example, still remember one traditional subclan leader who publicly beat a youth for the theft of a Kaupagam pig. Following this punishment the youth's father and lineage mates assaulted and axed the leader, causing serious injury.

I believe, therefore, that in Chuave and throughout the central highlands, traditional leaders who relied primarily or solely on the use of force and physical coercion within their own political group were extremely rare. Like Read (1959), I would argue that strength alone is never the defining characteristic of the big man. Great leaders, I suggest, regularly emerged when they combined ascribed and achieved characteristics similar to the Chuave 'true' big man.

Traditional highlands political systems, however, were sufficiently flexible to allow for the emergence of aggressive leaders under particular conditions. During hostilities or, as in Matoto's case, where groups needed to re-establish their security after defeat in war, 'strong' or 'hot' big men could dominate clan affairs. Such leaders emerged in situations where strength and aggression were encouraged in all men: their personalities contained qualities that were vital to the success of the group as a whole.
It is also true, as Salisbury argues, that acts of aggression against members of enemy groups could enhance a leader's standing within his own political unit (1964b: 228). But I believe that big men who persistently committed aggressive acts against other groups ran the risk of physical assault, as well as the potential attack against their clans as a whole. In times of peace therefore, men insisted that leaders control their aggressive behaviour or supported big men who were skilled in the arts of diplomacy, conciliation and mediation; big men who could settle inter-clan disputes without drawing the clan into unwanted or unnecessary confrontations. As I now demonstrate it was only after contact that despots regularly emerged to dominate not only their own clansmen but members of other groups.

**Village officials: post-contact despotism**

Salisbury believes despots could act autonomously with little regard for public opinion for long periods of time. For example, he estimates that Kavagl's rule lasted 20 years. Salisbury does not give evidence to suggest that pre-contact Siane leaders acted autonomously; rather he states only that for the period 1933-1955, Siane leaders called *bosbois* ruled for lengthy periods.\(^7\)

The office of *bosboi* is not recognized by the administration, but the rate of turnover has only been one per ten years, or one per 15 years if deaths, which hardly constitute "control by public opinion", are not considered (Salisbury 1964b: 228).

Salisbury discusses the *bosboi* under the rubric of 'indigenous despotism'. He then begins his analysis of the Australian administration's effect on local politics with the *luluai* and his assistant, the *tultul* - prominent government officials appointed in Chuave and Siane during the 1950s who were superior to the *bosboi*.\(^8\) But elsewhere Salisbury notes that, as of 1945, the administration began formally recognizing big men as *bosbois* and gave them 'rings, belts and articles of clothing' (1962: 123). Other evidence suggests that people always associated the title *bosboi* with early government leaders. As such their influence or tenure of office supports Brown's assertion that the presence of the Australian administration enhanced the power of local leaders.
Chuave was patrolled from Kundiawa, for example, at least annually from the late 1930s. A police base camp was established at Chuave by 1939 and a patrol officer stationed at irregular intervals during the 1940s. Patrol reports from 1939-1940 note government attempts to establish influence in peripheral areas such as Chuave, and that *kiaps* appointed 'headmen' who were given badges of office—a white china ring that everyone in Chuave and Siane today associates with the title *bosboi*. People were told to call these officials by title and not by name (Downs CPR 1939: 5; CPR June 1940: 3; CPR October 1940: 3). When in late 1940, a war broke out in Siane, 'bosbois of non-combatant groups decided that arbitration by Europeans, whom they had previously visited, was necessary' (Salisbury 1962: 123).

In Chuave, *bosbois*, having only indirect contact with *kiaps*, often appointed other men who, while lacking the china badge, used the title *bosboi* and were regarded as secondary government officials (cf. M. Strathern 1972b: 43). Siane was administered and patrolled from Goroka and not Kundiawa at this time, but there can be little doubt that some Siane groups—particularly those closest to the Chuave base camp—used the term *bosboi* for men who were government representatives. The power of these officials was subject to great variation; but in Chuave one or two *bosbois* in each tribe obtained unprecedented authority.

People say that government 'came with the ring'. Even today, when a former *bosboi* dies, Papua New Guinea flags are flown at half-mast at village courts and people sometimes purchase flags for the burial sites of these men. Koiboiri was Kaupagam's *bosboi*. A lineage head, and 'first man' of his subclan, Koiboiri was a powerful leader who dominated Kaupagam both prior to and following contact. Men do not clearly distinguish between Koiboiri's pre- and post-contact authority. But they do remember that he and Wemin, a Komogam *bosboi*, 'acted like *kiaps*' after receiving their rings. Kaupagam men say that as government representative, Koiboiri dominated not only his own, but also other clans. He publicly caned men for theft or fighting and tied ropes around their faces, arms and legs. On at least three occasions he took men to jail at Kundiawa. Koiboiri appointed three of his age-mates as secondary *bosbois*, and obtained rings for leaders in other clans. Wemin and Koiboiri encouraged clans to move closer to the rest
house, and men from several clans cleared this site and nearby footpaths to facilitate government patrols.

Part of Koiboiri's power undoubtedly resulted from his already established reputation as a 'true' big man. His control of shell valuables also enhanced his authority. Men recall how, on hearing of patrols near Chuave base camp, Koiboiri confiscated pigs to sell them for shells. Salisbury has argued that Siane lineage heads and other big men enhanced their power when they came to control shells after contact. He believes that a leader's control over a rapidly inflated ceremonial exchange, as much as the fear of administration sanctions, allowed government officials to expand their political following. As I noted in chapter two, the Siane yarafo seems to have had greater control over lineage land and wealth than the Chuave aunam. In 1953, for example, Siane government officials and lineage heads controlled the cash of returning labourers and by 1960, they had managed to isolate large tracts of lineage land for coffee production (Salisbury 1962: 136; 1964c: 3). All wealth in Chuave is individually owned, and lineage heads seem to have used neither of these economic strategies.

I fully treat the relationship between economic resources and political authority in the following chapter. Here I note only that it is difficult to estimate the importance of these economic changes for the power of early government officials who, along with other leaders, certainly enjoyed an advantage over lesser men in their access to shells. Yet given the degree of inflation and expansion of ceremonial activity (Salisbury estimates a five-fold increase during the period 1933-1944), economic competition must have been intense (see also A. Strathern 1966: 364-365). Nor was the sale of pigs and produce for shells at administrative outposts confined to leading men. Some lesser leaders or wealthy men must have challenged the power of government officials.

But men do not speak of bosbois as wealthy leaders. Rather, their statements stress the bosboi's role in stopping fights, settling inter-clan disputes, punishing men and encouraging cooperation between former enemy groups. Although the power of these officials was unprecedented by traditional standards, their actions did not always go unquestioned. Koiboiri and Wemin, for example,
apparently over-extended the limits of their authority. Tabiagam and
Marime men said that they raided Komogam and Kaupagam in the mid-1940s
to avenge several instances of physical abuse and punishment that these
officials inflicted upon members of their clans. Tabiagam and
Marime routed Kaupagam in this battle and 'many' men were jailed.
During the hostilities Komogam men fought on both sides of the battle.
Kaupagam men agreed that Wemin's and Koiboiri's behaviour may have been
contributing factors to the raid but stressed that the fight was
sparked by a quarrel concerning the theft of garden produce by Tabiagam
men. After Kaupagam returned to their village site, Koiboiri never
regained his power over the groups that had fought against him.

By 1953, the administration had begun replacing bosbois with
luluais and tultuls who were responsible to the kiap at Chuave
patrol post. Some bosbois became luluais but, at least in
Chuave, the administration commonly appointed younger men who were
better Pidgin speakers, or who had served the administration as
interpreters or carriers on patrols (cf. Brown 1963: 9). The
administration first appointed luluais as tribal leaders and
tultuls as clan leaders, but later appointed luluais for each clan,
made one paramount luluai (waitpus) for the tribe and assigned
tultuls to act as assistants to the luluai within the clan. These
officials oversaw government roadwork, the building of rest houses and
aid posts. They were also responsible for settling minor disputes and
for enforcing government regulations pertaining to the proper care and
maintenance of villages.

The Duma paramount luluai was Mama, who today, people say, ruled
like a king: a leader whose power has never been equalled and against
whom men measure the authority of all subsequent leaders. Mama was
in his early thirties when the kiap appointed him luluai at
Koiboiri's instigation. A member of Koiboiri's opposite door, Mama
was both the 'first man' of his subclan and a man who had demonstrated
leadership skills. A proven warrior, he was a strong, quick-tempered
man, who spoke some Pidgin. He and Kaupa, Koiboiri's son, had served
as adjutants to Koiboiri during the 1940s. Kaupa, a close friend of
Mama and his junior, expressed no interest in the position, but the
kiap made him tultul. Around this time also, Koiboiri retired as
lineage head, and was replaced by Mumuga, the only son of Koiboiri's
elder brother who had died in warfare years earlier.

By all accounts, Mama was powerful indeed; his influence with *kiaps* was certainly great. He received pigs and shells when the *kiap* appointed particular leaders as officials in other clans. He settled disputes throughout Duma and received shell payments, and later cash, for his services. About ten young men from several clans lived with Mama in Kaupagam, acting as his 'police'. Mama secured wives for these men: at least two were married women seized following marital disputes after Mama had declared their current marriages null and void. Mama beat people for transgressions of administrative law, enforced the building of bridges, roads, and latrines, and is said to have brought former enemy clans to their present location along the road. At a central location within Duma he built a compound which he used as a temporary holding centre (Pidgin: *kalabus*) for men who were to be forwarded to Chuave or Kundiawa for imprisonment.

Only one other *luluai*, Kuri of Gomia Meri tribe, rivalled Mama's power. People may occasionally exaggerate the extent of Mama's authority, but it is certainly true that Mama was able to obtain unprecedented authority early in his career as *luluai*. As *luluais* became entrenched in other local communities, competition for their positions would have increased, and the appointment of *luluais* for individual clans must have limited Mama's authority outside Kaupagam. According to one Chuave *kiap*, the positions of *luluai* and *tultul* were regarded as a 'supreme honor', and by 1958, there were not only countless requests to appoint men to these positions, but also efforts to purchase the office (Mackenzie CPR 24, 1958: 6).

Today when people are shown a *luluai* or *tultul* badge, they immediately produce detailed stories about the coercive power of specific officials, as well as general statements about the 'golden age' of government, when law and order were maintained, and all men feared government officials. Like Brown, I would argue that these officials' power rested primarily, if not solely, on the fear of administration sanctions. Salisbury (1964b) notes that *luluais* had no statutory authority to adjudicate disputes involving native custom, but recognizes that in practice *luluais* exploited the government court system and exacted obedience by threatening to take people to
court. But he believes that the administration's presence also gave people the opportunity to dispose of despotic leaders. Luluais were themselves subject to administrative sanctions, and by withholding their labour for government projects, by frame-ups, or by simply demonstrating that luluais had exceeded their authority, people could have the luluai replaced. He notes that Brown lists comments by patrol officers about untended rest houses or villages, and that the administration regarded many luluais as ineffective.

Salisbury has clearly shown that villagers could opt for a number of strategies, including 'passive resistance', when attempting to dispose unpopular officials. Mama, for instance, was dismissed by a kiap in 1960 after he failed to mobilize Duma men for a bridge building project. In Mama's case, two younger men, Kopon and Girimai, who later became councillors, encouraged people to ignore or disobey Mama's orders.

It is also necessary to distinguish between administration practice and policy. Chuave patrol reports make reference to 'lazy' officials or a luluai's inability to mobilize people to work on roads or maintain proper hygiene within the village. But kiaps clearly recognized the luluai's role as arbitrator of disputes. Government officials handled 'minor disputes' or settled complaints by arbitration and sought only the kiap's confirmation of their decisions (Keogh CPR 2 1953-54: 2). Officials were 'harsh' in matters of compensation by European standards (Mellor CPR 1955: 1). While maintaining law and order, 'occasional unintentional abuse' and 'a small degree of graft' sometimes took place (ibid.).

Rather than being aware of the dangers of 'satrapy' or 'leaning over backwards to be legalistically correct' (Salisbury 1964b: 229), some patrol officers did everything possible to increase the power of officials. Patrol officers Keogh and Mellor, for example, both noted that while officials performed satisfactorily, the indifferent attitudes of many villagers or the scheming and conniving of political rivals hampered the officials' authority. Because of this political competition, these kiaps were apt to ignore the officials' inability to maintain total control over government projects and were well aware of the possibility of 'faked' charges against luluais and tultuls.
After discovering such 'trumped-up charges', Keogh recommended that no dismissals or charges against officials should occur so as to strengthen the influence and prestige of government officials (ibid.).

The comments of two kiaps cannot be held to be representative of administration policy or practice. But quite obviously a wide range of options by particular kiaps, government officials, and villagers were possible. Burridge has shown how these leaders were subject to pressures from both their own community and from the administration (1960: 210). Government officials are middlemen who must manage both information and the respective demands of their own followers and superiors (Bailey 1969: 167). I argue that, in the 1940s and 1950s, the bosboi's and luluai's success and power rested in a real sense on their ability to convince their superiors that all was well within their appointed sphere of influence, and simultaneously, to convince villagers that bosboois and luluais had both the right and duty to enforce administration law.

Salisbury is also correct in asserting that, in some cases, luluais were 'straw bosses', men fronted for directors who were the true authority within the village (1964b: 236). Luluais and tultuls were not always big men in Chuave. The need to choose Pidgin speakers, or men who had government experience, who had worked as wage labourers and who were pro-administration, meant that the administration selected many young men unproven as leaders. But such young men could use their government position to enhance their political careers within the village, as Kondom did (Brown 1963). However, the administration also selected many established leaders as bosboois and luluais in Chuave, and their government affiliation both bolstered their power and increased their sphere of influence. The use of force, moreover, became part and parcel of the government leader's role rather than an extension of a 'strong' or authoritarian personality. People's perceptions of the government and of the government's officials meant that most luluais and tultuls legitimately used sanctions: these men were authorized arbitrators of disputes. The rewards of serving as bosboois and luluais, including their domination of dispute settlement and the economic benefits accruing to their positions, made these offices attractive to many big men and would-be leaders. The
competition of rivals for these positions and the continuing influence of particular big men who were unable to or uninterested in obtaining government offices therefore, best explains the limits of the luluais power.

Men's ability to gain access to these positions because of their Pidgin skills or previous associations with the administration, regardless of their political standing within the village, afforded them unprecedented opportunities to enhance their political careers. Missions, however, were a second major external force which provided men with an alternative avenue to power. I now examine, therefore, the importance of missionization before proceeding to a discussion of the next stage of political development, the introduction of government councils.

Mission leaders

Schäfer, notes Salisbury, characterized Kavagl as a protector of the mission and not its protege. Kavagl's ability in 1953, before the administration firmly established control, to mobilize several thousand men and two enemy groups to level a mission airstrip was due according to Salisbury to his 'force and oratory' — and to the time made available by the use of steel axes (1964b: 231).

While I agree that the size of Kavagl's following in this instance was unprecedented by traditional standards, Schäfer's (not, of course, disinterested) account makes it clear that Kavagl's post-contact authority owed much to his new, Christian status. Moreover, while Schäfer explicitly states that Kavagl's exceptional oratorical skills were important here, Kavagl's post-contact rule seems devoid of force, at least in the sense of physical coercion. Schäfer states that Kavagl took credit for bringing the first missionaries to the Wahgi Valley. During the five years since Schäfer's arrival, Kavagl always attended church services, 'listened attentively and then gave great speeches afterwards outside', frequently disclaiming his past aggression. Kavagl did a volte-face, and preached that hell, the 'great fire', was the penalty for theft, fighting, or other bad deeds (1975: 93). Kavagl's ability to mobilize thousands for a mission project, therefore undoubtedly owed a great deal to his standing as
a mission leader.

In some central Simbu areas, mission *bosbois* recruited people for church activities and competed with government officials for authority and political followings (Brown 1963: 9). As early as 1940, Downs (then a patrol officer) noted the tension between government officials and mission personnel, and clearly stated that it was necessary for *kiaps* to prop up the authority of officials to ensure that they were the primary leaders of local communities (CPR June 1940: 3).

Chuave men say the mission 'came with government'; in fact, mission influence preceded the establishment of a permanent patrol post in 1953. The Lutheran mission, established by Rev. Bergmann and Rev. Wolber, created a station in Gomia territory at Mainarao around 1947, and later established a second temporary site in Duma. Native teachers and evangelists manned both locations. In 1950, the Lutherans established a permanent mission at Monono in Mam tribe's territory. This station served as the major Lutheran centre under Rev. Heuter until the early 1960s when native missionaries undertook the entire operation of the church (Fowler CPR 7 1952-53: 5; McBride CPR February 1958: 1). By 1952, two additional missions, one Seventh Day Adventist and one Catholic, were established near Chuave station and at Wongoi in Elimbari respectively (McBride CPR 4 1954: 5). Even before this time, however, native evangelists trained by Bergmann at Ega (Kundiawa) had begun preaching in Chuave. Men remember such early mission *bosbois* who patrolled the entire Chuave area, delivering sermons from raised platforms, encouraging the cessation of warfare, and also the burning of flutes, *gerua* boards or other cult objects.

Shortly after World War Two Koiboiri divorced one of his wives in order to be baptized. After 1947, he resided for about two years in the Lutheran mission village of Mainamo and took Kaupa, Mama and several other Kaupagam men with him to receive religious instruction and be baptized. Converts lived in mission enclaves for up to two years prior to this ceremony, and were forced to abandon polygamous marriages, to cut their hair and wear *laplaps* which became the uniform of Christian converts. Entire families and lineages were converted simultaneously, and celebrated baptisms by killing large numbers of pigs and giving feasts to other Christians. Christians had
special privileges. Allegedly they received preferential treatment from *kiaps* and *luluais*, and physical punishment was confined to pagans. Converts ignored government officials who remained pagans or who had polygamous marriages. These officials faced constant disobedience (Bagita CPR 4 1962: 1).

By 1952 there were 16 Lutheran teachers in Chuave; two of these in Duma (McBride CPR 4 1952: 6). By all accounts antagonism between mission teachers and government officials was intense. Mama himself regarded the mission as the most powerful force in the Chuave area, and told me that his early baptism enabled him to take part in mission affairs and gain him the allegiance of converts. Fervent mission supporters, aided by Kolboiri and Mama, led a campaign against initiation, revealed the ancestral flutes to women, and burned cult objects as well as weapons (cf. Read 1952: 8).

Mission leaders clearly based their power on Christian ideology which rapidly supplanted traditional religious beliefs. Accounts by two Simbu missionaries illustrate the mission's conscious attempt to substitute Christian ritual and symbols for indigenous rites. Father Nilles notes that as early as 1938 in central Simbu, people brought *gerua* boards and burned them at his mission station. He suggests that a recent anthrax epidemic had motivated people to try out mission 'medicine and prayers' rather than their own magical techniques. While he and other missionaries never discouraged the celebration of pig festivals, he suggests that catechists may have encouraged the belief that traditional religious practices were the result of satanic influences. His mission succeeded in using crosses rather than *gerua* boards during the pig festival thereby substituting a Christian symbol for a traditional one (1977: 176-178).

Charles Turner, a New Tribes missionary who first worked in Sinasina in 1960, notes similar substitutions. There, as in Chuave, men placed *gerua* boards on fertility sites and poured pig's blood over sweet potato vines to ensure the health and growth of pigs and garden produce prior to large exchanges. By 1960 native priests were planting crosses and sprinkling holy water over vines. Following the opening of churches, men killed pigs and held fertility rites (1968: 20-21). Men often brought grasses to their baptisms to soak up
water that they later sprinkled over pigs and gardens. Turner also notes that Christians held a special status. Unbaptized individuals had no say in village disputes, and the church pastor, followed by the luluai and other Christians, decided the outcome of one adultery case he witnessed (1964: 180). Turner's mission sought out big men for leadership positions. Later, when the Church tried to institute a plurality of leadership, competition between big men within the mission became intense (1968: 22).

In Chuave, Lutheran pastors and pastors' assistants, called songon in Kote, also planted crosses on fertility sites and held services to pray for the success of new gardens. Christian teaching became associated with health, productivity, and general welfare as God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit became known as guardians whose power was superior to ancestral spirits. People spoke of aspects of traditional life, including warfare and the pig festival as the Devil's work (see also chapter four). Today taim bilong Satan (Satan's time) signifies the period before mission influence. People quickly associated Christian missions with western material wealth. Missions operated the first two tradestores and mission leaders told me how early songons spoke of the need to convert to Christianity as a prerequisite to obtaining white man's 'cargo'.

Mission leaders distinguished between pagans and converts and mobilized large numbers of people from different clans, thereby creating new villages which, in areas like Duma, radically altered traditional settlement patterns. The power of these mission leaders was an obvious threat to the authority of government officials. Like Koiboiri and Mama, most Chuave government officials - and other big men - rapidly converted to Christianity. By co-operating with mission leaders or becoming active in mission villages and affairs, therefore, government officials could use Christian ideology to legitimize their secular government roles and so command followings beyond their own clan (cf. Lawrence 1971: 26). At the same time friction between government and mission personnel forced leaders to map out separate spheres of influence (cf. Berndt 1971: 415).

Today songons no longer hold ceremonies concerned with fertility and productivity. Christian ideology, however, continues to link a
belief in God with the general welfare of groups and individuals – a point I discuss further in chapter five. The power of God as guardian and protector of people’s welfare and the destructive power of Satan permeate modern Christian beliefs – in particular, those of fundamentalist denominations. Many believe Satan, like witches, to be capable of entering a person’s body and upsetting a person’s moral and rational behaviour. Although Christian ideology is pervasive, belief in ghosts, witches and sorcery still continues. During crises – at death or during the sickness of humans and animals – traditional beliefs find expression. Fervent Christians condemn the discussion or mere mention of aspects of traditional religion, but some Lutheran songons allow divination and even the open discussion of sorcery and witchcraft.

Missions have effectively banned polygamous marriages: less than one per cent of all adult Duma men had such marriages in 1980. Prior to missionization I estimate 10 to 15 per cent of adult men would have had polygamous marriages at any given time. Every individual claims to be a baptized Christian. Being a Christian is a fact of life, and belonging to particular denominations denotes a specific social status. Four missions have churches in Duma. The Church of Christ, Four Square Pentecostal and New Tribes missions are all fundamentalist missions established after 1970. Combined they have perhaps 300 adherents, most of whom are under the age of 35. The Lutheran mission continues to dominate the Duma area. But there are also members of the Anglican, Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, Baptist and Ba’hai faiths in Chuave. Relations between missions differ dramatically. The Lutherans and Catholics for example, co-exist peacefully, and their members refer to both these missions as the 'true' and 'first' Churches. The relations between Four Square and Lutheran missions in contrast, are very poor. The Four Square mission, first established in 1978, competes with the Lutheran church for adherents, particularly among youths. Four Square pastors have been physically attacked by Lutherans; and the burning and destruction of a Four Square church, members say, was the result of the competition between these sects. As part of the ongoing ideological warfare between these missions, Four Square converts argue the need for spiritual rebirth through adult baptism and preach the imminence of the Second Coming. During my stay, there were rumours that Lutheran
were agents of the anti-Christ who would lead a communist government, and this would signal the return of Christ. Many people often dismiss such rumours but fervent Christians find them distressing. In villages where supporters of several missions reside together, these stories create tension between people of the same men's house group or clan.

At Keu members of these smaller missions joined together to pick and process coffee, build and run trade stores or co-operate in garden activities. Mission affiliation cross-cuts relationships based on subclan or men's house affiliation. Such coalitions, therefore, are cliques whose members share a common identity and which co-operate for both 'expressive' and pragmatic reasons (Bossevain 1974: 174). Fundamentalist cliques within particular men's houses or clans sometimes refuse to participate in ceremonies sponsored by Lutherans or to follow the instructions of Lutheran big men and songons. Mission affiliation, therefore, occasionally affects a leader's ability to mobilize people for particular projects.

Lutheran leadership is well organized. In Duma there are 29 songons, four of whom are senior officials recognizable by their badge - a yellow *chirho* cross monogram sewn onto white shirts (lesser songons wear a red *chirho*). Each clan has about three songons, usually one per men's house. After consulting villagers and other songons, pastors appoint men to these life-long positions. Only highly flagrant violations of moral norms - constant physical aggression, wife beating, or adultery - result in their dismissal. Most appointments occurred in the 1960s and so Duma songons are now men in their early forties to late fifties. In addition each village has Lutheran 'workmen' (Pidgin: *wojman*), young literate men who give Bible readings or sermons. Men hold all leadership positions. Weekly Monday night meetings of songons, workmen, and other Lutherans take place in various men's houses along a circuit linking the Ei, Gomia, Duma and Mara tribes. Leaders discuss the church's role in maintaining good relations between different tribes and communities, the songon's role in settling marital quarrels and encouraging correct moral behaviour, and various church projects. Meetings, lasting long into the night, include sermons, Bible readings, prayers and hymns. Women from the host men's house prepare and cook food for those present, but
Christians differ as to whether or not songons should become involved in government or restrict themselves to the teaching of Christianity. Prior to the 1980 council and village court elections, songons met and agreed that mission personnel should not run for office. Despite this consensus, however, several did stand. Only a small number of songons manage to become both mission and government representatives (see below). As I later show, mission leaders and other big men often come into conflict at ceremonial exchanges, but people everywhere respect songons and allow them to speak at any public gathering. Other important factors are the songon's moral and ethical leadership and their influence in dispensing an idealized conception of normative behaviour which leaders must attempt to approximate if they wish to be elected to public office (see chapter seven).

Democracy: local government councillors

My data do not support either Brown's (1963) suggestion that satrapy might continue under the council system, or Salisbury's argument that a council president, the 'supreme individual' within a given council area, should be classed as a director whereas lesser councillors are mere managers (1964b). It is true that councillors sometimes abuse their authority and that they occasionally maintain office for lengthy periods of time. But both tenure of office, and the authority of particular councillors are tied to democratic elections within the council and electoral ward. Those men who cannot meet the demands of their followers run the risk of being quickly dismissed and replaced by other leaders.

Chuave Council was formed in 1961. Each clan in Chuave district and part of Sinasina elected a councillor. By 1965 Sinasina groups were excluded and Elimbari and Siane groups incorporated in a new Elimbari Local Government Council (ELGC). Forty-one wards each elected one councillor. In 1975 following years of quarrels, factional fighting, and occasionally physical violence between Siane and Simbu councillors, Siane Council was created, reducing the number of Elimbari wards to 29. People greeted the initial Elimbari Council with great
enthusiasm but rapidly became disenchanted with its inability to
develop rural communities. Today people's expectations of the
council's potential remain high even while criticisms of the body
itself and of particular councillors are common. People describe the
council as the epitome of co-operative enterprise, wok bung, between
different tribes and as responsible for the development of rural
communities.

But people also argue that their tax money 'never comes back' to
the village or that it is used to develop other areas. In 1979 the
council collected only K15,618 of an estimated potential K40,000 tax - an indication of the villager's apathy towards this institution.
Of 300 people surveyed at Chuave and in Duma, 59 per cent of the males
and 34 per cent of females expressed disenchantment with the council's
work (18 and 33 per cent of men and women respectively were indifferent
or offered no opinion). Men criticized the councillors' laziness,
their theft of tax money, and their failure to listen to people or
communicate details of council meetings. People blamed the council
in general for failing to bring development, roads, bridges, schools
and aidposts, or complained that council staff were inept and
dishonest. Women had many of these same complaints but stressed the
council's failure to maintain market sites and the exclusion of women
from council participation (see chapter five).

Prior to 1978 a councillor's success depended on his role in
maintaining law and order and his ability to bring development to the
ward. Today village court personnel have the former responsibility,
and councillors bemoan the loss of power they suffered after the
implementation of courts. In chapter seven I detail the relationship
between law and political power in Chuave. Here I briefly outline the
councillor's former role as dispute settler.

Following in the footsteps of the luluai and tultul, the
councillor and his assistant, the komiti, came to have authority over
all disputes in the village. Although other big men took part in moots
and courts, the councillor made the final decision concerning sanctions
or compensation in quarrels and disputes disrupting the village. As
in Minj, the Chuave komiti was an underling of the councillor, and
komitis never acted as a unit (Reay 1970: 533). From 1965 to 1970,
the election of male and female komitis occurred, but the female komiti's role was ill-defined and was apparently restricted to domestic matters: encouraging diligence in garden work, proper hygiene such as washing dishes and clothes, and general maintenance of the village. By 1970, the Elimbari Council banned female komitis after several women had nominated for councillor's positions. After 1970 the election of male komitis was irregular, and as I noted in the previous chapter, it is now common practice for councillors to appoint komitis from the runners-up in elections.

Male komitis often bore the brunt of the legal workload; councillors heard only major offences or disputes that proved difficult to settle. Marilyn Strathern's excellent analysis of the Hagen unofficial court system clearly demonstrates that a key factor in these officials' authority was their ability to legitimately punish offenders of customary or administration law (1972b: 119-121). The Native Local Government Ordinance of 1949-60 and 1963 made no provision for councillors to settle disputes, but kiaps and Local Court Magistrates encouraged councillors to settle disputes on their own and villagers clearly believed councillors and komitis were acting as authorized dispute-settlers (ibid.: 86, 119-120, 124). Councillors acted not only as mediators but sometimes as arbitrators in a wide range of disputes including criminal offences. Officials often received part of compensation payments they awarded or small gifts in recognition of their role in settling disputes, and Europeans and Hageners related occasional tales of 'extortionist' komitis and councillors (ibid.: 109). Sinasina councillors, who also had great authority over disputes, occasionally pocketed court fines and people strongly reproved them for this action (Hatanaka 1972: 73).

In Chuave, villagers clearly perceived the councillor and his assistants as legitimate arbitrators of disputes. Although councillors sometimes referred difficult court cases to the Local Court Magistrate, their ability to impose compensation, fines, and to make binding decisions was unquestioned. Subsequently, appeals to kiaps or Magistrates at Chuave were rare. (As I show in chapter six, the appeal to higher authorities is a dangerous tactic for litigants.) Councillors and komitis also imposed fines and compensation, and, as in Hagen, people regarded the money officials received as rightful
payment for their services as mediator or arbitrator.

The second major aspect of the councillor's role is his responsibility for development. Brown notes that the ideal of progress, including the need for schools, co-operation between groups, and hard work in cash cropping, dominated the first year of councils in central Simbu. Councillors were almost invariably young men who had worked for whites outside their own localities and who believed in a 'new way', the economic progress the early council embodied (1963: 11). Hatanaka has likewise shown that economic development was a major concern of Sinasina councillors in the 1960s. Of 36 councillors, 33 had work experience outside of the area (1972: 64-69).

Development has a dual meaning for Chuave people. It embraces specific council or other government projects such as roads, schools and village water supplies, as well as group or individual enterprises like pig or poultry projects, coffee processing schemes, tradestores, or the purchase of vehicles. In sum, 'development' stands for people's desire to approximate western economic standards and models of material wealth and well-being. The concept also merges with people's conceptions of bisnis which I outline in the following chapter. Here I draw the distinction between development which people primarily regard as the responsibility of government agencies, and business which produces material success through individual entrepreneurial skills. I agree with Howlett that early councillors often gained status as innovators in economic ventures, but that in recent years, wider opportunities have reduced their monopoly in entrepreneurial ventures (1976: 185, note 2). Almost half of Chuave councillors in 1980 had some business interests, but only four of 29 councillors were major entrepreneurs. People believe the council is responsible for the balanced development of the council area, but they also expect their own councillor to give priority to the needs of his own ward or community. Councillors who use council resources for their personal economic careers are everywhere criticized as self-centred, and as failing to protect the interests of the group. Misappropriation of council funds or theft of tax money, therefore, greatly damages a councillor's reputation and endangers his chances of re-election.

A councillor consequently attempts to introduce economic innovations, to mobilize his ward to build and maintain schools,
aidposts and roads, and attempts to obtain the financial resources needed for these or other projects. He is a major link to government agencies in a society where knowledge of grants or loans is poor and where the council must approve all requests for funds from the provincial government.

Howlett correctly asserts that misappropriation of council funds, financial mismanagement, ill-considered decisions and a lack of supervision all contribute to people's disenchantment with local government (ibid.). My own investigation into the financial status of Elimbari Council failed because council bookkeeping was inconsistent and records were occasionally non-existent. During my 22 month stay in Chuave, four council clerks, alleged to have stolen funds, were dismissed. Several cases involving theft by councillors of small amounts of tax had occurred over recent years with at least three convictions.

Knowledge of the council's financial status is confined to an indigenous clerk and the District Officer In Charge (DOIC) of Chuave who acts as council supervisor. Councillors lack the formal education and managerial skills to adequately understand council revenue and expenditure. The full council rarely reviewed the council's K65,544 budget for 1979 and the clerk, who attempted to accommodate demands by particular councillors for projects, prepared the estimates of revenue and expenditure. Council meetings consist mainly of discussions of proposed projects in various wards and requests made to the provincial government for additional aid. Each year the council submits plans for Rural Improvement Projects (RIP) used to build government facilities and maintain tertiary roads. The council also recommends to the provincial government a small number of projects which aid small village undertakings such as coffee schemes. In 1980 the council received over 80 such applications, from which it selected a dozen to be forwarded to the provincial government for approval.

People's disenchantment with this institution is directly attributable to the council's allocation of resources. In 1979, for example, Elimbari Council applied for K33,500 in RIP funds to finance 14 projects. However the council received only K14,000. As a result many projects were not completed, and others deferred to the next
calendar year. This process, complicated by ill-conceived planning, is repeated each year. In 1979–1980, councillors voted to purchase a new vehicle, but had not included its cost (K4,960) in the estimate of council expenditure for that year. The council purchased but neglected to insure the vehicle and it was soon destroyed in an accident. Such failures oblige the council to divert money from other accounts, even from specific rural projects. Inaccurate estimates of tax and other revenue also lead to deficits. Elimbari Council's financial status, like that of other Simbu councils, has been precarious for many years.

Council structure also affects allocation of funds. The president and vice-president, along with five finance committee members, comprise the council's major decision-making body which meets in camera. These men, the clerk, and the DOIC dominate council meetings and clearly decide the allocations for particular projects. Lesser councillors, therefore, sometimes attempt to influence these men by using personal flattery, gifts of beer and occasionally money to gain support for their own projects. Despite these attempts the Elimbari Council finance committee attempted to balance the distribution of rural facilities and award projects to less developed areas. Nonetheless, when finance members requested projects, they often received priority over the proposals of other councillors.

Villagers therefore become disenchanted as councillors promise them specific projects that never materialize or are postponed for several years. From the villagers' viewpoint, the councillor's major task is to 'pull' development from the council. To do this he must be a powerful orator arguing the needs of his ward and capable of dominating council proceedings. Those councillors who become finance members stand a better chance of re-election because of the influence of this position. In addition a councillor must be capable of manipulating his relationships with other government officials. He must 'work the system'.

Howlett has noted the importance of the wantok system for Simbu politics. The term wantok, originally used for a person speaking the same language, has long been broadened to include relationships based on common work or friendship rather than kin or language ties.
Howlett also states, 'the extended meaning of the term now includes the evolution of a patronage-like system, influence peddling, and other forms of exploitation of political power and public office for personal advantage' (1976: 206-207). Within the council, there were few relationships I would characterize in terms of patronage. Certainly such relationships exist - particularly between provincial or national politicians and business men or other local leaders. But relationships between councillors shift and sometimes reverse themselves according to particular issues and goals, and it is often difficult to determine who is acting as patron to another's client at any given time.

People now occasionally omit the word wantok and simply use the phrase wokim sistim to describe how leaders manipulate their personal relationships. The phrase has either positive or negative connotations according to a person's frame of reference. Thus, a councillor's clan or ward members may praise him for working the system when he boasts that he has obtained development money because he has a wantok in high places - be he the council clerk, the DOIC, a provincial official or politician. But members of other clans or tribes simultaneously criticize the councillor on the grounds that he has taken advantage of his personal relationships and has ignored the needs of the council area as a whole. As a general rule villagers stress this latter, negative meaning. Subsequently, wantok sistim often becomes a catchphrase for all that is wrong with government; that is, for the council's mismanagement of money or for its inability to act as an unbiased institution that equitably distributes resources.

Few councillors manage to succeed within the competitive environment of this institution or to meet their electorates' expectations and thereby maintain power for more than one or two terms. Competition within the clan and ward also influences a leader's chances of maintaining power. People say that council elections have always been competitive occasions for clans within the ward. Each clan wants to elect its candidate so as to enhance its group's status and to ensure priority treatment in obtaining government funds. Block voting by clans results in advantages for the largest clan of a ward over successive elections. In practice, however, candidates do not always successfully prevent in-group rivalry or electoral competition, and the result, the splitting of a clan's votes, affords candidates of
smaller groups excellent chances for victory. Conversely, some councillors manage to become recognized leaders of the ward and return to office unopposed.

The appendix describes voting patterns in eight council elections. In sum, the results show that intra- and inter-clan rivalry is extremely variable. Moreover, voting occasionally cross-cuts clan boundaries; even when a man is a recognized leader, his clansmen sometimes choose to cast ballots for members of other groups. Particular conditions within the ward, such as the importance of mission affiliation and the success or failure of incumbent councillors in obtaining council funds, explain extreme instances of this pattern when over 60 per cent of a candidate's agnates vote for an 'outside' man. Because I documented some cases of voting by lineage members, I am able to state that where several candidates nominate from a single clan, voting does not always correspond to the segmentary structure of descent groups. Husbands and wives, people of the same men's house groups, lineages, and subclans occasionally support different candidates - as they do in provincial elections (see chapter seven).

The election results demonstrate that fragmentation of votes between candidates of the same clan may result in the defeat of very successful incumbents. People uphold the individual's right to vote for any candidate, be he an agnate or a member of another group. The element of chance and the importance of political competition are both recognized in the characterization of elections as a card game: 'One man pulls a queen but I pull a king. That's all. I win.'

I believe that in Chuave, the turnover of councillors in elections has always been high. In the first Hagen (Dei) Council elections, all but four councillors were re-elected. Andrew Strathern notes that this vote - by show of hands - was a 'ceremony of confirmation', but acknowledges that people understood the idea of voting and realized they could displace inefficient councillors (1970: 553). Hatanaka notes that Sinasina voters became severely critical of their representatives' performance after three successive council elections held during the 1960s (1970: 41). Elsewhere she provides data on successful candidates in these elections (1972: 68-69). Only 12 of 36 councillors had been elected for three straight terms; another four
served two terms. Based on her table, I calculate that the displacement of councillors was 61 and 55.5 per cent in the second and third elections respectively.

I have data on seven elections from 1966 to 1978. In 1977, 11 of 29 incumbents returned to office (38 per cent). In 1970, 30 of 41 councillors were re-elected (73 per cent). An average of 54.4 per cent of incumbents returned to office during these seven elections. My information concerning tenure of office is incomplete for the early 1960s. I was able to trace a number of councillors elected to the first council who had continued to hold power into the 1970s. If these men are included, the average tenure of office is just over six years, or two complete council terms. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the terms of office for 108 councillors.

Table 2: Councillors' tenure of office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms served</th>
<th>Number of councillors</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>29*</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>16#</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>6+</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
<td>99.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* includes two councillors who resigned
# includes one councillor who resigned
+ one councillor was replaced after his death

The sole councillor who had served six terms was a former luluai appointed in 1954. His government career spanned 27 years, during which he was also a member of the Simbu Interim Provincial Assembly. He lost in the 1980 provincial election and 1981 Elimbari Council elections. Because I lack data on the first two councils I am unable to say how many luluais or tultuls made the transition to councillor. For the Dei council in 1964, 27 of 40 (67.5 per cent) of
councillors had previously served as government officials (A. Strathern 1970: 555). In 1968, only five of 36 Sinasina councillors were former officials (Hatanaka 1972: 68). In Chuave by 1969, 13 of 41 councillors (31.7 per cent) had experience as bosbois, luluais, or tultuls (Bates 1969).

This information, plus people's statements, suggest that perhaps half of the early councillors were former government officials. By 1969 this figure was reduced to a third as these men who had served more than a decade as government representatives lost or resigned their offices. By the 1970s, with only a few exceptions a new generation of councillors had been elected.

It is difficult to draw a composite picture of the 'average' councillor. In the 1978-1981 Elimbari Council all but three councillors were fluent Pidgin speakers. On average, the councillors had less than two years mission or government education. Over one-half had previous government experience, usually as ward komitis. Only 22 per cent of councillors were also mission leaders while 40 per cent had some business interests. Only four men, however, were major business men. Finally, more than a third (37.9 per cent) were men whose fathers had served as councillors or other government officials. A few councillors manage to combine several of these characteristics. Mori Au, Elimbari Council Vice-President in 1980, for example, who was elected president in 1981, is a former komiti who had also served as the council's rules inspector. The son of a government bosboi, this man was already a prominent business man before being elected to the council in 1975. After a single term he became vice-president, and is today the most dominant of Chuave councillors.

Given the significant turnover in elections, it is possible to suggest that councillors of long-standing come to dominate the council and obtain finance committee positions. Factionalism within the council ensures that these positions, like those of president and vice-president, are difficult to maintain over time. Salisbury's suggestion that a president is the 'supreme individual' in the council, a director who rules for lengthy periods, ignores the competition within the council. Councillors from the same tribe or census division align themselves to chose a president who will aid them in obtaining council
funds. While it is possible for presidents to dominate the council through the force of their personalities, their re-elections are by no means assured. Since 1963 Elimbari Council has had five presidents, none of whom served more than two terms in this capacity. Moreover, far from being widely admired, presidents become the target of constant criticism by lesser councillors and their electorates, who use them as scapegoats for all the council's failings. The respect and decorum maintained towards the president at council or other public meetings, therefore, masks widespread disenchantment with his leadership in informal situations and these men have little or no influence beyond their own tribal areas.

Andrew Strathern notes that as many as one-third of Hagen councillors in the 1960s could not be considered big men (1970: 553-558). This contrasts the role of the councillor with more traditional leaders, 'moka-makers', influential in exchange within the segmentary political structure of the clan. Today, in Chuave, councillors are by definition regarded as big men and are addressed by this term or kaunsil. It is possible to distinguish councillors who being young men or serving their first term, have not established reputations as 'place leaders' or big men in the general sense of the term. Perhaps 5 or 10 per cent of Chuave councillors fall into this class. But successful councillors have specific skills associated with 'government' and 'development' of the clan or ward. I would argue, therefore, that a councillor embodies a separate political status, one which merges with or is distinct from other statuses such as mission leadership or a group representative in exchange. It is self-evident that men can use the position of councillor to enhance their reputations in these other areas: by simply being government representatives they may speak in any public forum or offer advice concerning the distribution of wealth in exchange.

Kopon's career illustrates many of the factors I have discussed. An excellent Pidgin speaker, who had experience of wage labour and had trained for a short time as an assistant patrol officer, Kopon was about 25 years old when he defeated Mama in the 1963 council elections. Development orientated, he encouraged kinsmen to plant coffee and start small tradestores; he also raised money to help a Kaupagam man buy the first Duma-owned vehicle. Today people describe Kopon as a man who
'knows' government, who dominates council meetings and whose talk is 'sweet': he is by far the best Pidgin orator in Kaupagam. Kaupagam men say Kopon brought development to Duma. Duma roads are excellent by local standards and these, as well as the government school, aidpost and large numbers of tradestores present in Duma, are all cited as evidence of Kopon's power within the council. Other Duma men argue that it was President Girimai, Kopon's close friend and a Komogam councillor, who in the 1960s succeeded in obtaining council funds for Duma. When pressed Kaupagam men admit Girimai was influential but stress, quite rightly, that since Girimai's death in 1978, Kopon has managed to provide funds for school classrooms and a tertiary road in Duma. Kopon is an active councillor. As finance member since 1975, he travelled throughout the council area overseeing council projects, and also to Kundiawa with other top ranking councillors to solicit government funds. Despite nominations, Kopon has twice failed to become president. He frequently expressed his disenchantment with the council, regretted his exclusion from the village court, and has threatened to retire from politics. He argued, however, that no one except his rival, Martin, a Komodurumo village court magistrate, is capable of replacing him. In the 1981 council elections, Kopon returned to the office unopposed.

Kopon had few claims to hereditary status when first elected as councillor. But he has used his position to act as group representative and dominates his own subclan, the smallest in Kaupagam, in ceremonial matters. Kopon's cousin, Bobiange, the wealthiest Kaupagam man and one of the two leading Duma business men, is uninterested in acting as spokesman within Kaupagam. Kopon, in contrast, is not a wealthy man; many others surpass his material wealth and contributions to exchanges. Outside Korowa, his own men's house group, Kopon does not dominate exchanges. In Aragor and Mamgram, the other two Kaupagam men's houses, Dege, a former komiti, village court magistrate, and the 'first man' of a larger subclan whom people regard as more skilled in methods of distribution than Kopon, controls these exchanges (see also chapter four).

Kopon rarely attends church services or songon's meetings, as he is content to distinguish between his own government leadership and mission affairs. With one exception — a Lutheran wokman, aged 30,
who has expressed a desire to stand for council — Kopon maintains excellent working relationships with leaders of several missions.

Within Komodurumo Kopon has a few close friends and supporters who admire his ability as councillor and have voted for him in elections. But Kopon has no influence in Komodurumo affairs. Martin continues to lead this clan and so intense is the rivalry between these leaders that Kopon rarely sets foot inside the Komodurumo section of Keu village. Kopon's relationship with Tabiagam, the ward's third clan, are better as they respect and support him as councillor, though Tabiagam big men control the daily and ceremonial affairs of this group. Kopon freely interacts with members of this group. When together in public, Kopon, Dege and Martin all share in the organization of ceremonies or participate in speech making. In private each man, along with a few close supporters, wage attacks against the others' character and criticize their abilities.

Kopon's reign has not always been uncontested. Martin, Mama, Dege, and a second Kaupagam komiti and two Tabiagam leaders have opposed Kopon in different elections. In 1972, following what many men now describe as Kopon's theft of council funds allotted to buy coffee processors for KTK ward, Kopon was defeated by Martin, his sole opponent, 187 votes to 162. Despite this setback Kopon regained his seat in 1975. Moreover since 1970, he has always polled over 100 votes in elections (File 42-35, 2, Local Government Office, Kundiawa).

Competition from principal rivals and aspiring leaders with whom he must co-operate in public forums restricts Kopon's personal power within the village and ward. His success in elections, I would argue, is not the result of personal obligations he has formed, of political patronage, or of his leadership in everyday activities. Indeed, Kopon is somewhat of a loner; he often spends a week or more living at his pig house near garden sites and fellow villagers criticize him for being 'hidden' during these periods. His influence, both inside KTK and throughout Duma, results rather from his reputation as an excellent orator and as a man intensely concerned with and successful in government. The respect accorded to Kopon and to his decisions is due primarily, if not solely, to his status as a government leader.
Despotism and democracy

I have argued that the regular emergence of despotic leaders could only have occurred in post-contact conditions. I reject the premise that major pre-contact leaders were 'autonomous', somehow immune to the influences constraining the power and authority of lesser leaders. Men who combined ascribed and achieved characteristics that followers admired and whose authority did not depend on coercive force managed to act as leaders for lengthy periods of time. In both pre- and post-contact society, moreover, the political competition of rivals restricted a leader's following. The power of bosbois and luluais, and the expanded following they led, rested primarily on the sanctions and potential force of the colonial administration and the actions of its agents, the kiaps.

Government officials, I believe, did become 'autonomous'. Kiaps supported these officials' power while often attempting to ensure that village officials, as symbols of government authority at the local level, were the dominant leaders in local communities. The success of these leaders and their ability to overstep the limits of their authority relied not only on the degree of competition from mission or other leaders within the village, but also on the official's ability to manipulate his relationship with the kiap in order to gain administration support.

The introduction of elections under the council system gave villagers unprecedented control over government officials. Instead of having to appeal directly to the kiap, withholding their support for government enterprises, or falsifying charges against luluais, villagers could replace officials by voting for other leaders. Competitive electioneering, including the opposition of clans within the council ward, ensures that regular tests of a councillor's authority occur. Yet some councillors manage to maintain power for long periods.

Their success depends on people's expectations of the government leader and the realization that some men are better equipped than others to fulfill the responsibilities and duties of elected office. Consequently it is possible for men who have little wealth, who have
little influence in mission affairs, or who are unskilled in methods of distribution to become successful councillors. Finally, until recently, councillors used sanctions and occasionally physical force as arbitrators of disputes. The use of sanctions, however, did not result from a leader's personal strength nor his authoritarian personality, but was defined by villagers as a legitimate right of the authorized government leader.
Notes

1. For example, men drew parallels between traditional warfare and current leaders' attempts to settle a war between Kebai and Sinasina groups which occurred in 1980. They stated that only leaders from proximate clans or tribes, and not provincial politicians or kiaps, would end the battle because they could threaten to join their clans in the battle causing further escalation of the fight.

2. Morauta's comments refer to self-made big men who were influential by the force of their personalities. She calls these men 'optional leaders'. Two other types of leaders, the land leader and magician, held office in the clan through a mixture of ascribed and achieved characteristics and were always found in each community (Morauta 1974: 21-22).

3. Generations are often skipped to account for characteristics lacking in ego's father but well-remembered for ego's grandfather.

4. Food prohibitions were extended to include age-mate's wives. Thus, a woman could not accept green vegetables or meat prepared by her husband's age-mate's wife.

5. *Nenam komeno*, literally 'my first father', is less often heard than *nenam*. *Auwo*, the familiar form of father and *auwom* the familiar of *aunam* are regularly used in common speech and to some extent interchangeable. There is little distinction, therefore, in terms of address or in the behaviour of eldest brother-father. Both men act as guardians to all younger men in the lineage. Christians use the words *auwo* and *auwom* for Amen and for God in prayers thereby emphasizing the guardian role of the creator.

6. Arguing that Simbu despotism was common, Bill Standish cites Rev. Bergmann's account of Simbu leaders who employed 'henchmen', who ordered the killing of more than 100 men, and who were 'esteemed' because they were feared. Bergmann's account, however, does not distinguish between the killing of enemies in battle and the killing of agnates, but the quote Standish cites falls under Bergmann's discussion of central Simbu warfare. Standish acknowledges that elsewhere Bergmann states leaders were killed when accused of witchcraft or having harmed the welfare of the group. In addition, Standish notes that Bergmann recorded 876 killings, 424 of which four men committed over several decades. While he recognizes that it is important to determine the operational political unit and the possibility for exaggeration, he arbitrarily decides that 10 per cent of these killings may have been within the men's own group. This figure—approximately ten murders by big men over three decades—I argue would be impossible under Chuave conditions and unlikely anywhere in Simbu (Bergmann 1971 Vol. 1: 94-95; 1972 Vol. 4: 75-76; Standish 1978: 75-76).

7. Salisbury also uses Tolai evidence to support his suggestion that despots ruled for lengthy periods of time. His primary example of arbitrary and despotic rule, however, is the account of Kavagl.
8. That some men retained the title *bosboi* under the *luluai* system is consistent with Salisbury's description of Siane leadership in the 1950s (1962: 28-29, 123-124, 127). At this time it was the *luluai* who was specially recognized in the distribution of valuables. The *bosboi* was a 'manager', the spokesman for the men's house group, and a man who could not become 'over-assertive' because lesser leaders would 'ostentatiously disregard any attempt by the figure-head to set himself up as a chief' (*ibid.*: 28-29).

9. I am unable to date this battle accurately as I could find no reference to it in patrol reports.

10. In central Simbu the introduction of *luluais* occurred earlier. Within Elimbari and south of the Wahgi River *bosbois* remained important government officials until 1955 (Keogh CPR 1953-53: 8).

11. Given Koiboiri's long association with the government, it is reasonable to believe he had great influence in the choice of his successor. Mama and Kaupa both say Koiboiri first made the decision and then accompanied by Koiboiri, they went to Chuave to receive their badges.

12. It is common for old men who are devout Christians or for young 'born again' Christians to dwell on past bad deeds or sinful behaviour and to exaggerate the extent of such behaviour in order to stress their moral transformation after 'finding Christ'. It is also possible that Schäfer overestimates Kavagl's 'volte face' or that Kavagl himself exaggerated his pre-contact aggression for this reason.

13. Brown notes that 10 per cent of 206 central Simbu men were polygamous in 1958 and states mission influence had decreased the incidence of polygamy by this time (1972: 33). In my survey of 175 adult men I found about 22 per cent had polygamous marriages during the course of their lives.

14. My arrival in the village sparked similar rumours. As a white man who smoked cigarettes and drank liquor, and who apparently possessed some article of clothing with markings which could be interpreted as the symbol 666 (Revelations 13: 18) and who was interested in studying *gavmen*, I was labelled an agent of Satan.

15. In 1979-1980 men paid K8 tax and women K2. The K40,000 estimate is based on population figures and my conversations with council clerks and the DOIC of Chuave.

16. Disarray in books meant that no charges could be proven. Only one attempt, subsequently withdrawn, was made to prosecute.

17. Almost half of council revenue comes from government grants and subsidies. Taxes, market and store licence fees, vehicle hire and village court fines raised the remaining revenue.
Chapter Four

*BISNIS BEFORE POLITICS*

The Pidgin word *bisnis* refers primarily to modern entrepreneurial activities: *bisnis man* are store owners, PMV operators or coffee buyers. But *bisnis* also includes all forms of personal wealth and ceremonial exchange. Thus, women *wok bisnis* when marketing garden produce, and men sometimes list pigs or coffee gardens as *bisnis*. Large prestations are *bisnis bilong tambuna* (the ancestors' or traditional business). *Bisnis* also describes friends or distant kin who receive wealth in exchange but are outside traditional kin categories - these are 'business relations'. Educated men, entrepreneurs, and politicians contrast *bisnis* to *develoman*, thereby opposing wealth or material success that is the product of people's labour, to the government's external and limitless resources used to build or maintain roads, aidposts and schools.

In this chapter I analyse the relationship between *bisnis* and politics. For most villagers, the prestige derived from giving wealth to others is an end in itself - a method of obtaining respect and recognition among one's closest friends and kinsmen within and beyond the clan. For leaders, wealth is an important, though not primary, element of their authority. Aspiring leaders must use their wealth wisely early in their careers. Individuals who fail to establish reputations as wealthy or generous men may lead - even obtain government office - but their prominence in group ceremonial activity will always remain limited. I show why those men who are engaged in western-style businesses are often politically inferior to other men, and how, inevitably, a few successful and politically ambitious entrepreneurs become the most prominent Chuave big men. The analytic separation of *bisnis* into ceremonial and western economic spheres, though descriptively useful, is very artificial. Wealth, prestige and occasionally political influence are the by-products of success in either sphere. The two spheres are also linked by a common valuable - money. Consequently, I describe how individual decisions or actions can simultaneously affect a person's success or failure in one or both economic sectors.
Economic change: 1933–1980

Here, as background to an analysis of current economic action, I describe the changes in the Chuave economy since contact. Two complementary accounts of cultures adjacent to Chuave – Salisbury's (1962) classic study of economic change in Siane, and Hide's (1980) detailed quantitative description of production and economics in Sinasina prior to 1973 – provide greater analytic depth than is possible here, and have immeasurably aided my own reconstruction.

People's poor memories, the necessity for quantifying valuables exchanged, and highlanders' penchant for self-aggrandizement make accurate estimates of the size of past ceremonial payments or feasts difficult. Bridewealth and wedding feasts – the best-remembered ceremonial occasions – provide a rough guideline to the changes and inflation that have occurred since contact. Table 3, based on a survey of 35 men, lists the major valuables exchanged at marriage over five decades.¹

Table 3: Valuables exchanged at marriage over five decades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Shell</th>
<th>Plumes</th>
<th>Pigs</th>
<th>Money (in cartons)</th>
<th>Beer (in cartons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2-6</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3-10</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9-20</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>4-10</td>
<td>£1-30</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>10-20</td>
<td>2-20</td>
<td>$20-150</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10-30</td>
<td>7-24</td>
<td>K300-1400</td>
<td>30-240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traditional payments to a man's maternal or affinal kinsmen were small in scale, relying on the productive capacity of a man's household and lineage. Men, 70 years or older, say traditional bridewealth was comprised of five or ten pig tusk necklaces, a small strand of cowrie shell, a few pearl shell fragments, tobacco, salt, and one or two parrot
or hawk wings. The inclusion of pig tusk necklaces differentiated Chuave from Siane bridewealth, though the scale of payments was similar in both areas (Salisbury 1962: 100). Both Siane and Chuave bridewealth payments differed from Sinasina and central Simbu ones in excluding stone axes, though in the late 1930s and 1940s, steel axes were sometimes given (Hide 1980: 115-130; Bergmann 1971, Vol. 1: 174). Traditional Chuave wedding feasts were held over a two day period in the groom's village. One or two pigs were slaughtered, cooked and exchanged between the bride and groom's lineage heads who then distributed pork to close agnates, friends and big men in attendance.

Other payments were smaller. 'Hand' payments to a man's eldest brother-in-law or wife's father in recognition of a woman's labour, 'head' payments to a male child's mother's brother, and 'lower back' payments to a child's maternal grandmother for her pain in bearing the child's mother seldom included pearl shell. Payments could either coincide with, or be separate from, feasts at which cooked pork and other foods were given to both agnates and non-agnates. Men say child payments or feasts were given only on behalf of male children and could be held at one or more stages: at birth, at naming or hair cutting ceremonies, upon ear and nose piercing of a boy between the ages of five and eight years, and prior to initiation. Those men who chose to celebrate each of their son's status changes, therefore, gained reputations as industrious and generous men.

Death payments for men to maternal kinsmen and for women to affinal kinsmen were comprised of two or three slaughtered pigs. The death of a 'true' big man, however, was specially marked. His death, unlike others, required the killing of ten or more pigs, plus a public display of the corpse for as long as a week in which leaders and other people from all clans within the tribe mourned. After any man's unnatural death - one attributed to sorcery or witchcraft rather than old age - maternal kinsmen raided the deceased's gardens and stole his own or his agnates' pigs. This practice continues today and, as in the past, obviates demands for any formal death payment.

As elsewhere in the central highlands, the scale of Chuave ceremonies increased dramatically during the period 1933-1950. The influx of shell valuables, the increased leisure time, as well as the
productive potential resulting from the availability of steel tools were all contributing factors. Just as important was the virtual cessation of warfare, occurring around 1940-1943 in Chuave. The creation of a stable political environment enabled whole clans to attend marriages or other ceremonies, thereby producing a wider audience for men who wished to use wealth to enhance their reputations (cf. Salisbury 1962: 119). This is not to imply that inter-clan exchange became a substitute for warfare as it did in other Melanesian societies (cf. A. Strathern 1971; Young 1971). In Chuave battles a man avoided close inter-clan kinsmen with whom he exchanged valuables. At the group level, particular exchanges stress inter-clan solidarity and co-operation. Chuave big men may delay exchanges in order to produce sufficient valuables to enhance their groups' reputation. However, unlike the situation in Hagen, clans do not attempt to 'beat' others in exchange, nor do 'superior' groups give valuables to 'inferior' ones to gain political dominance (A. Strathern 1971: 128-129). In Chuave, major imbalances between groups over time are the source of hostility and, in the past, could serve as a cause for warfare. Elements of individual and group competition are found in almost all Chuave exchanges. Ideally, however, it is co-operation between groups in exchanges which is stressed: exchange, therefore, is functionally opposed to warfare.

Using pearl shells as an index, Salisbury estimates a five-fold increase in the capitalization of Siane *gima* activities during this period (op. cit.: 153). Hide estimates that the average number of shells in Sinasina brideprice payments increased six-fold, that pigs doubled, and that after 1939 steel axes became a part of payments - at first competing with, and by 1944 surpassing, stone axes in importance (1980: 114-117). By 1953 steel tools were so common that axes became valueless as items of exchange in Siane. Chuave men state that they had become obsolete exchange items by about 1960.²

As Table 3 shows, the amount of cooked pork at marriage feasts continued to increase after 1950, but the use of pearl shells peaked during this decade, later to be replaced by bird plumes and cash - both originally introduced by returning migrants. Black plumes (*E. fastosus* and *A. stephaniae*) became much sought after during the early 1960s, but had declined proportionately to cash by the latter
Chuave men obtained plumes from Sinasina, central Simbu, Wahgi, and Hagen, either for cash or in return for, by then antiquated pearl shells (cf. A. Strathern and M. Strathern 1971: 29, cited by Hide 1980: 152). In 1980 high quality long and short plumes, valued at K20 and K10, comprised a portion of all bride payments, and were used as bride's decorations and as important ornaments for both males and females in inter-group dances.

Cultivated garden areas also increased during the 1950s. Salisbury estimates that one Siane clan increased its area under cultivation by 18 per cent during 1952-1962, and suggests many reasons for this trend: the increased reliance on mixed vegetables, the need to feed larger numbers of guests at ceremonies, the increased need for pig fodder, and the alienation of land for coffee. Ceremonial distributions of food increased at least four-fold during this period as people from a wide area participated in feasts and food exchanges (1964c: 6).

The introduction of coffee had the most far-reaching effects on the Chuave economy. Cash had entered Siane bridewealth payments by 1953 (Salisbury 1962: 132), and small amounts of cash were a part of all Chuave bridewealth payments by 1955 (M.V. McNeil CPR 1957: 9). In nearby Watabung, brideprices included as much as £15 by 1955 (Cleland, Goroka CPR 18 1954: 9). Although cash was at first restricted to returning labourers during the 1950s, it became general by the 1960s as coffee trees matured. Coffee trees, first planted in Chuave by 1952, became readily available from the Chuave nursery by 1955, at which time Duma men were especially active in planting (Salisbury 1962: 43; Mellor CPR 1956: 8). Bridewealth inflation illustrates the impact of cash cropping. Central Simbu payments had risen from £15 in 1958 to as much as £200 by 1965 (Brown 1967: 88). Chuave men widely ignored a 1963 council rule attempting to restrict bridewealth to a maximum of £25, and brideprices skyrocketed during the mid-1960s (Hiatt CPR 3 1964-65). The take-off point for cash cropping appears to have been 1964, when improvements to secondary roads and the formation of the Kundiawa Coffee Society caused traffic by coffee buyers to rise 500 to 600 per cent, and approximately 300 tonnes of coffee was sold (Wohlers CPR 4 1964-65: 1; CPR 5 1964-65: 1). Increases in ceremonial payments continued throughout the 1970s,
requiring contributions from a wider circle of agnates. I estimate that brideprices averaged K250 by 1972 and K500 by 1975. In 1980 clans attempted to conform to a standard brideprice of K1,000, though actual payments ranged from K340 to K1,400. Other payments were also subject to variation. Adoption payments for male children ranged from K50 to K500, and for female children, from K50 to K200. 'Head' payments similarly ranged from K50 to K500, and constituted a single payment or a series of payments over many years. 'Hand' payments, now regarded sometimes as a second bridewealth, are subject to the greatest variation: some men never give them; others make payments of up to K1,000.

The expansion of small scale business is more difficult to trace. In 1956, a twice-weekly market was established in Chuave. Both men and women sold produce and pigs— as many as 15 on a single day— mainly to patrol post staff, but also to other villagers (Mellor CPR 1956: 4, 6). Patrol reports do not mention rural markets until the mid-1960s. Dominated by female sellers, these markets were held twice or thrice weekly in each tribe. Today small markets, involving five to ten women, are held every day of the week except Sunday. In Duma, three large markets are held each week, and between 20 and 200 women sold items such as sweet potato, mixed vegetables, tobacco, scones, and cooked pork. Women primarily control proceeds from markets (see chapter five).

Duma clans purchased two vehicles prior to 1960, but single entrepreneurs controlled and operated these in the name of their groups. Data for Chuave during the 1960s are unavailable, but by 1969 there were 11 vehicles in Nambaiyufa, and a similar, or slightly larger, number must have existed in Chuave (Chuave District Office files). In contrast, by 1980 seven vehicles operated in Duma tribe alone; individuals, rather than corporate groups, owned five of these.

Tradestores also increased in popularity during the 1960s. As early as 1957, three stores—all mission controlled— had begun stimulating people's demands for European clothes, utensils and consumables such as rice, tinned meat and European tobacco. There were five tradestores in Duma by 1963; of these, three were owned by councillors who had raised the capital with the aid of their clans or
men's house groups. By the late 1960s patrol officers noted that 61 tradestores were operating in Elimbari (Downs CPR 1967; Faulkner CPR 1967). Using current population data, a similar figure for Chuave would represent a single store for every 187 people. Stores were a source of prestige and competition initially between clans and later between men's house groups.

Individual men, however, always controlled stores, no matter who financed them, and conflict inevitably arose between group and individual prestige and profits. Chuave men stress that many early businesses collapsed because contributors demanded profits or free access to store goods. Finney notes that one quality of early Goroka entrepreneurs was their ability to use group resources and labour for their own benefit, and he has argued that entrepreneurs are similar to traditional big men who use group resources to gain reputations in exchange (1969: 1973). He also states, however, that as early as 1967, men withdrew political support from business men who became too concerned with profits or claimed exclusive rights to prestige accruing from their entrepreneurial activities. I return later to the conflict between individual and group benefits intrinsic to both Chuave exchange and business enterprises. Chuave businesses that are started with group contributions reach a point when business men believe they have sufficiently repaid their debts to kinsmen and are free to use their profits as they wish. Further, by the 1970s, individuals could easily obtain the capital necessary to start small businesses. Consequently, a single person owned, as well as controlled, tradestores and PMV's, and economic competition was between individuals within and across clans. Unfortunately, Elimbari Council licensing of stores was lax and records are incomplete. Nonetheless, I estimate that, in 1980, about 500 tradestores existed within the council area. This figure, if accurate, would mean one store per 45 persons. Christie, using Sinasina Council files, estimated that during 1975, 1976 and 1977, there was one store for every 72, 55 and 49 persons respectively (1980: 72).

Rice and tinned foods now supplement the diet of Chuave villagers and, during periodic garden shortages, are the food staples of a few families for periods of one to two months. It is also common for women to sell garden produce, and then use their cash to buy luxury foods.
Store foods and other consumer products are also used in ceremonies. Feasts now include rice and tinned fish, and tailor-made cigarettes are mandatory gifts in ceremonial contexts. Western-style clothing, along with traditional items such as net bags and women's pubic coverings, are included in a bride's trousseau or given to women who have aided the bride's mother. As a result, store owners' profits are linked both to everyday preferences and to the ceremonial activities of clans.

The most important luxury consumable is beer, which is drunk on informal occasions and exchanged in ceremonial contexts. Beer had entered wedding feasts by 1968, but it became a common gift after the licensing of rural outlets in 1972. By this time clans exchanged about 30 cartons of beer on such occasions. It was during the dramatic increase in coffee prices from 1975 to 1977 that beer assumed its present ceremonial significance, and now beer is exchanged in all major Chuave ceremonies or feasts (see Townsend 1977: 167-168). The epitome of beer exchanges occurs at wedding feasts when the bride's clan gives about 80 cartons of beer to the groom's clan and receives, at a later date, over 100 cartons. These ceremonial prestations entail a cash outlay of over K1,000 per clan. I later outline the pattern of distributions and contributions that occur at these exchanges. Here, I stress only that, as a valuable, beer is equivalent to pork and is endowed with symbolic qualities similar to this traditional valuable. Thus, the traditional prohibition against eating a pig a man or his close age-mates have killed has been extended, so that men refuse to drink beer that they or their close age-mates have purchased for ceremonies.

The subsistence, ceremonial and luxury nexuses of Siane economic activity characterized by Salisbury can still be identified in Chuave. The use of money, however, has not only fixed the relative value of different commodities but has also facilitated the conversion between different categories. Every consumable or valuable can be priced: 10 toea for three sweet potato tubers, K14 for a carton of beer, K20 for a bird of paradise plume (A. stephaniae) and K200 or more for a large pig. But today men buy and sell pigs to obtain cash for payments to kinsmen, or conversely, buy pigs and freezer meat for use in feasts. Cash can be used in any transaction, but its common and
ceremonial uses are distinguished. Thus, when comprising part of a 
ceremonial payment, it is specially displayed: in bridewealth, 
concentric circles of K2 notes, preferably unfolded, are surrounded 
by a border of bird of paradise plumes; in 'head' payments money 
becomes 'leaves', strung along bamboo poles about 35 metres long. In a 
fashion similar to the former display of shell fragments, money is 
attached to a bride's netbag, constituting a portion of the personal 
wealth a woman carries to her husband's clan.

At a more basic level, the use of cash entails constant choices 
between the allocation of wealth for consumer, luxury and ceremonial 
activities. When men speak of months or years when they have 'hard 
work', they are referring to periods when they have to allocate a 
greater portion of their cash to ceremonies. Expenditure patterns, 
therefore, change dramatically over time, both according to the timing 
of particular events and to the social distance between the person and 
the principal sponsor of upcoming feasts or payments.5

There is a clear distinction between rich and poor which is 
consistent with men's degree of involvement in western-style business. 
In the next section, I examine the resources available to individuals 
and the increasing economic stratification of Chuave society.

Entrepreneurs: wealth and social differentiation

The majority of Chuave people have equal access to common 
resources: individual differences in material wealth are the product 
of ambition and industry. To some extent pig ownership differentiates 
men who continue to use exchange to gain prestige. Table 4 lists the 
numbers of pigs owned by 117 Keu households.6

With rare exceptions only men own pigs, though women share in 
their caretaking. The average of 3.73 per household is similar to that 
Significantly, half the men surveyed accounted for less than 20 per 
cent of all pigs, while 12 per cent of the sample, those owning eight 
pigs or more, accounted for 34 per cent of the pig population (cf. Hide 
1980: 319, 321). Those men owning one pig or none at all were often 
younger than 25 and older than 60 years of age, that is, either
unmarried and having few exchange commitments or past the age when men are expected to contribute to exchanges. However, men owning eight pigs or more included men as young as 22 or as old as 60. Thus, pig distribution is only slightly affected by age.

Table 4: Pig ownership

| Number of pigs owned | 0  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 437 |
| Number of owners     | 14 | 16 | 22 | 15 | 9  | 13 | 8  | 5  | 4  | 9  | 5  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 117 |
| Average:             | 3.73 |

Ten store owners in this sample each owned an average of 3.2 pigs (range 0-10). Eight men who were government officials or men's house leaders, in comparison, owned 6.7 pigs on average (range 2-13). Major big men say that they maintain large numbers of pigs to ensure they can contribute to any exchange. Thus, when pigs given by others are insufficiently large or numerous and thereby potentially damaging to their groups' reputation, big men kill pigs - a responsibility that leaders often describe as a burden of their position because such gifts are rarely, if ever, returned at a later date. But most men owning large numbers of pigs were neither recognized big men nor known as aspiring leaders. Most major owners, therefore, contributed pigs to their agnates' exchanges and so gained reputations as 'good' and generous men. But they seldom played an active role in the organization of feasts nor were they prominent in men's house conversations or other public forums.

Compared to other Simbu areas land is plentiful in Chuave. A married man has between 20 and 40 dispersed garden locations. Of these, up to seven sites may be allocated to coffee production, a similar number to subsistence production, one or two sites to pandanus nut or oil production, and the remainder are fallow. Individual locations, however, vary greatly in size, from single plots averaging 10 by 30 metres to quarter hectare sites, which are subdivided into
smaller plots and temporarily loaned to agnates, affines or maternal kinsmen. In June 1980 I surveyed the gardens of four men. The area under cultivation ranged from .18 hectares to .42 hectares per person, with an average of .295 hectares. Of this area between 20 and 25 per cent was allocated to coffee production. These figures are higher than those reported for Sinasina and central Simbu (Hide 1980: 301-302; Brookfield 1973: 156), in part, I suspect, because two owners were cultivating food crops for major distributions and required food above normal subsistence and exchange requirements.

Because land is readily accessible to everyone, leaders seldom rely on the gift or loan of land to attract followers. Men loan land to agnates and non-agnates for a variety of reasons, but especially to accommodate affines who wish to make regular or extended visits, or to ensure that aged people have sites near the village. Sites bordering on villages or roads are preferred for coffee gardens and tradestores. Men rarely give such coveted sites to kinsmen, though they may sell them for K100 to K300 for a 10 by 30 metre plot. Most men, however, retain roadside locations in the hope that they, or their children, will one day use the site for bisnis.

The introduction of coffee produced different results in Chuave than in either Siane or central Simbu. In one Siane clan, partly because of a misunderstanding over government policy concerning land rights, lineage heads were able to use their authority to plant and assume ownership over large tracts of coffee (Salisbury 1964c: 3, 9). Moreover, because direct father-son inheritance of coffee plots was established by 1963, the sons of these early planters had distinct advantages over other men (ibid.). Today, all Siane men own some coffee, but the significant impact of this early economic advantage remains. In Nambaiyufa I saw several individually owned coffee tracts or 'plantations' between one and two hectares in size. These served as an important resource base for three Siane entrepreneurs, one of whom was a man about 30 years old who had inherited a large holding from his father. Likewise, Brookfield reports that by 1961 some central Simbu leaders had 'extracted' land from private holdings and established communal blocks of coffee. Though some of these were subdivided, and though by 1961, almost all men had some coffee, a few leaders had as much as a hectare planted (1968: 101-102).
In Chuave luluais, tultuls, and later councillors were the earliest coffee planters, and during the early 1960s, these men may have enjoyed some economic advantage over others. However, Chuave coffee plots are individually owned, dispersed (generally within a 3 kilometre radius), and small in scale. People have always opposed individual attempts, beginning in the late 1950s and continuing to the present, to alienate agnates' land or to establish communal coffee gardens. One reason for this resistance is that most men believe that large continuous blocks of clan land should be reserved for food production for 'first fruits' ceremonies (see below). Although I lack quantitative data for the gardens of men known for their coffee growing, I estimate that few, if any, Chuave men have coffee holdings in excess of one-quarter of a hectare. In Chuave, therefore, coffee ownership serves as a universal resource for all men, and offers only slight advantage to the most industrious planters.

During 1980 roadside coffee prices fluctuated between 45 and 75 toea per kilogram. For a sample of 20 married men, ages 25 to 60, coffee incomes ranged from K146 to K296, averaging K226 per year. These figures represent household incomes, the division of which varies from family to family. Some men enforce their rights to all coffee incomes; others divide their cash or coffee holdings with their wives (see chapter five). Only ten of 117 men, 18 years or older, did not own coffee. Eight of these were unmarried men under the age of 25. A father usually divides his coffee plots after his son's marriage and encourages his son to plant coffee before considering marriage.

I found no correlation between coffee incomes and leadership or entrepreneurial status. Big men can, however, use coffee to obtain a following among young men. Martin, whose coffee income was K241, frequently contributed cash to Keukobu and Mamgram exchanges, and allowed Keukobu youths access to his coffee, particularly towards the end of the coffee season when picking was difficult. Bobiange, Kaupagam's premier bisnis man, allowed any Mamgram man to pick coffee from one of his plots adjacent to the men's house and still managed a coffee income of K230. In contrast, Dege - who, unlike Bobiange, was politically influential - was known to be stingy with his coffee and personal income. Although he frequently made token contributions to exchanges, his cash gifts were smaller than other men's, but, as
I show below, he played an important part as group representative in most Kaupagam exchanges.

Overall therefore, access to basic resources is relatively equal. Three other options - wage employment, coffee buying, and small scale businesses - are open to men who wish to increase their cash reserves. Government officials receive salaries and allowances in addition to coffee incomes: village court magistrates and peace officers about K200 and councillors between K96 and K144 per year. These leaders gain access to public funds which are sometimes appropriated for personal benefit (see also chapter six). In addition, Chuave station and road maintenance work affords young men the opportunity to gain temporary wages as provincial or council labourers, receiving K24.80 per fortnight for periods of usually four to eight weeks. Permanent salaried employment is also available for a few men in each tribe. In Duma there were three such men: a bank officer, an aidpost orderly and a road foreman, earning fortnightly salaries of K72, K75 and K84 respectively. The two largest Duma entrepreneurs, Bobiange and Tiena Maima, also employed between three and ten men at various times as storekeepers, drivers, mechanics and labourers, paying them K10 to K25 per fortnight. In addition, between 10 and 15 per cent of any clan's population resides outside Chuave census division in major towns where some people find jobs. Villagers receive cash gifts from these employed kinsmen and send messages to towns soliciting contributions to major ceremonies. The influence of townspeople, however, is rarely noticeable to an outside observer, except when men return to the village - permanently or temporarily - and use their savings to sponsor ceremonies or start businesses, and in doing so, gain recognition from kinsmen.

Coffee buyers, operating from private or company motor vehicles, are generally men under the age of 35. Independent 'foot' buyers often purchase unprocessed coffee, 'cherry', for as little as 8 toea per kilogram. They then process and dry the coffee themselves before selling it. Transportation costs limit foot buyers' profits; a man may have to pay a vehicle owner K50 or more to transport the coffee to factories in Goroka or Kundiawa. Only four such buyers operated in Duma during 1979-1980; the time and labour involved in this enterprise are too great an investment for most men. However, one Keu
man, age 22, accumulated profits of over K800 in this way during 1980, using his income to increase the stock of his small tradestore and then to build a larger, more permanent store.

Men owning vehicles concentrate on the purchase of coffee parchment. Their potential incomes are great, though limited over several years by the need to service their vehicles or save sufficient money to purchase new trucks. Short term problems are similar to those faced by a third type of buyer: major factories hire local buyers to purchase coffee in their own areas in order to decrease the chance of theft (of cash and coffee parchment) by local raskol gangs. In these cases, factories take responsibility for petrol and maintenance costs, and give each man about K1,000 to purchase parchment. From a salary of as much as K200 per fortnight, buyers must pay their driver (if a different individual) and one or two youths who weigh and load the coffee. Buyers told me they could expect to make about K80 to K130 over a 'good' two week period. However, hired buyers must account for any deficit caused by buying coffee above the factory recommended roadside price. Stock taking occurs after they take each load to the factory, and it is common for buyers to have a deficit of K40 to K100 which must be quickly repaid from salaries, or they risk losing their job. A coffee buyer competes with 15 to 20 other men within a single council or census area, and because few men have the mathematical skills required to pay proper prices consistently, most buyers shave losses by setting scales anywhere from 3 to 10 kilograms below zero.

Villagers are selective, often passing up five or more buyers to establish a maximum price for their coffee before selling. Consequently coffee incomes fluctuate enormously as factory manager, middlemen, and seller attempt to obtain maximum profits. Two Duma company buyers told me they made profits of K194 and K25 over a four week period, after paying their helpers. Buying strategies are also directly related to political patronage. Thus, a man who buys at above market prices, thereby reducing his own profits, quickly gains a reputation as a generous man and may even use his small income (however valid his statements) as proof that he works not for himself but for all men. A few coffee buyers said that the demands of kinsmen, or conversely the need to be recognized as a fair buyer, made them try to buy for less when in other tribal areas in order to balance losses
incurred when buying within their own tribe or clan. The political value of 'coffee patronage' is clearly evident when elections draw near, as candidates attempt to become buyers in order to establish reputations in different tribes or communities (see chapter seven).

The coffee economy is important to all villagers. Men's house discussions often revolve around the generosity or greed of particular local buyers, and the government's inability to control or stabilize road prices. One event demonstrates the importance of coffee-related issues. In 1980 the Simbu Interim Provincial Government, hoping to increase its revenue base (see Standish 1979), raised licence fees from K25 to K100 for foot buyers and K100 to K1,000 for vehicle buyers. In Chuave the reaction to this decision was one of widespread disapproval and outright hostility. Independent buyers, in tandem with bisnis man and councillors, organized a demonstration at Chuave, attended by several hundred people, which led to a bitter confrontation between provincial and local politicians. Although the demonstration had few immediate effects, the issue became central to the provincial government election campaign, ultimately fuelled resentment against the provincial government, and re-kindled calls for the creation of a separate Bomai Province (see chapter seven).

Tradestores or vehicles are the ultimate bisnis and status symbols to most villagers. All Duma vehicles served as PMV's on a daily or weekly basis. Owners of small trucks charge as many as 15 passengers K4 for a return Chuave-Goroka journey, earning up to K60 before expenses on a given day. Inevitably, close kinsmen and government officials are given free rides. Petrol expenses, as well as money spent on food or beer while in towns, further decrease profits. Moreover, accidents, mismanagement of profits, and improper vehicle maintenance make the lifespan of these operations the shortest of all Chuave businesses. The abandoned shells of old vehicles, along roads or in villages, serve as testimony to once viable enterprises. But for a few astute business men who can secure government or bank loans, trucking or PMV operations provide regular incomes. Tiene Maima, Duma's most successful entrepreneur, ran twice weekly trips to Goroka and bi-monthly trips to Lae, carrying up to 40 passengers in his 5 tonne vehicle, bought for K13,988 and serviced each month. In 1980 Tiene's educated son, who acted as his father's business manager,
stated this PMV operation yielded a K4,484 profit after expenses. In addition, Tiene made another K8,500 through trucking contracts with major highlands wholesalers.

Men start tradestores, spending between K50 and K1,000 to construct bush or permanent material buildings; the appearance of a store is itself a sign of material success. Initial purchase of stock from wholesalers entails cash outlays of K20 to K300 or more. Tables 5 and 6 show store stock varies considerably in size as do profits. Few store owners kept records of sales or receipts of wholesale purchases. Estimates of their profits and are subject to inaccuracies. Dama and Bobiange, owners of stores six and ten respectively, were unable to estimate incomes. They did keep receipts, however, and I derived their incomes from tallies of receipts and stock turnover based on an arbitrary mark-up of 20 per cent above wholesale prices. Mark-ups range from 5 to 30 per cent on food products to as much as 80 per cent on clothing. I believe both estimates are conservative as they ignore the sale of clothing for which no receipts were kept, and in Bobiange's case, only a partial estimate of petrol sales for which only some receipts were available.

The current situation, therefore, is one in which many small or newly established stores compete with a few successful, well-managed stores in each tribe or community. Small tradestores frequently fold after only a few months to a year because of mismanagement. Transport costs for small store owners, who must rely on PMV's, also severely restrict profits. Small stores are commonly stocked with such items as rice and tobacco for which there is a great demand. Large store owners have more capital invested in clothing and other consumer goods and consequently monopolize this trade. Similarly large stores offer a greater range of all products. Bobiange's store was equipped with a generator and freezer and was the only Duma store selling freezer meat. Moreover, his store, unlike most others, was open eight hours a day and was stocked with over 200 different products: everything from perfume, toothpaste, diapers and umbrellas to a variety of 'essentials' such as soaps and tinned meats. Bobiange's Kaupagam store was one of two he owned. The second, located in Nambaiyuqa and run by his sister's husband, provided him with some additional and undetermined income.
Table 5: Information on Keu village stores operating in February 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner's age</th>
<th>Political status</th>
<th>Other Retail value of stock</th>
<th>Cash on hand</th>
<th>Estimated yearly income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) 36</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>K 43</td>
<td>K 15</td>
<td>K 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 50</td>
<td>former \textit{kmiti}</td>
<td>K 64.20</td>
<td>K 30</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 43</td>
<td>songon</td>
<td>K 80.60</td>
<td>K ?</td>
<td>K 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 55</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>K 115.40</td>
<td>K 80</td>
<td>K 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) 36</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>K 328.90</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) 40</td>
<td>men's house leader</td>
<td>PM operator K 450.20</td>
<td>K 150</td>
<td>K 600*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) 37</td>
<td>men's house leader</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>K 534.85</td>
<td>K 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) 35</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>coffee buyer K 740.80</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) 50</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>K 864.15</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) 40</td>
<td>mission leader</td>
<td>PM operator K3296.89</td>
<td>K 300?</td>
<td>K 1200?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Owned by Joseph Dama and the only Keu store in the sample licensed to sell beer. Dama's K600 income includes a net profit of K450 from beer sales.

Table 6: Comparison of stock for three tradestores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock category</th>
<th>Large store Value</th>
<th>Percentage of stock</th>
<th>Medium store Value</th>
<th>Percentage of stock</th>
<th>Small store Value</th>
<th>Percentage of stock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food/soft drinks</td>
<td>K 917.52</td>
<td>27.83</td>
<td>K 224</td>
<td>41.95</td>
<td>K 25.70</td>
<td>59.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>K 6</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>K 7.40</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>K1430.50</td>
<td>43.38</td>
<td>K 224</td>
<td>41.95</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools/household goods*</td>
<td>K 728.45</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td>K 24</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene/soap</td>
<td>K 69.70</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>K 19.50</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>K 3.30</td>
<td>7.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other†</td>
<td>K 150.72</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>K 36.50</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>K 6.60</td>
<td>15.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>K3296.89</td>
<td>99.99</td>
<td>K534.00</td>
<td>99.99</td>
<td>K43.00</td>
<td>99.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Bobiange's store. Bobiange's religion prohibited the use of tobacco.
† Including machetes, axes, utensils, blankets, etc.
‡ Items such as playing cards, \textit{bilum} rope, batteries, razor blades.
Dama's business, in contrast, was in rapid decline. He had owned three stores and two vehicles in 1979, but by 1980, closed two stores and sold his largest vehicle to pay off debts to savings and loans societies and wholesalers. Dama's failure to properly maintain his vehicles, a number of ill-planned investments, and his willingness to allow kinsmen to buy on credit were all contributing factors in his business collapse (see also chapter seven). But despite his diminishing scale of business, Dama was considered second only to Bobiange as a business man and Kaupagan's premier entrepreneur by some men - a reflection of the Chuave belief that status gained is difficult to lose.

When compared to Tiene Maima, Bobiange's or Dama's operations were small in scale. Tiene, who first began his bisnis career in 1966 with $200, has constantly re-invested profits and has built a small business empire. He owns four tradestores - one of which is licensed to sell beer - and two vehicles. His son estimated Tiene's 1980 income at K17,914.06. In 1980 after spending K10,800 to begin building a tavern in Duma, Tiene had cash savings of K7,500. In addition he owned land in Wau, and had built permanent material houses for himself, his brother and son. A conservative estimate of Tiene Maima's total assets in 1980 would be in the vicinity of K50,000.

Tiene's career provides the classic role model for aspiring business men. However, most tradestores yield small profits - perhaps equal to half of the average coffee income - which, if properly re-invested over many years, could build a successful, highly competitive enterprise. But many small entrepreneurs are content to keep stores stocked with basic commodities to keep their stores afloat. They use their profits to buy consumer items, to make visits with kinsmen living in towns, and to contribute to exchanges. Such men gain reputations as unselfish individuals who cater to their kinsmen's needs, allowing credit when ceremonies arise, or opening stores at all hours of the night and day.

To some extent income levels create differences in material wealth owned or displayed and so differentiate villagers. Traditionally, few status markers existed in Chuave. Major big men possessed special bracelets which they, upon retirement from political life, gave to
their first born sons. After contact, shells and plumes, used as body decorations, differentiated men according to wealth. Like the central Simbu (Brown 1972: 41-42), Chuave men differentiate between big men, that is leaders (yar togara), 'ordinary' or married men (yarigan: 'man with a child'), unmarried men (yar kemimin), and 'rubbish' men (yar kwangan: 'dusty' or 'dirty' men).¹⁰ This last category included men with physical or mental disabilities as well as unambitious men who seldom contributed to ceremonial exchanges or raised pigs. Chuave women, like those in Minj, had uniformly low status in comparison to men (Reay 1980: 13). As Josephides has noted, 'where status is achieved for men it is ascribed for women, determined by their sex' (1981: 7). This statement holds true for traditional Chuave society, but, as I show in the next chapter, the socio-political status of Chuave women has improved greatly during recent decades.

No special term denoted 'wealthy men', but status markers were important on one occasion - the pig festival. Unlike Hagen men who wear bamboo sticks representing the number of shells they give away in moka exchanges, Chuave men do not use 'prestige tallies' (A. Strathern 1966: 362). Gerua boards, however, were important religious and status objects. Valuables and dried fingers of deceased kinsmen decorated these androgynous ancestral representations which, after use, were buried in fertility sites to promote the clan's wealth, as well as protect pigs and crops. Gerua were not only generalized symbols of wealth and productivity, but also signs of a man's personal wealth. Between three and five pigs were killed and distributed to agnates at separate stages during the gerua's manufacture. At pig festival dances, therefore, the gerua represented pigs killed that were above and beyond those given to inter-clan kin at the actual feast. Thus, the gerua, as men say, 'ate' pigs and were the hallmark of wealthy men. This status marker, moreover, was superior to the diri (a feathered ornament), which required the killing of a single pig, and to other common decorations, effectively and visibly dividing clansmen into three strata.

In 1980 some men as old as 35 had neither seen a gerua or knew of its significance. Not suprisingly, old men compared 'gerua men' to the current bisnis man. Pursuing this analogy, they argued that the status of 'gerua men' and big men was different in that gerua
men were not necessarily politically influential men or men's house leaders. They, like business men, were wealthy and sometimes generous with their wealth, but were often politically unambitious and secondary to the 'first man' of a lineage or subclan. The wealth they used, therefore, enhanced their own and their group's prestige, but served to detract from other leaders' ability to use wealth to obtain a secure political following.

Large stores and vehicles are major status symbols: signs of both individual and, in some cases, group success. Other status markers, in the form of consumer items, now abound in Chuave and differentiate the wealthy from the poor. All households surveyed had a variety of western utensils and some western clothing. Roughly one-quarter of 117 families owned radios, and 60 per cent owned one or more kerosene or pressurized gas lamps. Although 10 per cent still had some pearl shell, 60 per cent possessed bird of paradise plumes.

In contrast, successful business men maintain a material standard of living well above other villagers. Western-style clothing is mandatory for all entrepreneurs and between one and five business men in every tribe own houses that have tin roofs, glass windows, western furniture and running water. Bobiange and Dama both owned such houses, and, in addition, possessed more consumer products than other Keu villagers: from bisnis-related items such as mechanic's tools, calculators and sewing machines to household products like gas burning or iron stoves, tricycles and china.

Material signs of economic stratification, therefore, clearly exist at the rural level; social stratification, however, is a concept that remains antithetical to the villager's way of thinking. Although there is a growing concern among parents of educated children and wealthy men that their sons and daughters should not marry 'down', rich and poor do continue to intermarry and interact on a daily basis with little sign of deference behaviour. Not surprisingly, my initial attempts to have people rank others inevitably led to categorizations of men based on first born status within age grades. After further clarifying my interest in men's relative economic and political status, I found informants' responses were enormously inconsistent. In part this was due to segmentary group structure. Thus, men possessing
similar influence or wealth were ranked differently according to whether or not they belonged to the respondent's own subclan or clan; for example, no Kaupagam man ever ranked Tiene Maima above Bobiange or Kopon.11

However, a few trends were discernible. First, men refused to label any man as 'rubbish' as they insisted that this category was no longer applicable. They argued that every man had coffee, steel axes, and other western goods. People still use the term 'rubbish man' as an insult though without reference to a man's actual economic status; its utterance inevitably results in demands for compensation. Second, men place the most successful entrepreneurs 'above' all others on the basis of their 'cargo', that is, visible material wealth; but when asked to consider both economic and political prominence they continually ranked government or men's house leaders, who had fewer material possessions, above all entrepreneurs. Third, all other men, including minor leaders, village songons and small tradestore owners were differentiated only on the basis of first born status.

These trends help illustrate the conceptual distinction between material and political prominence. Within Duma, business men, men's house leaders, and government officials were often different individuals. Although these statuses occasionally coincide, I would argue that a division between political and business leaders in Chuave naturally arises because the time and effort required to become a business man detracts from men's ability to act as political leaders and, more important, the wealth held for reinvestment in business cannot be given away in exchange. I return to this point later in the chapter. First, however, it is necessary to consider the relationship between big men and exchange.

Big men and exchange

Chuave and Siane exchange systems involve corporate prestations and rely almost exclusively on the local production of food, pigs and coffee within the clan. As a clear example of what, after Andrew Strathern (1969b), may be called a 'home production' system, Chuave pig festivals and other ceremonial exchanges differ from such well known 'finance systems' such as the Hagen moka and Enga tee. In
finance systems men rely, in part, on inter-clan partnerships to amass wealth and exchange live pigs that have been acquired in earlier transactions.

Chuave men also rely on production to a greater extent than those in other Simbu areas to the west. In contrast to the situation in Sinasina and central Simbu, Chuave men have continued to resist the transfer of live pigs in exchange (see Hide 1980: 162, 526-528). For example, Hide notes that Sinasina bridewealth payments have always included live pigs. Since 1960, however, the percentage of live pigs exchanged has increased and, by 1972, live pigs surpassed the number of pigs slaughtered (ibid.: figure 4.5, p. 162). The exchange of live pigs allows men to re-allocate the pigs they receive to forthcoming ceremonies, including major pig festivals. Chuave men laugh at the idea that in other areas men exchange live pigs; they argue that all pigs 'must die' and stress that pork fat 'fastens' social relationships when exchanged. Thus, ten or more youths from a single men's house simultaneously eat the lacerated backside of a single pig, thereby demonstrating their solidarity. Chuave brideprices do not include pigs. At weddings the bride's closest kinsmen sometimes give the groom one or two live pigs, usually as the core of his and his wife's future heard. In comparison, clans slaughter, cook and exchange 15 to 20 pigs at two separate wedding feasts.

In Chuave inter-clan partnerships were rarely permanent nor were they used to link a series of exchange payments over time. In contrast to Hagen or central Simbu big men, Chuave leaders do not seem to have been energetic traders; they monopolized neither traditional nor post-contact trade routes (Brown 1978: 196; A. Strathern 1971: 225). Chuave men traded freely with maternal and affinal kinsmen on a single transaction basis to obtain salt, axes, pigs and shell. Trade was of limited importance following major pig festivals, insomuch as men used it to rebuild pig herds (see Hide 1980: 433-442). Chuave groups, like those in Siane, however, temporarily prohibited pig dealing for as much as a year prior to pig festivals by arguing that 'pigs belonged to the ancestors'. They also refused to kill small pigs to ensure breeding stocks for future herds (Salisbury 1962: 93). Nowadays, men sometimes purchase pigs from strangers or friends who receive cash; but all valuables ultimately remain home produced, that is, tied to gardening
or cash cropping.

Chuave pig festivals have declined in importance, scale and frequency, in contrast to Hagen moka and Enga tee exchanges which have become larger and more competitive. It is difficult to estimate the size of traditional pig festivals; but men insist that 'hundreds' of pigs were involved and that each clan member commonly killed between three and five pigs. But during the 1970s pig feasts involved the killing of only 50 to 70 pigs per clan, that is, less than one pig per adult male. Brown has noted the declining frequency of central Simbu pig festivals during the 1960s and 1970s and suggests that men's increased interest in development and cash cropping are responsible for this trend. However, Chuave people themselves argue that the major reason for this trend was the effect of missionization on the pig festival - an intrinsically religious rather than economic institution (cf. Salisbury 1962: 33, 94 n., 1965). It must be noted that other Chuave ceremonies - including those that had traditional religious significance - have survived and flourished, albeit in a secular form (see below). But it was the pig festival that became the focus of attacks by mission bosbois and catechists during the late 1940s and early 1950s. And present-day Christians - particularly members of fundamentalist sects - continue to associate the pig feast with paganism and with 'Satan's work'.

A major difference between finance and production systems concerns the type and locus of competition occurring between individual big men and the groups they represent. Here differences between authors who have studied finance systems, as well as between culture areas, make generalizations difficult. For example, Meggitt has stressed the corporate nature and competition of Mae Enga tee exchanges. He notes that the tee is ultimately concerned with the protection of clan territory; by making tee, clans not only gain prestige but also attract political allies. A big man's power base is firmly entrenched in the segmentary structure of the clan. But Meggitt has also suggested that, during times of peace when inter-group relations are relatively relaxed, inter-clan partnerships may significantly affect a big man's support group. At such time a Mae Enga leader needed to draw both wealth and support from various outside tee partners, as well as agnates, in order to maintain his position in the face of

According to Feil, among the Tombema, a fringe Enga people, group ideologies and group performance in exchange are unimportant. In comparison with the Mae Enga, however, Tombema population densities are low. Allies are also attracted on an individual, rather than group, basis, and no permanent alliances between clans exist (Feil 1978a: 33-34). Tombema subclansmen make tee prestations together at a common ceremonial ground. But Feil, who conducted his fieldwork long after pacification, stresses the significance of individual tee partnerships, and argues that Tombema men make tee prestations without reference to group concerns or co-ordination. A man's surest tee supporters, Feil states, are his inter-clan partners: inter-clan co-operation fuels intra-clan competition, specifically competition with a man's closest agnates or subclansmen (1978a: 27, 342-346, 1978b: 221-222).12

In Hagen, pairs of individuals as well as corporate groups make moka exchanges. Strathern's analysis, however, is primarily concerned with how groups use moka to cement alliances or gain temporary superiority over other groups (1972: 129-130, 218-223). But in noting the inapplicability of Sahlins' (1963) big man model for Hagen, Strathern argues that big men are, to some extent, set free from their 'segmentary enclavement' because they can rely on inter-clan partnerships to compete against rivals within the clan. Small segmentary groups can also hold their own in moka against larger groups so long as they have a capable big man who has extensive inter-clan networks (ibid. 218-223).

Precisely where the locus of competition lies in finance systems and whether or not the tee or moka are culturally tilted toward the expression of individual or group concerns are important questions. I would argue that individual and group concerns are intrinsically a part of all highlands exchanges. As a 'game', exchange necessarily allows individual players and whole teams to excel, be it a clan or, as in Tombema, a group of subclansmen who hold a prestation at the same time on the same ceremonial ground.

Different games or variations of a single game may also place
greater emphasis on group or individual performance. Furthermore, the rules of games are subject to change over time. Thus, Hageners have increasingly relied on the exchange of pearl shells and, more recently, cash in *moka*. In contrast, the Tombenma continue to resist using cash and to place primary value on the exchange of pigs (see Feil 1982; A. Strathern 1979). Inflation and the post-contact extension in exchange networks have also produced changes in *moka* and *tee* exchanges. But whether or not post-contact change has produced a major shift in the locus of political competition remains in doubt. Meggitt has stated that, in the decade immediately following pacification, a number of changes—including the rise of western businesses and the increased availability of cash—resulted in the 'progressive erosion' of many of the social, political and economic functions of Mae Enga segmentary descent groups (1971a: 208). Meggitt does not specifically suggest that the pacification of the Mae Enga area led to a shift in emphasis from group to individual concerns in *tee* exchanges. Nor does he state that there has been an increase in intra-clan competition in exchange. This latter trend, however, would be consistent with his observation that, traditionally, big men were able to use *tee* partnerships to unseat rivals during periods of peace.

In Chuave, pairs of agnates, men's house groups or entire clans undertake particular exchanges. As in central Simbu production exchanges, however, Chuave men organize major prestations involving a wide circle of agnates, so as to emphasize group rather than individual transactions (cf. Brown 1972: 50, 1978: 229; A. Strathern 1969b). All corporate exchanges are channelled through one or several group representatives; individual contributors are not entitled to make speeches or to exchange valuables directly with their inter-clan relations (cf. Salisbury 1962: 27). Chuave men display all valuables as corporate gifts. They first contribute to their group's gift and then representatives transfer valuables either to people in the receiving group or, more commonly, to the receiving group's big man. But as I show below, men's reliance on cash and other modern valuables has altered some exchanges so that individuals are now allowed greater freedom of action than in the past. At the same time, the size of modern Chuave prestations, in conjunction with changes to village settlements, makes co-operation between big men belonging to different
segmentary groups essential.

Although all exchange revolves around relationships created by the transfer of women between groups, the Chuave emphasis on corporate prestations forces women to the periphery of ceremonial life. Marilyn Strathern has noted that Hagen women depend on men for prestige and recognition of their productive ability. But although women's participation in exchange is of a private rather than public nature, they are key mediators of particular inter-clan partnerships (1972a: 146-147, 150-153). Andrew Strathern states that, despite the use of cash in moka and women's access to money from marketing produce, Hagen men refuse to recognize publicly a woman's cash contributions or allow them direct participation in moka. In Chuave a man's contributions to exchange are often as much in aid of his agnates as in recognition of inter-clan links created through his marriage, though different transactions stress agnatic or non-agnatic ties. Thus, a man who gives valuables to his wife's brother may be aided by contributions from agnates who have few, if any, direct ties to his wife's group. Although a woman's labour is critical in that it often produces the wealth that a man uses to help his agnates, women are rarely publicly recognized in exchange, nor, to my knowledge, do they determine how their husbands allocate cash, pigs, or produce (see chapter five).

As big men mediate major exchanges, it occasionally arises that men do not receive the same amount or kind of valuable they give in a series of delayed exchanges. Distribution, therefore, is critical in Chuave, and political competition revolves around access to distribution and the right to act as group representative. In most cases, aspiring leaders must use their wealth lavishly and show their generosity to agnates before being accorded this privilege. Once established as a big man, however, a man controls not only his own wealth, but also the wealth of others. It would be incorrect to say that leaders gain and maintain followings by using their own wealth to obligate others - though this is sometimes true in particular leader-follower relationships. Rather, a leader represents a certain group and protects their interests in exchange. Thus, over many years, several big men may contribute equally to the same exchanges or give valuables to the same individuals. In conjunction with a big man's gifts, men from an entire men's house group or clan make
additional, often larger, payments. What is required of an established leader is that he ensures that all contributors - even those agnates who have not contributed - receive a portion of the return gift. In other words, he must ensure that distribution is fair and impartial. What is not required of big men is the continual use of his own wealth or contributions greater than those of other men. It occasionally arises that songons or government leaders who are renowned for their oratorical skill act as group representatives in exchange. And because they have proven leadership abilities men give them the opportunity to distribute valuables even though they may have little personal wealth or have made only token contributions to their agnates' exchanges. Eventually such men may gain reputations as excellent distributors and play a prominent role in most inter- and intra-clan exchanges. Such men are exceptions to the rule that a man must prove his generosity to kinsmen early in his career. Nonetheless, these men serve as examples of the relative importance of distribution over contribution in exchange. I would argue, therefore, that a man commonly builds a following by using wealth to aid first, his own men's house kinsmen and second, men of other houses. Most big men then maintain their following by adequately discharging the responsibilities of group representative and make only small, token contributions to all exchanges. But those men who continue to make lavish use of wealth throughout their careers decrease the chance that younger, aspiring leaders will supplant them.

Reliance on production in Chuave has meant that small groups have undergone gradual incorporation into larger units. The Chuave lineage head, for example, was forced to rely on other segmentary units to produce sufficient wealth for inflated prestations. It seems that by the late 1950s, the aunam's control over distribution had already begun to decline. By this time mission activity had undermined both the aunam's ritual position and the institution of polygamy. Those men - particularly government officials - who had greater access to shell during the first decades following contact, or those who could increase their productive capacity through polygamous marriages, must certainly have been able to solidify their support by protecting their lineages' reputation vis-à-vis other groups. They may also have attracted followers from beyond their own lineage (cf. Salisbury 1962: 100). By the late 1950s, however, entire clans attended weddings,
necessitating the production of food and pigs by a large network of agnates, and the productive capacity of individual men, now monogamous, must have been relatively equal. The rapid abandonment of polygamy by the majority of Chuave men is itself one indication that wealth, though important, is not essential for leadership. As I have previously argued (chapter two), mission conversion and government office were more critical factors in determining political standing at this time. I would suggest that by the 1960s when all men had access to coffee incomes and when 100 people or more attended even baptismal parties given on behalf of male children, the reliance on a wide network of agnates was firmly established. The result of this process is clear: subclan leaders, often the first born of their generation, are today the principal group representatives in exchanges, and subclans - particularly co-resident subclansmen - are the prominent pooling unit for large exchanges. Moreover, major exchanges, those revolving around first marriages for example, entail contributions from almost all agnates; the result, therefore, is either political competition or co-operation between leaders who represent different men's house groups, subclans or clans. I later return to other special relationships between big men and exchange. First however, I describe how 'ordinary' men use exchange to enhance their own and their groups' reputations.

The gift of 'first fruits' - uncooked food from a new, previously unharvested garden - is a highly esteemed act. Sweet potato comprises the bulk of most prestations, but some payments also include yam, taro, sugar cane, and nut or oil pandanus. When in season, the two latter luxury foods may comprise the entire gift. Individuals, pairs of agnatic groups, and entire clans undertake these exchanges. For brevity's sake, I describe only the smallest and largest of these prestations.

A man, with the aid of agnates, harvests a portion of a new garden or the entire plot over a one or two day period. After harvesting, they decorate yams or other special food with flowers and vines, and then carry the food - as much as 300 kilograms - to the recipients' men's house square, and display it in a single pile. Although these gifts are occasionally considered betrothal payments for very young children, people realize a child is in no way bound by the payment.
Rather, the gift is a symbol of prior and potential marriages between different families. The recipient, usually a wife's brother or classificatory mother's brother, rarely distributes food unless he is a big man. Subclan leaders often distance themselves from the food pile until they are called upon at two stages: first, to deliver speeches thanking the visitors and promising a return gift, and second to distribute the food, often after the visitors have left the village. Big men attempt to ensure all people attending receive some food, but allocate oil and nut pandanus to men who will contribute to a return prestation, for not all men own these tree crops. With this exception, the principal recipient is responsible for planting a new garden, sufficient in size to provide an equal or slightly larger return prestation. Occasionally, no formal distribution occurs; people simply grab food from the pile as the recipient stands idle.

In contrast, the most elaborate prestation involves the delayed exchange of as much as 10 tonnes of food from communal gardens planted by 'friendly' clans, that is, those groups who have closely intermarried or wish to encourage further intermarriage. Clans of the same subtribe, therefore, rarely are in a donor-recipient relationship. According to some men, these ceremonies were formerly used to cement warfare alliances; but others rejected this idea, and all examples of exchange partnerships I collected included groups who had been enemies, as well as allies, over the years. Insomuch as these distributions promote good relations between groups and help create or re-affirm affinal relationships they resemble the secular food festivals found in central Simbu and Wahgi (see Brown 1972: 146-147; Reay 1959: 86-89). Traditionally, however, Chuave and Siane first fruits ceremonies were also important religious events held in honour of the ancestral spirits and aimed at promoting the fertility of clan land. Salisbury has described the fertility rites which used to precede prestations (1962: 32-33, 1965: 64-65). Here I note only that, in Chuave and Siane, the creation of affinal ties between groups was formally expressed when young unmarried women from the receiving group visited the host clan en masse to perform courtship dances for several days prior to the prestation. These corporate exchanges and their accompanying ceremony, therefore, were in many ways analogous to betrothal exchanges of individuals, symbolizing past and potential marriages between clans.
Today these major food prestations - like those to the west - are secular affairs that involve entire tribes or clans from other census divisions and sometimes coincide with inter-clan sports competitions. In 1981, for example, Koigam and Marime initiated a prestation to Komodurumo and Supagam. Komodurumo had held a prestation for Marime about 1968, which had been returned in 1974 or 1975. A Marime intra-clan distribution which recognized agnatic aid in past exchanges and everyday tasks preceded the inter-clan prestation. These gifts do not cancel agnatic 'debts'. Indeed, this is impossible because most agnatic aid requires no specific return. People consumed intra-clan gifts or used them to increase inter-clan prestations.

The following day, the major exchange occurred at Tiene Maima's (of Marime) tavern site. Supagam and Komodurumo big men led their respective clans into the clearing to dance around Marime and Koigam's clan displays. The formal prestation, lasting six hours, involved well over 1,000 separate prestations - from a single yam or oil pandanus to disc-shaped parcels of sweet potato weighing about 100 kilograms. Attached to each gift was a tag that named the donor and recipient. Recipient clans received food at staggered intervals, with speeches made prior to each clan distribution; Komodurumo and Supagam, the last and largest recipients, received about 60 per cent of all the food given. Six other Duma clans, as well as clans from Gomia, Mam and Nambaiyufa received the remaining food. All gifts were passed first between clan representatives - though not necessarily major big men - before reaching designated recipients, who constantly shouted accolades of wanoba-bee ('big thanks') or mandemande ('ground-ground') to acknowledge that a return payment will be quickly forthcoming. 'Free piles', donated by men without specified recipients, were also given to some clans. As in individual prestations, people who have not received food rush the pile and claim parcels. Men state that, in the past, inter-clan exchanges were occasionally comprised entirely of these corporate gifts.

The size of this prestation and the confusion surrounding individual transactions make generalizations difficult. Errors are certainly made: men complain that gifts are given to the wrong person. This is not surprising given that men belonging to the same clan have the same or similar names, and that literate youths, charged with
reading tags, frequently become frazzled by the pace and length of the prestation. However, I will note that reliance on communal gardens ensures that individual contributions are relatively equal. The contributions of Marime big men were neither larger nor more numerous than those of other men. Tiene Maima, however, received praise for his prowess in organizing the ceremony and for special gifts, which included betel nut and coconut purchased in Lae. The amount of food received, of course, varies considerably according to whether or not men have close relations in the host clan. Thus, 14 Keukobu men did not receive any food; in contrast, several men received over ten gifts totalling several hundred kilograms, which were redistributed to less fortunateagnates. Martin, Keukobu's leader, had expected to be well-recognized although he had only one direct tie to Marime, his mother's brother. As the prestation proceeded, he became increasingly agitated as his name failed to be called, and he finally left the central ceremonial area. As the distribution drew to a close, he received eight parcels from a Marime magistrate, Tiene Maima and Tiene's family. Although the total size of his gift was by no means exceptional, the timing of the prestation, prearranged by Tiene and unknown to Martin, enhanced his reputation as Komodurumo's major big man.

As described by Keukobu men, the return prestation highlights the corporate nature of this ceremony. Komodurumo men had planted a communal garden - about 20 hectares - realizing that a return prestation would be required. Because of Komodurumo's particular kin network, the core of the return payment is given to Marime and Koigam, but additional gifts are distributed to kin in other Duma and non-Duma clans. It may take years, even a decade, for all gifts to be returned. Kaupagam men may return individual prestation at any time or wait until Kaupagam sponsors a corporate payment to a clan other than Koigam or Marime. If the prestation is a corporate one, men repay debts incurred at the 1981 prestation and create new debts among Kaupagam's particular kin network. First fruits ceremonies, therefore, enable clans to signal special corporate relationships with other groups, even while expressing over time, a man's kin ties in several widely dispersed clans.

Men also gain status by acting as sponsors or 'fathers' of feasts and payments on occasions such as opening a tradestore or purchasing
a car and on behalf of male children or aged kinsmen. I have provided
detail on these ceremonies elsewhere (Warry 1982). Unambitious men
may never hold a major feast or payment. Instead, they make small
informal payments to agnates, maternal and affinal kinsmen, and
contribute to others' ceremonies and so gain recognition as good, if
not exceptional men.

A man and his close agnates sometimes raise major cash payments
to give to inter-clan kin at feasts. A variety of cooked food, pork
and beer, however, is given to a wider circle of non-agnates and
simultaneously to agnates throughout the clan. Consequently,
feasts significantly affect a sponsor's reputation within and beyond
the clan. Contributions of cash (used to buy tobacco and store foods),
pork and beer come primarily from the sponsor's lineage and co-resident
subclansmen. These, along with the sponsor's own contribution, are
displayed together in the men's house, and the men's house leader or
the sponsor's subclan leader formally distributes the gifts to agnates
and non-agnatic visitors. Over 100 people attend large feasts.

In this way men greatly enhance their status and gain partial
access to distribution. A sponsor, for example, decides which of his
closest inter-clan kin or distant agnates should receive large amounts
of pork and beer. Big men, however, ensure the sponsor's agnatic
reserve wealth is used to provide for all non-contributors, giving
especially large gifts to big men of other men's houses and the
visitors' clan. Big men also cajole or coerce the sponsor's closest
agnates into making contributions to protect the group's prestige and,
in exceptional instances, kill their own pigs when unexpectedly large
numbers of guests attend. A single feast does not entitle men to
control others' distributions. Rather, the signature of an aspiring
big man is the sponsorship of a series of feasts. In the interim, of
course, skilled distributors take responsibility for a variety of other
men's feasts. Established leaders often oppose aspiring big men
sponsoring their own feast. Although a man needs at least the minimal
support of his own lineage to contemplate sponsoring a major ceremony,
the support of subclansmen or other co-residents is seldom assured.
As a result, young men are sometimes forced to spend K100 or more to
buy tobacco, food and beer to guarantee their ceremony's success and
prove their independence from other leaders. They must also make
lavish gifts of beer and pork to rival big men within and outside the clan to ensure that, at future feasts, they will be publicly recognized by leaders controlling or influencing distribution.

A man and woman's first marriage rarely passes without elaborate celebrations. Marriage exchanges also best demonstrate the complex relationship between individual and group co-operation and competition. Bridewealth payments and wedding feasts usually occur during the coffee flush (May to August) when men have ready access to large amounts of cash. Bridewealth is essentially a corporate gift disguising individual performance and focussing attention on the strength of men's house groups, and ultimately, the entire clan. The groom and his father contribute a core payment of about one-fifth of the whole or approximately K250. Men's house groups make corporate cash contributions. Thus, in one Kaupagam payment totalling K1,200 the groom and his father contributed K226, their men's house group, Aragor, K480, and Mamgram and Korowa K240 and K160 respectively. Four Tabigaam friends donated the remaining K54. These corporate contributions hide individual donations which range from K1 to K40. Small contributions are sometimes made surreptitiously, but a man can easily discover which agnates have made significant payments and have donated plumes. However, men stress that this generalized aid eliminates the need for repayment of particular gifts. It is absurd, as well as almost impossible, therefore, for a groom or his father to feel obliged to repay individual contributors: they are indebted not to particular agnates but to all clansmen. Consequently, only inter-clan donations are repaid.

This practice also prevented me from gathering a complete list of all contributors to any payment. On three occasions, however, I obtained information on a substantial portion - about three-quarters - of the total bridewealth. Despite possible inaccuracies and variation between payments, there are three general points I wish to make. First, as in the above example, the groom's men's house is the principal pooling unit. Second, virtually all of a man's co-residents and about three-quarters of all clansmen make some token donation. Songons, government officials, men's house leaders and business men all made contributions to each payment. Their contributions, however, were substantial - K10 or more - only when the groom was a member of
their own subclan or men's house. Third, a man and his lineage donate about 30 to 35 per cent of the payment, and other subclansmen an additional 40 to 50 per cent. Men of opposite doors and non-agnates give the remainder - about one-quarter - of the payment.

Bridewealth distribution never parallels the method of collection. Plumes and cash are displayed in the centre of the men's house square; the bride's father and one or two big men huddle around the valuables and call people from the periphery of the yard to the centre to receive their portion of the pay. All men who will kill pigs at the bride's feast receive K50 to K70, depending on the size of the promised pig. Big men attempt to limit these payments so that between K500 and K800 is allocated to pig givers. Members of the bride's immediate family receive K50 to K200. Between K200 and K400 is left for individual and men's house payments. Men's houses receive K30 to K50, and individuals K2 to K20 on the basis of their prior relationships with the bride's father. One or two plumes accompany all major cash payments. Great leeway exists for big men to slight men or to bestow small gifts to supporters. Several leaders told me that bridewealth, if properly distributed, should yield at least K50, which they give to their closest supporters.

Bridewealth distributions are the source of great tension between rival leaders and between the bride's father and his clansmen. Men say that just as a person should not kill, butcher or eat his own pig least he draw attention to his own wealth and 'feel shame', so too men should not distribute their daughters' bridewealth. In fact, the bride's father makes most decisions at these distributions. But even when a big man's daughter marries, lesser leaders or even rival big men act as representatives. The presence of a leader who is not closely related to the bride is itself the sign of fair and just distributions, and because lesser men cannot confront a leader in public, clan solidarity is publicly maintained to visitors from other clans witnessing the distribution. The choice of a big man, however, also gives rise to problems; consequently, a single subclan leader usually takes primary responsibility for these affairs, allowing rival big men to remain close to the valuables or to participate in the complex decision-making that occurs.
But because these occasions present an ideal opportunity for men to prove their ability or their rival's expendability, men sometimes insist on acting alone. Miscalculations prove disastrous, and public criticism is almost assured as other big men, feeling slighted, encourage sarcastic remarks or outright confrontations. For example, Peter - a potential replacement for Mama as subclan leader - refused to allow any Kaupagam big man a part in the distribution of his daughter's bridewealth. Unfortunately, he miscalculated by giving K100 or more to several men willing to kill their pigs, and K180 for his son's pig. He also gave exceptionally small men's house payments and totally neglected two men who were to contribute pigs. Criticisms, open arguments, refusals to accept insufficient payments resulted and another of Peter's daughters and two of his lineage mates attacked him physically. Even though Peter disassociated himself from later distributions during the wedding feasts and relied on Martin and Dege to act as his representative, his reputation was irreparably damaged.

Wedding feasts involve the delayed exchange of food, pork, beer and cash. The two feasts, held in the bride's and then the groom's village, are separated by a period of one or two weeks allowing the groom's agnates to pick coffee and obtain cash to return the beer. A bride is formally given to her husband's agnates at the first of these feasts and thereafter resides in her husband's village. Bride-receivers commonly give greater amounts of beer and pork than bride-givers. At each feast the guests - over 200 people - enter the hosts' village en masse singing songs which recount prior relationships between the two clans. Visitors then sit in the courtyard opposite their hosts and immediately receive food prepared by women from several men's house groups.

Pig contributions for either feast are also influenced by group membership and residence. The groom and bride's father's men's house groups invariably give about one-half of all pigs. Lineage mates account for about 25 per cent of all pigs, subclansmen contribute an additional 45 to 50 per cent and non-agnates and distant agnates donate the remaining pigs. The extent to which the gift of pigs creates debts or diffuse obligation is difficult to judge. The bride's father's obligation to return agnates' pigs is partially alleviated by his gift of bridewealth and by the pork and beer pig contributors receive at
the return feast. A groom and his father are clearly more indebted. Although they give major portions of pork and whole cartons of beer to men who will kill pigs at the groom's feast, the need to provide for all agnates means that, although men may receive equal amounts of beer, the amount of pork they receive is seldom as much as they gave. Men say only the bride's father and the groom or his father must first give shoats or kill pigs to return those given by non-agnates or by distant agnates. Pigs given by co-residents or lineage mates are dismissed as part and parcel of the mutual aid that occurs over time. A man's closest agnates criticize him, therefore, only if he consistently fails to kill pigs or contribute in other ways to the exchange commitments of those men who have aided him at marriage. Men, however, sometimes contribute pigs to their age-mates' weddings with the explicit understanding that the groom will contribute to their own marriages.

Pork is also a corporate gift, controlled by the bride and groom's father in conjunction with big men. Again, leaders attempt to ensure pork is properly divided to provide for all guests and to allocate special gifts to every big man, including those in attendance from unrelated clans.

In contrast, beer exchanges resemble the first fruits ceremony, by including both corporate and individual transactions. Each carton of beer is marked with the names of the giver and receiver, and stacked in men's house or clan displays, visibly demonstrating intra-clan divisions or clan solidarity. For example, Kopon used Korowa's disenchantment with Peter's bridewealth distribution to insist on a separate Korowa beer display and prestation at the wedding feast. Keukobu, Mamgram and Aragor combined in single prestation under the direction of Dege and Martin. Martin's involvement was both a natural development of his influence in the village, and necessary in order to recognize publicly Komodurumo contributions.

Each carton of beer, along with tobacco and small cash payments, is transferred between group representatives before being given to the designated recipients who further distribute their beer by the single bottle. When the total prestation is considered, the net result is an overlapping of hundreds of individual gifts as men give their beer
to, and receive beer from, a wide circle of agnates. Women sometimes donate beer but only men publicly receive it and women consume beer only when their husbands who control cartons specifically give it to them. The bride and groom's closest agnates, and men having no direct ties to the visiting clan, give beer to the bride and groom's father. Consequently these men control more beer than others, and in conjunction with big men, distribute whole cartons or individual bottles as they see fit - often using beer for competitive drinking bouts or to provide what is called in Pidgin 'profit' beer, that is, beer additional to that which a man directly receives from his inter-clan kin. To ensure large gifts, the bride and groom's fathers usually spend as much as K100 on beer. Yet, at Peter's daughter's marriage, the father of the groom, an ex-tultul, spent about K1,000 to purchase 100 cartons. He used 16 of these to return the gifts he had personally received at the bride's feast, but gave the remainder as 'profit' beer to Kaupagam men. As a result, many of Peter's agnates and Peter himself, received more beer than they had given, and all Kaupagam and Komodorumo big men each controlled several cartons. This leader's reputation for generosity was immensely enhanced by this act; his gifts, however, created no obligation for informal or formal repayments by Kaupagam receivers.

When beer first entered wedding feasts, it was a corporate gift. As the quantities of beer increased, however, men insisted on making individual gifts to inter-clan kinsmen. These are returned tit for tat and differentiate agnates. Most men buy one or two cartons for inter-clan kinsmen, or conversely, ensure these are returned. Aspiring big men belonging to the bride's clan, however, use weddings to buy up to seven cartons of beer, which are given to a range of classificatory kin. At the return feast, they then receive these back and control the beer's distribution, using small gifts or whole cartons to extend their support in other men's house groups.

Beer exchanges are highly competitive. Entire clans, encouraged by big men, may leave wedding feasts early to show dissatisfaction with the size of beer gifts. Conversely, a clan and a clan's big men greatly enhance their reputations if dusk to dawn drinking occurs. The most successful wedding feasts entail virtual sobriety for the host clan, and wide-spread drunkenness for the visiting clan, who have
unopened beer left over that they consume over subsequent days.

The use of beer also highlights some special relationships between different types of leaders and exchange. As I have argued elsewhere, men use the cover of drunkenness as an excuse to confront big men openly and to air all kinds of grievances against agnates and fellow kinsmen in other clans (Warry 1982). Ensuing quarrels and physical assaults, often caused by the particular pattern of distribution, result in weddings being the most raucous of Chuave ceremonies. Consequently, men's house leaders and songons request village court magistrates and peace officers to attend any ceremony involving beer. Officials belonging to the host clan, moreover, use their government status to act as consultants or enforcers of particular distributions, and to give public speeches on the need for peaceful and co-operative behaviour. Magistrates maintain a higher profile than other leaders throughout the entire feast.

Magistrates also use their position to assume almost total control over divorce and bridewealth repayments, as well as death payments (see chapter six). Death payments rarely occur; they are given to a tribe or clan when one of its members has been murdered or killed in battle. When they arise, however, payments are large— as much as K3,000 and ten pigs. Because the chance of revenge killings or open warfare is enormous, magistrates take full responsibility for setting the size of payments, overseeing distribution and threatening men with jail terms or fines at the slightest show of hostility. In conjunction with the deceased's closest agnates, they distribute valuables to individuals and make corporate payments to men's house groups. When a member of another tribe kills a person of a magistrate's own tribe, magistrates ensure distribution covers the entire tribal area; each men's house group is allotted a portion of the pay in order to forestall tensions arising at future inter-clan or inter-tribal meetings.

All deaths thrust songons or other church leaders into the centre of public life. As upholders of Christian ideology and practice, they make concerted attacks on traditional mourning behaviour, attempt to prohibit mortuary payments and the raiding of gardens, and insist on maintaining a reverent atmosphere at mortuary
feasts. Although most Lutherans drink alcohol, *songons* discourage the use of beer or the killing of pigs at death. People circumvent these beliefs by sponsoring parties for aged kinsmen — traditionally unknown — at which beer, pork and cash payments are distributed. The gift of pork at mortuary feasts, which are actually a combined feast and church service, is very rare. *Songons* control cash contributions by men's house groups, using some of the money to purchase store foods for immediate consumption, and saving some for church projects such as wire fencing for graveyards.

Big men and the deceased's close agnates, however, often insist on purchasing beer. Tension and trauma surrounding the death of prominent men, in particular, is hard to contain and leads to confrontation between *songons* and other leaders. Because the death of prominent men must be lavishly commemorated, *songons* are usually the losers in these confrontations, resulting in the distribution of both beer and pork. When a Church leader dies, however, mourners pay honour to these men in a very different way, by strictly adhering to church dogma to the extent that all big men within the clan and community actively discourage bereavement songs, public shows of mourning and gifts of beer and pork.

Despite these special relationships and the individual variation of ceremonies, several generalizations are possible. Competition in exchange takes place simultaneously within and between clans over long periods. Within the clan, consistently large contributions and the sponsorship of particular payments and feasts differentiate segmentary groups, men's houses and individuals. All individual competition or one-upmanship, however, enhances the size of corporate payments, and inevitably fuels inter-clan rivalries. Underlying this competition are the principles that a wide circle of agnates co-operate in exchange, that mutual aid is as important as individual achievement, and that a man enhances group prestige by his own actions.

Inter-clan relationships are important in particular exchanges, though it would be misleading to call these dyads partnerships. In a delayed exchange or series of exchanges, a man who is generous to non-agnates or uses a wide network of inter-clan kinsmen eventually receives valuables that can be distributed to agnates to gain prestige,
and ultimately political support. Invariably, however, exchanges occur with a series of different clans, often those standing in a wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship. Consequently, some men are disadvantaged and others advantaged according to whether or not they have close kin ties to the guests present.

Established big men in each clan have a natural advantage in exchange; they are the focus of almost all transactions regardless of their particular inter-clan dyads. To the extent that a big man gives to or receives gifts from inter-clan kin in situations divorced from his representative role, he is on equal footing with others and must produce sufficient wealth to meet his obligations. But a few big men in each clan also gain partial or complete control over the wealth others exchange; they ensure and symbolize equitable distribution and protect the interests of all contributors. The expanding scale of some prestations, therefore, means that big men representing different groups are forced to co-operate or face the withdrawal of aid by other groups. Kopon's insistence on a Korowa distribution at Peter's daughter's marriage, for example, was a contributing factor to a boycott by Mamgram men of a wedding feast held on behalf of a Korowa bride the following coffee season. This type of intra-clan competition, therefore, can lead to reduction in the size of a clan's prestations and seriously endanger a group's reputation.

At the corporate level, exchange does not create reciprocal transactions between clans. Rather, each group is involved in numerous exchanges with many clans over time. Particular inter-clan ceremonies are often unbalanced: wife-givers gain more than wife-receivers. What is necessary, therefore, is attention to the size of prestations with different groups over time; clans strive for long-term balance in ceremonial activity and in the amounts of valuables exchanged, or else risk criticisms which lead to open confrontations or the abandonment of corporate exchange relationships. Inter-clan exchange is thus characterized by short-term imbalance in particular ceremonies, and long-term balance in a series of exchanges.

Bisnis before politics

The western and indigenous sectors of the Chuave economy are
intrinsically linked by common commodities, individual choice and by ideology. 'Fathers of stores', like the father of a feast, enhance both their own and their group's reputations by successfully manipulating wealth. Likewise men say women are similar to stores because they bring wealth, first to their fathers and second, to their fathers' agnates. Occasionally, men use their own and their immediate families' portion of bridewealth as capital to construct small stores. Adolescents, influenced by western ideas of marriage, suggest that both the bride and groom's clans should contribute 'bridewealth' solely to the married couple so that they could build western-style houses or start small businesses. Yet some men build tradestores only to find that the time and effort required to manage it properly, or the persistent demands of kinsmen to share in profits, outweigh the material benefits of store ownership. Such men may then decide to rid themselves of this burden and convert their wealth into prestige by sponsoring a feast, totally depleting their cash reserves or store stocks in the process.

These facts help introduce a nagging problem bisnis men and to a lesser extent all men face. Wealth is given away to produce status in exchange. Those who 'tightly hold' (save or consume) their own wealth are subject to the criticism that their personal success or well-being has been accomplished at the expense of others. At feasts, for example, men often ignore the traditional prohibition against eating pork one or one's close age-mate contributed. Those renowned for their generosity, however, follow this rule and also refuse to drink beer they have purchased. The mediation of big men, of course, prevents criticism. A man who contributes to a corporate gift and then receives beer or pork from this same reserve cannot be accused of being ungenerous; it was the big man's, and not his own decision, that he consume wealth. But at a wedding feast, those individuals who give beer to affines, and later receive a return gift can be criticized as having solicited beer for their own consumption; hence the common, though not universal practice, of redistributing individual cartons received.

The bisnis man's dilemma is of a different nature. Indirectly, tradestores and PMV operations still continue to reflect positively on a clan's or community's relative prosperity vis-à-vis other groups,
to the extent that one of the entrepreneur's most basic fears is that inter-clan jealousy may result in theft, looting or destruction of his vehicle or store, should open hostility between groups arise. But constantly underlying the entrepreneur's career is the potentially dangerous, and in some ways contradictory, assumption by agnates that his personal, financial success has been accomplished at the expense of group interests. As a man's material possessions increase, so too does the visible distinction between wealth that is saved or 'tightly held' versus that which he gives away or the group as a whole consumes. A common criticism of a successful business man is that he 'lifts up his own name'. In contrast, group representatives who distribute valuables, organize ceremonies and make public speeches lift up the 'name' of the entire clan or community.

Men often argue that the time a business man spends outside his community or tending his store prevents him from adequately carrying out the duties of elected office. Few entrepreneurs contemplate running for village court office. As I show in chapter six, these officials are constantly on call, and only the most industrious man can allocate sufficient time to undertake both bisnis and village court responsibilities. In the past, village councillors, who constantly heard village disputes, may have used this argument. Today, however, councillors use the critique of self-interest against business men who wish to run for public office. They argue that a bisnis man should not be allowed access to public funds, and say that stores or other enterprises are visible proof that money will be misappropriated for personal use and not used for the benefit of all. As previously noted (chapter three), government officials also face this same criticism from rivals. But when such accusations are made against councillors, they react by publicly pointing out that they lack material wealth or by disclaiming interest in entrepreneurial activities.

This belief partially explains why people say a bisnis man should not 'double work' by holding an elected office. Other related but practical considerations help explain why entrepreneurs are often ineffective political leaders. Few men have the industry, ambition or acumen to juggle successfully the demands of kinsmen, and so become both an exchange leader as well as a bisnis man. It is difficult for aspiring leaders to build and manage tradestores large enough to
Compete with other businesses, while simultaneously reserving enough of their income to sponsor ceremonies and so become group representatives. Established big men, in contrast, often say that their 'work' - that is, lavish ceremonial expenditures - are finished by the time they are 35 or 40 years old, and that they may now turn their attention to starting a business. Such late starts, however, mean a man's chances of building a competitive business are remote. Moreover, established leaders have sufficient status so that any material benefits a business would bring are superfluous and, to some extent, might detract from their reputations as men who are concerned with group, rather than personal, success.

It follows, therefore, that politically unambitious men more easily succeed in entrepreneurial activities. At a very general level, I would argue that those men who are unconcerned with acting as group representatives or with controlling distributions are able to avoid sponsoring ceremonies and so ensure sufficient savings to re-invest in expanding entrepreneurial activities. Taking a specific example, credit buying, I would suggest that only those business men who are unafraid of alienating agnates or unconcerned with maintaining a wide following, are capable of refusing credit or insisting - on threat of court action - that debts be repaid.

In contrast, young men who have little bsnis experience occasionally become elected as councillors on the basis of their development outlook. Councillors argue that it was only through government efforts that coffee was planted or that roads were built, thereby enabling the rise of small scale businesses. Those councillors who bring an aidpost or school to their areas, who succeed in obtaining coffee machines for clansmen, or who obtain contract work for a business man's trucking operation, therefore, claim that they work on behalf of all men's prosperity. Moreover, because these individuals are elected representatives and skilled orators, they sometimes assume a central role in intra- and inter-clan exchanges. Their control over distribution, however, remains limited unless they have a proven ability in exchange. Thus, Kopon frequently controlled Korowa distributions and always took primary responsibility for organizing Korowa contributions; he was not, however, known as a skilled distributor, and as a result, his role in Mamgram and Aragor exchanges
was second to Dege and to other minor big men who had proven ability as distributors. In contrast, Martin had been appointed *komiti* in the late 1960s, even before he was married, on the basis of his experience with wage labour and his association with several *kiaps*. From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, he had sponsored several exchanges which are still remembered for their size and for the extent of his personal contributions. He became renowned as the most skilled distributor in Keu, and despite the fact his contributions to current exchanges were smaller than other men's, he was frequently called upon to control exchanges in Mamgram, as well as Keukobu.

Inevitably, a few astute and extremely industrious men succeed in balancing the demands of both the exchange and western business sectors. Their businesses reach a take-off point where profit margins are sufficiently large to meet exchange commitments to kinsmen and to ensure continued growth of PMV or store operations. Three brief examples will help illustrate the range of behaviour that occurs in such cases.

Bobiange has a reputation as a constant, generous contributor to his agnates' exchanges. His personal beliefs, however, limit his effectiveness as a political leader. Because he is a leader of the New Tribes mission, he refused to sell cigarettes or beer in his store, nor will he give these commodities in any exchange situation. Politically unambitious, he has persistently denied that he has either the time or desire to run for office. In exchanges and public meetings he remains at the periphery of all distributions and rarely speaks. In everyday life, he is somewhat of a loner, rarely appearing at the men's house and always sleeping in his own house. His constant attention to his agnates and the community's needs, however, means that he is well-respected. He is Duma's aid post orderly, freely provides transportation to a number of small business men, gives close agnates free rides to Goroka and consistently contributes to Kaupagam and Komodurumo exchanges. Moreover, because he is not perceived as a threat to other leaders, Keu men rarely criticize him as self-interested. What wealth Bobiange gives to Kaupagam men only detracts from other big men's ability to gain stable political followings by creating economic obligations.
Tiene Maima, in contrast, has some, though limited, political ambitions. He dominates Marime exchanges and other Marime leaders, including government officials, and is also one of the most prominent songons in the Chuave area. The epitome of a clan representative, Tiene has long eschewed elected office, stating correctly that his Pidgin speaking ability is poor in comparison to other men and that his business and exchange commitments require most of his time and labour. His son, however, has publicly stated his desire to run in the 1987 national elections, and will undoubtedly receive lavish financial support from his father. Tiene's brother - a Lutheran pastor - and another lineage kinsmen, have both attempted to run for council with Tiene's public support and some financial backing. Both were defeated by non-Marime candidates. In 1981, Tiene decided to run for council, primarily for business-related reasons. After spending K10,800 on his tavern, the council told him that his bid for a liquor licence might be rejected because non-Lutherans complained that the tavern was located too close to Keu primary school. He then decided to run for council in order to use council and provincial contacts to influence the Liquor Licensing Commission. Despite the criticism of self-interest by rivals, Tiene's victory was never in doubt, though voting patterns clearly show that Tiene's major support was within Marime and not ward-wide (see appendix). Both preceding and following the vote, Tiene gave parties involving distributions of beer and store foods to ensure voters' support.

Mori Au, of Kamara, Elimbari Council President, is also a major business man. Fire destroyed his store, one of the largest in Chuave, in an obvious act of arson in 1980. Following the fire, speculation raged throughout Chuave concerning the responsible parties - who were never discovered - and the reasons for the act. Mori Au himself claimed members of other Kamara clans were responsible. Duma men, and some of Mori Au's own agnates, suggested that Mori Au's own clansmen or rivals, jealous of his success, were to blame. Duma men stated simply that Mori Au, then Vice-President, had become too influential, that his clan was noted for its intense political rivalry, and that Mori Au had ignored commitments to fellow clansmen in order to lift up his own name. Mori Au rebuilt his store and fully stocked it in a few short months - a fact which led to widespread criticism that Mori Au had misappropriated council funds. Mori Au's clan fiercely denied
these criticisms, which were, to my knowledge, groundless; the store had been insured and Mori Au had sufficient cash reserves to recover from this personal disaster. Moreover, Mori Au's intra-clan support was sufficient enough for him to be re-elected in 1981. Nonetheless, the incident demonstrates people's suspicions and mistrust of the councillor-entrepreneur and, as important, the ability of some leaders to ignore or overcome widespread criticism of their actions.

Chuave exchange and entrepreneurial activities remain male-dominated. Men formally control valuables, and ceremonial or western-style business success remains concerned with male, not female, prestige and political influence. Men's comparisons of women to tradestores, however, indicate that men recognize the exchange of women as the source of wealth received in intergroup exchanges. Men also clearly recognize that their wives' labour is necessary for their own material success and prestige derived from exchange. Although a few Chuave women have attempted to gain greater influence over how their husbands conduct exchanges or run businesses, most Chuave women have chosen a different course to assert themselves vis-à-vis males. They have created alternative corporate groups that enable them to control a portion of the wealth they produce, and alternative exchange systems which they alone dominate. In the next chapter, I examine the relationship between wealth, female status and political power.
Notes

1. I initially questioned 50 men, ten each of five different generations. Twelve men aged 45 or more could not remember the details of their payments. Also, assistants considered the responses of three other younger men unreliable, and I have eliminated these. The table does not include average payments because, with the exception of pigs and money, men often could not quantify valuables given. Hide provides information on bridewealth for first and other marriages in Sinasina (1980 appendix 3).

2. In Sinasina steel axes remained a part of bridewealth until as late as 1973 (Hide 1980: 114), presumably because stone axes initially had some symbolic value and, unlike the Chuave situation, were important items of traditional exchange.

3. Hide also documents the shift from red (P. raggiana) to black plumes which occurred during this decade (1980: 148-154).

4. Much of my information concerning the use of beer in Chuave ceremonies has been presented elsewhere. In particular, I have outlined beer's symbolic value, its suitability in conforming to traditional methods of distribution and the use of intoxicated states to confront kinsmen and big men. For ceremonial and other uses of alcohol throughout Papua New Guinea, see Marshall (1982).

5. See Christie (1980) for an account of how expenditure patterns differ between households and for an excellent analysis of changing consumer behaviour among town and rural Sinasina families.

6. Because pigs are agisted to protect against anthrax and to disguise the size of pig herds from agnates, this survey is subject to inaccuracy. I simply asked men to count the pigs they owned, including those agisted to kinsmen. I later made a random check of responses by counting the pigs of ten men. With the exception that men commonly exclude shoats from their responses, the figures were accurate.

7. Hide discusses the problems of comparing areas under cultivation in different cultures (1980: Appendix 6: 611-614). My survey, like Hide's, included only those areas planted with unharvested and recently planted crops and excluded all fenced in areas as yet unplanted.

8. Two other tactics are evident. Coffee is bought by weight and grade, whether or not the coffee is properly dried. Raskols occasionally increase weight by adding stones to the bottom of the bag or by topping off wet coffee with dried beans. All that is required for such a strategy to succeed is boldness and the speed to flee with money before being discovered. Middlemen also use company vehicles to buy coffee with their own savings, as well as company cash; their own coffee is kept separate, stored and later sold to a rival factory.

10. The analogy is to the soot of fires and is similar to the Hagen term for rubbish man (Strathern 1971: 187-190).

11. Consequently, I have not tried to quantify informants' responses. Hayano (1974) and Hawkes (1978) have quantitatively analysed big man status in two eastern highlands societies. Hayano found both traditional wealth and personal health were associated with high status among the Tauna Awa. But he was unable to estimate the importance of modern monetary or material wealth. Hawkes' analysis shows that wealth is not an important characteristic of Binumarien big men, but that big men 'co-operate more and more widely than do ordinary men in production tasks' (1978: 179).

12. Feil (1978a: 346) notes that his emphasis on inter-clan coop­
operation is analogous to Forge's (1972) remarks concerning kula partners, who, because they are outside the political community, 'cannot be in any sense a rival for prestige within their villages and their network of daily face to face relationships' (ibid.: 534).

13. Tombena women are exceptional by highlands standards in that they are 'essential participants' in tee exchanges who make 'key political decisions' (Feil 1978c: 265).

14. Mori Au, as well as his rival candidates, were reluctant to allow me to reveal their names in any analysis of voting patterns. This ward's election is not analysed in the appendix, and I have decided to give no further indication as to the ease or difficulty with which Mori Au gained re-election.
Kafaina is a savings and loan organization, created and controlled by women, which began in Chuave in the early 1960s with women's diffuse pleas for economic and political equality. The movement has progressed through several stages, with formalized group action first occurring in the late 1960s. Today Kafaina, or Wok Meri as it is called in Eastern Highlands province, provides an institutional framework that links together thousands of women from different tribal and language areas.

My analysis of this institution supplements earlier reports of the movement (Anggo 1975; Munster 1975) and expands on Lorraine Sexton's (1980, 1982) thesis that 'Wok Meri is an organized collective response by women to the erosion of their economic status in the last fifty years' (1980: 198). I demonstrate that Kafaina is also a response to the peripheral political status of women and a reaction against women's exclusion from modern political institutions. Kafaina beliefs are concerned with the inherent power of females and their ability to produce wealth. Women as producers have always been a source of wealth and political power, appropriated in the past by male control of wealth in exchange, and Kafaina women are viewed, and view themselves as responsible for wealth that will be used in the modern development sector of the cash economy. I show, for example, that characteristics of Kafaina groups parallel traditional beliefs about the power of women as producers of food, caretakers of pigs and sources of male wealth in general. In addition, within Kafaina, women not only produce and protect wealth but also strive to control its allocation, and this too was a characteristic of traditional roles vis-à-vis wealth objects. But although a correlation between women's roles in the exchange economy and in the modern cash economy is evident, they differ in one important respect. Whereas females formerly achieved only a modicum of success in the control and allocation of wealth used in exchange, Kafaina women have institutionalized their control over the valuables they produce, and hence have achieved a real degree of political power.
Male-female relations

Women still have few political and legal rights in comparison to men, though their status has improved enormously over the past 50 years. In the past a wife faced severe sanctions for publicly or privately confronting her husband. Verbal abuse or insults necessitated immediate compensation to her spouse; lineage mates of the aggrieved husband would seize and kill a woman's pig or that of her brother or father. A woman who physically assaulted a man or committed adultery would be publicly beaten; in severe cases, a husband might shoot an arrow into his wife's leg or thigh. Such extreme punishment was not regularly administered and depended on the quality of particular husband-wife relationships. In contrast, however, women could not claim compensation for mistreatment at the hands of their husbands. Informants were reluctant and ashamed to discuss the few cases of female suicide I discovered, and I suspect that they concealed additional cases from me. But people acknowledged that suicide and desertion by wives were responses to physical mistreatment by husbands. As Dorothy Counts (1980) has demonstrated in an excellent case study from Kaliai, New Britain, suicide by otherwise powerless females can be a political act.

Today men continue to physically and verbally abuse their wives. Because of administration law and mission teachings, however, women receive compensation in adultery cases; marital quarrels often dominate village court proceedings. In marital disputes, most women do not proceed with formal litigation unless injuries have been sustained or physical abuse has been prolonged, or they regard divorce as a real alternative to their current relationship. In court cases women continue to receive biased treatment by both male magistrates and mission leaders who believe that women are less than equal partners in marriage.

Women remain peripheral to political and public affairs within the clan and village. Although women are no longer prohibited from entering the men's house they rarely speak publicly. On those occasions when a 'strong' woman wishes to speak, a leader will call for complete silence so that she may be heard (unlike men, women's voices are not believed to be strong enough to compete with others').
But men almost always ignore such speeches, and the acknowledgement of a woman's right to speak is only a minimal advance towards the possibility of a political status equivalent to males. Women are totally excluded from public offices; no woman has ever been elected as councillor or village court magistrate. Women are likewise excluded from active participation in mission affairs and may not hold the position of pastor or songon. Both men and women regard all these positions as the domain of men.

In the previous chapter I stressed men's continuing domination of ceremonial exchange. As a general rule a woman still gains only a modicum of reflected status and prestige from her husband's or male kinsmen's transactions. Whereas in the past women were prohibited from even approaching displayed wealth, they now handle cash and other valuables freely; they restrict their movements only during the actual transfer of valuables.

Men continue to be the principal owners of pigs. Of 91 couples surveyed, only four women (4.3 per cent) claimed to own pigs—seldom more than two—which they could allocate to exchanges without their husbands' consent. Such pigs are usually those a woman brings to her marriage. Men differ in the extent to which they feel obliged to consult their wives before allocating pigs for particular ceremonies and both men and women agree that a woman cannot override her husband's decision. While the care and feeding of pigs is sometimes a shared activity, women assume a substantial part of this work. As in Siane, women often wail or protest when husbands kill their pigs, and they may receive small gifts to 'calm their stomachs' on such occasions (Salisbury 1962: 62). Such payments are not compensation for a woman's claim for co-ownership for the pig itself, but rather for the labour and care a woman has invested in raising the pig.

A woman exercises great control over all crops she plants though she relinquishes this control to her husband when foodstuffs are used in formal exchanges. A husband should, in theory, ask his wife's permission to enter her garden even though he is the owner of the property. Today this is seldom done, but men still seek their wives' permission before harvesting crops—a situation similar to the Siane (ibid.) and Hagen areas (M. Strathern 1972a: 23) but different to
the Daulo region where both men and women have rights to harvest crops (Sexton 1981).

A wife should allocate a portion of her crops to cook for both her husband and his men's house mates. Women who do not frequently bring food to the men's house are accused of stinginess and criticized for their lack of generosity. Such a woman may be a successful gardener; but ultimately her and her husband's prosperity, in combination with ungenerous behaviour, are believed to be signs that a woman is a witch whom men will then carefully watch and mistrust - a point I return to shortly.

Today markets flourish in Chuave, being held two or three times weekly in most areas. As few as 20 or as many as 100 women attend these markets to sell garden produce and other items such as netbags and clothing. Market income is a primary source of cash for Kafaina women. Thus, while 70 of 120 village women surveyed (58 per cent) sold produce at markets, 62 of 68 Kafaina women (91 per cent) obtained cash in this manner. Based on a survey of ten women over a three week period, the daily earnings from market sales ranged from as little as 40 toea to as much as K5.20, with women averaging K1 per market day. Men do not question a woman's right to sell produce but demand only that sufficient crops are planted for household use and for upcoming commitments to group exchanges. All men agree that the profits from these transactions belong to women. Women use this cash to buy cigarettes, gamble, obtain tradestore goods and to invest in Kafaina savings. But women often share their market incomes with spouses and use this money for household purposes.

Men plant and control yams, sugar cane, bananas, pandanus nut, oil pandanus and coffee; but money from coffee, the primary source of cash income, is the source of continuing tension between husbands and wives. As in the Daulo region, women complain that men waste money on beer and gambling and Kafaina women use this criticism as the primary rationale for their own savings (Sexton 1982: 169). But in practice, women gamble as frequently as males and their complaints must be regarded as a more general comment on their inability to control coffee incomes. In theory, because men own and plant coffee trees, they have total control over coffee incomes, even though women invest much more time
and labour in coffee production than men. Work patterns vary greatly from family to family. Some men refuse to pick coffee at all, and yet enforce their right to control cash incomes. Other men pay youths or children to aid their wives in picking and processing coffee, and some regard coffee production as a shared activity. In extreme instances men may allocate particular plots to their wives and so divide both labour and proceeds in what men regard as an equitable fashion. I have data regarding the division of coffee proceeds for only five couples and so can provide only an indication of the possible variation which exists between husbands and wives. Although women provided most of the labour in all these instances, their personal incomes from coffee ranged from K63 to K103 with an average of K75.60 per woman in 1980. These figures represent from 26 to 42 per cent of the total family income derived from coffee sales (an average of 38 per cent).^3

To summarize, women continue to provide most of the labour in both the subsistence and cash economies, while receiving a disproportionately small share of cash income. In noting the reduction in time males spend in subsistence activities, Salisbury estimated that traditionally Siane men and women spent 80 per cent of their time on subsistence labour (1962: 108). For the Daulo region in 1976-1978, Sexton reports that women spent 43.5 per cent of their daylight hours on subsistence tasks, and men only 18 per cent (1980: 131). When cash-generating activities were included, the figures were 53.1 per cent for women and 35 per cent for men. Women, furthermore, continue to have only a peripheral role in the exchange economy. While they now have access to more cash than in the past, they must allocate a portion of this to the care and maintenance of their households and face the possibility of having their husbands appropriate the cash for use in exchanges from which women can derive only second-hand status and respect as producers.

Something hidden: female power in Chuave

Despite the dominance of males over females in public affairs, men continue to both fear and mistrust women. The danger of females results first from contaminating effects of menstrual blood which is viewed as debilitating to men and other living things - including pigs
and garden produce. Among men who place some store in traditional religious beliefs, however, females are also powerful because they are more closely in tune with the ancestral spirits than men. Virtually all men, furthermore, continue to believe that at least some women are themselves supernatural beings, capable of destroying the wealth of men, and in the extreme, of causing death or physical injury to males at the slightest provocation.

As in Siane, women unlike men, were said to be able to 'see' ancestral spirits, giri, in a tangible form (Salisbury 1965: 75). In Chuave, middle-age or elderly women were in the past best able to speak to spirits and act as mediums in seances held in women's houses at night. People asked the girimo or obar kwiam garingwa ('woman who knows spirits') to call specific ancestors to the house so that they could be consulted on a range of decisions which needed to be made: for example, whether or not to marry, to plant gardens or prepare feasts. Upon hearing the whistling sound of the spirits, the girimo acted as a translator for those in attendance and often received payments such as a small pig, bits of shell or pig's teeth for her services. Today such seances are no longer held but a woman's supernatural power is emphasized in other ways.

Menstrual blood is still regarded as dangerous to men; sexual intercourse during menstruation never occurs, and women pay as much as K100 compensation to men who accidently come in contact with menstrual blood. Other prohibitions are no longer strictly enforced. Today men may receive food from a menstruating women; and females show no reluctance to travel through the village or to gardens during menses. Although male initiation no longer occurs, men still insist that a girl's first menstruation requires isolation of between one and two weeks (formerly two to three months). A girl stays behind an enclosed division or wall, sometimes called a 'bed', in her mother's house. The girl's father or brothers may not enter the house during this time, and all other men must remain in front of the barrier, and may not see the isolated girl. Shortly before leaving the house a girl is given food, formerly sugar cane and now also candy, which represents ancestral spirit substance (see also Salisbury 1965; Ross 1965; Whitemen 1965). When a girl leaves the house, dressed in her finest decorations
and a new pubic covering, she proceeds along a pathway and walks over pandanus leaves, associated with productivity, wealth and fertility (cf. Newman 1965: 77) (today coffee leaves are sometimes used), small net bags and money (formerly pigs' teeth or shell) which are then grabbed by people in attendance. This ritual act reverses the usual prohibition that women must not walk over any material items or food for fear of contaminating them and stresses both the girl's fertility and her ability to bring wealth to the clan in exchanges which will revolve around her marriage (see Sexton 1982: 179).

Read (1952) has demonstrated how men used secret cults surrounding male initiation and the ancestral flutes to preserve their superior status over women. He notes that old women were shown the flutes and that women, in fact knew of their existence (ibid.: 5-6, note 14); he argues that these cults, plus the secrecy surrounding them, are an artificial and culturally-contrived mechanism to separate male from female status. In Chuave old women were shown and allowed to handle the flutes, but men and women insisted that most women remained unaware of the true nature of the flutes.

While women in Chuave have known of the flutes' existence since the early 1950s when missions forced the dissolution of these male cults, women continue to withhold specific types of knowledge from men, and use secrecy to assert their common identity. Control over their reproductive capacities was one of the few methods women could use when seeking to assert themselves in the face of persistent male domination. As in Minj (Reay 1975-1976: 79), Chuave women may use abortion or infanticide to thwart their husbands' desire for children when husbands have mistreated them. Women continue to withhold information concerning abortion, infanticide, and contraception even to the present. Male informants could not elaborate on any such practices and some men even insisted that twin births had never occurred in Chuave until after the arrival of whites. Nor would women reply to my own questions concerning these topics. Only my wife's inquiries revealed such information, plus the fact that women still regard these topics as their sole concern and not to be discussed with or revealed to men.

Nowhere is female secrecy more feared and the power of women over
154

men more evident that in beliefs concerning witchcraft. The word for witch and for the vivifying substance that resides in witches giving them their power is kumo, a term which also means 'something hidden' or 'secret' in both the Chuave and Siane languages. Chuave witches are female. Informants state that men too may be witches, but in fact all accusations of witchcraft are against women; the female marker obar is regularly attached to kumo in speech (obar kumo, 'woman witch'), and descriptions of witches' potential powers always refer to women. A prevalence of female witches is also found in Sinasina (Hide 1980: 246) and in Gururumba (Newman 1965: 86). In contrast, in central Simbu (Brown 1977: 28; Bergmann 1971, Vol. 4: 15-21) witchcraft accusations involve both men and women while among the Kuma witches are usually male (Reay 1976: 1). As in all these areas, Chuave witchcraft is directed against a victim belonging to the local group (the clan) in contrast to lethal sorcery where the victim is a member of an enemy clan.

Women are not born witches; rather they receive kumo from a practising witch. A witch passes this substance to a novice, sometimes her daughter, simply by touching the skin or by giving a gift - usually a net bag - to an unsuspecting female. Once endowed with kumo, the novice receives further instruction and care from her tutor. Only the members of a witch's husband's lineage whose 'blood is cold' are free from attack. While women may occasionally be victims, children of both sexes and men are the primary targets of witchcraft.

Witches are the strongest supernatural beings in Chuave. They become invisible when attacking their victims, entering the body through a pathway located in the armpit, and cannibalize the intestinal organs (in particular the liver, the location of a person's vital essence) causing illness or death. Witches commonly use the cover of darkness to steal to people's houses and listen in on private conversations or roam the periphery of the village to seek out human and animal faeces, which they consume. Covens including women from several clans hold secret meetings at night in the bush or pig houses and may join together to rob the graves of the recently deceased. Because they eat the decaying flesh of corpses, men guarded graves in the past for several weeks after burial to deter attacks (cf. Brown 1977: 27; Reay 1976: 2). The witches' coven, in fact, is perhaps the
most dreaded of all possible scenarios for it involves secrecy and
group action by uncontrollable, powerful females. Few methods of
discovering witches and few remedies for illnesses caused by them are
available to men. Rather people accuse women on the basis of
observed behaviour and supposition. In the past, when witches were
discovered they were banished from the clan or quickly killed, and
their body discarded in a cave or thrown into a river. In the case
of young novices, however, there was occasionally ritual exorcism of
the witch substance.

Several authors have noted the relationship between social status,
wealth, and witchcraft in the central highlands (Hide 1980; Newman
1965; Reay 1976). In Chuave, as in Sinasina, witches are of either
exceptionally high or low social status. Thus, they are described as
poor, 'rubbish', or infirmed and consequently jealous of their victim's
material success. Conversely, they may be exceptionally wealthy,
 excellent gardeners occasionally possessing special garden magic as
in Gururumba (Newman 1965: 86), and successful in raising pigs, or the
wives of prominent men. People say that witches have voracious
appetites for pork and other animal flesh. Therefore, it is said one
must not place animal bones in a fire least the witch smell the burning
marrow and attack out of jealousy. Similarly they may capriciously
cause the illness or death of pigs, or attack when they feel slighted
or mistreated - when, for example, they fail to receive pork at
distributions. As previously noted, women who do not respond to social
obligations within the men's house group are likewise suspect and run
the risk of being accused as witches.

Today possible sanctions against witchcraft are no longer in
force, and accusations of witchcraft seldom result in serious public
discussion; I witnessed only two witchcraft 'courts' during 22 months
of fieldwork. At such discussions village court magistrates refuse
to have the case heard in formal court and will order compensation for
the accused women, arguing that, because there is no proof, the
accusation is slander. I know of no recent cases, furthermore, where
women have been forced to leave the clan.

But belief in witchcraft remains pervasive. Informants speak
in hushed tones when discussing the topic and even fervent mission
supporters or educated men who disdain talk of sorcery admit that
witches exist. Men continue to suggest that witches have caused the
illnesses of pigs and particular persons, though they are reluctant
to name specific women they suspect. It is not surprising that of
14 women so named by informants all belonged to Kafaina groups
for Kafaina remains a secretive organization, based on the withholding
of wealth from men, and is a perceived threat to men's domination over
women. Kafaina ritual and symbolism, in fact, perpetuate many of the
beliefs I have noted concerning the intrinsic power of females and
elaborate on the theme of female productivity in relation to modern
forms of wealth. Before discussing these facets of Kafaina
organization, however, I will describe the origins of the movement.

The origins of Kafaina

Kafaina is the name used for the current stage of women's groups
in the Chuave and Siane areas. As Anggo notes, the word has no meaning
in the Chuave or Siane languages (1975: 210). But Kafaina is a common
women's name of modern origin, and the only such 'meaningless' name
in Chuave. Women are commonly named after shell valuables, and Kafaina
may well be derived from the Siane word kifana meaning stones or
coins. What is clear is that since the attachment of this name to
a movement formerly recognized by other terms, the name itself has
become associated with the control of coins by women; Kafaina women's
personal savings are commonly coins and rarely paper money.

Although the origins of the movement are difficult to date, there
were several precursors of modern groups and historical antecedents
of women's action. Traditionally Chuave women joined together in stick
fights against women of other clans, or against their menfolk in
dances mimic these fights. However, Salisbury's account of a Chuave
indigenous cult in 1947, among the Gai and Onakari tribes located in
Elimbari census division, is the earliest indication of a three-fold
relationship between religious beliefs, women and wealth (1958: 67–
78).

A male prophet, a former mission evangelist from the Kainantu
area, told of an imminent flood that would transform everyday objects
into valuables such as shells and rifles. When a woman's vision confirmed this prophecy, the prophet persuaded people to build a cult house. They killed pigs and danced in honour of the ancestors. All the young girls of the tribe entered this house, as did the prophet, and stones - smeared with pig's blood and wrapped in leaves - were stored on one side inside the house in the belief that they would be transformed into shells. Information about the cult was eventually leaked to the administration, and in subsequent police action, 13 cultists were killed. Salisbury points out that many of the cult's features were congruent with traditional religious beliefs, in particular, the belief that young women, associated with the ancestral spirits, enhanced the potential for attracting or creating wealth within the clan.

Sexton has noted a possible forerunner of Kafaina in the missionary Bergmann's account of a 1955 women's movement in the Ega area (Kundiawa) of Simbu province (1980: 200). Though his description is brief, he remarks that decorated women sang and danced as they travelled from place to place - a feature of present-day Kafaina groups. Men complained to him about this behaviour, but apparently he made little effort to stop it. The movement began over a 'misunderstanding' about the coronation of Queen Elizabeth in 1953, when women declared that they wished to be appointed as luluais. This is the first indicator that women's group action might be a direct response to their peripheral political status. Queen Elizabeth remains the ultimate symbol of a politically dominant woman, a leader who rules men in a western political system. Chuave women told me that they formerly believed the Queen, Jesus and God resided together in heaven and they remember how administration officers instructed them not to work for three days in celebration of her coronation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the coronation provided the genesis of a movement which strove to correct the imbalance of power between men and women within the system of appointed administration officials that dominated local level politics during the 1950s.

Women's savings groups called Sande Skul (Sunday School) began in the early 1960s, originally I believe around Chuave Station, where today this name is still sometimes used for Kafaina. By 1964, and throughout the remainder of the decade, women's groups known either
by this name or *Meri Sande* and *Meri Maria* (after the virgin Mary) intermittently flourished in Chuave, Siane and Elimbari census divisions (cf. Anggo 1975). Lutheran and Catholic pastors originally started these groups in which women learned to sew; they also encouraged the market sale of clothing and foodstuffs, proceeds of which were used for church or small scale business enterprises. Women joined together once a week, chose a leader who was formerly a female council *komiti* and pooled their cash. A male clerk kept a record of each woman's personal savings in a ledger. Few men or women remember details of these groups but many state that each group was independent of others in the area. The lifespan of many groups was short. Women told me that groups often disbanded before they had saved large amounts of money, and that men associated with these groups often took women's savings for their personal use. Apparently, men started a few small stores with the proceeds but all eventually failed because of mismanagement.

The efflorescence of women's groups at this time must be seen in light of the conditions of the decade. As I have previously noted (chapters two and three), money supplanted pearl shells in exchange during the 1960s and pearl shells were sold to other areas to obtain cash. The decade was also characterized by an initial enthusiasm for local government councils followed by rapid disillusionment, in the late 1960s, with the council's failure to provide prosperity and development at the local level. People increasingly complained about taxes and enforced roadwork. During this time, group action by women was not confined to the Chuave area. A women's strike in the Minj area was itself related to the action of a candidate in the 1964 election and it established women's rights to a share in money derived from roadwork (Reay 1975: 6). The initial development of the Kafaina movement also preceded the introduction during the mid-1970s, of the government sponsored women's organization *Yangpela Didiman* (Young Farmers' Clubs). Furthermore, it occurred in the absence of western-style savings and loan organizations which, in Chuave, were not introduced until the late 1970s.10

From the Chuave and Siane areas, women's savings organizations spread northeast to the Watabung and Goroka regions (Sexton 1980; Munster 1975). These groups developed in Siane to become what is now
called Kafaina and they spread southeast into the Lufa census division. Simultaneously, a second, more formalized, savings association developed in Chuave in the early and mid-1970s, only to be replaced late in the decade by Kafaina which spread from Siane, first into Elimbari and then into Chuave. This secondary stage was usually called Meri Songon, and less commonly, Sande Skul (Sunday School). Both men and women met on Saturday and Sunday and contributed money - from as little as 10 cents to as much as 40 dollars - and women controlled all money directly (Schilling CPR 1973: 13). Each group selected female leaders, called komiti or songan, and unlike previous groups, these were bound together in a loose network for specific enterprises. A church bell called participating members to meetings, and money was kept in cash boxes. Money gathered could not be used to pay council tax. Savings eventually went to help buy materials for churches or to buy PMV trucks, controlled and managed by men associated with the groups. In Duma, Meri Songon groups had loan arrangements with other similar groups at distances of over seven kilometres.

There are a number of indicators that this stage of group action also had its origins in women's disenchantment with local government. In 1964 three women had nominated for council elections. By 1967 one woman in both Chuave and Siane nominated, and 21 women nominated in Elimbari census division (Cummins 1966-67, CPR 4). During the mid-1960s, female komitis who had no official government recognition were active in the council area and women took an interest in affairs previously dominated by men (ibid.). Apparently because of women's demands for participation in council affairs, the council made a provision that mandatory election of female ward komitis (two per ward) occur in the 1969 elections (Findlay 1968-69, CPR 2). No female nominations for the position of councillor occurred during this election; men apparently persuaded women not to stand (Sanders 1968-69 CPR 8).

A council ruling which followed this election obliterated any real gains women had made for 'equal' representation in council affairs. A 1970 administration report speaks of women's increased resentment of the council following an all male council's repeal of the regulation requiring the election of female komitis. The report adds
that women were incensed with this unilateral decision, which effectively excluded them from council participation, and they threatened not to pay council taxes in future. Following this decision, there is no further mention of any women's nomination for council positions. I regard the prohibition on meri songon savings being used to pay taxes and the continued use of the term komiti by females, therefore, as a women's protest against their exclusion from representative government.

By the mid-1970s women in Elimbari census division were participating in Kafaina, the latest development of women's savings and loan societies. Duma women began Kafaina in 1977, and informants clearly recognize the transitional nature of the movement over the last decade. Men and women state that while in the past they participated in Sunday School and Meri Songon, their efforts to save were often thwarted by mismanagement. They add that the latest stage, Kafaina, has 'laws' that protect against the theft and mismanagement of money and ensure the success of the group.

Anggo has described Kafaina's own origin story (1975: 211). It tells of a woman whose husband constantly took cash income from coffee for his own use. One coffee season the wife hid her income by burying her coins beneath the stones of the fireplace. Each time she hid the coins 'she would pray to God for the safety of the coins and also for the coins to multiply'. Eventually she removed the money, which totalled several hundred pounds, and showed it to other women in her village. She convinced them to gather money; they later appointed a leader to take care of their savings and held weekly meetings at which they sang traditional songs. The women then began to teach women from other villages about their group, and so created the existing network of groups.

Kafaina women still pray to God for the safety of their money, and ask for God's assistance in their work. Some people state that Kafaina groups actually believe their money 'grows' and pray to God for it to multiply (cf. Sexton 1980: 218). It is ironic that many Christians today actively oppose Kafaina, for it is clear that the movement grew from initial encouragement by male church leaders.
More important, the origins of this movement show that women regard themselves as excluded from participation in both mission and government institutions. Women, more than men, were central to traditional religious activities and yet they have been forced to the periphery of institutions proselytizing Christianity. As a result they created women 'pastors' totally without approval of the Lutheran authorities. Similarly they have created positions of absolute authority over men within the framework of Kafaina. Kafaina women view themselves as accomplishing tasks once seen as the responsibility of local government councils. The following statements illustrate the relationship between failed expectations concerning government and Kafaina participation. The first is by a bosmeri, the female leader of a Kafaina group.

I have lived a long time and my coffee is dry. I planted it again and it is still dry. And so I voted for my husband to become councillor, but he did not become councillor. I voted for him to be a committee man but he did not become a committee man and so he did not 'pull' anything to me.

I worked and nothing came of it. Now a mother of mine from another place came and looked after me.

This work came from an old woman and I think it is very good. My old mother came and gave me the name Kafaina and my name remains Kafaina.

The second statement is by a Kafaina 'cargo boy', a man who is often a bachelor and who runs errands for Kafaina women.

Councillors came, committee men came and I thought they would 'pull' something to me but I have seen nothing. Now women's work has come and I am very happy. I travel around as the 'legs' of women. I carry their net bags, cook their food, wash their clothes, and buy them cigarettes; that is my work.

Both speakers comment on the councillors' failure to 'pull' or bring something to people at the local level. They are referring to development, a concept, which as I have noted, includes not only specific projects such as schools and roads, but more generally the wealth and financial success which whites possess. Because modern political institutions have failed to provide economic prosperity at the local level, women have created Kafaina to accomplish this task. In doing
so, they have re-established the fundamental equation between female power, productivity and material success. As I will now show, this equation is evident in the ritual and symbolism surrounding Kafaina activity.

Kafaina organization

Kafaina groups range in size from five to 26 women, with an average of 12 women per group. These women, aged 30 or more (average age is approximately 38 years) are contributing members; each has her own cloth or net bag in which savings are kept, and a special ledger or 'pass book' that records her savings. These are kept locked in a small room called a 'bed' inside the Kafaina house. The walls of the bed are decorated with flowers and leaves and the room itself is accessible only to the bosmeri. She is on average 45 years old, selected by consensus, and frequently instrumental in the establishment of the group within the men's house group. Other women, who do not contribute or participate in Kafaina celebrations, may attend Kafaina meetings, which are held at night, twice weekly on market days.

Kafaina groups also have at least two male members. A male clerk (kuskus), often a young man with some education, tabulates the women's savings at each meeting and is responsible for keeping track of all loans made to other groups. As in Daulo, young men can use the position of clerk to prove that they are capable of handling money or are responsible adults who care about the welfare of others (Sexton 1980: 298). In doing so, they demonstrate some qualities which men look for in a leader, and ambitious young men can use this position to enhance their political careers.

A second, older man, on average 45 years, is selected as 'chairman' of the group. The chairman was the bosmeri's husband in ten of 32 groups in Duma tribe. This man guides the group and may make suggestions concerning the loan of money to other groups, but all decisions concerning Kafaina money are made by women. Should the bosmeri feel that the clerk or chairman are attempting to dominate Kafaina meetings she may overrule their suggestions or simply silence them by insisting Kafaina is women's work. The chairman also accompanies Kafaina women on their trips to other areas and may oversee
the organization of feasts given at inter-group meetings. From my conversations with Kafaina chairmen, it was clear that these men expected to act as managers of any future Kafaina enterprise. Men definitely see the position of chairman as a potentially influential and economically lucrative one. Only one of 32 Kafaina chairmen had ever been a councillor, but more than half had acted as komitis in the past or were men's house leaders. Thus, men regard the position of chairman as one alternative to elected office — a position by which men can obtain recognition within the men's house group, and which allows them to dominate big men or government representatives within the context of Kafaina celebrations.

Unlike in Daulo (Sexton 1980: 20) women of a Kafaina group are not necessarily the wives of a single lineage. Rather, they are married to men who belong to different lineages and subclans but who reside in a single men's house group. Women often take the name of the men's house to designate their group. Each new group forms under the tutelage of a pre-existing 'mother' group belonging to another clan and becomes their 'daughter' or 'child'. Once a daughter group has proven itself diligent in saving money it seeks permission from its mother to 'give birth' to its own child-group. In Duma individual mother groups have created up to three such daughters. Kafaina women also refer to their 'old mother' (grandmother group) and more rarely, to 'sister' groups. However, because Kafaina groups save money for four to seven years, grandmother groups have usually dissolved by the time their grand-daughter groups are fully active.

_Bosmeris_ or other women from different groups sometimes have close kinship relationships which serve as the basis for these inter-group ties. For example, a Kafaina woman may approach a real or classificatory mother from her natal group or a sister who is married into a nearby clan in order to start a daughter group. Perhaps half the Kafaina groups begin in this way. But proximity and the need to find as yet untouched Kafaina territory also are important criteria for the creation of groups. Thus, the mothers of most Duma groups belonged to tribes to the south-east in Elimbari census division at distances of between two and ten kilometres from their daughter's villages. The first Duma groups to be established in 1977 or 1978 sometimes founded daughter groups within the tribe — occasionally...
ignoring real or classificatory kin ties to establish groups within a short walking distance. As villages within Duma and neighbouring tribes became saturated with Kafaina groups, women were forced to travel greater distances to form daughter groups. Here again kinship ties are often important, but women sometimes solicit daughters after travelling along the road until they have found a men's house group which as yet has no established Kafaina group. Duma groups have started daughter groups to the north, west and east among other Chuave tribes and beyond the census division in Siane, Watabung and Sinasina. It is difficult to accurately estimate the number of women participating in various stages of Kafaina activity. Within Duma, however, just over one-half of all adult women (over 18 years) were contributing members of Kafaina groups.

The combined savings of these Duma groups are staggering. Because of the secrecy surrounding Kafaina savings I was not able to obtain accurate figures for all Duma groups. A very conservative estimate based on survey figures, however, indicates that some K50,000 has been saved since Kafaina first began in Duma in 1977 - an amount for a single tribe which is comparable to the annual budget of the Elimbari Local Government Council. Table 7, an outline of the financial status of Kafaina groups within Keu village, is based on my own tallies of the books for seven groups.12

Table 7: Keu village Kafaina savings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kafaina group</th>
<th>Operating months</th>
<th>Women Contributing</th>
<th>Total Amount</th>
<th>Debts</th>
<th>Net Savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>K 2,864.80</td>
<td>K 60.00</td>
<td>K 2,804.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>K 3,300.00</td>
<td>K 67.33</td>
<td>K 3,232.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>K 1,324.30</td>
<td>K 104.00</td>
<td>K 1,220.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>K 2,275.00</td>
<td>K 25.00</td>
<td>K 2,250.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>K 3,065.40</td>
<td>K 800.70</td>
<td>K 2,264.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>K 608.00</td>
<td>K 20.00</td>
<td>K 588.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>K 616.00</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>K 616.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>K14,053.50</td>
<td>K1,077.03</td>
<td>K12,976.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Individual savings increase during the coffee season, and some groups suspend operations during the off-season. Based on the figures in Table 7 individual women save between K6.23 and K13.68 per month and K74.79 and K166.40 per year.

Women stress the differences, not the similarities between Kafaina and western banking systems (cf. Sexton 1980: 265-266). Unlike banks, where money is easily withdrawn for use, Kafaina savings are protected; they constitute assured savings. Once a woman places money in her savings bilum she cannot withdraw it until the Kafaina group dissolves. Kafaina groups cannot use their savings to pay taxes or village court fines, nor can they use it to contribute to men's ceremonies. I witnessed only two occasions, both involving compensation ordered by village court magistrates, where bosmeris violated this rule. Many additional occasions arose, however, when men subjected Kafaina women to prolonged pressure and verbal persuasion to use their savings for group prestations. At such times Kafaina women simply refuse to discuss the matter stating that they could not touch their money because of Kafaina 'law'.

These and other decisions concerning Kafaina money are ultimately the responsibility of the bosmeri who is the guardian of the group's money. As Anggo notes, persons chosen to care for or safeguard valuables derive a great deal of status as 'good' and trustworthy people (1975: 213). By safeguarding Kafaina savings and having a key role in determining when and where Kafaina women engage in transactions with other groups, the bosmeri demonstrates skill comparable to male leaders who organize and oversee the distribution of valuables in group exchanges. As a guardian of group resources, the bosmeri is thus analogous to the male aunam, responsible for the allocation of lineage wealth in traditional society.

Kafaina meetings open with a prayer soliciting God's aid for the women's work and affirming their belief in Jesus Christ. The male chairman often gives the prayer. Kafaina women vehemently denied that they ask God to help make their money grow or multiply, and all prayers that I heard closely paralleled those heard in church services. After the prayer, women sing hymns and traditional songs, turning their heads back and forth in a fashion reminiscent of courting parties, a stylized
behaviour which has become a trademark of Kafaina women. Meetings last for several hours, and occasionally through the night, during which women sing, gossip, and discuss forthcoming meetings with other groups. Near the close of the meeting women place their savings in *bilums*, always with encouragement or admonishment from the *bosmeri*, who stresses that the members must be diligent in their work. Kafaina activity is clouded in secrecy. The amount of individual or group savings should never be revealed to outsiders, and men who do not attend are misinformed about what actually occurs at meetings. Non-members also over-estimate the size of Kafaina wealth. Men's initial reactions to the creation of Kafaina groups in their village range from laughter and derision at the mere mention of the word Kafaina, to mistrust, and in some cases, fear; though beyond the claim that some Kafaina women are witches or that Kafaina is somehow 'anti-mission', men are unable to explain their discomfort with these women's groups.

In the absence of male participants, mother groups teach a number of Kafaina 'laws' to daughter groups, and instruct them not to reveal these rules (see Table 8). Husbands of Kafaina women are misinformed or ignorant of these regulations and the few chairmen who knew of these prohibitions stated that they did not discuss them with men outside the Kafaina movement.\(^{13}\) Nor was I myself able to easily discover these laws; most information came from Leeanne Greenwood's discussions with Kafaina women. These 'secret' prohibitions along with some traditional correlates, are listed in Table 8.

In contrast to traditional prohibitions, which are regularly broken, Kafaina rules are rigidly obeyed. The sole exception to this statement is rule five. Kafaina women do in fact attend first menstruation parties and also aid in the instruction of young girls during isolation. I believe that this rule arose as an attempt by Kafaina women to end, by boycott, this rite which they regard as antiquated, unjust, and perpetuated at the insistence of men.

Women could not elaborate on the rationale behind these regulations and stated only that their mothers had taught them the rules which were to be obeyed to ensure the success of the group's enterprise. My own and my wife's suggestions that particular rules were related to traditional prohibitions were greeted with laughter
or simply denied by Kafaina women. Nonetheless, I regard Kafaina rules as analogous to many traditional beliefs and I believe that they emphasize the inherent power and danger of women vis-à-vis a modern valuable, cash, which is itself contextually regarded as intrinsically powerful.

Table 8: Kafaina rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kafaina Law</th>
<th>Traditional Prohibition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Sexual intercourse prohibited on Kafaina night.</td>
<td>1. After sexual intercourse men and women cannot enter a new garden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Money received from sexual services cannot be contributed to Kafaina savings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Menstruating women cannot attend Kafaina meetings.</td>
<td>3. Menstruating women cannot enter gardens or pig houses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Women cannot go to Kafaina after the death of a close family member.</td>
<td>4. Men and women who handle a corpse cannot enter a new garden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kafaina women should not attend or eat food given at first menstruation parties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. After the 'child' is given to daughter groups, daughter members cannot enter gardens for two weeks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Women cannot eat pork on the evening when they wish to contribute savings.</td>
<td>7. Women cannot enter a new garden after eating pork.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pork cannot be eaten inside the Kafaina house.</td>
<td>8. Men and women cannot eat pork inside a house where love magic substances or sorcery materials are stored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Rubbish (animal skin, bones, food scraps, etc.) cannot be put into the fireplace of a Kafaina house.</td>
<td>9. Animal bones or remains cannot be placed in fires for fear of witchcraft attack.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rules one to four relate to physical states believed to endanger the growth of living things or regarded as debilitating to individuals.
Just as garden produce and pigs could be endangered after intercourse, during menstruation, or from indirect contact with a corpse's flesh, so too, Kafaina savings must be protected from any polluting or contaminating influences. While for most Kafaina women rule four requires exclusion from Kafaina savings for approximately one week, the bosmeri — who not only comes into contact with money but also enters the Kafaina bed — must not participate in meetings for up to one month.

I would also argue that the existence of a separate and special space, the Kafaina bed within the Kafaina house, is the creation of a potent and efficacious environment for the coins that women contribute. The appearance of the 'bed' itself, resembles the enclosed space for a girl's isolation at first menstruation, and restrictions on entering this area, I believe, affirm the belief that the money itself is endowed with special qualities which are dangerous to both humans and other animate objects. The construction of new Kafaina houses, likewise, occasionally takes place on sites associated with traditional welfare magic that ensured the continued growth of garden produce and pigs. These are places where men stored or buried ancestral boards and ritually treated pig killing sticks. Again, Kafaina women insisted that they chose these sites for convenience sake, but equally suitable sites were available, and some people who were not Kafaina members saw a relationship between the 'growth' of Kafaina wealth and traditional beliefs.

As I have noted in chapter four, people take great care when displaying cash in inter-group exchanges; money should not be folded and men frequently obtain mint-condition bills for prestations. Similarly men and women say that coins and paper money should not be taken into gardens though they are unable to state the reason for this modern prohibition. The prohibition against eating pork within the Kafaina house affirms the belief that the savings themselves are potent. The only traditional corollary of this prohibition is the restriction against eating pork inside houses that store 'strong' or powerful substances used in sorcery or love magic. People thought that the presence of pork (specifically pork fat) contaminated these materials and reduced their efficacy. Pork was also believed to decrease people's strength. Thus, as men were prohibited from eating
pork prior to battle least they be susceptible to enemy attacks, women were prohibited from entering a new garden after consuming pork for fear that their power as producers be decreased and crops be damaged or fail to grow. Rule seven thus restates the relationship between women as producers and protectors of modern wealth within the Kafaina setting, and rule six elaborates on this theme and that concerning the potency of Kafaina wealth by forcing women who have received a major Kafaina payment to abstain from gardening activities.

The final prohibition is clearly meant to protect Kafaina women and savings from witchcraft attack. Women clearly regard their wealth as an obvious target for jealous witches - and for theft by young raskols. Men or women always watch over the Kafaina house when members are away from the village. It is ironic, therefore, that while Kafaina women fear witchcraft attacks, others suspect them of being witches because they hoard wealth and conceal Kafaina activities.

In addition to these prohibitions, other Kafaina 'laws' more regularly known by outsiders, reinforce the solidarity of Kafaina groups. Kafaina women, led by their bosmeri, hold courts (called 'making a fire') to enforce these regulations.14 Men who laugh or joke about Kafaina dances or decorations are fined up to ten kina for their insults. Physical assault against Kafaina women also results in compensation; attacks against a bosmeri result in an immediate ten kina fine. Non-Kafaina women who wear the kiruwa headdress associated with the movement are similarly fined. A bosmeri can prohibit Kafaina women who argue with her or fail to obey her instructions from attending Kafaina meetings for one week. Would-be mother groups may also demand compensation when men object to their wives' plans to start a daughter group. In one such instance a village court magistrate who rejected the idea of a Kafaina group paid K20 compensation for the women's labour in travelling to his village. After receiving this money the Kafaina women returned twice more, only to be rejected and receive compensation - until their fourth attempt to form a daughter group proved successful.

Men may ignore Kafaina women's demands for compensation, and in court, magistrates refuse to uphold the right of Kafaina women to fine
offenders of Kafaina law. But as in the above example, most men submit to Kafaina demands for compensation, stating that Kafaina women are 'strong' or that they do not wish to be on bad terms with particular Kafaina groups. Several times I saw Kafaina women join together for real or mock attacks on men who had mistreated their wives. Once, a Kafaina woman complained to her group that her husband had killed 'her' pig for a classificatory sister's feast even though he had received no part of the brideprice. The group waited for the husband to return from gathering firewood and set upon him, beating him, though not too strenuously, with fists and sticks. The attack ended with the women cautioning their member's husband not to be as foolish with his pigs in future and admonishing him to consult his wife over future transactions.

Inter-group ceremonies

Most inter-group visitation and exchanges take place during the coffee flush when groups of 20 or more Kafaina women sing and dance along major roads as they travel to Kafaina meetings. I will discuss first those meetings which take place between mother and daughter groups, and second those involving formal exchanges between non-related groups.

Mother-daughter visits last as long as three days during which time the hosts provide garden and store foods, freezer meat, and occasionally beer and cooked pork for their guests. Such reciprocal visits - as many as ten per year - provide women with the opportunity to travel to other villages and allow them respite from gardening and other household chores. Husbands of Kafaina women often complain that they are forced to harvest food, prepare their own meals (or rely on the generosity of other women), and care for children during their wives' absences from the village. When their wives act as hosts, furthermore, men must collect firewood, butcher and prepare pigs for cooking, or parry - often unsuccessfully - their wives' demands for men's crops such as sugar cane and bananas. Kafaina women from other groups in the village may also attend, and make small contributions to visits by mother or daughter groups, and as these informal meetings expand in size, Kafaina women may appropriate the use of the men's house for dawn-to-dusk singing sessions thereby forcing men to sleep
Small exchanges of money regularly take place at these meetings. All involve 'new' money (that which is not already a part of Kafaina savings); the receiving group divides any payment among its members and places this money in the Kafaina bed. Rough equivalence in payments exists over time, but with daughter groups providing some profit money to their mothers. Many women say that it is only by 'giving birth' to daughter groups that their own group will become successful and obtain profit. But the real strength of Kafaina as an economic organization results from the capital accumulated upon each transaction with the mother and other Kafaina groups (see below). After groups disperse, they may use this capital while continuing to repay any outstanding debts with 'new' money.

Exchanges between mother and daughter groups are couched in idiomatic reference to the Kafaina 'child' or 'daughter', a specially decorated payment given from the mother to daughter group. In Chuave this major payment generally occurs twice: the first, six months to a year after a group begins operation, and again after about two years (some daughter groups receive these when they have saved K1,000 and K2,000). Prior to these payments mothers say they are 'straightening the road' for the child, and following the transfer of the child, say they are giving money to care for, feed, or clothe the child. In contrast, daughter groups describe payments to their mother as brideprice and later as 'head' pay (child payments). The Kafaina daughter group, therefore, is regarded as wife-receiver to its mother group who is perceived as wife-giver. Sexton provides an analysis of exchanges initiated in Kafaina and actual marriages (1980: 276-277, n. 3, 307). Unlike Chuave women, Daulo women describe both major payments as brideprice and make no reference to 'head' pays. Despite idiomatic references there are clear differences between Kafaina and real marriage exchanges because the 'child' is itself a payment or loan given from mother (wife-giver) to daughter (wife-receiver); that is, a payment that reverses the flow of wealth occurring in actual marriages.

The 'child' itself exists for only a few weeks during and after the transfer of these payments (which range from K200 to K400). The
girl-child, a netbag in which the money is hidden, is decorated with a woman's pubic string skirt and other ornaments. A match box, containing a one or ten toea coin is also attached to the child. Informants interpret this as a symbol that the daughter, too, saves and hides money and brings wealth to her new clan. As in Daulo (Sexton 1979: 177-179) where some Christians believed Kafaina women prayed to these 'dolls,' members of fundamentalist missions in Chuave told me that the 'child' was a false idol or samting bilong Satan and that women prayed to it to help their money grow.

As Sexton (ibid.) has noted, the netbag is an important symbol of female productivity and nurturance, and she has interpreted the link between the netbag-child and coins as a symbolic statement concerning the importance of women as creators of wealth and reproducers of society. In Daulo, the netbag, called owo, meaning 'womb' is displayed on a wooden post following menarche as a symbol of the girl's future marriage and her ability to bring brideprice to her natal clan and also at betrothal in the bride's new village. In Chuave the words for netbag and womb are different, and netbags are not displayed at marriage. Brides, however, often carry newly made netbags, laced with two kina notes which constitute their personal wealth, when they travel to their new villages. In the Gai-Onakari region and in Siane, furthermore, netbags are sometimes displayed on a wooden frame - precisely as Kafaina women display them - following a girl's first menstruation. Another Kafaina practice explicitly demonstrates a young girl's ability to bring wealth to her natal group; some groups hide the netbag-child in the Kafaina bed for a period of two to three weeks after its arrival in the daughter group's village. During this time, when Kafaina women are also restricted from entering gardens, the receiving group may not open the netbag or see the actual payment.

Sexton notes that in Daulo the ritual departure of the 'child' from the mother group's house and village recapitulates all the important events in a woman's lifecycle, with the exception of menarche. Daulo women themselves, however, describe the ritual strictly as symbolic marriage of the 'child'. For example, the symbolic daughter is instructed in her duties as a wife, the mothers/wife-givers 'sob and cry out in sorrow at the girl's departure', and the daughter group
is urged to 'look after' the bride who, it is said, will be homesick for her family (Sexton 1982: 177-180). I witnessed only two departures of the 'child' and neither followed the pattern reported for Daulo. In Chuave, when the bosmeri carried the doll from the Kafaina house she proceeded along a path lined with coffee leaves and flowers, called the rot bilong moni - a practice analogous once again to a young girl's emergence from menstrual isolation. Women then publicly displayed the doll and bosmeris of both groups made speeches referring to the fact that the child was now married and to the bonds which united the two groups. Two men then carried the doll, which was tied to a pole, to the daughter group's village where it was again displayed and then, without ceremony, placed in the Kafaina 'bed'.

Despite cultural differences then, the rites surrounding the marriage and transfer of the Kafaina 'child' between mother and daughter groups in both Daulo and Chuave clearly stress the relationship between modern wealth, female productivity and reproductive power. It is also clear that this theme has been elaborated upon in recent years. Thus, although symbolic marriage was part of Wok Meri ritual in 1977 only the prohibition against menstruating women attending Wok Meri meetings existed at that time (Sexton: personal communication). All other rules are unique to the current state of Kafaina activity I witnessed in 1980.

Similarly, recent developments include several exchanges that link other Kafaina groups. All are clearly post-1976 in origin, and one celebration, the opening of special Kafaina houses, had apparently begun in 1979 shortly before my arrival in Chuave. These new exchanges increase the resource-building capacity of groups by adding sums of money to Kafaina savings and create a complex network of debts involving hundreds of groups. Thus, all money received from other groups is placed in savings and may not be touched. 'New' money given to other groups as either a return or initiatory gift must be raised by women in addition to the coins which women continue to save at regular Kafaina meetings. Equally important is the way inter-group exchanges and their accompanying celebrations reinforce a woman's identity and allegiance to the Kafaina movement. Not least they allow women the unprecedented opportunity to dominate large public meetings.
The first and second stage Kafaina exchanges revolve around Kafaina decorations. Kafaina women eschew western clothes and wear traditional string coverings now regularly worn only by elderly women. They decorate themselves in traditional finery or a mixture of traditional and modern garb including tinsel, plastic, and manufactured paints. Women also wear typically male attire - rear coverings of cordyline leaves placed over cloth or bark cloth and cassowary headdresses that in the past were a sign of a warrior. Another common male item now used by Kafaina women is spears, which they carry from place to place and use in group dances that mimic war-charges or attacks.

This decoration constitutes the uniform of the Kafaina movement and clearly affirms Kafaina women's common identity. Intense missionization in Chuave has resulted in the abandonment of traditional dress and many women stated that they felt deeply ashamed at the thought of wearing string coverings or being seen bare-breasted. One woman, after participating in Kafaina for almost a year and refusing to abandon her western dress, finally donned full Kafaina regalia, saying simply that the behaviour of her Kafaina 'sisters' had encouraged her and that she was now 'truly Kafaina'.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the women have developed inter-group exchanges that emphasize facets of Kafaina decoration. The duration of Kafaina activity is sometimes distinguished by reference to decoration: a short string skirt (kabiam kairi) cycle lasts for three to four years whereas the long string skirt (sambuna) terminates after five or more years. The first inter-group exchange occurs when a daughter group gives the mother between K40 and K60 for red nose paint, and occasionally cassowary headdresses, which members wear henceforth at inter-group meetings. This process is repeated (at variable intervals) when a daughter group gives about K100 and in turn, receives the right to wear the Kafaina kiruwa, a bird wing which is attached to a coil that sways as Kafaina women 'turn heads' during songs and dances.

Prior to both these occasions, male messengers travel to other groups throughout the area to inform them of the celebrations. On the appointed day as many as 30 groups travel to the daughter's village
to sing, dance and make small payments to the group's savings which will later be reciprocated with 'new' money. Each bosmeri makes a formal prestation of the money (either paper money or coins) in the name of her group, frequently cautioning the receiving group to guard their savings well, and acknowledging the date or festivity when they will expect a return payment. Slips of paper, called kontrak (contracts), are given to the Kafaina clerk. These list the donating group, the payment which ranges from K1 to K20, and note whether the money creates or cancels a debt. A host group can expect to receive between K100 and K150 at these times. Kafaina groups sing songs and perform stylized dances in which women ask to see or be given the Kafaina child and mimic the 'pulling' of money to the Kafaina house. In return for their participation, women are given food which is displayed on tables and reserved for women or men active in the groups attending.

The third stage celebration is much larger in scale. When a group first establishes itself, members build the Kafaina bed in the bosmeri's house where meetings will be held. After a group has given birth to daughters and has saved in excess of K1,500, it constructs (after consultation with its mother group) a Kafaina house, occasionally called a Kafaina haus lotu (Kafaina church). Kafaina houses, either round or oval, are larger than a woman's house, sometimes equivalent in size to a small men's house. Husbands of Kafaina women are responsible for the construction of the house, but other men from the men's house group may aid in this task. People gather bush flowers to decorate the bed and the house walls, gather firewood, and harvest crops which will be given to the celebrants. As many as five pigs owned by women, the chairman, or other men are killed for this major celebration, which groups from the entire region attend. (Alternatively, women purchase freezer meat requiring an expenditure of up to K300.) Other Kafaina groups within the village also aid in the preparation and organization of this event.

Over one thousand women, in one instance representing 167 groups, congregate for this ceremony which begins with a prayer officially opening the Kafaina house. The meeting lasts one or two days during which the host groups may collect contributions of between K600 and K1000. Individual payments range from less than one kina from unrelated
groups to as much as K100 from daughter groups. The presentation of all the money to the Kafaina clerk may take over five hours, as bosmeris use the presentation of their groups' payments to make speeches which stress the value of women's work, the histories of their own groups, and the relationship between groups in different areas. These meetings are also attended by people from nearby areas who are not part of the Kafaina movement, but simply want to witness the spectacle of 100 or more groups of decorated Kafaina women participating in mass singing and dancing throughout the day and late into the evening.

Women's work is finally completed when Kafaina groups 'wash hands' or 'wash plates'. I was unable to witness this ceremony while in Chuave, but the festivities and exchanges associated with house-openings closely parallel the 'washing hands' ceremonies Sexton describes for the Daulo region (1980-1982). Informants stated, however, that in Chuave, unlike Daulo, no 'marriage' payment is made during the washing hands ceremony. Excluding this difference all major features of the celebrations resemble the house-opening: prayers once again begin the ceremony, groups contribute a final payment to the sponsoring group, and Kafaina women participate in group singing and dancing. Informants state that two or more groups from a single village (as is the case in Daulo) might sponsor this final ceremony, but stressed that individual groups could also make the decision to wash hands. In the days following this final stage, Sexton reports that after the group publicly counts the cash saved, it announces the total amount to all present (presumably the clan or village) (1980: 242-244). In Daulo, conflict prevailed in this distribution as women accused clerks of having stolen some of their money. Sexton notes that in some groups women's savings had not been kept in individual bags; in Chuave money is always kept in individual netbags, and money received from other groups is quickly divided among all members.

Kafaina: female wealth and power in Chuave

Women in traditional Chuave society were producers and guardians of the wealth men used in exchanges; they were also themselves sources of wealth because their marriages created relationships necessary for an extended series of inter-group exchanges. Today, Kafaina women also watch over and protect modern wealth, but the extent to which they may
allocate wealth remains questionable.

I have little information on the use of money by groups who had 'washed hands'. Of three Elimbari groups that had reached this stage, all used their money to purchase trucks, which men operated and controlled. The 'owners' of these PMV businesses were all former chairmen of Kafaina groups, and they assured me that women received a share of profit money. But the women I spoke to from these former Kafaina groups denied that they had received any money; rather, they stated that they did not expect money and that their work had 'lifted up' the name of their village and clan. Informants from current groups stated that they would also use their money to buy trucks, to start tradestores, or as capital to start coffee buying schemes; but the group always defers the decision concerning the use of Kafaina savings until they 'wash hands'. Sexton provides details on the expenditure of Wok Meri savings (ibid.: 282-290). In one of 15 cases, money was returned to individual members and not used in any group enterprise. In nine instances, groups purchased trucks and, as she notes, trucks are the most important status symbol of western wealth at the local level. Of course, male drivers were employed and Sexton notes that, because of reckless driving and failure to service vehicles properly, trucking operations are notoriously subject to a high failure rate. Sexton does not indicate the extent to which women actually managed or controlled the trucks, though she states that the name of the Kafaina group was painted on the vehicle and that females clearly made the decision to purchase the truck.

In Chuave, men closely associated with Kafaina groups definitely see themselves as the future managers of Kafaina wealth. Women, furthermore, believe that they do not have the mathematical or managerial skills necessary for large economic ventures, and consequently, request the aid of male clerks and chairmen. Some husbands also make de facto contributions to Kafaina savings via their wives in order to freeze their incomes and escape demands on their money from kinsmen. Such men stated that they would expect a portion of Kafaina savings after the group had disbanded. When a local government councillor persuaded two Kafaina groups to use their savings as a basis for applying for RIP funds to start a coffee project, he proposed that only the savings of the younger members would be used
as older women had not been interested in the enterprise. The councillor made the actual application, and he stated that the business would be run by him and perhaps two other men. The women, he added, would receive a share of all profit money (from which he would subtract a portion as his salary), but only after he had determined that the business had grown sufficiently in size.

These facts demonstrate that having undertaken years of saving, women run the risk of having men mismanage their money and that some women may be content to abandon their claims to the money once businesses have begun. Like their traditional counterparts, therefore, Kafaina women protect wealth for years only to have men appropriate it, finally gaining in the process only tangential status and prestige within the development sector of the economy. Nor is the length of time over which Kafaina savings are protected greater than in the exchange sector of the economy. Kafaina cycles correspond closely to traditional pig cycles - periods of from three to seven years during which women constantly cared for pigs only to have men allocate them in massive pig killings and exchanges. When the total lifespan of Kafaina groups is considered, consequently, Kafaina women can be viewed as simply replicating their traditional position as producers within the modern cash economy.

The success of the Kafaina movement, however, is not to be judged by the degree of control women exercise over the allocation of wealth, because Kafaina, as a syncretic movement, has also created an institutional framework within which women have achieved an unprecedented degree of political power and status. It is the Kafaina institution itself, and the benefits women derive from membership, not the eventual use to which money is put, which women see as valuable.

Sexton has noted that the combination of Christian prayers, ritual and symbolism found in *Wok Meri* are strikingly reminiscent of cargo cult activity (1980: 252). Yet for Daulo she regards these elements as superficial; she notes that cargo cults are usually associated with a single leader, are dominated by men, involve a repudiation of at least a portion of traditional cosmology, seek to decipher a secret for obtaining European material goods, and seek to overturn the current power relationship between the colonized and colonizer. She regards
Wok Meri's emphasis on small savings as more reminiscent of a Protestant work ethic and as an essentially 'rationalistic' approach to women's grievances and she states that 'women do not strive to overturn the male-female or larger political power structure in the society' (ibid.)

My own interpretation, based on a later stage of Kafaina or Wok Meri activity than that observed by Sexton, elaborates on the themes raised by the Daulo material. Chuave women clearly explain their participation in Kafaina in pragmatic and rationalistic terms: men both control and waste modern wealth, and women must subsequently enforce their own right to products of their labour. But it is clear that Kafaina is a syncretic movement which blends both traditional and modern ideologies and that the movement's success rests as much on the unconscious and emotive force of Kafaina symbols and ritual as it does on the women's pragmatic, corporate actions.

The power equation colonizer-colonized is no longer appropriate simply because, while admiring the white man's 'cargo', people in Chuave rapidly realized that their colonizers possessed no secrets that generate wealth. Kafaina is concerned with self-help and the ability of men and women to accomplish what government has been unable to obtain for them: western style material success. It is not a coincidence that the precursors of Kafaina arose during the initial years of local and national government, or that Kafaina has flourished in the years following self-government and independence. People have long been disenchanted with the government's inability to bring wealth and development to the local level. Women in particular have been excluded not only from modern political institutions but also from small-scale business which is regarded as the exclusive domain of men.

In Kafaina women have created an alternative political domain in which they dominate men. They engage in inter-group exchanges and in public speaking during large scale meetings. Excluded from public office, they have created a specific political status, the bosmeri, whose authority cannot be challenged without risking the group's institutionalized sanctions. The degree to which this special and separate institution will ultimately affect women's political and jural status in the society at large is not easy to predict. Yet
participation in Kafaina groups has already had far-reaching effects. Having proven their ability to organize exchanges, some women now insist on their right to be active participants in exchanges of all types, and 'strong' women, often Kafaina bosmeris, now demand to be heard in other public forums. Kafaina courts serve as an alternative to village courts where women are not only excluded from acting as arbitrators but also continue to be treated as second class citizens.

Similarly, by institutionalizing their control over savings and developing regulations which prohibit the use of Kafaina money to pay council taxes or court fines, women delimit Kafaina activities as not only a substitute for modern political institutions but also, by definition, as antithetical to representative government. Men associated with Kafaina groups, furthermore, may also use this organization as an alternative avenue for gaining political prestige. Given continued disenchantment with government it is possible that Kafaina will serve, in future, as a model for other institutions that reject political bodies imposed by outside authorities, and attempt to develop political frameworks that are more responsive to local needs.

The threefold relationship between religious beliefs, women and wealth evident in the 1947 Chuave cult continues today. Although women were regarded as central to traditional ancestral beliefs, the introduction of missions, controlled by males, forced women to the periphery of institutions preaching modern religious ideologies. While women now regard Christianity as a legitimate substitute for ancestral beliefs, they continue to be neglected in church affairs, and in certain instances, have sometimes seen Christian ideology turned against them for the benefit of their husbands. Thus, use of Christian ideology in Kafaina is no more than an attempt by women to make these western beliefs more relevant for their own lives by transferring them from a male dominated institution to the context of women's work. Missions have taught that Jesus and God watch over, protect and through faith, are capable of endowing men and women with super-human strength. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kafaina women call upon these deities for aid in their work. The accusations that Kafaina women believe appeals to God or the Kafaina doll cause their wealth to grow, like statements that Kafaina is 'Satan's work', are easily dismissed because
such criticisms invariably stem from fervent mission supporters who feel threatened by the use of Christian ideology and practices in a context outside formal church services and in situations ripe with traditional ritual and symbolism. Kafaina savings do in fact 'grow' over time and appeals through Christian prayer (as well as any attempt to appeal to ancestral spirits by locating Kafaina houses on traditional 'sacred' sites) are fundamentally realistic. Kafaina women are not under the delusion that any miracle of loaves and fishes is about to occur in Chuave; rather, they seek only to affirm their faith in God and to ensure the success of their goals by harnessing any spiritual power at their disposal. But by simply adapting Christian practices for use in Kafaina, women link beliefs in the supernatural to their own status as protectors of wealth.

The movement's strength is also explained by the emotive power of increasingly elaborate Kafaina ritual and symbolism which are based on traditional beliefs concerning the danger and potency of female sexuality towards wealth objects. The reinvention of prohibitions revolving around this theme, furthermore, demonstrates that Kafaina ideology has become more and not less 'rationalistic' over time. Sexton notes that in 1977 Daulo men continued to regard Wok Meri 'as a kind of secret society for which there is no precedent in traditional culture' and which threatens male authority (ibid.: 302). She believes that men regard Wok Meri as akin to their own, now defunct, male cults by which men asserted their dominance over women.

Not all Chuave men are frightened or suspicious of Kafaina groups. Some are merely curious or puzzled; others are ignorant or unconcerned; some show little interest in what they believe is a women's affair, and their exclusion from Kafaina neither bothers nor offends them. Yet I would argue that men's initial reaction to the formation of Wok Meri groups in their own village is predominantly one of mistrust, if not fear. In Chuave, furthermore, a traditional precedent does exist. It is to be found in beliefs concerning witchcraft and the witches' coven - the prototypical female behaviour which links secrecy and supernatural power with material success. The accusations surreptitiously made against Kafaina women demonstrate that men consciously or unconsciously see a relationship between Kafaina and witchcraft. The power women obtain over men is, therefore, partially,
explained by men's equating Kafaina with the supernatural power of women; and, in some cases, men's failure to reassert their dominance over Kafaina women results from their apprehensions about supernatural reprisals by Kafaina women. Women, furthermore, have always asserted their common identity and independence from men by withholding information concerning their control over their biological and reproductive capacities. Kafaina women have expanded this women's knowledge by attempting to consciously restrict information concerning aspects of Kafaina activity from men and have thereby created a separate and bounded conceptual niche for Kafaina members. If women have as yet failed to overturn the balance of power between men and women in the society at large, they have at least created a special environment in which they both reign supreme over and achieve true independence from men. They have created an organization which, given future growth and evolution, may be used as a springboard for further assaults on men's domination of women.
Sugar cane, a male crop, is the only food commonly marketed by men. In general male sellers are scarce and would comprise less than 5 per cent of all sellers. Profits from the sale of other male crops such as pandanus nuts are often shared by women with their husbands.

Attendance at markets is subject to both personal and seasonal variation. The figures cited are based on women's responses to a village survey. Women were asked simply whether or not they had marketed produce within a previous one month period. I have no figures which could be used to project monthly or yearly market earnings for women. For Daulo, Sexton (1980: 153) gives an estimated mean annual market income of K51 for 15 women surveyed.

Here comparisons with Daulo are difficult to make. In 1977 Daulo women had a mean annual income of K62 from the sale of coffee cherry (Sexton ibid.: 153-157). Men averaged K321 for the sale of parchment. But while Sexton notes that men should ideally share their incomes with their wives, she gives no actual cases and notes only that (as in Chuave) women have no legal claims to their husbands' coffee incomes.

See Wagner (1977) for a detailed discussion of spirit mediums in Daribi. Daribi and Chuave beliefs about spirits and ghosts differ greatly but Daribi mediums, like those in Chuave, are predominantly female.

Salisbury (1965) discusses kumo as the manipulation of spirit material by men in curing as a sorcery technique. The technique referred to is also found in Chuave but is regarded as sorcery (gene) and distinguished from kumo. My own Siane informants used the word kumo for witchcraft but this may be a recent usage; the term is clearly western and not eastern highlands in origins: kumo being used in central Simbu and kum in the Minj area. Salisbury also notes that in attacks by ancestral spirits (Siane, korova; Chuave, giri) female spirits are considered more capricious and vindictive than those of men. From Salisbury's description it is clear that women were regarded as potentially dangerous spiritual beings and Siane spirit beliefs and Chuave witchcraft beliefs share many common characteristics.

An opposition exists, therefore, between sorcery or poisoning used against all other enemy clans and witchcraft in which all in-marrying females are regarded as potentially harmful. In both Hagen and Chuave, the poisoning of food was one method of killing enemies (both the Hagen and Chuave terms also mean 'root ginger'). But in contrast to the Hagen area, Chuave women rarely act as poisoners, nor are they regarded as susceptible to the suggestion by their natal groups that they use poison against their husbands' kinsmen (A. Strathern 1971: 81-82).

One past method of both curing and discovery was as follows. A witchcraft victim who falls ill with severe stomach pains could be healed by obtaining a piece of pandanus leaf from the door of the suspected witch's house. The leaf was burned and the victim made to inhale the smoke. Immediate recovery was regarded as a sure sign of the woman's guilt.
8. In certain circumstances it is possible to suggest that such accusations were indirect attacks on prominent big men. One situation within Keu village clearly had such political overtones. A discussion of the implications of witchcraft accusation for male leadership falls beyond my concerns in this chapter. Reay (1976) discusses several such examples in the Minj area.

9. Howlett et al (1976: 257) reports that prior to 1976 men and women contributed savings to groups called magai (a Kuman term meaning 'meeting') which were organized by Lutherans in Sinasina and notes that the word sande is used for savings and loan groups run by wage earners in coastal towns (1976: 257).

10. The Chuave branch of the Simbu Savings and Loan Society was not established until 1978. During the late 1960s and early 1970s membership in western-style credit associations in Simbu was concentrated in the Kerowagi and Kundiawa districts (Howlett et al 1976: 243-246). It is possible that the expansion in Kafaina activity in Chuave during the 1970s may be related to people's peripheral involvement in these western savings societies and their desire to create a local equivalent of such organizations. However, the origins of Kafaina clearly pre-date the introduction of western-style credit associations and people rarely mention these western institutions when discussing Kafaina.

11. Kafaina leaders may also be called 'mother' or 'the woman who holds the key' (to the Kafaina 'bed'). The term 'big woman' used in Daulo (Sexton 1980: 204) is uncommon, though heard in Chuave.

12. Kafaina groups (and individual members) save greater sums of money than Daulo Wok Meri groups. This is because Kafaina groups receive more loans from other groups during ceremonies which are of recent origin (see text). The largest total for a Daulo group, for example, was K2,481 for 35 members (Sexton 1980: 268). In contrast, one Duma Kafaina group, which had not yet completed its savings, had collected K6,783 for 26 members. Kafaina groups can now expect to save in excess of K4,000 on average.

13. It is possible that some leakage of Kafaina information occurs, though my questioning of non-members leads me to believe that these regulations are restricted from most men. Any knowledge of the regulations, furthermore, must only reinforce men's suspicions about the secrecy and covertness of Kafaina activity and thereby increase their misgivings about these groups.

Chapter Six

LAW, POLITICS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

The Simbu are aggressive, argumentative and litigious. People recognize incessant small scale disturbances to village life as necessary, if dangerous evils. Individual rights are both broadly defined and fiercely defended. Even the slightest infringement of these rights - a personal insult or the questioning of a person's motives or behaviour - can result in heated denial, counter-accusation and occasionally physical violence. Moreover, a man who fails to defend his family, property, character or personal rights loses face; passivity is synonymous with weakness. Consequently, for the 300 adults living in close quarters in Keu village, verbal arguments are daily events, and violence erupts at least once a week. No one is concerned to eliminate confrontations between kinsmen for that would represent a denial of human nature. Rather the phrase 'law and order', used by villagers, invokes the necessity to limit the scale of confrontation and to repair the damage to the social order that disturbances of the peace cause. People seek to re-establish, even temporarily, a balance between right and wrong, to restore a balance between disputants, and to prevent quarrels from escalating into violent clashes which threaten to disrupt entire clans and communities.

Men who successfully act to punish law breakers, or to restore by mediation or adjudication a balance between disputants, become respected and admired. Formerly, government officials - bosbois, lulualis, and later councillors as well as komitis - assumed primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. They reported serious breaches of administration law to the kiap or Local Court and settled a number of disputes by hearing kots in village settings. The establishment of village courts in 1978 separated the powers and duties formerly accruing to the same government official. As an institution responsible for law and order, village courts are a second arm of government, separate from, and often opposed to, the local government council. Village court officials, particularly magistrates, have become the most important government officials at the local level. Their power and influence supersedes that of councillors, who have been stripped of the de facto right to punish law breakers. The magistrate's authority over legal matters is far greater than that of prior government officials. However, villagers closely scrutinize
courts officials' behaviour. In this chapter, I analyse the interface between law and politics, and demonstrate how the interaction between leaders and followers affects the limits of the court officials' authority and the nature of the law itself.

The selection of court officials

Eleven village courts operate within the Elimbari Council area. Each court has, on average, six magistrates, three peace officers, and one court clerk; these officials are drawn from various clans in the area. Some clans may have both a councillor and a magistrate, or a magistrate and peace officer, but no clan ever has two magistrates. Inevitably some clans do not have a magistrate. When this occurs peace officers, councillors and magistrates often encounter conflict as they attempt to assert their authority outside their own agnatic group.

Within Keu community, the magistrates Martin and Dege (of Komodurumo and Kaupagam clans) often heard disputes at men's houses belonging to other clans (that is, Komogam and Subagam). Men of these clans usually accepted them, but would have preferred to have their own magistrate. In order to avoid confrontation, Martin and Dege allowed a Komogam peace officer to hear a number of small disputes, and frequently presided over men's house courts in tandem with this man or other local leaders. Where Martin or Dege's decisions were questioned, the magistrates sent the dispute to the official village court. Magistrates and peace officers, therefore, hear a number of disputes in unofficial settings outside of the formal village court (cf. M. Strathern 1972b). I define 'disputes' and outline dispute processing shortly, but first, I examine the selection and powers of village court officials.

Procedures for selecting magistrates are as yet undefined and therefore a source of great tension and criticism. The Village Courts Act stipulates that the Provincial Supervising Magistrate, after consultation with local government councils and with 'such other bodies as he considers appropriate', will submit to the High Commissioner, the names of village court magistrates to be appointed to specific courts (1973-74: section 6:7). A village court can have no fewer than three and no more than ten magistrates (section 7:2). The appointment of magistrates is 'reviewed' at the end of three years, and the
Supervising Magistrate may terminate appointments at any time for reasons of 'incompetence' or 'misconduct' (section 7:10). Magistrates and clerks are national government employees. Peace officers, similarly appointed, are employees of the council, which determines their salary and conditions of service (section 62). In 1981 magistrates received K203 per year (almost double the allowance of councillors), and peace officers and clerks received slightly less.

When Elimbari Council first established courts in 1978, councillors selected magistrates and peace officers, in theory, after they had obtained the consensus of their villagers. In practice, however, political patronage and the councillors' perception of the powers that magistrates would have influenced appointments. Although the Village Courts Act allows councillors to hold the office of magistrate, no Elimbari councillors chose this option (cf. Warren 1976: 3-4). Councillors told me they had assumed that magistrates would act as ward komitis and, wishing to rid themselves of the burden of dispute settlement, they selected former komitis or other leaders for this office. Of 46 first term magistrates, 23 had served as ward committee men, and four others had previously been councillors. In KTK ward Komodurumo men insisted that Martin should be appointed because, as komiti, he had long been responsible for hearing Keukobu disputes. Kopon, the Kaupagam councillor, told me he agreed to this because Martin was Komodurumo's recognized leader and his authority was minimal within Kaupagam. The Komodurumo men's house at Onama, therefore, was ignored. Kopon also ignored Tabiagam's demands for representation, and selected Mama as magistrate and Touri, a young educated man who had stood in the 1977 national elections, as court clerk. The choice of Mama was based on his prior reputation as luluai, his position as the land mediator for Chuave, and Kopon's regard for him as a capable arbitrator of disputes. Other Duma councillors selected the remaining officials, appointing five magistrates from the largest clans and two peace officers from the smaller clans. Because the DOIC and Local Court Magistrate had previously determined the size of the court, Tabiagam failed to obtain any representation. Later two Ei tribe magistrates and one peace officer joined the Duma court, bringing the total number of officials to eleven.
Once established, it became clear that the court was a separate institution from the council, and that magistrates were responsible to the Local Court Magistrate, not to the councillors. Magistrates, trained in their powers and duties by the Local Court Magistrate, received special uniforms and badges of office. Court officials then chose sites for the village court, and, aided by close kinsmen, built special court houses based on the model of the local court, complete with flag poles, benches and tables (see Westermark 1978). Magistrates rapidly took responsibility for hearing all disputes arising in the village and, backed by the DOIC and Local Court Magistrate, excluded councillors from acting as mediators or adjudicators in disputes.

Each court also elected a chairman. In Duma, Martin quickly used his position as chairman to persuade the Local Court Magistrate to replace Mama and Touri. Using Touri's inattendance at village court as an excuse, he selected a Tabiagam youth as clerk, thereby appeasing Tabiagam's claims for representation. Supported by several Mamgram men, Martin argued that Mama was too old to be a magistrate and that Kaupagam men preferred Dege, a close friend of Martin's, a former komiti and Kopon's rival. After pressure from other Kaupagam men, Kopon was forced to accept Dege's appointment.

By the end of the court's first term, magistrates had established themselves as the most powerful leaders at the local level, and their relationships with councillors were often strained. Today, councillors feel that magistrates have usurped their power and have become the true government leaders. Competition between the council and courts is sometimes bitter. Thus several magistrates encouraged a boycott of tax patrols in 1979 because the council had not empowered magistrates to fine tax offenders. In retaliation, the council ignored all magistrates' demands for funds to maintain or build new court houses and excluded magistrates from speaking at council meetings. Moreover, councillors often tried to discredit particular magistrates by spreading rumours that they were stealing court fines or by criticizing them for biased decisions and other abuses of power. I return to the legitimacy of these accusations later. By 1980, despite criticisms of the court and occasional vandalism of court buildings by youths, there was intense competition for village court positions.
Although the Village Courts Act makes no strict provisions for the re-appointment of magistrates, it is clear that community consultation and consensus should be sought. The DOIC at Chuave, after consultation with the Provincial Magistrate, agreed to villagers' requests to conduct a general election by show of hands. The council, however, maintained its authority to appoint peace officers.

Word of the impending election spread rapidly causing great confusion. People wishfully assumed that they would now elect a 'true' court and that each clan would select its own magistrate. The DOIC, after hearing this rumour, informed villagers that each court would elect the number of magistrates extant: no new positions would be created. Villagers then discussed the possibility of voting on an eria basis, suggesting that those seven magistrates who received the most votes should be elected. The DOIC also vetoed this proposal. Villagers then said they wished to vote on a community basis. Thus, Subagam people living at Keu wanted to vote for a Keu resident rather than voting with the Subagams living at Onama because magistrates from other communities are rarely available to hear informal courts in the village. They preferred to nominate a Subagam leader who would compete against Dege or Martin for the position of Keu magistrate. The DOIC dismissed this proposal on the day of the election on the basis that it would make voting too difficult, and, I believe, because the idea was so unprecedented that the DOIC wanted to conform to prior ward-clan divisions.

Nine of 46 existing magistrates were unopposed in the election. One hundred and twenty-seven men contested the remaining 37 positions. Overall, 25 of 46 magistrates were re-elected. I observed the election of magistrates in Chuave census division. Of the 26 successful Chuave candidates, 73 per cent had some previous government experience: two were currently peace officers, four had previously been councillors, and 13 had been komitis. Four successful candidates were Lutheran songons. Only two men who were currently councillors stood for this election, however, and both were defeated. People distinguish sharply between councillors and magistrates as types of government leaders. Thus everyone agreed that councillors should not be elected as magistrates or vice versa. The magistrates' election preceded the council election by one month. Only 12 men stood in both these
elections. Of these, three were successful in one election, but no candidate was elected to both village court and council.

Each contest was influenced by local conditions, in particular the division of clans between different communities and attempts by clans to elect not only their own kinsmen but also members of their local community. Because census books were not used to separate clans, heated arguments often arose as men attempted to vote several times for different candidates or as groups aligned themselves to improve their chances of electing a magistrate. KTK ward's election illustrates the type of competition that occurred.

Rumours about potential candidates spread several months prior to the election. The incumbents, Martin and Dege, made it clear that they would stand, but not campaign. People, they said, were aware of their reputations and could vote as they pleased. In fact, they made very few speeches or formal pledges. Conversations focussed on whether people should contest Martin's or Dege's office and emphasized the necessity of a high turn-out to the election. As weeks passed, it became clear that Dege's position would be contested. Many men felt that he had become 'too big' and that he was too demanding and assertive as a magistrate. Several days before the election there were rumours that Kopon, and as many as five others, would run as candidates. The day before the vote three men publicly announced they would contest Dege's office: Kopon, the only competitor belonging to a different subclan from Dege's; Man, a lineage head and leader of Aragor men's house; and Lewas, a Lutheran wokman and younger member of Dege's lineage who, like Kopon, belonged to Korowa men's house. Up until the day of the vote, there was confusion as to whether or not Martin and Dege would compete against each other and whether Tabiagam men would nominate. Martin, however, was considered unbeatable and many Kaupagam men suggested that they would vote for Martin in preference to Dege.

When the DOIC appeared at the court house to hold the vote, leaders from all three clans approached him to ask about who could stand and whether the ward would vote as a whole. The DOIC informed them that as the ward currently had two magistrates, they would vote for two positions; thus Tabiagam would have to contest either Martin's or Dege's position, but not both, as clans had to vote as a unit. Two
Tabiagam men then announced their candidacy, and a quick meeting of Tabiagam men decided that they would run against Dege. This choice was obvious given Martin's strong candidacy. Table 9 lists the results of the Tabiagam-Kaupagam vote.

Table 9: Tabiagam-Kaupagam village court election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Approximate Age</th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dege</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Kaupagam</td>
<td>Incumbent/subclan leader</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewas</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Kaupagam</td>
<td>Lutheran leader</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Kaupagam</td>
<td>Komiti/lineage leader</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopon</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Kaupagam</td>
<td>Councillor/subclan leader</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Tabiagam</td>
<td>(see text)</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Tabiagam</td>
<td>Subclan leader/former Komiti</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The winner, Robert, though having no claim to any hereditary status, nor previous government experience, was a young, literate man who had worked as a wage labourer for four years. He was also a member of the New Tribes mission, and Tabiagam men characterized him as an honest, hard working and 'educated' man. The election of younger men was by no means a universal feature of the Chuave elections, though in Elimbari this trend was noted by the DOIC (Mogna CPR 1 1981; 7). A growing awareness that magistrates should be literate in order to read the village court manual is juxtaposed with the competing belief that older men are more experienced in matters concerning customary law. Only 15 per cent of first term magistrates and 23 per cent of second term magistrates were literate.

As the smallest of KTK's clans, Tabiagam had never succeeded in electing a councillor. In this election, however, 76.7 per cent of Tabiagam adults voted compared with only 21.1 per cent of Kaupagam. Tabiagam's turn-out (or conversely, Dege's inability to mobilize
Kaupagam voters) therefore, largely account for Robert's success. While all Tabiagam men voted for their own candidates, four Kaupagam men cast their votes for Robert - another indication, however minor, that Dege's actions as magistrate had alienated his own kinsmen. Voters explained to me that they disregarded Man and More because these men were both renowned for their quick tempers and aggressiveness; they were 'hot' men whose personalities were incompatible with the magistrate's position. People argued that magistrates should be 'cold' men who 'scale' or balance both sides of an argument and who, unlike More or Man, rarely resort to physical violence.

In contrast, Kopon and Lewas were already established leaders, and this explains their poor showing. As councillor and church leader respectively, these men were not entitled to undertake a second 'profession'; they could not 'double work'. One month later, Kopon was returned as councillor unopposed by any KTK leader. Thus people explicitly stated that, although Kopon had formerly settled disputes as councillor and while his decisions were 'true' and unbiased, he would become too dominant in village affairs if he were elected to both government offices. Thus, they insisted on the separation of roles.

Martin was returned unopposed after a massive turn-out by his kinsmen who were concerned that he might have to compete against Kaupagam or Tabiagam candidates. But, several months later, before the swearing-in ceremony, the Senior Provincial Magistrate dismissed him on the grounds that the Local Court Magistrate insisted that Martin had twice failed to appear in Chuave for appeals against village court decisions. According to this Provincial Magistrate, the dismissal was also based on Martin's past record: as councillor in the early 1970s, he had been convicted of tax theft (G. Lapthorne: personal communication 1981). The overturning of the villagers' consensus caused great disenchantment with the Local and Provincial Magistrates - resentment fuelled by Martin's own complaints that the government was unfair. For villagers who have had almost 20 years experience with democratic elections, village court elections are the best method of obtaining consensus. Villagers, moreover, were aware of Martin's past record and did not see this as an obstacle to his proper fulfillment of the magistrate's office. They argued that other magistrates, too, had been jailed for various crimes before assuming office and that the
Local Court was meddling in village affairs.

At a meeting following this election, the council selected the peace officers. Typically, between five and ten men nominated for these positions in each court area. In Duma councillors decided on community rather than clan representation and re-appointed two peace officers from Gun and Onama. Kopon, however, successfully lobbied to replace the Keu peace officer, a Komogam, with a Subagam nominee. In doing so, he ignored three Kaupagam candidates. Although he denied any bias in this appointment, two of the Kaupagam men were highly respected. One, a former Papua New Guinea constable, was ideally suited in people's minds for the office. Men suggested that by ensuring Kaupagam had no court representation, Kopon could subsequently attempt to reassert his leadership in the village by acting as mediator in disputes or presiding with Martin in court cases involving Kaupagam.

The selection of court officials is an intrinsically political process, shaped by both individual and group rivalries. The results of these elections show that magistrates, like councillors, have great difficulty maintaining power. The degree of competition for court positions is mainly due to the enormous responsibility and power of these officials. Those men who obtain village court office quickly become the most dominant and influential men in their communities.

The village court

A village court manual, called the 'red book', outlines the duties and powers of court personnel. The clerk's duties include keeping track of court summonses and fines, as well as writing 'order' forms which record details of cases and list the names of litigants involved and the presiding magistrates. In Chuave, clerks are usually men in their early twenties, with at least a standard six education. Peace officers, called polis in Pidgin, are charged with maintaining order in the village court area and at the court house, ordering law breakers to appear in court, ensuring that community work as punishment for offences is fulfilled according to magistrates' decisions, and transporting people to the temporary lock-up in Chuave. They also have the power of arrest. In Chuave, peace officers are equipped with
handcuffs and a few have obtained billy-clubs which they carry while in uniform. Typically, peace officers are strong men, 'true musclemen', who are recognized for their aggressive personalities. Physical and verbal abuse of convicted parties and of individuals failing to show proper respect for the court are common. The slightest breach of court decorum — failure to remove a hat before entering the court building, failure to stand straight or to speak up in response to a magistrate's question — often results in a rapid cuff or slap from the peace officer (cf. Westermark 1978: 84). In extreme instances, faced with magistrates' vitriolic lectures and the intimidation of peace officers, litigants are driven to nervous shaking, crying, and fainting while in court.

Both peace officers and clerks, are in theory, restricted from participating in court decisions. In practice, they frequently make their opinions known, occasionally influencing the result of a case. When peace officers flagrantly attempt to intervene in court decisions, however, magistrates always caution them and sometimes order them from the court building.

In most areas the court meets twice a week, on Mondays and Fridays. Chuave courts, like those in Kainantu, are actually comprised of two forums: an 'outside' or kros kot held in the court's yard and an 'inside' or 'full' court held in the court building (see Warren 1976: 13; Westermark 1978). The outside forum is essentially a mediation court in which magistrates, peace officers and occasionally councillors, songons and other big men encourage litigants to reach an agreement. This court also determines the severity of the offence and whether any law has been broken. It acts as a clearing arena for the full court by eliminating those squabbles regarded as too petty to be heard inside. Of 404 cases for which I have data, 70 (17.3 per cent) were resolved in this forum or otherwise failed to proceed to the full court.

In the inside court, which is based on the model of the Local Court with benches and a desk separating magistrates from litigants, strict rules of decorum apply and peace officers cannot interfere (cf. Westermark 1978: 81-83). Here magistrates adjudicate. The red book sets out both court procedure and the sanctions available to
magistrates. To avoid split decisions, three, five or even seven magistrates hear each case. Magistrates cannot hear cases involving close agnates, affinal or maternal kinsmen (Pidgin: wanblut o wan pisin o kandere samting). In Chuave, magistrates broadly interpret this rule as not being able to hear disputes involving any close maternal or affinal kin or any member of their own clan. Magistrates go to great lengths to ensure the public believes the inside court is neutral. Thus, they always remove themselves from the bench and sometimes leave the court building when their kinsmen's cases are heard. When giving evidence, they remove their badges and uniforms before entering the court. As I show later, such public displays of neutrality often mask private interference in particular cases, and allow magistrates to disassociate themselves from particular settlements, even when they have played a crucial role in the case's outcome.

The red book outlines 16 categories of offences, which, given their ambiguous wording and the magistrates' flexible interpretation of them, cover any breach of customary or administration law. Assault, theft, property damage, disturbing the peace, lying or slander are all examples of separate offences. Offences are punishable by a maximum of K50, jail sentences of four weeks, or community work for four weeks (eight hours a day, six days a week); magistrates may also order compensation of up to K100 in lieu of fines. Magistrates make all court decisions in camera, after which they call the litigants back into the court, read the applicable offence and maximum penalty to the convicted party, and then announce their decision. The clerk writes the court order and then hands copies to the claimant and defendant. Occasionally, magistrates render verbal decisions and forego the use of written orders. Table 10 lists the average fines or compensation for seven offences frequently heard in village court. Of 270 cases for which I have accurate information, 90 (33.3 per cent) resulted in fines, 150 (55.5 per cent) in compensation, and 30 (11.1 per cent) in both fines and compensation.

People regard the village court as a harsh institution. In part, this stems from the frequency with which fines are imposed, a practice contrary to traditional methods of settlement based on compensation. This is particularly evident in cases involving physical violence,
which magistrates regard as a breach of administration rather than customary law. Such cases often result in fines, compensation being awarded only when injuries have been caused. People also realize that magistrates can link offences and impose fines which are impossible to pay. For example, a fight that starts over an insult can lead to several charges - *tok bilas* (lying or slander), assault, and disturbing the peace - and the potential fines could total K150. Failure to pay fines or compensation ordered by the court constitutes 'disobeying orders' and is subject to an additional fine of up to K50. Thus, despite the fact that offenders may perceive all offences as related to a single argument or dispute, the court can charge them for several offences and, failing payment, impose jail sentences. In the three years since the inception of the Duma court, 88 men and 14 women had been jailed and given sentences ranging from one week to three and a half months.6

Table 10: Fines and compensation imposed in village court*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Average fine</th>
<th>Average compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>K27</td>
<td>K30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital quarrels</td>
<td>K22</td>
<td>K26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig trespass</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>K12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>K12</td>
<td>K20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adultery</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>K40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*tok bilas/lying/slander</td>
<td>K14</td>
<td>K11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disobeying orders</td>
<td>K14</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* rounded off to the nearest kina

Chapter six of the red book outlines those offences over which magistrates have no power: motor vehicle regulations, land disputes7 and cases previously heard in another village court. Offences not covered by the 16 categories listed cannot be heard. Specific examples
of this latter type include murder, rape, theft of goods valued over K100, and escape from imprisonment. Even in these cases, however, the village court may order compensation. Rape cases, for example, are rarely reported to Local or District Courts. The village court simply orders compensation of between K50 and K100 to the victim, and fines the attacker for disturbing the peace or assault - a method of settlement regarded as legitimate by men and women alike.

Magistrates are further empowered to award unlimited compensation in matters concerning child, death or bridewealth payments. Only cases concerning the last of these is regularly heard in village court. Upon divorce, for example, the court often decides the amount of bridewealth that must be paid back to a man's agnates, based on the length of time the couple has been married. Divorce settlements for marriages of less than a year often result in repayment of one-half to three-quarters of the bridewealth. For long-term marriages, the settlements are usually a small portion of the initial payment - less than K50 - or none at all.

Magistrates are also responsible for 'settlement orders' and 'preventative orders', but in Chuave village courts these are rarely used. The former covers cases where the litigants themselves reach an agreement concerning compensation in kros kot. People who later renege on these can be charged with disobeying orders. Preventative orders are written when magistrates believe particular individuals or groups are about to fight or when they believe court decisions will not be followed. These are mostly given after divorce cases to prevent future quarrels between former spouses or to list the terms of child custody.

The magistrates' power to adjudicate is theoretically limited to those cases heard in village court, that is, the panel of at least three magistrates who make decisions by majority vote and who are unrelated to litigants. Magistrates are further empowered to act as mediators in any matter 'relating to a dispute' prior to resorting to adjudication (Village Courts Act part two, division two; part three, division four). In other words, magistrates are official government mediators in all disputes not formally heard in village court. In practice, however, a single magistrate often acts as an adjudicator.
because the people recognize him as a legitimate authority responsible for the maintenance of law and order. But although his authority extends beyond the village court and is embodied in the role of magistrate itself, the magistrate's actual power is restricted by his relationships with kinsmen and friends within the clan and community. Subsequently, magistrates are forced to temper their power and ignore a wide range of disputes. Those cases heard in village court – over 800 per year – represent approximately one-third of all disputes arising within the era. The magistrate's complex role is best understood by examining the options available to people when disputes arise within the village.

Dispute processing

Following Gulliver (1969: 14) and Counts (1974: 119), a dispute arises when disagreements between groups or individuals result in a claim by one party that 'alleged rights' have been infringed upon, interfered with, or denied by another (see also Epstein 1974: 8-9). Determining whether or not a 'claim' has been made is itself difficult. In Chuave, the use of go-betweens is common, and minor grievances may never become known to the general public. Likewise, at ceremonies or exchanges, many accusations or verbal skirmishes which can be called 'arguments' often arise. Thus, people may demand portions of a payment or claim publicly that individuals are not fulfilling their responsibilities to kinsmen. I do not consider such points of contention 'disputes'. Rather, only those cases where people publicly claim their rights have been infringed upon or where these arguments lead to physical violence, demands for compensation, or the threat of legal action, I consider disputes. I have information on 319 disputes involving members of Keu village. Of these, 21 resulted from Chuave police arrests and may be considered violations against the state. They include offences such as traffic violations, gambling, and carrying an offensive weapon. The remaining 298 disputes result from the claims of individuals in the local community. I use the phrase 'dispute processing' to indicate the choices, available to individual disputants and third parties, that determine both the outcome of disputes and the forums where resolution occurs.

Table 11 lists the types of disputes that arose and the number
Table 11: Categorization of Keu village disputes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of disputes</th>
<th>Number of violent disputes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Marital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>division of labour</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adultery accusations</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household expenditures</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insults/tok bilas</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>divorce</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drunkenness</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children/child rearing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sexual rights</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtotal</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Pig trespass</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Theft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pigs/fowl</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>garden produce</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>money</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coffee</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>store goods</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal possessions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtotal</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Tok bilas/slander</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Distribution/debts</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Drunkenness/spak bisnis*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Property rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>garden sites</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water rights/pollution</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtotal</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Property damage</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Sexual offences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rape</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sexual harassment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pregnancy/unwed mothers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>menstrual contamination</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtotal</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) Children's behaviour</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) Cards/gambling</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m) Responsibility for communal work</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n) Witchcraft. accusation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o) Accident liability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>107 (35.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cases where the cause itself is attributed to the intoxicating effects of alcohol (see Warry 1982).

# These are separate cases occurring between spouses and are additional to those listed under categories d and j.
of disputes involving violence. The cause of a dispute is usually clear cut. Occasionally, however, several causes merge in a single dispute. For example, a person who discovers some of his garden produce has been stolen, may accuse another person seen near the place of the theft. If there are no eye-witness accounts of the actual theft, the accusation may be unprovable, in which case the accused may counter-claim that his reputation has been damaged and receive compensation for the insult. Slander or insults often arise as part and parcel of any heated dispute. In Table 11, I have relied on informants' statements to list the principal cause of the dispute.

Often disputes do not result in any litigation. They may simply lapse because disputants decide not to press claims for compensation. Case A shows that even bitter disputes involving physical violence may not end in litigation.

Case A

Kaupa approached his son Bandi, age 17, at Mamgram and told him that Bandi's grandmother had complained about the boy's failure to gather firewood or help with other household chores. Kaupa berated his son for ignoring his responsibilities to his grandmother, who was old and infirm. He further accused Bandi of laziness, adding that, by belonging to a Keu gang, Bandi was always getting into trouble. Bandi replied by saying he was old enough to do as he pleased and finally told his father to 'shut up'. At this remark Kaupa slapped Bandi several times. Bandi then became incensed and attacked his father. The ensuing fight quickly became one-sided as Kaupa, a much stronger man, retaliated and beat his son. Hearing the fracas several men, including Silas, Bandi's uncle, and Paul, a patrilateral cousin of both Silas and Kaupa, emerged from Mamgram men's house. Silas was Bandi's 'second father', his guardian, and quickly entered the fight to defend Bandi. Paul also joined the fight, first attempting to restrain, and then attacking Bandi. Another Mamgram resident, Nime, who belonged to a different subclan, managed to intervene between Kaupa and Silas and persuaded them to stop fighting. After several minutes other onlookers also began shouting appeals for an end to the fight, telling the parties that it was a foolish quarrel, a 'rubbish' matter.

The men ceased fighting but continued to exchange insults. Kaupa argued he alone was responsible for Bandi's behaviour. Silas, in turn, maintained that Bandi was an adult, and deserved to be treated like one, arguing in effect, for Kaupa to pick on someone his own size. After an obscene insult, Kaupa broke loose from Nime and again attacked Silas, grabbing his brother by the throat. Both men then broke free, grabbed fence posts and exchanged several blows. Two additional men from Kaupa's subclan also joined the fight at this stage, both on different sides. There was no bloodshed during this stage of escalation which, by Chuave standards, did not reach serious proportions. Nime and a Keukobu man interceded and threw the fence
posts into a nearby garden. The matter, they shouted, was finished and would be settled in court. Kaupa and Silas again exchanged insults, this time concerning each man's alleged failure to contribute to lineage and men's house exchanges. Bandi remained silent throughout this stage, the initial quarrel now almost forgotten. Both Silas and Kaupa threatened each other with court action for the insults and blows. The matter ended when Silas dragged Bandi away by the arm, and Kaupa retired to the men's house, shouting about his son's pig-headed nature and his brother's unwarranted interference.

No court action resulted from this fight. The principal antagonists ignored each other for several weeks; Kaupa decided to sleep temporarily in his pig house away from the village, and Bandi made himself scarce around Mamgram by sleeping and eating at another men's house. Nime and Paul separately approached both Martin and Dege, and informed them of the fight. Dege, a Mamgram resident, immediately decided the matter should be allowed to lapse and informed Mamgram men that a court would be held only if Kaupa or Silas insisted. Martin later approached Dege and suggested that the men could be fined for fighting and disturbing the peace. Dege considered the fight a minor affair, calling it 'family business' (a lineage matter), and insisted that charges would only exacerbate the contention between the parties.

Obviously, no two disputes are the same. The intensity of the dispute and the decision to press claims for compensation are contingent on the personalities of the disputants and the relationship between parties. People recognize that violence may erupt in any dispute. Violence is more common in intra-clan disputes: of 183 intra-clan disputes, 74 or 40.4 per cent ended in violence, whereas in disputes between members of different clans, 33 of 115 or 28.7 per cent resulted in violence. The highest incidence of violence - 52 per cent - occurs in marital disputes. Even if these are excluded, however, intra-clan violence occurs in 33 per cent of all other cases. Ideally, of course, Chuave people like other highlanders, stress the peaceful, harmonious nature of relationships between close kin (Berndt 1962: 291; M. Strathern 1972b: 17). In practice, the figures I have cited show that strained relationships between spouses or clansmen result in a high degree of intra-clan or intra-village conflict. Berndt (ibid.: 292-293, 330) has also noted that in practice, relations between close kinsmen can lead to physical violence and reports that 59 per cent of disputes he recorded in the Kamano-Fore region (63 of 107 cases) were related to marital dissention (see also
Similarly for the Gumine area of Simbu province, Podolefsky (1978) has shown that certain types of disputes—those involving pig trespass, land encroachments or accusations of adulterous behaviour—occurred more often between clan members than between members of different clans. As in case A, violence itself is sometimes regarded as a legitimate mode of resolution. When I later questioned Mamgram men about this fight, they agreed that by fighting the disputants had cleared the air and that no further trouble would occur. Unlike the village court, therefore, people do not necessarily regard violence as a serious offence, but see it instead as a form of self-help and a method of asserting or protecting individual rights. Moreover, conventions exist that prevent the escalation of physical violence. Members of opposite 'doors' or men's houses should not choose sides in disputes. Like Nime, they should act as neutral parties, attempting to prevent physical violence. In contrast, inter-clan violence rapidly escalates because no co-residents or neutral parties exist to encourage an end to the fight. Moreover, people believe that any violence between clans is long remembered and that this increases the likelihood of further violent confrontations. Consequently, magistrates insist that any inter-clan dispute involving violence should proceed to litigation.

Large inter-clan confrontations result in an immediate show of authority by magistrates. Stick fights involving between 20 and 80 participants often lead to an *ad hoc* village court at the scene of the disturbance. Magistrates from the *eria* or tribe carry village court books to the scene, and word of the fight is sent to Chuave police. The magistrates tell the police on their arrival, that the matter is under control; their presence, however, is used to threaten villagers with immediate arrest if money for fines is not forthcoming. Anyone participating in the fight receives a fine of between K10 and K40, and after one such fight 27 men were fined a total of K440. Alternatively, magistrates are empowered to fine entire men's house groups or clans. Thus, when Miumabnu and Nudian men's houses fought, the two groups were fined K100 and K165, and ordered to kill, cook, and exchange a large pig at a formal 'shaking hands' ceremony which conclude these large settlements. At this court, James, an aspiring leader and Miumabnu youth who despised both Martin and Dege's constant interference in Miumabnu's affairs, insisted that no fines should be
paid. He argued that if Komodurumo or Kaupagam had been involved, the court would have ordered smaller fines. He also accused Martin of a number of transgressions, including the theft of court money. Other men accepted these arguments and began to quarrel with the presiding magistrates, eventually forcing them to leave the village. The magistrates returned the next day after consulting the Local Court Magistrate, and explained the Inter-Group Fighting Act which makes leaders liable for the actions of their clan. The magistrates then began to write orders of imprisonment for the Miunabnu councillor, songon and other leaders who had not participated in the fight. Faced with this threat and the return of Chuave police, the people quickly gathered the money and paid the fines. In addition, James was fined K50 for disobeying orders.

The decision to press claims is also linked to both the social distance between disputants and the type of dispute. Accusations of theft are only provable when eye-witness accounts are available. In contrast, disputes involving long outstanding debts usually end in litigation or the payment of compensation because they are a matter of public record. Section A of Table 12 shows that a higher percentage of cases lapse between subclansmen, lineage mates or husbands and wives, than between more distantly related kinsmen. Section B provides information for five major categories of disputes.

In 21 of 298 cases, the defendants themselves admitted guilt and offered compensation. Thus, almost one-third of all disputes, the majority of which involved spouses or lineage mates, did not end in litigation. When compensation is not offered, when the disputants insist on pressing claims, or when magistrates insist litigation is necessary, several options are available. A third party may mediate the dispute in Local, village, or men's house courts. I use the word 'settled' for those cases where guilt was determined or where compensation or fines were paid. Occasionally, aggrieved parties may accept the admission of guilt as an adequate resolution of a dispute. Each court, in fact, involves two separate arguments: one to establish guilty parties, and a second to determine whether compensation is necessary, and if so, the size of the payment. Thus, a man may argue that his pig was not responsible for damaging another's crops, or that it did so only because a fence was not properly maintained. If he is
Table 12: Decision to press claims for compensation or request litigation

A) Relationship between disputants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disputants</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Litigation/Compensation</th>
<th>Number of cases that lapsed</th>
<th>Percentage of cases lapsing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>spouses</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lineage members</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>74.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subclan members</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clan members</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter-clan</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B) Type of disputes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispute</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Litigation/Compensation</th>
<th>Number of cases that lapsed</th>
<th>Percentage of cases lapsing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>marital</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pig trespass</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theft</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tok bilas</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debts</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

found negligent, he may then use either of these arguments or others to claim exemption from compensation. He may also argue that the case is a first offence or that he will ensure that he tethers or fences in his pigs in future. The aggrieved party may accept these arguments and the accused simply admonished or a minimal compensation demanded. Where guilty parties are dissatisfied with the amount of compensation a disputant requests or a magistrate suggests, they may take the case to another forum. I use the word 'referral' for those cases where such appeals are made, or where disputants or third parties, having failed to establish guilt but believing the dispute to be serious enough to warrant further litigation, take the matter to another forum. Only about one-fifth of all referrals constitute appeals against court decisions. A third possible outcome of disputes is that litigants insist on their innocence and third parties lack sufficient evidence to determine guilt or award compensation. Once again, these cases lapse: litigants are forced to leave the matter unresolved. Table 13 provides a summary of dispute processing for Keu village.
Table 13: Keu village dispute processing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Settled</th>
<th>Lapsed</th>
<th>Referrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a) Informal mediation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by <em>songons</em> and councillors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 to village court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by magistrates</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 to men's house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 to village court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b) Men's house court**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Settled</th>
<th>Lapsed</th>
<th>Referrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>referral from mediator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 to village court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>referrals from village court</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>direct by litigants</strong></td>
<td>105</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27 to village court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**c) Village court**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Settled</th>
<th>Lapsed</th>
<th>Referrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>from mediation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from men's house</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Local Court</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>summons by magistrate</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 to local court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>direct by litigants</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 to local court 12 to men's house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>98</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**d) Local court**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Settled</th>
<th>Lapsed</th>
<th>Referrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>summons by police</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village court appeals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>direct by litigants</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 to village court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of five decisions, four were upheld by the Local Court Magistrate and one in case the magistrate ordered additional compensation.
This table shows that of 200 disputes, 50 per cent resulted in settlement in the first forum in which they were heard. An additional 26 per cent were settled after being heard in one or more additional forums. Moreover, the chance of settlement being reached or imposed increases at each level of the legal 'ladder'. The 'ladder' is a metaphor that police and court officials use when telling villagers that disputants themselves should settle their disagreements, or when magistrates refuse to hear a dispute at village court unless settlement is first attempted in the village. The Local Court Magistrate rarely hears any customary or civil dispute unless it has already been to village court and he confines himself to criminal matters and appeals.

Several factors influence the location of a court hearing. Usually disputes arising on the evening before, or day of, the village court proceed directly to this forum. Often parties or witnesses to a dispute fail to appear at village court, and the court instructs a particular magistrate to hold a men's house court in the interim between court days. Difficult cases, such as divorce, alternate between the men's house and village court because magistrates are reluctant to reach a decision and encourage the parties to undergo trial separation or a final period of reconciliation. Where spouses have been married in a Christian ceremony, divorces are referred to *songons*: magistrates are extremely hesitant to grant these divorces without church approval.

The numerical preference for men's house courts, however, is also due to the nature of the dispute, the differences between the two forums, and people's expectations of magistrates. Pig trespass, for example, is so common that the court has developed systematic, standardized methods of settlement. Almost always these offences result in K10 or K15 compensation, and magistrates often send these cases directly to village court rather than face long, involved discussions in the village. Other disputes, such as those involving breaches of incest rules and deciding responsibility for the pregnancy of young unmarried girls, rarely proceed to village court. These cases are 'hot', and magistrates believe they should be settled immediately least violence erupt before the matter can be taken to village court. The social stigma attached to these offences, moreover, means that the parties involved prefer to have the case aired among
kinsmen so as to avoid the gossip among other clans whose members have attended the public kros kot. Witchcraft or sorcery accusations also do not proceed to village court because magistrates stress the impossibility of proving the truth of the accusation, and are usually inclined to charge the accuser with slander. Instead, magistrates hear such cases in the men's house court. I discovered only three cases in which sorcery or witchcraft accusations led to an admission of guilt, with compensation of the aggrieved party.

The men's house courts, which resemble both traditional moots and the kros kot, are held early in the morning or following the evening meal. Disputes are taken to the men's house either by agreement between parties or when the aggrieved party approaches a magistrate, who then instructs the accused person to attend. In inter-clan disputes, the aggrieved person and his kinsmen travel to the men's house of the accused. Men shout to the peace officer or magistrate and inform him of the court. After arriving, the official first identifies the complainant and the defendant, and then asks the claimant to speak. After he has finished, the defendant airs his version of the dispute. Interruptions by either party - denials, amendments or accusations of lying - are not tolerated.

Following the speeches, anyone present may ask questions, contribute yet another version of the dispute, or join in the general discussion of how the dispute might be resolved. Men's house courts sometimes last for several hours during which people may comment on a number of other cases which involved the litigants or which can serve as precedents for a decision. Chuave men's house courts, like Hagen unofficial courts, attempt to find the 'root' or 'base cause' of the dispute (see M. Strathern 1974: 313). Determining the base cause not only allows court officials to categorize evidence as admissible or irrelevant, but also determines responsibility for the dispute. People fully realize that surface aspects of a case often disguise the base cause. A woman who sues for divorce or alleges that her husband has not given her a share of coffee money may be more concerned to publicly air the husband's mistreatment of her over several months. Once officials or other men realize that the dispute is a front for other contentions, they allow discussion of the marriage history in order to pressure publicly the husband into acting more responsibly.
Likewise, they may appeal to songons who can lecture the litigants on the sanctity of Christian marriages, the need for co-operation and, often the husband's right to dominate his wife. Similarly, even though men's house courts involving witchcraft accusations usually end in the compensation of the accused woman, by airing the grievance against her, the woman is publicly sanctioned for anti-social behaviour such as not bringing food to the men's house. In extreme cases, such as the discussion of land ownership which cannot be heard in village court, men's house courts allow the airing of long-standing quarrels which may hark back for years or even decades.

The 'base cause' of a dispute may also reveal evidence that a defendant can use to escape compensation or fines by placing responsibility for the dispute on someone else. When fights occur at small beer parties or card games, disputants may argue that the host brought them to the location of the dispute. Often the sponsor of the event pays the compensation based on the belief that, although he knew relationships were strained between the disputants, he insisted on bringing them together thereby creating trouble. Insults and physical fights between men and women may also reveal the root of the fight to be adultery or sexual flirtation. Thus, the principal dispute may be ignored and the man or woman responsible for establishing an illicit relationship is verbally chastised or forced to pay compensation.

Each men's house court, therefore, presents magistrates or peace officers with special problems. Court officials prefer to mediate in village settings for, as Bailey has noted, this is a more politically expedient strategy than adjudication (1969: 63-4). By suggesting decisions or relying on other leaders and interested persons to resolve the dispute, the magistrate avoids the risk of alienating one or both disputants, as well as any other kinsmen concerned with the outcome of the dispute. Magistrates must take into account their own commitment to the law as well as the severity of the dispute and the personalities of the disputants. Inevitably, however, magistrates do adjudicate in village settings. In such situations the men's house court resembles the kros kot: failure of mediation leads to the dispute being referred to village court or to imposed settlements.
The men's house court allows a full airing of relevant evidence. In contrast, the village court hears up to 17 cases at a sitting; the amount of time available for each case varies from between five minutes to one-half hour depending on the size of the court calendar. Thus, although magistrates attempt to account for the base cause of disputes, the time available for each case means that they often ignore a great deal of evidence and almost all testimony concerning the history of the relationship or a person's character. Thus, the court may disregard the fact that a fight resulted from a person's failure to contribute to a particular ceremony, from sexual flirtation or adultery, and simply deal with the overt aspects of the dispute - the insults that were exchanged or the resulting physical violence. Moreover, by first airing the dispute in the men's house, the litigants gain an understanding of the possible outcome of any appeal or further court, and magistrates become acquainted with relevant information that they can use to render verdicts in village court. Three cases help demonstrate the relationship between men's house and village court cases and illustrate some of the options available to both litigants and magistrates.

Case B

Simon, a Komodorumo man living at Keukobu, returned from his pig house early one morning and several people told him that his wife, Maki, had been seen the previous evening with Tonare, a Kaupagam man from Mamgram. He accused Maki of having sexual intercourse with Tonare and, after striking her several times, she admitted the transgression but maintained she had not initiated the liaison. Several Keukobu men heard this quarrel and immediately called to kinsmen saying that they wanted to find and 'kill' Tonare.

Martin calmed the men by saying that he would hold a court at Mamgram and by adding that anyone seen with a weapon or starting to fight would, in turn, be fined. Martin and 14 Keukobu men went to Mamgram where they seated themselves on one side of the men's house. Both Tonare and Dege were called for.

After they arrived, Simon spoke first, briefly stating that Tonare had cajoled his wife and had slept with her. Both Maki and Tonare were wrong, he said, and he demanded compensation from his wife and from Tonare. The affair, he added, was a serious and intolerable offence because Komodorumo and Kaupagam were 'brothers' and did not intermarry.

Maki then gave her version of the events stating that she had told Tonare she did not wish to have intercourse, that she was too old, but adding that Tonare had given her cigarettes and persisted in his advances. She included the events of the morning when Simon had beaten her. At this point, Martin interjected to ask whether Maki had had
intercourse with Tonare. When Maki admitted this, Martin ended her account saying she was in the wrong. He then asked Simon whether he had struck his wife, and this too was admitted. Martin then ordered Tonare to speak.

Tonare immediately admitted his guilt but argued that Maki had encouraged his advances. She had accepted his cigarettes and, when taking them, she encouraged his overture by gently rubbing his hand. He said that he had gone to Keukobu to play cards, but unable to find a game, he sat and gossipped with several men and women, including Maki. When Maki had decided to leave, he had accompanied her to her house where she invited him inside. He had given her K2 and slept with her. This last remark, insinuating that Maki was a prostitute, resulted in a quick denial from Maki and an accusation that Tonare was lying. Maki was silenced and Tonare ended his account by saying that he had felt ill the previous evening, and that he was a good Christian man. He suggested that a witch, or possibly Satan, had entered his body and enticed him to act as he did. He was 'sorry' for his actions, but his thoughts had been disturbed and he could not remember any other details.

Martin then called on Keukobu witnesses who testified that, when Maki was about to leave the group, they had heard her tell Tonare to remain behind and that she would find her own way. Someone had heard Tonare say that he would do as he pleased when he left with Maki. A long discussion then ensued. Keukobu men insisted that Maki was a 'good' woman and that Tonare should pay compensation for accusing her of prostitution.

A pastor from Tonare's mission, the Four Square church, then lectured to the group about Satan and insisted that the affair was the Devil's work and that Tonare, while guilty, was not responsible for his actions.

Even while this discussion was evolving, Martin and Dege began to confer. Each magistrates sided, in part, with his own kinsman. Dege believed that both Maki and Tonare were to blame and that each should pay compensation to Simon. He suggested K20 in each case. Martin, however, believed that the matter was more serious and that the compensation must be larger. He wanted Tonare fined for entering Simon's house without his permission and compensation of K100 to Simon. Maki, he argued, should pay only a small amount because she had already been punished. At this suggestion, Dege said that Simon too should be fined for striking his wife. After conferring for about 15 minutes, the two men reached agreement. Dege finally was persuaded by the argument that without heavy payment, violence would erupt between Keukobu and Mamgram.

Dege voiced the decision of the court by reiterating almost all of the points that had been raised, stressing that the court was both serious and difficult. He said that Tonare and Maki were both wrong, but that Tonare had been persistent in his advances and was guilty of a serious offence against his 'brother'. Dege admonished Simon for striking Maki and not bringing the matter to the immediate attention of Martin. No compensation was awarded between spouses; rather, they were lectured that any future violence or quarrelling would be taken to village court. Tonare was ordered to pay K80 to Simon and K10 to Dege - the latter a fine for trespassing. Tonare was told that because the case was difficult, he could take the matter to village court.
Tonare said he would accept the decision for Dege and Martin were 'lawmen' and he would try to find the money. Mamgram people spent the next hour or so attempting to raise it. Tonare's wife, along with two other men, contributed K10 each. An additional K30 was raised in amounts of K1 to K4. Tonare was then given two days to raise the remainder.

Case C

A Keukobu man, Andrew, was working temporarily in Port Moresby. During his absence his wife, Sesse, asked Peter, Andrew's brother, to sleep in her house to 'protect her from rascals' and thereby, to quell any suggestion that she was being unfaithful to her husband. Late one evening, Kaupa, a Keukobu leader, returned drunk from his affine's village and broke into Sesse's house. Peter awoke, attacked Kaupa and chased him out of the house, yelling to Keukobu that an intruder was in the village. He caught Kaupa and scuffled with him in the darkness. In the course of the fight, Kaupa struck his face on a fence badly cutting himself. Kaupa managed to escape but was seen and recognized near Keukobu.

After returning to his house near Keukobu, Kaupa emerged armed with an axe and set about threatening several men who had been awakened. At this point, Martin appeared and disarmed Kaupa. Peter then accused Kaupa of entering the house and wanting to have sexual intercourse with Sesse. At this accusation, Kaupa broke free from Martin and attacked Peter, striking him several times. Martin intervened, ordered everyone to disperse and said that he would hear the court in the morning.

The court began early next morning at Keukobu. Martin - fearing that Kaupa, his rival, would accuse him of bias - called Dege to hear the court and acted only as a witness in the case. Kaupa offered his drunkenness as an excuse for his behaviour and demanded that Peter pay him compensation for accusing him of wanting to sleep with Sesse, and for the injuries he had received. Peter and other Keukobu men offered their versions of the dispute, and while acknowledging that Kaupa was intoxicated, insisted that his threats and his attack of Peter demanded compensation.

After asking Martin to verify several points, Dege quickly rendered a decision. He found both Kaupa's claims unwarranted and Kaupa totally responsible for the trouble and ordered him to pay K5 compensation to Sesse for entering her house, K10 to Peter for assault, and K15 to be divided amongst Keukobu men who had been threatened. Both Martin and most Keukobu men present praised this decision, told Kaupa the matter was concluded, and warned him the formal village court would impose even larger fines. They told him he could pay the compensation as soon as he sold some coffee. Kaupa, however, vehemently contested the decision, saying that he refused to pay because Martin instructed Dege prior to the court to render a decision against him, and therefore Dege had been biased. Despite the shouts of his kinsmen to apologize for these remarks and to 'hear the law', he persisted in his attack on Dege, calling his court 'rubbish' and saying he had no right to hear Keukobu courts. Dege responded to these accusations by characterizing Kaupa's words as both an insult to him personally and an attack on all magistrates. He ordered Kaupa to pay the compensation, to appear in village court the next day for
Che charge of tok bilas, and then he stormed out of the men's house.

Kaupa failed to appear in the village court and to pay compensation. Dege then instructed a Subagam peace officer to summon Kaupa to court on the next village court day. There, the case was heard in both 'cross' and 'full' court. Dege and Peter acted as co-complainants, the latter on behalf of Keukobu men's house. Martin and Dege both publicly stated they would not participate in hearing any aspect of the case. Both men, however, privately approached all the other magistrates present and argued that failure to uphold Dege's decision would harm the reputation of magistrates and the court as a whole. After hearing all versions of the dispute in full court, a presiding magistrate approached Martin and asked him whether he would consider fines or compensation acceptable. At this point, Martin approached Kaupa and told him the court's decision would be harsh but that he would attempt to 'help' Kaupa by having the penalty decreased. He then entered the court, and participated in the decision by encouraging heavy penalties.

During both the full and kros courts, magistrates, by holding up the court manual, reading from sections of it, and displaying their badges of office, repeatedly stressed their rightful authority to adjudicate. From its outset, in fact, this case was used as an example of a serious attack on the authority of all magistrates. The outcome of the dispute was, therefore, never in question. The court awarded Dege K20 for the 'shame' he had incurred from Kaupa's accusation and fined Kaupa an additional K70 for four offences: disobeying orders, breaking and entering, disturbing the peace, and threatening actions. The court also ordered him to pay the compensation that Dege had sought to impose in the initial hearing of the case. Although embittered by this decision, Kaupa respectfully acknowledged the magistrates' decision and, after several weeks, raised the money to pay all these fines.

Case D

Dege invited some people to his house one evening to play cards. After playing several hours both he and his wife, Ruth, had lost about K10 each. The game broke up when Maki accused Gorai, Dege's 'sister' (FaBrDa) of stinginess; Gorai had neither paid Ruth for the use of the house, nor given Dege any of her winnings so that he might continue playing. The two women exchanged insults.

The next morning the women resumed their quarrel of the previous evening. As the quarrel became heated, Gorai accused Ruth of witchcraft, and Ruth accused Gorai of prostitution. These insults led to a fist fight, and then to a fence-post fight before Mangram men intervened. Gorai demanded a court and informed Ruth she should appear at the village court being held that day. Dege appeared, however, and cautioned both women that the village court would impose heavy fines. He persuaded the two women to shake hands and told them to forget the matter because it was family business and unworthy of a court.

Intent on legal action, however, Gorai travelled to Onama where she talked to a Subagam magistrate. He was of the opinion that the dispute was a minor affair and told Gorai to ask Martin to hear the case in the men's house. Gorai left the court and, believing that Martin would agree with Dege, his associate, she approached Kopon with
the dispute. Kopon was reluctant to hear the case for two reasons: he lacked formal authority and Dege would not tolerate his intervention in a lineage matter. But he suggested that Gorai could take the matter to Local Court if she was adamant that some litigation was necessary. Gorai then went to her garden.

The following morning the two women again fought, the quarrel beginning when Gorai accused Maki of being afraid to appear at court, and Maki counter-arguing that the matter was finished. This fight, however, resulted in minor injuries to both women as they once again resorted to using fence posts before several Kaupagam men intervened and disarmed them.

Men then escorted the women to the men's house and called for both Dege and Martin. Gorai told her story first, and, on hearing of Dege's involvement in the first 'settlement' and of the card game, Martin immediately said that Dege could not hear the case. After listening to the women's and Dege's versions of the events, Martin expressed his reluctance to hear the dispute. Several Mamgram men then attempted to mediate a settlement and, having failed, suggested that Kopon should be called to hear the court. Martin squashed this idea by stating that Kopon had no power to hear courts.

People then blamed Dege for bringing the two women together when he knew they always argued, and for playing cards, when he, as a magistrate, should respect the law which forbade it. When the conversation developed into a general attack on magistrates and their inability to prevent fights and theft in the village, Martin intervened and silenced the Mamgram men. He argued that such talk was useless. He then suggested a settlement: Dege to pay K5 for playing cards; Ruth and Gorai to pay each other K5 for their insults; Ruth to compensate Gorai K5 for fighting; and, because she was the first to resort to physical violence, Gorai to pay Ruth K10. He then asked each party if this was acceptable. Both Dege and Ruth agreed. Gorai, however, rejected the settlement and stated she wished to have the matter settled in village court, implying that Martin's decision was biased in favour of Dege. Martin then declared the matter unresolved and told Gorai she could take the matter to village court. But he cautioned Gorai that the village court would treat the matter seriously, and he listed all the offences for which she and Ruth could be fined: tok bilas, disturbing the peace, fighting with fence posts, and playing cards. His decision, he suggested, was fair and the compensation small because the matter was between members of a single 'post' or lineage.

Regardless, Gorai decided to take the dispute to village court. There, as a result of Martin's warning, however, both Ruth and Gorai by tacit agreement restricted their accounts to the original quarrel over cards and to the ensuing fight. No mention of any insults were made, nor did the women admit to fighting with fence posts: both explicitly denied these possibilities in response to magistrates' questions. Kaupagam onlookers ignored both omissions.

The magistrates' discussion, held in camera, concentrated on three points: Dege's involvement in gambling, the fact that the fight was between lineage members and not 'half-fires' or subclans, and the fact that Gorai was a determined woman. This last consideration proved extremely important because, as one peace officer argued, a decision against Gorai might lead her to make an appeal in Local Court. The court officials agreed that such an outcome was to be avoided at
all costs, for it would mean that the Local Court Magistrate would realize that magistrates themselves ignored the law against gambling. In spite of these considerations, however, the magistrates believed it was necessary to fine the women for fighting. They ignored Dege's involvement, but fined Ruth and Gorai K10 each for fighting. Ruth immediately paid her fine. After complaining that this decision too was unfair, Gorai finally paid K4, and was given two weeks to find the additional K6. Following the court, however, Dege and the peace officer approached her and said that no further payment was necessary - the fine would be forgotten.

The spirit and the letter of the law: abuses of power

Magistrates' actions and decisions define, and are synonymous with, 'law and order', as they determine not only the severity of punishment for particular offences, but also which disturbances of the peace should be punished. Thus, in Case C, even though Tonare believed the compensation was large, he accepted the magistrates' decision because, as he later told me, Martin and Dege were 'government' and must be obeyed. To disobey would not only be a personal impugnment on these leaders' authority and reputation, but would also 'ruin the law' and the 'law's name'. Of 300 people surveyed, 62 per cent of the men and and 52 per cent of the women believed that magistrates did a good job and that the court effectively maintained law and order (25 per cent of the men and 34 per cent of the women offered no response or were indifferent). Only 13 per cent of men and 14 per cent of women expressed the opinion that village courts were ineffective. When compared to people's attitudes toward the local government council (see chapter three), these figures indicate a very positive response to village courts. Furthermore, at national and provincial committee meetings occasionally held in Chuave, people expressed the opinion that magistrates should be given additional powers of arrest and punishment. Thus, men informed the Constitutional Planning Committee that they wanted magistrates to be better paid, that courts should be given vehicles like the Local Court and police, and that magistrates should be able to impose fines of up to K100.

Yet, even though people praise the concept of village courts, they criticize particular magistrates or individual court settlements. Here I examine the nature of these criticisms and the extent to which court officials abuse their power. I detail the extent to which magistrates behave in accordance with people's expectations of the magistrates'
role and with the instructions set down by the village court manual or Local Court.

Although, by law, a lone magistrate lacks the authority to adjudicate in village settings, both litigants and magistrates accept the men's house court as an extension of the more formal village court. People grant a magistrate this power because they continue to emphasize traditional methods of dispute settlement and because magistrates encourage the belief that they receive better treatment in the village forum. In cases C and D magistrates explicitly forewarned disputants that the village court would impose harsher settlements than their own. Gorai's appeal was successful in effecting a reduction of her settlement only because the court officials feared a reprimand from the Local Court Magistrate. Almost all contested decisions are either upheld or result in more severe penalties because the magistrates believe that the appeal itself undermines their authority in the village. In Kaupa's case, Martin warned people that his authority was limited in village court where he could not hear his kinsmen's disputes. Those people who persisted in opposing his or Dege's decisions would risk severe punishment. Of course Martin did, in fact, hear Kaupa's case; by approaching magistrates before the court, and by using the secrecy of the inside court, he was able to impose heavy fines and thereby ensure that the decisions in the village appeared lenient.

Magistrates rarely need to resort to these tactics. By making examples of a few people, their authority to adjudicate is seldom questioned. Most inside courts, therefore, are neutral and magistrates refrain from any involvement in their kinsmen's disputes. This is particularly noticeable in cases brought immediately to village court because no prior decisions are at question. As previously noted, only about one-fifth of cases heard in the village and at village court are appeals. More commonly these dual courts involve troublesome disputes or disputes in which people could accuse magistrates of bias. Hence, the magistrate refers the case to village court, thereby absolving himself from responsibility. Unfortunately for magistrates, this strategy sometimes leads to accusations that they are unconcerned with protecting their kinsmen, that they are ignoring the root of the dispute, or that they are failing to take into account a person's moral
character. Thus, although the concept of a neutral village court is becoming accepted in Chuave as the best way to settle disputes, it is flawed in its inability to provide sufficient time for lengthy discussions of cases in a manner similar to traditional moots.

Another option officials have is the suspension or cancellation of village court fines. Presiding magistrates clearly believe that fines constitute a final decision and should be paid. But the court gives convicted parties time - as much as three or four months and, occasionally longer - to raise the money. Magistrates are consequently able to ignore kinsmen's fines. The most common rationale for this practice is that a magistrate 'feels sorry' for a person, or believes the court's decision to have been wrong or unduly severe. Because records linking particular orders to fines are not kept properly, it is difficult to estimate overall how often these situations arise. Of 36 Keu cases ending in court fines, however, nine involving a total of 18 people, had lapsed without payment. Magistrates told me that they believed this practice effectively curtailed further breaches of the law; by giving a person a second chance and by making it clear that future offences would be heavily fined, an offender was placed on good behaviour. But this tactic is occasionally a form of political patronage. When an official says that he is 'helping' his kinsmen, his comment may contain the implied threat that failure to obey any future suggestions or instructions will lead to further legal action based on 'disobeying orders'. The threat need not be openly voiced because people realize that officials remember the details of countless cases. When the village court elections drew near, for example, Dege simply reminded several Kaupagam men that they had outstanding fines. All these men, except one, turned out to vote for Dege and several admitted later that they feared retribution if they did not vote for him. Dege later learned that Yogo, a Mamgram man, had cast his vote for a Tabiagara opponent. Dege then used his final days in office to summons Yogo to court for failing to pay a K5 fine, outstanding for four months. A peace officer arrested Yogo and magistrates fined him K40 for disobeying orders and, because he was unable to pay immediately, sentenced him to four weeks community work. Although Yogo believed he had been mistreated, few men questioned Dege's right to seek revenge. On the surface, of course, Dege was acting within his authority: Yogo had disobeyed a court order, and, as Dege had never
stated the matter was concluded, further punishment was legitimate. Men understood that Dege had 'turned' the law in this case and that the matter could have been forgotten.

Such actions remind people of the options available to magistrates and the potential risks people take when they do not grant court officials the necessary degree of respect and support they desire in everyday affairs. Explicit demonstrations of power, based on the control of legal sanctions, are usually unnecessary and seldom articulated by people when referring to an official's authority. When I asked why Dege and Martin dominated men's house discussions or why they were better able than other leaders to mobilize men or organize ceremonies and exchanges, few people mentioned their positions as magistrates. Both men, people said, were wise, good orators and, as a result, were now 'government'. Yet everyone agreed that Dege, in particular, had more influence now that he was a magistrate than he had had as a komiti; a few men specifically mentioned that Dege or Martin might remember any open show of disrespect or disobedience, and that this would harm their chances in court cases. The possibility was always voiced retrospectively. Thus, men tried to remember how they might have offended a magistrate in order to account for what they believed to be unfair treatment in a recent court case.

People realize that court officials respond to specific challenges to their authority by using the legal sanctions at their disposal, and that the threat of sanctions serves as a constant backdrop to all personal dealings with these leaders. Open assaults on a magistrate's reputation or on particular court cases, therefore, are rare. Only the most flagrant violations of an official's responsibilities to the clan or community lead to immediate retribution by villagers. More common are indirect criticisms by way of rumour, gossip and slander, which councillors and other rivals use to damage the reputation of particular magistrates.

Bias is acknowledged as a principal fault of the village court and of particular magistrates. The allegation that magistrates render one-sided verdicts (wokim wansait kot) is most commonly heard in inter-clan disputes when a magistrate participates in hearings involving his own clansmen. In such cases, magistrates, foreseeing
that non-agnates will accuse them of bias, often attempt to work in tandem with peace officers or big men of other clans, thereby sharing responsibility for decisions (see M. Strathern 1972b: 97-99, for similarities under the councillor-komiti system). When their own lineage or subclan is directly or indirectly involved, magistrates may ask a 'hidden' komiti whom they have appointed (without administration approval) to hear the dispute. Magistrates select these komiti from minor big men of other lineages and subclans. Despite these attempts to demonstrate neutrality, however, magistrates can seldom avoid the accusation that courts are one-sided. This complaint, like accusations that councillors aid their kinsmen or wantoks, entails a double-bind for magistrates. Thus, even when onlookers believe a decision is good or just, the litigants themselves can often claim the settlement was one-sided because of countless indirect or direct relationships of friendship or kinship a magistrate has with the parties involved. Moreover, because people expect magistrates to help their kinsmen, verdicts are always problematic for these officials. A decision against the magistrate's lineage, subclan or clan 'brother' can result in claims that the magistrate has forgotten his obligations or responsibilities to kin. Conversely a decision for kinsmen also may lead to the accusation of a biased court by members of opposed groups in the segmentary social structure of the clan. Criticism, therefore, is possible in almost any case where a magistrate resorts to adjudication. Magistrates fully realize this fundamental dilemma and accept the criticism as unavoidable.

There are occasional complaints about officials who too quickly resort to using violence or coercion. The separation of duties within the court allows magistrates to disassociate themselves from the use of physical violence. Thus magistrates tolerate, and sometimes encourage, beatings or physical intimidation by peace officers at village and men's house courts. Youths in particular are often punished physically as part and parcel of their treatment, and onlookers to disputes accept this. However, when peace officers constantly resort to aggression outside of court settings, the public, through verbal complaints and threats of physical assault on peace officers, forces magistrates to take action to restrain them and sometimes remove them from office. The local council, on the advice of councillors and magistrates, dismissed five peace officers following
villagers' persistent complaints that the men had acted like *kiaps* and were 'bigheads' who too often beat or struck people during or after court cases. Each dismissal followed severe physical punishment of adults in particular court cases. Many *polis* have ambitions to become magistrates. By hearing disputes in the village or *kros kot* they can gain reputations as skilled mediators or adjudicators. Few *polis*, therefore, are willing to risk their positions and most are careful to obey the instructions of magistrates; consequently peace officers temper their aggression or resort to violence only when cued by magistrates.

In theory, the Supervising Magistrate may dismiss magistrates after a council recommendation. In Chuave, however, councillors have never exercised this option, though the finance committee had discussed the dismissal of particular magistrates following complaints from villagers. Both magistrates and councillors believe that magistrates are responsible only to the Local Court Magistrate, who stated that absolute proof of gross misconduct was necessary before any dismissal could occur. Since the implementation of village courts, only three magistrates have been dismissed (excluding Martin); they all were involved in the same offence - the rape of a woman who had been convicted in village court for assaulting her husband with a knife.

In this case magistrates used their position to threaten the women with a lengthy jail sentence. After convicting the woman in the village court, the men took her to Chuave and told her she would be jailed for six months to a year. In Chuave, they briefly spoke to the police and then informed the woman that they had persuaded the police to forget the matter. In return for their aid, they suggested that the woman should let them 'hold her skin', that is, have sexual intercourse. They then took her back to the magistrates' own area where after constant verbal coercion, they raped her several times. They then told her to leave her husband's clan and return to her father's village.

However, people saw the magistrates on their return from Chuave and the woman's husband, James, was informed. The next day, James travelled to his affines' village, retrieved his wife and returned to
his clan where he informed his kinsmen of the rape. When two of the three magistrates appeared at village court two days later, James and several of his kinsmen immediately ambushed and assaulted them before peace officers could intervene. Peace officers arrested James and both magistrates and took them to Chuave where the Local Court Magistrate jailed the magistrates but released James on bail. The third magistrate involved surrendered to police at Chuave following two days of tense negotiation with the chairman of the village court. During this time, several clans mobilized for battle; the clans of the accused magistrates threatening retaliation against other court officials for the arrests, and James's clan along with two others, threatening vengeance on the third magistrate. The case was heard in Local Court where the presiding Magistrate reprimanded James for assault, but found him not guilty and released him. Two magistrates received jail sentences of six months, and the third nine months. Extreme cases of physical violence or coercion are, therefore, rare, and where they occur, are not tolerated by villagers.

Other complaints concern the use of court offices for personal economic gain. Old men, for example, argue that magistrates turn a blind eye to raskols and sometimes accept protection money from gangs. After the theft of cargo from trucks on the Highlands Highway, or the robbery of western and eastern highlands coffee buyers, magistrates and other leaders may receive a share of the booty in return for not taking legal action. Though this practice is punishable by administrative law as receiving stolen goods, few villagers consider it to be an abuse of power. People regard the thefts as 'fair play' against outsiders and take action only when the theft occurs within theeria or when 'friendly' groups are involved.\(^\text{12}\) Magistrates go to great lengths to find and punish raskols when thefts of store goods or coffee occur locally. In thefts in which the aggrieved parties membership is somewhat equivocal, magistrates feel obliged to protect their eria's reputation. Thus, when Duma rascals robbed Elimbari and Sinasina coffee buyers, magistrates obtained money from local business men to repay the stolen money, but made no serious attempt to locate or punish the raskols involved.

Another common complaint concerns the extortion of money by magistrates (Hatanaka 1972; M. Strathern 1972b; cf. Westermark 1978).
People have occasionally informed village court magistrates that an official has threatened to summons them to court for a dispute, and then he has extracted small sums of money - between K2 and K10 - ostensibly as a fine and allowed the matter to be forgotten. All these cases have involved non-agnates of the official who has then had to pay compensation to the disputants and has been fined by the court for 'disobeying orders'. Villagers, however, often regard small payments to magistrates as pay for their aid in settling disputes. Particularly troublesome cases may end with the gift of small amounts of money to magistrates, or a portion of the compensation payment being allocated for the magistrates' 'hard work'. The payment may also be to 'buy the legs' of the magistrates: the gift is equivalent to traditional payments to kinsmen in small ceremonies or exchanges between affines. Magistrates or peace officers are able to say therefore, that they understood the money to be a gift for services and plead not guilty to the charge of extortion. All those cases ending in the punishment of officials by the village court have been in response to specific claims of verbal or physical coercion or threats.

The theft of court fines is a constant topic of village rumour. Small fines awarded by the men's house court often do not reach the village court, and if they do, the clerk does not usually record them. Even inside court fines sometimes go unrecorded, and villagers seldom receive receipts. For villagers a receipt is no more than a piece of paper that is discarded or is shown to kinsmen as proof of particular court cases. Few people know that they have the right to demand receipts, or that giving receipts should be a part of every court decision ending in fines. Indeed, when I explained this to educated men and women, they were surprised and some began to demand receipts for their kinsmen in order to ensure that magistrates did not steal (Pidgin: kaikai, 'eat') court fines. More often, however, they did not request receipts and subsequently used this information to support allegations that magistrates stole court money.

The council is responsible for the collection of fine money which forms part of the council's revenue. The council clerk or DOIC takes stock of all village courts about once every six months. The court's receipt book is checked and the magistrates must pay any outstanding sum. The court chairman, clerk, and other magistrates usually
distribute the money amongst themselves, and when the court money is
down at stocktaking, magistrates simply postpone payment by saying that
they left the money in their villages, and then quickly raise the
required sum to be taken to the council. At one stocktaking in Chuave,
four of eleven village courts had to raise between K100 and K220 within
two weeks in order to balance their books. Failing this, the council
clerk deducts a portion of the magistrates' salary. Fines for which
no receipts are given are unverifiable as no record is kept which
correlates the court's order books with the receipt book - though, in
theory, this should be done.

The degree of theft is difficult to judge. Because magistrates
fail to record fines, a few courts actually contributed to the council
amounts greater than their receipt book tally. Moreover, magistrates
frequently complain that the council clerk does not give them receipts,
and that the theft takes place at the council level. There is also
evidence for this accusation; in at least three cases, council clerks
have failed to give receipts for money totalling over K700.
Nonetheless, magistrates sometimes openly use small court fines, those
amounting to less than K5, to purchase food and soft drinks on village
court days.

Magistrates also believe they are poorly paid and say that
occasional misappropriation of funds is no more than payment for their
hard work. Nonetheless, poor supervision and laxity in court procedure
ensure that the potential for theft is enormous. Several magistrates
estimated their personal gain from court fines to be between K70 and
K100 in one year, and I have little doubt that particular magistrates
abuse the court system to obtain much greater sums of money.
Magistrates use this money to gamble or maintain a higher than average
standard of living. I found no evidence that their kinsmen or core
following directly shared court funds. Nevertheless, court officials' access
to fines, coupled with their salaries, provides them with
greater financial resources than other people. This income, moreover,
in addition to coffee incomes, allows magistrates to maintain a high
profile as wealthy men, and more easily enables them to contribute cash
or beer to kinsmen's ceremonies.

People seldom accuse court officials directly of theft. In
private, however, they often describe the court as a 'bank' or a 'store', and the phrase baim kot (literally, to buy a court) long used to describe the payment of court fines or compensation now has a sarcastic connotation for villagers. Even though the offence presents councillors with the opportunity to dismiss from office men who have become their principal rivals, they turn a blind eye to theft; in part because when accused magistrates vehemently deny any theft or misappropriation of court money, and in part because the offence is virtually unprovable. But payments to officials for their services in settling disputes is not without precedent: both councillors and luluais received money in the past. Councillors and others accept that court officials have special access to money. While some segments of the population - songons or fervent Christians, for example - may see the theft of money as immoral, others accept the use of court money for personal gain as one of the several perks of office that these government leaders enjoy. Thus, even though men use the accusation of theft to damage a magistrate's reputation, they often admit that, given the same opportunities, they would do likewise.

The magistrates' power is immense and the fear of court sanctions certainly explains a large part of the influence these leaders have in dominating everyday affairs at the local level. It is not surprising, therefore, that by both community standards and the regulations of their office, magistrates abuse their power. Yet villagers rarely attempt to constrain the actions of magistrates and react to only the most serious abuses by openly confronting officials. I know of only one Duma man who complained to the Local Court Magistrate that officials were stealing court funds, and only a few men approached the DOIC or Local Court to complain about other misbehaviours that villagers constantly criticized. The power of these officials is based on people's respect for the law. Also magistrates enforce the law in accordance with community standards, and actually protect community members from the law. In return for this leniency and protection, magistrates are accorded great freedom of action. People realize that any dispute, particularly a violent one which is dangerous to long term interpersonal or interclan relationships, is subject to punishment by magistrates. Every serious breach of peace results in a discussion on the need for peaceful co-operation and in
a lecture by magistrates on the nature of the law. But magistrates also turn a blind eye to many offences and even allow violent disputes to lapse without legal action. Failure to punish disputants, therefore, may enhance the reputation of court officials because, by submitting to community expectations, the magistrate emphasizes his commitment to kinsmen at the expense of his official duties. One final case study illustrates the lengths to which magistrates go in order to protect kinsmen from the law.

Case E

When Andrew (see Case C) returned from Port Moresby, he heard rumours that his brother, Peter, had been having sexual intercourse with Sesse, Andrew's wife, under the guise of 'protecting' her. After verifying this, Andrew waited several days for an appropriate moment to confront Peter. One evening when Peter was drunk, Andrew confronted him saying that if Peter had money to buy beer, why had he not yet repaid Andrew's K10 loan. Andrew then attacked Peter.

Peter broke free, obtained an axe from the men's house and chased Andrew threatening to kill him. After Andrew sought refuge at Mamgram, Peter contented himself with axing the door of Sesse's house. When Andrew was sure Peter had gone, he returned to the house to get his bow and arrows. He then shouted that Peter had tried to kill him and waited near the door of the house. After several minutes, Peter again returned and started to axe the door of the house. Andrew then shot him in the abdomen. Andrew called to his kinsmen saying he had killed his brother. Peter was rushed to Chuave by car where he was taken by police vehicle to the Kundiawa hospital. He recovered from his wound and returned to the village after several months in the hospital.

In the days following the assault the police, the Local Court Magistrate, and village court associates pressured Martin to take immediate action against Andrew. Keu villagers, however, considered the matter settled: by committing adultery with Andrew's wife, Peter was guilty of a heinous crime that had been avenged by Andrew's attack. Keukobu men threatened to resist any police arrest of Andrew. After days of negotiation at village court, Martin succeeded in convincing his fellow magistrates that he would settle the matter in the men's house. He told the Local Court that he would keep close watch on Andrew, bring him to Chuave in the event of Peter's death, and have the matter heard in village court.

Martin alone presided over the men's house court heard when Peter returned to the village. The court concentrated only on Peter's drunkenness, the initial quarrel over money and the subsequent threats and attack. There was no mention of adultery and Sesse did not attend the court. Such tacit agreement to ignore the true cause of the case was predetermined by the severity of the sexual offence and the great shame it would bring to all parties if publicly discussed. Peter was severely admonished for his threatening behaviour. Because Andrew had
taken the law into his own hands, however, he was fined K10, and Peter was awarded a small pig as compensation for his injuries.

Immediately, after the assault, however, Martin had told me that he would jail or heavily fine Andrew. He believed that Peter's assault was never serious, and that, from the beginning, Andrew had used the occasion to seek revenge. It later became apparent, however, that any severe punishment of Andrew would damage Martin's reputation as a Komodorumo leader. Although he saw his decision as a token gesture to the principle of law and order, Keu men widely acclaimed him for his handling of the case. Other Duma men, however, criticized his decision, believing he had ruined the name of the law, and that this case would encourage others to resort to violence.

This case and the public pressure brought to bear on the magistrate are exceptional. I would argue, however, that every dispute that comes to the attention of magistrates confronts these leaders with difficult choices between their commitments to the duties of their office and their responsibilities to members of their own clan and community. The magistrate's role, therefore, more than any other leader's, is a difficult and dangerous one. Failure to punish lawbreakers or to uphold the principle of law and order can be criticized, used to damage a magistrate's reputation and inevitably lead to his removal from office. But too stringent a commitment to law and order may lead to the alienation of kinsmen and, hence, to political downfall. I would suggest that, although the choice between these two commitments is difficult, most magistrates are respected because they attempt to adjust their decisions to the consensus of their clan and community, ignore a wide range of minor offences, and resort to harsh sanctions only when their responsibilities as government leaders make this unavoidable. Because they are caught between these conflicting commitments, magistrates are criticized for failing to meet people's expectations, even while they attempt to define the nature of the law to suit community standards.

Law, politics and the balance of power

There are indications that the existence of village courts will produce a shift in the institutional locus of gavmen from the council to village court erias. Village courts are already political, as well as legal, institutions. They are a natural meeting place for discussions by songons, councillors, and magistrates concerned with eria development. Because magistrates may order fines for
transgressions of council laws, they have already succeeded in taking responsibility for the collection of taxes on an eria basis and have attempted unsuccessfully to gain a share in the decision-making process that allocates how this tax money should be spent. Magistrates, moreover, want to control the licensing of businesses and constantly argue that eria councils, similar to those in Kainantu, should be created. In 1980 a few councillors presented motions to the council to create eria councils. These propositions were opposed by the DOIC advisor and most councillors as ill-planned and financially unfeasible. Councillors, moreover, are hesitant to consider any plan that might further erode their authority at the village level. They believe that a committee of elected councillors should control any eria government, and that magistrates should necessarily be excluded from any decision-making body.

That councillors, magistrates and provincial politicians have seriously considered such a proposal indicates the enormous influence that village courts have had in shaping people's conception of the eria as a political unit. Village court officials are drawn from different clans— in some cases, different tribes— and law and order has become an eria concern. Each village court decision necessitates that people accept the authority of magistrates who belong to foreign clans and these leaders, more than any others, easily establish reputations and become recognized throughout the eria. The potential significance of the village court as a political institution, however, is as yet uncertain. Like the village court, the introduction of councils was greeted with great enthusiasm. But this latter institution quickly faltered as it failed to meet people's unrealistic expectations. Given the competition between councillors and magistrates, moreover, there is little hope for a co-ordinated effort to establish such a new form of government. The desire for eria councils, and the significance of the eria as a development or political unit, therefore, may prove to be transitory.

A more obvious shift in the balance of power, however, has already occurred. Councillors have seen their authority as government leaders not only contested but also supplanted by village court magistrates; in many cases by men who were formerly komitis and subordinate to councillors in the village. On the surface this shift in authority
seems to indicate that councillors grossly underestimated the use of sanctions or the control of kots as a source of their own power. But no one was able to predict the influence magistrates would come to exert. Magistrates themselves stated that they first envisioned their positions as recognized dispute settlers responsible to councillors - as a komiti with an official badge and government salary. The development of the court as a legal institution and the evolution of the magistrates' authority came after the selection of court officials as magistrates discovered the codified powers at their disposal, as they saw their decisions upheld and their powers supported by the DOIC and Local Court Magistrate, and as they took it upon themselves to construct, in many cases without administration approval, the buildings that would become the vilis kot. The magistrates' authority is omnipresent - it is a rare day when these officials are not called on to hear one or more disputes in their community. Magistrates' decisions deal with issues which are critical to personal and inter-personal rights and goals. The councillor's participation in monthly meetings, and his occasional control over resources are, by comparison, less significant.

The magistrates' reliance on village court sanctions is not easily compared to the previous use of sanctions by the luluai or councillor, nor do people usually compare these different stages of legal authority or history. When pressed, people simply characterize the village court as harsh in comparison to the councillors' court and add, by mentioning the village court book, that the law in now 'true' and 'close' to the people. Undoubtedly, luluais and councillors adjudicated disputes. But it is clear that the sanctions magistrates have at their disposal are far greater than those ever available to councillors, and that the presence of written powers and laws means villagers have accepted a magistrate's right to impose settlements and to fine or jail law breakers - powers formerly restricted to the Local Court. Another comparison concerns the use of physical force which people maintain was synonymous with a luluai's rule. Not surprisingly, people compare some peace officers to the luluais. Although magistrates wield great sanctions, they seldom need to rely on the use of force. When physical intimidation or punishment is deemed necessary, magistrates depend on peace officers to implement force. The physically strong or 'hot' man has, in some sense, become
an institutional role. In keeping with traditional preference, men
who demonstrate good judgement and who balance the two sides of a
dispute are accorded authority as magistrates; they are the true big
men of the court. Consequently, those peace officers who wish to
become magistrates are forced to temper their aggression and
demonstrate more general leadership capabilities in informal courts.

Finally, magistrates must also temper their authority and bow to
public opinion. The true balance of power is to be found in the
constant interaction of magistrates and their followers - be they
members of a particular men's house or an entire community. I have
focused on the strategies magistrates use to show how these leaders
can assert their authority in the face of political competition and
opposition from rivals or kinsmen. In return for submitting to this
authority, however, people force magistrates to adjust their
interpretation and application of village court laws. In the give and
take between leaders and followers, a balance is struck between the
goals and expectations of both magistrates and the public that shapes
the particular brand of law and order at the local level.
Notes

1. He is called the District Supervising Magistrate in the Village Courts Act. In Simbu these officials are based in Kundiawa.

2. The Village Courts Act stipulates only that councillors who are also magistrates are prohibited from hearing cases 'brought by or by authority or direction of a Local Government Council' (Division 7: Section 44). Warren notes that one Kainantu councillor became a village court magistrate when courts were introduced in 1975. However, he soon decided not to stand for re-election as councillor (1976: 3-4).

3. Several councillors maintained that the DOIC or Local Court Magistrate told them that they were ineligible to be magistrates. I was unable to speak to the officials who were present in Chuave when the courts were implemented. All officials who were later stationed in Chuave, however, were aware that the Village Courts Act allowed councillors to be magistrates.

4. Martin's dismissal occurred after I had left Chuave. Before my departure rumours of the dismissal had spread. My description of people's reactions to the dismissal, therefore, are based on conversations with villagers and letters I received from people after returning to Canberra.

5. Newly elected magistrates select court clerks by secret vote.

6. Magistrates often give women community work such as cleaning the school or court grounds in lieu of jail terms. Magistrates believe that community work is shameful for men and, unless there are specific male tasks to be done such as fence building, they prefer to jail men.

7. Within the tribe, land mediators often work closely with magistrates; but magistrates do not hear inter-tribal land disputes.

8. People commonly use fence posts in fighting, but stick fights constitute a higher level of escalation with different weapons. The sticks are actually special poles which are stored in the rafters of the men's houses. They are approximately six to eight metres long, and several centimetres in diameter.

9. In Table 13, I have listed these cases as a single referral according to where the final outcome was determined.

10. In a comparison of African and English lay courts, J. Van Velsen (1969) has shown that, in 'western' and 'tribal' legal systems, procedural flexibility allows the discussion of personal histories or evidence that might normally be considered irrelevant in more formal legal forums.

11. Even when compensation is balanced or when a smaller payment is 'cancelled' by a larger one, both parties must raise the payment which is then given to the magistrates and formally exchanged between parties.

12. For example, raskols around Chuave justified and rationalized their raids on Highway trucks by arguing that 'Australians had insurance on the cargo'.
Occasionally, events arise that highlight political cleavages within a men's house group or community, transform covert political relationships into overt ones and concentrate political processes before the eyes of the observer. Disputes, ceremonies or Kafaina meetings are all such situations—examples of what Victor Turner has aptly called 'social dramas' (1974: 32-36, 42-43; see also Swartz et al 1966: 32-34). Turner notes that the distinguishing feature of a social drama is its temporal structure: it is a sequence of related events or phases that together comprise a processual unit. Different types of dramas, however, vary in scale and in duration.

I witnessed no event when the Simbu passion for 'playing politics' (Pidgin: *pleim politiks*) was more explicit than the first election of the Simbu Provincial Government Assembly in 1980. I have previously used council or village court elections to indicate the degree of support particular leaders can muster or the degree of political competition occurring within clans and wards. But in comparison to these elections or other political events, the provincial election was a dramatic and, for particular men, traumatic event. Furthermore, as one example of a political process the election was exceptional in both scale and duration: it involved, directly or indirectly, the members of an entire census division over the course of many months.

In this chapter I use the election as an extended case study—an example of a drama when political issues and behaviour are most explicit. My aims are comparable to earlier Papua New Guinea election analyses, specifically, with Epstein et al's remarks concerning the use of elections for the study of political change. I analyse psephological data, describe the style of campaigning and detail the issues people believed were important. In short, I show how the existence of local political groups and rivalries colours the election outcome, and I demonstrate how men used the theme of higher government to generate ideas that can have a lasting influence on local political processes.
The Simbu Interim Provincial Government

To a certain extent, the form of government to be elected predetermined the campaign issues. The Simbu Interim Provincial Government (SIPG) was created as part and parcel of the decentralization process occurring throughout Papua New Guinea (see Conyers 1976; Standish 1979a; 1979b). Standish has expertly analysed the SIPG's troubled history, organization and practice (1979a). Here, as a background to the election, I outline local perceptions of this government.

The SIPG Assembly was not an elected body; rather, it evolved from the Chimbu Area Authority, a representative institution first established in 1972, which included two members from each of Simbu's nine councils and MHAs - the latter as ex officio non-voting members. In 1976 the Area Authority established a business arm in order to purchase a portion of a major highlands trucking firm. This year also marked the formal creation of the SIPG, the election of Premier Siwi Kurondo - a Kerowagi councillor, ex-chairman of the Area Authority and ex-Minister for Forests in the third House of Assembly - and the selection of the Secretariat, that is, the administrative wing of the government. In 1977 the Simbu Cabinet was created; Launa Meule, an ex-president of Elimbari Council became Deputy Premier. Formal decentralization of national government powers began in 1978.

Standish's analyses make it clear that ill-planning, financial mismanagement, and a lack of adequately trained administrative officials were all major problems the government confronted. No external agency monitored the SIPG's internal finances or its complex economic arrangements with the national government, both of which were undisclosed to the general public. The province raised about 10 per cent of its revenue locally. Liquor licensing, land taxes, and housing or trucking rentals are all important sources of revenue. The provincial business arm has widespread interests in trucking, real estate and a 40 per cent share in the Chimbu Coffee Co-operative; the latter, a dubious investment made in 1978, nevertheless saved the co-operative from bankruptcy. The SIPG's best known disaster was the loss of K50,000 in an aborted clothing factory scheme. Despite such failures, however, using business ventures to increase revenue is
understandable and commonly practised in other provinces. But villagers by and large reject any government involvement in bisnis. This is natural given the self-interest model of business men espoused at the local level (see chapter four), and the belief that the government should focus all its attention and revenue on local development. Chuave people also naturally assume that government money is stolen by politicians and public servants; failure of government businesses is cited as proof positive that expatriate or indigenous government officials are corrupt.

Villagers may overestimate the SIPG's involvement in the private sector, but they are well aware that most of the government revenue comes from national grants, and that the SIPG controls millions of kina; the 1981 budget, for example, totalled in excess of K4 million. People often fail to understand the cost of maintaining a large bureaucracy, and instead believe that such vast sums of money should easily provide limitless development and prosperity. The failure of the SIPG to maintain all schools or pave all roads, therefore, was proof of the government officials' corruption and incompetence. Complaints that the SIPG spent lavish amounts to 'lift up its own name' by purchasing a fleet of vehicles - each marked with the government's name and used by Assembly members and the public service - were also common in Chuave. But few people questioned the Chuave members' use of vehicles or would have denied them their large salaries or expense accounts - more than K4,000 per year. These were all viewed as legitimate benefits of provincial office. However, these complaints, like others - for example, that members or public servants constantly spent their time drinking rather than working, that government offices were never open, or that Goroka, not Kundiawa, should be the provincial capital because as many as ten provincial vehicles could be seen in the Eastern Highlands province on any given day - were symptomatic of the widespread cynicism towards a government believed to be unconcerned with people's welfare.

More important in people's opinions are promised government projects which are not forthcoming. For example, in 1977 the SIPG made a firm promise to build a lime cement 'factory' at a quarry located in Duma and Mam territories. In fact, foreign consultants studied the feasibility of this project in 1978 at a cost of K60,000 paid by the
National Planning Office (Standish 1981: 9). The Simbu government then purchased the land from local owners, thereby reinforcing people's expectations that the project was imminent. Local enthusiasm for this project, rumoured to be capable of employing hundreds of Chuave men, had waned by 1979 as the project failed to materialize. During the election campaign, SIPG supporters, including incumbent members and the Provincial Planner, an educated youth from Gai tribe, maintained that the factory would be started shortly after the election and publicly stated that K300,000 worth of equipment was on a ship travelling to Papua New Guinea from Australia. Detractors of the SIPG and most villagers considered this 'bullshit', believing rumours that K100,000 to K1 million allocated for the project had been spent on purchasing vehicles and building an airport in the Premier's district, as well as being used to prop up failing government businesses.

Standish has also shown how political infighting and patronage - involving Assembly members, administrative officers and national MHAs - contributed to the government's problems. Here again, however, knowledge of provincial politicians and Kundiawa politics is poor at the rural level. I asked 100 Keu people to identify the names and positions of prominent provincial politicians and administrative officials. Councillors and village court officials, as well as men below the age of 25, recognized most of the names listed. But others were usually only familiar with the names of the Provincial Premier, plus the Chuave and Nambaiyufo members. About one-third of men and 5 per cent of women over the age of 30 correctly identified Provincial Secretary Barunke Kaman and the Speaker, Kuman Dai - both from central Simbu.

Only the most educated and politically involved Chuave men have any real understanding of provincial politics. However, councillors and other big men often make a point of travelling to Kundiawa to learn the latest provincial scandal or rumours which they then pass on, usually in distorted form, to villagers. The central theme addressed by these rumours was that the administration (Pidgin: ol wokman o kuskus: the workmen and clerks) dominated the SIPG. Thus, the people believed that only the Premier had any real power, and that young educated public servants who controlled the government 'paper' dominated the Assembly at large. A corollary of this argument was that
Kuman speakers - in particular, Barunke Kaman - dominated the administration, which favoured central Simbu areas and neglected Chuave development. Both these complaints, I believe, were in some ways justified; regardless of their validity, however, they were politically potent weapons. Moreover, the anti-Kuman and anti-Assembly themes were invariably used to legitimize Chuave claims that, along with neighbouring districts, they should form a separate Bomai province which would exclude central Simbu leaders and thereby assure rural development.

To a great extent, perceptions of the SIPG were the product of the personalities and qualities of the two Chuave and two Nambaiyufa members; Elimbari was not represented in the Assembly. These men, on average 55 years old, had no formal education and were illiterate. All members, however, had extensive government experience: three had been tultuls and luluais in the 1950s; the fourth, the Deputy Premier, had been a government interpreter at this time. The two Nambaiyufa members were both very successful entrepreneurs; in contrast, neither Chuave member had business interests. Although all of these men were well respected as traditional-style big men in their local communities, detractors from areas other than their own often criticized them as being incompetent, as having antiquated ideals and occasionally as being senile. People considered only two members, Launa Meule and Yowie Moses, Nambaiyufa's most renowned politician and ex-MHA for the Chuave Open electorate, to have any influence in the Assembly, and all members to be subservient to the Premier and Provincial Secretary.

In many ways, these members were representative of the SIPG as a whole. Standish's 1976 survey of the Assembly reaffirms the characterization of the average member as being a traditional-style leader, lacking formal education and ill-equipped to deal with the complexities of provincial government (1979a: 56-58; 1979b: 17). In Chuave few men questioned a member's ability to lead other people; rather they argued that members were simply too old to understand government finances, were easily 'tricked' by literate public servants who controlled government paper work and consequently, were unable to fight hard for the area's development. These criticisms, therefore, parallel accusations against councillors who allowed the DOIC or
council clerk to determine council policy. From my discussions with these members, it was clear that all these men felt dismayed or embittered by their treatment by the educated Kundiawa elite.

Overall, therefore, the SIPG was constantly criticized for being a corrupt, ill-managed government. Assembly discussions were called meaningless 'wind talk', which did nothing to disguise the fact that the Premier and public service alone controlled the province. But the Simbu also have an abiding faith in the principle of representative government. Thus, the Simbu government, men argued, was close to the people and, unlike the national government, could respond better to people's requests for development. Many believed the elections would mark the birth of the 'true' and powerful Simbu Assembly. All that was required, therefore, was for people to think seriously about their choice of a candidate and select a strong member - a man who would fight hard for the electorate and not allow himself to be dominated by the administration or other politicians.

The 'steal campaign'

According to the Simbu constitution, the elections were to be held by August 1979. The Department of Decentralization, however, granted a SIPG request for a postponement of up to one year from this date. Consequently, throughout late 1979, the elections rarely figured in men's house or other public discussions. Two rumours circulated at this time: the Premier and Provincial Secretary were delaying the elections to 'turn the paper', that is, to cover up past financial malpractice; and incumbent members, fearing defeat, were using the delay to steal government money.

Within Duma, only Martin and Kopon were definite candidates as early as 1979, though people considered several other men, including Stephen (Tiene Maima's son), Andrew (a Komogam peace officer), and Dege as likely candidates. During 1979 Kopon, Martin and recognized candidates from other tribes made monthly trips to Pangu Party headquarters in Kundiawa. Even though Pangu was the only party actively preparing for the election at this time, its operations were totally disorganized and its meetings dominated by grand schemes such as renting helicopters to drop campaign leaflets, and requesting large
suras of money (K10,000 to K25,000) from national headquarters. This only fuelled potential candidates' expectations that Pangu affiliation would result in lavish financial support, and that the campaign would be conducted with flair and elan comparable to a national election (see Standish, in press). Both expectations would eventually prove illusory.

In January 1982, following the quiescence in government activity which occurs over the Christmas-New Year period, election campaigning became a regular, if subdued, feature of rural life. Men announced their candidacy, campaigned covertly by criticizing their rivals or the provincial government and adjusted their behaviour to meet the electorates' expectations. The first phase of this election drama, the stil kampein (steal campaign), had begun. The 'true campaign' with its formal speechmaking and appeals for support would begin only after candidates had paid their K50 nomination fee, the 'bet' in Pidgin. Official nominations, however, did not open until April 12, so the stil campaign lasted several months.

This campaign period coincided with several important events which later became election issues. In January a war between Kebai and Sinasina clans erupted along the Chuave border. It was sparked by the killing of a Sinasina big man during a death compensation payment. This had been attended by the Duman (Sinasina) and Kebai Meri clans, as well as tribal leaders, including village court officials and the Deputy Premier. The confrontation, initially limited to these two groups, escalated to include seven Sinasina and six Kebai clans. Despite persistent attempts by provincial politicians and public servants to end the war, fighting continued intermittently for six months, leaving seven Sinasina and five Kebai dead and many others injured. In addition, countless gardens and over 1,000 coffee trees were ruined; 200 houses, six tradestores and a church were destroyed, and a tavern and community school severely damaged. When a few Chuave and Elimbari men joined their Kebai kinsmen in the fight, rumours spread that any Chuave man seen on the Highlands Highway or in Kundiawa would be killed and that a Sinasina 'hit list' of Chuave big men existed. These effectively stopped all Chuave traffic to Kundiawa for several weeks, after which men ignored the rumours and resumed their journeys to the capital without incident. Yet the war had thrust the
issue of law and order into the centre of the campaign: candidates promised they would initiate a system of rural police posts or increase village court powers, and called for a return of the State of Emergency (see also Brown 1982: 538; Standish 1981). In Duma Martin made this issue the keystone of his campaign, arguing that he alone understood the law, and could forcefully argue in the Assembly for increased village court funding and powers.

In February two other important events occurred. First, Gola Ungan died in a road accident. He was a Sinasina candidate who had led demonstrations in Kundiawa calling for immediate elections, charged the SIPG with corruption and purported to have documented evidence of the government's financial mismanagement. Chuave people believed a rumour that the SIPG leaders had paid a PMV driver K3,000 to assassinate Gola by crashing into his stationary vehicle. Gola's death proved to them that SIPG corruption was rampant. Second, as I have previously noted in chapter four, the SIPG raised coffee buying licence fees without consulting councils or local business men. This led to a large demonstration in Chuave, renewing calls for the creation of Bomai province. Three entrepreneurs used the demonstration as a forum to announce their candidacies, and the promise to end government involvement in any business enterprise became integral to several other candidates' campaigns.

Another event worthy of special note was the overthrow in March 1980 of Michael Somare, the Prime Minister and Pangu leader, by Julius Chan (People's Progress Party) who along with Iambakey Okuk, the National Party leader and MHA for Simbu province, formed a new coalition government. To Chuave people, Somare is both the 'first man' and 'first father' of Papua New Guinea. Some old men claim that Somare's father, a policeman, had patrolled the highlands with Jim Taylor and married a Gomia women. Although Somare is rarely said to be the child of this marriage, his father's association with Taylor and men's claims to a fictive or mythical kinship relationship indicate that Somare himself is synonymous with government, and that they believe they have a vested interest in his welfare. Somare's name is also synonymous with Pangu and his overthrow was, to say the least, a traumatic episode for many villagers. Early rumours of a coup, Somare's murder, and immediate national elections quickly died as big
men sought additional information from myself and other educated men. Fundamentalist Christians rapidly incorporated this event into the body of revelatory signs to prove that the total disintegration of government and the Second Coming were both imminent.

As rumour gave way to reason and to an understanding of the stability of the new government, supporters of Iambakey Okuk, now Deputy Prime Minister, became more vocal, arguing that the change in government would favour highlanders, and that Okuk would soon replace Prime Minister Chan. Although in the minority, they alleged that provincial government abuses had occurred under the Somare-Pangu regime and that the new Simbu Assembly, with Okuk's aid, would be a truly forceful body. In Chuave Okuk, like Somare, is the epitome of an astute, influential politician. Moreover, criticisms levelled against Okuk - that he is self-interested and 'hungry for power' or has used government funds to start his own businesses - are more than compensated for by the fact that he is, above all else, a Simbu man who fights for regional interests. Arguments that both Somare and Okuk or their respective parties are responsible for development or for having brought independence to Papua New Guinea are seldom seen as contradictory.

Consequently, party affiliation became a major election issue. Martin and Kopon remained loyal to Somare and 'Somare's line'. But other candidates showed no hesitation in switching allegiance from Pangu to the National Party. Conflicting signals were also common: several candidates used the standard National Party campaign poster, which made no reference to the NP label, yet they actively campaigned as Pangu members. Others claimed they were official members of two parties. Tabia Maima, an Ei candidate, said he belonged to both PPP and Pangu; his Ei rival, Unagi, stated he was both a Pangu and National Party member. Candidates themselves, though, chose their political party. Pangu was the only party which attempted to preselect key candidates, a move that failed for lack of adequate organization.

Party affiliation did not signal any difference in policy or platform. Rather, candidates used party choice to make vague allusions to what was 'good' or 'bad' government, to state they were supporters of the national government or its opposition, or to capitalize on the
personality cults of the major national leaders. Several candidates, particularly the Pangu men, referred to an idea that the Assembly would be formed on a party basis, argued that Pangu would have a clear majority, and stated that they would more easily obtain Cabinet positions or be elected premier. To some voters, this was a persuasive argument, but by and large the possibility of the provincial government dividing on party lines was not understood. Moreover, in each electorate, several candidates stood as Independents. This not only freed them from having to align themselves with Okuk's or Somare's actions, but also allowed them to claim that the bane of Papua New Guinea government was party politics itself, and to suggest that the Assembly would be a party-free body working for all people, and not for particular districts or factions.

As I have previously noted, people recognize that opposed descent groups often vote en bloc for their own candidate (see also Parker 1971: 315-316). By mid February, when the rumour that nominations would open in April was verified, candidates had an excellent working knowledge of the number of candidates in other clans and tribes. Duma men estimated that a mere 600 to 800 votes would be necessary to win because of the fragmentation of votes in other areas - a prediction that proved to be sound. I was constantly besieged at this time by candidates seeking population figures for all the area's tribes. As Duma was second in numerical strength only to Kamara, where supposedly ten candidates were standing, Kopon and Martin saw their chances as excellent. But in late February, two other Duma men, somewhat unexpectedly, announced their intentions to run. One was Michael Girimai, Martin's cousin, who had long been viewed as a possible candidate. Martin, however, had frequently and publicly denounced Michael's candidacy, arguing that he and Michael were 'true' brothers and that because Michael had been absent from the province for more than six months he was ineligible to stand. Even Michael accepted this last and fallacious argument.³ A bankmaster working in the Eastern Highlands province, Michael had resigned his position in December 1979 to return to Keu in the hope that the election would be delayed until June 1980. He told people that even if he could not stand in the election he had permanently retired and wanted only to help the Duma area, often stressing the need for community projects involving young school leavers. Thirty-three years old, he was
slightly younger than Martin and, by Duma standards, very well-educated, as he was among the first Duma men to complete high school. After an additional two years of technical training, he had served four years in the army and another eight in clerical jobs. In February, when the DOIC assured him that he was eligible to stand regardless of the timing of the elections, Michael began a vigorous stil kempein, often giving cigarettes and beer to men throughout the Duma area, even as he informed them of his candidacy. Martin waited until after the formal nominations before appealing to the Electoral Commission in Kundiawa, only to be told that there was nothing he could do to prevent Michael's candidacy.

The fourth Duma candidate was Joseph Dama, a Kaupagam, who like Michael had never stood for public office. Dama was a well-respected man, whose entrepreneurial skill and success in the early and mid-1970s had been rivalled only by those of Tiene Maima (see chapter four). Dama's recent bisnis losses, however, had only affirmed his reputation as an impulsive and, to some people, eccentric individual. In 1980 his business was on the verge of collapse, and Dama admitted uncertainty as to whether he could pay his debts of over K1,000. There was much debate surrounding the reason for Dama's problems, but all agreed that his financial decline had begun about 1976, when he became infatuated with an eastern highlands woman, and sought to marry her. Dama admitted to having given large sums of money to his future affines, and to having gone 'crazy' and thrown literally hundreds of kina from his car in grief after the woman refused to marry him. Many Kaupagam believed Dama to be the victim of a witchcraft attack, and Dama's eccentricities - his impulsive decisions to travel to Lae, his explosive temper (often directed at the first of his two wives), or his amiability when cajoled by Korowa men into buying beer for all-night drinking parties - only affirmed this belief. None of these characteristics, however, detracted from Dama's reputation as a good man whose generosity was unquestionable.

The news that four Duma candidates were standing - all Keu village residents and members of the same subtribe - resulted in big men and other concerned voters attempting to preselect a single candidate in order to prevent the fragmentation of Duma votes and so ensure election victory. This tactic dates to the earliest elections in Simbu and
elsewhere in the highlands (cf. Criper 1964: 132-133; Hatanaka 1970: 40; Reay 1964: 167-169). If national elections are any indication, however, it is becoming increasingly difficult to prevent the fragmentation of votes within different groups; each successive national election in Chuave has had a greater number of candidates than the one before. In comparison to the 1964 elections when only four men nominated for the Chuave open electorate, in 1982, 24 candidates stood (see also Hatanaka 1970).^4

The 1980 preselection movement was initially sparked by a rumour that Pangu would send a committee to rural areas to seek information on preferred candidates. When this did not eventuate, big men from within Duma took it upon themselves to approach the candidates and attempt to arrange a preselection meeting. All four men agreed in principle to this idea, but were noticeably absent when the meetings occurred. Michael then purchased several cartons of beer, and invited the other candidates to Dama's house to discuss the preselection idea. But he was unable to persuade any of the candidates to withdraw and, in the end, the men agreed only to run a 'clean campaign', free of defamation, and to 'play cards', that is, allow voters to choose between them. Martin, Kopon and Dama all agreed they would stand as Pangu; Michael stated he would run as an Independent.

The proponents of preselection remained undeterred by the candidates' agreement. In March Yowie Moses of Nambaiyufa held a feast in honour of his impending nomination and victory, and summoned Duma leaders to this event, where they delivered speeches on Yowie's behalf, arguing that no other Nambaiyufa man should contest the elections. Yowie's tribesmen reiterated this sentiment. They stressed Yowie's long-term government service, and publicly informed the 'king' that he would be his tribe's sole candidate. This meeting rekindled Duma men's hopes for a single candidate; they insisted Yowie had shown 'all Duma' the proper way to play politics and scheduled another preselection meeting. A week after Yowie's feast, about forty Duma men assembled at Keu. This time all four candidates attended the meeting. Because of men's inability to confront publicly or to favour particular candidates, and the candidates' intransigent belief that they could win the election in the face of competition, the meeting was
destined to fail. Although each candidate realized his own chances would be immensely enhanced by the withdrawal of one or more opponents, none could withdraw without losing face. The fact that the candidates were all 'brothers' only complicated the situation, for the election had become a matter of relative status within the village, as well as within Duma. No candidate, therefore, could afford to admit to being inferior to his village rivals. Consequently the discussion at this meeting focussed on the idea that voters themselves would have to seek consensus in selecting a single candidate as the following speech by one of Martin's supporters, an educated Keu man shows.

Listen, this election is not about cutting pig. It is not about blood and family or wantoks. All the power belongs to the province now. It is made in Simbu now. The government cuts the money, the national government money, and distributes it to all the districts. They make us strong.

Now we are talking. Four men are standing up - three are Pangu and Michael - he is an Independent. You understand? He does not belong to a party. We know what Martin will do in this house [Assembly]; we do not know what Michael will do. We men who vote have to decide. When we go to the table [polling booth], you have to think well about who will bring work to this district. If you tell a man to withdraw - that is like defamation: he can turn around and take you to court. This is a free country. A man who wants to bet can bet. We people, all people, have the power when we vote.

Moreover, the speaker suggests that to tell a man to withdraw is tantamount to abandoning the principle of democracy.

In the stil campaign there was great variation in the amount of time candidates spent on canvassing support. Within Duma, Dama showed the greatest reluctance to solicit people's support, and simply contented himself with making people familiar with his candidacy and promising to work diligently on their behalf. But all candidates adjusted their behaviour to meet the electors' expectations. The most obvious modification was the assumption of a Christian outlook. To villagers, being a good Christian not only implies that a person is honest and moral but also, in the election context, that a person is prepared to work on behalf of all people and will not damage the government's reputation. Seventh Day Adventists and other fundamentalist Christians, who neither drink alcohol nor smoke, are
considered the epitome of responsible men; coffee companies and councils often hire them because, unlike others, they can be trusted with large sums of money. It is not surprising, therefore, that throughout Chuave many candidates abstained from smoking, drinking alcohol and card playing during the stil campaign. Some even took to carrying Bibles wherever they travelled.

In Duma all four candidates began to attend Lutheran services regularly, made a point of taking communion and confession, and with the aid of literate Christians, began to make references to biblical passages in their conversations with others. Michael, the only Duma candidate to abstain from alcohol, often used the fundamentalist Pidgin phrase, bel i kirap bek (to be reborn), as a rationale for this change. Martin and Kopon took a very pro-Lutheran stance at this time, attending weekly songon meetings and offering the use of their men's houses for these affairs on two separate occasions. In addition, they often criticized young members of the Four Square mission for their immoral behaviour, calling the building a 'courting house' where adolescents used the cover of Christianity to arrange illicit sexual rendezvous. Dama's new-found Christianity was perhaps the most blatant and uncharacteristic response, for he had rarely attended church services in the past, and songons had ostracized him because he was polygamous. Nonetheless, he made a point of saying he had found God, and that he did not wish to campaign or make election promises because he considered this sinful behaviour.

As early as 1979, Martin admitted to me that he had attempted to solicit the support of key groups he considered important for an election victory by favouring them in village court decisions. In particular, he wooed the Gomia men's house groups occasionally attending the Duma court, and the two most isolated Duma clans. During the steal campaign, however, he began to disentangle himself from village court affairs and, by March, formally announced his resignation as magistrate until the election was over. In fact, Martin continued to exercise considerable influence over village court decisions, but the resignation enabled him to distance himself from allegations that the court was biased, and to prevent alienating particular voters through decisions rendered prior to the voting. In marked contrast, both Michael and Kopon began to appear regularly at the court, using
court days not only to talk politics to men from Duma, Ei and Gomia tribes, but also to act occasionally as mediators in the 'cross court', thereby demonstrating their skill as dispute settlers and their concern for law and order. Martin, in theory, could have prevented this. And on three separate occasions, he did ban all 'outside men' from hearing cases. Yet big men risk a great deal if they openly confront their rivals; consequently, Martin was often hesitant to make the presence of other candidates at court an open issue least he be accused of defamation or playing 'dirty politics'.

Candidates also sought the support of key big men in other clans, hoping that these leaders could produce large blocks of votes amongst their kinsmen (cf. Hatanaka 1970: 40; Reay 1964: 151-152). Candidates considered wanwok relationships important. Thus, Kopon believed councillors would support him and persuade their closest kinsmen to do likewise. Martin similarly approached all Duma court officials, as well as magistrates from other tribes, believing he could win as many as ten votes from each court eria outside Duma. All Duma candidates considered Tiene Maima's support crucial, and therefore privately approached him to make both the implicit promise of future government grants for his many enterprises, and the explicit promise of Kaupagam or Komodurumo support for Tiene's son in any future national election.

The effect of these and other tactics — including gifts of beer or cigarettes to songons and men's house leaders — is difficult to judge. As I show below, voting patterns sometimes indicate that block voting within clans may have been linked to the influence of particular leaders. However, the majority of Duma big men publicly remained neutral, and stressed it was each person's right to decide on a candidate. Both Tiene and Dege, for example, consistently refused even to name their choice of candidate for fear that they would be criticized for influencing the vote. The two exceptions to this policy were Stephen — Tiene's son, who openly supported a non-Duma candidate, Wauri Suba from Gomia — and Andrew Wahgi who campaigned for Michael. Stephen made his choice both on the basis of his friendship with Wauri, and on his belief that this Gomia candidate was the most politically astute of the educated Chuave candidates. Andrew, a Komogam peace officer, had initially supported Martin, but during the stil
campaign, Andrew had attacked the council clerk and Kopon while quarrelling about village court salaries. Martin failed to convince the council that Andrew should not be dismissed, and therefore Andrew switched his allegiance to Michael.

Candidates also used residence and kinship ties to solidify their support. Kopon and Martin began affairs with Keu women, resident in Komogam and Subagam, respectively. This enabled them to give small gifts to men belonging to these groups without being accused of buying votes. Martin clearly sought to split Michael's Komogam support; although considered a Keukobu member, Michael lived with his Komogam wife in Aidpost village. That these relationships with women were politically motivated is not in doubt; both men regretted the fact that their wives' kinsmen resided in non-Chuave areas and mentioned that they were now assured of additional votes. The two men, of course, stopped short of claiming they had polygamous marriages; rather, they encouraged the belief that they were contemplating divorce. Likewise, three other non-Duma candidates built houses in their mothers' brothers' or affines' villages during the stil campaign so as to establish closer relationships with non-aligned groups or to split their rivals' votes.

A well-established political ploy - the gifts of pork, beer or cash to solidify kin-based support groups or to 'buy' non-kinsmen's votes - is now generally held in ill-favour. It is called gris in Pidgin, but 'bribery' by educated men. Tales of flagrant attempts to purchase votes in national elections are exceedingly common; for instance, the story of the Chuave Open member who, in 1977, threw K2 notes or gave bottles of beer to men during speeches as he promised additional government wealth. During the provincial election, however, such lavish use of wealth never occurred, and people constantly stressed that any gift should be treated automatically as gris and considered sufficient reason for selecting another candidate. The phrase 'take the bottle and vote for someone else' succinctly summarized this election theme. Joseph Dama, whose business gave him access to wholesale beer and other consumer goods, was initially criticized for having used his wealth during the stil campaign. In fact, Dama did not use his wealth in this way, and even refused to offer men cigarettes least he be accused of bribery -
behaviour which eventually gained him a reputation as a model candidate. Although some candidates gave small gifts of beer or cash during the stil campaign, they consistently refused to give even these gifts after the opening of nominations unless they had disguised them by other actions (see below).

A number of ceremonies, of course, occurred throughout this phase of the campaign. Duma candidates were careful to appear at all Keu feasts and payments, but they made only token contributions to the affairs. At this time, Michael alone sponsored a ceremony, a party given on behalf of his aged father, to which he contributed a large pig, eight cartons of beer and two bottles of gin. These he distributed along with tobacco, rice and sweet potatoes to 60 guests. Keukobu men and visitors placed less emphasis on Michael's use of his savings - rumoured to be several thousand kina - to buy votes, than on the fact that he was attempting to demonstrate his ability as a traditional exchange or 'place' leader by controlling the distribution. Michael refused Martin's offer to help distribute the beer and pork, and further slighted Martin by giving him less than a carton of beer when most men believed Martin should have controlled two or three cartons. Consequently, a somewhat inevitable, but particularly bitter, factional quarrel arose in which Michael's father sided with Martin and accused his son of incompetence by botching the distribution. Though I believe this event had little long-term effect on the election results, it did momentarily contrast the differences between Martin, Keukobu's established big man, and Michael whom older men considered a young upstart, lacking expertise in everyday village affairs.

Shortly before the opening of nominations, I asked 241 Komodurumo and Kaupagam residents of Keu village, and an additional 140 Duma adults - ten each from the remaining seven clans - whether they had decided to vote for a particular candidate. Martin and Kopon were preferred by 57 and 50 per cent of their respective clans. In contrast, only 15 per cent of Komodurumo and 3 per cent of Kaupagam adults preferred Michael and Dama, respectively. In Kaupagam, 6 per cent of the respondents listed Dege, whom some men still wanted to nominate. Less than 10 per cent of each clan supported a non-agnate. Undecided voters totalled 17 per cent of Komodurumo and 32 per cent of Kaupagam.
In other Duma clans, 87 adults (about 62 per cent) were undecided or claimed to be supporting two candidates. Of the remaining 53 respondents, Martin and Michael both obtained 20 preferences, Kopon 7, and Dama 4. Two men stated they would vote for non-Duma candidates. The reasons given for supporting or rejecting particular candidates centred on their personal characteristics or indicated aspects of political thought which I have characterized as pervasive in Chuave. Thus, people stated they would vote for Michael because he was well-educated, or stated they disagreed with Kopon's or Martin's attempts to 'double work'. Martin, Kopon and Dama were all regularly identified with their primary leadership roles. Respondents, therefore, stressed either Dama's managerial skills or characterized him as self-interested because of his *bisnis*; Martin personified the law or had 'ruined the law's name'; Kopon represented all that was good or bad about the council.

The high percentage of undecided voters was consistent with people's statements about the 'true campaign' determining the outcome of the election. Thus, people insisted that they would wait to hear campaign speeches and would first judge the merits of non-Duma candidates before reaching a decision. Consequently, I now turn to a consideration of the candidacies throughout the Chuave area, and emphasize how candidates used rhetoric in an attempt to win votes both within and beyond their own tribe.

The 'true campaign'

The *kempein tru* lasted six weeks, beginning with the opening of nominations requiring candidates to deposit K50 and ending with the opening of the polls. In Chuave, Elimbari and Nambaiyufa electorates, 21, 15 and 10 candidates nominated respectively. Ogan Kom - a Kamara divorcee, who was Chuave President of the provincial women's organization, *Yangpela Didiman* - was the only woman to nominate. Ogan dismissed any illusions of winning, and never, to my knowledge, made public speeches. Nor did she directly appeal to *Yangpela Didiman* or Kafaina women for votes. Rather, as she informed me, her sole purpose was to show women they were entitled to nominate for elections; a fact that Duma women, at least, were often unaware of.
It is impossible to provide a profile of the 'average' candidate: their ages, educational backgrounds, government or employment histories were extremely varied. But candidates clearly belonged to an elite segment of the society; usually they were men who had special qualities that set them apart from ordinary villagers (see also Standish, in press). Five candidates were, like Ogan, called *giamen* (false) candidates; they were considered either politically uninfluential or having little in their background to legitimize their candidacies. The remaining candidates were either current or ex-government officials, mission leaders, business men or they had, like Michael, qualities such as extensive education, wage labour or public service employment to their credit. Of the 45 men, 22 had previously contested council elections and ten had nominated for previous national (Chuave Open) elections. Nine councillors and six ex-councillors stood; three candidates were village court officials, and six were mission pastors or leaders. Eleven men were major entrepreneurs, and an additional ten had some business interests. However, only seven men — two mission pastors where were also business men, and five councillor-business men — had proven their ability to 'double' or combine discrepant leadership roles. To a great extent, then, the candidates had different backgrounds and represented what people saw as separate, and in some ways, equal models of leadership.

Overall, 21 candidates stood as Pangu representatives, ten as National Party and 15 as Independents. Significantly, Independents were on average much younger men, usually under 30 years old. In Chuave electorate, the combination of youth and extensive education, in conjunction with the Independent label, often distinguished liberal — if not radical — candidates from older, more conservative ones who were less informed about the workings of government and who saw their own impoverished education as a hindrance to their chances of success. On average, candidates had less than three years formal education. But 12 men had completed primary school (or the equivalent in mission education); of these, five were high school graduates. In Chuave electorate three young men, Wauri, Rocky and Albert were particularly vocal and active in their campaigns. Older candidates labelled them as 'big heads' and accused them of running dirty campaigns by openly criticizing more established leaders. In short, the antagonism noticeable between Michael and his Duma rivals, primarily based on the
threat posed by an educated man, was a generalized feature of the wider Chuave campaign.

The true campaign also highlighted the importance of mission affiliation. The nomination of SDA candidates in Kamara and Ei, both SDA strongholds, was natural. But candidates representing fundamentalist denominations also stood and these small missions took an active part in the campaign. Both Wauri and Albert were fundamentalist pastors. In addition, Togara, a Tolai who was married to a Kamara woman, represented himself as a pastor of the United Church, and - like Wauri and Albert - took an extreme mission stance. He warned members of small Christian sects that the government would ban all missions except the Lutheran, Catholic and SDA, promised aid to build permanent-material churches, and frequently cited Bible passages in his speeches. Duma candidates felt threatened only by Wauri; pastor of the Gomia Four Square church, he was well-known in Duma as a good Christian and entrepreneur. The 250 or more Duma Four Square adherents were clearly a target of his campaign. Fundamentalist missions also arranged several public speaking events; ten candidates attended one such affair coinciding with a mass Four Square baptism in Duma.

The close of nominations also allowed candidates to gauge the importance of different political groups and to focus on particular areas in their campaign. I have listed the distribution of candidates, along with basic details in Table 14. The candidates belonged to 14 clans; an additional 20 clans were unrepresented. Campaign strategies, of course, varied according to the proximity of different tribes and the candidates' personalities. From an Ei or Duma perspective, three Gomia Meri clans were believed to be non-aligned or unwilling to support Kuri, the Gomia Meri incumbent. Martin, Michael and Tabia all made patrols to various men's house groups within this tribe, concentrating their campaigns on those groups located adjacent to Duma and Ei territory. In addition, they travelled to all men's house groups within Duma and Ei. Kopon and Dama restricted their movements to Duma and Ei. Kopon frankly admitted he feared sorcery attacks from Gomia and Kamara if he should offend another candidate's supporters.

The distribution of candidates favoured the sole Kebai contender.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Approximate age</th>
<th>Party*</th>
<th>Education Status</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kamara (7 clans)</td>
<td>Kanuf</td>
<td>Baundo</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>St 6</td>
<td>SDA pastor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kanuf</td>
<td>Levi</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>St 6</td>
<td>SDA leader/Former APO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arogam</td>
<td>Eri</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Mission 3 years</td>
<td>ex-tulul/ex-army sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arogam</td>
<td>Ogan</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Chuave President Yangpela Bidiman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ibugwagu</td>
<td>Launa</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Deputy Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ibugwagu</td>
<td>Kombol</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>St 4</td>
<td>ex-constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kaingunua</td>
<td>Kai</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>St 6, mission 4 years</td>
<td>Baptist pastor/small bizinis man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fuigi</td>
<td>Kiwai</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Peace officer/small bizinis man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dona (9 clans)</td>
<td>Kaupagam</td>
<td>Dana</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>mission 3 years</td>
<td>major bizinis man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kaupagam</td>
<td>Kopon</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Komodurumo</td>
<td>Martin</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>mission 2 years</td>
<td>magistrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Komodurumo</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>form 4, technical college</td>
<td>ex-army/clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ゴンガ Kirwatu (3 clans)</td>
<td>Gomia Kinogu</td>
<td>Subamo</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>St 5</td>
<td>United Church leader/wage earner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subamo</td>
<td>Suba</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Form 4</td>
<td>Four Square pastor/major entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arogam</td>
<td>Whi</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>mission 2 years</td>
<td>small bizinis man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tribe | Clan | Candidate | Approximate age | Party* | Education Status | Status  
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- 
Gomia Kibi | Maragau | Rocky | 27 | I | Form 4 major entrepreneur/ ex-provincial employee  
Gomia Meri | Gomia Meri Kuri | 60 | P | — | councillor/ Assembly member  
Ei(gun) | Duangawon Tabia | 43 | P | mission 2 years | councillor/ SDA leader  
Kebai | Kebai Kama Kayapo | 28 | I | mission 4 years | ex-wage labourer  
Kebai | Maniku Kam | 35 | NP | mission 5 years | ex-missionary/ ex-APO  

* P = Pangu, NP = National party, I = Independent

Kebai, with 966 eligible voters, was the third largest tribe; Duma and Kamara, the larger groups, had four and eight candidates respectively. Kau and Ei plus the three Gomia groups, people believed, were too small to elect a winner without substantial cross-tribal voting. But Kayapo, the Kebai candidate, was considered a giame candidate and was thought to have little Kebai support. Because of the Kebai fight, however, most candidates were unwilling to venture into this area. Though both Martin and Kopon attended peace negotiations, neither man made special trips to individual Kebai clans. In contrast, several Kamara candidates, whose tribe shared a border with Kebai, campaigned extensively there. The Deputy Premier, for instance, took a very pro-Kebai stance, actually encouraged the fight, and promised that all Chuave clans would contribute to death compensation payments. Baundo, another Kamara candidate and also an SDA pastor, used about K600 of the K1265 he eventually spent on the campaign to buy cartons of tinned meat and bags of rice, which he distributed to Kebai people. Only after the polling had begun did this tactic become known to Duma candidates who vehemently condemned it as bribery. Baundo, however, denied this claim arguing that it was simply Christian charity to
those Kebai who had had their gardens and coffee trees destroyed.

The belief that cross-tribal voting would be an important aspect of the elections was, as I show below, a somewhat unwarranted though understandable phenomenon. Several candidates carried lists of men's house groups or clans who had promised their support. These compilations only served to fuel unrealistic expectations of victory: the deference lesser men maintain to leaders makes it impossible for candidates to assess accurately the degree of their support. On several occasions, I witnessed men's house groups assure candidates of their total support, or more commonly, state that they would seriously consider voting for them, only to repeat these pledges to a different candidate several days later. Save for those groups who had their own agnate as candidate, it is virtually impossible for men to deny their support to a big man, a temporary guest, without risking outright confrontation which could jeopardize inter-group relationships.

In addition, conceptions of the electoral process now stress the 'free' vote, which theoretically transcends the parochial interests of clans or communities. The essence of the following words, spoken by Martin to people attending a Duma market, was repeated in different form by other candidates throughout the campaign.

Listen, the law does not follow family, brother or sister. The law and government are our guardian: they have only one face. All right, you must think well, think about me and about Kamara and Gomia candidates, too. This election is not about cutting pig: you are not to think about blood and family. If you want to vote for a [Ej]Gun man, vote for him. Whatever kind of story or campaign he has made, you must judge it. Who will bring the work to Duma? Think well. If you think my campaign is good, if my talk is true, then give your full vote to me. If you think Tabia's or Kuri's is good, then you can vote for him. That is all right.

There are, of course, conflicting messages in this speech. The phrase, 'who will bring the work to Duma', recognizes the fact that only a Duma candidate will be concerned with the tribe's development. Likewise Martin's mention of two candidates whom he believed had little chance of winning, or more important, his failure to mention other Duma rivals and his reference to a 'full' vote, informs the listeners that a block
vote for a single Duma candidate - in this case Martin - would ensure victory. Nonetheless, he affirms the principle of conscience or cross-tribal voting.

Candidates and voters alike place great emphasis on speeches. Without oratorical skill, a leader cannot influence the Assembly and bring development to his electorate. Moreover, campaign rhetoric necessarily concerns itself with divergent beliefs that, I have argued, shape people's impressions of particular leaders and government itself. It would not be appropriate here to reproduce speeches in full: they sometimes lasted a half hour or more without interruption. The following excerpts, however, sufficiently illustrate a number of recurring themes.

The first is from a speech given at Chuave market by a young, educated and Independent candidate. The use of English words, italicized in the text, is characteristic of the educated speaker.

I look at this provincial government of ours and I see it is not right. Inside Chuave, we do not have one man who works for the government - not one! I alone worked for the government for nine months; I worked to start this cement factory. They allocated K100,000 for this factory - K70,000 they took and put in Kup [another electorate]; K30,000 they lost!

This was the reason I became angry and wanted to fight the Premier and Launa. I was angry with the Secretary - this Barunke Kaman. I argued with him right here. And because of this they wanted to get rid of me. I was in the industrial section and anything they wanted to hide I took and put in an open place. They all knew this, and said, 'Oh fucking Rocky - we are sacking you!' They did not give me two weeks early notice!

I can truthfully tell you - you cannot take money allocated for one project and put it to another project. You can't! All right, I saw this and they fired me and I was angry and now I want to stand up for this election ....

Now I'm telling you, Siwi's government and Launa's government stinks. They just think of filling up their own pockets. They think about buying cars. They are still buying them. They think they are small Gods. I alone know; there is not one man who can go there [Kundia], and talk to the cabinet as I can. I have played politics for seven solid years. Now if you elect me - if you give your vote to me I can dissolve
your worries. I want to work a clean campaign. A man who gives you beer or money, he will steal government money. I want to be your representative and to carry your worries. Give your vote to Rocky, give your vote to Rocky only!

This pointed - often vehement - attack, which did not attempt to hide the candidate's personal desire for revenge against an unjust government, contrasts well with an older candidate's speech which contains a critique of younger men and only vague allusions to the nature of government. The speaker is Tabia, the Ei councillor.

Our wantok [the anthropologist] another skin is here. He knows - he is a child. His father or grandfather, their generation alone controls his government. All the young men stay outside because they do not know people's concerns. The government makes laws, and people hold them strongly. If a man breaks the law, there is a big jail, and they are punished and pay large fines so that all men are afraid.

But our government turns and turns. It does not hold the people strongly, and development and government work do not go right. Listen. The district [provincial] government reports to the national government, the true government. Like Elimbari Mountain and this small Mainamo Mountain. Elimbari is the national government; it makes the law which falls down to Mainamo and from there it is thrown to all the places. Now Mainamo must talk strongly to the big government so that people everywhere can live well....

I feel ... when I was coming here I thought, 'Why doesn't the government give power to the police?' The police have no power. Before the Europeans were here and we were afraid; the luluais were here and we shook. Now look - if a fight like the one in Kebai comes up, the police just stand around and watch it. They don't jail and court men. Why? Because the district government is weak, and has not put power into their hands.

The third example is from a speech delivered to Duma men by Komboi, an ex-constable from Kamara. He first considers the issue of Chuave development before turning to an explicit attack on younger candidates. Listeners described this speech, unlike the previous two, as both 'sweet' and 'true'.

I was a police officer in Kerowagi. I know how the government works in Kerowagi. I asked where they got
the money for all their work, and they told me they got it from bank loans. Chuave roads, like the El road, such roads are highways in Kerowagi. Why? Because the Premier has helped them. When Siwi stands up in the Assembly and passes a motion, everyone votes for it. In Kerowagi tradestores and taverns are built close together - it is a town. But our members are slow and lazy. I wondered why Chuave was not like Kerowagi, and so I thought about helping you, and I resigned [my job] to stand in this election. Chuave is an ancestor place; we still follow the old ways. It is like that and now I want to help you and change Chuave. You will say I am not a councillor - that I have never been a councillor or made work at my place. But even though I haven't been a councillor, I know how to make this government work. I am thinking of strong government. I want to help you. I do not smoke or drink beer. All I want is a strong man for government. Now after this election, if I go to Kundiawa and do not drink beer, and I work hard for you and bring development, people will know I have told them the truth and they will vote for me again.

Wayne is here and in his country little children go to school and they get work. But it is not that way here. Our government is not concerned with schools. It is true that students are at school, but when they leave, they only think of standing and playing politics and being a 'big head'. If you vote for a young man, he will forget about you. But if you vote for an older man, he will remember you. Young men think only of themselves. Clerks will write the law. All our talk comes into our heads, and is good and the work is good and the clerks will write it down. Little children [young candidates] - their heads are not strong; their thoughts are not clear. We have knowledge the youths do not have. When the white man's government was here and kiaps and luluais were here, we met them and saluted them. Old strong men are like the luluai. You must vote for us. They would never give the luluai's work to a child!

Now the Papua New Guinea government is here, and young men think they know a lot of English. They stand up and they have work, but they drink and look for prostitutes. Our members are just as bad - they are like women. We have given our work to a coward. Think well, vote for a strong man. If he is selfish do not vote for him. If he will work hard and think of the people, give your vote to him.

In speeches, older candidates used the image of the luluai or kiap and the white man's government; my own presence, of course, enhanced the use of the image on many occasions. Komboi also painted a picture of young candidates as immoral and irresponsible. In contrast, the next speech by Wauri, a young candidate, while stressing government
corruption, also contains statements that are anti-colonial and critical of those who idealize the expatriates' advisory role in current governments.

Look, our provincial government is one-sided; they talk and everything goes to one side, nothing comes to Chuave. I am telling you I can carry your burden. I can fight hard and be your representative.

I think law and order have to come to this province - but who is thinking of law and order? We need police who live close to the people, so they can live peacefully. If we have peace, businesses will go ahead. If the law is not strong, business breaks down ....

Now is the time of change! Plenty of educated men are here; they are the leaders of tomorrow! You have to think what future government will be like in six or ten years time. Lots of men come and bullshit here - but I can tell you when they go to Kundiawa, all they say is, 'Yes master, yes master.' I do not like this kind of behaviour! I like to fight hard for everyone. I can tell you all the things we eat: rice they make in Japan, fish they make in Australia, cooking grease they make in Australia. All of our money flows out of our country. If I win this election, I can tell you I will close the road by which our money leaves the country.

I am telling you there are 21 candidates in Chuave, and if there are too many cooks, the soup will not be good. Many men are just liars; they want to 'eat' your money and they give beer and money to men. I can tell you the truth - I have not given beer to any man. I am telling you there is plenty of corruption government today. Men will take your vote, turn their backs on you, and 'eat' the government's money. Now I am standing to fight hard for all the people. Think hard and vote!

Later, when addressing a Four Square audience, Wauri tailored his rhetoric and spoke to Christian issues.

I am not criticizing any candidates. God can choose from all these leaders. God talks in Romans 13: 1. God put government on earth, and government is here to strengthen the behaviour of all good men. And God alone chooses leaders. A white man has come here to live with you at Keu, and he knows the news. Some countries in the world - like the Philippines - some countries are no good. Women and children - they all suffer. The reason is that government is not good. It is communist and people suffer.
In Papua New Guinea, we have good government. If I lived in a communist country, I could not come here to talk to you today. You must understand this - we must have a man who is on our side, who is the 'mouth' of all Christians. If we are not in government we cannot talk. Can you speak in the Assembly? If you want to build a church, and you want K7,000, you have to go to the council, the clerk, the Provincial Project Officer, and fill out application forms. Someone must be inside to support this and get you the money.

In the same way, one Christian man must support the work of God. So you must support a man who is a Christian - to stand up on the side of God. A 'hidden' man or giaman Christian [a non-Christian or non-fundamentalist] supports Satan's work. If you vote for a man who is on Satan's side and he goes and drinks a bottle of beer, you have helped this man and you have to answer before God. That is true. You alone know, and God, our Father, knows. Pray to God and He can help you think. He will say, 'Give your vote to this man or that man', and you must give it - he is the right man.

Wauri's speech is a straightforward example of fundamen
talist rhetoric. The references to 'communist' countries, to 'Satan's side', and in his first speech, the mention of 'future government' are revelatory - all are closely associated with visions of the Second Coming. These allusions are also anti-Lutheran; fundamentalists believed that Lutherans were pro-communist, and that songons were agents of the anti-Christ who will lead Papua New Guinea's first communist government. References to the Second Coming were more explicit in the speeches of other fundamentalist candidates, occasionally including claims of visionary skills or a direct line to God's words, as well as the threat, implied in Wauri's speech, that a vote for a Lutheran or an SDA candidate could bring eternal damnation.

Within Duma, Kopon and Dama rarely made public speeches; instead, they spoke to small groups of men, often playing the role of the concerned listener who would faithfully communicate people's ideas to the Assembly. Martin and Michael both made speeches at markets and other large gatherings. Their preferred method of campaigning, however, was to tour various men's house groups in the evenings, often with the aid of 'spears' or 'hidden spears', that is, men who were key supporters. Martin always travelled with a Kaupagam man who introduced him after stressing the free vote. The implication, of course, was
that Kaupagam men were willing to support Martin, rather than their own agnate. Both men approached members of men's houses to ask them to act as 'hidden spears'. These supporters feign disinterest or disclaim support for the candidate, only to reverse themselves and argue forcefully that they have been converted by the candidate's rhetoric, usually after the candidate has left the men's house. The effectiveness of this tactic is questionable. Nonetheless, it was a part of other candidates' repertoire of 'tricks', and aptly illustrates candidates' pragmatic approach to soliciting support.

As the final two examples show, Martin and Michael were as much concerned with attacking their rivals as with speaking to an idealized version of the government leader. The first excerpt is from a speech Michael delivered to a Marime men's house.

It is true we are having an election for our government. Here, at our place we say - you and I talk and say - 'Oh, there is our first man, our big man. We have to give work to him, and he will bring development to our place.' We say that; we give him work and we see nothing.

Now if I win, I cannot quickly come and give you something - an aidpost or something. These things are not in an open place where you simply grab them! In this kind of [Assembly] work, everyone votes. If they support me - all right, I can bring things to your place. It is not good if I lie to you - in English, promise you something, ah? You alone will decide and vote - all of you. You alone have business, and if you find your money is not sufficient, you go and ask the government for 'half' money. Then your business will grow and be good. Forget wantoks - you cannot come to me and expect me to give you something quickly ....

The government sends a great deal of money to Kundiawa - some goes to Gumine, some comes to Chuave. That is how it should work, just like cutting pig, ah? Put it everywhere. But now the money just goes to one place [Kuman side].

Before you gave work to men, and they worked slowly. Okay, now give the work to another man so it will run smoothly. Give your vote to one man. Before we gave our votes to councillors, and we have seen their work. Now magistrates have come, and we know of their work too. Now if you stand up and make one kind of work and then want to make another kind - that is not good. A man who is outside [the government] has space to hold this work well. That is excellent. Men who have
work already - that behaviour is rubbish.

In his speeches, Michael always avoided the extensive use of English, so as not to acquire a reputation as a 'big head' or braggard among older men. Instead, he relied on his supporters to mention his English-speaking ability and literacy. But also, he did not correct errors that enhanced his reputation; when he realized that many older men thought he was a DOIC - and not simply a clerk - he sometimes spoke of his 'patrols' to eastern highlands areas, while carefully avoiding use of the word *kiap* or DOIC, which might have led others to accuse him of lying. Similarly, the attack on Martin's and Kopon's big man or 'first man' status, like his comments against leaders who 'double work', are both overt in his speech. However, he never mentions names, and thus avoids any accusation of defamation.

Martin travelled to this same Marime men's house two days later and, in his talk, criticized Michael. In contrast to Martin's previously cited words, he now appeals to Duma solidarity.

The election is close now. You women who make Kafaina at your houses - you can talk about the election too. If you want to vote for me or someone else, you must think well. This Kafaina work - when it is finished or you do not have quite enough money for business, you can come to the government and we can help you ....

If a man wants to build a tradestore or church, the government can help him. Before, I was a councillor, and the council ran well. But I lost [this position], and now live simply. Now the elections are here and I am standing up. The council has not brought much to us - only the school and aidpost. Now this new government is beginning, and it will have all the power so we candidates are coming to talk to you. I am going into this government, and I will not 'eat' money or give it to Komodorumo. Whoever comes to me in the Assembly and asks about business, I will help you. Now think seriously about me.

A man who knows English or how to read and write - he is simply thinking of his own pocket. He is thinking about buying a car or about his affine's store. Think! Everyone should have enough wealth to live well.

If government goes to another place, you will get nothing. Kamara, Ei - all these men are standing up. In Duma there are four men. If you vote for me or Kopon, give him all your votes and he will win. The power is with you people now. If the vote breaks,
neither of us will win, and the government will belong to another place.

Here Martin criticizes Michael, who helped finance his brother-in-law's tradestore operation, as self-interested. This, according to Martin, is a natural by-product of his education. Again, he left much unstated because everyone knows the facts of Simbu life: educated men control the paper work, and often steal government funds. That Martin also promised to work the wantok system to people's benefit counter-balances his claim that his clan will not be the recipient of government money. The appeal to Kafaina women who were present in the men's house is exceptional - Martin was the only Duma candidate and only one of three men in Chuave to ask Kafaina groups for support. Most candidates assumed, quite rightly, that women would vote as their husbands or agnates dictated.

The recurring themes of these speeches - the need for law and order, the promise of development, the need to select a responsible, moral candidate - are reiterated verbatim or elaborated on in informal conversations among voters. Dire warnings that a Christian will become 'hungry for power' and will turn away from God after being elected conflict with the suggestion that only a church leader should be elected. Some claim that the law or the Bible forbids people to vote for a bisnis man; others argue that only entrepreneurs can manage government money. Old men argue for the importance of 'paper' and education, only to be told by educated teenagers that they should vote for an established big man. In short, confusion abounds, and people claim that the campaign talk has made them 'insane'.

Because of the emphasis on the principle of conscience voting, there is little doubt that some candidates win or lose votes by their words, as well as by their actions. Certainly, the power and style of oration, if not its substance, has an impact on voters. But because people belong to different political units, the need to support an agnate or co-member in a larger polity precludes conscience voting for many. The following examination of voting patterns clearly reveals the importance of group membership.
The voting

Polling began in Kamara on 31 May 1981, and ended in Duma three weeks later. The Simbu Electoral Law permits campaigning during polling, and prohibits only the canvassing of votes near polling stations. But candidates took the opening of voting as the end of the true campaign; formal speechmaking and the canvassing of votes both ceased. The only exceptions were three Chuave candidates who used coffee buying to campaign during the polling. A week prior to the polling, Martin obtained a Kundiawa factory vehicle and purchased coffee at high prices in Duma, Ei and Gomia tribes. Despite his attempts to recoup deficits in other areas, Martin often showed a net loss of factory funds during stock takings, and after repaying losses from his salary was fired shortly before the end of polling. In all three instances, candidates used coffee buying to make their names known outside their own tribe, and to establish reputations as generous men - that is, to try to buy votes, yet avoid public criticism.

Electoral officials conducted the polling in an orderly fashion, albeit with minor violations of the Electoral Law. Polling stations often closed before the required time of 6 p.m., after big men told officials - all from other electorates - that no other voters from the community would arrive. Also, polling officials accepted food gifts from candidates, though they were under strict orders not to do so. Underage voters, often as young as 12 years old, and recently married women from other electorates frequently cast ballots. Candidates or their scrutineers did not question these infractions: all, however, would be cited later as reasons for contesting the election results.

Candidates' scrutineers were less concerned with these infractions than with appearing at polling stations to mention their candidates' names as people prepared to vote. Candidates themselves disappear for several days prior to their group's vote. In Duma all candidates avoided men's houses or slept in their pig houses for several days before the Duma vote, so as not to be accused of campaigning at a time when people are making their final choices. Likewise, candidates eschew polling stations. After casting their ballots, candidates quickly left; a few even failed to appear. Because some feel 'shame' at the thought of supporting themselves, they cast their vote for a
rival.

Voter turn-out was high in all tribes except Kebai where less than 40 per cent of eligible voters cast ballots. Three separate battles raged on Kebai polling days, and many Kebai were hesitant to leave their villages unattended, or were otherwise too preoccupied to consider voting. Overall, the turn-out of eligible voters was 77 per cent.

Leeanne Greenwood and I accompanied the election patrol, and electoral officials and voters allowed us to record, by clan, people's choice of candidate. As the voting order followed an electoral roll, it was also possible with the aid of big men, to list voters according to subclan affiliation and, within Duma, to men's house residence. The final, official results are show in Table 15. These disguise the enormous variation in voting patterns produced by different contests involving candidates from separate clans or communities. Here, I outline only a few general trends and detail a few specific examples of candidates' support groups.

Differences in male/female voting, although sometimes noticeable, in no way affected the election outcome or the fate of individual candidates. Candidates who appealed to Kafaina groups fared no better among female voters than other candidates. Ogan Kom, who placed last overall, received only the partial support of her own clan. It was not possible to distinguish between women who were natal members of a clan and those who were married into it. Of 903 married women for whom I have accurate data, 214 (23.69 per cent) did not vote for the same candidates as their husbands. However, this does not mean that women are likely to vote for a member of their natal, rather than their husbands', clan. As often as not, differences between spouses involved a choice between candidates belonging to the same tribe or clan. A woman's primary allegiance is to her natal clan or, if married, to her husband's group. In fact, in those clans having their own candidates, women consistently showed a greater reluctance to vote for a candidate belonging to another group than did men.

At the tribal level this pattern was repeated. For example, 55 of 557 (9.8 per cent) of Duma women, as opposed to 99 of 641 men
(15.4 per cent), cast ballots for non-Duma candidates. Even in the single exception, Gomia Kibi, only slightly more women than men (45.5 per cent as against 43.4 per cent) cast their ballots for non-Kibi candidates.

Table 15: Candidates' final official standing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Official Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baundo</td>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>Kanui</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Duma</td>
<td>Komodurumo</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabia</td>
<td>Ei(gun)</td>
<td>Duangauwom</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken</td>
<td>Kau</td>
<td>Maniku</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wauri</td>
<td>Gomia Two</td>
<td>Arokama</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuri</td>
<td>Gomia One</td>
<td>Gomia Meri</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin</td>
<td>Duma</td>
<td>Komodurumo</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launa</td>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>Ibugwagu</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocky</td>
<td>Gomia Three</td>
<td>Maimagu</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiwai</td>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>Puigi</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai</td>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>Kaingunua</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopon</td>
<td>Duma</td>
<td>Kaupagam</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wai</td>
<td>Gomia Two</td>
<td>Subamo</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eri</td>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>Arungam</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dama</td>
<td>Duma</td>
<td>Kaupagam</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayepo</td>
<td>Kebai</td>
<td>Kebaikama</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togara</td>
<td>Gomia Two</td>
<td>Subamo</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levi</td>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>Kanui</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unagi</td>
<td>Ei(gun)</td>
<td>Duangauwom</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kombol</td>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>Ibugwagu</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogan</td>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>Arungam</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 16 lists votes cast by people for a candidate of their own tribe versus those given to other tribes. Overall 800 votes or 16.48 per cent of the total votes cast, flowed out to candidates from other tribal groups. Four tribes - Kamara, Gomia Two, Ei and Kau - showed a net gain in votes; there were more votes coming in for these tribes' candidates than were going out. The other four tribes showed a net loss. In Duma, 154 votes went to non-Duma candidates. The degree of tribal solidarity shown in voting was unrelated to a tribe's numerical strength or the number of candidates per tribe. Thus, two of the three tribes that had only one candidate showed the greatest willingness to vote for candidates in other groups. Only Kem, who polled 365 of Kau tribe's votes, had his chances of victory ruined, not by the splitting of votes by other candidates, but by the relatively small size of his tribe.

It is at this level that individual campaigns and the importance of the 'free' vote is most obvious. Candidates realize, of course, that tribal borders effectively divide the election into eight separate contests. But they also stress that vote fragmentation results in a narrow margin of victory and that, consequently, cross-tribal votes are critical to a candidate's success. Baundo, the winner, polled 584 votes - a mere 12 per cent of the total. His exceptional success outside Kamara, where he polled 236 votes, was the difference between a first and fifth place standing. His non-Kamara support came from the six Kebai clans, where he polled 209 of 298 votes given to outsiders, and from four Gomia clans bordering on Kamara territory. His victory, therefore, is attributable as much to the weakness of the Kebai candidate, who polled only 26 per cent of his tribe's votes, as it is to Baundo's own campaign and personality. He had no direct ties to Kebai groups through his mother, sisters or wife. Kebai supporters stressed both his largess during the current war and the fact that, as an SDA pastor, Baundo was a 'good' and Christian man.

Three other candidates polled exceptionally well outside their own tribe: Wauri received 148 votes (40 per cent of his total); Tabia 92 (20 per cent of his total); and Launa 82 votes (29 per cent of his total). Wauri's votes came from 17 different clans, 14 of which had some Four Square members. Although it was often impossible to estimate voters' ages accurately, Wauri's external support was clearly comprised
Table 16: Tribal voting

a) Distribution of votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Gomia 2</th>
<th>Ei</th>
<th>Kau</th>
<th>Kamara</th>
<th>Duma</th>
<th>Gomia 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gomia 2</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ei</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kau</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1228</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomia 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomia 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebai</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>1270</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>4852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Summary of tribal support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>No. of candidates</th>
<th>Votes for own candidates</th>
<th>Votes for other candidates</th>
<th>Total votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>per cent</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomia 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>98.57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ei</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98.82</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>97.07</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamara</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>96.69</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duma</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>87.14</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>12.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomia 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67.91</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>32.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomia 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56.23</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>43.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26.56</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>73.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The numbers in these tables are different from official totals because, first, I exclude votes by station workers whose home areas are outside Chuave and, second, I include votes that were later rejected in the official count.
of young, sometimes teenage, voters who were fundamentalist Christians. In contrast, Launa's external support - from 13 non-Kamara clans - came from all generations. Those supporters of the Deputy Premier I later questioned often mentioned that Launa would become premier if elected, or they characterized him as Chuave's true big man, comparing him to Yowie of Siane. Over one-third of Launa's 82 votes, however, came from two Gomia clans where he had classificatory kinship relations, and had contributed to past ceremonies. Unlike either Launa or Wauri, most of Tabia's external support derived from a single clan and community, Gomia Gawa, located near Ei(gun) on a tertiary road. Here Tabia polled 68 of his 92 votes; in comparison, the Gomia candidate, Kuri, received 53 Gawa votes. Duma and Ei candidates had campaigned intensely in this clan, and Tabia's success is not easily explained. Tabia's rival, in Ei tribe, who won no Gawa votes, was an SDA pastor, so Tabia's religion could have had little influence on these voters. Gawa voters stressed only the Kuri had 'turned his back' on their clan, and that Tabia's speeches had been well-received.

On average candidates received 78.7 per cent of their own clan's votes. In seven instances where a single candidate per clan stood, candidates received between 50 and 99 per cent of their agnates' votes. The remaining candidates each faced an agnatic rival, thereby splitting the clan's votes. Baundo fared the best against intra-clan competition, polling 70.17 per cent to his rival's 24.56 per cent. The poorest showing by a single candidate and by rivals combined was in the Kamara clan, Arungam, where Ogan polled only 13 per cent of her clan's votes, and her rival an additional 55 per cent. With the exception of Kaupagam (see below), only two instances - in Baundo's and Tabia's clans - occurred where rivals belonged to different subclans. The results of these two contests were very different: Baundo lost only 10 per cent of his subclan's votes, but won 50 per cent of his rival's. In Tabia's case, both his own and his opponent's subclans showed great solidarity, with less than 7 per cent of subclansmen selecting a candidate from the opposite door.

Candidates' maternal or affinal ties to other clans, though less important than agnatic support, also influenced voting. In six clans where voters had to choose between their own agnate and a candidate related through marriage, they overwhelmingly supported their own
clansmen. Usually, only a man's mother's or wife's brother ignored their own agnate in these cases. The sole exception to this was the Kamara clan, Ibugwagu, where 21.3 per cent of voters ignored their agnatic candidate and instead cast ballots for two candidates who had maternal or affinal ties to Ibugwagu women.

Far more common, however, were situations where there was no rival in a candidate's mother's or wife's natal clan. In 16 such cases, candidates received an average of 37 per cent of these clans' votes - ranging from 92 per cent in a case where the candidate was also resident in his wife's clan to two candidates who failed to poll a single vote in their wives' or mothers' groups. Perhaps Baundo's candidacy best illustrates the relative strength of agnatic versus maternal or affinal ties. In Kamara Baundo polled 75 per cent of Kuman, his wife's clan, which lacked its own candidate and belonged to Baundo's community. But in Arungam - his mother's natal group, which had two of its members contesting the election and which belonged to a community several kilometres from his village - Baundo failed to win a single vote.

Baundo's overall support - 160 votes from his own clan, 183 from other Kamara clans and 236 from non-Kamara groups - epitomized the Chuave ideal of a man who, faced with competition from rivals within and beyond his clan, managed to win the free vote necessary for victory. Prior to balloting, voters considered Baundo an unlikely if not impossible winner. In Duma he was virtually unknown; he neither campaigned nor had kin relations within the tribe. Certainly, no Kamara had thought Baundo could 'steal' over 100 votes from his tribal rivals. Such unpredictable results only affirm men's beliefs that elections are free-wheeling affairs: 'card games' where luck is a critical factor and where campaign talk or manoeuvring increases a candidate's odds or 'tricks' people (trikim man), thereby allowing him to obtain the margin needed for victory.10

Kinship ties or residence were less important in Duma where voters had to choose between Keu candidates. Table 17 lists voting for Kaupagam and Komodurumo, and Table 18 the Duma-wide vote. Kopon won 60.6 per cent of Kaupagam's votes, polling the vast majority of Korowa - his own and Dama's men's house - as well as almost half of
Table 17: Kaupagam and Komodurumo voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men's house</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Duma candidates</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kopon</td>
<td>Dama</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Martin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Kaupagam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamgram</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragor</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korowa</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Komodurumo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keukobu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This category includes young voters who usually slept in two or more men's houses.

Table 18: Duma voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Duma candidates</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kopon</td>
<td>Dama</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Martin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaupagam</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komodurumo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabiagam</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komogam</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supagam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suagu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorugu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# From non-Duma tribes, Michael received 2 votes, Martin 3 votes, Kopon 1 vote, and Dama 10 votes.
Mamgram's votes. Kopon's small subclan solidly supported him; he lost only two men's votes. Dama won only 45 per cent of his own subclan's votes. Dama won 17 per cent and Kopon 70 per cent of Dege's subclan's votes. Dama's best showing came in Aragor men's house where he, unlike Kopon, played a minor role as a ceremonial leader. Martin's hopes of attracting a large percentage of Mamgram's votes were clearly unwarranted; despite his occasional influence in Mamgram affairs, most people preferred to align themselves with their agnates.

Several people who were directly related to non-Duma candidates voted for them rather than for their clansmen. Some old men voted for candidates who were former luluais, irrespective of tribal affiliation. And a number of Four Square members gave votes to Wauri.

Komodurumo voters were forced to choose between lineage brothers. Martin outpolled Michael by a margin of 62 to 37 votes in their own subclan; in the candidates' opposite door these positions were reversed, with Michael receiving 35 and Martin 27 votes. To a great extent, these differences are attributable to men's house residence: the majority of the candidates' own subclan resided at Keukobu, while most members of their opposite door, a slightly smaller group, lived at Onama. As Table 17 shows, residence clearly affected intra-clan support. Thus, although Martin polled 71 per cent of his subclan's votes at Keukobu, he received only 33 per cent of his subclan's votes at Onama. Martin's success among Keukobu people is purely a reflection of his prominence in this group's everyday and ceremonial affairs. The willingness of Onama voters (and a significant portion of Keukobu voters) to abandon their big man, however, foreshadowed the support Michael would receive throughout Duma.

In all other Duma clans, Michael polled 49.8 per cent, Martin 24.2 per cent, Dama 7.1 per cent, and Kopon 2.7 per cent of votes. Voting varied considerably in different clans and communities. Martin outpolled Michael in Suagu - his sister's clan - and Gorugu. In both these clans, located furthest from Keu, Martin alone among the candidates had campaigned extensively. He also received the aid of these clans' principal big men - both village court magistrates - who publicly supported Martin in men's house discussions. Gorugu, Wauri's wife's natal group, also had a large number of Four Square adherents.
and here, Wauri polled 29 of 55 votes given to outsiders.

Marime was one of the most interesting contests because all Duma candidates could claim direct kin ties through their wives, mothers, or sisters. Nonetheless, only Michael polled well; in fact, all his Duma rivals combined received fewer votes than non-Duma candidates. Here again, Wauri polled well among young voters receiving 20 votes; Tabia of El and the two incumbents split the remaining votes given to non-Duma candidates. Both Martin's and Kopon's attempts to use women to establish ties in Komogam and Subagam had little effect on the voting. Kopon failed to win a single vote in Subagam. Martin succeeded in reducing Michael's Komogam support by a mere 27 votes, but these came from both Komogam men's houses, and are as easily attributable to Martin's reputation as a magistrate in Keu as they are to creating quasi-affinal links prior to the voting.

In sum, Duma results distinctively reflect the influence of campaigning. Widespread criticism of Dama and Kopon for being uninterested or lazy was common even in Kaupagam: Kopon did not even distribute campaign posters. Dama's strength outside Kaupagam in comparison to Kopon resulted, I believe, from his past largess; for example, virtually all his Tabiagam supporters mentioned his generosity, free rides on his PMV to Goroka or Lae, or his previous contributions to ceremonies. When compared to Kopon and Dama, Michael and Martin campaigned extensively. Michael, who came second in the ballot, had his chances of victory crushed both by his inability to poll well outside Duma where he was virtually unknown, and by those votes lost to Martin within Komodurumo and throughout Duma. But the Duma results also clearly indicate a preference for an educated candidate, or perhaps, for a man who, because he had resided outside the area, had few political enemies and an unsullied reputation.

The aftermath

Election interest and tension grew during the three weeks of voting, and peaked on the days immediately prior to and following the radio announcement of official tallies. Emotions run high during these climactic days; unrealistic expectations are raised and shattered, and candidates and their clans must postulate reasons for election
failures. Using Turner's terms, the announcement of election results marks the 'crisis' that is rapidly followed by a time of redressive action, and finally, as people force the results further into the background of everyday affairs, by a phase of re-integration, signalling a return to normal life (Turner 1974: 42-43; Swartz et al 1966: 32-39).

In Sinasina, an argument over the election results led to a confrontation involving 200 men from two candidates' clans, which left one man dead and resulted in the imprisonment of four others. In Chuave, village court officials contained most of the political violence. In three non-Duma areas, groups supporting unsuccessful candidates assaulted members of the clans of winning candidates. In a separate incident, a youth gang, paid by losing candidates, attacked and severely damaged a vehicle belonging to a new provincial member's kinsmen. Though several disgruntled losers threatened to go to war with Baundo's clan or to attack the DOIC and government vehicles, most candidates urged their kinsmen to accept the results. In Duma open hostility was confined to a few fist fights or drunken brawls sparked by election talk between supporters of rival candidates. The Duma candidates themselves, however, made a point of fraternizing with each other.

Among Duma candidates, Martin alone reacted bitterly to defeat by outspokenly criticizing the public service and electoral procedures. With about 15 other candidates, he openly confronted the DOIC at Chuave, and accused him of tampering with the ballot boxes. Over the following weeks, he - along with three other candidates - attempted to lodge appeals only to be dissuaded by lawyers in Kundiawa, Goroka and Mount Hagen. In Duma Martin confronted Komodurumo men, accused them of voting for Michael, and threatened to absolve himself from Komodurumo affairs, adding sarcastically that Michael would not be around to play the role of big man because he would soon return to wage employment. Because Martin could not openly confront men from other clans, he contented himself with making vague threats of retribution. He pointed out that he was happy with his role as magistrate, adding threateningly that he knew who had not voted for him and that he would continue to see people in court. Of all the Duma candidates, Martin clearly had most invested in the election outcome - he had
literally dreamed of being a member, of becoming Premier, and was absolutely convinced he would receive the majority of Duma votes. His poor showing in comparison to Michael was a particularly bitter pill for him to swallow. Within a few short weeks, however, Martin had put the election behind him. He was once again engrossed in Keu ceremonies, and, with the aid of court cases, was again acting as Keu's premier leader.

Other Duma candidates took the results graciously. Kopon simply stated that 'all Kaupagam' had voted for him, and he believed the results reaffirmed his status as Kaupagam's big man. Within a month, assisted by the lack of written notices listing results and by people's poor numerical skills, he and his supporters would claim that he had won, not 147, but over 350 votes. Dama maintained a low profile the week following the announcement, but privately admitted to me he was both pleased and somewhat surprised with his showing. He regretted only the fact that his candidacy might have cost Michael the election victory. Although Michael's supporters were often outraged that Duma candidates had spoiled his chance of victory, Michael actively discouraged criticisms of his rivals, never contemplated an appeal, and simply used the results to prove that Duma could easily win future provincial elections, stating he would again be a candidate in the next election. Michael's status within Duma, of course, was greatly enhanced. But the possibility of increased rivalry between himself and Martin was reduced when, contrary to his campaign assurances, and in accordance with Martin's predictions, Michael soon returned to wage employment in Eastern Highlands province.

The voters took comfort in the fact that ballot box totals, which incorporate entire tribes or groups of tribes, prevent candidates from learning clan or individual votes. Leaders often privately assured both Martin and Michael that their entire clan had given each man their 'full' vote. Likewise, Keukobu men explicitly denied to Martin that they had even contemplated voting for Michael. For the average villager, the results were a subject of conversation for only a few days. People by and large ignored results in other electorates. The news that Yowie had been re-elected in Nambaiyufa or that Tiene, Elimbari Council's President, had won a narrow victory (by 61 votes) in Elimbari, was taken matter of factly. Antagonism towards Baundo's
victory soon dissipated with the news that Baundo had received votes in all the ballot boxes and that he was an SDA pastor.

Winning members, aided in some cases by educated men who were ex-candidates, made attempts to form a 'Bomai Block' government that would exclude Kuman speakers and so redress the injustices of the SIPG. But this movement, like the attempt to form a Pangu government, failed for want of organization and internal consensus among new members. Instead, Iambakey Okuk gathered together a group of members who, after being flown to Port Moresby where they were wined, dined and promised various projects for their electorates, unofficially preselected cabinet positions and the Premier. The new Premier, Mathew Siune, was an educated Kuman speaker, an ex-provincial government employee and Iambakey's close political ally. Yowie became Assembly Speaker, Baundo and Tiene the Health Minister and RIP Committee Chairman respectively.

A month after the elections results became known, the new Premier and Iambakey announced, via radio, the firing of the Provincial Secretary and accused the SIPG of gross financial mismanagement. They claimed the new government faced a shortfall of K2 million, alleging that K230,000 of SIPG funds had been illegally loaned to former members and officials, as well as to their kinsmen and friends (Post Courier, 25 July 1980). This news surprised no one in Chuave; rather it verified people's belief in the general corruption of the SIPG and its politicians. A new word, 'bankrupt', came into use and was used by new members to caution people that the new government would be hard-pressed to develop local areas until it first corrected the wrongs of its predecessor. Big men encouraged the belief that the provincial government was ruined and argued that Chuave or Duma alone would once again have to attend to its own political affairs. In short, this announcement effectively ended the election aftermath by reorientating villagers' attention to local matters; the provincial government once again became an institution and an idea which had only a modicum of relevance for people's everyday lives.

Politics as drama

The importance of this election is to be measured, not by its aim or outcome - the selection of a provincial member - but by its less
tangible consequences for the process of political change as a whole. Above all, the election was a medium for raising political consciousness: an occasion when, however momentarily, people saw themselves not simply as members of a particular clan or community, but as members of the Chuave area and beyond that, a wider political world called Simbu province (see also Hatanaka 1970). Moreover, due to the lack of widespread political education programmes, campaign rhetoric is itself a primary means of conveying information about the nature of higher government and of political processes which rarely impinge on people's thoughts.

Campaign rhetoric also necessarily serves to differentiate candidates and the ideals they represent. Perhaps the most common campaign metaphor was the image of cutting and distributing pork. For Chuave people, this simple act embodies a number of important characteristics. Ideally, as no man butchers or eats his own pig, it is first and foremost a sign of a person's concern for others' welfare. It is also a principal metaphor for male socialization: just as old men instruct boys in the art of 'cutting pig', so too, the defining characteristic of adulthood is a man's willingness to partake in his group's obligations by rearing pigs and giving pork to others. Finally, pork distribution is the hallmark of political authority, of the right to make decisions on behalf of the polity as a whole.

It was appropriate, therefore, that this key metaphor encapsulated several important election themes. Thus, the retort, 'you would not let a child cut your pig', aptly caricatured the attempts by young candidates to usurp the authority of more established big men. The distribution metaphor also easily allowed men to understand the biased apportionment of wealth by the SIPG, and stressed the need to select a candidate who would equitably provide development throughout Simbu. Those who claimed that only big men had the proven ability to distribute wealth, of course, often confronted those who saw, not traditional knowledge, but the ability to 'cut the paper' as the key to the government's unlimited wealth. The pig metaphor was also used to attack the self-interested bisnis man or conversely, to argue that only business men had proven managerial skills or the ability to ignore kinsmen's demands, and thereby protect the interests of all Chuave people. More generally, campaign rhetoric also focussed on
other facets of political thought I have treated throughout this thesis, for instance, the fundamental importance of law and order.

The use of traditional metaphors in the campaign is simply one example of a more general, often unconscious, process by which people accept innovative or foreign ideas. They lend a degree of continuity and familiarity to rapidly changing ideals or modes of behaviour. Some men's repudiation of the pig-cutting metaphor - the suggestion that the elections were not about 'cutting pig' at all - best illustrates the discrepancy between new and old political ideals and behaviours. In this instance, men saw pork distribution as tied to an egocentric kinship network; but the choice of a candidate, they argued, should ideally transcend the parochial interests of clan and community. In short, they asked people to 'judge the talk' - to choose between idealized models of leadership rather than make choices based on blood or kinship ties. Yet in the final analysis, the results are not easily attributed to campaign rhetoric, and they do not reflect a preference for any particular type of leader or set of beliefs. Thus, candidates' final standings did not, in any way, correlate with party membership, mission affiliation, government experience, business interests, or other key characteristics that differentiated candidates and were the subject of so much campaign rhetoric. Rather, one basic principle explains the results: the degree of political competition within the hierarchical system of corporate political units.

This fact does not prevent men from using the relative success or failure of particular candidates to prove the legitimacy of certain ideals. To take only one example, Baundo's victory, though a result of the fragmentation of votes in other areas and the weakness of a candidate in a bordering tribe, indicated to certain men a preference for a Pangu candidate. Similarly, others argued that Baundo was free from *bisnis* involvement and, as he was an SDA pastor, his victory proved that people sought a member who was a true Christian. Baundo also, however coincidently, represented a compromise between young, educated candidates and old, traditional style big men: Kamara men often mentioned that Baundo was a 'true' man, an adult who was also literate and who could in no way be tagged with the educated 'big head' label.
That a percentage of Chuave people do in fact eschew clan ties to vote for other candidates (and here again Baundo's victory was a blend of new and old behaviours) only reaffirms the potency of political ideologies which candidates both generate and espouse during the course of an election drama. Thus, if the elections did not provide a clear decision for the concept of conscience voting, or a preference for one set of political beliefs over another, they were at least a forum for intense discussion and debate of the relative merits of different leaders and different political ideas. The relative showings of particular candidates, of course, had important consequences for their political futures. Some would later use the results to legitimize their political standing within communities or to challenge political rivals. For others who fared poorly, the election was the swan song of their political careers. These individual victories or defeats, however, in no way detract from the central contribution all candidates made. Because they represented not only different political groups, but also different political ideas, they were essential participants in the continuing process of political change and the vanguard of a movement, which, in seeking consistency and consensus from discrepant ideals, was attempting to create a new and better world.
One indication of poor centre-provincial relations is the fact that the National Planning Office never saw a copy of this report (Standish 1980: 9).

The payment was for a Kebai man who was married to a Duman woman and had died after an alleged sorcery attack by his wife's agnates while he was working on a coastal plantation. According to eyewitness accounts, the fight began when the deceased's sister attempted to grab the man's daughter from her Sinasina mother.

The Simbu Electoral Law requires only that candidates are at least 21 years old and are born or have continuously resided in Simbu for 12 months. Martin and Michael's confusion arose from statements by the DOIC and others that people from other provinces could not vote unless they had been Simbu residents during the past year.

The 1964 Open electorate also included part of Sinasina district, in addition to Chuave, Elimbari and Nambaiyufa. The numbers of candidates contesting national elections are as follows: 4 in 1964, 10 in 1968, 11 in 1972, 15 in 1977, and 24 in 1982.

For an excellent account of how candidates used cash and beer in the 1977 Simbu elections, see Standish (in press). Another example was the behaviour of Iambakey Okuk who was unsuccessful in his 1982 re-election bid in the Simbu Regional Electorate. He gave 4,000 cartons of beer at a pre-vote rally held in Kundiawa (Canberra Times, 4 June 1982). As in national elections, the sale of alcohol was prohibited throughout the polling period.

Candidates who receive less than 10 per cent of the votes polled by the winning candidate forfeit their deposit.

In Simbu a total of 235 candidates stood, an average of ten per electorate. Of these, six were female; most, like Ogan Kom, were active in the Yangpola Didiman Association (Standish 1981: 13).

Baundo was the only candidate I interviewed who kept a running total of his expenditures. Often men estimated they spent between K200 and K300 for 'food': travel costs, beer, cigarettes, and small cash gifts. In the three electorates, several candidates claimed they spent in excess of K1,000 and, in one case, K2,000. These claims, however, may have been sheer highlands hyperbole. Except for Baundo's use of wealth which was successful (see text), I found no correlation between estimated expenditures and candidates' final standings.

As well as acknowledging the co-operation of all voters and candidates in Chuave, I would like to express my thanks to Stanly Nuna, Provincial Returning Officer; James Kenna, Chuave Returning Officer; and Vincent Duambo, Presiding Officer, for their co-operation and encouragement of my study. Because few voters are literate, people whisper their choice of candidate to polling officials who then mark the ballot.
10. The analogy is to a *trik man* or card shark who takes advantage of older men's ignorance of cards to win at gambling.

11. The DOIC was wisely and noticeably absent from his office for two days following the announcement of results. Assaults on government officials or the damaging of government buildings have occurred in Chuave and throughout Simbu following national elections.
No person living in Chuave has been left untouched by the complex changes that have occurred during the last half-century. Even those few people residing permanently in their pig houses, outside the mainstream of village life, possess steel tools, tin utensils and western clothing - constant reminders of the imprint of an alien culture on their lives. For most people, however, change has been anything but superficial. It has penetrated the very heart of Chuave society and, as a result, traditional modes of interaction, institutions and ideologies have been modified, transformed and, in some cases, abandoned.

In this thesis I have documented various forces that have shaped current political action. And because change is a process that illuminates, rather than obscures, those practices that show continuity with traditional culture, I have also located the major sources of political stability in Chuave. I have isolated analytically - often in separate chapters - different facets of political life. This has allowed me to partially disentangle the inter-related changes occurring in Chuave, as well as to trace systematically the development of new beliefs, behavioural patterns and political organizations that I consider most relevant to the study of current leadership. Wherever possible, but particularly in the preceding chapter, I have also shown how these different facets of Chuave politics merge or conflict in terms of the co-operation or competition between rival big men. In this conclusion I review what I believe to be the most manifest features of the Chuave political system as a whole.

Peter Lawrence has contrasted western state and traditional New Guinea stateless societies (1971: 3-6). Western society, he suggests, is 'compartmentalized'; the political system, largely defined by the state apparatus, is analytically distinguishable from equally specialized economic and religious systems. In contrast, traditional New Guinea societies were 'generalized'. In the absence of state institutions politics is embedded in social, economic and religious behaviour. Big men are 'microcosms' of their society; men who possess generalized skills and operate within a hierarchy of co-ordinate groups whose members perform the same tasks and are linked by ties of kinship,
affinity and descent \textit{(ibid.: 14)}.

Co-ordinate social groups responsible for specialized functions, as well as mutually exclusive leadership roles, existed in a number of traditional New Guinea societies (see for example, Lowman-Vadya 1971; Morauta 1973; Hau'ofa 1981). However, as one version of two opposed and ideal societies—simple and complex—Lawrence's dichotomy is fundamentally sound. When speaking of pre-contact Chuave politics, for example, men often suggest that big men who possessed special skills or characteristics dominated particular situations. Strong or aggressive leaders gained influence when inter-clan tensions ran high; ritual experts sometimes controlled initiations or other religious ceremonies. But all men characterize major big men as generalists. They argue these leaders combined ascribed and achieved characteristics and were equally comfortable as well as influential in many situations: whether settling a dispute, organizing a feast, mobilizing men for battle, or performing a ritual. Indeed, the flexibility of hereditary ideology indicates men's propensity to generalize rather than compartmentalize traditional leadership roles. Thus, rather than strictly adhering to father-son succession and thereby isolating the status of 'first man', men adjust their age-grades to allow skilled leaders to claim this lineage or subclan position. Traditional big men competed with rivals representing parallel segmentary groups and their authority was restricted to the patrilineal clan-village.

The contemporary Chuave political system differs from its traditional counterpart in three key respects. First, Chuave is a part of an emergent nation-state. The political system, therefore, is partially defined by the presence of state institutions at the local level, and a great deal of political competition revolves around obtaining government office. Second, leaders interact within a greatly expanded political arena incorporating former enemy groups. These units are bound together not simply by ties of kinship or co-residence, but also through their relationship to state institutions and by men's commitment to common causes and beliefs. Third, although it would be inappropriate to suggest that Chuave is a 'complex' society, political behaviour in general and leadership in particular is, in many ways, compartmentalized.
The diversity of traditional cultures in Papua New Guinea has ensured that local responses to the process of encapsulation have varied greatly. But insomuch as the forces of political change in Chuave - missionization, cash cropping, the imposition of a state organization - are common to all Papua New Guinea societies, then, to a certain extent, all modern political systems must share the features I have outlined. I believe, therefore, that a central task facing political anthropologists is to describe, from a village perspective, how the diversification of leadership roles and political offices has effected the differential distribution of power and authority within contemporary political systems integrated in the nation-state.

Political, economic and religious behaviour, of course, remain closely linked at the local level. Furthermore, patrilineal ideology and loyalty to the clan continues to colour almost every aspect of political behaviour. For example, it will be clear from the previous chapter that current politicians must adjust their behaviour to approximate an idea of the model Christian. Young men also recognize that the distribution of wealth is closely associated with political authority - so much so that they sponsor ceremonies during campaigns. More flagrantly, candidates use wealth to attempt to purchase votes. And loyalty to clan or tribal candidates, more than any other factor, best explains election outcomes. However, many Chuave people now view a candidate's use of wealth in election contexts, as well as a man's business involvement, as a political liability. I would also suggest that conscience voting for politicians belonging to foreign clans and tribes will, over successive elections, gain credence and serve to decrease the importance of group membership for election results.

Morauta, in concluding her excellent analysis of local politics in Madang, draws a distinction between 'pragmatic' and 'ideological' conflict (1974: 147-162). In the former, kin ties, co-residence and ceremonial co-operation bind the members of a village together in opposition to other villages. Ideological conflict arises between men belonging to the same village and simultaneously links them with those men in other villages who share a common cause or belief. People's sharing of ideological values, therefore, promotes integration between groups; pragmatic conflict re-inforces the pre-existing autonomy of traditional socio-political units (ibid.: 161).
Morauta's principal example of ideological conflict, the opposition between cargo cultists and Christians, resembles the tension that arises between fundamentalist sects and Lutherans in Chuave. Thus, cross-clan or cross-tribal commitments to fundamentalist ideology served partly to influence voting patterns in the provincial elections. It is possible to predict, with I believe a great deal of certainty, that fundamentalist bloc voting will increase in future. I have also noted that, within the village, fundamentalists co-operate in a number of projects rather than rely on Lutheran big men or other agnates. At the inter-personal level one of the most strained of all Chuave relationships occurs between *songons* and their fundamentalist children.

For Chuave, however, I would rephrase Morauta's distinction in terms of the conflict that arises between men's allegiance to agnates versus their commitment to men belonging to other clans. Men clearly recognize that clan unity, and to a lesser extent the solidarity of other segmentary groups, endangers area-wide integration. They attempt to overcome this dilemma by ensuring different groups are represented in any co-operative task. But at the same time, for both pragmatic and ideological reasons, clan boundaries are consistently threatened; and at least at the level of the tribe or *eria*, integration of clans into a wider political entity and inter-group co-operation in everyday affairs are defining characteristics of the contemporary political system.

The persistence of clan solidarity has been a major source of stability in the Chuave political system since contact. Men continue to cling to the clan in order to orient themselves in a rapidly changing world and they still give clan goals priority. Thus, people believe that ideally magistrates should be unbiased in settling inter-clan disputes or that councillors should equitably distribute government resources for the entire Chuave area. Yet inter-clan competition in elections involving these offices is intense. This is due to the fact that it is prestigious for a clan to elect an official and, more pragmatically, because men realize that the behaviour of these officials is often tainted by their membership of particular groups. As re-election rests on clan-wide support magistrates realize they must occasionally protect their agnates in disputes; councillors do
give priority to their agnates when obtaining government loans or grants for businesses or small scale development projects.

In the absence of warfare, the inflation and expansion of ceremonial exchange have reinforced clan unity in the face of a number of countervailing pressures - changes in settlement patterns, the introduction of missions and local government wards - which threatened the boundaries of this corporate unit. To date even those segments of clans residing in different communities have continued to co-operate in exchange. Intra-clan competition between men's houses and subclans is still evident in Chuave. Major prestations, however, require that leaders representing these groups work together to protect the clan's ceremonial reputation. But today men belonging to different clans within common villages and, more rarely, the larger community, contribute to prestations which were once the sole responsibility of the clan. As yet these contributions take place on an *ad hoc* basis. But because shared locality has created ties of friendship between men's house groups, village prestations do sometimes occur - usually in Lutheran-organized mortuary feasts. Other, more formal inter-village prestations may also come to rival those exchanges that are currently the concern of clans.

However, men and women's interaction at markets, church services and village courts provides leaders with immense opportunities to establish reputations beyond their clan or village. All tribesmen respect major leaders who are often invited to the most distant men's houses to discuss a range of everyday matters. Rather than creating intra-village conflict, people's shared beliefs concerning the need for development, law and order, and Christian brotherhood promote inter-clan integration and reinforce the legitimacy of big men who act as recognized authorities within village court and council areas. Thus, although people criticize frequently particular councillors and magistrates, they rarely question their authority. Men fully accept the right of magistrates belonging to other clans or communities to settle any dispute; councillors rarely, if ever, seek to consult other big men before attending council meetings.

Ideally people believe government officials should be well
distributed in different clans and communities. Thus, while elections are highly competitive processes which often produce a shift in representation between clans, councillors often appoint peace officers to disadvantaged clans or villages to redress any imbalance in officials that successive election outcomes produce. Similarly, songons meet to discuss church policies for the whole eria. But they attempt to ensure that the opposition between different clans does not endanger church affairs by rotating meetings along a circuit to cover every clan under the church's jurisdiction.

More rarely, co-ordinated political action by leaders belonging to different tribes and erias occurs. Songons from throughout Chuave join together to collect funds and build churches. Business men have arranged large demonstrations involving people from the entire Chuave-Elimbari-Nambaiyuafa area to protest against council and provincial government policies which they regard as harmful to private enterprise. Different village courts select representatives and form temporary committees to mediate disputes that threaten to erupt into violence between clans or tribes belonging to different erias.

Such special interest action - like the suggestion that any future eria council should consist of select business men, songons, court officials, as well as councillors - points to the increasing compartmentalization of leadership roles. When speaking of different leaders or aspects of their society, Chuave men occasionally use the Pidgin bureaucratic phrase narapela depatmen (another department) to differentiate between ideas and actions associated with bisnis, particular missions or alternative branches of government. In doing so, they identify a leader's sphere of influence, if not discrete political domains. As I have maintained throughout this thesis, people regard these 'departments' as separate, but in many ways equal, avenues to power.

Certainly it is no longer possible to characterize any Chuave man as a microcosm of his society. The offices of magistrate and peace officer are, by law, exclusive. The time and energy a man must spend to become a successful entrepreneur or magistrate make these professions incompatible. The material resources the ceremonial leader
and business man must use to gain outstanding reputations lead to a natural separation of these roles. And because the Lutheran church appointed leaders in the 1960s, songons are often middle aged or old men who have poor Pidgin skills and who are conservative in outlook - qualities that, many men argue, should preclude them from holding government office.

Some of these leadership roles are more easily merged than others. Certainly, a reputation as a group representative in ceremonial exchange often catapults these men to government office. Conversely, government officials - and, at mortuary feasts, songons - often act as group representatives and much more rarely seize control of distributions. Many Lutheran songons are also small business men. To this extent men sometimes manage to act in several different capacities. Yet in selecting songons the Lutheran Church avoids, wherever possible, those men who are major entrepreneurs. Furthermore, unlike fundamentalists, Lutherans discourage even the youngest and most literate songons or wokman from seeking government office.

Thus, even where there are no practical reasons for men being unable to merge different leadership roles, political ideology often prevents them from doing so. Magistrates and peace officers are ideally associated with opposed characteristics. Men say a 'cold', even-tempered, and self-controlled big man is best equipped to dispense impartial justice; a 'hot', strong, aggressive leader is required to punish law breakers or instil in people fear and respect for court decisions. Business men are disadvantaged in their attempts to control distributions or become councillors because they are criticized as self-interested. Conversely, a councillor endangers his chance of re-election if he starts a small tradestore; he is immediately accused of misappropriating council funds. By far the most rigid separation of roles occurs between court and council offices - even though the qualities men seek in any government official are similar. Although no man has yet held these roles concurrently, men have, in fact, held court and council offices at different points in time. Incumbent magistrates, defeated in election bids, have become councillors one month later. I have also noted how Kopon failed to obtain a single vote in the court election, but was re-elected unopposed at KTK ward's councillor.
The separation of leadership statuses, therefore, is in many ways the result of personal preference and individual ambition. But the argument against 'double work' is also a pervasive, potent, and egalitarian political philosophy. It has arisen, I would argue, from the interaction of big men who have been forced to map out spheres of influence rather than face prolonged and open confrontations with rivals which could damage their reputations. This process began with the conflict between mission and government bosbois in the 1940s. Most recently, tension and open confrontations between councillors and magistrates over a number of issues - for example, the control of court fines, tax collection or the right to attend various government meetings - indicates that these leaders have yet to reach total agreement on their relative spheres of influence.

Viewed from a follower's perspective this political ideology provides men with a rationale that they can use to prevent the emergence of overly ambitious, self-centred or domineering leaders. Chuave men clearly recognize this when they suggest that those outstanding men who do combine roles become 'too big' within and beyond the clan. Thus, those peace officers who later manage to become magistrates are invariably men who have demonstrated that they do not use force excessively against men of a given community. Entrepreneurs who are elected to council must have proven their commitment to the group by using their wealth in exchange.

The combination of roles, therefore, often distinguishes exemplary leaders who become renowned throughout the Chuave area. More often than not, however, these different leadership positions are separate, and it is equally true that outstanding success in a given field compensates for a man's inability to act in other spheres. An experienced councillor or successful entrepreneur can gain recognition throughout the region even if he remains isolated from court, church or ceremonial affairs. In terms of everyday action, however, court offices involve the greatest degree of influence - though competition for these positions is so intense that it is exceedingly difficult for court officials to be re-elected. Even the magistrate, however, must temper his power in everyday discussions concerning council, church or business matters because he must acknowledge the expertise of other leaders.
Because men admire success in any activity, all leaders appear equal in a range of everyday affairs, and men's house discussions remain relatively consensual in nature. Indeed, all Chuave big men share certain characteristics. Above all else they are self-assured in public gatherings and, at least in the vernacular, skilled verbally. They have proven their commitment to their agnates by scrupulously contributing to their subclan and men's house exchanges. They actively take part, in co-operation with other big men, in the organization of ceremonies or work projects.

But beyond the clan or village, most leaders gain recognition and a real degree of influence only within the context of their specialized roles. Authority in Chuave, therefore, is often contextual and support is necessarily fluid. Leaders dominate, and often gain absolute authority over, particular events and discussions. Consequently, followers must be prepared to lend their support to big men belonging to their own and other clans and villages. Chuave men constantly shift their support between big men during the course of a single day or week depending on the context of events. They do so not simply because they have agnatic ties to a certain leader, but also according to whether or not a leader occupies a church or government office or is a recognized expert in ceremony or western business.

As yet I have refrained from referring to Kafaina because, as a syncretic movement, it encapsulates many aspects of the Chuave political system as a whole. The movement is exceptional and atypical to the extent that women isolate themselves in a shroud of Kafaina activity, often failing to take an active part in everyday political processes. But Kafaina has arisen in reaction to men's domination of every avenue to political prominence and power in Chuave. And the movement's strength derives, in part, from women's replication of male's political processes. Excluded from exchange, business, councils, missions and village courts, women have incorporated all these facets of political life into Kafaina organization. Kafaina activity - however consciously or unwittingly - provides a caricature of men's political behaviour. In a single stroke women demonstrate that they are comfortable and capable in a range of political situations - from organizing ceremonial exchanges to convening courts. It is the Kafaina bosmeri who is a microcosm of Chuave society: a generalist leader whose power is limited paradoxically to
Kafaina women falter only in their reliance on men's managerial skill and their inability to control the businesses that their savings create - failings that may well prove to be temporary. But by using ceremonial relationships to generate cash savings, women manage to blend the western and exchange sectors of the Chuave economy. They thereby present to men a unique organizational model which may, in future, serve to spark other creative and co-operative efforts in local development between different clans and villages.

Kafaina has overcome the central dilemma of being a female in a patrilineal, virilocal society - powerlessness which results from being a class of disenfranchised and disorganized individuals rather than true members of a political group. Within the context of Kafaina women are no longer simply individuals whose marriages provide men with opportunities to exchange valuables and establish inter-group ties. They have themselves created exchange networks and have thus gained political power. More broadly, the Kafaina movement is an excellent example of how shared beliefs can transcend the parochial interests of particular groups and promote integration within a large geographic area. Kafaina ideology and organization provide a framework which binds women - and indirectly men - residing in hundreds of men's house groups in different census divisions and provinces. The Kafaina movement, therefore, foreshadows a degree of societal integration and pan-regional identity which will, I am sure, produce concerted political action on an unprecedented scale during future decades.

I would like to conclude this thesis by returning to a point I raised in my introduction. There I spoke briefly of the anachronisms, common in Chuave, that are born of the process of rapid change. Alternatively, people use their knowledge of past customs to suit current needs and ambitions. Kafaina is a compelling illustration - one of many in Chuave - of how people reshape and remodel traditional practices to achieve present-day goals. Women combine pre-contact decorations with western ones to create a uniform of the Kafaina movement; they transform once antiquated prohibitions to protect cash savings. The traditional gains fresh relevance for people's lives by becoming undeniably contemporary in context and meaning.
All too often anthropologists treat change as a unique phenomenon, as a subject that can temporarily be set aside in order to describe an institution or entire culture as if it existed in a pristine environment - the historic ethnographic present. It is my firm belief that anthropologists must come to grips with change - as Papua New Guineans have - and begin to use their knowledge of traditional societies as a means for the further understanding of contemporary issues and behaviour. Unless this is accomplished, then the people who are the subject of our research, and who in future will become anthropologists' most strident critics, will rightfully view our discipline as anachronistic in presenting analyses of cultures that do not adequately reflect current reality.
Voting patterns for the 1981 Elimbari Local Government Council elections

In May 1981 Leeanne Greenwood and I acted as assistants to patrol officer Ben Beiyo during the election of 13 Chuave councillors. The election of Elimbari census division councillors occurred simultaneously but we did not observe this. Within Chuave three councillors were elected unopposed. Two of the remaining ten elections failed to separate voters from different clans. I am able, therefore, to present clan voting patterns for the remaining eight wards. As electoral rolls were seldom used I am unable to provide a complete breakdown of votes by subclan or men's house composition. Just over one-half of all eligible voters cast ballots.

The figures and brief supplementary explanations are provided as illustration of the range of variation in voting patterns. Both the patrol officer involved and the voters themselves allowed me to record individual votes and so gain an understanding of voting patterns which ballot box totals often disguise. At each polling place I explained that I would not reveal individual votes and that results would be tabulated and publicized according to the clan as a whole. Nowhere did I meet opposition to this proposal, and I would like to thank the Chuave people for their co-operation. Tables are arranged so that the incumbent is always candidate A1, and A1 and A2 are natal members of Clan A.

### Election One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan A</th>
<th>Clan B</th>
<th>Clan C</th>
<th>Ballot Box Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>123*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I was unable to account for only 123 of 141 (87.2%) of all votes in this election.

### Explanation

Candidate B received 86.5 per cent of his clan's votes in contrast to A1's 35 per cent. This is one example of people failing to support a candidate from their own clan, and several possible explanations can be suggested for this pattern. First, the two candidates were leaders of separate missions; A1 is a leader of the SDA mission and B is a Lutheran pastor. At least some of B's success in obtaining votes from A1's clan, therefore, is explained by mission affiliation. In later questioning men from Clan A who had voted for B, eight of ten mentioned B's leadership within the mission as a reason for their support. Second, A1 had resided with his wife in Clan C for over a year prior to the election. This group, who did not put forward a candidate, gave 20 of 31 or 64.5 per cent of their votes to A1. But several men from A1's clan suggested that A1 had become unconcerned with the welfare of his natal group, and by residing...
elsewhere AI may have lost some of his kinsmen's votes. Finally, the election and appointment of village court officials occurred one month previous to the council election. Clan A and C had both succeeded in electing a magistrate, and a popular man from Clan A was also re-appointed unopposed as constable. Thus Clan B had no government representative and many voters suggested that candidate B was elected so as to ensure that each clan had some representation: clans often attempt to maintain a balance of representatives within the ward so as to prevent conflict between groups and this was probably the deciding factor in the election's outcome.

### Election Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan A</th>
<th>Clan B</th>
<th>Clan C</th>
<th>Ballot Box Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A2</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Explanation**

Candidate B, Tiene Maima, is a very successful business man and Lutheran *songon* whose reputation extends well beyond his own group. Nonetheless he was able to win only seven of 92 votes from his opponents' clan. I was unable to accurately record the names of these seven voters and those people from Clan C who voted for this man. Speaking generally, men of Clan C stated that Tiene was regarded as a 'good' man and that they had given him their votes because he had aided them in past exchanges, or frequently donated his truck to use for community and church projects. While it is often characteristic to claim *post facto* support for the winning candidate this would seem to be an accurate rationale for Tiene's success in Clan C for he had no close kin relationships or a specific exchange relationship with men of this clan.

As is common when no candidate stands, Clan C's turn-out - 30 per cent of eligible voters - was low. Candidate A2 stood to contest the incumbency of A1 who was regarded as an inept and ineffective councillor. His may be regarded as a 'negative' candidacy; while he told men prior to the election that he had little chance of winning he was determined to damage the chances of his rival within the clan. Despite losing to Tiene therefore, his victory in numbers over A1 could be used as evidence of his support within his natal group and as a rationale for his candidacy in future elections. (No evidence exists for the possibility that Tiene attempted to 'front' A2 in order to enhance his chances. Even though he had the economic means to accomplish such a strategy, I believe such a tactic would be totally out of character in this instance.)
### Election Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan A</th>
<th>Clan B</th>
<th>Clan C</th>
<th>Ballot Box Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>95</strong></td>
<td><strong>103</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Explanation**

Clan C boycotted this election because they wished to protest their inclusion in a ward that forced them to be separated from their traditional subtribe members. This example shows both the corporateness of clan voting, and the degree of competition for government positions which can arise within the clan. Clan B voted entirely for its own candidates. Three men in Clan A voted for candidates in Clan B on the basis of close personal friendships they had formed with particular candidates. The eight votes received by B2 are easily explained by his residence in a men's house in Clan A - segments of Clans A and B share a common village and this leader, Andrew Wahgi, a former village court constable who was removed from office because of his violent behaviour and an attack on the council clerk, moves freely between men's houses of his natal group and his wife's group, frequently acting as a mediator within the village. The successful candidate A2 was a former village court magistrate who had been defeated in recent elections, and was the younger brother of A1, the incumbent. The incumbent was 'first man' of his subclan but at 55 was regarded as too old and an inefficient Pidgin speaker. Immediately after his election A2 was regarded as not only councillor but also the new leader of his subclan and the 'first man' of his age-grade. This election as government leader, therefore, both coincided with and marked the transition of subclan leadership. Candidates A3, B1 and B4 were all young men less than 30 years old who had as yet failed to demonstrate the qualities of a big man. They were regarded as giaman (false) candidates, and those few votes they received came, I believe, from members of their own lineage.

### Election Four

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan A</th>
<th>Clan B</th>
<th>Clan C</th>
<th>Clan D</th>
<th>Ballot Box Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A1</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
<td><strong>132</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Explanation

With a single exception, Clans A and B voted en bloc for their respective candidates. The fragmentation of Clan C's votes is to be explained by two factors. First, as is often the case, Candidate C was a giaman candidate. At the age of 31 and although fluent in Pidgin, he had failed to prove himself as a potential big man, and was regarded by his predominantly Lutheran constituency as a 'bighead' and outsider because he belonged to the New Tribes mission. He had twice stood for council election and failed each time. In such instances, therefore, voters do not hesitate to give their votes to 'true' big men of other clans, and in this situation, were encouraged to do so by their own group's big man, a magistrate who had no desire to run for council. Second, candidate B was married to a woman of Clan C, was resident in this group and despite being an affine was regarded as a minor leader of Clan C and superior to C as a recognized big man.

This election also marked the end of Al's, Kuri Mori, 30 year reign as a government leader. A former luluai, councillor for 20 years, and member of the Simbu Interim Provincial Government, his power and reputation had waned as he grew old. Aged 60 he was described by many as befuddled by recent political developments and as a man whose reputation was based entirely on past achievements. His reputation and former exploits had brought great prestige to his clan and as the results demonstrate, they fully supported him. But men outside his natal group were determined to elect a new councillor. His fellow clansmen had sensed the possibility of his defeat and had suggested he retire. This advice went unheeded, however, and Kuri affirmed to the end his faith in government stating simply that 'the people had the power' to remove him and that until he lost an election he would not resign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Five</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanation

Here the cross-over voting between Clan A and B, a subtribe, is difficult to explain. While accounting for only 20 of 185 (10.8 per cent) of votes cast by Clans A and B, none of those factors previously mentioned - residence, marriage ties, religion or a desire to balance government positions between clans - is applicable. Because I could not record particular cases of this voting behaviour, I can only suggest that such small out-flowing of votes from the clan results both from personal grievances against candidates from ego's own clan, and on the basis of personal friendships with candidates of other groups. Because
people also claim that they vote for men solely on the basis of ability and ignore agnatic relationships some of these votes may also approximate the western idea of conscience voting.

This election also easily demonstrates the importance of clan size. Clan A is comprised of 125 eligible voters versus 197 for Clan B. In order to have polled 105 votes, therefore, a turn-out of 84 per cent of candidate A1's group was necessary. In fact the turn-out was only 52 per cent.

**Election Six**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan A</th>
<th>Clan B</th>
<th>Ballot Box Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>119</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Explanation**

In this closely contested election, B3 almost succeeded in defeating the incumbent and managed to out-poll his major rivals with Clan B on the basis of the 32 votes he received from Clan A - 60 per cent of his total votes came from outside his natal group. This candidate, age 40, was the only candidate who could claim a direct relationship with Clan A, his wife's natal group. While resident in Clan B part of his success was undoubtedly due to this affinal link and exchange relationships he had with men of Clan B. In addition, as *songon* he could use the context of mission affairs to act regularly as a leader beyond his own group. With the exception of the incumbent, furthermore, he was the only candidate whose status provided him with this type of opportunity.

**Election Seven**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan A</th>
<th>Clan B</th>
<th>Ballot Box Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A1</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>214</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Explanation

Despite losing four votes to B2 whose wife was a member of Clan B, as well as 25 votes to B1 who was an SDA pastor, the incumbent, a Lutheran, managed to mobilize his own clan and poll 71 per cent of his group's votes.

Attempts had been made by Clan B to put forward only one candidate because it was realized that the incumbent for nine years had twice served on the council finance committee and managed to allocate council funds for several development projects. But the rivalry between B1 and B2 could not be resolved and their dual candidacy ensured the incumbent's victory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Eight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A1 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A2 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B2 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate C1 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate C2 _0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanation

In this election Clans B and C once again show solid support for their candidates with cross-over votes totalling 9.3 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively. Only 47.6 per cent of Clan A, however, voted for their candidates, one of whom was the incumbent. The second candidate was not regarded as a serious contender. Once again several factors, including mission affiliation and affinal relationships could be cited to account for this pattern. But in addition to failing to gain the support of his clansmen, A1 also failed to mobilize his group - only 33 per cent of Clan A turned out to vote. Both the vote itself and the apathy of Clan A's members, I would argue, are explained best by the incumbent's failure to fulfil the requirements of his office. He had continually promised to have an aid post built within his ward but had been outmanoeuvred by another councillor within his tribe. Within Clans B and C candidates were rivals and leaders of their respective subclans. On the surface, that is before the votes were counted, the contest had seemed perfectly balanced, each clan having two candidates. Candidate C2 polled only 60.8 per cent of his own clan's votes, and the turn-out by his clansmen was actually lower than that of Clan B. Yet because of the vote split in Clan B, he was the winning contestant. The unpredictable nature of this election, therefore, demonstrates the statement made by Chuave men that elections are truly 'like a card game'.
Summary

Together these examples demonstrate two major trends. First they show that the clan remains the most important political unit and that a candidate's primary support is within this group. But clan boundaries are not inviolable and a number of factors - specific affinal relationships, mission affiliation and the strength of a candidate's reputation beyond his own clan, or inversely, the weakness of candidates from ego's own group often lead to votes being cast for leaders of other groups.

Second, the degree of competition varies from clan to clan - as I would argue it always has. In some clans, no man chooses to stand, in others several men compete even when it is realized that their rivalry decreases the possibility of the group's electing a councillor. In those instances where a candidate fails to emerge within a particular clan, this group's votes may be critical to the success or failure of other candidates within the ward.

Although ballot box totals often disguise the particular voting patterns within the ward, people clearly perceive that votes cross clan boundaries. Candidates stress the voters' right to choose, by secret ballot, the best candidate - often encouraging people to ignore blood ties. In so doing, candidates and voters recognize the democratic process for what it is: a competitive and sometimes unpredictable enterprise - a game of cards for the high stakes of government office.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Administration publications and unpublished material

Cleland, R.D.M. PR 18 1954-1955 (Goroka).
Downs, B. CPR 1967.
Downs, I.G.F. PR 1939.
PR June 1940.
PR October 1940.

Electoral Law for Provincial Government Elections (Simbu province), 1980, Electoral Comission, Boroko.

Faulkner, P. CPR 1967.
Fowler, N. CPR 7 1952-1953.
CPR 3 1953-1954.


CPR 24 1958.
McBride, B. CPR 4 1952.
CPR February 1958.
McNeil, M.V. CPR 1957.
CPR 4 1956.
CPR 1956.

Mogna, J. CPR 1 1981.

National Statistical Office Census Figures (1981), Chimbu Rural Community Register, P.O. Box Wards Strip, Port Moresby.


General Bibliography


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Journal/Book Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canberra Times</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 June 1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Counts, Dorothy.

Counts, D. and D.

Criper, C.


Epstein, A.L.


Feil, D.K.


Finney B.R.


Forge, J.A.W.

Gulliver, P.H.
Hallpike, C.R.
1977  *Bloodshed and Vengeance in the Papuan Mountains.*

Hatanaka, S.
1970  'Elections and Political Consciousness in the Chiambu District',

1972  *Leadership and Socio-Economic Change In Sinasina.*

Hau'ofa, Epeli.

Hawkes, K.

Hayano, D.M.
1974  'Misfortune and Traditional Political Leadership among the Tauna Awa of New Guinea',

Hide, R.

Howlett, D., Hide, R., Young, E., with Arba, J., Bi, H., and Kaman, B.

Hughes, Ian.
Canberra: Department of Prehistory, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University.

Josephides, L.

Langness, L.L.
Lawrence, P.

de Lepervanche, Marie.

Lowman-Vayda, C.

Marshall, M. (ed)

Meggitt, M.J.


Morauta, L.


Munster, J.

Newman, P.L.

Nilles, J.

Parker, R.S.
Pascoe, N.
1975

Podolefsky, A.M.
1978


Read K.E.
1952

1959

Reay, Marie.
1959

1964

1965

1970

1975
'Politics, development and women in the rural Highlands', Administration for Development Vol. 5: 4-12.

1975-1976

1976

1980

Ross, J.A.
1965

Sahlins, M.D.
1963
Salisbury, R.F.


Schafer, A.


Sexton, L.


Standish, B.


Strathern, A.


1979 'Gender Ideology and Money in Mount Hagen', Man (n.s.) Vol. 14: 530-548.

Strathern, M.


Strathern, A. and Strathern, M.

Swartz, M.J., Turner, V.W., and Tuden, A. (eds)  
1966 'Introduction' in Political Anthropology, 1-42.  

Swartz, M. (ed)  

Swick, Joyce.  
1966 'Chuave Phonological Hierarchy', in S.A. Wurm (ed),  
Canberra: Linguistic Circle of Canberra Publications.

Townsend, D.  
1977 'Local Stresses From International Trade', Yagl Ambu,  
Vol. 4, No. 3: 162-173.

Turner, Charles V.  
1964 'The socio-religious Significance of Baptism in  

1968 'The Sinasina "Big Man" Complex: A Central Culture  
Theme', Practical Anthropology Vol. 15, No. 1: 16-23.

Turner, Victor.  
1974 Dramas, Fields and Metaphors. Ithaca: Cornell  
University Press.

Van Velsen, J.  
1967 'The Extended case method and Situational Analysis',  
A.L. Epstein (ed), The Craft of Social Anthropology,  
129-149. London: Tavistock.

1969 'Procedural Informality, Reconciliation and False  
Comparisons', in Max Gluckman (ed), Ideas and  
Procedures in African Customary Law, 137-150. London  
Oxford University Press.

Vincent, J.  
1978 'Political Anthropology: Manipulative Strategies',  

Wagner, R.  
1974 'Are there Social Groups in the New Guinea  
Highlands?', in M.J. Leaf (ed), Frontiers of  

1977 'Speaking For Others: Power and Identity as Factors  
in Daribi Mediumistic Hysteria', Journal de la  
Societe des Oceanistes Nos. 56-57: 145-152.
Warren, N.
1976

Warry, W.
1982

Watson, James B.
1971

Westermark, G.
1978

Whiteman, J.
1965
'Girls Puberty Ceremonies amongst the Chimbu', Anthropos Vol. 60: 410-422.

Wurm, S.A.
1971

Young, M.W.
1971
Fighting with Food. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.