TRADE AND SOCIETY: THE AMOY NETWORK
ON THE CHINA COAST 1683-1735

by

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ABSTRACT

The historical role of the South Vietnamese people was characterized by their persistent demand for national independence, and their active military resistance. The expansion of French colonialism (1858 and 1883) brought the development of the country as a French colony. It was only in 1945 that the country was declared an independent state. The country was then divided into North and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese people fought a long and hard war against the South Vietnamese people and the United States. The war ended in 1975 when the North Vietnamese people won the war and the country was reunified.

Following the reunification of the country, the North Vietnamese people continued to fight against the United States. The country was then divided into North and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese people fought a long and hard war against the South Vietnamese people and the United States. The war ended in 1975 when the North Vietnamese people won the war and the country was reunified. The country was then divided into North and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese people fought a long and hard war against the South Vietnamese people and the United States. The war ended in 1975 when the North Vietnamese people won the war and the country was reunified.

In the final years of the war, the North Vietnamese people continued to fight against the United States. The country was then divided into North and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese people fought a long and hard war against the South Vietnamese people and the United States. The war ended in 1975 when the North Vietnamese people won the war and the country was reunified. The country was then divided into North and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese people fought a long and hard war against the South Vietnamese people and the United States. The war ended in 1975 when the North Vietnamese people won the war and the country was reunified.

This thesis is based on original research carried out by myself

(CHIN-KEONG NG)

ABSTRACT

The maritime trade of the South Fukienese people was characterized by wide geographic dimensions, popular participation, and their extraordinary seafaring spirit. The expansion of trade between 1683 and 1735 brought the development of an interwoven coastal network centred at Amoy to maturity. This network developed by the Fukienese was able to cope with the commercial needs of coastal China and was the best that the Chinese had organized up to that time.

Fukienese trading activities cannot be attributed solely to such external factors as government policy or the burgeoning foreign trade. Nor can it be simply explained by "push-pull" factors. All these interpretations have long dominated the discussions of China's coastal trade by modern scholars. This study suggests, instead, that a more useful treatment should be based on the broad social context, analysing the aspects of internal life in Fukien and showing the organic unity between economic activities and social conditions. By surveying Fukienese society from within, we shall be in a better position to appreciate Fukienese initiative, their indigenous enterprise, creativeness and achievements in sea-going activities.

In the rural area, the heartland of Fukienese society, the momentum of commercialization stopped short of transforming a traditional agrarian economy into a commercial economy based on cash crops. The Fukienese rural society was agriculturally poor and the livelihood of its people was largely subsidized by the income from extra-village activities. Competition for such scarce resources as land had strengthened the traditional lineage organizations (*tsu*). The quest of organizational

strength had also bestowed on the *tsu* a new feature of inclusiveness by accommodating the non-kin members within the *tsu* structure.

On the extra-village scene, Amoy served as a rendezvous where people from different villages learned to become South Fukienese. Amoy was also the doorway to an extended maritime frontier. The expansion of the Amoy trading network was accompanied by a massive emigration of Fukienese, the opening-up of frontier land in Taiwan, and the establishment of strategic outposts along the coast. The South Fukienese were also able to gain supremacy in shipping where they transported bulky commodities in long-range voyages.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, the coastal trade of Amoy was characterized by the active and wider participation of merchants or shipowners with small or medium capital. On the other hand, there were also such wealthy merchants as the rice and sugar traders in Taiwan and the *hang* merchants in Amoy. Overall, the interregional trade catered mainly for the daily consumption of the general masses.

Within the Fukienese community itself, there were no psychological restraints against becoming involved in trading activities. Communications between native scholars and the authorities provided a sound basis for a better understanding and appreciation of maritime trade on the part of the court as well as the officials.

In addition to their commercial skills, the success of the South Fukienese was facilitated by their ability to establish personal relationships with the officials and their willingness to cooperate with other Chinese trading communities.

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To the staff of the Menzies and Chifley libraries at the University and at the Australian National Library, I wish to record my appreciation for their willing assistance. I would like to mention especially Mr Sidney Wang, the curator of the Oriental section at the National Library,

for his enthusiastic response to my request for the acquisition of some materials.

A preliminary survey of the source materials was completed prior to my arrival in Canberra. I was able to use the facilities of the Harvard-Yenching Library in 1976-1977 while I spent a year as a Research Fellow at the Harvard-Yenching Institute. During October-November 1977, I worked on the unpublished Ch'ing memorials collected in the Ch'ing Archives at the National Palace Museum, Taipei. To the patient assistance by their staff, I wish to express my sincere thanks.

I am grateful to Mr Liu Chia-chü, research fellow at the National Palace Museum, who kindly sent me the series of *Secret Palace Memorials of the Yung-cheng Period*, published by the National Palace Museum, immediately after they were made available. Thanks are also due to Mr Chuang Chi-fa of the National Palace Museum for translating some memorials written in the Manchu language, and Mr Wang Tai-ping, Mr Yap Key-chong and Mr Twang Peck-yang, for copying some materials.

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ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS IN FUKIEN, 1735

(A) PREFECTURES AND AUTONOMOUS DEPARTMENTS

Prefectures:

Foochow	福州	Yen-p'ing	延平
Hsing-hua	興化	Chien-ning	建寧
Ch'üan-chou	泉州	Shao-wu	邵武
Chang-chou	漳州	Ting-chou	汀州
Fu-ning	福寧	Taiwan	台灣

Autonomous Departments:

Yung-ch'un	永春	Lung-yen	龍岩
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(B) DISTRICTS IN SOUTH FUKIEN AND TAIWAN

Ch'üan-chou Prefecture:

Chin-chiang	晉江	T'ung-an	同安
Nan-an	南安	An-ch'i	安溪
Hui-an	惠安		

Chang-chou Prefecture:

Lung-ch'i	龍溪	Ch'ang-t'ai	長泰
Chang-p'u	漳浦	P'ing-ho	平和
Hai-ch'eng	海澄	Chao-an	詔安
Nan-ching	南靖		

Lung-yen Autonomous Department:

Lung-yen-chou	龍岩州	Ning-yang	寧洋
Chang-p'ing	漳平		

Yung-ch'un Autonomous Department:

Yung-ch'un-chou 永春州

Te-hua 德化

Taiwan Prefecture:

Taiwan

台灣

Feng-shan

鳳山

Chu-lo

諸羅

Chang-hua

彰化

Tan-shui t'ing

淡水廳

Peng-hu t'ing

澎湖廳

LISTS OF FUKIEN GOVERNORS-GENERAL, GOVERNORS,
AND NAVAL COMMANDERS, 1683-1735

(A) GOVERNORS-GENERAL*

Yao Ch'i-sheng (1678-)

姚啟聖

Shih Wei-han (1684)

施維翰

Wang Kuo-an (1684-)

王國安

Wang Hsin-min (1687-)

王新命

Wang Chih (1688-)

王 騰

Hsing Yung-ch'ao (1689-)

興永朝

Chu Hung-tsu (1692-)

朱宏祚

Kuo Shih-lung (1695-)

郭世隆

Chin Shih-yung (1703-)

金世榮

Liang Nai (1706-)

梁 鼎

Fan Shih-ch'ung (1710-)

范時榮

Chüeh-lo-man-pao (1715-)

覺羅滿保

Kao Ch'i-chuo (1726-)

高其倬

Shih I-chih (1729)

史貽直

Liu Shih-ming (1730-)

劉世明

Hao Yü-lin (1732-)

郝玉麟

*During the years 1684-1726 and after 1734, their jurisdiction covered both Chekiang (Che) and Fukien (Min).

Source: *Fu-chien t'ung-chih* (1868-1871 ed.), 107:1

(B) GOVERNORS

Chin Hung (1683-)

金 鋌

Chang Chung-chü (1686-)

張仲舉

Pien Yung-yü (1690-)

卞永譽

Kung Meng-jen (1697-)

宮夢仁

Chüeh-lo-man-pao (1712-)

覺羅滿保

Ch'en Pin (1716-)

陳 璜

Lü Yu-lung (1719-)

呂猶龍

Huang Kuo-ts'ai (1722-)

黃國材

Chang Chih-tung (1699-)

張志棟

Mei Ch'üan (1701-)

梅 綸

Li Ssu-i (1705-)

李斯義

Chang Po-hang (1707-)

張伯行

Hsü Ssu-hsing (1710-)

許嗣興

Huang Ping-chung (1710-)

黃秉中

Mao Wen-ch'üan (1725-)

毛文銓

Ch'ang Lai (1727-)

常 賚

Chu Kang (1728-)

朱 綱

Liu Shih-ming (1729-)

劉世明

Chao Kuo-lin (1730-)

趙國麟

Lu Cho (1735-)

盧 焯

Source: *Fu-chien t'ung-chih* (1868-1871 ed.), 107:2

(C) NAVAL COMMANDERS

Shih Lang* (1682-)

施 琅

Chang Wang (1696-)

張 旺

Huang Fang-shih* (?)

黃芳世

Wu Ying* (1698-)

吳 英

Shih Shih-p'iao* (1714-)

施世驄

Yao T'ang* (1722-)

姚 堂

Lan T'ing-chen* (1725-)

藍廷珍

Hsü Liang-pin* (1729-)

許良彬

Wang Chün (1733-)

王 郡

*South Fukienese

Source: *Hsia-men chih*, 10:11-13.

(C) CURRENCIES

1. 10 fen 分 (candareen) = 1 ch'ien 錢 (mace)
10 ch'ien = 1 liang 兩 (tael)
2. 1 pound = 3 taels = 4 Spanish dollars

- Sources: 1. Ch'üan Han-sheng and Richard A. Kraus, *Mid-Ch'ing Rice Market*, p.79.
2. Hosea B. Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1635-1834*, v.1, p.xxii.
3. Mathew's *Chinese-English Dictionary* (1969).

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES

CC	chou-chih 州志
CPYC	Yung-cheng chu-p'i yü-chih 雍正硃批諭旨
CSL:KH	Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu: 大清歷朝實錄: Sheng-tsu (K'ang-hsi) ch'ao 聖祖(康熙)朝
CSL:KT	Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu: 大清歷朝實錄: Kao-tsung ch'ao 高宗朝
CSL:ST	Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu: 大清歷朝實錄: Shih-tsung ch'ao 世宗朝
FC	fu-chih 府志
FCTC	Fu-chien t'ung-chih 福建通志
G-G	Governor-General 總督
HC	hsien-chih 縣志
HCCSWP	Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien 皇朝經世文編
HFHCYTTC	Hsiao-fang-hu chai yü-ti ts'ung- ch'ao 小方壺齋輿地叢鈔
HMC	Hsia-men chih 廈門志
KCTTC:CL	Kung-chung tang Ch'ien-lung ch'ao tsou-che 宮中檔乾隆朝奏摺
KCTTC:KH	Kung-chung tang K'ang-hsi ch'ao tsou-che 宮中檔康熙朝奏摺
KCTTC:YC	Kung-chung tang Yung-cheng ch'ao tsou-che 宮中檔雍正朝奏摺
MCSL:CP	Ming-Ch'ing shih-liao: Chi-pien 明清史料:己編
MCSL:KP	Ming-Ch'ing shih-liao: Keng-pien 明清史料:庚編
MCSL:TP	Ming-Ch'ing shih-liao: Ting-pien 明清史料:丁編
MCSL:WP	Ming-Ch'ing shih-liao: Wu-pien 明清史料:戊編
PCHSTK	Pi-chi hsiao-shuo ta-kuan 筆記小說大觀
TC	t'ung-chih 通志

TCHTSL

Ch'ing-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien
shih-li 欽定大清會典事例

TWWHTK

T'ai-wan wen-hsien ts'ung-k'an 台灣文獻叢刊

WHTP:KSSL

Wen-hsien ts'ung-pien: "Yung-cheng
ch'ao kuan-shui shih-liao" 文獻叢編:「雍正朝
關稅史料」

NOTES ON ROMANIZATION

The romanization used in this thesis is that of the Wade-Giles system. In the case of place names, conventional English spelling is used for some well-known geographic terms such as Amoy, Foochow, Fukien, Soochow and a few others.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The wide geographic dimensions, the popular participation by much of Fukienese society, and the extraordinary seafaring spirit of the Fukienese people distinguished Fukien's trade from that of other coastal provinces. The Fukienese were also the first important segment of China's population to establish themselves overseas in trade and to set up permanent settlements in widespread areas including Japan and the Nanyang (Southern Ocean, or present-day Southeast Asia), as well as in many other parts of China, particularly in Taiwan.

Fukienese maritime trade gained even greater momentum in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during which Fukien's merchants had become the indisputable leaders in seafaring enterprises. This period also saw the rise of Amoy not only as the new centre of Fukienese maritime trade, but also as the symbol of indigenous initiative, creativeness and achievement in sea-going activities.

The development of Fukienese maritime trade was greatly facilitated by three commercial centres on the Fukien coast, namely, the cities of Foochow, Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou. Their economic prominence was a result of factors similar to those set out in G. William Skinner's analysis of Chinese cities: their role in providing retail goods and services for a surrounding tributary area or hinterland, their position in the structure of distribution channels connecting economic centres,

and their place in the transport network.¹ In more concrete terms, Foochow served the large hinterland of north Fukien and the tributary area of the Min River, the longest in the province. Ch'üan-chou city had a commercial network covering the basin formed by the Chin River. Chang-chou city lay in the heart of the province's largest plain, created by the Chiu-lung (nine dragons) River and its tributaries.

South Fukien, which included the two prefectures of Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou, had long held a leading position in the realm of maritime trade. The Chang-Ch'üan people called themselves *Min-nan-jen* (South Fukienese), or simply *Fu-chien-jen* (Fukienese), with the implication that they represented the whole province because they were the major group involved in maritime trade and extraprovincial activities.

Since the economy of coastal Fukien depended to a great extent on maritime trade, the seaport which was the most active served as the centre of the provincial commercial network. Prior to the rise of Amoy, Ch'üan-chou city was the centre of Fukienese maritime trade from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. Beginning from the late fifteenth century, Yüeh-kang in Chang-chou prefecture, began to replace Ch'üan-chou as the centre of seafaring activities.² The rise of Yüeh-kang coincided with the passing of the political heyday of the Ming dynasty. As a non-administrative town, Yüeh-kang was used for the smuggling trade

1. G. William Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in G. William Skinner, ed., *The City in Late Imperial China* (Stanford University Press, 1977), p.276.
2. See Ng Chin-keong, "Gentry-Merchants and Peasant-Peddlers - The Responses of the South Fukienese to the Offshore Trading Opportunities 1522-1566," *The Nanyang University Journal*, 7 (1973), p.173. Also Fu I-ling 傅衣凌, *Ming-Ch'ing shih-tai shang-jen ch'i shang-yeh tzu-pen* 明清時代商人及商業資本 (Merchants and mercantile capital in Ming and Ch'ing times) (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1956), p.110.

with the Portuguese and the Japanese. To control the situation, the Ming government decided to promote the seaport as an administrative seat in 1567 and named it Hai-ch'eng.

After the mid-seventeenth century, a new era of South Fukienese maritime trade emerged with the new centre at Amoy. The intensity of trade during the years from 1683 to 1735 brought the development of the Amoy trading network to maturity.³ The period covered the K'ang-hsi reign from the pacification of Taiwan and the reign of his successor Yung-cheng (1723-1735), during which the two rulers steadily consolidated power and achieved their ultimate sovereignty both in theory and in practice.⁴ The contrast between this period and that of the late Ming is striking; in the late Ming, the state's power was in decline and it was, therefore, incapable of maintaining control over private trade.

The outstanding performance of the South Fukienese people in the economic realm provides us with good material for investigating the nature of commercial development in Chinese history. Often, explanations of trading conditions focused on external factors. Government policy and the relationship between the state and commerce represent two of the popular themes in such discussions. An impression is created that commerce was entirely at the mercy of the state and the merchants were nothing but a helpless class leading a precarious life. The burgeoning Western trade with China from the eighteenth century is another commonly accepted explanation of China's commercial growth. Another

3. From then on, Amoy became the symbol of Chang-Ch'üan trade, as described by Negishi Tadashi 根岸信 in his *Chūgoku no girudo 中国のギルド* (Chinese guilds) (Tokyo, 1953), p.112.
4. Pei Huang, "Aspect of Ch'ing Autocracy: An Institutional Study, 1644-1735," *The Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, new series, 6:1/2 (December 1967), p.105.

interpretation takes into account the "push-pull" factors. The former emphasizes rural poverty as the main factor which contributed to the large-scale emigration and the population's eagerness to take part in extra-village activities.⁵ The latter challenges the "traditional" view which stresses rising tenancy and its effect on peasant welfare, and argues that the peasantry's expectation of a better income derived from non-traditional economic activities is a more obvious explanation for increasing commercialization.⁶

Rather than focusing on the external factors and looking only at surface aspects of Fukienese society, I propose instead to analyse those aspects of internal life in Fukien which prompted the growth of its trading activities. I shall attempt to search for the origins of the dynamism and creativeness in Fukien's trading enterprise and to investigate how the South Fukienese skilfully maximized the possibility of expansion in their trading activities within the prescribed state framework during the period between 1683 and 1735.

In other words, what I intend to do is to look at trading activities in their broad social context, showing the organic unity between economic developments and social conditions. This type of analysis is particularly relevant in the case of South Fukien because the commercial activities were open to and involved the entire society in one way or another, even the vast supporting manpower of the rural sector.

5. A major work on Fukienese rural society which presents the "push" argument is Fu I-ling's *Ming-Ch'ing nung-ts'un she-hui ching-chi* 農村社會經濟 (Rural society and economy in the Ming-Ch'ing period) (Peking: San-lien, 1961).
6. A representative study of the "pull" factor and another major work on Fukien's agricultural economy is Evelyn S. Rawski, *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).

Based on this foundation, the South Fukienese were able to build up their commercial network not only in interregional but also in overseas trade. Commercial activities had thus become an extension of, rather than isolated from, society.

An explanation is necessary with regard to the title. In general terms, this is a case study of the Amoy coastal trading network. The term "trade" is interchangeable with "commerce." It will include such activities as the exchange of merchandise, commercial production, transport of trade items and brokerage. The major aspects of "society" to be discussed are the economic conditions, social response and government attitudes. "Network" refers here to the fabric of interconnected activities in which the South Fukienese engaged. The term not only indicates how the Amoy trade was extended and operated, but also includes such elements as the relationships between the state and commerce, between bureaucrats and merchants and the social connections among merchants. All these elements facilitated the smooth functioning of trading activities.

The scope of my present study covers, on the one hand, the basically intraregional trade of South Fukien with Chang-Ch'üan prefectures as its centre and Taiwan prefecture as its frontier extension, and on the other hand, the interregional trade on the China coast. The domestic end of South Fukien's overseas trade is discussed as an extension of the coastal trade, but Fukienese activities overseas are excluded from this study.⁷

7. Two important works related to the overseas trade by South Fukienese are Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652-1853* (Harvard East Asian Monographs 76; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), and Jennifer W. Cushman, "Fields

To provide a rural background related to the expansion of South Fukienese trade, I shall begin my survey in the second chapter by analysing major economic and social changes in South Fukien between 1600 and 1800 to see how Fukienese society responded and adjusted to economic opportunities. It is hoped that these explorations will shed new light on commercialization in rural Fukien, thereby reassessing the "pull" and "push" arguments put forward by scholars in recent years.

My third chapter traces the rise of Amoy as the new maritime centre of Fukien to see how this seaport functioned as an heir to a legacy of Fukienese seafaring trade and how a large scale coastal trading network centred at Amoy began to take shape. The discussion assesses the role of both the authorities and the local people in the formation of this city. How Amoy became a melting pot facilitating the formation of a Chang-Ch'üan commercial community which originated from lineages in rural Fukien is also a major concern.

In the fourth chapter, I shall describe the development and operation of the Amoy trading network and how the trading extensions were connected with one another to form Amoy's total coastal network.

The different categories of merchants are discussed in chapter five. In addition to the nature of their activities, the extent of their capital investment and profits will also be noted insofar as sources are available. I shall also describe in this part the establishment of extensive extraparochial social connections in the wider commercial world to examine how this social factor was related to their trading expansion.

(...cont) From the Seas: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam During the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation; Cornell University, 1975).

Finally, the sixth chapter will investigate the socio-political environment within which Fukienese trade operated.

Overall, both commercial expansion and human connections remain the major themes throughout this study. Instead of applying a more mechanic description of policy versus commerce, which inevitably submerges the faces of the human actors on the historical scene, I attempt to personalize as many figures as I can.

I have consulted the materials scattered among the voluminous compilations, memorials and edicts particularly those collected in the Archives of the National Palace Museum in Taipei, the local gazetteers, the voluminous *pi-chi* (notes) by Ch'ing scholars, the huge quantity of Taiwan sources collected and published by the Bank of Taiwan, some available epigraphic materials, and a few selected genealogies. I have, in addition, consulted the pioneering works of the various Japanese scholars, who have written about socio-economic development in China as well as the major scholarship in English. I have, however, relied primarily on Chinese materials because approaching Fukien's socio-economic development from the perspective of events and activities within the province has demanded a thorough examination of sources written by Chinese who participated in or observed those trends and developments.

MAP 1. FUKIEN PROVINCE
(Mainland) 1735

CHAPTER II

RURAL SOUTH FUKIEN 1600-1800

1. THE ECONOMIC CONDITION

The influence of commerce on the South Fukienese economy during the Ming-Ch'ing period has gained a general acceptance in modern scholarship.¹ Often, the rural economy is shown to have been commercialized. To what extent had the South Fukienese economy changed between 1600 and 1800? This question is the focus of the following discussion.

Agricultural Improvements

Fukien's mountainous topography permitted only limited acreage to be brought under cultivation. Nevertheless, throughout history, the province had long played a leading role in agricultural innovations. One aspect of agricultural improvements was the more efficient use of land from improved seeds, changing cropping patterns, and new crops to increase agricultural productivity, as Ho Ping-ti and Dwight Perkins have discussed.² As a matter of fact, the agricultural improvement started long ago in the eleventh century when a new crop called early-ripening rice was introduced from Champa on the southeastern coast of present-day Vietnam into China. It brought in its wake such revolutionary economic

1. A representative work in this area is provided by Evelyn Rawski. See her *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China*.
2. Ho Ping-ti, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), ch.8; and Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China 1369-1968* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969), ch.3.

consequences as double-cropping and terracing.³ In the late fifteenth century, the Chang-chou people brought back another new rice variety from Annam.⁴ The introduction of sweet potato into Fukien from Luzon in the late sixteenth century further increased agricultural production. As Ho Ping-ti has pointed out, its unusually high per-acre yield, nutritiveness, pleasant taste, preservability, value as an auxiliary food, relative immunity to locusts, greater resistance to drought, and the fact that it can be grown easily in poorer soils, hence competing with no other food crops for good land, made it a highly desirable crop.⁵ Peanuts, grown since the sixteenth century, are regarded as one of the main agents of the "second agricultural revolution."⁶

The conversion to commercial agriculture illustrates other aspects of the dynamism and responsiveness of the traditional peasant economy.⁷ Cash crops were introduced. Among them was sugar cane which was first grown in the northern part of the province in Sung times.⁸ By the late

3. Ho Ping-ti, "Early-Ripening Rice in Chinese History," *Economic History Review*, 9 (1956-1957), pp.200-218; also *Yung-ch'un HC 永春縣志* (Gazetteer of Yung-ch'un district) (Chia-ching ed.), chüan 1, "On products."
4. Kuo Po-ts'ang 郭柏蒼, *Min-ch'an lu-i 閩產錄異* (The typical products of Fukien) (1886 ed.), 1:1a.
5. Ho Ping-ti (1959), p.186.
6. *ibid.*, pp.183-84.
7. Maeda Katsutarō 前田勝太郎, "Min Shin no Fukken ni okeru nōka fukugyō 明清の福建における農家副業 (On the subsidiary industries of peasant households in Fukien during the Ming), Suzuki Shun kyōju kanreki kinen Tōyōshi ronsō 鈴木俊教授還暦記念東洋史論叢 (Collected articles on Far Eastern history commemorating Professor Suzuki Shun's 61st birthday) (Tokyo: San-yō sha, 1964), pp.569-72.
8. Shiba Yoshinobu 斯波義信, "Sōdai ni okeru Fukken shōnin to sono shakai keizai teki haikai" 宋代における福建商人とその社会経済的背景 (Fukien merchants in the Sung and their socio-economic background), in *Wada hakase koki kinen Tōyōshi ronsō 和田博士古稀記念東洋史論叢* (Studies in Oriental history in honor of the 70th birthday of Dr. Wada) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1960), p.489.

Ming, sugar was planted in the valleys of South Fukien mostly by the people of southern Chang-chou.⁹ Another cash crop in South Fukien was cotton. Ch'üan-chou had long been a growing area since the thirteenth century.¹⁰ According to one observer in the late sixteenth century, the crop was grown in a large region between T'ung-an and Lung-ch'i.¹¹ Ch'üan-chou also produced the country's best indigo in the late sixteenth century.¹² Tobacco represented another crop contending for the rice land and was grown in Chang-Ch'üan prefectures in the early seventeenth century.¹³ The development of commercial agriculture continued to be recorded after the establishment of the Ch'ing dynasty. According to a contemporary Fukienese, Kuo Ch'i-yüan, the growing of sugar, indigo, fruit trees, and tobacco could be seen everywhere in Fukien. Among these commercial products, tobacco was the most widely grown.¹⁴ The best of it came from Chang-chou.¹⁵

9. Ng Chin-keong, "The Peasant Society of South Fukien 1506-1644," *The Nanyang University Journal*, 6 (1972), p.211.

10. Shiba Yoshinobu, p.490.

11. Wang Shih-mou 王世懋, *Min-pu shu* 閩部疏 (An account on Fukien), 8a, in *PCHSTK*, series 4, v.6, p.4064. Arthur's preface 1585. X

12. Wang Shih-mou, *Min-pu shu*, 17a.

13. Chung-kuo jen-min ta-hsüeh 中國人民大學 (People's university of China), *Ming-Ch'ing she-hui ching-chi hsing-t'ai ti yen-chiu* 明清社會經濟形態的研究 (A study of the socio-economic aspects of the Ming-Ch'ing period) (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1957), p.11.

14. Kuo Ch'i-yüan 郭起元, "Lun Min-sheng wu-pen chieh-yung shu" 論閩省務本節用書 (On the pursuit of the fundamental occupation and thriftiness in Fukien), in *HCCSWP*, 36:20. Kuo's work was written sometime during the reign of Yung-cheng or the early Ch'ien-lung period. For dating, see his biography in *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 232:5b-6b.

15. *Lung-ch'i HC* 龍溪縣志 (Gazetteer of Lung-ch'i district) (1762 ed.), 19:22a.

Commercial Activities

Fukien had also a long history responding to geographic challenges by going beyond the traditional boundary of the economy. Fukienese found opportunities in domestic trade, overseas commerce, and handicraft industries. Fukien's commercial activities had already been well established during the Sung period, as described by Shiba Yoshinobu.¹⁶ At that time, Fukienese merchants went out to other provinces and actively engaged in both domestic and foreign trade, and in money lending. From this period, the fame of *Min-shang* (travelling merchants from Fukien), *Min-ku* (resident merchants from Fukien), and *Min-ch'uan* (Fukienese vessels) became widespread in the country.¹⁷ The Fukienese merchants also won for themselves the name *hai-shang* (sea merchants) because of their outstanding position in this area of trade.¹⁸

Among the Fukienese merchants in this earlier period, the Ch'üan-Chou seafarers dominated the foreign trade, while the Foochow and Chienning merchants were more active on the domestic scene.¹⁹ As early as the twelfth century during the Southern Sung, Ch'üan-chou had arisen as the most important centre for foreign trade and also one of the greatest shipbuilding centres sharing the prosperity of the maritime trade with Canton to the south and Ningpo to its north. In the late thirteenth century of the Yüan period, Ch'üan-Chou, known as Zayton to the West, overshadowed Canton in foreign trade and became the largest port of the country. The golden age of Ch'üan-chou was retained until the late fifteenth century of the Ming dynasty. Except for some short intervals,

16. Shiba Yoshinobu, pp.485-98.

17. *ibid.*, p.485.

18. *ibid.*, p.494.

19. *ibid.*, pp.494-98.

Ch'üan-chou was, during this long period, one of the government's designated centres for the state-sponsored trade with overseas tributary countries.

At the turn of the sixteenth century, Chang-chou was catching up as the new spot in overseas trade. The development was typified by the rapid growth of private trade in which Yüeh-kang (Hai-ch'eng) emerged as the centre. The enthusiastic response by the South Fukienese to the overseas trade culminated in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.

Trade in the pre-sixteenth-century period was mainly an endeavour of the urban population and monopolized by a small number of merchants. Around 1500, it is recorded in the local gazetteer that the more interior districts of Chang-Ch'üan prefectures, such as Nan-an, Yung-ch'un, Chang-p'ing, Lung-yen, Ch'ang-t'ai, and Nan-ching, were still "unfamiliar with commerce" and their people "value only the fundamental occupation (agriculture) and hold the secondary (trade and crafts) in contempt."²⁰ After the mid-sixteenth century, the trading activities in these districts were no longer the monopoly of the larger coastal cities such as Ch'üan-chou/Chin-Chiang or Chang-chou/Lung-ch'i. More local people engaged in trade, while tens of thousands of the rural South Fukienese sought their new livelihood in trade overseas. Around 1600, it was estimated that one half of the Fukienese population earned their living outside the home village.²¹

20. Ch'üan-chou FC 泉州府志, (Gazetteer of Ch'üan-chou prefecture) (1763 ed.), 20:8a; Pa-Min TC 八閩通志, (A gazetteer of the eight prefectures of Fukien) (1490 ed.), 3:9a; and Yung-ch'un HC (Chia-ching ed.), chüan 1; quoted in Ng Chin-keong (1972), p.208.
21. Hsieh Chao-che 謝肇淛, Wu Tsa-tsu 五雜俎 (Five miscellaneous chapters), 4:35b, in PCHSTK, series 8, v.8, pp.3471-72.

It is natural to find that the development of handicrafts kept pace with commercialization from Ming times. For example, Chang-chou silk was well known even in Japan. The prefecture also produced cotton goods which sold in large quantity. Dyes were another Chang-chou speciality. Iron pots and utensils made in Lung-yen and Chang-p'ing were exported to Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. Other goods which were sold abroad included crude porcelain specimens, lacquered boxes, fans, and salt.²²

In the early Ch'ing, handicraft industries continued to boom. Weaving had become more lucrative. The demand was so great that rural women could rely on needlework or home weaving for the support of their families.²³ Weaving had also been developed to be a city-based industry hiring male workers.²⁴ The products were of better quality and in greater variety.²⁵

Man-Land Ratio

How much had rural conditions in South Fukien improved by 1800 after the long period of agricultural innovations and involvement in trading activities? This is a controversial question that modern scholars have attempted to answer. Amano Motonosuke asserts that the new agricultural developments had enriched the livelihood of the peasants.²⁶ Evelyn Rawski

22. Evelyn Rawski, pp.46-47, and 66.

23. This is reported in the chapters of virtuous women in local gazetteers. See, for example, *Lung-ch'i HC* (1762 ed.), 18:18-45.

24. *ibid.*, 10:2b-3a.

25. *ibid.*; also *P'ing-ho HC* 平和縣志 (Gazetteer of P'ing-ho district) (1719 ed.), 10:7a.

26. Amano Motonosuke 天野元之助, "Mindai nōgyō no tenkai" 明代農業の展開 (The development of Ming agriculture), *Shakai keizai shigaku* 社會經濟史學 (Social and economic history), 23:5-6 (February 1958), p.415.

also emphasizes the positive result of economic development. According to her, the potential and possible conditions from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries were favourable for an able and ambitious peasant. Rawski argues that even the majority of the peasantry "must have enjoyed a stable if not slightly rising standard of living" during that time period.²⁷ However, other scholars, including Shimizu Taiji and Fu I-ling, offer a contradictory view. They present a picture of rural poverty in Ming-Ch'ing Fukien.²⁸ In repudiating their view, Rawski contended that "a group of subsistence level, marginal peasantry, who were heavily in debt and unable to make ends meet," must surely have existed in any period, but she implies that this group was not representative of the rural conditions.²⁹

What appear to be contradictory interpretations about the rural condition in South Fukien are, in fact, a reflection of the different emphases these scholars have brought to bear on the subject. Once the various economic factors affecting rural life are separated from each other, we can then begin to evaluate how much improvement had taken place in the countryside. The first important aspect is the man-land factor. Population and land were two ecological determinants in the social and economic development of South Fukien. Increased productivity due to new crops and the changing cropping patterns was closely related to labour

27. Evelyn Rawski, p.193; see also pp.24, 29, 162 and 163.

28. Shimizu Taiji 清水泰次, "Mindai Fukken no nōka keizai - toku ni ichi-den san-shu no kankō ni tsuite" 明代福建の農家經濟——特に田荘の慣行について (The peasant economy of Ming Fukien — The custom of three lords to a field in particular), *Shigaku zasshi* 史學雜誌. (Journal of history), 63:7 (July 54), p.606; and Fu I-ling (1961), pp.156-58.

29. Evelyn Rawski, p.193.

inputs.³⁰ Double cropping promoted a busier and better rotation system and therefore resulted in a rising man-land ratio. Dwight Perkins says that the Chinese population and presumably the output rose about six times between the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Only about half of this rise can be accounted for by an extension of cultivated acreage. The remainder was brought about by a doubling of the yields of the major grain crops.³¹ As the region where agricultural improvements were the most far-reaching, South China had a faster gain in population than took place in the north.³² By the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, the population of Fukien had reached and surpassed the 1953 census estimates.³³ In other words, agricultural improvements had contributed heavily to the growth of population and agriculture was becoming increasingly labour-intensive.³⁴

30. Dwight Perkins (1969), p.52.

31. *ibid.*, p.37.

32. Ho Ping-ti (1959), p.264.

33. Dwight Perkins (1969), p.208. For the period 1393-1851, the unadjusted population census data for Fukien are given by Perkins as 3,917,000 (1393), 7,620,000 (1749), 8,170,000 (1771), 11,220,000 (1776), 15,942,000 (1819), and 20,099,000 (1851). See *ibid.*, p.207. For interpretations of the Ch'ing statistics including those for Fukien, see Ho Ping-ti (1959), p.35, and Appendix II; Li Wen-chih 李文治, et al., comp., *Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh shih tzu-liao* 中國近代農業史資料 (Historical materials on agriculture in modern China) (3 vols; Peking: San-lien, 1957), v.1, pp.1-6; Lo Erh-kang 羅爾綱, "T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ke-ming ch'ien ti jen-k'ou ya-p'o wen-t'i" 太平天國革命前的人口壓迫問題 (The question of population pressure before the Taiping rebellion), originally published in 1947; reprinted in Chou K'ang-hsieh 周康燮, ed., *Chung-kuo chin-tai she-hui chin-chi shih lun-chi* 中國近代社會經濟史論集 (Collected essays on social and economic history of modern China) (2 vols; Hong Kong: Ch'ung-wen, 1971), v.1, pp.471-532; Irene B. Taeuber and Nai-chi Wang, "Population Reports in the Ch'ing Dynasty," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 19:4 (August 1960), pp.403-17; and Evelyn Rawski, Appendix.

34. Ho Ping-ti (1959), pp.175-76, and 264.

As Ho Ping-ti has indicated, reconstruction of China's population has long been painstaking work for demographers.³⁵ Figures in the sources are always puzzling. Nevertheless, a rough idea of the figures is necessary. The total figure for registered adult males (*ting*) for Chang-Ch'üan prefectures in 1711 was 259,994.³⁶ If we take the *ting* figures as the number of households, and then multiply by an average of five, we might reasonably estimate that the population of the two prefectures was around 1.3 million. The total population of Fukien province in 1751 was given as 7,736,155.³⁷ Since Chang-Ch'üan occupied some 20 per cent of the population total,³⁸ the figure for these two prefectures would be 1.55 million.

The reconstruction of the man-land ratio presents another problem.³⁹ All the official land figures were not intended as a true acreage return and the different grades of land were converted to fiscal *mou*.⁴⁰ Again, only a rough idea of the situation can be given. The unadjusted figures show that the average holding in Chang-chou was 5.0 *mou* per *k'ou* (mouth)

35. *ibid.*, p.35.

36. In 1712, the Ch'ing court fixed the national *ting* tax permanently on the basis of the 1711 *ting* returns. The cited figure was recorded in the *Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ung chih* 大清一統志 (A comprehensive gazetteer of the great Ch'ing) (1764 ed.), 328:2a and 329:2a.

37. KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Fukien governor P'an Ssu-chü 潘思榘 16/11/17. (Submitted on the 17th day of the 11th month, in the 16th year of the Ch'ien-lung reign).

38. The percentage is derived from figures recorded in the *Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ung chih*, 324:4a, 328:2a, 329:2a, and 335:1b.

39. For the various interpretations of the man-land ratio, see Dwight Perkins (1969), pp.207, 212, and 234; Ho Ping-ti (1959), pp.124, 125, and 283; Li Wen-chih, et al, comp., v.1, pp.9 and 60; and Lo Erh-kang, in Chou K'ang-hsieh, ed., v.1, p.491.

40. Ho Ping-ti (1959), pp.108 and 113; and Dwight Perkins (1969), p.218. *Mou* is a Chinese unit for acreage.

in 1571, while Ch'üan-chou recorded 8.4 *mou* in 1562.⁴¹ Although the above figures of average holdings could possibly be much higher than the actual situation, considering that shortage of land had already become serious after the mid-Ming, they do indicate a less deteriorated condition than that of the Ch'ing period. According to Lo Erh-kang, each person needed 4 *mou* of cultivated land to maintain a minimum livelihood.⁴² The figures of 1812, however, show that the average acreage in Fukien was 0.93 *mou*, far below the margin.⁴³ The situation in Chang-Ch'üan prefectures should have been even worse because their man-land proportion during the Ch'ing period was always regarded as being much lower than that of other prefectures. Despite the fact that the sources are not precise, the trend of a deteriorating man-land ratio is beyond doubt and it fits in well with the general observations made by both Ho Ping-ti and Dwight Perkins.

Multiple Landownership

The situation of the man-land ratio can best be illustrated by the pattern of multiple landownership. Studies of rural conditions in Ming-Ch'ing Fukien often deal with the local practice of multiple landownership. Despite several decades of painstaking research, the question seems to be more confusing than ever. The practice in Chinese was

41. See FCTC (1868-1871 ed.), 48:14a, 18a; *Chang-chou FC* 漳州府志 (Gazetteer of Chang-chou prefecture) (1877 ed.), 14:23; and *Ch'üan-chou FC* (1763 ed.), 20:80.

42. Lo Erh-kang, in Chou K'ang-hsieh, ed., v.1, pp.489-92.

43. *ibid.*

called "two owners" or "three owners to a plot of land" (*i-t'ien liang-chu* or *i-t'ien san-chu*).⁴⁴ In the most general and idealized terms, the *de jure* owner had the right to the subsoil, and, while he was entitled to receive rent, he was also responsible for the tax payments. Another party had the right to the topsoil. The latter was the *de facto* proprietor who had no legal liability of tax payments. Often, a third party rented the land from the *de facto* proprietor. The right to each of these three levels was transferable.

Different arguments and interpretations have been raised as to how multiple landownership functioned.⁴⁵ Niida Noboru suggests that the stimulus for the practice may have been the necessity for tremendous investments of labour in preparing fields for wet-rice cultivation. Security of tenure served as an inducement and compensation used to attract new tenants into uncultivated or abandoned lands.⁴⁶ However, Fu I-ling stresses the feudalistic and exploitative nature of the practice as a device to tie the peasant to the land.⁴⁷ Kataoka Shibako links the development to the commercialization of agriculture which

44. The practice was also found in Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Hupei, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Taiwan. See Mi Chü Wiens, "The Origins of Modern Chinese Landlordism," *Festschrift in Honor of the Eightieth Birthday of Professor Shen Kang-po* (Taipei, 1976), p.336; and Kataoka Shibako 片岡筭子, "Fukken no ichiden ryōshu sei ni tsuite" 福建の一田兩主制について (On the system of two levels of landownership in Fukien), *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* 歴史學研究 (Historical Studies), no.294 (September 1964), p.42.

45. A summary of the different interpretations is in Evelyn Rawski, pp.189-91.

46. Niida Noboru 仁井田陞, *Chūgoku hōsei-shi kenkyū* [Tochi-hō torihiki-hō] 中國法制史研究[土地法・取引法] (A study of Chinese legal history - Laws concerning land and transaction) (Tokyo, 1960), pp.167-68.

47. Fu I-ling (1961), p.158.

strengthened the tenants' bargaining power.⁴⁸ Both Shimizu Taiji and Fu I-ling focus on the tax evasion orientation of the practice.⁴⁹

More often, the controversies arise from each scholar's overemphasis of certain aspects of the ownership pattern. It is necessary, therefore, to look at the development of multiple ownership from an historical perspective. The earliest record of the practice so far cited is the 1558 edition of the Lung-yen district gazetteer. Most interestingly, Lung-yen was an interior district known as economically backward in the mid-Ming.⁵⁰ According to the gazetteer, rich landowners customarily transferred title to their land to other people, the nominal owners, in order to avoid taxation. The nominal owners held the land titles in name only and collected a certain amount of "rent" from the de facto holder and paid the land tax.⁵¹ In a different situation, on the other hand, the gazetteer of Chang-chou edited in 1613 tells how the land boom had tempted the landowners to sell their holdings for quick money. The purchaser would agree to pay higher prices on condition that the original holder retained the land title. Under both of these two circumstances, tax evasion was the main motive behind and the de facto proprietors were not liable for tax.⁵²

One reason for the confusion which has arisen over the interpretation of the practice is the unqualified use of the two terms "landlord"

48. Kataoka Shibako, p.48.

49. Fu I-ling (1961), p.49; and Shimizu Taiji (1954), p.611.

50. See *Pa-Min TC* (1490 ed.), 3:9a; and *Lung-yen CC* 龍岩州志 (Gazetteer of Lung-yen department) (1835 ed.), 7:1-5. The 1558 and the 1738 editions are quoted in Kataoka Shibako, pp.44-45.

51. Kataoka Shibako, p.44.

52. *Chang-chou FC* (1613 ed.), *chüan* 8, quoted in Shimizu Taiji (1954), p.615.

and "tenant" in the class sense. For example, Fu I-ling stresses the power of the landlord class,⁵³ while Evelyn Rawski indicates the strengthened position of the tenants.⁵⁴ Not infrequently, the term *yeh-chu* (proprietor) is indiscriminately taken to indicate an homogeneous landlord class. At the same time the de facto owner who did not hold the land title is mistaken as a tenant.⁵⁵ In fact, as I have just shown, the land-title holder, or nominal owner, was not necessarily the proprietor. The latter, in turn, did not always choose to register the actual holding under his name thereby avoiding taxation. Such practices were particularly prevalent during the late Ming, as seen in Shimizu Taiji's study.⁵⁶ In other words, it was not the nominal owner but the de facto proprietor who benefitted most. A contemporary gazetteer reveals that the de facto proprietors were "mostly well-established with property."⁵⁷ It is safe to say that the many nominal landowners were either the landless or originally small owner-tillers.

The practice of multiple ownership underwent changes during the Ch'ing period. Due to the benevolent policy of the Ch'ing rulers typified by a series of periodic exemptions from the payment of land

53. Fu I-ling (1961), pp.49 and 158.

54. Evelyn Rawski, pp.19-22.

55. This interpretation is particularly evident in Evelyn Rawski, pp.19-24.

56. Shimizu Taiji, *Mindai tochi seido shi kenkyū* 明代土地制度史研究 (A study of the history of Ming land systems) (Tokyo, 1968), pp.443-58.

57. *Chang-chou FC* (1573 ed.), 5:8b. See also the comment in the 1877 edition of the gazetteer which runs, "The rich and powerful people privately enjoy land proprietorship without paying tax. But the poor and the weak suffer from paying land tax without the proprietorship." (14:32a). The condition is also pointed out in *Chang-p'u HC* 漳浦縣志 (Gazetteer of Chang-p'u district) (1700 ed.), ch'üan 7.

tax⁵⁸ and lighter rates, the de facto proprietors were encouraged to become land-title holders. Nevertheless, the local authorities did not interfere with the transfer of tenancy rights among the tenants.⁵⁹ Such an attitude represents a recognition by the local officials of the transfer right among peasants.

With the freedom to buy and sell both the rights to the topsoil and the subsoil, the Fukienese were able to share land in flexible ways under the unfavourable conditions of the man-land ratio. The practice had the effect of rotating ownership. It facilitated purchases or sales to suit one's financial situation. In this respect, multiple ownership was injected with elements relating to commercial developments. The desire to live a more secure and prestigious life after retirement, to bring up offspring, and to keep the lineage intact was enough to attract a certain amount of investment in land. The system also enabled many less well-to-do to use their life-long savings for the purchase of a small piece of land, or at least the tenancy right for their family members who stayed behind in the native village. Nevertheless, land-holding in the Ch'ing period stemmed more from a desire for security rather than profit, as Evelyn Rawski has indicated.⁶⁰ Large land concentrations were absent in eighteenth-century South Fukien. This can be explained by Rawski's argument that commerce, instead of agriculture,

58. Liu Ts'ui-yung 劉翠溶, "Ch'ing-ch'u Shun-chih K'ang-hsi nien-chien chien-mien fu-shui ti kuo-ch'en" 清初順治康熙年間減免賦稅的過程 (The process of tax exemption during the Shun-chih and K'ang-hsi reigns in the early Ch'ing), in Chou K'ang-hsieh, ed., *Chung-kuo chin san-pai-nien she-hui chin-chi shih lun-chi* 中國近三百年社會經濟史論集 (Collected papers on the social and economic history of China in the last three hundred years) (2 vols; Hong Kong: Ch'ung-wen, 1972), v.1, p.33.

59. Chang-p'u HC (1700 ed.), chüan 7.

60. Evelyn Rawski, p.87.

remained the major attraction for large investment.⁶¹

Overall, there is one important aspect of multiple ownership which has been ignored in the discussion of the practice by other scholars. Under the system prevailing in the eighteenth century, the ability to transfer subsoil, topsoil, and tenancy rights freely meant that greater opportunities were available to rural people. The accessibility and transferability of landownership should have opened the way for the inflow of capital investment derived from the extra-village income. However, while land purchases for non-economic reasons were common, there was lack of serious investment in land and agriculture. Multiple ownership had resulted in an agricultural landscape which was more than ever before characterized by the customary fragmentation of land.

Limitations of Agricultural Development

Against the background discussed above, we are in a better position to evaluate agricultural development and commercial activities. The first question arises: To what extent could improvements in agriculture be achieved in order to maintain the level of productivity while absorbing the additional population without a serious fall in per-capita income? A saturation point would be reached sooner or later. And lack of expansion outside of traditional agricultural pursuits would ultimately render the process a self-defeating one.⁶² Commercialized agriculture would

61. *ibid.*

62. Clifford Geertz in his study of the Javanese wet-rice cultivation observes that "wet-rice cultivation, with its extraordinary ability to maintain levels of marginal labor productivity by always managing to work one more man in without a serious fall in per-capita income, soaked up almost the whole of the additional population that Western intrusion created, at least indirectly. It is this ultimately self-defeating process that I have proposed to call 'agricultural

have provided a possible remedy for the unfavourable man-land ratio, if the cash crops had become the major products in the rural economy. In this regard, Maeda Katsutarō has rightly suggested that the cash crops remained subsidiary to foodstuffs in Fukien.⁶³ More serious restraints came from the fragmentation of land and unstable landholding patterns as shown by frequent transfers under the practice of multiple ownership. All these factors had obstructed the development of commercialized farming and resulted, instead, in a condition of subsistence agriculture.

Generally, rural poverty continued to affect the peasantry. That "the land is barren and the people are poor" (*ti-chi min-p'in*) was a common description of the rural condition in the memorials submitted by the local officials to the court.⁶⁴ In fact, two thirds of the land for food crops in Chang-Ch'üan prefectures could grow little except sweet potato.⁶⁵ Governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo and governor P'an Ssu-chü in their memorials submitted respectively in 1726 and 1751 mentioned that the peasants lived on the margin of subsistence. The rural population mostly could not afford to eat rice but had to live on sweet potato as their staple food for several months in a year.⁶⁶ Even the bare

involution.'" He continues, "I take the concept of 'involution' from the American anthropologist Alexander Goldenweiser, who devised it to describe those culture patterns which, after having reached what would seem to be a definite form, nonetheless fail either to stabilize or transform themselves into a new pattern but rather continue to develop by becoming internally more complicated." See his *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1963), pp.80-81.

63. Maeda Katsutarō, p.585.

64. KCTTC:YC, Fu-ning brigade general Yen Kuang-wu 顏光晔, 6/4/18, v.10, p.282.

65. KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Fukien governor P'an Ssu-chü, 16/9/21.

66. *ibid.*; and KCTTC:YC, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo 高其倬, 4/6/19, v.6, p.174.

subsistence level was constantly threatened by droughts or floods. This situation explains why "rains" and "food prices" (yü-shui liang-chia) had always been regarded by the officials as two very important factors of maintaining social stability. The condition of the rural economy is well summed up by Kuo Ch'i-yüan, who lived in the early eighteenth century. He said:

Recently, both the households and the mouths have been increasing but the acreage remains the same. As the man-land ratio has become more unbalanced, the people are becoming poorer. To share one person's food among ten, surely they all become starved. To share one's clothes among ten, surely they all feel cold.⁶⁷

Nonetheless, conditions seldom reached the breaking point, mainly because the livelihood of the rural population in South Fukien was to a great extent subsidized by the income earned through commercial or other activities performed outside the native village.⁶⁸ Whenever the source of extra-village income was affected by government restrictions, rural livelihood became seriously menaced.

What, then, was the economic situation in Fukien in the eighteenth century? Generally speaking, South Fukien was agriculturally poor but its income from extra-village sources, particularly those from trading activities, represented an enormous amount. The flow of silver reaching China from the Spanish Philippines alone totalled some 2 to 4 million pesos (or roughly 1.5 to 3 million taels) a year in the period from 1600

67. Kuo Ch'i-yüan, "Lun Min-sheng wu-pen chieh-yung shu," in *HCCSWP*, 36:21a.

68. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 87:17b and 140:9b.

to 1729;⁶⁹ "Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou were direct recipients of much of this flow."⁷⁰

While a portion of the extra-village income went to rural area, a large proportion of it contributed mainly to urban prosperity. When eighteenth-century eyewitnesses talked about the prosperity of Fukien, they meant the cities rather than the countryside. For example, Kuo Ch'i-yüan criticized the "wasteful extravagance" of the Fukienese people, who lived a luxurious life and tried to compete in their good-quality clothing with the residents of the wealthiest regions such as Soochow and Hangchow.⁷¹ What he described was more possibly an urban phenomenon. It was the commercial boom in urban South Fukien, as shown by the numerous vessels entering the harbours of Amoy and Hai-ch'eng and the "hundreds of commodities" carried by them, that attracted the attention of the contemporary observers and led them to describe Chang-Ch'üan as the richest region of Fukien province.⁷²

69. Evelyn Rawski, p.76; and Ch'üan Han-sheng 全漢昇, *Chung-kuo ching-chi shi lun-ts'ung* 中國經濟史論叢 (A collection of papers on the economic history of China) (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1972), p.438.

70. Evelyn Rawski, p.76.

71. Kuo Ch'i-yüan, "Lun Min-sheng wu-pen chieh-yung shu," in *HCCSWP*, 36:21a.

72. See, for examples, *KCTTC:CL* (unpublished), Fukien governor P'an Ssu-chü, 16/9/21; *KCTTC:CL* (unpublished), Fukien governor Ch'en Hung-mou 陳宏謀, 19/6/13; and Cheng Chen-t'u 鄭振國, "Chih hsieh-tou i" 治械聞議 (On the suppression of the local feuds), in *HCCSWP*, 23:47a. Cheng was a northern Fukienese who lived during the Ch'ien-lung reign.

2. THE SOCIAL CONDITION

The sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries saw a trend towards accelerated commercialization. At the same time, the rural area was confronted with some economic restraints due to the unfavourable man-land ratio. How did these two factors affect the structure of rural society? What were the social implications of this structure in relation to the regulation of social behaviour, the formation of social groups, and the extra-village activities? These are some questions which will be examined below.

Late-Ming Rural Conflicts

In Mi Chü Wiens' interpretation of the impact of commercialization on the Yangtze Valley and the southeastern provinces, market forces began to erode rural social relations. According to Wiens, social relations had previously been personalistic. Protection and guidance were exchanged for service, and Confucian ethical codes dictated the behavioural pattern. Later, in the late Ming, she contends, such harmonious relations were gradually replaced by impersonal, contractual ones. The growth of market relations took the place of conventional paternalism. Fukien in the late Ming had already witnessed the erosion of the traditional socio-moral relationships based on Confucianism. The decline of bondservantry and the emergence of a more assertive tenantry were seen as the course that social development was taking. The tenants' movements precipitated, in Wiens' words, the founding of a new rural order. Tenant status evolved from one of dependence to one of autonomy. At the same time, there was also a change from harmony to conflict in

the relationship between landlords and their labourers.⁷³ In the latter respect, Wiens' point is not dissimilar to that held by Fu I-ling. Fu tends to see rural conflicts as a result of growing class consciousness stimulated by the tenants' contacts with the market.⁷⁴ Evelyn Rawski also focuses on the relations between landlords and tenants. Unlike Fu I-ling, Rawski emphasizes the autonomous status and economic improvement of tenants resulting from participation in commerce, absentee landlordism, and permanent tenure.⁷⁵ Absentee landholding increased due to market expansion, which provided new opportunities for accumulating wealth through commerce and thus lured the landlords away from villages. This was to the advantage of the cultivator-tenants who were allowed to enjoy security of tenure.

In order to examine the arguments portraying the landlord and his tenants as adversaries and postulating the erosion of Confucian paternalism, I shall discuss a case of landlord-tenant confrontation in late-Ming Ch'üan-chou. This case has often been cited⁷⁶ as an example of how market forces were eroding rural social relations.

As recorded in the gazetteer of Ch'üan-chou, relations between the landlords and their tenants became increasingly tense in the prefecture towards the last days of the Ming dynasty. Tenants had become more commercially oriented and, thus, more independent. Such was the trend from the turn of the seventeenth century. In the words of the gazetteer,

73. Mi Ch'ü Wiens, pp.326-29.

74. Fu I-ling (1961), pp.42, 92, 93 and 104.

75. Mi Ch'ü Wiens, pp.333 and 336; Evelyn Rawski, pp.24, 86, and 87; Fu I-ling (1961), pp.42, 92, 93 and 104. Kataoka Shibako also links tenants' autonomous status with commercial activity (see pp.48 and 49).

76. For examples, Fu I-ling (1961), pp.72-78; and Mi Ch'ü Wiens, pp. 331-33.

"after reaping the crops in the morning, they will sell them to the market in the afternoon."⁷⁷ At the same time, the alienation of landlords from their tenants was aggravated by the growth of impersonal relations between them. The sources indicate that before the full impact of commercialization had developed, landlords mostly resided in the villages and maintained a close relationship with their tenants. They went to the tenants' houses to collect the rents in person. The amount of rent collected depended on the extent of the harvest.⁷⁸ The development of commercialization, however, began to attract the landlords to cities. Later, rent payments were collected by household servants, and the personal and harmonious atmosphere rapidly lapsed as a result of the abuses of the rent collectors. Confrontation began to emerge in the form of rent resistance.⁷⁹ In the last years of the Ming dynasty, the relationship deteriorated further and tenant uprisings broke out in almost all the districts of the prefecture.⁸⁰

In reading the above materials, three questions should be asked. First, to what extent can we link the conflict to commercialization? Second, did the case represent an emerging trend or was it merely a transitional phenomenon? Third, what was the actual relationship between the landlords and their tenants?

In the first place, if it is suggested that commercialization created conflicts, as Fu I-ling and Mi Chü Wiens do suggest, we must note the fact that Chang-chou was even more commercialized in the late

77. *Ch'üan-chou FC* (1763 ed.), 20:13a.

78. *ibid.*, 10:13b.

79. *ibid.*, 20:13.

80. *ibid.*, 20:13-14.

Ming. Beginning from the mid-sixteenth century, while it was Ch'üan-chou that recorded the more widespread tenant uprisings, it was Chang-chou which was notorious for the practice of multiple landownership. The limited sources available do not help explain this anomaly, which may simply reflect gaps in the information about these two prefectures. However, some dissimilarities between Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou are evident. Despite the fact that Ch'üan-chou had a long history of maritime trade, it was Chang-chou that took the lead after the end of the fifteenth century. A more unfavourable man-land ratio in Chang-chou compared with that in Ch'üan-chou impelled a large exodus of its rural population from the prefecture in response to outside opportunities.⁸¹ This, in turn, created greater economic mobility. The landlords' increasing interest in commercial investment and the greater economic mobility of the rural population were mitigating rural tension and conflict, rather than inciting it.

In Ch'üan-chou, on the other hand, outright land encroachment seems to have been relatively more widespread and absentee landlordism was more severe.⁸² In his study of Hunan at the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty, Shigeta Atsushi found that, while tenants in one locality were driven hard like slaves under powerful landlords, those in another locality were too strong to be controlled by their landlords. He comes to the conclusion that the former reflects the situation in economically

81. In the early seventeenth century, the major overseas destination for Fukienese migration was Manila. Most of the 25,000 victims of the 1603 massacre in Manila came from Hai-ch'eng in Chang-chou. See *Chang-chou FC* (1714 ed.), 33:30a. In the later period, the Manila Chinese were mainly from Ch'üan-chou.

82. Ch'en Mou-jen 陳懋仁, *Ch'üan-nan tsa-chih* 泉南雜誌 (Casual notes on southern Ch'üan-chou), pt.1, 5a, in *FCHSTK*, series 4, v.6, p.3563.

backward areas and the latter in rich areas.⁸³ It is doubtful whether the differences between Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou were great enough to allow us to apply Shigeta Atsushi's findings. However, it is plausible to say that Chang-chou achieved greater economic mobility in the rural sector during the late-Ming period. Multiple landownership reduced the size of landholdings and, more significantly, also tended to create a new pattern whereby landholding was practiced generally within one's native village.

In Ch'üan-chou, the landholding pattern in the final decades of the Ming dynasty was quite different. As noted by Ch'en Mou-jen, a native of Ch'üan-chou who wrote during the final years of the Ming, the numerous large families in southern Ch'üan-chou competed with each other for larger landholdings.⁸⁴ Other sources also reported that the prominent families from the walled city Ch'üan-chou had taken over the garrison holdings in Te-hua,⁸⁵ and the lands in An-ch'i also fell into their hands.⁸⁶ By scrutinizing the wording of the gazetteer that records the landlord-tenant conflict in late-Ming Ch'üan-chou, one would easily gain the impression that the absentee landlords were often not natives to the villages where their holdings were located.

83. Shigeta Atsushi 重田徳, "Shin-sho ni okeru Konan no jinushi-sei ni tsuite - 'Konan-shō rei sei-an' ni yoru shōron" (清初における湖南の地主制について — 「湖南省例成案」による小論 (Notes on the early Ch'ing landlord system in Hunan, based on "Administrative Precedents for Hunan province"), *Wada hakase koki kinen Tōyōshi ronsō* 和田博士古稀記念東洋史論叢 (Studies in Oriental history in honour of the 70th birthday of Dr Wada) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1960), pp.473-75.

84. Ch'en Mou-jen, pt.1, 5a, in *PCHSTK*, series 4, v.6, p.3563.

85. Fu I-ling (1961), pp.166-67.

86. Shimizu Taiji (1954), p.606.

Yet the foregoing materials do not necessarily indicate the formation of two conflicting classes in the rural areas. More revealing is another type of source that describes the nature of rural resistance. Not infrequently, the term *chiang-tsu han-tien* (the fierce tenants from the strong *tsu* or lineage) was used.⁸⁷ In my judgment, the conflicts which occurred in late-Ming Ch'üan-chou signified the beginning of fierce rivalry between the different lineages rather than a landlord-tenant confrontation in the class sense. The accelerating commercialization of the period had rendered the local *tsu* more powerful. They began to challenge the land proprietorship of upstarts from outside. Local peasants dared to confront the rich families only because they had the strong backing of their own *tsu* organization. This lends further support to the view that the division between a landlord class on the one hand and a tenant class on the other could be misleading. Merely to pit the two classes in opposition is an oversimplified treatment of a more complicated and dynamic social phenomenon, within which vertical solidarity under the guise of the *tsu* was often more developed than horizontal alliances along class lines in the rural areas. *Tsu* politics, which emerged as an important element in the rural power structure of South Fukien in the Ch'ing period, helps explain these rural conflicts.

The late-Ming developments in Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou represented two variants of a similar process. The initially concentrated landownership in Chang-chou was gradually reduced through the practice of multiple landownership, while the non-native landownership in Ch'üan-chou had to be removed through the confrontation of *tsu*. In both cases, the development by which the tenants had, with *tsu* support, become more and

87. *ibid.*, p.619.

more assertive in their dealings with the outside landlords discouraged investment in land outside the geographical boundary of the tsu. Taking this into consideration, the character of absentee landlordism in South Fukien after the late Ming should be viewed rather differently. Although the landlord might habitually live away from the native village, land management was entrusted to close relatives and the tenants were frequently tsu members. The kinship relations might not necessarily change the nature of exploitation to any significant extent, but it was tsu paternalism that governed rural social relations.

Dynamics of Tsu Organizations

Kinship is one of the universals in human society and plays an important role in both the regulation of behaviour and the formation of social groups.⁸⁸ Within the structure of Chinese society, the role of kinship is marked by the common descent groups which have occupied a prominent place for many centuries. The members of a common descent group trace their ancestry to one first ancestor, who settled in a given locality. They are male patrilineal descendants of a single ancestor together with their unmarried sisters and their wives.⁸⁹ Ideally, their agnatic connections are demonstrable through a genealogical record, if they have one. This common descent group resembles to a considerable degree

88. David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (N.Y.: The Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1969), vols. 7-8, p.390.

89. Hu Hsien-chin, *The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions* (N.Y.: Viking Fund, Inc., 1948), p.9; Maurice Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung* (London: The Athlone Press, 1966), p.3; and Jacques Amyot, *The Manila Chinese: Familism in the Philippine Environment* (Quezon City: Institute of Philippine Culture, 1973), p.29.

lineage in other societies. To avoid confusion, the Chinese word *tsu* is used throughout.

The inner structure of the *tsu* consists of a number of lines of descent, usually called *fang*, or house, descended from the sons of the common ancestor. *Fang* is a conjugal family, a basic unit of the *tsu*. The different *fang* are usually numbered "eldest *fang*," "second *fang*," etc., according to the order of birth of the brother who is its head. At an earlier stage, these *fang* formed the subdivisions of the *chia*, an extended family in this respect.⁹⁰ More often, each *fang* is itself the *chia*, a family which may include parents, children, and grandchildren with or without their immediate dependents. In its contracted and idealized form, a *tsu* is composed of the circle of mourning relatives and the *chia*. They differ in scope and functions. The *tsu* is a much larger but less tightly-knit organization, which holds common property for religious, educational, and relief purposes. The circle of mourning relatives, which comprises all descendants from one great-great-grandfather, is less formal as an organization, though the members are expected to help each other in various ways. It is the *chia* that serves as the economic and child-rearing unit.⁹¹

The families within one *tsu* bear the same surname, or *hsing*. Often, the Chinese assume that persons with the same surname are genealogically related as patrilineal descendants of a common ancestor. In fact, families of the same surname do not necessarily belong to the same *tsu*.⁹²

90. Hu Hsien-chin, p.18.

91. *ibid.*

92. *ibid.*

As indicated by both Hu Hsien-chin and Maurice Freedman, the *tsu* organizations have long been more developed in South China, particularly in Fukien and Kwangtung, than in the north.⁹³ The *tsu* are also numerous in the rice-growing regions of the Yangtze Valley. Interestingly, both southeastern and central China were considerably commercialized in the Ming-Ch'ing period. In the two southeastern provinces, many of the villages are single-*tsu* settlements. This phenomenon has already drawn the attention of anthropologists, such as those whom I have just mentioned. However, the topic has not yet been adequately explored by historians.

After only a cursory examination of contemporary sources about Chang-Ch'üan society, one's attention is soon drawn to the frequent mention of *tsu* and *hsing* aggregates. Many of the local *tsu* traced their genealogies back to the Eastern Chin (317-420) or the T'ang-Sung period (618-1279), when they first migrated from the north.⁹⁴ By Sung times, the celebrated scholar, Chu Hsi, noted in a memorial to the court that the local *tsu* played an influential role in Fukienese society.⁹⁵ While some of the *tsu* might truly have had their origins in these early times, many of them emerged in the late-Ming and the early-Ch'ing periods, during which they underwent a process of dissolution, formation, re-organization, and growth. Freedman has rightly pointed out that a lineage is not always a kind of genealogical pyramid with the founding ancestor at the apex and a broad base representing the living

93. *ibid.*, p.11; and Maurice Freedman (1966), pp.3 and 5.

94. For one example, see *Chin-chiang Ling-shui Wu-shih chia-p'u* 晉江靈水吳氏家譜 (Genealogy of Wu lineage in Ling-shui of Chin-chiang district) (1909 ed.), 1:3a. A preface written by Ch'iu Feng-chia 邱逢甲. Ling-shui is a hamlet in the district of Chin-chiang.

95. *Chang-chou FC* (1877 ed.), 14:3b.

generations. In his words, "many lineages may be able to do no more than simply replace their losses by death, and others may well, because of epidemics, poverty, and migration, diminish greatly in numbers, even to the point of extinction."⁹⁶ He further comments that many deep lineages are not large, and some shallow lineages with only a few generations behind them have brought their numbers to bustling prosperity through early and universal marriage, high fertility, and adoption.⁹⁷

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were characterized by the contrast between desperation and hope, between destruction and prosperity. The turmoil caused by both Japanese and Chinese pirates in the sixteenth century and by the Ming loyalists' resistance in the early Ch'ing (1644-1683) caused tremendous hardship to the coastal Fukienese population in particular. For self-protection, they allied themselves around the local *tsu* organization. The *tsu* aggregates became an integral part of rural life.⁹⁸ A case recorded in the T'ung-an gazetteer noted that, during the wars in the early Ch'ing a person called Wang Shih-yü assembled his clan members, who had been dislodged from their home villages, to resettle in P'u-t'ou-hsiang. Wang contributed to the building of two forts from his own funds and trained the vigilance corps for their defence.⁹⁹ From the term *tsung-tsu*

96. Maurice Freedman (1966), p.14.

97. *ibid.*

98. *Chang-p'u HC* (1700 ed.), chüan 7. Another local gazetteer records that, during the maritime turbulence in the mid-sixteenth century some capable persons provided leadership in organizing their clan members to build fortified villages for self-protection. See *Chang-chou FC* (1714 ed.), 23:66b. The fortified villages have since become common in the landscape of rural Fukien, even in the modern period. See Niida Noboru, *Chugoku no nōson kazoku* 中國の農村家族 (The clans of rural China) (Tokyo, 1954), p.371.

99. *T'ung-an HC* 同安縣志 (Gazetteer of T'ung-an district) (1885 ed.), 23:40.

(clan)¹⁰⁰ used in the materials, the aggregate appears to have been based on a mixture of kinship and common-surname members. This new type of "tsu" formation was mentioned frequently in the contemporary sources of these turbulent years.

Nevertheless, maritime trade was the most important factor affecting the tsu organization. With capital derived originally from land and backed by large tsu organizations providing manpower, the prominent local families were able to monopolize the great profits from trade.¹⁰¹ They sent out their relatives or servants as managing "partners" for the risky voyages. The relationship of the two parties was that between superior and inferior rather than that of an equal partnership. The need for trade assistants also gave birth to a new custom in Fukien, that of adopting foster children. A gazetteer reports:

Fukienese people used to have many adopted sons even when they had children of their own. The adopted sons would be sent abroad on commercial enterprises after they grew up [while the true sons are generally kept at home]. If they earned a lot of money, the family would marry them to several wives and concubines to tie them to the family. And they would be treated as their true sons.¹⁰²

100. The term clan is used here to denote a same-surname group whose members may assume that they have a common ancestor, yet whose links are not demonstrable genealogically. See David L. Sills, ed., vols. 7-8, p. 402.
101. Simizu Taiji (1954), p. 605; and Katayama Seiji 片山誠二郎, *Mindai kaijō mitsu-bōeki to en kai chihō gōshinsō - Chu Wan no kai-kin seisaku kyōkō to sono zasetsu no katei o tōshite no ichi kōsatsu* 明代海上密貿易と沿海地方郷紳層—朱の海禁政策強行の挫折の過程を通し—考察 (Ming illegal sea trade and the coastal gentry - Chu Wan's enforcement of the sea prohibition and the course of its failure). *Rekishigaku kenkyū*, no. 164 (July 1953), p. 23. See also *FCTC* (1737 ed.), 9:8b, 69:35a-36b and 74:22.
102. *HMC*, 15:13a. A similar description is also found in *Lung-ch'i HC* (1762 ed.), 10:3a; and *FCTC* (1737 ed.), 9:9a, quoting a late-Ming gazetteer.

Many of the adopted sons were originally bondservants. Since the Ming code forbade commoners to have bondservants, the latter were designated as *chia-ting* (household male adults), *chia-jen* (household members), or *i-nan* (adopted sons) in the household.¹⁰³ By attaching kin titles to them, they would be included in the master's family circle. The recruitment of non-kin persons as *tsu* members was so popular that a magistrate of Chang-p'u in the K'ang-hsi reign, Ch'en Ju-han, deemed it necessary to rectify what he termed the immoral practice of including non-kin persons in the ceremony of the ancestral hall.¹⁰⁴

Fierce competition for scarce land and local resistance to menace or interference from outside also worked to strengthen the *tsu* organization. As discussed earlier, rent resistance, often regarded by modern scholars as a sign of either growing class consciousness or of tenant autonomy, involved in many cases confrontation between different *tsu*.

The need for re-organization of *tsu* and strengthening of its bargaining position in the locality often, as I have just shown, led to the phenomena of pseudo-*tsu*. Hu Hsien-chin has, in fact, noted that people in Kwangtung "usually regard persons of the same *hsing* as belonging to the same *tsu*."¹⁰⁵ This was even more often the case for the people of South Fukien. For the latter, the concept of *tsu* had wider connotations during the Ming-Ch'ing period. Contemporary sources show that the usage of *tsu* and *hsing*, and sometimes even *chia*, could be interchangeable, implying that a *tsu*'s kinship relations could be merely putative. Particularly in early Ch'ing literature, the terms *ta-hsing* (strong surname

103. Mi Chü Wiens, pp.293-94.

104. Chang-p'u HC (1700 ed.), chüan 7.

105. Hu Hsien-chin, p.10.

aggregate) and *hsiao-hsing* (weak surname aggregate) were commonly used to indicate *ta-tsu* (large "lineage") and *hsiao-tsu* (small "lineage").

Instances of pseudo-*tsu* are revealed in the Ch'ing archival documents. In a memorial to emperor Yung-cheng in 1727, the governor-general of Fukien, Kao Ch'i-chuo, reported on two surname aggregates in T'ung-an. One of them was a large and strong group called Pao chia (Pao family) and the other a small and weak group called Ch'i chia (Ch'i family).¹⁰⁶ In the following year, Kao Ch'i-chuo submitted a more detailed memorial explaining the situation. According to his investigation, the large surname aggregates in T'ung-an area included the Li, Ch'en, Su, Chuang, and K'o. They joined together under the leadership of a certain Li Pang and adopted the new *hsing*, Pao. To confront the threat created by the alliance, a certain Yeh Tsu-ch'uan led the small aggregates in the same area to form a larger surname group, calling themselves by the name Ch'i.¹⁰⁷ Interestingly, in their discussion of the Paos and the Ch'is, contemporary writers quite consciously used the terms, *hsing*, *chia*, and *tsu* interchangeably.¹⁰⁸ Both Amyot and Freedman have noted instances when one clan might include several surname groups, but they think that this phenomenon was probably based on local alliances in Southeast China.¹⁰⁹

106. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/11/17, v.9, p.311.

107. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/1/8, v.9, pp.571-73. The connotation of Pao implies everlasting victory, and Ch'i has the meaning of victory through unity, according to Cheng Chen-t'u, "Chih hsieh-tou i," in HCCSWP, 23:47.

108. In addition to the above sources, see also Chou Liang-kung 周亮工, *Min hsiao-chi 閩小記* (Casual notes on Fukien), in *Hsiao-fang-hu chai yü-ti ts'ung-ch'ao 小方壺齋輿地叢鈔* (Collected texts on geography from the Hsiao-fang-hu studio), comp. by Wang Hsi-ch'i 王錫祺, *chih* 9, 109a. Chou's work was probably written in the 1660s.

109. See Jacques Amyot, p.27. Amyot points out in his study of the Manila Chinese that the common surname group functions as a clan in the broadest sense of the word.

However, neither of them has indicated that such local alliances functioned as "tsu" by their adoption of a new common *hsing*. And, indeed, they were accepted as such by the local authorities and scholars who recorded the events. According to another secret memorial submitted in 1729, this local practice whereby different surnames often merged into larger organizations, each adopting a new surname, had become more widespread. The recently created surname groups such as T'ung, Hai, and Wan were mentioned in the memorial.¹¹⁰

The *tsu*, real or fictitious, was of great importance in rural Chang-ch'üan. A large *tsu* during the period of the Yung-cheng reign could consist of more than a thousand households and several thousand *ting*, while a small *tsu* usually was composed of about one hundred households.¹¹¹ Under the Ch'ing system, the smallest administrative units were *chou* (department) and *hsien* (district), whose size varied from about one hundred to several hundred *li* (one *li* is approximately 1/3 mile) in distance. Each contained a department or district seat, usually a walled city, surrounded by a few towns and several scores or hundreds of villages and hamlets. The population varied from several tens of thousands to several hundred thousand households.¹¹² Often, the strong *tsu* occupied the valleys far from the seat of local administration. The typically hilly landscape of Fukien also helped greatly in their evasion

110. KCTTC:YC (unpublished), Inspector deputed to investigate and re-order the local custom of Fukien, Liu Shih-shu 劉師恕, 7/10/16.

111. KCTTC:YC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan 毛文銓, 4/2/4, v.5, p.583; and Wang Chih-i 汪志伊, "Ching-ch'en chih-hua Chang-ch'üan feng-su shu" 敬陳治化漳泉風俗疏 (On the rectification of the Chang-Ch'üan customs), in HCCSWP, 23:42b-43a.

112. Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, *Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp.1-2.

of government control. In T'ung-an, the numerous *chuang* (villages) of the strong *tsu* spread along the fringe of the hills and were beyond the control of the magistrate. Other coastal districts like Chang-p'u and Chao-an in Chang-chou prefecture were also regarded by the local administration as too large for the magistrates to govern effectively. Ch'e-t'ien of Nan-ching district, for example, was seventy to eighty *li* from the walled city.

Under such circumstances, the *tsu* became the essential part of the local social structure. It was virtually a political and local entity in itself. When a single *tsu* dominated the local community, its leaders were the de facto administrators of community affairs. If there were several *tsu* in one locality, they competed for prestige and power with each other. The local authorities were seldom invited to intervene in local matters. Governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo used the expression *pien-ch'ang pu-chi* (even a long lash will not reach - meaning beyond the reach of the law) to describe the embarrassing and powerless position of the local authorities.¹¹³

Provided that enough taxes were delivered, the structure and ideology of government tended to encourage the exercise of local autonomy to a certain extent. Indirect rule was taken as the best policy. The state cherished the *tsu* system and was fully aware that the *tsu* could function as an effective mechanism for indirect social control. The local administrators were more than pleased to appoint a senior or a respected member of each *tsu* to take responsibility for the conduct of his own members.¹¹⁴

113. KCCTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/12/28, v.12, p.163.

114. KCCTC:YC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/2/4, v.5, p.583.

On the other hand, however, we should not overemphasize the aspect of local autonomy, not simply because the districts were "part of a centralized polity, but also because actual and potential agents of bureaucratic control were incorporated into its community."¹¹⁵ Closely related to the power of *tsu*, or *tsu-ch'üan*, was the power of the local elite, or *shen-ch'üan*. The strength of the *tsu* derived not merely from its large number but also from its capability to produce members of the "gentry" class. This group occupied a privileged position in the *tsu* and often provided the necessary leadership for it. It also linked the peasant communities to the sophisticated high culture of the centre.¹¹⁶

According to Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, the gentry class in the Ch'ing period was composed of the following groups: (1) Officials: active, retired, or dismissed, including those who purchased their official titles or ranks; (2) Holders of degree or academic titles, including civil and military *chin-shih* (holders of the Third Degree, or those who had passed the metropolitan examination); civil and military *chü-jen* (holders of the Second Degree, or those who had passed the provincial examination); *kung-sheng* (Senior Licentiates, including those who purchased their titles); *chien-sheng* (students of the Imperial Academy, including those who purchased their titles); and civil and military *sheng-yüan* (Students of government schools, who were holders of the First degree).¹¹⁷ These two groups constituted the gentry, known as *shen-shih* or *shen-chin*.

115. Maurice Freedman, *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China* (London: The Athlone Press, 1958), p.125.

116. For a relevant discussion of folk culture and high culture, see Leon E. Stover, *The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States* (New York: New American Library, 1974).

117. Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, p.171.

They represented an informal power bloc, sharing with the government the control of local affairs.¹¹⁸

Under the law of avoidance, which prohibited the holding of a post in the official's native province, a civil official assumed his influence in an indirect way. When he had retired or been dismissed or was at home on leave, he became a *hsiang-kuan* or *hsiang-shen* (official or former official living in his home town), and assumed direct influence.¹¹⁹ The local authorities generally treated the gentry class with courtesy and respect, and regarded them as a privileged group.¹²⁰

With their high social status and local influence, the gentry were able to abuse their power and promote their own interests, which they did very often. We could cite several examples for the case of Fukien to show this. Li Kuang-ti was one of them. Li came from An-ch'i in Ch'üan-chou prefecture and succeeded in becoming a celebrated scholar and high ranking official during the reign of emperor K'ang-hsi, who regarded him highly as a model official.¹²¹ Even a person of integrity like Li could not prevent his relatives from abusing his influence in the locality, something which later led to severe criticism by emperor Yung-cheng.¹²² The Duke of Hai-ch'eng, Huang Ying-tsuan, serves as

118. *ibid.*, p.168.

119. *ibid.*, p.172.

120. KCTTC:YC, Fukien land force commander Ting Shih-chieh 丁士傑, 5/4/6, v.7, p.903.

121. *Tung-hua lu* 東華錄 (Tung-hua records) (Shanghai: Kuang-pai chai 廣百齋), comp., Wang Hsien-ch'ien 王先謙, K'ang-hsi: 86:6a.

122. CPYC, Fukien provincial treasurer Chao Kuo-ling 趙國麟, 7/4/2, 16,2,4a (p.5404). The citing reads: In CPYC, a memorial submitted by Fukien provincial treasurer Chao Kuo-ling, on the 2nd day of the 4th month, in the 7th year of the Yung-cheng reign, in *han* 函 16, ts'e 冊 2, original page 4a, and p.5404 in the reproduction. CPYC is cited only when the original memorial is not found among the

another illustration. Among the charges made by the acting governor-general of Fukien, Shih I-chih, the duke was blamed for his contempt of the local authorities and his exploitation of the commoners.¹²³ Another example was that of the Shih tsu which had become the most prominent in the Chin-chiang district of Ch'üan-chou from the time of Admiral Shih Lang. Admiral Shih commanded the Ch'ing navy in subduing the Taiwan resistance in 1683. The Shih tsu soon became the most numerous in the locality. Its territory spread over several villages. The memorialist accused its members of the most arbitrary and notorious misbehaviour in local society.¹²⁴

The above situation in Fukien was further complicated by the practice whereby most of the military personnel, particularly the naval patrols, were native to Chang-Ch'üan. The tsu that had such official connections had always acted arbitrarily in the locality¹²⁵ and taken advantage of the weaker tsu lacking bargaining power.¹²⁶ The tsu which produced members of the *sheng-yüan* group could also benefit through their influence. It was a common practice for the *sheng-yüan* to visit the yamen (government offices) and interfere in the administration.

imperialy endorsed memorials of the Ch'ing Archives in the collection of The National Palace Museum at Taipei (referred as KCTTC), or it is not yet published in the series of KCTTC at the time of writing.

123. CPYC, acting Fukien G-G Shih I-chih 史貽直, 7/2/2, 16,3,46a (p.5449).
124. KCTTC:YC (unpublished), inspector deputed to investigate and reorder the local custom of Fukien Liu Shih-shu, 7/10/16.
125. The expression "wu-tuan hsiang-ch'ü 武斷鄉曲" was used here in this context.
126. For examples, see CPYC, Fukien governor Ch'ang Lai 常賚, 5/10/25, 5,2,37 (p.1358); CPYC, Fukien governor Ch'ang Lai, 5/11/22, 5,2,41 (p.1360); CSL:ST, 63:13; and KCTTC:KH, Che-Min G-G Liang Nai 梁霽, 46/11/21, v.1, pp.537-38.

Their association with the office clerks often turned out to be at the expense of justice.¹²⁷ In villages, they often took the law into their own hands. In other words, a *tsu* could greatly enhance its strength by having members of official rank.

Tsu as a Factor in Rural Instability

The competition between different *tsu* created social tension in the rural areas. In terms of local crisis when there was a need to resist outside interference, *tsu* sentiment always emerged forcefully. The members would stand shoulder to shoulder whenever they were confronted by another *tsu*. If the disputants were not able to become reconciled, they resorted to predatory wars.¹²⁸ The administration often stood aside to let the dispute be settled by the *tsu*'s own leaders in their own way.¹²⁹ In 1727, when inter-*tsu* feuds broke out between the Pao and the Ch'i groups in T'ung-an, the acting magistrate, Ch'en Yün-ch'ing rushed to the spot only to find himself confronted by threats from both sides. He had to leave almost immediately.¹³⁰

In a situation of conflict, the small *tsu* had always to suffer at the hands of the powerful ones. The former would either organize local alliances with the neighbouring small *tsu* or, to avoid violence, submit

127. Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, p.177.

128. The *tsu* fights are discussed in detail in Maurice Freedman (1958), pp.105-13; Hu Hsieh-chin, pp.91-94; Liu Hsing-t'ang 劉興唐, "Fu-chien ti hsüeh-tsu tsu-chih" 福建的血族組織 (The structure of kinship groups in Fukien), *Shih-huo* 食貨, 4:8 (September 1936), pp.43-44; Niida Noboru (1954), pp.357-93; and Harry J. Lamley, "Hsieh-tou: The Pathology of Violence in Southeastern China," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i*, 3:7 (November 1977), pp.1-39.

129. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/2/4, v.5, p.583.

130. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/11/17, v.9, p.311. In fact, Kao condemned the magistrate's measure.

and depend on the good will of the dominant *tsu*. In the district of Chao-an, for example, the small *tsu*, whose fields adjoined those of the large *tsu*, had to place them under the latter's protection, paying about one-tenth of the harvest to ensure that the crops would not be sabotaged.¹³¹ The exploitation of the weak *tsu* by the powerful was often the cause of bloodshed.¹³²

Nevertheless, the *tsu* were also characterized by internal dissension, and solidarity within the *tsu* should not be taken for granted. Ch'ü T'ung-tsu maintains that, within the *tsu*, "class interest was ... decisive in determining the behaviour of the gentry."¹³³ Maurice Freedman also notes that the members of a *tsu* "struggle among themselves for scarce resources of land and honour." In his conclusion, "harmony and conflict are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they imply each other."¹³⁴ These comments may well reflect intra-*tsu* contradictions. To see the *tsu* as a form of vertical cohesion also implies great differences of wealth within its structure. The strong house could easily exploit the weak through the management of the common property to their own advantage¹³⁵ and by the forced collection of money to finance inter-*tsu* fights.¹³⁶ In the latter case, the weak and the desperately poor branches had to pawn or sell their belongings or even borrow to

131. Liu Hsing-t'ang, p.41.

132. *ibid.*, p.43.

133. Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, p.181.

134. Maurice Freedman (1966), p.159.

135. Intra-*tsu* conflicts among the *fang* over common property can be detected from the genealogies. See, for example, *Chin-chiang Ling-shui Wu-shih chia-p'u*, 25:43; and *Hai-ch'eng Wu-kuan Wu-shih chia-p'u* 海澄梧貫吳氏家譜 (Genealogy of Wu lineage in Wu-kuan of Hai-ch'eng district) (1908), 5:17a.

136. Liu Hsing-t'ang, pp.38-43.

raise enough money. As Liu Hsing-t'ang has commented, "the people of Chang-Ch'üan have dared to refuse to pay taxes to the government, but they dared not refuse to pay the contributions; they were not afraid of government officials, but they were afraid of these tyrannical bullies [of the same tsu]."¹³⁷ Furthermore, most financial and land transactions were undertaken among tsu members. Tsu sentiment did not reduce exploitation from within. Deals were mostly concluded in a truly business-like manner.¹³⁸

Tsu and the Extra-Village Activities

Tsu formation and structure in actuality were much more complicated and dynamic than the tsu pattern in theory. Many of the self-claimed tsu were putative or fictitious. The term tsu when found in Chinese sources, particularly during the period of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, should never be taken as meaning a common descent group without careful scrutinization. This is because the term tsu has many connotations and has been used to describe a variety of practices. As a means for survival in a socially and economically restrained and competitive environment, tsu organizations and structures had become very flexible. The extendable and inclusive potential of the tsu structure was illustrated by the formation of local alliances. To accommodate the expectation of the local authorities and avoid the latter's suspicion, the local alliances in the early Ch'ing period took the form of tsu and, thus, served the supplementary functions that the existing tsu could not have satisfactorily fulfilled.

137. *ibid.*

138. Fu I-ling (1961), pp.21 and 23.

Surprisingly, perhaps, rural society with its dynamic structure provided a training ground for its people to develop organizational capability. Both the *tsu* and the cross-*tsu* organizations functioned as a medium for socialization within the rural environment. People learned not only the proper attitudes and behaviour pattern towards their relatives, but also techniques of accommodation to the government authorities. They also became less exclusive when the need arose.

This process of socialization within the village, in my opinion, would better explain the social behaviour of the Fukienese trading communities in the extra-village environment. Although the *tsu* organization did not function in its fully-fledged form outside the ancestral village, their rural experiences helped them establish wider social connections through the practice of extending the use of kin terms in a figurative way in the association with non-kin people.

As a factor of rural instability, however, the inter-*tsu* fights and the intra-*tsu* exploitations had added to the socio-economic conditions leading to the exodus from villages.¹³⁹

3. RURAL EXODUS

Looking for new opportunities beyond the village horizon had become customary for the South Fukienese from the mid-Ming. The turn of the seventeenth century saw unprecedented overseas emigration which numbered

139. Chuang Wei-chi 莊為璣, et al, "Fu-chien chin-chiang chuan-ch'i hua-chiao shih tiao-ch'a pao-kao" 福建晉江專區華僑史調查報告 (A survey of the history of the overseas Chinese from Ch'üan-chou), Hsia-men ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao 廈門大學學報 (Journal of Amoy University), 1/1958, p.113.

in the tens of thousands from Chang-Ch'üan to the Spanish Philippines. Others went to Japan; and the Dutch Indies also began to attract large numbers of them.

In the early Ch'ing, domestic population movements were even larger in scope than those to overseas. To work as hired labourers in district towns or prefectural cities had become an alternative life particularly for the unemployed peasants.¹⁴⁰ In Lung-yen, for example, people from Ch'üan-chou performed almost all the metal work, carpentry, dress-making, and even hair-cutting.¹⁴¹ Other towns and cities were also full of rural people seeking employment. Many of them were hired by the booming loom houses.¹⁴² A skilled carpenter had no difficulty in getting a job in large cities because it was fashionable for the urban rich to build big houses with magnificent carving and decorations.¹⁴³ Many others were employed as shop assistants since trade provided the greatest opportunities for the urban newcomers.¹⁴⁴

The more enterprising peasants ventured on distant journeys. In the late seventeenth century, many Chang-Ch'üan people moved into neighbouring Cheking to follow agricultural pursuits. They grew hemp and indigo. These migrants were mostly destitute peasants searching for land. After they had settled in the new locality, they brought along their families. Others took the local women in marriage.¹⁴⁵ There were

140. KCTTC:YC (unpublished), Fukien naval commander Wang Chün 王郡, 12/7/17; also P'ing-ho HC (1719 ed.), 10:7a.

141. Lung-yen CC (1835 ed.), 7:4b.

142. Lung-ch'i HC (1762 ed.), 10:2b-3a; and P'ing-ho HC (1719 ed.), 10:7a.

143. Lung-ch'i HC (1762 ed.), 10:3a.

144. KCTTC:YC (unpublished), Fukien naval commander Wang Chün, 12/7/17.

145. CPYC, Chekiang provincial judge Kan Kuo-k'uei 甘國奎, 2/7/24, 6, 6, 1b (p.1906); KCTTC:YC, Chekiang governor Li Wei 李衛,

even more Fukienese travelling as far as Szechuan. In the early Ch'ing, the authorities were, in fact, anxious to solve the problem of depopulation in Szechuan in the wake of the large-scale peasant rebellions during the last years of the Ming dynasty. Peasants from the provinces of Hupei, Hunan, Shensi, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, Kwangsi, and Kiangsu where little land could further be exploited, all headed for the fertile and unoccupied land of Szechuan.¹⁴⁶ Lacking exact information, it is not possible to tell how many immigrants originated from Fukien. As to the total number from the various provinces, it was given as several tens of thousands of households in the early eighteenth century alone.¹⁴⁷ Most of them took up agriculture, while a greater proportion of the Fukienese engaged in trade, according to a local gazetteer.¹⁴⁸ The Fukienese were found mainly in large cities such as Ch'eng-tu and Chungking.¹⁴⁹

Overall, the Fukienese colonization of Taiwan was the most far-reaching development. The first massive migrations from Chang-Ch'üan to Taiwan had already begun in the early seventeenth century. During the wars between the Manchus and Ming loyalists under the Cheng family's

5/i3/1, v.7, p.707; KCTTC:YC, Chekiang governor Li Wei, 5/10/13, v.9, p.121; KCTTC:YC, Chekiang G-G Li Wei, 6/5/9, v.10, p.417; and CPYC, Chekiang G-G Li Wei, 8/7/25, 13,5,24 (p.4512). An "i" before the month means intercalary.

146. CSL:ST, 61:29a-30b; KCTTC:YC, Szechuan governor Ma Hui-po 馬會伯, 5/4/18, v.8, p.67; KCTTC:YC, Szechuan provincial treasurer Kuan Ch'eng-che 管承澤, 6/2/6, v.9, p.768; and also Ho Ping-ti (1959), p.140.

147. CSL:ST, 61:29a.

148. Cited in Tou Chi-liang 竇季良, *T'ung-hsiang tsu-chih chih yen-chiu 同鄉組織之研究* (Organizations of fellow-regionals) (Chungking: Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1943), p.44.

149. Ho Ping-ti (1959), p.141.

leadership, which lasted until 1683, more Chang-Ch'üan people who formed the backbone of the Cheng resistance followed the retreating army to take refuge in Taiwan. After 1683, the southeast coast was thrown open and people from the two prefectures went to seek fortune there in vast numbers. About the same time, the people from the region of Ch'ao-chou in eastern Kwangtung also came to Taiwan. Soon after the Chia-ying-chou people from the inland area of northeastern Kwangtung followed suit. Among the colonists, the Chang-Ch'üan people have always retained their overwhelming majority throughout the history of migration to Taiwan.

Some figures may help us to understand the momentum of rural emigration from Chang-Ch'üan. At the time of the Ch'ing conquest, the Taiwan population was estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000.¹⁵⁰ A Dutch writing indicates that the Chinese population in Taiwan was somewhere between 200,000 and 250,000 at the end of the seventeenth century.¹⁵¹ At this time, only a negligible number of migrants had come from areas

150. Lien Heng 連橫, *T'ai-wan t'ung-shih 台灣通史* (A general history of Taiwan), in *TWWHTK*, no.128 (1962), p.152.

151. Cited in Ch'en Han-kuang 陳漢光, "T'ai-wan i-min shih-lüeh" 台灣移民史略 (A brief history of the migrations to Taiwan), in Lin Hsiung-hsiang 林熊祥 et al, *T'ai-wan wen-hua lun-ch'i 台灣文化論集* (Collected papers on the culture of Taiwan) (Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua shih-yeh ch'u-pan wei-yüan-hui, 1954), p.61. Without any actual census being taken, even the contemporaries could only make their own estimations. For example, Lan Ting-yüan 藍鼎元, a native of Chang-p'u of Chang-chou prefecture and a celebrated scholar wrote when he was with the military expedition in 1721 to put down the Chu I-kuei 朱一貴 rebellion in Taiwan that there was a population of several million on the island. Writing again in 1732 from Kwangtung, he stated that the emigrants from eastern Kwangtung numbered several hundred thousand. These figures seem to have been exaggerated. See his "Chin-li T'ai-wan shu" 經理台灣疏 (On the governing of Taiwan), in *P'ing-T'ai chi-lüeh 平台紀略* (Brief account on the pacification of Taiwan), in *TWWHTK*, no.14 (1958), p.67; and "Yüeh-chung feng-wen T'ai-wan shih lun" 粵中風聞台灣事論 (Comment on Taiwan incident as heard from Kwangtung), in *ibid.*, p.63.

other than the Chang-Ch'üan region.¹⁵² In other words, since the population of Chang-Ch'üan in Fukien was probably slightly over one million around 1700,¹⁵³ some 20 per cent of them were residing in Taiwan. Of the total Taiwan population, only 18,827 *ting* were originally registered as Taiwan residents,¹⁵⁴ the rest retained their household registration in the prefecture of Chang-Ch'üan.

The majority of Fukienese emigrants to Taiwan was said to be destitute people from the rural areas.¹⁵⁵ A Taiwan prefect, Shen Ch'i-yüan, during the Yung-cheng reign provides us with an illuminating comment on the matter. He said:

Those landless and unemployed people in Chang-Ch'üan could possibly get rich or at least easily survive once they manage to come to Taiwan. Occupations in agriculture, crafts, and trade, or all sorts of other professions were paid a remuneration double as much as what they could hope to get at the home village.¹⁵⁶

Here Shen had rightly put together both the "push" and the "pull" factors to explain the driving forces behind the rural emigration.

152. Around 1720, a local gazetteer of Taiwan district still claimed that all of its residents were Chang-Ch'üan people. See *T'ai-wan HC 台灣縣志* (Gazetteer of Taiwan district) (1720 ed.), in *TWWHTK*, no.103 (1961), p.57. In the eighteenth century, people from Kwangtung province began to migrate to Taiwan in large numbers. However, they remained the minority among the Taiwan population. According to the 1926 census conducted by the Japanese occupation authorities, the Chang-Ch'üan people composed 80% of the total, while the migrants from Kwangtung province occupied 17% and other Fukienese 3%. See Ch'en Chung-hua 陳忠華, "Min-jen i-chih T'ai-wan shih-lüeh" 閩人移殖台灣史略 (A brief history of the Fukienese migration to Taiwan), in *T'ai-pei wen-hsien* (Historical sources on Taipei) (Taipei), *chih* 直 edition, combined issue nos. 1-4 (July 1968), p.78.

153. Refer to section 1 on "man-land ratio."

154. *Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ung chih*, 335:1b.

155. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien land force commander Shih Yün-chuo 石雲倬, 6/4/26, v.10, p.333.

156. Shen Ch'i-yüan 沈起元, "T'iao-ch'en T'ai-wan shih-i chuang" 條陳台灣事宜狀 (A report on Taiwan affairs), in *HCCSWP*, 84:51-52.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF AMOY

South Fukien society from the mid-Ming was a mobile society. Among the population existed a willingness to accept extra-village activities within their traditional agrarian value system. In their exodus from villages to a wider economic frontier in other regions and overseas, Amoy served as a doorway and rendezvous. It also provided a crucial link in the entire maritime trading network of the South Fukienese people.

1. FROM GARRISON POST TO REBEL BASE

Geographic Condition

This is a famous Sea-Port, call'd *Emouy* from the Name of the Island which forms it, for it is properly a Place for Ships to ride at Anchor, and one of the best Harbours in the World; ... it can contain many thousands of Vessels, and the Sea there is so deep, that the largest Ships may come up close to the Shore, and ride there in perfect safety....¹

The above description of Amoy was written in the early eighteenth century by the Frenchman, P. du Halde (1674-1743), and remains true even today. Situated at Lat.24°N. and Long.118°E., the island of Amoy is about 7 miles in distance from east to west and 8 miles from north to south.

1. P. du Halde, *The General History of China* (4 vols.; London, 1741), vol.1, p.169. The original French edition was published in 1736.

MAP 2. AMOY AND ITS VICINITY

MAP 3. SOUTH FUKIEN COAST AS SHOWN IN CH'EN
LUN-CHIUNG'S HAI-KUO WEN-CH'EN LU

The circumference of the island is approximately 40 miles and its area 42 sq. miles. It is hidden behind the outlying islands of Quemoy, Lieh-yü, Ta-tan, Hsin-yü, and Wu-yü.² The township lies on the southwestern corner of the island.

The harbour is divided into inner and outer sections. The passage between the island of Amoy and Kulangsu forms the main part of the inner harbour. Shops and warehouses stretched out around the harbour and the trading junks drew up to them to anchor. The distance across at the entrance of the channel between Amoy and Kulangsu is 840 yards, and the narrowest part of the channel is 675 yards. The passage between Wu-yü and Ta-tan island forms the entrance to the outer harbour which provides a good anchorage for ships.³ A British naval officer commented in 1843 that the harbour "is superior in my opinion to any I have yet seen upon the coast of China...."⁴

In addition to a good harbour, Amoy is also conveniently situated for trading with many of the important cities and villages of Fukien province in which it lies.⁵ The Ch'üan-chou plain lies to the north and the mouth of the Chiu-lung River which leads to the Chang-chou basin is situated to the west. The city of Chang-chou/Lung-ch'i is some 35 miles west of Amoy, and between them lie Hai-ch'eng and Shih-ma. The whole region of South Fukien functions, therefore, as Amoy's hinterland.

2. Rev. Philip Wilson Pitcher, *In and About Amoy* (Shanghai & Foochow: The Methodist Publishing House in China, 1909), p.1.
3. Wang Erh-min 王爾敏, "Hsia-men k'ai-p'i chih kang-fou ch'ü-hua" 廈門開闢之港埠區畫 (The opening of the port of Amoy and its plan), *Shih-huo*, new series, 4:6 (September 1974), pp.223-28.
4. Quoted in *ibid.*, pp.228-29.
5. Wm. Fred Mayers, et al, *The Treaty Ports of China and Japan* (London: Trübner and Co., 1867), p.248.

Chung-tso-so: A Garrison Station

The early history of Amoy is obscure. It was called Chia-ho-yü (island of the auspicious grain) in Sung times. The island was under the administration of T'ung-an district of Ch'üan-chou prefecture. In the Yüan dynasty, the government established a garrison post on it.

Amoy gained military importance during the Ming period when, because of the presence of foreigners, mainly Japanese merchant-pirates, along the Chinese coast, the government renewed its attention to the offshore islands. For security reasons, an elaborate garrison system was introduced in the early Ming. Military stations were set up along the coast. In Fukien, there were five garrison units, each commanding five military stations.⁶ Originally, the garrison unit at Yung-ning in Ch'üan-chou commanded five stations as was usually the case. Shortly after the establishment of the garrison unit at Yung-ning, the Middle and the Left Stations were removed to Amoy. It was the beginning of the name Chung-tso-so (the middle-left station) for the island. About the same time in 1387, a wall was built to strengthen coastal defence. For the first time the town was called Hsia-men-ch'eng (the walled town of the gate of Hsia), or Amoy in the local dialect. The literary works in the Ming-Ch'ing period tend to use the more poetic name Lu-men (the gate of egrets) for the walled town and call the island Lu-tao (island of egrets), either because there were egrets everywhere on the island or because the island was shaped like an egret.⁷ During the Chia-ching reign (1522-66), the strategic importance of Amoy was further enhanced when the naval

6. *Nan-an HC* 南安縣志 (Gazetteer of Nan-an district) (1672 ed.), 5:4b-5a.

7. *HMC*, 2:1b-2a.

base at Wu-yü was withdrawn to the more defensible island of Amoy.⁸

From the mid-Ming, a customs checkpoint was set up on Amoy to oversee the vessels to and from the seaport of Hai-ch'eng. As Amoy was situated on the borderline of Chang-Ch'üan prefectures, it became a bone of contention between the prefectural officials on several occasions. Administratively, Amoy was under the jurisdiction of Ch'üan-chou prefecture. On the other hand, because of its strategic location at the estuary of the Chiu-lung River, it was described as "the throat of Chang-chou prefecture."⁹

Being fully alert to the competitive location of Amoy, Chang-chou officials were deliberating among themselves on a plan to annex the island to the administration of Chang-chou prefecture. The idea was discussed when the new district of Hai-ch'eng was about to be set up. The Ch'üan-chou officials were opposed to the plan because they maintained that, as Amoy was just three *li* (about one mile) from the mainland part of T'ung-an district, it was more a "throat" of T'ung-an than a "doorway" to Chang-chou. The discussion did not go any further. In 1592, a detachment was sent from Chang-chou to patrol the island. The Ch'üan-chou authorities saw this as an intrusion on their jurisdiction. They fought to maintain their control of the island but there was no immediate result.¹⁰

In the meantime, the Ch'üan-chou officials had shown their intention of skimming off the "fat" of the maritime revenue from Chang-chou

8. *Ch'üan-chou FC* (1763 ed.), 25:22a.

9. Ch'en Lun-chiung 陳倫炯, *Hai-kuo wen-chien lu* 海國聞見錄 (A record of things seen and heard in the maritime countries), chüan 1, 4a. Preface 1730.

10. For the events and their dating, see *HMC*, 9:21a-22b, 3:2b; and *Ch'üan-chou FC* (1763 ed.), 24:34b.

and their desire to promote Amoy as a separate centre of maritime trade. They proposed in 1594 a demarcation to separate the trading spheres between the Ch'üan-chou and the Chang-chou merchants. The former went only to the Eastern Ocean (Luzon, Moluccas, Sulu, Brunei, etc.) and the latter to the Western Ocean (the rest of the Nanyang countries, such as Siam, Malacca, Johore, Pattani, Java, and the modern Indo-China region). Under this arrangement, Taiwan, the Ryukyus, and Japan would also fall under the first category. If the proposal was accepted, Amoy would be the site of the customs administration, replacing Hai-ch'eng. The scheme was aimed at increasing the maritime revenue accruing to Ch'üan-chou. Understandably, the Chang-chou officials immediately rebuffed the proposal put forward by their counterparts. They were irritated by an idea which would certainly jeopardize the leading role of Chang-chou in maritime trade and drain away the customs revenue they had long enjoyed. By their strong opposition, the plan was killed.¹¹

To thwart the ambition of the Ch'üan-chou bureaucrats, a subprefect with the special duty of customs supervision named Wang Ch'i-tsung recommended in 1617 the removal of the Amoy checkpoint to Kuei-yü, an island lying between Amoy and Hai-ch'eng. Wang was stationed in Hai-ch'eng and as he himself was an official of Chang-chou prefecture, it was understandable that he wished to remove the checkpoint from Amoy. In fact, it was awkward for him to be present in a place where he had no jurisdiction to command the local officials. The situation would become worse whenever the civil and the military officials under the Ch'üan-chou administration on the island challenged his authority. He petitioned

11. Chang Hsieh 張燮, *Tung-hsi-yang k'ao* 東西洋考 (A study of the East and West Oceans) (Reprinted; Taipei: Cheng-chung, 1962), 6:21b. Preface 1618.

that Kuei-yü was a better location for the checkpoint because it was closer to the maritime centre Hai-ch'eng. More conveniently, it was under the administrative jurisdiction of the latter.¹² Permission for the removal was granted by the court.¹³

Although the checkpoint was removed, the Ch'üan-chou officials eventually succeeded in the early T'ien-ch'i reign (1621-1627) in taking over the garrison on Amoy and stationing their own battalion on it. This did not end the long wrangle. Two years later, the proposal to annex Amoy by Chang-chou was put forward again. This time, strong resistance to the proposal also came from the gentry members of the island and the administrative change did not come about.¹⁴

During the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, despite its obscurity as a non-administrative town known to outsiders only for its military function, Amoy had already started building up its reputation in the Chang-Ch'üan trading community. It was one of the islands in the vicinity notorious for providing sanctuary for smugglers, both local and foreign. Because so few officials were stationed there, Amoy was particularly popular among the smugglers after Hai-ch'eng's ascendancy to the administrative status of district in 1567. Thereafter, procedures in Hai-ch'eng had to be carried out with bureaucratic formality, which was exactly why the administrative change was instituted. The traders, who could be trapped by all kinds of administrative intricacy, preferred doing business, particularly with foreigners, on the more remote islands. The presence of naval patrols in the outlying areas

12. *ibid.*, 7:22.

13. *ibid.*, 9:2b.

14. *HMC*, 9:21a-22b, 3:2b; and *Ch'üan-chou FC* (1763 ed.), 24:34b.

could be a convenience rather than a nuisance for the merchants, considering that the patrols were mainly local recruits and it was a common practice for them to have a stake in the transactions. Traders faced less harassment and were given a more relaxed passage only because the trade was under the tacit protection and patronage provided by the naval officials. As recorded in the Amoy gazetteer, the local, the Japanese, and the Portuguese smugglers-cum-pirates were active on Wu-yü and Chung-tso-so throughout the sixteenth century. Whenever they were dissatisfied with the volume of trade, or they were hard-pressed by the local authorities, they would conspire to make bold raids on these islands and set up their smuggling dens to gain easy access to the mainland interior, T'ung-an and Hai-ch'eng in particular. The Dutch later followed the same pattern. In order to trade with the Fukinese, they made their first appearance in Chung-tso-so in 1622 and again in the following year.¹⁵

Ssu-ming-chou: A Rebel Base

The second phase of the development of Amoy, which lasted from 1626 to 1680, saw the rise of a rebel base. This period also witnessed the emergence of a Fukinese maritime empire under the leadership of the Cheng family. Economically, being merely a haven for the smugglers, Amoy was not more competitive than its neighbour Hai-ch'eng. The growth of Amoy as a commercial centre was, therefore, inseparable from the development of Cheng maritime commercial empire.

The great fortune of the Cheng family began from the time of Cheng Chih-lung. He was a maritime adventurer from Shih-ching village located at the entrance of the An-hai creek, in the district of Nan-an in

15. HMC, 16:1-4.

Ch'üan-chou prefecture. He had taken to the sea to seek his fortune through trade and piracy. In the 1620s, Cheng Chih-lung had already become the undisputed master of the Fukien coast with an enormous fleet. He harassed for many years the maritime districts of Fukien and Kwangtung. In 1626 and again in 1627 he invaded Amoy, defeated the government troops and took possession of it. The island became Chih-lung's commercial and recruiting base.¹⁶ The inland smugglers brought over there such items as fine silk and cotton cloths from Soochow and Hangchow, and even the precious things from the inner courts of Nanking and Peking, in exchange for commodities from East and Southeast Asia.¹⁷ In 1628, Chih-lung decided to surrender to the Ming authorities to enjoy official status. He was subsequently appointed to the rank of *yu-chi* (major) and later promoted to the high-ranking post of provincial military governor. Naval power, commercial wealth, and official position made Cheng Chih-lung and his family virtual overloads of Fukien.¹⁸ Now his maritime enterprise became even more prosperous.¹⁹ Amoy and Quemoy aside, he built a walled town in An-p'ing (An-hai) about 30 *li* (10 miles) from Ch'üan-chou city. An-p'ing soon developed into a busy seaport and became no less prosperous than Ch'üan-chou city. He was not only the overload of the high-seas, but he also acted as the patron of the Fukienese maritime population. He sold protection to the traders. There were more than a thousand vessels and a private navy under his

16. *ibid.*, 16:4.

17. Chi Liu-ch'i 計六奇, *Ming-chi pei-lueh* 明季北略 (Northern expeditions in the closing years of the Ming), 11:25b-26a, in *PCHSTK*, series 12, v.4, pp.2416-17.

18. Ralph C. Croizier, *Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth, and the Hero* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), p.12.

19. *HMC*, 16:5a.

control.²⁰ This was the first time that one man had solely controlled Fukienese maritime power and trade. Against this background, Amoy began a significant new chapter in its formative years as both a political base and a trading centre.

On the invasion of Fukien by the Manchus, Chen Chih-lung surrendered to the new Manchu dynasty. Two of his clansmen, Cheng Ts'ai and Cheng Lien, held back on Amoy and supported Prince Lu in the restoration cause. Even his son Cheng Ch'eng-kung (better known as Koxinga, Lord of the Imperial Surname), who was born in Japan, rebelled against his decision to surrender. Being only twenty-three years old in 1647, young Koxinga began his resistance movement against the Manchus with a handful of some ninety followers on Kulangsu. His initial financial difficulty in supporting his expanding army was overcome because he was able to inherit his father's large maritime assets, including the gigantic merchant fleets returning from Japan and Southeast Asia, which had not yet been captured by the Manchus.

A key event was the wresting of Amoy from his two clansmen in 1650. He amalgamated the troops on Amoy and Quemoy. With this success, "he was in unquestioned command of the Cheng family patrimony in Fukien and had his father's old base in the strategic twin islands of Amoy and Quemoy as the centre for his military campaigns and growing maritime commercial empire."²¹

20. *ibid.*; Chi Liu-ch'i, *Ming-chi pei-lüeh*, 11:24; Chiang Jih-sheng, 江日昇, *T'ai-wan wai-chi 台灣外記* (A romance of Taiwan), 8:8b, in *PCHSTK*, series 2, v.10, p.6104; and Ch'ü Ch'ang-wen 瞿昌文 *Yüeh-hsing chi-shih 粵行紀事* (An account of travel in Kwangtung), 1:3b, in *PCHSTK*, series 2, v.7, p.3887.

21. Ralph Croizier, p.14.

In fact, Amoy had already been his storehouse even before his takeover. Tax grain were levied from the controlled areas on the southeastern coast and shipped to the treasury in Amoy.²² The profit from the maritime trade was also deposited there. Under Koxinga's administration, Amoy as an entrepot was even more prosperous than before and had a widespread reputation of being a treasure island.²³ In 1651 while Koxinga was on a military campaign in eastern Kwangtung, the Ch'ing governor of Fukien, Chang Hsüeh-sheng, and the provincial military commander, Ma Te-kung, devastated the island. On his return shortly after, Koxinga recovered Amoy and from his base of this island he showed his might in the following years over Fukien, Kwangtung, and Chekiang. He collected levies from those areas under his control and all the revenues were deposited in the Amoy treasury.²⁴ All these developments further strengthened the formation of an interwoven commercial network centering on the island.

In 1655, Koxinga renamed Chung-tso-so as Ssu-ming-chou (Thinking of the Ming) to express his loyalty to Ming legitimacy.²⁵ In the remaining years of Koxinga's military campaigns, Ssu-ming-chou continued to be the fortified capital of the rebel force. In search of a safe rear base, Koxinga led his forces in 1661 to capture Fort Zeelandia (near present-

22. Yen Hsing 顏興, "Cheng Ch'eng-kung ti ts'ai-ching cheng ts'e" 鄭成功的財經政策 (Cheng Ch'eng-kung's financial and economic policies), *Wen-shih hui-k'an* 文史薈刊 (Literature and history magazine) (Tainan), 1 (June 1959), p.40.

23. *MCSL:TP*, p.79.

24. Yen Hsing, pp.40-41.

25. For the dating, see the examination in Hsieh Hao 謝浩, "Ming-Cheng Ssu-ming-chou chien-chih shih-liao k'ao-i" 明鄭思明建置史料考異 (An examination of the source materials on the establishment of Ssu-ming-chou by Koxinga of the Ming), *Tai-pei wen-hsien*, chih edition, no.28 (June 1974), pp.63 and 65.

day Tainan) on the island of Taiwan from the Dutch. He established his new capital there. Without fulfilling his ambition to restore the Ming he died in the following year at the age of thirty nine.

The resistance was continued by his son Cheng Ching. His first task was to enlarge the township of Amoy. He assigned the chief controller of revenue (*chuan-yün shih*), Weng T'ien-yu, as chief planner. Weng carried out instructions and began in 1663 to reconstruct the township, design the market places, and build the temples. "All the new streets and the cross-roads were planned by him for the first time," according to one source.²⁶ The reconstruction was abruptly cut short by the sudden fall of the island at the end of the year. The Cheng regime was driven out from both Amoy and Quemoy by a combined Dutch-Manchu fleet. The Ch'ing authorities deserted the two islands after the conquest and all the coastal population was removed to the mainland interior.²⁷ Despite the total destruction of Amoy, its later development was still modelled on Weng's original plan.²⁸

After Cheng Ching retreated to Taiwan, Amoy became the refuge of some bands of pirates. Within the brief period of six years, Cheng Ching was again able to re-establish his commercial base on the abandoned island of Amoy. He dispatched a company under the command of Chiang

26. Lin Ch'ien-kuang 林謙光, *T'ai-wan chi-lüeh* 台灣紀略 (A Brief account of Taiwan), in *Hsiao-fang-hu chai yü-ti ts'ung-ch'ao*, chih 9, 136a. Lin was a north Fukienese, who passed the second literary degree on the secondary list (*fu-pang* 副榜) in 1672.
27. HMC, 16:8a. Under a severe scheme of forced inland resettlement introduced by the Ch'ing court in 1661, the coastal inhabitants were ordered to clear the coast by moving 30 to 50 *li* (about 10 to 16 miles) inland. For details, see Ura Ren'ichi 浦兼一 "Ch'ing-ch'u ch'ien-chieh ling k'ao" 清初遷界令考 (A study of the frontier-shift law), trans. by Lai Yung-hsiang 賴永祥, *T'ai-wan wen-hsien*, 6:4 (December 1955), pp.109-22.
28. As implied in Lin Ch'ien-kuang's writing.

Sheng to Amoy to restore communication with the mainland. When the Revolt of the Three Feudatories broke out in 1674, it provided a good opportunity for Cheng Ching to revive his fortunes on the Fukien coast. He reoccupied Amoy and from there his forces took possession of eight of the coastal prefectures in Kwangtung and Fukien.²⁹

However, a tug of war between the Ch'ing and the Cheng regimes continued during the following three years before the latter was once again forced to retreat and to defend its position on the island of Amoy. In 1680, the Ch'ing navy landed on and recaptured the island of Amoy for the third time. All the Cheng forces withdrew to Taiwan. Cheng Ching died the following year and was succeeded by his son, Cheng K'e-shuang, in the wake of a palace intrigue. In 1683, admiral Shih Lang, formerly Koxinga's subordinate, led a successful invasion that conquered Taiwan. Cheng K'e-shuang's surrender ended the four-generation maritime enterprise of the Cheng family, which saw the emergence of Amoy as a trading centre. As it ceased to be a pirate refuge and a rebel base, Amoy began its third phase of development within the embrace of the Ch'ing empire.

The Formative Years of the Amoy Trading Network

In response to the Cheng resistance, the Ch'ing court had adopted a negative maritime policy. Failing to suppress Cheng resistance, the court decided to promulgate the first imperial edict in 1656 forbidding navigation on the sea.³⁰ The court was fully aware that smuggling activities had worked to sustain the financial viability of the Cheng force. Under the new law, the provincial authorities were ordered to

29. *HMC*, 16:8.

30. *MCSL:TP*, p.155a, for the full text of the edict.

ensure that the supply of all commodities for the rebels was cut off. When the sea prohibition law did not work out satisfactorily, the court introduced the scheme of forced inland resettlement. Almost immediately after the K'ang-hsi emperor came to the throne, he commanded his provincial officials to enforce the sea prohibition law seriously.³¹ The negative policy of the early Ch'ing towards the maritime trade did not stop the flourishing smuggling traffic between the inland regions and Amoy. As a matter of fact, it resulted in a further concentration of maritime trade in Amoy. The East and Southeast Asian countries "could then only rely on the Chengs for the supply of Chinese goods. As a result, the Chengs successfully monopolized all the profits from the maritime trade and their financial position was further enhanced."³²

Moreover, the more restrictive the law was, the more lucrative the trade became. The merchants did not have much difficulty bribing the garrison soldiers or the naval patrols into silence. Apparently, even such top provincial officials as governors-general and governors were accepting bribes to shut their eyes to the illicit activities.³³ With their tacit understanding, there were numerous boats smuggling between the various ports and Amoy.³⁴ As reported by governor-general Fan Ch'eng-mu in 1673, the smuggled items consisted mainly of materials for shipbuilding and silk and cotton cloth for export. Fan indicated that

31. *ibid.*, p.257, for the text of the order.

32. Yü Yung-ho 郁永河, *Cheng-shih i-shih 鄭氏逸事* (The anecdote of Cheng Ch'eng-kung), collected in *Pi-hai chi-yu 裨海紀遊* (A Travel account in the small sea), TWWHTK, no.44 (1959), p.48.

33. The irregularity was pointed out by emperor K'ang-hsi in 1684. See CSL:KH, 116:4a.

34. Yü Yung-ho, *Cheng-shih i-shih*, p.48. The smuggling boats were called t'ou yüeh ch'uan 透越船. See also Chiang Jih-sheng, *T'ai-wan wai-chi*, 14:5a, in PCHSTK, series 2, v.10, p.6130.

only those with enough capital would therefore be in a position to engage in this type of trade.³⁵ In other words, the many wealthy merchants on the coast were directly involved in this activity. It also attracted Ch'ing officials and members of the gentry class to invest in trade.³⁶ At the same time, smuggling into Amoy provided a livelihood for most of the destitute coastal populace, particularly after they were forced to resettle inland and were thus deprived of their original source of livelihood.³⁷ In short, the Ch'ing government failed to weaken the commercial position of Amoy even when it forcefully evacuated the coastal population and told the merchants to move their business to Hai-ch'eng.³⁸

Merchants with large capital were usually either the officials of the Cheng regime or the official merchants (*kuan-shang*) of its highly concealed commercial network. The top officials of the Cheng group owned their merchant ships sailing to the Eastern and the Western Oceans and Amoy was the centre of their overseas trade. While the shipowner held a lion's share of the investment, all the crewmen also joined the partnership (*kung-ssu* or *kongsi*). Many other investors who remained behind consigned (*fu-ta*) their goods to the ship. The foreign commodities shipped back to Amoy amounted to more than a hundred items, consisting of various types of cloth materials, brown sugar, gum benzoin, gamboge, swallow's nests, sapanwood, lead, tin, ivory, beche-de-mer, and

35. Fan Ch'eng-mu 范承謨, "T'iao-ch'en Min-sheng li-hai shu" 條陳閩省利害疏 (A report on the situation of Fukien), in HCCSWP, 84:61b.

36. MCSL:TP, p.257.

37. Chiang Jih-sheng, *T'ai-wan wai-chi*, in PCHSTK, series 2, v.10, p.6128.

38. Shen Yün 沈雲, *T'ai-wan Cheng-shih shih-mo* 台灣鄭氏始末 (Beginning and end of the Chengs in Taiwan), in TWWHTK, no.15 (1958), p.52.

so forth.³⁹ These imported items were then distributed throughout the country by the smugglers.

The official merchants were those appointed to take charge of the concealed network of business firms with their headquarters in both Hangchow and Amoy. There were also many independent merchants working with financial loans from the Cheng regime. Their main business was to smuggle out shipbuilding and weaponry materials, such as timber, hemp cordage, wood-oil made from the seeds of *aleurites cordata*, nails, iron tools, and saltpetre. Other major shipments in the smuggling business included mainly such items for export overseas as silk products from the lower Yangtze Valley.⁴⁰

There were altogether ten business firms called *hang* under Cheng control. Five of them set up their headquarters in Hangchow. They were assigned to collect silk products and cotton cloth from Hangchow and Soochow, and to smuggle them into Amoy. Another five business firms were established in Amoy. Their duty was to export the mainland goods to Taiwan and overseas.⁴¹

The ten commercial firms aside, there were also satellite merchants who borrowed capital from the minister for finance (*hu-kuan*) and started their own business. The sum they borrowed could amount to several tens of thousand or even several hundred thousand taels of silver. The borrowers were charged a monthly interest of 1.3% for their loans.⁴²

39. MCSL:TP, pp.289a-299a.

40. *ibid.*, p.257.

41. Nan Ch'i 南棲, "T'ai-wan Cheng-shih wu-shang chih yen-chiu" 台灣鄭氏五商之研究 (A study of the five merchant firms established by the Cheng of Taiwan), in T'ai-wan yen-chiu ts'ung-k'an 台灣研究叢刊 (Research series on Taiwan) (Taipei: The Bank of Taiwan), no.90 (September 1966), p.44.

42. MCSL:TP, p.215; and MCSL:CP, p.576a.

With the money, the merchants would purchase silk products from Soochow and Hangchow and deliver them to Koxinga in Amoy.⁴³

During the period of Koxinga, Amoy had already become the centre for the Fukienese ocean junks (*yang-ch'uan*). At the same time, all the foreign merchants who had business relations with the Cheng regime also called at the seaport of Amoy. During Cheng Ching's retreat to Taiwan, the foreign vessels had had to divert their journeys from Amoy to Taiwan. After the Cheng forces retook Amoy in 1674, the English ships and those from Bantam in West Java, Siam, and Annam resumed their calls at Amoy. The commodities were so abundant in Amoy that the English merchants pointed out in the same year, if they traded with Cheng Ching, it was in effect as if they were trading with China.⁴⁴ The flow of mainland products through Amoy to Taiwan was also resumed in great abundance.⁴⁵ Amoy's rapidly increasing maritime activities reflected an almost instant commercial recovery.⁴⁶ In short, a rudimentary form of the Amoy trading network had already come into being during the Cheng period.

43. MCSL:CP, p.576a.

44. "Shih-ch'i shih-chi T'ai-wan ying-kuo mou-i shih-liao" 十七世紀台灣英國貿易史料 (Sources on the trade between Taiwan and the English East India Company in the seventeenth century), in *T'ai-wan yen-chiu ts'ung-k'an*, no.57 (November 1959), p.96. The text is a translation, attached with the original texts drawn from the factory records in the collection of the Commonwealth Relations Office, India Office Library.

45. *ibid.*

46. Hsia Lin 夏琳, *Min-hai chi-yao* 閩海紀要 (A record of the major events in the Fukien seas), in *TWWHTK*, no.11 (1958), p.48. The author was contemporary and native of Ch'üan-chou.

2. LEGITIMATION AS A MARITIME CENTRE

Step by step after 1680, commercial activities in Amoy began to return to normal. The inland resettlement law was abolished in early 1681. In 1684, one year after the pacification of Taiwan, court permission was granted to rescind the maritime ban. Following the resumption of overseas trade, Amoy became the only designated port in Fukien for the junks trading to the Nanyang. The maritime customs and other branches of the military and civil administration were set up here by the Ch'ing government. These events legitimized the status of Amoy as the maritime centre of Fukien.

The Overseas Trading Extension

As reported by admiral Shih Lang in 1685, the ocean junks leaving for overseas in the first year after the lifting of the maritime ban were already numerous. They mostly carried limited capital and cargoes but many emigrants. One of the ships cited by Shih Lang illustrates this point. The ship of limited capacity left in 1685 for Luzon, carrying only a small amount of cargo, but overcrowded with 133 passengers. Shih Lang memorialized that the number of ocean junks should be restricted so that overseas trade could be concentrated in larger ships using more capital.⁴⁷ His recommendation was approved by the court. In the later years, the permit to build ships and to sail overseas was therefore granted only to well-to-do applicants.⁴⁸

However, the ocean junks continued to carry with them a large number of illegal emigrants. Each junk normally accepted 200 to 300

47. Shih Lang 施琅, *Ching-hai chi-shih* 靖海紀事 (An account of the maritime conquest), in *TWWHTK*, no.13 (1958), pp.93-95.

48. *HMC*, 5:16.

such passengers, in addition to 20 to 30 crewmen and some 40 to 60 travelling merchants.⁴⁹ Since a small number of ocean junks was permitted to go overseas, the capital invested in each voyage was increased. In the 1730s, for example, each ocean junk trading in the Nanyang usually carried a cargo worth a hundred thousand taels.⁵⁰ A profit of 100 per cent could normally be expected. Some commodities such as tea and porcelain were even much more lucrative. They could possibly be sold at a price of 150 to 200 per cent higher than the original cost.⁵¹

As to the number of Fukienese ocean junks trading to the Nanyang after 1683, not much data are available. An eyewitness account written in the 1690s recorded that all the ocean junks from Fukien to the Nanyang embarked from Amoy,⁵² but no exact figure is given. The first available report on the number of junks appears in a memorial submitted by Fukien governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo in 1729. From it we know that there were 21 ships leaving Amoy for the Nanyang trade when the north-east monsoon began at the end of 1726. In the following season, twelve of them had returned carrying over 11,800 *shih* (about 962 tons) of rice together with other cargoes such as birds' nests, beche-de-mer, sapan-wood, and water buffalo hides.⁵³ The number of ships which embarked for the Nanyang in the next northeast monsoon increased to 25.⁵⁴ Another memorial submitted by governor-general Hao Yü-lin in 1733 indicates that

49. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo and others, 5/9/9, v.8, pp.836-37.

50. KCTTC:YC (unpublished), Fukien G-G Hao Yü-lin 郝玉麟 11/4/5.

51. *ibid.*; and John Crawford, *History of the Indian Archipelago* (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable & Co., 1820), p.179.

52. Yü Yung-ho, *Yü-nei hsing-shih* 宇內形勢 (The conditions of the state), in *Pi-hai chi-yu*, p.70.

53. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/8/10, v.11, p.70.

54. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 7/3/27, p.751.

the ocean junks leaving Fukien each year were about 28 to 30 in number. In 1755, a total of 74 vessels returned to the port of Amoy from the Nanyang trade.⁵⁵

The increasing maritime trade after 1683 was the major factor which contributed to the growing prosperity of Amoy. By 1716, the local authorities were able to report a commercial boom which surpassed any in the past.⁵⁶

In 1717, emperor K'ang-hsi imposed a new maritime restriction to safeguard coastal security. Nevertheless, the effect of the restriction was not so destructive as one would have imagined. Nor were the maritime people totally helpless in such an unfavourable situation. In the first place, the ban, unlike the previous ones, was only partial. The domestic commercial network was allowed to function without disruption. Even the foreign trade was not banned totally. The trade with Japan, the Ryukyus, and Annam was to continue.⁵⁷ More significantly, foreign ships were still allowed to call at Chinese ports. On the other hand, for Fukienese ocean junks it was still illegal to trade with the Nanyang. They managed to sail to Siam or Batavia under the pretense that they were heading for Macao or Annam.⁵⁸ In 1727, emperor Yung-cheng accepted a recommendation of the provincial authorities to abolish the restriction.

The most significant administrative measure following the opening up of the ocean trade was that Amoy became the designated central port

55. *KCTTC:CL* (unpublished), the Tartar-general of Foochow and concurrently in charge of maritime customs, Hsin Chu 新柱, 20/10/3.

56. *KCTTC:KH*, Fukien naval commander Shih Shih-p'iao 施世驥, 55/9/6, v.6, p.590.

57. *MCSL:TP*, p.774; and *WHTP:KSSL*, v.17, p.8.

58. *WHTP:KSSL*, v.17, pp.3b-4a; and *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/7/10, v.8, p.524.

(*tsung-k'o*) of the province in 1728. Under the new law, all the ocean junks from Fukien to overseas were to take Amoy as their port of re-entry as well as embarkation.⁵⁹ In fact, Amoy had for decades been the centre for the Fukienese overseas trade. Therefore, the new measure served merely to reconfirm the usual practice for the purpose of efficient administrative control of the maritime trade. Certainly, the administrative measure meant that the court recognized the status of Amoy as the maritime centre of Fukien province.⁶⁰

The Amoy trade undoubtedly achieved further development during the early years of the Ch'ien-lung reign between 1736 and 1757.⁶¹ During this period, for example, Amoy and Canton became the focal point for the Sino-Siamese maritime trade.⁶² In fact, much of the Chinese private trade with Siam up to 1757 was conducted from Amoy.⁶³

There has been some controversy over the effect of the Ch'ien-lung decree of 1757, restricting trade to Canton, on the trade of Amoy.

59. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo and others, 6/1/8, v.9, p.566.

60. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 7/1/20, v.12, p.247. It is recorded that "Amoy is the designated central port for all the ocean junks from the whole province, and the throat of Taiwan and Peng-hu. People from all over [the province] gather here." It should be pointed out that the explanatory notes given in the Amoy gazetteer, saying, "the sailing of ocean junks from Amoy commenced in 1727," is a confusing if not erroneous statement. (See *HMC*, 5:30b.) Amoy had, in fact, been sending out ocean junks for many decades prior to the 1717 ban. However, as far as I know, most other scholars have quoted the gazetteer to indicate that Amoy started sending out the ocean junks overseas only from 1727. See, for example, Sarasin Viraphol, p.121; Fu I-ling (1956), p.202; and T'ien Ju-k'ang 田汝康, *Shih-ch'i [chih] shih-chiu shih-chi chung-yeh Chung-kuo fan-ch'uan tsai tung-nan-ya chou十七—十九世紀中葉中國帆船在東南亞* (The Chinese junks in Southeast Asia during the 17th to mid-19th centuries) (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1957), p.19.

61. *HMC*, 5:30b.

62. Sarasin Viraphol, p.71.

63. *ibid.*, p.246.

The decree is often seen as a drastic action which limited all foreign trade to the Canton area. Sarasin Viraphol attributes "the eclipse of Amoy" to the Ch'ien-lung decree.⁶⁴ Fu I-ling holds a similar view.⁶⁵

In fact, the 1757 decree was enacted to prohibit the English merchants from trading at Ningpo rather than the usual Western port of call, Canton. The English were attempting to avoid the customs exactions of the Canton officials.⁶⁶ For the rest of the Western countries, their trade was already conducted in Canton. Throughout the lengthy discussion between the court and the local officials, Amoy was only indirectly affected as when the local customs duty was raised to the same level as that of Canton. The purpose was to discourage the possible diversion of the Western traders to Amoy.⁶⁷ Since Western ships seldom visited Amoy after 1712,⁶⁸ the decree did not change the trade situation in Amoy. The ships from the Nanyang countries like Sulu, Siam, and Spanish Luzon were not prohibited from coming to Amoy and they continued to arrive at the seaport after 1757.⁶⁹ A decree, which was issued one month after the decision to restrict the English to Canton, plainly instructed the local authorities that the Southeast Asian ships should not be barred from entering Amoy, if they were regular visitors before the 1757 edict.⁷⁰

64. *ibid.*

65. Fu I-ling (1956), p.203.

66. For the whole matter leading to the 1757 decree, see *CSL:KT*, 516:16b-17b, 522:12, 525:19, 530:16b-17b, 533:11a-12b, 549:37, and more importantly the final decree in the series, 550:23b-25b.

67. *Ch'ing-ch'ao t'ung-tien* 清朝通典 (General records of the Ch'ing dynasty) (Reprint: 2 vols.; Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), ch'uan 8, p.2064.

68. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/3/10, v.5, p.689.

69. Fu I-ling (1956), pp.203-204.

70. *CSL:KT*, 533:6.

Even the increased tax rate did not necessarily have an unfavourable effect on them. Privileged treatment was often granted to what the court thought were its tributary subordinates.

Finally, the 1757 decree did not affect the native vessels at all. The ocean junks still embarked from Amoy. The local officials in their memorials continuously mentioned movements of ocean junks and actively encouraged them to bring back more rice from overseas.⁷¹ A memorial submitted in 1768 by the Che-Min governor-general reported that wealthy Chang-Ch'üan merchants continued to invest in ocean-junk ventures, "each winter season they buy goods in Amoy and then set sail for Luzon, Ke-la-pa (Batavia), and other Nanyang countries."⁷² In other words, Amoy still maintained its status as the designated port for the indigenous overseas trade.

It is true that the importation of rice through the port of Amoy had declined after the mid-eighteenth century as indicated in a 1767 memorial by the Che-Min governor-general Su Ch'ang.⁷³ Sarasin Viraphol also stresses this point to illustrate the decline of the Amoy trade. In his view, "the closure of Amoy to trade by foreigners in 1758" was the major cause for the decline of rice imports and "had a direct effect in curtailing the role of *yang-hang* (firms licensed to engage in foreign trade)."⁷⁴ He is right if what he means is that the number of *yang-hang*

71. KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Fukien governor Ting Chang 定長, 28,1,27; KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Su Ch'ang 蘇昌, 30/10/24; KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Su Ch'ang, 32/10/4; KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Yang Ching-su 楊景素, 43/4/16; and HMC, 5:30b.

72. KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Ts'ui Ying-chieh 崔應階, 33/7/8.

73. KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Su Ch'ang, 32/10/4.

74. Sarasin Viraphol, p.109.

decreased towards the end of the century. This aspect is clearly recorded in the Amoy gazetteer.⁷⁵ In terms of Amoy's commerce, however, my interpretation is somewhat different. The decline of rice imports and the *yang-hang* did not indicate the eclipse of Amoy's maritime trade. On the one hand, the direct rice trade with the producing countries was becoming less attractive to the more sophisticated Fukienese merchants or investors, despite the government incentive scheme and its tireless efforts to encourage the local importation of rice from overseas.⁷⁶ The Fukienese merchants were rediverting their energies towards the more traditional imported items from the Malay Archipelago and they became less numerous in the overseas rice trade and in the direct Sino-Siamese trade where Ch'ao-chou people from eastern Kwangtung began to predominate.

On the other hand, these final decades saw the expansion of the Amoy *shang-hang*, firms originally licensed to do business on the China coast. The *shang-hang* merchants successfully challenged and eventually replaced the *yang-hang*, the time-honoured and licensed operators of overseas trade.⁷⁷ Their rise meant a wider share of the overall overseas trade by the Fukienese merchants. As a whole, the commercial position of the Fukienese merchants remained solid or even expanded in the second half of the eighteenth century. As indicated by the Amoy gazetteer, the

75. HMC, 5:30b-31a.

76. Commenting on the suspected rice trade from China to overseas countries in the 1720s, Lan Ting-yüan pointed out that the Sino-overseas rice could not have been profitable because of the high freight costs and the bulky and low-value nature of the rice cargo. See his "Nanyang shih-i lun" 南洋事宜論 (A treatise on the Nanyang affairs), in HCCSWP, 83:39. As indicated by governor-general Su Ch'ang in 1767, the merchants imported rice from overseas mainly because they could obtain official titles under the incentive scheme. After they had achieved their purpose, they were no longer interested in importing rice. See KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Su Ch'ang, 32/10/4.

77. HMC, 5:31.

number of *yang-hang* was reduced to 8 but the *shang-hang* expanded to 30. Moreover, there were over a thousand ocean junks (*yang-ch'uan*) and merchant junks (*shang-ch'uan*, originally licensed for coastal trade) calling at Amoy.⁷⁸ The evidence suggests, therefore, that during this period Amoy's commercial prosperity and busy shipping continued. Because of its wealth, Amoy during this time had, in fact, earned for itself a reputation as the "city of silver" (*yin-ch'eng*).⁷⁹ As a Ch'ing scholar, Liang Chang-chü recalled during his old age:

In 1786 ..., Amoy was crowded with *yang-ch'uan*. The merchants were prosperous. Beautiful scenery and splendid houses were everywhere. It was the richest city in the South.⁸⁰

Military and Civil Administration

Amoy's rise as the maritime centre of Fukien province drew the government's attention to new strategic and commercial considerations. While the Ch'ing court was fully aware of its strategic location which facilitated coastal defence and control over the isolated prefecture of Taiwan, the seaport, located on an offshore island on the maritime frontier, was highly vulnerable to attack, either by native outcasts or foreign intruders. At the same time, the court had to take account of its commercial importance. Maritime trade not only yielded considerable customs revenue for the government, but, perhaps more importantly, provided a livelihood for the maritime population in an overcrowded region lacking

78. *ibid.*, 5:30b-31a.

79. *ibid.*, 15:1b.

80. Liang Chang-chü 梁章鉅, *T'ui-an sui-pi 退庵隨筆* (Random notes from the T'ui-an), "biography": 1b, in *PCHSTK*, series 1, no.9, p.5328.

land suitable for cultivation. From the lesson of Fukienese resistance during the founding years of the Ch'ing, the court had learnt to keep constant vigilance over what it thought the most unruly people in the country, not by force but by attempting to accommodate to their way of living. Perhaps no other emperors in Chinese history were better able to manage the art of ruling or more sensitive to the needs of the maritime people than emperors K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng. Flexibility governed their administrative measure towards Amoy, which was initiated in response to local conditions rather than based on administrative precedent. Amoy's government in the first few decades after the conquest was quite unique, therefore, when compared with the general administrative practices adopted for other Chinese cities.

In the wake of the Ch'ing occupation of the island, the authorities readopted the seldom used place-name, Hsia-men or Amoy.⁸¹ Under the Ch'ing, Amoy was the headquarters of the Fukien navy. A naval commander (sub-1st rank) in Amoy was charged with supervising provincial naval affairs. He oversaw the three garrison towns of Quemoy, Hai-t'an, and Nan-ao, and also Peng-hu and Taiwan.⁸² In the early Ch'ing, the naval commander was the most powerful figure in Fukien as far as maritime affairs were concerned. This was particularly true when Shih Lang was in office (1681-1696). His son, Shih-p'iao, held the post of naval commander from 1712 to 1721. In the provincial hierarchy, he ranked just below the governor-general, who was concurrently the commander-in-chief of the provincial forces.

81. HMC, 3:6 and 10:11a.

82. Li Kuang-t'ao 李光涛, comp., *Ming-Ch'ing tang-an ts'un-ch'en hsüan-chi* 明清檔案存真選輯 (Selected materials from the Ming-Ch'ing Archives) (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1959), p.173.

After its recapture from the Cheng regime, Amoy was an administrative part of T'ung-an district and remained so throughout the Ch'ing dynasty.⁸³ The district magistrate (*chih-hsien*, 7th rank) was represented on the island by his subdistrict magistrate (*hsün-chien*, sub-9th rank). The subdistrict magistrate took charge of police duties within the subdistrict of Chia-ho.⁸⁴ He was the lowest ranking official in the formal bureaucratic hierarchy on the island. Although in theory Amoy was within the jurisdictional territory of T'ung-an, the magistrate did not have much chance to participate in the island's administration.

Amoy's administrative history has been confused by the claims of many scholars and by documentary inaccuracies which indicate Amoy's administrative status to have been that of a *t'ing* (subprefecture) capital.⁸⁵ In the Ch'ing period, a province was divided into a number of

83. All the following sources provide evidence that Amoy was part of T'ung-an district: *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/11/28, v.7, pp.29-30; Li Kuang-t'ao, comp., p.173; and *HMC*, preface: 1b, 7b-8a, 13a and 25a. According to the preface writers, Amoy was one of the eleven subdistricts (*li*) under the T'ung-an district administration. It was called Chia-ho *li*. Only in 1913 was Amoy officially separated from T'ung-an's jurisdiction and elevated to *hsien* (district) status, as recorded in *T'ung-an HC 同安縣志* (Gazetteer of T'ung-an district) (1929 ed.), 1:1b-2a.

84. *HMC*, 10:4a.

85. See, for examples, Hsiao I-shang 蕭一山, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih 清代通史* (A general history of the Ch'ing period) (5 vols: Taipei: Commercial Press, 1967), v.1, p.529; G. William Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), p.332; and Chao Ch'üan-ch'eng 趙泉澄, *Ch'ing-tai ti-li yen-ke piao 清代地理沿革表* (The geographic changes during the Ch'ing period), in Shen Yün-lung 沈雲龍, ed. *Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung k'an 近代中國史料叢刊* (Compilation of the historical sources of modern China) (Original preface 1940; Reprint; Taipei: Wen-hai, 1979), series 2, v.63 (no. 628), pp.79-81. Chao mentions three *t'ing*: Amoy, P'ing-t'an, and Yün-hsiao in Fukien. The information given in *Tz'u-hai 辭海* (the encyclopedia) records that Amoy was called *Ssu-ming hsien* under the Chengs and it became a *t'ing* after the Ch'ing conquest. Both of these two accounts are inaccurate.

prefectures (*fu*), independent or autonomous departments (*chih-li chou*), and independent or autonomous subprefectures (*chih-li t'ing*). The three belonged to medium-level administrative units. Under them, there was a further division into ordinary departments (*chou*), ordinary subprefectures (*t'ing*), and districts (*hsien*), forming the lowest level in the administrative hierarchy. According to the 1899 edition of the Ch'ing Statutes, it is recorded under the Board of Civil Administration section that there were two ordinary *t'ing* in Fukien province, excluding Taiwan. They were Ma-hsiang and Yün-hsiao, established in 1775 and 1796 respectively.⁸⁶ In the section of Board of Revenue, however, Amoy was included as one of the six *t'ing* in the province.⁸⁷ In fact, both claims are inaccurate. Besides Ma-hsiang and Yün-hsiao, there was a third *t'ing* called P'ing-t'an, which was promoted in 1798,⁸⁸ in mainland Fukien. But Amoy was never a *t'ing*.

The confusion may have arisen from the presence of subprefect (*t'ung-chih*, 5th rank) on Amoy. In the early Ch'ing, a maritime subprefect was posted to the walled city of Ch'üan-chou. The yamen was moved to Amoy in 1686 apparently because the increasing importance of the island had become too much of an administrative burden for the low-ranking subdistrict magistrate. The subprefect administered the prefectural seaports, levied customs duties from the merchants and their junks, managed rice shipments from Taiwan, supervised the rationing of the troops, and administered justice locally.⁸⁹

86. *Ch'ing-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien* 欽定大清會典 (Imperial endorsed, collected administrative statutes of the great Ch'ing) (Reproduction from the 1899 edition; Taipei: Chung-wen, 1963), 4:7.

87. *ibid.*, 14:8a. Chü T'ung-tsu also quotes this number, see p.3.

88. *P'ing-t'an HC* 平潭縣志 (Gazetteer of P'ing-t'an district) (1923 ed.), 3:20b and 13:2a.

89. *HMC*, 10:4a.

Two categories of subprefects existed under the Ch'ing. That is to say, a subprefect or a second-class subprefect (*t'ung-p'an*, 6th rank) could either be a territorial head or function as a prefect's deputy charged with special duty.⁹⁰ When a subprefect or a second-class subprefect was assigned as a territorial head, then the territory under his jurisdiction was called a *t'ing*. Otherwise, even if he was charged with special duty in a particular subdistrict, he still functioned as a prefect's deputy and the subdistrict under him did not automatically become a *t'ing*.⁹¹

In the case of Amoy, the subprefect retained his designation as the deputy of the Ch'üan-chou prefect, charged with special duty for maritime affairs, not as a territorial head.⁹² His yamen was called,

90. The first was called *fu-min* 撫民 *t'ung-chih* or *t'ung-p'an*. He was an official in charge of the seal (*cheng-yin kuan* 正印官). The second belonged to the category of deputy (*tso-erh* 佐貳). See *Ch'ing-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien*, 4:3a and 4:7.

91. Two examples support my argument. Firstly, Quemoy and Ma-hsiang were both subdistricts of T'ung-an. Prior to 1775, a second-class subprefect was stationed on Quemoy but he only functioned as a deputy, not as territorial head, and Quemoy did not have the *t'ing* status. He later did become a territorial head with the same title of *t'ung-p'an* when he was transferred to Ma-hsiang. The latter was separated from T'ung-an district and officially elevated to *t'ing* status in 1775. See *Ma-hsiang t'ing chih* 馬巷廳志 (Gazetteer of Ma-hsiang subprefecture) (1777 ed.; supplemented 1893), 1:5a-14a. The second example was the *t'ung-chih* of Chang-chou prefecture. He was first posted to Nan-sheng as the prefect's deputy in charge of maritime affairs but Nan-sheng did not automatically become a *t'ing* even with the presence of a subprefect. Later, Yün-hsiao became a *t'ing*. The subprefect of Nan-sheng was transferred there and his designation became that of territorial head (*fu-min t'ung-chih*). See *Yün-hsiao t'ing-chih* 雲霄廳志 (Gazetteer of Yün-hsiao subprefecture) (1816 ed.), 1:3a. See also Hung Liang-chi 洪亮吉, *Ch'ien-lung fu t'ing chou hsien t'u-chih* 乾隆府廳州縣圖志 (Illustrated administrative units of the Ch'ien-lung reign), in *Hung Pei-chiang hsien-sheng i-chi* 洪北江先生遺集 (Collected works by Hung Liang-chi) (Preface 1788; Reprinted 1879), *han* 7, *ts'e* 69, 39:8b.

92. His designation should read Ch'üan-chou *hai-fang t'ung-chih* 泉州海防同知 or simply Ch'üan *fang t'ung-chih* 泉防同知. See KCTC: YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/8/10, v.11, p.70 for the term.

interchangeably, Hsia fang t'ing (office of maritime affairs in Amoy) or Ch'üan fang t'ing (office of Ch'üan-chou maritime affairs).⁹³ The word t'ing used here means office or yamen. It should not be confused with the same character which means a subprefecture.⁹⁴

The fact that Amoy had never been administratively designated as a t'ing is significant not only because the question has not been seriously investigated but also because it shows the administrative flexibility of the Ch'ing court. In the normal course of events, Amoy's economic position combined with the fact that a subprefect was stationed there would have justified its promotion to the status of an administrative t'ing. In 1775, a comparatively less strategic neighbouring subdistrict, Ma-hsiang, was elevated instead.⁹⁵

(...cont) Since he was stationed in Amoy, he was customarily called Hsia fang t'ung-chih 廈防同知, a simplified form of Hsia-men fen-fang t'ung-chih 廈門分防同知. Until the early Ch'ien-lung period, the designation Ch'üan fang t'ung-chih appeared more often in the documents. After that, another usage of Hsia fang t'ung-chih was applied.

93. Similarly, the term Ch'üan fang t'ing was applied more frequently until the early Ch'ien-lung period. To put the usage in context, I quote the following: "Permits were issued by the Ch'üan-chou maritime yamen (i.e. Ch'üan fang t'ing) to all the merchant ships embarking from Amoy for Taiwan" 商船自廈來台,由廈防廳給發印單. See Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC 重修台灣縣志, (Revised gazetteer of Taiwan district) (1752 ed.), in TWWHTK, no.113, p.65.
94. The proper name for the yamen should actually be Hsia-men fen-fang t'ung-chih shu 廈門分防同知署. See FCTC (1868-1871 ed.), 18:41a. As far as I know, it was never simplified to Hsia fang shu, but to Hsia fang t'ing.
95. What were the motives behind setting up an administrative t'ing? I shall consider the two cases of Ma-hsiang and Yün-hsiao for comparison. When Chung Ying 鍾音, the Che-Min governor-general, recommended the elevation of Ma-hsiang in 1774, he mentioned that Ma-hsiang was controlled by strong local lineages and was beyond the reach of the T'ung-an yamen. It was basically because T'ung-an district covered too large an area for the magistrate to govern. He concluded that the lack of administrative officials in such a strategic coastal area created serious security problems. The court approved the suggestion in the following year. Three of the eleven

The reason did not lie in the authorities having failed to weigh the importance of Amoy adequately. If Amoy had been promoted, it would have been under the administration of a subprefect as its territorial head. In fact, the court regarded Amoy as too important to be handled by a fifth-rank subprefect alone. To put the tiny island in a higher administrative hierarchy was deemed to be inappropriate, unless a major reshuffle of the existing units was conducted. But the main reason for maintaining the status quo was the consideration that Amoy was such a commercially and militarily strategic island that no one should be given a monopoly of power. The court adopted a system of checks and balances and mutual supervision.

Under the policy of checks and balances, another high-ranking official was stationed on the island. Before 1726, a Taiwan-Amoy circuit intendant (T'ai-Hsia tao) whose yamen was in Taiwan had jurisdiction over Amoy. In practical terms, he could hardly govern Amoy due to the great distance between them. Therefore, governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo recommended in that year that the circuit intendant (3b-5a rank)⁹⁶ for Hsing-hua/Ch'üan-chou prefectures (Hsing-Ch'üan tao) should remove his yamen from the prefectural capital of Ch'üan-chou to Amoy. At the same time, the T'ai-Hsia tao should cease to supervise Amoy and thus his title

(...cont) subdistricts were ceded from T'ung-an district to form *t'ing*. Consequently, a second-class subprefect was transferred from Quemoy to administer the new unit. The main reason for the establishment of Yün-hsiao *t'ing* was similar. Yün-hsiao occupied a strategic location bordering the three districts of Chang-p'u, P'ing-ho, and Chao-an, yet none of the magistrates in those districts could effectively rule the area.

96. During an administrative reform in 1753, the rank for circuit intendant was fixed at 4a, while the prefect was given a 4b rank, a grade lower than before. See *Ch'ing-ch'ao t'ung-tien*, chüan 40, p.2233.

was changed to Taiwan tao.⁹⁷ His recommendation was brought into effect in the following year.

The movement of the circuit yamen from Ch'üan-chou to Amoy indicates one aspect of the flexibility of the circuit system. As William Skinner points out, this kind of "administrative anomaly - circuit yamens located in cities that were not even prefectural-level capitals - may also be attributed to the court's overriding concern to locate intendants in whatever city within the circuit was most strategically situated for their mission."⁹⁸ The circuit system was flexible in other ways as well. Circuit intendants could, for example, perform different functions. Some of them were charged with special duties such as grain intendants and salt intendants. Other supervised more general administrative duties within the circuit. The Hsing-Ch'üan intendantship, for example, was charged with maritime responsibility after it was removed to Amoy in 1727. Four years later, its duties shifted from the financial side to general, civil administration. In 1767, when military duties were assigned to the intendant,⁹⁹ his authority became more concentrated on sea-port administration, including the control of trade, ocean vessels, and courier posts and on the duties of soldier rationing, and overseeing the building of war vessels.¹⁰⁰

97. KCTTC:YC, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/11/28, v.7, pp.29-30.

98. G. William Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), p.333.

99. The jurisdiction of the Hsing-Ch'üan tao was enlarged to include the newly elevated independent department of Yung-ch'un in 1734.

100. HMC, 10:4a. For more information on the tao system, see Fu Tsung-mou 傅宗懋, *Ch'ing-tai tu-fu chih-tu* 清代督撫制度, (The system of governor-generalships and governorships in the Ch'ing period) (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University, 1963), pp.5-6.

Intendants normally acted as regional authorities between the governor-general (*tu*), governor (*fu*), commissioners (*ssu*) on the top, and the prefects (*fu*) and magistrates (*hsien*) at the bottom. Nevertheless, "circuit yamens resembled specialized offices of the provincial government more than administrative offices at a separate level of the territorial hierarchy."¹⁰¹ In other words, circuits should not be included as a regular level of administrative units. In fact, the contemporary works such as the local gazetteers and Hung Liang-chi's *Ch'ien-lung fu t'ing chou hsien t'u-chih* all divide the administrative units into three regular levels, with the province at the top of the hierarchy, the prefectures, independent departments, and independent subprefectures in the middle, and the ordinary departments, ordinary subprefectures, and districts on the lowest level.

Thus, Amoy stands as an exception to William Skinner's generalization that "most of China's central places that ranked as local cities or higher in the economic hierarchy also served as administrative capitals."¹⁰² Despite the multiplicity of its economic and military functions and the presence of several ranking officials, Amoy was not designated a territorial seat of local government, a result of the government's recognition of its foremost commercial and strategic importance as a maritime centre.

101. G. William Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), p.302.

102. *ibid.*, p.301.

Maritime Customs Administration

Provincial and central control in Amoy is best illustrated by the establishment of the maritime customs administration (*hai-kuan*). After the maritime ban was rescinded following the conquest of Taiwan, the court established a maritime customs administration in Fukien and Kwangtung in 1684 and also in Chekiang and Kiangnan provinces in the succeeding year.

There are some discrepancies as to the seat of the customs administration in Fukien. One of the most important sources comes from Chiang Ch'en-ying (1628-1699). He was not only a contemporary, but also a compiler of the Hanlin Academy (*Han-lin yüan*) and, thus, had free access to the imperial archives. According to Chiang, when the maritime customs superintendency was first established, it was located in Chang-chou-fu.¹⁰³ However, a later source which was quoted in the Amoy gazetteer states that the maritime customs, begun in 1684, was set up in Amoy.¹⁰⁴ As to modern scholars, Sarasin Viraphol says that the headquarters of the Fukien maritime customs was at Chang-chou and was later transferred to Amoy.¹⁰⁵ Jennifer Cushman argues that Chang-chou housed the *hai-kuan*, but has some reservations.¹⁰⁶ Among the Japanese scholars, Terada Takanobu accepts without question the reliability of Chiang Ch'en-ying that Chang-chou was the seat of the superintendency.¹⁰⁷ On the other

103. Chiang Ch'en-ying 姜宸英, "Hai-fang tsung-lun" 海防總論 (A general discussion of maritime defence), in Ts'ao Yung 曹溶 comp., *Hsüeh-hai lei-pien* 學海類編 (A classified collection of various knowledge) (Reproduction; Shanghai, 1920), *han* 5, *che* 46, 2b-3a.

104. *HMC*, 7:1a.

105. Sarasin Viraphol, p.48.

106. Jennifer Cushman (1975), p.31.

107. Terada Takanobu 寺田隆信, "Shinchō no kaikan gyōsei ni tsuite" 清朝の海關行政について (Administration of maritime customs in the Ch'ing dynasty), *Shirin* 史林 (Journal of history), 49:2 (March 1966), p.268.

hand, H. Hiramatsu, quoting the Amoy gazetteer, rejects Chiang Ch'en-ying entirely.¹⁰⁸

Since the question is a starting point of this discussion and remains unsolved, a few lines are necessary here to clarify the issue. I shall begin with the term *Min-hai-kuan* or Fukien maritime customs which appears in the sources. It is important to note that the term often implied the whole system or the administration rather than a particular customs station. Within the system or administration, there were two constituent parts: First was the headquarters of the administration, the central yamen, where the superintendent or the director-general resided; the other part was comprised of the customs stations established at the ports of entry, where customs duty was levied from the incoming or outgoing vessels. The central yamen could be located at the major provincial port, but was not necessarily.

The prototype of the Fukien maritime customs system dealing with private shipping, as distinct from the *shih-po*, or tribute-and-trade system, began after the mid-sixteenth century. In 1567, it was first established in Mei-ling in Chao-an district in South Fukien. Six years later, Yüeh-kang in Hai-ch'eng replaced Mei-ling as the site of the maritime customs.¹⁰⁹ Despite its prosperity in maritime trade since the late

108. H. Hiramatsu 平松量, "Shinsho no gaikoku bōeki" 清初9外國貿易 (Foreign trade in the early Ch'ing dynasty), *Shigaku kenkyū* 史學研究 (Review of historical studies), no.43 (March 1951), p.51.

109. Hsüeh Ch'eng-ch'ing 薛澄清, "Ming-mo Fu-chien hai-kuan ch'ing-k'uang chi ch'i ti-tien pien-ch'ien k'ao-lüeh" 明末福建海關情況及其地點變遷考略 (The general condition of Fukien maritime customs in the late Ming and an examination of its location changes), *Yü-kung* 禹貢 (The Chinese historical geography semi-monthly), 5:7 (June 1936), pp.43-44, quoting Chang Hsieh, *Tung-hsi-yang k'ao*, 7:2a. The maritime customs yamen was called *tu-hsiang kuan* 督餉館 and the officer-in-charge the *tu-hsiang kuan* 督餉官, but the title was later changed to *fang-hai tai-fu* 防海大夫.

fifteenth century, the further development of Yüeh-kang in the late Ming was obstructed by the fact that the port had become too shallow for the anchorage of large vessels.¹¹⁰ During the Ch'ing resistance, Hai-ch'eng was constantly infested by the Cheng troops. These two conditions expedited the rise of Shih-ma further to the west which could be more safely controlled by the Ch'ing authorities. The town was under the jurisdiction of Lung-ch'i district. Chang-chou/Lung-ch'i city itself was not a seaport. The channels around the walled city had already silted up even before the sixteenth century.¹¹¹ Before the rise of Amoy, Chang-chou/Lung-ch'i city and its hinterland relied on Hai-ch'eng and later Shih-ma as the major seaport for the ocean-going traffic. Not surprisingly, Shih-ma in the early years of the Ch'ing functioned as the maritime customs station for the native ocean junks (*yang-ch'uan*).¹¹²

When peace returned, the court considered lifting the maritime ban. In 1684, the grand secretary, Hsi-Chu, returned from a mission to Fukien and Kwangtung to review maritime policy. In his report, he decided not to recommend that the ban be lifted. His main argument was that the government should continuously keep vigilant guard over the uncertain situation of the new conquered lands of Taiwan, Quemoy, and Amoy. He concluded that any consideration of relaxing the maritime ban should be delayed for a couple of years.¹¹³ Emperor K'ang-hsi rejected his

110. Chang Hsieh, *Tung-hsi-yang k'ao*, 9:2. The condition was confirmed in Yang Ying 楊英, *Ts'ung-cheng shih-lu* 從征實錄 (Record of following the campaigns of Koxinga) (Reproduction; Peiping: Academia Sinica, 1931), 20b.

111. *Chang-chou FC* (1714 ed.), 34:27a.

112. *HMC*, 5:28a.

113. *CSL:KH*, 116:3b-4a.

argument and soon after decreed the resumption of maritime trade.¹¹⁴ Whether Hsi Chu's writing had alerted the emperor to choose Chang-chou city as a safer place for the central yamen is unknown. Since Chang-chou had long been prominent in maritime trade and its prefectural capital was also an outstanding commercial centre, at least some such proposal must have been put forward to the emperor and read by Chiang Ch'eng-ying. Even if there was a plan to set up the central yamen at Chang-chou city, it was never carried out.¹¹⁵

Now we can consider Amoy. In the first place, the record that a *hai-kuan* was set up in Amoy in 1684 upon the recommendation by admiral Shih Lang cannot be doubted because such an establishment was absolutely necessary once the *yang-ch'uan* trade had resumed in Amoy. In fact, Hosea Morse has clearly indicated in his book that the Customs House at Amoy was established sometime between December 1684 and July 1685, by converting the old factory of the English East India Company.¹¹⁶

The only problem is whether the central maritime customs yamen was also located there. As recorded in the provincial gazetteer of Fukien, the court appointed maritime customs superintendents (*hai-kuan chien-tu*) in 1684. Two were sent to Fukien together; one Manchu and the other a Chinese. They each had *yamen*, one in Nan-t'ai in Foochow, and one in Amoy.¹¹⁷ The Amoy gazetteer also confirms the existence of the

114. *ibid.*, 116:18a and 117:10b.

115. I have checked the chapters on "offices" in the 1684 and 1737 editions of the Fukien provincial gazetteers and the 1714 edition of the Chang-chou prefectural gazetteer, but there is no mention of a maritime customs yamen in Chang-chou city.

116. Hosea B. Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1635-1834* (5 vols.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1926), v.1, pp.57-58.

117. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 107:21b.

superintendent's official residence in Amoy in the early years after the lifting of the maritime ban.¹¹⁸ Based on emperor K'ang-hsi's deliberate efforts to cushion the impact of his alien rule on local Chinese society, we can safely guess that the Manchu yamen was in Foochow and the Han Chinese official was assigned to the maritime port of Amoy. Anyway, there were two *hai-kuan* yamens, instead of one, established within the Fukien maritime customs system. From 1690 onward, only the Manchu appointment was continued.¹¹⁹ His office was very likely in Foochow. That is to say, while Amoy was the most important maritime customs station, the headquarters of the *hai-kuan* administration was no longer in Amoy from that year.

Under the Ch'ing system, customs administrations were established throughout the empire. With the exception of four under the control of the Board of Works, there were twenty four regional customs administrations supervised by the Board of Revenue.¹²⁰ Four of the latter category were set up in the coastal provinces and were called *hai-kuan*. They controlled the coastal and foreign trade. Accordingly, the Board of Revenue had the authority to appoint officials to administer the customs under their jurisdiction. Although the Board of Revenue was responsible for the appointment of customs officials, the candidates came from different ministries and departments.¹²¹ In fact, among the forty-four superintendents of the Fukien maritime customs appointed between 1683

118. HMC, 7:5a.

119. FCTC (1868-1871 ed.), 107:21b.

120. Shimoda Reisque 下田禮佐, "Kanton bōeki no kenkyū" カントニ貿易の研究 (A study of the Canton trade), *Shirin*, 15:1 (January 1930), p.47.

121. TCHTSL, 236:4a.

and 1729, only two were from the Board of Revenue. The Board of Justice and Board of War had five each, while the Imperial Household (*nei-wu fu*) had nine appointees.¹²² Because the appointment was made through the Board of Revenue, the appointee was known by the Western seafarers as the Hoppo (*hu-pu*).

The customs superintendent was empowered to handle the customs for the government, the Imperial Household, as well as the Board of Revenue.¹²³ The regular quota (*cheng-e*) went to the Board of Revenue as government earnings and the surplus quota (*ying-yü*) went to the Imperial Household. The sharing of the customs revenue had become the usual practice from the early Yung-cheng period.¹²⁴ For instance, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan reported in 1727 that he had sent the annual regular revenue from the maritime customs of the province, amounting to 66,549.0 taels, to the provincial treasurer and the surplus revenue of 50,054.0 taels to the Imperial Household through the Board of Revenue.¹²⁵ The maritime customs superintendent also oversaw the movement of trade at the various seaports. He was responsible directly to the court and thus independent of the provincial government.¹²⁶

122. FCTC (1868-1871 ed.), 107:21b-22a.

123. Sarasin Viraphol, p.49.

124. Terada Takanobu, p.282. Hosea Morse also indicates that the merchants were required to pay the emperor's and the Hoppo's duties. See *The Chronicles*, v.1, p.173. Also Chang Te-ch'ang, "The Economic Role of the Imperial Household (*Nei-wu-fu*) in the Ch'ing Dynasty," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 31:2 (February 1972), p.256.

125. Terada Takanobu, p.282. The regular quotas of the same period for the maritime customs of Kiangnan, Chekiang, and Kwangtung were 23,016.3, 32,030.6, and 40,000.2 taels respectively. See *ibid.*, p.280.

126. *Ch'ing-ch'ao wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao*, chüan 26, p.5082; also Shimoda Reisuke, p.48.

From the central yamen radiated a network of maritime customs stations (*k'ou-an*), totalling thirty-three in 1728.¹²⁷ A 1746 report from the governor listed Nan-t'ai, Amoy, Ch'üan-chou, Hai-ch'eng, T'ung-shan, and Ning-te as the major *k'ou-an* under the maritime customs administration of Fukien.¹²⁸ Among them, Amoy functioned as the central port of entry, called *tsung-k'ou* or *cheng-k'ou*.¹²⁹

The maritime customs stations were charged with three distinct functions.¹³⁰ Some were assigned to measure the size of the vessels and calculate the value of the cargoes. Then they issued a paper, with the tax amount written on it. The vessels paid their customs duty at the maritime customs in Amoy. Some stations were authorized to collect the customs duties, while others were responsible only for routine inspection of the incoming and outgoing vessels to prevent them from carrying contraband goods or avoiding customs duty.

Lacking coordination and efficiency was an obvious defect in the autonomous system of the customs superintendency.¹³¹ The stations were just too numerous and widespread for the customs superintendent himself to manage. Notwithstanding that the central station in Amoy contributed the major portion of the customs revenue which was collected from the province, only one of the two superintendents was posted on the spot. Even this posting did not last for more than a decade. Soon after, there was only one superintendent appointed and he presided over the

127. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/11/22, v.11, p.826.

128. *CSL:KT*, 279:18a.

129. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 7/1/20, v.12, p.247; and *HMC*, 7:5a.

130. *HMC*, 7:5a-6a; also Jennifer Cushman (1975), pp.32-35.

131. *TCHTSL*, 239:11.

system from his central yamen in Foochow. Although powerful in fact, in the bureaucratic hierarchy, he was only a middle-ranking officer normally with the fourth rank or lower,¹³² while there were a number of higher ranking dignitaries in the provincial civil and military services. He did not even have an official corps to assist him in the management of the system. Understandably, he relied on his clerical assistants and trusted household servants to supervise the local stations and collect revenue.¹³³ Often, his jealous provincial colleagues were reluctant to render their cooperation, and those in the local government would not voluntarily provide their service. As a result, the collection of customs revenue was usually delayed.

The court was indeed concerned about the condition. What had worried the court most was the inefficiency that could turn out to be detrimental to commerce and could create irregularities such as tax avoidance.¹³⁴ In 1720, emperor K'ang-hsi started a reform of the maritime customs in Kiangnan and Chekiang by transferring the administrative authority to the respective provincial governors. When the Yung-cheng emperor came to the throne, the same measure was applied to both Fukien and Kwangtung.¹³⁵ In Fukien, the governor in turn commissioned a regular staff member chosen from local officials of the fourth rank, either an intendent or a prefect, to run the customs administration.

It is interesting to note that the implementation of this reform did not result in strengthening the provincial administration down to local

132. For the official titles of the appointees, see *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 107:21b-22a. The corresponding rank of the respective official title is explained in *Ch'ing-Ch'ao T'ung-tien*, *ch'uan* 40, pp.2233-34.

133. *TCHTSL*, 239:5b, 11.

134. *ibid.*

135. *ibid.*, 236:6b, 7b and 8a.

government at the *hsien* level. But the court still asserted its central control through the appointment of a provincial governor.¹³⁶ His new duty involving the management of maritime customs was authorized directly by the court, by-passing the governor-general. Although the governor-general was not empowered to overrule the governor's management, he would constantly keep the court informed of administrative conditions within the maritime customs, thus preserving the checks and balances.

The provincial governor was in a good position to mobilize the local administrative apparatus for effective control of the maritime customs. In reality, a common practice apparent in almost every aspect of the provincial administration was that the officials did not always transmit their orders through the formal hierarchical channel of the bureaucracy. Instead, they often employed private staff and assistants such as personal servants, private secretaries, and clerks, as studied by Ch'ü T'ung-tsu.¹³⁷ In the case of Fukien *hai-kuan*, the household servants played a significant role in the system.

The employment of personal servants in the maritime customs and in other branches of local and provincial government with the court's tacit permission was a rather peculiar aspect in the Ch'ing bureaucracy. The Ch'ing emperors were aware of the fraudulent practice which resulted. For instance, in 1724, emperor Yung-cheng decreed that all the governors who were then in charge of the customs should be more careful in assigning household servants to manage official business.¹³⁸ According to the decree, household servants were noted as often abusing the power

136. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 107:21b.

137. Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, chs. 3, 5 and 6.

138. *TCHTSL*, 239:5b.

entrusted to them. Because of the influential background of most servants, local officials were reluctant to interfere with their activities. Nonetheless, the emperor seemed to regard such private appointments as an acceptable practice for the decree did not show any sign of objecting to them.¹³⁹

In 1728, Chu Kang took up the Fukien governorship. He followed the precedents by entrusting a commissioner with the management of the *hai-kuan*. He did not, however, assign any of his household servants to manage official business as a manifestation of his incorruptibility. Chu died shortly after his appointment and governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo was temporarily put in charge of the governor's yamen. He was hesitant to resume the previous practice of sending household servants to the stations so he would not be suspected by the court. But he soon found Chu's measure to be a nuisance. In a carefully worded memorial, he explained to the emperor both the advantage and disadvantage of Chu's new style. He did agree that the absence of the governor's private staff

139. *ibid.* We might also note the Ch'ien-lung emperor's attitude in this regard. In 1746, the Foochow Tartar-general, Hsin Chu, who concurrently supervised the Fukien maritime customs, was granted an audience with the emperor. As he was on leave in the imperial capital, he withdrew all his household servants from the management of the *hai-kuan* stations at Nan-t'ai, Amoy, Ch'üan-chou, Han-chiang, T'ung-shan and Ning-te, in order to give the succeeding official a free hand. The acting officer-in-charge of the Fukien *hai-kuan*, Chou Hsüeh-chien, also failed to send out any of his own servants, knowing that he was only temporarily in charge. Shortly after, Chou was promoted to a new post in Kiangnan. The newly appointed Fukien governor, Ch'en Ta-shou, took over customs supervision pending the Foochow Tartar-general's return. Governor Ch'en also refrained from dispatching his personal servants. When this came to the emperor's notice, he severely criticized Hsin Chu for evading his appointed duty; also the other officials for lacking openness and loyalty in their pretence to virtue. See *CSL:KT*, 279:18. This event indicates that the emperor took for granted the private appointment of personal servants to take charge of the day-to-day *hai-kuan* management. He even thought it improper and over-scrupulous when they were not appointed.

at the maritime customs stations reduced administrative confusion and corrupt practices, but pointed out that doing away with these servants was in fact impractical. Without household servants on the spot, the governor could not properly check up on the maritime customs commissioner. In any event, the latter still had to dispatch his own household servants to the various stations for the day-to-day management of affairs. Kao further argued that even if the commissioner was a man of integrity, it was practically impossible for him to personally oversee the often remote stations. Eventually, the situation arose in which either control was too loose or the commissioner was defrauded by the household servants.¹⁴⁰

As Ch'ü T'ung-tsu has explained, the practice of sending household servants for official functions had its own purpose. The official in charge of the overall administration of the maritime customs, for example, was usually a stranger and unfamiliar with the local situation. He could not trust the native clerks and runners because of their local involvement and personal connections. With his own servants in charge, the clerks and runners would be better supervised. He knew his servants well and believed he could rely upon their loyalty. More importantly, personal servants acted as middlemen in his illegal transactions thereby avoiding his own direct involvement. The emperors were aware of corruption and abuse of power by personal servants, yet they viewed the employment of informal and personal aides by the local officials as the best means of serving to check and supervise the formal bureaucracy.¹⁴¹ Consequently, two parallel, formal and informal, structures existed in

140. *KCTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/11/22, v.11, pp.826-27.

141. Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, pp.73-74 and 195-97.

the administration, as pointed out by John Watt in his study of Chinese urban government. Watt concludes that the formal structure of official government employees came to represent local interests, while the informal structure of nonofficial personnel emerged to support the formal administrative functions of the state.¹⁴²

Not surprisingly, with both formal and informal personnel involved in its operation, the maritime customs administration was inefficient. The court's distrust of the local authorities made it reluctant to improve the situation of poor organization and lack of coordination. The governor's takeover of the maritime customs from the superintendent, therefore, did not result in much improvement.

On the one hand, the court was successful in splitting the provincial and local administrations so that neither had a chance to built up its local power base, such as had the Three Feudatories or the Chengs. But on the other, the duplication of duties, with the resulting conflict of power and interest among the various groups, all contributed to administrative clumsiness and corruption.

The conflict of power and interest can be shown by two examples. In 1725, the commissioner of maritime customs, Han I, who also held the title of grain and postal intendant, was a relative of the Tartar-general of Foochow, I Chao-hsiung. Han in turn assigned his household servant, Wang Tzu-li, to superintend (*tsung-li*) the central maritime customs station in Amoy. When Han I died in the early 1726, the new governor, Mao Wen-ch'üan immediately memorialized emperor Yung-cheng that Wang Tzu-li greatly abused the power entrusted in him by his master.

142. John R. Watt, "The Yamen and Urban Administration," in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), pp.372-73.

Governor Mao also accused Wang Tzu-li of deliberately delaying the submission of the customs revenue which he had collected. Since the governor was held responsible for the punctual collection of the amount, he ordered Wang's arrest pending investigation. The Tartar-general, I Chao-hsiung, was annoyed at Mao's action against a trusted servant of his late relative.¹⁴³ The actual cause of I Chao-hsiung's irritation was, however, that his own interest in the maritime customs was interrupted by his provincial rival. In Han I's place, governor Mao appointed Yen-p'ing prefect, Chang Tao-p'ei, as the new commissioner to manage the Fukien *hai-kuan*.¹⁴⁴ The appointment of his own favoured man strengthened governor Mao's control and reduced the Tartar-general's influence in the lucrative business.

Another case of conflict is revealed by governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo in a memorial of 1729. The two contending parties were the Fukien naval commander, Lan T'ing-chen, and the Hsing-Ch'üan circuit intendant, Chang T'ing-mei. Admiral Lan had won the trust of the Yung-cheng emperor for his military role in subjugating the Taiwan rebellion of 1721-1724 led by Chu I-kuei. Even the governor-general could not question the admiral's activities. However, such was not the case for Chang T'ing-mei, who was considered relatively young to have reached as important a position as circuit intendant. Intendant Chang was furious with the admiral's arbitrary actions of punishing people who committed criminal offences or arresting them for attempting to cross the Taiwan Straits in an illegal way. Chang saw it as arrogant interference with his civil jurisdiction in Amoy and was bold enough to challenge Lan's

143. KCTTC:YC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/3/10, v.5, pp.689-90.

144. *ibid.*

power. We can understand that the governor-general would have been happy to see such a young subordinate standing against the powerful admiral. He sided with the intendant and criticized admiral Lan in his report, although using mild language. Knowing that he could not remove the admiral, he suggested that intendant Chang be transferred to promote harmony between the civil and military officials in charge of maritime affairs. He recommended Li Yü-hung, the grain intendant of Fukien as Chang's replacement, saying that Li was a man of honesty and experience. Then, the governor-general requested the emperor to instruct the admiral not to be too parochial as he always sided with his fellow natives. In addition, the admiral should cooperate better with the incoming intendant to foster appropriate official behaviour and promote local welfare. By implication, he skilfully laid the blame for future discord on the admiral.¹⁴⁵

The court reaction was interesting. Emperor Yung-cheng rebuked intendant Chang as an immature and self-satisfied young man and indicated that he believed admiral Lan would be on good terms with the new intendant. According to the emperor, if the discord remained in the future, it was the civil official who should be blamed. The emperor instructed the governor-general to warn the incoming intendant in this regard. As to the request of reminding the admiral to be impartial through an imperial decree, the throne did not think it necessary, but instructed the governor-general himself to do the job. Emperor Yung-cheng suggested that governor-general Kao should pass the decree to admiral Lan orally, and pretend that the emperor had heard about the matter from a different source. The emperor, nonetheless, expected Lan

145. KCTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 7/1/20, v.12, pp.247-48.

to be careful of his behaviour.¹⁴⁶ The example is typical of emperor Yung-cheng's method of control through secret memorials and balancing contending local officials.

As for corruption, one example is enough to illustrate the situation. In the late K'ang-hsi period, a merchant ship sailing from Taiwan to Amoy would be required to be escorted twice by the maritime patrols on its voyage and to go through inspection and registration eight times before its final arrival at the Amoy maritime customs station.¹⁴⁷ Needless to say, the merchants had to pay their way at each stage. Almost all the provincial and local civil and military yamen collected irregular contributions from the incoming and outgoing vessels at their separate checkpoints and by the private agents in Amoy. According to a memorial, those participating in the exactions included the governor-general, governor, Tartar-general of Foochow, Hsing-Ch'üan-Yung circuit intendant, maritime subprefect, maritime customs personnel, Ch'üan-chou prefect, T'ung-an magistrate, Nan-an magistrate, provincial treasurer, Fukien naval commander, and all the naval units stationed at the various customs checkpoints.¹⁴⁸ And one should not forget that all these

146. *ibid.*

147. Huang Shu-ching 黃叔璥, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu* 台海使槎錄 (A record of a voyage on mission to Taiwan), in *TWHTK*, no.4 (1957), p.21. Huang was appointed censor with special duty in Taiwan in 1722.

148. *KCTTC:CL* (unpublished), Fukien naval commander Huang Shih-chien 黃仕簡, 29/1/24. Corrupt practices are widely recorded in the contemporary sources, but none is so vividly written as Huang's. According to his memorial, each commercial vessel visiting Amoy was charged an "extra" amounting from a few to 1,500 foreign silver dollars (*hua-pien yin* 花邊銀). The corrupt money (*kuei-yin* 規銀) amounted to over a hundred thousand *yüan* 圓 annually. The sum was divided in the following shares: the governor-general was allotted 10,000, governor 8,000, Tartar-general 6,000, Hsing-Ch'üan-Yung circuit intendant 10,000 plus an extra 7,000, maritime subprefect 33,000 plus an extra 6,000, *hai-kuan* administration 17,000, Ch'üan-chou prefect 2,000, T'ung-an magistrate 3,600,

irregularities in the Fukien *hai-kuan* occurred with the tacit understanding and approval of the court.

The few examples shown above reflect the general pattern of the administrative problems on the provincial and local levels. This explains the situation that prompted governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo to recommend a major reform of the maritime customs administration. He was inclined to strengthen the regular bureaucracy and to reduce functional duplication. He recommended that an intendant should be appointed director-general of maritime customs with his yamen on Amoy. A superintendent should be appointed from the prefects to assist the director-general. More to the point, he further suggested that the customs stations in Foochow, Hsing-hua, Ch'üan-chou, and Chang-chou prefectures, and Fu-ning department should be placed under the supervision of the respective local governments. In putting forward these proposals, Kao undoubtedly intended to introduce administrative reform. But the emperor did not appreciate his efforts.¹⁴⁹

Instead of adopting Kao's recommendations, emperor Yung-cheng returned to the old system of the K'ang-hsi period. In 1729, shortly after Kao's proposals, the emperor reinstated the post of maritime customs superintendent, who was sent directly from the imperial capital. The new superintendent was Chun T'ai, a section director of the imperial household.¹⁵⁰ When his one year term expired, the court did not send a

(...cont) Nan-an magistrate 1,000, and the naval commander 21,500. Out of the naval allocation, the naval commander had a share of 9,500. One should bear in mind that these figures represent only the "legally" approved contributions made by the merchant ships, in the sense that the emperor was notified of them.

149. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/11/22, v.11, p.827.

150. According to the imperial endorsement in governor-general Kao's secret memorial, the Yung-cheng emperor mentioned that he had

new successor but retained him.¹⁵¹ Chun T'ai held the post for an unprecedentedly lengthy period and he was still mentioned as the superintendent in 1736. In the same year, Chun T'ai recommended that the governor should be given back the authority to supervise the maritime customs. The new emperor, Ch'ien-lung, did not accept this proposal. The court did decide, however, that the Che-Min governor-general should take over the supervision of maritime customs.¹⁵² Under him, the Hsing-Ch'üan-Yung circuit intendant was authorized for the first time with the special duty of overseeing the day-to-day administration.¹⁵³ In the third year of the Ch'ien-lung reign (1738), the Tartar-general of Foochow was given the authority to take charge of the *hai-kuan*,¹⁵⁴ together with the governor-general. Shortly after the Tartar-general's appointment, governor-general Hao Yü-lin was relieved of his concurrent post as *hai-kuan* supervisor because he was overburdened by the administration of two provinces.¹⁵⁵ From this year on, the Foochow Tartar-general was responsible

(...cont) already sent a metropolitan official to Fukien for the *hai-kuan* post. He also instructed Kao that the local administration should fully cooperate with the incoming official. See *ibid.* In a later imperial endorsement in a memorial by governor Liu Shih-ming 劉世明, which was submitted in February, 1729, the emperor indicated again that the designated superintendent was on his way. See KCTTC:YC, Fukien governor Liu Shih-ming, 7/1/25, v.12, p.327. Also FCTC (1868-1871 ed.), 107:22a for the superintendent's name.

151. FCTC (1868-1871 ed.), 107:22a. Chun T'ai was the last official to hold the title of Fukien maritime customs superintendent (*hai-kuan chien-tu*).

152. CSL:KT, 11:18a.

153. *ibid.*, 20:4b.

154. *ibid.*, 75:22a.

155. *ibid.*, 76:17.

for maritime customs management,¹⁵⁶ which was again outside the jurisdiction of the provincial government.

Overall, the court maintained, with few exceptions, direct control of the maritime customs administration. Nevertheless, administrative compartmentalization and duplication still characterized the government management of the maritime centre of Amoy.

3. URBAN MIGRATION AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

In the first one hundred years of the Ch'ing dynasty, Amoy had developed from a garrison station into a prosperous maritime centre. Accompanying its commercial expansion was the formation of interwoven social relationships connecting Amoy with the rest of South Fukien and also vertically relating the population of different strata on the island to one another.

Until recent years, Max Weber's observation on the social life of Chinese cities has been time-honoured. In his view, the Chinese cities were the home of officials, of the intelligentsia, of the "grand tradition."¹⁵⁷ His observation tends to exaggerate the sharp distinction between urban and rural life. In this regard, F.W. Mote has given an enlightening comment on China's urban culture. According to him, the urban-rural separateness, in social-psychological terms, disappeared very early in China. The people moved freely in these two directions.

156. His additional title was: "concurrently supervising matters related to the Fukien maritime customs" 兼管閩海關事.

157. Max Weber, *The Religion of China* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1964), p.13; and Wolfram Eberhard, "Data on the Structure of the Chinese City in the Pre-Industrial Period," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 4:3 (April 1956), pp.266-67.

Those involved in this movement were not aware of crossing any definite boundary.¹⁵⁸ In other words, the rural and urban sectors meshed into a whole that reinforced their organic unity.

Cities not only formed the central nodes of marketing structures but also provided common meeting places for people from different parts of the countryside. William Skinner illustrates the function of market structures by saying that they "provide one of the crucial modes for integrating myriad peasant communities into the single social system which is the total society."¹⁵⁹ Further, he concludes that the integrative task accomplished there was uniquely large.¹⁶⁰ In his view, "marketing structures inevitably shape local social organization."¹⁶¹

Amoy provides a clear example of the processes described by Mote and Skinner.

The Walled Town and Its Environs

There was a walled section in the southwest of Amoy island, which was called Hsia-men-ch'eng. The wall was first built in 1394 and the enclosure was intended to serve merely as a garrison fort. The circumference of the wall was about 0.8 miles. It was demolished in 1663 when the Ch'ing troops forced the islanders to resettle inland.¹⁶² Apparently,

158. F.W. Mote, "The Transformation of Nanking, 1350-1400," in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), pp.103-104.

159. G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, Part 1," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 24:1 (November 1964), p.3.

160. *ibid.*

161. *ibid.*

162. *HMC*, 16:8. Under the section "Walled Town," it is said that the wall was demolished in the 20th year of the K'ang-hsi reign (1681). Undoubtedly, it should be the 2nd year of K'ang-hsi (1663). For confirmation, see also *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 17:29a.

it was rebuilt after Cheng Ching recaptured the island in 1674. Six years later, the Ch'ing navy landed again at Amoy. Admiral Shih Lang enlarged the wall to a circumference of 1.1 miles.¹⁶³ The size was certainly not impressive if we compare it with the longest walled circumference in the province, that of Ch'üan-chou city. The wall of the latter extended to a length of 10 miles.¹⁶⁴ We may better understand how small Amoy's walled section was by imagining that its wall formed roughly a circle of only about 0.35 miles in diameter.

To say Amoy was a walled town or walled city is quite misleading in terms of its functions. This is because the word "wall" has led to certain preconceptions about the city. Inevitably, the city wall symbolized state authority, superimposed from the political centre, on local life. In this way, cities have too often been regarded as microcosms of empire, more or less uniform creations of an omnipotent state, as repudiated by Skinner.¹⁶⁵ As a result, discussions of Chinese cities have not been related to "the diversity characteristic of their local society and rich cultural heritage," says Harry Lamley.¹⁶⁶ As centres of local commercial and cultural activity, they in fact continued to be responsive to the

163. *ibid.*, 2:27b.

164. Some other walled cities of Fukien and their respective circumferences are: Foochow (6.2 miles), Lung-ch'i (3.7 miles), Chang-p'u (3.4 miles), Ch'ang-t'ai (2.4 miles), Hui-an (1.9 miles), T'ung-an (1.6 miles), Yün-shiao (1.5 miles), Nan-an (1.4 miles), Chao-an (1.2 miles), An-ch'i (1.2 miles), Nan-ching (1.2 miles), Quemoy (1.2 miles), P'ing-ho (1.1 miles) and Hai-ch'eng (1 mile). It is clear that the size of the walled section was not necessarily in proportion to the economic prosperity of the city. For most cases, it is impossible to figure out the urban population living within the wall, since the population data were given on the basis of the whole district, both urban and rural, rather than of the walled section.

165. G. William Skinner, "City and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), p.345.

166. Harry J. Lamley, "The Formation of Cities: Initiative and Motivation in Building Three Walled Cities in Taiwan," in *ibid.*, p.155.

needs of their hinterlands.¹⁶⁷ In the case of Amoy, the wall was basically built to house the headquarters of the Fukien naval force. Unlike most Chinese walled towns, in which all the civil and military offices in the locality were seated, the walled town of Amoy excluded from it all the branches of the civil yamen.¹⁶⁸ The latter, including offices for the circuit intendant, the customs officials, the subprefect, and the subdistrict magistrate, were located outside the wall. Also outside the wall were the government rest houses (*kung-kuan*) accommodating travelling officials to and from Quemoy, Nan-ao, T'ung-an, and Taiwan. Thus, we find indications of military preoccupation and the superior position of the provincial naval chief on the island in the early Ch'ing; the walled section was the prerogative of the naval commander, the de facto overlord of the island.

However, the impact of the central government's superimposed control was mitigated by the appointment of admiral Shih Lang, the naval commander who put down the Cheng resistance, and his successors who were mostly South Fukienese. The non-traditional appointment of a native to a highly sensitive and strategic position reflected the court's willingness to make concessions in the arena of local control, and to respect a considerable degree of local autonomy. In local affairs the naval commander's power and influence were always recognized by the emperor. Not infrequently, he represented the voice of local interest. The court's concession created room for the interplay between government and society and smoothed out any possible confrontation between the two. Instead of suppressing local initiatives in maritime affairs, the political

^{167.} *ibid.*

^{168.} *HMC*, 2:28b-31b.

situation enabled the local people to play positive roles in city development and provided a favourable integrative framework between the formal state apparatus and the informal local sociopolitical structure.

The island beyond this limited walled area was divided into rural and urban sectors. Administratively, the island was named Chia-ho and was a subdistrict (*li*) under the district of T'ung-an. Further down, the subdistrict covered four subdivisions (*tu*), each included two sections (*tu*). Altogether there were forty-five neighbourhoods (*pao*) in the subdistrict of Chia-ho designed for administrative and social control purposes.¹⁶⁹ The land was unproductive and only about 3,000 acres (less than 10% of the total) were under cultivation. Farmers grew mostly subsidiary foodstuffs and produced very little grain. A large portion of the land could grow only sweet potato. The population had to rely on imported grain. In fact, many of them worked part-time in agriculture and took up fishing for additional income. The number of fishermen was double that of agriculturists.¹⁷⁰

The essence of the island, therefore, lay in its urban sector spread along the coast on three sides of the walled section. The town consisted of four quarters, called *she*: Fu-shan, Huai-te, Fu-chai and Ho-feng. The Amoy harbour, Hsia-men-kang, was situated in Ho-feng.¹⁷¹ All the major streets of the commercial area stretched outside the town wall on the waterfront of the harbour.¹⁷² As a deep-water port, vessels could conveniently come to anchor by the wharfs joining the main streets.

169. *ibid.*, 2:20a-22a, quoting a gazetteer of the Ch'ien-lung period.

170. *ibid.*, preface: 1b; 2:43a; 7:33a; and, 15:5a.

171. *ibid.*, 2:20b-21a.

172. *ibid.*, 2:22b-23a, quoting two Ch'ien-lung-edition gazetteers.

Aside from the main commercial area, there were also other periodic markets around the city selling all kinds of vegetables and foodstuffs. The rural household producers sold peanut oil to store retailers or itinerant peddlers in the periodic market which specialized in this item. Other specialized periodic markets offered young pigs, vegetables, and so forth. The rural people from the nearby islands came every day by small boats carrying grain, cucumbers, pea pods, gourds, fruits and other foodstuffs.¹⁷³

But the wealth of Amoy was derived almost solely from the external trade. Not only were native people active in trade, the immigrants from other parts of Fukien, Chang-Ch'üan in particular, were also attracted to the township for jobs.

Trade and Migration

Amoy's commercial boom after 1683 provided new prospects and created a tremendous number of jobs in many related fields. Migrants and sojourners poured into the township of Amoy; among them, wealthy merchants and brokers who started with a small capital outlay.¹⁷⁴ Besides, skilled craftsmen such as carpenters, smiths in iron, copper and silver, and shipyard workers all came from outside of the island.¹⁷⁵ An even larger number of newcomers sought casual work as well as those more adventurous types who were prepared to make a living from riskier undertakings.¹⁷⁶

173. *ibid.*, 2:23.

174. *ibid.*, 2:43a. The record discusses the early nineteenth-century situation, but it also fits the general description of Amoy in the eighteenth century.

175. *ibid.*, 15:5b-6a.

176. *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/11/28, v.7, p.29.

As the maritime gateway to the province through which the rural people could look beyond to a wider economic frontier, Amoy attracted another category of sojourners. They were the migrants mostly from the rural Chang-Ch'üan region. These people came to Amoy and waited for arrangements to make the surreptitious crossings to Taiwan,¹⁷⁷ or to go overseas. There must have been thousands of them, considering the number of emigrants to Taiwan, and that Amoy was the major port of departure. To smuggle these people out of the mainland had become a profitable profession in Amoy. This was conducted by smugglers who shipped out the human cargo and brought back rice without going through the checkpoints at either side.

The heterogeneous nature of the Amoy population was clearly pointed out by governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo in the Yung-cheng period. In Kao's words, "people from the various directions come and mix in Amoy,"¹⁷⁸ indicating that the island's population was by no means homogeneous in terms of place origin and economic status. Officials and gentry aside, the population ranged from those successful merchants on the top of the socio-economic pyramid, down to a much wider base consisting of casual workers in the township and agriculturists and fishermen elsewhere on the island.¹⁷⁹

As for population figures, no exact data is available. In local gazetteers, population information is given on the basis of administrative units, the lowest of which were *chou*, *t'ing* and *hsien*. In the gazetteer of T'ung-an district, to which Amoy belonged, it does not record specifically the population of Amoy, for the figures include no

177. *ibid.*

178. *ibid.*; also KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 7/1/20, v.12, p.247.

179. HMC, 2:43a.

breakdown by subdistricts. Fortunately, thanks to the unusual practice of compiling a subdistrict gazetteer for Amoy alone by the then Hsing-Ch'üan-Yung circuit intendant, Chou K'ai, in 1832, some idea of the population can be gained. According to the gazetteer, the island had a population of "several tens of thousands" around 1680.¹⁸⁰ Another document of 1716 records that the total number of households on the island was around ten thousand,¹⁸¹ representing some forty or fifty thousand people. In 1769, the household total had reached 16,000.¹⁸² Figures for the first population count by head are available in the Amoy gazetteer, which gives a total of 144,893 registered natives in 1832.¹⁸³

The above estimates were for the whole island. The figures can hardly be taken as the real urban population. Like other population figures recorded in local gazetteers, the totals always indicate the registered taxation units of both the urban and the rural population in an administrative unit. Similarly, the Amoy figures represent the estimated, or the registered, totals of the whole island instead of those of the township itself. Another factor should also be taken into account when we estimate the urban population of Amoy. As mentioned earlier, the population of Amoy was highly transient in character. Even many permanent residents did not necessarily register themselves locally, let alone the short-term visitors. Residents would generally retain their residential registration in their place of origin unless they made an application to change. The shift of registration would normally be on the household

180. *ibid.*, 9:7b.

181. KCTTC:KH, Fukien naval commander Shih Shih-p'iao 施世驃, 55/9/6, v.6, p.590.

182. HMC, 7:32b.

183. *ibid.*

basis and the applicant had to have a stable occupation in the locality. For various reasons, many qualified residents preferred retaining their original registration in the ancestral village. For the sojourners, they were mostly single adult males, who were not qualified for registration and thus not included in the local population registry. This category of people must have occupied a very high percentage of the township's population.

An examination of the demographic history of Amoy leads me to the conclusion that Amoy was a migrant society.¹⁸⁴ There were two important factors contributing to the situation: the turmoil of the early Ch'ing period and economic motives. With regard to the former aspect, the Cheng resistance resulted in a massive flow of people into Amoy. For one thing, the Cheng forces, which set up their base on the island before their eventual retreat to Taiwan, were composed mainly of South Fukienese people. In 1663, when the Ch'ing army captured the island for the second time, the Ch'ing authorities decided that Amoy should be abandoned. But soon after, people began to sneak back to Amoy. In 1669, it was recorded that smuggling had become active again. The island rapidly regained its population. Five years later when Cheng Ching reoccupied Amoy, the island soon became "as populous as before."¹⁸⁵

Economic motives were, however, more important. During the years under Cheng control, Amoy had been very prosperous. The war-torn and economically dislodged people crowded on the island for the

184. The most relevant source materials supporting my arguments are those accounts in the biography section of the Amoy gazetteer. See *ibid.*, ch'üan 11-14.

185. Hsia Lin, *Min-hai chi-yao*, p.48.

opportunities provided by its commercial activities. After 1683, the population inflow was even greater.

Since the migrants came mainly from the South Fukien region, Amoy functioned as an extended arm of Chang-Ch'üan society. This aspect is illustrated by information given in the biography sections of various local gazetteers of the region and by numerous genealogies. I shall mention a family history as an example of some aspects of the urban migration pattern. A certain Wu Yüan-teng belonged to a lineage in Chin-chiang where they had lived for eleven generations since the mid-sixteenth century. The family had successfully produced several scholar-officials in the late Ming. During Yüan-teng's later years after the establishment of the new dynasty, the family fortune rapidly declined due to local turmoil during the resistance years. Two of his sons migrated to Nan-an, while another two remained in the native village. The Nan-an branch of the lineage seemed to be more obscure for some time after the migration. However, Yüan-teng's three great-grandsons began to raise the branch to prosperity. The eldest one was called Hsing-yeh, who rebuilt the family position by passing the first-degree civil examination in Nan-an. His two brothers, Hung-yeh and Shu-yeh, sought their fortune by taking up trade in Amoy. Shu-yeh eventually decided to settle down in Amoy for good with his own family. He had four sons. Three of them remained in Amoy to help with the family business; but the second son, Ch'ang-chin, was sent back to Nan-an to get married. Ch'ang-chin died in 1778 and was survived by three sons. The family arranged for his eldest son, Yüan-chia, to go back and take up residence in Chin-chiang, the original ancestral land. As a whole, Yüan-teng's branch had become prosperous from both the business in Amoy and achievements in the civil examinations,

which they enrolled for in Nan-an and Chin-chiang.¹⁸⁶

The Wu family history is a typical example of the success stories in Amoy business circles. Moreover, the case gives us some idea of the migration patterns to Amoy and of the close ties maintained by its residents with their previous places of origin. The Wu family history illustrates the very mobile character of the South Fukienese people. As a result, they were able to maintain much wider social connections than one might first have thought. Members of the more successful families, including merchants and gentry, were more aware of the widespread diffusion of the branches of their lineage. Many had shifted their native-place registration to the new locality in the course of migration. My preliminary survey of Fukien and Taiwan genealogies indicates, almost without exception, such region-wide connections by Fukienese people. This characteristic helped transcend the more parochial same-native-place mentality based on *hsien* unit to a more inclusive concept based on a higher level of the administrative hierarchy such as *fu*. This occurred particularly when the migrants found that there were too few people from their own native village in the new environment, or whenever the necessity of wider connections arose. In these cases, they often widened their association with people from the same prefecture, or even from the region of South Fukien generally.

As indicated, many urban migrants, including permanent residents, continued to retain their previous native-place registration. Aside from lineage attachments, business connections were also a reason. Taking up permanent residence in Amoy was important for business considerations, but it was a totally different thing to become a T'ung-an

186. Chin-chiang Ling-shui Wu-shih chia-p'u, 25:40b-43a.

"man" considering that T'ung-an was in no position to compete with the commercial importance of such cities as Chang-chou/Lung-ch'i, Ch'üan-chou/Chin-chiang, and Hai-ch'eng. To maintain the connection with the original native place might still be essential in terms of business. In addition, prospects for officialdom might also be taken into account. Understandably, as Amoy was not an administrative seat, its residents could only be registered under the district of T'ung-an. As was normally the case in non-administrative seats, no government school was set up in Amoy,¹⁸⁷ though some semi-government academies (*shu-yüan*) were in existence.¹⁸⁸ Because of the student (*t'ung-sheng*) quota system which restricted the number of student candidates in each district, a family would sometimes stand a better chance by sending its children back to the original native place for the competitive candidacy. This was particularly true for the first-generation migrants because they had more influence in the native place than in T'ung-an.

The practice of retaining the original registration of native place among the Amoy residents can be observed through the list of successful candidates in the civil examinations. While the candidates about whom we have information appear to have been accepted as local residents in Amoy, we find, in fact, that a large percentage of them were registered in their native districts. For the period of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, five from Amoy were awarded the third-degree *chin-shih* title. Two of them, however, still retained their original native-place registration in Lung-ch'i district. In the second-degree civil examinations, there were altogether 34 successful candidates from Amoy,

187. *HMC*, 9:25b.

188. *ibid.*; and *ibid.*, 2:33b-38b.

18 of them had T'ung-an registration, while the rest were registered in their original native places. Among the latter, two each previously enrolled in Chin-chiang, Chang-p'u, and Nan-ching district schools (*hsien-hsüeh*), three in Hai-ch'eng, and one each in Nan-an, Lung-ch'i, and the two prefectural schools. Another one sat for the examination in Kiangsi. The remaining two were former residents of Amoy but had migrated out of the province and thus took the examination in their newly registered residence. The distribution of native-place registration was even more widespread among the licentiates, whose parents were virtual, but not necessarily registered, residents of Amoy. A total of 28 licentiates was recorded in the Amoy gazetteer for the same period. Among them, 16 were locally registered residents. Four retained their names in the household register of Hai-ch'eng, while one each in the registers of Nan-an, Ning-yang, Lung-ch'i and Chu-lo (of Taiwan). One was from the prefectural school of Chang-chou and two from that of Taiwan. The remaining one took the examination in Hui-chou, Kwangtung province.¹⁸⁹

There was a general trend from the K'ang-hsi reign to the end of the Ch'ien-lung period towards an increasing percentage of the successful candidates coming from locally registered households. This indicates that, beneath the migration current, a process was developing which led to the formation of a more stable Amoy community in the later period.

Social Organizations and Integration

As I have just shown, trade brought a variety of people from all over south Fukien to Amoy, which had developed not only as a central node for

189. The information in this paragraph is based on *ibid.*, 12:9a-15a.

the south Fukienese trading network, but also as the centre of interwoven social connections radiating to various parts of south Fukien. Trade also provided a basis of personal interdependence. Through the medium of trade, people of different native places met and became integrated into the fabric of Amoy life, even if they did not all become Amoy people. Like its predecessors, Ch'üan-chou city and Hai-ch'eng, which had served as regional seaports of south Fukien in the pre-Ch'ing period, Amoy also fostered a sense of twin-prefecture identity. It provided a training ground for the merchants from the two prefectures to work together as a Chang-Ch'üan group, a same-native-place cohesion in the wider sense. Amoy was, therefore, more a melting pot than a strange land which alienated its heterogeneous population. Through commercial connections, Amoy became a natural extension of a wider south Fukinese society which facilitated the integrative process. The people in this region spoke similar south Fukienese (Min-nan) dialects, which in modern times were even standardized by the Amoy accent.

The integrative process can best be illustrated by the aspect of community organizations in urban Amoy. Among them, temples and temple activities were the most fundamental. In rural mainland Fukien, temples were characterized by elements of folk beliefs. They played less significant roles as local organizations because lineages were the major form of local organization. In urban areas, as we shall see, the lineages, which were removed from their power base, could no longer play any decisive role in aiding social cohesion. In their place, the community-type organizations which usually centred their activities around temples prevailed.

The Amoy gazetteer records a list of local temples which were in existence during the eighteenth century or

earlier.¹⁹⁰ The list is in no way complete, as the compiler deliberately left out all those he thought were immoral temples (*yin-tz'u*).¹⁹¹ Nevertheless, if we examine the materials more closely, they can still be very revealing. As the gazetteer mentions, cults existed in each neighbourhood. Around the cults, certain ad hoc committees or even associations (*hui*) were formed. The temple committees or neighbourhood associations provided mutual assistance for their members in times of hardship. Normally, the main task was fund raising for the annual religious processions.

The neighbourhood cult that stands out as more prevalent in the life of urban communities was the worship of T'u-ti-kung (the lord of earth). As the Amoy gazetteer shows, it was the most popular cult in the neighbourhoods of urban Amoy. Every street, market, or neighbourhood honoured the T'u-ti-kung.¹⁹²

The T'u-ti-kung cult has been an important element of popular religion. He keeps out the *kuei*, "ghosts" or "demons." More significantly, he manifests the ideal of the great equality; his main function, as mandated by Heaven, is to divide the riches of the earth among the people.¹⁹³ Hence, people of the lower economic strata widely accepted his cult. Moreover, the T'u-ti-kung cult may have also attracted followers among the sworn-brotherhood organizations; as a publicly and officially accepted cult, there was less jeopardy of government

190. *ibid.*, 2:45b-50b.

191. *ibid.*, 2:50a.

192. *ibid.*, 2:47b. The cult's official title begins with the term *fu-te* 福德, "good merit."

193. Kristofer M. Schipper, "Neighbourhood Cult Associations in Traditional Taiwan," in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), p.663.

persecution and, thus, it made a good cover for their forbidden activities.¹⁹⁴ At any rate, as a popular cult without particular local attachment, T'u-ti-kung served as a rallying point in communal neighbourhoods.

At the same time, the holy protectors of individual native places were also among the most popular cults in communal worship. Temples were dedicated to Wu-chen-jen (Wu the holy, spiritual man) who was regarded as the holy protector of T'ung-an people,¹⁹⁵ while the An-ch'i migrants in Amoy worshipped Ch'ing-shui, the great lord. Although the native-place temples were not necessarily exclusive, they mainly served the community from one locality.

It is true that the T'u-ti-kung temples and the affiliated associations represented the surrounding neighbourhood in general as a collectivity, and the native-place cults functioned as a cohesive ingredient among the fellow same-native-place in the township. They did not, however, become dividing forces in the formative years of Amoy society. Rather, they functioned more as basic units of a greater cultural unity. In light of Amoy's position as mainly a commercial town, mutual economic benefit was the decisive force that drew people together as seen by the influential role of the same-profession cults. For example, from the worship of Yao-wang (the holy king of medicinal herbs) a commercial guild was created for the medical profession.¹⁹⁶ It has become another medium of cohesion along occupational lines.

194. A memorial mentions a case in the Yung-cheng period when a group of about seventy people planned, under cover of a T'u-ti-kung temple in Amoy, to make a raid on the government treasury. Apparently, they belonged to a sworn-brotherhood organization. See KCTTC:YC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 3/10/6, v.5, pp.252-53.

195. Wu-chen-jen 吳真人 is also known as Pao-sheng-ta-ti 保生大帝.

196. HMC, 2:49b; also Liu Chih-wan 劉枝萬, "Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan chih shih-miao" 清代台灣之寺廟 (The temples in Taiwan during the Ch'ing period) T'ai-pe'i wen-hsien, no.5 (September 1963), pp.108-09.

A more interesting example was the cult of Kuan-ti, god of trustworthiness and loyalty in war and trade. The cult was popular among all classes of the population and was one example of popular cults which were incorporated into official religion (*ssu-tien*).¹⁹⁷ Its dual functions were distinguishable in the case of Amoy. Altogether there were three Kuan-ti temples in the township. But the one situated inside the town wall was called Wu-miao (temple dedicated to the god of war), a title which clearly indicates its official function. The other two were located near the waterfront, and housed the Holy Patron of merchants.¹⁹⁸

Similar to the status of Kuan-ti was T'ien-hou (the holy queen of heaven). The latter was another popular cult which was accepted in the official religion and, thus, performed dual functions. T'ien-hou, however, was not only the most widely worshipped along the southeast coast of China, but was also an indigenous cult of Fukien. People prefer to call her Ma-tsu to show both respect and intimacy. The gazetteer of Amoy records a total of 26 such temples around Amoy alone.¹⁹⁹

The cult of T'ien-hou originated in her native place in Mei-chou, an offshore island in P'u-t'ien district of Hsing-hua prefecture in Sung times. As maritime trade expanded, merchants from south Fukien in particular established offshoots of the cult in other coastal regions.

The two titles of the goddess describe her different roles. In the first place, the cult was the foremost state-recognized protectress of seamen. She was first deified in the Southern Sung period. During the Yüan, when maritime transportation was gaining ascendancy, the state

197. Stephan Feuchtwang, "School-Temple and City God," in G. William Skinner, ed., (1977), p.584.

198. *HMC*, 2:45b-46a.

199. *ibid.*, 2:45b-50b.

canonized the goddess as T'ien-fei (the heavenly lady). Emeprror K'ang-hsi further bestowed the title T'ien-hou on the goddess after the conquest of Taiwan, as a gesture of gratitude to her protection in the course of the sea expedition.²⁰⁰ Among the temples dedicated to the goddess, those which were built before 1683 were named after T'ien-fei, and those built after that year were named after T'ien-hou.

Nonetheless, the Fukienese have tended to regard the goddess as the native protectress of seafarers by calling her Ma-tsu. There is general belief that, if they called the goddess by the name Ma-tsu whenever they were desperately in need of her help during times of disaster, the protectress would appear instantly with her dishevelled hair. If the dignified name T'ien-hou was applied, her presence would be delayed because she needed time to dress in full official costume.²⁰¹ Such unsophisticated beliefs among the people vividly highlight the double identity of the goddess.

On the communal level, extravagant processions in which Ma-tsu's idol was carried had become important festive events almost throughout the year. Such celebrations were carried out in much more grandiose fashion than similar events of other local cults. In the religious festivals, residents offered their thanksgiving to the deity. Indigenous theatrical performances were held as part of the celebrating programme.²⁰² On the one hand, religious activities provided for the urban populace with a cultural sense, and social atmosphere which resembled

200. For the account of T'ien-hou see Wei Yin-ch'i 魏應麒, ed., *Fu-chien san-shen k'ao* 福建三神考 (A study of the three holy spirits from Fukien) (1928; reprinted; Taipei, 1969), pp.67-114.

201. Chao I 趙翼, *Kai-i ts'ung k'ao* 陔餘叢考, 35:12b-14. I am grateful to Mr Tso Sze-pong for drawing my attention to this source.

202. HMC, 2:50 and 15:12, 13b.

those in their native towns. On the other hand, through these festive activities, the temples "functioned both as a proto-government and as rallying points in the communal divisions of society," as Stephan Feuchtwang points out.²⁰³ This aspect is particularly important in the urban environment. In most cases, "the temple was in the central place of the marketing system, with a periodic market or row of permanent shops in front of it."²⁰⁴ Temples activities promoted community organizations; these, in turn, nourished self-government and leadership, in which merchants played a major role.

On the extra-community level, unlike many other communal or neighbourhood temples, the T'ien-hou and Kuan-ti cults were able to attract not only more prosperous merchants but also the local scholar-gentry and the officials to act as temple patrons. Imperial ideology in regard to the supernatural world maintained that the official patronage was a device "to pacify the hundred holy spirits" (*huai-jou pai-shen*).²⁰⁵ The fact that the emperor was in a position to bestow titles upon the holy spirits clearly implied the theoretical superiority of the secular power over the spiritual world. The emperor acted as the supreme patron of the state-recognized gods and goddesses. More critically, the state patronage of a popular cult enabled the court to assert some kind of control. When the court instructed that the populace should give more reverent attention to gods and goddesses,²⁰⁶ the message meant only

203. Stephan Feuchtwang, "City Temples in Taipei Under Three Regimes," in Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner, eds., *The Chinese City Between Two Worlds* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), p.263.

204. *ibid.*, p.268.

205. Chang Hsüeh-li 張學禮, *Shih Liu-ch'iu chi 使琉球記* (Record of a mission to the Ryukyus), pt.3:138a, in *HFHCYTTC*, chih 1. Chang was sent on the mission in 1663.

206. *FTC* (1868-1871 ed.), *ch'uan-shou* (Introductory chapter): pt.1:34a.

those deities sponsored by the state. Temples or shrines were not allowed to be erected if they were not patronized by the court.²⁰⁷

Otherwise, they could be taken as *yin-tz'u*, the immoral temples, and the worshippers be persecuted as bandit members of secret sects (*hui-fei*).

In practice, the involvement of the merchants and commoners in the day to day affairs of the temple was greater than that of the officials and gentry.²⁰⁸ Merchants and commoners were on the board of management and they were also accepted as the de facto community leaders. Nevertheless, the nominal participation of the officials and gentry had at least officially recognized the social status of the merchants. Unlike the countryside where official-gentry (*kuan-shen*) power was supreme, in urban Amoy, merchants (*shang*) were added in a tripartite cooperation in the management of the daily life of the township. The merchants shared a role in providing the necessary inspiration and leadership.

The trilateral involvement in the worship of the Kuan-ti and T'ien-hou cults was also extended to other arenas. An example is merchant contributions to the construction of government premises. In 1727, when the circuit yamen in Amoy was begun, the works ran into financial problems. It was finally completed only after having received a substantial contribution of a thousand taels from the town's licensed dealers.²⁰⁹ The Amoy merchants also made donations to the local educational institutions. They subscribed to the construction and maintenance funds of

207. Chao Tsun-lu 趙遵路, *Yü-ch'ao tsa-shih* 榆巢雜識, pt.1:13a, in *PCHSTK*, series 1, v.8, p.5268. It was decreed in 1735 that temple buildings should be subject to the government approval.

208. In this respect, see also Feuchtwang, in G. William Skinner, ed., (1977), p.585.

209. *HMC*, 2:29a.

the academies.²¹⁰ Other aspects of social welfare further involved the local merchants. Their contributions to the relief funds and the building of public granaries were equally substantial. Whenever natural disasters occurred, the local authorities would appeal to the merchants to give relief to the unfortunate. Often, the merchants would purchase grain from other regions and retail it at lower prices to the calamity-stricken masses, or they would set up charity soup-kitchens to feed the poor. In Amoy, as elsewhere, the public granaries were constructed for relief purposes. The local officials would initiate the projects with their own subscriptions and then appeal to the local gentry and the merchants for the rest of the funds needed.²¹¹

We might think that the merchants' role in the trilateral cooperation in local affairs was limited to the aspect of financial contributions, with local officials' sole purpose being to milk money from the merchants. In fact, their involvement was much more positive. They were invited by the local authorities to serve together with gentry members on the boards of the various social institutions, with the title of *tung-shih* (board member or trustee).²¹² The local authorities needed their services at least as much as the merchants' needed the help of these same authorities in their trading ventures.

In other words, when moral and social obligations, which were normally expected from the local gentry class, were bestowed upon the merchants, such obligations represented more an honour given to them than merely an extortion exercised by the authorities. This cooperation

210. *ibid.*, 9:26b.

211. *ibid.*, 9:31b.

212. *ibid.*, 2:43.

enabled the merchants to establish close and personal relationships with the officials and the gentry. There is no doubt that such personalized relationships facilitated the management of their business. Not infrequently, the officials or gentry petitioned on their behalf to higher authorities for better trading conditions. Their acquaintance with officials also helped consolidate their leadership in the community. Instead of resenting the social role, merchants were often willing to perform it. The considerable degree of harmony and interdependence reduced the possibility of confrontation and brought social integration to a higher level.

CHAPTER IV

THE COASTAL TRADING NETWORK OF AMOY

1. GROWTH AND THE TAIWAN FACTOR

The Growing Network

As we have seen, Amoy developed as a maritime centre for the Nanyang trade when it was under the control of the Cheng regime. After the Ch'ing takeover, it remained a centre until the mid-nineteenth century. During the Cheng period, a rudimentary form of the coastal network supported by smuggling activities came into existence. At that time, the illicit coastal network functioned as a feeder for the overseas trade; Chinese native products were collected there and foreign goods distributed. In other words, the coastal trade depended on the Nanyang trade for its development. We may say that, in the beginning, there was only one major maritime network which spread from Amoy out to overseas countries. There were also, however, numerous domestic connections which linked with overseas trade.

The legal resumption of the Nanyang trade after the defeat of Taiwan stimulated the growth of the coastal network. During the period between 1684 (the lifting of the maritime ban) and 1717 (the reimposition of a new ban), the Fukienese focused their attention on the maritime trade conducted through the overseas network. On the domestic scene, their counterparts from other provinces, Chekiang and Kiangsu in particular, seem in the beginning years to play an important role in

coastal trade.¹ These merchants all came to Amoy for the acquisition of foreign goods.²

Clearly, Amoy from the very beginning of this period, had become a maritime centre for the distribution of both Chinese native products and foreign goods. At the same time, it was also a connecting point between the overseas and the emerging coastal trading network. Amoy was more favourably located than Canton to perform these two functions as it could gain access to commodity resources and markets of the northern coastal provinces. It is not surprising to see the development of Amoy as a maritime centre serving the native merchants in the one and a half centuries from 1684, while Canton served as a maritime reception centre for the incoming foreign ships.

Following the upsurge of coastal trade towards the end of the K'ang-hsi reign, we can see the formation and maturity of a coastal commercial network radiating and extending from Amoy.³ The expansion of the coastal network was a direct result of the increasing role played by the Fukienese merchants. At the turn of the eighteenth century, they had already become the major operators of the Amoy coastal trading network.

1. CSL:KH, 126:23a. In 1686, Hu Shih-pa 胡什巴, the superintendent of Fukien Maritime Customs, stated in his memorial that the native people never took part in Fukien's trade with other provinces. The statement is puzzling indeed. As discussed above, the Fukienese were involved in interregional smuggling during the Cheng period. Many Chekiang and Kiangsu merchants were in fact Fukienese in origin. My explanation is that the local Fukienese were not as active as other merchants in the interprovincial trade during the first years after the maritime ban was rescinded, and that the superintendent had exaggerated the situation.
2. WHTP:KSSL, v.17, p.3b.
3. Evidence for the existence of coastal trading network can be seen in the shipping routes which radiated from Amoy. See, for examples, HMC, 4:35-45; Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, pp.15-16; Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC 重修台灣縣志 (Revised gazetteer of Taiwan district) (1752 ed.), in TWWHTK, no.113 (1961), pp.61-62.

These Fukienese merchants established several important outposts along the coast to conduct the interprovincial and also the overseas trade.

Canton was one of the Fukienese outposts. In the 1730s, the Chang-Ch'üan merchants in Canton numbered well over a thousand.⁴ About the same time, they also formed the most prominent merchant group among the native people in Macao.⁵ With these footholds, the Fukienese linked the coastal networks of Amoy to the incoming foreign traders. To the north of Amoy, Fukienese merchants also became well established. In Ningpo, for example, the Fukienese merchants from the Chang-Ch'üan region had, by the early eighteenth century, come to dominate the water-borne trade there, including long-distance shipping and entrepot functions.⁶ Since Ningpo was the main port for the Sino-Japanese trade, Chinese merchants embarked from there for Japan. The Fukienese in Ningpo were able to monopolize this lucrative overseas trade. In Soochow, a major terminal in the Fukienese coastal network, the Fukienese merchants numbered well over ten thousands in the early 1720s.⁷ They represented more than one half of the total travelling merchants in Soochow. These Fukienese merchants concentrated in Nan-hao, a commercial section of the city by the Ch'ang gate, which was in the vicinity of Feng-ch'iao, the major rice

4. *Ch'üan-chou FC* (1763 ed.), 32:3b.

5. Liang Chia-ping 梁嘉彬, *Kuang-tung shih-san-hang k'ao* 廣東十三行考 (A study of the thirteen hang of Kwangtung) (Shanghai: Kuo-li pien-i kuan 國立編譯館, 1937), p.59.

6. Shiba Yoshinobu, "Ningpo and Its Hinterland," in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), pp.403, 417 and 435. The number of Fukienese in Ningpo during this period is not clear. However, Shiba indicates, "As of 1854, there were several thousand Fukienese emigrants in Ningpo" (*ibid.*, p.417.)

7. *KCTTC:YC*, superintendent of the Soochow imperial silk works Hu Feng-hui 胡鳳翥, 1/4/5, v.1, p.163; and *KCTTC:YC*, acting Kiangsu governor Ho T'ien-p'ei 何天培, 1/5/24, v.1, p.292.

Figure 1. THE COASTAL TRADING NETWORK OF AMOY
AND ITS OVERSEAS EXTENSIONS

The Coastal Network

The Overseas Extensions

market of Soochow. From there, the Fukienese merchants were in a favourable position to connect their coastal trade with other rice markets in the Yangtze Valley. Their large concentration also indicated the importance of this city to the Fukienese trade.⁸

Two other coastal footholds were Shanghai and Tientsin. The rise of Shanghai in the early eighteenth century was facilitated by the Fukienese activities.⁹ Shipping was in their hands since the native people were not active in seafaring business.¹⁰ In Tientsin, the well-established Chang-Ch'üan merchants numbered at least several hundred.¹¹ Their main involvement in these two seaports was in the area of maritime entrepot business as well.

The Development of Taiwan

The stimulus of overseas trade, which extended from Amoy, Canton, and Ningpo, remained an inseparable factor in the growth of the Fukienese coastal network. Nevertheless, one other domestic development was able to give the coastal trade a new emphasis besides that of providing goods for overseas trade. This domestic stimulus came from the development of

8. The local authorities saw their presence as a great contribution to prosperity. Aside from yielding a considerable amount of customs revenue, they also created opportunities for the local small traders and peddlers. See Ho T'ien-p'ei's memorial cited above.
9. Susan Mann Jones, "The Ningpo Pang and the Financial Power at Shanghai," in Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner, eds. (1974), p. 76.
10. The Fukienese role in seafaring could still be observed in the mid-nineteenth century, except that the Kwangtung people from the region around Ch'ao-chou had begun to take over many of their trading functions probably from the early nineteenth century. See Wang T'ao 王韜, *Ying-juan tsa-chih* 瀛壖雜誌 (A record of the coastal lands), 1:5b-7a, in PCHSTK, series 2, v.9, pp.5277-78; also in HPHCYTTC, chih 9, 50b-51a. Wang's work was prefaced in 1853.
11. Ch'üan-chou FC (1763 ed.), 32:3b.

Taiwan after the Ch'ing conquest in 1683. The two main cash crops from Taiwan, sugar and rice, soon filled the Fukienese junks embarked for the mainland ports. As a result, the commercial traffic between Amoy and Lu-erh-men of Taiwanfu, the prefectural capital of Taiwan, became a trunk line in the overall Fukienese coastal network, and consolidated the position of Amoy as the indisputable centre of the trade. A description of the Taiwan connection becomes, therefore, crucial for understanding the Amoy coastal network.

Due to the scarcity of land, the production of Fukien's export products quickly reached its limits and could not support further expansion of coastal shipping. This condition not only made it inevitable that the coastal trade served in the main as a feeder for overseas trade, but also limited the capacity of active Fukienese participation in coastal shipping at the initial stage. Viewed from this aspect, the growth of Amoy-Taiwan trunk line which resulted from the development in Taiwan was a breakthrough by the Chang-Ch'üan people in their expansion of coastal trade. The rice and sugar production in Taiwan had in fact begun when it was still under the Dutch. A report in 1656 indicates that the rice acreage was about 2.5 times more than that of sugar.¹² The export of local products went to China, Japan and the Nanyang. Between the two major products, sugar dominated the export trade despite the smaller area devoted to cultivation. Rice was produced mainly for local consumption. Later, during the Cheng period, Taiwan was the supply base for the Cheng resistance force. At that time, Taiwan gradually became

12. Wang Shih-ch'ing 王世慶, "Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan ti mi-ch'an yü wai-hsiao" 清代台灣的米產與外銷 (The rice production and exports in Ch'ing Taiwan), *T'ai-wan wen-hsien*, 4:3/4 (March 1958), p.15.

the "granary" of the Chang-Ch'üan region. Nonetheless, sugar remained the major export; for the first time, the acreage under sugar cultivation overtook the total area devoted to rice cultivation.

After the Ch'ing conquest, the prefecture of Taiwan was established, with the three districts of Taiwan (present-day Tainan and its environ), Feng-shan, and Chu-lo (later called Chia-i) under its administration. The new prefecture formed part of Fukien province. In the early years, Taiwan district was fully exploited, while the other two districts were still very much underdeveloped. The district magistrates of Feng-shan and Chu-lo did not attend to their duties in their respective locality, but set up their yamen in the prefectural capital of Taiwanfu (Tainan).¹³ Only after 1704 did the two magistrates become resident officers.¹⁴ Even so, the northern part of Chu-lo and the south of Feng-shan remained mostly virgin lands in the first decade of the eighteenth century; however, settlers rapidly pushed northward from Chang-hua and southward from Feng-shan. Towards the end of the second decade, modern Chang-hua and Taichung were developed. At the same time, settlers began to open up lands in the region between Chang-hua and Tan-shui.¹⁵ This development led to the founding of the new district of Chang-hua and subprefecture Tan-shui in 1723,¹⁶ which were separated from Chu-lo.

13. Chuang Chin-teh, "Ch'ing-tai ch'u-ch'i T'ai-wan t'u-ti k'ai-fa tao-yen" 清代初期台灣土地開發導言 (A preliminary study of the land exploitation in Taiwan during the early Ch'ing), *T'ai-pei wen-hsien*, chih edition, 15/16 (June 1971), p.167.

14. *ibid.*

15. *Chu-lo HC 諸羅縣志*. (Gazetteer of Chu-lo) (1717 ed.), in *TWWHTK*, no.141 (1962), pp.110, 114.

16. The land development between 1683 and 1723 was described by Lan Ting-yüan, a contemporary, in the following words. "When the state

Since Ch'üan-chou people were already in Taiwan in the pre-1683 period, they were able to occupy the coastal plains. When Chang-chou migrants arrived later, they moved inland. The Kwangtung people from the Chia-ying-chou and Ch'ao-chou regions came in increasing numbers after the turn of the eighteenth century, and had to move further into the interior.¹⁷ Generally speaking, the South Fukienese formed the earliest major concentration in Taiwan district. They also formed the majority of the population in the district capitals of Chu-lo and Fengshan. In the early years of the eighteenth century, Ch'üan-chou settlers established themselves in the northern plain around present-day Taipei. The Kwangtung migrants mostly concentrated in the land pockets in the extreme south and the north of Chu-lo.¹⁸

Among the dialect groups, the South Fukienese were not only in the majority but also relatively well-off. Most of the merchants and landowners in Taiwan came from this group. As agriculture became increasingly commercialized, it served as an incentive for the Chang-Ch'üan people from the mainland to invest in land. What they had to do to reclaim land was to make applications to the district officials. Once approved, they would be granted exploitation licenses. The well-to-do

(...cont) established administrative units on the island, it ruled hardly more than a hundred *li* in distance. The last forty years have been the rapid development of land and massive migration, opening up an extended area of more than two thousand *li*. The land has become the foremost producer of sugar and rice in the state." See Lan Ting-yüan, *Tung-cheng chi* 東征集 (Collected writings on an expedition to the east), in *TWHTK*, no.12 (1958), p.34.

17. Tai Yen-hui 戴炎輝, "Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan hsiang-chuang chih she-hui ti k'ao-ch'a" 清代台灣鄉莊之社會的考察 (A study of village society in Ch'ing Taiwan), *T'ai-wan ying-hang chi-k'an* 台灣銀行季刊 (The Bank of Taiwan quarterly), 14:4 (December 1963), pp.208-209.

18. *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), pp.136-37.

investors normally would not open up the land by themselves. In the early eighteenth century, less than a third of the reclaimed land was cultivated by the landowners; instead, they employed tenants to do the farming.¹⁹ This, of course, required sufficient funds to mobilize migrants to clear the land, construct irrigation facilities, and plant the crops.²⁰ It would take some time to see the first harvest. For this reason, the landowners were usually given a three year tax-free period. When the land began to produce, the settlers paid a fixed annual rent to the landowners, who in turn were responsible for the land tax.²¹

The investors from South Fukien did not always choose to become landowners. Instead, they brought capital to Taiwan²² to meet the credit demands of small cultivators. The three principal ways to obtain credit were short-term and small-loan borrowing (*tai*), long-term and large-loan borrowing (*tien*), and borrowing from pawnshops (*tien-tang*).²³ Under the *tai* system, the debtor pledged some form of immoveable property such as land for a loan on which interest would be paid. In the case of *tien*, the debtor usually mortgaged a plot of land for a loan. The customs of *tai* and *tien* operated in the countryside as well as in

19. *ibid.*, p.95.

20. *ibid.* While many tenants were South Fukienese, the Fukienese landowners often found it necessary at times to rely on the Kwangtung migrants to open up the land. They called the Kwangtung settlers "guest people" 客仔 (*k'e-tzu*), while the latter addressed their landowner "the head household" (*t'ou-chia* 頭家, meaning boss). See *ibid.*, p.148.

21. Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan Under Ch'ing Imperial Rule, 1684-1895: The Traditional Economy," *The Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong*, 5:2 (December 1972), pp.383-84.

22. *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), p.136.

23. Myers, p.397; also *T'ai-wan FC* 台灣府志 (Gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture) (1696 ed.), in *TWWHTK*, no.65 (1960), p.248.

cities and towns.²⁴ The pawnshops often operated in the urban sector. They were large establishments with considerable capital. Loans granted by the pawnshops could extend from one to three years with interest paid by the month. The interest rates were not allowed by the authorities to go beyond three per cent per month; however, they often ran as high as six per cent or more.²⁵

When outside financial sources were not available to the Fukienese settlers of lower economic status, there was another very common practice of fund-raising among them. These were fund-pooling cooperatives, which often consisted of an ad hoc group of some 20 or 30 members. Each contributed a fixed amount of money at a certain time. The sum was then pooled together each time for bidding among the members. By this way, the members could pool together small sums of savings for urgent necessities or to start a small trade.²⁶

24. Ramon Myers (1972), p.399.

25. *ibid.*; also T'ai-wan FC (1696 ed.), p.248.

26. The fund-pooling cooperatives were called *hui* 會 or *yin-hui* 銀會 and are still very popular among the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia even today. I suspect that the practice began during the Ming-Ch'ing transition in Fukien and drew the court's attention particularly in the Yung-cheng reign. Its spread was related to the development of maritime trade and the land exploitation of Taiwan, in which poorer people were desperately in need of starting funds to take up new opportunities. At times, but not necessarily, these mutual-help groups might appear as sworn-brotherhoods. At any rate, the authorities in the early Ch'ing were suspicious of these popular cooperatives. Many seem to have been regarded as seditious *hui* (secret societies) and were so prosecuted. Some clues are available to support my suggestion. In the last few years of the K'ang-hsi reign, the Taiwan authorities began their arbitrary arrests of *hui* groups. The stringent measure was attributed as a reason for the outbreak of the Chu I-kuei rebellion in 1721. I tend to think that many of the *hui* members, who were rounded up by the authorities, were only members of the fund-pooling cooperatives, and the arbitrary arrests created a sense of grievance. See Ting Yüeh-chien 丁曰健, comp., *Chih-T'ai pi-kao lu* 治台必告錄 (The required information about the governing of Taiwan), TWWHTK, no.17 (1959), p.80. Two other cases were mentioned

With the availability of both capital investment and abundant labour, the pace of development in Taiwan was impressive. When new maritime restrictions were imposed in 1717, merchants and investors in overseas trade must have diverted part of their commercial capital into Taiwan as an alternative investment. At least we are sure that a greater number of Fukinese, who were affected by the restrictions, came to Taiwan to seek their fortunes.²⁷ This development accelerated the growth of agriculture and commerce in Taiwan and contributed to the expansion of coastal trade in the early 1720s.

The general picture of rapid development in Taiwan is also supported by the growing production of rice and sugar. Between 1683 and 1735, the total area of rice fields doubled. In 1735, it amounted to about 14,343 chia²⁸ or 162,076 mou (24,557 acres), as shown in Table 1.²⁹

(...cont) during the Yung-cheng period. One involved more than thirty Fukienese people living in Taiwan who organized a *Ma-chieh hui* 媽姐會. Each contributed one *ch'ien* 錢 (one-tenth of a tael). The second involved twenty-three people. They organized a sworn-brotherhood called *fu-mu hui* 父母會 by contributing one tael of silver each. How they made use of the collected fund is not known. But their small number suggests that these *hui* were more likely fund-pooling cooperatives than seditious associations. Even in the second case, the accused did not make any confession that the group was seditious in nature. See CPYC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/8/10, 14, 5, 123b-126b (pp.4903-04); and CPYC, Fukien governor Chao Kuo-lin, 9/3/19, 16, 2, 14 (p.5409). More document materials can be found in *T'ai-wan ssu-fa chai-ch'üan pien* 台灣私法債權編 (The customary laws in Taiwan, section on right of claim), TWWHTK, no.79 (1960), pp.220-25.

27. Lan Ting-yüan, "Lun Nan-yang shih-i shu," 83:38b.
28. Chia 甲 was an area unit in Taiwan and is still in use today. One chia amounted to 11.3 mou in the early eighteenth century. See Chu-lo HC (1717 ed.), p.87.
29. Ch'ung-hsiu Fu-chien T'ai-wan FC 重修福建台灣府志. (A Revised gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture, Fukien) (1741 ed.), TWWHTK, no.74 (1961), pp.129-62. The figures show the overall trend of development. However, these reported figures represent probably less than one half of the actual areas under cultivation as indicated in KCTTC:YC, censors with special duties in Taiwan So Lin 索琳 and Yin Ch'in 尹泰, 5/8/12, v.8, p.683.

TABLE 1: The Expansion of Rice Area 1683-1735: Reported Figures

Administrative Unit	Area 1683	Area 1735
Taiwan <i>hsien</i>	3,886 <i>chia</i> (43,912 <i>mou</i>)	4,934 <i>chia</i> (55,754 <i>mou</i>)
Feng-shan <i>hsien</i>	2,678 <i>chia</i> (30,261 <i>mou</i>)	3,566 <i>chia</i> (40,296 <i>mou</i>)
Chu-lo <i>hsien</i>	970 <i>chia</i> (10,961 <i>mou</i>)	1,639 <i>chia</i> (18,521 <i>mou</i>)
Chang-hua <i>hsien</i>	-	3,986 <i>chia</i> (45,042 <i>mou</i>)
Tan-shui t'ing	-	218 <i>chia</i> (2,463 <i>mou</i>)
TOTAL	7,534 <i>chia</i> (85,134 <i>mou</i>)	14,343 <i>chia</i> (162,076 <i>mou</i>)

The expansion of sugar fields during the same period was even more impressive. In 1735, the total area had reached a record high of about 36,750 *chia* or 415,275 *mou* (62,920 acres), about three times as much as the 1683 figure (see Table 2).³⁰

TABLE 2: The Expansion of Sugar Area 1683-1735: Reported Figures

Administrative Unit	Area 1683	Area 1735
Taiwan <i>hsien</i>	4,676 <i>chia</i> (52,839 <i>mou</i>)	7,888 <i>chia</i> (89,134 <i>mou</i>)
Feng-shan <i>hsien</i>	2,370 <i>chia</i> (26,781 <i>mou</i>)	7,377 <i>chia</i> (83,360 <i>mou</i>)
Chu-lo <i>hsien</i>	3,873 <i>chia</i> (43,765 <i>mou</i>)	13,469 <i>chia</i> (152,200 <i>mou</i>)
Chang-hua <i>hsien</i>	-	7,679 <i>chia</i> (86,773 <i>mou</i>)
Tan-shui t'ing	-	337 <i>chia</i> (3,808 <i>mou</i>)
TOTAL	10,919 <i>chia</i> (123,385 <i>mou</i>)	36,750 <i>chia</i> (415,275 <i>mou</i>)

As seen from the above Tables, the total area under sugar in 1735 was 2.5 times more than that under rice and is exactly the reverse proportion

30. *ibid.*

compared with the 1656 position. The increase of sugar acreage was due to higher prices, as reported by a T'ai-Hsia circuit intendant, Kao Kung-ch'ien, in the last decade of the seventeenth century.³¹

The expansion of sugar fields was accompanied by a rapid development of processing industry. Sugar mills were established in increasing numbers, which is shown in the following Table 3.³²

TABLE 3: The Expansion of Sugar Mills 1684-1745

Administrative Unit	Registered Mills 1684	Registered Mills 1693	Registered Mills 1745
Taiwan	44	45	49
Feng-shan	9	29	84.5
Chu-lo	22	25	154.69
Chang-hua	-	-	57.5
Tan-shui	-	-	1
TOTAL	75	99	346.69

As some of the figures were given in decimal fractions, the total of the registered mills shown above represented only the tax units rather than the actual numbers.³³ But the developmental pattern is consistent with

31. *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan FC* 重修台灣府志 (A Revised gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture) (1712 ed.), TWWHTK, no.66 (1960), pp.313-14.

32. For the 1684 and the 1693 figures, see *T'ai-wan FC* (1696 ed.), pp.138-40. The 1745 figures appear in the *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan FC* (1745 ed.), TWWHTK, no.105 (1961), pp.214-17.

33. According to Huang Shu-ching, a contemporary who wrote in the early 1720s, the processing of sugarcane from a field of 400 *mou* each season would require all the working hours of a well-established mill. Given the total sugar area in 1735 amounting to 415,275 *mou*, the number of sugar mills should have been more than a thousand. Considering that many of the mills were much smaller, the actual total should even well exceed the above estimate. See his *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, pp.56-57.

the overall picture of land development. Most of the mills were built after the pacification of Taiwan and the increase after the turn of the eighteenth century was particularly impressive. The trend also saw the rapid expansion of sugar production in the newly exploited areas of the island.

These mills were usually owned by the landlords, rich peasants, or sugar merchants.³⁴ Small farmers without considerable capital would sell their cane to a nearby mill or manage to build a mill through a partnership.³⁵ A sugar producer might also borrow from a merchant or broker to meet the production cost. Under such circumstances, the producer would be under an agreement to sell all the produce to the creditor for a contractual price.³⁶

The foregoing paragraphs have shown the rapid economic development in Taiwan after 1683. Naturally, as the cash crops expanded, the quality of life also greatly improved. The local gazetteers of Taiwan as well as other contemporary observers such as Lan Ting-yüan all noted the higher living standard of the island.³⁷ The local life was described by these observers as luxury and extravagance, which could be seen from the amount of money the people spent on the frequently held

34. *ibid.*, p.52; see also Chung-kuo jen-min ta-hsüeh, *Ming-Ch'ing she-hui*, p.295. According to Huang Shu-ching, a well established mill would hire some seventeen people, including two skilled technicians who supervised the overall processing. In addition, eighteen bullocks were used to help. The total wages per month amounted to 60 or 70 taels. A mill of this size was large and it required more capital investment. See Huang's *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, pp. 56-57.

35. Ramon Myers (1972), pp.388-89.

36. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.21.

37. See, for examples, *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), p.146; *T'ai-wan HC*, pp.54-55, 57; and Ting Yüeh-chien, comp., *Chi-T'ai pi-kao lu*, p.56.

banquets and the high-quality dresses often made of fine silk.³⁸

Economic boom also resulted in inflated prices of the imported commodities which were said to be the highest in the whole country.³⁹ All these had great bearing on commercial growth. The island had attracted an increasing number of merchants from South Fukien.⁴⁰ Even the local people responded enthusiastically to the opportunities offered by commercial activities. A local gazetteer compiler indicated that commerce expanded at a great pace and more people took up trade as their occupation.⁴¹ The commercialization of the Taiwan economy supported the formation of an extended subregional trading network on the island, linking it to the coastal trade centred in Amoy.

The Taiwan Extension of Coastal Network

The expansion of coastal network in Taiwan is best shown by the emergence of a series of seaports on the west coast of the island, serving as the central nodes in the marketing system (see maps 4 and 5). The major ports in the south were Ta-kou (modern Kao-hsiung) and Tung-kang of Fengshan district.⁴² Ta-kou was a fishing area in the late-Ming.⁴³ A small fishing community began to settle down during the early K'ang-hsi period. After 1683, Ta-kou and its vicinity became an important sugar producing

38. *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), p.146.

39. *ibid.*

40. *ibid.*, p.136.

41. *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC*, p.479.

42. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-wan shih-ch'a lu*, p.5.

43. Tseng Nai-shuo 曾延碩, "Ch'ing-chi Ta-kou chih yü-yeh 清代打狗之漁業" (The fishing in Ta-kou in the late Ch'ing), *T'ai-wan wen-hsien*, 8:2 (June 1957), p.19. In 1636, for example, more than 81 fishing junks came here from Fukien; each carried 15 to 25 fishermen. See *ibid.*

MAP 4. TAIWAN PREFECTURE
(Around 1735)

MAP 5. MAJOR HARBOURS ON THE WESTERN COAST OF TAIWAN AS SHOWN IN CH'EN LUN-CHIUNG'S HAI-KUO WEN-CHIEN LU

area.⁴⁴ For this new development, Ta-kou and Tung-kang began to serve the district as the major ports for rice and sugar export.⁴⁵ These two ports further expanded in the late K'ang-hsi period when the agricultural development spread from Feng-shan towards Lang-chiao (modern Heng-ch'un) near the southern tip of the island. An increased volume of trade went through Ta-kou and Tung-kang. Feng-shan district also grew in the early eighteenth century. At the turn of that century, the local gazetteers report only three market towns in the area.⁴⁶ By 1741, the number had increased to eleven, which were spread out in the newly exploited territory.⁴⁷

At the northern end of the island were two deep-water ports, Chi-lung and Tan-shui.⁴⁸ The area between Chi-lung and Tan-shui in the north and Chu-ch'ien (modern Hsin-chu) on their southwestern coast surrounds the Taipei Basin. When Tan-shui subprefecture was established in 1723, the t'ing capital was in Chu-ch'ien. The subprefecture, which administered this northern territory, extended from the Ta-chia River. Up until the end of the Yung-cheng period, the central part of the Taipei Basin was opened up basically by the Ch'üan-chou people. The Chang-chou migrants came during the early Ch'ien-lung years.⁴⁹

44. Lan Ting-yüan reported around 1723 that the sugar fields extended more than a hundred li from Ta-kou. See Ting Yüeh-chien, *comp.*, *Chih-T'ai pi-kao lu*, p.5. The district capital, Feng-shan, was mainly populated by South Fukienese. The area further south of Tung-kang and its neighbourhood (present-day P'ing-tung 屏東) was exploited by the Hakka people from Chia-ying-chou of East Kwangtung.

45. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.23.

46. *T'ai-wan FC* (1696 ed.), p.48; and *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan FC* (1712 ed.), p.54.

47. *Ch'ung-hsiu Fu-chien T'ai-wan FC* (1741 ed.), p.84.

48. *Tung-hua lu*, K'ang-hsi:101:9a.

49. The Hakka people from eastern Kwangtung arrived here in increasing numbers shortly after the early Ch'ien-lung reign. They

During the first half of the eighteenth century, trade in Tan-shui was very active. It began with the trade between the aborigines and the Fukinese. Often the aborigines came to Tan-shui in hundreds by canoes with various products, such as dried deer's meat, sinews, horns, skin, sesame, rattans, and laver, in exchange for salt, sugar, tobacco, and clothing materials.⁵⁰ When the Han Chinese came in larger numbers and started growing rice and other grains, those food products became the major export through the port of Tan-shui.⁵¹ It is interesting to note that Tan-shui was the only port other than Lu-erh-men which was given special permission to maintain a direct trade with Amoy. The Fukinese in Tan-shui built their ships either in Chang-chou or Ch'üan-chou. Initially, the number of ships for the direct trade was limited to four. In 1723, the authorities granted permission for them to build two additional ships. The number was further increased to ten in 1743. These ships were licensed to transport grains from northern Taiwan to Amoy. Even when restrictions on the export of rice from Taiwan were imposed from time to time, the bans did not affect the specially licensed trade between Tan-shui and Amoy. The only limitation was that these Tan-shui ships were allowed to conduct the direct trade in the last four months of the year. During the other months, they could only call at Lu-erh-men, as did other ships. Whenever they sailed back to Tan-shui, they

(...cont) concentrated in the vicinity of Chu-ch'ien. See Ch'en Nai-nieh 陳乃驥, "T'ai-pei shih hsing-ke shu-lüeh" 台北市興革述略 (A short account of the development of Taipei city), *T'ai-wan wen-hsien*, 8:2 (June 1957), pp.26-27.

50. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.134.

51. *Ch'ung-hsiu Fu-chien T'ai-wan FC* (1741 ed.), p.68.

brought along clothing materials, tobacco, tea, tools, and other commodities from Amoy.⁵²

There were other harbours situated on the central coast between Luerh-men and Chu-ch'ien, serving the vast area of the two districts of Chu-lo and Chang-hua, and southern Tan-shui subprefecture. During the K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng periods, Pen-kang was the major seaport on the Chu-lo coast.⁵³ It was also the centre of rice trade in Chu-lo district.⁵⁴ At the turn of the eighteenth century, there were nine coastal subdistricts, called respectively by the term *chuang* (village). Each of these subdistrict was served by a different harbour.⁵⁵ While Pen-kang was the central node of the whole subregion, smaller junks also called at other harbours in the district to collect grain products and sugar.⁵⁶ Small boats also visited coastal villages to gather local agricultural products and ship them to the nearby market towns.⁵⁷ In 1696, only one tiny market was recorded for the whole district of Chu-lo.⁵⁸ However, the following two decades saw the appearance of 17 market towns in this

52. Tung T'ien-kung 董天工, *T'ai-hai chien-wen lu* 台海見聞錄 (An account of what had been seen and heard in Taiwan seas), TWWHTK, no.129 (1961), pp.21-22. The book was printed in 1753. Tung was appointed chiao-yü 教諭 (director of studies) in Chang-hua district in 1746.
53. Pen-kang was located between present-day Pei-kang of Yün-lin district and Hsin-kang of Chia-i district.
54. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.23.
55. This territory has gone through great geographic changes in the last three centuries, during which the coastline moved some distance westward. See Lu Chia-hsing 盧家興, "Chia-i hsien shu hai-an hsien yen-pien kao" 嘉義縣屬海岸線演變考 (The transition of the coastline in Chia-i district), *T'ai-wan wen-hsien*, 10:3 (September 1959), p.27.
56. *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), pp.12-17.
57. *ibid.*
58. *T'ai-wan FC* (1696 ed.), p.48.

subregion.⁵⁹ Pen-kang was particularly prosperous in the first half of the eighteenth century among the emerging market towns.

The territory of Chang-hua lay between Hu-wei in the south and the Ta-chia River in the north. Before 1700, there was hardly a market town in this subregion.⁶⁰ Later, in 1717, four were recorded.⁶¹ The number of market towns increased to nine in 1741.⁶² As with the pattern of the development in Chu-lo, the rise of market towns was closely connected with the coastal trade of Taiwan. During the first two decades of the eighteenth century, the migrants from the mainland had already moved forward to open up land in the district. This land development resulted in an increased production of sesame, amounting to "several hundred thousand shih" every year during this period.⁶³ As land was abundant in the district, rice was produced in increasing quantities and its price was the cheapest in Taiwan.⁶⁴ During the same period, Lu-tsai-kang (modern Lukang) rose to become the centre for the rice trade.⁶⁵ In 1731, it was officially designated as a trading port for the coastal junks coming in through Lu-erh-men, but no direct trade between Lu-tsai-kang and the mainland was allowed. Export rice from the district was transshipped to the prefectural capital, Taiwanfu, through Lu-tsai-kang.⁶⁶ Merchant

59. *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), p.32.

60. *T'ai-wan FC* (1696 ed.), p.48.

61. *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), p.32.

62. *Ch'ung-hsiu Fu-chien T'ai-wan FC* (1741 ed.), pp.84-85.

63. *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), p.138.

64. *Ch'ung-hsiu Fu-chien T'ai-wan FC* (1741 ed.), p.93.

65. *ibid.*, p.84.

66. Chang Ping-nan 張炳楠, "Lu-kang k'ai-kang shih" 鹿港開港史 (The opening of the port of Lukang), *T'ai-wan wen-hsien*, 19:1 (March 1968), p.10.

junks also called at other lesser harbours to collect sesame, rice, and beans, while smaller boats came to the coastal villages for the local products.⁶⁷

Another group of harbours within the subregion was situated between the Ta-chia River and Chu-ch'ien. The most important of these was Hou-lung-kang, a deep-water port.⁶⁸ It served as an outlet for large quantities of such local products as sesame and rice.⁶⁹

In other words, the major seaports on the Taiwan coast functioned like central nodes, connecting the various lesser harbours in each sub-region.⁷⁰ In turn, each of the lesser harbours extended to its own hinterland where goods were produced. The land transport of local products to the nearby harbours was done by bullock carts. A cart with one bullock could carry a load of about 600 to 700 catties.⁷¹ In comparison with shipment by sea, land transport usually cost twice as much.⁷² For this reason, goods transported by land would go to the nearest harbours on the coast.

All the major seaports on the Taiwan coast were then connected with Lu-erh-men of Taiwanfu, the only seaport opened in all seasons for the direct trade with the mainland. The agricultural and commercial growth of Taiwan had brought increasing prosperity to this prefectural capital.⁷³

67. *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), pp.13-14.

68. *ibid.*, p.125.

69. *ibid.*, p.14.

70. In this manner, the major port in each subregion functioned as an entrepot absorbing and distributing commodities. See *MCSL:WP*, p.102a.

71. *Chu-lo HC* (1717 ed.), p.146.

72. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.23.

73. Taiwanfu (modern Tainan) was the prefectural capital (T'ai-wan fu-ch'eng 府城) and also the hsien capital (hsien-ch'eng 縣城) of Taiwan district.

In the first decade of the eighteenth century, the local gazetteers recorded 15 streets (*chieh*) and markets (*shih*) within the city boundary.⁷⁴ From 1710 to 1720, the number of streets and markets had expanded to 26;⁷⁵ by the middle of the century, there were 45 altogether.⁷⁶

On the whole, the accelerated pace of frontier development and the subsequent commercial expansion of Taiwan after the turn of the eighteenth century gave a boost not only to the rapid growth of the Amoy trading network, but also to the increasingly predominant role played by the South Fukienese merchants in the coastal trade, particularly after 1718, when emperor K'ang-hsi decreed, upon the recommendation of the Che-Min governor-general, Chüeh-lo-man-po, that all the ships sailing between Taiwan and other coastal regions must call at Amoy for customs and security checks.⁷⁷

2. COASTAL TRADE

Rice Export from Taiwan

From the Cheng period, Taiwan began to produce rice to feed the Cheng forces and the war-torn region of South Fukien. When peace returned after 1683, the rice trade between Taiwan and Fukien continued to develop but the pace was somewhat restricted in the remaining two decades of the century. Measures taken by the authorities to discourage emigration to Taiwan was one reason, and government control of rice exports from Taiwan

74. *T'ai-wan FC* (1696 ed.), pp.46-47; and *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan FC* (1712 ed.), pp.53-54.

75. *T'ai-wan HC* (1720 ed.), pp.90-92.

76. *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC* (1752 ed.), pp.27-28.

77. *CSL:KH*, 280:6.

was the other. Rice trade in the early Ch'ing was a sensitive issue. The government saw to it that rice should never be allowed to be smuggled out to feed the maritime outlaws.

Between 1702 and 1711, rice harvests in Taiwan were hit by bad weather. The Taiwan prefect, Chou Yüan-wen, adopted more stringent measures to stop rice exports.⁷⁸ Further attempts to prevent people from shipping rice out of Taiwan were introduced after the new maritime ban came into being in 1717. The rice trade was hit by another blow four years later when the Chu I-kuei rebellion broke out on the island. As was often the case, the local authorities strove hard to discourage the export of food grain to prevent shortages and price rises in the locality. Since their careers frequently depended on how well they could stabilize the local condition, they always preferred to play safe by retaining the grain.⁷⁹

The export restrictions did interrupt the smooth supply of Taiwan rice for South Fukien. Rice, however, continued to flow across the Taiwan Straits, particularly in years of plenty. In 1693, for instance, rice merchants found it profitable to export rice to Fukien due to the good harvest and cheap price in Taiwan.⁸⁰ In fact, restrictions only encouraged more active smuggling trade (*ssu-yün*). There were many different ways of smuggling rice out of the island. The more adventurous rice traders employed small junks normally plying along the Taiwan coast to cross the straits surreptitiously. These junks often embarked from

78. *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan FC* (1712 ed.), pp.323-25.

79. *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/7/26, v.6, p.356.

80. Wang Shih-ch'ing, p.18.

Peng-kang and Ta-kou,⁸¹ the smuggling centres in the vicinity of the two rice bowls of Taiwan. Another method was to transport rice by small boats to the waters near Peng-hu. From there the smugglers transferred the cargo to larger junks, sailing between Peng-hu and Ta-tan outside the Amoy harbour. Then the small *san-pan* or fishing boats would approach them to pick up the cargo and ship it to Amoy. The organizers were mostly those shopkeepers in Amoy who were able to establish close connections with the local officials.⁸² With the latters' assistance, smuggling was even conducted in a "legal" manner. There are many examples of this sort of collaboration. In 1725, as one source reveals, a colonel (*fu-chiang*) stationed in Peng-hu submitted an application on behalf of the owners of nineteen ships for transporting daily necessities between Peng-hu and Taiwan. Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan gave his approval. At the same time, the maritime subprefect in Amoy also successfully obtained permits for another group of thirteen ships to ferry goods between the two places. As a matter of fact, trade between Peng-hu and Taiwan did not require the large junks applied for by the officials on behalf of the owners. The job could be handled adequately by the small junks in the locality. It became clear later that the large junks were actually sailing between Peng-hu and Ta-tan. They smuggled emigrants to Taiwan and transported rice back to Fukien. The official sponsors received more than twenty taels of silver for each shipment of rice.⁸³ Even more notorious were the naval patrols. Both admiral Lan T'ing-chen and brigade-general of Quemoy, Hsieh Hsi-hsien,

81. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.23; and *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC* (1752 ed.), p.61.

82. *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/9/2, v.6, pp.523-26.

83. *ibid.*, p.525.

employed their own "patrol vessels" for smuggling purposes.⁸⁴ In the early Yung-cheng period, it was reported that there were more than twenty such vessels involved in the business.⁸⁵

In addition to the problem of control as illustrated above was the inconsistency on the part of the court in enforcing the rice ban. Immediately after the imposition of the maritime restrictions in 1717, emperor K'ang-hsi also decreed that any rice shipments from Taiwan to Amoy should be allowed to sell at market prices in order to remedy the shortages in South Fukien and lower the prices.⁸⁶ All the foregoing reasons eventually led governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo to recommend the abolition of the rice ban in 1726. His petition was approved by the court.⁸⁷

The factor crucial to why the restrictions were ineffective, as we have just seen, lay in the fact that Taiwan produced surplus and cheaper rice which could remedy the shortages in South Fukien. Taiwan produced such abundance of rice as being claimed in governor-general Kao's statement that "a single year's good harvest is sufficient to last [Taiwan] four or five years."⁸⁸ I do not agree with the judgment made by Ch'üan and Kraus that "the available Taiwan prices are close enough to the

84. *ibid.*

85. Hsü-hsiu T'ai-wan HC 續修台灣縣志 (A renewed gazetteer of T'ai-wan district) (1807 ed.), TWWHTK, no.140 (1962), p.139.

86. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:11a.

87. The original text of Kao's petition is in *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/7/26, v.6, pp.355-57.

88. Ch'üan Han-sheng and Richard A. Kraus have some doubts about the claim. See their *Mid-Ch'ing Rice Markets and Trade: An Essay in Price History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p.67. Kao's statement was made in *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/7/26, v.6, p.356. The translation quoted here is by Ch'üan and Kraus.

level of those on the rice deficit mainland to indicate that Taiwan simply was not awash in rice."⁸⁹

To support their view, Ch'üan and Kraus have chosen for analysis the average prices for December 1726 and December 1727, and a single price for September 1729. From these three sets of figures, they arrive at an average for Fukien regional prices (see below) on which they base their analysis.

TABLE 4: Fukien Regional Rice Prices⁹⁰ (in taels per *shih*)

<i>Fu</i> or <i>chou</i> (*coastal <i>fu</i>)	December 1726 Average of range	December 1727 Average of range	September 1729 Single price	Average of col- ums 1-3
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ch'üan-chou <i>fu</i> *	1.65	1.65	.81	1.37
Chang-chou <i>fu</i> *	1.40[1.5]	1.60	1.05	1.35
Ting-chou <i>fu</i>	1.30	1.50	1.10	1.30
Fu-ning <i>chou</i> *	1.375	1.20	1.15	1.24
Yen-p'ing <i>fu</i>	1.30[1.35]	1.29	1.12	1.24
Foochow <i>fu</i> *	1.10[1.125]	1.30[1.21]	1.10	1.17
Taiwan <i>fu</i>	1.30	1.29	.94	1.14
Hsing-hua <i>fu</i> *	1.15	1.315	.90	1.12
Chien-ning <i>fu</i>	1.48[1.03]	.96	.90	1.11
Shao-wu <i>fu</i>	.975	1.00	1.15	1.04

89. Ch'üan and Kraus, p.67.

90. *ibid.*, p.54. From p.127 of the preceding work, we know that the figures in column (1) are taken from CPYC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/11/9, 2, 5, 76 (p.611). The text is also in KCTC:YC, 4/11/9 (2 December 1726), v.6, pp.836-37. The figures in column (2) are from CPYC, Fukien governor Ch'ang Lai, 5/10/25, 5, 2.36 (p.1357). Several of the figures have been miscalculated. I have included my corrections in brackets.

As to these sets of figures presented by Ch'üan and Kraus, I want to point out two shortcomings at this stage, which are related to this part of my discussion. First, the figures represent the seasonal low prices, particularly in the rice-deficit region of Fukien. In fact, Ch'üan and Kraus are fully aware of the seasonal price differences. In their analysis of the Yangtze Valley pattern, they observe that price variation reached a peak in midsummer (June, July and August). This was followed by a decline in August-September and another in October-November-December, reaching a low in midwinter (December-January). Then a gradual rise began through the rest of winter and spring until the peak was again reached in midsummer.⁹¹ In Fukien, the August-September period followed immediately upon the early harvests in late summer when prices could be expected to go down. Late harvests began in mid-autumn and could keep the prices at a lower level. In other words, rice prices fluctuated during the year in Fukien, a condition similar to that shown by Ch'üan and Kraus for the lower Yangtze Valley. The figures for Fukien provided by Ch'üan and Kraus are, therefore, somewhat misleading in discussing the rice trade. These prices do not indicate the important aspect of normal fluctuations within the year.

The second shortcoming of the figures given by Ch'üan and Kraus arises from the fact that the significant disparity in prices within a prefecture even during the harvest season is submerged because the price differences are averaged. In most cases, the memorialists in the province did not go into the details to indicate the price variation from one district to the other. The sources from which the information

91. Ch'üan and Kraus, pp.20-22.

in columns (1) and (2) is derived, are in fact two of the few such detailed reports. The original figures (see Appendix A) in the cited documents are better evidence of the price disparity within a prefecture and, thus, provide a more accurate picture of price conditions.

Even figures given in the memorials are often unsatisfactory. They represent in most cases the ideal condition that the local officials were most willing to report. Not infrequently, only one flat price was given to cover the whole province including Taiwan. Bearing this in mind, we can better appreciate the different price levels which existed between Taiwan and South Fukien in particular. Although price data (see Appendix A) are by no means complete, a general pattern is evident. The price level for Taiwan in the 1720s remained for most of the decade relatively stable and lower than that for South Fukien, indicating the abundance of rice supplies. Even if we take the officially reported prices as accurate and add to them a freight rate of 10 to 15 percent of the original prices,⁹² the price margin between Taiwan and Fukien would still be commercially profitable, especially as part of the shipments went directly to Amoy from the producing villages where the prices were much lower than the market level.

92. The freight rate was Tls.0.108 per *shih* for hulled rice and Tls. 0.08 for unhulled rice from Lu-erh-men to Amoy. See *MCSL:WP*, p. 102b. The government in 1726-1727 was paying Tls.1.16 per *shih* of hulled rice, including the freight cost to Amoy. See *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/2/10, v.7, p.445. The total cost was still much lower than the price level in South Fukien. Even when the government shipments were sent in the form of unhulled rice, as was the case from 1730 to ensure longer storage, the weight was double the same amount of hulled rice. Consequently, the freight cost would also be nearly two-fold. But it was estimated that the Taiwan rice could still be sold competitively in Fukien and with profit. See *CPYC*, acting Fukien G-G Shih I-chih, 7/8/2, 16, 3, 28a (p.5440).

How heavily Fukien relied on Taiwan to supply rice is impossible to answer with actual figures. We can, nevertheless, establish a rough idea of the amount. First we must consider the official shipments, later known as *T'ai-yün*, the Taiwan shipments. In Yung-cheng 2 (1724), the emperor decreed that the Taiwan granaries should send an annual shipment of rice amounting to 50,000 *shih*⁹³ to Fukien. The court again approved an additional purchase of 100,000 *shih* in the following year.⁹⁴ According to a memorial submitted by the governor-general Kao, the planned purchases would be around 600,000 to 700,000 *shih* of both hulled and unhulled rice (*mi* and *ku*) in 1727.⁹⁵ In Yung-cheng 7 (1729), acting governor-general Shih I-chih recommended to the court that the annual shipment of rice from Taiwan to Amoy should be fixed at 83,000 *shih* which was subsequently approved.⁹⁶

The official shipments of rice formed but a small portion of rice exports from Taiwan; legal shipments by merchants (*shang-yün*) and those by smugglers occupied the lion's share. Two early Ch'ien-lung sources shed light on the volume of rice trade. The first is an edict issued at the beginning of 1743, which gives an estimate of 400,000-500,000 *shih* for both the official and the merchant shipments of rice from Taiwan to

93. The *shih* is used here as a measure of volume for rice. It should not be confused with the word picul. One should also avoid any hasty attempt to convert it to other equivalents. I have followed the calculation of one *shih* = 138.75 catties, as suggested by Ch'üan and Kraus, to get some quantitative idea of the unit. See Ch'üan and Kraus, pp.79-98 for a detailed discussion of the subject.

94. *CSL:ST*, 46:2; also *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/2/10, v.7, p.445.

95. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/2/10, v.7, p.445.

96. *CPYC*, acting Fukien G-G Shih I-chih, 7/8/2, 16, 3, 27b (p.5440); and *CSL:ST*, 92:8.

Fukien each year.⁹⁷ About the same time, two censors with special duties in Taiwan, Shu-shan and Chang Mei, calculated that the annual export of rice from Taiwan totalled 800,000-900,000 *shih*.⁹⁸ Interestingly, the estimate by Ch'üan and Kraus, giving the total as being somewhere between 500,000 to one million *shih*,⁹⁹ is approximate to the above figures, though they do not supply any documentary evidence to support their claim. Among the different estimates, the figure suggested by Su-shan and Chang Mei, seems most plausible, not only because they were in good position to gather information, but also because their estimate could possibly have taken into consideration the unrecorded smuggling trade.¹⁰⁰

The Soochow Connection in the Rice Trade

Another important supplier of rice to Fukien was the Yangtze Valley. My main concern here is to determine how the Fukienese coastal network was connected with the rice trade in that region. The study done by Ch'üan and Kraus is vague and at times confusing as far as this theme is concerned.

Rice, particularly from up the Yangtze, travelled a long distance to reach Fukien. Where exactly did the export rice come from? Did the Fukienese merchants have access to the sources of supply. These are the

97. CSL:KT, 181:18a. Since the figure represents the amount of *shang-yün* (merchant shipments) and *T'ai-yün* (government shipments), it does not include the volume of the *ssu-yün* (smuggled shipments).

98. Hsü-hsiu *T'ai-wan FC 續修台灣府志* (A renewed gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture) (Preface 1774), TWWHTK, no.121 (1962), p.723; also in MCSL:WP, p.812.

99. Ch'üan and Kraus, p.67.

100. The nearly one million *shih* of export rice would mean the official figures of rice acreage were very much underreported. So was the total area under sugar. The pioneer condition and administrative inefficiency in a remote land such as Taiwan are responsible for the underreporting.

two questions that I intend to start with in order to establish an over-all picture.

As to the first question, we are able to find several rice trading centres along the Yangtze. Chungking in Szechuan and Hankow in Hukwang far upstream were two of them. The exploitation of land in Szechuan was greatly facilitated by the large number of migrants from Kwangtung, Fukien, Hukwang and Kweichow. These migrants continued to arrive during the Yung-cheng period.¹⁰¹ Chekiang governor-general Li Wei reported in 1727 that Szechuan had become the largest rice producing province in the country, followed by Hukwang and Kiangsi.¹⁰² Hukwang with its centre at Hankow became rich in rice after the mid-seventeenth century,¹⁰³ while Kiangsi was mentioned as a major rice exporting region towards the end of the same century.¹⁰⁴ Nan-ch'ang was one of the centres in Kiangsi. Soochow in Kiangsu was another major rice market but, in the early eighteenth century, it became a net importer of rice.¹⁰⁵ A portion of the rice from the Yangtze Valley would eventually appear on the rice markets in Fukien.

After we briefly examine how the Yangtze rice moved from its areas of production to Fukien and we shall then be in a position to determine at which point the Fukienese merchants began to be associated with the Yangtze rice markets. Based on a 1727 case in which a

101. CPYC, Szechuan provincial treasurer Kuan Ch'eng-che, 5/9/9, 7, 6, 7-8 (p.2243).

102. KCTTC:YC, Chekiang G-G Li Wei, 5/12/3, v.9, pp.438-39. Ch'üan and Kraus cite a different source indicating that Hukwang (Hunan and Hupei) had become the most important rice surplus region after the mid-seventeenth century. See Ch'üan and Kraus, p.60.

103. Ch'üan and Kraus, p.60.

104. CSL:KH, 87:19a.

105. Ch'üan and Kraus, p.60.

large shipment of rice was sent direct from Szechuan to Chekiang, Ch'üan and Kraus conclude that large-scale, long-distance, and well-organized trade existed in China in the early eighteenth century.¹⁰⁶ Their proposition is, in fact, best exemplified by the Fukienese coastal trade rather than by the Yangtze-Fukien trade. I shall come back to this point in a later section. First, however, I have some doubts whether, as Ch'üan and Kraus have claimed, it was routine for Szechuan rice to be shipped straight to southern Kiangsu and even Chekiang.¹⁰⁷ In the case of 1727, the energetic Chekiang governor, Li Wei, experimented with a direct shipment of over 100,000 *shih* of rice from Chungking to Hangchow. I used the word "experimented" because it was a bold attempt and also the first of its kind, according to Li Wei himself. Although the mission was very successful, it was generally regarded by his subordinates as being too risky a voyage to be worth attempting on a regular basis. The direct official purchases from the source of supply had indeed brought back a large quantity of cheaper rice. Its net price was Tls.0.95 per *shih*, one third lower than the price of commercial rice. But the shipment also created serious complaints from different sectors of the Yangtze markets. It was certainly seen as unfair official competition by the merchants. Both they and the provincial authorities along the Yangtze were distressed because not only had the routine functioning of the markets been disrupted by the direct shipment, but also their personal interests in the rice trade were undercut.

Emperor Yung-cheng at first praised Li Wei's initiative. But as soon as the emperor heard of Li Wei's second attempt at an even more

106. Ch'üan and Kraus, pp.70, 76.

107. *ibid.*, p.70.

ambitious direct shipment from Chungking, he immediately discouraged the governor, knowing that the other provincial authorities felt displeasure at the purchases. Li Wei had originally proposed a total amount of Tls. 200,000 for the second purchases, but the emperor scaled it down to one-fourth of the proposed sum. Even Li Wei himself had conceded that it was too much trouble for his officials to take the risky journey upstream. This time, his officials stopped at Hankow, instead of traveling further upstream to Chungking. They brought up the required amount through rice merchants who shipped the Szechuan rice downstream to Hankow. Under these circumstances, Li Wei's initial enthusiasm was frustrated and it died down before long.¹⁰⁸

What I have tried to prove is that the normal shipments of Szechuan rice were sent to the transshipment centre at Hankow, rather than in direct shipments further downstream. The Chungking-Hankow shipments were managed by both rich rice merchants and small rice traders.¹⁰⁹ There is no doubt that the former were capable of transporting large quantities of rice and in a position to control rice markets and prices.

The area surrounding Hankow was densely populated, and was dependent on rice supplied from Szechuan and Hunan.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, Hankow was at the same time, a very important centre of rice transshipment,¹¹¹

108. My interpretation of the whole event is based on Li Wei's memorials. See KCTTC:YC, 4/6/1, v.6, pp.98-99; KCTTC:YC, 5/2/17, v.7, p.496. KCTTC:YC, 5/5/11, v.8, pp.192-94; KCTTC:YC, 5/6/27, v.8, pp.406-407; KCTTC:YC, 5/10/13, v.9, p.119; and KCTTC:YC, 5/12/3, v.9, pp.438-39.

109. CPYC, Szechuan governor Hsien Te 憲德, 11/2/7, 11, 2, 122a (p.3704).

110. CPYC, Hukwang G-G Mai Chu 邁柱 and Hupei governor Ma Hui-po 馬會伯, 6/3/11, 17, 1, 59a (p.5684).

111. KCTTC:YC, Chekiang governor Li Wei, 4/6/1, v.6, p.99.

as we have just seen. The Szechuan rice passing through this point was exported downstream as Hukwang rice.¹¹² The rice market in Hankow also shed some light on the question of who the rice merchants were. A memorial presented by Hukwang governor-general Mai Chu in 1732 revealed that salt merchants, using their large junks, transported a considerable portion of the export rice from the province. Their large capital enabled them to control a great portion of the downstream rice trade. Aside from them, there were also full-time rice shippers. The same memorial recorded over four hundred rice ships in three months' time, leaving Hankow with full loads of rice. These rice merchants were also wealthy and, therefore, in a position to manipulate rice prices; their profit was counted by tens of thousands of taels in the transactions.¹¹³

Kiangsi was another regular source of rice supply for Kiangsu, Chekiang and Fukien. Within Kiangsi, rice was collected from the producing areas by local brokers (*ya-hang*) based in the townships. The provincial capital, Nan-ch'ang was the major rice market. The rice brokers there sold probably one half of the export rice of the province.¹¹⁴ Direct shipments from Kiangsi to Fukien were also sent across the border. In 1727, for instance, an official shipment of 15,000 *shih*

112. As a matter of fact, emperor Yung-cheng stated that to his knowledge Kiangsu and Chekiang depended on Hukwang for rice supplies and Hukwang, in turn, imported rice from Szechuan. See CPYC, Szechuan governor Wang Ching-hao 王景灝, 2/8/20, 4, 2, 3a (p.1063).

113. CPYC, Hukwang G-G Mai Chu, 10/2/24, 17, 2, 55 (p.5758).

114. KCTTC:KH, Kiangsi governor Lang T'ing-chi 郎廷極, 49/7/4, v.2, pp.615-18. In a ten month period in 1709-1710, the amount of rice sold through the brokers in the province was reported as 648,708 *shih*. About 40 per cent was exported through the brokers in Nan-ch'ang. This information would supplement the data collected by Ch'üan and Kraus. They mention that they have no direct evidence on the size of the rice trade from Kiangsi. See Ch'üan and Kraus, p.69.

was sent from Kung-chou first by boats up to Ku-ch'eng. From there, the shipment crossed the border to Fukien by land, covering a distance of 70 li to reach Ting-chou in western Fukien.¹¹⁵ However, bulky shipments to coastal Fukien from Kiangsi were seldom sent by this land route which cost much more than the waterway shipments. Therefore, the bulk of export rice was transshipped to Chen-chiang via the Yangtze in large river junks, then via the Grand Canal in boats of smaller size to Soochow for the transshipment to Fukien.¹¹⁶

Three conclusions can be derived from the foregoing discussion of the Yangtze rice markets. First of all, Ch'üan and Kraus have clearly overemphasized the existence of direct rice trade between Chungking and Hangchow or even up to Fukien. The routine practice was to send the shipments through one or more transshipment points before they reached their destinations. Ch'üan and Kraus have, however, made a very significant point when they note that "the Ch'ing government officials were not innovators in the matter of trade routes and that they invariably both imitated merchant trade practices and followed trade routes long established by merchants."¹¹⁷ In governor Li Wei's first attempt at direct shipments, it was precisely because he attempted to do so in an unconventional way that he failed to convince others of the possibilities of his innovation. Finally, the foregoing survey shows no sign of Fukienese involvement in the Yangtze shipping and rice trade before rice reached Soochow.

From Soochow on, the Fukienese began to loom large in the sphere of marketing. Their concentration just by the city's central rice market,

115. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/2/10, v.7, p.443.

116. *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/7/18, v.6, p.302.

117. Ch'üan and Kraus, p.66.

Feng-chiao, indicates their involvement in the rice trade. The size of this group would indicate that the Fukienese merchants were the major group of rice importers and exporters in the city. Here they were able to receive "rice arriving in Soochow from Kiangsi and Hukwang in a great quantity everyday."¹¹⁸

There were two usual routes to ship rice from Soochow to the sea and thence directly to Fukien; one was toward Shanghai and the other Cha-p'u.¹¹⁹ On both, rice was shipped via river and canal (see map 6).¹²⁰ By the early eighteenth century, Cha-p'u was probably a busier seaport than Shanghai, largely due to the rice trade conducted by the Fukienese merchants.¹²¹

Both the government and private merchants organized the rice shipments. A large official shipment was authorized by emperor K'ang-hsi in 1710. In that year, South Fukien experienced a serious drought for over eight months and rice prices were rising. The emperor decreed that 300,000 *shih* from the annual tribute rice which was gathered in southern Kiangsu should be diverted to Fukien for the province's immediate relief. There were two assembly points for the relief grain; one in Lang-shan, located near Nan-t'ung on the north bank of the Yangtze in Kiangsu, and

118. KCTTC:YC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/5/14, v.6, p.13.

119. Ts'ai Shih-yuan 蔡世遠, "Yü Che-chiang Huang fu-chün ch'ing k'ai mi-chin shu" 與浙江黃撫軍請開米禁書 (A letter to governor Huang of Chekiang requesting relaxation of the restriction on rice trade), HCCSWP, 44:24a.

120. The most convenient route from Soochow to Cha-p'u was to take the Grand Canal to Chia-hsing 嘉興. From there the shipments would be diverted via river to Cha-p'u.

121. Official rice shipments also passed through Cha-p'u because of the port's excellent facilities.

MAP 6. LOWER YANGTZE RIVER AND ADJACENT WATERWAYS
(Adopted from *The Junks and Sampans of the Yangtze*)

the other in Cha-p'u, Chekiang.¹²²

Similar shipments, but in smaller quantity, continued in later years. For instance, 50,000 *shih* of tribute rice were sent to Fukien in 1713 for the purpose of price stabilization.¹²³ The court diverted tribute grain to Fukien more frequently during the Yung-cheng reign. In 1726, for example, too much rain as well as colder weather had delayed the rice crop in Fukien and rice prices soared. Several rice shipments were authorized, including 150,000 *shih* from Kiangsi, 200,000 *shih* of unhulled rice from the quota of Chekiang's annual tribute grain, and 70,000 *shih* from the granaries in Wen-chou and Tai'chou in southern Chekiang. Purchases from other areas were also instructed.¹²⁴ Again in 1727, the court decreed that the Kiangsu governor, Ch'en Shih-hsia, should send an official shipment of 100,000 *shih* of rice to Fukien for price stabilization purposes.¹²⁵ The Fukien governor-general also sent two missions to Soochow for the purchase of over 11,000 *shih* of rice and

122. This official shipment of 300,000 *shih* is recorded in *CSL:KH*, 243: 7a-8a. An undated letter by Ts'ai Shih-yüan (see fn.119) also mentioned the shipment of relief rice to Fukien. Ch'üan and Kraus have made a detailed examination of Ts'ai's letter (see Ch'üan and Kraus, pp.60, 61, 201), and concluded that it was written in 1727. From my examination of the evidence, I am certain that the letter was written seventeen years earlier. In the letter, the names of Chekiang governor-general Liang ("Chih-fu Liang kung" 制府梁公) and Chekiang governor Huang ("Huang fu-chün 黃撫軍) are mentioned. The Che-Min governor-general in 1710 was Liang Nai 梁霽. In addition, Chekiang governor Huang's full name was Huang Ping-chung 黃秉中. Huang was appointed for a one-year term in 1709-1710. See *Che-chiang TC 浙江通志* (A provincial gazetteer of Chekiang) (Reprint; Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1934), chüan 121, p.2144. Moreover, the provincial gazetteer of Fukien also clearly records the event. See *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 230:9.

123. *CSL:KH*, 256:10b.

124. *CSL:ST*, 45:35b-36a, 46:10 and 47:14a; also *KCTC:YC*, Fukien land force commander Wu Sheng 吳陞, 4/5/20, v.6, p.46.

125. *CSL:ST*, 52:21.

9,000 *shih* of wheat.¹²⁶

Aside from direct official purchases, the Fukien authorities also encouraged local merchants to purchase rice from places like Wen-chou and Soochow. They were issued with special permits to facilitate their purchases. In 1727, for example, the provincial authorities gave licenses to six groups of Fukienese merchants who went to Soochow during the spring season and shipped back over 20,000 *shih* of rice. More merchants embarked for the same purpose shortly after.¹²⁷ They were clearly not the regular license holders for the interprovincial rice trade, but were issued special permits on an occasional basis. The regular rice trade was probably conducted by the Fukienese merchants residing in Soochow.¹²⁸

Before ending this section, one last question regarding the volume of rice shipments from the Yangtze Valley to Fukien has to be asked. Unlike the case of Taiwan, in which some estimate of the total shipments was given by contemporary officials, no ready answer is available for the Yangtze Valley. According to the calculation made by Ch'üan and Kraus:

... a conservative estimate of the annual rice import into Chekiang and Fukien from the Yangtze valley would be some 750,000 to one million *shih*, composed of some 500,000 for Fukien and 250,000 to 500,000 for Chekiang.¹²⁹

126. KCTTC:YC, Soochow governor Ch'en Shih-hsia 陳時夏, 5/4/11, v.8, pp.15-16.

127. *ibid.*, p.16. The term "*chao-shang kei-chao*" 招商給照 (To invite merchants and issue them licenses) was often used for this purpose. See KCTTC:YC, Fukien land force commander Wu Sheng, 4/5/20, v.6, p.46.

128. A Chekiang official observed in 1726 that interprovincial rice trade depended on the shipments by travelling merchants. See KCTTC:YC, Chen-hai general Ho T'ien-p'ei, 4/7/20, v.6, p.323. Considering the Fukienese foothold in Soochow and other seaports, and also their predominant role in both shipping and maritime trade, these travelling merchants were most possibly Fukienese.

129. Ch'üan and Kraus, p.61.

In my view, 500,000 *shih* for Fukien represented both the official and commercial shipments in normal years during the Yung-cheng period. When there was natural catastrophe, grain shortages in Fukien would become critical. In the years 1710 and 1726, for example, the official shipments alone amounted to 300,000 *shih* in the first case and possibly another 300,000 *shih* of rice in hulled form in the second case. If commercial rice were added, an estimate of some 750,000 to one million *shih* seems plausible. In abundant years, Wen-chou and T'ai-chou of southern Chekiang might be capable of supplying up to 100,000 *shih* for Fukien.

Amoy as the Centre of Rice Trade in Fukien

In the last section, I dealt with the sources of rice supply from outside mainland Fukien; I shall concentrate next on the rice distribution network in Fukien. First, I quote some observations made by Ch'üan and Kraus:

The Fukien [price] averages ... are generally suggestive of trade down the upper tributaries of the Min river at least as far as Yen-p'ing fu, if not to Foochow; of trade from north to south along the Fukien coast; and of that from Taiwan to the Fukien coast.¹³⁰

The average prices, from which Ch'üan and Kraus derive their concluding remarks, are reproduced in Figure 2 for reference.¹³¹ Furthermore, Ch'üan and Kraus quite explicitly mention Foochow as the central rice market in Fukien whenever they touch upon the region during their

130. *ibid*, p.52.

131. Figure 7 in *ibid.*, p.53.

discussion.¹³² There is no mention of Amoy at all in their examination of the rice trade in Fukien. My survey in the following pages suggests some points which differ from theirs.

Figure 2: FUKIEN PRICES, AVERAGES OF THE PERIOD 1726-1729 (Reproduced from Ch'üan and Kraus)

We shall begin with a bird's-eye view of the general condition of supply in Fukien. Among the eight prefectures in mainland Fukien, Chien-ning, Shao-wu and Yen-p'ing, were three rice-surplus areas in the upper

132. *ibid.*, pp. 46, 56, 66.

tributaries of the Min River. Foochow in a year of plenty produced enough rice for seven to eight months' local consumption. But normally, it had to import one half of the total rice consumed each year. In its best year, Hsing-hua could hope to reach self-sufficiency, but this was not often the case. At the worst, Hsing-hua might have to import one half of its rice. similar to the situation in Foochow. The western prefecture of Ting-chou was able to supply its own needs up to nine months if the harvest was good. Not surprisingly, Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou had the worst rice-deficits among the prefectures. In an extremely good year, they might produce one half of their requirements. During normal years, rice production was 40 per cent of their consumption. Considering the fact that the people of these two prefectures relied largely on sweet potato as their staple food, and that bad years were common, it is reasonable to suppose that South Fukien would often have to look for outside supplies of up to between 60 to 75 per cent of their total consumption.¹³³

Now we shall look at the question how they procured their supplies for the times of shortage. Rice movement was not always in the direction argued for by Ch'üan and Kraus. Ting-chou could conveniently satisfy its demands by importing rice across the border from Kiangsi. Shortages of rice in Foochow were for the most part remedied by the supplies from the three upriver prefectures.¹³⁴ Governor Mao reported in 1726 that rice boats arrived in the provincial capital every day from upstream.¹³⁵

133. My observation in this paragraph is based on three memorials by governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo. See *KCTTC:YC*, 4/6/19, v.6, pp.173-76; *ibid.*, 4/11/28, v.7, pp.31-34; and *ibid.*, 6/9/17, v.11, pp.-373-36.

134. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/8/11, v.11, p.65.

135. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/2/4/, v.5, p.587.

In this respect, Ch'üan and Kraus are a little too cautious because they are not sure whether the rice trade down the Min River went as far as Foochow. Since Foochow was a rice-deficit area, the surplus from the upper tributaries was never sufficient to feed its large population. Therefore, the low-price rice from Shao-wu in particular was seldom shipped beyond the point of Foochow. In mid-1726, for instance, some rice merchants from Hsing-hua went upstream to Yen-p'ing and Chien-ning to purchase rice. When they came back with a few boat loads, they were stopped in Foochow by the local people who did not want their rice supplies to be diverted elsewhere.¹³⁶

Occasionally, rice prices in the upriver prefectures were slightly higher than those in Foochow, mostly because of temporary shortages. Bad weather, hoarding, and price manipulation could all occasionally raise prices in the producing areas. Such factors should always be taken into consideration. Another reason for the price level which was, in fact, more stable and lower in Foochow than that in South Fukien, was the sale of price-stabilization rice from the granaries at less than the market price. Serving as a provincial capital, with all the top officials residing there, Foochow benefitted by a careful control of rice prices. While the market price for every *shih* of rice in Foochow seldom fell below Tls.1.1 during Yung-cheng times, the granary stock was usually on sale at Tls.1.0 or even as low as Tls.0.9. The outlay by the authorities could not, therefore, be met by the sale price of the subsidized rice.¹³⁷

136. KCTTC:YC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/5/14, v.6, p.15.

137. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/12/20, 4.7, pp.138-41.

The foregoing discussion has been offered to explain my point that the north-to-south movement of rice on the Fukien coast did not normally exist between Foochow and Amoy. Where, then, did Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou obtain their rice? Without doubt, Taiwan was the sole supplier within the province,¹³⁸ while outside the province, rice came mainly from the Yangtze Valley, as mentioned above. In other words, not only was there no significant amount of rice coming from other prefectures of mainland Fukien, but the shipments from Taiwan and other provinces arrived directly in South Fukien.

The receiving and redistributing point was Amoy, which was also the central rice market particularly in South Fukien. Incoming official shipments from Taiwan and other provinces also arrived in Amoy. In 1721, a government shipment of 30,000 *shih* from the port of Cha-p'u went first to Amoy. From there, the rice was distributed to other granaries. While one third of it remained in the Amoy granary, 6,000 *shih* each were transshipped to Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou, and the rest to Foochow.¹³⁹ The 166,000 *shih* of unhulled rice that represented the annual Taiwan shipments were unloaded in Amoy. The granaries in Foochow, Hsing-hua, Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou all sent to Amoy to receive their share.¹⁴⁰

The commercial shipments were much larger in quantity. Rice merchants came incessantly with full shiploads of rice.¹⁴¹ Other supplies were also brought in by the returning junks from overseas or by foreigners. With rice in abundance, Amoy was able to function as a

138. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/2/4, v.5, p.587.

139. *CSL:KH*, 295:10b.

140. *CPYC*, acting Fukien G-G Shih I-chih, 7/8/2, 16, 3, 27b (p.5440), and *CSL:ST*, 92:8.

141. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Chu Kang, 6/8/1, v.11, p.1.

distributing centre. In 1728, Chin-chiang and Hui-an were expecting bad weather. The Ch'üan-chou prefect, Liu Erh-wei petitioned the provincial authorities for an appropriation of Tls.10,000 to make purchases in Amoy for granary storage.¹⁴²

In times of shortages, even other provinces looked to Amoy to supply rice. When T'ai-chou of southern Chekiang, which was normally a supplier, suffered a bad year in 1733, Fukien governor-general Hao Yü-ling adopted two measures to relieve his neighbour. First, he instructed an emergency shipment of 100,000 *shih* of unhulled rice from Taiwan to Amoy for purchase by Chekiang officials and merchants. Second, the Fukien authorities issued special permits to the local merchants, who transported rice from Amoy for sale in T'ai-chou.¹⁴³

Even more surprisingly, Amoy became a constant supplier of rice for the Ch'ao-chou area of eastern Kwangtung.¹⁴⁴ The trade probably started during the last decade of the K'ang-hsi reign.¹⁴⁵ In the Yung-cheng period, the flow of rice from Fukien to Ch'ao-chou had become a normal event. The great difference in price margins was a good incentive. In May 1727, for example, rice prices in Ch'ao-chou reached as high as Tls.4 per *shih*, while they were Tls.1.9-2.1 in Ch'üan-chou and Tls.2.5 in Chang-chou. Compared with these areas, the prices in Amoy were even lower.¹⁴⁶ Thus, between the two points of Amoy and Ch'ao-chou, the

142. *ibid.*

143. CPYC, Fukien G-G Hao Yü-ling 郝玉麟, 11/3/2, 17, 3, 65 (p.5896).

144. Ch'ao-chou region had long been a supplier of grain to South Fukien since the late Ming period.

145. Sometime before 1716 there were 300-400 rice junks transporting rice from Fukien to eastern Kwangtung area. See CSL:KH, 270:16a; also MCSL:TP, p.774a.

146. For all the information on rice prices, refer to Appendix A.

price levels show a rising gradation towards the southern end. The rice merchants were able to make a profit from the price variation because there was always a large stock of rice in Amoy for them to trade with the southern areas.¹⁴⁷

It is amazing to find that while there was still a pressing need for rice in South Fukien, a portion of the imported rice was diverted for re-export to the neighbouring regions of southern Chekiang and eastern Kwangtung. Such events indicate that the rice shipments within the coastal network had gone beyond the sole purpose of relief and had become highly commercialized.

Thanks to two sets of figures provided in the memorials, it is possible to examine further the two estimates of imported rice mentioned earlier as coming from Taiwan and the Yangtze Valley. The first set of figures was reported by governor Mao in 1726, showing the activity at the prefectural markets. He said that there were some 10,000-20,000 people arriving in Ch'üan-chou city from all of the prefecture to purchase rice; another 30,000-40,000 came to Chang-chou city.¹⁴⁸ Although such figures do not indicate the volume of trade, we are provided with a general picture of these cities as two other centres for the rice trade.

Other figures mentioned by governor-general Kao in the same year are more informative. He estimated that the daily demand for rice in Foochow was 3,000 *shih* or 90,000 *shih* per month. This means that the total annual demand would reach over one million *shih*. Kao further indicated that both Hsing-hua and Ch'üan-chou prefectures required the

147. Governor Mao Wen-ch'üan reported in 1726 that Ch'ao-chou had to look to Amoy for rice supplies. See KCTTC:YC, 4/5/4, v.5, p.892.

148. KCTTC:YC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/5/14, v.6, p.12.

same amount as Foochow. He did not say exactly how much Chang-chou prefecture was in need, but he presumed that its demand would be greater because the prefecture had a larger population and a smaller amount of granary stock.¹⁴⁹

In a normal year, Foochow could produce one half of its needs. Another half, amounting to 500,000 *shih*, would be largely filled by the upriver rice from the three interior prefectures. In addition, Foochow needed to make new purchases for part of its 150,000 *shih* granary rice. Probably, some 100,000 *shih* might be procured from official shipments through Amoy. Other official purchases were also made every year for price-stabilization purpose.¹⁵⁰ I would say an amount of 100,000 *shih* for one month's consumption during the rice growing season was certainly necessary. This source of supply again depended largely on the official shipments through Amoy. To sum up, Foochow needed a supply of about 200,000 *shih* from official shipments or commercial rice in each normal year. In the case of Hsing-hua, an import through Amoy of about 250,000 *shih*, out of its total demand of one million *shih*, would be necessary in a normal year. As to the two southern prefectures, they required annually well over two million *shih*. Sixty to seventy-five per cent of outside support would mean an import of at least 1,200,000 to 1,500,000 *shih*. In other words, a rather conservative estimate of the rice deficit in the four coastal prefectures would range from 1,600,000 to 2,000,000 in each normal year, excluding upriver supplies for the Foochow deficit.¹⁵¹

149. KCTTC:YC, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/6/19, v.6, p.176.

150. Ch'üan and Kraus, pp.28-32. The diversion of the tribute rice to Fukien during the Yung-cheng reign, for example, was mostly for this purpose.

151. My estimate of the various percentages is based on the supply and demand conditions discussed elsewhere in this and the preceding two

Nevertheless, "normal" years did not often occur, let alone years of plenty. We can reasonably expect, therefore, that the actual volume of rice shipped would greatly exceed my minimum estimates, which are in any case already well above those of Ch'üan and Kraus. Taking into account also the re-exports to eastern Kwangtung and sometimes southern Chekiang, the volume of rice imported through the port of Amoy was even larger.

My estimates that annual shipments amounted to around one million *shih* from Taiwan, some 500,000 to one million *shih* from the Yangtze Valley, and possibly 100,000 from southern Chekiang would still indicate a shortfall on rice needed to meet local demand. The remaining portion could also be sought from other non-traditional sources, such as Kwangsi and Shantung.¹⁵² Of the total amount in a normal year, a minimum of about 300,000 *shih* came from the official shipments during the Yung-cheng period.¹⁵³ This left a considerable balance to be made up by the commercial rice flow within the Fukienese coastal network.

(...cont) sections. Another method of evaluating rice imports is to base them on population figures and consumption. During the Yung-cheng reign, the Chang-Ch'üan population was probably somewhere near 1.3 million (see Chapter II). At 3.3 *shih* per year (see Ch'üan and Kraus, p.62) the annual total consumption of rice would be 4.3 million *shih*. Presuming that sweet potato as a staple food would provide one half of the consumption (see Chapter II), they still needed 2.2 million *shih* of rice. Sixty to 75 per cent of it was imported. Overall, my estimate of the demand for import rice is close to the minimum mark, rather than the opposite.

152. Shipments from Kwangsi and Shantung are frequently mentioned during the Yung-cheng period. For examples, see CPYC, acting Kwangtung governor Yang Yung-pin 楊永斌, 10/4/1, 16, 4, 12 (p.5500); and KCTTC:YC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/11/28, v.7, p.38.
153. In an edict of 1727, emperor Yung-cheng ordered that a minimum of 200,000 *shih* of rice should be diverted from the tribute grain annually to Fukien. See CSL:ST, 73:8. Taiwan was obliged to send annual official shipments of over 80,000 *shih* to Fukien, as mentioned before.

One important aspect of the government rice shipments should also be pointed out here. As Ch'üan and Kraus have rightly indicated, government rice was intended more for the purpose of price stabilization than famine relief.¹⁵⁴ In other words, there would be scheduled sales of government rice each year direct to the consumers at prices lower than the market level.¹⁵⁵ A large portion of it had, however, found its way into the local markets, instead of going directly to consumers. Because the price-stabilization rice from the government granaries was sold at prices below market value, rich households (*fu-hu*)¹⁵⁶ profitted themselves by purchasing the government stock in bulk and re-selling it. Consequently, each government sale would mean great business (*ta-sheng-i*) for them. They were in a position to bribe officials to allow them to make such transactions. Interestingly, if their persuasion failed, they could incite public pressure to urge for lower prices. In 1727, governor-general Kao complained to the court that the provincial authorities in the past had worked to win local support by selling granary stock at a loss. Not only did Kao want to save the government granaries from eventual bankruptcy for over-subsidizing rice sales, he also saw that the malpractices had rendered the stabilization policy ineffective and, worse still, caused market prices to prevail. To stop the malpractices, he resorted to two measures. He would either hold back the sale until there was real necessity or fix a price high enough to discourage speculation by the rice merchants as middlemen, but still

154. Ch'üan and Kraus, p.28.

155. For price-stabilization sale, see *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'ichuo, 5/2/10, v.7, pp.442-47.

156. These rich households included both local gentry families and professional rice merchants.

able to serve the stabilization purpose. Having done this, Kao was severely criticized by anonymous posters (*ni-ming tieh*), which was a common practice in Fukien to vent dissatisfaction.¹⁵⁷

By establishing the fact that Foochow in normal years relied mostly on its upriver rice bowl and that Amoy was the entry point for the shipments from Taiwan and the Yangtze Valley would clear the two unsolved questions raised by Ch'üan and Kraus. After their charting the price variation in various regions and presuming Foochow as the entry port for the large shipments of rice from Soochow and Taiwan, they are first puzzled "by the relative lack of evidence" to indicate higher prices in Foochow than in Soochow, which should have been the case if rice did go in this direction in large volume.¹⁵⁸ They also have doubts about Taiwan's capability of supplying large amounts of rice "for the available Taiwan prices are close enough to the level of those on the rice deficit mainland."¹⁵⁹ Once we are certain that rice flowed directly from Soochow and Taiwan to South Fukien via Amoy, we can see that the lower prices in Soochow and Taiwan than in South Fukien guaranteed a profitable trade. Not only did Taiwan supply a larger amount of rice for Fukien, but its prices most of the time were lower than, or close to, those of Soochow.¹⁶⁰ Adding the factor of shorter distance, Taiwan was in a much more favourable and competitive position than Soochow.

157. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/12/20, v.7, pp.138-41; *ibid*, 5/4/4, v.7, pp.894-97; and *CSL:KH*, 246:17a-18a.

158. Ch'üan and Kraus, p.62.

159. *ibid.*, p.67.

160. For the rice prices in Soochow, see *ibid.*, pp.167-74.

Trade in Sugar and Other Native Products

Aside from rice, sugar was another important commodity which was traded in large volume. In fact, sugar had long been a product native to mainland Fukien. When the Fukienese agriculturists discovered that they could grow the cash crop in the frontier land of Taiwan, they were more than willing to plant it there, for the land was plentiful. During the Cheng regime, more than one million catties of sugar were exported to Japan each year.¹⁶¹ After the Ch'ing conquest, it was the sugar trade that first occupied a dominant position in the traffic across the straits.

In the 1720s, Taiwan produced more than one hundred million catties of sugar every year.¹⁶² It seems most of the production was for export.¹⁶³ The major market for Taiwan sugar was Soochow. Almost all of the second-grade sugar was shipped there, while the low-grade production went to Shanghai, Ningpo, and Chen-chiang.¹⁶⁴ Since two thirds of the total production was second- and third-grade sugar, it could possibly mean that a large portion of the one hundred million catties was sold in these cities.¹⁶⁵

161. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:9b.

162. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.21.

163. In the 1720s, there were at least 500 to 700 sugar-carrying junks arriving in Amoy from Taiwan each year. Often, the total exceeded these figures. See *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'ian, 3/10/25, v.5, p.297. The sugar-carrying junks were usually of larger size among the coastal ships (see the next section on shipping). If the average carrying capacity of the junks was 1,000 *shih* (one *shih* = 120 catties), then about 60,000,000 to one hundred million catties of sugar were exported from Taiwan each year.

164. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, pp.21, 57.

165. *ibid.*, pp.56-57. Governor Mao reported in 1725 that most of the Taiwan sugar went to Kiangsu and Chekiang. See *KCTTC:YC*, 3/10/6, v.5, p.248.

Sugar arriving in Amoy for transshipment to the northern provinces might also originate in mainland Fukien or even eastern Kwangtung. Unfortunately, no sources are available to calculate the amounts which were exported from these two regions.

Besides that to Kiangsu and Chekiang, sugar also formed the major shipments from Fukien to Tientsin. Thanks to the unusual practice of reporting the arrivals of Fukienese ships at Tientsin by the Chihli authorities in itemized detail, we are able to gain some idea of the sugar trade conducted by the Fukienese merchants. So far, I am able to locate ten reports from among the memorials between 1717 and 1732 (see Appendix B).¹⁶⁶ With one exception, all the other nine cases represented reports which were submitted shortly after each group of Fukienese junks and, therefore, did not indicate the total visits in each of those years. The exception is a memorial submitted on the 12th of January 1732. According to it, a total of 53 ships arrived during the period between 27 July and 20 October 1731. Eight of them did not carry any sugar among their cargoes. The remaining 45 ships transported sugar

166. These ten reports appear in (1) KCTTC:KH, Chihli G-G Li Fa-chia 李發甲, 56/6/?, v.7, pp.116-17; (2) KCTTC:YC, Chihli governor Li Wei-chün 李維鈞, 1/8/11, v.1, p.603; (3) KCTTC:YC, 2/9/1, v.3, pp.104-105; (4) KCTTC:YC, acting Chihli G-G Ts'ai T'ing 蔡珽, 3/9/1, v.5, pp.64-65; (5) KCTTC:YC, 3/9/7, v.5, pp.99-100; (6) KCTTC:YC, 3/10/3, v.5, p.243; (7) KCTTC:YC, Chihli G-G Li Fu 李紱, 4/9/22, v.6, p.632; (8) WHTP:KSSL, acting Chihli G-G T'ang Chih-yü 唐執玉, YC7/7/22, v.18, pp.17b-18a; (9) WHTP:KSSL, YC7/8/9, v.18, p.18; and (10) WHTP:KSSL, Chihli G-G Liu Yü-i 劉於義, 9/12/15, v.18, pp.21-26. The last three cases have been analysed in Kosaka Masanori 香坂昌紀, "Shindai zenki no engan bōeki ni kansuru ichikōsatsu - Tokuni Yosei nenkan Fukken-Tenshin ni okonawarete ita mono ni tsuite" 清代前期の沿岸貿易に関する一考察——特に雍正年間・福建——天津に行われていたものについて (A study of the coastal trade in the early Ch'ing period - especially concerning that between Fukien and Tientsin in the Yung-cheng reign), *Bunka* (Culture) (Sendai, Japan: Tōhoku University), 35:1/2 (Spring/Summer 1971), pp.28-65.

amounting to some 4.5 million catties. Among the total, first- and second-grade sugar occupied 2.2 million catties each, while the rest was rock-candy.¹⁶⁷ The average sugar shipment per junk was about 100,000 catties.

The material show that merchants from Chin-chiang, Lung-ch'i and T'ung-an were the most intensively involved in the sugar trade. In 1731, for example, their ships carried 1.23, 1.15 and 0.95 million catties of sugar to trade in Tientsin.

Rice and sugar aside, native products from the coastal regions represented a third category of cargo (see Appendix C). Ships arriving in Amoy from Taiwan would bring commodities such as sweet potato, indigo, beans and deer's meat, in addition to rice and sugar.¹⁶⁸ Goods available in Amoy were too numerous to be mentioned. The Amoy gazetteer provides a long list of items which were subject to customs duties. These goods were grouped under three categories, namely, clothing, eatables, and articles for use. Each category in turn was composed of hundreds of items, mostly being Chinese native products with some coming from the Nanyang.¹⁶⁹ Ships departing from Amoy were loaded with Fukien

167. For the three different gradings of white or fine sugar (*pai-t'ang* 白糖), dry brown-sugar (*sung-t'ang* 松糖), and wet brown-sugar (*wu-t'ang* 烏糖), see Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, pp. 56-57; and Kosaka Masanori, pp. 64-65. Three terms are used in the documents for the volume of sugar, namely, *lou* 篓 (crate), *pao* 包 (parcel), and *t'ung* 桶 (bucket). The first two represented respectively a weight of 170-180 and 130-135 catties. See Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p. 21; and Kosaka Masanori, pp. 58-59. No information is available to indicate the volume represented by the term *t'ung*. For the purpose of a rough estimate, I assume it to be around 100 catties. In the documents, only a small volume of cargo is indicated by *t'ung* and, therefore, the margin of error does not affect the total picture.

168. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p. 48.

169. HMC, 7:10b-32a.

and overseas products. Items such as indigo and shark's fins were sold in Shanghai. Cargoes to Shantung included earthenware, pine-boards, paper, pepper and sapanwood, while tea, silks and satin, cloth, earthenware, paper, wheaten food, pepper and sapanwood were among the shipments to Manchuria.¹⁷⁰ The Tientsin trade also indicates that, except for a few items of overseas goods like sapanwood, shark's fins (also found locally), pepper, tin, myrrh and frankincense, almost all the other items were Fukienese native products. The most general were preserves and candies, earthenware, paper, tea, tobacco, marine delicacies, medicinal herbs and fruits.

Fukienese merchants from the different districts often specialized in some particular items. Chin-chiang, for instance, had long been known as an earthenware producing area since Sung times. In the early Ch'ing, it continued to export a large quantity of bowls, in particular to other coastal regions and overseas.¹⁷¹ In the Tientsin trade, earthen bowls often represented the next most important shipment to sugar. Because of their trade with the Nanyang or their Amoy connections, Chin-chiang, Lung-ch'i and T'ung-an merchants were able to re-export sapanwood to northern regions. There were also other common export items. Tea was one of them, which was exported in large quantity. This indicates that Fukien was a major tea growing and export region in the early Ch'ing.

Cargoes for the return voyages were also abundant. The Fukienese brought back cloth, gauze and satin, silk, hat wear, animal grease, ham and wine from Soochow; silk gauze, cotton-silk, crepe silk, handkerchief and woolen yarn from Chekiang; cotton and straw-matting from Ningpo;

170. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.48.

171. Kosaka Masanori, p.54.

white wax, purple dye, medicinal herbs, pongee, wheat, beans, salt, meat, red dates, walnuts, and dried persimmons from Shantung; and medicinal herbs, melon-seeds, hazel-nut, sea-slugs, silver-fish, and dried mussels from Manchuria.¹⁷² Some of the items were sent to the Nanyang through Amoy or Canton, but a large quantity of them went to Taiwan along with other Fukienese native products. The latter comprised silk thread, Chang-chou gauze, velvets, paper, tobacco, cloth, straw-matting, bricks and tiles, pine-boards, iron vessels, umbrellas, loose-skinned orange, pomelos, green fruits, orange cake and dried persimmons from Chang-chou; earthenware and paper from Ch'üan-chou; pine-boards, bricks and tiles from Hsing-hua; pine-boards, dried bamboo-shoots and mushrooms from Foochow; and tea from Chien-ning.¹⁷³

From the above discussion, we find that a salient feature of the Fukienese coastal trade is the predominant position of local products and handicrafts among the commodities. The upsurge of domestic trade in daily necessities intended for popular consumption, instead of merely supplying a privileged class with luxury goods, was a direct result of long political tranquility and general social well-being after 1683. The development of Taiwan was undoubtedly the most important force generating this trade expansion. In the Yung-cheng period, the inter-regional coastal trade catering for daily consumption of the general masses had reached its maturity. The growth of the coastal trade also provided new markets for local products and handicrafts.

172. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, pp.47-48.

173. *ibid.*

3. COASTAL SHIPPING

The Development of Coastal Shipping

The period between 1683 and 1735 saw the growth of coastal shipping radiating from Amoy to other coastal regions and overseas. In the coastal sphere, the Fukienese were also able to establish their undisputed command.

When shipping activities resumed after the lifting of the maritime ban in 1684, not many private vessels were available for the seafaring trade. To remedy the shortage, the government at first sought to appropriate warships to transport goods along the coast. But Chi Ch'i-kuang, a magistrate of Chu-lo, set out the following problems with the government's plan. The narrow-bodied warships, designed for speed rather than heavy loading, were not as appropriate for commercial undertakings as were the merchant ships with their wide cargo compartments. A further difficulty in carrying out the plan came from the fact that the naval crews were inadequately prepared for transport and commercial navigation. Chi suggested instead that the merchant ships previously owned by Cheng officials, later confiscated by the Ch'ing and now anchored idly in the Amoy harbour, should be released.¹⁷⁴ The appropriation of these ships for commercial purposes remedied for a time the shortage in trading vessels.

The government's initial plan to use warships for transport was reintroduced in the early years of the eighteenth century. Because of famine in Fukien, a total of 300,000 *shih* of tribute rice was sent to Fukien from southern Kiangsu in 1710. The grain was first gathered at two assembly points. One was Lang-shan, located on the north bank of

174. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:9b.

the Yangtze in Kiangsu; another was Cha-p'u in Chekiang. Apparently, the authorities were not able to hire enough private ships and Fukien warships were summoned to transport the bulky cargo.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, problems of inadequate shipping facilities in the private sector disappeared within the following decade.

The expansion of coastal trade was not entirely without obstructions even after the lifting of the maritime ban in 1684. Under the new restrictive regulations, only small vessels with a loading capacity under 500 *shih* (35 tons) were permitted to sail.¹⁷⁶ The cross-beam of such vessels was no more than 9 feet in width.¹⁷⁷ They were built with one mast. In 1703, the restrictions were relaxed to allow merchants to sail with two-mast vessels, the maximum length of cross-beam was 21 feet. The number of crew was limited to no more than 28. The crew would be reduced in the cases of smaller vessels. When the cross-beam did not exceed 20, 18 or 15 feet, the total number of crew was not allowed to go beyond 24, 16 or 14 in each case.¹⁷⁸

As to fishing boats, their size was limited to a maximum of 12 feet for the length of cross-beam and they were built with only one mast. These vessels could employ no more than 20 crew.¹⁷⁹ In 1707, the court approved a recommendation by the Che-Min governor-general, Liang Nai, that the fishing boats should be allowed to use two-masts. The reason given was that the one-mast boats were not seaworthy. The court also

175. Ts'ai Shih-yüan, "Yü Che-chiang Huang fu-chün," *HCCSWP*, 44:24b.

176. *HMC*, 5:25a.

177. The size of vessels was measured by the length of its cross-beam (*liang-t'ou* 樑頭).

178. *HMC*, 5:16a.

179. *ibid.*

granted permission for the fishing boats to carry cargo.¹⁸⁰ In fact, Liang's petition was nothing more than a recognition of the practice prevailing on the coast. Prior to the relaxation, fishing boats were already involved in trade and transportation of cargo. However, Che-Min governor-general Pan Shih-ch'ung sought permission from the court in 1712 to reinstate the restriction on fishing boats. They were barred from crossing provincial boundaries in an attempt to control the increased piracy on the coast.¹⁸¹ Clearly, as revealed in a memorial two years later, the restrictive regulations were confronted by some problems. Among other things, the provincial authorities found it difficult to distinguish merchantmen, fishing boats, and pirate ships from one another. Therefore, the court instructed the provincial authorities that all the coastal vessels should be painted with a big Chinese character, either "shang" (merchant) or "yu" (fishing), in the front and the rear to indicate their licensed function. In addition, they were also required to paint the locality, serial number and shipowner's name clearly on both sides of the vessel. Each of the crew and passengers should hold a valid license (*chao*), in which all the individual's details were included. The fishing boats were prohibited from carrying commercial cargo.¹⁸²

The restrictions which were based on security considerations could hardly be effective. For one thing, the naval patrols had never achieved such strength that they could effectively control smuggling. Restrictive regulations inevitably ended up in even more notorious corruption. In

180. CSL:KH, 229:7a.

181. *ibid.*, 249:9b-10a.

182. *ibid.*, 258:11b-12a.

practical terms, the restrictions created additional problems in the area of adequate shipping facilities particularly after the turn of the eighteenth century when coastal trade developed with great speed. The frequent diversion of tribute grain to Fukien for the purpose of price stabilization also required large numbers of ships which could be hired at short notice. The role played in coastal shipping by vessels registered under fishing licenses helps explain the puzzle of how provincial officials were able to hire and assemble a large fleet for transporting government rice without much difficulty or disruption to normal commercial affairs.¹⁸³

Due to the increasing demand on shipping during the Yung-cheng period, a much more flexible policy was adopted to allow fishing or cargo licenses to be interchanged depending on the season.¹⁸⁴ The Fukienese fishing boats enjoyed a privileged position because they were allowed to use two masts, while the fishing boats in other provinces were of a small size and had only one mast.¹⁸⁵ Fukienese fishing boats were thus able to function legally as part-time commercial carriers and provided a large pool of vessels for hire.

In the meantime, the development of private shipping was gaining momentum. Coastal shipping, as well as overseas, was mainly in the hands of the Chang-Ch'üan people.¹⁸⁶ By the end of the seventeenth century,

183. In the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, fishing boats were not necessarily smaller than the merchant junks in size. Nevertheless, the fishing boats enjoyed cheaper license fees and sometimes could even avoid certain obligations applied to the merchant junks. The benefits had, in fact, tempted merchant junks to change over to fishing registration. See *HMC*, 5:22a, 24b. See also *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 3/10/25, v.5, pp.297-98.

184. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:12b; also *HMC*, 5:24a-25a.

185. *HMC*, 5:23a.

186. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.47.

they had already firmly established themselves and provided the major shipping services. In 1696, for example, when the government was looking for ships to transport grain to Manchuria,¹⁸⁷ the court immediately thought of the Fukienese ships. Emperor K'ang-hsi instructed the Fukien authorities to encourage more Fukienese merchant ships to trade to Tientsin so that the government could hire their ships on the spot for the said purpose.¹⁸⁸

During the Yung-cheng period, a fleet of private ships (*min-ch'uan*) could conveniently be assembled for emergency shipments. In 1727, the transport of 200,000 *shih* of government grain from Chekiang to Fukien was loaded in private ships hired by the provincial authorities and was carried in two separate shipments.¹⁸⁹ The first dispatch of 100,000 *shih* was transported in 48 ships in January-February of 1727 from Cha-p'u. Each ship carried an average of slightly more than 2,000 *shih*. Ships of this carrying capacity were quite large by coastal standard at that time. After a month's interval, the second shipment was due to depart. This time, an additional 68 ships were hired.¹⁹⁰ Mainly because of Fukienese trade in rice, silk, cotton and sugar with Soochow, Cha-p'u was a prominent shipping centre in the early eighteenth century. Shanghai, another shipping centre on the rise, had to rely on Cha-p'u for extra ships to dispatch emergency shipments of government rice to Fukien,¹⁹¹ but this was only an occasional practice.

187. By the 1720s, Manchuria had become a rice-surplus region. See Ch'üan and Kraus, p.77.

188. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:10a; also *CSL:KH*, 171:3a.

189. *KCTTC:YC*, Chekiang governor Li Wei, 5/1/17, v.7, p.309.

190. *KCTTC:YC*, Chekiang G-G Li Wei, 6/7/18, v.10, pp.862-63.

191. *ibid.*

Ships and Shipbuilding

Now I shall examine the types of ship the Fukienese were using during the first half of the eighteenth century. There is no doubt that the Taiwan Straits witnessed the busiest shipping activities. A 1720 edition of a Taiwan gazetteer records that there were several thousands of commercial vessels plying annually between Taiwan and the mainland.¹⁹² When all the various cargo ships are taken into account, the above claim is justified. Among them were sugar-carrying junks (*t'ang-ch'uan*). According to a report submitted by governor Mao Wen-ch'uan in 1725, there were at least 500 to 700 of these ships calling at Amoy each year. The actual number could be well above his figure.¹⁹³

As to their size, the sources do not provide any direct information. By the early nineteenth century, the *t'ang-ch'uan* were the largest ships engaged in coastal trade. They carried two masts or more and their cross-beam was most probably above 24 feet.¹⁹⁴ Vessels of this size were stoutly built and their loading capacity could reach 6,000 to 7,000 *shih* (420 to 490 tons).¹⁹⁵ I am quite certain that such was not the case in the 1720s, at which time the *t'ang-ch'uan* were much smaller. Two reasons support my judgment. First, as I have already explained earlier (see fn. 163), it is hardly possible that the transport of even as much as 60,000,000 to one hundred million catties of export sugar from Taiwan would require some 500 to a thousand sugar-carrying junks of that large

192. *T'ai-wan HC* (1720 ed.), p.67.

193. See fn.163.

194. *HMC*, 5:15b.

195. Lien Heng, p.529; also Yao Ying 姚瑩, *Tung-ch'a chi-lüeh* 東槎
記略 (A brief account of an eastbound voyage), *TWWHTK*, no.7 (1957),
p.23. The latter was written in 1829.

Plate 1. Chinese Junk: Amoy Type. In the Chinese MS (Comp. in 1726), *Lansdown 1242, Oriental*, in the British Museum. From I.A. Donnelly, "Early Chinese Ships and Trade," *The Mariner's Mirror*, 11:4 (October 1925), p.352.

Plate 2. Chinese Junks: engraving in *Recueil des voyages Comp. Indes Orient.* Pais-Bas (Amsterdam, 1725). From E.H. Blair and J.A. Robertson, eds., *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, v.25, p.116.

size. Second, as seen from those Fukienese junks calling at Tientsin (see Appendix B), it is unlikely that junks of 6,000 to 7,000 *shih* were normally used for coastal trade. Therefore, the *t'ang-ch'uan* in the 1720s most probably had a carrying capacity of between 1,000 and 2,000 *shih* (70 to 140 ton). Yet junks of this size were already considered medium or large in the coastal shipping of the time.

There were other merchant junks (*shang-ch'uan*) which did not specialize in sugar shipments. In the early nineteenth century, large merchant junks sailing across the Taiwan straits were normally more than 24 feet as at the cross-beam.¹⁹⁶ The largest ones would have a carrying capacity between 400 and 500 tons; even smaller merchant junks carried 150 to 200 tons of cargo.¹⁹⁷ However, smaller vessels were used in the 1720s. One source reveals that, in 1763, the large merchant junks plying between Taiwan and Amoy could possibly be some 24 feet in width, well over 120 feet in length, and about 24 feet in depth.¹⁹⁸ Their loading capacity was probably around 150 to 300 tons. They were already smaller than the large coastal junks by the turn of the nineteenth century. But the merchant junks in around 1720s were probably even smaller. The best evidence comes from the size of vessels employed in the long-range shipping from Fukien to Tientsin during the period between 1717 and 1732. My calculation (see Appendix B) shows that they carried less than 150 tons of cargo in almost all cases which can be calculated with any

196. HMC, 5:15b.

197. Yao Ying, *Tung-ch'a chi-lüeh*, p.23.

198. Chu Shih-chieh 朱仕玠, *Hsiao-liu-ch'iu man-chih* 小琉球漫誌 (Random notes on Hsiao-liu-ch'iu), TWWHTP, no.3 (1957), p.7. The writing describes the author's travel from Foochow to Feng-shan of Taiwan in 1763. The island of Hsiao-liu-ch'iu is located in the southeast of Feng-shan.

precision. It is quite unlikely that all of them were underloaded. The number of crew on these ships ranged from 14 to 24, indicating that they were of two masts and 14 to 20 feet in width. Even the largest ones among them were still in line with the 1703 regulations that the merchant junks on the coast should not exceed 21 feet in width.

My calculation that the long-range or large merchant junks on the coast carried usually up to 150 tons is given further support by a case mentioned in the memorials. It concerned two merchant junks of the "sea-bird" model,¹⁹⁹ which came to trade in Chiao-chou, Shantung on 4 September 1728. One of them was from T'ung-an. The other held a Ningpo license but its owner originated from Fukien too.²⁰⁰ The "sea-bird" junks had also been selected as one type of warship during the K'ang-hsi period as they were very fast.²⁰¹ Their carrying capacity varied from one to another. The largest model did not exceed 150 tons.²⁰² During the Yung-cheng period, these "sea-bird" junks were among those in use for long-range coastal shipping.

At the Amoy maritime customs, those with a cross-beam beyond 18 feet in width and a carrying capacity starting probably from 70 tons or more but, in most cases, within the stipulated limit of 21 feet and a carrying capacity of 150 tons, would fall under the category of large merchant junks (*ta shang-ch'uan*).²⁰³ This would include both the

199. The model was originally called "*niao-ch'uan*" 鳥船, meaning bird-shaped junks.

200. *KCTTC:YC*, acting Kiangnan G-G Fan Shih-i 范時繹, 6/9/21, v.11, p.394; and *KCTTC:YC*, Chekiang G-G Li Wei, 6/9/25, v.11, p.411.

201. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:9b. As a matter of fact, the warship designs were modelled after the merchant junks. See *HMC*, 5:1.

202. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:9b.

203. *Fu-chien sheng-li*, p.639; also *CPYC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 3/10/25, 2, 5, 30b (p.588). According to the former, ships were

t'ang-ch'uan and the other large merchant junks in the same class. They formed the core of the long-range shipping fleet on the coast. Smaller junks were used because the shipping regulations during the K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng period which limited the size but not the number of vessels trading on the coast, were more strictly enforced. It was also a period when Fukienese coastal shipping just reached maturity and gained supremacy. The shipping regulations concerned had, in fact, opened the way for the more active and wider participation by merchants or ship-owners with small or medium capital. Unlike their counterparts in overseas trade, these merchants and owner/operators had better chances for organizing their own voyage from a moderate start.

Lacking complete quantitative data, it is not possible to tell the number of large merchant junks. Between 1717 and 1731, altogether 98 visits to Tientsin involving 88 different coastal vessels are recorded in a set of memorials.²⁰⁴ It is very unlikely that only 10 of them paid a second visit to Tientsin and the puzzle can be attributed to incomplete records. But, it is likely that the arrivals of the 53 ships between 27 July and 20 October 1731, were the total visits by the Fukienese vessels in that year since this memorial represented an end-of-year report. Even so, Kosaka Masanori suspects that normally more Fukienese ships would have paid annual visits to Tientsin. But because of flood

(...cont) grouped into three different sizes for customs purposes: a large ship (*ta-ch'uan* 大船), if the cross-beam was beyond 18 feet, a medium ship (*chung-ch'uan* 中船), if the length fell between 8 and 18 feet, and a small ship (*hsiao-ch'uan* 小船), if the cross-beam was below 8 feet.

204. See Appendix B. The one Ningpo ship, which arrived in 1731, was also reported as a Fukienese ship (*Min-ch'uan* 閩船). The ships which showed up for a second visit are those in nos. 4 & 46, 5 & 20, 12 & 69, 17 & 72, 25 & 53, 26 & 49, 33 & 76, 38 & 88, 42 & 70 and 43 & 61. The majority of them were owned by Chang-ch'uan people.

conditions in North China during 1731 inevitably affecting local agricultural production and living standards, the regular interprovincial trade would have been less.²⁰⁵ There is no way to prove or disprove Kosaka's suggestion. Considering that the coastal trade began to gain momentum in the 1720s, I tend to regard the figure of 53 ships for the year 1731 as indicating a larger, rather than a smaller number of ships as suggested by Kosaka Masanori.

The Amoy gazetteer furnishes us several terms which were applied to the large merchant junks plying along the coast and across the Taiwan Straits. Those sailing from Amoy to points north were called "north-bound ships" (*pei-ts'ao*), and those to points south were called "south-bound ships" (*nan-ts'ao*). The merchant junks travelling between Amoy and Lu-erh-men in Taiwan were known as "straits-crossing ships" (*heng-yang ch'uan*).²⁰⁶ While the gazetteer is describing the early-nineteenth-century conditions, I believe such terms were already in existence during the late K'ang-hsi and the Yung-cheng periods, when the terms *ts'ao* and *heng-yang* were widely known.²⁰⁷ The word "*ts'ao*" originally designated one of the several models of the coastal junks called "*ts'ao-ch'uan*" and was to become one of the most widely used types among the coastal merchant junks.

Understandably, smaller merchant junks were more numerous. *P'eng-ch'uan* or *p'eng-tzu-ch'uan* was one popular type. They were built with

205. Kosaka Masanori, pp.42-43.

206. HMC, 5:15b.

207. The word *ts'ao* comes from "*ts'ao-ch'uan*" 艚船, one type of merchant junk. See, for example, CPYC, Kwangtung G-G Oh-mi-ta 郭彌達 and governor Yang Yung-pin, 12/10/8, 17, 6, 56a (p.5996). The Straits of Taiwan was popularly known as *heng-yang* 橫洋 because ships sailing between Amoy and Lu-erh-men had to cut across the strong current. See Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.9.

flat bottoms. Until the late Yung-cheng period, they carried a single mast.²⁰⁸ In the following two decades, they were mostly with two masts. Their cargo capacity ranged from 30 to 60 tons.²⁰⁹ They provided ideal transport in shallow waters. Another widely used model was the *san-pan-tou* which carried a single or two masts. The capacity ranged from 20 to 50 tons.²¹⁰ Both the *p'eng-ch'uan* and *san-pan-tou* were Fukienese creations and used by them on the coast. During the late K'ang-hsi period when *san-pan-tou* were still built with a single mast, they already represented over 70 per cent of the merchant junks sailing between the various port towns and Lu-erh-men on the west coast of Taiwan. The rest were other larger junks with two masts.²¹¹ During the Yung-cheng period, both *p'eng-ch'uan* and *san-pan-tou* were commonly used on the Taiwan coast.²¹² At that time, their functions also began to increase. On the one hand, they became the main carriers of smuggled rice and sugar, departing directly from Pen-kang and Lu-tsai-kang to Fukien on the other side of the straits, without calling at Lu-erh-men, the designated port of departure.²¹³ On the other hand, legal exports of rice from Taiwan

208. CPYC, Chekiang G-G Li Wei, 8/3/10, 13, 4, 100b (p.4489). The Chinese characters for the ship are given as 彭仔船 or 艚船.

209. Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC (1752 ed.), p.121.

210. The name is written as 三板頭 in Chinese. See *ibid.*, also Ch'en lun-chiung, H'ai-kuo wen-chien lu, ch'uan 1:5a. Written during the Yung-cheng period, Ch'en stated that the cargo capacity of *san-pan-tou* was 30 to 35 tons. Like other merchant junks, which were built larger in the following decades, the capacity of the large *san-pan-tou* had reached 50 tons, as mentioned in Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC (1752 ed.), a source edited only two decades after Ch'en's work.

211. Chu-lo HC (1717 ed.), p.124.

212. CPYC, Chekiang G-G Li Wei, 8/3/10, 13, 4, 100b (p.4489).

213. Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC (1752 ed.), p.61; and Huang Shu-ching, T'ai hai shih-ch'a lu, p.34.

were mostly shipped by either *p'eng-ch'uan* or *san-pan-tou* throughout the eighteenth century.²¹⁴

As mentioned earlier, fishing boats (*yü-ch'uan*) played an equally important role in commercial shipping. It was particularly so among those junks classified as *pai-ti-chü-ch'uan* or *chü-ch'uan*. They could have either single or double masts. The smaller ones were about 8 feet wide, with cargo capacity of about 35 tons. When the maritime ban was lifted in 1684, junks that were allowed to go to sea belonged to this or a smaller category. The large model of *chü-ch'uan* carried two masts and were about 8 to 12 feet wide, presumably with a capacity of 35 to 70 tons.²¹⁵

In the eighteenth century, many junks of this model came to Lu-tsai-kang from Amoy to smuggle rice back, avoiding Lu-erh-men.²¹⁶ Various types of fishing junks also visited the Chekiang coast during winter and spring when more than a thousand of them arrived in Chekiang waters.²¹⁷

They could be conveniently employed by merchants to transport cargo.²¹⁸ Although there is no direct evidence available, I believe that these fishing junks provided many required services particularly for rice transshipments from Chekiang to Fukien.

Fukienese shipping also extended from Amoy to Canton and Macao. Unfortunately, there are few available materials to support a concrete discussion. Between Amoy and Ch'ao-chou there were 300 to 400 junks trading in rice in the early eighteenth century.²¹⁹ Judging by the fact

214. KCTTC:CL (unpublished), Min-Che G-G Ts'ui Ying-chieh 崔應階, 33/7/8.

215. HMC, 5:21b, 25a, as in Chinese 白底船 or 船船.

216. Fu-chien sheng-li, p.662.

217. *ibid.*, pp.605, 625.

218. HMC, 5:23a.

219. CSL:KH, 270:16a; also MCSL:TP, p.774a.

that these rice junks employed a crew of 30 to 40 each, their capacity could be around 70 tons (1,000 *shih*) or more. Very likely, they were either large-size *ts'ao-ch'uan* or *chü-ch'uan*. During Yung-cheng times, Fukienese *ts'ao-ch'uan* together with another type of vessels called *ku-ch'uan* were reported among other ships trading at Ch'iung-shan (Hainan) and other Kwangtung ports.²²⁰ The *ku-ch'uan* model was built in different sizes, with the names *ku-tzu-ch'uan* for the small size probably under 35 tons of capacity,²²¹ and *ku-tzu-t'ou* for the large size. The latter was known for its swiftness because of its high mast and wide sail.²²²

Clearly, the expansion of the coastal shipping network had inspired the Fukienese to invent all these different models to suit the various navigational conditions on the coast. With these ships, they were able to penetrate into the remote areas on the coast of Taiwan, where they navigated in shallow waters to collect native products from the village wharfs, or to undertake long-range voyages to Tientsin or Manchuria to transport bulky cargoes. Their expertise in navigation also enabled them to surpass other provinces in the shipping industry. Their ship models were popular along the coast; even the government warships were modelled after them. In 1730, for example, the central court ordered the building of four *p'eng-ch'uan* for the Tientsin naval force.²²³ Up until the late eighteenth century, warships basically adopted the designs used by the large-size Fukienese merchantmen called *kan-tseng* or the smaller model

220. CPYC, Kwangtung G-G Oh-mi-ta and governor Yang Yung-pin, 12/10/8, 17, 6, 56 (p.5996).

221. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.34.

222. HMC, 5:22b. The different names for the *ku-ch'uan* model are written as 船, 船仔(小船), and 船仔頭 in Chinese characters.

223. CPYC, Chekiang G-G Li Wei, 8/3/10, 13, 4, 100b-101a (pp.4489-4490). All these four ships were built in Fukien.

of fishing junks called *kan-chü*. The latter were probably based on the model of *chü-ch'uan* sailing between Amoy and Lu-tsai-kang. When the government decided in the late eighteenth century to phase out the two models of *kan-tseng* and *kan-chü* because of their clumsiness in movement, the new design still adopted another Fukienese model of merchantmen called *T'ung-an-so*.²²⁴

The government's dependence on the technology and experience of the private shipbuilders was further underscored by the court's decision in 1725 that the government shipyards should all be located in the maritime centres for easy access to materials and skills provided by the private shipping industry. In the early decades of the Ch'ing, three such shipyards were constructed in Fukien at Foochow, Chang-chou and T'ai-wan-fu.²²⁵ The one in Chang-chou prefecture was probably located in Hai-ch'eng, the most prominent shipbuilding centre in Fukien during the eighteenth century.²²⁶ Among the three, the Foochow shipyard suffered a shortage of skilled workers and could maintain its production only with the employment of Ch'üan-chou men.²²⁷ The establishment of the Foochow shipyard was clearly based on considerations of Foochow's administrative status and its construction was in fact at the expense of a more suitable site in Ch'üan-chou prefecture. The inconvenience of sending Ch'üan-chou skilled craftsmen to build ships in Foochow was rectified before long. In 1729, therefore, governor-general Kao recommended that Ch'üan-chou should have its own government shipyard to build warships for

224. 趕船, 趕船 and 同安梭 as in Chinese. HMC, 5:1. After all, the Fukienese merchantmen were not intended for the use as warships, but for the transport of bulky items.

225. *ibid.*, 5:3a.

226. *Fu-chien sheng-li*, p.641.

227. HMC, 5:3b.

the naval stations in Quemoy and Hai-t'an. After the proposal was accepted, it seems that the shipyard was first located in Ch'üan-chou city, and then moved to Amoy in 1736.²²⁸

Unfortunately, the smooth development of Fukienese shipping technology was frustrated from time to time by the government's unfounded suspicion, based not on anti-commercialism, but on political timidity. The authorities in 1747, for instance, found it necessary to ban the production of the *ku-tzu-t'ou* model by private Fukienese shipbuilders. The *ku-tzu-t'ou*'s advantage in speed was seen by the authorities as a threat that undermined the effectiveness of the naval force since the naval ships were unable to catch them whenever action was taken against any suspicious activities at sea.²²⁹ The restriction on the width of the cross-beam also handicapped the possibility of technological improvements. The relatively small size of the coastal junks during the late K'ang-hsi and the Yung-cheng period is not surprising given the court's determination to control maritime affairs. Although breaches in the regulations were common, the restraints remained. To evade the restrictions, shipbuilders found that they could enlarge the bottom part of the cargo compartments without lengthening the measurement of the cross-beam; capacity was increased at the expense of speed. Governor-general Hao Yü-lin in 1733 had suggested that cross-beam measurement was impractical, but his vagueness in making the point led to no concrete action.²³⁰

228. *ibid.*, 5:3b-4a.

229. *ibid.*, 5:22b.

230. *KCTTC:YC* (unpublished), Fukien G-G Hao Yü-lin, 11/4/5.

Fukienese ships were confronted by problems of seaworthiness as a result of technological defects. Shipwrecks were common among coastal and ocean junks.²³¹ A Chinese scholar, Chao Ou-peï, had already noticed sometime in the middle of the Ch'ien-lung period that Chinese junks were inferior to their Western counterparts in both stoutness and speed.²³² The South Fukienese were, nevertheless, paramount in eighteenth-century China's shipping industry, coastal trade and overseas commerce. The coastal shipping they built up was capable of coping with the commercial needs of the time and was the best that the Chinese had created.

Shipping Routes

In this final section, I shall describe some of the technical aspects of the Fukienese shipping operation. The crew composition on each ship was similar to that during the late Ming period.²³³ Each crew member was charged with a specialized duty. Their leader on board was of course the ship's captain (*ch'u-hai* or *ch'uan-chu*).²³⁴ He supervised the over-all navigation. Under him was a helmsman (*to-kung*). Other personnel took charge respectively of direction (*ya-pan*), lines for sails (*liao-shou*), anchor (*ssu-ting*), small boat(s) for landing use (*ssu-san-pan*), and food (*tsung-p'u*), in addition to more than 10 or 20 general sailors.

231. For example, among the 19 Fukienese junks coming back from the Nan-yang in 1728, only 13 of them arrived in Amoy on time without trouble. Two others were blown to Kwangtung, though no damage was caused. Another three were wrecked by storm beyond repair, while the last arrived in the vicinity of Macao with a broken mast. See KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 7/3/27, v.12, pp.751-52.

232. Chao Ou-peï 趙爾北, *Yen-p'u tsa-chi* 簪曝雜記, in PCHSTK, series 7, v.4, p.2474.

233. The case in the late Ming was described in Chang Hsieh, *Tung-hsi-yang kao*, 9:1b-2a.

234. *Ch'u-hai* 出海 or *ch'uan-chu* 船主 was called *po-chu* 舶主 in the late Ming. See *ibid*.

MAP 7. COASTAL CHINA

A large ocean junk employed more people. Among them were clerk cum treasurer (*ts'ai-fu*) in charge of money and cargo, one general manager (*tsung-han*), and two experts handling the compass (*huo-chang*).²³⁵ The two compass experts possessed handwritten seacharts and they guided the ship along proper sea-routes.²³⁶

To determine the distance along a sea-route, a standard unit, *keng* (or *ching*), was in use. Originally, *keng* denoted time rather than distance. Thus, one day was divided into 10 *keng* and each *keng* represented 2.4 hours. A standard *keng* could be measured by using a clepsydra or burning incense sticks. The theoretical distance that a ship could cover in one *keng* was slightly more than 40 *li* (about 13 nautical miles). Obviously, not all ships had the same speed. Therefore, one *keng* was in fact a standard distance of about 40 *li*.²³⁷ In other words, the nautical distance between two points of navigation was uniformly indicated by the term *keng*. To travel the same number of *keng* would often require different lengths of time, depending on the current and wind conditions.

As we have seen above, Amoy was the centre of the radiating shipping routes in the Fukienese coastal network.²³⁸ The sea-route between Amoy and Lu-erh-men was one of the trunk lines. The distance was measured as 7 *keng* between Amoy and Peng-hu, and 5 additional *keng* from Peng-hu to Lu-erh-men. It took more than one day to travel the distance between Amoy and Peng-hu under the most ideal conditions. Normally, two or even several days were necessary. For example, when Yü Yung-ho was on an official mission from Fukien to Taiwan in 1697, it took him almost ten

235. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.17.

236. *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC* (1752 ed.), p.51.

237. My explanation of *keng* is based on *ibid*.

238. *HMC*, 4:45b.

days to reach the prefectural capital of Taiwan. He boarded the ship from Amoy on March 8, but the ship could only set sail three days later for Ta-tan Island, situated only 20 li away when favourable winds prevailed. There were already another 12 ships waiting there for wind. The ships were able to depart for Peng-hu on March 13. Yü's ship and some others arrived there the following day. Because of problems with the current, Yü was only able to reach the prefectural capital on March 17 and arrived together with six other ships. The rest arrived three to seven days later. The last one missed the right wind and current but finally managed to cast its anchor at the harbour ten days after Yü had arrived.²³⁹ Normally, however, the sea-routes between Amoy and Taiwan were navigable the whole year round.²⁴⁰

Two other trunk lines also extended along the mainland coast. They were known as the South-Ocean Sea-Route (*Nanyang hai-tao*) and the North-Ocean Sea-Route (*Pei-yang hai-tao*).²⁴¹ The former went south to Kwangtung. Interprovincial shipping connected Amoy with Ch'ao-chou, Canton, Macao or Hainan in Kwangtung. On the interprovincial sea-route to the north, ships would first reach Chusan, an offshore island in Chekiang. From there, ships followed different courses to get to their respective destinations. Some entered the port of Ningpo, while other ships might go to Cha-p'u. The distance between Amoy and Ningpo was measured as 37 *keng*, and the sea-route going from Chusan to Cha-p'u covered a distance of 4 *keng*.

239. Yu Yung-ho, *Pi-hai chi-yu*, pp.4-9.

240. *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC* (1752 ed.), p.76.

241. *HMC*, 4:35-45; Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, pp.15-16; and *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan HC* (1752 ed.), pp.61-62.

Chusan was also the divergence point for ships going further north. Ships left there and followed a separate sea-route to Shanghai, which was 47 *keng* from Amoy (560 nautical miles in modern shipping). Other northbound ships bypassed Shanghai, taking the eastern tip of Ch'ung-ming Island at the Yangtze estuary as another navigation landmark, and sailed directly to Chiao-chou in Shantung province. It was about 34 *keng* (400 nautical miles) from Shanghai to Chiao-chou. Another sea-route headed for Ch'eng-shan-t'ou, a landmark for the seafarers, at the eastern extreme of Shantung. It was 32 *keng* away from Shanghai. From there, ships would either sail north to Lü-shun (Port Arthur), 11 *keng* away, at the southern tip of Manchuria, or go westward to Tientsin. The long-range voyage from Amoy to Tientsin covered a sea-route of 112 *keng* (1310 nautical miles in modern shipping). There were also sea-routes connecting Lü-shun or Tientsin with other seaports on the coast of Manchuria.

Shanghai towards the late eighteenth century had become a divergence point for the North-Ocean Sea-Route. The portion between Amoy and Shanghai was called Near Northbound Lines and the extended routes beyond Shanghai were known as Farther Northbound Lines.²⁴² The divergence point at Shanghai, or at Cha-p'u during the earlier decades of the eighteenth century, in my opinion, indicates the existence of two shipping spheres in the Fukienese coastal network north of Amoy. Ships visiting the ports of Chekiang and Kiangsu would not have enough time to go further north before the change of monsoon. In other words, the long-range shipping which went beyond Shanghai should take a direct course

242. Kosaka Masanori, p.45; also *Tan-shui T'ing-chih* 淡水廳志 (A gazetteer of Tanshui subprefecture) (1871 ed.), TWWHTK, no.172 (1963), p.299.

from Amoy to Chusan, passing by the eastern tip of Ch'ung-ming Island, and sailing straight to the northern ports in Shantung, Chihli or Manchuria.

As seen from the *keng* distance, it would ideally take less than 20 days to sail from Amoy to Tientsin. But unforeseen weather conditions often delayed the journey. More importantly, the coastal navigation was determined by the seasonal reversal of wind direction. The sources on Tientsin trade show that Fukienese ships were arriving in Tientsin during the period when the southwest monsoon prevailed, roughly between late July and October.²⁴³ From the beginning of the northeast monsoon sometime in October-November, the ships were able to embark for the return voyage to the south. Thus, the first ships from Tientsin would be arriving in Amoy around December. A second return trip was impossible because of the contrary monsoon. Even a medium-range voyage to Ningpo would take at least six months for a return trip. Other destinations further north required more time to make a return trip.²⁴⁴

The ships which returned to Amoy were not necessarily lying idle in the harbour, waiting some five months for the next season to go north again. During the first half of the year, the ships back from the north could make several other voyages between Amoy and Lu-erh-men. If the demand existed, they could even make one additional southbound shipment to Kwangtung. Ships which arrived early in Tientsin could also be hired to make an extended return trip between Tientsin and the ports in Manchuria. The possibility of extended voyages is in accordance with the claim by the Amoy gazetteer that the Fukienese ships:

243. Also *WHTP:KSSL*, v.18, p.21; and *CSL:KH*, 213:9a.

244. *HMC*, 6:7b. See also Hosea Morse, *The Chronicles*, v.1. pp.116, 302 and 305.

journeyed northward to Ningpo, Shanghai, Tientsin and Chin-chou, southward to Kwangtung, and also to Taiwan. Each year they were able to make several voyages.²⁴⁵

245. HMC, 15:5b.

CHAPTER V

MERCHANTS

1. SHIPOWNERS AND CARRIERS

Because maritime trade was lucrative, ownership of merchant junks was regarded by the South Fukienese as a form of investment¹ and one of the best ways of becoming wealthy.²

The sources mention that the cost of a small boat ranged from several ten to several hundred taels;³ a small merchant junk might cost more than a thousand. The price rose to several thousand taels or more for larger ships,⁴ in which case the mast alone could cost a thousand taels.⁵ Although it is impossible to be more precise, these figures give some idea of necessary outlay for purchasing a vessel. Needless to say, only people of wealth could afford to own them and some rich families often built more than one vessel. Frequently, two or more people pooled their capital to form a partnership and construct a junk to be owned in common.⁶

1. *KCTTC:CL* (unpublished), Min-Che G-G Ts'ui Ying-chieh, 33/9/1.

2. Lan Ting-yüan, "*Nan-yang shih-i lun*," 83:39a.

3. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 87-40a.

4. See fn.1. Lan Ting-yüan was more precise in this regard by saying that a sea-going junk would cost 4,000-5,000 taels to build. Refer to his "*Nan-yang shih-i lun*," 83:38a. Also *HMC*, 15:5b.

5. Lan Ting-yüan, "*Nan-yang shih-i lun*," 83:39a.

6. See fn.1; *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 87:30a; and *HMC*, 15:10a.

The government, however, imposed strict controls over shipbuilding. Before a new ship was built, the intended investor was required under a regulation of 1703 to apply to the local *hsien* or *chou* authorities, who would subsequently investigate the applicant's background. A license to build a ship was only issued to well-to-do and law-abiding persons.⁷ The local authorities required a guarantee of his reliability from the headmen of both the local harbour and his native village, together with one from the applicant's neighbours. When the ship was constructed, the local authorities inscribed a registration number and the owner's name on the sides of the ship. A separate license gave more detailed information of the owner's particulars (including age, his description, name, place of origin and occupation), the cross-beam measurement, and the total number of crew.⁸ The complexities facing the shipowner (usually called *ch'uan-hu*) did not end here. A 1707 regulation required that every ten ships pledge to guarantee the others and be responsible for their conduct and activities while at sea.⁹ The maritime regulations further stipulated that the shipowner should have his vessel guaranteed by a firm commissioned by the authorities located at the port of departure.

As I have indicated earlier, both the coastal and overseas trade was mainly controlled by the South Fukienese. The detailed information on the Tientsin trade enables us to trace their places of origin by prefectures and districts (see Appendices B and D1). Among the 96 ships

7. HMC, 5:16a; and FCTC (1868-1871 ed.), 87:30a.

8. HMC, 5:16. The crew were also required to be fingerprinted. See also KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, Fukien governor Ch'ang Lai, and Kwangtung governor Yang Wen-chien 楊文乾, 6/1/8, v.9, pp.566-67; KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/1/8, v.9, p.568.

9. HMC, 5:22a.

for which we know the place of origin, almost half of them came from Ch'üan-chou prefecture. A further breakdown shows that 30 per cent of these ships were registered in Chin-chiang and 19 per cent in T'ung-an. Twenty-one ships, or 22 per cent of the total, were from Chang-chou prefecture; all of them were registered in Lung-ch'i. The remaining ships originated from outside of South Fukien. Among them were 17 ships from Min-hsien (18%), 8 from P'u-t'ien (8%), and one each from Fu-ch'ing, Ch'iung-shan, and Ningpo (3%).

While information on the Tientsin trade proved to be far from complete, data of this sort about other areas of trade are as rare. From various sources I attempted to gather together names of Fukienese merchants and shipowners (see Appendix D2) and found only 13 others who were engaged in coastal trade during the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung period. Among them, 6 came from Chin-chiang, 2 from T'ung-an, 1 each from Lung-ch'i, Hai-ch'eng and Chang-p'u, and 2 from P'u-t'ien. The distribution pattern was similar to that of the Fukienese merchants going to Tientsin. For comparing purposes, we might also note that, for the same period some other 23 Fukienese names were mentioned as engaged in the Nanyang trade. 4 were from Chin-chiang, 5 from T'ung-an, 5 from Lung-ch'i, 8 from Hai-ch'eng, and 1 from Ningpo, who was originally a T'ung-an man. In other words, while the Ch'üan-chou people were in a stronger position in coastal trade, the Chang-chou merchants led their Ch'üan-chou counterparts by a margin of 13 to 10 in overseas trade.¹⁰ We can see, therefore, that the Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou merchants

10. Although the impression is based only on the scanty sources available, it does confirm my discussion in Chapter II of the leading role played by the Chang-chou merchants in the area of the Nanyang trade in the pre-nineteenth-century period.

played an important role in both the coastal and overseas trade.

Depending on individual cases, some shipowners conducted their own business using their own ships; some might rent their ships to other businessmen, while many others served mainly as carriers.

In the first situation, a shipowner might or might not accompany his ship personally. A well-established merchant would no longer feel it necessary to go to sea by himself; he could remain at home as financier (*ts'ai-tung*). What he had to do was to assign a captain (*ch'u-hai* or *ch'uan-chu*) to take charge of the ship and journey on his behalf.¹¹ In such a case, the captain might be his kinsman, a partner, or merely a hired employee. This practice was particularly common in the Nanyang trade, where large junks were normally required and the owner investor needed considerable capital. Coastal trade exhibited a variety of patterns. During Yung-cheng times, the shipowner would more often accompany his ship, even in the cases of larger merchant junks. This was partly because of the regulations. Otherwise, port officials would have had more excuse for their exactions and there would be greater risk of detection by naval patrols when the ship sailed from one port to the other. In addition, most of the junks visiting neighbouring regions were small and coastal trade was their owners' main occupation.

The shipowner might, however, have to rent his ship to others, either because he was no longer active in maritime trade,¹² or because he had run into financial difficulty.¹³ Nevertheless, the Ch'ing government discouraged the practice of renting ships to other non-owner

11. HMC, 15:5b.

12. Lan Ting-yüan, "*Nan-yang shih-i lun*," 83:39a.

13. See fn.1.

operators. The 1703 regulations explicitly stipulated that the authorities should grant a shipbuilding permit only to an applicant who would go to sea himself. A person who rented his ship to other operators would face a penalty and the local officials would also be held responsible. According to the regulations, the officials concerned would have their allowance terminated for one year. If the officials attempted to cover up for the shipowner, they could be demoted two grades.¹⁴ The reason the government adopted such strict rules was to ensure that all shipping movements could be traced and controlled. In practice, however, the regulations were often ignored. As reported by Lan Ting-yüan in the early 1720s, the local authorities did not or were not able to enforce the restrictions; shipowners continued to let other people operate their ships whenever necessary.¹⁵ The practice did not change much during the Ch'ien-lung period. If a shipowner found himself financially exhausted after acquiring a ship, he could not help but rent his ship out. The local authorities eventually had to face the reality and relax the rules. Ships would then be leased, provided that the renters registered themselves with the local authorities before their departure from the port. Both the shipowner and the renter were held responsible for any illicit activity.¹⁶

Finally, shipowners could serve as carriers. The rapid development of coastal trade from the beginning of the Yung-cheng period had promoted specialization among business people. More shipowners could rely on the booming carrier trade which did not require much extra capital after the

14. HMC, 5:16-17.

15. Lan Ting-yüan, "Nan-yang shih-i lun," 83:39a.

16. Refer to fn.1.

acquisition of the ship. Although he might normally bring along his own cargo to the destination for sale, the shipowner basically acted as a carrier for other shippers. Often, the whole ship was hired by one merchant, who was usually present during the voyage.

Since the volume of rice and sugar exports from Taiwan to or through Amoy was extremely large after the early 1720s, the carrying trade expanded rapidly. Normally, the cost of carriage was determined by distance, cargo value, and the cargo's profitability at the market. In the early nineteenth century, the carriers charged between Tls.0.25 and Tls.0.5 for every picul (100 catties) of cargo, depending on the nature of the shipment, between Taiwan and Amoy.¹⁷ What, then, were the commercial rates during the 1720s? Relevant information is scarce. One reference indicates that the carriers were paid at the rate of Tls.0.14 for shipping one picul of rice from Taiwan to southern Chekiang, a longer distance than to Amoy.¹⁸ According to other information, we know that the authorities paid Tls.0.08 per picul for the shipment of government rice from Taiwan to Amoy in 1727.¹⁹ Two years later, the government decided that the shipments should be in the form of unhulled rice and the new fixed rate was lowered to Tls.0.06 per picul.²⁰ There is reason

17. HMC, 6:8a. The rates are recorded as between Tls.0.3-0.6 for every *shih* of cargo. Presuming the unit *shih* here is a measure of weight equal to 120 catties (see Ch'üan and Kraus, p.79), I arrive at the amounts of Tls.0.25 and 0.5 for every picul.

18. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.23. The source does not specify which part of Chekiang the rice was shipped to, but, based on my discussion in the previous chapter, it is likely that the destination was southern Chekiang because the northern part relied on supplies from the lower Yangtze region. Again, I have converted the measure unit *shih* (138.75 catties) to picul (100 catties) for the convenience of comparison.

19. MCSL:WP, p.102b.

20. *ibid.*

to believe that the fixed rate was well below the commercial one. We find that this fixed rate remained almost unchanged in the following one hundred years. By the early nineteenth century, for example, the value of the government rate was only about 20 per cent of the commercial charge.²¹ In any event, it is safe to say that the commercial rate for shipping one picul of rice from Taiwan to Amoy in the 1720s was somewhere between the range of Tls.0.06 and Tls.0.14. Since the government rate was Tls.0.06 per picul, and if we assume this to have been roughly 50 per cent of the commercial charge when this rate was first fixed, then we can estimate the rate for the shipment of commercial rice from Taiwan to Amoy at Tls.0.12 per picul. This rate represented about 10 per cent of the average rice price at the Taiwan market during the period from 1727 to 1729.²²

It seems that a charge of 10 per cent of the market price in Taiwan for the shipping cost from Taiwan to Amoy was also applied to sugar. For example, one picul of sugar from Taiwan to Soochow cost about Tls. 0.12 for shipping in the early 1720s, or 10 to 15 per cent of the market price in Taiwan.²³ Therefore, a 10 per cent charge for the shorter shipping distance to Amoy would be reasonable. Since the sugar prices in Taiwan ranged from Tls.0.8 to 1.4 per picul in the early 1720s,²⁴ the carriers would be able to collect an average of Tls.0.11 for every picul of Amoy-bound sugar.

21. Yao Ying, *Tung-ch'a chi-lüeh*, p.25.

22. See Appendix A.

23. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.21. The sugar prices in Taiwan at that time were Tls.0.8-1.4, depending on the quality.

24. *ibid.*

Among the three patterns of operation I have just discussed, no statistical data is available to show which of them was the most prevalent. It is very likely that ships visiting the neighbouring regions of southern Chekiang and Kwangtung were commonly conducted by the owner-operators. Many of them were merchants of only moderate capital.²⁵ The practice of ship renting could not have been widespread during the Yung-cheng period as it was vigorously discouraged by the authorities. Comparatively speaking, to serve as a carrier was the most attractive alternative for the owners of moderate capital. They also did not have to bear the risk of price speculation. The carrying coastal trade was quite different from that practiced in the Nanyang trade. In the latter case, the consignment system, known by the term *fu-ta*, was more common. The shipowner or captain invited others to provide cargo for shipment at the port of call at home or overseas. He also took orders from people to buy goods and bring them back when he returned.²⁶ As Jennifer Cushman has pointed out, the captain played a role as an agent on behalf of the investors.²⁷ At the same time, travelling merchants (*huo-ke*) were also invited to share the cargo compartments of the ship.²⁸ As ocean ships

25. KCTTC:YC, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/10/2, v.6, p.684; KCTTC:YC, Fukien naval commander Lan T'ing-chen, 5/1/19, v.7, p.324; and CPYC, Kwangtung G-G Oh-mi-ta and governor Yang Yung-ping, 12/10/8, 17, 6, 56a-57b (pp.5996-97). All the ships mentioned in these memorials were conducted by owner-operators (*ch'uan-hu* 船戶). Some ships carried cash in amounts of slightly over 100 taels. One of them had about 70 taels plus over a hundred pieces of clothing on board. Only one case was said to have about 500 taels in cash in addition to twelve buckets of *hsia-pu* 夏布 (grass-cloth produced in Fukien) and over a hundred pieces of clothing. (See Oh-mi-ta's memorial.)

26. The term *fu-ta* 附搭 is seen in MCSL:KP, p.525b.

27. Jennifer Cushman (1975), p.143.

28. The information on *huo-ke* can be seen in KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/1/8, v.9, p.568; *ibid.*, 7/3/27, v.12, p.752; and CPYC, Fukien G-G Hao Yü-lin, 11/12/26, 17, 4, 101b-103a (pp.5914-15). According to the sources, the captain took care of such matters like

often had a larger cargo capacity and as the investment was also greater, a pool of capital and a corporate effort were necessary. On the coast, in contrast, the whole ship was often hired by a single merchant, as we shall see in the following discussion.

2. TRAVELLING MERCHANTS

The term *huo-ke* introduced in the last paragraph indicates only one category of travelling merchants. While it often implies merchants with small or moderate capital, who shared the cargo compartments with others, it can also refer to travelling merchants in the long-range coastal trade, who were well-established people with considerable amounts of capital. They were not necessarily shipowners; it had, in fact, become convenient for them to hire ships for their maritime business. Usually these merchants would purchase the goods and hire the transport at the same time.²⁹

With regard to travelling merchants in the long-range coastal trade, the sources on Tientsin's trade are revealing (see Appendix D1). In the first available memorial reporting the arrival of two Fukienese ships at the harbour of Tientsin in 1717, the owner-operator's name is mentioned in each case. It is likely that the cargo on the first ship was owned by the shipowner and his crew.³⁰ For the second ship, two passengers

(...cont) license application and customs clearance (see Hao's memorial). *Huo-ke* is also mentioned in coastal trade; see KCTTC:YC, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/10/2, v.6, p.684.

29. Tan-shui t'ing-chih 淡水廳志 (Gazetteer of Tan-shui subprefecture) (1871 ed.), TWWHTK, no.172 (1963), pp.298-99.

30. The memorial indicates that the crew (*shui-shou* 水手) brought along 10,000 earthen bowls.

were also reported on board. Possibly, they were travelling merchants accompanying their cargo to Tientsin.

Significantly, the remaining nine memorials from 1723 no longer mentioned the junk owner's name. In his place, a merchant's name was reported in addition to the number of crew. The only exception is ship no.7 registered in Lung-ch'i (series no.: Lung 300) in which a passenger's name was given. Clearly, they were travelling merchants going to Tientsin with their cargo. The question is whether they were owner-operators or whether they had hired the ships. Of the total 98 visits, ten ships appear twice in the memorials. There are only two occasions when the same ships were accompanied by the same merchants (see ship nos.5 and 20, 17 and 72). In three other cases, we find that a person on the second voyage with the surname and with one character of the given name the same as that of the person from the first voyage (see ship nos.4 and 46, 12 and 69, 42 and 70). This indicates they may have been members of the same family or clan.³¹ For the rest, a different merchant was on board the ship paying the second visit.³² This would suggest, therefore, that Kosaka Masanori is right in his conclusion that many of the Fukienese merchants hired out their ships for the Tientsin trade.³³

Normally, reports on the shipping movements would indicate the owner-operator's name on each occasion. For example, when Chin Lung-shun went to Chiao-chou in 1728, he was on board his T'ung-an-registered

31. The two names in ships nos.12 and 69 (沈德萬 and 沈得萬) could be the same person. Both are pronounced exactly the same except the middle characters are written differently.

32. Refer to ship nos.25 and 53, 26 and 49, 33 and 76, 38 and 88, 43 and 61, Appendix D1.

33. Kosaka Masanori, p.51.

junk (series no.: T'ung 1279).³⁴ Chin also traded in Tientsin in 1731. This time he sailed in a different ship (series no.: Shun 181, or ship no.61 in Appendix D1). He is identified as a *shang-jen* or merchant, instead of a *ch'uan-hu* or owner-operator. He had probably hired the ship because the same ship also visited Tientsin two years earlier (ship no. 43) when it was managed by a merchant named Fan Ts'ang-sheng. The practice of reporting the merchant's name rather than the owner-operator's is likely to have arisen because most of the ships coming to Tientsin were on a hire basis. Since there was only one merchant on each ship, he was probably the sole investor and the one who hired the ship. It was more appropriate to mention the merchant who was not only on board but also in possession of all the cargo.

There is, however, at least one case in which we can be sure that the name of the business firm was given in the reports in lieu of personal name. This is the name Te Lung Hao in ship no.37. Another name, Chin Lung-shun, could also be a doubt because the word "Chin" was a common character that prefixed the name of a partnership, as indicated in the Amoy gazetteer.³⁵ Among the rest of the names on the list, while some are likely to have been personal names, others look like firm names, as Kosaka Masanori has suggested. Such characters as Te, Wan, Li, Hsing and Sheng are often chosen by the Chinese for the names of business shops because of their auspicious meaning.³⁶

One possible explanation for the appearance of Te Lung Hao in the report is that the merchant was better known in his native district by

34. KCTTC:YC, acting Kiangnan G-G Fan Shih-i, 6/9/21, v.11, p.394.

35. HMC, 15:10a.

36. Kosaka Masanori, p.48.

his firm name and, therefore, registered under it.³⁷ This would also explain the use of what appears to have been a firm name. The name Chin Lung-shun, for example, was probably known in business circles as a personal name. He often traded to Chiao-chou in Shantung province. In 1728, his junk was mistaken by the naval patrol for being involved in illegal activities. A broker in Chiao-chou, Wang Yüan-sheng, testified on his behalf and claimed that Chin was his old acquaintance and customer. The authorities also checked the personal description as recorded in his trading licenses and were satisfied that Chin was truly a properly registered merchant.³⁸ The possibility should not be ruled out that Chin Lung-shun was originally a business name. When people became more familiar with the firm, they began to call the owner by the name of his firm. Whether merchants were using their business names or personal ones, there is little doubt that each of them accompanied the ship and cargo to Tientsin.

We also have evidence which indicates that members of the same family or clan made trading voyages to Tientsin. They were probably

37. It was common for the Chinese to use or be called by the firm's name. See, for examples, *T'ai-wan ssu-fa shang-shih pien* 台灣私法商事編 (The customary laws in Taiwan, section on commerce), TWWHTK, no.91 (1961), pp.280-81.
38. *Chin* 金 could either be a surname or a common prefix for a partnership. Even if the word *chin* prefaced a firm's name, it was not necessarily a partnership. To put it in another way, while the Fukienese often used the word *chin* to indicate a partnership because *chin* was not only an auspicious word (meaning gold), but also similar in appearance to the character *ho* 合 (meaning joint, combination), not all the *chin* firms were partnerships. See *ibid.*, pp. 271-83. The same materials also indicate that *chin* appeared quite often as a surname, and it was also frequently used to designate the ship and its owner or captain. For the reference to Chin Lung-shun's case, see KCTTC:YC, Sung-chiang commander Po Chih-fan 柏之蕃, 6/9/17, v.11, pp.377-78; KCTTC:YC, acting Kiangnan G-G Fan Shin-i, 6/9/21, v.11, p.394; KCTTC:YC, acting Shantung governor Yüeh Chün 岳尊, 6/9/22, v.11, pp.400-402; and KCTTC:YC, Sung-chiang commander Po Chih-fan, 6/12/5, v.11, pp.916-17.

representing a family firm. The various merchants named K'o seem to fall into this category. Their names were K'o Ying-hsing, K'o Yung-sheng, K'o Yung-shun and K'o Yung-sheng³⁹ from the same district of Lung-ch'i. K'o Yung-sheng^a came to Tientsin by the same ship (series no.: Ning 184, or ship nos. 17 and 72) in 1725 and 1731. He was also in Tientsin in 1724, but the memorial does not mention which ship he arrived on. Both K'o Yung-sheng^b and K'o Yung-shun used the same ship (series no.: Ning 295) in 1729 and 1731 respectively. They might either have owned or hired the same ship on these two occasions. Finally, K'o Ying-hsing's arrivals in Tientsin were recorded twice in 1723 and 1731. He came by different ships (series nos.: Lung 675 and Ning 182, or ship nos. 6 and 71). In 1731, K'o Yung-shun, K'o Ying-hsing and K'o Yung-sheng^a all came individually to trade in Tientsin on three separate ships (ship nos. 70, 71 and 72). The K'o case is particularly revealing in the sense that it indicates that even in a prosperous business family, several members might still personally go to sea.

Although relevant sources are again scanty, a rough idea of the travelling merchants' capital and profit can be provided. In the late eighteenth century, it was estimated that a large merchant junk in coastal trade would carry a shipment of cargo worth "several thousand taels."⁴⁰ During the 1720s and 1730s, however, a smaller amount of investment seems to be the case. Of the 98 voyages to Tientsin, we are given details of their cargoes and quantities for 73 of them. I excluded 15 ships from my calculation because they carried considerable amounts of

39. The second and the last K'o Yung-shengs used different Chinese characters for the *sheng*. They will be distinguished in the discussion as KYS^a and KYS^b.

40. *Fu-chien sheng-li*, p. 703.

paper products of which I was not able to determine either the value or volume. According to my calculation, 50 per cent of the 58 ships carried a cargo valued at between Tls.1,000 and 2,000. Some 41 per cent of them were loaded with commodities worth Tls.2,000 to 4,000. Only about 4 per cent of the ships carried a value between Tls.4,000 and 5,000, while the remaining 5 per cent transported some Tls.500-1,000 worth of cargoes (see Appendix E).

Moreover, a travelling merchant did not have to pay out the entire cost of the cargo. When he acquired the commodities from a broker at the seaport, credit was used. During the Yung-cheng period, the regulations of broker's firms in Amoy stipulated that a purchaser was required to pay initially only one half of the total cost for the goods. The balance would be cleared on the merchant's return from the trade.⁴¹

Compared with the junks trading with the Nanyang, the cargo investment in each voyage overseas was often ten times larger than that of a long-distance domestic shipment. Nevertheless, each coastal junk usually represented an investment by a single travelling merchant. His capital might not be as large as that invested by a wealthy consigner in the Nanyang trade, but a travelling merchant, particularly in long-distance coastal trade, often possessed larger capital than many of the travelling merchants who carried a few hundred taels to do business in the Nanyang. In addition, there were well over a thousand junks of various capacities engaged in coastal trade, compared with about 30 leaving Amoy annually for the Nanyang during the Yung-cheng period. In terms of popular participation and total investment then, the coastal trade operated by the Fukienese merchants could compete with their overseas

41. CPYC, Fukien G-G Hao Yü-lin, 11/2/20, 17, 4, 62a (p.5894).

business in importance. In this respect, the travelling merchants had made their significant contribution to Fukien's prosperity.

As to the profits derived from each voyage, the Amoy gazetteer indicates that merchant junks of 150 to 500 tons in domestic trade "would yield a profit of several thousand taels in each shipment."⁴² The information basically describes conditions in the early nineteenth century during which larger junks were used on the coast. Since the capital necessary for investment in such large junks would also amount to several thousand taels,⁴³ the profit was around 100 per cent. For the Yung-cheng period, a profit of 100 per cent might also be necessary to make the long-range voyages worthwhile, although the actual amounts might not often have been as much as "several thousand taels" because smaller junks were used. However, this percentage of profit was certainly not the case in the rice trade between Taiwan and Amoy, as we have seen from the price difference between these two places. A profit of some 20 per cent might possibly be made from each voyage, except during such times as 1726-1727 when there was a great deal of speculative activity in South Fukien and eastern Kwangtung. Since several voyages could be made in a year, the total annual profit could also be quite high.

3. RICE AND SUGAR MERCHANTS IN TAIWAN

Since the outbound ships from Taiwan and Amoy to other coastal regions were loaded mainly with either rice or sugar, merchants who were involved in trading these two commodities represented a very important

42. HMC, 6:7b.

43. *Fu-chien sheng-li*, p.703.

business group. The rice and sugar merchants of Taiwan provide us with concrete examples of their role in the coastal traffic.

The rice merchants in Taiwan lived mostly in either administrative seats or coastal towns. Many of them were landowners (*yeh-hu*). A landowner in the 1720s might collect rent in rice of ten thousand *shih*. Even a small landlord received at least 200 to 300 *shih*.⁴⁴ They did not have to cultivate the land themselves, nor did they have to go to the villages to collect rent. Instead, the tenants were required to transport the grain to the administrative seat or the nearby harbour. Otherwise, the landowner would hire someone to do the job and charge his tenants the transport fees. In Chang-hua, for instance, the tenants transported the grain paid as rent to the district capital or to the port of Lu-tsai-kang.⁴⁵ These landowners, no doubt, controlled much of the harvest and were in a good position to hoard it for higher prices. Governor-general Kao once commented:

[These landowners] hoard rice and raise the price. Whenever the government intends to purchase from them, they say they have no stock. When the travelling merchants want to buy, they have to pay the price fixed by these hoarders. The landowners should bear part of the responsibility for the high prices.⁴⁶

Another group of rice dealers consisted of millers (*lung-hu*) who resided on the coast. According to a memorial submitted in 1727 by governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, there were well over one thousand rice

44. KCTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/7/8, v.8, p.479.

45. If the landowner arranged the transport by bullock carts, the tenants were charged Tls.0.05 per *shih* as cartage. See Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan ta-tsu tiao-ch'a shu 清代台灣大租調查書 (A survey of 'large rents' in Taiwan during the Ch'ing period), TWWHTK, no.152 (1963), pp.59-63.

46. See fn.44.

millers in Taiwan. Governor Mao described their activities as follows:

The rice merchants from mainland Fukien came to them for supplies [of rice]. Whenever they have a large stock of hulled rice, the millers say that today they will reduce the price by three *fen* (Tls.0.03) or five *fen* for every *shih*. Then all the miller households in the area will cut the price by three *fen* or five *fen*. If they do not keep large stocks, they will say that today they have to increase the price by one *ch'ien* (Tls.0.1) or two. Then all the miller households will do the same.⁴⁷

The report indicates that these millers organized themselves effectively as a professional group at least on the local level. They often hoarded stocks until they were able to obtain good offers. They were in such a strong position to manipulate rice prices that the outgoing governor, Mao Wen-ch'üan proposed in July 1727 to break up their solidarity by moving all of them from their local strongholds to the prefectural capital.⁴⁸ The provincial officials must have discussed the matter for some time and differed among themselves about what should be done. At the end of December, the new governor, Ch'ang Lai, sent another memorial to oppose his predecessor's recommendation, saying that the measure was impracticable. The removal of the millers to the prefectural capital would only have resulted in higher prices because rice would then have to go through more channels before the final transaction. Governor Ch'ang said that the presence of these rice merchants on the coast near the producing areas in fact facilitated the shipments and thus benefitted the customers and the travelling merchants who came to them.⁴⁹ There is no sign to show that Mao's suggestion had even been put into practice

47. KCTTC:YC, outgoing governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 5/6/4, v.8, pp.298-99.

48. *ibid.*

49. CPYC, Fukien governor Ch'ang Lai, 5/11/17, 5, 2, 40 (p.1359).

and the rice millers continued to be active at the source of supply.

The distinction between landowners and millers is not always clear. In many cases, a landowner was at the same time both a miller and a grain dealer, though there was a trend towards specialization. The activities of these two groups help to explain the rice prices in Taiwan markets, and strengthen my previous argument that the one flat price given in the memorials for the whole prefecture is always misleading. Both the landowners and the millers were well informed as to the demand on the mainland and would not lightly reduce their manipulation of the price. The higher prices reported in the memorials were largely a result of these speculative activities rather than from a shortage of supply. A censor with special duties in Taiwan, So-lin, had clearly raised this point in 1726, when rice prices were soaring.⁵⁰ The high profits to be made had also been pointed out by the governor-general Kao in the following year. In that year, as mentioned above, the government intended to purchase up to 700,000 *shih* of rice from Taiwan. The rice merchants, including the landowners, began to hoard stocks, expecting that a rise of several *ch'ien* per *shih* in rice price would immediately turn out to be a great profit of perhaps one hundred thousand taels or more in total.⁵¹

The sugar trade appears to have functioned in a similar manner. In the upper reaches of the trading network in Taiwan, wholesale dealers in rice and sugar held a predominant position. Their shipping connections enabled them to act as the major exporters and importers of other native

50. KCTTC:YC, Censor with special duties in Taiwan So-lin 索琳, 4/7/6, v.6, p.258.

51. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/2/10, v.7, p.445.

products as well. According to a survey by Ts'ai Kuo-lin written at the turn of this century when Taiwan was under Japanese occupation, three commercial guilds (known as *san-chiao*) were formed in 1725 in Taiwanfu by merchants from Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou.⁵² They were respectively called Pei-chiao (North Guild), Nan-chiao (South Guild) and Kang-chiao (Native Guild). The Pei-chiao was headed by the Su Wan Li firm and included in its membership more than 20 business firms. The exports by the Pei-chiao from Taiwan were mainly sugar, which was shipped through Amoy to Ningpo, Soochow, and Tientsin. In the return shipments, they brought cloth, silk and other products to Taiwan. The Nan-chiao was led by the Chin Yung Shun firm and there were altogether more than 30 members. They exported rice, sesame, beans, sugar, and other local products to Amoy, Ch'üan-chou, Chang-chou and other ports in Kwangtung province. From Fukien and Kwangtung they shipped back to Taiwan commodities such as tobacco, cotton cloth, paper products, china-ware and other imported goods from overseas. The Kang-chiao conducted trade on the Taiwan coast. The Li Sheng Hsing firm became the leader of this group, which was composed of more than 50 firms.⁵³

Doubt has been raised by Fang Hao about the credibility of Ts'ai Kuo-lin's survey because the latter does not mention his sources.⁵⁴ According to Fang Hao, the guild under Li Sheng-hsing's leadership was,

52. Inō Kanori 伊能嘉矩, *Taiwan bunkashi* 台灣文化史 (A cultural history of Taiwan) (Originally 1928; reprinted; 3 vols.; Tokyo, 1965), v.3, p.4. For the text of the survey, see *T'ai-wan ssu-fa shang-shih pien*, pp.11-12.

53. *T'ai-wan ssu-fa shang-shih pien*, pp.11-14.

54. Fang Hao has contributed a series of articles on *chiao* organizations in Taiwan. See, for example, Fang Hao 方豪, "T'ai-nan chih chiao" 台南之「郊」 (The *chiao* in Tainan), *Ta-lu tsa-chih* 大陸雜誌 (Continental magazine), 44:4 (April 1962), pp.177-99.

in fact, called T'ang-chiao (Sugar Guild), instead of Kang-chiao. Fang Hao bases his argument on three stone inscriptions discovered in Tainan, showing the names Pei-chiao, Nan-chiao and T'ang-chiao. These inscriptions were erected respectively in 1765, 1772 and 1780, and they mentioned the names of the three guilds for the first time. For this reason, Fang Hao also claims that these three guilds must have been founded in those years.⁵⁵ In fact, these three dates represent only the times when the stone inscriptions were erected and do not indicate the founding years of the guilds. The 1765 inscription clearly relates how the member firms of Pei-chiao started to renovate a temple in 1763. It is also recorded in another inscription erected in 1774 that a board member of Pei-chiao contributed to the reconstruction of a bridge in 1754.⁵⁶ In the years just mentioned, these guilds were already firmly established.

There is other evidence which would support Ts'ai Kuo-lin's claim that the three guilds were established in the early eighteenth century. It is about the headquarters of these merchant guilds in Taiwanfu, called San-i-t'ang (The Hall of Three Advantages).⁵⁷ The guild hall, where the members held their meetings, was attached to a temple. According to an inscription, the guild hall was already in existence in 1741.⁵⁸ The same inscription also reveals that the temple which was devoted to worship of a sea guardian was a gathering place for the

55. *T'ai-wan nan-pu pei-wen chi-ch'eng* 台灣南部碑文集成 (A collection of stone inscriptions from southern Taiwan), TWWHTK, no.218 (1966), pp.69, 91 and 124. Also Fang Hao, pp.180-81.

56. *T'ai-wan nan-pu pei-wen chi-ch'eng*, p.92.

57. *T'ai-wan ssu-fa shang-shih pien*, p.12.

58. *T'ai-wan nan-pu pei-wen chi-ch'eng*, pp.29-30.

"even without guild regulations."⁶¹ Yang's explanation does not fit the case of maritime Fukien where, I would argue, the word *hang* is more related to the term *ya-hang* (broker firm). The government issued a broker's license (*ya-t'ieh*) to a broker and expected him to control trade on behalf of the government. He was to ensure proper conduct in the matter of prices, weights and measures, and quality. He was also to be responsible for recording the details of the customers and the amount of goods in the transactions.⁶² In the case of maritime Fukien, the word *hang* means simply an authorized firm and the term *hang-shang* denotes an authorized merchant.

Fu I-ling's studies are more relevant in this regard. According to him, some of the Fukienese sea-merchants in Ming times acted as authorized brokers (*ya-shang*), appointed by the government to manage foreign trade. They were called shopkeepers (*p'u-shang*) in Hai-ch'eng, the maritime centre of the time.⁶³ When the travelling merchants came back from their overseas trading voyages, they were not allowed to unload their cargo. The authorized shopkeepers would go on board the ship instead to purchase from (*chieh-mai*) the travelling merchants. After the shopkeepers had paid the customs duties for the cargo, they were allowed by the customs officials to unload the goods.⁶⁴ Since the shopkeepers actually made purchases, I would say that they were in this sense more like wholesalers than brokers. According to Fu I-ling, the Ch'ing authorities inherited the Ming institution in Fukien.⁶⁵

61. *ibid.*

62. *TCHTSL*, 765:1a, 3b, 7b and 14a.

63. Fu I-ling (1956), pp.132-33 and 200.

64. Cited in *ibid.*, p.133 from Chang Hsieh, *Tung-hsi-yang k'ao*, 7:2b-3a.

65. Fu I-ling (1956), p.201.

Although there is no direct evidence, I suspect that the authorized shopkeepers (*p'u-shang*) in Ming Fukien were selected from among the registered shopkeeper households (*p'u-hu*). Once a family started a business or accepted appointment as an authorized broker, its name would be recorded in the shopkeeper-household register. Such status was kept from generation to generation. These households were required to supply the local yamen with all kinds of necessities, often at below the market price or even free. In the early decades of the Ch'ing period, such practices remained unchanged. Chou Liang-kung (1612-1672), a prominent scholar and Fukien provincial treasurer, petitioned for abolition of the *p'u-hu* system.⁶⁶ Apparently, within the local household registration, the shopkeeper category was maintained, but more as a classification of trade or profession than to prolong the previous malpractices.

After the founding of the Ch'ing dynasty, *hang* merchants would probably have continued to be appointed from among the shopkeeper households. Wealth, business experience, and good official connections were three basic prerequisites for the appointment.⁶⁷ As authorized merchants, the *hang* households were placed in the forefront of maritime business. In the Yung-cheng period, the *hang* merchants overshadowed shopkeeper households without *hang* status and were mentioned more frequently in the sources.

In the eighteenth century, the two categories of shopkeeper households (*p'u-hu*) and *hang* households (*hang-chia*) existed side by side in

66. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 57:36b.

67. All these conditions are implied in *KCTTC:KH*, Fukien naval commander Shih Shih-p'iao 施世驃, 55/9/6; *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/1/8, v.9, pp.568-69; *TCHTSL*, 765:1a; and Yang Lien-sheng, pp.193-94.

Amoy, as is clearly indicated in a 1728 memorial.⁶⁸ The merchant, Wang P'ei-hsing, serves as a good example. In 1735, Wang was mentioned as a *hang* merchant,⁶⁹ but he was called a shopkeeper twenty years later.⁷⁰ Presumably, he had resigned his appointment as a *hang* merchant in his old age. A 1757 record mentions that Amoy was the home of numerous shopkeeper and *hang* households.⁷¹

From the 1720s, further specialization among the merchants in the handling of maritime trade was underway accompanying the booming business on the coast and in the Nanyang. Originally, the authorized firms dealing with foreign goods were called *yang-huo hang*. They were both exporters of native products to the Nanyang and importers of foreign goods for domestic trade; in other words, they controlled both coastal and overseas trade.⁷² Among all the authorized firms, the *yang-huo hang* were the most numerous in Amoy, as reported in governor Mao Wen-ch'üan's memorial of 1726.⁷³ The increasing volume of trade on the coast had led the authorities to decide that it was necessary to diversify the functions of the resident merchants in Amoy. In 1727, a new ruling stipulated that all the overseas trade should be placed under the management of the ocean *hang* (*yang-hang*) and the coastal trade under the management of the merchant *hang* (*shang-hang*).⁷⁴ While we do not know the number of

68. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/1/8, v.9, pp.568-69.

69. KCTTC:YC (unpublished), Foochow Tartar-general A-erh-sai 阿爾賽, Che-Min G-G Hao Yü-lin, Fukien governor Lu Chuo 盧焯, and Fukien naval commander Wang Chün, 13/4/18.

70. MCSL:KP, p.725.

71. CSL:KT, 537:34.

72. Fu I-ling (1956), p.205.

73. KCTTC:YC, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/3/10, v.5, p.689.

74. HMC, 5:28a and 31a. The source does not indicate when the *shang-hang* first began to take charge of the coastal trade. According to

hang in Amoy at that time, we do know that all the ocean *hang* in Fukien were located in Amoy.⁷⁵ According to the Amoy gazetteer, the ocean *hang* in the year 1796 were reduced to 8, and the merchant *hang* numbered more than 30.⁷⁶ It is likely that the number of merchant *hang* had increased towards the end of the century because of the expansion of coastal trade. On the other hand, the source also implies that the original number of the ocean *hang* was much more. Considering the great number of firms authorized to handle foreign goods during the early Yung-cheng period, the *yang-hang* business should have been much more prosperous then.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, the division of labour among the different merchant categories was not that clear-cut. In the first place, it was in the interest of the officials to ensure competition. Certainly, there was always room for other merchants to share the profits through official connections. For example, the shopkeeper households could still assert considerable influence in matters of maritime trade and perform duties normally required of the *hang* merchants. In 1728, a group of

(...cont) the Amoy gazetteer, they had done so well before the late eighteenth century (see *ibid.*, 5:31a). Fu I-ling holds the view that it started at the same time as the *yang-hang* were authorized to manage the overseas trade. See Fu's *Ming-Ch'ing shih-tai shang-jen*, p.205.

75. *MCSL:KP*, p.533a.

76. *HMC*, 5:30b-31a.

77. I believe my interpretation in this paragraph has shed some light on the puzzling question of the rise of *yang-hang* in Amoy. Both Liang Chia-pin, in *Kuang-tung shih-san hang k'ao* 廣東十三行考 (A Study of the thirteen *hang* of Kwangtung) (Shanghai: Kuo-li pien-i kuan, 1937), p.84, and Fu I-ling, in *Ming-Ch'ing shih-tai shang-jen* p.202, follow the account in Hosea B. Morse, *The Chronicles*, p.176. According to them, the actual beginning of the *yang-hang* system in Amoy was in 1724, when a group of Chang-Ch'üan merchants retreated to Amoy from their operations in Canton. I, however, have emphasized the internal factors of Amoy trade; following the expansion of maritime business in the 1720s, the diversification of their activities was but a natural result.

shopkeepers led by Chang Yü-i was able to persuade the naval commander, Lan T'ing-chen to petition the governor-general on their behalf for the relaxation of some regulations so that the travelling merchants and crew could obtain their sailing permits in Amoy instead of going back to their native districts for the purpose as stipulated.⁷⁸ They also had governor Ch'ang Lai's support,⁷⁹ though they failed to convince the governor-general.⁸⁰ Two other shopkeepers, Cheng Ning-yüan and Wang P'ei-hsing, were mentioned in 1754. In the previous year, a Spanish ship from Luzon suffered damages in a storm. After it was repaired in Amoy, the subprefect's yamen instructed Cheng and Wang to look for a Chinese junk trading in that area so that it could accompany the Spanish ship back to Luzon. They were also told to hire some Chinese crew to help sail the Spanish ship.⁸¹ In this case, Wang P'ei-hsing continued to be accepted by the local authorities as a respected senior merchant in Amoy, though he no longer held the *hang* status, as I have already mentioned earlier.

There was another important government-assigned function performed by both the shopkeepers and the *hang* merchants. The authorities expected them to act as security merchants (*pao-chia*) in maritime business. In the first few decades of the Ch'ing dynasty, commercial firms in Hai-ch'eng and Shih-ma had already been involved in the security business, giving guaranty for ocean ships. After 1683, all the security business was moved to Amoy.⁸²

78. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/1/8, v.9, pp.568-69.

79. CPYC, Fukien governor Ch'ang Lai, 6/1/8, 5, 2, 44b-45a (pp.1361-62).

80. Refer to fn.78.

81. MCSL:KP, p.725.

82. HMC, 5:28a, 29b. Also Fu I-ling (1956), p.201.

After the new maritime restrictions were introduced in 1717, the security system became more complicated. In 1718, upon the recommendation of the Che-Min governor-general, Chüeh-lo-man-pao, not only the ship, but also all the travelling merchants on board, were required to be guaranteed by the security merchants.⁸³ When the maritime ban was lifted in 1727, governor-general Kao further recommended that all the seafaring people should first seek guaranty from their neighbours in their native districts. The local authorities would issue them licenses with personal details. The port officials at the departure point would check these documents and grant them sailing permits.⁸⁴ Clearly, the new measure created a great deal of inconvenience. Although the governor-general insisted on his original plan, it seems that the travelling merchants had no difficulty in seeking guaranty in Amoy with the tacit approval of the Amoy authorities. The regulations had to be relaxed eventually in 1731 when coastal ships registered in Lung-ch'i, Hai-ch'eng, Chang-p'u and T'ung-an were all to be guaranteed in Amoy. Even the seafaring people could obtain their licenses there provided they had good reasons for doing so.⁸⁵

A guarantor was held responsible for any breach of laws by his client. In 1733, for instance, when a *hang* merchant, Cheng Shui of Amoy, heard that his client Ts'ai Tsu was helping to propagate Catholicism among the Chang-Ch'üan people, he immediately reported the case to the subprefect's office to avoid punishment.⁸⁶ Other guarantors were not as

83. CSL:KH, 277:19a.

84. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/1/8, v.9, pp.568-69; and CPYC, Fukien governor Ch'ang Lai, 6/1/8, 5, 2, 44b-45a (pp.1361-62).

85. HMC, 5:17.

86. KCTTC:YC (unpublished), Fukien G-G Hao Yü-lin, 11/12/26.

fortunate. *Hang* merchant Ch'en Jou-yüan was in trouble when his client Shih Hsiang-shui, an owner-operator, was caught by the authorities in 1731 before he could manage to smuggle out of Amoy some 61 piculs⁸⁷ of iron and 127 illegal emigrants to Luzon.⁸⁸ Another case occurred in 1736. A security merchant, Wu Nan-chen of Amoy, stood guaranty for a Hui-an ship owned by Ch'en Wu-sheng. Ch'en's ship was assigned to transport a government shipment to Taiwan. On the return voyage, the ship carried a shipload of government rice. This time, the ship was guaranteed by another security merchant in Taiwan, who was called Kuo Wan-ying. A storm caused the ship to drift to Luzon. The ship's captain sold the government rice there. When the trial was conducted four years later, both the two security merchants were to be punished by flogging for their failure to guarantee the right person; the sentence was later reduced.⁸⁹

All the above guarantors were *hang* merchants. I believe every *hang* merchant was qualified to be a guarantor. After 1727, all the ocean junks leaving Amoy for the Nanyang were, in theory, guaranteed by the ocean *hang* in Amoy,⁹⁰ and the coastal junks by the merchant *hang*.⁹¹ It was for this reason that the security merchants were normally called *hang* guarantors (*hang-pao*). But, in practice, other well-established shopkeepers would also be accepted by the authorities as guarantors for

87. The unit is written as *tan* 擔 in the text, a load of 100 catties. See Ch'üan and Kraus, p.79.

88. KCTTC:YC (unpublished), Fukien naval commander Hsü Liang-pin 許良彬, 9/3/15.

89. MCSL:KP, p.705.

90. HMC, 5:29b.

91. *ibid.*, 5:31a; also Fu I-ling (1956), p.205.

the seafarers. For example, after the shopkeepers (*p'u-hu*) in Amoy complied with the subprefect's instruction to arrange for an ocean junk to accompany the Spanish ship back to Luzon, Cheng Ning-yüan stood guaranty for the junk owner.

In this regard, the guaranty system in Amoy was not entirely the same as that in Canton. In the latter case, the most prominent security merchants were called *pao-shang*. The system began in the 1730s mainly to stand guaranty for the foreign ships which arrived in Canton. Initially, only one or two security merchants were available for this service. The number increased to five in 1745, while there were more than twenty ocean *hang* in Canton.⁹² These security merchants were selected by the provincial authorities from among the *yang-hang* merchants, who were financially solid. In contrast, the security merchants in Amoy, who were called either *hang-pao* or *pao-chia*, stood surety for the native merchants departing from Amoy for trade along the coast or in the Nanyang. In practical terms, every well-to-do merchant in Amoy, with or without the *hang* status, was qualified for the job.

Interestingly, the trade with foreign ships calling at Amoy did not fall automatically within the designated functions of the *yang-hang* merchants as Fu I-ling has suggested.⁹³ This further indicates the different roles played by the ocean *hang* in Amoy and Canton. The reason is not hard to understand. The arrivals of foreign ships in Amoy were accepted as special rather than normal occasions. Whenever there was a foreign ship coming to trade, the authorities would particularly appoint a merchant or make a new selection of an ad hoc group from among the

92. Liang Chia-pin, pp.86, 94 and 100.

93. Fu I-ling (1956), p.205.

existing *hang* merchants or even shopkeeper households to deal with the foreign traders. There were many examples of this practice. As early as 1684 when the English ship "Delight" arrived to trade in Amoy, the authorities appointed a merchant called Limia to manage the transactions.⁹⁴ The authorized merchant in the years around 1702 was a person named Anqua. Two years later, Anqua moved to Canton and his place was taken over by Kimco and Shabang, the principal merchants in Amoy, to trade with foreigners.⁹⁵

According to the regulations, only the provincial treasurer's office was empowered to issue the *hang* licenses. Nevertheless, the Amoy authorities could always ignore the regulations and appoint an ad hoc group from among the favoured and trusted merchants to handle the occasional visits by foreign ships. In 1716, for instance, a French ship came to trade in Amoy, proposing to purchase silk products worth 100 thousand taels. Using the excuse that previous transactions with other foreigners by unauthorized merchants were conducted in a fraudulent way, naval commander Shih Shih-p'iao personally selected more than ten wealthy merchants (*yin-shih shang-jen*), after consulting with both the governor-general and the governor, to deal with the French merchants.⁹⁶

In 1734, an English ship called at the harbour of Amoy. Despite the presence of *yang-hang* merchants, naval commander Wang Chün commissioned a selected group of well-to-do *hang* merchants to arrange buying and

94. H.B. Morse, *The Chronicles*, v.1, p.56; also cited in Liang Chia-pin, p.59; and Fu I-ling (1956), p.200.

95. H.B. Morse, *The Chronicles*, v.1, p.125, 128, 131-32 and 135; also cited in Liang Chia-pin, p.68; and Fu I-ling (1956), pp.200-201.

96. *KCTTC:KH*, Fukien naval commander Shih Shih-p'iao, 55/9/6, v.6, pp.595-96.

selling for the Englishmen (*tai-wei mai-mai*). The *hang* merchants subsequently met to consult among themselves and consider how they could supply the goods being requested. After a month of negotiation between the parties concerned, the *hang* merchants failed to finalize the deal and the English ship left for Canton. According to the naval commander, Amoy was not a usual port of call for foreign ships. This time, the arrival of a foreign ship again caught the local *hang* unprepared. They were not able to supply all the goods ordered by the Englishmen as they did not have time to go to the sources such as Hukwang and Kiangsi for supplies.⁹⁷

The above examples indicate that the ocean *hang* did not necessarily handle all the trade with foreign ships. At times, the authorized merchants who dealt with foreigners were not even chosen from among them. In 1755, a Spanish ship came to Amoy. The authorities selected two shopkeepers (*p'u-hu*), Lin Kuang-ho and Cheng Te-lin, and gave them a down payment of 50 thousand Spanish dollars so that they could purchase the ordered commodities in Soochow and Canton.⁹⁸ In other words, the well-established shopkeeper households with good official connections stood the same chances as the *hang* merchants in direct trade with the incoming foreign ships.

Both the *hang* merchants and a number of wealthy shopkeeper households functioned as importers and exporters linking the overseas and coastal networks. In this capacity, they supplied Chinese native products to the ocean junks. In early 1757, for instance, their warehouses

97. *KCTTC:YC* (unpublished), Fukien naval commander Wang Chün, 12/7/19 and 12/9/6.

98. Quoted in Fu I-ling, *Ming-Ch'ing shih-tai shang-jen*, p.206. Fu assumes that these two shopkeepers were among the *yang-hang* merchants, but they are not said to have been in the documents.

were damaged twice by fire. More than ten ocean junks were not able to make their journeys because they could not obtain enough export goods.⁹⁹

The *hang* merchants also performed other functions. In a memorial of 1726, it is indicated that the Amoy *hang* merchants, Hsü Ts'ang-hsing and others, were the authorized tax farmers for the customs administration. They had been acting in this capacity for some years since they were appointed before the maritime restriction in 1717.¹⁰⁰ Their duties included the collection of a fixed quota of maritime revenue. For this reason, they had to see that there were enough supplies of foreign goods in Amoy to meet the demands from other provinces. This had become more difficult during the maritime interdiction, when most of such commodities could only be smuggled into the island. The shortage of supply also jeopardized the collection of customs revenue. Therefore, Hsü and his colleagues petitioned the governor, Mao Wen-ch'üan, for the relaxation of the maritime ban. On other occasions, the *hang* merchants also provided their business expertise and facilities for the government. In 1733, for instance, the authorities sought their help to estimate the value of a confiscated cargo shipment.¹⁰¹ When a tributary mission arrived in Amoy from Sulu in 1742, and brought with them a variety of the Nanyang products, the authorities let the mission use the warehouse owned by a *hang* merchant, Li Ting-feng. Li's *hang* was also instructed to sell the goods for the mission at market prices.¹⁰²

99. CSL:KT, 537:34.

100. WHTP:KSSL, v.17, p.3.

101. CPYC, Fukien G-G Hao Yü-lin and governor Chao Kuo-lin, 11/2/20, 17, 4, 61b-62a (p.5894).

102. MCSL:KP, p.709b.

In summary, the above survey has shown that the shopkeeper households and the *hang* merchants were two categories of businessmen. The wealthy shopkeepers could apply for special licenses and authorization to become *hang* merchants in maritime business. They might later resign the appointments if they desired. Even without the *hang* status, the wealthy shopkeeper households could also become maritime guarantors or be granted favours to deal directly with foreign ships.

As to the *hang* merchants, it is true that the system itself originated from the *ya* (broker) institution. In this sense, they acted as intermediaries in commercial transactions. They functioned more as commercial agents than as merchants who did the buying and selling themselves.¹⁰³ Perhaps it was for this reason that, in maritime Fukien, the *hang* merchants continued to be called *ya-hang*, emphasizing their intermediary role.¹⁰⁴ Fu I-ling stresses that "the *yang-hang* were nothing but *ya-hang*, which acted as commercial intermediaries."¹⁰⁵ This comment contradicts his overall view of them as merchants. In Amoy, as a matter of fact, only merchants of wealth were selected to be the *hang* members; brokerage was only a part but not the major aspect of their business.

Normally, the *hang* merchants were in an advantageous and privileged position in maritime trade. For this reason, they were often regarded by both their contemporary Western counterparts and by modern scholars

103. See, for example, Liu Ch'ung-jih 劉重日 and Tso Yün-p'eng 左雲鵬, "Tui 'ya-jen' 'ya-hang' ti ch'u-pu t'an-t'ao 對'牙人' '牙行' 的初步探討" (A preliminary survey of *ya-jen* and *ya-hang*), *Wen Shih Che* 文史哲 (Literature, history and philosophy), 8/1957, p.38-39. Liu and Tso conclude that brokers were neither purchasers nor sellers. Being merely commercial intermediaries, they did not even have to possess large capital.

104. KCTTC:YC (unpublished), Fukien naval commander Wang Chün, 12/7/19.

105. Fu I-ling (1956), p.204.

as a monopolistic group.¹⁰⁶ In fact, monopoly was the last thing that the Ch'ing government wished to promote. While the *hang* merchants were charged with the actual management of maritime trade, this was introduced to ensure more effective control. The Ch'ing Statutes prohibited the monopolization of the market (*pa-ch'ih hang-shih*).¹⁰⁷ It is worthwhile to note two early nineteenth-century cases in this regard. In 1813, the only existing ocean *hang* in Amoy, Ho Ho Ch'eng, petitioned for the right to stand guaranty for all the merchant junks transporting cargoes from Amoy to Canton for export to the Nanyang. Permission was granted at first. However, the official decision had brought forward strong protest by Amoy's merchant *hang*. Four years later, the governor-general suspended the right to avoid what he called monopolization.¹⁰⁸ In 1821, the Amoy authorities appointed fourteen merchant *hang* to perform jointly the duties of the ocean *hang* because the last *yang-hang* merchant had just tendered his resignation because of old age and waning fortunes. There was a plan to appoint a supervising merchant from among the fourteen. But it was overruled by the Foochow Tartar-general who feared that it would create the possibility of monopoly.¹⁰⁹ What the Ch'ing authorities sought was a balance between profits and responsibility.

Up to this point, I have been using the term *hang* to indicate individual merchants or their firms authorized to control a certain area

106. See, for example, H.B. Morse, *The Chronicles*, v.1, p.56. Also cited in Liang Chia-pin, pp.59, 68; and Fu I-ling (1956), p.201.

107. TCHTSL, 765:7b.

108. HMC, 5:30b-31a.

109. *ibid*.

of trade. Whether there were *hang* associations (*hang-hui*), or a Co-hong as it was called in Canton, is a question that I have not been able to confirm. Despite the impression given by foreign merchants that there existed monopolistic organizations in Amoy during the K'ang-hsi period¹¹⁰ and despite the fact that coordination and mutual consultations were held among the *hang* merchants,¹¹¹ the Chinese sources do not give any hint to substantiate the existence of a formal association.

Overall, these two categories of resident merchants, shopkeeper and *hang* households, represented the central figures in the Amoy business community. They accumulated wealth from maritime trade. Even that part of their income derived from the collection of fees was considerable. In addition to charges for brokerage and guaranteeing, there is reason to believe that consignments, cargo ordering, and ship hiring were all done through the authorized shopkeepers or *hang* merchants. A 5 per cent commission based on the cargo value in each case would have yielded a large sum,¹¹² considering the density, volume and value of trade within the Amoy network.

110. H.B. Morse, *The Chronicles*, v.1, pp.56, 131-32.

111. See, for example, KCTTC:YC (unpublished), Fukien naval commander Wang Chün, 12/7/19.

112. A maximum charge of roughly 5% seems to have been customary and officially approved in the early eighteenth century. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the security merchants in Amoy "exact from the adventurers a duty of six per cent. on exports, and five on imports." See John Crawford, p.170. When a licensed boat firm (*ch'uan-hang* 船行) in the early nineteenth-century charged 10 to 20 per cent as commission (*yung-ch'ien* 用錢), it was regarded by the Fukien authorities as too burdensome for the merchants. For this reason, the authorities stipulated that the fees should be fixed at 6%. See *Fu-chien sheng-li*, p.681. In 1873, the rate was permitted to be raised to 12%. See Katō Shigeshi 加藤敏, "Shindai Fukken Kōso no senkō ni tsuite" 清代福建江蘇白船行 12 就 八 丁 (On the boat firms of Fukien and Kiangsu in the early Ch'ing period), *Shirin*, 14:4 (October 1929), p.534. In the case of the boat firms, the fees also represented a payment for

5. EXTRAPAROCHIAL CONNECTIONS

The commercial success of the Fukienese can be attributed to their migratory character, willingness to establish extraparochial connections and assimilability. The founding of extraregional outposts not only expanded their commercial influence, but also cushioned any unpredictable blow to their business in one locality. Their wide distribution in different coastal regions in the eighteenth century has been sketched previously. In the following paragraphs, I shall describe the features just mentioned with concrete examples.

Basically, the expansion of *hang* business to Canton was a Fukienese contribution. In 1704, a *hang* merchant from Amoy, whose name was Anqua, had already started his business in Canton. From there, he maintained close connections with the foreign traders.¹¹³ Another prominent Fukienese in Canton was P'an Ch'i (known as Puankequa). P'an's ancestors were originally Lung-ch'i people. They later migrated to T'ung-an and adopted the local household registration. P'an Ch'i himself was born in 1714. He served his apprenticeship apparently in Amoy when he was still young. When he had grown up, he came to Canton to conduct his business and subsequently traded with Luzon and other Nanyang countries. Afterwards, he joined a *hang* in Canton and became its manager. When he had accumulated enough capital and experience, he obtained a license for

(...cont) transportation insurance. Without specifying the period, Ramon H. Myers in a review article, mentions "These transport firms or *ch'uan-hang* received between 3 and 13 percent commission on the cost of freight hauled, and in return they minimized their clients' risk by arranging and guaranteeing for rapid and safe shipment." See "Some Issues on Economic Organization During the Ming and Ch'ing Periods: A Review Article," *Ch'ing-shih wen-ti*, 8:2 (December 1974), p.82.

113. H.B. Morse, *The Chronicles*, v.1, p.135; also cited in Liang Chia-pin, p.68.

the founding of his own ocean *hang* called T'ung Wen Hang.¹¹⁴ In fact, most of the *hang* merchants in Canton were Fukienese in origin.¹¹⁵ During the ten years' maritime ban (1717-1727), in particular, the Fukienese base in Canton enabled them to continue their overseas business more conveniently.

In 1724, when the Fukienese merchants in Canton had difficulties with the Kwangtung authorities, some of them moved back to Amoy. Included among them were Suqua, Cowlo, and others.

The prominent role of Fukienese in Ningpo is illustrated by the appointment of four of them, along with four other Chekiang merchants, by the Chekiang and Kiangsu authorities in 1728, as the principal merchants (*shang-tsung*). The eight principal merchants worked together to regulate the Japan trade and to act as guarantors for the merchants departing for Japan.¹¹⁶ When the English merchants came to trade in the 1750s, their main contacts were Kuo I-lung, Li Yüan-tsu, Hsin T'ing-ying and T'ing-ying's younger brother, T'ing-fen. All of them were *hang* merchants of Fukienese origin.¹¹⁷ Clearly, the Fukienese were among the major *hang* merchants in Ningpo.

In extraprovincial activities, family or lineage connections were important only within the boundary of the family business. The smooth operation of trade required the establishment of much wider relationships which were often personal but non-kin. Such connections might

114. Liang Chia-pin, pp.126, 261. P'an was among the other *hang* merchants who traded with the East India Company in 1753. See H.B. Morse, *The Chronicles*, v.1, pp.291, 294.

115. Liang Chia-pin, pp.3, 53.

116. KCTTC:YC, acting Kiangsu governor Yin Chi-shan 尹繼善, 6/12/11, v.12, p.46; KCTTC:YC, Chekiang G-G Li Wei, 6/12/11, v.12, p.58.

117. Liang Chia-pin, p.113.

often be based on the same-native-place bond, according to their native district, prefecture, or the twin prefecture of Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou. In Soochow, for instance, from at least the early eighteenth century, there was one Ch'üan-chou *hui-kuan* (same-native-place association) and another Chang-chou *hui-kuan*.¹¹⁸ The former was founded by a Chin-chiang merchant, Ts'ao Shih-hsin, who had resided in Soochow for fifteen years. Merchants from T'ung-an, Lung-ch'i, and Hai-ch'eng jointly established a Ch'üan-Chang *hui-kuan* in Shanghai. Its construction began in 1757 and it took six years to complete.¹¹⁹ There might have been some other Fukienese *hui-kuan* in Shanghai in the pre-1800 period during the peak of the Fukienese trading position in that city. Unfortunately, the sources are not helpful in dating exactly some existing Fukienese *hui-kuan* of the early nineteenth century.¹²⁰ Around the mid-Ch'ien-lung period, the T'ung-an merchant, P'an Ch'i, founded the Mei-chou *hui-kuan* in Canton to provide a meeting place for the Chang-Ch'üan merchants.¹²¹ These examples indicate, therefore, the active role played by merchants in the founding of the same-native-place associations.¹²²

118. *Chin-chiang HC* (1765 ed.), 13:12a; *Ch'üan-chou FC* (1763 ed.), 60: 94b-95a; and *Chiang-su sheng Ming-Ch'ing i-lai pei-ke tzu-liao hsüan-chi* 江蘇省明清以來碑刻資料選輯 (A selection of the epigraphic materials of Kiangsu province from the Ming-Ch'ing periods) (Peking: San-lien shu-tien, 1959), p.659.

119. Negishi Tadashi, pp.114-15.

120. Wang T'ao, *Ying-juan tsa-chih*, 1:6a, in *PCHSTK*, series 2, no.9, p. 5277. Wang states that there were six or seven Fukien and Kwangtung *hui-kuan* in Shanghai. Among them, the Chang-Ch'üan and the Hui-Ch'ao *hui-kuan* were the most prosperous.

121. Liang Chia-pin, p.262.

122. Ho Ping-ti 何炳棣, *Chung-kuo hui-kuan shih-lun* 中國會館史論 (A historical survey of *landmannschaften* in China) (Taipei: Hsüeh-sheng shu-chü, 1966), p.38.

However, the *hui-kuan* organizations represented only convenient and complementary associations in response to the social and economic needs in extraprovincial localities. They were not the only form of organization and did not represent parochialism. Gary Hamilton has convincingly shown that people from the same region would join a wide range of same-native-place associations, representing different combinations of districts. Furthermore, "individuals who in one location would invidiously distinguish between themselves, would in another location join the same association."¹²³

He goes on to argue that the business success of the Chinese merchants was also "due to their informal combinations and their business practices."¹²⁴ One aspect pointed out by him is the relationship between employers and employees.¹²⁵ Even a family business, which was normally the case in the Chinese commercial world, would often employ non-kin members, "who took the positions with the expectation that within a few years they would be independent craftsmen or merchants themselves."¹²⁶ Since an apprentice needed someone to pledge for his trustworthiness, it is natural that a fellow regional was often introduced and hired.¹²⁷ In this manner, an employer could obtain loyal shop assistants. Although it was obligatory for him to support a capable assistant to start his own business if he so decided in the future, it was also in the former employer's interest to be able to establish a

123. Gary G. Hamilton, "Nineteenth Century Chinese Merchant Associations: Conspiracy or Combination? The Case of the Swatow Opium Guild," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i*, 3:8 (December 1977, pp.61-62.

124. *ibid.*, p.63.

125. *ibid.*

126. *ibid.*

127. *ibid.*

network of connections through the system of apprentices. Many of the merchants first came to the business world from families without any business background. But the same system provided opportunities for them to join the commercial circle and rise from rags to riches. A good example was the P'an Ch'i mentioned earlier. He came from a poor family background, but, through connections, was able to migrate from Amoy to Canton. From there, he went on to conduct business in the Nanyang. Before he could become a prominent businessman, he worked for a *yang-hang* merchant with the surname Ch'en. The story continues as expected: due to P'an's honesty and trustworthiness, Ch'en entrusted him with full authority in the management. Several years later, P'an was experienced enough in the *hang* business and started his own ocean firm in Canton.¹²⁸

Nevertheless, the establishment of connections within the trading network was not limited to common geographic origin. Similar economic interests had become a more important factor for bringing together merchants of different local origins. The guild organizations which were open to all of the same profession represented one clear example. In Canton, the *hang* association (Co-hong) included all the *hang* merchants who traded in particular with the Europeans.¹²⁹ A similar association was also set up among the Fukienese and the Chekiang merchants when they worked together in the capacity of *shang-tsung*. Merchants in Chekiang rebuilt the cult-cum-guild of T'ien-hou Temple in Chen-hai in Ningpo in 1734. As Shiba Yoshinobu explains, "In time, ... her functions became more generic, and temples to T'ien-hou were founded in the Lower Yangtze

128. Liang Chia-pin, p.261.

129. H.B. Morse, *The Chronicles*, v.1, pp.163-64; also cited in Liang Chia-pin, pp.77-82.

region by shipping agents of whatever provenance."¹³⁰ Even in Taiwan, where the majority of merchants were Fukienese, the *chiao* organizations drew their members from the people engaged in the same trade, just like other guilds. Generally, the role of the guilds was to preserve "a stable economic environment where each member could carry on his activity free from competition by outsiders and undercutting by fellow members."¹³¹

Despite their concerns about their fellow regionals or commercial interests, both the same-native-place associations and the guilds seldom functioned as social enclaves. On the contrary, they were involved in the cultural and social activities of the locality. The merchants participated in local welfare events through money contributions and provided funds for local projects. They also helped impose moral and economic codes of conduct, as Gary Hamilton has pointed out.¹³² Moreover, they also assisted the government in collecting taxes and regulating trading activities.

Again, the *chiao* organizations in Taiwan offer a good example. As expected, temples were centres of solidarity, serving as headquarters for the merchant guilds. T'ien-hou or Ma-tzu was the most widely worshipped. Each year, the members elected a board of management with a *lu-chu*, master of the incense burner, as its head. The *lu-chu* was also the head of the guild. Since the membership was not large, everyone knew each other well. The election was based on consensus rather than confrontation. The head of the guild was chosen not only for his wealth,

130. Shiba Yoshinobu, in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), pp.416, 423.

131. Peter J. Golas, "Early Ch'ing Guilds," in G. William Skinner, ed. (1977), p.569.

132. Gary G. Hamilton, p.66.

but also for his ability to command respect. Once elected, his prestige allowed him to act paternalistically. The local officials were also willing to back his authority. In a frontier and migrant society such as Taiwan, merchants wielded greater influence in the urban communities, in fact, than their counterparts on the mainland. They were accepted to the status of *shen-shih* (gentry) even by the authorities. The *chiao* merchants in mid-eighteenth-century Taiwan had overtaken the local scholar gentry to become the leading patrons of social institutions. They were economically vital, socially prestigious, and politically influential.¹³³

Local involvements and their trade orientation facilitated the cohesive tendency among the merchants of different origins. This was further aided by the common activity centres of cult-cum-guild temples particularly those of T'ien-hou. They were able to foster cooperative and integrative spirit among the merchants. Even the same-native-place associations were often oriented towards the new locality because, as Gary Hamilton has rightly indicated, the majority of them "were independently organized in each location...." In other words, they "were strictly local organizations, even though their organizers were non-locals."¹³⁴ All these characteristics of local orientation had given the Fukienese merchants a favourable situation for merging with the social and economic networks of the resident city.¹³⁵ The Fukienese *hang* merchants in Canton represented only one such case. In Shanghai, many Fuk-

133. *T'ai-wan nan-pu pei-wen chi-ch'eng*, p.89. The generalization of the *chiao* organizations is based on the inscriptions collected in *ibid.* According to these sources, people who contributed to the local projects were mainly merchants.

134. Gary G. Hamilton, p.62.

135. Ho Ping-ti (1966), p.114.

ienese merchants had adopted the local household registration and "become native people."¹³⁶ In this way, they conveniently penetrated into the local networks no matter where they went. Their success was thus due to their willingness to be flexible in their integration into the host business circle.

Often, the Fukienese merchants would find ingroup business dealings in their extraprovincial activities impossible owing to absence of a sizeable or stable Fukienese community in the locality. Under such circumstances, they were quick to establish good relationships with local business contacts. For example, Chin Lung-shun, the travelling merchant and shipowner from T'ung-an already mentioned, had long maintained a good relationship with Wang Yüan-sheng, a local *hang* merchant in Chiao-chou of Shantung province. Whenever Chin arrived in Chiao-chou, he resided in Wang's shop. Wang acted as Chin's business guarantor. When Chin was suspected by the authorities in 1728 for illicit maritime activities, Wang was able to defend him on the basis of their long acquaintanceship.¹³⁷

The last but not least of the extraparochial connections was to be on good terms with the government officials. The following example illustrates the point. Chu Shu-ch'üan was appointed the Hsing-Ch'üan circuit intendant in 1730. When he was in Amoy, the merchants had already established a good relationship with him. In 1740, Chu was transferred to become the grain intendant of Kwangtung. More than a thousand members of the Chang-Ch'üan trading community in Canton gave

136. Wang T'ao, *Ying-juan tsa-chih*, 1:6a, in *PCHSTK*, series 2, no.9, p.5277.

137. *KCTTC:YC*, Sung-chiang commander Po Chih-fan, 6/12/5, v.11, p.917.

him a warm welcome on his arrival. Each time he left Canton on official duties, the Chang-Ch'üan merchants always gathered at the harbour to see him off. Three years later, he was demoted to Tientsin to be the sub-prefect. He headed for the north by land routes. The Chang-Ch'üan people in Canton accompanied him to the provincial border and only then bade him farewell. During his term in Tientsin, several hundred Fukienese merchants trading in the city went to Chu's lodging one day to congratulate him on his birthday. At the same time, a grandiose celebration was held by all the Fukienese junks in the Tientsin harbour. The junks lined up along the shore for several *li* and the celebration continued for three days with lanterns, incense, and music.¹³⁸ Good relationships such as this, which had been delicately cultivated, would certainly bear fruit in time; at the very least they would facilitate more convenient trading arrangements.

138. Ch'üan-chou FC (1763 ed.), 32:3. For the datings of Chu's postings, see FCTC (1868-1871 ed.), 107:23b, 25a; and Kuang-tung TC 廣東通志 (The provincial gazetteer of Kwangtung) (Reprint, 1864), 44:16a.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
AND MERCHANTS

1. THE STATE AND TRADE

In the late Ming, the Fukienese maritime population took advantage of the central government's increasing inability to enforce sea-going restrictions. They built up their far-extended sea-borne trade with the Nanyang and with Japan. Their maritime enterprises during this period were often characterized by restlessness and by rebellious acts. These characteristics enabled them to begin an intransigent resistance to the new Manchu regime in the middle decades of the seventeenth century. The K'ang-hsi emperor showed considerable restraint after the pacification of Taiwan by not resorting to retaliation upon the conquered maritime population. The Fukienese were not only allowed to resume their trade, they also further expanded the coastal trading network.

An obvious contrast can be observed between the maritime trade in the pre-1683 period and that in the following one hundred years. In the second period, emperor K'ang-hsi skilfully adopted a more positive attitude towards merchants. The energetic Yung-cheng emperor was even more flexible in his dealing with matters relating to trade. During the long reign of the Ch'ien-lung emperor, both the overseas and the coastal trade continued to flourish under similar conditions. Merchants in this peak period covering more than one hundred years of the Ch'ing dynasty were more positively accommodated by the state. On the one hand, the state had pacified the restless and rebellious character of the Fukienese

maritime population. On the other hand, the Fukienese merchants had also realized that it was to their advantage to establish an amicable, personal, and mutually-beneficial relationship with the authorities. In this manner, the sea rebels had been transformed into docile merchants who were willing to work within the state system, though their activities were often semi-legal.

Political and economic considerations governed the Ch'ing court's attitudes towards maritime trade. With respect to the political aspect, the court was most conscious of coastal security, as shown by the frequent use of the term "maritime defence" (*hai-fang*) in court discussions and contemporary writings. Maritime trade was often seen by the court as a factor related closely to coastal security. The court fully realized the political vulnerability of the maritime province of Fukien. Emperor K'ang-hsi once commented that the Fukienese were restless people¹ and maritime Fukien was the most troublesome area of the nation.² The Yung-cheng emperor also held the same view. He regarded Fukien as the most strategic region and believed that local authorities should make every effort to stabilize conditions there.³ For example, whenever there was rice shortage, particularly in South Fukien, these two emperors immediately felt alarmed and cautioned the local authorities against possible turmoil.⁴ Since the K'ang-hsi period, the Ch'ing court had regarded rice as an important factor in maintaining social stability. Rice trade for

1. CSL:KH, 243:12b-13a.

2. Quoted in Kawaguchi Chōju 川口長孺 (1774-1834), *T'ai-wan ko-chū chih* 台灣割據志 (The occupation of Taiwan), in *TWWHTK*, No.1 (1957), p.71.

3. KCTTC:YC, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/4/4, v.7, p.897. See the emperor's comment.

4. CSL:KH, 243:12b-13a.

the relief of rice-deficit regions was naturally seen by the court as an administrative priority in local affairs. The court even adopted incentives to encourage the import of foreign rice.⁵ Furthermore, the Ch'ing court understood well the dependence of the South Fukienese population on maritime trade for their livelihood. Whenever the Fukien authorities petitioned the court for relaxation of maritime restrictions, they were confident of convincing the court by repeating the well-known phrases that the maritime prefectures could hardly support the over-crowded population by their own food production and that the region had to rely on seafaring trade for its livelihood. This was the basic reasoning behind the court's decision to lift the maritime bans in 1684⁶ and again in 1727.⁷

The same sensitiveness of maritime security was, however, double-edged. It often worked at the expense of trade. What I would emphasize is that security considerations rather than the ideological bias against merchants led the court to restrict or even ban maritime trade from time to time. Needless to say, the maritime bans prior to the pacification of the Cheng resistance were adopted for political reasons. After 1683, some restrictions were still in force. For instance, the court restricted the number of ships which were allowed to sail overseas and the crew on board each vessel for reasons of maritime security and to take precautions against the possibility that a number of seafarers might gang together for activities detrimental to maritime security.⁸ The authorities also strictly prohibited any shipment of such items as iron,

5. See, for example, *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:11b.

6. *CSL:KH*, 116:18a.

7. *CSL:ST*, 54:20.

8. Shih Lang, *Chin-hai chi shih*, p.94.

shipbuilding materials, weapons, saltpetre, fire-arms, and rice overseas.⁹ The main worry was that these materials might be supplied to the maritime outcasts and, if this happened, would jeopardize maritime defence. In 1694, the court further imposed a ban on bringing back either weapons from overseas or ships which were built in foreign countries. The government found it difficult to control unregistered vessels and feared that both these weapons and ships might fall into the hands of maritime rebels.¹⁰ Equally undesirable was the alleged smuggling of rice to foreign countries and the court's apprehension was understandable. Since rice shortages were a frequent occurrence in the southeastern provinces, Fukien in particular, the region could not afford a drain of any amount of rice. Otherwise, the outflow would certainly drive the rice prices to higher levels and jeopardize the stability of the region. Even in the later period, considerations of possible domestic shortages contributed to the court's decision to ban the export of other commodities. The soaring prices and domestic shortage of silk products, for example, led the court to ban their export in 1759.¹¹ Moreover, the court was most reluctant to expose its coastal regions to foreigners. Attempts were therefore made in the eighteenth century to restrict the visits by Westerners to the port of Canton.

The example most illustrative of the court's security consciousness in its restrictions of trade is the maritime ban imposed by Emperor K'ang-hsi in 1717. The reasons leading to the decision were complex.

9. *CSL:KH*, 117:10b; *HMC*, 7:8b-10a; also *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:10b-12b.

10. *MCSL:TP*, pp.756-57.

11. *KCTTC:CL* (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Yang T'ing-chang 楊廷璋 and Fukien governor Ting-chang 定長, 29/2/28.

They were all, however, related to security problems rather than to discrimination against trading activities. First of all, the emperor had heard during his trip to Soochow the previous year that many of the ocean-going vessels built there were sold overseas. The court was also suspicious that Fukienese ships smuggled shipbuilding materials, such as masts, which were badly needed in the country to markets overseas. Secondly, the large number of overseas Chinese particularly those in Luzon and Batavia and the several thousand seafarers working on the rice ships plying between Fukien and Kwangtung were regarded by the authorities as potential outcasts or rebels. Thirdly, the court was not happy about the constant contacts between local people and foreigners, and worried about a leakage of defence secrets. Fourthly, the authorities were suspicious of rice smuggling from the coastal region overseas.¹²

Overall, the court's attitudes were security-oriented rather than based on ideological terms hostile towards merchants. More significantly, the ten-year maritime restriction between 1717 and 1727 was intended to restrict some parts of the Nanyang trade, particularly that with Luzon and Batavia, but it did not include the domestic trade on the coast.¹³ The fact that it did not aim at a blanket ban on the maritime trade clearly indicated the non-ideological aspects of the decision.

After considering the Ch'ing court's pragmatic attitude towards the maritime trade and the sensitivity of security issues related to seafaring activities, the government's position is best described with a

12. *CSL:ST*, 54:20; *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 140:9b-10a, 270:10B; and *MCSL:TP*, p.790.

13. *WHTP:KSSL*, v.17, p.8a.

sense of compromise, typically Chinese, by the compiler of a Ch'üan-chou gazetteer. He says:

The coastline of Ch'üan-chou covers more than 300 li. Its population depends on the benefits derived from fishing and salt production for their livelihood. More importantly, the sea makes possible the undertaking of voyages and the gathering of numerous commodities. However, Ch'üan-chou was previously infested by piratical disturbances, as shown in the older editions of the prefectural gazetteer. After considering all these aspects, it leads us to the conclusion that neither should the maritime ban be too strict, nor should the sea defence be left unprepared....¹⁴

While political preoccupations explain the non-ideological aspect of the maritime restrictions, the Ch'ing court had also displayed some understanding of the economic side. Both emperors K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng displayed examples of this sensitivity. When senior officials in the court were hesitant about the suitability of lifting the maritime ban in 1684, emperor K'ang-hsi pointed out that, since the coastal population was dependent on trade and fishing, there was no reason why the ban should be continued. In his view, lifting the ban would benefit both the national economy and the livelihood of the general populace (*kuo-chi min-sheng*).¹⁵ Furthermore, other provinces would also be able to share in the prosperity of Fukien and Kwangtung when maritime trade was growing. One immediate benefit, the emperor continued, would be the collection of customs revenue paid by the wealthy merchants. With this source of income, the two maritime provinces could be self-sufficient in terms of military expenses and the interior provinces would be free from the burden of diverting their revenue to support such expenses.¹⁶

14. Ch'üan-chou FC (1763 ed.), 25:1a.

15. CSL:KH, 116:3b-4a.

16. CSL:KH, 116:18a; also MCSL:TP, p.745b.

Among the commodities involved in the maritime trade, it is understandable that the court paid foremost attention to rice. As to the reason for rice shortages, the two emperors had their explanations. In an edict of 1712, emperor K'ang-hsi commented that the surging rice prices were normally a result of bad harvests. However, he felt surprised that, despite a series of good harvests in former years, the price of rice had not gone down. Some officials suggested to him that it was because the common practice of wine brewing among the populace had consumed too large a quantity of grain. The emperor dismissed this reason on the grounds that more sorghum than rice would have been used in that situation. If wine brewing was really a factor, the price of sorghum would have gone up too. Nevertheless, sorghum remained cheaper than rice. He was also not convinced by another suggestion that price manipulation by rich households was a cause. In his thinking, the good harvests would have brought down the price and, thus, discouraged any alleged speculation. He finally came to the conclusion that population growth had resulted in shortages of land and an increasing number of unemployed farmhands.¹⁷ No matter how accurate his reasoning, it had at least prevented him from accepting the suggestion of discriminating against rice merchants.

Emperor Yung-cheng's point of view on the same topic is even more revealing. In 1727, he attributed the rice shortages in both Fukien and Kwangtung to the fact that the local population was too keen on growing such cash crops as longan, sugar, tobacco, indigo, and other similar plants for instant profits. Consequently, the residents had become rich but rice was in serious shortage. While he showed no objection to such

17. CSL:KH, 250:11b-12b.

practices, he maintained that priority should be given to rice cultivation. However, he did urge local officials to "transform [the custom] by persuasion."¹⁸

In other words, the two emperors did not attempt to suppress commercial activities. Neither did they force their people to stick to the fundamental occupation of agriculture or food-grain production in accordance with traditional Confucian teaching.

As to the question of how to ensure sufficient supplies of rice for the southeastern maritime provinces, the court looked to trade for the solution. Consequently, the court endorsed a favourable attitude towards trade and expected its local administration "to facilitate commercial intercourse in order to benefit the populace" (*t'ung-shang pien-min*), particularly in the case of the rice trade.¹⁹ Both the court and its officials fully understood that the "natural circulation"²⁰ of rice from surplus regions to deficit areas was the most effective means of stabilizing the rice prices. Aside from the government's active participation in transporting rice from one region to another for relief or price stabilization purposes,²¹ the government also appreciated the role played by the travelling merchants. While the government's involvements taken in times of serious shortages were seen as an immediate remedy, the trade in rice undertaken by merchants was accepted by the authorities

18. *WHTP:KSSL*, v.17, pp.7b-8a.

19. *KCTTC:YC*, Tartar-general of Chen-hai Ho T'ien-p'ei 何天培, 4/7/20, v.6, p.323.

20. *Tzu-jan liu-t'ung* 自然流通. See *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/4/4, v.7, p.897.

21. As in the terms *yün-chi* 運濟 (to transport to provide relief) and *p'ing-t'iao* 平糶 (price stabilization).

as the most efficient measure under normal circumstances of meeting demand.²²

Often, exporting rice in large quantities could drive prices to high levels or result in shortages in the rice-producing regions. Under such circumstances, both the local authorities and the urban residents found it necessary to temporarily suspend further export. Local merchants were also known to have hoarded rice and emperor Yung-cheng expressed his displeasure at the practice. He decreed time and again that the authorities in the rice-surplus regions should never prevent the travelling merchants from buying and transporting rice.²³ Complying with the emperor's wishes, the governor-general of Fukien, Liu Shih-ming, even went a step forward to "communicate with the [local] people" and appeal to both "the gentry and the wealthy households" to import rice from other regions.²⁴

A flexible approach was also adopted by the court to facilitate the rice trade. In 1693, for example, the K'ang-hsi emperor instructed the Board of Revenue to encourage wealthy merchants to engage in rice trade by giving them licenses and interest-free loans.²⁵ Although one of the reasons for implementing the maritime restriction in 1717 was to prohibit rice shipments along the coast, emperor K'ang-hsi decreed that merchants should be allowed to transport rice to Fukien.²⁶ The rice trade between Taiwan and Fukien was also permitted by the court during the entire time

22. Refer to fn.19.

23. The practice of "stopping purchases" was known by the term o-ti (過糶). See *ibid.*

24. CPYC, Fukien G-G Liu Shih-ming 劉世明, 10/1/26, 5, 3, 89a (p.1432).

25. CSL:KH, 158:5b.

26. *ibid.*, 293:6b.

the interdiction was in force.²⁷ In fact, the rice trade began to gain momentum during the ten-year maritime restriction.

Neither the K'ang-hsi nor Yung-cheng emperors appears to have had any particular prejudice against merchants or their business activities. For example, emperor K'ang-hsi pointed out in 1681 that merchants belonged to one of the four categories of people and their wealth should be equally protected by the state.²⁸ Emperor Yung-cheng held similar views in this regard. In 1729, he decreed that the rich households were also good citizens (*liang-min*) of the state because their wealth was either inherited from past generations or accumulated through their business efforts and frugality.²⁹ On one occasion, he reminded a provincial governor that he should never discriminate against wealthy merchants. According to the emperor, these people might have often been extravagant in their daily life but the authorities should tolerate them if they had never infringed the laws.³⁰

Elsewhere in the records from the K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng periods, we come across several terms which show the court's favourable attitude towards commercial activities. The court always instructed officials "to

27. Yang Ching-jen 楊景仁, "T'ung-shang" 通商 (On commercial intercourse), in *HCCSWP*, 41:44b.

28. *Tung-hua lu*, K'ang-hsi:28:2b. The four categories of registered population (*ssu-min* 四民) in the Ch'ing were military (*chün* 軍), civilians (*min* 民), merchants (*shang* 商), and salt producers (*tsao* 灶). However, the category *shang*, as Yang Lien-sheng has pointed out, "was the same as the *shang-chi*, referring to salt merchants only, and not to all merchants in general." See Yang Lien-sheng, "Government Control of Urban Merchants," p.192. When emperor K'ang-hsi made the comment in 1681, he used both the terms "*shang-min*" 商民 and "*shang-jen*" 商人, probably implying that he had all merchants in mind.

29. *FCTC* (1737 ed.), *chüan-shou* (introductory chapter): maxims 3:27a.

30. *KCTTC:YC*, Soochow governor Ch'en Shih-hsia, 5/3/17, v.7, p.635.

assist the merchants" (*hsü-shang*) not only "to enrich the revenue" (*yü-k'o*) but also "to enrich the people" (*yü-min*).³¹ In 1686, emperor K'ang-hsi showed his concern about irregularities practiced by customs officials in various parts of the country. He warned the officials that the national economy would be harmed if the merchants were hard-pressed. Only with proper management of customs would "hundreds of commodities circulate freely and the livelihood of the people become prosperous."³² The same concern was also expressed by emperor Yung-cheng when he lay down a decree to the provincial customs officials that "by establishing the customs the state aims at facilitating commercial intercourse, not distressing the merchants; and benefiting the people, not causing them hardship."³³

The maritime customs administrations also adopted measures in accordance with the court's benevolence to merchants. In 1685, the court approved I-erh-ke-t'u's proposal that the customs duties charged by the four maritime customs administrations in Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu should be reduced by 20 per cent, considering that the imported shipments consisted of less luxurious items than before.³⁴ A further reduction of Tls.6,494 was granted to the Fukien maritime customs in 1689.³⁵ In 1718, the court accepted a proposal by the Che-Min governor-general Chüeh-lo-man-pao that, to avoid double customs duties, the Amoy *hai-kuan* should not levy any taxes on the transit vessels from Taiwan to

31. See, for examples, *CSL:KH*, 121:7a; 124:13b-14a; and 126:23.

32. *ibid.*, 124:13b-14a.

33. *CSL:ST*, 10:4.

34. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:10a.

35. *Ch'ing-ch'ao wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao*, chüan 26, p.5079.

other coastal ports. All these merchant junks would pay the duties only once at their ultimate destination.³⁶

Emperor Yung-cheng also attempted to keep under control the amount of surplus quota (*yīng-yǔ*) levied by the customs administrations. In Ch'ing times, the practice of levying such quotas in addition to the regular quota of tax was openly approved by the court so that the officials could use the amount for public and private expenses locally. The emperor expected the officials to report from time to time on the amount of surplus quota collected and how they made use of the money. He required the officials to see to it that such extra levies did not create unbearable burden on the merchants. Officials were also reminded not to impose extra levies privately in addition to the surplus quota.³⁷

Most significantly was a 1724 decree to the various customs administrations in the country that they should make public in printed form all the commodities subject to tax and issue one copy to every shop. All the official announcements relating to customs matters should be posted in the main streets so people might be fully informed and prevent any irregularities by the customs officials. The court further decided in 1732 that the provincial government should instruct its local authorities near the customs stations to print a booklet containing all the relevant information and sell it to the merchants. For each booklet there was a charge of Tls.0.02 to cover printing costs. In addition, the provincial authorities should also assign officials from time to time to see whether the customs notices were properly posted and to report on any abuses by

36. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:11a.

37. *KCTTC:YC*, Tartar-general of Chen-hai Ho T'ien-p'ei, 1/9/9, v.1, p.685; *ibid.*, 2/4/10, v.2, p.470; and *KCTTC:YC*, Kiangsi governor P'ei Shui-tu 裴緯度, 2/3/28, v.2, p.438.

customs personnel. If the information in the booklet was not accurate, the local officials should be punished. Three years later, the court issued another instruction that the customs notices should be written in big characters so that people could see them. No unauthorized personnel were to be stationed within several *li* in the vicinity of the customs in order to relieve the merchants' anxiety.³⁸

A decision was also made by the authorities to assist sea-going merchants with only a small amount of capital. The regulations governing maritime trade originally required all the sea merchants to apply for licenses and to obtain guaranty in their native district. The small merchants had problems complying with the rules. After coming back from overseas with goods, they had to sell them personally from place to place on the coast. They would often miss the following monsoon to sail overseas if they were obliged to travel back to their native district for license and guaranty renewals. Under the new concession, these merchants were allowed to meet all the sailing requirements at the maritime subprefect's office in Amoy, Nan-hai in Kwangtung, or Cha-p'u in Chekiang, whichever they found most convenient. Under this arrangement, these merchants were able to conduct their annual business both overseas and on the coast.³⁹

As to the general policy relating to commerce, the Ch'ing government followed some guidelines, as pointed out by Yang Lien-sheng.⁴⁰ The Ch'ing Statutes outlawed private brokerage (*ssu-ya*), prohibited monopolization of the market, and upheld the principles of adopting fair prices,

38. *HMC*, 7:10b-11a.

39. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:13.

40. Yang Lien-sheng, p.193.

using approved weights and measures, and maintaining standards for the quality of utensils and cloth sold in the market.⁴¹ In 1686, shortly after the establishment of the four maritime customs administrations, emperor K'ang-hsi reminded the officials concerned not to abuse their power of selecting authorized merchants and levying duties. There should be "no excesses and no harshness," the instruction emphasized.⁴²

Certainly, the court never relaxed its determination to keep commercial activities under surveillance. While relying on the local or regional officials for necessary information and recommendations on matters relating to commerce, the court was never willing to loosen its grip on decision making, whether with regard to policy or administrative trifles.⁴³ Nevertheless, it is certain that the court did not apply the traditional Confucian ideology to condemn commercial endeavours, though it relied on the time-honoured concepts of security and guaranty for efficient but indirect control. Through the acceptance of merchants' expertise and by granting them some degree of autonomy in business management, the government had skilfully and successfully avoided face-to-face confrontation with the trading communities.

2. THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES

In line with the court's attitude, there was no ideological objection on the part of the provincial authorities to commercial activities.

41. *ibid.*; also *TCHTSL*, 765:1a; and *CSL:KH*, 238:7b.

42. *CSL:KH*, 126:23.

43. As, for example, whether local officials should send high-quality water-melons from Taiwan to the court to express their piety towards the emperor, or whether they should use paper of the best quality for writing the memorial.

A pragmatic view normally prevailed, as illustrated by the two maxims of "yü-kuo t'ung-shang" (in order to enrich the state, it should facilitate commercial intercourse) and "t'ung-shang pien-min" (by facilitating commercial intercourse, the people benefit). In the minds of provincial authorities, trade was more a means of ensuring continuous customs revenue and maintaining social stability, rather than an ideological matter. In a province such as Fukien, therefore, which could not produce enough rice or employment in agriculture, maritime trade was seen by the government as the only assurance of maintaining social well-being. This explains the concern of the provincial authorities with trading conditions.

Viewed in this context, it is not surprising that provincial authorities saw the maritime bans as obstructive to the administrative goal of social stability. However, in cases like the 1717 restriction, the badly informed K'ang-hsi emperor initiated the idea. Although the authorities of the maritime provinces were subsequently consulted by the court on the matter, they were in no position to question the emperor's wisdom under such circumstances. They could only endorse the deliberation. The court in the later years, particularly during the Yung-cheng reign, seldom initiated measures which would drastically affect the livelihood of the maritime population. Instead, the emperor would wait for the suggestions from the provincial governments.

In 1726, governor Mao Wen-ch'üan had already begun to propose a partial relaxation of the 1717 maritime ban so that the Fukienese could improve their livelihood and the customs revenue would be ensured.⁴⁴ Although emperor Yung-cheng did not accept the recommendation, he was,

44. *WHTP:KSSL*, v.17, pp.3a-4a; also *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/10/12, v.6, pp.728-30.

in fact, also considering the matter. Nevertheless, the emperor deemed it inappropriate to make any hasty decision on such a highly sensitive issue. In the meantime, he was waiting for a more detailed investigation and suggestions from the newly appointed and trusted Che-Min governor-general, Kao Ch'i-chuo. As a preparation for a possible lifting of the restriction, Kao's administrative burden was lessened and he was assigned to concentrate on the maritime matters of the sensitive province of Fukien.

In the following year, governor-general Kao submitted a more persuasive memorial to the Yung-cheng emperor. He explained that the lifting of the 1717 restriction was an urgent matter; the maritime population badly needed the income from trade. Kao assured the court that the maritime trade would not create a security problem. On the contrary, the problem of illicit seafaring activities could then be remedied. Kao's recommendation was approved by the court.⁴⁵

The case indicates that the role of the provincial authorities was often influential in the court's decision making with respect to local affairs. Particularly during the time of Yung-cheng, communication between provincial officials and the court was unprecedentedly intense. The major decisions on maritime matters in Fukien came mainly from local or provincial initiatives rather than being arbitrary impositions by the court. This is not, however, to suggest that all local recommendations were accepted.

Within this context, governor-general Kao Ch'i-chuo can be singled out as a good model. On several occasions, he acted as a spokesman for his provincial subjects. His major contribution to maritime trade in his

45. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 140:9b-10a.

first year of appointment was through a petition which led to the lifting of a rice ban in the Taiwan Straits. Earlier, in 1721, rice exports from Taiwan to the mainland were prohibited upon a recommendation by the Taiwan officials when the Chu I-kuei rebellion broke out. It was feared at that time that rice might fall into the hands of the maritime rebels. However, governor-general Kao criticized them for being too parochial: what they were really concerned about was that rice exports would probably raise the price in the local markets. If this happened, it would possibly provoke the local residents to riots and jeopardize the officials' careers. Kao viewed such attitudes as irresponsible and selfish because the local officials only intended to protect themselves. The effect on Chang-Ch'üan people if there were serious famines after being deprived of rice supplies from Taiwan was not their concern. In Kao's opinion, rice trade between Taiwan and Fukien should be encouraged simply because the annual rice production in Taiwan was in great surplus. He may have exaggerated when he said that one year's yield in Taiwan would be sufficient for four or five years' local consumption. But what he tried to convey was that Taiwan producers had to sell after each harvest. According to Kao's argument, the agriculturists did not produce for self-sufficiency, but intended to sell the products for profit. Once the rice trade was banned, the surplus rice was useless to the producers on the one hand and the Chang-Ch'üan people were deprived of their source of supply on the other. Such circumstances, Kao continued, only encouraged smuggling activities in the straits. "The more strict the ban, the more sophisticated the abuses have become," said the governor-general. It ended up in a situation whereby both Taiwan and Chang-Ch'üan prefectures suffered from the prohibition. Kao concluded, "Flexibility is the only remedy. Furthermore, your majesty has reprimanded the

authorities in all provinces who stopped the rice trade. It is ridiculous to allow the practice to exist within the one province [of Fukien], even though Taiwan is located on the other side of the sea."

In summing up his presentation, Kao listed four advantages of lifting the rice ban in Taiwan. First, the Chang-Ch'üan people would not suffer from grain shortages; second, the Taiwan people would be free from a situation of oversupply and the profits derived from grain sales would serve as an incentive for further land development; third, both the Taiwan and the Chang-Ch'üan people would no longer be forced to conduct illicit trade and would therefore be relieved of blackmail and exactions by officials; and finally, with rice supplies from Taiwan, the Chang-Ch'üan people would not have to compete for the limited surplus from the provincial interior.⁴⁶

In 1727, Kao brought continuous pressure to bear on the Taiwan officials to ensure that the rice trade was not impeded. He stated in explicit terms in another memorial, "The Taiwan people intended to sell their rice only because they have a surplus, and the Chang-Ch'üan people decided to buy only when prices are cheap. All the transactions were based on mutual agreements. We should leave the matter to its natural course and there is no need to stipulate any ban on it."⁴⁷ On other occasions, he consistently made known his endorsement of the idea of "natural circulation" (*tzu-jan liu-t'ung*) with regard to the rice trade.⁴⁸

46. *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/7/26, v.6, pp.355-57. The court approved Kao's recommendation. See *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/2/10, v.7, p.445.

47. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/2/10, v.7, p.446.

48. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 5/4/4, v.7, p.897.

Governor-general Kao's favourable attitude towards trade was also shown in his handling of other maritime activities. His successful petition for the lifting of the 1717 restriction represented his major contribution to the development of Fukienese trade. Again, he supported a pragmatic solution. He argued in his 1727 memorial that, after the restriction, economic hardship had forced numerous unemployed (*wu-yeh che*) to become bandits. Before the restriction, people could easily seek their fortune in trade. The rich could become shipowners or merchants, while the poor were employed as crewmen. Each ship carried almost a hundred people. They did not need to be supported locally. Quite the contrary, these seafaring people earned their income from trade to feed their families. In addition, maritime trade created opportunities for local craftsmen to sell their products. The trading junks also contributed to the commercial prosperity in the area. He discarded the fears that maritime trade might lead to rice smuggling either to foreign countries or in support of maritime outlaws, that contacts with foreign countries would be a security leak or that trading junks smuggled sailing masts. He argued instead that, in the first place, the Nanyang countries were abundant in rice and Chinese junks in fact brought back rice rather than smuggling it out. It was also nonsense that merchants sold rice to the pirates. The latter only plundered what they wanted, but they never purchased it. Even the question of plundering could be discarded because the criminal acts at sea during the period were committed by small bands, who plied along the coastline and, thus, were not capable of plundering the ocean junks. Second, he ridiculed the fear of information leakage. Since the foreign ships were allowed to come to Canton and leave freely without the fear that they might spread information concerning coastal defence, why should the Fukienese junks be subject to suspicion?

Lastly, he explained that the sailing masts produced in China could not match the better quality of foreign products. The question of selling them overseas did not exist.⁴⁹

His sympathies for the seafaring population had influenced his view that maritime trade should not be jeopardized by these unfounded suspicions which had been worrying the court. In 1727, the year when the Nanyang trade was reopened, it came to the court's attention that there was a large number of outlaws among the Chinese emigrants residing in Luzon and Batavia. The newly opened trade with the Nanyang could have become a short-lived undertaking if the provincial authorities had not been able to dissuade the emperor from adopting preventive measures based on a fear of the bandits. Kao, in a joint memorial which involved the governors of Fukien and Kwangtung, separated the two issues of maritime trade and irregularities. According to the memorialists, what should be stopped was the large number of emigrants being smuggled out of the country. As a positive measure, Kao and his colleagues recommended the enforcement of the existing preventive system, including joint guaranty and tightening up the checkpoints.⁵⁰

Governor-general Kao's sympathy for the seafaring merchants cannot be better shown than by his handling of merchants who overstayed their permits to travel abroad. Despite the emperor's initial reluctance,⁵¹

49. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 140:9b-10a.

50. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, Fukien governor Ch'ang Lai, and Kwangtung governor Yang Wen-ch'ien, 5/9/9. The same memorial also suggested that Amoy should be the only designated port for the Nanyang trade. Interestingly, the memorialists recommended sending special agents disguised as merchants to the two countries to gather information on the activities of the overseas Chinese. Emperor Yung-cheng endorsed the idea.

51. The court was suspicious that the returnees, after a long stay overseas, might spread undesirable influences among the local population. See *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 6/4/12, v.10, p.246.

Kao was able to persuade him in 1728 to allow overseas Chinese who went abroad before the maritime restriction of 1717 to come back without harassment.⁵² Kao had indeed set a good example for his successors who continued to adopt a favourable attitude towards maritime trade and petitioned from time to time on behalf of the seafaring Fukienese.⁵³ They maintained close, personal, though somewhat paternalistic and corrupt, relationships with the local merchants. Such communication kept the officials informed of the maritime situation and enabled them to report conditions more accurately to the court. They often used their good offices to help the merchants.⁵⁴

The generally favourable attitude towards maritime trade complied with the court's political preoccupation of maintaining social stability and pacifying what the court thought to be the rebellious character of the Fukienese maritime people. Within this framework, the provincial officials could safely advocate the benefits of trading activities under their pretext of preserving the social order. Certainly, no matter what the motives, they were not espousing a new pro-commerce policy. It was also obvious that to accommodate the merchants was in the officials' best self-interest. By sharing commercial profits with the officials, the trading community could hope that a condition of mutual benefit in trade would be maintained.

52. Refer to fn.50; also *KCTTC:YC* (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Hao Yü-lin, 13/4/18.

53. See, for example, *KCTTC:YC* (unpublished), Fukien G-G Hao Yü-lin, 11/4/5; *KCTTC:YC* (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Hao Yü-lin, 13/4/18. Hao followed Kao's example to separate trade from illicit overseas emigration. Even more explicitly, Hao petitioned for the Chang-Ch'üan emigrants who had overstayed their permits by describing them as good citizens (*liang-min*). They went abroad only to seek a better income and should be allowed to come back.

54. *KCTTC:YC* (unpublished), Che-Min G-G Hao Yü-lin and others, 13/4/18.

To the officials, the booming trade had brought along extra private income through semi-legal or illegal practices. Theoretically, any outright bribery was a felony that the court could not tolerate. However, as I have indicated, the collection of "extra charges" (*hao-hsien*) or "surplus quota" (*ying-yü* or *hsien-yü*) was accepted as regular practice. Often, the amount was distributed among the officials as allowances, additional to their meagre regular salary. With this "extra grant," the court thought that the officials might have no excuse for extortions. All other unreported bribes (*lou-kuei*) were banned.⁵⁵ However, the distinction between the semi-legal and illegal acceptance of fees was never clear-cut.

An accusation was made by governor Mao Wen-ch'üan in 1726, for example, against the former governor-general, Chüeh-lo-man-pao. The latter was appointed Fukien governor in 1712 and promoted to the governor-generalship three years later. His long service in Fukien lasted until 1725. Among his alleged wrong-doings, merchants involved in overseas trade had to satisfy his demands for extra charges before they could obtain their sailing permits; particularly during the maritime restriction after 1717. The merchants had to buy their way out to sea. He and the subordinates were most willing to welcome visits by foreign ships. For a Western ship with a capital of a million taels, the governor-general, the governor, the naval commander, and the brigade-general's offices, would each demand five or six thousand taels as extra charges. Different amounts were also required by other officials.⁵⁶ Mao also mentioned in

55. For the information, see *CSL:ST*, 69:5a-6a; *CPYC*, Fukien governor Liu Shih-ming, 7/6/16, 5,3,43-44 (p.1409); and *CPYC*, Prince I 怡親王 Yün Hsiang 允祥, 7/?/? , 5,3,56a-58a (pp.1415-16).

56. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/3/10, v.5, pp.688-90.

another memorial that, when the maritime customs administration was formerly under the charge of the superintendents, they always retired "fully laden" with money (*wu-pu man-tsai erh kuei*).⁵⁷ Mao also accused his predecessor, Huang Kuo-ts'ai of demanding that each sugar-carrying ship passing through Amoy pay an amount of Tls.16.2 in checking fees. The total income from this item alone would amount to more than ten thousand taels. The governor's office received additional extra charges from other merchant junks calling at Amoy, Ch'üan-chou and other seaports totalling about 20 thousand taels.⁵⁸

The officials' involvement in trade was another source of private income. Governor Mao himself was involved in local business. His household servants managed a bank and a rice shop in the provincial capital, Foochow.⁵⁹ It is unlikely that the business was conducted without Mao's knowledge or investment. Although the officials' involvement in trade was forbidden by the court, it was commonplace that they were keen to make a profit from business investments.⁶⁰ Money lending to merchants from which interest was derived (*chiao-shang sheng-hsi*), represented another category of income. Often, officials misappropriated government funds and lent them to merchants for interest.⁶¹

57. *WHTP:KSSL*, v.17, p.3a; also *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/10/12, v.6, p.728.

58. *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 3/10/25, v.5, p.293; *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 3/10/25, v.5, p.297; and *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/5/4/, v.5, pp.893-94.

59. *KCTTC:YC*, provincial treasurer Shen T'ing-cheng, 4/9/29, v.6, p.665.

60. See, for example, *CPYC*, Fukien governor Ch'ang Lai, 5/10/25, 5, 2, 34a (p.1356).

61. For instance, Taiwan magistrate Chou Chung-hsüan 周鍾瑄, who was a compiler of one of the Taiwan gazetteers, was involved in a case in which he was suspected of misappropriating government funds for earning interest. See *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien governor Mao Wen-ch'üan, 4/3/10, v.5, p.693.

In other words, officials had a real stake in trade. They were happy to see the development of maritime trade so that their share in it would be larger. Instead of being hostile to trade, they acted as patrons and established close and personal relationships with merchants. Whether the nature of such patronage represented a damaging factor to the healthy development of trade in the long run is another question which is beyond the scope of this work. During the period of the present study, the merchants were undoubtedly able to exploit the willing cooperation of the officials and maximize the benefits derived from such good relationships with them. It was, in any event, just a price that the merchants could not avoid paying.

3. FUKIENESE SCHOLARS AND OFFICIALS

Within the Fukienese community, there were two other factors which served to advance the development of trade. One was the deep appreciation of, and even direct involvement in, trading activities among scholars; the second was the patronage of native military officials.

During the Ch'ing dynasty, as Yang Lien-sheng has pointed out, "there was a remarkable lack of obstacles for merchants climbing the political ladder."⁶² Either they arranged for some of their sons to take civil examinations for degrees or they could purchase titles or offices by contributions (*ch'üan-na*).⁶³ Nevertheless, it was equally common in Fukien for many scholars to shift their career to commercial undertaking. This was done not necessarily because of their failure in the civil examinations but because trade offered more instant income and better prospects.⁶⁴ In Chang-chou city, for example, governor P'an Ssu-chü reported that "over one half of the gentry [*shen-shih*] and the rich households engage in maritime trade for their livelihood."⁶⁵ On the local scene, gentry members openly operated periodic markets. Ts'ai Shih-yüan, an outstanding scholar from Chang-p'u and a junior vice-president of the Board of Rites, provides a typical example of gentry participation in trade. A large part of rural business in his native village was under the management and control of his son and household servants.⁶⁶ For a

62. Yang Lien-sheng, p.189.

63. *ibid.*, p.190.

64. For the information, see the biography sections of the various gazetteers.

65. See *KCTTC:CL* (unpublished), Fukien governor P'an Ssu-chü, 16/9/21.

66. *KCTTC:YC* (unpublished, Inspector deputed to investigate and reorder the local custom of Fukien, Liu Shih-shu, 7/12/8; and *CPYC*, Fukien G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 8/6/6, 14, 6, 48a (p.4931).

poor scholar without capital or business experience, the most common way to start a new profession was by becoming a bookkeeper in a business firm.⁶⁷ Many of them had later become successful merchants.⁶⁸

The deep involvement in trade by scholars led to the creation of a group of merchants who successfully combined the elements of scholarship and trade. P'an Ch'i, the Fukienese *hang* merchant in Canton, was just one example. He started his career as a scholar. In Canton, he became a manager for a *hang* merchant before he began his own successful *hang* business. As the founder of the Chang-Ch'üan *hui-kuan*, his leadership among his fellow regionals in Canton is beyond question. Another case is Ts'ao Shih-hsing. He started as a scholar and later became a successful and leading merchant in Soochow. He also founded a Chin-chiang/Ch'üan-chou *hui-kuan*. Both P'an and Ts'ao became deeply involved in scholarly circles.

These scholar merchants or merchant scholars had acted to blur the dividing line between the two social classes of scholars and merchants in the Confucian tradition. They or their family members could maintain the dual identity of scholar and merchant or move freely between the two classes without creating value conflict. Their compatibility not only bolstered the frequency of contact between the two groups but in fact created a common gentry (*shen*) circle within local society. Even if a scholar did not take up a business profession, he would often develop his scholarship along practical lines by relating it to local socio-economic conditions; in other words, a scholarship capable of helping "develop the land and save the people" (*chin-shih chi-min*). This practical

67. *Chin-chiang HC* (1765 ed.), 10:37b-38a.

68. *Ch'üan-chou FC* (1763 ed.), 60:94b.

scholarship had great bearing on the development of the region particularly with respect to trade. The closeness of scholarship and practical matters had also produced a number of Fukienese people who possessed a solid knowledge of local socio-economic conditions, trading activities, and foreign lands. Their understanding was further enhanced by a command of foreign languages among many of the merchants who dealt with foreign trade.⁶⁹

The second aspect which worked to the advantage of the Fukienese in trading activities was the presence of native naval officials. Fukien's position as the most sensitive province in the country had often resulted in the court's overconcern and overreaction towards it. Emperor Yung-cheng personally interviewed and selected all the officials for the more important Fukien posting.⁷⁰ He also followed his father's non-traditional practice of appointing Fukienese to almost all the naval posts in their native province. It was partly because of their maritime talents and partly because of the understanding of local conditions that no other group could better safeguard maritime security. The court, however, never concealed its dissatisfaction with the naval personnel for the "improper" protection and patronage given to their fellow regionals.⁷¹

In the following paragraphs, I shall illustrate the above discussion by giving examples of five prominent Fukienese: Shih Lang, Hsü Liang-pin, Ch'en Lun-chiung, Lan Ting-yüan, and Ts'ai Hsin.

69. *KCTTC:YC* (unpublished), Fukien naval commander Wang Chün, 12/7/19. P'an Ch'i's success in foreign trade was partly attributed to his command of several foreign languages. See Liang Chia-pin, p.261.

70. *CPYC*, Fukien governor Liu Shih-ming, 7/1/25, 5, 3, 29a(1402).

71. For the discussion above, see *CSL:KH*, 243:12b-13a; *HCCSWP*, 84:54a; *KCTTC:YC*, Fukien naval commander Lan T'ing-chen, 4/8/15, v.6, p.455; *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/7/25, v.6, p.354; *KCTTC:YC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/9/2, v.6, p.517; and *CPYC*, Che-Min G-G Kao Ch'i-chuo, 4/9/2, 14, 4, 76b(p.4829).

Shih Lang (1621-1696), a Chin-chiang man, was first educated to be a scholar. But before he reached adulthood, his father's fortune waned. In the turbulent years during the Ming-Ch'ing transition, it was quite natural that he should start a military career.⁷² Most of his career was served in the navy, first under Cheng Ch'eng-kung before his defection to the Ch'ing, while at the same time taking part in maritime trade.⁷³ His contributions to maritime trade were related to the retention of Taiwan, the lifting of the early Ch'ing maritime ban, and the regularization of maritime trade.

After the conquest of Taiwan in 1683, the Ch'ing court did not wish to see a resurgence of maritime turbulence. What the court originally planned to do was to withdraw all the population on Taiwan back to the mainland and abandon the island. Shih Lang strongly opposed the idea of withdrawal. He saw the plan as unrealistic not only because withdrawing the entire population would take a few years to complete, but the re-settlement on the mainland would also create huge problems. In addition, either the outlaws or the Dutch would very soon fill the vacuum and re-occupy the island. Should the pre-1683 situation be repeated, the security of the coastal provinces would be threatened. Significantly, Shih Lang at that time had already possessed a clear vision of Taiwan's economic and commercial potential. With its fertile soil and agricultural products, Taiwan could easily achieve self-sufficiency and support

72. Shih Lang, *Ching-hai chi-shih*, introductory section, p.23. See also Arthur W. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)* (2 vols; Washington: The Library of Congress, 1943), v.2, p.653 for Shih Lang's biography.

73. John E. Wills, Jr., "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang," in Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr., eds., *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1979), pp.229-30.

trade between the mainland and the island, as Shih Lang pointed out.⁷⁴ His successful petition served both to save the island from being deserted and to lay the foundation of the booming coastal trade in the following decades.

At almost the same time, Shih Lang also pressed for the opening of maritime trade.⁷⁵ His initiative successfully led to the establishment of the Fukien customs administration in 1684. He knew very well that the conservative group at court might attempt to reimpose restrictions on the seafaring trade. To avoid such a possible move, he proposed a scheme of regularization to safeguard the smooth development of maritime trade. His major points included the establishment of a unified system to administer maritime matters such as issuing licenses for the merchant junks, controlling illegal emigrants to foreign lands, and setting up regulations for both the coastal and the Nanyang trade. With regard to the overseas trade, he proposed that the number of ocean-going junks should be fixed. The financially capable households should be allowed to build ships of larger size and to invite travelling merchants to invest, or consignments from elsewhere. Control was aimed at increasing the capital of each merchant junk and reducing the non-merchant elements who went to sea in large numbers. Ch'ing maritime control was basically based on Shih Lang's recommendations.

However, Shih Lang's real intention was made clear in a memorial of 1695. While he did not wish to see any reimposition of maritime bans or restrictions in future, he thought that the best way to safeguard the

74. The complete text of his memorial is in Shih Lang, *Ching-hai chi-shih*, pp.59-62.

75. Ting Yüeh-chien, comp., *Chih-T'ai pi-kao lu*, p.79.

continuation of maritime trade was to introduce some form of self-restraint and reduce the chance of illicit activities. With these measures of control, the Ch'ing court could relax about the growth of maritime trade.⁷⁶

Hsü Liang-pin (c.1670-1733), a native of Hai-ch'eng, was another scholar-merchant figure who later turned naval official. He was also trained first as a scholar but soon became interested in military studies and maritime affairs. On a trip to the Nanyang, he carefully surveyed the conditions of the foreign countries and gained a knowledge of navigation. His Nanyang trip and his knowledge of overseas trade became a great help to him when he decided to start his own business in Canton. He soon became a very successful merchant through his contacts and good relationships with the native headmen in the Nanyang countries. Like many other Fukienese merchants, his Nanyang trade expanded under the patronage of the Fukienese commanders in Kwangtung during the late K'ang-hsi years when the maritime restriction was in force. The two major patrons were his clan uncle Hsü Cheng and Yao T'ang. The latter was a native of Chang-p'u. Not surprisingly, Hsü Liang-pin decided to add to his commercial achievements by purchasing a subprefect title. His knowledge of the foreign and maritime affairs also prompted him to offer his service as an adviser to his patrons. In 1722, he came back to Amoy and assisted Yao T'ang, who was newly appointed Fukien naval commander, to suppress the remnants of the Taiwan rebels seeking refuge in the Fukien interior.

In 1725, Lan T'ing-chen of Chang-p'u succeeded Yao T'ang. Lan recommended Hsü Liang-pin to emperor Yung-cheng, saying that Hsü's

76. For the full text of the memorial, see Shih Lang, *Ching-hai chi-shih*, pp.69-74.

expertise in maritime affairs should qualify him for exceptional consideration and requested that he be transferred from his civil appointment to a more relevant naval posting. The emperor told Lan to consult with the Che-Min governor-general, Chüeh-lo-man-pao, on this matter. The governor-general agreed to send a favourable recommendation to the emperor. Subsequently, Hsü was summoned to appear before the Yung-cheng emperor for a face-to-face interview. In the meantime, Hsü's fellow Fukienese serving at the court, including Ts'ai Shih-yüan, gave their full support for him. The emperor himself was satisfied with Hsü's capability. Hsü was first appointed a naval rank of lieutenant-colonel. Soon he was promoted to brigade-general. He succeeded Lan T'ing-chen as the Fukien naval commander in 1729.⁷⁷

Being both a Nanyang-trade expert and an established merchant himself, but not a professional military man like his predecessors Shih Lang and Lan T'ing-chen, there is reason to believe that his appointment with the naval force in a period which coincided with the rapid growth of coastal trade and the resumption of Nanyang trade, could have been beneficial to other merchants and Fukienese merchants in particular.⁷⁸

Ch'en Lun-chiung (c.1683-c.1747) of T'ung-an should in fact be discussed together with his father Ch'en Mao. The Ch'en family is also representative for this survey because of their connections with the three aspects of scholarship, commerce and military career. Ch'en Mao began

77. For Hsu's biographies, see *Chang-chou FC* (1877 ed.), 33:35; and *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 230:34b-35a.

78. Unlike his predecessors, he seems to have been an incorruptible official during his term. Since Shih Lang's time, the naval commander had a private income of more than a thousand taels from the levies on fishery in the Peng-hu Islands. After Hsü Liang-pin came to hold the position, he reported to emperor Yung-cheng that he decided to appropriate the sum for official expenses. The emperor praised his integrity but rejected his request, believing that he was entitled to that private income. See *MCSL:WP*, p.42a; and *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 230:35a.

his career as a scholar, but was forced by poverty to give up his classical learning and become a merchant in overseas trade. After extensive travels in foreign lands, he turned out to be an expert in navigation and maritime affairs. When Shih Lang prepared for the Taiwan expedition in 1682, Ch'en Mao joined the naval force and served as a navigation adviser. Immediately after the successful military campaign, Ch'en Mao was sent by admiral Shih Lang to do intelligence work for five years in the Eastern and Southern Oceans because of his familiarity with the regions. The main purpose was to search for the Cheng remnants. When the mission was completed, he was formally appointed to a military rank of major. Following successive promotions, he became a brigade-general and later deputy commander of the Kwangtung provincial force. When the renewed maritime restriction was declared in 1717, he felt much concern about the livelihood of the coastal people, who depended upon the sale of native products and on the Nanyang trade. Ch'en Mao was also disappointed that the real situation had not been properly related to the court. He became very ill shortly after, but managed to hand down a memorial. It was submitted posthumously to emperor K'ang-hsi. According to the source, the emperor was moved by Ch'en Mao's sincere concern and had subsequently relaxed part of the ban.

His son Lun-chiung was also good in military arts. From his childhood, his father explained his maritime experience to him. When his father was serving in Chekiang, he was able to visit Japan in 1710 and reminded himself of the late-Ming piracy problem. In the final years of the K'ang-hsi period, he served the emperor as an imperial body-guard. The emperor was very impressed by his military and maritime expertise. In 1721, he took up his first military command as a lieutenant-colonel in southern Taiwan. After 1723, he was promoted first to be colonel and

then brigade-general, serving in the Peng-hu Islands, Taiwan, and coastal Kwangtung. During his term in Kwangtung, he was able to meet daily with merchants from foreign countries. He studied their customs, books, and maps. With this information, additional to his previous maritime knowledge, he decided to compile the book *Hai-kuo wen-chien lu*. It was completed in 1730, dealing with the topics of maritime affairs, products, and trade, with the intention of providing relevant information for officials responsible for coastal defence and merchants.⁷⁹

Ch'en Mao and Ch'en Lun-chiung were both very concerned about the merchants' well-being. They worked to bring about better trading conditions during their time of military service on the coast. Like Shih Lang and Hsü Liang-pin, the two Ch'ens provided yet another example of patronage for Fukienese merchants.⁸⁰

Lan Ting-yüan (1680-1733) from Chang-p'u was a prominent Fukienese scholar. His father died when he was still in his childhood. Despite poverty, he studied hard and succeeded in becoming a learned man in his

79. The above information is based on Ch'en Lun-chiung, *Hai-kuo wen-chien lu*, preface:10a-11b; Ch'üan-chou FC (1763 ed.), 56:37; FCTC (1868-1871 ed.), 229:4b-5a; HMC, 12:12b-13b; Wang Gungwu, "The Melayu in *Hai-kuo wen-chien lu*," *The Journal of the Historical Society* (Kuala Lumpur), 2 (1963/64), pp.1-2; and Jennifer W. Cushman and A.C. Milner, "Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Chinese Accounts of the Malay Peninsula," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 52:Pt.1 (June 1979), pp.1-2. Ch'en Lun-chiung's book was part of a tradition of Fukienese scholars who tried to understand the high seas and foreign lands. Their knowledge of this field was closely related to the livelihood of the coastal Fukienese. For example, Chang Hsieh, a native of Lung-ch'i, in the late Ming had already communicated his expertise in maritime affairs in his outstanding work, *Tung-hsi-yang k'ao*.

80. There was a case which exhibits Ch'en Lun-chiung's concern about his fellow Fukienese. In 1742, when he was promoted to Chekiang commander, he purchased a piece of land as the burial ground for the Fukienese who died during their sojourn in Chekiang. Another piece of cultivated land was set aside to provide for maintenance funds. All the Fukienese travellers there were grateful to him. See HMC, 12:13b.

youth. His scholarship focused on practical learning which could help develop the state and benefit the people. The Lan clan of the time produced many outstanding military officials, but Ting-yüan, while undoubtedly a military expert, did not pursue a military career. Neither did he show any keen interest in an official career because he felt obliged to stay close to his mother and grandparents in order to take care of them. His two year term as the magistrate of P'u-ning district in eastern Kwangtung represented his major posting in local government. He had been an acting Canton prefect for only one month before his death.

There is no indication in the sources as to whether he had ever participated in commercial activity. Nevertheless, his written works had a great bearing on the development of coastal and Nanyang trade. His self-cultivated expertise in maritime studies started when he was only seventeen. He was then in Amoy, observing the maritime conditions around the island. Then he navigated along the coast to familiarize himself with all the offshore islands between Hai-men in the vicinity of Ch'ao-chou and Chusan in Chekiang. In the following years, he extended his knowledge by becoming an expert on Taiwan and Nanyang affairs.⁸¹

His first major contribution to the development of trade was a repetition of admiral Shih Lang's role nearly forty years earlier in reversing the court's negative attitude towards Taiwan. Their achievements in this regard paralleled each other. The value of retaining Taiwan again became a topic of discussion at court when Chu I-kuei's rebellion broke

81. For Lan Ting-yüan's biographies, see Lan Ting-yüan, *Tung-cheng chi*, preface, pp.1-5; Lan Ting-yüan, *P'ing-T'ai chi-lüeh*, preface, pp. 1-16; *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 230:18b-20b, and Arthur Hummel, ed., v.1, pp.440-41. For modern studies on Lan, see Chuang Chin-teh, "Lan Ting-yüan ti chih-T'ai tang-lun" 藍鼎元的治台論 (Lan Ting-yüan's remonstrances on the ruling of Taiwan), in *TWWH*, 17:2 (June 1966), pp.1-27.

out in 1721. During the military campaign against Taiwan under brigade-general Lan T'ing-chen's command, a clansman of Ting-yüan's, the latter served as a secretary and adviser. Ting-yüan's major works on Taiwan were begun at this time. After seven days' war, Lan T'ing-chen's landing force reconquered the island, but it took another two years for the whole situation to calm down. Having little faith in Taiwan's loyalty, the Ch'ing court began to devise a scheme to resettle the rural population of the island on the mainland.⁸² They even planned to remove the main military command on the island and to set up a new frontline in the Peng-hu islands.⁸³ The process would eventually lead to the abandonment of Taiwan. Against this background Lan Ting-yüan came forward with his expertise in the maritime affairs. In some of his arguments, he gave a warning similar to that raised by Shih Lang previously about the possible repercussions if the island were abandoned. More positively, he gave a vivid picture of the agricultural and commercial growth of the island in less than forty years under Ch'ing rule. He strongly argued that the production of sugar and rice benefitted the country as a whole. Through close commercial relations with all the coastal provinces, Taiwan had become an integral part of the country's economic network.⁸⁴ In view of this, he made a counterproposal that not only was the question of abandonment irrelevant, but that the island administration should be immediately extended. He supported the suggestion raised by his fellow same-district and the compiler of the Chu-lo gazetteer, Ch'en Meng-lin, that a new district should be established in northern Chu-lo to encourage

82. Lan Ting-yüan, *Tung-cheng chi*, p.40.

83. *ibid.*, pp.46-47.

84. *ibid.*, pp.2, 32-34.

development and settlement. When emperor Yung-cheng came to the throne, the proposal to set up Chang-hua district and Tan-shui subprefecture was approved.⁸⁵

In commercial matters, such as the treatment of merchants, Lan Ting-yüan also aired his disappointment with certain practices. He was opposed, for instance, to the extra levies imposed by the officials upon the merchant junks plying between Amoy and Lu-erh-men. He petitioned for the merchants and shipowners saying "(they) make the long and risky voyages for a return of small and trifling profits. It is proper that they are given sympathy."⁸⁶ Most interesting was his view of whether merchant junks should be allowed to arm themselves. On the part of the court, the maintenance of coastal security retained top priority in the consideration of maritime affairs. Junks, therefore, were forbidden outright to carry arms. Lan Ting-yüan proposed in the early Yung-cheng period that merchant junks should be given permission to carry arms. In his opinion, it was the most effective way for the merchant junks to protect themselves from piracy. He fully understood the sensitiveness of the issue. To persuade the authorities, he argued that, by arming the merchant junks, the lingering problem of piracy on the coast could be immediately solved. The apprehension of danger for allowing merchant junks to carry arms was unwarranted, stressed Lan. It was because all the merchant junks were owned by people of property. They would never risk their positions by becoming involved in illegal activities, especially if they were placed under guaranty before their embarkation.

85. Chuang Chin-teh (1966), p.14.

86. Lan Ting-yüan, *P'ing-T'ai chi-lüeh*, p.51.

The authorities should have faith with these well-established people.⁸⁷

Although there is no mention of the outcome in the sources, I suspect that the court's subsequent relaxation of the arms ban was a result of Lan's persuasiveness. As his biography relates,⁸⁸ he was recommended to the Hanlin Academy in 1724. In the following year, he took part in the compilation of the *Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ung chih* (A comprehensive gazetteer of the great Ch'ing). The Yung-cheng emperor granted him an audience in 1728, one year after the lifting of the maritime ban. Apparently, Lan was received as an expert on both Taiwan and maritime affairs. It was on this occasion that he submitted to the emperor his six suggestions in 5,000 words on the proper ruling of Taiwan.⁸⁹ The emperor greatly appreciated his expertise. In the same year, emperor Yung-cheng decreed a ruling on the matter of carrying arms. While the merchant and fishing junks sailing along the coast were forbidden to be armed, the overseas junks might carry a maximum of eight guns, ten sets of arrows and bows, and twenty catties of gunpowder. Two years later, the emperor granted permission for ocean ships to carry two cannon in addition to the previously approved items. The amount of gunpowder also increased to thirty catties.⁹⁰

Lan's insight into maritime affairs was best illustrated by his treatise on the Nanyang, published in the early 1720s. In fact, the essay did not limit itself to the overseas trade *per se*. It was an

87. Lan's writing on this issue is collected in Ting Yüeh-chien, comp., *Chih T'ai pi-kao lu*, pp.46-47.

88. Lan Ting-yüan, *P'ing-T'ai chi-lüeh*, p.8; *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 230:18b-19a.

89. For the full text, see Lan Ting-yüan, *P'ing-T'ai chi-lüeh*, pp.67-69.

90. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:12b-13a.

overall examination and evaluation of the trading conditions affecting both domestic and overseas activities. His argument was so lucid and so well informed that the treatise, in my opinion, represents the best essay on the topic in the pre-nineteenth-century period. Its impact was beyond doubt and the reopening of the Nanyang trade can be originally attributed to Lan's petition.⁹¹

His presentation is three-fold. In the first place, he conceived of future threats to coastal security as coming from Japan and the Western maritime powers. The latter included the Dutch, English, Spanish, and French whose aggressiveness was indicated by their activities in the Nanyang. In his view, the Nanyang countries were weak and not in any position to create trouble. Despite this, since Westerners were allowed to spread their religion and build their outposts in Canton and Macao, and trade with Japan was not prohibited, he could not understand why the Chinese trade with the harmless people of the Nanyang was banned.

Lan's second argument ridiculed the excuses for imposing the ban, saying that the Nanyang countries produced ship masts of better quality and rice in great surplus. The smuggling of such items from China had never occurred. The other worry that ocean junks might serve as lures for pirates on the high seas and, thus, increase the incidence of piracy was dismissed. Lan pointed out that Chinese pirates were only active in the off-shore waters, usually within a distance of a hundred li. The coastal merchant junks, rather than those going overseas, became the targets of the outcasts.

91. Wei Yüan 魏源, the author of the *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* 海國圖誌 (An illustrated treatise on maritime kingdoms), made such comment. See Ting Yüeh-chien, comp., *Chi-T'ai pi-kao lu*, p.79.

Thirdly, Lan discussed why the lifting of the maritime ban was necessary. On the negative side, he said, the ban had deprived the coastal population of its livelihood. Because of unemployment, many of them went to Taiwan and became outlaws. The outbreak of the Taiwan rebellion was indicative of the harm caused by the ban. On the positive side, if the people were allowed to trade freely, "the surplus resources from overseas could be utilized to compensate for shortages in the country." The native products, many of them being cheap and of no great use in China, could be sold overseas as precious things. All the local handicrafts were collected by the merchants for the overseas markets.

In the treatise, Lan also showed his disappointment in the previous provincial authorities who supported the ban. Their views of maritime conditions were criticized by him as reflecting a limited outlook (*tso-ching kuan-t'ien chih chien*). As to those court ministers responsible for the final recommendation of the ban's imposition, he blamed them for their inexperience in, and ignorance of, the actual conditions. Lan regretted that the opinions of native Fukienese, including scholars without official rank, had not been sought, though they were the people who knew the true situation.⁹²

If we compare Lan's essay with governor-general Kao's memorial, in which he petitioned for the reopening of Nanyang trade, it is clear that Kao based his argument and information almost exactly on Lan's suggestions. It is unfortunate that Ch'en Mao's memorial, which was written even earlier than Lan's, is not available so we could not see if it had any influence on Lan. However, Lan's contribution to the lifting of maritime restriction is indisputable.

92. Lan Ting-yüan, "Nan-yang shih-i lun," in *HCCSWP*, 83:37-39.

Lastly, I shall briefly mention Ts'ai Hsin (1710-1799), also a Chang-p'u man. He passed the highest *chin-shih* degree in 1736. In the following year, he was appointed an imperial compiler in the Hanlin Academy. His scholarship greatly impressed the Ch'ien-lung emperor. After a massacre of the Chinese population in Batavia by the Dutch in 1740, a vigorous debate was initiated among Ch'ing officials of high rank under the instruction from the court to see whether a maritime ban on foreign trade should be renewed.⁹³ When the discussion was still going on, the thirty-year-old Ts'ai Hsin was consulted by the sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat, Fang Pao. Fang knew that Ts'ai was not only a learned scholar in Confucian classics, but often advocated a practical approach to problem solving. In his reply, Ts'ai indicated his opposition to so drastic a measure as reimposing the maritime ban. He gave some figures to support his argument. According to him, a new maritime ban would leave useless no fewer than 110 ocean junks worth around 5 to 6 million taels. The value of another several million taels of cargo which were stocked in Amoy and Canton would be lost. Around a thousand households who depended on the maritime income would be left without a means of earning their livelihood. All this would happen immediately after the imposition of ban. Worse still, in a few years' time, the ban would eventually hurt both the national economy as well as the people. From these considerations he proposed that the court's deliberations should be well-calculated and cool-headed. After the debate, the court decreed in 1742 that overseas trade should continue as usual.⁹⁴

93. The debate is best discussed in Jennifer W. Cushman, "Duke Ch'ing-fu Deliberates: A Mid-Eighteenth Century Reassessment of Sino-Nanyang Commercial Relations," *Papers on Far Eastern History*, 17 (March 1978), pp.137-56.

94. Ts'ai Hsin's biographies are available in *Chang-chou FC* (1877 ed.), 33:64a-65a; *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 230:21b-26b; and Arthur Hummel, ed., v.2, p.734.

From the above survey, we see that, starting from the emperor down to the native scholars of Fukien, a pragmatic approach to the issue of maritime trade was evident during the late seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries. They all appreciated the profits that maritime trade could bring forth and how important the enterprise was to the coastal population. Whether it was an ideal occupation in line with the traditional and orthodox Confucian ideology was not an important issue.

4. PATERNALISTIC RELATIONSHIPS AND TRADE

Based on the foregoing discussion, we are now able to examine some of the generalizations which have emerged on the topic of the socio-political environment in which merchants were operating.

Two types of generalizations are often put forward to illustrate the relationship of Confucian ideology and of the state bureaucracy with commerce in traditional China. The first of the two may be termed the "dominance-submission" bias. This interpretation is based on the conceptualization of Chinese social structure which can best be described by the concept of the four-tiered hierarchy of classes: scholar-official, farmer, artisan, and merchant. According to this idealization, farming was regarded as fundamental, and the occupations of merchant and artisan were secondary. It is thus convenient to argue that, since commercial activity conflicted with Confucian ideology, it was subject to state exploitation and control.

The state-commerce relationship, as Etienne Balazs asserts, was governed by the dominant position of the omnipresent and omnipotent

state through which the scholar-official class served as the apex of the social pyramid.⁹⁵ An atmosphere of routinization, traditionalism, immobility, nepotism, and corruption characterized the imperial administration of commerce.⁹⁶ Nothing could possibly escape official regulation. The bureaucracy managed to control commercial activity by means of taxation, state monopoly, licenses, franchises, and political pressure.⁹⁷

The Confucian scholar-officials also took over from Legalism a powerful device for social control - collective responsibility.⁹⁸ It was found in almost every sector of political, social, and economic life. Naturally, merchants were not only of inferior status but also lacked autonomy.⁹⁹ Initiative and innovation were relentlessly obstructed. Their positive function was greatly reduced. Only marginal undertakings could be created. Urban life was dominated by the state, and the merchants were milked at will by the officials through legal, quasi-legal, or even illegal means. Under such circumstances, Balazs considers Confucianism to have been mainly a system of ideas used to rationalize and justify a system of power.¹⁰⁰ As a result, political power could normally create wealth for one-self; however, it was quite exceptional that by

95. Etienne Balazs, *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy*, ed. by Arthur F. Wright and translated by H.M. Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p.16.

96. *ibid.*, pp.xv, 11. See also Albert Feuerwerker, *China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsüan-huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp.242-44.

97. Balazs, p.xv. Also Yü Ying-shih 余英時, *Li-shih yü ssu-hsiang 歷史與思想* (History and thoughts) (Taipei, 1976), pp.279-81.

98. Balazs, pp.xv, 11. Also Yang Lien-sheng, "Government Control of Urban Merchants," for details of the *pao* 保 (guaranty) system.

99. Balazs, p.16; and Hirase Minokichi 平瀬巳之吉, *Kindai shina keizai shi 近代支那經濟史* (Modern Chinese economic history) (Tokyo, 1942), p.243.

100. Balazs, p.xvi.

means of wealth one would achieve political power. From Yü Ying-shih's point of view, only the combination of both would ensure better security. Wealth alone could only put one in a precarious position.¹⁰¹ Merchants' fortunes could be taken over the moment they seemed about to become a class apart and thus a threat to the status quo. Upstart economic groups were effectively weakened. Psychologically, merchants constantly felt insecure unless they were assimilated into the official bureaucracy through the purchase of official titles, as Feuerwerker points out.¹⁰²

According to Balazs, it was the overwhelming prestige of the state bureaucracy that killed private enterprise and prevented China from achieving a modern economy.¹⁰³

A variant of this "dominance-submission" bias is the Marxist interpretation as presented by the scholars of mainland China. They stress the hostile and exploitative nature of government policy towards commerce on the one hand and the resistance struggle by merchants and handicraft-investors against the feudal rulers on the other.¹⁰⁴

Among the scholarly works by mainland scholars, Fu I-ling's are worth specific mention here.¹⁰⁵ Fu has produced the most relevant research on the socio-economic history of Fukien in Ch'ing times. He remarks that the Ch'ing government should be held responsible for the stagnation in commercial development.¹⁰⁶

101. Yü Ying-shih, pp.279-81.

102. Albert Feuerwerker, pp.242-44.

103. Balazs, pp.10, 11, 18, 53, 78.

104. See, for example, the treatment by P'eng Tse-i 彭澤益, ed., *Chung-kuo chin-tai shou-kung-yeh shih tzu-liao* 中國近代手工業史資料 (Sources on handicraft industry of modern China (Peking: San-lien, 1957)).

105. Fu I-ling, *Ming-Ch'ing shih-tai shang-jen*; and *Ming-Ch'ing nung-ts'un*.

106. Fu I-ling (1956), p.200.

This foregoing gloomy picture of commercial development is offset by an alternative generalization which appraises merchant status positively. We may call it the "benevolent state" bias. In an illuminating paper, Yang Lien-shang argues that, in the first two hundred years of the Ch'ing period, there were few obstacles preventing merchants from improving their status, limited checks on their business activities, and relatively light taxation and extortion imposed on them. He concludes that the merchants had in the last several hundred years "received a kind of political emancipation."¹⁰⁷ Thomas Metzger even doubts that Confucian ideology was anti-commercial in practice and theory. In his view, commercial development was in harmony with orthodox Confucianism. At the same time, it was "outside state control, and involved considerable state cooperation."¹⁰⁸ One example given is the innumerable references in Ch'ing writings to the need for commerce, such as the cliché *an-min t'ung-shang* (make the people content and facilitate the activities of merchants).¹⁰⁹

Both Dwight Perkins and Thomas Metzger touch on the government factor as an obstacle to industrialization in nineteenth century China. Perkins believes that the reputed official hostility to commerce, in fact, played only a marginal role.¹¹⁰ His argument is that many Ch'ing officials not only understood commerce but they themselves were deeply

107. Yang Lien-sheng, 'pp.188 and 190.

108. Thomas A. Metzger, "The State and Commerce in Imperial China," *Asian and African Studies* (Jerusalem), v.6 (1970), pp.23-24.

109. *ibid.*, p.32. Also by the same author, "Ch'ing Commercial Policy," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i*, 1:3 (February 1966), p.7.

110. Dwight H. Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China," *The Journal of Economic History*, 27:4 (December 1967), p.478.

involved in it. It was essentially economic conditions that limited the size and nature of China's commerce in the nineteenth century and earlier.¹¹¹ On the other hand, Metzger sees the scope of government monopoly in commerce as being limited. The state was conscious of its restricted power to organize commerce and, therefore, was willing to share power in monopolies with merchants. It had "a favorable if ambivalent attitude" towards private commerce and "cooperated with merchants" in carrying out the market's activities.¹¹²

Despite the different points of view inherent in these two generalizations, they share a common theme - the interrelationship between the state and commerce or between the bureaucracy and merchants. First of all, Balazs makes certain qualifications to his approach by conceding that there were mutual interests between the merchants and the scholar-officials, though often expressed through bribery in return for short-term concessions.¹¹³ Nevertheless, he maintains that the merchants were never allowed to develop an independent position. As a result, the scholar-officials and the merchants formed two "hostile but interdependent classes."¹¹⁴ Fu I-ling's view on this question is very similar to Balazs's.¹¹⁵

Cooperation is the word used both by Perkins and Metzger to indicate the interrelationship between the state and merchants.¹¹⁶ The bureaucrats depended on well-to-do merchants for cooperation in implementing

111. *ibid.*

112. Thomas Metzger (1970), p.46.

113. Balazs, p.xvi.

114. *ibid.*, p.32.

115. Fu I-ling (1956), p.40.

116. Dwight Perkins (1967), p.480; and Thomas Metzger (1970), pp.30, 39, 45, and 46.

policies. The state and merchants also performed supplementary functions which sustained the commercial framework such as the maintenance of peace, a monetary system, a system of weights and measures, and so forth.

These two categories of interpretation contribute much to a clearer understanding of the state-commerce relationship. Nevertheless, discussions of the traditional ideology have too often been overly abstract. Stress on the anti-commercial aspect of Confucianism can be refuted by pro-commerce references in Confucian writings. There also existed a considerable disparity between theory and practice. Moreover, neither of the interpretations presents an accurate picture of the situation. The first bias does not coincide with the fact that commerce had long been in existence and blossomed from time to time. But to argue that the court's attitudes towards merchants were pro-commercial is to ignore the uncertainty which had always confronted them. In general, the two interpretations are complementary rather than contradictory.

The state-commerce interrelationship can be better understood if it is surveyed from a wider social perspective, instead of the overly simplified approach focusing on the two-way interaction between state and commerce. In the latter, too much emphasis is put on state policy. We gain an impression that the state of affairs was dictated by an impersonal policy and the effectiveness of this policy depended on the strength of the state.

As I have shown throughout this study, Fukienese commercial expansion was accompanied by the formation of interwoven social relationships. On the horizontal level, both the social connections and commercial network coincided with each other. However, the social connections also extended hierarchically; between the state and the trading community

were several levels of intermediaries. In this situation, any state policy could have only an indirect impact upon the local scene, and the trading community was allowed flexibility in its endeavours.

The relationship between officials and merchants within the network was based on mutual dependence, but involved two parties of unequal status; an atmosphere of paternalism permeated the relations. Although the relationship was somewhat exploitative, it also provided patronage. It was exactly within the complex socio-political milieu that the Fukienese expanded their trade during the early eighteenth century.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The momentum of commercialization between 1600 and 1800 stopped short of transforming Fukien's traditional agrarian economy into a commercial economy based on cash crops. This was not because the value system held by the peasantry forced them to eschew non-traditional methods of production, but stemmed from other factors. Even with the large supplies of rice and the increasing demands for native commodities when the volume of trade soared, particularly after the turn of the eighteenth century, the speculative nature of markets and the vulnerability of small agriculturists' economic position were partially responsible for their reluctance to make an all-out effort to change the traditional pattern of cultivation. Moreover, the ease with which land could be transferred and the "within-village bits-and-pieces land sale"¹ produced a diminution of individual holdings at the expense of economic practicality. Fragmentation had discouraged a smooth development of agricultural entrepreneurship.

When all the foregoing factors combined together, scarcity of arable land and the growing population impeded the improvement of rural conditions in South Fukien. A small agriculturist would sooner or later become involved in usurious entanglements and debts, and eventually lose

1. See Clifford Geertz, p.97.

the land he owned. He would probably end up by leaving the village himself or sending his son to seek outside opportunities and come back when he or his son could afford to rent or buy another small piece of land. Then the cycle started all over again. The small number of well-to-do people saw better prospects in extra-village trade investments rather than in land. This complicated process which combined both "push" and "pull" factors, illustrates better the phenomenon of rural exodus than singling out one factor or another.

Nevertheless, rural emigrants had not initially expected a voyage of no return. The basic structural pattern of rural society maintained its vitality. The ancestral hall in the native village continued to serve as both a spiritual source and a strong centripetal force. Much of the extra-village income that had drained back to the ancestral land was used to keep the traditional institutions working. A prolonged situation of fierce competition for scarce resources in the rural area required corporate effort and protection. Under these circumstances, *tsu* ("lineage") power was consolidated rather than undermined by the process of commercialization.

At the same time, however, the *tsu*'s internal dynamism had undergone profound changes. It became less exclusive and the use of kin terms was often expanded to include association with non-kin members. *Tsu* did not normally function beyond the borders of their ancestral village, but the same elements of paternalism, mutual dependence, reciprocity and inclusiveness that characterized the *tsu* organizations helped bridge their transition to the extra-village world.

Amoy, serving the extra-village activities of the South Fukienese, was the most important doorway to an extended maritime frontier. This city was undoubtedly an indigenous creation by the South Fukienese

trading community. Its rise could be partly attributed to its strategic location linking the two prefectures of Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou together, while keeping the central bases of the administrative power in Foochow, Ch'üan-chou and Chang-chou cities at arm's length. Moreover, the government's flexibility in administrative matters left room for local initiatives, which in turn were able to further the expansion of maritime trade.

An impressive degree of social cohesion existed among the different segments of population within the urban area of Amoy. This is not to say that a common Amoy identity was formed during the period in question, but that a more inclusive twin-prefecture awareness was fostered. Indeed, trade functioned as the major integrative ingredient and merchants played a vital role in the process. The social connections became even more far-reaching with the formation of a tripartite relationship among the officials, gentry and merchants. On the community level, merchants provided *de facto* leadership. The nominal participation of the officials and gentry in temple activities implied a recognition and an acceptance of the social role played by the merchants. Not infrequently, merchants were even accepted as "gentry" because many of them held purchased official titles. The personalized tripartite relationship was of great convenience for the merchants in the management of their maritime trade.

Amoy's trading position was officially legitimized when it became the only designated port on the mainland for the Taiwan trade in 1718 and the central port in Fukien for overseas trade in 1727. The maturity, by the 1720s, of the coastal network extending from Amoy represented another prominent achievement of the Amoy trade. Both the rapid development of frontier land in Taiwan, particularly in the 1710s and 1720s, and Taiwan's highly commercialized economy contributed to the growth of

the Amoy coastal network. Since the development of Taiwan was mainly a result of the South Fukienese expansion, the Chang-Ch'üan merchants dominated the trade on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. With their control of this commercial trunk line, aided by the fact that they were also the undisputed leaders in the overseas trade, they soon established their dominant role on the China coast by the 1720s. The shipping facilities provided by the South Fukienese also greatly increased the export volume from the lower Yangtze Valley and North China to the southern provinces.

One of the salient features in the coastal trade was that rice, sugar, clothing materials, handicrafts and other miscellaneous native products formed the bulk of the commodities. These items indicate that the interregional trade catered for the daily consumption of the general masses, instead of supplying a privileged class with luxury goods.

The rice and sugar trade was particularly important. Rice came from Taiwan and the Yangtze Valley. Amoy was the receiving and redistributing centre in Fukien. While most of the rice went to feed the South Fukienese population, a smaller portion was also transported to Foochow, eastern Kwangtung, and, at times, even southern Chekiang. Sugar from Taiwan was also exported through Amoy to Ningpo, Shanghai, Soochow and Tientsin.

There were well over one thousand merchant junks of various sizes in the 1720s serving on the sea-routes extending from Amoy. The most characteristic feature of these vessels was shown by their relatively small capacity, normally under 140 tons in the pre-1750 period. Nevertheless, they were capable of transporting such bulky commodities as sugar in the long-range voyages from Amoy to Tientsin and Manchuria. The network that the Fukienese had developed was able to cope with the

commercial needs of coastal China in the eighteenth century and was the best that the Chinese had organized up to that time.

Coastal trade during the Yung-cheng period was also characterized by the active and wider participation of merchants or shipowners with small or medium capital. A trend towards functional specialization came into being as well. Rich merchants no longer needed to become shipowners to conduct their large-scale and long-distance business activities; they relied instead on the many shipowners who willingly provided their services as carriers. Among the different categories of merchants, the rice and sugar traders in Taiwan and the *hang* merchants in Amoy were especially wealthy.

Along the coast, the South Fukienese established their strategic outposts in places like Canton, Ningpo, Shanghai, Soochow and Tientsin. Their presence at these seaports greatly facilitated the expansion and functioning of the trading network. The success of the Fukienese merchants, however, rested not only on the good connections with their fellow regionals, but also on their willingness to cooperate smoothly with the native trading communities. The social connections enabled them to penetrate local markets and obtain patronage from the local officials. Many of them even became assimilated within the new social environment.

Overall, the South Fukienese were able to operate their business within quite a favourable socio-political environment. The court acted with restraint in matters related to the livelihood of coastal Fukienese. Although it would be futile to explain the court's attitudes towards merchants and trade on the assumption that they were pro-commercial, it is nonetheless, reasonable to conclude that both the court and the provincial authorities acted in a pragmatic way, appreciated to a great extent

the positive role played by the merchants, and showed no obvious contempt of the trading community.

Even if there existed restrictive regulations from time to time, the direct impact upon the trading community was minimized because of the flexible attitudes adopted by the officials on the provincial and local levels. The officials' own political and economic interests would be jeopardized if they adopted too drastic measures against the trading community. Not only would they have had difficulty in collecting the fixed quota of customs revenue unless merchants were trading actively, but their private income through semi-legal or illegal channels would also be reduced. Moreover, their careers depended on how successfully they were able to maintain the social stability of the region under their jurisdiction. On the other hand, merchants could also assert their influence over officials on the basis of personalized relationships. Often, the officials petitioned the court on behalf of the trading community for a better business environment.

Within the Fukienese community itself, there were no psychological restraints against becoming involved in trading activities. The native scholars truly appreciated the importance of maritime commerce for the local population and showed a great interest in maritime affairs. Through their writings and petitions, accurate information about maritime conditions was conveyed to the authorities; officials relied on the scholars' expertise in these matters. Communications between native scholars and the authorities formed a sound basis for a better understanding and appreciation of maritime trade on the part of the court as well as the officials. Naval officials, some of whom were themselves merchants, also provided patronage to local trading enterprises. In addition, Fukienese scholars were known to have become merchants.

The large number of these scholar merchants may have added to the sophistication of the South Fukienese trading community.

In short, the success of the South Fukienese merchants can best be attributed to their commercial skills and to favourable social connections. These two elements provided the foundation for the expansion of their trade during the eighteenth century.

APPENDIX A: Rice Prices in Fukien, 1707-1734

		(Taels per shih)										Additional Information and Sources
I	II	Foochow fu	Hsing- hua fu	Ch'uan- chou fu	Chang- chou fu	Ting- chou fu	Chien- ning fu	Shao-wu fu	Yen- ping fu	Fu-ning chou	Taiwan fu	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1707: Dec 14	KH46/ 11/21	1.2- 1.3	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0		1.8- 2.0	KCTTC:KH, v.1, p.534
1708: Jun 7	KH47/ 4/19	1.4- 1.5	1.4- 1.5	1.4- 1.5	1.4- 1.5	1.4- 1.5	1.4- 1.5	1.4- 1.5	1.4- 1.5			ibid., v.1, p.775**
1709: Feb 28	KH48/ 1/19	1.0		0.6- 0.7	0.6- 0.7		0.5- 0.6	0.5- 0.6	0.5- 0.6			ibid., v.2, p.46
1709: Sep 27	KH48/ 8/24	0.6- 0.9	0.6- 0.9	0.6- 0.9	0.6- 0.9	0.6- 0.9	0.6- 0.9	0.6- 0.9	0.6- 0.9			ibid., v.2, p.333**
1710: Aug 2	KH49/ 7/8	0.9					0.7- 0.8		0.7- 0.8			ibid., v.2, p.625
1719: Jul 20	KH58/ 6/4	T1.2- 1.3 L1.0	T1.2- 1.3 L1.0	T1.3- 1.4 L1.1- 1.2	T1.3- 1.4 L1.1- 1.2	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 0.9	ibid., v.7, p.540
1723: Apr 10	YC1/ 3/6	1.0	1.0	1.1- 1.2	1.1- 1.2	0.9- 1.0	0.9- 1.0	0.9- 1.0	0.9- 1.0		0.7- 0.8	KCTTC:YC, v.1. p.116
1723: May 3	YC1/ 3/29	0.9- 1.0	0.9- 1.0	1.1- 1.2	1.1- 1.2	0.9- 1.0	0.9- 1.0	0.9- 1.0	0.9- 1.0		0.7- 0.8	ibid., v.1, p.152.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
1723:	YC1/	0.9-	1.0-	1.0-	1.0-	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-		0.8-		
Jun 16	5/14	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.9		<i>ibid.</i> , v.1, p.259
1723:	YC1/	0.9-	1.1-	1.1-	1.1-	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-		0.8-		
Jul 1	5/29	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.9		<i>ibid.</i> , v.1, p.307
1723:	YC1/	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-		0.8-		
Sep 11	8/12	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		1.0		<i>ibid.</i> , v.1, p.612**
1723:	YC1/	0.9-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-		0.7-		
Nov 15	10/18	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.8		<i>ibid.</i> , v.1, p.874.
1723:	YC1/	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-		0.8-		
Dec 6	11/9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		1.0		<i>ibid.</i> , v.2, p.33**
1724:	YC2/	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-		0.8-		
Feb 19	1/24	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9		0.9		<i>ibid.</i> , v.2, p.264**
1724:	YC2/	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-	0.9-		0.7-		
Apr 19	3/26	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		0.8		<i>ibid.</i> , v.2, p.423**
1724:	YC2/	0.9-	1.1-	1.1-	1.1-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-		0.7-		
May 19	4/27	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9		0.8		<i>ibid.</i> , v.2, p.523
1724:	YC2/	0.9-	1.1-	1.1-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-			0.8-		
Jun 4	14/23	1.0	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9			0.9		<i>ibid.</i> , v.2, p.560
1724:	YC2/	0.9-	1.0-	1.0-	1.0-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-		0.8-		
Jun 25	5/5	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9		0.9		<i>ibid.</i> , v.2, p.639
1724:	YC2/	0.9-	1.0-	1.0-	1.0-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-		0.8-		
Jul 11	5/21	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9		0.9		<i>ibid.</i> , v.2, p.688
1724:	YC2/	0.8-	0.9-	1.1-	1.1-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-		0.8-		
Aug 2	6/14	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9		0.9		<i>ibid.</i> , v.2, p.748

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
1724:	YC2/	0.8-	0.9-	1.1-	1.1-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-		0.8-		
Sep 11	7/24	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9		0.9		<i>ibid.</i> , v.2, p.908
1724:	YC2/	0.8-	0.9-	0.9-	1.1-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-				
Nov 30	10/15	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9				<i>ibid.</i> , v.3, p.328
1725:	YC3/			1.7-	1.5-								
Mar 12	1/28			1.8	1.6								<i>ibid.</i> , v.3, p.780
1725:	YC3/				1.5-								
Apr 13	3/1				1.6								<i>ibid.</i> , v.4, p.4
1725:	YC3/	1.2-	1.2-	1.2-	1.2-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	0.8-	1.2-	0.8-		Taiwan hsien & Feng-shan:
Nov 29	10/25	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.29		1.28-1.29; Chu-lo & Chang-
													hua: 0.8-1.0.
													<i>ibid.</i> , v.5, p.299
1725:	YC3/										0.72-		
12/15	11/20										0.73		<i>ibid.</i> , v.5, p.404
1726:	YC4/	1.4-		1.7-	1.7-		1.0+	1.0+	1.0+				
Mar 7	2/4	1.6		1.9	1.9								<i>ibid.</i> , v.5, p.587
1726:	YC4/	1.5-		1.8-	1.8-								
May 2	4/1	1.6		1.9	1.9								<i>ibid.</i> , v.5, p.769
1726:	YC4/	1.5+	1.6-	1.6-	1.6-	1.2-	1.2-	1.2-	1.2-	1.2-	0.95		
May 22	4/21		2.0	2.0	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.3		<i>ibid.</i> , v.5, p.831
1726:	YC4/			2.1-	2.1-								Ch'ao-chou of Kwangtung:
Jun 3	5/4			2.3	2.3								3.2-3.5
													<i>ibid.</i> , v.5, p.892
1726:	YC4/												*Price in P'u-ch'eng. <i>ibid.</i> ,
Jun 10	5/11												v.6, p.257. Reported in
													YC/4/7/6.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
1726:	YC4/		2.5-	2.5-	2.5-	2.5							
Jun 13	5/14		2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8							<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.12
1726:	YC4/	1.7-											<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.257
Jun 18	5/19	1.8											Reported in YC4/7/6
1726:	YC4/		2.5-	2.5-	2.5-	2.5-							
Jun 19	5/20		2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9							<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.46
1726:	YC4/		1.7-	1.7-									<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.257
Jun 18-29	5/19-30		1.8	1.8									Reported in YC4/7/6
1726:	YC4/	1.8-	3.0	3.0	3.0								
Jun	5/?	1.9											<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.174
1726:	YC4/												
Jun 29	5/30										1.3-		<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.257
											1.4		Reported in YC/7/6
1726:	YC4/	1.4-	2.5-	2.5-	2.5-	2.5-	1.4-	1.4-	1.4-				
Jul 21	6/22	1.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	1.8	1.8	1.8				<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.208
1726:	YC4/										1.1-		
Aug 3	7/6										1.2		<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.257
1726:	YC4/	1.5-		1.7-	1.7-								
Aug 15	7/18	2.0+		4.0	4.0								<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.301
1726:	YC4/	1.4-	1.4-	1.6-	1.6-	1.2-	1.2-	1.2-	1.2-				
Sep 27	9/2	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5				<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.521
1726:	YC4/	1.2-	1.0-	1.4-	1.4-	1.4-	1.0-	1.0-	1.0-	1.2-			
Oct 24	9/29	1.3		1.5	1.5	1.5				1.3			<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.669
1726:	YC4/	T1.4	1.1-	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.1-	1.1-	1.1-				
Nov 6	10/13	L1.3	1.2				1.2	1.2	1.2				<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.740

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
1726: Dec 2	YC4/ 11/9	0.85- 1.4	1.1- 1.2	1.4- 1.9	1.2- 1.8	0.9- 1.7	0.86- 1.2	0.9- 1.05	1.1- 1.6	1.1- 1.65	1.2- 1.4		<i>ibid.</i> , v.6, p.837
1727: Feb 4	YC5/ 1/14	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8		<i>ibid.</i> , v.7, p.390**
1727: Mar 2	YC5/ 2/10	Tl.45- 1.5 Ll.35	Tl.45- 1.5 Ll.35	1.7- 1.8	1.8- 1.9	1.3- 2.0	1.1- 1.3	1.1- 1.3	1.4	1.4	1.16	1.7	Quemoy: 1.9; T'ung-shan: 1.9; Hai-t'an: 1.8; Yün- hsiao: 1.9; & Nao-ao: 1.8- 2.0. <i>ibid.</i> , v.7, p.442. Prices since early February
1727: Mar 2	YC5/ 2/10	0.8- 1.0	1.2- 1.8	2.02	2.1- 2.2	1.2- 1.8	1.2- 1.8	1.2- 1.8	1.2- 1.8	1.2- 1.8	1.2		<i>ibid.</i> , v.7, p.431
1727: May 24	YC5/ 4/4	0.9- 1.5	1.55- 1.9	1.5- 2.5	1.4- 3.0	1.0- 2.9	0.86- 1.3	0.9- 1.8	1.15- 1.4	1.15- 1.5	1.4- 1.7		<i>ibid.</i> , v.7, pp.877-78.
1727: May 24	YC5/ 4/4	1.23- 1.28	1.43- 1.48	1.9- 2.1	2.5								Ch'ao-chou of Kwang-tung:4+ <i>ibid.</i> , v.7, pp.895-96
1727: Jul 22	YC5/ 6/4	0.85- 1.5	1.3- 1.4	1.6- 2.1	1.3- 3.0	1.1- 2.9	0.86- 1.3	0.9- 1.2	1.2- 1.4	1.15- 1.5	1.5- 1.92		<i>ibid.</i> , v.8, pp.297-98.
1727: Jul 22	YC5/ 6/4				1.7 2.3							1.5- 1.6	T'ung-shan & Quemoy: 1.5- 1.6; Nan-ao: 2.7-3.0 KCTTC:YC, v.8, pp.300-301
1727: Nov 25	YC5/ 10/13										1.15- Tl.183		Taiwan hsien: 1.17; Feng- shan: 1.16; Chu-lo: Tl.183; & Chang-hua: 1.15 KCTTC:YC, v.9, p.130
1727: Dec 7	YC5/ 10/25	1.02- 1.4	1.23- 1.4	1.5- 1.8	1.3- 1.9	1.2- 1.8	0.82- 1.1	0.9- 1.1	1.18- 1.4	1.0- 1.4	1.18- 1.4		CPYC, p.1357

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
1727: Dec 8	YC5/ 10/26	1.2- 1.3	1.2	1.5- 1.6	1.7- 1.8	1.4- 1.6	1.1- 1.15	1.1- 1.15	1.1- 1.15				KCTTC:YC, v.9, p.189
1728: Feb 17	YC6/ 1/8	1.1- 1.4	1.1- 1.4	1.3- 1.6	1.3- 1.6	1.3- 1.6	0.8- 1.1+	0.8- 1.1+	0.8- 1.1+	0.9- 1.0+	1.1- 1.2		ibid., v.9, p.576
1728: Mar 20	YC6/ 2/10			1.4- 1.7	1.4- 1.7								ibid., v.9, p.789
1728: Apr 30	YC6/ 3/22	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4		CPYC, p.1364**
1728: May 20	YC6/ 4/12	1.2- 1.3	1.2- 1.3	1.2- 1.3	1.2- 1.3	1.2- 1.3	1.2- 1.3	1.2- 1.3	1.2- 1.3	1.2- 1.3	1.2- 1.3		ibid., p.1366**
1728: May 20	YC6/ 4/12	1.2+ 1.2	1.1- 1.2	1.4- 1.5	1.5- 1.6	1.5- 1.6	1.1- 1.2	1.1- 1.2	1.1- 1.2				KCTTC:YC, v.10, pp.240-41
1728: Jun 13	YC6/ 5/6										1.05- 1.3		ibid., v.10, p.394
1728: Jul 13	YC6/ 6/7			1.2	1.2								ibid., v.10, p.571
1728: Aug 11	YC6/ 7/6	1.1- 1.2	1.1- 1.2	1.3- 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.5	1.1- 1.2	1.0+ 1.4	1.3- 1.4	1.0+ 1.4	1.2		KCTTC:YC, v.10, p.787
1728: Sep 21	YC6/ 8/18										1.05- 1.3		ibid., v.11, p.122
1728: Oct 3	YC6/ 9/1										1.07- 1.08		ibid., v.11, p.226
1728: Dec 4	YC6/ 11/4										1.0+ 1.3+		Taiwan hsien: 1.3+; Feng- shan:1.2+; Chu-lo: 1.2+;

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
(...cont)													& Chang-hua: 1.0+ <i>ibid.</i> , v.11, p.686
1728:	YC6/			1.07-	1.07-								
Dec 5	11/5			1.08	1.08								<i>ibid.</i> , v.11, p.690
1728:	YC6	1.4-	1.1-	1.1-	1.1-	1.4-	1.1-	1.1-	1.1-	1.1-			
Dec 5	11/5	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2			<i>ibid.</i> , v.11, p.691
1729:	YC6/	1.4-				1.3+							
Jan 27	12/28	1.5											<i>ibid.</i> , v.12, p.158
1729:	YC7/	T1.3+	T1.1-	T1.1-	T1.1-	T1.3-	T1.1-	T1.1-	T1.1-	T1.2-			
Feb 17	1/20	L1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3			
			L1.05-	L1.15-	L1.05-								<i>ibid.</i> , v.12, p.245
			1.06	1.06	1.06								
1729:	YC7/	1.04-	1.04-	1.04-	1.04-	0.95-	0.95-	0.95-	0.95-	1.04-			
Feb 22	1/25	1.3+	1.3+	1.3+	1.3+	1.14	1.14	1.14	1.14	1.3+			<i>ibid.</i> , v.12, p.323
1729:	YC7/	T1.2	T1.17-	T1.17-	T1.2	1.3-	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1+		1.04-	
Apr 7	3/10	L1.1-	1.18	1.18	L1.1	1.4						1.05	
		1.06	L1.07-	L1.07-									<i>ibid.</i> , v.12, p.664
			1.08	1.08									
1729:	YC7/										0.94		
May 8	4/11												<i>ibid.</i> , v.12, p.822
1729:	YC7/										0.96-		
May 9	4/12										0.97		<i>ibid.</i> , v.12, p.857
1729:	YC7/	1.1	0.94-	0.94-	0.94-	0.94-	0.94-	0.94-	0.94-	0.94-	0.94-		
Jul 11	6/16		1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16		CPYC, p.1409**

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
1729: Sep 16	YC7/ 17/24	1.1	0.9	0.81	1.05	1.1	0.9	1.15	1.12	1.15	0.94		<i>ibid.</i> , p.5437
1729: Oct 27	YC7/ 9/6	0.95											<i>ibid.</i> , p.1414
1730: Feb 11	YC7/ 12/24	0.6- 0.8	0.6- 0.8	0.6- 0.8	0.6- 0.8	0.6- 0.8	0.6- 0.8	0.6- 0.8	0.6- 0.8	0.6- 0.8	0.6- 0.8		<i>ibid.</i> , p.5451**
1731: Apr 25	YC9/ 3/19	0.94- 1.0		0.9+ 0.9+			0.8+ 0.8+		0.8+ 0.8+		0.85- 0.86		<i>ibid.</i> , p.546.
1731: Jun	YC9/ 5/?	1.0- 2.0	0.7- 0.8	0.8- 1.1	0.7- 1.0	0.7- 1.0	0.8- 1.1	0.7- 1.0	0.8- 1.1	0.8- 1.1	0.6- 0.77		<i>ibid.</i> , p.5066
1731: Jul 11	YC9/ 6/8	0.9- 1.3	0.9- 1.3	0.9- 1.3	0.9- 1.3	0.9- 1.3	0.9- 1.3	0.9- 1.3	0.9- 1.3	0.9- 1.3	0.9- 1.3		<i>ibid.</i> , p.2181**
1733: May 18	YC11/ 4/5	1.0- 1.1	1.0- 1.1	1.0- 1.1	1.0- 1.1	1.0- 1.1	1.0- 1.1	1.0- 1.1	1.0- 1.1	1.0- 1.1	1.0- 1.1		<i>ibid.</i> , p.5896**
1733: Oct 9	YC11/ 9/2	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0		<i>ibid.</i> , p.5907**
1733: Dec 23	YC11/ 11/18	0.76- 1.0+	0.76- 1.0+	0.76- 1.0+	0.76- 1.0+	0.76- 1.0+	0.76- 1.0+	0.76- 1.0+	0.76- 1.0+	0.76- 1.0+	0.76- 1.0+		<i>ibid.</i> , p.5911**
1734: Jun 23	YC12/ 5/22	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+		<i>ibid.</i> , p.5919**
1734: Jul 12	YC12/ 6/12	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0	0.8- 1.0		<i>ibid.</i> , p.5921**
1734: Oct 21	YC12/ 9/25	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+	0.9- 1.0+		<i>ibid.</i> , p.5422**

Note: Column I denotes the Western date and Column II Chinese date. The latter is written in year/month/day sequence, with KH, YC, and "i" indicating K'ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and intercalary respectively. Unless "T" or "L" is prefixed to the prices, in which cases "T" means prices for rice of top grade and "L" rice of low grade, no grades are specified in the documents. In many cases, only one flat price was reported for several prefectures or even the whole province. Such situation is indicated with "***" following the source information.

APPENDIX B: Fukienese Ships in Tientsin Trade 1717-1731

Order	Date of arrival	Origin of ship	Serial number	No. of crew	White sugar	Medium-grade sugar	Brown sugar	Rock-Candy	Earthen bowls	Small earthenware items	Paper	Tea	Preserves	Tobacco	Other Products	Est. Total Loading Weight (shih)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
1	23.7.1717	Chin-chiang	Fa 816 1,136	19	500 lou		4 lou	30 t'ung	25,000 ko				24 t'ung		bamboo-shoots: 26 pa; shark's fins: 5 k'un	1,000
2.	23.7.1717	"	Fa 1,528	19	550			20	15,000				4		fish bladders: 1 k'un	900
3.	10.8.1723	"	Fa 474	18	456 pao	45 pao		29	50,000	28,500 ko		45 lou (big & small)	2	50 chin	fish bladders: 15 k'un; seaweed varieties: 16 pao; dried fish: 5 lan	1,100
4.	10.8.1723	"	Fa 478	17	78	426 lou		50	25,000	14,000		56			fish bladders: 10 k'un; peanut: 50 chin; shark's fins: 2 k'un	1,000
5.	7.8.1723	T'ung -an	T'ung 10 1,178	24	327	851 pao		9	1,500			63 lou (small)	41		seaweed varieties: 7 pao; peanut: 2 pao; lu-ts'ai(?) 3 pao; betel-nut: 4 pao; sapanwood: 1,787 chin	1,400

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
6.	7.8. 1723	Lung- ch'i	Lung 龍 675	24	357	573		16	12,350			179	76	6 hsiang	seaweed vari- eties: 8 k'un; peanut: 5 pao; dried orange- peel: 1 pao; sapanwood: 4, 718 chin	1,400
7.	8.8 1723	"	Lung 300	17	118	505		24					83	40 k'un	dried fish-eggs: 3 pao; peanut: 360 chin; sapan- wood: 2,450 chin; shark's fins: 3 k'un (small)	800
8.	? 1724	"														
9.	? 1724															
10.	? 1724															
11.	4.9. 1724	T'ung -an	T'ung 1,108	18	107	212		21	12,850	14,200	7,464 lou	779 chin (top grade)	44	2 hsiang	seaweed varieties: 14 pao; dried fish eggs: 3 hsiang; isinglass: 3 k'un; mushroom: 3 pao; black plums: 2 lou; betel-nut: 1 pao; vermillion: 1 t'ung; yellow lead: 7 t'ung; ta-liao(?) 大料: 6 pao; (cont.../)	

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
																(/...cont) sapan- wood: 1,190 chin; tin: 1 pao; shark's fins: 4 pao; pepper: 55 pao
12. 4.9. 1724	Lung- ch'i	Ning 寧 94	18	106	550			8	9,750	14,700		1,615	9			seaweed varieties: 50 pao; dried fish- eggs: 1 pao; ising- glass: 1 pao; pea- nut: 400 chin; dried orange-peel: 4 hsiang; betel-nut: 13 pao; curcuma longa: 5 hsiang; sapanwood: 16,188 chin; shark's fins: 9 k'un; pepper: 31 pao 1,100
13. 4.9. 1724	"	Yüan 元 47	18	199	407			19	22,500			361	58	150 chin		seaweed varieties: 32 pao; peanut: 2 pao; cloth: 19 k'un; ebony-like wood: 5 k'un; sapanwood: 5,775 chin; pepper: 20 pao 1,000
14. 4.9 1724	"	Yü 宇 81	22	76	1,014 lou			15	9,750			25 lou (top grade)	53			fish bladders: 73 chin; seaweed varieties: 10 pao; dried fish-eggs: 5 hsiang; mushroom: 2 pao; (...cont/)

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
																(/...cont) citrus medica, subsp limonum: 2 <i>hsiang</i> ; dried orange-peel: 112 <i>chin</i> ; sapan- wood: 3,100 <i>chin</i> ; shark's fins: 2 <i>pao</i> ; pepper: 13 <i>pao</i> 1,700
15.	11.8.	T'ung 1725	T'ung an 1,282	18	664	345 <i>pao</i>		52	6,000			299	82	354		porphyia tenera: 1 <i>hsiang</i> ; sweet- potato starch: 953 <i>chin</i> ; black plums: 2 <i>pao</i> ; dried orange-peel: 352 <i>chin</i> ; betel- nut: 40 <i>pao</i> ; ta- liao(?): 50 <i>pao</i> ; ling-ling <i>ts'ao</i> (?) 蔞蔞草 : 8 <i>pao</i> ; cloth: 300 <i>p'i</i> ; boards: 1 <i>fu</i> ; sapanwood: 2,087 <i>chin</i> ; shark's fins: 90 <i>chin</i> ; myrrh: 2 <i>t'ung</i> ; frankin- cense: 1 <i>t'ung</i> 1,600
16.	11.8.	Lung- 1725	Ning ch'i 170	21	20	712		1				318				porphyia tenera: 3 <i>pao</i> ; dried fish-eggs: 3 <i>hsiang</i> ; mushroom: 2 <i>hsiang</i> ; (cont.../)

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>j</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>o</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>q</i>
																(/...cont) dried orange-peel: 290 chin; sapanwood: 1,210 chin 1,100
17	11.8. 1725	"	Ning 184	22	66	742		15			4,100 chang chin 8,165 lou 42 Kuai	702				seaweed varieties: 10 pao; dried fish- eggs: 1 hsiang; pea- nut: 22 tai; orange biscuits: 20 t'ung; dried orange peel: 4 tai; fragrant beads: 220 ch'uan; rattens: 34 k'un; pepper: 1 pao 1,000
18	11.8. 1725	Min- hsien	Shen 4頂 254	20	40						6,357 lou 1,055 Kuai	235				fish bladders: 80 chin; seaweed varieties: 3 lou; bamboo-shoots: 5 lou; mushroom: 1 tai; sweet-potato starch: 2 pao; lotus-seeds: 3 tai; black plums: 4 lou; sweet oranges: 3 t'ung; citrus medica, var. sarcodac-tylus: 5 t'ung; dried oranges: 1 lou; gardenia: 45 chin; yeast: 2 lou; resin: 8 lou; planks: 1 fu

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
19	11.8. 1725	Min- hsien	Shen 372	21	70	27						110				sweet-potato starch: 2 pao; planks: 2 fu; black plums: 7 lou; dried oranges: 230 chin; resin: 8 lou; sapanwood: 145 chin
20	14.9 1725	T'ung -an	T'ung 1,178	22	602	543		33	11,670		5 lou	486 lou	26			mushroom: 1 lou; sweet-potato starch: 4 pao; orange biscuits: 3l t'ung; ta-liao (?): 12 pao; boards: 1 fu sapanwood: 2,888 chin; shark's fins: 3 pao 1,900
21	15.10. 1725	Chin chiang	Chou 18	18	42						4,308 lou 545 kuai	31				bamboo-shoots: 478 lou; lotus- seeds: 2 tai; black plums: 29 lou; dried oranges: 5 tai
22	28.8. 1726	"	Fa 1,093	19	241	490		1				310 chin				fish bladders: 9 pao; seaweed vari- eties: 5 pao; dried fish: 53 pao; bamboo-shoots: 7 pao; mushroom: 2 pao; (cont.../)

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>j</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>o</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>q</i>
																orange biscuits: 1 <i>t'ung</i> ; sapan- wood: 9,495 <i>chin</i> ; shark's fins: 2 <i>pao</i> ; pepper: 6 <i>pao</i> ; hams: 1 <i>pao</i> 900
23.	28.8 1726	T'ung -an	T'ung 1,122	17	241	456		40		2,800	2 <i>lou</i>		66 <i>t'ung</i> 895 <i>chin</i>	375	dried orange-peel: 1 <i>pao</i> ; chopsticks: 628 <i>pa</i> ; sapanwood: 4,627 <i>chin</i> ; pepper: 5 <i>pao</i> 900	
24.	9.7.- 21.8. 1729	Chin- chiang	Fa 1,112	18												medium-grade sugar; shark's fins; orange biscuits; pepper; rattens; earthen bowls, etc.
25.	"	"	Fa 895	23												(same as above)
26.	"	"	Fa 358	17												(same as above)
27.	"	"	Fa 1,075	18												(same as above)
28.	"	"	Fa 1,091	18												(same as above)
29.	"	"	Fa 1,211	21												(same as above)
30.	"	T'ung -an	Shun 順 262	17												(same as above)

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
31	"	T'ung -an	Shun 161	18											(same as above)	
32	"	"	Shun 19	19											(same as above)	
33	"	Lung- ch'i	Ning 200	18											(same as above)	
34	12.8- 1.10. 1729	Chin- chiang	Fa 43	14											medium-grade sugar; earthen bowls; sapanwood; iron pots; paper, etc.	
35	"	"	Fa 478	17											(same as above)	
36	"	"	Fa 204	15											(same as above)	
37	"	"	Fa 1,254	18											(same as above)	
38	"	Min- hsien	P'ing 平 48	22											(same as above)	
39	"	"	P'ing 347	21											(same as above)	
40	"	"	P'ing 181	22											(same as above)	
41	"	Lung- ch'i	Ning 286	18											(same as above)	

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
42	"	"	Ning 295	22												(same as above)
43	"	T'ung -an	Shun 181	23												(same as above)
44	"	Fu- ch'ing	Ch'ang 昌 73	19												(same as above)
45	"	Ch'iong -shan	Mao 眞 1	19												(same as above)
46	27.7.- 20.10. 1731	Chin- chiang	Fa 478	17	200			10	100,000	33,600						seaweed varie- ties: 10 chin; fish sauce: 110 chin; ts'ao-yü(?) 糟魚 : 160 chin; orange bis- cuits: 50 chin; dried lichee: 5 chin; lichee wine: 3 t'an 1,100
47	"	"	Fa 1,042	18	370	16		40	120,050	41,500		236				fish bladders: 80 chin; dried orange-peel: 8 pao 1,500
48	"	"	Fa 1,658	23	739	676		71				1,132				seaweed vari- eties: 11 k'un; dried fish-eggs: 2 hsiang; ginger: 18 hsiang; (...cont/)

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
																(/...cont)
																orange biscuits:
																25 t'ung; citrus
																medica, subsp limo-
																num: 4 hsiang;
																dried orange-peel:
																16 tai and 2 hsiang;
																asparagus lucidus
																and lirioppe gramin-
																ifolia: 2 t'ung;
																sapanwood: 2,355
																chin 1,600
49	"	"	Fa 358	17	210			20	45,000	16,500						alum: 9 lou 700
50	"	"	Fa 1,688	20	4	475						30 lou				dried fish-eggs: 3
																hsiang; black
																plums: 12 pao;
																orange biscuits: 9
																hsiang; betel-nut:
																7 pao; sapanwood:
																1,260 chin 600
51	"	"	Fa 1,229	23	736	770		35					2			ginger: 4 t'ung;
																orange biscuits:
																76 t'ung; dried
																orange-peel: 11
																tai; asparagus
																lucidus and lirioppe
																graminifolia: 3
																t'ung 1,700
52	"	"	Fa 242	18	220			19	90,000							cyperus rotundus:
								5	ko and							2 tai; gardenia:
									5 lou							(cont.../)

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
																(/...cont) 9 tai; shark's fins: 150 chin 1,000
53	"	"	Fa 895	23	993	415		32								ginger: 2 t'ung; orange biscuits: 84 t'ung; dried orange-peel: 9 tai; asparagus lucidus and liri- ope graminifolia: 1 t'ung; sapan- wood: 990 chin 1,600
54	"	"	Fa 1,319	18					18,000 ko	1,800		226 hsiang				ginger: 17 lou; alum: 27 lou; cloth: 152 p'i 400
55	"	"	Fa 979	16	60				19,000							syrup: 26 t'ung 200
56	"	"	Fa 874	21	1,060	66										rattens: 5 k'un and 3 pao; sapan- wood: 625 chin 1,200
57	"	"	Fa 1,334	20	467 pao 57 lou	380										Shao-hsing wine: 451 t'an 1,400
58	"	"	Fa 1,687	19	1,339 pao											1,500
59	"	T'ung -an	Shun 10	21	77	584										dried orange-peel: 12 pao; sapanwood: 410 chin 700

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>j</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>o</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>q</i>
60	"	"	Shun 312	21	778	408		29				226 <i>chin</i>			dried fish-eggs: 6 <i>hsiang</i> ; orange biscuits: 30 <i>t'ung</i> ; dried orange-peel: 30 <i>tai</i> ; sapanwood: 2,500 <i>chin</i>	1,400
61	"	"	Shun 181	23	90	656										800
62	"	"	Shun 393	20	213	511		10							orange biscuits: 6 <i>t'ung</i> ; pepper: 10 <i>pao</i>	800
63	"	"	T'ung 162	23	57	506						5 <i>lou</i> (top grade)	2	3	sapanwood: 271 <i>hsiang chin</i>	600
64	"	"	Shun 125	17	613	238									ginger: 40 <i>pao</i> ; betel-nut: 27 <i>pao</i> ; san-nai(?) 三奈 : 42 <i>pao</i>	1,000
65	"	"	Shun 244	21	676	290		64				155			ginger: 4 <i>t'ung</i> ; black plums: 5 <i>lou</i> ; orange bis- cuits: 26 <i>t'ung</i> ; sapanwood: 5,410 <i>chin</i> ; pepper: 35 <i>pao</i>	1,300

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>j</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>o</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>q</i>
66	"	"	Shun 151	18								548 <i>hsiang</i> (top grade)				500
67	"	"	Shun 204	21	1,227	275										1,600
68	"	Lung- ch'i	Ning 9	23	1,617	104		11					1		dried fish-eggs: 1 <i>hsiang</i> ; ginger: 20 t'ung; black plums: 4 lou; orange biscuits: 22 t'ung; dried orange-peel: 41 tai; green orange- peel: 1 tai; cur- cuma longa: 2 tai	2,000
69	"	"	Ning 94	22	222	290		62				51 lou (top grade)			dried fish-eggs: 4 <i>hsiang</i> ; ginger: 8 t'ung; orange biscuits: 10 t'ung; longan: 2 lou; dried orange- peel: 2 tai and 3 <i>hsiang</i> ; betel-nut: 4 <i>hsiang</i> ; asparagus lucidus & lirioppe graminifolia: 2 t'ung; curcuma longa: 9 tai; rattens: 650 chin; pepper: 3 pao	700

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>j</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>o</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>q</i>
70	"	"	Ning 295	23	282	447								3	orange biscuits: 9 t'ung; curcuma longa: 26 lou; pepper: 23 pao	800
71	"	"	Ning 182	23	860	619		73							ginger: 2 t'ung; orange biscuits: 75 t'ung; citrus medica, subsp limonum: 4 t'ung; dried orange-peel: 31 tai; betel-nut: 4 pao; asparagus lucidus and liriop graminifolia: 8 t'ung; sapanwood: 460 chin	1,700 800
72	"	"	Ning 184	23	10	693		16								
73	"	"	Ning 21	21	328	500		7				10			dried fish-eggs: 1 hsiang; orange biscuits: 2 t'ung; dried orange-peel: 1 hsiang	900
74	"	"	Ning 291	17	161	398		22							ginger: 22 t'ung; orange biscuits: 55 t'ung; dried orange-peel: 5 hsiang; asparagus lucidus and liriop graminifolia: 31 t'ung; unboiled varnish: 6 lou	700

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
75	"	"	Ning 185	23	549	928		66				110 (top grade)			dried fish-eggs: 2 <i>hsiang</i> ; ginger: 8 <i>t'ung</i> ; black plums: 5 <i>lou</i> ; orange biscuits: 68 <i>t'ung</i> ; longan (?): 2 <i>hsiang</i> ; dried orange-peel: 10 <i>tai</i> ; asparagus <i>lucidus</i> and <i>liriope</i> <i>graminifolia</i> : 1 <i>t'ung</i> ; unboiled varnish: 20 <i>lou</i> ; sapanwood: 5,515 <i>chin</i>	1,900
76	"	"	Ning 200	18	144	475		32							asparagus <i>lucidus</i> and <i>liriope</i> <i>graminifolia</i> : 2 <i>t'ung</i> ; sapanwood: 1,265 <i>chin</i>	700
77	"	"	Ning 193	22								490 (top grade)				400
78	"	Min- hsien	P'ing 420	23	75	817									black plums: 9 <i>pao</i>	1,000
79	"	"	P'ing 207	23	12	701		18								800
80	"	"	P'ing 395	23	112	419			25,000		117 <i>kuai</i>	68			porphyria <i>tenera</i> : 12 <i>lou</i> ; dried fish-eggs: 2 <i>hsiang</i> ; black plums: 25 <i>lou</i> ; (cont.../)	326

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
															longan(?): 43 <i>hsiang</i> ; dried orange-peel: 3 <i>tai</i> ; curcuma longa: 10 <i>tai</i> ; yeast: 23 <i>lou</i> ; resin: 8 <i>lou</i> ; sapanwood: 1,800 <i>chin</i>	1,000+
81	"	"	P'ing 194	23	190	84		4			3,473 <i>lou</i> 499 <i>Kuai</i>	169		4	black plums: 10 <i>lou</i> ; orange biscuits: 4 <i>t'ung</i>	
82	"	"	P'ing 55	23	91	100		5			6,556 <i>lou</i> 382 <i>Kuai</i>	2		3	bamboo-shoots: 40 <i>lou</i> ; black plums: 17 <i>lou</i> ; longan: 21 <i>hsiang</i> ; yeast: 8 <i>lou</i>	
83	"	"	P'ing 214	23							6,504 <i>lou</i> 137 <i>Kuai</i>	9			bamboo-shoots: 86 <i>lou</i> ; black plums: 5 <i>lou</i> ; dried orange- peel: 25 <i>pao</i> ; yeast: 1 <i>lou</i> ; alisma plantago- aquatica; 1 <i>hsiang</i> ; resin: 5 <i>hsiang</i> ; pillar- wood: 5 <i>pao</i>	

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
84	"	"	P'ing 426		23	5 pao 119 lou					6,569 lou					bamboo-shoots: 28 lou
85	"	"	P'ing 36	22							6,220					
86	"	"	P'ing 338	23							4,862					black plums: 50 lou; orange biscuits: 51 t'ung
87	"	"	P'ing 25	21							5,448					
88	"	"	P'ing 48	21	145 pao						4,128					porphyia tenera: 1 lou; bamboo- shoots: 242 lou; yeast: 2 lou
89	"	"	P'ing 213	22							4,423	28				yeast: 8 lou
90	"	P'u- t'ien	Kung 公 57	21	1	507			4,900	5,690						600
91	"	"	Kung 214	21	75	380			6,510			92				porphyia tenera: 19 lou; ginger: 4 lou; black plums: 4 pao; longan: 50 t'ung; yeast: 6 lou; shark's fins: 1 pao

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
92	"	"	Kung 117	18	60	446					70 kuai	2 pao			longan: 39 t'ung and 3 hsiang; dried orange-peel: 5 tai	600+
93	"	"	Kung 134	23	89	536						12 lou			peanut: 3 lou; black plums: 12 pao; dried longan: 8 hsiang; citrus medica, subsp limonum: 31 t'ung; lichee: 6 t'ung	700
94	"	"	Kung 186	22	155	420						30				600
95	"	"	Kung 193	19		381					50 lou	87			dried longan: 20 t'ung	
96	"	"	Kung 221	21	30	409						76			black plums: 17 lou; dried longan: 63 t'ung; citrus medica, var. sarcodac-tylus: 10 t'ung; curcuma longa: 1 pao	600
97	"	"	Kung 218	23	112 lou	493 lou				9,010		10			black plums: 17 lou; sweet oranges: 2 t'ung; dried longan: 5 t'ung; (cont.../)	

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q

citrus medica,
var. sarcodac-
tylus: 14 t'ung;
dried orange-peel:
8 tai 800

98 " Ning- Shang 21 1,453 14
po 商
136 pao pao

1,600

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. The measure units appeared in the above table are as follows:

lou	簍	(crate)	chin	斤	(catty)
t'ung	桶	(bucket)	hsiang	箱	(case)
pa	把	(bunch)	pao	包	(parcel)
k'un	捆	(bundle)	ko	個	(piece)
Lan	籃	(basket)	tai	代	(bag)
fu	副	(set)	ch'uan	串	(string)
pi	足	(roll)	kuai	塊	(lump: pile)
t'an	罈	(jar)	chang	張	(sheet)

The units could be further divided into large and small. Whenever the unit is not given after the figure, it means the same unit as the preceding one in the top column is applied.

2. Some problems exist when an attempt is made to estimate the total volume of cargoes carried by each ship because of the different measures employed. The unit *chin* (catty), of course, is clear. In addition, a *lou* and a *pao* of sugar represent respectively, a load of about 170 and 130 catties (see fn.167). But there is no way to tell whether they indicate the same volume when they are applied to other types of cargo. To work out a rough estimate, doubtful units were taken to indicate a load of about one hundred catties, except in a few cases,

such as the unit *pa* applied to chopsticks (see ship no.23). At the customs houses, customs duties were calculated on the basis of one hundred catties (one picul) (see *HMC*, 7:11a-32a). Packing was presumably done as often as possible to meet this practice. Rice and sugar, however, retained their special packing methods. But I am reluctant to make any estimate of the cargo weight for those ships carrying paper. The remaining miscellaneous commodities form only a small portion of the total volume in most cases, and mistakes in calculating their volume will not change the overall total.

3. A separate note is necessary here to explain the method of calculation in the case of earthenware, which is divided into two categories. The earthen bowls are designated as "ts'u-wan" 粗碗 (large bowls), and was said to weigh about one catty. The small earthenware is designated as "hsi-tz'u" 細磁. Based on the information in the Amoy gazetteer, I estimate that roughly five of them would weigh a catty. See *HMC* 7:25b. Two columns are set aside in the table for these items because their quantity is usually large in many shipments.
4. The table is based on the ten memorials cited in fn.166. In sequence, each of them includes ship nos.1-2, 3-7, 8-14, 15-19, 20, 21, 22-23, 24-33, 34-45 and 46-98.

APPENDIX C: Native Products of Fukien as
seen in Tientsin's Trade

	Foochow	Hsing- hua	Ch'üan- chou	Chang- chou	Yen- p'ing	Chien- ning	Shao- wu	Ting- chou	Fu-ning	T'ai-wan
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
sugar	ac	ac	ac	ac	abc	c	ac	ac	abc	ac
earthenware	c		c	c	ac	ac	ac	c	bc	
paper	ac		bc	a	abc	bc	ac	ac	abc	c
tea	ac	c	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	c	bc
preserves								b		
tobacco	c	c	c	bc	c	c	c		bc	c
fish bladders	ac	ac	ac			c			a	
seaweed										
varieties	bc	ac	bc	ac					c	
porphyria										
tenera	c	ac	bc	c					ac	abc
dried										
fish-eggs	c		bc	c						ac
dried fish	ac	c	ac	b		c			a	
isinglass	ac	a	ac			c			a	
fish sauce										
ts'ao-yü										
bamboo-shoots	abc	ac	c	c	c	abc	ac	c	c	ac
peanut	a	c	c	bc			c	c	bc	c
lu-ts'ai										
mushroom	ac	ac	bc	bc	a	a	a	ab	c	
sweet-potato										
starch	c	c	c	c	c		c	c	c	c
ginger	a	ac	ac	a	ac	c	ac	ac	c	
lotus-seeds	c	c	c	c	a	ac	c	ac	ac	bc
black plums										
(dried)	abc	b								
orange										
biscuits										
sweet orange										
longan	ac	ac	ac	ac					ac	c

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
dried longan	c	c	c	c					c	c
citrus medica, var. sarcodac- tylus	c		c	c	c	c			c	c
citrus medica, subsp limonum		ac	ac	ac	ac	ac		bc	ac	
syrup										
dried lichee										
lichee	ac	ac	ac	a					ac	c
lichee-wine	b			c						
dried orange-peel		bc	bc	c		c				
green orange-peel										
betel-nut										ac
dried oranges	c	c	c	abc		c				
asparagus lucidus and liriope graminifolia	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	c	ac
cyperus rotundus	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	ac	c	ac
vermilion	b						a			
yellow lead										
gardenia	c	bc	bc	c	bc	c	bc	bc	bc	c
curcuma longa					c	ac	abc	a		c
yeast	a		b	b	c			c		b
alum	c	c	c	ac	c				c	
ta-liao										
ling-ling tsao										
san-nai	c	c		c						ac
alisma plantago -acuatia						ac	c			
fragrant beads										
resin	a			c						
cloth	a	c	ac	ab	a	ac			bc	ac
chopsticks										
unboiled varnish	c	c		c	c	abc	c	ac		c

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
rattens										
boards										
planks										
ebony-like										
wood										
pillar-wood										
shark's fins	a	ac		b			c		ac	c

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. Most of the products are recorded in *Fu-chien t'ung-chih*, chapters on "Products" (wu-ch'an 物產). (a), (b) and (c) denote 1737, 1768 and 1868-1871 editions respectively.
2. From the above list, we know that the majority of products traded in Tientsin was from Fukien.
3. Some products are not recorded in the gazetteers because the records are by no means complete. The first two editions of the provincial gazetteer were not as well compiled as the third, and they record fewer items. The items which were not included in the first two editions may, in fact, have been traded during the earlier periods.

APPENDIX D1: Merchants on Board the Tientsin-Bound Ships, 1717-1731

(According to the original order of the ships given in Appendix B)

1. Ch'en Shun-hsing 陳順興
(Ch'en was mentioned as <i>ch'uan hu</i> 船戶,
the shipowner.)	13. Chang Te-hsing 張德興
2. Ts'ai Hsing li 蔡興利
(Ts'ai was also mentioned as <i>ch'uan-hu</i> .
Two other passengers or <i>k'e-jen</i> 客人,
Hou Shih-ying 侯世英 and Huang Ch'ao-shui 黃朝瑞
were mentioned too.)	14. Ch'en Shih-ying 陳世英
3. Lin Yüan-hsing 林元興	15. Hsieh Wan-sheng 謝萬勝
4. Ch'iu Ho-hsing 丘合興	16. Ch'en Shih-ying 陳世英
5. Li Yüan-mei 李元美	17. K'o Yung-sheng 柯榮勝
6. K'o Ying-hsing 柯瀛興	18. Lin Chang 林璋
7. K'ang Te-sheng 康德盛 (k'e-jen)	19. Wang Ch'ang-tai 王昌太
8. K'o Yung-sheng 柯榮勝	20. Li Yüan-mei 李元美
9. (no name is given)	21. Lien Te-chieh 連得捷
10. (no name is given)	22. Li Li 李栗
11. Shih Ch'uan-man 施傳滿	23. Lin Yü-chu 林玉柱
12. Shen Te-wan 沈德萬	24. Chang Ning-shih 張寧世
	25. Wang K'un-yu 王崑瑜
	26. Hung Ch'üan-hsing 洪全興
	27. Lin Sheng-chang 林陞璋

28. Li Ho-mei 李和美
 29. Chuang Ch'en 莊岑
 30. Chao Chih-yung 趙志榮
 31. Ch'en Wan-hsing 陳萬興
 32. Lin T'ung-fu 林桐甫
 33. Yang Shih-yüan 楊士元
 34. Ts'ai Pi-sheng 蔡必勝
 35. Shih Hsi-kuan 施聖觀
 36. Ts'ai Wan-yüan 蔡萬源
 37. Te Lung Hao 德隆號
 38. Ts'ao Kuang-hsing 曹廣興
 39. Chang Ts'ai-ming 張彩鳴
 40. Chang Ch'ang-chi 張長吉
 41. Lin Cheng-shun 林正順
 42. K'o Yung-sheng 柯榮盛
 43. Fan Ts'ang-sheng 范蒼盛
 44. Chang Te-i 張德億
 45. Wang Hsing-shih 王興使
 46. Ch'iu Te-pao 邱得寶

47. Wang Yüan-li 王源利
 48. Li Te-hsing 李德興
 49. Chuang Ch'ih 莊多
 50. Tseng Fang-t'ai 曾方泰
 51. Kuo Feng-hsing 郭鳳興
 52. Lin Sheng-hsing 林勝興
 53. Su Yüan-ho 蘇元合
 54. Ch'en Yüan-hsing 陳元興
 55. Ts'ai Hsing-sheng 蔡興盛
 56. Wang Te-wan 王得萬
 57. Li Te-li 李德利
 58. Ch'en Chen -feng 陳振豐
 59. Wei Hsing-pao 魏興寶
 60. Ch'en Feng-sheng 陳鳳陞
 61. Chin Lung-shun 金隆順
 62. Hung Chen-yüan 洪振源
 63. Huang Wan-ch'un 黃萬春
 64. Su Chen-wan 蘇振萬
 65. Wang Ch'i-hsing 王起興

66. Hsü Liang-hsing
67. Hsü Yung-hsing
68. Lin Ts'ang-hsing
69. Shen Te-wan
70. K'o Yung-shun
71. K'o Ying-hsing
72. K'o Yung-sheng
73. Cheng Ts'ung-ta
74. Kuo Chang
75. Yen Shu-hung
76. Lin Sheng-chang
77. Wu Wan-feng
78. Hsieh Te-wan
79. Wang Ta-li
80. Lin Yung-hsing
81. Li T'ing-fu
82. Cheng Ch'üan-hsing

徐良興
徐永興
林藏興
沈得萬
柯榮順
柯瀛興
柯榮勝
鄭從達
郭長
嚴淑鴻
林陞漳
吳萬豐
謝得萬
王大利
林榮興
李廷輔
鄭全興

83. Yeh T'ai-mou
84. Li Ho-shun
85. Hung Te-hsiang
86. Wang Shang-chih
87. Shih Chien-hou
88. Liu Yü-te
89. Chang Yüan-hsing
90. Huang Hsiang-kuang
91. Ch'en Chang-sheng
92. Ch'en Yü
93. Su Fu-sheng
94. Wu Hsing
95. Wu Te-sheng
96. Ch'en Ch'i
97. Hsü T'ing-fu
98. Huang T'ung-ch'un

葉泰茂
林合順
洪得祥
王尚志
施簡侯
劉裕德
張源興
黃祥光
陳章盛
陳譽
蘇富盛
吳興
伍得勝
陳琦
許廷輔
黃同春

APPENDIX D2: Supplementary List of Merchants' Names

Origin	Status	Name	Activity	Year Reported	Source
T'ung-an	Owner-operator	Chang Sheng-lung 張盛隆	Coastal trade	1727	KCTTC:YC, v.7, p.324
T'ung-an	Owner-operator	Wu Te-sheng 吳德勝	Coastal trade	1727	ibid.
T'ung-an	Owner-operator	Li Te-hsing 李德興	Nanyang trade	1716	MCSL:KP, p.703
T'ung-an	Owner-operator	Lin Ch'ing-hsiang 林青祥	Nanyang trade	1716	ibid.
T'ung-an	Owner-operator	Chin Te-ch'un 金得春	Nanyang trade	1761	ibid., p.528
T'ung-an	Owner-operator	Wu Shui-ch'un 吳瑞春	Nanyang trade	1765	KCTTC:CL (unpublished), 30/10/24
T'ung-an	Consigner	Yeh Hsi-hui 葉錫會	Nanyang trade	1761	MCSL:KP, p.528
Chin-chiang	Owner-operator	Chi Ho-li 紀合利	Coastal trade	1726	KCTTC:YC, v.6, p.684
Chin-chiang	Owner-operator	Lin Te-heng 林德亨	Coastal trade	1726	ibid.
Chin-chiang	Owner-operator	Wu Ho-hsing 吳合興	Coastal trade	1727	ibid., v.7, p.324
Chin-chiang	Owner-operator	Lin Chin-hsing 林進興	Coastal trade	1727	ibid.

Origin	Status	Name	Activity	Year Reported	Source
Chin-chiang	Owner-operator	Cheng Te-sheng 鄭得勝	Coastal trade	1727	<i>ibid.</i>
Chin-chiang	Owner	Ch'en Wu-sheng/Chang Ch'ing 陳吳勝(又名) 張清	Coastal and Nanyang trade	1740	MCSL:KP, p.705.
Chin-chiang	Owner-operator	Ts'ai Ch'ang-mou 蔡長茂	Nanyang trade	1740	MCSL:KP, p.706
Chin-chiang	Consigner	Yang T'ing-mou 楊廷茂	Nanyang trade	1765	KCTTC:CL (unpublished), 30/10/24
Chin-chiang	Consigner	Lü Yu-kung 呂有恭	Nanyang trade	1778	<i>ibid.</i> , 43/4/16
Lung-ch'i	Owner-operator	Huang Yung-ch'eng 黃永成	Coastal trade	1734	CPYC, 12/10/8, 17, 6, 56a (p.5996).
Lung-ch'i	Owner-operator	Cheng Wu-hsing 鄭吳興	Nanyang trade	1759	MCSL:KP, p.525
Lung-ch'i	Owner-operator	Ch'en Kuo-ch'en 陳國珍	Nanyang trade	1778	KCTTC:CL (unpublished), 43/4/16
Lung-ch'i	Travelling merchant	Ch'en Wei 陳魏	Nanyang trade	1733	CPYC, 11/12/26, 17, 4, 101b (p.5914).
Lung-ch'i	Travelling merchant	Yang Ying 楊營	Nanyang trade	1733	<i>ibid.</i>
Lung-ch'i	Consigner	Kuo Ssu-ching 郭嗣澄	Nanyang trade	1778	KCTTC:CL (unpublished), 43/4/16
Chang-p'u	Owner-operator	Ch'en Yüan-hsing 陳元興	Coastal trade	1727	KCTTC:YC, v.7, p.324

Origin	Status	Name	Activity	Year Reported	Source
Hai-ch'eng	Owner-operator	Lin Sheng 林盛	Coastal trade	1726	ibid., v.6, p.684
Hai-ch'eng	owner-operator	Tai Yung-hsing 戴永興	Nanyang trade	1754	MCSL:KP, p.725
Hai-ch'eng	Owner-operator	Huang Shun-hsiang 黃順祥	Nanyang trade	1759	ibid., p.525
Hai-ch'eng	Owner operator	Chin Yung-shui 金永瑞	Nanyang trade	1765	KCTTC:CL (unpublished), 30/10/24
Hai-ch'eng	Owner-operator	Ch'en Yüan-feng 陳源豐	Nanyang trade	1778	ibid., 43/4/16
Hai-ch'eng	Travelling merchant	Yang Hsing-fa 楊興發	Nanyang trade	1740	MCSL:KP, p.706
Hai-ch'eng	Consigner	Chuang Wen-hui 莊文輝	Nanyang trade	1759	ibid., p.525
Hai-ch'eng	Consigner	Fang Hsüeh-shan 方學山	Nanyang trade	1759	ibid.
Hai-ch'eng	Consigner	Lin Kuo-chen 林國珍	Nanyang trade	1765	ibid.
Ningpo (originally T'ung-an man)	Owner-operator	Li Chin 李進	Nanyang trade	1729	WHTP:KSSL, v.17, p.3b.
P'u-t'ien	Owner-operator	Shih Pao-hsing 施寶興	Coastal trade	1726	KCTTC:YC, v.6., p.684
P'u-t'ien	Owner-operator	Ch'en Yao 陳瑤	Coastal trade	1726	ibid.

APPENDIX E: Estimated Value¹ of the Cargo for
the Tientsin-Bound Ships 1717-1731

Difficulties do exist in an attempt to estimate the cargo values of each ship sailing to Tientsin. Except for sugar, the information on the prices of other commodities are scarce. Nevertheless, as sugar forms the bulk of the shipments in most cases, the estimates may not be far from the actual figures. Around 1723, each picul of top-grade sugar cost Tls.1.35 in Taiwan, while third-grade sugar cost Tls.0.85.² Between 1730 and 1731, sugar prices soared. The average for the two years was Tls.2.1 for the top grade and 0.85 for the low grade. For the whole period between 1723 and 1731, the average price was Tls.1.725 and 0.85 respectively. The cost of second-grade sugar is not known, but I have estimated its value as an average of the top and the low grades (Tls. 1.288).

As to the prices of other commodities mentioned in Tientsin's trade, no exact figures are available. However, the tax per-unit of weight for the various goods is given in the Amoy gazetteer.⁴ The full list was first published in 1724. If we can determine what percentage of the prices the per-unit tax represents, then we shall be able to estimate the prices of the various commodities. When such estimates are made, they indicate only idealized figures because the real prices fluctuated from

1. At source of supply - i.e. Taiwan or Amoy.
2. Huang Shu-ching, *T'ai-hai shih-ch'a lu*, p.21.
3. CPYC, Fukien governor Chao Kuo-lin, 9/3/19, 16, 2, 13b (p.5409).
4. HMC, 7:10b-32a.

time to time. I shall base my estimates on the per-unit tax for the three different grades of sugar as shown below:

SUGAR PRICES AND PER UNIT TAX, 1723-1731
(taels/picul)

Grade	Price Average 1723-1731	Tax Per Unit	%
Top	1.725	0.1	6
Medium	1.288	0.06	5
Low	0.85	0.03	4

The above table shows that domestic commodities were taxed at the rate of around 5 per cent. As to the imported items, they were also levied at a flat percentage of price. In the late-Ming, all foreign goods were taxed at a flat rate of 2 per cent.⁵ The rate was increased to 6 per cent in the 1680s, as mentioned by Hosea Morse,⁶ but it was still regarded as "exceedingly light" even by foreign merchants.⁷ Although lacking evidence, I assume that the general rate was further increased at least to 10 per cent in the 1720s and 1730s considering that domestic goods were already taxed at a rate of 5 per cent.

5. *FCTC* (1868-1871 ed.), 270:8b.

6. Hosea Morse, *The Chronicles*, v.1, p.81.

7. *ibid.* In Hosea Morse's words, "... the legal rate of Chinese customs according to the official tariff, was, apart from fees and bribes, exceedingly light, being at the general rate of 6 per cent *ad valorem*."

ESTIMATED VALUE OF THE CARGO*
(taels)

Cargo†	Ship Nos:→	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Sugar:							
White		1,148	1,262	1,023	174	959	800
Medium-Grade		-	-	76	714	1,425	960
Brown		6	-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy		72	48	70	120	22	38
Subtotal		1,226	1,310	1,169	1,008	2,406	1,798
%		67	81	44	51	88	53
2. Earthenware:							
Bowls		500	300	1,000	500	30	247
Small Items		-	-	228	112	-	-
Subtotal		500	300	1,228	612	30	247
%		27	18	46	31	1	7
3. Tea		-	-	210	336	192	1,074
%		-	-	8	17	7	32
4. Fukien Products:							
Preserves		41	7	3	-	70	129
Tobacco		-	-	2	-	-	18
Others		42	2	38	21	8	10
Subtotal		83	9	43	21	78	157
%		5	1	2	1	3	5
5. Overseas Goods:							
Sapanwood, Pepper and Shark's Fins		23	-	-	9	32	85
Myrrh & Frankincense		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		23	-	-	9	32	85
%		1	-	-	0	1	3
6. Other Native Products:							
Hams & Shao-hsing wine		-	-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL		1,832	1,619	2,650	1,986	2,738	3,361

*see notes at the end of this appendix

(taels)

Cargo+	Ship Nos:→	7	12	13	14	15	16
1. Sugar:							
White		264	238	261	171	1,489	45
Medium-Grade		846	716	681	2,277	578	1,193
Brown		-	-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy		58	19	46	36	125	2
Subtotal		1,168	973	988	2,484	2,192	1,240
%		76	48	46	76	50	38
2. Earthenware:							
Bowls		-	195	450	195	120	-
Small Items		-	118	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	313	450	195	120	-
%		-	15	21	6	3	-
3. Tea		-	96	22	300	1,794	1,908
%		-	5	1	9	40	59
4. Fukien Products:							
Preserves		141	15	97	90	139	-
Tobacco		120	-	5	39	11	-
Others		64	75	316	116	90	80
Subtotal		325	90	418	245	240	80
%		21	4	20	7	5	2
5. Overseas Goods:							
Sapanwood, Pepper and Shark's Fins		51	561	252	65	42	22
Myrrh & Frankincense		-	-	-	-	37	-
Subtotal		51	561	252	65	79	22
%		3	28	12	2	2	1
6. Other Native Products:							
Hams & Shao-hsing wine		-	-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL		1,544	2,033	2,130	3,289	4,425	3,250

(taels)

Cargo+	Ship Nos:→	17	20	22	23	46	47
1. Sugar:							
White		148	1,351	540	540	449	830
Medium Grade		1,243	909	820	764	-	27
Brown		-	-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy		36	79	2	96	24	96
Subtotal		1,427	2,339	1,362	1,400	473	953
%		79	41	82	83	17	26
2. Earthenware:							
Bowls		-	233	-	-	2,000	2,401
Small Items		-	-	-	22	269	332
Subtotal		-	233	-	22	2,269	2,733
%		-	4	-	1	83	74
3. Tea		42	2,916	19	-	-	14
%		2	52	1	-	-	0
4. Fukien Products:							
Preserves		-	44	-	127	-	-
Tobacco		-	-	-	11	-	-
Others		324	67	73	-	7	2
Subtotal		324	111	73	138	7	2
%		18	2	4	8	0	0
5. Overseas Goods:							
Sapanwood, Pepper and Shark's Fins		7	66	216	120	-	-
Myrrh & Frankincense		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		7	66	216	120	-	-
%		1	1	13	8	-	-
6. Other Native Products:							
Hams & Shao-hsing wine		-	-	4	-	-	-
%		-	-	0	-	-	-
TOTAL		1,800	5,665	1,674	1,683	2,749	3,702

(taels)

Cargo+	Ship Nos:→					
	48	49	50	51	52	53
1. Sugar:						
White	1,658	471	9	1,651	493	2,227
Medium-Grade	1,132	-	796	1,289	-	1,211
Brown	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy	170	48	-	84	46	77
Subtotal	2,960	519	805	3,024	539	3,515
%	93	33	73	95	23	95
2. Earthenware:						
Bowls	-	900	-	-	1,810(?)	-
Small Items	-	132	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	-	1,032	-	-	1,810(?)	-
%	-	66	-	-	75(?)	-
3. Tea	68	-	180	-	-	-
%	2	-	16	-	-	-
4. Fukien Products:						
Preserves	-	-	-	3	-	-
Tobacco	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	104	9	97	159	42	171
Subtotal	104	9	97	162	42	171
%	3	1	9	5	2	5
5. Overseas Goods:						
Sapanwood, Pepper & Shark's Fins	42	-	23	-	7	18
Myrrh & Frankincense	-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	42	-	23	-	7	18
%	2	-	2	-	0	0
6. Other Native Products:						
Hams & Shao-hsing wine	-	-	-	-	-	-
%	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	3,174	1,560	1,105	3,186	2,398(?)	3,704

(taels)

Cargo+	Ship Nos:→	54	55	56	57	58	59
1. Sugar:							
White		-	135	2,377	1,214	3,003	173
Medium-Grade		-	-	111	636	-	978
Brown		-	-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	135	2,488	1,850	3,003	1,151
%		-	26	99	96	100	99
2. Earthenware:							
Bowls		360	380	-	-	-	-
Small Items		14	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		374	380	-	-	-	-
%		21	73	-	-	-	-
3. Tea		1,356	-	-	-	-	-
%		76	-	-	-	-	-
4. Fukien Products:							
Preserves		-	-	-	-	-	-
Tobacco		-	-	-	-	-	-
Others		50	5	13	-	-	-
Subtotal		50	5	13	-	-	-
%		3	1	1	-	-	-
5. Overseas Goods:							
Sapanwood, Pepper and Shark's Fins		-	-	11	-	-	7
Myrrh & Frankincense		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	-	11	-	-	7
%		-	-	0	-	-	1
6. Other Native Products:							
Hams & Shao-hsing wine		-	-	-	81	-	-
%		-	-	-	4	-	-
TOTAL		1,780	520	2,512	1,931	3,003	1,158

(taels)

Cargo+	Ship Nos:→	60	61	62	63	64	65
1. Sugar:							
White		1,744	202	478	128	1,375	1,516
Medium-Grade		683	1,099	855	848	394	486
Brown		-	-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy		70	-	24	-	-	154
Subtotal		2,497	1,301	1,357	976	1,769	2,156
%		91	100	94	93	98	61
2. Earthenware:							
Bowls		-	-	-	-	-	-
Small Items		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Tea		14	-	-	60	-	930
%		0	-	-	6	-	27
4. Fukien Products:							
Preserves		-	-	-	3	-	-
Tobacco		-	-	-	9	-	-
Others		180	-	12	-	39	58
Subtotal		180	-	12	12	39	58
%		7	-	1	1	2	2
5. Overseas Goods:							
Sapanwood, Pepper and Shark's Fins		45	-	74	5	-	356
Myrrh & Frankincense		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		45	-	74	5	-	356
%		2	-	5	0	-	10
6. Other Native Products:							
Hams & Shao-hsing wine		-	-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL		2,736	1,301	1,443	1,053	1,808	3,500

(taels)

Cargo+	Ship Nos:→	66	67	68	69	70	71
1. Sugar:							
White		-	2,751	3,626	499	633	1,929
Medium-Grade		-	461	174	486	748	1,037
Brown		-	-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy		-	-	26	149	-	175
Subtotal		-	3,212	3,826	1,134	1,381	3,141
%		-	100	98	59	85	95
2. Earthenware:							
Bowls		-	-	-	-	-	-
Small Items		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Tea		3,288	-	-	612	-	-
%		100	-	-	32	-	-
4. Fukien Products:							
Preserves		-	-	2	-	-	-
Tobacco		-	-	-	-	9	-
Others		-	-	80	142	70	173
Subtotal		-	-	82	142	79	173
%		-	-	2	8	5	5
5. Overseas Goods:							
Sapanwood, Pepper and Shark's Fins		-	-	-	22	170	8
Myrrh & Frankincense		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	-	-	22	170	8
%		-	-	-	1	10	0
6. Other Native Products:							
Hams & Shao-hsing wine		-	-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL		3,288	3,212	3,908	1,910	1,630	3,322

(taels)

Cargo+	Ship Nos:→	72	73	74	75	76	77
1. Sugar:							
White		22	735	361	1,232	323	-
Medium-Grade		1,160	837	666	1,553	612	-
Brown		-	-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy		38	17	53	158	77	-
Subtotal		1,220	1,589	1,080	2,943	1,012	-
%		100	95	77	59	98	-
2. Earthenware:							
Bowls		-	-	-	-	-	-
Small Items		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Tea		-	60	-	1,320	-	2,940
%		-	4	-	26	-	100
4. Fukien Products:							
Preserves		-	-	-	-	-	-
Tobacco		-	-	-	-	-	-
Others		-	24	323	670	4	-
Subtotal		-	24	323	670	4	-
%		-	1	23	13	0	-
5. Overseas Goods:							
Sapanwood, Pepper and Shark's Fins		-	-	-	99	23	-
Myrrh & Frankincense		-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	-	-	99	23	-
%		-	-	-	2	2	-
6. Other Native Products:							
Hams & Shao-Hsing wine		-	-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL		1,220	1,673	1,403	5,032	1,039	2,940

(taels)

Cargo+	Ship Nos:→					
	78	79	80	90	91	92
1. Sugar:						
White	169	28	252	2	169	135
Medium Grade	1,368	1,173	702	849	636	747
Brown	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy	-	43	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	1,537	1,244	954	851	805	882
%	99	100	45	86	49	90
2. Earthenware:						
Bowls	-	-	500	98	130	-
Small Items	-	-	-	44	-	-
Subtotal	-	-	500	142	130	-
%	-	-	23	14	8	-
3. Tea	-	-	408	-	552	12
%	-	-	19	-	34	1
4. Fukien Products:						
Preserves	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tobacco	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	9	-	248	-	149	84
Subtotal	9	-	248	-	149	84
%	1	-	11	-	9	9
5. Overseas Goods:						
Sapanwood, Pepper and Shark's Fins	-	-	32	-	5	-
Myrrh & Frankincense	-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	-	-	32	-	5	-
%	-	-	2	-	0	-
6. Other Native Products:						
Hams & Shao-hsing wine	-	-	-	-	-	-
%	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	1,546	1,244	2,142	993	1,641	978

(taels)

Cargo+	Ship Nos:->	93	94	96	97	98
1. Sugar:						
White		193	348	67	328	3,259
Medium-Grade		898	703	685	1,079	23
Brown		-	-	-	-	-
Rock-Candy		-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		1,091	1,051	752	1,407	3,282
%		85	85	40	82	100
2. Earthenware:						
Bowls		-	-	-	180	-
Small Items		-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	-	-	180	-
%		-	-	-	10	-
3. Tea		72	180	456	60	-
%		6	15	25	4	-
4. Fukien Products:						
Preserves		-	-	-	-	-
Tobacco		-	-	-	-	-
Others		122	-	653	68	-
Subtotal		122	-	653	68	-
%		9	-	35	4	-
5. Overseas Goods:						
Sapanwood, Pepper and Shark's Fins		-	-	-	-	-
Myrrh & Frankincense		-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal		-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-
6. Other Native Products:						
Hams & Shao-hsing wine		-	-	-	-	-
%		-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL		1,285	1,231	1,861	1,715	3,282

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. The sugar prices for top, medium and low grades, are respectively estimated to be Tls.1.725, 1.288 and 0.85 per picul. The rest are calculated by their tax per-unit of weight as shown in HMC, 7:11a-32a, assuming that the tax is respectively 5% and 10% of the cargo value for domestic and overseas products.
2. In the case of tea, there are three levels of prices for different grades. Both the fine tea and Bohea (Wu-i 武夷) tea are counted as top grade. When the sources do not indicate specifically, I assume that the tea belongs to the medium grade.
3. The estimated per-unit prices are given below (in taels):

<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Est. price/picul</u>
rock-candy	2.4
bowls	2.0/100 pieces
small earthenware items	4.0/500 pieces
tea: top grade	12.0
medium grade	6.0
low grade	2.0
preserves	1.7
tobacco	3.0
fish bladders	2.0
seaweed varieties	0.3
porphia tenera	2.0
dried fish-eggs	20.0
dried fish	0.6
isinglass	4.0
fish sauce	0.6
ts'ao-yü	?
bamboo-shoots	1.6
peanut	1.2
lu-ts'ai	?
mushroom	4.0
sweet-potato starch	0.3
ginger	0.3

<u>/...cont</u> <u>Cargo</u>	<u>Est. price/picul</u>
lotus-seeds	1.2
dried black plums	1.0
orange biscuit	2.0
sweet organes	0.4
longan	2.0
dried longan	10.0
citrus medica, var. sarcodac-tylus	0.4
citrus medica, subsp limonum	0.4
syrup	0.2
dried lichee	?
lichee	?
lichee-wine	1.0/jar
dried orange-peel	2.0
green orange-peel	1.6
betel-nut	1.0
dried organes	2.0
asparagus lucidus and liriopse graminifolia	2.0
cyperus rotundus	12.0
vermillion	26.0
yellow lead	7.0
gardenia	2.0
curcuma longa	2.0
yeast	1.0
alum	1.0
ta-liao	?
ling-ling-ts'ao	?
san-nai	?
alisma plantago-aquatica	2.0
fragrant beads	0.8
resin	1.6
cloth	16.0 or 0.12/roll
chopsticks	?
rattans	1.6
boards	?
planks	?
ebony-like wood	?

<u>/...cont</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Est. price/picul</u>
pillar wood		?
sapanwood		1.8
tin		?
shark's fins		4.6
pepper		7.4
myrrh		12.3
frankincense		12.0
hams		4.0
shao-hsing wine		0.18/jar

GLOSSARY

(A) PERSONAL NAMES

Chang Hsüeh-sheng	張學聖	Chou Hsüeh-chien	周學健
Chang Mei	張湄	Chu Hsi	朱熹
Chang Shui	張瑞	Chu I-kuei	朱一貴
Chang Tao-p'ei	張道沛	Chu Shu-ch'üan	朱叔權
Chang T'ing-mei	張廷枚	Chun T'ai	準泰
Chang Yü-i	張喻義	Chung Ying	鍾音
Ch'en Hung-mou	陳宏謀	Fan Ch'eng-mu	范承謨
Ch'en Jou-yüan	陳柔遠	Fang Pao	方苞
Ch'en Ju-han	陳汝咸	Han I	韓奕
Ch'en Lun-chiung	陳倫姻	Hsi Chu	席柱
Ch'en Mao	陳昂	Hsieh Hsi-hsien	謝希賢
Ch'en Meng-lin	陳夢林	Hsin Chu	新柱
Ch'en Shih-hsia	陳時夏	Hsin T'ing-fen	辛(信)廷芬
Ch'en Ta-shou	陳大受	Hsin T'ing-ying	辛(信)廷英
Ch'en Wu-sheng	陳吳勝	Hsü Cheng	許正
Cheng Ch'eng-kung	鄭成功	Hsü Ts'ang-hsing	許藏興
Cheng Chih-lung	鄭芝龍	Huang Wu	黃梧
Cheng Ching	鄭經	Huang Ying-tsuan	黃應贊
Cheng K'e-shuang	鄭克塽	Hung Lui	洪磊
Cheng Lien	鄭聯	I Chao-hsiung	宜兆熊
Cheng Ning-yüan	鄭寧遠	I-erh-ke-t'u	伊爾格圖
Cheng Shui	鄭瑞	Kao Kung-ch'ien	高拱乾
Cheng Te-lin	鄭德林	Kuo Ch'i-yüan	郭起元
Cheng T'ai	鄭泰	Kuo I-lung	郭益隆
Cheng Ts'ai	鄭彩	Kuo Wan-ying	郭萬盈
Ch'eng Yün-ch'ing	程運青	Lan Li	藍理
Chi Ch'i-kuang	李麒光	Lan Ting-yüan	藍鼎元
Chiang Sheng	江勝	Li Kuang-ti	李光地
Chin Yung-shun	金永順	Li Pang	李邦
Chou Chung-hsüan	周鍾璦	Li Sheng-hsing	李勝興

Li Ting-feng 李鼎豐
 Li Tsai-san 李在衛
 Li Wei 李
 Li Yü-hung 李玉銓
 Li Yüan-tsu 李元祚
 Lin Kuang-ho 林廣和
 Liu Erh-wei 劉兩位
 Ma Te-kung 馬得功
 P'an Ch'i (Puankhequa) 潘啟(潘啟官)
 P'an Ssu-chü 潘思梨
 Sheng Ch'i-yüan 沈起元
 Shih Hsiang-shui 召祥瑞
 Shu-shan 書山
 Su Wan-li 蘇萬利
 Teng Mao-ch'i 鄧茂七
 Ts'ai Hsin 蔡新
 Ts'ai Kuo-lin 蔡國琳
 Ts'ai Shih-yüan 蔡世遠
 Ts'ai Tsu 蔡祖

Ts'ao Shih-hsin 曹士馨
 Wan Cheng-se 曹萬正
 Wang Chi-fu 王吉甫
 Wang Ch'i-tsung 王起宗
 Wang P'ei-hsing 王沛興
 Wang Shih-yü 王士豫
 Wang Tzu-li 王子禮
 Wang Yüan-sheng 王源盛
 Wei Yüan 魏源
 Weng T'ien-yu 翁天佑
 Wu Ch'ang-chin 吳昌縉
 Wu Hsing-yeh 吳興業
 Wu Hung-yeh 吳宏業
 Wu Nan-chen 吳南珍
 Wu Shu-yeh 吳樹業
 Wu Yüan-chia 吳源嘉
 Wu Yüan-teng 吳元登
 Yeh Tsu-chuan 葉祖傳

(B) PLACE NAMES

Amoy 廈門
 An-hai 安海
 An-p'ing 安平
 Cha-p'u 乍浦
 Chang-Ch'üan 漳泉
 Chang-hua 彰化
 Ch'ang[-men] 閩門
 Ch'ao-chou 潮卅
 Che-Min 浙閩
 Ch'e-t'ien 車田
 Chen-chiang 鎮江
 Chen-hai 鎮海

Ch'en-shan-t'ou 成山頭
 Chi-lung 鷄籠(基隆)
 Chia-ho-yü 嘉和興
 Chia-hsing 嘉興
 Chia-i 嘉義
 Chia-ying-chou 嘉應卅
 Chiao-chou 脚卅
 Chihli 直隸
 Chin-chou 錦卅
 Chiu-lung 九龍
 Chu-ch'ien 竹塹
 Ch'u-chou 處卅

Chu-lo 諸羅
 Ch'ung-ming 崇明
 Chung-tso-so 中左所
 Feng-ch'iao 楓橋
 Feng-shan 鳳山
 Foochow 福州
 Fu-chai 附寨
 Fu-shan 福山
 Hai-t'an 海壇
 Han-chiang 涵江
 Hangchow 杭
 Heng-ch'un 恆春
 Ho-feng 和鳳
 Hou-lung-kang 後壠港
 Hsia-men 廈門
 Hsin-chu 新竹
 Hsin-yü 星嶼
 Hu-chou 湖州
 Hu-wei 虎尾
 Huai-te 懷德
 Hui-chou 惠
 Ke-lo-pa 葛羅巴(咬啣吧)
 Ku-ch'eng 古城
 Kuei-yü 圭嶼
 Kulangsu 鼓浪嶼
 Kung-chou 龍
 Lang-chiao 郎嬌
 Lang-shan 琅山
 Lieh-yü 烈嶼
 Lu-erh-men 鹿耳門
 Lu-men 鷺門
 Lü-shun 旅順
 Lu-tao 鷺島
 Lu-tsai-kang 鹿仔港
 Ma-hsiang 馬巷
 Mei-chou 湄
 Mei-ling 梅嶺

Min 閩
 Min-nan 閩南
 Nan-ao 南澳
 Nan-hao 南濠
 Nan-sheng 南勝
 Nan-t'ai 南台
 Nan-t'ung 南通
 Nanyang 南洋
 Ningpo 寧波
 Ning-te 寧德
 Pen-kang 笨港
 Peng-hu 澎湖
 P'ing-t'an 平潭
 P'u-t'ien 莆田
 P'u-t'ou-hsiang 埔頭鄉
 Quemoy 金門
 Jen-ho 仁和
 Shao-hsing 紹興
 Shih-ching 石井
 Shih-hsün 石滬
 Shih-ma 石碼
 Soochow 蘇
 Ssu-ming-chou 思明
 Ta-chia 大甲
 Ta-kou 打狗
 T'ai-chou 台
 Taiwanfu 台灣府(城)
 Tan-shui 淡水
 T'ang-pei 塘北
 Ta-tan 大担
 Tainan 台南
 Tientsin 天津
 Ting-chou 汀
 Tou-liu-men 斗六門
 Tung-kang 東港

Tung-kang 冬港
T'ung-shan 銅山
Wen-chou 温州
Wu-yü 永嘉

Yüeh-kang 月港
Yün-hsiao 雲霄
Yung-ning 永寧

(C) TERMS

an-min t'ung-shang 安民通商
chao 照
Ch'en 陳
ch'eng 城
cheng-e 正額
cheng-k'ou 正口
Ch'i chia 齊家
chia 家
chia 甲
Chia-ching 嘉靖
chia-jen 家人
chia-ting 家丁
chiang-tsu han-tien 強族悍佃
chiao 郊
chiao-shang sheng-hsi 交商生息
chieh 街
chieh-mai 接買
ch'ien-chieh ling 遷界令
Ch'ien-lung 乾隆
chien-sheng 監生
chih-hsien 知縣
chin-shih 進士
chin-shih chi-min 經世濟民
ch'ing 頃
Ch'ing-shui [-tsu-shih] 清水祖師
chou 卅
ch'u-hai 出海

chü-jen 舉人
ch'uan-chu 船主
Ch'üan fang-t'ing 泉防廳
Ch'uan-hu 船戶
ch'üan-na 捐納
ch'uan-yün-shih 轉運使
chuang 莊 (庄)
Chuang 莊
Co-hong 公行
fan-Ch'ing fu-Ming 反清復明
fan-ch'uan 番船
fan-shang 番商
fang 房
fen-hsün 分巡
fen-shou 分守
fu 府
fu 撫
fu-chiang 副將
Fu-chien-jen 福建人
fu-hu 富戶
fu-min t'ung-chih 撫民同知
fu-pu 戶部
fu-ta 附搭
Hai 海
Hai-ch'eng-kung 海澄公
hai-fang 海防
hai-kuan 海關

hai-kuan chien-tu 海關監督
 hai-shang 海商
 han-lin yüan 翰林院
 hang 行
 hang-chia 行家
 hang-hui 行會
 hang-pao 行保
 hang-shang 行商
 hao-hsien 耗羨
 heng-yang ch'uan 橫洋船
 Ho Ho Ch'eng 和合成
 Hsia fang-t'ing 厦防廳
 hsiang-kuan 鄉官
 hsiang-shen 鄉紳
 hsiao-hsing 小姓
 hsien 縣
 hsien-hsüeh 縣學
 hsien-yü 羨餘
 hsing 姓
 hsü-shang 恤商
 hsün-chien 巡檢
 hsün-hai 巡海
 hu 斛
 hu-kuan 戶官
 huai-jou pai-shen 懷柔百紳
 hui 會
 hui-fei 匪
 hui-kuan 會館
 hui-tang 會黨
 huo-chang 會火長
 huo-ke 貨客
 i 義
 i-ch'uan 義船
 i-nan 義男
 i-t'ien liang-chu 一田兩主
 i-t'ien san-chu 一田三主
 kang 港

Kang-chiao
 K'ang-hsi
 ke-shang
 keng (or ching)
 k'ou
 K'ou-an
 Koxinga
 ku
 kuan-shang
 kuan-shen
 Kuan-ti
 kuei
 kung-kuan
 kung-sheng
 kung-ssu (kongsu)
 kuo-chi min-sheng
 li
 Li
 liang-min
 liao-shou
 lou-kuei
 Lu, Prince
 lu-chu
 lung-hu
 Ma-tsu
 mi
 mi-ch'uan
 min-ch'uan
 Min-ch'uan
 Min-hai-kuan
 Min-ku
 Min-nan-jen
 Min-shang
 mou
 Nan-chiao
 nan-ts'ao

港郊
 康熙
 客商
 更口
 口岸
 國姓爺
 谷
 官商
 官紳
 關帝
 鬼館
 貢生
 公司
 國計民生
 里
 李
 民
 良民
 縹手
 陋規
 魯王
 爐主
 龍戶
 媽祖
 米
 米船
 民船
 閩船
 閩海關
 閩賈人
 閩南商
 畝
 郊
 南
 南槽

Nan-yang hai-tao 南洋海道
 nei-wu fu 內務府
 ni-ming t'ieh 匿名帖
 pa-ch'ih hang-shih 把持行市
 Pao 保
 Pao chia 包家
 pao-chia 保家
 pao-shang 保商
 Pei-chiao 北郊
 pei-ts'ao 北槽
 Pei-yang hai-tao 北洋海道
 pien-ch'ang pu-chi 鞭長不及
 p'u-hu 鋪戶
 p'u-shang 鋪商
 san-chiao 三郊
 San-i-t'ang 三益堂
 san-pan 杉板
 shang 商
 shang-chi 商籍
 shang-ch'uan 商船
 shang-hang 商行
 shang-tsung 商總
 shang-yün 商運
 she 社
 shen 紳
 shen-chin 紳衿
 shen-ch'üan 紳權
 shen-shih 紳士
 sheng-fu-hsien 省府縣
 sheng-yüan 生員
 shih 市
 shih 市
 shih-po 市舶
 shu-yüan 書院
 shui-shih t'i-tu 水師提督
 ssu 司
 ssu-tien 祀典

ssu-san-pan 司杉板
 ssu-ting 司碇
 ssu-ya 私牙
 ssu-yün 私運
 Su 蘇
 ta-hsing 大姓
 ta shang-ch'uan 大商船
 ta sheng-i 大生意
 ta-tsu 大族
 tai 貸
 tai-wei mai-mai 代為買賣
 T'ai-yün 台運
 T'ang-chiao 糖郊
 t'ang-ch'uan 糖船
 tao 道
 ti-chi min-p'in 地瘠民貧
 t'i-tu 提督
 tien 典
 T'ien-fei 天妃
 T'ien-hou 天后
 tien-tang 典當
 T'ien-ti-hui 天地會
 t'ing 廳
 ting 丁
 to-kung 舵工
 ts'ai-fu 財富
 ts'ai-tung 財東
 tso-ching kuan-t'ien 坐井觀天之見
 chih chien 族
 tsu 族
 tsu-ch'üan 族權
 tsung-han 族總
 tsung-k'ou 總口
 tsung-p'u 總鋪
 tsung-li 總理
 tsung-ping 總兵
 tsung-tsu 族宗

tu	都	ya-shang	牙商
tu	督	ya-t'ieh	牙帖
t'u	園	yamen	衙門
T'u-ti-kung	土地公	yang-ch'uan	洋船
T'ung	同	yang-hang	洋行
t'ung-chih	同知	yang-huo hang	洋貨行
t'ung-p'an	通判	yang-shang	洋商
t'ung-shang pien-min	通商便民	Yao-wang	藥王
t'ung-sheng	童生	yeh-chu	業主
tung-shih	董事	yeh-hu	業戶
T'ung Wen Hang	同文行	yin-ch'eng	銀城
tzu-jan liu-t'ung	自然流通	yin-shih shang-jen	殷實商人
Wan	萬	yin-tz'u	淫祠
wo-k'ou	倭寇	ying-yü	贏餘
Wu-chen-jen	吳真人	yü	漁
Wu-miao	武廟	yu-chi	游擊
wu-pu man-tsai erh kuei	無不滿載而歸	yü-ch'uan	漁船
wu-yeh che	無業者	yü-k'o	裕課
ya	牙	yü-ko t'ung-shang	裕課通商
ya-hang	牙行	yü-shui liang-chia	雨水糧價
ya-pan	亞班	Yung-cheng	雍正

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