
by

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Declaration

Except where otherwise indicated this thesis is my own work.

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August 1988
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ABSTRACT

In Western Europe, the late 1960’s saw the emergence of many non-state terrorist groups. Twenty years later several of these groups are still in existence, and still perpetrating terrorist acts. This thesis explores some of the factors facilitating this survival. It concentrates on relating the ideologies and propaganda of two terrorist groups, the Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA, to their wider operating environment. It concludes that there have been limited instances where the relationship between the two has been close, and terrorists have enjoyed success.

The first part of this thesis addresses the question of why the terrorists are rejecting the society in which they live, and what alternative they are proposing? It focuses on ideology and ideological sources. The second part of the thesis asks to whom and what are the terrorists trying to communicate? It analyses the propaganda of both groups within a framework of target audiences; the uncommitted, the sympathetic and the active. The third part of this thesis evaluates the success of both groups’ propaganda. It assesses to what degree the terrorists’ messages penetrated the target audiences, and to what extent they were accepted.

The thesis concludes that in the case of the Red Army Faction, although propaganda is consistent with ideological objectives, ideological objectives are not widely accepted, and even in those areas where the Red Army Faction did achieve success, the linkage with ideological objectives is weak. The Provisional IRA’s ideological objectives are also consistent with its propaganda, but are much more widely accepted than the RAF’s. This explains why the Provisional IRA has been comparatively more successful.
Neither group has achieved, nor looks like achieving, its major ideological objective, but both groups have achieved certain tactical successes. The evidence produced in this thesis suggests that these tactical successes are closely related to government responses to terrorism, especially in relation to security force behaviour, legislative changes and the treatment of terrorists in custody. Successes in these areas were attributed to propaganda’s ability to base itself on a credible derivation of ‘fact’ acceptable to the target audience. It follows from this that these are areas of the state’s counter-terrorism strategy that are the least credible, and thus in need of reassessment and further research.
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# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APO</td>
<td>Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (Extraparliamentary Opposition).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKA</td>
<td>Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Office).</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Fighting Communist Cells.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union).</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union).</td>
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<tr>
<td>DKP</td>
<td>Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (Communist Party of Germany).</td>
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<tr>
<td>INLA</td>
<td>Irish National Liberation Army.</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German Communist Party).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noraid</td>
<td>Irish Northern Aid.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.</td>
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<td>RTE</td>
<td>Radio Telefis Eireann.</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Red Army Faction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIC</td>
<td>Royal Irish Constabulary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>Royal Ulster Constabulary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>Social Democratic and Labour Party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (German Socialist Student Organisation).</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHB</td>
<td>Sozialistische Hochschulbund (Socialist Student Federation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany).</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPK</td>
<td>Sozialistische Patienten Kollectiv (Socialist Patients’ Collective).</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Sozialistische Reichspartei (Socialist Reich Party).</td>
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<tr>
<td>RZ</td>
<td>Revolutionary Cells.</td>
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<td>UDR</td>
<td>Ulster Defence Regiment.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In one respect this thesis is a reflection of the success non-state terrorist organisations have had since 1968. Since then the media have overflowed with references to yet more terrorist outrages. The bookshops too, have become full of accounts that purport to describe, explain or solve ‘terrorism’. Terrorism has inspired countless novels, films and television ‘mini-series’. No event has ever had a larger or more captive audience than the Black September organisation’s seizure of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. Terrorism, it seems, is one of the major dangers facing the modern world.

Yet there is much evidence to suggest that this is not the case. Terrorism did not emerge in 1968, and on a comparative scale non-state terrorism is fairly insignificant. Since 1968 over one million people have been killed in the nine year Iran-Iraq war. Many more have died of starvation in Africa. Countless millions have died at the hands of repressive governments. The Coca-Cola Company has probably spent more, and can afford to spend more, on promoting its product than Ireland or Greece have spent in countering terrorism. It is certainly true that in this comparative sense, terrorism has created an impact disproportionate to its significance. And in the sense that terrorism is specifically designed to do this, this thesis, along with the hundreds of works on non-state terrorism, is guilty of giving terrorists the attention they want. But does this mean non-state terrorism should be ignored?

Firstly, non-state terrorism can only be dismissed as insignificant on a broadly comparative scale. For those countries particularly subject to terrorist attack it is highly significant. Its impact and its casualty rate has had an immense effect on a very small community like Northern Ireland. Even in societies like West Germany, where the casualty rate from terrorism is insignificant, the overall impact has been great. Secondly,
terrorism as a strategy depends on the response it provokes, therefore selecting the appropriate response level is vital; over-reacting is as dangerous as under-reacting. Because response is so vital, studying terrorism is a legitimate area for academics who may be able to take a more detached and a more complete view than government-sponsored response agencies. And thirdly, while certain 'types' of terrorist activity such as hijacking may have appeared to decline, terrorism is far from being a dormant phenomenon. 1987, for example, was the worst year of 'terrorism' in Northern Ireland since 1972. Many of the issues around which terrorist groups formed in 1968 remain unresolved. No solution has been found for the Basques, the Palestinians or the Northern Irish. Rising unemployment is creating millions of dissatisfied and increasingly frustrated people all over Western Europe. The decreasing hegemony of the bi-polar international system is revealing a number of previously unpublicised ethnic conflicts in Romania, Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan. It would be an extremely unwise person who would predict the 'end' of terrorism. Therefore studies of terrorism, its causes and its ideologies will continue to have relevance to international relations for the foreseeable future.

This thesis hopes to contribute to an understanding of why non-state terrorism survives by examining the ideologies and propaganda of two groups operating in Western Europe. It attempts to explore some of the reasons why people will support terrorist organisations. Terrorism is a strategy, not an ideology; it has been used in support of both left and right-wing ideologies, and by state and non-state actors. But ideology does define the objectives for which terrorism is adopted. Therefore it is important to establish what the ideological objectives of any particular terrorist group are. It is these ideological objectives that most of the active members of a terrorist group will believe in. These objectives will also be concerned primarily with the environment in which the terrorists operate.¹ Thus it is essential that terrorism from any quarter is considered in

¹ As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the Red Army Faction's ideology has global visions, but its primary target is the Federal Republic of Germany.
relation to its operating environment. Terrorism is just not amenable to general theories; there are many types of terrorism with different causes and therefore different 'solutions'. Admittedly this thesis will shed little light on state uses of terrorism, but that is not its intention. Instead it will present two non-state groups and their operating environments, and hopefully shed some light on them.

If it is to attract any support or sympathy, a non-state terrorist group must present arguments that its ideological objectives are important enough to justify the adoption of a terrorist strategy to achieve them, and that no other means of struggle will achieve them. Before this, however, the terrorist group must bring attention to itself and what it perceives to be wrong with the current situation. It is in doing this that terrorist violence as propaganda 'by deed' is most evident. The perpetration of terrorist acts is only the most obvious manifestation of terrorist propaganda, and the one which has received the most attention from policy-makers and analysts. But it may not be the most important one, especially from the point of view of a total counter-terrorism strategy. Isolating any areas where terrorists have succeeded in attracting support or sympathy is as important as defining the areas where they have failed.

The Red Army Faction, once known as the Baader Meinhof Gang, and the Provisional IRA are probably Europe's two most recognisable indigenous terrorist groups. Both have been in existence for about the same amount of time, and both have had huge impacts on their respective societies, although for very different reasons. They are also broadly representative of the 'types' of terrorist group operating in Europe. The Red Army Faction sees itself as a communist revolutionary group working to overthrow the West German state, and can be compared to other similarly minded groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy, or Action Directe in France. The Provisional IRA sees itself as

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2 This, of course, assumes that propaganda's initial target is an uncommitted actor, and the aim is to transform this actor into a sympathetic one. But as will be seen in Chapter 5, both groups involved in this study defined a pre-existing sympathetic audience.
a nationalist group working to free Ireland of English domination, and can be compared to groups such as ETA, the Basque separatist organisation. However, while the propaganda techniques and themes may be similar, the actual content of the messages justifying or explaining behaviour is quite context specific, providing another reason for considering terrorist groups individually. It is not denied that international co-operation is important in countering terrorism, but of even more importance is the domestic environment in which terrorism survives. It is this aspect of terrorism that has received the least attention from policy-makers, governments and academics.

In essence, this thesis will attempt to answer three pairs of questions: what are the Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA rejecting and what are they trying to achieve?; to whom and what are they trying to communicate?; and have they been successful, and if so why? These three pairs of questions correspond to the three parts of this thesis.

Part I begins with a definitional discussion of terrorism, which focuses on distinguishing terrorism from other strategies of conflict, most notably guerrilla warfare. The remaining two chapters of Part I present the contextual setting necessary for any understanding of propaganda. Chapter 2 presents the historical context from which both groups emerged, and Chapter 3 outlines their ideological objectives and the sources of these ideologies.

Part II examines the propaganda of both groups. It identifies three target audiences, and devotes a chapter to each. It begins with the ‘uncommitted’ audience, then moves on to consider, in turn, the ‘sympathetic’ audience and the ‘active’ audience. Propaganda is not neutral; it aims to further the aims of the propagandist. One assumption of terrorist strategy is that violence will bring the terrorists mass support by provoking the state to adopt repressive counter-measures. Therefore a major objective of propaganda is to militarise the political situation. Violence as propaganda ‘by deed’ is
certainly instrumental in this, but accompanying it are themes designed to discredit the state, and present the state as disadvantaging a particular section of society. These themes, and the channels through which they are promoted, are aimed essentially, although not exclusively, at an ‘uncommitted’ audience. Once the uncommitted actor begins to ask why an organisation perpetrates such terrorist acts, propaganda shifts its emphasis and reclassifies the actor as at least potentially ‘sympathetic’. Here propaganda concentrates on justifying the need for violence, and attempts to widen the sympathetic audience usually by focussing on issues much narrower than the overall objective. The objective as regards the ‘sympathetic’ audience can be said to be to provoke action, and once this happens propaganda again shifts its emphasis. Within the ‘active’ audience, propaganda aims to keep the individual bound to the cause, and stresses morale boosting themes such as the inevitability of victory and the justness of the cause.

Part III tries to determine and explain the degree of success achieved by the Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA. It discusses how widely within the respective societies both group’s ideological objectives are accepted as legitimate. It also discusses the legitimacy of terrorists’ tactical objectives, and specifies the areas where tactical successes have occurred. The thesis ends by suggesting some areas where counter-terrorism strategy should be reassessed or further researched, taking special consideration of propaganda.
PART I

CONTEXT
"He who fights for a just cause, he who fights for the liberation of his country, he who fights against invasion and exploitation or single-mindedly against colonialism, can never be defined a terrorist."

Yasser Arafat, United Nations General Assembly, 1974

As will be seen, especially in Chapter 3, both groups involved in this study claim to be fighting for a just cause and liberation, and against exploitation and colonialism. They also reject the label terrorist, preferring instead to be called ‘urban guerrillas’. However, this thesis chooses to label both groups ‘terrorist’ on the grounds that they fail to exhibit the fundamental characteristics of true guerrilla groups. The reason why these groups prefer the label guerrilla is because of the pejorative connotations of the label terrorist. But terrorism has not always been such a pejorative term. Some of the nineteenth century anarchist groups willingly labelled themselves terrorist. According to Rapoport, the last group to call itself terrorist was the Stern Gang which operated in Palestine in the late 1940’s,1 and it is from about this time that pejorative connotations enter the definitional debate. The reasons for this lie in the developing global political and ideological divisions, and the growth of ‘national liberation’ movements, which professed to liberate peoples from colonial rule or oppressive political systems. A corresponding move in the United Nations and international legislation attempted to raise the status of such national liberation movements, and therein lies much of the reason why groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA) confer upon themselves the label ‘urban guerrillas’. However, what follows is an attempt to define terrorism based on the distinctions between terrorists and guerrillas. It will then be argued that despite their claims to the contrary, neither the RAF

nor the Provisional IRA qualify for national liberation movement status under even the revised international conventions.

**TERRORIST VIOLENCE**

It is the cause for which and the context in which terrorism is used that introduce political and value judgements. While context and cause are important in understanding individual terrorist groups, they need not enter the definitional debate. As a starting point for discussion, terrorism may be defined as the use of fear-inducing violence for a political purpose. Two points need immediate clarification: firstly, how does one define violence; and secondly, how can terrorism be distinguished from other types of fear-inducing violence for a political purpose, such as war?

Honderich argues that problems surrounding the definition of violence and especially political violence centre on attempts to define violence outside "ordinary usage and belief." The example he uses is Marcuse's claim that policemen, landlords and the state are engaging in violence, and not in what most people regard as their normal peaceful conduct. Wilkinson, Etzioni and Van den Haag adopt similar views. Wilkinson argues that "[m]uch difficulty and confusion arises from rhetorical and pejorative uses of the term, for example to describe poverty, underprivilege and discrimination." Etzioni expounds the differences, saying that the victims of both violence and poverty suffer but,

[w]hile economic and psychic pressures can be very great indeed, except in limited circumstances they leave the ultimate decision to the subject - the pressures reduce but do not eliminate his freedom. When physical

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3 *ibid.*
force is used however, when a person is jailed, gagged or shot - under most conditions he has no choice left in the matter.\textsuperscript{5}

Van den Haag argues that because violence often violates norms or expectations, it has lured some theoreticians into referring to violations of their standards of justice as 'violence' even when no force is used. Such an extension of the meaning of 'violence' makes it hard to distinguish unjust physical force from violations which occur without physical force, such as unjust deprivation.\textsuperscript{6}

Van den Haag's distinctions lead him to a definition of violence which is more accurate than Wilkinson's. Wilkinson defines violence as

\begin{quote}
the illegitimate use or threatened use of coercion resulting in, or intended to result in, the death, injury, restraint or intimidation of persons or the destruction or seizure of property.\textsuperscript{7}
\end{quote}

But an industrial strike, for example, is clearly intended to coerce owners or management into acceding to workers' demands through fear of losing profit or production. But strikes need not be, and usually are not, violent. Similarly restraint can be produced without using violence or indeed coercion. Clearly then, any definition of violence must have an implicit reference to the use of physical force and the results it produces or intends to produce. Also, Wilkinson's characterisation of violence as illegitimate inhibits the development of a universal definition of terrorism. For once one enters the realms of the legitimate use of force, political context becomes paramount. And context, which necessarily includes political justification for acts of terrorism, is replete with subjectivity. Van den Haag's definition of violence, on the other hand, is based on the results or intended results of violence;

\textsuperscript{7} Wilkinson, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 23-24.
physical force used by a person, directly or through a weapon, to hurt, destroy or control another or to damage destroy or control an object (e.g., territory or property).8

Using this definition of violence, it is now possible to attempt to isolate the distinctive characteristics of fear-inducing violence without regard to cause or context. Although this is also potentially problematic as fear is subjective and therefore difficult to quantify, it is possible to find considerable consensus. Many authors argue that the fear-inducing qualities of terrorism centre on the ‘extraordinariness’ of the violence and the status of its victims.

Wilkinson argues that one of the defining characteristics of terrorist violence is its denial of all rules and conventions of war.9 Added to this is a rejection of all moral constraints.10 In this Wilkinson is supported by Crenshaw-Hutchinson who notes that terrorist violence "is manifested in acts of socially and politically unacceptable violence."11 Another defining characteristic she notes is "a consistent pattern of symbolic or representative selection of the victims or objects."12 The symbolic or representative nature of the terrorist victim13 is more accurate than saying the victim of terrorist violence is totally arbitrary. That is not to suggest that terrorist violence is not indiscriminate, something emphasised by several authors,14 but rather that,

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8 ibid., p. 54.
9 ibid., p. 55.
10 ibid.
12 ibid.
The victim must represent a whole class of persons who are identified as possible targets. However, while the particular class of persons to be terrorized may be carefully selected, the actual identity of those attacked is arbitrary. It is this lack of discrimination that is the source of terror.\textsuperscript{15}

The symbolic nature of the terrorist victim lies in the fact that the terrorist action is intended to influence a wider audience than just the victim (although the victim, in the case of a policeman or a prison warder for example, can also be the real target). In this sense the terrorist victim is instrumental in attacking the real target - the government’s political will or restraint, business investors, or members or potential members of the security services.\textsuperscript{16} Schmid and de Graff use the instrumental status of terrorist victims as a basis for defining terrorism as

the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence against instrumental (human) targets (C) in a conflict between two (A,B) or more parties, whereby the immediate victims C - who might not even be part of the conflicting parties - cannot through a change of attitude or behaviour dissociate themselves from the conflict.\textsuperscript{17}

This distinction although generally valid is not absolute, as in one sense every target in war is instrumental, in that the side attacking is trying to make the other side give up.

Another common perception of terrorist violence is that the victims are civilians. But this is not generally valid either. Many armies, guerrillas and terrorist groups have used terrorist violence (in the sense that the violence involved is beyond the rules and constraints of war, that it has an extraordinary character,\textsuperscript{18} and that the victim is in some sense symbolic or instrumental) against members of the armed services. Both the RAF and the Provisional IRA have attacked members of the armed services, and even if they


\textsuperscript{18} Dum-dum bullets for example.
have been in 'off duty' situations as most of them have, this does not make their status civilian. However, it is possible to distinguish groups such as the RAF’s and the Provisional IRA’s use of terrorist violence from its use by guerrillas and conventional armies. To do this an examination of some instances of the use of terrorist violence in conflict is necessary.

**TERRORIST VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT**

Terrorism as it has been defined so far (the use of fear-inducing violence for a political purpose) is not an inappropriate way of describing the Allies’ saturation bombing of Hamburg or Dresden, or the American bombing of Hiroshima. Both these actions were terrorist in nature in that they were deliberate, and were intended to intimidate the German and Japanese populations and armies into ending their resistance to the Allies. However, although these actions had important results, they were only tactical moves in terms of the outcome of the overall political and military offensive of which they were a part. Another component of this overall offensive comprised groups of irregulars who used both guerrilla tactics and terrorism. These ‘resistance fighters’, mainly in Europe, used classic guerrilla tactics of ‘hit and run’ against the German military effort, and terrorist violence against both the military and members of civilian population who in any way aided the Axis occupation. But it is from post Second World War conflicts, involving the strategic use of guerrilla tactics by one set of combatants, that much of the confusion has arisen in distinguishing guerrillas from terrorists.

*Guerrillas and Terrorists*

The writings of the twentieth century guerrilla warfare theorists suggest two things: firstly, that guerrilla warfare was conceived of as essentially a rural phenomenon; and secondly, that terrorism was tactical. Debray, for example, emphasises the subordinate nature of terrorism in the city;
Of course city terrorism cannot assume any decisive role, and it entails certain dangers of a political order. But if it is subordinate to the fundamental struggle, the struggle in the countryside, it has, from the military point of view, a strategic value; it immobilizes thousands of enemy soldiers, it ties up most of the repressive mechanism in unrewarding tasks of protection ...\(^{19}\)

Guevara too, warned that terrorism could produce effects harmful to the overall guerrilla struggle. He believed terrorism to be

a measure that is generally indiscriminate and ineffective in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution.\(^{20}\)

Carlos Marighella, one of the few theorists to outline a guerrilla strategy designed primarily for the urban environment, lists terrorism as one of fourteen tactics of the urban guerrilla.\(^{21}\) Marighella equates terrorism with explosives and incendiaries, and although he argues that terrorism "is an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish,"\(^{22}\) it is clear he does not equate terrorism with urban guerrilla warfare in general. In fact, terrorism occupies very little space in Marighella's outline of urban guerrilla strategy and tactics.\(^{23}\) (As will be pointed out below, it is a questionable assumption that the urban environment can produce a true guerrilla movement.)

Mao was even more specific about the tactical role of terrorism. He saw "acts of sabotage and terrorism" as the second phase or stage of revolution.\(^{24}\) Other observers agree with Mao that terrorism is a stage of conflict preceding guerrilla warfare.\(^{25}\)


\(^{22}\) *ibid.*, p. 36.

\(^{23}\) *ibid.*, pp. 30-37.


\(^{25}\) However, while such a theory does have some applicability, and as we shall see it has certain characteristics in common with the terrorists who hope that their
Fairbairn argues that "terrorism is as carefully phased as other aspects of the revolutionary guerrilla war." Crozier, in one of the earliest and most influential works on post-war insurrections, observes,

"[t]he pattern of insurrection is, in fact, strangely consistent. Whatever the country or the circumstances, insurrection tends to follow a sequence of three phases: terrorism, guerrilla warfare and full-scale war. That is the tendency, but the pattern is not always completed: not all rebellions reach the second phase, and fewer still the third ... the pattern of the rebellions that have been allowed to run their course suggests that when the opportunity comes, the rebels will drop terrorism in favour of guerrilla activities, or at least relegate it to second place."

Although Crozier notes that the phases can overlap and coexist, he argues that in Cuba, Vietnam and Algeria where rebellions did run their course, all became less reliant on terrorism. Among the rebellions listed by Crozier as never passing the first terrorist stage are those of the Stern Gang in Palestine, the Egyptians in the Suez Canal Zone, and the Mau-Mau in Kenya. He also, somewhat incorrectly, includes Eoka in Cyprus in this list. While it is true that Grivas conceived of Eoka’s strategy in terms of stages or phases, it is also true that there was a definite guerrilla component early in Eoka’s struggle. The guerrilla component was maintained throughout Eoka’s campaign, but it will develop into more general confrontation, there are many exceptions to it. Terrorism was not a preliminary stage in Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines or El Salvador. Sabotage rather than terrorism per se can be seen as a preliminary stage in both China and Cyprus.


28 *ibid.* In Cuba, he says, terrorism was used to heighten publicity in the early days. (p. 127.) See also R. Moss, *Urban Guerrillas*, London: Temple Smith, 1972, p. 142-143, and H. Thomas, *Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom*, London: Harper and Row, 1971. In Vietnam, Crozier argues that from 1952 onwards, "terrorism played a reduced role." (p. 162.) See also R. Asprey, *War in the Shadows The Guerrilla in History*, London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1976, p. 921. And in Algeria, although he notes that terrorism flared up again, Crozier argues that "terrorism died down during 1957, when the National Army of Liberation was at its strongest and set battles were being fought." (p. 129.)

was urban terrorism that came to dominate. On this basis Eoka, along with the Stern Gang, the Egyptians and the Mau-Mau, can be labelled terrorist in that terrorism was its major or strategic weapon. Other writers argue that the extent to which a group uses terrorism as a strategic or tactical weapon, determines whether it should be classified as guerrilla or terrorist. Burton, for example, argues that

> [o]nly those who utilize terror as a stage or tactic complementary to a campaign of strikes, riots and political front activity aimed to lead eventually to a ‘revolutionary war’ are properly described as guerrillas.\(^{30}\)

So applying these criteria to the two groups involved in this study, is one way of determining whether guerrilla or terrorist is the more appropriate term. And if terrorist does prove to be more appropriate, then any definition should allow for differentiation between strategic and tactical uses of terrorism.

**TERRORISM AS STRATEGY**

Since the terrorists’ fundamental objection to the incumbent regime is political, their primary objective can be said to be to militarise the political situation. This is achieved by armed confrontation with the state which forces the authorities to react by deploying armed police, and possibly even soldiers, in defence of vulnerable targets. As the attacks continue, so the security forces will be provoked into more and more overt and repressive countermeasures. The terrorists calculate that this will serve to alienate the people from the counter-offensive of the state, which greatly impedes the state’s intelligence gathering processes. Without access to accurate and immediate information, the state is forced to adopt sweeping powers of search and arrest. Such powers are particularly vulnerable to abuse and mishandling, accentuating polarisation. The terrorists then hope to gain by presenting themselves as defenders of the people against the overwhelming power of the state.

In this battle of the weak against the strong, the prime targets for the terrorists are the state’s legitimacy and the will of its population and security forces. The terrorists’ campaign is one of attrition and survival; to demonstrate to the population, and especially the security forces, that they cannot be beaten into submission, and simultaneously to erode faith in the ability of the government and security forces to protect life and property. Terrorist violence serves this strategy particularly well because of the publicity it attracts.

So, having outlined briefly terrorist strategy, we can go on to consider if the two groups in this study use it, and how they apply it to their own particular situations.

Both the RAF and the Provisional IRA have been in existence for almost twenty years. This is certainly sufficient to assess whether either group has progressed or attempted to progress to the second stage of Crozier’s theory, or to fit Burton’s description. One of the most obvious differences between the RAF and the Provisional IRA on the one hand, and, say, the Vietnamese or Cubans on the other, is their operating environments. The RAF and the Provisional IRA are urban based groups, and it is interesting to note that of Crozier’s examples of terrorist groups, only the Mau-Mau was predominantly rural. Eoka maintained a significant rural base, but as mentioned above it was the urban environment that came to dominate. This suggests that urban environments may never be conducive to the evolution of terrorist groups into guerrilla organisations.

Laqueur clearly believes this is the case. He argues that the “essence of guerrilla warfare lies in the fact that the guerrilla can hide in the countryside and this, quite self-evidently, is impossible to do in a city.”31 The risks of being detected in the city increase in direct proportion to the number of guerrillas, therefore, the urban guerrilla unit cannot

grow beyond a certain number. Laqueur's implication is that without the space of the countryside, guerrillas cannot develop their own areas of control and with them alternative schools, hospitals and administrative structures, and hence develop the mass movement necessary for a successful guerrilla war.

If one accepts the guerrilla/terrorist dichotomy and the terrorist strategy outlined above, it is quite simple to label the RAF terrorist. As will be illustrated throughout this thesis, it remains an organisation with very limited popular appeal. Although it recognises the importance of propaganda and propaganda channels, it has made no real effort to convert the mass of German people to its cause. Its only message to these people is through its violence which is clearly intended to intimidate. Non-violent propaganda certainly forms a part of the RAF's campaign, but this is targeted only at those whom the RAF perceives to be sympathetic to its cause. The RAF's strategy for revolution is based on its continuing use of violence which it hopes will provoke enough government repression that the people will then regard the RAF as their defenders and saviours and thus rally to its cause. The RAF has never been a significant organisation in terms of membership. It has certainly not expanded, indeed it has probably contracted. Thus the RAF can be characterised as a terrorist group because of its strategic use of terrorist violence, its urban environment and its lack of progress in creating a broad revolutionary movement.

Although it will be argued below that it is the strategic use of terrorist violence that also provides the basis for defining the Provisional IRA as terrorist, in other respects the Provisional IRA's status as a terrorist organisation is less straightforward. For although the Provisional IRA is predominantly an urban organisation, the existence of solely Roman Catholic ghettos in Northern Ireland does provide it with areas where the

32 ibid., p. 403.
33 See Chapters 4 and 7.
34 See Chapter 5.
35 For a discussion of levels of RAF membership see Chapter 7.
security forces exercise relatively little control. This then affords the Provisional IRA opportunities to develop a popular organisation and to include in its strategy tactics other than terrorist violence. The most obvious is its establishment of a political front organisation, Provisional Sinn Fein. And, as will be seen, the Provisionals engage in a much more considered propaganda campaign with much greater audience differentiation than the RAF. But as will also be seen, these things remain subordinate to the military command of the Provisional IRA. The Provisional IRA constantly reiterates its belief that only armed force will achieve its objective of forcing the British to remove their presence in Northern Ireland, but it also recognises that it does not have the capacity to develop into any sort of military force capable of engaging the British army in any conventional battles. Thus the Provisional IRA cannot be defined as guerrilla according to Crozier’s development theory. The Provisional IRA has adopted a strategy of terrorist violence to undermine the will of the British government to maintain Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. It is also designed to provoke what can be presented as repressive counter-measures by the British. The Protestant community in Northern Ireland, however, is the most susceptible to the Provisional IRA’s provocation, and thus is the most subject to its terrorist violence. If repressive counter-measures are adopted by the British, and Protestants engage in terrorist violence against Catholics, then the Provisional IRA can improve its position both in the international community by presenting itself as an oppressed, anti-colonial group, and among the Catholic community as its defenders. (These aspects of Provisional IRA strategy and the propaganda that is a part of it are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.)

Thus the Provisional IRA too, can be characterised as a terrorist group due to its strategic use of terrorist violence, its urban environment, and although it has created a more broad based movement than the RAF, the potential for this to develop into a classic guerrilla war against the British is extremely low.
TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The laws of war are binding on all participants in hostilities, not because of the legality or illegality of their resort to force, but because any resort to force has presumed equality of right between the belligerents irrespective of the lesser or greater use of military and paramilitary force. The laws of war are binding on all participants in hostilities not because of the lesser or greater use of military and paramilitary force, but because any resort to force has presumed equality of right between the belligerents irrespective of the lesser or greater use of military and paramilitary force.

In pursuit of a political objective, terrorism, therefore, may now be defined as the strategic use of fear-inducing violence.

Since terrorism, therefore, may now be defined as the strategic use of fear-inducing violence, terrorism, whose impact may be great, but which are not part of a systemic campaign, can be so easily isolated that make the distinction a rather arbitrary one.

Thus to distinguish terrorism from guerrilla warfare, any definition of terrorism

*Laqueur, op. cit., p. 403.*

*G. Waldow, Political Terrorism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.*

*Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, op. cit., p. 51.*

*Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 37.*
force, whether legal or illegal, remains subject to the restrictions of the laws of war on overriding grounds of policy and humanity.39

Such is a contemporary expression of a notion first formed by Grotius in the seventeenth century, that the laws of war should be observed by all combatants regardless of cause. The idea of any unequal application of the laws of war is rejected in the Hague Conventions of 1907, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The role of guerrilla movements in the Second World War prompted their inclusion in the Geneva Conventions, but to be classified under the conventions, and thus receive Prisoner of War status, guerrillas had to satisfy five requirements: 1) they had to belong to a Party of the conflict; 2) they had to be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 3) they had to have a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; 4) they had to carry arms openly; and 5) they had to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.40 However in the 1950’s and 1960’s, in direct response to the rise of national liberation movements, attempts were made, mostly by Third World countries and the Eastern bloc, to resurrect the medieval notion of a ‘just war’, and to afford national liberation movements much greater status under international law. This movement culminated in the addition of two Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977.

The 1977 Protocols are a reflection of the movement in the United Nations to transform “the principles of self-determination of peoples”41 into a fundamental Human Right, as exemplified in Article 1 of the 1966 United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This was then enshrined in the 1970 United Nations Declaration on

41 Article 1, United Nations Charter.
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. This declares that not only have all states "a duty to promote ... realisation of the principle [of self-determination]," but also that

every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples of their right of self-determination. ... In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of their right of self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and receive support.

These clauses can be seen as a United Nations legitimisation of struggles undertaken in the name of national liberation, and an invitation for international support for such struggles. The Provisional IRA claims that it is fighting in just such a struggle for Irish self-determination, and the RAF claims that it is fighting in support of such struggles for self-determination. And as will be seen in a later chapter, both the RAF and the Provisional IRA claim that their cause and their actions entitle them to treatment under the Geneva Conventions. But regardless of the validity of these claims, Protocol I does impose obligations on movements claiming national liberation status which neither the RAF nor the Provisional IRA can or do fulfil. Protocol II does not grant national liberation status, but nor does it provide a basis for according terrorists any privileges associated with the laws of war.

Protocol I essentially uses the parties involved in an armed struggle to determine whether or not that struggle should be classified as an international conflict to which the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict should be applied. Protocol I grants some national liberation movements full belligerent status under certain circumstances, and diminishes the requirements that guerrilla movements have to fulfil in order to be classified as a national liberation movement. For example, unlike the pre-1977 situation, national liberation guerrillas are only required to carry arms openly at the moment of attack, and are no longer required to distinguish themselves from non-combatants, i.e., civilians. Protocol II purports to apply complimentary measures to Protocol I with regard to conflicts between the armed forces of a government and an armed dissident group.
The transformation of the principle of self-determination to a fundamental human right discussed above, is most evident in the scope Article 1 (4) of Protocol I. Accordingly it specifies that the situations to which it applies include "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation, and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination ... ." This gives entities engaged in such struggles the legal competence to declare them international armed conflicts to which the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict would then be applicable. Furthermore once classified as an international conflict under Protocol I, national liberation struggles could not be classified as internal struggles under Protocol II, for the two Protocols were drafted as mutually exclusive.

The scope Article 1 (4) of Protocol I was certainly a political victory for national liberation movements and their sponsoring states, but by the same token, Protocol I imposes obligations on national liberation movements which not only would they find difficult to meet, but which may also hamper their progress from a national liberation movement to a government. While violations of these obligations would not in themselves remove national liberation status, they would provide a basis for the international community or individual governments to take action against national liberation movements as war criminals.

Protocol I does not enable national liberation movements to be a Party to it, but Article 96 (3) does allow an authority representing people engaged in an armed struggle against a High Contracting Party to undertake to apply the Conventions and Protocol I by making a declaration to the depository (Switzerland). Upon receipt of such a declaration, Article 96 (3) stipulates;

(a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the said authority as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect;

(b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations which have been assumed by the High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this Protocol; and
(c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to the conflict.

Thus it is clear that national liberation movements must also bear the burdens of the Protocol as well as enjoying its benefits. Among the burdens of Protocol I is Article 82 which requires that

[t]he High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in the time of armed conflict [including national liberation movements] shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level in the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject.

There is no indication that the RAF or the Provisional IRA have ever done this. Article 85 (3) of Protocol I defines certain acts that will be regarded as "grave breaches" of the Protocol. These include:

(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack; and

(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population in the knowledge that such an attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects ...

Both the RAF and the Provisional IRA have engaged in such activities, although they usually try to justify actions under heading (a) on the grounds that their victim is a representative of imperialism or colonialism. The RAF has, perhaps, been somewhat less guilty of actions under heading (b) than the Provisional IRA. When the Provisional IRA engages in such activities it frequently tries to blame the civilian deaths on the inadequacies of the security forces, but it is incredible to claim that the Provisional IRA had no knowledge or expectations that civilians would be killed by bombs in restaurants, supermarkets and remembrance day services. Indeed the vast majority of Provisional IRA victims have been civilians.42 Although the Provisional IRA could undoubtedly make a stronger case for status as a national liberation movement under Protocol I than the RAF could, it is not surprising that it has made no real effort to do so. While, as we

42 See Chapter 7.
shall see, it is keen to present itself as engaged in a struggle for national liberation, it has no desire to see itself presented to the world or its supporters as war criminals. So if neither the RAF nor the Provisional IRA have sought national liberation status under Protocol I, is there, perhaps, scope for granting them any sort of special status under Protocol II?

Article 1 of Protocol II requires that a group engaging in an armed struggle against a state which does not fall under the scope of Protocol I, must be able to fulfil two conditions to receive its benefits. Firstly, it must act under responsible command, and secondly, it must exercise such a control over a part of its territory as to enable sustained and concerted military operations. The RAF’s rejection of any responsible command structure, insisting that it operates under a ‘collective leadership’, would seem to be a violation of Protocol II’s first condition. The Provisional IRA however, does, perhaps, meet this requirement. It certainly operates under a much more defined military structure, complete with a Chief-of-Staff. One of the purposes of the Provisional IRA’s 1972 cease-fire was to demonstrate to the British government that it had centralised and effective control of its forces. However, in some instances, such as the Harrod’s bombing in 1982, the leadership has claimed that its members have acted without due authority. Nonetheless, the RAF and the Provisional IRA can be considered disqualified from any special status by their inability to meet Protocol II’s second obligation. As stated earlier, the Provisional IRA does have some control over areas in Belfast and Londonderry, but this is insufficient to enable it to engage in sustained and concerted military action. Further weakening the RAF’s and the Provisional IRA’s claim to any special status is Article 1 of Protocol II which states that it regards

situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, and other acts of a similar nature as not being armed conflicts.

43 The British government would also prefer to prosecute Provisional IRA members under ordinary domestic criminal legislation.

44 See, for example, An Phoblacht/Republican News, 5:1:84.
Thus the sporadic actions of the RAF and the Provisional IRA against the security forces do not entitle them to any sort of special consideration under Protocol II.

This brief discussion of international law does not make any modification of the definition of terrorism necessary. However, it may be that the definition offered earlier - the strategic use of terrorist violence for a political purpose - is as close as one can come to a universally accepted definition, given the extent of current global ideological and political divisions.

To summarise: Terrorism can be defined as the strategic use of fear-inducing violence. ‘Violence’ implies the use of physical force to hurt or kill, or to intend to hurt or kill, or to damage or destroy property. For violence to be fear-inducing it generally contains certain characteristics: it must in some sense be extraordinary in that it represents a rejection of moral or legal restraints; and the targets of terrorist violence must be symbolic, instrumental and indiscriminate. For a group to be labelled terrorist (and thus to distinguish it from guerrillas or conventional armies who use terrorist violence) it must fundamentally rely on terrorism to bring about its stated objectives and tactics. (It does not have to use terrorism exclusively, but must have a fundamental reliance on terrorism to gain publicity, for example, or to provoke repression from which it then hopes to gain.)

History seems to suggest that in all instances where terrorism has been used by non-state groups, unique characteristics ultimately help determine the success, partial success or failure of terrorism as a political strategy. There are, perhaps, only two instances where the use of terrorism by a non-state group can be said to have been successful. In Palestine in the late 1940’s, for example, although terrorism can hardly be said to have produced a lasting solution, it was undoubtedly a principal factor in causing the British to withdraw. Terrorism was also a decisive factor in causing the British to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone in 1954. In both these instances terrorism had the
tacit support of the majority of the population, (and indeed the government in the case of Egypt) the targets were clearly foreign and the context colonial. There was then a clear relation between cause and context that was widely understood by the native population.

Cyprus is another colonial context in which terrorism was used strategically. However, it cannot be said that terrorism as used by Eoka in Cyprus was either decisive or successful. It did not produce the stated objective of *enosis* with Greece nor a lasting solution. Indeed Eoka’s terrorism provided the Turks with a powerful weapon to use in their arguments against Greek rule, and resulted in their ultimately realised demands for partition.45 Crozier argues that it was Suez that prompted a change in British government policy;

> Until then the government did not seriously seek an integral solution of the Cypriot problem. Thereafter it did. It cannot be said that terrorism was a decisive factor in this change of attitude. On the other hand, the Cypriot problem, which had existed in dormant state for several decades, would not have become acute without Eoka’s intervention. To that extent there was a link between terrorism and policy making in Whitehall and Westminster.46

So in Cyprus, although there was a strong link between cause and Eoka’s supporters, the overall context, including the Turkish Cypriots and Britain’s own political priorities, was in the end more important.

In Uruguay, terrorism was without doubt decisive, but not in producing the Tupamaros’ stated objectives. However, for a while their terrorist strategy produced desired results. It pushed an increasingly besieged liberal democratic government into adopting more and more repressive countermeasures. It accentuated a rapidly declining economy and produced an acute political crisis. It made what was already a weak police force appear totally paralysed and ineffective, especially in relation to the Tupamaros’ speciality of political kidnapping. The end result though, was not a government

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45 It was also Turkish attitudes that caused Makarios to settle for independence rather than *enosis*, and thus the split with Grivas.

representative of the Tupamaros, but a brutal, repressive military dictatorship which had little difficulty in then eliminating the Tupamaros. The cause of the Tupamaros was not sufficiently related to the context of Uruguay to enable it to develop into anything other than a terrorist group, although at times it was successful in motivating considerable active support. (Moss quotes a source as claiming that in August 1970, the Tupamaros had as many as 3,000 active volunteers in Montevideo, a city of only one and a quarter million people.\textsuperscript{47})

Clearly then, any attempt to analyse a particular terrorist group would not be complete without some general discussion of the unique characteristics applicable to them. The remaining two chapters of Part I of this thesis will attempt to present both the context in which the RAF and the Provisional IRA operate, and the cause they represent as espoused in their ideology. How they try to relate the two in their propaganda is the subject of Part II, and their degree of success the subject of Part III.

\textsuperscript{47} Moss, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 211.
CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The aim of this chapter, and the next, is to provide contextual settings for both groups under study. While Chapter 3 focuses on ideology and ideological influences, this one concentrates on presenting the historical context from which both groups emerged. The Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland are all relatively new entities, and their respective terrorist groups are very much rooted in them. In the Irish case however, one does find many references to history preceding the partition of the island, and the Provisional IRA is essentially a ‘backwards looking’ group, idealising past generations and heroes. The RAF, on the other hand, is a ‘forward looking’ group. It does not look back towards an ideal Germany, and the few historical reference points it does use are all negative.1

Although the history and current conditions within any society are central to understanding its terrorist groups, the fact that so many terrorist groups appeared at the end of the 1960’s would seem to point to the existence of extraneous factors which compound internal ones. An examination of these will be made before going on to discuss factors peculiar to the Federal Republic of Germany and Ireland.

1968 is usually given as the starting point of modern political terrorism. The international system, then as now, was characterised by a multiplicity of actors both state and non-state, and a legacy of post-war state boundaries which conflicted with religious, cultural, ethnic and language boundaries. Despite the changes brought to the international environment by nuclear weapons, military force as a means was still

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1 As will be seen in later chapters, historical reference points in the RAF’s propaganda centre on accusations that the Federal Republic has failed to expunge its Nazi past.
relevant and thus justified. There had been many examples of former colonial powers being defeated by vastly inferior ones. There had also been several 'revolutionary' struggles, with again the militarily inferior power ultimately achieving victory. From these struggles emerged new theories of guerrilla war which gave limited support to the use of terrorism, and could be added to the theories of Marx, Lenin and the nineteenth century anarchists.2

Two events at this time are worth special mention. One is America's involvement in Vietnam which was beginning to be viewed as 'unwinnable', not because of any lack of military power, but because the American public was becoming increasingly unwilling to provide the necessary resources in terms of manpower and political cohesion. Thus, for the Vietnamese, the American citizen watching events from the comfort of his own home became as much the target as the soldier in the field. In other words, developments in mass modes of communication had made the media a major, perhaps even decisive, battleground. The second event worth mentioning is the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, which left the Palestinians unable to rely on conventional Arab military power to achieve their aims, and compelled to search for a new mode and arena for their struggle.

If certain tensions and dissatisfactions within the political world facilitated the emergence of political terrorism, then so too did technological advances. Light, mobile weapons systems, both accurate and with immense velocity, became standard pieces of terrorists' armouries. Sophisticated hardware, either from sponsoring states or the black market, was soon in the terrorists' possession. (As early as 1973, surface-to-air missiles were found by Italian police close to Rome airport.) Improved modes of international travel have given terrorists great powers of mobility, increasing their potential theatre of action and the possibilities of escape.

2 These theories and their limited support for terrorism are detailed in the next chapter.
The strategic environment of Western Europe, in which both groups in this study operate, offers a number of inherent advantages for any potential terrorist group. The proximity and openness of borders, a policy deliberately cultivated by the EEC, has the unfortunate side effect of making terrorist evasion of the authorities easier. Once the terrorist has escaped to a neighbouring or near-by country, differences in legal systems can be readily exploited to evade extradition.\(^3\) The free media associated with the European democracies give terrorists access to an audience of millions, and the open nature of society presents vulnerable and ideal targets.

However, as stated above, while these factors may have facilitated the emergence of terrorism in the late 1960’s, individual terrorist groups cannot be understood without reference to their particular operating environment. It is to considering these that we now turn.

THE RED ARMY FACTION

In the brief interlude between the ending of the war and the tensions of the Cold War, Shell argues that social and political life was characterised among leaders by

demands for a radical break with the evil past, for a new beginning which, however dimly outlined, had to be marked by absolute honesty in human relations, by total rejection of violence, and by humanistic socialism which protected the sanctity of the individual.\(^4\)

In the search for meaningful explanations for the rise of the Third Reich, the ruling Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union (CDU/CSU) singled out selfish materialism as responsible for Hitler’s triumph. Thus, the subsequent neo-liberal market economy, introduced by Erhard, which moulded social and political life was

\(^3\) Admittedly since 1968, the European states have taken some action to overcome this, and to prevent terrorists avoiding extradition on the basis that their actions are political.

viewed by some with disgust. However, the vast majority of the population failed to respond to the calls for moral regeneration which came from a minority of intellectuals, a few socialists, Protestant moralists and pacifists. So even as early as the 1950’s, the radical dissenter began to feel isolated.

The *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD), reformed after the war, was one of the few parties able to resume its activities with an impeccable record in the struggle for democracy. Some of its leaders had survived the horrors of the Third Reich’s concentration camps while others returned from exile. The Party’s policy in the early years of the Federal Republic was based on a nationalist outlook. Led by Kurt Schumacher, the Party vigorously opposed Adenauer’s policy of integration with the West and attempted to prohibit any measures which might hinder German reunification. The Party advocated direction and planning of the economy and nationalisation of basic industries. However, although the Party did well in some state elections (*Landtagswahlen*), it did not fare particularly well at the Federal level (*Bundestagwahlen*). The SPD’s policies had failed to attract voters outside its traditional working class support.

A reassessment of policy and strategy led to a fundamental rupture with history and tradition which was encapsulated in the Godesberg Programme of 1959. The Godesberg Programme recognised the new socio-economic base of the Republic, and that this stemmed from a free enterprise economy. It also accepted the success of Adenauer’s foreign policy. The Godesberg Programme was designed to bring the Party more into the centre of German politics and allow for a plurality of interests. The change in policy direction served the Party well in electoral terms. After 1961, its vote increased steadily, reflected firstly in its joining the Grand Coalition in 1966, and culminating in 1972, when for the first time the SPD became the strongest single party in the Bundestag. However, the change in direction did not please the more radical of the Party’s members who felt that the Party was betraying its left wing ideals.
In the mid-1950's, radical theorising was resumed in the universities and research institutes. The main centres of the new Marxist approach were in Berlin, Marburg and Frankfurt. These new ideas were quick to spread, as Shell explains,

[b]ecause of the relative smallness of the German intellectual establishment and the ease and frequency of communication, a rather rapid process of permeation from a few centres is feasible and noticeable.5

By the late 1950's, then, the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS) had begun the task of theoretical analysis of the Federal Republic based on, and inspired by, the radical criticism of liberal parliamentary democracy of the ‘Frankfurt School’.

This line of student thinking was not consistent with the policy of the parent party, the SPD. After several attempts to persuade the SDS to adopt a more conservative approach had failed, the SPD severed relations with the SDS and set up an alternative student organisation the Sozialistische Hochschulbund (SHB). The SDS, now freed from the constraints of SPD policy, continued the task of radical criticism, although with a considerably reduced membership. By 1964, the SDS had begun to pin its hopes for change on extraparliamentary opposition. It had concluded that none of the existing parties would effect significant changes or "defend the allegedly weakened constitution against the process of ‘fascization’."6 The SDS now argued that parliament had become powerless, giving a monopoly to the oligarchic parties and, quoting Habermas, that the only "alternative still possible was between our authoritarian, ultimately neofascist system and one which developed into a social democracy."7 Two points are important here. Firstly, the SDS was still essentially theorising; it was not, yet, indulging in 'revolutionary practise'. Secondly, 'development' was still the operative word.

Increases in activity can be observed as early as 1965, although it was limited to Berlin and the Free University. Events in 1966, however, brought a significant change.

5 ibid., p. 660.
6 ibid., p. 666.
7 Helmut Schauer, Chairman of the SDS, at 19th Delegate Conference of the SDS, reported in Neue Kritik, 25-26 October, 1964, p. 12.
As well as forming a coalition with the CDU, the SPD agreed to the passing of the Emergency Laws, giving the executive powers to deal with emergency situations. The two parties now controlled over 90% of the seats in the Bundestag, which was conceived of as eliminating open opposition to the ruling majority. It also pushed more and more students towards extraparliamentary opposition. The SPD, it was now argued, had ‘sold out’ completely and was betraying the very concept of parliamentary democracy. The politicisation of students was heightened even further by the growing demands for university reform and international events.

The universities in the Federal Republic were undoubtedly slow in responding to the changing conditions of postwar society, and were totally unequipped for the vast increase in student numbers. It is also true that the Federal Republic was not the only country facing this problem. But it can be argued that in the German case, student protest was coupled with a generational conflict which was unique to the character of German student protest. Merritt states that this factor was symbolised in

... the revulsion felt by many young Germans towards the sins of Nazism.
... The older generation [had] failed to realise even those limited ideals that it set as standards to guide German youth. It [had] failed, for example, to eradicate the Nazi past. It is all too easy to point to ex-Nazis in high places, the recurrence of styles of thinking reminiscent of the Nazi mentality, and instances of ‘political justice’ in the Federal Republic. 8

This sort of feeling was easily compatible with events as the students saw them. They came to believe themselves to be in possession of superior moral theory, and felt justified in taking direct action against a parliamentary system which had become

a functionless appendix to the system of rule which was not eliminated merely in order to leave the citizens the fictitious belief that they still possessed an effective instrument of participation and control. 9

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Thus the cry for necessary university reform, which was the issue concerning most students, was able to be coupled with wider generational issues, and directed into extraparliamentary opposition. Even the SPD's recently created student organization, the SHB, was participating in the extraparliamentary movement, although with a much more moderate position than the SDS.

The international environment also had an input into the development of the student protest movement and the Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (APO) (Extraparliamentary Opposition). By the late 1950's and early 1960's, the generation of students in the universities was seeking an amelioration of the Cold War conditions that had concerned its predecessors. They saw the Cold War as something they did not cause, but which affected their lives deeply. They saw a certain hypocrisy in the West's pronouncements on the Eastern bloc and actions in Suez, Algeria and Vietnam. They identified with the struggles of the peoples of the Third World and leaders of those struggles, such as Guevara and Fanon, were turned into heroes.  

The student protest movement was given added impetus when, as part of a state visit, the Shah of Iran attended a performance of the Berlin opera on 2 June, 1967. A group of students had gathered to protest against the visit and in the course of the police dispersal of the gathering, a young student was shot dead. This had an immediate impact on the students and others. Various members of the disaffected left came together to form a united front.

The students' immediate reaction was to organise a Congress in Hanover which was attended by 5,000 students and academics from all over Germany. Many leaders of the SDS called openly for illegal actions. Among them was Rudi Dutschke, who outlined SDS strategy thus;

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Guevara and Fanon as well as Marcuse and Sartre are all important in the RAF's ideology, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
... the established rules of the game of this irrational democracy are not our rules of the game, that the starting point for the politicising of the students must be the conscious breaking of these established rules by us.11

In other words, the democratisation of society was to be through confrontation. Similarly Dutschke explains that the purpose of demonstrating against the Vietnam war was through systematic, controlled and limited confrontation with the power structure and imperialism in West Berlin, to force the representative 'democracy' to show openly its class character, its authoritarian nature, to force it to expose itself as a 'dictatorship of force'.12

The question of the use of violence was hotly debated within the ranks of the APO, in the wake of a series of bloody confrontations in German cities. However, as the universities met the students’ demands and reforms were introduced, the extremists in the APO found themselves more and more isolated. Their calls for further confrontation were ignored, and it seemed to them that the left had once again failed.

It was at this point that the RAF emerged and, as will be seen in the next chapter, the RAF’s ideology reflects most of the developments outlined above. The RAF itself acknowledges two basic origins: the student protest movement; and its perception of the constitutional left’s failure. However, the international context mentioned earlier, particularly Vietnam and the ‘winning’ theorists of guerrilla warfare, also feature in the RAF’s ideology. The radical critiques of Marcuse and Sartre provided a rationale through which the RAF could link together these various strands to form its eclectic yet distinctive ideology.


The Provisional IRA

In considering the contextual setting from which the Provisional IRA emerged, it is necessary to delve much further back in Irish history than 1969. Irish resistance to English rule has a history stretching back even further than Tone's rebellion in 1798, and the Provisional IRA are most insistent that they are the legitimate heirs to this historic tradition. The IRA too, has a history. The IRA came officially into existence in 1919 by order of the first Dail Eireann, but by 1923, was on the losing side of a bitter civil war, after which its fortunes continued to decline. Before the IRA however, were the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), the Fenians, the Young Irelanders, Emmet and Tone who all engaged in the use of physical force against England. As the next chapter details the historical legacy of events in the 1880's, 1848, 1804 and 1798, which it argues assumed great historical significance only when viewed through the rising of 1916, this chapter will concentrate on the historical context post-1916, and particularly on the existence of the IRA.

The fifteen years preceding the emergence of the Provisional IRA are characteristic of the entire history of the IRA: military action; division; radical politics; and very little popular support. The military action centred on attacking institutions in the border area, such as customs houses. This campaign, begun in 1956, had by the time it ended in 1962, cost the lives of six policemen and eleven IRA men. The campaign was always a low key affair, and when the decision was taken to end it, members of the IRA and Sinn Fein began a reassessment of policy and tactics. As had happened in the past when IRA fortunes were at a low, the organisation moved to the left. Sinn Fein, the organisation's political front, had started to attract a new generation who were not tied to the past, nor committed to the notion that any involvement in politics was a betrayal of

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13 The phrase Irish Republican Army, however, was first used to describe a group of Irish-American rebels who made a rather farcical 'invasion' of Canada in 1866. See R. Kee, The Bold Fenian Men, London: Quartet, 1976, p. 30.

14 In terms of contemporary levels of popular support and perceptions of success Grattan, O'Connell, Parnell and Redmond are all far more significant.
Republican ideals. Indeed this faction blamed Sinn Fein and the IRA's lack of interest in social and economic issues, and its abstentionist policy, for the movement's isolated position. Agitation began within Sinn Fein and the IRA for more positive social and economic policies and an end to abstentionism. At the 1967 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, (national convention) president Thomas McGoilla declared that Sinn Fein would aim to have a majority in the Dail within five years.\textsuperscript{15} Earlier in the same year in a speech at Wolfe Tone's grave at Bodenstown, IRA Chief-of-Staff, Cathal Goulding, expressed support for socialist policies and criticised the movement's reliance on the 'physical force' tradition.

However, many in the movement were dedicated to the tradition of physical force. They believed that the IRA's only \textit{raison d'etre} was to fight. The abstentionist issue split the movement and the tension increased in 1968, when the Army Convention met to consider the issue, but failed to reach any conclusion. The issue went forward to the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, but an amendment proposed by Sean Garland effectively stalled the issue again. It was in this tense and confused atmosphere that events in Northern Ireland exploded.

Those members of Sinn Fein and the IRA who favoured a wider political approach had become involved in the Civil Rights movement in Northern Ireland. Bowyer Bell argues that for strategic reasons the IRA GHQ had accepted the Civil Rights tactics of civil disobedience, the result of which was that by 1969 the most militant members of the IRA in the North were often undertaking regular assignments to prevent attacks against the RUC or the Orange mobs, and to contain the demonstrators.\textsuperscript{16}

Shortly before the 1968 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, the Unionist Westminster MP for Mid-Ulster died, necessitating a by-election. The seat had an in-built nationalist majority and


was won by a Unionist only when the nationalist vote was split. The politicians within Sinn Fein and the IRA saw this as a golden opportunity to further their new approach, but a problem arose when it became clear that the Civil Rights movement would field their own candidate, who would actively promote civil rights at Westminster. The solution was obviously to drop abstentionism, and the 1968 failure to do this caused the resignation of prominent northern Republicans in January 1969. Their resignation statement declared:

We believe that the abstentionist policy bears no relevance to conditions in 1969 ... an abstentionist candidate ensures the return of the Unionist nominee. This would be a disaster for the Civil Rights movement.17

No doubt influenced by this, later in 1969 the Army GHQ decided to embrace the new political approach which would involve direct political action. Abstentionism therefore, had to go, and a motion to this end was put to the 1969 Army Convention.

Meanwhile the tense and increasingly violent situation in the North worsened and criticism of the IRA's lack of military action intensified. At the Army Convention in December 1969, the basics of the new political approach were accepted by a majority of the delegates,18 but out of the dissenters emerged the Provisional IRA. The following month attention was focussed on the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis. In a dramatic meeting attended by Tom Maguire, the last surviving member of the Second Dail, a motion ending abstentionism was passed, but was short of the required two thirds majority to effect a constitutional change. When a resolution supporting IRA policy was called for, which would only have required a simple majority, about one third of the delegates walked out, and formed Provisional Sinn Fein.

There was really little at this stage that would have supported offensive military action by either faction of the IRA. At the end of the last military campaign in 1962,

17 The Irish Times, 29:1:69. In April, Bernadette Devlin was elected as MP for Mid-Ulster.
18 Bowyer Bell suggests by a margin of 39 to 12, op. cit., p. 366.
Sinn Fein's vote in the Republic was half of what it had been before the campaign. The support generated by the positive approach of the Civil Rights movement provided empirical evidence of the value of a political approach. And finally, the prominent issues of the Civil Rights movement were in no way connected with the IRA's objective of a united Ireland. By 1972, however, the Provisionals had succeeded in re-defining the situation to their advantage. The propaganda used to do this makes little reference to this period,\(^{19}\) indeed there is little reference to the entire post-1923 period. Therefore to understand the historical context of Provisional IRA propaganda a wider historical survey is necessary, the crucial years being those between 1916 and 1923.

The isolation of the IRA from the mass of Irish society began with its split with de Valera, which was completed in 1926. The issue forcing the split was again abstentionism. De Valera had realised the futility of continued military struggle against the Free State army when he gave the IRA the order to 'dump arms' in 1923. De Valera rationalised further that Republicans would be morally free to enter the Dail once the oath of allegiance to the British monarch was removed. But this was anathema to the doctrinaire Republicans, who considered that the order to dump arms was just a pause to wait for the inevitable next round. In 1926, de Valera resigned from Sinn Fein and entered the Dail with his new Fianna Fail grouping. Even at this stage the high point of Sinn Fein and the IRA's popularity had long passed, and what little remained was eroded further when de Valera assumed power in 1932.

De Valera quickly adopted a policy of transferring old grievances into new loyalties. Compensation was given for civil war losses, and pensions introduced for the Republican wounded. Ex-IRA men were encouraged to join the reconstituted police force, and a new constitution in 1937 ended the despised Free State, creating instead Eire. After the Second World War, Fianna Fail engaged in an international publicity campaign

\(^{19}\) Most of the propaganda referring to this period was used to discredit the Official IRA. See Chapter 4.
against the border, but national pride, it seems, was satisfied with the 1948 Republic of Ireland Act. After this date, until the eruption of violence in Northern Ireland, there was little public interest in the South in the border and even less in the IRA.

The IRA in these years swung between radical politics and hard line physical force. A brief bombing campaign was undertaken in England shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, but once war broke out de Valera acted swiftly and strongly against the IRA by introducing internment and strict censorship. After the war, a severely demoralised IRA was temporarily encouraged by the anti-partition campaign, but was unable to seize any sort of initiative. By the time the IRA was able to respond to the calls for military action, the Republic had been declared, and the border had faded as an issue of central importance to the every-day existence of the Republic. The resultant border campaign, as discussed above, did little to improve the IRA’s position. The period 1916-1923, however, tells a different story for the IRA, and it is this period that dominates Provisional IRA propaganda, and provides it with its claims to historic legitimacy.

When war broke out in Europe in 1914, a Home Rule Bill had passed through the British Parliament, but with it was another act suspending implementation of Home Rule for the duration of the war. Although Unionist opposition to Home Rule in Ulster had not been resolved and partition had, at this point, already been mooted, the vast majority of Irish people were content that national aspirations would be fulfilled after the war. The leader of the parliamentary Nationalist Party, John Redmond, had considerable success in encouraging members of the Volunteer movement to join the British Army. A minority of Volunteers, however, had rejected this and constituted itself as the Irish Volunteers under the nominal leadership of Eion MacNeill. Within the Irish Volunteers was another minority group which had ideas of its own, and was creating an historical

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20 See Chapter 3.
21 The Volunteers were formed as a countermeasure to the Ulster Volunteers who had been formed to oppose Home Rule.
interpretation that was later to assume great significance.  

These men were mostly members of the IRB, an organisation which had its roots in the days of the Fenians. They maintained dedication to the Fenian philosophy of physical force, and began to plan a rising to take place in Ireland before the end of the war. The Rising, which took place at Easter in 1916, was a total disaster from a military point of view, but then few of the leaders expected anything else. However, this Rising which was so unrepresentative of the Irish people at the time, was soon to become the major symbol in the Irish struggle for independence.

Two extraneous factors were partly responsible for this: one was the British treatment of the captured rebels; and the other was an attempt to impose conscription on Ireland. All in all the British executed sixteen rebels, which in one sense may not seem excessive considering the British were at war. But the manner in which these executions were carried out concerned most and appalled many. With the exception of Roger Casement who was hanged in August, the rest had been given the briefest of military trials and shot by 10 May. (James Connolly was shot tied to a chair as his broken ankle made it impossible for him to stand.) In addition to those executed many thousands more were imprisoned or placed in prisoner of war camps in Wales. Bowyer Bell records that "[u]ltimately there were ninety death sentences and approximately 3,500 men and seventy-nine women under arrest or sentence." Many had nothing to do with either planning or participating in the rebellion. This prompted a swell in support for Sinn Fein which had itself little to do with the rising. Once the war ended, Sinn Fein was joined by

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22 See Chapter 3.

23 Connolly, who was not a Fenian but joined the rebels with his Citizens' Army, expressly stated "[w]e are going out to be slaughtered." See J. Connolly, Labour and Easter Week, (ed.) Desmond Ryan, Dublin: At the Sign of Three Candles, 1949, p. 21.


25 Other reasons included the powerful and emotional propaganda left behind by leaders such as Pearse, (discussed in Chapter 3) and the romanticism associated with the event itself such as Joseph Plunkett's marriage just hours before his execution.

the newly released internees who had been politicised by their experiences, and who were received as heroes by Sinn Fein. In the December 1918 election, Sinn Fein won 73 of the 105 seats available at Westminster, totally obliterating the Nationalist Party. Those members who were not in gaol, or absent for other reasons,\(^{27}\) refused to take up their seats at Westminster, and constituted themselves in Dublin as the First Dail Eireann in January 1919.

The Volunteers, now reconstituted as the IRA, came under the direction of Michael Collins. Collins began to organise a very effective counter-intelligence network which formed the basis of his guerrilla campaign against the British.\(^{28}\) One of the first tasks undertaken by the IRA was to ‘neutralise’ the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). Largely through measures of intimidation this was achieved by the end of 1919, and the British were forced to replace resigning RIC men with English volunteers. With the arrival of these so-called ‘Black and Tans’, the situation rapidly became more brutal. The British totally failed to realise that while most of the population was disturbed by the growing violence, they did not view the IRA in the same murderous light as the British. And thus the British by their heavy handed actions created a whole new generation of heroes and martyrs; Kevin Barry, Tom Barry and Terence MacSwiney to name a few.

In May 1921, a general election was called after which the British declared the provisions of the Better Government of Ireland Bill would come into operation. Although Sinn Fein was by now a proscribed organisation, it used the election to form what it called the Second Dail.\(^{29}\) The fighting continued, but by now both sides had begun to realise that military force alone could not bring victory. In July a truce was

\(^{27}\) Thirty-four were in gaol and another eight were on various missions.


\(^{29}\) This is still referred to by the Provisional IRA as the last legitimate government of Ireland.
called, and political negotiations began. The IRA could claim, and certainly not without justification, that its guerrilla tactics

had prevented British authority from functioning in Ireland, laid its administration in ruins, driven out or under cover the British minions, necessitated a large and costly army of occupation, humiliated British military power, caused the name of Britain to stink in the nostrils of all decent peoples, and inflicted sufficient casualties on their soldiers to seriously disturb a government finding it difficult to supply reinforcements. (Sic.)³⁰

The terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty provoked a bitter civil war in Ireland which still arouses considerable passion, and provides the legitimacy on which the IRA continues to exist. While granting 26 counties of Ireland independence within the British Empire, the Treaty did not create the 32 county Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916. Those who had negotiated the Treaty including Griffith and Collins, argued that the Treaty provided Ireland with a measure of freedom and independence she had never before enjoyed, and that it provided a ‘stepping stone’ to the Republic. In a heated debate in the Dail on 4 January 1922, the Treaty was accepted by 64 votes to 57. Griffith replaced de Valera as the new Free State’s titular head, and a provisional government was formed to enact the provisions of the Treaty.

The pro-Treaty forces gradually gained the upper hand over the IRA, now a name given only to anti-Treaty forces. In the August 1923 general election, the pro-Treaty Cumann na nGaedheal won 63 seats to Sinn Fein’s 44. But although the country had expressed its willingness to accept the Treaty, the IRA and Sinn Fein continued to recognise and declare their allegiance to the Second Dail. The IRA was most definitely now an unconstitutional force, and became more and more isolated, as discussed above.

As stated earlier, conditions in 1969 did not particularly favour the resumption of physical force in pursuit of the 32 county Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916. But, as this

brief historical survey has shown, physical force in pursuit of such an objective has been a notable if not popular factor in Irish history, especially in the twentieth century. The next chapter of this thesis will argue that the 1916-1923 period in Irish history not only forms the basis of Provisional IRA ideology, but is also used by it to claim an historic legitimacy stretching even further back into Irish history.
CHAPTER THREE
IDEOLOGY

Much of the literature in social sciences and philosophy regarding ideology is concerned with the relationship between ideology and truth or the sociology of knowledge. It is not the intention of this thesis to explain or explore these themes, although references will be made in the remaining chapters to contradictions or inconsistencies in the two ideologies of particular concern. These contradictions or inconsistencies are judged to be so because they appear to be inconsistent with available historical evidence, or they include references to ‘facts’ that are not generally accepted as such by their respective societies.

It can be argued that all ideology is fundamentally the product of social conflict. In societies where social cohesion is total, words, their meanings and the ideas they import will be consistent and uniform for all members of that society. Or, in other words, differing thought processes will not exist, at least to the extent of seriously challenging the dominant ideology. An alternative ideology emerges when a section of society feels or perceives that its needs are not being met by the prevailing outlook. Any ideology challenging the dominant one must also present an alternative; the mere rejection of the prevailing order is not sufficient to be classed as ideology.

Marx was one of the first social theorists to question ideology as ‘true’ and incorporating ‘truths’. Marx, it seems, saw ideology as resolving the irresolvable, a solution to the contradictions of capitalism. But a solution based on a misrepresentation of material reality. Mannheim agreed with Marx that ideologies can distort, but held that

this was so of all ideologies and not just the bourgeois one discussed by Marx. He believed that both incumbent and challenging ideologies present distorted visions of the truth. The ruling group, he says,

can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination.2

Ideologies which are based on messianic inspiration3 contain oppressed groups who are

intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it.4

So, although Mannheim believed that ideology distorts, it would appear that he does not believe that this is necessarily deliberate. Marx also did not believe that deliberate distortion was necessarily the defining characteristic of ideology. An incomplete or partial picture of reality can incidentally favour one class or group. Others argue that all ideologies are deliberate distortions, and thus a sign of an unhealthy society.5

A definitive answer to the question of the relationship of ideology and truth, normative values or factual truth can only be given if one believes that factual truth can be established independent of normative values. The argument that factual truth can be established centres on the belief that it can be separated from normative values. Facts, as they are discovered, do not help establish values, and therefore can be scientifically neutral. However, as Mannheim noted any social theory is rooted in the desire of the theorists to bring about certain goals.6 And as Taylor explains,

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2 ibid., p. 36.
3 Mannheim called this utopian thinking, ibid.
4 ibid.
[i]n setting out a given framework, a theorist is also setting out the gamut of possible polities and policies. But a political framework cannot fail to contain some, even implicit, conception of human needs, wants, and purposes ... in the light of the framework certain goods can be accepted as such without further argument, whereas other rival ones cannot be adopted without adducing overriding considerations. The framework can be said to distribute the onus of argument in a certain way. It is thus not neutral.7

An example Taylor uses to illustrate this is his claim that an orthodox Marxist framework would not allow a phenomenon such as McCarthyism to be explained in terms of upbringing resulting in a certain kind of personality structure.8 This thesis accepts such arguments that the social sciences are ‘theory laden’, and cannot be totally empirical and objective.9 The facts which are used to support certain normative frameworks can, of course, be further researched and tested, but this may never result in an objective truth. For the purposes of this thesis, Ryan’s comments provide an appropriate framework within which to approach the relationship between ideology and truth;

... we may indefinitely disagree about what ought to be going on, and thus about what the significance of the fact is; nonetheless we shall seek objectivity in the sense that we shall not hide facts for the sake of the values we happen to hold, and we shall not confuse the goals of the theorist with the truth about the world. If the goal of the truth is illusory, no matter, we shall at any rate discover truths.10

As will be outlined in the sections below, the ideologies with which we are concerned construct a framework based on the significance of certain ‘facts’. How other groups in their societies assess the significance of these ‘facts’ is part of the discussion in Chapter 7.

Ideology is usually conceived of in a ‘persuasive’ sense. Like religion, it provides on a day-to-day basis, guidance on the ideal way of conducting politics or

8 ibid., p. 144.
organising social life. Apter claims that one function of ideology is to provide a link between "mundane practices" and a "wider set of meanings." 11 This interpretation of ideology, he says, "lays emphasis on the behaviour of individuals in a setting of action-in-relation-to-principle." 12

Ideology can also be conceived of in a 'prescriptive' sense. The beliefs and theories laid down by a particular ideology can include overt instructions on how men should behave and prescriptive measures should they not behave accordingly. But both senses of ideology (persuasive and prescriptive) are also descriptive and explanatory. Of prescriptive ideology Plamenatz says,

[the injunctions and advice, and the value judgments, are supported by assertions that purport to describe or explain facts. Unless this were so, the set of beliefs would not be ideological. 13

One function of ideology then, is to provide, promote or demand social cohesion. 14 Analysing the social cohesion aspects of ideologies espousing violence is one component of this thesis, but it is proposed to separate the mechanisms through which social cohesion is projected from the central descriptive tenets of the ideology. Although by no means unique to minority or emerging ideologies, it is possible to detect the presence of an ideologically primary group. Shils argues that in ideologically primary groups, strict discipline is the distinguishing characteristic, and that "intense solidarity and unwavering loyalty are demanded." 15 This thesis also intends to examine how the ideologically primary group maintains discipline, solidarity and loyalty.

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12 ibid.
Ideologies, and those who espouse them, claim jurisdiction over a group wider than the immediate adherents. Their actions, they claim, are directed towards achieving the ideal way of life, society or world order from which all will benefit. But again it is proposed to separate mechanisms which aim to influence non-adherents from the ideology’s central descriptive tenets. For our purposes mechanisms used to promote social cohesion or to influence non-adherents will be considered as supportive of the central tenets, and thus will be discussed in terms of persuasive and prescriptive propaganda. In other words, this thesis will attempt to distinguish between propositions held to be true, and the influences, rules and arguments used to support them.\(^{16}\)

Therefore, in the following sections only the ‘descriptive’ features will be determined as ideology.

Shils also argues that ideologies are frequently centred around a single premise or idea such as salvation, equality or ethnic purity.\(^{17}\) It seems that this is so as regards the two ideologies with which we are concerned. It is proposed to arrive at this central premise or idea by examining what the ideologies are rejecting, and what alternative they are proposing.

**THE RED ARMY FACTION**

In the case of the Red Army Faction and its affiliate 2 June Movement, it is certainly simpler to identify what the organisations reject in their society than it is to identify an alternative proposal. Pridham says of their ideology that it is "largely negative, certainly utopian and very much second hand."\(^ {18}\) The RAF not only rejects society in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also the world order which it invariably

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16 It is possible to criticise Marx and others for not doing this. See, for example, Plamenatz, *op. cit.*
17 *ibid.*, p. 66.
describes as capitalist, imperialist, exploitative, fascist and repressive. Horst Mahler, a principal RAF ideologist, stated at his trial that, "[t]he imperialist system forms a world-unit which transcends national boundaries. ... Exploitation and repression are globally organized." In this a major ideological target, and significant military target, is the United States. Israel is strongly condemned as an adjunct to the United States' imperialism, as is NATO. The Federal Republic of Germany is rejected not only for its ally status with the United States and its central role in NATO, but also for domestic reasons. As will be discussed later, NATO became the principal military target in the 1980's; before this (and concurrent with it) the Federal Republic was itself the prime target. Kellen points out that the United States and NATO "were always the enemy, of course. But they were enemy no. 2. Enemy no. 1 was the domestic establishment and domestic capitalism." Pridham agrees with this, saying that the terrorists continued to regard the West German state and its post-war system as their main enemy. The RAF and its ideological affiliates reject the entire parliamentary process. Essentially they accept the theses of academics such as Marcuse and Adorno, who argue that economic progress has not liberated people, but instead brought new forms of repression. People are now slaves to the desire to possess consumer goods. References to the rejection of this 'consumer terror' are readily found in the German terrorists' literature. Baumann, a former 2 June member, says in his memoirs that he experienced an "instinctive reaction against stress, against the pressure to achieve." In response to a questionnaire sent to them by Stern, four other members of the 2 June Movement stated that what had inspired them and others were,

[t]he experiences of every day; in the hurly-burly against the capitalist production line way of production and of life. Against the family, the

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21 Pridham, op. cit., p. 17.

school, the company, the office, the factory, the university, the nick, the
multinationals, the very ordinary demeanor of capitalist daily life which
led the young of the entire world onto the barricades and which pushed
them into trying new forms of collective life and new forms of struggle
(sic).23

Some reasons why students in particular became disillusioned with the
parliamentary Left have already been discussed in Chapter 2. However, those who
became involved with terrorism totally rejected any role for the parliamentary Left as
well as the policies and ideas it represented. This rejection was expressed by Ulrike
Meinhof who said, "all the Leftists have run over to the Right to boil the common pot and
cook in it, there is nothing but one anger, one hatred, one lament ... ."24 Shell argues that
it was Marcuse’s critique of society which provided the justification for the rejection of
"the game of parliamentary politics based on respect for the market place of ideas and
rules of liberal discussion."25 Andreas Baader, during his trial for setting fire to a
department store in Frankfurt in April 1968, referred to Marcuse’s Repressive Tolerance,
arguing that "suppressed and overpowered minorities" have the "natural right" to act
outside the parliamentary system.26 The parliamentary system was merely formal; it
contained no real democratic substance. Parliament was viewed as providing citizens
with the illusion that they were part of an effective means of control. The reality,
according to the terrorists, was that parliament was a "functionless appendix."27

Thus it is evident that the German terrorist groups reject most aspects of the
society in which they live.28 Klein, in his memoirs, stresses a need for "demonstrating

23 "The Berlin Indomitable," an interview with the Moabit Gang of Four, (Ronald
Fritzch, Gerald Klopper, Ralf Reinder and Fritz Teufel) in J.M. Bougereau,
Memoirs of an International Terrorist: conversations with Hans Joachim Klein,
25 Shell, op. cit., p. 663.
26 See H.J. Horchem, "West Germany’s Red Army Anarchists," Conflict Studies,
no. 46, June 1974, p. 5.
27 Shell, op. cit., p. 668. See page 33, Chapter 2.
28 Other groups have certainly rejected the society in which they live without
resorting to violence. The reasons why some individuals resort to violence are
varied and complex. The thesis explores two factors contributing to the adoption
that a better society is possible," but there is very little in the way of a concrete alternative to be found in the writings of the RAF or the 2 June Movement. One can of course surmise the kind of society they envisaged from those aspects they rejected: a world order without military alliances; the elimination of imperialism and racism; a society where no man feels alienated from the product he is producing and there is no compulsion to possess; and the destruction of capitalism and a global redistribution of wealth. Becker defines the ideology of the RAF as "world communist revolution" which is an appropriate way of expressing the central tenet of its ideology. Its other aims and ideas can be seen to be supporting this goal even if what comes after the revolution is vague.

THE PROVISIONAL IRA

The ideology of the Provisional IRA is in some respects simpler and in some more complex than that of the RAF. It is simpler in that its objective is more limited than "world communist revolution," but it is more complex in that it contains several distinct and identifiable strands at any one time. It is also more complex because the prominence of any one of these strands has fluctuated against the others throughout the history of the Irish Republican movement. The proposal for an alternative Ireland outlined below is based on the Provisional IRA's stance in the early 1980's. It is recognised that this stance is not historically consistent, and the reasons for this are discussed elsewhere. These swings in attitude also make it easier to identify those aspects of society which are rejected than the positive alternative proposal. However, as with the RAF, it is intended to present in this section only the central descriptive features of the ideology. All other aspects are deemed persuasive or prescriptive and will be considered in other chapters.

29 Klein in Bourgereau, op. cit., p. 65.
30 Becker, "Another Battle ...," op. cit., p. 92.
The Provisional IRA rejects Northern Ireland as a British-imposed statelet. Northern Ireland’s very existence, they claim, denies the Irish people their right to national self-determination, and the British guarantee to Northern Ireland’s Unionists is anti-democratic. British military presence is constantly condemned, as are instruments of law enforcement within Northern Ireland such as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). The constitutional processes set up by the British are rejected categorically, as Sinn Fein’s Danny Morrison made clear in his 1984 European election manifesto, "it is impossible for real progress to be achieved by peaceful appeal or by involvement in British constitutional politics."

Those shot or injured by the crown security forces are the victims of British aggression, so too are the victims of Provisional IRA violence, but everyone is the victim of the social and economic system which, according to Gerry Adams,

is geared not to Irish interests but in the interests of foreign and native capitalists or in the military and strategic interests of a British government and its superpower allies.

In short, there is nothing to justify the existence of Northern Ireland, except the imperialist desires of the British.

The Republic of Ireland is rejected for many of the same reasons as Northern Ireland is rejected. It is also condemned as a British statelet where "the ethos of the ruling class ensures its dependency upon, and subservience to, the British government." The Irish Republic, the Provisionals argue, has totally failed to establish any independence, indeed quite the reverse. It is in rejecting the Irish Republic that the Provisional IRA’s ideological view widens and there seems to be, at least ostensibly, some common ground with the RAF. For example, the Provisional IRA claims to be

32 ibid.
33 ibid., 7:11:85.
opposed to military alliances. It accuses both Fianna Fail and the Fine Gael-Labour coalition of being prepared to trade Ireland's neutrality for a settlement of the national issue. Ireland's membership of the European Community is rejected, and the community described as a "European capitalist bloc." The citizens of the Irish Republic are thus subjected to the alien values of capitalism, and are "victims of the imperialistic social, economic and cultural system. Membership of the European Community and the presence of multinationals have left the Irish with little control over their own destiny. Similarly,

[t]he so-called first language of the Free State is denigrated and ignored while a mid-Atlantic pseudo-culture is transported over any independence or sense of Irish culture.

So the Irish Republic is rejected for its position in the world order, as the Federal Republic is by the RAF. But the alternative proposed by the Provisional IRA centres more on what it perceives establishes national independence, rather than establishing Ireland on the basis of a new world order.

Within the global sphere, the new Ireland envisaged by the Provisional IRA would be neutral and non-aligned. It would renegotiate Ireland's status within the European Community, and trading relationships would then be orientated towards the Third World. Ireland itself would be organised in "accordance with the Easter Proclamation of 1916 and the democratic programme of the First Dail in 1919." According to Gerry Adams the new system would include democratic institutes of government with direct and realistic popular control and participation. It means a planned economy which is controlled by its workers, which can set up its own aims and divide its own wealth with justice and equality, an independent economy which can exploit and

34 ibid., 17:11:83.
35 ibid.
36 ibid.
37 ibid.
develop its own extensive natural resources, process its own food and feed its own people.38

But before any of these programmes can be implemented the English presence in Northern Ireland must be ended, and its influence over the Republic of Ireland curtailed. All Ireland’s problems are caused by the English presence in Ireland. It is a presence that the people of Ireland reject, and therefore it has to be maintained by force. In essence the central tenet of the Provisional IRA’s ideology is encapsulated in the old Fenian adage that England’s rule in Ireland is based on force and can only be ended by force.

IDEOLOGICAL SOURCES

The previous sections identify the central descriptive tenet of the RAF’s ideology as "world communist revolution", and that of the Provisional IRA as "England’s rule in Ireland is based on force and can only be ended by force." The remaining sections of this chapter will attempt to identify the major sources of these ideologies, with particular focus on those which encourage or are used to justify violence.

THE RED ARMY FACTION

One can detect three major influences on the ideology of the RAF, and it seems that these have been selected and modified to produce an ideology in support of violence that is certainly eclectic, but also identifiable to the RAF. Orthodox Marxist analyses have clearly had some impact on the thinking of major RAF personalities, as have the writings of Marcuse, Sartre and Fanon. But also of considerable significance are the models provided by the Third World liberation movements and the frameworks for revolution provided by Mao, Guevara and Marighella.

38 ibid.
Marx and Lenin

It is possible to isolate quotations from Marx and Lenin which would appear to support the revolutionary terrorism of the RAF. But at the same time one can also find aspects of the RAF's behaviour and ideology which are inconsistent with, or deviate significantly from the theories of Marx and Lenin. For example, Marx's often-quoted article "Victory of the Counter-Revolution in Vienna" is postulated as supporting or encouraging revolutionary terrorism. In it he says, "there is only one means to shorten, simplify and concentrate the death agony of the old society and the bloody birth pangs of the new one, one means only revolutionary terrorism."40

There is no doubt that Marx thought that violence would be necessary to force the 'old' order to give way to the 'new' one, but what is important is that he viewed violence as an instrument towards that end and not as an end in itself. Calvert argues that while Marx and Engels recognised the importance of power to the proletariat, neither provided "a blueprint for action."41 This omission was left for other Marxists (most significantly Lenin) to fill. But specifics aside, it is clear that both Marx and Engels saw revolution as a mass movement with revolutionary terrorism being, at most, only a tactic in a larger strategy. The proletarian revolution was not to be a conspiratorial or solely terrorist movement.

Marx also believed that the social polarisation brought about by capitalism, and its economic crises, would inevitably produce the necessary conditions for revolution. Marxists have continued to argue that there are objective conditions which determine the timing of revolutionary action. Theoretically the RAF rejects this Marxist notion, arguing that the conditions for revolution can be created, and thus it stresses subjective factors.

39 Also Trotsky.
On an operational level, the RAF has also rejected the strategy of contemporary Marxists operating within the liberal democracies of Western Europe, of infiltrating the existing governmental and societal structures - effecting a take over from within. The orthodox Marxists have conceded that the possibility of revolution in advanced industrial democracies is extremely remote, but the RAF continues to argue that it is possible, desirable and achievable. And it is in so arguing that the influences of Lenin and the Asian and Latin American revolutionaries come to the fore.

Lenin's writings, like those of Marx, contain references to terrorism which, if taken in isolation and out of context, would appear to be supportive of terrorism by groups like the RAF. But this is not the case. For example, Lenin in "Where to Begin?," declares "[i]n principle we have never rejected, and cannot reject terror," but he goes on to point out "it is our duty to sound a vigorous warning against becoming infatuated with terror, against taking it to be the chief and basic means of struggle."42 Lenin argued that groups which used terrorism in such a way not only demonstrated a lack "of faith in insurrection,"43 but also that it prevented the establishment of "closer contact with the masses."44 (As will be discussed below, Marcuse provided the RAF with a basis to reverse this argument totally.) The Social Revolutionaries were a contemporary group that Lenin analysed as being terrorist, and his criticisms of them are clear and frequently repeated.45 Lenin did not reject terrorism totally, but he believed it must be mass terror against the terror of the imperialists and capitalists, and that it must be part of a strategy of seizing power.

43 Lenin, "Situation in Russia and Tactics of Workers' Party," ibid., vol. 10, p. 117.
44 Lenin, "What is to be Done?," ibid., vol. 5, p. 512.
Lenin, therefore, would not have approved of the terrorism of the RAF, as it is neither aimed at seizing power (but, rather, at disrupting the existing order) nor used in conjunction with other modes of conflict. While it can be said that Lenin’s thoughts and prescriptions on the use of terrorist violence were not followed by the RAF, the same cannot be said of his notion of a revolutionary vanguard.

The backwardness of Russian society at the beginning of the twentieth century made it difficult for Lenin to accept the Marxist doctrine of inevitability - that capitalism would produce a politically conscious working class able to successfully carry out the revolution. So Lenin argued that a militant minority should become the political elite whose task was to organise and direct those below. It was certainly through a small militant group (in which Trotsky played a leading role) that Lenin was able both to achieve and establish power. Calvert suggests that Lenin’s 1917 pamphlet, "State and Revolution," was a necessary justification of his actions, since they were inconsistent with Marxist theory of historical determinants. As will be seen, the RAF sees itself as a revolutionary vanguard acting in the name of the proletariat, because the proletariat itself has been too duped by capitalist and bourgeois liberal ideas to be aware of its exploited situation.

Marxist/Leninist concepts and influences are clearly evident in the RAF’s ideology, but it is also clear that if either theory were rigidly adhered to, the RAF would neither exist in its current form nor implement its current operational strategy. Obviously, then, we need to examine other influences on the RAF’s ideology. As the RAF considers itself a guerrilla group, one would expect to be able to detect strong echoes of Mao and Guevara. But it will be argued below, that the RAF’s concept of guerrilla warfare is arrived at through, in one sense, a revolutionary process. Mao and Guevara’s ideas are returned, via Carlos Marighella, Herbert Marcuse and Jean-Paul Sartre, to the urban environment in which Marx and Lenin envisaged revolution.

Calvert, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
**Guerrilla Warfare**

As the realities of early twentieth century Russia had caused Lenin to doubt whether a mass organisation leading to revolution was possible,\(^47\) so Mao, given the realities of China, came to doubt that the proletarian base for revolution that Marxist theory prescribed was the only one. Both the novelty and importance of Mao’s guerrilla war theory in achieving victory may indeed be over-estimated.\(^48\) But both Taber and Laqueur agree that Mao’s innovation was to link the technique of guerrilla fighting to a particular political ideology. Taber, in his seminal work, *The War of the Flea*, says that Mao is the apostle of the application of guerrilla activity, in a conscious and deliberate way, to specific political objectives, without immediate reference to the outcome of battles as such, provided only that the revolutionaries survive.\(^49\)

Laqueur argues that although the idea of combining guerrilla strategy and tactics within a framework of political doctrine had occurred to others, "they had never been applied on such a scale, or ultimately with such effect."\(^50\) While conditions and terrain in the Federal Republic of Germany made the application of Mao’s theories untenable, his influence should not be discounted. As well as being able to isolate aspects of Mao’s writings which would appear to support "revolutionary" violence,\(^51\) Mao introduced at least one aspect of revolutionary guerrilla warfare that was to influence greatly Che Guevara. Guevara was in turn to influence greatly not only the RAF, but a whole

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\(^{47}\) Lenin argued that in Russia a mass organisation, in stead of being most accessible to the masses, would, in fact, be most accessible to the police. It was to counteract this problem that Lenin advocated the formation of professional revolutionaries. See Lenin, "What is to be Done?," *op. cit.*

\(^{48}\) Laqueur, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-262.


\(^{50}\) Laqueur, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

\(^{51}\) For example, Mao’s second phase of revolution where "acts of sabotage and terrorism multiply," see footnote 24, Chapter 1. And: "Our chief method is to learn warfare through warfare. A person who has had no opportunity to go to school can learn warfare - he can learn through fighting in a war. A revolutionary war is a mass undertaking; it is often not a matter of first learning then doing, but of doing and then learning, for doing itself is learning." Quoted in Taber, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
generation of so-called guerrilla movements which sprang up in the late 1960's. Mao in adapting Marxism/Leninism to Chinese conditions, reassessed objective conditions and introduced an element of 'voluntarism' into the revolutionary process, an idea taken much further by Guevara.

Guevara's most significant contribution to the theory of revolution is his thoughts on how the revolution can be brought about. Guevara argued that the Cuban revolution proved not only that "popular forces" can win a war against an army, but also that it refuted,

those who feel the need to wait until, in some perfect way, all the required objective and subjective conditions are at hand, instead of hastening to bring these conditions about by their own efforts.52

So Guevara provides justification for acting under conditions that orthodox Marxists would reject. Guevara also adopts Lenin's notion of a revolutionary vanguard and applies it to the guerrillas;

the essence of guerrilla warfare is the miracle by which a small nucleus of men - looking beyond their immediate tactical objective - becomes the vanguard of a mass movement, achieving its ideals, establishing a new society, ending the ways of the old, and winning social justice.53

In Cuba, according to Guevara, Castro achieved this with a nucleus of only twelve men.54

Guevara also elucidated a strategy for the cities centred around what he called suburban groups. Although these groups could, when operating effectively, provide valuable assistance to the struggle, Guevara felt they were operating in "exceptionally unfavourable terrain." Because of this, groups should contain no more than four or five

53 ibid., p. 114.
54 ibid., p. 147.
members, who must be both discreet and disciplined. The main base and decisive battleground was however, the rural environment. Guevara’s warnings against an over-reliance on urban areas are clear. In the cities, he argues, the armed movement can easily be suppressed by suspending or ignoring civil liberties, thus forcing the movement to operate underground, with inadequate arms in an unsuitable environment. These conditions do not arise in rural areas because the "guerrillas and inhabitants co-operate closely, beyond the reach of the oppressor forces." Guevara repeatedly pointed out that his theory of revolution was only applicable to conditions in Latin America, where ‘land hunger’ was an essential factor. Guevara also pointed out that the establishment of a centre of rebellion required that the people "see clearly the futility of maintaining a fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate," - a condition that the guerrillas can accentuate but not create.

So thus it seems that the RAF needed to reinterpret Guevara’s strategy in two ways. Firstly, it needed to re-emphasise the importance of the urban environment, and secondly, although it argued that progress within the parliamentary system of the Federal Republic of Germany is impossible, it needed to provide further justifications for its existence and its violence. In the former it was helped by Carlos Marighella in Brazil, and in the latter by Western philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre. But before leaving the thoughts of Guevara one more, perhaps intangible, influence should be noted. The victory in Cuba and the subsequent publication of Guevara’s *La Guerre de Guerrillas*, contributed significantly to a general feeling of revolutionary optimism - that even in the most unfavourable circumstances and against vastly superior firepower, revolution could be achieved. The technique was guerrilla warfare, and the basis could be established by a very small group. Among those affected by this optimism was Carlos Marighella who,

55 *ibid.*, p. 112.
56 Guevara quoted in Taber *op. cit.*, p. 31.
57 See Debray, *op. cit.*
although he continued to embrace the notion that the rural environment was decisive, espoused and theorised a much more positive role for the urban guerrilla.

Marighella reasoned that as more and more people moved to the cities the rural areas would become more marginal to the life and centre of the country as a whole. So he developed a strategy of urban guerrilla warfare based around 'firing groups'. Although these firing groups should respond to tasks set by the strategic command, they should also act independently and on their own initiative. Marighella argues that

it is essential to avoid any rigidity in the organization in order to permit the greatest possible initiative on the part of the firing group. 58

The major tactic for the urban guerrilla, according to Marighella, is to shoot, although, as has been discussed in Chapter 1, he also sees a role for terrorism, which he defines as "usually involving the placement of a bomb or fire explosion of great destructive power". 59 The urban guerrilla takes part in a war of nerves, and the tactics prescribed by Marighella are apparent not only in the actions of the RAF, but also among all other terrorist organisations;

using the telephone and the mail to announce false clues to the police and the government, including information and the planting of bombs and any other act of terrorism in public offices and other places, kidnapping and assassination plans, etc., to oblige the authorities to wear themselves out, following up the information fed them. 60

While emphasising the necessity of propaganda to gain support, Marighella argues that this support is not going to be total, but that partial support is enough. He suggests that revolutionaries should popularise the slogan: "Let him who does not wish to do anything for the revolutionaries do nothing against them." 61 Just how partial this support can be, Marighella does not specify, and there is certainly a vast differential between support

59 ibid., p. 36.
60 ibid., p. 37.
61 ibid., p. 36.
needed to survive and support needed for victory. But of victory Marighella was sure (as were Mao and Guevara);

they [the security forces] find no way to halt guerrilla operations, nor to wipe out the revolutionary organization with its fragmented groups that move around and operate throughout the national territory persistently and contagiously.

The people refuse to collaborate with the authorities, and the general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents.62

The idea of the inevitability of victory was certainly adopted by the RAF, despite the lack of empirical evidence of victory in the urban environment. Clearly though, the urban environment had to be the setting for any struggle in the Federal Republic of Germany, as land hunger was not an issue and the government was not, at least openly, oppressive. Thus it seems that none of the justifications offered for the recourse to violence by the theorists mentioned so far, are totally applicable to the Federal Republic of Germany. What was needed was either a new view of violence or a new analysis of conditions within liberal democracies that would justify recourse to violence.

A New Analysis

So far we have considered influences on the RAF which come from outside the post-war experiences of the liberal democracies. The conditions under which revolution was advocated were politically and geographically remote from the Federal Republic of Germany. But there are influences which come from within the experiences of the post-war liberal democracies.63 The philosophies of Marcuse, Sartre, Fanon and the whole New Left movement produced two particularly significant concepts: the glorification of action over intellect; and the sociological analysis which defined students as marginal

62 ibid., p. 40.
63 Wilkinson argues that in influencing the ideologies of groups operating within the liberal democracies, the roles of Guevara and Marighella have been exaggerated. "Their true intellectual mentors," he says, "were figures such as Herbert Marcuse and Jean Paul Sartre." "Terrorism and the Liberal State," op. cit., p. 99 and p. 71.
men, opening the way for them to assume an *avant-garde* function within the liberal democracies.

It is not the intention of the following to provide a critical analysis of the thinking of either Marcuse or Sartre, but rather to highlight those aspects which, rightly or wrongly, helped inspire or were used as justifications for its actions by the RAF. Marcuse would seem to have contributed to the RAF ideology in three significant areas: his analysis of liberal democratic societies, and the social basis for revolution which he drew from it; the positive role he attributed to students; and his linkage with the Third World.

Marcuse, in an interview with French journalists, claimed that he had

> tried to show that contemporary society is a repressive society in all its aspects, that even the comfort, the prosperity, the alleged political and moral freedom are utilized for oppressive ends.64

The source of the problem in Marcuse’s view is the capitalist mode of production, which binds ever increasing numbers to processes which have no room for personal gratification or creativity. The desire to possess consumer goods increases competition and aggression between men, and thus diminishes the quality of life. Ultimately, Marcuse argues, this will lead to revolution motivated by disgust at the "general inhumanity, dehumanization, waste and excess of the so-called consumer society."65 However, revolution in twentieth century capitalist societies "will have a base, strategy and direction quite different from its predecessors."66

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Marcuse widens considerably the social basis of revolution to include the technical and professional classes along with the proletariat. Since the consumer society has so welded the proletariat to capitalism, the revolution could not be achieved through its mass action. Instead it would have to be led by those who saw the true situation, and the dictatorship during the transition from capitalism to communism would have to be an alliance between these forces (the New Left) and the proletariat. Marcuse expresses it thus:

the basic idea is: how can slaves who do not even know they are slaves free themselves? How can they liberate themselves by their own power, by their own faculties? They must be taught and must be led to be free, and this is the more so the more the society in which they live uses all available means in order to shape and preform their consciousness and to make it immune against possible alternatives. This idea of an educational, preparatory dictatorship has today become an integral element of revolution and of the justification of the revolutionary oppression.67

It is in this educational function that Marcuse sees a particular role for students. He argues that because students are not fully integrated into the processes of production, they can develop and lead the revolutionary consciousness.68 In the interview already cited, Marcuse says of the students that they are "militant minorities who can articulate the needs and aspirations of the silent masses. ... the students can truly be called spokesmen."69

Marcuse, in re-defining the social basis of revolution, also provided a rationale for the glorification of action over intellect, i.e., revolutionary praxis. Under Marcuse's "technically rationalised" society, all the productive classes, not just the proletariat, were 'objective' factors in the revolutionary situation. The New Left had the role of raising revolutionary consciousness; to make the productive classes 'subjectively' disposed to

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69 "Marcuse Defines His New Left Line," *op. cit.* Marcuse does point out that the students cannot by themselves be revolutionary, but what was important for the students, and ultimately for the RAF, was this leading role given to them.
revolutionary transformation. Thus the New Left could also be viewed as an 'objective' factor in the revolutionary process, and could be the vehicle through which theory and practice were united;

... under these changed circumstances, radical change in consciousness is the beginning, the first step in changing social existence: emergence of the new Subject. Historically, it is again the period of enlightenment prior to material change - a period of education which turns into praxis: demonstration, confrontation, rebellion.70

As shall be seen over the next three chapters, the RAF constantly argues firstly, the need for action, and secondly, that this action will itself raise the revolutionary consciousness of the masses.

Marcuse's concept of revolution however, was not limited to the Western industrial societies, but contained a global perspective. Capitalism had global effects, he argued, and while an alliance of strategically placed socioeconomic groups within the industrial democracies could accentuate the contradictions of capitalism, this would not be sufficient in itself to bring about revolution. But if at this stage capitalism could be attacked by revolutions in the Third World, then capitalism could be defeated. Thus successful revolution required an alliance between forces within industrial societies and forces in the Third World. Marcuse saw the two forces as being mutually dependent, neither being able to succeed without the other.71 Marcuse’s attitude to violence is at best ambivalent, and certainly open to various interpretations. Contextually, one can find Marcuse declaring his support for revolutionary violence, such as his defence of Babeuf;

... because those for whom the revolution is to be made are deceived, hostile or apathetic, it will be a revolution by the minority, that means, it will involve the Terror - against the enemies of the revolution who would presumably include the deceived and misled people in whose interest the revolution is to be carried through.72

72 H. Marcuse, "Thoughts on the Defence of Gracchus Babeuf," in S.A. Scott, (ed.) The Defence of Gracchus Babeuf, Amherst: University of Massachusets Press,
Marcuse did, however, provide a rejection of West German terrorism in the following terms;

In taking a position towards terrorism in West Germany, the Left must ask itself two questions. Do terrorist actions contribute to the weakening of capitalism? Are these actions justified in view of the demands of revolutionary morality? To both questions I must answer in the negative.73

Nevertheless, Marcuse certainly allowed the militants sole latitude in determining the answers to such questions,74 which not only adds to the ambivalence of Marcuse’s thoughts on violence but also permits the RAF to embrace Marcuse’s analysis as part of their ideology.

If Marcuse’s thoughts on violence are ambivalent, those of Jean-Paul Sartre are much less so. Sartre draws his philosophy from the belief that fundamentally life is based on competition for resources. His dialectic is based on the fact that on the one hand, one man is an object in the way of another man obtaining resources, yet on the other hand, men must co-operate with each other to gain access to resources. In the group, which Sartre argues is formed by men committed to gaining the same resources,75 he says "terror is the statutory guarantee, freely called for, that none shall fall back into seriality."76 In seriality each man pursues his own objectives while objectifying others and preventing them from achieving their goals. Thus Cranston argues that in Sartre’s

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74 See, for example, Marcuse, "Counterrevolution and Revolt," op. cit., p. 50.
75 The group as opposed to the ‘series’ which is a collection of individuals defined only by their close proximity to each other, such as in a bus queue. The series does not co-ordinate its efforts, i.e., each individual is competing for a seat on the bus.
inherently violent world "[t]error is in fact fraternity"77, and Aron that "Dialectical Reason is violence."78

According to Sartre’s vision of society man himself is violent, and therefore a non-violent or lawful revolution is meaningless; nothing, including the position of the bourgeoisie, can be achieved without violence. Man is his own worst enemy in an environment which mocks his struggle for survival;

Nothing indeed - neither wild beasts nor microbes - could more be terrible for man than this intelligent, flesh eating, cruel species, which knows how to follow and outwit the human intelligence and of which the aim is precisely the destruction of man. This species is manifestly our own, as each of us see it, in the Other, in the context of scarcity.79

This leads Sartre to his essential problem, which he defines in a 1962 newspaper interview as refuting "that theory according to which the left ought not to answer violence with violence."80 However, violence can improve this rather distressing situation. And it is in this positive view of violence that Sartre’s influence on the RAF is most evident.

Sartre’s view of the positiveness of violence coincides with that of Frantz Fanon, and indeed is best expressed in his preface to Fanon’s book *The Wretched of the Earth*. Both Sartre and Fanon argue that anti-colonial violence has a humanising effect, and that it is an integral part of human development. Fanon claims that for the native, violence makes him fearless and restores his self respect. ... When people have taken violent part in the national liberation they will allow no one to set themselves up as ‘liberators’ ... Illuminated by violence, the consciousness of the people rebels against pacification.81

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77 ibid.
79 Sartre quoted in Cranston, *op. cit.*., p. 22.
And Sartre echoes this by saying,

[t]he rebel's weapon is proof of his humanity. For in the first days of the revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time.82

Society will recover and man will recreate himself through violence, because violence "like the Achilles' lance can heal the wounds that it has inflicted."83 Thus Sartre has created a philosophy of violence for its own sake rather than as a rational choice towards a political objective. Nor does Sartre restrict in any way the conditions under which violence can be used. In both these aspects he differs from Marx, Lenin, Mao, Guevara and Marighella. So it can be argued that Sartre's philosophy, along with the thesis of repressive tolerance, provided justification for attempting to apply violence in the guise of guerrilla warfare to the urban environment demanded by Marxist theory.

THE PROVISIONAL IRA

The Provisional IRA's justifications for violence are much less complex than those of the RAF, and are generated to a great degree from internal historical sources. The Provisionals claim as the bases of their ideology "[t]he socialism of James Connolly, the idealism of Patrick 'Pearse and the unrepentant Republicanism of Tom Clarke ... ."84 The historical context of these themes has already been partially discussed in Chapter 2; what is intended here is to elucidate in more detail the Provisionals' interpretation of those events on which they stake their claim to historical legitimacy and justify their violence.

It is significant that figures associated with the Easter 1916 Rising are so prominent in the Provisionals' ideology. 1916 is seen as both the culmination of a long

82 J.P. Sartre, Preface to Fanon, ibid., p. 19.
83 ibid., p. 25.
struggle against English dominance and the basis for an unfinished task, i.e., Irish unification. It is the events of 1916 and the thoughts and writings of its leaders which permit an interpretation of Irish history allowing the Provisionals to claim people such as Tone, Davis and Hyde as ideological forefathers. However, before considering such influences, which may only be secondary, it is necessary to examine the philosophy of physical force on which the Provisionals base their ideology.

*Physical Force Republicanism*

Like the RAF, the Provisionals use an eclectic method to justify their violence, and isolated quotations from various thinkers (mainly Irish) to support their position. But unlike the RAF they have a relatively uncomplicated philosophy of violence, which has a strong degree of historic legitimacy. Essentially this philosophy is centred on the view that English rule in Ireland can only be ended by force. This notion was certainly predominant during the 1916 rising, and was then applied retrospectively, by Patrick Pearse, to earlier rebellions such as 1798 and 1848. Pearse’s willingness to use violence to attain the republic he envisaged has also had a major impact on physical force republicanism post-1916.

The Fenian movement was established by two Irishmen who left Ireland after the disappointing failure of 1848. O’Mahoney went to the United States, where he believed he could establish substantial support for another rebellion. Stephens, on the other hand, returned to Ireland in 1858, and established a secret organisation which later became known as the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and can be said to be the predecessor of the IRA. However, both the organisation established by O’Mahoney in America and that established in Ireland became popularly known as the Fenian Brotherhood. Eminent Irish historian J.C. Beckett argues that the Fenian movement was in no way democratic, and that it had no programme of reform to attract support. Instead it was a military organisation which
The Fenian movement did instigate a rebellion in 1867, which was as disastrous as that of 1848,86 but it marked the beginning of a tradition of secretive, conspiratorial and unconstitutional nationalism. Despite the dismal failure of the insurrection, both the IRB in Ireland and the Fenians in America continued to plan and advocate violence to remove the English presence from Ireland. A specifically terrorist campaign was launched on mainland Britain in the 1880’s, sponsored by the American Fenians. In Ireland, Lord Cavendish and his Under Secretary, Burke, were assassinated in Phoenix Park, Dublin, by an American backed group called ‘The Invincibles’.87 Many of those involved in the Fenian movement did not condone these tactics, indeed John Devoy specifically diverted funds sent for such purposes and channelled them into anti-landlord agitation.88 However, the Fenians did evolve an ideology centred on the use of force by self-appointed leaders accountable only to a secret organisation, without any discernible supportive social programme. The idea that only force, not constitutional methods, could secure an independent Ireland was given added impetus by Patrick Pearse and the events of 1916.

Pearse adopted the Fenian idea that a small group - perhaps just seven men - could lead Ireland to independence. He believed that the majority of Irishmen had sold their Irishness to the Home Rule concept, and needed to be mobilised by those qualified

to defend the national honour. Pearse defined the national honour in terms of an independent and Gaelic state, and said "I do not know how nationhood is achieved except by armed men, I do not know how nationhood is guarded except by armed men." Pearse was highly critical of the Home Rule generation of Redmond. Nationality, he said, is a spiritual thing which Redmond and his colleagues had thought of as

a thing to be negotiated about as men negotiate about a tariff or about a trade route, rather than as an immediate jewel to be preserved at all peril, a thing so sacred that it may not be brought into the market place at all or spoken of where men traffic.

The whole concept of Home Rule disgusted Pearse, as he believed that accepting anything less than an independent Irish Republic made a man guilty of "so immense a crime against the Irish nation that one can only say of him that it were better for that man ... that he had not been born." Pearse's attitude to violence was similarly uncompromising. He argued that the nation which regards bloodshed as the "final horror has lost its manhood." And in the midst of the Great War Pearse wrote,

[the last sixteen months have been the most glorious in Europe. Heroism has come back to earth. .. It is good for the world that such things should be done. The old heart of the earth needed to be warmed with the red wine of the battlefield. Such august homage was never before offered to God as this, the homage of millions of lives gladly given for the love of country. ... Many people in Ireland dread war because they do not know it. ... When war comes to Ireland she must welcome it as she would welcome the Angel of God. And she will.

Such an attitude, in view of time and context, is not particularly abnormal or unique. Pearse's glorification of death and bloodshed in the service of country is, perhaps, better illustrated in his oration at the funeral of O'Donovan Rossa. In it Pearse claims

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91 *ibid.*, p. 224-225.
92 *ibid.*, p. 232.
93 *ibid.*, p. 99.
94 *ibid.*, p. 216-217.
[our] foes ... cannot undo the miracles of God who ripens in the hearts of young men the seeds sown by the young men of a former generation. Life springs from death; and from the graves of patriot men and women spring living nations ... but the fools, the fools, the fools! they have left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace.95

Pearse, while following much of the philosophy of the Fenians, was responsible for expressing these views in terms acceptable to Catholic Ireland. Admittedly Pearse's views only became widespread after his death, but there can be little doubt about his immense influence. Pearse's historical interpretations and the fact that Irish independence could be seen as ultimately resulting from his actions, allowed both the glorification of what Pearse called 'separatist' violence in Irish history and provided a legitimisation for the future use of violence.96

Among those deemed a separatist hero of Ireland by Pearse was Wolfe Tone. Tone is often proclaimed as the father of Irish Republicanism and the champion of Catholic Ireland. The former claim is not difficult to sustain, but the latter owes much to Pearse. Tone certainly sympathised with the Catholics as people denied their political rights, but he had little sympathy for their religion. After a visit to Rouen Cathedral he wrote,

[h]eard part of sermon this being Easter Sunday. Sad trash. ... The church was full of women but, I did not see twenty men. I wonder how people can listen to such abominable nonsense.97

The fact that Tone, a Protestant and a Jacobin, whose views were widely condemned by the contemporary Catholic church, holds such a prominent position in the ideology of

95 ibid., p. 136-137. In this speech Pearse also declares "[t]hey think they have pacified Ireland. They think they have purchased half of us and intimidated the other half." Presumably this is a reference to the Home Rule concept. The fact that, in his later years, O'Donovan Rossa was a supporter of Home Rule and had shared a platform with Redmond in New York seems to have escaped Pearse.


97 Entry in Tone’s diary, quoted in Cronin, op. cit., p. 62.
physical force republicanism is due mostly to Pearse's interpretation and portrayal of Tone and others\textsuperscript{98} as separatists rather than as revolutionaries. In his pamphlet, "The Separatist Idea," Pearse claimed that both Tone and Emmet were "Nationalists first, and revolutionaries only in so far as revolution was essential to the establishment of the nation."\textsuperscript{99} It was Pearse’s adulation of Tone, untainted by secularism and expressed in Gaelic and Catholic terms, that gave Tone his status in the new Irish Free State. The rebellion led by Tone in 1798, like the rebellions of 1803, 1848 and 1867, was poorly planned, and was significant for the fact that the people failed to respond to its republican message. But it began a myth of heroic failure in the face of overwhelming superiority. The repeat of the failure in 1916 culminated in the apotheosis of martyrdom, and viewed in this light, Tone’s importance is at once understood. Tone’s place in Irish history is not because his political ideas were better than those of his contemporaries, but because he was condemned to death by the British for his part in a failed rebellion. His departure from Ireland in 1795, and his declaration from Cave Hill, overlooking Belfast, that he and his fellow United Irishmen would never "desist in our efforts until we have subverted the authority of England over our country and asserted our independence,"\textsuperscript{100} has a revered place in republican ideology. It provides a beginning for an historical sanction for the use of force against England, and for seeking the aid of England’s enemies.

Tone was however, a revolutionary who advocated a whole new economic and social structure for Ireland. There is a radical socialist strand of republican ideology, which is used by the Provisionals to support their physical force, as will be discussed presently. It is now proposed to examine the development of physical force post-1916. Pearse had established four basic premises: that the use of force was legitimate; that the Republic was not a thing to be negotiated for; accepting anything less than a Republic

\textsuperscript{98} Particularly Robert Emmet.
\textsuperscript{99} "Collected Works of Pearse...," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 291.
\textsuperscript{100} Quoted in Coogan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 17.
was a betrayal of national honour; and that a small elite group could both define and defend the national honour.

The first time physical force republicanism, as defined by the four premises above, became evident post-1916 was during the debate over the acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. Cathal Brugha argued in the Dail,

[t]here has been a body of opinion in this country ... that has always repudiated English authority in this country. Each generation had that body of opinion in it, and whenever they found themselves strong they went out in insurrection against England and English authority here. The last one as you know was in 1916 when we established our Republic; ... This is the spirit which has lasted all through the centuries, and you people in favour of the Treaty know that the British government and the British Empire will have gone down before that spirit in Ireland dies out.101

For Brugha the Treaty setting up the Free State was something less than the thirty-two county Republic and, therefore, unacceptable, necessitating a return to war. Those against the Treaty argued that the Dail’s acceptance of the Treaty by 64 votes to 57 had destroyed the Republic proclaimed in 1916. The Brugha camp then refused to accept the wishes of the Irish people when the issue was put to them. Less than 22 per cent of Irish people cast an explicitly anti-treaty vote, and the civil war continued.102

Although de Valera was not, at this stage, prepared to compromise, his eventual compromise of taking seats in the Dail with his Fianna Fail grouping was seen by many in the IRA as yet another betrayal.103 For a while though, they held out hope that de Valera would bring about the Republic.

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103 By this stage only those who were anti-Treaty were known as the IRA.
De Valera’s compromise essentially involved an acceptance of reality. He recognised that further military struggle was hopeless, and that abstentionist policies would continue to isolate the IRA. He proposed that Republicans would be morally free to enter the Dail once the oath of allegiance to the English King had been removed, which would then enable the Republic to be achieved by constitutional methods. The IRA’s response to these suggestions was to elect Andy Cooney Chief-of-Staff “with an implicit mandate to lead the IRA back from the stoop of Leinster House to the field of battle.” De Valera however, continued on his constitutional path, removing the oath of allegiance, and in 1936 introducing the External Relations Act which to all intents and purposes created the Republic. Again this was not enough for the IRA who accused de Valera of using coercion against Republicans today because they are an embarrassment to the conspiracy for yet another betrayal of the Republic based on Mr. de Valera’s ‘external association’ plan. ... Mr. de Valera can no more succeed in intimidating Republicans than Churchill or Greenwood, Collins or Cosgrave succeeded. The Republican army will continue in its training and organization, preparing for its task of overthrowing British imperialism and native treason. That is our answer to Mr. de Valera.105

In the months leading up to the Second World War, the IRA initiated a bombing campaign in England. But the movement emerged from the war in a state of confusion, disarray and disillusion. The failure of the border campaign in 1958-1962 revealed further the extent of the decline. Within the movement there was a great deal of debate over future direction. The new breed attracted to the movement in the 1960’s was eager to broaden the base of appeal and become involved in direct political action, arguing that the soldier mentality of the IRA was outdated and isolationist. By 1969 the army GHQ was convinced and supported a change in direction which would include direct political action. But the hardliners saw this as betrayal yet again, and refused to compromise with what they knew was majority opinion. In December 1969, the dissenters withdrew and

104 Bowyer Bell, op. cit., p. 53.
formed the Provisional IRA, and a month later their counterparts in Sinn Fein formed Provisional Sinn Fein.

So we can see that the Provisionals emerged directly from a tradition of uncompromising faith in the need for physical force to achieve the thirty-two county Irish Republic envisaged by Patrick Pearse. In ascertaining the influences on the Provisionals’ ideology, however, two further themes need to be examined with particular attention to how they can be used to justify the Provisionals’ position and their use of violence.

**Socialism**

Social radicalism has been one of the most consistent, if not successful, themes in Republican ideology. Its prominence, or lack of it, can be related to national and international events, but it also has to be conceded that many of socialism’s prescriptions contradict those of the Catholic church which has been (and is) the major influence on Irish social and political life. These contradictions presented by socialism to mainstream Irish life have, at times, been blamed for the ill-fortunes of the IRA. For example, in the 1930’s the IRA was advocating a socially radical programme in the form of Saor Eire.106 But after accusations of "atheistic communism" by both church and state, the IRA reacted by electing arch-conservative Sean Russell as Chief-of-Staff. Socialism was also given as the reason by the Provisionals for splitting with the ‘Official’ movement in 1969. Internal methods of operation had, they said, expelled the faithful and replaced them with those interested in a "more radical form of movement."107 But having said that, the Provisionals do claim ‘the socialism of James Connolly’ as part of their ideology.

Pearse’s attempts at reconciling some aspects of Fenianism with Catholicism have already been discussed, and Connolly’s attempts to reconcile Marxist socialism with

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106 For a discussion of Saor Eire, see *ibid.*, pp. 87-92, and Rumpf and Hepburn, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-96.

107 Bowyer Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 368.
Catholicism is one area in which the Provisional IRA can profitably claim James Connolly as a primary ideological influence. Connolly’s thoughts on the subject of socialism and religion are contained in his pamphlet "Labour, Nationality and Religion," which was prepared as a reply to a series of Lenten lectures given by Father Kane in Dublin in 1910. Connolly argues that Catholic lay opinion emphatically supports O’Connell’s statement that he would "take his religion from Rome but not his politics,"108 and he goes on to refute Father Kane’s claim that a "true Catholic cannot be a real socialist."109 But Connolly’s strongest point as far as the Provisional IRA is concerned is his argument that history provides many instances where the "instincts of the reformers and revolutionaries have been right," whereas "the political theories of the Vatican and the clergy have been unquestionably wrong."110 Such an argument allows the Provisionals a means of reconciling actions which the Catholic church condemns with their own self-image of being ‘good Catholics’.111

It is clear that Connolly did not agree with Pearse’s analysis of bloodshed as a "cleansing and sanctifying thing." "No," he declared, "we do not think that the old heart of the earth needs to be warmed with the red wine of millions of lives. We think anyone who does is a blithering idiot."112 But Connolly was not averse to the use of physical force. Although Connolly fervently believed in an independent Ireland, his definition of an independent Ireland and his rationale for the use of force to achieve it, were somewhat different from those of Pearse.

110 ibid., p. 66.
111 See quote at footnote 81, page 151, Chapter 5.
Connolly argued that England's rule over Ireland was based on her landlords, financiers and capitalists, so that removing the English army from Irish soil would make little difference. Irish independence depended on Irish ownership of the means of production, and for this Connolly was prepared to fight. He was adamant that nationalism without socialism, "without a reorganisation of society on the basis of a broader and more developed form of that common property ... is only national recreancy."¹¹³ Connolly's justifications for the use of force and his espousing of the differences between socialists' use of force, and what he called 'advanced' nationalists' use of force, reveal a serious deviation from his theories by the Provisional IRA;

We neither exalt it [physical force] into a principle nor repudiate it as something not to be thought of. Our position towards it is that the use or non-use of force for the realization of the ideas of progress always has been and always will be determined by the attitude, not of the party of progress, but of the governing class opposed to that party. If the time should arrive when the party of progress finds its way to freedom barred by the stubborn greed of a possessing class entrenched behind the barriers of law and order; if the party of progress has indoctrinated the people at large with the new revolutionary conception of society and is therefore representative of the will of a majority of the nation; if it has exhausted all the peaceful means at its disposal for the purpose of demonstrating to the people and their enemies that the new revolutionary ideas do possess the suffrage of the majority; then, but not till then the party which represents the revolutionary idea is justified in taking steps to assume the powers of government, and in using the weapons of force to dislodge the usurping class or government in possession, and in treating its members and supporters as usurpers and rebels against the constituted authorities always have been treated. In other words, Socialists believe that the question of force is of very minor importance; the really important question is of the principles upon which is based the movement that may or may not need the use of force to realize its object.¹¹⁴

As was discussed earlier, the Provisional IRA's ideology is centralised on the claim that the English presence in Ireland can only be ended by physical force. And as we shall see over the next three chapters, it is a claim that is constantly reiterated. Therefore, it seems that the use of force is not a question of minor importance but one of principle. Also, while the Provisional IRA would undoubtedly claim that all Connolly's conditions justifying the use of force have been met, it cannot demonstrate that it has "indoctrinated

the people at large ... and is therefore representative of the will of a majority of the
nation." Peaceful methods are totally rejected by the Provisional IRA, as are those who
advocate them. The efficacy of physical force dominates the thinking of the Provisional
IRA. As Lenin would have rejected the RAF as genuine revolutionaries, so Connolly
would have rejected the Provisional IRA as genuine socialists. His characterisation of
the physical force movement of his own generation is equally applicable to the
Provisional IRA, and it is undoubtedly under this heading that Connolly would categorise
the Provisional IRA. According to Connolly the physical force movement

bases its hopes upon the disgust of the people over the failure of the Home
Rule movement; it seeks to enlist the people under its banners, not so
much by pointing to the base ideals of the constitutionalists or the total
inadequacy of their pet measures to remedy the evils under which the
people suffer, as by emphasizing the greater efficacy of physical force as a
national weapon. ... No matter what their political faith may be, if only
they are prepared to express belief in the saving grace of physical force,
they are acclaimed as advanced Nationalists - worthy descendants of the
'men of '98'.115

One area where Connolly was prepared to consider the use of physical force was
against partition, an idea which had been mooted by the Liberal Party in 1914. Connolly
proposed violent opposition on the grounds that partition would enable the capitalists in
all parts of Ireland (and England) to maintain their positions. He advised that against
partition "Labour should give the bitterest opposition, against it Labour in Ulster should
fight to the death, if necessary, as our fathers fought before us."116 Similarly, during the
war, as food was leaving Ireland, Connolly advocated that workers be prepared for
"armed battling in the streets to keep in this country the food for our people."117 He was
also prepared to align himself and his Citizens' Army with the rebellious plans of Pearse
and his co-conspirators.

115 ibid., p. 207.
117 Connolly, "Our Duty in the Crises," Ellis, op. cit., p. 238. He also published a
pamphlet detailing the sort of tactics involved in street fighting. See "Street
Fighting - Summary," ibid., pp. 228-231.
The alliance between Connolly and ‘advanced’ nationalism was not an easy one, and it seems that Connolly suspected that even though success at Easter was extremely unlikely, it would not be the end of the struggle for his vision of an independent Ireland. Shortly before the rising, he told the Citizens’ Army

[...]he odds are a thousand to one against us but in the event of victory hold on to your rifles as those with whom we are fighting may stop before our goal is reached. We are out for economic as well as political liberty.118

Connolly’s willingness to continue against such odds119 certainly adds to the apotheosis of martyrdom symbolised by 1916. But even more important, Connolly’s willingness to use physical force against British imperialism and his advocacy of violent opposition to partition, as we shall see, are used by the Provisional IRA to justify its violence.

Post-1916, the first attempt to combine socialism with the IRA was Sinn Fein’s encouragement of direct action to enforce the British government’s tillage order of 1918. But by 1920 Sinn Fein was discouraging agrarian revolutions, and land courts set up under the aegis of the Dail Eireann were bringing in verdicts favouring landlords. Rumpf and Hepburn argue that the socialist statements of Sinn Fein and the IRA,

remained simply a form of words which may have served a useful short term political purpose as far as relations between national and labour leaders were concerned, but which never at any stage bore much resemblance to the social policy pursued by Sinn Fein.120

Apart from Saor Eire, socialism was not a prominent feature of the IRA until the 1960’s, although it was nearly always present. In the 1960’s, there was a move to use the army for social issues but, as discussed previously, while this was supported by the majority, it provoked the formation of the Provisionals with the resultant condemnations of

119 On the morning of the rising Connolly declared that they were going out “to be slaughtered” and that there was “none whatever” chance of success. See Ellis, op. cit., p. 30.
120 Rumpf and Hepburn, op. cit., p. 24.
socialism. It would be fair to conclude that there is an historical tradition of socialism within the Republican movement from Tone onwards, but that the Provisionals are not a linear representation of it. A socialist and particularly an anti-imperialist analysis of Northern Ireland is, nonetheless, used by the Provisionals in support of their ideology. Much the same can be said of their interpretation of what constitutes Irish nationalism.

**Irish Nationalism**

Patrick Pearse decreed that Ireland should be Gaelic as well as free, and in doing so limited Irish nationality to the Gael. Pearse claimed inspiration from the Young Ireland group, particularly Thomas Davis, and the Gaelic League. It should, perhaps, be stressed again at this point, that the intention here is not to give a full summary of the philosophies concerned, but rather to stress those aspects which can be (or are) used to support the Provisionals’ position. For like the RAF, the Provisionals often ignore significant parts of theories and philosophies when they do not suit their purpose.

Both the Young Ireland group and the Gaelic League were essentially cultural organisations stressing language, literature, folk stories and sport. They believed that these were central features in defining the Irish nation. Hyde helped launch a movement to save the rapidly decaying Irish language, from which emerged the Gaelic League. And of the Gaelic League, Pearse claimed to have "said it again and again that when the Gaelic League was founded in 1893, the Irish revolution began." But Pearse certainly took the centrality of the language much further than either Davis or Hyde;

Irish nationality is an ancient and spiritual tradition, and the Irish nation could not die as long as that tradition lived in the heart of one faithful man or woman. But had the last repositior of the Gaelic tradition, the last unconquered Gael, died, the Irish nation was no more. Any free state that might thereafter be erected in Ireland, whatever it might call itself, would certainly not be the historic Irish nation.

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121 "Collected Works of Pearse...," *op. cit.*, p. 135.
122 Pearse, quoted in Cronin, *op. cit.*, p.100.
123 "Collected Works of Pearse...," *op. cit.*, p. 303.
Thus Pearse equates Gaelicness with Irishness, and in doing so denies a diversity of culture.

The phrase 'Irish Ireland' was coined by D.P. Moran who edited a weekly magazine, *The Leader*. It was also Moran who imbued nationalist ideology with a sectarian tone which was absent from predecessor movements. Moran argued that the new political system would have to be Catholic; non-Catholics would either have to subscribe or leave. So, religion was now added to the badge of nationality, and legitimised as a political wedge.

Davis' views on violence were dependent on the situation in which violence was to be used. He opposed the conspiratorial terrorist attacks of Ribbonism and uncontrolled violence generally. But he, like others in Young Ireland, refused to condemn violence categorically, considering the use of violence more as a tactic than as a principle. It was Young Ireland's refusal to condemn violence that led to the split with O'Connell's Repeal Movement, which advocated using only moral force. Davis' death in 1845 allowed O'Connell to make political gain out of this split, as Davis' successor as chief writer on *The Nation* had more to say on the use of physical force.

As well as being influenced by the cultural aspects of the Young Ireland group, John Mitchel was influenced by the agrarian policies of Finton Lalor, who linked the national question to land ownership. But these policies did not find favour with the rest of Young Ireland, and Mitchel was forced to leave *The Nation* and establish his own weekly, *The United Irishman*. In it, Mitchel advocated rebellion and peasant insurrection, and was quickly deported to Australia for his pains. It would, however, be incorrect to refer to Mitchel as a socialist; he defended slavery and expressed delight at the suppression of the June 1848 workers' insurrection in Paris. But Mitchel does fuse the three themes of republican ideology so far discussed, and it is perhaps for this that he is significant. The Young Ireland group did help stage a rebellion in 1848, which was
another dismal failure, but is important for its impact on the development of Irish nationalism. Its justification for the rebellion was based on the historic right of the Irish nation to exist. It was not based on a ‘foreign’ philosophy as was Tone’s advocacy of the Rights of Man. It provided the model to fight for an Ireland not merely free but Gaelic as well, for ridding Ireland of English language and cultural dominance as well as political dominance. The definition of Ireland as Catholic and Gaelic thus provides a further justification for the Provisionals’ ends, if not for their means.

*The Irish Republic*

Another justification for the Provisionals’ ends comes from the Irish Republic, particularly the first fifty years of its existence. The new Irish Free State took much of its ideology from Pearse, including his interpretation of what the Irish nation should be. Pearse’s own unquestionable devotion to Catholicism made some of the more secular heroes of Irish nationalism such as Tone or Davis more acceptable to the new Catholic state. Once the civil war (during which Northern Ireland and partition were not issues) was settled, the Free State concentrated on asserting its independence, rather than on establishing any sort of relationship with its northern neighbour. In accordance with the ideas of Pearse, independence involved asserting Catholicism and Gaelicism. In the 1920’s and 1930’s, a series of laws was passed enshrining the Catholic moral code. In 1923 and 1929, Acts were passed censoring films and publications. In 1925 divorce was prohibited, and this prohibition was subsequently enshrined in the constitution, requiring a referendum to change. In the 1930’s dance halls were required to apply for licenses and the importation and sale of contraceptives was forbidden. In 1937 the secular constitution of 1920 was dropped, in favour of one acknowledging the special position of the Catholic church. The Catholic church was given control over education, and in 1923, Gaelic was made compulsory in all primary and secondary schools.124

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124 So compulsory, in fact, that failure to reach the required mark in Gaelic meant failure in the overall School Leaving Certificate.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic's constitution also provide support for the Provisionals' ideological basis. Article 2 defines the national territory of the Republic as the complete island, and article 3 claims the right of the Dublin government to legislate for the whole island. These two articles can be said to support a myth of inevitability, that somehow a united Ireland is preordained. The Provisionals can therefore, claim to be fighting for *THE* national aspiration as defined by the constitution of the Irish Republic.

The Provisional IRA then, by virtue of 1916 and Patrick Pearse, are able to claim direct descent from a physical force tradition which aims to create a thirty-two county Irish Republic. Ideologically they are supported in this aim by the current constitution of the twenty-six county Irish Republic. An interpretation of Irish nationalism which puts the English conquest in direct opposition to Irish civilisation, the Anglo-Saxon against the Gael, is also an influence on the Provisionals' ideology helping to justify their position. Similarly, they can use a socialist analysis to defend their actions, even if they have not adopted socialist policies themselves.
SUMMARY

This chapter has sought to provide a framework of ideology which separates propositions held to be true from the influences, rules and arguments used to support them. The propositions held to be true are essentially descriptive or explanatory of an ideal way of life or society the ideology envisages. In the case of the RAF and the Provisional IRA, this central descriptive tenet was deduced by a process of examining what the two groups reject in their respective societies, and what limited alternatives they propose. The chapter then proceeded to discuss the sources from which this central tenet is drawn.

THE RED ARMY FACTION

The RAF's central ideological tenet was described as 'world communist revolution'. It rejects the world order as capitalist and imperialist, and the Federal Republic's position within it. It reasoned that since capitalism was globally organised, a global alliance of non-capitalist forces would be necessary to defeat it, and accepted Marcuse's argument that this global alliance should be based on groups in the metropolitan centres and in the Third World. It thus sees itself as a force contributing to 'world communist revolution'.

But, its main concern and target is the domestic environment of the Federal Republic, and here it is important to recall the historical discussion in Chapter 2. This detailed the emergence of a radical critique of West German society, disillusionment with the constitutional left and the growth of the APO, all closely associated with the radical student movement, whose numbers were swelled by the demand for university reform.
The radical critique of industrial democracies in general was provided by the ‘Frankfurt School’ of political philosophy, and is best illustrated in the writings of Herbert Marcuse, who argued that advanced industrialisation had created a society whose members were slaves to the desire to possess. It had also widened the class basis of those who could be ‘objectively’ defined as the base for social revolution. Students, however, because they were not fully integrated into the means of production, could play a special role in making the educated and productive classes ‘subjectively’ disposed to revolutionary change.

The small group of students largely responsible for forming the RAF and 2 June Movement accepted this analysis, and formed a theory of revolution by adopting Lenin’s notion of a revolutionary vanguard, the ‘voluntarism’ of Mao, Guevara and Marighella, and Sartre’s and Fanon’s analysis of violence as ‘humanizing’.

The RAF thus produced an eclectic ideology which reasoned that a small group of enlightened people could, through violent actions raise a revolutionary consciousness sufficient in alliance with the Third World, to change the entire global order. In short, ‘world communist revolution’.

THE PROVISIONAL IRA

The Provisional IRA’s central ideological tenet was described as the use of force to rid Ireland of English influence. It rejects both parts of Ireland as legitimate states, and recognises only one united Irish Republic. In understanding how it came to hold this position, consideration of Irish history is necessary. The events of primary importance are the 1916 Easter Rising and the thoughts of its leaders, particularly Patrick Pearse, which are used to produce both backward-looking justifications for the current stance, and justification as completing the task that 1916 left unfinished.
The Provisional IRA arose in 1969 from a split in the IRA. The IRA’s last recourse to physical force in 1956-1962 had been a dismal failure, and its already insignificant popular vote in the Republic had been halved. The majority in the movement favoured a new strategy of affirmative political action and less reliance on physical force. However, a minority of the IRA and Sinn Fein saw this as anathema, and formed a breakaway movement based on the old ideals of physical force. The Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Fein claim to be the direct heirs of the Republican tradition.\textsuperscript{125} They envisage a new Irish Republic totally free of English influence, an economy withdrawn from the EEC, and instead associated with Third World trading structures. Internally the economy would be organised in accordance with the ideals of 1916, and Gaelic would replace English as the everyday language. But to achieve any of this, England must first be forced out of Northern Ireland. In adopting this ideological position the Provisional IRA has certainly interpreted its sources eclectically, but unlike the RAF, the Provisional IRA’s sources are drawn essentially from the country’s own history.

The Young Ireland group and the Gaelic League provided models to fight for an Ireland free of English cultural dominance. Patrick Pearse provided the idea of Irish nationality synonymous with a distinctively Gaelic culture, and James Connolly provided a model for the use of force against English capitalists and against partition which he saw as supportive of capitalism, though it is extremely doubtful that he would recognise the Provisional IRA as a socialist organisation. Fenianism and the later Irish Republican Brotherhood provided sources both for the philosophy that only force would drive the English from Ireland, and for the notion of secretive, conspiratorial and self-appointed national leaders. The IRB was responsible for the 1916 Rising, and those who survived went on to direct what became the IRA in 1919. 1916, and particularly Pearse, provided models both for a small, elite group defining and defending the national honour, and for rejecting any compromise, or indeed any negotiation. Furthermore, this ideological

\textsuperscript{125} This is discussed more fully in Chapter 5.
source is not complicated by the need for a specific formulation of the type of society envisaged. Its centrality is the use of force to achieve vague ideals such as ‘independence’, ‘unity’, or ‘The Republic’.

If one were to draw up a hypothetical list of propaganda assets and liabilities for a left wing terrorist group emerging in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1969, and one for a Republican group emerging in Ireland at the same time, one would undoubtedly assess the Irish group as having more advantages. These will be discussed in Chapter 7. We shall now examine the influences, rules and arguments both groups use to support their basic ideological tenets, and to convince others of their value. For no matter how just the cause, propaganda is essential to its advancement.
PART II

PROPAGANDA
CHAPTER FOUR

PROPAGANDA — THE UNCOMMITTED AUDIENCE

The next three chapters will discuss the propaganda of the two terrorist groups with which this thesis is concerned. Before doing so, some preliminary remarks will be made on defining propaganda, its relation to terrorism, its techniques and its limitations. This will be followed by an outline of the chosen framework for analysis and an explanation as to why this framework has been chosen. To conclude these introductory remarks, there will be a brief note on the sources from which the main data for the chapters are drawn.

In defining propaganda it is not intended to follow Thornton’s claim that both terror and propaganda "are tools for creating public support in the pursuit of political ends."¹ But it is intended to include terrorism as a form of propaganda, and therefore the following definition used by NATO in its glossary of military terms is considered appropriate;

any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence opinion, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly.²

This definition is chosen because it is not thought that terror is capable of, or even intended to, create public support as it is understood in liberal democracy. But terror as an idea is clearly intended to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour. Terrorist violence is an integral part of terrorist strategy and trying to separate it from forms of non-violent propaganda, although certainly possible, will not give a complete picture of the group under study. Furthermore, the definition above gives propaganda an

¹ Thornton, op. cit., p. 73.
² NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions for Military Use, NATO, February, 1974, p. 2-176.
identifiable motive which is important in distinguishing propaganda from communication, informative communication and persuasion.

Communication and persuasion are essentially interactive processes with the goal being to satisfy the needs of all concerned. The goal of propaganda, on the other hand, is to satisfy or further the needs of the propagandist. Informative communication also differs from propaganda in that its aim is to create a mutual understanding of data that are considered to be accurate, of concepts that are considered to be indisputable and of ideas that are based on facts.\(^3\)

If this happens to favour a partisan cause then this is incidental, it is not the intention.

The ultimate aim of the propagandist is to provoke action. Ellul argues that when propaganda intervenes in public opinion, it transforms the public into an acting crowd or, more precisely, into a participating crowd. ... Propaganda can make the individual feel the urgency, the necessity of some action, its unique character. And at the same time propaganda shows him what to do. The individual who burns with desire for action but does not know what to do is a common type in our society. He wants to act for the sake of justice, peace, progress, but does not know how. If propaganda can show him this 'how' it has won the game; action will surely follow.\(^4\)

However, propaganda is not a policy in itself: it neither appears from nor operates in a void. Every society and cultural group has its structures and beliefs, of which the propagandist must take account. If, for example, a propagandist wishes to discredit or stimulate hostility towards a particular object or policy, he must present it as an obstacle, or alien to structures and beliefs. If it is the structures and beliefs that the propagandist wants to alter, then the processes involved are lengthier and more complex. This requires what Ellul calls "pre-propaganda", the purpose of which is "to prepare man for a particular action, to make him sensitive to some influence..."\(^5\) The effectiveness of pre-

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\(^5\) *ibid.*, p. 30.
propaganda is evidenced in Cyprus where Eoka was able to exploit generations of Greeks who had been brought up to work and pray for enosis. From the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, it should be evident that the major propaganda asset that the Provisional IRA has that the RAF has not, is a period of pre-propaganda. The desire to work and pray for a united Ireland may not be as strong or well defined as the Greek desire for enosis, but the ideal of a united Ireland, free of English domination, has been in existence for several hundred years. This ideal as was discussed in Chapter 3, is even enshrined in the constitution of the Republic of Ireland, and the existence of a period of pre-propaganda helps ultimately to explain the Provisional IRA's degree of success. (See Chapter 7.)

Ellul also warns that propaganda cannot "be a propaganda of ideas, but must pronounce judgment on certain facts." Partly as a result of the experiences during the First World War, and partly due to the development of sophisticated methods of communication, propaganda must also be based on some derivation of fact acceptable to the target audience. Although, as established earlier, propaganda and information can be distinguished in theory, the propagandist can make use of man's finite ability to absorb information. For example, people form a generalised image of the things that can (and possibly therefore should) be done without any understanding of the complexities or facts involved. This need to use credible derivation of fact acceptable to the target audience, was something that the RAF's general ideological analysis failed to do. The Provisional IRA's derivation of fact, although frequently questionable, produced an ideological analysis that was much more acceptable to its target audiences, which also helps explain its degree of success.

The development of mass means of communication increased not only the number of channels available to the propagandist, but also the necessity to use a wide variety of sources. It is certainly true that different people respond to different stimuli, just as it is true that those who read newspapers are not necessarily those who will attend

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6 *ibid.*, p. 299.
political meetings or rallies. So the propagandist not only has to co-ordinate his message within a wide variety of propaganda channels, but also to select the tactics most suitable for visual, audio or print modes of communication. All this, of course, must take due consideration of the strategic objective of the propaganda and the cause the propagandist is trying to promote.

In unconventional conflicts the strategic objective cannot be attained by conventional military battles and victories. The victory must come through indirect methods. Tugwell argues that as a consequence, the campaign becomes one of leverage where the objective is to move the ‘asset’ (a policy, a territory, the right to govern etc.) into a liability or something no longer worth fighting for. This, he says, brings "propagandists onto a central and dominating feature of the battle landscape." Debray, on the other hand, while recognising the need to co-ordinate military action and propaganda, left no doubt as to which he considered most effective; "[t]he destruction of a troop transport truck or the public execution of a police torturer is more effective propaganda than a hundred speeches." Debray also demanded that the leadership must be concerned with the armed struggle,

pure ‘politicians’ - who want to remain pure - cannot lead the armed struggle of the people; pure ‘military’ men can do so, and by the experience acquired in leading a guerrilla group, they become ‘politicians’ as well.

But this thesis sides more with Tugwell, in that it argues the ‘military’ component of terrorism is itself a form of propaganda, and thus its perpetrators are themselves propagandists.

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8 Debray, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
9 *ibid.*, p. 89.
This decision to view the violence of terrorist groups as a form of propaganda has also influenced the chosen framework for analysis of this and the following two chapters. There are a number of ways in which a study of propaganda can be approached, such as mechanisms used, language adopted, or broad labels of 'type' of propaganda like black, white or grey. But in the interests of producing a thesis which contributes to the understanding of how and why terrorist groups survive, none of the above approaches will be adopted. It is thought that these approaches, while useful in analysing propaganda per se, if applied to terrorist propaganda would produce a result which would lose sight of the strategies and tactics of terrorism. It is also thought that the picture presented would be fragmented, and therefore difficult to draw prescriptive conclusions from. The basic framework chosen involves distinguishing target audiences, and then assessing the strategic goals the propagandist is aiming for in regard to that particular reference audience. The tactics within each strategy comprise the major data for the chapters. How the themes used incorporate historical and ideological experiences as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 will form the core of Chapter 7. Chapter 8 will include an examination of the implications for any counter-propaganda strategy.

Specifically this part of the thesis will consider the hypothesis that terrorist propaganda, including violence, has specific targets and messages which are adjusted or emphasised according to the target selected or the particular tactic being adopted. Three target audiences have been defined, the uncommitted, the sympathetic and the active, although membership of them and the propaganda themes directed towards them are not mutually exclusive. But as stated above, it is intended to argue that distinctions can be made.

The first consideration will be of propaganda aimed at the uncommitted audience. This uncommitted audience has two components: the general public of the country in which the terrorist group is operating; and international public opinion. However, Irish communities abroad, as will be seen, are more appropriately regarded as part of the
sympathetic audience. The reason for considering this audience first is that many of the themes used in this area of propaganda reappear in propaganda directed at the other two audiences. (From a terrorists’ point of view, however, it is more accurate to consider these themes as expanding up through the target audiences than to consider them as filtering down through them).

The second major target audience identified by this thesis is the sympathetic audience. This is defined as those who already have a broad historical or ideological sympathy with the terrorists’ expressed political aims. This is the audience which will help keep the political debate on the terrorists’ aims rather than on their actions. On a practical level, they are those who will provide food, money or shelter for the night. It is also this audience which provides most of the recruits for our third audience, the active.

This active audience is defined as the active members of the terrorist organization. This chapter will be the most speculative of the three, as the data are not always readily available or readily substantiated. However, having said that, it is safe to assume that at least part of the propaganda produced by a terrorist organisation is intended for internal consumption as well as wider dissemination.

Having outlined the framework for analysis, it is thought pertinent to comment briefly on some of the sources on which these chapters are based. Most terrorist propaganda comes from open sources, and is therefore easily identifiable. Included in this category would be press releases claiming responsibility for attacks which are usually signed with a *nom de plume* in the case of the Provisional IRA, and collectively as a command group in the case of the RAF. Both groups have also given interviews to various newspapers and magazines, as well as publishing their own pamphlets, analyses and policy documents. Terrorists rarely write biographies, and when they do, it is usually to discredit a particular personality within the terrorist group or a direction that the group
is taking. Nonetheless, taking this proviso into account, biographies still provide a useful source.

Many of the RAF's writings are contained in two volumes: Aktuelle Dokumente\textsuperscript{10} edited by Reinhard Rauball; and Texte: der RAF published in 1977.\textsuperscript{11} A large number of the secondary sources used in this chapter also cite articles contained within these two volumes. The sources of the material used in connection with the Provisional IRA are more varied, and it is appropriate to make a brief survey of them before including them in the text.

In 1969-1970, as tension in Northern Ireland began to mount, the Provisional IRA encouraged the establishment of local citizens’ defence groups to aid its recruitment. Practically all of these groups as well as the local Sinn Fein cummans (branches) produced pamphlets and newsletters. Many of these were unsophisticated, unprofessional and irregular, like the sole issue of the Sean McCartney Sinn Fein cumman’s "Bits and Pieces," which instructed its readers that the cumman "would appreciate if you after reading, would lend this copy to your next door neighbour." Frequently it is difficult to date and place these publications accurately, and calculating their circulation figures is impossible. Nonetheless, they are a valuable source of propaganda directed at both the sympathetic and active audiences. Belfast’s Linenhall Library houses the most comprehensive collection of this type of propaganda in its special Irish section. Therefore, when reference is made to these documents, the Linenhall references number will be included in parenthesis at the end of the footnote. For example, the "Bits and Pieces" quotation cited above would be footnoted "Bits and Pieces," Belfast: Sean McCartney, Sinn Fein, N.D., (F20).

At the outset of its campaign, the Provisional IRA's statements and publicity emanated from its HQ in Dublin, as did the movement’s newspaper, *An Phoblacht*. In 1970, the Republican Press Centre was established in Belfast as well as another newspaper, *Republican News*, to cater specifically for northern republicans. As events developed, Belfast became more important as a source of information, and the two newspapers came into direct competition with each other. In January 1979, the two papers were merged as *An Phoblacht/Republican News* with the northerners taking editorial control.

By 1980, the Republican Press Centre had been relocated at 51-53 Falls Road, Belfast, and was equipped with telex machines and video making material. Although propaganda continues to be released by local groups, it is now more carefully coordinated with the Republican Press Centre. The result, as this thesis hopes to show, is a carefully considered and centralised propaganda campaign which has brought the Provisionals at least a degree of success.
PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT THE UNCOMMITTED AUDIENCE

Propaganda reaches the uncommitted audience primarily through the channels of the mass media. Papers or pamphlets prepared by terrorist organisations do not have a mass circulation, and even if they were mass produced it is extremely unlikely that they would be widely read, and perhaps even less likely that they would be understood. As we shall see in the following chapters, the pamphlets and papers of the RAF are stylistically awkward and full of Marxist rhetoric with which most people are unfamiliar. Those of the Provisional IRA are embued with historical reference points, which again would be unfamiliar to most of the uncommitted audience. Therefore the material in this section is based on direct approaches to the mass media such as statements of responsibility, or the occasional interviews given by the organisation. Also included in this section are indirect approaches to the media via the staging of events which the terrorists know the media will cover, like trials, and most importantly violent actions.

Terrorist propaganda directed towards this uncommitted audience has the major strategic aim of militarising the political situation. The ideological appeal towards this audience is at a fairly general level. Its basic aim is to present the day-to-day business of the state as disadvantaging a particular group in society. This then opens the way for attacks on the credibility of the state and security forces, and a process of what Tugwell calls "guilt transfer," whereby blame for the deaths, injuries and destruction caused by terrorist violence is put on the shoulders of the regime. As terrorist actions provoke the deployment of more police, or the enactment of special legislation, these can be presented as oppressive and reactionary measures taken by the state. Therefore, the terrorists' actions become a reaction to the oppressive conditions within the state.

Terror as ‘propaganda by deed’ obviously plays a role in the strategy of militarising the political situation. It aims to transform a situation perceived by most people as normal into a situation of perceived danger or crisis. But it is also used as a tactic in itself. It can, for example, be used to make the public in the country in which the attacks are taking place more fearful of the consequences of co-operating with the security forces than of those of not co-operating with them. An illustration of this was the difficulty experienced by the West German authorities in placing ‘wanted posters’ during the period immediately following the ‘German Autumn.’ Previous to this, hundreds of wanted posters were willingly displayed by small shops and businesses. The Provisional IRA has also used this tactic by attacking contractors and suppliers to the security forces. Attacks on judicial witnesses and their families are another example of this type of propaganda. Having surveyed what sort of results the terrorists are aiming for with regard to this audience, it is appropriate to examine what they are saying themselves.

THE RED ARMY FACTION

_Ideological Appeal_

It has been suggested above that within the overall strategy of militarising the political situation, one of the primary objectives of a terrorist group is to present the everyday existence of the state as disadvantaging a particular group. In the case of the RAF the basis for this comes from the central ideological tenet identified in Chapter 3 as ‘world communist revolution’. The group disadvantaged by the West German state therefore, because of its position within the political spectrum and its alliances, is global.

At his trial in the spring of 1971, Horst Mahler claimed

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13 This was the period in the autumn of 1977, when the RAF kidnapped Hanns Martin Schleyer and demanded the release of imprisoned colleagues. A Lufthansa jet was hijacked with the hijackers presenting the same demands. The plane, however, was successfully stormed at Mogadishu whereupon the-prisoners in Stammheim committed suicide. The body of Hanns Martin Schleyer was found a few days later.
... all together the imperialistic Monopoly Capital - [is] the most monstrous criminal association in history. To destroy this with all necessary and obtainable means is a necessity of life for more than 3 billion people.\(^{14}\)

Although as will be seen below, the workers within West Germany are presented as disadvantaged by the activities of the West German state, in the early 1970's it was very much groups in the Third World, and particularly Vietnam, that were emphasised by the RAF.\(^{15}\) Gudrun Ensslin claimed that her action in setting fire to a department store in Frankfurt in 1968 was "out of protest against the indifference towards the war in Vietnam."\(^{16}\) With respect to Vietnam, West Germany’s alliance with the United States is particularly significant. Both the RAF and the 2 June Movement claimed that the American action in Vietnam was imperialistic, denying the people of Vietnam their right to national self-determination, and thus disadvantaging them. West Germany, they claimed, was a logistical support base for the Americans. Hans Joachim Klein claimed in his memoirs that it was "obvious that the Americans could never have conducted the war without support from the rear. And Germany was one of their bases."\(^{17}\) In May 1972, the RAF planted bombs in US military institutions in Frankfurt and Heidelberg which killed four. The statement claiming responsibility issued after the Frankfurt explosion asserted:

West Germany and West Berlin will no longer be a safe hinterland for the strategists of extermination in Vietnam. They must know that their crimes against the Vietnamese have made them new and bitter enemies, that there will be nowhere in the world left where they can be safe from the attacks of revolutionary guerrilla units.\(^{18}\)

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14 Mahler quoted in Becker, "Another Battle ...," *op. cit.*, p. 95.

15 Vietnam is very prominent in early RAF propaganda and is aimed at all the target audiences. It will however, be argued that the Vietnam theme is used for different purposes within different target audiences. For example, in the chapter concerning the sympathetic audience it will be postulated that Vietnam is used as a means of justifying violent actions. For the moment though, we are only concerned with the attempt to present disadvantaged groups.

16 Ensslin at her trial in April, 1968, quoted in Becker, "Hitler’s Children...," *op. cit.*, p. 79.


Also in May 1972, attacks were carried out against internal German targets. On
15 May, an attempt to murder Federal Judge Budenberg failed, but injured his wife.
Then on 19 May, three bombs exploded at the offices of the Springer Corporation in
Hamburg, injuring seventeen. The ‘2 June Commando’ subsequently claimed
responsibility in a statement sent to the German Press Agency. This statement reveals
how those responsible believed the economic and political system in West Germany
produced disadvantaged groups;

Springer would rather risk seeing his workers and clerical staff injured by
bombs than risk losing a few hours’ working time, which means profit,
over a false alarm. To capitalists, profit is everything and the people who
create it are dirt (sic).

However, to find the link between disadvantaged groups outside and inside Germany,
and the connection to the next component of propaganda strategy, to embarrass and
attack the credibility of the state, it is necessary to return to general ideology, and again
Vietnam.

Chapter 2 contained some discussion of Germany’s sensitivity to its Nazi past. In
Chapter 3 it was argued that the RAF’s ideology had a global vision even if its main
target was the West German state. The RAF brought together these two aspects in a way
which was also designed to embarrass and attack the credibility of the West German
state. One of the most striking examples of this was the comparison of American actions
in Vietnam with Nazi actions against the Jews. Otto Schily, at the time a defending
lawyer, said at the main trial in 1975

[1]he pictures are the same: The Jewish child in the ghetto going towards
the SS man with his hands up, the Vietnamese child running, burned and
screaming, towards the photographer ...

The West German people, claims the RAF, will not help the security forces in their
search for the bombers of American installations in Germany "because they want nothing

19 Quoted in Aust, *ibid.*, p. 211.
to do with the crimes of American imperialism and their condonation by the ruling class here; because they have not forgotten Auschwitz, Dresden and Hamburg. 21 The Nazi analogy, however, is not only applied to the actions of the Americans. The Federal Republic itself is often accused of being fascist, and with failing to remove fascists from prominent positions in society. Raspe, in one of the many challenges to the authority of the court during the major RAF trial, claimed that it

is impossible not to see the analogy with the judicature of the Third Reich. In his arguments, lies and methods, this judge is a model of the type of supposedly independent judicature which got up en masse after 1945 and claimed to know nothing of its victims. 22

The fascist nature of the state occurs again as the RAF tries to present itself as a defensive force, but the fascist theme is also used to present a picture of disadvantaged and persecuted groups within West Germany. While certainly not doubting that the terrorists believed the West German state was, at least to a degree, fascist, 23 and conceding that their accusations about former Nazis could on occasion be substantiated, there can be no doubt that the Nazi/fascist theme was also deliberately used to embarrass and attack the credibility of the Federal Republic.

Credibility Attacks and Guilt Transfer

A further way of embarrassing and damaging the credibility of the state is to accuse it of unlawful and surreptitious actions. An illuminating example in the case of the RAF concerns Peter Urbach. Urbach, worked for the German intelligence agencies and penetrated the student movement in 1967, from where he progressed to the embryonic RAF. Later in 1971, Urbach was called to give evidence at Mahler’s trial.

22 Raspe quoted in Aust, op. cit., p. 315.
23 2 June member, Bomi Baumann, decried "[t]hese same people who gassed six million Jews, they harass you because of your hair [style]," Baumann, op. cit., p. 31.
But Berlin Senator Kurt Neubauer announced to the press that Urbach’s evidence would be limited, which, according to Mahler, he had good reason to do, as if he had not,

Urbach might have been obliged to shed light on the mysterious provenance of the fire bomb found on the Jewish synagogue premises in November 1969. Kurt Neubauer would surely find it very difficult to explain satisfactorily to an international public that the bombs which so alarmed the Jewish community of Berlin came from the arsenals of the Protection of the Constitution Office.24

The calling of witnesses to the major RAF trial was also designed to embarrass the state. Amongst those the defence moved to have called were Richard Nixon, Melvin Laird (former US Secretary of Defense), Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. The defence claimed that the evidence these people could provide, would demonstrate the Federal Republic’s compliance in violations of international law, which would then justify the RAF’s attacks on US installations.

Attacking the credibility of the security forces is commonly done by accusing them of adopting ‘shoot-to-kill’ policies, and of torturing prisoners in custody. Related to this is the process of ‘guilt transfer’ where the blame for all the death and destruction is attributed to the regime. There are two ways in which this can be done; one is to claim that the violence and death are the result of the state ignoring the terrorists’ demands; and the second is to claim that terrorist actions are a defensive reaction to the aggression of the state. The second of these will be mentioned in the section regarding violence below, and will be more illustratively discussed in the next chapter. An example of the former occurred during the final stages of a fatal hunger strike. Lawyer, Klaus Croissant, who was later arrested and extradited from France in connection with his dealings with the RAF, delivered a letter to Judge Prinzing which said, "Holger Meins is dying. He will be dead within two days at the outside. You are responsible for his death because you determine the conditions of imprisonment."25

24 Mahler quoted in Aust, op. cit., p. 145.
25 Croissant quoted in Aust, ibid., p. 265.
Croissant himself, after his arrest, released a statement through his lawyer claiming that he would not end his own life despite

"the special regime reserved for political prisoners aimed at destroying the physical integrity in West German prisons. If you learn of my death in a West German prison, that will never be a suicide. Do not believe the lies of the assassins."26

(Andreas Baader had also claimed that none of the group intended to commit suicide. The day after making these claims, however, he gave Alfred Klaus of the Criminal Investigation Office the impression that suicide was the exact intention.27)

As another tactic in its attack on the credibility of the state and security forces, the RAF tried to use prominent German citizens in ways that would lend credibility to its accusations. Ensslin specifically instructed the defending lawyers to approach people such as "Böll, Sölle, Scharf, Mitscherlich, Niemöler, Gollwitzer, Amnesty International ..."28 to persuade them to instigate legal proceedings against the state’s holding of prisoners in isolation. If this request was refused, Ensslin urged the lawyers "to put pressure on them to think of something else ... for instance, there’s the kind of thing Böll wrote in Der Spiegel."29 The Böll article referred to by Ensslin was written in January 1972. In it Böll argues that the state is over-reacting to a group whose theories sound more violent than they actually are: it was after all "six against sixty million."30

Ensslin’s comments show that she was aware of the value of attaching the credibility of someone like Böll to the RAF. The same idea was behind Ulrike Meinhof’s invitation to Sartre to visit the RAF in prison:

What we want is for you to interview Andreas Baader in connection with this hunger strike - I mean, now. Because the cops ... intend to murder Andreas. ... It’s not a necessary condition of the interview for you to agree

26 The Times, 18:11:77.
28 Ensslin quoted in Aust, oop. cit., p. 244.
29 ibid.
30 Der Spiegel, 10:1:72, p. 54 ff.
with us on all points; what we’re asking is that you’ll give us the protection of your name and your gifts as a Marxist philosopher, journalist and moralist in the interview, so that we can have a chance to convey certain political matters relating to the carrying on of the anti-imperialist struggle...

In July 1978, RAF lawyers brought the case of three prisoners before the European Commission on Human Rights, but the Commission cleared West Germany of any violation. And in March 1981, a group of RAF supporters interrupted a meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission, accusing West Germany of mistreating prisoners and demanding that the Commission intervene in a hunger strike that was current at the time. West Germany’s alleged treatment of RAF prisoners forms a considerable part of RAF propaganda directed at both the sympathetic and the active audiences, and will be discussed again in the next two chapters. What is important here, however, is simply the conscious attempt to discredit the state and present it as the aggressor. This leads to the role of terrorist violence in the overall strategy of militarising the political situation. Terrorist violence has certainly had the greatest impact on the uncommitted audience. It is also the area in which the role of the mass media is most evident.

*Propaganda by Deed*

The RAF was certainly aware of the importance of the media. One of the criticisms Baumann later laid against the RAF was its reliance on the media to the exclusion of political analysis:

The RAF said the revolution wouldn’t be built through political work, but through headlines, through appearances in the press, over and over again, reporting: ‘Here are guerrillas fighting in Germany’. Klein also reveals an awareness of the potential value of publicity:

We convened and asked ourselves ... what would be an action that no one can disregard, that everyone must talk about and report on? We found it:

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33 Baumann, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
A bomb exploding in the Jewish community house - on the very anniversary of the so-called Kristallnacht. Even though the bomb did not explode, this story went halfway around the world. ... We looked for a focal point where everything would come together: The Germans still wrestling with their past; the newly arising Palestinian problem; a starting gun for the guerrilla fight. Such an action could not be disregarded by anyone, from liberals to old Nazis. Simply everyone had to take note, even abroad.34

However, it also seems that some awareness of the potential detrimental affect of publicity is shown on occasion. According to Klein, in April 1976, a plan to kidnap the Pope and ransom him in exchange for RAF and 2 June prisoners was mooted. PFLP leader Haddad who was approached to finance the operation refused on the basis that "if you kidnap the Pope, you commit suicide. ... No Arab country can officially tolerate that you run around free after that."35

It will be suggested below that there are a number of components in the message of violence transmitted by the terrorists through the mass media. Firstly, that the terrorist group has such capabilities that the state cannot defeat it. These capabilities are also able to eliminate those whom the terrorists perceive as directly opposing them, such as the police and judiciary. Then the image presented is of the state in a crisis to which it reacts by becoming even more repressive. The terrorists are therefore only defending themselves and society against the overwhelming odds opposing them.

In early 1972, in response to reports that he wished to give himself up to police, Andreas Baader warned that he and his associates were "not in flight; we are here to organize armed resistance to the existing property-based order and the increasing exploitation of the people. The struggle has only just begun."36 A similar message was transmitted during the 1977 kidnapping of Hanns Martin Schleyer, when the RAF warned that it would continue its attacks as the state was not able to provide absolute security.37

34 Klein in Bougereau, op. cit., p. 13.
35 ibid.
36 Baader quoted in Aust, op cit., p. 193.
37 ibid., p. 440.
Implicit in the argument that the state cannot defeat the terrorists is a claim of being able to control sufficient resources.38 Baumann gives a tactical insight into how these resources are exaggerated:

Ten or twelve attempts were made against judges, prosecutors, prison superintendents and others... And of course each time someone else claimed the action. This was to suggest that suddenly, overnight, a giant people’s army had come into being and was now operating - to create confusion among the police and show the people that we are already a very large circle. In fact, there are only about ten people or so.39

Another way in which the RAF attempted to exaggerate its capabilities was to link itself with other groups engaging in both guerrilla and terrorist actions for a variety of causes. In a statement to Der Spiegel in January, 1975, the RAF claimed.

it is silly to attribute to us the intent to ‘go it alone’, given the state of the contemporary anti-imperialist battle in Asia, Latin America, Africa, in Vietnam, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina. There are also in Western Europe not only the RAF but also the IRA, ETA, groups engaged in armed combat in Italy, in Portugal, in England.40

The idea, of course, was to give the impression that the RAF was part of a global attack against imperialism and colonialism; that it was already part of a mass-movement which unreservedly supported its actions. The RAF claimed that in Hanoi "there were fotos of us in the streets, because [of] the bombing in Heidelberg, for which the RAF has taken responsibility" (sic).41

Part of the process of terror is to make people believe that they are vulnerable to whatever is threatened. The seeming arbitrariness of terrorist violence is almost sufficient in itself. But to be terrorism in a political sense, the terror must be related to a

38 Resources here do not include the ‘justness’ of the cause. Although this is sometimes referred to in propaganda directed towards the uncommitted audience, the type of propaganda source in which it usually appears is directed more towards the sympathetic and active audiences. In this section resources refer to personnel and military equipment.

39 Baumann, op cit., p. 57.


41 ibid., p. 57.
particular group and its aims. This is most often done by an admission of responsibility with the association of the threat of the next action left to the public imagination. But frequently the threat is directly communicated, especially against representatives of the state.

One group of state representatives particularly prone to RAF attack is the judiciary. In 1974 the RAF warned that it would "execute attacks with explosives against judges and prosecutors as frequently and as long as they will not have ceased to violate the laws at the expense of the political prisoners." Later that year the 2 June Movement murdered the President of the Supreme Court in Berlin, Gunter von Drenkmann. Drenkmann was regarded as a liberal lawyer, was a member of the SPD, and never had any professional connection with any terrorist trial or hearing. The RAF prisoners in Stammheim reacted to Drenkmann's murder with the statement

[w]e shed no tears for Drenkmann. We rejoice at such an action. This action was necessary because it showed every pig of a lawyer or a cop that he too can be called to account. (Andreas Vogel, who was later charged with this murder, blamed a failed escape attempt on "the scruples we still have about giving a subordinate jailer what he deserves." Lawyers appointed by the state to defend members of the RAF and 2 June Movement were also subject to violence and threats of violence. Of the two lawyers appointed to defend Andreas Vogel and Ronald Fritzsch, one was shot in the legs and the other found an explosive device under his car. Later the same month other state-appointed lawyers received threats of violence if they did not stand down from trials concerning 2 June Movement members.

42 Der Spiegel, 24:6:74, p. 29.
43 Quoted in Aust, op cit., p. 266.
44 The Times, 3:5:78.
45 ibid., 1:6:78.
46 ibid., 15:6:78.
In March, 1975, Der Spiegel reported that the RAF had established files on 500 West German citizens, containing information such as addresses, telephone numbers, family members and habitual bars and restaurants. Whether or not this was true, the impression was to create a general climate of fear, that the security forces cannot adequately protect citizens despite the more visible profile that terrorist actions force them to take. Therefore, according to the terrorists, the state is in a crisis which it attempts to resolve by becoming more repressive, and thus drives people to the side of the terrorists. The RAF claimed that if it was not precipitating this crisis by its actions, and only had a small base, Helmut Schmidt would "not in his new year's allocation have included the actions of the RAF under the five most threatening facts/developments for imperialism in 1974... ."

All these themes are encapsulated in a letter written under RAF influence by the kidnapped Hanns Martin Schleyer to his son Eberhard which is worth quoting at length:

if the kidnappers' demands are not met, their aims will only impel them to take another victim after I have been liquidated. As we have seen, there is no absolute security against people who work as carefully and as logically as the RAF ... So one must look at it soberly, taking into account all the future kidnapping cases that may come to a fatal conclusion (given the demands now being made, and given that the same demands are made later). Helmut Schmidt must know this as well as Helmut Kohl and H.D. Genscher. My case is only one phase of this conflict, and in my present state of knowledge I don't see the BKA winning the contest, because the people whose release my kidnappers are demanding will motivate them to undertake further actions, going to undreamt-of lengths. However, those in positions of responsibility in our country cannot always go around in armoured cars, and so they will always have vulnerable spots...

Defensive themes are certainly prominent in RAF propaganda as a whole, but many of the sources in which it appears are clearly aimed at audiences other than the uncommitted one. For the uncommitted audience the theme is, perhaps, more accurately described as 'reactive', that is, a reaction to the repressive operations of the state or as

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47 Der Spiegel, 10:3:75, p. 25.
48 ibid., 20:1:75, p. 56.
49 Schleyer quoted in Aust, op cit., p. 440.
revenge for these actions. This theme is related to that of presenting the state as disadvantaging certain groups, as the terrorists can then portray themselves as the champions or liberators of such groups. Horst Mahler explains that the point of the violent struggle "was to be some kind of sabotage and punishment of responsible personages for cruelties against the people."50 Similarly, the murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer was presented as revenge:

After 43 days we have put an end to the miserable existence of Hanns Martin Schleyer... His death is in keeping with our sadness and our anger after the massacre of Mogadishu and Stammheim. Andreas, Gudrun, Carl, Inngard and ourselves are not astonished by the fascist dramatic effects of the imperialists. We will never forget the blood spilled by Schmidt and the imperialists who support him.51

The propaganda aimed at this audience does contain both historical and ideological reference points but to what degree the uncommitted audience responded to them will be the subject of Chapter 7. There it will be argued that the most significant, and from its point of view successful, component of the RAF's propaganda was simply the violence.

THE PROVISIONAL IRA

Although many of the propaganda techniques and the overall strategy used by the Provisional IRA are very similar to those of the RAF, there are some differences which need to be clearly stated. The contextual setting of the Irish ‘problem’ presents an uncommitted audience of two fairly distinct components: the British general public; and the international community which does not have any Irish connections. Although the general public in the Republic of Ireland and Irish communities outside Ireland will be defined as components of the sympathetic audience, the ready availability of other, particularly British, news sources means that the Provisional IRA cannot aim its

51 Message received by French newspaper *Liberation*, quoted in *The Times*, 20:10:77.
messages to them through separate or distinct channels. It must adopt a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach, and present its message in a form appropriate for an uncommitted audience. The Provisional IRA will also start with the premise that some actors in the international community are essentially neutral in its fight against the British, whereas the RAF adopt a more polemical stance on the basis that a particular actor is either for or against it. For the Provisional IRA, the British general public is a target audience for which there is no real RAF equivalent. In all areas of Provisional IRA propaganda, Britain is presented as the source of all evil even if, on occasion, the evils of capitalism also enter the equation. The removal of the British presence in Northern Ireland would therefore achieve the Provisional IRA’s major objective. The British tax payers’ position as the final guarantor of Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the United Kingdom thus makes them a particularly significant target. It will be argued below that this is the target audience at which the violence is really aimed, and the techniques used are similar to those used by the RAF.

_Ideological Appeal_

It was stated earlier that one of the first tasks of terrorist propaganda is to present the state and its every-day business as disadvantaging a particular group in society. For the Provisional IRA this meant a tactical attack on the Stormont regime until its abolition in 1972, then the strategic attack on the British government which it always held as ultimately responsible. The group presented as clearly disadvantaged by the British guaranteed Northern Ireland is the Roman Catholic community, which has been both physically abused and discriminated against in terms of political representation, jobs and housing. The basic analogy is a colonial one, with Britain’s presence being motivated solely by self-interest. In short, the Irish people have been denied their inalienable right of self-determination.

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52 Most citizens in the Irish Republic are able to receive British television and radio broadcasts. British newspapers are also readily available.
The Provisionals certainly tried to exploit Britain's colonial past, as well as claiming to derive much of their strategy from Britain's previous colonial battles. Maria McGuire, one of the first defectors from the Provisionals, recalls in her book *To Take Arms*, that the Provisionals rationalised that "Aden and Cyprus showed that force could end their [British] power." On a military level she claimed,

"the main examples followed by the Provisionals in deciding to hit British soldiers were the guerrilla campaigns against the British in Cyprus in the 1950s and Aden in the 1960s...The Army Council's first target was to kill thirty-six British soldiers - the same number who died in Aden."

(When this target was reached in November, 1971, the Army Council revised its estimate and declared the need for 80 British soldiers to be killed).

In the early 1970's there was also a deliberate attempt to portray Northern Ireland as Britain's Vietnam. Many hundreds of posters on this theme were displayed throughout Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The colonial analogy is also very prominent in propaganda directed towards the sympathetic audience, although its reference points are almost completely historic. For the non-Irish general audience the reference points for the colonial imagery are primarily ideological, and specifically aimed at the left of the political spectrum. In a response to the Pope's appeal for peace in Ireland, the Provisionals claimed that their cause is as just as any other movement's fighting for national liberation; "we believe that our prospects for victory are supported by examples of other colonial struggles... ."

A second prong of the propaganda attack directed towards the non-Irish general audience is a socialist analysis of domestic politics. Socialism has had a very checkered history within the Republican movement. Indeed increasing socialist policies was cited by the Provisionals as one of the reasons why they split from the Official movement in

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54 *ibid.*, p. 74-75.
1970. Nonetheless, in 1982 Danny Morrison declared that the aim of the Republican movement,

...has been to establish a socialist Republic based on the 1916 Proclamation. What we want to see is a fair and equal distribution of wealth throughout the country, an end to poverty, proper schools and hospitals, an end to exploitation, every one having the right to own a home.

Similarly, and significantly in an Italian magazine, a Provisional spokesman declared,

[w]e must educate the workers to destabilise capitalism in the whole of Ireland through armed struggle, creating an irremediable conflict between the needs of local capitalism and international imperialism, and those of the popular masses.

It is in sources such as this Italian one that one can find the Provisionals deviating from their more usual line. While it will be contended in Chapter 7 that the Provisionals were reasonably successful in attracting declarations of support from the British and European left, it will also be argued that the Provisionals view support from this particular section as valuable but by no means crucial. However, this line of propaganda still allows the Provisionals to portray the Roman Catholic community of Northern Ireland as disadvantaged, in fact doubly disadvantaged: firstly, as people denied their right to national self-determination, and secondly, as workers exploited by both foreign and native capitalism.

These same themes portraying the Roman Catholic community as disadvantaged are, of course, emphasised again in propaganda aimed at the sympathetic audience, particularly in the US. Attacks on the credibility of the state and security forces, and guilt transfer techniques are also consistent in Provisional IRA propaganda aimed at all audiences. Because these credibility attacks are the most consistent part of Provisional

56 See Bowyer Bell, *op.cit.*, p. 368.
IRA propaganda, a discussion of them is included here under the most general of the three target audiences. But it is important to remember that these propaganda themes are directed at all the audiences simultaneously.

*Credibility Attacks and Guilt Transfer*

British credibility in Northern Ireland is attacked from a number of angles. Its presence is attacked morally, its policies as ineffective and its security forces as both of these and physically. The Provisionals also use similar tactics as the RAF to attach credibility to themselves and to attribute all blame for the unhappy situation to the British.

Allegations of torture and brutality began in earnest after internment was introduced in August 1971, and have been a consistent theme of Provisional propaganda ever since. Internment is without doubt a very distasteful practice and should only be a weapon of last resort. It is certainly possible with the benefit of hindsight to criticise the British for countenancing its introduction to Northern Ireland in 1971, not least because it provided "no more effective way of helping to recruit members for the Republican movement."59 The Provisionals’ Belfast paper *Republican News*, reiterated this and scored valuable propaganda points;

The Republican movement in Belfast extends to her Majesty’s forces their heartfelt thanks for the magnificent recruiting drive that they have held on our behalf.60

Nor is it possible to praise the British for the physical implementation of internment. It was frequently clumsy, and out of date and leaked intelligence resulted in the internment of many who had little or no connection with the Provisionals, and the escape of those who

The clumsiness of the internment operation, and the techniques used by the British on some of those detained, led to the Irish government entering a petition against Britain in the European Commission on Human Rights. Similarly, allegations of security force misbehaviour prompted Amnesty International to undertake several investigations in Northern Ireland. These allegations certainly embarrassed the British, and whatever the degree of truth contained in them, they were undoubtedly encouraged and manipulated by the Provisionals.

As they established themselves in early 1970, the Provisionals worked through Citizens’ Defence Committees, which also served other propaganda purposes such as presenting themselves as a defensive force. In July 1970, Tom Conaty, chairman of the Central Citizens’ Defence Committee, claimed less than a year after the British Army had been active in Northern Ireland:

we wish to censor in the strongest terms the unnecessary suffering inflicted on thousands of innocent people and the inhuman conduct of individual soldiers.

It is conceded that on occasions both the British Army and the RUC have engaged in interrogation techniques which were "illegal alike by the law of England and the law of Northern Ireland." (See Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism, (Parker) London: HMSO, 1972, Cmnd 4901, p. 14.) In January, 1978, the European Court of Human Rights found Britain in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'. The basis of this finding was Britain’s use of five sensory deprivation techniques - the hooding of detainees, subjecting them to constant noise, sleep deprivation, diet restriction and long periods of positioning against a wall. By the time of the European Court’s findings Britain had already undertaken to abandon the 5 techniques in question and compensated those involved to the extent of more than two hundred thousand pounds.

The purpose of the discussion here is to demonstrate that the Provisionals exaggerated and manipulated such findings with the intent to discredit the British state and the security forces. Indeed, Tugwell argues that they were so successful in this type of propaganda with the "effect of making arrested members 'sing' the moment they fell into police or army hands." (Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda ....", op. cit., pp. 238-242.)

These incidents and their repercussions are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

Belfast Telegraph, 6:7:70.
(It should also be noted that at this stage in order to survive, the Provisionals had to change the original image of the British troops as 'peace keepers' to one of oppressors).

In the following months and particularly after the introduction of internment. Provisional Sinn Fein urged people to go to bodies such as The Association for Legal Justice and voice allegations of brutality. Posters were displayed in the Republic of Ireland and in some parts of mainland Britain showing baton wielding and gas masked soldiers in an attempt to brutalise the image of the army. Prison officers were also accused of brutality and frequently threatened with revenge.

Strongly linked with this theme is the process of guilt transfer referred to earlier, and the Provisionals use much the same tactics as the RAF. Blaming the British for all the violence in Northern Ireland is common in all areas of Provisional propaganda, and related to colonial and oppressive themes. Gerry Adams, in a pamphlet written while he was interned in Long Kesh, claimed that, "violence in Ireland finds its roots, regardless of which groups are involved, within the conquest of Britain by Ireland."68

Less than a month after the Provisionals had shocked the world with their detonation of a bomb at the Conservative Party's annual conference in Brighton, Adams described this action as "an inevitable result of the British occupation of the six counties." Danny Morrison reacted to the same event by saying "[t]he moral position is irrelevant. What the British government and the British people have to realise is that

64 Since the political party associated with the Official IRA dropped Sinn Fein from its title in 1982, henceforth Provisional Sinn Fein will be referred to as just Sinn Fein.


66 S. O'Riain, Provos - Patriots or Terrorists?, Dublin: Irish Book Bureau, 1975, p. 45, (F 6.8).


Similarly Owen Carron, on his election as a Westminster M.P., when asked to condemn violence said,

the major part of violence is created and maintained by Britain. All other violence is a counter to the state violence of the security forces. The real terrorists are the UDR and the Police.71

This statement contains both elements of the 'guilt transfer' process: blaming all violence on the enemy; and depicting any violence by the terrorist organisation as reactive.

Attacking the credibility of the state and the security forces has a logical inverse implication of building the credibility of the terrorist organisation. The nature of the Provisional IRA and the course of events in Northern Ireland have produced more opportunities for the Provisionals to enhance their credibility than those afforded the RAF. Other methods, though, are certainly comparable. As the RAF tried to use Böll and other prominent members of West German society to lend credibility to its cause, so the Provisional IRA has tried to use members of British society. One such person was the leader of the now defunct Greater London Council, Ken Livingstone. In December 1982, Livingstone invited members of Sinn Fein to London to discuss "ways of bringing about a British withdrawal from Ulster and the reunification of Ireland."72 While in no way supportive of its cause, other British politicians have, perhaps without intention, lent their credibility to the Provisional IRA. In March 1972, the then leader of the British Opposition, Harold Wilson, met with Provisional IRA leaders in Dublin, which according to Bowyer Bell, heralded the Provisionals' arrival in the "big time politically. At a minimum they had veto power and at best they had bumped themselves ahead of Lynch in the queue to the bargaining table."73 McGuire also records that it was "a considerable

70 Observer, 14:10:84. See also International Herald Tribune, 15:10:84.
72 Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXIX, p. 32197 A-B. Livingstone's comments and their implications are discussed more fully in Chapter 7.
73 Bowyer Bell, op cit., p. 386.
propaganda victory for us that a leading politician like Wilson should have talked to us - however unproductive the talks themselves."74 However, only four months later the Provisionals were able to score an even bigger propaganda coup by meeting with Secretary of State Whitelaw in July 1972. The Provisionals then claimed that the "British government by being prepared to negotiate with the IRA ascribed that army a belligerent status."75 Senior British officials met with Republican representatives again in 1975 to negotiate a ceasefire. One result of these negotiations was the establishment of 'incident centres', supposedly to monitor the ceasefire. These centres were maintained and equipped by the British, but manned by Sinn Fein. The credibility these centres gave the Provisionals is well explained in a contemporary Belfast Telegraph editorial:

This gives the Provisionals a status which would normally only be accorded to elected representatives, and they can be expected to use it to create a power base in the community. ... But the Government must be keenly aware of the need to keep elected politicians in the picture, and although the Provisionals are more concerned with possible breaches of the ceasefire, all Assemblymen and councillors should have the same freedom of access to the incident centres. If their position is seriously undermined the cure for violence could be worse than the disease.76

Another method used by both the Provisionals and the RAF to enhance their credibility was to link themselves with or focus on an issue much narrower than their strategic aims. These issues are typically topical and enjoy a fairly high degree of credibility as being a legitimate societal concern. An example in the case of the Provisionals would be the 'smash Stormont' campaign, or issues surrounding the administration of justice. (In the case of the RAF good examples would be its involvement with the anti-nuclear movement and its opposition to the building of a new runway at Frankfurt Airport.) However, this adopting of issues is considered more important in relation to the sympathetic audience and will be more fully detailed in next chapter.

74 McGuire, op cit., p. 102.
75 O'Riain, op cit., p. 22.
76 Belfast Telegraph, 13:12:75.
In this chapter, however, there remains a discussion of Provisional IRA's violence. The Provisionals' violence is sending many of the same messages as that of the RAF. But the uncommitted audience does become more specific. Most of the violence is aimed at the British audience, and most definitely included in this is a community not mentioned so far - the Protestants of Northern Ireland. The Provisionals' sometimes claim to be non-sectarian does not square with an analysis of their behaviour, and to the Protestants the Provisional IRA is synonymous with a threat to their desire to be British. A Protestant is a legitimate target to the Provisionals if he is a member of the RUC or UDR, engages in business with or has social contacts with a member of the RUC or UDR, is a fireman, a prison officer, an ambulance officer, a taxi driver, a farmer, or he can simply be in the wrong place at the wrong time. It is not surprising therefore, that the only message the Protestants receive from the Provisionals is though violence, although it must be said that the Provisionals have made no serious effort to communicate in any other way.

*Propaganda by Deed*

In communicating violence, the role of the media is again essential. In response to a planned news conference by the then GOC in Northern Ireland, General Harry Tuzo, McGuire reports how the Provisionals deliberately "drove him off the front pages of the *Belfast Evening Telegraph* with a dozen bomb explosions in Belfast, demonstrating very clearly just who was winning in the Six Counties".77 Richard Clutterbuck, using a 1974 analysis, claims that of 60 explosions "over 80% were timed to obtain maximum coverage on television news."78 The Provisional IRA has also, on occasion directly attacked the media for expressing unsympathetic views. In July, 1971, an explosion wrecked the Belfast printing plant of the *Daily Mirror*. The Provisionals admitted responsibility and cited hostile propaganda as the motivating factor. Chris Ryder, a

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journalist with The Sunday Times, has been threatened,\textsuperscript{79} and in July 1984, a Dublin-based journalist was shot for his supposed unsympathetic views.

The Provisional IRA has a well organised and rehearsed routine when it faces the media. Martin Bell, of the BBC, describes a case where a man had been shot in a republican area of Belfast;

...and it had been fairly clear that he had been carrying a gun because as soon as one got there with one’s camera there was deep hostility whereas if in fact he was an innocent bystander they would say ‘come and see what those bastards have done to us’. But no, I was chased out at gunpoint by the IRA. They had no time to manufacture a fancy story. A lot of the disputed incidents when you actually look at the case histories tended to take place the maximum possible distance from where the media was.\textsuperscript{80}

An equally sinister manipulation of the media occurred in 1979, when the BBC’s ‘Panorama’ decided to feature the Provisionals. While the investigating team was in Dublin interviewing, it received a telephone call advising it to travel to Carrickmore just over the border into Northern Ireland. Waiting for it there were several hooded IRA men who were then filmed stopping cars. The Panorama crew returned to Belfast where it informed BBC lawyers, but not the security forces. Before the programme could be screened however, a Dublin journalist, Ed Maloney, discovered the incident, and wrote an article in the November 8 edition of Hibernia detailing the BBC’s experiences and the discomfiture of the security forces. On the same day the Provisionals announced their version of events:

In an audacious show of strength, a heavily armed IRA force effectively sealed off the County Tyrone village of Carrickmore and held it for a full three hours while being filmed by a BBC television crew. ... Two M60 machine guns, RPG7 rocket propelled grenade launchers and many Armalite rifles were brought into the village of 400 people for display in front of the cameras. ... Some sources estimate the total size of the force to be in excess of 100 ... \textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79} Irish Times, 10:10:79.
\textsuperscript{80} Bell quoted in Clutterbuck, \textit{op cit.}, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{81} Belfast Telegraph, 9:11:79.
Maloney was appalled at the extent to which this version was accepted by many British and foreign journalists. He declared in the British *Guardian* newspaper "I'm a full-time journalist. For the first time I'm really getting an insight into how awful they can be."82

So having established that the Provisionals are well aware of the media, and that they have used and abused it, we will now consider the messages contained in their violence.

The Provisionals certainly send messages to the British and other components of the international audience that they have capabilities that cannot be defeated. But their interpretation of the 'justness' of their cause is more prominent as a resource in this type of propaganda than is the case with the RAF. This is explained by the much larger degree of overlap between the sympathetic and uncommitted audiences, and the fact that information is taken by these two groups from many of the same sources. Typical of this type of propaganda is the notion that only armed force can bring the desired end of the British presence in Northern Ireland, therefore the use of the armed force is morally, strategically and tactically correct:

Historically 'constitutional nationalists' have sold people the line that it is possible to talk the British out of Ireland, but the reality remains that the British only left the twenty-six counties as a result of the then IRA's armed struggle and they will only leave the six counties in the same way.83

Similarly, after attempts to expel the newly elected MP for Fermanagh/South Tyrone, Bobby Sands, Danny Morrison is reported as saying "[t]hese moves can only further justify the IRA's argument that the Ballot Box has its limitations and only armed force can get the British out of Ireland."84 In a 1984 speech to 130 members of the American group Irish Northern Aid (Noraid), Owen Carron of Provisional Sinn Fein is reported to have said "[y]ou and I know the righteousness of our cause. Ireland has a moral right to

her freedom."85 The moral objection to the British presence is based on the same sort of issues as those discussed above, oppression and national self determination.

More specifically aimed at the British however, are themes of long war, inevitably of victory and terror. The Provisionals claim that against a peoples' army and the righteousness of their cause, British military policy is totally ineffectual. At the 1978 Easter commemoration parade, the crowd was told "[w]e have recently acquired new war materials and no measure of British terror will defeat this force until we have the freedom to choose our own government."86 In a December 1978 statement, which also promised pre-Christmas terror, the Provisional IRA claimed "we are committed to, and more importantly geared to, a long term war."87 The following year the Provisionals elaborated:

We have conditioned our people to think in terms of a long struggle... We have suffered too much and come through too much to settle for anything less than full freedom. We have the determination, and resolve, and the resources to keep going until we get the Brits out.88

The clear implication of this is that the British are not only committing moral outrages by maintaining their presence in Northern Ireland, but also that they are wasting human lives and considerable financial resources on something that must inevitably end.

The financial costs of their terror campaign have been something the Provisionals have coldly and deliberately taken into consideration throughout their existence. McGuire confirms this, and explains the strategy behind it:

The campaign was aimed at economic targets, like the Electricity Board Headquarters. It was intended to bring life in the Six Counties to a halt,

85 Belfast Telegraph, 11:8:84.
86 ibid., 28:3:78.
87 Belfast Telegraph, 1:12:78.
drive out international investors, and make it so costly for the British to repair the damage we were causing that they would have to meet our demands.89

But of at least equal importance is simply the terror of indiscriminate violence.

Although violence in Northern Ireland is designed to communicate with the British public, the Provisionals have reinforced their message with violence on the mainland, indeed some of their most savage attacks have occurred on the mainland.90 On 19 November 1974, the then Chief-of-Staff of the Provisionals, David O'Connell, warned in a television interview that England as well as Ireland would be subject to attack.91 Then on 21 November, several bombs exploded in Birmingham killing twenty-one and seriously injuring many others. At the height of the 1981 hunger strike, the Provisional IRA warned that the English people would be subject to revenge.92 The Provisional IRA statement of responsibility after the Brighton bombing was not only characteristically callous, but also contains the chilling warning "[t]oday we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once, you will have to be lucky always."93 Terrorism par excellence!

Tugwell suggests that the murder of British soldiers in Northern Ireland was to be the chief form of communication with the British audience, with the idea that the British public would sicken at the cost in lives and agitate for a withdrawal.94 The Provisionals certainly make no secret of their willingness to attack British soldiers;

89 McGuire, op cit., p. 35.
90 Bombs in London have been packed with nails and bolts to cause maximum injury.
94 Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda...," op cit., p. 231. See also p. 113.
The British soldiers being sent onto the streets of Ireland by an imperialist
government should be aware that they are being sent to their deaths.95

And should the soldiers along with the RUC and UDR "fail; to take this warning let them
fully understand the consequences: they will die."96 But the security forces are not the
only group to be regarded as legitimate targets by the Provisionals. They also warn
"those who maintain British rule in Ireland,"97 that they will also be the subject of
attack. All people are warned to "stay away from British terrorists, soldiers and RUC, in
uniform or out. The safety of anyone who associates or socialises with these people
cannot be guaranteed."98 The Provisionals have repeatedly threatened and often attacked
people who they perceive to be hampering their ‘war effort’. For example, in early 1975,
a petrol tanker was hijacked and fitted with an explosive device. The driver of the tanker
halted it short of its intended target, the Newtownhamilton RUC Station, where it was
defused. The local IRA brigade issued a statement which said,

[s]uch drivers should consider they are in a war situation and by failing to
co-operate fully with the instructions of the men who are already
operating at great personal risk, they leave us no option but to deal with
them subsequently as the IRA deals with traitors.99

Similarly in August, 1985, the Provisionals planted a bomb in a Londonderry petrol
station. In the statement issued by the Derry brigade the supposed reason was to warn
other premises in the area "to stop serving members of the crown forces."100 Again in
August, 1985, the Provisionals murdered a building contractor in Dublin. In claiming
responsibility for Seamus McAvoy’s murder, the IRA said,

[w]e repeat our recent warning to those in the construction industry and to
those working in barracks that they will suffer the consequences of such
collaboration. Mr McAvoy, who supplied Rowan cabins and building

96 ibid., 27:3:86.
97 ibid., 2:1:86.
98 ibid., 13:2:86.
99 ibid., 1:2:75.
100 ibid., 29:8:85.
materials to barracks and border posts for renovation work, was not earning an honest day’s pay but was receiving ill-gotten gains. ... There will be no more warnings.101

A year later the Provisionals were threatening anyone who had any business with police or army buildings from electricians to milkmen.102

This move of attacking local people, especially the UDR, coincides with the British army taking a much less obtrusive role in security operations in Northern Ireland. The UDR provides the Provisionals with the ideal target: the victim is usually alone when hit; he is usually in an off-duty situation; and he wears, or has worn, a British uniform. This wearing of a crown uniform is the justification used by the Provisional IRA for attacking the UDR and RUC; the fact that the vast majority of those murdered are Protestants is, it says, irrelevant. John Cushnahan, former leader of the Alliance Party, dismisses these claims saying "the IRA are subtle and they say they are attacking the UDR, but really it is the Protestant community."103 Ken Maginnis, security spokesman for the Official Unionist Party, agrees with this, claiming that where the Provisionals used to say 'get the Brits out', they now say 'get the occupiers out'. The 'occupiers' are the Protestant community which the Provisionals seek to eliminate.104

The Provisionals' attack on these sections of the community serves two functions. One is simply to terrorise; to demonstrate that the Provisionals have the capacity to continue their attack regardless of security measures. After murdering two RUC officers in Armagh the Provisionals claimed that their attack "in the heart of the sealed security zone" was deliberately to "demonstrate our capacity to strike wherever and whenever we so decide."105 The RUC agrees that the predominant message being sent to the

101 ibid., 22:8:85. See also Belfast Telegraph, 22:8:85.
102 See The Australian, 2:9:86.
103 Interview with author, 18:7:86.
104 Interview with author, 23:7:86.
community is one of violence and fear. The attacks on armoured police and UDR vehicles are saying "if we can do this to armoured police what can we do to you?" The second, and perhaps more sinister, function of the Provisionals' terrorism within Northern Ireland is to provoke a Protestant backlash. The Workers' Party (the descendant of Official Sinn Fein - the prefix Sinn Fein having been dropped in 1982) say of the Provisionals' claim to be nonsectarian,

[the provos have been waging a sectarian campaign which knows no off season and which is calculated to bring violent reaction from loyalists.]

If the Provisionals are successful in this, they can then portray themselves in their most profitable role as Catholic defenders and portray all their own violence as reactive. And of course the more open the Provisionals can force security precautions and preventive legislation to become, the more they can claim the state is oppressive and in crisis.

The Provisionals' propaganda directed towards the uncommitted audience is considered, and contains both historical and ideological reference points, with the degree of emphasis adjusted as they deem appropriate. How successful they have been among this group will be examined in Chapter 7, but, as with the RAF, it seems reasonable to conclude that the most significant component of this type of propaganda is violence.

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106 Interview with Superintendent RUC Community Relations, 23:7:86.
107 Northern People, 18:7:86. (Emphasis in original.)
CHAPTER FIVE
THE SYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE

In each of the case studies concerning this thesis, the sympathetic audience is extremely important, not least because it is from this group that a terrorist organization will recruit most of its active volunteers. But it is also the audience that will determine the degree of success. In Mao's classic dictum this is the 'sea in which the fish swim'. Thus the terrorists' strategic objective in respect to this particular target audience is to make the 'sea' as deep as possible. It will be argued below that there are two major components in this strategy. Firstly, the ideological appeal which presents an explanation and analysis of what the terrorists perceive as 'wrong' with the current situation. It includes a rejection of all constitutional and non-violent methods of redressing the situation, and conversely stresses that violence is the only mode through which the terrorists' objectives can be attained. Needless to say, the 'justness' and necessity of these objectives are also stressed. The second component of this type of propaganda is a deliberate attempt to widen the base of the sympathetic audience. The way this is usually attempted is to single out a 'specific' issue or aspect of the struggle that is likely to have a broader appeal than the fundamental ideological premises. Support or front groups can then be formed around such issues. One such example, common to both groups in this study, is the use of prisoners and prison conditions.

However, it should also be stressed at the outset of this chapter that the sympathetic audience contains several strata. Clearly there are legal differences between someone who, for whatever reasons, philosophically supports a terrorist group's objectives, and someone who is prepared to offer them some sort of material aid short of taking part in any active operations. It is, of course, also possible to support terrorist objectives while totally condemning the means used to achieve them. Why some are prepared to go further than others in supporting terrorist groups is probably dependent on
many factors, such as moral disposition, peer pressure, life experiences, individual analysis and educational levels. However, as we shall see, propaganda does encourage involvement, and ultimately direct action. When direct action occurs, propaganda shifts its emphasis inwards on the terrorist group itself, which is the subject of the next chapter. This one concerns propaganda directed at all levels below actual membership of a terrorist group.

**THE RED ARMY FACTION**

Perhaps the most appropriate starting point is to consider where the RAF itself perceives its support as coming from. In terms of a 'lowest common denominator', the RAF clearly locates itself on the left of the political spectrum. Its use of language and selection of targets are intended to appeal to Leftist groups, as is its general ideological analysis - for example, the rejection of West German society based on Marcuse’s theory of ‘consumption terror’ (see Chapter 3). In an unpublished interview with *Stern* the ‘Moabit Gang of Four’ (Ronald Fritzsch, Gerald Klopper, Ralph Reinders and Fritz Teufel) cited this rejection of the consumer society as a motivating factor in their decision to begin an armed struggle;

> the desire to live in an autonomous way, not to be a puppet, a cog, a robot, a brutalised consumer manipulated by a so-called ‘social nature’, guided in reality by profit. ¹

Another aspect of ideological appeal used by the RAF, and one which had quite a wide acceptance among Leftist groups, was that the Western democracies were directly responsible for the poverty in the Third World. Chapter 3 discussed the global visions of the RAF’s ideology, and it is in propaganda directed towards the sympathetic audience that this is emphasised. Horst Mahler argues that the struggle in which the RAF is engaged in is

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...a world war - it will be the last and at the same time the longest and bloodiest war of history, because the exploiters do not hesitate to use the most horrendous actions to retain their dominance. It is not a war among nations but a war of classes, which will sweep all nations, social, cultural, and religious boundaries and barriers forever from the stage of history.\(^2\)

In a letter to the Labour Party of the Peoples’ Republic of Korea, Meinhof expanded on this and said

> [w]e think that the organization of armed operations in the big cities of the Federal Republic is the right way to support the liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the correct contribution of West German and West Berlin communists to the strategy of the international socialist movement in splitting the powers of imperialism by attacking them from all sides, and striking once they are split...\(^3\)

The central role of Vietnam in the RAF’s ideology has already been mentioned, and will be discussed again as an issue around which the RAF tried to motivate support. The plight of the Palestinians was also interpreted by the RAF as a part of the global struggle against imperialism, fascism and colonialism. After the attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich olympic games by Black September, Ulrike Meinhof wrote a pamphlet claiming that both the RAF and Black September were fighting for common aims.\(^4\)

So it is certainly possible to conclude that the RAF expected people who saw themselves as anti-imperialist, anti-fascist or communist to relate to its ideas. The next step for RAF propaganda was to reject any other method of furthering these objectives than through violence. Before discussing this, however, it should be stated that the RAF saw two particular groups in society as being particularly amenable to its ideas: one was those who were adopting ‘alternative’ lifestyles that were fashionable in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, and were usually centred around communes and narcotics; and the second was university students.

\(^2\) Mahler quoted in Becker, "Another Battle ...".\textit{op. cit.}, p. 95-96.
\(^3\) Meinhof quoted in Aust, \textit{op cit.}, p. 183. See also Horchem, "West Germany’s Red Army Anarchists," \textit{Conflict Studies}, No. 46.
In regards to the first of these two societal groups, Baumann claimed that the theoretical grounds for expecting its support comes from Mao. On the basis that Mao and Chu-Teh had created the first cadre of the Red Army from robber bands, Baumann and his associates "directed our agitation to make the dopers who were still partly unpolitical conscious of their situation." He goes on to say that they were impressed by the methods used by the Black Panthers in Harlem. We said 'the passionate fixer can exchange the needle for the gun' ... Later, the SPK (a politically motivated crisis centre) in Heidelberg picked that up again.

The SPK, (Socialist Patients’ Collective) was a group run by psychiatrist Dr. Huber and his wife. The philosophy of Dr. Huber is summed up in a manifesto entitled "Patients Info. No. 1" which declares;

Comrades! There can be no therapeutic act that is not shown clearly and unmistakably to be a revolutionary act ... the system has made us sick, let us give the death blow to the sick system.

Several members of the SPK and Dr Huber formed the core of the ‘second generation’ of the RAF members, and were heavily involved in the seizure of the West German embassy in Stockholm in April 1975. This was always a small group and very quickly became actively involved and thus, in terms of this thesis, overstepped the margin between the sympathetic audience and the active one. Of far more importance, both from an ideological and a numerical standpoint, were the university students.

In one of Ulrike Meinhof’s most prominent pieces of writing for the RAF, Das Konzept Stadtguerilla, (The Urban Guerrilla Concept) she recognises that the origins of the RAF stem from the student movement of the late 1960’s. In section four of this

5 Baumann, op. cit., p. 40.
6 ibid., p. 41.
7 Quoted in Aust, op. cit., p. 146.
9 See Chapter 2.
document, "Primat der Praxis", Meinhof argues that because the workers in West Germany have become so absorbed in the capitalist system, it is impossible to unite them in resistance. But, continues Meinhof,

[w]e maintain that without revolutionary initiative, without practical revolutionary intervention of (this is our own concept) of the avant-garde, ... there can be no unifying process. 11

The avant garde theme is taken up by Horst Mahler in his major written contribution to the RAF's ideology, Über den bewaffneten Kampf in Westeuropa (On the Armed Struggle in West Europe). 12 Mahler, no doubt influenced by Marcuse, assigned the students the role of the avant garde saying,

[i]t is not the organization of the industrial working class, but the revolutionary sections of the student body that are today the bearers of the contemporary conscience. 13

Having thus established whom the RAF perceived as the sympathetic audience, and what sections of it were singled out for special attention, it is now proposed to examine what sort of ideological explanations the RAF put forward to appeal to, and justify its actions to, this audience. Much of the RAF's writing in the form of pamphlets, manifestos or analytical papers is devoted to explaining and justifying the need for an armed struggle. Although it is impossible to assess accurately the number of people who may have read these writings, it is extremely unlikely to have been very wide ranging. The particular style in which most of these documents are written would only attract those with a fairly extreme left-wing bias, and even then would demand a dedicated reader, as the language is heavily imbued with Marxist terminology, and is repetitive and awkward. The interviews in magazines such as Stern or Spiegel, and reporting in left wing newspapers like Tagesspiegel would undoubtedly have reached a much wider

11 Meinhof quoted in Horchem, "West Germany's ...," op. cit., p. 7.
13 Mahler quoted in Horchem, "West Germany's ...," op. cit., p. 7-8.
readership, but, as will be argued in Chapter 7, the RAF failed to take much account of this.

**Ideological Appeal**

Beginning from the premise that the situation in Germany is repressive, capitalist, fascist and imperialist, the RAF firstly needs to explain how it intends to ‘revolutionise’ the system and thus change it. The problem of why the masses do not seem to respond to the RAF’s message also has to be solved. The most convenient way to do this is simply to argue that the masses do not fully understand the implications of their repressed situation under capitalism. Therefore it "would be wrong to engage in armed struggle only when the ‘consent of the masses’ is assured for this would mean to ... renounce this struggle altogether..."14 The ‘consent of the masses’, however, is not totally elusive, but can only be won through the armed struggle itself.15 In 1970, the radical Berlin journal *Agit 833*, of which Mahler was a co-founder, declared "the comprehension of the masses is only aroused through the armed struggle."16 This argument is repeated in Mahler’s "On the Armed Struggle in West Europe," when he says "we throw bombs aimed at the apparatus of oppression also into the consciousness of the masses."17 Such an analysis leads Mahler to conclude that "a few dozen fighters who really begin to act and not merely discuss endlessly ... [can] radically change the political scene."18

Stressing the need for action is a logical extension of this argument, but the action called for by the RAF is both illegal and violent. Ulrike Meinhof in "The Urban Guerrilla Concept," devoted a whole section to arguing that action was the correct ideology:

14 Mahler, "Kollectiv RAF ...," *op.cit.*, p. 43.
15 *ibid.*
17 Mahler, "Kollectiv RAF ...," *op. cit.*, p. 59.
18 *ibid.*, p. 43.
We affirm that a process of unification can't take place without revolutionary initiative, without the practical intervention of an avant-garde formed by the workers and socialist intellectuals, without a concrete anti-imperialist struggle. We affirm that the alliance between them can only be realized by common struggle in which the most conscious faction of the workers and intellectuals set example rather than act as directors. Without a connection between practice and theory, reading "Capital" is nothing other than a bourgeois study. To place oneself theoretically on the side of the proletariat means, to also set about it in practice (sic).

Gudrun Ensslin at her 1968 trial for arson, stated "we have learned that talking without activity is wrong." Because the workers of West Germany have become so incorporated into the capitalist system, they are slaves to "the habit of obedience with regard to the bourgeois order." To overcome this, however, the "repeated violation of norms in deeds is required." Der Spiegel concluded that it was Andreas Baader, who had a criminal record before becoming involved with the RAF, who "transmitted the feeling that violating ... laws is ... a revolutionary act."

The RAF's propaganda in this area clearly promotes its ideological analysis that the situation in Germany required a revolutionary avant garde, which would be able to motivate the masses through its direct actions. The fact that most of these actions were violent was justified by a rejection of non-violent and constitutional means of achieving its aims. Some like Baumann however, simply accepted

that revolution is a matter of violence, and at some point you have to start with it, so you prepare yourself for it as soon as possible. ... Violence in the political realm was never a problem for me.

The disillusionment with the constitutional Left which emerged in the mid-1960's has been discussed in Chapter 2, and there is no doubt that the RAF felt that this

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21 Mahler, "Kollectiv RAF ...," *op. cit.*, p. 45.
22 *ibid.*, p. 46. (Emphasis in original.)
24 Baumann, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
disillusionment would provide it with a reservoir of support. Within the whole range of its propaganda, it is possible to find bitter condemnations of the Left in general. In a RAF paper entitled Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf, (Urban Guerrillas and the Class Struggle) it is postulated that there is no real difference between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), or that the difference is like the difference between "plague and cholera." The Left's submersion into the capitalist system has led it to reject any sort of real action. The press, and particularly the Springer press, was blamed for much of this. The Left, says Baumann, "kept falling into the pitfalls of the press. They kept saying, 'don't scare the people off' whenever we showed any determination." 

The intellectual Left was also subject to harsh criticism from Ulrike Meinhof for failing to apply its theories to its own situation. These people have no difficulty, when talking about the Panthers, to use their words for cops, namely the word pigs. But they do not apply this word to the police which they encounter themselves. ... We say, naturally the cops are pigs.

The New Left and the Extraparliamentary Opposition were not omitted from the RAF's condemnations. Mahler outlined a deep sense of disappointment when it became clear that the Extraparliamentary Opposition would not be successful in inducing the state to accord to all its demands:

It can only be termed deeply frustrating to recognise the necessity of a revolution with growing clarity and yet be unable to know who and where the revolutionary class, in other words the beneficiaries of this upheaval

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27 Baumann, op.cit., p. 32.
itself, actually are. That is bad, and how easily can such a state of affairs lead to a mood of desperation. 29

One reason that the RAF felt contributed to the failure of the Extraparliamentary Opposition was that it failed to take sufficient action to publicise its aims. The press, of course, was basically at fault since it was capitalist and imperialist controlled, but the Extraparliamentary Opposition could have done more to make the press take notice of it. For example, Ensslin and Baader claimed that their setting fire to a Frankfurt department store, as well as drawing attention to Vietnam, was designed to "prevent the voice of the Extraparliamentary Opposition from not being able to find a hearing." 30 Klein confirms this feeling that the Left were failing to communicate,

[they did nothing ... they got used to broken windows, the battles with the police, even the petrol bombs. So there came a point when it was decided that something new would have to be found. 31

It was then that the actions of the RAF began. 32 However, as mentioned above, the RAF argued that action was what was needed, rather than the endless discussions and theorising of the New Left and Extraparliamentary Opposition.

It would be wrong to say that the RAF viewed violence simply as a mode of communication, although it clearly believed violence would demonstrate certain things to be true. Firstly, Mahler argued that illegal acts not only raised revolutionary consciousness, but also that they demonstrated the destruction of the current West German regime was possible. The first phase of the armed struggle, he said, was "to demonstrate that armed groups can form and maintain themselves against the apparatus

29 Die Zeit, 9:9:77. Mahler, who while in prison rejected terrorism as a strategy, went on to say "[f]rom this point, via a completely abstract identification with the liberation struggles in the Third World, the further course led to out-and-out adventurous concepts."
31 Klein quoted in Bougereau, op. cit., p. 15.
32 ibid.
of the state." Ultimately, Mahler continues, only a lengthy armed struggle which
progressively enfeebles the state will enable it to be ultimately destroyed.

A further function of violence, the RAF believed, is to force the state to reveal
openly its fascism. In 1975 it declared, "many changed their attitudes towards this State
because of the measures of the government against us, [they] begin to recognise it for
what it is ... ." Furthermore, the fascist German state left the RAF with no alternative
but violence. Surveillance by the ‘political police’ made it impossible for the RAF to
meet and discuss with already existing socialist groups. The government’s reaction in
sending police to break up student demonstrations showed the futility of this kind of
direct action. And worse, the government was actively seeking to destroy all the
protesters. After the police had shot dead a student demonstrator in 1967, Gudrun
Ensllin is reported to have said

[t]his fascist state means to kill us all. We must organise resistance.
Violence is the only way to answer violence. This is the Auschwitz
generation and there’s no arguing with them.

Ulrike Meinhof also tried to present the state and its resources as a direct threat when she
wrote,

[p]eople are right when they claim that all the resources expended on
hunting us down are really intended for the whole socialist left in the
Federal Republic and West Berlin. The small sums of money we are said
to have stolen, the occasional theft of cars and documents with which we
are charged, the attempted murder they are trying to pin on us, are their
justifications for it all.

Thus the RAF is not only stressing the need for violence, but is presenting its violence as
defensive.

33 Mahler, "Kollectiv RAF ...," op. cit., p. 43.
34 ibid., p. 8.
36 Ensllin quoted in Aust, op cit., p. 44.
37 Meinhof quoted ibid., p. 143.
Allied to this defensive theme, and possibly to ward off criticisms of cold blooded murder, the RAF claims that its violence is considered and discriminate. For example:

We do not ‘make reckless use of guns.’ The cop who finds himself in the contradictory situation of being a 'little man' and a capitalist lackey, a low wage earner and a police officer of monopoly capitalism, is not under absolute compulsion to act. We shoot when we are shot at. We spare the cop who spares us.38

Some members of the RAF claimed that their violence was motivated by their love of fellow man. Ulrike Meinhof stated "[l]ove for human beings is possible today only in the death-dealing hate-filled attack on imperialism-fascism."39 Baumann made similar claims.40 To what extent these ideological explanations and justifications were accepted by the RAF’s sympathetic audience will be discussed in Chapter 7. Now, however, it is proposed to examine the second component of the sympathetic audience strategy identified at the beginning of this chapter, that is, the expansion of the sympathetic audience base by linking issues to the overall objectives of the terrorist group.

**Deepening the Sea**

In Chapter 3 it was argued that although the RAF’s ideology had global aspects and visions, attacking the Federal Republic was its major priority. The issues that the RAF chose to emphasise confirm this. There is however, the simple logistic necessity of creating even small reservoirs of support in the locality in which a terrorist group operates. To do this the terrorist group is obviously going to have to raise concerns that are more directly felt among potential supporters than an ideological or abstract affiliation with conflicts or causes in distant places. Three such issues adopted by the RAF will be outlined below: environmental issues; attacks on NATO particularly after

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38 ibid.
1979; and the state's treatment of prisoners, including the RAF's use of the hunger strike tactic.

Two other issues are significant in RAF propaganda, and their significance in motivating at least the original members of the RAF should not be underestimated. The first of these issues is Vietnam. Klein claimed that wanting to oppose American actions in Vietnam was much more than an ideological identification with the struggle of the north Vietnamese;

[t]o my mind, it wasn't simply an international question, but also an internal problem. The B 52's stopped over at Wiesbaden on their way from Vietnam.41

He went on to claim that the "Germans should have been the first to start shouting about Vietnam, not merely a few leftists. They did nothing."42 In considering the use the RAF made of Vietnam, it should be noted that Vietnam was the 'issue' of the day, and therefore the RAF could not fail to consider it. Vietnam was an issue which brought many thousands onto the streets of Western Europe and North America. What distinguished the RAF from the thousands of 'anti-Vietnam' marchers was its linkage, through its ideology, with the West German state. Obviously the vast majority of those who were prepared to demonstrate against America's Vietnam policy failed to appreciate this link, indeed Horchem argues that the RAF's bomb attacks against US military installations in May 1972, began the process of totally isolating the RAF from the sympathy which did exist for them in Leftist circles at this time.43

As Vietnam faded as an issue, it was replaced by the plight of the Palestinians. The Palestinians were also the victims of capitalism and imperialism, and thus easily incorporated into the RAF's ideology. However, this was not entirely without problems

41 Klein quoted in Bougereau, op cit., p. 12.
43 Horchem, "West Germany's ...," op cit., p. 9.
for the RAF as it required that Israel be condemned as imperialist and Zionism as racism, which was problematic in terms of twentieth century German history. Becker explains that Ulrike Meinhof overcame this problem by arguing that the Jews were murdered by the Third Reich not because of their race, but because the people associated them with capitalism. Thus

it was not murder for purely reasons of race hatred which would have been wrong according to the ideology of the Left in the 1970's, but more for reasons of class hatred, which is not wrong; and therefore the people can be pronounced ‘not guilty’ of genocide.44

And thus the RAF is free to accuse Israel of using imperialist and racist policies against the Palestinians.

The RAF had more than an ideological affiliation with the Palestinians, it received training and financial support, particularly from Haddad’s PFLP. Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin and Mahler all received training in the Middle East. Joint operations were also undertaken, with the Palestinians involved in the Mogadishu hijack, and Germans in the Vienna OPEC raid in December 1975. As Palestinian strategy changed, partly due to widespread revulsion at its use of terrorist tactics, so Palestine faded as a very prominent issue in RAF propaganda.

As stated earlier, criticisms and condemnations of the West German state are found consistently in RAF propaganda. Schiller argues that a new wave of youth unrest in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, gave the RAF some new issues to focus on.45 Furthermore, although these issues had international implications, they were also much more identifiable as West German issues. Indeed these issues were to play a central role in German politics (and still do), something which neither Vietnam nor Palestine ever did. Some of these issues concerned environmental problems and can be seen as an

44 Becker, "Another Battle ...," op. cit., p. 94.
attempt to tap into the growing support for West Germany’s ‘Green Movement’ in the early 1980’s. But of more importance was a concerted attack on NATO which coincided with the peace movement prompted by the planned deployment of US Cruise and Pershing missiles on West German soil.

**Environmental Issues**

One example of the German terrorists trying to exploit environmental concerns surrounds a proposal to build a third runway at Frankfurt international airport. There was considerable opposition to this proposal, which the terrorists decided to try and turn into support for direct action. In July 1982, another ideological affiliate of the RAF, the Revolutionary Cells, claimed responsibility for a series of bombs which damaged the equipment of firms involved in the construction of the new runway.\(^{46}\) A year later an explosion at the home of the Frankfurt airport chief caused over £14,000 worth of damage.\(^{47}\) Then early in 1984, stones and petrol bombs were thrown at police in protest against the runway construction.\(^{48}\) This pattern of action would certainly suggest a degree of success in the terrorists’ objective of encouraging repeated ‘violation of norms in deeds’, or of bringing increasing numbers of people into direct confrontation with the apparatus of the state.

After the 1977 suicides in Stammheim, there was certainly a lull in German terrorist activity. Police pressure and the drying up of any public sympathy after the Schleyer murder undoubtedly contributed to this. It also seemed that what remained of the RAF was either reassessing its strategy, or contained no ideologues like Mahler or Meinhof, as this period is also marked by a lack of RAF pamphlets or discussion papers. By 1980 however, the RAF had re-emerged, having taken over the remnants of the 2 June Movement. The basis for attempting to create another ‘revolutionary environment’

\(^{46}\) *The Times*, 21:7:82.
\(^{47}\) *ibid.*, 29:6:83.
\(^{48}\) *ibid.*, 2:1:84.
concentrated on the familiar theme of US imperialism. But this time it could be directly linked to US policy in West Germany itself, within the context of NATO. It is, of course, no coincidence that the RAF’s concentration on this tactic coincided with the rising tide of anti-American and anti-nuclear feeling beginning to sweep many countries in Western Europe.

The use of this tactic was evident as early as 1979, when the ‘Andreas Baader Commando’ claimed responsibility for an attempt on the life of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, General Haig.49 But it was not until 1981 that the RAF’s anti-NATO campaign really began.

**NATO**

On August 31 1981, the RAF claimed responsibility for an attack on the Ramstein Air Base which injured twenty people. Two weeks later, the RAF attempted to assassinate the US Army Commander in Europe, General Kroesen, with a Soviet RPG-7 rocket launcher. The statement admitting responsibility for this attack reveals clearly the RAF’s line of thinking. It claimed that Kroesen

> decides on conventional destruction and specifies when and where neutron warheads should be fired ... He will be one of the American leaders who, instead of Schmidt, Genscher, Strauss, Kohl or whoever, will take command in West Germany when the resistance seriously shatters the colonial status of this country.50


By 1984, the RAF felt confident enough to once again widen the targets of its attack. A ‘Plans and Discussion’ paper found by police in July 1984, revealed a three pronged strategy.51 The first prong of this strategy was to continue with attacks on

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49 *Sunday Telegraph*, 1:7:79.
50 *The Times*, 17:9:81.
NATO. The other two however, were attempts to link this line of attack with other aspects of the RAF's struggle. Namely, an attack on internal German targets who were "representatives of repression" such as Attorney General Regmann, and demands that RAF prisoners be placed together in the same prison.52

In 1985, however, the RAF reverted to the tactic of making NATO its main target. In this it was joined by the French group Action Directe. A joint statement from the two groups claimed that they were forming a "Political Military Front in Western Europe" with NATO as its main target. The statement went on to vow that the two groups would instigate attacks "against the multi-national structures of NATO, against its bases and its strategies against its plans and its propaganda... ."53 These attacks would constitute the first step in a "large mobilization."54 Ten days later Action Directe murdered General Audran. Another joint statement claimed that he had been killed because he was

responsible for arms production, exports and sales to NATO [and] his economic and military role put him at the heart of NATO's strategic project of imperialism to homogenize the European states under its control.55

(West German police claimed that the RAF was possibly involved in this murder as the explosives used were from the same batch used by the RAF in an attack on the NATO training school at Oberammergau in December 1984.56) Then on 1 February, the RAF murdered German arms dealer Ernst Zimmermann whose name had also appeared in the July 1984 'Plans and Discussion Paper' mentioned above. This they claimed was the beginning of a "war of liberation."57

52 ibid.
53 The Times, 16:1:85.
54 ibid.
55 Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXI,1985, p. 33555B.
56 The Times, 31:1:85.
57 ibid., 6:2:85.
Using NATO as a target was extremely useful for the RAF. It enabled them to use the familiar themes of imperialism and liberation. The main difference from earlier propaganda was that it was now West Germany and the other states of Western Europe that needed to be liberated rather, than Vietnam or Palestine. The political climate of Western Europe certainly favoured such propaganda, but it is equally certain that the RAF moved to exploit the situation to its advantage, and build up its base of support.

It is interesting to note that the statement claiming responsibility for Zimmermann’s death was signed the ‘Patrick O’Hara Commando’. O’Hara was one of the people who died during the 1981 Provisional IRA hunger strike. The hunger strike is one tactic the RAF and the Provisional IRA have in common. It is part of an overall use of prisoners in propaganda which is one of the central components in terrorist propaganda generally. It is used as an issue, and the sympathetic audience is directly targeted, but it also provides the major link between the sympathetic and the active audience, which is why it has been left until the end of this section.

**Prisoners**

In propaganda concerning prisoners, there are again two main themes. One is an attempt to avoid being classed as criminals, and the other is to present the state as torturing the prisoners or that the conditions under which the prisoners are held amount to torture. As soon as its members were imprisoned, the RAF began to complain about the conditions under which they were held. These conditions were undoubtedly severe, although the state claimed they were necessary. (It will be argued in Chapter 7 that this type of issue propaganda was the most successful for the RAF because of this severity.) For much of their time in custody, RAF prisoners were held separately from other prisoners and frequently in total isolation. This, felt the RAF, made it victims, and it began to draw comparisons with the Third Reich. Ulrike Meinhof claimed "[t]he

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58 O’Hara was actually a member of the Irish National Liberation Army which also took part in the 1981 hunger strike.
political concept behind the dead section at Cologne, I will say it straight out, is the gas chamber. My ideas of Auschwitz became very realistic in there ... "59 Similarly at the 1975 trial, Baader argued that the conditions in which they were held are conditions of imprisonment which, in their duration and their harshness, weren't even employed by the state police of the Third Reich ... 60

The RAF appealed for action from others to bring an end to these conditions and the release of the prisoners. Meinhof demanded daily militant actions ... for 'freedom for all imprisoned revolutionaries - an end to torture by isolation - away with all special measures in the prisons - long live the RAF!' ... the number of actions cannot be large enough and they cannot be militant enough as long as all the prisoners are not liberated.61

To further publicise its cause and accentuate the pressure on the state, the RAF engaged in several hunger strikes, which were ultimately to result in the deaths of two people, Holger Meins in November 1974, and Sigurd Debus in April 1981. The hunger strike can be a particularly effective weapon, as the state can be presented as barbaric if it lets the prisoner die, and barbaric if it intervenes to force feed. The purpose of the RAF’s hunger strikes was to force the state to change the conditions under which it held the prisoners, and to recognise the political component of their crimes. The RAF prisoners invariably described themselves as political, and demanded treatment as such. The main RAF trial in 1975, declared Ulrike Meinhof was "the first political trial in the Federal Republic since 1945."62 Announcing the 1981 hunger strike in a letter sent to the West German press agency (DPA), the terrorists claimed to be prisoners of war and demanded to be treated under the terms of the Geneva Conventions.63 The advantage of adopting these fairly limited objectives was that single issue support groups could be formed

60 ibid., p. 317.
61 Der Spiegel, 2:6:75, p. 29.
63 The Times, 10:2:81.
around them, which would attract support in areas and volume that the terrorists' ultimate objectives would not.

Two such groups were formed in Germany. Red Aid, which was formed in West Berlin by Wilfred Boese, who was killed at Entebbe, and the Committee Against Torture By Isolation. The function of these committees was to prepare press statements and organise demonstrations in support of the prisoners. They also prepared information for the prisoners themselves, and complied with the prisoners' requests for books etc. However, the RAF then tried to link any support that was forthcoming on these issues with its overall objectives. Klein explains,

the RAF tries to bring moral pressure to bear on the left in connection with the prisoners. ... But as soon as you give your support, you also have to declare your agreement with the guerrillas' politics ... 64

As stated earlier, it will be argued that the RAF's use of prisoners was undoubtedly its singularly most successful theme in attracting support, both at the sympathetic level and in terms of recruiting more members. As Aust points out,

young people who had never met Baader or Ensslin in their lives, ... started along the path to illegality in a state of indignation at the real or imagined inhumanity of [the] conditions of imprisonment. At no time of the 'underground struggle' did the RAF have so magnetic a power of attraction as they did when imprisoned.65

THE PROVISIONAL IRA

As it was possible to identify the RAF's sympathetic audience in general terms, it is also possible to identify the Provisional IRA's. In general terms this audience is defined as those who support the idea of a united Ireland, and either live in or are ancestrally linked with Ireland. Although there are some who would support a united

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64 Klein quoted in Bougereau, op. cit., p. 49-50. See also H. Mahler "The Hunger Strikes were like a Whip against an Imaginary Left," Der Tagesspiegel, 18:10:80.
65 Aust, op. cit., p. 273.
Ireland even though they are in no way connected with Ireland, their support is valuable but not crucial. And although, as in the case of Provisional IRA's uncommitted audience, different strata can be detected, for propaganda purposes they are very similar and are subject to many of the same sources. For the Provisional IRA the really crucial component of the sympathetic audience is the Roman Catholic community in Northern Ireland among whom it has to exist. Societal structures within Northern Ireland ensure that this community remains geographically isolated, compact and easily identifiable. In order to maintain this situation, the Provisional IRA directs certain propaganda themes to this audience which are not directed anywhere else. Central to this is the Provisionals' political wing Sinn Fein. (The relationship between the two organisations is outlined below.) The other two components of the sympathetic audience, the Irish Republic and Irish communities living abroad, are subject to propaganda which is fairly tightly controlled by Sinn Fein, and emanates mostly from *An Phoblacht/Republican News* which is available in the Republic, or, in the case of Irish communities living abroad, articles which are reprinted in more local outlets, such as *Saoirse* in New Zealand.

The broad propaganda themes directed by the Provisionals at their sympathetic audience are technically comparable to those used by the RAF. The strategy of making the 'sea' as deep as possible and therefore preventing the terrorist group from becoming perceived and treated simply as a criminal threat is the same. The 'wrongness' of the situation is stressed, and non-violent or constitutional methods of redressing it are dismissed. The 'justness' of the cause itself is sufficient to justify the use of violence. The Provisionals, like the RAF, use issues in an attempt not only to broaden their appeal, but also to present themselves as a genuine popular political force within Ireland, both north and south. Much of this is directed solely at the Roman Catholic communities of Belfast, Londonderry and the border areas, with the view to convincing them that only the Provisionals can deliver their needs - from their national aspirations to ridding their areas of crime, to better street lighting. However, the Provisionals themselves 'police' these areas quite severely, often resorting to violence and terrorism. Some discussion of
the propaganda used to control the Roman Catholic communities in Northern Ireland will also be included in this chapter.

Since much of the propaganda used in this chapter emanates from Sinn Fein, it is useful to explain the relationship between it and the Provisionals. At the beginning of 1986, An Phoblacht/Republican News outlined republican strategy in Northern Ireland as having two clearly defined but mutually dependent fronts. One, the civil resistance front, exposes the social, political and economic injustices of British rule. Such resistance can be expressed in a variety of community, cultural and trade union activities but finds its ultimate expression in membership and electoral support of Sinn Fein. The determined military campaign being waged by the IRA is the other front, the 'cutting edge' of resistance to British rule. ... Without the military challenge provided by the IRA, civil resistance would not be capable of effecting real change.66

In 1977 Sinn Fein was included in a reorganisation of the Provisional IRA instigated by the current President, Gerry Adams. According to this proposal Sinn Fein should "come under Army organisers at all levels ... be radicalized (under Army direction) and should agitate on social and economic issues which attacked the welfare of the people."67 Although this was resisted by some within the movement (mentioned below and discussed in the next chapter) it was generally implemented, and Sinn Fein assumed a higher profile as indicated by the quotation above. The Provisional IRA regards itself and Sinn Fein as engaged in the same struggle, although Danny Morrison at the 1981 Ard Fheis (national convention) left no doubt as to which aspect was more important;

... who here believes that we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand, and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?68

Sinn Fein admits that it shares the same objectives as the Provisionals and supports the armed struggle, but denies any organisational link.69 This however, is rejected by all other political factions in Northern Ireland. Former leader of the Alliance Party, John Cushnehan, views Sinn Fein as an integral part of the Provisionals, and stated that he uses the terms interchangeably.70 Secretary General of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), Eamon Hanna, claims "Sinn Fein is a political mouthpiece for the Provisional IRA. One member of Sinn Fein’s executive council will always be an IRA member."71 The Workers’ Party sees "no difference" between Sinn Fein and the Provisionals72 and Ken Maginnis of the Official Unionists describes them as "virtually synonymous".73 Other sources and events indicate that there is, in fact, a strong overlap in membership between the two organisations.

McGuire tells us that Rory O’Brady’s claim to speak only for Sinn Fein in his capacity as President of that organisation, "was a polite fiction which everyone ignored."74 McGuire also says of a press conference held in 1972 to launch Sinn Fein’s social and economic programme, "[t]he line-up was strongly IRA - to have called it a Sinn Fein occasion would have stretched the meaning of the words even further."75 In July 1971, Maire Drumm, a member of the Sinn Fein executive and later its President, told a meeting "it’s a waste of time shouting - up the IRA - the important thing is to join."76 Two days later she was found guilty of IRA membership. In July 1973, Rory O’Brady was sentenced in Dublin to six months gaol for IRA membership. The same

69 Interview with Mr. E. Howell, Sinn Fein, 21:7:86.
70 Interview with author, 18:7:86.
71 Interview with author, 16:7:86.
72 Interview with Mr. K. Bradley and Mr. K. Smith, The Workers’ Party, 22:7:86.
73 Interview with author, 31:7:86. Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party undoubtedly hold a similar view although despite repeated requests they were unable to grant an interview.
74 Maguire, op. cit., p. 69.
75 ibid., p. 134.
month the editor of An Phoblacht was also found guilty of IRA membership and gaol ed. The new An Phoblacht editor was gaol ed the following month and again the following year for IRA membership. It also seems that leading figures in today's Sinn Fein hold, or have held, leading positions in the Provisional IRA. In the early 1970's McGuinness and Adams commanded the Derry and Belfast Brigades respectively. The importance of Adams to the Provisional IRA can also be gauged from its demand that Adams be released from internment to participate in direct negotiations with the British. (McGuinness also took part in these negotiations.) Barrie Penrose, of the Sunday Times, claims that in August 1985 Adams resumed the position of Chief-of-Staff of the Provisional IRA, a position he had held in the early 1970's. Penrose also argues that McGuinness was the man Adams replaced. Undoubtedly, the Provisionals do maintain a tight control over Sinn Fein, which they are able to use as a valuable overt propaganda outlet.

Any awareness shown by the Provisionals of the sensitivities within a particular group is a good indicator that the Provisionals assess this group to be a potentially sympathetic audience. The Provisionals have, on occasion, shown some degree of sensitivity to the doctrines of the Catholic church. For example, McGuire admits that the prospect of an arms deal with a communist country caused concern among some Provisionals;

if things did go wrong, how would the Irish people both inside and outside the movement react to the Provisionals making an arms deal with a Communist country?


78 The Australian, 5:8:85. See also Sunday Times, 19:5:85 for a reference to McGuinness as Chief-of-Staff.

79 McGuire, op. cit., p. 45.
Similarly the issue of abortion reveals that Sinn Fein is prepared to consider Catholic sensitivities. Legalised abortion was adopted by Sinn Fein as part of its social and economic programme in the early 1980’s, but was later unceremoniously dumped as it was felt too many people would find it offensive.80

Time and time again the Catholic hierarchy has condemned the actions of the Provisionals. While the Provisionals ignore these condemnations, they still feel the need to argue that not all Catholic clergy are so condemnatory of them:

... it must be pointed out that there are several well known clergymen - just as well versed in Catholic theology as Bishops Daly and Philbin - who have made no secret of their support for the IRA. Several of them have suffered and still suffer for their principles - men like Fr. Patrick Fell and Br. Bartholomew Burns. The stance of these clerics and the absence of any precise church pronounciation on the IRA make it clear that those Roman Catholics who condemn the IRA are not acting on behalf of the church but are merely voicing personal opinions and conclusions.81

Many individual Provisional IRA members are well known for their religious piety, an attribute that is actively encouraged.82 However, historical tradition and societal structures predetermine the Provisionals’ sympathetic audience; no extenuous ideological analysis by the Provisionals is needed to identify it.

_Ideological Appeal_

From Chapter 2 it should be apparent that the Provisionals have a rich historical tradition to call upon. It is essentially this historical tradition that is the basis for most of the propaganda directed at the sympathetic audience. The bitter civil war in Ireland which followed the 1916 rebellion is still within living memory, as is the harshness of the Dublin government towards the IRA in the 1940’s and 1960’s. However, with the failure of the IRA’s border campaign in 1957-1962, the Irish national question faded from the

80 See Clarke, _op. cit._, p. 230.
81 O’Riain, _op. cit._, p. 29.
political arena in the Republic. The IRA’s re-emergence in 1969 certainly seemed to catch at least some members of the Dublin government off-guard. At any event, the popular disturbances in Northern Ireland at this time concerned civil rights, not a united Ireland. For the IRA to initiate any sort of campaign, it needed to interpret the situation in Northern Ireland in terms of the old struggle to free Ireland from English rule. Therefore it is not surprising to find propaganda overflowing with historical reference points and comparisons, especially with the 1916-1922 period. For example, the *Ardoyne Freedom Fighter*, with its copious references to the excesses of the Black and Tans, was designed to draw comparisons with the brutal anti-Catholic behaviour of the contemporary British army.

Catholics were encouraged to see themselves as oppressed slaves who should fight their way out of slavery just as Patrick Pearse recommended;

I should like to see any and everybody of Irish citizens armed. We must accustom ourselves to the sight of arms, to the use of arms. We may make mistakes in the beginning and shoot the wrong people; but bloodshed is a cleansing and sanctifying thing, and the nation that regards it as the final horror has lost its manhood. THERE ARE MANY THINGS MORE HORRIBLE THAN BLOODSHED; AND SLAVERY IS ONE OF THEM.

The men and women of all generations in Ireland who have fought against British rule have provided "our glorious heritage" and to "follow in their footsteps is at once an obligation, a privilege, and an inspiration." Historical appeals are still found consistently in *An Phoblacht/Republican News* and the analogy with the present situation is emphasised;

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83 Not for long though. Bowyer Bell claims that by August 1969, "the Dublin government appeared to be following a policy of a tacit alliance with the Provos for the defence of Northern Catholics and some suspected in hopes of a United Ireland." Bowyer Bell, op. cit., p. 370.

84 *Ardoyne Freedom Fighter*, Belfast 1972. (F/4.5)


There is little doubt that recent IRA operations ... evoked memories of Tom Barry's IRA freedom fighters driving the British out of the twenty-six counties and people can be confident that today's IRA will push the British out of the rest of Ireland.87

The history of Ireland, argue the Provisionals, shows that there will be no peace until the British leave, and that increased repression or even execution cannot deter the Provisional IRA. The IRA and its true descendants the Provisional IRA, did not disappear after 1916 when they executed the leaders and interned thousands and nor did it in 1981 when they executed ten republicans on a hunger-strike in Long Kesh after years at the hands of a barbarous brutal prison system which had inflicted repression and torture at will.88

The same reference points are used in propaganda directed towards Irish communities living abroad. In relation to the American audience, McGuire gives one of the best examples of the Provisionals' awareness of playing to the audience:

There should be copious references to the martyrs of 1916 and 1920-22 - the period most of the audience would be living in. Anti-British sentiment, recalling Cromwell, the potato famine, and the Black and Tans, could be profitably exploited. By no means should anything be said against the Catholic Church. and all references to socialism should be strictly avoided - tell them by all means that the Ireland we are fighting for would be free and united, but say nothing about just what form the new free and united Ireland would take.89

Another example of the Provisionals playing to American sensitivities was the painting out of a Belfast wall mural depicting the Provisionals and the PLO in "one struggle".

The frequent references to Ireland's historic battle for self-determination and independence are coupled with appeals for a lost 'identity' and a lost language. The Irish language is heavily promoted in the pages of An Phoblacht/Republican News, and Sinn Fein claim to be striving for a situation where "the Irish language will become the every day language of the people."90 At the 1983 Ard Fheis, Gerry Adams told the delegates

88 ibid., 3:4:86.
89 McGuire, op. cit., p. 108.
"'Better broken Irish than clever English.' If you have Irish, no matter how little or how poor, use it."\textsuperscript{91} Other aspects of Irish culture stressed within the pages of An Phoblacht/Republican News include the activities of the Gaelic Athletic Association, and traditional folk and dance evenings. Musical tributes and laments have always been a prominent part of republican culture, and traditional as well as new songs are frequently circulated. (In August 1984, two songs written by hunger striker Bobby Sands were recorded by Dublin singer Christy Moore and sold nearly 20,000 copies.\textsuperscript{92}) Stressing a distinct culture alongside historic appeals is important for the Provisionals to encourage people north and south of the border to see themselves as culturally distinct from the English, and to prevent the Irish from becoming totally submerged in American 'pop culture'. (American 'soap' operas are as popular in Ireland as anywhere else, as is American 'pop' music. Also, as stated earlier, British television and radio are very easily accessible in the Republic whereas the Republic's broadcasting service, Radio Telefís Eireann, is not so readily available in the north of Ireland, at least not uniformly.)

However, while the English presence in Ireland may be wrong, and while there may be no real peace in Ireland while it remains, the Provisionals still need to convince the sympathetic audience that their strategy of violence is the correct one. Violence is justified in three closely related themes, which can be compared to the RAF's justifications for violence. Firstly, that violence is morally right. Secondly, that violence is defensive. And thirdly, that violence is necessary because no other method will bring the desired results.

The 'justness' of their cause, the Provisionals believe, gives them the moral right to engage in violent actions. There can, they argue,

be no simple equation drawn between the violence of the oppressor and the violence of the oppressed. The people and the people's army have a perfect right to strike back at the mercenary invader. This means that the

\textsuperscript{91} An Phoblacht/Republican News, 17:11:83.
\textsuperscript{92} Belfast Telegraph, 25:8:84.
IRA has every moral and political right to shoot dead any Brit. Whereas the Brits have no right to even set foot here, let alone carry out their current campaign of terrorism against the people.93

During the 1983 Ard Fheis, Gerry Adams claimed that the armed struggle is a "morally correct form of resistance in the six counties."94 Within this armed struggle the Provisionals enthusiastically present themselves as defenders of the Roman Catholic community. As will be pointed out in Chapter 7, this was a profitable role for the Provisional IRA, and the levels of sympathetic support markedly increased when events could be interpreted with it in this defensive role. (Two examples of this would be ‘Bloody Sunday’ and after the death of Sean Downes who was killed by a plastic bullet in August 1984.) To compound their defensive image the Provisionals accuse all other sections of the Irish community of being inadequate. The ability of the IRA to defend Catholics during the disturbances of 1969 is another reason cited by the Provisionals for their formation.95 The Dublin government, headed at that time by Jack Lynch, was also criticised:

Mr. Lynch and his cronies stood idly by while our homes were burned to the ground. He stood idly by while our men and boys were slaughtered. He guaranteed us nothing but continued heartbreak. ... He remained aloof of our horrors as men and boys were hauled off into internment camps and the brutalities which followed this cruelty. The death of young boys, priests and women do not seem to impress on this man the terrible time we are experiencing.96

There was, of course, no hope that the British army would protect the Catholics as they were now joining with the RUC in actively persecuting Catholics. It is in the Provisionals’ interests to keep the sectarian tension in Northern Ireland high, which they do with their constant attacks on the security forces. They can then hold themselves in readiness to defend the people if the implied ‘Protestant backlash’ eventuates. The Provisionals’ role "in this type of scenario would be first and foremost to provide an

93 Republican News, 24:12:77.
95 See Bowyer Bell op. cit., p. 369.
adequate defence for our people ... We are confident of our ability to do so."97 Similarly because past "loyalist protests have turned into full-scale attacks on people in nationalist areas ... we mobilised our volunteers in a number of areas to provide a defensive cover."98

However, by no stretch of the imagination can all of the Provisional IRA’s actions be described as defensive. Many of its offensive actions it tries to justify in terms of a war situation. British soldiers for example, while on duty in Northern Ireland are never "innocent".99 It will also claim that adequate warnings are given, so that any resulting deaths are the result of the inadequacies of the security forces. Even when the Provisionals recognise that their warnings are inadequate, it is still the fault of the British. This line of reasoning was evident after a particularly horrific incident in February 1978, in which twelve people were incinerated. The Provisionals’ statement of responsibility said,

[t]here is nothing we can offer in mitigation bar that our enquiries have established that a nine-minute warning was given to the RUC. This was proved totally inadequate given the disastrous consequences. We accept condemnation and criticism from only two sources: from the relatives and friends of those who were accidentally killed and from our supporters who have rightly and severely criticised us ... 100

However, the vast majority of people, outside these two groups, must concede that "[a]ll killings stem from British interference and from their denial of Irish sovereignty."101 Similarly in August 1985, when the Provisional IRA murdered two men, one of whom was a republican supporter and the other mistaken for a member of the security forces, An Phoblacht/Republican News told its readers that they must remember that these deaths "have taken place against the background of an undemocratic state maintained in Ireland

98 ibid., 6:3:86.
101 ibid.
by Britain's military might." 102 As will be discussed in Chapter 7, these spurious justifications of violence are generally rejected by the Provisional IRA's sympathetic audience. It is also considered that such actions and their justification have more relevance to the internal dynamics of the Provisional IRA, which will be considered in the next chapter.

Like the RAF, the Provisional IRA also uses the argument that nothing else will work to justify its violence. Synonymous with this is a fervent rejection of any other political group's ability to represent the nationalist community. Included in this are two groups which use, or have used, violence; the Official IRA (IRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).

The rejection of any sort of constitutional road to a united Ireland is based on historical grounds. According to Gerry Adams,

"[t]here are those who tell us that the British will not be moved by armed struggle. As has been said before, the history of Ireland and of British colonial involvement throughout the world tells us that they will not be moved by anything else."

103

Owen Carron at Bobby Sands' funeral declared "we must take what they [the British] will not give, and there is no way freedom can be given and then maintained except by armed men."

104 Following from this, anyone who advocates a constitutional or non-violent approach is utterly condemned. Bearing the brunt of this type of attack by the Provisionals are the political parties of Dublin, London and particularly the SDLP in Northern Ireland.

103 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 17:11:83. See also quote at footnote 83, page 122, Chapter 4.
104 Irish News, 8:8:81. Incidentally, Carron is now sought by British police in connection with the Brighton bomb.
In rejecting anything other than armed struggle, the Provisionals once again revert to history. The argument is that each time republicans put their faith in constitutional politics they were out-manoeuvered and blatantly disregarded by the British. The last and most significant time was the acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. History proved that the 'stepping stone' theory of Collins had failed and the British were still in Ireland. Now there is no room for compromise because

each time we compromised in our struggle for independence, we succeeded in doing nothing but bringing destruction and death on our country, and handing on to a new generation an unfinished struggle for freedom, which the young men and women, in their turn, had to pay for in rivers of blood.105

Thus any demands for peace are "reactionary rubbish," as they in no way advance the "freedom struggle."106 The last legitimate government of Ireland recognised by the Provisionals is the 'Second Dail', which met in 1921. On this basis, the Provisionals remind people that "Stormont, Westminster and the Dail Eireann have no right to direct the destiny of the Irish people,"107 and furthermore, "neither Heath Lynch nor Faulkner have the authority to speak on behalf of any section of the IRISH PEOPLE."108 Singled out for special attention is the predominantly Catholic SDLP. McGuire records the significance of the SDLP;

We knew too that we had to compete for their [the Roman Catholic community] sympathy with other groups - most notably the SDLP, whose continual manoeuvrings preoccupied the Provisional leadership more even than the military posturing of the Loyalist UDA.109

The Provisionals still consider themselves to be in direct political opposition to the SDLP, and claim that constitutional nationalism is "a misnomer - a contradiction in terms."110 Members of the SDLP and their supporters have been physically abused by

106 ibid., 24:12:77.
110 Interview with Mr. E. Howell, Sinn Fein, 21:7:86.
the Provisionals,111 and they have been condemned as Britain's "nationalist ally."112 In 1971, Republican News advised its readers in the following terms:

We strongly recommend every decent person to completely ostracise and boycott the Stormont members of the SDLP, they must be shunned in public and in private. ... we can make it very clear to them that they stink and that they represent no-one but themselves.113

As will be seen in Chapter 7, Sinn Fein has, at times, been successful in attracting support away from the SDLP, but this is very much issue-related, and the SDLP has, in the main, been successful in regaining this support.

Equally strong rejections are made of the Official IRA and the INLA. The Provisionals were soon denying the Officials, from whom they had split in 1970, any legitimacy as representatives of the Irish people;

The people who have pledged their allegiance to CATHAL GOULDING [Chief of Staff] and his CRONIES have no right whatsoever to speak on behalf of the people of the Ardoyne or ANY IRISH PERSON.114

This battle of legitimacy revolves around the issue of which group carries the historical continuity of the Republican movement.115 The Provisionals accused the Officials of Marxism, and of abandoning cherished republican principles such as abstentionism. In advocating participation in the electoral processes, both north and south of the border, the Provisionals accused the Officials of betrayal.116 The Officials, on the other hand, accused the Provisionals of being unsophisticated sectarian thugs. This legitimacy battle spilled over into a physical battle in October 1975, when the Provisionals began to shoot members of the Officials. Rory O'Brady of the Provisionals claimed that the Officials,

111 See Clarke, op. cit., pp. 131-132 and 151.
112 Interview with Mr. E. Howell, Sinn Fein, 21:7:86.
113 Republican News, 6:2:71.
114 Ardoyne Freedom Fighter, Belfast: 1972. Emphasis in original. (F/4.51)
115 See "Join the IRA" reproduced as appendix I.
116 Somewhat hypocritically in view of the Provisional IRA's current stance of theoretical participation in the Dail.
like "communists all over the world", were trying to gain control of the streets. But so were the Provisionals, and this battle for control of the streets and their lucrative ‘businesses’ is as much a contributor to the feud as any ideological difference.

The Irish National Liberation Army also emerged from a split with the Officials, and was also involved in a feud with the Officials in early 1975. The Provisionals, perhaps seeing a chance to join in an attack on the Officials, certainly aided their INLA colleagues. Coogan suggests that they may also have engaged in joint ventures against the British enemy. But by 1986, the Provisionals were calling for the INLA to disband, saying they were "a group of people who, for personal financial benefit are masquerading as Republicans." By the end of 1986, another feud had broken out within the INLA between a Provisionals-backed faction who favoured disbanding the organisation and those who wished it to continue.

The Provisional IRA has used many issues in an attempt to broaden its base of support within the Roman Catholic community. The vast majority of these come under the generic headings of either Sinn Fein or prisoners. Two other issues, however, will also be discussed; civil rights and the Provisionals’ self appointed role as community ‘police’. Included in the later, are intimidatory tactics used by the Provisionals to discourage behaviour which they perceive as disadvantaging them, or in some way a threat to the internal integrity of their organisation.

**Deepening the Sea - Civil Rights**

In many respects the outbreak of civil rights agitation and sectarian rioting in Northern Ireland in 1969 was not to the IRA’s advantage. Firstly, as stated earlier, the issues involved were one man one vote and the fair allocation of state housing - not a

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united Ireland. Secondly, the Roman Catholic community was looking to the British army for protection, not the IRA. And finally, the IRA itself was unsure how to react to these events and was, anyhow, preoccupied with its own problems, and its latest tactic of attacking foreign landowners in the Republic. However, by July 1969, posters had begun to appear in the traditional Republican stronghold of Dundalk (just south of the border) appealing for volunteers. In August, Chief-of-Staff, Cathal Goulding, warned that IRA units were active in the north and a special northern command was set up. Both wings of the IRA then moved to infiltrate the civil rights movement, particularly the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA);

local Republicans should immediately set up local CR branches in cooperation with NICRA ... They should contact CR HQ where they can get the names of non-Republicans who will be interested in co-operation with them ... \(^{120}\)

As the IRA became more involved with the civil rights movement, so Unionist opposition to civil rights mounted. (In the meantime all the original demands of the movement had been implemented, or were in the process of being implemented.) Also by this stage the IRA and particularly the Provisionals had succeeded in casting the British army in the traditional role of enemy, aided immeasurably by the introduction of internment. The focus of the civil rights movement was then turned to the ‘Smash Stormont’ campaign. This was a successful theme for the Provisionals, as they were able to exploit an alliance involving not only the NICRA but also the SDLP, which freed the Provisionals’ leaders of any need to formulate or explain policy. (It also enabled them to exploit the credibility of spokespeople to reach audiences the Provisional IRA spokespeople could not. See Chapter 4.)

The establishment of Direct Rule from Westminster in March 1972, removed the basis for the ‘Smash Stormont’ campaign, and also marked the beginning of a ‘lean’ period for the Provisionals in terms of any measure of popular support. By the end of

\(^{120}\) *The Bulletin*, Belfast: Official Republican Movement, 1971. (F.34)
1972, the Provisionals had been forced to abandon the ‘no-go’ areas established in Londonderry, and the security forces were beginning to make inroads into the organisation. This and a lack of funds, rather than any desire to comply with popular feeling, were the contributing factors to the 1975 decision to engage in a cease fire. During 1976, the Provisionals’ position within the Roman Catholic community was further eroded by the immensely popular and spontaneous Peace Movement, which arose after the deaths of three young children. Also in 1976, the Republic moved against the Provisionals, introducing the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act 1976, which, in short, allowed for prosecution in the Republic of terrorist offences committed in Great Britain or Northern Ireland. Clearly from the Provisionals’ point of view some major innovation was called for. This came in the form of the 1977 reorganisation mentioned earlier, and led directly to the higher profile of Sinn Fein from about this date. However, before discussing the use of Sinn Fein, another type of propaganda directed by the Provisionals towards the sympathetic audience needs to be considered. Again societal structures and the internal dynamics of the Provisional IRA make this an area which is not directly comparable to RAF propaganda.

**Community Control**

Up until 1977, the Provisional IRA operated in a conventional military structure of brigades, battalions and companies which made it difficult to maintain internal security, a fact that was recognised in the 1977 reorganisation document.\(^{121}\) The compactness of the communities also made it difficult to prevent a flow of sensitive information, and, to compound all this, informers were a perennial problem for the IRA and the Provisionals. So the Provisionals had to establish a degree of control over the community, which sometimes took the form of outright intimidation, and other times was dressed up with the Provisionals in the role of community ‘police’.

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\(^{121}\) Clarke, *op.cit.*, p.251.
The Provisionals have not been slow to name individuals or organisations they feel are not supporting the cause actively enough. For example, teachers at a Belfast school were criticised for not joining in a protest against internment by donating a day’s salary to the Detainees’ Dependent Fund:

One school in the ARDOYNE AREA is noticeable in its absence from this Protest. SAINT GABRIELS, CRUMLIN ROAD. Perhaps the staff in this school are in agreement with the introduction of INTERNMENT or maybe they are poorer than everyone else. We wonder?122

(Later the Provisionals issued a rather muted apology, when further information revealed that Saint Gabriels not only had taken part in the protest, but was instrumental in organising it.123) The Provisionals will attempt to dress up this sort of action by claiming that they are dealing with people who engage in ‘anti-social’ behaviour, from joy riding to drugs abuse. As early as 1971, the Provisionals were claiming to have smashed a drug ring, warning others that they would "be sought out ... and they themselves punished in an appropriate fashion."124 The "appropriate fashion" usually took the form of shooting individual ‘offenders’ in the knees, ankles or elbows. In 1983, the Provisionals claimed that they were abandoning punishment shootings for anti-social behaviour saying "[t]he IRA accepts that punishment shooting of young offenders has outlived its usefulness, and now favours a socially involved solution to the problem."125 But by 1985, the Provisional IRA was again engaging in punishment shootings. In December 1985, the Provisionals shot Belfast man Brendan Healy in both legs, and issued a statement claiming

Healy was one of those named by the IRA on August 22nd and given 48 hours to leave Belfast ... We will not tolerate people who try to fool us ... and we will continue to take physical action against these thugs.126

123 ibid.
By 1986, the Provisionals were claiming the right to execute "a 'hard core' of organised crime."127 In the same statement they claimed that a young joy rider had died only because he attempted to disarm the men who had come to shoot him in the legs.128 In late 1986 and early 1987, some local youths criticised the Provisionals for their actions against local people, and threatened retaliation. One of those involved in this was 19 years old Sean McCartan, who was seized by masked men at a social club, pushed onto the stage, and an announcement made that he was going to be killed. Minutes later he was shot in both kneecaps. The same evening, two other teenagers were the subjects of punishment shootings; one was shot in both legs and the other in the stomach.129

Over the past eighteen years countless members of the Roman Catholic community have been 'tarred and feathered', injured or murdered. (Eamon Hanna of the SDLP suggested that more Catholics have been murdered by the IRA than by all the so-called forces of oppression put together.130) So, while direct appeals for support are certainly aimed at the Roman Catholic community, clearly there is also the threat of violence, if at least tacit support is not given. In terms of a terrorist group's survival this is sufficient, as refusals to co-operate with the security forces produce the same result whether the refusal is motivated positively, through identification with the cause, or negatively through fear.

The Provisional IRA has over the years, and particularly over the past seven or eight, built up quite a power base in certain areas of Northern Ireland. It is hoped to show below that this coincides directly with the rise to prominence of Sinn Fein and individuals such as Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and Danny Morrison. Sinn Fein has become active in local political arenas, something which is comparatively new for it, and the value of which is not universally accepted within the Provisional IRA. However,

127 ibid., 2:1:86.
128 ibid.
130 Interview with author, 16:7:86.
there can be little doubt that the use of Sinn Fein has yielded positive results for the Provisional IRA, and it is to its use that we now turn.

_Sinn Fein_

The involvement of the IRA in politics has always raised considerable and emotional debate within the republican movement. The current rise of Sinn Fein has much to do with internal power struggles, which will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. It is also thought that Sinn Fein's current status owes much to the aftermath of the 1981 hunger strike (discussed below). However, the beginnings of Sinn Fein's rise to prominence lie in the mid-1970's, and coincide with the powerful northern personalities of Adams, McGuinness and Morrison, who became editor of _Republican News_ in 1975. As mentioned earlier Sinn Fein was incorporated into the 1977 reorganisation of the Provisional IRA. As well as coming under "Army control at all levels," Sinn Fein should be directed to infiltrate other organisations to win support for, and sympathy to, the movement, Sinn Fein should be re-educated and have a big role to play in publicity and propaganda depts, complaints and problems ... It gains the respect of the people which in turn leads to increased support for the cell.\textsuperscript{131}

A serious reassessment of the Provisional IRA's policy of abstaining from the political processes of both the Republic and Britain, as well as any functioning Northern Ireland assembly, began in 1981, and was no doubt prompted by the electoral victories of first Bobby Sands and then Owen Carron. The Ard Fheis of that year saw a discussion and a recognition "with very few dissenting voices, that a more positive approach needs to be adopted to standing republican candidates in elections."\textsuperscript{132} The same Ard Fheis then went on to decide that although no successful republican candidates would take their seats in the Dail or Westminster, they would take their seats on local councils, and would consider their position in regard to the forthcoming European elections.

\textsuperscript{131} Quoted in Clarke, _op. cit._, p. 253.

\textsuperscript{132} _An Phoblacht/Republican News_, 5:11:81.
By 1983, and significantly with Gerry Adams now president, the decision had been taken to contest the European election on an attendance basis. Adams, in his first presidential address, said that the mid to late 1970's had been a period when "anti-imperialist politics had become, to a large extent, isolated and restricted to its active base." He claimed that this realisation led to the conscious reorientation of Sinn Fein towards an electoral strategy and the orientation of our policies towards the radical roots of our republican ideology. ... It became clear to many that it was no longer sufficient to be passive supporters of the IRA and more and more people realised that ... they ... as republicans or republican supporters had a duty and a responsibility to establish alternatives to all the other facets of British involvement on this island.

Although Adams claimed at this stage that he had no intention of taking Sinn Fein into the Dublin parliament, this was due to the fact that he had not yet the necessary degree of control over the Army Council to make such a move. By 1986, however, Adams had succeeded in abolishing abstentionism as regards Leinster House, but Sinn Fein failed dismally to win any seats.

Meanwhile the process of involvement at local levels continued, and was claimed as a resounding success by the leadership. At the 1985 Ard Fheis Adams argued that it was this continued consolidation of our base and the obvious potential for further expansion which the British and Irish establishments perceive as confirmation of their worst fears about the political threat which Irish republicanism represents to their interests.

Sinn Fein has become involved in a wide range of community services and issues. It will arrange transport for pensioners and parties for under-privileged children. Mainly through its advice centres, of which dozens were established after Adams' election to Westminster, Sinn Fein offers information on state benefits and how to claim for them.

133 ibid., 17:11:83.
134 ibid.
135 ibid., 7:11:85.
At the local council level, Sinn Fein will agitate for improved housing, street lighting and other rates issues. That these sorts of activities have gained Sinn Fein votes is admitted by it, and conceded by the SDLP and the Official Unionists. 136

**Prisoners**

Prisoners and hunger strikes are nothing new to the republican movement, with names such as O'Donovan Rossa and Terence MacSwiney a prominent part of republican history and mythology. But in terms of the Provisional IRA's campaign, no event was more successful in attracting attention and short term gains than the 1981 hunger strike with its ten deaths. The election and subsequent death of Bobby Sands even brought the Provisionals the long sought-after recognition by a foreign government, that of Iran. Because the 1981 hunger strike provides an excellent example of the use of a single issue to broaden support, it is proposed to devote the rest of this section to it and the build-up to it.

Like the RAF, the Provisionals' propaganda concerning prisoners centred around allegations of mistreatment and improper conditions, and the demand to be treated as political offenders. Often printed in the pages of Republican News and later An Phoblacht/Republican News were letters smuggled out of the prisons, complaining of beatings and thefts by prison staff. 137 In 1975 Republican News carried a statement complaining about the authorities' refusal to grant compassionate parole;

Only a fortnight before Christmas a Republican prisoner was denied parole to visit his dying mother. The question of compassionate parole has figured largely in many protests carried out by Republican prisoners over the years. In April '74, a hunger strike was undertaken. The denial of compassionate parole has been used by the jail authorities as a callous weapon in its arsenal of oppression. 138

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136 Interviews with Mr. E. Howell, Sinn Fein, 21:7:86, Mr. E. Hanna, SDLP, 16:7:86, and Mr. K. Maginnis, Official Unionists, 31:7:86 respectively.
137 "Letter smuggled out of Long Kesh," Linenhall collection. (F/2.39)
Another aspect of the prison regime to be criticised in such emotional terms was "the tortuous indignity of strip-searches." 139

Republicans who were confined under the conditions of internment were in many respects held as political prisoners, in that they were permitted free association, exemption from any work and to wear their own clothing. Even those terrorists brought before the courts and sentenced were granted ‘special category’ status. (A hunger strike had been undertaken to achieve this, but its actual granting had more to do with developments outside the prisons.) The British were later to argue that the granting of ‘special category’ status had been a mistake, and rescinded it in 1976. From then on all convicted terrorists were to be treated as ordinary criminals. This caused the Provisionals some internal problems, (discussed in the next chapter) and led to the ‘blanket protest’ with accompanying demands for treatment as political prisoners.

Prisoners on the ‘blanket protest’ refused to wear prison clothing, and eventually escalated the protest to a point where prisoners were deliberately fouling their cells with their own urine and excrement. With one major exception,140 the Provisionals were not very successful in gaining media coverage of this protest, and in general most people agreed with the European Commission on Human Rights assessment of the situation;

the protest campaign was designed and co-ordinated by the prisoners to create the maximum public sympathy for their political aims. That such a strategy involved self-inflicted debasement and humiliation to an almost sub-human degree must be taken into account.141

140 In October 1978, a US journalist for the United Features Syndicate was refused permission to enter the H-Blocks. As a result the article syndicated to 800 US newspapers contained the impression that the conditions of filth were deliberately imposed by the British and contained calls for US action. After this the Northern Ireland Office abandoned its policy of keeping journalists out of the prison.
141 Four protesting prisoners took their case for political status to the European Commission on Human Rights at the end of 1979. The Commission ruled that the prisoners had no case for political status. Quoted in Clarke, op. cit., p. 115.
However, some sections of Irish society, both north and south, were understandably concerned about the horrific situation in some of the H-Block cells. In June 1978, Archbishop (now Cardinal) O'Fiach visited the H-Blocks and compared the situation to "hundreds of homeless people living in the sewer pipes of Calcutta." Meanwhile the Provisionals and Sinn Fein, who were becoming increasingly involved in the protest, saw a golden opportunity to link concern about conditions within the prisons with demands for treatment as political prisoners. In 1976, with the Provisionals' backing, Relatives Action Committees were set up to publicise the situation in the H-Blocks. Their demands were:

that political status should be retained and extended to all who are in jail because of their opposition to British interference in Irish affairs. We further demand that there should be a total amnesty for all Irish political prisoners. We finally demand the withdrawal of all British troops from Ireland and the re-establishment of a 32 county Republic as proclaimed in Easter 1916.

But by 1979, these demands were softened at the insistence of Sinn Fein to what it felt encapsulated the essence of political status, but at the same time would enable the building of a broader coalition of people concerned about the conditions in prison. The resultant 'five demands' became the centre of the ensuing hunger strikes.

In the prisons themselves however, the 'blanket protest' was beginning to lose momentum, and as stated earlier, it really failed to make any sort of national or international agenda. The British government had announced some concessions, but declared that political status was non-negotiable. As a response, the Provisionals in May 1980, announced that the Prisoner of War department would be made into a full time

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142 Archbishop O’Fiach quoted in Clarke, *ibid.*, p. 94.
144 The five demands were for: 1) exemption from wearing prison clothing; 2) exemption from prison work; 3) freedom of association with fellow political prisoners; 4) the right to organise educational and recreational facilities, to have one weekly visit, to receive and send out one letter per week and to receive one parcel per week; and 5) entitlement to full remission of sentence.
position, and that the H-Blocks issue was their top priority. Accordingly more resources were devoted to this issue, and the Provisionals did succeed in prompting a short burst of rioting in August. But in reality the propaganda value of the ‘blanket protest’ was declining just as the Provisionals were devoting more resources to it. The solution, of course, was to ‘up the ante’, and a hunger strike began on the 27 October.

Within the H-Blocks, preparations for a hunger strike were already underway with "200 to 300 letters a week ... leaving the prison for publicity purposes." There is also some evidence that not all this publicity was genuine in its source, with some of it actually being produced by Sinn Fein. The selection of those prisoners to go on hunger strike was in itself a propaganda exercise. There were to be seven, like the seven of 1916, and their home areas were taken into consideration in order to attract the widest interest and sympathy possible. The type of ‘crime’ committed by the hunger strikers was also taken into consideration. This was to prevent any negation of the propaganda value by the media presenting orphans, widows or other victims of Provisional IRA violence. This strike was ended in December 1980 without any deaths. But the prisoners accused the British government of not honouring the terms under which the strike had been settled, and on March 1 1981, Bobby Sands resumed the strike. It was estimated that his condition would become critical around the highly significant time of Easter.

An unexpected chance to bring further attention to the hunger strikes was a Westminster by-election in the strongly divided constituency of Fermanagh/South Tyrone, for which Sands was nominated. The election campaign reveals how the Provisionals both played themselves down and used other people to attract support that they normally would not receive. Firstly, Sands stood under the banner of ‘Anti H-Block Armagh Political Prisoner’. And secondly, much of the literature distributed contained endorsements of one sort or another from Bernadette McAliskey (nee Devlin), Tom

145 Clarke, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
146 *ibid.*, p. 130.
Murray (SDLP), Neil Blaney (member of the Irish parliament, who was also involved in a 1970 arms trial with the current Irish Prime Minister, Charles Haughey) and Noel Maguire, the death of whose brother had caused the by-election. A vote for Sands, it was argued, would save his life and those of three other men who had by this stage joined the hunger strike. 147

Sands’ success in this election has been attributed to several factors, including the failure of the SDLP to field a candidate, thus leaving the nationalist people in the area the choice between Sands and a Unionist, and widespread intimidation and personation. While these things are undoubtedly contributory, it must also be said that Sands’ election demonstrates the ability of the Provisionals to attract support from a large number of people who would ordinarily be revolted by their actions. This was possible because the Provisionals were able to focus exclusively on one issue in the emotive atmosphere of the hunger strike.

Sands’ election, however, did not resolve the H-Blocks issue and he died on 5 May. Widespread rioting followed his death, and the Provisionals began to make their presence felt by increasing sectarian tension and warning that the ‘Protestant backlash’ would now come. 148 Back in the prison Sands had left nine more men on hunger strike, who were all to die before it ended.

The hunger strikes and the deaths resulting from them undoubtedly brought benefits to the Provisional IRA. By 1982 it was claiming

the heroism of the hunger-strikers caused a reawakening of national consciousness and an increase in passive support for the IRA ... Of course the IRA and the Republican movement has benefited in terms of resistance, recruitment and support and this will become visible over the next two years ... 149

147 Linenhall collection.
149 ibid., 1:4:82.
As stated above, the benefits to Sinn Fein certainly became visible, but the benefits to the active component of the Provisional IRA are not so clear, and it is to propaganda directed inwards towards the active volunteer that we now turn.
CHAPTER SIX
THE ACTIVE AUDIENCE

This final chapter of Part II is concerned with propaganda directed towards the active volunteer. The term ‘active’ specifically refers to those engaging in violent actions, or logistical operations designed to support violent actions, such as bank robberies, kidnapping or extortion. Two points about the limitations of this chapter need to be stressed at the outset. Firstly, its seemingly more speculative nature is necessitated by the fact that most of the relevant data are just not available. Terrorists rarely permit observers at their meetings, and do not permit or encourage questions or investigations into the running of their organisations. Internal communiques from one member of a terrorist cell to another do not usually survive to be examined by the researcher, journalist or intelligence officer, although a few have become public after raids by the security forces - the Provisional IRA reorganisation document of 1977 being a good example. Other internal communiques which are available usually exist because the terrorist organisation, for its own reasons, wants them to, and therefore must be treated with caution. Nonetheless, there are certain aspects of public propaganda that do have inward looking implications. Also an examination of this type of propaganda can reveal clues as to how the active part of the organisation works, and evidence of power struggles or feuds within it.

1 A good example of this is the voluminous correspondence between Provisional IRA hunger strikers and the outside leadership, some of which is housed in Belfast's Linenhall Library. From the Provisionals point of view, public knowledge of these letters, some of which were printed in An Phoblacht/Republican News, had several propaganda advantages. They demonstrated that the prison security system could be circumvented, and the references to prison officer brutality and to the declining health of the hunger strikers could be used to provoke public sympathy. They could also be used to dispel accusations that the hunger strikers were being manipulated and sacrificed by the Provisionals' leadership.
The second limitation of this chapter concerns individual motivations for becoming an active member of a terrorist cell. As stated earlier, motivation is a complex matter, and analysing such factors as socio-economic background or educational levels is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is apparent that political motivation, as expressed in ideology and propaganda, does have a significant role in overall motivation. While a proportion of a terrorist organisation’s active members may be attracted by a cult of violence or criminal activities, most members are recruited from what this thesis has termed the sympathetic audience. Therefore their motivations will come, at least in part, from the propaganda directed at this group. The active members recruited in this way will have accepted the ideological appeal directed at both the uncommitted and sympathetic audiences. They will have a strong belief in the terrorist organisation’s ideological analysis of the current situation and its disadvantaged groups. Active volunteers obviously agree with the argument that only violence will change the situation and advance the cause. So any further propaganda directed towards the uncommitted and sympathetic audiences will serve the function of repeating and reaffirming the same messages for the active audience. Also it is probable that the process of producing propaganda, writing statements or engaging in military actions, for example, helps reinforce belief in the cause.

Propaganda strategy towards the active volunteer can be summarised neatly as binding individuals to the cause through action, and, once they have traversed the line between legality and illegality, to keep them there. To do this, the individual must become isolated from alternative sources of propaganda; the internal structure and lifestyle of a terrorist organisation facilitates this. Supporting propaganda emphasises the supreme importance of the cause and of the collective over the individual, thus helping resolve any moral dilemma individuals may have about the acts they have committed or will commit. The theme of a ‘war situation’ is dominant, with constant references to a long war and the inevitability of victory. Also, to maintain morale among active volunteers, the terrorist organisation’s treatment of its imprisoned members is vital. It is
essential for volunteers to believe that even if captured they will retain a place in the overall struggle, and that attempts will be made to release them. For the volunteer killed in action there is the promise of martyrdom. These propaganda aspects will be discussed below, and the organisational structure of the two groups under consideration will be briefly described.

THE RED ARMY FACTION

Mahler considered that since the situation was not seen by many as repressive, those who considered themselves revolutionaries could only be bound to the armed struggle by acting outside the law. This would also force the volunteer into a continuation of criminal activities. Leites suggests that this engaging in criminal activities was particularly important for middle-class revolutionaries like the RAF. Acting outside societal norms demonstrated the seriousness of their revolution, as once outside society they could not easily return. It also dismissed charges that revolution was just some sort of a game. In following such a scenario, the organisational structure of the group and its operational procedures obviously play an important role. The propaganda discussed in Chapter 5 will encourage the individual to commit the first illegal act, but after that the terrorist organisation itself must dominate that individual’s very existence.

One source of information regarding a terrorist group’s operating procedures is to examine criticisms by other similarly minded groups. In the German case, criticism comes from two other groups which claimed an ideological affiliation with the RAF. The first of these is the 2 June Movement, which the RAF absorbed in 1980, and the second is a diffuse group known as the Revolutionary Cells (RZ). Both of these groups

2 Horchem, "West Germany’s ..." op. cit., p. 8.
3 Leites, op. cit., p. 6.
have levelled some ideological criticism at the RAF on the basis that its *avant garde* approach is elitist. But mostly it is the RAF’s *modus operandi* that is criticised.

**Organisational Structure**

The RAF’s core of active volunteers has never been very large. In the early 1980’s Horchem estimated this core at ten. For these ten or so life ‘underground’ required a constant supply of false identities, money, cars and ‘safe houses’. Also to prevent capture by security services, active members are forced to curtail severely their societal contacts. In practice this means that the only people active members come into communicative contact with are other active members, or members of the approximately 200 peripheral support group. This produced an elaborately conspiratorial life-style, which the RZ reasoned was one weakness of the RAF’s operating system. Similarly the 2 June Movement claimed that the RAF’s operating system was preventing its progress; ‘[i]t’s not illegality which ‘bars the way to the masses’ but the putrid avant gardism which can result from it.” However, such an operating system is ideal from a propaganda point of view, as it seals the individual off from any outside propaganda source, and makes it easier for the individual to become part of the collective and to view society in terms of ‘black and white’ standards of good and evil. But this is not to say that all actions are immediately accepted by individual members of a terrorist cell, and much of the propaganda directed inwards revolves around refining and furthering the arguments used to justify violence discussed in Chapter 5. There may also be a suggestion of attempting to resolve any feelings of guilt an individual may have over committing a terrorist act. As suggested above, the propaganda in this area concentrates on presenting a war situation.

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4 Horchem, "The Development of West German Terrorism," *op. cit.*, p. 12.
5 *ibid.*
7 Becker argues that for both Meinhof and Ensslin "the moral fervour they brought to bear on what they preferred to call political issues was of the religious crusading kind." Becker, "Another Battle ...," *op. cit.*, p. 99.
More Ideological Justifications

In presenting a case to those who they felt would or should support them, the RAF offered an analysis of society that required violence in order to be changed. The society that they were trying to alter was inherently repressive, with ex-Nazis continuing to occupy prominent places in the societal structure. Those who should be objecting to the fascist, capitalist and imperialist West German state (the workers) were not doing so because they had become so subsumed by capitalism and its consumption terror. This also prevented the West German state from giving support to other peoples in the Third World subject to imperialist aggression, particularly the Vietnamese and the Palestinians, and led to an alliance with the imperialist United States. (Later RAF propaganda linked to the anti-NATO campaign, portrayed West Germany itself as an American colony.)

The Left in West Germany, both parliamentary and extraparliamentary, had failed totally to confront this, or to take any action to change it. Thus it was left to the avant garde, the student bearers of the revolutionary consciousness, to take direct action, the intention of which "was to provoke the state to blatant counterrepression that would turn the population against it." While such reasoning may have been accepted by the active members of the RAF, it is still possible to find significant propaganda emphasising that the RAF does have a social conscience, and further justification of its acts in terms of this.

This could be explained in terms of RAF sensitivities to criticism of its actions by the Left, but Klein dismisses such a consideration. In response to appeals from Left wing groups for the RAF to lay down its arms, the RAF

killed themselves laughing. They don't pay any attention to what the left is doing. One example was the bomb aimed at a leading lawyer in Frankfurt, which exploded right in the middle of a campaign against the

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8 See pages 134-136, Chapter 5.
9 See quote at footnote 13, page 132, Chapter 5.
10 Mahler quoted in Kellen, "Terrorists - What are they Like ...," op. cit., p. 33.
Ministry of Justice that was going really well. It put a stop to everything!11

Klein also goes on to say that as far as the RAF is concerned, "the left doesn’t understand anything."12 So, if such propaganda is not a reaction to criticisms from the Left, then, perhaps, it is designed to serve more inward looking purposes.

Kellen suggests that there are two ways in which the ‘social conscience’ of the terrorist can be manifested;

One is through overall or individual objectives which may, at least in the terrorist’s mind, be political and motivated by social concerns. The other is in the execution of an action, i.e., in deciding who is fair game, and under what circumstances.13

As noted before, a year before her death in 1976, Ulrike Meinhof declared "love for human beings is today only possible in the death-dealing hate-filled attack on imperialism-fascism."14 It is unlikely that this would have been accepted as justification for murder among most of the RAF’s sympathisers; instead it can be seen as the group’s internal reasoning, that the motives behind the act justified it. Similarly, Mahler presents a socially conscious image;

we were quite aware of the fact that if we wanted to fight with arms it would be necessary to kill. ... Of course, it was not ‘the people,’ the little man who is innocent [of] any repression that we would kill. The main point of our struggle was to be some kind of sabotage and punishment of responsible personages for cruelties against the people.15

This statement by Mahler also reveals another aspect of terrorist propaganda which is relayed to the audiences discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, but which also has internal applications, that is, the defensive-reaction theme. Ensslin expressed the situation in

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11 Klein in Bourgereau, op. cit., p. 45-46.
12 ibid., p. 49.
13 Kellen, "Terrorists - What are they Like ....", op. cit., p. 53.
15 Mahler quoted in Kellen, "Terrorists - What are they Like ....", op. cit., p. 33.
defensive terms after the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg,\textsuperscript{16} and after the attempt on the life of student activist Rudi Dutschke, Baumann claimed "it was clear now: HIT THEM, no more pardons."\textsuperscript{17} However, it was not just violent acts that were justified in defensive terms. All acts are explained in terms of the RAF being the avenger of evil, and thus no act committed by the RAF can be criminal. Bank robbery, for example, is justified thus:

Many people say that a bank robbery is not political. But, financing a political organization is a political question. This is how you solve the revolutionary organization's financial problem. It is right because the financial problem could not be solved in any other way. It is tactically right because it is a proletarian action. It is also strategically right because it serves the purpose of financing the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{18}

The implication is clearly that no member of the RAF should feel guilt over any RAF actions, as they are all necessary. But the question of guilt or remorse was taken even further by Georg von Rauch, who was shot by the police in December 1971. According to Lasky, Rauch specified the need for liquidating any feelings of guilt;\textsuperscript{19} "we must be clear about this: that in such situations we must, I must, simply liquidate human feeling."\textsuperscript{20} This, of course, has strong echoes of Sartre's preface to Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, where Sartre argued that the act of murdering a colon had a double liberating effect, in that, the victim has been freed from his role as oppressor, and the culprit attains his freedom in the very act of murder.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{The Inevitability of Victory}

One problem for the RAF is that its actions did not produce the results its theory predicted. The 'revolutionary consciousness' of the people was not raised by its violent actions (some of the reasons why will be discussed in Chapter 7). So the RAF constantly

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} See quote at footnote 36, page 137, Chapter 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Baumann, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 31. (Emphasis in the original.)
  \item \textsuperscript{18} RAF quoted in Wagenlehner, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 196.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} von Rauch quoted \textit{ibid}.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} See Chapter 3.
\end{itemize}
revised the time scale in which the revolution could be brought about. Mahler wrote of a "lengthy" armed struggle in which the enemy must be "progressively enfeebled" before being "finally smashed." He also wrote that the combined effects of RAF actions would produce

a gradual attrition of the enemy's forces, degradation of morale ... the disorganisation and demoralisation of the oppressor's armed forces by a lengthy extenuating small war.

Added to this claim that a lengthy struggle is in store are themes of inevitability of victory and invulnerability of the terrorist group.

Of course as far as the RAF is concerned, the justness of its cause ensures victory (even if what exactly constitutes victory is vague). However the tactics used will also contribute to ultimate victory, and therefore must be maintained. The idea is that if the RAF keeps up its attacks, particularly on the security forces, it will make it increasingly difficult to recruit new policemen or soldiers, thereby exerting further pressure on the system and occasioning its downfall. Mahler explains,

those who see a cushy job in being a policeman or a soldier will increasingly understand the risk which this profession entails under the changed circumstances.

And ultimately, asks Mahler, "[w]here can the state find the tens of thousands of heroes ready to fight under such anxiety." The active volunteer, therefore, must continue his or her actions, and victory will be inevitable.

In terms of encouraging the individual to maintain attacks on the regime, one further point is relevant. In West Germany, as in Ireland, there are seemingly several

22 Mahler, "Kollectiv RAF ...," op. cit., p. 8.
23 ibid., pp. 28-31.
24 ibid., p. 33-34. This argument, almost word for word, was also put forward by the Tupamaros in Uruguay.
25 ibid., p. 42.
autonomous left wing groups operating simultaneously. Although the RAF is clearly the dominant, both ideologically and physically, individual terrorists regarded themselves as belonging to separate groups. Baumann, regarding himself as a member of the 2 June Movement, reveals that there was a certain competition between active groups. Referring to the arson attacks on the department stores in Frankfurt in 1968, he says,

[O]f course, the arson was a matter of competition too; an attempt to claim the vanguard position through praxis. ‘The Vanguard creates itself’ - Che Guevara. Whoever does the heaviest action determines the direction.26

This may be the one example where propaganda from other sources has a significant impact within the terrorist group. As we shall see, this ‘propaganda by deed’ of other groups had an influence on the Provisional IRA. This sort of ‘propaganda by deed’ can influence the active membership of a terrorist group in at least two ways. Firstly, it can send messages to other active terrorist cells to the effect that ‘we are the most determined, organised and effective group.’ And secondly, it can reinforce the morale of the active members by encouraging them to believe that they do, in fact, hold the vanguard position.

**Prisoners**

At times the entire campaign of both the RAF and the Provisional IRA has been focused on prisoners. Aust suggests that from about the beginning of 1975 until the suicides the RAF’s fighting energies, both inside and outside the prison system, were devoted to freeing the prisoners.27 For this reason alone, it is safe to assume that prisoners have an important bearing on propaganda directed inwards as well as outwards. One of the most obvious functions is to assure volunteers still at liberty that the movement will not forget them if they are taken prisoner. Since all imprisoned terrorists were at some stage active volunteers, what happens to them will have a direct impact on

26 Baumann, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
other non-imprisoned volunteers. Also securing the release of prisoners, whether by extortionate means or by escape, has immense morale-boosting value.

Needless to say the terrorist group needs to maintain some hold over the captured volunteer, as he or she will now be subject to other propaganda influences, and may be persuaded or coerced into revealing information about other members or activities. Thus it is not surprising that one of the main demands of imprisoned terrorists, supported by the group as a whole, is segregation from other prisoners and association with each other. Keeping the prisoners involved in the struggle in some way is essential to the continued existence of the group, and therefore the propaganda surrounding prisoners has as much internal as external value.

In maintaining volunteer morale in prison, the RAF had initially an unwitting ally in the West German penal system. The judges responsible for censoring mail and books sent to the prisoners while on remand permitted them to accumulate an impressive library on such subjects as

- the detonation of explosive devices, means of preventing such devices being de-activated, on recent police methods of hunting suspects, on new weapons, alarm systems, industrial security forces, miniaturized spying devices, the construction of police roadblocks, and similar subjects.28

Reading materials on these subjects obviously played a role in maintaining 'revolutionary consciousness', but from a propaganda view point, successful circumventions of the prison system are more important. These demonstrate that the fight can be continued from a prison cell, and that the terrorist organisation can continue to function despite the authorities' efforts to break it.

Towards the end of 1976, the police recovered from the apartment of Elisabeth von Dyck photographs taken inside Stammheim gaol, some of which contained pictures

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28 *ibid.*, p. 251.
of the prisoners themselves. Although this was irrefutable evidence in itself, RAF member Volker Speitel confirmed that a camera had been smuggled into the prisoners in a hollowed out file carried by lawyer Arndt Müller. Speitel also claimed that similar methods were used to smuggle both guns and explosives into the gaol. Several guns and explosives were in fact discovered in RAF members' cells at Stammheim, including a .38-calibre revolver, a Colt Detective Special revolver, a Hungarian FEK 7.65 mm pistol and a Heckler and Koch 9-mm pistol which, it was later established, was the gun that killed Jan Carl Raspe.

Having such resources available within the prison enabled the prisoners themselves to continue operational planning, and for the outside leadership to include the prisoners in operational plans, even if none of these plans actually eventuated. (The coordination of action between those inside and those outside prison will be discussed later.) However, having resources available for operations is only one aspect of maintaining morale. Of more importance is the maintenance of some sort of organisational structure and communication between, on the one hand, individual terrorists inside gaol, and on the other, between prisoners and the outside leadership.

Aust, one source who had personal contact with many of the leading RAF figures, describes how the RAF was able to maintain quite an effective organisational structure and communications system. For example, he cites a code of conduct the RAF had established for imprisoned members;

Not a word to the pigs, in whatever guise they may appear, particularly as doctors. Not a single word. And naturally give them no assistance, never lift a finger to help them, nothing but hostility and contempt. ... No provocation; that's important. But we will defend ourselves implacably, relentlessly, with what human methods we have.29

29 ibid., p. 232-233.
He also goes on to explain that Baader and Ensslin were able to use their cells as a sort of GHQ, giving orders and directing communications.30

Especially in the early years of its existence, the RAF used defending lawyers to communicate with each other and the outside leadership. (Thirty lawyers including Siegfried Haag and Arndt Müller, were subsequently arrested for aiding the RAF, and considerable pressure was exerted on the German judicial system as regards the rights of defending lawyers. A fuller discussion of this is contained in the next chapter.) However, after June 1977, when up to eight RAF prisoners were housed together on the seventh floor of Stammheim, a more elaborate system of communication was able to be erected by adapting stereo equipment.31 It was probably by using this system that the three successful and one unsuccessful suicides were co-ordinated in October 1977. So having established that the RAF was able to maintain an organisational structure and communications system, it is necessary to examine the role of prisoners generally in internal propaganda and, how they were incorporated into the overall struggle.

The importance of prisoners to the terrorist struggle can be demonstrated by the number of actions dedicated to freeing them. Apart from the obvious fact of bringing experienced personnel back into the struggle, there are significant morale boosting factors. In February 1975, members of the 2 June Movement kidnapped Berlin politician Peter Lorenz, and succeeded in exchanging him for five imprisoned 2 June members.32 The kidnappers sent a message to their imprisoned colleagues:

To our comrades in jail: we would like to get more of you out, but at our present strength we’re not in a position to do it.33

30 ibid., p. 250.
31 For an explanation as to how this was done, see ibid., pp. 451-456.
32 The five were Verena Becker, Rolf Pohle, Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann, Rolf Heissler and Ingrid Siepmann. The release of Horst Mahler was also demanded but he refused to be ‘liberated’.
33 2 June Movement quoted in Aust, op. cit., p. 287.
This, and the fact that the German government acceded to the demands, undoubtedly inspired members of the RAF to seize the West German embassy in Stockholm just two months later. The assailants demanded the release of twenty-six prisoners including Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin and Raspe. When the German government refused to concede to this demand, the assailants shot dead two embassy personnel. Although it seems that the Swedish police may have been preparing to storm the building, the siege was brought to an end when the assailants accidentally set off their own explosives. This accidental ending of the siege encouraged the RAF to try again by kidnapping Hanns Martin Schleyer and hijacking the Lufthansa plane that was ultimately stormed at Mogadishu. That such resources were devoted to the freeing of prisoners is a sure determinant of how important they are to the overall struggle, and a striking illustration of how they are incorporated into the struggle.

Another major use to which prisoners can be put in internal propaganda is to increase determination. It seems that this is particularly so when prisoners are engaged in the process of hunger striking. The use of the hunger strike weapon to try and increase or win sympathy has already been discussed in Chapter 5, but Klein gives us an indication of the effect on active members still at liberty. Klein reports that the death of Holger Meins

acted like a trigger: I had to put an end to the impotence of legality. ... For quite a while I kept the horrendous photograph of Holger’s autopsy with me, so as not to dull the edge of my hatred.34

With this sharpened ‘edge of hatred’ the active volunteer is more willing to undertake action. This action can simply be in support of the hunger strike action, or it can be in revenge for any deaths resulting from a hunger strike. The former can be demonstrated in the RAF admission of responsibility for the attempted murder of judge Ziegler in November 1974, which said in part,

[t]he hunger strike in jails and the successful action against the cop-guarded Ziegler shows the helplessness of the fascist apparatus against consistent revolutionary resistance ... we will become people.35

Similarly in August 1977, the RAF attempted to attack the Federal Prosecutor's office with a home made rocket launcher. The active volunteer responsible for building the rocket launcher, Peter Jürgen Boock, claimed that the action was intended as "a sign to the comrades imprisoned in Stammheim."36 The statement of responsibility for this attempt also reveals the link between prisoners and the overall struggle;

This was not a matter of any bloodbath ... it was simply meant as a warning in a situation where over 40 political prisoners were on hunger strike ... should Andreas, Gudrun and Jan be killed, the apologists who support a hard line will feel ... that we have enough love - and enough hatred and imagination - to turn our and their weapons against them so that their pain will equal ours ... .37

The July 1984 RAF policy document discovered by police, advocated a prisoners' hunger strike as part of a three pronged attack.38 At the end of 1984, this plan was put into action, and a group of RAF prisoners began a hunger strike. At the same time, and in accordance with the overall plan, a series of attacks was made against NATO installations. Then in February 1985, the RAF murdered German arms dealer Ernst Zimmermann. According to Miller, this prompted RAF prisoners to end their fast as "eating was all right again since the RAF's actions outside prison had reached a 'new threshold'."39 This not only reveals the co-ordination between those inside and outside prison, but also suggests that action by one group reinforces the determination and morale of another. It could also be said that a tactical emphasis on prisoners can be used to cover any lull in terrorist activities outside prison, or to hide logistical difficulties (as

35 The Times, 23:11:74.
36 Boock quoted in Aust, ibid., p. 414. Boock also claimed at his trial that, seeing the devastation and death of ordinary workers that would result from this attack, he deliberately sabotaged the rocket launcher so the attack would fail.
37 RAF quoted in Aust, op. cit., p. 415.
38 The other two prongs being attacks on NATO targets and attacks on members of West German society.
will be seen below, this is more apparent in the case of the Provisional IRA than it is in the case of the RAF).

Finally, in this section, a short word on the use of the body as a weapon against the authorities. As mentioned earlier, the hunger strike is a particularly effective weapon because of the slow build up of pressure and the emotive atmosphere it can produce. In February 1973, RAF member Manfred Grashof, wrote to his lawyer claiming "[o]ur last and strongest weapon is the body; collectively we have brought ours into the fight."40

The question of how willingly or otherwise individuals have engaged in hunger strikes is a controversial one. For example, Klein throws doubt on Holger Meins' decision to go on hunger strike when he says,

[There was a person at one time who had received orders to croak in prison. It was not Holger Meins, but someone else. However, that person survived, fortunately. That person was told when he went to prison: 'You have to croak. We need a dead body.' Since then I find it really difficult to believe that Meins was simply an unfortunate victim of the 'system'.]41

The accuracy of this statement is difficult to establish beyond doubt. However, it is reasonable to conclude that the RAF leadership had no reason to regret the death of Meins. It had a martyr, the effect of which on people like Klein has already been noted. Although not through a hunger strike, Meinhof, Baader, Ensslin, Raspe and Möller all ultimately brought their bodies into the fight. The suicides and attempted suicide at Stammheim gaol produced four more martyrs for the RAF. How successful this was in motivating further support for the RAF is considered in the next chapter.

The use of prisoners in RAF propaganda, it seems was aimed internally as much as externally. It is interesting to note that the RAF obviously assessed the 1981 Provisional IRA hunger strike as a success, for it claimed that its 1985 hunger strike was modelled on it.

40 Grashof quoted in Aust, op. cit., p. 244.
41 Klein quoted in Kellen, "Terrorists - What are they Like ...", op cit., p. 24.
THE PROVISIONAL IRA

As stated earlier, the first process in recruiting an active volunteer is to bring him or her into direct confrontation with the security forces. In the early days of its campaign the IRA used the civil rights marches as a method of instigating confrontation. The Cameron Report, which was the government enquiry into the 1969 disturbances, concluded

[t]here is ample evidence that in most of the larger demonstrations promoted by the Civil Rights Association identified members of the I.R.A. have taken part as marchers or stewards.42

Other sources concluded much the same thing. O'Ballance claims that rioting in early 1971, which was centred on the Ballymurphy housing estate in Belfast, was "instigated and organized by the Provos."43 And Tugwell claims that riots in Londonderry at about the same time "exemplified the Provisional tactics ... which aimed to bring the maximum number of Catholics into violent confrontation with the security forces ... ."44

Apart from sporadic events mainly associated with commemoration marches, the next phase of consistent rioting in Northern Ireland coincided with the 1981 hunger strike. In the build up to the hunger strike, Relatives' Action Committees were formed, partly in order to present a non-Provisional IRA propaganda front. But in reality the Provisionals' degree of control over these committees fluctuated, and this was to cause friction during the hunger strike. At any rate the Provisionals were instrumental in the formation of these committees, the aim of which, as expressed by Gerry Adams, was to involve people who did not necessarily support Republican aims but did support the five demands. "What we want," he said, "is these people on the streets no matter what their

44 Tugwell "Revolutionary Propaganda ....," op. cit., p. 233.
reason for supporting us might be."45 After the death of Bobby Sands An Phoblacht/Republican News advocated that

there urgently needs to be popular street riots, the erection of barricades against the British forces, and other violent acts of disobedience building towards the establishment of no-go areas in the nationalist ghettos; plus of course the armed action of IRA Volunteers against military occupation forces.46

Danny Morrison of Sinn Fein freely admitted that the hunger strike of 1981 had increased support for the Provisional IRA,47 and this may well have been one of the reasons it was instigated. So, having thus recruited active volunteers, how does the Provisional IRA use propaganda to keep them?

Organisational Structure

The Provisional IRA, for the first six or so years of its existence, operated under the historic IRA structure. This was more or less a traditional army structure complete with military titles for its members. Under this system, each local IRA unit sent one delegate to the annual convention or to emergency conventions. At these an executive committee of twelve was elected, which then retired into closed session to form the seven person Army Council. From these seven were chosen the Chief-of-Staff, the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General. The IRA operated a policy of replacing any imprisoned officer, including the Chief-of-Staff, and, according to O’Ballance, members were permitted to resign or retire from the movement without fear of recrimination.48 In the north of Ireland, the Provisional IRA established a Belfast brigade, in which there were three battalions, one each for Upper Falls, Lower Falls, and the rest of the city. Derry City also had its own brigade and other active units were stationed in North and

45 Adams quoted in Clarke, op. cit., p. 102.
47 See Clarke, op. cit., p. 169. See also An Phoblacht/Republican News 1:4:82.
South Armagh, North, South and West Fermanagh, Fermanagh, Tyrone, North Antrim, South Down and Newry.

From an operational point of view, this system had both advantages and disadvantages. It had the advantages of facilitating contact with the local communities in which the IRA, and later the Provisionals, lived, and was good for the cohesion of the Republican movement as a whole. But it also had two distinct disadvantages, which ultimately prompted the reorganisation of 1977. Firstly, IRA members were widely known as such among their local communities, and this facilitated intelligence collecting by the security services. And secondly, with the classic army structure, any captured volunteer had a fairly detailed knowledge of the command structure and individuals involved in any particular action. This was cited by the Provisionals as the reasoning behind the 1977 reorganisation:

The old system came close to identifying those responsible for different operations, for if a car was hijacked in, say, Turf Lodge, and used in a bombing expedition or such like, the British knew that the unit which carried out the operation was based in Turf Lodge. Then all they had to do was to arrest all the known suspected activists in that area, torture them, and eventually they would get a confession from at least one implicating the others. 49

The document advocating reorganisation, which was found in the then Chief-of-Staff Seamus Twomey’s flat, candidly admitted that "contributing to our defeat" is "an inefficient infrastructure of commands, brigades, battalions and companies." 50 So in 1977, the Provisional IRA began restructuring itself along the lines of the cellular model used by the RAF and many other terrorist groups.

Although the reorganisation did present some further problems (discussed below), the immediate problem of ensuring greater secrecy surrounding active members and actions was eased. By the end of 1978, British intelligence was admitting

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49 Provisional IRA interview in Magill, August, 1978.
50 Quoted in Clarke, op. cit., p. 251.
we know little of the detailed workings of the hierarchy in Dublin. In particular we have scant knowledge of how the logistic system works, nor do we know the extent to which older, apparently retired, republican leaders influence the movement.51

So with an immediate improvement in its security situation, the Provisional IRA could begin the task of rebuilding the movement, and particularly the morale of active volunteers which had been devastated by security force successes.52

Active volunteers in the now cellular Provisional IRA were warned that any association with other known volunteers would bring disciplinary action.53 This new enforced isolation was not popular with many volunteers, who had enjoyed the ‘prestige’ of being known as the Provisionals’ man in their area. It was also unpopular among many sympathisers, as their day-to-day knowledge of what was going on was greatly reduced. It was undoubtedly the need to alleviate this that led to the greater prominence of Sinn Fein, and to a much greater co-ordination of propaganda from about this date. Although many of the Provisional IRA’s active volunteers are forced into living ‘underground’, their degree of isolation from society is not as great as the RAF’s. But, as stated earlier the sympathetic audience in the Republic of Ireland and that in Northern Ireland, despite its segregation, are subject to alternative propaganda sources. Therefore a centralised and strong propaganda network is essential among these audiences, hence the need for Sinn Fein. Creating a dedicated and vocal sympathetic audience has obvious morale boosting advantages for the active volunteer, but, as with the RAF, it is possible to detect further ideological justifications, especially for violence, directed towards the active volunteer.

51 "Future Terrorist Trends," more commonly known as the Glover Report after its author Brigadier J. Glover. This document was intercepted by the Provisional IRA and leaked to the press by them. It is reprinted as an appendix in Cronin, op. cit., pp. 339-357. This particular quote can be found on page 346.

52 See Kelley, op. cit., p. 285.

53 See Clarke, op. cit., p. 252.
More Ideological Justifications

The Provisional IRA's organisational structure, especially since the creation of the cell system, undoubtedly aids the internal propaganda processes. The number of active volunteers is difficult to gauge accurately, but is generally believed to fluctuate between 100 and 200. However, it does seem clear that the number of Provisional IRA active volunteers, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the population, exceeds that of the RAF. The Provisional IRA's involvement in the criminal world of racketeering, fraud and even the Dublin drugs scene certainly attracts membership, a factor which is accentuated by economic depression on both sides of the border. But it also has to be admitted that societal segregation and again economic depression in Northern Ireland make it inevitable that individuals will emerge steeped in Provisional IRA ideology, mythology and propaganda. They are the active members who will accept the Provisional IRA's analysis of Northern Ireland as a colony of Britain struggling for national self determination. They will believe that the British government will continue this oppression, and that all the lessons of history prove that only physical force will prompt Britain to leave. They tend to assume that all other Catholics in Northern Ireland and the population of the Republic of Ireland also believe in national reunification. The Dublin government, however, in their analysis, still being a colony of Britain, has lost all sense of national identity and purpose.

Nonetheless, throughout its existence, the Provisional IRA has had constantly to reinforce the morale of its active volunteers. Thematically the propaganda designed to do this is very similar to the RAF's, the emphasis being on a war situation which will inevitably be won. While one does not find remorse per se in the Provisionals' propaganda, one does find reassurances to the active volunteer that the motives behind the act were sound, and atrocities such as La Mon and Eniskillen can always be blamed

54 All interviewed sources, except Provisional Sinn Fein, agreed on this figure. Provisional Sinn Fein's representative, not being a member of the Provisional IRA, did not know how many active volunteers there may be.
on the incompetence of the security services. Also, as will be illustrated below, any feeling of guilt can be eased by claiming that many acts reveal the Provisionals' social conscience.

As with the RAF, it is possible to reject the argument that much of the Provisional IRA's propaganda in this area is revealing sensitivity to criticisms of it by other groups. The Provisionals have consistently rejected appeals for peace from prominent Irish, British and American personalities, and from the Pope. In 1972, with the imposition of direct rule from Westminster, a real possibility of restoring Catholic confidence in government, and widespread revulsion at Provisional IRA tactics, the only response from the Provisionals was a declaration from the then Chief-of-Staff, Sean MacStiofain, that the campaign would continue. By 1975, the Provisionals were arguing that the only result from any compromise would be "rivers of blood." In the early 1980's, the Provisional IRA dropped its plan for a future federal united Ireland, arguing that it was only a sop to Unionists. The Loyalist people of Northern Ireland are simply "neo-fascist, anti-nationalist and anti-democratic," and had better "capitulate to the inevitable or face the inevitable consequences of resistance." This, as O'Malley argues, smacks of elitism,

the few taking it upon themselves to know what's best for the many, the few inflexibly intent on leading the reluctant many into the hallowed land of 'Ourselves Alone' [Sinn Fein]

The Workers' Party would certainly agree with this, saying that Sinn Fein is not interested in the political future but

only in controlling their own area - setting up roadblocks and policing etc. This was very noticeable during the hunger strike when they stopped you

57 ibid.
58 Quoted in O'Malley, op. cit., p. 288.
59 ibid., p. 296.
and asked ‘have you any identification sir?’ They take great joy in that sort of thing. The incident centres of 1975 fulfilled many of their aspirations. They want totally divided areas. Thus it seems that what others say about them is far from being a prime consideration of the Provisionals (although as will be argued in Chapter 7, they took their sympathetic audience more into consideration than did the RAF). However, the Republican movement as a whole and the Provisional IRA within it, is far from united. Criticism by one faction of another produces unambiguously inward looking propaganda.

The current northern dominance of Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA, spearheaded by Adams, McGuinness and Morrison, was not achieved without cost. Many of the traditionalists within the movement were suspicious of the new high profile of Sinn Fein. They argued that the move towards participation in politics was neglecting the very reasons why the Provisional IRA split off from the Official IRA in the first place. To conciliate these traditionalists, many of whom would be or have been active volunteers, the primacy of the armed struggle is emphasised. The ‘ballot box and Armalite’ strategy was first articulated at the 1981 Ard Fheis by Danny Morrison;

But recognising the EXTENSIVE LIMITATIONS of the ballot box does not mean that it is a weapon which cannot be used to SUPPLEMENT the armed struggle. ... will anyone here object if, with a ballot box in this hand and an Armalite in this hand we take power in Ireland.

This was elaborated further by Morrison as;

elections are only one part of the overall struggle. The main struggle, the main thrust - and this goes without saying - is the armed struggle ...

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60 Interview with the Workers’ Party, 22:7:86.


63 Morrison quoted in O’Malley, op. cit., p. 275-276. By 1986 however, the Northerners had succeeded in taking over control of the Army Council. In his 1986 presidential address Gerry Adams was able to remind people that “the Army
Thus the active volunteers, and those who support them, are reassured that the movement will continue to support their actions, and that the necessity for armed action is in no way diminished.

It was suggested above that one method used by terrorist organisations to assuage any feelings of guilt or remorse felt by their active members is to stress that the violence is motivated out of some sort of social concern, that it is discriminate, and that it is in revenge for much worse actions on the part of the security forces. The Provisional IRA is no exception to this.

The Provisional IRA consistently rejects claims that it is a sectarian organisation. Protestants are killed not because they are Protestants but because they are members of the security services. Therefore, the Provisionals do not randomly murder civilians. Unionist politicians like Robert Bradford are murdered because they are

responsible to a considerable degree for motivating the series of purely sectarian attacks on ordinary nationalists, and while they do not pull the trigger they provide the ideological framework for the UDA and UVF gunmen who do the murdering.64

(However, it is possible to link such killings as these with the part of the Provisional IRA’s strategy that aims to keep sectarian tension high.) In other cases though, such reasoning is clearly inappropriate, and the victim of Provisional IRA violence is undeniably a civilian. The death of Angela Gallagher, a 17 months old baby killed in cross fire in 1971, was dismissed by the then Provisional Sinn Fein president, Rory O’Brady, as "a hazard of urban guerrilla warfare."65 The deaths of the twelve members of a dog breeders’ association at La Mon in 1978, were blamed on the poor reaction of

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64 Authority of Oglaigh na hEireann, [IRA] the rank and file volunteers, assembled in the General Army Convention, has democratically made a judgement on this issue [abstentionism] and that Oglaigh na hEireann has remained united in its determination to pursue the armed struggle and is united in its confidence in us and our ability to pursue the political struggle." "The Politics of Revolution ....," *op. cit.*, p. 6.


65 Quoted in Deutsch and Magowan, *op. cit.*, vol.1, p. 124.
the security forces and the terrorists' inability to locate a telephone box in working order.\textsuperscript{66} (It is Provisional IRA policy to destroy telephone boxes especially in rural areas.) In December 1983 the Provisional IRA planted a bomb at Harrods department store, which killed five people. Despite the fact that this is London's best known department store, and is frequently packed with overseas visitors, the Provisional IRA subsequently claimed "we do not believe that the Volunteers involved set out to deliberately kill civilians."\textsuperscript{67} Even the most dedicated of the Provisional IRA's sympathetic supporters would have extreme difficulty in accepting such explanations, indeed the Provisional IRA was criticised severely after La Mon. Instead they can be seen as attempts to justify them both to the active volunteers involved in these particular operations, and to other active volunteers. The Provisional IRA statement regarding the Harrods bombing also reveals another facet of this type of propaganda, that is, taking or attempting to take responsibility away from the individual;

\begin{quote}
The Irish Republican Army does not abdicate responsibility for actions carried out by its volunteers. We are comrades in arms who work at all levels in this army under tremendous pressures.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

There is no doubt that being an active member of a terrorist cell does involve 'tremendous pressures', and it is to propaganda designed to relieve these pressures and maintain morale that we now turn.

\textit{The Inevitability of Victory}

The lull in Provisional IRA activity in the mid 1970's was due in part to successes of the security forces, and in part to the Provisional IRA reorganisation. However, maintaining morale among active volunteers at this time received an unexpected boost with the Provisional IRA's discovery of a British intelligence report. The Glover Report

\textsuperscript{66} See quote at footnote 100, page 156, Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{An Phoblacht}/Republican News, 5:1:84.

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{ibid.}
was written in 1978, and leaked by the Provisionals to the press in May 1979. Of rank and file members of the Provisional IRA, Brigadier Glover concluded that his evidence does not support the view that they are merely mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and unemployable. PIRA now trains and uses its members with some care. The Active Service Units (ASUs) are for the most part manned by terrorists tempered by up to ten years of operational experience.69

Glover’s report, which was a survey of terrorist activity over the succeeding five years, also concluded that the PIRA will probably continue to recruit the men it needs. They will still be able to attract enough people with leadership talent, good education and manual skills to continue to enhance their all round professionalism. The movement will retain popular support sufficient to maintain secure bases in the traditional Republican areas.70

And perhaps most significantly for the Provisional IRA, Glover assessed that its campaign of violence "is likely to continue while the British remain in Northern Ireland."71 That the enemy regarded the calibre of membership so highly and recognised that this would continue to be the case, was undoubtedly a great morale boost at a time when the Provisional IRA appeared to be in disarray.

A steady stream of successful actions, and having them reported, is important to the Provisional IRA active volunteers’ morale as a number of incidents testify. For example, in the week that the Provisionals bombed La Mon in 1978, Republican News relegated coverage of this to the inside pages, and instead led with a story bitterly bemoaning the fact that the British press failed to report a successful action against a helicopter.72 Similarly in 1981, the Provisional IRA expressed its fury that a bomb placed in Shetland, which exploded just after a visit by the Queen, "was played down by

71 ibid.
the British" and not reported as a "great victory" in breaching British security. In the early months of 1982, the Provisional IRA was keen to explain another seeming lull in activity. Again it was stressed that the media report selective actions, and that for every successful action there are "perhaps half a dozen which do not come off." In the same article the Provisional IRA doubted the validity of recent arms finds in the Republic, because no photographic evidence was produced.

Adding to the pressure on the Provisionals at this time was the British government's use of the policy of granting immunity from prosecution for terrorists who agreed to turn Queen's evidence. Much of the Provisionals' propaganda surrounding this issue concentrates on insisting that the supergrass system has not in any way damaged their internal structures. The "paid agents," to use Provisional IRA terminology,

that have been recruited by the RUC have very limited information at their disposal, apart form that which they invent. There has been no infiltration of IRA active service units and where any Volunteer has broken in RUC custody our security personnel usually crack informers in debriefing sessions. For an informer to be valuable to the enemy he had to give accurate and vital information and this is his downfall.

While there are undoubtedly messages in this for both the uncommitted and sympathetic audiences, its primary function is internal. Messages such as that quoted above, are attempting to reassure active volunteers that they are not in any danger from the evidence of supergrasses. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the Provisional IRA, in the end, probably benefited more than the British government from the use of the supergrass system.

Morale boosting factors can also be found in the familiar themes of long war and inevitability of victory. In 1971, the Provisional IRA announced that it was ready "to face up to the hardships of the final phase, which of course will be more intensive than

74 ibid., 1:4:82.
75 ibid.
anything experienced so far."76 In 1975, Provisional IRA prisoners released a statement which was published in full in Republican News referring to

the passing of another year of resistance and the rapidly approaching realisation of the objectives of the Republican Movement ... 77

By 1978 however, this expectation of victory had changed to that of long war. In a spate of pre-Christmas bombing throughout Northern Ireland the Provisionals disclosed "we are committed to, and more importantly geared to, a long term war."78 And by 1986, the Provisionals were reporting the "past year was characteristic of our people's long history of struggle against British imperialism."79 Nonetheless, it will still only be armed force that will bring about British withdrawal80 so the armed attacks must continue. And this members of the Provisional IRA can look forward to because of "our increasing ability to inflict heavier casualties on those who maintain British rule in Ireland."81

Reinforcing active volunteers' morale through encouraging them to "inflict heavier casualties", and thus stressing their importance, is also common in Provisional IRA propaganda. McGuire confirms the importance of this when she says that "the movement's main dynamic was the military campaign in the Six Counties: it was the struggle there which gave the movement its strength."82 In 1971, the vice-president of Provisional Sinn Fein, Maire Drumm, told a meeting in Londonderry, "I would personally prefer to see all the British army going back dead. But the people will not succeed with stones and bottles."83 O'Ballance quotes a Noraid spokesperson in New

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76 Republican News 30:10:71.
77 ibid., 6:1:75.
78 Belfast Telegraph, 1:12:78.
80 ibid.
81 ibid.
82 McGuire, op. cit., p. 73.
83 See Deutsch and Magowan, op. cit., vol.1, p. 114.
York as saying, "[t]he more British soldiers who go back home in coffins the sooner it will be over." 84

As stated earlier a terrorist group makes promises of martyrdom to its active volunteers. That the Provisionals take due consideration of this can be demonstrated by an incident in 1971, which did not altogether work to the their advantage. In October of that year two women were shot dead by the security forces. The Provisionals' first reaction was to try and gain propaganda points by claiming that these women had no connection with them, that they were just innocent victims of security force brutality. But the death notices in the local press revealed that one of the women was in fact a Staff Officer in the Provisional IRA. 85 One can conclude from this that the Provisional IRA was forced to honour its promises of martyrdom in death for active volunteers.

Competition for the ‘vanguard’ position in the Republican movement also produces some inward looking propaganda. Within Northern Ireland the Provisionals have had two other groups to compete with for the position of ‘vanguard’ of the Republican movement. Some of the discrediting propaganda aimed by the Provisionals at the Officials and the INLA has already been discussed in Chapter 5. But being seen as the most determined, dynamic, organised and best-positioned to defend the Catholic community from the threatened Protestant backlash has obvious internal implications. There is also the question of simple competition: that one set of volunteers do not like to see another in the headlines for ‘spectacular’ actions. Clutterbuck suggests it was reasons such as these that were behind the Provisionals’ murder of Earl Mountbatten and other members of his family and staff. He postulates that it was the INLA’s murder of Conservative politician Airey Neave within the precincts of the House of Commons that prompted the Provisionals to attempt an equally ‘spectacular’ action. 86

86 Clutterbuck, op. cit., p. 160.
Comparatively few terrorists are killed in action; most are taken prisoner. As this is also the case with the Provisionals, it is proposed to conclude this chapter with the role of prisoners in Provisional IRA propaganda directed inwards on its active volunteers.

**Prisoners**

Just as the remand judges in West Germany had aided the morale building processes of the RAF, so did the internment system aid the morale building processes for the Provisional IRA. In fact it could be said that internment was the morale boosting factor for the Provisionals in the early 1970's. While not denying that conditions within the Nissen huts were unpleasant, nonetheless, they facilitated the emergence of a very efficient command and even training structure. Internees were permitted to wear their own clothing, and with no sort of prison work system, and very few association restrictions, they could organise how they spent their time. The internment regime also segregated the men according to paramilitary allegiance, with each hut, or 'cage' as they became known, having its own OC. The OCs were permitted to liaise with each other and the camp authorities. Under such a system, the Provisional IRA was able not only to maintain but also to improve morale. Education classes were run by the internees with, a strong emphasis on Irish politics, history and language. Military training was conducted openly and, according to Clarke,

> [t]he degree of association granted was such that weapons classes, using real and replica guns, took place and escapes could be planned in relative ease and privacy, often round a blackboard drawing of the prison's defences.\(^{87}\)

Indeed it was mainly this system that produced the leading figures in today's Provisionals, including Gerry Adams and Danny Morrison.

However, the ending of internment, and particularly the ending of special status for prisoners convicted after 1 March 1976, dissolved the Provisionals' internment

\(^{87}\) Clarke, *op cit.*, p. 56.
system. Conviction and sentencing removed what was in effect POW status. Also, in the meantime the British had replaced the Long Kesh compound with the Maze prison and its now infamous H-Blocks. Although the IRA had experienced internment many times in its history on both sides of the border, and many convicted IRA prisoners had continued protests inside gaol, this was the first time that the Provisionals had to design a strategy and a system for keeping convicted prisoners motivated and within the organisational structure. The tactic that was initially decided upon was the campaign to restore special status involving the ‘blanket protest’, and which ultimately resulted in the 1981 hunger strike. But before discussing these a little more needs to be said regarding organisational structure and communications inside the H-Blocks.

As more and more active volunteers received sentences, the Provisionals adopted the policy of making the more experienced prisoners OCs of the wings within the H-Blocks. This was designed to encourage respect among the younger and less experienced volunteers, and to tighten the degree of control over all imprisoned volunteers. Under the new prison regime, which still essentially segregated prisoners, morale and the organisational structure could be strengthened by daily and sometimes trivial confrontations with prison officers.88 Political discussions and Irish classes also continued, although usually just by shouting from one cell to another.

Simply shouting in Irish, which could not be understood by prison officers, was one method the prisoners used to communicate with each other. Communicating with other wings and the outside leadership was achieved by both prisoners and visitors concealing messages and materials about their person. As will be illustrated during the remainder of this chapter, this system proved very efficient indeed.

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Like the RAF prisoners, the Provisional IRA prisoners were incorporated into the overall struggle. The tactics and reasoning were also very similar. The Provisional IRA however, has not engaged in hostage taking or sieges to demand the release of prisoners, but considerable resources have, nonetheless, been devoted to the freeing of prisoners. McGuire has testified to the propaganda value of news conferences by escaped prisoners. Most of the propaganda value of these incidents lies in boosting morale among both those inside and outside gaol. One of the most spectacular prison escapes, and one which returned Chief-of-Staff Seamus Twomey to active service, occurred in October 1973. This involved the Provisionals, under the guise of an American film unit, hiring a helicopter and forcing its pilot to land in the exercise yard of Dublin’s Mountjoy gaol. Three prisoners, including Twomey, escaped, and the internal propaganda value was such that Bowyer Bell claims it injected "new life into what appeared a faltering purpose." In September 1983, the Provisionals organised a mass breakout from the Maze prison, during which 38 of their members escaped. In October, the Provisionals published an interview with some of the escapees which they claimed rubbed salt into British wounds. The real propaganda value though, was in boosting morale, especially among prisoners, in the wake of the 1981 hunger strike.

The emergence of the campaign for special status suited the Provisional IRA in a number of ways. Firstly, it served as a focus for the prisoners themselves; secondly, it coincided with the Provisional IRA’s reorganisation, and a concentration on the H-Block

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89 n October 1974, Eddie Gallagher and Marion Coyle kidnapped Dr. T. Herrema in the Republic and demanded the release of Gallagher’s pregnant girlfriend, Rose Dugdale, Kevin Mallon and James Hyland. But this action was not supported by the Provisionals who regarded Gallagher as a maverick. Other kidnappings orchestrated by the Provisionals such as that of Don Tidey in December 1983 or Dublin dentist, John O’Grady, in November 1987, have been accompanied by demands for money, not the release of prisoners. Similarly the one notable siege that the Provisionals were involved in (Balcome Street) was not a pre-planned action, and no release of prisoners was demanded.
90 McGuire, op. cit., p. 78.
91 Bowyer Bell, op. cit., p. 401.
93 ibid., 5:1:84.
issue would enable them to hide the inevitable lull in activities until the reorganisation was complete. The Provisionals certainly supported their imprisoned colleagues, warning at the end of 1978 that British intransigence on the issue of political status might "force us into considering inflicting heavy civilian casualties."94 Despite the best efforts of the Provisionals to attract support for this campaign (see Chapter 5), they were not successful. Thus to save face and boost prisoners morale in what was by 1979 a diminishing protest, some form of escalation was necessary. Escalation to the scale of a mass hunger strike was certainly opposed by some within the Republican movement,95 probably in realisation of the dangers involved in such a task, and the resources it would require. However, on 26 May 1980 the Provisionals announced that the H-Block issue would become their top priority, and the POW department would have a full-time co-ordinator. In essence the die was now cast, and once cast the Provisionals were determined to maintain control of events both inside and outside prison.

The 1981 Provisional IRA hunger strike reveals how closely active members inside and outside gaol co-ordinated their activities. At the conclusion of the 1980 hunger strike Brendan McFarlane took over as OC from Bobby Sands, as the latter prepared to engage in a hunger strike himself. During the preparation for the hunger strike, it seems that the outside leadership decided Sands should make a tape recorded statement to be used for propaganda purposes. As to the content of the statement, McFarlane, in one of his many communications with the outside leadership, asks,

re the statement you want Charlie [Sands] to record. Do you intend to send us in a prepared statement or do you want us to do one ourselves?96

As the hunger strike of Kieren Doherty progressed, the outside leadership sent a letter to him through his girlfriend. She opened the letter and revealed that it was a request from

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94 The Provisional IRA quoted in Kelley, op. cit., p. 297.
95 Gerry Adams is reported to have told Sands that the leadership was "tactically, strategically, physically and morally opposed to a hunger strike." Quoted in Clarke, op. cit., p. 121.
96 B. McFarlane quoted in Beresford, op. cit., p. 73.
the leadership that Doherty permit them to issue statements in his name but without consultation.97 These statements reveal the degree of co-ordination and co-operation between the Provisionals' leadership and the prisoners. Just who ultimately controlled the hunger strike was and remains a point of contention. Both Sinn Fein and Provisional IRA continually insisted that it was the prisoners themselves who planned, controlled, executed and ended the hunger strike. Others however, including prisoners' relatives and Father Faul, who was instrumental in ending the hunger strike, believed differently. Faul even reported that OC McFarlane had told him "the buck stops with Gerry Adams."98 This question of who had ultimate control of the hunger strike is largely irrelevant to this section of the thesis. As far as the thesis is concerned the degree of co-operation made the hunger strike at worst a 'joint venture'; the questions to be asked are whom it benefited, and how?

For the active volunteer and leadership outside the prison, the hunger strike provided ten more martyrs to a cause already teeming with martyrs. It undoubtedly increased determination and encouraged action couched in terms of revenge. Just after Sands' death the Provisional IRA declared,

[t]he stream of coffins from the H-blocks will be paid for. Anyone from Elizabeth, Queen of England down to Johnny Brit ... will pay dearly for dragging tortured Ireland through more war, through more death and suffering.99

And after the conclusion of the hunger strike the revenge threat was repeated,

[t]he deaths of the ten hunger-striking comrades have understandably caused frustration among IRA Volunteers on the ground ... who believe that the IRA should pay the British government in kind for the deaths of the comrades and for the deaths on the streets. That the IRA will do this goes without saying ....100

97 ibid., p. 369.
98 ibid., p. 343.
100 ibid., 5:9:81.
As discussed earlier the Provisionals were able to use the hunger strike to provoke direct confrontation, and thus presumably gain further active volunteers.

For the prisoners themselves, the hunger strike produced short term benefits in that morale and determination were improved, as demonstrated by the fact that many prisoners rejoined the blanket protest. (The blanket protest was ended about the same time as the hunger strike.) In the long term however, the prisoners lost from the hunger strike. Ten were dead, and the concessions wrought from the British were really little more than those that had been on offer at the end of the 1980 hunger strike. Morale was undoubtedly devastated, and only partially restored with the Maze breakout in September 1983.

The hunger strike certainly brought internal benefits for the Provisional IRA, the most significant of which may simply have been the morale boosting factors associated with having its ‘cause’ publicised daily through the world’s media. Prisoners and martyrs have a prestigious place in Republican ideology, and it is important for the Provisional IRA to maintain this expectation among its members. How successful they have been, and why, form part of the next chapter.
SUMMARY

Part II of this thesis has sought to present an analysis of propaganda within a framework of target audiences. Terrorism itself is an important form of propaganda, but as these three chapters have shown, it is not the only one. Both groups involved in this study have put forward explanations and justifications for their actions based on the ideological premises discussed in Chapter 3. On a theoretical level, the three target audiences presented are consistent with the propagandist’s ultimate aim of provoking action. Thus propaganda’s objective can be said to promote the progressive movement of an actor from the uncommitted audience to the sympathetic audience and then to the active audience.

It is among the uncommitted audience that terrorism as ‘propaganda by deed’ is, perhaps, most significant. For first and foremost the publicity that terrorist actions attract brings the terrorist group’s existence to the attention of a domestic and international general public. These actions, when repeated, will eventually cause some people to consider why they are being perpetrated. And here ideological propaganda makes its appearance in its most general form. Propaganda argues that these acts are taking place because the state is disadvantaging particular groups. The more the terrorists try to bring the plight of these disadvantaged groups to prominence, the more repressive the state becomes.\(^{101}\) The state then is the aggressor, and the terrorists’ actions are only defensive. Accompanying this most general ideological appeal is propaganda attacking the credibility of the state and particularly the security forces. Meanwhile, the continuing violent actions are designed to give the impression that the terrorist group cannot be

\(^{101}\) Rapoport argues that "in a world so burdened with guilt ... we are peculiarly susceptible to terrorist appeals, when two antagonists appear to be employing similar tactics, the weaker (\textit{mutatis mutandis}) is more likely to gain the sympathies and help of the uncommitted because we value equality so much." D.C. Rapoport, "Introduction," in D.C Rapoport and Y. Alexander, (eds) \textit{The Morality of Terrorism Religious and Secular Justifications}, New York: Pergamon, 1982, p. xvi-xvii.
defeated, and to exaggerate its numbers and capabilities. When the uncommitted actor asks his or herself 'why are these groups disadvantaged, and why are people resorting to terrorist acts to promote their interests?', propaganda can then classify them as potentially sympathetic.

As regards the potentially sympathetic audience, propaganda's ideological emphasis is stepped up. It presents an analysis of why the current situation is so objectionable. The RAF argues that because the Federal Republic of Germany is capitalist and imperialist the workers of the Federal Republic and the oppressed of the Third World are disadvantaged. The Provisional IRA argues that the English presence in Ireland denies Irish self-determination. English policies in Northern Ireland disadvantage the Roman Catholic community, and English influence over Ireland as a whole subjects the Irish to an alien culture and language. However, such analyses can exist independently of either the RAF or the Provisional IRA. Where their ideology, and thus their propaganda, differs from other groups is in the rejection of constitutional methods of redressing grievances, and the promotion of violence.

Much of the propaganda produced by both the RAF and the Provisional IRA directed at the sympathetic audience is dedicated to deriding constitutional methods and those who advocate them. This, of course, can be partially explained by the fact that those who held similar but non-violent views to the terrorists and the terrorists themselves are in direct competition for the same sympathetic audience. But the positive promotion of violence in the RAF's and the Provisional IRA's propaganda is not surprising, as it is totally consistent with their ideology. The RAF believes that its 'world communist revolution' can be led by a small avant garde which, through its actions, increases revolutionary consciousness. The Provisional IRA believes that a small dedicated group can force the British out of Ireland. However, there have been occasions when both groups have been prepared to play down their major ideological objective, in
the hope of widening their support base by concentrating on a narrower and more defined objective.

Two issues adopted in this way by the RAF were environmental concerns and a concentrated attack on NATO. These issues, particularly the latter, brought a resurgence of life to the RAF which had been fairly dormant in the period after the Stammheim suicides until 1979. The propaganda surrounding the NATO issue was mainly 'by deed', and involved an alliance with the French group *Action Directe*. This alliance attempted to portray itself as a politico-military front against the multi-national NATO, and particularly US hegemony. The RAF argued that West Germany was really an American colony, and attempted to exploit the political divisions there over the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on West German soil. The Provisional IRA, in the first couple of years of its existence, focussed on civil rights issues and the campaign to dissolve the Northern Ireland parliament. From about 1977 onwards it has used its political front organisation to promote a whole range of issues. Throughout its existence the Provisional IRA has sought to present itself as the only force capable of meeting all the needs of the Roman Catholic communities of Northern Ireland. This has led it to assume the role of community police, supposedly punishing crime in those areas. But in reality this is used as a brutal and frequently clumsy method of exercising control.

The use of prisoners and hunger strikes are two tactics the RAF and the Provisional IRA have in common. Both the West German and the British governments are accused of torturing prisoners and of holding them in inhuman conditions. Support groups have been formed in both countries to agitate for a change in the conditions under which terrorist prisoners are held. (The legislation under which terrorists are held is also criticised - as will be discussed in the next chapter.) The idea behind these support groups, focussing on issues much narrower than the terrorist organisation's ultimate aim,

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102 See quote at footnote 50, page 142, Chapter 5.
is to bring more and more people into direct confrontation with the security forces. When this happens, propaganda again shifts its emphasis, if not its themes.

The aim of propaganda as regards the active volunteer is to further bind the individual to the cause. Thus it is not surprising to find propaganda stressing the need for further action, and emphasising morale-boosting themes such as the inevitability of victory. The organisational structure of the terrorist group also plays a part in isolating the individual from alternative propaganda sources. Ideology plays its part by providing further justifications for the need to commit acts of terrorism, and reassurances that the 'cause' justifies such acts. Prisoners too, seem to assume a role of some significance in propaganda directed inwards. Certainly prisoners and the state's treatment of them seem to provide the terrorists with the most tangible link to their sympathetic audience and ways to increase it, but how the terrorist group itself treats its imprisoned members has obvious internal implications. Both the RAF and the Provisional IRA have been reasonably successful in maintaining organisational structures within the prisons, and both have devoted considerable resources to actions attempting to free prisoners. While successful operations freeing prisoners undoubtedly send messages to the uncommitted and sympathetic audiences, their primary effect is on internal morale, especially if an 'experienced' volunteer is returned to active service.

In general the propaganda of both the RAF and the Provisional IRA is fairly consistent with their ideology. But as stated at the beginning of Chapter 4, propaganda must be based on credible derivation of fact acceptable to the target audience. The final part of this thesis will try to establish whether the ideological reference points and the 'facts' selected to support them, as expressed in propaganda, are generally accepted by the target audiences. This then, will help determine the degree of success.

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103 See Chapter 7.
104 Two examples where it is not are the Provisional IRA's selective references to socialism and the possibility of a Protestant backlash.
PART III

CONCLUSIONS
So far this thesis has attempted to isolate and describe historical and ideological influences on two terrorist groups emerging in Europe at the end of the 1960's. It has also identified three propaganda target audiences and the strategies and tactics within each group. This chapter will attempt to measure how successful they have been. What is immediately apparent is that in the sense of achieving their major strategic goals, neither of the two groups has been successful. However, this is not the case at the tactical level. Explaining these successes is as important for any counter-propaganda offensive as it is for the terrorists themselves. The hypothesis offered here is that terrorists will achieve the most tactical success when the objective is fairly limited, and is clearly linked with either ideological or historical reference points. Empirically, it seems that tactical successes are also closely linked to government actions and reactions. Some government responses to terrorism have clearly been mistakes, producing a ground swell of support for terrorists. Again it should be stressed that these terrorist successes are limited, but nonetheless, governments should openly acknowledge them as part of the learning process.

The fact that terrorist successes are all at the tactical level points to the importance of the sympathetic audience, and it is on this group that the major focus of this chapter falls. This chapter will also proceed from the basis of how terrorists view their success. Therefore again the focus falls on the sympathetic audience and how to expand it. In both the other target groups a positive success rate is not essential; a neutralisation effect is sufficient. All that is required is non-co-operation with the government and security forces, whether this is fear induced or ideologically induced.
THE UNCOMMITTED AUDIENCE

Terrorists' major strategic aim as regards this group has been postulated as attempting to militarise the political situation. Supporting propaganda tactics have portrayed the current situation as one of danger or crisis, as disadvantaging particular sections in society, and of requiring more and more repression to maintain it. Attempts are made to embarrass the government and attack the credibility of the security forces. One can certainly detect a degree of success in this area, although the results that emanated from it could hardly be described as successful from the RAF's point of view.

Although figures for the number of active members in the RAF and its sympathisers vary, (discussed below) they all suggest a fairly insignificant involvement in terrorism. Deaths and injuries resulting from terrorism also pale into insignificance when compared to the numbers of road accident victims. In October 1978, the Federal Ministry of Justice reported to the Bundestag that between 1970 and 1978, twenty-nine people had been killed and ninety-seven wounded in terrorist attacks. There had also been 108 attempted murders and 163 people had been taken hostage.¹ When this is compared to the massive injection of resources into the security forces, it does seem to suggest a certain militarisation of the political situation. Aust, for example, states that the Federal Criminal Police's budget jumped from 54.8 million Deutschmarks in 1971 to 290 million in 1981. The number of people employed also rose, from 1,113 in 1971 to 3,536 in 1981.²

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Such an increase in police resources could also be used to suggest a climate of fear or danger, and again one can detect a measure of success for the RAF in doing this. Pridham and Krieger both argue that the feeling of crisis in West Germany caused by the RAF, best manifests itself in the constant references to ‘Weimar’ in the contemporary press, the analogy being that democracy was again being threatened internally, and that care needed to be taken to ensure that extremists were unable to use the constitution to undermine the state, as Hitler had done. While the RAF was eager to draw comparisons between Nazi Germany and the Federal Republic, this particular reference point brought it both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages were mainly among the sympathetic audience and will be discussed in the next section. Among the uncommitted audience, while they undoubtedly embarrassed the government, references to Weimar or to Nazi Germany produced disadvantages for the RAF (detailed below).

After the kidnapping of Berlin politician Peter Lorenz in February 1975, a television news editor reveals the crisis feeling this event produced;

For 72 hours we just lost control of the medium. It was theirs not ours ... We shifted shows in order to meet their time-table. Our cameras had to be in position to record each of the released prisoners as they boarded the plane to freedom, and our news coverage had to include prepared statements at their dictate ... We preferred to think that we were being ‘flexible’, but actually we were just helpless.

The murder of Zimmermann in February 1985 brought a reaction from Chancellor Kohl, demonstrating that terrorism was still regarded as an immediate and real danger. As well as personally promising to intervene in the struggle against terrorism, Kohl hastily arranged a meeting with his French counterpart, as the murder of Zimmermann was a joint venture between the RAF and Action Directe. This public reaction, argues Kellen,

illustrates the enormous leverage terrorists have or still have: two unknown insignificant young persons, [the murderers of Zimmermann]

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4 Quoted in Lasky, op.cit., p. 15-16.
forcing the heads of the two most important European states to take up the gauntlet in public.5

A further indication of crisis is the resources devoted to countering terrorism. Blum claims that at times up to twenty-five per cent of the entire uniformed strength of a state’s police force has been engaged in protection and anti-terrorist duties.6 In Bonn alone there are 3,000 police officers on guard and protection duty at a cost of about 400 million Deutschmarks.7 But of course there is another explanation for all this, besides the RAF’s thesis of continuing and increasing repression.

Much of this explanation is contained in West Germany’s sensitivities to its past, and in the nature of terrorism itself. Continuing terrorist attacks throughout the world prove that absolute security is impossible. The identifying and ‘hardening’ of possible targets intrinsically involves an increase of resources and a higher police profile. The overall threat to democracy from terrorism from a handful of self-styled revolutionaries is real: democratically elected governments have been held to ransom; citizens have been kidnapped, murdered or savagely maimed; special laws have been introduced which undeniably limit civil liberties; and countless resources have been committed to countering terrorism that could have been used to improve living standards. It is this perceived threat to democracy that explains why the RAF’s propaganda, other than by deed, never made any real impact on this audience.

In assessing German sensitivities to the defence of democracy, two things are paramount: the Weimar/Hitler experience, and Cold War politics in which West Germany and particularly West Berlin still form the front. The fact that West Germany or Germany as a whole does not have a significant liberal democratic tradition is also of

5 Kellen, "The New Challenge ...," op.cit., p. 3.
import. The West German drafters of the 'Basic Law' and their Allied partners, learning from inter-war experience, not only removed the national question from the establishment of democracy, but also provided a clause under which a political party could be banned if it objectively seeks to undermine and destroy the democratic system. Under this provision the neo-fascist SRP and the Stalinist KPD were dissolved by the Supreme Court in 1952 and 1956 respectively. The non-Stalinist communist party (DKP) was founded in 1968 and continues to function. However, its members are regarded with suspicion by the West German state, as will be outlined below. This distrust of communists and their sympathisers brings into play the second major West German sensitivity to the need to defend its democracy; Cold War politics.

The advance of Soviet soldiers over German territory was particularly shocking for most Germans. Hitler's campaign against the Soviet Union had been presented to the German people as a moral necessity against an inferior people. Thus the influx of refugees from the eastern sector to the western sectors, and the growing ideological and political tensions between the Allies and the Soviet Union seemed to confirm the picture of the Soviets and communism already instilled in many people by Hitler. The subsequent establishment of the German Democratic Republic and the consolidation of East and West put the Federal Republic in the forefront of the stance against communism. In the almost siege mentality of the Adenauer era it was just about impossible to reject communism on any other than 'crusading' type grounds, or to develop any sort of radical critique of the West German state itself. It is, therefore, understandable that when radical critique did emerge in the 1960's, and with it a violent group espousing world communist revolution, the West Germans felt their state under a more extreme threat than it actually was. At any rate, it is clear that the vast majority of Germans responded to these historical and ideological reference points and interpretations, and not to the RAF's.
The RAF claimed that its actions would serve to raise the revolutionary consciousness of the people it purported to represent. However, the propaganda accompanying these consciousness raising actions (statements of responsibility etc.) is couched in language and reference points alien to the vast majority of West German workers. Not surprisingly, few workers were able to identify their own situations with those of the Vietnamese or Palestinians. The communist-like utterances of the RAF would also have been viewed by German workers with great reserve and suspicion. For West German workers, communism was defined in terms of the hard, grey and depressed German Democratic Republic. Many with relatives living in the East would have had personal experience of requests for items readily available and regarded as necessities in the West. Aspirations to communism, therefore, would be viewed as a direct threat to their economic and social well-being. In reality the RAF’s violence only served to increase this sense of threat.

Only violence itself can be said to have achieved any real degree of success for the RAF as regards the uncommitted audience. Even then, the historical reference points which do appear in its propaganda provided a framework for taking strong action against rather than in support of the RAF. It almost seems that although the RAF recognised the importance of propaganda channels to an uncommitted audience (mass media), it did not recognise the existence of an uncommitted audience. The RAF’s stance was polemic, and it really made very little effort to encourage movement between the uncommitted audience and the sympathetic one.

THE SYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE

The major strategic aim as regards this target audience has been identified as making the ‘sea’ in which the RAF swims as deep as possible. Supporting propaganda stresses the terrorist group’s analysis of what is wrong with the current situation, and the necessity for violence to bring about change. Specific issues have also been used in an
Defining just who constitutes the sympathetic audience is not easy, and can clearly carry political connotations. This thesis is not *per se* concerned with legal or political definitions. It concedes that there is a 'grey' area between this audience and the committed one. The person who lends his car or apartment to a terrorist group is certainly liable to be charged with aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation. But as will be illustrated below, this person may well have strong objections to the activities of the terrorist group as a whole. Terrorists themselves will usually regard only those who carry out military operations as fully fledged members of their organisation. However, that is far from saying that terrorists regard non-active support as unimportant. The different strata comprising the sympathetic audience can produce different strata of success. This success, from the terrorists’ point of view, can range from private expressions of sympathy to public declarations of sympathy, culminating in the sought after objective of direct confrontation with the security forces.

As will be discussed below, marked increases in sympathy at all levels for the RAF can be positively correlated to three broad headings, which can, in turn, be positively correlated to RAF propaganda. These three themes are; police behaviour, prison conditions, and legislative changes particularly to the criminal code. Included in the latter is the *Berufsverbot* or Radicals Edict, which was introduced by the West German government in 1972, and served to bar supposed terrorist sympathisers from all civil service occupations. Added to this list is also the government’s handling or mishandling of the Stammheim suicides, which left an aura of doubt and myth.
Security Force Behaviour

As the West German police had to face mounting demonstrations for the first time in the late 1960's, their reaction was seen by many as heavy handed or even brutal. Police actions on the night of 2 June 1967, when a demonstrating student was shot dead, were particularly shocking to many. Rioting over a variety of issues continued, and by 1968 German police had been issued with plastic riot shields, longer truncheons and special helmets with face guards. In May 1971, German police shot dead twenty year old Petra Schelm in Hamburg. Despite the fact that Schelm was armed and had fired on police, this incident caused considerable public disquiet, as is revealed in a survey by the Allensbacher Institute of Public Opinion.

This survey posed the question "Baader-Meinhof: Criminals or Heroes?" It found that one in twenty West German citizens would shelter a wanted member of the gang overnight, and that one in four citizens under thirty admitted a 'certain sympathy' with the RAF.8 This poll, conducted only ten days after the death of Schelm, is a clear indication that the actions of the police and security forces can have an immediate, if not lasting, effect on public sympathy for terrorists. Police action in the years 1967-1972 is recognised by most commentators as being a significant, perhaps even the most significant, factor in attracting people to the RAF in the early years. Rasch, for example, argues that during these years "[w]hen public meetings and demonstrations took place, the unjustified, brutal intervention of the police was seen repeatedly."9 Horchem argues that there was unanimous condemnation by the New Left groups who felt that the police actions were directed against the entire Left. There was, he says, a feeling of the "need for solidarity."10 And Aust states that groups and demonstrations expressing sympathy

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8 Quoted in Aust, op.cit., p. 154.
9 Rasch, op.cit., p. 81.
10 Horchem, "West Germany’s ...", op.cit., p. 9.
for the RAF at this time naturally came to the attention of the police. Police searches and arrests only "drove them further towards" the RAF.11

Although the treatment of the RAF in custody continued to be an issue, (discussed below) the behaviour of the police ceased to be a great source of public support after 1972, when the RAF really began its bombing operations. It can be concluded the RAF's propaganda in this area contained at least two vital components for success. Its accusations of fascism and aggression were consistent with the general feeling of anti-authoritarianism prominent at the time, and connected with a whole range of issues from university reform to the legalisation of narcotics. And secondly, it was based on a credible derivation of 'truth'. The state could not deny that it was using violent tactics against its citizens. In the end, though, many peoples' sympathy for the RAF at this time was motivated not by support for its objectives or tactics, but by a genuine and widespread feeling that members of the RAF were not going to be afforded the privileges of liberal democracy and its rationales of 'minimum force' and 'fair trial', i.e., that members of the RAF were clear underdogs in a state determined to extract revenge. Writer Michael Schulte, in whose apartment the group had stayed, sums up the motivation of many RAF supporters at this time;

I really did it out of good nature. I've always felt more sympathy for people wanted by the police than I have for the cops themselves.12

Prison Conditions

Conditions while in custody, and hunger strikes undertaken by prisoners to improve these conditions, are the two areas where the RAF has attracted most overt support. Declarations of support surrounding these issues have not been limited to the West German state boundaries. Attacks have been made on West German targets on foreign soil and demonstrations have been made in support of RAF members in foreign

11 Aust, op.cit., p. 150.
12 Quoted in Aust, ibid., p. 125. This sentiment was also expressed in conversation with the author by several West Germans who were students at the time.
gaols. For example in October 1978, a Dutch support group seized the offices of Amnesty International in Amsterdam and demanded better treatment for RAF prisoners in Dutch gaols.\(^{13}\) In March 1979 also in Amsterdam, an attempt was made to take over the offices of the Swiss National airline, this time protesting the "ill treatment" of two West Germans in a Berne gaol.\(^{14}\) Similar demonstrations also took place regularly within West Germany, such as in March 1981, when police had to evict protesters from the canteen of Der Spiegel in Hamburg.\(^{15}\) Hunger strikes too provoked direct action. Again in March 1981, RAF supporters interrupted a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, demanding the UN intervene in the hunger strike current at the time. Rioting in support of this hunger strike became fairly widespread in April, especially after the death of Debus.\(^{16}\) During the 1984-1985 hunger strike, RAF supporters halted the Amsterdam-Munich express, and painted slogans in support of the RAF prisoners.\(^{17}\) Acts of arson and sabotage were also undertaken by the Belgian terrorist group CCC (Fighting Communist Cells) in support of the RAF prisoners. At the 1978 trial of Günter Sonnenberg, RAF supporters shouting expressions of solidarity and demanding treatment for prisoners under the Geneva Convention clashed with police in court.\(^{18}\) A similar spectacle was seen at the trial of Stefan Wisniewski, who was accused of complicity in the Schleyer kidnap in 1980. So clearly, some attempt must be made to explain why these particular themes attracted so much apparent sympathy.

Complaints by the RAF about conditions in prison centred on the practice of keeping the prisoners in total isolation from each other, and from other non-RAF prisoners. One of the first attempts to publicise this issue involved a visit by Jean Paul Sartre to Andreas Baader in December 1974. Speaking to the media after the visit, Sartre

\(^{13}\) *The Times*, 10:10:78.
\(^{14}\) *Daily Telegraph*, 29:3:79.
\(^{15}\) *The Times*, 5:3:81.
\(^{16}\) See *The Times*, especially 14:4:81.; and 19:4:81.
\(^{17}\) *ibid.*, 5:1:85.
\(^{18}\) *ibid.*, 3:3:78.
described the conditions of custody as torture. The white painted cells, with no natural light, and no sound other than the sound of the warders' footsteps three times a day, Sartre claimed, were likely to cause "psychological disturbances." The effects of spending long periods in isolation, the RAF and its lawyers claimed, severely diminished the ability of the defendants to follow the proceedings of their trial. In the second month of the trial, three court appointed doctors agreed that the health of the prisoners had been detrimentally affected by the years in isolation. Amnesty International psychiatrists also agreed that this sort of custody was likely to lead to both mental and physical disorders.

The German authorities reacted to these criticisms and eased conditions for the prisoners in Stammheim and elsewhere. But in many respects the damage had already been done. The RAF had a cause, the validity of which was confirmed by independent authorities. Furthermore, this cause could be directly related to accusations that the state was deliberately torturing them, in keeping with its fascist nature.

Hunger strikes, undertaken in support of demands to ease the prison conditions, therefore had a degree of credibility. During such a strike in May-June 1973, the German authorities engaged in forcible feeding. Two of the RAF's lawyers, Schily and Croissant, brought charges against the doctors responsible for it, accusing them of "deliberate mistreatment and sadistic torture." The hunger strike received wide publicity and the authorities eased the conditions somewhat. Again this sort of propaganda had a vital component for success: it was credible. As Rasch points out, the German authorities, who had tried so hard to create a "system which aimed at perfection cannot escape being labelled 'torture by isolation'" The RAF also succeeded in having changes made to the criminal code, and caused some people to question the state's treatment of it.

19 ibid., 5:12:74.
20 ibid., 2:11:80.
21 See Aust, op.cit., p. 261.
22 Rasch, op.cit., p. 83.
**Legislative Changes**

Conducting any kind of trial when the defendant refuses to co-operate with the court is extremely difficult. The RAF deliberately interrupted legal proceedings, which it refused to recognise anyway. In order to try and overcome the difficulties that the courts faced, a number of changes were made to the criminal code. In December 1974, two laws of significance were passed, and became effective on 1 January 1975. Both dealt with defending lawyers, some of whom had come under grave suspicion, especially since a letter written by Gudrun Ensslin in prison was found in Ulrike Meinhof’s possession at the time of her arrest. Under the first of these provisions, a defending lawyer could be prohibited from the defence if:

- there is serious suspicion that the defending lawyer may abuse his contacts with the defendant in prison for the purpose of putting in jeopardy the security of any institution;
- where there is serious suspicion that the defence lawyer is likely to abuse his privileges of contact with defendants; and
- where there is very strong suspicion of personal involvement by counsel in the commission of the crime, in benefiting from the profits of the crime, in assisting in the frustration of their recovery by the authorities, or in frustrating the apprehension, processing and disposition of the perpetrators of the crime.23

The second law prohibited lawyers from representing more than one defendant, and limited the number of counsel available to the defendant to three.

At the end of September 1975 a further legislative amendment provided that a trial could continue in the defendant’s absence, if the defendant’s incapacity to stand trial was self inflicted. As Fetscher points out, these now "in absentia trials break with a legal tradition that, with the exception of the Nazi era, has been followed in Germany since

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Certain rights were also given to the prosecution, such as the right to call witnesses without the consent of the judge, and to access defendant's confiscated mail.

Perhaps the most controversial measure of all was the Contact Ban introduced in 1977, in direct response to the Schleyer kidnapping. As early as 6 September, once the demands of the kidnappers had been clarified, prisoners were subject to a contact ban which extended to their defending lawyers. This was clearly unconstitutional, and some defending lawyers appealed to the constitutional court for an interim ruling. But before the court could give its ruling, a law had been passed establishing a legal basis for the contact ban. According to this new law a contact ban was justified if there was "acute threat to the life, limb, or liberty of a person" in which a terrorist group was believed to be involved. The ban, which was renewable, could be imposed for a period of thirty days, but had to be confirmed by a court within two weeks.

While on one level many of these measures may seem justified, they did cause concern among many West German lawyers and other observers. In 1978, while Croissant was on trial, The Times reported that of the thirty or so lawyers charged in connection with the RAF, the majority were on trial for "no more than what the Zeit recently called 'the normal fulfilling of a defence lawyer's duties'." According to The Times it was the lawyers' "eagerness to publicise the appalling conditions in which their clients were kept [that] was judged provocative." The same article claimed that lawyers inside and outside West Germany were concerned because,

the political pressure for a conviction now is considerable, and what better way is there to intimidate other lawyers, and crush opposition. ... The mass

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24 Fetscher, op.cit., p. 50.
25 ibid.
27 The Times, 26:5:78.
28 ibid.
of ordinary German lawyers is ashamed by what is happening. But they are also frightened. To practice in Germany every law student must do a period of training in a public office; if at the end of it his attitude is deemed unsuitable for defending the constitution, he will be kept from office. 29

Fetscher also finds changes to the criminal code "objectionable." He argues that they have "upset the delicate balance of defence and prosecution rights." 30

In terms of the RAF’s propaganda strategy all these measures were a success. Shortly after the beginning of the Stammheim trial, all three of Baader’s lawyers were removed on suspicion of complicity in the RAF actions. Meinhof’s lawyer was also removed. Baader quickly drew attention to this, saying,

[we had no intention of going along with the way this case had been stacked against us. And its impossible for anyone to appear for the defence in a trial where the law is being permanently altered the whole time, and where the legal process is unsatisfactory, and bent or made look ridiculous by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 31

The whole trial, argued Baader, proved the RAF’s analysis to be true.

The combination of prison conditions and these changes to the criminal code certainly provoked a number of accounts more sympathetic to the RAF than they otherwise might have been. 32 So it seems, therefore, that the use of such issues was at least a partially successful tactic for the RAF. However, as will be argued below, this support did not include a complete embracing of the RAF’s ideology, strategy or tactics.

In January 1972, at the height of the hunt for the RAF, the German government introduced a Radicals Edict which became popularly known as Berufsverbot (job ban).

29 ibid.
30 Fetscher, op.cit., p. 49.
31 Baader quoted in Aust, op.cit., p. 289.
The purpose of this edict was to ban from employment or tenured status in all government sponsored positions, people whose loyalty to the constitution was in question. While their behaviour may be perfectly legal, suspicion was frequently sufficient to have a person subjected to the *Berufsverbot*. In the first four years of its existence nearly half a million people were screened under the provisions of the Radicals Edict, not just for potential terrorist connections, but for any activity which might cast doubt on their political reliability. Obviously such a measure could be used to support the RAF's thesis of a repressive and fascist state. This could also be combined with credible allegations of ex-Nazis occupying prominent places in West German society. That the *Berufsverbot* attached a degree of credibility to part of the RAF's thesis seems undeniable. However, it did not attach credibility to their thesis as a whole, nor to their strategy.

In examining the areas in which the RAF was able to attract support or sympathy, one further issue needs to be addressed. The events in Stammheim gaol on the night of 17-18 October 1977, have left an aura of mystery and intrigue which have continued to fuel speculation and conspiracy theories. That this is so is due in part to the way the events and subsequent inquiry were conducted by the West German government. What exactly happened between the hours of midnight, when news of the successful operation at Mogadishu was released, and 7.45am when the mortally wounded body of Jan Carl Raspe was discovered in his cell, may never be known. The doubts that have been allowed to remain are an object lesson in how governments have unwittingly fuelled terrorist propaganda.

*Stammheim*

The deaths of Baader, Ensslin and Raspe produced widespread demonstrations and accusations that had been murdered by the state. Forty people were detained at the

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33 *The Times*, 26:5:78. For a fuller account of the operation of *Berufsverbot* and some case studies see M. Oppenheimer, "The Criminalization of Political Dissent in the Federal Republic of Germany," *Contemporary Crises*, (2) 1978, pp. 97-103.
joint funeral and, according to The Times, the previous weekend "a clandestine radio station in North Rhine Westphalia region urged listeners to destroy police stations, banks and two halls." Sympathisers also attacked West German targets in France, The Hague and Italy. Two years later violent demonstrations took place to mark the anniversary of the deaths, with more accusations that the three had been murdered by the state. On 18 October 1979, a crowd of about one hundred stormed a court in Hamburg, and rescued three women who had been charged with distributing leaflets blaming the deaths on the government.

Without doubt there are those who need no convincing that Baader, Ensslin and Raspe were murdered in Stammheim gaol, that a murderous attempt had also been made on Irmgard Möller, and that all references by the prisoners themselves and all other evidence were deliberately planted by the security forces to make the deaths look like suicides. Conversely, there are those equally committed to the suicide theory, who believed evidence was deliberately constructed by the terrorists to make their suicides look like murder. Some of the wilder conspiracy theories can easily be discounted, but others cannot. Many of the doubts about events in Stammheim centre on the single issue of whether or not the cells of Baader, Ensslin, Raspe and Möller were bugged by the authorities during part or all of the duration of the Schleyer kidnap.

The German authorities admitted to the bugging of cells (seven in all) at Stammheim on two occasions; during the Stockholm embassy siege in April-May 1975,

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34 The Times, 28:10:77.
35 See The Times, 22:10:77; and 27:10:77.
36 ibid., 19:10:79.
37 See Chapter 5.
38 Such as the weapons found in the cells.
39 One of the more outlandish rumours concerned grains of sand discovered on Andreas Baader’s shoes. This led to speculation that Baader had been flown to Mogadishu in an attempt to fool the hijackers, then shot by the authorities. However, even a supersonic jet would not have been able to make the return flight within the relevant time span.
and after the arrest of Siegfried Haag and Roland Meyer between December and January 1977. The authorities claimed that the listening devices were used only to monitor conversations between the defendants and their lawyers, and not between the defendants themselves. However, the number of cells bugged led Aust to formulate several hypotheses and questions which he relayed to the Interior Ministry of Baden-Württemberg:

According to further information before us, there were only four [of seven bugged] cells in which the prisoners talked to their defence lawyers.

Is all this information correct? ...

Is it not also correct that there was at least a chance of monitoring conversations between the prisoners themselves, as well as conversations with their lawyers? ...

According to information we have, the microphones were not primarily installed for the monitoring of the prisoners' conversations with their lawyers, but for the monitoring of conversations between themselves in the event of their being brought together before an exchange that might be brought about by blackmail through the taking of hostages.

This would then lead to the logical conclusion that conversations between the prisoners may possibly have been monitored in connection with the Schleyer kidnapping. ... Is it possible that anyone was tuned in to the communications system secretly constructed by the prisoners?40

The German authorities denied any bugging during the Schleyer kidnapping, but credible speculation nonetheless was possible. Indeed as the final pages of this thesis will postulate, much of the limited support for terrorism is as much the unintended result of government behaviour as it is of terrorist behaviour. The West German government, as were many other governments in Western Europe, was facing a type of terrorism that was qualitatively new. Twenty years on from the emergence of this new terrorism, it is time to take stock; to recognise the mistakes as mistakes and devise new strategies to remove areas where sympathy for terrorists is most likely to exist.

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40 Aust, op.cit., pp. 550-551. The communications system was the one devised using stereo equipment. This equipment was supposedly checked by the prison authorities for interference. The reason that they found no interference, postulates Aust, is that the authorities wanted to be able to monitor conversations between the prisoners. See p. 432.
However, if identifying areas where terrorist propaganda may generate support is important, then so is identifying those areas where support is least likely or where linkage to overall objectives is weak. In the case of the RAF, this involves an examination of how its ideology was viewed by its self-defined sympathetic audience - the Left, and particularly the student Left.

**Ideological Objectives and Strategy**

Chapter 3 discussed the influences on RAF ideology including Marxism/Leninism. That the RAF saw themselves as a Leninist-type cadre is revealed in the following;

What the Bolshevik cadre-party was for Lenin, the organisation of the proletarian counterpower is today, as it emerges from the guerrilla war under conditions of multinational organization of capital and the transnational structure of imperialist repression, both internally and externally.\(^41\)

However, the Left in West Germany generally realised the inapplicability of this to the parliamentary democracies of the West. The RAF’s basis for justifying armed revolution was therefore also denied. As Wellmer argues,

[O]nly a violent jumble of images and models in the terrorists’ fantasy can explain their conviction that a disruption of the cities brought about by armed conflict must lead to a better, liberated and socialist society.\(^42\)

Similarly, the RAF’s application of the guerrilla war theorists (Mao, Guevara, Marighella) was dismissed as totally unrealistic and inapplicable to the conditions in the Federal Republic. Admittedly even before the RAF emerged, orthodox communists had revised their notion of revolution to infiltration, but Lasky outlines Marxist charges against the RAF on more than strategic grounds;


\(^{42}\) *ibid.*
Why did they call themselves 'political prisoners' when all prisoners in a period of capitalist decline (from pickpockets to rapists) were products of a political system? Why did they, all scions of the middle class, flaunt in such an elitist way their battery of defence attorneys when so many poor convicts are helpless? How could they dare to be so arrogant as to dare to raise the call for Hunger Strikes among the prison population when most, in only for short sentences, would not want to risk permanent injury to their health? Baader-Meinhof were guilty of splitting tactics, elitist deviations, petty bourgeois illusions, infantile fantasies ...

The RAF’s claim that its actions would force the state to reveal its latent fascism which would then cause the masses to rise, also caused problems for the Left in Germany. The history of fascist Germany showed the futility of this argument. Similarly the increased powers given to the security forces as a direct result of the RAF’s actions provoked no cry of protest from the mass of Germans. The Left, therefore, had good reason to distance itself from the ideology and strategy of the RAF. The SPD and its student counterpart SDS, consistently did this (although as was noted in Chapter 5 the RAF totally rejected the SPD as embourgeoised).

Andreas Baader claimed that RAF’s aims should be formulated in a way that "any rocker, anyone who has done in his old lady will see himself in them." But this is essentially what the RAF did not do. Anyone who did struggle through the RAF’s writings rejected the inherent weakness in the line of analysis. Many of those on the Left who did give shelter to RAF members did so for reasons that had little or no connection to the RAF’s strategic aims. As this chapter has demonstrated, the RAF was able to generate support, but only around specific issues. However, before coming to some general conclusions, we need to assess the degree of success among the third target audience identified by this thesis as comprising the active volunteer.

43 Lasky, op.cit., p. 12.
44 Baader quoted in Aust, op.cit., p. 251.
THE ACTIVE VOLUNTEER

Two factors are obvious in assessing the degree of success of the RAF’s strategic aim with respect to this audience (to bind individuals to the cause through action, and once bound to keep them there). One is the fact that the RAF has continued to exist over a period of twenty years. While the German authorities have had considerable success in apprehending RAF members, the RAF has been able to replace captured members on a fairly consistent basis. The second is the seemingly high incidence of recidivism among RAF prisoners. At least part of the reason for this is the efficacy of the RAF’s prison system.

The importance of isolating the active volunteer from alternative sources of propaganda was stressed in Chapter 6. It was also concluded that the RAF’s conspiratorial life underground facilitated this process. Baumann describes the effects of such a lifestyle:

You start developing the instincts of an animal of prey. After a while, you just run around like a gunman. Any sharp eye could recognize you. It’s crazy what you do, always running around with a gun. A man who runs around with a gun anchors his center on the weapon - where you carry it, that’s your center, you move so that you can always pull it out any time, anywhere. ... You only have contact with other people as objects, when you meet somebody all you say is, listen old man, you have to get me this or that, rent me a place to live, here or there, and in three days we’ll meet here at this corner. If he has any criticism of you, you say, that doesn’t interest me at all. Either you participate, or you leave it, easy and clear. At the end it’s caught up with you - you become like the apparatus you fight against.45

It is this sort of internal pressure, accentuated by external pressure (the closing in of the security forces) that is responsible for the RAF’s extremely polemical stance. Everyone was either for it or a police sympathiser;

Either a pig or a human being
either survival at any price
or a fight to the death
either a problem or a solution
nothing in between.46

The early biographical details of many RAF members, particularly Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin,47 suggest that they were not only intelligent people but also extremely compassionate. Indeed both Meinhof and Ensslin had, at some stage of their lives, strong religious convictions. Meinhof had first become involved in politics through the movement opposing West German rearmament, and Ensslin spent many years working with young homeless people in Frankfurt. Both were extremely dissatisfied with West German society, which they felt had lost all contact with human values, was refusing to expunge its Nazi past, and was only interested in the production of capital wealth. Both were disgusted at the Cold War dominance of international relations, and particularly at American involvement in Vietnam. It should also be said that Meinhof, Ensslin and all the other founder members of the RAF were very much a product of the heady 'student power/Che Guevara' days of the late 1960's. What has to be conceded about the RAF in its early days, is that its members were motivated, at least in part, by a genuine desire to produce a better society and an international environment not based on imperialist power blocks.

The RAF’s movement towards the extreme can also be expressed in terms of its members’ frustration at the seeming impossibility of change, caused first by the SPD’s Grand Coalition with the CDU/CSU in 1966, and then by the fading of the Extraparlamentary Opposition. As the members of the RAF became more and more isolated from alternative sources of propaganda or information, and from the people it purported to represent, so their views became more extreme, unrealistic and desperate. In

46 RAF quoted in Aust op.cit., p. 543.
47 Some authors suggest that Baader’s motivation was criminal, or that he was attracted by a cult of violence. (See, for example. Pridham, op. cit., p. 25 and Becker, "Hitler’s Children ...", op.cit.) Aust suggests that Ruhland was motivated simply by money. Aust op. cit., p. 107.
such a situation it is not surprising to find inward looking propaganda concentrating on the need for action and then justifying the actions taken. The net result was propaganda successful in reinforcing the beliefs of its own producers, Difficult as it may be to believe, the initial RAF members had complete and unshakable faith in their ideology and the strategy it dictated. In this respect the propaganda they produced for themselves was more or less completely successful. But what of propaganda designed to increase the number of active volunteers? The main founders of the RAF, Mahler, Meinhof, Baader and Ensslin, were, after all, taken into custody within the first two years of the RAF's active existence.

Estimates of the number of active volunteers vary enormously, and are clearly related to particular types of events and to the general perception of threat caused by the RAF. In 1970, as the RAF concentrated on logistical exercises, Karl-Heinz Ruhland was approached to 'disguise' stolen cars. At this stage Ruhland put the number of active volunteers at twenty-five. By 1975, after many RAF actions, and a propaganda campaign focussing on the harsh treatment of prisoners and including hunger strikes, estimates of the numbers involved had risen to "about 150." After the traumatic experiences of 1977, the number of terrorists had supposedly risen again; the number of terrorists presently [1977] under arrest is 103, and 123 trials against terrorists have been conducted. Yet, an estimated 100 hardcore terrorists are still at large, 30 of whom have been identified and are wanted by the police.

By 1979, after a lull in RAF activity, the numbers had once again declined. In May Horst Herold, President of the Bundeskriminalamt, (BKA) revealed that "39 persons including 31 'hardcore' terrorists were currently wanted in the Federal Republic in connection with

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48 Ultimately Mahler, Proll, Klein and Baumann were all to concede that in some ways their ideology and strategy were wrong.


51 Fetscher, op.cit., p. 49.
terrorist offences."52 However, after yet more hunger strikes and a propaganda campaign targeting growing anti-nuclear sentiment, the West German Ministry of Interior believed the RAF’s hardcore had been reactivated and numbered "around 500."53 This contrasts sharply with Horchem’s estimate that in the early 1980’s the core of active volunteers numbered around ten.54

This sharp divergence is, no doubt, explained by perceptions of threat and the government’s lack of a rigorous definition of what constitutes an active volunteer and what constitutes a sympathiser. It also raises the question of just how many active volunteers are needed to conduct a terrorist campaign in a Western democracy such as the Federal Republic of Germany. One determining factor is the group’s ability to procure the necessary resources, both in military and non-military terms. In the case of most terrorist groups in Western Europe, it is probably the non-military resources that are the most important. The international ‘black’ market in weapons, the ability to create explosive devices from commercially available materials, and liberal democracy’s inability to impose or create absolute security are all factors contributing to the relative ease of military operations. But what is absolutely essential is the support environment; the availability of people willing to supply false documents, rent cars or apartments, and otherwise place at least some barrier between the terrorists and the security forces. One factor limiting the RAF’s ability to create a significant or even stable basis for this support environment is its lack of consistent income. To finance itself the RAF uses mainly extortion (including kidnapping) and bank robberies, something that distinguishes it from the Provisional IRA. However, as this thesis hopefully has shown, the RAF’s propaganda, based on its ideology, is another and possibly the major limiting factor.

53 ibid., vol. XXXI 1985, p. 33748B.
54 Horchem, "The Development of West German Terrorism," op. cit., p. 12
The RAF's propaganda has created a small dedicated group of active volunteers who, through processes of isolation from society and internal means of reinforcement, unshakably believe in their cause and strategy. The cause and strategy as revealed in propaganda, however, has produced only a proportionally small supportive environment. A sympathetic environment has been created in limited circumstances where propaganda can be shown to have some credible relation to the actions of the state, but the RAF's propaganda failed to create any real link between these limited instances of sympathy and its strategy. The propaganda aimed at the committed audience had an impact only when it was violent, and the reaction it produced was not in accordance with the RAF's ideology. In summary, the RAF's propaganda was certainly consistent with its ideology. But this ideology was consistent neither with the realities of the Federal Republic, nor with the historical experiences of Germany. Thus it was always possible to predict that the RAF would fail in its objectives. That is not to say that it presented no danger at all to West German democracy. The danger, however, came more from a threat of over-reaction by the West German authorities. The RAF has also cost the West Germans: people have been killed; property has been destroyed, requiring massive insurance payouts; and resources devoted to security have increased dramatically. The ideological devotion of a very few makes it impossible to say with certainty that the RAF will not continue to threaten and cost the Federal Republic. But considering those areas where the RAF has been able to achieve 'a degree of success', and devising strategies for any future need to counter these areas is of great importance. Removing areas of support or sympathy will not cause the immediate disappearance of the RAF, but as Günther Grass points out, reasoning with ideologues is futile. Narrowing even further the RAF's supportive environment may cause it to burn itself out.55

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Guelke argues that Northern Ireland reveals the clear differences between international legitimacy and internal legitimacy.\textsuperscript{56} He then goes on to argue that because the dominant international perception of ‘self’ in self-determination relates to a territorial criterion rather than an ethnic or cultural one, the nationalist perspective of Northern Ireland “has had the greatest influence on the views of the rest of the world.”\textsuperscript{57} Guelke uses the \textit{New Ireland Forum Report}\textsuperscript{58} to formulate three main tenets of the nationalist perspective. Firstly, that Northern Ireland is an artificially created entity, which prior to the 1920 Treaty had been part of the single unit of Ireland. Secondly, that the December 1918 election mandated that Ireland should remain a single unit, and therefore Northern Ireland’s inclusion in the United Kingdom represented a direct denial of the Irish people’s right to self-determination. And thirdly, Britain’s continued presence in Northern Ireland constitutes a form of colonial rule.\textsuperscript{59} This chapter hopes to demonstrate that Guelke’s thesis provides the Provisionals with the ‘lowest common denominator’ for their propaganda among all audiences.

Chapter 4 identified the uncommitted audience as the British general public and the non-ethnically Irish international community. The sympathetic audience identified in Chapter 5 centred on the Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland, but also included the Republic of Ireland and ethnically Irish communities abroad. The nationalist perspective outlined above allows for two frameworks of analysis within which the Provisionals’

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{ibid.}, pp. 39-44.
\textsuperscript{59} Guelke, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 44-45.
propaganda can be accommodated, and which correspond, more or less, to the uncommitted and sympathetic audiences. As regards the sympathetic audience, the framework is simply an historic analysis that presents Britain as an oppressive and occupying colonial power, in a country in which it has inflicted and continues to inflict suffering and misery on the native population. Although the dominant perception of self-determination supports this view, its images are essentially internal, focussing on Irish history and historical figures. The second framework of analysis into which the Provisionals can fit their propaganda, although it arrives at the same basic premise that the source of Ireland’s problems is the British presence in Northern Ireland, uses different reference points. This is a distinctly left-wing analysis that presents British policies in Ireland, including the creation and maintenance of Northern Ireland, as imperialistic and designed only to protect British strategic and capitalist interests. It is with this analysis, particularly among the British left, that we begin an examination of the success of the Provisional IRA’s propaganda.

THE UNCOMMITTED AUDIENCE

British Public Opinion

As stated in Chapter 3, radical socialism has always been a part of Republican ideology, although in terms of motivating support it has always been the least successful. It was also argued that the socialist tendencies of today’s Provisionals are more a marriage of convenience than a deeply held or realistic analysis of the situation. The Provisionals’ socialist pronouncements contain elements of opportunism, and their target is essentially the British left. To what extent the British left’s analysis of Northern Ireland exists independently of the Provisional IRA is a moot question, for without the existence of the Provisional IRA the Northern Ireland situation/problem would undoubtedly be different. However, two things point to the British left’s being heavily influenced by the Provisional IRA’s analysis. Firstly, British left-wing interest in Northern Ireland was virtually non-existent before 1969. And secondly, the analysis of
the more genuinely left-wing Workers’ Party is largely ignored, except by the British Irish Communist Organisation. Even if the British left’s analysis does exist totally independently from the Provisional IRA’s, it still provides an environment into which the Provisionals can slot their propaganda, and which has certainly brought them some political allies in British left-wing politics and academia.

In his book *The Politics of Irish Freedom*, Gerry Adams declares,

> [t]he British government and army have no right to Ireland and no right to be in Ireland. ... Ireland is historically, culturally and geographically one single unit. ... The British connection denies civil and human rights to the Irish people and is maintained by concentration camps, summary executions, torture, paid perjurers and kangaroo courts. ... The pro-British elements will face up to the reality of the situation only when the British prop and the system which uses them as its tools and its storm troopers is removed.60

All these themes are common in left wing analyses and declarations from British academics and politicians. Geoffrey Bell, an often quoted left wing writer, bases his “suitable case for withdrawal” by the British on three arguments which are virtually synonymous with Adams’ argument cited above. Firstly, he says that long established socialist principles accord a democratic justification for self-determination. Secondly, that the British presence in Ireland has historically been shown to be the major cause of Irish trouble and continues to be so. And thirdly, history denies the six counties of Northern Ireland any existence outside the rest of Ireland.61 Michael Farrell, who was prominent in the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, is another analyst who has had considerable impact on left wing thinking on Ireland. He too, centres the problems in Northern Ireland on the British presence, arguing that British military and financial support has always been the Northern Irish state’s "ultimate line of defence."62

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While this analysis is based on some false premises and blatantly ignores others, it is, no doubt, genuinely believed by many. And what is of interest here is that this analysis provides an environment amenable to many other aspects of Provisional IRA propaganda, such as blaming all violence on the government, attacks on the credibility of the government and security forces, and the acute disadvantaging of a particular section of society.

In recent years the most prominent and outspoken British politician favouring British withdrawal has been Ken Livingstone, former head of the Greater London Council and now a Westminster MP. Some of his Labour colleagues on the GLC, particularly Steve and Cathy Bundred, have also adopted a pro-Republican stance. In July 1981, Livingstone met the mother of a hunger striker in London, and after the meeting declared that the "H-Block protests are about the struggle to bring about a free, United Ireland. They have my support." In October, after a nail bomb in Chelsea had killed two and injured thirty-eight, Livingstone stated, "[a]s long as we are in Ireland people will be letting off bombs in London ... ." A year later Steve Bundred told an anti-internment rally that the bombing campaign in Great Britain and Northern Ireland would continue until the "war" ends. The "war" could only be ended by British withdrawal and the removal of partition. Such statements undoubtedly add to the Provisional IRA's efforts to create a climate of fear and crisis among the British public, and particularly among the Protestant communities of Northern Ireland. They also reveal

63 For a left wing critique of the left wing analysis see P. Bew and H. Patterson, The British State and the Ulster Crisis, London: Verso, 1985. While agreeing that British interests are imperialist, the authors argue that left wing views on Northern Ireland seriously underestimate the indigenous support for the British connection (p. 143). This book remains one of the most outstanding analyses of Northern Ireland from any quarter.

64 Livingstone quoted in Clarke, op.cit., p. 182.

65 The Sun, 13:10:81.

66 Belfast Telegraph, 9:8:82.

67 See also the Irish News, 9:8:82.
an acceptance of the Provisional IRA’s argument that it cannot be beaten, and therefore victory is inevitable.

In December 1982, Livingstone invited Adams, Morrison and McGuinness to London "to discuss ways of bringing about a British withdrawal and the reunification of Ireland." Shortly after this a bomb exploded at a disco in Ballykelly which killed sixteen, eleven of whom were British soldiers. This, and a strong British public reaction against Livingstone’s invitation, led to the Home Secretary serving exclusion orders on the Sinn Fein trio under the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Livingstone, undeterred, chose to visit Belfast early in the new year. Amongst other things Livingstone claimed "clearly British troops are being used to impose control on the Catholic population." Livingstone went on to predict a British withdrawal within the next decade, and to claim an overwhelming majority in the constituency Labour Parties favouring immediate withdrawal. Livingstone and Greater London Council colleagues are certainly not the only prominent advocates of British withdrawal.

In the aftermath of the 1981 hunger strike, several British newspapers and periodicals published surveys claiming majority (though not overwhelming) support for British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. The Sunday Times in August 1981, made a brief flirtation with the idea of British withdrawal, not however, in favour of a united Ireland, but in favour of an independent Ulster. The New Society poll quoted 54% in favour of withdrawal but only 21% in favour of the idea of Irish unification. In the Daily

70 ibid.
71 Daily Star, 15:5:81, 59% in favour of British withdrawal. New Society, 24:9:81, 54% supported British troop withdrawal immediately or within the next five years. Sunday Times, 21:12:81, 63% said they would vote against Northern Ireland remaining in the United Kingdom in a referendum.
72 Sunday Times, 16:8:81. This argument was put forward on the basis that "the root Catholic instinct in the North is a rejection of British rule: nothing else." For a critique of this see. C.C. O’Brien’s reply in the Observer, 23:8:81, and the letters page of the Sunday Times, 23:8:81.
Star poll only 4% were prepared to express a positive sympathy with the hunger strikers. This very low reservoir of sympathy for the hunger strikers is confirmed by the fact that a London demonstration against the death of Bobby Sands attracted only 3,000. Indeed the Provisional IRA support group "Troops Out" has been unsuccessful in attracting British popular support for demonstrations against British presence or British policy in Northern Ireland. It certainly seems undeniable that there is considerable public discomfort about the presence in Northern Ireland, but there is equally clearly immense public antipathy towards the Provisional IRA, as can be demonstrated by public reaction to its violence, particularly on the mainland.

British public reaction against the Provisional IRA was most evident after two explosions in Birmingham on 21 November 1984, which killed 21 and injured over 150. This resulted in the proscribing of the IRA in Britain and the speedy introduction of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The Birmingham bombings also provoked a call in Parliament for the reintroduction of the death penalty which was defeated by 369 votes to 217. Similar outcries occurred after the assassination of Earl Mounbatten in August 1979, after Provisional IRA bombs exploded in London in July 1982, killing twelve army musicians and maiming many other soldiers, civilians and horses, and after the Brighton Hotel attack on the Conservative Party conference in October 1984. While there is undoubtedly a certain emotional appeal in arguing that British soldiers and therefore British lives are being lost for someone else’s cause, much of the British public’s negative feelings towards Northern Ireland can be explained by sheer frustration at the seeming irresolvable nature of the conflict. They have witnessed their government and army being maligned in the international community for abusing even the most fundamental of human rights. That this is so is due, in part, to the behaviour of both Protestant extremists and Unionist politicians, but also to a relentless Provisional IRA propaganda campaign targeting the credibility of the British government and its security forces.

73 Daily Star, 15:5:81.
As discussed in Chapter 5, allegations of torture began with the internment procedure instigated in August 1971. Within a couple of months the *Sunday Times* was declaring

> there is now a weight of circumstantial evidence which cannot be brushed aside that the interrogation techniques used in Ulster ... ought to be unacceptable in a civilized country.\(^{74}\)

The next day Edward Heath announced that there would be an official inquiry into the allegations of mistreatment,\(^{75}\) and the already existing Compton Commission had its terms of reference widened to include allegations of torture. The Compton Report’s conclusion that torture implied that the inflictor derived pleasure from his actions, and that therefore the British Army was not guilty of torture, remains as a damning indictment of British government policy in Northern Ireland. The Report was widely condemned throughout Britain, Ireland and the US. The Irish government immediately announced that it would be requesting that the European Commission on Human Rights investigate the allegations of torture. A letter written by Graham Greene, to the *New York Times* is indicative of the criticism faced by the British government about this Report:

> Mr Maudling ... suggests that no one has suffered permanent injury from this form of torture, by standing long hours pressed against a wall, hooded in darkness, isolated and deprived of hearing as well as sight by permanent noise, prevented in the intervals of the ordeal from sleep. These were the methods we condemned in the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia and in the case of Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary. Slansky is dead; he cannot be asked by Mr Maudling how permanent was the injury he suffered, but one would like to know the opinion of the cardinal on methods which when applied by Communists or Fascists we call ‘torture’ and when applied by the British become down-graded to ‘ill-treatment’. ... How can any Englishman now protest against torture in Vietnam, in Greece, in Brazil, in the psychiatric wards of the USSR without being told, ‘You have a double standard: one for others and another for your own country’.\(^{76}\)

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\(^{74}\) *Sunday Times*, 17:10:71.

\(^{75}\) These allegations were based on the five techniques.

In September 1976, the European Commission found against Britain and the case proceeded to the European Court of Human Rights. After the Commission’s findings Britain suffered another round of attacks on its credibility:

Britain holds the unenviable distinction of being the only European country to be accused before the Human Rights Commission twice (the last time was in Cyprus). The techniques of sensory deprivation were not applied to only 14 men in Belfast as long ago as 1971. ... They have been used in varying combinations by British Army interrogators in almost every colonial campaign the UK has fought since the end of World War II.77

In 1978, the European Court eventually ruled that the five techniques did not constitute torture. In the meantime the British government had accepted the recommendations of Lord Gardiner, abandoned the techniques in question and compensated those involved. Whether the five techniques in question did constitute torture as opposed to ill-treatment, is essentially a definitional problem as not all ill-treatment is torture. This thesis accepts that they were used, and argues with Lord Gardiner that the techniques were “illegal alike by the law of England and the law of Northern Ireland.”78 And in using these techniques, whatever the justification, the British government gave the Provisional IRA a successful and credible propaganda line.

However, the abandonment of the five techniques did not end allegations of torture and brutality although the centre of these allegations shifted to the RUC and the Castlereagh Holding Centre in Belfast. In June 1978, after a series of media disclosures, an Amnesty International Mission concluded,

[0]n the basis of information available to it, Amnesty International believes that maltreatment of suspected terrorists by the RUC has taken place with sufficient frequency to warrant the establishment of a public inquiry to investigate it.79

77 *New Statesman*, 10:9:76.
The Government responded with the Bennett Report into interrogation techniques. Bennett’s recommendations, including the video taping of interviews, were all implemented and the number of complaints against the RUC fell dramatically.\textsuperscript{80} Still the indefensible behaviour of a section of the RUC and the British government’s failure to counter it, gave the Provisionals more valuable and credible propaganda, and led to writers such as Kelley and Curtis giving the impression that all Provisional IRA suspects were callously tortured by all members of the RUC.\textsuperscript{81}

The RUC was again at the centre of an embarrassing episode for the British government, involving the Deputy Chief Constable of Manchester, John Stalker. Stalker had been asked by the Chief Constable of the RUC to investigate a number of fatal shootings by the RUC in 1982. But before Stalker could finish the inquiry, he was removed and suspended from the police force on the flimsiest of evidence. Although it was denied by the government and the RUC that Stalker’s removal had any connection with his work in Northern Ireland, it was generally believed that he was about to uncover evidence pointing to a RUC shoot-to-kill policy. Stalker, in his account of these bizarre and intricate events, seems reluctant to use such terminology, but clearly suggests that an informant led the RUC to target several of those shot in revenge for a land mine explosion which had killed three policemen in November 1982.\textsuperscript{82} Coincidentally, like the suicides at Stammheim gaol, a tape recording of events that led to the shooting of Richard McCauley (not fatally) and Michael Tighe in a hay shed in County Armagh in November 1982, lay at the centre of the controversy. Although Stalker was able to establish the existence of the tape recording, he was unable to procure it, and it was at


\textsuperscript{81} Kelley, \textit{op.cit.}, especially p. 299-300, and Curtis, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 51-67. Curtis also accuses the media of aiding the government cover up of torture.

this stage that he was removed from the inquiry. Stalker’s report was completed by Colin Sampson, Deputy Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, but in February 1988, the Attorney General decided that no charges would be brought against any member of the RUC. Stalker, however, in his book levels some very serious charges against the RUC, including conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, and alleges some chronic weaknesses in the RUC operating procedure. The issues raised by Stalker, including MI5 and MI6 involvement in Northern Ireland, are extremely complex and are outside the scope of this thesis. What is not however, is the blundering and clumsy manner in which these events were handled by the British government. The Stalker episode is another object lesson in governments transferring credibility to the terrorists’ cause. It is by ruthlessly exploiting British policy mistakes in Northern Ireland, rather than through its own actions, that the Provisional IRA has been able to attract the most support among the uncommitted audience.

Within Britain, Northern Ireland is simply not high on the national political agenda. Northern Ireland is discussed regularly in parliament when emergency legislation is renewed, bi-annually in the case of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, and annually in the case of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act. Debates on Northern Ireland also take place periodically, when there appears to be a new political initiative or a deterioration in the security situation. The Labour Party has an official policy of unity by ‘consent’. But there is also a recognition that the prospect of such consent is so remote as to allow for a fairly bi-partisan

83 Stalker, op. cit., p. 9 and p. 92.
84 Another very complex and very controversial issue is the use of the police in military type situations. The RUC officers involved in the incidents investigated by Stalker had been specially trained in SAS techniques. Indeed many of them were ex-British soldiers. There are clearly operational, moral and political problems in expecting the militarily trained personnel to operate within the civil policing model so fiercely defended in the United Kingdom as a whole. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see K. Bryett, The Effects of Political Terrorism on the Police in Great Britain and Northern Ireland since 1969, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1987.
85 See speeches by Peter Archer and Clive Soley in HC Debs., series 6, vol. 63, 1983-84, cols. 30-37, and cols. 96-101 respectively.
approach to Northern Ireland. This is reflected in the massive majority (473 to 47) given to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which, as Kenny points out, was "one of the largest majorities on a division in Parliamentary history."86 Those in the Labour Party, such as Livingstone, who have chosen to meet with Sinn Fein have been roundly and categorically condemned by Leader Neil Kinnock.87 However, all in all, the Provisional IRA can claim to have had a degree of success as regards the British component of the uncommitted audience.

In attempting to align themselves with other ‘national liberation’ groups, the Provisional IRA has offered NATO as a rationale for the British wanting to maintain their presence in Northern Ireland;

The British presence, which once made sense in classic imperialist/capitalist terms, can only now be explained in terms of strategic interest, of NATO and can properly be defined as political imperialism.88

Following this line of analysis, Adams, in his 1985 presidential address, claims that the natural and logical place for Ireland is alongside the Palestinians, the Chileans, El Salvadorans and Nicaraguans. ... We are anti-imperialists ...89

The Irish Republican support group of Great Britain supports this line recognising

the Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army as sections of the liberation movement in Ireland, with status alongside the PLO, ANC, and the FMLA in El Salvador.90

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86 A. Kenny, op.cit., p. 117.
88 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 5:4:84. British politician Tony Benn seemingly accepts this and argues that "the occupation of Ireland is primarily a defence issue - it is like a curious cul-de-sac of NATO." The British Troops Out Movement has also supported this analysis. See Bew and Patterson, op.cit., p. 141.
This leads to a consideration of the extent to which the rest of the uncommitted audience, i.e., the international community, has been influenced by Provisional IRA propaganda.

**International Public Opinion**

In the early 1970's, communist coverage of Northern Ireland centred on the colonial/imperialist nature of the British presence, rejecting any indigenous causes of the conflict. Radio Tirana of Albania, for example, in July 1970, broadcast that the "true causes of this revolt have their roots in the 700-year old, ruthless colonial oppression of the Irish people by the English colonialists." China's news agency referred to "savage oppression by British imperialist troops," and Radio Prague argued that the violence is not the product of sectarian differences. The British government is now attempting to describe the events in Belfast and other cities as an expression of religious unrest and the role of the British troops as that of keeping order and preventing clashes between the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority. It is, however, a class-motivated social and political struggle of the oppressed Catholics against the Protestant majority. The unrest in Northern Ireland at the same time, however, gives expression to the colonialist policy of the British government.

However, with the exception of Iran and Libya (which did nothing to increase or enhance the Provisional IRA's credibility) governments have refrained from supporting the Provisional IRA. Among the European democracies support for the Provisionals has been limited to individuals, or members of minority political parties. International attendance and declarations of support at the annual Ard Fheis are certainly given prominent coverage by Sinn Fein. For example, Sinn Fein claimed over forty foreign observers at their 1981 Ard Fheis from Norway, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Britain. "Greetings" were reportedly sent by the Italian Euro-MP Mario Capana, and messages of solidarity from six Danish MPs, the Canadian Party of Labour, the Communist League of Germany and the Socialist League in Denmark. Sinn Fein

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92 *ibid.*, p. 88.
93 *ibid.*
arranged a special meeting for these foreign visitors to discuss "the development of interest, raised by the hunger strike, into campaigns calling for the withdrawal of British troops and self-determination for the Irish people."94

The Provisional IRA is certainly aware of the existence of an uncommitted audience, and of the two components which make it up. It has developed, unlike the RAF, a considerable infrastructure to market its propaganda abroad. The Irish Republican Information Service is the agent through which press releases etc. are disseminated, and the press centres located in Belfast and Dublin enthusiastically provide foreign journalists with 'information'. The Provisional IRA has clearly had a degree of success in attaching credibility to its cause in the international environment. In doing this, it has been able to deflect attention away from its own behaviour towards British behaviour. The Republic of Ireland did in 1969 try to encourage the United Nations to send a peace keeping mission to Northern Ireland, but the issue failed to reach the agenda of the Security Council. United Nations consideration of Northern Ireland has been limited to periodic statements by Irish politicians in the General Assembly. In general the international community has tended to accept Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom and views the problems as internal British ones.95

While the existence of a sympathetic Norwegian MP is not essential to the everyday existence of the Provisional IRA, it is certainly an indication of movement between the target audiences and an increased sensitivity to further propaganda. It is to propaganda aimed at the sympathetic audience, mainly within Ireland, that we now turn.

95 Libya and Iran have certainly supported the Provisional IRA, although this is closely related to the state of their relations with Britain.
THE SYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE

As with the RAF, it is possible to correlate successes in Provisional IRA propaganda with the general headings of security force behaviour, prison conditions especially the 1981 hunger strike and legislative changes. Added to this is the Provisionals' use of Sinn Fein. However, the major difference between the RAF and the Provisional IRA is that where the Left, even the extreme Left, in Germany had good reason to maintain a sharp ideological and practical distinction from the RAF and its objectives, the Provisional IRA's objective of a united Ireland is actually enshrined in the constitution of the Republic of Ireland. In practice this gives the Provisional IRA a credibility that the RAF could never claim to have. This credibility is enhanced even further when the Provisional IRA's tactical objectives are closely aligned with the objectives of constitutional nationalism expressed by the SDLP and the Republic of Ireland, as was the case in the 'Smash Stormont' campaign. Indeed, after the demise of the Stormont government Adams claimed that the Provisional IRA was acting on behalf of all those who wished to see the removal of Stormont.96 This credibility, derived from the objectives of constitutional nationalism, and primarily from the Republic of Ireland, is the biggest single factor in explaining the Provisional IRA's propaganda success. It follows from this that the Republic of Ireland and the SDLP have certainly as much to contribute towards defeating the Provisional IRA as the British. However, by the same token, the illegitimacy of the means used by the Provisional IRA in pursuit of these objectives explains why it is so rejected by the voters of the Republic of Ireland, and why it remains a terrorist organisation.

Security Force Behaviour

As was discussed in Chapter 4, the first task for the Provisionals was to present Northern Ireland in 1969-1970 in terms of the historic struggle for a united and independent Ireland. To do this the British army had to be recast as the oppressors, and

the Provisional IRA as the defenders, of the Catholic community. It was immediately admitted by the Provisionals that it was the August 1971 introduction of internment which enabled them to do this.97 Most commentators agree with this assessment. Bowyer Bell, for example, says that "[i]nternment did not crush the Provos but unleashed them."98 Apart from the fact that bad intelligence led to the internment of large numbers of innocent people, its demonstrably one sided (anti-Catholic) bias had the effect of alienating many previously neutral and middle-class Catholics - especially since much of the initial violence was actually the responsibility of Protestant extremists. The British Army's change of image was completed six months later when on 30 January 1972 13 civilians were shot dead by troops at the culmination of a civil rights march in Londonderry. Interpreting the events of 'Bloody Sunday' remains one of the most controversial issues in the history of the current troubles. Kelley tells of a Provisional IRA agent within the Army reporting that a few days before the march a sergeant-major said "[w]e're going into Derry and these fuckers are going to get their come-uppance."99 At the other extreme, Tugwell quotes an ex-Provisional who fled to Australia as saying "the Bloody Sunday massacre was the most devious bit of propaganda ever perpetrated by our group."100 The official Widgery Report concluded that all thirteen were innocent but, that the Army as a whole was not guilty.101

These two events combined gave the Provisionals an image that was based on a credible derivation of fact. The insensitive and clumsy handling of the internment operation, and the image of 13 dead men, allowed the Provisionals to present themselves

97 See page 115, Chapter 4.
99 Kelley, op.cit., p. 162.
100 Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda ....," op.cit., p. 261 quoting from Sunday Independent, (Western Australia) 27:1:74.
as the only force able to defend Catholics from Protestants, and now also from the traditional enemy, the British Army. The response in the Republic of Ireland was both immediate and violent. Two days after ‘Bloody Sunday’ a large crowd attacked and burnt the British Embassy in Dublin, and the Irish Prime Minister declared that there would be a day of national mourning for the 13 dead. The SDLP, which had already withdrawn from Stormont in protest against internment, was forced to become more and more isolated from any sort of normal political contact with its largely Roman Catholic electorate. The Provisionals were able to exploit the void and this period, Sands’ election in 1981 notwithstanding, marks the high point of Provisional influence. Within a couple of months Stormont, the bastion of Protestant rule, was suspended, and a major Provisional IRA tactical objective achieved.

The great relief and hope generated among the Catholic community in Northern Ireland and in the Republic by the suspension of Stormont was not capitalised on by the Provisional IRA or anyone else. The Provisionals’ continuing violence began a very lean period for them. However, events over these six months demonstrated how successful the Provisionals could be when they could be seen in a defensive role, and, more importantly, how crucial the behaviour of the security forces is in countering terrorism. The Provisionals have continued to try and maintain their image of defenders by provoking sectarian tension and then warning of a ‘Protestant backlash’. The Provisionals have also continued to exploit every death at the hands of the security forces as a brutal act of aggression. Even when volunteers are killed in action, such as at Loughall in 1987, the Provisional IRA claim its members are deliberately shot when in fact, they could have been arrested. But although the British have continued to make blunders in Northern Ireland, none have been on the scale of the internment operation or

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102 The threat of a Protestant backlash is one of the few inconsistencies in Provisional IRA propaganda. It tends to be played up in propaganda aimed at the Catholic community in Northern Ireland and played down whenever anyone else suggests it as a possibility.

103 See An Phoblacht/Republican News, 14:5:87. The Provisional IRA statement after Loughall reads, in part, "[v]olunteers who shot their way out of the ambush and escaped saw other Volunteers being shot on the ground after being captured."
'Bloody Sunday'. From the mid-1970's onwards, Provisional IRA propaganda focussing on the behaviour of the security forces has centred on treatment while on remand and in prison. The legislative and judicial processes under which Provisional IRA members are convicted are also attacked and, like the RAF, this is an area where some success in generating a sympathetic audience is evident.

**Legislative Changes**

In 1973 the British government accepted most of the provisions of Lord Diplock's enquiry into legal measures to combat terrorism. The major recommendation of this enquiry was the establishment of non-jury courts to try 'scheduled', i.e. terrorist, offences. This and other aspects of the Diplock Report were incorporated in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (EPA). Under the provisions of the EPA, a person may now be arrested and held for 72 hours, and can be photographed and fingerprinted without being charged. A parallel measure was introduced for the whole United Kingdom under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (PTA). Under this Act, a person may now be held for 48 hours, and for a further five days if permission is granted by the Home Secretary or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The PTA also allows for the exclusion of any person from mainland Britain. The main Provisional IRA arguments against these laws are that they are applied indiscriminately, and are used simply for the purposes of harassment and information gathering. For example, Adams claims that in 1973, the security forces searched 75,000, one fifth of the number of houses in the whole of the 6 counties; almost every

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104 At the time of writing the full ramifications of the 'Gibraltar shootings' are not apparent, but it seems unlikely that they will provoke a backlash on the same scale as 'Bloody Sunday'. While it may not have been necessary to shoot dead the three Provisional IRA members, it is clear that they were far from being innocent civilians, unlike the 13 killed in 'Bloody Sunday'.


106 The Act was amended slightly in 1975 and 1978.

107 This Act was amended in 1976 and in 1984.
house searched was in a nationalist area." But more significantly the Republic of Ireland has attacked these measures in similar terms. The legislation, it is claimed, has led to the harassment of the civilian population by use of abnormally wide powers of arrest and detention, exercised not for the purpose of bringing suspects before a court of justice and making them amenable to a process of law but for the purpose of gathering information and unjustifiably invading the privacy of a person's life; e.g. between 1978 and 1982 more than 22,000 people were arrested and interrogated, the vast majority being released without charge.

Arousing even more controversy is Section 8 of the EPA which allows for the admissibility of confessions as long as they are not obtained by torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.

Walsh, in a generally exaggerated account of the operation of emergency legislation in Northern Ireland, argues that section 8 bears "considerable responsibility" for abuses of persons in custody as it renders "admissible confessions which would otherwise be inadmissible at common law." The concern is not only that the confessions are obtained by ill-treatment of some sort, but that uncorroborated confessions are accepted so often. Both Kelley and Adams quote Amnesty International figures as showing that between 70% and 90% of the convictions obtained through the Diplock courts are on the basis of confessions made while in custody.

The use of 'supergrasses' is another area in the administration of justice that has raised many questions and produced profitable propaganda for the Provisional IRA. Questions most often raised about the use of supergrasses involve the use of questionable

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and uncorroborated evidence (mainly the confession and subsequent allegations of the supergrass), the number of people involved in the trials, and the length of time spent on remand while awaiting trial.\textsuperscript{112} While the use of supergrasses undoubtedly caused the Provisional IRA some internal problems, the overall cost was probably greater to the British. The spectacle of over 30 people in the dock, with the supergrass as often as not retracting his evidence,\textsuperscript{113} certainly gives credibility to Provisional IRA accusations of 'sham' and 'show' trials. These trials did nothing to re-establish confidence in the British system of justice, already severely dented both north and south of the border. And coinciding as they did with the mounting accusations of a RUC 'shoot-to-kill' policy, the Provisional IRA was able to attract much sympathy and credibility, which was supported by similar expressions of concern from the Republic. Like other successful propaganda, this was successful because it was based on a credible derivation of fact. And again all the Provisionals had to do was to react to government policy which allowed them to keep the focus away from their own activity.

1981 Hunger Strike

The Provisional IRA's most successful propaganda campaign among all sections of the sympathetic audience revolved around the 1980-1981 hunger strikes, and culminated in the election of a convicted Provisional IRA member as Westminster MP for Fermanagh/South Tyrone. This campaign was successful not only because, like the 'Smash Stormont' campaign, it involved the constitutional side of Irish nationalism, but also because it was presented in strong historical and religious terms. Additionally it could be viewed as an integral part of an ideology of Irish unity which, as will be

\textsuperscript{112} For a detailed discussion of these issues see P. Hillyard and J. Percy-Smith, "Converting Terrorists: The Use of Supergrasses in Northern Ireland," \textit{Journal of Law and Society}, vol. 11, no. 3, 1984, pp. 337-355.

\textsuperscript{113} 38 people were put on trial on the word of Provisional IRA supergrass Christopher Black, and 40 on the word of Raymond Gilmore. Gifford states that of the 15 supergrasses granted immunity up to 1984, 12 retracted their statements and refused any further co-operation. (See T. Gifford, \textit{Supergrasses: The use of accomplice evidence in Northern Ireland}, Great Britain: The Cobden Trust, 1984.) The Provisional IRA kidnapped supergrass Raymond Gilmore's father and the INLA seized Harry Kirkpatrick's wife to put pressure on them to retract.
discussed below, provides the overall framework for explaining the success of Provisional IRA’s propaganda.

As was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Irish history and nationalist ideology has an abundance of martyrs. Hunger striking produced at least three of these martyrs; Thomas Ashe (1916), Terence MacSwiney (1920), and Tony D’Arcy (1940). During the 1980 hunger strike, *An Phoblacht/Republican News* published a two page article entitled "Resistance to Criminalization: the days of the Fenians to the 1940’s." This article details a history of Republican prison protest, making direct comparisons with Provisional IRA prisoners. Prisoners of the Fenian era it says, "[l]ike the men and women in the H-Blocks and Armagh jail ... were treated with an almost unbelievable vindictiveness ... ." Also quoted in the article is the now immortal phrase first attributed to MacSwiney; "It is not those who can inflict the most, but those who can suffer the most who will conquer." The historic connection was emphasised again in the same *An Phoblacht/Republican News* edition;

The historical bond of continuity between the seven signatories of the 1916 Proclamation and today’s seven hunger strikers was symbolically sealed at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, last Saturday, when, on the platform of Dublin’s Mansion House, James Connolly’s daughter, Nora Connolly O’Brien, clasped the hand of a recently released ‘blanketman’, Martin Lawlor, and congratulated the H-Block men on their heroic stance.

The 9 May 1981 issue of *An Phoblacht/Republican News*, is full of direct comparisons between Sands and MacSwiney, and on 4 July 1981 the newspaper began a five part serial on hunger strikes of the past.

The individual suffering and pain of the hunger strikers was widely covered in the Irish press and particularly in *An Phoblacht/Republican News*. This, combined with religious imagery, was a very potent mobilising factor. One of the strongest images of

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115 *ibid.*
116 *ibid.*
religious sentiment was the Belfast murals depicting a hunger striker as a Christ-like figure complete with rosary beads. On the eve of Sands’ death the *Irish Times* reported the hunger strike campaign in the following terms;

‘Now when you all kneel down to say your Rosary tonight, as I know you will do, you’ll be praying for Bobby Sands, so we’ll say a decade now.’ And the young man who a minute earlier had led the H-Block chant reverently dealt out a decade of the Rosary. ... on the steps of Enniskillen Town Hall, the Rosary was said, rhythmic, flowing, automatic and passing Catholic housewives joined in.117

On the day Sands died the *Irish News* reported,

He [Sands] is lying on a waterbed close to a large golden Crucifix given him by the Pope’s special envoy Mgr. John Magee and which he held in his arms just before lapsing into unconsciousness.118

*An Phoblacht/Republican News* also reported people praying the Rosary.119 While it would be inaccurate to describe the alliance of the SDLP, Republic of Ireland and the Catholic church as supportive of the Provisional IRA or even the five demands,120 what did unite them was a concern to prevent death and a condemnation of British ‘intransigence’. The presentation, especially in Sands’ election campaign, of the five demands as essentially humanitarian requests,121 also added to the emotional appeal for the 30,492 people who elected Bobby Sands as a Westminster MP.

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119 *An Phoblacht/Republican News*, 9:5:81. To be fair to the Catholic church, it did consistently call on the prisoners to end their hunger strike, and was instrumental, in the form of Fr. Paul, in ultimately ending the protest.
120 The five demands were for: 1) exemption from wearing prison clothing; 2) exemption from prison work; 3) freedom of association with fellow political prisoners; 4) the right to organise educational and recreational facilities, to have one weekly visit, to receive and send out one letter per week and to receive one parcel per week; and 5) entitlement to full remission of sentence.
121 Sands’ election manifesto declared in part, "There is but one issue at stake and that is the right of human dignity for Irish men and women taking part in this period of the heroic struggle for Irish independence."
The 1981 hunger strike was indeed a huge success for the Provisional IRA. It had all the necessary ingredients for success; history, heroics, mythology, emotion and credibility. O'Malley has correctly argued that it was the success of the hunger strike that "allowed the IRA to re-establish itself in the heroic mould and to reaffirm its legitimacy in a historical context ... ."\textsuperscript{122} The struggle was once again seen in colonial terms, the ‘Brits’ were "the culprits; their intransigence was deliberate, their highhandedness inhumane."\textsuperscript{123} Bew and Patterson also argue that with the hunger strike "the Provos had transformed their relationship to the Catholic masses."\textsuperscript{124} The vehicle through which this transformation was conducted and continued was Sinn Fein, but before discussing Sinn Fein, it is proposed to survey briefly propaganda among Irish communities abroad.

\textit{Irish Immigrant Communities}

In assessing Provisional IRA’s impact abroad, the United States is by far the most significant. Monies collected by Provisional support groups such as Irish Northern Aid (Noraid) and the Irish National Caucus are certainly substantial, although erratic, and sudden increases and decreases are easily related to specific events. In the mid-1970’s the Irish Embassy in Washington estimated that 25% of all the money spent by the Provisional IRA on weapons came from US sources.\textsuperscript{125} By the end of the 1970’s (partly due to the Mountbatten atrocity) the US subvention had fallen to about $100,000 per year, but rose again during the 1981 hunger strike.\textsuperscript{126} A similar resurgence of funds occurred in August 1984, when in front of millions of television viewers Sean Downes

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\textsuperscript{122} O’Malley, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{124} Bew and Patterson, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{125} Quoted in O’Ballance, "Terror in Ireland ....," \textit{op.cit.}, p.242.
\end{flushleft}
was killed by a plastic bullet. However, as will be discussed below, the overall proportion of American contributions to the Provisional IRA budget is quite small. The US audience’s importance can be defined in propaganda terms: to produce an emotionally sympathetic audience which will then apply diplomatic pressure on the British and embarrass them internationally.

In this the Provisionals have been aided by several prominent Irish Americans including Senators Edward Kennedy and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, House of Representatives members Hugh Carey and ‘Tip’ O’Neill, and civil rights activist Paul O’Dwyer. Another House of Representatives member, Mario Biaggi, formed in 1977 the Ad Hoc Irish Committee, which has been a relatively successful lobby group. In 1971, Kennedy, in supporting a motion to the Massachusetts State Senate urging Britain to withdraw its troops from Northern Ireland, said "if only the constant and cruel irritation of the British military presence is withdrawn, Ireland can be whole again." The motion was carried 'on the voices'. The Provisionals soon exploited such romanticism, and as McGuire explains they put it to good use in smoothing out any difficulties in fund raising tours,

... we enlisted the help of the prominent Civil Rights lawyer, Paul O’Dwyer. ... A phone call from Kennedy’s office to the American Embassy in Dublin would result, and all the difficulties would magically disappear.

American diplomatic pressure on Britain peaked during the Carter administration, and is best exemplified by the successful implementation of a Kennedy, Moynihan, O’Neill and Carey-sponsored call to ban the sale of small arms to the RUC in August 1979. As

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127 Michael Flannery of Noraid was reported as saying "This incident will bring in over 250,000 dollars. The money is just rolling in." Courier Mail, (Brisbane) 17:8:84.


129 Kennedy quoted in Mansbach, op.cit., p. 147.

130 M. McGuire, op.cit., p. 36.
Guelke rightly states this was an "alarming development for the British government,"131 and Bew and Patterson suggest that it was American pressure that later pushed the "flustered Atkins" towards a new initiative.132

The historical basis of Provisional IRA propaganda directed towards America was outlined in Chapter 5. That these are appropriate terms of reference is confirmed by a former US official at the State Department's Irish desk:

Most Americans simply do not know what goes on over there. What Noraid contributors know about Ireland seems to derive from hazy folk memories of the potato famine and the brutality of the British during the 1919 revolution (sic).133

During the hunger strike, Kennedy, Carey, Moynihan and O'Neill adopted the same stance as most of the Irish establishment, the Catholic church and the SDLP, putting responsibility for ending the strike on the British, and criticising British inflexibility. In a letter to Mrs. Thatcher, the four Americans declared that it was Britain's "inflexible posture which must lead inevitably to more senseless violence and death," and continued, "the leaders of Great Britain have an urgent responsibility to end this tragic and unnecessary conflict."134

In other countries with significant numbers of Irish immigrants the pattern has been similar, although nowhere near on the same scale as America. In Australia, for example, even though up to one third of the population has some Irish ancestry, support for the Provisional IRA is not discernible. Sympathy for the concept of a united Ireland is most frequently expressed by protests during visits by members of the British Royal family, and there is an occasional event-related media interview with Provisional IRA

131 A. Guelke, "The American Connection to the Northern Ireland Conflict," Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 1, no. 4, 1984, p. 34.
132 Bew and Patterson, op.cit., p. 122.
sympathisers. The Provisional IRA will periodically refer to Australian support, and interestingly claimed the Australian government's decision not to contribute to an economic aid package under the Anglo-Irish Agreement as a victory for it.

Irish-Americans and other Irish immigrant communities have a framework of reference that will respond to appeals based on accusations of British brutality, acceptance that the cause of a united Ireland and the history of Ireland dictate that force must be used, and therefore that the Provisional IRA is the current manifestation of a long and heroic colonial struggle. All these themes are reflected in the pronouncements of Martin Galvin, Noraid's director of publicity:

We [Irish-Americans] understand only too well that the war being fought now in the six counties is over a very simple issue - whether the British will continue to dominate Ireland ... whether Irish national rights will continue to mean nothing, or whether the British will be driven out of Ireland with their sectarianism, their economic exploitation, the poverty they have caused, or whether the Irish will continue to be driven out of their own country.

American journalist Kevin Kelley's book, *The Longest War*, is one of the best examples of a colonial interpretation, and the whole book is imbued with colonial imagery. According to Kelley, the Thatcher/Haughey communiqué pledging that there would be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority, meant that "[s]elf-determination for the Irish people as a whole (all 32 counties) was once more rejected in favour of the colonial gerrymander." The 1981 hunger strike, he claims, "demonstrated to the world at large that armed struggle in the

135 For example, Q. Dempster interview with S. Whealen, on the ABC's 7.30 Report, 17:3:88. This interview took place after a loyalist extremist had attacked a Provisional IRA funeral, killing three and injuring over 50.
137 *Sunday Times*, 19:4:87. The Australian Foreign Affairs Minister claimed the decision was part of a larger cut back in overseas aid packages.
139 This communiqué was issued on 8:12:80.
six counties may well be the only recourse open to Irish patriots." Kelley's justification for his pro-Provisional IRA stance is couched in typical colonial fashion;

Nothing the Provisos have done or might do can be comparable to the suffering inflicted on Ireland by British rulers and armies down the centuries. For every civilian by-stander killed or maimed by an IRA car bomb since 1970, literally thousands of Irish people have been deliberately slaughtered by a much more efficient and powerful marauder who must be assigned the ultimate blame for '800 years of crime'.

Such international sympathy is important but not crucial for the Provisional IRA. The Provisional IRA would have no difficulty in surviving without US financial contributions. The removal of American support would probably increase logistical difficulties for the Provisional IRA in acquiring arms, but would not lead to its defeat. However, the sympathetic environment for the Provisional IRA in the US undoubtedly provides it with encouragement, and the statements of Kennedy and his colleagues provide good ammunition with which to hit the British government. However, the Roman Catholic community of Northern Ireland is what really ensures Provisional IRA survival, and it is to propaganda specifically aimed at it that we now turn.

Sinn Fein

The electoral success of Sinn Fein has one very important international aspect, articulated by Danny Morrison as undermining "British propaganda, which states that Republicans have no support. They show that Republicans have popular support." While in general Morrison's point is valid, it is not quite so simple. Sinn Fein claims that a vote for it is not necessarily a vote for the Provisional IRA, just as a defeat for Sinn Fein is not a defeat for Provisional IRA. The reasons why people vote for Sinn Fein are varied and not all positive. Sinn Fein does not contest all seats, only those where it knows it is likely to attract significant votes. It should also be pointed out that Sinn Fein's involvement in Northern Irish politics is a relatively new development, (1981) and

141 ibid., p. 345.
142 ibid., p. 351.
143 Morrison quoted in O'Malley, op.cit., p. 276.
it may be too early to assess its longer term significance or even the likelihood that it will continue (see Chapter 6).

Disaffection among SDLP voters is often cited as a reason why people vote for Sinn Fein.144 An additional explanation is that many people who had never voted before began voting for Sinn Fein during and after the hunger strike. In the 1983 Westminster election, the SDLP captured 54% of the Catholic/nationalist vote compared to Sinn Fein’s 46%. However, the SDLP was widely perceived among the nationalist community as middle-aged, middle-class and worn out. The lack of political progress in the early 1980’s, and the SDLP’s refusal to sit in the Northern Ireland Assembly set up by Prior in 1982, added to the impression of a party in a vacuum with nothing to offer. Sinn Fein, at a local level, moved to fill this vacuum, opening dozens of new advice centres and agitating on a whole range of community issues. With the combination of this, the momentum created by the election of Sands, (which probably would not have happened, had the SDLP fielded a candidate) and a relentless Provisional IRA campaign against the SDLP, it is not surprising that Sinn Fein appeared to many voters as more dynamic and more capable.

The hypothesis of disaffected SDLP voters voting Sinn Fein in the early 1980’s is confirmed by the fact that by the mid-1980’s the tide had swung, and the SDLP appeared as the dynamic force. The major impetus for the SDLP’s change of fortune was the Anglo-Irish Agreement, of which the SDLP was perceived as the major architect. In a series of by-elections held in January 1986, as a Unionist protest against the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the SDLP’s share of the Catholic/nationalist vote rose to 63%, while Sinn Fein’s declined to 35%.

It is certainly easy to interpret the Sinn Fein vote as being against things; against the British government, against the British Army, the RUC, the UDR, the judicial system,

144 Interviews with Alliance Party, OUP, SDLP and the Workers’ Party, July 1986.
and against the existence of Northern Ireland in any shape or form. It is easy, perhaps, to rationalise that the SDLP is not seen as 'against' enough. Whether or not all the votes for Sinn Fein are votes for the tactics of the Provisional IRA is more difficult to assess. As the Workers' Party point out, it is impossible for people not to know that they are voting for a violent campaign. The Alliance Party expresses itself more circumspectly, saying that votes for Sinn Fein are not votes in favour of violence, but do represent an "ambivalence." However, it can be demonstrated that some aspects of violence are more acceptable than others. So before discussing why it is that Provisional IRA's propaganda has been successful, an examination will be made of those areas where it has not been successful. As will be seen, this tends to be when the focus is on 'offensive' violent action.

Even at the height of sectarian tension in the early 1970's, there was concern among the Catholic community in Belfast that the Provisional IRA was provoking retaliation from Protestants. According to Burton, there was concern that the "IRA had overstepped their traditional role in the North as a defence corps and had jeopardized the safety of those Catholics who lived in Protestant and mixed areas." The SDLP confirms that a similar situation exists today, especially when a Catholic is murdered in Belfast there is a tendency to say "we [Belfast Catholics] are paying for IRA murders in the border area." The Catholic community has also reacted strongly against many acts of violence. (Indeed it was largely in reaction to a popular outcry against violence that the Official IRA declared a cease fire in May 1972). By far the largest and most spontaneous reaction against the Provisionals' violence was the Peace People campaign of 1976. The Provisionals at first did not take the Peace People seriously, but as the campaign gathered momentum they resorted to a virulent propaganda campaign accusing

145 Interview with author 22:7:86.
146 Interview with author 18:7:86.
148 Interview with author 16:7:86.
the Peace People of bias and outright intimidation.\textsuperscript{149} Intimidation among the Catholic community has also been an integral part of Provisional IRA’s campaign and has been abetted by a patronage system it has been able to develop mostly in West Belfast around a ‘black economy’ (discussed below). Condemnations of violence have been made consistently by politicians and prominent Catholics north and south of the border. One of the strongest came from the then Irish Minister of Justice (now opposition leader), Alan Dukes, in a speech to the British Irish Association in September 1986. Of the Provisional IRA he said,

\begin{quote}
[n]o feudal lord ever said ‘he shall live, and he shall die’ more arrogantly than the present lords of the IRA. No rack-renting landlord fatted on the Irish people more richly than the present extortionists of the IRA. No bird of carrion hovered more expectantly over the dying than those who lead Sinn Fein.\textsuperscript{150}
\end{quote}

And of Gerry Adams in particular,

\begin{quote}
Mr Adams has just solemnly warned nationalists that they are the potential victims of loyalist gangs. How can he expect any sane person to take him as anything other than a hypocrite when we all know that sectarian murders by Sinn Fein/IRA are deliberately designed to provoke sectarian murders of Catholics?\textsuperscript{151}
\end{quote}

Garret FitzGerald condemned the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein in equally strong terms after the Brighton bomb of October 1984. Contained in his condemnation however, is a very significant phrase which provides the basis for the explanation as to why not only have the Provisionals survived despite their many outrages, but also why their propaganda among the sympathetic audience has been so successful;

\begin{quote}
There is however one particular shade of our feeling today which is unique to those of the Irish nationalist tradition. I mean our deep anger at
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{149} See Kelley, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 254.
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Belfast Telegraph}, 20:9:86.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
the arrogance of the Provisional IRA in doing these things in the name of our tradition, in the name of our aspiration, in the name of our legitimacy.152

OUR tradition, OUR aspiration, OUR legitimacy.

**Ideological Objectives and Strategy**

In all aspects of Provisional IRA propaganda the dominant theme is that Britain is the single and root cause of all the problems in Ireland. Its historical analysis demands the forceful eviction of the British as the only solution. Unionist objections to a united Ireland will only be abrogated when the British guarantee is withdrawn and they are forced to consider their position in a new Ireland. But despite FitzGerald’s remarks, and his own considerable personal understanding of Northern Ireland, this historical analysis and interpretation is clearly recognisable in the ethos of the Irish Republic.

The *New Ireland Forum Report* was an attempt to define the problems of Ireland and the two major cultural identities within it. However, it was far from a critical review of the origins and attitudes of the Republic itself, and as a result ‘old’ rather than ‘new’ Ireland attitudes predominate. The chapter dealing with the historical origins of the problem, like the Provisional IRA, puts the blame solely on the British. The British establishment of Northern Ireland, the Report declares, "was contrary to the desire of the great majority of the Irish people for the political unity and sovereignty of Ireland as expressed in the last all-Ireland election of 1918."153 And because of the British failure to accept the democratically expressed wishes of the Irish people and because of the denial of the right of nationalists in the North to political expression of the Irish identity and to effective participation in the institutions of Government, the 1920 arrangements did not succeed.154

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154 *ibid.*, p. 9.
The hope generated among nationalists by the Sunningdale agreement was destroyed because the British "failed to sustain" it.\textsuperscript{155} Since then the only British policy in practice is one of crisis management, that is, the effort to contain violence through emergency measures by the military forces and the police and through extra-ordinary judicial measures and a greatly expanded prison system.\textsuperscript{156}

Thus we have the same historical analysis which puts Britain at the heart of the problem, and because it failed to consider the wishes of the Irish people as a whole Northern Ireland is and always will be a failed political entity. There are many things the Report fails to consider,\textsuperscript{157} but among the most obvious are a recognition that the Irish state and Provisional IRA have the same heroes and martyrs, and that the Free State was established by a forerunner of the 'ballot box and Armalite' strategy.

Although the degree of commitment to a united Ireland among both northern and southern nationalists can be questioned,\textsuperscript{158} the aspiration is undoubtedly strong. The rhetoric too, is frequently forthright and unambiguous. For example, in 1969 the then Irish Prime Minister, Jack Lynch, took to the national air waves to declare,

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{ibid.}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{ibid.}, p. 14. This passage is one of the best examples of bias in the whole Report. While bitterly condemning the Diplock courts, no mention is made of the Republic's own system of non-jury courts. The EPA is criticised, but no mention is made of the Republic's own "Offences Against the State Act" which contains many of same provisions found so objectionable when administered by the British in the North. Similarly, while pleas were made from the South for the British to be 'flexible' during the hunger strike, no 'flexibility' has been shown towards Provisional IRA hunger strikers in Southern gaols.

\textsuperscript{157} For example, the only mandate Sinn Fein derived from the 1918 election was to take Ireland's case to the peace conference in Paris. How does this then translate into a mandate for an all Ireland Republic? And what explanation can be put on the fact that on an all Ireland basis this election produced a total anti-Republic vote of 557,435 compared to the 485,105 polled by Sinn Fein? (This former figure includes 237,393 votes for the Nationalist Party which, while certainly not Unionist votes, were also not Sinn Fein votes. See R. Kee, \textit{Ourselves Alone}, London: Quartet, 1976, p. 53.) Also like so many other analyses, the Report ignores the strength of indigenous support for the British connection.

\textsuperscript{158} See O'Malley, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 88-97.
... the reunification of the national territory can provide the only permanent solution for the problem, it is our intention to request the British government to enter into early negotiations with the Irish government to review the present constitutional position of the six counties of Northern Ireland.159

After a decade and a half, the Forum Report had dropped unity as the only solution, but maintained it as the political structure that the Forum "would wish to see established."160 By 1984, "agreement and consent" had also entered the calculations.161 But it seems that at least Mr. Haughey’s interpretation of consent provides a constitutional equivalent of the Provisional IRA’s argument that northern Protestants will only realise where their true interests lie when the British withdraw.

The Forum Report proposes a set of ten realities which it claims are "necessary elements of a framework within which a new Ireland could emerge."162 The third of these states,

[a]greement means that the political arrangements for a new and sovereign Ireland would have to be freely negotiated and agreed to by people of the North and by the people of the South.163

The central ambiguity of this is when do these negotiations take place, before or after a British withdrawal? Haughey, in explaining his interpretation of "agreement", seems to confirm the Unionist interpretation that negotiations will take place only after a British withdrawal;

Agreement and consent means that the political arrangements in Ireland to be established following the cessation of British military and political presence will have to be negotiated .... 164

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161 ibid.
163 ibid., p. 27.
164 Haughey quoted in Kenny, op.cit., p. 45. (Emphasis added.)
This raises the question of Unionist resistance to any sort of united Ireland. And again, particularly Fianna Fail’s answer bears close resemblance to the Provisional IRA’s. In 1971 Neil Blaney\textsuperscript{165} dismissed the Unionist backlash theory in the following terms,

\begin{quote}
\ldots there has been no backlash, and there will be no backlash now, because the people have come to realise that they are our people and we are their people \ldots They realise that the six county setup cannot last much longer, and that is why there has been no backlash.\textsuperscript{166}
\end{quote}

Over ten years later, and despite a massive showing of Unionist strength in bringing down the Sunningdale agreement, Fianna Fail still dismissed lightly the threat of Unionist resistance; "They’ve never actually been pushed into a situation of having to carry out their threats."\textsuperscript{167} This agrees with the Provisional IRA’s argument that the question of Unionist resistance is merely "hypothetical."\textsuperscript{168}

Even if much of this is simply political rhetoric, (and much of it is because the Republic has given very little serious thought to what would happen to it in a united Ireland or to the social, economic and political costs of absorbing the north) it is still highly significant in explaining the success of Provisional IRA propaganda. For it shows that, unlike the Left in Germany, constitutional nationalists feel unable to impose a rigid ideological demarcation between themselves and the Provisional IRA. Also as the Forum Report demonstrates, there is a fairly monolithic interpretation of Catholic/nationalist history which presents Britain as the source of the problem and claims the whole island should be administered as one unit. Unlike Germany, Ireland has

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{165} Blaney was a co-defendant with Haughey in a 1970 arms trial where both were accused of attempting to import arms to supply the Provisional IRA. Both were acquitted as were the other two defendants in the trial. Blaney is now an independent member of the Dail.
\item \textsuperscript{166} \textit{Republican News}, 27:11:71.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Manseragh, Director of Research for Fianna Fail, quoted in O’Malley, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 48.
\item \textsuperscript{168} David O’Connell, ex-Provisional IRA Chief-of-Staff in \textit{Belfast Telegraph}, 28:7:71. Such arguments as this "are simply empirically wrong." P. Bew, Gibbon and H. Patterson, \textit{The State in Northern Ireland 1921-72}, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979, p. 207.
\end{itemize}
not been able to shed reunification as the national aspiration, and this as the Unionists rightly point out means

with both the state and church supporting the same objective of unity as the Provisional IRA, that the great mass of Roman Catholics in Ireland find the legitimacy of the IRA can be couched in terms which they find difficult to reject.169

In simple terms, the means of the Provisional IRA are widely condemned, but the ends are not. Until these ends are de-legitimised or at least re-defined, the Provisional IRA will continue to be able to attract a sympathetic hearing in the Republic. Levels of overt support for the Provisional IRA will probably continue to peak and trough as they have done over the past twenty years. Eradicating the Provisional IRA can only be achieved with much more positive co-operation from the Republic. The British can only ensure that Provisional IRA support remains in a trough by refusing to give it much of the propaganda it thrives upon in the form of security force blunders.

THE ACTIVE AUDIENCE

Like the RAF, the fact that the Provisional IRA has survived for twenty years despite the many successes of the security forces, points to a degree of success in propaganda directed at the active volunteer. One of the reasons given for the RAF’s success (even though it was a contributor to its overall failure) was the degree of isolation of active members from alternative sources of propaganda. For the Provisional IRA, its success among the sympathetic audience obviates this need to a great extent. This, in turn, explains its much less polemic stance, and its more calculated propaganda. The existence of a wide pool of sympathisers obviously eases operating and logistical problems, but it also provides social and psychological comfort to the active volunteer. The Republic of Ireland, often only a few hundred metres away, provides a sanctuary for

Provisional IRA active volunteers which undoubtedly increases their 'active life expectancy'.

And like the RAF, the biographies of the current Provisional IRA leaders, Adams, Morrison and McGuinness, suggest that they are totally committed to ridding Ireland of British influence using physical force. All three come from hardline nationalist areas in Belfast or Londonderry. All three lived through the re-emergence of the IRA in 1969, and the formation of the Provisional IRA in 1970. All three have been taken into custody for Provisional IRA activities. Adams and Morrison are very much products of the internment system, and Adams and McGuinness are widely believed to have commanded the Belfast and Derry brigades of the Provisional IRA respectively. These three men are the principal architects of the 'ballot box and Armalite' strategy, and all three hold positions on the Sinn Fein national executive. And all three are or were elected representatives - Adams at Westminster, and Morrison and McGuinness in local government. The major motivating incidents for these men have all been northern ones; sectarian rioting in 1969, with the seeming inability of the then IRA to defend Catholics, internment and 'Bloody Sunday'. Their localities have been the ones most subject to the police and army searches, and their friends and relatives the ones most subject to arrest and questioning, as opposed to the Southern leaders whose identification with the northern Catholic community was much more abstract. One does not have to judge the rightness or wrongness of these incidents to see that they must have strengthened and confirmed the already existing Republican interpretation of history and the tradition of physical force Republicanism. Adams, Morrison and McGuinness, although identifiable as products of their time, are the latest manifestation of the objection to any British presence in Ireland, and it is essentially this, rather than any claimed socialist ideas, which helps explain the success of propaganda aimed at the active volunteer. The whole infrastructure created around Sinn Fein, and control over local economies, are also important contributing factors.

170 McGuinness in the Republic.
Membership of the Provisional IRA, like that of the RAF, fluctuates, and can be related to events and perceptions of threat (although it may be that the British government's interest is in portraying the figure as low as possible whereas the West German government's interest was in portraying a slightly exaggerated picture). The Provisionals began as a minority faction of the IRA. As Bowyer Bell points out, only twelve as opposed to thirty-nine of the delegates at the 1969 Army Convention refused to accept 'official' policy. However, especially in the North, the Provisionals soon became the dominant organisation. O'Malley estimates an early membership of about 1,500, with 600 concentrated in Belfast. As the security forces began to gather accurate intelligence, and arrests increased, and after the reorganisation of what was a fairly cumbersome and insecure military structure, numbers fell. But, as Brigadier Glover concluded, the Provisionals no longer needed to attract large numbers;

PIRA's organisation is now such that a small number of activists can maintain a disproportionate level of violence. There is a substantial pool of young Fianna aspirants, nurtured in a climate of violence, eagerly seeking promotion to full gun-carrying status and there is a steady release from the prisons of embittered and dedicated terrorists. Thus, though PIRA may be hard hit by Security Force attrition from time to time, they will probably continue to have the manpower they need to sustain violence during the next 5 years.

This is essentially what did happen and continues to happen. The number of Provisional IRA active volunteers has probably remained fairly constant over the past seven or eight years at 100-200. The Provisional IRA's youth wing and its reservoir of sympathy undoubtedly provides replacements for those captured, killed, removed or retired, but of equal importance is the Provisional IRA's ability to acquire the necessary resources to maintain such a number of active volunteers.

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171 O'Malley, op.cit., p. 207.
172 Glover quoted in Cronin, op.cit., p. 342.
173 The Sunday Times, 19:5:85, estimated that the Provisional IRA had fewer than 50 fighting activists. Wilkinson, in the aftermath of the 1981 hunger strike, puts the number of 'hard core' members at 300-350. ("The Provisional IRA in the Aftermath of the 1981 Hunger Strike," op.cit., p. 142.)
In 1978, Brigadier Glover put the Provisional IRA's annual income at around £950,000. The two major components of this were theft (£550,000) and racketeering (£250,000), both of which continue to contribute vast amounts to Provisional IRA coffers. Coogan estimates that in the Republic alone the Provisional IRA could have netted as much as £2 million from bank robberies in the period 1978 to mid-1979. When this is added to bank robberies in the North, Wilkinson comes up with a total of £5 million. The Provisional IRA has managed to secure large amounts of money through kidnapping. About £750,000 was paid in 1981 for the release of retail executive Benn Dunne, and in 1985, both the British and Irish governments began actions to seize £2 million which had been deposited in a Swiss bank account after the kidnapping of another retail executive, Don Tidey, in 1983. Currency forgery and drugs deals have also on occasion been used to boost the Provisional IRA's income. In recent years the Provisional IRA has built up a thriving local black market economy which, operating in such economically depressed areas, brings with it considerable powers of patronage. Income from legitimate and semi-legitimate businesses such as taxis, drinking clubs and gambling machines, and the amount of money generated from tax frauds, particularly in the construction industry, far exceeds money provided from the United States. More importantly this money provides a regular income with which the Provisionals can engage in forward financial planning.

Among the most significant costs for the Provisional IRA are members' 'wages' and expenses and payments to prisoners' families. (The cost of Sinn Fein's

174 Coogan, "The IRA ...," op.cit., p. 535.
175 Wilkinson, "The Provisional IRA ...," op. cit., p. 150.
176 A cannabis haul worth approximately £1 million was captured by the Gardai in August 1979. See Coogan, ibid.
178 Glover estimated these at £400,000 and £180,000 respectively in 1978. (Glover in Cronin, op.cit., p. 344.)
participation in elections has also become a great demand on Provisional IRA resources.)
But this is essential expenditure for the Provisional IRA. For one thing it enables it to
maintain almost total control of every aspect of active volunteers' existence. The
payments to prisoners' dependents also have important ramifications among both the
active and sympathetic audiences. For both groups these payments help create an image
of a caring and welfare-orientated organisation. The success of the Provisional IRA's
propaganda towards its active volunteers can be gauged from the fact that there have
been relatively few defectors who subsequently speak out against it. There are no
indications that this will change radically in the next few years, although Sinn Fein's
electoral involvement, especially if it does not do well, is likely to provoke tension within
the Provisional IRA and perhaps even another 1969-like split.

Although the Provisional IRA's propaganda has produced a proportionately larger
number of active volunteers than the RAF, the absolute devotion to the cause is similar.
But unlike the RAF's, the Provisional IRA's cause, as articulated in most of its
propaganda, could be viewed as consistent with the current realities of Northern Ireland,
mostly due to government actions, and the dominant interpretation of Irish history,
reinforced by events like the hunger strike. As was seen during this thesis, the
Provisional IRA makes voluminous use of historical reference points and insists on
presenting itself as part of the Republican tradition stretching back to the eighteenth
century. The British presence in Northern Ireland is also part of the same historical
continuum. Thus, with the Provisional IRA it was always possible to predict that it
would have a certain reservoir of sympathy, but it would not have been possible to
predict that within twenty years it would have one Westminster MP and representation on
17 out of 26 local district councils in Northern Ireland.179 That it has done so is due in
no small part to a considered and in the main carefully executed propaganda campaign.

179 "Of the fifty-nine Sinn Fein councillors elected in the 1985 elections, ten had
convictions for serious terrorist offences and had, between them, served more
than 100 years in jail. All the offences were committed on behalf of the IRA."
(J. Adams, op.cit., p. 165.)
The Provisionals have taken note of their audience, whether the uncommitted, the sympathetic or the active, and have adjusted their propaganda accordingly, something which the RAF almost totally failed to do. And this has made the Provisional IRA altogether a much more effective organisation than the RAF.

Of the approximately 2,300 people killed since 1969, not only were the vast majority civilian, but they were also killed by the Provisional IRA. The economic costs are almost incalculable. Using March 1984 exchange rates, the *New Ireland Forum Report* estimated that the direct cost of the violence in Northern Ireland 1969-1982 to the British Exchequer was £4,507 million. It also estimated indirect costs (loss of jobs, output etc.) at £3,278 million. (The same costs to the Republic were estimated at £901 million and £983 respectively.) O'Malley concluded that the 1983 British subvention was £1.2 billion. But the greatest cost is political. The violence generated by the Provisional IRA has been singularly successful in polarizing even further majority and minority communities in Northern Ireland. And while this extreme polarization exists, not just while the British presence exists, the Provisional IRA will be able to survive. Its propaganda reveals much of how and why the Provisionals have been able to survive for twenty years; it also provides a basis for devising a more effective counter-propaganda strategy.

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180 "New Ireland Forum Report," *op.cit.*, p. 15 (2,300), O'Malley, *op.cit.*, p. 10 (2,300) and Kenny, *op.cit.*, p. 35 (2,304). Kenny gives the following breakdown of the death toll: "Republicans had killed 1264, Loyalists 613. The security forces had caused 264 deaths and had themselves sustained a loss of 702 lives." (p. 35.)


CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS

Part I of this thesis began with a definitional discussion focusing on distinguishing terrorism from other forms of conflict. Having then classified both the RAF and the Provisional IRA as terrorist, it went on to portray the historical and ideological influences on both groups. Chapter 2 introduced some international factors which facilitated the emergence of not only the RAF and the Provisional IRA, but a whole range of terrorist groups operating within the Western democracies. But many of these groups have long since disappeared, like the Angry Brigade in England, or the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. So clearly internal factors must be of at least equal importance in explaining why both groups survived, and why they have had such a great impact on their respective polities. In Germany it is the historical experiences of Nazism, and particularly Germany's position in Cold War politics that explain why the RAF assumes a great importance. History explains much about the Provisional IRA too.

Three factors in the history of the Federal Republic were considered important in the emergence of the RAF. One was the radical critique of society associated with the Universities of Berlin, Marburg and Frankfurt. The second was the gradual acceptance by the SPD of West Germany's capitalist based economy, and rearmed position within NATO. And thirdly, there was the pressing need for university reform. With two of these three factors directly related to universities, it is not surprising that the RAF was comprised mainly of students. The RAF blamed the world order for many of the ills in West Germany, and West Germany for many of the ills in the world order. To remedy all these ills a world-wide communist revolution was necessary.
In arriving at this premise, one can detect the influence of many sources on the RAF’s thinking. Its terminology is Marxist, and its notion of a revolutionary vanguard Leninist. The ‘voluntarism’ of Mao, and the optimism of Guevara are also detectable, as is the urban emphasis of Marighella. But even the RAF could see that these theories had only limited applicability to its West German operating environment. But the structural repression theories of Marcuse and Sartre, it believed, could be applied more generally, and the RAF embarked on a campaign of terrorism to achieve a world communist revolution.

The historical factors important in explaining the emergence of the Provisional IRA lie in the 1916-1923 period. The 1916 Easter rebellion, which had not been popularly sanctioned or participated in, was transformed into a heroic national event by the British handling of the aftermath. The first elections held after the rebellion in December 1918, produced a majority in favour of Sinn Fein, the party which had by now become associated with the Rising. A ruthless guerrilla campaign, that was by no means devoid of terrorist tactics, was undertaken by the new Irish Republican Army to force the British out of Ireland. Further elections were announced for 1921, after which the British declared the provisions of the Better Government of Ireland Bill would come into force setting up partition. The guerrilla campaign continued, but a truce was called in 1922, and negotiations led to the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The guerrilla campaign then developed into an even more ruthless civil war between pro and anti-Treaty forces, with the pro-Treaty forces gaining the upper hand. The anti-Treaty forces, mainly the IRA, did not regard themselves as defeated, but rather that the struggle would have to be postponed until more favourable times. These anti-Treaty irregulars claimed they were fighting for the republican ideals of 1916, and 1916 provided a role model for fighting for one Ireland, Gaelic and free. The socialist James Connolly’s participation in the 1916 rebellion provided a role model for fighting for a socialist Ireland. It is these historical events that are the major influences on the Provisional IRA’s ideology.
The most prominent influence on the Provisional IRA's ideology is the relatively unsophisticated philosophy of the Fenians; driving the English presence out of Ireland by force. The thoughts, writings and actions of Patrick Pearse are also highly significant, particularly his interpretation of what constituted the Irish Republic, i.e., Gaelic and free. Radical politics have been present in the Republican movement since the father of Irish republicanism, Wolfe Tone. However, socialism has had a very chequered history within the IRA, and references to it by today's Provisional IRA are for purely propaganda purposes. Finally, the current Irish Republic's constitution, and acceptance of Pearce's ideals provide a source of legitimacy for the Provisional IRA's stated objective of one unified Ireland free of English influence.

This contextual setting reveals clearly a number of differences between the RAF and the Provisional IRA. The RAF cannot claim any historic legitimacy; its roots are very much in the 1960's. It is essentially a small group of middle-class students, whose ideology dictates that they can change society through violent attacks. The RAF's vision of the future is vague, and the influences on its ideology are mainly foreign. The Provisional IRA, on the other hand, relies on historic legitimacy. It claims the roots of its existence stretch back directly to 1916, and through 1916 to 1798 and beyond. The Provisional IRA is neither a student nor a middle-class organisation. Its vision of the future is both narrower and slightly more defined than the RAF's, and the influences on its ideology are mainly Irish. However, while understanding the bases of terrorist groups' ideologies is important, so is the study of the 'facts' and arguments used to support them. For it is through these that terrorist groups send their messages to governments and peoples. Part II of this thesis presented a study of such 'facts' and arguments.

Terror as propaganda by deed is aimed at, and has the greatest impact upon, the uncommitted audience. Its overall objective is to militarise the political situation. It is designed to publicise the group's existence, and create a climate of fear and crisis.
Violence, however, is not the only message aimed at this audience, but it is the vehicle through which the terrorists communicate their most general ideological message - that the state is disadvantaging some particular section of society. This is most often done through statements of responsibility after violent attacks.

The RAF certainly has had success as regards publicising its existence, and creating a climate of fear and crisis. It can also claim a degree of success in militarising the political situation. The climate of fear and crisis produced by the RAF is best illustrated by the parallels that were drawn between Weimar Germany and the Federal Republic. Police were given considerably widened powers of search and arrest, and changes were introduced into the criminal code. (These measures, indicative of a state which perceives itself to be under direct threat, were also responsible for generating the RAF a limited degree of sympathy, as will be discussed below.) However, as regards the ideological message directed at the uncommitted audience, the RAF has had really very little success.

The RAF saw the West German state because of its capitalist economy as disadvantaging West German workers. West Germany's position within NATO also caused it to disadvantage groups in the Third World who were subject to the imperialist designs of the United States, its multi-national corporations and its allies. But the West German working class failed to perceive itself as disadvantaged, and was not able to relate its position to that of the Vietnamese or Palestinians. The Marxist terminology and communist utterances of the RAF were not credible reference points for a people who saw themselves as being in the forefront of the battle against communism. Communism for many West Germans is symbolised by the comparatively stagnant and politically oppressed East German state. Therefore, it is not surprising that the RAF aroused hostility among most of the uncommitted audience, rather than encouraging any movement towards the sympathetic audience.
The Provisional IRA also has had some success in portraying the situation in Northern Ireland as one of danger and crisis. As in West Germany, police in Northern Ireland and mainland Britain have been given additional powers of search and arrest, and special legislation has been introduced; and as in West Germany, these measures have also been responsible for attracting the Provisional IRA a degree of sympathy. The Provisional IRA has been successful in convincing some among the uncommitted audience that it is a genuinely popular movement fighting for national liberation. This indicates that not only is its message of violence being communicated, but also some parts of its ideological appeal.

The Provisional IRA argues that the British guaranteed Northern Irish entity denies the Irish people their inalienable right to national self-determination. British imperialist, and sometimes capitalist, interests maintain the connection by using increased repression. The group particularly disadvantaged by this is the Roman Catholic community of Northern Ireland, which is physically, socially and politically harassed. The success of the Provisionals’ barrage of propaganda against the credibility of the British presence is due to three main factors; British policy mistakes, the inexcusable behaviour of some sections of the security forces, and the way the Provisionals’ arguments supporting their ideology can be presented within a socialist framework of analysis. Examples of the former discussed in the thesis were the Compton Report into allegations of torture in the early 1970’s, and the Stalker affair in the early 1980’s. Examples of the latter were declarations of support from the British and European left. In general though, the international community has viewed Northern Ireland as an internal British issue, and the British general public has been fairly apathetic towards Northern Ireland. Apathy however, becomes antipathy when the Provisionals direct their violence against mainland Britain. But it would be accurate to conclude that the Provisional IRA has had more success in encouraging movement towards the sympathetic audience than has the RAF.
Two major components form propaganda's strategy towards the sympathetic audience. One is the expansion of the ideological appeal to an analysis of what is perceived to be wrong with the current situation, and a rejection of all non-violent means of achieving it. The second is the use of specific issues to expand the base of support. Both components are very evident in the propaganda of the two groups involved in this study.

The RAF argued that the capitalist mode of production had brought new forms of repressive terror. The people most subject to this terror had become so tied to the processes of production that they could not see their oppressed situation. The violence perpetrated by the RAF would itself help the oppressed see their true situation, and demonstrate that an alternative was possible. The RAF’s violence would force the state to reveal its real fascist nature, and thus the people would rally to the RAF as their defenders and saviours. The parliamentary and extraparliamentary left had failed totally to respond to the situation, and therefore there was no option but to resort to violence, or in the RAF’s terminology "urban guerrilla warfare."

However, as the RAF’s most general ideological appeal was rejected by the uncommitted audience, so was its more detailed one by the sympathetic audience. Orthodox communists had already given up the notion of a violent revolution within the Western democracies by the time the RAF emerged. Others on the left also rejected the RAF’s analysis, and the students main concern proved to be university reform, not a violent revolution. The RAF clearly identified a potentially sympathetic audience and directed a considerable propaganda effort towards it. But this sympathetic audience was not generally the disadvantaged group defined by the RAF’s ideology. It was, like the RAF, essentially middle-class and educated. In contrast, the Provisional IRA’s sympathetic audience to a great extent coincided with the group its ideology defined as disadvantaged. Those defined as disadvantaged by the RAF, as discussed above, did not
see themselves as disadvantaged, and were subject primarily to messages of violence and threat.

Nonetheless, the RAF was at times able to increase discernibly its sympathy. This sympathy was limited to fairly specific objectives, and was more a result of government reaction than of actions by the RAF itself. As mentioned earlier, the climate of fear generated by the RAF led to increased police powers, and to changes in the criminal code. The West German state also argued that even in prison the RAF presented such a danger to the state that special holding conditions were necessary. The actions of the police, legislative changes and the prison conditions were successful for the RAF because they were based on a credible derivation of fact acceptable to the target audience. The RAF’s sympathetic audience was amenable to suggestions of increasing repression, which the state’s treatment of the RAF seemed to show. But while many were critical of the police’s behaviour and of the legislative changes, and supported a considerable easing of the conditions under which RAF prisoners were held, the linkage with the RAF’s overall objectives was inherently weak. The RAF, in the early 1980’s, tried to strengthen this link by presenting West Germany as an American colony within NATO. Its 1984 strategy paper advocated attacks on NATO, but these attacks were to be accompanied by attacks on representatives of West German ‘fascism’, and a hunger strike by RAF prisoners. How successful the RAF will be in this tactic remains to be seen. Present indications though, suggest that while the NATO issue may motivate support, once again the linkage with overall objectives is weak.\footnote{It will be interesting to see if the RAF tries to exploit further developments in relation to NATO. For example, NATO’s reaction to a reduction in the number of Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe.}

The linkage between objectives, ideology and the sympathetic audience is much stronger in the case of the Provisional IRA. Its analysis of the British presence in Northern Ireland as disadvantaging Roman Catholics is consistent with other ideologies.
It is consistent with the historical argument of British exploitation of Ireland, and it is consistent with the dominant notion of self-determination applicable to geographic areas. It is consistent with the structural discrimination against Roman Catholics that existed under the Stormont regime. The Provisionals' argument that progress can only be made after the British withdraw, and that a unitary Ireland is the only viable option can be seen as consistent with that of the current Irish Prime Minister, and the dominant perception of Irish history as expressed in the *New Ireland Forum Report*. The major weakness in the linkage is strategy. The Provisionals' insistence that only violence will force the British out of Northern Ireland, and their adoption of terrorist violence to do it is rejected by all other united Ireland advocates. However, the emotional and historical propaganda of the Provisional IRA make a rigid ideological demarcation between it and constitutional nationalism somewhat more difficult in the eyes of the sympathetic audience. One function of the Provisionals' political front organisation, Sinn Fein, is to keep this demarcation blurred, for the Provisionals realise that they are in direct competition with the constitutional Irish nationalism for the considerable reservoir of sympathy there exists for a united Ireland free of English influence, both within Ireland and abroad.

Because this sympathy for the notion of a united Ireland is essentially historically based, historically based propaganda concentrating on past British oppression has been profitable for the Provisional IRA, especially when direct comparisons can be made with contemporary events. The most striking and successful example of this was the 1981 hunger strike. The propaganda associated with this event contained a potent mixture of history, mythology and religious imagery. The vital component of credibility was provided by the seeming intransigence of the British government. Although it had good reason for refusing the Provisional IRA's 'five demands', the British government's stance was widely criticised. It was the old colonial enemy acting with colonial high-handedness. This perceived intransigence of the British government played a large part in the election campaign of Bobby Sands, who was duly elected as a Westminster MP.
Security force behaviour, legislative changes and prison conditions are also important issues in Provisional IRA propaganda which have succeeded in attracting sympathy. As in the case of the RAF, these issues have been successful because they have aspects of credibility which can then be presented as ‘facts’ acceptable to the target audience. Additionally these issues have been used to attack British credibility on the national and international stage.

One area of Provisional IRA propaganda for which there is no RAF equivalent is the use of a political front organisation. Any involvement in politics, north or south of the border, is a contentious issue within the Provisional IRA. Abstaining from political institutions set up by the British is considered by many as a sacred principle of republicanism. The current policy of contesting and taking seats at local council level, in the Dail and European parliament, and contesting but not taking seats at Westminster is very much associated with the northern triumvirate of Adams, McGuinness and Morrison. It has produced mixed results for the Provisional IRA, and its ultimate success is difficult to determine. Evidence so far suggests that the fate of Sinn Fein is linked to that of the SDLP. In the early 1980’s, the SDLP certainly had an ‘image problem’, which was compounded when Gerry Fitt lost the Westminster seat of West Belfast to Gerry Adams in 1982. The SDLP then instigated the New Ireland Forum which is clearly reflected in the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in 1985. Since then the SDLP has recaptured many of the votes it lost to Sinn Fein in the early 1980’s. However, Sinn Fein has increased its representation on local councils in Northern Ireland, which serves the purpose of dismissing any claims that the Provisional IRA has no popular support. The ‘ballot box and Armalite’ strategy is not universally accepted within the Provisional IRA, although it will probably continue while Adams, McGuinness and Morrison control the organisation. The use of Sinn Fein has certainly brought advantages to the Provisional IRA, but if it continues to lose ground to the SDLP, its position will become much more precarious.
That both the RAF and the Provisional IRA have survived for nearly twenty years, illustrates that they must have been able to attract a sufficient number of active volunteers. The reasons why inwards looking propaganda is successful are fairly speculative, due to the lack of relevant data. Nonetheless, a number of conclusions can be drawn. Most, although by no means all, of a terrorist group’s active members will have accepted the group’s ideological analysis, and the argument that violence is necessary. In keeping the active volunteer within the terrorist group’s structure three major propaganda themes were ascertained: further ideological justifications; the inevitability of victory; and prisoners. The organisational structure of the group itself, and the resources it is able to procure were also considered significant.

The RAF’s organisational structure and its conspiratorial lifestyle were such that the individual was isolated from alternative propaganda sources. On the other hand, this prevented the RAF from obtaining necessary resources in terms of an expanded sympathetic audience. The RAF’s lack of a consistent income also caused it logistical problems. The RAF’s assets, including its ideological appeal and sympathisers, are very limited, and probably could not support an active group of more than ten or so at any one time. But one can assume that the propaganda these ten or so produce for themselves, stressing the necessity and righteousness of violent action, is fairly successful. Evidence supporting this can be found among RAF prisoners, many of whom retain a dedication to the ‘cause’. Both the RAF and the Provisional IRA maintained an effective organisational structure among prisoners, and have at times centred their whole campaigns on either freeing prisoners, or supporting their demands. The terrorist group’s treatment of its imprisoned colleagues has obvious morale implications, and both groups have had successes and failures.

2 Numbers required to survive probably differs vastly from numbers needed for victory. There is little empirical evidence for the latter, but the RAF has survived with, perhaps, as few as ten active volunteers.
The Provisional IRA's operating structure is now fairly similar to that of the RAF, but the Northern Irish context provides a number of significant differences. Firstly, the Provisional IRA's sympathetic audience is much larger than the RAF's, which obviates the need to isolate its individual members to the same extent. Secondly, the Republic of Ireland provides a certain amount of sanctuary to Provisional IRA members, which again reduces the need for total isolation, and provides an environment where the pressures involved in being an active terrorist can be reduced somewhat. And thirdly, the Provisional IRA's consistent income permits it to procure more resources, and make payments to the families of wanted and imprisoned terrorists. All these factors undoubtedly have a positive effects on morale. Nonetheless, one still finds messages in Provisional IRA propaganda designed to boost the morale of its active volunteers, such as collective responsibility, or reassurances that British counter-terrorist strategy will not be successful. Prisoners too, play a large part in internal propaganda, to some extent dictated by the almost mythological role prisoners have in republican ideology. Provisional IRA propaganda directed towards its active volunteers has been successful enough that it can maintain its numbers at a reasonably consistent level of between 100 and 200. Propaganda directed towards its sympathetic audience has also been successful enough to maintain this figure.

Terrorism presents a challenge to both academics and policy makers, although policy makers can rarely afford the luxury of classifying terrorism as a transitory or insignificant phenomenon as some academics have done. Terrorism is profoundly disturbing, but it is not incomprehensible. Countless resources have been devoted to countering terrorism, most of which have tended to concentrate on improving overt security, and preventing terrorists from obtaining material resources. Preventing terrorists from obtaining non-material resources, i.e. sympathy, should clearly be another component of an overall counter-terrorism strategy. Obviously the first step in such an approach to countering terrorism is to isolate those areas where terrorists have generated sympathy, and the reasons why they have done so. The final few paragraphs of this
thesis will attempt to define those areas which, from a counter-propaganda viewpoint, present opportunities for reassessment and further research.

REASESSMENT AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The tactical successes enjoyed by both the RAF and the Provisional IRA proved to be in areas where their propaganda was based on a credible derivation of fact acceptable to the target audience. Three of these areas of success, security force behaviour, legislative changes and prisoners, are directly related to the state’s reactions to terrorism. It follows from this that these are areas where counter-terrorism strategy is least credible.

The behaviour of the security forces was one area that brought profitable propaganda for both the RAF and the Provisional IRA. At a general level it must be accepted that the use of force, including lethal force, is sometimes necessary against terrorists. Liberal arguments that it is not are as pointless as denying that any terrorists’ grievances are legitimate. Civil liberties groups have tended to focus their arguments and analyses on the rights of the terrorist, while often ignoring the rights of terrorists’ victims. Such analyses, as we have seen, are interpreted by the terrorists as supportive of them, which undoubtedly causes governments to do so as well, the only result being further valuable and credible propaganda for the terrorists. The qualitative ‘newness’ of terrorism provides an opportunity for a reassessment of the rationales surrounding the liberal state’s use of force to defend itself internally.

A politically open and consultative process of redefining rationales for the use of force internally could produce a number of advantages. One of the most obvious would be that governments would be able to move away from the claim that they deal with terrorists as with ordinary criminals. This is clearly not the case, and governments claiming that it is puts them in an unnecessarily difficult counter-propaganda position.
(This also has applicability to terrorist prisoners, as is discussed below.) For example, the British government's claim that Provisional IRA members are ordinary criminals, alongside its use of the SAS against them, not only lacks credibility, but also has had the effect of at times making it appear ridiculous. SAS units operating against the Provisional IRA give credibility to its analysis of an oppressive state, and convey the impression that the government is not really in control of the situation, especially when statements are issued that subsequently have to be revised. This is not to say that an elite military group such as the SAS can never be used as an aid to the civil power, but having politically and publicly defined situations where it can be used would allow governments to take an offensive propaganda approach, rather than always having to defend the actions of its security forces. It should be stressed that the number of active volunteers and the number of incidents requiring the use of force is small. Having them clearly defined and publicised would mean that terrorists would not only have knowledge of the risks entailed in their behaviour, but also, in a legal sense, would have to consent to these risks (volenti non fit injuria). Obtaining the necessary degree of political consensus is, of course, more difficult, and producing discussion papers and proposals a research challenge for academics, lawyers and politicians.

It is clearly impossible to pre-determine all eventualities that may be faced by the security forces. Indeed it is probably during spontaneous rioting that the credibility of the security forces' behaviour is at its most vulnerable. Here the role for further research is to continue to evolve riot control strategies and training programmes for individual police and army officers. Immense propaganda value can accrue to terrorist organisations from even a single incident of security force misbehaviour. However, bearing in mind that a major aim of terrorist propaganda is to provoke confrontation with

3 The latest example of this is the SAS shooting of three Provisional IRA members in Gibraltar. Regardless of the controversies surrounding this event, and the propaganda the Provisional IRA will generate, it was an ill-conceived act. Intelligence plays the key role in practically countering terrorism, and gathering intelligence from three dead bodies is beyond the capabilities of even the SAS.

4 The "Yellow Card" containing instructions for security forces operating in Northern Ireland, for example, is a restricted document.
the security forces, a number of situations can be seen to have high potential for confrontation; for example, one such situation common to both the West German and the Northern Irish experience was demonstrations surrounding the death of terrorist members in gaol. In these situations the role of the media is vital. While in liberal democracies it is unacceptable for governments or security forces to control the media, further research could aim to reduce the 'news worthiness' of such situations. In these situations the role of the media is vital. While in liberal democracies it is unacceptable for governments or security forces to control the media, further research could aim to reduce the 'news worthiness' of such situations.5 A clear example of a government inadvertently increasing the 'news worthiness' of an event occurred in Belfast in August 1984. Noraid's director of publicity, Martin Galvin, disregarded a British government exclusion order banning him from entering Northern Ireland, and appeared at an internment commemoration rally in Belfast. The RUC was thus faced with a flagrant breach of the law, which unchallenged would have caused it morale problems, and increased the tension within the Protestant community. During the RUC's unsuccessful attempt to snatch Galvin, 22 years old Sean Downes was shot in the chest with a plastic bullet. The frantic scenes of medical crews trying to resuscitate Downes were flashed around the world. When television pictures emerged from RTE showing that Downes was about to attack a policeman, they were too late to upstage the ugly red welt on Downes' chest, and the British government and the RUC were roundly condemned. Had Galvin appeared at a dozen commemoration rallies unmolested by the RUC, the 'news worthiness' would have been virtually non-existent.

5 In this sense the RUC's decision in March 1988 not to police Provisional IRA funerals in return for a promise from families and the church that there would be no paramilitary displays, was a courageous one. Many of those who attend Provisional IRA funerals are there in the hope of direct confrontation with the RUC, rather than from any great wish to pay respects to the 'fallen' volunteer. Many news crews are there for the same reason. However, the RUC's decision was portrayed to the Loyalists as capitulation to the Provisional IRA, and a Loyalist engaged in a barbaric attack on the mourners at the funerals of the three Provisional IRA members shot at Gibraltar. The RUC bravely refused demands for the reintroduction of policing at the funeral of one of those killed during the attack on Milltown cemetery. But the most sickening scenes yet captured on film in Northern Ireland put paid to the RUC's policy before any benefits could accrue. Although the RUC's credibility was probably increased by the lynching of two British soldiers, politicians fell over themselves to denounce the RUC's decision not to police the funeral. The RUC is now once again faced with the difficult dilemma of Provisional IRA funerals. Northern Ireland's problems are undoubtedly compounded by short-sighted politicians whose careers have become dependent on the continuance of terrorism.
There is no doubt that to a certain extent terrorism and the media have a symbiotic relationship. But this can also be used to counter-propaganda's advantage. For in the case of both groups involved in this study, their terrorist acts have been the part of their strategy most consistently rejected by all audiences. Conversely, it has been incidents where attention has been able to be focussed on government or security force actions that have brought most benefits to the terrorists. Therefore, security policies should aim to keep as much attention as possible on the terrorists’ actions, except, of course, when deterrence is the specific objective.

The state’s treatment of imprisoned terrorists is another area where both the RAF and the Provisional IRA have been able to generate sympathy. This raises questions as to the credibility of the state’s attempts to classify convicted terrorists as criminal. Empirical evidence would seem to suggest that the majority of terrorists, while they commit criminal acts, are not criminally motivated. Thus attempts to criminalise them are always going to have to be at variance with credible propaganda claiming that terrorists are political prisoners. States do not have to grant terrorists the status of political prisoners, or that of POWs under the terms of the Geneva Conventions, but terrorists do commit extraordinary acts, and they are frequently convicted under extraordinary judicial processes. So why not imprison them under conditions that are in some sense extraordinary? What practical difference does it make to the state if terrorist prisoners choose to remain in their cells all day wearing their own clothing, as opposed to working within the prison regime wearing prison clothing? It obviously makes a great deal of difference to the terrorists, and provides them with a valuable motivating issue among themselves, and among the sympathetic audience. Prisoners and how they are treated is probably the most important single issue for terrorists, internally as well as externally. Therefore devising new penal arrangements must be one of the most important issues facing counter-terrorism strategists.
Terrorism, like many other political problems, is not easy to solve. Indeed it may prove irresolvable. But its impact and its potential can be lessened by identifying areas where terrorists have been able to achieve even minor successes, and areas where government responses to terrorism lack credibility. Terrorism is above all a political and ideological struggle in which, as one observer has noted, words are weapons not ideological tools. Governments have been slower to recognise this than terrorists. George C. Scott, in his role as General Patton in the film of the same name, declares after his victory "Rommel, you bastard, I read your goddamn book!" Terrorists, it seems, have read the book on the vulnerabilities and sensibilities of liberal democracy much more closely than liberal democratic governments have read the terrorists’ books.

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JOIN THE IRA

(Reprinted from the United Irishman)

I ask you to be a soldier, because Ireland has need of soldiers today. From the soldiers of yesterday has been handed to us the sacred task of renewing the fight for the Cause, for which they so heroically gave their lives.

The Cause is that of Freedom and to the standards must rally again the young men of Ireland. This is no easy task and because it is difficult there are not many prepared to undertake it.

A great goal demands great sacrifices, and the cause of Irish Freedom is a great goal. "The man who is afraid to die, is not fit to live," said Terence MacSweeny, and realising that great truth he sacrificed his life for the principles of Freedom. Those of us who have the National Faith must come together in the fight. Nobody who realises its importance dare stand aloof.

That unwillingness to fight for the Nation's Independence explains why so many generations have failed to realise the ideal. The battle was lost by the few, because the many stood idle by.

AN EXTRACT FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF OGLAIGH NA hEIREANN:

(Reprinted from the United Irishman, November, 1952)

OBJECTS
1. To guard the honour and uphold the sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Ireland.

2. To establish and uphold a lawful Government in sole and absolute control of the Republic.

3. To secure and defend civil and religious liberty and equal rights and equal opportunities for all citizens.

4. To promote the revival of the Irish language as the every day language of the people and to promote the development of the best mental and physical characteristics of our race.

These objects are worthy of the approval of anyone claiming to be an Irishman and are those for which Mitchel, Pearse, McCaughhey and the hosts of Irish Republicans lived and died and are deserving of your support. There realisation depends on the success of the means.

MEANS
The Means by which Oglaiigh na hEireann shall endeavour to achieve its objects are:-
1. Force of arms.

2. Organising, training and equipping the manhood of Ireland as an efficient military force.

3. Assisting as directed by the Army Authority, all organisations working for the same objects.

The means are those used by Mitchel, Pearse and McCaughhey and the host of Irish Republicans who fell in the fray. These means have been approved by history and are worthy of your support. They call for men of high ideals and great moral courage.

There are those who call themselves the Official Republican Movement and claim continuity with the men who drew up this constitution. By their deeds you shall know them. We leave the reader to judge.

Source: Republic News, 8 February 1975.
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